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diff --git a/44929-0.txt b/44929-0.txt index 888f24c..205222e 100644 --- a/44929-0.txt +++ b/44929-0.txt @@ -1,35 +1,4 @@ -The Project Gutenberg EBook of The Basis of Morality, by Arthur Schopenhauer - -This eBook is for the use of anyone anywhere at no cost and with -almost no restrictions whatsoever. You may copy it, give it away or -re-use it under the terms of the Project Gutenberg License included -with this eBook or online at www.gutenberg.org - - -Title: The Basis of Morality - -Author: Arthur Schopenhauer - -Translator: Arthur Broderick Bullock - -Release Date: February 16, 2014 [EBook #44929] - -Language: English - -Character set encoding: UTF-8 - -*** START OF THIS PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK THE BASIS OF MORALITY *** - - - - -Produced by Marc D'Hooghe at http://www.freeliterature.org -(Images generously made available by the Internet Archive -- Cornell University) - - - - +*** START OF THE PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK 44929 *** THE BASIS OF MORALITY @@ -7644,360 +7613,4 @@ confiteri_.--(_Translator_.) 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You may copy it, give it away or -re-use it under the terms of the Project Gutenberg License included -with this eBook or online at www.gutenberg.org - - -Title: The Basis of Morality - -Author: Arthur Schopenhauer - -Translator: Arthur Broderick Bullock - -Release Date: February 16, 2014 [EBook #44929] - -Language: English - -Character set encoding: UTF-8 - -*** START OF THIS PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK THE BASIS OF MORALITY *** - - - - -Produced by Marc D'Hooghe at http://www.freeliterature.org -(Images generously made available by the Internet Archive -- Cornell University) - - - - - - -</pre> <h1>THE BASIS OF MORALITY</h1> @@ -8446,374 +8410,7 @@ Joannes Vablen, Bonnae, 1887.)—(<i>Translator</i>)</p></div> -<pre> - - - - - -End of Project Gutenberg's The Basis of Morality, by Arthur Schopenhauer - -*** END OF THIS PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK THE BASIS OF MORALITY *** - -***** This file should be named 44929-h.htm or 44929-h.zip ***** -This and all associated files of various formats will be found in: - http://www.gutenberg.org/4/4/9/2/44929/ - -Produced by Marc D'Hooghe at http://www.freeliterature.org -(Images generously made available by the Internet Archive -- Cornell University) - - -Updated editions will replace the previous one--the old editions -will be renamed. - -Creating the works from public domain print editions means that no -one owns a United States copyright in these works, so the Foundation -(and you!) can copy and distribute it in the United States without -permission and without paying copyright royalties. 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diff --git a/old/44929-0.txt b/old/44929-0.txt deleted file mode 100644 index 888f24c..0000000 --- a/old/44929-0.txt +++ /dev/null @@ -1,8003 +0,0 @@ -The Project Gutenberg EBook of The Basis of Morality, by Arthur Schopenhauer - -This eBook is for the use of anyone anywhere at no cost and with -almost no restrictions whatsoever. You may copy it, give it away or -re-use it under the terms of the Project Gutenberg License included -with this eBook or online at www.gutenberg.org - - -Title: The Basis of Morality - -Author: Arthur Schopenhauer - -Translator: Arthur Broderick Bullock - -Release Date: February 16, 2014 [EBook #44929] - -Language: English - -Character set encoding: UTF-8 - -*** START OF THIS PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK THE BASIS OF MORALITY *** - - - - -Produced by Marc D'Hooghe at http://www.freeliterature.org -(Images generously made available by the Internet Archive -- Cornell University) - - - - - -THE BASIS OF MORALITY - -BY - -ARTHUR SCHOPENHAUER - -_Translated with Introduction and Notes by_ - -ARTHUR BRODRICK BULLOCK, MA. - -TRINITY COLLEGE, CAMBRIDGE - -LONDON - -SWAN SONNENSCHEIN & CO., LIMITED - -PATERNOSTER SQUARE - -1903 - - -PRIZE ESSAY - -ON - -THE BASIS OF MORALITY - -NOT APPROVED - -BY - -THE DANISH ROYAL SOCIETY OF SCIENCES - -COPENHAGEN, 30 _January_, 1840. - -"To preach Morality is easy, to found it difficult.--" - -(SCHOPENHAUER: _Ueber den Willen in der Natur_; p. 128) - - -MATRI CARISSIMAE. - - - - -CONTENTS. - - - -TRANSLATOR'S PREFACE - -TRANSLATOR'S INTRODUCTION - -THE QUESTION - -PART I. - -_INTRODUCTION._ - - I. THE PROBLEM - II. GENERAL RETROSPECT - -PART II. - -_CRITIQUE OF KANT'S BASIS OF ETHICS._ - - I. PRELIMINARY REMARKS - II. ON THE IMPERATIVE FORM OF THE KANTIAN ETHICS - III. ON THE ASSUMPTION OF DUTIES TOWARDS OURSELVES IN PARTICULAR - IV. ON THE BASIS OF THE KANTIAN ETHICS. - NOTE. - V. ON THE LEADING PRINCIPLE OF THE KANTIAN ETHICS - VI. ON THE DERIVED FORMS OF THE LEADING PRINCIPLE OF THE KANTIAN ETHICS - VII. KANT'S DOCTRINE OF CONSCIENCE - VIII. KANT'S DOCTRINE OP THE INTELLIGIBLE AND EMPIRICAL CHARACTER, - THEORY OF FREEDOM - NOTE - IX. FICHTE'S ETHICS AS A MAGNIFYING GLASS FOR THE ERRORS OF THE KANTIAN - -PART III. - -_THE FOUNDING OF ETHICS._ - - I. CONDITIONS OF THE PROBLEM - II. SCEPTICAL VIEW - III. ANTIMORAL INCENTIVES - IV. CRITERION OF ACTIONS OF MORAL WORTH - V. STATEMENT AND PROOF OF THE ONLY TRUE MORAL INCENTIVE - VI. THE VIRTUE OF JUSTICE - VII. THE VIRTUE OF LOVING-KINDNESS - VIII. THE PROOF NOW GIVEN CONFIRMED BY EXPERIENCE - IX. ON THE ETHICAL DIFFERENCE OF CHARACTER. - -PART IV. - -_ON THE METAPHYSICAL EXPLANATION OF THE PRIMAL ETHICAL PHAENOMENON._ - - I. HOW THIS APPENDIX MUST BE UNDERSTOOD - II. THE METAPHYSICAL GROUNDWORK - -JUDICIUM REGIAE DANICAE SCIENTIARUM SOCIETATIS - - - - -TRANSLATOR'S PREFACE. - - -This translation was undertaken in the belief that there are many -English-speaking people who feel more than a merely superficial -interest in ethical research, but who may not read German with -sufficient ease to make them care to take up the original. The -present Essay is one of the most important contributions to Ethics -since the time of Kant, and, as such, is indispensable to a thorough -knowledge of the subject. Moreover, from whatever point of view it be -regarded,--whether the reader find, when he closes the book, that his -conviction harmonises with the conclusion reached, or not; it would -be difficult to find any treatise on Moral Science more calculated -to stimulate thought, and lift it out of infantile imitation of some -prescribed pattern. The believer in the Kantian, or any other, basis of -Ethics, could hardly measure the strength or the weakness of his own -position more surely than by comparing it with the Schopenhauerian; -while he who is yet in search of a foundation will find much in the -following pages to claim his attention. - -Those acquainted with the luminous imagery, the subtle irony, the -brusque and penetrating vigour of the German, will doubtless admit that -it is no easy task to reduce Schopenhauer to adequate English prose; -and if this has been attempted by the present writer, no one can be -more conscious than he of the manifold shortcomings discoverable. But -such as it is, the work is heartily offered to all who still follow the -true student's rule, "Gladig wolde he lerne und gladig teche," with -the single hope that it may help, however slightly, to widen their -knowledge, and ripen their judgment. - -My friend, R. E. Candy, Esq., I.C.S., has kindly given me information -concerning several Indian names. - -ROME: _June_, 1902. - - - - -TRANSLATOR'S INTRODUCTION. - - - Ὃν δὲ θεοὶ τιμῶσιν, ὁ καὶ μωμεύμενος αἰνεῑ. - --Theognis: 169. - - -In 1837 the Danish Royal Society of Sciences propounded, as subject -for a prize competition, the question with which this treatise opens; -and Schopenhauer, who was glad to seize the opportunity of becoming -better known, prepared, and sent to Copenhagen, the earliest form of -"The Basis of Morality." In January, 1840, the work was pronounced -unsuccessful, though there was no other candidate. In September of the -same year it was published by the author, with only a few unimportant -additions, but preceded by a long introduction, which, cast in the form -of an exceedingly caustic philippic, is, in its way, a masterpiece. In -1860, (only a month before Schopenhauer's death,) the second edition -was printed with many enlargements and insertions, the short preface, -dated August being one of the last things he wrote.[1] - -The reason why the prize was withheld is not far to seek, and need not -detain us. At that time the philosophical atmosphere was saturated with -Hegel, and, to a certain extent, with Fichte; hence it is easy to -imagine with what ruffled, not to say, scandalised feelings the Academy -must have risen from its perusal of the work. Moreover, putting Hegel -and Fichte out of the question, the position advanced was in 1840 so -new, indeed so paradoxical (as Schopenhauer himself admits); there is -at times such an aggressiveness in the style; the whole essay is so -much more calculated to startle than to conciliate; that we cannot feel -much surprise at the official decision. - -In the Judgment published by the Society three reasons are given for -its unfavourable attitude. The second is declared to be not only -dissatisfaction with the mode of discussion (_ipsa disserendi forma_), -but also inability to see that Schopenhauer proves his case. As the -third is alleged the "unseemly" language employed in connection with -certain "_summi philosophi_" (Hegel and Fichte). These two objections -are of course in themselves perfectly legitimate, and how far the -Academy was right or wrong may be left for the reader to determine. - -But the first reason stated is of a different kind, and affords as neat -an instance of self-stultification proceeding _ex cathedra_ as can well -be found. It is true that the question is worded vaguely enough, but -if it means anything, it asks where the "_philosophiae moralis fons -et fundamentum_"--the foundation of moral science--is to be sought -for, _i.e._, where it is to be found. Turning to the Judgment we read: -"He" (Schopenhauer) "has omitted to deal with the essential part of -the question, apparently thinking that he was required to establish -some fundamental principle of Ethics": which he was required to do, -unless the Society's Latin is borrowed from _Νεϕαλοκοκκυγία._ And then -it goes on to declare that he treated as secondary, indeed as an _opus -supererogationis,_ the very thing which the Academy intended should -occupy the first place, namely, the connection between Metaphysics -and Ethics.[2] But the "_metaphysicae et ethicae nexus_," so far from -being formulated in the question as the chief point to be considered, -is not even mentioned! The Society thus denies having asked what it -actually did ask, while the discussion, which it asserts was specially -indicated, is not suggested by a single word. Its embarrassment is -sufficiently shown by this unworthy shifting, to enlarge upon which -would here be out of place.[3] - -It is not intended to offer any criticism either on Schopenhauer's main -position in this essay, or on the various side-issues involved. The -reader is supposed to be accurately acquainted with the fundamentals of -his philosophy, as contained in _Die Welt als Wille und Vorstellung_, -and is invited to be the critic himself. But perhaps a few remarks on -the structure and general trend of the work may not be amiss. - -After preliminary considerations, partly to show the difficulty of the -subject, partly to clear the ground (Part I.), the treatise opens with -a searching critique of Kant's Ethical Basis, of the Leading Principle -of his system, and of its derived forms. (Part II., Chapters I.-VI.)[4] -Schopenhauer's conclusion is that the Categorical Imperative is a very -cleverly woven web, yet in reality nothing but the old theological -basis in disguise, the latter being the indispensable, if invisible, -clothes' peg for the former; and that Kant's _tour de main_ of deducing -his Moral Theology from Ethics is like inverting a pyramid. The theory -of Conscience is next discussed (Chapter VII.). The half-supernatural -element which Kant introduced under the highly dramatic form of a court -of justice holding secret session in the breast, is examined, and -eliminated; and Conscience is defined as the knowledge that we have of -ourselves through our acts. - -But if, so far, the result obtained is distinctly unfavourable to -Kant, Schopenhauer is glad to agree with him on one point, namely, the -theory of Freedom, to a brief notice of which he now passes (Chapter -VIII.). He points out that the solution of this question is found in -the doctrine of the co-existence of Liberty and Necessity: according to -which the basis of our nature, the so-called Intelligible Character, -that lies outside the forms attaching to phaenomena, namely, Time, -Space, and Causality, is transcendentally free; while the Empirical -Character, together with the whole person, being, as a phaenomenon, -the transient objectivation of the Intelligible Character, under the -laws of the _principium individuationis_, is strictly determined.[5] -Part II. closes with a sufficiently amusing examination of Fichte -(Chapter IX.). His proper function is shown to be that of a magnifying -glass for Kant. By means of this powerful human lens we can see the -monstrous shapes into which the Kantian pet creations are capable of -developing. Thus we find the Categorical Imperative become a Despotic -Imperative, the "Absolute Ought" grown into a fathomless inscrutable -_Εἱμαρμένη_, etc. - -With Part III. we reach the positive part of the work. Schopenhauer -begins (Chapter I.) by emphasising the necessity of finding a basis -for Ethics that appeals, not to the intellect, but to the intuitive -perception. Such (he says) can never be any artificial formula, which -surely crumbles to powder beneath the rough touch of real life; -rather must it be something springing out of the heart of things, and -therefore lying at the root of man's nature. But is there, he asks -(Chapter II.), after all, such a thing as natural morality? Is anything -good ever done absolutely without an egoistic motive? The conclusion -arrived at is that, although much may be, and has been, at all times, -said in favour of the Sceptical View, and although this view is in -fact true as regards the greater number of apparently unselfish -acts, yet there can be no doubt that truly moral conduct does occur, -that deeds of justice and loving-kindness are occasionally performed -without the smallest hope of reward, or fear of punishment involved -in their omission. The last paragraph of chis chapter is important -because it puts in the clearest light what, according to Schopenhauer, -is the end of Ethics. Its aim, he says, is =not= to treat of that -which people =ought to do= (for "ought" has no place except in -theological Morals, whether explicit, or implicit); but "to point out -all the varied moral lines of human conduct; to explain them; and to -trace them to their ultimate source." This definition, which assigns no -educative function to Ethics, strictly agrees with the doctrine of the -unchangeableness of character. (_V_. Chapter IX. of this Part.) - -Our philosopher then proceeds to show (Chapter III.) that there are two -fundamental "antimoral" incentives in man's nature: Egoism and Malice. -Be it, however, here remarked that a still simpler classification would -reduce these two to one. Malice may well be regarded as nothing but -Egoism carried to its extreme, developed to gigantic proportions. It is -a distinct source of gratification to certain natures to witness the -suffering of another; because a diminution of the latter's capacity -for action, whether effected by itself, or not, is regarded by an ego -of this kind as an increase of its own power to do as it likes,--as an -enhancement of its own glorification. - -In Chapter IV. the ultimate test of truly moral conduct is explained to -be the absence of all egoistic motivation; and in Chapters V.-VII., -by a process of careful reasoning, every human act is traced to one -of three original springs, namely, (1) Egoism, (2) Malice, and (3) -Compassion; or to a combination of (1) and (3), or (1) and (2).[6] Of -these the third is shown to be the only counter-motive to the first -and second, and in fact the sole source of the two cardinal virtues, -justice and loving-kindness, which are explained as the manifestation -of Compassion in a lower, and a higher, degree, respectively. In -the course of the demonstration the question as to how far a lie is -legitimate comes incidentally under discussion; as also the theory of -Duty; duties being defined as "actions, the simple omission of which -constitutes a wrong." (Cf. Part II., Chapter III.) - -The position now reached, namely, that Compassion is the one and only -fount of true morality, because it is the sole non-egoistic source of -action, is (says Schopenhauer) a strange paradox; hence the testimony -of experience and of universal human sentiment is appealed to, in -confirmation of it, under nine different considerations (Chapter -VIII.). They are as follows:-- - -(1) An imaginary case. - -(2) Cruelty, which means the maximum deficiency in Compassion, is the -mark of the deepest moral depravity. Therefore the real moral incentive -must be Compassion. - -(3) Compassion is the only thoroughly effective spring of moral conduct. - -(4) Limitless Compassion for all living things is the surest and most -certain token of a really good man. - -(5) The evidence of separate matters of detail. - -(6) Compassion is more easily discerned in its higher power; it is more -obviously the root of loving-kindness than of justice. - -(7) Compassion does not stop short with men; it includes all living -beings. - -(8) Considered simply from the empirical point of view, Compassion is -the best possible antidote to Egoism, no less than the most soothing -balsam for the world's inevitable suffering. - -(9) Rousseau's testimony is quoted, as well as passages from the -Paṅća-tantra, Pausanias, Lucian, Stobaeus, and Lessing; and reference -is made to Chinese Ethics and Hindu customs. - -Part III. closes (Chapter IX.) with an inquiry into the Ethical -Difference of Character. The theory that this difference is innate -and immutable is supported by numerous extracts from various writers -of all periods, and illustrated in many ways. But all the evidence -accumulated hardly amounts to more than so many hints and indications, -and the matter (says Schopenhauer) was only satisfactorily explained -by Kant's doctrine of the Intelligible and Empirical Character. (Cf. -Part II., Chapter VIII.) According to this, the ethical difference -between man and man is an original and ultimate datum, caused by -the transcendentally free act of the Intelligible Character, that -is, the Will, as Thing in itself, outside phaenomena; the Empirical -Character being, so to say, the reflection of the Intelligible, -mirrored through the functions of our perceptive faculty, namely, -Time, Space, and Causality. Hence the former, while manifested in -plurality and difference of acts, yet necessarily always wears the same -unchangeable features, inasmuch as it is but the appearance-form of -the unity behind. If the reader asks why "the essential constitution -of the Thing in itself underlying the phaenomenon" is so enormously -different in different individuals, it can only be said that our -intellect, conditioned, as it is, by the laws of Causality, Space, and -Time, has no power to deal with noumena, its range being limited to -phaenomena; and that therefore this question is one of those which have -no conceivable answer. (Cf. _Die Welt als Wille und Vorstellung_, vol. -ii., chap. 50., Epiphilosophie.)[7] - -The discussion now terminated points to the conclusion that -nine-tenths, or perhaps nineteen-twentieths, of what we do is, more -or less, due to Egoism, conscious or unconscious; while acts of real -morality, that is, of unselfish justice and pure loving-kindness -(admitting that they occur) are to be attributed to Compassion, that -is, the sense of =suffering with= another. Nor is the principle of -Altruism new. It is as old as man himself. All the rare and sensitive -natures in the world have given utterance to it, each in his own way. -Like a golden thread it runs from the earliest Indian literature to -George Eliot, to Tolstoï; and every day, for unnumbered ages, "from -youth to eld, from sire to son," in lowly dwellings and in princes' -palaces, it has been unawares translated into action. - -And if we may forecast the future from the past, it would appear that -in all the stormy seas yet to be traversed by the human race, before -its little day is spent, Compassion will ever be the surest guide to -better things; and that the light of knowledge illuminating the path, -whereby the world may become relatively happier, will always vary -directly as man's susceptibility to its promptings: for "=Durch -Mitleid wissend=" is not truer of Parsifal than of all other -saviours. - -In the fourth Part of the treatise Schopenhauer attempts the -metaphysical explanation of Compassion, which for those, who still -think that Metaphysics is something more than a pseudo-science of the -past--like Alchemy or Astrology--will have special interest. - -It should be observed (as is pointed out in our author's Preface -to the first edition) that the line of thought followed does not -belong to any particular metaphysical school, but to many; being in -fact a principle at the root of the oldest systems in the world, and -traceable in one form or another down to Kant. As in the dawn of -history it was our own Aryan forefathers, who divined with subtle -intuition the ideality of Time and Space; so in the fulness of the -ages it was reserved for another Aryan of Scotch descent to formulate -the same in exact language. Now, by the vast majority of men the -ideality of the _principium individuationis_ is undoubtedly either -not consciously realised at all, or else but dimly perceived under -the form of allegories and mythologies. Yet, if this theory be true, -if individuation be only a phaenomenon depending on the subjectivity -of Time and Space, then Compassion, and its external expression, the -_ἀγάπη_ that is greater than Faith and Hope, receive their final -explanation. And every _εὐθανασία_; every word that vibrates in -harmony with the inspired rhapsody of 1 Corinthians xiii.; every act -of genuine justice, or of true loving-kindness, done by man to man, as -well as the uplifting emotion which stirs our hearts at the sight of -such conduct:--all these things become fraught with a new and luminous -significance: the secret writing is interpreted, its deepest meaning -disclosed. - -Moreover, the "thou shalt," and the "thou shalt not," no less of the -various theologies than of the Categorical Imperative, may from this -point of view be accounted for, on the ground of the =identity= -of man, so far as he is =noumenal=, with the transcendental -Reality behind phaenomena. The crude threats of punishment and promises -of reward, the stern Moral Law, poised in mid air,--these hypotheses, -and all their varieties (whose function is in reality nothing -else but to check Egoism), are seen to be due to the intellect's -imperfect comprehension of, or rather, its vague groping after, the -transcendental unity of life, however individualised and differentiated -as a phaenomenon in Time and Space.[8] It thus becomes apparent -that the position developed by Schopenhauer in the third and fourth -parts of the Essay is not so much destructive, as explanatory, of -the usual theories, which, if once the former be fully grasped, lose -themselves in it as stars and moon in the light of day. They are at -once interpreted, and shown to be no longer of importance. Similarly, -all the religions of the world, "which are the Metaphysics of the -people," find their _raison d'être_ in the same doctrine. The theory -of an =external= _δημιουργὸς_ takes its place as the natural mode -of denoting, in children's language, the =internal= metaphysical -Entity, whose appearance-form, in terms of our consciousness, is -called the Universe. The circle is completed; the discords vanish, -and an ultimate harmony is reached. And so over the thrice-tangled -skein of phaenominal existence a simplifying and integrating light -is shed, showing that the _πᾱν_ is but the reflection of the _ἕν_, -under the forms of our faculty of perception, namely, Time, Space, and -Causality--forms, which necessarily imply plurality and change, on -which, again, in the last resort the _Welt-Schmerz_ depends. - - "The One remains, the many change and pass; - . . . . . . . . . . . . . . - Life, like a dome of many-coloured glass, - Stains the white radiance of Eternity, - Until Death tramples it to fragments." - -"What an unspeakable gain," says Richard Wagner,[9] "we should bring -to those who are terrified by the threats of the Church, and, on the -other hand, to those who are reduced to despair by our physicists, if -we could quicken the noble edifice of 'Love, Faith, and Hope,' with a -clear consciousness of the ideality of the world, conditioned by the -laws of Space and Time, which form the sole basis of our perceptive -capacity! In that case all anxious inquiries as to a 'Where' and 'When' -of the 'other world' would be understood to be only answerable by a -blissful smile. For, if there is a solution to these questions, which -seem of such boundless importance, our philosopher has given it with -incomparable precision and beauty in the following sentence, which, to -a certain extent, is only a corollary to the definition of the ideality -of Time and Space: 'Peace, Rest, and Bliss dwell only there where there -is =no where, and no when=.'" (_V_. Schopenhauer: _Parerga and -Paralipomena,_ vol. ii., chap. 3, § 30 bis.) - - - -[1] He died September 21st. - -[2] It should be noticed that this "essential part of the question," a -few lines before, is said to have been passed over altogether (_omisso -enim eo, quod potissimum postulabatur_). - -[3] Any one who cares to see how this Judgment, the Danish Royal -Society of Sciences, Hegel, Fichte, and "Professors of Philosophy" in -general, are all pulverised together under our sage's withering wrath -and trenchant irony, should read his Introduction to each Edition. - -[4] Incidentally (Chapter III.), duties towards ourselves, properly -so called, are shown to be non-existent from the Schopenhauerian -standpoint. Cf. the definition of Duty in Part III., Chapter VI. - -[5] Schopenhauer treated this subject exhaustively in his Essay on -"The Freedom of the Will," which, written immediately before, and more -fortunate than, the present treatise, was awarded the prize by the -Royal Norwegian Society of Sciences in January, 1839. - -[6] If, as above suggested, Malice be taken as a form of Egoism, we may -simplify as follows:-- - -Egoism. Compassion. (_a_) Lower power: seen in (_a_) Lower power: seen -in selfishness, covetousness, etc. justice. (_b_) Higher power: seen in -(_d_) Higher power: seen in malice, cruelty, etc. loving-kindness. - - -Egoism (not in its higher power) may be simultaneously operative with -Compassion in every possible proportion. - - -[7] _V_. Also the _Neue Paralipomena_, chap. vii.; _Zur Ethik,_ § -248, where Schopenhauer calls this "the hardest of all problems." On -the one hand, we have the metaphysical unity of the Will, as Thing in -itself, which, as the Intelligible Character, is present, whole and -undivided, in all phaenomena, in every individual; on the other hand, -we find, as a fact of experience, the widest possible difference in the -Empirical Character, no less of animals than of men. That is to say, -"_difference_" must be predicated of the Thing in itself! It is obvious -that we here touch a contradiction, which, for the rest, lies at the -root of the Schopenhauerian doctrine of the Will. - -[8] The reader will remember the fine poetic presentment of this view -of things, which Goethe with intuitive perception gives in the Faust, -Part I., where the Erdgeist says: - -"_So schaff' ich am sausenden_ WEBSTUHL DER ZEIT, _Und wirke_ DER -GOTTHEIT LEBENDIGES KLEID." ] - -[9] V. _Gesammelte Schriften und Dichtungen_ von Richard Wagner. Zweite -Auflage, vol. x. "Was nützt diese Erkenntnis?" p. 361:--_Welchen -unsäglichen Gewinn würden wir aber den einerseits von den Drohungen -der Kirche Erschreckten, andererseits den durch unsere Physiker zur -Verzweiflung Gebrachten zuführen, wenn wir dein erhabenen Gebäude von -"Liebe, Glaube und Hoffnung" eine deutliche Erkenntnis der, durch die -unserer Wahrnehmung einzig zu Grunde liegenden Gesetze des Raumes -und der Zeit bedingten, Idealität der Welt einfügen könnten, durch -welche dann alle die Fragen des beängstigten Gemüthes nach einem -"Wo" und "Wann" der "anderen Welt" als nur durch ein seliges Lächeln -beantwortbar erkannt werden müssten? Denn, giebt es auf diese, so -grenzenlos wichtig dünkenden Fragen eine Antwort, so hat sie unser -Philosoph, mit unübertrefflicher Präzision und Schönheit, mit diesem, -gewissermaassen nur der Definition der Idealität von Zeit und Raum -beigegebenen Ausspruche ertheilt: "Frieda, Ruhe, und Glückseligkeit -wohnt allein da, wo es_ KEIN WO UND KEIN WANN _giebt."_ - - - - -THE QUESTION - - -The question advanced by the Royal Society, together with the -considerations leading up to it, is as follows:-- - -_Quum primitiva,', moralitatis idea, sive de summa lege morali -principalis notio, sua quadam 'propria eaque minime logica necessitate, -turn in ea disciplina appareat, cui propositum est cognitionem_ τοῡ -ἠθικοῡ _explicare, turn in vita, partim in conscientiae judicio de -nostris actionibus, partim in censura morali de actionibus aliorum -hominum; quumque complures, quae ab illa ider inseparables sunt, -eamque tanquam originem respiciunt, notiones principales ad_ τὸ ἠθικόν -_spectantes, velut officii notio et imputationis, eadem necessitate -eodemque ambitu vim suam exserant,--et tamen inter eos cursus viasque, -quas nostrae aetatis meditatio philosophica persequitur, magni momenti -esse videatur, hoc argumentum ad disputationem revocare,--cupit -Societas, ut accurate haec quaestio perpendatur et pertractetur:_ - -_=Philosophiae moralis fons et fundamentum= utrum in idea -moralitatis, quae immediate conscientia contineatur, et ceteris -notionibus fundamentalibus, quae ex illa prodeant, explicandis -=quaerenda sunt=, an in alio cognoscendi principio?_ - -(The original idea of morality, or the leading conception of the -supreme moral law, occurs by a necessity which seems peculiar to the -subject, but which is by no means a logical one, both in that science, -whose object it is to set forth the knowledge of what is moral, and -also in real life, where it shows itself partly in the judgment passed -by conscience on our own actions, partly in our moral estimation of the -actions of others; moreover, most of the chief conceptions in Ethics, -springing as they do out of that idea, and inseparable from it (as, -for instance, the conception of duty, and the ascription of praise -or blame) assert themselves with the same necessity, and under the -same conditions. In view of these facts and because it appears highly -desirable, considering the trend of philosophic investigation in our -time, to submit this matter to further scrutiny; the Society desires -that the following question be carefully considered and discussed:-- - -=Is the fountain and basis of Morals to be sought for= in an idea -of morality which lies directly in the consciousness (or conscience), -and in the analysis of the other leading ethical conceptions which -arise from it? or is it to be found an some other source of knowledge?) - - - - -PART I. - -INTRODUCTION. - - - - -CHAPTER I. - -THE PROBLEM. - - -"Why do philosophers differ so widely as to the first principles of -Morals, but agree respecting the conclusions and duties which they -deduce from those principles?" - -This is the question which was set as subject for a prize essay by -the Royal Society of Holland at Harlem, 1810, and solved by J.C.F. -Meister; and in comparison with the task before us, the inquiry -presented no extraordinary difficulty. For:-- - -(1) The present question of the Royal Society has to do with nothing -less important than the objectively true basis of morals, and -consequently of morality. It is an Academy, be it observed, which -invites this inquiry; and hence, from its position, it has no practical -purpose in view; it asks for no discourse inculcating the exercise of -uprightness and virtue, with arguments based on evidence, of which -the plausibility is dwelt on, and the sophistry evaded, as is done -in popular manuals. Rather, as its aim is not practical, but only -theoretical, it desires nothing but the purely philosophical, that -is, the objective, undisguised, and naked exposition of the ultimate -basis of all good moral conduct, independent of every positive law, of -every improved assumption, and hence free from all groundwork, whether -metaphysical or mythical. This, however, is a problem whose bristling -difficulties are attested by the circumstance that all philosophers in -every age and land have blunted their wits on it, and still more by -the fact that all gods, oriental and occidental, actually derive their -existence therefrom. Should therefore this opportunity serve to solve -it, assuredly the Royal Society will not have expended its money amiss. - -(2) Apart from this, a peculiar disadvantage will be found to attach -to any theoretical examination of the basis of morals, because such -an investigation is suspiciously like an attempt to undermine, and -occasion the collapse of, the structure itself. The fact is, that in -this matter we are apt to so closely associate practical aims with -theory, that the well-meant zeal of the former is with difficulty -restrained from ill-timed intervention. Nor is it within the power -of every one to clearly dissociate the purely theoretical search for -objective truth, purged of all interest, even of that of morality as -practised, from a shameless attack on the heart's sacred convictions. -Therefore he, who here puts his hand to the plough, must, for his -encouragement, ever bear in mind that from the doings and affairs of -the populace, from the turmoil and bustle of the market-place, nothing -is further removed than the quiet retreat and sanctuary of the Academy, -where no noise of the world may enter, and where the only god raised on -a pedestal is Truth, in solitary, naked sublimity. - -The conclusion from these two premises is that I must be allowed -complete freedom of speech, as well as the right of questioning -everything; and furthermore, that if I succeed in really contributing -something, however small, to this subject, then that contribution will -be of no little importance. - -But there are still other difficulties obstructing my path. The -Royal Society asks for a short monograph setting forth the basis of -Ethics entirely by itself; which means to say, independent of its -connection with the general system, _i.e._, the actual metaphysics of -any philosophy. Such a demand must not only render the accomplishment -of the task more difficult, but necessarily make it imperfect. Long -ago Christian Wolff, in his _Philosophia Practica_ (P. II., § 28) -observed: "_Tenebrae in philosophia practica non dispelluntur, nisi -luce metaphysica effulgente_" (Darkness in practical philosophy is -only dispersed, when the light of metaphysics shines on it;) and Kant -in the Preface to his _Grundlegung zur Metaphysik der Sitten_ remarks: -"Metaphysics must precede, and is in every case indispensable to, -moral philosophy." For, just as every religion on earth, so far as -it prescribes morality, does not leave the latter to rest on itself, -but backs it by a body of dogmas (the chief end of which is precisely -to be the prop of the moral sense); so with philosophy, the ethical -basis, whatever it be, must itself attach to, and find its support in, -one system of metaphysics or another, that is to say, in a presupposed -explanation of the world, and of existence in general. This is so, -because the ultimate and true conclusion concerning the essential -nature of the Universe must necessarily be closely connected with that -touching the ethical significance of human action; and because, in any -case, that which is presented as the foundation of morality, if it is -not to be merely an abstract formula, floating in the clouds, and out -of contact with the real world, must be some fact or other discoverable -either in the objective kosmos, or else in man's consciousness; but, -as such, it can itself be only a phaenomenon; and consequently, like -all other phaenomena, it requires a further explanation; and this -explanation is supplied by Metaphysics. Philosophy indeed is such a -connected whole that it is impossible to exhaustively discuss any one -part without all the others being involved. Thus Plato says quite -correctly: _ψυχῆs oὗν ϕύσιν ἀξίως λόγου κατανοῆσαι oἴει δυνατὸν εἷναι, -ἄνευ τῆς τοῡ ὅλον ϕυσεως_; (Phaedr., p. 371, Ed. Bip.) (Do you think -then it is possible to understand at all adequately the nature of -the soul, without at the same time understanding the nature of the -Whole, _i.e._, the totality of things?) The metaphysics of nature, the -metaphysics of morals, and the metaphysics of the beautiful mutually -presuppose each other, and only when taken as connected together do -they complete the explanation of things as they really are, and of -existence in general. So that whoever should exactly trace one of -these three to its ultimate origin, would be found to have necessarily -brought the others into his solution of the problem; just as an -absolutely clear and exhaustive understanding of any single thing in -the world would imply a perfect comprehension of everything else. - -Now if we were to start from a given system of metaphysics, which is -assumed to be true, we should reach synthetically a basis of morals, -and this basis, being, so to say, built up from below, would provide -the resulting ethical structure with a sure foundation. But in the -present case, since the terms of the question enforce the separation -of ethics from all metaphysics, there remains nothing but the analytic -method, which proceeds from facts either of external experience, or of -consciousness. It is true that thus the ultimate origin of the latter -may be traced back to the human spirit, a source which then, however, -must be taken as a fundamental fact, a primary phaenomenon, underivable -from anything else, with the result that the whole explanation remains -simply a psychological one. At best its connection with any general -metaphysical standpoint can only be described as accessory. On the -other hand, the fundamental datum, the primary phaenomenon of Ethics, -so found in man's nature, could itself in its turn be accounted for -and explained, if we might first treat of metaphysics, and then by -the synthetic method deduce Ethics from it. This would mean, however, -nothing less than the construction of a complete system, of philosophy, -whereby the limits of the given question would be far exceeded. I -am, therefore, compelled to answer it within the lines which its own -isolated narrowness has laid down. - -And lastly, there is the following consideration. The basis on which -it is here intended to place Ethics will prove to be a very small -one; and the consequence is that of the many lawful, approvable, and -praiseworthy actions of mankind, only the minority will be found to -spring from purely moral motives, while the majority will have to be -attributed to other sources. This gives less satisfaction, has not such -a specious glitter as, let us say, a Categorical Imperative, which -always stands ready for commands, only that itself in its turn may -command what ought to be done, and what ought to be left undone;[1] not -to mention other foundations that are entirely material. - -I can only, therefore, remind the reader of the saying in Ecclesiastes -(iv. 6): "Better is an handful with quietness, than both the hands full -with travail and vexation of spirit." In all knowledge the genuine, -proof-resisting, indestructible coefficient is never large; just as in -the earth's metallic strata a hundredweight of stone hides but a few -ounces of gold. But whether others will prefer--as I do--the assured -to the bulky possession, the small quantity of gold which remains in -the crucible to the big lump of matter that was brought along with -it; or whether I shall rather be charged with having removed from -Ethics its basis, instead of providing one, in so far as I prove that -the lawful and commendable actions of mankind often do not contain a -particle of pure moral worth, and in most cases only a very little, -resting, as they do, otherwise on motives, the sufficiency of which -must ultimately be referred to the egoism of the doer; all this I must -leave undecided; and I do so, not without anxiety, nay, rather with -resignation, because I have long since been of the same mind as Johann -Georg von Zimmermann, when he said: "Rest assured until your dying day, -that nothing in the world is so rare as a good judge." (_Ueber die -Einsamkeit_; Pt. I., Ch. iii., p. 93.) - -For all true and voluntary righteousness, for all loving-kindness, for -all nobleness, wherever these qualities may be found, my theory can -only point to a very small foundation; whereas my opponents confidently -construct broad bases for Morals, which are made strong enough for -every possible burden, and are at the same time thrust upon every -doubter's conscience, accompanied with a threatening side-glance at his -own morality. As contrasted with these, my own position is indeed in -sore and sorry plight. It is like that of Cordelia before King Lear, -with her weakly worded assurance of dutiful affection, compared with -the effusive protestations of her more eloquent sisters. So that there -seems to be need of a cordial that may be furnished by some maxim taken -from intellectual hunting grounds, such as, _Magna est vis veritatis, -et praevalebit_. (Great is the strength of truth, and it will prevail.) -But to a man who has lived and laboured even this fails to give much -encouragement. Meanwhile, I will for once make the venture with truth -on my side; and what opposes me will at the same time oppose truth. - - -[1] That is, the Categorical Imperative appears at first as your -"obedient humble servant," ready to perform any useful service, _e.g._, -the solving of ethical riddles; while it ends by gaining the upper -hand, and commanding.--(_Translator_.) - - - - -CHAPTER II. - -GENERAL RETROSPECT. - - -For the people morality comes through, and is founded on, theology, as -the express will of God. On the other hand, we see philosophers, with -few exceptions, taking special pains to entirely exclude this kind of -foundation; indeed, so they may but avoid it, they prefer even to find -a refuge in sophistry. Whence comes this antithesis? Assuredly no more -efficient basis for Ethics can be imagined than the theological; for -who would be so bold as to oppose the will of the Almighty and the -Omniscient? Unquestionably, no one; if only this will were proclaimed -in an authentic, official manner (if one may say so), whereby no -possible room for doubt could be left. This, however, is precisely the -condition which does not admit of being realised. It is rather the -inverse process which is attempted. The law declared to be the will of -God men try to accredit as such, by demonstrating its agreement with -our own independent, and hence, natural moral views, and an appeal -is consequently made to these as being more direct and certain. But -this is not all. We perceive that an action performed solely through -threat of punishment and promise of reward would be moral much more -in appearance than in reality; since, after all, it would have its -root in Egoism, and in the last resort the scale would be turned by -the greater or less amount of credulity evinced in each case. Now it -was none other than Kant who destroyed the foundations of Speculative -Theology, which up to his time were accounted unshakable. Speculative -Theology had hitherto sustained Ethics, and in order to procure for the -former an existence of some sort, if only an imaginary one, his wish -was to proceed inversely, and make Ethics sustain Speculative Theology. -So that it is now more than ever impossible to think of basing Ethics -on Theology; for no one knows any longer which of the two is to be the -supporter, and which the supported, and the consequence is a _circulus -vitiosus_. - -It is precisely through the influence of Kant's philosophy; through the -contemporaneous effect of the unparalleled progress made in all the -natural sciences, with regard to which every past age in comparison -with our own appears childish; and lastly, through the knowledge of -Sanskrit literature, and of those most ancient and widest spread -faiths, Brahmanism and Buddhism, which, as far as time and space go, -are the most important religions systems of mankind, and, as a matter -of fact, are the original native religions of our own race, now well -known to be of Asiatic descent--our race, to which in its new strange -home they once more send a message across the centuries;--it is because -of all this, I say, that the fundamental philosophical convictions of -learned Europe have in the course of the last fifty years undergone a -revolution, which perhaps many only reluctantly admit, but which cannot -be denied. The result of this change is that the old supports of Ethics -have been shown to be rotten, while the assurance remains that Ethics -itself can never collapse; whence the conviction arises that for it -there must exist a groundwork different from any hitherto provided, -and adaptable to the advanced views of the age. The need of such is -making itself felt more and more, and in it we undoubtedly find the -reason that has induced the Royal Society to make the present important -question the subject of a prize essay. - -In every age much good morality has been preached; but the explanation -of its _raison d'être_ has always been encompassed with difficulties. -On the whole we discern an endeavour to get at some objective truth, -from which the ethical injunctions could-be logically deduced; and -it has been sought for both in the nature of things, and in the -nature of man; but in vain. The result was always the same. The will -of each human unit was found to gravitate solely towards its own -individual welfare, the idea of which in its entirety is designated -by the term "blissfulness" (_Glückseligkeit_); and this striving -after self-satisfaction leads mankind by a path very, different to -the one morality would fain point out. The endeavour was next made -now to identify "blissfulness" with virtue, now to represent it as -virtue's consequence and effect. Both attempts have always failed; and -this for no want of sophistry. Then recourse was had to artificial -formulas, purely objective and abstract, as well _a posteriori_ as -_a priori_, from which correct ethical conduct undoubtedly admitted -of being deduced. But there was nothing found in man's nature to -afford these a footing, whereby they might have availed to guide the -strivings of his volition, in face of its egoistic tendency. It appears -to me superfluous to verify all this by describing and criticising -every hitherto existing foundation of morality; not only because I -share Augustine's opinion, _non est pro magno habendum quid homines -senserint, sed quae sit rei veritas_ (It is the truth about a thing, -not men's opinions thereon, that is of importance); but also because it -would be like _γλαύκας εἰς 'Aθήνας κομίζειν_ (_i.e._, carrying coals to -Newcastle); for previous attempts to give a foundation to Ethics are -sufficiently well-known to the Royal Society, and the very question -proposed shows that it is also convinced of their inadequateness. -Any reader less well-informed will find a careful, if not complete, -presentment of the attempts hitherto made, in Garve's _Uebersicht der -vornehmsten Principien der Sittenlehre_, and again, in Stäudlin's -_Geschichte der Moralphilosophie._ It is of course very disheartening -to reflect that Ethics, which so directly concerns life, has met with -the same unhappy fate as the abstruse science of Metaphysics, and that -its first principle, though perpetually sought for ever since the time -of Socrates, has still to be found. Moreover, we must remember that -in Ethics, much more than in any other science, what is essential -is contained in its fundamental propositions; the deductions are so -simple that they come of themselves. For all are capable of drawing -a conclusion, but few of judging. And this is exactly the reason why -lengthy text-books and dissertations on Morals are as superfluous as -they are tedious. Meantime, if I may postulate an acquaintance with all -the former foundations of Ethics, my task will be lightened. Whoever -observes how ancient as well as modern philosophers (the Church creed -sufficed for the middle ages) have had recourse to the most diverse -and extraordinary arguments, in order to provide for the generally -recognised requirements of morality a basis capable of proof, and how -notwithstanding they admittedly failed; he will be able to measure the -difficulty of the problem, and estimate my contribution accordingly. -And he who has learned to know that none of the roads hitherto struck -on lead to the goal, will be the more willing to tread with me a very -different path from these--a path which up to now either has not been -noticed, or else has been passed over with contempt; perhaps because -it was the most natural one.[1] As a matter of fact my solution of the -question will remind many of Columbus' egg. - -It is solely to the latest attempt at giving, a basis to Ethics--I mean -the Kantian--that a critical examination will be devoted. I shall make -it all the more exhaustive, partly because the great ethical reform of -Kant gave to this science a foundation having a real superiority to -previous ones and partly because it still remains the last important -pronouncement in this domain; for which reason it has obtained general -acceptance up to the present day, and is universally taught, although -differently garnished by certain changes in the demonstration and in -the terminology. It is the ethical system of the last sixty years, -which must be removed ere we enter on another path. Furthermore, my -criticism of the Kantian basis will give me occasion to examine and -discuss most of the fundamental conceptions of Ethics, and the outcome -of this investigation I shall later on be able to postulate. Besides, -inasmuch as opposites illustrate each other, it is exactly this course -which will be the best preparation and guide, indeed the direct way, to -my own position, which in its essential points is diametrically opposed -to Kant's. It would therefore be a very perverse beginning to skip -the following criticism, and turn at once to the positive part of my -exposition, which then would remain only half intelligible. - -In any case the time has assuredly arrived for once to cite Ethics -before the bar of a searching scrutiny. During more than half a century -it has been lying comfortably on the restful cushion which Kant -arranged for it--the cushion of the Categorical Imperative of Practical -Reason. In our day this Imperative is mostly introduced to us under -a name which, being smoother and less ostentatious, has obtained more -currency. It is called "the Moral Law"; and thus entitled, with a -passing bow to reason and experience, it slips through unobserved into -the house. Once inside, there is no end to its orders and commands; nor -can it ever afterwards be brought to account. It was proper, indeed -inevitable, that Kant, as the inventor of the thing, should remain -satisfied with his creation, particularly as he shelved by its means -errors still more glaring. But to be obliged to look on and see asses -disporting themselves on the comfortable cushion which he prepared, and -which since his time has been more and more trampled on and flattened -out--this truly is hard. I allude to the daily hackney compilers, who, -with the ready confidence born of stupidity, imagine that they have -given a foundation to Ethics, if they do but appeal to that "Moral -Law" which Is alleged to be inherent in our reason; and then they -complacently weave upon this such a confused and wide-reaching tissue -of phrases that they succeed in rendering unintelligible the clearest -and simplest relations of life: and all this, without ever once -seriously asking themselves whether in point of fact there really does -exist such a "Moral Law," as a convenient code of morality, graven in -our heads or hearts. - -Hence I admit the especial pleasure I feel in proceeding to remove -from Ethics its broad cushion of repose, and I unreservedly -declare my intention of proving that Kant's Practical Reason and -Categorical Imperative are completely unwarrantable, baseless, -and fabricated assumptions; and I shall further show that Kant's -whole system, like those of his predecessors, is in want of a solid -foundation. Consequently Ethics will again be consigned to its -former entirely helpless condition, there to remain, until I come to -demonstrate the true moral principle of human nature--a principle -which is incontestably efficient, and has its root in our very -being. The latter, however, has no such broad basis to offer as the -above-mentioned cushion; so that, doubtless, those who are accustomed -to take things easily, will not abandon their comfortable old seat, -before they are thoroughly aware how deeply the ground on which it -stands is undermined. - - -[1] - -_Io dir non vi saprei per qual sventura,_ - _O piuttosto per qual fatalità,_ -_Da noi credito ottien più l'impostura,_ - _Che la semplice e nuda verità._ - CASTI. - -[I cannot tell what mischief sly, - Or rather what fatality, -Leads man to credit more the lie - Than truth in naked purity.] (_Translator_) - - - - - -PART II. - -CRITIQUE OF KANT'S BASIS OF ETHICS. - - - - -CHAPTER I. - -PRELIMINARY REMARKS. - - -It is Kant's great service to moral science that he purified it of all -Eudaemonism. With the ancients, Ethics was a doctrine of Eudaemonism; -with the moderns for the most part it has been a doctrine of salvation. -The former wished to prove that virtue and happiness are identical; -but this was like having two figures which never coincide with each -other, no matter how they may be placed. The latter have endeavoured -to connect the two, not by the principle of identity, but by that of -causation, thus making happiness the result of virtue; but to do this, -they were obliged to have recourse to sophisms, or else to assume the -existence of a world beyond any possible perception of the senses. - -Among the ancients Plato alone forms an exception: his system is not -eudaemonistic; it is mystic, instead. Even the Ethics of the Cynics -and Stoics is nothing but a special form of Eudaemonism, to prove -which, there is no lack of evidence and testimony, but the nature of my -present task forbids the space.[1] - -The ancients, then, equally with the moderns, Plato being the single -exception, agree in making virtue only a means to an end. Indeed, -strictly speaking, even Kant banished Eudaemonism from Ethics more in -appearance than in reality, for between virtue and happiness he still -leaves a certain mysterious connection;--there is an obscure and -difficult passage in his doctrine of the Highest Good, where they occur -together; while it is a patent fact that the course of; virtue runs -entirely counter to that of happiness. But, passing over this, we may -say that with Kant the ethical principle appears as something quite -independent of experience and its teaching; it is transcendental, or -metaphysical. He recognises that human conduct possesses a significance -that oversteps all possibility of experience, and is therefore actually -the bridge leading to that which he calls the "intelligible"[2] world, -the _mundus noumenôn_, the world of Things in themselves. - -The fame, which the Kantian Ethics has won, is due not only to this -higher level, which it reached, but also to the moral purity and -loftiness of its conclusions. It is by the latter that most people have -been attracted, without paying much attention to the foundation, which -is propounded in a very complex, abstract and artificial form; and Kant -himself required all his powers of acumen and synthesis to give it an -appearance of solidity. Fortunately, he separated his Ethics from the -exposition of its basis, devoting to the latter a special work entitled -the _Grundlegung zur Metaphysik der Sitten_, the theme of which will -be found to be precisely the same as that of our prize essay. For on -page xiii of the preface he says: "The present treatise is nothing -else but an attempt to find out and establish the supreme principle of -morality. This is an investigation, whose scope is complete in itself, -and which should be kept apart from all other moral researches.". It -is in this book that we find the basis, that is to say, the essentials -of his Ethics set forth with an acute penetration and systematic -conciseness, as in no other of his writings. It has, moreover, the -great advantage of being the first of Kant's moral works, appearing,[3] -as it did, only four years later than the _Kritik der Reinen Vernunft_, -and consequently it dates from the period when, although he was -sixty-one, the detrimental effect of old age on his intellect was not -yet perceptible. On the other hand, this is distinctly traceable in -the _Kritik der Praktischen Vernunft_, which was published in 1788, or -one year later than the unhappy remodelling of the _Kritik der Reinen -Vernunft_ in the second edition, whereby the latter, his immortal -master-piece, was obviously marred. An analysis of this question is -to be found in the preface to the new edition by Rosenkranz,[4] from -which my own investigation makes it impossible for me to dissent. The -_Kritik der Praktischen Vernunft_ contains in its essentials the same -material as the above-mentioned--_Grundlegung_; only the latter has -a more concise and rigorous form, while in the former the subject is -handled with greater prolixity, interspersed with digressions and even -padded with some pieces of moral rhetoric, to heighten the impression. -When Kant wrote it, he had at last, and late in life, become deservedly -famous; hence, being certain of boundless attention, he allowed greater -play to the garrulity of old age. - -But the _Kritik der Praktischen Vernunft_ contains two sections -which are peculiar to itself. First: the exposition of the relation -between Freedom and Necessity (pp. 169-179 of the fourth edition, -and pp. 223-231 in Rosenkranz). This passage is above all praise, -and undoubtedly was framed earlier in his life, as it is entirely -in harmony with his treatment of the same subject in the _Kritik -der Reinen Vernunft_ (pp. 560-586; Rosenkranz, p. 438, sqq.). And -secondly: the _Moraltheologie_, which will more and more come to be -recognised as the real object Kant had in view. In his _Metaphysische -Anfangsgründe der Tugendlehre_ this _pendant_ to the deplorable -_Rechtslehre_, written in 1797, the debility of old age is at length -fully pre-ponderant. For all these reasons the present criticism will -mainly deal with the treatise first mentioned, _viz.,_ the _Grundlegung -zur Metaphysik der Sitten_, and the reader will please understand -that all the page numbers given by themselves refer to it. Both the -other works will only be considered as accessory and secondary. For a -proper comprehension of the present criticism, which, in probing the -Kantian Ethics to its depths, bears directly and principally on this -_Grundlegung_, it is very desirable that the latter be carefully read -through again, so that the mind may have a perfectly clear and fresh -presentment of what it contains. It is but a matter of 128 and xiv -pages (in Rosenkranz only 100 pages altogether). I shall quote from -the third edition of 1792, adding the page number of the new complete -publication by Rosenkranz, with an R. prefixed. - - -[1] For a complete demonstration v. _Die Welt als Wille und -Vorstellung_, Vol. I., § 16, p. 103, sqq., and Vol. II., Chap. 16, p. -166, sqq. of the third edition. _Die Welt als Wille und Vorstellung_, -that is, _The World as Will and Idea_; "Idea" being used much as -_εἵδωλον_ sometimes is (cf. Xen. _Sym.,_ 4, 21), in the sense of "an -image in the mind," "a mental picture."--(_Translator_.) - -[2] It seems better to keep this technical word than to attempt a -cumbrous periphrasis. The meaning is perfectly clear. The _sensibilia_ -(_phaenomena_) are opposed to the _intelligibilia_ (_noumena_), which -compose the transcendental world. So the individual, in so far as he -is a phaenomenon, has an empirical character; in so far as he is a -noumenôn, his character is intelligible (_intelligibilis_). The _mundus -intelligibilis,_ or _mundus noumenôn_ is the _κόσμος νοητὸς_ of New -Platonism.--(_Translator_.) - -[3] It was published in 1785: _The Kritik der Reinen Vernunft,_ first -edition, in 1781.--(_Translator_.) - -[4] His analysis is really derived from myself, but in this place I am -speaking incognito. - - - - -CHAPTER II. - -ON THE IMPERATIVE FORM OF THE KANTIAN ETHICS. - - -Kant's _πρῶτον ψεῡδος_ (first false step) lies in his conception of -Ethics itself, and this is found very clearly expressed on page 62 -(R., p. 54): "In a system of practical philosophy we are not concerned -with adducing reasons for that which takes place, but with formulating -laws regarding that which =ought to take place, even if it never -does take place=." This is at once a distinct _petitio principii._ -Who tells you that there are laws to which our conduct =ought= to -be subject? Who tells you that that =ought to take place, which in -fact never does take place=? What justification have you for making -this assumption at the outset, and consequently for forcing upon us, -as the only possible one, a system of Ethics couched in the imperative -terms of legislation? I say, in contradistinction to Kant, that the -student of Ethics, and no less the philosopher in general, must content -himself with explaining and interpreting that which is given, in -other words, that which really is, or takes place, so as to obtain an -=understanding= of it, and I maintain furthermore that there is -plenty to do in this direction, much more than has hitherto been done, -after the lapse of thousands of years. Following the above _petitio -principii_, Kant straightway, without any previous investigation, -assumes in the preface (which is entirely devoted to the subject), -that purely moral laws exist; and this assumption remains thenceforth -undisturbed, and forms the very foundation of his whole system. We, -however, prefer first of all to examine the conception denoted by the -word "law." The true and original meaning of the term is limited to -law as between citizens; it is the _lex_, _νόμος_, of the Romans and -Greeks, a human institution, and depending on human volition. It has -a secondary, derived, figurative, metaphorical meaning, when applied -to Nature, whose operations, partly known _a priori_, partly learnt -by experience, and which are always constant, we call natural laws. -Only a very small portion of these natural laws can be discerned _a -priori_, and with admirable acuteness, Kant set them apart, and classed -them under the name "Metaphysics of Nature." There is also undoubtedly -a law for the human will, in so far as man belongs to Nature; and -this law is strictly provable, admits of no exception, is inviolable, -and immovable as the mountains, and does not, like the Categorical -Imperative, imply a quasi-necessity, but rather a complete and absolute -one. It is the law of motivation, a form of the law of causation; in -other words, it is the causation which is brought about by the medium -of the understanding. It is the sole demonstrable law to which the -human will =as such= is subject. It means that every action can -only take place in consequence of a sufficient motive. Like causality -in general, it is a natural law. On the other hand, moral laws, apart -from human institution, state ordinance, or religious doctrine, cannot -rightly be assumed as existing without proof. Kant, therefore, by -taking such laws for granted, is guilty of a _petitio principii_, which -is all the bolder, in that he at once adds (page vi of the preface) -that a moral law ought to imply "=absolute necessity=." But -"absolute necessity" is everywhere characterised by an inevitable chain -of consequence; how, then, can such a conception be attached to these -alleged moral laws (as an instance of which he adduces "thou shalt -not lie"[1])? Every one knows, and he himself admits, that no such -consecution for the most part takes place; the reverse, indeed, is the -rule. - -In scientific Ethics before we admit as controlling the will other laws -besides that of motivation-laws which are original and independent of -all human ordinance--we must first prove and deduce their existence; -that is, provided in things ethical we are concerned not merely with -recommending honesty, but with practising it. Until that proof be -furnished, I shall recognise only one source to which is traceable -the importation into Ethics of the conception =Law, Precept, -Obligation=. It is one which is foreign to philosophy. I mean the -Mosaic Decalogue. Indeed the spelling "=du sollt="[2] in the -above instance of a moral law, the first put forward by Kant, naïvely -betrays this origin. A conception, however, which can\ point to no -other source than this, has no right, without undergoing further -scrutiny, thus to force its way into philosophical Ethics. It will -be rejected, until introduced by duly accredited proof. Thus on the -threshold of the subject Kant makes his first _petitio principii_, and -that no small one. - -Our philosopher, then, by begging the question in his preface, simply -assumes the conception of =Moral Law= as given and existing -beyond all doubt; and he treats the closely related conception of Duty -(page 8, R., p. 16) exactly in the same way. Without subjecting it -to any further test, he admits it forthwith as a proper appurtenance -of Ethics. But here, again, I am compelled to enter a protest. This -conception, equally with the kindred notions of =Law, Command, -Obligation=, etc., taken thus unconditionally, has its source in -theological morals, and it will remain a stranger to philosophical -morals, so long as it fails to furnish sufficient credentials drawn -either from man's nature, or from the objective world. Till then, I -can only recognise the Decalogue as the origin of all these connected -conceptions. Since the rise of Christianity there is no doubt that -philosophical has been unconsciously moulded by theological ethics. -And since the latter is essentially dictatorial, the former appears in -the shape of precepts and inculcation of Duty, in all innocence, and -without any suspicion that first an ulterior sanction is needful for -this _rôle_; rather does she suppose it to be her proper and natural -form. It is true that all peoples, ages, and creeds, and indeed all -philosophers (with the exception of the materialists proper) have -undeniably recognised that the ethical significance of human conduct is -a metaphysical one, in other words, that it stretches out beyond this -phaenomenal existence and reaches to eternity; but it is equally true -that the presentment of this fact in terms of Command and Obedience, of -Law and Duty, is no part of its essence. Furthermore, separated from -the theological hypotheses whence they have sprung, these conceptions -lose in reality all meaning, and to attempt a substitute for the -former by talking with Kant of =absolute= obligation and of -=unconditioned= duty, is to feed the reader with empty words, nay -more, is to give him a _contradictio in adjecto_[3] to digest. - -Every obligation derives all sense and meaning; simply and solely from -its relation to threatened punishment or promised reward. Hence, long -before Kant was thought of, Locke says: "For since it would be utterly -in vain, to suppose a rule set to the free actions of man, without -annexing to it some enforcement of good and evil to determine his -will; we must, wherever we suppose a law, suppose also some reward or -punishment annexed to that law." (_Essay on the Human Understanding_, -Bk. II., ch. 33, § 6). What =ought= to be done is therefore -necessarily conditioned by punishment or reward; consequently, to use -Kant's language, it is essentially and inevitably =hypothetical=, -and never, as he maintains, =categorical=. If we think away these -conditions, the conception of obligation becomes void of sense; hence -absolute obligation is most certainly a _contradictio in adjecto._ -A commanding voice, whether it come from within, or from without, -cannot possibly be imagined except as threatening or promising. -Consequently obedience to it, which may be wise or foolish according -to circumstances, is yet always actuated by selfishness, and therefore -morally worthless. - -The complete unthinkableness and nonsense of this conception of an -=unconditioned obligation=, which lies at the root of the Kantian -Ethics, appears later in the system itself, namely in the _Kritik der -Praktischen Vernunft_: just as some concealed poison in an organism -cannot remain hid, but sooner or later must come out and show itself. -For this =obligation=, said to be so =unconditioned=, -nevertheless postulates more than one condition in the background; it -assumes a rewarder, a reward, and the immortality of the person to be -rewarded. - -This is of course unavoidable, if one really makes Duty and Obligation -the fundamental conception of Ethics; for these ideas are essentially -relative, and depend for their significance on the threatened penalty -or the promised reward. The guerdon which is assumed to be in store -for virtue shows clearly enough that only in appearance she works -for nothing. It is, however, put forward modestly veiled, under the -name of the =Highest Good=, which is the union of Virtue and -Happiness. But this is at bottom nothing else but a morality that -derives its origin from Happiness, which means, a morality resting on -selfishness. In other words, it is Eudaemonism, which Kant had solemnly -thrust out of the front door of his system as an intruder, only to -let it creep in again by the postern under the name of the =Highest -Good=. This is how the assumption of =unconditioned absolute -obligation=, concealing as it does a contradiction, avenges itself. -=Conditioned= obligation, on the other hand, cannot of course be -any first principle for Ethics, since everything done out of regard for -reward or punishment is necessarily an egoistic transaction, and as -such is without any real moral value. All this makes it clear that a -nobler and wider view of Ethics is needed, if we are in earnest about -our endeavour to truly account for the significance of human conduct--a -significance which extends beyond phaenomena and is eternal. - -As all obligation is entirely dependent on a condition, so also is -all duty. Both conceptions are very closely related, indeed almost -identical. The only difference between them might be said to be that -obligation in general may rest on mere force, whereas duty involves -the sense of obligation deliberately undertaken, such as we see -between master and servant, principal and subordinate, rulers and the -ruled. And since no one undertakes a duty _gratis,_ every duty implies -also a right. The slave has no duties, because he has no rights; but -he is subject to an obligation which rests on sheer force. In the -following Part I shall explain the only meaning which the conception -"=Duty=" has in Ethics. - -If we put Ethics in an =imperative= form, making it a Doctrine of -Duties, and regard the moral worth or worthlessness of human conduct -as the fulfilment or violation of duties, we must remember that this -view of Duty, and of Obligation in general, is undeniably derived -solely from theological Morals, and primarily from the Decalogue, -and consequently that it rests essentially and inseparably on the -assumption of man's dependence on another will which gives him commands -and announces reward or punishment. But the more the assumption of -such a will is in Theology positive and precise, the less should it -be quietly and unsuspectingly introduced into philosophical Morals. -Hence we have no right to assume beforehand that for the latter the -=imperative Form=, the ordaining of commands, laws, and duties -is an essential and a matter of course; and it is a very poor shift -to substitute the word "absolute" or "categorical" for the external -condition which is indissolubly attached to such conceptions by -their very nature: for this gives rise, as explained above, to a -_contradictio in adjecto_. - -Kant, then, without more ado or any close examination, borrowed -this =imperative Form= of Ethics from theological Morals. The -hypotheses of the latter (in other words, Theology) really lie at -the root of his system, and as these alone in point of fact lend -it any meaning or sense, so they cannot be separated from, indeed -are implicitly contained in, it. After this, when he had expounded -his position the task of developing in turn a Theology out of his -Morals--the famous _Moraltheologie_--was easy enough. For the -conceptions which are implicitly involved in his Imperative, and which -lie hidden at the base of his Morals, only required to be brought -forward and expressed explicitly as postulates of Practical Reason. And -so it was that, to the world's great edification, a Theology appeared -depending simply on Ethics, indeed actually derived therefrom. But -this came about because the ethical system itself rests on concealed -theological hypotheses. I mean no derisive comparison, but in its form -the process is analogous to that whereby a conjurer prepares a surprise -for us, when he lets us find something where he had previously employed -his art to place it. Described in the abstract, Kant's procedure is -this: what ought to have been his first principle, or hypothesis -(_viz_., Theology) he made the conclusion, and what ought to have been -deduced as the conclusion (_viz_., the Categorical Command) he took as -his hypothesis.[4] But after he had thus turned the thing upside down, -nobody, not even he himself, recognised it as being what it really was, -namely the old well-known system of theological Morals. How this trick -was accomplished we shall consider in the sixth and seventh chapters of -the present Part. - -Ethics was of course frequently put in the imperative form, and treated -as a doctrine of duties also in pre-Kantian philosophy; but it was -always then based upon the will of a God whose existence had been -otherwise proved, and so there was no inconsequence. As soon, however, -as the attempt was made, as Kant attempted, to give a foundation to -Ethics independent of this will, and establish it without metaphysical -hypotheses, there was no longer any justification for taking as its -basis the words "thou shalt," and "it is thy duty" (that is, the -imperative form), without first deducing the truth thereof from some -other source. - - -[1] Du sollt (_sic_) nicht lügen. - -[2] Sollt is the old form for "_sollst_." Cf. Eng., _shalt_: Icel; -_skalt_--(_Translator_.) - -[3] A contradiction in the adjective. This occurs when the epithet -applied to a noun contradicts its essential meaning.--(_Translator_.) - -[4] Like the converse of a geometrical proposition, this Kantian -inversion is not necessarily true; its validity, in fact, depends -on the conclusion being implicitly contained in the hypothesis. ---(_Translator_.) - - - - -CHAPTER III. - -ON THE ASSUMPTION OF DUTIES TOWARDS OURSELVES IN PARTICULAR. - - -This form of the doctrine of duties was very acceptable to Kant, -and in working out his position he left it untouched; for, like his -predecessors, along with the duties towards others he ranged also -duties towards ourselves. I, however, entirely reject this assumption, -and, as there will be no better opportunity, I shall here incidentally -explain my view. - -Duties towards ourselves must, just as all others, be based either -on right or on love. Duties towards ourselves based on right are -impossible, because of the self-evident fundamental principle _volenti -non fit injuria_ (where the will assents, no injury is done). For what -I do is always what I will; consequently also what I do to myself is -never anything but what I will, therefore it cannot be unjust. Next, as -regards duties towards ourselves based on love. Ethics here finds her -work already done, and comes too late. The impossibility of violating -the duty of self-love is at once assumed by the first law of Christian -Morals: "Love thy neighbour as thyself." According to this, the love -which each man cherishes for himself is postulated as the _maximum_, -and as the condition of all other love; while the converse, "Love -thyself as thy neighbour" is never added; for every one would feel that -the latter does not claim enough. Moreover, self-love would be the sole -duty regularly involving an _opus supererogationis_. Kant himself says -in the _Metaphysische Anfangsgründe zur Tugendlehre_, p. 13 (R., p. -230): "That which each man inevitably wills of himself, does not belong -to the conception of Duty." This idea of duties towards ourselves is -nevertheless still held in repute, indeed it enjoys for the most part -special favour; nor need we feel surprise. But it has an amusing effect -in cases where people begin to show anxiety about their persons, and -talk quite earnestly of the duty of self-preservation; the while it is -sufficiently clear that fear will lend them legs soon enough, and that -they have no need of any law of duty to help them along. - -First among the duties towards ourselves is generally placed that of -not committing suicide, the line of argument taken being extremely -prejudiced and resting on the shallowest basis. Unlike animals, man is -not only a prey to =bodily= pain limited to the passing moment, -but also to those incomparably greater =mental= sufferings, which, -reaching forwards and backwards, draw upon the future and the past; and -nature, by way of compensation, has granted to man alone the privilege -of being able to end his life at his own pleasure, before she herself -sets a term to it; thus, while animals necessarily live so long as they -can, man need only live so long as he =will=. - -Whether he ought on ethical grounds to forego this privilege is a -difficult question, which in any case cannot be decided by the usual -superficial reasoning. The arguments against suicide which Kant does -not deem unworthy of adducing (p. 53, R., p. 48 and p. 67, R., p. -57), I cannot conscientiously describe as other than pitiable, and -quite undeserving of an answer. It is laughable indeed to suppose that -reflections of such a kind could have wrested the dagger from the hands -of Cato, of Cleopatra, of Cocceius Nerva (Tac. _Ann_., vi. 26) or of -Arria the wife of Paetus (Plin., _Ep_., iii. 16). If real moral motives -for not committing suicide actually exist, it is certain that they lie -very deep, and cannot be reached by the plummet of ordinary Ethics. -They belong to a higher view of things than is adaptable even to the -standpoint of the present treatise.[1] - -That which generally comes next on the rubric of duties towards -ourselves may be divided partly into rules of worldly wisdom, partly -into hygienic prescriptions; but neither class belongs to Morals in the -proper sense. Last on the catalogue comes the prohibition of unnatural -lust--onanism, _paederastia,_ and bestiality. Of these onanism is -mainly a vice of childhood, and must be fought against much more with -the weapon of dietetics than with that of ethics; hence we find that -the authors of books directed against it are physicians (_e.g._, -Tissot and others) rather than moralists. After dietetics and hygiene -have done their work, and struck it down by irrefutable reasoning, if -Ethics desires to take up the matter, she finds little left for her to -do. Bestiality, again, is of very rare occurrence; it is thoroughly -abnormal and exceptional, and, moreover, so loathsome and foreign to -human nature, that itself, better than all arguments of reason, passes -judgment on itself, and deters by sheer disgust. For the rest, as being -a degradation of human nature, it is in reality an offence against the -species as such, and in the abstract; not against human units. Of the -three sexual perversions of which we are speaking it is consequently -only with _paederastia_ that Ethics has to do, and in treating of -Justice this vice finds its proper place. For Justice is infringed by -it, in face of which fact, the dictum _volenti non fit injuria_ is -unavailing. The injustice consists in the seduction of the younger and -inexperienced person, who is thereby ruined physically and morally. - - -[1] There are ascetic reasons, which may be found in the Fourth Book, -Vol. I., § 69, of my chief work (_Die Welt als Wille und Vorstellung_). - - - - -CHAPTER IV. - -ON THE BASIS OF THE KANTIAN ETHICS. - - -With the imperative Form of Ethics, which in Chapter II. we proved to -be a _petitio principii_, is directly connected a favourite idea of -Kant's, that may be excused, but cannot be adopted. Sometimes we see -a physician, after having employed a certain remedy with conspicuous -success, henceforth prescribing it for almost all diseases; to such -a one Kant may be likened. By separating the _a priori_ from the -_a posteriori_ in human knowledge he made the most brilliant and -pregnant discovery that Metaphysics can boast of. What wonder then -that thereafter he should try to apply this method, this sundering of -the two forms, everywhere, and should consequently make Ethics also -consist of two parts, a pure, _i.e._ an _a priori_ knowable part, and -an empirical? The latter of these he rejects as unreliable for the -purpose of founding Ethics. To trace out the former and; exhibit it by -itself is his purpose in the _Grundlegung der Metaphysik der Sitten_, -which he accordingly represents as a science purely _a priori_, exactly -in the same way as he sets forth the _Metaphysische Anfangsgründe der -Naturwissenschaft_. He asserts in fact that the =Moral Law=, -which without warrant, without deduction, or proof of any sort, he -postulates as existing, is furthermore a Law knowable _a priori_ and -independent of all =internal= or =external experience=; it -"_rests_" (he says) "=solely on conceptions of pure Reason; and is -to be taken as a synthetic proposition a priori=" (_Kritik der -Praktischen Vernunft_: p. 56 of fourth Edition; R., p. 142). But -from this definition the implication immediately follows that such a -Law can only be formal, like everything else known _a priori_, and -consequently has only to do with the =Form= of actions, not -with their =Essence=. Let it be thought what this means! He -emphatically adds (p. vi of the preface to the _Grundlegung;_ R., p. 5) -that it is "useless to look for it either subjectively in man's nature, -or objectively in the accidents of the external world," and (preface -of the same, page vii; R., p. 6) that "nothing whatever connected -with it can be borrowed from knowledge relating to man, _i.e._, from -anthropology." On page 59 (R., p. 52) he repeats, "That one ought on no -account to fall into the mistake of trying to derive one's principle of -morality from the special constitution of human nature"; and again, on -page 60 (R., p. 52), he says that, "Everything derived from any natural -disposition peculiar to man, or from certain feelings and propensities, -or indeed from any special trend attaching solely to human nature, -and not necessarily to be taken as the Will of =every rational -being=," is incapable of affording a foundation for the moral law. -This shows beyond all possibility of contradiction that Kant does not -represent the alleged moral law as a _fact of consciousness_, capable -of empirical proof--which is how the later would-be philosophers, both -individually and collectively, wish to pass it off. In discarding every -empirical basis for Morals, he rejects all internal, and still more -decidedly all external, experience., Accordingly he founds--and I call -special attention to this--his moral principle not on any provable -_fact of consciousness_, such as an inner natural disposition, nor yet -upon any objective relation of things in the external world. No! That -would be an empirical foundation. Instead of this, _pure conceptions -a priori_, _i.e._, conceptions, which so far contain nothing derived -from internal or external experience, and thus are simply shells -without kernels--these are to be made the basis of Morals. Let us -consider the full meaning of such a position. Human consciousness as -well as the whole external world, together with all the experience and -all the facts they comprise, are swept from under our feet. We have -nothing to stand upon. And what have we to hold to? Nothing but a few -entirely abstract, entirely unsubstantial conceptions, floating in the -air equally with ourselves. It is from these, or, more correctly, from -the mere form of their connection with judgments made, that a _Law_ is -declared to proceed, which by so-called =absolute necessity= is -supposed to be valid, and to be strong enough to lay bit and bridle on -the surging throng of human desires, on the storm of passion, on the -giant might of _egoism_. We shall see if such be the case. - -With this preconceived notion that the basis of Morals must be -necessarily and strictly a priori, and entirely free from everything -empirical, another of Kant's favourite ideas is closely connected. -The moral principle that he seeks to establish is, he says, a -=synthetic proposition a priori, of merely formal contents=, and -hence exclusively a matter of =Pure Reason=; and accordingly, -as such, to be regarded as valid =not only for men=, but for -=all possible rational beings=; indeed he declares it to hold -good for man "on this account alone," _i.e._, because _per accidens_ -man comes under the category of rational beings. Here lies the cause -of his basing the Moral principle not on any feeling, but on =pure -Reason= (which knows nothing but itself and the statement of its -antithesis). So that this =pure Reason= is taken, not as it -really and exclusively is--an intellectual faculty of man--but =as -a self-existent hypostatic essence=, yet without the smallest -authority; the pernicious effects of such example and precedent being -sufficiently shown in the pitiful philosophy of the present day. -Indeed, this view of Morals as existing not for men, as men, but for -all rational beings, as such, is with Kant a principle so firmly -established, an idea so favourite, that he is never tired of repeating -it at every opportunity. - -I, on the contrary, maintain that we are never entitled to raise -into a _genus_ that which we only know of in a single species. For -we could bring nothing into our idea of the _genus_ but what we had -abstracted from this one species; so that what we should predicate of -the _genus_ could after all only be understood of the single species. -While, if we should attempt to think away (without any warrant) the -particular attributes of the species, in order to form our _genus_, -we should perhaps remove the exact condition whereby the remaining -attributes, hypostatised as a _genus_, are made possible. Just as we -recognise =intelligence in general= to be an attribute of animal -beings alone, and are therefore never justified in thinking of it as -existing outside, and independent, of animal nature; so we recognise -=Reason= as the exclusive attribute of the human race, and have -not the smallest right to suppose that Reason exists externally to -it, and then proceed to set up a _genus_ called "Rational Beings," -differing from its single known species "Man"; still less are we -warranted in laying down laws for such imaginary =rational beings -in the abstract=. To talk of rational beings external to men is -like talking of =heavy beings= external to bodies. One cannot -help suspecting that Kant was thinking a little of the dear cherubim, -or at any rate counted on their presence in the conviction of the -reader. In any case this doctrine contains a tacit assumption of an -_anima rationalis,_ which as being entirely different from the _anima -sensitiva_, and the _anima vegetativa_, is supposed to persist after -death, and then to be indeed nothing else but _rationalis_. But in the -_Kritik der Reinen Vernunft_ Kant himself has expressly and elaborately -made an end of this most transcendent hypostasis. Nevertheless, in -his ethics generally, and in the _Kritik der Praktischen Vernunft_ -especially, there seems always to hover in the background the thought -that the inner and eternal essence, of man consists of =Reason=. -In this connection, where the matter only occurs incidentally, I must -content myself with simply asserting the contrary. Reason, as indeed -the intellectual faculty as a whole, is secondary, is an attribute of -phaenomena, being in point of fact conditioned by the organism; whereas -it is the =Will= in man which is his very self, the only part of -him which is metaphysical, and therefore indestructible. - -The success with which Kant had applied his method to the theoretical -side of philosophy led him on to extend it to the practical. Here -also he endeavoured to separate pure _a priori_ from empirical _a -posteriori_ knowledge. For this purpose he assumed that just as -we know _a priori_ the laws of Space, of Time, and of Causality, -so in like manner, or at any rate analogously, we have the moral -plumb-line for our conduct given us prior to all experience, and -revealed in a Categorical Imperative, an absolute "Ought." But how -wide is the difference between this alleged moral law _a priori_, and -our theoretical knowledge _a priori_ of Space, Time, and Causality! -The latter are nothing but the expression of the forms, _i.e._, the -functions of our intellect, whereby alone we are capable of grasping -an objective world, and wherein alone it can be mirrored; so that the -world (as we know it) is absolutely conditioned by these forms, and all -experience =must= invariably and exactly correspond to them--just -as everything that I see through a blue glass must appear blue. While -the former, the so-called moral law, is something that experience pours -ridicule on at every step; indeed, as Kant himself says, it is doubtful -whether in practice it has ever really been followed on any single -occasion. How completely unlike are the things which are here classed -together under the conception of =apriority=! Moreover, Kant -overlooked the fact that, according to his own teaching, in theoretical -philosophy, it is exactly the =Apriority= of our knowledge of -Time, Space, and Causality--independent as this is of experience--that -limits it strictly to phaenomena, _i.e._, to the picture of the world -as reflected in our consciousness, and makes it entirely invalid as -regards the real nature of things, _i.e._, as regards whatever exists -independently of our capacity to grasp it. - -Similarly, when we turn to practical philosophy, his alleged moral -law, if it have an _a priori_ origin in ourselves, must also be only -phaenomenal, and leave entirely untouched the essential nature of -things. Only this conclusion would stand in the sharpest contradiction -as much to the facts themselves, as to Kant's view of them. For it is -precisely the moral principle in us that he everywhere (_e.g., Kritik -der Praktischen Vernunft_, p. 175; R., p. 228) represents as being in -the closest connection with the real essence of things, indeed, as -directly in contact with it; and in all passages in the _Kritik der -Reinen Vernunft,_ where the mysterious Thing in itself comes forward a -little more clearly, it shows itself as the =moral principle= in -us, as =Will=. But of this he failed to take account. - -In Chapter II. of this Part, I explained how Kant took over bodily -from theological Morals the =imperative form= of Ethics, _i.e._, -the conception of obligation, of law, and of duty; and how at the same -time he was constrained to leave behind that which in the realm of -theology alone lends force and significance to these ideas. But he -felt the need of some basis for them, and accordingly went so far as -to require that the _conception of duty_ itself should be also the -_ground of its fulfilment_; in other words, that it should itself be -its own enforcement. An action, he says (p. 11; R., p. 18), has no -genuine moral worth, unless it be done simply as a matter of duty, -and for duty's sake, without any liking for it being felt; and the -character only begins to have value, if a man, who has no sympathy in -his heart, and is cold and indifferent to others' sufferings, and who -is =not by nature a lover of his kind=, is nevertheless a doer of -good actions, solely out of a pitiful sense of duty. This assertion, -which is revolting to true moral sentiment; this apotheosis of -lovelessness, the exact opposite, as it is, of the Christian doctrine -of Morals, which places love before everything else, and teaches that -without it nothing profiteth (1 Cor. xiii. 3); this stupid moral -pedantry has been ridiculed by Schiller in two apposite epigrams, -entitled _Gewissensskrupel_ (Scruples of Conscience) and _Entscheidung_ -(Decision).[1] - -It appears that some passages in the _Kritik der Praktischen Vernunft_, -which exactly suit this connection, were the immediate occasion of the -verses. Thus, for instance, on p. 150 (R., p. 211) we find: "Obedience -to the moral law, which a man feels incumbent on him, is based not on -voluntary inclination, nor on endeavour willingly put forth, without -any authoritative command, but on a sense of duty." Yes, it must be -commanded! What slavish morality! And again on p. 213 (R., p. 257): -"Feelings of compassion, and of tender-hearted sympathy would be -actually troublesome to persons who think aright, because through such -emotions their well weighed maxims would become confused, and so the -desire would grow up to be rid of them, and to be subject solely to -the lawgiver--Reason." Now I maintain without hesitation that what -opens the hand of the above-described (p. 11; R., p. 18) loveless doer -of good, who is indifferent to the sufferings of other people, cannot -(provided he have no secondary motives) be anything else than a slavish -_δεισιδαιμονία_ (fear of the gods), equally whether he calls his fetich -"Categorical Imperative" or Fitzlipuzli.[2] For what but fear can move -a hard heart? - -Furthermore, on p. 13 (R., p. 19), in accordance with the above view, -we find that the moral worth of an action is supposed to lie, by -no means in the =intention= which led to it, but in the maxim -which was followed. Whereas I, on the contrary, ask the reader to -reflect that it is the =intention alone= which decides as to the -moral worth, or worthlessness, off an action, so that the same act -may deserve condemnation or praise according to the intention which -determined it. Hence it is that, whenever men discuss a proceeding -to which some moral importance is attached, the =intention= is -always investigated, and by this standard alone the matter is judged; -as, likewise, it is in the _intention_ alone that every one seeks -justification, if he see his conduct misinterpreted or excuse, if its -consequence be mischievous. - -On p. 14 (R., p. 20) we at last reach the definition of Duty, which -is the fundamental conception of Kant's entire ethical system. It is: -"The necessity of an action out of respect for the law." But what is -=necessary= takes place with absolute certainty while conduct -based on pure duty generally does not come off at all. And not only -this; Kant himself admits (p. 25; R., p. 28) that there are =no -certain instances= on record of conduct determined solely by pure -duty; and on p. 26 (R., p. 29) he says: "It is utterly impossible to -know with certainty from experience whether there has ever really -been one single case in which an action, however true to duty, has -rested simply on its idea."--And similarly on p. 28 (R., p. 30) -and p. 49 (R., p. 50). In what sense then can =necessity= be -attributed to such an action? As it is only fair always to put the -most favourable interpretation on an author's words, we will suppose -him to mean that an act true to duty is =objectively= necessary, -but =subjectively= accidental. Only it is precisely this that -is more easily said than thought for where is the =Object= of -this =objective= necessity, the consequence of which for the -most part, perhaps indeed always, fails to be realised in objective -reality! With every wish to be unbiassed, I cannot but think that -the expression--=necessity of an action=--is nothing but an -artificially concealed, very forced paraphrase of the word "ought."[3] -This will become clearer if we notice that in the same definition the -word _Achtung_ (respect) is employed, where _Gehorsam_ (obedience) is -meant. Similarly in the note on p. 16 (R., p. 20) we read: "_Achtung_ -signifies simply the subordination of my will to a law. The direct -determination of the will by a law, and the consciousness that it is -so determined--this is what is denoted by _Achtung_" In what language? -In German the proper term is _Gehorsam_. But the word _Achtung_, so -unsuitable as it is, cannot without a reason have been put in place of -the word _Gehorsam._ It must serve some purpose; and this is obviously -none other than to veil the derivation of the imperative form, and of -the conception of duty, from theological Morals; just as we saw above -that the expression "necessity of an action," which is such a forced -and awkward substitute for the word "shall," was only chosen because -"shall" is the exact language of the Decalogue. The above definition: -"Duty is the necessity of an action out of respect for the law," would -therefore read in natural, undisguised, plain language: "Duty signifies -an action which =ought= to be done out of obedience to a law." -This is "the real form of the poodle."[4] - -But now as to the Law, which is the real foundation stone of the -Kantian Ethics. =What does it contain? And where is it inscribed?= -This is the chief point of inquiry. In the first place, be it observed -that we have two questions to deal with: the one has to do with the -=Principle=, the other with the =Basis= of Ethics--two -entirely different things, although they are frequently, and sometimes -indeed intentionally, confused. - -The principle or main proposition of an ethical system is the shortest -and most concise definition of the line of conduct which it prescribes, -or, if it have no imperative form, of the line of conduct to which it -attaches real moral worth. It thus contains, in the general terms of -a single enunciation, the direction for following the path of virtue, -which is derived from that system: in other words, it is the _ὅ,τι_[5] -of virtue. Whereas the =Basis= of any theory of Ethics is the -_διότι_[6] of virtue, the =reason= of the obligation enjoined, -of the exhortation or praise given, whether it be sought in human -nature, or in the external conditions of the world, or in anything -else. As in all sciences, so also in Ethics the _ὅ,τι_ must be clearly -distinguished from the _διότι_. But most teachers of Morals wilfully -confound this difference: probably because the _ὅ,τι_ is so easy, the -_διότι_ so exceedingly difficult, to give. They are therefore glad to -try to make up for the poverty on the one hand, by the riches on the -other, and to bring about a happy marriage between _Πενία_ (poverty) -and _Πόρος_ (plenty), by putting them together in one proposition.[7] -This is generally done by taking the familiar _ὅ,τι_ out of the simple -form in which it can be expressed, and forcing it into an artificial -formula, from which it is only to be deduced as the conclusion of -given premises; and the reader is led by this performance to feel -as if he had grasped not only the thing, but its cause as well. We -may easily convince ourselves of this by recalling all the most -familiar principles of Morals. As, however, in what follows I have -no intention of imitating acrobatic tricks of this sort, but purpose -proceeding with all honesty and straightforwardness, I cannot make the -principle of Ethics equivalent to its basis, but must keep the two -quite separate. Accordingly, this _ὅ,τι_--_i.e._, the principle, the -fundamental proposition--as to which in its essence all teachers of -Morals are really at one, however much they may clothe it in different -costumes, I shall at once express in the form which I take to be -the simplest and purest possible, _viz.: Neminem laede, immo omnes, -quantum potes, juva_. (Do harm to no one; but rather help all people, -as far as lies in your power.) This is in truth the proposition which -all ethical writers expend their energies in endeavouring to account -for. It is the common result of their manifold and widely differing -deductions; it is the _ὅ,τι_ for which the _διότι_ is still sought -after; the consequence, the cause of which is wanting. Hence it is -itself nothing but the _Datum_ (the thing given), in relation to which -the _Quaesitum_ (the thing required) is the problem of every ethical -system, as also of the present prize essay. The solution of this -riddle will disclose the real foundation of Ethics, which, like the -philosopher's stone, has been searched for from time immemorial. That -the _Datum_, the _ὅ,τι_, the principle is most purely expressed by the -enunciation I have given, can be seen from the fact that it stands to -every other precept of Morals as a conclusion to given premises, and -therefore constitutes the real goal it is desired to attain; so that -all other ethical commandments can only be regarded as paraphrases, as -indirect or disguised statements, of the above simple proposition. This -is true, for instance, even of that trite and apparently elementary -maxim: _Quod tibi fieri non vis, alteri ne feceris_[8] (Do not to -another what you are unwilling should be done to yourself.) The defect -here is that the wording only touches the duties imposed by law, not -those required by virtue;--a thing which can be easily remedied by -the omission of _non_ and _ne_. Thus changed, it really means nothing -else than: _Neminem laede, immo omnes, quantum potes, juva._ But as -this sense is only reached by a periphrasis, the formula gains the -appearance of having also revealed its own ultimate foundation, its -_διότι_; which, however, is not the case, because it does not in the -least follow that, if I am unwilling that something be done to myself, -I ought not to do it to others. The same is true of every other -principle or leading proposition of Ethics that has hitherto been put -forward. - -If we now return to the above question:--how does the law read, in -obeying which, according to Kant, duty consists? and on what is it -based?--we shall find that our philosopher, like most others, has in an -extremely artificial manner closely connected the principle of Morals -with its basis. I again call attention to what I have already examined -at the outset--I mean, the Kantian claim that the principle of Ethics -must be purely _a priori_ and purely formal, indeed an _a priori_ -synthetical proposition, which consequently may not contain anything -material, nor rest upon anything empirical, whether objectively in -the external world, or subjectively in consciousness, such as any -feeling, inclination, impulse, and the like. Kant was perfectly aware -of the difficulty of this position; for on p. 60 (R., p. 53) he says: -"It will be seen that philosophy has here indeed reached a precarious -standpoint, which yet is to be immovable, notwithstanding that it -is neither dependent on, nor supported by, anything in heaven or on -earth." We shall therefore with all the greater interest and curiosity -await the solution of the problem he has set himself, namely, how -something is to arise out of nothing, that is, how out of purely _a -priori_ conceptions, which contain nothing empirical or material, the -laws of material human action are to grow up. This is a process which -we may find symbolised in chemistry, where out of three invisible gases -(Azote, Hydrogen, and Chlorine[9]), and thus in apparently empty space, -solid sal-ammoniac is evolved before our eyes. - -I will, however, explain, more clearly than Kant either would or -could, the method whereby he accomplishes this difficult task. The -demonstration is all the more necessary because what he did appears -to be seldom properly understood. Almost all Kant's disciples have -fallen into the mistake of supposing that he presents his Categorical -Imperative directly as a fact of consciousness. But in that case -its origin would be anthropological, and, as resting on experience, -although internal, it would have an empirical basis: a position which -runs directly counter to the Kantian view, and which he repeatedly -rejects. Thus on p. 48 (R., p. 44) he says: "It cannot be empirically -determined whether any such Categorical Imperative exists everywhere"; -and again, on p. 49 (R., p. 45): "The possibility of the Categorical -Imperative must be investigated entirely on _a priori_ grounds, -because here we are not helped by any testimony of experience as to -its reality." Even Reinhold, his first pupil, missed this point; for -in his _Beitrage zur Uebersicht der Philosophie am Anfange des_ 19. -_Jahrhunderts_, No. 2, p. 21, we find him saying: "Kant assumes the -moral law to be a direct and certain reality, an original fact of the -moral consciousness." But if Kant had wished to make the Categorical -Imperative a fact of consciousness, and thus give it an empirical -foundation, he certainly would not have failed at least to put it -forward as such. And this is precisely what he never does. As far as -I know, the Categorical Imperative appears for the first time in the -_Kritik der Reinen Vernunft_ (p. 802 of the first, and p. 830 of the -fifth edition), entirely ex nunc (unexpectedly), without any preamble, -and merely connected with the preceding sentence by an altogether -unjustifiable "therefore."; It is only in the _Grundlage zur Metaphysik -der Sitten_--a book to which we here devote especial attention--that -it is first introduced expressly and formally, as a deduction from -certain concepts. Whereas in Reinhold's _Formula concordiae des -Kriticismus_,[10] we actually read on p. 122 the following sentence: -"We distinguish moral self-consciousness from the =experience= -with which it, as an original fact transcending all knowledge, is -bound up in the human consciousness; and we understand by such -self-consciousness the =direct consciousness of duty=, that is, of -the =necessity= we are under of admitting the legitimacy--whether -pleasurable or the reverse--of the will, as the stimulus and as the -measure of its own operations." - -This would of course be "a charming _thesis_, with a very pretty -_hypothesis_ to boot."[11] But seriously: into what an outrageous -_petitio principii_ do we find Kant's moral law here developed! If -=that= were true, Ethics would indubitably have a basis of -incomparable solidity, and there would be no need of any questions -being set for prize essays, to encourage inquiry in this direction. -But the greatest marvel would be, that men had been so slow in -discovering such a fact of consciousness, considering that for the -space of thousands of years a basis for Morals has been sought after -with zealous patient toil. How Kant himself is responsible for this -deplorable mistake, I shall explain further on; nevertheless, one -cannot but wonder at the undisputed predominance of such a radical -error among his disciples. Have they never, whilst writing all their -numberless books on the Kantian philosophy, noticed the disfigurement -which the _Kritik der Reinen Vernunft_ underwent in the second -edition, and which made it an incoherent, self-contradictory work? -It seems that this has only now come to light; and, in my opinion, -the fact has been quite correctly analysed in Rosenkranz's preface to -the second volume of his complete edition of Kant's works. We must, -however, remember that many scholars, being unceasingly occupied as -teachers and authors, find very little time left for private and exact -research. It is certain that _docendo disco_ (I learn by teaching) is -not unconditionally true; sometimes indeed one is tempted to parody -it by saying: _semper docendo nihil disco_ (by always teaching I -learn nothing); and even what Diderot puts into the mouth of Rameau's -nephew is not altogether without reason: "'And as for these teachers, -do you suppose they understand the sciences they give instruction -in? Not a bit of it, my dear sir, not a bit of it. If they possessed -sufficient knowledge to be able to teach them, they would not do so.' -'Why?' 'Because they would have devoted their lives to the study of -them.'"--(Goethe's translation, p. 104.) Lichtenberg too says: "I have -rather observed that professional people are often exactly those who -do not know best." But to return to the Kantian Ethics: most persons, -provided only the conclusion reached agrees with their moral feelings, -immediately assume that there is no flaw to be found in its derivation; -and if the process of deduction looks difficult, they do not trouble -themselves much about it, but are content to trust the faculty. - -Thus the foundation which Kant gave to his moral law by no means -consists in its being proved empirically to be a fact of consciousness; -neither does he base it on an appeal to moral feeling, nor yet on -a _petitio principii_, under its fine modern name of an "absolute -Postulate." It is formed rather of a very subtle process of thought, -which he twice advances, on p. 17 and p. 51 (R., p. 22, and p. 46), and -which I shall now proceed to make clear. - -Kant, be it observed, ridiculed all empirical stimuli of the will, -and began by removing everything, whether subjective or objective, on -which a law determining the will's action could be empirically based. -The consequence is, that he has nothing left for the substance of his -law but simply its =Form=. Now this can only be the abstract -conception of =lawfulness=. But the conception of lawfulness -is built up out of what is valid for all persons equally. Therefore -the substance of the law consists of the conception of what is -universally valid, and its contents are of course nothing else than its -=universal validity=. Hence the formula will read as follows: "Act -only in accordance with that precept which you can also wish should -be a general law for all rational beings." This, then, is the real -foundation--for the most part so greatly misunderstood--which Kant -constructed for his principle of Morals, and therefore for his whole -ethical system. Compare also the _Kritik der Praktischen Vernunft_, p. -61 (R., p. 147); the end of Note 1. - -I pay Kant a tribute of sincere admiration for the great acumen he -displayed in carrying out this dexterous feat, but I continue in -all seriousness my examination of his position according to the -standard of truth. I will only observe--and this point I shall take -up again later on--that here =reason=, because, and in so far -as, it works out the above explained special ratiocination, receives -the name of =practical reason=. Now the Categorical Imperative -of Practical Reason is the law which results from this process of -thought. Consequently Practical Reason is not in the least what most -people, including even Fichte, have regarded it--a special faculty -that cannot be traced to its source, a _qualitas occulta_, a sort of -moral instinct, like Hutcheson's "moral sense"; but it is (as Kant -himself in his preface, p. xii. [R., p. 8], and elsewhere, often enough -declares) one and the same with =theoretical reason=--is, in fact, -=theoretical reason= itself, in so far as the latter works out the -ratiocinative process I have described. It is noticeable that Fichte -calls the Categorical Imperative of Kant an =absolute Postulate= -(_Grundlage der gesammten Wissenschaftslehre_, Tübingen, 1802, p. -240, Note). This is the modern, more showy, expression for _petitio -principii_, and thus we see that he, too, regularly accepted the -Categorical Imperative, and consequently must be included among those -who have fallen into the mistake above criticised. - -The objection, to which this Kantian basis of Morals is at once and -directly exposed, lies in the fact that such an origin of a moral law -in us is impossible, because of its assumption that man would quite -of his own accord hit on the idea of looking about for, and inquiring -after, a law to which his will should be subject, and which should -shape its actions. This procedure, however, cannot possibly occur to -him of itself; at best it could only be after another moral; stimulus -had supplied the first impulse and motive thereto; and such a stimulus -would have to be positively operative, and real; and show itself to be -such, as well as spontaneously influence, indeed force its presence -upon, the mind. But anything of this sort would run counter to Kant's -assumption, which, according to the chain of reasoning above described, -is to be regarded as itself the origin of all moral conceptions--in -fact, the _punctum saliens_ of Morality. Consequently, as long as there -is no such antecedent incentive (because, _ex hypothesi_, there exists -no other moral stimulus but the process of thought already explained), -so long Egoism alone must remain as the plumb-line of human conduct, -as the guiding thread of the law of motivation; so long the entirely -empirical and egoistic motives of the moment, alone and unchecked, -must determine, in each separate case, the conduct of a man; since, -on this assumption, there is no voice to arrest him, neither does any -reason whatever exist, why he should be minded to inquire after, to -say nothing of anxiously searching for, a law which should limit and -govern his will. And yet it is only possible on this supposition that -he should think out the above remarkable piece of mental legerdemain. -It matters not how far we may care to put a strict and exact -interpretation on this Kantian process, or whether we choose to tone it -down to some dim, obscurely felt operation of thought. No modification -of it can attack the primary truths that out of nothing, nothing -comes, and that an effect requires a cause. The moral stimulus, like -every motive that effects the will, must in all cases make itself felt -spontaneously, and therefore have a positive working, and consequently -be real. And because for men the only thing which has reality is the -empirical, or else that which is supposed to have a possibly empirical -existence, therefore it follows that the moral stimulus cannot but -be empirical, and show itself as such of its own accord; and without -waiting for us to begin our search, it must come and press itself upon -us, and this with such force that it may, at least possibly, overcome -the opposing egoistic motives in all their giant strength. For Ethics -has to do with actual human conduct, and not with the _a priori_ -building of card houses--a performance which yields results that no man -would ever turn to in the stern stress and battle of life, and which, -in face of the storm of our passions, would be about as serviceable as -a syringe in a great fire. - -I have already noticed above how Kant considered it a special merit of -his moral law that it is founded solely on abstract, pure _a priori_ -conceptions, consequently on =pure reason=; whereby its validity -obtains (he says) not only for men, but for all rational beings as -such. All the more must we regret that pure, abstract conceptions _a -priori_, without real contents, and without any kind of empirical -basis can never move, at any rate, men; of other rational beings -I am of course incapable of speaking. The second defect, then, in -Kant's ethical basis is its lack of real substance. So far this has -escaped notice, because the real nature of his foundation has in all -probability been thoroughly understood only by an exceedingly small -number of those who were its enthusiastic propagandists. The second -fault, I repeat, is entire want of reality, and hence of possible -efficacy. The structure floats in the air, like a web of the subtlest -conceptions devoid of all contents; it is based on nothing, and can -therefore support nothing, and move nothing. And yet Kant loaded it -with a burden of enormous weight, namely, the hypothesis of the Freedom -of the Will. In spite of his oft declared conviction that freedom in -human action has absolutely no place; that theoretically not even its -possibility is thinkable (_Kritik der Praktischen Vernunft_, p. 168; -R., p. 223); that, if the character of a man, and all the motives which -work on him were exactly known, his conduct could be calculated as -certainly and as precisely as an eclipse of the moon (_ibidem_, p. 177; -R., p. 230): he nevertheless makes an assumption of freedom (although -only _idealiter_, and as a postulate) by his celebrated conclusion: -"You can, because you ought"; and this on the strength of his precious -ethical basis, which, as we see, floats in the air incorporeal. But if -it has once been clearly recognised that a thing =is not=, and -=cannot be=, what is the use of all the postulates in the world? -It would be much more to the purpose to cast away that on which the -postulate is based, because it is an impossible supposition; and this -course would be justified by the rule _a non posse ad non esse valet -consequentia_;[12] and by a _reductio ad absurdum_, which would at the -same time be fatal to the Categorical Imperative. Instead of which one -false doctrine is built up on the other. - -The inadmissibility of a basis for Morals consisting of a few entirely -abstract and empty conceptions must have been apparent to Kant himself -in secret. For in the _Kritik der Praktischen Vernunft_, where (as I -have already said) he is not so strict and methodical in his work, and -where we find him becoming bolder on account of the fame he had gained, -it is remarkable how the ethical basis gradually changes its nature, -and almost forgets that it is a mere web of abstract ideas; in fact, -it seems distinctly desirous of becoming more substantial. Thus, for -instance, on p. 81 (R., p. 163) of the above work are the words: "The -Moral Law =in some sort a fact of Pure Reason=." What is one to -think of this extraordinary expression? In every other place that which -is fact is opposed to what is knowable by pure reason. Similarly on -p. 83 (R., p. 164) we read of "a Reason which directly determines the -Will"; and so on. - -Now let us remember that in laying his foundation Kant expressly and -repeatedly rejects every anthropological basis, everything that -could prove the Categorical Imperative to be a fact of consciousness, -because such a proof would be empirical. Nevertheless, his successors -were so emboldened by incidental utterances like the above that -they went to much greater lengths. Fichte in his work, _System der -Sittenlehre_, p. 49, warns us expressly "not to allow ourselves to be -misled into trying to explain, and derive from external sources, the -consciousness that we have duties, because this would be detrimental -to the dignity and absoluteness of the law." A very nice excuse! Again -on p. 66 he says: "The principle of Morality is a thought which is -based on the =intellectual intuition= of the absolute activity -of the intelligence, and which is directly conceived by the pure -intelligence of its own accord." What a fine flourish to conceal the -helplessness of this clap-trap! Whoever may like to convince himself -how Kant's disciples, little by little, totally forgot and ignored -the real nature of the foundation and derivation which their master -originally gave to the moral law, should read a very interesting essay -in Reinhold's _Beitrage zur Uebersicht der Philosophie im Anfange des_ -19. _Jahrhunderts_, No. 2, 1801. In it, on pp. 105 and 106, it is -maintained "that in the Kantian philosophy Autonomy (which is the same -thing as the Categorical Imperative) is a fact of consciousness, and -cannot be traced further back, inasmuch as it declares itself by means -of a direct consciousness." - -But in this case, it would have an anthropological, and consequently -empirical, foundation--a position which is diametrically opposed to -Kant's explicit and repeated utterances. Again, on p. 108 we find: -"Both in the practical philosophy of criticism, and in the whole of the -purified or higher transcendental philosophy, Autonomy is that which -is founded, and which founds, by itself alone; and which is neither -capable of, nor requires, any other foundation; it is that which is -absolutely original, true and certain _per se;_ the primal truth; the -_prius κατ' ἐξοχήν (par excellence)_; the absolute principle. Whoever, -therefore, imagines, requires, or seeks any basis for this Autonomy -external to itself, can only be regarded by the Kantian School as -wanting in moral consciousness;[13] or else as failing to interpret -this consciousness correctly, through the employment of false first -principles in his speculations. The School of Fichte and Schelling -declares him to be afflicted with a dulness of intellect that renders -him incapable of being a philosopher, and forms the characteristic of -the unholy _canaille_, and the sluggish brute, or (to use Schelling's -more veiled expression) of the _profanum vulgus_ and the _ignavum -pecus_." Every one will understand how much truth there can be in a -doctrine which it is sought to uphold by such defiant and dogmatic -rhetoric. Meanwhile, we must doubtless explain by the respect that this -language inspired, the really childish credulity with which Kant's -followers accepted the Categorical Imperative, and at once treated -it as a matter beyond dispute. The truth is that in this case any -objections raised to a theoretical assertion might easily be confounded -with moral obliquity; so that every one, although he had no very clear -idea in his own mind of the Categorical Imperative, yet preferred to -be silent, believing, as he did, in secret, that others were probably -better off, and had succeeded in evolving a clearer and more definite -mental picture of it. For no one likes to turn his conscience inside -out. - -Thus in the Kantian School Practical Reason with its Categorical -Imperative appears more and more as a hyperphysical fact, as a Delphian -temple in the human soul, out of whose dark recesses proceed oracles -that infallibly declare not, alas! what will, but what ought to, -happen. This doctrine of Practical Reason, as a direct and immediate -fact, once it had been adopted, or rather introduced by artifice -combined with defiance, was unhappily later on extended also to -Theoretical Reason; and not unnaturally: for Kant himself had often -said that both are but one and the same Reason (_e.g_., Preface, p. -xii; R., p. 8). After it had been once admitted that in the domain of -the Practical there is a Reason which dictates _ex tripode_,[14] it was -an easy step to concede the same privilege to Theoretical Reason also, -closely related as the latter is to the former--indeed, consubstantial -with it. The one was thus pronounced to be just as immediate as the -other, the advantage of this being no less immense than obvious. - -Then it was that all philosophasters and fancy-mongers, with J.H. -Jacobi--the denouncer of atheists--at their head, came crowding to -this postern which was so unexpectedly opened to them. They wanted -to bring their small wares to market, or at least to save what they -most valued of the old heirlooms which Kant's teaching threatened -to pulverise. As in the life of the individual a single youthful -mistake often ruins the whole career; so when Kant made that one -false assumption of a Practical Reason furnished with credentials -exclusively transcendent, and (like the supreme courts of appeal) -with powers of decision "without grounds," the result was that out of -the austere gravity of the Critical Philosophy was evolved a teaching -utterly heterogeneous to it. We hear of a Reason at first only dimly -"surmising," then clearly "comprehending" the "Supersensuous," and -at last endowed with a perfect "intellectual intuition" of it. Every -dreamer could now promulgate his mental freaks as the "absolute," -_i.e._, officially issued, deliverances, and revelations of this -Reason. Nor need we be surprised if the new privilege was fully taken -advantage of. - -Here, then, is the origin of that philosophical method which appeared -immediately after Kant, and which is made up of clap-trap, of -mystification, of imposture, of deception, and of throwing dust in the -eyes. This era will be known one day in the History of Philosophy as -"The Period of Dishonesty." For it was signalised by the disappearance -of the characteristic of honesty, of searching after truth in common -with the reader, which was well marked in the writings of all previous -philosophers. The philosophaster's object was not to instruct, but -to befool his hearers, as every page attests. At first Fichte and -Schelling shine as the heroes of this epoch; to be followed by the man -who is quite unworthy even of them, and greatly their inferior in point -of talent--I mean the stupid and clumsy charlatan Hegel. The Chorus is -composed of a mixed company of professors of philosophy, who in solemn -fashion discourse to their public about the Endless, the Absolute, and -many other matters of which they can know absolutely nothing. - -As a stepping-stone to raise Reason to her prophetic throne a -wretched _jeu d'esprit_ was actually dragged in, and made to serve. -It was asserted that, as the word _Vernunft_ (Reason) comes from -_vernehmen_ (to comprehend), therefore _Vernunft_ means a capacity -to =comprehend= the so-called "Supersensuous," _i.e._, -_Νεϕελοκοκκυγία_,[15] or Cloud-cuckoo-town. This pretty notion met -with boundless, approval, and for the space of thirty years was -constantly repeated in Germany with immense satisfaction; indeed, it -was made the foundation of philosophic manuals. And yet it is as clear -as noon-day that of course _Vernunft_ (Reason) comes from. _vernehmen_ -(to comprehend), but only because Reason makes man superior to animals, -so that he not only hears, but also =comprehends= (_vernimmt_)--by -no means, what is going on in Cloud-cuckoo-town--but what is said, -as by one reasonable person to another, the words spoken being -=comprehended= (_vernommen_) by the listener; and this capacity is -called _Reason_ (_Vernunft_). - -Such is the interpretation that all peoples, ages, and languages -have put on the word Reason. It has always been understood to mean -the possession of general, abstract, non-intuitive ideas, named -=concepts=, which are denoted and fixed by means of words. This -faculty alone it is which in reality gives to men their advantage -over animals. For these abstract ideas, or concepts, that is, mental -impressions formed of the sum of many separate things, are the -condition of =language= and through it of actual =thought=; -through which again they determine the consciousness not only of the -present (which animals also have), but of the past and the future as -such; whence it results that they are the _modulus_, so to say, of -clear recollection, of circumspection, of foresight, and of intention; -the constant factor in the evolution of systematic co-operation, of -the state, of trades, arts, sciences, religions, and philosophies, -in short, of everything that so sharply distinguishes human from -animal life. Beasts have only intuitive ideas, and therefore also -only intuitive motives; consequently the dependence of their volition -on motives is manifest. With man this dependence is no less a fact; -he, too (with due allowance for individual character), is affected -by motives under the strictest law of necessity. Only these are -for the most part not _intuitive_ but _abstract_ ideas, that is, -conceptions, or thoughts, which nevertheless are the result of previous -intuitions, hence of external influences. This, however, gives him -a relative freedom--relative, that is, as compared with an animal. -For his action is not determined (as it is in all other creatures) by -the surroundings of the moment as intuitively perceived, but by the -thoughts he has derived from experience, or gained by instruction. -Consequently the motive, by which he, too, is necessarily swayed, is -not always at once obvious to the looker-on simultaneously with the -act; it lies concealed in the brain. It is this that lends to all his -movements, as well as to his conduct and work as a whole, a character -manifestly different from that observable in the habits of beasts. He -seems as though guided by finer, invisible threads; whence all his -acts bear the stamp of deliberation and premeditation, thus gaining -an appearance of independence, which sufficiently distinguishes them -from those of animals. All these great differences, however, spring -solely out of the capacity for =abstract ideas, concepts=. This -capacity is therefore the essential part of =Reason=, that is, -of the faculty peculiar to man, and it is called _το λόγιμον_,[16] -_το λογιστικον,_ =ratio, la ragione, il discorso, raison, reason, -discourse of reason=. If I were asked what the distinction is -between it and =Verstand=, _νοῡς_, =intellectus, entendement, -understanding=; I should reply thus: The latter is that capacity -for knowledge which animals also possess in varying degrees, and which -is seen in us at its highest development; in other words, it is the -direct consciousness of the law of =Causality=--a consciousness -which precedes all experience, being constituted by the very form -of the understanding, whose essential nature is, in fact, therein -contained. On it depends in the first place the intuitive perception of -the external world; for the senses by themselves are only capable of -=impression=, a thing which is very far from being =intuitive -perception=; indeed, the former is nothing but the material of the -latter: _νοῡς ὁρᾷ, καὶ νοῡς ἀκούει, τ'ἄλλα κωϕὰ καὶ τυϕλά._ (The mind -sees, the mind hears; everything else is deaf and blind.) =Intuitive -perception= is the result of our directly referring the impressions -of the sense-organs to their cause, which, exactly because of this -act of the intelligence, presents itself as an =external object= -under the mode of intuition proper to us, _i.e._, in =space=. -This is a proof that the Law of Causality is known to us _a priori_, -and does not arise from experience, since experience itself, inasmuch -as it presupposes intuitive perception, is only possible through the -same law. All the higher qualities of the intellect, all cleverness, -sagacity, penetration, acumen are directly proportional to the -exactness and fulness with which the workings of Causality in all its -relations are grasped; for all knowledge of the =connection= -of things, in the widest sense of the word, is based on the -comprehension of this law, and the clearness and accuracy with which -it is understood is the measure of one man's superiority to another -in =understanding=, shrewdness, cunning. On the other hand, the -epithet =reasonable= has at all times been applied to the man who -does not allow himself to be guided by intuitive impressions, but by -=thoughts= and =conceptions=, and who therefore always sets -to work logically after due reflection and forethought. Conduct of this -sort is everywhere known as =reasonable=. Not that this by any -means implies uprightness and love for one's fellows. On the contrary, -it is quite possible to act in the most reasonable way, that is, -according to conclusions scientifically deduced, and weighed with the -nicest exactitude; and yet to follow the most selfish, unjust, and even -iniquitons maxims. So that never before Kant did it occur to any one -to identify just, virtuous, and noble conduct with =reasonable=; -the two lines of behaviour have always been completely separated, and -kept apart. The one depends on the =kind of motivation=; the -other on the difference in fundamental principles. Only after Kant -(because he taught that virtue has its source in Pure Reason) did the -virtuous and the reasonable become one and the same thing, despite the -usage of these words which all languages have adopted--a usage which -is not fortuitous, but the work of universal, and therefore uniform, -human judgment. "Reasonable" and "vicious" are terms that go very -well together; indeed great, far-reaching crimes are only possible -from their union. Similarly, "unreasonable" and "noble-minded" are -often found associated; _e.g._, if I give to-day to the needy man -what I shall myself require to-morrow more urgently than he; or, -if I am so far affected as to hand over to one in distress the sum -which my creditor is waiting for; and such cases could be multiplied -indefinitely. - -We have seen that this exaltation of Reason to be the source of all -virtue rests on two assertions. First, as =Practical Reason=, -it is said to issue, like an oracle, peremptory Imperatives purely -_a priori._ Secondly, taken in connection with the false explanation -of =Theoretical Reason=, as given in the _Kritik der Reinen -Vernunft_, it is presented as a certain faculty essentially concerned -with the =Unconditioned=, as manifested in three alleged Ideas[17] -(the impossibility of which the intellect at the same time recognises -_a priori_). And we found that this position, as an _exemplar vitiis -imitabile_,[18] led our muddy-headed philosophers, Jacobi at their -head, from bad to worse. They talked of =Reason= (_Vernunft_) -as directly comprehending (_vernehmend_) the "=Supersensuous=," -and absurdly declared that it is a certain mental property which has -to do essentially with things transcending all experience, _i.e._, -with metaphysics; and that it perceives directly and intuitively the -ultimate causes of all things, and of all Being, the Supersensuous, -the Absolute, the Divine, etc. Now, had it been wished to use Reason, -instead of deifying it, such assertions as these must long ago have -been met by the simple remark that, if man, by virtue of a special -organ, furnished by his Reason, for solving the riddle of the world, -possessed an innate metaphysics that only required development; in -that case there would have to be just as complete agreement on -metaphysical matters as on the truths of arithmetic and geometry; and -this would make it totally impossible that there should exist on the -earth a large number of radically different religions, and a still -larger number of radically different systems of philosophy. Indeed, -we may rather suppose that, if any one were found to differ from the -rest in his religious or philosophical views, he would be at once -regarded as a subject for mental pathology. Nor would the following -plain reflection have failed to present itself. If we discovered a -species of apes which intentionally prepared instruments for fighting, -or building, or for any other purpose; we should immediately admit -that it was endowed with Reason. On the other hand, if we meet with -savages destitute of all metaphysics, or of all religion (and there are -such); it does not occur to us to deny them Reason on that account. -The Reason that =proves= its pretended supersensuous knowledge -was duly brought back to bounds by Kant's critique; but Jacobi's -wonderful Reason, that directly =comprehends= the supersensuous, -he must indeed have thought =beneath= all criticism. Meanwhile, a -certain imperious and oracular Reason of the same kind is still, at the -Universities, fastened on the shoulders of our innocent youth. - -NOTE. - -If we wish to reach the real origin of this hypothesis of Practical -Reason, we must trace its descent a little further back. We shall find -that it is derived from a doctrine, which Kant totally confuted, -but which nevertheless, in this connection, lies secretly (indeed -he himself is not aware of it) at the root of his assumption of a -Practical Reason with its Imperatives and its Autonomy--a reminiscence -of a former mode of thought. I mean the so-called Rational Psychology, -according to which man is composed of two entirely heterogeneous -substances--the material body, and the immaterial soul. Plato was -the first to formulate this dogma, and he endeavoured to prove it -as an objective truth. But it was Descartes who, by working it out -with scientific exactness, perfectly developed and completed it. And -this is just what brought its fallacy to light, as demonstrated by -Spinoza, Locke, and Kant successively. It was demonstrated by Spinoza; -because his philosophy consists chiefly in the refutation of his -master's twofold dualism, and because he entirely and expressly denied -the two Substances of Descartes, and took as his main principle the -following proposition: "_Substantia cogitans et substantia externa -una eademque est substantia, quae jam sub hoc, jam sub illo attribute -comprehenditur._"[19] It was demonstrated by Locke; for he combated -the theory of innate ideas, derived all knowledge from the sensuous, -and taught that it is not impossible that Matter should think. And -lastly, it was demonstrated by Kant, in his _Kritik der Rationalen -Psychologie_, as given in the first edition. Leibnitz and Wolff were -the champions on the bad side; and this brought Leibnitz the undeserved -honour of being compared to the great Plato, who was really so unlike -him. - -But to enter into details here would be out of place. According to -this Rational Psychology, the soul was originally and in its essence -a =perceiving= substance, and only as a consequence thereof did -it become possessed of volition. According as it carried on these two -modes of its activity, Perception and Volition, conjoined with the -body, or incorporeal, and entirely _per se_, so it was endowed with a -lower or higher faculty of perception, and of volition in like kind. -In its higher faculty the immaterial soul was active solely by itself, -and without co-operation of the body. In this case it was _intellectus -purus_, being composed of concepts, belonging exclusively to itself, -and of the corresponding acts of will, both of which were absolutely -spiritual, and had nothing sensuous about them--the sensuous being -derived from the body.