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diff --git a/44437-0.txt b/44437-0.txt index fae7723..271ab13 100644 --- a/44437-0.txt +++ b/44437-0.txt @@ -1,34 +1,4 @@ -Project Gutenberg's The War With Mexico, Volume I (of 2), by Justin H. Smith - -This eBook is for the use of anyone anywhere at no cost and with -almost no restrictions whatsoever. You may copy it, give it away or -re-use it under the terms of the Project Gutenberg License included -with this eBook or online at www.gutenberg.org - - -Title: The War With Mexico, Volume I (of 2) - -Author: Justin H. 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You may copy it, give it away or -re-use it under the terms of the Project Gutenberg License included -with this eBook or online at www.gutenberg.org - - -Title: The War With Mexico, Volume I (of 2) - -Author: Justin H. Smith - -Release Date: December 16, 2013 [EBook #44437] - -Language: English - -Character set encoding: ISO-8859-1 - -*** START OF THIS PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK THE WAR WITH MEXICO, VOLUME I *** - - - - -Produced by KD Weeks, David Edwards and the Online -Distributed Proofreading Team at http://www.pgdp.net (This -file was produced from images generously made available -by The Internet Archive) - - - - - -Transcriber's Note - -For this version of the text, italics are denoted with _underscore_ -characters, and bold text with =equal= signs. The ligature for 'oe' is -separated into its two letters, e.g., 'manoeuvre'. - -Please consult the notes at the end of this text for a detailed -discussion of the various footnotes, endnotes, and navigation through -this text, as well as any other textual issues. - -Right-side page headers contained descriptions of the current topics -covered by the two open pages. These were retained and are placed on -separate lines prior to the paragraph where the topic is introduced, and -enclosed in brackets, as [Sidenotes]. The choice of that position is -not always obvious and should be regarded as approximate. Should the -topic persist over multiple pages, any redundant headers have been -removed. - -Illustrations, all but one of them maps, are denoted with square -brackets as [Illustration: <caption>] at approximately the point -where they were printed. The captions are usually printed on the maps -themselves. Where there is no obvious title to the map, the caption -has been provided from the table of illustrations. - - - - - THE WAR WITH MEXICO - - - - - +----------------------------------------+ - | BY THE SAME AUTHOR | - | | - | The | - | Annexation of Texas | - | | - | _Octavo ix + 496 pages_ | - | | - | _By mail, postpaid, $3.00_ | - | | - | ------------------------ | - | This is the only work attempting to | - | deal thoroughly with an affair that | - | was intrinsically far more important | - | than had previously been supposed, | - | and was also of no little significance | - | on account of its relation to the war | - | with Mexico. | - | ------------------------ | - | | - | THE MACMILLAN COMPANY | - | _PUBLISHERS_ | - +----------------------------------------+ - - - - - THE - - WAR WITH MEXICO - - BY - - JUSTIN H. SMITH - - FORMERLY PROFESSOR OF MODERN HISTORY - AT DARTMOUTH COLLEGE - AUTHOR OF "THE ANNEXATION OF TEXAS," "OUR - STRUGGLE FOR THE FOURTEENTH COLONY," - "ARNOLD'S MARCH FROM - CAMBRIDGE TO QUEBEC," - ETC. - - - VOLUME I - - New York - - THE MACMILLAN COMPANY - 1919 - - _All rights reserved_ - - COPYRIGHT, 1919, - BY THE MACMILLAN COMPANY. - - Set up and printed. Published December, 1919. - - Norwood Press - J. S. Cushing Co.--Berwick & Smith Co. - Norwood, Mass., U.S.A. - - - - - TO - - HENRY CABOT LODGE, LL.D. - - SENATOR OF THE UNITED STATES - HISTORIAN - PRESIDENT OF THE MASSACHUSETTS HISTORICAL SOCIETY - WHO GAVE THE AUTHOR INVALUABLE ASSISTANCE - IN THE COLLECTION OF MATERIAL RELATING - TO THE WAR WITH MEXICO - THIS WORK - IS VERY RESPECTFULLY INSCRIBED - - - - - PREFACE - - -As every one understands, our conflict with Mexico has been almost -entirely eclipsed by the greater wars following it. But in the field -of thought mere size does not count for much; and while the number of -troops and the lists of casualties give the present subject little -comparative importance, it has ample grounds for claiming attention. As -a territorial stake New Mexico, Arizona and California were of immense -value. National honor was involved, and not a few of the Mexicans -thought their national existence imperilled. Some of the diplomatic -questions were of the utmost difficulty and interest. The clash of North -and South, American and Mexican, produced extraordinary lights and -shades, and in both countries the politics that lay behind the military -operations made a dramatic and continual by-play. The military conduct -of the governments--especially our own--and the behavior of our troops -on foreign soil afforded instruction worthy to be pondered. While vast -concentrations of forces and complicated tactical operations on a great -scale were out of the question, the handling of even small armies at a -long distance from home and in a region that was not only foreign but -strange, created problems of a peculiar interest and afforded lessons of -a peculiar value, such as no earlier or later war of ours has provided; -and the examples of courage, honor and heroism exhibited in a conflict -not only against man but against nature merited correct appreciation and -lasting remembrance.[P.1][A] - - [A] The notes to which this and the other "superior figures" invite - attention will be found immediately after the text of the volume. - In the notes only brief titles of books are given, but these may be - supplemented by reference to the list of printed sources given in - the appendix of the second volume. Citations (in the notes) - preceded by a number in black type refer to the list of MS. sources - standing at the end of the notes. - -The warrant for offering another work on the subject rests primarily -on the extent and results of the author's investigations. His -intention was to obtain substantially all the valuable information -regarding it that is in existence, and no effort was spared to reach -his end. The appendix of volume II gives a detailed account of the -sources. By special authorization from the Presidents of the United -States and Mexico it was possible to examine every pertinent document -belonging to the two governments. The search extended to the archives -of Great Britain, France, Spain, Cuba, Colombia and Peru, those of -the American and Mexican states, and those of Mexican cities. The -principal libraries here, in Mexico and in Europe, the collections of -our historical societies, and papers belonging to many individuals in -this country and elsewhere were sifted. It may safely be estimated that -the author examined personally more than 100,000 manuscripts bearing -upon the subject, more than 1200 books and pamphlets, and also more -than 200 periodicals, the most important of which were studied, issue -by issue, for the entire period.[B] Almost exclusively the book is -based upon first-hand sources, printed matter having been found of -little use except for the original material it contains or for data -regarding biography, geography, customs, industries and other ancillary -subjects.[P.2] - - [B] These figures cover also the author's "Annexation of Texas," which - is virtually an introduction to the present work. - -The author also talked or corresponded with as many of the veterans as -he could reach, and he spent more than a year, all told, in Mexico, -where he not only studied the chief battlefields but endeavored, through -conversations with Mexicans of all grades and by the aid of foreigners -long resident in the country, to become well acquainted with the -character and psychology of the people. As the war was fought almost -exclusively among them, and its inception, course and results depended -in large part upon these factors, the author attaches not a little -importance to his opportunities for such personal investigations and to -his Mexican data in general.[P.2] - -Probably more than nine tenths of the material used in the preparation -of this work is in fact new. No previous writer on the subject had been -through the diplomatic and military archives of either belligerent -nation, for example. Virtually a still larger percentage is new, for -the published documents needed to be compared with the originals. In -the printed American reports relating to the battles of September 8 and -13, 1847, for instance, over fifty departures from the manuscripts, -that seemed worth noting, were found. Nor did the additional documents -prove by any means to supply mere details. A great number of unprinted -statements from subordinate officers, who were nearer to the facts than -their superiors could be, were discovered. The major official reports -needed both to be supplemented and to be corrected. Such reports were in -most instances colored more or less, and in some radically distorted, -for personal reasons or from a justifiable desire to produce an effect -on the subordinates concerned, the army in general, the writer's -government, the enemy, and the public at home and abroad; while, as -General Scott stated in orders, unintentional omissions and mistakes -were "common." Taylor's account of the battle of May 9, 1846, for -example, failed completely to explain his victory. It has been only by -obtaining and comparing a large number of statements that approximate -verity has been reached. The same has been true of the diplomatic and -political aspects of the subject. The reports of the British, French and -Spanish ministers residing at Mexico, to cite one illustration, proved -indispensable. In reality, therefore, aside from its broader outlines -the field presented ample opportunities for study; and while no doubt -so extended an investigation included many facts of slight value, La -Rochefoucauld was right when he said, "To know things perfectly, one -should know them in detail."[P.3] - -As a particular consequence of this full inquiry, an episode that has -been regarded both in the United States and abroad as discreditable to -us, appears now to wear quite a different complexion. Such a result, it -may be presumed, will gratify patriotic Americans, but the author must -candidly admit that he began with no purpose or even thought of reaching -it. His view of the war at the outset of his special inquiries coincided -substantially with that prevailing in New England, and the subject was -taken up simply because he felt convinced that it had not been studied -thoroughly. This conviction, indeed, has seemed to be gaining ground -rapidly for some time, and hence it is believed that new opinions, -resting upon facts, will be acceptable now in place of opinions resting -largely upon traditional prejudices and misinformation. - -Some might suggest that only a military man could properly write this -work. But, in the first place, the author did not wish to prepare a -technical military account of the war. His aim was to offer a correct -and complete view of it suitable for all interested in American history, -and it will be found that politics, diplomacy and other phases of the -subject required as full investigation as did its military aspects. - -Secondly, the author took pains to qualify himself for his task. The -real difficulty of the commanding general consists in applying the -principles of war under complicated, obscure and changeful conditions, -and in overcoming "friction" of many sorts. The intellectual side of the -art is readily enough understood. "In war everything is very simple," -wrote Clausewitz, the fountainhead of the modern system. "The theory of -the great speculative combinations of war is simple enough in itself," -said Jomini; "it only requires intelligence and attentive reflection." -"Strategy is the application of common sense to the conduct of war," -declared Von Moltke. Arnold in his Lectures on Modern History said: "An -unprofessional person may, without blame, speak or write on military -subjects, and may judge of them sufficiently;" and the eminent military -authority, G. F. R. Henderson, endorsed this view. "The theory of war -is simple," wrote another expert, "and there is no reason why any man -who chooses to take the trouble to read and reflect carefully on one or -two of the acknowledged best books thereon, should not attain to a fair -knowledge thereof." As may be seen from the list of printed sources, -the present author--beginning with the volumes recommended by a board -of officers to the graduates of the United States Military Academy--did -much more than is here proposed. - -Finally, during the entire time occupied in writing this work he -fortunately enjoyed the advantage of corresponding and occasionally -conferring with Brigadier General Oliver L. Spaulding, Jr., of the -United States Field Artillery, formerly instructor at the Army Service -Schools, Fort Leavenworth, and more recently Assistant Commandant of the -School of Fire, Fort Sill, who had distinguished himself not only in the -service but as a writer on professional subjects. General Spaulding has -kindly discussed with the author such military questions as have arisen, -and has read critically all the battle chapters. No responsibility -should, however, be attached to him, if a mistake is detected.[P.4] - -A word must be added with reference to the notes. These have been placed -at the ends of the volumes because the author believes the best plan -will be to read the text of each chapter before looking at the notes -that bear upon it, and also in part because he did not wish any one -to feel that he was parading his discussions and citations. The notes -contain supplementary material designed to make the work a critical -as well as a narrative history, and contain also specific references -to the sources on which the text is based. These references involved -a most annoying problem. When one's citations are limited in number -and proceed in single file, as it were, they can be handled easily. -But in the present instance as many as 1800 documents were used for a -chapter, not a few of which were cited more than once; and each sentence -of the text--to speak broadly--resulted from comparing a number of -sources. Under these conditions the usual method would have produced a -repellent mass of references, perhaps greater in extent than the text -itself, which would have been very expensive to print and from their -multiplicity would have been extremely inconvenient. Where that method -appeared feasible it was adopted, but as a rule the references have -been grouped by paragraphs or topics. In many cases, however, pains -have been taken to indicate in the text itself the basis of important -statements, and further hints will be found in the notes. The reader can -thus always ascertain in general the basis of the text, and will find -specific references wherever the author has thought it likely they would -be desired. The special student will wish to look up all the citations -bearing on any topic that interests him. No doubt the plan is somewhat -unsatisfactory, but after studying the subject for a dozen years the -author feels sure that any other would have been more so.[P.5] - -To thank all who kindly assisted the author to obtain material is -practically impossible; but a number of names appear in the list of -MS. sources, and others must be mentioned here. Without the cordial -support of Presidents Theodore Roosevelt and Porfirio Diaz, Secretary of -State Elihu Root, Minister of Relations Ignacio Mariscal, and Senator -Henry Cabot Lodge this history could not have been written; and the -author acknowledges with no less pleasure his special obligations to -Whitelaw Reid, American Ambassador to Great Britain, Joseph E. Willard, -Ambassador to Spain; Henri Vignaux, First Secretary of our embassy at -Paris; J. J. Limantour, Minister of Hacienda, Mexico; Major General -J. Franklin Bell, Chief of Staff; Major General F. C. Ainsworth, Adj. -Gen.; Admiral Alfred T. Mahan; Admiral French E. Chadwick; Brigadier -General J. E. Kuhn, Head of the War College, Washington; Dr. J. Franklin -Jameson, Director of the Department of Historical Research, Carnegie -Institution; Dr. Gaillard Hunt, Chief of the Division of MSS., Library -of Congress; Dr. St. George L. Sioussat, Brown University; Dr. Eugene -C. Barker, University of Texas; Dr. Herbert E. Bolton, Professor -Frederick J. Teggart and Dr. H. I. Priestley of the University of -California; Dr. R. W. Kelsey of Haverford College; Dr. J. W. Jordan, -Pennsylvania Historical Society; Dr. Worthington C. Ford, Editor for the -Massachusetts Historical Society; Dr. Solon J. Buck of the Minnesota -Historical Society; R. D. W. Connor, Secretary of the Historical -Commission of North Carolina; Dr. R. P. Brooks of the University of -Georgia; Dr. Dunbar Rowland, Director of the Archives and Historical -Department of Mississippi; T. M. Owen, Director of the Historical -Department of Alabama; Dr. George M. Philips, State Normal School, West -Chester, Pa.; Waldo G. Leland, Secretary of the American Historical -Association; W. B. Douglas and Miss Stella M. Drumm, Librarian, of the -Missouri Historical Society; Dr. Clarence E. Alvord of the University of -Illinois and Mrs. Alvord (formerly Miss Idress Head, Librarian of the -Missouri Historical Society); Ignacio Molina, Head of the Cartography -Section, Department of Fomento, Mexico; Charles W. Stewart, Librarian -of the Navy Department; James W. Cheney, long the Librarian of the War -Department; Major Gustave R. Lukesh, Director, and Henry E. Haferkorn, -Librarian of the United States Engineer School, Washington Barracks; D. -C. Brown, Librarian of the Indiana State Library; Victor H. Paltsits, -Department of MSS., New York Public Library; W. L. Ostrander of the -library at West Point; Lieutenant James R. Jacobs, 28th United States -Infantry; Dr. Katherine J. Gallagher; Dr. Martha L. Edwards. To the -widow of Admiral Charles S. Sperry and their son, Professor Charles -S. Sperry, the author is particularly indebted for an opportunity to -examine important papers left by William L. Marcy. Valuable suggestions -were most kindly given by Dr. William A. Dunning of Columbia University -and Dr. Davis R. Dewey of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, who -read portions of the text, by Francis W. Halsey, Esq., of New York, who -read nearly all of it, and by Dr. Edward Channing of Harvard University, -who was so good as to look over more or less closely all of the proofs. -To the helpers not mentioned by name the author begs leave to offer -thanks no less sincere. - -Finally, the author desires to mention the enterprise and public spirit -shown by the publishers in bringing out so expensive a work at this time -of uncertainty. - - THE CENTURY CLUB, NEW YORK, - September, 1919. - - - - - CONTENTS OF VOLUME I - - - PAGE - - MAPS AND PLANS IN VOLUME I xvii - - CONSPECTUS OF EVENTS xix - - PRONUNCIATION OF SPANISH xxi - - CHAPTER - - I. MEXICO AND THE MEXICANS 1 - - II. THE POLITICAL EDUCATION OF MEXICO 29 - - III. THE RELATIONS BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND - MEXICO, 1825-1843 58 - - IV. THE RELATIONS BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND - MEXICO, 1843-1846 82 - - V. THE MEXICAN ATTITUDE ON THE EVE OF WAR 102 - - VI. THE AMERICAN ATTITUDE ON THE EVE OF WAR 117 - - VII. THE PRELIMINARIES OF THE CONFLICT 138 - - VIII. PALO ALTO AND RESACA DE GUERRERO 156 - - IX. THE UNITED STATES MEETS THE CRISIS 181 - - X. THE CHOSEN LEADERS ADVANCE 204 - - XI. TAYLOR SETS OUT FOR SALTILLO 225 - - XII. MONTEREY 239 - - XIII. SALTILLO, PARRAS, AND TAMPICO 262 - - XIV. SANTA FE 284 - - XV. CHIHUAHUA 298 - - XVI. THE CALIFORNIA QUESTION 315 - - XVII. THE CONQUEST OF CALIFORNIA 331 - - XVIII. THE GENESIS OF TWO CAMPAIGNS 347 - - XIX. SANTA ANNA PREPARES TO STRIKE 370 - - XX. BUENA VISTA 384 - - NOTES ON VOLUME I 402 - - APPENDIX (MANUSCRIPT SOURCES) 565 - - - - - MAPS AND PLANS IN VOLUME ONE - -As equally good sources disagree sometimes, a few inconsistencies are -unavoidable. Numerous errors have been corrected. An asterisk indicates -an unpublished original. Statements, cited in the notes, have also been -used. - - - PAGE - - 1. Mexico in 1919. Based upon standard maps xxii - - 2. Profile of the Route between Vera Cruz and Mexico 2 - - Drawn by Lieut. Hardcastle (Sen. Ex. Doc. 1; 30 Cong., - 1 sess.). - - 3. Matamoros and Fort Brown 159 - - Sketch map based on a *map drawn by Luis Berlandier, - Arista's chief engineer (War Dept., Mexico); Meade, - Letters, i, 73; McCall, Letters, 444; New Orleans - _Picayune_, June 28, 1846; *sketch by Mansfield, - Taylor's chief engineer (War Dept., Washington); and - an anonymous plan (Mass. Hist. Society). - - 4. Fort Brown to Brazos Island 162 - - Sketch map based principally upon the map in Apuntes para - la Historia de la Guerra entre México y los Estados-Unidos - and a map by Eaton of Third Infantry (Ho. Ex. Doc. 209; - 29 Cong., 1 sess.). - - 5. Battle of Palo Alto 164 - - Sketch map drawn by a U. S. army officer. Based on Eaton's - plan (Ho. Ex. Doc., 209; 29 Cong., 1 sess.); a *sketch by - Berlandier (War Dept., Mexico); Apuntes; México á través - de los Siglos, iv, 562; _El Republicano_ (Berlandier); - a map in Campaña contra los Norte-Americanos; a map by - Lieut. Dobbins in Life of General Taylor; and _Journal of - Milit. Service Institution_, xli, 96. - - 6. Battle of Resaca de la Palma (_i.e._ Resaca de Guerrero) 170 - - Sketch map based on Apuntes; New Orleans _Picayune_, - June 25, 1846, from official drawings; a plan by Dobbins - in Life of General Taylor; a map in Campaña contra, _etc._; - a plan by Berlandier in _El Republicano_; a plan by - Eaton (Ho. Ex. Doc. 209; 29 Cong., 1 sess.); French, Two Wars, - 52; and _Journal of Milit. Service Instit._, xli, 100. - - 7. From Matamoros to Monterey 210 - - Based on an official Mexican map prepared by the Fomento - Dept. and on Gen. Arista's map. - - 8. Battles of Monterey: General Map 232 - - Based on *three plans drawn by Lieut. Gardner from surveys - of Lieut. Scarritt (War Dept., Washington); _Picayune_ - Extra, Nov. 19, 1846 (Lieut. Benjamin); a *drawing by - Adjutant Heiman (Tennessee Hist. Society); a map in - Apuntes; and a plan by Balbontín (Invasión Americana). - - 9. Battles of Monterey. Central Operations 240 - - Based on the same sources as No. 8 _supra_. - - 10. General Wool's March 271 - - Based on reconnaissances of Capt. Hughes, Lieut. Sitgreaves, - and Lieut. Franklin (Sen. Ex. Doc. 32; 31 Cong., 1 sess.). - - 11. Tampico and Its Environs 276 - - Based on a sketch by Lee and Gilmer (War Dept., - Washington); and a Fomento Dept. Map (_see_ No. 7 - _supra_). - - 12. General Kearny's March to Santa Fe 287 - - From a sketch drawn by A. Wislizenus (Sen. Misc. Doc. - 26; 30 Cong., 1 sess.). - - 13. El Paso to Rosales, Mexico 305 - - From a U. S. War College map, Washington. - - 14. Battle of Sacramento 307 - - Based on a map in Sen. Ex. Doc. 1; 30 Cong., 1 sess.; and - a plan in México á través de los Siglos, iv, 644. - - 15. California in 1846 316 - - Based on a map in Sen. Ex. Doc. 1; 30 Cong., 1 sess. - - 16. Northern California 317 - - From a sketch by Lieut. Derby (Sen. Ex. Doc. 18; 31 Cong., - 1 sess.) and recent maps. - - 17. Fight at San Pascual 341 - - From a plan in Sen. Ex. Doc. 1; 30 Cong., 1 sess. - - 18. Fight near Los Angeles 344 - - From a plan in Sen. Ex. Doc. 1; 30 Cong., 1 sess. - - 19. General Patterson's March 360 - - From a map in Ho. Ex. Doc. 13; 31 Cong., 2 sess. - - 20. From Mexico City to Agua Nueva 381 - - From a Fomento Dept. map. - - 21. From Monterey to La Encarnación 382 - - Based on a map in Rápida Ojeada sobre la Campaña, _etc._; - and a *sketch by Lee and Gilmer (War Dept., Washington). - - 22. Battle of Buena Vista 387 - - Based on a map drawn by Capt. Linnard from the surveys of - Capt. Linnard and Lieuts. Pope and Franklin (Sen. Ex. Doc. 1; - 30 Cong., 1 sess.); *two plans by the same officers (War - Dept., Washington); a *map based on a sketch by Dr. - Vanderlinden, chief Mexican surgeon (War Dept., Mexico); - a map by Balbontín (Invasión Americana); a *map drawn by - Stanislaus Lasselle (Indiana State Library); a plan by Lieut. - Green (Scribner, Campaign in Mexico); *Croquis para la - intelligencia de la Batalla de la Angostura (War Dept., - Washington). - - - - - CONSPECTUS OF EVENTS - - - 1845 - - March. The United States determines to annex Texas; W. S. Parrott - sent to conciliate Mexico. - - July. Texas consents; Taylor proceeds to Corpus Christi. - - Oct. 17. Larkin appointed a confidential agent in California. - - Nov. 10. Slidell ordered to Mexico. - - Dec. 20. Slidell rejected by Herrera. - - 1846 - - Jan. 13. Taylor ordered to the Rio Grande. - - Mar. 8. Taylor marches from Corpus Christi. - - 21. Slidell finally rejected by Paredes. - - 28. Taylor reaches the Rio Grande. - - Apr. 25. Thornton attacked. - - May 8. Battle of Palo Alto. - - 9. Battle of Resaca de la Palma. - - 13. The war bill becomes a law. - - June 5. Kearny's march to Santa Fe begins. - - July 7. Monterey, California, occupied. - - 14. Camargo occupied. - - Aug. 4. Paredes overthrown. - - 7. First attack on Alvarado. - - 13. Los Angeles, California, occupied. - - 16. Santa Anna lands at Vera Cruz. - - 18. Kearny takes Santa Fe. - - 19. Taylor advances from Camargo. - - Sept. 14. Santa Anna enters Mexico City. - - 20-24. Operations at Monterey, Mex. - - 22-23. Insurrection in California precipitated. - - 23. Wool's advance from San Antonio begins. - - 25. Kearny leaves Santa Fe for California. - - Oct. 8. Santa Anna arrives at San Luis Potosí. - - Oct. 15. Second attack on Alvarado. - - 24. San Juan Bautista captured by Perry. - - 28. Tampico evacuated by Parrodi. - - 29. Wool occupies Monclova. - - Nov. 15. Tampico captured by Conner. - - 16. Saltillo occupied by Taylor. - - 18. Scott appointed to command the Vera Cruz expedition. - - Dec. 5. Wool occupies Parras. - - 6. Kearny's fight at San Pascual. - - 25. Doniphan's skirmish at El Brazito. - - 27. Scott reaches Brazos Id. - - 29. Victoria occupied. - - 1847 - - Jan. 3. Scott orders troops from Taylor. - - 8. Fight at the San Gabriel, Calif. - - 9. Fight near Los Angeles, Calif. - - 11. Mexican law regarding Church property. - - 28. Santa Anna's march against Taylor begins. - - Feb. 5. Taylor places himself at Agua Nueva. - - 19. Scott reaches Tampico. - - 22-23. Battle of Buena Vista. - - 27. Insurrection at Mexico begins. - - 28. Battle of Sacramento. - - Mar. 9. Scott lands near Vera Cruz. - - 29. Vera Cruz occupied. - - 30. Operations in Lower California opened. - - Apr. 8. Scott's advance from Vera Cruz begins. - - 18. Battle of Cerro Gordo; Tuxpán captured by Perry. - - 19. Jalapa occupied. - - May 15. Worth enters Puebla. - - June 6. Trist opens negotiations through the British legation. - - 16. San Juan Bautista again taken. - - Aug. 7. The advance from Puebla begins. - - 20. Battles of Contreras and Churubusco. - - Aug. 24-Sept. 7. Armistice. - - Sept. 8. Battle of Molino del Rey. - - 13. Battle of Chapultepec; the "siege" of Puebla begins. - - 14. Mexico City occupied. - - 22. Peña y Peña assumes the Presidency. - - Oct. 9. Fight at Huamantla. - - 20. Trist reopens negotiations. - - Nov. 11. Mazatlán occupied by Shubrick. - - - 1848 - - Feb. 2. Treaty of peace signed. - - Mar. 4-5. Armistice ratified. - - 10. Treaty accepted by U. S. Senate. - - May 19, 24. Treaty accepted by Mexican Congress. - - 30. Ratifications of the treaty exchanged. - - June 12. Mexico City evacuated. - - July 4. Treaty proclaimed by President Polk. - - - THE PRONUNCIATION OF SPANISH - -The niceties of the matter would be out of place here, but a few general -rules may prove helpful. - -_A_ as in English "ah"; _e_, at the end of a syllable, like _a_ in -"fame," otherwise like _e_ in "let"; _i_ like _i_ in "machine"; _o_, at -the end of a syllable, like _o_ in "go," otherwise somewhat like _o_ in -"lot"; _u_ like _u_ in "rude" (but, unless marked with two dots, silent -between _g_ or _q_ and _e_ or _i_); _y_ like _ee_ in "feet." - -_C_ like _k_ (but, before _e_ and _i,_ like [C]_th_ in "thin"); _ch_ as -in "child"; _g_ as in "go" (but, before _e_ and _i_, like a harsh _h_); -_h_ silent; _j_ like a harsh _h_; _ll_ like [D]_lli_ in "million"; _ñ_ -like _ni_ in "onion"; _qu_ like _k_; _r_ is sounded with a vibration -(trill) of the tip of the tongue (_rr_ a longer and more forcible sound -of the same kind); _s_ as in "sun"; _x_ like _x_ in "box" (but, in -"México" and a few other names, like Spanish _j_); _z_ like [C]_th_ in -"thin." - -Words bearing no mark of accentuation are stressed on the last syllable -if they end in any consonant except _n_ or _s_, but on the syllable next -to the last if they end in _n_, _s_ or a vowel. - - [C] In Mexico, however, usually like _s_ in "sun." - - [D] In Mexico usually like _y_. - - - [Illustration: MEXICO IN 1919] - - - - - THE WAR WITH MEXICO - - - - - I - - MEXICO AND THE MEXICANS - - 1800-1845 - - -Mexico, an immense cornucopia, hangs upon the Tropic of Cancer and opens -toward the north pole. The distance across its mouth is about the same -as that between Boston and Omaha, and the line of its western coast -would probably reach from New York to Salt Lake City. Nearly twenty -states like Ohio could be laid down within its limits, and in 1845 it -included also New Mexico, Arizona, Utah, Nevada, California and portions -of Colorado and Wyoming.[1.1] - -On its eastern side the ground rises almost imperceptibly from the Gulf -of Mexico for a distance varying from ten to one hundred miles, and -ascends then into hills that soon become lofty ranges, while on the -western coast series of cordilleras tower close to the ocean. Between -the two mountain systems lies a plateau varying in height from 4000 to -8000 feet, so level--we are told--that one could drive, except where -deep gullies make trouble, from the capital of Montezuma to Santa Fe, -New Mexico. The country is thus divided into three climatic zones, in -one or another of which, it has been said, every plant may be found that -grows between the pole and the equator.[1.1][E] - - [E] It will be seen that occasionally the same "superior figure" is - attached to several paragraphs, and that sometimes these reference - numbers are not in consecutive order. The reasons will be - discovered when the reader consults the notes, which follow the - text of each volume. - -Except near the United States the coast lands are tropical or -semi-tropical; and the products of the soil, which in many quarters is -extraordinarily deep and rich, are those which naturally result from -extreme humidity and heat. Next comes an intermediate zone varying in -general height from about 2000 to about 4000 feet, where the rainfall, -though less abundant than on the coast, is ample, and the climate far -more salubrious than below. Here, in view of superb mountains and even -of perpetual snows, one finds a sort of eternal spring and a certain -blending of the tropical and the temperate zones. Wheat and sugar -sometimes grow on the same plantation, and both of them luxuriantly; -while strawberries and coffee are not far apart.[1.1] - - [Illustration: PROFILE OF THE ROUTE BETWEEN MEXICO AND VERA CRUZ] - -The central plateau lacks moisture and at present lacks trees. The -greater part of it is indeed a semi-desert, though a garden wherever -water can be supplied. During the wet season--June to October--it is -covered with wild growths, but the rains merely dig huge gullies or -_barrancas_, and almost as soon as they are over, most of the vegetation -begins to wither away. The climate of the plateau is quite equable, -never hot and never cold. Wheat, Indian corn and maguey--the plant from -which _pulque_, the drink of the common people, is made--are the most -important products; and at the north great herds of cattle roam. In the -mountains, finally, numberless mines yield large quantities of silver, -some gold, and a considerable amount of copper and lead.[1.1] - -The principal cities on the eastern coast are Vera Cruz, the chief -seaport, and Tampico, not far south of the Rio Grande River. In the -temperate zone between Vera Cruz and Mexico lie Jalapa and Orizaba, -and behind Tampico lies Monterey. On the central plateau one finds the -capital reposing at an elevation of about eight thousand feet and, about -seventy miles toward the southeast, Puebla; while on the other side of -the capital are the smaller towns of Querétaro and San Luis Potosí -toward the north, and Zacatecas and Chihuahua toward the northwest. -In the middle zone of the Pacific slope rises the large city of -Guadalajara, capital of Jalisco state; and along the coast below may be -found a number of seaports, the most important of which are Guaymas, far -to the north, Mazatlán opposite the point of Lower California, San Blas -a little farther down, and Acapulco in the south.[1.1] - -[THE PEOPLE] - -Exactly how large the population of Mexico was in 1845 one cannot -be sure, and it included quite a number of racial mixtures; but for -the present inquiry we may suppose it consisted of 1,000,000 whites, -4,000,000 Indians, and 2,000,000 of mixed white and Indian blood.[1.2] -The Spaniards from Europe, called Gachupines in Mexico, were of two -principal classes during her colonial days. Many had been favorites of -the Spanish court, or the protégés of such favorites, and had exiled -themselves to occupy for a longer or shorter time high and lucrative -posts; but by far the greater number were men who had left home in -their youth--poor, but robust, energetic and shrewd--to work their way -up. With little difficulty such immigrants found places in mercantile -establishments or on the large estates. Merciless in pursuit of gain yet -kind to their families, faithful to every agreement, and honest when -they could afford to be, they were intrinsically the strongest element -of the population, and almost always they became wealthy.[1.3] - -Their sons, poorly educated, lacking the spur of poverty, and finding -themselves in a situation where idleness and self-indulgence were their -logical habits, commonly took "_Siempre alegre_" (Ever light-hearted) -for their motto, and spent their energy in debauchery and gambling. -To this result their own fathers, while disgusted with it, usually -contributed. Spanish pride revolted at the ladder of subordination by -which these very men had climbed. They felt ambitious to make gentlemen -of their sons, and some easy position in the army, church or civil -service--or, in default of it, idleness--was the career towards which -they pointed; and naturally the heirs to their wealth, whose ignoble -propensities had prevented them from acquiring efficiency or sense of -responsibility, made haste, on getting hold of the paternal wealth, -to squander it. If the pure whites, with some exceptions of course, -fell into this condition, nothing better could fairly be expected of -those who were partly Indian; and before the revolution it was almost -universally felt in Spain and among the influential class of colonials -themselves, that nothing of much value could be expected of Creoles, as -the whites born in Mexico and the half-breeds were generally called. -The achievement of independence naturally tended to increase their -self-respect, broaden their views and stimulate their ambition; but the -less than twenty-five years that elapsed between 1821 and 1846, when -the war between Mexico and the United States began, were not enough to -transform principles, reverse traditions and uproot habits.[1.3] - -The pure-blooded Indians--of whom there were many tribes, little -affiliated if at all--had changed for the worse considerably since -the arrival of the whites. In their struggles against conquest and -oppression the most intelligent, spirited and energetic had succumbed, -and the rest, deprived of strength, happiness, consolation and even -hope, and aware that they existed merely to fill the purses or sate -the passions of their masters, had rapidly degenerated. Their natural -apathy, reticence and intensity were at the same time deepened. While -apparently stupid and indifferent, they were capable of volcanic -outbursts. Though fanatically Christian in appearance, they seem to -have practiced often a vague nature worship under the names and forms -of Catholicism. Indeed they were themselves almost a part of the soil, -bound in soul to the spot where they were born; and, although their -women could put on silk slippers to honor a church festival and every -hut could boast a crucifix or a holy image, they lived and often slept -beside their domestic animals with a brutish disregard for dirt.[1.3] - -Legally they had the rights of freemen and were even the wards of the -government, and a very few acquired education and property; but as -a rule they had to live by themselves in little villages under the -headship of lazy, ignorant caciques and the more effective domination -of the priests. As the state levied a small tax upon them and the -Church several heavy ones, their scanty earnings melted fast, and if -any surplus accumulated they made a fiesta in honor of their patron -saint, and spent it in masses, fireworks, drink, gluttony and gambling. -When sickness or accident came they had to borrow of the landowner -to whose estate they were attached; and then, as they could not leave -his employ until the debt had been discharged, they not only became -serfs, but in many cases bequeathed their miserable condition to -their children. Silent and sad, apparently frail but capable of great -exertion, trotting barefooted to and from their huts with their coarse -black hair flowing loosely or gathered in two straight braids, watching -everything with eyes that seemed fixed on the ground, loving flowers -much but a dagger more, fond of melody but preferring songs that were -melancholy and wild, always tricky, obstinate, indolent, peevish and -careless yet affectionate and hospitable, often extracting a dry humor -from life as their donkeys got nourishment from the thistles, they went -their wretched ways as patient and inscrutable as the sepoy or the -cat--infants with devils inside.[1.3] - -[THE CLASSES] - -At the head of the social world stood a titled aristocracy maintained by -the custom of primogeniture. But as the nobles were few in number, and -for a long time had possessed no feudal authority, their influence at -the period we are studying depended mainly upon their wealth. Next these -came aristocrats of other kinds. Some claimed the honor of tracing their -pedigree to the conquerors, and with it enjoyed great possessions; and -others had the riches without the descent. The two most approved sources -of wealth were the ownership of immense estates and the ownership of -productive mines. On a lower level stood certain of the rich merchants, -and lower still, if they were lucky enough to gain social recognition, -a few of those who acquired property by dealing in the malodorous -government contracts. To these must be added in general the high -dignitaries of the church, the foreign ministers, the principal generals -and statesmen and the most notable doctors and lawyers. Such was the -upper class.[1.4] - -A sort of middle class included the lesser professional men, prelates, -military officers and civil officials, journalists, a few teachers, -business men of importance and some fairly well-to-do citizens without -occupations. Of small farms and small mines there were practically -none, and the inferior clergy signified little. The smaller importing -and wholesale merchants came to be almost entirely British, French -and German soon after independence was achieved, and the retailers -were mostly too low in the scale to rank anywhere. The case of those -engaged in the industries was even more peculiar. Working at a trade -seemed menial to the Spaniard, especially since the idea of labor was -associated with the despised Indians, and most of the half-breeds and -Indians lacked the necessary intelligence. Skilled workers at the -trades were therefore few, and these few mostly high-priced foreigners. -Articles of luxury could be had but not comforts; pastries and ices -but not good bread; saddles covered with gold and embroidery, but not -serviceable wagons; and the highly important factor of intelligent, -self-respecting handicraftsmen was thus well-nigh missing.[1.4] - -The laboring class consisted almost entirely of half-breeds and -Indians. In public affairs they were not considered, and their own -degraded state made them despise their tasks. Finally, the dregs of the -population, especially in the large cities, formed a vicious, brutal and -semi-savage populace. At the capital there were said to be nearly 20,000 -of the _léperos_, as they were called, working a little now and then, -but mainly occupied in watching the religious processions, begging, -thieving, drinking and gambling. In all, Humboldt estimated at 200,000 -or 300,000 the number of these creatures, whose law was lawlessness and -whose heaven would have been a hell.