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diff --git a/.gitattributes b/.gitattributes new file mode 100644 index 0000000..6833f05 --- /dev/null +++ b/.gitattributes @@ -0,0 +1,3 @@ +* text=auto +*.txt text +*.md text diff --git a/44508-0.txt b/44508-0.txt new file mode 100644 index 0000000..8ccb14a --- /dev/null +++ b/44508-0.txt @@ -0,0 +1,2278 @@ +*** START OF THE PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK 44508 *** + +THE MYTH OF A GUILTY NATION + +BY + +ALBERT JAY NOCK + +("HISTORICUS") + +[Illustration: Decoration] + +NEW YORK B.W. HUEBSCH, INC. MCMXXII + + +COPYRIGHT, 1922, BY +THE FREEMAN, INC. + +COPYRIGHT, 1922, BY +B. W. HUEBSCH, INC. + +PRINTED IN U. S. A. + + + + +PREFACE + + +This book is made up of a series of articles originally published in the +_Freeman_. It was compiled to establish one point and only one, namely: +that the German Government was not solely guilty of bringing on the war. +I have not been at all concerned with measuring the German Government's +share of guilt, with trying to show that it was either great or small, +or that it was either less or more than that of any other Government or +association of Governments. All this is beside the point. I do not by +any means wish to escape the responsibility of saying that I think the +German Government's share of guilt in the matter is extremely small; so +small by comparison with that of the major Powers allied against +Germany, as to be inconsiderable. That is my belief, demonstrable as I +think by such evidence as has now become available to any candid person. +But this has nothing whatever to do with the subject-matter of this +volume. If the guilt of the German Government could be proved to be ten +times greater than it was represented to be by the publicity-bureaux of +the Allied Powers, the conclusion established in the following chapters +would still remain. Guilty as the German Government may have been; +multiply by ten any estimate that any person, interested or +disinterested, informed or uninformed, may put upon its guilt; the fact +remains that it was far, very far indeed, from being the only guilty +party concerned. + +If there were no practical end to be gained by establishing this +conclusion, if one's purpose were only to give the German Government the +dubious vindication of a _tu quoque_, the effort would be hardly worth +making. But as I say at the outset, there is at stake an extremely +important matter, one that will unfavourably affect the peace of the +world for at least a generation--the treaty of Versailles. If the German +Government may not be assumed to be solely responsible for the war, this +treaty is indefensible; for it is constructed wholly upon that +assumption. It becomes, not a treaty, but a verdict pronounced after the +manner of Brennus, by a superior power which, without regard to justice, +arrogates to itself the functions of prosecutor, jury and judge. + +It is probably superfluous to point out that this treaty, conceived in +the pure spirit of the victorious Apache, has, in practice, utterly +broken down. It has not worked and it will not work, because it sets at +defiance certain economic laws which are as inexorable as the law of +gravitation. The incidence of these laws was well understood and clearly +foretold, at the time of the peace-conference, by an informed minority +in Europe, notably by Mr. Maynard Keynes in his volume entitled "The +Economic Consequences of the Peace." In this country also, a minority, +sufficiently informed to know its right hand from its left in economic +affairs, stood aghast in contemplation of the ruinous consequences which +it perceived as inevitable under any serious attempt to put this vicious +instrument into operation. But both here and in Europe, this minority +was very small and uninfluential, and could accomplish nothing against +the ignorant and unreasoning bad temper which the politicians kept +aflame. + +The treaty had therefore to go to the test of experiment; and of the +results of this, one need surely say nothing, for they are obvious. The +harder Germany tried to fulfill the conditions of the treaty, and the +nearer she came to doing so, the worse things went in all the countries +that were presumably to benefit by her sacrifice. The Central Empires +are, as the informed minority in all countries has been from the +beginning anxiously aware, the key-group in the whole of European +industry and commerce. If they must work and trade under unfavourable +conditions, they also thereby automatically impose correspondingly +unfavourable conditions upon the whole of Europe; and, correspondingly +unfavourable conditions are thereby in turn automatically set up +wherever the trade of Europe reaches--for example, in the United States. +There is now no possible doubt about this, for one has but to glance at +the enormous dislocations of international commerce, and the universal +and profound stagnation of industry, in order to prove it to one's +complete satisfaction. Germany wisely and far-sightedly made a sincere +and vigourous effort to comply with the conditions of the treaty; and by +so doing she has carried the rest of the world to the verge of economic +collapse. The damage wrought by the war was in general of a spectacular +and impressive type, and was indeed very great--no one would minimize +it--but the damage, present and prospective, wrought by the treaty of +peace is much greater and more far-reaching. + +The political inheritors of those who made the peace are now extremely +uneasy about it. Their predecessors (including Mr. Lloyd George, who +still remains in office) had flogged up popular hatred against the +Central Empires at such a rate that when they took office they still +had, or thought they had, to court and indulge this hatred. Thus we +found Mr. Secretary Hughes, for example, in his first communication to +the German Government, laying it down that the basis of the Versailles +treaty was sound--that Germany was solely responsible for the war. He +spoke of it quite in the vein of Mr. Lloyd George, as a _chose jugée_. +After having promulgated the treaty with such immense ceremony, and +raised such preposterous and extravagant popular expectations on the +strength of it, the architects of the treaty bequeathed an exceedingly +difficult task to their successors; the task of letting the public down, +diverting their attention with this or that gesture, taking their mind +off their disappointments and scaling down their expectations, so that +in time it might be safe to let the Versailles treaty begin to sink out +of sight. + +The task is being undertaken; the curious piece of mountebankery +recently staged in Washington, for example, was an ambitious effort to +keep the peoples, particularly those of Europe, hopeful, confiding and +diverted; and if economic conditions permit, if times do not become too +hard, it may succeed. The politicians can not say outright that the +theory of the Versailles treaty is dishonest and outrageous, and that +the only chance of peace and well-being is by tearing up the treaty and +starting anew on another basis entirely. They can not say this on +account of the exigencies of their detestable trade. The best that they +can do is what they are doing. They must wait until the state of public +feeling permits them to ease down from their uncompromising stand upon +the treaty. Gradually, they expect, the public will accustom itself to +the idea of relaxations and accommodations, as it sees, from day to day, +the patent impracticability of any other course; feelings will weaken, +asperities soften, hatreds die out, contacts and approaches of one kind +or another will take place; and finally, these public men or their +political inheritors will think themselves able to effect in an +unobtrusive way, such substantial modifications of the treaty of +Versailles as will amount to its annulment. + +The process is worth accelerating by every means possible; and what I +have here done is meant to assist it. There are many persons in the +country who are not politicians, and who are capable and desirous of +approaching a matter of this kind with intellectual honesty. Quite +possibly they are not aware, many of them, that the Versailles treaty +postulates the sole responsibility of the German Government for bringing +on the war; undoubtedly they are not acquainted with such evidence as I +have here compiled to show that this assumption is unjust and erroneous. +Having read this evidence, they will be in a position to review the +terms of the Versailles treaty and reassess the justice of those terms. +They will also be able to understand the unwillingness, the inability, +of the German people to acquiesce in those terms; and they can +comprehend the slowness and difficulty wherewith peace and good feeling +are being re-established in Europe, and the extreme precariousness and +uncertainty of Europe's situation--and our own, in +consequence--throughout a future that seems longer than one cares to +contemplate. + +The reader will perceive at once that this book is a mere compilation +and transcription of fact, containing not a shred of opinion or of any +original matter. On this account it was published anonymously in its +serial form, because it seemed to me that such work should be judged +strictly as it stands, without regard to the authority, or lack of +authority, which the compiler might happen to possess. Almost all of it +is lifted straight from the works of my friends Mr. Francis Neilson and +Mr. E. D. Morel. I earnestly hope--indeed, it is my chief motive in +publishing this book--that it may serve as an introduction to these +words. I can not place too high an estimate upon their importance to a +student of British and Continental diplomacy. They are, as far as I +know, alone in their field; nothing else can take their place. They are +so thorough, so exhaustive and so authoritative that I wonder at their +being so little known in the United States. Mr. Morel's works,[1] "Ten +Years of Secret Diplomacy," "Truth and the War," and "Diplomacy +Revealed," are simply indispensable. Mr. Neilson's book "How Diplomats +Make War,"[2] is not an easy book to read; no more are Mr. Morel's; but +without having read it no serious student can possibly do justice to the +subject. + +ALBERT JAY NOCK + +FOOTNOTES: + +[1] "Ten Years of Secret Diplomacy." $1.25. "Truth and the War." $1.25. +E. D. Morel. New York: B. W. Huebsch. + +"Diplomacy Revealed." E. D. Morel. London, 8 & 9 Johnson's Court: +National Labour Press. + +[2] "How Diplomats Make War." Francis Neilson. New York: B. W. Huebsch. +$2.00 + + + + +THE MYTH OF A GUILTY NATION + + + + +I + + +The present course of events in Europe is impressing on us once more the +truth that military victory, if it is to stand, must also be +demonstrably a victory for justice. In the long run, victory must appeal +to the sense of justice in the conquered no less than in the conquerors, +if it is to be effective. There is no way of getting around this. Mr. +Gilbert K. Chesterton is right when he says that if the South had not +finally accepted the outcome of the Civil War as being on the whole +just, Lincoln would have been wrong in trying to preserve the Union; +which is only another way of expressing Lincoln's own homely saying that +nothing is ever really settled until it is settled right. The present +condition of Europe is largely due to the fact that the official +peacemakers have not taken into their reckoning the German people's +sense of justice. Their mistake--it was also Mr. Wilson's great +mistake--was in their disregard of what Bismarck called the +imponderabilia. The terms of the peace treaty plainly reflect this +mistake. That is largely the reason why the treaty is to-day inoperative +and worthless. That is largely why the Governments of Europe are +confronted with the inescapable alternative: they can either tear up the +treaty and replace it by an understanding based on justice, or they can +stick to the treaty and by so doing protract indefinitely the dismal +succession of wars, revolutions, bankruptcies and commercial +dislocations that the treaty inaugurated. + +That is the situation; and it is a situation in which the people of the +United States have an interest to preserve--the primary interest of a +creditor, and also the interest of a trader who needs a large and stable +market. It is idle to suppose that American business can prosper so long +as Europe remains in a condition of instability and insolvency. Our +business is adjusted to the scale of a solvent Europe, and it can not be +readjusted without irreparable damage. Until certain matters connected +with the war are resolutely put under review, Europe can not be +reconstructed, and the United States can not be prosperous. The only +thing that can better our own situation is the resumption of normal +economic life in Europe; and this can be done only through a thorough +reconsideration of the injustices that have been put upon the German +people by the conditions of the armistice and the peace treaty. + +Of these injustices, the greatest, because it is the foundation for all +the rest, is the imputation of Germany's sole responsibility for the +war. The German people will never endure that imputation; they should +never be expected to endure it. Nothing can really be settled until the +question of responsibility is openly and candidly re-examined, and an +understanding established that is based on facts instead of on official +misrepresentation. This question is by no means one of abstract justice +alone, or of chivalry and fair play towards a defeated enemy. It is a +question of self-interest, immediate and urgent. However it may be +regarded by the American sense of justice and fair play, it remains, to +the eye of American industry and commerce, a straight question of +dollars and cents. The prosperity of the United States, as we are +beginning to see, hangs upon the economic re-establishment of Europe. +Europe can not possibly be settled upon the present terms of peace; and +these terms can not be changed without first vacating the theory of +Germany's sole responsibility, because it is upon this theory that the +treaty of Versailles was built. This theory, therefore, must be +re-examined in the light of evidence that the Allied and Associated +Governments have done their best either to ignore or to suppress. Hence, +for the American people, the way to prosperity lies through a searching +and honest examination of this theory that has been so deeply implanted +in their mind--the theory of a brigand-nation, plotting in solitude to +achieve the mastery of the world by fire and sword. + +Americans, however, come reluctantly to the task of this examination, +for two reasons. First, we are all tired of the war, we hate to think of +it or of anything connected with it, and as far as possible, we keep it +out of our minds. Second, nearly every reputation of any consequence in +this country, political, clerical, academic and journalistic, is already +committed, head over ears, to the validity of this theory. How many of +our politicians are there whose reputations are not bound up +inextricably with this legend of a German plot? How many of our +newspaper-editors managed to preserve detachment enough under the +pressure of war-propaganda to be able to come forward to-day and say +that the question of responsibility for the war should be re-opened? How +can the pro-war liberals and ex-pacifists ask for such an inquest when +they were all swept off their feet by the specious plea that _this_ war +was a different war from all other wars in the history of mankind? What +can our ministers of religion say after the unreserved endorsement that +they put upon the sanctity of the Allied cause? What can our educators +say, after having served so zealously the ends of the official +propagandists? From our journalists and men of letters what can we +expect--after all his rodomontade about Potsdam and the Potsdam gang, +how could we expect Dr. Henry Van Dyke, for instance, to face the fact +that the portentous Potsdam meeting of the Crown Council on 5 July, +1914, _never took place at all_? There is no use in trying to put a +breaking-strain upon human nature, or, on the other hand, in assuming a +pharisaic attitude towards its simplest and commonest frailties. It is +best, under the circumstances, merely to understand that on this +question every institutional voice in the United States is tongue-tied. +Press, pulpit, schools and universities, charities and foundations, +forums, all are silent; and to expect them to break their silence is to +expect more than should be expected from the pride of opinion in average +human nature. + + + + +II + + +In examining the evidence let us first take Mr. Lloyd George's own +statement of the theory. Except in one particular, it presents the case +against Germany quite as it has been rehearsed by nearly every +institutional voice in the United States. On 4 August, 1917--after +America's entry into the war--the British Premier said: + + + What are we fighting for? To defeat the most dangerous conspiracy + ever plotted against the liberty of nations; carefully, skilfully, + insidiously, clandestinely planned in every detail, with ruthless, + cynical determination. + + +Except for one point, this statement sums up what we have all heard to +be the essential doctrine of the war. The one missing point in Mr. Lloyd +George's indictment is that the great German conspiracy was launched +upon an _unprepared_ Europe. In Europe itself, the official +propagandists did not make much of this particular point, for far too +many people knew better; but in the United States it was promulgated +widely. Indeed, this romance of Allied unpreparedness was an essential +part of the whole story of German responsibility. Germany, so the +official story ran, not only plotted in secret, but she sprung her plot +upon a Europe that was wholly unprepared and unsuspecting. Her action +was like that of a highwayman leaping from ambush upon a defenceless +wayfarer. Belgium was unprepared, France unprepared, Russia unprepared, +England unprepared; and in face of an unprovoked attack, these nations +hurriedly drew together in an extemporized union, and held the "mad dog" +at bay with an extemporized defence until they could devise a plan of +common action and a pooling of military and naval resources. + +Such, then, is a fair statement of the doctrine of the war as America +was taught it. Next, in order to show how fundamental this doctrine is +to the terms of the peace treaty, let us consider another statement of +Mr. Lloyd George made 3 March, 1921: + + + For the allies, German responsibility for the war is fundamental. + It is the basis upon which the structure of the treaty of + Versailles has been erected, and if that acknowledgment is + repudiated or abandoned, the treaty is destroyed.... We wish, + therefore, once and for all, to make it quite clear that German + responsibility for the war must be treated by the Allies as a + _chose jugée_. + + +Thus the British Premier explicitly declares that the treaty of +Versailles is based upon the theory of Germany's sole responsibility. + +Now, as against this theory, the main facts may be summarized as +follows: (1) The British and French General Staffs had been in active +collaboration for war with Germany ever since January 1906. (2) The +British and French Admiralty had been in similar collaboration. (3) The +late Lord Fisher [First Sea Lord of the British Admiralty], twice in the +course of these preparations, proposed an attack upon the German fleet +and a landing upon the coast of Pomerania, _without a declaration of +war_. (4) Russia had been preparing for war ever since 1909, and the +Russian and French General Staffs had come to a formal understanding +that Russian mobilization should be held equivalent to a declaration of +war. (5) Russian mobilization was begun in the spring of 1914, under the +guise of "tests," and these tests were carried on continuously to the +outbreak of the war. (6) In April, 1914, four months before the war, +the Russian and French naval authorities initiated joint plans for +maritime operations against Germany. (7) Up to the outbreak of the war, +Germany was selling grain in considerable quantities to both France and +Russia. (8) It can not be shown that the German Government ever in a +single instance, throughout all its dealings with foreign Governments, +demanded or intimated for Germany anything more than a position of +economic equality with other nations. + +These facts, among others to which reference will hereafter be made, +have come to light only since the outbreak of the war. They effectively +dispose of the theory of an unprepared and unsuspecting Europe; and a +historical survey of them excludes absolutely, and stamps as utterly +untenable and preposterous, the theory of a deliberate German plot +against the peace of the world. + + + + +III + + +Let us now consider the idea so generally held in America, though not in +Europe, that in 1914, England and the Continental nations were not +expecting war and not prepared for war. The fact is that Europe was as +thoroughly organized for war as it could possibly be. The point to which +that organization was carried by England, France and Russia, as compared +with Germany and Austria, may to some extent be indicated by statistics. +In 1913, Russia carried a military establishment (on a peace footing) of +1,284,000 men; France, by an addition of 183,000 men, proposed to raise +her peace-establishment to a total of 741,572. Germany, by an addition +of 174,373 men, proposed to raise her total to 821,964; and Austria, by +additions of 58,505 already made, brought her total up to 473,643. These +are the figures of the British War Office, as furnished to the House of +Commons in 1913. + +Here is a set of figures that is even more interesting and significant. +From 1909 to 1914, the amount spent on new naval construction by +England, France and Russia, as compared with Germany, was as follows: + + + ENGLAND FRANCE RUSSIA GERMANY + + 1909 £11,076,551 £ 4,517,766 £ 1,758,487 £10,177,062 + + 1910 £14,755,289 £ 4,977,682 £ 1,424,013 £11,392,856 + + 1911 £15,148,171 £ 5,876,659 £ 3,216,396 £11,710,859 + + 1912 £16,132,558 £ 7,114,876 £ 6,897,580 £11,491,187 + + 1913 £16,883,875 £ 8,893,064 £12,082,516 £11,010,883 + + 1914 £18,676,080 £11,772,862 £13,098,613 £10,316,264 + + +These figures can not be too carefully studied by those who have been +led to think that Germany pounced upon a defenceless and unsuspecting +Europe like a cat upon a mouse. If it be thought worth while to consider +also the period of a few years preceding 1909, one finds that England's +superiority in battleships alone was 112 per cent in 1901, and her +superiority rose to nearly 200 per cent in 1904; in which year England +spent £42,431,000 on her navy, and Germany £11,659,000. Taking the +comparative statistics of naval expenditure from 1900, in which year +England spent £32,055,000 on her navy, and Germany spent £7,472,000, +down to 1914 it is absolutely impossible to make the figures show that +Germany enforced upon the other nations of Europe an unwilling +competition in naval armament. + +But the German army! According to all accounts of German militarism +which were suffered to reach these shores, it is here that we shall find +evidence of what Mr. Lloyd George, on 4 August, 1917, called "the most +dangerous conspiracy ever plotted against the liberty of nations; +carefully, skilfully, insidiously, clandestinely planned in every +detail, with ruthless, cynical determination." Well, if one chooses to +hold the current view of German militarism, it must be admitted that +Germany had at her disposal some miraculous means of getting something +for nothing, getting a great deal for nothing, in fact, for on any other +supposition, the figures are far from supporting that view. In 1914 +(pre-war figures), Germany and Austria together carried an +army-expenditure of £92 million; England, France and Russia together +carried one of £142 million. England "had no army," it was said; all her +military strength lay in her navy. If that were true, then it must be +said that she had as miraculous a faculty as Germany's; only, whereas +Germany's was a faculty for getting more than her money's worth, +England's was for getting less than her money's worth. England's +army-expenditure for 1914 (pre-war figures) was £28 million; £4 million +more than Austria's. Nor was this a sudden emergency-outlay. Going back +as far as 1905, we find that she laid out in that year the same amount, +£28 million. In that year, Germany and Austria together spent £48 +million on their armies; England, France and Russia together spent £94 +million on theirs. If between 1905 and 1913, England, France and Russia +spent any such sums upon their armies as their statistics show, and +nothing came of it but an unprepared and unsuspecting Europe in 1914, it +seems clear that the taxpayers of those countries were swindled on an +inconceivably large scale. + + + + +IV + + +At this point, some questions may be raised. Why, in the decade +preceding 1914, did England, France and Russia arm themselves at the +rate indicated by the foregoing figures? Why did they accelerate their +naval development progressively from about £17 million in 1909 to about +£43 million in 1914? Why did Russia alone propose to raise her military +peace-establishment to an army of 1,700,000, more than double the size +of Germany's army? Against whom were these preparations directed, and +understood to be directed? Certainly not against one another. France and +Russia had been bound by a military convention ever since 17 August, +1892; England and France had been bound since January, 1906, by a +similar pact; and this was subsequently extended to include Belgium. +These agreements will be considered in detail hereafter; they are now +mentioned merely to show that the military activity in these countries +was not independent in purpose. France, England, Russia and Belgium +were not uneasy about one another and not arming against one another; +nor is there any evidence that anyone thought that they were. It was +against the Central Empires only that these preparations were addressed. +Nor can one who scans the table of relative expenditure easily believe +that the English-French-Russian combination was effected for purely +defensive purposes; and taking the diplomatic history of the period in +conjunction with the testimony of the budgets, such belief becomes +impossible. + + + + +V + + +The British Government is the one which was most often represented to us +as taken utterly by surprise by the German onslaught on Belgium. Let us +see. The Austrian Archduke was assassinated 28 June, 1914, by three men +who, according to wide report in Europe and absolute certainty in +America, were secret agents of the German Government, acting under +German official instruction. The findings of the court of inquiry showed +that they were Serbs, members of a pan-Slav organization; that the +assassination was plotted in Belgrade, and the weapons with which it was +committed were obtained there.[3] Serbia denied all connexion with the +assassins (the policy of Serbia being then controlled by the Russian +Foreign Office), and then the Russian Government stepped forward to +prevent the humiliation of Serbia by Austria. It is clear from the +published diplomatic documents that the British Foreign Office knew +everything that took place between the assassination and the burial of +the Archduke; all the facts, that is, connected with the murder. The +first dispatch in the British White Paper is dated 20 July, and it is +addressed to the British Ambassador at Berlin. One wonders why not to +the Ambassador at Vienna; also one wonders why the diplomats apparently +found nothing to write about for nearly three weeks between the +Archduke's funeral and 20 July. It is a strange silence. Sir Edward +Grey, however, made a statement in the House of Commons, 27 July, in +which he gave the impression that he got his first information about the +course of the quarrel between Austria and Serbia no earlier than 24 +July, three days before. The Ambassador at Vienna, Sir M. de Bunsen, +had, notwithstanding, telegraphed him that the Austrian Premier had +given him no hint of "the impending storm" and that it was from a +private source "that I received, 15 July, the forecast of what was about +to happen, concerning which I _telegraphed to you the following day_." +Sir Maurice de Bunsen's telegram on this important subject thus +evidently was suppressed; and the only obvious reason for the +suppression is that it carried evidence that Sir E. Grey was thoroughly +well posted by 16 July on what was taking place in Vienna. Sir M. de +Bunsen's allusion to this telegram confirms this assumption; in fact, it +can be interpreted in no other way. + +On 28 July, the House of Commons was informed that Austria had declared +war on Serbia. Two days later, 30 July, Sir E. Grey added the item of +information that Russia had ordered a partial mobilization "which has +not hitherto led to any corresponding steps by other Powers, so far as +our information goes." Sir E. Grey did not add, however, that he knew +quite well what "corresponding steps" other Powers were likely to take. +He knew the terms of the Russian-French military convention, under which +a mobilization by Russia was to be held equivalent to a declaration of +war; he also knew the terms of the English-French agreement which he +himself had authorized--although up to the eve of the war he denied, in +reply to questions in the House of Commons, that any such agreement +existed, and acknowledged it only on 3 August, 1914.[4] He had promised +Sazonov, the Russian Foreign Minister, in 1912, that in the event of +Germany's coming to Austria's aid, Russia could rely on Great Britain to +"stake everything in order to inflict the most serious blow to German +power." To say that Sir E. Grey, and _à fortiori_ Mr. Asquith, the Prime +Minister; Lord Haldane, the Minister for War, whose own book has been a +most tremendous let-down to the fictions of the propagandists; Mr. +Winston Churchill, head of the Admiralty, who at Dundee, 5 June, 1915, +declared that he had been sent to the Admiralty in 1911 with the express +duty laid upon him by the Prime Minister to put the fleet in a state of +instant and constant readiness for war; to say that these men were taken +by surprise and unprepared, is mere levity. + +Austria was supposed to be, and still is by some believed to have been, +Germany's vassal State, and by menacing Serbia to have been doing +Germany's dirty work. No evidence of this has been adduced; and the +trouble with this idea of Austria's status is that it breaks down before +the report of Sir M. de Bunsen, 1 September, 1914, that Austria finally +yielded and agreed to accept all the proposals of the Powers for +mediation between herself and Serbia. She made every concession. +Russian mobilization, however, had begun on 25 July and become general +four days later; and it was not stopped. Germany then gave notice that +she would mobilize her army if Russian mobilization was not stopped in +twelve hours; and also, knowing the terms of the Russian-French +convention of 1892, she served notice on France, giving her eighteen +hours to declare her position. Russia made no reply; France answered +that she would do what she thought best in her own interest; and almost +at the moment, on 1 August, when Germany ordered a general mobilization, +Russian troops were over her border, the British fleet had been +mobilized for a week in the North Sea, and British merchant ships were +lying at Kronstadt, empty, to convey Russian troops from that port to +the Pomeranian coast, in pursuance of the plan indicated by Lord Fisher +in his autobiography, recently published. + +These matters are well summed up by Lord Loreburn, as follows: + + + Serbia gave offence to the Austro-Hungarian Empire, cause of just + offence, as our Ambassador frankly admits in his published + dispatches. We [England] had no concern in that quarrel, as Sir + Edward Grey says in terms. But Russia, the protectress of Serbia, + came forward to prevent her being utterly humiliated by Austria. We + were not concerned in that quarrel either, as Sir Edward also says. + And then Russia called upon France under their treaty to help in + the fight. France was not concerned in that quarrel any more than + ourselves, as Sir Edward informs us. But France was bound by a + Russian treaty, of which he did not know the terms, and then France + called on us for help. We were tied by the relations which our + Foreign Office had created, without apparently realizing that they + had created them. + + +In saying that Sir E. Grey did not know the terms of the Franco-Russian +agreement, Lord Loreburn is generous, probably more generous than he +should be; but that is no matter. The thing to be remarked is that Lord +Loreburn's summing-up comes to something wholly different from Mr. Lloyd +George's "most dangerous conspiracy ever plotted against the liberty of +nations." It comes to something wholly different from the notion +implanted in Americans, of Germany pouncing upon a peaceful, unprepared +and unsuspecting Europe. The German nation, we may be sure, is keenly +aware of this difference; and therefore, any peace which, like the peace +of Versailles, is bottomed on the _chose jugée_ of laying the sole +responsibility for the war at the door of the German nation, or even at +the door of the German Government, is simply impracticable and +impossible. + +FOOTNOTES: + +[3] Six months after the armistice, the bodies of the three assassins +were dug up, according to a Central News dispatch from Prague, "with +great solemnity, in the presence of thousands of the inhabitants. The +remains of _these Serbian officers_ are to be sent to their native +country." This is a naïve statement. It remains to be explained why +these "German agents" should be honoured in this distinguished way by +the Serbs! + +[4] See footnote to chapter XVIII. + + + + +VI + + +If the theory upon which the treaty of Versailles is based, the theory +of a single guilty nation, were true, there would be no trouble about +saying what the war was fought for. The Allied belligerents would have a +simple, straight story to tell; they could describe their aims and +intentions clearly in a few words that any one could understand, and +their story would be reasonably consistent and not vary greatly from +year to year. It would be practically the same story in 1918 as in 1915 +or at any time between. In America, indeed, the story did not greatly +vary up to the spring of 1917, for the reason that this country was +pretty much in the dark about European international relations. Once our +indignation and sympathies were aroused, it was for the propagandists +mostly a matter of keeping them as hot as possible. Few had the +information necessary to discount the plain, easy, understandable story +of a robber nation leaping upon an unprepared and defenceless Europe for +no cause whatever except the lofty ambition, as Mr. Joseph Choate said, +"to establish a world-empire upon the ruins of the British Empire." +Those who had this information could not make themselves heard; and thus +it was that the propagandists had no need to vary the one story that was +most useful to their purpose of keeping us in a state of unreasoning +indignation, and accordingly they did not vary it. + +In Europe and in England, however, the case was different. International +relations were better understood by those who were closer to them than +we were; more questions were raised and more demands made. Hence the +Allied politicians and propagandists were kept busy upon the defensive. +When from time to time the voice of popular discontent or of some +influential body of opinion insisted on a statement of the causes of the +war or of the war-aims of the Allies, they were confronted with the +politician's traditional difficulty. They had to say something plausible +and satisfactory, which yet must be something that effectively hid the +truth of the situation. As the war hung on, their difficulty became +desperate and they threw consistency to the winds, telling any sort of +story that would enable them for the moment to "get by." The publication +of the secret treaties which had been seined out of the quagmire of the +old Russian Foreign Office by the revolutionists made no end of trouble +for them. It is amusing now to remember how promptly these treaties were +branded by the British Foreign Office as forgeries; especially when it +turned out that the actual terms of the armistice--not the nominal +terms, which were those of Mr. Wilson's Fourteen Points, but the actual +terms--were the terms of the secret treaties! The publication of the +secret treaties in this country did not contribute much towards a +disillusionment of the public; the press as a rule ignored or lied about +them, they were not widely read, and few who did read them had enough +understanding of European affairs to interpret them. But abroad they put +a good deal of fat into the fire; and this was a specimen of the kind of +thing that the Allied politicians had to contend with in their efforts +to keep their peoples in line. + +The consequence was that the official and semi-official statements of +the causes of the war and of the war-aims of the Allies are a most +curious hotchpotch. In fact, if any one takes stock in the theory of the +one guilty nation and is therefore convinced that the treaty of +Versailles is just and proper and likely to enforce an enduring peace, +one could suggest nothing better than that he should go through the +literature of the war, pick out these statements, put them in parallel +columns, and see how they look. If the war originated in the unwarranted +conspiracy of a robber nation, if the aims of the Allies were to defeat +that conspiracy and render it impotent and to chastise and tie the hands +of the robber nation--and that is the theory of the treaty of +Versailles--can anyone in his right mind suppose that the Allied +politicians and propagandists would ever give out, or need to give out, +these ludicrously contradictory and inconsistent explanations and +statements? When one has a simple, straight story to tell, and a most +effective story, why complicate it and undermine it and throw all sorts +of doubts upon it, by venturing upon all sorts of public utterances that +will not square with it in any conceivable way? Politicians, of all men, +never lie for the fun of it; their available margin of truth is always +so narrow that they keep within it when they can. Mr. Lloyd George, for +example, is one of the cleverest of politicians. We have already +considered his two statements; first, that of 4 August, 1917: + + + What are we fighting for? To defeat the most dangerous conspiracy + ever plotted against the liberty of nations; carefully, skilfully, + insidiously, clandestinely planned in every detail with ruthless, + cynical determination. + + +--and then that of 3 March, 1921: + + + For the Allies, German responsibility for the war is fundamental. + It is the basis upon which the structure of the treaty of + Versailles has been erected, and if that acknowledgment is + repudiated or abandoned, the treaty is destroyed.... German + responsibility for the war must be treated by the Allies as a + _chose jugée_. + + +A little over two months before Mr. George made this latter utterance, +on 23 December, 1920, he said this: + + + The more one reads memoirs and books written in the various + countries of what happened before the first of August, 1914, the + more one realizes that no one at the head of affairs quite meant + war at that stage. It was something into which they glided, or + rather staggered and stumbled, perhaps through folly; and a + discussion, I have no doubt, would have averted it. + + +Well, it would strike an unprejudiced person that if this were true, +there is a great deal of doubt put upon Mr. Lloyd George's former +statements by Mr. Lloyd George himself. Persons who plot carefully, +skilfully, insidiously and clandestinely, do not glide; they do not +stagger or stumble, especially through folly. They keep going, as we in +America were assured that the German Government did keep going, right up +to The Day of their own choosing. Moreover, they are not likely to be +headed off by discussion; highwaymen are notoriously curt in their +speech and if one attempts discussion with them they become irritable +and peremptory. This is the invariable habit of highwaymen. Besides, if +discussion would have averted war in 1914, why was it not forthcoming? +Certainly not through any fault of the Austrian Government, which made +every concession, as the British Ambassador's report shows, +notwithstanding its grievance against Serbia was a just one. Certainly +not through any fault of the German Government, which never refused +discussion and held its hand with all the restraint possible under the +circumstances just described. Well, then, how is it so clear that German +responsibility for the war should be treated as a _chose jugée_? + + + + +VII + + +People who have a clear and simple case do not talk in this fashion. +Picking now at random among the utterances of politicians and +propagandists, we find an assorted job-lot of aims assigned and causes +alleged, and in all of them there is that curious, incomprehensible and +callous disregard of the power of conviction that a straight story +always exercises, if you have one to tell. In November, 1917, when the +Foreign Office was being pestered by demands for a statement of the +Allied war-aims, Lord Robert Cecil said in the House of Commons, that +the restitution of Alsace and Lorraine to France was a "well-understood +war-aim from the moment we entered the war." As things have turned out, +it is an odd coincidence how so many of these places that have iron or +coal or oil in them seem to represent a well-understood war-aim. Less +than a month before, in October, 1917, General Smuts said that to his +mind the one great dominating war-aim was "the end of militarism, the +end of standing armies." Well, the Allies won the war, but judging by +results, this dominating war-aim seems rather to have been lost sight +of. Mr. Lloyd George again on another occasion, said in the House of +Commons that "self-determination was one of the principles for which we +entered the war ... a principle from which we have never departed since +the beginning of the war." This, too, seems an aim that for some reason +the victorious nations have not quite realized; indeed in some cases, as +in Ireland, for example, there has been no great alacrity shown about +trying to realize it. Viscount Bryce said that the war sprang from the +strife of races and religions in the Balkan countries, and from the +violence done to the sentiment of nationality in Alsace-Lorraine which +made France the ally of Russia. But the fact is that France became the +ally of Russia on the basis of hard cash, and since the Russian +Revolution, she has been a bit out of luck by way of getting her money +back. Mr. Asquith in the House of Commons, 3 August, 1914 said: + + + If I am asked what we are fighting for, I reply in two sentences. + In the first place, to fulfil a solemn international obligation.... + Secondly we are fighting ... to vindicate the principle that small + nationalities are not to be crushed in defiance of international + good faith. + + +Just so: and in the House of Commons, 20 December, 1917, he said: + + + The League of Nations ... was the avowed purpose, the very purpose + ... for which we entered the war and for which we are continuing + the war. + + +You pays your money, you see, and takes your choice. The point to be +made, however, is that one who has a strong case, a real case, never +trifles with it in this way. Would the reader do it? + + + + +VIII + + +Mr. Asquith's citation of a "solemn international obligation" refers to +the so-called Belgian treaties. It will be remembered that the case of +Belgium was the great winning card played by the Allied Governments for +the stakes of American sympathies; and therefore we may here properly +make a survey, somewhat in detail, of the status of Belgium at the +outset of the war. + +Belgium had learned forty years ago how she stood under the treaties of +1831 and 1839. When in the late 'eighties there was likelihood of a +Franco-German war, the question of England's participation under these +treaties was thoroughly discussed, and it was shown conclusively that +England was not obligated. Perhaps the best summary of the case was that +given by Mr. W. T. Stead in the _Pall Mall Gazette_ in the issues of 4 +and 5 February, 1887. After an examination of the treaties of 1831, 1839 +and 1870--an examination unfortunately too long to be quoted here--Mr. +Stead briefly sums up the result of his investigation in the following +statement: + + + There is therefore no English guarantee to Belgium. It is possible + perhaps, to 'construct' such a guarantee; but the case may be + summed up as follows: (1) England is under no guarantee whatever + except such as is common to Austria, France, Russia and Germany; + (2) that guarantee is not specifically of the neutrality of Belgium + at all; and (3) is given, not to Belgium but to the Netherlands. + + +This was the official view of the British Government at the time, and it +is reflected in the celebrated letter signed "Diplomaticus" in the +_Standard_ of 4 February, to which Mr. Stead refers; which, indeed, he +makes the guiding text for his examination. The _Standard_ was then the +organ of Lord Salisbury's Government, and it is as nearly certain as +anything of the sort can be, that the letter signed "Diplomaticus" was +written by the hand of the British Prime Minister, Lord Salisbury +himself. + +How Mr. Asquith's Government in August 1914 came suddenly to extemporize +a wholly different view of England's obligations to Belgium is +excellently told by that inveterate diarist and chronicler, Mr. Wilfred +Scawen Blunt: + + + The obligation of fighting in alliance with France in case of a war + with Germany concerned the honour of three members only of + Asquith's Cabinet, who alone were aware of the exact promises that + had been made. These, though given verbally and with reservations + as to the consent of Parliament, bound the three as a matter of + personal honour, and were understood at the Quai d'Orsay as binding + the British nation. Neither Asquith nor his two companions[5] in + this inner Cabinet could have retained office had they gone back + from their word in spirit or in letter. It would also doubtless + have entailed a serious quarrel with the French Government had they + failed to make it good. So clearly was the promise understood at + Paris to be binding that President Poincaré, when the crisis came, + had written to King George reminding him of it as an engagement + made between the two nations which he counted on His Majesty to + keep. + + Thus faced, the case was laid before the Cabinet, but was found to + fail as a convincing argument for war. It was then that Asquith, + with his lawyer's instinct, at a second Cabinet meeting brought + forward the neutrality of Belgium as a better plea than the other + to lay before a British jury, and by representing the + neutrality-treaties of 1831 and 1839 as entailing an obligation on + England to fight (of which the text of the treaties contains no + word) obtained the Cabinet's consent, and war was declared. + + +Belgium was not thought of by the British Cabinet before 2 August, 1914. +She was brought in then as a means of making the war go down with the +British people. The fact is that Belgium was thoroughly prepared for +war, thoroughly prepared for just what happened to her. Belgium was a +party to the military arrangements effected among France, England and +Russia; for this we have the testimony of Marshal Joffre before the +Metallurgic Committee in Paris, and also the record of the +"conversations" that were carried on in Brussels between the Belgian +chief of staff and Lt.-Col. Barnardiston. On 24 July, 1914, the day when +the Austrian note was presented to Serbia (the note of which Sir E. Grey +had gotten an intimation as early as 16 July by telegraph from the +British Ambassador at Vienna, Sir M. de Bunsen), the Belgian Foreign +Minister, M. Davignon, promptly dispatched to all the Belgian embassies +an identical communication containing the following statement, the +significance of which is made clear by a glance at a map: + + + All necessary steps to ensure respect of Belgian neutrality have + nevertheless been taken by the Government. The Belgian army has + been mobilized and is taking up such strategic positions as have + been chosen to secure the defence of the country and the respect of + its neutrality. The forts of Antwerp and on the Meuse have been put + in a state of defence. + + +It was on the eastern frontier, we perceive, therefore--not on the +western, where Belgium might have been invaded by France--that all the +available Belgian military force was concentrated. Hence, to pretend any +longer that the Belgian Government was surprised by the action of +Germany, or unprepared to meet it; to picture Germany and Belgium as cat +and mouse, to understand the position of Belgium otherwise than that she +was one of four solid allies under definite agreement worked out in +complete practical detail, is sheer absurdity. + +FOOTNOTE: + +[5] Sir E. Grey and Lord Haldane. + + + + +IX + + +If the official theory of German responsibility were correct, it would +be impossible to explain the German Government's choice of the year 1914 +as a time to strike at "an unsuspecting and defenceless Europe." The +figures quoted in Chapter III show that the military strength of +Germany, relatively to that of the French-Russian-English combination, +had been decreasing since 1910. If Germany had wished to strike at +Europe, she had two first-rate chances, one in 1908 and another in 1912, +and not only let them both go by, but threw all her weight on the side +of peace. This is inexplicable upon the theory that animates the treaty +of Versailles. Germany was then in a position of advantage. The occasion +presented itself in 1908, in Serbia's quarrel with Austria over the +annexation of Bosnia and the Herzegovina. Russia, which was backing +Serbia, was in no shape to fight; her military strength, used up in the +Russo-Japanese war, had not recovered. France would not at this time +have been willing to go to war with Germany over her weak ally's +commitments in the Danube States. Germany, however, contented herself +with serving notice on the Tsar of her unequivocal support of Austria; +and this was enough. The Tsar accepted the _fait accompli_ of the +annexation of Bosnia and the Herzegovina; Serbia retired and cooled off; +and Turkey, from whom the annexed province was ravished, was compensated +by Austria. It is not to the point to scrutinize the propriety of these +transactions; the point is that Germany held the peace of Europe in the +hollow of her hand, with immense advantages in her favour, and chose not +to close her hand. The comment of a neutral diplomat, the Belgian +Minister in Berlin, is interesting. In his report of 1 April, 1909, to +the Belgian Foreign Office, he says: + + + The conference scheme elaborated by M. Isvolsky and Sir Edward + Grey; the negotiations for collective representations in Vienna; + and the whole exchange of ideas among London, Paris and Petersburg, + were steadily aimed at forcing Austria-Hungary into a transaction + which would strongly have resembled a humiliation. This humiliation + would have affected Germany as directly and as sensibly as + Austria-Hungary, and would have struck a heavy blow at the + confidence which is inspired in Vienna by the alliance with + Germany. These machinations were frustrated by Germany's + absolutely unequivocal and decided attitude, from which she has + never departed in spite of all the urgings with which she has been + harassed. Germany alone has accomplished the preservation of peace. + The new grouping of the Powers, organized by the King of England, + has measured its forces with the alliance of the Central European + Powers, and has shown itself incapable of impairing the same. Hence + the vexation which is manifested. + + +The last two sentences of the foregoing seem to show--putting it +mildly--that the Belgian Minister did not suspect the German Government +of any aggressive spirit. In the same dispatch, moreover, he remarks: + + + As always, when everything does not go as the French, English or + Russian politicians want it to, the _Temps_ shows its bad temper. + Germany is the scapegoat. + + +Again, at the time of the Balkan War in 1912, Germany had an excellent +opportunity to gratify her military ambition, if she had any, at the +expense of an "unsuspecting and unprepared Europe"; not as advantageous +as in 1908 but more advantageous than in 1914. Serbia's provocations +against Austria-Hungary had become so great that the Austrian Archduke +(assassinated in 1914 at Sarajevo) told the German Emperor personally +that they had reached the limit of endurance. On this occasion also, +however, William II put himself definitely on the side of peace, and in +so doing left the Austrian Government somewhat disappointed and +discontented. Another neutral diplomat reports of the German Foreign +Minister that + + + whatever plans he may have in his head (and he has big ideas), for + winning the sympathies of the young Balkan Powers over to Germany, + one thing is absolutely certain, and that is that he is rigidly + determined to avoid a European conflagration. On this point the + policy of Germany is similar to that of England and France, both of + which countries are determinedly pacifist. + + +This is a fair statement of the English and French position in 1912. +There was a great revulsion of feeling in England after her close shave +of being dragged into war over Morocco and her sentiment was all for +attending to certain pressing, domestic problems. Besides, it was only +in November, 1911, and only through the indiscretion of a French +newspaper, that the British public (and the British Parliament as well) +had learned that the Anglo-French agreement of 1904 had secret articles +attached to it, out of which had emanated the imbroglio over Morocco; +and there was a considerable feeling of distrust towards the Foreign +Office. In fact, Sir E. Grey, the Foreign Minister, was so unpopular +with his own party that quite probably he would have had to get out of +office if he had not been sustained by Tory influence. Mr. W. T. Stead +expressed a quite general sentiment in the _Review of Reviews_ for +December, 1911: + + + The fact remains that in order to put France in possession of + Morocco, we all but went to war with Germany. We have escaped war, + but we have not escaped the national and abiding enmity of the + German people. Is it possible to frame a heavier indictment of the + foreign policy of any British Ministry? The secret, the open + secret, of this almost incredible crime against treaty-faith, + British interests and the peace of the world, is the unfortunate + fact that Sir Edward Grey has been dominated by men in the Foreign + Office who believe all considerations must be subordinated to the + one supreme duty of thwarting Germany at every turn, even if in + doing so British interests, treaty-faith and the peace of the world + are trampled underfoot. I speak that of which I know. + + +This was strong language and it went without challenge, for too many +Englishmen felt that way. In France, the Poincaré-Millerand-Delcassé +combination was getting well into the saddle; but with English public +opinion in this notably undependable condition, English support of +France, in spite of the secret agreement binding the two governments, +was decidedly risky. Thereupon France also was "determinedly pacifist." +Now if Germany had been the prime mover in "the most dangerous +conspiracy ever plotted against the liberty of nations," why did she not +take advantage of that situation? + +Russia, too, was "determinedly pacifist" in 1912, and with good reason. +There was a party of considerable influence in the Tsar's court that was +strongly for going to war in behalf of Serbia, but it was finally headed +off by the Foreign Minister, Sazonov, who knew the state of public +opinion in England and its effect on France, and knew therefore that the +French-Russian-English alliance was not yet in shape to take on large +orders. It is true that the Poincaré-Millerand-Delcassé war-party in +France had proof enough in 1912 that it could count on the British +Government's support; and what France knew, Russia knew. Undoubtedly, +too, the British Government would somehow, under some pretext or other, +possibly Belgian neutrality, have contrived to redeem its obligations as +it did in 1914. But the atmosphere of the country was not favourable and +the thing would have been difficult. Accordingly, Sazonov saw that it +was best for him to restrain Serbia's impetuosity and truculence for +the time being--Russia herself being none too ready--and accordingly he +did so. + +But how? The Serbian Minister at Petersburg says that Sazonov told him +that in view of Serbia's successes "he had confidence in our strength +and believed that we would be able to deliver a blow at Austria. For +that reason we should feel satisfied with what we were to receive, and +consider it merely as a temporary halting-place on the road to further +gains." On another occasion "Sazonov told me that we must work for the +future because we would acquire a great deal of territory from Austria." +The Serbian Minister at Bucharest says that his Russian and French +colleagues counselled a policy of waiting "with as great a degree of +preparedness as possible the important events which must make their +appearance among the Great Powers." How, one may ask, was the Russian +Foreign Office able to look so far and so clearly into the future? If +German responsibility for the war is fundamental, a _chose jugée_, as +Mr. Lloyd George said it is, this seems a strange way for the Russian +Foreign Minister to be talking, as far back as 1912. But stranger still +is the fact that the German Government did not jump in at this juncture +instead of postponing its blow until 1914 when every one was apparently +quite ready to receive it. When the historian of the future considers +the theory of the Versailles treaty and considers the behaviour of the +German Government in the crisis of 1908 and in the crisis of 1912, he +will have to scratch his head a great deal to make them harmonize. + + + + +X + + +By the spring of 1913, the diplomatic representatives of the Allied +Danube States made no secret of the relations in which their Governments +stood to the Tsar's Foreign Office. The Balkan League was put through by +Russian influence and Russia controlled its diplomacy. Serbia was as +completely the instrument of Russia as Poland is now the instrument of +France. "If the Austrian troops invade Balkan territory," wrote Baron +Beyens on 4 April, 1913, "it would give cause for Russia to intervene, +and might let loose a universal war." Now, if Germany had been plotting +"with ruthless, cynical determination," as Mr. Lloyd George said, +against the peace of Europe, what inconceivable stupidity for her not to +push Austria along rather than do everything possible to hold her back! +Why give Russia the benefit of eighteen months of valuable time for the +feverish campaign of "preparedness" that she carried on? Those eighteen +months meant a great deal. In February, 1914, the Tsar arranged to +provide the Serbian army with rifles and artillery, Serbia agreeing to +put half a million soldiers in the field. In the same month Russia +negotiated a French loan of about $100 million for improvements on her +strategic railways and frontier-roads. During the spring, she made +"test" mobilizations of large bodies of troops which were never +demobilized, and these "test" mobilizations continued down to the +outbreak of the war; and in April Russian agents made technical +arrangements with agents of the British and French Admiralties for +possible combined naval action. + +Yes, those eighteen months were very busy months for Russia. True, she +came out at the end of them an "unprepared and unsuspecting" nation, +presumably, for was not all Europe unprepared and unsuspecting? Is it +not so nominated in the Versailles treaty? One can not help wondering, +however, how it is that Germany, "carefully, skilfully, insidiously, +clandestinely planning in every detail" a murderous attack on the peace +of Europe, should have given Russia the inestimable advantage of those +eighteen months. + + + + +XI + + +Mr. E. D. Morel, editor of the British monthly, _Foreign Affairs_, +performed more than a distinguished service--it is a splendid, an +illustrious service--to the disparaged cause of justice, when recently +he translated and published in England through the National Labour +Press, a series of remarkable State documents.[6] This consists of +reports made by the Belgian diplomatic representatives at Paris, London +and Berlin, to the Belgian Minister of Foreign Affairs, covering the +period from 7 February, 1905 to 2 July, 1914. Their authenticity has +never been questioned. They have received no notice in this country; +their content and import were carefully kept from the American people as +long as it was possible to do so, and consequently they remain unknown +except to a few who are students of international affairs or who have +some similar special interest. + +It can hardly be pretended by anyone that Belgian officials had, during +that decade, any particular love or leaning towards Germany. The Belgian +Foreign Office has always been as free from sentimental attachments as +any other. It has always been governed by the same motives that govern +the British, French, German and Russian Foreign Offices. Its number, +like theirs, was number one; it was out, first and last, for the +interests of the Belgian Government, and it scrutinized every +international transaction from the viewpoint of those interests and +those only. It was fully aware of the position of Belgium as a mere +"strategic corridor" and battle-ground for alien armies in case of a +general European war, and aware that Belgium had simply to make the best +of its bad outlook, for nothing else could be done. If the Belgian +Foreign Office and its agents, moreover, had no special love for +Germany, neither had they any special fear of her. They were in no more +or deeper dread of a German invasion than of a British or French +invasion. In fact, in 1911, the Belgian Minister at Berlin set forth in +a most matter-of-fact way his belief that in the event of war, Belgian +neutrality would be first violated by Great Britain.[7] These +observers, in short, may on all accounts, as far as one can see, be +accepted as neutral and disinterested, with the peculiar +disinterestedness of one who has no choice between two evils. + +Well, then, under the circumstances it is remarkable that if Germany +during the ten years preceding August, 1914, were plotting against the +peace of the world, these Belgian observers seem unaware of it. It is +equally noteworthy that if Germany's assault were unprovoked, they seem +unaware of that also. These documents relate in an extremely +matter-of-fact way a continuous series of extraordinary provocations put +upon the German Government, and moreover, they represent the behaviour +of the German Government, under these provocations, in a very favourable +light. On the other hand, they show from beginning to end a most +profound distrust of English diplomacy. If there is any uncertainty +about the causes of ill-feeling between England and Germany, these +Belgian officials certainly do not share it. They regularly speak of +England's jealousy of Germany's economic competition, and the +provocative attitude to which this jealousy gave rise. They speak of it, +moreover, as though it were something that the Belgian Government were +already well aware of; they speak of it in the tone of pure commonplace, +such as one might use in an incidental reference to the weather or to a +tariff-schedule or to any other matter that is well understood and about +which there is no difference of opinion and nothing new to be said. This +is all the more remarkable in view of the fact that it was nominally to +save Belgium and to defend the sanctity of Belgian neutrality that +England entered the war in August, 1914. These Belgian agents are +invariably suspicious of English diplomacy, as Mr. E. D. Morel points +out, "mainly because they feel that it is tending to make the war which +they dread for their country." They persistently and unanimously +"insinuate that if left to themselves, France and Germany would reach a +settlement of their differences, and that British diplomacy was being +continually exercised to envenom the controversy and to draw a circle of +hostile alliances round Germany." This, indeed, under a specious concern +for the "balance of power," has been the historic rôle of English +diplomacy. Every one remembers how in 1866, just before the +Franco-Prussian war, Mr. Matthew Arnold's imaginary Prussian, Arminius +von Thunder-ten-Tronckh, wrote to the editor of the _Pall Mall Gazette_, +begging him to prevail upon his fellow-countrymen "for Heaven's sake not +to go on biting, first the French Emperor's tail, and then ours." + +On 18 February, 1905, the Belgian Minister in Berlin reported thus: + + + The real cause of the English hatred of Germany is the jealousy + aroused by the astonishing development of Germany's merchant navy + and of her commerce and manufactures. This hatred will last until + the English have thoroughly learned to understand that the world's + trade is not by rights an exclusively English monopoly. Moreover, + it is studiously fostered by the _Times_ and a whole string of + other daily papers and periodicals that do not stop short of + calumny in order to pander to the tastes of their readers. + + +At that time the centre of the English navy had just been shifted to the +North Sea, to the accompaniment of a very disturbing and, as at first +reported, a very flamboyant speech from the Civil Lord of the Admiralty, +Mr. Lee. Of the sensation thereby created in Germany, the Belgian +Minister says: + + + In informing the British public that Germany does not dream of any + aggression against England, Count Bülow [the German Chancellor] + said no more than what is recognized by every one who considers the + matter dispassionately. Germany would have nothing to gain from a + contest.... The German fleet has been created with a purely + defensive object. The small capacity of the coal-bunkers in her + High Seas Fleet, and the small number of her cruisers, prove + besides that her fleet is not intended for use at any distance from + the coast. + + +On the other hand, he remarks in the same report: + + + It was obvious that the new disposition of the English navy was + aimed at Germany ... it certainly is not because of Russia, whose + material stock is to a great extent destroyed and whose navy has + just given striking proof of incompetence [in the Russo-Japanese + war]. + + +Such is the tone uniformly adopted by these neutral observers throughout +their reports from 1905 to 1914. On 24 October, 1905, the Belgian +Minister in Paris wrote: + + + England, in her efforts to maintain her supremacy and to hinder the + development of her great German rival, is evidently inspired by the + wish to avoid a conflict, but are not her selfish aims in + themselves bringing it upon us?... She thought, when she concluded + the Japanese alliance and gradually drew France into similar ties, + that she had found the means to her end, by sufficiently + paralysing Germany's powers as to make war impossible. + + +This view of the Anglo-Japanese alliance is interesting and significant, +especially now when that instrument is coming up for renewal, with the +United States standing towards England in the same relation of economic +competitorship that Germany occupied in 1905. True, Viscount Bryce +assured the Institute of Politics at Williams College last summer that +it was not Germany's economic rivalry that disturbed England; but on +this point it would be highly advantageous for the people of the United +States, while there is yet time, to read what the Belgian Minister in +Berlin had to say on 27 October, 1905: + + + A very large number of Germans are convinced that England is either + seeking allies for an attack upon Germany, or else, which would be + more in accordance with British tradition, that she is labouring to + provoke a Continental war in which she would not join, but of which + she would reap the profit. + + I am told that many English people are troubled with similar fears + and go in dread of German aggression. + + I am puzzled upon what foundations such an impression in London can + be based. Germany is absolutely incapable of attacking England.... + Are these people in England really sincere who go about expressing + fears of a German invasion which could not materialize? Are they + not rather pretending to be afraid of it in order to bring on a war + which would annihilate Germany's navy, her merchant-fleet and her + foreign commerce? Germany is as vulnerable to attack as England is + safe from it; and if England were to attack Germany merely for the + sake of extinguishing a rival, it would only be in accordance with + her old precedents. + + In turn she wiped out the Dutch fleet, with the assistance of Louis + XIV; then the French fleet; and the Danish fleet she even destroyed + in time of peace and without any provocation, simply because it + constituted a naval force of some magnitude. + + There are no ostensible grounds for war between Germany and + England. The English hatred for Germany arises solely from jealousy + of Germany's progress in shipping, in commerce and in manufacture. + + +Baron Greindl here presents an opinion very different from that in which +the majority of Americans have been instructed; and before they accept +further instruction at the hands of Viscount Bryce, they had better look +into the matter somewhat for themselves. + +Baron Greindl wrote the foregoing in October. In December, the head of +the British Admiralty, Sir John Fisher, assured Colonel Repington that +"Admiral Wilson's Channel fleet was alone strong enough to smash the +whole German fleet." _Two years_ later, Sir John Fisher wrote to King +Edward VII that "it is an absolute fact that Germany has not laid down +a single dreadnaught, nor has she commenced building a single battleship +or big cruiser for eighteen months.... England has ... ten dreadnaughts +built and building, while Germany in March last had not even begun one +dreadnaught ... we have 123 destroyers and forty submarines. The Germans +have forty-eight destroyers and one submarine." Hence, if Sir John +Fisher knew what he was talking about, and in such matters he usually +did, he furnishes a very considerable corroboration of Baron Greindl's +view of the German navy up to 1905. Looking back at the third chapter of +this book, which deals with the comparative strength of the two navies +and naval groups as developed from 1905 to 1914, the reader may well +raise again Baron Greindl's question, "Are those people in England +really sincere?" + +FOOTNOTES: + +[6] Under the title "Diplomacy Revealed." National Labour Press. 8 and 9 +Johnson's Court, London, E.C., 4, England. + +[7] This belief received some corroboration in the spring of 1912, when +in the course of military "conversations," the British Military Attaché, +Lieutenant-Colonel Bridges, told the Belgian Minister of War that if war +had broken out over the Agadir incident in 1911, the British Government +would have landed troops in Belgium with or without the Belgian +Government's consent. So much did the British Government think of the +"scrap of paper!" + + + + +XII + + +Such is the inveterate suspicion, the melancholy distrust, put upon +English diplomacy by these foreign and neutral observers who could see +so plainly what would befall their own country in the event of a +European war. Such too, was the responsibility which these observers +regularly imputed to the British Foreign Office--the British Foreign +Office which was so soon to fix upon the neutrality of Belgium as a +_casus belli_ and pour out streams of propaganda about the sanctity of +treaties and the rights of small nations! Every one of these observers +exhibits this suspicion and distrust. In March, 1906, when Edward VII +visited Paris and invited the discredited ex-Minister Delcassé to +breakfast, the Belgian Minister at Paris wrote: + + + It looks as though the king wished to demonstrate that the policy + which called forth Germany's active intervention [over Morocco] has + nevertheless remained unchanged.... In French circles it is not + over well received; Frenchmen feeling that they are being dragged + against their will in the orbit of English policy, a policy whose + consequences they dread, and which they generally condemned by + throwing over M. Delcassé. In short, people fear that this is a + sign that England wants so to envenom the situation that war will + become inevitable. + + +On 10 February, 1907, when the English King and Queen visited Paris, he +says: "One can not conceal from oneself that these tactics, though their +ostensible object is to prevent war, are likely to arouse great +dissatisfaction in Berlin and to stir up a desire to risk anything that +may enable Germany to burst the ring which England's policy is +tightening around her." On 28 March, 1907, the Belgian _chargé +d'affaires_ in London speaks of "English diplomacy, whose whole effort +is directed to the isolation of Germany." On the same date, by a curious +coincidence, the Minister at Berlin, in the course of a blistering +arraignment of French policy in Morocco, says: "But at the bottom of +every settlement that has been made, or is going to be made, there lurks +always that hatred of Germany.... It is a sequence of the campaign very +cleverly conducted with the object of isolating Germany.... The English +press is carrying on its campaign of calumny more implacably than ever. +It sees the finger of Germany in everything that goes contrary to +English wishes." On 18 April, 1907, Baron Greindl says of the King of +England's visit to the King of Spain that, like the alliances with Japan +and France and the negotiations with Russia, it is "one of the moves in +the campaign to isolate Germany that is being personally directed with +as much perseverance as success by His Majesty King Edward VII." In the +same dispatch he remarks: "There is some right to regard with suspicion +this eagerness to unite, for a so-called defensive object, Powers who +are menaced by nobody. At Berlin they can not forget that offer of +100,000 men made by the King of England to M. Delcassé." + +On 24 May, 1907, the Minister at London reported that "it is plain that +official England is pursuing a policy that is covertly hostile, and +tending to result in the isolation of Germany, and that King Edward has +not been above putting his personal influence at the service of this +cause." On 19 June, 1907, Count de Lalaing again writes from London of +the Anglo-Franco-Spanish agreement concerning the _status quo_ in the +Mediterranean region, that "it is, however, difficult to imagine that +Germany will not regard it as a further step in England's policy, which +is determined, by every sort of means, to isolate the German Empire." + +Perusal of these documents from beginning to end will show nothing to +offset against the view of English diplomacy exhibited in the foregoing +quotations; nothing to modify or qualify that view in any way. Baron +Greindl, however, speaks highly of the British Ambassador at Berlin, Sir +F. Lascelles, and praises his personal and unsupported attempt to +establish friendly relations between England and Germany. Of this he +says: "I have been a witness for the last twelve years of the efforts he +has made to accomplish it. And yet, possessing as he justly does the +absolute confidence of the Emperor and the German Government, and +eminently gifted with the qualities of a statesman, he has nevertheless +not succeeded very well so far." The next year, 1908, when Sir F. +Lascelles was forced to resign his post, Baron Greindl does not hesitate +to say that "the zeal with which he has worked to dispel +misunderstandings that he thought absurd and highly mischievous for both +countries, does not fall in with the political views of his sovereign." + + + + +XIII + + +King Edward VII died 6 May, 1910. During the early part of 1911, the +Belgian Ministers in London, Paris and Berlin report some indications of +a less unfriendly policy towards Germany on the part of the British +Government. In March of that year, Sir Edward Grey delivered a +reassuring speech on British foreign policy, on the occasion of the +debate on the naval budget. The Belgian Minister in Berlin says of this +that it should have produced the most agreeable impression in Germany if +one could confidently believe that it really entirely reflected the +ideas of the British Government. It would imply, he says, that "England +no longer wishes to give to the Triple Entente the aggressive character +which was stamped upon it by its creator, King Edward VII." He remarks, +however, the slight effect produced in Berlin by Sir E. Grey's speech, +and infers that German public feeling may have "become dulled by the +innumerable meetings and mutual demonstrations of courtesy which have +never produced any positive result," and he adds significantly that +"this distrust is comprehensible." + +It must be remembered that at the time this speech was delivered, +England was under a secret agreement dating from 1904 to secure France's +economic monopoly in Morocco. England was also under a secret obligation +to France, dating from 1906, to support her in case of war with Germany. +It must be above all remembered that this latter obligation carried with +it a contingent liability for the Franco-Russian military alliance that +had been in effect for many years. Thus if Russia went to war with +Germany, France was committed, and in turn England was committed. The +whole force of the Triple Entente lay in these agreements; and it can +not be too often pointed out that they were _secret_ agreements. No one +in England knew until November, 1911, that in 1904 the British +Government had bargained with the French Government, in return for a +free hand in Egypt, to permit France to squeeze German economic +interests out of Morocco--in violation of a published agreement, signed +by all the interested nations, concerning the status of Morocco. No one +in England knew until 3 August, 1914, that England had for several years +been under a military and naval agreement with France which carried the +enormous contingent liability of the Franco-Russian military alliance. +No matter what appeared on the surface of politics; no matter how many +pacific speeches were made by Sir E. Grey and Mr. Asquith, no matter +what the newspapers said, no matter how often and how impressively Lord +Haldane might visit Berlin in behalf of peace and good feeling; _those +secret agreements held_, they were the only things that did hold, and +everything worked out in strict accordance with them and with nothing +else, least of all with any public understanding or any statement of +policy put out for public consumption. It was just as in the subsequent +case of the armistice and the peace--and this is something that has been +far too little noticed in this country. The real terms of the armistice +and of the peace were not the terms of the Fourteen Points or of any of +the multitudinous published statements of Allied war aims. On the +contrary, they were the precise terms of the secret treaties made among +the Allied belligerents during the war, and made public on their +discovery by the Soviet Government in the archives of the Tsarist +Foreign Office. + +It is no wonder then, that the German Government was not particularly +impressed by Sir E. Grey's speech, especially as Germany saw France +helping herself to Moroccan territory with both hands, and England +looking on in indifferent complacency. In May, 1911, on a most +transparent and preposterous pretext, a French army was ordered to march +on Fez, the capital of Morocco. The German Government then informed +France that as the Algeciras Act, which guaranteed the integrity and +independence of Morocco, had thereby gone by the board, Germany would no +longer consider herself bound by its provisions. In June, 30,000 French +troops "relieved" Fez, occupied it and stayed there, evincing no +intention whatever of getting out again, notwithstanding that the +ostensible purpose of the expedition was accomplished; in reality, there +was nothing to accomplish. Two months before this _coup d'état_, Baron +Greindl, the Belgian Minister at Berlin, wrote to the Belgian Foreign +Office as follows: + + + Every illusion, if ever entertained on the value of the Algeciras + Act, which France signed with the firm intention of never + observing, must long since have vanished. She has not ceased for + one moment to pursue her plans of annexation; either by seizing + opportunities for provisional occupations destined to last for ever + or by extorting concessions which have placed the Sultan in a + position of dependence upon France, and which have gradually + lowered him to the level of the Bey of Tunis. + + +A week later, 29 April, Baron Guillaume, who had succeeded M. Leghait as +Belgian Minister in Paris, reported that "there are, so far, no grounds +for fearing that the French expedition will bring about any disturbance +of international policy. Germany is a calm spectator of events." He +adds, significantly, "England, having thrust France into the Moroccan +bog, is contemplating her work with satisfaction." + +France professed publicly that the object of this expedition was to +extricate certain foreigners who were imperilled at Fez; and having done +so, she would withdraw her forces. The precious crew of concessionaires, +profiteers, and dividend-hunters known as the _Comité du Maroc_ had +suddenly discovered a whole French colony living in Fez in a state of +terror and distress. There was, in fact, nothing of the sort. Fez was +never menaced, it was never short of provisions, and there were no +foreigners in trouble. When the expeditionary force arrived, it found no +one to shoot at. As M. Francis de Pressensé says: + + + Those redoubtable rebels who were threatening Fez had disappeared + like dew in the morning. Barely did a few ragged horsemen fire off + a shot or two before turning around and riding away at a furious + gallop. A too disingenuous, or too truthful, correspondent gave the + show away. The expeditionary force complains, he gravely records, + of the absence of the enemy; the approaching harvest season is + keeping all the healthy males in the fields! Thus did the phantom + so dexterously conjured by the _Comité du Maroc_ for the benefit of + its aims, disappear in a night. + + +Nevertheless, the expeditionary force did not, in accordance with the +public professions of the French Government, march out of Fez as soon as +it discovered this ridiculous mare's nest. It remained there and held +possession of the Moorish capital. What was the attitude of the British +Government in the premises? On 2 May, in the House of Commons, Sir +Edward Grey said that "the action taken by France is not intended to +alter the political status of Morocco, and His Majesty's Government can +not see why any objection should be taken to it." + +Germany had remained for eight years a tolerant observer of French +encroachments in Morocco, and quite clearly, as Baron Greindl observes +in his report of 21 April, 1911, could not "after eight years of +tolerance, change her attitude unless she were determined to go to war, +and war is immeasurably more than Morocco is worth." In July, 1911, +however, while the French force of 30,000 was still occupying Fez, +Germany dispatched a gunboat, the "Panther," which anchored off the +coast of Agadir. + + + + +XIV + + +This was the famous "Agadir incident," of which we have all heard. Did +it mean that the worm had turned, that Germany had changed her attitude +and was determined to go to war? It has been so represented; but there +are many difficult inconsistencies involved in that explanation of the +German Government's act, and there is also an alternative explanation +which fits the facts far better. In the first place the "Panther" was +hardly more than an ocean-going tug. She was of 1000 tons burden, +mounting two small naval guns, six machine-guns, and she carried a +complement of only 125 men. Second, she never landed a man upon the +coast of Morocco. She chose for her anchorage a point where the coast is +practically inaccessible; Agadir has no harbour, and there is nothing +near it that offers any possible temptation to the predatory instinct. +No more ostentatiously unimpressive and unmenacing demonstration could +have been devised. Germany, too, was quite well aware that Morocco was +not worth a European war; and as Baron Guillaume said in his report of +29 April, "possibly she [Germany] is congratulating herself on the +difficulties that weigh upon the shoulders of the French Government, and +asks nothing better than to keep out of the whole affair as long as she +is not forced into it by economic considerations." But the most +significant indication that Germany had not changed her attitude is in +the fact that if she were determined upon war, then, rather than two +years later, was her time to go about it. This aspect of Germany's +behaviour has been dealt with in a previous chapter. It can not be too +often reiterated that if Germany really wanted war and was determined +upon war, her failure to strike in 1908, when Russia was prostrate and +France unready, and again in 1912, a few months after the Agadir +incident, when the Balkan war was on, is inexplicable.