[20] So that it perceived nothing else but pure -Abstracts, Universals, innate conceptions, _aeternae veritates_, -etc.; wherefore also its volition was entirely controlled by purely -spiritual ideas like these. On the other hand, the soul's =lower= -faculty of Perception and Volition was the result of its working in -concert and close union with the various organs of the body, whereby a -prejudicial effect was produced on its an mixed spiritual activity. -Here, _i.e._, to this =lower= faculty, was supposed to belong -every =intuitive= perception, which consequently would have -to be obscure and confused, while the =abstract=, formed by -separating from objects their qualities, would be clear! The will, -which was determined by preceptions thus sensuously conditioned, formed -the lower Volition, and it was for the most part bad; for its acts -were guided by the impulse of the senses; while the other will (the -higher) was untrammelled, was guided by Pure Reason, and appertained -only to the immaterial soul. This doctrine of the Cartesians has been -best expounded by De la Forge, in his _Tractatus de Mente Humana_, -where in chap. 23 we read:[21] _Non nisi eadem voluntas est, quae -appellatur appetitus sensitivus, quando excitatur per judicia, quae -formantur consequenter ad perceptiones sensuum; et quae appetitus -rationalis nominatur, cum mens judicia format de propriis suis ideis, -independenter a cogitationibus sensuum confusis, quae inclinationum -ejus sunt causae.... Id, quod occasionem dedit, ut duae istae diversae -voluntatis propensiones pro duobus diversis appetitibus sumerentur, -est, quod saepissime unus alteri opponatur, quia propositum, quod mens -superaedificat propriis suis perceptionibus, non semper consentit cum -cogitationibus, quae menti a corporis dispositione suggeruntur, per -quam saepe obligatur ad aliquid volendum, dum ratio ejus earn aliud -optare facit._ - -Out of the dim reminiscence of such views there finally arose Kant's -doctrine of the Autonomy of the Will, which, as the mouth-piece of -Pure, Practical Reason, lays down the law for all rational beings as -such, and recognises nothing but =formal= motives, as opposed -to =material=; the latter determining only the lower faculty of -desires, to which the higher is hostile. For the rest, this whole -theory, which was not really systematically set forth till the time -of Descartes, is nevertheless to be found as far back as Aristotle. -In his _De Anima_ I. 1, it is sufficiently clearly stated; while -Plato in the _Phaedo_ (pp. 188 and 189, edit. Bipont.) had already -paved the way, with no uncertain hints. After being elaborated to -great perfection by the Cartesian doctrine, we find it a hundred -years later waxed bold and strong, and occupying the foremost place; -but precisely for this reason forced to reveal its true nature. An -excellent _résumé_ of the view which then prevailed is presented in -Muratori's _Della Forza della Fantasia,_ chaps. 1-4 and 13. In this -work the imagination is regarded as a purely material, corporeal organ -of the brain (the lower faculty of perception), its function being to -intuitively apprehend the external world on the data of the senses; -and nought remains for the immaterial soul but thinking, reflecting, -and determining. It must have been felt how obviously this position -involves the whole subject in doubt. For if Matter is capable of the -intuitive apprehension of the world in all its complexity, it is -inconceivable that it should not also be capable of abstracting this -intuition; wherefrom everything else would follow. Abstraction is of -course nothing else than an elimination of the qualities attaching to -things which are not necessary for general purposes, in other words, -the individual and special differences. For instance, if I disregard, -or abstract, that which is peculiar to the sheep, ox, stag, camel, -etc., I reach the conception of ruminants. By this operation the ideas -lose their intuitiveness, and as merely abstract, non-intuitive notions -or concepts, they require words to fix them in the consciousness, and -allow of their being adequately handled. All this shows that Kant -was still under the influence of the after-effect of that old-time -doctrine, when he propounded his Practical Reason with its Imperatives. - - -[1] These epigrams form the close of Schiller's poem "Die Philosophen," -which is worth reading in this connection--(_Translator_.) - -[2] More correctly, Huitzilopochtli: a Mexican deity. - -[3] Or "shall," as in the "thou shall," of the Decalogue ---(_Translator_.) - -[4] "_Des Pudels Kern_"; _V._ Goethe's _Faust_, Part I. _Studirzimmer._ -Schopenhauer means that his analysis has forced the real meaning -out of Kant's language, just as Faust by his exorcism compels -Mephistopheles, who was in the form of a poodle, to resume his true -form.--(_Translator_.) - -[5] _ὅ,τι_: _i.e._, the "what" a thing is; its principle, or -essence.--(_Translator_.) - -[6] _διότι_: _i.e._, the "wherefore" of a thing; its _raison d'être,_ -its underlying cause.--(_Translator_.) - -[7] Schopenhauer was doubtless thinking of the famous myth in -Plato's _Symposium_ Chap. 23 (Teubner's edition, Leipzig, 1875), -where Eros is represented as the offspring of _Πόρος_ and _Πενία_, -who on the birthday of Aphrodite were united in the garden of -Zeus.--(_Translator._) - -[8] Hugo Grotius attributes it to the Emperor Severus. - -[9] Azote=Nitrogen. The formula for Ammonium Chloride or Sal-ammoniac -is NH4Cl.--(_Translator_). - -[10] To be found in the fifth number of the _Beiträge zur Uebersicht -der Philosophie am Anfange des_ 19. _Jahrhunderts_--a journal of the -greatest importance for critical philosophy. - -[11] "_Einen erklecklichen_ SATZ, _ja, und der auch was_ SETZT." -SCHILLER. - -[12] To argue from impossibility to non-existence is valid--_i.e._ -the impossibility of a thing makes its non-existence a safe -conclusion.--(_Translator._) - -[13] - -_Dacht' ich's doch! Wissen sie nichts Vernünftiges mehr_ - _zu erwidern,_ -_Schieben sie's Einem geschwind in das Gewissen hinein_. - --SCHILLER, _Die Philosophen._ - -_Just as I thought! Can they give no more any answer of reason,_ -_Quickly the ground is changed: Conscience, they say, is at fault._ - --(_Translator._) - - -[14] As from the Pythian tripod: _i.e._,--with official authority, _ex -cathedra._ - -[15] _V_. Aristoph., _Aves_, 819 _et alibi_.--(_Translator_.) - -[16] _λόγιμος_ means "remarkable," being never used in the sense of -"rational." _Tὸ logikὸn_ is perhaps a possible expression; the right -word is _λόγος_.--(_Translator_.) - -[17] The three Ideas are: (1) The Psychological; (2) The Cosmological; -(3) The Theological. _V_. The Paralogisms of Pure Reasons, in the -Dialectics: _Kritik der Reinen Vernunft,_ Part I.--(_Translator_.) - -[18] An example easy to be imitated in its faults. _V_. Horace, _Ep._ -Lib. I., xix. 17.--(_Translator_.) - -[19] The thinking substance, and substance in extension are one and the -self-same substance, which is contained now under the latter attribute -(_i.e._, extension), now under the former (_i.e._, the attribute of -thinking).--_Ethica_, Part II., Prop. 7. Corollary. - -[20] _Intellectio pura est intellectio, quae circa nullas imagines -corporeas versatur_. (Pure intelligence is intelligence that has -nothing to do with any bodily forms.)--Cart., _Medit_., p. 188. - -[21] It is nothing but one and the same will, which at one time is -called sensuous desire, when it is stimulated by acts of judgment, -formed in consequence of perceptions of the senses; and which at -another time is called rational desire (_i.e._ desire of the reason), -when the mind forms acts of judgment about its own proper ideas, -independently of the thoughts belonging to, and mixed up with, the -senses; which thoughts are the causes of the mind's tendencies.... -That these two diverse propensities of the will should be regarded as -two distinct desires is occasioned by the fact that very often the -one is opposed to the other, because the intention, which is built -up by the mind on the foundation of its own proper perceptions, does -not always agree with the thoughts which are suggested to the mind by -the body's disposition; whereby it (the mind) is often constrained -to will something, while its reason makes it choose something -different.--(_Translator_.) - - - - -CHAPTER V. - -ON THE LEADING PRINCIPLE OF THE KANTIAN ETHICS. - - -After having tested in the preceding chapter the actual basis of Kant's -Ethics, I now turn to that which rests on it--his =leading principle -of Morals=. The latter is very closely connected with the former; -indeed, in a certain sense, they both grew up together. We have seen -that the formula expressing the principle reads as follows: "Act only -in accordance with that precept which you can also wish should be a -general law for all rational beings." It is a strange proceeding for a -man, who _ex hypothesi_ is seeking a law to determine what he should -do, and what he should leave undone, to be instructed first to search -for one fit to regulate the conduct of all possible rational beings; -but we will pass over that. It is sufficient only to notice the fact -that in the above guiding rule, as put forth by Kant, we have obviously -not reached the moral law itself, but only a finger-post, or indication -where it is to be looked for. The money, so to say, is not yet paid -down, but we hold a safe draft for it. And who, then, is the cashier? -To say the truth at once: a paymaster in this connection surely very -unexpected, being neither more nor less than =Egoism=, as I shall -now demonstrate. - -The precept, it is said, which =I can wish= were the guide of all -men's conduct, is itself the real moral principle. That which =I can -wish= is the hinge on which the given direction turns. But what can -I truly wish, and what not? Clearly, in order to determine what I can -wish in the matter under discussion, I require yet another criterion; -for without such I could never find the key to the instruction which -comes to me like a sealed order. Where, then, is this criterion to -be discovered? Certainly nowhere else but in my Egoism, which is the -nearest, ever ready, original, and living standard of all volition, and -which has at any rate the _jus primi occupantis_ before every moral -principle. The direction for finding the real moral law, which is -contained in the Kantian rule, rests, as a matter of fact, on the tacit -assumption that I can only wish for that which is most to my advantage. -Now because, in framing a precept to be generally followed, I cannot -regard myself as always active, but must contemplate my playing a -=passive= part _eventualiter_ and at times; therefore from this -point of view my =egoism= decides for justice and loving-kindness; -not from any wish to =practise= these virtues, but because it -desires to =experience= them. We are reminded of the miser, who, -after listening to a sermon on beneficence, exclaims: - - "_Wie gründlich ausgeführt, wie schön!_-- - _Fast möcht' ich betteln gehn."_ - (How well thought out, how excellent!-- - Almost I'd like to beg.) - -This is the indispensable key to the direction in which Kant's leading -principle of Ethics is embedded; nor can he help supplying it -himself. Only he refrains from doing so at the moment of propounding -his precept, lest we should feel shocked. It is found further on in -the text, at a decent distance, so as to prevent the fact at once -leaping to light, that here, after all, in spite of his grand _a -priori_ edifice, =Egoism= is sitting on the judge's seat, scales -in hand. Moreover, it does not occur, till after he has decided, -from the point of view of the _eventualiter_ passive side, that this -position holds good for the active _rôle_ as well. Thus, on p. 19 (R., -p. 24) we read: "That I could not =wish= for a general law to -establish lying, because people would no longer believe me, or else -pay me back in the =same coin=." Again on p. 55 (R., p. 49): "The -universality of a law to the effect that every one could promise what -he likes, without any intention of keeping his word, would make the -promise itself, together with the object in view, whatever that might -be, impossible; for no one would =believe= it." On p. 56 (R., p. -50), in connection with the maxim of =hard-heartedness=, we find -the following: "A will, which should determine this, would contradict -itself; for cases can occur, in which a man needs the love and sympathy -of others, and in which he, by virtue of such a natural law, evolved -from his own will, would deprive himself of all hope of the help, -which he desires." Similarly in the _Kritik der Praktischen Vernunft_ -(Part I., vol. i., chap. 2, p. 123; R., p. 192): "If every one were to -regard others' distress with total indifference, and you were to belong -to such an order of things; would you be there with the concurrence -of your will?" _Quam temere in nosmet legem sancimus iniquam_![1] -one could reply. These passages sufficiently show in what sense the -phrase, "to be able to wish," in Kant's formula is to be understood. -But it is in the _Metaphysische Anfangsgründe der Tugendlehre_, that -this real nature of his ethical principle is most clearly stated. In -§ 30 we read: "For every one wishes to be helped. If, however, a man -were to give utterance to his rule of unwillingness to help others, -all people would be justified in refusing him assistance. Thus this -rule of selfishness contradicts itself." =Would be justified=, -he says, =would be justified=! Here, then, it is declared, as -explicitly as anything can be, that moral obligation rests solely and -entirely on presupposed =reciprocity=; consequently it is utterly -selfish, and only admits of being interpreted by egoism, which, under -the condition of =reciprocity=, knows how to make a compromise -cleverly enough. Such a course would be quite in place if it were a -question of laying down the fundamentals of state-organisation, but -not, when we come to construct those of ethics. In the _Grundlegung_, -p. 81 (R., p. 67), the following sentence occurs: "The principle of -always acting in accordance with that precept which you can also wish -were universally established as law--this is the only condition under -which a man's will can never be in antagonism with itself." From what -has been said above, it will be apparent that the true meaning of the -word "antagonism" may be thus explained: if a man should sanction the -precept of injustice and hard-heartedness, he would subsequently, in -the event of his playing a =passive= part, recall it, and so his -will would =contradict= itself. - -From this analysis it is abundantly clear that Kant's famous leading -principle is not--as he maintains with tireless repetition--a -=categorical=, but in reality a =hypothetical= Imperative; -because it tacitly presupposes the condition that the law to be -established for what I do--inasmuch as I make it universal--shall -also be a law for what is done to me; and because I, under this -condition, as the _eventualiter_ non-active party, =cannot= -possibly =wish= for injustice and hard-heartedness. But if I -strike out this proviso, and, trusting perhaps to my surpassing -strength of mind and body, think of myself as always =active=, -and never =passive=; then, in choosing the precept which is to -be universally valid, if there exists no basis for ethics other than -Kant's, I can perfectly well wish that injustice and hard-heartedness -should be the general rule, and consequently order the world - - Upon the simple plan, - That they should take, who have the power, - And they should keep, who can. - --(WORDSWORTH.) - -In the foregoing chapter we showed that the Kantian leading principle -of Ethics is devoid of all real foundation. It is now clear that to -this singular defect must be added, notwithstanding Kant's express -assertion to the contrary, its concealed hypothetical nature, whereby -its basis turns out to be nothing else than Egoism, the latter being -the secret interpreter of the direction which it contains. Furthermore, -regarding it solely as a formula, we find that it is only a -periphrasis, an obscure and disguised mode of expressing the well-known -rule: _Quod tibi fieri non vis, alteri ne feceris_ (do not to another -what you are unwilling should be done to yourself); if, that is, by -omitting the _non_ and _ne_, we remove the limitation, and include the -duties taught by love as well as those prescribed by law. For it is -obvious that this is the only precept which I can wish should regulate -the conduct of all men (speaking, of course, from the point of view of -the possibly =passive part= I may play, where my =Egoism= -is touched). This rule, _Quod tibi fieri, etc._, is, however, in its -turn, merely a circumlocution for, or, if it be preferred, a premise -of, the proposition which I have laid down as the simplest and purest -definition of the conduct required by the common consent of all ethical -systems; namely, _Neminem laede, immo omnes, quantum potes, juva_ (do -harm to no one; but rather help all people, as far as lies in your -power). The true and real substance of Morals is this, and never can -be anything else. But on what is it based? What is it that lends force -to this command? This is the old and difficult problem with which man -is still to-day confronted. For, on the other side, we hear Egoism -crying with a loud voice: _Neminem juva, immo omnes, si forte conducit, -laede_ (help nobody, but rather injure all people, if it brings you any -advantage); nay more, Malice gives us the variant: _Immo omnes, quantum -potes, laede_ (but rather injure all people as far as you can). To -bring into the lists a combatant equal, or rather superior to Egoism -and Malice combined--this is the task of all Ethics. _Heic Rhodus, heic -salta!_[2] - -The division of human duty into two classes has long been recognised, -and no doubt owes its origin to the nature of morality itself. We -have. (1) the duties ordained by law (otherwise called the--perfect, -obligatory, narrower duties), and (2) those prescribed by virtue -(otherwise called imperfect, wider, meritorious, or, preferably, the -duties taught by love). On p. 57 (R., p. 60) we find Kant desiring -to give a further confirmation to the moral principle, which he -propounded, by undertaking to derive this classification from it. But -the attempt turns out to be so forced, and so obviously bad, that -it only testifies in the strongest way against the soundness of his -position. For, according to him, the duties laid down by statutes rest -on a precept, the contrary of which, taken as a general natural law, is -declared to be quite =unthinkable= without contradiction; while -the duties inculcated by virtue are made to depend on a maxim, the -opposite of which can (he says) be conceived as a general natural law, -but cannot possibly be wished for. I beg the reader to reflect that the -rule of injustice, the reign of might instead of right, which in the -Kantian view is not even thinkable as a natural law, is in reality, -and in point of fact, the dominant order of things not only in the -animal kingdom, but among men as well. It is true that an attempt has -been made among civilised peoples to obviate its injurious effects by -means of all the machinery of state government; but as soon as this, -wherever, or of whatever kind, it be, is suspended or eluded, the -natural law immediately resumes its sway. Indeed between nation and -nation it never ceases to prevail; the customary jargon about justice -is well known to be nothing but diplomacy's official style; the real -arbiter is brute force. On the other hand, genuine, _i.e._, voluntary, -acts of justice, do occur beyond all doubt, but always only as -exceptions to the rule. Furthermore: wishing to give instances by way -of introducing the above-mentioned classification, Kant establishes the -duties prescribed by law first (p. 53; R., p. 48) through the so-called -duty towards oneself,--the duty of not ending one's life voluntarily, -if the pain outweigh the pleasure. Accordingly, the rule of suicide is -held to be not even =thinkable= as a general natural law. I, on -the contrary, maintain that, since here there can be no intervention -of state control, it is exactly this rule which is proved to be an -actually existing, unchecked natural law. For it is absolutely certain -(as daily experience attests) that men in the vast majority of cases -turn to self-destruction directly the gigantic strength of the innate -instinct of self-preservation is distinctly overpowered by great -suffering. To suppose that there is any thought whatever that can have -a deferring effect, after the fear of death, which is so strong and -so closely bound up with the nature of every living thing, has shown -itself powerless; in other words, to suppose that there is a thought -still mightier than this fear--is a daring assumption, all the more so, -when we see, that it is one which is so difficult to discover that the -moralists are not yet able to determine it with precision. In any case, -it is certain that arguments against suicide of the sort put forward -by Kant in this connection (p. 53: R., p. 48, and p. 67; R., p. 57) -have never hitherto restrained any one tired of life even for a moment. -Thus a natural law, which incontestably exists, and is operative every -day, is declared by Kant to be simply =unthinkable= without -contradiction, and all for the sake of making his Moral Principle the -basis of the classification of duties! At this point it is, I confess, -not without satisfaction that I look forward to the groundwork which I -shall give to Ethics in the sequel. From it the division of Duty into -what is prescribed by law, and what is taught by love, or, better, -into justice and loving-kindness, results quite naturally though a -principle of separation which arises from the nature of the subject, -and which entirely of itself draws a sharp line of demarkation; so that -the foundation of Morals, which I shall present, has in fact ready to -hand that confirmation, to which Kant, with a view to support his own -position, lays a completely groundless claim. - - -[1] How rashly do we sanction an unjust law, which will come home to -ourselves!--(Hor., _Sat_., Lib. I., iii. 67.) - -[2] "Here is Rhodes, here make your leap!" _I.e._, "Here is the place -of trial, here let us see what you can do!" This Latin proverb is -derived from one of Aesop's fables. A braggart boasts of having once -accomplished a wonderful jump in Rhodes, and appeals to the evidence -of the eye-witnesses. The bystanders then exclaim: "Friend, if this -be true, you have no need of witnesses; for this is Rhodes, and your -leap you can make here." The words are: _ἀλλ', ὦ ϕίλε, εἰ τοῡtο ἀληθές -ἐστιν, oὐδὲν δεῑ σοι μαρτύρων αὕtη γὰρ 'Rόδος καὶ πήδημα_. _V._ -_Fabulae Aesopicae Collectae_. Edit. Halm, Leipzig: Teubner. 1875. Nr. -203b, p. 102. The other version of the fable (Nr. 203, p. 101) gives: -_ὦ oὗtos, eἰ ἀlêthès τoῡτ ἐstin, oὐdὲn deῑ soi martyrôn ἰdoὺ ἡ Ρόδος, -ἰdoὺ kaὶ τὸ πήδημα._--(_Translator_.) - - - - -CHAPTER VI. - -ON THE DERIVED FORMS OF THE LEADING PRINCIPLE OF THE KANTIAN ETHICS. - - -It is well known that Kant put the leading principle of his Ethics -into another quite different shape, in which it is expressed directly; -the first being indirect, indeed nothing more than an indication as -to how the principle is to be sought for. Beginning at p. 63 (R., -p. 55), he prepares the way for his second formula by means of very -strange, ambiguous, not to say distorted,[1] definitions of the -conceptions =End= and =Means=, which may be much more simply -and correctly denoted thus: an =End= is the direct motive of an -act of the Will, a =Means= the indirect: _simplex sigillum veri_ -(simplicity is the seal of truth). Kant, however, slips through his -wonderful enunciations to the statement: "=Man=, indeed every -rational being, exists =as an end in himself=." On this I must -remark that "to exist as an end in oneself==" is an unthinkable -expression, a _contradictio in adjecto_.[2] To be an end means to -be an object of volition. Every end can only exist in relation to a -will, whose end, _i.e._, (as above stated), whose direct motive it is. -Only thus can the idea, "end" have any sense, which is lost as soon as -such connection is broken. But this relation, which is essential to -the thing, necessarily excludes every "in itself." "End in oneself" -is exactly like saying: "Friend in oneself;--enemy in oneself;--uncle -in oneself;--north or east in itself;--above or below in itself;" -and so on. At bottom the "end in itself" is in the same case as the -"absolute ought"; the same thought--the theological--secretly, indeed, -unconsciously lies at the root of each as its condition. Nor is the -"absolute worth," which is supposed to be attached to this alleged, -though unthinkable, "end in itself," at all better circumstanced. -It also must be characterised, without pity, as a _contradictio in -adjecto_. Every "worth" is a valuation by comparison, and its bearing -is necessarily twofold. First, it is =relative=, since it exists -for some one; and secondly, it is =comparative=, as being compared -with something else, and estimated accordingly. Severed from these two -conditions, the conception, "worth," loses all sense and meaning, and -so obviously, that further demonstration is needless. But more: just -as the phrases "end in itself" and "absolute worth" outrage logic, so -true morality is outraged by the statement on p. 65 (R., p. 56), that -irrational beings (that is, animals) are =things=, and should -therefore be treated simply as =means=, which are not at the same -time ends. In harmony with this, it is expressly declared in the -_Metaphysische Anfanggründe der Tugendlehre,_ § 16: "A man can have no -duties towards any being, except towards his fellow-men;" and then, § -17, we read: "To treat animals cruelly runs counter to the duty of man -=towards himself=; because it deadens the feeling of sympathy for -them in their sufferings, and thus weakens a natural tendency which -is very serviceable to morality in relation to =other men=." So -one is only to have compassion on animals for the sake of practice, -and they are as it were the pathological phantom on which to train -one's sympathy with men! In common with the whole of Asia that is not -tainted by Islâm (which is tantamount to Judaism), I regard such tenets -as odious and revolting. Here, once again, we see withal how entirely -this philosophical morality, which is, as explained above, only a -theological one in disguise, depends in reality on the biblical Ethics. -Thus, because Christian morals leave animals out of consideration -(of which more later on); therefore in philosophical morals they -are of course at once outlawed; they are merely "things," simply -=means= to ends of any sort; and so they are good for vivisection, -for deer-stalking, bull-fights, horse-races, etc., and they may be -whipped to death as they struggle along with heavy quarry carts. -Shame on such a morality which is worthy of Pariahs, Chandalas and -Mlechchas[3]; which fails to recognise the Eternal Reality immanent -in everything that has life, and shining forth with inscrutable -significance from all eyes that see the sun! This is a morality which -knows and values only the precious species that gave it birth; whose -characteristic--=reason=--it makes the condition under which a -being may be an object of moral regard. - -By this rough path, then,--indeed, _per fas et nefas_ (by fair means -and by foul), Kant reaches the second form in which he expresses the -fundamental principle of his Ethics: "Act in such a way that you at -all times treat mankind, as much in your own person, as in the person -of every one else, not only as a Means, but also as an End." Such a -statement is a very artificial and roundabout way of saying: "Do not -consider yourself alone, but others also;" this in turn is a paraphrase -for: _Quod tibi fieri non vis, alteri ne feceris_ (do not to another -what you are unwilling should be done to yourself); and the latter, -as I have said, contains nothing but the premises to the conclusion, -which is the true and final goal of all morals and of all moralising; -_Neminem laede, immo omnes, quantum potes juva_ (do harm to no one; -but rather help all people as far as lies in your power). Like all -beautiful things, this proposition looks best unveiled. Be it only -observed that the alleged duties towards oneself are dragged into this -second Kantian edict intentionally and not without difficulty. Some -place of course had to be found for them.[4] - -Another objection that could be raised against the formula is that the -malefactor condemned to be executed is treated merely as an instrument, -and not as an end, and this with perfectly good reason; for he is -the indispensable means of upholding the terror of the law by its -fulfilment, and of thus accomplishing the law's end--the repression of -crime. - -But if this second definition helps nothing towards laying a foundation -for Ethics, if it cannot even pass muster as its leading principle, -that is, as an adequate and direct summary of ethical precepts; it -has nevertheless the merit of containing a fine _aperçu_ of moral -psychology, for it marks =egoism= by an exceedingly characteristic -token, which is quite worth while being here more closely considered. -This =egoism=, then, of which each of us is full, and to conceal -which, as our _partie honteuse_, we have invented =politeness=, -is perpetually peering through every veil cast over it, and may -especially be detected in the fact that our dealings with all those, -who come across our path, are directed by the one object of trying -to find, before everything else, and as if by instinct, a possible -=means= to any of the numerous =ends= with which we are -always engrossed. When we make a new acquaintance, our first thought, -as a rule, is whether the man can be useful to us in some way. If he -can do =nothing= for our benefit, then as soon as we are convinced -of this, he himself generally becomes nothing to us. To seek in all -other people a possible means to our ends, in other words, to make -them our instruments, is almost part of the very nature of human -eyes; and whether the instrument will have to suffer more or less -in the using, is a thought which comes much later, sometimes not at -all. That we assume others to be similarly disposed is shown in many -ways; _e.g._, by the fact that, when we ask any one for information -or advice, we lose all confidence in his words directly we discover -that he may have some =interest= in the matter, however small or -remote. For then we immediately take for granted that he will make us -a means to his ends, and hence give his advice not in accordance with -his =discernment=, but with his =desire=, and this, no matter -how exact the former may be, or how little the latter seem involved; -since we know only too well that a cubic inch of desire weighs much -more than a cubic yard of discernment. Conversely, when we ask in such -cases: "What ought I to do?" as a rule, nothing else will occur to our -counsellor, but how we should shape our action to suit his own ends; -and to this effect he will give his reply immediately, and as it were -mechanically, without so much as bestowing a thought on our ends; -because it is his Will that directly dictates the answer, or ever the -question can come before the bar of his real judgment. Hence he tries -to mould our conduct to his own benefit, without even being conscious -of it, and while he supposes that he is speaking out of the abundance -of his discernment, in reality he is nothing but the mouth-piece of -his own desire; indeed, such self-deception may lead him so far as to -utter lies, without being aware of it. So greatly does the influence of -the Will preponderate that of the Intelligence. Consequently, it is not -the testimony of our own consciousness, but rather, for the most part, -that of our interest, which avails to determine whether our language be -in accordance with what we discern, or what we desire. To take another -case. Let us suppose that a man pursued by enemies and in danger of -life, meets a pedlar and inquires for some by-way of escape; it may -happen that the latter will answer him by the question: "Do you need -any of my wares?" It is not of course meant that matters are always -like this. On the contrary, many a man is found to show a direct and -real participation in another's weal and woe, or (in Kant's language) -to regard him as an end and not as a means. How far it seems natural, -or the reverse, to each one to treat his neighbour for once in the way -as an end, instead of (as usual) a means,--this is the criterion of the -great ethical difference existing between character and character; and -that on which the mental attitude of sympathy rests in the last resort -will be the true basis of Ethics, and will form the subject of the -third part of this Essay. - -Thus, in his second formula, Kant distinguishes Egoism and its opposite -by a very characteristic trait; and this point of merit I have all the -more gladly brought out into strong light and illustrated, because in -other respects there is little in the groundwork of his Ethics that I -can admit. - -The third and last form in which Kant put forward his Moral Principle -is the =Autonomy= of the Will: "The Will of every rational -being is universally legislative for all rational beings." This of -course follows from the first form. As a consequence of the third, -however, we are asked to believe (see p. 71; R., p. 60) that the -specific characteristic of the Categorical Imperative lies in the -=renunciation of all interest= by the Will when acting from a -sense of duty. All previous moral principles had thus (he says) broken -down, "because the latter invariably attributed to human actions at -bottom a certain interest, whether originating in compulsion, or -in pleasurable attraction--an interest which might be one's own, -or another's" (p. 73; R., p. 62). (=Another's=: let this be -particularly noticed.) "Whereas a universally legislative Will must -prescribe actions which are =not= based on any =interest= at -all, but solely on a feeling of duty." I beg the reader to think what -this really means. As a matter of fact, nothing less than volition -without motive, in other words, effect without cause. Interest and -Motive are interchangeable ideas; what is interest but _quod mea -interest_, that which is of importance to me? And is not this, in one -word, whatever stirs and sets in motion my Will? Consequently, what is -an interest other than the working of a motive upon the Will? Therefore -where a motive moves the Will, there the latter has an interest; but -where the Will is affected by no motive, there in truth it can be as -little active, as a stone is able to leave its place without being -pushed or pulled. No educated person will require any demonstration of -this. It follows that every action, inasmuch as it necessarily must -have a motive, necessarily also presupposes an interest. Kant, however, -propounds a second entirely new class of actions which are performed -without any interest, _i.e._, without motive. And these actions -are--all deeds of justice and loving-kindness! It will be seen that -this monstrous assumption, to be refuted, needed only to be reduced to -its real meaning, which was concealed through the word "interest" being -trifled with. Meanwhile Kant celebrates (p. 74 sqq.; R., p. 62) the -triumph of his Autonomy of the Will by setting up a moral Utopia called -the Kingdom of Ends, which is peopled with nothing but =rational -beings= _in abstracto_. These, one and all, are always willing, -without willing any actual =thing= (_i.e._, without interest): -the only thing that they will is that they may all perpetually will in -accordance with one maxim (_i.e._, Autonomy). _Difficile est satiram -non scribere_[5] (it is difficult to refrain from writing a satire). - -But there is something else to which Kant is led by his autonomy of -the will; and it involves more serious consequences than the little -innocent Kingdom of Ends, which is perfectly harmless and may be left -in peace. I mean the conception of =human dignity=. Now this -"dignity" is made to rest solely on man's autonomy, and to lie in the -fact that the law which he ought to obey is his own work, his relation -to it thus being the same as that of the subjects of a constitutional -government to their statutes. As an ornamental finish to the Kantian -system of morals such a theory might after all be passed over. Only -this expression "=Human Dignity=," once it was uttered by Kant, -became the shibboleth of all perplexed and empty-headed moralists. For -behind that imposing formula they concealed their lack, not to say, -of a real ethical basis, but of any basis at all which was possessed -of an intelligible meaning; supposing cleverly enough that their -readers would be so pleased to see themselves invested with such a -"dignity" that they would be quite satisfied.[6] Let us, however, -look at this conception a little more carefully, and submit it to -the test of reality. Kant (p. 79; R., p. 66) defines =dignity= -as "an unconditioned, incomparable value." This is an explanation -which makes such an effect by its magnificent sound that one does -not readily summon up courage to examine it at close quarters; else -we should find that it too is nothing but a hollow hyperbole, within -which there lurks like a gnawing worm, the _contradictio in adjecto_. -Every value is the estimation of one thing compared with another; it -is thus a conception of comparison, and consequently relative; and -this relativity is precisely that which forms the essence of the idea. -According to Diogenes Laertius (Book VII., chap. 106),[7] this was -already correctly taught by the Stoics. He says: _τὴn δὲ ἀξίαν εἶναι -ἀμοιβὴν δοκιμάστου, ἢν ἂν ὁ ἔμπειρος τῶν Πραγμάτων τάξῃ ὅμοιον εἐπεῑν, -ἀμείβεσθαι πυροὺς πρὸς τὰς σὺν ἡμιονô κριθάς._[8] An =incomparable, -unconditioned, absolute value=, such as "dignity" is declared by -Kant to be, is thus, like so much else in Philosophy, the statement in -words of a thought which is really unthinkable; just as much as "the -highest number," or "the greatest space." - - "_Doch eben wo Begriffe fehlen_, - _Da stellt ein WORT zu rechter Zeit sich ein._" - (But where conceptions fail, - Just there a WORD comes in to fill the blank.) - -So it was with this expression, "=Human Dignity=." A most -acceptable phrase was brought into currency. Thereon every system of -Morals, that was spun out through all classes of duty, and all forms of -casuistry, found a broad basis; from which serene elevation it could -comfortably go on preaching. - -At the end of his exposition (p. 124; E., p. 97), Kant says: "But how -it is that =Pure Reason= without other motives, that may have -their derivation elsewhere, can by itself be =practical=; that is, -how, without there being any object for the Will to take an antecedent -interest in, the simple principle of the universal validity of all the -precepts of Pure Reason, as laws, can of itself provide a motive and -bring about an interest which may be called purely moral; or, in other -words, how it is that Pure Reason can be practical;--to explain this -problem, all human reason is inadequate, and all trouble and work spent -on it are vain." Now it should be remembered that, if any one asserts -the existence of a thing which cannot even be conceived as possible, it -is incumbent on him to prove that it is an actual reality; whereas the -Categorical Imperative of Practical Reason is expressly not put forward -as a fact of consciousness, nor otherwise founded on experience. Rather -are we frequently cautioned not to attempt to explain it by having -recourse to empirical anthropology. (Cf. _e.g._, p. vi. of the preface; -R., p. 5; and pp. 59, 60; R., p. 52). Moreover, we are repeatedly -(_e.g._, p. 48; R., p. 44) assured "that no instance can show, and -consequently there can be no empirical proof, that an Imperative of -this sort exists everywhere." And further, on p. 49 (R., p. 45), we -read, "that the reality of the Categorical Imperative is not a fact of -experience." Now if we put all this together, we can hardly avoid the -suspicion that Kant is jesting at his readers' expense. But although -this practice may be allowed by the present philosophical public of -Germany, and seem good in their eyes, yet in Kant's time it was not so -much in vogue; and besides, Ethics, then, as always, was precisely the -subject that least of all could lend itself to jokes. Hence we must -continue to hold the conviction that what can neither be conceived as -possible, nor proved as actual, is destitute of all credentials to -attest its existence. And if, by a strong effort of the imagination, -we try to picture to ourselves a man, possessed, as it were, by a -_daemon_, in the form of an =absolute Ought=, that speaks only in -Categorical Imperatives, and, confronting his wishes and inclinations, -claims to be the perpetual controller of his actions; in this figure -we see no true portrait of human nature, or of our inner life; what we -=do= discern is an artificial substitute for theological Morals, -to which it stands in the same relation as a wooden leg to a living one. - -Our conclusion, therefore, is, that the Kantian Ethics, like all -anterior systems, is devoid of any sure foundation. As I showed at -the outset, in my examination of its =imperative Form=, the -structure is at bottom nothing but an inversion of theological Morals, -cloaked in very abstract formulae of an apparently _a priori_ origin. -That this disguise was most artificial and unrecognisable is the more -certain, from the fact that Kant, in all good faith, was actually -himself deceived by it, and really believed that he could establish, -independently of all theology, and on the basis of pure intelligence _a -priori_, those conceptions of the Law and of the hests of Duty, which -obviously have no meaning except in =theological Ethics=; whereas -I have sufficiently proved that with him they are destitute of all real -foundation, and float loosely in mid air. However, the mask at length -falls away in his own workshop, and theological Ethics stands forth -unveiled, as witness his doctrine of the Highest Good, the Postulates -of Practical Reason; and lastly, his Moral Theology. But this -revelation freed neither Kant nor the public from their illusion as to -the real state of things; on the contrary, both he and they rejoiced to -see all those precepts, which hitherto had been sanctioned by Faith, -now ratified and established by Ethics (although only _idealiter_, and -for practical purposes). The truth is that they, in all sincerity, put -the effect for the cause, and the cause for the effect, inasmuch as -they failed to perceive that at the root of this system of Morals there -lay, as absolutely necessary assumptions, however tacit and concealed, -all the alleged consequences that had been drawn from it. - -At the end of this severe investigation, which must also have been -tiring to my readers, perhaps I may be allowed, by way of diversion, to -make a jesting, indeed frivolous comparison. I would liken Kant, in his -self-mystification, to a man who at a ball has been flirting the whole -evening with a masked beauty, in hopes of making a conquest; till at -last, throwing off her disguise, she reveals herself--as his wife. - - -[1] To keep the play of words in "_geschrobene," "verschrobene,"_ we -may perhaps render them: "twisted ... mistwisted."--(_Translator._) - -[2] A contradiction in that which is added. A term applied to two ideas -which cannot be brought into a thinkable relationship.--(_Translator._) - -[3] A Chaṇḍāla (or Ćaṇḍāla) means one who is born of a Brahman woman -by a Śūdra husband, such a union being an abomination. Hence it is a -term applied to a low common person. Mlechcha (or Mleććha) means a -foreigner; one who does not speak Sanskṛit, and is not subject to Hindu -institutions. The transition from a "a barbarian" to a bad or wicked -man, is easy.--(_Translator_.) - -[4] These so-called duties have been discussed in Chapter III. of this -Part. - -[5] Juvenal, _Sat_. I. 30. - -[6] It appears that G. W. Block in his _Neue Grundlegung der -Philosophie der Sitten_, 1802, was the first to make "Human Dignity" -expressly and exclusively the foundation-stone of Ethics, which he then -built up entirely on it. - -[7] _V_. Diogenes Laertius, _de Clarorum Philosophorum Vitis, etc._, -edit. O. Gabr. Cobet. Paris; Didot, 1862. In this edition the passage -quoted is in chap. 105 _ad fin.,_, p. 182.--(_Translator_.) - -[8] They teach that "worth" is the equivalent value of a thing -which has been tested, whatever an expert may fix that value to -be; as, for instance, to take wheat in exchange for barley and a -mule.--(_Translator._) - - - - -CHAPTER VII. - -KANT'S DOCTRINE OF CONSCIENCE. - - -The alleged Practical Reason with its Categorical Imperative, is -manifestly very closely connected with Conscience, although essentially -different from it in two respects. In the first place, the Categorical -Imperative, as commanding, necessarily speaks =before= the -act, whereas Conscience does not till afterwards. =Before= -the act Conscience can at best only speak =indirectly=, that -is, by means of reflection, which holds up to it the recollection -of previous cases, in which similar acts after they were committed -received its disapproval. It is on this that the etymology of the word -=Gewissen= (Conscience) appears to me to rest, because =only -what has already taken place is gewiss=[1] (certain). Undoubtedly, -through external inducement and kindled emotion, or by reason of the -internal discord of bad humour, impure, base thoughts, and evil desires -rise up in all people, even in the best. But for these a man is not -morally responsible, and need not load his conscience with them; -since they only show what the genus _homo,_ not what the individual, -who thinks them, would be capable of doing. Other motives, if not -simultaneously, yet almost immediately, come into his consciousness, -and confronting the unworthy inclinations prevent them from ever being -crystallised into deeds; thus causing them to resemble the out-voted -minority of an acting committee. By deeds alone each person gains an -empirical knowledge no less of himself than of others, just as it is -deeds alone that burden the conscience. For, unlike thoughts, these are -not problematic; on the contrary, they are certain (_gewiss_), they are -unchangeable, and are not only thought, but =known= (_gewusst_). -The Latin _conscientia_,[2] and the Greek _συνείδησις_[3] have the same -sense. Conscience is thus the =knowledge= that a man has about -what he has done. - -The second point of difference between the alleged Categorical -Imperative and Conscience is, that the latter always draws its -material from experience; which the former cannot do, since it is -purely _a priori_. Nevertheless, we may reasonably suppose that Kant's -Doctrine of Conscience will throw some light on this new conception -of an =absolute Ought= which he introduced. His theory is -most completely set forth in the _Metaphysische Anfangsgründe zur -Tugendlehre_, § 13, and in the following criticism I shall assume that -the few pages which contain it are lying before the reader. - -The Kantian interpretation of Conscience makes an exceedingly imposing -effect, before which one used to stand with reverential awe, and -all the less confidence was felt in demurring to it, because there -lay heavy on the mind the ever-present fear of having theoretical -objections construed as practical, and, if the correctness of Kant's -view were denied, of being regarded as devoid of conscience. I, -however, cannot be led astray in this manner, since the question -here is of theory, not of practice; and I am not concerned with the -preaching of Morals, but with the exact investigation of the ultimate -ethical basis. - -We notice at once that Kant employs exclusively Latin legal -terminology, which, however, would seem little adapted to reflect the -most secret stirrings of the human heart. Yet this language, this -judicial way of treating the subject, he retains from first to last, -as though it were essential and proper to the matter. And so we find -brought upon the stage of our inner self a complete Court of justice, -with indictment, judge, plaintiff, defendant, and sentence;--nothing is -wanting. Now if this tribunal, as portrayed by Kant, really existed in -our breasts, it would be astonishing if a single person could be found -to be, I do not say, =so bad=, but =so stupid=, as to act -against his conscience. For such a supernatural assize, of an entirely -special kind, set up in our consciousness, such a secret court--like -another Fehmgericht[4]--held in the dark recesses of our inmost being, -would inspire everybody with a terror and fear of the gods strong -enough to really keep him from grasping at short transient advantages, -in face of the dreadful threats of superhuman powers, speaking in tones -so near and so clear. In real life, on the contrary, we find, that -the efficiency of conscience is generally considered such a vanishing -quantity that all peoples have bethought themselves of helping it out -by means of positive religion, or even of entirely replacing it by the -latter. Moreover, if Conscience were indeed of this peculiar nature, -the Royal Society could never have thought of the question put for the -present Prize Essay. - -But if we look more closely at Kant's exposition, we shall find -that its imposing effect is mainly produced by the fact that he -attributes to the moral verdict passed on ourselves, as its peculiar -and essential characteristic, a form which in fact is not so at all. -This metaphorical bar of judgment is no more applicable to moral -self-examination than it is to every other reflection as regards -what we have done, and might have done otherwise, where no ethical -question is involved. For it is not only true that the same procedure -of indictment, defence, and sentence is occasionally assumed by that -obviously spurious and artificial conscience which is based on mere -superstition; as, for instance, when a Hindu reproaches himself with -having been the murderer of a cow, or when a Jew remembers that he has -smoked his pipe at home on the Sabbath; but even the self-questioning -which springs from no ethical source, being indeed rather unmoral than -moral, often appears in a shape of this sort, as the following case -may exemplify. Suppose I, good-naturedly, but thoughtlessly, have made -myself surety for a friend, and suppose there comes with evening the -clear perception of the heavy responsibility I have taken on myself--a -responsibility that may easily involve me in serious trouble, as the -wise old saying, _ἐγγύα παρά δ' ἃτα_![5] predicts; then at once there -rise up within me the Accuser and the Counsel for the defence, ready -to confront each other. The latter endeavours to palliate my rashness -in giving bail so hastily, by pointing out the stress of circumstance -or of obligation, or, it may be, the simple straightforwardness of -the transaction; perhaps he even seeks excuse by commending my kind -heart. Last of all comes the Judge who inexorably passes the sentence: -"A fool's piece of work!" and I am overwhelmed with confusion So much -for this judicial form of which Kant is so fond; his other modes of -expression are, for the most part, open to the same criticism. For -instance, that which he attributes to conscience, at the beginning of -the paragraph, as its peculiar property, applies equally to all other -scruples of an entirely different sort. He says: "It (conscience) -follows him like his shadow, try though he may to escape. By pleasures -and distractions he may be stupefied and billed to sleep, but he -cannot avoid occasionally waking up and coming to himself; and then he -is immediately aware of the terrible voice," etc. Obviously, this may -be just as well understood, word for word, of the secret consciousness -of some person of private means, who feels that his expenses far exceed -his income, and that thus his capital is being affected, and will -gradually melt away. - -We have seen that Kant represents the use of legal terms as essential -to the subject, and that he keeps to them from beginning to end; let -it now be noted how he employs the same style for the following finely -devised sophism. He says: "That a person accused by his conscience -should be identified with the judge is an absurd way of portraying a -court of justice; for in that case the accuser would invariably lose." -And he adds, by way of elucidating this statement, a very ambiguous -and obscure note. His conclusion is that, if we would avoid falling -into a contradiction, we must think of the judge (in the judicial -conscience-drama that is enacted in our breasts) as different from us, -in fact, as another person; nay more, as one that is an omniscient -knower of hearts, whose hests are obligatory on all, and who is -almighty for every purpose of executive authority.[6] He thus passes by -a perfectly smooth path from conscience to superstition, making the -latter a necessary consequence of the former; while he is secretly sure -that he will be all the more willingly followed because the reader's -earliest training will have certainly rendered him familiar with such -ideas, if not have made them his second nature. Here, then, Kant finds -an easy task,--a thing he ought rather to have despised; for he -should have concerned himself not only with preaching, but also with -practising truthfulness. I entirely reject the above quoted sentence, -and all the conclusions consequent thereon, and I declare it to be -nothing but a shuffling trick. It is =not true= that the accuser -must always lose, when the accused is the same person as the judge; -at least not in the court of judgment in our hearts. In the instance -I gave of one man going surety for another, did the accuser lose? Or -must we in this case also, if we wish to avoid a contradiction, really -assume a personification after Kant's fashion, and be driven to view -objectively as =another person= that voice whose deliverance would -have been those terrible words: "A fool's piece of work!"? A sort of -Mercury, forsooth, in living flesh? Or perhaps a prosopopoeia of the -_Μῆτις_ (cunning) recommended by Homer (_Il._ xxiii. 313 sqq.)?[7] -But thus we should only be landed, as before, on the broad path of -superstition, aye, and pagan superstition too. - -It is in this passage that Kant indicates his Moral Theology, briefly -indeed, yet not without all its vital points. The fact that he takes -care, not to attribute to it any objective validity, but rather to -present it merely as a form subjectively unavoidable, does not free him -from the arbitrariness with which he constructs it, even though he only -claims its necessity for human consciousness. His fabric rests, as we -have seen, on a tissue of baseless assumptions. - -So much, then, is certain. The entire imagery--that of a judicial -drama--whereby Kant depicts conscience is wholly unessential and in -no way peculiar to it; although he keeps this figure, as if it were -proper to the subject, right through to the end, in order finally -to deduce certain conclusions from it. As a matter of fact it is a -sufficiently common form, which our thoughts easily take when we -consider any circumstance of real life. It is due for the most part to -the conflict of opposing motives which usually spring up, and which -are successively weighed and tested by our reflecting reason. And no -difference is made whether these motives are moral or egoistic in their -nature, nor whether our deliberations are concerned with some action in -the past, or in the future. Now if we strip from Kant's exposition its -dress of legal metaphor, which is only an optional dramatic appendage, -the surrounding nimbus with all its imposing effect immediately -disappears as well, and there remains nothing but the fact that -sometimes, when we think over our actions, we are seized with a certain -self-dissatisfaction, which is marked by a special characteristic. -It is with our conduct _per se_ that we are discontented, not with -its result, and this feeling does not, as in every other case in -which we regret the stupidity of our behaviour, rest on egoistic -grounds. For on these occasions the cause of our dissatisfaction is -precisely because we have been too egoistic, because we have taken -too much thought for ourselves, and not enough for our neighbour; or -perhaps even because, without any resulting advantage, we have made -the misery of others an object in itself. That we may be dissatisfied -with ourselves, and saddened by reason of sufferings which we have -inflicted, not undergone, is a plain fact and impossible to be denied. -The connection of this with the only ethical basis that can stand an -adequate test we shall examine further on. But Kant, like a clever -special pleader, tried by magnifying and embellishing the original -_datum_ to make all that he possibly could of it, in order to prepare a -very broad foundation for his Ethics and Moral Theology. - - -[1] Both words are, of course, derived from _wissen = scire_ = -_εἱδέναι_.--(_Translator_.) - -[2] Cf. Horace's _conscire sibi, pallescere culpa: Epist_. I. 1, 61. To -be conscious of having done wrong, to turn pale at the thought of the -crime. - -[3] _Συνείδησις = consciousness_ (of right or wrong -done).--(_Translator._) - -[4] The celebrated Secret Tribunal of Westphalia, which came into -prominence about A.D. 1220. In A.D. 1335 the Archbishop of Cologne was -appointed head of all the Fehme benches in Westphalia by the Emperor -Charles IV. The reader will remember the description of the trial scene -in Scott's _Anne of Geierstein_. Perhaps the Court of Star Chamber -comes nearest to it in English History.--(_Translator._) - -[5] If you give a pledge, be sure that Ate (the goddess of mischief) -is beside you; _i.e._, beware of giving pledges.--Thales ap. Plat. -_Charm_. 165 A. - -[6] Kant leads up to this position with great ingenuity, by having -recourse to the theory of the two characters coexistent in man--the -_noumenal_ (or _intelligible_) and the _empirical_; the one being in -time, the other, timeless; the one, fast bound by the law of causality, -the other free.--(_Translator._) - -[7] Greek: _Άλλ' ἄγε δὴ σύ, ϕίλος, μêτιν ἐμβάλλεο θυμῷ, κ.τ.λ._ - - - - -CHAPTER VIII. - -KANT'S DOCTRINE OF THE INTELLIGIBLE[1] AND EMPIRICAL CHARACTER. THEORY -OF FREEDOM. - - -The attack I have made, in the cause of truth, on Kant's system of -Morals, does not, like those of my predecessors, touch the surface -only, but penetrates to its deepest roots. It seems, therefore, -only just that, before I leave this part of my subject, I should -bring to remembrance the brilliant and conspicuous service which he -nevertheless rendered to ethical science. I allude to his doctrine of -the co-existence of Freedom and Necessity. We find it first in the -_Kritik der Reinen Vernunft_ (pp. 533-554 of the first, and pp. 561-582 -of the fifth, edition); but it is still more clearly expounded in the -_Kritik der Praktischen Vernunft_ (fourth edition, pp. 169-179; R., pp. -224-231). - -The strict and absolute necessity of the acts of Will, determined by -motives as they arise, was first shown by Hobbes, then by Spinoza, -and Hume, and also by Dietrich von Holbach in his _Système de la -Nature_; and lastly by Priestley it was most completely and precisely -demonstrated. This point, indeed, has been so clearly proved, and -placed beyond all doubt, that it must be reckoned among the number of -perfectly established truths, and only crass ignorance could continue -to speak of a freedom, of a _liberum arbitrium indifferentiae_ (a -free and indifferent choice) in the individual acts of men. Nor did -Kant, owing to the irrefutable reasoning of his predecessors, hesitate -to consider the Will as fast bound in the chains of Necessity, the -matter admitting, as he thought, of no further dispute or doubt. This -is proved by all the passages in which he speaks of freedom only from -the =theoretical= standpoint. Nevertheless, it is true that our -actions are attended with a consciousness of independence and original -initiative, which makes us recognise them as our own work, and every -one with ineradicable certainty feels that he is the real author -of his conduct, and morally =responsible= for it. But since -responsibility implies the possibility of having acted otherwise, -which possibility means freedom in some sort or manner; therefore -in the consciousness of responsibility is indirectly involved also -the consciousness of freedom. The key to resolve the contradiction, -that thus arises out of the nature of the case, was at last found by -Kant through the distinction he drew with profound acumen, between -phaenomena and the Thing in itself (_das Ding an sich_). This -distinction is the very core of his whole philosophy, and its greatest -merit. - -The individual, with his immutable, innate character strictly -determined in all his modes of expression by the law of Causality, -which, as acting through the medium of the intellect, is here called -by the name of Motivation,--the individual so constituted is only the -=phaenomenon= (_Erscheinung_). The =Thing= in itself which -underlies this phaenomenon is outside of Time and Space, consequently -free from all succession and plurality, one, and changeless. Its -constitution in itself is the =intelligible character=, which -is equally present in all the acts of the individual, and stamped on -every one of them, like the impress of a signet on a thousand seals. -The empirical character of the phaenomenon--the character which -manifests itself in time, and in succession of acts--is thus determined -by the intelligible character; and consequently, the individual, as -phaenomenon, in all his modes of expression, which are called forth -by motives, must show the invariableness of a natural law. Whence it -results that all his actions are governed by strict necessity. Now -it used to be commonly maintained that the character of a man may -be transformed by moral admonitions and remonstrances appealing to -reason; but when the distinction between the intelligible and empirical -character had once been drawn, it followed that the unchangeableness, -the inflexible rigidity of the empirical character, which thinking -people had always observed, was explained and traced to a rational -basis, and consequently accepted as an established fact by Philosophy. -Thus the latter was so far harmonised with experience, and ceased to -stand abashed, before popular wisdom, which long before had spoken the -words of truth in the Spanish proverb: _Lo que entra con el capillo, -sale con la mortaja_ (that which comes in with the child's cap, goes -out with the winding-sheet); or: _Lo que en la leche se mama, en la -mortaja se derrama_ (what is imbibed with the milk, is poured out again -in the winding-sheet). - -This doctrine of the co-existence of Freedom and Necessity I regard -as the greatest of all the achievements of human sagacity. With the -Transcendental Aesthetics it forms the two great diamonds in the crown -of Kant's fame, which will never pass away. In his Treatise on Freedom, -Schelling obviously served up the Kantian teaching in a paraphrase, -which by reason of its lively colouring and graphic delineation, is for -many people more comprehensible. The work would deserve praise if its -author had had the honesty to say that he is drawing on Kant's wisdom, -not on his own. As it is, a certain part of the philosophic public -still credits him with the entire performance. - -The theory itself, and the whole question regarding the nature of -Freedom, can be better understood if we view them in connection with -a general truth, which I think, is most concisely expressed by a -formula frequently occurring in the scholastic writings: _Operari -sequitur esse_.[2] In other words, everything in the world operates in -accordance with what it is, in accordance with its inherent nature, in -which, consequently, all its modes of expression are already contained -potentially, while actually they are manifested when elicited by -external causes; so that external causes are the means whereby the -essential constitution of the thing is revealed. And the modes of -expression so resulting form the =empirical= character; whereas -its hidden, ultimate basis, which is inaccessible to experience, is -the =intelligible= character, that is, the real nature _per se_ -of the particular thing in question. Man forms no exception to the -rest of nature; he too has a changeless character, which, however, -is strictly individual and different in each case. This character is -of course =empirical= as far as we can grasp it, and therefore -only =phaenomenal=; while the =intelligible= character is -whatever may be the real nature in itself of the person. His actions -one and all, being, as regards their external constitution, determined -by motives, can never be shaped otherwise than in accordance with the -unchangeable individual character. As a man is, so he his bound to act. -Hence for a given person in every single case, there is absolutely only -one way of acting possible: _Operari sequitur esse_[3] Freedom belongs -only to the intelligible character, not to the empirical. The _operari_ -(conduct) of a given individual is necessarily determined externally -by motives, internally by his character; therefore everything that he -does necessarily takes place. But in his _esse_ (_i.e._, in what he -is), =there=, we find Freedom. He =might have been= something -different; and guilt or merit attaches to that which he is. All that -he does follows from what he is, as a mere corollary. Through Kant's -doctrine we are freed from the primary error of connecting Necessity -with _esse_ (what one is), and Freedom with _operari_ (what one does); -we become aware that this is a misplacement of terms, and that exactly -the inverse arrangement is the true one. Hence it is clear that the -moral responsibility of a man, while it, first of all, and obviously, -of course, touches what he does, yet at bottom touches what he is; -because, what he is being the original =datum=, his conduct, as -motives arise, could never take any other course than that which it -actually does take. But, however strict be the necessity, whereby, -in the individual, acts are elicited by motives, it yet never occurs -to anybody--not even to him who is convinced of this necessity--to -exonerate himself on that account, and cast the blame on the motives; -for he knows well enough that, objectively considered, any given -circumstance, and its causes, perfectly admitted quite a different, -indeed, a directly opposite course of action; nay, that such a course -would actually have taken place, =if only he had been a different -person=. That he is precisely such a one as his conduct proclaims -him to be, and no other--this it is for which he feels himself -responsible; in his _esse_ (what he is) lies the vulnerable place, -where the sting of conscience penetrates. For Conscience is nothing -but acquaintance with one's own self--an acquaintance that arises out -of one's actual mode of conduct, and which becomes ever more intimate. -So that it is the _esse_ (what one is) which in reality is accused -by conscience, while the _operari_ (what one does) supplies the -incriminating evidence. Since we are only conscious of =Freedom= -through the sense of =responsibility=; therefore where the latter -lies the former must also be; in the _esse_ (in one's being). It is -the _operari_ (what one does) that is subject to necessity. But we can -only get to know ourselves, as well as others =empirically=; we -have no _a priori_ knowledge of our character. Certainly our natural -tendency is to cherish a very high opinion of it, because the maxim: -_Quisque praesumitur bonus, donec probetur contrarium_ (every one is -presumed to be good, until the contrary is proved), is perhaps even -more true of the inner court of justice than of the world's tribunals. - - - -NOTE. - - -He who is capable of recognising the essential part of a thought, -though clothed in a dress very different from what he is familiar with, -will see, as I do, that this Kantian doctrine of the intelligible and -empirical character is a piece of insight already possessed by Plato. -The difference is, that with Kant it is sublimated to an abstract -clearness; with Plato it is treated mythically, and connected with -metempsychosis, because, as he did not perceive the ideality of Time, -he could only represent it under a temporal form. The identity of the -one doctrine with the other becomes exceedingly plain, if we read the -explanation and illustration of the Platonic myth, which Porphyrius has -given with such clear exactitude, that its agreement with the abstract -language of Kant comes out unmistakably. In the second book of his -Eclogues, chap. 8, §§ 37-40,[4] Stobaeus has preserved for us _in -extenso_ that part of one of Porphyrius' lost writings which specially -comments on the myth in question, as Plato gives it in the second half -of the tenth book of the Republic.[5] The whole section is eminently -worth reading. As a specimen I shall quote the short § 39, in the hope -of inducing any one who cares for these things to study Stobaeus for -himself. It will then immediately become apparent that this Platonic -myth is nothing less than an allegory of the profound truth which Kant -stated in its abstract purity, as the doctrine of the intelligible and -empirical character, and consequently that the latter had been reached, -in its essentials, by Plato thousands of years ago. Indeed, this view -seems to go back much further still, for Porphyrins is of opinion that -Plato took it from the Egyptians. Certainly we already find the same -theory in the Brahmanical doctrine of metempsychosis, and it is from -this Indian source that the Egyptian priests, in all probability, -derived their wisdom. § 39 is as follows:-- - -_Τὸ γὰρ ὅλον βούλημα τοιοῡτ' ἔοικεν εἶναι τὸ τοῡ Πλάτωνος ἔχειν μὲν τὸ -αὐτεξουσιον τὰς ψυχὰς, πρὶν εἰς σώματα καὶ βίους διαϕέρους ἐμπεσεῖν, -εἰς τὸ ἢ τοῡτoν τὸν βίον ἕλεσθαι, ἢ ἄλλον, ὅν, μετὰ ποιᾱς ζωῆς καὶ -σώματος οἰκείον τῇ ζωῇ, κτέλεσειν μέλλει (καὶ γὰρ λέοντος βίον ἐπ' -αὐτῇ εἶνai ἔλεσθαι, καὶ ἀνδρὸς). Kakeῑνο μέντοι τὸ αὐτeξoύσιον, ἅμα -τῇ πρός τινα τῶν τοιούτων βίων πτώσει, ἐμπεπόδισται. Κατελθοῡσαι -γὰρ εἰς τὰ σώματα, καὶ ἀντὶ ψυχῶν aπολυτῶν γεγονῑυαι ψυχαὶ ζώων, τὸ -αὐτεξούσιον ϕέρουσιν οἰκείον τῇ τοῡ ζώον κατασκευῇ, καὶ ἐϕ' ὧν μὲν -εἶνai πολύνουν καὶ πολυκίνητον, ὡς ἐπ' ἀνθρώπον, ἐϕ' ὡν δὲ λυγοκίνηττον -καὶ μονότροπον, ὡς ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλον σχεδὸν πάντων ζώων. Ήρτῆσθαι δὲ -τὸ αὐτeξoύσιον τοῡτo ἀπὸ τῆς κατασκετῆς, κινούμενον μὲν ἐξ αὐτοῡ, -ϕερόμενον δὲ κατὰ τὰς ἐκ τῆς κατασκευῇς γυγνομένας προθυμίας._[6] - - - -[1] _V_. Note on "intelligible" in Chapter I. of this -Part.--(_Translator_) - -[2] _I.e._, what is done is a consequence of that which is. - -[3] _I.e._, his acts are a consequence of what he is. - -[4] _V_. Joannes Stobaeus. _Eclogae Physicae et Ethicae_, edit. -Curtius Wachsmuth et Otto Hense; Weidmann, Berlin, 1884. Vol. II., pp. -163-168.--(_Translator._) - -[5] _V_. Plat., _Rep_., edit. Stallbaum, 614 sqq. It is the _ἀπόλoγos -Ήρὸς τοῡ Άρμενίον_.--(_translator._) - -[6] To sum up. What Plato meant seems to be this. Souls (he said) have -free power, before passing into bodies and different modes of being, -to choose this or that form of life, which they will pass through in a -certain kind of existence, and in a body adapted thereto. (For a soul -may choose a lion's, equally with a man's, mode of being.) But this -free power of choice is removed simultaneously with entrance into one -or other of such forms of life. For when once they have descended into -bodies, and instead of unfettered souls have become the souls of living -things, then they take that measure of free power which belongs in each -case to the organism of the living thing. In some forms this power -is very intelligent and full of movement, as in man; in some it has -but little energy, and is of a simple nature, as in almost all other -creatures. Moreover, this free power depends on the organism in such a -way that while its capability of action is caused by itself alone, its -impulses are determined by the desires which have their origin in the -organism.--(_Translator._) - - - - -CHAPTER IX. - -FICHTE'S ETHICS AS A MAGNIFYING GLASS FOR THE ERRORS OF THE KANTIAN. - - -Just as in Anatomy and Zoology, many things are not so obvious to the -pupil in preparations and natural products as in engravings where there -is some exaggeration; so if there is any one who, after the above -criticism, is still not entirely satisfied as to the worthlessness -of the Kantian foundation of Ethics, I would recommend him Fichte's -_System der Sittenlehre_, as a sure means of freeing him from all doubt. - -In the old German Marionnettes a fool always accompanied the emperor, -or hero, so that he might afterwards give in his own way a highly -coloured version of what had been said or done In like manner behind -the great Kant there stands the author of the _Wissenschaftslehre_,[1] -a true _Wissenschaftsleere[2]._ In order to secure his own, and his -family's welfare, Fichte formed the idea of creating a sensation by -means of subtle mystification. It was a very suitable and reasonable -plan, considering the nature of the German philosophic public, and he -executed it admirably by outdoing Kant in every particular. He appeared -as the latter's living superlative, and produced a perfect caricature -of his philosophy by magnifying all its salient points. Nor did the -Ethics escape similar treatment? In his _System der Sittenlehre_, we -find the Categorical Imperative grown into a Despotic Imperative; while -the absolute "Ought," the law-giving Reason, and the Hest of Duty -have developed into a =moral Fate=, an unfathomable Necessity, -requiring mankind to act strictly in accordance with certain maxims. -To judge (pp. 308, 309) from the pompous show made, a great deal must -depend on these formulae, although one never quite discovers what. -So much only seems clear. As in bees there is implanted an instinct -to build cells and a hive for life in common, so men (it is alleged) -are endowed with an impulse leading them to play in common a great, -strictly moral, world-embracing Comedy, their part being merely to -figure as puppets--nothing else. But there is this important difference -between the bees and men. The hive is really brought to completion; -while instead of a moral World-Comedy, as a matter of fact, an -exceedingly immoral one is enacted. Here, then, we see the imperative -form of the Kantian Ethics, the moral Law, and the absolute "Ought" -pushed further and further till a system of ethical =Fatalism= is -evolved, which, as it is worked out, lapses at times into the comic.[3] - -If in Kant's doctrine we trace a certain moral pedantry; with Fichte -this pedantry reaches the absurd, and furnishes abundant material -for satire. Let the reader notice, for example (pp. 407-409), how he -decides the well-known instance of casuistry, where of two human lives -one must be lost. We find indeed all the errors of Kant raised to the -superlative. Thus, on p. 199, we read: "To act in accordance with -the dictates of sympathy, of compassion, and of loving-kindness is -distinctly unmoral; indeed this line of conduct, as such, is contrary -to morality." Again, on p. 402: "The impulse that makes us ready to -serve others must never be an inconsiderate good-nature, but a clearly -thought-out purpose; that, namely, of furthering as much as possible -the causality of Reason." However, between these sallies of ridiculous -pedantry, Fichte's real philosophic crudeness peeps out clearly -enough, as we might only expect in the case of a man whose teaching -left no time for learning. He seriously puts forward the _liberum -arbitrium indifferentiae_ (a free and indifferent choice), giving as -its foundation the most trivial and frivolous reasons. (Pp. 160, 173, -205, 208, 237, 259, 261.) There can be no doubt that a motive, although -working through the medium of the intelligence, is, nevertheless, a -cause, and consequently involves the same necessity of effect as all -other causes; the corollary being that all human action is a strictly -necessary result. Whoever remains unconvinced of this, is still, -philosophically speaking, barbarous, and ignorant of the rudiments -of exact knowledge. The perception of the strict necessity governing -man's conduct forms the line of demarcation which separates philosophic -heads from all others; arrived at this limit Fichte clearly showed that -he belonged to the others. Moreover, following the footsteps of Kant -(p. 303), he proceeds to make various statements which are in direct -contradiction to the above mentioned passages; but this inconsistency, -like many more in his writings, only proves that he, being one -who was never serious in the search for truth, possessed no strong -convictions to build on; as indeed for his purpose they were not in -the least necessary. Nothing is more laughable than the fact that this -man has received so much posthumous praise for strictly consequential -reasoning; his pedantic style full of loud declamation about trifling -matters being actually mistaken for such. - -The most complete development of Fichte's system of =moral -Fatalism= is found in his last work: _Die Wissenschaftslehre in -ihrem Allgemeinen Umrisse Dargestellt_, Berlin, 1810. It has the -advantage of being only forty-six pages (duodecimo) long, while it -contains his whole philosophy in a nutshell. It is therefore to be -recommended to all those who consider their time too precious to be -wasted on his larger productions, which are framed with a length and -tediousness worthy of Christian Wolff, and with the intention, in -reality, of deluding, not of instructing the reader. In this little -treatise we read on p. 32: "The intuitive perception of a phaenomenal -world only came about, to the end that in such a world the Ego as the -=absolute Ought= might be visible to itself." On p. 33 we actually -find: "The =ought=," (_i.e._, the moral necessity,) "of the -=Ought's= visibility;" and on p. 36: "An =ought=," (_i.e._, a -moral necessity,) "of the perception that I =ought=." This, then, -is what we have come to so soon after Kant! =His imperative Form=, -with its unproved =Ought=, which it secured as a most convenient -_ποῡ στῶ_ (standpoint), is indeed an _exemplar vitiis imitabile_! - -For the rest, all that I have said does not overthrow the service -Fichte rendered. Kant's philosophy, this late masterpiece of human -sagacity, in the very land where it arose, he obscured, nay, supplanted -by empty, bombastic superlatives, by extravagances, and by the nonsense -which is found, in his _Grundlage der gesammten Wissenschaftslehre,_ -appearing under the disguise of profound penetration. His merit was -thus to show the world unmistakably what the capacity of the German -philosophical public is; for he made it play the part of a child who -is coaxed into giving up a precious gem in exchange for a Nürnberg -toy. The fame he obtained in this fashion still lives on credit; and -still Fichte is always mentioned in the same breath with Kant as being -another such _Ἡραkλῆς καὶ πίθηêκος!_[4] Indeed his name is often -placed above the latter's.[5] It was, of course, Fichte's example that -encouraged his successors in the art of enveloping the German people, -in philosophic fog. These were animated by the same spirit, and crowned -with the same prosperity. Every one knows their names; nor is this the -place to consider them at length. Needless to say, their different -opinions, down to the minutest details, are still set forth, and -seriously discussed, by the Professors of Philosophy; as if one had -really to do with philosophers! We must, then, thank Fichte for lucid -documents now existing, which will have to be revised one day before -the Tribunal of posterity, that Court of Appeal from the verdicts of -the present, which--like the Last Judgment looked forward to by the -Saints--at almost all periods, has been left to give to true merit its -just award. - - -[1] _I.e._ Scientific Doctrine. - -[2] _I.e._ Scientific Blank. Perhaps we might translate:--"Scientific -Instruction" and "Scientific Misinstruction."--(_Translator._) - -[3] As evidence of the truth of my words, space prevents me from -quoting more than a few passages. P. 196: "The moral instinct is -absolute, and its requirements are peremptory, without any object -outside itself." P. 232: "In consequence of the Moral Law, the -empirical Being in Time must be an exact copy of the original Ego." P. -308: "The whole man is a vehicle of the Moral Law." P. 342: "I am only -an instrument, a mere tool of the Moral Law, not in any sense an end." -P. 343: "The end laid before every one is to be the means of realising -Reason: this is the ultimate purpose of his existence; for this alone -he has his being, and if this end should not be attained, there is not -the least occasion for him to live." P. 347: "I am an instrument of the -Moral Law in the phaenomenal world." P. 360: "It is an ordinance of the -Moral Law to nourish one's body, and study one's health; this of course -should be done in no way, and for no other purpose, except to provide -an _efficient instrument_ for furthering the end decreed by Reason, -_i.e._, its realisation,"--(cf. p. 371.) P. 376: "Every human body is -an instrument for furthering the end decreed by Reason, _i.e._, its -realisation; therefore the greatest possible fitness of each instrument -must constitute for me an end: consequently I must take thought for -every one."--This is Fichte's derivation of loving-kindness! P. 377: "I -can and dare take thought for myself, solely because, and is so far as -I am, _an instrument of the Moral Law_." P. 388: "To defend a hunted -man at the risk of one's own life, is an absolute duty; whenever the -life of another human being is in danger, you have no right to think -of the safety of your own." P. 420: "In the province of the Moral -Law there is no way whatever of regarding my fellow-man except as an -_instrument_ of Reason." - -[4] _I.e._, Hercules and an ape. A Greek proverb denoting the -juxtaposition of the sublime and the ridiculous. _V_. Greg. Cypr. -_M._3, 66; Macar. 4, 53; Luc. _pisc._ 37; and _Schol. Bachm. An._ 2, -332.--(_Translator._) - -[5] My proof for this is a passage from the latest philosophical -literature. Herr Feuerbach, an Hegelian (_c'est tout dire!_) in his -book, _Pierre Bayle: Ein Beitrag zur Geschichte der Philosophie_, 1838, -p. 80, writes as follows: "But still more sublime than Kant's are -Fichte's ideas as expressed in his Doctrine of Morals and elsewhere. -Christianity has nothing in sublimity that could bear comparison with -them." - - - - -PART III. - -THE FOUNDING OF ETHICS. - - - - -CHAPTER I. - -CONDITIONS OF THE PROBLEM. - - -Thus the foundation which Kant gave to Ethics, which for the last sixty -years has been regarded as a sure basis, proves to be an inadmissible -assumption, and merely theological Morals in disguise; it sinks -therefore before our eyes into the deep gulf of philosophic error, -which perhaps will never be filled up. That the previous attempts to -lay a foundation are still less satisfactory, I take for granted, as -I have already said. They consist, for the most part, of unproved -assertions, drawn from the impalpable world of dreams, and at the -same time--like Kant's system itself--full of an artificial subtlety -dealing with the finest distinctions, and resting on the most abstract -conceptions. We find difficult combinations; rules invented for the -purpose; formulae balanced on a needle's point; and stilted maxims, -from which it is no longer possible to look down and see life as it -really is with all its turmoil. Such niceties are doubtless admirably -adapted for the lecture-room, if only with a view to sharpening -the wits; but they can never be the cause of the impulse to act -justly and to do good, which is found in every man; as also they are -powerless to counterbalance the deep-seated tendency to injustice and -hardness of heart. Neither is it possible to fasten the reproaches of -conscience upon them; to attribute the former to the breaking of such -hair-splitting precepts only serves to make the same ridiculous. In a -word, artificial associations of ideas like these cannot possibly--if -we take the matter seriously--contain the true incentive to justice and -loving-kindness. Rather must this be something that requires but little -reflection, and still less abstraction and complicated synthesis; -something that, independent of the training of the understanding,. -speaks to every one, even to the rudest,--a something resting simply on -intuitive perception, and forcing its way home as a direct emanation -from the reality of things. So long as Ethics cannot point to a -foundation of this sort, she may go on with her discussions, and make -a great display in the lecture-rooms; but real life will only pour -contempt upon her. I must therefore give our moralists the paradoxical -advice, first to look about them a little among their fellow-men. - - - - -CHAPTER II - -SCEPTICAL VIEW. - - -But when we cast a retrospect over the attempts made, and made in vain, -for more than two thousand years, to find a sure basis for Ethics, -ought we not perhaps to think that after all there is no natural -morality, independent of human institution? Shall we not conclude that -all moral systems are nothing but artificial products, means invented -for the better restraint of the selfish and wicked race of men; and -further, that, as they have no internal credentials and no natural -basis, they would fail in their purpose, if without the support of -positive religion? The legal code and the police are not sufficient in -all cases; there are offences, the discovery of which is too difficult; -some, indeed, where punishment is a precarious matter; where, in short, -we are left without public protection. Moreover, the civil law can at -most enforce justice, not loving-kindness and beneficence; because, -of course, these are qualities as regards which every one would like -to play the passive, and no one the active, part. All this has given -rise to the hypothesis that morality rests solely on religion, and that -both have the same aim--that of being complementary to the necessary -inadequacy of state machinery and legislation. Consequently, there -cannot be (it is said) a natural morality, _i.e._, one based simply -on the nature of things, or of man, and the fruitless search of -philosophers for its foundation is explained. This view is not without -plausibility; and we find it as far back as the Pyrrhonians: - - _οὔτε ἀγάθον ἐστί ϕύσει, oὔτε κακόν,_ - _ἀλλὰ πρὸς ἀνθροπών ταὒτα νό κέκριται,_ - _κατὰ τὸν Tίρωνα_[1] - --_Sext. Emp. adv. Math_., XI., 140. - -Also in modern times distinguished thinkers have given their adherence -to it. A careful examination therefore it deserves; although the easier -course would be to shelve it by giving an inquisitorial glance at the -consciences of those in whom such a theory could arise. - -We should fall into a great, a very childish blunder, if we believed -all the just and legal actions of mankind to have a moral origin. This -is far from being the case. As a rule, between the justice, which men -practise, and genuine singleness of heart, there exists a relation -analogous to that between polite expressions, and the true love of -one's neighbour, which, unlike the former, does not ostensibly overcome -Egoism, but really does so. That honesty of sentiment, everywhere -so carefully exhibited, which requires to be regarded as above all -suspicion; that deep indignation, which is stirred by the smallest -sign of a doubt in this direction, and is ready to break out into -furions anger;--to what are we to attribute these symptoms? None but -the inexperienced and simple will take them for pure coin, for the -working of a fine moral feeling, or conscience. In point of fact, the -general correctness of conduct which is adopted in human intercourse, -and insisted on as a rule no less immovable than the hills, depends -principally on two external necessities; first, on legal ordinance, -by virtue of which the rights of every man are protected by public -authority; and secondly, on the recognised need of possessing civil -honour, in other words, a good name, in order to advance in the world. -This is why the steps taken by the individual are closely watched by -public opinion, which is so inexorably severe that it never forgives -even a single false move or slip, but remembers it against the guilty -person as an indelible blot, all his life long. As far as this goes, -public opinion is wise enough; for, starting from the fundamental -principle: _Operari sequitur esse_ (what one does is determined by what -one is), it shows its conviction that the character is unchangeable, -and that therefore what a man has once done, he will assuredly do -again, if only the circumstances be precisely similar. Such are the two -custodians that keep guard on the correct conduct of people, without -which, to speak frankly, we should be in a sad case, especially with -reference to property, this central point in human life, around which -the chief part of its energy and activity revolves. For the purely -ethical motives to integrity, assuming that they exist, cannot as a -rule be applied, except very indirectly, to the question of ownership -as guaranteed by the state. These motives, in fact, have a direct and -essential bearing only on =natural= right; with =positive= -right their connection is merely indirect, in so far as the latter -is based on the former. Natural right, however, attaches to no other -property than that which has been gained by one's own exertion; -because, when this is seized, the owner is at the same time robbed of -all the efforts he expended in acquiring it. The theory of preoccupancy -I reject absolutely, but cannot here set forth its refutation.[2] -Now of course all estate based on positive right ought ultimately -and in the last instance (it matters not how many intermediate links -are involved) to rest on the natural right of possession. But what -a distance there is, in most cases, between the title-deeds, that -belong to our civil life, and this natural right--their original -source! Indeed their connection with the latter is generally either -very difficult, or else impossible, to prove. What we hold is ours by -inheritance, by marriage, by success in the lottery; or if in no way -of this kind, still it is not gained by our own work, with the sweat -of the brow, but rather by shrewdness and bright ideas (_e.g._, in the -field of speculation), yes, and sometimes even by our very stupidity, -which, through a conjunction of circumstances, is crowned and glorified -by the _Deus eventus._ It is only in a very small minority of cases -that property is the fruit of real labour and toil; and even then -the work is usually mental, like that of lawyers, doctors, civilians, -teachers, etc.; and this in the eyes of the rude appears to cost but -little effort. - -Now, when wealth is acquired in any such fashion, there is need of -considerable education before the ethical right can be recognised and -respected out of a purely moral impulse. Hence it comes about that -not a few secretly regard the possessions of others as held merely by -virtue of positive right. So, if they find means to wrest from another -man his goods, by using, or perhaps by evading, the laws, they feel -no scruples; for in their opinion he would lose what he holds, in the -same way in which he had previously obtained it, and they consequently -regard their own claims as equal to his. From their point of view, the -right of the stronger in civil society is superseded by the right of -the cleverer. - -Incidentally we may notice that the =rich= man often shows an -inflexible correctness of conduct. Why? Because with his whole heart -he is attached to, and rigidly maintains, a rule, on the observance of -which his entire wealth, and all its attendant advantages, depend. For -this reason his profession of the principle: _Suum cuique_ (to each his -own), is thoroughly in earnest, and shows an unswerving consistency. -No doubt there is an =objective= loyalty to sincerity and good -faith, which avails to keep them sacred; but such loyalty is based -simply on the fact that sincerity and good faith are the foundation of -all free intercourse among men; of good order; and of secure ownership. -Consequently they very often benefit =ourselves=, and with this -end in view they must be preserved even at some cost: just as a good -piece of land is worth a certain outlay. But integrity thus derived -is, as a rule, only to be met with among wealthy people, or at least -those who are engaged in a lucrative business. It is an especial -characteristic of tradesmen; because they have the strongest conviction -that for all the operations of commerce the one thing indispensable -is mutual trust and credit; and this is why mercantile honour stands -quite by itself. On the other hand, the _poor_ man, who cannot make -both ends meet, and who, by reason of the unequal division of property, -sees himself condemned to want and hard work, while others before his -eyes are lapped in luxury and idleness, will not easily perceive that -the _raison d'être_ of this inequality is a corresponding inequality of -service and honest industry. And if he does =not= recognise this, -how is he to be governed by the purely ethical motive to uprightness, -which should keep him from stretching out his hand to grasp the -superfluity of another? Generally, it is the order of government -as established by law that restrains him. But should ever the rare -occasion present itself when he discovers that he is beyond the reach -of the police, and that he could by a single act throw off the galling -burden of penury, which is aggravated by the sight of others' opulence; -if he feels this, and realises that he could thus enter into the -possession and enjoyment of all that he has so often coveted: what is -there then to stay his hand? Religions dogmas? It is seldom that faith -is so firm. A purely moral incentive to be just and upright? Perhaps -in a few isolated cases. But in by far the greater number there is in -reality nothing but the anxiety a man feels to keep his good name, -his civil honour--a thing that touches closely even those in humble -circumstances. He knows the imminent danger incurred of having to pay -for dishonest conduct by being expelled from the great Masonic Lodge -of honourable people who live correct lives. He knows that property -all over the world is in their hands, and duly apportioned among -themselves, and that they wield the power of making him an outcast for -life from good society, in case he commit a single disgraceful action. -He knows that whoever takes one false step in this direction is marked -as a person that no one trusts, whose company every one shuns, and from -whom all advancement is cut off; to whom, as being "a fellow that has -stolen," the proverb is applied: "He who steals once is a thief all his -life." - -These, then, are the guards that watch over correct behaviour between -man and man, and he who has lived, and kept his eyes open, will admit -that the vast majority of honourable actions in human intercourse must -be attributed to them; nay, he will go further, and say that there are -not wanting people who hope to elude even their vigilance, and who -regard justice and honesty merely as an external badge, as a flag, -under the protection of which they can carry out their own freebooting -propensities with better success. We need not therefore break out into -holy wrath, and buckle on our armour, if a moralist is found to suggest -that perhaps all integrity and uprightness may be at bottom only -conventional. This is what Holbach, Helvetius, d'Alembert, and others -of their time did; and, following out the theory, they endeavoured -with great acumen to trace back all moral conduct to egoistic motives, -however remote and indirect. That their position is literally true of -most just actions, as having an ultimate foundation centred in the -Self, I have shown above. That it is also true to a large extent of -what is done in kindness and humanity, there can be no doubt; acts of -this sort often arise from love of ostentation, still oftener from -belief in a retribution to come, which may be dealt out in the second -or even the third power;[3] or they can be explained by other egoistic -motives. Nevertheless, it is equally certain that there occur actions -of disinterested good-will and entirely voluntary justice. To prove -the latter statement, I appeal only to the facts of experience, not -to those of consciousness. There are isolated, yet indisputable cases -on record, where not only the danger of legal prosecution, but also -all chance of discovery, and even of suspicion has been excluded, and -where, notwithstanding, the poor man has rendered to the rich his own. -For example, things lost, and found, have been given back without any -thought or hope of reward; a deposit made by a third person has been -restored after his death to the rightful owner; a poor man, secretly -intrusted with a treasure by a fugitive, has faithfully kept, and -then returned, it. Instances of this sort can be found, beyond all -doubt; only the surprise, the emotion, and the high respect awakened, -when we hear of them, testify to the fact that they are unexpected -and very exceptional. There are in truth really honest people: like -four-leaved clover, their existence is not a fiction. But Hamlet uses -no hyperbole when he says: "To be honest, as this world goes, is to be -one man pick'd out of ten thousand." If it be objected that, after all, -religious dogmas, involving rewards and penalties in another world, -are at the root of conduct as above described; cases could probably be -adduced where the actors possessed no religions faith whatever. And -this is a thing by no means so infrequent as is generally maintained. - -Those who combat the =sceptical view= appeal specially to the -testimony of =conscience=. But conscience itself is impugned, -and doubts are raised about its natural origin. Now, as a matter of -fact, there is a _conscientia spuria_ (false conscience), which is -often confounded with the true. The regret and anxiety which many a -man feels for what he has done is frequently, at bottom, nothing but -fear of the possible consequences. Not a few people, if they break -external, voluntary, and even absurd rules, suffer from painful -searchings of heart, exactly similar to those inflicted by the real -conscience. Thus, for instance, a bigoted Jew, if on Saturday he -should smoke a pipe at home, becomes really oppressed with the sense -of having disobeyed the command in Exodus xxxv. 3: "Ye shall kindle -no fire throughout your habitations upon the Sabbath day." How often -it happens that a nobleman or officer is the victim of self-reproach, -because on some occasion or other he has not properly complied with -that fools' codex, which is called knightly honour! Nay more: there -are many of this class, who, if they see the impossibility of merely -doing enough in some quarrel to satisfy the above-named code--to say -nothing of keeping their pledged word of honour--are ready to shoot -themselves. (Instances of both have come under my knowledge.) And this, -while the self-same man would with an easy mind break his promise every -day, if only the shibboleth "Honour" be not involved. In short, every -inconsequent, and thoughtless action, all conduct contrary to our -prejudices, principles, or convictions, whatever these may be; indeed, -every indiscretion, every mistake, every piece of stupidity rankles -in us secretly, and leaves its sting behind. The average individual, -who thinks his conscience such an imposing structure, would be -surprised, could he see of what it actually consists: probably of about -one-fifth, fear of men; one-fifth, superstition; one-fifth, prejudice; -one-fifth, vanity; and one-fifth, habit. So that in reality he is no -better than the Englishman, who said quite frankly: "I cannot afford -to keep a conscience." Religious people of every creed, as a rule, -understand by conscience nothing else than the dogmas and injunctions -of their religion, and the self-examination based thereon; and it -is in this sense that the expressions =coercion of conscience= -and =liberty of conscience= are used. The same interpretation -was always given by the theologians, schoolmen, and casuists of the -middle ages and of later times. Whatever a man knew of the formulae and -prescriptions of the Church, coupled with a resolution to believe and -obey it, constituted his conscience. Thus we find the terms "a doubting -conscience," "an opinionated conscience," "an erring conscience," and -the like; and councils were held, and confessors employed, for the -special purpose of setting such irregularities straight. How little the -conception of conscience, just as other conceptions, is determined by -its own object; how differently it is viewed by different people; how -wavering and uncertain it appears in books; all this is briefly but -clearly set forth in Stäudlin's _Geschichte der Lehre vom Gewissen_. -These facts taken in conjunction are not calculated to establish the -reality of the thing; they have rather given rise to the question -whether there is in truth a genuine, inborn conscience. I have already -had occasion in Part II., Chapter VIII., where the theory of Freedom is -discussed, to touch on my view of conscience, and I shall return to it -below. - -All these sceptical objections added together do not in the least avail -to prove that no true morality exists, however much they may moderate -our expectations as to the moral tendency in man, and the natural basis -of Ethics. Undoubtedly a great deal that is ascribed to the ethical -sense can be proved to spring from other incentives; and when we -contemplate the moral depravity of the world, it is sufficiently clear -that the stimulus for good cannot be very powerful, especially as it -often does not work even in cases where the opposing motives are weak, -although then the individual difference of character makes itself fully -felt. - -It should be observed that this moral depravity is all the more -difficult to discern, because its manifestations are checked and -cloaked by public order, as enforced by law; by the necessity of -having a good name; and even by ordinary polite manners. And this is -not all. People commonly suppose that in the education of the young -their moral interests are furthered by representing uprightness and -virtue as principles generally followed by the world. Later on, it is -often to their great harm that experience teaches them something else; -for the discovery, that the instructors of their early years were the -first to deceive them, is likely to have a more mischievous effect on -their morality than if these persons had given them the first example -of ingenuous truthfulness, by saying frankly: "The world is sunk in -evil, and men are not what they ought to be; but be not misled thereby, -and see that you do better." All this, as I have said, increases the -difficulty of recognising the real immorality of mankind. The state ---this masterpiece, which sums up the self-conscious, intelligent -egoism of all--consigns the rights of each person to a power, which, -being enormously superior to that of the individual, compels him to -respect the rights of all others. This is the leash that restrains -the limitless egoism of nearly every one, the malice of many, the -cruelty of not a few. The illusion thus arising is so great that, -when in special cases, where the executive power is ineffective, or -is eluded, the insatiable covetousness, the base greed, the deep -hypocrisy, or the spiteful tricks of men are apparent in all their -ugliness, we recoil with horror, supposing that we have stumbled on -some unheard-of monster: whereas, without the compulsion of law, and -the necessity of keeping an honourable name, these sights would be of -every day occurrence. In order to discover what, from a moral point -of view, human beings are made of, we must study anarchist records, -and the proceedings connected with criminals. The thousands that -throng before our eyes, in peaceful intercourse each with the other, -can only be regarded as so many tigers and wolves, whose teeth are -secured by a strong muzzle. Let us now suppose this muzzle cast off, -or, in other words, the power of the state abolished; the contemplation -of the spectacle then to be awaited would make all thinking people -shudder; and they would thus betray the small amount of trust they -really have in the efficiency either of religion, or of conscience, or -of the natural basis of Morals, whatever it be. But if these immoral, -antinomian forces should be unshackled and let loose, it is precisely -then that the true moral incentive, hidden before, would reveal its -activity, and consequently be most easily recognised. And nothing -would bring out so clearly as this the prodigious moral difference of -character between man and man; it would be found to be as great as the -intellectual, which is saying much. - -The objection will perhaps be raised that Ethics is not concerned with -what men actually do, but that it is the science which treats of what -their conduct =ought= to be. Now this is exactly the position -which I deny. In the critical part of the present treatise I have -sufficiently demonstrated that the conception of =ought=, in -other words, the =imperative form= of Ethics, is valid only in -theological morals, outside of which it loses all sense and meaning. -The end which I place before Ethical Science is to point out all the -varied moral lines of human conduct; to explain them; and to trace -them to their ultimate source. Consequently there remains no way of -discovering the basis of Ethics except the empirical. We must search -and see whether we can find any actions to which we are obliged to -ascribe =genuine moral worth=: actions, that is, of voluntary -justice, of pure loving-kindness, and of true nobleness. Such conduct, -when found, is to be regarded as a given phaenomenon, which has to -be properly accounted for; in other words, its real origin must be -explored, and this will involve the investigation and explanation of -the peculiar motives which lead men to actions so radically distinct -from all others, that they form a class by themselves. These motives, -together with a responsive susceptibility for them, will constitute -the ultimate basis of morality, and the knowledge of them will be -the foundation of Ethics. This is the humble path to which I direct -the Science of Morals. It contains no construction _a priori_, no -absolute legislation for all rational beings _in abstracto_; it lacks -all official, academic sanction. Therefore, whoever thinks it not -sufficiently fashionable, may return to the Categorical Imperative; -to the Shibboleth of "Human Dignity"; to the empty phrases, the -cobwebs, and the soap-bubbles of the Schools; to principles on which -experience pours contempt at every step, and of which no one, outside -the lecture-rooms knows anything, or has ever had the least notion. On -the other hand, the foundation which is reached by following my path -is upheld by experience; and it is experience which daily and hourly -delivers its silent testimony in favour of my theory. - - -[1] _I.e._, there is nothing either good or bad by nature, but these -things are decided by human judgment, as Timon says. _V_. Sexti -Empirici _Opera Quae Exstant: Adversus Mathematicos;_ p. 462 A _ad -fin_. Aurelianae: Petrus et Jacobus Chouët, 1621. _V_. also: Sexti -Empirici _Opera_, edit. Jo. Albertus Fabricius: Lipsiae, 1718, Lib. -XI., 140, p. 716. - -[2] See _Die Welt als Wille und Vorstellung_, Vol I., § 62, p. 396 -sqq., and Vol. II., chap. 47, p. 682. - -[3] In other words: If _a_ be a given offence, or virtuous act, and _x_ -the punishment, or reward, proportional to it; then the punishment, -or reward, actually inflicted, instead of being _x_, may be _x_^2 or -_x_^3.--(Translator.) - - - - -CHAPTER III. - -ANTIMORAL[1] INCENTIVES. - - -The chief and fundamental incentive in man, as in animals, is -=Egoism=, that is, the urgent impulse to exist, and exist under -the best circumstances. The German word _Selbstsucht_ (self-seeking) -involves a false secondary idea of disease (_Sucht_).