[1.4] - -[THE CHURCH] - -The only church legally tolerated was that of Rome; and this, as the -unchallenged authority in the school and the pulpit, the keeper of -confessional secrets and family skeletons, and the sole dispenser -of organized charity, long wielded a tremendous power. The clerical -_fuero_, which exempted all ecclesiastics from the jurisdiction of the -civil courts, reinforced it, and the wealth and financial connections -of the Church did the same. In certain respects, however, the strength -of the organization began to diminish early in the nineteenth century; -and in particular the Inquisition was abolished in Mexico, as it was -in Spain. Soon after the colony became independent, a disposition to -bar ecclesiastics from legislative bodies, to philosophize on religious -matters and to view Protestants with some toleration manifested itself. -Ten years more, and the urgent need of public schools led to certain -steps, as we shall see, toward secular education. Political commotions, -the exactions of powerful civil authorities under the name of loans, -and various other circumstances cut into the wealth of the Church; and -the practical impossibility of selling the numberless estates upon which -it had mortgages or finding good reinvestments in the case of sales, -compelled it, as the country became less and less prosperous, to put up -with delays and losses of interest.[1.5] - -Moreover the Church was to no slight extent a house divided against -itself. Under Spanish rule and substantially down to 1848, all the high -dignities fell to Gachupines, who naturally faced toward Spain, whereas -the parish priests were mainly Creoles with Mexican sympathies; and -while the bishops and other managers had the incomes of princes, nearly -all of the monks and ordinary priests lived in poverty. There was, -therefore, but little in common between the two ranks except the bare -fact of being churchmen, which was largely cancelled on the one side by -contempt and on the other side by envy; and the common priests, having -generally sided against Spain during the revolution and always been -closely in touch with the people, exercised, in spite of their pecuniary -exactions, an influence that largely balanced the authority of their -heads. Finally, the ignorance of most ecclesiastics and the immorality -of nearly all greatly diminished their moral force. A large number, -even among the higher clergy, were unable to read the mass; and the -monks, who in the early days of the colony had rendered good service as -missionaries, were now recruited--wrote an American minister--from "the -very dregs of the people," and constituted a public scandal.[1.5] - -Still, the Church wielded immense power as late as 1845, and this was -reinforced by the type of religion that it offered. High and low alike, -the Mexicans, with some exceptions, lived in the senses, differing -mainly in the refinement of the gratifications they sought; and the -priests offered them a sensuous worship. Sometimes, almost crazed by -superstitious fears, men would put out the lights in some church, -strip themselves naked, and ply the scourge till every blow fell with -a splash. It was pleasanter, however, and usually edifying enough, to -kneel at the mass, gaze upon the extraordinary display of gold and -silver, gorgeous vestments, costly images and elaborately carved and -gilded woodwork, follow the smoke of the incense rolling upward from -golden censers, listen to sonorous incantations called prayers, and -confess to some fat priest well qualified to sympathize with every -earthy desire. A man who played this game according to the rule was -good and safe. A brigand counting the chances of a fray could touch his -scapularies with pious confidence, and the intending murderer solicit a -benediction on his knife. Enlightened Catholics as well as enlightened -non-Catholics deplored the state of religion in Mexico.[1.5] - -Next after the Church came the "army," which meant a social order, a -body of professional military men--that is to say, officers--exempted -by their fuero from the jurisdiction of the civil law and almost -exclusively devoted to the traditions, principles and interests of their -particular group. As the Church held the invisible power, the army held -the visible; and whenever the bells ceased to ring, the roll of the drum -could be heard. Every President and almost every other high official -down to the close of our Mexican war was a soldier, and sympathized -with his class; and as almost every family of any importance included -members of the organization, its peculiar interests had a strong social -backing. By force of numbers, too, this body was influential, for at -one time, when the army contained scarcely 20,000 soldiers, it had -24,000 officers; and so powerful became the group that in 1845, when -the real net revenue of the government did not exceed $12,000,000, its -appropriation was more than $21,000,000.[1.5] - -Under Spanish rule, although the army enjoyed great privileges, it -had been kept in strict subordination, and usefully employed on the -frontiers; but independence changed the situation. Apparently the -revolution was effected by the military men, and they not merely claimed -but commonly received the full credit. Not only did a large number of -unfit persons, who pretended to have commanded men during the struggle, -win commissions, but wholesale promotions were made in order to gain -the favor of the officers; and in these ways the organization was both -demoralized and strengthened. Over and over again military men learned -to forswear their allegiance, and at one time the government actually -set before the army, as a standard of merit, success in inducing -soldiers of the opposite party to change sides.[1.5] - -[THE ARMY] - -In the course of political commotions, to be reviewed in the next -chapter, the armed forces were more and more stationed at the cities, -where they lost discipline and became the agents of political schemers; -and naturally, when the government admitted their right to take part as -organized bodies in political affairs, the barracks came to supersede -the legislative halls, bullets took the place of arguments, and the -military men, becoming the arbiters on disputed points, regarded -themselves as supreme. Moreover, every administration felt it must have -the support of this organization, and, not being able to dominate it, -had to be dominated by it. Political trickery could therefore bring the -officer far greater rewards than professional merit, and success in a -revolt not only wiped away all stains of insubordination, cowardice and -embezzlement, but ensured promotion. A second lieutenant who figured -in six affairs of that sort became almost necessarily a general, and -frequently civilians who rendered base but valuable services on such -occasions were given high army rank. No doubt some risk was involved, -but it was really the nation as a whole that paid the penalties; and -anyhow one could be bold for a day far more easily than be courageous, -patient, studious, honest and loyal for a lifetime. All true military -standards were thus turned bottom-side up, and some of the worst -crimes a soldier can perpetrate became in Mexico the brightest of -distinctions.[1.5] - -Of course the discovery that rank and pay did not depend upon deserving -them set every corrupt officer at work to get advanced, while it drove -from the service, or at least discouraged, the few men of talents and -honor; and as all subordination ceased, a general not only preferred -officers willing to further his dishonorable interests, but actually -dreaded to have strong and able men serve in his command. In 1823 the -Mexican minister of war reported to Congress, "Almost the whole army -must be replaced, for it has contracted vices that will not be removed -radically in any other way," and four years later a militia system -was theoretically established with a view to that end; but the old -organization continued to flourish, and in April, 1846, the British -minister said, "The Officers ... are, as a Corps, the worst perhaps to -be found in any part of the world. They are totally ignorant of their -duty, ... and their personal courage, I fear, is of a very negative -character."[1.5] - -In 1838, a German visitor stated there were a hundred and sixty generals -for an army of thirty thousand, and this was perhaps a fair estimate -of the usual proportion; but out of all these, every one of whom could -issue a glowing proclamation, probably not a single "Excellency" -could properly handle a small division, while few out of thousands -of colonels could lead a regiment on the field, and some were not -qualified to command a patrol. A battle was almost always a mob fight -ending in a cavalry charge; and Waddy Thompson, an American minister to -Mexico, said he did not believe a manoeuvre in the face of the enemy -was ever attempted. Naturally the general administration of military -affairs became a chaos; and, worst of all, a self-respecting general -thought it almost a disgrace to obey an order--even an order from the -President.[1.5] - -The privates and non-commissioned officers, on the other hand, mainly -Indians with a sprinkling of half-breeds, were not bad material. The -Indians in particular could be described as naturally among the best -soldiers in the world, for they were almost incredibly frugal, docile -and enduring, able to make astonishing marches, and quite ready--from -animal courage, racial apathy or indifference about their miserable -lives--to die on the field. But usually they were seized by force, -herded up in barracks as prisoners, liberally cudgelled but scantily -fed, and after a time driven off to the capital, chained, in a double -file, with distracted women beside them wailing to every saint. When -drilled enough to march fairly well through the street in column, -clothed in a serge uniform or a coarse linen suit, and equipped with -an old English musket and some bad powder, they were called soldiers, -and were exhorted to earn immortal glory; but naturally they got -away if they could, and frequently on a long expedition half a corps -deserted.[1.5] - -Such men were by no means "thinking bayonets," and as a rule they -shot very badly, often firing with their guns at the hip in order to -avoid the heavy recoil. Not only did they lack the inspiration of good -officers, but in pressing times it was customary to empty the prisons, -and place their inmates in the ranks to inculcate vice. The government -furnished their wages, upon which as a rule they had to live from day -to day, even more irregularly than it paid the officers, and the latter -frequently embezzled the money; so that it became a common practice to -sell one's arms and accoutrements, if possible, for what they would -bring. Finally, the duty always enjoined upon the troops was "blind -obedience," not the use of what little intelligence they possessed; -and their bravery, like that of such officers as had any, was mainly -of the impulsive, passionate and therefore transient sort, whereas -Anglo-Saxon courage is cool, calculating, resolute and comparatively -inexhaustible.[1.5] - -The special pride of all military men was the cavalry; but the horses -were small, and the riders badly trained and led. "The regular Mexican -cavalry is worth nothing," wrote the British minister early in 1846; and -as the mounts were quite commonly hired merely for the parades, just as -the rolls of the whole army were stuffed with fictitious names on which -the officers drew pay, it was never certain how much of the nominal -force could be set in motion. As for the artillery, Waddy Thompson -remarked that in a battle of 1841 between the foremost generals of the -country, not one ball in a thousand reached the enemy. On the other hand -there were excellent military bands, and one of them dispensed lively -selections every afternoon in front of the palace at Mexico.[1.5] - -[THE CIVIL OFFICIALS] - -Third in the official order of precedence and in the actual control of -affairs came the government officials, and these, like the army and -the clergy, formed a special group with a similar fuero, a similar -self-interest and a similar disregard for the general good. Once -appointed to an office one had a vested right therein, and could not -legally be removed without a prosecution. To eliminate a person in -that manner was extremely difficult; and when the government, in a few -notorious instances, tried ejectment, the newspapers of the opposition -hastened to raise an outcry against it for attacking property rights, -and the culprits were soon reinstated.[1.5] - -Offering such permanence of tenure, a "genteel" status, idleness even -beyond the verge of ennui, a perfect exemption from the burden of -initiative, and occasional opportunities for illegitimate profits, -government offices appealed strongly to the Mexicans, and a greed for -them--dignified with the name of aspirantism when it aimed at the -higher positions--was a recognized malady of the nation. To get places, -all the tricks and schemes employed in the army and, if possible, still -more degrading intrigues were put in play; and offices had to be created -by the wholesale to satisfy an appetite that grew by what it fed upon. -The clerks became so numerous that work room--or rather desk room--could -not be provided for all of them. Only a favored portion had actual -employment and received full pay--if they received any--while the rest -were laid off on barely enough to support life. Some were competent -and willing to be faithful; but when they saw ignorance, laziness, -disloyalty and fraud given the precedence, they naturally asked, Why do -right? Idleness is the mother of vice; and so there was a very large -body of depraved and discontented fellows, wriggling incessantly for -preferment, fawning, backbiting, grabbing at any scheme that would -advance their interests, intensely jealous of one another, but ready to -make common cause against any purification of the civil service.[1.5] - -How justice was administered in Mexico one is now able to surmise. The -laws, not codified for centuries, were a chaos. Owing to numberless -intricacies and inconsistencies, the simplest case could be made almost -eternal, especially as all proceedings were slow and tedious. A litigant -prepared to spend money seldom needed to lose a suit. Some cases lasted -three generations. The methods of administering justice, reported the -British representative in 1835, "afford every facility" for "artifices -and manoeuvres."[1.6] - -Another difficulty was that the courts lacked prestige. During the -revolution the magistrates, practically all of them Gachupines, -committed so many acts of injustice in behalf of the government, that -people forgot the proper connection between crime and retribution. -Punishment seemed like a disease that any one might get. In 1833 the -minister of this department complained that for five years Congress -had almost ignored the administration of justice; and in 1845, the -head of the same department said that for a long time the government -had systematically reduced the dignity and influence of the judges and -magistrates. Their pay was not only diminished but often withheld; and -the official journal once remarked, that the authorities had more -important business in hand than paying legal functionaries.[1.6] - -This was obviously wrong, but in a sense the judges merited such -treatment, for they seem to have lacked even the most necessary -qualifications. To make the situation still worse, the executive -authorities had a way of stepping in and perverting justice arbitrarily. -Even the Mexicans were accustomed to say, "A bad compromise is better -than a good case at law"; but it was naturally aliens who suffered -most. "The great and positive evil which His Majesty's subjects, in -common with other Foreigners, have to complain of in this country is the -corrupt and perverse administration of justice," reported the minister -of England in 1834.[1.6] - -Criminal law was executed no better than civil. The police of the city -are a complete nullity, stated the American representative in 1845. A -fault, a vice and a crime were treated alike; and the prisons, always -crowded with wrongdoers of every class, became schools in depravity, -from which nearly all, however bad, escaped in the end to prey upon -society. Well-known robbers not only went about in safety, but were -treated with kindly attentions even by their late victims, for all -understood that if denounced and punished, they would sooner or later go -free, and have their revenge.[1.6] - -[EDUCATION] - -Adverting formally before Congress in 1841 to the "notoriously -defective" administration of justice, the Mexican President said, "the -root of the evil lies in the deplorable corruption which pervades -all classes of society and in the absence of any corrective arising -from public opinion." In large measure this condition of things was -chargeable to the low state of religion, but in part it could be -attributed to the want of education. Spain had required people to think -as little as possible, keep still and obey orders; and for such a rôle -enlightenment seemed unnecessary and even dangerous. To read and write a -little and keep accounts fairly well was about enough secular knowledge -for anybody, and the catechism of Father Ripalda, which enjoined the -duty of blind obedience to the King and the Pope, completed the circle -of useful erudition. In the small towns, as there were few elementary -schools, even these attainments could not easily be gained; and as for -the Indians they were merely taught--with a whip at the church door, if -necessary--to fear God, the priest and the magistrate. Religion gave no -help; and the ceremonies of worship benumbed the intellect as much as -they fascinated the senses.[1.6] - -When independence arrived, however, there sprang up not a little -enthusiasm for the education of the people, and the states moved quite -generally in that direction. But there were scarcely any good teachers, -few schoolhouses and only the most inadequate books and appliances; -money could not be found; and the prelates, now chiefly absorbed in -their political avocations, not only failed to promote the cause, but -stood in the way of every step toward secular schools. A few of the -leaders--notably Santa Anna--professed great zeal, but this was all for -effect, and they took for very different uses whatever funds could be -extorted from the nation. In 1843 a general scheme of public instruction -was decreed, but no means were provided to carry it into effect. The -budget for 1846 assigned $29,613 to this field, of which $8000 was -intended for elementary schools, while for the army and navy it required -nearly twenty-two millions. In short, though of course a limited number -of boys and a few girls acquired the rudiments--and occasionally -more--in one way or another, no system of popular education existed.[1.6] - -Higher instruction was in some respects more flourishing. Before the -revolution the School of Mines, occupying a noble and costly edifice, -gave distinction to the country; the university was respectable; an -Academy of Fine Arts did good work; and botany received much attention. -But at the university mediaeval Latin, scholastic and polemic theology, -Aristotle and arid comments on his writings were the staples, and even -these innocent subjects had to be investigated under the awful eye of -the Inquisition. Speculation on matters of no practical significance -formed the substance of the work, and the young men learned that worst -of lessons--to discourse volubly and plausibly on matters of which they -knew nothing. This course of discipline, emphasizing the natural bent -of the Creoles, turned out a set of conceited rhetoricians, ignorant -of history and the real world, but eager to distinguish themselves by -some brilliant experiment. When the yoke of Spain had been cast off, -all these institutions declined greatly, and the university became so -unimportant that in 1843 it was virtually destroyed; but the view that -speculation was better than inquiry, theory better than knowledge, -and talk better than anything--a view that suited Mexican lightness, -indolence and vanity so well, and had so long been taught by precept and -example--still throve despite a few objectors. Of foreign countries, in -particular, very little was commonly known. While elementary education, -then, was nothing, higher education was perhaps worse than nothing.[1.6] - -Nor could the printed page do much to supply the lack. Only a few had -the taste for reading books or opportunities to gratify the taste, if -they possessed it. Great numbers of catchy pamphlets on the topics -of the day flew about the streets; newspapers had a great vogue; and -there were poor echoes of European speeches, articles and books; but -most of the printed material was shockingly partisan, irresponsible -and misleading. "Unfortunately for us," observed the minister of the -interior in 1838, "the abuse of the liberty of the press among us is so -great, general and constant, that it has only served our citizens as the -light of the meteor to one travelling in a dark night, misguiding him -and precipitating him into an abyss of evils."