[8] + +The dispatch of the "Panther" gave the three Belgian observers a great +surprise, and they were much puzzled to account for it. Baron +Guillaume's thoughts at once turned to England. He writes 2 July: + + + It was long regarded as an axiom that England would never allow the + Germans to establish themselves at any point of Moroccan territory. + Has this policy been abandoned; and if so, at what price were they + bought off? + + +During the month of July, while waiting for a statement from the British +Foreign Office, the Belgian observers canvassed the possibility that +Germany's action was a hint that she would like some territorial +compensation for having been bilked out of her share in the Moroccan +market. But the interesting fact, and for the purpose of this book the +important fact, is that none of these diplomats shows the slightest +suspicion that Germany was bent on war or that she had any thought of +going to war. Baron Guillaume says, 28 July, "undoubtedly the present +situation wears a serious aspect.... Nobody, however, wants war, and +they will try to avoid it." He proceeds: + + + The French Government knows that a war would be the death-knell of + the Republic.... I have very great confidence in the Emperor + William's love of peace, notwithstanding the not infrequent air of + melodrama about what he says and does.... Germany can not go to war + for the sake of Morocco, nor yet to exact payment of those + compensations that she very reasonably demands for the French + occupation of Fez, which has become more or less permanent. On the + whole I feel less faith in Great Britain's desire for peace. She + would not be sorry to see the others destroying one another; only, + under those circumstances, it would be difficult for her to avoid + armed intervention.... As I thought from the very first, the crux + of the situation is in London. + + +By the end of July, a different conception of Germany's action seemed to +prevail. It began to be seen that the episode of the "Panther" had been +staged by way of calling for a show-down on the actual intentions and +purposes of the Triple Entente; and it got one. Mr. Lloyd George, "the +impulsive Chancellor of the Exchequer," as Count de Lalaing calls him, +made a typical jingo speech at the Mansion House; a speech which the +Prime Minister, Mr. Asquith, and Sir Edward Grey, the Foreign Minister, +had helped him to compose. The air was cleared at once--England stood by +France--and what better plan could have been devised for clearing the +air than the dispatch of the "Panther"? Germany stood for the policy of +economic equality, the policy of the open door to which all the Powers +interested had agreed in the case of Morocco. France, at the end of a +course of continuous aggression, had put 30,000 troops in occupation of +the capital of Morocco on an infamously unscrupulous pretext, and put +them there to stay, and the British Government "could not see why any +objection should be taken to it." Germany, on the other hand, anchored +an insignificant gunboat off an inaccessible coast, and without landing +a man or firing a shot, left her there as a silent reminder of the +Algeciras Act and the principle of the open door--carefully and even +ostentatiously going no further--and the British Government promptly, +through the mouth of Mr. Lloyd George, laid down a challenge and a +threat. Thereupon Germany and France understood their relative +positions; they understood, even without Sir E. Grey's explicit +reaffirmation of 27 November of the policy of the Triple Entente, that +England would stand by her arrangements with France. Baron Greindl +writes from Berlin 6 December, and puts the case explicitly: + + + Was it not assuming the right of veto on German enterprise for + England to start a hue and cry because a German cruiser cast anchor + in the roads of Agadir, seeing that she had looked on without a + murmur whilst France and Spain had proceeded step by step to + conquer Morocco and to destroy the independence of its Sultan? + + England could not have acted otherwise. She was tied by her secret + treaty with France. The explanation was extremely simple, but it + was not of a sort to allay German irritation. + + +FOOTNOTE: + +[8] Critics of German foreign policy are hard put to it to show that she +was ever guided by territorial ambitions; which is an extremely +troublesome thing when one wants to believe that she proposed in 1914 to +put the world under a military despotism. Can any one show where in a +single instance she ever demanded anything more than economic equality +with other nations, in a foreign market? Certainly she never demanded +more than this in Morocco. Ex-Premier Caillaux says that his predecessor +Rouvier offered Germany a good Moroccan port (Mogador) and some +adjoining territory, and Germany declined. + + + + +XV + + +Let us glance at British political chronology for a moment. King Edward +VII, the chief factor in the Entente, the moving spirit in England's +foreign alliances, had been dead a year. In December, 1905, the Liberal +party had come into power. In April, 1908, Mr. H. H. Asquith became +Prime Minister. In 1910, Anglo-German relations were apparently +improving; in July, 1910, Mr. Asquith spoke of them in the House of +Commons as "of the most cordial character. I look forward to increasing +warmth and fervour and intimacy in these relations year by year." The +great question was, then, in 1911, whether the Liberal Government would +actually, when it came down to the pinch, stick by its secret covenant +with France. Were the new Liberals, were Mr. Asquith, Lord Haldane, Sir +E. Grey, Mr. Lloyd George, true-blue Liberal imperialists, or were they +not? Could France and Russia safely trust them to continue the Foreign +Office policy that Lord Lansdowne had bequeathed to Sir E. Grey; or, +when the emergency came, would they stand from under? After all, there +_had_ been a Campbell-Bannerman; there was no doubt of that; and one, at +least, of the new Liberals, Mr. Lloyd George, had a bad anti-imperialist +record in the South African war. + +The Agadir incident elicited a satisfactory answer to these questions. +The Liberal Government was dependable. However suspiciously the members +of the Liberal Cabinet might talk, they were good staunch imperialists +at heart. They were, as the theologians say, "sound on the essentials." +Baron Greindl wrote, 6 December, 1911: + + + The Entente Cordiale was founded, not on the positive basis of + defence of common interests, but on the negative one of hatred of + the German Empire.... Sir Edward Grey adopts this tradition without + reservation. He imagines that it is in conformity with English + interests.... A revision of Great Britain's policy is all the less + to be looked for, as ever since the Liberal Ministry took office, + and more especially during the last few months, English foreign + policy has been guided by the ideas with which King Edward VII + inspired it. + + + + +XVI + + +Mr. Lloyd George's speech at the Mansion House in July, 1911, after the +German gunboat "Panther" had anchored off the Moroccan coast, gave an +immense impulse to the jingo spirit in France, because it was taken as +definite assurance of England's good faith in seeing her secret +agreements through to a finish. M. Caillaux, the French Premier, appears +to have had his doubts, nevertheless, inasmuch as the British Foreign +Office did not give a straight reply to the French Foreign Office's +inquiry concerning British action in case the Germans landed a force in +Morocco. He says: + + + Are we to understand that our powerful neighbours will go right + through to the end with the resolve which they suggest? Are they + ready for all eventualities? The British Ambassador, Sir Francis + Bertie, with whom I converse, does not give me formal assurances. + It is said, of course, that he would see without displeasure the + outbreak of a conflict between France and Germany; his mind works + in the way attributed to a number of leading British officials at + the Foreign Office. + + +M. Caillaux here suggests the same suspicion of British intentions +which the Belgian diplomats at London, Paris and Berlin intimate +continually throughout their correspondence since 1905.[9] He +accordingly favoured a less energetic policy towards Germany, and was +thrown out of office. Count de Lalaing reported from London, 15 January, +1912, that the revelations which provoked this political crisis were +disagreeable for the English Government. "They seem to prove," he says, +"that the French Premier had been trying to negotiate with Berlin +without the knowledge of the Minister for Foreign Affairs and his other +colleagues, and this is naturally disquieting to a Government whose +interests are bound up with those of France, and which accordingly can +ill tolerate any lapses of this kind." He adds: + + + These revelations have also strengthened the impression that M. + Caillaux had recently favoured an ultra-conciliatory policy towards + Germany, and this impression was felt all the more painfully in + English official circles, as the full extent of the tension between + London and Berlin caused by the Cabinet of St. James's loyal + behaviour towards the Cabinet at Paris had hardly been grasped. + People in England are reluctant to face the fact that they have + been 'more royalist than the King,' and have shown themselves even + less accommodating than the friend they were backing.... + Accordingly the press unanimously hails with delight the departure + of M. Caillaux, and trusts that sounder traditions may be reverted + to without delay. + + +This comment on the position of M. Caillaux is one of the most +interesting observations to be found in these documents. + +FOOTNOTE: + +[9] This is worth noticing since M. Caillaux was the pioneer victim of +the charge of being "pro-German." + + + + +XVII + + +The Balkan war took place in 1912, and the whole history of the year +shows the most mighty efforts of European politicians--efforts which +seem ludicrous and laughable in spite of their tragic quality--to avert +with their left hand the war which they were bringing on with their +right. Mr. Lloyd George is right in saying that no one really wanted +war. What every one wanted, and what every one was trying with might and +main to do, was to cook the omelette of economic imperialism without +breaking any eggs. There was in all the countries, naturally, a jingo +nationalist party which wanted war. In Russia, which was then busily +reorganizing her military forces which had been used up and left +prostrate by the war with the Japanese, the pan-Slavists were +influential and vociferous, but they were not on top. In England there +was a great popular revulsion against the behaviour of the Government +which had so nearly involved the English in a war against Germany the +year before; and Mr. Asquith's Government, which was pacifist in +tendency, was meeting the popular sentiment in every way possible, +_short of the one point of revealing the secret engagements which bound +it to the French Government and contingently to the Russian Government_. +Lord Haldane undertook an official mission to Berlin, which was attended +with great publicity and was popularly supposed to be of a pacificatory +nature; and really, within the limits of the Franco-English diplomatic +agreement, it went as far as it could in the establishment of good +relations. In fact, of course, it came to nothing; as long as the +diplomatic agreement remained in force, it could come to nothing, +nothing of the sort could come to anything; and the diplomatic agreement +being guarded as a close secret, the reason why it must come to nothing +was not apparent. The German Government also made tremendous efforts in +behalf of peace; and it must be noted by those who accept the theory +upon which the treaty of Versailles is based, that if Germany had wished +or intended at any time to strike at the peace of Europe, now was the +moment for her to do so. Instead, the German Emperor in person, and the +German Government, through one of its best diplomatic agents, Baron von +Marschall, met every pacific overture more than half-way, and +themselves initiated all that could be thought of. "There is no doubt," +wrote Baron Beyens from Berlin, "that the Emperor, the Chancellor and +the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs (von Kiderlen-Wächter) are +passionately pacifists." Baron Beyens again says, 28 June, 1912, "The +Emperor is persistent and has not given up hopes of winning back English +sympathies, just as he has succeeded up to a certain point in obtaining +the confidence of the Tsar, by the force of his personal attractions." +Those who believe in the extraordinary notion of an unprepared and +unsuspecting Europe, should read the diplomatic history of the year +1912, when all the chief office-holders in England and on the Continent +were struggling like men caught in a quicksand, or like flies on +fly-paper, to avert, or if they could not avert, to defer the inevitable +war. + +In one country, however, the jingo nationalist and militarist party came +on top; and that country was France. M. Caillaux was succeeded by +Raymond Poincaré; and in January, 1913, Poincaré became President of the +Republic. Up to 1912, the people of France were increasingly indisposed +to war and were developing a considerable impatience with militarism, +and the French Government was responsive to this sentiment. It knew, as +Baron Guillaume remarked at the time of the Agadir incident, that "a war +would be the death-knell of the Republic." M. Caillaux seems to have +measured the feelings of his countrymen quite well. Baron Guillaume says +that after the dispatch of the "Panther," the British Cabinet's first +proposal was that the British and French Governments should each +immediately send two men-of-war to Agadir; and that the French Cabinet +strongly objected. Again, he says in his report of 8 July, 1911, "I am +persuaded that Messrs. Caillaux and de Selves regret the turn given to +the Moroccan affair by their predecessors in office. They were quite +ready to give way, provided they could do so without humiliation." + +The speech of Mr. Lloyd George at the Mansion House, however, which was +taken by the French (and how correctly they took it became apparent on 3 +August, 1914) as a definite assurance of British support against +Germany, gave the militarist-nationalist party the encouragement to go +ahead and dominate the domestic politics of France. It put the +Poincaré-Millerand-Delcassé element on its feet and stiffened its +resolution, besides clearing the way in large measure for its +predominance. On 14 February, 1913, Baron Guillaume reports from Paris +thus: + + + The new President of the Republic enjoys a popularity in France + to-day unknown to any of his predecessors.... Various factors + contribute to explain his popularity. His election had been + carefully prepared in advance; people are pleased at the skilful + way in which, while a Minister, he manoeuvred to bring France to + the fore in the concert of Europe; he has hit upon some happy + phrases that stick in the popular mind. + + +The career of M. Poincaré, in fact, and his management of popular +sentiment, show many features which _mutatis mutandis_, find a parallel +in the career of Theodore Roosevelt. Baron Guillaume adds, however, this +extremely striking observation concerning the popularity of M. Poincaré: + + + But above all, one must regard it as a manifestation of the old + French chauvinistic spirit, which had for many years slumbered, but + which had come to life again since the affair of Agadir. + + +In the same communication to the Belgian Foreign Office, Baron Guillaume +remarks: + + + M. Poincaré is a native of Lorraine, and loses no opportunity of + telling people so. He was M. Millerand's colleague, and the + instigator of his militarist policy. + + Finally, the first word that he uttered at the very moment when he + learned that he was elected President of the Republic, was a + promise that he would watch over and maintain all the means of + national defence. + + +M. Poincaré had not been in office two months when he recalled the +French Ambassador at Petersburg, M. Georges Louis, and appointed in his +stead M. Delcassé. Concerning this stupendous move, Baron Guillaume +reported 21 February, 1913, to the Belgian Foreign Office thus: + + + The news that M. Delcassé is shortly to be appointed Ambassador at + Petersburg burst like a bomb here yesterday afternoon.... He was + one of the architects of the Franco-Russian alliance, and still + more so of the Anglo-French _entente_. + + +Baron Guillaume goes on to say that he does not think that M. Delcassé's +appointment should be interpreted as a demonstration against Germany; +but he adds: + + + I do think, however, that M. Poincaré, a Lorrainer, was not sorry + to show, from the first day of entering on his high office, how + anxious he is to stand firm and hold aloft the national flag. That + is the danger involved in having M. Poincaré at the Elysée in these + anxious days through which Europe is passing. It was under his + Ministry that the militarist, slightly bellicose instincts of the + French woke up again. He has been thought to have a measure of + responsibility for this change of mood. + + +M. Georges Louis, who had represented the French Government at +Petersburg for three years, was a resolute opponent of the militarist +faction in France, and was therefore distinctly _persona non grata_ to +the corresponding faction in Russia. At the head of this faction stood +Isvolsky, who was a friend of M. Poincaré and a kindred spirit; hence +when M. Poincaré became Premier, an attempt was made to oust M. Louis, +but it was unsuccessful. M. Delcassé, on the other hand, is described by +Mr. Morel as "the man identified more than any other man in French +public life with the anti-German war-party." Mr. Morel, in commenting on +the appointment of M. Delcassé quotes the following from a report sent +by the Russian Ambassador in London to the Foreign Office in Petersburg. +It was written four days after the appointment of M. Delcassé, and quite +bears out the impression made upon the Belgian agents.[10] + + + When I recall his [M. Cambon, the French Ambassador in London] + conversations with me, and the attitude of Poincaré, the thought + comes to me as a conviction, that of all the powers France is the + only one which, not to say that it wishes war, would yet look upon + it without great regret.... She [France] has, either rightly or + wrongly, complete trust in her army; the old effervescing minority + has again shown itself. + + +FOOTNOTE: + +[10] But perhaps Count Beuckendorf was pro-German, too! + + + + +XVIII + + +The French war-party, represented by MM. Poincaré, Millerand and +Delcassé, came into political predominance in January, 1912, and +consolidated its ascendancy one year later, when M. Raymond Poincaré +became President of the French Republic. All through 1912 there was an +immense amount of correspondence and consultation between the French and +Russian Governments, and all through 1913 Russia showed extraordinary +activity in military preparation. In England, Mr. Asquith's Government +had to face a strong revulsion of popular feeling against the attitude +of its diplomacy, which had so nearly involved the country in war with +Germany at the time of the Agadir incident. + +As always, the figures of expenditure tell the story; and the history of +1912-14 should be continually illustrated by reference to the financial +statistics of the period, which have been given in earlier chapters. For +instance, Russia, which spent (in round numbers) £3¼ million on new +naval construction in 1911, spent £7 million in 1912, £12 million in +1913, and £13 million in 1914. The fact that, as Professor Raymond +Beazley puts it, in the ten years before the war, and with increasing +insistence, Paris and St. Petersburg spent upon armaments £159 million +more than Berlin or Vienna, ought to suffice at least to reopen the +question of responsibility. + +It must be carefully noted that by the spring of 1912, the Balkan +League, which was engineered by the Russian diplomat Hartwig, was fully +formed. This put the diplomacy of the Balkan States under the direct +control of the Russian Foreign Office. It now became necessary for the +Russian Foreign Office to ascertain, in case war between Serbia and +Austria broke out, and Germany should help Austria and Russia should +help Serbia, whether Russia could count on the support of France and +England. Russia received this assurance in secret, and the terms of it +were discovered by the Soviet Government in the archives of the Foreign +Office and published in 1919. This is a most important fact, and should +be continually borne in mind in connexion with the fact that the war was +precipitated by the murder of the Austrian Archduke by Serbian officers, +members of the pan-Slavist organization fostered and encouraged by MM. +Isvolsky and Hartwig. + +On 9 August, 1912, M. Poincaré, then Premier of France, made a visit to +St. Petersburg, where he was joined by his kindred spirit, M. Isvolsky, +who was then the Russian Ambassador at Paris. It was the usual visit of +State, and Russia staged an imposing series of military manoeuvres in +M. Poincaré's honour. But the really important events that took place +were these. First, a naval agreement was made between France and Russia, +whereby France agreed to concentrate her naval forces in the Eastern +Mediterranean in order to support the Russian navy in the Black Sea. +This agreement was secret, and revealed by the Soviet Government in +1918. Then, in the same month, the Third French Naval Squadron was +transferred from the Atlantic to the Mediterranean. M. Poincaré told M. +Isvolsky that "this decision has been made in agreement with England, +and forms the further development and completion of the arrangement +already made previously between the French and British +Staffs"--referring to the conference of Messrs. Asquith and Churchill +and Lord Kitchener at Malta, the month before, at which the new +disposition of the English and French fleets was decided. The third +matter of consequence that took place in the month of August was that +the Russian Government began to put pressure on the French Government to +re-establish the Three Years Military Service law. + +So much for August. In the month of September, M. Poincaré gave the +Russian Foreign Minister, M. Sazonov, assurance that if Germany helped +Austria in a struggle in the Balkans, and if Russia were drawn in on the +other side, France "would not hesitate for a moment to fulfil its +obligations towards Russia." In the same month, M. Isvolsky had an +interview with the King of England and Sir Edward Grey, the British +Foreign Minister, in which both King George and Sir E. Grey assured him +of the fullest British co-operation in the same event. M. Isvolsky +reported to the Russian Foreign Office at St. Petersburg, that "Grey, +upon his own initiative, corroborated what I already knew from +Poincaré--the existence of an agreement between France and Great +Britain, according to which England undertook, in case of a war with +Germany, not only to come to the assistance of France on the sea, but +also on the Continent, by landing troops." These two understandings +between MM. Poincaré and Sazonov, and between M. Isvolsky and Sir E. +Grey, were secret, and nothing was known of them until 1919, when the +memoranda of them were published by the Soviet Government.[11] + +A train of gunpowder, in other words, had been laid from Belgrade +through Paris and London to St. Petersburg; and at the beginning of that +train was the highly inflammable and inflammatory pan-Slavism, organized +by M. Hartwig with the connivance of M. Isvolsky. A spark struck in the +Balkans would cause the train to flash into flame throughout its entire +length. + +FOOTNOTE: + +[11] On 10 March of the following year, Mr. Asquith, replying to a +question in the Commons from Lord Hugh Cecil, denied that England was +under an "obligation arising owing to an assurance given by the Ministry +in the course of diplomatic negotiations, to send a very large armed +force out of this country to operate in Europe." On 24 March, he made +similar denials in reply to questions from Sir W. Byles and Mr. King. On +14 April, Mr. Runciman, in a speech at Birkenhead, denied "in the most +categorical way" the existence of a secret understanding with any +foreign Power! On 3 May, the Secretary for the Colonies, Mr. Harcourt, +declared publicly that he "could conceive no circumstances in which +Continental operations would not be a crime against the people of this +country." On 28 June, the under-Secretary for Foreign Affairs, Mr. +Acland, declared publicly that "in no European question were we +concerned to interfere with a big army." On 1 July, Lord Loreburn, Lord +Chancellor from 1906 to 1912, said "that any British Government would be +so guilty towards our country as to take up arms in a foreign quarrel is +more than I can believe." On 28 April, 1914, and again on 11 June, Sir +E. Grey confirmed, in the House of Commons, Mr. Asquith's assertion, +made 10 and 24 March, 1913, of British freedom from engagements with +Continental Powers. + +Yet, curiously the professions of politicians are still trusted, and +people still expect something from their machinations; they expected +something substantial from the recent conference in Washington, on the +limitation of armaments, for instance--a striking and pathetic example +of the strength of superstition. + + + + +XIX + + +On 25 April, 1912, the German Reichstag put through its first reading a +bill, with only perfunctory debate, for an increase in the German army +and navy. This measure has been regularly and officially interpreted as +a threat. Yet nearly a year after, on 19 February, 1913, Baron +Guillaume, writing from Paris about the prospects of the Three Years +Service bill, reports to the Belgian Foreign Office that the French +Minister of War "does not regard the measures taken by Germany as a +demonstration of hostility, but rather as an act of prudence for the +future. Germany fears that she may one day have to fight Russia and +France together, perhaps England too; and then any help that Austria +might give her would be seriously handicapped by the fact that the Dual +Monarchy [Austria-Hungary] would have to withstand a coalition of Balkan +States." + +Naturally. The bill was presented to the Reichstag in April, and the +"coalition of Balkan States," M. Hartwig's Balkan League, had already +completed its organization in February. Not only so, but the very first +step taken by this exemplary organization provided for a division of +spoils in the event of a successful war with Turkey; and six months +after the organization of the League was concluded, it served an +ultimatum upon Turkey over Albania, and in October went to war. The +German Government could quite plainly see the future about to be +inaugurated through this consolidation of Balkan policy into the hands +of the Russian Foreign Office--any one even an attentive reader of +newspapers, could see it--and it could see the vastly increased +responsibility of its Austrian ally, in case of a quarrel, should it +have to take on a coalition of the Balkan States instead of a single +one. + +Count de Lalaing reported from London, 24 February, 1918, that the +British Foreign Office took the same sensible view of the German +military increases as, according to Baron Guillaume, was taken by M. +Jonnart. "The English press," he says, "is of course anxious to saddle +Germany with the responsibility for the fresh tension caused by her +schemes--a tension which may give Europe fresh reasons for uneasiness." +But, he goes on-- + + + At the Foreign Office I found a more equitable and calmer estimate + of the situation. They see in the reinforcement of the German + armies not so much a provocation as an admission that circumstances + have weakened Germany's military position, and that it must be + strengthened. The Berlin Government is compelled to recognize that + it can no longer count upon being supported by the whole force of + its Austrian ally, now that a new Power, that of the Balkan + Federation, has made its appearance in South-eastern Europe, right + at the gates of the Dual Empire.... Under these circumstances, the + Foreign Office sees nothing astonishing in Germany's finding it + imperative to increase the number of her army corps. The Foreign + Office also states that the Berlin Government had told the Paris + Cabinet quite frankly that such were the motives for its action. + + +The same view was publicly expressed by Mr. Lloyd George himself as late +as 1 January, 1914, when he said: + + + The German army was vital, not merely to the existence of the + German Empire, but to the very life and independence of the nation + itself, surrounded, as Germany is, by other nations, each of which + possesses armies as powerful as her own. We forget that while we + insist upon a sixty-per-cent superiority (as far as our naval + strength is concerned) over Germany being essential to guarantee + the integrity of our own shores, Germany herself has nothing like + that superiority over France alone, and she has of course, in + addition, to reckon with Russia on her eastern frontier. Germany + has nothing which approximates to a two-Power standard. She has, + therefore, become alarmed by recent issues, and is spending huge + sums of money on the expansion of her military resources. + + +Those are the words, be it remembered, of the same person who says +to-day that German responsibility for the war which broke out six months +after he had made the foregoing statement, is a _chose jugée_! The +statement was made, furthermore, not only _after_ the German bill of 25 +April, 1912, but _after_ the bill of 8 April, 1913, as well, which fixed +the peace-strength of the German army at 870,000. + +The Three Years Service law passed the French Chamber in August, 1913, +after a passionate popular campaign. Of this measure Baron Guillaume +says that the French newspapers, _Le Temps_ in particular, "are wrong in +representing the French Government's plans as being in response to +measures adopted by Germany. Many of them are but the outcome of +measures which have long been prepared." The French Minister, M. +Jonnart, told him that "we know very well what an advantage our +neighbour [Germany] has in the continual growth of his population; +still, we must do all that lies in our power to compensate this +advantage by better military organization." Probably this view of the +Three Years Service law was the view held by all save the relatively +small and highly-integrated war-faction; and in so far as military +measures are ever reasonable, this, like the corresponding measures +taken in Germany, must be regarded as reasonable. As M. Pichon told +Baron Guillaume, "We are not arming for war, we are arming to avoid it, +to exorcise it.... We must go on arming more and more in order to +prevent war." There is no reason whatever to suppose that this view was +not sincerely entertained by M. Pichon and by many others, probably by a +majority of the persons most responsibly concerned. + +But the consequences of the Three Years Service law were contemplated by +Baron Guillaume with great apprehension. He reports on 12 June, 1913, +that "the burden of the new law will fall so heavily upon the +population, and the expenditure which it will involve will be so +exorbitant, that there will soon be an outcry in the country, and France +will be faced with this dilemma: either renounce what she can not bear +to forgo, or else, war at short notice." Of the militarist party now in +the ascendancy, he says: "They are followed with a sort of infatuation, +a kind of frenzy which is interesting but deplorable. One is not now +allowed, under pain of being marked as a traitor, to express even a +doubt of the need for the Three Years Service." + +Public opinion was evidently confiscated by the +Poincaré-Millerand-Delcassé group, much as it was in the United States +in 1917 by the war-party headed by Mr. Wilson. Baron Guillaume uses +words that must remind us of those days. "Every one knows," he says, +"that the mass of the nation is by no means in favour of the projected +reform, and they understand the danger that lies ahead. But they shut +their eyes and press on." + + + + +XX + + +The train of powder, however, had been laid by the diplomatic +engagements. Austria-Hungary and Serbia came into collision in the +spring of 1913 over the Scutari incident. In December, 1912, M. Sazonov +had urged Serbia to play a waiting game in order to "deliver a blow at +Austria." But on 4 April, 1913, Baron Beyens reports from Berlin that +the arrogance and contempt with which the Serbs receive the Vienna +Cabinet's protests over Scutari + + + can only be explained by their belief that St. Petersburg will + support them. The Serbian chargé d'affaires was quite openly saying + here lately that his Government would not have persisted in its + course for the last six months in the face of the Austrian + opposition had they not received encouragement in their course from + the Russian Minister, M. de Hartwig, who is a diplomatist of M. + Isvolsky's school.... M. Sazonov's heart is with his colleagues who + are directing the policy of the Great Powers, but he feels his + influence with the Tsar being undermined by the court-party and the + pan-Slavists. Hence his inconsequent behaviour. + + +The military activity which the Russian Government displayed in 1913 +gives interest to this estimate of M. Sazonov's position. No doubt to +some extent the estimate was correct; M. Sazonov, like Sir E. Grey, was +probably, when it was too late, much disquieted by the events which +marshalled him the way that he was going. In 1914, this military +activity gained extraordinary intensity. The Russian army was put upon a +peace-footing of approximately 1,400,000, "an effective numerical +strength hitherto unprecedented," said the St. Petersburg correspondent +of the London _Times_. From January to June, the Russian Government made +immense purchases of war material. In February, it concluded a loan in +Paris for the improvement of its strategic roads and railways on the +German frontier. Russia, as was generally known at the time, had her eye +on the acquisition of Constantinople; and in the same month, February, a +council of war was held in St. Petersburg to work out "a general +programme of action in order to secure for us a favourable solution of +the historical question of the Straits." In March, the St. Petersburg +newspaper which served as the mouthpiece of the Minister of War, +published an article stating that Russia's strategy would no longer be +"defensive" but "active." Another paper spoke of the time coming when +"the crossing of the Austrian frontier by the Russian army would be an +unavoidable decision." In the same month, Russia raised a heavy tariff +against the importation of German grain and flour; thus bearing out the +evidence of German trade-reports that even at this time Germany was +still exporting grain to Russia--a most extraordinary proceeding for a +nation which contemplated a sudden declaration of war before the next +harvest. In the same month, the Russian Government brought in military +estimates of £97 million. It exercised heavy pressure on the French +Government in the protracted political turmoil over the maintenance of +the Three Years Service law. In April, "trial mobilizations" were begun, +and were continued up to the outbreak of the war. In May, M. Sazonov +informed the Tsar that the British Government "has decided to empower +the British Admiralty Staff to enter into negotiations with French and +Russian naval agents in London for the purpose of drawing technical +conditions for possible action by the naval forces of England, Russia +and France." In the same month, a complete mobilization of all the +reserves of the three annual contingents of 1907-1909 was ordered for +the whole Russian Empire, as a "test," to take place in the autumn. In +the same month the Russian Admiralty instructed its agent in London, +Captain Volkov, as follows: + + + Our interests on the Northern scene of operations require that + England keeps as large a part of the German fleet as possible in + check in the North Sea.... The English Government could render us a + substantial service if it would agree to send a sufficient number + of boats to our Baltic ports to compensate for our lack of means of + transport, before the beginning of war-operations. + + +This document, revealed by the Soviet Government in 1919, is pretty +damaging to the assumption of an "unprepared and unsuspecting Europe"; +especially as Professor Conybeare has given publicity to the fact that +"before the beginning of war-operations" those English boats were there, +prompt to the minute, empty, ready and waiting. + +In June, the Russian Ambassador warned the Russian naval staff in London +that they must exercise great caution in talking about a landing in +Pomerania or about the dispatch of English boats to the Russian Baltic +ports before the outbreak of war, "so that the rest may not be +jeopardized." On 13 June, the newspaper-organ of the Russian Minister +of War published an inspired article under the caption: "Russia is +Ready: France must be Ready." + +Two weeks later, the Austrian heir-apparent, the Archduke Francis +Joseph, was murdered at Sarajevo, a town in Bosnia, by Serbian officers. +The murder was arranged by the Serbian Major Tankesitch, of the +pan-Slavist organization known as the Black Hand; and this organization +was fostered, if not actually subsidized, by the Russian Minister at +Belgrade, M. Hartwig, the pupil and _alter ego_ of M. Isvolsky, and the +architect and promoter of the Balkan League! + + + + + +End of Project Gutenberg's The Myth of a Guilty Nation, by Albert Jay Nock + +*** END OF THE PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK 44508 *** diff --git a/44508-h/44508-h.htm b/44508-h/44508-h.htm new file mode 100644 index 0000000..fdadb4c --- /dev/null +++ b/44508-h/44508-h.htm @@ -0,0 +1,2306 @@ +<!DOCTYPE html PUBLIC "-//W3C//DTD XHTML 1.0 Strict//EN" + "http://www.w3.org/TR/xhtml1/DTD/xhtml1-strict.dtd"> + +<html xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"> + <head> + <meta http-equiv="Content-Type" content="text/html;charset=UTF-8" /> + <title> + The Project Gutenberg eBook of The Myth Of A Guilty Nation, by Albert Jay Nock. + </title> + <style type="text/css"> + + p { margin-top: .75em; + text-align: justify; + margin-bottom: .75em; + } + + p.bold {text-align: center; font-weight: bold;} + p.bold2 {text-align: center; font-weight: bold; font-size: 150%;} + + h1,h2,h3,h4,h5,h6 { + text-align: center; /* all headings centered */ + clear: both; + } + h1 span, h2 span { display: block; text-align: center; } + #id1 { font-size: smaller } + + + hr { + width: 33%; + margin-top: 2em; + margin-bottom: 2em; + margin-left: 33.5%; + margin-right: 33.5%; + clear: both; + } + + hr.smler { + width: 5%; + margin-top: 2em; + margin-bottom: 2em; + margin-left: 47.5%; + margin-right: 47.5%; + clear: both; + } + + body{margin-left: 10%; + margin-right: 10%; + } + + table {margin-left: auto; margin-right: auto; border-spacing: 10px; border-collapse: separate; border: none; text-align: right;} + + .pagenum { /* uncomment the next line for invisible page numbers */ + /* visibility: hidden; */ + position: absolute; + left: 92%; + font-size: smaller; + text-align: right; + text-indent: 0px; + } /* page numbers */ + + .center {text-align: center;} + .smcap {font-variant: small-caps;} + .space-above {margin-top: 3em;} + .right {text-align: right;} + + </style> + </head> +<body> +<div>*** START OF THE PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK 44508 ***</div> + +<p><span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_1" id="Page_1">[Pg 1]</a></span></p> + +<h1>THE MYTH OF A GUILTY NATION</h1> + +<hr /> + +<div class="center"><a name="cover.jpg" id="cover.jpg"></a><img src="images/cover.jpg" alt="cover" /></div> + +<hr /> + +<p><span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_3" id="Page_3">[Pg 3]</a></span></p> + +<p class="bold2">THE MYTH OF A<br />GUILTY NATION</p> + +<p class="bold space-above">BY</p> + +<p class="bold">ALBERT JAY NOCK<br />("HISTORICUS")</p> + +<div class="center space-above"><img src="images/dec.jpg" alt="decoration" /></div> + +<p class="bold space-above"><span class="smcap">new york B.W. HUEBSCH, Inc. mcmxxii</span></p> + +<hr /> + +<p><span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_4" id="Page_4">[Pg 4]</a></span></p> + +<p class="center">COPYRIGHT, 1922, BY<br /><span class="smcap">THE FREEMAN, Inc.</span><br /> +COPYRIGHT, 1922, BY<br /><span class="smcap">B. W. HUEBSCH, Inc.</span></p> + +<hr class="smler" /> + +<p class="center">PRINTED IN U. S. A.</p> + +<hr /> + +<p><span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_5" id="Page_5">[Pg 5]</a></span></p> + +<h2>PREFACE</h2> + +<p>This book is made up of a series of articles originally published in the +<i>Freeman</i>. It was compiled to establish one point and only one, namely: +that the German Government was not solely guilty of bringing on the war. +I have not been at all concerned with measuring the German Government's +share of guilt, with trying to show that it was either great or small, +or that it was either less or more than that of any other Government or +association of Governments. All this is beside the point. I do not by +any means wish to escape the responsibility of saying that I think the +German Government's share of guilt in the matter is extremely small; so +small by comparison with that of the major Powers allied against +Germany, as to be inconsiderable. That is my belief, demonstrable as I +think by such evidence as has now become available to any candid person. +But this has nothing whatever to do with the subject-matter of this +volume. If the guilt of the German Government could be<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_6" id="Page_6">[Pg 6]</a></span> proved to be ten +times greater than it was represented to be by the publicity-bureaux of +the Allied Powers, the conclusion established in the following chapters +would still remain. Guilty as the German Government may have been; +multiply by ten any estimate that any person, interested or +disinterested, informed or uninformed, may put upon its guilt; the fact +remains that it was far, very far indeed, from being the only guilty +party concerned.</p> + +<p>If there were no practical end to be gained by establishing this +conclusion, if one's purpose were only to give the German Government the +dubious vindication of a <i>tu quoque</i>, the effort would be hardly worth +making. But as I say at the outset, there is at stake an extremely +important matter, one that will unfavourably affect the peace of the +world for at least a generation—the treaty of Versailles. If the German +Government may not be assumed to be solely responsible for the war, this +treaty is indefensible; for it is constructed wholly upon that +assumption. It becomes, not a treaty, but a verdict pronounced after the +manner of Brennus, by a superior power which, without regard to justice, +arrogates to itself the functions of prosecutor, jury and judge.</p> + +<p><span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_7" id="Page_7">[Pg 7]</a></span></p><p>It is probably superfluous to point out that this treaty, conceived in +the pure spirit of the victorious Apache, has, in practice, utterly +broken down. It has not worked and it will not work, because it sets at +defiance certain economic laws which are as inexorable as the law of +gravitation. The incidence of these laws was well understood and clearly +foretold, at the time of the peace-conference, by an informed minority +in Europe, notably by Mr. Maynard Keynes in his volume entitled "The +Economic Consequences of the Peace." In this country also, a minority, +sufficiently informed to know its right hand from its left in economic +affairs, stood aghast in contemplation of the ruinous consequences which +it perceived as inevitable under any serious attempt to put this vicious +instrument into operation. But both here and in Europe, this minority +was very small and uninfluential, and could accomplish nothing against +the ignorant and unreasoning bad temper which the politicians kept aflame.</p> + +<p>The treaty had therefore to go to the test of experiment; and of the +results of this, one need surely say nothing, for they are obvious. The +harder Germany tried to fulfill the conditions of the treaty, and the +nearer she came to doing so, the worse things went in all the countries +that<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_8" id="Page_8">[Pg 8]</a></span> were presumably to benefit by her sacrifice. The Central Empires +are, as the informed minority in all countries has been from the +beginning anxiously aware, the key-group in the whole of European +industry and commerce. If they must work and trade under unfavourable +conditions, they also thereby automatically impose correspondingly +unfavourable conditions upon the whole of Europe; and, correspondingly +unfavourable conditions are thereby in turn automatically set up +wherever the trade of Europe reaches—for example, in the United States. +There is now no possible doubt about this, for one has but to glance at +the enormous dislocations of international commerce, and the universal +and profound stagnation of industry, in order to prove it to one's +complete satisfaction. Germany wisely and far-sightedly made a sincere +and vigourous effort to comply with the conditions of the treaty; and by +so doing she has carried the rest of the world to the verge of economic +collapse. The damage wrought by the war was in general of a spectacular +and impressive type, and was indeed very great—no one would minimize +it—but the damage, present and prospective, wrought by the treaty of +peace is much greater and more far-reaching.</p> + +<p><span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_9" id="Page_9">[Pg 9]</a></span></p><p>The political inheritors of those who made the peace are now extremely +uneasy about it. Their predecessors (including Mr. Lloyd George, who +still remains in office) had flogged up popular hatred against the +Central Empires at such a rate that when they took office they still +had, or thought they had, to court and indulge this hatred. Thus we +found Mr. Secretary Hughes, for example, in his first communication to +the German Government, laying it down that the basis of the Versailles +treaty was sound—that Germany was solely responsible for the war. He +spoke of it quite in the vein of Mr. Lloyd George, as a <i>chose jugée</i>. +After having promulgated the treaty with such immense ceremony, and +raised such preposterous and extravagant popular expectations on the +strength of it, the architects of the treaty bequeathed an exceedingly +difficult task to their successors; the task of letting the public down, +diverting their attention with this or that gesture, taking their mind +off their disappointments and scaling down their expectations, so that +in time it might be safe to let the Versailles treaty begin to sink out +of sight.</p> + +<p>The task is being undertaken; the curious piece of mountebankery +recently staged in Washington, for example, was an ambitious effort to +keep the<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_10" id="Page_10">[Pg 10]</a></span> peoples, particularly those of Europe, hopeful, confiding and +diverted; and if economic conditions permit, if times do not become too +hard, it may succeed. The politicians can not say outright that the +theory of the Versailles treaty is dishonest and outrageous, and that +the only chance of peace and well-being is by tearing up the treaty and +starting anew on another basis entirely. They can not say this on +account of the exigencies of their detestable trade. The best that they +can do is what they are doing. They must wait until the state of public +feeling permits them to ease down from their uncompromising stand upon +the treaty. Gradually, they expect, the public will accustom itself to +the idea of relaxations and accommodations, as it sees, from day to day, +the patent impracticability of any other course; feelings will weaken, +asperities soften, hatreds die out, contacts and approaches of one kind +or another will take place; and finally, these public men or their +political inheritors will think themselves able to effect in an +unobtrusive way, such substantial modifications of the treaty of +Versailles as will amount to its annulment.</p> + +<p>The process is worth accelerating by every means possible; and what I +have here done is meant to assist it. There are many persons in the<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_11" id="Page_11">[Pg 11]</a></span> +country who are not politicians, and who are capable and desirous of +approaching a matter of this kind with intellectual honesty. Quite +possibly they are not aware, many of them, that the Versailles treaty +postulates the sole responsibility of the German Government for bringing +on the war; undoubtedly they are not acquainted with such evidence as I +have here compiled to show that this assumption is unjust and erroneous. +Having read this evidence, they will be in a position to review the +terms of the Versailles treaty and reassess the justice of those terms. +They will also be able to understand the unwillingness, the inability, +of the German people to acquiesce in those terms; and they can +comprehend the slowness and difficulty wherewith peace and good feeling +are being re-established in Europe, and the extreme precariousness and +uncertainty of Europe's situation—and our own, in +consequence—throughout a future that seems longer than one cares to +contemplate.</p> + +<p>The reader will perceive at once that this book is a mere compilation +and transcription of fact, containing not a shred of opinion or of any +original matter. On this account it was published anonymously in its +serial form, because it seemed to me that such work should be judged +strictly<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_12" id="Page_12">[Pg 12]</a></span> as it stands, without regard to the authority, or lack of +authority, which the compiler might happen to possess. Almost all of it +is lifted straight from the works of my friends Mr. Francis Neilson and +Mr. E. D. Morel. I earnestly hope—indeed, it is my chief motive in +publishing this book—that it may serve as an introduction to these +words. I can not place too high an estimate upon their importance to a +student of British and Continental diplomacy. They are, as far as I +know, alone in their field; nothing else can take their place. They are +so thorough, so exhaustive and so authoritative that I wonder at their +being so little known in the United States. Mr. Morel's works,<a name="FNanchor_1_1" id="FNanchor_1_1"></a><a href="#Footnote_1_1" class="fnanchor">[1]</a> "Ten +Years of Secret Diplomacy," "Truth and the War," and "Diplomacy +Revealed," are simply indispensable. Mr. Neilson's book "How Diplomats +Make War,"<a name="FNanchor_2_2" id="FNanchor_2_2"></a><a href="#Footnote_2_2" class="fnanchor">[2]</a> is not an easy book to read; no more are Mr. Morel's; but +without having read it no serious student can possibly do justice to the subject.</p> + +<p class="right"><span class="smcap">Albert Jay Nock</span></p> + +<div class="footnotes"><h3>FOOTNOTES:</h3> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_1_1" id="Footnote_1_1"></a><a href="#FNanchor_1_1"><span class="label">[1]</span></a> "Ten Years of Secret Diplomacy." $1.25. "Truth and the +War." $1.25. E. D. Morel. New York: B. W. Huebsch. +</p><p> +"Diplomacy Revealed." E. D. Morel. London, 8 & 9 Johnson's Court: +National Labour Press.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_2_2" id="Footnote_2_2"></a><a href="#FNanchor_2_2"><span class="label">[2]</span></a> "How Diplomats Make War." Francis Neilson. New York: B. W. +Huebsch. $2.00</p></div></div> + +<hr /> + +<p><span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_13" id="Page_13">[Pg 13]</a></span></p> + +<p class="bold2">THE MYTH OF<br />A GUILTY NATION</p> + +<h2>I</h2> + +<p>The present course of events in Europe is impressing on us once more the +truth that military victory, if it is to stand, must also be +demonstrably a victory for justice. In the long run, victory must appeal +to the sense of justice in the conquered no less than in the conquerors, +if it is to be effective. There is no way of getting around this. Mr. +Gilbert K. Chesterton is right when he says that if the South had not +finally accepted the outcome of the Civil War as being on the whole +just, Lincoln would have been wrong in trying to preserve the Union; +which is only another way of expressing Lincoln's own homely saying that +nothing is ever really settled until it is settled right. The present +condition of Europe is largely due to the fact that the official +peacemakers have not taken into their reckoning the<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_14" id="Page_14">[Pg 14]</a></span> German people's +sense of justice. Their mistake—it was also Mr. Wilson's great +mistake—was in their disregard of what Bismarck called the +imponderabilia. The terms of the peace treaty plainly reflect this +mistake. That is largely the reason why the treaty is to-day inoperative +and worthless. That is largely why the Governments of Europe are +confronted with the inescapable alternative: they can either tear up the +treaty and replace it by an understanding based on justice, or they can +stick to the treaty and by so doing protract indefinitely the dismal +succession of wars, revolutions, bankruptcies and commercial +dislocations that the treaty inaugurated.</p> + +<p>That is the situation; and it is a situation in which the people of the +United States have an interest to preserve—the primary interest of a +creditor, and also the interest of a trader who needs a large and stable +market. It is idle to suppose that American business can prosper so long +as Europe remains in a condition of instability and insolvency. Our +business is adjusted to the scale of a solvent Europe, and it can not be +readjusted without irreparable damage. Until certain matters connected +with the war are resolutely put under review, Europe can not be<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_15" id="Page_15">[Pg 15]</a></span> +reconstructed, and the United States can not be prosperous. The only +thing that can better our own situation is the resumption of normal +economic life in Europe; and this can be done only through a thorough +reconsideration of the injustices that have been put upon the German +people by the conditions of the armistice and the peace treaty.</p> + +<p>Of these injustices, the greatest, because it is the foundation for all +the rest, is the imputation of Germany's sole responsibility for the +war. The German people will never endure that imputation; they should +never be expected to endure it. Nothing can really be settled until the +question of responsibility is openly and candidly re-examined, and an +understanding established that is based on facts instead of on official +misrepresentation. This question is by no means one of abstract justice +alone, or of chivalry and fair play towards a defeated enemy. It is a +question of self-interest, immediate and urgent. However it may be +regarded by the American sense of justice and fair play, it remains, to +the eye of American industry and commerce, a straight question of +dollars and cents. The prosperity of the United States, as we are +beginning to see, hangs upon the economic <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_16" id="Page_16">[Pg 16]</a></span>re-establishment of Europe. +Europe can not possibly be settled upon the present terms of peace; and +these terms can not be changed without first vacating the theory of +Germany's sole responsibility, because it is upon this theory that the +treaty of Versailles was built. This theory, therefore, must be +re-examined in the light of evidence that the Allied and Associated +Governments have done their best either to ignore or to suppress. Hence, +for the American people, the way to prosperity lies through a searching +and honest examination of this theory that has been so deeply implanted +in their mind—the theory of a brigand-nation, plotting in solitude to +achieve the mastery of the world by fire and sword.</p> + +<p>Americans, however, come reluctantly to the task of this examination, +for two reasons. First, we are all tired of the war, we hate to think of +it or of anything connected with it, and as far as possible, we keep it +out of our minds. Second, nearly every reputation of any consequence in +this country, political, clerical, academic and journalistic, is already +committed, head over ears, to the validity of this theory. How many of +our politicians are there whose reputations are not bound up +inextricably with this legend of a German plot? How many of our +newspaper-editors<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_17" id="Page_17">[Pg 17]</a></span> managed to preserve detachment enough under the +pressure of war-propaganda to be able to come forward to-day and say +that the question of responsibility for the war should be re-opened? How +can the pro-war liberals and ex-pacifists ask for such an inquest when +they were all swept off their feet by the specious plea that <i>this</i> war +was a different war from all other wars in the history of mankind? What +can our ministers of religion say after the unreserved endorsement that +they put upon the sanctity of the Allied cause? What can our educators +say, after having served so zealously the ends of the official +propagandists? From our journalists and men of letters what can we +expect—after all his rodomontade about Potsdam and the Potsdam gang, +how could we expect Dr. Henry Van Dyke, for instance, to face the fact +that the portentous Potsdam meeting of the Crown Council on 5 July, +1914, <i>never took place at all</i>? There is no use in trying to put a +breaking-strain upon human nature, or, on the other hand, in assuming a +pharisaic attitude towards its simplest and commonest frailties. It is +best, under the circumstances, merely to understand that on this +question every institutional voice in the United States is tongue-tied. +Press, pulpit, schools and universities, charities and<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_18" id="Page_18">[Pg 18]</a></span> foundations, +forums, all are silent; and to expect them to break their silence is to +expect more than should be expected from the pride of opinion in average +human nature.</p> + +<hr /> + +<p><span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_19" id="Page_19">[Pg 19]</a></span></p> + +<h2>II</h2> + +<p>In examining the evidence let us first take Mr. Lloyd George's own +statement of the theory. Except in one particular, it presents the case +against Germany quite as it has been rehearsed by nearly every +institutional voice in the United States. On 4 August, 1917—after +America's entry into the war—the British Premier said:</p> + +<blockquote><p>What are we fighting for? To defeat the most dangerous conspiracy +ever plotted against the liberty of nations; carefully, skilfully, +insidiously, clandestinely planned in every detail, with ruthless, +cynical determination.</p></blockquote> + +<p>Except for one point, this statement sums up what we have all heard to +be the essential doctrine of the war. The one missing point in Mr. Lloyd +George's indictment is that the great German conspiracy was launched +upon an <i>unprepared</i> Europe. In Europe itself, the official +propagandists did not make much of this particular point, for far too +many people knew better; but in the<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_20" id="Page_20">[Pg 20]</a></span> United States it was promulgated +widely. Indeed, this romance of Allied unpreparedness was an essential +part of the whole story of German responsibility. Germany, so the +official story ran, not only plotted in secret, but she sprung her plot +upon a Europe that was wholly unprepared and unsuspecting. Her action +was like that of a highwayman leaping from ambush upon a defenceless +wayfarer. Belgium was unprepared, France unprepared, Russia unprepared, +England unprepared; and in face of an unprovoked attack, these nations +hurriedly drew together in an extemporized union, and held the "mad dog" +at bay with an extemporized defence until they could devise a plan of +common action and a pooling of military and naval resources.</p> + +<p>Such, then, is a fair statement of the doctrine of the war as America +was taught it. Next, in order to show how fundamental this doctrine is +to the terms of the peace treaty, let us consider another statement of +Mr. Lloyd George made 3 March, 1921:</p> + +<blockquote><p>For the allies, German responsibility for the war is fundamental. +It is the basis upon which the structure of the treaty of +Versailles has been erected, and if that acknowledgment is +repudiated or abandoned, the treaty<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_21" id="Page_21">[Pg 21]</a></span> is destroyed.... We wish, +therefore, once and for all, to make it quite clear that German +responsibility for the war must be treated by the Allies as a +<i>chose jugée</i>.</p></blockquote> + +<p>Thus the British Premier explicitly declares that the treaty of +Versailles is based upon the theory of Germany's sole responsibility.</p> + +<p>Now, as against this theory, the main facts may be summarized as +follows: (1) The British and French General Staffs had been in active +collaboration for war with Germany ever since January 1906. (2) The +British and French Admiralty had been in similar collaboration. (3) The +late Lord Fisher [First Sea Lord of the British Admiralty], twice in the +course of these preparations, proposed an attack upon the German fleet +and a landing upon the coast of Pomerania, <i>without a declaration of +war</i>. (4) Russia had been preparing for war ever since 1909, and the +Russian and French General Staffs had come to a formal understanding +that Russian mobilization should be held equivalent to a declaration of +war. (5) Russian mobilization was begun in the spring of 1914, under the +guise of "tests," and these tests were carried on continuously to the +outbreak of the war. (6) In April, 1914, four months before the war, +the<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_22" id="Page_22">[Pg 22]</a></span> Russian and French naval authorities initiated joint plans for +maritime operations against Germany. (7) Up to the outbreak of the war, +Germany was selling grain in considerable quantities to both France and +Russia. (8) It can not be shown that the German Government ever in a +single instance, throughout all its dealings with foreign Governments, +demanded or intimated for Germany anything more than a position of +economic equality with other nations.</p> + +<p>These facts, among others to which reference will hereafter be made, +have come to light only since the outbreak of the war. They effectively +dispose of the theory of an unprepared and unsuspecting Europe; and a +historical survey of them excludes absolutely, and stamps as utterly +untenable and preposterous, the theory of a deliberate German plot +against the peace of the world.</p> + +<hr /> + +<p><span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_23" id="Page_23">[Pg 23]</a></span></p> + +<h2>III</h2> + +<p>Let us now consider the idea so generally held in America, though not in +Europe, that in 1914, England and the Continental nations were not +expecting war and not prepared for war. The fact is that Europe was as +thoroughly organized for war as it could possibly be. The point to which +that organization was carried by England, France and Russia, as compared +with Germany and Austria, may to some extent be indicated by statistics. +In 1913, Russia carried a military establishment (on a peace footing) of +1,284,000 men; France, by an addition of 183,000 men, proposed to raise +her peace-establishment to a total of 741,572. Germany, by an addition +of 174,373 men, proposed to raise her total to 821,964; and Austria, by +additions of 58,505 already made, brought her total up to 473,643. These +are the figures of the British War Office, as furnished to the House of +Commons in 1913.</p> + +<p>Here is a set of figures that is even more interesting and significant. +From 1909 to 1914, the<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_24" id="Page_24">[Pg 24]</a></span> amount spent on new naval construction by +England, France and Russia, as compared with Germany, was as follows:</p> + +<table summary="amount spent on new naval construction"> + <tr> + <td></td> + <td class="center"><span class="smcap">England</span></td> + <td class="center"><span class="smcap">France</span></td> + <td class="center"><span class="smcap">Russia</span></td> + <td class="center"><span class="smcap">Germany</span></td> + </tr> + <tr> + <td>1909</td> + <td>£11,076,551</td> + <td>£ 4,517,766</td> + <td>£ 1,758,487</td> + <td>£10,177,062</td> + </tr> + <tr> + <td>1910</td> + <td>£14,755,289</td> + <td>£ 4,977,682</td> + <td>£ 1,424,013</td> + <td>£11,392,856</td> + </tr> + <tr> + <td>1911</td> + <td>£15,148,171</td> + <td>£ 5,876,659</td> + <td>£ 3,216,396</td> + <td>£11,710,859</td> + </tr> + <tr> + <td>1912</td> + <td>£16,132,558</td> + <td>£ 7,114,876</td> + <td>£ 6,897,580</td> + <td>£11,491,187</td> + </tr> + <tr> + <td>1913</td> + <td>£16,883,875</td> + <td>£ 8,893,064</td> + <td>£12,082,516</td> + <td>£11,010,883</td> + </tr> + <tr> + <td>1914</td> + <td>£18,676,080</td> + <td>£11,772,862</td> + <td>£13,098,613</td> + <td>£10,316,264</td> + </tr> +</table> + +<p>These figures can not be too carefully studied by those who have been +led to think that Germany pounced upon a defenceless and unsuspecting +Europe like a cat upon a mouse. If it be thought worth while to consider +also the period of a few years preceding 1909, one finds that England's +superiority in battleships alone was 112 per cent in 1901, and her +superiority rose to nearly 200 per cent in 1904; in which year England +spent £42,431,000 on her navy, and Germany £11,659,000. Taking the +comparative statistics of naval expenditure from 1900, in which year +England spent £32,055,000 on her navy, and Germany spent £7,472,000, +down to 1914 it is absolutely impossible to make the figures show that +Germany enforced upon the other nations of Europe an unwilling +competition in naval armament.</p> + +<p><span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_25" id="Page_25">[Pg 25]</a></span></p><p>But the German army! According to all accounts of German militarism +which were suffered to reach these shores, it is here that we shall find +evidence of what Mr. Lloyd George, on 4 August, 1917, called "the most +dangerous conspiracy ever plotted against the liberty of nations; +carefully, skilfully, insidiously, clandestinely planned in every +detail, with ruthless, cynical determination." Well, if one chooses to +hold the current view of German militarism, it must be admitted that +Germany had at her disposal some miraculous means of getting something +for nothing, getting a great deal for nothing, in fact, for on any other +supposition, the figures are far from supporting that view. In 1914 +(pre-war figures), Germany and Austria together carried an +army-expenditure of £92 million; England, France and Russia together +carried one of £142 million. England "had no army," it was said; all her +military strength lay in her navy. If that were true, then it must be +said that she had as miraculous a faculty as Germany's; only, whereas +Germany's was a faculty for getting more than her money's worth, +England's was for getting less than her money's worth. England's +army-expenditure for 1914 (pre-war figures) was £28 million; £4 million +more than Austria's. Nor<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_26" id="Page_26">[Pg 26]</a></span> was this a sudden emergency-outlay. Going back +as far as 1905, we find that she laid out in that year the same amount, +£28 million. In that year, Germany and Austria together spent £48 +million on their armies; England, France and Russia together spent £94 +million on theirs. If between 1905 and 1913, England, France and Russia +spent any such sums upon their armies as their statistics show, and +nothing came of it but an unprepared and unsuspecting Europe in 1914, it +seems clear that the taxpayers of those countries were swindled on an +inconceivably large scale.</p> + +<hr /> + +<p><span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_27" id="Page_27">[Pg 27]</a></span></p> + +<h2>IV</h2> + +<p>At this point, some questions may be raised. Why, in the decade +preceding 1914, did England, France and Russia arm themselves at the +rate indicated by the foregoing figures? Why did they accelerate their +naval development progressively from about £17 million in 1909 to about +£43 million in 1914? Why did Russia alone propose to raise her military +peace-establishment to an army of 1,700,000, more than double the size +of Germany's army? Against whom were these preparations directed, and +understood to be directed? Certainly not against one another. France and +Russia had been bound by a military convention ever since 17 August, +1892; England and France had been bound since January, 1906, by a +similar pact; and this was subsequently extended to include Belgium. +These agreements will be considered in detail hereafter; they are now +mentioned merely to show that the military activity in these countries +was not independent in purpose. France, England, Russia and Belgium<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_28" id="Page_28">[Pg 28]</a></span> +were not uneasy about one another and not arming against one another; +nor is there any evidence that anyone thought that they were. It was +against the Central Empires only that these preparations were addressed. +Nor can one who scans the table of relative expenditure easily believe +that the English-French-Russian combination was effected for purely +defensive purposes; and taking the diplomatic history of the period in +conjunction with the testimony of the budgets, such belief becomes impossible.</p> + +<hr /> + +<p><span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_29" id="Page_29">[Pg 29]</a></span></p> + +<h2>V</h2> + +<p>The British Government is the one which was most often represented to us +as taken utterly by surprise by the German onslaught on Belgium. Let us +see. The Austrian Archduke was assassinated 28 June, 1914, by three men +who, according to wide report in Europe and absolute certainty in +America, were secret agents of the German Government, acting under +German official instruction. The findings of the court of inquiry showed +that they were Serbs, members of a pan-Slav organization; that the +assassination was plotted in Belgrade, and the weapons with which it was +committed were obtained there.<a name="FNanchor_3_3" id="FNanchor_3_3"></a><a href="#Footnote_3_3" class="fnanchor">[3]</a> Serbia denied all connexion with the +assassins (the policy of Serbia being then controlled by the Russian +Foreign Office), and then the Russian<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_30" id="Page_30">[Pg 30]</a></span> Government stepped forward to +prevent the humiliation of Serbia by Austria. It is clear from the +published diplomatic documents that the British Foreign Office knew +everything that took place between the assassination and the burial of +the Archduke; all the facts, that is, connected with the murder. The +first dispatch in the British White Paper is dated 20 July, and it is +addressed to the British Ambassador at Berlin. One wonders why not to +the Ambassador at Vienna; also one wonders why the diplomats apparently +found nothing to write about for nearly three weeks between the +Archduke's funeral and 20 July. It is a strange silence. Sir Edward +Grey, however, made a statement in the House of Commons, 27 July, in +which he gave the impression that he got his first information about the +course of the quarrel between Austria and Serbia no earlier than 24 +July, three days before. The Ambassador at Vienna, Sir M. de Bunsen, +had, notwithstanding, telegraphed him that the Austrian Premier had +given him no hint of "the impending storm" and that it was from a +private source "that I received, 15 July, the forecast of what was about +to happen, concerning which I <i>telegraphed to you the following day</i>." +Sir Maurice de Bunsen's telegram on this important<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_31" id="Page_31">[Pg 31]</a></span> subject thus +evidently was suppressed; and the only obvious reason for the +suppression is that it carried evidence that Sir E. Grey was thoroughly +well posted by 16 July on what was taking place in Vienna. Sir M. de +Bunsen's allusion to this telegram confirms this assumption; in fact, it +can be interpreted in no other way.</p> + +<p>On 28 July, the House of Commons was informed that Austria had declared +war on Serbia. Two days later, 30 July, Sir E. Grey added the item of +information that Russia had ordered a partial mobilization "which has +not hitherto led to any corresponding steps by other Powers, so far as +our information goes." Sir E. Grey did not add, however, that he knew +quite well what "corresponding steps" other Powers were likely to take. +He knew the terms of the Russian-French military convention, under which +a mobilization by Russia was to be held equivalent to a declaration of +war; he also knew the terms of the English-French agreement which he +himself had authorized—although up to the eve of the war he denied, in +reply to questions in the House of Commons, that any such agreement +existed, and acknowledged it only on 3 August, 1914.<a name="FNanchor_4_4" id="FNanchor_4_4"></a><a href="#Footnote_4_4" class="fnanchor">[4]</a> He<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_32" id="Page_32">[Pg 32]</a></span> had promised +Sazonov, the Russian Foreign Minister, in 1912, that in the event of +Germany's coming to Austria's aid, Russia could rely on Great Britain to +"stake everything in order to inflict the most serious blow to German +power." To say that Sir E. Grey, and <i>à fortiori</i> Mr. Asquith, the Prime +Minister; Lord Haldane, the Minister for War, whose own book has been a +most tremendous let-down to the fictions of the propagandists; Mr. +Winston Churchill, head of the Admiralty, who at Dundee, 5 June, 1915, +declared that he had been sent to the Admiralty in 1911 with the express +duty laid upon him by the Prime Minister to put the fleet in a state of +instant and constant readiness for war; to say that these men were taken +by surprise and unprepared, is mere levity.</p> + +<p>Austria was supposed to be, and still is by some believed to have been, +Germany's vassal State, and by menacing Serbia to have been doing +Germany's dirty work. No evidence of this has been adduced; and the +trouble with this idea of Austria's status is that it breaks down before +the report of Sir M. de Bunsen, 1 September, 1914, that Austria finally +yielded and agreed to accept all the proposals of the Powers for +mediation <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_33" id="Page_33">[Pg 33]</a></span>between herself and Serbia. She made every concession. +Russian mobilization, however, had begun on 25 July and become general +four days later; and it was not stopped. Germany then gave notice that +she would mobilize her army if Russian mobilization was not stopped in +twelve hours; and also, knowing the terms of the Russian-French +convention of 1892, she served notice on France, giving her eighteen +hours to declare her position. Russia made no reply; France answered +that she would do what she thought best in her own interest; and almost +at the moment, on 1 August, when Germany ordered a general mobilization, +Russian troops were over her border, the British fleet had been +mobilized for a week in the North Sea, and British merchant ships were +lying at Kronstadt, empty, to convey Russian troops from that port to +the Pomeranian coast, in pursuance of the plan indicated by Lord Fisher +in his autobiography, recently published.</p> + +<p>These matters are well summed up by Lord Loreburn, as follows:</p> + +<blockquote><p>Serbia gave offence to the Austro-Hungarian Empire, cause of just +offence, as our Ambassador frankly admits in his published +dispatches. We [England] had no<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_34" id="Page_34">[Pg 34]</a></span> concern in that quarrel, as Sir +Edward Grey says in terms. But Russia, the protectress of Serbia, +came forward to prevent her being utterly humiliated by Austria. We +were not concerned in that quarrel either, as Sir Edward also says. +And then Russia called upon France under their treaty to help in +the fight. France was not concerned in that quarrel any more than +ourselves, as Sir Edward informs us. But France was bound by a +Russian treaty, of which he did not know the terms, and then France +called on us for help. We were tied by the relations which our +Foreign Office had created, without apparently realizing that they +had created them.</p></blockquote> + +<p>In saying that Sir E. Grey did not know the terms of the Franco-Russian +agreement, Lord Loreburn is generous, probably more generous than he +should be; but that is no matter. The thing to be remarked is that Lord +Loreburn's summing-up comes to something wholly different from Mr. Lloyd +George's "most dangerous conspiracy ever plotted against the liberty of +nations." It comes to something wholly different from the notion +implanted in Americans, of Germany pouncing upon a peaceful, unprepared +and unsuspecting Europe. The German nation, we may be sure, is keenly +aware of this difference; and therefore, any peace which, like the peace +of Versailles, is bottomed on the <i>chose jugée</i> of <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_35" id="Page_35">[Pg 35]</a></span>laying the sole +responsibility for the war at the door of the German nation, or even at +the door of the German Government, is simply impracticable and +impossible.</p> + +<div class="footnotes"><h3>FOOTNOTES:</h3> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_3_3" id="Footnote_3_3"></a><a href="#FNanchor_3_3"><span class="label">[3]</span></a> Six months after the armistice, the bodies of the three +assassins were dug up, according to a Central News dispatch from Prague, +"with great solemnity, in the presence of thousands of the inhabitants. +The remains of <i>these Serbian officers</i> are to be sent to their native +country." This is a naïve statement. It remains to be explained why +these "German agents" should be honoured in this distinguished way by +the Serbs!