[2] The term -_Eigennutz_ (self-interest) denotes Egoism, so far as the latter -is guided by reason, which enables it, by means of reflection, to -prosecute its purposes systematically; so that animals may be called -egoistic, but not self-interested (_eigennutzig_). I shall therefore -retain the word =Egoism= for the general idea. Now this Egoism -is, both in animals and men, connected in the closest way with their -very essence and being; indeed, it is one and the same thing. For this -reason all human actions, as a rule, have their origin in Egoism, and -to it, accordingly, we must always first turn, when we try to find the -explanation of any given line of conduct; just as, when the endeavour -is made to guide a man in any direction, the means to this end are -universally calculated with reference to the same all-powerful motive. -Egoism is, from its nature, limitless. The individual is filled with -the unqualified desire of preserving his life, and of keeping it free -from all pain, under which is included all want and privation. He -wishes to have the greatest possible amount of pleasurable existence, -and every gratification that he is capable of appreciating; indeed, -he attempts, if possible, to evolve fresh capacities for enjoyment. -Everything that opposes the strivings of his Egoism awakens his -dislike, his anger, his hate: this is the mortal enemy, which he tries -to annihilate. If it were possible, he would like to possess everything -for his own pleasure; as this is impossible, he wishes at least to -control everything. "All things for me, and nothing for others" is his -maxim. Egoism is a huge giant overtopping the world. If each person -were allowed to choose between his own destruction and that of the -rest of mankind, I need not say what the decision would be in most -cases. Thus, it is that every human unit makes himself the centre of -the world, which he views exclusively from that standpoint. Whatever -occurs, even, for instance, the most sweeping changes in the destinies -of nations, he brings into relation first and foremost with his own -interests, which, however slightly and indirectly they may be affected, -he is sure to think of before anything else. No sharper contrast can -be imagined than that between the profound and exclusive attention -which each person devotes to his own self, and the indifference with -which, as a rule, all other people regard that self,--an indifference -precisely like that with which he in turn looks upon them. To a -certain extent it is actually comic to see how each individual out of -innumerable multitudes considers himself, at least from the practical -point of view, as the only real thing, and all others in some sort -as mere phantoms. The ultimate reason of this lies in the fact that -every one is =directly= conscious of himself, but of others only -_indirectly_, through his mind's eye; and the direct impression asserts -its right. In other words, it is in consequence of the subjectivity -which is essential to our consciousness that each person is himself -the whole world; for all that is objective exists only indirectly, as -simply the mental picture of the subject; whence it comes about that -everything is invariably expressed in terms of self-consciousness. The -only world which the individual really grasps, and of which he has -certain knowledge, he carries in himself, as a mirrored image fashioned -by his brain; and he is, therefore, its centre. Consequently he is all -in all to himself; and since he feels that he contains within his ego -all that is real, nothing can be of greater importance to him than his -own self.[3] Moreover this supremely important self, this microcosm, -to which the macrocosm stands in relation as its mere modification -or accident,--this, which is the individual's whole world, he knows -perfectly well must be destroyed by death; which is therefore for him -equivalent to the destruction of all things. - -Such, then, are the elements out of which, on the basis of the Will to -live, Egoism grows up, and like a broad trench it forms a perennial -separation between man and man. If on any occasion some one actually -jumps across, to help another, such an act is regarded as a sort of -miracle, which calls forth amazement and wins approval. In Part II., -Chapter VI., where Kant's principle of Morals is discussed, I had -the opportunity of describing how Egoism behaves in everyday life, -where it is always peering out of some corner or other, despite -ordinary politeness, which, like the traditional fig-leaf, is used -as a covering. In point of fact, politeness is the conventional and -systematic disavowal of Egoism in the trifles of daily intercourse, -and is, of course, a piece of recognised hypocrisy. Gentle manners are -expected and commended, because that which they conceal--Egoism--is so -odious, that no one wishes to see it, however much it is known to be -there; just as people like to have repulsive objects hidden at least by -a curtain. Now, unless external force (under which must be included -every source of fear whether of human or superhuman powers), or else -the real moral incentive is in effective operation, it is certain that -Egoism always pursues its purposes with unqualified directness; hence -without these checks, considering the countless number of egoistic -individuals, the _bellum omnium contra omnes_[4] would be the order -of the day, and prove the ruin of all. Thus is explained the early -construction by reflecting reason of state government, which, arising, -as it does, from a mutual fear of reciprocal violence, obviates the -disastrous consequences of the general Egoism, as far as it is possible -to do by =negative= procedure. Where, however, the two forces -that oppose Egoism fail to be operative, the latter is not slow to -reveal all its horrible dimensions, nor is the spectacle exactly -attractive. In order to express the strength of this antimoral power -in a few words, to portray it, so to say, at one stroke, some very -emphatic hyperbole is wanted. It may be put thus: many a man would -be quite capable of killing another, simply to rub his boots over -with the victim's fat. I am only doubtful whether this, after all, is -any exaggeration. =Egoism=, then, is the first and principal, -though not the only, power that the =moral Motive= has to contend -against; and it is surely sufficiently clear that the latter, in order -to enter the lists against such an opponent, must be something more -real than a hair-splitting sophism or an _a priori_ soap-bubble. In war -the first thing to be done is to know the enemy well; and in the shock -of battle, now impending, =Egoism=, as the chief combatant on its -own side, is best set against the virtue of =Justice=, which, in -my opinion, is the first and original cardinal virtue. - -The virtue of =loving-kindness=, on the other hand, is rather to -be matched with =ill-will=, or =spitefulness=, the origin -and successive stages of which we will now consider. Ill-will, in -its lower degrees, is very frequent, indeed, almost a common thing; -and it easily rises in the scale. Goethe is assuredly right when -he says that in this world indifference and aversion are quite at -home.--(_Wahlverwandtschaften,_ Part I., chap. 3.) It is very fortunate -for us that the cloak, which prudence and politeness throw over this -vice, prevents us from seeing how general it is, and how the _bellum -omnium contra omnes_ is constantly waged, at least in thought. Yet -ever and anon there is some appearance of it: for instance, in the -relentless backbiting so frequently observed; while its clearest -manifestation is found in all out-breaks of anger, which, for the most -part, are quite disproportional to their cause, and which could hardly -be so violent, had they not been compressed--like gunpowder--into the -explosive compound formed of long cherished brooding hatred. Ill-will -usually arises from the unavoidable collisions of Egoism which occur -at every step. It is, moreover, objectively excited by the view of -the weakness, the folly, the vices, failings, shortcomings, and -imperfections of all kinds, which every one more or less, at least -occasionally, affords to others. Indeed, the spectacle is such, that -many a man, especially in moments of melancholy and depression, may -be tempted to regard the world, from the aesthetic standpoint, as a -cabinet of caricatures; from the intellectual, as a madhouse; and -from the moral, as a nest of sharpers. If such a mental attitude be -indulged, misanthropy is the result. Lastly, one of the chief sources -of ill-will is envy; or rather, the latter is itself ill-will, kindled -by the happiness, possessions, or advantages of others. No one is -absolutely free from envy; and Herodotus (III. 80) said long ago: -_ϕθόνος ἀρχῆθεν ἐμϕύεται ἀνθρώπῳ_ (envy is a natural growth in man from -the beginning). But its degrees vary considerably. It is most poisonous -and implacable when directed against personal qualities, because then -the envious have nothing to hope for. And precisely in such cases -its vilest form also appears, because men are made to hate what they -ought to love and honour. Yet so "the world wags," even as Petrarca -complained: - -_Di lor par più, che d'altri, invidia s'abbia,_ -_Che per se stessi son levati a volo,_ -_Uscendo fuor della commune gabbia._ -(For envy fastens most of all on those, -Who, rising on their own strong wings, escape -The bars wherein the vulgar crowd is cag'd.) - -The reader is referred to the Parerga, vol. ii., § 114, for a more -complete examination of envy. - -In a certain sense the opposite of envy is the habit of gloating over -the misfortunes of others, At any rate, while the former is human, the -latter is diabolical. There is no sign more infallible of an entirely -bad heart, and of profound moral worthlessness than open and candid -enjoyment in seeing other people suffer. The man in whom this trait is -observed ought to be for ever avoided: _Hic niger est, hunc tu, Romane, -caveto_.[5] These two vices are in themselves merely theoretical; in -practice they become malice and cruelty. It is true that Egoism may -lead to wickedness and crime of every sort; but the resulting injury -and pain to others are simply the means, not the end, and are therefore -involved only as an accident. Whereas malice and cruelty make others' -misery the end in itself, the realisation of which affords distinct -pleasure. They therefore constitute a higher degree of moral turpitude. -The maxim of Egoism, at its worst is: _Neminem juva, immo omnes, si -forte conducit_ (thus there is always a condition), _laede_ (help no -body, but rather injure all people, if it brings you any advantage). -The guiding rule of malice is: _Omnes, quantum potes, laede_ (injure -all people as far as you can). As malicious joy is in fact theoretical -cruelty, so, conversely, cruelty is nothing but malicious joy put into -practice; and the latter is sure to show itself in the form of cruelty, -directly an opportunity offers. - -An examination of the special vices that spring from these two primary -antimoral forces forms no part of the present treatise: its proper -place would be found in a detailed system of Ethics. From =Egoism= -we should probably derive greed, gluttony, lust, selfishness, avarice, -covetousness, injustice, hardness of heart, pride, arrogance, etc.; -while to =spitefulness= might be ascribed disaffection, envy, -ill-will, malice, pleasure in seeing others suffer, prying curiosity, -slander, insolence, petulance, hatred, anger, treachery, fraud, thirst -for revenge, cruelty, etc. The first root is more bestial, the second -more devilish; and according as either is the stronger; or according -as the moral incentive, to be described below, predominates, so -the salient points for the ethical classification of character are -determined. No man is entirely free from some traces of all three. - -Here I bring to an end my review of these terrible powers of evil; -it is an array reminding one of the Princes of Darkness in Milton's -Pandemonium. But my plan, which in this respect of course differs from -that of all other moralists, required me to consider at the outset -this gloomy side of human nature, and, like Dante, to descend first to -Tartarus. - -It will now be fully apparent how difficult our problem is. We have -to find a motive capable of making a man take up a line of conduct -directly opposed to all those propensities which lie deeply ingrained -in his nature; or, given such conduct as a fact of experience, we must -search for a motive capable of supplying an adequate and non-artificial -explanation of it. The difficulty, in fact, is so great that, in order -to solve it, for the vast majority of mankind, it has been everywhere -necessary to have recourse to machinery from another world. Gods have -been pointed to, whose will and command the required mode of behaviour -was said to be, and who were represented as emphasising this command -by penalties and rewards either in this, or in another world, to -which death would be the gate. Now let us assume that belief in a -doctrine of this sort took general root (a thing which is certainly -possible through strenuous inculcation at a very early age); and let -us also assume that it brought about the intended effect,--though this -is a much harder matter to admit, and not nearly so well confirmed -by experience; we should then no doubt succeed in obtaining strict -legality of action, even beyond the limits that justice and the police -can reach; but every one feels that this would not in the least imply -what we mean by morality of the heart. For obviously, every act arising -from motives like those just mentioned is after all derived simply from -pure Egoism. How can I talk of unselfishness when I am enticed by a -promised guerdon, or deterred by a threatened punishment? A recompense -in another world, thoroughly believed in, must be regarded as a bill -of exchange, which is perfectly safe, though only payable at a very -distant date. It is thus quite possible that the profuse assurances, -which beggars so constantly make, that those, who relieve them, will -receive a thousandfold more for their gifts in the next world, may lead -many a miser to generous alms-giving; for such a one complacently views -the matter as a good investment of money, being perfectly convinced -that he will rise again as a Croesus. For the mass of mankind, it -will perhaps be always necessary to continue the appeal to incentives -of this nature, and we know that such is the teaching promulgated by -the different religions, which are in fact the =metaphysics of the -people=. Be it, however, observed in this connection that a man is -sometimes just as much in error as to the true motives that govern -his own acts, as he is with regard to those of others. Hence it is -certain that many persons, while they can only account to themselves -for their noblest actions by attributing them to motives of the kind -above described, are, nevertheless, really guided in their conduct by -far higher and purer incentives, though the latter may be much more -difficult to discover. They are doing, no doubt, out of direct love -of their neighbour, that which they can but explain as the command of -their God. On the other hand, Philosophy, in dealing with this, as with -all other problems, endeavours to extract the true and ultimate cause -of the given phaenomena from the disclosures which the nature itself -of man yields, and which, freed as they must be from all mythical -interpretation, from all religious dogmas, and transcendent hypostases, -she requires to see confirmed by external or internal experience. Now, -as our present task is a philosophical one, we must entirely disregard -all solutions conditioned by any religion; and I have here touched on -them merely in order to throw a stronger light on the magnitude of the -difficulty. - - -[1] I venture to use this word although irregularly formed, because -"antiethical" would not here give an adequate meaning. _Sittlich_ -(in accordance with good manners) and _unsittlich_ (contrary to good -manners), which have lately come into vogue, are bad substitutes -for _moralisch_ (moral) and _unmoralisch_ (immoral): first, because -_moralisch_ is a scientific conception, which, as such, requires to be -denoted by a Greek or Latin term, for reasons which may be found in -_Die Welt als Wille und Vorstellung_, vol. ii., chap. 12, p. 134 sqq.; -and secondly, because _sittlich_ is a weaker and tamer expression, -difficult to distinguish from _sittsam_ (modest) which in popular -acceptation means _zimperlich_ (simpering). No concessions must be made -to this extravagant love of germanising! - -[2] In _Sucht_ (_siech_ = sick) and _Selbst-sucht_ (_suchen_= -seek) there is an apparent confusion between the two bases SUK -(_seuka_) to be ill, and SÔKYAN, to seek. _V_. Skeat's _Etymological -Dictionary._--(_Translator._) - -[3] It should be noticed that while from the _subjective_ side a man's -self assumes these gigantic proportions, _objectively_ it shrinks to -almost nothing--namely, to about the one-thousand-millionth part of the -human race. - -[4] The war of all against all. Hobbes uses this expression. ---(_Translator._) - -[5] This man is black; of him shalt thou, O Roman, beware. _V_. Horace, -_Sat_., Lib. I. 4. 85.--(_Translator_.) - - - - -CHAPTER IV. - -CRITERION OF ACTIONS OF MORAL WORTH. - - -There is first the empirical question to be settled, whether actions -of voluntary justice and unselfish loving-kindness, which are capable -of rising to nobleness and magnanimity, actually occur in experience. -Unfortunately, this inquiry cannot be decided altogether empirically, -because it is invariably only the act that experience gives, the -=incentives= not being apparent. Hence the possibility always -remains that an egoistic motive may have had weight in determining a -just or good deed. In a theoretical investigation like the present, -I shall not avail myself of the inexcusable trick of shifting the -matter on to the reader's conscience. But I believe there are few -people who have any doubt about the matter, and who are not convinced -from their own experience that just acts are often performed simply -and solely to prevent a man suffering from injustice. Most of as, I -do not hesitate to say, are persuaded that there are persons in whom -the principle of giving others their due seems to be innate, who -neither intentionally injure any one, nor unconditionally seek their -own advantage, but in considering themselves show regard also for the -rights of their neighbours; persons who, when they undertake matters -involving reciprocal obligations, not only see that the other party -does his duty, but also that he gets his own, because it is really -against their will that any one, with whom they have to do, should be -shabbily treated. These are the men of true probity, the few _aequi_ -(just) among the countless number of the _iniqui_ (unjust). Such -people exist. Similarly, it will be admitted, I think, that many help -and give, perform services, and deny themselves, without having any -further intention in their hearts than that of assisting another, whose -distress they see. When Arnold von Winkelried exclaimed: "_Trüwen, -lieben Eidgenossen, wullt's minem Wip und Kinde gedenken_,"[1] and then -clasped in his arms as many hostile spears as he could grasp; can any -one believe that he had some selfish purpose? I cannot. To cases of -voluntary justice, which cannot be denied without deliberate and wilful -trifling with facts, I have already drawn attention in Chapter II. of -this Part. Should any one, however, persist in refusing to believe that -such actions ever happen, then, according to his view, Ethics would -be a science without any real object, like Astrology and Alchemy, and -it would be waste of time to discuss its basis any further. With him, -therefore, I have nothing to do, and address myself to those who allow -that we are dealing with something more than an imaginary citation. - -It is, then, only to conduct of the above kind that genuine moral worth -can be ascribed. Its special mark is that it rejects and excludes -the whole class of motives by which otherwise all human action is -prompted: I mean the =self-interested= motives, using the word in -its widest sense. Consequently the moral value of an act is lowered by -the disclosure of an accessory selfish incentive; while it is entirely -destroyed, if that incentive stood alone. The absence of all egoistic -motives is thus the =Criterion= of an action of moral value. It -may, no doubt, be objected that also acts of pure malice and cruelty -are not selfish.[2] But it is manifest that the latter cannot be -meant, since they are, in kind, the exact opposite of those now being -considered. If, however, the definition be insisted on in its strict -sense, then we may expressly except such actions, because of their -essential token--the compassing of others' suffering. - -There is also another characteristic of conduct having real moral -worth, which is entirely internal and therefore less obvious. I allude -to the fact that it leaves behind a certain self-satisfaction which -is called the approval of conscience: just as, on the other hand, -injustice and unkindness, and still more malice and cruelty, involve -a secret self-condemnation. Lastly, there is an external, secondary, -and accidental sign that draws a clear line between the two classes. -Acts of the former kind win the approval and respect of disinterested -witnesses: those of the latter incur their disapproval and contempt. - -Those actions that bear the stamp of moral value, so determined, -and admitted to be realities, constitute the phaenomenon that lies -before us, and which we have to explain. We must accordingly search -out what it is that moves men to such conduct. If we succeed in our -investigation, we shall necessarily bring to light the true moral -incentive; and, as it is upon this that all ethical science must -depend, our problem will then be solved. - - -[1] Comrades, true and loyal to our oath, care for my wife and child in -remembrance of this. - -[2] Acts of malice and cruelty are so many gratifications of the ego, -and are therefore, in a certain sense, selfish. _V_. Introduction, pp. -xvi. and xvii.--(_Translator._) - - - - -CHAPTER V. - -STATEMENT AND PROOF OF THE ONLY TRUE MORAL INCENTIVE. - - -The preceding considerations, which were unavoidably necessary in order -to clear the ground, now enable me to indicate the true incentive -which underlies all acts of real moral worth. The seriousness, and -indisputable genuineness, with which we shall find it is distinguished, -removes it far indeed from the hair-splittings, subtleties, -sophisms, assertions formulated out of airy nothings, and _a priori_ -soap-bubbles, which all systems up to the present have tried to make -at once the source of moral conduct and the basis of Ethics. This -incentive I shall not put forward as an hypothesis to be accepted or -rejected, as one pleases; I shall actually =prove= that it is -the only possible one. But as this demonstration requires several -fundamental truths to be borne in mind, the reader's attention is first -called to certain propositions which we must presuppose, and which may -properly be considered as axioms; except the last two, which result -from the analysis contained in the preceding chapter, and in Part II., -Chapter III. - -(1) No action can take place without a sufficient motive; as little as -a stone can move without a sufficient push or pull. - -(2) Similarly, no action can be left undone, when, given the character -of the doer, a sufficient motive is present; unless a stronger -counter-motive necessarily prevents it. - -(3) Whatever moves the Will,--this, and this alone, implies the sense -of weal and woe, in the widest sense of the term; and conversely, weal -and woe signify "that which is in conformity with, or which is contrary -to, a Will." Hence every motive must have a connection with weal and -woe. - -(4) Consequently every action stands in relation to, and has as its -ultimate object, a being susceptible of weal and woe. - -(5) This being is either the doer himself; or another, whose position -as regards the action is therefore =passive=; since it is done -either to his harm, or to his benefit and advantage. - -(6) Every action, which has to do, as its ultimate object, with the -weal and woe of the agent himself, is =egoistic=. - -(7) The foregoing propositions with regard to what is done apply -equally to what is left undone, in all cases where motive and -counter-motive play their parts. - -(8) From the analysis in the foregoing chapter, it results that -=Egoism= and the =moral worth= of an action absolutely -exclude each other. If an act have an =egoistic= object as its -motive, then no moral value can be attached to it; if an act is to -have moral value, then no egoistic object, direct or indirect, near or -remote, may be its motive. - -(9) In consequence of my elimination in Part II., Chapter III., of -alleged duties towards ourselves, the moral significance of our conduct -can only lie in the effect produced upon others; its relation to the -latter is alone that which lends it moral worth, or worthlessness, and -constitutes it an act of justice, loving-kindness, etc., or the reverse. - -From these propositions the following conclusion is obvious: The -=weal and woe=, which (according to our third axiom) must, as its -ultimate object, lie at the root of everything done, or left undone, -is either that of the doer himself, or that of some other person, -whose _rôle_ with reference to the action is passive. Conduct in the -first case is necessarily =egoistic=, as it is impelled by an -interested motive. And this is not only true when men--as they nearly -always do--plainly shape their acts for their own profit and advantage; -it is equally true when from anything done we expect some benefit to -ourselves, no matter how remote, whether in this or in another world. -Nor is it less the fact when our honour, our good name, or the wish -to win the respect of some one, the sympathy of the lookers on, etc., -is the object we have in view; or when our intention is to uphold a -rule of conduct, which, if generally followed, would occasionally be -useful to ourselves, for instance, the principle of justice, of mutual -succour and aid, and so forth. Similarly, the proceeding is at bottom -egoistic, when a man considers it a prudent step to obey some absolute -command issued by an unknown, but evidently supreme power; for in such -a case nothing can be the motive but =fear= of the disastrous -consequences of disobedience, however generally and indistinctly these -may be conceived. Nor is it a whit the less Egoism that prompts us -when we endeavour to emphasise, by something done or left undone, -the high opinion (whether distinctly realised or not) which we have -of ourselves, and of our value or dignity; for the diminution of -self-satisfaction, which might otherwise occur, would involve the -wounding of our pride. Lastly, it is still Egoism that is operative, -when a man, following Wolff's principles, seeks by his conduct to work -out his own perfection. In short, one may make the ultimate incentive -to an action what one pleases; it will always turn out, no matter by -how circuitous a path, that in the last resort what affects the actual -weal and woe of the agent himself is the real motive; consequently what -he does is =egoistic=, and therefore =without moral worth=. -There is only a single case in which this fails to happen: namely, -when the ultimate incentive for doing something, or leaving it undone, -is precisely and exclusively centred in the weal and woe of some one -else, who plays a passive part; that is to say, when the person on the -active side, by what he does, or omits to do, simply and solely regards -the weal and woe of another, and has absolutely no other object than -to benefit him, by keeping harm from his door, or, it may be, even -by affording help, assistance, and relief. It is this aim alone that -gives to what is done, or left undone, the stamp of moral worth; which -is thus seen to depend exclusively on the circumstance that the act -is carried out, or omitted, purely for the benefit and advantage of -another. If and when this is not so, then the question of weal and woe -which incites to, or deters from, every action contemplated, can only -relate to the agent himself; whence its performance, or non-performance -is entirely egoistic, and without moral value. - -But if what I do is to take place solely on account of some one else; -then it follows that =his= weal and woe must directly constitute -=my= motive; just is, ordinarily, =my own= weal and woe -form it. This narrows the limits of our problem, which may now be -stated as follows: How is it possible that another's weal and woe -should influence my will directly, that is, exactly in the same way -as otherwise my own move it? How can that which affects another for -good or bad become my immediate motive, and actually sometimes assume -such importance that it more or less supplants my own interests, which -are, as a rule, the single source of the incentives that appeal to me? -Obviously, only because that other person becomes the ultimate object -of my will, precisely as usually I myself am that object; in other -words, because I directly desire weal, and not woe, for him, just as -habitually I do for myself. This, however, necessarily implies that I -suffer with him, and feel his woe, exactly as in most cases I feel only -mine, and therefore desire his weal as immediately as at other times I -desire only my own. But, for this to be possible, I must in some way -or other be =identified= with him; that is, the =difference= -between myself and him, which is the precise _raison d'être_ of my -Egoism, must be =removed=, at least to a certain extent. Now, -since I do not live in his skin, there remains only the knowledge, that -is, the mental picture, I have of him, as the possible means whereby -I can so far identify myself with him, that my action declares the -difference to be practically effaced. The process here analysed is not -a dream, a fancy floating in the air; it is perfectly real, and by -no means infrequent. It is, what we see every day,--the phaenomenon -of =Compassion=; in other words, the direct participation, -independent of all ulterior considerations, in the sufferings of -another, leading to sympathetic assistance in the effort to prevent -or remove them; whereon in the last resort all satisfaction and all -well-being and happiness depend. It is this Compassion alone which is -the real basis of all =voluntary= justice and all =genuine= -loving-kindness. Only so far as an action springs therefrom, has it -moral value; and all conduct that proceeds from any other motive -whatever has none. When once compassion is stirred within me, by -another's pain, then his weal and woe go straight to my heart, exactly -in the same way, if not always to the same degree, as otherwise I feel -only my own. Consequently the difference between myself and him is no -longer an absolute one. - -No doubt this operation is astonishing, indeed hardly comprehensible. -It is, in fact, the great mystery of Ethics, its original phaenomenon, -and the boundary stone, past which only transcendental speculation -may dare to take a step. Herein we see the wall of partition, -which, according to the light of nature (as reason is called by old -theologians), entirely separates being from being, broken down, and -the non-ego to a certain extent identified with the ego. I wish -for the moment to leave the metaphysical explanation of this enigma -untouched, and first to inquire whether all acts of voluntary justice -and true loving-kindness really arise from it. If so, our problem will -be solved, for we shall have found the ultimate basis of morality, and -shown that it lies in human nature itself. This foundation, however, -in its turn cannot form a problem of Ethics, but rather, like every -other ultimate fact as such, of Metaphysics. Only the solution, that -the latter offers of the primary ethical phaenomenon, lies outside -the limits of the question put by the Danish Royal Society, which is -concerned solely with the basis; so that the transcendental explanation -can be given merely as a voluntary and unessential appendix. - -But before I turn to the derivation of the Cardinal virtues from -the original incentive, as here disclosed, I have still to bring to -the notice of the reader two observations which the subject renders -necessary. - -(1) For the purpose of easier comprehension I have simplified the -above presentation of compassion as the sole source of truly moral -actions, by intentionally leaving out of consideration the incentive -of =Malice=, which while it is equally useless to the self as -compassion, makes the =pain= of others its ultimate purpose. We -are now, however, in a position, by including it, to state the above -proof more completely, and rigorously, as follows:-- - -There are only =three= fundamental springs of human conduct, and -all possible motives arise from one or other of these. They are: - -(_a_) Egoism; which desires the weal of the self, and is limitless. - -(_b_) Malice; which desires the woe of others, and may develop to the -utmost cruelty. - -(_c_) Compassion; which desires the weal of others, and may rise to -nobleness and magnanimity. - -Every human act is referable to one of these springs; although two of -them may work together. Now, as we have assumed that actions of moral -worth are in point of fact realities; it follows that they also must -proceed from one of these primal sources. But, by the eighth axiom, -they cannot arise from the first, and still less from the second; since -all conduct springing from the latter is morally worthless, while the -offshoots of the former are in part neither good nor bad in themselves. -Hence they must have their origin in the third incentive; and this will -be established _a posteriori_ in the sequel. - -(2) Direct sympathy with another is limited to his sufferings, and is -not immediately awakened by his well-being: the latter _per se_ leaves -us indifferent. J. J. Rousseau in his _Émile_ (Bk. IV.) expresses the -same view: "_Première maxime: il n'est pas dans le cœur humain, de -se mettre à la place des gens, qui sont plus heureux que nous, mais -seulement de ceux, qui sont plus à plaindre_,"[1] etc. - -The reason of this is that pain or suffering, which includes all -want, privation, need, indeed every wish, is =positive=, and -works =directly= on the consciousness. Whereas the nature of -satisfaction, of enjoyment, of happiness, and the like, consists solely -in the fact that a hardship is done away with, a pain lulled: whence -their effect is =negative=. We thus see why need or desire is the -condition of every pleasure. Plato understood this well enough, and -only excepted sweet odours, and intellectual enjoyment. (_De Rep.,_ -IX., p. 264 sq., edit. Bipont.)[2] And Voltaire says: "_Il n'est pas -de vrais plaisirs, qu'avec de vrais besoins_."[3] Pain, then, is -=positive=, and makes itself known by itself: satisfaction or -pleasure is =negative=--simply the removal of the former. This -principle explains the fact that only the suffering, the want, the -danger, the helplessness of another awakens our sympathy directly -and as such. The lucky or contented man, =as such=, leaves us -indifferent--in reality because his state is negative; he is without -pain, indigence, or distress. We may of course take pleasure in the -success, the well-being, the enjoyment of others: but if we do, it is -a secondary pleasure, and caused by our having previously sorrowed -over their sufferings and privations. Or else we share the joy and -happiness of a man, not =as such=, but because, and in so far as, -he is our child, father, friend, relation, servant, subject, etc. In a -word, the good fortune, or pleasure of another, =purely as such=, -does not arouse in us the same direct sympathy as is certainly elicited -by his misfortune, privation, or misery, =purely as such=. If -even on =our own behalf= it is only suffering (under which must -be reckoned all wants, needs, wishes, and even ennui) that stirs our -activity; and if contentment and prosperity fill us with indolence and -lazy repose; why should it not be the same when others are concerned? -For (as we have seen) our sympathy rests on an identification of -ourselves with them. Indeed, the sight of success and enjoyment, -=purely as such=, is very apt to raise the envy, to which every -man is prone, and which has its place among the antimoral forces -enumerated above. - -In connection with the exposition of Compassion here given, as the -coming into play of motives directly occasioned by another's calamity, -I take the opportunity of condemning the mistake of Cassina,[4] which -has been so often repeated. His view is that compassion arises from -a sudden hallucination, which makes us put ourselves in the place -of the sufferer, and then imagine that we are undergoing =his= -pain in =own own person=. This is not in the least the case. The -conviction never leaves us for a moment that he is the sufferer, not -we; and it is precisely in his person, not in ours, that we feel the -distress which afflicts us. We suffer =with= him, and therefore in -him; we feel his trouble as =his=, and are not under the delusion -that it is ours; indeed, the happier we are, the greater the contrast -between our own state and his, the more we are open to the promptings -of Compassion. The explanation of the possibility of this extraordinary -phaenomenon is, however, not so easy; nor is it to be reached by the -path of pure psychology, as Cassina supposed. The key can be furnished -by Metaphysics alone; and this I shall attempt to give in the last Part -of the present treatise. - -I now turn to consider the derivation of actions of real moral worth -from the source which has been indicated. The general rule by which to -test such conduct, and which, consequently, is the leading principle -of Ethics, I have already enlarged upon in the foregoing Part, and -enunciated as follows: _Neminem laede; immo omnes, quantum potes, -juva._ (Do harm to no one; but rather help all people, as far as lies -in your power.) As this formula contains two clauses, so the actions -corresponding to it fall naturally into two classes. - - -[1] First maxim: it is not in our hearts to identify ourselves with -those who are happier than we are, but only with those who are less -happy. - -[2] Stallbaum: p. 584, sq.--(_Translator._) - -[3] There are no real pleasures, without real needs. - -[4] _V_. his _Saggio Analitico sulla Compassione_, 1788; German -translation by Pockels, 1790. - - - - -CHAPTER VI. - -THE VIRTUE OF JUSTICE. - - -If we look more closely at this process called Compassion, which we -have shown to be the primary ethical phaenomenon, we remark at once -that there are two distinct degrees in which another's suffering may -become directly my motive, that is, may urge me to do something, or -to leave it undone. The first degree of Compassion is seen when, -by counter-acting egoistic and malicious motives, it keeps me from -bringing pain on another, and from becoming myself the cause of -trouble, which so far does not exist. The other higher degree is -manifested, when it works positively, and incites me to active help. -The distinction between the so-called duties of law and duties of -virtue, better described as justice and loving-kindness, which was -effected by Kant in such a forced and artificial manner, here results -entirely of itself; whence the correctness of the principle is -attested. It is the natural, unmistakable, and sharp separation between -negative and positive, between doing no harm, and helping. The terms in -common use--namely, "the duties of law," and "the duties of virtue," -(the latter being also called "duties of love," or "imperfect duties,") -are in the first place faulty because they co-ordinate the _genus_ -with the _species_; for justice is one of the virtues. And next, they -owe their origin to the mistake of giving a much too wide extension to -the idea "Duty"; which I shall reduce to its proper limits below. In -place, therefore, of these duties I put two virtues; the one, justice, -and the other, loving-kindness; and I name them cardinal virtues, -since from them all others not only in fact proceed, but also may be -theoretically derived.... Both have their root in natural Compassion. -And this Compassion is an undeniable fact of human consciousness, -is an essential part of it, and does not depend on assumptions, -conceptions, religions, dogmas, myths, training, and education. On -the contrary, it is original and immediate, and lies in human nature -itself. It consequently remains unchanged under all circumstances, and -reveals itself in every land, and at all times. This is why appeal is -everywhere confidently made to it, as to something necessarily present -in every man; and it is never an attribute of the "strange gods." [1] -As he, who appears to be without compassion, is called inhuman; so -"humanity" is often used as its synonyme. - -The first degree, then, in which this natural and genuine moral -incentive shows itself is only =negative=. Originally we are all -disposed to injustice and violence, because our need, our desire, our -anger and hate pass into the consciousness directly, and hence have -the _Jus primi occupantis_. (The right of the first occupant.) Whereas -the sufferings of others, caused by our injustice and violence, enter -the consciousness indirectly, that is, by the secondary channel of a -mental picture, and not till they are understood by experience. Thus -Seneca (_Ep._ 50) says: _Ad neminem ante bona mens venit, quam mala_. -(Good feelings never come before bad ones.) In its first degree, -therefore, Compassion opposes and baffles the design to which I am -urged by the antimoral forces dwelling within me, and which will bring -trouble on a fellow-being. It calls out to me: "Stop!" and encircles -the other as with a fence, so as to protect him from the injury which -otherwise my egoism or malice would lead me to inflict on him. So -arises out of this first degree of compassion the rule: _Neminem -laede_. (Do harm to no one.) This is the fundamental principle of the -virtue of justice, and here alone is to be found its origin, pure and -simple,--an origin which is truly moral, and free from all extraneous -admixture. Otherwise derived, justice would have to rest on Egoism,--a -_reductio ad absurdum_. If my nature is susceptible of Compassion up -to this point, then it will avail to keep me back, whenever I should -like to use others' pain as a means to obtain my ends; equally, whether -this pain be immediate, or an after-consequence, whether it be effected -directly, or indirectly, through intermediate links. I shall therefore -lay hands on the property as little as on the person of another, and -avoid causing him distress, no less mental than bodily. I shall thus -not only abstain from doing him physical injury, but also, with equal -care I shall guard against inflicting on him the suffering of mind, -which mortification and calumny, anxiety and vexation so surely work. -The same sense of Compassion will check me from gratifying my desires -at the cost of women's happiness for life, or from seducing another -man's wife, or from ruining youths morally and physically by tempting -them to _paederastia_. Not that it is at all necessary in each single -case that Compassion should be definitely excited; indeed it would -often come too late; but rather the rule: _Neminem laede_, is formed by -noble minds out of the knowledge, gained once for all, of the injury -which every unjust act necessarily entails upon others, and which is -aggravated by the feeling of having to endure wrong through a _force -majeure_. Such natures are led by reflecting reason to carry out this -principle with unswerving resolution. They respect the rights of every -man, and abstain from all encroachment on them; they keep themselves -free from self-reproach, by refusing to be the cause of others' -trouble; they do not shift on to shoulders not their own, by force or -by trickery, the burdens and sorrows of life, which circumstances bring -to every one; they prefer to bear themselves the portions allotted -to them, so as not to double those of their neighbours. For although -generalising formulae, and abstract knowledge of whatever kind, are -not in the least the cause, or the real basis of morality; these are -nevertheless indispensable for a moral course of life. They are the -cistern or reservoir, in which the habit of mind, that springs from -the fount of all morality (a fount not at all moments flowing), may -be stored up, thence to be drawn off, as occasion requires. There is -thus an analogy between things moral and things physiological; among -many instances of which we need only mention that of the gall-bladder, -which is used for keeping the secretion of the liver. Without -firmly held principles we should inevitably be at the mercy of the -antimoral incentives, directly they are roused to activity by external -influences; and =self-control= lies precisely in steadfast -adherence and obedience to such principles, despite the motives which -oppose them. - -In general, the feminine half of humanity is inferior to the -masculine in the virtue of justice, and its derivatives, uprightness, -conscientiousness, etc.; the explanation is found in the fact that, -owing to the weakness of its reasoning powers the former is much less -capable than the latter of understanding and holding to general laws, -and of taking them as a guiding thread. Hence injustice and falseness -are women's besetting sins, and lies their proper element. On the -other hand, they surpass men in the virtue of loving-kindness; because -usually the stimulus to this is =intuitive=, and consequently -appeals directly to the sense of Compassion, of which females are -much more susceptible than males. For the former nothing but what -is intuitive, present, and immediately real has a true existence; -that which is knowable only by means of concepts, as for instance, -the absent, the distant, the past, the future, they do not readily -grasp. We thus find compensation here, as in so much else; justice -is more the masculine, loving-kindness more the feminine virtue. -The mere idea of seeing women sitting on the judges' bench raises a -smile; but the sisters of mercy far excel the brothers of charity. -Now animals, as they have no power of gaining knowledge by reason, -that is, of forming abstract ideas, are entirely incapable of fixed -resolutions, to say nothing of principles; they consequently totally -lack =self-control=, and are helplessly given over to external -impressions and internal impulses. This is why they have no conscious -morality; although the different species show great contrasts of good -and evil in their characters, and as regards the highest races these -are traceable even in individuals. - -From the foregoing considerations we see that in the single acts of -the just man Compassion works only indirectly through his formulated -principles, and not so much _actu_ as _potentiâ_; much in the same way -as in statics the greater length of one of the scale-beams, owing to -its greater power of motion, balances the smaller weight attached to -it with the larger on the other side, and works, while at rest, only -_potentiâ,_ not _actu_; yet with the same efficiency. - -Nevertheless, Compassion is always ready to pass into active operation. -Therefore, whenever, in special cases, the established rule shows signs -of breaking down, the one incentive (for we exclude of course those -based on Egoism), which is capable of infusing fresh life into it, is -that drawn from the fountain-head itself--Compassion. This is true -not only where it is a question of personal violence, but also where -property is concerned, for instance, when any one feels the desire to -keep some valuable object which he has found. In such cases,--if we set -aside all motives prompted by worldly wisdom, and by religion--nothing -brings a man back so easily to the path of justice, as the realisation -of the trouble, the grief, the lamentation of the loser. It is because -this is felt to be true, that, when publicity is given to the loss of -money, the assurance is so often added that the loser is a poor man, a -servant, etc. - -It is hoped that these considerations have made it clear that, however -contrary appearances may be at first sight, yet undoubtedly justice, as -a genuine and voluntary virtue has its origin in Compassion. But if any -one should suppose such a soil too barren and meagre to bear this great -cardinal virtue, let him reflect on what is said above, and remember -how small is the amount of true, spontaneous, unselfish, unfeigned -justice among men; how the real thing only occurs as a surprising -exception, and how, to its counterfeit,--the justice that rests on mere -worldly wisdom and is everywhere published abroad--it is related, both -in quality and quantity, as gold is to copper. I should like to call -the one _δικαιοσύνη πάνδημος_ (common, ordinary justice), the other -_οὐρανία_ (heavenly justice).[2] For the latter is she, who, according -to Hesiod,[3] leaves the earth in the iron age, to dwell with the -celestial gods. To produce such a rare exotic as this the root we have -indicated is surely vigorous enough. - -It will now be seen that =injustice= or =wrong= always -consists in =working harm= on another. Therefore the conception of -wrong is =positive=, and antecedent to the conception of right, -which is =negative=, and simply denotes the actions performable -without injury to others; in other words, without wrong being done. -That to this class belongs also whatever is effected with no other -object than that of warding off from oneself meditated mischief is -an easy inference. For no participation in another's interests, and -no sympathy for him, can require me to let myself be harmed by him, -that is, to undergo wrong. The theory that right is negative, in -contradistinction to wrong as positive, we find supported by Hugo -Grotius, the father of philosophical jurisprudence. The definition of -justice which he gives at the beginning of his work, _De Jure Belli et -Pacis_ (Bk. I., chap. 1., § 3), runs as follows:--_Jus hic nihil aliud, -quam quod justum est, significant, idque negante magis sensu, quam -aiente, ut jus sit, quod injustum non est._[4] The negative character -of justice is also established, little as it may appear, even by the -familiar formula: "Give to each one his own." Now, there is no need -to give a man his own, if he has it. The real meaning is therefore: -"Take from none his own." Since the requirements of justice are only -negative, they may be effected by coercion; for the _Neminem laede_ -can be practised by all alike. The coercive apparatus is the state, -whose sole _raison d'être_ is to protect its subjects, individually -from each other, and collectively from external foes. It is true that -a few German would-be philosophers of this venal age wish to distort -the state into an institution for the spread of morality, education, -and edifying instruction. But such a view contains, lurking in the -background, the Jesuitical aim of doing away with personal freedom -and individual development, and of making men mere wheels in a huge -Chinese governmental and religious machine. And this is the road that -once led to Inquisitions, to Autos-da-fé, and religious wars. Frederick -the Great showed that he at least never wished to tread it, when he -said: "In my land every one shall care for his own salvation, as he -himself thinks best." Nevertheless, we still see everywhere (with the -more apparent than real exception of North America) that the state -undertakes to provide for the metaphysical needs of its members. The -governments appear to have adopted as their guiding principle the tenet -of Quintus Curtius: _Nulla res efficacius multitudinem regit, quam -superstitio: alioquin impotens, saeva, mutabilis; ubi vana religione -capta est, melius vatibus, quam ducibus suis paret._[5] - -We have seen that "wrong" and "right" are convertible synonymes of "to -do harm" and "to refrain from doing it," and that under "right" is -included the warding off of injury from oneself. It will be obvious -that these conceptions are independent of, and antecedent to, all -positive legislation. There is, therefore, a pure ethical right, or -natural right, and a pure doctrine of right, detached from all positive -statutes. The first principles of this doctrine have no doubt an -empirical origin, so far as they arise from the idea of harm done, -but _per se_ they rest on the pure understanding, which _a priori_ -furnishes ready to hand the axiom: _causa causae est causa effectus_. -(The cause of a cause is the cause of the effect.) Taken in this -connection the words mean: if any one desires to injure me, it is -not I, but he, that is the cause of whatever I am obliged to do in -self-defence; and I can consequently oppose all encroachments on his -part, without wronging him. Here we have, so to say, a law of moral -repercussion. Thus it comes about that the union of the empirical idea -of injury done with the axiom supplied by the pure understanding, gives -rise to the fundamental conceptions of wrong and right, which every one -grasps _a priori_, and learns by actual trial to immediately adopt. -The empiric, who denies this, and refuses to accept anything but the -verdict of experience, may be referred to the testimony of the savage -races, who all distinguish between wrong and right quite correctly, -often indeed with nice precision; as is strikingly manifested when -they are engaged in bartering and other transactions with Europeans, -or visit their ships. They are bold and self-assured, when they are in -the right; but uneasy, when they know they are wrong. In disputes a -just settlement satisfies them, whereas unjust procedure drives them to -war. The Doctrine of Eight is a branch of Ethics, whose function is to -determine those actions which may not be performed, unless one wishes -to injure others, that is, to be guilty of wrong-doing; and here the -=active= part played is kept in view. But legislation applies this -chapter of moral science conversely, that is, with reference to the -=passive= side of the question, and declares that the same actions -need not be endured, since no one ought to have wrong inflicted on him. -To frustrate such conduct the state constructs the complete edifice -of the law, as positive Right. Its intention is that no one shall -=suffer= wrong; the intention of the Doctrine of Moral Right is -that no one shall =do= wrong.[6] - -If by unjust action I molest some one, whether in his person, -his freedom, his property, or his honour, the wrong as regards -=quality= remains the same. But with respect to =quantity= -it may vary very much. This difference in the amount of wrong effected -appears not to have been as yet investigated by moralists, although it -is everywhere recognised in real life, because the censure passed is -always proportional to the harm inflicted. So also with just actions, -the right done is constant in quality, but not in quantity. To explain -this better: he, who when dying of starvation steals a loaf, commits -a wrong; but how small is this wrong in comparison with the act of an -opulent proprietor, who, in whatever way, despoils a poor man of his -last penny! Again: the rich person who pays his hired labourer, acts -justly; but how insignificant is this piece of justice when contrasted -with that of a penniless toiler, who voluntarily returns to its wealthy -owner a purse of gold which he has found! The measure, however, of this -striking difference in the quantity of justice, and injustice (the -=quality= being always constant), is not direct and absolute, as -on a graduated scale; it is indirect and relative, like the ratio of -sines and tangents. I give therefore the following definition: the -amount of injustice in my conduct varies as the amount of evil, which -I thereby bring on another, divided by the amount of advantage, which -I myself gain; and the amount of justice in my conduct varies as the -amount of advantage, which injury done to another brings me, divided by -the amount of harm which he thereby suffers. - -We have further to notice a =double= form of injustice which is -specifically different from the simple kind, be it never so great. This -variety may be detected by the fact that the amount of indignation -shown by disinterested witnesses, which is always proportional to the -amount of wrong inflicted, never reaches the =maximum= except -when it is present. We then see how the deed is loathed, as something -revolting and heinous, as an _ἄγος_ (_i.e._, abomination), before -which, as it were, the gods veil their faces. =Double= injustice -occurs when some one, after definitely undertaking the obligation of -protecting his friend, master, client, etc., in a special way, not -only is guilty of non-fulfilment of that duty (which of itself would -be injurious to the other, and therefore a wrong); but when, in -addition, he turns round, and attacks the man, and strikes at the very -spot which he promised to guard. Instances are: the appointed watch, -or guide, who becomes an assassin; the trusted caretaker, who becomes -a thief; the guardian, who robs his ward of her property; the lawyer, -who prevaricates; the judge, who is corruptible; the adviser, who -deliberately gives some fatal counsel. All such conduct is known by the -name of =treachery=, and is viewed with abhorrence by the whole -world. Hence Dante puts traitors in the lowest circle of Hell, where -Satan himself is found (_Inferno_: xi, 61-60). - -As we have here had occasion to mention the word "obligation," this -is the place to determine the conception of =Duty=, which is so -often spoken of both in Ethics and in real life, but with too wide -an extension of meaning. We have seen that wrong always signifies -injury done to another, whether it be in his person, his freedom, his -property, or his honour. The consequence appears to be that every wrong -must imply a positive aggression, and so a definite act. Only there are -actions, the simple omission of which constitutes a wrong; and these -are Duties. This is the true philosophic definition of the conception -"Duty,"--a term which loses its characteristic note, and hence becomes -valueless, if it is used (as hitherto it has been in Moral Science) -to designate all praiseworthy conduct. It is forgotten that "Duty"[7] -necessarily means a =debt= which is owing, being thus an action, -by the simple omission of which another suffers harm, that is, a wrong -comes about. Clearly in this case the injury only takes place through -the person, who neglects the duty, having distinctly pledged or bound -himself to it. Consequently all duties depend on an obligation which -has been entered into. This, as a rule, takes the form of a definite, -if sometimes tacit, agreement between two parties: as for instance, -between prince and people, government and its servants, master and -man, lawyer and client, physician and patient; in a word, between any -and every one who undertakes to perform some task, and his employer -in the widest sense of the word. Hence every duty involves a right; -since no one undertakes an obligation without a motive, which means, -in this case, without seeing some advantage for himself. There is -only =one= obligation that I know of which is not subject to an -agreement, but arises directly and solely through an act; this is -because one of the persons with whom it has to do was not in existence -when it was contracted. I refer to the duty of parents towards their -children. Whoever brings a child into the world, has incumbent on him -the duty of supporting his offspring, until the latter is able to -maintain himself; and should this time never come, owing to incapacity -from blindness, deformity, cretinism, and the like, neither does the -duty ever come to an end. It is clear that merely by failing to provide -for the needs of his son, that is, by a simple omission, the father -would injure him, indeed jeopardise his life. Children's duty towards -their parents is not so direct and imperative. It rests on the fact -that, as every duty involves a right, parents also must have some just -claim on their issue. This is the foundation of the duty of filial -obedience, which, however, in course of time ceases simultaneously -with the right out of which it sprang. It is replaced by gratitude for -that which was done by father and mother over and above their strict -duty. Nevertheless, although ingratitude is a hateful, often indeed a -revolting vice, gratitude cannot be called a =duty=; because its -omission inflicts no injury on the other side, and is therefore no -=wrong=. Otherwise we should have to suppose that in his heart -of hearts the benefactor aims at making a good bargain. It should be -noticed that reparation made for harm done may also be regarded as a -duty arising directly through an action. This, however, is something -purely negative, as it is nothing but an attempt to remove and blot out -the consequences of an unjust deed, as a thing that ought never to have -taken place. Be it also observed that equity[8] is the foe of justice, -and often comes into harsh collision with it; so that the former ought -only to be admitted within certain limits. The German is a friend of -equity, while the Englishman holds to justice. - -The law of motivation is just as strict as that of physical causality, -and hence involves the same irresistible necessity. Consequently -wrong may be compassed not only by violence, but also by cunning. If -by violence I am able to kill or rob another, or compel him to obey -me, I can equally use cunning to accomplish the same ends; that is, I -can place false motives before his intellect, by reason of which he -must do what otherwise he would not. These false motives are effected -by lies. In reality lies are unjustifiable solely in so far as they -are instruments of cunning, in other words, of compulsion, by means of -motivation.[9] And this is precisely their function, as a rule. For, -in the first place, I cannot tell a falsehood without a motive, and -this motive will certainly be, with the rarest exceptions, an unjust -one; namely, the intention of holding others, over whom I have no -power, under my will, that is, of coercing them through the agency of -motivation. Also in mere exaggerations and untruthful bombast there -is the same purpose at work; for, by employing such language, a man -tries to place himself higher in the sight of others than is his due. -The binding force of a promise or a compact is contained in the fact -that, if it be not observed, it is a deliberate lie, pronounced in the -most solemn manner,--a lie, whose intention (that of putting others -under moral compulsion) is, in this case, all the clearer, because -its motive, the desired performance of something on the other side, -is expressly declared. The contemptible part of the fraud is that -hypocrisy is used to disarm the victim before he is attacked. The -highest point of villainy is reached in =treachery=, which, as we -have seen, is a =double= injustice, and is always, regarded with -loathing. - -It is, then, obvious that, just as I am not wrong, that is, right in -resisting violence by violence, so where violence is not feasible, -or it appears more convenient, I am at liberty to resort to cunning; -accordingly, whenever I am entitled to use force, I may, if I please, -employ falsehood; for instance, against robbers and miscreants of -every sort, whom in this way I entice into a trap. Hence a promise -which is extorted by violence is not binding. But, as a matter of -fact, the right to avail myself of lies extends further. It occurs -whenever an unjustifiable question is asked, which has to do with my -private, or business affairs, and is hence prompted by curiosity; for -to answer it, or even to put it off by the suspicion-awakening words, -"I can't tell you," would expose me to danger. Here an untruth is -the indispensable weapon against unwarranted inquisitiveness, whose -motive is hardly ever a well-meaning one. For, just as I have the -right to oppose the apparent bad will of another, and to anticipate -with physical resistance, to the danger of my would-be aggressor, the -physical violence presumably thence resulting; so that, for instance, -as a precaution, I can protect my garden wall with sharp spikes, let -loose savage dogs in my court at night, and even, if circumstances -require it, set man-traps and spring-guns, for the evil consequences of -which the burglar has only himself to thank:--if I have the right to do -this, then I am equally authorised in keeping secret, at any price, -that which, if known, would lay me bare to the attack of others. And I -have good reason for acting thus, because, in moral, no less than in -physical, relations, I am driven to assume that the bad will of others -is very possible, and must therefore take all necessary preventive -measures beforehand. Whence Ariosto says:-- - - _Quantunque il similar sia le più volte_ - _Ripreso, e dia di mala mente indict,_ - _Si trova pure in molte cose e molte_ - _Avere fatti evidenti benefici,_ - _E danni e biasmi e morti avere tolte:_ - _Che non conversiam' sempre con gli amici,_ - _In questa assai più oscura che serena_ - _Vita mortal, tutta d'invidia piena_[10] - _--Orl. Fur._, IV., 1. - -I may, then, without any injustice match cunning with cunning, and -anticipate all crafty encroachments on me, even if they be only -probable; and I need neither render an account to him who unwarrantably -pries into my personal circumstances, nor by replying: "I cannot -answer this," show him the spot where I have a secret, which perilous -to me, and perhaps advantageous to him, in any case puts me in his -power, if divulged: _Scire volunt secreta domus, atque inde timeri_. -(They wish to know family secrets, and thus become feared.) On the -contrary, I am justified in putting him off with a lie, involving -danger to himself, in case he is thereby led into a mistake that -works him harm. Indeed, a falsehood is the only means of opposing -inquisitive and suspicious curiosity; to meet which it is the one -weapon of necessary self-defence. "Ask me no questions, and I'll tell -you no lies" is here the right maxim. For among the English, who regard -the reproach of being a liar as the deepest insult, and who on that -account are really more truthful than other nations, all unjustifiable -questions, having to do with another's affairs, are looked upon as -a piece of ill-breeding, which is denoted by the expression, "to -ask questions." Certainly every sensible person, even when he is -of the strictest rectitude, follows the principle above set forth. -Suppose, for instance, such a one is returning from a remote spot, -where he has raised a sum of money; and suppose an unknown traveller -joins him, and after the customary "whither" and "whence" gradually -proceeds to inquire what may have taken him to that place; the former -will undoubtedly give a false answer in order to avoid the danger -of robbery. Again: if a man be found in the house of another, whose -daughter he is wooing; and he is asked the cause of his unexpected -presence; unless he has entirely lost his head, he will not give the -true reason, but unhesitatingly invent a pretext. And the cases are -numberless in which every reasonable being tells an untruth, without -the least scruple of conscience. It is this view of the matter alone -that removes the crying contradiction between the morality which is -taught, and that which is daily practised, even by the best and most -upright of men. At the same time, the restriction of a falsehood to -the single purpose of self-defence must be rigidly observed; for -otherwise this doctrine would admit of terrible abuse, a lie being in -itself a very dangerous instrument. But just as, even in time of public -peace, the law allows every one to carry weapons and to use them, when -required for self-defence, so Ethics permits lies to be employed for -the same purpose, and--be it observed--for this one purpose only. Every -mendacious word is a wrong, excepting only when the occasion arises of -defending oneself against violence or cunning. Hence justice requires -truthfulness towards all men. But the entirely unconditional and -unreserved condemnation of lies, as properly involved in their nature, -is sufficiently refuted by well known facts. Thus, there are cases -where a falsehood is a =duty=, especially for doctors; and there -are =magnanimous= lies, as, for instance, that of the Marquis -Posa in _Don Carlos_[11] or that in the _Gerusalemme Liberata_, II., -22;[12] they occur, indeed, whenever a man wills to take on himself -the guilt of another; and lastly, Jesus Christ himself is reported -(_John_ vii. 8; cf. ver. 10) on one occasion to have intentionally -told an untruth. The reader will remember that Campanella, in his -_Poesie Filosofiche_ (Delia Bellezza: Madr. 9), does not hesitate to -say: "_Bello è il mentir, se a fare gran ben' si trova_."[13] On the -other hand, the current teaching as regards necessary falsehoods is a -wretched patch on the dress of a poverty-stricken morality. Kant is -responsible for the theory found in many text-books, which derives -the unjustifiableness of lies from man's faculty of speech; but the -arguments are so tame, childish and absurd that one might well be -tempted, if only to pour contempt on them, to join sides with the -devil, and say with Talleyrand: _l'homme a reçu la parole pour pouvoir -cacher sa pensée_[14]. The unqualified and boundless horror shown by -Kant for falsehoods, whenever he has the opportunity, is due either to -affectation, or to prejudice. In the chapter of his "_Tugendlehre_," -dealing with lies, he loads them with every kind of defamatory epithet, -but does not adduce a single adequate reason for their condemnation; -which would have been more to the point. Declamation is easier than -demonstration, and to moralise less difficult than to be sincere. Kant -would have done better to open the vials of his wrath on that vice -which takes pleasure in seeing others suffer; it is the latter, and not -a falsehood, which is truly fiendish. For malignant joy is the exact -opposite of Compassion, and nothing else but powerless cruelty, which, -unable itself to bring about the misery it so gladly beholds others -enduring, is thankful to _Τύχη_ for having done so instead. According -to the code of knightly honour, the reproach of being a liar is of -extreme gravity, and only to be washed out with the accuser's blood. -Now this obtains, not because the lie is wrong in itself, since, were -such the reason, to accuse a man of an injury done by violence would -certainly be regarded as equally outrageous,--which is not the case, -as every one knows; but it is due to that principle of chivalry, which -in reality bases right on might; so that whoever, when trying to work -mischief, has recourse to falsehood, proves that he lacks either power, -or the requisite courage. Every untruth bears witness of his fear; and -this is why a fatal verdict is passed on him. - - -[1] Thus, when the first gleam of _Mitleid_ stole into her heart, -Brünhilde could no longer remain a Walküre; and Wotan's end comes, when -by the same solvent he is at length set free from the delusion of the -_principium individuationis._--(_Translator._) - -[2] There is here an allusion to the _πάνδημος Ἓρως_ and _Oὐρανία_ in -Plato's _Symposium. V_. Chap. 8, sq. Edit. Schmelzer: Weidmann, Berlin, -1882.--(_Translator._) - -[3] _V_. Hesiod, _Opera et Dies_, 174-201.--(_Translator._) - -[4] Justice here denotes nothing else than that which is just, and -this, rather in a negative than in a positive sense; so that what is -not unjust is to be regarded as justice. - -[5] There is no more efficient instrument in ruling the masses than -superstition. Without this they have no self-control; they are brutish; -they are changeable; but once they are caught by some vain form of -religion, they lend a more willing ear to its soothsayers than to their -own leaders. - -[6] The Doctrine of Eight in detail may be found in _Die Welt als Wille -und Vorstellung_, vol. i., § 62. - -[7] Duty = _τὸ δέον_ = le devoir = Pflicht [cf. _plight_, O. H. G. -_plegan_.]--(_Translator_.) - -[8] The word here translated "equity" (_Billigkeit_: Lat. _aequitas_) -means the sense of fairness, or of natural justice which determines -what is fitting and due in all human relations, as opposed to justice -(_Gerechtigkeit_) taken as positive written law.--(_Translator._) - -[9] Motivation is defined in Part II., Chapter VIII., as "the law of -Causality acting through the medium of the intellect." It is thus the -law of the determination of conduct by motives.--(_Translator._) - -[10] - -However much we're won't to blame a lie, -As index of a mind estranged from right, -Yet times unnumber'd it hath shap'd results -Of good most evident; disgrace and loss, -It chang'd; e'en death it cheated. For with friends, -Alas! not always in this mortal life, -Where envy fills all hearts, and gloom prevails -Much more than light, are we in converse join'd. - --(_Translator._) - - -[11] _Vide_, Schiller's _Don Carlos_: Act V., Sc. 3.--(_Translator._) - -[12] - - "_Magnanima menzogna, or quando è il vero_ - _Si hello che si possa a te preporre?"_ - -Cf. also the Horatian _splendid mendax. Carm._ III., 11, 35.--(_Translator._) - -[13] 'Tis well to lie, an there result much good therefrom. _Vide, -Opere_ di Tommaso Campanella, da Alessandro d'Ancona, Torino, -1854.--(_Translator._) - -[14] Man has received the gift of language, so as to be able to conceal -his thoughts. - - - - -CHAPTER VII. - -THE VIRTUE OF LOVING-KINDNESS. - - -Thus justice is the primary and essentially cardinal virtue. Ancient -philosophers recognised it as such, but made it co-ordinate with three -others unsuitably chosen.[1] Loving-kindness (_caritas, ἀγάπη_) was not -as yet ranked as a virtue. Plato himself, who rises highest in moral -science, reaches only so far as voluntary, disinterested justice. It -is true that loving-kindness has existed at all times in practice and -in fact; but it was reserved for Christianity,--whose greatest service -is seen in this--to theoretically formulate, and expressly advance it -not only as a virtue, but as the queen of all; and to extend it even -to enemies. We are thinking of course only of Europe. For in Asia, a -thousand years before, the boundless love of one's neighbour had been -prescribed and taught, as well as practised: the Vedas[2] are full -of it; while in the Dharma-Śāstra,[3] Itihāsa,[4] and Purāna[5] it -constantly recurs, to say nothing of the preaching of Śakya-muni, the -Buddha. And to be quite accurate we must admit that there are traces -to be found among the Greeks and Romans of a recommendation to follow -loving-kindness; for instance, in Cicero, _De Finibus_, V., 23;[6] and -also in Pythagoras, according to Iamblichus, _De vita Pythagorae_, -chap. 33.[7] My task is now to give a philosophical derivation of this -virtue from the principle I have laid down. - -It has been demonstrated in Chapter V. of this Part, that the sense of -Compassion, however much its origin is shrouded in mystery, is the one -and sole cause whereby the suffering I see in another, of itself, and -as such, becomes directly my motive; and we have seen that the first -stage of this process is =negative=. The second degree is sharply -distinguished from the first, through the =positive= character -of the actions resulting therefrom; for at this point Compassion -does more than keep me back from injuring my neighbour; it impels me -to help him. And according as, on the one hand, my sense of direct -participation is keen and deep, and, on the other hand, the distress -is great and urgent, so shall I be constrained by this motive, which -(be it noted) is purely and wholly moral, to make a greater or less -sacrifice in order to meet the need or the calamity which I observe; -and this sacrifice may involve the expenditure of my bodily or mental -powers, the loss of my property, freedom, or even life. So that in -this direct =suffering with= another, which rests on no arguments -and requires none, is found the one simple origin of loving-kindness, -_caritas, aγάπη_ in other words, that virtue whose rule is: _Omnes, -quantum potes, juva_ (help all people, as far as lies in your power); -and from which all those actions proceed which are prescribed by -Ethics under the name of duties of virtue, otherwise called duties of -love, or imperfect duties. It is solely by direct and, as it were, -instinctive participation in the sufferings which we see, in other -words, by Compassion, that conduct so defined is occasioned; at least -when it can be said to have moral worth, that is, be declared free -from all egoistic motives, and when on that account it awakens in us -that inward contentment which is called a good, satisfied, approving -conscience, and elicits from the spectator (not without making him -cast a humiliating glance at himself), that remarkable commendation, -respect, and admiration which are too well-known to be denied. - -But if a beneficent action have any other motive whatever, then it -must be egoistic, if not actually malicious. For as the fundamental -springs of all human conduct (_v_. Chapter V. of this Part), are three, -namely, Egoism, Malice, Compassion; so the various motives which are -capable of affecting men may be grouped under three general heads: (1) -one's own weal; (2) others' woe; (3) others' weal. Now if the motive -of a kind act does not belong to the third class, it must of course -be found in the first or second. To the second it is occasionally to -be ascribed; for instance, if I do good to some one, in order to vex -another, to whom I am hostile; or to make the latter's sufferings more -acute; or, it may be, to put to shame a third person, who refrained -from helping; or lastly, to inflict a mortification on the man whom I -benefit. But it much more usually springs from the first class. And -this is the case whenever, in doing some good, I have in view my own -weal, no matter how remote or indirect it may be; that is, whenever -I am influenced by the thought of reward whether in this, or in -another, world, or by the hope of winning high esteem, and of gaining -a reputation for nobleness of character; or again, when I reflect that -the person, whom I now aid, may one day be able to assist me in return, -or otherwise be of some service and benefit; or when, lastly, I am -guided by the consideration that I must keep the rules of magnanimity -and beneficence, because I too may on some occasion profit thereby. In -a word, my motive is egoistic as soon as it is anything other than -the purely objective desire of simply knowing, without any ulterior -purpose, that my neighbour is helped, delivered from his distress and -need, or freed from his suffering. If such an aim--shorn, as it is, of -all subjectivity--be really mine, then, and then only, have I given -proof of that loving-kindness, _caritas, ἀγάπη_, which it is the great -and distinguishing merit of Christianity to have preached. It should -be observed, in this connection, that the injunctions which the Gospel -adds to its commandment of love, _e.g., μὴ γνώτω ἡ ἀρίστερα σου, τί -ποιεῑ ἡ δεξιά σου_ (let not thy left hand know what thy right hand -doeth), and the like, are, in point of fact, based on a consciousness -of the conclusion I have here reached,--namely, that another's -distress, of itself alone, without any further consideration, must be -my motive, if what I do is to be of moral value. And in the same place -(_Matth_. vi. 2) we find it stated with perfect truth that ostentations -almsgivers _ἀπέχουσιν τὸν μισθὸν αὐτῶν_. (Get in full--exhaust their -reward.) Although, in this respect too, the Vedas shed on us the light -of a higher teaching. They repeatedly declare that he, who desires any -sort of recompense for his work, is still wandering in the path of -darkness, and not yet ripe for deliverance. If any one should ask me -what he gets from a charitable act, my answer in all sincerity would -be: "This, that the lot of the poor man you relieve is just so much the -lighter; otherwise absolutely nothing. If you are not satisfied, and -feel that such is not a sufficient end, then your wish was not to give -alms, but to make a purchase; and you have effected a bad bargain. -But if the one thing you are concerned with is that he should feel the -pressure of poverty less; then you have gained your object; you have -diminished his suffering, and you see exactly how far your gift is -requited." - -Now, how is it possible that trouble which is not mine, and by which -I am untouched, should become as direct a motive to me as if it were -my own, and incite me to action? As already explained, only through -the fact that, although it comes before me merely as something outside -myself, by means of the external medium of sight or hearing; I am, -nevertheless, sensible of it with the sufferer; I feel it as my own, -not indeed in myself, but in him And so what Calderon said comes to -pass: - - _que entre el ver_ - _Padecer y el padecer_ - _Ninguna distancia habia_. - (_No Siempre lo Peor es Cierto_. Jorn. II., Esc. 9.)[8] - -This, however, presupposes that to a certain extent I have become -identified with the other, and consequently that the barrier between -the ego and the non-ego is, for the moment, broken down. It is then, -and then only, that I make his interests, his need, his distress, his -suffering directly my own; it is then that the empirical picture I have -of him vanishes, and I no longer see the stranger, who is entirely -unlike myself, and to whom I am indifferent; but I share his pain in -him, despite the certainty that his skin does not enclose my nerves. -Only in this way is it possible for =his= woe, =his= distress -to become a motive =for me=; otherwise I should be influenced -solely by my own. This process is, I repeat, =mysterious=. For it -is one which Reason can give no direct account of, and its causes lie -outside the field of experience. And yet it is of daily occurrence. -Every one has often felt its working within himself; even to the most -hard-hearted and selfish it is not unknown. Each day that passes brings -it before our eyes, in single acts, on a small scale; whenever a man, -by direct impulse, without much reflection, helps a fellow-creature and -comes to his aid, sometimes even exposing himself to the most imminent -peril for the sake of one he has never seen before, and this, without -once thinking of anything but the fact that he witnesses another's -great distress and danger. It was manifested on a large scale, when -after long consideration, and many a stormy debate, the noble-hearted -British nation gave twenty millions of pounds to ransom the negroes in -its colonies, with the approbation and joy of a whole world. If any one -refuses to recognise in Compassion the cause of this deed, magnificent -as it is in its grand proportions, and prefers to ascribe it to -Christianity; let him remember that in the whole of the New Testament -not one word is said against slavery, though at that time it was -practically universal; and further, that as late as A.D. 1860, in North -America, when the question was being discussed, a man was found who -thought to strengthen his case by appealing to the fact that Abraham -and Jacob kept slaves! - -What will be in each separate case the practical effect of this -mysterious inner process may be left to Ethics to analyse, in chapters -and paragraphs entitled "Duties of Virtue," "Duties of Love," -"Imperfect Duties," or whatever other name be used. The root, the -basis of all these is the one here indicated; for out of it arises -the primary precept: _Omnes, quantum potes, juva_; from which in turn -everything else required can very easily be deduced; just as out of the -_Neminem laede_--the first half of my principle--all duties of justice -are derivable. Ethics is in truth the easiest of all sciences. And -this is only to be expected, since it is incumbent on each person to -construct it for himself, and himself form the rule for every case, as -it occurs, out of the fundamental law which lies deep in his heart; for -few have leisure and patience enough to learn a ready-made system of -Morals. From justice and loving-kindness spring all the other virtues; -for which reason these two may properly be called cardinal, and the -disclosure of their origin lays the corner-stone of Moral Science. The -entire ethical content of the Old Testament is justice; loving-kindness -being that of the New. The latter is the _καινὴ ἐντολὴ_ (the new -commandment [_John_ xiii. 34]), which according to Paul (_Romans_ xiii. -8-10) includes all Christian virtues. - - -[1] Plato taught that Justice (_δικαιοσύνη_) includes in itself the -three other virtues of Wisdom (σοϕία), Fortitude (_ἀνδρεία,_) and -Temperance (_σωϕρούυν_). With Aristotle, too, Justice is the chief -of virtues; while the Stoic doctrine is that Virtue is manifested -in four leading co-ordinate forms: Wisdom, Justice, Fortitude, and -Temperance.--(_Translator_.) - -[2] There are four Vedas: the _Big-Veda, Yajur-Veda, Sāma-Veda,_ and -_Atharva-Veda_.--(_Translator._) - -[3] _Dharma-Śāstra_ ("a law book"): the body or code of Hindu -law.--(_Translator._) - -[4] _Itihāsa_ (iti-ha-āsa, "so indeed it is"): talk, legend, -traditional accounts of former events, heroic history; _e.g._, the -Mahā-bhārata.--(_Translator_.) - -[5] _Purāna_ (ancient, legendary): the name given to certain -well-known sacred works, eighteen in number, comprising the whole -body of modern Hindu mythology. _V_. Monier Williams' _Sanskrit -Dictionary_.--(_Translator._) - -[6] _Ipsa_ CARITAS _generis humani, quae nata a primo satu, quod a -procreatoribus nati diliguntur, et tota domus conjugio et stirpe -conjungitur, serpit sensim foras, cognationibus primum, tum -affinitatibus, deinde amicitiis, post vicinitatibus tum civibus et iis, -qui publice socii atque amici sunt, deinde_ TOTIUS COMPLEXU GENTIS -HUMANAE. - -[7] This chapter describes the Pythagorean ϕίλια πάντων πρὸς ἃπαντας, -which comes very near to loving-kindness. It contains also certain -_καλὰ τῆς ϕίλιας τεκήρια_.--(_Translator_.) - -[8] - -For between the view Of pain, and pain itself, I never knew A distance -lie. - -It is not Always the Worst that is Certain: Act II., Sc. -9.--(_Translator._) - - - - -CHAPTER VIII. - -THE PROOF NOW GIVEN CONFIRMED BY EXPERIENCE. - - -The truth I have here laid down, that Compassion is the sole -non-egoistic stimulus, and therefore the only really moral one, is -a strange, indeed almost incomprehensible paradox. I shall hope, -therefore, to render it less extraordinary to the reader, if I show -that it is confirmed by experience, and by the universal testimony of -human sentiment. - -(1) For this purpose I shall, in the first place, state an imaginary -case, which in the present investigation may serve as an _experimentum -crucis_[1] (a crucial test). But not to make the matter too easy, I -shall take no instance of loving-kindness, but rather a breach of -lawful right, and that of the worse kind. Let us suppose two young -people, Caius and Titus, to be passionately in love, each with a -different girl, and that both are completely thwarted by two other men -who are preferred because of certain external circumstances. They have -both resolved to put their rivals out of the way, and are perfectly -secure from every chance of detection, even from all suspicion. But -when they come to actually prepare for the murder, each of them, after -an inward struggle, draws back. They are now to give us a truthful -and clear account of the reasons why they abandoned their project. As -for Caius, I leave it entirely to the reader to choose what motive he -likes. It may be that religions grounds checked him; for instance, the -thought of the Divine Will, of future retribution, of the judgment to -come, etc. Or perhaps he may say: "I reflected that the principle I -was going to apply in this case would not be adapted to provide a rule -universally valid for all possible rational beings; because I should -have treated my rival only as a means, and not at the same time as an -end." Or, following Fichte, he may deliver himself as follows: "Every -human life is a means towards realising the moral law; consequently, -I cannot, without being indifferent to this realisation, destroy a -being ordained to do his part in effecting it."--(_Sittenlehre_, p. -373.) (This scruple, be it observed in passing, he might well overcome -by the hope of soon producing a new instrument of the moral law, when -once in possession of his beloved.) Or, again, he may speak after the -fashion of Wollaston: "I considered that such an action would be the -expression of a false tenet." Or like Hutcheson: "The Moral Sense, -whose perceptions, equally with those of every other sense, admit -of no final explanation, forbade me to commit such a deed." Or like -Adam Smith: "I foresaw that my act would awaken no sympathy with me -in the minds of the spectators." Or his language may be borrowed from -Christian Wolff: "I recognised that I should thereby advance neither -the work of making myself perfect, nor the same process in any one -else." Or from Spinoza: "_Homini nihil utilius homine: ergo hominem -interimere nolui_." (To man nothing is more useful than man: therefore -I was unwilling to destroy a man.) In short, he may say what one -pleases. But Titus, whose explanation is supplied by myself, will speak -as follows: "When I came to make arrangements for the work, and so, for -the moment, had to occupy myself not with my own passion, but with my -rival; then for the first time I saw clearly what was going to happen -to him. But simultaneously I was seized with compassion and pity; -sorrow for him laid hold upon me, and overmastered me: I could not -strike the blow." Now I ask every honest and unprejudiced reader: Which -of these two is the better man? To which would he prefer to entrust his -own destiny? Which is restrained by the purer motive? Consequently, -where does the basis of morality lie? - -(2) There is nothing that revolts our moral sense so much as cruelty. -Every other offence we can pardon, but not cruelty. The reason is found -in the fact that cruelty is the exact opposite of Compassion. When we -hear of intensely cruel conduct, as, for instance, the act, which -has just been recorded in the papers, of a mother, who murdered her -little son of five years, by pouring boiling oil into his throat, and -her younger child, by burying it alive; or what was recently reported -from Algiers: how a casual dispute between a Spaniard and an Algerine -ended in a fight; and how the latter, having vanquished the other, tore -out the whole of his lower jaw bone, and carried it off as a trophy, -leaving his adversary still alive;--when we hear of cruelty like this, -we are seized with horror, and exclaim: "How is it possible to do such -a thing?" Now, let me ask what this question signifies. Does it mean: -"How is it possible to fear so little the punishments of the future -life?" It is difficult to admit this interpretation. Then perhaps it -intends to say: "How is it possible to act according to a principle -which is so absolutely unfitted to become a general law for all -rational beings?" Certainly not. Or, once more: "How is it possible to -neglect so utterly one's own perfection as well as that of another?"' -This is equally unimaginable. The sense of the question is assuredly -nothing but this: "How is it possible to be so utterly bereft of -compassion?" The conclusion is that when an action is characterised by -an extraordinary absence of compassion, it bears the certain stamp of -the deepest depravity and loathsomeness. Hence Compassion is the true -moral incentive. - -(3) The ethical basis, or the original moral stimulus, which I have -disclosed, is the only one that can be justly said to have a real -and extended sphere of effective influence. No one will surely -venture to maintain as much of all the other moral principles that -philosophers have set up; for these are composed of abstract, sometimes -even of hair-splitting propositions, with no foundation other than -an artificial combination of ideas; such that their application to -actual conduct would often incline to the comic. A good action, -inspired solely by Kant's Moral Principle, would be at bottom the -work of philosophic pedantry; or else would lead the doer into -self-deception, through his reason interpreting conduct, which had -other, perhaps nobler, incentives, as the product of the Categorical -Imperative, and of the conception of Duty, which, as we have seen, -rests on nothing. But not only is it true that the =philosophic= -moral principles, purely theoretical as they are, have seldom any -operative power; of those established by =religion=, and expressly -framed for practical purposes, it is equally difficult to predicate -any marked efficiency. The chief evidence of this lies in the fact -that in spite of the great religious differences in the world, the -amount of morality, or rather of immorality, shows no corresponding -variation, but in essentials is pretty much the same everywhere. Only -it is important not to confound rudeness and refinement with morality -and immorality. The religion of Hellas had an exceedingly small moral -tendency,--it hardly went further than respect for oaths. No dogma was -taught, and no system of Ethics publicly preached; nevertheless, all -things considered, it does not appear that the Greeks were morally -inferior to the men of the Christian era. The morality of Christianity -is of a much higher kind than that of any other religion which -previously appeared in Europe. But if any one should believe for this -reason that European morals have improved proportionally, and that -now at any rate they surpass what obtains elsewhere, it would not be -difficult to demonstrate that among the Mohammedans, Gnebres, Hindus, -and Buddhists, there is at least as much honesty, fidelity, toleration, -gentleness, beneficence, nobleness, and self-denial as among Christian -peoples. Indeed, the scale will be found rather to turn unfavourably -for Christendom, when we put into the balance the long list of inhuman -cruelties which have constantly been perpetrated within its limits -and often in its name. We need only recall for a moment the numerous -religious wars; the crusades that nothing can justify; the extirpation -of a large part of the American aborigines, and the peopling of that -continent by negroes, brought over from Africa, without the shadow of -a right, torn from their families, their country, their hemisphere, -and, as slaves, condemned for life to forced labour;[2] the tireless -persecution of heretics; the unspeakable atrocities of the Inquisition, -that cried aloud to heaven; the Massacre of St. Bartholomew; the -execution of 18,000 persons in the Netherlands by the Duke of Alva; and -these are but a few facts among many. Speaking generally, however, -if we compare with the performances of its followers the excellent -morality which Christianity, and, more or less, every creed preaches, -and then try to imagine how far theory would become practice, if crime -were not impeded by the secular arm of the state; nay more, what would -probably happen, if, for only one day all laws should be suspended; we -shall be obliged to confess that the effect of the various religions -on Morals is in fact very small. This is of course due to weakness of -faith. Theoretically, and so long as it is only a question of piety in -the abstract, every one supposes his belief to be firm enough. Only -the searching touch-stone of all our convictions is--what we do. When -the moment for acting arrives, and our faith has to be tested by great -self-denial and heavy sacrifices, then its feebleness becomes evident. -If a man is seriously planning some evil, he has already broken the -bounds of true and pure morality. Thenceforward the chief restraint -that checks him is invariably the dread of justice and the police. -Should he be so hopeful of escaping detection as to cast such fears -aside, the next barrier that meets him is regard for his honour. If -this second rampart be crossed, there is very little likelihood, after -both these powerful hindrances are withdrawn, that any religious dogma -will appeal to him strongly enough to keep him back from the deed. For -if he be not frightened by near and immediate dangers, he will hardly -be curbed by terrors which are distant, and rest merely on belief. -Moreover, there is a positive objection that may be brought against -all good conduct proceeding solely from religions conviction; it is -not purged of self-interest, but done out of regard for reward and -punishment, and hence can have no purely moral value. This view we find -very clearly expressed in a letter of the celebrated Grand-Duke of -Weimar, Karl August. He writes: "Baron Weyhers was himself of opinion -that he, who is good through religion, and not by natural inclination, -must be a bad fellow at heart. _In vino veritas."[3]--(Letters to -J. H. Merck_; No. 229.) But now let us turn to the moral incentive -which I have disclosed. Who ventures for a moment to deny that it -displays a marked and truly wonderful influence at all times, among all -peoples, in all circumstances of life; even when constitutional law is -suspended, and the horrors of revolutions and wars fill the air; in -small things and in great, every day and every hour? Who will refuse -to admit that it is constantly preventing much wrong, and calling into -existence many a good action, often quite unexpectedly, and where there -is no hope of reward? Is there any one who will gainsay the fact that, -where it and it alone has been operative, we all with deep respect and -emotion unreservedly recognise the presence of genuine moral worth? - -(4) Boundless compassion for all living beings is the surest and most -certain guarantee of pure moral conduct, and needs no casuistry. -Whoever is filled with it will assuredly injure no one, do harm to -no one, encroach on no man's rights; he will rather have regard for -every one, forgive every one, help every one as far as he can, and -all his actions will bear the stamp of justice and loving-kindness. -On the other hand, if we try to say: "This man is virtuous, but he is -a stranger to Compassion"; or: "he is an unjust and malicious man, -yet very compassionate;" the contradiction at once leaps to light. In -former times the English plays used to finish with a petition for the -King. The old Indian dramas close with these words: "May all living -beings be delivered from pain." Tastes differ; but in my opinion there -is no more beautiful prayer than this. - -(5) Also from separate matters of detail it may be inferred that -the original stimulus of true morality is Compassion. For instance, -to make a man lose a hundred thalers, by legal tricks involving no -danger, is equally unjust, whether he be rich or poor; but in the -latter case the rapping of conscience is much louder, the censure of -disinterested witnesses more emphatic. Aristotle was well aware of -this, and said: _δεινότερον δέ εστι τὸν ἀτυχοῡντα, ἢ τον ετὐχοῡντα, -ἀδικεῑν_. (It is worse to injure a man in adversity than one who is -prosperous.)--(_Probl._ xxix. 2.) If the man have wealth, self-reproach -is proportionally faint, and grows still fainter, if it be the treasury -that has been overreached; for state coffers can form no object of -Compassion. It thus appears that the grounds for self-accusation as -well as for the spectators' blame are not furnished directly by the -infringement of the law, but chiefly by the suffering thereby brought -upon others. The violation of right, by itself and as such, which is -involved in cheating the exchequer, (to take the above instance,) -will be disapproved by the conscience alike of actor and witness; but -only because, and in so far as, the rule of respecting =every= -right, which forms the _sine qua non_ of all honourable conduct, is in -consequence broken. The stricture passed will, in fact, be indirect and -limited. If, however, it be a confidential _employé_ in the service -that commits the fraud, the case assumes quite another aspect; it -then has all the specific attributes of, and belongs to, that class -of actions described above, whose characteristic is a =double -injustice=. The analysis here given explains why the worst charge -which can ever be brought against rapacious extortioners and legal -sharpers is, that they appropriate for themselves the goods of widows -and orphans. The reason appears in the fact that the latter, more -than others, owing to their helplessness, might be expected to excite -Compassion in the most callous heart. Hence we conclude that the entire -absence of this sense is sufficient to lower a man to the last degree -of villainy. - -(6) Compassion is the root no less of justice than of loving-kindness; -but it is more clearly evidenced in the latter than in the former. -We never receive proofs of genuine loving-kindness on the part of -others, so long as we are in all respects prosperous. The happy man -may, no doubt, often hear the words of good-will on his relations' -and friends' lips; but the expression of that pure, disinterested, -objective participation in the condition and lot of others, which -loving-kindness begets, is reserved for him who is stricken with some -sorrow or suffering, whatever it be. For the fortunate =as such= -we do not feel sympathy; unless they have some other claim on us, they -remain alien to our hearts: _habeant sibi sua._ (They may keep their -own affairs, pleasures, etc., to themselves.) Nay, if a man has many -advantages over others, he will easily become an object of envy, which -is ready, should he once fall from his height of prosperity, to turn -into malignant joy. Nevertheless this menace is, for the most part, -not fulfilled; the Sophoclean _γελῶσι δ' ἐχθροί _ (his enemies laugh) -does not generally become an actual fact. As soon as the day of ruin -comes to one of fortune's spoiled children, there usually takes place -a great transformation in the minds of his acquaintances, which for us -in this connection is very instructive. In the first place this change -clearly reveals the real nature of the interest that the friends of his -happiness took in him: _diffugiunt cadis cum faece siccatis amici._ -(When the casks are drained to the dregs, one's friends run away.)[4] -On the other hand, the exultation of those who envied his prosperity, -the mocking laugh of malicious satisfaction, which he feared more than -adversity itself, and the contemplation of which he could not face, -are things usually spared him. Jealousy is appeased, and disappears -with its cause; while Compassion which takes its place is the parent -of loving-kindness. Those who were envious of, and hostile to, a man -in the full tide of success, after his downfall, have not seldom -become his friends, ready to protect, comfort, and help. Who has not, -at least in a small way, himself experienced something of the sort? -Where is the man, who, when overtaken by some calamity, of whatever -nature, has not noticed with surprise how the persons that previously -had displayed the greatest coldness, nay, ill-will towards him, then -came forward with unfeigned sympathy? For misfortune is the condition -of Compassion, and Compassion the source of loving-kindness. When our -wrath is kindled against a person, nothing quenches it so quickly, even -when it is righteous, as the words: "He is an unfortunate man." And the -reason is obvious: Compassion is to anger as water to fire. Therefore, -whoever would fain have nothing to repent of, let him listen to my -advice. When he is inflamed with rage, and meditates doing some one a -grievous injury, he should bring the thing vividly before his mind, -as a _fait accompli_; he should clearly picture to himself this other -fellow-being tormented with mental or bodily pain, or struggling with -need and misery; so that he is forced to exclaim: "This is my work!" -Such thoughts as these, if anything, will avail to moderate his wrath. -For Compassion is the true antidote of anger; and by practising on -oneself this artifice of the imagination, one awakes beforehand, while -there is yet time, - - _la pitié, dont la voix,_ -_Alors qu'on est vengé, fait entendre ses lois_.[5] - --(Voltaire, _Sémiramis_, V. 6.) - -And in general, the hatred we may cherish for others is overcome by -nothing so easily as by our taking a point of view whence they can -appeal to our Compassion. The reason indeed why parents, as a rule, -specially love the sickly one of their children is because the sight of -it perpetually stirs their Compassion. - -(7) There is another proof that the moral incentive disclosed by me -is the true one. I mean the fact that animals also are included under -its protecting aegis. In the other European systems of Ethics no place -is found for them,--strange and inexcusable as this may appear. It is -asserted that beasts have no rights; the illusion is harboured that our -conduct, so far as they are concerned, has no moral significance, or, -as it is put in the language of these codes, that "there are no duties -to be fulfilled towards animals." Such a view is one of revolting -coarseness, a barbarism of the West, whose source is Judaism. In -philosophy, however, it rests on the assumption, despite all evidence -to the contrary, of the radical difference between man and beast,--a -doctrine which, as is well known, was proclaimed with more trenchant -emphasis by Descartes than by any one else: it was indeed the necessary -consequence of his mistakes. When Leibnitz and Wolff, following out -the Cartesian view, built up out of abstract ideas their Rational -Psychology, and constructed a deathless _anima rationalis_ (rational -soul); then the natural claims of the animal kingdom visibly rose up -against this exclusive privilege, this human patent of immortality, and -Nature, as always in such circumstances, entered her silent protest. -Our philosophers, owing to the qualms of their intellectual conscience, -were soon forced to seek aid for their Rational Psychology from the -empirical method; they accordingly tried to reveal the existence of -a vast chasm, an immeasurable gulf between animals and men, in order -to represent them, in the teeth of opposing testimony, as existences -essentially different. These efforts did not escape the ridicule of -Boileau; for we find him saying: - -_Les animaux ont-ils des universités?_ -_Voit-on fleurir chez eux des quatre facultés?_[6] - -Such a supposition would end in animals being pronounced incapable -of distinguishing themselves from the external world, and of having -any self-consciousness, any ego! As answer to such absurd tenets, it -would only be necessary to point to the boundless Egoism innate in -every animal, even the smallest and humblest; this amply proves how -perfectly they are conscious of their self, as opposed to the world, -which lies outside it. If any one of the Cartesian persuasion, with -views like these in his head, should find himself in the claws of a -tiger, he would be taught in the most forcible manner what a sharp -distinction such a beast draws between his ego and the non-ego. -Corresponding to these philosophical fallacies we notice a peculiar -sophism in the speech of many peoples, especially the Germans. For the -commonest matters connected with the processes of life,--for food, -drink, conception, the bringing forth of young; for death, and the dead -body; such languages have special words applicable only to animals, -not to men. In this way the necessity of using the same terms for -both is avoided, and the perfect identity of the thing concealed under -verbal differences. Now, since the ancient tongues show no trace of -such a dual mode of expression, but frankly denote the same things -by the same words; it follows that this miserable artifice is beyond -all doubt the work of European priestcraft, which, in its profanity, -knows no limit to its disavowal of, and blasphemy against, the Eternal -Reality that lives in every animal. Thus was laid the foundation of -that harshness and cruelty towards beasts which is customary in Europe, -and on which a native of the Asiatic uplands could not look without -righteous horror. In English this infamous invention is not to be -found; assuredly because the Saxons, when they conquered England, were -not yet Christians. Nevertheless the English language shows something -analogous in the strange fact that it makes all animals of the neuter -gender, the pronoun "it" being employed for them, just as if they -were lifeless things. This idiom has a very objectionable sound, -especially in the case of dogs, monkeys, and other Primates, and is -unmistakably a priestly trick, designed to reduce beasts to the level -of inanimate objects. The ancient Egyptians, who dedicated all their -days to religion, were accustomed to place in the same vault with a -human mummy that of an ibis, a crocodile, etc.; in Europe it is a -crime, an abomination to bury a faithful dog beside the resting-place -of his master, though it is there perhaps that he, with a fidelity -and attachment unknown to the sons of men, awaited his own end. To a -recognition of the identity, in all essentials, of the phaenomena -which we call "man" and "beast," nothing leads more surely than the -study of zoology and anatomy. What shall we say then, when in these -days (1839) a canting dissector has been found, who presumes to insist -on an absolute and radical difference between human beings and animals, -and who goes so far as to attack and calumniate honest zoologists that -keep aloof from all priestly guile, eye-service, and hypocrisy, and -dare to follow the leading of nature and of truth? - -Those persons must indeed be totally blind, or else completely -chloroformed by the _foetor Judaicus_ (Jewish stench), who do not -discern that the truly essential and fundamental part in man and beast -is identically the same thing. That which distinguishes the one from -the other does not lie in the primary and original principle, in the -inner nature, in the kernel of the two phaenomena (this kernel being -in both alike the Will of the individual); it is found in what is -secondary, in the intellect, in the degree of perceptive capacity. It -is true that the latter is incomparably higher in man, by reason of -his added faculty of abstract knowledge, called Reason; nevertheless -this superiority is traceable solely to a greater cerebral development, -in other words, to the corporeal difference, which is quantitative, -not qualitative, of a single part, the brain. In all other respects -the similarity between men and animals, both psychical and bodily, is -sufficiently striking. So that we must remind our judaised friends -in the West, who despise animals, and idolise Reason, that if they -were suckled by their mothers, so also was the dog by his. Even Kant -fell into this common mistake of his age, and of his country, and I -have already administered the censure[7] which it is impossible to -withhold. The fact that Christian morality takes no thought for beasts -is a defect in the system which is better admitted than perpetuated. -One's astonishment is, however, all the greater, because, with this -exception, it shows the closest agreement with the Ethics of Brahmanism -and Buddhism, being only less strongly expressed, and not carried to -the last consequences imposed by logic. On the whole, there seems -little room for doubting that, in common with the idea of a god become -man, or Avatar,[8] it has an Asiatic origin, and probably came to -Judaea by way of Egypt; so that Christianity would be a secondary -reflection of the primordial light that shone in India, which, -falling first on Egypt, was unhappily refracted from its ruins upon -Jewish soil. An apt symbol of the insensibility of Christian Ethics -to animals, while in other points its similarity to the Indian is so -great, may be found in the circumstance that John the Baptist comes -before us in all respects like a Hindu Sannyasin,[9] except that he -is clothed in skins: a thing which would be, as is well known, an -abomination in the eyes of every follower of Brahmanism or Buddhism. -The Royal Society of Calcutta only received their copy of the Vedas -on their distinctly promising that they would not have it bound in -leather, after European fashion. In silken binding, therefore, it is -now to be seen on the shelves of their library. Again: the Gospel story -of Peter's draught of fishes, which the Saviour blesses so signally -that the boats are overladen, and begin to sink (_Luke_ v. 1-10), -forms a characteristic contrast to what is related of Pythagoras. It -is said that the latter, initiated as he was in all the wisdom of the -Egyptians, bought the draught from the fishermen, while the net was -still under water, in order to at once set at liberty the captive -denizens of the sea. (Apuleius: _De Magia_, p. 36: edit. Bipont.)[10] -Compassion for animals is intimately connected with goodness of -character, and it may be confidently asserted that he, who is cruel -to living creatures, cannot be a good man. Moreover, this compassion -manifestly flows from the same source whence arise the virtues of -justice and loving-kindness towards men. Thus, for instance, people -of delicate sensitiveness, on realising that in a fit of ill-humour, -or anger, or under the influence of wine, they punished their dog, -their horse, their ape undeservedly, or unnecessarily, or excessively, -are seized with the same remorse, feel the same dissatisfaction with -themselves, as when they are conscious of having done some wrong to -one of their fellows. The only difference--a purely nominal one--is -that in the latter case this remorse, this dissatisfaction is called -the voice of conscience rising in rebuke. I remember having read of -an Englishman, who, when hunting in India, had killed a monkey, that -he could not forget the dying look which the creature cast on him; so -that he never fired at these animals again. Another sportsman, William -Harris by name, a true Nimrod, has much the same story to tell. During -the years 1836-7 he travelled far into the heart of Africa, merely to -indulge his passion for the chase. A passage in his book, published at -Bombay in 1838, describes how he shot his first elephant, a female. -Next morning on going to look for his game, he found that all the -elephants had fled from the neighbourhood, except a young one which had -spent the night beside its dead mother. Seeing the huntsmen, it forgot -all fear, and came to meet them, with the clearest and most lively -signs of disconsolate grief, and put its tiny trunk about them, as if -to beg for help. "Then," says Harris, "I was filled with real remorse -for what I had done, and felt as if I had committed a murder." - -The English nation, with its fine sensibility, is, in fact, -distinguished above all others for extraordinary compassion towards -animals, which appears at every opportunity, and is so strong that, -despite the "cold superstition" which otherwise degrades them, these -Anglo-Saxons have been led through its operation to fill up by -legislation the _lacuna_ that their religion leaves in morality. For -this gap is precisely the reason why in Europe and America there is -need of societies for the protection of animals, which are entirely -dependent on the law for their efficiency. In Asia the religions -themselves suffice, consequently no one there ever thinks of such -associations. Meanwhile Europeans are awakening more and more to a -sense that beasts have rights, in proportion as the strange notion -is being gradually overcome and outgrown, that the animal kingdom -came into existence solely for the benefit and pleasure of man. This -view,[11] with the corollary that non-human living creatures are to be -regarded merely as things, is at the root of the rough and altogether -reckless treatment of them, which obtains in the West. To the honour, -then, of the English be it said that they are the first people who -have, in downright earnest, extended the protecting arm of the law to -animals: in England the miscreant, that commits an outrage on beasts, -has to pay for it, equally whether they are his own or not. Nor is this -all. There exists in London the Society for the Prevention of Cruelty -to Animals, a corporate body voluntarily formed, which, without state -assistance, and at great cost, is of no small service in lessening the -tale of tortures inflicted on animals. Its emissaries are ubiquitous, -and keep secret watch in order to inform against the tormentors of -dumb, sensitive creatures; and such persons have therefore good reason -to stand in fear of them.[12] At all the steep bridges in London this -Society stations a pair of horses, which without any charge is attached -to heavy freight-waggons. Is not this admirable? Does it not elicit our -approval, as unfailingly as any beneficent action towards men? Also the -Philanthropic Society of London has done its part. In 1837 it offered a -prize of £30 for the best exposition of the moral reasons which exist -to keep men from torturing animals. The line of argument, however, -had to be taken almost exclusively from Christianity, whereby the -difficulty of the task was, of course, increased; but two years later, -in 1839, Mr. Macnamara was the successful competitor. At Philadelphia -there is an Animals' Friends' Society, having the same aims; and it -is to the President of the latter that a book called _Philozoia; or, -Moral Reflections on the Actual Condition of Animals, and the Means -of Improving the Same_ (Brussels, 1839), has been dedicated by its -author, T. Forster. It is original and well written. Mr. Forster -earnestly commends to his readers the humane treatment of animals. As -an Englishman he naturally tries to strengthen his position by the -support of the Bible; but he is on slippery ground, and meets with -such poor success that he ends by catching at the following ingenious -position: Jesus Christ (he says) was born in a stable among oxen and -asses; which was meant to indicate symbolically that we ought to regard -the beasts as our brothers, and treat them accordingly. All that I -have here adduced sufficiently proves that the moral chord, of which -we are speaking, is now at length beginning to vibrate also in the -West. For the rest, we may observe that compassion for sentient beings -is not to carry us to the length of abstaining from flesh, like the -Brahmans. This is because, by a natural law, capacity for pain keeps -pace with the intelligence; consequently men, by going without animal -food, especially in the North, would suffer more than beasts do through -a quick death, which is always unforeseen; although the latter ought -to be made still easier by means of chloroform. Indeed without meat -nourishment mankind would be quite unable to withstand the rigours of -the Northern climate. The same reasoning explains, too, why we are -right in making animals work for us; it is only when they are subjected -to an excessive amount of toil that cruelty begins. - -(8) It is perhaps not impossible to investigate and explain -metaphysically the ultimate cause of that Compassion in which alone all -non-egoistic conduct can have its source; but let us for the moment put -aside such inquiries, and consider the phaenomenon in question, from -the empirical point of view, simply as a natural arrangement. Now if -Nature's intention was to soften as much as possible the numberless -sufferings of every sort, to which our life is exposed, and which no -one altogether escapes; if she wished to provide some counterbalance -for the burning Egoism, which fills all beings, and often develops into -malice; it will at once strike every one as obvious that she could not -have chosen any method more effectual than that of planting in the -human heart the wonderful disposition, which inclines one man to share -the pain of another, and from which proceeds the voice that bids us, in -tones strong and unmistakable, take thought for our neighbour; calling, -at one time, "Protect!" at another, "Help!" Assuredly, from the mutual -succour thus arising, there was more to be hoped for, towards the -attainment of universal well-being, than from a stern Command of duty, -couched in general, abstract terms,--the product of certain reasoning -processes, and of artificial combinations of conceptions. From such -an Imperative, indeed, all the less result could be expected because -to the rough human unit general propositions and abstract truths are -unintelligible, the concrete only having some meaning for him. And -it should be remembered that mankind in its entirety, a very small -part alone excepted, has always been rude, and must remain so, since -the large amount of bodily toil, which for the race as a whole is -inevitable, leaves no time for mental culture. Whereas, in order to -awaken that sense, which has been proved to be the sole source of -disinterested action, and consequently the true basis of Morals, there -is no need of abstract knowledge, but only of intuitive perception, of -the simple comprehension of a concrete case. To this Compassion is at -once responsive, without the mediation of other thoughts. - -(9) The following circumstance will be found in complete accord with -the last paragraph. The foundation, which I have given to Ethics, -leaves me without a forerunner among the School Philosophers; indeed, -my position is paradoxical, as far as their teaching goes, and many -of them, for instance, the Stoics (Seneca, _De Clementia_, II., 5), -Spinoza (_Ethica_, IV., prop. 50), and Kant (_Kritik der Praktischen -Vernunft,_ p. 213; R. p. 257) only notice the motive of Compassion to -utterly reject and contemn it. On the other hand, my basis is supported -by the authority of the greatest moralist of modern times; for such, -undoubtedly, J. J. Rousseau is,--that profound reader of the human -heart, who drew his wisdom not from books, but from life, and intended -his doctrine not for the professorial chair, but for humanity; he, -the foe of all prejudice, the foster-child of nature, whom alone she -endowed with the gift of being able to moralise without tediousness, -because he hit the truth and stirred the heart. I shall therefore -venture here to cite some passages from his works in support of my -theory, observing that, so far, I have been as sparing as possible with -regard to quotations. - -In the _Discours sur l'Origine de l'Inégalité_, p. 91 (edit. Bipont.), -he says: _Il y a un autre principe, que Hobbes n'a point aperçu, et qui -ayant été donné à l'homme pour adoucir, en certaines circonstances, -la férocité de son amour-propre, tempère l'ardeur qu'il a pour son -bien-être par une RÉPUGNANCE INNÉE À VOIR SOUFFRIR SON SEMBLABLE. Je ne -crois pas avoir aucune contradiction à craindre en accordant à l'homme -la SEULE VERTU NATURELLE qu'ait été forcé de reconnaître le détracteur -le plus outré des vertus humaines. Je parle DE LA PITIÉ_, etc.[13] - -P. 92: _Mandeville a bien senti qu'avec toute leur morale les hommes -n'eussent jamais été que des monstres, si la nature ne leur eut donné -LA PITIÉ à l'appui de la raison: mais il n'a pas vu, que DE CETTE SEULE -QUALITÉ DECOULENT TOUTES LES VERTUS SOCIALES, qu'il veut disputer aux -hommes. En effet, qu'est-ce que la générosité, la clémence, l'humanité, -sinon LA PITIÉ, appliquée aux faibles, aux coupables, ou a l'espèce -humaine en général? La bienveillance et l'amitié même sont, à le bien -prendre, des productions d'une pitié constante, fixée sur un objet -particulier; car désirer que quelqu'un ne souffre point, qu'est-ce -autre chose, que désirer qu'il soit heureux?... La commisération sera -d'autant plus énergique, que L'ANIMAL SPECTATEUR S'IDENTIFIERA plus -intimement avec L'ANIMAL SOUFFRANT._[14] - -P. 94: _Il est donc bien certain, que la pitié est un sentiment -naturel, qui, modérant dans chaque individu l'amour de soi-même, -concourt à la conservation mutuelle de toute l'espèce. C'est elle, qui -dans l'état de nature, tient lieu de lois, de mœurs, et de vertus, avec -cet avantage, que nul ne sera tenté de désobéir à sa douce voix: c'est -elle, qui détournera tout sauvage robuste d'enlever à un faible enfant, -ou à un vieillard infirme, sa subsistence acquise avec peine, si lui -même espère pouvoir trouver la sienne ailleurs: c'est elle qui, au lieu -de cette maxime sublime de justice raisonnée: "Fais à autrui comme tu -veux qu'on te fasse;" inspire à tous les hommes cette autre maxime de -bonté naturelle, bien moins parfaite, mais plus utile peut-être que -la précédente: "Fais ton bien avec le moindre mal d'autrui qu'il est -possible." C'est, en un mot, DANS CE SENTIMENT NATUREL PLUTÔT, QUE DANS -LES ARGUMENTS SUBTILS, qu'il faut chercher la cause de la repugnance -qu'éprouverait tout homme à mal faire, même indépendamment des maximes -de l'éducation._[15] - -Let this be compared with what he says in _Émile,_ Bk. IV., pp. 115-120 -(edit. Bipont.), where the following passage occurs among others:-- - -_En effet, comment nous laissons-nous émouvoir à la pitié, si ce n'est -en nous transportant hors de nous et en nous IDENTIFIANT AVEC L'ANIMAL -SOUFFRANT: EN QUITTANT, pour ainsi dire, NOTRE ÊTRE, POUR PRENDRE LE -SIEN? Nous ne souffrons qu'autant que nous jugeons qu'il souffre: CE -N'EST PAS DANS NOUS, C'EST DANS LUI, que nous souffrons ... offrir au -jeune homme des objets, sur lesquels puisse agir la force expansive de -son cœur, qui le dilatent, qui l'étendent sur les autres êtres, qui le -fassent partout SE RETROUVER HORS DE LUI: écarter avec soin ceux, qui -le resserrent, le concentrent, et tendent le ressort DU MOI HUMAIN_, -etc.