[1.6] - -[THE INDUSTRIES] - -Only some 300,000 out of 3,000,000 white and mixed people were actual -producers--three times as many being clericals, military men, civil -officials, lawyers, doctors and idlers, and the rest old men, women -and children. The most brilliant of their industries was mining, the -annual output of which was about $18,000,000 in 1790, fell during the -revolution to $5,000,000, and by 1845 rose again--despite the unwise -policy of the government--to about the earlier level. During the period -of depression most of the old proprietors and many of their properties -were ruined; but English companies took up the work, and although -for some time their liberal expenditures went largely to waste, they -gradually learned the business, and their example encouraged some -Germans to enter the field. How greatly the nation profited from the -mines was not entirely clear. About as much silver went abroad each -year as they produced, paying interest on loans that should not have -been made, and buying goods for which substitutes could usually have -been manufactured at home. But the government laid valuable taxes -on the extraction and export of the precious metals, and there was -also a profit in the compulsory minting of them--though, as all the -inventiveness of the nation expended itself in politics, the processes -at the mints were about as tedious and costly in 1845 as while Cortez -ruled the country.[1.7] - -Little more can be said for the cultivation of the soil. When Mexico -separated from Spain, the vine and the olive, flax and certain other -plants formerly prohibited were acquired, and coffee soon became -important; but on the other hand agriculture had met with disaster -after disaster in the course of the revolution. "Up to the present," -said a ministerial report in December, 1843, "agriculture among us has -not departed from the routine established at the time of the conquest." -A cart-wheel consisted still of boards nailed together crosswise, cut -into a circular shape and bored at the centre; a pointed stick, shod -sometimes with iron, was still the plough; a short pole with a spike -driven through one end served as the hoe; the corn, instead of going -to a mill, was ground on a smooth stone with a hand roller; and no -adequate means existed of transporting such products as were raised -to such markets as could be found. Most of the "roads" made so much -trouble even for donkeys and pack-mules that it was seriously proposed -to introduce camels; and the most important road of all, the National -Highway from the capital to Jalapa and Vera Cruz, was allowed to become -almost impassable in spots. Besides poor methods, bad roads, brigands, -revolutions and a great number of holidays, there were customhouses -everywhere and a system of almost numberless formalities, the accidental -neglect of which might involve, if nothing worse, the confiscation of -one's goods. In short, how could agriculture prosper, said a memorial on -the subject, when he that sowed was not permitted to gather, and he that -gathered could reach no market?[1.7] - -[COMMERCE] - -However, more could be produced than used. The prime requisite was -population. So much appeared to be clear; and for that reason, as well -as to obtain the profits of the industries and prevent money from -going abroad, great efforts were made by independent Mexico to develop -manufacturing, which had been prohibited--though not with entire -success--by Spain. The year 1830 was a time of golden hopes in this -regard. At the instance of Lucas Alamán a grand industrial scheme went -into effect, and a bank was founded to promote it by lending public -money to intending manufacturers. Cotton fields were to whiten the -plains; merino sheep and Kashmir goats to cover the hillsides; mulberry -trees to support colonies of silk-worms; imported bees to produce the -tons of wax needed for candles; and ubiquitous factories to work up the -raw materials. A few men honestly tried to establish plants, but the -industry chiefly promoted by the law and the bank was that of prying -funds from the national treasury; and when this income failed, as it -did in a few years, many half-built mills came to a stop, and much -half-installed machinery began to rust. Alamán himself, partner in a -cotton factory, became bankrupt in 1841, and the bubble soon burst.[1.7] - -The manufacturers formed, however, a strong political clique, and in -their interest a system not only of protection, but of absolutely -prohibiting the importation of numerous articles, was adopted by law. -This had the effect of making the people pay dearly for many of their -purchases. The farmers, who wished raw materials kept out, had influence -too, and were always blocking the scheme of the manufacturers to let raw -materials in; and, as the cost of producing and transporting made native -goods dear, smuggled merchandise undersold Mexican articles even after -paying for the necessary bribery and other expenses. In a word, although -certain coarse and bulky things continued to be made in the country, the -endeavor to build up an industrial population, support agriculture, and -thus doubly strengthen the nation was very superficially planned and -very unsuccessfully carried out. Nearly all the better manufactures, a -large part of the food, most of the clothing, and substantially all the -luxuries came from abroad.[1.7] - -The business of importing continued to be mainly in Spanish hands for -some years after Mexico became independent, but for reasons that will -appear in the next chapter the Spaniard had to retire about 1830. The -British then obtained the lion's share; and as they were Protestants -they could not, even when they so desired, identify themselves with the -nation, and take a responsible share in public affairs. Commerce was -not, in fact, a source of strength. A few raw products were exported, -but essentially commerce consisted, as was natural, in merely receiving -goods from foreigners and letting the foreigners have money in return. -Moreover the volume of commerce dwindled notably, like that of all other -business. As for retail trade, when the Spaniards had to retire, it fell -mainly into Mexican hands; but it was conducted in a small way, the -profits were narrow, and the failures were many.[1.7] - -[LIFE IN THE COUNTRY] - -Even more significant for us, however, than such details were the life -and character of the people, and it may be helpful to call back the year -1845 and visit Mexico for a couple of days. First we will stroll along -a country road in a fairly typical region. The general aspect is one of -semi-wildness, but soon the tops of well-bleached ruins amid the soft -green indicate decrepitude instead, suggesting as the national character -decay preceding maturity. A long mule team approaches in a waving line, -and on a finely equipped horse at the head of it we observe a swarthy -man in green broadcloth trousers open on the outside from the knee down, -with bright silver buttons in a double row from hip to ankle, and loose -linen drawers visible where the trousers open. A closely fitting jacket, -adorned with many such buttons and much braid, is turned back at the -chin enough to reveal an embroidered shirt; and the costume reaches a -climax in a huge sombrero with a wide, rounding brim and high sugar-loaf -crown, adorned with tassels and a wide band of silver braid. This -gentleman, the _arriero_, is the railroad king of Mexico, for he and -others of his class transport the freight and express. Trust him with -anything you please, and it will surely be delivered; but should he be -unlucky at cards and out of work, he might rob you the next day.[1.8] - -A group of Indians meet us, little more human in appearance than the -donkeys they drive; and we observe how easily they carry loads on their -backs, and how quickly and lightly they march. Yonder we see their -huts--pigpens, Americans would suppose; and a little apart from these -we notice a stone or adobe house. Certainly there is nothing grand -about this dwelling, for it contains only a single room, and that half -full of implements, horse furniture, charcoal, provisions and what -not; but it affords a home for six or eight persons of the two sexes. -Presently the master, though not the owner, of the establishment rides -up, prodding his active but light and stubby horse with blunt steel -spurs almost as large as the palm of one's hand, to make a dash for our -benefit. Swinging his wife from the saddle-bow the _ranchero_ alights, -and we find him to be a short, wiry, muscular person, with a bronzed -and rather saturnine countenance but friendly and respectful manners. -He wears tough leggings, leather trousers, a small rectangular shawl -(_serape_) that falls over his back and breast, allowing his head to -protrude through a hole in the middle, and a wide sombrero, while at -the saddle-bow hang the inevitable lasso and a bag of corn and jerked -beef, one meal a day from which is all he requires. Apparently he does -not feel quite at home on the ground, and that is natural, for he -spends about half of his waking hours in the saddle. Herdsman, farmer -or brigand, according to circumstances, he is also cavalryman at need; -and a corps of such fellows, if properly trained and led, would make the -best light horse in the world, perhaps. His chief interests in life, -however, are gambling and cock-fighting, and he is quite capable of -losing all his worldly goods, his wife and even his pony at the national -game of monte, and then of lighting a cigarette and sauntering off -without a sign of regret.[1.8] - -Now we approach what may be called a village, but one extremely -different from a village in the United States. The great things are a -handsome grove and in the midst of it one old church of gray stone, full -of saints and relics and ancient plate, with a ragged, stupid Indian -crouching on the floor. Near by are two or three ranchero cottages with -a group of Indian huts in the distance, and yonder stands a large, -rambling edifice of stone with a mighty door and heavily barred windows. -From the ends of the building run high walls inclosing several acres, -and within the protected space may be seen a number of substantial -dwellings and what appear to be storehouses and stables, while far -away over hill and plain spreads the _hacienda_, an estate as large -as a county. Finally, on a gentle slope not far distant we observe a -monastery with a rich garden behind it, and a fat, contented prior -riding sleepily up to its arched gateway through a dozen or two of -kneeling aborigines.[1.8] - -Toward evening we reach the state capital, and as we cross a bridge -on the outskirts, we see a crowd of people bathing. Both sexes are -splashing and swimming, all as happy as ducks and all entirely nude. -Even the presence of strangers does not embarrass the young women, -some of whom are decidedly good-looking; and they even try to draw our -attention by extra displays of skill. Looking for an inn we discover -two lines of low, rickety buildings alternating with heaps of rubbish, -fodder and harness. After some efforts a waiter is found and we obtain a -room, with a mule already slumbering in one corner of it and all sorts -of household litter thrown about. A wretched cot with a rope bottom, a -dirty table and an abundance of saints portrayed in Mexican dress help -to make the place homelike. The waiter is amiable, and ejects the mule -with a great show of indignation; but when we ask for water and a towel -his good nature fails. "Oh, what a man," he cries, flinging up his -hands; "What a lunatic, Ave María Purísima; Ha! Ha! Ha! He wants water, -he wants a towel; what the devil--! Good-by." The dining-room is a hot, -steamy cell, fitted up with charcoal furnaces; and for viands we are -offered plenty of hard beef, _chile_ (pepper) and _tortillas_ (flapjacks -of a sort), besides a number of dishes that only a native could either -describe or eat. Chile and tortillas appear, however, to be the -essentials; and the latter, partly rolled up, serve also as spoons.[1.8] - -After dinner we look about the town. All is monotonous and sombre. The -houses, mostly of one story, form a continuous wall along the street--or -along the sidewalk, if there be one--and their projecting, heavily -barred windows, in front of which the young fellows have to do their -courting, suggest prisons more than homes. Now we come to the massive, -crumbling, gloomy church, and wonder where the priest keeps the family -which everybody knows he has. Here is the government house, and we stop -to picture the wily politicians, who--with noble exceptions--obtain the -offices of local grandeur, and the little horde of clerks, many of them -rendered prematurely decrepit by their vices, that fawn but cannot be -made to work at the nod of authority. In vain we look for a book-store, -though somewhere that name doubtless appears on a sign; but we do find -the office of the comandante general, an officer who represents the -central power, has charge of the military, and often is mining and -counter-mining in a sharp struggle with the governor. How intolerably -dull it must be to live here! Business of a large sort there is none. -The little newspapers are scarcely more than echoes from partisan -sheets at Mexico. Religion is a subject that one must let alone, and -education a subject that it is useless to discuss. Of science, history, -art, nothing is known. The small men in power brook no criticism except -from enemies. Affairs in other states, even a famine or a flood, -excite little interest. Not much is left except petty intriguing and -the gratification of coarse appetites. A revolution is about the only -possible escape from this more deadly ennui.[1.8] - -[LIFE AT MEXICO] - -Our second day shall be given to the metropolis. The suburbs of Mexico -are mostly ragged and unclean, but some broad avenues lined with fine -trees run through them, and entering the city by one of these we make -our way to the great central plaza. On the eastern side of this extends -the palace, a very long two-storied building of little distinction, and -on the northern side towers the huge cathedral, quite in the grand, -heavy, Spanish style, seamed with earthquake scars and pockmarked by -revolutionary bullets. It is a Sunday morning and still rather early, -but the plaza is alive. The usual nightly crop of dead and wounded is -being carried to the morgue or the hospital. Sick men, cripples and -stalwart beggars are beginning to pose for alms. Prisoners in chains -are pretending to put the streets in order; but their guards, with that -mixture of good nature and indolence that characterizes the Mexican -unless his passions are excited, let them do about as they please, and -they take their cue for street-cleaning from the Book of Revelation: -They that be filthy, let them be filthy still.[1.8] - -Indians in various tribal costumes, mostly picturesque and all dirty, -patter through the square with loads of provisions or babies. As -no stoves or fireplaces exist, the charcoal man's loud "Carbosiú!" -(_Carbón, señor!_) resounds through the streets. So does the plaintive -cry of the water-carrier, bending under his great earthen jar, for the -houses are all supplied from a few public fountains, the termini of -aqueducts. "Orchata, lemon, pineapple, tamarind!" calls out a shrill -voice; "What will you take, my darling? This way for refreshment:" -and we see a good-looking girl in a short skirt expanded wide with -hoops, her arms bare and her bodice cut low enough for a ball, selling -"temperance" drinks. Here is a dingy cell stuffed with chin-basins, -razors, dental implements, boxes of pomade, a guitar, a fighting-cock -tethered in a corner, and sundry pictures of saints, parrots and -battles; and there a cigar shop with a slender, black-eyed girl behind -the counter, bold enough and handsome enough, even without the red rose -in her hair, to tempt St. Anthony. Observe the _evangelista_, or public -letter-writer, with two quills and an inkstand ready on his little desk -under a canopy of straw matting; and observe, too, that lépero with his -back against a donkey's pannier, robbing the pannier while he pretends -to be buying a knife.[1.8] - -Priests in long shovel hats; lousy soldiers in ragged, ill-fitting -uniforms; gaudy officers chatting and smoking; jugglers with snakes and -balls; cynical dandies retailing love affairs; half-naked léperos in the -corners sleeping off their pulque; lottery venders with long strings -of tickets; sellers of flowers, toys, candy, glass, wax-work, mock -jewellery, cheap cutlery, and a thousand other things; closed carriages -taking ladies to church; more beggars and still more--these and many -other sights keep us too busy for reflection; but we cannot help -noticing that seven out of ten persons are social drones or parasites, -and that vice of one sort or another dims the face and weakens the step -of almost every one. Suddenly a light bell tinkles, and the crowd is -instantly grave and still. "God is coming," they whisper, or in other -words the viatic is going to a sick man. A coach drawn by two mules -and followed by a dozen slovenly friars holding lighted candles and -chanting, comes slowly down a street. All uncover and kneel, and we must -do likewise or very likely get a pummelling.[1.8] - -This reminds us of duty; and, electing the cathedral in preference to -sixty other churches, we enter. Before us is a great throng, chiefly -women and léperos, of most devout worshippers. The finest ladies in -the city are here, dressed all in black, with no ornaments except -a silk mantilla, edged with lace, and a high tortoise-shell comb; -and they kneel humbly beside the drudge or the beggar. The church -itself--designed in the Spanish style, which places the choir in the -middle of the nave and a balustraded walk between that and the great -altar--with a cloud of incense filling the air and many hundreds -of candles gleaming murkily from the shrines, is most mysterious -and impressive. The gorgeousness of the sacred ornaments amazes us. -Literally tons of silver are in sight; gold, precious stones and gems -abound; and magnificent vestments try to hide the vulgar priests. But -the splendor is oppressive, and the stench of the léperos intolerable; -let us return to the light of day.[1.8] - -All the streets are laid out at right angles, and most of the houses -that line them are in two stories, of which the lower one is reserved -for horses, carriages, servants, cows and storage; and the walls, built -of rough stone, are very thick. The outside is usually frescoed in -white, orange, blue, red or pale green, and often adorned with pious -verses or biblical texts. Entering the big double gateway, we find -ourselves in a courtyard, upon which doors and grated windows open; and -we observe that a covered balcony of wrought iron or possibly bronze, -reached by a central stairway and giving access to the rooms of the -second story, is built round it. In many courtyards there are flowers -and a fountain, and sometimes there are trees. Occasionally we find -what looks like a grandee's residence, for Mexico was called in the -Spanish time a city of palaces, and some of these residences, built of -superior stone, equipped with gilded balconies and stairs, adorned with -artistic sculptures, and perhaps decorated with Dutch tiles in blue and -white, have survived in a fair condition the ruin of fortunes and the -disappearance of titles; but at their best they were always imperfect, -reminding one of the golden image with clay feet, and now most of them -are dilapidated.[1.8] - -Here is a gambling place, well filled; but it is only the usual monte, -and if we care to watch a game, there will be something like a thousand -more opportunities. Already, people are making for the bull-fight; but -the upper classes mostly ignore that sport, and we may well follow -their example. On the other hand let us drop in at the cock-pit. "Hail, -immaculate Mary, the cocks are coming!" the herald is proclaiming. On -the benches one may see the most delicate and fashionable young ladies -of the city as well as the sharpest gamblers, and everything is quiet -and orderly. But a glance is enough; and now as the "quality" will soon -have dined, we will stroll on past the stately trees of the Alameda to -the New Promenade, and be ready for them.