</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_4_4" id="Footnote_4_4"></a><a href="#FNanchor_4_4"><span class="label">[4]</span></a> See footnote to <a href="#Footnote_11_11">chapter XVIII.</a></p></div> +</div> + +<hr /> + +<p><span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_36" id="Page_36">[Pg 36]</a></span></p> + +<h2>VI</h2> + +<p>If the theory upon which the treaty of Versailles is based, the theory +of a single guilty nation, were true, there would be no trouble about +saying what the war was fought for. The Allied belligerents would have a +simple, straight story to tell; they could describe their aims and +intentions clearly in a few words that any one could understand, and +their story would be reasonably consistent and not vary greatly from +year to year. It would be practically the same story in 1918 as in 1915 +or at any time between. In America, indeed, the story did not greatly +vary up to the spring of 1917, for the reason that this country was +pretty much in the dark about European international relations. Once our +indignation and sympathies were aroused, it was for the propagandists +mostly a matter of keeping them as hot as possible. Few had the +information necessary to discount the plain, easy, understandable story +of a robber nation leaping upon an unprepared and defenceless Europe for +no cause whatever<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_37" id="Page_37">[Pg 37]</a></span> except the lofty ambition, as Mr. Joseph Choate said, +"to establish a world-empire upon the ruins of the British Empire." +Those who had this information could not make themselves heard; and thus +it was that the propagandists had no need to vary the one story that was +most useful to their purpose of keeping us in a state of unreasoning +indignation, and accordingly they did not vary it.</p> + +<p>In Europe and in England, however, the case was different. International +relations were better understood by those who were closer to them than +we were; more questions were raised and more demands made. Hence the +Allied politicians and propagandists were kept busy upon the defensive. +When from time to time the voice of popular discontent or of some +influential body of opinion insisted on a statement of the causes of the +war or of the war-aims of the Allies, they were confronted with the +politician's traditional difficulty. They had to say something plausible +and satisfactory, which yet must be something that effectively hid the +truth of the situation. As the war hung on, their difficulty became +desperate and they threw consistency to the winds, telling any sort of +story that would enable them for the moment to "get by." The publication +of the secret treaties which had been seined out<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_38" id="Page_38">[Pg 38]</a></span> of the quagmire of the +old Russian Foreign Office by the revolutionists made no end of trouble +for them. It is amusing now to remember how promptly these treaties were +branded by the British Foreign Office as forgeries; especially when it +turned out that the actual terms of the armistice—not the nominal +terms, which were those of Mr. Wilson's Fourteen Points, but the actual +terms—were the terms of the secret treaties! The publication of the +secret treaties in this country did not contribute much towards a +disillusionment of the public; the press as a rule ignored or lied about +them, they were not widely read, and few who did read them had enough +understanding of European affairs to interpret them. But abroad they put +a good deal of fat into the fire; and this was a specimen of the kind of +thing that the Allied politicians had to contend with in their efforts +to keep their peoples in line.</p> + +<p>The consequence was that the official and semi-official statements of +the causes of the war and of the war-aims of the Allies are a most +curious hotchpotch. In fact, if any one takes stock in the theory of the +one guilty nation and is therefore convinced that the treaty of +Versailles is just and proper and likely to enforce an <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_39" id="Page_39">[Pg 39]</a></span>enduring peace, +one could suggest nothing better than that he should go through the +literature of the war, pick out these statements, put them in parallel +columns, and see how they look. If the war originated in the unwarranted +conspiracy of a robber nation, if the aims of the Allies were to defeat +that conspiracy and render it impotent and to chastise and tie the hands +of the robber nation—and that is the theory of the treaty of +Versailles—can anyone in his right mind suppose that the Allied +politicians and propagandists would ever give out, or need to give out, +these ludicrously contradictory and inconsistent explanations and +statements? When one has a simple, straight story to tell, and a most +effective story, why complicate it and undermine it and throw all sorts +of doubts upon it, by venturing upon all sorts of public utterances that +will not square with it in any conceivable way? Politicians, of all men, +never lie for the fun of it; their available margin of truth is always +so narrow that they keep within it when they can. Mr. Lloyd George, for +example, is one of the cleverest of politicians. We have already +considered his two statements; first, that of 4 August, 1917:</p> + +<blockquote><p>What are we fighting for? To defeat the most dangerous conspiracy +ever plotted against the liberty of<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_40" id="Page_40">[Pg 40]</a></span> nations; carefully, skilfully, +insidiously, clandestinely planned in every detail with ruthless, +cynical determination.</p></blockquote> + +<p>—and then that of 3 March, 1921:</p> + +<blockquote><p>For the Allies, German responsibility for the war is fundamental. +It is the basis upon which the structure of the treaty of +Versailles has been erected, and if that acknowledgment is +repudiated or abandoned, the treaty is destroyed.... German +responsibility for the war must be treated by the Allies as a +<i>chose jugée</i>.</p></blockquote> + +<p>A little over two months before Mr. George made this latter utterance, +on 23 December, 1920, he said this:</p> + +<blockquote><p>The more one reads memoirs and books written in the various +countries of what happened before the first of August, 1914, the +more one realizes that no one at the head of affairs quite meant +war at that stage. It was something into which they glided, or +rather staggered and stumbled, perhaps through folly; and a +discussion, I have no doubt, would have averted it.</p></blockquote> + +<p>Well, it would strike an unprejudiced person that if this were true, +there is a great deal of doubt put upon Mr. Lloyd George's former +statements by Mr. Lloyd George himself. Persons who plot carefully, +skilfully, insidiously and clandestinely, do not glide; they do not +stagger or stumble, especially through folly. They keep <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_41" id="Page_41">[Pg 41]</a></span>going, as we in +America were assured that the German Government did keep going, right up +to The Day of their own choosing. Moreover, they are not likely to be +headed off by discussion; highwaymen are notoriously curt in their +speech and if one attempts discussion with them they become irritable +and peremptory. This is the invariable habit of highwaymen. Besides, if +discussion would have averted war in 1914, why was it not forthcoming? +Certainly not through any fault of the Austrian Government, which made +every concession, as the British Ambassador's report shows, +notwithstanding its grievance against Serbia was a just one. Certainly +not through any fault of the German Government, which never refused +discussion and held its hand with all the restraint possible under the +circumstances just described. Well, then, how is it so clear that German +responsibility for the war should be treated as a <i>chose jugée</i>?</p> + +<hr /> + +<p><span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_42" id="Page_42">[Pg 42]</a></span></p> + +<h2>VII</h2> + +<p>People who have a clear and simple case do not talk in this fashion. +Picking now at random among the utterances of politicians and +propagandists, we find an assorted job-lot of aims assigned and causes +alleged, and in all of them there is that curious, incomprehensible and +callous disregard of the power of conviction that a straight story +always exercises, if you have one to tell. In November, 1917, when the +Foreign Office was being pestered by demands for a statement of the +Allied war-aims, Lord Robert Cecil said in the House of Commons, that +the restitution of Alsace and Lorraine to France was a "well-understood +war-aim from the moment we entered the war." As things have turned out, +it is an odd coincidence how so many of these places that have iron or +coal or oil in them seem to represent a well-understood war-aim. Less +than a month before, in October, 1917, General Smuts said that to his +mind the one great dominating war-aim was "the end of militarism, the +end of standing armies." Well, the Allies won the war, but judging by<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_43" id="Page_43">[Pg 43]</a></span> +results, this dominating war-aim seems rather to have been lost sight +of. Mr. Lloyd George again on another occasion, said in the House of +Commons that "self-determination was one of the principles for which we +entered the war ... a principle from which we have never departed since +the beginning of the war." This, too, seems an aim that for some reason +the victorious nations have not quite realized; indeed in some cases, as +in Ireland, for example, there has been no great alacrity shown about +trying to realize it. Viscount Bryce said that the war sprang from the +strife of races and religions in the Balkan countries, and from the +violence done to the sentiment of nationality in Alsace-Lorraine which +made France the ally of Russia. But the fact is that France became the +ally of Russia on the basis of hard cash, and since the Russian +Revolution, she has been a bit out of luck by way of getting her money +back. Mr. Asquith in the House of Commons, 3 August, 1914 said:</p> + +<blockquote><p>If I am asked what we are fighting for, I reply in two sentences. +In the first place, to fulfil a solemn international obligation.... +Secondly we are fighting ... to vindicate the principle that small +nationalities are not to be crushed in defiance of international +good faith.</p></blockquote> + +<p><span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_44" id="Page_44">[Pg 44]</a></span></p><p>Just so: and in the House of Commons, 20 December, 1917, he said:</p> + +<blockquote><p>The League of Nations ... was the avowed purpose, the very purpose +... for which we entered the war and for which we are continuing +the war.</p></blockquote> + +<p>You pays your money, you see, and takes your choice. The point to be +made, however, is that one who has a strong case, a real case, never +trifles with it in this way. Would the reader do it?</p> + +<hr /> + +<p><span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_45" id="Page_45">[Pg 45]</a></span></p> + +<h2>VIII</h2> + +<p>Mr. Asquith's citation of a "solemn international obligation" refers to +the so-called Belgian treaties. It will be remembered that the case of +Belgium was the great winning card played by the Allied Governments for +the stakes of American sympathies; and therefore we may here properly +make a survey, somewhat in detail, of the status of Belgium at the +outset of the war.</p> + +<p>Belgium had learned forty years ago how she stood under the treaties of +1831 and 1839. When in the late 'eighties there was likelihood of a +Franco-German war, the question of England's participation under these +treaties was thoroughly discussed, and it was shown conclusively that +England was not obligated. Perhaps the best summary of the case was that +given by Mr. W. T. Stead in the <i>Pall Mall Gazette</i> in the issues of 4 +and 5 February, 1887. After an examination of the treaties of 1831, 1839 +and 1870—an examination unfortunately too long to be quoted here—Mr. +Stead briefly sums up the result of his investigation in the following +statement:</p> + +<p><span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_46" id="Page_46">[Pg 46]</a></span></p><blockquote><p>There is therefore no English guarantee to Belgium. It is possible +perhaps, to 'construct' such a guarantee; but the case may be +summed up as follows: (1) England is under no guarantee whatever +except such as is common to Austria, France, Russia and Germany; +(2) that guarantee is not specifically of the neutrality of Belgium +at all; and (3) is given, not to Belgium but to the Netherlands.</p></blockquote> + +<p>This was the official view of the British Government at the time, and it +is reflected in the celebrated letter signed "Diplomaticus" in the +<i>Standard</i> of 4 February, to which Mr. Stead refers; which, indeed, he +makes the guiding text for his examination. The <i>Standard</i> was then the +organ of Lord Salisbury's Government, and it is as nearly certain as +anything of the sort can be, that the letter signed "Diplomaticus" was +written by the hand of the British Prime Minister, Lord Salisbury +himself.</p> + +<p>How Mr. Asquith's Government in August 1914 came suddenly to extemporize +a wholly different view of England's obligations to Belgium is +excellently told by that inveterate diarist and chronicler, Mr. Wilfred +Scawen Blunt:</p> + +<blockquote><p>The obligation of fighting in alliance with France in case of a war +with Germany concerned the honour of three members only of +Asquith's Cabinet, who alone were aware of the exact promises that +had been made.<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_47" id="Page_47">[Pg 47]</a></span> These, though given verbally and with reservations +as to the consent of Parliament, bound the three as a matter of +personal honour, and were understood at the Quai d'Orsay as binding +the British nation. Neither Asquith nor his two companions<a name="FNanchor_5_5" id="FNanchor_5_5"></a><a href="#Footnote_5_5" class="fnanchor">[5]</a> in +this inner Cabinet could have retained office had they gone back +from their word in spirit or in letter. It would also doubtless +have entailed a serious quarrel with the French Government had they +failed to make it good. So clearly was the promise understood at +Paris to be binding that President Poincaré, when the crisis came, +had written to King George reminding him of it as an engagement +made between the two nations which he counted on His Majesty to +keep.</p> + +<p>Thus faced, the case was laid before the Cabinet, but was found to +fail as a convincing argument for war. It was then that Asquith, +with his lawyer's instinct, at a second Cabinet meeting brought +forward the neutrality of Belgium as a better plea than the other +to lay before a British jury, and by representing the +neutrality-treaties of 1831 and 1839 as entailing an obligation on +England to fight (of which the text of the treaties contains no +word) obtained the Cabinet's consent, and war was declared.</p></blockquote> + +<p>Belgium was not thought of by the British Cabinet before 2 August, 1914. +She was brought in then as a means of making the war go down with the +British people. The fact is that Belgium was thoroughly prepared for +war, thoroughly <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_48" id="Page_48">[Pg 48]</a></span>prepared for just what happened to her. Belgium was a +party to the military arrangements effected among France, England and +Russia; for this we have the testimony of Marshal Joffre before the +Metallurgic Committee in Paris, and also the record of the +"conversations" that were carried on in Brussels between the Belgian +chief of staff and Lt.-Col. Barnardiston. On 24 July, 1914, the day when +the Austrian note was presented to Serbia (the note of which Sir E. Grey +had gotten an intimation as early as 16 July by telegraph from the +British Ambassador at Vienna, Sir M. de Bunsen), the Belgian Foreign +Minister, M. Davignon, promptly dispatched to all the Belgian embassies +an identical communication containing the following statement, the +significance of which is made clear by a glance at a map:</p> + +<blockquote><p>All necessary steps to ensure respect of Belgian neutrality have +nevertheless been taken by the Government. The Belgian army has +been mobilized and is taking up such strategic positions as have +been chosen to secure the defence of the country and the respect of +its neutrality. The forts of Antwerp and on the Meuse have been put +in a state of defence.</p></blockquote> + +<p>It was on the eastern frontier, we perceive, therefore—not on the +western, where Belgium might have been invaded by France—that all the<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_49" id="Page_49">[Pg 49]</a></span> +available Belgian military force was concentrated. Hence, to pretend any +longer that the Belgian Government was surprised by the action of +Germany, or unprepared to meet it; to picture Germany and Belgium as cat +and mouse, to understand the position of Belgium otherwise than that she +was one of four solid allies under definite agreement worked out in +complete practical detail, is sheer absurdity.</p> + +<div class="footnotes"><h3>FOOTNOTE:</h3> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_5_5" id="Footnote_5_5"></a><a href="#FNanchor_5_5"><span class="label">[5]</span></a> Sir E. Grey and Lord Haldane.</p></div> +</div> + +<hr /> + +<p><span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_50" id="Page_50">[Pg 50]</a></span></p> + +<h2>IX</h2> + +<p>If the official theory of German responsibility were correct, it would +be impossible to explain the German Government's choice of the year 1914 +as a time to strike at "an unsuspecting and defenceless Europe." The +figures quoted in Chapter III show that the military strength of +Germany, relatively to that of the French-Russian-English combination, +had been decreasing since 1910. If Germany had wished to strike at +Europe, she had two first-rate chances, one in 1908 and another in 1912, +and not only let them both go by, but threw all her weight on the side +of peace. This is inexplicable upon the theory that animates the treaty +of Versailles. Germany was then in a position of advantage. The occasion +presented itself in 1908, in Serbia's quarrel with Austria over the +annexation of Bosnia and the Herzegovina. Russia, which was backing +Serbia, was in no shape to fight; her military strength, used up in the +Russo-Japanese war, had not recovered. France would not at this time +have been willing to go to<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_51" id="Page_51">[Pg 51]</a></span> war with Germany over her weak ally's +commitments in the Danube States. Germany, however, contented herself +with serving notice on the Tsar of her unequivocal support of Austria; +and this was enough. The Tsar accepted the <i>fait accompli</i> of the +annexation of Bosnia and the Herzegovina; Serbia retired and cooled off; +and Turkey, from whom the annexed province was ravished, was compensated +by Austria. It is not to the point to scrutinize the propriety of these +transactions; the point is that Germany held the peace of Europe in the +hollow of her hand, with immense advantages in her favour, and chose not +to close her hand. The comment of a neutral diplomat, the Belgian +Minister in Berlin, is interesting. In his report of 1 April, 1909, to +the Belgian Foreign Office, he says:</p> + +<blockquote><p>The conference scheme elaborated by M. Isvolsky and Sir Edward +Grey; the negotiations for collective representations in Vienna; +and the whole exchange of ideas among London, Paris and Petersburg, +were steadily aimed at forcing Austria-Hungary into a transaction +which would strongly have resembled a humiliation. This humiliation +would have affected Germany as directly and as sensibly as +Austria-Hungary, and would have struck a heavy blow at the +confidence which is inspired in Vienna by the alliance with +Germany. These machinations were frustrated by Germany's +absolutely<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_52" id="Page_52">[Pg 52]</a></span> unequivocal and decided attitude, from which she has +never departed in spite of all the urgings with which she has been +harassed. Germany alone has accomplished the preservation of peace. +The new grouping of the Powers, organized by the King of England, +has measured its forces with the alliance of the Central European +Powers, and has shown itself incapable of impairing the same. Hence +the vexation which is manifested.</p></blockquote> + +<p>The last two sentences of the foregoing seem to show—putting it +mildly—that the Belgian Minister did not suspect the German Government +of any aggressive spirit. In the same dispatch, moreover, he remarks:</p> + +<blockquote><p>As always, when everything does not go as the French, English or +Russian politicians want it to, the <i>Temps</i> shows its bad temper. +Germany is the scapegoat.</p></blockquote> + +<p>Again, at the time of the Balkan War in 1912, Germany had an excellent +opportunity to gratify her military ambition, if she had any, at the +expense of an "unsuspecting and unprepared Europe"; not as advantageous +as in 1908 but more advantageous than in 1914. Serbia's provocations +against Austria-Hungary had become so great that the Austrian Archduke +(assassinated in 1914 at Sarajevo) told the German Emperor personally +that they had reached the limit of endurance.<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_53" id="Page_53">[Pg 53]</a></span> On this occasion also, +however, William II put himself definitely on the side of peace, and in +so doing left the Austrian Government somewhat disappointed and +discontented. Another neutral diplomat reports of the German Foreign +Minister that</p> + +<blockquote><p>whatever plans he may have in his head (and he has big ideas), for +winning the sympathies of the young Balkan Powers over to Germany, +one thing is absolutely certain, and that is that he is rigidly +determined to avoid a European conflagration. On this point the +policy of Germany is similar to that of England and France, both of +which countries are determinedly pacifist.</p></blockquote> + +<p>This is a fair statement of the English and French position in 1912. +There was a great revulsion of feeling in England after her close shave +of being dragged into war over Morocco and her sentiment was all for +attending to certain pressing, domestic problems. Besides, it was only +in November, 1911, and only through the indiscretion of a French +newspaper, that the British public (and the British Parliament as well) +had learned that the Anglo-French agreement of 1904 had secret articles +attached to it, out of which had emanated the imbroglio over Morocco; +and there was a considerable feeling of distrust towards the Foreign +Office. In fact, Sir<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_54" id="Page_54">[Pg 54]</a></span> E. Grey, the Foreign Minister, was so unpopular +with his own party that quite probably he would have had to get out of +office if he had not been sustained by Tory influence. Mr. W. T. Stead +expressed a quite general sentiment in the <i>Review of Reviews</i> for +December, 1911:</p> + +<blockquote><p>The fact remains that in order to put France in possession of +Morocco, we all but went to war with Germany. We have escaped war, +but we have not escaped the national and abiding enmity of the +German people. Is it possible to frame a heavier indictment of the +foreign policy of any British Ministry? The secret, the open +secret, of this almost incredible crime against treaty-faith, +British interests and the peace of the world, is the unfortunate +fact that Sir Edward Grey has been dominated by men in the Foreign +Office who believe all considerations must be subordinated to the +one supreme duty of thwarting Germany at every turn, even if in +doing so British interests, treaty-faith and the peace of the world +are trampled underfoot. I speak that of which I know.</p></blockquote> + +<p>This was strong language and it went without challenge, for too many +Englishmen felt that way. In France, the Poincaré-Millerand-Delcassé +combination was getting well into the saddle; but with English public +opinion in this notably undependable condition, English support of +France, in spite of the secret agreement binding<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_55" id="Page_55">[Pg 55]</a></span> the two governments, +was decidedly risky. Thereupon France also was "determinedly pacifist." +Now if Germany had been the prime mover in "the most dangerous +conspiracy ever plotted against the liberty of nations," why did she not +take advantage of that situation?</p> + +<p>Russia, too, was "determinedly pacifist" in 1912, and with good reason. +There was a party of considerable influence in the Tsar's court that was +strongly for going to war in behalf of Serbia, but it was finally headed +off by the Foreign Minister, Sazonov, who knew the state of public +opinion in England and its effect on France, and knew therefore that the +French-Russian-English alliance was not yet in shape to take on large +orders. It is true that the Poincaré-Millerand-Delcassé war-party in +France had proof enough in 1912 that it could count on the British +Government's support; and what France knew, Russia knew. Undoubtedly, +too, the British Government would somehow, under some pretext or other, +possibly Belgian neutrality, have contrived to redeem its obligations as +it did in 1914. But the atmosphere of the country was not favourable and +the thing would have been difficult. Accordingly, Sazonov saw that it +was best for him to restrain Serbia's impetuosity and truculence<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_56" id="Page_56">[Pg 56]</a></span> for +the time being—Russia herself being none too ready—and accordingly he +did so.</p> + +<p>But how? The Serbian Minister at Petersburg says that Sazonov told him +that in view of Serbia's successes "he had confidence in our strength +and believed that we would be able to deliver a blow at Austria. For +that reason we should feel satisfied with what we were to receive, and +consider it merely as a temporary halting-place on the road to further +gains." On another occasion "Sazonov told me that we must work for the +future because we would acquire a great deal of territory from Austria." +The Serbian Minister at Bucharest says that his Russian and French +colleagues counselled a policy of waiting "with as great a degree of +preparedness as possible the important events which must make their +appearance among the Great Powers." How, one may ask, was the Russian +Foreign Office able to look so far and so clearly into the future? If +German responsibility for the war is fundamental, a <i>chose jugée</i>, as +Mr. Lloyd George said it is, this seems a strange way for the Russian +Foreign Minister to be talking, as far back as 1912. But stranger still +is the fact that the German Government did not jump in at this juncture +instead of postponing its blow until 1914<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_57" id="Page_57">[Pg 57]</a></span> when every one was apparently +quite ready to receive it. When the historian of the future considers +the theory of the Versailles treaty and considers the behaviour of the +German Government in the crisis of 1908 and in the crisis of 1912, he +will have to scratch his head a great deal to make them harmonize.</p> + +<hr /> + +<p><span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_58" id="Page_58">[Pg 58]</a></span></p> + +<h2>X</h2> + +<p>By the spring of 1913, the diplomatic representatives of the Allied +Danube States made no secret of the relations in which their Governments +stood to the Tsar's Foreign Office. The Balkan League was put through by +Russian influence and Russia controlled its diplomacy. Serbia was as +completely the instrument of Russia as Poland is now the instrument of +France. "If the Austrian troops invade Balkan territory," wrote Baron +Beyens on 4 April, 1913, "it would give cause for Russia to intervene, +and might let loose a universal war." Now, if Germany had been plotting +"with ruthless, cynical determination," as Mr. Lloyd George said, +against the peace of Europe, what inconceivable stupidity for her not to +push Austria along rather than do everything possible to hold her back! +Why give Russia the benefit of eighteen months of valuable time for the +feverish campaign of "preparedness" that she carried on? Those eighteen +months meant a great deal. In February, 1914, the Tsar <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_59" id="Page_59">[Pg 59]</a></span>arranged to +provide the Serbian army with rifles and artillery, Serbia agreeing to +put half a million soldiers in the field. In the same month Russia +negotiated a French loan of about $100 million for improvements on her +strategic railways and frontier-roads. During the spring, she made +"test" mobilizations of large bodies of troops which were never +demobilized, and these "test" mobilizations continued down to the +outbreak of the war; and in April Russian agents made technical +arrangements with agents of the British and French Admiralties for +possible combined naval action.</p> + +<p>Yes, those eighteen months were very busy months for Russia. True, she +came out at the end of them an "unprepared and unsuspecting" nation, +presumably, for was not all Europe unprepared and unsuspecting? Is it +not so nominated in the Versailles treaty? One can not help wondering, +however, how it is that Germany, "carefully, skilfully, insidiously, +clandestinely planning in every detail" a murderous attack on the peace +of Europe, should have given Russia the inestimable advantage of those +eighteen months.</p> + +<hr /> + +<p><span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_60" id="Page_60">[Pg 60]</a></span></p> + +<h2>XI</h2> + +<p>Mr. E. D. Morel, editor of the British monthly, <i>Foreign Affairs</i>, +performed more than a distinguished service—it is a splendid, an +illustrious service—to the disparaged cause of justice, when recently +he translated and published in England through the National Labour +Press, a series of remarkable State documents.<a name="FNanchor_6_6" id="FNanchor_6_6"></a><a href="#Footnote_6_6" class="fnanchor">[6]</a> This consists of +reports made by the Belgian diplomatic representatives at Paris, London +and Berlin, to the Belgian Minister of Foreign Affairs, covering the +period from 7 February, 1905 to 2 July, 1914. Their authenticity has +never been questioned. They have received no notice in this country; +their content and import were carefully kept from the American people as +long as it was possible to do so, and consequently they remain unknown +except to a few who are students of international affairs or who have +some similar special interest.</p> + +<p><span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_61" id="Page_61">[Pg 61]</a></span></p><p>It can hardly be pretended by anyone that Belgian officials had, during +that decade, any particular love or leaning towards Germany. The Belgian +Foreign Office has always been as free from sentimental attachments as +any other. It has always been governed by the same motives that govern +the British, French, German and Russian Foreign Offices. Its number, +like theirs, was number one; it was out, first and last, for the +interests of the Belgian Government, and it scrutinized every +international transaction from the viewpoint of those interests and +those only. It was fully aware of the position of Belgium as a mere +"strategic corridor" and battle-ground for alien armies in case of a +general European war, and aware that Belgium had simply to make the best +of its bad outlook, for nothing else could be done. If the Belgian +Foreign Office and its agents, moreover, had no special love for +Germany, neither had they any special fear of her. They were in no more +or deeper dread of a German invasion than of a British or French +invasion. In fact, in 1911, the Belgian Minister at Berlin set forth in +a most matter-of-fact way his belief that in the event of war, Belgian +neutrality would be first violated by Great Britain.<a name="FNanchor_7_7" id="FNanchor_7_7"></a><a href="#Footnote_7_7" class="fnanchor">[7]</a> These<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_62" id="Page_62">[Pg 62]</a></span> +observers, in short, may on all accounts, as far as one can see, be +accepted as neutral and disinterested, with the peculiar +disinterestedness of one who has no choice between two evils.</p> + +<p>Well, then, under the circumstances it is remarkable that if Germany +during the ten years preceding August, 1914, were plotting against the +peace of the world, these Belgian observers seem unaware of it. It is +equally noteworthy that if Germany's assault were unprovoked, they seem +unaware of that also. These documents relate in an extremely +matter-of-fact way a continuous series of extraordinary provocations put +upon the German Government, and moreover, they represent the behaviour +of the German Government, under these provocations, in a very favourable +light. On the other hand, they show from beginning to end a most +profound distrust of English diplomacy. If there is any uncertainty +about the causes of ill-feeling between England and Germany, these +Belgian officials certainly do not share it. They regularly speak<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_63" id="Page_63">[Pg 63]</a></span> of +England's jealousy of Germany's economic competition, and the +provocative attitude to which this jealousy gave rise. They speak of it, +moreover, as though it were something that the Belgian Government were +already well aware of; they speak of it in the tone of pure commonplace, +such as one might use in an incidental reference to the weather or to a +tariff-schedule or to any other matter that is well understood and about +which there is no difference of opinion and nothing new to be said. This +is all the more remarkable in view of the fact that it was nominally to +save Belgium and to defend the sanctity of Belgian neutrality that +England entered the war in August, 1914. These Belgian agents are +invariably suspicious of English diplomacy, as Mr. E. D. Morel points +out, "mainly because they feel that it is tending to make the war which +they dread for their country." They persistently and unanimously +"insinuate that if left to themselves, France and Germany would reach a +settlement of their differences, and that British diplomacy was being +continually exercised to envenom the controversy and to draw a circle of +hostile alliances round Germany." This, indeed, under a specious concern +for the "balance of power," has been the historic rôle of English<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_64" id="Page_64">[Pg 64]</a></span> +diplomacy. Every one remembers how in 1866, just before the +Franco-Prussian war, Mr. Matthew Arnold's imaginary Prussian, Arminius +von Thunder-ten-Tronckh, wrote to the editor of the <i>Pall Mall Gazette</i>, +begging him to prevail upon his fellow-countrymen "for Heaven's sake not +to go on biting, first the French Emperor's tail, and then ours."</p> + +<p>On 18 February, 1905, the Belgian Minister in Berlin reported thus:</p> + +<blockquote><p>The real cause of the English hatred of Germany is the jealousy +aroused by the astonishing development of Germany's merchant navy +and of her commerce and manufactures. This hatred will last until +the English have thoroughly learned to understand that the world's +trade is not by rights an exclusively English monopoly. Moreover, +it is studiously fostered by the <i>Times</i> and a whole string of +other daily papers and periodicals that do not stop short of +calumny in order to pander to the tastes of their readers.</p></blockquote> + +<p>At that time the centre of the English navy had just been shifted to the +North Sea, to the accompaniment of a very disturbing and, as at first +reported, a very flamboyant speech from the Civil Lord of the Admiralty, +Mr. Lee. Of the sensation thereby created in Germany, the Belgian +Minister says:</p> + +<p><span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_65" id="Page_65">[Pg 65]</a></span></p><blockquote><p>In informing the British public that Germany does not dream of any +aggression against England, Count Bülow [the German Chancellor] +said no more than what is recognized by every one who considers the +matter dispassionately. Germany would have nothing to gain from a +contest.... The German fleet has been created with a purely +defensive object. The small capacity of the coal-bunkers in her +High Seas Fleet, and the small number of her cruisers, prove +besides that her fleet is not intended for use at any distance from +the coast.</p></blockquote> + +<p>On the other hand, he remarks in the same report:</p> + +<blockquote><p>It was obvious that the new disposition of the English navy was +aimed at Germany ... it certainly is not because of Russia, whose +material stock is to a great extent destroyed and whose navy has +just given striking proof of incompetence [in the Russo-Japanese +war].</p></blockquote> + +<p>Such is the tone uniformly adopted by these neutral observers throughout +their reports from 1905 to 1914. On 24 October, 1905, the Belgian +Minister in Paris wrote:</p> + +<blockquote><p>England, in her efforts to maintain her supremacy and to hinder the +development of her great German rival, is evidently inspired by the +wish to avoid a conflict, but are not her selfish aims in +themselves bringing it upon us?... She thought, when she concluded +the Japanese alliance and gradually drew France into similar ties, +that she had found the means to her end, by sufficiently<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_66" id="Page_66">[Pg 66]</a></span> +paralysing Germany's powers as to make war impossible.</p></blockquote> + +<p>This view of the Anglo-Japanese alliance is interesting and significant, +especially now when that instrument is coming up for renewal, with the +United States standing towards England in the same relation of economic +competitorship that Germany occupied in 1905. True, Viscount Bryce +assured the Institute of Politics at Williams College last summer that +it was not Germany's economic rivalry that disturbed England; but on +this point it would be highly advantageous for the people of the United +States, while there is yet time, to read what the Belgian Minister in +Berlin had to say on 27 October, 1905:</p> + +<blockquote><p>A very large number of Germans are convinced that England is either +seeking allies for an attack upon Germany, or else, which would be +more in accordance with British tradition, that she is labouring to +provoke a Continental war in which she would not join, but of which +she would reap the profit.</p> + +<p>I am told that many English people are troubled with similar fears +and go in dread of German aggression.</p> + +<p>I am puzzled upon what foundations such an impression in London can +be based. Germany is absolutely incapable of attacking England.... +Are these people in England really sincere who go about expressing +fears of a German invasion which could not materialize?<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_67" id="Page_67">[Pg 67]</a></span> Are they +not rather pretending to be afraid of it in order to bring on a war +which would annihilate Germany's navy, her merchant-fleet and her +foreign commerce? Germany is as vulnerable to attack as England is +safe from it; and if England were to attack Germany merely for the +sake of extinguishing a rival, it would only be in accordance with +her old precedents.</p> + +<p>In turn she wiped out the Dutch fleet, with the assistance of Louis +XIV; then the French fleet; and the Danish fleet she even destroyed +in time of peace and without any provocation, simply because it +constituted a naval force of some magnitude.</p> + +<p>There are no ostensible grounds for war between Germany and +England. The English hatred for Germany arises solely from jealousy +of Germany's progress in shipping, in commerce and in manufacture.</p></blockquote> + +<p>Baron Greindl here presents an opinion very different from that in which +the majority of Americans have been instructed; and before they accept +further instruction at the hands of Viscount Bryce, they had better look +into the matter somewhat for themselves.</p> + +<p>Baron Greindl wrote the foregoing in October. In December, the head of +the British Admiralty, Sir John Fisher, assured Colonel Repington that +"Admiral Wilson's Channel fleet was alone strong enough to smash the +whole German fleet." <i>Two years</i> later, Sir John Fisher wrote to King +<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_68" id="Page_68">[Pg 68]</a></span>Edward VII that "it is an absolute fact that Germany has not laid down +a single dreadnaught, nor has she commenced building a single battleship +or big cruiser for eighteen months.... England has ... ten dreadnaughts +built and building, while Germany in March last had not even begun one +dreadnaught ... we have 123 destroyers and forty submarines. The Germans +have forty-eight destroyers and one submarine." Hence, if Sir John +Fisher knew what he was talking about, and in such matters he usually +did, he furnishes a very considerable corroboration of Baron Greindl's +view of the German navy up to 1905. Looking back at the third chapter of +this book, which deals with the comparative strength of the two navies +and naval groups as developed from 1905 to 1914, the reader may well +raise again Baron Greindl's question, "Are those people in England +really sincere?"</p> + +<div class="footnotes"><h3>FOOTNOTES:</h3> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_6_6" id="Footnote_6_6"></a><a href="#FNanchor_6_6"><span class="label">[6]</span></a> Under the title "Diplomacy Revealed." National Labour +Press. 8 and 9 Johnson's Court, London, E.C., 4, England.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_7_7" id="Footnote_7_7"></a><a href="#FNanchor_7_7"><span class="label">[7]</span></a> This belief received some corroboration in the spring of +1912, when in the course of military "conversations," the British +Military Attaché, Lieutenant-Colonel Bridges, told the Belgian Minister +of War that if war had broken out over the Agadir incident in 1911, the +British Government would have landed troops in Belgium with or without +the Belgian Government's consent. So much did the British Government +think of the "scrap of paper!"</p></div></div> + +<hr /> + +<p><span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_69" id="Page_69">[Pg 69]</a></span></p> + +<h2>XII</h2> + +<p>Such is the inveterate suspicion, the melancholy distrust, put upon +English diplomacy by these foreign and neutral observers who could see +so plainly what would befall their own country in the event of a +European war. Such too, was the responsibility which these observers +regularly imputed to the British Foreign Office—the British Foreign +Office which was so soon to fix upon the neutrality of Belgium as a +<i>casus belli</i> and pour out streams of propaganda about the sanctity of +treaties and the rights of small nations! Every one of these observers +exhibits this suspicion and distrust. In March, 1906, when Edward VII +visited Paris and invited the discredited ex-Minister Delcassé to +breakfast, the Belgian Minister at Paris wrote:</p> + +<blockquote><p>It looks as though the king wished to demonstrate that the policy +which called forth Germany's active intervention [over Morocco] has +nevertheless remained unchanged.... In French circles it is not +over well received; Frenchmen feeling that they are being dragged +against their will in the orbit of English policy, a policy<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_70" id="Page_70">[Pg 70]</a></span> whose +consequences they dread, and which they generally condemned by +throwing over M. Delcassé. In short, people fear that this is a +sign that England wants so to envenom the situation that war will +become inevitable.</p></blockquote> + +<p>On 10 February, 1907, when the English King and Queen visited Paris, he +says: "One can not conceal from oneself that these tactics, though their +ostensible object is to prevent war, are likely to arouse great +dissatisfaction in Berlin and to stir up a desire to risk anything that +may enable Germany to burst the ring which England's policy is +tightening around her." On 28 March, 1907, the Belgian <i>chargé +d'affaires</i> in London speaks of "English diplomacy, whose whole effort +is directed to the isolation of Germany." On the same date, by a curious +coincidence, the Minister at Berlin, in the course of a blistering +arraignment of French policy in Morocco, says: "But at the bottom of +every settlement that has been made, or is going to be made, there lurks +always that hatred of Germany.... It is a sequence of the campaign very +cleverly conducted with the object of isolating Germany.... The English +press is carrying on its campaign of calumny more implacably than ever. +It sees the finger of Germany in everything that goes contrary to +English wishes." On 18 April, 1907, Baron<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_71" id="Page_71">[Pg 71]</a></span> Greindl says of the King of +England's visit to the King of Spain that, like the alliances with Japan +and France and the negotiations with Russia, it is "one of the moves in +the campaign to isolate Germany that is being personally directed with +as much perseverance as success by His Majesty King Edward VII." In the +same dispatch he remarks: "There is some right to regard with suspicion +this eagerness to unite, for a so-called defensive object, Powers who +are menaced by nobody. At Berlin they can not forget that offer of +100,000 men made by the King of England to M. Delcassé."</p> + +<p>On 24 May, 1907, the Minister at London reported that "it is plain that +official England is pursuing a policy that is covertly hostile, and +tending to result in the isolation of Germany, and that King Edward has +not been above putting his personal influence at the service of this +cause." On 19 June, 1907, Count de Lalaing again writes from London of +the Anglo-Franco-Spanish agreement concerning the <i>status quo</i> in the +Mediterranean region, that "it is, however, difficult to imagine that +Germany will not regard it as a further step in England's policy, which +is determined, by every sort of means, to isolate the German Empire."</p> + +<p><span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_72" id="Page_72">[Pg 72]</a></span></p><p>Perusal of these documents from beginning to end will show nothing to +offset against the view of English diplomacy exhibited in the foregoing +quotations; nothing to modify or qualify that view in any way. Baron +Greindl, however, speaks highly of the British Ambassador at Berlin, Sir +F. Lascelles, and praises his personal and unsupported attempt to +establish friendly relations between England and Germany. Of this he +says: "I have been a witness for the last twelve years of the efforts he +has made to accomplish it. And yet, possessing as he justly does the +absolute confidence of the Emperor and the German Government, and +eminently gifted with the qualities of a statesman, he has nevertheless +not succeeded very well so far." The next year, 1908, when Sir F. +Lascelles was forced to resign his post, Baron Greindl does not hesitate +to say that "the zeal with which he has worked to dispel +misunderstandings that he thought absurd and highly mischievous for both +countries, does not fall in with the political views of his sovereign."</p> + +<hr /> + +<p><span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_73" id="Page_73">[Pg 73]</a></span></p> + +<h2>XIII</h2> + +<p>King Edward VII died 6 May, 1910. During the early part of 1911, the +Belgian Ministers in London, Paris and Berlin report some indications of +a less unfriendly policy towards Germany on the part of the British +Government. In March of that year, Sir Edward Grey delivered a +reassuring speech on British foreign policy, on the occasion of the +debate on the naval budget. The Belgian Minister in Berlin says of this +that it should have produced the most agreeable impression in Germany if +one could confidently believe that it really entirely reflected the +ideas of the British Government. It would imply, he says, that "England +no longer wishes to give to the Triple Entente the aggressive character +which was stamped upon it by its creator, King Edward VII." He remarks, +however, the slight effect produced in Berlin by Sir E. Grey's speech, +and infers that German public feeling may have "become dulled by the +innumerable meetings and mutual demonstrations of courtesy which have +never <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_74" id="Page_74">[Pg 74]</a></span>produced any positive result," and he adds significantly that +"this distrust is comprehensible."</p> + +<p>It must be remembered that at the time this speech was delivered, +England was under a secret agreement dating from 1904 to secure France's +economic monopoly in Morocco. England was also under a secret obligation +to France, dating from 1906, to support her in case of war with Germany. +It must be above all remembered that this latter obligation carried with +it a contingent liability for the Franco-Russian military alliance that +had been in effect for many years. Thus if Russia went to war with +Germany, France was committed, and in turn England was committed. The +whole force of the Triple Entente lay in these agreements; and it can +not be too often pointed out that they were <i>secret</i> agreements. No one +in England knew until November, 1911, that in 1904 the British +Government had bargained with the French Government, in return for a +free hand in Egypt, to permit France to squeeze German economic +interests out of Morocco—in violation of a published agreement, signed +by all the interested nations, concerning the status of Morocco. No one +in England knew until 3 August, 1914, that England had for several years +been under a military and naval<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_75" id="Page_75">[Pg 75]</a></span> agreement with France which carried the +enormous contingent liability of the Franco-Russian military alliance. +No matter what appeared on the surface of politics; no matter how many +pacific speeches were made by Sir E. Grey and Mr. Asquith, no matter +what the newspapers said, no matter how often and how impressively Lord +Haldane might visit Berlin in behalf of peace and good feeling; <i>those +secret agreements held</i>, they were the only things that did hold, and +everything worked out in strict accordance with them and with nothing +else, least of all with any public understanding or any statement of +policy put out for public consumption. It was just as in the subsequent +case of the armistice and the peace—and this is something that has been +far too little noticed in this country. The real terms of the armistice +and of the peace were not the terms of the Fourteen Points or of any of +the multitudinous published statements of Allied war aims. On the +contrary, they were the precise terms of the secret treaties made among +the Allied belligerents during the war, and made public on their +discovery by the Soviet Government in the archives of the Tsarist +Foreign Office.</p> + +<p>It is no wonder then, that the German Government was not particularly +impressed by Sir E.<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_76" id="Page_76">[Pg 76]</a></span> Grey's speech, especially as Germany saw France +helping herself to Moroccan territory with both hands, and England +looking on in indifferent complacency. In May, 1911, on a most +transparent and preposterous pretext, a French army was ordered to march +on Fez, the capital of Morocco. The German Government then informed +France that as the Algeciras Act, which guaranteed the integrity and +independence of Morocco, had thereby gone by the board, Germany would no +longer consider herself bound by its provisions. In June, 30,000 French +troops "relieved" Fez, occupied it and stayed there, evincing no +intention whatever of getting out again, notwithstanding that the +ostensible purpose of the expedition was accomplished; in reality, there +was nothing to accomplish. Two months before this <i>coup d'état</i>, Baron +Greindl, the Belgian Minister at Berlin, wrote to the Belgian Foreign +Office as follows:</p> + +<blockquote><p>Every illusion, if ever entertained on the value of the Algeciras +Act, which France signed with the firm intention of never +observing, must long since have vanished. She has not ceased for +one moment to pursue her plans of annexation; either by seizing +opportunities for provisional occupations destined to last for ever +or by extorting concessions which have placed the Sultan in a<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_77" id="Page_77">[Pg 77]</a></span> +position of dependence upon France, and which have gradually +lowered him to the level of the Bey of Tunis.</p></blockquote> + +<p>A week later, 29 April, Baron Guillaume, who had succeeded M. Leghait as +Belgian Minister in Paris, reported that "there are, so far, no grounds +for fearing that the French expedition will bring about any disturbance +of international policy. Germany is a calm spectator of events." He +adds, significantly, "England, having thrust France into the Moroccan +bog, is contemplating her work with satisfaction."</p> + +<p>France professed publicly that the object of this expedition was to +extricate certain foreigners who were imperilled at Fez; and having done +so, she would withdraw her forces. The precious crew of concessionaires, +profiteers, and dividend-hunters known as the <i>Comité du Maroc</i> had +suddenly discovered a whole French colony living in Fez in a state of +terror and distress. There was, in fact, nothing of the sort. Fez was +never menaced, it was never short of provisions, and there were no +foreigners in trouble. When the expeditionary force arrived, it found no +one to shoot at. As M. Francis de Pressensé says:</p> + +<blockquote><p>Those redoubtable rebels who were threatening Fez had disappeared +like dew in the morning. Barely did<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_78" id="Page_78">[Pg 78]</a></span> a few ragged horsemen fire off +a shot or two before turning around and riding away at a furious +gallop. A too disingenuous, or too truthful, correspondent gave the +show away. The expeditionary force complains, he gravely records, +of the absence of the enemy; the approaching harvest season is +keeping all the healthy males in the fields! Thus did the phantom +so dexterously conjured by the <i>Comité du Maroc</i> for the benefit of +its aims, disappear in a night.</p></blockquote> + +<p>Nevertheless, the expeditionary force did not, in accordance with the +public professions of the French Government, march out of Fez as soon as +it discovered this ridiculous mare's nest. It remained there and held +possession of the Moorish capital. What was the attitude of the British +Government in the premises? On 2 May, in the House of Commons, Sir +Edward Grey said that "the action taken by France is not intended to +alter the political status of Morocco, and His Majesty's Government can +not see why any objection should be taken to it."</p> + +<p>Germany had remained for eight years a tolerant observer of French +encroachments in Morocco, and quite clearly, as Baron Greindl observes +in his report of 21 April, 1911, could not "after eight years of +tolerance, change her attitude unless she were determined to go to war, +and war<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_79" id="Page_79">[Pg 79]</a></span> is immeasurably more than Morocco is worth." In July, 1911, +however, while the French force of 30,000 was still occupying Fez, +Germany dispatched a gunboat, the "Panther," which anchored off the +coast of Agadir.</p> + +<hr /> + +<p><span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_80" id="Page_80">[Pg 80]</a></span></p> + +<h2>XIV</h2> + +<p>This was the famous "Agadir incident," of which we have all heard. Did +it mean that the worm had turned, that Germany had changed her attitude +and was determined to go to war? It has been so represented; but there +are many difficult inconsistencies involved in that explanation of the +German Government's act, and there is also an alternative explanation +which fits the facts far better. In the first place the "Panther" was +hardly more than an ocean-going tug. She was of 1000 tons burden, +mounting two small naval guns, six machine-guns, and she carried a +complement of only 125 men. Second, she never landed a man upon the +coast of Morocco. She chose for her anchorage a point where the coast is +practically inaccessible; Agadir has no harbour, and there is nothing +near it that offers any possible temptation to the predatory instinct. +No more ostentatiously unimpressive and unmenacing demonstration could +have been devised. Germany, too, was quite well aware that Morocco was +not<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_81" id="Page_81">[Pg 81]</a></span> worth a European war; and as Baron Guillaume said in his report of +29 April, "possibly she [Germany] is congratulating herself on the +difficulties that weigh upon the shoulders of the French Government, and +asks nothing better than to keep out of the whole affair as long as she +is not forced into it by economic considerations." But the most +significant indication that Germany had not changed her attitude is in +the fact that if she were determined upon war, then, rather than two +years later, was her time to go about it. This aspect of Germany's +behaviour has been dealt with in a previous chapter. It can not be too +often reiterated that if Germany really wanted war and was determined +upon war, her failure to strike in 1908, when Russia was prostrate and +France unready, and again in 1912, a few months after the Agadir +incident, when the Balkan war was on, is inexplicable.<a name="FNanchor_8_8" id="FNanchor_8_8"></a><a href="#Footnote_8_8" class="fnanchor">[8]</a></p> + +<p><span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_82" id="Page_82">[Pg 82]</a></span></p><p>The dispatch of the "Panther" gave the three Belgian observers a great +surprise, and they were much puzzled to account for it. Baron +Guillaume's thoughts at once turned to England. He writes 2 July:</p> + +<blockquote><p>It was long regarded as an axiom that England would never allow the +Germans to establish themselves at any point of Moroccan territory. +Has this policy been abandoned; and if so, at what price were they +bought off?</p></blockquote> + +<p>During the month of July, while waiting for a statement from the British +Foreign Office, the Belgian observers canvassed the possibility that +Germany's action was a hint that she would like some territorial +compensation for having been bilked out of her share in the Moroccan +market. But the interesting fact, and for the purpose of this book the +important fact, is that none of these diplomats shows the slightest +suspicion that Germany was bent on war or that she had any thought of +going to war. Baron Guillaume says, 28 July, "undoubtedly the present +situation wears a serious aspect.... Nobody, however, wants war, and +they will try to avoid it." He proceeds:</p> + +<blockquote><p>The French Government knows that a war would be the death-knell of +the Republic.... I have very great<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_83" id="Page_83">[Pg 83]</a></span> confidence in the Emperor +William's love of peace, notwithstanding the not infrequent air of +melodrama about what he says and does.... Germany can not go to war +for the sake of Morocco, nor yet to exact payment of those +compensations that she very reasonably demands for the French +occupation of Fez, which has become more or less permanent. On the +whole I feel less faith in Great Britain's desire for peace. She +would not be sorry to see the others destroying one another; only, +under those circumstances, it would be difficult for her to avoid +armed intervention.... As I thought from the very first, the crux +of the situation is in London.</p></blockquote> + +<p>By the end of July, a different conception of Germany's action seemed to +prevail. It began to be seen that the episode of the "Panther" had been +staged by way of calling for a show-down on the actual intentions and +purposes of the Triple Entente; and it got one. Mr. Lloyd George, "the +impulsive Chancellor of the Exchequer," as Count de Lalaing calls him, +made a typical jingo speech at the Mansion House; a speech which the +Prime Minister, Mr. Asquith, and Sir Edward Grey, the Foreign Minister, +had helped him to compose. The air was cleared at once—England stood by +France—and what better plan could have been devised for clearing the +air than the dispatch of the "Panther"? Germany stood for the policy of +economic equality,<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_84" id="Page_84">[Pg 84]</a></span> the policy of the open door to which all the Powers +interested had agreed in the case of Morocco. France, at the end of a +course of continuous aggression, had put 30,000 troops in occupation of +the capital of Morocco on an infamously unscrupulous pretext, and put +them there to stay, and the British Government "could not see why any +objection should be taken to it." Germany, on the other hand, anchored +an insignificant gunboat off an inaccessible coast, and without landing +a man or firing a shot, left her there as a silent reminder of the +Algeciras Act and the principle of the open door—carefully and even +ostentatiously going no further—and the British Government promptly, +through the mouth of Mr. Lloyd George, laid down a challenge and a +threat. Thereupon Germany and France understood their relative +positions; they understood, even without Sir E. Grey's explicit +reaffirmation of 27 November of the policy of the Triple Entente, that +England would stand by her arrangements with France. Baron Greindl +writes from Berlin 6 December, and puts the case explicitly:</p> + +<blockquote><p>Was it not assuming the right of veto on German enterprise for +England to start a hue and cry because a German cruiser cast anchor +in the roads of Agadir, seeing that she had looked on without a +murmur whilst<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_85" id="Page_85">[Pg 85]</a></span> France and Spain had proceeded step by step to +conquer Morocco and to destroy the independence of its Sultan?</p> + +<p>England could not have acted otherwise. She was tied by her secret +treaty with France. The explanation was extremely simple, but it +was not of a sort to allay German irritation.</p></blockquote> + +<div class="footnotes"><h3>FOOTNOTE:</h3> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_8_8" id="Footnote_8_8"></a><a href="#FNanchor_8_8"><span class="label">[8]</span></a> Critics of German foreign policy are hard put to it to show +that she was ever guided by territorial ambitions; which is an extremely +troublesome thing when one wants to believe that she proposed in 1914 to +put the world under a military despotism. Can any one show where in a +single instance she ever demanded anything more than economic equality +with other nations, in a foreign market? Certainly she never demanded +more than this in Morocco. Ex-Premier Caillaux says that his predecessor +Rouvier offered Germany a good Moroccan port (Mogador) and some +adjoining territory, and Germany declined.</p></div></div> + +<hr /> + +<p><span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_86" id="Page_86">[Pg 86]</a></span></p> + +<h2>XV</h2> + +<p>Let us glance at British political chronology for a moment. King Edward +VII, the chief factor in the Entente, the moving spirit in England's +foreign alliances, had been dead a year. In December, 1905, the Liberal +party had come into power. In April, 1908, Mr. H. H. Asquith became +Prime Minister. In 1910, Anglo-German relations were apparently +improving; in July, 1910, Mr. Asquith spoke of them in the House of +Commons as "of the most cordial character. I look forward to increasing +warmth and fervour and intimacy in these relations year by year." The +great question was, then, in 1911, whether the Liberal Government would +actually, when it came down to the pinch, stick by its secret covenant +with France. Were the new Liberals, were Mr. Asquith, Lord Haldane, Sir +E. Grey, Mr. Lloyd George, true-blue Liberal imperialists, or were they +not? Could France and Russia safely trust them to continue the Foreign +Office policy that Lord Lansdowne had bequeathed to Sir E.<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_87" id="Page_87">[Pg 87]</a></span> Grey; or, +when the emergency came, would they stand from under? After all, there +<i>had</i> been a Campbell-Bannerman; there was no doubt of that; and one, at +least, of the new Liberals, Mr. Lloyd George, had a bad anti-imperialist +record in the South African war.</p> + +<p>The Agadir incident elicited a satisfactory answer to these questions. +The Liberal Government was dependable. However suspiciously the members +of the Liberal Cabinet might talk, they were good staunch imperialists +at heart. They were, as the theologians say, "sound on the essentials." +Baron Greindl wrote, 6 December, 1911:</p> + +<blockquote><p>The Entente Cordiale was founded, not on the positive basis of +defence of common interests, but on the negative one of hatred of +the German Empire.... Sir Edward Grey adopts this tradition without +reservation. He imagines that it is in conformity with English +interests.... A revision of Great Britain's policy is all the less +to be looked for, as ever since the Liberal Ministry took office, +and more especially during the last few months, English foreign +policy has been guided by the ideas with which King Edward VII inspired it.</p></blockquote> + +<hr /> + +<p><span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_88" id="Page_88">[Pg 88]</a></span></p> + +<h2>XVI</h2> + +<p>Mr. Lloyd George's speech at the Mansion House in July, 1911, after the +German gunboat "Panther" had anchored off the Moroccan coast, gave an +immense impulse to the jingo spirit in France, because it was taken as +definite assurance of England's good faith in seeing her secret +agreements through to a finish. M. Caillaux, the French Premier, appears +to have had his doubts, nevertheless, inasmuch as the British Foreign +Office did not give a straight reply to the French Foreign Office's +inquiry concerning British action in case the Germans landed a force in +Morocco. He says:</p> + +<blockquote><p>Are we to understand that our powerful neighbours will go right +through to the end with the resolve which they suggest? Are they +ready for all eventualities? The British Ambassador, Sir Francis +Bertie, with whom I converse, does not give me formal assurances. +It is said, of course, that he would see without displeasure the +outbreak of a conflict between France and Germany; his mind works +in the way attributed to a number of leading British officials at +the Foreign Office.</p></blockquote> + +<p><span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_89" id="Page_89">[Pg 89]</a></span></p><p>M. Caillaux here suggests the same suspicion of British intentions +which the Belgian diplomats at London, Paris and Berlin intimate +continually throughout their correspondence since 1905.<a name="FNanchor_9_9" id="FNanchor_9_9"></a><a href="#Footnote_9_9" class="fnanchor">[9]</a> He +accordingly favoured a less energetic policy towards Germany, and was +thrown out of office. Count de Lalaing reported from London, 15 January, +1912, that the revelations which provoked this political crisis were +disagreeable for the English Government. "They seem to prove," he says, +"that the French Premier had been trying to negotiate with Berlin +without the knowledge of the Minister for Foreign Affairs and his other +colleagues, and this is naturally disquieting to a Government whose +interests are bound up with those of France, and which accordingly can +ill tolerate any lapses of this kind." He adds:</p> + +<blockquote><p>These revelations have also strengthened the impression that M. +Caillaux had recently favoured an ultra-conciliatory policy towards +Germany, and this impression was felt all the more painfully in +English official circles, as the full extent of the tension between +London and Berlin caused by the Cabinet of St. James's loyal +behaviour towards the Cabinet at Paris had hardly<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_90" id="Page_90">[Pg 90]</a></span> been grasped. +People in England are reluctant to face the fact that they have +been 'more royalist than the King,' and have shown themselves even +less accommodating than the friend they were backing.... +Accordingly the press unanimously hails with delight the departure +of M. Caillaux, and trusts that sounder traditions may be reverted +to without delay.</p></blockquote> + +<p>This comment on the position of M. Caillaux is one of the most +interesting observations to be found in these documents.</p> + +<div class="footnotes"><h3>FOOTNOTE:</h3> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_9_9" id="Footnote_9_9"></a><a href="#FNanchor_9_9"><span class="label">[9]</span></a> This is worth noticing since M. Caillaux was the pioneer +victim of the charge of being "pro-German."</p></div></div> + +<hr /> + +<p><span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_91" id="Page_91">[Pg 91]</a></span></p> + +<h2>XVII</h2> + +<p>The Balkan war took place in 1912, and the whole history of the year +shows the most mighty efforts of European politicians—efforts which +seem ludicrous and laughable in spite of their tragic quality—to avert +with their left hand the war which they were bringing on with their +right. Mr. Lloyd George is right in saying that no one really wanted +war. What every one wanted, and what every one was trying with might and +main to do, was to cook the omelette of economic imperialism without +breaking any eggs. There was in all the countries, naturally, a jingo +nationalist party which wanted war. In Russia, which was then busily +reorganizing her military forces which had been used up and left +prostrate by the war with the Japanese, the pan-Slavists were +influential and vociferous, but they were not on top. In England there +was a great popular revulsion against the behaviour of the Government +which had so nearly involved the English in a war against Germany the +year before; and Mr. <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_92" id="Page_92">[Pg 92]</a></span>Asquith's Government, which was pacifist in +tendency, was meeting the popular sentiment in every way possible, +<i>short of the one point of revealing the secret engagements which bound +it to the French Government and contingently to the Russian Government</i>. +Lord Haldane undertook an official mission to Berlin, which was attended +with great publicity and was popularly supposed to be of a pacificatory +nature; and really, within the limits of the Franco-English diplomatic +agreement, it went as far as it could in the establishment of good +relations. In fact, of course, it came to nothing; as long as the +diplomatic agreement remained in force, it could come to nothing, +nothing of the sort could come to anything; and the diplomatic agreement +being guarded as a close secret, the reason why it must come to nothing +was not apparent. The German Government also made tremendous efforts in +behalf of peace; and it must be noted by those who accept the theory +upon which the treaty of Versailles is based, that if Germany had wished +or intended at any time to strike at the peace of Europe, now was the +moment for her to do so. Instead, the German Emperor in person, and the +German Government, through one of its best diplomatic agents, Baron von +Marschall, met every<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_93" id="Page_93">[Pg 93]</a></span> pacific overture more than half-way, and +themselves initiated all that could be thought of. "There is no doubt," +wrote Baron Beyens from Berlin, "that the Emperor, the Chancellor and +the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs (von Kiderlen-Wächter) are +passionately pacifists." Baron Beyens again says, 28 June, 1912, "The +Emperor is persistent and has not given up hopes of winning back English +sympathies, just as he has succeeded up to a certain point in obtaining +the confidence of the Tsar, by the force of his personal attractions." +Those who believe in the extraordinary notion of an unprepared and +unsuspecting Europe, should read the diplomatic history of the year +1912, when all the chief office-holders in England and on the Continent +were struggling like men caught in a quicksand, or like flies on +fly-paper, to avert, or if they could not avert, to defer the inevitable +war.</p> + +<p>In one country, however, the jingo nationalist and militarist party came +on top; and that country was France. M. Caillaux was succeeded by +Raymond Poincaré; and in January, 1913, Poincaré became President of the +Republic. Up to 1912, the people of France were increasingly indisposed +to war and were developing a considerable impatience with militarism, +and the<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_94" id="Page_94">[Pg 94]</a></span> French Government was responsive to this sentiment. It knew, as +Baron Guillaume remarked at the time of the Agadir incident, that "a war +would be the death-knell of the Republic." M. Caillaux seems to have +measured the feelings of his countrymen quite well. Baron Guillaume says +that after the dispatch of the "Panther," the British Cabinet's first +proposal was that the British and French Governments should each +immediately send two men-of-war to Agadir; and that the French Cabinet +strongly objected. Again, he says in his report of 8 July, 1911, "I am +persuaded that Messrs. Caillaux and de Selves regret the turn given to +the Moroccan affair by their predecessors in office. They were quite +ready to give way, provided they could do so without humiliation."</p> + +<p>The speech of Mr. Lloyd George at the Mansion House, however, which was +taken by the French (and how correctly they took it became apparent on 3 +August, 1914) as a definite assurance of British support against +Germany, gave the militarist-nationalist party the encouragement to go +ahead and dominate the domestic politics of France. It put the +Poincaré-Millerand-Delcassé element on its feet and stiffened its +resolution, besides clearing the way in large measure<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_95" id="Page_95">[Pg 95]</a></span> for its +predominance. On 14 February, 1913, Baron Guillaume reports from Paris thus:</p> + +<blockquote><p>The new President of the Republic enjoys a popularity in France +to-day unknown to any of his predecessors.... Various factors +contribute to explain his popularity. His election had been +carefully prepared in advance; people are pleased at the skilful +way in which, while a Minister, he manœuvred to bring France to +the fore in the concert of Europe; he has hit upon some happy +phrases that stick in the popular mind.</p></blockquote> + +<p>The career of M. Poincaré, in fact, and his management of popular +sentiment, show many features which <i>mutatis mutandis</i>, find a parallel +in the career of Theodore Roosevelt. Baron Guillaume adds, however, this +extremely striking observation concerning the popularity of M. Poincaré:</p> + +<blockquote><p>But above all, one must regard it as a manifestation of the old +French chauvinistic spirit, which had for many years slumbered, but +which had come to life again since the affair of Agadir.</p></blockquote> + +<p>In the same communication to the Belgian Foreign Office, Baron Guillaume remarks:</p> + +<blockquote><p>M. Poincaré is a native of Lorraine, and loses no opportunity of +telling people so. He was M. Millerand's colleague, and the +instigator of his militarist policy.</p> + +<p>Finally, the first word that he uttered at the very<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_96" id="Page_96">[Pg 96]</a></span> moment when he +learned that he was elected President of the Republic, was a +promise that he would watch over and maintain all the means of +national defence.</p></blockquote> + +<p>M. Poincaré had not been in office two months when he recalled the +French Ambassador at Petersburg, M. Georges Louis, and appointed in his +stead M. Delcassé. Concerning this stupendous move, Baron Guillaume +reported 21 February, 1913, to the Belgian Foreign Office thus:</p> + +<blockquote><p>The news that M. Delcassé is shortly to be appointed Ambassador at +Petersburg burst like a bomb here yesterday afternoon.... He was +one of the architects of the Franco-Russian alliance, and still +more so of the Anglo-French <i>entente</i>.</p></blockquote> + +<p>Baron Guillaume goes on to say that he does not think that M. Delcassé's +appointment should be interpreted as a demonstration against Germany; but he adds:</p> + +<blockquote><p>I do think, however, that M. Poincaré, a Lorrainer, was not sorry +to show, from the first day of entering on his high office, how +anxious he is to stand firm and hold aloft the national flag. That +is the danger involved in having M. Poincaré at the Elysée in these +anxious days through which Europe is passing. It was under his +Ministry that the militarist, slightly bellicose instincts of the +French woke up again. He has been thought to have a measure of +responsibility for this change of mood.</p></blockquote> + +<p><span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_97" id="Page_97">[Pg 97]</a></span></p><p>M. Georges Louis, who had represented the French Government at +Petersburg for three years, was a resolute opponent of the militarist +faction in France, and was therefore distinctly <i>persona non grata</i> to +the corresponding faction in Russia. At the head of this faction stood +Isvolsky, who was a friend of M. Poincaré and a kindred spirit; hence +when M. Poincaré became Premier, an attempt was made to oust M. Louis, +but it was unsuccessful. M. Delcassé, on the other hand, is described by +Mr. Morel as "the man identified more than any other man in French +public life with the anti-German war-party." Mr. Morel, in commenting on +the appointment of M. Delcassé quotes the following from a report sent +by the Russian Ambassador in London to the Foreign Office in Petersburg. +It was written four days after the appointment of M. Delcassé, and quite +bears out the impression made upon the Belgian agents.<a name="FNanchor_10_10" id="FNanchor_10_10"></a><a href="#Footnote_10_10" class="fnanchor">[10]</a></p> + +<blockquote><p>When I recall his [M. Cambon, the French Ambassador in London] +conversations with me, and the attitude of Poincaré, the thought +comes to me as a conviction, that of all the powers France is the +only one which, not to say that it wishes war, would yet look upon +it <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_98" id="Page_98">[Pg 98]</a></span>without great regret.... She [France] has, either rightly or +wrongly, complete trust in her army; the old effervescing minority +has again shown itself.</p></blockquote> + +<div class="footnotes"><h3>FOOTNOTE:</h3> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_10_10" id="Footnote_10_10"></a><a href="#FNanchor_10_10"><span class="label">[10]</span></a> But perhaps Count Beuckendorf was pro-German, too!</p></div> +</div> + +<hr /> + +<p><span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_99" id="Page_99">[Pg 99]</a></span></p> + +<h2>XVIII</h2> + +<p>The French war-party, represented by MM. Poincaré, Millerand and +Delcassé, came into political predominance in January, 1912, and +consolidated its ascendancy one year later, when M. Raymond Poincaré +became President of the French Republic. All through 1912 there was an +immense amount of correspondence and consultation between the French and +Russian Governments, and all through 1913 Russia showed extraordinary +activity in military preparation. In England, Mr. Asquith's Government +had to face a strong revulsion of popular feeling against the attitude +of its diplomacy, which had so nearly involved the country in war with +Germany at the time of the Agadir incident.</p> + +<p>As always, the figures of expenditure tell the story; and the history of +1912-14 should be continually illustrated by reference to the financial +statistics of the period, which have been given in earlier chapters. For +instance, Russia, which spent (in round numbers) £3¼ million on new<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_100" id="Page_100">[Pg 100]</a></span> +naval construction in 1911, spent £7 million in 1912, £12 million in +1913, and £13 million in 1914. The fact that, as Professor Raymond +Beazley puts it, in the ten years before the war, and with increasing +insistence, Paris and St. Petersburg spent upon armaments £159 million +more than Berlin or Vienna, ought to suffice at least to reopen the +question of responsibility.</p> + +<p>It must be carefully noted that by the spring of 1912, the Balkan +League, which was engineered by the Russian diplomat Hartwig, was fully +formed. This put the diplomacy of the Balkan States under the direct +control of the Russian Foreign Office. It now became necessary for the +Russian Foreign Office to ascertain, in case war between Serbia and +Austria broke out, and Germany should help Austria and Russia should +help Serbia, whether Russia could count on the support of France and +England. Russia received this assurance in secret, and the terms of it +were discovered by the Soviet Government in the archives of the Foreign +Office and published in 1919. This is a most important fact, and should +be continually borne in mind in connexion with the fact that the war was +precipitated by the murder of the Austrian Archduke by Serbian officers, +members of the pan-Slavist organization fostered<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_101" id="Page_101">[Pg 101]</a></span> and encouraged by MM. +Isvolsky and Hartwig.