[16] - -Inside the pale of the Schools, as above remarked, there is not a -single authority in favour of my position; but outside, I have other -testimony to cite, in addition to Rousseau's. The Chinese admit five -cardinal virtues (Tschang), of which the chief is Compassion (*Sin). -The other four are: justice, courtesy, wisdom, and sincerity.[17] -Similarly, among the Hindus, we find that on the tablets placed to -the memory of dead chieftains, compassion for men and animals takes -the first place in the record of their virtues. At Athens there was -an altar to Compassion in the Agora, as we know from Pausanias, I. -17: _Άθηναίοις δὲ ἐν τῇ ἀγορᾷ ἐστι Ἐλέου βωμός, ᾧ, μάλιστα θεῶν ἐς -ἀνθρώπινον βίον καὶ μεταβολὰς πραγμάτων ὃτι ὠ-ϕέλιμος, μόνοι τιμὰς -Ἑλλήνων νέμουσιν Ἀθηνᾱίοι_.[18] - -Lucian also mentions this altar in the Timon, § 99.[19] A phrase of -Phocion, preserved by Stobaeus, describes Compassion as the most sacred -thing in human life: _οὕτε ἐξ ἱεροn βωμόν, οὕτε ἐκ τῆς ἀνθρωπίυης -ϕύσεως ἀϕαιρετέον τὸν ἔλεον._[20] In the _Sapientia Indorum,_ the Greek -translation of the Paṅća-tantra, we read (Section 3, p. 220): _Δέγεται -γάρ, ὡς πρώτη τῶν ἀρετῶν ἡ ἐλεημοσύνη_.[21] It is clear, then, that the -real source of morality has been distinctly recognised at all times and -in all countries; Europe alone excepted, owing to the _foetor Judaicus_ -(Jewish stench), which here pervades everything, and is the reason why -the Western races require for the object of their obedience a command -of duty, a moral law, an imperative, in short, an order and decree. -They remain wedded to this habit of thought, and refuse to open their -eyes to the fact that such a view is, after all, based upon nothing -but Egosim. Of course, now and then, isolated individuals of fine -perception have felt the truth, and given it utterance: such a one was -Rousseau; and such, Lessing. In a letter written by the latter in 1756 -we read: "The best man, and the one most likely to excel in all social -virtues, in all forms of magnanimity, is he who is most compassionate." - - -[1] This term appears to have been first used by Newton and Boyle. -The sense is undoubtedly derived from Bacon's phrase "_instantia -crucis_," which is one of his "Prerogative Instances." _Vide, Novum -Organum_: Lib. II., xxxvi., where it is explained as follows: _Inter -Praerogativas Instantiarum ponemus loco decimo quarto_ INSTANTIAS -CRUCIS; _translate vocabulo a Crucibus, quae erectae in Biviis, -indicant et signant viarum separationes. Has etiam Instantias -Decisorias et Judiciales, et in Casibus nonnullis Instantias Oraculi et -Mandati, appellare consuevimus_, etc.--(_Translator_.) - -[2] According to Buxton (_The African Slave-trade_, 1839), their number -is even now yearly increased by about 150,000 freshly imported; and to -these more than 200,000 must be added, who perish miserably at the time -of their capture, or on the voyage. - -[3] _I.e_., under the influence of wine one speaks the truth. Cf. -Pliny, _Nat. Hist_, xiv., chap. 22, § 28, 141, edit. Teubner; -_vulgoque_ VERITAS _jam attributa_ VINO _est_. Gk. _οἶνος καὶ ἀλήθεια. -V. Paroemiographi_, edit. Gaisford.--(_Translator_.) - -[4] Hor., _Carm_., I., 35, 26.--(_Translator. _) - -[5] - - Compassion, who with no uncertain tone, - The work of vengeance done, her laws makes known. - - -[6] - - Have beasts, forsooth, their universities, - Endowed, like ours, with all four faculties? - - -[7] _V_. Part II., Chapter VI. - -[8] Avatāra (ava-tṛī to descend), descent of a deity from heaven; -_e.g._, the ten incarnations of Vishṇu. _V_. Monier Williams' _Sanskrit -Dictionary_.--(_Translator_.) - -[9] Sannyāsin (one who lays down, or resigns), an ascetic; a religious -mendicant, or Brāhman of the fourth order. _V._ Monier Williams' -_Sanskrit Dictionary_.--(_Translator_.) - -[10] _V_. Apuleius: _Apologia sive De Magia Liber_ (Lipsiae, Teubner, -1900: page 41, chap, xxxi): _Pythagoram ... memoriae prodiderunt, -cum animaduertisset proxime Metapontum in litore Italiae suae, quam -subsiciuam Graeciam fecerat, a quibusdam piscatoribus euerriculum -trahi, fortunam iactus eius emisse et pretio dato iussisse, -ilico piscis eos qui capti tenebantur solui retibus et reddi -profundo._--(_Translator_.) - -[11] In Vol. II. of my _Parerga_, § 177, I have shown that its origin -can be traced to the Old Testament. - -[12] How seriously the matter is being taken up may be seen from the -following case which is quite recent. I quote from the _Birmingham -Journal_ of December, 1839. "Arrest of a company of eighty-four -abettors of dog-fights.--It had come to the knowledge of the Society -of Animals' Friends that the Square in Fox Street, Birmingham, was -yesterday to be the scene of a dog-fight. Measures were accordingly -taken to secure the assistance of the police, and a strong detachment -of constables was sent to the spot. At the right moment all the persons -present were arrested. These precious conspirators were then handcuffed -together in pairs, and the whole party was made fast by a long rope -passing between each couple. In this fashion they were marched off -to the Police Station, where mayor and magistrate were sitting in -readiness for them. The two ringleaders were condemned to pay, each, -a fine of £1, and 8s. _6d_. costs; in default, to undergo 14 days' -hard labour." The coxcombs whose habit is never to miss noble sport of -this sort, must have looked somewhat crestfallen in the midst of the -procession. But the _Times_ of April 6, 1855, p. 6, supplies a still -more striking instance from the present day; and here we find the paper -itself assuming judicial functions, and imposing the right punishment. -It recounts the case of a very wealthy Scotch baronet's daughter. The -matter had been brought before the law, and the evidence showed that -the girl had used a cudgel and knife on her horse with the greatest -cruelty; for which she was ordered to pay a fine of £5. But for one -in her position such a sum means nothing, and she would practically -have got off scot-free, had not the _Times_ intervened to inflict -on her a proper correction, such as she would really feel. It twice -mentions the young lady's name in full, printing it in large type, -and concludes as follows: "We cannot help saying that a few months' -imprisonment with the addition of an occasional whipping administered -in private, but by the most muscular woman in Hampshire, would have -been a much more suitable penalty for Miss M. N. A wretched being of -this sort has forfeited all the consideration and the privileges that -attach to her sex; we cannot regard her any longer as a woman." These -newspaper paragraphs I would especially recommend to the notice of the -associations now formed in Germany against cruelty to animals; for they -show what lines should be adopted, in order to reach some solid result. -At the same time I desire to express my cordial appreciation of the -praiseworthy zeal shown by Herrn Hofrath Perner, of Munich, who has -entirely devoted himself to this branch of well-doing, and succeeded in -arousing interest in it all over the country. [It should be observed -that the first portion of this note belongs to the earliest edition -of the work, published September, 1840; the latter part was written -for the second edition, which appeared in August, 1860. This explains -why Schopenhauer says that the first instance, dated 1839, is "quite -recent," and that the second, dated 1855, is taken "from the present -day."--(_Translator_.) - -[13] There is another principle which Hobbes did not perceive -at all. It was implanted in man in order to soften, in certain -circumstances, the fierceness of his self-love, and it moderates the -ardour, which he feels for his own well-being, by producing a certain -_innate aversion to the sight of a fellow-creature's suffering_. In -attributing to man _the only natural virtue,_ which even the most -advanced scepticism has been forced to recognise, I stand, assuredly, -in no fear of any contradiction. I allude to _compassion_, etc. - -[14] Mandeville was right in thinking that with all their -systems of morality, men would never have been anything but monsters, -if nature had not given them _compassion_ to support their reason; but -he failed to see that _from this one quality spring all the social -virtues_, which he was unwilling to credit mankind with. In reality, -what is generosity, clemency, humanity, if not _compassion_, applied -to the weak, to the guilty, or to the human race, as a whole? Even -benevolence and friendship, if we look at the matter rightly, are -seen to result from a constant compassion, directed upon a particular -object; for to desire that some one should not suffer is nothing else -than to desire that he should be happy.... The more closely _the living -spectator identifies himself with the living sufferer,_ the more active -does pity become. - -[15] It is, then, quite certain that compassion is a natural -feeling, which checking, as it does, the love of self in each -individual, helps by a reciprocal process to preserve the whole race. -This it is, which in the state of nature, takes the place of laws, -customs, and virtues, with the added advantage that no one will be -tempted to disobey its gentle voice; this it is, which will restrain -every able-bodied savage, provided he hope to find his own livelihood -elsewhere, from robbing a weak child, or depriving an infirm old man of -the subsistence won by hard toil; this it is, which inspires all men, -not indeed with that sublime maxim of reasoned justice: "Do to others -as you would they should do unto you;" but with another rule of natural -goodness, no doubt less perfect, but perhaps more useful, namely: "Do -what is good for yourself with the least possible harm to others." In a -word, it is _in this natural feeling rather than in subtle arguments_ -that we must look for the reason of the repugnance with which every -one is accustomed to view bad conduct, quite independently of the -principles laid down by education. - -[16] In fact, how is it that we let ourselves be moved to -pity, if not by getting out of our own consciousness, and _becoming -identified with the living sufferer; by leaving_, so to say, _our own -being, and entering into his?_ We do not suffer, except as we suppose -he suffers; _it is not in us, it is in him_, that we suffer ... offer -a young man objects, on which the expansive force of his heart can -act; objects such as may enlarge his nature, and incline it to go out -to _other beings_, in whom he may everywhere _find himself again_. -Keep carefully away those things which narrow his view, and make -him self-centred, and which tighten the strings of the _human ego_. -(_Tendent le ressort_ (stretch the spring) _du moi humain: i.e._, -stimulate the _egoistic tendency_.)--(_Translator_.) - -[17] _Journal Asiatique_, Vol. ix., p. 62. Cf. Meng-Tseu -(otherwise called Mencius), edited by Stanislas Julien, 1824, Bk. I, § -45; also Meng-Tseu in the _Livres Sacrés de l'Orient_, by Panthier p. -281. - -_V. Dictionnaire Français--Latin--Chinois_, par Paul Perny (Didot Frères, Paris, -1869); where the five cardinal virtues (image) are transliterated] ou -châng. _V_. also: _A Syllabic Dictionary of the Chinese Language_; by -S. Wells Williams, LL.B. (Shanghai: 1874); where Sin (Sin), _i.e._, -humanity, love of one's neighbour, is written Sin'.--(_Translator._) - -[18] The Athenians have an altar in their Agora to Compassion; -for this deity, they believe, is of all the gods the most helpful in -human life, and its vicissitudes. They are the only Greeks who have -instituted this cultus.--(_Translator_.) - -[19] _V_. Lucian, _Timon_, chap. 42 (_Ausgewählte Schriften des -Lucian_, edit. Julius Sommerbrodt; Weidmann, Berlin, 1872, p. 75): -_ϕίλος δὲ ἣ ξένος ἣ ἑταῑρος ἣ Έλέον βωμός ὔθλος πολύς_. _V_. also -Apollodorus (edit. J. Bekker); 2, 8, 1. 3, 7, 1. Dem. (edit. Reisk.), -57. Scholiast on Soph. _Œd. Col._,258.--(_Translator_.) - - -[20] A temple must not be despoiled of its altar, nor human -nature of compassion. _V_. Joannis Stobaei _Anthologium,_ edit. Curtius -Wachsmuth et Otto Hense; Weidmann, Berlin, 1894; Vol. III., p. 20, Nr. -52.--(_Translator_.) - -[21] The chief of virtues is said to be Compassion. The -_Paṅća-tantra_ is a well-known collection of moral stories and fables -in five (_paṅćan_) books or chapters (_tantra_), from which the author -of the _Hitopadeśa_ drew a large portion of his materials. _V_. Monier -Williams' _Sanskrit Dictionary_.--(_Translator_.) - - - - -CHAPTER IX. - -ON THE ETHICAL DIFFERENCE OF CHARACTER. - - -There still remains a question to be resolved, before the basis which -I have given to Ethics can be presented in all its completeness. It -is this. On what does the great difference in the moral behaviour of -men rest? If Compassion be the original incentive of all true, that -is, disinterested justice and loving-kindness; how comes it that some -are, while others are not, influenced thereby? Are we to suppose that -Ethics, which discloses the moral stimulus, is also capable of setting -it in motion? Can Ethics fashion the hard-hearted man anew, so that -he becomes compassionate, and, as a consequence, just and humane? -Certainly not. The difference of character is innate, and ineradicable. -The wicked man is born with his wickedness as much as the serpent is -with its poison-fangs and glands, nor can the former change his nature -a whit more than the latter.[1] _Velle non discitur_ (to use one's will -is not a thing that can be taught) is a saying of Nero's tutor. In the -_Meno_, Plato minutely investigates the nature of virtue, and inquires -whether it can, or cannot, be taught. He quotes a passage from Theognis: - - _ἀλλὰ διδάσκων_ - _Οὔποτε ποιήσεις τὸν κακὸν ἄνδρ' ἀγαθόν._ - - (But thou wilt ne'er, - By teaching make the bad man virtuous.) - -and finally reaches this conclusion: _ἀρετὴ ἃν εἴη oὔτε ϕύσει, -oὔτε διδακτόν, ἀλλὰ θείᾳ μοίρᾳ παραγυγνομένη, ἄνευ νοῡ, οἷς ἄν -παραγίγνηται_.[2] Here the terms _ϕύσει_ and _θείᾳ μοίρᾳ_, form a -distinction, in my opinion, much the same as that between "physical" -and "metaphysical." Socrates, the father of Ethics, if we may trust -Aristotle, declared that _oὐκ ἐϕ' ἡ μῑν γενέσθαι τὸ σπουδαίους εἶναι, -ἢ ϕαύλους._[3] (_Moralia Magna_, i. 9.) Moreover, Aristotle himself -expresses the same view; _παςι γὰρ δοκεῑ ἕκαστα τῶν ἠθῶν ὑπάρχειν -ϕύσει τως' καὶ γὰρ δίκαιοι, καὶ σωϕρονικοὶ, καὶ τἄλλa ἔχομεν εὐθyς -ἐκ γενετῆς._[4] (_Eth. Nicom._ vi. 13.) We find also a similar -conviction very decidedly expressed in the fragments attributed -to the Pythagorean Archytas, and preserved by Stobaeus in the -_Florilegium_ (Chap. i. § 77).[5] If not authentic, they are certainly -very old. Orelli gives them in his _Opuscula Graecorum Sententiosa et -Moralia_. There (Vol. II., p. 240) we read in the Dorian dialect as -follows:--_Τὰς γὰρ λόγοις καὶ ἀποδείξεσιν ποτιχρωμένας ἀρετὰς δέον -έπιστάμας ποταγορεύεν, ἀρετὰν δέ, τὰν ἠθικὰν καὶ βελτίσταν ἕξιν τῶ -ἀλόγω μέρεος τᾱς ·ψυχᾱς, καθ' ἃν καὶ ποιοί τινες ἦμεν λεγόμεθα κατὰ -τὸ ἦθος, οἷον ἐλευθέριοι, δίκαιοι καὶ σώϕρονες_.[6] On examining the -virtues and vices, as summarised by Aristotle in the _De Virtutibus -et Vitiis_, it will be found that all of them, without exception, are -not properly thinkable unless assumed to be inborn qualities, and -that only as such can they be genuine. If, in consequence of reasoned -reflection, we take them as voluntary, they are then seen to lose their -reality, and pass into the region of empty forms; whence it immediately -follows that their permanence and resistance under the storm and stress -of circumstance could not be counted on. And the same is true of the -virtue of loving-kindness, of which Aristotle, in common with all the -ancients, knows nothing. Montaigne keeps, of course, his sceptical -tone, but he practically agrees with the venerable authorities -above quoted, when he says: _Serait-il vrai, que pour être bon tout -à fait, il nous le faille être par occulte, naturelle et universelle -propriété, sans lot, sans raison, sans exemple_?[7]--(Liv. II., chap. -11.) Lichtenberg hits the mark exactly in his _Vermischte Schriften_, -(_v. Moralische Bemerkungen_). He writes: "All virtue arising from -premeditation is not worth much. What is wanted is feeling or habit." -Lastly, it should be noted that Christianity itself, in its original -teaching, recognises, and bears witness to this inherent, immutable -difference between character and character. In the Sermon on the Mount -we find the allegory of the fruit which is determined by the nature of -the tree that bears it (_Luke_ vi. 43, 44; cf. _Matthew_ vii. 16-18); -and then in the following verse (_Luke_ vi. 45), we read: _ὁ ἀγαθὸς -ἄνθρωπος ἐκ τοῡ ἀγαθοῡ θησαυροῡ τῆς καρδίας αὐτοῡ προϕέρει τὸ ἀγαθὸν -καὶ ὁ πονμρὸς ἄνθρωπος ἐκ τοῡ πoνηροῡ θησαυροῡ τῆς καρδίας αὐτοῡ -προϕέρει τὸπονηρόν._[8] (Cf. _Matthew_ xii. 35.) - -But it was Kant who first completely cleared up this important -point through his profound doctrine of the =empirical= and -=intelligible=[9] character. He showed that the empirical -character, which manifests itself in time and in multiplicity -of action, is a phaenomenon; while the reality behind it is the -intelligible character, which, being the essential constitution of the -Thing in itself underlying the phaenomenon, is independent of time, -space, plurality, and change. In this way alone can be explained what -is so astonishing, and yet so well known to all who have learnt life's -lessons,--the fixed unchangeableness of human character. There are -certain ethical writers, whose aim is the moral improvement of men, and -who talk of progress made in the path of virtue; but their assurances -are always met and victoriously confuted by the irrefragable facts -of experience, which prove that virtue is nature's work and cannot -be inculcated. The character is an original datum, immutable, and -incapable of any amelioration through correction by the intellect. Now, -were this not so; and further: if (as the above-mentioned dull-headed -preachers maintain) an improvement of the character, and hence "a -constant advance towards the good" were possible by means of moral -instruction; then, unless we are prepared to suppose that all the -various religious institutions, and all the efforts of the moralists -fail in their purpose, we should certainly expect to find that the -older half of mankind, at least on an average, is distinctly better -than the younger. This, however, is so far from being the case, that it -is not to the old, who have, as we see, grown worse by experience, but -to the young that we look for something good. It may happen that in his -old age one man appears somewhat better, another worse, than he was in -his youth. But the reason is not far to seek. It is simply because with -length of days the intelligence by constant correction becomes riper, -and hence the character stands out in purer and clearer shape; while -early life is a prey to ignorance, mistakes, and chimeras, which now -present false motives, and now veil the real. For a fuller explanation -I would refer the reader to the principles laid down in Chapter III. of -the preceding Essay, on "The Freedom of the Will."[10] It is true that -among convicts the young have a large majority; but this is because, -when a tendency to crime exists in the character, it soon finds a way -of expressing itself in acts, and of reaching its goal--the galleys, or -the gibbet; while he, whom all the inducements to wrong doing, which -a long life offers, have failed to lead astray, is not likely to fall -at the eleventh hour. Hence the respect paid to age is, in my opinion, -due to the fact that the old are considered to have passed through a -test of sixty or seventy years, and kept their integrity unsullied; for -this of course is the _sine qua non_ of the honour accorded them. These -things are too well known for any one, in real life, to be misled by -the promises of the moralists we have spoken of. He who has once been -proved guilty of evil-doing, is never again trusted, just as the noble -nature, of which a man has once given evidence, is always confidently -believed in, whatever else may have changed. _Operari sequitur esse_ -(what one does follows from what one is) forms, as we have seen in Part -II., Chapter VIII., a pregnant tenet of the Schoolmen. Everything in -the world works according to the unchangeable constitution of which -its being, its =essentia= is composed. And man is no exception. -As the individual is, so will he, so must he, act: and the _liberum -arbitrium indifferentiae_ (free and indifferent choice) is an invention -of philosophy in her childhood, long since exploded; although there -are some old women, in doctor's academicals, who still like to drag it -about with them. - -The three fundamental springs of human action--Egoism, Malice, -Compassion--are inherent in every one in different and strangely -unequal proportions. Their combination in any given case determines -the weight of the motives that present themselves, and shapes the -resulting line of conduct. To an egoistic character egoistic motives -alone appeal, and those, which suggest either compassion or malice, -have no appreciable effect. Thus, a man of this type will sacrifice -his interests as little to take vengeance on his foes, as to help his -friends. Another, whose nature is highly susceptible to malicious -motives, will not shrink from doing great harm to himself, so only he -may injure his neighbour. For there are characters which take such -delight in working mischief on others, that they forget their own -loss, which is perhaps, equal to what they inflict. One may say of -such: _Dum alteri noceat sui negligens_[11] (disregarding himself so -long as he injures the other). These are the people that plunge with -passionate joy into the battle in which they expect to receive quite -as many wounds as they deal; indeed, experience not seldom testifies -that they are ready deliberately, first to kill the man who thwarts -their purposes, and then themselves, in order to escape the penalty -of the law. On the other hand, =goodness of heart= consists of a -deeply felt, all-embracing Compassion for everything that has breath, -and especially for man; because, in proportion as the intelligence -develops, capacity for pain increases; and hence, the countless -sufferings of human beings, in mind and body, have a much stronger -claim to Compassion than those of animals, which are only physical, -and in any case less acute. This goodness of heart, therefore, in the -first place restrains a man from doing any sort of harm to others, and, -next, it bids him give succour whenever and wherever he sees distress. -And the path of Compassion may lead as far in one direction as Malice -does in the other. Certain rare characters of fine sensibility take to -heart the calamities of others more than their own, so that they make -sacrifices, which, it may be, entail on themselves a greater amount -of suffering than that removed from those they benefit. Nay, in cases -where several, or, perhaps, a large number of persons, at one time, -can be helped in this way, such men do not, if need be, flinch from -absolute self-effacement. Arnold von Winkelried was one of these. So -was Paulinus, Bishop of Nola, in the fifth century, when the Vandals -crossed over from Africa and invaded Italy. Of him we read in Johann -von Müller's _Weltgeschichte_ (Bk. X., chap. 10) that "in order to -ransom some of the prisoners, he had already disposed of all the church -plate, his own and his friends' private property. Then, on seeing the -anguish of a widow, whose only son was being carried off, he offered -himself for servitude in the other's stead. For whoever was of suitable -age, and had not fallen by the sword, was taken captive to Carthage." - -There is, then, an enormous difference between character and character. -Being original and innate, it measures the responsiveness of the -individual to this or that motive, and those alone, to which he is -specially sensitive, will appeal to him with anything like compelling -force. As in chemistry, with unchangeable certainty, one substance -reacts only upon acids, another only upon alkalies, so, with equal -invariableness, different natures respond to different stimuli. The -motives suggesting loving-kindness, which stir so deeply a good -disposition, can, of themselves, effect nothing in a heart that listens -only to the promptings of Egoism. If it be wished to induce the egoist -to act with beneficence and humanity, this can be done but in one way: -he must be made to believe that the assuaging of others' suffering -will, somehow or other, surely turn out to his =own advantage=. -What, indeed, are most moral systems but attempts of different kinds in -this direction? But such procedure only misleads, does not better, the -will. To make a real improvement, it would be necessary to transform -the entire nature of the individual's susceptibility for motives. Thus, -from one we should have to remove his indifference to the suffering -of others as such; from another, the delight which he feels in causing -pain; from a third, the natural tendency which makes him regard the -smallest increase of his own well-being as so far outweighing all other -motives, that the latter become as dust in the balance. Only it is far -easier to change lead into gold than to accomplish such a task. For -it means the turning round, so to say, of a man's heart in his body, -the remoulding of his very being. In point of fact, all that can be -done is to clear the =intellect=, correct the =judgment=, -and so bring him to a better comprehension of the objective realities -and actual relations of life. This effected, the only result gained is -that his will reveals itself more logically, distinctly, and decidedly, -with no false ring in its utterance. It should be noted that just as -many a good act rests at bottom on false motives, on well-meant, yet -illusory representations of an advantage to be obtained thereby in -this, or another, world; so not a few misdeeds are due solely to an -imperfect understanding of the conditions of human life. It is on this -latter truth that the American penitentiary system is based. Here the -aim is not, to improve the =heart=, but simply, to educate the -=head= of the criminal, so that he may intellectually come to -perceive that prosperity is more surely, indeed more easily, reached by -work and honesty than by idleness and knavery. - -By the proper presentment of motives =legality= may be secured, -but not =morality=. It is possible to remodel what one does, but -not what one =wills to do=; and it is to the will alone that -real moral worth belongs. It is not possible to change the goal which -the will strives after, but only the path expected to lead thither. -Instruction may alter the selection of means, but not the choice of -the ultimate object which the individual keeps before him in all he -does; this is determined by his will in accordance with its original -nature. It is true that the egoist may be brought to understand that, -if he gives up certain small advantages, he will gain greater; and the -malicious man may be taught that by injuring others he will injure -himself still more. But Egoism itself, and Malice itself, will never -be argued out of a person; as little as a cat can be talked out of her -inclination for mice. Similarly with goodness of heart. If the judgment -be trained, if the relations and conditions of life become understood, -in a word, if the intellect be enlightened; the character dominated by -loving-kindness will be led to express itself more consistently and -completely than it otherwise could. This happens when we perceive the -remoter consequences which our conduct has for others: the sufferings, -perhaps, that overtake them indirectly, and only after lapse of -time, through one act or another of ours, which we had no idea was -so harmful. It occurs, too, when we come to discern the evil results -of many a well-meant action, as, for instance, the screening of a -criminal; and it is especially true when we realise that the _Neminem -laede_ (injure no one) has in all cases precedence over the _Omnes -juva_ (help all men). In this sense there is undoubtedly such a thing -as a moral education, an ethical training capable of making men better. -But it goes only as far as I have indicated, and its limits are quickly -discovered. The head is filled with the light of knowledge; the heart -remains unimproved. The fundamental and determining element, in things -moral, no less than in things intellectual, and things physical, is -that which is inborn. Art is always subordinate, and can only lend a -helping hand. Each man is, what he is, as it were, "by the grace of -God," _jure divino, θείᾳ, μοίρᾳ_, (by divine dispensation). - - _Du bist am Ende--WAS DU BIST._ - _Setz' dir Perrücken auf von Millionen Locken,_ - _Setz' deinen Fuss auf ellenhohe Socken:_ - _DU BLEIBST DOCH IMMER WAS DU BIST._[12] - -But the reader, I am sure, has long been wishing to put the question: -Where, then, does blame and merit come in? The answer is fully -contained in Part IL, Chapter VIII., to which I therefore beg to call -particular attention. It is there that the explanation, which otherwise -would now follow, found a natural place; because the matter is closely -connected with Kant's doctrine of the co-existence of Freedom and -Necessity. Our investigation led to the conclusion that, once the -motives are brought into play, the _Operari_ (what, is done) is a thing -of absolute necessity; consequently, Freedom, the existence of which -is betokened solely by the sense of =responsibility=, cannot -but belong to the _Esse_ (what one is). No doubt the reproaches of -conscience have to do, in the first place, and ostensibly, with our -acts, but through these they, in reality, reach down to what we are; -for what we do is the only indisputable index of what we =are=, -and reflects our character just as faithfully as symptoms betray the -malady. Hence it is to this _Esse_, to what we =are=, that blame -and merit must ultimately be attributed. Whatever we esteem and love, -or else despise and hate, in others, is not a changeable, transient -appearance, but something constant, stable, and persistent; it is that -which they are. If we find reason to alter our first opinion about -any one, we do not suppose that he is changed, but that we have been -mistaken in him. In like manner, when we are pleased or displeased -with our own conduct, we say that we are satisfied or dissatisfied -with ourselves, meaning, in reality, with that which we are, and are -unalterably, irreversibly; and the same is true with regard to our -intellectual qualities, nay, it even applies to the physiognomy. How -is it possible, then, for blame and merit to lie otherwise than in -what we =are=? As we saw in Part II., Chapter VII., Conscience -is that =register= of our acts, which is always growing longer, -and therefore that acquaintance with ourselves which every day becomes -more complete. Conscience concerns itself directly with all that we -do; when, at one time, actuated by Egoism, or perhaps Malice, we -turn a deaf ear to Compassion, which bids us at least refrain from -harming others, if we will not afford them help and protection; or -when again, at another time, we overcome the first two incentives, -and listen to the voice of the third. Both cases measure the -=distinction= we =draw between ourselves and others=. And on -=this distinction= depends in the last resort the degree of our -morality or immorality, that is, of our justice and loving-kindness, -or the reverse. Little by little the number of those actions, whose -testimony is significant on this point, accumulates in the storehouse -of our memory; and thus the lineaments of our character are depicted -with ever greater clearness, and a true knowledge of ourselves is -nearer attainment. And out of such knowledge there springs a sense of -satisfaction, or dissatisfaction with ourselves, with that which we -are, according as we have been ruled by Egoism, by Malice, or else by -Compassion; in other words, according as the difference we have made -between ourselves and others is greater or smaller. And when we look -outside ourselves, it is by the same standard that we judge those about -us; and we become acquainted with their character--less perfectly -indeed--yet by the same empirical method as we employ with reference to -our own. In this case our feelings take the form of praise, approval, -respect, or, on the other hand, of reproach, displeasure, contempt, -and they are the objective translation, so to say, of the subjective -satisfaction or dissatisfaction (the latter deepening perhaps into -remorse), which arises in us when we sit in judgment on ourselves. -Lastly, there is the evidence of language. We find certain constantly -occurring forms of speech which bear eloquent testimony to the fact -that the blame we cast upon others is in reality directed against their -unchangeable character, touching but superficially what they do; that -virtue and vice are practically, if tacitly, regarded as inherent -unalterable qualities. The following are some of these expressions: -_Jetzt sehe ich, wie du bist_! (Now I know your nature!) _In dir habe -ich mich geirrt_. (I was mistaken in you.) "Now I see what you are!" -_Voilà donc, comme tu es!_ (This, then, is what you are!) _So bin ich -nicht!_ (I am not a person of that sort!) _Ich bin nicht der Mann, der -fähig wäre, Sie zu hintergehen_. (I am not the man to impose upon you.) -Also: _les âmes bien nées_ (persons well-born, _i.e._, noble-minded), -the Spanish _bien nacido; εὐγενής_ (properly "well-born"), _εὐγένεια_ -(properly "nobility of birth") used for "virtuous" and "virtue"; -_generosioris animi amicus_ (a friend of lofty mind. _Generosus_: lit. -"of noble birth"), etc. - -Reason is a necessary condition for conscience, but only because -without the former a clear and connected recollection is impossible. -From its very nature conscience does not speak till =after= -the act; hence we talk of being arraigned before its =bar=. -Strictly speaking, it is improper to say that conscience speaks -=beforehand=; for it can only do so indirectly; that is, when -the remembrance of particular cases in the past leads us, through -reflection, to disapprove of some analogous course of action, while yet -in embryo. - -Such is the ethical fact as delivered by consciousness. It forms of -itself a metaphysical problem, which does not directly belong to the -present question, but which will be touched on in the last part. - -Conscience, then, is nothing else than the acquaintance we make -with our own changeless character through the instrumentality of -our acts. A little consideration will show that this definition -harmonises perfectly with, and hence receives additional confirmation -from, what I have here specially emphasised: namely, the fact that -=susceptibility= for the motives of Egoism, of Malice, and of -Compassion, which is so widely dissimilar in different individuals, and -on which the whole moral value of a man depends, cannot be interpreted -by anything else, nor be gained, or removed, by instruction, as if it -were something born in time, and therefore variable, and subject to -chance. On the contrary, we have seen that it is innate and fixed, an -ultimate datum, admitting of no further explanation. Thus an entire -life, with the whole of its manifold activity, may be likened to a -clock-dial, that marks every movement of the internal works, as they -were made once for all; or it resembles a mirror, wherein alone, with -the eye of his intellect, each person sees reflected the essential -nature of his own Will, that is, the core of his being. - -Whoever takes the trouble to thoroughly think out what has been put -forward here, and in Part. II., Chapter VIII., will discover in the -foundation given by me to Ethics a logical consecution, a rounded -completeness, wanting to all other theories; to say nothing of the -consonance of my view with the facts of experience,--a consonance which -he will look for in vain elsewhere. For only the truth can uniformly -and consistently agree with itself and with nature; while all false -principles are internally at variance with themselves, and externally -contradict the testimony of experience, which at every step records its -silent protest. - -I am perfectly aware that the truths advanced in this Essay, and -particularly here at the close, strike directly at many deeply rooted -prejudices and mistakes, and especially at those attaching to a -certain rudimentary system of morals, now much in vogue, and suitable -for elementary schools. But I cannot own to feeling any penitence or -regret. For, in the first place, I am addressing neither children, nor -the _profanum vulgus_, but an Academy of light and learning. Their -inquiry is a purely theoretical one, concerned with the ultimate -fundamental verities of Ethics; and to a most serious question a -serious answer is undoubtedly expected. And secondly, in my opinion, -there can be no such thing as harmless mistakes, still less privileged -or useful ones. On the contrary, every error works infinitely more evil -than good. If, however, it is wished to make existing prepossessions -the standard of truth, or the boundary beyond which its investigation -is not to go, then it would be more honest to abolish philosophical -Faculties and Academies altogether. For where no reality exists, there -also no semblance of it should be. <hr class="r5" /> - -[1] Cf. _Jeremiah_ xiii. 23.--(_Translator._) - -[2] Virtue would appear not to come naturally (_i.e_., through -the physical order of things), nor can it be taught; but in whomsoever -it dwells, there it is present, _apart from the intellect, under divine -ordinance. [V_. Platonis _Opera_, edit. Didot, Paris, 1856; Vol. I. -_Meno_, 96 and 99, _ad fin_.-- (_Translator_.) - -[3] _It is not in our power_ to be either good or bad. - -[4] For it appears that the different characters of all men -are in some way implanted in them _by nature_; if we are just, and -temperate, and otherwise virtuous, we are so _straightway from our -birth._ - -[5] _V_. Joannis Stobaei _Florilegium_, edit. Meineke, publ. -Lipsiae, Teubner, 1855; Vol. I., p. 33,1. 14, sqq.--(_Translator_.) - -[6] For the so-called virtues, that require reasoning and -demonstration, ought to be called sciences. By the term "virtue" we -mean rather a certain moral and excellent disposition of _the soul's -unreasoning part_. This disposition determines the character which we -show, and in accordance with which we are called generous, just, or -temperate. - -[7] Are we to believe it true that we can only be thoroughly -good by virtue of a certain occult, natural, and universal faculty, -without law, without reason, without precedent? - -[8] The good man out of the good treasure of his heart -bringeth forth that which is good; and the evil man out of the evil -treasure of his heart bringeth forth that which is evil. - -[9] _V_. Note on "intelligible," Part. II., Chapter -I.--(_translator_.) - -[10] _Die Freiheit des Willens_ and the present treatise -were published by Schopenhauer together, under the title of -_Die Beiden Grundprobleme der Ethik. V_. Introduction, p. xv., -note.--(_Translator_.) - -[11] Seneca, _De Ira_, I. 1. - -[12] - -In spite of all, thou art still--_what thou art._ -Though wigs with countless curls thy head-gear be, -Though shoes an ell in height adorn thy feet: -_Unchang'd thou e'er remainest what thou art._ - -_V_. Goethe's _Faust_, Part I., Studirzimmer.--(_Translator_.)] - - - - -PART IV. - -ON THE METAPHYSICAL EXPLANATION OF THE PRIMAL ETHICAL PHAENOMENON. - - - - -CHAPTER I. - -HOW THIS APPENDIX MUST BE UNDERSTOOD. - - -In the foregoing pages the moral incentive (Compassion) has been -established as a fact, and I have shown that from it alone can proceed -unselfish justice and genuine loving-kindness, and that on these two -cardinal virtues all the rest depend. Now, for the purpose of supplying -Ethics with a foundation, this is sufficient, in a certain sense; that -is, in so far as Moral Science necessarily requires to be supported by -some actual and demonstrable basis, whether existing in the external -world, or in the consciousness. The only alternative is to tread in the -footsteps that so many of my predecessors have left, in other words, to -choose arbitrarily some proposition or other,--some bare and abstract -formula--and make it the source of all that morality prescribes; -or, like Kant, to sublimate a mere idea, that of =law=, into -the key-stone of the ethical arch. But, dismissing this method for -the reasons discussed above, in the Second Part, the investigation -proposed by the Royal Society appears to me now completed. For their -question, as it stands, deals only with the foundation of Ethics; as -to a possible metaphysical explanation of this foundation nothing -whatever is asked. Nevertheless, at the point we have reached, I am -very sensible that the human spirit can find no abiding satisfaction, -no real repose. As in all branches of practical research, so also -in Ethical Science, when all is said, man is inevitably confronted -with an ultimate phaenomenon, which while it renders an account -of everything that it includes, and everything deducible from it, -remains itself an unexplained riddle. So that here, as elsewhere, the -want is felt of a final interpretation (which, obviously, cannot but -be =metaphysical=) of the ultimate data, as such, and through -these,--if they be taken in their entirety--of the world. And here, -too, this want finds utterance in the question: How is it that, what -is present to our senses, and grasped by our intellect, is as it is, -and not otherwise? And how does the character of the phaenomenon, as -manifest to us, shape itself out of the essential nature of things? -Indeed, in Moral Science the need of a metaphysical basis is more -urgent than in any other, because all systems, philosophical no less -than religious, are at one in persistently attaching to =conduct= -not only an ethical, but also a metaphysical significance, which, -passing beyond the mere appearance of things, transcends every -possibility of experience, and therefore stands in the closest -connection with human destiny and with the whole cosmic process. For -if life (it is averred) have a meaning, then the supreme goal to which -it points is undoubtedly ethical. Nor is this view a bare unsupported -theory; it is sufficiently established by the undeniable fact that, -as death draws nigh, the thoughts of each individual assume a moral -trend, equally whether he be credulous of religious dogmas, or not; -he is manifestly anxious to wind up the affairs of his life, now -verging to its end, entirely from the =moral= standpoint. In -this particular the testimony of the ancients is of special value, -standing, as they do, outside the pale of Christian influence. I shall -therefore here quote a remarkable passage preserved by Stobaeus, in his -_Florilegium_ (chap. 44, §. 20). It has been attributed to the earliest -Hellenic lawgiver, Zaleucus, though, according to Bentley and Heyne, -its source is Pythagorean. The language is graphic and unmistakable. -_Δεῑ τίθεσθαι πρὸ ὀμμάτων τὸν καιρὸν τοῡτον, ἐν ᾧ γίγνεται τὸ τέλος -ἑκάστῳ τῆς ἀπαλλαγς τοῡ ξῆν. Πᾱσι γὰρ ἐμπίπτει μεταμέλεια τοῑς μέλλουσι -τελευτᾱν, μεμνημένοις ὧν ἠδικήκασι, καὶ ὁρμὴ τοῡ βούλεσθαι πάντα -πεπράχθαι δικαίως αὐτοῑς_.[1] - -Furthermore, to come to an historical personage, we find Pericles, on -his death-bed, unwilling to hear anything about his great achievements, -and only anxious to know that he had never brought trouble on a -citizen. (Plutarch, _Life of Pericles_.) Turning to modern times, if -a very different case may be placed beside the preceding, I remember -having noticed in a report of depositions made before an English jury -the following occurrence. A rough negro lad, fifteen years old, had -been mortally injured in some brawl on board a ship. As he was dying, -he eagerly begged that all his companions might be fetched in haste: -he wanted to ask if he had ever vexed or insulted any one of them, and -after hearing that he had not, his mind appeared greatly relieved. It -is indeed the uniform teaching of experience that those near death wish -to be reconciled with every one before they pass away. - -But there is evidence of another kind that Ethics can only be finally -explained by Metaphysics. It is well known that, while the author of an -intellectual performance,--even should it be a supreme masterpiece--is -quite willing to take whatever remuneration he can get, those, on the -other hand, who have done something morally excellent, almost without -exception, refuse compensation for it. The latter fact is specially -observable where conduct rises to the heroic. For instance, when a -man at the risk of his life has saved another, or perhaps many, from -destruction, as a rule, he simply declines all reward, poor though he -may be; because he instinctively feels that the metaphysical value -of his act would be thereby impaired. At the end of Bürger's song, -"The Brave Man," we find a poetical presentment of this psychological -process. Nor does the reality, for the most part, differ at all from -the ideal, as I have frequently noticed in English papers. Conduct -of this kind occurs in every part of the world, and independently of -all religious differences. In human beings there is an undeniable -ethical tendency, rooted (however unconsciously) in Metaphysics, and -without an explanation of life on these lines, no religion could gain -standing-ground; for it is by virtue of their ethical side that they -all alike keep their hold on the mind. Every religion makes its body -of dogmas the basis of the moral incentive which each man feels, but -which he does not, on that account, understand; and it unites the two -so closely, that they appear to be inseparable. Indeed the priests take -special pains to proclaim unbelief and immorality as one and the same -thing. The reason is thus apparent, why believers regard unbelievers -as identical with the vicious, and why expressions such as "godless," -"atheistic," "unchristian," "heretic," etc., are used as synonymes -for moral depravity. The religions have, in fact, a sufficiently easy -task. =Faith= is the principle they start from. Hence they are -in a position to simply insist on its application to their dogmas, -and this, even to the point of employing threats. But philosophy -has no such convenient instrument ready to hand. If the different -systems be examined, it will be found that the situation is beset with -difficulties, both as regards the foundation to be provided for Ethics, -and in relation to the point of connection discoverable in any such -foundation with the given metaphysical theory. And yet,--as I have -emphasised in the introduction, with an appeal to the authority of -Wolff and Kant--we are under the stringent necessity of obtaining from -Metaphysics a support for Moral Science. - -Now, of all the problems that the human intellect has to grapple with, -that of Metaphysics is by far the hardest; so much so that it is -regarded by many thinkers as absolutely insoluble. Apart from this, -in the present case, I labour under the special disadvantage which -the form of a detached monograph involves. In other words, I am not -at liberty to start from some definite metaphysical system, of which -I may be an adherent; because, if I did, either it would have to be -expounded in detail, which would take too much space; or else there -would be the necessity of supposing it granted and unquestioned,--an -exceedingly precarious proceeding. The consequence is that I am as -little able to use the synthetic method here as in the foregoing Part. -Analysis alone is possible: that is, I must work backwards from the -effects to their cause, and not _vice versâ_. This stern obligation, -however, of having at the outset no previous hypothesis, no standpoint -other than the commonly accepted one, made the discovery of the ethical -basis so laborious that, as I look back upon the task, I seem to have -accomplished some wondrous feat of dexterity, not unlike that of a man -who executes with subtlest skill in mid air what otherwise is only -done on a solid support. But now that we have come to the question -whether there can be given a metaphysical explanation of the foundation -obtained, the difficulty of proceeding without any assumption becomes -so enormous, that but one course appears to me open, namely, to attempt -nothing beyond a general sketch of the subject. I shall, therefore, -indicate rather than elaborate the line of thought: I shall point out -the way leading to the goal, but not follow it thither; in short, I -shall present but a very small part of what, under other circumstances, -could be adduced. In adopting this attitude for the reasons stated, I -wish, before beginning, to emphatically remark, that in any case the -actual problem put forward has now been solved; consequently, that what -I here add is an _opus supererogationis_, an appendix to be given and -taken entirely at will. - - -[1] We ought to realise as if before our eyes that moment -of time when the end comes to each one for deliverance from living. -Because all who are about to die are seized with repentance, -remembering, as they do, their unjust deeds, and being filled with the -wish that they had always acted justly.-- _Ἀπαλλαγή = Erlösung. V_. -Joannes Stobeaus, _Florilegium,_ edit. Meineke; publ. Lipsiae: Teubner, -1855. Vol. ii., p. 164, l. 7 sqq.--(_Translator_.) - - - - -CHAPTER II. - -THE METAPHYSICAL GROUNDWORK. - - -So far all our steps have been supported by the firm rock of -experience. But at this point it fails us, and the solid earth sinks -from under our feet, as we press forward in our search after a final -theoretical satisfaction, there, where no experience can ever by any -possibility penetrate; and happy shall we be, if perchance we gain -one hint, one transient gleam, that may bring us a certain measure -of content. What, however, shall not desert us is the honesty that -has hitherto attended our procedure. We shall not make shift with -dreams, and serve up fairy tales, after the fashion of the so-called -post-Kantian philosophers; nor shall we, like them, seek, by a wordy -exuberance, to impose upon the reader, and cast dust in his eyes. A -little is all we promise; but that little will be presented in perfect -sincerity. - -The principle, which we discovered to be the final explanation of -Ethics, now in turn itself requires explaining; so that our present -problem has to deal with that natural Compassion, which in every man -is innate and indestructible, and which has been shown to be the sole -source of =non-egoistic= conduct, this kind alone being of real -moral worth. Now many modern thinkers treat the conceptions of Good -and Bad as =simple=, that is, as neither needing, nor admitting -any elucidation, and then they go on, for the most part, to talk very -mysteriously and devoutly of an "Idea of the Good," out of which -they make a pedestal for their moral system, or at least a cloak for -their poverty.[1] Hence I am obliged in this connection to point out -parenthetically, that these conceptions are anything but =simple=, -much less _a priori_; that they in fact express a relation, and are -derived from the commonest daily experience. Whatever is in conformity -with the desires of any individual will, is, relatively to it, termed -=good=; for instance, good food, good roads, a good omen; the -contrary is called =bad=, and, in the case of living beings, -=malicious=. And so one, who by virtue of his character, has -no wish to oppose what others strive after, but rather, as far as -he reasonably may, shows himself favourable and helpful to them; -one, who, instead of injuring, assists his neighbours, and promotes -their interests, when he can; is named by the latter, in respect to -themselves, a =good man=; the term =good= being applied to -him in the sense of the above definition, and from their own point of -view, which is thus relative, empirical, and centred in the passive -subject. Now, if we examine the nature of such a man, not only as it -affects others, but as it is in itself, we are enabled by the foregoing -exposition to perceive that the virtues of justice and loving-kindness, -which he practises, are due to a direct participation in weal and -woe external to himself; and we have learnt that the source of such -participation is Compassion. If, further, we pause to consider what is -the essential part in this type of character, we shall certainly find -it to lie in the fact that such a person =draws less distinction -between himself and others than is usually done=. - -In the eyes of the malicious individual this difference is so great -that he takes direct delight in the spectacle of suffering,--a delight, -which he accordingly seeks without thought of any other benefit to -himself, nay, sometimes, even to his own hurt. From the egoist's point -of view the same difference is still large enough to make him bring -much trouble on his neighbours, in order to obtain a small personal -advantage. Hence for both of these, between the =ego=, which is -limited to their own persons, and the =non-ego=, which includes -all the rest of the world, there is fixed a great gulf, a mighty abyss: -_Pereat mundus, dum ego salvus sim_ (the world may perish, provided -I be safe), is their maxim. For the good man, on the contrary, this -distinction is by no means so pronounced; indeed, in the case of -magnanimous deeds, it appears to become a vanishing quantity, because -then the weal of another is advanced at the cost of the benefactor, the -self of another placed on an equality with his own. And when it is a -question of saving a number of fellow-beings, total self-obliteration -may be developed, the one giving his life for many. - -The inquiry now presents itself, whether the latter way of looking at -the relation subsisting between the ego and the non-ego, which forms -the mainspring of a good man's conduct, is mistaken and due to an -illusion; or whether the error does not rather attach to the opposite -view, on which Egoism and Malice are based. - -No doubt the theory lying at the root of Egoism is, from the -=empirical standpoint=, perfectly justified. From the testimony of -experience, the =distinction= between one's own person and that of -another appears to be absolute. I do not occupy the same space as my -neighbour, and this difference, which separates me from him physically, -separates me also from his weal and woe. But in the first place, it -should be observed that the knowledge we have Of our own selves is by -no means exhaustive and transparent to its depths. By means of the -intuition, which the brain constructs out of the data supplied by the -senses, that is to say, in an indirect manner, we recognise our body as -an object in space; through an inward perception, we are aware of the -continuous series of our desires, of our volitions, which arise through -the agency of external motives; and finally, we come to discern the -manifold movements, now stronger, now weaker, of our will itself, to -which all feelings from within are ultimately traceable. And that is -all: =for the perceiving faculty is not in its turn perceived=. -On the contrary, the real substratum of our whole phaenomenal nature, -our inmost essence in itself, that which wills and perceives, is not -accessible to us. We see only the outward side of the ego; its inward -part is veiled in darkness. Consequently, the knowledge we possess -of ourselves is in no sort radical and complete, but rather very -superficial. The larger and more important part of our being remains -unknown, and forms a riddle to speculate about; or, as Kant puts it: -"The ego knows itself only as a phaenomenon; of its real essence, -whatever that may be, it has no knowledge." Now, as regards that side -of the self which falls within our ken, we are, undoubtedly, sharply -distinguished, each from the other; but it does not follow therefrom -that the same is true of the remainder, which, shrouded in impenetrable -obscurity, is yet, in fact, the very substance of which we consist. -There remains at least the possibility that the latter is in all men -uniform and identical. - -What is the explanation of all plurality, of all numerical diversity of -existence? Time and Space. Indeed it is only through the latter that -the former is possible: because the concept "many" inevitably connotes -the idea either of succession (time), or of relative position (space). -Now, since a homogeneous plurality is composed of =Individuals=, -I call Space and Time, as being the conditions of multiplicity, the -_principium individuationis_ (the principle of individuation); and I -do not here pause to consider whether this expression was exactly so -employed by the Schoolmen. - -If in the disclosures which Kant's wonderful acumen gave to the world -there is anything true beyond the shadow of a doubt, this is to be -found in the Transcendental Aesthetics, that is to say, in his -doctrine of the ideality of Space and Time. On such solid foundations -is the structure built that no one has been able to raise even an -apparent objection. It is Kant's triumph, and belongs to the very small -number of metaphysical theories which may be regarded as really proved, -and as actual conquests in that field of research. It teaches us that -Space and Time are the forms of our own faculty of intuition, to which -they consequently belong, and not to the objects thereby perceived; -and further, that they can in no way be a condition of things in -themselves, but rather attach only to their mode of =appearing=, -such as is alone possible for us who have a consciousness of the -external world determined by strictly physiological limits. Now, if to -the Thing in itself, that is, to the Reality underlying the kosmos, as -we perceive it, Time and Space are foreign; so also must multiplicity -be. Consequently that which is objectivated in the countless phaenomena -of this world of the senses cannot but be a unity, a single indivisible -entity, manifested in each and all of them. And conversely, the web of -plurality, woven in the loom of Time and Space, is not the Thing in -itself, but only its =appearance-form=. Externally to the thinking -subject, this appearance-form, as such, has no existence; it is merely -an attribute of our consciousness, bounded, as the latter is, by -manifold conditions, indeed, depending on an organic function. - -The view of things as above stated,--that all plurality is only -apparent, that in the endless series of individuals, passing -simultaneously and successively into and out of life, generation -after generation, age after age, there is but one and the same entity -really existing, which is present and identical in all alike;--this -theory, I say, was of course known long before Kant; indeed, it may be -carried back to the remotest antiquity. It is the alpha and omega of -the oldest book in the world, the sacred *Vedas, whose dogmatic part, -or rather esoteric teaching, is found in the *Upanishads.[2] There, in -almost every page this profound doctrine lies enshrined; with tireless -repetition, in countless adaptations, by many varied parables and -similes it is expounded and inculcated. That such was, moreover, the -fount whence Pythagoras drew his wisdom, cannot be doubted, despite -the scanty knowledge we possess of what he taught. That it formed -practically the central point in the whole philosophy of the Eleatic -School, is likewise a familiar fact. Later on, the New Platonists -were steeped in the same, one of their chief tenets being: _διὰ τὴν -ἑνότητα ἀπάντων πάσας ψuχὰς mίαν εἶναι_. (All souls are one, because -all things form a unity.) In the ninth century we find it unexpectedly -appearing in Europe. It kindles the spirit of no less a divine than -Johannes Scotus Erigena, who endeavours to clothe it with the forms and -terminology of the Christian religion. Among the Mohammedans we detect -it again in the rapt mysticism of the *Sûfi.[3] In the West Giordano -Bruno cannot resist the impulse to utter it aloud; but his reward is a -death of shame and torture. And at the same time we find the Christian -Mystics losing themselves in it, against their own will and intention, -whenever and wherever we read of them![4] Spinoza's name is identified -with it. Lastly, in our own days, after Kant had annihilated the old -dogmatism, and the world stood aghast at its smoking ruins, the same -teaching was revived in Schelling's eclectic philosophy. The latter -took all the systems of Plotinus, Spinoza, Kant, and Jacob Boehm, -and mixing them together with the results of modern Natural Science, -speedily served up a dish sufficient to satisfy for the moment the -pressing needs of his contemporaries; and then proceeded to perform a -series of variations on the original theme. The consequence is that -in the learned circles of Germany this line of thought has come to be -generally accepted; indeed even among people of ordinary education, -it is almost universally diffused.[5] A solitary exception is formed -by the University philosophers of the present day. They have the hard -task of fighting what is called =Pantheism=. Being brought -through the stress of battle into great embarrassment and difficulty, -they anxiously catch now at the most pitiful sophisms, now at phrases -of choicest bombast, so only they may patch together some sort of -respectable disguise, wherein to dress up the favourite petticoat -Philosophy, that has duly received official sanction. In a word, the -_Ἕν καὶ πᾱν_[6] has been in all ages the laughing-stock of fools, for -the wise a subject of perpetual meditation. Nevertheless, the strict -demonstration of this theory is only to be obtained from the Kantian -teaching, as I have just shown. Kant himself did not carry it out; -after the fashion of clever orators, he only gave the premises, leaving -to his hearers the pleasure of drawing the conclusion. - -Now if plurality and difference belong only to the -=appearance-form=; if there is but one and the same Entity -manifested in all living things: it follows that, when we obliterate -the distinction between the _ego_ and the _non-ego_, we are not the -sport of an illusion. Rather are we so, when we maintain the reality of -individuation,--a thing the Hindus call *Mâyâ,[7] that is, a deceptive -vision, a phantasma. The former theory we have found to be the actual -source of the phaenomenon of Compassion; indeed Compassion is nothing -but its translation into definite expression. This, therefore, is -what I should regard as the metaphysical foundation of Ethics, and -should describe it as the sense which identifies the =ego= with -the =non-ego=, so that the individual directly recognises in -another his own self, his true and very being. From this standpoint -the profoundest teaching of theory pushed to its furthest limits may -be shown in the end to harmonise perfectly with the rules of justice -and loving-kindness, as exercised; and conversely, it will be clear -that practical philosophers, that is, the upright, the beneficent, -the magnanimous, do but declare through their acts the same truth as -the man of speculation wins by laborious research, by the loftiest -flights of intellect. Meanwhile moral excellence stands higher than -all theoretical sapience. The latter is at best nothing but a very -unfinished and partial structure, and only by the circuitous path of -reasoning attains the goal which the former reaches in one step. He -who is morally noble, however deficient in mental penetration, reveals -by his conduct the deepest insight, the truest wisdom; and puts to -shame the most accomplished and learned genius, if the latter's acts -betray that his heart is yet a stranger to this great principle,--the -metaphysical unity of life. - -"Individuation is real. The _principium individuationis,_ with the -consequent distinction of individuals, is the order of things in -themselves. Bach living unit is an entity radically different from all -others. In my own self alone I have my true being; everything outside -it belongs to the =non-ego=, and is foreign to me." This is the -creed to the truth of which flesh and bone bear witness: which is at -the root of all egoism, and which finds its objective expression in -every loveless, unjust, or malicious act. - -"Individuation is merely an appearance, born of Space and Time; the -latter being nothing else than the forms under which the external -world necessarily manifests itself to me, conditioned as they are -by my brain's faculty of perception. Hence also the plurality and -difference of individuals is but a =phaenomenon=, that is, exists -only as my mental picture. My true inmost being subsists in every -living thing, just as really, as directly as in my own consciousness -it is evidenced only to myself." This is the higher knowledge: for -which there is in Sanskrit the standing formula, =tat tvam asi=, -"that art thou."[8] Out of the depths of human nature it wells up in -the shape of Compassion, and is therefore the source of all genuine, -that is, disinterested virtue, being, so to say, incarnate in every -good deed. It is this which in the last resort is invoked, whenever we -appeal to gentleness, to loving-kindness; whenever we pray for mercy -instead of justice. For such appeal, such prayer is in reality the -effort to remind a fellow-being of the ultimate truth that we are all -one and the same entity. On the other hand, Egoism and its derivatives, -envy, hatred, the spirit of persecution, hardness of heart, revenge, -pleasure at the sight of suffering, and cruelty, all claim support -from the other view of things, and seek their justification in it. The -emotion and joy we experience when we hear of, still more, when we see, -and most of all, when we ourselves do, a noble act, are at bottom -traceable to the feeling of certainty such a deed gives, that, beyond -all plurality and distinction of individuals, which the _principium -individuationis_, like a kaleidoscope, shows us in ever-shifting -evanescent forms, there is an underlying unity, not only truly -existing, but actually accessible to us; for lo! in tangible, objective -form, it stands before our sight. - -Of these two mental attitudes, according as the one or the other is -adopted, so the _ϕιλία_ (Love) or the _νεῑκος_ (Hatred) of Empedocles -appears between man and man. If any one, who is animated by _νεῑκος_, -could forcibly break in upon his most detested foe, and compel him to -lay bare the inmost recesses of his heart; to his surprise, he would -find again in the latter his very self. For just as in dreams, all the -persons that appear to us are but the masked images of ourselves; so -in the dream of our waking life, it is our own being which looks on -us from out our neighbours' eyes,--though this is not equally easy to -discern. Nevertheless, =tat tvam asi=. - -The preponderance of either mode of viewing life not only determines -single acts; it shapes a man's whole nature and temperament. Hence the -radical difference of mental habit between the =good= character -and the =bad=. The latter feels everywhere that a thick wall -of partition hedges him off from all others. For him the world is -an =absolute non-ego=, and his relation to it an essentially -hostile one; consequently, the key-note of his disposition is hatred, -suspicion, envy, and pleasure in seeing distress. The good character, -on the other hand, lives in an external world homogeneous with his -own being; the rest of mankind is not in his eyes a non-ego; he -thinks of it rather as "myself once more." He therefore stands on an -essentially amicable footing with every one: he is conscious of being, -in his inmost nature, akin to the whole human race,[9] takes direct -interest in their weal and woe, and confidently assumes in their -case the same interest in him. This is the source of his deep inward -peace, and of that happy, calm, contented manner, which goes out on -those around him, and is as the "presence of a good diffused." Whereas -the bad character in time of trouble has no trust in the help of his -fellow-creatures. If he invokes aid, he does so without confidence: -obtained, he feels no real gratitude for it; because he can hardly -discern therein anything but the effect of others' folly. For he is -simply incapable of recognising his own self in some one else; and -this, even after it has furnished the most incontestible signs of -existence in that other person: on which fact the repulsive nature of -all unthankfulness in reality depends. The moral isolation, which thus -naturally and inevitably encompasses the bad man, is often the cause -of his becoming the victim of despair. The good man, on the contrary, -will appeal to his neighbours for assistance, with an assurance equal -to the consciousness he has of being ready himself to help them. As I -have said: to the one type, humanity is a =non-ego=; to the other, -"myself once more." The magnanimous character, who forgives his enemy, -and returns good for evil, rises to the sublime, and receives the -highest meed of praise; because he recognises his real self even there -where it is most conspicuously disowned. - -Every purely beneficent act all help entirely and genuinely unselfish, -being, as such, exclusively inspired by another's distress, is, in -fact, if we probe the matter to the bottom, a dark enigma, a piece -of mysticism put into practice; inasmuch as it springs out of, and -finds its only true explanation in, the same higher knowledge that -constitutes the essence of whatever is mystical. - -For how, otherwise than metaphysically, are we to account for even -the smallest offering of alms made with absolutely no other object -than that of lessening the want which afflicts a fellow-creature? Such -an act is only conceivable, only possible, in so far as the giver -=knows= that it is his very self which stands before him, clad in -the garments of suffering; in other words, so far as he recognises the -essential part of his own being, under a form not his =own=.[10] -It now becomes apparent, why in the foregoing part I have called -Compassion the great mystery of Ethics. - -He, who goes to meet death for his fatherland, has freed himself from -the illusion which limits a man's existence to his own person. Such a -one has broken the fetters of the _principium individuationis_. In his -widened, enlightened nature he embraces all his countrymen, and in them -lives on and on. Nay, he reaches forward to, and merges himself in the -generations yet unborn, for whom he works; and he regards death as a -wink of the eyelids, so momentary that it does not interrupt the sight. - -We may here sum up the characteristics of the two human types -above indicated. To the Egoist all other people are uniformly and -intrinsically strangers. In point of fact, he considers nothing -to be truly real, except his own person, and regards the rest of -mankind practically as troops of phantoms, to whom he assigns merely -a relative existence, so far as they may be instruments to serve, or -barriers to obstruct, his purposes; the result being an immeasurable -difference, a vast gulf between =his ego= on the one side, and the -=non-ego= on the other. In a word, he lives exclusively centred in -his own individuality, and on his death-day he sees all reality, indeed -the whole world, coming to an end along with himself.[11] Whereas the -Altruist discerns in all other persons, nay, in every living thing, -his own entity, and feels therefore that his being is commingled, is -identical with the being of whatever is alive. By death he loses only -a small part of himself. Patting off the narrow limitations of the -individual, he passes into the larger life of all mankind, in whom he -always recognised, and, recognising, loved, his very self; and the -illusion of Time and Space, which separated his consciousness from that -of others, vanishes. These two opposite modes of viewing the world are -probably the chief, though not indeed the sole cause of the difference -we find between very good and exceptionally bad men, as to the manner -in which they meet their last hour. - -In all ages Truth, poor thing, has been put to shame for being -paradoxical; and yet it is not her fault. She cannot assume the form -of Error seated on his throne of world-wide sovereignty. So then, with -a sigh, she looks up to her tutelary god, Time, who nods assurance -to her of future victory and glory, but whose wings beat the air so -slowly with their mighty strokes, that the individual perishes or ever -the day of triumph be come. Hence I, too, am perfectly aware of the -paradox which this metaphysical explanation of the ultimate ethical -phaenomenon must present to Western minds, accustomed, as they are, to -very different methods of providing Morals with a basis. Nevertheless, -I cannot offer violence to the truth. All that is possible for me to -do, out of consideration for European blindness, is to assert once -more, and demonstrate by actual quotation, that the Metaphysics of -Ethics, which I have here suggested, was thousands of years ago the -fundamental principle of Indian wisdom. And to this wisdom I point -back, as Copernicus did to the Pythagorean cosmic system, which was -suppressed by Aristotle and Ptolemaeus. In the Bhagavadgîtâ (Lectio -XIII.; 27, 28), according to A. W. von Schlegel's translation, we find -the following passage: _Eundem in omnibus animantibus consistentem -summum dominum, istis pereuntibus kaud pereuntem qui cernit, is vere -cernit. Eundem vero cernens ubique praesentem dominum, non violat -semet ipsum sua ipsius culpa: exinde pergit ad summum iter_.[12] - -With these hints towards the elaboration of a metaphysical basis for -Ethics I must close, although an important step still remains to be -taken. The latter would presuppose a further advance in Moral Science -itself; and this can hardly be made, because in the West the highest -aim of Ethics is reached in the theory of justice and virtue. What lies -beyond is unknown, or at any rate ignored. The omission, therefore, is -unavoidable; and the reader need feel no surprise, if the above slight -outline of the Metaphysics of Ethics does not bring into view--even -remotely--the corner-stone of the whole metaphysical edifice, nor -reveal the connection of all the parts composing the _Divina Commedia_. -Such a presentment, moreover, is involved neither in the question set, -nor in my own plan. A man cannot say everything in one day, and should -not answer more than he is asked. - -He who tries to promote human knowledge and insight is destined to -always encounter the opposition of his age, which is like the dead -weight of some mass that has to be dragged along: there on the ground -it lies, a huge inert deformity, defying all efforts to quicken -its shape with new life. But such a one must take comfort from the -certainty that, although prejudices beset his path, yet the truth is -with him. And Truth does but wait for her ally, Time, to join her; once -he is at her side, she is perfectly sure of victory, which, if to-day -delayed, will be won =to-morrow=. - - -[1] The conception of _the Good_, in its purity, is an -_ultimate_ one, "an _absolute Idea_, whose substance loses itself in -infinity."--(Bouterweek: _Praktische Aphorismen_, p. 54.) - -It is obvious that this writer would like to transform the familiar, nay, -trivial conception "_Good_" into a sort of _Διἴπετής,_ to be set up -as an idol in his temple. _Διἴπετής_ lit., "fallen from Zeus"; and so -"heaven-sent," "a thing of divine origin." Cf. Horn., _Il._. XVI, 174; -_Od._. IV. 477. Eur., _Bacch._, 1268.--(_Translator_.) - -[2] The genuineness of the Oupnek'hat has been disputed on -the ground of certain marginal glosses which were added by Mohammedan -copyists, and then interpolated in the text, it has, however, been -fully established by the Sanskrit scholar, F. H. H. Windischmann -(junior) in his _Sancara, sive de Theologumenis Vedanticorum_, 1833, -p. xix; and also by Bochinger in his book _De la Vie Contemplative -chez les Indous_, 1831, p. 12. The reader though ignorant of Sanskrit, -may yet convince himself that Anquetil Duperron's word for word Latin -translation of the Persian version of the Upanishads made by the martyr -of this creed, the Sultan Dârâ-Shukoh, is based on a thorough and -exact knowledge of the language. He has only to compare it with recent -translations of some of the Upanishads by Rammohun Boy, by Poley, and -especially with that of Colebrooke, as also with Röer's, (the latest). -These writers are obviously groping in obscurity, and driven to make -shift with hazy conjectures, so that without doubt their work is much -less accurate. More will be found on this subject in Vol. II. of the -_Parerga_, chap. 16, § 184. [_V. The Upanishads_, translated by Max -Müller, in _The Sacred Books of the East_, Vols. I. and XV. Cf. also -Max Müller, _The Science of Language_, Vol. I., p. 171. Now that an -adequate translation of the original exists, the Oupnek'hat has only -an historical interest. The value which Schopenhauer attached to the -Upanishads is very clearly expressed also in the _Welt als Wille und -Vorstellung_, Preface to the first Edition; and in the _Parerga,_ II., -chap, xvi., § 184.--(_Translator_.) - -[3] For the Sûfi, more correctly *Sūfīy a sect which appeared already -in the first century of the Hijrah, the reader is referred to: -Tholuck's _Blüthensammlung aus der Morgenländischen Mystik_ (Berlin, -1825); Tholuck's _Sûfismus, sive Theosophia Persarum Pantheistica_ -(Berlin, 1821); Kremer's _Geschichte der Herrschenden Ideen des -Islâms_ (Leipzig, 1868); _Palmer's Oriental Mysticism_ (London, 1867); -Gobineau's _Les Religions et les Philosophies dans l'Asie Centrale_ -(2nd edit. Paris, 1866); _A Dictionary of Islâm_, by T. P. Hughes -(London, 1885), p. 608 sqq.--(_Translator_.)] - -[4] This is too well-known to need verification by references. -The _Cantico del Sole_ by St. Francis of Assisi sounds almost like a -passage from the Upanishads or the *Bhagavadgîtâ.--(_Translator_.)] - -5: - On ne peut assez longtemps, chez notre espèce,_ - _Fermer la porte à la Raison._ - _Mais, dès qu'elle entre avec adresse,_ - _Elle reste dans la maison,_ - _Et bientôt elle en est maîtresse._ - --(Voltaire.) - - (We men may, doubtless, all our lives - To Reason bar the door. - But if to enter she contrives, - The house she leaves no more, - And soon as mistress there presides.) - -[6] _Τὸ ἔν_= the eternal Reality outside Time and Space _Tὸ -πᾱν_ = the phaenomenal universe.--(_Translator_.) - -[7] Mâyâ is "the delusive reflection of the true eternal -Entity."--(_Translator_.)] - -[8] This expression is used in the Brahmanical philosophy -to denote the relation between the world-fiction as a whole and its -individualised parts. _V._ A. E. Gough, _Philosophy of the Upanishads_, -1882.--(_Translator_.) - -[9] _Homo sum: humani nil a me alienum puto_. Terence, -_Heaut_., I. 1, 25.--(_Translator_.) - -[10] It is probable that many, perhaps, most cases of truly -disinterested Compassion--when they really occur--are due not to any -conscious _knowledge_ of this sort, but to an unconscious impulse -springing from the ultimate unity of all living things, and acting, so -to say, automatically.--(_Translator_.) - -[11] Cf. Richard Wagner: _Jesus von Nazareth_; pp. -79-90.--(_Translator_.) - -[12] That man is endowed with true insight who sees that -the same ruling power is inherent in all things, and that when these -perish, it perishes not. For if he discerns the same ruling power -everywhere present, he does not degrade himself by his own fault: -thence he passes to the highest path.--For the _Bhagavadgîtâ_ the -reader is referred to Vol. VIII. of _The Sacred Books of the East_ -(Oxford: Clarendon Press), where (p. 105) this passage is translated as -follows:--"He sees (truly) who sees the supreme lord abiding alike in -all entities, and not destroyed though they are destroyed. For he who -sees the lord abiding everywhere alike, does not destroy himself[*] by -himself, and then reaches the highest goal." - -[*]Not to have true knowledge, is equivalent to self-destruction." - -Cf. Fauche] Le Mahā-bhārata: Paris, 1867; Vol. VII., p. 128:-- - -"Celui-là possède une vue nette des choses, qui voit ce principe -souverain en tous les êtres d'une manière égale, et leur survivre, -quand ils périssent. Il ne se fait aucun tort à soi-même par cette vue -d'un principe qui subsiste également partout: puis, après cette vie, il -entre dans la voie supérieure." - -The obscurity of Schlegel's Latin in the second sentence is sufficiently -removed by these more recent translations.--(_Translator_.) - - - -JUDICIUM - -REGIAE DANICAE SCIENTIARUM SOCIETATIS. - - -_Quaestionem anno_ 1837 _propositam, "utrum philosophiae moralis -fons et fundamentum in idea moralitatis, quae immediate conscientia -contineatur, et ceteris notionibus fundamentalibus, quae ex ilia -prodeant, explicandis quaerenda sint, an in alio cognoscendi -principio," unus tantum scriptor explicare conatus est, cujus -commentationem, germanico sermone compositam, et his verbis -notatam_: "MORAL PREDIGEN IST LEICHT, MORAL BEGRÜNDEN IST SCHWER," -_praemio dignam judicare nequivimus. Omisso enim eo, quod potissimum -postulabatur, hoc expeti putavit, ut principium aliquod ethicae -conderetur, itaqae eam partem commentationis suae, in qua principii -ethicae a se propositi et metaphysicae suae nexum exponit, appendices -loco habuit, in qua plus quam postulatum esset praestaret, quum tamen -ipsum thema ejusmodi disputationem flagitaret, in qua vel praecipuo -loco metaphysicae et ethicae nexus consideraretur. Quod autem scriptor -in sympathia fundamentum ethicae constituere conatus est, neque ipsa -disserendi forma nobis satisfecit, neque reapse, hoc fundamentum -sufficere, evicit; quin ipse contra esse confiteri coactus est. Neque -reticendum videtur, plures recentioris aetatis summos philosophos tam -indecenter commemorari, ut justam et gravem offensionem habeat._ - -JUDGMENT OF THE DANISH ROYAL SOCIETY OF SCIENCES. - -In 1837 the following question was set as subject for a Prize Essay: -"Is the fountain and basis of Morals to be sought for in an idea of -morality which lies directly in the consciousness (or conscience), and -in the analysis of the other leading ethical conceptions which arise -from it? Or is it to be found in some other source of knowledge?" There -was only one competitor; but his dissertation, written in German, -and bearing the motto: "_To preach Morality is easy, to found it is -difficult_"[1] we cannot adjudge worthy of the Prize. He has omitted -to deal with the essential part of the question, apparently thinking -that he was asked to establish some fundamental principle of Ethics. -Consequently, that part of the treatise, which explains how the moral -basis he proposes is related to his system of metaphysics, we find -relegated to an appendix, as an "_opus supererogationis_," although -it was precisely the connection between Metaphysics and Ethics that -our question required to be put in the first and foremost place. The -writer attempts to show that compassion is the ultimate source of -morality; but neither does his mode of discussion appear satisfactory -to us, nor has he, in point of fact, succeeded in proving that such a -foundation is adequate. Indeed he himself is obliged to admit that it -is not.[2] Lastly, the Society cannot pass over in silence the fact -that he mentions several recent philosophers of the highest standing in -an unseemly manner, such as to justly occasion serions offence. - - -[1] The Academy has been good enough to insert the second "is" on its -own account, by way of proving the truth of Longinus' theory (_V. De -Sublimitate_: chap. 39, _ad fin._), that the addition or subtraction -of a single syllable is sufficient to destroy the whole force of a -sentence. (P. Longinus: _De Sublimitate Libellus_; edit. Joannes -Vablen, Bonnae, 1887.)--(_Translator_) - -[2] I suppose this is the meaning of _contra esse -confiteri_.--(_Translator_.) - - - - - - -End of Project Gutenberg's The Basis of Morality, by Arthur Schopenhauer - -*** END OF THIS PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK THE BASIS OF MORALITY *** - -***** This file should be named 44929-0.txt or 44929-0.zip ***** -This and all associated files of various formats will be found in: - http://www.gutenberg.org/4/4/9/2/44929/ - -Produced by Marc D'Hooghe at http://www.freeliterature.org -(Images generously made available by the Internet Archive -- Cornell University) - - -Updated editions will replace the previous one--the old editions -will be renamed. - -Creating the works from public domain print editions means that no -one owns a United States copyright in these works, so the Foundation -(and you!) can copy and distribute it in the United States without -permission and without paying copyright royalties. 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You may copy it, give it away or -re-use it under the terms of the Project Gutenberg License included -with this eBook or online at www.gutenberg.org - - -Title: The Basis of Morality - -Author: Arthur Schopenhauer - -Translator: Arthur Broderick Bullock - -Release Date: February 16, 2014 [EBook #44929] - -Language: English - -Character set encoding: UTF-8 - -*** START OF THIS PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK THE BASIS OF MORALITY *** - - - - -Produced by Marc D'Hooghe at http://www.freeliterature.org -(Images generously made available by the Internet Archive -- Cornell University) - - - - - - -</pre> - -<h1>THE BASIS OF MORALITY</h1> - -<h3>BY</h3> - -<h2>ARTHUR SCHOPENHAUER</h2> - -<h4><i>Translated with Introduction and Notes by</i></h4> - -<h4>ARTHUR BRODRICK BULLOCK, MA.</h4> - -<h4>TRINITY COLLEGE, CAMBRIDGE</h4> - -<h5>LONDON</h5> - -<h5>SWAN SONNENSCHEIN & CO., LIMITED</h5> - -<h5>PATERNOSTER SQUARE</h5> - -<h5>1903</h5> -<hr class="full" /> - -<p class="center"> -<span style="font-size: 0.8em;">PRIZE ESSAY</span><br /> - -<span style="font-size: 0.8em;">ON</span><br /> - -<span style="font-size: 0.8em;">THE BASIS OF MORALITY</span><br /> - -<span style="font-size: 0.8em;">NOT APPROVED</span><br /> - -<span style="font-size: 0.8em;">BY</span><br /> - -<span style="font-size: 0.8em;">THE DANISH ROYAL SOCIETY OF SCIENCES</span><br /> - -<span style="font-size: 0.8em;">COPENHAGEN</span>, <span style="font-size: 0.8em;">30</span> <i>January</i>, 1840.<br /> - -"To preach Morality is easy, to found it difficult.—"<br /> - -(<span style="font-size: 0.8em;">SCHOPENHAUER</span>: <i>Ueber den Willen in der Natur</i>; p. 128)<br /> -<br /> - -<span style="font-size: 0.8em;">MATRI CARISSIMAE</span>.</p> - -<hr class="chap" /> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_vii" id="Page_vii">[Pg vii]</a></span></p> - - -<p class="caption" style="margin-left: 25%;">CONTENTS.</p> - -<p class="content"><a href="#TRANSLATORS_PREFACE">TRANSLATOR'S PREFACE</a></p> - -<p class="content"><a href="#TRANSLATORS_INTRODUCTION">TRANSLATOR'S INTRODUCTION</a></p> - -<p class="content"><a href="#THE_QUESTION">THE QUESTION</a></p> - -<p class="content">PART I.</p> - -<p class="content"><i><a href="#PART_I">INTRODUCTION</a>.</i></p> - -<p class="content"> - I. <a href="#CHAPTER_I">THE PROBLEM</a><br /> - II. <a href="#CHAPTER_II">GENERAL RETROSPECT</a> -</p> - -<p class="content">PART II.</p> - -<p class="content"><i><a href="#PART_II">CRITIQUE OF KANT'S BASIS OF ETHICS.</a></i></p> - -<p class="content"> - I. <a href="#CHAPTER_Ib">PRELIMINARY REMARKS</a><br /> - II. <a href="#CHAPTER_IIb">ON THE IMPERATIVE FORM OF THE KANTIAN ETHICS</a><br /> - III. <a href="#CHAPTER_IIIb">ON THE ASSUMPTION OF DUTIES TOWARDS OURSELVES IN PARTICULAR</a><br /> - IV. <a href="#CHAPTER_IVb">ON THE BASIS OF THE KANTIAN ETHICS</a>. -</p> -<p class="content"><a href="#NOTE_b">NOTE.</a></p> - -<p class="content"> - V. <a href="#CHAPTER_Vb">ON THE LEADING PRINCIPLE OF THE KANTIAN ETHICS</a><br /><br /> - VI. <a href="#CHAPTER_VIb">ON THE DERIVED FORMS OF THE LEADING PRINCIPLE OF THE KANTIAN ETHICS</a><br /> - VII. <a href="#CHAPTER_VIIb">KANT'S DOCTRINE OF CONSCIENCE</a><br /> - VIII. <a href="#CHAPTER_VIIIb">KANT'S DOCTRINE OP THE INTELLIGIBLE AND EMPIRICAL CHARACTER</a>. -</p> -<p class="content"><a href="#NOTEc">NOTE</a></p> - - -<p class="content"> IX. <a href="#CHAPTER_IXb">FICHTE'S ETHICS AS A MAGNIFYING GLASS FOR THE ERRORS OF THE KANTIAN</a> </p> - - -<p class="content">PART III.</p> - -<p class="content"><i><a href="#PART_III">THE FOUNDING OF ETHICS.</a></i></p> - - -<p class="content"> - I. <a href="#CHAPTER_Ic">CONDITIONS OF THE PROBLEM</a><br /> - II. <a href="#CHAPTER_IIc">SCEPTICAL VIEW</a><br /> - III. <a href="#CHAPTER_IIIc">ANTIMORAL INCENTIVES</a><br /> - IV. <a href="#CHAPTER_IVc">CRITERION OF ACTIONS OF MORAL WORTH</a><br /> - V. <a href="#CHAPTER_Vc">STATEMENT AND PROOF OF THE ONLY TRUE MORAL INCENTIVE</a><br /> - VI. <a href="#CHAPTER_VIc">THE VIRTUE OF JUSTICE</a><br /> - VII. <a href="#CHAPTER_VIIc">THE VIRTUE OF LOVING-KINDNESS</a><br /> - VIII. <a href="#CHAPTER_VIIIc">THE PROOF NOW GIVEN CONFIRMED BY EXPERIENCE</a><br /> - IX. <a href="#CHAPTER_IXc">ON THE ETHICAL DIFFERENCE OF CHARACTER</a>. -</p> - -<p class="content">PART IV.</p> - -<p class="content"><i><a href="#PART_IV">ON THE METAPHYSICAL EXPLANATION OF THE PRIMAL ETHICAL PHAENOMENON.</a></i></p> - - -<p class="content"> - I. <a href="#CHAPTER_Id">HOW THIS APPENDIX MUST BE UNDERSTOOD</a><br /> - II. <a href="#CHAPTER_IId">THE METAPHYSICAL GROUNDWORK</a> -</p> - -<p class="content"><a href="#JUDICIUM">JUDICIUM REGIAE DANICAE SCIENTIARUM SOCIETATIS</a></p> - -<hr class="chap" /> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_ix" id="Page_ix">[Pg ix]</a></span></p> - - - - -<h4><a name="TRANSLATORS_PREFACE" id="TRANSLATORS_PREFACE">TRANSLATOR'S PREFACE.</a></h4> - - -<p>This translation was undertaken in the belief that there are many -English-speaking people who feel more than a merely superficial -interest in ethical research, but who may not read German with -sufficient ease to make them care to take up the original. The -present Essay is one of the most important contributions to Ethics -since the time of Kant, and, as such, is indispensable to a thorough -knowledge of the subject. Moreover, from whatever point of view it be -regarded,—whether the reader find, when he closes the book, that his -conviction harmonises with the conclusion reached, or not; it would -be difficult to find any treatise on Moral Science more calculated -to stimulate thought, and lift it out of infantile imitation of some -prescribed pattern. The believer in the Kantian, or any other, basis of -Ethics, could hardly measure the strength or the weakness of his own -position more surely than by comparing it with the Schopenhauerian; -while he who is yet<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_x" id="Page_x">[Pg x]</a></span> in search of a foundation will find much in the -following pages to claim his attention.</p> - -<p>Those acquainted with the luminous imagery, the subtle irony, the -brusque and penetrating vigour of the German, will doubtless admit that -it is no easy task to reduce Schopenhauer to adequate English prose; -and if this has been attempted by the present writer, no one can be -more conscious than he of the manifold shortcomings discoverable. But -such as it is, the work is heartily offered to all who still follow the -true student's rule, "Gladig wolde he lerne und gladig teche," with -the single hope that it may help, however slightly, to widen their -knowledge, and ripen their judgment.</p> - -<p>My friend, R. E. Candy, Esq., I.C.S., has kindly given me information -concerning several Indian names.</p> - -<p>ROME: <i>June</i>, 1902.</p> - -<hr class="chap" /> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_xi" id="Page_xi">[Pg xi]</a></span></p> - - - - -<h4><a name="TRANSLATORS_INTRODUCTION" id="TRANSLATORS_INTRODUCTION">TRANSLATOR'S INTRODUCTION.</a></h4> - -<hr class="r5" /> -<p style="margin-left: 30%;"> -<span style="margin-left: 0.5em;">Ὃν δὲ θεοὶ τιμῶσιν, ὁ καὶ μωμεύμενος αἰνεῑ.</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 16.5em;">—Theognis: 169.</span><br /> -</p> -<hr class="r5" /> - -<p>In 1837 the Danish Royal Society of Sciences propounded, as subject -for a prize competition, the question with which this treatise opens; -and Schopenhauer, who was glad to seize the opportunity of becoming -better known, prepared, and sent to Copenhagen, the earliest form of -"The Basis of Morality." In January, 1840, the work was pronounced -unsuccessful, though there was no other candidate. In September of the -same year it was published by the author, with only a few unimportant -additions, but preceded by a long introduction, which, cast in the form -of an exceedingly caustic philippic, is, in its way, a masterpiece. In -1860, (only a month before Schopenhauer's death,) the second edition -was printed with many enlargements and insertions, the short preface, -dated August being one of the last things he wrote.<a name="FNanchor_1_1" id="FNanchor_1_1"></a><a href="#Footnote_1_1" class="fnanchor">[1]</a></p> - -<p>The reason why the prize was withheld is not far to seek, and need not -detain us. At that time the philosophical atmosphere was saturated with -Hegel, and, to a certain extent, with Fichte; hence<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_xii" id="Page_xii">[Pg xii]</a></span> it is easy to -imagine with what ruffled, not to say, scandalised feelings the Academy -must have risen from its perusal of the work. Moreover, putting Hegel -and Fichte out of the question, the position advanced was in 1840 so -new, indeed so paradoxical (as Schopenhauer himself admits); there is -at times such an aggressiveness in the style; the whole essay is so -much more calculated to startle than to conciliate; that we cannot feel -much surprise at the official decision.</p> - -<p>In the Judgment published by the Society three reasons are given for -its unfavourable attitude. The second is declared to be not only -dissatisfaction with the mode of discussion (<i>ipsa disserendi forma</i>), -but also inability to see that Schopenhauer proves his case. As the -third is alleged the "unseemly" language employed in connection with -certain "<i>summi philosophi</i>" (Hegel and Fichte). These two objections -are of course in themselves perfectly legitimate, and how far the -Academy was right or wrong may be left for the reader to determine.</p> - -<p>But the first reason stated is of a different kind, and affords as neat -an instance of self-stultification proceeding <i>ex cathedra</i> as can well -be found. It is true that the question is worded vaguely enough, but -if it means anything, it asks where the "<i>philosophiae moralis fons -et fundamentum</i>"—the foundation of moral science—is to be sought -for, <i>i.e.</i>, where it is to be found. Turning to the Judgment we read: -"He" (Schopenhauer) "has omitted to deal with the essential part of -the question, apparently thinking that he was required to establish -some fundamental<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_xiii" id="Page_xiii">[Pg xiii]</a></span> principle of Ethics": which he was required to do, -unless the Society's Latin is borrowed from <i>Νεϕαλοκοκκυγία.</i> And then -it goes on to declare that he treated as secondary, indeed as an <i>opus -supererogationis,</i> the very thing which the Academy intended should -occupy the first place, namely, the connection between Metaphysics -and Ethics.<a name="FNanchor_2_2" id="FNanchor_2_2"></a><a href="#Footnote_2_2" class="fnanchor">[2]</a> But the "<i>metaphysicae et ethicae nexus</i>," so far from -being formulated in the question as the chief point to be considered, -is not even mentioned! The Society thus denies having asked what it -actually did ask, while the discussion, which it asserts was specially -indicated, is not suggested by a single word. Its embarrassment is -sufficiently shown by this unworthy shifting, to enlarge upon which -would here be out of place.<a name="FNanchor_3_3" id="FNanchor_3_3"></a><a href="#Footnote_3_3" class="fnanchor">[3]</a></p> - -<p>It is not intended to offer any criticism either on Schopenhauer's main -position in this essay, or on the various side-issues involved. The -reader is supposed to be accurately acquainted with the fundamentals of -his philosophy, as contained in <i>Die Welt als Wille und Vorstellung</i>, -and is invited to be the critic himself. But perhaps a few remarks on -the structure and general trend of the work may not be amiss.</p> - -<p>After preliminary considerations, partly to show<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_xiv" id="Page_xiv">[Pg xiv]</a></span> the difficulty of the -subject, partly to clear the ground (Part I.), the treatise opens with -a searching critique of Kant's Ethical Basis, of the Leading Principle -of his system, and of its derived forms. (Part II., Chapters I.-VI.)<a name="FNanchor_4_4" id="FNanchor_4_4"></a><a href="#Footnote_4_4" class="fnanchor">[4]</a> -Schopenhauer's conclusion is that the Categorical Imperative is a very -cleverly woven web, yet in reality nothing but the old theological -basis in disguise, the latter being the indispensable, if invisible, -clothes' peg for the former; and that Kant's <i>tour de main</i> of deducing -his Moral Theology from Ethics is like inverting a pyramid. The theory -of Conscience is next discussed (Chapter VII.). The half-supernatural -element which Kant introduced under the highly dramatic form of a court -of justice holding secret session in the breast, is examined, and -eliminated; and Conscience is defined as the knowledge that we have of -ourselves through our acts.</p> - -<p>But if, so far, the result obtained is distinctly unfavourable to -Kant, Schopenhauer is glad to agree with him on one point, namely, the -theory of Freedom, to a brief notice of which he now passes (Chapter -VIII.). He points out that the solution of this question is found in -the doctrine of the co-existence of Liberty and Necessity: according to -which the basis of our nature, the so-called Intelligible Character, -that lies outside the forms attaching to phaenomena, namely, Time, -Space, and Causality, is transcendentally free; while the Empirical -Character, together with the whole<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_xv" id="Page_xv">[Pg xv]</a></span> person, being, as a phaenomenon, -the transient objectivation of the Intelligible Character, under the -laws of the <i>principium individuationis</i>, is strictly determined.<a name="FNanchor_5_5" id="FNanchor_5_5"></a><a href="#Footnote_5_5" class="fnanchor">[5]</a> -Part II. closes with a sufficiently amusing examination of Fichte -(Chapter IX.). His proper function is shown to be that of a magnifying -glass for Kant. By means of this powerful human lens we can see the -monstrous shapes into which the Kantian pet creations are capable of -developing. Thus we find the Categorical Imperative become a Despotic -Imperative, the "Absolute Ought" grown into a fathomless inscrutable -<i>Εἱμαρμένη</i>, etc.</p> - -<p>With Part III. we reach the positive part of the work. Schopenhauer -begins (Chapter I.) by emphasising the necessity of finding a basis -for Ethics that appeals, not to the intellect, but to the intuitive -perception. Such (he says) can never be any artificial formula, which -surely crumbles to powder beneath the rough touch of real life; -rather must it be something springing out of the heart of things, and -therefore lying at the root of man's nature. But is there, he asks -(Chapter II.), after all, such a thing as natural morality? Is anything -good ever done absolutely without an egoistic motive? The conclusion -arrived at is that, although much may be, and has been, at all times, -said in favour of the Sceptical View, and although this view is in -fact<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_xvi" id="Page_xvi">[Pg xvi]</a></span> true as regards the greater number of apparently unselfish -acts, yet there can be no doubt that truly moral conduct does occur, -that deeds of justice and loving-kindness are occasionally performed -without the smallest hope of reward, or fear of punishment involved -in their omission. The last paragraph of chis chapter is important -because it puts in the clearest light what, according to Schopenhauer, -is the end of Ethics. Its aim, he says, is <b>not</b> to treat of that -which people <b>ought to do</b> (for "ought" has no place except in -theological Morals, whether explicit, or implicit); but "to point out -all the varied moral lines of human conduct; to explain them; and to -trace them to their ultimate source." This definition, which assigns no -educative function to Ethics, strictly agrees with the doctrine of the -unchangeableness of character. (<i>V</i>. Chapter IX. of this Part.)</p> - -<p>Our philosopher then proceeds to show (Chapter III.) that there are two -fundamental "antimoral" incentives in man's nature: Egoism and Malice. -Be it, however, here remarked that a still simpler classification would -reduce these two to one. Malice may well be regarded as nothing but -Egoism carried to its extreme, developed to gigantic proportions. It is -a distinct source of gratification to certain natures to witness the -suffering of another; because a diminution of the latter's capacity -for action, whether effected by itself, or not, is regarded by an ego -of this kind as an increase of its own power to do as it likes,—as an -enhancement of its own glorification.</p> - -<p>In Chapter IV. the ultimate test of truly moral conduct is explained to -be the absence of all egoistic<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_xvii" id="Page_xvii">[Pg xvii]</a></span> motivation; and in Chapters V.-VII., -by a process of careful reasoning, every human act is traced to one -of three original springs, namely, (1) Egoism, (2) Malice, and (3) -Compassion; or to a combination of (1) and (3), or (1) and (2).<a name="FNanchor_6_6" id="FNanchor_6_6"></a><a href="#Footnote_6_6" class="fnanchor">[6]</a> Of -these the third is shown to be the only counter-motive to the first -and second, and in fact the sole source of the two cardinal virtues, -justice and loving-kindness, which are explained as the manifestation -of Compassion in a lower, and a higher, degree, respectively. In -the course of the demonstration the question as to how far a lie is -legitimate comes incidentally under discussion; as also the theory of -Duty; duties being defined as "actions, the simple omission of which -constitutes a wrong." (Cf. Part II., Chapter III.)</p> - -<p>The position now reached, namely, that Compassion is the one and only -fount of true morality, because it is the sole non-egoistic source of -action, is (says Schopenhauer) a strange paradox; hence the testimony -of experience and of universal human sentiment is appealed to, in -confirmation of it, under nine different considerations (Chapter -VIII.). They are as follows:—</p> - -<p>(1) An imaginary case.</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_xviii" id="Page_xviii">[Pg xviii]</a></span></p> - -<p>(2) Cruelty, which means the maximum deficiency in Compassion, is the -mark of the deepest moral depravity. Therefore the real moral incentive -must be Compassion.</p> - -<p>(3) Compassion is the only thoroughly effective spring of moral conduct.</p> - -<p>(4) Limitless Compassion for all living things is the surest and most -certain token of a really good man.</p> - -<p>(5) The evidence of separate matters of detail.</p> - -<p>(6) Compassion is more easily discerned in its higher power; it is more -obviously the root of loving-kindness than of justice.</p> - -<p>(7) Compassion does not stop short with men; it includes all living -beings.</p> - -<p>(8) Considered simply from the empirical point of view, Compassion is -the best possible antidote to Egoism, no less than the most soothing -balsam for the world's inevitable suffering.</p> - -<p>(9) Rousseau's testimony is quoted, as well as passages from the -Paṅća-tantra, Pausanias, Lucian, Stobaeus, and Lessing; and reference -is made to Chinese Ethics and Hindu customs.</p> - -<p>Part III. closes (Chapter IX.) with an inquiry into the Ethical -Difference of Character. The theory that this difference is innate -and immutable is supported by numerous extracts from various writers -of all periods, and illustrated in many ways. But all the evidence -accumulated hardly amounts to more than so many hints and indications, -and the matter (says Schopenhauer) was only satisfactorily explained -by Kant's doctrine of the Intelligible and Empirical<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_xix" id="Page_xix">[Pg xix]</a></span> Character. (Cf. -Part II., Chapter VIII.) According to this, the ethical difference -between man and man is an original and ultimate datum, caused by -the transcendentally free act of the Intelligible Character, that -is, the Will, as Thing in itself, outside phaenomena; the Empirical -Character being, so to say, the reflection of the Intelligible, -mirrored through the functions of our perceptive faculty, namely, -Time, Space, and Causality. Hence the former, while manifested in -plurality and difference of acts, yet necessarily always wears the same -unchangeable features, inasmuch as it is but the appearance-form of -the unity behind. If the reader asks why "the essential constitution -of the Thing in itself underlying the phaenomenon" is so enormously -different in different individuals, it can only be said that our -intellect, conditioned, as it is, by the laws of Causality, Space, and -Time, has no power to deal with noumena, its range being limited to -phaenomena; and that therefore this question is one of those which have -no conceivable answer. (Cf. <i>Die Welt als Wille und Vorstellung</i>, vol. -ii., chap. 50., Epiphilosophie.)<a name="FNanchor_7_7" id="FNanchor_7_7"></a><a href="#Footnote_7_7" class="fnanchor">[7]</a></p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_xx" id="Page_xx">[Pg xx]</a></span></p> - -<p>The discussion now terminated points to the conclusion that -nine-tenths, or perhaps nineteen-twentieths, of what we do is, more -or less, due to Egoism, conscious or unconscious; while acts of real -morality, that is, of unselfish justice and pure loving-kindness -(admitting that they occur) are to be attributed to Compassion, that -is, the sense of <b>suffering with</b> another. Nor is the principle of -Altruism new. It is as old as man himself. All the rare and sensitive -natures in the world have given utterance to it, each in his own way. -Like a golden thread it runs from the earliest Indian literature to -George Eliot, to Tolstoï; and every day, for unnumbered ages, "from -youth to eld, from sire to son," in lowly dwellings and in princes' -palaces, it has been unawares translated into action.</p> - -<p>And if we may forecast the future from the past, it would appear that -in all the stormy seas yet to be traversed by the human race, before -its little day is spent, Compassion will ever be the surest guide to -better things; and that the light of knowledge illuminating the path, -whereby the world may become relatively happier, will always vary -directly as man's susceptibility to its promptings: for "<b>Durch -Mitleid wissend</b>" is not truer of Parsifal than of all other -saviours.</p> - -<p>In the fourth Part of the treatise Schopenhauer attempts the -metaphysical explanation of Compassion, which for those, who still -think that Metaphysics is something more than a pseudo-science of the -past—like Alchemy or Astrology—will have special interest.</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_xxi" id="Page_xxi">[Pg xxi]</a></span></p> - -<p>It should be observed (as is pointed out in our author's Preface -to the first edition) that the line of thought followed does not -belong to any particular metaphysical school, but to many; being in -fact a principle at the root of the oldest systems in the world, and -traceable in one form or another down to Kant. As in the dawn of -history it was our own Aryan forefathers, who divined with subtle -intuition the ideality of Time and Space; so in the fulness of the -ages it was reserved for another Aryan of Scotch descent to formulate -the same in exact language. Now, by the vast majority of men the -ideality of the <i>principium individuationis</i> is undoubtedly either -not consciously realised at all, or else but dimly perceived under -the form of allegories and mythologies. Yet, if this theory be true, -if individuation be only a phaenomenon depending on the subjectivity -of Time and Space, then Compassion, and its external expression, the -<i>ἀγάπη</i> that is greater than Faith and Hope, receive their final -explanation. And every <i>εὐθανασία</i>; every word that vibrates in -harmony with the inspired rhapsody of 1 Corinthians xiii.; every act -of genuine justice, or of true loving-kindness, done by man to man, as -well as the uplifting emotion which stirs our hearts at the sight of -such conduct:—all these things become fraught with a new and luminous -significance: the secret writing is interpreted, its deepest meaning -disclosed.</p> - -<p>Moreover, the "thou shalt," and the "thou shalt not," no less of the -various theologies than of the Categorical Imperative, may from this -point of view be accounted for, on the ground of the <b>identity</b> -of<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_xxii" id="Page_xxii">[Pg xxii]</a></span> man, so far as he is <b>noumenal</b>, with the transcendental -Reality behind phaenomena. The crude threats of punishment and promises -of reward, the stern Moral Law, poised in mid air,—these hypotheses, -and all their varieties (whose function is in reality nothing -else but to check Egoism), are seen to be due to the intellect's -imperfect comprehension of, or rather, its vague groping after, the -transcendental unity of life, however individualised and differentiated -as a phaenomenon in Time and Space.<a name="FNanchor_8_8" id="FNanchor_8_8"></a><a href="#Footnote_8_8" class="fnanchor">[8]</a> It thus becomes apparent -that the position developed by Schopenhauer in the third and fourth -parts of the Essay is not so much destructive, as explanatory, of -the usual theories, which, if once the former be fully grasped, lose -themselves in it as stars and moon in the light of day. They are at -once interpreted, and shown to be no longer of importance. Similarly, -all the religions of the world, "which are the Metaphysics of the -people," find their <i>raison d'être</i> in the same doctrine. The theory -of an <b>external</b> <i>δημιουργὸς</i> takes its place as the natural mode -of denoting, in children's language, the <b>internal</b> metaphysical -Entity, whose appearance-form, in terms of our consciousness, is -called the Universe. The circle is completed; the discords vanish, -and an ultimate harmony is reached. And so over the thrice-tangled -skein of phaenominal<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_xxiii" id="Page_xxiii">[Pg xxiii]</a></span> existence a simplifying and integrating light -is shed, showing that the <i>πᾱν</i> is but the reflection of the <i>ἕν</i>, -under the forms of our faculty of perception, namely, Time, Space, and -Causality—forms, which necessarily imply plurality and change, on -which, again, in the last resort the <i>Welt-Schmerz</i> depends.</p> - -<p style="margin-left: 20%;"> -"The One remains, the many change and pass;<br /> -. . . . . . . . . . . . . .<br /> -Life, like a dome of many-coloured glass,<br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1.5em;">Stains the white radiance of Eternity,</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1.5em;">Until Death tramples it to fragments."</span><br /> -</p> - -<p>"What an unspeakable gain," says Richard Wagner,<a name="FNanchor_9_9" id="FNanchor_9_9"></a><a href="#Footnote_9_9" class="fnanchor">[9]</a> "we should bring -to those who are terrified by the threats of the Church, and, on the -other hand, to those who are reduced to despair by our physicists,<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_xxiv" id="Page_xxiv">[Pg xxiv]</a></span> if -we could quicken the noble edifice of 'Love, Faith, and Hope,' with a -clear consciousness of the ideality of the world, conditioned by the -laws of Space and Time, which form the sole basis of our perceptive -capacity! In that case all anxious inquiries as to a 'Where' and 'When' -of the 'other world' would be understood to be only answerable by a -blissful smile. For, if there is a solution to these questions, which -seem of such boundless importance, our philosopher has given it with -incomparable precision and beauty in the following sentence, which, to -a certain extent, is only a corollary to the definition of the ideality -of Time and Space: 'Peace, Rest, and Bliss dwell only there where there -is <b>no where, and no when</b>.'" (<i>V</i>. Schopenhauer: <i>Parerga and -Paralipomena,</i> vol. ii., chap. 3, § 30 bis.)</p> -<hr class="r5" /> - - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_1_1" id="Footnote_1_1"></a><a href="#FNanchor_1_1"><span class="label">[1]</span></a> He died September 21st.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_2_2" id="Footnote_2_2"></a><a href="#FNanchor_2_2"><span class="label">[2]</span></a> It should be noticed that this "essential part of the -question," a few lines before, is said to have been passed over -altogether (<i>omisso enim eo, quod potissimum postulabatur</i>).</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_3_3" id="Footnote_3_3"></a><a href="#FNanchor_3_3"><span class="label">[3]</span></a> Any one who cares to see how this Judgment, the Danish -Royal Society of Sciences, Hegel, Fichte, and "Professors of -Philosophy" in general, are all pulverised together under our sage's -withering wrath and trenchant irony, should read his Introduction to -each Edition.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_4_4" id="Footnote_4_4"></a><a href="#FNanchor_4_4"><span class="label">[4]</span></a> Incidentally (Chapter III.), duties towards ourselves, -properly so called, are shown to be non-existent from the -Schopenhauerian standpoint. Cf. the definition of Duty in Part III., -Chapter VI.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_5_5" id="Footnote_5_5"></a><a href="#FNanchor_5_5"><span class="label">[5]</span></a> Schopenhauer treated this subject exhaustively in his -Essay on "The Freedom of the Will," which, written immediately before, -and more fortunate than, the present treatise, was awarded the prize by -the Royal Norwegian Society of Sciences in January, 1839.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_6_6" id="Footnote_6_6"></a><a href="#FNanchor_6_6"><span class="label">[6]</span></a> If, as above suggested, Malice be taken as a form of -Egoism, we may simplify as follows:— -</p> - -<div class="center"> -<table border="0" cellpadding="2" cellspacing="0" summary=""> -<tr><td align="left">Egoism.</td><td align="left">Compassion.</td></tr> -<tr><td align="left">(<i>a</i>) Lower power: seen in</td><td align="left">(<i>a</i>) Lower power: seen in</td></tr> -<tr><td align="left">selfishness, covetousness, etc.</td><td align="left">justice.</td></tr> -<tr><td align="left">(<i>b</i>) Higher power: seen in</td><td align="left">(<i>d</i>) Higher power: seen in</td></tr> -<tr><td align="left">malice, cruelty, etc.</td><td align="left">loving-kindness.</td></tr> -</table></div> - -<p> -Egoism (not in its higher power) may be simultaneously operative with -Compassion in every possible proportion.</p></div> - - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_7_7" id="Footnote_7_7"></a><a href="#FNanchor_7_7"><span class="label">[7]</span></a> <i>V</i>. Also the <i>Neue Paralipomena</i>, chap. vii.; <i>Zur -Ethik,</i> § 248, where Schopenhauer calls this "the hardest of all -problems." On the one hand, we have the metaphysical unity of the Will, -as Thing in itself, which, as the Intelligible Character, is present, -whole and undivided, in all phaenomena, in every individual; on the -other hand, we find, as a fact of experience, the widest possible -difference in the Empirical Character, no less of animals than of men. -That is to say, "<i>difference</i>" must be predicated of the Thing in -itself! It is obvious that we here touch a contradiction, which, for -the rest, lies at the root of the Schopenhauerian doctrine of the Will.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_8_8" id="Footnote_8_8"></a><a href="#FNanchor_8_8"><span class="label">[8]</span></a> The reader will remember the fine poetic presentment of -this view of things, which Goethe with intuitive perception gives in -the Faust, Part I., where the Erdgeist says: -</p> -<p> -"<i>So schaff' ich am sausenden</i> <span style="font-size: 0.8em;">WEBSTUHL DER ZEIT</span>,<br /> -<i>Und wirke</i> <span style="font-size: 0.8em;">DER GOTTHEIT LEBENDIGES KLEID</span>."</p></div> - - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_9_9" id="Footnote_9_9"></a><a href="#FNanchor_9_9"><span class="label">[9]</span></a> V. <i>Gesammelte Schriften und Dichtungen</i> von Richard -Wagner. Zweite Auflage, vol. x. "Was nützt diese Erkenntnis?" p. -361:—<i>Welchen unsäglichen Gewinn würden wir aber den einerseits von -den Drohungen der Kirche Erschreckten, andererseits den durch unsere -Physiker zur Verzweiflung Gebrachten zuführen, wenn wir dein erhabenen -Gebäude von "Liebe, Glaube und Hoffnung" eine deutliche Erkenntnis der, -durch die unserer Wahrnehmung einzig zu Grunde liegenden Gesetze des -Raumes und der Zeit bedingten, Idealität der Welt einfügen könnten, -durch welche dann alle die Fragen des beängstigten Gemüthes nach einem -"Wo" und "Wann" der "anderen Welt" als nur durch ein seliges Lächeln -beantwortbar erkannt werden müssten? Denn, giebt es auf diese, so -grenzenlos wichtig dünkenden Fragen eine Antwort, so hat sie unser -Philosoph, mit unübertrefflicher Präzision und Schönheit, mit diesem, -gewissermaassen nur der Definition der Idealität von Zeit und Raum -beigegebenen Ausspruche ertheilt: "Frieda, Ruhe, und Glückseligkeit -wohnt allein da, wo es</i> <span style="font-size: 0.8em;">KEIN WO UND KEIN WANN</span> <i>giebt."</i></p></div> - -<hr class="chap" /> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_1" id="Page_1">[Pg 1]</a></span></p> - - - - -<h4><a name="THE_QUESTION" id="THE_QUESTION">THE QUESTION</a></h4> -<hr class="r5" /> - -<p>The question advanced by the Royal Society, together with the -considerations leading up to it, is as follows:—</p> - -<p><i>Quum primitiva,', moralitatis idea, sive de summa lege morali -principalis notio, sua quadam 'propria eaque minime logica necessitate, -turn in ea disciplina appareat, cui propositum est cognitionem</i> τοῡ -ἠθικοῡ <i>explicare, turn in vita, partim in conscientiae judicio de -nostris actionibus, partim in censura morali de actionibus aliorum -hominum; quumque complures, quae ab illa ider inseparables sunt, -eamque tanquam originem respiciunt, notiones principales ad</i> τὸ ἠθικόν -<i>spectantes, velut officii notio et imputationis, eadem necessitate -eodemque ambitu vim suam exserant,—et tamen inter eos cursus viasque, -quas nostrae aetatis meditatio philosophica persequitur, magni momenti -esse videatur, hoc argumentum ad disputationem revocare,—cupit -Societas, ut accurate haec quaestio perpendatur et pertractetur:</i></p> - -<p><i><b>Philosophiae moralis fons et fundamentum</b> utrum in idea -moralitatis, quae immediate conscientia contineatur, et ceteris -notionibus fundamentalibus, quae ex illa prodeant, explicandis -<b>quaerenda sunt</b>, an in alio cognoscendi principio?</i></p> - -<p>(The original idea of morality, or the leading conception of the -supreme moral law, occurs by a necessity which seems<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_2" id="Page_2">[Pg 2]</a></span> peculiar to the -subject, but which is by no means a logical one, both in that science, -whose object it is to set forth the knowledge of what is moral, and -also in real life, where it shows itself partly in the judgment passed -by conscience on our own actions, partly in our moral estimation of the -actions of others; moreover, most of the chief conceptions in Ethics, -springing as they do out of that idea, and inseparable from it (as, -for instance, the conception of duty, and the ascription of praise -or blame) assert themselves with the same necessity, and under the -same conditions. In view of these facts and because it appears highly -desirable, considering the trend of philosophic investigation in our -time, to submit this matter to further scrutiny; the Society desires -that the following question be carefully considered and discussed:—</p> - -<p><b>Is the fountain and basis of Morals to be sought for</b> in an idea -of morality which lies directly in the consciousness (or conscience), -and in the analysis of the other leading ethical conceptions which -arise from it? or is it to be found an some other source of knowledge?)</p> - -<hr class="chap" /> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_3" id="Page_3">[Pg 3]</a></span></p> - - - - -<h3><a name="PART_I" id="PART_I">PART I.</a></h3> - -<h3>INTRODUCTION.</h3> - -<hr class="chap" /> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_5" id="Page_5">[Pg 5]</a></span></p> - - - - -<h4><a name="CHAPTER_I" id="CHAPTER_I">CHAPTER I.</a></h4> - -<h3>THE PROBLEM.</h3> -<hr class="r5" /> - -<p>"Why do philosophers differ so widely as to the first principles of -Morals, but agree respecting the conclusions and duties which they -deduce from those principles?"</p> - -<p>This is the question which was set as subject for a prize essay by -the Royal Society of Holland at Harlem, 1810, and solved by J. C. F. -Meister; and in comparison with the task before us, the inquiry -presented no extraordinary difficulty. For:—</p> - -<p>(1) The present question of the Royal Society has to do with nothing -less important than the objectively true basis of morals, and -consequently of morality. It is an Academy, be it observed, which -invites this inquiry; and hence, from its position, it has no practical -purpose in view; it asks for no discourse inculcating the exercise of -uprightness and virtue, with arguments based on evidence, of which -the plausibility is dwelt on, and the sophistry evaded, as is done -in popular manuals. Rather, as its aim is not practical, but only -theoretical, it desires nothing but the purely philosophical, that -is, the objective, undisguised, and naked exposition of the ultimate -basis of all good moral conduct, independent of<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_6" id="Page_6">[Pg 6]</a></span> every positive law, of -every improved assumption, and hence free from all groundwork, whether -metaphysical or mythical. This, however, is a problem whose bristling -difficulties are attested by the circumstance that all philosophers in -every age and land have blunted their wits on it, and still more by -the fact that all gods, oriental and occidental, actually derive their -existence therefrom. Should therefore this opportunity serve to solve -it, assuredly the Royal Society will not have expended its money amiss.</p> - -<p>(2) Apart from this, a peculiar disadvantage will be found to attach -to any theoretical examination of the basis of morals, because such -an investigation is suspiciously like an attempt to undermine, and -occasion the collapse of, the structure itself. The fact is, that in -this matter we are apt to so closely associate practical aims with -theory, that the well-meant zeal of the former is with difficulty -restrained from ill-timed intervention. Nor is it within the power -of every one to clearly dissociate the purely theoretical search for -objective truth, purged of all interest, even of that of morality as -practised, from a shameless attack on the heart's sacred convictions. -Therefore he, who here puts his hand to the plough, must, for his -encouragement, ever bear in mind that from the doings and affairs of -the populace, from the turmoil and bustle of the market-place, nothing -is further removed than the quiet retreat and sanctuary of the Academy, -where no noise of the world may enter, and where the only god raised on -a pedestal is Truth, in solitary, naked sublimity.</p> - -<p>The conclusion from these two premises is that<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_7" id="Page_7">[Pg 7]</a></span> I must be allowed -complete freedom of speech, as well as the right of questioning -everything; and furthermore, that if I succeed in really contributing -something, however small, to this subject, then that contribution will -be of no little importance.