[1.8] - -Here, every afternoon at about five o'clock, and especially on Sunday, -may be seen the Mexican élite. About a thousand carriages are in line -to-day, many of them heavy, grand affairs from Europe, but some very -antiquated and shabby, for the lady, however poor, must have a carriage -of some sort. Here one sees the fair sex at their best. Clad in the -most sumptuous and brilliant costumes they can possibly obtain and -well covered with diamonds--for everybody above the rank of a lépero -has diamonds--they sit up straight and handsome, and many of them -look almost regal. More horses than mules are to be seen, and many of -them have been imported. Guided by postilions instead of drivers, the -carriages roll sedately along with an exchange of mutual salutes but -not a word of conversation, and after a turn or two draw up and stop -side by side, so that the ladies may review some four or five thousand -cavaliers, who now ride past.[1.8] - -Each gallant, without appearing to notice the carriage of his choice, -pays court to an adored occupant of it by a special show of grace and -horsemanship as he goes by. Small fortunes in silver and gold are -lavished on the equipment of the steed, and the cavalier is resplendent -in his tightly fitting trousers, short jacket, huge sombrero, gilded -spurs, silver buttons, silk braid and gold lace. For us the impression -is impaired considerably by his manner of riding, for he leans forward, -puts barely his toes into the stirrup, and carries his heels far back; -but he can ride very showily after all, curvetting and prancing, and the -Mexicans are fully satisfied that no other horsemen in the world are -their equals.[1.8] - -The promenade over, all go to the play--not that anybody of fashion -cares for it, but because that is the style, and few have any other way -to pass the time. Let us have a look ourselves at the principal theatre, -which travellers have pronounced--after one at Naples--the finest -edifice of the kind. It accommodates more than eight thousand persons, -and the rent of the best boxes is about $3000 a year. But almost every -man and many of the women appear to be smoking; one can hardly see -the actors; the noise of conversation is distracting; and as we are -not adepts in the play of glances and fans which keep so many ladies -in the boxes and so many gallants in the pit fully occupied, we shall -find it pleasanter at the British legation ball. _Allons!_ Why, what a -clangor the church bells are making! To be sure that opens the gates of -purgatory for a while and gives the inmates a respite, but it certainly -bears rather hard on the living.[1.8] - -While by nature the most sociable of people, the Mexicans are the least -so in practice, wrote an American minister at that capital. This is -partly because many of social rank now lack the means to entertain, and -partly because society is cut up by intrigues, jealousies and bitter -memories; but at a foreign legation one has no expenses, and all meet on -neutral ground. As we enter, everything seems fine and even brilliant. -Diamonds are in profusion again, and the lustre of the great pearls -matches them. But in Mexico it is never wise to look closely, for gross -imperfections are sure to be discovered; and here, as we soon observe, -the gowns are not really in style, and the musicians are only unshaven, -half-blind, tatterdemalion scrapers.[1.8] - -However, the people are what we care for, and they are certainly most -interesting. Again we see the dignified ladies; they move now, and with -a decided though rather ponderous grace. Conversation is not their -forte, for they seldom read and never think; but all have beautiful -eyes, teeth and hair; all have small hands and feet; and all are -amiable, sincerely kind and by no means wanting in tact. The older -ones appear stout and rather phlegmatic, it is true, but those of an -earlier age are often fascinating. Look for instance at the girl under -the chandelier, plainly all sentiment and senses, not really tall but -slender enough to appear so, with a profile of carved ivory, pale cheeks -just warmed with crimson, large, dark, languorous eyes, and a voluptuous -figure disguised with no stays; and all this poised seemingly on the toe -of a dainty satin slipper. What matters it if she and the rest of the -ladies passed their day in gazing idly out of windows, smoking, nibbling -sweetmeats and chattering trifles, and did not put on their stockings or -do up their hair until dinner-time?[1.8] - -But for us the men are more important. That short individual in -spectacles, who looks erudite and speaks in a low tone with a -gravity and reserve that emphasize his remarks, is Alamán, the most -distinguished of the conservatives. The thin-featured, sharp-nosed -person, so elegant and cynical, is Tornel, posing now in his favorite -attitude as the patron of learning. Smooth-faced Bocanegra, an honorable -if not very able statesman, is talking yonder to the British minister -with the easy courtliness of a genuine hidalgo. Handsome and brave -Almonte--"a good boy," as Santa Anna calls him--is laying siege to the -belle under the chandelier; and Peña y Peña, seemingly rather dry and -uninspired, is debating somewhat laboriously with a brother judge.[1.8] - -Let us join a group. How strong, genial, easy, ready and gay, yet -dignified and reposeful, they all are! Few indeed of our own countrymen -could be so charming. Some one approaches, and they grasp him warmly by -the hand, throwing the left arm at the same time round his shoulder and -softly patting his back. "Friend," "Comrade," are frequent salutations. -We are presented to the group, and find ourselves at once among devoted -intimates. "My house is yours," exclaims one with a look that carries -conviction. "Remember, I exist only to serve you," says another. "Only -command me and all that are mine," exclaims a third.[1.8] - -Mexico, however, reported a British minister, "judged merely by outward -Appearances, is a perfectly different thing from Mexico seen in the -Interior." One might be presented with a dozen houses and all their -contents, yet go to bed on the sidewalk hungry. These friends and -comrades are daily intriguing and conspiring against one another. Talk -with an eloquent declaimer, and you will find his beautiful ideas vague -and impracticable. Discuss them with him, and you will either excite -wrath by demolishing his opinions or earn contempt--since he suspects -in his heart that he is an ignoramus--by letting him vanquish you. -Notice how lightly they speak of religion. That is considered good -form. The Church is to be regarded as an institution for the women. -But at bottom almost every one is mortally afraid of the hereafter, -as a child is afraid of the dark, and when seriously ill is ready to -grovel before a priest. The apparent robustness of these men, largely -due to their indolence, is too often undermined by Cyprian accidents, -which are confessed without hesitation. Hardly one of the husbands is -loyal to his vows, while the other sex care only to elude numberless -watchful eyes, and observe a strict regard for appearances; and in -the lower walks a mother will quite readily sell her daughter's good -name. However, courtesy is delightful whatever lies behind it, and if -a person will try to eat a picture of grapes, he should blame himself -for his disappointment. Temperament, environment and education make -sangfroid and intellectual mastery impossible here; and in a world -where passionate men and women grow up in traditions of idleness and -self-indulgence they can hardly be expected, especially with the -bad example of their priests before them, to be distinguished for -self-restraint.[1.8] - -Meanwhile, are the common people at home knitting? Let us walk back to -the cathedral. The full moon is out. Almost above us rise the powerful -towers against the clear firmament, and on our left is the palace, -filling one whole side of the square with its numberless balconies -and windows, while in front spreads the great plaza, glittering with -innumerable lights against the shadowy arcades that fill the opposite -side. The sky is a soft, pale blue; and the stars, fading near the -brilliant moon, appear like dust raised by her chariot wheels. Under the -trees on our right a huge serpent, the scales of which are human beings, -turns, winds, bends, parts and rejoins in a circular promenade.[1.8] - -Some occupy themselves with prosaic thoughts,--business, politics -or social events--and a few talk of science and poetry. Yonder goes -a millionaire, a real king of gold, at sight of whom all hats come -off, while all eyes court his glance; but another, who passes with -a triumphant step and bold gestures, appears to the crowd a greater -man, for he is the king of the sword, the king of the bull-ring, the -_matador_. But most, perhaps, are talking and thinking of love and of -pleasure. Furtive but meaning glances are often exchanged; occasionally -hand presses hand under the folds of the cloak; at times a few -mysterious words pass quickly; now and then one sees a pretty woman -on the arm of her bold lover, showing herself proudly to the world, -while the husband follows on behind as best he can; and here and there -a scowling, discarded friend looks out from behind a post with a knife -clutched behind him. - -Would you like to see a little more? Then visit the Barrio Santa Anna, -and watch men with bloodshot eyes and women in red petticoats and loose, -open chemisettes dancing a wild fandango, or plunge into a lépero's -dive and watch the pariahs gambling sedately with a bloody knife on the -table before them, while down in one corner a crouching woman moans and -mutters over a prostrate figure. But how lightly all is done, even the -tragedies, compared with northern depth and seriousness. In a sense we -feel we are observing children.[1.8] - -Of course in so brief a space the subject of this chapter could not be -thoroughly treated, but our inquiry seems to make certain facts plain. -Little in the material, mental and moral spheres was really sound in -the Mexico of 1845. Her population was insufficient, and was badly -welded together, so far as it had been welded at all; and while the -lower orders of the people lay deep in ignorance, laziness and vice, the -upper class, if we ignore exceptions, were soft, superficial, indolent -and lax, urbane, plausible and eloquent, apathetic but passionate, -amiable and kind though cruel when excited, generous but untrustworthy, -wasteful but athirst for gain, suspicious and subtle but not sagacious, -personally inclined to be pompous and nationally afflicted with a -provincial vanity, greatly enamoured of the formalities of life, -greatly wanting in the cool, steady resolution for which occasional -obstinacy is a poor substitute, and still more wanting in that simple, -straightforward, sober and solid common sense which is the true -foundation of personal and national strength. In particular, the Mexican -was intensely personal. This made him and his politics very interesting -yet was really unfortunate, for in such men principles and institutions -could have but feeble roots. Finally, as one result of this awareness -of self, every man of any strength had the instincts of a dictator. -Authority he instinctively resented; but on the other hand, when some -one appeared to be dominant, a consciousness of this inner recalcitrancy -and a fear of its being detected, combining with a hope of favors, -produced adulation and apparent slavishness. - -Evidently, then, Mexico was not intrinsically a strong country. -Evidently her people had few qualifications for self-government. -Evidently, too, they were unlikely to handle in the best manner a grave -and complicated question requiring all possible sanity of judgment and -perfect self-control; and, in particular, misunderstandings between them -and a nation like the United States were not only sure to arise but sure -to prove troublesome. - - - - - II - - THE POLITICAL EDUCATION OF MEXICO - - 1800-1845 - - -It was of course the political side of Mexican civilization that had the -most direct bearing on our relations with that country, and this can -best be explained by approaching it historically. At the same time we -shall be aided in studying, not only some of the principal figures in -the war and their mutual attitudes, but some of its most important and -mysterious events. - -The colonial régime of Spain was intended and carefully planned to -ensure the safety, prosperity and contentment of her distant subjects, -but for certain reasons it worked badly. Like all nations of that -period, she believed that her colonies existed for the good of the -mother-country, and aimed first of all to control and exploit them. She -had to depend upon very human agents that were practically beyond her -reach. While theoretically all Mexicans, except the aborigines, enjoyed -an equality before the law, the government felt that emigrants from the -Peninsula were especially worthy of confidence; and at the same time -not a few of these men had friends industriously scheming for them at -court. The consequences were, first, the establishment of a powerful -Gachupine oligarchy, largely dependent on the royal will, the lowest -member of which, even if penniless, felt superior to every Creole, -and, secondly, the enthronement of privilege, often gained by ignoble -means, in government, army, church and business. The Creoles--overawed -by the almost divine prestige of the king, trembling before his power, -and convinced that only his troops could protect them against the -Indians--submitted; but they hated their insolent oppressors, and the -Indians hated both groups. On the principle of "Divide and conquer" -the government fomented these dissensions; and, supported by the -intolerance of the Church, it did its utmost to bar out foreigners and -foreign ideas in order to ensure an unreasoning subordination.[1.1] - -What Mexico owed to Spain, therefore, aside from the remembrance and -fruits of an efficiency that she could not hope to equal, was a settled -tradition of arbitrary rule based on force, of authority selfishly -and often corruptly used, of the government as possessing the sole -initiative, of social disunion resulting from privilege and monopoly, -of personal successes frequently due to intrigue or purchased favor, of -political indifference except among the controlling or aspiring cliques, -of apathy concerning all high interests, of ignorance, inertness, -fanaticism, hard oppression, blind obedience, passionate feuds and gross -pleasures.[2.1] - -[THE REVOLUTION AGAINST SPAIN] - -Little by little new ideas reached a few of the more intelligent, -however. The American Declaration of Independence became known, and also -the fact that Spain, by supporting England's rebellious colonies, had -coöperated with heretics long pictured as infidels and fiends. Echoes -from Diderot's encyclopædia and reports of the French revolution crept -in; and the natural desire both to share on equal terms in the offices -and in business, and to escape from the extra cost of living due to the -monopolies, quickened thought. When war with England led to the raising -of Mexican troops, a new sense of power began to be felt; when the -Spanish monarchy crumbled before Napoleon in 1808, the illusion of the -king's divinity and invincibility faded; when the royal family exhorted -the Mexicans to accept the heir of the French revolution as their -master, loyalty quivered to its base; and when the people of Spain took -up arms to defend their betrayed nationality, the principle of popular -sovereignty loomed up as greater than royal prerogatives. Finally the -mass of the people, though too apathetic to realize the full meaning of -these facts, were roused by a thunder-clap at home.[2.2] - -Struggling with the crisis precipitated by events in the Peninsula, -the viceroy--partly to gain support for himself, it is probable, and -partly to gain support for the monarchy--showed a disposition to give -the Creoles a voice in the government, upon which the leaders of the -oligarchy were so amazingly foolish as to depose him by force, and usurp -his authority. This conduct proved that much of their boasted loyalty -and supposed ability had been shams, that what they really meant was to -enjoy the wealth and power, that the cause of the Creoles was not one -of subjects against their king, but one of subjects against subjects, -and that only force could settle the issue. Dreams of independence -immediately crystallized into schemes of insurrection.[2.2] - -Foremost among the conspirators was Hidalgo, commonly described by the -Mexicans as a Washington, but in reality a kindly, public-spirited, -mockingly irreligious and frankly immoral priest. His plans were -discovered; and so on the sixteenth of September, 1810, in the -desperate hope of saving himself and his associates, he called upon -the Indians, rabid with fanaticism and hatred of their oppressors, to -rise against the Spanish, who, he declared, had now allied themselves -with infidel Frenchmen against their holy religion. What followed was -like the bursting of reservoirs filled with blood and fire. Scarcely -a trace of statesmanship was exhibited by the leaders; most of their -disciples acted like fiends let loose; and their enemies did little -better. Soon many common priests, many Creole military men, and not a -few other persons who felt sore under the heel of wealth and power and -were ambitious to rise, embraced the cause, and so many of the rest -sympathized with Hidalgo's demand for independence, that probably by -good management he could have succeeded; but against a campaign like -his the substantial elements of society found it necessary to combine, -and when the heads of the insurrection were betrayed, captured and shot -in 1811, little of it remained except horrible memories and lessons in -conspiracy, treachery, hate, folly, wholesale destruction and wholesale -murder.[2.2] - -In a new form, however, the cause of independence lived on. Instead of -wild hordes crying, "Death to the Gachupines!" there were now for the -most part stealthy but merciless bands of guerillas, and the government -soldiers followed close behind them in daring and ruthlessness. On the -coast near Vera Cruz an officer named Antonio López de Santa Anna won a -captaincy about this time by hunting down insurgents, and on the plateau -a handsome, dashing man with brown hair and reddish side-whiskers named -Agustín de Itúrbide, who had negotiated with Hidalgo about accepting -the lieutenant generalship of the revolutionary army, distinguished -himself on the royal side for greed and bloodthirstiness. In 1814 he -wrote to the viceroy one Good Friday, "In honor of the day, I have just -ordered three hundred excommunicated wretches to be shot," and the women -among his prisoners fared no better than the men. On the other side -Nicolás Bravo, whose father had been taken and executed, won a noble -distinction by releasing about three hundred captives despite orders -to kill them; Guadalupe Victoria, as he named himself, earned renown -by living in caves like a wild beast rather than give up; and Vicente -Guerrero, operating at the south in unexplored mountains, exhibited -great resourcefulness, remarkable knowledge of men and extraordinary -courage. The principal hero of this period, however, was Morelos, an -Indian priest, who showed himself a consummate partisan leader.[2.2] - -So successful were these and the many other chiefs in terrorism, -robbery, slaughter and sack, and so deep a sentiment in favor of -independence now existed, that with a little sagacity in counsel and a -little concert in action the cause might have triumphed; but ambitions, -jealousies, insubordination, disloyalty and political incompetence -ruined everything, and by the end of 1819, although Guerrero still made -head a little, the second phase also of the revolution was substantially -at an end, leaving behind it hot embers of turmoil, fighting, treachery -and massacre, and countless examples of making pillage a livelihood, -selfishly disregarding the common cause, and grossly blundering in -political management. Thought and feeling in Mexico had, however, been -so educated by reflection, experience, discussion and foreign comments -during the past nine or ten years, that a longer acceptance of the -old régime could not be expected. Absolutism, though triumphant, was -doomed.