</p> + +<p>On 9 August, 1912, M. Poincaré, then Premier of France, made a visit to +St. Petersburg, where he was joined by his kindred spirit, M. Isvolsky, +who was then the Russian Ambassador at Paris. It was the usual visit of +State, and Russia staged an imposing series of military manœuvres in +M. Poincaré's honour. But the really important events that took place +were these. First, a naval agreement was made between France and Russia, +whereby France agreed to concentrate her naval forces in the Eastern +Mediterranean in order to support the Russian navy in the Black Sea. +This agreement was secret, and revealed by the Soviet Government in +1918. Then, in the same month, the Third French Naval Squadron was +transferred from the Atlantic to the Mediterranean. M. Poincaré told M. +Isvolsky that "this decision has been made in agreement with England, +and forms the further development and completion of the arrangement +already made previously between the French and British +Staffs"—referring to the conference of Messrs. Asquith and Churchill +and Lord Kitchener at Malta, the month before, at which the new +disposition of the English and French fleets was decided. The third +matter of consequence that took place in the month of<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_102" id="Page_102">[Pg 102]</a></span> August was that +the Russian Government began to put pressure on the French Government to +re-establish the Three Years Military Service law.</p> + +<p>So much for August. In the month of September, M. Poincaré gave the +Russian Foreign Minister, M. Sazonov, assurance that if Germany helped +Austria in a struggle in the Balkans, and if Russia were drawn in on the +other side, France "would not hesitate for a moment to fulfil its +obligations towards Russia." In the same month, M. Isvolsky had an +interview with the King of England and Sir Edward Grey, the British +Foreign Minister, in which both King George and Sir E. Grey assured him +of the fullest British co-operation in the same event. M. Isvolsky +reported to the Russian Foreign Office at St. Petersburg, that "Grey, +upon his own initiative, corroborated what I already knew from +Poincaré—the existence of an agreement between France and Great +Britain, according to which England undertook, in case of a war with +Germany, not only to come to the assistance of France on the sea, but +also on the Continent, by landing troops." These two understandings +between MM. Poincaré and Sazonov, and between M. Isvolsky and Sir E. +Grey, were secret, and nothing was known of them until 1919, when the +memoranda of<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_103" id="Page_103">[Pg 103]</a></span> them were published by the Soviet Government.<a name="FNanchor_11_11" id="FNanchor_11_11"></a><a href="#Footnote_11_11" class="fnanchor">[11]</a></p> + +<p>A train of gunpowder, in other words, had been laid from Belgrade +through Paris and London to St. Petersburg; and at the beginning of that +train was the highly inflammable and inflammatory pan-Slavism, organized +by M. Hartwig with the connivance of M. Isvolsky. A spark struck in the +Balkans would cause the train to flash into flame throughout its entire +length.</p> + +<div class="footnotes"><h3>FOOTNOTE:</h3> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_11_11" id="Footnote_11_11"></a><a href="#FNanchor_11_11"><span class="label">[11]</span></a> On 10 March of the following year, Mr. Asquith, replying +to a question in the Commons from Lord Hugh Cecil, denied that England +was under an "obligation arising owing to an assurance given by the +Ministry in the course of diplomatic negotiations, to send a very large +armed force out of this country to operate in Europe." On 24 March, he +made similar denials in reply to questions from Sir W. Byles and Mr. +King. On 14 April, Mr. Runciman, in a speech at Birkenhead, denied "in +the most categorical way" the existence of a secret understanding with +any foreign Power! On 3 May, the Secretary for the Colonies, Mr. +Harcourt, declared publicly that he "could conceive no circumstances in +which Continental operations would not be a crime against the people of +this country." On 28 June, the under-Secretary for Foreign Affairs, Mr. +Acland, declared publicly that "in no European question were we +concerned to interfere with a big army." On 1 July, Lord Loreburn, Lord +Chancellor from 1906 to 1912, said "that any British Government would be +so guilty towards our country as to take up arms in a foreign quarrel is +more than I can believe." On 28 April, 1914, and again on 11 June, Sir +E. Grey confirmed, in the House of Commons, Mr. Asquith's assertion, +made 10 and 24 March, 1913, of British freedom from engagements with +Continental Powers. +</p><p> +Yet, curiously the professions of politicians are still trusted, and +people still expect something from their machinations; they expected +something substantial from the recent conference in Washington, on the +limitation of armaments, for instance—a striking and pathetic example +of the strength of superstition.</p></div></div> + +<hr /> + +<p><span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_104" id="Page_104">[Pg 104]</a></span></p> + +<h2>XIX</h2> + +<p>On 25 April, 1912, the German Reichstag put through its first reading a +bill, with only perfunctory debate, for an increase in the German army +and navy. This measure has been regularly and officially interpreted as +a threat. Yet nearly a year after, on 19 February, 1913, Baron +Guillaume, writing from Paris about the prospects of the Three Years +Service bill, reports to the Belgian Foreign Office that the French +Minister of War "does not regard the measures taken by Germany as a +demonstration of hostility, but rather as an act of prudence for the +future. Germany fears that she may one day have to fight Russia and +France together, perhaps England too; and then any help that Austria +might give her would be seriously handicapped by the fact that the Dual +Monarchy [Austria-Hungary] would have to withstand a coalition of Balkan +States."</p> + +<p>Naturally. The bill was presented to the Reichstag in April, and the +"coalition of Balkan<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_105" id="Page_105">[Pg 105]</a></span> States," M. Hartwig's Balkan League, had already +completed its organization in February. Not only so, but the very first +step taken by this exemplary organization provided for a division of +spoils in the event of a successful war with Turkey; and six months +after the organization of the League was concluded, it served an +ultimatum upon Turkey over Albania, and in October went to war. The +German Government could quite plainly see the future about to be +inaugurated through this consolidation of Balkan policy into the hands +of the Russian Foreign Office—any one even an attentive reader of +newspapers, could see it—and it could see the vastly increased +responsibility of its Austrian ally, in case of a quarrel, should it +have to take on a coalition of the Balkan States instead of a single +one.</p> + +<p>Count de Lalaing reported from London, 24 February, 1918, that the +British Foreign Office took the same sensible view of the German +military increases as, according to Baron Guillaume, was taken by M. +Jonnart. "The English press," he says, "is of course anxious to saddle +Germany with the responsibility for the fresh tension caused by her +schemes—a tension which may give Europe fresh reasons for uneasiness." +But, he goes on—</p> + +<p><span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_106" id="Page_106">[Pg 106]</a></span></p><blockquote><p>At the Foreign Office I found a more equitable and calmer estimate +of the situation. They see in the reinforcement of the German +armies not so much a provocation as an admission that circumstances +have weakened Germany's military position, and that it must be +strengthened. The Berlin Government is compelled to recognize that +it can no longer count upon being supported by the whole force of +its Austrian ally, now that a new Power, that of the Balkan +Federation, has made its appearance in South-eastern Europe, right +at the gates of the Dual Empire.... Under these circumstances, the +Foreign Office sees nothing astonishing in Germany's finding it +imperative to increase the number of her army corps. The Foreign +Office also states that the Berlin Government had told the Paris +Cabinet quite frankly that such were the motives for its action.</p></blockquote> + +<p>The same view was publicly expressed by Mr. Lloyd George himself as late +as 1 January, 1914, when he said:</p> + +<blockquote><p>The German army was vital, not merely to the existence of the +German Empire, but to the very life and independence of the nation +itself, surrounded, as Germany is, by other nations, each of which +possesses armies as powerful as her own. We forget that while we +insist upon a sixty-per-cent superiority (as far as our naval +strength is concerned) over Germany being essential to guarantee +the integrity of our own shores, Germany herself has nothing like +that superiority over France alone, and she has of course, in +addition, to reckon with Russia<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_107" id="Page_107">[Pg 107]</a></span> on her eastern frontier. Germany +has nothing which approximates to a two-Power standard. She has, +therefore, become alarmed by recent issues, and is spending huge +sums of money on the expansion of her military resources.</p></blockquote> + +<p>Those are the words, be it remembered, of the same person who says +to-day that German responsibility for the war which broke out six months +after he had made the foregoing statement, is a <i>chose jugée</i>! The +statement was made, furthermore, not only <i>after</i> the German bill of 25 +April, 1912, but <i>after</i> the bill of 8 April, 1913, as well, which fixed +the peace-strength of the German army at 870,000.</p> + +<p>The Three Years Service law passed the French Chamber in August, 1913, +after a passionate popular campaign. Of this measure Baron Guillaume +says that the French newspapers, <i>Le Temps</i> in particular, "are wrong in +representing the French Government's plans as being in response to +measures adopted by Germany. Many of them are but the outcome of +measures which have long been prepared." The French Minister, M. +Jonnart, told him that "we know very well what an advantage our +neighbour [Germany] has in the continual growth of his population; +still, we must do all that lies in our power to compensate<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_108" id="Page_108">[Pg 108]</a></span> this +advantage by better military organization." Probably this view of the +Three Years Service law was the view held by all save the relatively +small and highly-integrated war-faction; and in so far as military +measures are ever reasonable, this, like the corresponding measures +taken in Germany, must be regarded as reasonable. As M. Pichon told +Baron Guillaume, "We are not arming for war, we are arming to avoid it, +to exorcise it.... We must go on arming more and more in order to +prevent war." There is no reason whatever to suppose that this view was +not sincerely entertained by M. Pichon and by many others, probably by a +majority of the persons most responsibly concerned.</p> + +<p>But the consequences of the Three Years Service law were contemplated by +Baron Guillaume with great apprehension. He reports on 12 June, 1913, +that "the burden of the new law will fall so heavily upon the +population, and the expenditure which it will involve will be so +exorbitant, that there will soon be an outcry in the country, and France +will be faced with this dilemma: either renounce what she can not bear +to forgo, or else, war at short notice." Of the militarist party now in +the ascendancy, he says: "They are followed with a sort of infatuation, +a kind<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_109" id="Page_109">[Pg 109]</a></span> of frenzy which is interesting but deplorable. One is not now +allowed, under pain of being marked as a traitor, to express even a +doubt of the need for the Three Years Service."</p> + +<p>Public opinion was evidently confiscated by the +Poincaré-Millerand-Delcassé group, much as it was in the United States +in 1917 by the war-party headed by Mr. Wilson. Baron Guillaume uses +words that must remind us of those days. "Every one knows," he says, +"that the mass of the nation is by no means in favour of the projected +reform, and they understand the danger that lies ahead. But they shut +their eyes and press on."</p> + +<hr /> + +<p><span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_110" id="Page_110">[Pg 110]</a></span></p> + +<h2>XX</h2> + +<p>The train of powder, however, had been laid by the diplomatic +engagements. Austria-Hungary and Serbia came into collision in the +spring of 1913 over the Scutari incident. In December, 1912, M. Sazonov +had urged Serbia to play a waiting game in order to "deliver a blow at +Austria." But on 4 April, 1913, Baron Beyens reports from Berlin that +the arrogance and contempt with which the Serbs receive the Vienna +Cabinet's protests over Scutari</p> + +<blockquote><p>can only be explained by their belief that St. Petersburg will +support them. The Serbian chargé d'affaires was quite openly saying +here lately that his Government would not have persisted in its +course for the last six months in the face of the Austrian +opposition had they not received encouragement in their course from +the Russian Minister, M. de Hartwig, who is a diplomatist of M. +Isvolsky's school.... M. Sazonov's heart is with his colleagues who +are directing the policy of the Great Powers, but he feels his +influence with the Tsar being undermined by the court-party and the +pan-Slavists. Hence his inconsequent behaviour.</p></blockquote> + +<p><span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_111" id="Page_111">[Pg 111]</a></span></p><p>The military activity which the Russian Government displayed in 1913 +gives interest to this estimate of M. Sazonov's position. No doubt to +some extent the estimate was correct; M. Sazonov, like Sir E. Grey, was +probably, when it was too late, much disquieted by the events which +marshalled him the way that he was going. In 1914, this military +activity gained extraordinary intensity. The Russian army was put upon a +peace-footing of approximately 1,400,000, "an effective numerical +strength hitherto unprecedented," said the St. Petersburg correspondent +of the London <i>Times</i>. From January to June, the Russian Government made +immense purchases of war material. In February, it concluded a loan in +Paris for the improvement of its strategic roads and railways on the +German frontier. Russia, as was generally known at the time, had her eye +on the acquisition of Constantinople; and in the same month, February, a +council of war was held in St. Petersburg to work out "a general +programme of action in order to secure for us a favourable solution of +the historical question of the Straits." In March, the St. Petersburg +newspaper which served as the mouthpiece of the Minister of War, +published an article <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_112" id="Page_112">[Pg 112]</a></span>stating that Russia's strategy would no longer be +"defensive" but "active." Another paper spoke of the time coming when +"the crossing of the Austrian frontier by the Russian army would be an +unavoidable decision." In the same month, Russia raised a heavy tariff +against the importation of German grain and flour; thus bearing out the +evidence of German trade-reports that even at this time Germany was +still exporting grain to Russia—a most extraordinary proceeding for a +nation which contemplated a sudden declaration of war before the next +harvest. In the same month, the Russian Government brought in military +estimates of £97 million. It exercised heavy pressure on the French +Government in the protracted political turmoil over the maintenance of +the Three Years Service law. In April, "trial mobilizations" were begun, +and were continued up to the outbreak of the war. In May, M. Sazonov +informed the Tsar that the British Government "has decided to empower +the British Admiralty Staff to enter into negotiations with French and +Russian naval agents in London for the purpose of drawing technical +conditions for possible action by the naval forces of England, Russia +and France." In the same month, a complete mobilization of all the +reserves of the three annual<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_113" id="Page_113">[Pg 113]</a></span> contingents of 1907-1909 was ordered for +the whole Russian Empire, as a "test," to take place in the autumn. In +the same month the Russian Admiralty instructed its agent in London, +Captain Volkov, as follows:</p> + +<blockquote><p>Our interests on the Northern scene of operations require that +England keeps as large a part of the German fleet as possible in +check in the North Sea.... The English Government could render us a +substantial service if it would agree to send a sufficient number +of boats to our Baltic ports to compensate for our lack of means of +transport, before the beginning of war-operations.</p></blockquote> + +<p>This document, revealed by the Soviet Government in 1919, is pretty +damaging to the assumption of an "unprepared and unsuspecting Europe"; +especially as Professor Conybeare has given publicity to the fact that +"before the beginning of war-operations" those English boats were there, +prompt to the minute, empty, ready and waiting.</p> + +<p>In June, the Russian Ambassador warned the Russian naval staff in London +that they must exercise great caution in talking about a landing in +Pomerania or about the dispatch of English boats to the Russian Baltic +ports before the outbreak of war, "so that the rest may not be +jeopardized." On 13 June, the newspaper-organ of the<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_114" id="Page_114">[Pg 114]</a></span> Russian Minister +of War published an inspired article under the caption: "Russia is +Ready: France must be Ready."</p> + +<p>Two weeks later, the Austrian heir-apparent, the Archduke Francis +Joseph, was murdered at Sarajevo, a town in Bosnia, by Serbian officers. +The murder was arranged by the Serbian Major Tankesitch, of the +pan-Slavist organization known as the Black Hand; and this organization +was fostered, if not actually subsidized, by the Russian Minister at +Belgrade, M. Hartwig, the pupil and <i>alter ego</i> of M. Isvolsky, and the +architect and promoter of the Balkan League!</p> + +<div>*** END OF THE PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK 44508 ***</div> +</body> +</html> diff --git a/44508-h/images/cover.jpg b/44508-h/images/cover.jpg Binary files differnew file mode 100644 index 0000000..8b6371c --- /dev/null +++ b/44508-h/images/cover.jpg diff --git a/44508-h/images/dec.jpg b/44508-h/images/dec.jpg Binary files differnew file mode 100644 index 0000000..2e4e87d --- /dev/null +++ b/44508-h/images/dec.jpg diff --git a/LICENSE.txt b/LICENSE.txt new file mode 100644 index 0000000..6312041 --- /dev/null +++ b/LICENSE.txt @@ -0,0 +1,11 @@ +This eBook, including all associated images, markup, improvements, +metadata, and any other content or labor, has been confirmed to be +in the PUBLIC DOMAIN IN THE UNITED STATES. + +Procedures for determining public domain status are described in +the "Copyright How-To" at https://www.gutenberg.org. + +No investigation has been made concerning possible copyrights in +jurisdictions other than the United States. Anyone seeking to utilize +this eBook outside of the United States should confirm copyright +status under the laws that apply to them. diff --git a/README.md b/README.md new file mode 100644 index 0000000..55b0b7c --- /dev/null +++ b/README.md @@ -0,0 +1,2 @@ +Project Gutenberg (https://www.gutenberg.org) public repository for +eBook #44508 (https://www.gutenberg.org/ebooks/44508) diff --git a/old/44508-8.txt b/old/44508-8.txt new file mode 100644 index 0000000..7ec7d5e --- /dev/null +++ b/old/44508-8.txt @@ -0,0 +1,2671 @@ +Project Gutenberg's The Myth of a Guilty Nation, by Albert Jay Nock + +This eBook is for the use of anyone anywhere at no cost and with +almost no restrictions whatsoever. You may copy it, give it away or +re-use it under the terms of the Project Gutenberg License included +with this eBook or online at www.gutenberg.org/license + + +Title: The Myth of a Guilty Nation + +Author: Albert Jay Nock + +Release Date: December 25, 2013 [EBook #44508] + +Language: English + +Character set encoding: ISO-8859-1 + +*** START OF THIS PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK THE MYTH OF A GUILTY NATION *** + + + + +Produced by Martin Pettit and the Online Distributed +Proofreading Team at http://www.pgdp.net (This file was +produced from images generously made available by The +Internet Archive) + + + + + + +THE MYTH OF A GUILTY NATION + +BY + +ALBERT JAY NOCK + +("HISTORICUS") + +[Illustration: Decoration] + +NEW YORK B.W. HUEBSCH, INC. MCMXXII + + +COPYRIGHT, 1922, BY +THE FREEMAN, INC. + +COPYRIGHT, 1922, BY +B. W. HUEBSCH, INC. + +PRINTED IN U. S. A. + + + + +PREFACE + + +This book is made up of a series of articles originally published in the +_Freeman_. It was compiled to establish one point and only one, namely: +that the German Government was not solely guilty of bringing on the war. +I have not been at all concerned with measuring the German Government's +share of guilt, with trying to show that it was either great or small, +or that it was either less or more than that of any other Government or +association of Governments. All this is beside the point. I do not by +any means wish to escape the responsibility of saying that I think the +German Government's share of guilt in the matter is extremely small; so +small by comparison with that of the major Powers allied against +Germany, as to be inconsiderable. That is my belief, demonstrable as I +think by such evidence as has now become available to any candid person. +But this has nothing whatever to do with the subject-matter of this +volume. If the guilt of the German Government could be proved to be ten +times greater than it was represented to be by the publicity-bureaux of +the Allied Powers, the conclusion established in the following chapters +would still remain. Guilty as the German Government may have been; +multiply by ten any estimate that any person, interested or +disinterested, informed or uninformed, may put upon its guilt; the fact +remains that it was far, very far indeed, from being the only guilty +party concerned. + +If there were no practical end to be gained by establishing this +conclusion, if one's purpose were only to give the German Government the +dubious vindication of a _tu quoque_, the effort would be hardly worth +making. But as I say at the outset, there is at stake an extremely +important matter, one that will unfavourably affect the peace of the +world for at least a generation--the treaty of Versailles. If the German +Government may not be assumed to be solely responsible for the war, this +treaty is indefensible; for it is constructed wholly upon that +assumption. It becomes, not a treaty, but a verdict pronounced after the +manner of Brennus, by a superior power which, without regard to justice, +arrogates to itself the functions of prosecutor, jury and judge. + +It is probably superfluous to point out that this treaty, conceived in +the pure spirit of the victorious Apache, has, in practice, utterly +broken down. It has not worked and it will not work, because it sets at +defiance certain economic laws which are as inexorable as the law of +gravitation. The incidence of these laws was well understood and clearly +foretold, at the time of the peace-conference, by an informed minority +in Europe, notably by Mr. Maynard Keynes in his volume entitled "The +Economic Consequences of the Peace." In this country also, a minority, +sufficiently informed to know its right hand from its left in economic +affairs, stood aghast in contemplation of the ruinous consequences which +it perceived as inevitable under any serious attempt to put this vicious +instrument into operation. But both here and in Europe, this minority +was very small and uninfluential, and could accomplish nothing against +the ignorant and unreasoning bad temper which the politicians kept +aflame. + +The treaty had therefore to go to the test of experiment; and of the +results of this, one need surely say nothing, for they are obvious. The +harder Germany tried to fulfill the conditions of the treaty, and the +nearer she came to doing so, the worse things went in all the countries +that were presumably to benefit by her sacrifice. The Central Empires +are, as the informed minority in all countries has been from the +beginning anxiously aware, the key-group in the whole of European +industry and commerce. If they must work and trade under unfavourable +conditions, they also thereby automatically impose correspondingly +unfavourable conditions upon the whole of Europe; and, correspondingly +unfavourable conditions are thereby in turn automatically set up +wherever the trade of Europe reaches--for example, in the United States. +There is now no possible doubt about this, for one has but to glance at +the enormous dislocations of international commerce, and the universal +and profound stagnation of industry, in order to prove it to one's +complete satisfaction. Germany wisely and far-sightedly made a sincere +and vigourous effort to comply with the conditions of the treaty; and by +so doing she has carried the rest of the world to the verge of economic +collapse. The damage wrought by the war was in general of a spectacular +and impressive type, and was indeed very great--no one would minimize +it--but the damage, present and prospective, wrought by the treaty of +peace is much greater and more far-reaching. + +The political inheritors of those who made the peace are now extremely +uneasy about it. Their predecessors (including Mr. Lloyd George, who +still remains in office) had flogged up popular hatred against the +Central Empires at such a rate that when they took office they still +had, or thought they had, to court and indulge this hatred. Thus we +found Mr. Secretary Hughes, for example, in his first communication to +the German Government, laying it down that the basis of the Versailles +treaty was sound--that Germany was solely responsible for the war. He +spoke of it quite in the vein of Mr. Lloyd George, as a _chose jugée_. +After having promulgated the treaty with such immense ceremony, and +raised such preposterous and extravagant popular expectations on the +strength of it, the architects of the treaty bequeathed an exceedingly +difficult task to their successors; the task of letting the public down, +diverting their attention with this or that gesture, taking their mind +off their disappointments and scaling down their expectations, so that +in time it might be safe to let the Versailles treaty begin to sink out +of sight. + +The task is being undertaken; the curious piece of mountebankery +recently staged in Washington, for example, was an ambitious effort to +keep the peoples, particularly those of Europe, hopeful, confiding and +diverted; and if economic conditions permit, if times do not become too +hard, it may succeed. The politicians can not say outright that the +theory of the Versailles treaty is dishonest and outrageous, and that +the only chance of peace and well-being is by tearing up the treaty and +starting anew on another basis entirely. They can not say this on +account of the exigencies of their detestable trade. The best that they +can do is what they are doing. They must wait until the state of public +feeling permits them to ease down from their uncompromising stand upon +the treaty. Gradually, they expect, the public will accustom itself to +the idea of relaxations and accommodations, as it sees, from day to day, +the patent impracticability of any other course; feelings will weaken, +asperities soften, hatreds die out, contacts and approaches of one kind +or another will take place; and finally, these public men or their +political inheritors will think themselves able to effect in an +unobtrusive way, such substantial modifications of the treaty of +Versailles as will amount to its annulment. + +The process is worth accelerating by every means possible; and what I +have here done is meant to assist it. There are many persons in the +country who are not politicians, and who are capable and desirous of +approaching a matter of this kind with intellectual honesty. Quite +possibly they are not aware, many of them, that the Versailles treaty +postulates the sole responsibility of the German Government for bringing +on the war; undoubtedly they are not acquainted with such evidence as I +have here compiled to show that this assumption is unjust and erroneous. +Having read this evidence, they will be in a position to review the +terms of the Versailles treaty and reassess the justice of those terms. +They will also be able to understand the unwillingness, the inability, +of the German people to acquiesce in those terms; and they can +comprehend the slowness and difficulty wherewith peace and good feeling +are being re-established in Europe, and the extreme precariousness and +uncertainty of Europe's situation--and our own, in +consequence--throughout a future that seems longer than one cares to +contemplate. + +The reader will perceive at once that this book is a mere compilation +and transcription of fact, containing not a shred of opinion or of any +original matter. On this account it was published anonymously in its +serial form, because it seemed to me that such work should be judged +strictly as it stands, without regard to the authority, or lack of +authority, which the compiler might happen to possess. Almost all of it +is lifted straight from the works of my friends Mr. Francis Neilson and +Mr. E. D. Morel. I earnestly hope--indeed, it is my chief motive in +publishing this book--that it may serve as an introduction to these +words. I can not place too high an estimate upon their importance to a +student of British and Continental diplomacy. They are, as far as I +know, alone in their field; nothing else can take their place. They are +so thorough, so exhaustive and so authoritative that I wonder at their +being so little known in the United States. Mr. Morel's works,[1] "Ten +Years of Secret Diplomacy," "Truth and the War," and "Diplomacy +Revealed," are simply indispensable. Mr. Neilson's book "How Diplomats +Make War,"[2] is not an easy book to read; no more are Mr. Morel's; but +without having read it no serious student can possibly do justice to the +subject. + +ALBERT JAY NOCK + +FOOTNOTES: + +[1] "Ten Years of Secret Diplomacy." $1.25. "Truth and the War." $1.25. +E. D. Morel. New York: B. W. Huebsch. + +"Diplomacy Revealed." E. D. Morel. London, 8 & 9 Johnson's Court: +National Labour Press. + +[2] "How Diplomats Make War." Francis Neilson. New York: B. W. Huebsch. +$2.00 + + + + +THE MYTH OF A GUILTY NATION + + + + +I + + +The present course of events in Europe is impressing on us once more the +truth that military victory, if it is to stand, must also be +demonstrably a victory for justice. In the long run, victory must appeal +to the sense of justice in the conquered no less than in the conquerors, +if it is to be effective. There is no way of getting around this. Mr. +Gilbert K. Chesterton is right when he says that if the South had not +finally accepted the outcome of the Civil War as being on the whole +just, Lincoln would have been wrong in trying to preserve the Union; +which is only another way of expressing Lincoln's own homely saying that +nothing is ever really settled until it is settled right. The present +condition of Europe is largely due to the fact that the official +peacemakers have not taken into their reckoning the German people's +sense of justice. Their mistake--it was also Mr. Wilson's great +mistake--was in their disregard of what Bismarck called the +imponderabilia. The terms of the peace treaty plainly reflect this +mistake. That is largely the reason why the treaty is to-day inoperative +and worthless. That is largely why the Governments of Europe are +confronted with the inescapable alternative: they can either tear up the +treaty and replace it by an understanding based on justice, or they can +stick to the treaty and by so doing protract indefinitely the dismal +succession of wars, revolutions, bankruptcies and commercial +dislocations that the treaty inaugurated. + +That is the situation; and it is a situation in which the people of the +United States have an interest to preserve--the primary interest of a +creditor, and also the interest of a trader who needs a large and stable +market. It is idle to suppose that American business can prosper so long +as Europe remains in a condition of instability and insolvency. Our +business is adjusted to the scale of a solvent Europe, and it can not be +readjusted without irreparable damage. Until certain matters connected +with the war are resolutely put under review, Europe can not be +reconstructed, and the United States can not be prosperous. The only +thing that can better our own situation is the resumption of normal +economic life in Europe; and this can be done only through a thorough +reconsideration of the injustices that have been put upon the German +people by the conditions of the armistice and the peace treaty. + +Of these injustices, the greatest, because it is the foundation for all +the rest, is the imputation of Germany's sole responsibility for the +war. The German people will never endure that imputation; they should +never be expected to endure it. Nothing can really be settled until the +question of responsibility is openly and candidly re-examined, and an +understanding established that is based on facts instead of on official +misrepresentation. This question is by no means one of abstract justice +alone, or of chivalry and fair play towards a defeated enemy. It is a +question of self-interest, immediate and urgent. However it may be +regarded by the American sense of justice and fair play, it remains, to +the eye of American industry and commerce, a straight question of +dollars and cents. The prosperity of the United States, as we are +beginning to see, hangs upon the economic re-establishment of Europe. +Europe can not possibly be settled upon the present terms of peace; and +these terms can not be changed without first vacating the theory of +Germany's sole responsibility, because it is upon this theory that the +treaty of Versailles was built. This theory, therefore, must be +re-examined in the light of evidence that the Allied and Associated +Governments have done their best either to ignore or to suppress. Hence, +for the American people, the way to prosperity lies through a searching +and honest examination of this theory that has been so deeply implanted +in their mind--the theory of a brigand-nation, plotting in solitude to +achieve the mastery of the world by fire and sword. + +Americans, however, come reluctantly to the task of this examination, +for two reasons. First, we are all tired of the war, we hate to think of +it or of anything connected with it, and as far as possible, we keep it +out of our minds. Second, nearly every reputation of any consequence in +this country, political, clerical, academic and journalistic, is already +committed, head over ears, to the validity of this theory. How many of +our politicians are there whose reputations are not bound up +inextricably with this legend of a German plot? How many of our +newspaper-editors managed to preserve detachment enough under the +pressure of war-propaganda to be able to come forward to-day and say +that the question of responsibility for the war should be re-opened? How +can the pro-war liberals and ex-pacifists ask for such an inquest when +they were all swept off their feet by the specious plea that _this_ war +was a different war from all other wars in the history of mankind? What +can our ministers of religion say after the unreserved endorsement that +they put upon the sanctity of the Allied cause? What can our educators +say, after having served so zealously the ends of the official +propagandists? From our journalists and men of letters what can we +expect--after all his rodomontade about Potsdam and the Potsdam gang, +how could we expect Dr. Henry Van Dyke, for instance, to face the fact +that the portentous Potsdam meeting of the Crown Council on 5 July, +1914, _never took place at all_? There is no use in trying to put a +breaking-strain upon human nature, or, on the other hand, in assuming a +pharisaic attitude towards its simplest and commonest frailties. It is +best, under the circumstances, merely to understand that on this +question every institutional voice in the United States is tongue-tied. +Press, pulpit, schools and universities, charities and foundations, +forums, all are silent; and to expect them to break their silence is to +expect more than should be expected from the pride of opinion in average +human nature. + + + + +II + + +In examining the evidence let us first take Mr. Lloyd George's own +statement of the theory. Except in one particular, it presents the case +against Germany quite as it has been rehearsed by nearly every +institutional voice in the United States. On 4 August, 1917--after +America's entry into the war--the British Premier said: + + + What are we fighting for? To defeat the most dangerous conspiracy + ever plotted against the liberty of nations; carefully, skilfully, + insidiously, clandestinely planned in every detail, with ruthless, + cynical determination. + + +Except for one point, this statement sums up what we have all heard to +be the essential doctrine of the war. The one missing point in Mr. Lloyd +George's indictment is that the great German conspiracy was launched +upon an _unprepared_ Europe. In Europe itself, the official +propagandists did not make much of this particular point, for far too +many people knew better; but in the United States it was promulgated +widely. Indeed, this romance of Allied unpreparedness was an essential +part of the whole story of German responsibility. Germany, so the +official story ran, not only plotted in secret, but she sprung her plot +upon a Europe that was wholly unprepared and unsuspecting. Her action +was like that of a highwayman leaping from ambush upon a defenceless +wayfarer. Belgium was unprepared, France unprepared, Russia unprepared, +England unprepared; and in face of an unprovoked attack, these nations +hurriedly drew together in an extemporized union, and held the "mad dog" +at bay with an extemporized defence until they could devise a plan of +common action and a pooling of military and naval resources. + +Such, then, is a fair statement of the doctrine of the war as America +was taught it. Next, in order to show how fundamental this doctrine is +to the terms of the peace treaty, let us consider another statement of +Mr. Lloyd George made 3 March, 1921: + + + For the allies, German responsibility for the war is fundamental. + It is the basis upon which the structure of the treaty of + Versailles has been erected, and if that acknowledgment is + repudiated or abandoned, the treaty is destroyed.... We wish, + therefore, once and for all, to make it quite clear that German + responsibility for the war must be treated by the Allies as a + _chose jugée_. + + +Thus the British Premier explicitly declares that the treaty of +Versailles is based upon the theory of Germany's sole responsibility. + +Now, as against this theory, the main facts may be summarized as +follows: (1) The British and French General Staffs had been in active +collaboration for war with Germany ever since January 1906. (2) The +British and French Admiralty had been in similar collaboration. (3) The +late Lord Fisher [First Sea Lord of the British Admiralty], twice in the +course of these preparations, proposed an attack upon the German fleet +and a landing upon the coast of Pomerania, _without a declaration of +war_. (4) Russia had been preparing for war ever since 1909, and the +Russian and French General Staffs had come to a formal understanding +that Russian mobilization should be held equivalent to a declaration of +war. (5) Russian mobilization was begun in the spring of 1914, under the +guise of "tests," and these tests were carried on continuously to the +outbreak of the war. (6) In April, 1914, four months before the war, +the Russian and French naval authorities initiated joint plans for +maritime operations against Germany. (7) Up to the outbreak of the war, +Germany was selling grain in considerable quantities to both France and +Russia. (8) It can not be shown that the German Government ever in a +single instance, throughout all its dealings with foreign Governments, +demanded or intimated for Germany anything more than a position of +economic equality with other nations. + +These facts, among others to which reference will hereafter be made, +have come to light only since the outbreak of the war. They effectively +dispose of the theory of an unprepared and unsuspecting Europe; and a +historical survey of them excludes absolutely, and stamps as utterly +untenable and preposterous, the theory of a deliberate German plot +against the peace of the world. + + + + +III + + +Let us now consider the idea so generally held in America, though not in +Europe, that in 1914, England and the Continental nations were not +expecting war and not prepared for war. The fact is that Europe was as +thoroughly organized for war as it could possibly be. The point to which +that organization was carried by England, France and Russia, as compared +with Germany and Austria, may to some extent be indicated by statistics. +In 1913, Russia carried a military establishment (on a peace footing) of +1,284,000 men; France, by an addition of 183,000 men, proposed to raise +her peace-establishment to a total of 741,572. Germany, by an addition +of 174,373 men, proposed to raise her total to 821,964; and Austria, by +additions of 58,505 already made, brought her total up to 473,643. These +are the figures of the British War Office, as furnished to the House of +Commons in 1913. + +Here is a set of figures that is even more interesting and significant. +From 1909 to 1914, the amount spent on new naval construction by +England, France and Russia, as compared with Germany, was as follows: + + + ENGLAND FRANCE RUSSIA GERMANY + + 1909 £11,076,551 £ 4,517,766 £ 1,758,487 £10,177,062 + + 1910 £14,755,289 £ 4,977,682 £ 1,424,013 £11,392,856 + + 1911 £15,148,171 £ 5,876,659 £ 3,216,396 £11,710,859 + + 1912 £16,132,558 £ 7,114,876 £ 6,897,580 £11,491,187 + + 1913 £16,883,875 £ 8,893,064 £12,082,516 £11,010,883 + + 1914 £18,676,080 £11,772,862 £13,098,613 £10,316,264 + + +These figures can not be too carefully studied by those who have been +led to think that Germany pounced upon a defenceless and unsuspecting +Europe like a cat upon a mouse. If it be thought worth while to consider +also the period of a few years preceding 1909, one finds that England's +superiority in battleships alone was 112 per cent in 1901, and her +superiority rose to nearly 200 per cent in 1904; in which year England +spent £42,431,000 on her navy, and Germany £11,659,000. Taking the +comparative statistics of naval expenditure from 1900, in which year +England spent £32,055,000 on her navy, and Germany spent £7,472,000, +down to 1914 it is absolutely impossible to make the figures show that +Germany enforced upon the other nations of Europe an unwilling +competition in naval armament. + +But the German army! According to all accounts of German militarism +which were suffered to reach these shores, it is here that we shall find +evidence of what Mr. Lloyd George, on 4 August, 1917, called "the most +dangerous conspiracy ever plotted against the liberty of nations; +carefully, skilfully, insidiously, clandestinely planned in every +detail, with ruthless, cynical determination." Well, if one chooses to +hold the current view of German militarism, it must be admitted that +Germany had at her disposal some miraculous means of getting something +for nothing, getting a great deal for nothing, in fact, for on any other +supposition, the figures are far from supporting that view. In 1914 +(pre-war figures), Germany and Austria together carried an +army-expenditure of £92 million; England, France and Russia together +carried one of £142 million. England "had no army," it was said; all her +military strength lay in her navy. If that were true, then it must be +said that she had as miraculous a faculty as Germany's; only, whereas +Germany's was a faculty for getting more than her money's worth, +England's was for getting less than her money's worth. England's +army-expenditure for 1914 (pre-war figures) was £28 million; £4 million +more than Austria's. Nor was this a sudden emergency-outlay. Going back +as far as 1905, we find that she laid out in that year the same amount, +£28 million. In that year, Germany and Austria together spent £48 +million on their armies; England, France and Russia together spent £94 +million on theirs. If between 1905 and 1913, England, France and Russia +spent any such sums upon their armies as their statistics show, and +nothing came of it but an unprepared and unsuspecting Europe in 1914, it +seems clear that the taxpayers of those countries were swindled on an +inconceivably large scale. + + + + +IV + + +At this point, some questions may be raised. Why, in the decade +preceding 1914, did England, France and Russia arm themselves at the +rate indicated by the foregoing figures? Why did they accelerate their +naval development progressively from about £17 million in 1909 to about +£43 million in 1914? Why did Russia alone propose to raise her military +peace-establishment to an army of 1,700,000, more than double the size +of Germany's army? Against whom were these preparations directed, and +understood to be directed? Certainly not against one another. France and +Russia had been bound by a military convention ever since 17 August, +1892; England and France had been bound since January, 1906, by a +similar pact; and this was subsequently extended to include Belgium. +These agreements will be considered in detail hereafter; they are now +mentioned merely to show that the military activity in these countries +was not independent in purpose. France, England, Russia and Belgium +were not uneasy about one another and not arming against one another; +nor is there any evidence that anyone thought that they were. It was +against the Central Empires only that these preparations were addressed. +Nor can one who scans the table of relative expenditure easily believe +that the English-French-Russian combination was effected for purely +defensive purposes; and taking the diplomatic history of the period in +conjunction with the testimony of the budgets, such belief becomes +impossible. + + + + +V + + +The British Government is the one which was most often represented to us +as taken utterly by surprise by the German onslaught on Belgium. Let us +see. The Austrian Archduke was assassinated 28 June, 1914, by three men +who, according to wide report in Europe and absolute certainty in +America, were secret agents of the German Government, acting under +German official instruction. The findings of the court of inquiry showed +that they were Serbs, members of a pan-Slav organization; that the +assassination was plotted in Belgrade, and the weapons with which it was +committed were obtained there.[3] Serbia denied all connexion with the +assassins (the policy of Serbia being then controlled by the Russian +Foreign Office), and then the Russian Government stepped forward to +prevent the humiliation of Serbia by Austria. It is clear from the +published diplomatic documents that the British Foreign Office knew +everything that took place between the assassination and the burial of +the Archduke; all the facts, that is, connected with the murder. The +first dispatch in the British White Paper is dated 20 July, and it is +addressed to the British Ambassador at Berlin. One wonders why not to +the Ambassador at Vienna; also one wonders why the diplomats apparently +found nothing to write about for nearly three weeks between the +Archduke's funeral and 20 July. It is a strange silence. Sir Edward +Grey, however, made a statement in the House of Commons, 27 July, in +which he gave the impression that he got his first information about the +course of the quarrel between Austria and Serbia no earlier than 24 +July, three days before. The Ambassador at Vienna, Sir M. de Bunsen, +had, notwithstanding, telegraphed him that the Austrian Premier had +given him no hint of "the impending storm" and that it was from a +private source "that I received, 15 July, the forecast of what was about +to happen, concerning which I _telegraphed to you the following day_." +Sir Maurice de Bunsen's telegram on this important subject thus +evidently was suppressed; and the only obvious reason for the +suppression is that it carried evidence that Sir E. Grey was thoroughly +well posted by 16 July on what was taking place in Vienna. Sir M. de +Bunsen's allusion to this telegram confirms this assumption; in fact, it +can be interpreted in no other way. + +On 28 July, the House of Commons was informed that Austria had declared +war on Serbia. Two days later, 30 July, Sir E. Grey added the item of +information that Russia had ordered a partial mobilization "which has +not hitherto led to any corresponding steps by other Powers, so far as +our information goes." Sir E. Grey did not add, however, that he knew +quite well what "corresponding steps" other Powers were likely to take. +He knew the terms of the Russian-French military convention, under which +a mobilization by Russia was to be held equivalent to a declaration of +war; he also knew the terms of the English-French agreement which he +himself had authorized--although up to the eve of the war he denied, in +reply to questions in the House of Commons, that any such agreement +existed, and acknowledged it only on 3 August, 1914.[4] He had promised +Sazonov, the Russian Foreign Minister, in 1912, that in the event of +Germany's coming to Austria's aid, Russia could rely on Great Britain to +"stake everything in order to inflict the most serious blow to German +power." To say that Sir E. Grey, and _à fortiori_ Mr. Asquith, the Prime +Minister; Lord Haldane, the Minister for War, whose own book has been a +most tremendous let-down to the fictions of the propagandists; Mr. +Winston Churchill, head of the Admiralty, who at Dundee, 5 June, 1915, +declared that he had been sent to the Admiralty in 1911 with the express +duty laid upon him by the Prime Minister to put the fleet in a state of +instant and constant readiness for war; to say that these men were taken +by surprise and unprepared, is mere levity. + +Austria was supposed to be, and still is by some believed to have been, +Germany's vassal State, and by menacing Serbia to have been doing +Germany's dirty work. No evidence of this has been adduced; and the +trouble with this idea of Austria's status is that it breaks down before +the report of Sir M. de Bunsen, 1 September, 1914, that Austria finally +yielded and agreed to accept all the proposals of the Powers for +mediation between herself and Serbia. She made every concession. +Russian mobilization, however, had begun on 25 July and become general +four days later; and it was not stopped. Germany then gave notice that +she would mobilize her army if Russian mobilization was not stopped in +twelve hours; and also, knowing the terms of the Russian-French +convention of 1892, she served notice on France, giving her eighteen +hours to declare her position. Russia made no reply; France answered +that she would do what she thought best in her own interest; and almost +at the moment, on 1 August, when Germany ordered a general mobilization, +Russian troops were over her border, the British fleet had been +mobilized for a week in the North Sea, and British merchant ships were +lying at Kronstadt, empty, to convey Russian troops from that port to +the Pomeranian coast, in pursuance of the plan indicated by Lord Fisher +in his autobiography, recently published. + +These matters are well summed up by Lord Loreburn, as follows: + + + Serbia gave offence to the Austro-Hungarian Empire, cause of just + offence, as our Ambassador frankly admits in his published + dispatches. We [England] had no concern in that quarrel, as Sir + Edward Grey says in terms. But Russia, the protectress of Serbia, + came forward to prevent her being utterly humiliated by Austria. We + were not concerned in that quarrel either, as Sir Edward also says. + And then Russia called upon France under their treaty to help in + the fight. France was not concerned in that quarrel any more than + ourselves, as Sir Edward informs us. But France was bound by a + Russian treaty, of which he did not know the terms, and then France + called on us for help. We were tied by the relations which our + Foreign Office had created, without apparently realizing that they + had created them. + + +In saying that Sir E. Grey did not know the terms of the Franco-Russian +agreement, Lord Loreburn is generous, probably more generous than he +should be; but that is no matter. The thing to be remarked is that Lord +Loreburn's summing-up comes to something wholly different from Mr. Lloyd +George's "most dangerous conspiracy ever plotted against the liberty of +nations." It comes to something wholly different from the notion +implanted in Americans, of Germany pouncing upon a peaceful, unprepared +and unsuspecting Europe. The German nation, we may be sure, is keenly +aware of this difference; and therefore, any peace which, like the peace +of Versailles, is bottomed on the _chose jugée_ of laying the sole +responsibility for the war at the door of the German nation, or even at +the door of the German Government, is simply impracticable and +impossible. + +FOOTNOTES: + +[3] Six months after the armistice, the bodies of the three assassins +were dug up, according to a Central News dispatch from Prague, "with +great solemnity, in the presence of thousands of the inhabitants. The +remains of _these Serbian officers_ are to be sent to their native +country." This is a naïve statement. It remains to be explained why +these "German agents" should be honoured in this distinguished way by +the Serbs! + +[4] See footnote to chapter XVIII. + + + + +VI + + +If the theory upon which the treaty of Versailles is based, the theory +of a single guilty nation, were true, there would be no trouble about +saying what the war was fought for. The Allied belligerents would have a +simple, straight story to tell; they could describe their aims and +intentions clearly in a few words that any one could understand, and +their story would be reasonably consistent and not vary greatly from +year to year. It would be practically the same story in 1918 as in 1915 +or at any time between. In America, indeed, the story did not greatly +vary up to the spring of 1917, for the reason that this country was +pretty much in the dark about European international relations. Once our +indignation and sympathies were aroused, it was for the propagandists +mostly a matter of keeping them as hot as possible. Few had the +information necessary to discount the plain, easy, understandable story +of a robber nation leaping upon an unprepared and defenceless Europe for +no cause whatever except the lofty ambition, as Mr. Joseph Choate said, +"to establish a world-empire upon the ruins of the British Empire." +Those who had this information could not make themselves heard; and thus +it was that the propagandists had no need to vary the one story that was +most useful to their purpose of keeping us in a state of unreasoning +indignation, and accordingly they did not vary it. + +In Europe and in England, however, the case was different. International +relations were better understood by those who were closer to them than +we were; more questions were raised and more demands made. Hence the +Allied politicians and propagandists were kept busy upon the defensive. +When from time to time the voice of popular discontent or of some +influential body of opinion insisted on a statement of the causes of the +war or of the war-aims of the Allies, they were confronted with the +politician's traditional difficulty. They had to say something plausible +and satisfactory, which yet must be something that effectively hid the +truth of the situation. As the war hung on, their difficulty became +desperate and they threw consistency to the winds, telling any sort of +story that would enable them for the moment to "get by." The publication +of the secret treaties which had been seined out of the quagmire of the +old Russian Foreign Office by the revolutionists made no end of trouble +for them. It is amusing now to remember how promptly these treaties were +branded by the British Foreign Office as forgeries; especially when it +turned out that the actual terms of the armistice--not the nominal +terms, which were those of Mr. Wilson's Fourteen Points, but the actual +terms--were the terms of the secret treaties! The publication of the +secret treaties in this country did not contribute much towards a +disillusionment of the public; the press as a rule ignored or lied about +them, they were not widely read, and few who did read them had enough +understanding of European affairs to interpret them. But abroad they put +a good deal of fat into the fire; and this was a specimen of the kind of +thing that the Allied politicians had to contend with in their efforts +to keep their peoples in line. + +The consequence was that the official and semi-official statements of +the causes of the war and of the war-aims of the Allies are a most +curious hotchpotch. In fact, if any one takes stock in the theory of the +one guilty nation and is therefore convinced that the treaty of +Versailles is just and proper and likely to enforce an enduring peace, +one could suggest nothing better than that he should go through the +literature of the war, pick out these statements, put them in parallel +columns, and see how they look. If the war originated in the unwarranted +conspiracy of a robber nation, if the aims of the Allies were to defeat +that conspiracy and render it impotent and to chastise and tie the hands +of the robber nation--and that is the theory of the treaty of +Versailles--can anyone in his right mind suppose that the Allied +politicians and propagandists would ever give out, or need to give out, +these ludicrously contradictory and inconsistent explanations and +statements? When one has a simple, straight story to tell, and a most +effective story, why complicate it and undermine it and throw all sorts +of doubts upon it, by venturing upon all sorts of public utterances that +will not square with it in any conceivable way? Politicians, of all men, +never lie for the fun of it; their available margin of truth is always +so narrow that they keep within it when they can. Mr. Lloyd George, for +example, is one of the cleverest of politicians. We have already +considered his two statements; first, that of 4 August, 1917: + + + What are we fighting for? To defeat the most dangerous conspiracy + ever plotted against the liberty of nations; carefully, skilfully, + insidiously, clandestinely planned in every detail with ruthless, + cynical determination. + + +--and then that of 3 March, 1921: + + + For the Allies, German responsibility for the war is fundamental. + It is the basis upon which the structure of the treaty of + Versailles has been erected, and if that acknowledgment is + repudiated or abandoned, the treaty is destroyed.... German + responsibility for the war must be treated by the Allies as a + _chose jugée_. + + +A little over two months before Mr. George made this latter utterance, +on 23 December, 1920, he said this: + + + The more one reads memoirs and books written in the various + countries of what happened before the first of August, 1914, the + more one realizes that no one at the head of affairs quite meant + war at that stage. It was something into which they glided, or + rather staggered and stumbled, perhaps through folly; and a + discussion, I have no doubt, would have averted it. + + +Well, it would strike an unprejudiced person that if this were true, +there is a great deal of doubt put upon Mr. Lloyd George's former +statements by Mr. Lloyd George himself. Persons who plot carefully, +skilfully, insidiously and clandestinely, do not glide; they do not +stagger or stumble, especially through folly. They keep going, as we in +America were assured that the German Government did keep going, right up +to The Day of their own choosing. Moreover, they are not likely to be +headed off by discussion; highwaymen are notoriously curt in their +speech and if one attempts discussion with them they become irritable +and peremptory. This is the invariable habit of highwaymen. Besides, if +discussion would have averted war in 1914, why was it not forthcoming? +Certainly not through any fault of the Austrian Government, which made +every concession, as the British Ambassador's report shows, +notwithstanding its grievance against Serbia was a just one. Certainly +not through any fault of the German Government, which never refused +discussion and held its hand with all the restraint possible under the +circumstances just described. Well, then, how is it so clear that German +responsibility for the war should be treated as a _chose jugée_? + + + + +VII + + +People who have a clear and simple case do not talk in this fashion. +Picking now at random among the utterances of politicians and +propagandists, we find an assorted job-lot of aims assigned and causes +alleged, and in all of them there is that curious, incomprehensible and +callous disregard of the power of conviction that a straight story +always exercises, if you have one to tell. In November, 1917, when the +Foreign Office was being pestered by demands for a statement of the +Allied war-aims, Lord Robert Cecil said in the House of Commons, that +the restitution of Alsace and Lorraine to France was a "well-understood +war-aim from the moment we entered the war." As things have turned out, +it is an odd coincidence how so many of these places that have iron or +coal or oil in them seem to represent a well-understood war-aim. Less +than a month before, in October, 1917, General Smuts said that to his +mind the one great dominating war-aim was "the end of militarism, the +end of standing armies." Well, the Allies won the war, but judging by +results, this dominating war-aim seems rather to have been lost sight +of. Mr. Lloyd George again on another occasion, said in the House of +Commons that "self-determination was one of the principles for which we +entered the war ... a principle from which we have never departed since +the beginning of the war." This, too, seems an aim that for some reason +the victorious nations have not quite realized; indeed in some cases, as +in Ireland, for example, there has been no great alacrity shown about +trying to realize it. Viscount Bryce said that the war sprang from the +strife of races and religions in the Balkan countries, and from the +violence done to the sentiment of nationality in Alsace-Lorraine which +made France the ally of Russia. But the fact is that France became the +ally of Russia on the basis of hard cash, and since the Russian +Revolution, she has been a bit out of luck by way of getting her money +back. Mr. Asquith in the House of Commons, 3 August, 1914 said: + + + If I am asked what we are fighting for, I reply in two sentences. + In the first place, to fulfil a solemn international obligation.... + Secondly we are fighting ... to vindicate the principle that small + nationalities are not to be crushed in defiance of international + good faith. + + +Just so: and in the House of Commons, 20 December, 1917, he said: + + + The League of Nations ... was the avowed purpose, the very purpose + ... for which we entered the war and for which we are continuing + the war. + + +You pays your money, you see, and takes your choice. The point to be +made, however, is that one who has a strong case, a real case, never +trifles with it in this way. Would the reader do it? + + + + +VIII + + +Mr. Asquith's citation of a "solemn international obligation" refers to +the so-called Belgian treaties. It will be remembered that the case of +Belgium was the great winning card played by the Allied Governments for +the stakes of American sympathies; and therefore we may here properly +make a survey, somewhat in detail, of the status of Belgium at the +outset of the war. + +Belgium had learned forty years ago how she stood under the treaties of +1831 and 1839. When in the late 'eighties there was likelihood of a +Franco-German war, the question of England's participation under these +treaties was thoroughly discussed, and it was shown conclusively that +England was not obligated. Perhaps the best summary of the case was that +given by Mr. W. T. Stead in the _Pall Mall Gazette_ in the issues of 4 +and 5 February, 1887. After an examination of the treaties of 1831, 1839 +and 1870--an examination unfortunately too long to be quoted here--Mr. +Stead briefly sums up the result of his investigation in the following +statement: + + + There is therefore no English guarantee to Belgium. It is possible + perhaps, to 'construct' such a guarantee; but the case may be + summed up as follows: (1) England is under no guarantee whatever + except such as is common to Austria, France, Russia and Germany; + (2) that guarantee is not specifically of the neutrality of Belgium + at all; and (3) is given, not to Belgium but to the Netherlands. + + +This was the official view of the British Government at the time, and it +is reflected in the celebrated letter signed "Diplomaticus" in the +_Standard_ of 4 February, to which Mr. Stead refers; which, indeed, he +makes the guiding text for his examination. The _Standard_ was then the +organ of Lord Salisbury's Government, and it is as nearly certain as +anything of the sort can be, that the letter signed "Diplomaticus" was +written by the hand of the British Prime Minister, Lord Salisbury +himself. + +How Mr. Asquith's Government in August 1914 came suddenly to extemporize +a wholly different view of England's obligations to Belgium is +excellently told by that inveterate diarist and chronicler, Mr. Wilfred +Scawen Blunt: + + + The obligation of fighting in alliance with France in case of a war + with Germany concerned the honour of three members only of + Asquith's Cabinet, who alone were aware of the exact promises that + had been made. These, though given verbally and with reservations + as to the consent of Parliament, bound the three as a matter of + personal honour, and were understood at the Quai d'Orsay as binding + the British nation. Neither Asquith nor his two companions[5] in + this inner Cabinet could have retained office had they gone back + from their word in spirit or in letter. It would also doubtless + have entailed a serious quarrel with the French Government had they + failed to make it good. So clearly was the promise understood at + Paris to be binding that President Poincaré, when the crisis came, + had written to King George reminding him of it as an engagement + made between the two nations which he counted on His Majesty to + keep. + + Thus faced, the case was laid before the Cabinet, but was found to + fail as a convincing argument for war. It was then that Asquith, + with his lawyer's instinct, at a second Cabinet meeting brought + forward the neutrality of Belgium as a better plea than the other + to lay before a British jury, and by representing the + neutrality-treaties of 1831 and 1839 as entailing an obligation on + England to fight (of which the text of the treaties contains no + word) obtained the Cabinet's consent, and war was declared. + + +Belgium was not thought of by the British Cabinet before 2 August, 1914. +She was brought in then as a means of making the war go down with the +British people. The fact is that Belgium was thoroughly prepared for +war, thoroughly prepared for just what happened to her. Belgium was a +party to the military arrangements effected among France, England and +Russia; for this we have the testimony of Marshal Joffre before the +Metallurgic Committee in Paris, and also the record of the +"conversations" that were carried on in Brussels between the Belgian +chief of staff and Lt.-Col. Barnardiston. On 24 July, 1914, the day when +the Austrian note was presented to Serbia (the note of which Sir E. Grey +had gotten an intimation as early as 16 July by telegraph from the +British Ambassador at Vienna, Sir M. de Bunsen), the Belgian Foreign +Minister, M. Davignon, promptly dispatched to all the Belgian embassies +an identical communication containing the following statement, the +significance of which is made clear by a glance at a map: + + + All necessary steps to ensure respect of Belgian neutrality have + nevertheless been taken by the Government. The Belgian army has + been mobilized and is taking up such strategic positions as have + been chosen to secure the defence of the country and the respect of + its neutrality. The forts of Antwerp and on the Meuse have been put + in a state of defence. + + +It was on the eastern frontier, we perceive, therefore--not on the +western, where Belgium might have been invaded by France--that all the +available Belgian military force was concentrated. Hence, to pretend any +longer that the Belgian Government was surprised by the action of +Germany, or unprepared to meet it; to picture Germany and Belgium as cat +and mouse, to understand the position of Belgium otherwise than that she +was one of four solid allies under definite agreement worked out in +complete practical detail, is sheer absurdity. + +FOOTNOTE: + +[5] Sir E. Grey and Lord Haldane. + + + + +IX + + +If the official theory of German responsibility were correct, it would +be impossible to explain the German Government's choice of the year 1914 +as a time to strike at "an unsuspecting and defenceless Europe." The +figures quoted in Chapter III show that the military strength of +Germany, relatively to that of the French-Russian-English combination, +had been decreasing since 1910. If Germany had wished to strike at +Europe, she had two first-rate chances, one in 1908 and another in 1912, +and not only let them both go by, but threw all her weight on the side +of peace. This is inexplicable upon the theory that animates the treaty +of Versailles. Germany was then in a position of advantage. The occasion +presented itself in 1908, in Serbia's quarrel with Austria over the +annexation of Bosnia and the Herzegovina. Russia, which was backing +Serbia, was in no shape to fight; her military strength, used up in the +Russo-Japanese war, had not recovered. France would not at this time +have been willing to go to war with Germany over her weak ally's +commitments in the Danube States. Germany, however, contented herself +with serving notice on the Tsar of her unequivocal support of Austria; +and this was enough. The Tsar accepted the _fait accompli_ of the +annexation of Bosnia and the Herzegovina; Serbia retired and cooled off; +and Turkey, from whom the annexed province was ravished, was compensated +by Austria. It is not to the point to scrutinize the propriety of these +transactions; the point is that Germany held the peace of Europe in the +hollow of her hand, with immense advantages in her favour, and chose not +to close her hand. The comment of a neutral diplomat, the Belgian +Minister in Berlin, is interesting. In his report of 1 April, 1909, to +the Belgian Foreign Office, he says: + + + The conference scheme elaborated by M. Isvolsky and Sir Edward + Grey; the negotiations for collective representations in Vienna; + and the whole exchange of ideas among London, Paris and Petersburg, + were steadily aimed at forcing Austria-Hungary into a transaction + which would strongly have resembled a humiliation. This humiliation + would have affected Germany as directly and as sensibly as + Austria-Hungary, and would have struck a heavy blow at the + confidence which is inspired in Vienna by the alliance with + Germany. These machinations were frustrated by Germany's + absolutely unequivocal and decided attitude, from which she has + never departed in spite of all the urgings with which she has been + harassed. Germany alone has accomplished the preservation of peace. + The new grouping of the Powers, organized by the King of England, + has measured its forces with the alliance of the Central European + Powers, and has shown itself incapable of impairing the same. Hence + the vexation which is manifested. + + +The last two sentences of the foregoing seem to show--putting it +mildly--that the Belgian Minister did not suspect the German Government +of any aggressive spirit. In the same dispatch, moreover, he remarks: + + + As always, when everything does not go as the French, English or + Russian politicians want it to, the _Temps_ shows its bad temper. + Germany is the scapegoat. + + +Again, at the time of the Balkan War in 1912, Germany had an excellent +opportunity to gratify her military ambition, if she had any, at the +expense of an "unsuspecting and unprepared Europe"; not as advantageous +as in 1908 but more advantageous than in 1914. Serbia's provocations +against Austria-Hungary had become so great that the Austrian Archduke +(assassinated in 1914 at Sarajevo) told the German Emperor personally +that they had reached the limit of endurance. On this occasion also, +however, William II put himself definitely on the side of peace, and in +so doing left the Austrian Government somewhat disappointed and +discontented. Another neutral diplomat reports of the German Foreign +Minister that + + + whatever plans he may have in his head (and he has big ideas), for + winning the sympathies of the young Balkan Powers over to Germany, + one thing is absolutely certain, and that is that he is rigidly + determined to avoid a European conflagration. On this point the + policy of Germany is similar to that of England and France, both of + which countries are determinedly pacifist. + + +This is a fair statement of the English and French position in 1912. +There was a great revulsion of feeling in England after her close shave +of being dragged into war over Morocco and her sentiment was all for +attending to certain pressing, domestic problems. Besides, it was only +in November, 1911, and only through the indiscretion of a French +newspaper, that the British public (and the British Parliament as well) +had learned that the Anglo-French agreement of 1904 had secret articles +attached to it, out of which had emanated the imbroglio over Morocco; +and there was a considerable feeling of distrust towards the Foreign +Office. In fact, Sir E. Grey, the Foreign Minister, was so unpopular +with his own party that quite probably he would have had to get out of +office if he had not been sustained by Tory influence. Mr. W. T. Stead +expressed a quite general sentiment in the _Review of Reviews_ for +December, 1911: + + + The fact remains that in order to put France in possession of + Morocco, we all but went to war with Germany. We have escaped war, + but we have not escaped the national and abiding enmity of the + German people. Is it possible to frame a heavier indictment of the + foreign policy of any British Ministry? The secret, the open + secret, of this almost incredible crime against treaty-faith, + British interests and the peace of the world, is the unfortunate + fact that Sir Edward Grey has been dominated by men in the Foreign + Office who believe all considerations must be subordinated to the + one supreme duty of thwarting Germany at every turn, even if in + doing so British interests, treaty-faith and the peace of the world + are trampled underfoot. I speak that of which I know. + + +This was strong language and it went without challenge, for too many +Englishmen felt that way. In France, the Poincaré-Millerand-Delcassé +combination was getting well into the saddle; but with English public +opinion in this notably undependable condition, English support of +France, in spite of the secret agreement binding the two governments, +was decidedly risky. Thereupon France also was "determinedly pacifist." +Now if Germany had been the prime mover in "the most dangerous +conspiracy ever plotted against the liberty of nations," why did she not +take advantage of that situation? + +Russia, too, was "determinedly pacifist" in 1912, and with good reason. +There was a party of considerable influence in the Tsar's court that was +strongly for going to war in behalf of Serbia, but it was finally headed +off by the Foreign Minister, Sazonov, who knew the state of public +opinion in England and its effect on France, and knew therefore that the +French-Russian-English alliance was not yet in shape to take on large +orders. It is true that the Poincaré-Millerand-Delcassé war-party in +France had proof enough in 1912 that it could count on the British +Government's support; and what France knew, Russia knew. Undoubtedly, +too, the British Government would somehow, under some pretext or other, +possibly Belgian neutrality, have contrived to redeem its obligations as +it did in 1914. But the atmosphere of the country was not favourable and +the thing would have been difficult. Accordingly, Sazonov saw that it +was best for him to restrain Serbia's impetuosity and truculence for +the time being--Russia herself being none too ready--and accordingly he +did so. + +But how? The Serbian Minister at Petersburg says that Sazonov told him +that in view of Serbia's successes "he had confidence in our strength +and believed that we would be able to deliver a blow at Austria. For +that reason we should feel satisfied with what we were to receive, and +consider it merely as a temporary halting-place on the road to further +gains." On another occasion "Sazonov told me that we must work for the +future because we would acquire a great deal of territory from Austria." +The Serbian Minister at Bucharest says that his Russian and French +colleagues counselled a policy of waiting "with as great a degree of +preparedness as possible the important events which must make their +appearance among the Great Powers." How, one may ask, was the Russian +Foreign Office able to look so far and so clearly into the future? If +German responsibility for the war is fundamental, a _chose jugée_, as +Mr. Lloyd George said it is, this seems a strange way for the Russian +Foreign Minister to be talking, as far back as 1912. But stranger still +is the fact that the German Government did not jump in at this juncture +instead of postponing its blow until 1914 when every one was apparently +quite ready to receive it. When the historian of the future considers +the theory of the Versailles treaty and considers the behaviour of the +German Government in the crisis of 1908 and in the crisis of 1912, he +will have to scratch his head a great deal to make them harmonize. + + + + +X + + +By the spring of 1913, the diplomatic representatives of the Allied +Danube States made no secret of the relations in which their Governments +stood to the Tsar's Foreign Office. The Balkan League was put through by +Russian influence and Russia controlled its diplomacy. Serbia was as +completely the instrument of Russia as Poland is now the instrument of +France. "If the Austrian troops invade Balkan territory," wrote Baron +Beyens on 4 April, 1913, "it would give cause for Russia to intervene, +and might let loose a universal war." Now, if Germany had been plotting +"with ruthless, cynical determination," as Mr. Lloyd George said, +against the peace of Europe, what inconceivable stupidity for her not to +push Austria along rather than do everything possible to hold her back! +Why give Russia the benefit of eighteen months of valuable time for the +feverish campaign of "preparedness" that she carried on? Those eighteen +months meant a great deal. In February, 1914, the Tsar arranged to +provide the Serbian army with rifles and artillery, Serbia agreeing to +put half a million soldiers in the field. In the same month Russia +negotiated a French loan of about $100 million for improvements on her +strategic railways and frontier-roads. During the spring, she made +"test" mobilizations of large bodies of troops which were never +demobilized, and these "test" mobilizations continued down to the +outbreak of the war; and in April Russian agents made technical +arrangements with agents of the British and French Admiralties for +possible combined naval action. + +Yes, those eighteen months were very busy months for Russia. True, she +came out at the end of them an "unprepared and unsuspecting" nation, +presumably, for was not all Europe unprepared and unsuspecting? Is it +not so nominated in the Versailles treaty? One can not help wondering, +however, how it is that Germany, "carefully, skilfully, insidiously, +clandestinely planning in every detail" a murderous attack on the peace +of Europe, should have given Russia the inestimable advantage of those +eighteen months. + + + + +XI + + +Mr. E. D. Morel, editor of the British monthly, _Foreign Affairs_, +performed more than a distinguished service--it is a splendid, an +illustrious service--to the disparaged cause of justice, when recently +he translated and published in England through the National Labour +Press, a series of remarkable State documents.[6] This consists of +reports made by the Belgian diplomatic representatives at Paris, London +and Berlin, to the Belgian Minister of Foreign Affairs, covering the +period from 7 February, 1905 to 2 July, 1914. Their authenticity has +never been questioned. They have received no notice in this country; +their content and import were carefully kept from the American people as +long as it was possible to do so, and consequently they remain unknown +except to a few who are students of international affairs or who have +some similar special interest. + +It can hardly be pretended by anyone that Belgian officials had, during +that decade, any particular love or leaning towards Germany. The Belgian +Foreign Office has always been as free from sentimental attachments as +any other. It has always been governed by the same motives that govern +the British, French, German and Russian Foreign Offices. Its number, +like theirs, was number one; it was out, first and last, for the +interests of the Belgian Government, and it scrutinized every +international transaction from the viewpoint of those interests and +those only. It was fully aware of the position of Belgium as a mere +"strategic corridor" and battle-ground for alien armies in case of a +general European war, and aware that Belgium had simply to make the best +of its bad outlook, for nothing else could be done. If the Belgian +Foreign Office and its agents, moreover, had no special love for +Germany, neither had they any special fear of her. They were in no more +or deeper dread of a German invasion than of a British or French +invasion. In fact, in 1911, the Belgian Minister at Berlin set forth in +a most matter-of-fact way his belief that in the event of war, Belgian +neutrality would be first violated by Great Britain.