</p> - -<p>But there are still other difficulties obstructing my path. The -Royal Society asks for a short monograph setting forth the basis of -Ethics entirely by itself; which means to say, independent of its -connection with the general system, <i>i.e.</i>, the actual metaphysics of -any philosophy. Such a demand must not only render the accomplishment -of the task more difficult, but necessarily make it imperfect. Long -ago Christian Wolff, in his <i>Philosophia Practica</i> (P. II., § 28) -observed: "<i>Tenebrae in philosophia practica non dispelluntur, nisi -luce metaphysica effulgente</i>" (Darkness in practical philosophy is -only dispersed, when the light of metaphysics shines on it;) and Kant -in the Preface to his <i>Grundlegung zur Metaphysik der Sitten</i> remarks: -"Metaphysics must precede, and is in every case indispensable to, -moral philosophy." For, just as every religion on earth, so far as -it prescribes morality, does not leave the latter to rest on itself, -but backs it by a body of dogmas (the chief end of which is precisely -to be the prop of the moral sense); so with philosophy, the ethical -basis, whatever it be, must itself attach to, and find its support in, -one system of metaphysics or another, that is to say, in a presupposed -explanation of the world, and of existence in general. This is so, -because the ultimate and true conclusion concerning the essential<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_8" id="Page_8">[Pg 8]</a></span> -nature of the Universe must necessarily be closely connected with that -touching the ethical significance of human action; and because, in any -case, that which is presented as the foundation of morality, if it is -not to be merely an abstract formula, floating in the clouds, and out -of contact with the real world, must be some fact or other discoverable -either in the objective kosmos, or else in man's consciousness; but, -as such, it can itself be only a phaenomenon; and consequently, like -all other phaenomena, it requires a further explanation; and this -explanation is supplied by Metaphysics. Philosophy indeed is such a -connected whole that it is impossible to exhaustively discuss any one -part without all the others being involved. Thus Plato says quite -correctly: <i>ψυχῆs oὗν ϕύσιν ἀξίως λόγου κατανοῆσαι oἴει δυνατὸν εἷναι, -ἄνευ τῆς τοῡ ὅλον ϕυσεως</i>; (Phaedr., p. 371, Ed. Bip.) (Do you think -then it is possible to understand at all adequately the nature of -the soul, without at the same time understanding the nature of the -Whole, <i>i.e.</i>, the totality of things?) The metaphysics of nature, the -metaphysics of morals, and the metaphysics of the beautiful mutually -presuppose each other, and only when taken as connected together do -they complete the explanation of things as they really are, and of -existence in general. So that whoever should exactly trace one of -these three to its ultimate origin, would be found to have necessarily -brought the others into his solution of the problem; just as an -absolutely clear and exhaustive understanding of any single thing in -the world would imply a perfect comprehension of everything else.</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_9" id="Page_9">[Pg 9]</a></span></p> - -<p>Now if we were to start from a given system of metaphysics, which is -assumed to be true, we should reach synthetically a basis of morals, -and this basis, being, so to say, built up from below, would provide -the resulting ethical structure with a sure foundation. But in the -present case, since the terms of the question enforce the separation -of ethics from all metaphysics, there remains nothing but the analytic -method, which proceeds from facts either of external experience, or of -consciousness. It is true that thus the ultimate origin of the latter -may be traced back to the human spirit, a source which then, however, -must be taken as a fundamental fact, a primary phaenomenon, underivable -from anything else, with the result that the whole explanation remains -simply a psychological one. At best its connection with any general -metaphysical standpoint can only be described as accessory. On the -other hand, the fundamental datum, the primary phaenomenon of Ethics, -so found in man's nature, could itself in its turn be accounted for -and explained, if we might first treat of metaphysics, and then by -the synthetic method deduce Ethics from it. This would mean, however, -nothing less than the construction of a complete system, of philosophy, -whereby the limits of the given question would be far exceeded. I -am, therefore, compelled to answer it within the lines which its own -isolated narrowness has laid down.</p> - -<p>And lastly, there is the following consideration. The basis on which -it is here intended to place Ethics will prove to be a very small -one; and the consequence is that of the many lawful, approvable, and -praiseworthy actions of mankind, only the minority will be found to<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_10" id="Page_10">[Pg 10]</a></span> -spring from purely moral motives, while the majority will have to be -attributed to other sources. This gives less satisfaction, has not such -a specious glitter as, let us say, a Categorical Imperative, which -always stands ready for commands, only that itself in its turn may -command what ought to be done, and what ought to be left undone;<a name="FNanchor_1_10" id="FNanchor_1_10"></a><a href="#Footnote_1_10" class="fnanchor">[1]</a> not -to mention other foundations that are entirely material.</p> - -<p>I can only, therefore, remind the reader of the saying in Ecclesiastes -(iv. 6): "Better is an handful with quietness, than both the hands full -with travail and vexation of spirit." In all knowledge the genuine, -proof-resisting, indestructible coefficient is never large; just as in -the earth's metallic strata a hundredweight of stone hides but a few -ounces of gold. But whether others will prefer—as I do—the assured -to the bulky possession, the small quantity of gold which remains in -the crucible to the big lump of matter that was brought along with -it; or whether I shall rather be charged with having removed from -Ethics its basis, instead of providing one, in so far as I prove that -the lawful and commendable actions of mankind often do not contain a -particle of pure moral worth, and in most cases only a very little, -resting, as they do, otherwise on motives, the sufficiency of which -must ultimately be referred to the egoism of the doer; all this I must -leave undecided; and I do so, not without anxiety, nay, rather<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_11" id="Page_11">[Pg 11]</a></span> with -resignation, because I have long since been of the same mind as Johann -Georg von Zimmermann, when he said: "Rest assured until your dying day, -that nothing in the world is so rare as a good judge." (<i>Ueber die -Einsamkeit</i>; Pt. I., Ch. iii., p. 93.)</p> - -<p>For all true and voluntary righteousness, for all loving-kindness, for -all nobleness, wherever these qualities may be found, my theory can -only point to a very small foundation; whereas my opponents confidently -construct broad bases for Morals, which are made strong enough for -every possible burden, and are at the same time thrust upon every -doubter's conscience, accompanied with a threatening side-glance at his -own morality. As contrasted with these, my own position is indeed in -sore and sorry plight. It is like that of Cordelia before King Lear, -with her weakly worded assurance of dutiful affection, compared with -the effusive protestations of her more eloquent sisters. So that there -seems to be need of a cordial that may be furnished by some maxim taken -from intellectual hunting grounds, such as, <i>Magna est vis veritatis, -et praevalebit</i>. (Great is the strength of truth, and it will prevail.) -But to a man who has lived and laboured even this fails to give much -encouragement. Meanwhile, I will for once make the venture with truth -on my side; and what opposes me will at the same time oppose truth.</p> -<hr class="r5" /> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_1_10" id="Footnote_1_10"></a><a href="#FNanchor_1_10"><span class="label">[1]</span></a> That is, the Categorical Imperative appears at first as -your "obedient humble servant," ready to perform any useful service, -<i>e.g.</i>, the solving of ethical riddles; while it ends by gaining the -upper hand, and commanding.—(<i>Translator</i>.)</p></div> - -<hr class="chap" /> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_12" id="Page_12">[Pg 12]</a></span></p> - - - - -<h4><a name="CHAPTER_II" id="CHAPTER_II">CHAPTER II.</a></h4> - -<h3>GENERAL RETROSPECT.</h3> -<hr class="r5" /> - -<p>For the people morality comes through, and is founded on, theology, as -the express will of God. On the other hand, we see philosophers, with -few exceptions, taking special pains to entirely exclude this kind of -foundation; indeed, so they may but avoid it, they prefer even to find -a refuge in sophistry. Whence comes this antithesis? Assuredly no more -efficient basis for Ethics can be imagined than the theological; for -who would be so bold as to oppose the will of the Almighty and the -Omniscient? Unquestionably, no one; if only this will were proclaimed -in an authentic, official manner (if one may say so), whereby no -possible room for doubt could be left. This, however, is precisely the -condition which does not admit of being realised. It is rather the -inverse process which is attempted. The law declared to be the will of -God men try to accredit as such, by demonstrating its agreement with -our own independent, and hence, natural moral views, and an appeal -is consequently made to these as being more direct and certain. But -this is not all. We perceive that an action performed solely through -threat of punishment and promise of reward would<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_13" id="Page_13">[Pg 13]</a></span> be moral much more -in appearance than in reality; since, after all, it would have its -root in Egoism, and in the last resort the scale would be turned by -the greater or less amount of credulity evinced in each case. Now it -was none other than Kant who destroyed the foundations of Speculative -Theology, which up to his time were accounted unshakable. Speculative -Theology had hitherto sustained Ethics, and in order to procure for the -former an existence of some sort, if only an imaginary one, his wish -was to proceed inversely, and make Ethics sustain Speculative Theology. -So that it is now more than ever impossible to think of basing Ethics -on Theology; for no one knows any longer which of the two is to be the -supporter, and which the supported, and the consequence is a <i>circulus -vitiosus</i>.</p> - -<p>It is precisely through the influence of Kant's philosophy; through the -contemporaneous effect of the unparalleled progress made in all the -natural sciences, with regard to which every past age in comparison -with our own appears childish; and lastly, through the knowledge of -Sanskrit literature, and of those most ancient and widest spread -faiths, Brahmanism and Buddhism, which, as far as time and space go, -are the most important religions systems of mankind, and, as a matter -of fact, are the original native religions of our own race, now well -known to be of Asiatic descent—our race, to which in its new strange -home they once more send a message across the centuries;—it is because -of all this, I say, that the fundamental philosophical convictions of -learned Europe have in the course<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_14" id="Page_14">[Pg 14]</a></span> of the last fifty years undergone a -revolution, which perhaps many only reluctantly admit, but which cannot -be denied. The result of this change is that the old supports of Ethics -have been shown to be rotten, while the assurance remains that Ethics -itself can never collapse; whence the conviction arises that for it -there must exist a groundwork different from any hitherto provided, -and adaptable to the advanced views of the age. The need of such is -making itself felt more and more, and in it we undoubtedly find the -reason that has induced the Royal Society to make the present important -question the subject of a prize essay.</p> - -<p>In every age much good morality has been preached; but the explanation -of its <i>raison d'être</i> has always been encompassed with difficulties. -On the whole we discern an endeavour to get at some objective truth, -from which the ethical injunctions could-be logically deduced; and -it has been sought for both in the nature of things, and in the -nature of man; but in vain. The result was always the same. The will -of each human unit was found to gravitate solely towards its own -individual welfare, the idea of which in its entirety is designated -by the term "blissfulness" (<i>Glückseligkeit</i>); and this striving -after self-satisfaction leads mankind by a path very, different to -the one morality would fain point out. The endeavour was next made -now to identify "blissfulness" with virtue, now to represent it as -virtue's consequence and effect. Both attempts have always failed; and -this for no want of sophistry. Then recourse was had to artificial -formulas, purely<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_15" id="Page_15">[Pg 15]</a></span> objective and abstract, as well <i>a posteriori</i> as -<i>a priori</i>, from which correct ethical conduct undoubtedly admitted -of being deduced. But there was nothing found in man's nature to -afford these a footing, whereby they might have availed to guide the -strivings of his volition, in face of its egoistic tendency. It appears -to me superfluous to verify all this by describing and criticising -every hitherto existing foundation of morality; not only because I -share Augustine's opinion, <i>non est pro magno habendum quid homines -senserint, sed quae sit rei veritas</i> (It is the truth about a thing, -not men's opinions thereon, that is of importance); but also because it -would be like <i>γλαύκας εἰς 'Aθήνας κομίζειν</i> (<i>i.e.</i>, carrying coals to -Newcastle); for previous attempts to give a foundation to Ethics are -sufficiently well-known to the Royal Society, and the very question -proposed shows that it is also convinced of their inadequateness. -Any reader less well-informed will find a careful, if not complete, -presentment of the attempts hitherto made, in Garve's <i>Uebersicht der -vornehmsten Principien der Sittenlehre</i>, and again, in Stäudlin's -<i>Geschichte der Moralphilosophie.</i> It is of course very disheartening -to reflect that Ethics, which so directly concerns life, has met with -the same unhappy fate as the abstruse science of Metaphysics, and that -its first principle, though perpetually sought for ever since the time -of Socrates, has still to be found. Moreover, we must remember that -in Ethics, much more than in any other science, what is essential -is contained in its fundamental propositions; the deductions are so -simple that they come<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_16" id="Page_16">[Pg 16]</a></span> of themselves. For all are capable of drawing -a conclusion, but few of judging. And this is exactly the reason why -lengthy text-books and dissertations on Morals are as superfluous as -they are tedious. Meantime, if I may postulate an acquaintance with all -the former foundations of Ethics, my task will be lightened. Whoever -observes how ancient as well as modern philosophers (the Church creed -sufficed for the middle ages) have had recourse to the most diverse -and extraordinary arguments, in order to provide for the generally -recognised requirements of morality a basis capable of proof, and how -notwithstanding they admittedly failed; he will be able to measure the -difficulty of the problem, and estimate my contribution accordingly. -And he who has learned to know that none of the roads hitherto struck -on lead to the goal, will be the more willing to tread with me a very -different path from these—a path which up to now either has not been -noticed, or else has been passed over with contempt; perhaps because -it was the most natural one.<a name="FNanchor_1_11" id="FNanchor_1_11"></a><a href="#Footnote_1_11" class="fnanchor">[1]</a> As a matter of fact my solution of the -question will remind many of Columbus' egg.</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_17" id="Page_17">[Pg 17]</a></span></p> - -<p>It is solely to the latest attempt at giving, a basis to Ethics—I mean -the Kantian—that a critical examination will be devoted. I shall make -it all the more exhaustive, partly because the great ethical reform of -Kant gave to this science a foundation having a real superiority to -previous ones and partly because it still remains the last important -pronouncement in this domain; for which reason it has obtained general -acceptance up to the present day, and is universally taught, although -differently garnished by certain changes in the demonstration and in -the terminology. It is the ethical system of the last sixty years, -which must be removed ere we enter on another path. Furthermore, my -criticism of the Kantian basis will give me occasion to examine and -discuss most of the fundamental conceptions of Ethics, and the outcome -of this investigation I shall later on be able to postulate. Besides, -inasmuch as opposites illustrate each other, it is exactly this course -which will be the best preparation and guide, indeed the direct way, to -my own position, which in its essential points is diametrically opposed -to Kant's. It would therefore be a very perverse beginning to skip -the following criticism, and turn at once to the positive part of my -exposition, which then would remain only half intelligible.</p> - -<p>In any case the time has assuredly arrived for once to cite Ethics -before the bar of a searching scrutiny. During more than half a century -it has been lying comfortably on the restful cushion which Kant -arranged for it—the cushion of the Categorical Imperative of Practical -Reason. In our day this<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_18" id="Page_18">[Pg 18]</a></span> Imperative is mostly introduced to us under -a name which, being smoother and less ostentatious, has obtained more -currency. It is called "the Moral Law"; and thus entitled, with a -passing bow to reason and experience, it slips through unobserved into -the house. Once inside, there is no end to its orders and commands; nor -can it ever afterwards be brought to account. It was proper, indeed -inevitable, that Kant, as the inventor of the thing, should remain -satisfied with his creation, particularly as he shelved by its means -errors still more glaring. But to be obliged to look on and see asses -disporting themselves on the comfortable cushion which he prepared, and -which since his time has been more and more trampled on and flattened -out—this truly is hard. I allude to the daily hackney compilers, who, -with the ready confidence born of stupidity, imagine that they have -given a foundation to Ethics, if they do but appeal to that "Moral -Law" which Is alleged to be inherent in our reason; and then they -complacently weave upon this such a confused and wide-reaching tissue -of phrases that they succeed in rendering unintelligible the clearest -and simplest relations of life: and all this, without ever once -seriously asking themselves whether in point of fact there really does -exist such a "Moral Law," as a convenient code of morality, graven in -our heads or hearts.</p> - -<p>Hence I admit the especial pleasure I feel in proceeding to remove -from Ethics its broad cushion of repose, and I unreservedly -declare my intention of proving that Kant's Practical Reason and<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_19" id="Page_19">[Pg 19]</a></span> -Categorical Imperative are completely unwarrantable, baseless, -and fabricated assumptions; and I shall further show that Kant's -whole system, like those of his predecessors, is in want of a solid -foundation. Consequently Ethics will again be consigned to its -former entirely helpless condition, there to remain, until I come to -demonstrate the true moral principle of human nature—a principle -which is incontestably efficient, and has its root in our very -being. The latter, however, has no such broad basis to offer as the -above-mentioned cushion; so that, doubtless, those who are accustomed -to take things easily, will not abandon their comfortable old seat, -before they are thoroughly aware how deeply the ground on which it -stands is undermined.</p> - -<hr class="r5" /> -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_1_11" id="Footnote_1_11"></a><a href="#FNanchor_1_11"><span class="label">[1]</span></a> -</p> -<p> -<i>Io dir non vi saprei per qual sventura,</i><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1.5em;"><i>O piuttosto per qual fatalità,</i></span><br /> -<i>Da noi credito ottien più l'impostura,</i><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1.5em;"><i>Che la semplice e nuda verità.</i></span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 19.5em; font-size: 0.8em;">CASTI.</span></p> - -<p> -[I cannot tell what mischief sly,<br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1.5em;">Or rather what fatality,</span><br /> -Leads man to credit more the lie<br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1.5em;">Than truth in naked purity.]</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 14em;">(<i>Translator</i>)</span><br /> -</p></div> - - -<hr class="chap" /> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_21" id="Page_21">[Pg 21]</a></span></p> - - - - -<h4><a name="PART_II" id="PART_II">PART II.</a></h4> - -<h3>CRITIQUE OF KANT'S BASIS OF ETHICS.</h3> - -<hr class="chap" /> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_23" id="Page_23">[Pg 23]</a></span></p> - - - - -<h4><a name="CHAPTER_Ib" id="CHAPTER_Ib">CHAPTER I.</a></h4> - -<h3>PRELIMINARY REMARKS.</h3> -<hr class="r5" /> - -<p>It is Kant's great service to moral science that he purified it of all -Eudaemonism. With the ancients, Ethics was a doctrine of Eudaemonism; -with the moderns for the most part it has been a doctrine of salvation. -The former wished to prove that virtue and happiness are identical; -but this was like having two figures which never coincide with each -other, no matter how they may be placed. The latter have endeavoured -to connect the two, not by the principle of identity, but by that of -causation, thus making happiness the result of virtue; but to do this, -they were obliged to have recourse to sophisms, or else to assume the -existence of a world beyond any possible perception of the senses.</p> - -<p>Among the ancients Plato alone forms an exception: his system is not -eudaemonistic; it is mystic, instead. Even the Ethics of the Cynics -and Stoics is nothing but a special form of Eudaemonism, to prove -which, there is no lack of evidence and testimony, but the nature of my -present task forbids the space.<a name="FNanchor_1_12" id="FNanchor_1_12"></a><a href="#Footnote_1_12" class="fnanchor">[1]</a></p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_24" id="Page_24">[Pg 24]</a></span></p> - -<p>The ancients, then, equally with the moderns, Plato being the single -exception, agree in making virtue only a means to an end. Indeed, -strictly speaking, even Kant banished Eudaemonism from Ethics more in -appearance than in reality, for between virtue and happiness he still -leaves a certain mysterious connection; —there is an obscure and -difficult passage in his doctrine of the Highest Good, where they occur -together; while it is a patent fact that the course of; virtue runs -entirely counter to that of happiness. But, passing over this, we may -say that with Kant the ethical principle appears as something quite -independent of experience and its teaching; it is transcendental, or -metaphysical. He recognises that human conduct possesses a significance -that oversteps all possibility of experience, and is therefore actually -the bridge leading to that which he calls the "intelligible"<a name="FNanchor_2_13" id="FNanchor_2_13"></a><a href="#Footnote_2_13" class="fnanchor">[2]</a> world, -the <i>mundus noumenôn</i>, the world of Things in themselves.</p> - -<p>The fame, which the Kantian Ethics has won, is due not only to this -higher level, which it reached,<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_25" id="Page_25">[Pg 25]</a></span> but also to the moral purity and -loftiness of its conclusions. It is by the latter that most people have -been attracted, without paying much attention to the foundation, which -is propounded in a very complex, abstract and artificial form; and Kant -himself required all his powers of acumen and synthesis to give it an -appearance of solidity. Fortunately, he separated his Ethics from the -exposition of its basis, devoting to the latter a special work entitled -the <i>Grundlegung zur Metaphysik der Sitten</i>, the theme of which will -be found to be precisely the same as that of our prize essay. For on -page xiii of the preface he says: "The present treatise is nothing -else but an attempt to find out and establish the supreme principle of -morality. This is an investigation, whose scope is complete in itself, -and which should be kept apart from all other moral researches.". It -is in this book that we find the basis, that is to say, the essentials -of his Ethics set forth with an acute penetration and systematic -conciseness, as in no other of his writings. It has, moreover, the -great advantage of being the first of Kant's moral works, appearing,<a name="FNanchor_3_14" id="FNanchor_3_14"></a><a href="#Footnote_3_14" class="fnanchor">[3]</a> -as it did, only four years later than the <i>Kritik der Reinen Vernunft</i>, -and consequently it dates from the period when, although he was -sixty-one, the detrimental effect of old age on his intellect was not -yet perceptible. On the other hand, this is distinctly traceable in -the <i>Kritik der Praktischen Vernunft</i>, which was published in 1788, or -one year later than the unhappy remodelling of the <i>Kritik der Reinen -Vernunft</i><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_26" id="Page_26">[Pg 26]</a></span> in the second edition, whereby the latter, his immortal -master-piece, was obviously marred. An analysis of this question is -to be found in the preface to the new edition by Rosenkranz,<a name="FNanchor_4_15" id="FNanchor_4_15"></a><a href="#Footnote_4_15" class="fnanchor">[4]</a> from -which my own investigation makes it impossible for me to dissent. The -<i>Kritik der Praktischen Vernunft</i> contains in its essentials the same -material as the above-mentioned—<i>Grundlegung</i>; only the latter has -a more concise and rigorous form, while in the former the subject is -handled with greater prolixity, interspersed with digressions and even -padded with some pieces of moral rhetoric, to heighten the impression. -When Kant wrote it, he had at last, and late in life, become deservedly -famous; hence, being certain of boundless attention, he allowed greater -play to the garrulity of old age.</p> - -<p>But the <i>Kritik der Praktischen Vernunft</i> contains two sections -which are peculiar to itself. First: the exposition of the relation -between Freedom and Necessity (pp. 169-179 of the fourth edition, -and pp. 223-231 in Rosenkranz). This passage is above all praise, -and undoubtedly was framed earlier in his life, as it is entirely -in harmony with his treatment of the same subject in the <i>Kritik -der Reinen Vernunft</i> (pp. 560-586; Rosenkranz, p. 438, sqq.). And -secondly: the <i>Moraltheologie</i>, which will more and more come to be -recognised as the real object Kant had in view. In his <i>Metaphysische -Anfangsgründe der Tugendlehre</i> this <i>pendant</i> to the deplorable -<i>Rechtslehre</i>, written in 1797, the debility of old age is at length -fully pre-ponderant. For all these reasons the present criticism<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_27" id="Page_27">[Pg 27]</a></span> will -mainly deal with the treatise first mentioned, <i>viz.,</i> the <i>Grundlegung -zur Metaphysik der Sitten</i>, and the reader will please understand -that all the page numbers given by themselves refer to it. Both the -other works will only be considered as accessory and secondary. For a -proper comprehension of the present criticism, which, in probing the -Kantian Ethics to its depths, bears directly and principally on this -<i>Grundlegung</i>, it is very desirable that the latter be carefully read -through again, so that the mind may have a perfectly clear and fresh -presentment of what it contains. It is but a matter of 128 and xiv -pages (in Rosenkranz only 100 pages altogether). I shall quote from -the third edition of 1792, adding the page number of the new complete -publication by Rosenkranz, with an R. prefixed.</p> -<hr class="r5" /> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_1_12" id="Footnote_1_12"></a><a href="#FNanchor_1_12"><span class="label">[1]</span></a> For a complete demonstration v. <i>Die Welt als Wille und -Vorstellung</i>, Vol. I., § 16, p. 103, sqq., and Vol. II., Chap. 16, p. -166, sqq. of the third edition. <i>Die Welt als Wille und Vorstellung</i>, -that is, <i>The World as Will and Idea</i>; "Idea" being used much as -<i>εἵδωλον</i> sometimes is (cf. Xen. <i>Sym.,</i> 4, 21), in the sense of "an -image in the mind," "a mental picture."—(<i>Translator</i>.)</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_2_13" id="Footnote_2_13"></a><a href="#FNanchor_2_13"><span class="label">[2]</span></a> It seems better to keep this technical word than to -attempt a cumbrous periphrasis. The meaning is perfectly clear. The -<i>sensibilia</i> (<i>phaenomena</i>) are opposed to the <i>intelligibilia</i> -(<i>noumena</i>), which compose the transcendental world. So the individual, -in so far as he is a phaenomenon, has an empirical character; in so far -as he is a noumenôn, his character is intelligible (<i>intelligibilis</i>). -The <i>mundus intelligibilis,</i> or <i>mundus noumenôn</i> is the <i>κόσμος -νοητὸς</i> of New Platonism.—(<i>Translator</i>.)</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_3_14" id="Footnote_3_14"></a><a href="#FNanchor_3_14"><span class="label">[3]</span></a> It was published in 1785: <i>The Kritik der Reinen -Vernunft,</i> first edition, in 1781.—(<i>Translator</i>.)</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_4_15" id="Footnote_4_15"></a><a href="#FNanchor_4_15"><span class="label">[4]</span></a> His analysis is really derived from myself, but in this -place I am speaking incognito.</p></div> - -<hr class="chap" /> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_28" id="Page_28">[Pg 28]</a></span></p> - - - - -<h4><a name="CHAPTER_IIb" id="CHAPTER_IIb">CHAPTER II.</a></h4> - -<h3>ON THE IMPERATIVE FORM OF THE KANTIAN ETHICS.</h3> -<hr class="r5" /> - -<p>Kant's <i>πρῶτον ψεῡδος</i> (first false step) lies in his conception of -Ethics itself, and this is found very clearly expressed on page 62 -(R., p. 54): "In a system of practical philosophy we are not concerned -with adducing reasons for that which takes place, but with formulating -laws regarding that which <b>ought to take place, even if it never -does take place</b>." This is at once a distinct <i>petitio principii.</i> -Who tells you that there are laws to which our conduct <b>ought</b> to -be subject? Who tells you that that <b>ought to take place, which in -fact never does take place</b>? What justification have you for making -this assumption at the outset, and consequently for forcing upon us, -as the only possible one, a system of Ethics couched in the imperative -terms of legislation? I say, in contradistinction to Kant, that the -student of Ethics, and no less the philosopher in general, must content -himself with explaining and interpreting that which is given, in -other words, that which really is, or takes place, so as to obtain an -<b>understanding</b> of it, and I maintain furthermore that there is -plenty to do in this direction, much more than has hitherto been done, -after the lapse<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_29" id="Page_29">[Pg 29]</a></span> of thousands of years. Following the above <i>petitio -principii</i>, Kant straightway, without any previous investigation, -assumes in the preface (which is entirely devoted to the subject), -that purely moral laws exist; and this assumption remains thenceforth -undisturbed, and forms the very foundation of his whole system. We, -however, prefer first of all to examine the conception denoted by the -word "law." The true and original meaning of the term is limited to -law as between citizens; it is the <i>lex</i>, <i>νόμος</i>, of the Romans and -Greeks, a human institution, and depending on human volition. It has -a secondary, derived, figurative, metaphorical meaning, when applied -to Nature, whose operations, partly known <i>a priori</i>, partly learnt -by experience, and which are always constant, we call natural laws. -Only a very small portion of these natural laws can be discerned <i>a -priori</i>, and with admirable acuteness, Kant set them apart, and classed -them under the name "Metaphysics of Nature." There is also undoubtedly -a law for the human will, in so far as man belongs to Nature; and -this law is strictly provable, admits of no exception, is inviolable, -and immovable as the mountains, and does not, like the Categorical -Imperative, imply a quasi-necessity, but rather a complete and absolute -one. It is the law of motivation, a form of the law of causation; in -other words, it is the causation which is brought about by the medium -of the understanding. It is the sole demonstrable law to which the -human will <b>as such</b> is subject. It means that every action can -only take place in<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_30" id="Page_30">[Pg 30]</a></span> consequence of a sufficient motive. Like causality -in general, it is a natural law. On the other hand, moral laws, apart -from human institution, state ordinance, or religious doctrine, cannot -rightly be assumed as existing without proof. Kant, therefore, by -taking such laws for granted, is guilty of a <i>petitio principii</i>, which -is all the bolder, in that he at once adds (page vi of the preface) -that a moral law ought to imply "<b>absolute necessity</b>." But -"absolute necessity" is everywhere characterised by an inevitable chain -of consequence; how, then, can such a conception be attached to these -alleged moral laws (as an instance of which he adduces "thou shalt -not lie"<a name="FNanchor_1_16" id="FNanchor_1_16"></a><a href="#Footnote_1_16" class="fnanchor">[1]</a>)? Every one knows, and he himself admits, that no such -consecution for the most part takes place; the reverse, indeed, is the -rule.</p> - -<p>In scientific Ethics before we admit as controlling the will other laws -besides that of motivation-laws which are original and independent of -all human ordinance—we must first prove and deduce their existence; -that is, provided in things ethical we are concerned not merely with -recommending honesty, but with practising it. Until that proof be -furnished, I shall recognise only one source to which is traceable -the importation into Ethics of the conception <b>Law, Precept, -Obligation</b>. It is one which is foreign to philosophy. I mean the -Mosaic Decalogue. Indeed the spelling "<b>du sollt</b>"<a name="FNanchor_2_17" id="FNanchor_2_17"></a><a href="#Footnote_2_17" class="fnanchor">[2]</a> in the<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_31" id="Page_31">[Pg 31]</a></span> -above instance of a moral law, the first put forward by Kant, naïvely -betrays this origin. A conception, however, which can\ point to no -other source than this, has no right, without undergoing further -scrutiny, thus to force its way into philosophical Ethics. It will -be rejected, until introduced by duly accredited proof. Thus on the -threshold of the subject Kant makes his first <i>petitio principii</i>, and -that no small one.</p> - -<p>Our philosopher, then, by begging the question in his preface, simply -assumes the conception of <b>Moral Law</b> as given and existing -beyond all doubt; and he treats the closely related conception of Duty -(page 8, R., p. 16) exactly in the same way. Without subjecting it -to any further test, he admits it forthwith as a proper appurtenance -of Ethics. But here, again, I am compelled to enter a protest. This -conception, equally with the kindred notions of <b>Law, Command, -Obligation</b>, etc., taken thus unconditionally, has its source in -theological morals, and it will remain a stranger to philosophical -morals, so long as it fails to furnish sufficient credentials drawn -either from man's nature, or from the objective world. Till then, I -can only recognise the Decalogue as the origin of all these connected -conceptions. Since the rise of Christianity there is no doubt that -philosophical has been unconsciously moulded by theological ethics. -And since the latter is essentially dictatorial, the former appears in -the shape of precepts and inculcation of Duty, in all innocence, and -without any suspicion that first an ulterior sanction is needful for -this <i>rôle</i>; rather does she suppose it to be her proper and natural -form. It is true that<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_32" id="Page_32">[Pg 32]</a></span> all peoples, ages, and creeds, and indeed all -philosophers (with the exception of the materialists proper) have -undeniably recognised that the ethical significance of human conduct is -a metaphysical one, in other words, that it stretches out beyond this -phaenomenal existence and reaches to eternity; but it is equally true -that the presentment of this fact in terms of Command and Obedience, of -Law and Duty, is no part of its essence. Furthermore, separated from -the theological hypotheses whence they have sprung, these conceptions -lose in reality all meaning, and to attempt a substitute for the -former by talking with Kant of <b>absolute</b> obligation and of -<b>unconditioned</b> duty, is to feed the reader with empty words, nay -more, is to give him a <i>contradictio in adjecto</i><a name="FNanchor_3_18" id="FNanchor_3_18"></a><a href="#Footnote_3_18" class="fnanchor">[3]</a> to digest.</p> - -<p>Every obligation derives all sense and meaning; simply and solely from -its relation to threatened punishment or promised reward. Hence, long -before Kant was thought of, Locke says: "For since it would be utterly -in vain, to suppose a rule set to the free actions of man, without -annexing to it some enforcement of good and evil to determine his -will; we must, wherever we suppose a law, suppose also some reward or -punishment annexed to that law." (<i>Essay on the Human Understanding</i>, -Bk. II., ch. 33, § 6). What <b>ought</b> to be done is therefore -necessarily conditioned by punishment or reward; consequently, to use -Kant's language, it is essentially and inevitably<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_33" id="Page_33">[Pg 33]</a></span> <b>hypothetical</b>, -and never, as he maintains, <b>categorical</b>. If we think away these -conditions, the conception of obligation becomes void of sense; hence -absolute obligation is most certainly a <i>contradictio in adjecto.</i> -A commanding voice, whether it come from within, or from without, -cannot possibly be imagined except as threatening or promising. -Consequently obedience to it, which may be wise or foolish according -to circumstances, is yet always actuated by selfishness, and therefore -morally worthless.</p> - -<p>The complete unthinkableness and nonsense of this conception of an -<b>unconditioned obligation</b>, which lies at the root of the Kantian -Ethics, appears later in the system itself, namely in the <i>Kritik der -Praktischen Vernunft</i>: just as some concealed poison in an organism -cannot remain hid, but sooner or later must come out and show itself. -For this <b>obligation</b>, said to be so <b>unconditioned</b>, -nevertheless postulates more than one condition in the background; it -assumes a rewarder, a reward, and the immortality of the person to be -rewarded.</p> - -<p>This is of course unavoidable, if one really makes Duty and Obligation -the fundamental conception of Ethics; for these ideas are essentially -relative, and depend for their significance on the threatened penalty -or the promised reward. The guerdon which is assumed to be in store -for virtue shows clearly enough that only in appearance she works -for nothing. It is, however, put forward modestly veiled, under the -name of the <b>Highest Good</b>, which is the union of Virtue and -Happiness. But this is at bottom nothing else but a morality that -derives its origin from<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_34" id="Page_34">[Pg 34]</a></span> Happiness, which means, a morality resting on -selfishness. In other words, it is Eudaemonism, which Kant had solemnly -thrust out of the front door of his system as an intruder, only to -let it creep in again by the postern under the name of the <b>Highest -Good</b>. This is how the assumption of <b>unconditioned absolute -obligation</b>, concealing as it does a contradiction, avenges itself. -<b>Conditioned</b> obligation, on the other hand, cannot of course be -any first principle for Ethics, since everything done out of regard for -reward or punishment is necessarily an egoistic transaction, and as -such is without any real moral value. All this makes it clear that a -nobler and wider view of Ethics is needed, if we are in earnest about -our endeavour to truly account for the significance of human conduct—a -significance which extends beyond phaenomena and is eternal.</p> - -<p>As all obligation is entirely dependent on a condition, so also is -all duty. Both conceptions are very closely related, indeed almost -identical. The only difference between them might be said to be that -obligation in general may rest on mere force, whereas duty involves -the sense of obligation deliberately undertaken, such as we see -between master and servant, principal and subordinate, rulers and the -ruled. And since no one undertakes a duty <i>gratis,</i> every duty implies -also a right. The slave has no duties, because he has no rights; but -he is subject to an obligation which rests on sheer force. In the -following Part I shall explain the only meaning which the conception -"<b>Duty</b>" has in Ethics.</p> - -<p>If we put Ethics in an <b>imperative</b> form, making<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_35" id="Page_35">[Pg 35]</a></span> it a Doctrine of -Duties, and regard the moral worth or worthlessness of human conduct -as the fulfilment or violation of duties, we must remember that this -view of Duty, and of Obligation in general, is undeniably derived -solely from theological Morals, and primarily from the Decalogue, -and consequently that it rests essentially and inseparably on the -assumption of man's dependence on another will which gives him commands -and announces reward or punishment. But the more the assumption of -such a will is in Theology positive and precise, the less should it -be quietly and unsuspectingly introduced into philosophical Morals. -Hence we have no right to assume beforehand that for the latter the -<b>imperative Form</b>, the ordaining of commands, laws, and duties -is an essential and a matter of course; and it is a very poor shift -to substitute the word "absolute" or "categorical" for the external -condition which is indissolubly attached to such conceptions by -their very nature: for this gives rise, as explained above, to a -<i>contradictio in adjecto</i>.</p> - -<p>Kant, then, without more ado or any close examination, borrowed -this <b>imperative Form</b> of Ethics from theological Morals. The -hypotheses of the latter (in other words, Theology) really lie at -the root of his system, and as these alone in point of fact lend -it any meaning or sense, so they cannot be separated from, indeed -are implicitly contained in, it. After this, when he had expounded -his position the task of developing in turn a Theology out of his -Morals—the famous <i>Moraltheologie</i>—was easy enough. For the -conceptions which are implicitly<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_36" id="Page_36">[Pg 36]</a></span> involved in his Imperative, and which -lie hidden at the base of his Morals, only required to be brought -forward and expressed explicitly as postulates of Practical Reason. And -so it was that, to the world's great edification, a Theology appeared -depending simply on Ethics, indeed actually derived therefrom. But -this came about because the ethical system itself rests on concealed -theological hypotheses. I mean no derisive comparison, but in its form -the process is analogous to that whereby a conjurer prepares a surprise -for us, when he lets us find something where he had previously employed -his art to place it. Described in the abstract, Kant's procedure is -this: what ought to have been his first principle, or hypothesis -(<i>viz</i>., Theology) he made the conclusion, and what ought to have been -deduced as the conclusion (<i>viz</i>., the Categorical Command) he took as -his hypothesis.<a name="FNanchor_4_19" id="FNanchor_4_19"></a><a href="#Footnote_4_19" class="fnanchor">[4]</a> But after he had thus turned the thing upside down, -nobody, not even he himself, recognised it as being what it really was, -namely the old well-known system of theological Morals. How this trick -was accomplished we shall consider in the sixth and seventh chapters of -the present Part.</p> - -<p>Ethics was of course frequently put in the imperative form, and treated -as a doctrine of duties also in pre-Kantian philosophy; but it was -always then based upon the will of a God whose existence had been -otherwise proved, and so there was no<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_37" id="Page_37">[Pg 37]</a></span> inconsequence. As soon, however, -as the attempt was made, as Kant attempted, to give a foundation to -Ethics independent of this will, and establish it without metaphysical -hypotheses, there was no longer any justification for taking as its -basis the words "thou shalt," and "it is thy duty" (that is, the -imperative form), without first deducing the truth thereof from some -other source.</p> - -<hr class="r5" /> -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_1_16" id="Footnote_1_16"></a><a href="#FNanchor_1_16"><span class="label">[1]</span></a> Du sollt (<i>sic</i>) nicht lügen.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_2_17" id="Footnote_2_17"></a><a href="#FNanchor_2_17"><span class="label">[2]</span></a> Sollt is the old form for "<i>sollst</i>." Cf. Eng., <i>shalt</i>: -Icel; <i>skalt</i>—(<i>Translator</i>.)</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_3_18" id="Footnote_3_18"></a><a href="#FNanchor_3_18"><span class="label">[3]</span></a> A contradiction in the adjective. This occurs -when the epithet applied to a noun contradicts its essential -meaning.—(<i>Translator</i>.)</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_4_19" id="Footnote_4_19"></a><a href="#FNanchor_4_19"><span class="label">[4]</span></a> Like the converse of a geometrical proposition, this -Kantian inversion is not necessarily true; its validity, in fact, -depends on the conclusion being implicitly contained in the hypothesis. -—(<i>Translator</i>.)</p></div> - -<hr class="chap" /> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_38" id="Page_38">[Pg 38]</a></span></p> - - - - -<h4><a name="CHAPTER_IIIb" id="CHAPTER_IIIb">CHAPTER III.</a></h4> - -<h3>ON THE ASSUMPTION OF DUTIES TOWARDS OURSELVES IN PARTICULAR.</h3> - -<hr class="r5" /> -<p>This form of the doctrine of duties was very acceptable to Kant, -and in working out his position he left it untouched; for, like his -predecessors, along with the duties towards others he ranged also -duties towards ourselves. I, however, entirely reject this assumption, -and, as there will be no better opportunity, I shall here incidentally -explain my view.</p> - -<p>Duties towards ourselves must, just as all others, be based either -on right or on love. Duties towards ourselves based on right are -impossible, because of the self-evident fundamental principle <i>volenti -non fit injuria</i> (where the will assents, no injury is done). For what -I do is always what I will; consequently also what I do to myself is -never anything but what I will, therefore it cannot be unjust. Next, as -regards duties towards ourselves based on love. Ethics here finds her -work already done, and comes too late. The impossibility of violating -the duty of self-love is at once assumed by the first law of Christian -Morals: "Love thy neighbour as thyself." According to this, the love -which each man cherishes for himself is postulated as the <i>maximum</i>, -and as<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_39" id="Page_39">[Pg 39]</a></span> the condition of all other love; while the converse, "Love -thyself as thy neighbour" is never added; for every one would feel that -the latter does not claim enough. Moreover, self-love would be the sole -duty regularly involving an <i>opus supererogationis</i>. Kant himself says -in the <i>Metaphysische Anfangsgründe zur Tugendlehre</i>, p. 13 (R., p. -230): "That which each man inevitably wills of himself, does not belong -to the conception of Duty." This idea of duties towards ourselves is -nevertheless still held in repute, indeed it enjoys for the most part -special favour; nor need we feel surprise. But it has an amusing effect -in cases where people begin to show anxiety about their persons, and -talk quite earnestly of the duty of self-preservation; the while it is -sufficiently clear that fear will lend them legs soon enough, and that -they have no need of any law of duty to help them along.</p> - -<p>First among the duties towards ourselves is generally placed that of -not committing suicide, the line of argument taken being extremely -prejudiced and resting on the shallowest basis. Unlike animals, man is -not only a prey to <b>bodily</b> pain limited to the passing moment, -but also to those incomparably greater <b>mental</b> sufferings, which, -reaching forwards and backwards, draw upon the future and the past; and -nature, by way of compensation, has granted to man alone the privilege -of being able to end his life at his own pleasure, before she herself -sets a term to it; thus, while animals necessarily live so long as they -can, man need only live so long as he <b>will</b>.</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_40" id="Page_40">[Pg 40]</a></span></p> - -<p>Whether he ought on ethical grounds to forego this privilege is a -difficult question, which in any case cannot be decided by the usual -superficial reasoning. The arguments against suicide which Kant does -not deem unworthy of adducing (p. 53, R., p. 48 and p. 67, R., p. -57), I cannot conscientiously describe as other than pitiable, and -quite undeserving of an answer. It is laughable indeed to suppose that -reflections of such a kind could have wrested the dagger from the hands -of Cato, of Cleopatra, of Cocceius Nerva (Tac. <i>Ann</i>., vi. 26) or of -Arria the wife of Paetus (Plin., <i>Ep</i>., iii. 16). If real moral motives -for not committing suicide actually exist, it is certain that they lie -very deep, and cannot be reached by the plummet of ordinary Ethics. -They belong to a higher view of things than is adaptable even to the -standpoint of the present treatise.<a name="FNanchor_1_20" id="FNanchor_1_20"></a><a href="#Footnote_1_20" class="fnanchor">[1]</a></p> - -<p>That which generally comes next on the rubric of duties towards -ourselves may be divided partly into rules of worldly wisdom, partly -into hygienic prescriptions; but neither class belongs to Morals in the -proper sense. Last on the catalogue comes the prohibition of unnatural -lust—onanism, <i>paederastia,</i> and bestiality. Of these onanism is -mainly a vice of childhood, and must be fought against much more with -the weapon of dietetics than with that of ethics; hence we find that -the authors of books directed against it are physicians (<i>e.g.</i>, -Tissot and others) rather than moralists. After dietetics and hygiene<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_41" id="Page_41">[Pg 41]</a></span> -have done their work, and struck it down by irrefutable reasoning, if -Ethics desires to take up the matter, she finds little left for her to -do. Bestiality, again, is of very rare occurrence; it is thoroughly -abnormal and exceptional, and, moreover, so loathsome and foreign to -human nature, that itself, better than all arguments of reason, passes -judgment on itself, and deters by sheer disgust. For the rest, as being -a degradation of human nature, it is in reality an offence against the -species as such, and in the abstract; not against human units. Of the -three sexual perversions of which we are speaking it is consequently -only with <i>paederastia</i> that Ethics has to do, and in treating of -Justice this vice finds its proper place. For Justice is infringed by -it, in face of which fact, the dictum <i>volenti non fit injuria</i> is -unavailing. The injustice consists in the seduction of the younger and -inexperienced person, who is thereby ruined physically and morally.</p> -<hr class="r5" /> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_1_20" id="Footnote_1_20"></a><a href="#FNanchor_1_20"><span class="label">[1]</span></a> There are ascetic reasons, which may be found in the -Fourth Book, Vol. I., § 69, of my chief work (<i>Die Welt als Wille und -Vorstellung</i>).</p></div> - -<hr class="chap" /> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_42" id="Page_42">[Pg 42]</a></span></p> - - - - -<h4><a name="CHAPTER_IVb" id="CHAPTER_IVb">CHAPTER IV.</a></h4> - -<h3>ON THE BASIS OF THE KANTIAN ETHICS.</h3> -<hr class="r5" /> - -<p>With the imperative Form of Ethics, which in Chapter II. we proved to -be a <i>petitio principii</i>, is directly connected a favourite idea of -Kant's, that may be excused, but cannot be adopted. Sometimes we see -a physician, after having employed a certain remedy with conspicuous -success, henceforth prescribing it for almost all diseases; to such -a one Kant may be likened. By separating the <i>a priori</i> from the -<i>a posteriori</i> in human knowledge he made the most brilliant and -pregnant discovery that Metaphysics can boast of. What wonder then -that thereafter he should try to apply this method, this sundering of -the two forms, everywhere, and should consequently make Ethics also -consist of two parts, a pure, <i>i.e.</i> an <i>a priori</i> knowable part, and -an empirical? The latter of these he rejects as unreliable for the -purpose of founding Ethics. To trace out the former and; exhibit it by -itself is his purpose in the <i>Grundlegung der Metaphysik der Sitten</i>, -which he accordingly represents as a science purely <i>a priori</i>, exactly -in the same way as he sets forth the <i>Metaphysische Anfangsgründe der -Naturwissenschaft</i>. He asserts in fact that the <b>Moral Law</b>, -which without warrant,<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_43" id="Page_43">[Pg 43]</a></span> without deduction, or proof of any sort, he -postulates as existing, is furthermore a Law knowable <i>a priori</i> and -independent of all <b>internal</b> or <b>external experience</b>; it -"<i>rests</i>" (he says) "<b>solely on conceptions of pure Reason; and is -to be taken as a synthetic proposition a priori</b>" (<i>Kritik der -Praktischen Vernunft</i>: p. 56 of fourth Edition; R., p. 142). But -from this definition the implication immediately follows that such a -Law can only be formal, like everything else known <i>a priori</i>, and -consequently has only to do with the <b>Form</b> of actions, not -with their <b>Essence</b>. Let it be thought what this means! He -emphatically adds (p. vi of the preface to the <i>Grundlegung;</i> R., p. 5) -that it is "useless to look for it either subjectively in man's nature, -or objectively in the accidents of the external world," and (preface -of the same, page vii; R., p. 6) that "nothing whatever connected -with it can be borrowed from knowledge relating to man, <i>i.e.</i>, from -anthropology." On page 59 (R., p. 52) he repeats, "That one ought on no -account to fall into the mistake of trying to derive one's principle of -morality from the special constitution of human nature"; and again, on -page 60 (R., p. 52), he says that, "Everything derived from any natural -disposition peculiar to man, or from certain feelings and propensities, -or indeed from any special trend attaching solely to human nature, -and not necessarily to be taken as the Will of <b>every rational -being</b>," is incapable of affording a foundation for the moral law. -This shows beyond all possibility of contradiction that Kant does not -represent the alleged moral law as a <i>fact of consciousness</i>, capable<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_44" id="Page_44">[Pg 44]</a></span> -of empirical proof—which is how the later would-be philosophers, both -individually and collectively, wish to pass it off. In discarding every -empirical basis for Morals, he rejects all internal, and still more -decidedly all external, experience., Accordingly he founds—and I call -special attention to this—his moral principle not on any provable -<i>fact of consciousness</i>, such as an inner natural disposition, nor yet -upon any objective relation of things in the external world. No! That -would be an empirical foundation. Instead of this, <i>pure conceptions -a priori</i>, <i>i.e.</i>, conceptions, which so far contain nothing derived -from internal or external experience, and thus are simply shells -without kernels—these are to be made the basis of Morals. Let us -consider the full meaning of such a position. Human consciousness as -well as the whole external world, together with all the experience and -all the facts they comprise, are swept from under our feet. We have -nothing to stand upon. And what have we to hold to? Nothing but a few -entirely abstract, entirely unsubstantial conceptions, floating in the -air equally with ourselves. It is from these, or, more correctly, from -the mere form of their connection with judgments made, that a <i>Law</i> is -declared to proceed, which by so-called <b>absolute necessity</b> is -supposed to be valid, and to be strong enough to lay bit and bridle on -the surging throng of human desires, on the storm of passion, on the -giant might of <i>egoism</i>. We shall see if such be the case.</p> - -<p>With this preconceived notion that the basis of Morals must be -necessarily and strictly a priori, and entirely free from everything -empirical, another of<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_45" id="Page_45">[Pg 45]</a></span> Kant's favourite ideas is closely connected. -The moral principle that he seeks to establish is, he says, a -<b>synthetic proposition a priori, of merely formal contents</b>, and -hence exclusively a matter of <b>Pure Reason</b>; and accordingly, -as such, to be regarded as valid <b>not only for men</b>, but for -<b>all possible rational beings</b>; indeed he declares it to hold -good for man "on this account alone," <i>i.e.</i>, because <i>per accidens</i> -man comes under the category of rational beings. Here lies the cause -of his basing the Moral principle not on any feeling, but on <b>pure -Reason</b> (which knows nothing but itself and the statement of its -antithesis). So that this <b>pure Reason</b> is taken, not as it -really and exclusively is—an intellectual faculty of man—but <b>as -a self-existent hypostatic essence</b>, yet without the smallest -authority; the pernicious effects of such example and precedent being -sufficiently shown in the pitiful philosophy of the present day. -Indeed, this view of Morals as existing not for men, as men, but for -all rational beings, as such, is with Kant a principle so firmly -established, an idea so favourite, that he is never tired of repeating -it at every opportunity.</p> - -<p>I, on the contrary, maintain that we are never entitled to raise -into a <i>genus</i> that which we only know of in a single species. For -we could bring nothing into our idea of the <i>genus</i> but what we had -abstracted from this one species; so that what we should predicate of -the <i>genus</i> could after all only be understood of the single species. -While, if we should attempt to think away (without any warrant) the -particular attributes of the species, in order to form<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_46" id="Page_46">[Pg 46]</a></span> our <i>genus</i>, -we should perhaps remove the exact condition whereby the remaining -attributes, hypostatised as a <i>genus</i>, are made possible. Just as we -recognise <b>intelligence in general</b> to be an attribute of animal -beings alone, and are therefore never justified in thinking of it as -existing outside, and independent, of animal nature; so we recognise -<b>Reason</b> as the exclusive attribute of the human race, and have -not the smallest right to suppose that Reason exists externally to -it, and then proceed to set up a <i>genus</i> called "Rational Beings," -differing from its single known species "Man"; still less are we -warranted in laying down laws for such imaginary <b>rational beings -in the abstract</b>. To talk of rational beings external to men is -like talking of <b>heavy beings</b> external to bodies. One cannot -help suspecting that Kant was thinking a little of the dear cherubim, -or at any rate counted on their presence in the conviction of the -reader. In any case this doctrine contains a tacit assumption of an -<i>anima rationalis,</i> which as being entirely different from the <i>anima -sensitiva</i>, and the <i>anima vegetativa</i>, is supposed to persist after -death, and then to be indeed nothing else but <i>rationalis</i>. But in the -<i>Kritik der Reinen Vernunft</i> Kant himself has expressly and elaborately -made an end of this most transcendent hypostasis. Nevertheless, in -his ethics generally, and in the <i>Kritik der Praktischen Vernunft</i> -especially, there seems always to hover in the background the thought -that the inner and eternal essence, of man consists of <b>Reason</b>. -In this connection, where the matter only occurs incidentally, I must -content myself with<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_47" id="Page_47">[Pg 47]</a></span> simply asserting the contrary. Reason, as indeed -the intellectual faculty as a whole, is secondary, is an attribute of -phaenomena, being in point of fact conditioned by the organism; whereas -it is the <b>Will</b> in man which is his very self, the only part of -him which is metaphysical, and therefore indestructible.</p> - -<p>The success with which Kant had applied his method to the theoretical -side of philosophy led him on to extend it to the practical. Here -also he endeavoured to separate pure <i>a priori</i> from empirical <i>a -posteriori</i> knowledge. For this purpose he assumed that just as -we know <i>a priori</i> the laws of Space, of Time, and of Causality, -so in like manner, or at any rate analogously, we have the moral -plumb-line for our conduct given us prior to all experience, and -revealed in a Categorical Imperative, an absolute "Ought." But how -wide is the difference between this alleged moral law <i>a priori</i>, and -our theoretical knowledge <i>a priori</i> of Space, Time, and Causality! -The latter are nothing but the expression of the forms, <i>i.e.</i>, the -functions of our intellect, whereby alone we are capable of grasping -an objective world, and wherein alone it can be mirrored; so that the -world (as we know it) is absolutely conditioned by these forms, and all -experience <b>must</b> invariably and exactly correspond to them—just -as everything that I see through a blue glass must appear blue. While -the former, the so-called moral law, is something that experience pours -ridicule on at every step; indeed, as Kant himself says, it is doubtful -whether in practice it has ever really been followed on any single -occasion. How completely unlike are the things<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_48" id="Page_48">[Pg 48]</a></span> which are here classed -together under the conception of <b>apriority</b>! Moreover, Kant -overlooked the fact that, according to his own teaching, in theoretical -philosophy, it is exactly the <b>Apriority</b> of our knowledge of -Time, Space, and Causality—independent as this is of experience—that -limits it strictly to phaenomena, <i>i.e.</i>, to the picture of the world -as reflected in our consciousness, and makes it entirely invalid as -regards the real nature of things, <i>i.e.</i>, as regards whatever exists -independently of our capacity to grasp it.</p> - -<p>Similarly, when we turn to practical philosophy, his alleged moral -law, if it have an <i>a priori</i> origin in ourselves, must also be only -phaenomenal, and leave entirely untouched the essential nature of -things. Only this conclusion would stand in the sharpest contradiction -as much to the facts themselves, as to Kant's view of them. For it is -precisely the moral principle in us that he everywhere (<i>e.g., Kritik -der Praktischen Vernunft</i>, p. 175; R., p. 228) represents as being in -the closest connection with the real essence of things, indeed, as -directly in contact with it; and in all passages in the <i>Kritik der -Reinen Vernunft,</i> where the mysterious Thing in itself comes forward a -little more clearly, it shows itself as the <b>moral principle</b> in -us, as <b>Will</b>. But of this he failed to take account.</p> - -<p>In Chapter II. of this Part, I explained how Kant took over bodily -from theological Morals the <b>imperative form</b> of Ethics, <i>i.e.</i>, -the conception of obligation, of law, and of duty; and how at the same -time he was constrained to leave behind that which in the realm<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_49" id="Page_49">[Pg 49]</a></span> of -theology alone lends force and significance to these ideas. But he -felt the need of some basis for them, and accordingly went so far as -to require that the <i>conception of duty</i> itself should be also the -<i>ground of its fulfilment</i>; in other words, that it should itself be -its own enforcement. An action, he says (p. 11; R., p. 18), has no -genuine moral worth, unless it be done simply as a matter of duty, -and for duty's sake, without any liking for it being felt; and the -character only begins to have value, if a man, who has no sympathy in -his heart, and is cold and indifferent to others' sufferings, and who -is <b>not by nature a lover of his kind</b>, is nevertheless a doer of -good actions, solely out of a pitiful sense of duty. This assertion, -which is revolting to true moral sentiment; this apotheosis of -lovelessness, the exact opposite, as it is, of the Christian doctrine -of Morals, which places love before everything else, and teaches that -without it nothing profiteth (1 Cor. xiii. 3); this stupid moral -pedantry has been ridiculed by Schiller in two apposite epigrams, -entitled <i>Gewissensskrupel</i> (Scruples of Conscience) and <i>Entscheidung</i> -(Decision).<a name="FNanchor_1_21" id="FNanchor_1_21"></a><a href="#Footnote_1_21" class="fnanchor">[1]</a></p> - -<p>It appears that some passages in the <i>Kritik der Praktischen Vernunft</i>, -which exactly suit this connection, were the immediate occasion of the -verses. Thus, for instance, on p. 150 (R., p. 211) we find: "Obedience -to the moral law, which a man feels incumbent on him, is based not on -voluntary inclination, nor on endeavour willingly put forth, without -any authoritative<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_50" id="Page_50">[Pg 50]</a></span> command, but on a sense of duty." Yes, it must be -commanded! What slavish morality! And again on p. 213 (R., p. 257): -"Feelings of compassion, and of tender-hearted sympathy would be -actually troublesome to persons who think aright, because through such -emotions their well weighed maxims would become confused, and so the -desire would grow up to be rid of them, and to be subject solely to -the lawgiver—Reason." Now I maintain without hesitation that what -opens the hand of the above-described (p. 11; R., p. 18) loveless doer -of good, who is indifferent to the sufferings of other people, cannot -(provided he have no secondary motives) be anything else than a slavish -<i>δεισιδαιμονία</i> (fear of the gods), equally whether he calls his fetich -"Categorical Imperative" or Fitzlipuzli.<a name="FNanchor_2_22" id="FNanchor_2_22"></a><a href="#Footnote_2_22" class="fnanchor">[2]</a> For what but fear can move -a hard heart?</p> - -<p>Furthermore, on p. 13 (R., p. 19), in accordance with the above view, -we find that the moral worth of an action is supposed to lie, by -no means in the <b>intention</b> which led to it, but in the maxim -which was followed. Whereas I, on the contrary, ask the reader to -reflect that it is the <b>intention alone</b> which decides as to the -moral worth, or worthlessness, off an action, so that the same act -may deserve condemnation or praise according to the intention which -determined it. Hence it is that, whenever men discuss a proceeding -to which some moral importance is attached, the <b>intention</b> is -always investigated, and by this standard alone the matter is judged; -as, likewise, it is in the <i>intention</i> alone that every one seeks<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_51" id="Page_51">[Pg 51]</a></span> -justification, if he see his conduct misinterpreted or excuse, if its -consequence be mischievous.</p> - -<p>On p. 14 (R., p. 20) we at last reach the definition of Duty, which -is the fundamental conception of Kant's entire ethical system. It is: -"The necessity of an action out of respect for the law." But what is -<b>necessary</b> takes place with absolute certainty while conduct -based on pure duty generally does not come off at all. And not only -this; Kant himself admits (p. 25; R., p. 28) that there are <b>no -certain instances</b> on record of conduct determined solely by pure -duty; and on p. 26 (R., p. 29) he says: "It is utterly impossible to -know with certainty from experience whether there has ever really -been one single case in which an action, however true to duty, has -rested simply on its idea."—And similarly on p. 28 (R., p. 30) -and p. 49 (R., p. 50). In what sense then can <b>necessity</b> be -attributed to such an action? As it is only fair always to put the -most favourable interpretation on an author's words, we will suppose -him to mean that an act true to duty is <b>objectively</b> necessary, -but <b>subjectively</b> accidental. Only it is precisely this that -is more easily said than thought for where is the <b>Object</b> of -this <b>objective</b> necessity, the consequence of which for the -most part, perhaps indeed always, fails to be realised in objective -reality! With every wish to be unbiassed, I cannot but think that -the expression—<b>necessity of an action</b>—is nothing but an -artificially concealed, very forced paraphrase of the word "ought."<a name="FNanchor_3_23" id="FNanchor_3_23"></a><a href="#Footnote_3_23" class="fnanchor">[3]</a> -This will become<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_52" id="Page_52">[Pg 52]</a></span> clearer if we notice that in the same definition the -word <i>Achtung</i> (respect) is employed, where <i>Gehorsam</i> (obedience) is -meant. Similarly in the note on p. 16 (R., p. 20) we read: "<i>Achtung</i> -signifies simply the subordination of my will to a law. The direct -determination of the will by a law, and the consciousness that it is -so determined—this is what is denoted by <i>Achtung</i>" In what language? -In German the proper term is <i>Gehorsam</i>. But the word <i>Achtung</i>, so -unsuitable as it is, cannot without a reason have been put in place of -the word <i>Gehorsam.</i> It must serve some purpose; and this is obviously -none other than to veil the derivation of the imperative form, and of -the conception of duty, from theological Morals; just as we saw above -that the expression "necessity of an action," which is such a forced -and awkward substitute for the word "shall," was only chosen because -"shall" is the exact language of the Decalogue. The above definition: -"Duty is the necessity of an action out of respect for the law," would -therefore read in natural, undisguised, plain language: "Duty signifies -an action which <b>ought</b> to be done out of obedience to a law." -This is "the real form of the poodle."<a name="FNanchor_4_24" id="FNanchor_4_24"></a><a href="#Footnote_4_24" class="fnanchor">[4]</a></p> - -<p>But now as to the Law, which is the real foundation stone of the -Kantian Ethics. <b>What does it contain? And where is it inscribed?</b> -This is the chief<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_53" id="Page_53">[Pg 53]</a></span> point of inquiry. In the first place, be it observed -that we have two questions to deal with: the one has to do with the -<b>Principle</b>, the other with the <b>Basis</b> of Ethics—two -entirely different things, although they are frequently, and sometimes -indeed intentionally, confused.</p> - -<p>The principle or main proposition of an ethical system is the shortest -and most concise definition of the line of conduct which it prescribes, -or, if it have no imperative form, of the line of conduct to which it -attaches real moral worth. It thus contains, in the general terms of -a single enunciation, the direction for following the path of virtue, -which is derived from that system: in other words, it is the <i>ὅ,τι</i><a name="FNanchor_5_25" id="FNanchor_5_25"></a><a href="#Footnote_5_25" class="fnanchor">[5]</a> -of virtue. Whereas the <b>Basis</b> of any theory of Ethics is the -<i>διότι</i><a name="FNanchor_6_26" id="FNanchor_6_26"></a><a href="#Footnote_6_26" class="fnanchor">[6]</a> of virtue, the <b>reason</b> of the obligation enjoined, -of the exhortation or praise given, whether it be sought in human -nature, or in the external conditions of the world, or in anything -else. As in all sciences, so also in Ethics the <i>ὅ,τι</i> must be clearly -distinguished from the <i>διότι</i>. But most teachers of Morals wilfully -confound this difference: probably because the <i>ὅ,τι</i> is so easy, the -<i>διότι</i> so exceedingly difficult, to give. They are therefore glad to -try to make up for the poverty on the one hand, by the riches on the -other, and to bring about a happy marriage between <i>Πενία</i> (poverty) -and <i>Πόρος</i> (plenty), by putting them together in one proposition.<a name="FNanchor_7_27" id="FNanchor_7_27"></a><a href="#Footnote_7_27" class="fnanchor">[7]</a><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_54" id="Page_54">[Pg 54]</a></span> -This is generally done by taking the familiar <i>ὅ,τι</i> out of the simple -form in which it can be expressed, and forcing it into an artificial -formula, from which it is only to be deduced as the conclusion of -given premises; and the reader is led by this performance to feel -as if he had grasped not only the thing, but its cause as well. We -may easily convince ourselves of this by recalling all the most -familiar principles of Morals. As, however, in what follows I have -no intention of imitating acrobatic tricks of this sort, but purpose -proceeding with all honesty and straightforwardness, I cannot make the -principle of Ethics equivalent to its basis, but must keep the two -quite separate. Accordingly, this <i>ὅ,τι</i>—<i>i.e.</i>, the principle, the -fundamental proposition—as to which in its essence all teachers of -Morals are really at one, however much they may clothe it in different -costumes, I shall at once express in the form which I take to be -the simplest and purest possible, <i>viz.: Neminem laede, immo omnes, -quantum potes, juva</i>. (Do harm to no one; but rather help all people, -as far as lies in your power.) This is in truth the proposition which -all ethical writers expend their energies in endeavouring to account -for. It is the common result of their manifold and widely differing -deductions; it is the <i>ὅ,τι</i> for which the <i>διότι</i> is still sought -after; the consequence, the cause of which is wanting. Hence it is -itself nothing but the<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_55" id="Page_55">[Pg 55]</a></span> <i>Datum</i> (the thing given), in relation to which -the <i>Quaesitum</i> (the thing required) is the problem of every ethical -system, as also of the present prize essay. The solution of this -riddle will disclose the real foundation of Ethics, which, like the -philosopher's stone, has been searched for from time immemorial. That -the <i>Datum</i>, the <i>ὅ,τι</i>, the principle is most purely expressed by the -enunciation I have given, can be seen from the fact that it stands to -every other precept of Morals as a conclusion to given premises, and -therefore constitutes the real goal it is desired to attain; so that -all other ethical commandments can only be regarded as paraphrases, as -indirect or disguised statements, of the above simple proposition. This -is true, for instance, even of that trite and apparently elementary -maxim: <i>Quod tibi fieri non vis, alteri ne feceris</i><a name="FNanchor_8_28" id="FNanchor_8_28"></a><a href="#Footnote_8_28" class="fnanchor">[8]</a> (Do not to -another what you are unwilling should be done to yourself.) The defect -here is that the wording only touches the duties imposed by law, not -those required by virtue;—a thing which can be easily remedied by -the omission of <i>non</i> and <i>ne</i>. Thus changed, it really means nothing -else than: <i>Neminem laede, immo omnes, quantum potes, juva.</i> But as -this sense is only reached by a periphrasis, the formula gains the -appearance of having also revealed its own ultimate foundation, its -<i>διότι</i>; which, however, is not the case, because it does not in the -least follow that, if I am unwilling that something be done to myself, -I ought not to do it to others. The same is true of every other -principle or leading proposition of Ethics that has hitherto been put -forward.</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_56" id="Page_56">[Pg 56]</a></span></p> - -<p>If we now return to the above question:—how does the law read, in -obeying which, according to Kant, duty consists? and on what is it -based?—we shall find that our philosopher, like most others, has in an -extremely artificial manner closely connected the principle of Morals -with its basis. I again call attention to what I have already examined -at the outset—I mean, the Kantian claim that the principle of Ethics -must be purely <i>a priori</i> and purely formal, indeed an <i>a priori</i> -synthetical proposition, which consequently may not contain anything -material, nor rest upon anything empirical, whether objectively in -the external world, or subjectively in consciousness, such as any -feeling, inclination, impulse, and the like. Kant was perfectly aware -of the difficulty of this position; for on p. 60 (R., p. 53) he says: -"It will be seen that philosophy has here indeed reached a precarious -standpoint, which yet is to be immovable, notwithstanding that it -is neither dependent on, nor supported by, anything in heaven or on -earth." We shall therefore with all the greater interest and curiosity -await the solution of the problem he has set himself, namely, how -something is to arise out of nothing, that is, how out of purely <i>a -priori</i> conceptions, which contain nothing empirical or material, the -laws of material human action are to grow up. This is a process which -we may find symbolised in chemistry, where out of three invisible gases -(Azote, Hydrogen, and Chlorine<a name="FNanchor_9_29" id="FNanchor_9_29"></a><a href="#Footnote_9_29" class="fnanchor">[9]</a>), and thus in apparently empty space, -solid sal-ammoniac is evolved before our eyes.</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_57" id="Page_57">[Pg 57]</a></span></p> - -<p>I will, however, explain, more clearly than Kant either would or -could, the method whereby he accomplishes this difficult task. The -demonstration is all the more necessary because what he did appears -to be seldom properly understood. Almost all Kant's disciples have -fallen into the mistake of supposing that he presents his Categorical -Imperative directly as a fact of consciousness. But in that case -its origin would be anthropological, and, as resting on experience, -although internal, it would have an empirical basis: a position which -runs directly counter to the Kantian view, and which he repeatedly -rejects. Thus on p. 48 (R., p. 44) he says: "It cannot be empirically -determined whether any such Categorical Imperative exists everywhere"; -and again, on p. 49 (R., p. 45): "The possibility of the Categorical -Imperative must be investigated entirely on <i>a priori</i> grounds, -because here we are not helped by any testimony of experience as to -its reality." Even Reinhold, his first pupil, missed this point; for -in his <i>Beitrage zur Uebersicht der Philosophie am Anfange des</i> 19. -<i>Jahrhunderts</i>, No. 2, p. 21, we find him saying: "Kant assumes the -moral law to be a direct and certain reality, an original fact of the -moral consciousness." But if Kant had wished to make the Categorical -Imperative a fact of consciousness, and thus give it an empirical -foundation, he certainly would not have failed at least to put it -forward as such. And this is precisely what he never does. As far as -I know, the Categorical Imperative appears for the first time in the -<i>Kritik der Reinen Vernunft</i> (p. 802 of the first, and p. 830 of the -fifth edition), entirely ex nunc<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_58" id="Page_58">[Pg 58]</a></span> (unexpectedly), without any preamble, -and merely connected with the preceding sentence by an altogether -unjustifiable "therefore."; It is only in the <i>Grundlage zur Metaphysik -der Sitten</i>—a book to which we here devote especial attention—that -it is first introduced expressly and formally, as a deduction from -certain concepts. Whereas in Reinhold's <i>Formula concordiae des -Kriticismus</i>,<a name="FNanchor_10_30" id="FNanchor_10_30"></a><a href="#Footnote_10_30" class="fnanchor">[10]</a> we actually read on p. 122 the following sentence: -"We distinguish moral self-consciousness from the <b>experience</b> -with which it, as an original fact transcending all knowledge, is -bound up in the human consciousness; and we understand by such -self-consciousness the <b>direct consciousness of duty</b>, that is, of -the <b>necessity</b> we are under of admitting the legitimacy—whether -pleasurable or the reverse—of the will, as the stimulus and as the -measure of its own operations."</p> - -<p>This would of course be "a charming <i>thesis</i>, with a very pretty -<i>hypothesis</i> to boot."<a name="FNanchor_11_31" id="FNanchor_11_31"></a><a href="#Footnote_11_31" class="fnanchor">[11]</a> But seriously: into what an outrageous -<i>petitio principii</i> do we find Kant's moral law here developed! If -<b>that</b> were true, Ethics would indubitably have a basis of -incomparable solidity, and there would be no need of any questions -being set for prize essays, to encourage inquiry in this direction. -But the greatest marvel would be, that men had been so slow in -discovering such a fact of consciousness, considering<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_59" id="Page_59">[Pg 59]</a></span> that for the -space of thousands of years a basis for Morals has been sought after -with zealous patient toil. How Kant himself is responsible for this -deplorable mistake, I shall explain further on; nevertheless, one -cannot but wonder at the undisputed predominance of such a radical -error among his disciples. Have they never, whilst writing all their -numberless books on the Kantian philosophy, noticed the disfigurement -which the <i>Kritik der Reinen Vernunft</i> underwent in the second -edition, and which made it an incoherent, self-contradictory work? -It seems that this has only now come to light; and, in my opinion, -the fact has been quite correctly analysed in Rosenkranz's preface to -the second volume of his complete edition of Kant's works. We must, -however, remember that many scholars, being unceasingly occupied as -teachers and authors, find very little time left for private and exact -research. It is certain that <i>docendo disco</i> (I learn by teaching) is -not unconditionally true; sometimes indeed one is tempted to parody -it by saying: <i>semper docendo nihil disco</i> (by always teaching I -learn nothing); and even what Diderot puts into the mouth of Rameau's -nephew is not altogether without reason: "'And as for these teachers, -do you suppose they understand the sciences they give instruction -in? Not a bit of it, my dear sir, not a bit of it. If they possessed -sufficient knowledge to be able to teach them, they would not do so.' -'Why?' 'Because they would have devoted their lives to the study of -them.'"—(Goethe's translation, p. 104.) Lichtenberg too says: "I have -rather observed that professional people are often exactly those who -do<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_60" id="Page_60">[Pg 60]</a></span> not know best." But to return to the Kantian Ethics: most persons, -provided only the conclusion reached agrees with their moral feelings, -immediately assume that there is no flaw to be found in its derivation; -and if the process of deduction looks difficult, they do not trouble -themselves much about it, but are content to trust the faculty.</p> - -<p>Thus the foundation which Kant gave to his moral law by no means -consists in its being proved empirically to be a fact of consciousness; -neither does he base it on an appeal to moral feeling, nor yet on -a <i>petitio principii</i>, under its fine modern name of an "absolute -Postulate." It is formed rather of a very subtle process of thought, -which he twice advances, on p. 17 and p. 51 (R., p. 22, and p. 46), and -which I shall now proceed to make clear.</p> - -<p>Kant, be it observed, ridiculed all empirical stimuli of the will, -and began by removing everything, whether subjective or objective, on -which a law determining the will's action could be empirically based. -The consequence is, that he has nothing left for the substance of his -law but simply its <b>Form</b>. Now this can only be the abstract -conception of <b>lawfulness</b>. But the conception of lawfulness -is built up out of what is valid for all persons equally. Therefore -the substance of the law consists of the conception of what is -universally valid, and its contents are of course nothing else than its -<b>universal validity</b>. Hence the formula will read as follows: "Act -only in accordance with that precept which you can also wish should -be a general law for all rational beings." This, then, is the real -foundation—for the most part so<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_61" id="Page_61">[Pg 61]</a></span> greatly misunderstood—which Kant -constructed for his principle of Morals, and therefore for his whole -ethical system. Compare also the <i>Kritik der Praktischen Vernunft</i>, p. -61 (R., p. 147); the end of Note 1.</p> - -<p>I pay Kant a tribute of sincere admiration for the great acumen he -displayed in carrying out this dexterous feat, but I continue in -all seriousness my examination of his position according to the -standard of truth. I will only observe—and this point I shall take -up again later on—that here <b>reason</b>, because, and in so far -as, it works out the above explained special ratiocination, receives -the name of <b>practical reason</b>. Now the Categorical Imperative -of Practical Reason is the law which results from this process of -thought. Consequently Practical Reason is not in the least what most -people, including even Fichte, have regarded it—a special faculty -that cannot be traced to its source, a <i>qualitas occulta</i>, a sort of -moral instinct, like Hutcheson's "moral sense"; but it is (as Kant -himself in his preface, p. xii. [R., p. 8], and elsewhere, often enough -declares) one and the same with <b>theoretical reason</b>—is, in fact, -<b>theoretical reason</b> itself, in so far as the latter works out the -ratiocinative process I have described. It is noticeable that Fichte -calls the Categorical Imperative of Kant an <b>absolute Postulate</b> -(<i>Grundlage der gesammten Wissenschaftslehre</i>, Tübingen, 1802, p. -240, Note). This is the modern, more showy, expression for <i>petitio -principii</i>, and thus we see that he, too, regularly accepted the -Categorical Imperative, and consequently must be included among those -who have fallen into the mistake above criticised.</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_62" id="Page_62">[Pg 62]</a></span></p> - -<p>The objection, to which this Kantian basis of Morals is at once and -directly exposed, lies in the fact that such an origin of a moral law -in us is impossible, because of its assumption that man would quite -of his own accord hit on the idea of looking about for, and inquiring -after, a law to which his will should be subject, and which should -shape its actions. This procedure, however, cannot possibly occur to -him of itself; at best it could only be after another moral; stimulus -had supplied the first impulse and motive thereto; and such a stimulus -would have to be positively operative, and real; and show itself to be -such, as well as spontaneously influence, indeed force its presence -upon, the mind. But anything of this sort would run counter to Kant's -assumption, which, according to the chain of reasoning above described, -is to be regarded as itself the origin of all moral conceptions—in -fact, the <i>punctum saliens</i> of Morality. Consequently, as long as there -is no such antecedent incentive (because, <i>ex hypothesi</i>, there exists -no other moral stimulus but the process of thought already explained), -so long Egoism alone must remain as the plumb-line of human conduct, -as the guiding thread of the law of motivation; so long the entirely -empirical and egoistic motives of the moment, alone and unchecked, -must determine, in each separate case, the conduct of a man; since, -on this assumption, there is no voice to arrest him, neither does any -reason whatever exist, why he should be minded to inquire after, to -say nothing of anxiously searching for, a law which should limit and -govern his will. And yet it is only possible<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_63" id="Page_63">[Pg 63]</a></span> on this supposition that -he should think out the above remarkable piece of mental legerdemain. -It matters not how far we may care to put a strict and exact -interpretation on this Kantian process, or whether we choose to tone it -down to some dim, obscurely felt operation of thought. No modification -of it can attack the primary truths that out of nothing, nothing -comes, and that an effect requires a cause. The moral stimulus, like -every motive that effects the will, must in all cases make itself felt -spontaneously, and therefore have a positive working, and consequently -be real. And because for men the only thing which has reality is the -empirical, or else that which is supposed to have a possibly empirical -existence, therefore it follows that the moral stimulus cannot but -be empirical, and show itself as such of its own accord; and without -waiting for us to begin our search, it must come and press itself upon -us, and this with such force that it may, at least possibly, overcome -the opposing egoistic motives in all their giant strength. For Ethics -has to do with actual human conduct, and not with the <i>a priori</i> -building of card houses—a performance which yields results that no man -would ever turn to in the stern stress and battle of life, and which, -in face of the storm of our passions, would be about as serviceable as -a syringe in a great fire.</p> - -<p>I have already noticed above how Kant considered it a special merit of -his moral law that it is founded solely on abstract, pure <i>a priori</i> -conceptions, consequently on <b>pure reason</b>; whereby its validity -obtains (he says) not only for men, but for all rational beings<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_64" id="Page_64">[Pg 64]</a></span> as -such. All the more must we regret that pure, abstract conceptions <i>a -priori</i>, without real contents, and without any kind of empirical -basis can never move, at any rate, men; of other rational beings -I am of course incapable of speaking. The second defect, then, in -Kant's ethical basis is its lack of real substance. So far this has -escaped notice, because the real nature of his foundation has in all -probability been thoroughly understood only by an exceedingly small -number of those who were its enthusiastic propagandists. The second -fault, I repeat, is entire want of reality, and hence of possible -efficacy. The structure floats in the air, like a web of the subtlest -conceptions devoid of all contents; it is based on nothing, and can -therefore support nothing, and move nothing. And yet Kant loaded it -with a burden of enormous weight, namely, the hypothesis of the Freedom -of the Will. In spite of his oft declared conviction that freedom in -human action has absolutely no place; that theoretically not even its -possibility is thinkable (<i>Kritik der Praktischen Vernunft</i>, p. 168; -R., p. 223); that, if the character of a man, and all the motives which -work on him were exactly known, his conduct could be calculated as -certainly and as precisely as an eclipse of the moon (<i>ibidem</i>, p. 177; -R., p. 230): he nevertheless makes an assumption of freedom (although -only <i>idealiter</i>, and as a postulate) by his celebrated conclusion: -"You can, because you ought"; and this on the strength of his precious -ethical basis, which, as we see, floats in the air incorporeal. But if -it has once been clearly recognised<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_65" id="Page_65">[Pg 65]</a></span> that a thing <b>is not</b>, and -<b>cannot be</b>, what is the use of all the postulates in the world? -It would be much more to the purpose to cast away that on which the -postulate is based, because it is an impossible supposition; and this -course would be justified by the rule <i>a non posse ad non esse valet -consequentia</i>;<a name="FNanchor_12_32" id="FNanchor_12_32"></a><a href="#Footnote_12_32" class="fnanchor">[12]</a> and by a <i>reductio ad absurdum</i>, which would at the -same time be fatal to the Categorical Imperative. Instead of which one -false doctrine is built up on the other.</p> - -<p>The inadmissibility of a basis for Morals consisting of a few entirely -abstract and empty conceptions must have been apparent to Kant himself -in secret. For in the <i>Kritik der Praktischen Vernunft</i>, where (as I -have already said) he is not so strict and methodical in his work, and -where we find him becoming bolder on account of the fame he had gained, -it is remarkable how the ethical basis gradually changes its nature, -and almost forgets that it is a mere web of abstract ideas; in fact, -it seems distinctly desirous of becoming more substantial. Thus, for -instance, on p. 81 (R., p. 163) of the above work are the words: "The -Moral Law <b>in some sort a fact of Pure Reason</b>." What is one to -think of this extraordinary expression? In every other place that which -is fact is opposed to what is knowable by pure reason. Similarly on -p. 83 (R., p. 164) we read of "a Reason which directly determines the -Will"; and so on.</p> - -<p>Now let us remember that in laying his foundation Kant expressly and -repeatedly rejects every<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_66" id="Page_66">[Pg 66]</a></span> anthropological basis, everything that -could prove the Categorical Imperative to be a fact of consciousness, -because such a proof would be empirical. Nevertheless, his successors -were so emboldened by incidental utterances like the above that -they went to much greater lengths. Fichte in his work, <i>System der -Sittenlehre</i>, p. 49, warns us expressly "not to allow ourselves to be -misled into trying to explain, and derive from external sources, the -consciousness that we have duties, because this would be detrimental -to the dignity and absoluteness of the law." A very nice excuse! Again -on p. 66 he says: "The principle of Morality is a thought which is -based on the <b>intellectual intuition</b> of the absolute activity -of the intelligence, and which is directly conceived by the pure -intelligence of its own accord." What a fine flourish to conceal the -helplessness of this clap-trap! Whoever may like to convince himself -how Kant's disciples, little by little, totally forgot and ignored -the real nature of the foundation and derivation which their master -originally gave to the moral law, should read a very interesting essay -in Reinhold's <i>Beitrage zur Uebersicht der Philosophie im Anfange des</i> -19. <i>Jahrhunderts</i>, No. 2, 1801. In it, on pp. 105 and 106, it is -maintained "that in the Kantian philosophy Autonomy (which is the same -thing as the Categorical Imperative) is a fact of consciousness, and -cannot be traced further back, inasmuch as it declares itself by means -of a direct consciousness."</p> - -<p>But in this case, it would have an anthropological, and consequently -empirical, foundation—a position<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_67" id="Page_67">[Pg 67]</a></span> which is diametrically opposed to -Kant's explicit and repeated utterances. Again, on p. 108 we find: -"Both in the practical philosophy of criticism, and in the whole of the -purified or higher transcendental philosophy, Autonomy is that which -is founded, and which founds, by itself alone; and which is neither -capable of, nor requires, any other foundation; it is that which is -absolutely original, true and certain <i>per se;</i> the primal truth; the -<i>prius κατ' ἐξοχήν (par excellence)</i>; the absolute principle. Whoever, -therefore, imagines, requires, or seeks any basis for this Autonomy -external to itself, can only be regarded by the Kantian School as -wanting in moral consciousness;<a name="FNanchor_13_33" id="FNanchor_13_33"></a><a href="#Footnote_13_33" class="fnanchor">[13]</a> or else as failing to interpret -this consciousness correctly, through the employment of false first -principles in his speculations. The School of Fichte and Schelling -declares him to be afflicted with a dulness of intellect that renders -him incapable of being a philosopher, and forms the characteristic of -the unholy <i>canaille</i>, and the sluggish brute, or (to use Schelling's -more veiled expression) of the <i>profanum vulgus</i> and the <i>ignavum -pecus</i>." Every one will understand how much truth there can be in a -doctrine which it is sought to uphold by such<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_68" id="Page_68">[Pg 68]</a></span> defiant and dogmatic -rhetoric. Meanwhile, we must doubtless explain by the respect that this -language inspired, the really childish credulity with which Kant's -followers accepted the Categorical Imperative, and at once treated -it as a matter beyond dispute. The truth is that in this case any -objections raised to a theoretical assertion might easily be confounded -with moral obliquity; so that every one, although he had no very clear -idea in his own mind of the Categorical Imperative, yet preferred to -be silent, believing, as he did, in secret, that others were probably -better off, and had succeeded in evolving a clearer and more definite -mental picture of it. For no one likes to turn his conscience inside -out.</p> - -<p>Thus in the Kantian School Practical Reason with its Categorical -Imperative appears more and more as a hyperphysical fact, as a Delphian -temple in the human soul, out of whose dark recesses proceed oracles -that infallibly declare not, alas! what will, but what ought to, -happen. This doctrine of Practical Reason, as a direct and immediate -fact, once it had been adopted, or rather introduced by artifice -combined with defiance, was unhappily later on extended also to -Theoretical Reason; and not unnaturally: for Kant himself had often -said that both are but one and the same Reason (<i>e.g</i>., Preface, p. -xii; R., p. 8). After it had been once admitted that in the domain of -the Practical there is a Reason which dictates <i>ex tripode</i>,<a name="FNanchor_14_34" id="FNanchor_14_34"></a><a href="#Footnote_14_34" class="fnanchor">[14]</a> it was -an easy step to concede the same privilege to Theoretical Reason also, -closely related<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_69" id="Page_69">[Pg 69]</a></span> as the latter is to the former—indeed, consubstantial -with it. The one was thus pronounced to be just as immediate as the -other, the advantage of this being no less immense than obvious.</p> - -<p>Then it was that all philosophasters and fancy-mongers, with J.H. -Jacobi—the denouncer of atheists—at their head, came crowding to -this postern which was so unexpectedly opened to them. They wanted -to bring their small wares to market, or at least to save what they -most valued of the old heirlooms which Kant's teaching threatened -to pulverise. As in the life of the individual a single youthful -mistake often ruins the whole career; so when Kant made that one -false assumption of a Practical Reason furnished with credentials -exclusively transcendent, and (like the supreme courts of appeal) -with powers of decision "without grounds," the result was that out of -the austere gravity of the Critical Philosophy was evolved a teaching -utterly heterogeneous to it. We hear of a Reason at first only dimly -"surmising," then clearly "comprehending" the "Supersensuous," and -at last endowed with a perfect "intellectual intuition" of it. Every -dreamer could now promulgate his mental freaks as the "absolute," -<i>i.e.</i>, officially issued, deliverances, and revelations of this -Reason. Nor need we be surprised if the new privilege was fully taken -advantage of.</p> - -<p>Here, then, is the origin of that philosophical method which appeared -immediately after Kant, and which is made up of clap-trap, of -mystification, of imposture, of deception, and of throwing dust in the -eyes. This era will be known one day in the History of Philosophy as -"The Period of<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_70" id="Page_70">[Pg 70]</a></span> Dishonesty." For it was signalised by the disappearance -of the characteristic of honesty, of searching after truth in common -with the reader, which was well marked in the writings of all previous -philosophers. The philosophaster's object was not to instruct, but -to befool his hearers, as every page attests. At first Fichte and -Schelling shine as the heroes of this epoch; to be followed by the man -who is quite unworthy even of them, and greatly their inferior in point -of talent—I mean the stupid and clumsy charlatan Hegel. The Chorus is -composed of a mixed company of professors of philosophy, who in solemn -fashion discourse to their public about the Endless, the Absolute, and -many other matters of which they can know absolutely nothing.</p> - -<p>As a stepping-stone to raise Reason to her prophetic throne a -wretched <i>jeu d'esprit</i> was actually dragged in, and made to serve. -It was asserted that, as the word <i>Vernunft</i> (Reason) comes from -<i>vernehmen</i> (to comprehend), therefore <i>Vernunft</i> means a capacity -to <b>comprehend</b> the so-called "Supersensuous," <i>i.e.</i>, -<i>Νεϕελοκοκκυγία</i>,<a name="FNanchor_15_35" id="FNanchor_15_35"></a><a href="#Footnote_15_35" class="fnanchor">[15]</a> or Cloud-cuckoo-town. This pretty notion met -with boundless, approval, and for the space of thirty years was -constantly repeated in Germany with immense satisfaction; indeed, it -was made the foundation of philosophic manuals. And yet it is as clear -as noon-day that of course <i>Vernunft</i> (Reason) comes from. <i>vernehmen</i> -(to comprehend), but only because Reason makes man superior to animals, -so that he not only hears, but also <b>comprehends</b> (<i>vernimmt</i>)—by -no means,<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_71" id="Page_71">[Pg 71]</a></span> what is going on in Cloud-cuckoo-town—but what is said, -as by one reasonable person to another, the words spoken being -<b>comprehended</b> (<i>vernommen</i>) by the listener; and this capacity is -called <i>Reason</i> (<i>Vernunft</i>).</p> - -<p>Such is the interpretation that all peoples, ages, and languages -have put on the word Reason. It has always been understood to mean -the possession of general, abstract, non-intuitive ideas, named -<b>concepts</b>, which are denoted and fixed by means of words. This -faculty alone it is which in reality gives to men their advantage -over animals. For these abstract ideas, or concepts, that is, mental -impressions formed of the sum of many separate things, are the -condition of <b>language</b> and through it of actual <b>thought</b>; -through which again they determine the consciousness not only of the -present (which animals also have), but of the past and the future as -such; whence it results that they are the <i>modulus</i>, so to say, of -clear recollection, of circumspection, of foresight, and of intention; -the constant factor in the evolution of systematic co-operation, of -the state, of trades, arts, sciences, religions, and philosophies, -in short, of everything that so sharply distinguishes human from -animal life. Beasts have only intuitive ideas, and therefore also -only intuitive motives; consequently the dependence of their volition -on motives is manifest. With man this dependence is no less a fact; -he, too (with due allowance for individual character), is affected -by motives under the strictest law of necessity. Only these are -for the most part not <i>intuitive</i> but <i>abstract</i> ideas, that is, -conceptions, or thoughts, which nevertheless are the result of previous -intuitions, hence<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_72" id="Page_72">[Pg 72]</a></span> of external influences. This, however, gives him -a relative freedom—relative, that is, as compared with an animal. -For his action is not determined (as it is in all other creatures) by -the surroundings of the moment as intuitively perceived, but by the -thoughts he has derived from experience, or gained by instruction. -Consequently the motive, by which he, too, is necessarily swayed, is -not always at once obvious to the looker-on simultaneously with the -act; it lies concealed in the brain. It is this that lends to all his -movements, as well as to his conduct and work as a whole, a character -manifestly different from that observable in the habits of beasts. He -seems as though guided by finer, invisible threads; whence all his -acts bear the stamp of deliberation and premeditation, thus gaining -an appearance of independence, which sufficiently distinguishes them -from those of animals. All these great differences, however, spring -solely out of the capacity for <b>abstract ideas, concepts</b>. This -capacity is therefore the essential part of <b>Reason</b>, that is, -of the faculty peculiar to man, and it is called <i>το λόγιμον</i>,<a name="FNanchor_16_36" id="FNanchor_16_36"></a><a href="#Footnote_16_36" class="fnanchor">[16]</a> -<i>το λογιστικον,</i> <b>ratio, la ragione, il discorso, raison, reason, -discourse of reason</b>. If I were asked what the distinction is -between it and <b>Verstand</b>, <i>νοῡς</i>, <b>intellectus, entendement, -understanding</b>; I should reply thus: The latter is that capacity -for knowledge which animals also possess in varying degrees, and which -is seen in us at its highest development; in other words, it is the<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_73" id="Page_73">[Pg 73]</a></span> -direct consciousness of the law of <b>Causality</b>—a consciousness -which precedes all experience, being constituted by the very form -of the understanding, whose essential nature is, in fact, therein -contained. On it depends in the first place the intuitive perception of -the external world; for the senses by themselves are only capable of -<b>impression</b>, a thing which is very far from being <b>intuitive -perception</b>; indeed, the former is nothing but the material of the -latter: <i>νοῡς ὁρᾷ, καὶ νοῡς ἀκούει, τ'ἄλλα κωϕὰ καὶ τυϕλά.</i> (The mind -sees, the mind hears; everything else is deaf and blind.) <b>Intuitive -perception</b> is the result of our directly referring the impressions -of the sense-organs to their cause, which, exactly because of this -act of the intelligence, presents itself as an <b>external object</b> -under the mode of intuition proper to us, <i>i.e.</i>, in <b>space</b>. -This is a proof that the Law of Causality is known to us <i>a priori</i>, -and does not arise from experience, since experience itself, inasmuch -as it presupposes intuitive perception, is only possible through the -same law. All the higher qualities of the intellect, all cleverness, -sagacity, penetration, acumen are directly proportional to the -exactness and fulness with which the workings of Causality in all its -relations are grasped; for all knowledge of the <b>connection</b> -of things, in the widest sense of the word, is based on the -comprehension of this law, and the clearness and accuracy with which -it is understood is the measure of one man's superiority to another -in <b>understanding</b>, shrewdness, cunning. On the other hand, the -epithet <b>reasonable</b> has at all times been applied to the man who -does<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_74" id="Page_74">[Pg 74]</a></span> not allow himself to be guided by intuitive impressions, but by -<b>thoughts</b> and <b>conceptions</b>, and who therefore always sets -to work logically after due reflection and forethought. Conduct of this -sort is everywhere known as <b>reasonable</b>. Not that this by any -means implies uprightness and love for one's fellows. On the contrary, -it is quite possible to act in the most reasonable way, that is, -according to conclusions scientifically deduced, and weighed with the -nicest exactitude; and yet to follow the most selfish, unjust, and even -iniquitons maxims. So that never before Kant did it occur to any one -to identify just, virtuous, and noble conduct with <b>reasonable</b>; -the two lines of behaviour have always been completely separated, and -kept apart. The one depends on the <b>kind of motivation</b>; the -other on the difference in fundamental principles. Only after Kant -(because he taught that virtue has its source in Pure Reason) did the -virtuous and the reasonable become one and the same thing, despite the -usage of these words which all languages have adopted—a usage which -is not fortuitous, but the work of universal, and therefore uniform, -human judgment. "Reasonable" and "vicious" are terms that go very -well together; indeed great, far-reaching crimes are only possible -from their union. Similarly, "unreasonable" and "noble-minded" are -often found associated; <i>e.g.</i>, if I give to-day to the needy man -what I shall myself require to-morrow more urgently than he; or, -if I am so far affected as to hand over to one in distress the sum -which my creditor is waiting for; and such cases could be multiplied -indefinitely.</p> - -<p>We have seen that this exaltation of Reason to<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_75" id="Page_75">[Pg 75]</a></span> be the source of all -virtue rests on two assertions. First, as <b>Practical Reason</b>, -it is said to issue, like an oracle, peremptory Imperatives purely -<i>a priori.</i> Secondly, taken in connection with the false explanation -of <b>Theoretical Reason</b>, as given in the <i>Kritik der Reinen -Vernunft</i>, it is presented as a certain faculty essentially concerned -with the <b>Unconditioned</b>, as manifested in three alleged Ideas<a name="FNanchor_17_37" id="FNanchor_17_37"></a><a href="#Footnote_17_37" class="fnanchor">[17]</a> -(the impossibility of which the intellect at the same time recognises -<i>a priori</i>). And we found that this position, as an <i>exemplar vitiis -imitabile</i>,<a name="FNanchor_18_38" id="FNanchor_18_38"></a><a href="#Footnote_18_38" class="fnanchor">[18]</a> led our muddy-headed philosophers, Jacobi at their -head, from bad to worse. They talked of <b>Reason</b> (<i>Vernunft</i>) -as directly comprehending (<i>vernehmend</i>) the "<b>Supersensuous</b>," -and absurdly declared that it is a certain mental property which has -to do essentially with things transcending all experience, <i>i.e.</i>, -with metaphysics; and that it perceives directly and intuitively the -ultimate causes of all things, and of all Being, the Supersensuous, -the Absolute, the Divine, etc. Now, had it been wished to use Reason, -instead of deifying it, such assertions as these must long ago have -been met by the simple remark that, if man, by virtue of a special -organ, furnished by his Reason, for solving the riddle of the world, -possessed an innate metaphysics that only required development; in -that<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_76" id="Page_76">[Pg 76]</a></span> case there would have to be just as complete agreement on -metaphysical matters as on the truths of arithmetic and geometry; and -this would make it totally impossible that there should exist on the -earth a large number of radically different religions, and a still -larger number of radically different systems of philosophy. Indeed, -we may rather suppose that, if any one were found to differ from the -rest in his religious or philosophical views, he would be at once -regarded as a subject for mental pathology. Nor would the following -plain reflection have failed to present itself. If we discovered a -species of apes which intentionally prepared instruments for fighting, -or building, or for any other purpose; we should immediately admit -that it was endowed with Reason. On the other hand, if we meet with -savages destitute of all metaphysics, or of all religion (and there are -such); it does not occur to us to deny them Reason on that account. -The Reason that <b>proves</b> its pretended supersensuous knowledge -was duly brought back to bounds by Kant's critique; but Jacobi's -wonderful Reason, that directly <b>comprehends</b> the supersensuous, -he must indeed have thought <b>beneath</b> all criticism. Meanwhile, a -certain imperious and oracular Reason of the same kind is still, at the -Universities, fastened on the shoulders of our innocent youth.</p> - -<h4><a id="NOTE_b"></a>NOTE.</h4> - -<p>If we wish to reach the real origin of this hypothesis of Practical -Reason, we must trace its descent a little further back. We shall find -that it is derived<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_77" id="Page_77">[Pg 77]</a></span> from a doctrine, which Kant totally confuted, -but which nevertheless, in this connection, lies secretly (indeed -he himself is not aware of it) at the root of his assumption of a -Practical Reason with its Imperatives and its Autonomy—a reminiscence -of a former mode of thought. I mean the so-called Rational Psychology, -according to which man is composed of two entirely heterogeneous -substances—the material body, and the immaterial soul. Plato was -the first to formulate this dogma, and he endeavoured to prove it -as an objective truth. But it was Descartes who, by working it out -with scientific exactness, perfectly developed and completed it. And -this is just what brought its fallacy to light, as demonstrated by -Spinoza, Locke, and Kant successively. It was demonstrated by Spinoza; -because his philosophy consists chiefly in the refutation of his -master's twofold dualism, and because he entirely and expressly denied -the two Substances of Descartes, and took as his main principle the -following proposition: "<i>Substantia cogitans et substantia externa -una eademque est substantia, quae jam sub hoc, jam sub illo attribute -comprehenditur.</i>"<a name="FNanchor_19_39" id="FNanchor_19_39"></a><a href="#Footnote_19_39" class="fnanchor">[19]</a> It was demonstrated by Locke; for he combated -the theory of innate ideas, derived all knowledge from the sensuous, -and taught that it is not impossible that Matter should think. And -lastly, it was demonstrated by<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_78" id="Page_78">[Pg 78]</a></span> Kant, in his <i>Kritik der Rationalen -Psychologie</i>, as given in the first edition. Leibnitz and Wolff were -the champions on the bad side; and this brought Leibnitz the undeserved -honour of being compared to the great Plato, who was really so unlike -him.</p> - -<p>But to enter into details here would be out of place. According to -this Rational Psychology, the soul was originally and in its essence -a <b>perceiving</b> substance, and only as a consequence thereof did -it become possessed of volition. According as it carried on these two -modes of its activity, Perception and Volition, conjoined with the -body, or incorporeal, and entirely <i>per se</i>, so it was endowed with a -lower or higher faculty of perception, and of volition in like kind. -In its higher faculty the immaterial soul was active solely by itself, -and without co-operation of the body. In this case it was <i>intellectus -purus</i>, being composed of concepts, belonging exclusively to itself, -and of the corresponding acts of will, both of which were absolutely -spiritual, and had nothing sensuous about them—the sensuous being -derived from the body.<a name="FNanchor_20_40" id="FNanchor_20_40"></a><a href="#Footnote_20_40" class="fnanchor">[20]</a> So that it perceived nothing else but pure -Abstracts, Universals, innate conceptions, <i>aeternae veritates</i>, -etc.; wherefore also its volition was entirely controlled by purely -spiritual ideas like these. On the other hand, the soul's <b>lower</b> -faculty of Perception and Volition was the result of its working in -concert and close union with the various organs of the body, whereby a -prejudicial<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_79" id="Page_79">[Pg 79]</a></span> effect was produced on its an mixed spiritual activity. -Here, <i>i.e.</i>, to this <b>lower</b> faculty, was supposed to belong -every <b>intuitive</b> perception, which consequently would have -to be obscure and confused, while the <b>abstract</b>, formed by -separating from objects their qualities, would be clear! The will, -which was determined by preceptions thus sensuously conditioned, formed -the lower Volition, and it was for the most part bad; for its acts -were guided by the impulse of the senses; while the other will (the -higher) was untrammelled, was guided by Pure Reason, and appertained -only to the immaterial soul. This doctrine of the Cartesians has been -best expounded by De la Forge, in his <i>Tractatus de Mente Humana</i>, -where in chap. 23 we read:<a name="FNanchor_21_41" id="FNanchor_21_41"></a><a href="#Footnote_21_41" class="fnanchor">[21]</a> <i>Non nisi eadem voluntas est, quae -appellatur appetitus sensitivus, quando excitatur per judicia, quae -formantur consequenter ad perceptiones sensuum; et quae appetitus -rationalis nominatur, cum<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_80" id="Page_80">[Pg 80]</a></span> mens judicia format de propriis suis ideis, -independenter a cogitationibus sensuum confusis, quae inclinationum -ejus sunt causae.... Id, quod occasionem dedit, ut duae istae diversae -voluntatis propensiones pro duobus diversis appetitibus sumerentur, -est, quod saepissime unus alteri opponatur, quia propositum, quod mens -superaedificat propriis suis perceptionibus, non semper consentit cum -cogitationibus, quae menti a corporis dispositione suggeruntur, per -quam saepe obligatur ad aliquid volendum, dum ratio ejus earn aliud -optare facit.</i></p> - -<p>Out of the dim reminiscence of such views there finally arose Kant's -doctrine of the Autonomy of the Will, which, as the mouth-piece of -Pure, Practical Reason, lays down the law for all rational beings as -such, and recognises nothing but <b>formal</b> motives, as opposed -to <b>material</b>; the latter determining only the lower faculty of -desires, to which the higher is hostile. For the rest, this whole -theory, which was not really systematically set forth till the time -of Descartes, is nevertheless to be found as far back as Aristotle. -In his <i>De Anima</i> I. 1, it is sufficiently clearly stated; while -Plato in the <i>Phaedo</i> (pp. 188 and 189, edit. Bipont.) had already -paved the way, with no uncertain hints. After being elaborated to -great perfection by the Cartesian doctrine, we find it a hundred -years later waxed bold and strong, and occupying the foremost place; -but precisely for this reason forced to reveal its true nature. An -excellent <i>résumé</i> of the view which then prevailed is presented in -Muratori's <i>Della Forza della Fantasia,</i> chaps. 1-4 and 13. In this -work the imagination is<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_81" id="Page_81">[Pg 81]</a></span> regarded as a purely material, corporeal organ -of the brain (the lower faculty of perception), its function being to -intuitively apprehend the external world on the data of the senses; -and nought remains for the immaterial soul but thinking, reflecting, -and determining. It must have been felt how obviously this position -involves the whole subject in doubt. For if Matter is capable of the -intuitive apprehension of the world in all its complexity, it is -inconceivable that it should not also be capable of abstracting this -intuition; wherefrom everything else would follow. Abstraction is of -course nothing else than an elimination of the qualities attaching to -things which are not necessary for general purposes, in other words, -the individual and special differences. For instance, if I disregard, -or abstract, that which is peculiar to the sheep, ox, stag, camel, -etc., I reach the conception of ruminants. By this operation the ideas -lose their intuitiveness, and as merely abstract, non-intuitive notions -or concepts, they require words to fix them in the consciousness, and -allow of their being adequately handled. All this shows that Kant -was still under the influence of the after-effect of that old-time -doctrine, when he propounded his Practical Reason with its Imperatives.</p> -<hr class="r5" /> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_1_21" id="Footnote_1_21"></a><a href="#FNanchor_1_21"><span class="label">[1]</span></a> These epigrams form the close of Schiller's -poem "Die Philosophen," which is worth reading in this -connection—(<i>Translator</i>.)</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_2_22" id="Footnote_2_22"></a><a href="#FNanchor_2_22"><span class="label">[2]</span></a> More correctly, Huitzilopochtli: a Mexican deity.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_3_23" id="Footnote_3_23"></a><a href="#FNanchor_3_23"><span class="label">[3]</span></a> Or "shall," as in the "thou shall," of the Decalogue -—(<i>Translator</i>.)</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_4_24" id="Footnote_4_24"></a><a href="#FNanchor_4_24"><span class="label">[4]</span></a> "<i>Des Pudels Kern</i>"; <i>V.</i> Goethe's <i>Faust</i>, Part I. -<i>Studirzimmer.</i> Schopenhauer means that his analysis has forced the -real meaning out of Kant's language, just as Faust by his exorcism -compels Mephistopheles, who was in the form of a poodle, to resume his -true form.—(<i>Translator</i>.)</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_5_25" id="Footnote_5_25"></a><a href="#FNanchor_5_25"><span class="label">[5]</span></a> <i>ὅ,τι</i>: <i>i.e.</i>, the "what" a thing is; its principle, or -essence.—(<i>Translator</i>.)</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_6_26" id="Footnote_6_26"></a><a href="#FNanchor_6_26"><span class="label">[6]</span></a> <i>διότι</i>: <i>i.e.</i>, the "wherefore" of a thing; its <i>raison -d'être,</i> its underlying cause.—(<i>Translator</i>.)