[2.2] - -[ITÚRBIDE] - -The fatal blow came from its champions. In 1820 a revolution in Spain -revived the liberal constitution that had been adopted eight years -before and then had been abolished by Ferdinand VII; and Apodaca, -now viceroy of Mexico, felt compelled to proclaim the new law. The -troops and the people began to dread another civil war; and the -oligarchy, especially the Church dignitaries, concluding at once that -only separation from the mother-country could save their privileges, -looked about for an instrument. One was easily found. Itúrbide's greed -had finally driven him from his post, his fortune had been wasted in -self-indulgence, and he was now desperate. Long since, his active mind -had seen that if the Creole troops could be seduced, they--supported -by the revolutionary sentiment of the people--could overmatch about -half their number of Spanish regiments; and he agreed readily to become -the champion of autocracy in order to betray it. Cleverly deceiving -the government, he obtained a command through the aid of his backers, -and, in order to clear the field, attacked Guerrero. To dispose of that -wary foe proved, however, no easy task; so he negotiated privately -with a public enemy, described himself as "destitute of ambition and -self-interest," and finally inveigled the insurgent leader into joining -the conspiracy. Victoria followed that example. Santa Anna, though -recently made a lieutenant colonel by the viceroy, came over with his -men. Other leaders did the same; and on February 24, 1821, Itúrbide felt -strong enough to announce a programme, the famous Plan of Iguala.[2.2] - -This declared for independence, a limited monarchy under a Bourbon -king, the Roman Catholic church as the sole form of religion, the -old _fueros_, the right of office-holders to retain their posts, the -fraternal union and political equality of Gachupines, Creoles and -Indians, and the appointment of a committee (_junta_) to govern Mexico -provisionally. No scheme could have seemed more inviting, and none could -have been more delusive, for it ignored insurmountable difficulties -and promised incompatible advantages. In all probability Itúrbide knew -this; but prelates, troops, officials and people took the shining bait; -O'Donojú, the new Spanish general, deciding it would be useless to -fight, made a treaty with the revolutionary chief; and on September 27, -1821, Itúrbide carried the tricolor through the gate of the capital, -stopped his gallant black charger at the convent of San Francisco, -and received the golden keys of the city. Obedience, the sole basis -of Mexican society, had been swept away; treachery and perjury had -triumphed; and yet the unthinking multitude hurrahed.[2.2] - -The generalísimo, violating the principle of popular sovereignty, now -appointed the junta himself, excluding all the old revolutionists; that -body in turn elected him and four associates to exercise the executive -power as regents; and a Constituent Congress was prematurely summoned -to draw up an organic law. The situation soon proved to be extremely -difficult. Resentments needed to be healed, jealousies appeased, -commerce and the industries put in motion, and the whole edifice of -society and politics rebuilt on new foundations out of incongruous -elements. Peculiarly urgent was the demand for money--the more so as -some of the taxes were abolished in order to sweeten the revolution, -while the expenses grew. On entering Mexico Itúrbide had proclaimed, -"You see me in the most opulent of capitals;" and every one expected the -new government--an independent, Mexican, popular government--to bear -an open purse. In October, 1821, some fourteen thousand claims were -presented to it.[2.3] - -Itúrbide, whatever his aims and whatever his faults, was the sole -Mexican of recognized preëminence, the sole possible rallying point; -and patriotism called upon all to support his prestige and patiently -correct his errors until society could take shape. Nothing of the sort -occurred, however. The army idolized him; the civil officials counted -on him; the prelates feared him less than they did his enemies; and -the masses, ignorant of what went on below the surface, revered him as -the Father of Independence; but the cheated absolutists, disappointed -borbonistas, cajoled insurgents, distanced comrades, eclipsed leaders -and unsuccessful claimants, the patriots, indignant that a cruel -royalist should be the heir of the revolution, the republicans, few -in number but increasingly influential, the friends of those he had -massacred or plundered, and behind all the Scottish Rite Freemasons, who -were liberals yet partisans of Spain--all these hated and dogged him. -Honors and emoluments were heaped upon him to excite envy and odium; his -weaknesses were baited; his strength was provoked; his administrative -blundering was stimulated instead of corrected. When financial -necessities compelled him to decree a forced loan, paper money and other -arbitrary measures, many began to denounce him as a tyrant. Plausibly -enough he was accused of disloyalty to his pledges and of aiming to be -king. Finally his enemies, making the most of certain indiscretions that -he committed, undertook to remove him from the command of the army. -Whatever had been his purpose, he now found it necessary to strike; and -a mutiny of the troops--endorsed later by the Congress under military -and mob pressure--declared him emperor.[2.3] - -Expenses then increased still more. Jealousies and enmities were -embittered. Public sentiment veered sharply. Time, strength and -funds were swallowed up in pomps that created no more illusion than -a college student in a toga. Encompassed with flatterers, foes and -traitors, financially and politically incompetent himself and guided by -incompetent advisers, well enough aware that after deceiving everybody -he could expect no one to be true, Itúrbide lost his head, sometimes -wavered and sometimes tyrannized. Finally he thought it necessary to -deprive Santa Anna of an authority that had no doubt been abused; and -this interesting young man, who had recently proclaimed that he welcomed -Itúrbide's elevation with a positively uncontrollable exuberance of -joy, "pronounced" for a republic, knowing scarcely anything about that -system, but knowing a great deal about the Emperor's unpopularity. This -precipitated a revolution; and the movement, soon taken up by Victoria, -Guerrero and Bravo, spread rapidly. Itúrbide's most intimate and trusted -general was despatched against the insurgents, but betrayed him. The -army went over. The people, who revered the Liberator but not the -Emperor, concurred. With bad faith and gratuitous outrages his enemies -crowded savagely upon him. Early in 1823 he abdicated; and in May, -forsaken by every one of the many he had benefited, the discredited hero -sailed for Europe, leaving behind him examples and suggestions of the -most demoralizing kind.[2.3] - -The junta, meanwhile, had disgusted the nation with its frivolities, -political and fiscal incompetence and usurpation of powers, and there -was a feeling of relief when it dissolved in February, 1822, the next -day after Congress met. Congress, however, did no better and fared even -worse, for it earned much contempt by sanctioning under pressure the -elevation of Itúrbide; and then Itúrbide made Congress, and made all -popular government, quite ridiculous in the eyes of the people and the -army by forcibly sending the members home. When at his wit's end, he -recalled it as if inviting the _coup de grace_, and soon it not only -earned more contempt by pronouncing his elevation illegal and punishing -every mark of condolence for the fallen chief, but undertook to outrank -omnipotence by pretending that no empire had existed. Soon, too, all the -selfish ambitions that had combined against Itúrbide in this body showed -themselves so clearly as to add further discredit; and worse yet the -Congress, though chosen merely to frame a constitution under the Plan of -Iguala, held on after the refusal of Spain to coöperate had put an end -to that scheme.[2.3] - -The republicans, who were gaining ground because evidently no other -Mexican could stand where Itúrbide had fallen, and the Iturbidistas, who -desired to create anarchy in order to force the recall of their hero, -clamored for new elections. Five provinces demanded them formally; and -at length, despised by every one, Congress, the firstfruit of popular -government, fell to the ground. Almost every institution that should -have enjoyed respect was now discredited--even the Church, for it had -crowned the emperor and shed its benedictions liberally on Congress. The -army, however, stood, for it had shown its power both to elevate and to -overthrow.[2.3] - -The next Congress, which met November 7, 1823, had a more democratic -basis; but the members were personally inferior, intrigue and -self-seeking again prevailed, and the young orators--convinced -that winning applause from the galleries was the true object of -speaking--launched forth on all occasions with that fatal fluency -which their intoxicating idiom encouraged. After centuries of enforced -silence, men to whom liberty could only mean license were called upon -to decide the gravest questions of statesmanship. Naturally they were -eager to build before laying foundations; and naturally, too, where -nine tenths of the people could not read, it seemed like genuine -statesmanship to flourish the novel vocabulary of independence.[2.3] - -Frivolous, fickle, now torpid and now running amuck, Congress found -itself compelled eventually to frame a constitution. Under Spanish rule -the provinces, each governed by an intendant, had known little and -cared less about one another; and now, stimulated by the centrifugal -tendency of the Iberian character and the dread of a tyrant, inflamed -by transcendental doctrines of liberty, disgusted with the proceedings -of the national authorities, and captivated by the thought of offices -for all, they began to claim sovereignty; and something had to be -done at once. A republic, though alien to all the habits and feelings -of the nation, seemed evidently necessary, because no possible monarch -existed, and because no other system could make it the interest of a -sufficient number of persons to maintain the government; but this did -not end the difficulties. The centralized type of republic was ardently -desired by the oligarchy as likely to prove controllable, and by all -the monarchists as a sloping path toward their goal; but the friends of -Itúrbide and the enemies of privilege--strongest at a distance from the -capital--fought against it, and at length, as the federal system, about -which only the vaguest notions were entertained, promised more offices -and seemed more likely to hold the country together, it was decided -upon.[2.3] - -To meet the crisis one individual, taking the constitution of the -United States as a basis,[2.4] drafted the required instrument in -three days; and so an untrained and uneducated nation found itself -provided with a complicated mixture of democracy and privilege, liberty -and intolerance, progress and reaction, which paralyzed itself by -combining such antagonistic elements, omitted the safeguard of a supreme -court like ours, and showed its own inadequacy by providing that in -emergencies the President might be given "extraordinary powers," or in -other words become a dictator. In short, the government was organized -as a permanent revolution. There was much enthusiasm, however, over -this triumph of nationality, and on New Year's day, 1825, the first -constitutional Congress assembled. The treasury was now full of borrowed -English gold; and--as every one hoped the new system might be developed -in the direction he preferred--all agreed that an era of peace, joy and -prosperity had at length arrived.[2.3] - -[VICTORIA'S ADMINISTRATION] - -Victoria was elected President. His frank, ruddy, bronzed face, peering -out of gray whiskers and curly gray hair, looked happy and encouraging, -but soon the mass of the nation felt once more cheated; for although -Bravo had been the candidate of the oligarchy, Victoria--yielding to the -pressure of that element--gave it a preponderance in the administration. -A multitude of people were exasperated to find the old privileged -classes again in control, and the execution of Itúrbide under an illegal -law--for he had returned to Mexico--infuriated his partisans. Worse -yet, the oligarchy denied the practicability of the federal system for -so unwieldy a country, where the states felt so independent, where so -many men aspired to hold office and where so few were qualified, and -plotted to set up the centralized regime, with monarchy--preferably -under a Spanish prince--as the ultimate aim of many; and Victoria, a -polite, weak, indolent, easily-flattered man of small abilities, little -education and immense vanity, who idolized his country but felt she -would always need him as chief-priest, fell in with this plan, because -without a change of the constitution he could not be President a second -time.[2.5] - -Disgusted and alarmed, the Federalists, who included the Iturbidistas, -began therefore to scheme gropingly for a new revolution, a new war of -independence; but at length, realizing that under the constitution a -majority could rule, they established Masonic lodges of the York Rite, -and with great skill, activity and perseverance organized their forces. -Before long their power showed itself at the voting-urns, and the -President, recognizing the logic of events and perceiving he could never -supplant Bravo in the favor of the aristocracy, changed the complexion -of the government. This in turn angered the faction displaced, and most -unwisely--being physically much the weaker side--it massed its power -in December, 1827, and revolted under a certain Montaño. Bravo, though -Vice-President, placed himself at the head of the insurgents; but the -government forces under Guerrero, attacking him during a truce, quickly -ended the revolt.[2.5] - -Peace, however, did not return. The newspapers unearthed or invented so -many unsavory tales about the leading citizens that, besides proving -those men unworthy of confidence, they excited lasting resentments. The -Federalists--particularly the Iturbidistas--harshly avenged their past -sufferings, for the Mexican idea of justice meant a chance to persecute -the oppressor; and every thinking mind saw with dismay that whereas -previous insurrections had occurred in a natural revolutionary period, -the government legally established by the nation had now been defied by -a great party led by the Vice-President himself. This was the letting -out of waters, and to palliate it as chargeable to circumstances would -be to excuse all political crimes.[2.5] - -Meanwhile another storm had been gathering. The Spanish element, which -not only was superior but felt so, had given much offence; and, quite -aside from grudges, many thought it unsafe to have so large a number of -Gachupines in the country--many of them active and able, not a few of -them soldiers, and some occupying high civil and military positions--at -a time when Spain was preparing to reassert her authority over Mexico. -Others argued that should the Spaniards go, their places in business -and the public service would be available for Mexicans. Still others -considered this a good way to enfeeble the oligarchy, so as to curtail -its privileges. Many demagogues perceived that here lay a splendid -opportunity to acquire a following; and the Spaniards, for their -part, long accustomed to despise and lord it over the Mexicans, often -exasperated the public by offensive and imprudent conduct. The natural -consequences followed. Many insurrections, benevolently treated by the -government, demanded the expulsion of the Gachupines; some of the states -passed laws in that sense; and finally, in 1827 and 1828, Congress -did the same. A very large number of Gachupines actually departed and -carried away their money. This drew out the strongest fibres of public -life, the army, finance, trade and the industries; while the injustice -and impolicy of these decrees and the bloody vengeance taken upon a few -silly Spanish conspirators embittered feeling in Mexico, and greatly -injured Mexican credit in Europe, where few except the Spanish merchants -enjoyed any financial standing.[2.5] - -By the time Victoria's administration drew near its end, Mexico -had marked out her downward route. The parties faced each other as -implacable foes. Each perpetrated as much electoral fraud and violence -as it could; each kept up a savage press; and each worked in the dark -through secret societies. Owing to extravagance, peculation, bad -management, the backwardness of the states in paying their quotas, and -the failure of an English banking house, the treasury was empty in spite -of lavish borrowing. "Liberty" had become a by-word, for Victoria had -wielded the extraordinary powers for a year and a half, punishments had -gone beyond the laws, and the government had been given authority, not -only to expel foreigners at will, but even to banish citizens from their -states. Corruption was general and profound, commerce feeble, credit -extinct, justice perverted, reported the French agent; and, as his -British colleague added, the "Name of Patriotism" was used as a "Cloak -to cover the greatest Excesses."[2.5] - -And now came something worse. Well aware they could not elect one of -their own number President against the popular candidate, Guerrero, the -Centralists looked about for an acceptable Federalist. Gómez Pedraza, -Victoria's minister of war, though narrow, harsh and passionate, was a -strict and honest man, a laborious official and a thoughtful, effective -orator. He had fought on the Spanish side in the revolution, and -naturally favored a conservative, aristocratic régime. He, therefore, -was secretly adopted in place of Bravo, now in exile. All those who -detested unseemly party strife preferred him, and as the moderate wing -of the Federalists also took that side, quite unaware that Centralism -lurked in the shadow, Guerrero's noisy and overconfident supporters -found themselves beaten. This result and the open exultation, threats -and hostilities of their old enemies, who still controlled the senate -and the supreme court, enraged them, for they perceived they had been -duped once more, and they hotly charged--no doubt with some reason--that -money and Pedraza's power as head of the war department had frustrated -the will of the people; while it disgusted Victoria to be superseded by -a man he had looked down upon as merely a useful clerk.[2.6] - -[SANTA ANNA] - -Another individual also took offence. After setting the ball in motion -against Itúrbide, Santa Anna had been eclipsed by larger figures, and -to shine again he took up arms as Protector of the People; but this -enterprise collapsed at once, and he issued a very humble proclamation, -closing with the words, "Permit me, permit me to dig myself an obscure -grave that my ashes and my memory may disappear." A fairly comfortable -grave was, however, dug for him by removing His Penitence to Yucatan -as military commandant, and he proceeded at once to gild its interior -by permitting illicit commerce with Cuba. Returning after a while to -the proper field of ambition, he was more than suspected of complicity -in two insurrections; but in each case he read the omens in season to -extricate himself, and virtuously offered his sword to the government. -Now, however, he took a bold stand. Not only were he and the successful -candidate personal enemies, but he felt that little would be left of -himself after four years of Pedraza's rule; and he knew that Guerrero, -in addition to being favored by the army, really had a majority of the -people on his side. Accordingly he unfurled his flag in September, 1828, -for Guerrero, popular rights and a total expulsion of the Gachupines. In -this contest he showed amazing quickness, audacity and resourcefulness, -keeping up his motley troops principally by brigandage; but very soon -his cause appeared to be doomed.[2.6] - -At this point Lorenzo de Zavala, one of those human meteors that rarely -illuminate Anglo-Saxon skies, came forward. His political relations were -extremely intense; and now, believing the Centralists intended to place -him before a firing-squad, he organized at Mexico, in the hope of saving -himself and Santa Anna, the woeful insurrection of the Acordada, which -fixed the example of party revolution. Victoria had an understanding -with him, though after betraying the government and letting the handful -of rioters get a safe start, he lost his nerve and betrayed them also; -and in the end, at the cost of some bloodshed and extensive robberies, -the insurrection triumphed; "the vile and unnatural Pedraza"--as his -foes called him--fled to the United States, and Congress, after having -declared Pedraza elected, pronounced Guerrero President on the express -ground that revolts had occurred in his favor. In reality this was a -revolution of numbers and popular ideas against privilege and oligarchy, -and before long the country accepted the situation.