[7] These +observers, in short, may on all accounts, as far as one can see, be +accepted as neutral and disinterested, with the peculiar +disinterestedness of one who has no choice between two evils. + +Well, then, under the circumstances it is remarkable that if Germany +during the ten years preceding August, 1914, were plotting against the +peace of the world, these Belgian observers seem unaware of it. It is +equally noteworthy that if Germany's assault were unprovoked, they seem +unaware of that also. These documents relate in an extremely +matter-of-fact way a continuous series of extraordinary provocations put +upon the German Government, and moreover, they represent the behaviour +of the German Government, under these provocations, in a very favourable +light. On the other hand, they show from beginning to end a most +profound distrust of English diplomacy. If there is any uncertainty +about the causes of ill-feeling between England and Germany, these +Belgian officials certainly do not share it. They regularly speak of +England's jealousy of Germany's economic competition, and the +provocative attitude to which this jealousy gave rise. They speak of it, +moreover, as though it were something that the Belgian Government were +already well aware of; they speak of it in the tone of pure commonplace, +such as one might use in an incidental reference to the weather or to a +tariff-schedule or to any other matter that is well understood and about +which there is no difference of opinion and nothing new to be said. This +is all the more remarkable in view of the fact that it was nominally to +save Belgium and to defend the sanctity of Belgian neutrality that +England entered the war in August, 1914. These Belgian agents are +invariably suspicious of English diplomacy, as Mr. E. D. Morel points +out, "mainly because they feel that it is tending to make the war which +they dread for their country." They persistently and unanimously +"insinuate that if left to themselves, France and Germany would reach a +settlement of their differences, and that British diplomacy was being +continually exercised to envenom the controversy and to draw a circle of +hostile alliances round Germany." This, indeed, under a specious concern +for the "balance of power," has been the historic rôle of English +diplomacy. Every one remembers how in 1866, just before the +Franco-Prussian war, Mr. Matthew Arnold's imaginary Prussian, Arminius +von Thunder-ten-Tronckh, wrote to the editor of the _Pall Mall Gazette_, +begging him to prevail upon his fellow-countrymen "for Heaven's sake not +to go on biting, first the French Emperor's tail, and then ours." + +On 18 February, 1905, the Belgian Minister in Berlin reported thus: + + + The real cause of the English hatred of Germany is the jealousy + aroused by the astonishing development of Germany's merchant navy + and of her commerce and manufactures. This hatred will last until + the English have thoroughly learned to understand that the world's + trade is not by rights an exclusively English monopoly. Moreover, + it is studiously fostered by the _Times_ and a whole string of + other daily papers and periodicals that do not stop short of + calumny in order to pander to the tastes of their readers. + + +At that time the centre of the English navy had just been shifted to the +North Sea, to the accompaniment of a very disturbing and, as at first +reported, a very flamboyant speech from the Civil Lord of the Admiralty, +Mr. Lee. Of the sensation thereby created in Germany, the Belgian +Minister says: + + + In informing the British public that Germany does not dream of any + aggression against England, Count Bülow [the German Chancellor] + said no more than what is recognized by every one who considers the + matter dispassionately. Germany would have nothing to gain from a + contest.... The German fleet has been created with a purely + defensive object. The small capacity of the coal-bunkers in her + High Seas Fleet, and the small number of her cruisers, prove + besides that her fleet is not intended for use at any distance from + the coast. + + +On the other hand, he remarks in the same report: + + + It was obvious that the new disposition of the English navy was + aimed at Germany ... it certainly is not because of Russia, whose + material stock is to a great extent destroyed and whose navy has + just given striking proof of incompetence [in the Russo-Japanese + war]. + + +Such is the tone uniformly adopted by these neutral observers throughout +their reports from 1905 to 1914. On 24 October, 1905, the Belgian +Minister in Paris wrote: + + + England, in her efforts to maintain her supremacy and to hinder the + development of her great German rival, is evidently inspired by the + wish to avoid a conflict, but are not her selfish aims in + themselves bringing it upon us?... She thought, when she concluded + the Japanese alliance and gradually drew France into similar ties, + that she had found the means to her end, by sufficiently + paralysing Germany's powers as to make war impossible. + + +This view of the Anglo-Japanese alliance is interesting and significant, +especially now when that instrument is coming up for renewal, with the +United States standing towards England in the same relation of economic +competitorship that Germany occupied in 1905. True, Viscount Bryce +assured the Institute of Politics at Williams College last summer that +it was not Germany's economic rivalry that disturbed England; but on +this point it would be highly advantageous for the people of the United +States, while there is yet time, to read what the Belgian Minister in +Berlin had to say on 27 October, 1905: + + + A very large number of Germans are convinced that England is either + seeking allies for an attack upon Germany, or else, which would be + more in accordance with British tradition, that she is labouring to + provoke a Continental war in which she would not join, but of which + she would reap the profit. + + I am told that many English people are troubled with similar fears + and go in dread of German aggression. + + I am puzzled upon what foundations such an impression in London can + be based. Germany is absolutely incapable of attacking England.... + Are these people in England really sincere who go about expressing + fears of a German invasion which could not materialize? Are they + not rather pretending to be afraid of it in order to bring on a war + which would annihilate Germany's navy, her merchant-fleet and her + foreign commerce? Germany is as vulnerable to attack as England is + safe from it; and if England were to attack Germany merely for the + sake of extinguishing a rival, it would only be in accordance with + her old precedents. + + In turn she wiped out the Dutch fleet, with the assistance of Louis + XIV; then the French fleet; and the Danish fleet she even destroyed + in time of peace and without any provocation, simply because it + constituted a naval force of some magnitude. + + There are no ostensible grounds for war between Germany and + England. The English hatred for Germany arises solely from jealousy + of Germany's progress in shipping, in commerce and in manufacture. + + +Baron Greindl here presents an opinion very different from that in which +the majority of Americans have been instructed; and before they accept +further instruction at the hands of Viscount Bryce, they had better look +into the matter somewhat for themselves. + +Baron Greindl wrote the foregoing in October. In December, the head of +the British Admiralty, Sir John Fisher, assured Colonel Repington that +"Admiral Wilson's Channel fleet was alone strong enough to smash the +whole German fleet." _Two years_ later, Sir John Fisher wrote to King +Edward VII that "it is an absolute fact that Germany has not laid down +a single dreadnaught, nor has she commenced building a single battleship +or big cruiser for eighteen months.... England has ... ten dreadnaughts +built and building, while Germany in March last had not even begun one +dreadnaught ... we have 123 destroyers and forty submarines. The Germans +have forty-eight destroyers and one submarine." Hence, if Sir John +Fisher knew what he was talking about, and in such matters he usually +did, he furnishes a very considerable corroboration of Baron Greindl's +view of the German navy up to 1905. Looking back at the third chapter of +this book, which deals with the comparative strength of the two navies +and naval groups as developed from 1905 to 1914, the reader may well +raise again Baron Greindl's question, "Are those people in England +really sincere?" + +FOOTNOTES: + +[6] Under the title "Diplomacy Revealed." National Labour Press. 8 and 9 +Johnson's Court, London, E.C., 4, England. + +[7] This belief received some corroboration in the spring of 1912, when +in the course of military "conversations," the British Military Attaché, +Lieutenant-Colonel Bridges, told the Belgian Minister of War that if war +had broken out over the Agadir incident in 1911, the British Government +would have landed troops in Belgium with or without the Belgian +Government's consent. So much did the British Government think of the +"scrap of paper!" + + + + +XII + + +Such is the inveterate suspicion, the melancholy distrust, put upon +English diplomacy by these foreign and neutral observers who could see +so plainly what would befall their own country in the event of a +European war. Such too, was the responsibility which these observers +regularly imputed to the British Foreign Office--the British Foreign +Office which was so soon to fix upon the neutrality of Belgium as a +_casus belli_ and pour out streams of propaganda about the sanctity of +treaties and the rights of small nations! Every one of these observers +exhibits this suspicion and distrust. In March, 1906, when Edward VII +visited Paris and invited the discredited ex-Minister Delcassé to +breakfast, the Belgian Minister at Paris wrote: + + + It looks as though the king wished to demonstrate that the policy + which called forth Germany's active intervention [over Morocco] has + nevertheless remained unchanged.... In French circles it is not + over well received; Frenchmen feeling that they are being dragged + against their will in the orbit of English policy, a policy whose + consequences they dread, and which they generally condemned by + throwing over M. Delcassé. In short, people fear that this is a + sign that England wants so to envenom the situation that war will + become inevitable. + + +On 10 February, 1907, when the English King and Queen visited Paris, he +says: "One can not conceal from oneself that these tactics, though their +ostensible object is to prevent war, are likely to arouse great +dissatisfaction in Berlin and to stir up a desire to risk anything that +may enable Germany to burst the ring which England's policy is +tightening around her." On 28 March, 1907, the Belgian _chargé +d'affaires_ in London speaks of "English diplomacy, whose whole effort +is directed to the isolation of Germany." On the same date, by a curious +coincidence, the Minister at Berlin, in the course of a blistering +arraignment of French policy in Morocco, says: "But at the bottom of +every settlement that has been made, or is going to be made, there lurks +always that hatred of Germany.... It is a sequence of the campaign very +cleverly conducted with the object of isolating Germany.... The English +press is carrying on its campaign of calumny more implacably than ever. +It sees the finger of Germany in everything that goes contrary to +English wishes." On 18 April, 1907, Baron Greindl says of the King of +England's visit to the King of Spain that, like the alliances with Japan +and France and the negotiations with Russia, it is "one of the moves in +the campaign to isolate Germany that is being personally directed with +as much perseverance as success by His Majesty King Edward VII." In the +same dispatch he remarks: "There is some right to regard with suspicion +this eagerness to unite, for a so-called defensive object, Powers who +are menaced by nobody. At Berlin they can not forget that offer of +100,000 men made by the King of England to M. Delcassé." + +On 24 May, 1907, the Minister at London reported that "it is plain that +official England is pursuing a policy that is covertly hostile, and +tending to result in the isolation of Germany, and that King Edward has +not been above putting his personal influence at the service of this +cause." On 19 June, 1907, Count de Lalaing again writes from London of +the Anglo-Franco-Spanish agreement concerning the _status quo_ in the +Mediterranean region, that "it is, however, difficult to imagine that +Germany will not regard it as a further step in England's policy, which +is determined, by every sort of means, to isolate the German Empire." + +Perusal of these documents from beginning to end will show nothing to +offset against the view of English diplomacy exhibited in the foregoing +quotations; nothing to modify or qualify that view in any way. Baron +Greindl, however, speaks highly of the British Ambassador at Berlin, Sir +F. Lascelles, and praises his personal and unsupported attempt to +establish friendly relations between England and Germany. Of this he +says: "I have been a witness for the last twelve years of the efforts he +has made to accomplish it. And yet, possessing as he justly does the +absolute confidence of the Emperor and the German Government, and +eminently gifted with the qualities of a statesman, he has nevertheless +not succeeded very well so far." The next year, 1908, when Sir F. +Lascelles was forced to resign his post, Baron Greindl does not hesitate +to say that "the zeal with which he has worked to dispel +misunderstandings that he thought absurd and highly mischievous for both +countries, does not fall in with the political views of his sovereign." + + + + +XIII + + +King Edward VII died 6 May, 1910. During the early part of 1911, the +Belgian Ministers in London, Paris and Berlin report some indications of +a less unfriendly policy towards Germany on the part of the British +Government. In March of that year, Sir Edward Grey delivered a +reassuring speech on British foreign policy, on the occasion of the +debate on the naval budget. The Belgian Minister in Berlin says of this +that it should have produced the most agreeable impression in Germany if +one could confidently believe that it really entirely reflected the +ideas of the British Government. It would imply, he says, that "England +no longer wishes to give to the Triple Entente the aggressive character +which was stamped upon it by its creator, King Edward VII." He remarks, +however, the slight effect produced in Berlin by Sir E. Grey's speech, +and infers that German public feeling may have "become dulled by the +innumerable meetings and mutual demonstrations of courtesy which have +never produced any positive result," and he adds significantly that +"this distrust is comprehensible." + +It must be remembered that at the time this speech was delivered, +England was under a secret agreement dating from 1904 to secure France's +economic monopoly in Morocco. England was also under a secret obligation +to France, dating from 1906, to support her in case of war with Germany. +It must be above all remembered that this latter obligation carried with +it a contingent liability for the Franco-Russian military alliance that +had been in effect for many years. Thus if Russia went to war with +Germany, France was committed, and in turn England was committed. The +whole force of the Triple Entente lay in these agreements; and it can +not be too often pointed out that they were _secret_ agreements. No one +in England knew until November, 1911, that in 1904 the British +Government had bargained with the French Government, in return for a +free hand in Egypt, to permit France to squeeze German economic +interests out of Morocco--in violation of a published agreement, signed +by all the interested nations, concerning the status of Morocco. No one +in England knew until 3 August, 1914, that England had for several years +been under a military and naval agreement with France which carried the +enormous contingent liability of the Franco-Russian military alliance. +No matter what appeared on the surface of politics; no matter how many +pacific speeches were made by Sir E. Grey and Mr. Asquith, no matter +what the newspapers said, no matter how often and how impressively Lord +Haldane might visit Berlin in behalf of peace and good feeling; _those +secret agreements held_, they were the only things that did hold, and +everything worked out in strict accordance with them and with nothing +else, least of all with any public understanding or any statement of +policy put out for public consumption. It was just as in the subsequent +case of the armistice and the peace--and this is something that has been +far too little noticed in this country. The real terms of the armistice +and of the peace were not the terms of the Fourteen Points or of any of +the multitudinous published statements of Allied war aims. On the +contrary, they were the precise terms of the secret treaties made among +the Allied belligerents during the war, and made public on their +discovery by the Soviet Government in the archives of the Tsarist +Foreign Office. + +It is no wonder then, that the German Government was not particularly +impressed by Sir E. Grey's speech, especially as Germany saw France +helping herself to Moroccan territory with both hands, and England +looking on in indifferent complacency. In May, 1911, on a most +transparent and preposterous pretext, a French army was ordered to march +on Fez, the capital of Morocco. The German Government then informed +France that as the Algeciras Act, which guaranteed the integrity and +independence of Morocco, had thereby gone by the board, Germany would no +longer consider herself bound by its provisions. In June, 30,000 French +troops "relieved" Fez, occupied it and stayed there, evincing no +intention whatever of getting out again, notwithstanding that the +ostensible purpose of the expedition was accomplished; in reality, there +was nothing to accomplish. Two months before this _coup d'état_, Baron +Greindl, the Belgian Minister at Berlin, wrote to the Belgian Foreign +Office as follows: + + + Every illusion, if ever entertained on the value of the Algeciras + Act, which France signed with the firm intention of never + observing, must long since have vanished. She has not ceased for + one moment to pursue her plans of annexation; either by seizing + opportunities for provisional occupations destined to last for ever + or by extorting concessions which have placed the Sultan in a + position of dependence upon France, and which have gradually + lowered him to the level of the Bey of Tunis. + + +A week later, 29 April, Baron Guillaume, who had succeeded M. Leghait as +Belgian Minister in Paris, reported that "there are, so far, no grounds +for fearing that the French expedition will bring about any disturbance +of international policy. Germany is a calm spectator of events." He +adds, significantly, "England, having thrust France into the Moroccan +bog, is contemplating her work with satisfaction." + +France professed publicly that the object of this expedition was to +extricate certain foreigners who were imperilled at Fez; and having done +so, she would withdraw her forces. The precious crew of concessionaires, +profiteers, and dividend-hunters known as the _Comité du Maroc_ had +suddenly discovered a whole French colony living in Fez in a state of +terror and distress. There was, in fact, nothing of the sort. Fez was +never menaced, it was never short of provisions, and there were no +foreigners in trouble. When the expeditionary force arrived, it found no +one to shoot at. As M. Francis de Pressensé says: + + + Those redoubtable rebels who were threatening Fez had disappeared + like dew in the morning. Barely did a few ragged horsemen fire off + a shot or two before turning around and riding away at a furious + gallop. A too disingenuous, or too truthful, correspondent gave the + show away. The expeditionary force complains, he gravely records, + of the absence of the enemy; the approaching harvest season is + keeping all the healthy males in the fields! Thus did the phantom + so dexterously conjured by the _Comité du Maroc_ for the benefit of + its aims, disappear in a night. + + +Nevertheless, the expeditionary force did not, in accordance with the +public professions of the French Government, march out of Fez as soon as +it discovered this ridiculous mare's nest. It remained there and held +possession of the Moorish capital. What was the attitude of the British +Government in the premises? On 2 May, in the House of Commons, Sir +Edward Grey said that "the action taken by France is not intended to +alter the political status of Morocco, and His Majesty's Government can +not see why any objection should be taken to it." + +Germany had remained for eight years a tolerant observer of French +encroachments in Morocco, and quite clearly, as Baron Greindl observes +in his report of 21 April, 1911, could not "after eight years of +tolerance, change her attitude unless she were determined to go to war, +and war is immeasurably more than Morocco is worth." In July, 1911, +however, while the French force of 30,000 was still occupying Fez, +Germany dispatched a gunboat, the "Panther," which anchored off the +coast of Agadir. + + + + +XIV + + +This was the famous "Agadir incident," of which we have all heard. Did +it mean that the worm had turned, that Germany had changed her attitude +and was determined to go to war? It has been so represented; but there +are many difficult inconsistencies involved in that explanation of the +German Government's act, and there is also an alternative explanation +which fits the facts far better. In the first place the "Panther" was +hardly more than an ocean-going tug. She was of 1000 tons burden, +mounting two small naval guns, six machine-guns, and she carried a +complement of only 125 men. Second, she never landed a man upon the +coast of Morocco. She chose for her anchorage a point where the coast is +practically inaccessible; Agadir has no harbour, and there is nothing +near it that offers any possible temptation to the predatory instinct. +No more ostentatiously unimpressive and unmenacing demonstration could +have been devised. Germany, too, was quite well aware that Morocco was +not worth a European war; and as Baron Guillaume said in his report of +29 April, "possibly she [Germany] is congratulating herself on the +difficulties that weigh upon the shoulders of the French Government, and +asks nothing better than to keep out of the whole affair as long as she +is not forced into it by economic considerations." But the most +significant indication that Germany had not changed her attitude is in +the fact that if she were determined upon war, then, rather than two +years later, was her time to go about it. This aspect of Germany's +behaviour has been dealt with in a previous chapter. It can not be too +often reiterated that if Germany really wanted war and was determined +upon war, her failure to strike in 1908, when Russia was prostrate and +France unready, and again in 1912, a few months after the Agadir +incident, when the Balkan war was on, is inexplicable.[8] + +The dispatch of the "Panther" gave the three Belgian observers a great +surprise, and they were much puzzled to account for it. Baron +Guillaume's thoughts at once turned to England. He writes 2 July: + + + It was long regarded as an axiom that England would never allow the + Germans to establish themselves at any point of Moroccan territory. + Has this policy been abandoned; and if so, at what price were they + bought off? + + +During the month of July, while waiting for a statement from the British +Foreign Office, the Belgian observers canvassed the possibility that +Germany's action was a hint that she would like some territorial +compensation for having been bilked out of her share in the Moroccan +market. But the interesting fact, and for the purpose of this book the +important fact, is that none of these diplomats shows the slightest +suspicion that Germany was bent on war or that she had any thought of +going to war. Baron Guillaume says, 28 July, "undoubtedly the present +situation wears a serious aspect.... Nobody, however, wants war, and +they will try to avoid it." He proceeds: + + + The French Government knows that a war would be the death-knell of + the Republic.... I have very great confidence in the Emperor + William's love of peace, notwithstanding the not infrequent air of + melodrama about what he says and does.... Germany can not go to war + for the sake of Morocco, nor yet to exact payment of those + compensations that she very reasonably demands for the French + occupation of Fez, which has become more or less permanent. On the + whole I feel less faith in Great Britain's desire for peace. She + would not be sorry to see the others destroying one another; only, + under those circumstances, it would be difficult for her to avoid + armed intervention.... As I thought from the very first, the crux + of the situation is in London. + + +By the end of July, a different conception of Germany's action seemed to +prevail. It began to be seen that the episode of the "Panther" had been +staged by way of calling for a show-down on the actual intentions and +purposes of the Triple Entente; and it got one. Mr. Lloyd George, "the +impulsive Chancellor of the Exchequer," as Count de Lalaing calls him, +made a typical jingo speech at the Mansion House; a speech which the +Prime Minister, Mr. Asquith, and Sir Edward Grey, the Foreign Minister, +had helped him to compose. The air was cleared at once--England stood by +France--and what better plan could have been devised for clearing the +air than the dispatch of the "Panther"? Germany stood for the policy of +economic equality, the policy of the open door to which all the Powers +interested had agreed in the case of Morocco. France, at the end of a +course of continuous aggression, had put 30,000 troops in occupation of +the capital of Morocco on an infamously unscrupulous pretext, and put +them there to stay, and the British Government "could not see why any +objection should be taken to it." Germany, on the other hand, anchored +an insignificant gunboat off an inaccessible coast, and without landing +a man or firing a shot, left her there as a silent reminder of the +Algeciras Act and the principle of the open door--carefully and even +ostentatiously going no further--and the British Government promptly, +through the mouth of Mr. Lloyd George, laid down a challenge and a +threat. Thereupon Germany and France understood their relative +positions; they understood, even without Sir E. Grey's explicit +reaffirmation of 27 November of the policy of the Triple Entente, that +England would stand by her arrangements with France. Baron Greindl +writes from Berlin 6 December, and puts the case explicitly: + + + Was it not assuming the right of veto on German enterprise for + England to start a hue and cry because a German cruiser cast anchor + in the roads of Agadir, seeing that she had looked on without a + murmur whilst France and Spain had proceeded step by step to + conquer Morocco and to destroy the independence of its Sultan? + + England could not have acted otherwise. She was tied by her secret + treaty with France. The explanation was extremely simple, but it + was not of a sort to allay German irritation. + + +FOOTNOTE: + +[8] Critics of German foreign policy are hard put to it to show that she +was ever guided by territorial ambitions; which is an extremely +troublesome thing when one wants to believe that she proposed in 1914 to +put the world under a military despotism. Can any one show where in a +single instance she ever demanded anything more than economic equality +with other nations, in a foreign market? Certainly she never demanded +more than this in Morocco. Ex-Premier Caillaux says that his predecessor +Rouvier offered Germany a good Moroccan port (Mogador) and some +adjoining territory, and Germany declined. + + + + +XV + + +Let us glance at British political chronology for a moment. King Edward +VII, the chief factor in the Entente, the moving spirit in England's +foreign alliances, had been dead a year. In December, 1905, the Liberal +party had come into power. In April, 1908, Mr. H. H. Asquith became +Prime Minister. In 1910, Anglo-German relations were apparently +improving; in July, 1910, Mr. Asquith spoke of them in the House of +Commons as "of the most cordial character. I look forward to increasing +warmth and fervour and intimacy in these relations year by year." The +great question was, then, in 1911, whether the Liberal Government would +actually, when it came down to the pinch, stick by its secret covenant +with France. Were the new Liberals, were Mr. Asquith, Lord Haldane, Sir +E. Grey, Mr. Lloyd George, true-blue Liberal imperialists, or were they +not? Could France and Russia safely trust them to continue the Foreign +Office policy that Lord Lansdowne had bequeathed to Sir E. Grey; or, +when the emergency came, would they stand from under? After all, there +_had_ been a Campbell-Bannerman; there was no doubt of that; and one, at +least, of the new Liberals, Mr. Lloyd George, had a bad anti-imperialist +record in the South African war. + +The Agadir incident elicited a satisfactory answer to these questions. +The Liberal Government was dependable. However suspiciously the members +of the Liberal Cabinet might talk, they were good staunch imperialists +at heart. They were, as the theologians say, "sound on the essentials." +Baron Greindl wrote, 6 December, 1911: + + + The Entente Cordiale was founded, not on the positive basis of + defence of common interests, but on the negative one of hatred of + the German Empire.... Sir Edward Grey adopts this tradition without + reservation. He imagines that it is in conformity with English + interests.... A revision of Great Britain's policy is all the less + to be looked for, as ever since the Liberal Ministry took office, + and more especially during the last few months, English foreign + policy has been guided by the ideas with which King Edward VII + inspired it. + + + + +XVI + + +Mr. Lloyd George's speech at the Mansion House in July, 1911, after the +German gunboat "Panther" had anchored off the Moroccan coast, gave an +immense impulse to the jingo spirit in France, because it was taken as +definite assurance of England's good faith in seeing her secret +agreements through to a finish. M. Caillaux, the French Premier, appears +to have had his doubts, nevertheless, inasmuch as the British Foreign +Office did not give a straight reply to the French Foreign Office's +inquiry concerning British action in case the Germans landed a force in +Morocco. He says: + + + Are we to understand that our powerful neighbours will go right + through to the end with the resolve which they suggest? Are they + ready for all eventualities? The British Ambassador, Sir Francis + Bertie, with whom I converse, does not give me formal assurances. + It is said, of course, that he would see without displeasure the + outbreak of a conflict between France and Germany; his mind works + in the way attributed to a number of leading British officials at + the Foreign Office. + + +M. Caillaux here suggests the same suspicion of British intentions +which the Belgian diplomats at London, Paris and Berlin intimate +continually throughout their correspondence since 1905.[9] He +accordingly favoured a less energetic policy towards Germany, and was +thrown out of office. Count de Lalaing reported from London, 15 January, +1912, that the revelations which provoked this political crisis were +disagreeable for the English Government. "They seem to prove," he says, +"that the French Premier had been trying to negotiate with Berlin +without the knowledge of the Minister for Foreign Affairs and his other +colleagues, and this is naturally disquieting to a Government whose +interests are bound up with those of France, and which accordingly can +ill tolerate any lapses of this kind." He adds: + + + These revelations have also strengthened the impression that M. + Caillaux had recently favoured an ultra-conciliatory policy towards + Germany, and this impression was felt all the more painfully in + English official circles, as the full extent of the tension between + London and Berlin caused by the Cabinet of St. James's loyal + behaviour towards the Cabinet at Paris had hardly been grasped. + People in England are reluctant to face the fact that they have + been 'more royalist than the King,' and have shown themselves even + less accommodating than the friend they were backing.... + Accordingly the press unanimously hails with delight the departure + of M. Caillaux, and trusts that sounder traditions may be reverted + to without delay. + + +This comment on the position of M. Caillaux is one of the most +interesting observations to be found in these documents. + +FOOTNOTE: + +[9] This is worth noticing since M. Caillaux was the pioneer victim of +the charge of being "pro-German." + + + + +XVII + + +The Balkan war took place in 1912, and the whole history of the year +shows the most mighty efforts of European politicians--efforts which +seem ludicrous and laughable in spite of their tragic quality--to avert +with their left hand the war which they were bringing on with their +right. Mr. Lloyd George is right in saying that no one really wanted +war. What every one wanted, and what every one was trying with might and +main to do, was to cook the omelette of economic imperialism without +breaking any eggs. There was in all the countries, naturally, a jingo +nationalist party which wanted war. In Russia, which was then busily +reorganizing her military forces which had been used up and left +prostrate by the war with the Japanese, the pan-Slavists were +influential and vociferous, but they were not on top. In England there +was a great popular revulsion against the behaviour of the Government +which had so nearly involved the English in a war against Germany the +year before; and Mr. Asquith's Government, which was pacifist in +tendency, was meeting the popular sentiment in every way possible, +_short of the one point of revealing the secret engagements which bound +it to the French Government and contingently to the Russian Government_. +Lord Haldane undertook an official mission to Berlin, which was attended +with great publicity and was popularly supposed to be of a pacificatory +nature; and really, within the limits of the Franco-English diplomatic +agreement, it went as far as it could in the establishment of good +relations. In fact, of course, it came to nothing; as long as the +diplomatic agreement remained in force, it could come to nothing, +nothing of the sort could come to anything; and the diplomatic agreement +being guarded as a close secret, the reason why it must come to nothing +was not apparent. The German Government also made tremendous efforts in +behalf of peace; and it must be noted by those who accept the theory +upon which the treaty of Versailles is based, that if Germany had wished +or intended at any time to strike at the peace of Europe, now was the +moment for her to do so. Instead, the German Emperor in person, and the +German Government, through one of its best diplomatic agents, Baron von +Marschall, met every pacific overture more than half-way, and +themselves initiated all that could be thought of. "There is no doubt," +wrote Baron Beyens from Berlin, "that the Emperor, the Chancellor and +the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs (von Kiderlen-Wächter) are +passionately pacifists." Baron Beyens again says, 28 June, 1912, "The +Emperor is persistent and has not given up hopes of winning back English +sympathies, just as he has succeeded up to a certain point in obtaining +the confidence of the Tsar, by the force of his personal attractions." +Those who believe in the extraordinary notion of an unprepared and +unsuspecting Europe, should read the diplomatic history of the year +1912, when all the chief office-holders in England and on the Continent +were struggling like men caught in a quicksand, or like flies on +fly-paper, to avert, or if they could not avert, to defer the inevitable +war. + +In one country, however, the jingo nationalist and militarist party came +on top; and that country was France. M. Caillaux was succeeded by +Raymond Poincaré; and in January, 1913, Poincaré became President of the +Republic. Up to 1912, the people of France were increasingly indisposed +to war and were developing a considerable impatience with militarism, +and the French Government was responsive to this sentiment. It knew, as +Baron Guillaume remarked at the time of the Agadir incident, that "a war +would be the death-knell of the Republic." M. Caillaux seems to have +measured the feelings of his countrymen quite well. Baron Guillaume says +that after the dispatch of the "Panther," the British Cabinet's first +proposal was that the British and French Governments should each +immediately send two men-of-war to Agadir; and that the French Cabinet +strongly objected. Again, he says in his report of 8 July, 1911, "I am +persuaded that Messrs. Caillaux and de Selves regret the turn given to +the Moroccan affair by their predecessors in office. They were quite +ready to give way, provided they could do so without humiliation." + +The speech of Mr. Lloyd George at the Mansion House, however, which was +taken by the French (and how correctly they took it became apparent on 3 +August, 1914) as a definite assurance of British support against +Germany, gave the militarist-nationalist party the encouragement to go +ahead and dominate the domestic politics of France. It put the +Poincaré-Millerand-Delcassé element on its feet and stiffened its +resolution, besides clearing the way in large measure for its +predominance. On 14 February, 1913, Baron Guillaume reports from Paris +thus: + + + The new President of the Republic enjoys a popularity in France + to-day unknown to any of his predecessors.... Various factors + contribute to explain his popularity. His election had been + carefully prepared in advance; people are pleased at the skilful + way in which, while a Minister, he manoeuvred to bring France to + the fore in the concert of Europe; he has hit upon some happy + phrases that stick in the popular mind. + + +The career of M. Poincaré, in fact, and his management of popular +sentiment, show many features which _mutatis mutandis_, find a parallel +in the career of Theodore Roosevelt. Baron Guillaume adds, however, this +extremely striking observation concerning the popularity of M. Poincaré: + + + But above all, one must regard it as a manifestation of the old + French chauvinistic spirit, which had for many years slumbered, but + which had come to life again since the affair of Agadir. + + +In the same communication to the Belgian Foreign Office, Baron Guillaume +remarks: + + + M. Poincaré is a native of Lorraine, and loses no opportunity of + telling people so. He was M. Millerand's colleague, and the + instigator of his militarist policy. + + Finally, the first word that he uttered at the very moment when he + learned that he was elected President of the Republic, was a + promise that he would watch over and maintain all the means of + national defence. + + +M. Poincaré had not been in office two months when he recalled the +French Ambassador at Petersburg, M. Georges Louis, and appointed in his +stead M. Delcassé. Concerning this stupendous move, Baron Guillaume +reported 21 February, 1913, to the Belgian Foreign Office thus: + + + The news that M. Delcassé is shortly to be appointed Ambassador at + Petersburg burst like a bomb here yesterday afternoon.... He was + one of the architects of the Franco-Russian alliance, and still + more so of the Anglo-French _entente_. + + +Baron Guillaume goes on to say that he does not think that M. Delcassé's +appointment should be interpreted as a demonstration against Germany; +but he adds: + + + I do think, however, that M. Poincaré, a Lorrainer, was not sorry + to show, from the first day of entering on his high office, how + anxious he is to stand firm and hold aloft the national flag. That + is the danger involved in having M. Poincaré at the Elysée in these + anxious days through which Europe is passing. It was under his + Ministry that the militarist, slightly bellicose instincts of the + French woke up again. He has been thought to have a measure of + responsibility for this change of mood. + + +M. Georges Louis, who had represented the French Government at +Petersburg for three years, was a resolute opponent of the militarist +faction in France, and was therefore distinctly _persona non grata_ to +the corresponding faction in Russia. At the head of this faction stood +Isvolsky, who was a friend of M. Poincaré and a kindred spirit; hence +when M. Poincaré became Premier, an attempt was made to oust M. Louis, +but it was unsuccessful. M. Delcassé, on the other hand, is described by +Mr. Morel as "the man identified more than any other man in French +public life with the anti-German war-party." Mr. Morel, in commenting on +the appointment of M. Delcassé quotes the following from a report sent +by the Russian Ambassador in London to the Foreign Office in Petersburg. +It was written four days after the appointment of M. Delcassé, and quite +bears out the impression made upon the Belgian agents.[10] + + + When I recall his [M. Cambon, the French Ambassador in London] + conversations with me, and the attitude of Poincaré, the thought + comes to me as a conviction, that of all the powers France is the + only one which, not to say that it wishes war, would yet look upon + it without great regret.... She [France] has, either rightly or + wrongly, complete trust in her army; the old effervescing minority + has again shown itself. + + +FOOTNOTE: + +[10] But perhaps Count Beuckendorf was pro-German, too! + + + + +XVIII + + +The French war-party, represented by MM. Poincaré, Millerand and +Delcassé, came into political predominance in January, 1912, and +consolidated its ascendancy one year later, when M. Raymond Poincaré +became President of the French Republic. All through 1912 there was an +immense amount of correspondence and consultation between the French and +Russian Governments, and all through 1913 Russia showed extraordinary +activity in military preparation. In England, Mr. Asquith's Government +had to face a strong revulsion of popular feeling against the attitude +of its diplomacy, which had so nearly involved the country in war with +Germany at the time of the Agadir incident. + +As always, the figures of expenditure tell the story; and the history of +1912-14 should be continually illustrated by reference to the financial +statistics of the period, which have been given in earlier chapters. For +instance, Russia, which spent (in round numbers) £3¼ million on new +naval construction in 1911, spent £7 million in 1912, £12 million in +1913, and £13 million in 1914. The fact that, as Professor Raymond +Beazley puts it, in the ten years before the war, and with increasing +insistence, Paris and St. Petersburg spent upon armaments £159 million +more than Berlin or Vienna, ought to suffice at least to reopen the +question of responsibility. + +It must be carefully noted that by the spring of 1912, the Balkan +League, which was engineered by the Russian diplomat Hartwig, was fully +formed. This put the diplomacy of the Balkan States under the direct +control of the Russian Foreign Office. It now became necessary for the +Russian Foreign Office to ascertain, in case war between Serbia and +Austria broke out, and Germany should help Austria and Russia should +help Serbia, whether Russia could count on the support of France and +England. Russia received this assurance in secret, and the terms of it +were discovered by the Soviet Government in the archives of the Foreign +Office and published in 1919. This is a most important fact, and should +be continually borne in mind in connexion with the fact that the war was +precipitated by the murder of the Austrian Archduke by Serbian officers, +members of the pan-Slavist organization fostered and encouraged by MM. +Isvolsky and Hartwig. + +On 9 August, 1912, M. Poincaré, then Premier of France, made a visit to +St. Petersburg, where he was joined by his kindred spirit, M. Isvolsky, +who was then the Russian Ambassador at Paris. It was the usual visit of +State, and Russia staged an imposing series of military manoeuvres in +M. Poincaré's honour. But the really important events that took place +were these. First, a naval agreement was made between France and Russia, +whereby France agreed to concentrate her naval forces in the Eastern +Mediterranean in order to support the Russian navy in the Black Sea. +This agreement was secret, and revealed by the Soviet Government in +1918. Then, in the same month, the Third French Naval Squadron was +transferred from the Atlantic to the Mediterranean. M. Poincaré told M. +Isvolsky that "this decision has been made in agreement with England, +and forms the further development and completion of the arrangement +already made previously between the French and British +Staffs"--referring to the conference of Messrs. Asquith and Churchill +and Lord Kitchener at Malta, the month before, at which the new +disposition of the English and French fleets was decided. The third +matter of consequence that took place in the month of August was that +the Russian Government began to put pressure on the French Government to +re-establish the Three Years Military Service law. + +So much for August. In the month of September, M. Poincaré gave the +Russian Foreign Minister, M. Sazonov, assurance that if Germany helped +Austria in a struggle in the Balkans, and if Russia were drawn in on the +other side, France "would not hesitate for a moment to fulfil its +obligations towards Russia." In the same month, M. Isvolsky had an +interview with the King of England and Sir Edward Grey, the British +Foreign Minister, in which both King George and Sir E. Grey assured him +of the fullest British co-operation in the same event. M. Isvolsky +reported to the Russian Foreign Office at St. Petersburg, that "Grey, +upon his own initiative, corroborated what I already knew from +Poincaré--the existence of an agreement between France and Great +Britain, according to which England undertook, in case of a war with +Germany, not only to come to the assistance of France on the sea, but +also on the Continent, by landing troops." These two understandings +between MM. Poincaré and Sazonov, and between M. Isvolsky and Sir E. +Grey, were secret, and nothing was known of them until 1919, when the +memoranda of them were published by the Soviet Government.[11] + +A train of gunpowder, in other words, had been laid from Belgrade +through Paris and London to St. Petersburg; and at the beginning of that +train was the highly inflammable and inflammatory pan-Slavism, organized +by M. Hartwig with the connivance of M. Isvolsky. A spark struck in the +Balkans would cause the train to flash into flame throughout its entire +length. + +FOOTNOTE: + +[11] On 10 March of the following year, Mr. Asquith, replying to a +question in the Commons from Lord Hugh Cecil, denied that England was +under an "obligation arising owing to an assurance given by the Ministry +in the course of diplomatic negotiations, to send a very large armed +force out of this country to operate in Europe." On 24 March, he made +similar denials in reply to questions from Sir W. Byles and Mr. King. On +14 April, Mr. Runciman, in a speech at Birkenhead, denied "in the most +categorical way" the existence of a secret understanding with any +foreign Power! On 3 May, the Secretary for the Colonies, Mr. Harcourt, +declared publicly that he "could conceive no circumstances in which +Continental operations would not be a crime against the people of this +country." On 28 June, the under-Secretary for Foreign Affairs, Mr. +Acland, declared publicly that "in no European question were we +concerned to interfere with a big army." On 1 July, Lord Loreburn, Lord +Chancellor from 1906 to 1912, said "that any British Government would be +so guilty towards our country as to take up arms in a foreign quarrel is +more than I can believe." On 28 April, 1914, and again on 11 June, Sir +E. Grey confirmed, in the House of Commons, Mr. Asquith's assertion, +made 10 and 24 March, 1913, of British freedom from engagements with +Continental Powers. + +Yet, curiously the professions of politicians are still trusted, and +people still expect something from their machinations; they expected +something substantial from the recent conference in Washington, on the +limitation of armaments, for instance--a striking and pathetic example +of the strength of superstition. + + + + +XIX + + +On 25 April, 1912, the German Reichstag put through its first reading a +bill, with only perfunctory debate, for an increase in the German army +and navy. This measure has been regularly and officially interpreted as +a threat. Yet nearly a year after, on 19 February, 1913, Baron +Guillaume, writing from Paris about the prospects of the Three Years +Service bill, reports to the Belgian Foreign Office that the French +Minister of War "does not regard the measures taken by Germany as a +demonstration of hostility, but rather as an act of prudence for the +future. Germany fears that she may one day have to fight Russia and +France together, perhaps England too; and then any help that Austria +might give her would be seriously handicapped by the fact that the Dual +Monarchy [Austria-Hungary] would have to withstand a coalition of Balkan +States." + +Naturally. The bill was presented to the Reichstag in April, and the +"coalition of Balkan States," M. Hartwig's Balkan League, had already +completed its organization in February. Not only so, but the very first +step taken by this exemplary organization provided for a division of +spoils in the event of a successful war with Turkey; and six months +after the organization of the League was concluded, it served an +ultimatum upon Turkey over Albania, and in October went to war. The +German Government could quite plainly see the future about to be +inaugurated through this consolidation of Balkan policy into the hands +of the Russian Foreign Office--any one even an attentive reader of +newspapers, could see it--and it could see the vastly increased +responsibility of its Austrian ally, in case of a quarrel, should it +have to take on a coalition of the Balkan States instead of a single +one. + +Count de Lalaing reported from London, 24 February, 1918, that the +British Foreign Office took the same sensible view of the German +military increases as, according to Baron Guillaume, was taken by M. +Jonnart. "The English press," he says, "is of course anxious to saddle +Germany with the responsibility for the fresh tension caused by her +schemes--a tension which may give Europe fresh reasons for uneasiness." +But, he goes on-- + + + At the Foreign Office I found a more equitable and calmer estimate + of the situation. They see in the reinforcement of the German + armies not so much a provocation as an admission that circumstances + have weakened Germany's military position, and that it must be + strengthened. The Berlin Government is compelled to recognize that + it can no longer count upon being supported by the whole force of + its Austrian ally, now that a new Power, that of the Balkan + Federation, has made its appearance in South-eastern Europe, right + at the gates of the Dual Empire.... Under these circumstances, the + Foreign Office sees nothing astonishing in Germany's finding it + imperative to increase the number of her army corps. The Foreign + Office also states that the Berlin Government had told the Paris + Cabinet quite frankly that such were the motives for its action. + + +The same view was publicly expressed by Mr. Lloyd George himself as late +as 1 January, 1914, when he said: + + + The German army was vital, not merely to the existence of the + German Empire, but to the very life and independence of the nation + itself, surrounded, as Germany is, by other nations, each of which + possesses armies as powerful as her own. We forget that while we + insist upon a sixty-per-cent superiority (as far as our naval + strength is concerned) over Germany being essential to guarantee + the integrity of our own shores, Germany herself has nothing like + that superiority over France alone, and she has of course, in + addition, to reckon with Russia on her eastern frontier. Germany + has nothing which approximates to a two-Power standard. She has, + therefore, become alarmed by recent issues, and is spending huge + sums of money on the expansion of her military resources. + + +Those are the words, be it remembered, of the same person who says +to-day that German responsibility for the war which broke out six months +after he had made the foregoing statement, is a _chose jugée_! The +statement was made, furthermore, not only _after_ the German bill of 25 +April, 1912, but _after_ the bill of 8 April, 1913, as well, which fixed +the peace-strength of the German army at 870,000. + +The Three Years Service law passed the French Chamber in August, 1913, +after a passionate popular campaign. Of this measure Baron Guillaume +says that the French newspapers, _Le Temps_ in particular, "are wrong in +representing the French Government's plans as being in response to +measures adopted by Germany. Many of them are but the outcome of +measures which have long been prepared." The French Minister, M. +Jonnart, told him that "we know very well what an advantage our +neighbour [Germany] has in the continual growth of his population; +still, we must do all that lies in our power to compensate this +advantage by better military organization." Probably this view of the +Three Years Service law was the view held by all save the relatively +small and highly-integrated war-faction; and in so far as military +measures are ever reasonable, this, like the corresponding measures +taken in Germany, must be regarded as reasonable. As M. Pichon told +Baron Guillaume, "We are not arming for war, we are arming to avoid it, +to exorcise it.... We must go on arming more and more in order to +prevent war." There is no reason whatever to suppose that this view was +not sincerely entertained by M. Pichon and by many others, probably by a +majority of the persons most responsibly concerned. + +But the consequences of the Three Years Service law were contemplated by +Baron Guillaume with great apprehension. He reports on 12 June, 1913, +that "the burden of the new law will fall so heavily upon the +population, and the expenditure which it will involve will be so +exorbitant, that there will soon be an outcry in the country, and France +will be faced with this dilemma: either renounce what she can not bear +to forgo, or else, war at short notice." Of the militarist party now in +the ascendancy, he says: "They are followed with a sort of infatuation, +a kind of frenzy which is interesting but deplorable. One is not now +allowed, under pain of being marked as a traitor, to express even a +doubt of the need for the Three Years Service." + +Public opinion was evidently confiscated by the +Poincaré-Millerand-Delcassé group, much as it was in the United States +in 1917 by the war-party headed by Mr. Wilson. Baron Guillaume uses +words that must remind us of those days. "Every one knows," he says, +"that the mass of the nation is by no means in favour of the projected +reform, and they understand the danger that lies ahead. But they shut +their eyes and press on." + + + + +XX + + +The train of powder, however, had been laid by the diplomatic +engagements. Austria-Hungary and Serbia came into collision in the +spring of 1913 over the Scutari incident. In December, 1912, M. Sazonov +had urged Serbia to play a waiting game in order to "deliver a blow at +Austria." But on 4 April, 1913, Baron Beyens reports from Berlin that +the arrogance and contempt with which the Serbs receive the Vienna +Cabinet's protests over Scutari + + + can only be explained by their belief that St. Petersburg will + support them. The Serbian chargé d'affaires was quite openly saying + here lately that his Government would not have persisted in its + course for the last six months in the face of the Austrian + opposition had they not received encouragement in their course from + the Russian Minister, M. de Hartwig, who is a diplomatist of M. + Isvolsky's school.... M. Sazonov's heart is with his colleagues who + are directing the policy of the Great Powers, but he feels his + influence with the Tsar being undermined by the court-party and the + pan-Slavists. Hence his inconsequent behaviour. + + +The military activity which the Russian Government displayed in 1913 +gives interest to this estimate of M. Sazonov's position. No doubt to +some extent the estimate was correct; M. Sazonov, like Sir E. Grey, was +probably, when it was too late, much disquieted by the events which +marshalled him the way that he was going. In 1914, this military +activity gained extraordinary intensity. The Russian army was put upon a +peace-footing of approximately 1,400,000, "an effective numerical +strength hitherto unprecedented," said the St. Petersburg correspondent +of the London _Times_. From January to June, the Russian Government made +immense purchases of war material. In February, it concluded a loan in +Paris for the improvement of its strategic roads and railways on the +German frontier. Russia, as was generally known at the time, had her eye +on the acquisition of Constantinople; and in the same month, February, a +council of war was held in St. Petersburg to work out "a general +programme of action in order to secure for us a favourable solution of +the historical question of the Straits." In March, the St. Petersburg +newspaper which served as the mouthpiece of the Minister of War, +published an article stating that Russia's strategy would no longer be +"defensive" but "active." Another paper spoke of the time coming when +"the crossing of the Austrian frontier by the Russian army would be an +unavoidable decision." In the same month, Russia raised a heavy tariff +against the importation of German grain and flour; thus bearing out the +evidence of German trade-reports that even at this time Germany was +still exporting grain to Russia--a most extraordinary proceeding for a +nation which contemplated a sudden declaration of war before the next +harvest. In the same month, the Russian Government brought in military +estimates of £97 million. It exercised heavy pressure on the French +Government in the protracted political turmoil over the maintenance of +the Three Years Service law. In April, "trial mobilizations" were begun, +and were continued up to the outbreak of the war. In May, M. Sazonov +informed the Tsar that the British Government "has decided to empower +the British Admiralty Staff to enter into negotiations with French and +Russian naval agents in London for the purpose of drawing technical +conditions for possible action by the naval forces of England, Russia +and France." In the same month, a complete mobilization of all the +reserves of the three annual contingents of 1907-1909 was ordered for +the whole Russian Empire, as a "test," to take place in the autumn. In +the same month the Russian Admiralty instructed its agent in London, +Captain Volkov, as follows: + + + Our interests on the Northern scene of operations require that + England keeps as large a part of the German fleet as possible in + check in the North Sea.... The English Government could render us a + substantial service if it would agree to send a sufficient number + of boats to our Baltic ports to compensate for our lack of means of + transport, before the beginning of war-operations. + + +This document, revealed by the Soviet Government in 1919, is pretty +damaging to the assumption of an "unprepared and unsuspecting Europe"; +especially as Professor Conybeare has given publicity to the fact that +"before the beginning of war-operations" those English boats were there, +prompt to the minute, empty, ready and waiting. + +In June, the Russian Ambassador warned the Russian naval staff in London +that they must exercise great caution in talking about a landing in +Pomerania or about the dispatch of English boats to the Russian Baltic +ports before the outbreak of war, "so that the rest may not be +jeopardized." On 13 June, the newspaper-organ of the Russian Minister +of War published an inspired article under the caption: "Russia is +Ready: France must be Ready." + +Two weeks later, the Austrian heir-apparent, the Archduke Francis +Joseph, was murdered at Sarajevo, a town in Bosnia, by Serbian officers. +The murder was arranged by the Serbian Major Tankesitch, of the +pan-Slavist organization known as the Black Hand; and this organization +was fostered, if not actually subsidized, by the Russian Minister at +Belgrade, M. Hartwig, the pupil and _alter ego_ of M. Isvolsky, and the +architect and promoter of the Balkan League! + + + + + +End of Project Gutenberg's The Myth of a Guilty Nation, by Albert Jay Nock + +*** END OF THIS PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK THE MYTH OF A GUILTY NATION *** + +***** This file should be named 44508-8.txt or 44508-8.zip ***** +This and all associated files of various formats will be found in: + http://www.gutenberg.org/4/4/5/0/44508/ + +Produced by Martin Pettit and the Online Distributed +Proofreading Team at http://www.pgdp.net (This file was +produced from images generously made available by The +Internet Archive) + + +Updated editions will replace the previous one--the old editions +will be renamed. + +Creating the works from public domain print editions means that no +one owns a United States copyright in these works, so the Foundation +(and you!) can copy and distribute it in the United States without +permission and without paying copyright royalties. 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You may copy it, give it away or +re-use it under the terms of the Project Gutenberg License included +with this eBook or online at www.gutenberg.org/license + + +Title: The Myth of a Guilty Nation + +Author: Albert Jay Nock + +Release Date: December 25, 2013 [EBook #44508] + +Language: English + +Character set encoding: ISO-8859-1 + +*** START OF THIS PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK THE MYTH OF A GUILTY NATION *** + + + + +Produced by Martin Pettit and the Online Distributed +Proofreading Team at http://www.pgdp.net (This file was +produced from images generously made available by The +Internet Archive) + + + + + + +</pre> + + +<p><span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_1" id="Page_1">[Pg 1]</a></span></p> + +<h1>THE MYTH OF A GUILTY NATION</h1> + +<hr /> + +<div class="center"><a name="cover.jpg" id="cover.jpg"></a><img src="images/cover.jpg" alt="cover" /></div> + +<hr /> + +<p><span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_3" id="Page_3">[Pg 3]</a></span></p> + +<p class="bold2">THE MYTH OF A<br />GUILTY NATION</p> + +<p class="bold space-above">BY</p> + +<p class="bold">ALBERT JAY NOCK<br />("HISTORICUS")</p> + +<div class="center space-above"><img src="images/dec.jpg" alt="decoration" /></div> + +<p class="bold space-above"><span class="smcap">new york B.W. HUEBSCH, Inc. mcmxxii</span></p> + +<hr /> + +<p><span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_4" id="Page_4">[Pg 4]</a></span></p> + +<p class="center">COPYRIGHT, 1922, BY<br /><span class="smcap">THE FREEMAN, Inc.</span><br /> +COPYRIGHT, 1922, BY<br /><span class="smcap">B. W. HUEBSCH, Inc.</span></p> + +<hr class="smler" /> + +<p class="center">PRINTED IN U. S. A.</p> + +<hr /> + +<p><span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_5" id="Page_5">[Pg 5]</a></span></p> + +<h2>PREFACE</h2> + +<p>This book is made up of a series of articles originally published in the +<i>Freeman</i>. It was compiled to establish one point and only one, namely: +that the German Government was not solely guilty of bringing on the war. +I have not been at all concerned with measuring the German Government's +share of guilt, with trying to show that it was either great or small, +or that it was either less or more than that of any other Government or +association of Governments. All this is beside the point. I do not by +any means wish to escape the responsibility of saying that I think the +German Government's share of guilt in the matter is extremely small; so +small by comparison with that of the major Powers allied against +Germany, as to be inconsiderable. That is my belief, demonstrable as I +think by such evidence as has now become available to any candid person. +But this has nothing whatever to do with the subject-matter of this +volume. If the guilt of the German Government could be<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_6" id="Page_6">[Pg 6]</a></span> proved to be ten +times greater than it was represented to be by the publicity-bureaux of +the Allied Powers, the conclusion established in the following chapters +would still remain. Guilty as the German Government may have been; +multiply by ten any estimate that any person, interested or +disinterested, informed or uninformed, may put upon its guilt; the fact +remains that it was far, very far indeed, from being the only guilty +party concerned.</p> + +<p>If there were no practical end to be gained by establishing this +conclusion, if one's purpose were only to give the German Government the +dubious vindication of a <i>tu quoque</i>, the effort would be hardly worth +making. But as I say at the outset, there is at stake an extremely +important matter, one that will unfavourably affect the peace of the +world for at least a generation—the treaty of Versailles. If the German +Government may not be assumed to be solely responsible for the war, this +treaty is indefensible; for it is constructed wholly upon that +assumption. It becomes, not a treaty, but a verdict pronounced after the +manner of Brennus, by a superior power which, without regard to justice, +arrogates to itself the functions of prosecutor, jury and judge.</p> + +<p><span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_7" id="Page_7">[Pg 7]</a></span></p><p>It is probably superfluous to point out that this treaty, conceived in +the pure spirit of the victorious Apache, has, in practice, utterly +broken down. It has not worked and it will not work, because it sets at +defiance certain economic laws which are as inexorable as the law of +gravitation. The incidence of these laws was well understood and clearly +foretold, at the time of the peace-conference, by an informed minority +in Europe, notably by Mr. Maynard Keynes in his volume entitled "The +Economic Consequences of the Peace." In this country also, a minority, +sufficiently informed to know its right hand from its left in economic +affairs, stood aghast in contemplation of the ruinous consequences which +it perceived as inevitable under any serious attempt to put this vicious +instrument into operation. But both here and in Europe, this minority +was very small and uninfluential, and could accomplish nothing against +the ignorant and unreasoning bad temper which the politicians kept aflame.</p> + +<p>The treaty had therefore to go to the test of experiment; and of the +results of this, one need surely say nothing, for they are obvious. The +harder Germany tried to fulfill the conditions of the treaty, and the +nearer she came to doing so, the worse things went in all the countries +that<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_8" id="Page_8">[Pg 8]</a></span> were presumably to benefit by her sacrifice. The Central Empires +are, as the informed minority in all countries has been from the +beginning anxiously aware, the key-group in the whole of European +industry and commerce. If they must work and trade under unfavourable +conditions, they also thereby automatically impose correspondingly +unfavourable conditions upon the whole of Europe; and, correspondingly +unfavourable conditions are thereby in turn automatically set up +wherever the trade of Europe reaches—for example, in the United States. +There is now no possible doubt about this, for one has but to glance at +the enormous dislocations of international commerce, and the universal +and profound stagnation of industry, in order to prove it to one's +complete satisfaction. Germany wisely and far-sightedly made a sincere +and vigourous effort to comply with the conditions of the treaty; and by +so doing she has carried the rest of the world to the verge of economic +collapse. The damage wrought by the war was in general of a spectacular +and impressive type, and was indeed very great—no one would minimize +it—but the damage, present and prospective, wrought by the treaty of +peace is much greater and more far-reaching.</p> + +<p><span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_9" id="Page_9">[Pg 9]</a></span></p><p>The political inheritors of those who made the peace are now extremely +uneasy about it. Their predecessors (including Mr. Lloyd George, who +still remains in office) had flogged up popular hatred against the +Central Empires at such a rate that when they took office they still +had, or thought they had, to court and indulge this hatred. Thus we +found Mr. Secretary Hughes, for example, in his first communication to +the German Government, laying it down that the basis of the Versailles +treaty was sound—that Germany was solely responsible for the war. He +spoke of it quite in the vein of Mr. Lloyd George, as a <i>chose jugée</i>. +After having promulgated the treaty with such immense ceremony, and +raised such preposterous and extravagant popular expectations on the +strength of it, the architects of the treaty bequeathed an exceedingly +difficult task to their successors; the task of letting the public down, +diverting their attention with this or that gesture, taking their mind +off their disappointments and scaling down their expectations, so that +in time it might be safe to let the Versailles treaty begin to sink out +of sight.</p> + +<p>The task is being undertaken; the curious piece of mountebankery +recently staged in Washington, for example, was an ambitious effort to +keep the<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_10" id="Page_10">[Pg 10]</a></span> peoples, particularly those of Europe, hopeful, confiding and +diverted; and if economic conditions permit, if times do not become too +hard, it may succeed. The politicians can not say outright that the +theory of the Versailles treaty is dishonest and outrageous, and that +the only chance of peace and well-being is by tearing up the treaty and +starting anew on another basis entirely. They can not say this on +account of the exigencies of their detestable trade. The best that they +can do is what they are doing. They must wait until the state of public +feeling permits them to ease down from their uncompromising stand upon +the treaty. Gradually, they expect, the public will accustom itself to +the idea of relaxations and accommodations, as it sees, from day to day, +the patent impracticability of any other course; feelings will weaken, +asperities soften, hatreds die out, contacts and approaches of one kind +or another will take place; and finally, these public men or their +political inheritors will think themselves able to effect in an +unobtrusive way, such substantial modifications of the treaty of +Versailles as will amount to its annulment.</p> + +<p>The process is worth accelerating by every means possible; and what I +have here done is meant to assist it. There are many persons in the<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_11" id="Page_11">[Pg 11]</a></span> +country who are not politicians, and who are capable and desirous of +approaching a matter of this kind with intellectual honesty. Quite +possibly they are not aware, many of them, that the Versailles treaty +postulates the sole responsibility of the German Government for bringing +on the war; undoubtedly they are not acquainted with such evidence as I +have here compiled to show that this assumption is unjust and erroneous. +Having read this evidence, they will be in a position to review the +terms of the Versailles treaty and reassess the justice of those terms. +They will also be able to understand the unwillingness, the inability, +of the German people to acquiesce in those terms; and they can +comprehend the slowness and difficulty wherewith peace and good feeling +are being re-established in Europe, and the extreme precariousness and +uncertainty of Europe's situation—and our own, in +consequence—throughout a future that seems longer than one cares to +contemplate.</p> + +<p>The reader will perceive at once that this book is a mere compilation +and transcription of fact, containing not a shred of opinion or of any +original matter. On this account it was published anonymously in its +serial form, because it seemed to me that such work should be judged +strictly<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_12" id="Page_12">[Pg 12]</a></span> as it stands, without regard to the authority, or lack of +authority, which the compiler might happen to possess. Almost all of it +is lifted straight from the works of my friends Mr. Francis Neilson and +Mr. E. D. Morel. I earnestly hope—indeed, it is my chief motive in +publishing this book—that it may serve as an introduction to these +words. I can not place too high an estimate upon their importance to a +student of British and Continental diplomacy. They are, as far as I +know, alone in their field; nothing else can take their place. They are +so thorough, so exhaustive and so authoritative that I wonder at their +being so little known in the United States. Mr. Morel's works,<a name="FNanchor_1_1" id="FNanchor_1_1"></a><a href="#Footnote_1_1" class="fnanchor">[1]</a> "Ten +Years of Secret Diplomacy," "Truth and the War," and "Diplomacy +Revealed," are simply indispensable. Mr. Neilson's book "How Diplomats +Make War,"<a name="FNanchor_2_2" id="FNanchor_2_2"></a><a href="#Footnote_2_2" class="fnanchor">[2]</a> is not an easy book to read; no more are Mr. Morel's; but +without having read it no serious student can possibly do justice to the subject.</p> + +<p class="right"><span class="smcap">Albert Jay Nock</span></p> + +<div class="footnotes"><h3>FOOTNOTES:</h3> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_1_1" id="Footnote_1_1"></a><a href="#FNanchor_1_1"><span class="label">[1]</span></a> "Ten Years of Secret Diplomacy." $1.25. "Truth and the +War." $1.25. E. D. Morel. New York: B. W. Huebsch. +</p><p> +"Diplomacy Revealed." E. D. Morel. London, 8 & 9 Johnson's Court: +National Labour Press.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_2_2" id="Footnote_2_2"></a><a href="#FNanchor_2_2"><span class="label">[2]</span></a> "How Diplomats Make War." Francis Neilson. New York: B. W. +Huebsch. $2.00</p></div></div> + +<hr /> + +<p><span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_13" id="Page_13">[Pg 13]</a></span></p> + +<p class="bold2">THE MYTH OF<br />A GUILTY NATION</p> + +<h2>I</h2> + +<p>The present course of events in Europe is impressing on us once more the +truth that military victory, if it is to stand, must also be +demonstrably a victory for justice. In the long run, victory must appeal +to the sense of justice in the conquered no less than in the conquerors, +if it is to be effective. There is no way of getting around this. Mr. +Gilbert K. Chesterton is right when he says that if the South had not +finally accepted the outcome of the Civil War as being on the whole +just, Lincoln would have been wrong in trying to preserve the Union; +which is only another way of expressing Lincoln's own homely saying that +nothing is ever really settled until it is settled right. The present +condition of Europe is largely due to the fact that the official +peacemakers have not taken into their reckoning the<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_14" id="Page_14">[Pg 14]</a></span> German people's +sense of justice. Their mistake—it was also Mr. Wilson's great +mistake—was in their disregard of what Bismarck called the +imponderabilia. The terms of the peace treaty plainly reflect this +mistake. That is largely the reason why the treaty is to-day inoperative +and worthless. That is largely why the Governments of Europe are +confronted with the inescapable alternative: they can either tear up the +treaty and replace it by an understanding based on justice, or they can +stick to the treaty and by so doing protract indefinitely the dismal +succession of wars, revolutions, bankruptcies and commercial +dislocations that the treaty inaugurated.</p> + +<p>That is the situation; and it is a situation in which the people of the +United States have an interest to preserve—the primary interest of a +creditor, and also the interest of a trader who needs a large and stable +market. It is idle to suppose that American business can prosper so long +as Europe remains in a condition of instability and insolvency. Our +business is adjusted to the scale of a solvent Europe, and it can not be +readjusted without irreparable damage. Until certain matters connected +with the war are resolutely put under review, Europe can not be<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_15" id="Page_15">[Pg 15]</a></span> +reconstructed, and the United States can not be prosperous. The only +thing that can better our own situation is the resumption of normal +economic life in Europe; and this can be done only through a thorough +reconsideration of the injustices that have been put upon the German +people by the conditions of the armistice and the peace treaty.</p> + +<p>Of these injustices, the greatest, because it is the foundation for all +the rest, is the imputation of Germany's sole responsibility for the +war. The German people will never endure that imputation; they should +never be expected to endure it. Nothing can really be settled until the +question of responsibility is openly and candidly re-examined, and an +understanding established that is based on facts instead of on official +misrepresentation. This question is by no means one of abstract justice +alone, or of chivalry and fair play towards a defeated enemy. It is a +question of self-interest, immediate and urgent. However it may be +regarded by the American sense of justice and fair play, it remains, to +the eye of American industry and commerce, a straight question of +dollars and cents. The prosperity of the United States, as we are +beginning to see, hangs upon the economic <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_16" id="Page_16">[Pg 16]</a></span>re-establishment of Europe. +Europe can not possibly be settled upon the present terms of peace; and +these terms can not be changed without first vacating the theory of +Germany's sole responsibility, because it is upon this theory that the +treaty of Versailles was built. This theory, therefore, must be +re-examined in the light of evidence that the Allied and Associated +Governments have done their best either to ignore or to suppress. Hence, +for the American people, the way to prosperity lies through a searching +and honest examination of this theory that has been so deeply implanted +in their mind—the theory of a brigand-nation, plotting in solitude to +achieve the mastery of the world by fire and sword.</p> + +<p>Americans, however, come reluctantly to the task of this examination, +for two reasons. First, we are all tired of the war, we hate to think of +it or of anything connected with it, and as far as possible, we keep it +out of our minds. Second, nearly every reputation of any consequence in +this country, political, clerical, academic and journalistic, is already +committed, head over ears, to the validity of this theory. How many of +our politicians are there whose reputations are not bound up +inextricably with this legend of a German plot? How many of our +newspaper-editors<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_17" id="Page_17">[Pg 17]</a></span> managed to preserve detachment enough under the +pressure of war-propaganda to be able to come forward to-day and say +that the question of responsibility for the war should be re-opened? How +can the pro-war liberals and ex-pacifists ask for such an inquest when +they were all swept off their feet by the specious plea that <i>this</i> war +was a different war from all other wars in the history of mankind? What +can our ministers of religion say after the unreserved endorsement that +they put upon the sanctity of the Allied cause? What can our educators +say, after having served so zealously the ends of the official +propagandists? From our journalists and men of letters what can we +expect—after all his rodomontade about Potsdam and the Potsdam gang, +how could we expect Dr. Henry Van Dyke, for instance, to face the fact +that the portentous Potsdam meeting of the Crown Council on 5 July, +1914, <i>never took place at all</i>? There is no use in trying to put a +breaking-strain upon human nature, or, on the other hand, in assuming a +pharisaic attitude towards its simplest and commonest frailties. It is +best, under the circumstances, merely to understand that on this +question every institutional voice in the United States is tongue-tied. +Press, pulpit, schools and universities, charities and<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_18" id="Page_18">[Pg 18]</a></span> foundations, +forums, all are silent; and to expect them to break their silence is to +expect more than should be expected from the pride of opinion in average +human nature.</p> + +<hr /> + +<p><span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_19" id="Page_19">[Pg 19]</a></span></p> + +<h2>II</h2> + +<p>In examining the evidence let us first take Mr. Lloyd George's own +statement of the theory. Except in one particular, it presents the case +against Germany quite as it has been rehearsed by nearly every +institutional voice in the United States. On 4 August, 1917—after +America's entry into the war—the British Premier said:</p> + +<blockquote><p>What are we fighting for? To defeat the most dangerous conspiracy +ever plotted against the liberty of nations; carefully, skilfully, +insidiously, clandestinely planned in every detail, with ruthless, +cynical determination.