</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_7_27" id="Footnote_7_27"></a><a href="#FNanchor_7_27"><span class="label">[7]</span></a> Schopenhauer was doubtless thinking of the famous myth -in Plato's <i>Symposium</i> Chap. 23 (Teubner's edition, Leipzig, 1875), -where Eros is represented as the offspring of <i>Πόρος</i> and <i>Πενία</i>, -who on the birthday of Aphrodite were united in the garden of -Zeus.—(<i>Translator.</i>)</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_8_28" id="Footnote_8_28"></a><a href="#FNanchor_8_28"><span class="label">[8]</span></a> Hugo Grotius attributes it to the Emperor Severus.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_9_29" id="Footnote_9_29"></a><a href="#FNanchor_9_29"><span class="label">[9]</span></a> Azote=Nitrogen. The formula for Ammonium Chloride or -Sal-ammoniac is NH4Cl.—(<i>Translator</i>).</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_10_30" id="Footnote_10_30"></a><a href="#FNanchor_10_30"><span class="label">[10]</span></a> To be found in the fifth number of the <i>Beiträge zur -Uebersicht der Philosophie am Anfange des</i> 19. <i>Jahrhunderts</i>—a -journal of the greatest importance for critical philosophy.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_11_31" id="Footnote_11_31"></a><a href="#FNanchor_11_31"><span class="label">[11]</span></a> "<i>Einen erklecklichen</i> <span style="font-size: 0.8em;">SATZ</span>, <i>ja, und der auch was</i> -<span style="font-size: 0.8em;">SETZT</span>." <span style="font-size: 0.8em;">SCHILLER</span>.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_12_32" id="Footnote_12_32"></a><a href="#FNanchor_12_32"><span class="label">[12]</span></a> To argue from impossibility to non-existence is -valid—<i>i.e.</i> the impossibility of a thing makes its non-existence a -safe conclusion.—(<i>Translator.</i>)</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_13_33" id="Footnote_13_33"></a><a href="#FNanchor_13_33"><span class="label">[13]</span></a> -</p> -<p> -<i>Dacht' ich's doch! Wissen sie nichts Vernünftiges mehr</i><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 3em;"><i>zu erwidern,</i></span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;"><i>Schieben sie's Einem geschwind in das Gewissen hinein</i>.</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 14.5em;">—<span style="font-size: 0.8em;">SCHILLER</span>, <i>Die Philosophen.</i></span><br /> -</p> -<p> -<i>Just as I thought! Can they give no more any answer of reason,</i><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;"><i>Quickly the ground is changed: Conscience, they say,</i></span><br /> -<i>is at fault.</i><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 17em;">—(<i>Translator.</i>)</span> -</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_14_34" id="Footnote_14_34"></a><a href="#FNanchor_14_34"><span class="label">[14]</span></a> As from the Pythian tripod: <i>i.e.</i>,—with official -authority, <i>ex cathedra.</i></p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_15_35" id="Footnote_15_35"></a><a href="#FNanchor_15_35"><span class="label">[15]</span></a> <i>V</i>. Aristoph., <i>Aves</i>, 819 <i>et alibi</i>.—(<i>Translator</i>.)</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_16_36" id="Footnote_16_36"></a><a href="#FNanchor_16_36"><span class="label">[16]</span></a> <i>λόγιμος</i> means "remarkable," being never used in the -sense of "rational." <i>Tὸ logikὸn</i> is perhaps a possible expression; the -right word is <i>λόγος</i>.—(<i>Translator</i>.)</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_17_37" id="Footnote_17_37"></a><a href="#FNanchor_17_37"><span class="label">[17]</span></a> The three Ideas are: (1) The Psychological; (2) The -Cosmological; (3) The Theological. <i>V</i>. The Paralogisms of Pure -Reasons, in the Dialectics: <i>Kritik der Reinen Vernunft,</i> Part -I.—(<i>Translator</i>.)</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_18_38" id="Footnote_18_38"></a><a href="#FNanchor_18_38"><span class="label">[18]</span></a> An example easy to be imitated in its faults. <i>V</i>. -Horace, <i>Ep.</i> Lib. I., xix. 17.—(<i>Translator</i>.)</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_19_39" id="Footnote_19_39"></a><a href="#FNanchor_19_39"><span class="label">[19]</span></a> The thinking substance, and substance in extension are -one and the self-same substance, which is contained now under the -latter attribute (<i>i.e.</i>, extension), now under the former (<i>i.e.</i>, the -attribute of thinking).—<i>Ethica</i>, Part II., Prop. 7. Corollary.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_20_40" id="Footnote_20_40"></a><a href="#FNanchor_20_40"><span class="label">[20]</span></a> <i>Intellectio pura est intellectio, quae circa nullas -imagines corporeas versatur</i>. (Pure intelligence is intelligence that -has nothing to do with any bodily forms.)—Cart., <i>Medit</i>., p. 188.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_21_41" id="Footnote_21_41"></a><a href="#FNanchor_21_41"><span class="label">[21]</span></a> It is nothing but one and the same will, which at one -time is called sensuous desire, when it is stimulated by acts of -judgment, formed in consequence of perceptions of the senses; and -which at another time is called rational desire (<i>i.e.</i> desire of the -reason), when the mind forms acts of judgment about its own proper -ideas, independently of the thoughts belonging to, and mixed up with, -the senses; which thoughts are the causes of the mind's tendencies.... -That these two diverse propensities of the will should be regarded as -two distinct desires is occasioned by the fact that very often the -one is opposed to the other, because the intention, which is built -up by the mind on the foundation of its own proper perceptions, does -not always agree with the thoughts which are suggested to the mind by -the body's disposition; whereby it (the mind) is often constrained -to will something, while its reason makes it choose something -different.—(<i>Translator</i>.)</p></div> - -<hr class="chap" /> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_82" id="Page_82">[Pg 82]</a></span></p> - - - - -<h4><a name="CHAPTER_Vb" id="CHAPTER_Vb">CHAPTER V.</a></h4> - -<h3>ON THE LEADING PRINCIPLE OF THE KANTIAN ETHICS.</h3> -<hr class="r5" /> - -<p>After having tested in the preceding chapter the actual basis of Kant's -Ethics, I now turn to that which rests on it—his <b>leading principle -of Morals</b>. The latter is very closely connected with the former; -indeed, in a certain sense, they both grew up together. We have seen -that the formula expressing the principle reads as follows: "Act only -in accordance with that precept which you can also wish should be a -general law for all rational beings." It is a strange proceeding for a -man, who <i>ex hypothesi</i> is seeking a law to determine what he should -do, and what he should leave undone, to be instructed first to search -for one fit to regulate the conduct of all possible rational beings; -but we will pass over that. It is sufficient only to notice the fact -that in the above guiding rule, as put forth by Kant, we have obviously -not reached the moral law itself, but only a finger-post, or indication -where it is to be looked for. The money, so to say, is not yet paid -down, but we hold a safe draft for it. And who, then, is the cashier? -To say the truth at once: a paymaster in this connection surely very -unexpected, being neither more nor less than <b>Egoism</b>, as I shall -now demonstrate.</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_83" id="Page_83">[Pg 83]</a></span></p> - -<p>The precept, it is said, which <b>I can wish</b> were the guide of all -men's conduct, is itself the real moral principle. That which <b>I can -wish</b> is the hinge on which the given direction turns. But what can -I truly wish, and what not? Clearly, in order to determine what I can -wish in the matter under discussion, I require yet another criterion; -for without such I could never find the key to the instruction which -comes to me like a sealed order. Where, then, is this criterion to -be discovered? Certainly nowhere else but in my Egoism, which is the -nearest, ever ready, original, and living standard of all volition, and -which has at any rate the <i>jus primi occupantis</i> before every moral -principle. The direction for finding the real moral law, which is -contained in the Kantian rule, rests, as a matter of fact, on the tacit -assumption that I can only wish for that which is most to my advantage. -Now because, in framing a precept to be generally followed, I cannot -regard myself as always active, but must contemplate my playing a -<b>passive</b> part <i>eventualiter</i> and at times; therefore from this -point of view my <b>egoism</b> decides for justice and loving-kindness; -not from any wish to <b>practise</b> these virtues, but because it -desires to <b>experience</b> them. We are reminded of the miser, who, -after listening to a sermon on beneficence, exclaims:</p> - -<p style="margin-left: 25%;"> -"<i>Wie gründlich ausgeführt, wie schön!</i>—<br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1.5em;"><i>Fast möcht' ich betteln gehn."</i></span><br /> -(How well thought out, how excellent!—<br /> -<span style="margin-left: 2.5em;">Almost I'd like to beg.)</span><br /> -</p> - -<p>This is the indispensable key to the direction in which Kant's leading -principle of Ethics is embedded;<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_84" id="Page_84">[Pg 84]</a></span> nor can he help supplying it -himself. Only he refrains from doing so at the moment of propounding -his precept, lest we should feel shocked. It is found further on in -the text, at a decent distance, so as to prevent the fact at once -leaping to light, that here, after all, in spite of his grand <i>a -priori</i> edifice, <b>Egoism</b> is sitting on the judge's seat, scales -in hand. Moreover, it does not occur, till after he has decided, -from the point of view of the <i>eventualiter</i> passive side, that this -position holds good for the active <i>rôle</i> as well. Thus, on p. 19 (R., -p. 24) we read: "That I could not <b>wish</b> for a general law to -establish lying, because people would no longer believe me, or else -pay me back in the <b>same coin</b>." Again on p. 55 (R., p. 49): "The -universality of a law to the effect that every one could promise what -he likes, without any intention of keeping his word, would make the -promise itself, together with the object in view, whatever that might -be, impossible; for no one would <b>believe</b> it." On p. 56 (R., p. -50), in connection with the maxim of <b>hard-heartedness</b>, we find -the following: "A will, which should determine this, would contradict -itself; for cases can occur, in which a man needs the love and sympathy -of others, and in which he, by virtue of such a natural law, evolved -from his own will, would deprive himself of all hope of the help, -which he desires." Similarly in the <i>Kritik der Praktischen Vernunft</i> -(Part I., vol. i., chap. 2, p. 123; R., p. 192): "If every one were to -regard others' distress with total indifference, and you were to belong -to such an order of things; would you be there with the concurrence -of your<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_85" id="Page_85">[Pg 85]</a></span> will?" <i>Quam temere in nosmet legem sancimus iniquam</i>!<a name="FNanchor_1_42" id="FNanchor_1_42"></a><a href="#Footnote_1_42" class="fnanchor">[1]</a> -one could reply. These passages sufficiently show in what sense the -phrase, "to be able to wish," in Kant's formula is to be understood. -But it is in the <i>Metaphysische Anfangsgründe der Tugendlehre</i>, that -this real nature of his ethical principle is most clearly stated. In -§ 30 we read: "For every one wishes to be helped. If, however, a man -were to give utterance to his rule of unwillingness to help others, -all people would be justified in refusing him assistance. Thus this -rule of selfishness contradicts itself." <b>Would be justified</b>, -he says, <b>would be justified</b>! Here, then, it is declared, as -explicitly as anything can be, that moral obligation rests solely and -entirely on presupposed <b>reciprocity</b>; consequently it is utterly -selfish, and only admits of being interpreted by egoism, which, under -the condition of <b>reciprocity</b>, knows how to make a compromise -cleverly enough. Such a course would be quite in place if it were a -question of laying down the fundamentals of state-organisation, but -not, when we come to construct those of ethics. In the <i>Grundlegung</i>, -p. 81 (R., p. 67), the following sentence occurs: "The principle of -always acting in accordance with that precept which you can also wish -were universally established as law—this is the only condition under -which a man's will can never be in antagonism with itself." From what -has been said above, it will be apparent that the true meaning of the -word "antagonism" may be thus explained:<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_86" id="Page_86">[Pg 86]</a></span> if a man should sanction the -precept of injustice and hard-heartedness, he would subsequently, in -the event of his playing a <b>passive</b> part, recall it, and so his -will would <b>contradict</b> itself.</p> - -<p>From this analysis it is abundantly clear that Kant's famous leading -principle is not—as he maintains with tireless repetition—a -<b>categorical</b>, but in reality a <b>hypothetical</b> Imperative; -because it tacitly presupposes the condition that the law to be -established for what I do—inasmuch as I make it universal—shall -also be a law for what is done to me; and because I, under this -condition, as the <i>eventualiter</i> non-active party, <b>cannot</b> -possibly <b>wish</b> for injustice and hard-heartedness. But if I -strike out this proviso, and, trusting perhaps to my surpassing -strength of mind and body, think of myself as always <b>active</b>, -and never <b>passive</b>; then, in choosing the precept which is to -be universally valid, if there exists no basis for ethics other than -Kant's, I can perfectly well wish that injustice and hard-heartedness -should be the general rule, and consequently order the world</p> - -<p style="margin-left: 25%;"> -<span style="margin-left: 8em;">Upon the simple plan,</span><br /> -That they should take, who have the power,<br /> -And they should keep, who can.<br /> -<span style="margin-left: 12em;">—(<span style="font-size: 0.8em;">WORDSWORTH</span>.)</span><br /> -</p> - -<p>In the foregoing chapter we showed that the Kantian leading principle -of Ethics is devoid of all real foundation. It is now clear that to -this singular defect must be added, notwithstanding Kant's express -assertion to the contrary, its concealed hypothetical nature, whereby -its basis turns out to be nothing else<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_87" id="Page_87">[Pg 87]</a></span> than Egoism, the latter being -the secret interpreter of the direction which it contains. Furthermore, -regarding it solely as a formula, we find that it is only a -periphrasis, an obscure and disguised mode of expressing the well-known -rule: <i>Quod tibi fieri non vis, alteri ne feceris</i> (do not to another -what you are unwilling should be done to yourself); if, that is, by -omitting the <i>non</i> and <i>ne</i>, we remove the limitation, and include the -duties taught by love as well as those prescribed by law. For it is -obvious that this is the only precept which I can wish should regulate -the conduct of all men (speaking, of course, from the point of view of -the possibly <b>passive part</b> I may play, where my <b>Egoism</b> -is touched). This rule, <i>Quod tibi fieri, etc.</i>, is, however, in its -turn, merely a circumlocution for, or, if it be preferred, a premise -of, the proposition which I have laid down as the simplest and purest -definition of the conduct required by the common consent of all ethical -systems; namely, <i>Neminem laede, immo omnes, quantum potes, juva</i> (do -harm to no one; but rather help all people, as far as lies in your -power). The true and real substance of Morals is this, and never can -be anything else. But on what is it based? What is it that lends force -to this command? This is the old and difficult problem with which man -is still to-day confronted. For, on the other side, we hear Egoism -crying with a loud voice: <i>Neminem juva, immo omnes, si forte conducit, -laede</i> (help nobody, but rather injure all people, if it brings you any -advantage); nay more, Malice gives us the variant: <i>Immo omnes, quantum -potes, laede</i> (but rather injure all people as far as you can). To -bring into the<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_88" id="Page_88">[Pg 88]</a></span> lists a combatant equal, or rather superior to Egoism -and Malice combined—this is the task of all Ethics. <i>Heic Rhodus, heic -salta!</i><a name="FNanchor_2_43" id="FNanchor_2_43"></a><a href="#Footnote_2_43" class="fnanchor">[2]</a></p> - -<p>The division of human duty into two classes has long been recognised, -and no doubt owes its origin to the nature of morality itself. We -have. (1) the duties ordained by law (otherwise called the—perfect, -obligatory, narrower duties), and (2) those prescribed by virtue -(otherwise called imperfect, wider, meritorious, or, preferably, the -duties taught by love). On p. 57 (R., p. 60) we find Kant desiring -to give a further confirmation to the moral principle, which he -propounded, by undertaking to derive this classification from it. But -the attempt turns out to be so forced, and so obviously bad, that -it only testifies in the strongest way against the soundness of his -position. For, according to him, the duties laid down by statutes rest -on a precept, the contrary of which, taken as a general natural law, is -declared to be quite <b>unthinkable</b> without contradiction; while<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_89" id="Page_89">[Pg 89]</a></span> -the duties inculcated by virtue are made to depend on a maxim, the -opposite of which can (he says) be conceived as a general natural law, -but cannot possibly be wished for. I beg the reader to reflect that the -rule of injustice, the reign of might instead of right, which in the -Kantian view is not even thinkable as a natural law, is in reality, -and in point of fact, the dominant order of things not only in the -animal kingdom, but among men as well. It is true that an attempt has -been made among civilised peoples to obviate its injurious effects by -means of all the machinery of state government; but as soon as this, -wherever, or of whatever kind, it be, is suspended or eluded, the -natural law immediately resumes its sway. Indeed between nation and -nation it never ceases to prevail; the customary jargon about justice -is well known to be nothing but diplomacy's official style; the real -arbiter is brute force. On the other hand, genuine, <i>i.e.</i>, voluntary, -acts of justice, do occur beyond all doubt, but always only as -exceptions to the rule. Furthermore: wishing to give instances by way -of introducing the above-mentioned classification, Kant establishes the -duties prescribed by law first (p. 53; R., p. 48) through the so-called -duty towards oneself,—the duty of not ending one's life voluntarily, -if the pain outweigh the pleasure. Accordingly, the rule of suicide is -held to be not even <b>thinkable</b> as a general natural law. I, on -the contrary, maintain that, since here there can be no intervention -of state control, it is exactly this rule which is proved to be an -actually existing, unchecked natural law.<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_90" id="Page_90">[Pg 90]</a></span> For it is absolutely certain -(as daily experience attests) that men in the vast majority of cases -turn to self-destruction directly the gigantic strength of the innate -instinct of self-preservation is distinctly overpowered by great -suffering. To suppose that there is any thought whatever that can have -a deferring effect, after the fear of death, which is so strong and -so closely bound up with the nature of every living thing, has shown -itself powerless; in other words, to suppose that there is a thought -still mightier than this fear—is a daring assumption, all the more so, -when we see, that it is one which is so difficult to discover that the -moralists are not yet able to determine it with precision. In any case, -it is certain that arguments against suicide of the sort put forward -by Kant in this connection (p. 53: R., p. 48, and p. 67; R., p. 57) -have never hitherto restrained any one tired of life even for a moment. -Thus a natural law, which incontestably exists, and is operative every -day, is declared by Kant to be simply <b>unthinkable</b> without -contradiction, and all for the sake of making his Moral Principle the -basis of the classification of duties! At this point it is, I confess, -not without satisfaction that I look forward to the groundwork which I -shall give to Ethics in the sequel. From it the division of Duty into -what is prescribed by law, and what is taught by love, or, better, -into justice and loving-kindness, results quite naturally though a -principle of separation which arises from the nature of the subject, -and which entirely of itself draws a sharp line of demarkation; so that -the<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_91" id="Page_91">[Pg 91]</a></span> foundation of Morals, which I shall present, has in fact ready to -hand that confirmation, to which Kant, with a view to support his own -position, lays a completely groundless claim.</p> -<hr class="r5" /> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_1_42" id="Footnote_1_42"></a><a href="#FNanchor_1_42"><span class="label">[1]</span></a> How rashly do we sanction an unjust law, which will come -home to ourselves!—(Hor., <i>Sat</i>., Lib. I., iii. 67.)</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_2_43" id="Footnote_2_43"></a><a href="#FNanchor_2_43"><span class="label">[2]</span></a> "Here is Rhodes, here make your leap!" <i>I.e.</i>, "Here -is the place of trial, here let us see what you can do!" This Latin -proverb is derived from one of Aesop's fables. A braggart boasts of -having once accomplished a wonderful jump in Rhodes, and appeals to the -evidence of the eye-witnesses. The bystanders then exclaim: "Friend, if -this be true, you have no need of witnesses; for this is Rhodes, and -your leap you can make here." The words are: <i>ἀλλ', ὦ ϕίλε, εἰ τοῡtο -ἀληθές ἐστιν, oὐδὲν δεῑ σοι μαρτύρων αὕtη γὰρ 'Rόδος καὶ πήδημα</i>. <i>V.</i> -<i>Fabulae Aesopicae Collectae</i>. Edit. Halm, Leipzig: Teubner. 1875. Nr. -203b, p. 102. The other version of the fable (Nr. 203, p. 101) gives: -<i>ὦ oὗtos, eἰ ἀlêthès τoῡτ ἐstin, oὐdὲn deῑ soi martyrôn ἰdoὺ ἡ Ρόδος, -ἰdoὺ kaὶ τὸ πήδημα.</i>—(<i>Translator</i>.)</p></div> - -<hr class="chap" /> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_92" id="Page_92">[Pg 92]</a></span></p> - - - - -<h4><a name="CHAPTER_VIb" id="CHAPTER_VIb">CHAPTER VI.</a></h4> - -<h3>ON THE DERIVED FORMS OF THE LEADING PRINCIPLE OF THE KANTIAN ETHICS.</h3> -<hr class="r5" /> - -<p>It is well known that Kant put the leading principle of his Ethics -into another quite different shape, in which it is expressed directly; -the first being indirect, indeed nothing more than an indication as -to how the principle is to be sought for. Beginning at p. 63 (R., -p. 55), he prepares the way for his second formula by means of very -strange, ambiguous, not to say distorted,<a name="FNanchor_1_44" id="FNanchor_1_44"></a><a href="#Footnote_1_44" class="fnanchor">[1]</a> definitions of the -conceptions <b>End</b> and <b>Means</b>, which may be much more simply -and correctly denoted thus: an <b>End</b> is the direct motive of an -act of the Will, a <b>Means</b> the indirect: <i>simplex sigillum veri</i> -(simplicity is the seal of truth). Kant, however, slips through his -wonderful enunciations to the statement: "<b>Man</b>, indeed every -rational being, exists <b>as an end in himself</b>." On this I must -remark that "<b>to exist as an end in oneself</b>" is an unthinkable -expression, a <i>contradictio in adjecto</i>.<a name="FNanchor_2_45" id="FNanchor_2_45"></a><a href="#Footnote_2_45" class="fnanchor">[2]</a> To be an<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_93" id="Page_93">[Pg 93]</a></span> end means to -be an object of volition. Every end can only exist in relation to a -will, whose end, <i>i.e.</i>, (as above stated), whose direct motive it is. -Only thus can the idea, "end" have any sense, which is lost as soon as -such connection is broken. But this relation, which is essential to -the thing, necessarily excludes every "in itself." "End in oneself" -is exactly like saying: "Friend in oneself;—enemy in oneself;—uncle -in oneself;—north or east in itself;—above or below in itself;" -and so on. At bottom the "end in itself" is in the same case as the -"absolute ought"; the same thought—the theological—secretly, indeed, -unconsciously lies at the root of each as its condition. Nor is the -"absolute worth," which is supposed to be attached to this alleged, -though unthinkable, "end in itself," at all better circumstanced. -It also must be characterised, without pity, as a <i>contradictio in -adjecto</i>. Every "worth" is a valuation by comparison, and its bearing -is necessarily twofold. First, it is <b>relative</b>, since it exists -for some one; and secondly, it is <b>comparative</b>, as being compared -with something else, and estimated accordingly. Severed from these two -conditions, the conception, "worth," loses all sense and meaning, and -so obviously, that further demonstration is needless. But more: just -as the phrases "end in itself" and "absolute worth" outrage logic, so -true morality is outraged by the statement on p. 65 (R., p. 56), that -irrational beings (that is, animals) are <b>things</b>, and should -therefore be treated simply as <b>means</b>, which are not at the same -time ends. In harmony with this, it is expressly declared<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_94" id="Page_94">[Pg 94]</a></span> in the -<i>Metaphysische Anfanggründe der Tugendlehre,</i> § 16: "A man can have no -duties towards any being, except towards his fellow-men;" and then, § -17, we read: "To treat animals cruelly runs counter to the duty of man -<b>towards himself</b>; because it deadens the feeling of sympathy for -them in their sufferings, and thus weakens a natural tendency which -is very serviceable to morality in relation to <b>other men</b>." So -one is only to have compassion on animals for the sake of practice, -and they are as it were the pathological phantom on which to train -one's sympathy with men! In common with the whole of Asia that is not -tainted by Islâm (which is tantamount to Judaism), I regard such tenets -as odious and revolting. Here, once again, we see withal how entirely -this philosophical morality, which is, as explained above, only a -theological one in disguise, depends in reality on the biblical Ethics. -Thus, because Christian morals leave animals out of consideration -(of which more later on); therefore in philosophical morals they -are of course at once outlawed; they are merely "things," simply -<b>means</b> to ends of any sort; and so they are good for vivisection, -for deer-stalking, bull-fights, horse-races, etc., and they may be -whipped to death as they struggle along with heavy quarry carts. -Shame on such a morality which is worthy of Pariahs, Chandalas and -Mlechchas<a name="FNanchor_3_46" id="FNanchor_3_46"></a><a href="#Footnote_3_46" class="fnanchor">[3]</a>; which fails to recognise<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_95" id="Page_95">[Pg 95]</a></span> the Eternal Reality immanent -in everything that has life, and shining forth with inscrutable -significance from all eyes that see the sun! This is a morality which -knows and values only the precious species that gave it birth; whose -characteristic—<b>reason</b>—it makes the condition under which a -being may be an object of moral regard.</p> - -<p>By this rough path, then,—indeed, <i>per fas et nefas</i> (by fair means -and by foul), Kant reaches the second form in which he expresses the -fundamental principle of his Ethics: "Act in such a way that you at -all times treat mankind, as much in your own person, as in the person -of every one else, not only as a Means, but also as an End." Such a -statement is a very artificial and roundabout way of saying: "Do not -consider yourself alone, but others also;" this in turn is a paraphrase -for: <i>Quod tibi fieri non vis, alteri ne feceris</i> (do not to another -what you are unwilling should be done to yourself); and the latter, -as I have said, contains nothing but the premises to the conclusion, -which is the true and final goal of all morals and of all moralising; -<i>Neminem laede, immo omnes, quantum potes juva</i> (do harm to no one; -but rather help all people as far as lies in your power). Like all -beautiful things, this proposition looks best unveiled. Be it only -observed that the alleged duties towards oneself are dragged into this -second Kantian edict intentionally<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_96" id="Page_96">[Pg 96]</a></span> and not without difficulty. Some -place of course had to be found for them.<a name="FNanchor_4_47" id="FNanchor_4_47"></a><a href="#Footnote_4_47" class="fnanchor">[4]</a></p> - -<p>Another objection that could be raised against the formula is that the -malefactor condemned to be executed is treated merely as an instrument, -and not as an end, and this with perfectly good reason; for he is -the indispensable means of upholding the terror of the law by its -fulfilment, and of thus accomplishing the law's end—the repression of -crime.</p> - -<p>But if this second definition helps nothing towards laying a foundation -for Ethics, if it cannot even pass muster as its leading principle, -that is, as an adequate and direct summary of ethical precepts; it -has nevertheless the merit of containing a fine <i>aperçu</i> of moral -psychology, for it marks <b>egoism</b> by an exceedingly characteristic -token, which is quite worth while being here more closely considered. -This <b>egoism</b>, then, of which each of us is full, and to conceal -which, as our <i>partie honteuse</i>, we have invented <b>politeness</b>, -is perpetually peering through every veil cast over it, and may -especially be detected in the fact that our dealings with all those, -who come across our path, are directed by the one object of trying -to find, before everything else, and as if by instinct, a possible -<b>means</b> to any of the numerous <b>ends</b> with which we are -always engrossed. When we make a new acquaintance, our first thought, -as a rule, is whether the man can be useful to us in some way. If he -can do <b>nothing</b> for our benefit, then as soon as we are convinced -of this, he himself generally becomes<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_97" id="Page_97">[Pg 97]</a></span> nothing to us. To seek in all -other people a possible means to our ends, in other words, to make -them our instruments, is almost part of the very nature of human -eyes; and whether the instrument will have to suffer more or less -in the using, is a thought which comes much later, sometimes not at -all. That we assume others to be similarly disposed is shown in many -ways; <i>e.g.</i>, by the fact that, when we ask any one for information -or advice, we lose all confidence in his words directly we discover -that he may have some <b>interest</b> in the matter, however small or -remote. For then we immediately take for granted that he will make us -a means to his ends, and hence give his advice not in accordance with -his <b>discernment</b>, but with his <b>desire</b>, and this, no matter -how exact the former may be, or how little the latter seem involved; -since we know only too well that a cubic inch of desire weighs much -more than a cubic yard of discernment. Conversely, when we ask in such -cases: "What ought I to do?" as a rule, nothing else will occur to our -counsellor, but how we should shape our action to suit his own ends; -and to this effect he will give his reply immediately, and as it were -mechanically, without so much as bestowing a thought on our ends; -because it is his Will that directly dictates the answer, or ever the -question can come before the bar of his real judgment. Hence he tries -to mould our conduct to his own benefit, without even being conscious -of it, and while he supposes that he is speaking out of the abundance -of his discernment, in reality he is nothing but the mouth-piece of -his own desire; indeed, such<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_98" id="Page_98">[Pg 98]</a></span> self-deception may lead him so far as to -utter lies, without being aware of it. So greatly does the influence of -the Will preponderate that of the Intelligence. Consequently, it is not -the testimony of our own consciousness, but rather, for the most part, -that of our interest, which avails to determine whether our language be -in accordance with what we discern, or what we desire. To take another -case. Let us suppose that a man pursued by enemies and in danger of -life, meets a pedlar and inquires for some by-way of escape; it may -happen that the latter will answer him by the question: "Do you need -any of my wares?" It is not of course meant that matters are always -like this. On the contrary, many a man is found to show a direct and -real participation in another's weal and woe, or (in Kant's language) -to regard him as an end and not as a means. How far it seems natural, -or the reverse, to each one to treat his neighbour for once in the way -as an end, instead of (as usual) a means,—this is the criterion of the -great ethical difference existing between character and character; and -that on which the mental attitude of sympathy rests in the last resort -will be the true basis of Ethics, and will form the subject of the -third part of this Essay.</p> - -<p>Thus, in his second formula, Kant distinguishes Egoism and its opposite -by a very characteristic trait; and this point of merit I have all the -more gladly brought out into strong light and illustrated, because in -other respects there is little in the groundwork of his Ethics that I -can admit.</p> - -<p>The third and last form in which Kant put forward<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_99" id="Page_99">[Pg 99]</a></span> his Moral Principle -is the <b>Autonomy</b> of the Will: "The Will of every rational -being is universally legislative for all rational beings." This of -course follows from the first form. As a consequence of the third, -however, we are asked to believe (see p. 71; R., p. 60) that the -specific characteristic of the Categorical Imperative lies in the -<b>renunciation of all interest</b> by the Will when acting from a -sense of duty. All previous moral principles had thus (he says) broken -down, "because the latter invariably attributed to human actions at -bottom a certain interest, whether originating in compulsion, or -in pleasurable attraction—an interest which might be one's own, -or another's" (p. 73; R., p. 62). (<b>Another's</b>: let this be -particularly noticed.) "Whereas a universally legislative Will must -prescribe actions which are <b>not</b> based on any <b>interest</b> at -all, but solely on a feeling of duty." I beg the reader to think what -this really means. As a matter of fact, nothing less than volition -without motive, in other words, effect without cause. Interest and -Motive are interchangeable ideas; what is interest but <i>quod mea -interest</i>, that which is of importance to me? And is not this, in one -word, whatever stirs and sets in motion my Will? Consequently, what is -an interest other than the working of a motive upon the Will? Therefore -where a motive moves the Will, there the latter has an interest; but -where the Will is affected by no motive, there in truth it can be as -little active, as a stone is able to leave its place without being -pushed or pulled. No educated person will require any demonstration of -this. It follows that every<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_100" id="Page_100">[Pg 100]</a></span> action, inasmuch as it necessarily must -have a motive, necessarily also presupposes an interest. Kant, however, -propounds a second entirely new class of actions which are performed -without any interest, <i>i.e.</i>, without motive. And these actions -are—all deeds of justice and loving-kindness! It will be seen that -this monstrous assumption, to be refuted, needed only to be reduced to -its real meaning, which was concealed through the word "interest" being -trifled with. Meanwhile Kant celebrates (p. 74 sqq.; R., p. 62) the -triumph of his Autonomy of the Will by setting up a moral Utopia called -the Kingdom of Ends, which is peopled with nothing but <b>rational -beings</b> <i>in abstracto</i>. These, one and all, are always willing, -without willing any actual <b>thing</b> (<i>i.e.</i>, without interest): -the only thing that they will is that they may all perpetually will in -accordance with one maxim (<i>i.e.</i>, Autonomy). <i>Difficile est satiram -non scribere</i><a name="FNanchor_5_48" id="FNanchor_5_48"></a><a href="#Footnote_5_48" class="fnanchor">[5]</a> (it is difficult to refrain from writing a satire).</p> - -<p>But there is something else to which Kant is led by his autonomy of -the will; and it involves more serious consequences than the little -innocent Kingdom of Ends, which is perfectly harmless and may be left -in peace. I mean the conception of <b>human dignity</b>. Now this -"dignity" is made to rest solely on man's autonomy, and to lie in the -fact that the law which he ought to obey is his own work, his relation -to it thus being the same as that of the subjects of a constitutional -government to their statutes. As an ornamental finish to the Kantian -system of morals<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_101" id="Page_101">[Pg 101]</a></span> such a theory might after all be passed over. Only -this expression "<b>Human Dignity</b>," once it was uttered by Kant, -became the shibboleth of all perplexed and empty-headed moralists. For -behind that imposing formula they concealed their lack, not to say, -of a real ethical basis, but of any basis at all which was possessed -of an intelligible meaning; supposing cleverly enough that their -readers would be so pleased to see themselves invested with such a -"dignity" that they would be quite satisfied.<a name="FNanchor_6_49" id="FNanchor_6_49"></a><a href="#Footnote_6_49" class="fnanchor">[6]</a> Let us, however, -look at this conception a little more carefully, and submit it to -the test of reality. Kant (p. 79; R., p. 66) defines <b>dignity</b> -as "an unconditioned, incomparable value." This is an explanation -which makes such an effect by its magnificent sound that one does -not readily summon up courage to examine it at close quarters; else -we should find that it too is nothing but a hollow hyperbole, within -which there lurks like a gnawing worm, the <i>contradictio in adjecto</i>. -Every value is the estimation of one thing compared with another; it -is thus a conception of comparison, and consequently relative; and -this relativity is precisely that which forms the essence of the idea. -According to Diogenes Laertius (Book VII., chap. 106),<a name="FNanchor_7_50" id="FNanchor_7_50"></a><a href="#Footnote_7_50" class="fnanchor">[7]</a> this was -already correctly taught by the Stoics. He says: <i>τὴn δὲ ἀξίαν εἶναι<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_102" id="Page_102">[Pg 102]</a></span> -ἀμοιβὴν δοκιμάστου, ἢν ἂν ὁ ἔμπειρος τῶν Πραγμάτων τάξῃ ὅμοιον εἐπεῑν, -ἀμείβεσθαι πυροὺς πρὸς τὰς σὺν ἡμιονô κριθάς.</i><a name="FNanchor_8_51" id="FNanchor_8_51"></a><a href="#Footnote_8_51" class="fnanchor">[8]</a> An <b>incomparable, -unconditioned, absolute value</b>, such as "dignity" is declared by -Kant to be, is thus, like so much else in Philosophy, the statement in -words of a thought which is really unthinkable; just as much as "the -highest number," or "the greatest space."</p> - -<p style="margin-left: 25%;"> -<span style="margin-left: 1.5em;">"<i>Doch eben wo Begriffe fehlen</i>,</span><br /> -<i>Da stellt ein <span style="font-size: 0.8em;">WORT</span> zu rechter Zeit sich ein.</i>"<br /> -<span style="margin-left: 3.5em;">(But where conceptions fail,</span><br /> -Just there a <span style="font-size: 0.8em;">WORD</span> comes in to fill the blank.)<br /> -</p> - -<p>So it was with this expression, "<b>Human Dignity</b>." A most -acceptable phrase was brought into currency. Thereon every system of -Morals, that was spun out through all classes of duty, and all forms of -casuistry, found a broad basis; from which serene elevation it could -comfortably go on preaching.</p> - -<p>At the end of his exposition (p. 124; E., p. 97), Kant says: "But how -it is that <b>Pure Reason</b> without other motives, that may have -their derivation elsewhere, can by itself be <b>practical</b>; that is, -how, without there being any object for the Will to take an antecedent -interest in, the simple principle of the universal validity of all the -precepts of Pure Reason, as laws, can of itself provide a motive and -bring about an interest which may be called purely moral; or, in other -words, how it is that Pure Reason can<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_103" id="Page_103">[Pg 103]</a></span> be practical;—to explain this -problem, all human reason is inadequate, and all trouble and work spent -on it are vain." Now it should be remembered that, if any one asserts -the existence of a thing which cannot even be conceived as possible, it -is incumbent on him to prove that it is an actual reality; whereas the -Categorical Imperative of Practical Reason is expressly not put forward -as a fact of consciousness, nor otherwise founded on experience. Rather -are we frequently cautioned not to attempt to explain it by having -recourse to empirical anthropology. (Cf. <i>e.g.</i>, p. vi. of the preface; -R., p. 5; and pp. 59, 60; R., p. 52). Moreover, we are repeatedly -(<i>e.g.</i>, p. 48; R., p. 44) assured "that no instance can show, and -consequently there can be no empirical proof, that an Imperative of -this sort exists everywhere." And further, on p. 49 (R., p. 45), we -read, "that the reality of the Categorical Imperative is not a fact of -experience." Now if we put all this together, we can hardly avoid the -suspicion that Kant is jesting at his readers' expense. But although -this practice may be allowed by the present philosophical public of -Germany, and seem good in their eyes, yet in Kant's time it was not so -much in vogue; and besides, Ethics, then, as always, was precisely the -subject that least of all could lend itself to jokes. Hence we must -continue to hold the conviction that what can neither be conceived as -possible, nor proved as actual, is destitute of all credentials to -attest its existence. And if, by a strong effort of the imagination, -we try to picture to ourselves a man, possessed, as it were, by a -<i>daemon</i>, in the form of an <b>absolute Ought</b>,<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_104" id="Page_104">[Pg 104]</a></span> that speaks only in -Categorical Imperatives, and, confronting his wishes and inclinations, -claims to be the perpetual controller of his actions; in this figure -we see no true portrait of human nature, or of our inner life; what we -<b>do</b> discern is an artificial substitute for theological Morals, -to which it stands in the same relation as a wooden leg to a living one.</p> - -<p>Our conclusion, therefore, is, that the Kantian Ethics, like all -anterior systems, is devoid of any sure foundation. As I showed at -the outset, in my examination of its <b>imperative Form</b>, the -structure is at bottom nothing but an inversion of theological Morals, -cloaked in very abstract formulae of an apparently <i>a priori</i> origin. -That this disguise was most artificial and unrecognisable is the more -certain, from the fact that Kant, in all good faith, was actually -himself deceived by it, and really believed that he could establish, -independently of all theology, and on the basis of pure intelligence <i>a -priori</i>, those conceptions of the Law and of the hests of Duty, which -obviously have no meaning except in <b>theological Ethics</b>; whereas -I have sufficiently proved that with him they are destitute of all real -foundation, and float loosely in mid air. However, the mask at length -falls away in his own workshop, and theological Ethics stands forth -unveiled, as witness his doctrine of the Highest Good, the Postulates -of Practical Reason; and lastly, his Moral Theology. But this -revelation freed neither Kant nor the public from their illusion as to -the real state of things; on the contrary, both he and they rejoiced to -see all those precepts, which hitherto had been sanctioned<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_105" id="Page_105">[Pg 105]</a></span> by Faith, -now ratified and established by Ethics (although only <i>idealiter</i>, and -for practical purposes). The truth is that they, in all sincerity, put -the effect for the cause, and the cause for the effect, inasmuch as -they failed to perceive that at the root of this system of Morals there -lay, as absolutely necessary assumptions, however tacit and concealed, -all the alleged consequences that had been drawn from it.</p> - -<p>At the end of this severe investigation, which must also have been -tiring to my readers, perhaps I may be allowed, by way of diversion, to -make a jesting, indeed frivolous comparison. I would liken Kant, in his -self-mystification, to a man who at a ball has been flirting the whole -evening with a masked beauty, in hopes of making a conquest; till at -last, throwing off her disguise, she reveals herself—as his wife.</p> -<hr class="r5" /> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_1_44" id="Footnote_1_44"></a><a href="#FNanchor_1_44"><span class="label">[1]</span></a> To keep the play of words in "<i>geschrobene," -"verschrobene,"</i> we may perhaps render them: "twisted ... -mistwisted."—(<i>Translator.</i>)</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_2_45" id="Footnote_2_45"></a><a href="#FNanchor_2_45"><span class="label">[2]</span></a> A contradiction in that which is added. A term -applied to two ideas which cannot be brought into a thinkable -relationship.—(<i>Translator.</i>)</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_3_46" id="Footnote_3_46"></a><a href="#FNanchor_3_46"><span class="label">[3]</span></a> A Chaṇḍāla (or Ćaṇḍāla) means one who is born of a Brahman -woman by a Śūdra husband, such a union being an abomination. Hence it -is a term applied to a low common person. Mlechcha (or Mleććha) means a -foreigner; one who does not speak Sanskṛit, and is not subject to Hindu -institutions. The transition from a "a barbarian" to a bad or wicked -man, is easy.—(<i>Translator</i>.)</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_4_47" id="Footnote_4_47"></a><a href="#FNanchor_4_47"><span class="label">[4]</span></a> These so-called duties have been discussed in Chapter III. -of this Part.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_5_48" id="Footnote_5_48"></a><a href="#FNanchor_5_48"><span class="label">[5]</span></a> Juvenal, <i>Sat</i>. I. 30.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_6_49" id="Footnote_6_49"></a><a href="#FNanchor_6_49"><span class="label">[6]</span></a> It appears that G. W. Block in his <i>Neue Grundlegung der -Philosophie der Sitten</i>, 1802, was the first to make "Human Dignity" -expressly and exclusively the foundation-stone of Ethics, which he then -built up entirely on it.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_7_50" id="Footnote_7_50"></a><a href="#FNanchor_7_50"><span class="label">[7]</span></a> <i>V</i>. Diogenes Laertius, <i>de Clarorum Philosophorum Vitis, -etc.</i>, edit. O. Gabr. Cobet. Paris; Didot, 1862. In this edition the -passage quoted is in chap. 105 <i>ad fin.,</i>, p. 182.—(<i>Translator</i>.)</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_8_51" id="Footnote_8_51"></a><a href="#FNanchor_8_51"><span class="label">[8]</span></a> They teach that "worth" is the equivalent value of a -thing which has been tested, whatever an expert may fix that value -to be; as, for instance, to take wheat in exchange for barley and a -mule.—(<i>Translator.</i>)</p></div> - -<hr class="chap" /> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_106" id="Page_106">[Pg 106]</a></span></p> - - - - -<h4><a name="CHAPTER_VIIb" id="CHAPTER_VIIb">CHAPTER VII.</a></h4> - -<h3>KANT'S DOCTRINE OF CONSCIENCE.</h3> -<hr class="r5" /> - -<p>The alleged Practical Reason with its Categorical Imperative, is -manifestly very closely connected with Conscience, although essentially -different from it in two respects. In the first place, the Categorical -Imperative, as commanding, necessarily speaks <b>before</b> the -act, whereas Conscience does not till afterwards. <b>Before</b> -the act Conscience can at best only speak <b>indirectly</b>, that -is, by means of reflection, which holds up to it the recollection -of previous cases, in which similar acts after they were committed -received its disapproval. It is on this that the etymology of the word -<b>Gewissen</b> (Conscience) appears to me to rest, because <b>only -what has already taken place is gewiss</b><a name="FNanchor_1_52" id="FNanchor_1_52"></a><a href="#Footnote_1_52" class="fnanchor">[1]</a> (certain). Undoubtedly, -through external inducement and kindled emotion, or by reason of the -internal discord of bad humour, impure, base thoughts, and evil desires -rise up in all people, even in the best. But for these a man is not -morally responsible, and need not load his conscience with them; -since they only show what the genus <i>homo,</i> not what the individual, -who thinks them, would be<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_107" id="Page_107">[Pg 107]</a></span> capable of doing. Other motives, if not -simultaneously, yet almost immediately, come into his consciousness, -and confronting the unworthy inclinations prevent them from ever being -crystallised into deeds; thus causing them to resemble the out-voted -minority of an acting committee. By deeds alone each person gains an -empirical knowledge no less of himself than of others, just as it is -deeds alone that burden the conscience. For, unlike thoughts, these are -not problematic; on the contrary, they are certain (<i>gewiss</i>), they are -unchangeable, and are not only thought, but <b>known</b> (<i>gewusst</i>). -The Latin <i>conscientia</i>,<a name="FNanchor_2_53" id="FNanchor_2_53"></a><a href="#Footnote_2_53" class="fnanchor">[2]</a> and the Greek <i>συνείδησις</i><a name="FNanchor_3_54" id="FNanchor_3_54"></a><a href="#Footnote_3_54" class="fnanchor">[3]</a> have the same -sense. Conscience is thus the <b>knowledge</b> that a man has about -what he has done.</p> - -<p>The second point of difference between the alleged Categorical -Imperative and Conscience is, that the latter always draws its -material from experience; which the former cannot do, since it is -purely <i>a priori</i>. Nevertheless, we may reasonably suppose that Kant's -Doctrine of Conscience will throw some light on this new conception -of an <b>absolute Ought</b> which he introduced. His theory is -most completely set forth in the <i>Metaphysische Anfangsgründe zur -Tugendlehre</i>, § 13, and in the following criticism I shall assume that -the few pages which contain it are lying before the reader.</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_108" id="Page_108">[Pg 108]</a></span></p> - -<p>The Kantian interpretation of Conscience makes an exceedingly imposing -effect, before which one used to stand with reverential awe, and -all the less confidence was felt in demurring to it, because there -lay heavy on the mind the ever-present fear of having theoretical -objections construed as practical, and, if the correctness of Kant's -view were denied, of being regarded as devoid of conscience. I, -however, cannot be led astray in this manner, since the question -here is of theory, not of practice; and I am not concerned with the -preaching of Morals, but with the exact investigation of the ultimate -ethical basis.</p> - -<p>We notice at once that Kant employs exclusively Latin legal -terminology, which, however, would seem little adapted to reflect the -most secret stirrings of the human heart. Yet this language, this -judicial way of treating the subject, he retains from first to last, -as though it were essential and proper to the matter. And so we find -brought upon the stage of our inner self a complete Court of justice, -with indictment, judge, plaintiff, defendant, and sentence;—nothing is -wanting. Now if this tribunal, as portrayed by Kant, really existed in -our breasts, it would be astonishing if a single person could be found -to be, I do not say, <b>so bad</b>, but <b>so stupid</b>, as to act -against his conscience. For such a supernatural assize, of an entirely -special kind, set up in our consciousness, such a secret court—like -another Fehmgericht<a name="FNanchor_4_55" id="FNanchor_4_55"></a><a href="#Footnote_4_55" class="fnanchor">[4]</a>—held in the dark recesses of our<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_109" id="Page_109">[Pg 109]</a></span> inmost being, -would inspire everybody with a terror and fear of the gods strong -enough to really keep him from grasping at short transient advantages, -in face of the dreadful threats of superhuman powers, speaking in tones -so near and so clear. In real life, on the contrary, we find, that -the efficiency of conscience is generally considered such a vanishing -quantity that all peoples have bethought themselves of helping it out -by means of positive religion, or even of entirely replacing it by the -latter. Moreover, if Conscience were indeed of this peculiar nature, -the Royal Society could never have thought of the question put for the -present Prize Essay.</p> - -<p>But if we look more closely at Kant's exposition, we shall find -that its imposing effect is mainly produced by the fact that he -attributes to the moral verdict passed on ourselves, as its peculiar -and essential characteristic, a form which in fact is not so at all. -This metaphorical bar of judgment is no more applicable to moral -self-examination than it is to every other reflection as regards -what we have done, and might have done otherwise, where no ethical -question is involved. For it is not only true that the same procedure -of indictment, defence, and sentence is occasionally assumed by that -obviously spurious and artificial conscience which is based on mere -superstition; as, for instance, when a Hindu reproaches himself with -having been the murderer of<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_110" id="Page_110">[Pg 110]</a></span> a cow, or when a Jew remembers that he has -smoked his pipe at home on the Sabbath; but even the self-questioning -which springs from no ethical source, being indeed rather unmoral than -moral, often appears in a shape of this sort, as the following case -may exemplify. Suppose I, good-naturedly, but thoughtlessly, have made -myself surety for a friend, and suppose there comes with evening the -clear perception of the heavy responsibility I have taken on myself—a -responsibility that may easily involve me in serious trouble, as the -wise old saying, <i>ἐγγύα παρά δ' ἃτα</i>!<a name="FNanchor_5_56" id="FNanchor_5_56"></a><a href="#Footnote_5_56" class="fnanchor">[5]</a> predicts; then at once there -rise up within me the Accuser and the Counsel for the defence, ready -to confront each other. The latter endeavours to palliate my rashness -in giving bail so hastily, by pointing out the stress of circumstance -or of obligation, or, it may be, the simple straightforwardness of -the transaction; perhaps he even seeks excuse by commending my kind -heart. Last of all comes the Judge who inexorably passes the sentence: -"A fool's piece of work!" and I am overwhelmed with confusion So much -for this judicial form of which Kant is so fond; his other modes of -expression are, for the most part, open to the same criticism. For -instance, that which he attributes to conscience, at the beginning of -the paragraph, as its peculiar property, applies equally to all other -scruples of an entirely different sort. He says: "It (conscience) -follows him like his shadow, try though he may to escape. By pleasures -and<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_111" id="Page_111">[Pg 111]</a></span> distractions he may be stupefied and billed to sleep, but he -cannot avoid occasionally waking up and coming to himself; and then he -is immediately aware of the terrible voice," etc. Obviously, this may -be just as well understood, word for word, of the secret consciousness -of some person of private means, who feels that his expenses far exceed -his income, and that thus his capital is being affected, and will -gradually melt away.</p> - -<p>We have seen that Kant represents the use of legal terms as essential -to the subject, and that he keeps to them from beginning to end; let -it now be noted how he employs the same style for the following finely -devised sophism. He says: "That a person accused by his conscience -should be identified with the judge is an absurd way of portraying a -court of justice; for in that case the accuser would invariably lose." -And he adds, by way of elucidating this statement, a very ambiguous -and obscure note. His conclusion is that, if we would avoid falling -into a contradiction, we must think of the judge (in the judicial -conscience-drama that is enacted in our breasts) as different from us, -in fact, as another person; nay more, as one that is an omniscient -knower of hearts, whose hests are obligatory on all, and who is -almighty for every purpose of executive authority.<a name="FNanchor_6_57" id="FNanchor_6_57"></a><a href="#Footnote_6_57" class="fnanchor">[6]</a> He thus passes by -a<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_112" id="Page_112">[Pg 112]</a></span> perfectly smooth path from conscience to superstition, making the -latter a necessary consequence of the former; while he is secretly sure -that he will be all the more willingly followed because the reader's -earliest training will have certainly rendered him familiar with such -ideas, if not have made them his second nature. Here, then, Kant finds -an easy task,—a thing he ought rather to have despised; for he -should have concerned himself not only with preaching, but also with -practising truthfulness. I entirely reject the above quoted sentence, -and all the conclusions consequent thereon, and I declare it to be -nothing but a shuffling trick. It is <b>not true</b> that the accuser -must always lose, when the accused is the same person as the judge; -at least not in the court of judgment in our hearts. In the instance -I gave of one man going surety for another, did the accuser lose? Or -must we in this case also, if we wish to avoid a contradiction, really -assume a personification after Kant's fashion, and be driven to view -objectively as <b>another person</b> that voice whose deliverance would -have been those terrible words: "A fool's piece of work!"? A sort of -Mercury, forsooth, in living flesh? Or perhaps a prosopopoeia of the -<i>Μῆτις</i> (cunning) recommended by Homer (<i>Il.</i> xxiii. 313 sqq.)?<a name="FNanchor_7_58" id="FNanchor_7_58"></a><a href="#Footnote_7_58" class="fnanchor">[7]</a> -But thus we should only be landed, as before, on the broad path of -superstition, aye, and pagan superstition too.</p> - -<p>It is in this passage that Kant indicates his Moral Theology, briefly -indeed, yet not without all its vital points. The fact that he takes -care, not to attribute<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_113" id="Page_113">[Pg 113]</a></span> to it any objective validity, but rather to -present it merely as a form subjectively unavoidable, does not free him -from the arbitrariness with which he constructs it, even though he only -claims its necessity for human consciousness. His fabric rests, as we -have seen, on a tissue of baseless assumptions.</p> - -<p>So much, then, is certain. The entire imagery—that of a judicial -drama—whereby Kant depicts conscience is wholly unessential and in -no way peculiar to it; although he keeps this figure, as if it were -proper to the subject, right through to the end, in order finally -to deduce certain conclusions from it. As a matter of fact it is a -sufficiently common form, which our thoughts easily take when we -consider any circumstance of real life. It is due for the most part to -the conflict of opposing motives which usually spring up, and which -are successively weighed and tested by our reflecting reason. And no -difference is made whether these motives are moral or egoistic in their -nature, nor whether our deliberations are concerned with some action in -the past, or in the future. Now if we strip from Kant's exposition its -dress of legal metaphor, which is only an optional dramatic appendage, -the surrounding nimbus with all its imposing effect immediately -disappears as well, and there remains nothing but the fact that -sometimes, when we think over our actions, we are seized with a certain -self-dissatisfaction, which is marked by a special characteristic. -It is with our conduct <i>per se</i> that we are discontented, not with -its result, and this feeling does not, as in every other case in -which we regret the stupidity of our behaviour, rest<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_114" id="Page_114">[Pg 114]</a></span> on egoistic -grounds. For on these occasions the cause of our dissatisfaction is -precisely because we have been too egoistic, because we have taken -too much thought for ourselves, and not enough for our neighbour; or -perhaps even because, without any resulting advantage, we have made -the misery of others an object in itself. That we may be dissatisfied -with ourselves, and saddened by reason of sufferings which we have -inflicted, not undergone, is a plain fact and impossible to be denied. -The connection of this with the only ethical basis that can stand an -adequate test we shall examine further on. But Kant, like a clever -special pleader, tried by magnifying and embellishing the original -<i>datum</i> to make all that he possibly could of it, in order to prepare a -very broad foundation for his Ethics and Moral Theology.</p> -<hr class="r5" /> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_1_52" id="Footnote_1_52"></a><a href="#FNanchor_1_52"><span class="label">[1]</span></a> Both words are, of course, derived from <i>wissen = scire</i> = -<i>εἱδέναι</i>.—(<i>Translator</i>.)</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_2_53" id="Footnote_2_53"></a><a href="#FNanchor_2_53"><span class="label">[2]</span></a> Cf. Horace's <i>conscire sibi, pallescere culpa: Epist</i>. -I. 1, 61. To be conscious of having done wrong, to turn pale at the -thought of the crime.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_3_54" id="Footnote_3_54"></a><a href="#FNanchor_3_54"><span class="label">[3]</span></a> <i>Συνείδησις = consciousness</i> (of right or wrong -done).—(<i>Translator.</i>)</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_4_55" id="Footnote_4_55"></a><a href="#FNanchor_4_55"><span class="label">[4]</span></a> The celebrated Secret Tribunal of Westphalia, which -came into prominence about A.D. 1220. In A.D. 1335 the Archbishop of -Cologne was appointed head of all the Fehme benches in Westphalia by -the Emperor Charles IV. The reader will remember the description of the -trial scene in Scott's <i>Anne of Geierstein</i>. Perhaps the Court of Star -Chamber comes nearest to it in English History.—(<i>Translator.</i>)</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_5_56" id="Footnote_5_56"></a><a href="#FNanchor_5_56"><span class="label">[5]</span></a> If you give a pledge, be sure that Ate (the goddess of -mischief) is beside you; <i>i.e.</i>, beware of giving pledges.—Thales ap. -Plat. <i>Charm</i>. 165 A.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_6_57" id="Footnote_6_57"></a><a href="#FNanchor_6_57"><span class="label">[6]</span></a> Kant leads up to this position with great ingenuity, by -having recourse to the theory of the two characters coexistent in -man—the <i>noumenal</i> (or <i>intelligible</i>) and the <i>empirical</i>; the one -being in time, the other, timeless; the one, fast bound by the law of -causality, the other free.—(<i>Translator.</i>)</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_7_58" id="Footnote_7_58"></a><a href="#FNanchor_7_58"><span class="label">[7]</span></a> Greek: <i>Άλλ' ἄγε δὴ σύ, ϕίλος, μêτιν ἐμβάλλεο θυμῷ, -κ.τ.λ.</i></p></div> - -<hr class="chap" /> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_115" id="Page_115">[Pg 115]</a></span></p> - - - - -<h4><a name="CHAPTER_VIIIb" id="CHAPTER_VIIIb">CHAPTER VIII.</a></h4> - -<h3>KANT'S DOCTRINE OF THE INTELLIGIBLE<a name="FNanchor_1_59" id="FNanchor_1_59"></a> -<a href="#Footnote_1_59" class="fnanchor" style="font-size: 0.7em; font-weight: normal;">[1]</a> AND EMPIRICAL CHARACTER. THEORY -OF FREEDOM.</h3> -<hr class="r5" /> - -<p>The attack I have made, in the cause of truth, on Kant's system of -Morals, does not, like those of my predecessors, touch the surface -only, but penetrates to its deepest roots. It seems, therefore, -only just that, before I leave this part of my subject, I should -bring to remembrance the brilliant and conspicuous service which he -nevertheless rendered to ethical science. I allude to his doctrine of -the co-existence of Freedom and Necessity. We find it first in the -<i>Kritik der Reinen Vernunft</i> (pp. 533-554 of the first, and pp. 561-582 -of the fifth, edition); but it is still more clearly expounded in the -<i>Kritik der Praktischen Vernunft</i> (fourth edition, pp. 169-179; R., pp. -224-231).</p> - -<p>The strict and absolute necessity of the acts of Will, determined by -motives as they arise, was first shown by Hobbes, then by Spinoza, -and Hume, and also by Dietrich von Holbach in his <i>Système de la -Nature</i>; and lastly by Priestley it was most completely and precisely -demonstrated. This point, indeed, has been so clearly proved, and -placed beyond<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_116" id="Page_116">[Pg 116]</a></span> all doubt, that it must be reckoned among the number of -perfectly established truths, and only crass ignorance could continue -to speak of a freedom, of a <i>liberum arbitrium indifferentiae</i> (a -free and indifferent choice) in the individual acts of men. Nor did -Kant, owing to the irrefutable reasoning of his predecessors, hesitate -to consider the Will as fast bound in the chains of Necessity, the -matter admitting, as he thought, of no further dispute or doubt. This -is proved by all the passages in which he speaks of freedom only from -the <b>theoretical</b> standpoint. Nevertheless, it is true that our -actions are attended with a consciousness of independence and original -initiative, which makes us recognise them as our own work, and every -one with ineradicable certainty feels that he is the real author -of his conduct, and morally <b>responsible</b> for it. But since -responsibility implies the possibility of having acted otherwise, -which possibility means freedom in some sort or manner; therefore -in the consciousness of responsibility is indirectly involved also -the consciousness of freedom. The key to resolve the contradiction, -that thus arises out of the nature of the case, was at last found by -Kant through the distinction he drew with profound acumen, between -phaenomena and the Thing in itself (<i>das Ding an sich</i>). This -distinction is the very core of his whole philosophy, and its greatest -merit.</p> - -<p>The individual, with his immutable, innate character strictly -determined in all his modes of expression by the law of Causality, -which, as acting through the medium of the intellect, is here called -by the<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_117" id="Page_117">[Pg 117]</a></span> name of Motivation,—the individual so constituted is only the -<b>phaenomenon</b> (<i>Erscheinung</i>). The <b>Thing</b> in itself which -underlies this phaenomenon is outside of Time and Space, consequently -free from all succession and plurality, one, and changeless. Its -constitution in itself is the <b>intelligible character</b>, which -is equally present in all the acts of the individual, and stamped on -every one of them, like the impress of a signet on a thousand seals. -The empirical character of the phaenomenon—the character which -manifests itself in time, and in succession of acts—is thus determined -by the intelligible character; and consequently, the individual, as -phaenomenon, in all his modes of expression, which are called forth -by motives, must show the invariableness of a natural law. Whence it -results that all his actions are governed by strict necessity. Now -it used to be commonly maintained that the character of a man may -be transformed by moral admonitions and remonstrances appealing to -reason; but when the distinction between the intelligible and empirical -character had once been drawn, it followed that the unchangeableness, -the inflexible rigidity of the empirical character, which thinking -people had always observed, was explained and traced to a rational -basis, and consequently accepted as an established fact by Philosophy. -Thus the latter was so far harmonised with experience, and ceased to -stand abashed, before popular wisdom, which long before had spoken the -words of truth in the Spanish proverb: <i>Lo que entra con el capillo, -sale con la mortaja</i> (that which comes in<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_118" id="Page_118">[Pg 118]</a></span> with the child's cap, goes -out with the winding-sheet); or: <i>Lo que en la leche se mama, en la -mortaja se derrama</i> (what is imbibed with the milk, is poured out again -in the winding-sheet).</p> - -<p>This doctrine of the co-existence of Freedom and Necessity I regard -as the greatest of all the achievements of human sagacity. With the -Transcendental Aesthetics it forms the two great diamonds in the crown -of Kant's fame, which will never pass away. In his Treatise on Freedom, -Schelling obviously served up the Kantian teaching in a paraphrase, -which by reason of its lively colouring and graphic delineation, is for -many people more comprehensible. The work would deserve praise if its -author had had the honesty to say that he is drawing on Kant's wisdom, -not on his own. As it is, a certain part of the philosophic public -still credits him with the entire performance.</p> - -<p>The theory itself, and the whole question regarding the nature of -Freedom, can be better understood if we view them in connection with -a general truth, which I think, is most concisely expressed by a -formula frequently occurring in the scholastic writings: <i>Operari -sequitur esse</i>.<a name="FNanchor_2_60" id="FNanchor_2_60"></a><a href="#Footnote_2_60" class="fnanchor">[2]</a> In other words, everything in the world operates in -accordance with what it is, in accordance with its inherent nature, in -which, consequently, all its modes of expression are already contained -potentially, while actually they are manifested when elicited by -external causes; so that external causes are the means whereby the -essential constitution of the thing is<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_119" id="Page_119">[Pg 119]</a></span> revealed. And the modes of -expression so resulting form the <b>empirical</b> character; whereas -its hidden, ultimate basis, which is inaccessible to experience, is -the <b>intelligible</b> character, that is, the real nature <i>per se</i> -of the particular thing in question. Man forms no exception to the -rest of nature; he too has a changeless character, which, however, -is strictly individual and different in each case. This character is -of course <b>empirical</b> as far as we can grasp it, and therefore -only <b>phaenomenal</b>; while the <b>intelligible</b> character is -whatever may be the real nature in itself of the person. His actions -one and all, being, as regards their external constitution, determined -by motives, can never be shaped otherwise than in accordance with the -unchangeable individual character. As a man is, so he his bound to act. -Hence for a given person in every single case, there is absolutely only -one way of acting possible: <i>Operari sequitur esse</i><a name="FNanchor_3_61" id="FNanchor_3_61"></a><a href="#Footnote_3_61" class="fnanchor">[3]</a> Freedom belongs -only to the intelligible character, not to the empirical. The <i>operari</i> -(conduct) of a given individual is necessarily determined externally -by motives, internally by his character; therefore everything that he -does necessarily takes place. But in his <i>esse</i> (<i>i.e.</i>, in what he -is), <b>there</b>, we find Freedom. He <b>might have been</b> something -different; and guilt or merit attaches to that which he is. All that -he does follows from what he is, as a mere corollary. Through Kant's -doctrine we are freed from the primary error of connecting Necessity -with <i>esse</i> (what one is), and Freedom with <i>operari</i> (what one does); -we<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_120" id="Page_120">[Pg 120]</a></span> become aware that this is a misplacement of terms, and that exactly -the inverse arrangement is the true one. Hence it is clear that the -moral responsibility of a man, while it, first of all, and obviously, -of course, touches what he does, yet at bottom touches what he is; -because, what he is being the original <b>datum</b>, his conduct, as -motives arise, could never take any other course than that which it -actually does take. But, however strict be the necessity, whereby, -in the individual, acts are elicited by motives, it yet never occurs -to anybody—not even to him who is convinced of this necessity—to -exonerate himself on that account, and cast the blame on the motives; -for he knows well enough that, objectively considered, any given -circumstance, and its causes, perfectly admitted quite a different, -indeed, a directly opposite course of action; nay, that such a course -would actually have taken place, <b>if only he had been a different -person</b>. That he is precisely such a one as his conduct proclaims -him to be, and no other—this it is for which he feels himself -responsible; in his <i>esse</i> (what he is) lies the vulnerable place, -where the sting of conscience penetrates. For Conscience is nothing -but acquaintance with one's own self—an acquaintance that arises out -of one's actual mode of conduct, and which becomes ever more intimate. -So that it is the <i>esse</i> (what one is) which in reality is accused -by conscience, while the <i>operari</i> (what one does) supplies the -incriminating evidence. Since we are only conscious of <b>Freedom</b> -through the sense of <b>responsibility</b>; therefore where the latter -lies the former must<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_121" id="Page_121">[Pg 121]</a></span> also be; in the <i>esse</i> (in one's being). It is -the <i>operari</i> (what one does) that is subject to necessity. But we can -only get to know ourselves, as well as others <b>empirically</b>; we -have no <i>a priori</i> knowledge of our character. Certainly our natural -tendency is to cherish a very high opinion of it, because the maxim: -<i>Quisque praesumitur bonus, donec probetur contrarium</i> (every one is -presumed to be good, until the contrary is proved), is perhaps even -more true of the inner court of justice than of the world's tribunals.</p> - - - -<h4><a id="NOTEc"></a>NOTE.</h4> - - -<p>He who is capable of recognising the essential part of a thought, -though clothed in a dress very different from what he is familiar with, -will see, as I do, that this Kantian doctrine of the intelligible and -empirical character is a piece of insight already possessed by Plato. -The difference is, that with Kant it is sublimated to an abstract -clearness; with Plato it is treated mythically, and connected with -metempsychosis, because, as he did not perceive the ideality of Time, -he could only represent it under a temporal form. The identity of the -one doctrine with the other becomes exceedingly plain, if we read the -explanation and illustration of the Platonic myth, which Porphyrius has -given with such clear exactitude, that its agreement with the abstract -language of Kant comes out unmistakably. In the second book of his -Eclogues, chap. 8, §§ 37-40,<a name="FNanchor_4_62" id="FNanchor_4_62"></a><a href="#Footnote_4_62" class="fnanchor">[4]</a> Stobaeus has preserved<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_122" id="Page_122">[Pg 122]</a></span> for us <i>in -extenso</i> that part of one of Porphyrius' lost writings which specially -comments on the myth in question, as Plato gives it in the second half -of the tenth book of the Republic.<a name="FNanchor_5_63" id="FNanchor_5_63"></a><a href="#Footnote_5_63" class="fnanchor">[5]</a> The whole section is eminently -worth reading. As a specimen I shall quote the short § 39, in the hope -of inducing any one who cares for these things to study Stobaeus for -himself. It will then immediately become apparent that this Platonic -myth is nothing less than an allegory of the profound truth which Kant -stated in its abstract purity, as the doctrine of the intelligible and -empirical character, and consequently that the latter had been reached, -in its essentials, by Plato thousands of years ago. Indeed, this view -seems to go back much further still, for Porphyrins is of opinion that -Plato took it from the Egyptians. Certainly we already find the same -theory in the Brahmanical doctrine of metempsychosis, and it is from -this Indian source that the Egyptian priests, in all probability, -derived their wisdom. § 39 is as follows:—</p> - -<p><i>Τὸ γὰρ ὅλον βούλημα τοιοῡτ' ἔοικεν εἶναι τὸ τοῡ Πλάτωνος ἔχειν μὲν τὸ -αὐτεξουσιον τὰς ψυχὰς, πρὶν εἰς σώματα καὶ βίους διαϕέρους ἐμπεσεῖν, -εἰς τὸ ἢ τοῡτoν τὸν βίον ἕλεσθαι, ἢ ἄλλον, ὅν, μετὰ ποιᾱς ζωῆς καὶ -σώματος οἰκείον τῇ ζωῇ, κτέλεσειν μέλλει (καὶ γὰρ λέοντος βίον ἐπ' -αὐτῇ εἶνai ἔλεσθαι, καὶ ἀνδρὸς). Kakeῑνο μέντοι τὸ αὐτeξoύσιον, ἅμα -τῇ πρός τινα τῶν τοιούτων βίων πτώσει, ἐμπεπόδισται. Κατελθοῡσαι -γὰρ εἰς τὰ σώματα, καὶ ἀντὶ ψυχῶν aπολυτῶν γεγονῑυαι ψυχαὶ ζώων, τὸ -αὐτεξούσιον ϕέρουσιν οἰκείον τῇ τοῡ<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_123" id="Page_123">[Pg 123]</a></span> ζώον κατασκευῇ, καὶ ἐϕ' ὧν μὲν -εἶνai πολύνουν καὶ πολυκίνητον, ὡς ἐπ' ἀνθρώπον, ἐϕ' ὡν δὲ λυγοκίνηττον -καὶ μονότροπον, ὡς ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλον σχεδὸν πάντων ζώων. Ήρτῆσθαι δὲ -τὸ αὐτeξoύσιον τοῡτo ἀπὸ τῆς κατασκετῆς, κινούμενον μὲν ἐξ αὐτοῡ, -ϕερόμενον δὲ κατὰ τὰς ἐκ τῆς κατασκευῇς γυγνομένας προθυμίας.</i><a name="FNanchor_6_64" id="FNanchor_6_64"></a><a href="#Footnote_6_64" class="fnanchor">[6]</a></p> - -<hr class="r5" /> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_1_59" id="Footnote_1_59"></a><a href="#FNanchor_1_59"><span class="label">[1]</span></a> <i>V</i>. Note on "intelligible" in Chapter I. of this -Part.—(<i>Translator</i>)</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_2_60" id="Footnote_2_60"></a><a href="#FNanchor_2_60"><span class="label">[2]</span></a> <i>I.e.</i>, what is done is a consequence of that which is.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_3_61" id="Footnote_3_61"></a><a href="#FNanchor_3_61"><span class="label">[3]</span></a> <i>I.e.</i>, his acts are a consequence of what he is.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_4_62" id="Footnote_4_62"></a><a href="#FNanchor_4_62"><span class="label">[4]</span></a> <i>V</i>. Joannes Stobaeus. <i>Eclogae Physicae et Ethicae</i>, -edit. Curtius Wachsmuth et Otto Hense; Weidmann, Berlin, 1884. Vol. -II., pp. 163-168.—(<i>Translator.</i>)</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_5_63" id="Footnote_5_63"></a><a href="#FNanchor_5_63"><span class="label">[5]</span></a> <i>V</i>. Plat., <i>Rep</i>., edit. Stallbaum, 614 sqq. It is the -<i>ἀπόλoγos Ήρὸς τοῡ Άρμενίον</i>.—(<i>translator.</i>)</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_6_64" id="Footnote_6_64"></a><a href="#FNanchor_6_64"><span class="label">[6]</span></a> To sum up. What Plato meant seems to be this. Souls (he -said) have free power, before passing into bodies and different modes -of being, to choose this or that form of life, which they will pass -through in a certain kind of existence, and in a body adapted thereto. -(For a soul may choose a lion's, equally with a man's, mode of being.) -But this free power of choice is removed simultaneously with entrance -into one or other of such forms of life. For when once they have -descended into bodies, and instead of unfettered souls have become the -souls of living things, then they take that measure of free power which -belongs in each case to the organism of the living thing. In some forms -this power is very intelligent and full of movement, as in man; in -some it has but little energy, and is of a simple nature, as in almost -all other creatures. Moreover, this free power depends on the organism -in such a way that while its capability of action is caused by itself -alone, its impulses are determined by the desires which have their -origin in the organism.—(<i>Translator.</i>)</p></div> - -<hr class="chap" /> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_124" id="Page_124">[Pg 124]</a></span></p> - - -<h4><a name="CHAPTER_IXb" id="CHAPTER_IXb">CHAPTER IX.</a></h4> - -<h3>FICHTE'S ETHICS AS A MAGNIFYING GLASS FOR THE ERRORS OF THE KANTIAN.</h3> - -<hr class="r5" /> -<p>Just as in Anatomy and Zoology, many things are not so obvious to the -pupil in preparations and natural products as in engravings where there -is some exaggeration; so if there is any one who, after the above -criticism, is still not entirely satisfied as to the worthlessness -of the Kantian foundation of Ethics, I would recommend him Fichte's -<i>System der Sittenlehre</i>, as a sure means of freeing him from all doubt.</p> - -<p>In the old German Marionnettes a fool always accompanied the emperor, -or hero, so that he might afterwards give in his own way a highly -coloured version of what had been said or done In like manner behind -the great Kant there stands the author of the <i>Wissenschaftslehre</i>,<a name="FNanchor_1_65" id="FNanchor_1_65"></a><a href="#Footnote_1_65" class="fnanchor">[1]</a> -a true <i>Wissenschaftsleere<a name="FNanchor_2_66" id="FNanchor_2_66"></a><a href="#Footnote_2_66" class="fnanchor">[2]</a>.</i> In order to secure his own, and his -family's welfare, Fichte formed the idea of creating a sensation by -means of subtle mystification. It was a very suitable and reasonable -plan, considering<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_125" id="Page_125">[Pg 125]</a></span> the nature of the German philosophic public, and he -executed it admirably by outdoing Kant in every particular. He appeared -as the latter's living superlative, and produced a perfect caricature -of his philosophy by magnifying all its salient points. Nor did the -Ethics escape similar treatment? In his <i>System der Sittenlehre</i>, we -find the Categorical Imperative grown into a Despotic Imperative; while -the absolute "Ought," the law-giving Reason, and the Hest of Duty -have developed into a <b>moral Fate</b>, an unfathomable Necessity, -requiring mankind to act strictly in accordance with certain maxims. -To judge (pp. 308, 309) from the pompous show made, a great deal must -depend on these formulae, although one never quite discovers what. -So much only seems clear. As in bees there is implanted an instinct -to build cells and a hive for life in common, so men (it is alleged) -are endowed with an impulse leading them to play in common a great, -strictly moral, world-embracing Comedy, their part being merely to -figure as puppets—nothing else. But there is this important difference -between the bees and men. The hive is really brought to completion; -while instead of a moral World-Comedy, as a matter of fact, an -exceedingly immoral one is enacted. Here, then, we see the imperative -form of the Kantian Ethics, the moral Law, and the absolute "Ought" -pushed further and further till a system of ethical <b>Fatalism</b> is -evolved, which, as it is worked out, lapses at times into the comic.<a name="FNanchor_3_67" id="FNanchor_3_67"></a><a href="#Footnote_3_67" class="fnanchor">[3]</a></p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_126" id="Page_126">[Pg 126]</a></span></p> - -<p>If in Kant's doctrine we trace a certain moral pedantry; with Fichte -this pedantry reaches the absurd, and furnishes abundant material -for satire. Let the reader notice, for example (pp. 407-409), how he -decides the well-known instance of casuistry, where of two human lives -one must be lost. We find indeed all the errors of Kant raised to the -superlative. Thus, on p. 199, we read: "To act in accordance with<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_127" id="Page_127">[Pg 127]</a></span> -the dictates of sympathy, of compassion, and of loving-kindness is -distinctly unmoral; indeed this line of conduct, as such, is contrary -to morality." Again, on p. 402: "The impulse that makes us ready to -serve others must never be an inconsiderate good-nature, but a clearly -thought-out purpose; that, namely, of furthering as much as possible -the causality of Reason." However, between these sallies of ridiculous -pedantry, Fichte's real philosophic crudeness peeps out clearly -enough, as we might only expect in the case of a man whose teaching -left no time for learning. He seriously puts forward the <i>liberum -arbitrium indifferentiae</i> (a free and indifferent choice), giving as -its foundation the most trivial and frivolous reasons. (Pp. 160, 173, -205, 208, 237, 259, 261.) There can be no doubt that a motive, although -working through the medium of the intelligence, is, nevertheless, a -cause, and consequently involves the same necessity of effect as all -other causes; the corollary being that all human action is a strictly -necessary result. Whoever remains unconvinced of this, is still, -philosophically speaking, barbarous, and ignorant of the rudiments -of exact knowledge. The perception of the strict necessity governing -man's conduct forms the line of demarcation which separates philosophic -heads from all others; arrived at this limit Fichte clearly showed that -he belonged to the others. Moreover, following the footsteps of Kant -(p. 303), he proceeds to make various statements which are in direct -contradiction to the above mentioned passages; but this inconsistency, -like many more in his writings, only proves that he,<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_128" id="Page_128">[Pg 128]</a></span> being one -who was never serious in the search for truth, possessed no strong -convictions to build on; as indeed for his purpose they were not in -the least necessary. Nothing is more laughable than the fact that this -man has received so much posthumous praise for strictly consequential -reasoning; his pedantic style full of loud declamation about trifling -matters being actually mistaken for such.</p> - -<p>The most complete development of Fichte's system of <b>moral -Fatalism</b> is found in his last work: <i>Die Wissenschaftslehre in -ihrem Allgemeinen Umrisse Dargestellt</i>, Berlin, 1810. It has the -advantage of being only forty-six pages (duodecimo) long, while it -contains his whole philosophy in a nutshell. It is therefore to be -recommended to all those who consider their time too precious to be -wasted on his larger productions, which are framed with a length and -tediousness worthy of Christian Wolff, and with the intention, in -reality, of deluding, not of instructing the reader. In this little -treatise we read on p. 32: "The intuitive perception of a phaenomenal -world only came about, to the end that in such a world the Ego as the -<b>absolute Ought</b> might be visible to itself." On p. 33 we actually -find: "The <b>ought</b>," (<i>i.e.</i>, the moral necessity,) "of the -<b>Ought's</b> visibility;" and on p. 36: "An <b>ought</b>," (<i>i.e.</i>, a -moral necessity,) "of the perception that I <b>ought</b>." This, then, -is what we have come to so soon after Kant! <b>His imperative Form</b>, -with its unproved <b>Ought</b>, which it secured as a most convenient -<i>ποῡ στῶ</i> (standpoint), is indeed an <i>exemplar vitiis imitabile</i>!</p> - -<p>For the rest, all that I have said does not<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_129" id="Page_129">[Pg 129]</a></span> overthrow the service -Fichte rendered. Kant's philosophy, this late masterpiece of human -sagacity, in the very land where it arose, he obscured, nay, supplanted -by empty, bombastic superlatives, by extravagances, and by the nonsense -which is found, in his <i>Grundlage der gesammten Wissenschaftslehre,</i> -appearing under the disguise of profound penetration. His merit was -thus to show the world unmistakably what the capacity of the German -philosophical public is; for he made it play the part of a child who -is coaxed into giving up a precious gem in exchange for a Nürnberg -toy. The fame he obtained in this fashion still lives on credit; and -still Fichte is always mentioned in the same breath with Kant as being -another such <i>Ἡραkλῆς καὶ πίθηêκος!</i><a name="FNanchor_4_68" id="FNanchor_4_68"></a><a href="#Footnote_4_68" class="fnanchor">[4]</a> Indeed his name is often -placed above the latter's.<a name="FNanchor_5_69" id="FNanchor_5_69"></a><a href="#Footnote_5_69" class="fnanchor">[5]</a> It was, of course, Fichte's example that -encouraged his successors in the art of enveloping the German people, -in philosophic fog. These were animated by the same spirit, and crowned -with the same prosperity. Every one knows their names; nor is this the -place to consider them at length. Needless to say, their different -opinions, down to the minutest details, are<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_130" id="Page_130">[Pg 130]</a></span> still set forth, and -seriously discussed, by the Professors of Philosophy; as if one had -really to do with philosophers! We must, then, thank Fichte for lucid -documents now existing, which will have to be revised one day before -the Tribunal of posterity, that Court of Appeal from the verdicts of -the present, which—like the Last Judgment looked forward to by the -Saints—at almost all periods, has been left to give to true merit its -just award.</p> -<hr class="r5" /> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_1_65" id="Footnote_1_65"></a><a href="#FNanchor_1_65"><span class="label">[1]</span></a> <i>I.e.</i> Scientific Doctrine.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_2_66" id="Footnote_2_66"></a><a href="#FNanchor_2_66"><span class="label">[2]</span></a> <i>I.e.</i> Scientific Blank. Perhaps we might -translate:—"Scientific Instruction" and "Scientific -Misinstruction."—(<i>Translator.</i>)</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_3_67" id="Footnote_3_67"></a><a href="#FNanchor_3_67"><span class="label">[3]</span></a> As evidence of the truth of my words, space prevents me -from quoting more than a few passages. P. 196: "The moral instinct -is absolute, and its requirements are peremptory, without any object -outside itself." P. 232: "In consequence of the Moral Law, the -empirical Being in Time must be an exact copy of the original Ego." P. -308: "The whole man is a vehicle of the Moral Law." P. 342: "I am only -an instrument, a mere tool of the Moral Law, not in any sense an end." -P. 343: "The end laid before every one is to be the means of realising -Reason: this is the ultimate purpose of his existence; for this alone -he has his being, and if this end should not be attained, there is not -the least occasion for him to live." P. 347: "I am an instrument of the -Moral Law in the phaenomenal world." P. 360: "It is an ordinance of the -Moral Law to nourish one's body, and study one's health; this of course -should be done in no way, and for no other purpose, except to provide -an <i>efficient instrument</i> for furthering the end decreed by Reason, -<i>i.e.</i>, its realisation,"—(cf. p. 371.) P. 376: "Every human body is -an instrument for furthering the end decreed by Reason, <i>i.e.</i>, its -realisation; therefore the greatest possible fitness of each instrument -must constitute for me an end: consequently I must take thought for -every one."—This is Fichte's derivation of loving-kindness! P. 377: "I -can and dare take thought for myself, solely because, and is so far as -I am, <i>an instrument of the Moral Law</i>." P. 388: "To defend a hunted -man at the risk of one's own life, is an absolute duty; whenever the -life of another human being is in danger, you have no right to think -of the safety of your own." P. 420: "In the province of the Moral -Law there is no way whatever of regarding my fellow-man except as an -<i>instrument</i> of Reason."</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_4_68" id="Footnote_4_68"></a><a href="#FNanchor_4_68"><span class="label">[4]</span></a> <i>I.e.</i>, Hercules and an ape. A Greek proverb denoting -the juxtaposition of the sublime and the ridiculous. <i>V</i>. Greg. Cypr. -<i>M.</i>3, 66; Macar. 4, 53; Luc. <i>pisc.</i> 37; and <i>Schol. Bachm. An.</i> 2, -332.—(<i>Translator.</i>)</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_5_69" id="Footnote_5_69"></a><a href="#FNanchor_5_69"><span class="label">[5]</span></a> My proof for this is a passage from the latest -philosophical literature. Herr Feuerbach, an Hegelian (<i>c'est tout -dire!</i>) in his book, <i>Pierre Bayle: Ein Beitrag zur Geschichte der -Philosophie</i>, 1838, p. 80, writes as follows: "But still more sublime -than Kant's are Fichte's ideas as expressed in his Doctrine of Morals -and elsewhere. Christianity has nothing in sublimity that could bear -comparison with them."</p></div> - -<hr class="chap" /> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_131" id="Page_131">[Pg 131]</a></span></p> - - - - -<h4><a name="PART_III" id="PART_III">PART III.</a></h4> - -<h3>THE FOUNDING OF ETHICS.</h3> - -<hr class="chap" /> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_133" id="Page_133">[Pg 133]</a></span></p> - - - -<h4><a name="CHAPTER_Ic" id="CHAPTER_Ic">CHAPTER I.</a></h4> - -<h3>CONDITIONS OF THE PROBLEM.</h3> -<hr class="r5" /> - -<p>Thus the foundation which Kant gave to Ethics, which for the last sixty -years has been regarded as a sure basis, proves to be an inadmissible -assumption, and merely theological Morals in disguise; it sinks -therefore before our eyes into the deep gulf of philosophic error, -which perhaps will never be filled up. That the previous attempts to -lay a foundation are still less satisfactory, I take for granted, as -I have already said. They consist, for the most part, of unproved -assertions, drawn from the impalpable world of dreams, and at the -same time—like Kant's system itself—full of an artificial subtlety -dealing with the finest distinctions, and resting on the most abstract -conceptions. We find difficult combinations; rules invented for the -purpose; formulae balanced on a needle's point; and stilted maxims, -from which it is no longer possible to look down and see life as it -really is with all its turmoil. Such niceties are doubtless admirably -adapted for the lecture-room, if only with a view to sharpening -the wits; but they can never be the cause of the impulse to act -justly and to do good, which is found in every man; as also they are -powerless<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_134" id="Page_134">[Pg 134]</a></span> to counterbalance the deep-seated tendency to injustice and -hardness of heart. Neither is it possible to fasten the reproaches of -conscience upon them; to attribute the former to the breaking of such -hair-splitting precepts only serves to make the same ridiculous. In a -word, artificial associations of ideas like these cannot possibly—if -we take the matter seriously—contain the true incentive to justice and -loving-kindness. Rather must this be something that requires but little -reflection, and still less abstraction and complicated synthesis; -something that, independent of the training of the understanding,. -speaks to every one, even to the rudest,—a something resting simply on -intuitive perception, and forcing its way home as a direct emanation -from the reality of things. So long as Ethics cannot point to a -foundation of this sort, she may go on with her discussions, and make -a great display in the lecture-rooms; but real life will only pour -contempt upon her. I must therefore give our moralists the paradoxical -advice, first to look about them a little among their fellow-men.</p> - -<hr class="chap" /> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_135" id="Page_135">[Pg 135]</a></span></p> - - - - -<h4><a name="CHAPTER_IIc" id="CHAPTER_IIc">CHAPTER II</a></h4> - -<h3>SCEPTICAL VIEW.</h3> -<hr class="r5" /> - -<p>But when we cast a retrospect over the attempts made, and made in vain, -for more than two thousand years, to find a sure basis for Ethics, -ought we not perhaps to think that after all there is no natural -morality, independent of human institution? Shall we not conclude that -all moral systems are nothing but artificial products, means invented -for the better restraint of the selfish and wicked race of men; and -further, that, as they have no internal credentials and no natural -basis, they would fail in their purpose, if without the support of -positive religion? The legal code and the police are not sufficient in -all cases; there are offences, the discovery of which is too difficult; -some, indeed, where punishment is a precarious matter; where, in short, -we are left without public protection. Moreover, the civil law can at -most enforce justice, not loving-kindness and beneficence; because, -of course, these are qualities as regards which every one would like -to play the passive, and no one the active, part. All this has given -rise to the hypothesis that morality rests solely on religion, and that -both have the same aim—that of being complementary to the necessary<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_136" id="Page_136">[Pg 136]</a></span> -inadequacy of state machinery and legislation. Consequently, there -cannot be (it is said) a natural morality, <i>i.e.</i>, one based simply -on the nature of things, or of man, and the fruitless search of -philosophers for its foundation is explained. This view is not without -plausibility; and we find it as far back as the Pyrrhonians:</p> - -<p style="margin-left: 25%;"> -<i>οὔτε ἀγάθον ἐστί ϕύσει, oὔτε κακόν</i>,<br /> -<span style="margin-left: 2em;"><i>ἀλλὰ πρὸς ἀνθροπών ταὒτα νό κέκριται,</i></span><br /> -<i>κατὰ τὸν Tίρωνα</i><a name="FNanchor_1_70" id="FNanchor_1_70"></a><a href="#Footnote_1_70" class="fnanchor">[1]</a><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 7.5em;">—Sext. Emp. <i>adv. Math</i>., XI., 140.</span><br /> -</p> - -<p>Also in modern times distinguished thinkers have given their adherence -to it. A careful examination therefore it deserves; although the easier -course would be to shelve it by giving an inquisitorial glance at the -consciences of those in whom such a theory could arise.</p> - -<p>We should fall into a great, a very childish blunder, if we believed -all the just and legal actions of mankind to have a moral origin. This -is far from being the case. As a rule, between the justice, which men -practise, and genuine singleness of heart, there exists a relation -analogous to that between polite expressions, and the true love of -one's neighbour, which, unlike the former, does not ostensibly overcome -Egoism, but really does so. That honesty of sentiment, everywhere -so carefully exhibited, which<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_137" id="Page_137">[Pg 137]</a></span> requires to be regarded as above all -suspicion; that deep indignation, which is stirred by the smallest -sign of a doubt in this direction, and is ready to break out into -furions anger;—to what are we to attribute these symptoms? None but -the inexperienced and simple will take them for pure coin, for the -working of a fine moral feeling, or conscience. In point of fact, the -general correctness of conduct which is adopted in human intercourse, -and insisted on as a rule no less immovable than the hills, depends -principally on two external necessities; first, on legal ordinance, -by virtue of which the rights of every man are protected by public -authority; and secondly, on the recognised need of possessing civil -honour, in other words, a good name, in order to advance in the world. -This is why the steps taken by the individual are closely watched by -public opinion, which is so inexorably severe that it never forgives -even a single false move or slip, but remembers it against the guilty -person as an indelible blot, all his life long. As far as this goes, -public opinion is wise enough; for, starting from the fundamental -principle: <i>Operari sequitur esse</i> (what one does is determined by what -one is), it shows its conviction that the character is unchangeable, -and that therefore what a man has once done, he will assuredly do -again, if only the circumstances be precisely similar. Such are the two -custodians that keep guard on the correct conduct of people, without -which, to speak frankly, we should be in a sad case, especially with -reference to property, this central point in human life, around which -the chief part of its energy and<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_138" id="Page_138">[Pg 138]</a></span> activity revolves. For the purely -ethical motives to integrity, assuming that they exist, cannot as a -rule be applied, except very indirectly, to the question of ownership -as guaranteed by the state. These motives, in fact, have a direct and -essential bearing only on <b>natural</b> right; with <b>positive</b> -right their connection is merely indirect, in so far as the latter -is based on the former. Natural right, however, attaches to no other -property than that which has been gained by one's own exertion; -because, when this is seized, the owner is at the same time robbed of -all the efforts he expended in acquiring it. The theory of preoccupancy -I reject absolutely, but cannot here set forth its refutation.<a name="FNanchor_2_71" id="FNanchor_2_71"></a><a href="#Footnote_2_71" class="fnanchor">[2]</a> -Now of course all estate based on positive right ought ultimately -and in the last instance (it matters not how many intermediate links -are involved) to rest on the natural right of possession. But what -a distance there is, in most cases, between the title-deeds, that -belong to our civil life, and this natural right—their original -source! Indeed their connection with the latter is generally either -very difficult, or else impossible, to prove. What we hold is ours by -inheritance, by marriage, by success in the lottery; or if in no way -of this kind, still it is not gained by our own work, with the sweat -of the brow, but rather by shrewdness and bright ideas (<i>e.g.</i>, in the -field of speculation), yes, and sometimes even by our very stupidity, -which, through a conjunction of circumstances, is crowned and glorified -by the <i>Deus eventus.</i> It is only in a very small minority of cases -that<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_139" id="Page_139">[Pg 139]</a></span> property is the fruit of real labour and toil; and even then -the work is usually mental, like that of lawyers, doctors, civilians, -teachers, etc.; and this in the eyes of the rude appears to cost but -little effort.</p> - -<p>Now, when wealth is acquired in any such fashion, there is need of -considerable education before the ethical right can be recognised and -respected out of a purely moral impulse. Hence it comes about that -not a few secretly regard the possessions of others as held merely by -virtue of positive right. So, if they find means to wrest from another -man his goods, by using, or perhaps by evading, the laws, they feel -no scruples; for in their opinion he would lose what he holds, in the -same way in which he had previously obtained it, and they consequently -regard their own claims as equal to his. From their point of view, the -right of the stronger in civil society is superseded by the right of -the cleverer.</p> - -<p>Incidentally we may notice that the <b>rich</b> man often shows an -inflexible correctness of conduct. Why? Because with his whole heart -he is attached to, and rigidly maintains, a rule, on the observance of -which his entire wealth, and all its attendant advantages, depend. For -this reason his profession of the principle: <i>Suum cuique</i> (to each his -own), is thoroughly in earnest, and shows an unswerving consistency. -No doubt there is an <b>objective</b> loyalty to sincerity and good -faith, which avails to keep them sacred; but such loyalty is based -simply on the fact that sincerity and good faith are the foundation of -all free intercourse among men; of good order; and of secure ownership. -Consequently they very<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_140" id="Page_140">[Pg 140]</a></span> often benefit <b>ourselves</b>, and with this -end in view they must be preserved even at some cost: just as a good -piece of land is worth a certain outlay. But integrity thus derived -is, as a rule, only to be met with among wealthy people, or at least -those who are engaged in a lucrative business. It is an especial -characteristic of tradesmen; because they have the strongest conviction -that for all the operations of commerce the one thing indispensable -is mutual trust and credit; and this is why mercantile honour stands -quite by itself. On the other hand, the <i>poor</i> man, who cannot make -both ends meet, and who, by reason of the unequal division of property, -sees himself condemned to want and hard work, while others before his -eyes are lapped in luxury and idleness, will not easily perceive that -the <i>raison d'être</i> of this inequality is a corresponding inequality of -service and honest industry. And if he does <b>not</b> recognise this, -how is he to be governed by the purely ethical motive to uprightness, -which should keep him from stretching out his hand to grasp the -superfluity of another? Generally, it is the order of government -as established by law that restrains him. But should ever the rare -occasion present itself when he discovers that he is beyond the reach -of the police, and that he could by a single act throw off the galling -burden of penury, which is aggravated by the sight of others' opulence; -if he feels this, and realises that he could thus enter into the -possession and enjoyment of all that he has so often coveted: what is -there then to stay his hand? Religions dogmas? It is seldom that faith -is so firm. A purely moral incentive to be just and<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_141" id="Page_141">[Pg 141]</a></span> upright? Perhaps -in a few isolated cases. But in by far the greater number there is in -reality nothing but the anxiety a man feels to keep his good name, -his civil honour—a thing that touches closely even those in humble -circumstances. He knows the imminent danger incurred of having to pay -for dishonest conduct by being expelled from the great Masonic Lodge -of honourable people who live correct lives. He knows that property -all over the world is in their hands, and duly apportioned among -themselves, and that they wield the power of making him an outcast for -life from good society, in case he commit a single disgraceful action. -He knows that whoever takes one false step in this direction is marked -as a person that no one trusts, whose company every one shuns, and from -whom all advancement is cut off; to whom, as being "a fellow that has -stolen," the proverb is applied: "He who steals once is a thief all his -life."</p> - -<p>These, then, are the guards that watch over correct behaviour between -man and man, and he who has lived, and kept his eyes open, will admit -that the vast majority of honourable actions in human intercourse must -be attributed to them; nay, he will go further, and say that there are -not wanting people who hope to elude even their vigilance, and who -regard justice and honesty merely as an external badge, as a flag, -under the protection of which they can carry out their own freebooting -propensities with better success. We need not therefore break out into -holy wrath, and buckle on our armour, if a moralist is found to suggest -that perhaps all integrity and<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_142" id="Page_142">[Pg 142]</a></span> uprightness may be at bottom only -conventional. This is what Holbach, Helvetius, d'Alembert, and others -of their time did; and, following out the theory, they endeavoured -with great acumen to trace back all moral conduct to egoistic motives, -however remote and indirect. That their position is literally true of -most just actions, as having an ultimate foundation centred in the -Self, I have shown above. That it is also true to a large extent of -what is done in kindness and humanity, there can be no doubt; acts of -this sort often arise from love of ostentation, still oftener from -belief in a retribution to come, which may be dealt out in the second -or even the third power;<a name="FNanchor_3_72" id="FNanchor_3_72"></a><a href="#Footnote_3_72" class="fnanchor">[3]</a> or they can be explained by other egoistic -motives. Nevertheless, it is equally certain that there occur actions -of disinterested good-will and entirely voluntary justice. To prove -the latter statement, I appeal only to the facts of experience, not -to those of consciousness. There are isolated, yet indisputable cases -on record, where not only the danger of legal prosecution, but also -all chance of discovery, and even of suspicion has been excluded, and -where, notwithstanding, the poor man has rendered to the rich his own. -For example, things lost, and found, have been given back without any -thought or hope of reward; a deposit made by a third person has been -restored after his death to the rightful owner; a poor man, secretly -intrusted with<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_143" id="Page_143">[Pg 143]</a></span> a treasure by a fugitive, has faithfully kept, and -then returned, it. Instances of this sort can be found, beyond all -doubt; only the surprise, the emotion, and the high respect awakened, -when we hear of them, testify to the fact that they are unexpected -and very exceptional. There are in truth really honest people: like -four-leaved clover, their existence is not a fiction. But Hamlet uses -no hyperbole when he says: "To be honest, as this world goes, is to be -one man pick'd out of ten thousand." If it be objected that, after all, -religious dogmas, involving rewards and penalties in another world, -are at the root of conduct as above described; cases could probably be -adduced where the actors possessed no religions faith whatever. And -this is a thing by no means so infrequent as is generally maintained.</p> - -<p>Those who combat the <b>sceptical view</b> appeal specially to the -testimony of <b>conscience</b>. But conscience itself is impugned, -and doubts are raised about its natural origin. Now, as a matter of -fact, there is a <i>conscientia spuria</i> (false conscience), which is -often confounded with the true. The regret and anxiety which many a -man feels for what he has done is frequently, at bottom, nothing but -fear of the possible consequences. Not a few people, if they break -external, voluntary, and even absurd rules, suffer from painful -searchings of heart, exactly similar to those inflicted by the real -conscience. Thus, for instance, a bigoted Jew, if on Saturday he -should smoke a pipe at home, becomes really oppressed with the sense -of having disobeyed the command in Exodus xxxv. 3: "Ye shall kindle -no fire throughout your habitations<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_144" id="Page_144">[Pg 144]</a></span> upon the Sabbath day." How often -it happens that a nobleman or officer is the victim of self-reproach, -because on some occasion or other he has not properly complied with -that fools' codex, which is called knightly honour! Nay more: there -are many of this class, who, if they see the impossibility of merely -doing enough in some quarrel to satisfy the above-named code—to say -nothing of keeping their pledged word of honour—are ready to shoot -themselves. (Instances of both have come under my knowledge.) And this, -while the self-same man would with an easy mind break his promise every -day, if only the shibboleth "Honour" be not involved. In short, every -inconsequent, and thoughtless action, all conduct contrary to our -prejudices, principles, or convictions, whatever these may be; indeed, -every indiscretion, every mistake, every piece of stupidity rankles -in us secretly, and leaves its sting behind. The average individual, -who thinks his conscience such an imposing structure, would be -surprised, could he see of what it actually consists: probably of about -one-fifth, fear of men; one-fifth, superstition; one-fifth, prejudice; -one-fifth, vanity; and one-fifth, habit. So that in reality he is no -better than the Englishman, who said quite frankly: "I cannot afford -to keep a conscience." Religious people of every creed, as a rule, -understand by conscience nothing else than the dogmas and injunctions -of their religion, and the self-examination based thereon; and it -is in this sense that the expressions <b>coercion of conscience</b> -and <b>liberty of conscience</b> are used. The same interpretation -was always given by the theologians,<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_145" id="Page_145">[Pg 145]</a></span> schoolmen, and casuists of the -middle ages and of later times. Whatever a man knew of the formulae and -prescriptions of the Church, coupled with a resolution to believe and -obey it, constituted his conscience. Thus we find the terms "a doubting -conscience," "an opinionated conscience," "an erring conscience," and -the like; and councils were held, and confessors employed, for the -special purpose of setting such irregularities straight. How little the -conception of conscience, just as other conceptions, is determined by -its own object; how differently it is viewed by different people; how -wavering and uncertain it appears in books; all this is briefly but -clearly set forth in Stäudlin's <i>Geschichte der Lehre vom Gewissen</i>. -These facts taken in conjunction are not calculated to establish the -reality of the thing; they have rather given rise to the question -whether there is in truth a genuine, inborn conscience. I have already -had occasion in Part II., Chapter VIII., where the theory of Freedom is -discussed, to touch on my view of conscience, and I shall return to it -below.</p> - -<p>All these sceptical objections added together do not in the least avail -to prove that no true morality exists, however much they may moderate -our expectations as to the moral tendency in man, and the natural basis -of Ethics. Undoubtedly a great deal that is ascribed to the ethical -sense can be proved to spring from other incentives; and when we -contemplate the moral depravity of the world, it is sufficiently clear -that the stimulus for good cannot be very powerful, especially as it -often does not work even in cases where the opposing motives are<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_146" id="Page_146">[Pg 146]</a></span> weak, -although then the individual difference of character makes itself fully -felt.</p> - -<p>It should be observed that this moral depravity is all the more -difficult to discern, because its manifestations are checked and -cloaked by public order, as enforced by law; by the necessity of -having a good name; and even by ordinary polite manners. And this is -not all. People commonly suppose that in the education of the young -their moral interests are furthered by representing uprightness and -virtue as principles generally followed by the world. Later on, it is -often to their great harm that experience teaches them something else; -for the discovery, that the instructors of their early years were the -first to deceive them, is likely to have a more mischievous effect on -their morality than if these persons had given them the first example -of ingenuous truthfulness, by saying frankly: "The world is sunk in -evil, and men are not what they ought to be; but be not misled thereby, -and see that you do better." All this, as I have said, increases the -difficulty of recognising the real immorality of mankind. The state -—this masterpiece, which sums up the self-conscious, intelligent -egoism of all—consigns the rights of each person to a power, which, -being enormously superior to that of the individual, compels him to -respect the rights of all others. This is the leash that restrains -the limitless egoism of nearly every one, the malice of many, the -cruelty of not a few. The illusion thus arising is so great that, -when in special cases, where the executive power is ineffective, or -is eluded, the insatiable covetousness, the base greed, the deep<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_147" id="Page_147">[Pg 147]</a></span> -hypocrisy, or the spiteful tricks of men are apparent in all their -ugliness, we recoil with horror, supposing that we have stumbled on -some unheard-of monster: whereas, without the compulsion of law, and -the necessity of keeping an honourable name, these sights would be of -every day occurrence. In order to discover what, from a moral point -of view, human beings are made of, we must study anarchist records, -and the proceedings connected with criminals. The thousands that -throng before our eyes, in peaceful intercourse each with the other, -can only be regarded as so many tigers and wolves, whose teeth are -secured by a strong muzzle. Let us now suppose this muzzle cast off, -or, in other words, the power of the state abolished; the contemplation -of the spectacle then to be awaited would make all thinking people -shudder; and they would thus betray the small amount of trust they -really have in the efficiency either of religion, or of conscience, or -of the natural basis of Morals, whatever it be. But if these immoral, -antinomian forces should be unshackled and let loose, it is precisely -then that the true moral incentive, hidden before, would reveal its -activity, and consequently be most easily recognised. And nothing -would bring out so clearly as this the prodigious moral difference of -character between man and man; it would be found to be as great as the -intellectual, which is saying much.</p> - -<p>The objection will perhaps be raised that Ethics is not concerned with -what men actually do, but that it is the science which treats of what -their conduct <b>ought</b> to be. Now this is exactly the position<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_148" id="Page_148">[Pg 148]</a></span> -which I deny. In the critical part of the present treatise I have -sufficiently demonstrated that the conception of <b>ought</b>, in -other words, the <b>imperative form</b> of Ethics, is valid only in -theological morals, outside of which it loses all sense and meaning. -The end which I place before Ethical Science is to point out all the -varied moral lines of human conduct; to explain them; and to trace -them to their ultimate source. Consequently there remains no way of -discovering the basis of Ethics except the empirical. We must search -and see whether we can find any actions to which we are obliged to -ascribe <b>genuine moral worth</b>: actions, that is, of voluntary -justice, of pure loving-kindness, and of true nobleness. Such conduct, -when found, is to be regarded as a given phaenomenon, which has to -be properly accounted for; in other words, its real origin must be -explored, and this will involve the investigation and explanation of -the peculiar motives which lead men to actions so radically distinct -from all others, that they form a class by themselves. These motives, -together with a responsive susceptibility for them, will constitute -the ultimate basis of morality, and the knowledge of them will be -the foundation of Ethics. This is the humble path to which I direct -the Science of Morals. It contains no construction <i>a priori</i>, no -absolute legislation for all rational beings <i>in abstracto</i>; it lacks -all official, academic sanction. Therefore, whoever thinks it not -sufficiently fashionable, may return to the Categorical Imperative; -to the Shibboleth of "Human Dignity"; to the empty phrases, the -cobwebs, and the soap-bubbles of the Schools; to<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_149" id="Page_149">[Pg 149]</a></span> principles on which -experience pours contempt at every step, and of which no one, outside -the lecture-rooms knows anything, or has ever had the least notion. On -the other hand, the foundation which is reached by following my path -is upheld by experience; and it is experience which daily and hourly -delivers its silent testimony in favour of my theory.</p> -<hr class="r5" /> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_1_70" id="Footnote_1_70"></a><a href="#FNanchor_1_70"><span class="label">[1]</span></a> <i>I.e.</i>, there is nothing either good or bad by nature, -but these things are decided by human judgment, as Timon says. <i>V</i>. -Sexti Empirici <i>Opera Quae Exstant: Adversus Mathematicos;</i> p. 462 A -<i>ad fin</i>. Aurelianae: Petrus et Jacobus Chouët, 1621. <i>V</i>. also: Sexti -Empirici <i>Opera</i>, edit. Jo. Albertus Fabricius: Lipsiae, 1718, Lib. -XI., 140, p. 716.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_2_71" id="Footnote_2_71"></a><a href="#FNanchor_2_71"><span class="label">[2]</span></a> See <i>Die Welt als Wille und Vorstellung</i>, Vol I., § 62, p. -396 sqq., and Vol. II., chap. 47, p. 682.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_3_72" id="Footnote_3_72"></a><a href="#FNanchor_3_72"><span class="label">[3]</span></a> In other words: If <i>a</i> be a given offence, or virtuous -act, and <i>x</i> the punishment, or reward, proportional to it; then the -punishment, or reward, actually inflicted, instead of being <i>x</i>, may be -<i>x</i><sup>2</sup> or <i>x</i><sup>3</sup>.—(Translator.)</p></div> - -<hr class="chap" /> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_150" id="Page_150">[Pg 150]</a></span></p> - - - - -<h4><a name="CHAPTER_IIIc" id="CHAPTER_IIIc">CHAPTER III.</a></h4> - -<h3>ANTIMORAL<a name="FNanchor_1_73" id="FNanchor_1_73"></a><a href="#Footnote_1_73" class="fnanchor" style="font-size: 0.7em; font-weight: normal;">[1]</a> INCENTIVES.</h3> -<hr class="r5" /> - -<p>The chief and fundamental incentive in man, as in animals, is -<b>Egoism</b>, that is, the urgent impulse to exist, and exist under -the best circumstances. The German word <i>Selbstsucht</i> (self-seeking) -involves a false secondary idea of disease (<i>Sucht</i>).