[2.6] - -[A NEW REVOLUTION] - -Santa Anna was now a popular hero, the saviour of the nation; and he -proceeded to confirm his title. In 1829 came the long expected blow from -Spain, and having calmly assumed the military authority at Vera Cruz, -he advanced to meet it. Near Tampico the invading army, stricken with -fever, desired to lay down its arms; but Santa Anna, eager for laurels, -attacked it. Spanish valor accepted the challenge; the Mexicans were -repulsed; and their ambitious leader left the field before the battle -ended. The invaders were then permitted to surrender, and soon a new cry -was echoing through the streets of Mexico, "Viva Santa Anna, the Victor -of Tampico!" Clothing himself with modesty and grace he now posed as a -sort of benevolent divinity. Rather tall, thin, apparently feeble but -capable of great exertions on occasion, with a head that bulged at the -top, a swarthy complexion, brilliant and restless eyes, a very clear-cut -voice and a voluble tongue, he moved about his estate at Manga de Clavo -and the near-by city of Vera Cruz in an easy, affable way, accumulating -popularity. "Can read somewhat," reported our consul in that city; but -his thoughts were above literature. "Were I made God," it was said that -he once remarked, "I should wish to be something more."[2.6] - -Meantime, April 1, 1829, Guerrero assumed the Presidency. In his green -jacket edged with fur, red waistcoat bound with a blue sash, brown -mantle and heavy sabre, with his thick hair bristling toward all -points of the compass, he was a picturesque figure, and as candidate -had answered very well. For the role of chief magistrate, however, the -British minister justly described him as "totally unfit." Being mostly -of Indian and partly--it was stated--of negro blood, he instinctively -distrusted the whites, while the latter utterly despised the class to -which he belonged. Though his intuitive judgment was quick and within -the range of his experience remarkably correct, he knew nothing whatever -of letters and politics, necessarily depended upon the self-seeking -flatterers of his party, and veered about like the wind. In military -emergencies he could burst his bonds like a Samson, but the things he -really cared for were a wench, a bottle, a game of monte and a nap -under some spreading tree. Without ideas, knowledge, experience or -high character, he faced a terrible inheritance: the laws ignored, the -authorities despised, the administration disorganized, the treasury -worse than empty, the country in distress and turmoil.[2.6] - -Professions of loyalty to the "sacred" constitution and the laws could -not blot out the fact that his authority was based upon a riot; and -others would not feel satisfied merely because he was content. The -extraordinary powers of the Executive, granted in view of the Spanish -invasion, were used oppressively. A multitude of persons clamored for -money and he could give them none; a multitude clamored for reforms, and -he scarcely knew what they were talking about. As far as possible the -rest of the Gachupines were driven out, but this merely added to the -confusion. President and nation simply drifted, and the rocks were near. -Before long the general government was practically ignored except at the -capital, and the heads of the secret societies wielded the real power. -Guerrero even allowed the oligarchy, his deadliest foe, to alienate him -from the common people, the source of his strength. He became almost -as isolated as Mahomet's coffin; and then--as soon as ambition could -disguise itself with a programme--he fell.[2.6] - -Mainly owing to the good-will of Guerrero, the Vice-President was -General Anastasio Bustamante, a heavy, dull, rather kindly and fairly -honest aristocrat, though nominally a moderate Federalist. When -appointed by Guerrero to command the army of reserve at Jalapa, the -principal military force in the country, he exclaimed on taking leave -of the President, "Never will I unsheathe my sword against General -Guerrero," but within a year (December, 1829) he did it; and, though a -beneficiary of the Acordada riot, he revolted against the government -in the name of the constitution. As a matter of fact his rebellion was -merely another effort of the privileged classes, a revised edition of -Montaño's, and the army received its pay from the money chests of the -oligarchs. Little opposition was encountered, for Guerrero had let -Delilah shear him, the Acordada episode and much other misconduct had -completely discredited the radical Federalists, and the Federalists in -general--who had raised Bustamante from a political prison to the second -place in the nation--could not believe, after his fresh protestations of -loyalty to the constitution, that he would betray them. The President, -finding nobody to lean upon, fled to his old haunts in the south, -was treacherously captured and was shot; and meanwhile, on the first -of January, 1830, Bustamante took up the reins. Greed, corruption, -imprudence, evil passions and lawlessness had ruined the cause of -democracy, and Victoria's experiment of letting aristocrats administer a -professedly popular system had to be tried again.[2.6] - -Bustamante opened Congress with a bit of the fashionable hypocrisy, -asserting that a "sacred Constitution" had placed him in power; but he -showed that what interested him was "the wishes of the army," and the -army reciprocated this affection. Alamán, who had been Victoria's chief -adviser at first, now became the real head of the government. More -than any other man in Mexico he could claim to be called a statesman, -for he knew some history, had observed politics in Europe, and in a -superficial yet impressive way could reason; but he was a statesman of -the Metternich school, wily and insincere, wholly unable to sympathize -with democracy, and profoundly in love with force. Whatever did not suit -the government he demolished without regard to law; whoever opposed it -was crushed. In administration the government did well, but--attempting -to represent democracy and privilege, progress and reaction, the past -and the future, a self-governing state and an all-controlling church at -one and the same time--it undertook to perform an impossible task by -impossible means. Consequently it satisfied neither of the parties and -offended both. King Stork proved worse than King Log.[2.7] - -Santa Anna, incensed because Guerrero would not appoint him minister -of war, had at first coquetted with Bustamante's movement; but soon, -overshadowed at Jalapa by the Vice-President and by Bravo, whom -Guerrero had pardoned, he retired to his estate. On the outbreak of -the revolution he took up arms for Guerrero; but when his chief gave -up, he followed that example, and patiently awaited, crouching, the -time to spring. Now he saw the tide of passion rising, and saw also -the best citizens agreeing that Mier y Terán,[F] an able and honorable -man, should be the next chief magistrate. Accordingly, to prevent an -election if nothing more, he "pronounced" in the name of Federalism -at the beginning of 1832, and called for a change of Cabinet, though -four years earlier he had battled for the principle that nobody should -interfere with a President's choice of ministers; and then he required -that Bustamante should give up his place to Pedraza as the rightful head -of the state, though Santa Anna himself had been the cause of Pedraza's -exclusion on the ground of illegal election. Supported by the Vera Cruz -customhouse and defended by the pestilence of the coast, he occupied a -most advantageous position; and consistency did not signify.[2.7] - - [F] A Mexican sometimes chose to bear the family name of his mother - as well as that of his father. The former was connected to the - latter with the word "and" (_y_). Paredes y Arrillaga, Peña y - Peña, Mora y Villamil are instances. In referring to such - persons, however, it was customary to use only the first of the - names. Thus one finds much more often "Paredes" than "Paredes y - Arrillaga." - -Near the close of the year the two chiefs, brought together by Pedraza, -adjusted the affairs of the nation--that is to say, the offices--as -private business, and the troops on both sides were liberally rewarded. -Congress protested, but was utterly powerless. Bustamante soon found it -wise to give up the Presidency; and as the elections were not general -enough, at the proper time, to create a Congress, constitutional -government vanished. However, though Pedraza had resigned and even -left the country, which no President could legally do, Santa Anna and -Bustamante now hoisted him into power to complete the term interrupted -by Guerrero, while the "best citizens" fell out over offices and -personal issues, and so dissipated the brightest prospect seen as yet in -Mexican public life.[2.7] - -[SANTA ANNA PRESIDENT] - -Under these circumstances, of course, the dominant general, Santa Anna, -was elected President. For Vice-President the choice fell upon Valentín -Gómez Farías, leader of the radical Federalists. In many ways Farías -deserved warm admiration. He was active, indefatigable, fearless, -thoroughly honest, and willing--perhaps a little more than willing--to -serve the public in the humblest or the highest office. He loved -Mexico ardently, and he believed in the supremacy of law and the civil -authority. Unfortunately, however, his education was inadequate for the -work he undertook to do; and he lacked prudence, patience and common -sense. In short, he may be characterized as a fanatical democrat and -political idealist.[2.7] - -Santa Anna now had the army at his back, but he desired to have also -the privileged classes there, and they had been exasperated by his -overthrowing Bustamante. He therefore decided to let them see they -needed him; and, retiring early in 1833 to his estate--which in fact he -enjoyed much more than bearing the burdens of administration--he left -the Vice-President in power. Farías then undertook to transform Mexico, -by merely saying "Open Sesame!" to the Federalist majority in Congress, -into a modern, liberal, orderly and prosperous nation; and reform -projects made their appearance at once. The privileges of the army -were boldly attacked and still more those of the Church, which aimed -to be _in_ the social order enough to dominate it, yet enough outside -to escape from all obligations. Farías proposed, therefore, without -having a well-digested plan, to reassert the supreme authority formerly -exercised by the king, abolish the clerical fuero and the compulsory -tithes, provide for popular, lay education, and bring into productive -circulation the immense wealth controlled by the Church; and Congress, -fully aware that reforms were necessary, dazzled by the boldness and -novelty of his programme, and misled by the Mexican faith in theories -and formulæ, supported him.[2.7] - -Naturally such projects and their foreseen consequences roused the -clericals and all in that camp to fury, and the proprietors of great -estates also grew alarmed. The President felt his time had come, and -in May, therefore, he resumed his functions. The progress of reform -promptly halted, and soon it was announced that Santa Anna, ingeniously -made a prisoner by his own troops, had been proclaimed dictator. -Undoubtedly he expected the mutiny that now broke out at the capital -to overthrow the government; but Farías, again in power during the -President's absence, quelled the revolt, and Santa Anna found it -necessary to "escape" and resume his office.[2.7] - -[A CHANGE OF RÉGIME] - -Pretending still with consummate address to favor both parties--though -really a Centralist now--he made both of them court and fear him, and -proved his power by breaking down and then restoring the army. Of -course, however, these manoeuvres excited suspicion. The privileged -classes, though anxious for his support, hesitated to pledge him theirs, -and so he returned on a six months' leave of absence to his figurative -plow, leaving Tornel, whom an American minister described as "a very bad -man," to scheme in his interest. The now embittered and excited forces -of reform were thus unleashed, and before long the Church and the rich -proprietors offered the Cincinnatus of Manga de Clavo absolute power on -condition that he should protect them. In April, 1834, therefore, two -months before his leave was to expire, he took possession of the supreme -power again, and was hailed by the clergy as a new Messiah. Supported -soon by the revolutionary "plan" of Cuernavaca, he made himself in -effect a dictator. The cause of reform was harshly checked and turned -back. Congress found the door of its hall barred; and Farías, covered -with abuse, was driven from the country.[2.7] - -Secretly encouraging reactionary insurrections and instigating demands -for a centralized régime, though still professing publicly the other -creed, Santa Anna ordered the people to surrender their weapons, and -crushed with a ruthless hand the state of Zacatecas, which dared to -oppose his will. "Worthy son of the father of lies," "unrivalled -chameleon," "shameless hypocrite," "atheist and blasphemer," shrieked -his opponents. "With the tranquility of a tiger, which, sated with the -flesh of its prey, reposes on what it does not wish to devour, Santa -Anna reports his victory," cried _El Crepúsculo_. But resentment counted -for nothing; Mexico was prostrate. Late in 1835, therefore, a packed -Congress of self-seeking politicians decided upon centralization, and -it was understood that Santa Anna would be chosen President for ten -years, with a longer term and a higher title in prospect. But now the -scene was tragically shifted. In March, 1836, the Texans declared their -independence. The Napoleon of the West fell into their hands at San -Jacinto, where they defeated his army; and, as an inkling got abroad -of the unpatriotic agreements made with his captors while in fear of -revenge for his cruelties, he thought it wise to announce, on returning -to Mexico in 1837, a definitive retirement from public life.[2.7] - -According to the organic law, any proposed constitutional change had to -remain under consideration for two years; but the Congress of 1835, not -minding a trifle like this, drew up as fast as possible what it named -the Seven Laws--called by others the Seven Plagues. By December, 1836, -despite the resistance and threats of the Federalists, the new régime -was fully organized, and Bustamante soon held the reins again. The -Church and the wealthy were now satisfied. The army also felt pleased, -for the Federalists denounced its privileges, the cost of the many state -offices created by them reduced the amount of money it could get, and -an aristocratic government seemed likely to need it constantly and pay -it with some regularity; and so the prospect was, especially with Santa -Anna eliminated, that the new regime would be stable.[2.7] - -But among the aristocrats it had become unfashionable by this time to -meddle with politics. The groups that made up the dominant party, -though united against the democrats, had little else in common. Each -group desired to enjoy privileges and shun burdens; each aimed to -exploit the nation; and there was not enough to satisfy all. The -expulsion of the Spaniards had weakened the numbers, ability, energy -and wealth of the party; and now, as after every revolution, it proved -so impossible to fulfill the promises made to win support, that soon -disappointed friends were allying themselves with open enemies.[2.8] - -A new difficulty, too, arose, for under a centralized system the -government had to assume financial responsibilities previously borne -by the states. A strong treasury was therefore essential; yet the -rich, and in particular the clergy, would not pay enough to carry on -the government they had established. Consequently funds had to be -borrowed, Church property being the only available security; and the -clergy, instead of meeting the terms of the money-lenders, busily hid or -exported their wealth. Every dollar that could be raised had to be given -the army as the price of its allegiance, and for six months not one -civil employé, from the President down, received a salary. In October, -1837, the ministry resigned in a body, and would not return to their -desks, for nobody cared to support so heavy a load when there was no -chance to steal or even to get paid.[2.8] - -Early in November the British representative, although the legation -had all along sympathized with the aristocratic party, reported -that Centralism had completely failed; and it was notorious that -Bustamante himself desired a restoration of Federalism as the only -possible expedient. Seeing their enemies divided, the liberals took -heart, and petitions for a change of system were soon pouring in -from the departments, which had now taken the places of the states. -Dissatisfaction spread. Pronunciamientos began, and only the popularity -of Bustamante, who had mellowed with age and foreign travel during his -period of eclipse, maintained the government. Yet Federalism could not -act, for at this juncture the French minister was pressing claims, -and the two wings of the party--the moderates led by Pedraza and the -radicals led by Farías--disagreed passionately on this foreign issue. -A complete state of anarchy prevails, reported our consul at Mexico in -December, 1838.[2.8] - -[FALL OF BUSTAMANTE] - -Santa Anna all this time was quietly at work, though he had called -heaven to witness that he would be loyal to the existing regime; and, -as often happened, chance came to his aid. A French fleet captured the -fortress of Ulúa, off Vera Cruz, at this time, and a party of marines -landed at the town, destroyed some war material, and then marched -back to reëmbark. Santa Anna commanded there, and, being wounded in -attacking these troops, had to undergo amputation at the knee. This was -his opportunity, and he at once issued a most eloquent address. Already -he had outdone opera bouffe, and now he outdid himself. "Probably this -will be the last victory I shall give my country," he said; "I die happy -that Divine Providence has permitted me to devote to her every drop -of my blood.... May all my fellow-citizens, forgetting my political -errors, concede to me the one title that I would leave my children, -that of a Good Mexican." There had been no victory, for the French -drove him out of Vera Cruz before he could dictate the address, and he -did not dream of dying; but the Mexicans are tender-hearted, and the -episode--particularly in contrast with the inaction of the government, -which could not afford an efficient regular army and dared not arm the -people--gave him a fresh hold on the nation, even though all capable of -thinking felt by this time profoundly skeptical about him.[2.8] - -Accordingly he became the power behind the tottering throne in December, -1838, and when Bustamante took the field early the next year to put -down an insurgent named Mejía, the Centralist leaders had Santa Anna -made temporary President as a bulwark against Federalism. The quality -of his penitence quickly showed itself. His power was audaciously used -to cripple Bustamante, suppress liberty, gain partisans and benefit -himself and his friends. In a word, he achieved the most lawless and -shameless administration yet witnessed, and though universally feared, -was now execrated by almost all except his personal followers. In July, -1839, the President resumed his functions, but matters only went on from -worse to worst--corruption rampant in the administration, public spirit -dead. In July, 1840, rioters actually made him their prisoner for a -time. False advisers, particularly Tornel, drew him farther and farther -into Santa Anna's net. Corpulent and aging rapidly, he fell into a sort -of mental stupor; and in August, 1841, the British minister reported -that the government, if left to itself, would soon expire of inanition. -As for the nation, it was not merely in anarchy but in chaos. Even the -conservatives admitted that the Seven Laws would not do.[2.8] - -This very month rang the bell for the next scene. General Mariano -Paredes, another important figure in the history of our war with Mexico, -was a brave but rather besotted officer, more honest but less clever -than his leading contemporaries. On a mere pretext, though he owed much -to Bustamante, he revolted; more or less in collusion with him Santa -Anna pronounced as mediator; and General Valencia, correctly described -by an American consul as "destitute of every principle of honor or -honesty," treacherously getting hold of what was called the citadel -at Mexico, rebelled on his own account: check from two knights and a -castle, as Señora Calderón wittily described the situation. Weary, -disgusted, indifferent, cynical, men heard unmoved the "Quién vive?" and -"Centinela alerte!" of the insurgents at the capital, and between two -puffs of their cigarettes gossiped about the revolution as if it had -occurred in Europe. It was only a game of chess, and the public were -spectators. They understood now that nearly all the pompous phrases of -the politicians had meant, as Lara's _Revista Política_ of 1840 put it, -"Move, and let me have your place."