</p></blockquote> + +<p>Except for one point, this statement sums up what we have all heard to +be the essential doctrine of the war. The one missing point in Mr. Lloyd +George's indictment is that the great German conspiracy was launched +upon an <i>unprepared</i> Europe. In Europe itself, the official +propagandists did not make much of this particular point, for far too +many people knew better; but in the<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_20" id="Page_20">[Pg 20]</a></span> United States it was promulgated +widely. Indeed, this romance of Allied unpreparedness was an essential +part of the whole story of German responsibility. Germany, so the +official story ran, not only plotted in secret, but she sprung her plot +upon a Europe that was wholly unprepared and unsuspecting. Her action +was like that of a highwayman leaping from ambush upon a defenceless +wayfarer. Belgium was unprepared, France unprepared, Russia unprepared, +England unprepared; and in face of an unprovoked attack, these nations +hurriedly drew together in an extemporized union, and held the "mad dog" +at bay with an extemporized defence until they could devise a plan of +common action and a pooling of military and naval resources.</p> + +<p>Such, then, is a fair statement of the doctrine of the war as America +was taught it. Next, in order to show how fundamental this doctrine is +to the terms of the peace treaty, let us consider another statement of +Mr. Lloyd George made 3 March, 1921:</p> + +<blockquote><p>For the allies, German responsibility for the war is fundamental. +It is the basis upon which the structure of the treaty of +Versailles has been erected, and if that acknowledgment is +repudiated or abandoned, the treaty<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_21" id="Page_21">[Pg 21]</a></span> is destroyed.... We wish, +therefore, once and for all, to make it quite clear that German +responsibility for the war must be treated by the Allies as a +<i>chose jugée</i>.</p></blockquote> + +<p>Thus the British Premier explicitly declares that the treaty of +Versailles is based upon the theory of Germany's sole responsibility.</p> + +<p>Now, as against this theory, the main facts may be summarized as +follows: (1) The British and French General Staffs had been in active +collaboration for war with Germany ever since January 1906. (2) The +British and French Admiralty had been in similar collaboration. (3) The +late Lord Fisher [First Sea Lord of the British Admiralty], twice in the +course of these preparations, proposed an attack upon the German fleet +and a landing upon the coast of Pomerania, <i>without a declaration of +war</i>. (4) Russia had been preparing for war ever since 1909, and the +Russian and French General Staffs had come to a formal understanding +that Russian mobilization should be held equivalent to a declaration of +war. (5) Russian mobilization was begun in the spring of 1914, under the +guise of "tests," and these tests were carried on continuously to the +outbreak of the war. (6) In April, 1914, four months before the war, +the<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_22" id="Page_22">[Pg 22]</a></span> Russian and French naval authorities initiated joint plans for +maritime operations against Germany. (7) Up to the outbreak of the war, +Germany was selling grain in considerable quantities to both France and +Russia. (8) It can not be shown that the German Government ever in a +single instance, throughout all its dealings with foreign Governments, +demanded or intimated for Germany anything more than a position of +economic equality with other nations.</p> + +<p>These facts, among others to which reference will hereafter be made, +have come to light only since the outbreak of the war. They effectively +dispose of the theory of an unprepared and unsuspecting Europe; and a +historical survey of them excludes absolutely, and stamps as utterly +untenable and preposterous, the theory of a deliberate German plot +against the peace of the world.</p> + +<hr /> + +<p><span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_23" id="Page_23">[Pg 23]</a></span></p> + +<h2>III</h2> + +<p>Let us now consider the idea so generally held in America, though not in +Europe, that in 1914, England and the Continental nations were not +expecting war and not prepared for war. The fact is that Europe was as +thoroughly organized for war as it could possibly be. The point to which +that organization was carried by England, France and Russia, as compared +with Germany and Austria, may to some extent be indicated by statistics. +In 1913, Russia carried a military establishment (on a peace footing) of +1,284,000 men; France, by an addition of 183,000 men, proposed to raise +her peace-establishment to a total of 741,572. Germany, by an addition +of 174,373 men, proposed to raise her total to 821,964; and Austria, by +additions of 58,505 already made, brought her total up to 473,643. These +are the figures of the British War Office, as furnished to the House of +Commons in 1913.</p> + +<p>Here is a set of figures that is even more interesting and significant. +From 1909 to 1914, the<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_24" id="Page_24">[Pg 24]</a></span> amount spent on new naval construction by +England, France and Russia, as compared with Germany, was as follows:</p> + +<table summary="amount spent on new naval construction"> + <tr> + <td></td> + <td class="center"><span class="smcap">England</span></td> + <td class="center"><span class="smcap">France</span></td> + <td class="center"><span class="smcap">Russia</span></td> + <td class="center"><span class="smcap">Germany</span></td> + </tr> + <tr> + <td>1909</td> + <td>£11,076,551</td> + <td>£ 4,517,766</td> + <td>£ 1,758,487</td> + <td>£10,177,062</td> + </tr> + <tr> + <td>1910</td> + <td>£14,755,289</td> + <td>£ 4,977,682</td> + <td>£ 1,424,013</td> + <td>£11,392,856</td> + </tr> + <tr> + <td>1911</td> + <td>£15,148,171</td> + <td>£ 5,876,659</td> + <td>£ 3,216,396</td> + <td>£11,710,859</td> + </tr> + <tr> + <td>1912</td> + <td>£16,132,558</td> + <td>£ 7,114,876</td> + <td>£ 6,897,580</td> + <td>£11,491,187</td> + </tr> + <tr> + <td>1913</td> + <td>£16,883,875</td> + <td>£ 8,893,064</td> + <td>£12,082,516</td> + <td>£11,010,883</td> + </tr> + <tr> + <td>1914</td> + <td>£18,676,080</td> + <td>£11,772,862</td> + <td>£13,098,613</td> + <td>£10,316,264</td> + </tr> +</table> + +<p>These figures can not be too carefully studied by those who have been +led to think that Germany pounced upon a defenceless and unsuspecting +Europe like a cat upon a mouse. If it be thought worth while to consider +also the period of a few years preceding 1909, one finds that England's +superiority in battleships alone was 112 per cent in 1901, and her +superiority rose to nearly 200 per cent in 1904; in which year England +spent £42,431,000 on her navy, and Germany £11,659,000. Taking the +comparative statistics of naval expenditure from 1900, in which year +England spent £32,055,000 on her navy, and Germany spent £7,472,000, +down to 1914 it is absolutely impossible to make the figures show that +Germany enforced upon the other nations of Europe an unwilling +competition in naval armament.</p> + +<p><span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_25" id="Page_25">[Pg 25]</a></span></p><p>But the German army! According to all accounts of German militarism +which were suffered to reach these shores, it is here that we shall find +evidence of what Mr. Lloyd George, on 4 August, 1917, called "the most +dangerous conspiracy ever plotted against the liberty of nations; +carefully, skilfully, insidiously, clandestinely planned in every +detail, with ruthless, cynical determination." Well, if one chooses to +hold the current view of German militarism, it must be admitted that +Germany had at her disposal some miraculous means of getting something +for nothing, getting a great deal for nothing, in fact, for on any other +supposition, the figures are far from supporting that view. In 1914 +(pre-war figures), Germany and Austria together carried an +army-expenditure of £92 million; England, France and Russia together +carried one of £142 million. England "had no army," it was said; all her +military strength lay in her navy. If that were true, then it must be +said that she had as miraculous a faculty as Germany's; only, whereas +Germany's was a faculty for getting more than her money's worth, +England's was for getting less than her money's worth. England's +army-expenditure for 1914 (pre-war figures) was £28 million; £4 million +more than Austria's. Nor<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_26" id="Page_26">[Pg 26]</a></span> was this a sudden emergency-outlay. Going back +as far as 1905, we find that she laid out in that year the same amount, +£28 million. In that year, Germany and Austria together spent £48 +million on their armies; England, France and Russia together spent £94 +million on theirs. If between 1905 and 1913, England, France and Russia +spent any such sums upon their armies as their statistics show, and +nothing came of it but an unprepared and unsuspecting Europe in 1914, it +seems clear that the taxpayers of those countries were swindled on an +inconceivably large scale.</p> + +<hr /> + +<p><span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_27" id="Page_27">[Pg 27]</a></span></p> + +<h2>IV</h2> + +<p>At this point, some questions may be raised. Why, in the decade +preceding 1914, did England, France and Russia arm themselves at the +rate indicated by the foregoing figures? Why did they accelerate their +naval development progressively from about £17 million in 1909 to about +£43 million in 1914? Why did Russia alone propose to raise her military +peace-establishment to an army of 1,700,000, more than double the size +of Germany's army? Against whom were these preparations directed, and +understood to be directed? Certainly not against one another. France and +Russia had been bound by a military convention ever since 17 August, +1892; England and France had been bound since January, 1906, by a +similar pact; and this was subsequently extended to include Belgium. +These agreements will be considered in detail hereafter; they are now +mentioned merely to show that the military activity in these countries +was not independent in purpose. France, England, Russia and Belgium<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_28" id="Page_28">[Pg 28]</a></span> +were not uneasy about one another and not arming against one another; +nor is there any evidence that anyone thought that they were. It was +against the Central Empires only that these preparations were addressed. +Nor can one who scans the table of relative expenditure easily believe +that the English-French-Russian combination was effected for purely +defensive purposes; and taking the diplomatic history of the period in +conjunction with the testimony of the budgets, such belief becomes impossible.</p> + +<hr /> + +<p><span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_29" id="Page_29">[Pg 29]</a></span></p> + +<h2>V</h2> + +<p>The British Government is the one which was most often represented to us +as taken utterly by surprise by the German onslaught on Belgium. Let us +see. The Austrian Archduke was assassinated 28 June, 1914, by three men +who, according to wide report in Europe and absolute certainty in +America, were secret agents of the German Government, acting under +German official instruction. The findings of the court of inquiry showed +that they were Serbs, members of a pan-Slav organization; that the +assassination was plotted in Belgrade, and the weapons with which it was +committed were obtained there.<a name="FNanchor_3_3" id="FNanchor_3_3"></a><a href="#Footnote_3_3" class="fnanchor">[3]</a> Serbia denied all connexion with the +assassins (the policy of Serbia being then controlled by the Russian +Foreign Office), and then the Russian<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_30" id="Page_30">[Pg 30]</a></span> Government stepped forward to +prevent the humiliation of Serbia by Austria. It is clear from the +published diplomatic documents that the British Foreign Office knew +everything that took place between the assassination and the burial of +the Archduke; all the facts, that is, connected with the murder. The +first dispatch in the British White Paper is dated 20 July, and it is +addressed to the British Ambassador at Berlin. One wonders why not to +the Ambassador at Vienna; also one wonders why the diplomats apparently +found nothing to write about for nearly three weeks between the +Archduke's funeral and 20 July. It is a strange silence. Sir Edward +Grey, however, made a statement in the House of Commons, 27 July, in +which he gave the impression that he got his first information about the +course of the quarrel between Austria and Serbia no earlier than 24 +July, three days before. The Ambassador at Vienna, Sir M. de Bunsen, +had, notwithstanding, telegraphed him that the Austrian Premier had +given him no hint of "the impending storm" and that it was from a +private source "that I received, 15 July, the forecast of what was about +to happen, concerning which I <i>telegraphed to you the following day</i>." +Sir Maurice de Bunsen's telegram on this important<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_31" id="Page_31">[Pg 31]</a></span> subject thus +evidently was suppressed; and the only obvious reason for the +suppression is that it carried evidence that Sir E. Grey was thoroughly +well posted by 16 July on what was taking place in Vienna. Sir M. de +Bunsen's allusion to this telegram confirms this assumption; in fact, it +can be interpreted in no other way.</p> + +<p>On 28 July, the House of Commons was informed that Austria had declared +war on Serbia. Two days later, 30 July, Sir E. Grey added the item of +information that Russia had ordered a partial mobilization "which has +not hitherto led to any corresponding steps by other Powers, so far as +our information goes." Sir E. Grey did not add, however, that he knew +quite well what "corresponding steps" other Powers were likely to take. +He knew the terms of the Russian-French military convention, under which +a mobilization by Russia was to be held equivalent to a declaration of +war; he also knew the terms of the English-French agreement which he +himself had authorized—although up to the eve of the war he denied, in +reply to questions in the House of Commons, that any such agreement +existed, and acknowledged it only on 3 August, 1914.<a name="FNanchor_4_4" id="FNanchor_4_4"></a><a href="#Footnote_4_4" class="fnanchor">[4]</a> He<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_32" id="Page_32">[Pg 32]</a></span> had promised +Sazonov, the Russian Foreign Minister, in 1912, that in the event of +Germany's coming to Austria's aid, Russia could rely on Great Britain to +"stake everything in order to inflict the most serious blow to German +power." To say that Sir E. Grey, and <i>à fortiori</i> Mr. Asquith, the Prime +Minister; Lord Haldane, the Minister for War, whose own book has been a +most tremendous let-down to the fictions of the propagandists; Mr. +Winston Churchill, head of the Admiralty, who at Dundee, 5 June, 1915, +declared that he had been sent to the Admiralty in 1911 with the express +duty laid upon him by the Prime Minister to put the fleet in a state of +instant and constant readiness for war; to say that these men were taken +by surprise and unprepared, is mere levity.</p> + +<p>Austria was supposed to be, and still is by some believed to have been, +Germany's vassal State, and by menacing Serbia to have been doing +Germany's dirty work. No evidence of this has been adduced; and the +trouble with this idea of Austria's status is that it breaks down before +the report of Sir M. de Bunsen, 1 September, 1914, that Austria finally +yielded and agreed to accept all the proposals of the Powers for +mediation <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_33" id="Page_33">[Pg 33]</a></span>between herself and Serbia. She made every concession. +Russian mobilization, however, had begun on 25 July and become general +four days later; and it was not stopped. Germany then gave notice that +she would mobilize her army if Russian mobilization was not stopped in +twelve hours; and also, knowing the terms of the Russian-French +convention of 1892, she served notice on France, giving her eighteen +hours to declare her position. Russia made no reply; France answered +that she would do what she thought best in her own interest; and almost +at the moment, on 1 August, when Germany ordered a general mobilization, +Russian troops were over her border, the British fleet had been +mobilized for a week in the North Sea, and British merchant ships were +lying at Kronstadt, empty, to convey Russian troops from that port to +the Pomeranian coast, in pursuance of the plan indicated by Lord Fisher +in his autobiography, recently published.</p> + +<p>These matters are well summed up by Lord Loreburn, as follows:</p> + +<blockquote><p>Serbia gave offence to the Austro-Hungarian Empire, cause of just +offence, as our Ambassador frankly admits in his published +dispatches. We [England] had no<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_34" id="Page_34">[Pg 34]</a></span> concern in that quarrel, as Sir +Edward Grey says in terms. But Russia, the protectress of Serbia, +came forward to prevent her being utterly humiliated by Austria. We +were not concerned in that quarrel either, as Sir Edward also says. +And then Russia called upon France under their treaty to help in +the fight. France was not concerned in that quarrel any more than +ourselves, as Sir Edward informs us. But France was bound by a +Russian treaty, of which he did not know the terms, and then France +called on us for help. We were tied by the relations which our +Foreign Office had created, without apparently realizing that they +had created them.</p></blockquote> + +<p>In saying that Sir E. Grey did not know the terms of the Franco-Russian +agreement, Lord Loreburn is generous, probably more generous than he +should be; but that is no matter. The thing to be remarked is that Lord +Loreburn's summing-up comes to something wholly different from Mr. Lloyd +George's "most dangerous conspiracy ever plotted against the liberty of +nations." It comes to something wholly different from the notion +implanted in Americans, of Germany pouncing upon a peaceful, unprepared +and unsuspecting Europe. The German nation, we may be sure, is keenly +aware of this difference; and therefore, any peace which, like the peace +of Versailles, is bottomed on the <i>chose jugée</i> of <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_35" id="Page_35">[Pg 35]</a></span>laying the sole +responsibility for the war at the door of the German nation, or even at +the door of the German Government, is simply impracticable and +impossible.</p> + +<div class="footnotes"><h3>FOOTNOTES:</h3> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_3_3" id="Footnote_3_3"></a><a href="#FNanchor_3_3"><span class="label">[3]</span></a> Six months after the armistice, the bodies of the three +assassins were dug up, according to a Central News dispatch from Prague, +"with great solemnity, in the presence of thousands of the inhabitants. +The remains of <i>these Serbian officers</i> are to be sent to their native +country." This is a naïve statement. It remains to be explained why +these "German agents" should be honoured in this distinguished way by +the Serbs!</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_4_4" id="Footnote_4_4"></a><a href="#FNanchor_4_4"><span class="label">[4]</span></a> See footnote to <a href="#Footnote_11_11">chapter XVIII.</a></p></div> +</div> + +<hr /> + +<p><span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_36" id="Page_36">[Pg 36]</a></span></p> + +<h2>VI</h2> + +<p>If the theory upon which the treaty of Versailles is based, the theory +of a single guilty nation, were true, there would be no trouble about +saying what the war was fought for. The Allied belligerents would have a +simple, straight story to tell; they could describe their aims and +intentions clearly in a few words that any one could understand, and +their story would be reasonably consistent and not vary greatly from +year to year. It would be practically the same story in 1918 as in 1915 +or at any time between. In America, indeed, the story did not greatly +vary up to the spring of 1917, for the reason that this country was +pretty much in the dark about European international relations. Once our +indignation and sympathies were aroused, it was for the propagandists +mostly a matter of keeping them as hot as possible. Few had the +information necessary to discount the plain, easy, understandable story +of a robber nation leaping upon an unprepared and defenceless Europe for +no cause whatever<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_37" id="Page_37">[Pg 37]</a></span> except the lofty ambition, as Mr. Joseph Choate said, +"to establish a world-empire upon the ruins of the British Empire." +Those who had this information could not make themselves heard; and thus +it was that the propagandists had no need to vary the one story that was +most useful to their purpose of keeping us in a state of unreasoning +indignation, and accordingly they did not vary it.</p> + +<p>In Europe and in England, however, the case was different. International +relations were better understood by those who were closer to them than +we were; more questions were raised and more demands made. Hence the +Allied politicians and propagandists were kept busy upon the defensive. +When from time to time the voice of popular discontent or of some +influential body of opinion insisted on a statement of the causes of the +war or of the war-aims of the Allies, they were confronted with the +politician's traditional difficulty. They had to say something plausible +and satisfactory, which yet must be something that effectively hid the +truth of the situation. As the war hung on, their difficulty became +desperate and they threw consistency to the winds, telling any sort of +story that would enable them for the moment to "get by." The publication +of the secret treaties which had been seined out<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_38" id="Page_38">[Pg 38]</a></span> of the quagmire of the +old Russian Foreign Office by the revolutionists made no end of trouble +for them. It is amusing now to remember how promptly these treaties were +branded by the British Foreign Office as forgeries; especially when it +turned out that the actual terms of the armistice—not the nominal +terms, which were those of Mr. Wilson's Fourteen Points, but the actual +terms—were the terms of the secret treaties! The publication of the +secret treaties in this country did not contribute much towards a +disillusionment of the public; the press as a rule ignored or lied about +them, they were not widely read, and few who did read them had enough +understanding of European affairs to interpret them. But abroad they put +a good deal of fat into the fire; and this was a specimen of the kind of +thing that the Allied politicians had to contend with in their efforts +to keep their peoples in line.</p> + +<p>The consequence was that the official and semi-official statements of +the causes of the war and of the war-aims of the Allies are a most +curious hotchpotch. In fact, if any one takes stock in the theory of the +one guilty nation and is therefore convinced that the treaty of +Versailles is just and proper and likely to enforce an <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_39" id="Page_39">[Pg 39]</a></span>enduring peace, +one could suggest nothing better than that he should go through the +literature of the war, pick out these statements, put them in parallel +columns, and see how they look. If the war originated in the unwarranted +conspiracy of a robber nation, if the aims of the Allies were to defeat +that conspiracy and render it impotent and to chastise and tie the hands +of the robber nation—and that is the theory of the treaty of +Versailles—can anyone in his right mind suppose that the Allied +politicians and propagandists would ever give out, or need to give out, +these ludicrously contradictory and inconsistent explanations and +statements? When one has a simple, straight story to tell, and a most +effective story, why complicate it and undermine it and throw all sorts +of doubts upon it, by venturing upon all sorts of public utterances that +will not square with it in any conceivable way? Politicians, of all men, +never lie for the fun of it; their available margin of truth is always +so narrow that they keep within it when they can. Mr. Lloyd George, for +example, is one of the cleverest of politicians. We have already +considered his two statements; first, that of 4 August, 1917:</p> + +<blockquote><p>What are we fighting for? To defeat the most dangerous conspiracy +ever plotted against the liberty of<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_40" id="Page_40">[Pg 40]</a></span> nations; carefully, skilfully, +insidiously, clandestinely planned in every detail with ruthless, +cynical determination.</p></blockquote> + +<p>—and then that of 3 March, 1921:</p> + +<blockquote><p>For the Allies, German responsibility for the war is fundamental. +It is the basis upon which the structure of the treaty of +Versailles has been erected, and if that acknowledgment is +repudiated or abandoned, the treaty is destroyed.... German +responsibility for the war must be treated by the Allies as a +<i>chose jugée</i>.</p></blockquote> + +<p>A little over two months before Mr. George made this latter utterance, +on 23 December, 1920, he said this:</p> + +<blockquote><p>The more one reads memoirs and books written in the various +countries of what happened before the first of August, 1914, the +more one realizes that no one at the head of affairs quite meant +war at that stage. It was something into which they glided, or +rather staggered and stumbled, perhaps through folly; and a +discussion, I have no doubt, would have averted it.</p></blockquote> + +<p>Well, it would strike an unprejudiced person that if this were true, +there is a great deal of doubt put upon Mr. Lloyd George's former +statements by Mr. Lloyd George himself. Persons who plot carefully, +skilfully, insidiously and clandestinely, do not glide; they do not +stagger or stumble, especially through folly. They keep <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_41" id="Page_41">[Pg 41]</a></span>going, as we in +America were assured that the German Government did keep going, right up +to The Day of their own choosing. Moreover, they are not likely to be +headed off by discussion; highwaymen are notoriously curt in their +speech and if one attempts discussion with them they become irritable +and peremptory. This is the invariable habit of highwaymen. Besides, if +discussion would have averted war in 1914, why was it not forthcoming? +Certainly not through any fault of the Austrian Government, which made +every concession, as the British Ambassador's report shows, +notwithstanding its grievance against Serbia was a just one. Certainly +not through any fault of the German Government, which never refused +discussion and held its hand with all the restraint possible under the +circumstances just described. Well, then, how is it so clear that German +responsibility for the war should be treated as a <i>chose jugée</i>?</p> + +<hr /> + +<p><span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_42" id="Page_42">[Pg 42]</a></span></p> + +<h2>VII</h2> + +<p>People who have a clear and simple case do not talk in this fashion. +Picking now at random among the utterances of politicians and +propagandists, we find an assorted job-lot of aims assigned and causes +alleged, and in all of them there is that curious, incomprehensible and +callous disregard of the power of conviction that a straight story +always exercises, if you have one to tell. In November, 1917, when the +Foreign Office was being pestered by demands for a statement of the +Allied war-aims, Lord Robert Cecil said in the House of Commons, that +the restitution of Alsace and Lorraine to France was a "well-understood +war-aim from the moment we entered the war." As things have turned out, +it is an odd coincidence how so many of these places that have iron or +coal or oil in them seem to represent a well-understood war-aim. Less +than a month before, in October, 1917, General Smuts said that to his +mind the one great dominating war-aim was "the end of militarism, the +end of standing armies." Well, the Allies won the war, but judging by<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_43" id="Page_43">[Pg 43]</a></span> +results, this dominating war-aim seems rather to have been lost sight +of. Mr. Lloyd George again on another occasion, said in the House of +Commons that "self-determination was one of the principles for which we +entered the war ... a principle from which we have never departed since +the beginning of the war." This, too, seems an aim that for some reason +the victorious nations have not quite realized; indeed in some cases, as +in Ireland, for example, there has been no great alacrity shown about +trying to realize it. Viscount Bryce said that the war sprang from the +strife of races and religions in the Balkan countries, and from the +violence done to the sentiment of nationality in Alsace-Lorraine which +made France the ally of Russia. But the fact is that France became the +ally of Russia on the basis of hard cash, and since the Russian +Revolution, she has been a bit out of luck by way of getting her money +back. Mr. Asquith in the House of Commons, 3 August, 1914 said:</p> + +<blockquote><p>If I am asked what we are fighting for, I reply in two sentences. +In the first place, to fulfil a solemn international obligation.... +Secondly we are fighting ... to vindicate the principle that small +nationalities are not to be crushed in defiance of international +good faith.</p></blockquote> + +<p><span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_44" id="Page_44">[Pg 44]</a></span></p><p>Just so: and in the House of Commons, 20 December, 1917, he said:</p> + +<blockquote><p>The League of Nations ... was the avowed purpose, the very purpose +... for which we entered the war and for which we are continuing +the war.</p></blockquote> + +<p>You pays your money, you see, and takes your choice. The point to be +made, however, is that one who has a strong case, a real case, never +trifles with it in this way. Would the reader do it?</p> + +<hr /> + +<p><span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_45" id="Page_45">[Pg 45]</a></span></p> + +<h2>VIII</h2> + +<p>Mr. Asquith's citation of a "solemn international obligation" refers to +the so-called Belgian treaties. It will be remembered that the case of +Belgium was the great winning card played by the Allied Governments for +the stakes of American sympathies; and therefore we may here properly +make a survey, somewhat in detail, of the status of Belgium at the +outset of the war.</p> + +<p>Belgium had learned forty years ago how she stood under the treaties of +1831 and 1839. When in the late 'eighties there was likelihood of a +Franco-German war, the question of England's participation under these +treaties was thoroughly discussed, and it was shown conclusively that +England was not obligated. Perhaps the best summary of the case was that +given by Mr. W. T. Stead in the <i>Pall Mall Gazette</i> in the issues of 4 +and 5 February, 1887. After an examination of the treaties of 1831, 1839 +and 1870—an examination unfortunately too long to be quoted here—Mr. +Stead briefly sums up the result of his investigation in the following +statement:</p> + +<p><span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_46" id="Page_46">[Pg 46]</a></span></p><blockquote><p>There is therefore no English guarantee to Belgium. It is possible +perhaps, to 'construct' such a guarantee; but the case may be +summed up as follows: (1) England is under no guarantee whatever +except such as is common to Austria, France, Russia and Germany; +(2) that guarantee is not specifically of the neutrality of Belgium +at all; and (3) is given, not to Belgium but to the Netherlands.</p></blockquote> + +<p>This was the official view of the British Government at the time, and it +is reflected in the celebrated letter signed "Diplomaticus" in the +<i>Standard</i> of 4 February, to which Mr. Stead refers; which, indeed, he +makes the guiding text for his examination. The <i>Standard</i> was then the +organ of Lord Salisbury's Government, and it is as nearly certain as +anything of the sort can be, that the letter signed "Diplomaticus" was +written by the hand of the British Prime Minister, Lord Salisbury +himself.</p> + +<p>How Mr. Asquith's Government in August 1914 came suddenly to extemporize +a wholly different view of England's obligations to Belgium is +excellently told by that inveterate diarist and chronicler, Mr. Wilfred +Scawen Blunt:</p> + +<blockquote><p>The obligation of fighting in alliance with France in case of a war +with Germany concerned the honour of three members only of +Asquith's Cabinet, who alone were aware of the exact promises that +had been made.<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_47" id="Page_47">[Pg 47]</a></span> These, though given verbally and with reservations +as to the consent of Parliament, bound the three as a matter of +personal honour, and were understood at the Quai d'Orsay as binding +the British nation. Neither Asquith nor his two companions<a name="FNanchor_5_5" id="FNanchor_5_5"></a><a href="#Footnote_5_5" class="fnanchor">[5]</a> in +this inner Cabinet could have retained office had they gone back +from their word in spirit or in letter. It would also doubtless +have entailed a serious quarrel with the French Government had they +failed to make it good. So clearly was the promise understood at +Paris to be binding that President Poincaré, when the crisis came, +had written to King George reminding him of it as an engagement +made between the two nations which he counted on His Majesty to +keep.</p> + +<p>Thus faced, the case was laid before the Cabinet, but was found to +fail as a convincing argument for war. It was then that Asquith, +with his lawyer's instinct, at a second Cabinet meeting brought +forward the neutrality of Belgium as a better plea than the other +to lay before a British jury, and by representing the +neutrality-treaties of 1831 and 1839 as entailing an obligation on +England to fight (of which the text of the treaties contains no +word) obtained the Cabinet's consent, and war was declared.</p></blockquote> + +<p>Belgium was not thought of by the British Cabinet before 2 August, 1914. +She was brought in then as a means of making the war go down with the +British people. The fact is that Belgium was thoroughly prepared for +war, thoroughly <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_48" id="Page_48">[Pg 48]</a></span>prepared for just what happened to her. Belgium was a +party to the military arrangements effected among France, England and +Russia; for this we have the testimony of Marshal Joffre before the +Metallurgic Committee in Paris, and also the record of the +"conversations" that were carried on in Brussels between the Belgian +chief of staff and Lt.-Col. Barnardiston. On 24 July, 1914, the day when +the Austrian note was presented to Serbia (the note of which Sir E. Grey +had gotten an intimation as early as 16 July by telegraph from the +British Ambassador at Vienna, Sir M. de Bunsen), the Belgian Foreign +Minister, M. Davignon, promptly dispatched to all the Belgian embassies +an identical communication containing the following statement, the +significance of which is made clear by a glance at a map:</p> + +<blockquote><p>All necessary steps to ensure respect of Belgian neutrality have +nevertheless been taken by the Government. The Belgian army has +been mobilized and is taking up such strategic positions as have +been chosen to secure the defence of the country and the respect of +its neutrality. The forts of Antwerp and on the Meuse have been put +in a state of defence.</p></blockquote> + +<p>It was on the eastern frontier, we perceive, therefore—not on the +western, where Belgium might have been invaded by France—that all the<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_49" id="Page_49">[Pg 49]</a></span> +available Belgian military force was concentrated. Hence, to pretend any +longer that the Belgian Government was surprised by the action of +Germany, or unprepared to meet it; to picture Germany and Belgium as cat +and mouse, to understand the position of Belgium otherwise than that she +was one of four solid allies under definite agreement worked out in +complete practical detail, is sheer absurdity.</p> + +<div class="footnotes"><h3>FOOTNOTE:</h3> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_5_5" id="Footnote_5_5"></a><a href="#FNanchor_5_5"><span class="label">[5]</span></a> Sir E. Grey and Lord Haldane.</p></div> +</div> + +<hr /> + +<p><span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_50" id="Page_50">[Pg 50]</a></span></p> + +<h2>IX</h2> + +<p>If the official theory of German responsibility were correct, it would +be impossible to explain the German Government's choice of the year 1914 +as a time to strike at "an unsuspecting and defenceless Europe." The +figures quoted in Chapter III show that the military strength of +Germany, relatively to that of the French-Russian-English combination, +had been decreasing since 1910. If Germany had wished to strike at +Europe, she had two first-rate chances, one in 1908 and another in 1912, +and not only let them both go by, but threw all her weight on the side +of peace. This is inexplicable upon the theory that animates the treaty +of Versailles. Germany was then in a position of advantage. The occasion +presented itself in 1908, in Serbia's quarrel with Austria over the +annexation of Bosnia and the Herzegovina. Russia, which was backing +Serbia, was in no shape to fight; her military strength, used up in the +Russo-Japanese war, had not recovered. France would not at this time +have been willing to go to<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_51" id="Page_51">[Pg 51]</a></span> war with Germany over her weak ally's +commitments in the Danube States. Germany, however, contented herself +with serving notice on the Tsar of her unequivocal support of Austria; +and this was enough. The Tsar accepted the <i>fait accompli</i> of the +annexation of Bosnia and the Herzegovina; Serbia retired and cooled off; +and Turkey, from whom the annexed province was ravished, was compensated +by Austria. It is not to the point to scrutinize the propriety of these +transactions; the point is that Germany held the peace of Europe in the +hollow of her hand, with immense advantages in her favour, and chose not +to close her hand. The comment of a neutral diplomat, the Belgian +Minister in Berlin, is interesting. In his report of 1 April, 1909, to +the Belgian Foreign Office, he says:</p> + +<blockquote><p>The conference scheme elaborated by M. Isvolsky and Sir Edward +Grey; the negotiations for collective representations in Vienna; +and the whole exchange of ideas among London, Paris and Petersburg, +were steadily aimed at forcing Austria-Hungary into a transaction +which would strongly have resembled a humiliation. This humiliation +would have affected Germany as directly and as sensibly as +Austria-Hungary, and would have struck a heavy blow at the +confidence which is inspired in Vienna by the alliance with +Germany. These machinations were frustrated by Germany's +absolutely<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_52" id="Page_52">[Pg 52]</a></span> unequivocal and decided attitude, from which she has +never departed in spite of all the urgings with which she has been +harassed. Germany alone has accomplished the preservation of peace. +The new grouping of the Powers, organized by the King of England, +has measured its forces with the alliance of the Central European +Powers, and has shown itself incapable of impairing the same. Hence +the vexation which is manifested.</p></blockquote> + +<p>The last two sentences of the foregoing seem to show—putting it +mildly—that the Belgian Minister did not suspect the German Government +of any aggressive spirit. In the same dispatch, moreover, he remarks:</p> + +<blockquote><p>As always, when everything does not go as the French, English or +Russian politicians want it to, the <i>Temps</i> shows its bad temper. +Germany is the scapegoat.</p></blockquote> + +<p>Again, at the time of the Balkan War in 1912, Germany had an excellent +opportunity to gratify her military ambition, if she had any, at the +expense of an "unsuspecting and unprepared Europe"; not as advantageous +as in 1908 but more advantageous than in 1914. Serbia's provocations +against Austria-Hungary had become so great that the Austrian Archduke +(assassinated in 1914 at Sarajevo) told the German Emperor personally +that they had reached the limit of endurance.<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_53" id="Page_53">[Pg 53]</a></span> On this occasion also, +however, William II put himself definitely on the side of peace, and in +so doing left the Austrian Government somewhat disappointed and +discontented. Another neutral diplomat reports of the German Foreign +Minister that</p> + +<blockquote><p>whatever plans he may have in his head (and he has big ideas), for +winning the sympathies of the young Balkan Powers over to Germany, +one thing is absolutely certain, and that is that he is rigidly +determined to avoid a European conflagration. On this point the +policy of Germany is similar to that of England and France, both of +which countries are determinedly pacifist.</p></blockquote> + +<p>This is a fair statement of the English and French position in 1912. +There was a great revulsion of feeling in England after her close shave +of being dragged into war over Morocco and her sentiment was all for +attending to certain pressing, domestic problems. Besides, it was only +in November, 1911, and only through the indiscretion of a French +newspaper, that the British public (and the British Parliament as well) +had learned that the Anglo-French agreement of 1904 had secret articles +attached to it, out of which had emanated the imbroglio over Morocco; +and there was a considerable feeling of distrust towards the Foreign +Office. In fact, Sir<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_54" id="Page_54">[Pg 54]</a></span> E. Grey, the Foreign Minister, was so unpopular +with his own party that quite probably he would have had to get out of +office if he had not been sustained by Tory influence. Mr. W. T. Stead +expressed a quite general sentiment in the <i>Review of Reviews</i> for +December, 1911:</p> + +<blockquote><p>The fact remains that in order to put France in possession of +Morocco, we all but went to war with Germany. We have escaped war, +but we have not escaped the national and abiding enmity of the +German people. Is it possible to frame a heavier indictment of the +foreign policy of any British Ministry? The secret, the open +secret, of this almost incredible crime against treaty-faith, +British interests and the peace of the world, is the unfortunate +fact that Sir Edward Grey has been dominated by men in the Foreign +Office who believe all considerations must be subordinated to the +one supreme duty of thwarting Germany at every turn, even if in +doing so British interests, treaty-faith and the peace of the world +are trampled underfoot. I speak that of which I know.</p></blockquote> + +<p>This was strong language and it went without challenge, for too many +Englishmen felt that way. In France, the Poincaré-Millerand-Delcassé +combination was getting well into the saddle; but with English public +opinion in this notably undependable condition, English support of +France, in spite of the secret agreement binding<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_55" id="Page_55">[Pg 55]</a></span> the two governments, +was decidedly risky. Thereupon France also was "determinedly pacifist." +Now if Germany had been the prime mover in "the most dangerous +conspiracy ever plotted against the liberty of nations," why did she not +take advantage of that situation?</p> + +<p>Russia, too, was "determinedly pacifist" in 1912, and with good reason. +There was a party of considerable influence in the Tsar's court that was +strongly for going to war in behalf of Serbia, but it was finally headed +off by the Foreign Minister, Sazonov, who knew the state of public +opinion in England and its effect on France, and knew therefore that the +French-Russian-English alliance was not yet in shape to take on large +orders. It is true that the Poincaré-Millerand-Delcassé war-party in +France had proof enough in 1912 that it could count on the British +Government's support; and what France knew, Russia knew. Undoubtedly, +too, the British Government would somehow, under some pretext or other, +possibly Belgian neutrality, have contrived to redeem its obligations as +it did in 1914. But the atmosphere of the country was not favourable and +the thing would have been difficult. Accordingly, Sazonov saw that it +was best for him to restrain Serbia's impetuosity and truculence<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_56" id="Page_56">[Pg 56]</a></span> for +the time being—Russia herself being none too ready—and accordingly he +did so.</p> + +<p>But how? The Serbian Minister at Petersburg says that Sazonov told him +that in view of Serbia's successes "he had confidence in our strength +and believed that we would be able to deliver a blow at Austria. For +that reason we should feel satisfied with what we were to receive, and +consider it merely as a temporary halting-place on the road to further +gains." On another occasion "Sazonov told me that we must work for the +future because we would acquire a great deal of territory from Austria." +The Serbian Minister at Bucharest says that his Russian and French +colleagues counselled a policy of waiting "with as great a degree of +preparedness as possible the important events which must make their +appearance among the Great Powers." How, one may ask, was the Russian +Foreign Office able to look so far and so clearly into the future? If +German responsibility for the war is fundamental, a <i>chose jugée</i>, as +Mr. Lloyd George said it is, this seems a strange way for the Russian +Foreign Minister to be talking, as far back as 1912. But stranger still +is the fact that the German Government did not jump in at this juncture +instead of postponing its blow until 1914<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_57" id="Page_57">[Pg 57]</a></span> when every one was apparently +quite ready to receive it. When the historian of the future considers +the theory of the Versailles treaty and considers the behaviour of the +German Government in the crisis of 1908 and in the crisis of 1912, he +will have to scratch his head a great deal to make them harmonize.</p> + +<hr /> + +<p><span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_58" id="Page_58">[Pg 58]</a></span></p> + +<h2>X</h2> + +<p>By the spring of 1913, the diplomatic representatives of the Allied +Danube States made no secret of the relations in which their Governments +stood to the Tsar's Foreign Office. The Balkan League was put through by +Russian influence and Russia controlled its diplomacy. Serbia was as +completely the instrument of Russia as Poland is now the instrument of +France. "If the Austrian troops invade Balkan territory," wrote Baron +Beyens on 4 April, 1913, "it would give cause for Russia to intervene, +and might let loose a universal war." Now, if Germany had been plotting +"with ruthless, cynical determination," as Mr. Lloyd George said, +against the peace of Europe, what inconceivable stupidity for her not to +push Austria along rather than do everything possible to hold her back! +Why give Russia the benefit of eighteen months of valuable time for the +feverish campaign of "preparedness" that she carried on? Those eighteen +months meant a great deal. In February, 1914, the Tsar <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_59" id="Page_59">[Pg 59]</a></span>arranged to +provide the Serbian army with rifles and artillery, Serbia agreeing to +put half a million soldiers in the field. In the same month Russia +negotiated a French loan of about $100 million for improvements on her +strategic railways and frontier-roads. During the spring, she made +"test" mobilizations of large bodies of troops which were never +demobilized, and these "test" mobilizations continued down to the +outbreak of the war; and in April Russian agents made technical +arrangements with agents of the British and French Admiralties for +possible combined naval action.</p> + +<p>Yes, those eighteen months were very busy months for Russia. True, she +came out at the end of them an "unprepared and unsuspecting" nation, +presumably, for was not all Europe unprepared and unsuspecting? Is it +not so nominated in the Versailles treaty? One can not help wondering, +however, how it is that Germany, "carefully, skilfully, insidiously, +clandestinely planning in every detail" a murderous attack on the peace +of Europe, should have given Russia the inestimable advantage of those +eighteen months.</p> + +<hr /> + +<p><span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_60" id="Page_60">[Pg 60]</a></span></p> + +<h2>XI</h2> + +<p>Mr. E. D. Morel, editor of the British monthly, <i>Foreign Affairs</i>, +performed more than a distinguished service—it is a splendid, an +illustrious service—to the disparaged cause of justice, when recently +he translated and published in England through the National Labour +Press, a series of remarkable State documents.<a name="FNanchor_6_6" id="FNanchor_6_6"></a><a href="#Footnote_6_6" class="fnanchor">[6]</a> This consists of +reports made by the Belgian diplomatic representatives at Paris, London +and Berlin, to the Belgian Minister of Foreign Affairs, covering the +period from 7 February, 1905 to 2 July, 1914. Their authenticity has +never been questioned. They have received no notice in this country; +their content and import were carefully kept from the American people as +long as it was possible to do so, and consequently they remain unknown +except to a few who are students of international affairs or who have +some similar special interest.</p> + +<p><span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_61" id="Page_61">[Pg 61]</a></span></p><p>It can hardly be pretended by anyone that Belgian officials had, during +that decade, any particular love or leaning towards Germany. The Belgian +Foreign Office has always been as free from sentimental attachments as +any other. It has always been governed by the same motives that govern +the British, French, German and Russian Foreign Offices. Its number, +like theirs, was number one; it was out, first and last, for the +interests of the Belgian Government, and it scrutinized every +international transaction from the viewpoint of those interests and +those only. It was fully aware of the position of Belgium as a mere +"strategic corridor" and battle-ground for alien armies in case of a +general European war, and aware that Belgium had simply to make the best +of its bad outlook, for nothing else could be done. If the Belgian +Foreign Office and its agents, moreover, had no special love for +Germany, neither had they any special fear of her. They were in no more +or deeper dread of a German invasion than of a British or French +invasion. In fact, in 1911, the Belgian Minister at Berlin set forth in +a most matter-of-fact way his belief that in the event of war, Belgian +neutrality would be first violated by Great Britain.<a name="FNanchor_7_7" id="FNanchor_7_7"></a><a href="#Footnote_7_7" class="fnanchor">[7]</a> These<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_62" id="Page_62">[Pg 62]</a></span> +observers, in short, may on all accounts, as far as one can see, be +accepted as neutral and disinterested, with the peculiar +disinterestedness of one who has no choice between two evils.</p> + +<p>Well, then, under the circumstances it is remarkable that if Germany +during the ten years preceding August, 1914, were plotting against the +peace of the world, these Belgian observers seem unaware of it. It is +equally noteworthy that if Germany's assault were unprovoked, they seem +unaware of that also. These documents relate in an extremely +matter-of-fact way a continuous series of extraordinary provocations put +upon the German Government, and moreover, they represent the behaviour +of the German Government, under these provocations, in a very favourable +light. On the other hand, they show from beginning to end a most +profound distrust of English diplomacy. If there is any uncertainty +about the causes of ill-feeling between England and Germany, these +Belgian officials certainly do not share it. They regularly speak<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_63" id="Page_63">[Pg 63]</a></span> of +England's jealousy of Germany's economic competition, and the +provocative attitude to which this jealousy gave rise. They speak of it, +moreover, as though it were something that the Belgian Government were +already well aware of; they speak of it in the tone of pure commonplace, +such as one might use in an incidental reference to the weather or to a +tariff-schedule or to any other matter that is well understood and about +which there is no difference of opinion and nothing new to be said. This +is all the more remarkable in view of the fact that it was nominally to +save Belgium and to defend the sanctity of Belgian neutrality that +England entered the war in August, 1914. These Belgian agents are +invariably suspicious of English diplomacy, as Mr. E. D. Morel points +out, "mainly because they feel that it is tending to make the war which +they dread for their country." They persistently and unanimously +"insinuate that if left to themselves, France and Germany would reach a +settlement of their differences, and that British diplomacy was being +continually exercised to envenom the controversy and to draw a circle of +hostile alliances round Germany." This, indeed, under a specious concern +for the "balance of power," has been the historic rôle of English<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_64" id="Page_64">[Pg 64]</a></span> +diplomacy. Every one remembers how in 1866, just before the +Franco-Prussian war, Mr. Matthew Arnold's imaginary Prussian, Arminius +von Thunder-ten-Tronckh, wrote to the editor of the <i>Pall Mall Gazette</i>, +begging him to prevail upon his fellow-countrymen "for Heaven's sake not +to go on biting, first the French Emperor's tail, and then ours."</p> + +<p>On 18 February, 1905, the Belgian Minister in Berlin reported thus:</p> + +<blockquote><p>The real cause of the English hatred of Germany is the jealousy +aroused by the astonishing development of Germany's merchant navy +and of her commerce and manufactures. This hatred will last until +the English have thoroughly learned to understand that the world's +trade is not by rights an exclusively English monopoly. Moreover, +it is studiously fostered by the <i>Times</i> and a whole string of +other daily papers and periodicals that do not stop short of +calumny in order to pander to the tastes of their readers.</p></blockquote> + +<p>At that time the centre of the English navy had just been shifted to the +North Sea, to the accompaniment of a very disturbing and, as at first +reported, a very flamboyant speech from the Civil Lord of the Admiralty, +Mr. Lee. Of the sensation thereby created in Germany, the Belgian +Minister says:</p> + +<p><span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_65" id="Page_65">[Pg 65]</a></span></p><blockquote><p>In informing the British public that Germany does not dream of any +aggression against England, Count Bülow [the German Chancellor] +said no more than what is recognized by every one who considers the +matter dispassionately. Germany would have nothing to gain from a +contest.... The German fleet has been created with a purely +defensive object. The small capacity of the coal-bunkers in her +High Seas Fleet, and the small number of her cruisers, prove +besides that her fleet is not intended for use at any distance from +the coast.</p></blockquote> + +<p>On the other hand, he remarks in the same report:</p> + +<blockquote><p>It was obvious that the new disposition of the English navy was +aimed at Germany ... it certainly is not because of Russia, whose +material stock is to a great extent destroyed and whose navy has +just given striking proof of incompetence [in the Russo-Japanese +war].</p></blockquote> + +<p>Such is the tone uniformly adopted by these neutral observers throughout +their reports from 1905 to 1914. On 24 October, 1905, the Belgian +Minister in Paris wrote:</p> + +<blockquote><p>England, in her efforts to maintain her supremacy and to hinder the +development of her great German rival, is evidently inspired by the +wish to avoid a conflict, but are not her selfish aims in +themselves bringing it upon us?... She thought, when she concluded +the Japanese alliance and gradually drew France into similar ties, +that she had found the means to her end, by sufficiently<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_66" id="Page_66">[Pg 66]</a></span> +paralysing Germany's powers as to make war impossible.</p></blockquote> + +<p>This view of the Anglo-Japanese alliance is interesting and significant, +especially now when that instrument is coming up for renewal, with the +United States standing towards England in the same relation of economic +competitorship that Germany occupied in 1905. True, Viscount Bryce +assured the Institute of Politics at Williams College last summer that +it was not Germany's economic rivalry that disturbed England; but on +this point it would be highly advantageous for the people of the United +States, while there is yet time, to read what the Belgian Minister in +Berlin had to say on 27 October, 1905:</p> + +<blockquote><p>A very large number of Germans are convinced that England is either +seeking allies for an attack upon Germany, or else, which would be +more in accordance with British tradition, that she is labouring to +provoke a Continental war in which she would not join, but of which +she would reap the profit.</p> + +<p>I am told that many English people are troubled with similar fears +and go in dread of German aggression.</p> + +<p>I am puzzled upon what foundations such an impression in London can +be based. Germany is absolutely incapable of attacking England.... +Are these people in England really sincere who go about expressing +fears of a German invasion which could not materialize?<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_67" id="Page_67">[Pg 67]</a></span> Are they +not rather pretending to be afraid of it in order to bring on a war +which would annihilate Germany's navy, her merchant-fleet and her +foreign commerce? Germany is as vulnerable to attack as England is +safe from it; and if England were to attack Germany merely for the +sake of extinguishing a rival, it would only be in accordance with +her old precedents.</p> + +<p>In turn she wiped out the Dutch fleet, with the assistance of Louis +XIV; then the French fleet; and the Danish fleet she even destroyed +in time of peace and without any provocation, simply because it +constituted a naval force of some magnitude.</p> + +<p>There are no ostensible grounds for war between Germany and +England. The English hatred for Germany arises solely from jealousy +of Germany's progress in shipping, in commerce and in manufacture.</p></blockquote> + +<p>Baron Greindl here presents an opinion very different from that in which +the majority of Americans have been instructed; and before they accept +further instruction at the hands of Viscount Bryce, they had better look +into the matter somewhat for themselves.</p> + +<p>Baron Greindl wrote the foregoing in October. In December, the head of +the British Admiralty, Sir John Fisher, assured Colonel Repington that +"Admiral Wilson's Channel fleet was alone strong enough to smash the +whole German fleet." <i>Two years</i> later, Sir John Fisher wrote to King +<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_68" id="Page_68">[Pg 68]</a></span>Edward VII that "it is an absolute fact that Germany has not laid down +a single dreadnaught, nor has she commenced building a single battleship +or big cruiser for eighteen months.... England has ... ten dreadnaughts +built and building, while Germany in March last had not even begun one +dreadnaught ... we have 123 destroyers and forty submarines. The Germans +have forty-eight destroyers and one submarine." Hence, if Sir John +Fisher knew what he was talking about, and in such matters he usually +did, he furnishes a very considerable corroboration of Baron Greindl's +view of the German navy up to 1905. Looking back at the third chapter of +this book, which deals with the comparative strength of the two navies +and naval groups as developed from 1905 to 1914, the reader may well +raise again Baron Greindl's question, "Are those people in England +really sincere?"</p> + +<div class="footnotes"><h3>FOOTNOTES:</h3> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_6_6" id="Footnote_6_6"></a><a href="#FNanchor_6_6"><span class="label">[6]</span></a> Under the title "Diplomacy Revealed." National Labour +Press. 8 and 9 Johnson's Court, London, E.C., 4, England.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_7_7" id="Footnote_7_7"></a><a href="#FNanchor_7_7"><span class="label">[7]</span></a> This belief received some corroboration in the spring of +1912, when in the course of military "conversations," the British +Military Attaché, Lieutenant-Colonel Bridges, told the Belgian Minister +of War that if war had broken out over the Agadir incident in 1911, the +British Government would have landed troops in Belgium with or without +the Belgian Government's consent. So much did the British Government +think of the "scrap of paper!"</p></div></div> + +<hr /> + +<p><span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_69" id="Page_69">[Pg 69]</a></span></p> + +<h2>XII</h2> + +<p>Such is the inveterate suspicion, the melancholy distrust, put upon +English diplomacy by these foreign and neutral observers who could see +so plainly what would befall their own country in the event of a +European war. Such too, was the responsibility which these observers +regularly imputed to the British Foreign Office—the British Foreign +Office which was so soon to fix upon the neutrality of Belgium as a +<i>casus belli</i> and pour out streams of propaganda about the sanctity of +treaties and the rights of small nations! Every one of these observers +exhibits this suspicion and distrust. In March, 1906, when Edward VII +visited Paris and invited the discredited ex-Minister Delcassé to +breakfast, the Belgian Minister at Paris wrote:</p> + +<blockquote><p>It looks as though the king wished to demonstrate that the policy +which called forth Germany's active intervention [over Morocco] has +nevertheless remained unchanged.... In French circles it is not +over well received; Frenchmen feeling that they are being dragged +against their will in the orbit of English policy, a policy<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_70" id="Page_70">[Pg 70]</a></span> whose +consequences they dread, and which they generally condemned by +throwing over M. Delcassé. In short, people fear that this is a +sign that England wants so to envenom the situation that war will +become inevitable.</p></blockquote> + +<p>On 10 February, 1907, when the English King and Queen visited Paris, he +says: "One can not conceal from oneself that these tactics, though their +ostensible object is to prevent war, are likely to arouse great +dissatisfaction in Berlin and to stir up a desire to risk anything that +may enable Germany to burst the ring which England's policy is +tightening around her." On 28 March, 1907, the Belgian <i>chargé +d'affaires</i> in London speaks of "English diplomacy, whose whole effort +is directed to the isolation of Germany." On the same date, by a curious +coincidence, the Minister at Berlin, in the course of a blistering +arraignment of French policy in Morocco, says: "But at the bottom of +every settlement that has been made, or is going to be made, there lurks +always that hatred of Germany.... It is a sequence of the campaign very +cleverly conducted with the object of isolating Germany.... The English +press is carrying on its campaign of calumny more implacably than ever. +It sees the finger of Germany in everything that goes contrary to +English wishes." On 18 April, 1907, Baron<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_71" id="Page_71">[Pg 71]</a></span> Greindl says of the King of +England's visit to the King of Spain that, like the alliances with Japan +and France and the negotiations with Russia, it is "one of the moves in +the campaign to isolate Germany that is being personally directed with +as much perseverance as success by His Majesty King Edward VII." In the +same dispatch he remarks: "There is some right to regard with suspicion +this eagerness to unite, for a so-called defensive object, Powers who +are menaced by nobody. At Berlin they can not forget that offer of +100,000 men made by the King of England to M. Delcassé."</p> + +<p>On 24 May, 1907, the Minister at London reported that "it is plain that +official England is pursuing a policy that is covertly hostile, and +tending to result in the isolation of Germany, and that King Edward has +not been above putting his personal influence at the service of this +cause." On 19 June, 1907, Count de Lalaing again writes from London of +the Anglo-Franco-Spanish agreement concerning the <i>status quo</i> in the +Mediterranean region, that "it is, however, difficult to imagine that +Germany will not regard it as a further step in England's policy, which +is determined, by every sort of means, to isolate the German Empire."</p> + +<p><span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_72" id="Page_72">[Pg 72]</a></span></p><p>Perusal of these documents from beginning to end will show nothing to +offset against the view of English diplomacy exhibited in the foregoing +quotations; nothing to modify or qualify that view in any way. Baron +Greindl, however, speaks highly of the British Ambassador at Berlin, Sir +F. Lascelles, and praises his personal and unsupported attempt to +establish friendly relations between England and Germany. Of this he +says: "I have been a witness for the last twelve years of the efforts he +has made to accomplish it. And yet, possessing as he justly does the +absolute confidence of the Emperor and the German Government, and +eminently gifted with the qualities of a statesman, he has nevertheless +not succeeded very well so far." The next year, 1908, when Sir F. +Lascelles was forced to resign his post, Baron Greindl does not hesitate +to say that "the zeal with which he has worked to dispel +misunderstandings that he thought absurd and highly mischievous for both +countries, does not fall in with the political views of his sovereign."</p> + +<hr /> + +<p><span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_73" id="Page_73">[Pg 73]</a></span></p> + +<h2>XIII</h2> + +<p>King Edward VII died 6 May, 1910. During the early part of 1911, the +Belgian Ministers in London, Paris and Berlin report some indications of +a less unfriendly policy towards Germany on the part of the British +Government. In March of that year, Sir Edward Grey delivered a +reassuring speech on British foreign policy, on the occasion of the +debate on the naval budget. The Belgian Minister in Berlin says of this +that it should have produced the most agreeable impression in Germany if +one could confidently believe that it really entirely reflected the +ideas of the British Government. It would imply, he says, that "England +no longer wishes to give to the Triple Entente the aggressive character +which was stamped upon it by its creator, King Edward VII." He remarks, +however, the slight effect produced in Berlin by Sir E. Grey's speech, +and infers that German public feeling may have "become dulled by the +innumerable meetings and mutual demonstrations of courtesy which have +never <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_74" id="Page_74">[Pg 74]</a></span>produced any positive result," and he adds significantly that +"this distrust is comprehensible."</p> + +<p>It must be remembered that at the time this speech was delivered, +England was under a secret agreement dating from 1904 to secure France's +economic monopoly in Morocco. England was also under a secret obligation +to France, dating from 1906, to support her in case of war with Germany. +It must be above all remembered that this latter obligation carried with +it a contingent liability for the Franco-Russian military alliance that +had been in effect for many years. Thus if Russia went to war with +Germany, France was committed, and in turn England was committed. The +whole force of the Triple Entente lay in these agreements; and it can +not be too often pointed out that they were <i>secret</i> agreements. No one +in England knew until November, 1911, that in 1904 the British +Government had bargained with the French Government, in return for a +free hand in Egypt, to permit France to squeeze German economic +interests out of Morocco—in violation of a published agreement, signed +by all the interested nations, concerning the status of Morocco. No one +in England knew until 3 August, 1914, that England had for several years +been under a military and naval<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_75" id="Page_75">[Pg 75]</a></span> agreement with France which carried the +enormous contingent liability of the Franco-Russian military alliance. +No matter what appeared on the surface of politics; no matter how many +pacific speeches were made by Sir E. Grey and Mr. Asquith, no matter +what the newspapers said, no matter how often and how impressively Lord +Haldane might visit Berlin in behalf of peace and good feeling; <i>those +secret agreements held</i>, they were the only things that did hold, and +everything worked out in strict accordance with them and with nothing +else, least of all with any public understanding or any statement of +policy put out for public consumption. It was just as in the subsequent +case of the armistice and the peace—and this is something that has been +far too little noticed in this country. The real terms of the armistice +and of the peace were not the terms of the Fourteen Points or of any of +the multitudinous published statements of Allied war aims. On the +contrary, they were the precise terms of the secret treaties made among +the Allied belligerents during the war, and made public on their +discovery by the Soviet Government in the archives of the Tsarist +Foreign Office.</p> + +<p>It is no wonder then, that the German Government was not particularly +impressed by Sir E.<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_76" id="Page_76">[Pg 76]</a></span> Grey's speech, especially as Germany saw France +helping herself to Moroccan territory with both hands, and England +looking on in indifferent complacency. In May, 1911, on a most +transparent and preposterous pretext, a French army was ordered to march +on Fez, the capital of Morocco. The German Government then informed +France that as the Algeciras Act, which guaranteed the integrity and +independence of Morocco, had thereby gone by the board, Germany would no +longer consider herself bound by its provisions. In June, 30,000 French +troops "relieved" Fez, occupied it and stayed there, evincing no +intention whatever of getting out again, notwithstanding that the +ostensible purpose of the expedition was accomplished; in reality, there +was nothing to accomplish. Two months before this <i>coup d'état</i>, Baron +Greindl, the Belgian Minister at Berlin, wrote to the Belgian Foreign +Office as follows:</p> + +<blockquote><p>Every illusion, if ever entertained on the value of the Algeciras +Act, which France signed with the firm intention of never +observing, must long since have vanished. She has not ceased for +one moment to pursue her plans of annexation; either by seizing +opportunities for provisional occupations destined to last for ever +or by extorting concessions which have placed the Sultan in a<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_77" id="Page_77">[Pg 77]</a></span> +position of dependence upon France, and which have gradually +lowered him to the level of the Bey of Tunis.</p></blockquote> + +<p>A week later, 29 April, Baron Guillaume, who had succeeded M. Leghait as +Belgian Minister in Paris, reported that "there are, so far, no grounds +for fearing that the French expedition will bring about any disturbance +of international policy. Germany is a calm spectator of events." He +adds, significantly, "England, having thrust France into the Moroccan +bog, is contemplating her work with satisfaction."</p> + +<p>France professed publicly that the object of this expedition was to +extricate certain foreigners who were imperilled at Fez; and having done +so, she would withdraw her forces. The precious crew of concessionaires, +profiteers, and dividend-hunters known as the <i>Comité du Maroc</i> had +suddenly discovered a whole French colony living in Fez in a state of +terror and distress. There was, in fact, nothing of the sort. Fez was +never menaced, it was never short of provisions, and there were no +foreigners in trouble. When the expeditionary force arrived, it found no +one to shoot at. As M. Francis de Pressensé says:</p> + +<blockquote><p>Those redoubtable rebels who were threatening Fez had disappeared +like dew in the morning. Barely did<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_78" id="Page_78">[Pg 78]</a></span> a few ragged horsemen fire off +a shot or two before turning around and riding away at a furious +gallop. A too disingenuous, or too truthful, correspondent gave the +show away. The expeditionary force complains, he gravely records, +of the absence of the enemy; the approaching harvest season is +keeping all the healthy males in the fields! Thus did the phantom +so dexterously conjured by the <i>Comité du Maroc</i> for the benefit of +its aims, disappear in a night.</p></blockquote> + +<p>Nevertheless, the expeditionary force did not, in accordance with the +public professions of the French Government, march out of Fez as soon as +it discovered this ridiculous mare's nest. It remained there and held +possession of the Moorish capital. What was the attitude of the British +Government in the premises? On 2 May, in the House of Commons, Sir +Edward Grey said that "the action taken by France is not intended to +alter the political status of Morocco, and His Majesty's Government can +not see why any objection should be taken to it."</p> + +<p>Germany had remained for eight years a tolerant observer of French +encroachments in Morocco, and quite clearly, as Baron Greindl observes +in his report of 21 April, 1911, could not "after eight years of +tolerance, change her attitude unless she were determined to go to war, +and war<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_79" id="Page_79">[Pg 79]</a></span> is immeasurably more than Morocco is worth." In July, 1911, +however, while the French force of 30,000 was still occupying Fez, +Germany dispatched a gunboat, the "Panther," which anchored off the +coast of Agadir.</p> + +<hr /> + +<p><span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_80" id="Page_80">[Pg 80]</a></span></p> + +<h2>XIV</h2> + +<p>This was the famous "Agadir incident," of which we have all heard. Did +it mean that the worm had turned, that Germany had changed her attitude +and was determined to go to war? It has been so represented; but there +are many difficult inconsistencies involved in that explanation of the +German Government's act, and there is also an alternative explanation +which fits the facts far better. In the first place the "Panther" was +hardly more than an ocean-going tug. She was of 1000 tons burden, +mounting two small naval guns, six machine-guns, and she carried a +complement of only 125 men. Second, she never landed a man upon the +coast of Morocco. She chose for her anchorage a point where the coast is +practically inaccessible; Agadir has no harbour, and there is nothing +near it that offers any possible temptation to the predatory instinct. +No more ostentatiously unimpressive and unmenacing demonstration could +have been devised. Germany, too, was quite well aware that Morocco was +not<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_81" id="Page_81">[Pg 81]</a></span> worth a European war; and as Baron Guillaume said in his report of +29 April, "possibly she [Germany] is congratulating herself on the +difficulties that weigh upon the shoulders of the French Government, and +asks nothing better than to keep out of the whole affair as long as she +is not forced into it by economic considerations." But the most +significant indication that Germany had not changed her attitude is in +the fact that if she were determined upon war, then, rather than two +years later, was her time to go about it. This aspect of Germany's +behaviour has been dealt with in a previous chapter. It can not be too +often reiterated that if Germany really wanted war and was determined +upon war, her failure to strike in 1908, when Russia was prostrate and +France unready, and again in 1912, a few months after the Agadir +incident, when the Balkan war was on, is inexplicable.<a name="FNanchor_8_8" id="FNanchor_8_8"></a><a href="#Footnote_8_8" class="fnanchor">[8]</a></p> + +<p><span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_82" id="Page_82">[Pg 82]</a></span></p><p>The dispatch of the "Panther" gave the three Belgian observers a great +surprise, and they were much puzzled to account for it. Baron +Guillaume's thoughts at once turned to England. He writes 2 July:</p> + +<blockquote><p>It was long regarded as an axiom that England would never allow the +Germans to establish themselves at any point of Moroccan territory. +Has this policy been abandoned; and if so, at what price were they +bought off?</p></blockquote> + +<p>During the month of July, while waiting for a statement from the British +Foreign Office, the Belgian observers canvassed the possibility that +Germany's action was a hint that she would like some territorial +compensation for having been bilked out of her share in the Moroccan +market. But the interesting fact, and for the purpose of this book the +important fact, is that none of these diplomats shows the slightest +suspicion that Germany was bent on war or that she had any thought of +going to war. Baron Guillaume says, 28 July, "undoubtedly the present +situation wears a serious aspect.... Nobody, however, wants war, and +they will try to avoid it." He proceeds:</p> + +<blockquote><p>The French Government knows that a war would be the death-knell of +the Republic.... I have very great<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_83" id="Page_83">[Pg 83]</a></span> confidence in the Emperor +William's love of peace, notwithstanding the not infrequent air of +melodrama about what he says and does.... Germany can not go to war +for the sake of Morocco, nor yet to exact payment of those +compensations that she very reasonably demands for the French +occupation of Fez, which has become more or less permanent. On the +whole I feel less faith in Great Britain's desire for peace. She +would not be sorry to see the others destroying one another; only, +under those circumstances, it would be difficult for her to avoid +armed intervention.... As I thought from the very first, the crux +of the situation is in London.</p></blockquote> + +<p>By the end of July, a different conception of Germany's action seemed to +prevail. It began to be seen that the episode of the "Panther" had been +staged by way of calling for a show-down on the actual intentions and +purposes of the Triple Entente; and it got one. Mr. Lloyd George, "the +impulsive Chancellor of the Exchequer," as Count de Lalaing calls him, +made a typical jingo speech at the Mansion House; a speech which the +Prime Minister, Mr. Asquith, and Sir Edward Grey, the Foreign Minister, +had helped him to compose. The air was cleared at once—England stood by +France—and what better plan could have been devised for clearing the +air than the dispatch of the "Panther"? Germany stood for the policy of +economic equality,<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_84" id="Page_84">[Pg 84]</a></span> the policy of the open door to which all the Powers +interested had agreed in the case of Morocco. France, at the end of a +course of continuous aggression, had put 30,000 troops in occupation of +the capital of Morocco on an infamously unscrupulous pretext, and put +them there to stay, and the British Government "could not see why any +objection should be taken to it." Germany, on the other hand, anchored +an insignificant gunboat off an inaccessible coast, and without landing +a man or firing a shot, left her there as a silent reminder of the +Algeciras Act and the principle of the open door—carefully and even +ostentatiously going no further—and the British Government promptly, +through the mouth of Mr. Lloyd George, laid down a challenge and a +threat. Thereupon Germany and France understood their relative +positions; they understood, even without Sir E. Grey's explicit +reaffirmation of 27 November of the policy of the Triple Entente, that +England would stand by her arrangements with France. Baron Greindl +writes from Berlin 6 December, and puts the case explicitly:</p> + +<blockquote><p>Was it not assuming the right of veto on German enterprise for +England to start a hue and cry because a German cruiser cast anchor +in the roads of Agadir, seeing that she had looked on without a +murmur whilst<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_85" id="Page_85">[Pg 85]</a></span> France and Spain had proceeded step by step to +conquer Morocco and to destroy the independence of its Sultan?</p> + +<p>England could not have acted otherwise. She was tied by her secret +treaty with France. The explanation was extremely simple, but it +was not of a sort to allay German irritation.