<a name="FNanchor_2_74" id="FNanchor_2_74"></a><a href="#Footnote_2_74" class="fnanchor">[2]</a> The term -<i>Eigennutz</i> (self-interest) denotes Egoism, so far as the latter -is guided by reason, which enables it, by means of reflection, to -prosecute its purposes<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_151" id="Page_151">[Pg 151]</a></span> systematically; so that animals may be called -egoistic, but not self-interested (<i>eigennutzig</i>). I shall therefore -retain the word <b>Egoism</b> for the general idea. Now this Egoism -is, both in animals and men, connected in the closest way with their -very essence and being; indeed, it is one and the same thing. For this -reason all human actions, as a rule, have their origin in Egoism, and -to it, accordingly, we must always first turn, when we try to find the -explanation of any given line of conduct; just as, when the endeavour -is made to guide a man in any direction, the means to this end are -universally calculated with reference to the same all-powerful motive. -Egoism is, from its nature, limitless. The individual is filled with -the unqualified desire of preserving his life, and of keeping it free -from all pain, under which is included all want and privation. He -wishes to have the greatest possible amount of pleasurable existence, -and every gratification that he is capable of appreciating; indeed, -he attempts, if possible, to evolve fresh capacities for enjoyment. -Everything that opposes the strivings of his Egoism awakens his -dislike, his anger, his hate: this is the mortal enemy, which he tries -to annihilate. If it were possible, he would like to possess everything -for his own pleasure; as this is impossible, he wishes at least to -control everything. "All things for me, and nothing for others" is his -maxim. Egoism is a huge giant overtopping the world. If each person -were allowed to choose between his own destruction and that of the -rest of mankind, I need not say what the decision would be in most -cases. Thus, it is that every human unit<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_152" id="Page_152">[Pg 152]</a></span> makes himself the centre of -the world, which he views exclusively from that standpoint. Whatever -occurs, even, for instance, the most sweeping changes in the destinies -of nations, he brings into relation first and foremost with his own -interests, which, however slightly and indirectly they may be affected, -he is sure to think of before anything else. No sharper contrast can -be imagined than that between the profound and exclusive attention -which each person devotes to his own self, and the indifference with -which, as a rule, all other people regard that self,—an indifference -precisely like that with which he in turn looks upon them. To a -certain extent it is actually comic to see how each individual out of -innumerable multitudes considers himself, at least from the practical -point of view, as the only real thing, and all others in some sort -as mere phantoms. The ultimate reason of this lies in the fact that -every one is <b>directly</b> conscious of himself, but of others only -<i>indirectly</i>, through his mind's eye; and the direct impression asserts -its right. In other words, it is in consequence of the subjectivity -which is essential to our consciousness that each person is himself -the whole world; for all that is objective exists only indirectly, as -simply the mental picture of the subject; whence it comes about that -everything is invariably expressed in terms of self-consciousness. The -only world which the individual really grasps, and of which he has -certain knowledge, he carries in himself, as a mirrored image fashioned -by his brain; and he is, therefore, its centre. Consequently he is all -in all to himself; and since he<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_153" id="Page_153">[Pg 153]</a></span> feels that he contains within his ego -all that is real, nothing can be of greater importance to him than his -own self.<a name="FNanchor_3_75" id="FNanchor_3_75"></a><a href="#Footnote_3_75" class="fnanchor">[3]</a> Moreover this supremely important self, this microcosm, -to which the macrocosm stands in relation as its mere modification -or accident,—this, which is the individual's whole world, he knows -perfectly well must be destroyed by death; which is therefore for him -equivalent to the destruction of all things.</p> - -<p>Such, then, are the elements out of which, on the basis of the Will to -live, Egoism grows up, and like a broad trench it forms a perennial -separation between man and man. If on any occasion some one actually -jumps across, to help another, such an act is regarded as a sort of -miracle, which calls forth amazement and wins approval. In Part II., -Chapter VI., where Kant's principle of Morals is discussed, I had -the opportunity of describing how Egoism behaves in everyday life, -where it is always peering out of some corner or other, despite -ordinary politeness, which, like the traditional fig-leaf, is used -as a covering. In point of fact, politeness is the conventional and -systematic disavowal of Egoism in the trifles of daily intercourse, -and is, of course, a piece of recognised hypocrisy. Gentle manners are -expected and commended, because that which they conceal—Egoism—is so -odious, that no one wishes to see it, however much it is known to be -there; just as people like to have repulsive objects hidden at least by -a curtain. Now, unless<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_154" id="Page_154">[Pg 154]</a></span> external force (under which must be included -every source of fear whether of human or superhuman powers), or else -the real moral incentive is in effective operation, it is certain that -Egoism always pursues its purposes with unqualified directness; hence -without these checks, considering the countless number of egoistic -individuals, the <i>bellum omnium contra omnes</i><a name="FNanchor_4_76" id="FNanchor_4_76"></a><a href="#Footnote_4_76" class="fnanchor">[4]</a> would be the order -of the day, and prove the ruin of all. Thus is explained the early -construction by reflecting reason of state government, which, arising, -as it does, from a mutual fear of reciprocal violence, obviates the -disastrous consequences of the general Egoism, as far as it is possible -to do by <b>negative</b> procedure. Where, however, the two forces -that oppose Egoism fail to be operative, the latter is not slow to -reveal all its horrible dimensions, nor is the spectacle exactly -attractive. In order to express the strength of this antimoral power -in a few words, to portray it, so to say, at one stroke, some very -emphatic hyperbole is wanted. It may be put thus: many a man would -be quite capable of killing another, simply to rub his boots over -with the victim's fat. I am only doubtful whether this, after all, is -any exaggeration. <b>Egoism</b>, then, is the first and principal, -though not the only, power that the <b>moral Motive</b> has to contend -against; and it is surely sufficiently clear that the latter, in order -to enter the lists against such an opponent, must be something more -real than a hair-splitting sophism or an <i>a priori</i> soap-bubble. In war -the first<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_155" id="Page_155">[Pg 155]</a></span> thing to be done is to know the enemy well; and in the shock -of battle, now impending, <b>Egoism</b>, as the chief combatant on its -own side, is best set against the virtue of <b>Justice</b>, which, in -my opinion, is the first and original cardinal virtue.</p> - -<p>The virtue of <b>loving-kindness</b>, on the other hand, is rather to -be matched with <b>ill-will</b>, or <b>spitefulness</b>, the origin -and successive stages of which we will now consider. Ill-will, in -its lower degrees, is very frequent, indeed, almost a common thing; -and it easily rises in the scale. Goethe is assuredly right when -he says that in this world indifference and aversion are quite at -home.—(<i>Wahlverwandtschaften,</i> Part I., chap. 3.) It is very fortunate -for us that the cloak, which prudence and politeness throw over this -vice, prevents us from seeing how general it is, and how the <i>bellum -omnium contra omnes</i> is constantly waged, at least in thought. Yet -ever and anon there is some appearance of it: for instance, in the -relentless backbiting so frequently observed; while its clearest -manifestation is found in all out-breaks of anger, which, for the most -part, are quite disproportional to their cause, and which could hardly -be so violent, had they not been compressed—like gunpowder—into the -explosive compound formed of long cherished brooding hatred. Ill-will -usually arises from the unavoidable collisions of Egoism which occur -at every step. It is, moreover, objectively excited by the view of -the weakness, the folly, the vices, failings, shortcomings, and -imperfections of all kinds, which every one more or less, at least -occasionally, affords to others. Indeed, the spectacle<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_156" id="Page_156">[Pg 156]</a></span> is such, that -many a man, especially in moments of melancholy and depression, may -be tempted to regard the world, from the aesthetic standpoint, as a -cabinet of caricatures; from the intellectual, as a madhouse; and -from the moral, as a nest of sharpers. If such a mental attitude be -indulged, misanthropy is the result. Lastly, one of the chief sources -of ill-will is envy; or rather, the latter is itself ill-will, kindled -by the happiness, possessions, or advantages of others. No one is -absolutely free from envy; and Herodotus (III. 80) said long ago: -<i>ϕθόνος ἀρχῆθεν ἐμϕύεται ἀνθρώπῳ</i> (envy is a natural growth in man from -the beginning). But its degrees vary considerably. It is most poisonous -and implacable when directed against personal qualities, because then -the envious have nothing to hope for. And precisely in such cases -its vilest form also appears, because men are made to hate what they -ought to love and honour. Yet so "the world wags," even as Petrarca -complained:</p> - -<p style="margin-left: 25%;"> -<i>Di lor par più, che d'altri, invidia s'abbia,</i><br /> -<i>Che per se stessi son levati a volo,</i><br /> -<i>Uscendo fuor della commune gabbia.</i><br /> -(For envy fastens most of all on those,<br /> -Who, rising on their own strong wings, escape<br /> -The bars wherein the vulgar crowd is cag'd.)<br /> -</p> - -<p>The reader is referred to the Parerga, vol. ii., § 114, for a more -complete examination of envy.</p> - -<p>In a certain sense the opposite of envy is the habit of gloating over -the misfortunes of others, At any rate, while the former is human, the -latter is diabolical. There is no sign more infallible of an<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_157" id="Page_157">[Pg 157]</a></span> entirely -bad heart, and of profound moral worthlessness than open and candid -enjoyment in seeing other people suffer. The man in whom this trait is -observed ought to be for ever avoided: <i>Hic niger est, hunc tu, Romane, -caveto</i>.<a name="FNanchor_5_77" id="FNanchor_5_77"></a><a href="#Footnote_5_77" class="fnanchor">[5]</a> These two vices are in themselves merely theoretical; in -practice they become malice and cruelty. It is true that Egoism may -lead to wickedness and crime of every sort; but the resulting injury -and pain to others are simply the means, not the end, and are therefore -involved only as an accident. Whereas malice and cruelty make others' -misery the end in itself, the realisation of which affords distinct -pleasure. They therefore constitute a higher degree of moral turpitude. -The maxim of Egoism, at its worst is: <i>Neminem juva, immo omnes, si -forte conducit</i> (thus there is always a condition), <i>laede</i> (help no -body, but rather injure all people, if it brings you any advantage). -The guiding rule of malice is: <i>Omnes, quantum potes, laede</i> (injure -all people as far as you can). As malicious joy is in fact theoretical -cruelty, so, conversely, cruelty is nothing but malicious joy put into -practice; and the latter is sure to show itself in the form of cruelty, -directly an opportunity offers.</p> - -<p>An examination of the special vices that spring from these two primary -antimoral forces forms no part of the present treatise: its proper -place would be found in a detailed system of Ethics. From <b>Egoism</b> -we should probably derive greed, gluttony, lust, selfishness, avarice, -covetousness, injustice, hardness<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_158" id="Page_158">[Pg 158]</a></span> of heart, pride, arrogance, etc.; -while to <b>spitefulness</b> might be ascribed disaffection, envy, -ill-will, malice, pleasure in seeing others suffer, prying curiosity, -slander, insolence, petulance, hatred, anger, treachery, fraud, thirst -for revenge, cruelty, etc. The first root is more bestial, the second -more devilish; and according as either is the stronger; or according -as the moral incentive, to be described below, predominates, so -the salient points for the ethical classification of character are -determined. No man is entirely free from some traces of all three.</p> - -<p>Here I bring to an end my review of these terrible powers of evil; -it is an array reminding one of the Princes of Darkness in Milton's -Pandemonium. But my plan, which in this respect of course differs from -that of all other moralists, required me to consider at the outset -this gloomy side of human nature, and, like Dante, to descend first to -Tartarus.</p> - -<p>It will now be fully apparent how difficult our problem is. We have -to find a motive capable of making a man take up a line of conduct -directly opposed to all those propensities which lie deeply ingrained -in his nature; or, given such conduct as a fact of experience, we must -search for a motive capable of supplying an adequate and non-artificial -explanation of it. The difficulty, in fact, is so great that, in order -to solve it, for the vast majority of mankind, it has been everywhere -necessary to have recourse to machinery from another world. Gods have -been pointed to, whose will and command the required mode of behaviour -was said to be, and who were represented as emphasising this command<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_159" id="Page_159">[Pg 159]</a></span> -by penalties and rewards either in this, or in another world, to -which death would be the gate. Now let us assume that belief in a -doctrine of this sort took general root (a thing which is certainly -possible through strenuous inculcation at a very early age); and let -us also assume that it brought about the intended effect,—though this -is a much harder matter to admit, and not nearly so well confirmed -by experience; we should then no doubt succeed in obtaining strict -legality of action, even beyond the limits that justice and the police -can reach; but every one feels that this would not in the least imply -what we mean by morality of the heart. For obviously, every act arising -from motives like those just mentioned is after all derived simply from -pure Egoism. How can I talk of unselfishness when I am enticed by a -promised guerdon, or deterred by a threatened punishment? A recompense -in another world, thoroughly believed in, must be regarded as a bill -of exchange, which is perfectly safe, though only payable at a very -distant date. It is thus quite possible that the profuse assurances, -which beggars so constantly make, that those, who relieve them, will -receive a thousandfold more for their gifts in the next world, may lead -many a miser to generous alms-giving; for such a one complacently views -the matter as a good investment of money, being perfectly convinced -that he will rise again as a Croesus. For the mass of mankind, it -will perhaps be always necessary to continue the appeal to incentives -of this nature, and we know that such is the teaching promulgated by -the different religions, which are in fact the<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_160" id="Page_160">[Pg 160]</a></span> <b>metaphysics of the -people</b>. Be it, however, observed in this connection that a man is -sometimes just as much in error as to the true motives that govern -his own acts, as he is with regard to those of others. Hence it is -certain that many persons, while they can only account to themselves -for their noblest actions by attributing them to motives of the kind -above described, are, nevertheless, really guided in their conduct by -far higher and purer incentives, though the latter may be much more -difficult to discover. They are doing, no doubt, out of direct love -of their neighbour, that which they can but explain as the command of -their God. On the other hand, Philosophy, in dealing with this, as with -all other problems, endeavours to extract the true and ultimate cause -of the given phaenomena from the disclosures which the nature itself -of man yields, and which, freed as they must be from all mythical -interpretation, from all religious dogmas, and transcendent hypostases, -she requires to see confirmed by external or internal experience. Now, -as our present task is a philosophical one, we must entirely disregard -all solutions conditioned by any religion; and I have here touched on -them merely in order to throw a stronger light on the magnitude of the -difficulty.</p> -<hr class="r5" /> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_1_73" id="Footnote_1_73"></a><a href="#FNanchor_1_73"><span class="label">[1]</span></a> I venture to use this word although irregularly formed, -because "antiethical" would not here give an adequate meaning. -<i>Sittlich</i> (in accordance with good manners) and <i>unsittlich</i> -(contrary to good manners), which have lately come into vogue, are -bad substitutes for <i>moralisch</i> (moral) and <i>unmoralisch</i> (immoral): -first, because <i>moralisch</i> is a scientific conception, which, as such, -requires to be denoted by a Greek or Latin term, for reasons which may -be found in <i>Die Welt als Wille und Vorstellung</i>, vol. ii., chap. 12, -p. 134 sqq.; and secondly, because <i>sittlich</i> is a weaker and tamer -expression, difficult to distinguish from <i>sittsam</i> (modest) which in -popular acceptation means <i>zimperlich</i> (simpering). No concessions must -be made to this extravagant love of germanising!</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_2_74" id="Footnote_2_74"></a><a href="#FNanchor_2_74"><span class="label">[2]</span></a> In <i>Sucht</i> (<i>siech</i> = sick) and <i>Selbst-sucht</i> (<i>suchen</i>= -seek) there is an apparent confusion between the two bases SUK -(<i>seuka</i>) to be ill, and SÔKYAN, to seek. <i>V</i>. Skeat's <i>Etymological -Dictionary.</i>—(<i>Translator.</i>)</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_3_75" id="Footnote_3_75"></a><a href="#FNanchor_3_75"><span class="label">[3]</span></a> It should be noticed that while from the <i>subjective</i> -side a man's self assumes these gigantic proportions, <i>objectively</i> it -shrinks to almost nothing—namely, to about the one-thousand-millionth -part of the human race.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_4_76" id="Footnote_4_76"></a><a href="#FNanchor_4_76"><span class="label">[4]</span></a> The war of all against all. Hobbes uses this expression. -—(<i>Translator.</i>)</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_5_77" id="Footnote_5_77"></a><a href="#FNanchor_5_77"><span class="label">[5]</span></a> This man is black; of him shalt thou, O Roman, beware. -<i>V</i>. Horace, <i>Sat</i>., Lib. I. 4. 85.—(<i>Translator</i>.)</p></div> - -<hr class="chap" /> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_161" id="Page_161">[Pg 161]</a></span></p> - - - - -<h4><a name="CHAPTER_IVc" id="CHAPTER_IVc">CHAPTER IV.</a></h4> - -<h3>CRITERION OF ACTIONS OF MORAL WORTH.</h3> -<hr class="r5" /> - -<p>There is first the empirical question to be settled, whether actions -of voluntary justice and unselfish loving-kindness, which are capable -of rising to nobleness and magnanimity, actually occur in experience. -Unfortunately, this inquiry cannot be decided altogether empirically, -because it is invariably only the act that experience gives, the -<b>incentives</b> not being apparent. Hence the possibility always -remains that an egoistic motive may have had weight in determining a -just or good deed. In a theoretical investigation like the present, -I shall not avail myself of the inexcusable trick of shifting the -matter on to the reader's conscience. But I believe there are few -people who have any doubt about the matter, and who are not convinced -from their own experience that just acts are often performed simply -and solely to prevent a man suffering from injustice. Most of as, I -do not hesitate to say, are persuaded that there are persons in whom -the principle of giving others their due seems to be innate, who -neither intentionally injure any one, nor unconditionally seek their -own advantage, but in considering themselves show regard also for the -rights of their neighbours; persons who,<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_162" id="Page_162">[Pg 162]</a></span> when they undertake matters -involving reciprocal obligations, not only see that the other party -does his duty, but also that he gets his own, because it is really -against their will that any one, with whom they have to do, should be -shabbily treated. These are the men of true probity, the few <i>aequi</i> -(just) among the countless number of the <i>iniqui</i> (unjust). Such -people exist. Similarly, it will be admitted, I think, that many help -and give, perform services, and deny themselves, without having any -further intention in their hearts than that of assisting another, whose -distress they see. When Arnold von Winkelried exclaimed: "<i>Trüwen, -lieben Eidgenossen, wullt's minem Wip und Kinde gedenken</i>,"<a name="FNanchor_1_78" id="FNanchor_1_78"></a><a href="#Footnote_1_78" class="fnanchor">[1]</a> and then -clasped in his arms as many hostile spears as he could grasp; can any -one believe that he had some selfish purpose? I cannot. To cases of -voluntary justice, which cannot be denied without deliberate and wilful -trifling with facts, I have already drawn attention in Chapter II. of -this Part. Should any one, however, persist in refusing to believe that -such actions ever happen, then, according to his view, Ethics would -be a science without any real object, like Astrology and Alchemy, and -it would be waste of time to discuss its basis any further. With him, -therefore, I have nothing to do, and address myself to those who allow -that we are dealing with something more than an imaginary citation.</p> - -<p>It is, then, only to conduct of the above kind that genuine moral worth -can be ascribed. Its special mark is that it rejects and excludes -the whole class<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_163" id="Page_163">[Pg 163]</a></span> of motives by which otherwise all human action is -prompted: I mean the <b>self-interested</b> motives, using the word in -its widest sense. Consequently the moral value of an act is lowered by -the disclosure of an accessory selfish incentive; while it is entirely -destroyed, if that incentive stood alone. The absence of all egoistic -motives is thus the <b>Criterion</b> of an action of moral value. It -may, no doubt, be objected that also acts of pure malice and cruelty -are not selfish.<a name="FNanchor_2_79" id="FNanchor_2_79"></a><a href="#Footnote_2_79" class="fnanchor">[2]</a> But it is manifest that the latter cannot be -meant, since they are, in kind, the exact opposite of those now being -considered. If, however, the definition be insisted on in its strict -sense, then we may expressly except such actions, because of their -essential token—the compassing of others' suffering.</p> - -<p>There is also another characteristic of conduct having real moral -worth, which is entirely internal and therefore less obvious. I allude -to the fact that it leaves behind a certain self-satisfaction which -is called the approval of conscience: just as, on the other hand, -injustice and unkindness, and still more malice and cruelty, involve -a secret self-condemnation. Lastly, there is an external, secondary, -and accidental sign that draws a clear line between the two classes. -Acts of the former kind win the approval and respect of disinterested -witnesses: those of the latter incur their disapproval and contempt.</p> - -<p>Those actions that bear the stamp of moral value, so determined, -and admitted to be realities, constitute<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_164" id="Page_164">[Pg 164]</a></span> the phaenomenon that lies -before us, and which we have to explain. We must accordingly search -out what it is that moves men to such conduct. If we succeed in our -investigation, we shall necessarily bring to light the true moral -incentive; and, as it is upon this that all ethical science must -depend, our problem will then be solved.</p> -<hr class="r5" /> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_1_78" id="Footnote_1_78"></a><a href="#FNanchor_1_78"><span class="label">[1]</span></a> Comrades, true and loyal to our oath, care for my wife and -child in remembrance of this.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_2_79" id="Footnote_2_79"></a><a href="#FNanchor_2_79"><span class="label">[2]</span></a> Acts of malice and cruelty are so many gratifications -of the ego, and are therefore, in a certain sense, selfish. <i>V</i>. -Introduction, pp. xvi. and xvii.—(<i>Translator.</i>)</p></div> - -<hr class="chap" /> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_165" id="Page_165">[Pg 165]</a></span></p> - - - - -<h4><a name="CHAPTER_Vc" id="CHAPTER_Vc">CHAPTER V.</a></h4> - -<h3>STATEMENT AND PROOF OF THE ONLY TRUE MORAL INCENTIVE.</h3> -<hr class="r5" /> - -<p>The preceding considerations, which were unavoidably necessary in order -to clear the ground, now enable me to indicate the true incentive -which underlies all acts of real moral worth. The seriousness, and -indisputable genuineness, with which we shall find it is distinguished, -removes it far indeed from the hair-splittings, subtleties, -sophisms, assertions formulated out of airy nothings, and <i>a priori</i> -soap-bubbles, which all systems up to the present have tried to make -at once the source of moral conduct and the basis of Ethics. This -incentive I shall not put forward as an hypothesis to be accepted or -rejected, as one pleases; I shall actually <b>prove</b> that it is -the only possible one. But as this demonstration requires several -fundamental truths to be borne in mind, the reader's attention is first -called to certain propositions which we must presuppose, and which may -properly be considered as axioms; except the last two, which result -from the analysis contained in the preceding chapter, and in Part II., -Chapter III.</p> - -<p>(1) No action can take place without a sufficient<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_166" id="Page_166">[Pg 166]</a></span> motive; as little as -a stone can move without a sufficient push or pull.</p> - -<p>(2) Similarly, no action can be left undone, when, given the character -of the doer, a sufficient motive is present; unless a stronger -counter-motive necessarily prevents it.</p> - -<p>(3) Whatever moves the Will,—this, and this alone, implies the sense -of weal and woe, in the widest sense of the term; and conversely, weal -and woe signify "that which is in conformity with, or which is contrary -to, a Will." Hence every motive must have a connection with weal and -woe.</p> - -<p>(4) Consequently every action stands in relation to, and has as its -ultimate object, a being susceptible of weal and woe.</p> - -<p>(5) This being is either the doer himself; or another, whose position -as regards the action is therefore <b>passive</b>; since it is done -either to his harm, or to his benefit and advantage.</p> - -<p>(6) Every action, which has to do, as its ultimate object, with the -weal and woe of the agent himself, is <b>egoistic</b>.</p> - -<p>(7) The foregoing propositions with regard to what is done apply -equally to what is left undone, in all cases where motive and -counter-motive play their parts.</p> - -<p>(8) From the analysis in the foregoing chapter, it results that -<b>Egoism</b> and the <b>moral worth</b> of an action absolutely -exclude each other. If an act have an <b>egoistic</b> object as its -motive, then no moral value can be attached to it; if an act is to -have moral value, then no egoistic object, direct or indirect, near or -remote, may be its motive.</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_167" id="Page_167">[Pg 167]</a></span></p> - -<p>(9) In consequence of my elimination in Part II., Chapter III., of -alleged duties towards ourselves, the moral significance of our conduct -can only lie in the effect produced upon others; its relation to the -latter is alone that which lends it moral worth, or worthlessness, and -constitutes it an act of justice, loving-kindness, etc., or the reverse.</p> - -<p>From these propositions the following conclusion is obvious: The -<b>weal and woe</b>, which (according to our third axiom) must, as its -ultimate object, lie at the root of everything done, or left undone, -is either that of the doer himself, or that of some other person, -whose <i>rôle</i> with reference to the action is passive. Conduct in the -first case is necessarily <b>egoistic</b>, as it is impelled by an -interested motive. And this is not only true when men—as they nearly -always do—plainly shape their acts for their own profit and advantage; -it is equally true when from anything done we expect some benefit to -ourselves, no matter how remote, whether in this or in another world. -Nor is it less the fact when our honour, our good name, or the wish -to win the respect of some one, the sympathy of the lookers on, etc., -is the object we have in view; or when our intention is to uphold a -rule of conduct, which, if generally followed, would occasionally be -useful to ourselves, for instance, the principle of justice, of mutual -succour and aid, and so forth. Similarly, the proceeding is at bottom -egoistic, when a man considers it a prudent step to obey some absolute -command issued by an unknown, but evidently supreme power; for in such -a case nothing can be the motive but <b>fear</b> of<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_168" id="Page_168">[Pg 168]</a></span> the disastrous -consequences of disobedience, however generally and indistinctly these -may be conceived. Nor is it a whit the less Egoism that prompts us -when we endeavour to emphasise, by something done or left undone, -the high opinion (whether distinctly realised or not) which we have -of ourselves, and of our value or dignity; for the diminution of -self-satisfaction, which might otherwise occur, would involve the -wounding of our pride. Lastly, it is still Egoism that is operative, -when a man, following Wolff's principles, seeks by his conduct to work -out his own perfection. In short, one may make the ultimate incentive -to an action what one pleases; it will always turn out, no matter by -how circuitous a path, that in the last resort what affects the actual -weal and woe of the agent himself is the real motive; consequently what -he does is <b>egoistic</b>, and therefore <b>without moral worth</b>. -There is only a single case in which this fails to happen: namely, -when the ultimate incentive for doing something, or leaving it undone, -is precisely and exclusively centred in the weal and woe of some one -else, who plays a passive part; that is to say, when the person on the -active side, by what he does, or omits to do, simply and solely regards -the weal and woe of another, and has absolutely no other object than -to benefit him, by keeping harm from his door, or, it may be, even -by affording help, assistance, and relief. It is this aim alone that -gives to what is done, or left undone, the stamp of moral worth; which -is thus seen to depend exclusively on the circumstance that the act -is carried out, or omitted, purely for the benefit and advantage<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_169" id="Page_169">[Pg 169]</a></span> of -another. If and when this is not so, then the question of weal and woe -which incites to, or deters from, every action contemplated, can only -relate to the agent himself; whence its performance, or non-performance -is entirely egoistic, and without moral value.</p> - -<p>But if what I do is to take place solely on account of some one else; -then it follows that <b>his</b> weal and woe must directly constitute -<b>my</b> motive; just is, ordinarily, <b>my own</b> weal and woe -form it. This narrows the limits of our problem, which may now be -stated as follows: How is it possible that another's weal and woe -should influence my will directly, that is, exactly in the same way -as otherwise my own move it? How can that which affects another for -good or bad become my immediate motive, and actually sometimes assume -such importance that it more or less supplants my own interests, which -are, as a rule, the single source of the incentives that appeal to me? -Obviously, only because that other person becomes the ultimate object -of my will, precisely as usually I myself am that object; in other -words, because I directly desire weal, and not woe, for him, just as -habitually I do for myself. This, however, necessarily implies that I -suffer with him, and feel his woe, exactly as in most cases I feel only -mine, and therefore desire his weal as immediately as at other times I -desire only my own. But, for this to be possible, I must in some way -or other be <b>identified</b> with him; that is, the <b>difference</b> -between myself and him, which is the precise <i>raison d'être</i> of my -Egoism, must be <b>removed</b>, at least to a certain<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_170" id="Page_170">[Pg 170]</a></span> extent. Now, -since I do not live in his skin, there remains only the knowledge, that -is, the mental picture, I have of him, as the possible means whereby -I can so far identify myself with him, that my action declares the -difference to be practically effaced. The process here analysed is not -a dream, a fancy floating in the air; it is perfectly real, and by -no means infrequent. It is, what we see every day,—the phaenomenon -of <b>Compassion</b>; in other words, the direct participation, -independent of all ulterior considerations, in the sufferings of -another, leading to sympathetic assistance in the effort to prevent -or remove them; whereon in the last resort all satisfaction and all -well-being and happiness depend. It is this Compassion alone which is -the real basis of all <b>voluntary</b> justice and all <b>genuine</b> -loving-kindness. Only so far as an action springs therefrom, has it -moral value; and all conduct that proceeds from any other motive -whatever has none. When once compassion is stirred within me, by -another's pain, then his weal and woe go straight to my heart, exactly -in the same way, if not always to the same degree, as otherwise I feel -only my own. Consequently the difference between myself and him is no -longer an absolute one.</p> - -<p>No doubt this operation is astonishing, indeed hardly comprehensible. -It is, in fact, the great mystery of Ethics, its original phaenomenon, -and the boundary stone, past which only transcendental speculation -may dare to take a step. Herein we see the wall of partition, -which, according to the light of nature (as reason is called by old -theologians), entirely separates being from being, broken down, and -the non-ego to<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_171" id="Page_171">[Pg 171]</a></span> a certain extent identified with the ego. I wish -for the moment to leave the metaphysical explanation of this enigma -untouched, and first to inquire whether all acts of voluntary justice -and true loving-kindness really arise from it. If so, our problem will -be solved, for we shall have found the ultimate basis of morality, and -shown that it lies in human nature itself. This foundation, however, -in its turn cannot form a problem of Ethics, but rather, like every -other ultimate fact as such, of Metaphysics. Only the solution, that -the latter offers of the primary ethical phaenomenon, lies outside -the limits of the question put by the Danish Royal Society, which is -concerned solely with the basis; so that the transcendental explanation -can be given merely as a voluntary and unessential appendix.</p> - -<p>But before I turn to the derivation of the Cardinal virtues from -the original incentive, as here disclosed, I have still to bring to -the notice of the reader two observations which the subject renders -necessary.</p> - -<p>(1) For the purpose of easier comprehension I have simplified the -above presentation of compassion as the sole source of truly moral -actions, by intentionally leaving out of consideration the incentive -of <b>Malice</b>, which while it is equally useless to the self as -compassion, makes the <b>pain</b> of others its ultimate purpose. We -are now, however, in a position, by including it, to state the above -proof more completely, and rigorously, as follows:—</p> - -<p>There are only <b>three</b> fundamental springs of human conduct, and -all possible motives arise from one or other of these. They are:</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_172" id="Page_172">[Pg 172]</a></span></p> - -<p>(<i>a</i>) Egoism; which desires the weal of the self, and is limitless.</p> - -<p>(<i>b</i>) Malice; which desires the woe of others, and may develop to the -utmost cruelty.</p> - -<p>(<i>c</i>) Compassion; which desires the weal of others, and may rise to -nobleness and magnanimity.</p> - -<p>Every human act is referable to one of these springs; although two of -them may work together. Now, as we have assumed that actions of moral -worth are in point of fact realities; it follows that they also must -proceed from one of these primal sources. But, by the eighth axiom, -they cannot arise from the first, and still less from the second; since -all conduct springing from the latter is morally worthless, while the -offshoots of the former are in part neither good nor bad in themselves. -Hence they must have their origin in the third incentive; and this will -be established <i>a posteriori</i> in the sequel.</p> - -<p>(2) Direct sympathy with another is limited to his sufferings, and is -not immediately awakened by his well-being: the latter <i>per se</i> leaves -us indifferent. J. J. Rousseau in his <i>Émile</i> (Bk. IV.) expresses the -same view: "<i>Première maxime: il n'est pas dans le cœur humain, de -se mettre à la place des gens, qui sont plus heureux que nous, mais -seulement de ceux, qui sont plus à plaindre</i>,"<a name="FNanchor_1_80" id="FNanchor_1_80"></a><a href="#Footnote_1_80" class="fnanchor">[1]</a> etc.</p> - -<p>The reason of this is that pain or suffering, which includes all -want, privation, need, indeed every wish, is <b>positive</b>, and -works <b>directly</b> on the consciousness.<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_173" id="Page_173">[Pg 173]</a></span> Whereas the nature of -satisfaction, of enjoyment, of happiness, and the like, consists solely -in the fact that a hardship is done away with, a pain lulled: whence -their effect is <b>negative</b>. We thus see why need or desire is the -condition of every pleasure. Plato understood this well enough, and -only excepted sweet odours, and intellectual enjoyment. (<i>De Rep.,</i> -IX., p. 264 sq., edit. Bipont.)<a name="FNanchor_2_81" id="FNanchor_2_81"></a><a href="#Footnote_2_81" class="fnanchor">[2]</a> And Voltaire says: "<i>Il n'est pas -de vrais plaisirs, qu'avec de vrais besoins</i>."<a name="FNanchor_3_82" id="FNanchor_3_82"></a><a href="#Footnote_3_82" class="fnanchor">[3]</a> Pain, then, is -<b>positive</b>, and makes itself known by itself: satisfaction or -pleasure is <b>negative</b>—simply the removal of the former. This -principle explains the fact that only the suffering, the want, the -danger, the helplessness of another awakens our sympathy directly -and as such. The lucky or contented man, <b>as such</b>, leaves us -indifferent—in reality because his state is negative; he is without -pain, indigence, or distress. We may of course take pleasure in the -success, the well-being, the enjoyment of others: but if we do, it is -a secondary pleasure, and caused by our having previously sorrowed -over their sufferings and privations. Or else we share the joy and -happiness of a man, not <b>as such</b>, but because, and in so far as, -he is our child, father, friend, relation, servant, subject, etc. In a -word, the good fortune, or pleasure of another, <b>purely as such</b>, -does not arouse in us the same direct sympathy as is certainly elicited -by his misfortune, privation, or misery, <b>purely as such</b>. If -even on <b>our own behalf</b> it is only suffering (under which must -be reckoned all wants, needs,<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_174" id="Page_174">[Pg 174]</a></span> wishes, and even ennui) that stirs our -activity; and if contentment and prosperity fill us with indolence and -lazy repose; why should it not be the same when others are concerned? -For (as we have seen) our sympathy rests on an identification of -ourselves with them. Indeed, the sight of success and enjoyment, -<b>purely as such</b>, is very apt to raise the envy, to which every -man is prone, and which has its place among the antimoral forces -enumerated above.</p> - -<p>In connection with the exposition of Compassion here given, as the -coming into play of motives directly occasioned by another's calamity, -I take the opportunity of condemning the mistake of Cassina,<a name="FNanchor_4_83" id="FNanchor_4_83"></a><a href="#Footnote_4_83" class="fnanchor">[4]</a> which -has been so often repeated. His view is that compassion arises from -a sudden hallucination, which makes us put ourselves in the place -of the sufferer, and then imagine that we are undergoing <b>his</b> -pain in <b>own own person</b>. This is not in the least the case. The -conviction never leaves us for a moment that he is the sufferer, not -we; and it is precisely in his person, not in ours, that we feel the -distress which afflicts us. We suffer <b>with</b> him, and therefore in -him; we feel his trouble as <b>his</b>, and are not under the delusion -that it is ours; indeed, the happier we are, the greater the contrast -between our own state and his, the more we are open to the promptings -of Compassion. The explanation of the possibility of this extraordinary -phaenomenon is, however, not so easy; nor is it to be reached by the -path of pure psychology, as Cassina supposed. The<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_175" id="Page_175">[Pg 175]</a></span> key can be furnished -by Metaphysics alone; and this I shall attempt to give in the last Part -of the present treatise.</p> - -<p>I now turn to consider the derivation of actions of real moral worth -from the source which has been indicated. The general rule by which to -test such conduct, and which, consequently, is the leading principle -of Ethics, I have already enlarged upon in the foregoing Part, and -enunciated as follows: <i>Neminem laede; immo omnes, quantum potes, -juva.</i> (Do harm to no one; but rather help all people, as far as lies -in your power.) As this formula contains two clauses, so the actions -corresponding to it fall naturally into two classes.</p> -<hr class="r5" /> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_1_80" id="Footnote_1_80"></a><a href="#FNanchor_1_80"><span class="label">[1]</span></a> First maxim: it is not in our hearts to identify ourselves -with those who are happier than we are, but only with those who are -less happy.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_2_81" id="Footnote_2_81"></a><a href="#FNanchor_2_81"><span class="label">[2]</span></a> Stallbaum: p. 584, sq.—(<i>Translator.</i>)</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_3_82" id="Footnote_3_82"></a><a href="#FNanchor_3_82"><span class="label">[3]</span></a> There are no real pleasures, without real needs.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_4_83" id="Footnote_4_83"></a><a href="#FNanchor_4_83"><span class="label">[4]</span></a> <i>V</i>. his <i>Saggio Analitico sulla Compassione</i>, 1788; -German translation by Pockels, 1790.</p></div> - -<hr class="chap" /> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_176" id="Page_176">[Pg 176]</a></span></p> - - - - -<h4><a name="CHAPTER_VIc" id="CHAPTER_VIc">CHAPTER VI.</a></h4> - -<h3>THE VIRTUE OF JUSTICE.</h3> -<hr class="r5" /> - -<p>If we look more closely at this process called Compassion, which we -have shown to be the primary ethical phaenomenon, we remark at once -that there are two distinct degrees in which another's suffering may -become directly my motive, that is, may urge me to do something, or -to leave it undone. The first degree of Compassion is seen when, -by counter-acting egoistic and malicious motives, it keeps me from -bringing pain on another, and from becoming myself the cause of -trouble, which so far does not exist. The other higher degree is -manifested, when it works positively, and incites me to active help. -The distinction between the so-called duties of law and duties of -virtue, better described as justice and loving-kindness, which was -effected by Kant in such a forced and artificial manner, here results -entirely of itself; whence the correctness of the principle is -attested. It is the natural, unmistakable, and sharp separation between -negative and positive, between doing no harm, and helping. The terms in -common use—namely, "the duties of law," and "the duties of virtue," -(the latter being also called "duties of love," or "imperfect duties,") -are in the<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_177" id="Page_177">[Pg 177]</a></span> first place faulty because they co-ordinate the <i>genus</i> -with the <i>species</i>; for justice is one of the virtues. And next, they -owe their origin to the mistake of giving a much too wide extension to -the idea "Duty"; which I shall reduce to its proper limits below. In -place, therefore, of these duties I put two virtues; the one, justice, -and the other, loving-kindness; and I name them cardinal virtues, -since from them all others not only in fact proceed, but also may be -theoretically derived.... Both have their root in natural Compassion. -And this Compassion is an undeniable fact of human consciousness, -is an essential part of it, and does not depend on assumptions, -conceptions, religions, dogmas, myths, training, and education. On -the contrary, it is original and immediate, and lies in human nature -itself. It consequently remains unchanged under all circumstances, and -reveals itself in every land, and at all times. This is why appeal is -everywhere confidently made to it, as to something necessarily present -in every man; and it is never an attribute of the "strange gods." <a name="FNanchor_1_84" id="FNanchor_1_84"></a><a href="#Footnote_1_84" class="fnanchor">[1]</a> -As he, who appears to be without compassion, is called inhuman; so -"humanity" is often used as its synonyme.</p> - -<p>The first degree, then, in which this natural and genuine moral -incentive shows itself is only <b>negative</b>. Originally we are all -disposed to injustice and violence, because our need, our desire, our -anger and hate<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_178" id="Page_178">[Pg 178]</a></span> pass into the consciousness directly, and hence have -the <i>Jus primi occupantis</i>. (The right of the first occupant.) Whereas -the sufferings of others, caused by our injustice and violence, enter -the consciousness indirectly, that is, by the secondary channel of a -mental picture, and not till they are understood by experience. Thus -Seneca (<i>Ep.</i> 50) says: <i>Ad neminem ante bona mens venit, quam mala</i>. -(Good feelings never come before bad ones.) In its first degree, -therefore, Compassion opposes and baffles the design to which I am -urged by the antimoral forces dwelling within me, and which will bring -trouble on a fellow-being. It calls out to me: "Stop!" and encircles -the other as with a fence, so as to protect him from the injury which -otherwise my egoism or malice would lead me to inflict on him. So -arises out of this first degree of compassion the rule: <i>Neminem -laede</i>. (Do harm to no one.) This is the fundamental principle of the -virtue of justice, and here alone is to be found its origin, pure and -simple,—an origin which is truly moral, and free from all extraneous -admixture. Otherwise derived, justice would have to rest on Egoism,—a -<i>reductio ad absurdum</i>. If my nature is susceptible of Compassion up -to this point, then it will avail to keep me back, whenever I should -like to use others' pain as a means to obtain my ends; equally, whether -this pain be immediate, or an after-consequence, whether it be effected -directly, or indirectly, through intermediate links. I shall therefore -lay hands on the property as little as on the person of another, and -avoid causing him distress, no less mental than bodily. I shall thus<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_179" id="Page_179">[Pg 179]</a></span> -not only abstain from doing him physical injury, but also, with equal -care I shall guard against inflicting on him the suffering of mind, -which mortification and calumny, anxiety and vexation so surely work. -The same sense of Compassion will check me from gratifying my desires -at the cost of women's happiness for life, or from seducing another -man's wife, or from ruining youths morally and physically by tempting -them to <i>paederastia</i>. Not that it is at all necessary in each single -case that Compassion should be definitely excited; indeed it would -often come too late; but rather the rule: <i>Neminem laede</i>, is formed by -noble minds out of the knowledge, gained once for all, of the injury -which every unjust act necessarily entails upon others, and which is -aggravated by the feeling of having to endure wrong through a <i>force -majeure</i>. Such natures are led by reflecting reason to carry out this -principle with unswerving resolution. They respect the rights of every -man, and abstain from all encroachment on them; they keep themselves -free from self-reproach, by refusing to be the cause of others' -trouble; they do not shift on to shoulders not their own, by force or -by trickery, the burdens and sorrows of life, which circumstances bring -to every one; they prefer to bear themselves the portions allotted -to them, so as not to double those of their neighbours. For although -generalising formulae, and abstract knowledge of whatever kind, are -not in the least the cause, or the real basis of morality; these are -nevertheless indispensable for a moral course of life. They are the -cistern or reservoir, in which the habit<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_180" id="Page_180">[Pg 180]</a></span> of mind, that springs from -the fount of all morality (a fount not at all moments flowing), may -be stored up, thence to be drawn off, as occasion requires. There is -thus an analogy between things moral and things physiological; among -many instances of which we need only mention that of the gall-bladder, -which is used for keeping the secretion of the liver. Without -firmly held principles we should inevitably be at the mercy of the -antimoral incentives, directly they are roused to activity by external -influences; and <b>self-control</b> lies precisely in steadfast -adherence and obedience to such principles, despite the motives which -oppose them.</p> - -<p>In general, the feminine half of humanity is inferior to the -masculine in the virtue of justice, and its derivatives, uprightness, -conscientiousness, etc.; the explanation is found in the fact that, -owing to the weakness of its reasoning powers the former is much less -capable than the latter of understanding and holding to general laws, -and of taking them as a guiding thread. Hence injustice and falseness -are women's besetting sins, and lies their proper element. On the -other hand, they surpass men in the virtue of loving-kindness; because -usually the stimulus to this is <b>intuitive</b>, and consequently -appeals directly to the sense of Compassion, of which females are -much more susceptible than males. For the former nothing but what -is intuitive, present, and immediately real has a true existence; -that which is knowable only by means of concepts, as for instance, -the absent, the distant, the past, the future, they do not readily -grasp. We thus find<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_181" id="Page_181">[Pg 181]</a></span> compensation here, as in so much else; justice -is more the masculine, loving-kindness more the feminine virtue. -The mere idea of seeing women sitting on the judges' bench raises a -smile; but the sisters of mercy far excel the brothers of charity. -Now animals, as they have no power of gaining knowledge by reason, -that is, of forming abstract ideas, are entirely incapable of fixed -resolutions, to say nothing of principles; they consequently totally -lack <b>self-control</b>, and are helplessly given over to external -impressions and internal impulses. This is why they have no conscious -morality; although the different species show great contrasts of good -and evil in their characters, and as regards the highest races these -are traceable even in individuals.</p> - -<p>From the foregoing considerations we see that in the single acts of -the just man Compassion works only indirectly through his formulated -principles, and not so much <i>actu</i> as <i>potentiâ</i>; much in the same way -as in statics the greater length of one of the scale-beams, owing to -its greater power of motion, balances the smaller weight attached to -it with the larger on the other side, and works, while at rest, only -<i>potentiâ,</i> not <i>actu</i>; yet with the same efficiency.</p> - -<p>Nevertheless, Compassion is always ready to pass into active operation. -Therefore, whenever, in special cases, the established rule shows signs -of breaking down, the one incentive (for we exclude of course those -based on Egoism), which is capable of infusing fresh life into it, is -that drawn from the fountain-head itself—Compassion. This is true -not only where it is a question of personal violence, but also where<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_182" id="Page_182">[Pg 182]</a></span> -property is concerned, for instance, when any one feels the desire to -keep some valuable object which he has found. In such cases,—if we set -aside all motives prompted by worldly wisdom, and by religion—nothing -brings a man back so easily to the path of justice, as the realisation -of the trouble, the grief, the lamentation of the loser. It is because -this is felt to be true, that, when publicity is given to the loss of -money, the assurance is so often added that the loser is a poor man, a -servant, etc.</p> - -<p>It is hoped that these considerations have made it clear that, however -contrary appearances may be at first sight, yet undoubtedly justice, as -a genuine and voluntary virtue has its origin in Compassion. But if any -one should suppose such a soil too barren and meagre to bear this great -cardinal virtue, let him reflect on what is said above, and remember -how small is the amount of true, spontaneous, unselfish, unfeigned -justice among men; how the real thing only occurs as a surprising -exception, and how, to its counterfeit,—the justice that rests on mere -worldly wisdom and is everywhere published abroad—it is related, both -in quality and quantity, as gold is to copper. I should like to call -the one <i>δικαιοσύνη πάνδημος</i> (common, ordinary justice), the other -<i>οὐρανία</i> (heavenly justice).<a name="FNanchor_2_85" id="FNanchor_2_85"></a><a href="#Footnote_2_85" class="fnanchor">[2]</a> For the latter is she, who, according -to Hesiod,<a name="FNanchor_3_86" id="FNanchor_3_86"></a><a href="#Footnote_3_86" class="fnanchor">[3]</a> leaves the earth in the iron age, to dwell with the -celestial gods. To produce such a<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_183" id="Page_183">[Pg 183]</a></span> rare exotic as this the root we have -indicated is surely vigorous enough.</p> - -<p>It will now be seen that <b>injustice</b> or <b>wrong</b> always -consists in <b>working harm</b> on another. Therefore the conception of -wrong is <b>positive</b>, and antecedent to the conception of right, -which is <b>negative</b>, and simply denotes the actions performable -without injury to others; in other words, without wrong being done. -That to this class belongs also whatever is effected with no other -object than that of warding off from oneself meditated mischief is -an easy inference. For no participation in another's interests, and -no sympathy for him, can require me to let myself be harmed by him, -that is, to undergo wrong. The theory that right is negative, in -contradistinction to wrong as positive, we find supported by Hugo -Grotius, the father of philosophical jurisprudence. The definition of -justice which he gives at the beginning of his work, <i>De Jure Belli et -Pacis</i> (Bk. I., chap. 1., § 3), runs as follows:—<i>Jus hic nihil aliud, -quam quod justum est, significant, idque negante magis sensu, quam -aiente, ut jus sit, quod injustum non est.</i><a name="FNanchor_4_87" id="FNanchor_4_87"></a><a href="#Footnote_4_87" class="fnanchor">[4]</a> The negative character -of justice is also established, little as it may appear, even by the -familiar formula: "Give to each one his own." Now, there is no need -to give a man his own, if he has it. The real meaning is therefore: -"Take from none his own." Since the requirements of justice are only -negative, they may be effected by coercion; for the <i>Neminem<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_184" id="Page_184">[Pg 184]</a></span> laede</i> -can be practised by all alike. The coercive apparatus is the state, -whose sole <i>raison d'être</i> is to protect its subjects, individually -from each other, and collectively from external foes. It is true that -a few German would-be philosophers of this venal age wish to distort -the state into an institution for the spread of morality, education, -and edifying instruction. But such a view contains, lurking in the -background, the Jesuitical aim of doing away with personal freedom -and individual development, and of making men mere wheels in a huge -Chinese governmental and religious machine. And this is the road that -once led to Inquisitions, to Autos-da-fé, and religious wars. Frederick -the Great showed that he at least never wished to tread it, when he -said: "In my land every one shall care for his own salvation, as he -himself thinks best." Nevertheless, we still see everywhere (with the -more apparent than real exception of North America) that the state -undertakes to provide for the metaphysical needs of its members. The -governments appear to have adopted as their guiding principle the tenet -of Quintus Curtius: <i>Nulla res efficacius multitudinem regit, quam -superstitio: alioquin impotens, saeva, mutabilis; ubi vana religione -capta est, melius vatibus, quam ducibus suis paret.</i><a name="FNanchor_5_88" id="FNanchor_5_88"></a><a href="#Footnote_5_88" class="fnanchor">[5]</a></p> - -<p>We have seen that "wrong" and "right" are convertible synonymes of "to -do harm" and "to<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_185" id="Page_185">[Pg 185]</a></span> refrain from doing it," and that under "right" is -included the warding off of injury from oneself. It will be obvious -that these conceptions are independent of, and antecedent to, all -positive legislation. There is, therefore, a pure ethical right, or -natural right, and a pure doctrine of right, detached from all positive -statutes. The first principles of this doctrine have no doubt an -empirical origin, so far as they arise from the idea of harm done, -but <i>per se</i> they rest on the pure understanding, which <i>a priori</i> -furnishes ready to hand the axiom: <i>causa causae est causa effectus</i>. -(The cause of a cause is the cause of the effect.) Taken in this -connection the words mean: if any one desires to injure me, it is -not I, but he, that is the cause of whatever I am obliged to do in -self-defence; and I can consequently oppose all encroachments on his -part, without wronging him. Here we have, so to say, a law of moral -repercussion. Thus it comes about that the union of the empirical idea -of injury done with the axiom supplied by the pure understanding, gives -rise to the fundamental conceptions of wrong and right, which every one -grasps <i>a priori</i>, and learns by actual trial to immediately adopt. -The empiric, who denies this, and refuses to accept anything but the -verdict of experience, may be referred to the testimony of the savage -races, who all distinguish between wrong and right quite correctly, -often indeed with nice precision; as is strikingly manifested when -they are engaged in bartering and other transactions with Europeans, -or visit their ships. They are bold and self-assured, when they are in -the right; but uneasy, when they<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_186" id="Page_186">[Pg 186]</a></span> know they are wrong. In disputes a -just settlement satisfies them, whereas unjust procedure drives them to -war. The Doctrine of Eight is a branch of Ethics, whose function is to -determine those actions which may not be performed, unless one wishes -to injure others, that is, to be guilty of wrong-doing; and here the -<b>active</b> part played is kept in view. But legislation applies this -chapter of moral science conversely, that is, with reference to the -<b>passive</b> side of the question, and declares that the same actions -need not be endured, since no one ought to have wrong inflicted on him. -To frustrate such conduct the state constructs the complete edifice -of the law, as positive Right. Its intention is that no one shall -<b>suffer</b> wrong; the intention of the Doctrine of Moral Right is -that no one shall <b>do</b> wrong.<a name="FNanchor_6_89" id="FNanchor_6_89"></a><a href="#Footnote_6_89" class="fnanchor">[6]</a></p> - -<p>If by unjust action I molest some one, whether in his person, -his freedom, his property, or his honour, the wrong as regards -<b>quality</b> remains the same. But with respect to <b>quantity</b> -it may vary very much. This difference in the amount of wrong effected -appears not to have been as yet investigated by moralists, although it -is everywhere recognised in real life, because the censure passed is -always proportional to the harm inflicted. So also with just actions, -the right done is constant in quality, but not in quantity. To explain -this better: he, who when dying of starvation steals a loaf, commits -a wrong; but how small is this wrong in comparison with the act of an -opulent proprietor,<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_187" id="Page_187">[Pg 187]</a></span> who, in whatever way, despoils a poor man of his -last penny! Again: the rich person who pays his hired labourer, acts -justly; but how insignificant is this piece of justice when contrasted -with that of a penniless toiler, who voluntarily returns to its wealthy -owner a purse of gold which he has found! The measure, however, of this -striking difference in the quantity of justice, and injustice (the -<b>quality</b> being always constant), is not direct and absolute, as -on a graduated scale; it is indirect and relative, like the ratio of -sines and tangents. I give therefore the following definition: the -amount of injustice in my conduct varies as the amount of evil, which -I thereby bring on another, divided by the amount of advantage, which -I myself gain; and the amount of justice in my conduct varies as the -amount of advantage, which injury done to another brings me, divided by -the amount of harm which he thereby suffers.</p> - -<p>We have further to notice a <b>double</b> form of injustice which is -specifically different from the simple kind, be it never so great. This -variety may be detected by the fact that the amount of indignation -shown by disinterested witnesses, which is always proportional to the -amount of wrong inflicted, never reaches the <b>maximum</b> except -when it is present. We then see how the deed is loathed, as something -revolting and heinous, as an <i>ἄγος</i> (<i>i.e.</i>, abomination), before -which, as it were, the gods veil their faces. <b>Double</b> injustice -occurs when some one, after definitely undertaking the obligation of -protecting his friend, master, client, etc., in a special way, not -only is guilty of non-fulfilment of that duty (which of itself would -be injurious to the<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_188" id="Page_188">[Pg 188]</a></span> other, and therefore a wrong); but when, in -addition, he turns round, and attacks the man, and strikes at the very -spot which he promised to guard. Instances are: the appointed watch, -or guide, who becomes an assassin; the trusted caretaker, who becomes -a thief; the guardian, who robs his ward of her property; the lawyer, -who prevaricates; the judge, who is corruptible; the adviser, who -deliberately gives some fatal counsel. All such conduct is known by the -name of <b>treachery</b>, and is viewed with abhorrence by the whole -world. Hence Dante puts traitors in the lowest circle of Hell, where -Satan himself is found (<i>Inferno</i>: xi, 61-60).</p> - -<p>As we have here had occasion to mention the word "obligation," this -is the place to determine the conception of <b>Duty</b>, which is so -often spoken of both in Ethics and in real life, but with too wide -an extension of meaning. We have seen that wrong always signifies -injury done to another, whether it be in his person, his freedom, his -property, or his honour. The consequence appears to be that every wrong -must imply a positive aggression, and so a definite act. Only there are -actions, the simple omission of which constitutes a wrong; and these -are Duties. This is the true philosophic definition of the conception -"Duty,"—a term which loses its characteristic note, and hence becomes -valueless, if it is used (as hitherto it has been in Moral Science) -to designate all praiseworthy conduct. It is forgotten that "Duty"<a name="FNanchor_7_90" id="FNanchor_7_90"></a><a href="#Footnote_7_90" class="fnanchor">[7]</a> -necessarily means a<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_189" id="Page_189">[Pg 189]</a></span> <b>debt</b> which is owing, being thus an action, -by the simple omission of which another suffers harm, that is, a wrong -comes about. Clearly in this case the injury only takes place through -the person, who neglects the duty, having distinctly pledged or bound -himself to it. Consequently all duties depend on an obligation which -has been entered into. This, as a rule, takes the form of a definite, -if sometimes tacit, agreement between two parties: as for instance, -between prince and people, government and its servants, master and -man, lawyer and client, physician and patient; in a word, between any -and every one who undertakes to perform some task, and his employer -in the widest sense of the word. Hence every duty involves a right; -since no one undertakes an obligation without a motive, which means, -in this case, without seeing some advantage for himself. There is -only <b>one</b> obligation that I know of which is not subject to an -agreement, but arises directly and solely through an act; this is -because one of the persons with whom it has to do was not in existence -when it was contracted. I refer to the duty of parents towards their -children. Whoever brings a child into the world, has incumbent on him -the duty of supporting his offspring, until the latter is able to -maintain himself; and should this time never come, owing to incapacity -from blindness, deformity, cretinism, and the like, neither does the -duty ever come to an end. It is clear that merely by failing to provide -for the needs of his son, that is, by a simple omission, the father -would injure him, indeed jeopardise his life. Children's duty towards -their parents is<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_190" id="Page_190">[Pg 190]</a></span> not so direct and imperative. It rests on the fact -that, as every duty involves a right, parents also must have some just -claim on their issue. This is the foundation of the duty of filial -obedience, which, however, in course of time ceases simultaneously -with the right out of which it sprang. It is replaced by gratitude for -that which was done by father and mother over and above their strict -duty. Nevertheless, although ingratitude is a hateful, often indeed a -revolting vice, gratitude cannot be called a <b>duty</b>; because its -omission inflicts no injury on the other side, and is therefore no -<b>wrong</b>. Otherwise we should have to suppose that in his heart -of hearts the benefactor aims at making a good bargain. It should be -noticed that reparation made for harm done may also be regarded as a -duty arising directly through an action. This, however, is something -purely negative, as it is nothing but an attempt to remove and blot out -the consequences of an unjust deed, as a thing that ought never to have -taken place. Be it also observed that equity<a name="FNanchor_8_91" id="FNanchor_8_91"></a><a href="#Footnote_8_91" class="fnanchor">[8]</a> is the foe of justice, -and often comes into harsh collision with it; so that the former ought -only to be admitted within certain limits. The German is a friend of -equity, while the Englishman holds to justice.</p> - -<p>The law of motivation is just as strict as that of physical causality, -and hence involves the same<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_191" id="Page_191">[Pg 191]</a></span> irresistible necessity. Consequently -wrong may be compassed not only by violence, but also by cunning. If -by violence I am able to kill or rob another, or compel him to obey -me, I can equally use cunning to accomplish the same ends; that is, I -can place false motives before his intellect, by reason of which he -must do what otherwise he would not. These false motives are effected -by lies. In reality lies are unjustifiable solely in so far as they -are instruments of cunning, in other words, of compulsion, by means of -motivation.<a name="FNanchor_9_92" id="FNanchor_9_92"></a><a href="#Footnote_9_92" class="fnanchor">[9]</a> And this is precisely their function, as a rule. For, -in the first place, I cannot tell a falsehood without a motive, and -this motive will certainly be, with the rarest exceptions, an unjust -one; namely, the intention of holding others, over whom I have no -power, under my will, that is, of coercing them through the agency of -motivation. Also in mere exaggerations and untruthful bombast there -is the same purpose at work; for, by employing such language, a man -tries to place himself higher in the sight of others than is his due. -The binding force of a promise or a compact is contained in the fact -that, if it be not observed, it is a deliberate lie, pronounced in the -most solemn manner,—a lie, whose intention (that of putting others -under moral compulsion) is, in this case, all the clearer, because -its motive, the desired performance of something on the other side, -is expressly declared. The contemptible part of the<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_192" id="Page_192">[Pg 192]</a></span> fraud is that -hypocrisy is used to disarm the victim before he is attacked. The -highest point of villainy is reached in <b>treachery</b>, which, as we -have seen, is a <b>double</b> injustice, and is always, regarded with -loathing.</p> - -<p>It is, then, obvious that, just as I am not wrong, that is, right in -resisting violence by violence, so where violence is not feasible, -or it appears more convenient, I am at liberty to resort to cunning; -accordingly, whenever I am entitled to use force, I may, if I please, -employ falsehood; for instance, against robbers and miscreants of -every sort, whom in this way I entice into a trap. Hence a promise -which is extorted by violence is not binding. But, as a matter of -fact, the right to avail myself of lies extends further. It occurs -whenever an unjustifiable question is asked, which has to do with my -private, or business affairs, and is hence prompted by curiosity; for -to answer it, or even to put it off by the suspicion-awakening words, -"I can't tell you," would expose me to danger. Here an untruth is -the indispensable weapon against unwarranted inquisitiveness, whose -motive is hardly ever a well-meaning one. For, just as I have the -right to oppose the apparent bad will of another, and to anticipate -with physical resistance, to the danger of my would-be aggressor, the -physical violence presumably thence resulting; so that, for instance, -as a precaution, I can protect my garden wall with sharp spikes, let -loose savage dogs in my court at night, and even, if circumstances -require it, set man-traps and spring-guns, for the evil consequences of -which the burglar has only himself to thank:—if I have the right to do -this, then I am<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_193" id="Page_193">[Pg 193]</a></span> equally authorised in keeping secret, at any price, -that which, if known, would lay me bare to the attack of others. And I -have good reason for acting thus, because, in moral, no less than in -physical, relations, I am driven to assume that the bad will of others -is very possible, and must therefore take all necessary preventive -measures beforehand. Whence Ariosto says:—</p> - -<p style="margin-left: 15%;"> -<i>Quantunque il similar sia le più volte</i><br /> -<i>Ripreso, e dia di mala mente indict,</i><br /> -<i>Si trova pure in molte cose e molte</i><br /> -<i>Avere fatti evidenti benefici,</i><br /> -<i>E danni e biasmi e morti avere tolte:</i><br /> -<i>Che non conversiam' sempre con gli amici,</i><br /> -<i>In questa assai più oscura che serena</i><br /> -<i>Vita mortal, tutta d'invidia piena</i><a name="FNanchor_10_93" id="FNanchor_10_93"></a><a href="#Footnote_10_93" class="fnanchor">[10]</a><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 11.5em;"><i>—Orl. Fur.</i>, IV., 1.</span><br /> -</p> - -<p>I may, then, without any injustice match cunning with cunning, and -anticipate all crafty encroachments on me, even if they be only -probable; and I need neither render an account to him who unwarrantably -pries into my personal circumstances, nor by replying: "I cannot -answer this," show him the spot where I<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_194" id="Page_194">[Pg 194]</a></span> have a secret, which perilous -to me, and perhaps advantageous to him, in any case puts me in his -power, if divulged: <i>Scire volunt secreta domus, atque inde timeri</i>. -(They wish to know family secrets, and thus become feared.) On the -contrary, I am justified in putting him off with a lie, involving -danger to himself, in case he is thereby led into a mistake that -works him harm. Indeed, a falsehood is the only means of opposing -inquisitive and suspicious curiosity; to meet which it is the one -weapon of necessary self-defence. "Ask me no questions, and I'll tell -you no lies" is here the right maxim. For among the English, who regard -the reproach of being a liar as the deepest insult, and who on that -account are really more truthful than other nations, all unjustifiable -questions, having to do with another's affairs, are looked upon as -a piece of ill-breeding, which is denoted by the expression, "to -ask questions." Certainly every sensible person, even when he is -of the strictest rectitude, follows the principle above set forth. -Suppose, for instance, such a one is returning from a remote spot, -where he has raised a sum of money; and suppose an unknown traveller -joins him, and after the customary "whither" and "whence" gradually -proceeds to inquire what may have taken him to that place; the former -will undoubtedly give a false answer in order to avoid the danger -of robbery. Again: if a man be found in the house of another, whose -daughter he is wooing; and he is asked the cause of his unexpected -presence; unless he has entirely lost his head, he will not give the -true reason, but unhesitatingly invent a pretext. And the cases are<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_195" id="Page_195">[Pg 195]</a></span> -numberless in which every reasonable being tells an untruth, without -the least scruple of conscience. It is this view of the matter alone -that removes the crying contradiction between the morality which is -taught, and that which is daily practised, even by the best and most -upright of men. At the same time, the restriction of a falsehood to -the single purpose of self-defence must be rigidly observed; for -otherwise this doctrine would admit of terrible abuse, a lie being in -itself a very dangerous instrument. But just as, even in time of public -peace, the law allows every one to carry weapons and to use them, when -required for self-defence, so Ethics permits lies to be employed for -the same purpose, and—be it observed—for this one purpose only. Every -mendacious word is a wrong, excepting only when the occasion arises of -defending oneself against violence or cunning. Hence justice requires -truthfulness towards all men. But the entirely unconditional and -unreserved condemnation of lies, as properly involved in their nature, -is sufficiently refuted by well known facts. Thus, there are cases -where a falsehood is a <b>duty</b>, especially for doctors; and there -are <b>magnanimous</b> lies, as, for instance, that of the Marquis -Posa in <i>Don Carlos</i><a name="FNanchor_11_94" id="FNanchor_11_94"></a><a href="#Footnote_11_94" class="fnanchor">[11]</a> or that in the <i>Gerusalemme Liberata</i>, II., -22;<a name="FNanchor_12_95" id="FNanchor_12_95"></a><a href="#Footnote_12_95" class="fnanchor">[12]</a> they occur, indeed, whenever a man wills to take on himself -the guilt of another; and lastly, Jesus Christ himself is reported -(<i>John<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_196" id="Page_196">[Pg 196]</a></span></i> vii. 8; cf. ver. 10) on one occasion to have intentionally -told an untruth. The reader will remember that Campanella, in his -<i>Poesie Filosofiche</i> (Delia Bellezza: Madr. 9), does not hesitate to -say: "<i>Bello è il mentir, se a fare gran ben' si trova</i>."<a name="FNanchor_13_96" id="FNanchor_13_96"></a><a href="#Footnote_13_96" class="fnanchor">[13]</a> On the -other hand, the current teaching as regards necessary falsehoods is a -wretched patch on the dress of a poverty-stricken morality. Kant is -responsible for the theory found in many text-books, which derives -the unjustifiableness of lies from man's faculty of speech; but the -arguments are so tame, childish and absurd that one might well be -tempted, if only to pour contempt on them, to join sides with the -devil, and say with Talleyrand: <i>l'homme a reçu la parole pour pouvoir -cacher sa pensée</i><a name="FNanchor_14_97" id="FNanchor_14_97"></a><a href="#Footnote_14_97" class="fnanchor">[14]</a>. The unqualified and boundless horror shown by -Kant for falsehoods, whenever he has the opportunity, is due either to -affectation, or to prejudice. In the chapter of his "<i>Tugendlehre</i>," -dealing with lies, he loads them with every kind of defamatory epithet, -but does not adduce a single adequate reason for their condemnation; -which would have been more to the point. Declamation is easier than -demonstration, and to moralise less difficult than to be sincere. Kant -would have done better to open the vials of his wrath on that vice -which takes pleasure in seeing others suffer; it is the latter, and not -a falsehood, which is truly fiendish. For malignant joy is the exact<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_197" id="Page_197">[Pg 197]</a></span> -opposite of Compassion, and nothing else but powerless cruelty, which, -unable itself to bring about the misery it so gladly beholds others -enduring, is thankful to <i>Τύχη</i> for having done so instead. According -to the code of knightly honour, the reproach of being a liar is of -extreme gravity, and only to be washed out with the accuser's blood. -Now this obtains, not because the lie is wrong in itself, since, were -such the reason, to accuse a man of an injury done by violence would -certainly be regarded as equally outrageous,—which is not the case, -as every one knows; but it is due to that principle of chivalry, which -in reality bases right on might; so that whoever, when trying to work -mischief, has recourse to falsehood, proves that he lacks either power, -or the requisite courage. Every untruth bears witness of his fear; and -this is why a fatal verdict is passed on him.</p> -<hr class="r5" /> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_1_84" id="Footnote_1_84"></a><a href="#FNanchor_1_84"><span class="label">[1]</span></a> Thus, when the first gleam of <i>Mitleid</i> stole into her -heart, Brünhilde could no longer remain a Walküre; and Wotan's end -comes, when by the same solvent he is at length set free from the -delusion of the <i>principium individuationis.</i>—(<i>Translator.</i>)</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_2_85" id="Footnote_2_85"></a><a href="#FNanchor_2_85"><span class="label">[2]</span></a> There is here an allusion to the <i>πάνδημος Ἓρως</i> and -<i>Oὐρανία</i> in Plato's <i>Symposium. V</i>. Chap. 8, sq. Edit. Schmelzer: -Weidmann, Berlin, 1882.—(<i>Translator.</i>)</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_3_86" id="Footnote_3_86"></a><a href="#FNanchor_3_86"><span class="label">[3]</span></a> <i>V</i>. Hesiod, <i>Opera et Dies</i>, 174-201.—(<i>Translator.</i>)</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_4_87" id="Footnote_4_87"></a><a href="#FNanchor_4_87"><span class="label">[4]</span></a> Justice here denotes nothing else than that which is just, -and this, rather in a negative than in a positive sense; so that what -is not unjust is to be regarded as justice.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_5_88" id="Footnote_5_88"></a><a href="#FNanchor_5_88"><span class="label">[5]</span></a> There is no more efficient instrument in ruling the masses -than superstition. Without this they have no self-control; they are -brutish; they are changeable; but once they are caught by some vain -form of religion, they lend a more willing ear to its soothsayers than -to their own leaders.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_6_89" id="Footnote_6_89"></a><a href="#FNanchor_6_89"><span class="label">[6]</span></a> The Doctrine of Eight in detail may be found in <i>Die Welt -als Wille und Vorstellung</i>, vol. i., § 62.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_7_90" id="Footnote_7_90"></a><a href="#FNanchor_7_90"><span class="label">[7]</span></a> Duty = <i>τὸ δέον</i> = le devoir = Pflicht [cf. <i>plight</i>, O. -H. G. <i>plegan</i>.]—(<i>Translator</i>.)</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_8_91" id="Footnote_8_91"></a><a href="#FNanchor_8_91"><span class="label">[8]</span></a> The word here translated "equity" (<i>Billigkeit</i>: Lat. -<i>aequitas</i>) means the sense of fairness, or of natural justice -which determines what is fitting and due in all human relations, -as opposed to justice (<i>Gerechtigkeit</i>) taken as positive written -law.—(<i>Translator.</i>)</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_9_92" id="Footnote_9_92"></a><a href="#FNanchor_9_92"><span class="label">[9]</span></a> Motivation is defined in Part II., Chapter VIII., -as "the law of Causality acting through the medium of the -intellect." It is thus the law of the determination of conduct by -motives.—(<i>Translator.</i>)</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_10_93" id="Footnote_10_93"></a><a href="#FNanchor_10_93"><span class="label">[10]</span></a> -</p> -<p style="margin-left: 15%;"> -However much we're won't to blame a lie,<br /> -As index of a mind estranged from right,<br /> -Yet times unnumber'd it hath shap'd results<br /> -Of good most evident; disgrace and loss,<br /> -It chang'd; e'en death it cheated. For with friends,<br /> -Alas! not always in this mortal life,<br /> -Where envy fills all hearts, and gloom prevails<br /> -Much more than light, are we in converse join'd.<br /> -<span style="margin-left: 12.5em;">—(<i>Translator.</i>)</span> -</p></div> -<hr class="r5" /> -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_11_94" id="Footnote_11_94"></a><a href="#FNanchor_11_94"><span class="label">[11]</span></a> <i>Vide</i>, Schiller's <i>Don Carlos</i>: Act V., Sc. -3.—(<i>Translator.</i>)</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_12_95" id="Footnote_12_95"></a><a href="#FNanchor_12_95"><span class="label">[12]</span></a> -</p> -<p style="margin-left: 15%;"> -<span style="margin-left: 0.5em;">"<i>Magnanima menzogna, or quando è il vero</i></span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;"><i>Si hello che si possa a te preporre?"</i></span><br /> -</p> -<p> -Cf. also the Horatian <i>splendid mendax. Carm.</i> III., 11, -35.—(<i>Translator.</i>) </p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_13_96" id="Footnote_13_96"></a><a href="#FNanchor_13_96"><span class="label">[13]</span></a> 'Tis well to lie, an there result much good therefrom. -<i>Vide, Opere</i> di Tommaso Campanella, da Alessandro d'Ancona, Torino, -1854.—(<i>Translator.</i>)</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_14_97" id="Footnote_14_97"></a><a href="#FNanchor_14_97"><span class="label">[14]</span></a> Man has received the gift of language, so as to be able -to conceal his thoughts.</p></div> - -<hr class="chap" /> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_198" id="Page_198">[Pg 198]</a></span></p> - - - - -<h4><a name="CHAPTER_VIIc" id="CHAPTER_VIIc">CHAPTER VII.</a></h4> - -<h3>THE VIRTUE OF LOVING-KINDNESS.</h3> -<hr class="r5" /> - -<p>Thus justice is the primary and essentially cardinal virtue. Ancient -philosophers recognised it as such, but made it co-ordinate with three -others unsuitably chosen.<a name="FNanchor_1_98" id="FNanchor_1_98"></a><a href="#Footnote_1_98" class="fnanchor">[1]</a> Loving-kindness (<i>caritas, ἀγάπη</i>) was not -as yet ranked as a virtue. Plato himself, who rises highest in moral -science, reaches only so far as voluntary, disinterested justice. It -is true that loving-kindness has existed at all times in practice and -in fact; but it was reserved for Christianity,—whose greatest service -is seen in this—to theoretically formulate, and expressly advance it -not only as a virtue, but as the queen of all; and to extend it even -to enemies. We are thinking of course only of Europe. For in Asia, a -thousand years before, the boundless love of one's neighbour had been -prescribed and taught, as well as practised: the <span class="gesperrt">Vedas</span><a name="FNanchor_2_99" id="FNanchor_2_99"></a><a href="#Footnote_2_99" class="fnanchor">[2]</a> are<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_199" id="Page_199">[Pg 199]</a></span> full -of it; while in the <span class="gesperrt">Dharma-Śāstra</span>,<a name="FNanchor_3_100" id="FNanchor_3_100"></a><a href="#Footnote_3_100" class="fnanchor">[3]</a> <span class="gesperrt">Itihāsa</span>,<a name="FNanchor_4_101" id="FNanchor_4_101"></a><a href="#Footnote_4_101" class="fnanchor">[4]</a> and <span class="gesperrt">Purāna</span><a name="FNanchor_5_102" id="FNanchor_5_102"></a><a href="#Footnote_5_102" class="fnanchor">[5]</a> it -constantly recurs, to say nothing of the preaching of <span class="gesperrt">Śakya-muni</span>, the -Buddha. And to be quite accurate we must admit that there are traces -to be found among the Greeks and Romans of a recommendation to follow -loving-kindness; for instance, in Cicero, <i>De Finibus</i>, V., 23;<a name="FNanchor_6_103" id="FNanchor_6_103"></a><a href="#Footnote_6_103" class="fnanchor">[6]</a> and -also in Pythagoras, according to Iamblichus, <i>De vita Pythagorae</i>, -chap. 33.<a name="FNanchor_7_104" id="FNanchor_7_104"></a><a href="#Footnote_7_104" class="fnanchor">[7]</a> My task is now to give a philosophical derivation of this -virtue from the principle I have laid down.</p> - -<p>It has been demonstrated in Chapter V. of this Part, that the sense of -Compassion, however much its origin is shrouded in mystery, is the one -and sole cause whereby the suffering I see in another, of itself, and -as such, becomes directly my motive; and we have seen that the first -stage of this process is <b>negative</b>.<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_200" id="Page_200">[Pg 200]</a></span> The second degree is sharply -distinguished from the first, through the <b>positive</b> character -of the actions resulting therefrom; for at this point Compassion -does more than keep me back from injuring my neighbour; it impels me -to help him. And according as, on the one hand, my sense of direct -participation is keen and deep, and, on the other hand, the distress -is great and urgent, so shall I be constrained by this motive, which -(be it noted) is purely and wholly moral, to make a greater or less -sacrifice in order to meet the need or the calamity which I observe; -and this sacrifice may involve the expenditure of my bodily or mental -powers, the loss of my property, freedom, or even life. So that in -this direct <b>suffering with</b> another, which rests on no arguments -and requires none, is found the one simple origin of loving-kindness, -<i>caritas, aγάπη</i> in other words, that virtue whose rule is: <i>Omnes, -quantum potes, juva</i> (help all people, as far as lies in your power); -and from which all those actions proceed which are prescribed by -Ethics under the name of duties of virtue, otherwise called duties of -love, or imperfect duties. It is solely by direct and, as it were, -instinctive participation in the sufferings which we see, in other -words, by Compassion, that conduct so defined is occasioned; at least -when it can be said to have moral worth, that is, be declared free -from all egoistic motives, and when on that account it awakens in us -that inward contentment which is called a good, satisfied, approving -conscience, and elicits from the spectator (not without making him -cast a humiliating glance at himself), that remarkable<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_201" id="Page_201">[Pg 201]</a></span> commendation, -respect, and admiration which are too well-known to be denied.</p> - -<p>But if a beneficent action have any other motive whatever, then it -must be egoistic, if not actually malicious. For as the fundamental -springs of all human conduct (<i>v</i>. Chapter V. of this Part), are three, -namely, Egoism, Malice, Compassion; so the various motives which are -capable of affecting men may be grouped under three general heads: (1) -one's own weal; (2) others' woe; (3) others' weal. Now if the motive -of a kind act does not belong to the third class, it must of course -be found in the first or second. To the second it is occasionally to -be ascribed; for instance, if I do good to some one, in order to vex -another, to whom I am hostile; or to make the latter's sufferings more -acute; or, it may be, to put to shame a third person, who refrained -from helping; or lastly, to inflict a mortification on the man whom I -benefit. But it much more usually springs from the first class. And -this is the case whenever, in doing some good, I have in view my own -weal, no matter how remote or indirect it may be; that is, whenever -I am influenced by the thought of reward whether in this, or in -another, world, or by the hope of winning high esteem, and of gaining -a reputation for nobleness of character; or again, when I reflect that -the person, whom I now aid, may one day be able to assist me in return, -or otherwise be of some service and benefit; or when, lastly, I am -guided by the consideration that I must keep the rules of magnanimity -and beneficence, because I too may on some occasion profit thereby. In -a word, my motive<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_202" id="Page_202">[Pg 202]</a></span> is egoistic as soon as it is anything other than -the purely objective desire of simply knowing, without any ulterior -purpose, that my neighbour is helped, delivered from his distress and -need, or freed from his suffering. If such an aim—shorn, as it is, of -all subjectivity—be really mine, then, and then only, have I given -proof of that loving-kindness, <i>caritas, ἀγάπη</i>, which it is the great -and distinguishing merit of Christianity to have preached. It should -be observed, in this connection, that the injunctions which the Gospel -adds to its commandment of love, <i>e.g., μὴ γνώτω ἡ ἀρίστερα σου, τί -ποιεῑ ἡ δεξιά σου</i> (let not thy left hand know what thy right hand -doeth), and the like, are, in point of fact, based on a consciousness -of the conclusion I have here reached,—namely, that another's -distress, of itself alone, without any further consideration, must be -my motive, if what I do is to be of moral value. And in the same place -(<i>Matth</i>. vi. 2) we find it stated with perfect truth that ostentations -almsgivers <i>ἀπέχουσιν τὸν μισθὸν αὐτῶν</i>. (Get in full—exhaust their -reward.) Although, in this respect too, the Vedas shed on us the light -of a higher teaching. They repeatedly declare that he, who desires any -sort of recompense for his work, is still wandering in the path of -darkness, and not yet ripe for deliverance. If any one should ask me -what he gets from a charitable act, my answer in all sincerity would -be: "This, that the lot of the poor man you relieve is just so much the -lighter; otherwise absolutely nothing. If you are not satisfied, and -feel that such is not a sufficient end, then your wish was not to give -alms,<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_203" id="Page_203">[Pg 203]</a></span> but to make a purchase; and you have effected a bad bargain. -But if the one thing you are concerned with is that he should feel the -pressure of poverty less; then you have gained your object; you have -diminished his suffering, and you see exactly how far your gift is -requited."</p> - -<p>Now, how is it possible that trouble which is not mine, and by which -I am untouched, should become as direct a motive to me as if it were -my own, and incite me to action? As already explained, only through -the fact that, although it comes before me merely as something outside -myself, by means of the external medium of sight or hearing; I am, -nevertheless, sensible of it with the sufferer; I feel it as my own, -not indeed in myself, but in him And so what Calderon said comes to -pass:</p> - -<p style="margin-left: 15%;"> -<span style="margin-left: 10em;"><i>que entre el ver</i></span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 5.5em;"><i>Padecer y el padecer</i></span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 5.5em;"><i>Ninguna distancia habia</i>.</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">(<i>No Siempre lo Peor es Cierto</i>. Jorn. II., Esc. 9.)<a name="FNanchor_8_105" id="FNanchor_8_105"></a><a href="#Footnote_8_105" class="fnanchor">[8]</a></span><br /> -</p> - -<p>This, however, presupposes that to a certain extent I have become -identified with the other, and consequently that the barrier between -the ego and the non-ego is, for the moment, broken down. It is then, -and then only, that I make his interests, his need, his distress, his -suffering directly my own; it is then that the empirical picture I have -of him vanishes,<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_204" id="Page_204">[Pg 204]</a></span> and I no longer see the stranger, who is entirely -unlike myself, and to whom I am indifferent; but I share his pain in -him, despite the certainty that his skin does not enclose my nerves. -Only in this way is it possible for <b>his</b> woe, <b>his</b> distress -to become a motive <b>for me</b>; otherwise I should be influenced -solely by my own. This process is, I repeat, <b>mysterious</b>. For it -is one which Reason can give no direct account of, and its causes lie -outside the field of experience. And yet it is of daily occurrence. -Every one has often felt its working within himself; even to the most -hard-hearted and selfish it is not unknown. Each day that passes brings -it before our eyes, in single acts, on a small scale; whenever a man, -by direct impulse, without much reflection, helps a fellow-creature and -comes to his aid, sometimes even exposing himself to the most imminent -peril for the sake of one he has never seen before, and this, without -once thinking of anything but the fact that he witnesses another's -great distress and danger. It was manifested on a large scale, when -after long consideration, and many a stormy debate, the noble-hearted -British nation gave twenty millions of pounds to ransom the negroes in -its colonies, with the approbation and joy of a whole world. If any one -refuses to recognise in Compassion the cause of this deed, magnificent -as it is in its grand proportions, and prefers to ascribe it to -Christianity; let him remember that in the whole of the New Testament -not one word is said against slavery, though at that time it was -practically universal; and further, that as late as A.D. 1860, in North -America, when the<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_205" id="Page_205">[Pg 205]</a></span> question was being discussed, a man was found who -thought to strengthen his case by appealing to the fact that Abraham -and Jacob kept slaves!</p> - -<p>What will be in each separate case the practical effect of this -mysterious inner process may be left to Ethics to analyse, in chapters -and paragraphs entitled "Duties of Virtue," "Duties of Love," -"Imperfect Duties," or whatever other name be used. The root, the -basis of all these is the one here indicated; for out of it arises -the primary precept: <i>Omnes, quantum potes, juva</i>; from which in turn -everything else required can very easily be deduced; just as out of the -<i>Neminem laede</i>—the first half of my principle—all duties of justice -are derivable. Ethics is in truth the easiest of all sciences. And -this is only to be expected, since it is incumbent on each person to -construct it for himself, and himself form the rule for every case, as -it occurs, out of the fundamental law which lies deep in his heart; for -few have leisure and patience enough to learn a ready-made system of -Morals. From justice and loving-kindness spring all the other virtues; -for which reason these two may properly be called cardinal, and the -disclosure of their origin lays the corner-stone of Moral Science. The -entire ethical content of the Old Testament is justice; loving-kindness -being that of the New. The latter is the <i>καινὴ ἐντολὴ</i> (the new -commandment [<i>John</i> xiii. 34]), which according to Paul (<i>Romans</i> xiii. -8-10) includes all Christian virtues.</p> -<hr class="r5" /> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_1_98" id="Footnote_1_98"></a><a href="#FNanchor_1_98"><span class="label">[1]</span></a> Plato taught that Justice (<i>δικαιοσύνη</i>) includes -in itself the three other virtues of Wisdom (σοϕία), Fortitude -(<i>ἀνδρεία,</i>) and Temperance (<i>σωϕρούυν</i>). With Aristotle, too, Justice -is the chief of virtues; while the Stoic doctrine is that Virtue -is manifested in four leading co-ordinate forms: Wisdom, Justice, -Fortitude, and Temperance.—(<i>Translator</i>.)</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_2_99" id="Footnote_2_99"></a><a href="#FNanchor_2_99"><span class="label">[2]</span></a> There are four Vedas: the <i>Big-Veda, Yajur-Veda, -Sāma-Veda,</i> and <i>Atharva-Veda</i>.—(<i>Translator.</i>)</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_3_100" id="Footnote_3_100"></a><a href="#FNanchor_3_100"><span class="label">[3]</span></a> <i>Dharma-Śāstra</i> ("a law book"): the body or code of Hindu -law.—(<i>Translator.</i>)</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_4_101" id="Footnote_4_101"></a><a href="#FNanchor_4_101"><span class="label">[4]</span></a> <i>Itihāsa</i> (iti-ha-āsa, "so indeed it is"): talk, legend, -traditional accounts of former events, heroic history; <i>e.g.</i>, the -Mahā-bhārata.—(<i>Translator</i>.)</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_5_102" id="Footnote_5_102"></a><a href="#FNanchor_5_102"><span class="label">[5]</span></a> <i>Purāna</i> (ancient, legendary): the name given to certain -well-known sacred works, eighteen in number, comprising the whole -body of modern Hindu mythology. <i>V</i>. Monier Williams' <i>Sanskrit -Dictionary</i>.—(<i>Translator.</i>)</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_6_103" id="Footnote_6_103"></a><a href="#FNanchor_6_103"><span class="label">[6]</span></a> <i>Ipsa</i> CARITAS <i>generis humani, quae nata a primo satu, -quod a procreatoribus nati diliguntur, et tota domus conjugio et -stirpe conjungitur, serpit sensim foras, cognationibus primum, tum -affinitatibus, deinde amicitiis, post vicinitatibus tum civibus et -iis, qui publice socii atque amici sunt, deinde</i> TOTIUS COMPLEXU GENTIS -HUMANAE.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_7_104" id="Footnote_7_104"></a><a href="#FNanchor_7_104"><span class="label">[7]</span></a> This chapter describes the Pythagorean ϕίλια πάντων πρὸς -ἃπαντας, which comes very near to loving-kindness. It contains also -certain <i>καλὰ τῆς ϕίλιας τεκήρια</i>.—(<i>Translator</i>.)</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_8_105" id="Footnote_8_105"></a><a href="#FNanchor_8_105"><span class="label">[8]</span></a> -</p> -<p style="margin-left: 15%;" > -<span style="margin-left: 8em;">For between the view</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 4em;">Of pain, and pain itself, I never knew</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 4em;">A distance lie.</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 2em;">It is not Always the Worst that is Certain: Act II., -Sc. 9.—(<i>Translator.</i>)</span></p></div> - -<hr class="chap" /> - - -<h4><a id="CHAPTER_VIIIc"></a>CHAPTER VIII.</h4> - -<h3>THE PROOF NOW GIVEN CONFIRMED BY EXPERIENCE.</h3> -<hr class="r5" /> -<p> -The truth I have here laid down, that Compassion -is the sole non-egoistic stimulus, and therefore the -only really moral one, is a strange, indeed almost -incomprehensible paradox. I shall hope, therefore, -to render it less extraordinary to the reader, if I -show that it is confirmed by experience, and by the -universal testimony of human sentiment.</p> -<p> -(1) For this purpose I shall, in the first place, -state an imaginary case, which in the present investigation -may serve as an <i>experimentum crucis</i><a name="FNanchor_1_106" id="FNanchor_1_106"></a><a href="#Footnote_1_106" class="fnanchor">[1]</a> (a crucial -test). But not to make the matter too easy, I shall -take no instance of loving-kindness, but rather a -<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_207" id="Page_207">[Pg 207]</a></span>breach of lawful right, and that of the worse kind. -Let us suppose two young people, Caius and Titus, -to be passionately in love, each with a different girl, -and that both are completely thwarted by two other -men who are preferred because of certain external -circumstances. They have both resolved to put their -rivals out of the way, and are perfectly secure from -every chance of detection, even from all suspicion. -But when they come to actually prepare for the -murder, each of them, after an inward struggle, -draws back. They are now to give us a truthful and -clear account of the reasons why they abandoned -their project. As for Caius, I leave it entirely to -the reader to choose what motive he likes. It may -be that religions grounds checked him; for instance, -the thought of the Divine Will, of future -retribution, of the judgment to come, etc. Or perhaps -he may say: "I reflected that the principle I was -going to apply in this case would not be adapted to -provide a rule universally valid for all possible -rational beings; because I should have treated my -rival only as a means, and not at the same time as -an end." Or, following Fichte, he may deliver -himself as follows: "Every human life is a means -towards realising the moral law; consequently, I -cannot, without being indifferent to this realisation, -destroy a being ordained to do his part in effecting -it."—(<i>Sittenlehre</i>, p. 373.) (This scruple, be it observed -in passing, he might well overcome by the -hope of soon producing a new instrument of the moral -law, when once in possession of his beloved.) Or, -again, he may speak after the fashion of Wollaston: -<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_208" id="Page_208">[Pg 208]</a></span>"I considered that such an action would be the -expression of a false tenet." Or like Hutcheson: "The -Moral Sense, whose perceptions, equally with those -of every other sense, admit of no final explanation, -forbade me to commit such a deed." Or like Adam -Smith: "I foresaw that my act would awaken no -sympathy with me in the minds of the spectators." -Or his language may be borrowed from Christian -Wolff: "I recognised that I should thereby advance -neither the work of making myself perfect, nor the -same process in any one else." Or from Spinoza: -"<i>Homini nihil utilius homine: ergo hominem interimere -nolui</i>." (To man nothing is more useful than man: -therefore I was unwilling to destroy a man.) In -short, he may say what one pleases. But Titus, -whose explanation is supplied by myself, will speak -as follows: "When I came to make arrangements -for the work, and so, for the moment, had to occupy -myself not with my own passion, but with my rival; -then for the first time I saw clearly what was going -to happen to him. But simultaneously I was seized -with compassion and pity; sorrow for him laid hold -upon me, and overmastered me: I could not strike the -blow." Now I ask every honest and unprejudiced -reader: Which of these two is the better man? To -which would he prefer to entrust his own destiny? -Which is restrained by the purer motive? Consequently, -where does the basis of morality lie?</p> -<p> -(2) There is nothing that revolts our moral sense -so much as cruelty. Every other offence we can -pardon, but not cruelty. The reason is found in the -fact that cruelty is the exact opposite of Compassion. -<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_209" id="Page_209">[Pg 209]</a></span>When we hear of intensely cruel conduct, as, for -instance, the act, which has just been recorded in -the papers, of a mother, who murdered her little -son of five years, by pouring boiling oil into his -throat, and her younger child, by burying it alive; -or what was recently reported from Algiers: how a -casual dispute between a Spaniard and an Algerine -ended in a fight; and how the latter, having vanquished -the other, tore out the whole of his lower -jaw bone, and carried it off as a trophy, leaving his -adversary still alive;—when we hear of cruelty like -this, we are seized with horror, and exclaim: "How -is it possible to do such a thing?" Now, let me -ask what this question signifies. Does it mean: -"How is it possible to fear so little the punishments -of the future life?" It is difficult to admit this -interpretation. Then perhaps it intends to say: -"How is it possible to act according to a principle -which is so absolutely unfitted to become a general -law for all rational beings?" Certainly not. Or, -once more: "How is it possible to neglect so utterly -one's own perfection as well as that of another?"' -This is equally unimaginable. The sense of the -question is assuredly nothing but this: "How is -it possible to be so utterly bereft of compassion?" -The conclusion is that when an action is characterised -by an extraordinary absence of compassion, it bears -the certain stamp of the deepest depravity and loathsomeness. -Hence Compassion is the true moral -incentive.</p> -<p> -(3) The ethical basis, or the original moral stimulus, -which I have disclosed, is the only one that can be -<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_210" id="Page_210">[Pg 210]</a></span>justly said to have a real and extended sphere of -effective influence. No one will surely venture to -maintain as much of all the other moral principles -that philosophers have set up; for these are composed -of abstract, sometimes even of hair-splitting propositions, -with no foundation other than an artificial -combination of ideas; such that their application -to actual conduct would often incline to the comic. -A good action, inspired solely by Kant's Moral Principle, -would be at bottom the work of philosophic -pedantry; or else would lead the doer into self-deception, -through his reason interpreting conduct, -which had other, perhaps nobler, incentives, as the -product of the Categorical Imperative, and of the -conception of Duty, which, as we have seen, rests -on nothing. But not only is it true that the <b>philosophic</b> -moral principles, purely theoretical as they -are, have seldom any operative power; of those -established by <b>religion</b>, and expressly framed for -practical purposes, it is equally difficult to predicate -any marked efficiency. The chief evidence of this lies -in the fact that in spite of the great religious differences -in the world, the amount of morality, or rather -of immorality, shows no corresponding variation, but -in essentials is pretty much the same everywhere. -Only it is important not to confound rudeness and -refinement with morality and immorality. The religion -of Hellas had an exceedingly small moral -tendency,—it hardly went further than respect for -oaths. No dogma was taught, and no system of -Ethics publicly preached; nevertheless, all things -considered, it does not appear that the Greeks were -<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_211" id="Page_211">[Pg 211]</a></span>morally inferior to the men of the Christian era. The -morality of Christianity is of a much higher kind than -that of any other religion which previously appeared -in Europe. But if any one should believe for this -reason that European morals have improved proportionally, -and that now at any rate they surpass -what obtains elsewhere, it would not be difficult to -demonstrate that among the Mohammedans, Gnebres, -Hindus, and Buddhists, there is at least as much -honesty, fidelity, toleration, gentleness, beneficence, -nobleness, and self-denial as among Christian peoples. -Indeed, the scale will be found rather to turn unfavourably -for Christendom, when we put into the balance -the long list of inhuman cruelties which have constantly -been perpetrated within its limits and often -in its name. We need only recall for a moment the -numerous religious wars; the crusades that nothing -can justify; the extirpation of a large part of the -American aborigines, and the peopling of that continent -by negroes, brought over from Africa, without -the shadow of a right, torn from their families, their -country, their hemisphere, and, as slaves, condemned -for life to forced labour;<a name="FNanchor_2_107" id="FNanchor_2_107"></a><a href="#Footnote_2_107" class="fnanchor">[2]</a> the tireless persecution of -heretics; the unspeakable atrocities of the Inquisition, -that cried aloud to heaven; the Massacre of St. -Bartholomew; the execution of 18,000 persons in -the Netherlands by the Duke of Alva; and these are -<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_212" id="Page_212">[Pg 212]</a></span>but a few facts among many. Speaking generally, -however, if we compare with the performances of its -followers the excellent morality which Christianity, -and, more or less, every creed preaches, and then -try to imagine how far theory would become practice, -if crime were not impeded by the secular arm of the -state; nay more, what would probably happen, if, for -only one day all laws should be suspended; we shall -be obliged to confess that the effect of the various -religions on Morals is in fact very small. This is -of course due to weakness of faith. Theoretically, -and so long as it is only a question of piety in the -abstract, every one supposes his belief to be firm -enough. Only the searching touch-stone of all our -convictions is—what we do. When the moment for -acting arrives, and our faith has to be tested by -great self-denial and heavy sacrifices, then its feebleness -becomes evident. If a man is seriously planning -some evil, he has already broken the bounds of true -and pure morality. Thenceforward the chief restraint -that checks him is invariably the dread of justice -and the police. Should he be so hopeful of escaping -detection as to cast such fears aside, the next -barrier that meets him is regard for his honour. If -this second rampart be crossed, there is very little -likelihood, after both these powerful hindrances are -withdrawn, that any religious dogma will appeal -to him strongly enough to keep him back from the -deed. For if he be not frightened by near and -immediate dangers, he will hardly be curbed by -terrors which are distant, and rest merely on belief. -Moreover, there is a positive objection that may be -<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_213" id="Page_213">[Pg 213]</a></span>brought against all good conduct proceeding solely from -religions conviction; it is not purged of self-interest, -but done out of regard for reward and punishment, and -hence can have no purely moral value. This view we -find very clearly expressed in a letter of the celebrated -Grand-Duke of Weimar, Karl August. He writes: -"Baron Weyhers was himself of opinion that he, who -is good through religion, and not by natural inclination, -must be a bad fellow at heart. <i>In vino veritas.</i>"<a name="FNanchor_3_108" id="FNanchor_3_108"></a><a href="#Footnote_3_108" class="fnanchor">[3]</a> -—(<i>Letters to J. H. Merck</i>; No. 229.) But now let us -turn to the moral incentive which I have disclosed. -Who ventures for a moment to deny that it displays -a marked and truly wonderful influence at all times, -among all peoples, in all circumstances of life; even -when constitutional law is suspended, and the horrors -of revolutions and wars fill the air; in small things -and in great, every day and every hour? Who will -refuse to admit that it is constantly preventing much -wrong, and calling into existence many a good action, -often quite unexpectedly, and where there is no hope -of reward? Is there any one who will gainsay the -fact that, where it and it alone has been operative, -we all with deep respect and emotion unreservedly -recognise the presence of genuine moral worth?</p> -<p> -(4) Boundless compassion for all living beings -is the surest and most certain guarantee of pure moral -conduct, and needs no casuistry. Whoever is filled -with it will assuredly injure no one, do harm to no -<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_214" id="Page_214">[Pg 214]</a></span>one, encroach on no man's rights; he will rather have -regard for every one, forgive every one, help every -one as far as he can, and all his actions will bear the -stamp of justice and loving-kindness. On the other -hand, if we try to say: "This man is virtuous, but -he is a stranger to Compassion"; or: "he is an -unjust and malicious man, yet very compassionate;" -the contradiction at once leaps to light. In former -times the English plays used to finish with a petition -for the King. The old Indian dramas close with -these words: "May all living beings be delivered -from pain." Tastes differ; but in my opinion there -is no more beautiful prayer than this.</p> -<p> -(5) Also from separate matters of detail it may -be inferred that the original stimulus of true morality -is Compassion. For instance, to make a man lose -a hundred thalers, by legal tricks involving no -danger, is equally unjust, whether he be rich or poor; -but in the latter case the rapping of conscience is -much louder, the censure of disinterested witnesses -more emphatic. Aristotle was well aware of this, -and said: <i>δεινότερον δέ εστι τὸν ἀτυχοῡντα, ἢ τον -ετὐχοῡντα, ἀδικεῑν</i>. (It is worse to injure a man -in adversity than one who is prosperous.)—(<i>Probl.</i> -xxix. 2.) If the man have wealth, self-reproach is -proportionally faint, and grows still fainter, if it be -the treasury that has been overreached; for state -coffers can form no object of Compassion. It thus -appears that the grounds for self-accusation as well -as for the spectators' blame are not furnished directly -by the infringement of the law, but chiefly by the -suffering thereby brought upon others. The violation -<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_215" id="Page_215">[Pg 215]</a></span>of right, by itself and as such, which is involved in -cheating the exchequer, (to take the above instance,) -will be disapproved by the conscience alike of actor -and witness; but only because, and in so far as, the -rule of respecting <b>every</b> right, which forms the <i>sine -qua non</i> of all honourable conduct, is in consequence -broken. The stricture passed will, in fact, be indirect -and limited. If, however, it be a confidential -<i>employé</i> in the service that commits the fraud, the -case assumes quite another aspect; it then has all -the specific attributes of, and belongs to, that class -of actions described above, whose characteristic is -a <b>double injustice</b>. The analysis here given explains -why the worst charge which can ever be brought -against rapacious extortioners and legal sharpers is, -that they appropriate for themselves the goods of -widows and orphans. The reason appears in the -fact that the latter, more than others, owing to their -helplessness, might be expected to excite Compassion -in the most callous heart. Hence we conclude that -the entire absence of this sense is sufficient to lower -a man to the last degree of villainy.</p> -<p> -(6) Compassion is the root no less of justice than -of loving-kindness; but it is more clearly evidenced -in the latter than in the former. We never receive -proofs of genuine loving-kindness on the part of others, -so long as we are in all respects prosperous. The -happy man may, no doubt, often hear the words of -good-will on his relations' and friends' lips; but -the expression of that pure, disinterested, objective -participation in the condition and lot of others, which -loving-kindness begets, is reserved for him who is -<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_216" id="Page_216">[Pg 216]</a></span>stricken with some sorrow or suffering, whatever -it be. For the fortunate <b>as such</b> we do not feel -sympathy; unless they have some other claim on -us, they remain alien to our hearts: <i>habeant sibi sua.</i> -(They may keep their own affairs, pleasures, etc., to -themselves.) Nay, if a man has many advantages -over others, he will easily become an object of envy, -which is ready, should he once fall from his height -of prosperity, to turn into malignant joy. Nevertheless -this menace is, for the most part, not fulfilled; -the Sophoclean <i>γελῶσι δ' ἐχθροί </i> (his enemies laugh) -does not generally become an actual fact. As soon -as the day of ruin comes to one of fortune's spoiled -children, there usually takes place a great transformation -in the minds of his acquaintances, which for us -in this connection is very instructive. In the first -place this change clearly reveals the real nature of -the interest that the friends of his happiness took -in him: <i>diffugiunt cadis cum faece siccatis amici.</i> -(When the casks are drained to the dregs, one's -friends run away.)<a name="FNanchor_4_109" id="FNanchor_4_109"></a><a href="#Footnote_4_109" class="fnanchor">[4]</a> On the other hand, the exultation -of those who envied his prosperity, the mocking laugh -of malicious satisfaction, which he feared more than -adversity itself, and the contemplation of which he -could not face, are things usually spared him. Jealousy -is appeased, and disappears with its cause; while -Compassion which takes its place is the parent of -loving-kindness. Those who were envious of, and -hostile to, a man in the full tide of success, after his -downfall, have not seldom become his friends, ready -to protect, comfort, and help. Who has not, at least -<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_217" id="Page_217">[Pg 217]</a></span>in a small way, himself experienced something of the -sort? Where is the man, who, when overtaken by -some calamity, of whatever nature, has not noticed -with surprise how the persons that previously had -displayed the greatest coldness, nay, ill-will towards -him, then came forward with unfeigned sympathy? -For misfortune is the condition of Compassion, and -Compassion the source of loving-kindness. When our -wrath is kindled against a person, nothing quenches -it so quickly, even when it is righteous, as the words: -"He is an unfortunate man." And the reason is -obvious: Compassion is to anger as water to fire. -Therefore, whoever would fain have nothing to repent -of, let him listen to my advice. When he is inflamed -with rage, and meditates doing some one a grievous -injury, he should bring the thing vividly before his -mind, as a <i>fait accompli</i>; he should clearly picture -to himself this other fellow-being tormented with -mental or bodily pain, or struggling with need and -misery; so that he is forced to exclaim: "This is -my work!" Such thoughts as these, if anything, -will avail to moderate his wrath. For Compassion -is the true antidote of anger; and by practising on -oneself this artifice of the imagination, one awakes -beforehand, while there is yet time,</p> - -<p style="margin-left: 25%;"> -<span style="margin-left: 8.5em;"><i>la pitié, dont la voix,</i></span><br /> -<i>Alors qu'on est vengé, fait entendre ses lois</i>.<a name="FNanchor_5_110" id="FNanchor_5_110"></a><a href="#Footnote_5_110" class="fnanchor">[5]</a><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 9.5em;">—(Voltaire, <i>Sémiramis</i>, V. 6.)</span><br /> -</p> - -<p>And in general, the hatred we may cherish for others is overcome by -nothing so easily as by our taking a point of view whence they can -appeal to our<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_218" id="Page_218">[Pg 218]</a></span> Compassion. The reason indeed why parents, as a rule, -specially love the sickly one of their children is because the sight of -it perpetually stirs their Compassion.</p> - -<p>(7) There is another proof that the moral incentive disclosed by me -is the true one. I mean the fact that animals also are included under -its protecting aegis. In the other European systems of Ethics no place -is found for them,—strange and inexcusable as this may appear. It is -asserted that beasts have no rights; the illusion is harboured that our -conduct, so far as they are concerned, has no moral significance, or, -as it is put in the language of these codes, that "there are no duties -to be fulfilled towards animals." Such a view is one of revolting -coarseness, a barbarism of the West, whose source is Judaism. In -philosophy, however, it rests on the assumption, despite all evidence -to the contrary, of the radical difference between man and beast,—a -doctrine which, as is well known, was proclaimed with more trenchant -emphasis by Descartes than by any one else: it was indeed the necessary -consequence of his mistakes. When Leibnitz and Wolff, following out -the Cartesian view, built up out of abstract ideas their Rational -Psychology, and constructed a deathless <i>anima rationalis</i> (rational -soul); then the natural claims of the animal kingdom visibly rose up -against this exclusive privilege, this human patent of immortality, and -Nature, as always in such circumstances, entered her silent protest. -Our philosophers, owing to the qualms of their intellectual conscience, -were soon forced to seek aid for their Rational Psychology from the -empirical<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_219" id="Page_219">[Pg 219]</a></span> method; they accordingly tried to reveal the existence of -a vast chasm, an immeasurable gulf between animals and men, in order -to represent them, in the teeth of opposing testimony, as existences -essentially different. These efforts did not escape the ridicule of -Boileau; for we find him saying:</p> - -<p style="margin-left: 25%;"> -<i>Les animaux ont-ils des universités?</i><br /> -<i>Voit-on fleurir chez eux des quatre facultés?</i><a name="FNanchor_6_111" id="FNanchor_6_111"></a><a href="#Footnote_6_111" class="fnanchor">[6]</a><br /> -</p> - -<p>Such a supposition would end in animals being pronounced incapable -of distinguishing themselves from the external world, and of having -any self-consciousness, any ego! As answer to such absurd tenets, it -would only be necessary to point to the boundless Egoism innate in -every animal, even the smallest and humblest; this amply proves how -perfectly they are conscious of their self, as opposed to the world, -which lies outside it. If any one of the Cartesian persuasion, with -views like these in his head, should find himself in the claws of a -tiger, he would be taught in the most forcible manner what a sharp -distinction such a beast draws between his ego and the non-ego. -Corresponding to these philosophical fallacies we notice a peculiar -sophism in the speech of many peoples, especially the Germans. For the -commonest matters connected with the processes of life,—for food, -drink, conception, the bringing forth of young; for death, and the dead -body; such languages have special words applicable only to animals, -not to men. In this way the<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_220" id="Page_220">[Pg 220]</a></span> necessity of using the same terms for -both is avoided, and the perfect identity of the thing concealed under -verbal differences. Now, since the ancient tongues show no trace of -such a dual mode of expression, but frankly denote the same things -by the same words; it follows that this miserable artifice is beyond -all doubt the work of European priestcraft, which, in its profanity, -knows no limit to its disavowal of, and blasphemy against, the Eternal -Reality that lives in every animal. Thus was laid the foundation of -that harshness and cruelty towards beasts which is customary in Europe, -and on which a native of the Asiatic uplands could not look without -righteous horror. In English this infamous invention is not to be -found; assuredly because the Saxons, when they conquered England, were -not yet Christians. Nevertheless the English language shows something -analogous in the strange fact that it makes all animals of the neuter -gender, the pronoun "it" being employed for them, just as if they -were lifeless things. This idiom has a very objectionable sound, -especially in the case of dogs, monkeys, and other Primates, and is -unmistakably a priestly trick, designed to reduce beasts to the level -of inanimate objects. The ancient Egyptians, who dedicated all their -days to religion, were accustomed to place in the same vault with a -human mummy that of an ibis, a crocodile, etc.; in Europe it is a -crime, an abomination to bury a faithful dog beside the resting-place -of his master, though it is there perhaps that he, with a fidelity -and attachment unknown to the sons of men, awaited his own end. To a -recognition of the identity, in all<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_221" id="Page_221">[Pg 221]</a></span> essentials, of the phaenomena -which we call "man" and "beast," nothing leads more surely than the -study of zoology and anatomy. What shall we say then, when in these -days (1839) a canting dissector has been found, who presumes to insist -on an absolute and radical difference between human beings and animals, -and who goes so far as to attack and calumniate honest zoologists that -keep aloof from all priestly guile, eye-service, and hypocrisy, and -dare to follow the leading of nature and of truth?</p> - -<p>Those persons must indeed be totally blind, or else completely -chloroformed by the <i>foetor Judaicus</i> (Jewish stench), who do not -discern that the truly essential and fundamental part in man and beast -is identically the same thing. That which distinguishes the one from -the other does not lie in the primary and original principle, in the -inner nature, in the kernel of the two phaenomena (this kernel being -in both alike the Will of the individual); it is found in what is -secondary, in the intellect, in the degree of perceptive capacity. It -is true that the latter is incomparably higher in man, by reason of -his added faculty of abstract knowledge, called Reason; nevertheless -this superiority is traceable solely to a greater cerebral development, -in other words, to the corporeal difference, which is quantitative, -not qualitative, of a single part, the brain. In all other respects -the similarity between men and animals, both psychical and bodily, is -sufficiently striking. So that we must remind our judaised friends -in the West, who despise animals, and idolise Reason, that if they -were suckled by their mothers, so also was the dog by his. Even Kant -fell<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_222" id="Page_222">[Pg 222]</a></span> into this common mistake of his age, and of his country, and I -have already administered the censure<a name="FNanchor_7_112" id="FNanchor_7_112"></a><a href="#Footnote_7_112" class="fnanchor">[7]</a> which it is impossible to -withhold. The fact that Christian morality takes no thought for beasts -is a defect in the system which is better admitted than perpetuated. -One's astonishment is, however, all the greater, because, with this -exception, it shows the closest agreement with the Ethics of Brahmanism -and Buddhism, being only less strongly expressed, and not carried to -the last consequences imposed by logic. On the whole, there seems -little room for doubting that, in common with the idea of a god become -man, or Avatar,<a name="FNanchor_8_113" id="FNanchor_8_113"></a><a href="#Footnote_8_113" class="fnanchor">[8]</a> it has an Asiatic origin, and probably came to -Judaea by way of Egypt; so that Christianity would be a secondary -reflection of the primordial light that shone in India, which, -falling first on Egypt, was unhappily refracted from its ruins upon -Jewish soil. An apt symbol of the insensibility of Christian Ethics -to animals, while in other points its similarity to the Indian is so -great, may be found in the circumstance that John the Baptist comes -before us in all respects like a Hindu Sannyasin,<a name="FNanchor_9_114" id="FNanchor_9_114"></a><a href="#Footnote_9_114" class="fnanchor">[9]</a> except that he -is clothed in skins: a thing which would be, as is well known, an -abomination in the eyes of every follower of Brahmanism or Buddhism. -The Royal Society of Calcutta only<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_223" id="Page_223">[Pg 223]</a></span> received their copy of the <span class="gesperrt">Vedas</span> -on their distinctly promising that they would not have it bound in -leather, after European fashion. In silken binding, therefore, it is -now to be seen on the shelves of their library. Again: the Gospel story -of Peter's draught of fishes, which the Saviour blesses so signally -that the boats are overladen, and begin to sink (<i>Luke</i> v. 1-10), -forms a characteristic contrast to what is related of Pythagoras. It -is said that the latter, initiated as he was in all the wisdom of the -Egyptians, bought the draught from the fishermen, while the net was -still under water, in order to at once set at liberty the captive -denizens of the sea. (Apuleius: <i>De Magia</i>, p. 36: edit. Bipont.)<a name="FNanchor_10_115" id="FNanchor_10_115"></a><a href="#Footnote_10_115" class="fnanchor">[10]</a> -Compassion for animals is intimately connected with goodness of -character, and it may be confidently asserted that he, who is cruel -to living creatures, cannot be a good man. Moreover, this compassion -manifestly flows from the same source whence arise the virtues of -justice and loving-kindness towards men. Thus, for instance, people -of delicate sensitiveness, on realising that in a fit of ill-humour, -or anger, or under the influence of wine, they punished their dog, -their horse, their ape undeservedly, or unnecessarily, or excessively, -are seized with the same remorse, feel the same dissatisfaction with -themselves, as when they are conscious<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_224" id="Page_224">[Pg 224]</a></span> of having done some wrong to -one of their fellows. The only difference—a purely nominal one—is -that in the latter case this remorse, this dissatisfaction is called -the voice of conscience rising in rebuke. I remember having read of -an Englishman, who, when hunting in India, had killed a monkey, that -he could not forget the dying look which the creature cast on him; so -that he never fired at these animals again. Another sportsman, William -Harris by name, a true Nimrod, has much the same story to tell. During -the years 1836-7 he travelled far into the heart of Africa, merely to -indulge his passion for the chase. A passage in his book, published at -Bombay in 1838, describes how he shot his first elephant, a female. -Next morning on going to look for his game, he found that all the -elephants had fled from the neighbourhood, except a young one which had -spent the night beside its dead mother. Seeing the huntsmen, it forgot -all fear, and came to meet them, with the clearest and most lively -signs of disconsolate grief, and put its tiny trunk about them, as if -to beg for help. "Then," says Harris, "I was filled with real remorse -for what I had done, and felt as if I had committed a murder."</p> - -<p>The English nation, with its fine sensibility, is, in fact, -distinguished above all others for extraordinary compassion towards -animals, which appears at every opportunity, and is so strong that, -despite the "cold superstition" which otherwise degrades them, these -Anglo-Saxons have been led through its operation to fill up by -legislation the <i>lacuna</i> that their religion leaves in morality. For -this gap is precisely the<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_225" id="Page_225">[Pg 225]</a></span> reason why in Europe and America there is -need of societies for the protection of animals, which are entirely -dependent on the law for their efficiency. In Asia the religions -themselves suffice, consequently no one there ever thinks of such -associations. Meanwhile Europeans are awakening more and more to a -sense that beasts have rights, in proportion as the strange notion -is being gradually overcome and outgrown, that the animal kingdom -came into existence solely for the benefit and pleasure of man. This -view,<a name="FNanchor_11_116" id="FNanchor_11_116"></a><a href="#Footnote_11_116" class="fnanchor">[11]</a> with the corollary that non-human living creatures are to be -regarded merely as things, is at the root of the rough and altogether -reckless treatment of them, which obtains in the West. To the honour, -then, of the English be it said that they are the first people who -have, in downright earnest, extended the protecting arm of the law to -animals: in England the miscreant, that commits an outrage on beasts, -has to pay for it, equally whether they are his own or not. Nor is this -all. There exists in London the Society for the Prevention of Cruelty -to Animals, a corporate body voluntarily formed, which, without state -assistance, and at great cost, is of no small service in lessening the -tale of tortures inflicted on animals. Its emissaries are ubiquitous, -and keep secret watch in order to inform against the tormentors of -dumb, sensitive creatures; and such persons have therefore good reason -to stand in fear of them.<a name="FNanchor_12_117" id="FNanchor_12_117"></a><a href="#Footnote_12_117" class="fnanchor">[12]</a> At all the steep bridges in London<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_226" id="Page_226">[Pg 226]</a></span> this -Society stations a pair of horses, which without any charge is attached -to heavy freight-waggons. Is not this admirable? Does it not elicit our -approval, as unfailingly as any beneficent action towards men? Also the -Philanthropic Society of London has done its part. In 1837 it offered a -prize of £30 for the best exposition of the moral reasons which exist -to keep men from torturing animals. The line of argument, however, -had to be taken almost exclusively from Christianity, whereby the -difficulty of the task was, of course, increased; but two years <span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_227" id="Page_227">[Pg 227]</a></span>later, -in 1839, Mr. Macnamara was the successful competitor. At Philadelphia -there is an Animals' Friends' Society, having the same aims; and it -is to the President of the latter that a book called <i>Philozoia; or, -Moral Reflections on the Actual Condition of Animals, and the Means -of Improving the Same</i> (Brussels, 1839), has been dedicated by its -author, T. Forster. It is original and well written. Mr. Forster -earnestly commends to his readers the humane treatment of animals. As -an Englishman he naturally tries to strengthen his position by the -support of the Bible; but he is on slippery ground, <span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_228" id="Page_228">[Pg 228]</a></span>and meets with -such poor success that he ends by catching at the following ingenious -position: Jesus Christ (he says) was born in a stable among oxen and -asses; which was meant to indicate symbolically that we ought to regard -the beasts as our brothers, and treat them accordingly. All that I -have here adduced sufficiently proves that the moral chord, of which -we are speaking, is now at length beginning to vibrate also in the -West. For the rest, we may observe that compassion for sentient beings -is not to carry us to the length of abstaining from flesh, like the -Brahmans. This is because, by a natural law, capacity for pain keeps -pace with the intelligence; consequently men, by going without animal -food, especially in the North, would suffer more than beasts do through -a quick death, which is always unforeseen; although the latter ought -to be made still easier by means of chloroform. Indeed without meat -nourishment mankind would be quite unable to withstand the rigours of -the Northern climate. The same reasoning explains, too, why we are -right in making animals work for us; it is only when they are subjected -to an excessive amount of toil that cruelty begins.</p> - -<p>(8) It is perhaps not impossible to investigate and explain -metaphysically the ultimate cause of that Compassion in which alone all -non-egoistic conduct can have its source; but let us for the moment put -aside such inquiries, and consider the phaenomenon in question, from -the empirical point of view, simply as a natural arrangement. Now if -Nature's intention was to soften as much as possible the<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_229" id="Page_229">[Pg 229]</a></span> numberless -sufferings of every sort, to which our life is exposed, and which no -one altogether escapes; if she wished to provide some counterbalance -for the burning Egoism, which fills all beings, and often develops into -malice; it will at once strike every one as obvious that she could not -have chosen any method more effectual than that of planting in the -human heart the wonderful disposition, which inclines one man to share -the pain of another, and from which proceeds the voice that bids us, in -tones strong and unmistakable, take thought for our neighbour; calling, -at one time, "Protect!" at another, "Help!" Assuredly, from the mutual -succour thus arising, there was more to be hoped for, towards the -attainment of universal well-being, than from a stern Command of duty, -couched in general, abstract terms,—the product of certain reasoning -processes, and of artificial combinations of conceptions. From such -an Imperative, indeed, all the less result could be expected because -to the rough human unit general propositions and abstract truths are -unintelligible, the concrete only having some meaning for him. And -it should be remembered that mankind in its entirety, a very small -part alone excepted, has always been rude, and must remain so, since -the large amount of bodily toil, which for the race as a whole is -inevitable, leaves no time for mental culture. Whereas, in order to -awaken that sense, which has been proved to be the sole source of -disinterested action, and consequently the true basis of Morals, there -is no need of abstract knowledge, but only of intuitive perception, of -the simple comprehension of a concrete case. To this<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_230" id="Page_230">[Pg 230]</a></span> Compassion is at -once responsive, without the mediation of other thoughts.</p> - -<p>(9) The following circumstance will be found in complete accord with -the last paragraph. The foundation, which I have given to Ethics, -leaves me without a forerunner among the School Philosophers; indeed, -my position is paradoxical, as far as their teaching goes, and many -of them, for instance, the Stoics (Seneca, <i>De Clementia</i>, II., 5), -Spinoza (<i>Ethica</i>, IV., prop. 50), and Kant (<i>Kritik der Praktischen -Vernunft,</i> p. 213; R. p. 257) only notice the motive of Compassion to -utterly reject and contemn it. On the other hand, my basis is supported -by the authority of the greatest moralist of modern times; for such, -undoubtedly, J. J. Rousseau is,—that profound reader of the human -heart, who drew his wisdom not from books, but from life, and intended -his doctrine not for the professorial chair, but for humanity; he, -the foe of all prejudice, the foster-child of nature, whom alone she -endowed with the gift of being able to moralise without tediousness, -because he hit the truth and stirred the heart. I shall therefore -venture here to cite some passages from his works in support of my -theory, observing that, so far, I have been as sparing as possible with -regard to quotations.</p> - -<p>In the <i>Discours sur l'Origine de l'Inégalité</i>, p. 91 (edit. Bipont.), -he says: <i>Il y a un autre principe, que Hobbes n'a point aperçu, et qui -ayant été donné à l'homme pour adoucir, en certaines circonstances, -la férocité de son amour-propre, tempère l'ardeur qu'il a pour son -bien-être par une <span style="font-size: 0.8em;">RÉPUGNANCE INNÉE À VOIR SOUFFRIR SON SEMBLABLE</span>. Je ne -crois pas<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_231" id="Page_231">[Pg 231]</a></span> avoir aucune contradiction à craindre en accordant à l'homme -la SEULE VERTU NATURELLE qu'ait été forcé de reconnaître le détracteur -le plus outré des vertus humaines. Je parle <span style="font-size: 0.8em;">DE LA PITIÉ</span></i>, etc.<a name="FNanchor_13_118" id="FNanchor_13_118"></a><a href="#Footnote_13_118" class="fnanchor">[13]</a></p> - -<p>P. 92: <i>Mandeville a bien senti qu'avec toute leur morale les hommes -n'eussent jamais été que des monstres, si la nature ne leur eut donné -<span style="font-size: 0.8em;">LA PITIÉ</span> à l'appui de la raison: mais il n'a pas vu, que <span style="font-size: 0.8em;">DE CETTE SEULE -QUALITÉ DECOULENT TOUTES LES VERTUS SOCIALES</span>, qu'il veut disputer aux -hommes. En effet, qu'est-ce que la générosité, la clémence, l'humanité, -sinon LA PITIÉ, appliquée aux faibles, aux coupables, ou a l'espèce -humaine en général? La bienveillance et l'amitié même sont, à le bien -prendre, des productions d'une pitié constante, fixée sur un objet -particulier; car désirer que quelqu'un ne souffre point, qu'est-ce -autre chose, que désirer qu'il soit heureux?... La commisération sera -d'autant plus énergique, que <span style="font-size: 0.8em;">L'ANIMAL SPECTATEUR S'IDENTIFIERA</span> plus -intimement avec <span style="font-size: 0.8em;">L'ANIMAL SOUFFRANT</span>.</i><a name="FNanchor_14_119" id="FNanchor_14_119"></a><a href="#Footnote_14_119" class="fnanchor">[14]</a></p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_232" id="Page_232">[Pg 232]</a></span></p> - -<p>P. 94: <i>Il est donc bien certain, que la pitié est un sentiment -naturel, qui, modérant dans chaque individu l'amour de soi-même, -concourt à la conservation mutuelle de toute l'espèce. C'est elle, qui -dans l'état de nature, tient lieu de lois, de mœurs, et de vertus, avec -cet avantage, que nul ne sera tenté de désobéir à sa douce voix: c'est -elle, qui détournera tout sauvage robuste d'enlever à un faible enfant, -ou à un vieillard infirme, sa subsistence acquise avec peine, si lui -même espère pouvoir trouver la sienne ailleurs: c'est elle qui, au lieu -de cette maxime sublime de justice raisonnée: "Fais à autrui comme tu -veux qu'on te fasse;" inspire à tous les hommes cette autre maxime de -bonté naturelle, bien moins parfaite, mais plus utile peut-être que -la précédente: "Fais ton bien avec le moindre mal d'autrui qu'il est -possible." C'est, en un mot, <span style="font-size: 0.8em;">DANS CE SENTIMENT NATUREL PLUTÔT, QUE DANS -LES ARGUMENTS SUBTILS</span>, qu'il faut chercher la cause de la repugnance -qu'éprouverait tout homme à mal faire, même indépendamment des maximes -de l'éducation.</i><a name="FNanchor_15_120" id="FNanchor_15_120"></a><a href="#Footnote_15_120" class="fnanchor">[15]</a></p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_233" id="Page_233">[Pg 233]</a></span></p> - -<p>Let this be compared with what he says in <i>Émile,</i> Bk. IV., pp. 115-120 -(edit. Bipont.), where the following passage occurs among others:—</p> - -<p><i>En effet, comment nous laissons-nous émouvoir à la pitié, si ce n'est -en nous transportant hors de nous et en nous <span style="font-size: 0.8em;">IDENTIFIANT AVEC L'ANIMAL -SOUFFRANT: EN QUITTANT</span>, pour ainsi dire, <span style="font-size: 0.8em;">NOTRE ÊTRE, POUR PRENDRE LE -SIEN</span>? Nous ne souffrons qu'autant que nous jugeons qu'il souffre: <span style="font-size: 0.8em;">CE -N'EST PAS DANS NOUS, C'EST DANS LUI</span>, que nous souffrons ... offrir au -jeune homme des objets, sur lesquels puisse agir la force expansive de -son cœur, qui le dilatent, qui l'étendent sur les autres êtres, qui le -fassent partout <span style="font-size: 0.8em;">SE RETROUVER HORS DE LUI</span>: écarter avec soin ceux, qui -le resserrent, le concentrent, et tendent le ressort <span style="font-size: 0.8em;">DU MOI HUMAIN</span></i>, -etc.<a name="FNanchor_16_121" id="FNanchor_16_121"></a><a href="#Footnote_16_121" class="fnanchor">[16]</a></p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_234" id="Page_234">[Pg 234]</a></span></p> - -<p>Inside the pale of the Schools, as above remarked, there is not a -single authority in favour of my position; but outside, I have other -testimony to cite, in addition to Rousseau's. The Chinese admit five -cardinal virtues (<span class="gesperrt">Tschang</span>), of which the chief is Compassion (<span class="gesperrt">Sin</span>). -The other four are: justice, courtesy, wisdom, and sincerity.<a name="FNanchor_17_122" id="FNanchor_17_122"></a><a href="#Footnote_17_122" class="fnanchor">[17]</a> -Similarly, among the Hindus, we find that on the tablets placed to -the memory of dead chieftains, compassion for men and animals takes -the first place in the record of their virtues. At Athens there was -an altar to Compassion in the Agora, as we know from Pausanias, I. -17: <i>Άθηναίοις δὲ ἐν τῇ ἀγορᾷ ἐστι Ἐλέου βωμός, ᾧ, μάλιστα θεῶν ἐς -ἀνθρώπινον βίον καὶ μεταβολὰς πραγμάτων ὃτι ὠ-ϕέλιμος, μόνοι τιμὰς -Ἑλλήνων νέμουσιν Ἀθηνᾱίοι</i>.<a name="FNanchor_18_123" id="FNanchor_18_123"></a><a href="#Footnote_18_123" class="fnanchor">[18]</a></p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_235" id="Page_235">[Pg 235]</a></span></p> - -<p>Lucian also mentions this altar in the Timon, § 99.<a name="FNanchor_19_124" id="FNanchor_19_124"></a><a href="#Footnote_19_124" class="fnanchor">[19]</a> A phrase of -Phocion, preserved by Stobaeus, describes Compassion as the most sacred -thing in human life: <i>οὕτε ἐξ ἱεροn βωμόν, οὕτε ἐκ τῆς ἀνθρωπίυης -ϕύσεως ἀϕαιρετέον τὸν ἔλεον.</i><a name="FNanchor_20_125" id="FNanchor_20_125"></a><a href="#Footnote_20_125" class="fnanchor">[20]</a> In the <i>Sapientia Indorum,</i> the Greek -translation of the <span class="gesperrt">Paṅća-tantra</span>, we read (Section 3, p. 220): <i>Δέγεται -γάρ, ὡς πρώτη τῶν ἀρετῶν ἡ ἐλεημοσύνη</i>.<a name="FNanchor_21_126" id="FNanchor_21_126"></a><a href="#Footnote_21_126" class="fnanchor">[21]</a> It is clear, then, that the -real source of morality has been distinctly recognised at all times and -in all countries; Europe alone excepted, owing to the <i>foetor Judaicus</i> -(Jewish stench), which here pervades everything, and is the reason why -the Western races require for the object of their obedience a command -of duty, a moral law, an imperative, in short, an order and decree. -They remain wedded to this habit of thought, and<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_236" id="Page_236">[Pg 236]</a></span> refuse to open their -eyes to the fact that such a view is, after all, based upon nothing -but Egosim. Of course, now and then, isolated individuals of fine -perception have felt the truth, and given it utterance: such a one was -Rousseau; and such, Lessing. In a letter written by the latter in 1756 -we read: "The best man, and the one most likely to excel in all social -virtues, in all forms of magnanimity, is he who is most compassionate."</p> -<hr class="r5" /> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_1_106" id="Footnote_1_106"></a><a href="#FNanchor_1_106"><span class="label">[1]</span></a> This term appears to have been first used by Newton -and Boyle. The sense is undoubtedly derived from Bacon's phrase -"<i>instantia crucis</i>," which is one of his "Prerogative Instances." -<i>Vide, Novum Organum</i>: Lib. II., xxxvi., where it is explained as -follows: <i>Inter Praerogativas Instantiarum ponemus loco decimo quarto</i> -<span style="font-size: 0.8em;">INSTANTIAS CRUCIS</span>; <i>translate vocabulo a Crucibus, quae erectae in -Biviis, indicant et signant viarum separationes. Has etiam Instantias -Decisorias et Judiciales, et in Casibus nonnullis Instantias Oraculi et -Mandati, appellare consuevimus</i>, etc.—(<i>Translator</i>.)</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_2_107" id="Footnote_2_107"></a><a href="#FNanchor_2_107"><span class="label">[2]</span></a> According to Buxton (<i>The African Slave-trade</i>, 1839), -their number is even now yearly increased by about 150,000 freshly -imported; and to these more than 200,000 must be added, who perish -miserably at the time of their capture, or on the voyage.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_3_108" id="Footnote_3_108"></a><a href="#FNanchor_3_108"><span class="label">[3]</span></a> <i>I.e</i>., under the influence of wine one speaks the truth. -Cf. Pliny, <i>Nat. Hist</i>, xiv., chap. 22, § 28, 141, edit. Teubner; -<i>vulgoque</i> <span style="font-size: 0.8em;">VERITAS</span> <i>jam attributa</i> <span style="font-size: 0.8em;">VINO</span> <i>est</i>. Gk. <i>οἶνος καὶ ἀλήθεια. -V. Paroemiographi</i>, edit. Gaisford.—(<i>Translator</i>.)</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_4_109" id="Footnote_4_109"></a><a href="#FNanchor_4_109"><span class="label">[4]</span></a> Hor., <i>Carm</i>., I., 35, 26.—(<i>Translator. </i>)</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_5_110" id="Footnote_5_110"></a><a href="#FNanchor_5_110"><span class="label">[5]</span></a> -</p> -<p> -Compassion, who with no uncertain tone,<br /> -The work of vengeance done, her laws makes known.<br /> -</p> -</div> -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_6_111" id="Footnote_6_111"></a><a href="#FNanchor_6_111"><span class="label">[6]</span></a> -</p> -<p> -Have beasts, forsooth, their universities,<br /> -Endowed, like ours, with all four faculties? -</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_7_112" id="Footnote_7_112"></a><a href="#FNanchor_7_112"><span class="label">[7]</span></a> <i>V</i>. Part II., Chapter VI.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_8_113" id="Footnote_8_113"></a><a href="#FNanchor_8_113"><span class="label">[8]</span></a> Avatāra (ava-tṛī to descend), descent of a deity from -heaven; <i>e.g.</i>, the ten incarnations of Vishṇu. <i>V</i>. Monier Williams' -<i>Sanskṛit Dictionary</i>.—(<i>Translator</i>.)</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_9_114" id="Footnote_9_114"></a><a href="#FNanchor_9_114"><span class="label">[9]</span></a> Sannyāsin (one who lays down, or resigns), an ascetic; -a religious mendicant, or Brāhman of the fourth order. <i>V.</i> Monier -Williams' <i>Sanskṛit Dictionary</i>.—(<i>Translator</i>.)</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_10_115" id="Footnote_10_115"></a><a href="#FNanchor_10_115"><span class="label">[10]</span></a> <i>V</i>. Apuleius: <i>Apologia sive De Magia Liber</i> (Lipsiae, -Teubner, 1900: page 41, chap, xxxi): <i>Pythagoram ... memoriae -prodiderunt, cum animaduertisset proxime Metapontum in litore Italiae -suae, quam subsiciuam Graeciam fecerat, a quibusdam piscatoribus -euerriculum trahi, fortunam iactus eius emisse et pretio dato -iussisse, ilico piscis eos qui capti tenebantur solui retibus et reddi -profundo.</i>—(<i>Translator</i>.)</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_11_116" id="Footnote_11_116"></a><a href="#FNanchor_11_116"><span class="label">[11]</span></a> In Vol. II. of my <i>Parerga</i>, § 177, I have shown that its -origin can be traced to the Old Testament.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_12_117" id="Footnote_12_117"></a><a href="#FNanchor_12_117"><span class="label">[12]</span></a>How seriously the matter is being taken up may be -seen from the following case which is quite recent. I quote from -the <i>Birmingham Journal</i> of December, 1839. "Arrest of a company of -eighty-four abettors of dog-fights.—It had come to the knowledge -of the Society of Animals' Friends that the Square in Fox Street, -Birmingham, was yesterday to be the scene of a dog-fight. Measures were -accordingly taken to secure the assistance of the police, and a strong -detachment of constables was sent to the spot. At the right moment all -the persons present were arrested. These precious conspirators were -then handcuffed together in pairs, and the whole party was made fast -by a long rope passing between each couple. In this fashion they were -marched off to the Police Station, where mayor and magistrate were -sitting in readiness for them. The two ringleaders were condemned to -pay, each, a fine of £1, and 8s. <i>6d</i>. costs; in default, to undergo -14 days' hard labour." The coxcombs whose habit is never to miss -noble sport of this sort, must have looked somewhat crestfallen in -the midst of the procession. But the <i>Times</i> of April 6, 1855, p. 6, -supplies a still more striking instance from the present day; and here -we find the paper itself assuming judicial functions, and imposing -the right punishment. It recounts the case of a very wealthy Scotch -baronet's daughter. The matter had been brought before the law, and -the evidence showed that the girl had used a cudgel and knife on her -horse with the greatest cruelty; for which she was ordered to pay a -fine of £5. But for one in her position such a sum means nothing, and -she would practically have got off scot-free, had not the <i>Times</i> -intervened to inflict on her a proper correction, such as she would -really feel. It twice mentions the young lady's name in full, printing -it in large type, and concludes as follows: "We cannot help saying -that a few months' imprisonment with the addition of an occasional -whipping administered in private, but by the most muscular woman in -Hampshire, would have been a much more suitable penalty for Miss M. N. -A wretched being of this sort has forfeited all the consideration and -the privileges that attach to her sex; we cannot regard her any longer -as a woman." These newspaper paragraphs I would especially recommend to -the notice of the associations now formed in Germany against cruelty to -animals; for they show what lines should be adopted, in order to reach -some solid result. At the same time I desire to express my cordial -appreciation of the praiseworthy zeal shown by Herrn Hofrath Perner, of -Munich, who has entirely devoted himself to this branch of well-doing, -and succeeded in arousing interest in it all over the country. [It -should be observed that the first portion of this note belongs to the -earliest edition of the work, published September, 1840; the latter -part was written for the second edition, which appeared in August, -1860. This explains why Schopenhauer says that the first instance, -dated 1839, is "quite recent," and that the second, dated 1855, is -taken "from the present day."—(<i>Translator</i>.)]</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_13_118" id="Footnote_13_118"></a><a href="#FNanchor_13_118"><span class="label">[13]</span></a> There is another principle which Hobbes did not perceive -at all. It was implanted in man in order to soften, in certain -circumstances, the fierceness of his self-love, and it moderates the -ardour, which he feels for his own well-being, by producing a certain -<i>innate aversion to the sight of a fellow-creature's suffering</i>. In -attributing to man <i>the only natural virtue,</i> which even the most -advanced scepticism has been forced to recognise, I stand, assuredly, -in no fear of any contradiction. I allude to <i>compassion</i>, etc.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_14_119" id="Footnote_14_119"></a><a href="#FNanchor_14_119"><span class="label">[14]</span></a> Mandeville was right in thinking that with all their -systems of morality, men would never have been anything but monsters, -if nature had not given them <i>compassion</i> to support their reason; but -he failed to see that <i>from this one quality spring all the social -virtues</i>, which he was unwilling to credit mankind with. In reality, -what is generosity, clemency, humanity, if not <i>compassion</i>, applied -to the weak, to the guilty, or to the human race, as a whole? Even -benevolence and friendship, if we look at the matter rightly, are -seen to result from a constant compassion, directed upon a particular -object; for to desire that some one should not suffer is nothing else -than to desire that he should be happy.... The more closely <i>the living -spectator identifies himself with the living sufferer,</i> the more active -does pity become.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_15_120" id="Footnote_15_120"></a><a href="#FNanchor_15_120"><span class="label">[15]</span></a> It is, then, quite certain that compassion is a natural -feeling, which checking, as it does, the love of self in each -individual, helps by a reciprocal process to preserve the whole race. -This it is, which in the state of nature, takes the place of laws, -customs, and virtues, with the added advantage that no one will be -tempted to disobey its gentle voice; this it is, which will restrain -every able-bodied savage, provided he hope to find his own livelihood -elsewhere, from robbing a weak child, or depriving an infirm old man of -the subsistence won by hard toil; this it is, which inspires all men, -not indeed with that sublime maxim of reasoned justice: "Do to others -as you would they should do unto you;" but with another rule of natural -goodness, no doubt less perfect, but perhaps more useful, namely: "Do -what is good for yourself with the least possible harm to others." In a -word, it is <i>in this natural feeling rather than in subtle arguments</i> -that we must look for the reason of the repugnance with which every -one is accustomed to view bad conduct, quite independently of the -principles laid down by education.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_16_121" id="Footnote_16_121"></a><a href="#FNanchor_16_121"><span class="label">[16]</span></a> In fact, how is it that we let ourselves be moved to -pity, if not by getting out of our own consciousness, and <i>becoming -identified with the living sufferer; by leaving</i>, so to say, <i>our own -being, and entering into his?</i> We do not suffer, except as we suppose -he suffers; <i>it is not in us, it is in him</i>, that we suffer ... offer -a young man objects, on which the expansive force of his heart can -act; objects such as may enlarge his nature, and incline it to go out -to <i>other beings</i>, in whom he may everywhere <i>find himself again</i>. -Keep carefully away those things which narrow his view, and make -him self-centred, and which tighten the strings of the <i>human ego</i>. -(<i>Tendent le ressort</i> (stretch the spring) <i>du moi humain: i.e.</i>, -stimulate the <i>egoistic tendency</i>.)—(<i>Translator</i>.)</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_17_122" id="Footnote_17_122"></a><a href="#FNanchor_17_122"><span class="label">[17]</span></a> <i>Journal Asiatique</i>, Vol. ix., p. 62. Cf. Meng-Tseu -(otherwise called Mencius), edited by Stanislas Julien, 1824, Bk. I, § -45; also Meng-Tseu in the <i>Livres Sacrés de l'Orient</i>, by Panthier p. -281. -</p> -<p> -<i>V. Dictionnaire Français—Latin—Chinois</i>, par Paul Perny (Didot -Frères, Paris, 1869); where the five cardinal virtues (image) are -transliterated: ou châng. <i>V</i>. also: <i>A Syllabic Dictionary of the -Chinese Language</i>; by S. Wells Williams, LL.B. (Shanghai: 1874); where -Sin (Sin), <i>i.e.</i>, humanity, love of one's neighbour, is written -Sin'.—(<i>Translator.</i>)</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_18_123" id="Footnote_18_123"></a><a href="#FNanchor_18_123"><span class="label">[18]</span></a> The Athenians have an altar in their Agora to Compassion; -for this deity, they believe, is of all the gods the most helpful in -human life, and its vicissitudes. They are the only Greeks who have -instituted this cultus.—(<i>Translator</i>.)</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_19_124" id="Footnote_19_124"></a><a href="#FNanchor_19_124"><span class="label">[19]</span></a> <i>V</i>. Lucian, -<i>Timon</i>, chap. 42 (<i>Ausgewählte Schriften des Lucian</i>, edit. Julius -Sommerbrodt; Weidmann, Berlin, 1872, p. 75): <i>ϕίλος δὲ ἣ ξένος ἣ -ἑταῑρος ἣ Έλέον βωμός ὔθλος πολύς</i>. <i>V</i>. also Apollodorus (edit. J. -Bekker); 2, 8, 1. 3, 7, 1. Dem. (edit. Reisk.), 57. Scholiast on Soph. -<i>Œd. Col.</i>,258.—(<i>Translator</i>.)</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_20_125" id="Footnote_20_125"></a><a href="#FNanchor_20_125"><span class="label">[20]</span></a> A temple must not be despoiled of its altar, nor human -nature of compassion. <i>V</i>. Joannis Stobaei <i>Anthologium,</i> edit. Curtius -Wachsmuth et Otto Hense; Weidmann, Berlin, 1894; Vol. III., p. 20, Nr. -52.—(<i>Translator</i>.)</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_21_126" id="Footnote_21_126"></a><a href="#FNanchor_21_126"><span class="label">[21]</span></a> The chief of virtues is said to be Compassion. The -<i>Paṅća-tantra</i> is a well-known collection of moral stories and fables -in five (<i>paṅćan</i>) books or chapters (<i>tantra</i>), from which the author -of the <i>Hitopadeśa</i> drew a large portion of his materials. <i>V</i>. Monier -Williams' <i>Sanskrit Dictionary</i>.—(<i>Translator</i>.)</p></div> - -<hr class="chap" /> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_237" id="Page_237">[Pg 237]</a></span></p> - - - - -<h2><a name="CHAPTER_IXc" id="CHAPTER_IXc">CHAPTER IX.</a></h2> - -<p>ON THE ETHICAL DIFFERENCE OF CHARACTER.</p> - - -<p>There still remains a question to be resolved, before the basis which -I have given to Ethics can be presented in all its completeness. It -is this. On what does the great difference in the moral behaviour of -men rest? If Compassion be the original incentive of all true, that -is, disinterested justice and loving-kindness; how comes it that some -are, while others are not, influenced thereby? Are we to suppose that -Ethics, which discloses the moral stimulus, is also capable of setting -it in motion? Can Ethics fashion the hard-hearted man anew, so that -he becomes compassionate, and, as a consequence, just and humane? -Certainly not. The difference of character is innate, and ineradicable. -The wicked man is born with his wickedness as much as the serpent is -with its poison-fangs and glands, nor can the former change his nature -a whit more than the latter.<a name="FNanchor_1_127" id="FNanchor_1_127"></a><a href="#Footnote_1_127" class="fnanchor">[1]</a> <i>Velle non discitur</i> (to use one's will -is not a thing that can be taught) is a saying of Nero's tutor. In the -<i>Meno</i>, Plato minutely investigates<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_238" id="Page_238">[Pg 238]</a></span> the nature of virtue, and inquires -whether it can, or cannot, be taught. He quotes a passage from Theognis:</p> - -<p style="margin-left: 15%;"> -<span style="margin-left: 13.5em;"><i>ἀλλὰ διδάσκων</i></span><br /> -<i>Οὔποτε ποιήσεις τὸν κακὸν ἄνδρ' ἀγαθόν.</i><br /> -<br /> -<span style="margin-left: 8.5em;">(But thou wilt ne'er,</span><br /> -By teaching make the bad man virtuous.)<br /> -</p> - -<p>and finally reaches this conclusion: <i>ἀρετὴ ἃν εἴη oὔτε ϕύσει, -oὔτε διδακτόν, ἀλλὰ θείᾳ μοίρᾳ παραγυγνομένη, ἄνευ νοῡ, οἷς ἄν -παραγίγνηται</i>.<a name="FNanchor_2_128" id="FNanchor_2_128"></a><a href="#Footnote_2_128" class="fnanchor">[2]</a> Here the terms <i>ϕύσει</i> and <i>θείᾳ μοίρᾳ</i>, form a -distinction, in my opinion, much the same as that between "physical" -and "metaphysical." Socrates, the father of Ethics, if we may trust -Aristotle, declared that <i>oὐκ ἐϕ' ἡ μῑν γενέσθαι τὸ σπουδαίους εἶναι, -ἢ ϕαύλους.</i><a name="FNanchor_3_129" id="FNanchor_3_129"></a><a href="#Footnote_3_129" class="fnanchor">[3]</a> (<i>Moralia Magna</i>, i. 9.) Moreover, Aristotle himself -expresses the same view; <i>παςι γὰρ δοκεῑ ἕκαστα τῶν ἠθῶν ὑπάρχειν -ϕύσει τως' καὶ γὰρ δίκαιοι, καὶ σωϕρονικοὶ, καὶ τἄλλa ἔχομεν εὐθyς -ἐκ γενετῆς.</i><a name="FNanchor_4_130" id="FNanchor_4_130"></a><a href="#Footnote_4_130" class="fnanchor">[4]</a> (<i>Eth. Nicom.</i> vi. 13.) We find also a similar -conviction very decidedly expressed in the fragments attributed -to the Pythagorean<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_239" id="Page_239">[Pg 239]</a></span> Archytas, and preserved by Stobaeus in the -<i>Florilegium</i> (Chap. i. § 77).<a name="FNanchor_5_131" id="FNanchor_5_131"></a><a href="#Footnote_5_131" class="fnanchor">[5]</a> If not authentic, they are certainly -very old. Orelli gives them in his <i>Opuscula Graecorum Sententiosa et -Moralia</i>. There (Vol. II., p. 240) we read in the Dorian dialect as -follows:—<i>Τὰς γὰρ λόγοις καὶ ἀποδείξεσιν ποτιχρωμένας ἀρετὰς δέον -έπιστάμας ποταγορεύεν, ἀρετὰν δέ, τὰν ἠθικὰν καὶ βελτίσταν ἕξιν τῶ -ἀλόγω μέρεος τᾱς ·ψυχᾱς, καθ' ἃν καὶ ποιοί τινες ἦμεν λεγόμεθα κατὰ -τὸ ἦθος, οἷον ἐλευθέριοι, δίκαιοι καὶ σώϕρονες</i>.<a name="FNanchor_6_132" id="FNanchor_6_132"></a><a href="#Footnote_6_132" class="fnanchor">[6]</a> On examining the -virtues and vices, as summarised by Aristotle in the <i>De Virtutibus -et Vitiis</i>, it will be found that all of them, without exception, are -not properly thinkable unless assumed to be inborn qualities, and -that only as such can they be genuine. If, in consequence of reasoned -reflection, we take them as voluntary, they are then seen to lose their -reality, and pass into the region of empty forms; whence it immediately -follows that their permanence and resistance under the storm and stress -of circumstance could not be counted on. And the same is true of the -virtue of loving-kindness, of which Aristotle, in common with all the -ancients, knows nothing. Montaigne keeps, of course, his sceptical -tone, but he practically agrees<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_240" id="Page_240">[Pg 240]</a></span> with the venerable authorities -above quoted, when he says: <i>Serait-il vrai, que pour être bon tout -à fait, il nous le faille être par occulte, naturelle et universelle -propriété, sans lot, sans raison, sans exemple</i>?<a name="FNanchor_7_133" id="FNanchor_7_133"></a><a href="#Footnote_7_133" class="fnanchor">[7]</a>—(Liv. II., chap. -11.) Lichtenberg hits the mark exactly in his <i>Vermischte Schriften</i>, -(<i>v. Moralische Bemerkungen</i>). He writes: "All virtue arising from -premeditation is not worth much. What is wanted is feeling or habit." -Lastly, it should be noted that Christianity itself, in its original -teaching, recognises, and bears witness to this inherent, immutable -difference between character and character. In the Sermon on the Mount -we find the allegory of the fruit which is determined by the nature of -the tree that bears it (<i>Luke</i> vi. 43, 44; cf. <i>Matthew</i> vii. 16-18); -and then in the following verse (<i>Luke</i> vi. 45), we read: <i>ὁ ἀγαθὸς -ἄνθρωπος ἐκ τοῡ ἀγαθοῡ θησαυροῡ τῆς καρδίας αὐτοῡ προϕέρει τὸ ἀγαθὸν -καὶ ὁ πονμρὸς ἄνθρωπος ἐκ τοῡ πoνηροῡ θησαυροῡ τῆς καρδίας αὐτοῡ -προϕέρει τὸπονηρόν.</i><a name="FNanchor_8_134" id="FNanchor_8_134"></a><a href="#Footnote_8_134" class="fnanchor">[8]</a> (Cf. <i>Matthew</i> xii. 35.)</p> - -<p>But it was Kant who first completely cleared up this important -point through his profound doctrine of the <b>empirical</b> and -<b>intelligible</b><a name="FNanchor_9_135" id="FNanchor_9_135"></a><a href="#Footnote_9_135" class="fnanchor">[9]</a> character. He<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_241" id="Page_241">[Pg 241]</a></span> showed that the empirical -character, which manifests itself in time and in multiplicity -of action, is a phaenomenon; while the reality behind it is the -intelligible character, which, being the essential constitution of the -Thing in itself underlying the phaenomenon, is independent of time, -space, plurality, and change. In this way alone can be explained what -is so astonishing, and yet so well known to all who have learnt life's -lessons,—the fixed unchangeableness of human character. There are -certain ethical writers, whose aim is the moral improvement of men, and -who talk of progress made in the path of virtue; but their assurances -are always met and victoriously confuted by the irrefragable facts -of experience, which prove that virtue is nature's work and cannot -be inculcated. The character is an original datum, immutable, and -incapable of any amelioration through correction by the intellect. Now, -were this not so; and further: if (as the above-mentioned dull-headed -preachers maintain) an improvement of the character, and hence "a -constant advance towards the good" were possible by means of moral -instruction; then, unless we are prepared to suppose that all the -various religious institutions, and all the efforts of the moralists -fail in their purpose, we should certainly expect to find that the -older half of mankind, at least on an average, is distinctly better -than the younger. This, however, is so far from being the case, that it -is not to the old, who have, as we see, grown worse by experience, but -to the young that we look for something good. It may happen that in his -old age one man appears somewhat better, another worse,<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_242" id="Page_242">[Pg 242]</a></span> than he was in -his youth. But the reason is not far to seek. It is simply because with -length of days the intelligence by constant correction becomes riper, -and hence the character stands out in purer and clearer shape; while -early life is a prey to ignorance, mistakes, and chimeras, which now -present false motives, and now veil the real. For a fuller explanation -I would refer the reader to the principles laid down in Chapter III. of -the preceding Essay, on "The Freedom of the Will."<a name="FNanchor_10_136" id="FNanchor_10_136"></a><a href="#Footnote_10_136" class="fnanchor">[10]</a> It is true that -among convicts the young have a large majority; but this is because, -when a tendency to crime exists in the character, it soon finds a way -of expressing itself in acts, and of reaching its goal—the galleys, or -the gibbet; while he, whom all the inducements to wrong doing, which -a long life offers, have failed to lead astray, is not likely to fall -at the eleventh hour. Hence the respect paid to age is, in my opinion, -due to the fact that the old are considered to have passed through a -test of sixty or seventy years, and kept their integrity unsullied; for -this of course is the <i>sine qua non</i> of the honour accorded them. These -things are too well known for any one, in real life, to be misled by -the promises of the moralists we have spoken of. He who has once been -proved guilty of evil-doing, is never again trusted, just as the noble -nature, of which a man has once given evidence, is always confidently -believed in, whatever else may<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_243" id="Page_243">[Pg 243]</a></span> have changed. <i>Operari sequitur esse</i> -(what one does follows from what one is) forms, as we have seen in Part -II., Chapter VIII., a pregnant tenet of the Schoolmen. Everything in -the world works according to the unchangeable constitution of which -its being, its <b>essentia</b> is composed. And man is no exception. -As the individual is, so will he, so must he, act: and the <i>liberum -arbitrium indifferentiae</i> (free and indifferent choice) is an invention -of philosophy in her childhood, long since exploded; although there -are some old women, in doctor's academicals, who still like to drag it -about with them.</p> - -<p>The three fundamental springs of human action—Egoism, Malice, -Compassion—are inherent in every one in different and strangely -unequal proportions. Their combination in any given case determines -the weight of the motives that present themselves, and shapes the -resulting line of conduct. To an egoistic character egoistic motives -alone appeal, and those, which suggest either compassion or malice, -have no appreciable effect. Thus, a man of this type will sacrifice -his interests as little to take vengeance on his foes, as to help his -friends. Another, whose nature is highly susceptible to malicious -motives, will not shrink from doing great harm to himself, so only he -may injure his neighbour. For there are characters which take such -delight in working mischief on others, that they forget their own -loss, which is perhaps, equal to what they inflict. One may say of -such: <i>Dum alteri noceat sui negligens</i><a name="FNanchor_11_137" id="FNanchor_11_137"></a><a href="#Footnote_11_137" class="fnanchor">[11]</a> (disregarding himself so -long as he injures the other). These are<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_244" id="Page_244">[Pg 244]</a></span> the people that plunge with -passionate joy into the battle in which they expect to receive quite -as many wounds as they deal; indeed, experience not seldom testifies -that they are ready deliberately, first to kill the man who thwarts -their purposes, and then themselves, in order to escape the penalty -of the law. On the other hand, <b>goodness of heart</b> consists of a -deeply felt, all-embracing Compassion for everything that has breath, -and especially for man; because, in proportion as the intelligence -develops, capacity for pain increases; and hence, the countless -sufferings of human beings, in mind and body, have a much stronger -claim to Compassion than those of animals, which are only physical, -and in any case less acute. This goodness of heart, therefore, in the -first place restrains a man from doing any sort of harm to others, and, -next, it bids him give succour whenever and wherever he sees distress. -And the path of Compassion may lead as far in one direction as Malice -does in the other. Certain rare characters of fine sensibility take to -heart the calamities of others more than their own, so that they make -sacrifices, which, it may be, entail on themselves a greater amount -of suffering than that removed from those they benefit. Nay, in cases -where several, or, perhaps, a large number of persons, at one time, -can be helped in this way, such men do not, if need be, flinch from -absolute self-effacement. Arnold von Winkelried was one of these. So -was Paulinus, Bishop of Nola, in the fifth century, when the Vandals -crossed over from Africa and invaded Italy. Of him we read in Johann -von Müller's <i>Weltgeschichte</i> (Bk. X., chap. 10)<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_245" id="Page_245">[Pg 245]</a></span> that "in order to -ransom some of the prisoners, he had already disposed of all the church -plate, his own and his friends' private property. Then, on seeing the -anguish of a widow, whose only son was being carried off, he offered -himself for servitude in the other's stead. For whoever was of suitable -age, and had not fallen by the sword, was taken captive to Carthage."</p> - -<p>There is, then, an enormous difference between character and character. -Being original and innate, it measures the responsiveness of the -individual to this or that motive, and those alone, to which he is -specially sensitive, will appeal to him with anything like compelling -force. As in chemistry, with unchangeable certainty, one substance -reacts only upon acids, another only upon alkalies, so, with equal -invariableness, different natures respond to different stimuli. The -motives suggesting loving-kindness, which stir so deeply a good -disposition, can, of themselves, effect nothing in a heart that listens -only to the promptings of Egoism. If it be wished to induce the egoist -to act with beneficence and humanity, this can be done but in one way: -he must be made to believe that the assuaging of others' suffering -will, somehow or other, surely turn out to his <b>own advantage</b>. -What, indeed, are most moral systems but attempts of different kinds in -this direction? But such procedure only misleads, does not better, the -will. To make a real improvement, it would be necessary to transform -the entire nature of the individual's susceptibility for motives. Thus, -from one we should have to remove his indifference to the<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_246" id="Page_246">[Pg 246]</a></span> suffering -of others as such; from another, the delight which he feels in causing -pain; from a third, the natural tendency which makes him regard the -smallest increase of his own well-being as so far outweighing all other -motives, that the latter become as dust in the balance. Only it is far -easier to change lead into gold than to accomplish such a task. For -it means the turning round, so to say, of a man's heart in his body, -the remoulding of his very being. In point of fact, all that can be -done is to clear the <b>intellect</b>, correct the <b>judgment</b>, -and so bring him to a better comprehension of the objective realities -and actual relations of life. This effected, the only result gained is -that his will reveals itself more logically, distinctly, and decidedly, -with no false ring in its utterance. It should be noted that just as -many a good act rests at bottom on false motives, on well-meant, yet -illusory representations of an advantage to be obtained thereby in -this, or another, world; so not a few misdeeds are due solely to an -imperfect understanding of the conditions of human life. It is on this -latter truth that the American penitentiary system is based. Here the -aim is not, to improve the <b>heart</b>, but simply, to educate the -<b>head</b> of the criminal, so that he may intellectually come to -perceive that prosperity is more surely, indeed more easily, reached by -work and honesty than by idleness and knavery.</p> - -<p>By the proper presentment of motives <b>legality</b> may be secured, -but not <b>morality</b>. It is possible to remodel what one does, but -not what one <b>wills to do</b>; and it is to the will alone that -real moral worth belongs. It is not possible to change the goal which -the will<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_247" id="Page_247">[Pg 247]</a></span> strives after, but only the path expected to lead thither. -Instruction may alter the selection of means, but not the choice of -the ultimate object which the individual keeps before him in all he -does; this is determined by his will in accordance with its original -nature. It is true that the egoist may be brought to understand that, -if he gives up certain small advantages, he will gain greater; and the -malicious man may be taught that by injuring others he will injure -himself still more. But Egoism itself, and Malice itself, will never -be argued out of a person; as little as a cat can be talked out of her -inclination for mice. Similarly with goodness of heart. If the judgment -be trained, if the relations and conditions of life become understood, -in a word, if the intellect be enlightened; the character dominated by -loving-kindness will be led to express itself more consistently and -completely than it otherwise could. This happens when we perceive the -remoter consequences which our conduct has for others: the sufferings, -perhaps, that overtake them indirectly, and only after lapse of -time, through one act or another of ours, which we had no idea was -so harmful. It occurs, too, when we come to discern the evil results -of many a well-meant action, as, for instance, the screening of a -criminal; and it is especially true when we realise that the <i>Neminem -laede</i> (injure no one) has in all cases precedence over the <i>Omnes -juva</i> (help all men). In this sense there is undoubtedly such a thing -as a moral education, an ethical training capable of making men better. -But it goes only as far as I have indicated, and its limits are quickly -discovered.<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_248" id="Page_248">[Pg 248]</a></span> The head is filled with the light of knowledge; the heart -remains unimproved. The fundamental and determining element, in things -moral, no less than in things intellectual, and things physical, is -that which is inborn. Art is always subordinate, and can only lend a -helping hand. Each man is, what he is, as it were, "by the grace of -God," <i>jure divino, θείᾳ, μοίρᾳ</i>, (by divine dispensation).</p> - -<p> -<i>Du bist am Ende—<span style="font-size: 0.8em;">WAS DU BIST</span>.</i><br /> -<i>Setz' dir Perrücken auf von Millionen Locken,</i><br /> -<i>Setz' deinen Fuss auf ellenhohe Socken:</i><br /> -<i><span style="font-size: 0.8em;">DU BLEIBST DOCH IMMER WAS DU BIST</span>.</i><a name="FNanchor_12_138" id="FNanchor_12_138"></a><a href="#Footnote_12_138" class="fnanchor">[12]</a><br /> -</p> - -<p>But the reader, I am sure, has long been wishing to -put the question: Where, then, does blame and merit -come in? The answer is fully contained in Part IL, -Chapter VIII., to which I therefore beg to call -particular attention. It is there that the explanation, -which otherwise would now follow, found a natural -place; because the matter is closely connected with -Kant's doctrine of the co-existence of Freedom and -Necessity. Our investigation led to the conclusion -that, once the motives are brought into play, the -<i>Operari</i> (what, is done) is a thing of absolute -necessity; consequently, Freedom, the existence of -which is betokened solely by the sense of <b>responsibility</b>, -cannot but belong to the <i>Esse</i> (what one is). -No doubt the reproaches of conscience have to do,<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_249" id="Page_249">[Pg 249]</a></span> -in the first place, and ostensibly, with our acts, but -through these they, in reality, reach down to what -we are; for what we do is the only indisputable -index of what we <b>are</b>, and reflects our character just -as faithfully as symptoms betray the malady. Hence -it is to this <i>Esse</i>, to what we <b>are</b>, that blame and -merit must ultimately be attributed. Whatever we -esteem and love, or else despise and hate, in others, -is not a changeable, transient appearance, but something -constant, stable, and persistent; it is that -which they are. If we find reason to alter our first -opinion about any one, we do not suppose that he -is changed, but that we have been mistaken in him. -In like manner, when we are pleased or displeased -with our own conduct, we say that we are satisfied -or dissatisfied with ourselves, meaning, in reality, -with that which we are, and are unalterably, irreversibly; -and the same is true with regard to our -intellectual qualities, nay, it even applies to the -physiognomy. How is it possible, then, for blame -and merit to lie otherwise than in what we <b>are</b>? As -we saw in Part II., Chapter VII., Conscience is that -<b>register</b> of our acts, which is always growing longer, -and therefore that acquaintance with ourselves which -every day becomes more complete. Conscience concerns -itself directly with all that we do; when, at -one time, actuated by Egoism, or perhaps Malice, -we turn a deaf ear to Compassion, which bids us at -least refrain from harming others, if we will not -afford them help and protection; or when again, at -another time, we overcome the first two incentives, -and listen to the voice of the third. Both cases<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_250" id="Page_250">[Pg 250]</a></span> -measure the <b>distinction</b> we <b>draw between ourselves -and others</b>. And on <b>this distinction</b> depends in the -last resort the degree of our morality or immorality, -that is, of our justice and loving-kindness, or the -reverse. Little by little the number of those -actions, whose testimony is significant on this point, -accumulates in the storehouse of our memory; and -thus the lineaments of our character are depicted -with ever greater clearness, and a true knowledge of -ourselves is nearer attainment. And out of such -knowledge there springs a sense of satisfaction, or -dissatisfaction with ourselves, with that which we -are, according as we have been ruled by Egoism, -by Malice, or else by Compassion; in other words, -according as the difference we have made between -ourselves and others is greater or smaller. And -when we look outside ourselves, it is by the same -standard that we judge those about us; and we become -acquainted with their character—less perfectly -indeed—yet by the same empirical method as we -employ with reference to our own. In this case our -feelings take the form of praise, approval, respect, or, -on the other hand, of reproach, displeasure, contempt, -and they are the objective translation, so to say, -of the subjective satisfaction or dissatisfaction (the -latter deepening perhaps into remorse), which arises -in us when we sit in judgment on ourselves. Lastly, -there is the evidence of language. We find certain -constantly occurring forms of speech which bear -eloquent testimony to the fact that the blame we -cast upon others is in reality directed against their -unchangeable character, touching but superficially<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_251" id="Page_251">[Pg 251]</a></span> -what they do; that virtue and vice are practically, -if tacitly, regarded as inherent unalterable qualities. -The following are some of these expressions: <i>Jetzt -sehe ich, wie du bist</i>! (Now I know your nature!) -<i>In dir habe ich mich geirrt</i>. (I was mistaken -in you.) "Now I see what you are!" <i>Voilà -donc, comme tu es!</i> (This, then, is what you are!) -<i>So bin ich nicht!</i> (I am not a person of that -sort!) <i>Ich bin nicht der Mann, der fähig wäre, -Sie zu hintergehen</i>. (I am not the man to impose -upon you.) Also: <i>les âmes bien nées</i> (persons well-born, -<i>i.e.</i>, noble-minded), the Spanish <i>bien nacido; -εὐγενής</i> (properly "well-born"), <i>εὐγένεια</i> (properly -"nobility of birth") used for "virtuous" and -"virtue"; <i>generosioris animi amicus</i> (a friend of -lofty mind. <i>Generosus</i>: lit. "of noble birth"), etc.</p> - -<p>Reason is a necessary condition for conscience, -but only because without the former a clear and -connected recollection is impossible. From its very -nature conscience does not speak till <b>after</b> the act; -hence we talk of being arraigned before its <b>bar</b>. -Strictly speaking, it is improper to say that conscience -speaks <b>beforehand</b>; for it can only do so -indirectly; that is, when the remembrance of particular -cases in the past leads us, through reflection, -to disapprove of some analogous course of action, -while yet in embryo.</p> - -<p>Such is the ethical fact as delivered by consciousness. -It forms of itself a metaphysical problem, -which does not directly belong to the present question, -but which will be touched on in the last part.</p> - -<p>Conscience, then, is nothing else than the acquaintance<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_252" id="Page_252">[Pg 252]</a></span> -we make with our own changeless character -through the instrumentality of our acts. A little -consideration will show that this definition harmonises -perfectly with, and hence receives additional -confirmation from, what I have here specially emphasised: -namely, the fact that <b>susceptibility</b> for the -motives of Egoism, of Malice, and of Compassion, -which is so widely dissimilar in different individuals, -and on which the whole moral value of a man -depends, cannot be interpreted by anything else, -nor be gained, or removed, by instruction, as if it -were something born in time, and therefore variable, -and subject to chance. On the contrary, we have -seen that it is innate and fixed, an ultimate datum, -admitting of no further explanation. Thus an entire -life, with the whole of its manifold activity, may -be likened to a clock-dial, that marks every movement -of the internal works, as they were made once -for all; or it resembles a mirror, wherein alone, -with the eye of his intellect, each person sees reflected -the essential nature of his own Will, that -is, the core of his being.</p> - -<p>Whoever takes the trouble to thoroughly think -out what has been put forward here, and in Part. II., -Chapter VIII., will discover in the foundation given by -me to Ethics a logical consecution, a rounded completeness, -wanting to all other theories; to say -nothing of the consonance of my view with the facts -of experience,—a consonance which he will look for -in vain elsewhere. For only the truth can uniformly -and consistently agree with itself and with nature; -while all false principles are internally at variance with<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_253" id="Page_253">[Pg 253]</a></span> -themselves, and externally contradict the testimony -of experience, which at every step records its silent -protest.</p> - -<p>I am perfectly aware that the truths advanced -in this Essay, and particularly here at the close, -strike directly at many deeply rooted prejudices and -mistakes, and especially at those attaching to a certain -rudimentary system of morals, now much in vogue, -and suitable for elementary schools. But I cannot -own to feeling any penitence or regret. For, in the -first place, I am addressing neither children, nor the -<i>profanum vulgus</i>, but an Academy of light and -learning. Their inquiry is a purely theoretical one, -concerned with the ultimate fundamental verities -of Ethics; and to a most serious question a serious -answer is undoubtedly expected. And secondly, in -my opinion, there can be no such thing as harmless -mistakes, still less privileged or useful ones. On -the contrary, every error works infinitely more evil -than good. If, however, it is wished to make existing -prepossessions the standard of truth, or the boundary -beyond which its investigation is not to go, then -it would be more honest to abolish philosophical -Faculties and Academies altogether. For where no -reality exists, there also no semblance of it should be.</p> -<hr class="r5" /> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_1_127" id="Footnote_1_127"></a><a href="#FNanchor_1_127"><span class="label">[1]</span></a> Cf. <i>Jeremiah</i> xiii. 23.—(<i>Translator.</i>)</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_2_128" id="Footnote_2_128"></a><a href="#FNanchor_2_128"><span class="label">[2]</span></a>Virtue would appear not to come naturally (<i>i.e.</i>, through -the physical order of things), nor can it be taught; but in -whomsoever it dwells, there it is present, <i>apart from the -intellect, under divine ordinance</i>. [<i>V</i>. Platonis <i>Opera</i>, edit. -Didot, Paris, 1856; Vol. I. <i>Meno</i>, 96 and 99, <i>ad fin</i>.— -(<i>Translator</i>.)]</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_3_129" id="Footnote_3_129"></a><a href="#FNanchor_3_129"><span class="label">[3]</span></a> <i>It is not in our power</i> to be either good or bad.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_4_130" id="Footnote_4_130"></a><a href="#FNanchor_4_130"><span class="label">[4]</span></a> For it appears that the different characters of all men -are in some way implanted in them <i>by nature</i>; if we are just, -and temperate, and otherwise virtuous, we are so <i>straightway -from our birth.</i></p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_5_131" id="Footnote_5_131"></a><a href="#FNanchor_5_131"><span class="label">[5]</span></a> <i>V</i>. Joannis Stobaei <i>Florilegium</i>, edit. Meineke, publ. -Lipsiae, Teubner, 1855; Vol. I., p. 33,1. 14, sqq.—(<i>Translator</i>.)</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_6_132" id="Footnote_6_132"></a><a href="#FNanchor_6_132"><span class="label">[6]</span></a> For the so-called virtues, that require reasoning and demonstration, -ought to be called sciences. By the term "virtue" -we mean rather a certain moral and excellent disposition of -<i>the soul's unreasoning part</i>. This disposition determines the -character which we show, and in accordance with which we -are called generous, just, or temperate.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_7_133" id="Footnote_7_133"></a><a href="#FNanchor_7_133"><span class="label">[7]</span></a> Are we to believe it true that we can only be thoroughly -good by virtue of a certain occult, natural, and universal -faculty, without law, without reason, without precedent?</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_8_134" id="Footnote_8_134"></a><a href="#FNanchor_8_134"><span class="label">[8]</span></a> The good man out of the good treasure of his heart -bringeth forth that which is good; and the evil man out of -the evil treasure of his heart bringeth forth that which is -evil.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_9_135" id="Footnote_9_135"></a><a href="#FNanchor_9_135"><span class="label">[9]</span></a> <i>V</i>. Note on "intelligible," Part. II., Chapter I.—(<i>translator</i>.)</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_10_136" id="Footnote_10_136"></a><a href="#FNanchor_10_136"><span class="label">[10]</span></a> <i>Die Freiheit des Willens</i> and the present treatise were -published by Schopenhauer together, under the title of <i>Die -Beiden Grundprobleme der Ethik. V</i>. Introduction, p. xv., -note.—(<i>Translator</i>.)</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_11_137" id="Footnote_11_137"></a><a href="#FNanchor_11_137"><span class="label">[11]</span></a> Seneca, <i>De Ira</i>, I. 1.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_12_138" id="Footnote_12_138"></a><a href="#FNanchor_12_138"><span class="label">[12]</span></a> -</p> -<p style="margin-left: 15%;"> -In spite of all, thou art still—<i>what thou art.</i><br /> -Though wigs with countless curls thy head-gear be,<br /> -Though shoes an ell in height adorn thy feet:<br /> -<i>Unchang'd thou e'er remainest what thou art.</i> -</p> -<p> -<i>V</i>. Goethe's <i>Faust</i>, Part I., Studirzimmer.—(<i>Translator</i>.)</p></div> - -<hr class="chap" /> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_255" id="Page_255">[Pg 255]</a></span></p> - - - - -<h4><a name="PART_IV" id="PART_IV">PART IV.</a></h4> - -<h3>ON THE METAPHYSICAL EXPLANATION OF THE PRIMAL ETHICAL PHAENOMENON.</h3> - -<hr class="chap" /> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_257" id="Page_257">[Pg 257]</a></span></p> - - - - -<h4><a name="CHAPTER_Id" id="CHAPTER_Id">CHAPTER I.</a></h4> - -<h3>HOW THIS APPENDIX MUST BE UNDERSTOOD.</h3> - - -<p>In the foregoing pages the moral incentive (Compassion) has been -established as a fact, and I have shown that from it alone can proceed -unselfish justice and genuine loving-kindness, and that on these two -cardinal virtues all the rest depend. Now, for the purpose of supplying -Ethics with a foundation, this is sufficient, in a certain sense; that -is, in so far as Moral Science necessarily requires to be supported by -some actual and demonstrable basis, whether existing in the external -world, or in the consciousness. The only alternative is to tread in the -footsteps that so many of my predecessors have left, in other words, to -choose arbitrarily some proposition or other,—some bare and abstract -formula—and make it the source of all that morality prescribes; -or, like Kant, to sublimate a mere idea, that of <b>law</b>, into -the key-stone of the ethical arch. But, dismissing this method for -the reasons discussed above, in the Second Part, the investigation -proposed by the Royal Society appears to me now completed. For their -question, as it stands, deals only with the foundation of Ethics; as -to a possible metaphysical explanation of this foundation nothing -whatever is asked. Nevertheless,<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_258" id="Page_258">[Pg 258]</a></span> at the point we have reached, I am -very sensible that the human spirit can find no abiding satisfaction, -no real repose. As in all branches of practical research, so also -in Ethical Science, when all is said, man is inevitably confronted -with an ultimate phaenomenon, which while it renders an account -of everything that it includes, and everything deducible from it, -remains itself an unexplained riddle. So that here, as elsewhere, the -want is felt of a final interpretation (which, obviously, cannot but -be <b>metaphysical</b>) of the ultimate data, as such, and through -these,—if they be taken in their entirety—of the world. And here, -too, this want finds utterance in the question: How is it that, what -is present to our senses, and grasped by our intellect, is as it is, -and not otherwise? And how does the character of the phaenomenon, as -manifest to us, shape itself out of the essential nature of things? -Indeed, in Moral Science the need of a metaphysical basis is more -urgent than in any other, because all systems, philosophical no less -than religious, are at one in persistently attaching to <b>conduct</b> -not only an ethical, but also a metaphysical significance, which, -passing beyond the mere appearance of things, transcends every -possibility of experience, and therefore stands in the closest -connection with human destiny and with the whole cosmic process. For -if life (it is averred) have a meaning, then the supreme goal to which -it points is undoubtedly ethical. Nor is this view a bare unsupported -theory; it is sufficiently established by the undeniable fact that, -as death draws nigh, the thoughts of each individual assume<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_259" id="Page_259">[Pg 259]</a></span> a moral -trend, equally whether he be credulous of religious dogmas, or not; -he is manifestly anxious to wind up the affairs of his life, now -verging to its end, entirely from the <b>moral</b> standpoint. In -this particular the testimony of the ancients is of special value, -standing, as they do, outside the pale of Christian influence. I shall -therefore here quote a remarkable passage preserved by Stobaeus, in his -<i>Florilegium</i> (chap. 44, §. 20). It has been attributed to the earliest -Hellenic lawgiver, Zaleucus, though, according to Bentley and Heyne, -its source is Pythagorean. The language is graphic and unmistakable. -<i>Δεῑ τίθεσθαι πρὸ ὀμμάτων τὸν καιρὸν τοῡτον, ἐν ᾧ γίγνεται τὸ τέλος -ἑκάστῳ τῆς ἀπαλλαγς τοῡ ξῆν. Πᾱσι γὰρ ἐμπίπτει μεταμέλεια τοῑς μέλλουσι -τελευτᾱν, μεμνημένοις ὧν ἠδικήκασι, καὶ ὁρμὴ τοῡ βούλεσθαι πάντα -πεπράχθαι δικαίως αὐτοῑς</i>.<a name="FNanchor_1_139" id="FNanchor_1_139"></a><a href="#Footnote_1_139" class="fnanchor">[1]</a></p> - -<p>Furthermore, to come to an historical personage, we find Pericles, on -his death-bed, unwilling to hear anything about his great achievements, -and only anxious to know that he had never brought trouble on a -citizen. (Plutarch, <i>Life of Pericles</i>.) Turning to modern times, if -a very different case may be placed beside the preceding, I remember -having noticed in a report of depositions made<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_260" id="Page_260">[Pg 260]</a></span> before an English jury -the following occurrence. A rough negro lad, fifteen years old, had -been mortally injured in some brawl on board a ship. As he was dying, -he eagerly begged that all his companions might be fetched in haste: -he wanted to ask if he had ever vexed or insulted any one of them, and -after hearing that he had not, his mind appeared greatly relieved. It -is indeed the uniform teaching of experience that those near death wish -to be reconciled with every one before they pass away.</p> - -<p>But there is evidence of another kind that Ethics can only be finally -explained by Metaphysics. It is well known that, while the author of an -intellectual performance,—even should it be a supreme masterpiece—is -quite willing to take whatever remuneration he can get, those, on the -other hand, who have done something morally excellent, almost without -exception, refuse compensation for it. The latter fact is specially -observable where conduct rises to the heroic. For instance, when a -man at the risk of his life has saved another, or perhaps many, from -destruction, as a rule, he simply declines all reward, poor though he -may be; because he instinctively feels that the metaphysical value -of his act would be thereby impaired. At the end of Bürger's song, -"The Brave Man," we find a poetical presentment of this psychological -process. Nor does the reality, for the most part, differ at all from -the ideal, as I have frequently noticed in English papers. Conduct -of this kind occurs in every part of the world, and independently of -all religious differences. In human beings there is an undeniable -ethical tendency, rooted (however<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_261" id="Page_261">[Pg 261]</a></span> unconsciously) in Metaphysics, and -without an explanation of life on these lines, no religion could gain -standing-ground; for it is by virtue of their ethical side that they -all alike keep their hold on the mind. Every religion makes its body -of dogmas the basis of the moral incentive which each man feels, but -which he does not, on that account, understand; and it unites the two -so closely, that they appear to be inseparable. Indeed the priests take -special pains to proclaim unbelief and immorality as one and the same -thing. The reason is thus apparent, why believers regard unbelievers -as identical with the vicious, and why expressions such as "godless," -"atheistic," "unchristian," "heretic," etc., are used as synonymes -for moral depravity. The religions have, in fact, a sufficiently easy -task. <b>Faith</b> is the principle they start from. Hence they are -in a position to simply insist on its application to their dogmas, -and this, even to the point of employing threats. But philosophy -has no such convenient instrument ready to hand. If the different -systems be examined, it will be found that the situation is beset with -difficulties, both as regards the foundation to be provided for Ethics, -and in relation to the point of connection discoverable in any such -foundation with the given metaphysical theory. And yet,—as I have -emphasised in the introduction, with an appeal to the authority of -Wolff and Kant—we are under the stringent necessity of obtaining from -Metaphysics a support for Moral Science.</p> - -<p>Now, of all the problems that the human intellect has to grapple with, -that of Metaphysics is by far the hardest; so much so that it is -regarded by many<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_262" id="Page_262">[Pg 262]</a></span> thinkers as absolutely insoluble. Apart from this, -in the present case, I labour under the special disadvantage which -the form of a detached monograph involves. In other words, I am not -at liberty to start from some definite metaphysical system, of which -I may be an adherent; because, if I did, either it would have to be -expounded in detail, which would take too much space; or else there -would be the necessity of supposing it granted and unquestioned,—an -exceedingly precarious proceeding. The consequence is that I am as -little able to use the synthetic method here as in the foregoing Part. -Analysis alone is possible: that is, I must work backwards from the -effects to their cause, and not <i>vice versâ</i>. This stern obligation, -however, of having at the outset no previous hypothesis, no standpoint -other than the commonly accepted one, made the discovery of the ethical -basis so laborious that, as I look back upon the task, I seem to have -accomplished some wondrous feat of dexterity, not unlike that of a man -who executes with subtlest skill in mid air what otherwise is only -done on a solid support. But now that we have come to the question -whether there can be given a metaphysical explanation of the foundation -obtained, the difficulty of proceeding without any assumption becomes -so enormous, that but one course appears to me open, namely, to attempt -nothing beyond a general sketch of the subject. I shall, therefore, -indicate rather than elaborate the line of thought: I shall point out -the way leading to the goal, but not follow it thither; in short, I -shall present but a very small part of what, under other circumstances, -could be<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_263" id="Page_263">[Pg 263]</a></span> adduced. In adopting this attitude for the reasons stated, I -wish, before beginning, to emphatically remark, that in any case the -actual problem put forward has now been solved; consequently, that what -I here add is an <i>opus supererogationis</i>, an appendix to be given and -taken entirely at will.</p> - - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_1_139" id="Footnote_1_139"></a><a href="#FNanchor_1_139"><span class="label">[1]</span></a> We ought to realise as if before our eyes that moment -of time when the end comes to each one for deliverance from living. -Because all who are about to die are seized with repentance, -remembering, as they do, their unjust deeds, and being filled with the -wish that they had always acted justly.—<i>Ἀπαλλαγή = Erlösung. V</i>. -Joannes Stobeaus, <i>Florilegium,</i> edit. Meineke; publ. Lipsiae: Teubner, -1855. Vol. ii., p. 164, l. 7 sqq.—(<i>Translator</i>.)</p></div> - -<hr class="chap" /> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_264" id="Page_264">[Pg 264]</a></span></p> - - - - -<h4><a name="CHAPTER_IId" id="CHAPTER_IId">CHAPTER II.</a></h4> - -<h3>THE METAPHYSICAL GROUNDWORK.</h3> -<hr class="r5" /> - -<p>So far all our steps have been supported by the firm rock of -experience. But at this point it fails us, and the solid earth sinks -from under our feet, as we press forward in our search after a final -theoretical satisfaction, there, where no experience can ever by any -possibility penetrate; and happy shall we be, if perchance we gain -one hint, one transient gleam, that may bring us a certain measure -of content. What, however, shall not desert us is the honesty that -has hitherto attended our procedure. We shall not make shift with -dreams, and serve up fairy tales, after the fashion of the so-called -post-Kantian philosophers; nor shall we, like them, seek, by a wordy -exuberance, to impose upon the reader, and cast dust in his eyes. A -little is all we promise; but that little will be presented in perfect -sincerity.</p> - -<p>The principle, which we discovered to be the final explanation of -Ethics, now in turn itself requires explaining; so that our present -problem has to deal with that natural Compassion, which in every man -is innate and indestructible, and which has been shown to be the sole -source of <b>non-egoistic</b> conduct, this kind alone being of real -moral worth. Now<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_265" id="Page_265">[Pg 265]</a></span> many modern thinkers treat the conceptions of Good -and Bad as <b>simple</b>, that is, as neither needing, nor admitting -any elucidation, and then they go on, for the most part, to talk very -mysteriously and devoutly of an "Idea of the Good," out of which -they make a pedestal for their moral system, or at least a cloak for -their poverty.<a name="FNanchor_1_140" id="FNanchor_1_140"></a><a href="#Footnote_1_140" class="fnanchor">[1]</a> Hence I am obliged in this connection to point out -parenthetically, that these conceptions are anything but <b>simple</b>, -much less <i>a priori</i>; that they in fact express a relation, and are -derived from the commonest daily experience. Whatever is in conformity -with the desires of any individual will, is, relatively to it, termed -<b>good</b>; for instance, good food, good roads, a good omen; the -contrary is called <b>bad</b>, and, in the case of living beings, -<b>malicious</b>. And so one, who by virtue of his character, has -no wish to oppose what others strive after, but rather, as far as -he reasonably may, shows himself favourable and helpful to them; -one, who, instead of injuring, assists his neighbours, and promotes -their interests, when he can; is named by the latter, in respect to -themselves, a <b>good man</b>; the term <b>good</b> being applied to -him in the sense of the above definition, and from their own point of -view, which is thus relative,<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_266" id="Page_266">[Pg 266]</a></span> empirical, and centred in the passive -subject. Now, if we examine the nature of such a man, not only as it -affects others, but as it is in itself, we are enabled by the foregoing -exposition to perceive that the virtues of justice and loving-kindness, -which he practises, are due to a direct participation in weal and -woe external to himself; and we have learnt that the source of such -participation is Compassion. If, further, we pause to consider what is -the essential part in this type of character, we shall certainly find -it to lie in the fact that such a person <b>draws less distinction -between himself and others than is usually done</b>.</p> - -<p>In the eyes of the malicious individual this difference is so great -that he takes direct delight in the spectacle of suffering,—a delight, -which he accordingly seeks without thought of any other benefit to -himself, nay, sometimes, even to his own hurt. From the egoist's point -of view the same difference is still large enough to make him bring -much trouble on his neighbours, in order to obtain a small personal -advantage. Hence for both of these, between the <b>ego</b>, which is -limited to their own persons, and the <b>non-ego</b>, which includes -all the rest of the world, there is fixed a great gulf, a mighty abyss: -<i>Pereat mundus, dum ego salvus sim</i> (the world may perish, provided -I be safe), is their maxim. For the good man, on the contrary, this -distinction is by no means so pronounced; indeed, in the case of -magnanimous deeds, it appears to become a vanishing quantity, because -then the weal of another is advanced at the cost of the benefactor, the -self of another placed on an equality with his own. And when it is a -question of<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_267" id="Page_267">[Pg 267]</a></span> saving a number of fellow-beings, total self-obliteration -may be developed, the one giving his life for many.</p> - -<p>The inquiry now presents itself, whether the latter way of looking at -the relation subsisting between the ego and the non-ego, which forms -the mainspring of a good man's conduct, is mistaken and due to an -illusion; or whether the error does not rather attach to the opposite -view, on which Egoism and Malice are based.</p> - -<p>No doubt the theory lying at the root of Egoism is, from the -<b>empirical standpoint</b>, perfectly justified. From the testimony of -experience, the <b>distinction</b> between one's own person and that of -another appears to be absolute. I do not occupy the same space as my -neighbour, and this difference, which separates me from him physically, -separates me also from his weal and woe. But in the first place, it -should be observed that the knowledge we have Of our own selves is by -no means exhaustive and transparent to its depths. By means of the -intuition, which the brain constructs out of the data supplied by the -senses, that is to say, in an indirect manner, we recognise our body as -an object in space; through an inward perception, we are aware of the -continuous series of our desires, of our volitions, which arise through -the agency of external motives; and finally, we come to discern the -manifold movements, now stronger, now weaker, of our will itself, to -which all feelings from within are ultimately traceable. And that is -all: <b>for the perceiving faculty is not in its turn perceived</b>. -On the contrary, the real substratum of our whole phaenomenal nature, -our inmost<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_268" id="Page_268">[Pg 268]</a></span> essence in itself, that which wills and perceives, is not -accessible to us. We see only the outward side of the ego; its inward -part is veiled in darkness. Consequently, the knowledge we possess -of ourselves is in no sort radical and complete, but rather very -superficial. The larger and more important part of our being remains -unknown, and forms a riddle to speculate about; or, as Kant puts it: -"The ego knows itself only as a phaenomenon; of its real essence, -whatever that may be, it has no knowledge." Now, as regards that side -of the self which falls within our ken, we are, undoubtedly, sharply -distinguished, each from the other; but it does not follow therefrom -that the same is true of the remainder, which, shrouded in impenetrable -obscurity, is yet, in fact, the very substance of which we consist. -There remains at least the possibility that the latter is in all men -uniform and identical.</p> - -<p>What is the explanation of all plurality, of all numerical diversity of -existence? Time and Space. Indeed it is only through the latter that -the former is possible: because the concept "many" inevitably connotes -the idea either of succession (time), or of relative position (space). -Now, since a homogeneous plurality is composed of <b>Individuals</b>, -I call Space and Time, as being the conditions of multiplicity, the -<i>principium individuationis</i> (the principle of individuation); and I -do not here pause to consider whether this expression was exactly so -employed by the Schoolmen.</p> - -<p>If in the disclosures which Kant's wonderful acumen gave to the world -there is anything true beyond the shadow of a doubt, this is to be -found<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_269" id="Page_269">[Pg 269]</a></span> in the Transcendental Aesthetics, that is to say, in his -doctrine of the ideality of Space and Time. On such solid foundations -is the structure built that no one has been able to raise even an -apparent objection. It is Kant's triumph, and belongs to the very small -number of metaphysical theories which may be regarded as really proved, -and as actual conquests in that field of research. It teaches us that -Space and Time are the forms of our own faculty of intuition, to which -they consequently belong, and not to the objects thereby perceived; -and further, that they can in no way be a condition of things in -themselves, but rather attach only to their mode of <b>appearing</b>, -such as is alone possible for us who have a consciousness of the -external world determined by strictly physiological limits. Now, if to -the Thing in itself, that is, to the Reality underlying the kosmos, as -we perceive it, Time and Space are foreign; so also must multiplicity -be. Consequently that which is objectivated in the countless phaenomena -of this world of the senses cannot but be a unity, a single indivisible -entity, manifested in each and all of them. And conversely, the web of -plurality, woven in the loom of Time and Space, is not the Thing in -itself, but only its <b>appearance-form</b>. Externally to the thinking -subject, this appearance-form, as such, has no existence; it is merely -an attribute of our consciousness, bounded, as the latter is, by -manifold conditions, indeed, depending on an organic function.</p> - -<p>The view of things as above stated,—that all plurality is only -apparent, that in the endless series<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_270" id="Page_270">[Pg 270]</a></span> of individuals, passing -simultaneously and successively into and out of life, generation -after generation, age after age, there is but one and the same entity -really existing, which is present and identical in all alike;—this -theory, I say, was of course known long before Kant; indeed, it may be -carried back to the remotest antiquity. It is the alpha and omega of -the oldest book in the world, the sacred <span class="gesperrt">Vedas</span>, whose dogmatic part, -or rather esoteric teaching, is found in the <span class="gesperrt">Upanishads</span>.<a name="FNanchor_2_141" id="FNanchor_2_141"></a><a href="#Footnote_2_141" class="fnanchor">[2]</a> There, in -almost every page this profound doctrine lies<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_271" id="Page_271">[Pg 271]</a></span> enshrined; with tireless -repetition, in countless adaptations, by many varied parables and -similes it is expounded and inculcated. That such was, moreover, the -fount whence Pythagoras drew his wisdom, cannot be doubted, despite -the scanty knowledge we possess of what he taught. That it formed -practically the central point in the whole philosophy of the Eleatic -School, is likewise a familiar fact. Later on, the New Platonists -were steeped in the same, one of their chief tenets being: <i>διὰ τὴν -ἑνότητα ἀπάντων πάσας ψuχὰς mίαν εἶναι</i>. (All souls are one, because -all things form a unity.) In the ninth century we find it unexpectedly -appearing in Europe. It kindles the spirit of no less a divine than -Johannes Scotus Erigena, who endeavours to clothe it with the forms and -terminology of the Christian religion. Among the Mohammedans we detect -it again in the rapt mysticism of the <span class="gesperrt">Sûfi</span>.<a name="FNanchor_3_142" id="FNanchor_3_142"></a><a href="#Footnote_3_142" class="fnanchor">[3]</a> In the West Giordano -Bruno cannot resist the impulse to utter it aloud; but his reward is a -death of shame and torture. And at the same time we find the Christian -Mystics losing themselves in it, against their own will and<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_272" id="Page_272">[Pg 272]</a></span> intention, -whenever and wherever we read of them!<a name="FNanchor_4_143" id="FNanchor_4_143"></a><a href="#Footnote_4_143" class="fnanchor">[4]</a> Spinoza's name is identified -with it. Lastly, in our own days, after Kant had annihilated the old -dogmatism, and the world stood aghast at its smoking ruins, the same -teaching was revived in Schelling's eclectic philosophy. The latter -took all the systems of Plotinus, Spinoza, Kant, and Jacob Boehm, -and mixing them together with the results of modern Natural Science, -speedily served up a dish sufficient to satisfy for the moment the -pressing needs of his contemporaries; and then proceeded to perform a -series of variations on the original theme. The consequence is that -in the learned circles of Germany this line of thought has come to be -generally accepted; indeed even among people of ordinary education, -it is almost universally diffused.<a name="FNanchor_5_144" id="FNanchor_5_144"></a><a href="#Footnote_5_144" class="fnanchor">[5]</a> A solitary exception is formed -by the University philosophers of the present day. They have the hard -task of fighting what is called <b>Pantheism</b>. Being brought<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_273" id="Page_273">[Pg 273]</a></span> -through the stress of battle into great embarrassment and difficulty, -they anxiously catch now at the most pitiful sophisms, now at phrases -of choicest bombast, so only they may patch together some sort of -respectable disguise, wherein to dress up the favourite petticoat -Philosophy, that has duly received official sanction. In a word, the -<i>Ἕν καὶ πᾱν</i><a name="FNanchor_6_145" id="FNanchor_6_145"></a><a href="#Footnote_6_145" class="fnanchor">[6]</a> has been in all ages the laughing-stock of fools, for -the wise a subject of perpetual meditation. Nevertheless, the strict -demonstration of this theory is only to be obtained from the Kantian -teaching, as I have just shown. Kant himself did not carry it out; -after the fashion of clever orators, he only gave the premises, leaving -to his hearers the pleasure of drawing the conclusion.</p> - -<p>Now if plurality and difference belong only to the -<b>appearance-form</b>; if there is but one and the same Entity -manifested in all living things: it follows that, when we obliterate -the distinction between the <i>ego</i> and the <i>non-ego</i>, we are not the -sport of an illusion. Rather are we so, when we maintain the reality of -individuation,—a thing the Hindus call <span class="gesperrt">Mâyâ</span>,<a name="FNanchor_7_146" id="FNanchor_7_146"></a><a href="#Footnote_7_146" class="fnanchor">[7]</a> that is, a deceptive -vision, a phantasma. The former theory we have found to be the actual -source of the phaenomenon of Compassion; indeed Compassion is nothing -but its translation into definite expression. This, therefore, is -what I should regard as the metaphysical foundation of Ethics, and -should describe<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_274" id="Page_274">[Pg 274]</a></span> it as the sense which identifies the <b>ego</b> with -the <b>non-ego</b>, so that the individual directly recognises in -another his own self, his true and very being. From this standpoint -the profoundest teaching of theory pushed to its furthest limits may -be shown in the end to harmonise perfectly with the rules of justice -and loving-kindness, as exercised; and conversely, it will be clear -that practical philosophers, that is, the upright, the beneficent, -the magnanimous, do but declare through their acts the same truth as -the man of speculation wins by laborious research, by the loftiest -flights of intellect. Meanwhile moral excellence stands higher than -all theoretical sapience. The latter is at best nothing but a very -unfinished and partial structure, and only by the circuitous path of -reasoning attains the goal which the former reaches in one step. He -who is morally noble, however deficient in mental penetration, reveals -by his conduct the deepest insight, the truest wisdom; and puts to -shame the most accomplished and learned genius, if the latter's acts -betray that his heart is yet a stranger to this great principle,—the -metaphysical unity of life.</p> - -<p>"Individuation is real. The <i>principium individuationis,</i> with the -consequent distinction of individuals, is the order of things in -themselves. Bach living unit is an entity radically different from all -others. In my own self alone I have my true being; everything outside -it belongs to the <b>non-ego</b>, and is foreign to me." This is -the creed to the truth of which flesh and bone bear witness: which is -at the root of all egoism, and which finds its objective expression in -every loveless, unjust, or malicious act.</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_275" id="Page_275">[Pg 275]</a></span></p> - -<p>"Individuation is merely an appearance, born of Space and Time; the -latter being nothing else than the forms under which the external -world necessarily manifests itself to me, conditioned as they are -by my brain's faculty of perception. Hence also the plurality and -difference of individuals is but a <b>phaenomenon</b>, that is, exists -only as my mental picture. My true inmost being subsists in every -living thing, just as really, as directly as in my own consciousness -it is evidenced only to myself." This is the higher knowledge: for -which there is in Sanskrit the standing formula, <b>tat tvam asi</b>, -"that art thou."<a name="FNanchor_8_147" id="FNanchor_8_147"></a><a href="#Footnote_8_147" class="fnanchor">[8]</a> Out of the depths of human nature it wells up in -the shape of Compassion, and is therefore the source of all genuine, -that is, disinterested virtue, being, so to say, incarnate in every -good deed. It is this which in the last resort is invoked, whenever we -appeal to gentleness, to loving-kindness; whenever we pray for mercy -instead of justice. For such appeal, such prayer is in reality the -effort to remind a fellow-being of the ultimate truth that we are all -one and the same entity. On the other hand, Egoism and its derivatives, -envy, hatred, the spirit of persecution, hardness of heart, revenge, -pleasure at the sight of suffering, and cruelty, all claim support -from the other view of things, and seek their justification in it. The -emotion and joy we experience when we hear of, still more, when we see, -and most of all, when<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_276" id="Page_276">[Pg 276]</a></span> we ourselves do, a noble act, are at bottom -traceable to the feeling of certainty such a deed gives, that, beyond -all plurality and distinction of individuals, which the <i>principium -individuationis</i>, like a kaleidoscope, shows us in ever-shifting -evanescent forms, there is an underlying unity, not only truly -existing, but actually accessible to us; for lo! in tangible, objective -form, it stands before our sight.</p> - -<p>Of these two mental attitudes, according as the one or the other is -adopted, so the <i>ϕιλία</i> (Love) or the <i>νεῑκος</i> (Hatred) of Empedocles -appears between man and man. If any one, who is animated by <i>νεῑκος</i>, -could forcibly break in upon his most detested foe, and compel him to -lay bare the inmost recesses of his heart; to his surprise, he would -find again in the latter his very self. For just as in dreams, all the -persons that appear to us are but the masked images of ourselves; so -in the dream of our waking life, it is our own being which looks on -us from out our neighbours' eyes,—though this is not equally easy to -discern. Nevertheless, <b>tat tvam asi</b>.</p> - -<p>The preponderance of either mode of viewing life not only determines -single acts; it shapes a man's whole nature and temperament. Hence the -radical difference of mental habit between the <b>good</b> character -and the <b>bad</b>. The latter feels everywhere that a thick wall -of partition hedges him off from all others. For him the world is -an <b>absolute non-ego</b>, and his relation to it an essentially -hostile one; consequently, the key-note of his disposition is hatred, -suspicion, envy, and pleasure in seeing distress. The good character, -on the other hand, lives in an external<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_277" id="Page_277">[Pg 277]</a></span> world homogeneous with his -own being; the rest of mankind is not in his eyes a non-ego; he -thinks of it rather as "myself once more." He therefore stands on an -essentially amicable footing with every one: he is conscious of being, -in his inmost nature, akin to the whole human race,<a name="FNanchor_9_148" id="FNanchor_9_148"></a><a href="#Footnote_9_148" class="fnanchor">[9]</a> takes direct -interest in their weal and woe, and confidently assumes in their -case the same interest in him. This is the source of his deep inward -peace, and of that happy, calm, contented manner, which goes out on -those around him, and is as the "presence of a good diffused." Whereas -the bad character in time of trouble has no trust in the help of his -fellow-creatures. If he invokes aid, he does so without confidence: -obtained, he feels no real gratitude for it; because he can hardly -discern therein anything but the effect of others' folly. For he is -simply incapable of recognising his own self in some one else; and -this, even after it has furnished the most incontestible signs of -existence in that other person: on which fact the repulsive nature of -all unthankfulness in reality depends. The moral isolation, which thus -naturally and inevitably encompasses the bad man, is often the cause -of his becoming the victim of despair. The good man, on the contrary, -will appeal to his neighbours for assistance, with an assurance equal -to the consciousness he has of being ready himself to help them. As I -have said: to the one type, humanity is a <b>non-ego</b>; to the other, -"myself once more." The magnanimous character, who forgives his enemy,<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_278" id="Page_278">[Pg 278]</a></span> -and returns good for evil, rises to the sublime, and receives the -highest meed of praise; because he recognises his real self even there -where it is most conspicuously disowned.</p> - -<p>Every purely beneficent act all help entirely and genuinely unselfish, -being, as such, exclusively inspired by another's distress, is, in -fact, if we probe the matter to the bottom, a dark enigma, a piece -of mysticism put into practice; inasmuch as it springs out of, and -finds its only true explanation in, the same higher knowledge that -constitutes the essence of whatever is mystical.</p> - -<p>For how, otherwise than metaphysically, are we to account for even -the smallest offering of alms made with absolutely no other object -than that of lessening the want which afflicts a fellow-creature? Such -an act is only conceivable, only possible, in so far as the giver -<b>knows</b> that it is his very self which stands before him, clad in -the garments of suffering; in other words, so far as he recognises the -essential part of his own being, under a form not his <b>own</b>.<a name="FNanchor_10_149" id="FNanchor_10_149"></a><a href="#Footnote_10_149" class="fnanchor">[10]</a> -It now becomes apparent, why in the foregoing part I have called -Compassion the great mystery of Ethics.</p> - -<p>He, who goes to meet death for his fatherland, has freed himself from -the illusion which limits a man's existence to his own person. Such a -one has broken the fetters of the <i>principium individuationis</i>. In his<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_279" id="Page_279">[Pg 279]</a></span> -widened, enlightened nature he embraces all his countrymen, and in them -lives on and on. Nay, he reaches forward to, and merges himself in the -generations yet unborn, for whom he works; and he regards death as a -wink of the eyelids, so momentary that it does not interrupt the sight.</p> - -<p>We may here sum up the characteristics of the two human types -above indicated. To the Egoist all other people are uniformly and -intrinsically strangers. In point of fact, he considers nothing -to be truly real, except his own person, and regards the rest of -mankind practically as troops of phantoms, to whom he assigns merely -a relative existence, so far as they may be instruments to serve, or -barriers to obstruct, his purposes; the result being an immeasurable -difference, a vast gulf between <b>his ego</b> on the one side, and the -<b>non-ego</b> on the other. In a word, he lives exclusively centred in -his own individuality, and on his death-day he sees all reality, indeed -the whole world, coming to an end along with himself.<a name="FNanchor_11_150" id="FNanchor_11_150"></a><a href="#Footnote_11_150" class="fnanchor">[11]</a> Whereas the -Altruist discerns in all other persons, nay, in every living thing, -his own entity, and feels therefore that his being is commingled, is -identical with the being of whatever is alive. By death he loses only -a small part of himself. Patting off the narrow limitations of the -individual, he passes into the larger life of all mankind, in whom he -always recognised, and, recognising, loved, his very self; and the -illusion of Time and Space, which separated his consciousness from that -of others, vanishes. These two opposite modes<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_280" id="Page_280">[Pg 280]</a></span> of viewing the world are -probably the chief, though not indeed the sole cause of the difference -we find between very good and exceptionally bad men, as to the manner -in which they meet their last hour.</p> - -<p>In all ages Truth, poor thing, has been put to shame for being -paradoxical; and yet it is not her fault. She cannot assume the form -of Error seated on his throne of world-wide sovereignty. So then, with -a sigh, she looks up to her tutelary god, Time, who nods assurance -to her of future victory and glory, but whose wings beat the air so -slowly with their mighty strokes, that the individual perishes or ever -the day of triumph be come. Hence I, too, am perfectly aware of the -paradox which this metaphysical explanation of the ultimate ethical -phaenomenon must present to Western minds, accustomed, as they are, to -very different methods of providing Morals with a basis. Nevertheless, -I cannot offer violence to the truth. All that is possible for me to -do, out of consideration for European blindness, is to assert once -more, and demonstrate by actual quotation, that the Metaphysics of -Ethics, which I have here suggested, was thousands of years ago the -fundamental principle of Indian wisdom. And to this wisdom I point -back, as Copernicus did to the Pythagorean cosmic system, which was -suppressed by Aristotle and Ptolemaeus. In the Bhagavadgîtâ (Lectio -XIII.; 27, 28), according to A. W. von Schlegel's translation, we find -the following passage: <i>Eundem in omnibus animantibus consistentem -summum dominum, istis pereuntibus kaud pereuntem qui cernit, is vere -cernit. Eundem vero<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_281" id="Page_281">[Pg 281]</a></span> cernens ubique praesentem dominum, non violat -semet ipsum sua ipsius culpa: exinde pergit ad summum iter</i>.<a name="FNanchor_12_151" id="FNanchor_12_151"></a><a href="#Footnote_12_151" class="fnanchor">[12]</a></p> - -<p>With these hints towards the elaboration of a metaphysical basis for -Ethics I must close, although an important step still remains to be -taken. The latter would presuppose a further advance in Moral Science -itself; and this can hardly be made, because in the West the highest -aim of Ethics is reached in the theory of justice and virtue. What lies -beyond is unknown, or at any rate ignored. The omission, therefore, is -unavoidable; and the reader<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_282" id="Page_282">[Pg 282]</a></span> need feel no surprise, if the above slight -outline of the Metaphysics of Ethics does not bring into view—even -remotely—the corner-stone of the whole metaphysical edifice, nor -reveal the connection of all the parts composing the <i>Divina Commedia</i>. -Such a presentment, moreover, is involved neither in the question set, -nor in my own plan. A man cannot say everything in one day, and should -not answer more than he is asked.</p> - -<p>He who tries to promote human knowledge and insight is destined to -always encounter the opposition of his age, which is like the dead -weight of some mass that has to be dragged along: there on the ground -it lies, a huge inert deformity, defying all efforts to quicken -its shape with new life. But such a one must take comfort from the -certainty that, although prejudices beset his path, yet the truth is -with him. And Truth does but wait for her ally, Time, to join her; once -he is at her side, she is perfectly sure of victory, which, if to-day -delayed, will be won <b>to-morrow</b>.</p> - -<hr class="r5" /> -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_1_140" id="Footnote_1_140"></a><a href="#FNanchor_1_140"><span class="label">[1]</span></a> The conception of <i>the Good</i>, in its purity, is an -<i>ultimate</i> one, "an <i>absolute Idea</i>, whose substance loses itself in -infinity."—(Bouterweek: <i>Praktische Aphorismen</i>, p. 54.) -</p> -<p> -It is obvious that this writer would like to transform the familiar, -nay, trivial conception "<i>Good</i>" into a sort of <i>Διἴπετής,</i> to be set -up as an idol in his temple. <i>Διἴπετής</i> lit., "fallen from Zeus"; and -so "heaven-sent," "a thing of divine origin." Cf. Horn., <i>Il.</i>. XVI, -174; <i>Od.</i>. IV. 477. Eur., <i>Bacch.</i>, 1268.—(<i>Translator</i>.)</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_2_141" id="Footnote_2_141"></a><a href="#FNanchor_2_141"><span class="label">[2]</span></a>The genuineness of the <span class="gesperrt">Oupnek'hat</span> has been disputed on -the ground of certain marginal glosses which were added by Mohammedan -copyists, and then interpolated in the text, it has, however, been -fully established by the Sanskrit scholar, F.H.H. Windischmann -(junior) in his <i>Sancara, sive de Theologumenis Vedanticorum</i>, 1833, -p. xix; and also by Bochinger in his book <i>De la Vie Contemplative -chez les Indous</i>, 1831, p. 12. The reader though ignorant of Sanskrit, -may yet convince himself that Anquetil Duperron's word for word Latin -translation of the Persian version of the <span class="gesperrt">Upanishads</span> made by the -martyr of this creed, the Sultan <span class="gesperrt">Dârâ-Shukoh</span>, is based on a thorough -and exact knowledge of the language. He has only to compare it with -recent translations of some of the <span class="gesperrt">Upanishads</span> by Rammohun Boy, by -Poley, and especially with that of Colebrooke, as also with Röer's, -(the latest). These writers are obviously groping in obscurity, and -driven to make shift with hazy conjectures, so that without doubt their -work is much less accurate. More will be found on this subject in Vol. -II. of the <i>Parerga</i>, chap. 16, § 184. [<i>V. The Upanishads</i>, translated -by Max Müller, in <i>The Sacred Books of the East</i>, Vols. I. and XV. Cf. -also Max Müller, <i>The Science of Language</i>, Vol. I., p. 171. Now that -an adequate translation of the original exists, the <span class="gesperrt">Oupnek'hat</span> has -only an historical interest. The value which Schopenhauer attached to -the <span class="gesperrt">Upanishads</span> is very clearly expressed also in the <i>Welt als Wille -und Vorstellung</i>, Preface to the first Edition; and in the <i>Parerga,</i> -II., chap, xvi., § 184.—(<i>Translator</i>.)]</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_3_142" id="Footnote_3_142"></a><a href="#FNanchor_3_142"><span class="label">[3]</span></a> For the <span class="gesperrt">Sûfi</span>, more correctly *Sūfīy a sect which appeared -already in the first century of the <span class="gesperrt">Hijrah</span>, the reader is referred to: -Tholuck's <i>Blüthensammlung aus der Morgenländischen Mystik</i> (Berlin, -1825); Tholuck's <i>Sûfismus, sive Theosophia Persarum Pantheistica</i> -(Berlin, 1821); Kremer's <i>Geschichte der Herrschenden Ideen des -Islâms</i> (Leipzig, 1868); <i>Palmer's Oriental Mysticism</i> (London, 1867); -Gobineau's <i>Les Religions et les Philosophies dans l'Asie Centrale</i> -(2nd edit. Paris, 1866); <i>A Dictionary of Islâm</i>, by T. P. Hughes -(London, 1885), p. 608 sqq.—(<i>Translator</i>.)</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_4_143" id="Footnote_4_143"></a><a href="#FNanchor_4_143"><span class="label">[4]</span></a> This is too well-known to need verification by references. -The <i>Cantico del Sole</i> by St. Francis of Assisi sounds almost like a -passage from the <span class="gesperrt">Upanishads</span> or the <span class="gesperrt">Bhagavadgîtâ</span>.—(<i>Translator</i>.)</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_5_144" id="Footnote_5_144"></a><a href="#FNanchor_5_144"><span class="label">[5]</span></a> -</p> -<p> -<i>On peut assez longtemps, chez notre espèce,</i><br /> -<i>Fermer la porte à la Raison.</i><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;"><i>Mais, dès qu'elle entre avec adresse,</i></span><br /> -<i>Elle reste dans la maison,</i><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;"><i>Et bientôt elle en est maîtresse.</i></span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 12em;">—(Voltaire.)</span><br /> -</p> -<p> -(We men may, doubtless, all our lives<br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">To Reason bar the door.</span><br /> -But if to enter she contrives,<br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">The house she leaves no more,</span><br /> -And soon as mistress there presides.)<br /> -</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_6_145" id="Footnote_6_145"></a><a href="#FNanchor_6_145"><span class="label">[6]</span></a> <i>Τὸ ἔν</i>= the eternal Reality outside Time and Space <i>Tὸ -πᾱν</i> = the phaenomenal universe.—(<i>Translator</i>.)</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_7_146" id="Footnote_7_146"></a><a href="#FNanchor_7_146"><span class="label">[7]</span></a> Mâyâ is "the delusive reflection of the true eternal -Entity."—(<i>Translator</i>.)</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_8_147" id="Footnote_8_147"></a><a href="#FNanchor_8_147"><span class="label">[8]</span></a> This expression is used in the Brahmanical philosophy -to denote the relation between the world-fiction as a whole and its -individualised parts. <i>V.</i> A. E. Gough, <i>Philosophy of the Upanishads</i>, -1882.—(<i>Translator</i>.)</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_9_148" id="Footnote_9_148"></a><a href="#FNanchor_9_148"><span class="label">[9]</span></a> <i>Homo sum: humani nil a me alienum puto</i>. Terence, -<i>Heaut</i>., I. 1, 25.—(<i>Translator</i>.)</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_10_149" id="Footnote_10_149"></a><a href="#FNanchor_10_149"><span class="label">[10]</span></a> It is probable that many, perhaps, most cases of truly -disinterested Compassion—when they really occur—are due not to any -conscious <i>knowledge</i> of this sort, but to an unconscious impulse -springing from the ultimate unity of all living things, and acting, so -to say, automatically.—(<i>Translator</i>.)</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_11_150" id="Footnote_11_150"></a><a href="#FNanchor_11_150"><span class="label">[11]</span></a> Cf. Richard Wagner: <i>Jesus von Nazareth</i>; pp. -79-90.—(<i>Translator</i>.)</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_12_151" id="Footnote_12_151"></a><a href="#FNanchor_12_151"><span class="label">[12]</span></a> That man is endowed with true insight who sees that -the same ruling power is inherent in all things, and that when these -perish, it perishes not. For if he discerns the same ruling power -everywhere present, he does not degrade himself by his own fault: -thence he passes to the highest path.—For the <i>Bhagavadgîtâ</i> the -reader is referred to Vol. VIII. of <i>The Sacred Books of the East</i> -(Oxford: Clarendon Press), where (p. 105) this passage is translated as -follows:—"He sees (truly) who sees the supreme lord abiding alike in -all entities, and not destroyed though they are destroyed. For he who -sees the lord abiding everywhere alike, does not destroy himself[*] by -himself, and then reaches the highest goal." -</p> -<p> -[*]"Not to have true knowledge, is equivalent to self-destruction." -</p> -<p> -Cf. Fauche: Le Mahā-bhārata: Paris, 1867; Vol. VII., p. 128:— -</p> -<p> -"Celui-là possède une vue nette des choses, qui voit ce principe -souverain en tous les êtres d'une manière égale, et leur survivre, -quand ils périssent. Il ne se fait aucun tort à soi-même par cette vue -d'un principe qui subsiste également partout: puis, après cette vie, il -entre dans la voie supérieure." -</p> -<p> -The obscurity of Schlegel's Latin in the second -sentence is sufficiently removed by these more recent -translations.—(<i>Translator</i>.)</p></div> - -<hr class="chap" /> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_283" id="Page_283">[Pg 283]</a></span></p> - - - - -<h3><a name="JUDICIUM" id="JUDICIUM">JUDICIUM</a></h3> - -<h4>REGIAE DANICAE SCIENTIARUM SOCIETATIS.</h4> - - -<p><i>Quaestionem anno</i> 1837 <i>propositam, "utrum philosophiae moralis -fons et fundamentum in idea moralitatis, quae immediate conscientia -contineatur, et ceteris notionibus fundamentalibus, quae ex ilia -prodeant, explicandis quaerenda sint, an in alio cognoscendi -principio," unus tantum scriptor explicare conatus est, cujus -commentationem, germanico sermone compositam, et his verbis -notatam</i>: "<span style="font-size: 0.8em;">MORAL PREDIGEN IST LEICHT, MORAL BEGRÜNDEN IST SCHWER</span>," -<i>praemio dignam judicare nequivimus. Omisso enim eo, quod potissimum -postulabatur, hoc expeti putavit, ut principium aliquod ethicae -conderetur, itaqae eam partem commentationis suae, in qua principii -ethicae a se propositi et metaphysicae suae nexum exponit, appendices -loco habuit, in qua plus quam postulatum esset praestaret, quum tamen -ipsum thema ejusmodi disputationem flagitaret, in qua vel praecipuo -loco metaphysicae et ethicae nexus consideraretur. Quod autem scriptor -in sympathia fundamentum ethicae constituere conatus est, neque ipsa -disserendi forma nobis satisfecit, neque reapse, hoc fundamentum -sufficere, evicit; quin ipse contra esse confiteri coactus est. Neque -reticendum videtur, plures recentioris aetatis summos philosophos<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_284" id="Page_284">[Pg 284]</a></span> tam -indecenter commemorari, ut justam et gravem offensionem habeat.</i></p> - -<h4>JUDGMENT OF THE DANISH ROYAL SOCIETY OF SCIENCES.</h4> - -<p>In 1837 the following question was set as subject for a Prize Essay: -"Is the fountain and basis of Morals to be sought for in an idea of -morality which lies directly in the consciousness (or conscience), and -in the analysis of the other leading ethical conceptions which arise -from it? Or is it to be found in some other source of knowledge?" There -was only one competitor; but his dissertation, written in German, -and bearing the motto: "<i>To preach Morality is easy, to found it is -difficult</i>"<a name="FNanchor_1_152" id="FNanchor_1_152"></a><a href="#Footnote_1_152" class="fnanchor">[1]</a> we cannot adjudge worthy of the Prize. He has omitted -to deal with the essential part of the question, apparently thinking -that he was asked to establish some fundamental principle of Ethics. -Consequently, that part of the treatise, which explains how the moral -basis he proposes is related to his system of metaphysics, we find -relegated to an appendix, as an "<i>opus supererogationis</i>," although -it was precisely the connection between Metaphysics and Ethics that -our question required to be put in the first and foremost<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_285" id="Page_285">[Pg 285]</a></span> place. The -writer attempts to show that compassion is the ultimate source of -morality; but neither does his mode of discussion appear satisfactory -to us, nor has he, in point of fact, succeeded in proving that such a -foundation is adequate. Indeed he himself is obliged to admit that it -is not.<a name="FNanchor_2_153" id="FNanchor_2_153"></a><a href="#Footnote_2_153" class="fnanchor">[2]</a> Lastly, the Society cannot pass over in silence the fact -that he mentions several recent philosophers of the highest standing in -an unseemly manner, such as to justly occasion serions offence.</p> -<hr class="r5" /> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_1_152" id="Footnote_1_152"></a><a href="#FNanchor_1_152"><span class="label">[1]</span></a> The Academy has been good enough to insert the second -"is" on its own account, by way of proving the truth of Longinus' -theory (<i>V. De Sublimitate</i>: chap. 39, <i>ad fin.</i>), that the addition -or subtraction of a single syllable is sufficient to destroy the whole -force of a sentence. (P. Longinus: <i>De Sublimitate Libellus</i>; edit. -Joannes Vablen, Bonnae, 1887.)—(<i>Translator</i>)</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_2_153" id="Footnote_2_153"></a><a href="#FNanchor_2_153"><span class="label">[2]</span></a> I suppose this is the meaning of <i>contra esse confiteri</i>.— -(<i>Translator</i>.)</p></div> - - - - - - - - - -<pre> - - - - - -End of Project Gutenberg's The Basis of Morality, by Arthur Schopenhauer - -*** END OF THIS PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK THE BASIS OF MORALITY *** - -***** This file should be named 44929-h.htm or 44929-h.zip ***** -This and all associated files of various formats will be found in: - http://www.gutenberg.org/4/4/9/2/44929/ - -Produced by Marc D'Hooghe at http://www.freeliterature.org -(Images generously made available by the Internet Archive -- Cornell University) - - -Updated editions will replace the previous one--the old editions -will be renamed. - -Creating the works from public domain print editions means that no -one owns a United States copyright in these works, so the Foundation -(and you!) can copy and distribute it in the United States without -permission and without paying copyright royalties. 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