</p></blockquote> + +<div class="footnotes"><h3>FOOTNOTE:</h3> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_8_8" id="Footnote_8_8"></a><a href="#FNanchor_8_8"><span class="label">[8]</span></a> Critics of German foreign policy are hard put to it to show +that she was ever guided by territorial ambitions; which is an extremely +troublesome thing when one wants to believe that she proposed in 1914 to +put the world under a military despotism. Can any one show where in a +single instance she ever demanded anything more than economic equality +with other nations, in a foreign market? Certainly she never demanded +more than this in Morocco. Ex-Premier Caillaux says that his predecessor +Rouvier offered Germany a good Moroccan port (Mogador) and some +adjoining territory, and Germany declined.</p></div></div> + +<hr /> + +<p><span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_86" id="Page_86">[Pg 86]</a></span></p> + +<h2>XV</h2> + +<p>Let us glance at British political chronology for a moment. King Edward +VII, the chief factor in the Entente, the moving spirit in England's +foreign alliances, had been dead a year. In December, 1905, the Liberal +party had come into power. In April, 1908, Mr. H. H. Asquith became +Prime Minister. In 1910, Anglo-German relations were apparently +improving; in July, 1910, Mr. Asquith spoke of them in the House of +Commons as "of the most cordial character. I look forward to increasing +warmth and fervour and intimacy in these relations year by year." The +great question was, then, in 1911, whether the Liberal Government would +actually, when it came down to the pinch, stick by its secret covenant +with France. Were the new Liberals, were Mr. Asquith, Lord Haldane, Sir +E. Grey, Mr. Lloyd George, true-blue Liberal imperialists, or were they +not? Could France and Russia safely trust them to continue the Foreign +Office policy that Lord Lansdowne had bequeathed to Sir E.<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_87" id="Page_87">[Pg 87]</a></span> Grey; or, +when the emergency came, would they stand from under? After all, there +<i>had</i> been a Campbell-Bannerman; there was no doubt of that; and one, at +least, of the new Liberals, Mr. Lloyd George, had a bad anti-imperialist +record in the South African war.</p> + +<p>The Agadir incident elicited a satisfactory answer to these questions. +The Liberal Government was dependable. However suspiciously the members +of the Liberal Cabinet might talk, they were good staunch imperialists +at heart. They were, as the theologians say, "sound on the essentials." +Baron Greindl wrote, 6 December, 1911:</p> + +<blockquote><p>The Entente Cordiale was founded, not on the positive basis of +defence of common interests, but on the negative one of hatred of +the German Empire.... Sir Edward Grey adopts this tradition without +reservation. He imagines that it is in conformity with English +interests.... A revision of Great Britain's policy is all the less +to be looked for, as ever since the Liberal Ministry took office, +and more especially during the last few months, English foreign +policy has been guided by the ideas with which King Edward VII inspired it.</p></blockquote> + +<hr /> + +<p><span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_88" id="Page_88">[Pg 88]</a></span></p> + +<h2>XVI</h2> + +<p>Mr. Lloyd George's speech at the Mansion House in July, 1911, after the +German gunboat "Panther" had anchored off the Moroccan coast, gave an +immense impulse to the jingo spirit in France, because it was taken as +definite assurance of England's good faith in seeing her secret +agreements through to a finish. M. Caillaux, the French Premier, appears +to have had his doubts, nevertheless, inasmuch as the British Foreign +Office did not give a straight reply to the French Foreign Office's +inquiry concerning British action in case the Germans landed a force in +Morocco. He says:</p> + +<blockquote><p>Are we to understand that our powerful neighbours will go right +through to the end with the resolve which they suggest? Are they +ready for all eventualities? The British Ambassador, Sir Francis +Bertie, with whom I converse, does not give me formal assurances. +It is said, of course, that he would see without displeasure the +outbreak of a conflict between France and Germany; his mind works +in the way attributed to a number of leading British officials at +the Foreign Office.</p></blockquote> + +<p><span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_89" id="Page_89">[Pg 89]</a></span></p><p>M. Caillaux here suggests the same suspicion of British intentions +which the Belgian diplomats at London, Paris and Berlin intimate +continually throughout their correspondence since 1905.<a name="FNanchor_9_9" id="FNanchor_9_9"></a><a href="#Footnote_9_9" class="fnanchor">[9]</a> He +accordingly favoured a less energetic policy towards Germany, and was +thrown out of office. Count de Lalaing reported from London, 15 January, +1912, that the revelations which provoked this political crisis were +disagreeable for the English Government. "They seem to prove," he says, +"that the French Premier had been trying to negotiate with Berlin +without the knowledge of the Minister for Foreign Affairs and his other +colleagues, and this is naturally disquieting to a Government whose +interests are bound up with those of France, and which accordingly can +ill tolerate any lapses of this kind." He adds:</p> + +<blockquote><p>These revelations have also strengthened the impression that M. +Caillaux had recently favoured an ultra-conciliatory policy towards +Germany, and this impression was felt all the more painfully in +English official circles, as the full extent of the tension between +London and Berlin caused by the Cabinet of St. James's loyal +behaviour towards the Cabinet at Paris had hardly<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_90" id="Page_90">[Pg 90]</a></span> been grasped. +People in England are reluctant to face the fact that they have +been 'more royalist than the King,' and have shown themselves even +less accommodating than the friend they were backing.... +Accordingly the press unanimously hails with delight the departure +of M. Caillaux, and trusts that sounder traditions may be reverted +to without delay.</p></blockquote> + +<p>This comment on the position of M. Caillaux is one of the most +interesting observations to be found in these documents.</p> + +<div class="footnotes"><h3>FOOTNOTE:</h3> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_9_9" id="Footnote_9_9"></a><a href="#FNanchor_9_9"><span class="label">[9]</span></a> This is worth noticing since M. Caillaux was the pioneer +victim of the charge of being "pro-German."</p></div></div> + +<hr /> + +<p><span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_91" id="Page_91">[Pg 91]</a></span></p> + +<h2>XVII</h2> + +<p>The Balkan war took place in 1912, and the whole history of the year +shows the most mighty efforts of European politicians—efforts which +seem ludicrous and laughable in spite of their tragic quality—to avert +with their left hand the war which they were bringing on with their +right. Mr. Lloyd George is right in saying that no one really wanted +war. What every one wanted, and what every one was trying with might and +main to do, was to cook the omelette of economic imperialism without +breaking any eggs. There was in all the countries, naturally, a jingo +nationalist party which wanted war. In Russia, which was then busily +reorganizing her military forces which had been used up and left +prostrate by the war with the Japanese, the pan-Slavists were +influential and vociferous, but they were not on top. In England there +was a great popular revulsion against the behaviour of the Government +which had so nearly involved the English in a war against Germany the +year before; and Mr. <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_92" id="Page_92">[Pg 92]</a></span>Asquith's Government, which was pacifist in +tendency, was meeting the popular sentiment in every way possible, +<i>short of the one point of revealing the secret engagements which bound +it to the French Government and contingently to the Russian Government</i>. +Lord Haldane undertook an official mission to Berlin, which was attended +with great publicity and was popularly supposed to be of a pacificatory +nature; and really, within the limits of the Franco-English diplomatic +agreement, it went as far as it could in the establishment of good +relations. In fact, of course, it came to nothing; as long as the +diplomatic agreement remained in force, it could come to nothing, +nothing of the sort could come to anything; and the diplomatic agreement +being guarded as a close secret, the reason why it must come to nothing +was not apparent. The German Government also made tremendous efforts in +behalf of peace; and it must be noted by those who accept the theory +upon which the treaty of Versailles is based, that if Germany had wished +or intended at any time to strike at the peace of Europe, now was the +moment for her to do so. Instead, the German Emperor in person, and the +German Government, through one of its best diplomatic agents, Baron von +Marschall, met every<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_93" id="Page_93">[Pg 93]</a></span> pacific overture more than half-way, and +themselves initiated all that could be thought of. "There is no doubt," +wrote Baron Beyens from Berlin, "that the Emperor, the Chancellor and +the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs (von Kiderlen-Wächter) are +passionately pacifists." Baron Beyens again says, 28 June, 1912, "The +Emperor is persistent and has not given up hopes of winning back English +sympathies, just as he has succeeded up to a certain point in obtaining +the confidence of the Tsar, by the force of his personal attractions." +Those who believe in the extraordinary notion of an unprepared and +unsuspecting Europe, should read the diplomatic history of the year +1912, when all the chief office-holders in England and on the Continent +were struggling like men caught in a quicksand, or like flies on +fly-paper, to avert, or if they could not avert, to defer the inevitable +war.</p> + +<p>In one country, however, the jingo nationalist and militarist party came +on top; and that country was France. M. Caillaux was succeeded by +Raymond Poincaré; and in January, 1913, Poincaré became President of the +Republic. Up to 1912, the people of France were increasingly indisposed +to war and were developing a considerable impatience with militarism, +and the<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_94" id="Page_94">[Pg 94]</a></span> French Government was responsive to this sentiment. It knew, as +Baron Guillaume remarked at the time of the Agadir incident, that "a war +would be the death-knell of the Republic." M. Caillaux seems to have +measured the feelings of his countrymen quite well. Baron Guillaume says +that after the dispatch of the "Panther," the British Cabinet's first +proposal was that the British and French Governments should each +immediately send two men-of-war to Agadir; and that the French Cabinet +strongly objected. Again, he says in his report of 8 July, 1911, "I am +persuaded that Messrs. Caillaux and de Selves regret the turn given to +the Moroccan affair by their predecessors in office. They were quite +ready to give way, provided they could do so without humiliation."</p> + +<p>The speech of Mr. Lloyd George at the Mansion House, however, which was +taken by the French (and how correctly they took it became apparent on 3 +August, 1914) as a definite assurance of British support against +Germany, gave the militarist-nationalist party the encouragement to go +ahead and dominate the domestic politics of France. It put the +Poincaré-Millerand-Delcassé element on its feet and stiffened its +resolution, besides clearing the way in large measure<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_95" id="Page_95">[Pg 95]</a></span> for its +predominance. On 14 February, 1913, Baron Guillaume reports from Paris thus:</p> + +<blockquote><p>The new President of the Republic enjoys a popularity in France +to-day unknown to any of his predecessors.... Various factors +contribute to explain his popularity. His election had been +carefully prepared in advance; people are pleased at the skilful +way in which, while a Minister, he manœuvred to bring France to +the fore in the concert of Europe; he has hit upon some happy +phrases that stick in the popular mind.</p></blockquote> + +<p>The career of M. Poincaré, in fact, and his management of popular +sentiment, show many features which <i>mutatis mutandis</i>, find a parallel +in the career of Theodore Roosevelt. Baron Guillaume adds, however, this +extremely striking observation concerning the popularity of M. Poincaré:</p> + +<blockquote><p>But above all, one must regard it as a manifestation of the old +French chauvinistic spirit, which had for many years slumbered, but +which had come to life again since the affair of Agadir.</p></blockquote> + +<p>In the same communication to the Belgian Foreign Office, Baron Guillaume remarks:</p> + +<blockquote><p>M. Poincaré is a native of Lorraine, and loses no opportunity of +telling people so. He was M. Millerand's colleague, and the +instigator of his militarist policy.</p> + +<p>Finally, the first word that he uttered at the very<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_96" id="Page_96">[Pg 96]</a></span> moment when he +learned that he was elected President of the Republic, was a +promise that he would watch over and maintain all the means of +national defence.</p></blockquote> + +<p>M. Poincaré had not been in office two months when he recalled the +French Ambassador at Petersburg, M. Georges Louis, and appointed in his +stead M. Delcassé. Concerning this stupendous move, Baron Guillaume +reported 21 February, 1913, to the Belgian Foreign Office thus:</p> + +<blockquote><p>The news that M. Delcassé is shortly to be appointed Ambassador at +Petersburg burst like a bomb here yesterday afternoon.... He was +one of the architects of the Franco-Russian alliance, and still +more so of the Anglo-French <i>entente</i>.</p></blockquote> + +<p>Baron Guillaume goes on to say that he does not think that M. Delcassé's +appointment should be interpreted as a demonstration against Germany; but he adds:</p> + +<blockquote><p>I do think, however, that M. Poincaré, a Lorrainer, was not sorry +to show, from the first day of entering on his high office, how +anxious he is to stand firm and hold aloft the national flag. That +is the danger involved in having M. Poincaré at the Elysée in these +anxious days through which Europe is passing. It was under his +Ministry that the militarist, slightly bellicose instincts of the +French woke up again. He has been thought to have a measure of +responsibility for this change of mood.</p></blockquote> + +<p><span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_97" id="Page_97">[Pg 97]</a></span></p><p>M. Georges Louis, who had represented the French Government at +Petersburg for three years, was a resolute opponent of the militarist +faction in France, and was therefore distinctly <i>persona non grata</i> to +the corresponding faction in Russia. At the head of this faction stood +Isvolsky, who was a friend of M. Poincaré and a kindred spirit; hence +when M. Poincaré became Premier, an attempt was made to oust M. Louis, +but it was unsuccessful. M. Delcassé, on the other hand, is described by +Mr. Morel as "the man identified more than any other man in French +public life with the anti-German war-party." Mr. Morel, in commenting on +the appointment of M. Delcassé quotes the following from a report sent +by the Russian Ambassador in London to the Foreign Office in Petersburg. +It was written four days after the appointment of M. Delcassé, and quite +bears out the impression made upon the Belgian agents.<a name="FNanchor_10_10" id="FNanchor_10_10"></a><a href="#Footnote_10_10" class="fnanchor">[10]</a></p> + +<blockquote><p>When I recall his [M. Cambon, the French Ambassador in London] +conversations with me, and the attitude of Poincaré, the thought +comes to me as a conviction, that of all the powers France is the +only one which, not to say that it wishes war, would yet look upon +it <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_98" id="Page_98">[Pg 98]</a></span>without great regret.... She [France] has, either rightly or +wrongly, complete trust in her army; the old effervescing minority +has again shown itself.</p></blockquote> + +<div class="footnotes"><h3>FOOTNOTE:</h3> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_10_10" id="Footnote_10_10"></a><a href="#FNanchor_10_10"><span class="label">[10]</span></a> But perhaps Count Beuckendorf was pro-German, too!</p></div> +</div> + +<hr /> + +<p><span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_99" id="Page_99">[Pg 99]</a></span></p> + +<h2>XVIII</h2> + +<p>The French war-party, represented by MM. Poincaré, Millerand and +Delcassé, came into political predominance in January, 1912, and +consolidated its ascendancy one year later, when M. Raymond Poincaré +became President of the French Republic. All through 1912 there was an +immense amount of correspondence and consultation between the French and +Russian Governments, and all through 1913 Russia showed extraordinary +activity in military preparation. In England, Mr. Asquith's Government +had to face a strong revulsion of popular feeling against the attitude +of its diplomacy, which had so nearly involved the country in war with +Germany at the time of the Agadir incident.</p> + +<p>As always, the figures of expenditure tell the story; and the history of +1912-14 should be continually illustrated by reference to the financial +statistics of the period, which have been given in earlier chapters. For +instance, Russia, which spent (in round numbers) £3¼ million on new<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_100" id="Page_100">[Pg 100]</a></span> +naval construction in 1911, spent £7 million in 1912, £12 million in +1913, and £13 million in 1914. The fact that, as Professor Raymond +Beazley puts it, in the ten years before the war, and with increasing +insistence, Paris and St. Petersburg spent upon armaments £159 million +more than Berlin or Vienna, ought to suffice at least to reopen the +question of responsibility.</p> + +<p>It must be carefully noted that by the spring of 1912, the Balkan +League, which was engineered by the Russian diplomat Hartwig, was fully +formed. This put the diplomacy of the Balkan States under the direct +control of the Russian Foreign Office. It now became necessary for the +Russian Foreign Office to ascertain, in case war between Serbia and +Austria broke out, and Germany should help Austria and Russia should +help Serbia, whether Russia could count on the support of France and +England. Russia received this assurance in secret, and the terms of it +were discovered by the Soviet Government in the archives of the Foreign +Office and published in 1919. This is a most important fact, and should +be continually borne in mind in connexion with the fact that the war was +precipitated by the murder of the Austrian Archduke by Serbian officers, +members of the pan-Slavist organization fostered<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_101" id="Page_101">[Pg 101]</a></span> and encouraged by MM. +Isvolsky and Hartwig.</p> + +<p>On 9 August, 1912, M. Poincaré, then Premier of France, made a visit to +St. Petersburg, where he was joined by his kindred spirit, M. Isvolsky, +who was then the Russian Ambassador at Paris. It was the usual visit of +State, and Russia staged an imposing series of military manœuvres in +M. Poincaré's honour. But the really important events that took place +were these. First, a naval agreement was made between France and Russia, +whereby France agreed to concentrate her naval forces in the Eastern +Mediterranean in order to support the Russian navy in the Black Sea. +This agreement was secret, and revealed by the Soviet Government in +1918. Then, in the same month, the Third French Naval Squadron was +transferred from the Atlantic to the Mediterranean. M. Poincaré told M. +Isvolsky that "this decision has been made in agreement with England, +and forms the further development and completion of the arrangement +already made previously between the French and British +Staffs"—referring to the conference of Messrs. Asquith and Churchill +and Lord Kitchener at Malta, the month before, at which the new +disposition of the English and French fleets was decided. The third +matter of consequence that took place in the month of<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_102" id="Page_102">[Pg 102]</a></span> August was that +the Russian Government began to put pressure on the French Government to +re-establish the Three Years Military Service law.</p> + +<p>So much for August. In the month of September, M. Poincaré gave the +Russian Foreign Minister, M. Sazonov, assurance that if Germany helped +Austria in a struggle in the Balkans, and if Russia were drawn in on the +other side, France "would not hesitate for a moment to fulfil its +obligations towards Russia." In the same month, M. Isvolsky had an +interview with the King of England and Sir Edward Grey, the British +Foreign Minister, in which both King George and Sir E. Grey assured him +of the fullest British co-operation in the same event. M. Isvolsky +reported to the Russian Foreign Office at St. Petersburg, that "Grey, +upon his own initiative, corroborated what I already knew from +Poincaré—the existence of an agreement between France and Great +Britain, according to which England undertook, in case of a war with +Germany, not only to come to the assistance of France on the sea, but +also on the Continent, by landing troops." These two understandings +between MM. Poincaré and Sazonov, and between M. Isvolsky and Sir E. +Grey, were secret, and nothing was known of them until 1919, when the +memoranda of<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_103" id="Page_103">[Pg 103]</a></span> them were published by the Soviet Government.<a name="FNanchor_11_11" id="FNanchor_11_11"></a><a href="#Footnote_11_11" class="fnanchor">[11]</a></p> + +<p>A train of gunpowder, in other words, had been laid from Belgrade +through Paris and London to St. Petersburg; and at the beginning of that +train was the highly inflammable and inflammatory pan-Slavism, organized +by M. Hartwig with the connivance of M. Isvolsky. A spark struck in the +Balkans would cause the train to flash into flame throughout its entire +length.</p> + +<div class="footnotes"><h3>FOOTNOTE:</h3> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_11_11" id="Footnote_11_11"></a><a href="#FNanchor_11_11"><span class="label">[11]</span></a> On 10 March of the following year, Mr. Asquith, replying +to a question in the Commons from Lord Hugh Cecil, denied that England +was under an "obligation arising owing to an assurance given by the +Ministry in the course of diplomatic negotiations, to send a very large +armed force out of this country to operate in Europe." On 24 March, he +made similar denials in reply to questions from Sir W. Byles and Mr. +King. On 14 April, Mr. Runciman, in a speech at Birkenhead, denied "in +the most categorical way" the existence of a secret understanding with +any foreign Power! On 3 May, the Secretary for the Colonies, Mr. +Harcourt, declared publicly that he "could conceive no circumstances in +which Continental operations would not be a crime against the people of +this country." On 28 June, the under-Secretary for Foreign Affairs, Mr. +Acland, declared publicly that "in no European question were we +concerned to interfere with a big army." On 1 July, Lord Loreburn, Lord +Chancellor from 1906 to 1912, said "that any British Government would be +so guilty towards our country as to take up arms in a foreign quarrel is +more than I can believe." On 28 April, 1914, and again on 11 June, Sir +E. Grey confirmed, in the House of Commons, Mr. Asquith's assertion, +made 10 and 24 March, 1913, of British freedom from engagements with +Continental Powers. +</p><p> +Yet, curiously the professions of politicians are still trusted, and +people still expect something from their machinations; they expected +something substantial from the recent conference in Washington, on the +limitation of armaments, for instance—a striking and pathetic example +of the strength of superstition.</p></div></div> + +<hr /> + +<p><span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_104" id="Page_104">[Pg 104]</a></span></p> + +<h2>XIX</h2> + +<p>On 25 April, 1912, the German Reichstag put through its first reading a +bill, with only perfunctory debate, for an increase in the German army +and navy. This measure has been regularly and officially interpreted as +a threat. Yet nearly a year after, on 19 February, 1913, Baron +Guillaume, writing from Paris about the prospects of the Three Years +Service bill, reports to the Belgian Foreign Office that the French +Minister of War "does not regard the measures taken by Germany as a +demonstration of hostility, but rather as an act of prudence for the +future. Germany fears that she may one day have to fight Russia and +France together, perhaps England too; and then any help that Austria +might give her would be seriously handicapped by the fact that the Dual +Monarchy [Austria-Hungary] would have to withstand a coalition of Balkan +States."</p> + +<p>Naturally. The bill was presented to the Reichstag in April, and the +"coalition of Balkan<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_105" id="Page_105">[Pg 105]</a></span> States," M. Hartwig's Balkan League, had already +completed its organization in February. Not only so, but the very first +step taken by this exemplary organization provided for a division of +spoils in the event of a successful war with Turkey; and six months +after the organization of the League was concluded, it served an +ultimatum upon Turkey over Albania, and in October went to war. The +German Government could quite plainly see the future about to be +inaugurated through this consolidation of Balkan policy into the hands +of the Russian Foreign Office—any one even an attentive reader of +newspapers, could see it—and it could see the vastly increased +responsibility of its Austrian ally, in case of a quarrel, should it +have to take on a coalition of the Balkan States instead of a single +one.</p> + +<p>Count de Lalaing reported from London, 24 February, 1918, that the +British Foreign Office took the same sensible view of the German +military increases as, according to Baron Guillaume, was taken by M. +Jonnart. "The English press," he says, "is of course anxious to saddle +Germany with the responsibility for the fresh tension caused by her +schemes—a tension which may give Europe fresh reasons for uneasiness." +But, he goes on—</p> + +<p><span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_106" id="Page_106">[Pg 106]</a></span></p><blockquote><p>At the Foreign Office I found a more equitable and calmer estimate +of the situation. They see in the reinforcement of the German +armies not so much a provocation as an admission that circumstances +have weakened Germany's military position, and that it must be +strengthened. The Berlin Government is compelled to recognize that +it can no longer count upon being supported by the whole force of +its Austrian ally, now that a new Power, that of the Balkan +Federation, has made its appearance in South-eastern Europe, right +at the gates of the Dual Empire.... Under these circumstances, the +Foreign Office sees nothing astonishing in Germany's finding it +imperative to increase the number of her army corps. The Foreign +Office also states that the Berlin Government had told the Paris +Cabinet quite frankly that such were the motives for its action.</p></blockquote> + +<p>The same view was publicly expressed by Mr. Lloyd George himself as late +as 1 January, 1914, when he said:</p> + +<blockquote><p>The German army was vital, not merely to the existence of the +German Empire, but to the very life and independence of the nation +itself, surrounded, as Germany is, by other nations, each of which +possesses armies as powerful as her own. We forget that while we +insist upon a sixty-per-cent superiority (as far as our naval +strength is concerned) over Germany being essential to guarantee +the integrity of our own shores, Germany herself has nothing like +that superiority over France alone, and she has of course, in +addition, to reckon with Russia<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_107" id="Page_107">[Pg 107]</a></span> on her eastern frontier. Germany +has nothing which approximates to a two-Power standard. She has, +therefore, become alarmed by recent issues, and is spending huge +sums of money on the expansion of her military resources.</p></blockquote> + +<p>Those are the words, be it remembered, of the same person who says +to-day that German responsibility for the war which broke out six months +after he had made the foregoing statement, is a <i>chose jugée</i>! The +statement was made, furthermore, not only <i>after</i> the German bill of 25 +April, 1912, but <i>after</i> the bill of 8 April, 1913, as well, which fixed +the peace-strength of the German army at 870,000.</p> + +<p>The Three Years Service law passed the French Chamber in August, 1913, +after a passionate popular campaign. Of this measure Baron Guillaume +says that the French newspapers, <i>Le Temps</i> in particular, "are wrong in +representing the French Government's plans as being in response to +measures adopted by Germany. Many of them are but the outcome of +measures which have long been prepared." The French Minister, M. +Jonnart, told him that "we know very well what an advantage our +neighbour [Germany] has in the continual growth of his population; +still, we must do all that lies in our power to compensate<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_108" id="Page_108">[Pg 108]</a></span> this +advantage by better military organization." Probably this view of the +Three Years Service law was the view held by all save the relatively +small and highly-integrated war-faction; and in so far as military +measures are ever reasonable, this, like the corresponding measures +taken in Germany, must be regarded as reasonable. As M. Pichon told +Baron Guillaume, "We are not arming for war, we are arming to avoid it, +to exorcise it.... We must go on arming more and more in order to +prevent war." There is no reason whatever to suppose that this view was +not sincerely entertained by M. Pichon and by many others, probably by a +majority of the persons most responsibly concerned.</p> + +<p>But the consequences of the Three Years Service law were contemplated by +Baron Guillaume with great apprehension. He reports on 12 June, 1913, +that "the burden of the new law will fall so heavily upon the +population, and the expenditure which it will involve will be so +exorbitant, that there will soon be an outcry in the country, and France +will be faced with this dilemma: either renounce what she can not bear +to forgo, or else, war at short notice." Of the militarist party now in +the ascendancy, he says: "They are followed with a sort of infatuation, +a kind<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_109" id="Page_109">[Pg 109]</a></span> of frenzy which is interesting but deplorable. One is not now +allowed, under pain of being marked as a traitor, to express even a +doubt of the need for the Three Years Service."</p> + +<p>Public opinion was evidently confiscated by the +Poincaré-Millerand-Delcassé group, much as it was in the United States +in 1917 by the war-party headed by Mr. Wilson. Baron Guillaume uses +words that must remind us of those days. "Every one knows," he says, +"that the mass of the nation is by no means in favour of the projected +reform, and they understand the danger that lies ahead. But they shut +their eyes and press on."</p> + +<hr /> + +<p><span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_110" id="Page_110">[Pg 110]</a></span></p> + +<h2>XX</h2> + +<p>The train of powder, however, had been laid by the diplomatic +engagements. Austria-Hungary and Serbia came into collision in the +spring of 1913 over the Scutari incident. In December, 1912, M. Sazonov +had urged Serbia to play a waiting game in order to "deliver a blow at +Austria." But on 4 April, 1913, Baron Beyens reports from Berlin that +the arrogance and contempt with which the Serbs receive the Vienna +Cabinet's protests over Scutari</p> + +<blockquote><p>can only be explained by their belief that St. Petersburg will +support them. The Serbian chargé d'affaires was quite openly saying +here lately that his Government would not have persisted in its +course for the last six months in the face of the Austrian +opposition had they not received encouragement in their course from +the Russian Minister, M. de Hartwig, who is a diplomatist of M. +Isvolsky's school.... M. Sazonov's heart is with his colleagues who +are directing the policy of the Great Powers, but he feels his +influence with the Tsar being undermined by the court-party and the +pan-Slavists. Hence his inconsequent behaviour.</p></blockquote> + +<p><span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_111" id="Page_111">[Pg 111]</a></span></p><p>The military activity which the Russian Government displayed in 1913 +gives interest to this estimate of M. Sazonov's position. No doubt to +some extent the estimate was correct; M. Sazonov, like Sir E. Grey, was +probably, when it was too late, much disquieted by the events which +marshalled him the way that he was going. In 1914, this military +activity gained extraordinary intensity. The Russian army was put upon a +peace-footing of approximately 1,400,000, "an effective numerical +strength hitherto unprecedented," said the St. Petersburg correspondent +of the London <i>Times</i>. From January to June, the Russian Government made +immense purchases of war material. In February, it concluded a loan in +Paris for the improvement of its strategic roads and railways on the +German frontier. Russia, as was generally known at the time, had her eye +on the acquisition of Constantinople; and in the same month, February, a +council of war was held in St. Petersburg to work out "a general +programme of action in order to secure for us a favourable solution of +the historical question of the Straits." In March, the St. Petersburg +newspaper which served as the mouthpiece of the Minister of War, +published an article <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_112" id="Page_112">[Pg 112]</a></span>stating that Russia's strategy would no longer be +"defensive" but "active." Another paper spoke of the time coming when +"the crossing of the Austrian frontier by the Russian army would be an +unavoidable decision." In the same month, Russia raised a heavy tariff +against the importation of German grain and flour; thus bearing out the +evidence of German trade-reports that even at this time Germany was +still exporting grain to Russia—a most extraordinary proceeding for a +nation which contemplated a sudden declaration of war before the next +harvest. In the same month, the Russian Government brought in military +estimates of £97 million. It exercised heavy pressure on the French +Government in the protracted political turmoil over the maintenance of +the Three Years Service law. In April, "trial mobilizations" were begun, +and were continued up to the outbreak of the war. In May, M. Sazonov +informed the Tsar that the British Government "has decided to empower +the British Admiralty Staff to enter into negotiations with French and +Russian naval agents in London for the purpose of drawing technical +conditions for possible action by the naval forces of England, Russia +and France." In the same month, a complete mobilization of all the +reserves of the three annual<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_113" id="Page_113">[Pg 113]</a></span> contingents of 1907-1909 was ordered for +the whole Russian Empire, as a "test," to take place in the autumn. In +the same month the Russian Admiralty instructed its agent in London, +Captain Volkov, as follows:</p> + +<blockquote><p>Our interests on the Northern scene of operations require that +England keeps as large a part of the German fleet as possible in +check in the North Sea.... The English Government could render us a +substantial service if it would agree to send a sufficient number +of boats to our Baltic ports to compensate for our lack of means of +transport, before the beginning of war-operations.</p></blockquote> + +<p>This document, revealed by the Soviet Government in 1919, is pretty +damaging to the assumption of an "unprepared and unsuspecting Europe"; +especially as Professor Conybeare has given publicity to the fact that +"before the beginning of war-operations" those English boats were there, +prompt to the minute, empty, ready and waiting.</p> + +<p>In June, the Russian Ambassador warned the Russian naval staff in London +that they must exercise great caution in talking about a landing in +Pomerania or about the dispatch of English boats to the Russian Baltic +ports before the outbreak of war, "so that the rest may not be +jeopardized." On 13 June, the newspaper-organ of the<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_114" id="Page_114">[Pg 114]</a></span> Russian Minister +of War published an inspired article under the caption: "Russia is +Ready: France must be Ready."</p> + +<p>Two weeks later, the Austrian heir-apparent, the Archduke Francis +Joseph, was murdered at Sarajevo, a town in Bosnia, by Serbian officers. +The murder was arranged by the Serbian Major Tankesitch, of the +pan-Slavist organization known as the Black Hand; and this organization +was fostered, if not actually subsidized, by the Russian Minister at +Belgrade, M. Hartwig, the pupil and <i>alter ego</i> of M. Isvolsky, and the +architect and promoter of the Balkan League!</p> + + + + + + + + +<pre> + + + + + +End of Project Gutenberg's The Myth of a Guilty Nation, by Albert Jay Nock + +*** END OF THIS PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK THE MYTH OF A GUILTY NATION *** + +***** This file should be named 44508-h.htm or 44508-h.zip ***** +This and all associated files of various formats will be found in: + http://www.gutenberg.org/4/4/5/0/44508/ + +Produced by Martin Pettit and the Online Distributed +Proofreading Team at http://www.pgdp.net (This file was +produced from images generously made available by The +Internet Archive) + + +Updated editions will replace the previous one--the old editions +will be renamed. + +Creating the works from public domain print editions means that no +one owns a United States copyright in these works, so the Foundation +(and you!) can copy and distribute it in the United States without +permission and without paying copyright royalties. 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Thus, we do not necessarily +keep eBooks in compliance with any particular paper edition. + + +Most people start at our Web site which has the main PG search facility: + + http://www.gutenberg.org + +This Web site includes information about Project Gutenberg-tm, +including how to make donations to the Project Gutenberg Literary +Archive Foundation, how to help produce our new eBooks, and how to +subscribe to our email newsletter to hear about new eBooks. + + +</pre> + +</body> +</html> diff --git a/old/44508-h/images/cover.jpg b/old/44508-h/images/cover.jpg Binary files differnew file mode 100644 index 0000000..8b6371c --- /dev/null +++ b/old/44508-h/images/cover.jpg diff --git a/old/44508-h/images/dec.jpg b/old/44508-h/images/dec.jpg Binary files differnew file mode 100644 index 0000000..2e4e87d --- /dev/null +++ b/old/44508-h/images/dec.jpg diff --git a/old/44508.txt b/old/44508.txt new file mode 100644 index 0000000..c50421d --- /dev/null +++ b/old/44508.txt @@ -0,0 +1,2671 @@ +Project Gutenberg's The Myth of a Guilty Nation, by Albert Jay Nock + +This eBook is for the use of anyone anywhere at no cost and with +almost no restrictions whatsoever. You may copy it, give it away or +re-use it under the terms of the Project Gutenberg License included +with this eBook or online at www.gutenberg.org/license + + +Title: The Myth of a Guilty Nation + +Author: Albert Jay Nock + +Release Date: December 25, 2013 [EBook #44508] + +Language: English + +Character set encoding: ASCII + +*** START OF THIS PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK THE MYTH OF A GUILTY NATION *** + + + + +Produced by Martin Pettit and the Online Distributed +Proofreading Team at http://www.pgdp.net (This file was +produced from images generously made available by The +Internet Archive) + + + + + + +THE MYTH OF A GUILTY NATION + +BY + +ALBERT JAY NOCK + +("HISTORICUS") + +[Illustration: Decoration] + +NEW YORK B.W. HUEBSCH, INC. MCMXXII + + +COPYRIGHT, 1922, BY +THE FREEMAN, INC. + +COPYRIGHT, 1922, BY +B. W. HUEBSCH, INC. + +PRINTED IN U. S. A. + + + + +PREFACE + + +This book is made up of a series of articles originally published in the +_Freeman_. It was compiled to establish one point and only one, namely: +that the German Government was not solely guilty of bringing on the war. +I have not been at all concerned with measuring the German Government's +share of guilt, with trying to show that it was either great or small, +or that it was either less or more than that of any other Government or +association of Governments. All this is beside the point. I do not by +any means wish to escape the responsibility of saying that I think the +German Government's share of guilt in the matter is extremely small; so +small by comparison with that of the major Powers allied against +Germany, as to be inconsiderable. That is my belief, demonstrable as I +think by such evidence as has now become available to any candid person. +But this has nothing whatever to do with the subject-matter of this +volume. If the guilt of the German Government could be proved to be ten +times greater than it was represented to be by the publicity-bureaux of +the Allied Powers, the conclusion established in the following chapters +would still remain. Guilty as the German Government may have been; +multiply by ten any estimate that any person, interested or +disinterested, informed or uninformed, may put upon its guilt; the fact +remains that it was far, very far indeed, from being the only guilty +party concerned. + +If there were no practical end to be gained by establishing this +conclusion, if one's purpose were only to give the German Government the +dubious vindication of a _tu quoque_, the effort would be hardly worth +making. But as I say at the outset, there is at stake an extremely +important matter, one that will unfavourably affect the peace of the +world for at least a generation--the treaty of Versailles. If the German +Government may not be assumed to be solely responsible for the war, this +treaty is indefensible; for it is constructed wholly upon that +assumption. It becomes, not a treaty, but a verdict pronounced after the +manner of Brennus, by a superior power which, without regard to justice, +arrogates to itself the functions of prosecutor, jury and judge. + +It is probably superfluous to point out that this treaty, conceived in +the pure spirit of the victorious Apache, has, in practice, utterly +broken down. It has not worked and it will not work, because it sets at +defiance certain economic laws which are as inexorable as the law of +gravitation. The incidence of these laws was well understood and clearly +foretold, at the time of the peace-conference, by an informed minority +in Europe, notably by Mr. Maynard Keynes in his volume entitled "The +Economic Consequences of the Peace." In this country also, a minority, +sufficiently informed to know its right hand from its left in economic +affairs, stood aghast in contemplation of the ruinous consequences which +it perceived as inevitable under any serious attempt to put this vicious +instrument into operation. But both here and in Europe, this minority +was very small and uninfluential, and could accomplish nothing against +the ignorant and unreasoning bad temper which the politicians kept +aflame. + +The treaty had therefore to go to the test of experiment; and of the +results of this, one need surely say nothing, for they are obvious. The +harder Germany tried to fulfill the conditions of the treaty, and the +nearer she came to doing so, the worse things went in all the countries +that were presumably to benefit by her sacrifice. The Central Empires +are, as the informed minority in all countries has been from the +beginning anxiously aware, the key-group in the whole of European +industry and commerce. If they must work and trade under unfavourable +conditions, they also thereby automatically impose correspondingly +unfavourable conditions upon the whole of Europe; and, correspondingly +unfavourable conditions are thereby in turn automatically set up +wherever the trade of Europe reaches--for example, in the United States. +There is now no possible doubt about this, for one has but to glance at +the enormous dislocations of international commerce, and the universal +and profound stagnation of industry, in order to prove it to one's +complete satisfaction. Germany wisely and far-sightedly made a sincere +and vigourous effort to comply with the conditions of the treaty; and by +so doing she has carried the rest of the world to the verge of economic +collapse. The damage wrought by the war was in general of a spectacular +and impressive type, and was indeed very great--no one would minimize +it--but the damage, present and prospective, wrought by the treaty of +peace is much greater and more far-reaching. + +The political inheritors of those who made the peace are now extremely +uneasy about it. Their predecessors (including Mr. Lloyd George, who +still remains in office) had flogged up popular hatred against the +Central Empires at such a rate that when they took office they still +had, or thought they had, to court and indulge this hatred. Thus we +found Mr. Secretary Hughes, for example, in his first communication to +the German Government, laying it down that the basis of the Versailles +treaty was sound--that Germany was solely responsible for the war. He +spoke of it quite in the vein of Mr. Lloyd George, as a _chose jugee_. +After having promulgated the treaty with such immense ceremony, and +raised such preposterous and extravagant popular expectations on the +strength of it, the architects of the treaty bequeathed an exceedingly +difficult task to their successors; the task of letting the public down, +diverting their attention with this or that gesture, taking their mind +off their disappointments and scaling down their expectations, so that +in time it might be safe to let the Versailles treaty begin to sink out +of sight. + +The task is being undertaken; the curious piece of mountebankery +recently staged in Washington, for example, was an ambitious effort to +keep the peoples, particularly those of Europe, hopeful, confiding and +diverted; and if economic conditions permit, if times do not become too +hard, it may succeed. The politicians can not say outright that the +theory of the Versailles treaty is dishonest and outrageous, and that +the only chance of peace and well-being is by tearing up the treaty and +starting anew on another basis entirely. They can not say this on +account of the exigencies of their detestable trade. The best that they +can do is what they are doing. They must wait until the state of public +feeling permits them to ease down from their uncompromising stand upon +the treaty. Gradually, they expect, the public will accustom itself to +the idea of relaxations and accommodations, as it sees, from day to day, +the patent impracticability of any other course; feelings will weaken, +asperities soften, hatreds die out, contacts and approaches of one kind +or another will take place; and finally, these public men or their +political inheritors will think themselves able to effect in an +unobtrusive way, such substantial modifications of the treaty of +Versailles as will amount to its annulment. + +The process is worth accelerating by every means possible; and what I +have here done is meant to assist it. There are many persons in the +country who are not politicians, and who are capable and desirous of +approaching a matter of this kind with intellectual honesty. Quite +possibly they are not aware, many of them, that the Versailles treaty +postulates the sole responsibility of the German Government for bringing +on the war; undoubtedly they are not acquainted with such evidence as I +have here compiled to show that this assumption is unjust and erroneous. +Having read this evidence, they will be in a position to review the +terms of the Versailles treaty and reassess the justice of those terms. +They will also be able to understand the unwillingness, the inability, +of the German people to acquiesce in those terms; and they can +comprehend the slowness and difficulty wherewith peace and good feeling +are being re-established in Europe, and the extreme precariousness and +uncertainty of Europe's situation--and our own, in +consequence--throughout a future that seems longer than one cares to +contemplate. + +The reader will perceive at once that this book is a mere compilation +and transcription of fact, containing not a shred of opinion or of any +original matter. On this account it was published anonymously in its +serial form, because it seemed to me that such work should be judged +strictly as it stands, without regard to the authority, or lack of +authority, which the compiler might happen to possess. Almost all of it +is lifted straight from the works of my friends Mr. Francis Neilson and +Mr. E. D. Morel. I earnestly hope--indeed, it is my chief motive in +publishing this book--that it may serve as an introduction to these +words. I can not place too high an estimate upon their importance to a +student of British and Continental diplomacy. They are, as far as I +know, alone in their field; nothing else can take their place. They are +so thorough, so exhaustive and so authoritative that I wonder at their +being so little known in the United States. Mr. Morel's works,[1] "Ten +Years of Secret Diplomacy," "Truth and the War," and "Diplomacy +Revealed," are simply indispensable. Mr. Neilson's book "How Diplomats +Make War,"[2] is not an easy book to read; no more are Mr. Morel's; but +without having read it no serious student can possibly do justice to the +subject. + +ALBERT JAY NOCK + +FOOTNOTES: + +[1] "Ten Years of Secret Diplomacy." $1.25. "Truth and the War." $1.25. +E. D. Morel. New York: B. W. Huebsch. + +"Diplomacy Revealed." E. D. Morel. London, 8 & 9 Johnson's Court: +National Labour Press. + +[2] "How Diplomats Make War." Francis Neilson. New York: B. W. Huebsch. +$2.00 + + + + +THE MYTH OF A GUILTY NATION + + + + +I + + +The present course of events in Europe is impressing on us once more the +truth that military victory, if it is to stand, must also be +demonstrably a victory for justice. In the long run, victory must appeal +to the sense of justice in the conquered no less than in the conquerors, +if it is to be effective. There is no way of getting around this. Mr. +Gilbert K. Chesterton is right when he says that if the South had not +finally accepted the outcome of the Civil War as being on the whole +just, Lincoln would have been wrong in trying to preserve the Union; +which is only another way of expressing Lincoln's own homely saying that +nothing is ever really settled until it is settled right. The present +condition of Europe is largely due to the fact that the official +peacemakers have not taken into their reckoning the German people's +sense of justice. Their mistake--it was also Mr. Wilson's great +mistake--was in their disregard of what Bismarck called the +imponderabilia. The terms of the peace treaty plainly reflect this +mistake. That is largely the reason why the treaty is to-day inoperative +and worthless. That is largely why the Governments of Europe are +confronted with the inescapable alternative: they can either tear up the +treaty and replace it by an understanding based on justice, or they can +stick to the treaty and by so doing protract indefinitely the dismal +succession of wars, revolutions, bankruptcies and commercial +dislocations that the treaty inaugurated. + +That is the situation; and it is a situation in which the people of the +United States have an interest to preserve--the primary interest of a +creditor, and also the interest of a trader who needs a large and stable +market. It is idle to suppose that American business can prosper so long +as Europe remains in a condition of instability and insolvency. Our +business is adjusted to the scale of a solvent Europe, and it can not be +readjusted without irreparable damage. Until certain matters connected +with the war are resolutely put under review, Europe can not be +reconstructed, and the United States can not be prosperous. The only +thing that can better our own situation is the resumption of normal +economic life in Europe; and this can be done only through a thorough +reconsideration of the injustices that have been put upon the German +people by the conditions of the armistice and the peace treaty. + +Of these injustices, the greatest, because it is the foundation for all +the rest, is the imputation of Germany's sole responsibility for the +war. The German people will never endure that imputation; they should +never be expected to endure it. Nothing can really be settled until the +question of responsibility is openly and candidly re-examined, and an +understanding established that is based on facts instead of on official +misrepresentation. This question is by no means one of abstract justice +alone, or of chivalry and fair play towards a defeated enemy. It is a +question of self-interest, immediate and urgent. However it may be +regarded by the American sense of justice and fair play, it remains, to +the eye of American industry and commerce, a straight question of +dollars and cents. The prosperity of the United States, as we are +beginning to see, hangs upon the economic re-establishment of Europe. +Europe can not possibly be settled upon the present terms of peace; and +these terms can not be changed without first vacating the theory of +Germany's sole responsibility, because it is upon this theory that the +treaty of Versailles was built. This theory, therefore, must be +re-examined in the light of evidence that the Allied and Associated +Governments have done their best either to ignore or to suppress. Hence, +for the American people, the way to prosperity lies through a searching +and honest examination of this theory that has been so deeply implanted +in their mind--the theory of a brigand-nation, plotting in solitude to +achieve the mastery of the world by fire and sword. + +Americans, however, come reluctantly to the task of this examination, +for two reasons. First, we are all tired of the war, we hate to think of +it or of anything connected with it, and as far as possible, we keep it +out of our minds. Second, nearly every reputation of any consequence in +this country, political, clerical, academic and journalistic, is already +committed, head over ears, to the validity of this theory. How many of +our politicians are there whose reputations are not bound up +inextricably with this legend of a German plot? How many of our +newspaper-editors managed to preserve detachment enough under the +pressure of war-propaganda to be able to come forward to-day and say +that the question of responsibility for the war should be re-opened? How +can the pro-war liberals and ex-pacifists ask for such an inquest when +they were all swept off their feet by the specious plea that _this_ war +was a different war from all other wars in the history of mankind? What +can our ministers of religion say after the unreserved endorsement that +they put upon the sanctity of the Allied cause? What can our educators +say, after having served so zealously the ends of the official +propagandists? From our journalists and men of letters what can we +expect--after all his rodomontade about Potsdam and the Potsdam gang, +how could we expect Dr. Henry Van Dyke, for instance, to face the fact +that the portentous Potsdam meeting of the Crown Council on 5 July, +1914, _never took place at all_? There is no use in trying to put a +breaking-strain upon human nature, or, on the other hand, in assuming a +pharisaic attitude towards its simplest and commonest frailties. It is +best, under the circumstances, merely to understand that on this +question every institutional voice in the United States is tongue-tied. +Press, pulpit, schools and universities, charities and foundations, +forums, all are silent; and to expect them to break their silence is to +expect more than should be expected from the pride of opinion in average +human nature. + + + + +II + + +In examining the evidence let us first take Mr. Lloyd George's own +statement of the theory. Except in one particular, it presents the case +against Germany quite as it has been rehearsed by nearly every +institutional voice in the United States. On 4 August, 1917--after +America's entry into the war--the British Premier said: + + + What are we fighting for? To defeat the most dangerous conspiracy + ever plotted against the liberty of nations; carefully, skilfully, + insidiously, clandestinely planned in every detail, with ruthless, + cynical determination. + + +Except for one point, this statement sums up what we have all heard to +be the essential doctrine of the war. The one missing point in Mr. Lloyd +George's indictment is that the great German conspiracy was launched +upon an _unprepared_ Europe. In Europe itself, the official +propagandists did not make much of this particular point, for far too +many people knew better; but in the United States it was promulgated +widely. Indeed, this romance of Allied unpreparedness was an essential +part of the whole story of German responsibility. Germany, so the +official story ran, not only plotted in secret, but she sprung her plot +upon a Europe that was wholly unprepared and unsuspecting. Her action +was like that of a highwayman leaping from ambush upon a defenceless +wayfarer. Belgium was unprepared, France unprepared, Russia unprepared, +England unprepared; and in face of an unprovoked attack, these nations +hurriedly drew together in an extemporized union, and held the "mad dog" +at bay with an extemporized defence until they could devise a plan of +common action and a pooling of military and naval resources. + +Such, then, is a fair statement of the doctrine of the war as America +was taught it. Next, in order to show how fundamental this doctrine is +to the terms of the peace treaty, let us consider another statement of +Mr. Lloyd George made 3 March, 1921: + + + For the allies, German responsibility for the war is fundamental. + It is the basis upon which the structure of the treaty of + Versailles has been erected, and if that acknowledgment is + repudiated or abandoned, the treaty is destroyed.... We wish, + therefore, once and for all, to make it quite clear that German + responsibility for the war must be treated by the Allies as a + _chose jugee_. + + +Thus the British Premier explicitly declares that the treaty of +Versailles is based upon the theory of Germany's sole responsibility. + +Now, as against this theory, the main facts may be summarized as +follows: (1) The British and French General Staffs had been in active +collaboration for war with Germany ever since January 1906. (2) The +British and French Admiralty had been in similar collaboration. (3) The +late Lord Fisher [First Sea Lord of the British Admiralty], twice in the +course of these preparations, proposed an attack upon the German fleet +and a landing upon the coast of Pomerania, _without a declaration of +war_. (4) Russia had been preparing for war ever since 1909, and the +Russian and French General Staffs had come to a formal understanding +that Russian mobilization should be held equivalent to a declaration of +war. (5) Russian mobilization was begun in the spring of 1914, under the +guise of "tests," and these tests were carried on continuously to the +outbreak of the war. (6) In April, 1914, four months before the war, +the Russian and French naval authorities initiated joint plans for +maritime operations against Germany. (7) Up to the outbreak of the war, +Germany was selling grain in considerable quantities to both France and +Russia. (8) It can not be shown that the German Government ever in a +single instance, throughout all its dealings with foreign Governments, +demanded or intimated for Germany anything more than a position of +economic equality with other nations. + +These facts, among others to which reference will hereafter be made, +have come to light only since the outbreak of the war. They effectively +dispose of the theory of an unprepared and unsuspecting Europe; and a +historical survey of them excludes absolutely, and stamps as utterly +untenable and preposterous, the theory of a deliberate German plot +against the peace of the world. + + + + +III + + +Let us now consider the idea so generally held in America, though not in +Europe, that in 1914, England and the Continental nations were not +expecting war and not prepared for war. The fact is that Europe was as +thoroughly organized for war as it could possibly be. The point to which +that organization was carried by England, France and Russia, as compared +with Germany and Austria, may to some extent be indicated by statistics. +In 1913, Russia carried a military establishment (on a peace footing) of +1,284,000 men; France, by an addition of 183,000 men, proposed to raise +her peace-establishment to a total of 741,572. Germany, by an addition +of 174,373 men, proposed to raise her total to 821,964; and Austria, by +additions of 58,505 already made, brought her total up to 473,643. These +are the figures of the British War Office, as furnished to the House of +Commons in 1913. + +Here is a set of figures that is even more interesting and significant. +From 1909 to 1914, the amount spent on new naval construction by +England, France and Russia, as compared with Germany, was as follows: + + + ENGLAND FRANCE RUSSIA GERMANY + + 1909 L11,076,551 L 4,517,766 L 1,758,487 L10,177,062 + + 1910 L14,755,289 L 4,977,682 L 1,424,013 L11,392,856 + + 1911 L15,148,171 L 5,876,659 L 3,216,396 L11,710,859 + + 1912 L16,132,558 L 7,114,876 L 6,897,580 L11,491,187 + + 1913 L16,883,875 L 8,893,064 L12,082,516 L11,010,883 + + 1914 L18,676,080 L11,772,862 L13,098,613 L10,316,264 + + +These figures can not be too carefully studied by those who have been +led to think that Germany pounced upon a defenceless and unsuspecting +Europe like a cat upon a mouse. If it be thought worth while to consider +also the period of a few years preceding 1909, one finds that England's +superiority in battleships alone was 112 per cent in 1901, and her +superiority rose to nearly 200 per cent in 1904; in which year England +spent L42,431,000 on her navy, and Germany L11,659,000. Taking the +comparative statistics of naval expenditure from 1900, in which year +England spent L32,055,000 on her navy, and Germany spent L7,472,000, +down to 1914 it is absolutely impossible to make the figures show that +Germany enforced upon the other nations of Europe an unwilling +competition in naval armament. + +But the German army! According to all accounts of German militarism +which were suffered to reach these shores, it is here that we shall find +evidence of what Mr. Lloyd George, on 4 August, 1917, called "the most +dangerous conspiracy ever plotted against the liberty of nations; +carefully, skilfully, insidiously, clandestinely planned in every +detail, with ruthless, cynical determination." Well, if one chooses to +hold the current view of German militarism, it must be admitted that +Germany had at her disposal some miraculous means of getting something +for nothing, getting a great deal for nothing, in fact, for on any other +supposition, the figures are far from supporting that view. In 1914 +(pre-war figures), Germany and Austria together carried an +army-expenditure of L92 million; England, France and Russia together +carried one of L142 million. England "had no army," it was said; all her +military strength lay in her navy. If that were true, then it must be +said that she had as miraculous a faculty as Germany's; only, whereas +Germany's was a faculty for getting more than her money's worth, +England's was for getting less than her money's worth. England's +army-expenditure for 1914 (pre-war figures) was L28 million; L4 million +more than Austria's. Nor was this a sudden emergency-outlay. Going back +as far as 1905, we find that she laid out in that year the same amount, +L28 million. In that year, Germany and Austria together spent L48 +million on their armies; England, France and Russia together spent L94 +million on theirs. If between 1905 and 1913, England, France and Russia +spent any such sums upon their armies as their statistics show, and +nothing came of it but an unprepared and unsuspecting Europe in 1914, it +seems clear that the taxpayers of those countries were swindled on an +inconceivably large scale. + + + + +IV + + +At this point, some questions may be raised. Why, in the decade +preceding 1914, did England, France and Russia arm themselves at the +rate indicated by the foregoing figures? Why did they accelerate their +naval development progressively from about L17 million in 1909 to about +L43 million in 1914? Why did Russia alone propose to raise her military +peace-establishment to an army of 1,700,000, more than double the size +of Germany's army? Against whom were these preparations directed, and +understood to be directed? Certainly not against one another. France and +Russia had been bound by a military convention ever since 17 August, +1892; England and France had been bound since January, 1906, by a +similar pact; and this was subsequently extended to include Belgium. +These agreements will be considered in detail hereafter; they are now +mentioned merely to show that the military activity in these countries +was not independent in purpose. France, England, Russia and Belgium +were not uneasy about one another and not arming against one another; +nor is there any evidence that anyone thought that they were. It was +against the Central Empires only that these preparations were addressed. +Nor can one who scans the table of relative expenditure easily believe +that the English-French-Russian combination was effected for purely +defensive purposes; and taking the diplomatic history of the period in +conjunction with the testimony of the budgets, such belief becomes +impossible. + + + + +V + + +The British Government is the one which was most often represented to us +as taken utterly by surprise by the German onslaught on Belgium. Let us +see. The Austrian Archduke was assassinated 28 June, 1914, by three men +who, according to wide report in Europe and absolute certainty in +America, were secret agents of the German Government, acting under +German official instruction. The findings of the court of inquiry showed +that they were Serbs, members of a pan-Slav organization; that the +assassination was plotted in Belgrade, and the weapons with which it was +committed were obtained there.[3] Serbia denied all connexion with the +assassins (the policy of Serbia being then controlled by the Russian +Foreign Office), and then the Russian Government stepped forward to +prevent the humiliation of Serbia by Austria. It is clear from the +published diplomatic documents that the British Foreign Office knew +everything that took place between the assassination and the burial of +the Archduke; all the facts, that is, connected with the murder. The +first dispatch in the British White Paper is dated 20 July, and it is +addressed to the British Ambassador at Berlin. One wonders why not to +the Ambassador at Vienna; also one wonders why the diplomats apparently +found nothing to write about for nearly three weeks between the +Archduke's funeral and 20 July. It is a strange silence. Sir Edward +Grey, however, made a statement in the House of Commons, 27 July, in +which he gave the impression that he got his first information about the +course of the quarrel between Austria and Serbia no earlier than 24 +July, three days before. The Ambassador at Vienna, Sir M. de Bunsen, +had, notwithstanding, telegraphed him that the Austrian Premier had +given him no hint of "the impending storm" and that it was from a +private source "that I received, 15 July, the forecast of what was about +to happen, concerning which I _telegraphed to you the following day_." +Sir Maurice de Bunsen's telegram on this important subject thus +evidently was suppressed; and the only obvious reason for the +suppression is that it carried evidence that Sir E. Grey was thoroughly +well posted by 16 July on what was taking place in Vienna. Sir M. de +Bunsen's allusion to this telegram confirms this assumption; in fact, it +can be interpreted in no other way. + +On 28 July, the House of Commons was informed that Austria had declared +war on Serbia. Two days later, 30 July, Sir E. Grey added the item of +information that Russia had ordered a partial mobilization "which has +not hitherto led to any corresponding steps by other Powers, so far as +our information goes." Sir E. Grey did not add, however, that he knew +quite well what "corresponding steps" other Powers were likely to take. +He knew the terms of the Russian-French military convention, under which +a mobilization by Russia was to be held equivalent to a declaration of +war; he also knew the terms of the English-French agreement which he +himself had authorized--although up to the eve of the war he denied, in +reply to questions in the House of Commons, that any such agreement +existed, and acknowledged it only on 3 August, 1914.[4] He had promised +Sazonov, the Russian Foreign Minister, in 1912, that in the event of +Germany's coming to Austria's aid, Russia could rely on Great Britain to +"stake everything in order to inflict the most serious blow to German +power." To say that Sir E. Grey, and _a fortiori_ Mr. Asquith, the Prime +Minister; Lord Haldane, the Minister for War, whose own book has been a +most tremendous let-down to the fictions of the propagandists; Mr. +Winston Churchill, head of the Admiralty, who at Dundee, 5 June, 1915, +declared that he had been sent to the Admiralty in 1911 with the express +duty laid upon him by the Prime Minister to put the fleet in a state of +instant and constant readiness for war; to say that these men were taken +by surprise and unprepared, is mere levity. + +Austria was supposed to be, and still is by some believed to have been, +Germany's vassal State, and by menacing Serbia to have been doing +Germany's dirty work. No evidence of this has been adduced; and the +trouble with this idea of Austria's status is that it breaks down before +the report of Sir M. de Bunsen, 1 September, 1914, that Austria finally +yielded and agreed to accept all the proposals of the Powers for +mediation between herself and Serbia. She made every concession. +Russian mobilization, however, had begun on 25 July and become general +four days later; and it was not stopped. Germany then gave notice that +she would mobilize her army if Russian mobilization was not stopped in +twelve hours; and also, knowing the terms of the Russian-French +convention of 1892, she served notice on France, giving her eighteen +hours to declare her position. Russia made no reply; France answered +that she would do what she thought best in her own interest; and almost +at the moment, on 1 August, when Germany ordered a general mobilization, +Russian troops were over her border, the British fleet had been +mobilized for a week in the North Sea, and British merchant ships were +lying at Kronstadt, empty, to convey Russian troops from that port to +the Pomeranian coast, in pursuance of the plan indicated by Lord Fisher +in his autobiography, recently published. + +These matters are well summed up by Lord Loreburn, as follows: + + + Serbia gave offence to the Austro-Hungarian Empire, cause of just + offence, as our Ambassador frankly admits in his published + dispatches. We [England] had no concern in that quarrel, as Sir + Edward Grey says in terms. But Russia, the protectress of Serbia, + came forward to prevent her being utterly humiliated by Austria. We + were not concerned in that quarrel either, as Sir Edward also says. + And then Russia called upon France under their treaty to help in + the fight. France was not concerned in that quarrel any more than + ourselves, as Sir Edward informs us. But France was bound by a + Russian treaty, of which he did not know the terms, and then France + called on us for help. We were tied by the relations which our + Foreign Office had created, without apparently realizing that they + had created them. + + +In saying that Sir E. Grey did not know the terms of the Franco-Russian +agreement, Lord Loreburn is generous, probably more generous than he +should be; but that is no matter. The thing to be remarked is that Lord +Loreburn's summing-up comes to something wholly different from Mr. Lloyd +George's "most dangerous conspiracy ever plotted against the liberty of +nations." It comes to something wholly different from the notion +implanted in Americans, of Germany pouncing upon a peaceful, unprepared +and unsuspecting Europe. The German nation, we may be sure, is keenly +aware of this difference; and therefore, any peace which, like the peace +of Versailles, is bottomed on the _chose jugee_ of laying the sole +responsibility for the war at the door of the German nation, or even at +the door of the German Government, is simply impracticable and +impossible. + +FOOTNOTES: + +[3] Six months after the armistice, the bodies of the three assassins +were dug up, according to a Central News dispatch from Prague, "with +great solemnity, in the presence of thousands of the inhabitants. The +remains of _these Serbian officers_ are to be sent to their native +country." This is a naive statement. It remains to be explained why +these "German agents" should be honoured in this distinguished way by +the Serbs! + +[4] See footnote to chapter XVIII. + + + + +VI + + +If the theory upon which the treaty of Versailles is based, the theory +of a single guilty nation, were true, there would be no trouble about +saying what the war was fought for. The Allied belligerents would have a +simple, straight story to tell; they could describe their aims and +intentions clearly in a few words that any one could understand, and +their story would be reasonably consistent and not vary greatly from +year to year. It would be practically the same story in 1918 as in 1915 +or at any time between. In America, indeed, the story did not greatly +vary up to the spring of 1917, for the reason that this country was +pretty much in the dark about European international relations. Once our +indignation and sympathies were aroused, it was for the propagandists +mostly a matter of keeping them as hot as possible. Few had the +information necessary to discount the plain, easy, understandable story +of a robber nation leaping upon an unprepared and defenceless Europe for +no cause whatever except the lofty ambition, as Mr. Joseph Choate said, +"to establish a world-empire upon the ruins of the British Empire." +Those who had this information could not make themselves heard; and thus +it was that the propagandists had no need to vary the one story that was +most useful to their purpose of keeping us in a state of unreasoning +indignation, and accordingly they did not vary it. + +In Europe and in England, however, the case was different. International +relations were better understood by those who were closer to them than +we were; more questions were raised and more demands made. Hence the +Allied politicians and propagandists were kept busy upon the defensive. +When from time to time the voice of popular discontent or of some +influential body of opinion insisted on a statement of the causes of the +war or of the war-aims of the Allies, they were confronted with the +politician's traditional difficulty. They had to say something plausible +and satisfactory, which yet must be something that effectively hid the +truth of the situation. As the war hung on, their difficulty became +desperate and they threw consistency to the winds, telling any sort of +story that would enable them for the moment to "get by." The publication +of the secret treaties which had been seined out of the quagmire of the +old Russian Foreign Office by the revolutionists made no end of trouble +for them. It is amusing now to remember how promptly these treaties were +branded by the British Foreign Office as forgeries; especially when it +turned out that the actual terms of the armistice--not the nominal +terms, which were those of Mr. Wilson's Fourteen Points, but the actual +terms--were the terms of the secret treaties! The publication of the +secret treaties in this country did not contribute much towards a +disillusionment of the public; the press as a rule ignored or lied about +them, they were not widely read, and few who did read them had enough +understanding of European affairs to interpret them. But abroad they put +a good deal of fat into the fire; and this was a specimen of the kind of +thing that the Allied politicians had to contend with in their efforts +to keep their peoples in line. + +The consequence was that the official and semi-official statements of +the causes of the war and of the war-aims of the Allies are a most +curious hotchpotch. In fact, if any one takes stock in the theory of the +one guilty nation and is therefore convinced that the treaty of +Versailles is just and proper and likely to enforce an enduring peace, +one could suggest nothing better than that he should go through the +literature of the war, pick out these statements, put them in parallel +columns, and see how they look. If the war originated in the unwarranted +conspiracy of a robber nation, if the aims of the Allies were to defeat +that conspiracy and render it impotent and to chastise and tie the hands +of the robber nation--and that is the theory of the treaty of +Versailles--can anyone in his right mind suppose that the Allied +politicians and propagandists would ever give out, or need to give out, +these ludicrously contradictory and inconsistent explanations and +statements? When one has a simple, straight story to tell, and a most +effective story, why complicate it and undermine it and throw all sorts +of doubts upon it, by venturing upon all sorts of public utterances that +will not square with it in any conceivable way? Politicians, of all men, +never lie for the fun of it; their available margin of truth is always +so narrow that they keep within it when they can. Mr. Lloyd George, for +example, is one of the cleverest of politicians. We have already +considered his two statements; first, that of 4 August, 1917: + + + What are we fighting for? To defeat the most dangerous conspiracy + ever plotted against the liberty of nations; carefully, skilfully, + insidiously, clandestinely planned in every detail with ruthless, + cynical determination. + + +--and then that of 3 March, 1921: + + + For the Allies, German responsibility for the war is fundamental. + It is the basis upon which the structure of the treaty of + Versailles has been erected, and if that acknowledgment is + repudiated or abandoned, the treaty is destroyed.... German + responsibility for the war must be treated by the Allies as a + _chose jugee_. + + +A little over two months before Mr. George made this latter utterance, +on 23 December, 1920, he said this: + + + The more one reads memoirs and books written in the various + countries of what happened before the first of August, 1914, the + more one realizes that no one at the head of affairs quite meant + war at that stage. It was something into which they glided, or + rather staggered and stumbled, perhaps through folly; and a + discussion, I have no doubt, would have averted it. + + +Well, it would strike an unprejudiced person that if this were true, +there is a great deal of doubt put upon Mr. Lloyd George's former +statements by Mr. Lloyd George himself. Persons who plot carefully, +skilfully, insidiously and clandestinely, do not glide; they do not +stagger or stumble, especially through folly. They keep going, as we in +America were assured that the German Government did keep going, right up +to The Day of their own choosing. Moreover, they are not likely to be +headed off by discussion; highwaymen are notoriously curt in their +speech and if one attempts discussion with them they become irritable +and peremptory. This is the invariable habit of highwaymen. Besides, if +discussion would have averted war in 1914, why was it not forthcoming? +Certainly not through any fault of the Austrian Government, which made +every concession, as the British Ambassador's report shows, +notwithstanding its grievance against Serbia was a just one. Certainly +not through any fault of the German Government, which never refused +discussion and held its hand with all the restraint possible under the +circumstances just described. Well, then, how is it so clear that German +responsibility for the war should be treated as a _chose jugee_? + + + + +VII + + +People who have a clear and simple case do not talk in this fashion. +Picking now at random among the utterances of politicians and +propagandists, we find an assorted job-lot of aims assigned and causes +alleged, and in all of them there is that curious, incomprehensible and +callous disregard of the power of conviction that a straight story +always exercises, if you have one to tell. In November, 1917, when the +Foreign Office was being pestered by demands for a statement of the +Allied war-aims, Lord Robert Cecil said in the House of Commons, that +the restitution of Alsace and Lorraine to France was a "well-understood +war-aim from the moment we entered the war." As things have turned out, +it is an odd coincidence how so many of these places that have iron or +coal or oil in them seem to represent a well-understood war-aim. Less +than a month before, in October, 1917, General Smuts said that to his +mind the one great dominating war-aim was "the end of militarism, the +end of standing armies." Well, the Allies won the war, but judging by +results, this dominating war-aim seems rather to have been lost sight +of. Mr. Lloyd George again on another occasion, said in the House of +Commons that "self-determination was one of the principles for which we +entered the war ... a principle from which we have never departed since +the beginning of the war." This, too, seems an aim that for some reason +the victorious nations have not quite realized; indeed in some cases, as +in Ireland, for example, there has been no great alacrity shown about +trying to realize it. Viscount Bryce said that the war sprang from the +strife of races and religions in the Balkan countries, and from the +violence done to the sentiment of nationality in Alsace-Lorraine which +made France the ally of Russia. But the fact is that France became the +ally of Russia on the basis of hard cash, and since the Russian +Revolution, she has been a bit out of luck by way of getting her money +back. Mr. Asquith in the House of Commons, 3 August, 1914 said: + + + If I am asked what we are fighting for, I reply in two sentences. + In the first place, to fulfil a solemn international obligation.... + Secondly we are fighting ... to vindicate the principle that small + nationalities are not to be crushed in defiance of international + good faith. + + +Just so: and in the House of Commons, 20 December, 1917, he said: + + + The League of Nations ... was the avowed purpose, the very purpose + ... for which we entered the war and for which we are continuing + the war. + + +You pays your money, you see, and takes your choice. The point to be +made, however, is that one who has a strong case, a real case, never +trifles with it in this way. Would the reader do it? + + + + +VIII + + +Mr. Asquith's citation of a "solemn international obligation" refers to +the so-called Belgian treaties. It will be remembered that the case of +Belgium was the great winning card played by the Allied Governments for +the stakes of American sympathies; and therefore we may here properly +make a survey, somewhat in detail, of the status of Belgium at the +outset of the war. + +Belgium had learned forty years ago how she stood under the treaties of +1831 and 1839. When in the late 'eighties there was likelihood of a +Franco-German war, the question of England's participation under these +treaties was thoroughly discussed, and it was shown conclusively that +England was not obligated. Perhaps the best summary of the case was that +given by Mr. W. T. Stead in the _Pall Mall Gazette_ in the issues of 4 +and 5 February, 1887. After an examination of the treaties of 1831, 1839 +and 1870--an examination unfortunately too long to be quoted here--Mr. +Stead briefly sums up the result of his investigation in the following +statement: + + + There is therefore no English guarantee to Belgium. It is possible + perhaps, to 'construct' such a guarantee; but the case may be + summed up as follows: (1) England is under no guarantee whatever + except such as is common to Austria, France, Russia and Germany; + (2) that guarantee is not specifically of the neutrality of Belgium + at all; and (3) is given, not to Belgium but to the Netherlands. + + +This was the official view of the British Government at the time, and it +is reflected in the celebrated letter signed "Diplomaticus" in the +_Standard_ of 4 February, to which Mr. Stead refers; which, indeed, he +makes the guiding text for his examination. The _Standard_ was then the +organ of Lord Salisbury's Government, and it is as nearly certain as +anything of the sort can be, that the letter signed "Diplomaticus" was +written by the hand of the British Prime Minister, Lord Salisbury +himself. + +How Mr. Asquith's Government in August 1914 came suddenly to extemporize +a wholly different view of England's obligations to Belgium is +excellently told by that inveterate diarist and chronicler, Mr. Wilfred +Scawen Blunt: + + + The obligation of fighting in alliance with France in case of a war + with Germany concerned the honour of three members only of + Asquith's Cabinet, who alone were aware of the exact promises that + had been made. These, though given verbally and with reservations + as to the consent of Parliament, bound the three as a matter of + personal honour, and were understood at the Quai d'Orsay as binding + the British nation. Neither Asquith nor his two companions[5] in + this inner Cabinet could have retained office had they gone back + from their word in spirit or in letter. It would also doubtless + have entailed a serious quarrel with the French Government had they + failed to make it good. So clearly was the promise understood at + Paris to be binding that President Poincare, when the crisis came, + had written to King George reminding him of it as an engagement + made between the two nations which he counted on His Majesty to + keep. + + Thus faced, the case was laid before the Cabinet, but was found to + fail as a convincing argument for war. It was then that Asquith, + with his lawyer's instinct, at a second Cabinet meeting brought + forward the neutrality of Belgium as a better plea than the other + to lay before a British jury, and by representing the + neutrality-treaties of 1831 and 1839 as entailing an obligation on + England to fight (of which the text of the treaties contains no + word) obtained the Cabinet's consent, and war was declared. + + +Belgium was not thought of by the British Cabinet before 2 August, 1914. +She was brought in then as a means of making the war go down with the +British people. The fact is that Belgium was thoroughly prepared for +war, thoroughly prepared for just what happened to her. Belgium was a +party to the military arrangements effected among France, England and +Russia; for this we have the testimony of Marshal Joffre before the +Metallurgic Committee in Paris, and also the record of the +"conversations" that were carried on in Brussels between the Belgian +chief of staff and Lt.-Col. Barnardiston. On 24 July, 1914, the day when +the Austrian note was presented to Serbia (the note of which Sir E. Grey +had gotten an intimation as early as 16 July by telegraph from the +British Ambassador at Vienna, Sir M. de Bunsen), the Belgian Foreign +Minister, M. Davignon, promptly dispatched to all the Belgian embassies +an identical communication containing the following statement, the +significance of which is made clear by a glance at a map: + + + All necessary steps to ensure respect of Belgian neutrality have + nevertheless been taken by the Government. The Belgian army has + been mobilized and is taking up such strategic positions as have + been chosen to secure the defence of the country and the respect of + its neutrality. The forts of Antwerp and on the Meuse have been put + in a state of defence. + + +It was on the eastern frontier, we perceive, therefore--not on the +western, where Belgium might have been invaded by France--that all the +available Belgian military force was concentrated. Hence, to pretend any +longer that the Belgian Government was surprised by the action of +Germany, or unprepared to meet it; to picture Germany and Belgium as cat +and mouse, to understand the position of Belgium otherwise than that she +was one of four solid allies under definite agreement worked out in +complete practical detail, is sheer absurdity. + +FOOTNOTE: + +[5] Sir E. Grey and Lord Haldane. + + + + +IX + + +If the official theory of German responsibility were correct, it would +be impossible to explain the German Government's choice of the year 1914 +as a time to strike at "an unsuspecting and defenceless Europe." The +figures quoted in Chapter III show that the military strength of +Germany, relatively to that of the French-Russian-English combination, +had been decreasing since 1910. If Germany had wished to strike at +Europe, she had two first-rate chances, one in 1908 and another in 1912, +and not only let them both go by, but threw all her weight on the side +of peace. This is inexplicable upon the theory that animates the treaty +of Versailles. Germany was then in a position of advantage. The occasion +presented itself in 1908, in Serbia's quarrel with Austria over the +annexation of Bosnia and the Herzegovina. Russia, which was backing +Serbia, was in no shape to fight; her military strength, used up in the +Russo-Japanese war, had not recovered. France would not at this time +have been willing to go to war with Germany over her weak ally's +commitments in the Danube States. Germany, however, contented herself +with serving notice on the Tsar of her unequivocal support of Austria; +and this was enough. The Tsar accepted the _fait accompli_ of the +annexation of Bosnia and the Herzegovina; Serbia retired and cooled off; +and Turkey, from whom the annexed province was ravished, was compensated +by Austria. It is not to the point to scrutinize the propriety of these +transactions; the point is that Germany held the peace of Europe in the +hollow of her hand, with immense advantages in her favour, and chose not +to close her hand. The comment of a neutral diplomat, the Belgian +Minister in Berlin, is interesting. In his report of 1 April, 1909, to +the Belgian Foreign Office, he says: + + + The conference scheme elaborated by M. Isvolsky and Sir Edward + Grey; the negotiations for collective representations in Vienna; + and the whole exchange of ideas among London, Paris and Petersburg, + were steadily aimed at forcing Austria-Hungary into a transaction + which would strongly have resembled a humiliation. This humiliation + would have affected Germany as directly and as sensibly as + Austria-Hungary, and would have struck a heavy blow at the + confidence which is inspired in Vienna by the alliance with + Germany. These machinations were frustrated by Germany's + absolutely unequivocal and decided attitude, from which she has + never departed in spite of all the urgings with which she has been + harassed. Germany alone has accomplished the preservation of peace. + The new grouping of the Powers, organized by the King of England, + has measured its forces with the alliance of the Central European + Powers, and has shown itself incapable of impairing the same. Hence + the vexation which is manifested. + + +The last two sentences of the foregoing seem to show--putting it +mildly--that the Belgian Minister did not suspect the German Government +of any aggressive spirit. In the same dispatch, moreover, he remarks: + + + As always, when everything does not go as the French, English or + Russian politicians want it to, the _Temps_ shows its bad temper. + Germany is the scapegoat. + + +Again, at the time of the Balkan War in 1912, Germany had an excellent +opportunity to gratify her military ambition, if she had any, at the +expense of an "unsuspecting and unprepared Europe"; not as advantageous +as in 1908 but more advantageous than in 1914. Serbia's provocations +against Austria-Hungary had become so great that the Austrian Archduke +(assassinated in 1914 at Sarajevo) told the German Emperor personally +that they had reached the limit of endurance. On this occasion also, +however, William II put himself definitely on the side of peace, and in +so doing left the Austrian Government somewhat disappointed and +discontented. Another neutral diplomat reports of the German Foreign +Minister that + + + whatever plans he may have in his head (and he has big ideas), for + winning the sympathies of the young Balkan Powers over to Germany, + one thing is absolutely certain, and that is that he is rigidly + determined to avoid a European conflagration. On this point the + policy of Germany is similar to that of England and France, both of + which countries are determinedly pacifist. + + +This is a fair statement of the English and French position in 1912. +There was a great revulsion of feeling in England after her close shave +of being dragged into war over Morocco and her sentiment was all for +attending to certain pressing, domestic problems. Besides, it was only +in November, 1911, and only through the indiscretion of a French +newspaper, that the British public (and the British Parliament as well) +had learned that the Anglo-French agreement of 1904 had secret articles +attached to it, out of which had emanated the imbroglio over Morocco; +and there was a considerable feeling of distrust towards the Foreign +Office. In fact, Sir E. Grey, the Foreign Minister, was so unpopular +with his own party that quite probably he would have had to get out of +office if he had not been sustained by Tory influence. Mr. W. T. Stead +expressed a quite general sentiment in the _Review of Reviews_ for +December, 1911: + + + The fact remains that in order to put France in possession of + Morocco, we all but went to war with Germany. We have escaped war, + but we have not escaped the national and abiding enmity of the + German people. Is it possible to frame a heavier indictment of the + foreign policy of any British Ministry? The secret, the open + secret, of this almost incredible crime against treaty-faith, + British interests and the peace of the world, is the unfortunate + fact that Sir Edward Grey has been dominated by men in the Foreign + Office who believe all considerations must be subordinated to the + one supreme duty of thwarting Germany at every turn, even if in + doing so British interests, treaty-faith and the peace of the world + are trampled underfoot. I speak that of which I know. + + +This was strong language and it went without challenge, for too many +Englishmen felt that way. In France, the Poincare-Millerand-Delcasse +combination was getting well into the saddle; but with English public +opinion in this notably undependable condition, English support of +France, in spite of the secret agreement binding the two governments, +was decidedly risky. Thereupon France also was "determinedly pacifist." +Now if Germany had been the prime mover in "the most dangerous +conspiracy ever plotted against the liberty of nations," why did she not +take advantage of that situation? + +Russia, too, was "determinedly pacifist" in 1912, and with good reason. +There was a party of considerable influence in the Tsar's court that was +strongly for going to war in behalf of Serbia, but it was finally headed +off by the Foreign Minister, Sazonov, who knew the state of public +opinion in England and its effect on France, and knew therefore that the +French-Russian-English alliance was not yet in shape to take on large +orders. It is true that the Poincare-Millerand-Delcasse war-party in +France had proof enough in 1912 that it could count on the British +Government's support; and what France knew, Russia knew. Undoubtedly, +too, the British Government would somehow, under some pretext or other, +possibly Belgian neutrality, have contrived to redeem its obligations as +it did in 1914. But the atmosphere of the country was not favourable and +the thing would have been difficult. Accordingly, Sazonov saw that it +was best for him to restrain Serbia's impetuosity and truculence for +the time being--Russia herself being none too ready--and accordingly he +did so. + +But how? The Serbian Minister at Petersburg says that Sazonov told him +that in view of Serbia's successes "he had confidence in our strength +and believed that we would be able to deliver a blow at Austria. For +that reason we should feel satisfied with what we were to receive, and +consider it merely as a temporary halting-place on the road to further +gains." On another occasion "Sazonov told me that we must work for the +future because we would acquire a great deal of territory from Austria." +The Serbian Minister at Bucharest says that his Russian and French +colleagues counselled a policy of waiting "with as great a degree of +preparedness as possible the important events which must make their +appearance among the Great Powers." How, one may ask, was the Russian +Foreign Office able to look so far and so clearly into the future? If +German responsibility for the war is fundamental, a _chose jugee_, as +Mr. Lloyd George said it is, this seems a strange way for the Russian +Foreign Minister to be talking, as far back as 1912. But stranger still +is the fact that the German Government did not jump in at this juncture +instead of postponing its blow until 1914 when every one was apparently +quite ready to receive it. When the historian of the future considers +the theory of the Versailles treaty and considers the behaviour of the +German Government in the crisis of 1908 and in the crisis of 1912, he +will have to scratch his head a great deal to make them harmonize. + + + + +X + + +By the spring of 1913, the diplomatic representatives of the Allied +Danube States made no secret of the relations in which their Governments +stood to the Tsar's Foreign Office. The Balkan League was put through by +Russian influence and Russia controlled its diplomacy. Serbia was as +completely the instrument of Russia as Poland is now the instrument of +France. "If the Austrian troops invade Balkan territory," wrote Baron +Beyens on 4 April, 1913, "it would give cause for Russia to intervene, +and might let loose a universal war." Now, if Germany had been plotting +"with ruthless, cynical determination," as Mr. Lloyd George said, +against the peace of Europe, what inconceivable stupidity for her not to +push Austria along rather than do everything possible to hold her back! +Why give Russia the benefit of eighteen months of valuable time for the +feverish campaign of "preparedness" that she carried on? Those eighteen +months meant a great deal. In February, 1914, the Tsar arranged to +provide the Serbian army with rifles and artillery, Serbia agreeing to +put half a million soldiers in the field. In the same month Russia +negotiated a French loan of about $100 million for improvements on her +strategic railways and frontier-roads. During the spring, she made +"test" mobilizations of large bodies of troops which were never +demobilized, and these "test" mobilizations continued down to the +outbreak of the war; and in April Russian agents made technical +arrangements with agents of the British and French Admiralties for +possible combined naval action. + +Yes, those eighteen months were very busy months for Russia. True, she +came out at the end of them an "unprepared and unsuspecting" nation, +presumably, for was not all Europe unprepared and unsuspecting? Is it +not so nominated in the Versailles treaty? One can not help wondering, +however, how it is that Germany, "carefully, skilfully, insidiously, +clandestinely planning in every detail" a murderous attack on the peace +of Europe, should have given Russia the inestimable advantage of those +eighteen months. + + + + +XI + + +Mr. E. D. Morel, editor of the British monthly, _Foreign Affairs_, +performed more than a distinguished service--it is a splendid, an +illustrious service--to the disparaged cause of justice, when recently +he translated and published in England through the National Labour +Press, a series of remarkable State documents.[6] This consists of +reports made by the Belgian diplomatic representatives at Paris, London +and Berlin, to the Belgian Minister of Foreign Affairs, covering the +period from 7 February, 1905 to 2 July, 1914. Their authenticity has +never been questioned. They have received no notice in this country; +their content and import were carefully kept from the American people as +long as it was possible to do so, and consequently they remain unknown +except to a few who are students of international affairs or who have +some similar special interest. + +It can hardly be pretended by anyone that Belgian officials had, during +that decade, any particular love or leaning towards Germany. The Belgian +Foreign Office has always been as free from sentimental attachments as +any other. It has always been governed by the same motives that govern +the British, French, German and Russian Foreign Offices. Its number, +like theirs, was number one; it was out, first and last, for the +interests of the Belgian Government, and it scrutinized every +international transaction from the viewpoint of those interests and +those only. It was fully aware of the position of Belgium as a mere +"strategic corridor" and battle-ground for alien armies in case of a +general European war, and aware that Belgium had simply to make the best +of its bad outlook, for nothing else could be done. If the Belgian +Foreign Office and its agents, moreover, had no special love for +Germany, neither had they any special fear of her. They were in no more +or deeper dread of a German invasion than of a British or French +invasion. In fact, in 1911, the Belgian Minister at Berlin set forth in +a most matter-of-fact way his belief that in the event of war, Belgian +neutrality would be first violated by Great Britain.[7] These +observers, in short, may on all accounts, as far as one can see, be +accepted as neutral and disinterested, with the peculiar +disinterestedness of one who has no choice between two evils. + +Well, then, under the circumstances it is remarkable that if Germany +during the ten years preceding August, 1914, were plotting against the +peace of the world, these Belgian observers seem unaware of it. It is +equally noteworthy that if Germany's assault were unprovoked, they seem +unaware of that also. These documents relate in an extremely +matter-of-fact way a continuous series of extraordinary provocations put +upon the German Government, and moreover, they represent the behaviour +of the German Government, under these provocations, in a very favourable +light. On the other hand, they show from beginning to end a most +profound distrust of English diplomacy. If there is any uncertainty +about the causes of ill-feeling between England and Germany, these +Belgian officials certainly do not share it. They regularly speak of +England's jealousy of Germany's economic competition, and the +provocative attitude to which this jealousy gave rise. They speak of it, +moreover, as though it were something that the Belgian Government were +already well aware of; they speak of it in the tone of pure commonplace, +such as one might use in an incidental reference to the weather or to a +tariff-schedule or to any other matter that is well understood and about +which there is no difference of opinion and nothing new to be said. This +is all the more remarkable in view of the fact that it was nominally to +save Belgium and to defend the sanctity of Belgian neutrality that +England entered the war in August, 1914. These Belgian agents are +invariably suspicious of English diplomacy, as Mr. E. D. Morel points +out, "mainly because they feel that it is tending to make the war which +they dread for their country." They persistently and unanimously +"insinuate that if left to themselves, France and Germany would reach a +settlement of their differences, and that British diplomacy was being +continually exercised to envenom the controversy and to draw a circle of +hostile alliances round Germany." This, indeed, under a specious concern +for the "balance of power," has been the historic role of English +diplomacy. Every one remembers how in 1866, just before the +Franco-Prussian war, Mr. Matthew Arnold's imaginary Prussian, Arminius +von Thunder-ten-Tronckh, wrote to the editor of the _Pall Mall Gazette_, +begging him to prevail upon his fellow-countrymen "for Heaven's sake not +to go on biting, first the French Emperor's tail, and then ours." + +On 18 February, 1905, the Belgian Minister in Berlin reported thus: + + + The real cause of the English hatred of Germany is the jealousy + aroused by the astonishing development of Germany's merchant navy + and of her commerce and manufactures. This hatred will last until + the English have thoroughly learned to understand that the world's + trade is not by rights an exclusively English monopoly. Moreover, + it is studiously fostered by the _Times_ and a whole string of + other daily papers and periodicals that do not stop short of + calumny in order to pander to the tastes of their readers. + + +At that time the centre of the English navy had just been shifted to the +North Sea, to the accompaniment of a very disturbing and, as at first +reported, a very flamboyant speech from the Civil Lord of the Admiralty, +Mr. Lee. Of the sensation thereby created in Germany, the Belgian +Minister says: + + + In informing the British public that Germany does not dream of any + aggression against England, Count Buelow [the German Chancellor] + said no more than what is recognized by every one who considers the + matter dispassionately. Germany would have nothing to gain from a + contest.... The German fleet has been created with a purely + defensive object. The small capacity of the coal-bunkers in her + High Seas Fleet, and the small number of her cruisers, prove + besides that her fleet is not intended for use at any distance from + the coast. + + +On the other hand, he remarks in the same report: + + + It was obvious that the new disposition of the English navy was + aimed at Germany ... it certainly is not because of Russia, whose + material stock is to a great extent destroyed and whose navy has + just given striking proof of incompetence [in the Russo-Japanese + war]. + + +Such is the tone uniformly adopted by these neutral observers throughout +their reports from 1905 to 1914. On 24 October, 1905, the Belgian +Minister in Paris wrote: + + + England, in her efforts to maintain her supremacy and to hinder the + development of her great German rival, is evidently inspired by the + wish to avoid a conflict, but are not her selfish aims in + themselves bringing it upon us?... She thought, when she concluded + the Japanese alliance and gradually drew France into similar ties, + that she had found the means to her end, by sufficiently + paralysing Germany's powers as to make war impossible. + + +This view of the Anglo-Japanese alliance is interesting and significant, +especially now when that instrument is coming up for renewal, with the +United States standing towards England in the same relation of economic +competitorship that Germany occupied in 1905. True, Viscount Bryce +assured the Institute of Politics at Williams College last summer that +it was not Germany's economic rivalry that disturbed England; but on +this point it would be highly advantageous for the people of the United +States, while there is yet time, to read what the Belgian Minister in +Berlin had to say on 27 October, 1905: + + + A very large number of Germans are convinced that England is either + seeking allies for an attack upon Germany, or else, which would be + more in accordance with British tradition, that she is labouring to + provoke a Continental war in which she would not join, but of which + she would reap the profit. + + I am told that many English people are troubled with similar fears + and go in dread of German aggression. + + I am puzzled upon what foundations such an impression in London can + be based. Germany is absolutely incapable of attacking England.... + Are these people in England really sincere who go about expressing + fears of a German invasion which could not materialize? Are they + not rather pretending to be afraid of it in order to bring on a war + which would annihilate Germany's navy, her merchant-fleet and her + foreign commerce? Germany is as vulnerable to attack as England is + safe from it; and if England were to attack Germany merely for the + sake of extinguishing a rival, it would only be in accordance with + her old precedents. + + In turn she wiped out the Dutch fleet, with the assistance of Louis + XIV; then the French fleet; and the Danish fleet she even destroyed + in time of peace and without any provocation, simply because it + constituted a naval force of some magnitude. + + There are no ostensible grounds for war between Germany and + England. The English hatred for Germany arises solely from jealousy + of Germany's progress in shipping, in commerce and in manufacture. + + +Baron Greindl here presents an opinion very different from that in which +the majority of Americans have been instructed; and before they accept +further instruction at the hands of Viscount Bryce, they had better look +into the matter somewhat for themselves. + +Baron Greindl wrote the foregoing in October. In December, the head of +the British Admiralty, Sir John Fisher, assured Colonel Repington that +"Admiral Wilson's Channel fleet was alone strong enough to smash the +whole German fleet." _Two years_ later, Sir John Fisher wrote to King +Edward VII that "it is an absolute fact that Germany has not laid down +a single dreadnaught, nor has she commenced building a single battleship +or big cruiser for eighteen months.... England has ... ten dreadnaughts +built and building, while Germany in March last had not even begun one +dreadnaught ... we have 123 destroyers and forty submarines. The Germans +have forty-eight destroyers and one submarine." Hence, if Sir John +Fisher knew what he was talking about, and in such matters he usually +did, he furnishes a very considerable corroboration of Baron Greindl's +view of the German navy up to 1905. Looking back at the third chapter of +this book, which deals with the comparative strength of the two navies +and naval groups as developed from 1905 to 1914, the reader may well +raise again Baron Greindl's question, "Are those people in England +really sincere?" + +FOOTNOTES: + +[6] Under the title "Diplomacy Revealed." National Labour Press. 8 and 9 +Johnson's Court, London, E.C., 4, England. + +[7] This belief received some corroboration in the spring of 1912, when +in the course of military "conversations," the British Military Attache, +Lieutenant-Colonel Bridges, told the Belgian Minister of War that if war +had broken out over the Agadir incident in 1911, the British Government +would have landed troops in Belgium with or without the Belgian +Government's consent. So much did the British Government think of the +"scrap of paper!" + + + + +XII + + +Such is the inveterate suspicion, the melancholy distrust, put upon +English diplomacy by these foreign and neutral observers who could see +so plainly what would befall their own country in the event of a +European war. Such too, was the responsibility which these observers +regularly imputed to the British Foreign Office--the British Foreign +Office which was so soon to fix upon the neutrality of Belgium as a +_casus belli_ and pour out streams of propaganda about the sanctity of +treaties and the rights of small nations! Every one of these observers +exhibits this suspicion and distrust. In March, 1906, when Edward VII +visited Paris and invited the discredited ex-Minister Delcasse to +breakfast, the Belgian Minister at Paris wrote: + + + It looks as though the king wished to demonstrate that the policy + which called forth Germany's active intervention [over Morocco] has + nevertheless remained unchanged.... In French circles it is not + over well received; Frenchmen feeling that they are being dragged + against their will in the orbit of English policy, a policy whose + consequences they dread, and which they generally condemned by + throwing over M. Delcasse. In short, people fear that this is a + sign that England wants so to envenom the situation that war will + become inevitable. + + +On 10 February, 1907, when the English King and Queen visited Paris, he +says: "One can not conceal from oneself that these tactics, though their +ostensible object is to prevent war, are likely to arouse great +dissatisfaction in Berlin and to stir up a desire to risk anything that +may enable Germany to burst the ring which England's policy is +tightening around her." On 28 March, 1907, the Belgian _charge +d'affaires_ in London speaks of "English diplomacy, whose whole effort +is directed to the isolation of Germany." On the same date, by a curious +coincidence, the Minister at Berlin, in the course of a blistering +arraignment of French policy in Morocco, says: "But at the bottom of +every settlement that has been made, or is going to be made, there lurks +always that hatred of Germany.... It is a sequence of the campaign very +cleverly conducted with the object of isolating Germany.... The English +press is carrying on its campaign of calumny more implacably than ever. +It sees the finger of Germany in everything that goes contrary to +English wishes." On 18 April, 1907, Baron Greindl says of the King of +England's visit to the King of Spain that, like the alliances with Japan +and France and the negotiations with Russia, it is "one of the moves in +the campaign to isolate Germany that is being personally directed with +as much perseverance as success by His Majesty King Edward VII." In the +same dispatch he remarks: "There is some right to regard with suspicion +this eagerness to unite, for a so-called defensive object, Powers who +are menaced by nobody. At Berlin they can not forget that offer of +100,000 men made by the King of England to M. Delcasse." + +On 24 May, 1907, the Minister at London reported that "it is plain that +official England is pursuing a policy that is covertly hostile, and +tending to result in the isolation of Germany, and that King Edward has +not been above putting his personal influence at the service of this +cause." On 19 June, 1907, Count de Lalaing again writes from London of +the Anglo-Franco-Spanish agreement concerning the _status quo_ in the +Mediterranean region, that "it is, however, difficult to imagine that +Germany will not regard it as a further step in England's policy, which +is determined, by every sort of means, to isolate the German Empire." + +Perusal of these documents from beginning to end will show nothing to +offset against the view of English diplomacy exhibited in the foregoing +quotations; nothing to modify or qualify that view in any way. Baron +Greindl, however, speaks highly of the British Ambassador at Berlin, Sir +F. Lascelles, and praises his personal and unsupported attempt to +establish friendly relations between England and Germany. Of this he +says: "I have been a witness for the last twelve years of the efforts he +has made to accomplish it. And yet, possessing as he justly does the +absolute confidence of the Emperor and the German Government, and +eminently gifted with the qualities of a statesman, he has nevertheless +not succeeded very well so far." The next year, 1908, when Sir F. +Lascelles was forced to resign his post, Baron Greindl does not hesitate +to say that "the zeal with which he has worked to dispel +misunderstandings that he thought absurd and highly mischievous for both +countries, does not fall in with the political views of his sovereign." + + + + +XIII + + +King Edward VII died 6 May, 1910. During the early part of 1911, the +Belgian Ministers in London, Paris and Berlin report some indications of +a less unfriendly policy towards Germany on the part of the British +Government. In March of that year, Sir Edward Grey delivered a +reassuring speech on British foreign policy, on the occasion of the +debate on the naval budget. The Belgian Minister in Berlin says of this +that it should have produced the most agreeable impression in Germany if +one could confidently believe that it really entirely reflected the +ideas of the British Government. It would imply, he says, that "England +no longer wishes to give to the Triple Entente the aggressive character +which was stamped upon it by its creator, King Edward VII." He remarks, +however, the slight effect produced in Berlin by Sir E. Grey's speech, +and infers that German public feeling may have "become dulled by the +innumerable meetings and mutual demonstrations of courtesy which have +never produced any positive result," and he adds significantly that +"this distrust is comprehensible." + +It must be remembered that at the time this speech was delivered, +England was under a secret agreement dating from 1904 to secure France's +economic monopoly in Morocco. England was also under a secret obligation +to France, dating from 1906, to support her in case of war with Germany. +It must be above all remembered that this latter obligation carried with +it a contingent liability for the Franco-Russian military alliance that +had been in effect for many years. Thus if Russia went to war with +Germany, France was committed, and in turn England was committed. The +whole force of the Triple Entente lay in these agreements; and it can +not be too often pointed out that they were _secret_ agreements. No one +in England knew until November, 1911, that in 1904 the British +Government had bargained with the French Government, in return for a +free hand in Egypt, to permit France to squeeze German economic +interests out of Morocco--in violation of a published agreement, signed +by all the interested nations, concerning the status of Morocco. No one +in England knew until 3 August, 1914, that England had for several years +been under a military and naval agreement with France which carried the +enormous contingent liability of the Franco-Russian military alliance. +No matter what appeared on the surface of politics; no matter how many +pacific speeches were made by Sir E. Grey and Mr. Asquith, no matter +what the newspapers said, no matter how often and how impressively Lord +Haldane might visit Berlin in behalf of peace and good feeling; _those +secret agreements held_, they were the only things that did hold, and +everything worked out in strict accordance with them and with nothing +else, least of all with any public understanding or any statement of +policy put out for public consumption. It was just as in the subsequent +case of the armistice and the peace--and this is something that has been +far too little noticed in this country. The real terms of the armistice +and of the peace were not the terms of the Fourteen Points or of any of +the multitudinous published statements of Allied war aims. On the +contrary, they were the precise terms of the secret treaties made among +the Allied belligerents during the war, and made public on their +discovery by the Soviet Government in the archives of the Tsarist +Foreign Office. + +It is no wonder then, that the German Government was not particularly +impressed by Sir E. Grey's speech, especially as Germany saw France +helping herself to Moroccan territory with both hands, and England +looking on in indifferent complacency. In May, 1911, on a most +transparent and preposterous pretext, a French army was ordered to march +on Fez, the capital of Morocco. The German Government then informed +France that as the Algeciras Act, which guaranteed the integrity and +independence of Morocco, had thereby gone by the board, Germany would no +longer consider herself bound by its provisions. In June, 30,000 French +troops "relieved" Fez, occupied it and stayed there, evincing no +intention whatever of getting out again, notwithstanding that the +ostensible purpose of the expedition was accomplished; in reality, there +was nothing to accomplish. Two months before this _coup d'etat_, Baron +Greindl, the Belgian Minister at Berlin, wrote to the Belgian Foreign +Office as follows: + + + Every illusion, if ever entertained on the value of the Algeciras + Act, which France signed with the firm intention of never + observing, must long since have vanished. She has not ceased for + one moment to pursue her plans of annexation; either by seizing + opportunities for provisional occupations destined to last for ever + or by extorting concessions which have placed the Sultan in a + position of dependence upon France, and which have gradually + lowered him to the level of the Bey of Tunis. + + +A week later, 29 April, Baron Guillaume, who had succeeded M. Leghait as +Belgian Minister in Paris, reported that "there are, so far, no grounds +for fearing that the French expedition will bring about any disturbance +of international policy. Germany is a calm spectator of events." He +adds, significantly, "England, having thrust France into the Moroccan +bog, is contemplating her work with satisfaction." + +France professed publicly that the object of this expedition was to +extricate certain foreigners who were imperilled at Fez; and having done +so, she would withdraw her forces. The precious crew of concessionaires, +profiteers, and dividend-hunters known as the _Comite du Maroc_ had +suddenly discovered a whole French colony living in Fez in a state of +terror and distress. There was, in fact, nothing of the sort. Fez was +never menaced, it was never short of provisions, and there were no +foreigners in trouble. When the expeditionary force arrived, it found no +one to shoot at. As M. Francis de Pressense says: + + + Those redoubtable rebels who were threatening Fez had disappeared + like dew in the morning. Barely did a few ragged horsemen fire off + a shot or two before turning around and riding away at a furious + gallop. A too disingenuous, or too truthful, correspondent gave the + show away. The expeditionary force complains, he gravely records, + of the absence of the enemy; the approaching harvest season is + keeping all the healthy males in the fields! Thus did the phantom + so dexterously conjured by the _Comite du Maroc_ for the benefit of + its aims, disappear in a night. + + +Nevertheless, the expeditionary force did not, in accordance with the +public professions of the French Government, march out of Fez as soon as +it discovered this ridiculous mare's nest. It remained there and held +possession of the Moorish capital. What was the attitude of the British +Government in the premises? On 2 May, in the House of Commons, Sir +Edward Grey said that "the action taken by France is not intended to +alter the political status of Morocco, and His Majesty's Government can +not see why any objection should be taken to it." + +Germany had remained for eight years a tolerant observer of French +encroachments in Morocco, and quite clearly, as Baron Greindl observes +in his report of 21 April, 1911, could not "after eight years of +tolerance, change her attitude unless she were determined to go to war, +and war is immeasurably more than Morocco is worth." In July, 1911, +however, while the French force of 30,000 was still occupying Fez, +Germany dispatched a gunboat, the "Panther," which anchored off the +coast of Agadir. + + + + +XIV + + +This was the famous "Agadir incident," of which we have all heard. Did +it mean that the worm had turned, that Germany had changed her attitude +and was determined to go to war? It has been so represented; but there +are many difficult inconsistencies involved in that explanation of the +German Government's act, and there is also an alternative explanation +which fits the facts far better. In the first place the "Panther" was +hardly more than an ocean-going tug. She was of 1000 tons burden, +mounting two small naval guns, six machine-guns, and she carried a +complement of only 125 men. Second, she never landed a man upon the +coast of Morocco. She chose for her anchorage a point where the coast is +practically inaccessible; Agadir has no harbour, and there is nothing +near it that offers any possible temptation to the predatory instinct. +No more ostentatiously unimpressive and unmenacing demonstration could +have been devised. Germany, too, was quite well aware that Morocco was +not worth a European war; and as Baron Guillaume said in his report of +29 April, "possibly she [Germany] is congratulating herself on the +difficulties that weigh upon the shoulders of the French Government, and +asks nothing better than to keep out of the whole affair as long as she +is not forced into it by economic considerations." But the most +significant indication that Germany had not changed her attitude is in +the fact that if she were determined upon war, then, rather than two +years later, was her time to go about it. This aspect of Germany's +behaviour has been dealt with in a previous chapter. It can not be too +often reiterated that if Germany really wanted war and was determined +upon war, her failure to strike in 1908, when Russia was prostrate and +France unready, and again in 1912, a few months after the Agadir +incident, when the Balkan war was on, is inexplicable.[8] + +The dispatch of the "Panther" gave the three Belgian observers a great +surprise, and they were much puzzled to account for it. Baron +Guillaume's thoughts at once turned to England. He writes 2 July: + + + It was long regarded as an axiom that England would never allow the + Germans to establish themselves at any point of Moroccan territory. + Has this policy been abandoned; and if so, at what price were they + bought off? + + +During the month of July, while waiting for a statement from the British +Foreign Office, the Belgian observers canvassed the possibility that +Germany's action was a hint that she would like some territorial +compensation for having been bilked out of her share in the Moroccan +market. But the interesting fact, and for the purpose of this book the +important fact, is that none of these diplomats shows the slightest +suspicion that Germany was bent on war or that she had any thought of +going to war. Baron Guillaume says, 28 July, "undoubtedly the present +situation wears a serious aspect.... Nobody, however, wants war, and +they will try to avoid it." He proceeds: + + + The French Government knows that a war would be the death-knell of + the Republic.... I have very great confidence in the Emperor + William's love of peace, notwithstanding the not infrequent air of + melodrama about what he says and does.... Germany can not go to war + for the sake of Morocco, nor yet to exact payment of those + compensations that she very reasonably demands for the French + occupation of Fez, which has become more or less permanent. On the + whole I feel less faith in Great Britain's desire for peace. She + would not be sorry to see the others destroying one another; only, + under those circumstances, it would be difficult for her to avoid + armed intervention.... As I thought from the very first, the crux + of the situation is in London. + + +By the end of July, a different conception of Germany's action seemed to +prevail. It began to be seen that the episode of the "Panther" had been +staged by way of calling for a show-down on the actual intentions and +purposes of the Triple Entente; and it got one. Mr. Lloyd George, "the +impulsive Chancellor of the Exchequer," as Count de Lalaing calls him, +made a typical jingo speech at the Mansion House; a speech which the +Prime Minister, Mr. Asquith, and Sir Edward Grey, the Foreign Minister, +had helped him to compose. The air was cleared at once--England stood by +France--and what better plan could have been devised for clearing the +air than the dispatch of the "Panther"? Germany stood for the policy of +economic equality, the policy of the open door to which all the Powers +interested had agreed in the case of Morocco. France, at the end of a +course of continuous aggression, had put 30,000 troops in occupation of +the capital of Morocco on an infamously unscrupulous pretext, and put +them there to stay, and the British Government "could not see why any +objection should be taken to it." Germany, on the other hand, anchored +an insignificant gunboat off an inaccessible coast, and without landing +a man or firing a shot, left her there as a silent reminder of the +Algeciras Act and the principle of the open door--carefully and even +ostentatiously going no further--and the British Government promptly, +through the mouth of Mr. Lloyd George, laid down a challenge and a +threat. Thereupon Germany and France understood their relative +positions; they understood, even without Sir E. Grey's explicit +reaffirmation of 27 November of the policy of the Triple Entente, that +England would stand by her arrangements with France. Baron Greindl +writes from Berlin 6 December, and puts the case explicitly: + + + Was it not assuming the right of veto on German enterprise for + England to start a hue and cry because a German cruiser cast anchor + in the roads of Agadir, seeing that she had looked on without a + murmur whilst France and Spain had proceeded step by step to + conquer Morocco and to destroy the independence of its Sultan? + + England could not have acted otherwise. She was tied by her secret + treaty with France. The explanation was extremely simple, but it + was not of a sort to allay German irritation. + + +FOOTNOTE: + +[8] Critics of German foreign policy are hard put to it to show that she +was ever guided by territorial ambitions; which is an extremely +troublesome thing when one wants to believe that she proposed in 1914 to +put the world under a military despotism. Can any one show where in a +single instance she ever demanded anything more than economic equality +with other nations, in a foreign market? Certainly she never demanded +more than this in Morocco. Ex-Premier Caillaux says that his predecessor +Rouvier offered Germany a good Moroccan port (Mogador) and some +adjoining territory, and Germany declined. + + + + +XV + + +Let us glance at British political chronology for a moment. King Edward +VII, the chief factor in the Entente, the moving spirit in England's +foreign alliances, had been dead a year. In December, 1905, the Liberal +party had come into power. In April, 1908, Mr. H. H. Asquith became +Prime Minister. In 1910, Anglo-German relations were apparently +improving; in July, 1910, Mr. Asquith spoke of them in the House of +Commons as "of the most cordial character. I look forward to increasing +warmth and fervour and intimacy in these relations year by year." The +great question was, then, in 1911, whether the Liberal Government would +actually, when it came down to the pinch, stick by its secret covenant +with France. Were the new Liberals, were Mr. Asquith, Lord Haldane, Sir +E. Grey, Mr. Lloyd George, true-blue Liberal imperialists, or were they +not? Could France and Russia safely trust them to continue the Foreign +Office policy that Lord Lansdowne had bequeathed to Sir E. Grey; or, +when the emergency came, would they stand from under? After all, there +_had_ been a Campbell-Bannerman; there was no doubt of that; and one, at +least, of the new Liberals, Mr. Lloyd George, had a bad anti-imperialist +record in the South African war. + +The Agadir incident elicited a satisfactory answer to these questions. +The Liberal Government was dependable. However suspiciously the members +of the Liberal Cabinet might talk, they were good staunch imperialists +at heart. They were, as the theologians say, "sound on the essentials." +Baron Greindl wrote, 6 December, 1911: + + + The Entente Cordiale was founded, not on the positive basis of + defence of common interests, but on the negative one of hatred of + the German Empire.... Sir Edward Grey adopts this tradition without + reservation. He imagines that it is in conformity with English + interests.... A revision of Great Britain's policy is all the less + to be looked for, as ever since the Liberal Ministry took office, + and more especially during the last few months, English foreign + policy has been guided by the ideas with which King Edward VII + inspired it. + + + + +XVI + + +Mr. Lloyd George's speech at the Mansion House in July, 1911, after the +German gunboat "Panther" had anchored off the Moroccan coast, gave an +immense impulse to the jingo spirit in France, because it was taken as +definite assurance of England's good faith in seeing her secret +agreements through to a finish. M. Caillaux, the French Premier, appears +to have had his doubts, nevertheless, inasmuch as the British Foreign +Office did not give a straight reply to the French Foreign Office's +inquiry concerning British action in case the Germans landed a force in +Morocco. He says: + + + Are we to understand that our powerful neighbours will go right + through to the end with the resolve which they suggest? Are they + ready for all eventualities? The British Ambassador, Sir Francis + Bertie, with whom I converse, does not give me formal assurances. + It is said, of course, that he would see without displeasure the + outbreak of a conflict between France and Germany; his mind works + in the way attributed to a number of leading British officials at + the Foreign Office. + + +M. Caillaux here suggests the same suspicion of British intentions +which the Belgian diplomats at London, Paris and Berlin intimate +continually throughout their correspondence since 1905.[9] He +accordingly favoured a less energetic policy towards Germany, and was +thrown out of office. Count de Lalaing reported from London, 15 January, +1912, that the revelations which provoked this political crisis were +disagreeable for the English Government. "They seem to prove," he says, +"that the French Premier had been trying to negotiate with Berlin +without the knowledge of the Minister for Foreign Affairs and his other +colleagues, and this is naturally disquieting to a Government whose +interests are bound up with those of France, and which accordingly can +ill tolerate any lapses of this kind." He adds: + + + These revelations have also strengthened the impression that M. + Caillaux had recently favoured an ultra-conciliatory policy towards + Germany, and this impression was felt all the more painfully in + English official circles, as the full extent of the tension between + London and Berlin caused by the Cabinet of St. James's loyal + behaviour towards the Cabinet at Paris had hardly been grasped. + People in England are reluctant to face the fact that they have + been 'more royalist than the King,' and have shown themselves even + less accommodating than the friend they were backing.... + Accordingly the press unanimously hails with delight the departure + of M. Caillaux, and trusts that sounder traditions may be reverted + to without delay. + + +This comment on the position of M. Caillaux is one of the most +interesting observations to be found in these documents. + +FOOTNOTE: + +[9] This is worth noticing since M. Caillaux was the pioneer victim of +the charge of being "pro-German." + + + + +XVII + + +The Balkan war took place in 1912, and the whole history of the year +shows the most mighty efforts of European politicians--efforts which +seem ludicrous and laughable in spite of their tragic quality--to avert +with their left hand the war which they were bringing on with their +right. Mr. Lloyd George is right in saying that no one really wanted +war. What every one wanted, and what every one was trying with might and +main to do, was to cook the omelette of economic imperialism without +breaking any eggs. There was in all the countries, naturally, a jingo +nationalist party which wanted war. In Russia, which was then busily +reorganizing her military forces which had been used up and left +prostrate by the war with the Japanese, the pan-Slavists were +influential and vociferous, but they were not on top. In England there +was a great popular revulsion against the behaviour of the Government +which had so nearly involved the English in a war against Germany the +year before; and Mr. Asquith's Government, which was pacifist in +tendency, was meeting the popular sentiment in every way possible, +_short of the one point of revealing the secret engagements which bound +it to the French Government and contingently to the Russian Government_. +Lord Haldane undertook an official mission to Berlin, which was attended +with great publicity and was popularly supposed to be of a pacificatory +nature; and really, within the limits of the Franco-English diplomatic +agreement, it went as far as it could in the establishment of good +relations. In fact, of course, it came to nothing; as long as the +diplomatic agreement remained in force, it could come to nothing, +nothing of the sort could come to anything; and the diplomatic agreement +being guarded as a close secret, the reason why it must come to nothing +was not apparent. The German Government also made tremendous efforts in +behalf of peace; and it must be noted by those who accept the theory +upon which the treaty of Versailles is based, that if Germany had wished +or intended at any time to strike at the peace of Europe, now was the +moment for her to do so. Instead, the German Emperor in person, and the +German Government, through one of its best diplomatic agents, Baron von +Marschall, met every pacific overture more than half-way, and +themselves initiated all that could be thought of. "There is no doubt," +wrote Baron Beyens from Berlin, "that the Emperor, the Chancellor and +the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs (von Kiderlen-Waechter) are +passionately pacifists." Baron Beyens again says, 28 June, 1912, "The +Emperor is persistent and has not given up hopes of winning back English +sympathies, just as he has succeeded up to a certain point in obtaining +the confidence of the Tsar, by the force of his personal attractions." +Those who believe in the extraordinary notion of an unprepared and +unsuspecting Europe, should read the diplomatic history of the year +1912, when all the chief office-holders in England and on the Continent +were struggling like men caught in a quicksand, or like flies on +fly-paper, to avert, or if they could not avert, to defer the inevitable +war. + +In one country, however, the jingo nationalist and militarist party came +on top; and that country was France. M. Caillaux was succeeded by +Raymond Poincare; and in January, 1913, Poincare became President of the +Republic. Up to 1912, the people of France were increasingly indisposed +to war and were developing a considerable impatience with militarism, +and the French Government was responsive to this sentiment. It knew, as +Baron Guillaume remarked at the time of the Agadir incident, that "a war +would be the death-knell of the Republic." M. Caillaux seems to have +measured the feelings of his countrymen quite well. Baron Guillaume says +that after the dispatch of the "Panther," the British Cabinet's first +proposal was that the British and French Governments should each +immediately send two men-of-war to Agadir; and that the French Cabinet +strongly objected. Again, he says in his report of 8 July, 1911, "I am +persuaded that Messrs. Caillaux and de Selves regret the turn given to +the Moroccan affair by their predecessors in office. They were quite +ready to give way, provided they could do so without humiliation." + +The speech of Mr. Lloyd George at the Mansion House, however, which was +taken by the French (and how correctly they took it became apparent on 3 +August, 1914) as a definite assurance of British support against +Germany, gave the militarist-nationalist party the encouragement to go +ahead and dominate the domestic politics of France. It put the +Poincare-Millerand-Delcasse element on its feet and stiffened its +resolution, besides clearing the way in large measure for its +predominance. On 14 February, 1913, Baron Guillaume reports from Paris +thus: + + + The new President of the Republic enjoys a popularity in France + to-day unknown to any of his predecessors.... Various factors + contribute to explain his popularity. His election had been + carefully prepared in advance; people are pleased at the skilful + way in which, while a Minister, he manoeuvred to bring France to + the fore in the concert of Europe; he has hit upon some happy + phrases that stick in the popular mind. + + +The career of M. Poincare, in fact, and his management of popular +sentiment, show many features which _mutatis mutandis_, find a parallel +in the career of Theodore Roosevelt. Baron Guillaume adds, however, this +extremely striking observation concerning the popularity of M. Poincare: + + + But above all, one must regard it as a manifestation of the old + French chauvinistic spirit, which had for many years slumbered, but + which had come to life again since the affair of Agadir. + + +In the same communication to the Belgian Foreign Office, Baron Guillaume +remarks: + + + M. Poincare is a native of Lorraine, and loses no opportunity of + telling people so. He was M. Millerand's colleague, and the + instigator of his militarist policy. + + Finally, the first word that he uttered at the very moment when he + learned that he was elected President of the Republic, was a + promise that he would watch over and maintain all the means of + national defence. + + +M. Poincare had not been in office two months when he recalled the +French Ambassador at Petersburg, M. Georges Louis, and appointed in his +stead M. Delcasse. Concerning this stupendous move, Baron Guillaume +reported 21 February, 1913, to the Belgian Foreign Office thus: + + + The news that M. Delcasse is shortly to be appointed Ambassador at + Petersburg burst like a bomb here yesterday afternoon.... He was + one of the architects of the Franco-Russian alliance, and still + more so of the Anglo-French _entente_. + + +Baron Guillaume goes on to say that he does not think that M. Delcasse's +appointment should be interpreted as a demonstration against Germany; +but he adds: + + + I do think, however, that M. Poincare, a Lorrainer, was not sorry + to show, from the first day of entering on his high office, how + anxious he is to stand firm and hold aloft the national flag. That + is the danger involved in having M. Poincare at the Elysee in these + anxious days through which Europe is passing. It was under his + Ministry that the militarist, slightly bellicose instincts of the + French woke up again. He has been thought to have a measure of + responsibility for this change of mood. + + +M. Georges Louis, who had represented the French Government at +Petersburg for three years, was a resolute opponent of the militarist +faction in France, and was therefore distinctly _persona non grata_ to +the corresponding faction in Russia. At the head of this faction stood +Isvolsky, who was a friend of M. Poincare and a kindred spirit; hence +when M. Poincare became Premier, an attempt was made to oust M. Louis, +but it was unsuccessful. M. Delcasse, on the other hand, is described by +Mr. Morel as "the man identified more than any other man in French +public life with the anti-German war-party." Mr. Morel, in commenting on +the appointment of M. Delcasse quotes the following from a report sent +by the Russian Ambassador in London to the Foreign Office in Petersburg. +It was written four days after the appointment of M. Delcasse, and quite +bears out the impression made upon the Belgian agents.[10] + + + When I recall his [M. Cambon, the French Ambassador in London] + conversations with me, and the attitude of Poincare, the thought + comes to me as a conviction, that of all the powers France is the + only one which, not to say that it wishes war, would yet look upon + it without great regret.... She [France] has, either rightly or + wrongly, complete trust in her army; the old effervescing minority + has again shown itself. + + +FOOTNOTE: + +[10] But perhaps Count Beuckendorf was pro-German, too! + + + + +XVIII + + +The French war-party, represented by MM. Poincare, Millerand and +Delcasse, came into political predominance in January, 1912, and +consolidated its ascendancy one year later, when M. Raymond Poincare +became President of the French Republic. All through 1912 there was an +immense amount of correspondence and consultation between the French and +Russian Governments, and all through 1913 Russia showed extraordinary +activity in military preparation. In England, Mr. Asquith's Government +had to face a strong revulsion of popular feeling against the attitude +of its diplomacy, which had so nearly involved the country in war with +Germany at the time of the Agadir incident. + +As always, the figures of expenditure tell the story; and the history of +1912-14 should be continually illustrated by reference to the financial +statistics of the period, which have been given in earlier chapters. For +instance, Russia, which spent (in round numbers) L31/4 million on new +naval construction in 1911, spent L7 million in 1912, L12 million in +1913, and L13 million in 1914. The fact that, as Professor Raymond +Beazley puts it, in the ten years before the war, and with increasing +insistence, Paris and St. Petersburg spent upon armaments L159 million +more than Berlin or Vienna, ought to suffice at least to reopen the +question of responsibility. + +It must be carefully noted that by the spring of 1912, the Balkan +League, which was engineered by the Russian diplomat Hartwig, was fully +formed. This put the diplomacy of the Balkan States under the direct +control of the Russian Foreign Office. It now became necessary for the +Russian Foreign Office to ascertain, in case war between Serbia and +Austria broke out, and Germany should help Austria and Russia should +help Serbia, whether Russia could count on the support of France and +England. Russia received this assurance in secret, and the terms of it +were discovered by the Soviet Government in the archives of the Foreign +Office and published in 1919. This is a most important fact, and should +be continually borne in mind in connexion with the fact that the war was +precipitated by the murder of the Austrian Archduke by Serbian officers, +members of the pan-Slavist organization fostered and encouraged by MM. +Isvolsky and Hartwig. + +On 9 August, 1912, M. Poincare, then Premier of France, made a visit to +St. Petersburg, where he was joined by his kindred spirit, M. Isvolsky, +who was then the Russian Ambassador at Paris. It was the usual visit of +State, and Russia staged an imposing series of military manoeuvres in +M. Poincare's honour. But the really important events that took place +were these. First, a naval agreement was made between France and Russia, +whereby France agreed to concentrate her naval forces in the Eastern +Mediterranean in order to support the Russian navy in the Black Sea. +This agreement was secret, and revealed by the Soviet Government in +1918. Then, in the same month, the Third French Naval Squadron was +transferred from the Atlantic to the Mediterranean. M. Poincare told M. +Isvolsky that "this decision has been made in agreement with England, +and forms the further development and completion of the arrangement +already made previously between the French and British +Staffs"--referring to the conference of Messrs. Asquith and Churchill +and Lord Kitchener at Malta, the month before, at which the new +disposition of the English and French fleets was decided. The third +matter of consequence that took place in the month of August was that +the Russian Government began to put pressure on the French Government to +re-establish the Three Years Military Service law. + +So much for August. In the month of September, M. Poincare gave the +Russian Foreign Minister, M. Sazonov, assurance that if Germany helped +Austria in a struggle in the Balkans, and if Russia were drawn in on the +other side, France "would not hesitate for a moment to fulfil its +obligations towards Russia." In the same month, M. Isvolsky had an +interview with the King of England and Sir Edward Grey, the British +Foreign Minister, in which both King George and Sir E. Grey assured him +of the fullest British co-operation in the same event. M. Isvolsky +reported to the Russian Foreign Office at St. Petersburg, that "Grey, +upon his own initiative, corroborated what I already knew from +Poincare--the existence of an agreement between France and Great +Britain, according to which England undertook, in case of a war with +Germany, not only to come to the assistance of France on the sea, but +also on the Continent, by landing troops." These two understandings +between MM. Poincare and Sazonov, and between M. Isvolsky and Sir E. +Grey, were secret, and nothing was known of them until 1919, when the +memoranda of them were published by the Soviet Government.[11] + +A train of gunpowder, in other words, had been laid from Belgrade +through Paris and London to St. Petersburg; and at the beginning of that +train was the highly inflammable and inflammatory pan-Slavism, organized +by M. Hartwig with the connivance of M. Isvolsky. A spark struck in the +Balkans would cause the train to flash into flame throughout its entire +length. + +FOOTNOTE: + +[11] On 10 March of the following year, Mr. Asquith, replying to a +question in the Commons from Lord Hugh Cecil, denied that England was +under an "obligation arising owing to an assurance given by the Ministry +in the course of diplomatic negotiations, to send a very large armed +force out of this country to operate in Europe." On 24 March, he made +similar denials in reply to questions from Sir W. Byles and Mr. King. On +14 April, Mr. Runciman, in a speech at Birkenhead, denied "in the most +categorical way" the existence of a secret understanding with any +foreign Power! On 3 May, the Secretary for the Colonies, Mr. Harcourt, +declared publicly that he "could conceive no circumstances in which +Continental operations would not be a crime against the people of this +country." On 28 June, the under-Secretary for Foreign Affairs, Mr. +Acland, declared publicly that "in no European question were we +concerned to interfere with a big army." On 1 July, Lord Loreburn, Lord +Chancellor from 1906 to 1912, said "that any British Government would be +so guilty towards our country as to take up arms in a foreign quarrel is +more than I can believe." On 28 April, 1914, and again on 11 June, Sir +E. Grey confirmed, in the House of Commons, Mr. Asquith's assertion, +made 10 and 24 March, 1913, of British freedom from engagements with +Continental Powers. + +Yet, curiously the professions of politicians are still trusted, and +people still expect something from their machinations; they expected +something substantial from the recent conference in Washington, on the +limitation of armaments, for instance--a striking and pathetic example +of the strength of superstition. + + + + +XIX + + +On 25 April, 1912, the German Reichstag put through its first reading a +bill, with only perfunctory debate, for an increase in the German army +and navy. This measure has been regularly and officially interpreted as +a threat. Yet nearly a year after, on 19 February, 1913, Baron +Guillaume, writing from Paris about the prospects of the Three Years +Service bill, reports to the Belgian Foreign Office that the French +Minister of War "does not regard the measures taken by Germany as a +demonstration of hostility, but rather as an act of prudence for the +future. Germany fears that she may one day have to fight Russia and +France together, perhaps England too; and then any help that Austria +might give her would be seriously handicapped by the fact that the Dual +Monarchy [Austria-Hungary] would have to withstand a coalition of Balkan +States." + +Naturally. The bill was presented to the Reichstag in April, and the +"coalition of Balkan States," M. Hartwig's Balkan League, had already +completed its organization in February. Not only so, but the very first +step taken by this exemplary organization provided for a division of +spoils in the event of a successful war with Turkey; and six months +after the organization of the League was concluded, it served an +ultimatum upon Turkey over Albania, and in October went to war. The +German Government could quite plainly see the future about to be +inaugurated through this consolidation of Balkan policy into the hands +of the Russian Foreign Office--any one even an attentive reader of +newspapers, could see it--and it could see the vastly increased +responsibility of its Austrian ally, in case of a quarrel, should it +have to take on a coalition of the Balkan States instead of a single +one. + +Count de Lalaing reported from London, 24 February, 1918, that the +British Foreign Office took the same sensible view of the German +military increases as, according to Baron Guillaume, was taken by M. +Jonnart. "The English press," he says, "is of course anxious to saddle +Germany with the responsibility for the fresh tension caused by her +schemes--a tension which may give Europe fresh reasons for uneasiness." +But, he goes on-- + + + At the Foreign Office I found a more equitable and calmer estimate + of the situation. They see in the reinforcement of the German + armies not so much a provocation as an admission that circumstances + have weakened Germany's military position, and that it must be + strengthened. The Berlin Government is compelled to recognize that + it can no longer count upon being supported by the whole force of + its Austrian ally, now that a new Power, that of the Balkan + Federation, has made its appearance in South-eastern Europe, right + at the gates of the Dual Empire.... Under these circumstances, the + Foreign Office sees nothing astonishing in Germany's finding it + imperative to increase the number of her army corps. The Foreign + Office also states that the Berlin Government had told the Paris + Cabinet quite frankly that such were the motives for its action. + + +The same view was publicly expressed by Mr. Lloyd George himself as late +as 1 January, 1914, when he said: + + + The German army was vital, not merely to the existence of the + German Empire, but to the very life and independence of the nation + itself, surrounded, as Germany is, by other nations, each of which + possesses armies as powerful as her own. We forget that while we + insist upon a sixty-per-cent superiority (as far as our naval + strength is concerned) over Germany being essential to guarantee + the integrity of our own shores, Germany herself has nothing like + that superiority over France alone, and she has of course, in + addition, to reckon with Russia on her eastern frontier. Germany + has nothing which approximates to a two-Power standard. She has, + therefore, become alarmed by recent issues, and is spending huge + sums of money on the expansion of her military resources. + + +Those are the words, be it remembered, of the same person who says +to-day that German responsibility for the war which broke out six months +after he had made the foregoing statement, is a _chose jugee_! The +statement was made, furthermore, not only _after_ the German bill of 25 +April, 1912, but _after_ the bill of 8 April, 1913, as well, which fixed +the peace-strength of the German army at 870,000. + +The Three Years Service law passed the French Chamber in August, 1913, +after a passionate popular campaign. Of this measure Baron Guillaume +says that the French newspapers, _Le Temps_ in particular, "are wrong in +representing the French Government's plans as being in response to +measures adopted by Germany. Many of them are but the outcome of +measures which have long been prepared." The French Minister, M. +Jonnart, told him that "we know very well what an advantage our +neighbour [Germany] has in the continual growth of his population; +still, we must do all that lies in our power to compensate this +advantage by better military organization." Probably this view of the +Three Years Service law was the view held by all save the relatively +small and highly-integrated war-faction; and in so far as military +measures are ever reasonable, this, like the corresponding measures +taken in Germany, must be regarded as reasonable. As M. Pichon told +Baron Guillaume, "We are not arming for war, we are arming to avoid it, +to exorcise it.... We must go on arming more and more in order to +prevent war." There is no reason whatever to suppose that this view was +not sincerely entertained by M. Pichon and by many others, probably by a +majority of the persons most responsibly concerned. + +But the consequences of the Three Years Service law were contemplated by +Baron Guillaume with great apprehension. He reports on 12 June, 1913, +that "the burden of the new law will fall so heavily upon the +population, and the expenditure which it will involve will be so +exorbitant, that there will soon be an outcry in the country, and France +will be faced with this dilemma: either renounce what she can not bear +to forgo, or else, war at short notice." Of the militarist party now in +the ascendancy, he says: "They are followed with a sort of infatuation, +a kind of frenzy which is interesting but deplorable. One is not now +allowed, under pain of being marked as a traitor, to express even a +doubt of the need for the Three Years Service." + +Public opinion was evidently confiscated by the +Poincare-Millerand-Delcasse group, much as it was in the United States +in 1917 by the war-party headed by Mr. Wilson. Baron Guillaume uses +words that must remind us of those days. "Every one knows," he says, +"that the mass of the nation is by no means in favour of the projected +reform, and they understand the danger that lies ahead. But they shut +their eyes and press on." + + + + +XX + + +The train of powder, however, had been laid by the diplomatic +engagements. Austria-Hungary and Serbia came into collision in the +spring of 1913 over the Scutari incident. In December, 1912, M. Sazonov +had urged Serbia to play a waiting game in order to "deliver a blow at +Austria." But on 4 April, 1913, Baron Beyens reports from Berlin that +the arrogance and contempt with which the Serbs receive the Vienna +Cabinet's protests over Scutari + + + can only be explained by their belief that St. Petersburg will + support them. The Serbian charge d'affaires was quite openly saying + here lately that his Government would not have persisted in its + course for the last six months in the face of the Austrian + opposition had they not received encouragement in their course from + the Russian Minister, M. de Hartwig, who is a diplomatist of M. + Isvolsky's school.... M. Sazonov's heart is with his colleagues who + are directing the policy of the Great Powers, but he feels his + influence with the Tsar being undermined by the court-party and the + pan-Slavists. Hence his inconsequent behaviour. + + +The military activity which the Russian Government displayed in 1913 +gives interest to this estimate of M. Sazonov's position. No doubt to +some extent the estimate was correct; M. Sazonov, like Sir E. Grey, was +probably, when it was too late, much disquieted by the events which +marshalled him the way that he was going. In 1914, this military +activity gained extraordinary intensity. The Russian army was put upon a +peace-footing of approximately 1,400,000, "an effective numerical +strength hitherto unprecedented," said the St. Petersburg correspondent +of the London _Times_. From January to June, the Russian Government made +immense purchases of war material. In February, it concluded a loan in +Paris for the improvement of its strategic roads and railways on the +German frontier. Russia, as was generally known at the time, had her eye +on the acquisition of Constantinople; and in the same month, February, a +council of war was held in St. Petersburg to work out "a general +programme of action in order to secure for us a favourable solution of +the historical question of the Straits." In March, the St. Petersburg +newspaper which served as the mouthpiece of the Minister of War, +published an article stating that Russia's strategy would no longer be +"defensive" but "active." Another paper spoke of the time coming when +"the crossing of the Austrian frontier by the Russian army would be an +unavoidable decision." In the same month, Russia raised a heavy tariff +against the importation of German grain and flour; thus bearing out the +evidence of German trade-reports that even at this time Germany was +still exporting grain to Russia--a most extraordinary proceeding for a +nation which contemplated a sudden declaration of war before the next +harvest. In the same month, the Russian Government brought in military +estimates of L97 million. It exercised heavy pressure on the French +Government in the protracted political turmoil over the maintenance of +the Three Years Service law. In April, "trial mobilizations" were begun, +and were continued up to the outbreak of the war. In May, M. Sazonov +informed the Tsar that the British Government "has decided to empower +the British Admiralty Staff to enter into negotiations with French and +Russian naval agents in London for the purpose of drawing technical +conditions for possible action by the naval forces of England, Russia +and France." In the same month, a complete mobilization of all the +reserves of the three annual contingents of 1907-1909 was ordered for +the whole Russian Empire, as a "test," to take place in the autumn. In +the same month the Russian Admiralty instructed its agent in London, +Captain Volkov, as follows: + + + Our interests on the Northern scene of operations require that + England keeps as large a part of the German fleet as possible in + check in the North Sea.... The English Government could render us a + substantial service if it would agree to send a sufficient number + of boats to our Baltic ports to compensate for our lack of means of + transport, before the beginning of war-operations. + + +This document, revealed by the Soviet Government in 1919, is pretty +damaging to the assumption of an "unprepared and unsuspecting Europe"; +especially as Professor Conybeare has given publicity to the fact that +"before the beginning of war-operations" those English boats were there, +prompt to the minute, empty, ready and waiting. + +In June, the Russian Ambassador warned the Russian naval staff in London +that they must exercise great caution in talking about a landing in +Pomerania or about the dispatch of English boats to the Russian Baltic +ports before the outbreak of war, "so that the rest may not be +jeopardized." On 13 June, the newspaper-organ of the Russian Minister +of War published an inspired article under the caption: "Russia is +Ready: France must be Ready." + +Two weeks later, the Austrian heir-apparent, the Archduke Francis +Joseph, was murdered at Sarajevo, a town in Bosnia, by Serbian officers. +The murder was arranged by the Serbian Major Tankesitch, of the +pan-Slavist organization known as the Black Hand; and this organization +was fostered, if not actually subsidized, by the Russian Minister at +Belgrade, M. Hartwig, the pupil and _alter ego_ of M. Isvolsky, and the +architect and promoter of the Balkan League! + + + + + +End of Project Gutenberg's The Myth of a Guilty Nation, by Albert Jay Nock + +*** END OF THIS PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK THE MYTH OF A GUILTY NATION *** + +***** This file should be named 44508.txt or 44508.zip ***** +This and all associated files of various formats will be found in: + http://www.gutenberg.org/4/4/5/0/44508/ + +Produced by Martin Pettit and the Online Distributed +Proofreading Team at http://www.pgdp.net (This file was +produced from images generously made available by The +Internet Archive) + + +Updated editions will replace the previous one--the old editions +will be renamed. + +Creating the works from public domain print editions means that no +one owns a United States copyright in these works, so the Foundation +(and you!) can copy and distribute it in the United States without +permission and without paying copyright royalties. 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