[2.8] - -In this confusion Santa Anna, whom the conservatives had now decided -to support instead of the inefficient Bustamante, came rapidly to the -front. His triumph was soon foreseen, and the nation acquiesced. Most -people knew he was a villain, but felt that at any rate he possessed -energy. Probably he could keep order, they said, and perhaps, if -entirely trusted, would act well. If not, one big rascal could not be -so bad as many little ones; and at the very least any change must be an -improvement. In reality this bold, cunning, hungry, sharp adventurer, -who knew what he wanted and got it, dazzled the average Mexicans. They -saw in him a fulfilment of themselves, and in letting him rule they had -the feeling of success without the trouble.[2.8] - -For a while Bustamante, whose government practically faded out in -September, 1841, resisted with dignity though with no chance of -survival; but at length, in a fit of desperation, he cut the ground -of legality from under his own feet by pronouncing for Federalism, and -on October 7, Santa Anna, driving rapidly through Mexico behind four -white horses belonging to a stockbroker, with a retinue of splendid -coaches and an immense escort of cavalry, took up his quarters at the -palace in Tacubaya, a few miles beyond. Yet not a single viva greeted -his magnificent entry or his address to Congress. Memory paralyzed -admiration. In despair, not love, Mexico consented to be his.[2.8] - -[SANTA ANNA VIRTUALLY DICTATOR] - -By the new arrangement, called the Bases of Tacubaya, a new Congress was -to draw a new constitution. Meantime some one, the choice of a junta -appointed by the successful chief, was to have the powers "necessary for -the organization of all branches of the public service," and naturally -Santa Anna himself received the votes of his junta. This arrangement -was regarded by the nation as a mere parenthesis, but the General -held a different idea. On October 10, the gloomy old cathedral was as -bright as gold, silver, gems and hundreds of candles could make it. -Troops entered the sacred precincts, and formed to the music of drums -and cornets. The archbishop proceeded to the main entrance in cope and -mitre, holding in his hands a crucifix equally beautiful and precious, -and there he waited for about three quarters of an hour, when a military -officer, who had not even deigned to put on full dress, marched in and -seated himself on a splendid throne. A large suite of generals followed, -but none of them ventured to sit, though the _Te Deum_ lasted an hour; -and finally the man on the throne rose and took this oath: I swear to -God--to do as I please; for such was the meaning of the Bases. Hardened -by seeing his superior astuteness, audacity and energy balked so many -times by circumstances and a lack of confidence in his honor, Santa Anna -proposed, now that he once more had the power, to grip it with a hand of -steel.[2.9] - -As dictator he indulged himself by running through the entire diapason -from childishness to omnipotence, announcing impossibilities and -attempting absurdities. The freedom of the press and the freedom of -speech were violated. The tariff was juggled with for selfish pecuniary -reasons. He ordered the university to give one of his friends a degree -and a chair--that is to say, learning and a profession. He closed a -bank without allowing it the time to liquidate. He put up a cheap -building of rubble work that was merely an eyesore--though Tornel -compared it to the Simplon road of Napoleon--and the city government -had to fall down and worship it. His amputated foot was dug up and -reinterred with extraordinary pomp. On the top of a monument was erected -a gilded statue of him pointing toward Texas, though some said it was -pointing at the mint. The Church, now governed by the soft Archbishop -Posada, drowsy with satisfaction and carelessly fattening on sweetmeats -presented to him by adoring nuns, was forced to make "loans"; and -payments on public debts, for which revenues had been solemnly pledged, -were suspended.[2.9] - -Nothing, one might almost say, was too great or too small for Santa -Anna, if it looked auriferous. No coach wheel could turn without first -paying a tax. Anybody with a promising scheme to get national funds -could find a partner at the palace. Brokers and contractors took the -places of politicians; wealthy merchants, able to loan great sums at -great percentages, took the places of statesmen. Corruption was rampant -everywhere, of course. "An arbitrary system, indeed, must always be a -corrupt one," as Burke said; "there never was a man who thought he had -no law but his own will, who did not soon find that he had no end but -his own profit." These words describe Santa Anna's course. And when his -chest was full enough and his army big enough, putting a substitute in -his place and shaking off the cares of state, he went down to enjoy his -gambling and cockfighting and plan his next political move at Manga -de Clavo, secure from observation and protected by troops. Hints of a -formal dictatorship began to be heard.[2.9] - -To keep up appearances, however, he summoned the proposed Congress. A -majority of the members were Federalists, but he promptly informed it -that Federalism would not do, and when they insisted on their notion, -Tornel, the minister of war, who was glad to be his lackey and wear -the livery of the house, barred Congress out of its hall. Presently, -without a sign of protest from any one, it was dissolved by decree; -and then eighty persons, chosen by the administration, drew up a new -constitution called the Organic Bases. Valencia was president of this -junta; and both he and Paredes began to plot against the dictator. -Santa Anna forced them to swallow their ambitions for the time being, -however, and by dint of military interference--though his enemies were -bestirring themselves and he was now increasingly unpopular--he became -President in January, 1844, under the new constitution. This appeared -like a concession to legality, but no doubt it was intended as a recoil -for another spring. His dream of empire still went on, it was fully -believed.[2.9] - -Although the minister of justice described this period as "an epoch of -glory" and an "era of absolute felicity," the new Congress manifested -a disposition to antagonize the President; but an almost supernatural -dread of him paralyzed even his enemies, and he readily bowled them -over. Then he was given a special sum of four millions for war with -Texas; and after that sum was promptly absorbed, he demanded not only -ten millions more but "extraordinary powers" to lay taxes. This meant -that he wanted to have every man's property at his disposal, and it -was generally believed that with a foreign war as excuse he would soon -try to make himself autocrat. Congress resisted, and before long was -suspended.[2.9] - -[DOWNFALL OF SANTA ANNA] - -But now the people took fire. They had trusted Santa Anna completely, -and their confidence had been as completely abused. It was felt that -he had shown a deliberate intention to ignore the public interest and -feed upon the nation--disregarding all personal rights, threatening -all fortunes and contradicting all principles. Paredes, who had never -forgiven Santa Anna for running him off the track in 1841, pronounced. -In November, 1844, war began. The President attempted both to cajole -and to terrorize his enemies, and moved against the insurgents with a -powerful army; but on December 6 the troops at the capital revolted, and -the nation concurred. In the departments he was particularly hated, for -he had impoverished them with taxes and spent the money elsewhere; but -Mexico itself blazed. "Death to the lame man!" shouted the populace, -dragging his foot round the streets. Dazed and overwhelmed, Santa Anna, -after moving about irresolutely with his dwindling army, left it with -a small escort early in January, 1845, and then took to his heels with -only four servants. Before long some peasants captured him, and later in -the year he was banished.[2.9] - -At first sight this collapse amazes us. It seems impossible that -Santa Anna, whose particular talent lay in discovering the direction -of political currents, should have lost so suddenly his tremendous -power. But the explanation is readily found. Without a doubt he was -the foremost Mexican of his time. Seen at the head of a ragged, -undisciplined mob called a regiment, inspiring them with eye, gesture -and words, and leading them on with almost electrical energy; seen at -a banquet, where he could show himself--despite the six colonels erect -and stiff behind his chair--merely a prince of good fellows, dignified -but cordial, courtly but unrestrained, brilliant yet apparently simple; -seen at the council board, seizing upon a shrewd idea expressed by one -of his associates and developing, illustrating and applying it in a way -that made its real author marvel at his chief's wisdom; seen in one of -his outbursts of Jacksonian rage, as when he threatened at a diplomatic -reception to run the boundary line between Mexico and the United -States at the cannon's mouth; seen at the opera house, in a crimson -and gold box with a retinue of crimson and gold officers, dressed in -the plainest of costumes himself, and wearing on his countenance an -interesting expression of gentle melancholy and resignation, as if he -were sacrificing himself for the nation and shrank from the gaze of an -adoring public--seen in these and other phases he appeared remarkable, -and even, as combining them, extraordinary.[2.9] - -But in reality he was a charlatan. Though head of an army, he knew -nothing of military science; though head of a nation, he knew nothing -of statesmanship. By right of superiority and by right of conquest -Mexico seemed to be his; and, with what Burke described as "the generous -rapacity of the princely eagle," he proposed to take the chief share of -wealth, power, honor and pleasure, leaving to others the remnants of -these as a compensation for doing the work. It was a cardinal principle -with him that the masses could be ignored; and in 1844, having reduced -the Church to subservience and formed a combination with the military -and the financial men, based on a community of interest in exploiting -the national revenues, he deemed himself invulnerable, the more so -because the coterie of base flatterers that he loved to have about -him reflected this conviction. Of a true national uprising he had no -conception; and when this came, finding himself in the presence of a -power that amazed and overawed him, seeing his axioms disproved and his -pillars going down, he lost heart, and plunged from the zenith to the -nadir of his essentially emotional nature.[2.9] - -[HERRERA BECOMES PRESIDENT] - -Santa Anna's legal successor was General J. J. Herrera, president of -the council of state, a fair, pacific, reasonable and honest man; and -the new ministry commanded respect. For a time the halcyon days of -1825 returned. This was the first great popular movement since Mexico -had become independent. All had united in it, and therefore all were -in harmony; every one had assisted, and therefore every one felt an -agreeable expectation of reward. Factions laid down their arms. For -a few weeks all remembered they were Mexicans. But the situation was -extremely difficult. Santa Anna's constitution, which commanded no -respect because neither authorized by the people nor endorsed by good -results, was still in force. All who believed in his system, including -twenty thousand half-pay--or rather no-pay--officers, dissipated, hungry -and reckless, began at once to plot for his return or for some one of -the same kind to succeed him. Herrera's aim to introduce reforms, both -civil and military, gave great offence. Paredes, representing the Church -and the aristocracy, stood at the head of the main army, and soon showed -a disposition to hold aloof. Indeed every prominent man had a busily -scheming clique.[2.10] - -The correct course for the new President would have been to declare -for the constitution of 1824, and throw himself upon the Federalists; -but, fearing that such a step would excite a revolution, he adopted -the timid and hopeless policy of trying to balance one party against -another. Owing to fear of the army, though he knew he could not rely -upon it, he dared not organize militia; and before long a body of troops -were allowed to revolt with impunity. Soon, therefore, the government -had no prestige and no substantial backing. Every sort of a complaint -was made against it. The financial troubles became acute. Confusion and -uncertainty reigned, and the President was physically incapable of a -hard day's work.[2.10] - -In March a conspiracy that indicated an ominous combination of -Federalists and Santannistas came to light. In May, under strenuous -pressure from England and France, the government shrinkingly agreed -to recognize Texas if she would bind herself not to join the United -States; and this wise though tardy move brought an avalanche of abuse -upon it. In June the Federalists rose, but the affair was badly managed -and failed. Tornel, the arch-plotter, a general who never had a command, -was sent to the northern army; and other turbulent men were imprisoned. -But still the government merely drifted--blind, irresolute, vacillating, -moribund; and the general public looked on with complete indifference. -Going to sleep red and waking up green--for revolutions usually began at -night--was no longer a novelty.[2.10] - -In August the ministers resigned; "the chief offices of state were -begging in the streets," wrote the correspondent of the London _Times;_ -and the men who finally took them, while personally well enough, had -little strength and less prestige. By September the government stood -in hourly fear of a revolution; but so little booty could be seen, -that although the plots thickened, they were lazily developed, and -amounted to nothing. Paredes, the Santannistas and the Federalists -became constantly more threatening, however, and the administration -more and more afraid to take any step whatever, good or bad. Nobody -could guess what it would do to-day from what it did yesterday. The -anarchy of weakness constituted the government. A triumvirate of -Paredes, Tornel and Valencia was much talked of. Many prayed for some -respectable despot, many for a foreign prince; and some of the more -thoughtful suggested cautiously an American protectorate. "Sterile, -deplorably sterile" has been the movement against Santa Anna, exclaimed -the friendly _Siglo XIX_ in October, describing it as "a moment of -happy illusion." By this time the administration was powerless even at -the capital; and on November 30 _El Amigo del Pueblo_, an opposition -sheet, announced, "There is no government in Mexico." This, however, was -premature. Before the dénouement of this tragi-farce the United States -was to enter upon the scene; and as this new phase of the drama requires -to be prepared for, we must here leave Herrera, for a brief space, in -the midst of his difficulties.[2.10] - -[DEPLORABLE STATE OF MEXICO] - -Sterile indeed and most deplorable was the whole series of events that -we have now followed. One is glad to pass on; but let it be noted first -that while circumstances promoted, they did not produce it. The Mexicans -knew better, far better, than they acted. In 1824 the Constituent -Congress pointed out distinctly in a solemn address to the nation, that -without virtue liberal institutions would fail, revolution would follow -revolution, anarchy would ensue; and as time went on editors and orators -frequently traced the causes of Mexico's downfall in vivid and truthful -sentences. The trouble was that a great majority of those who might -have advanced her welfare preferred ease to effort, guile to wisdom, -self-indulgence to self-control, private advantage to the public weal, -partisan victory to national success; and naturally, in such a state -of things, the few honorable, public-spirited citizens could seldom -command a sufficient following to accomplish anything. Our leading -public men, said a contemporary, having been for one reason or another -contemptible, have learned to despise and distrust one another, and the -public, sick to death of their manoeuvres, have learned to despise and -distrust them all; yet such persons--demagogues and soldiers--were still -permitted to lead. Paper constitutions and paper laws, naturally of -little validity in the eyes of such a wilful, passionate race, had been -rendered by experience contemptible. - -For the consequences, if there be such a principle as national -responsibility, the people as a body were responsible; and so they -were for the results of this deplorable schooling as it affected the -relations between their country and ours. The inheritance from Spain had -been unfortunate, but there had been time enough to recover from it; and -instead of improving, the Mexicans had even degenerated.[2.11] - - - - - III - - THE RELATIONS BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND MEXICO - - 1825-1843 - - -In turning from the domestic to the foreign affairs of Mexico we must -beware of carrying prejudice with us. Our minds must be open to all -the facts, and see them exactly as they were. But it is right and even -necessary, for our guidance in interpreting these facts, to presume that -aliens, traditionally disliked by the Mexicans,[3.1] were treated -no more kindly, fairly and honestly than fellow-citizens; and the -evidence is conclusive that even the highest authorities were generally -unbusinesslike, often unjust or tricky, and on too many occasions -positively dishonorable in their dealings with foreigners.[3.2] - -Our first minister to Mexico, received there on June 1, 1825, was Joel -R. Poinsett. Apparently a better man for the office could not have been -chosen or even created; and the warm interest of the United States in -the cause of Spanish-American independence, our prompt recognition of -Mexico, and the fact that her political institutions had been modeled -upon ours, were additional auguries for the success of his mission. -But duty required him to stand for a Protestant power in a country -intensely Roman Catholic, to represent democracy where the dominant -element consisted of aristocrats hoping more or less generally for a -Bourbon king, to support Monroe's doctrine of America for the Americans -against the strength of Europe and the European affiliations of Mexico, -to vindicate the equal position of the United States where Great Britain -had established a virtual protectorate, to insist upon full commercial -privileges when the Spanish-American states favored mutual concessions, -and to antagonize other influences possessing no little strength.[3.3] - -[FRICTION BETWEEN THE TWO COUNTRIES] - -His only feasible course was to affiliate with men of the popular, -democratic, Federalist party. Largely through his advice they abandoned -their plan of rebelling, placed their confidence in organization and the -ballot, and so gained the ascendency. They soon fell into excesses of -their own, however, which they were glad to charge against a Protestant -and foreigner; all the other elements antagonized by him joined in the -accusations; envy of the recognized prosperity of the United States -assisted; and in the end he came to be almost universally denounced -by the Mexicans as the diabolical agent of a jealous, hypocritical, -designing government.[3.3] - -Of course, the Poinsett affair planted a root of bitterness in the -United States. Our national authorities could but protest against the -attacks upon our minister that were made by state legislatures in -contempt of all diplomatic usage, against the neglect of the Mexican -Executive to shield him, and against the general attitude of distrust -and ill-will exhibited by that country. Indeed, our government fully -believed that baseless popular clamor had been permitted to exert "a -sinister influence" against the Americans in its councils, and pointedly -informed Guerrero that unless "a marked change" in the temper of his -administration should "speedily" occur, a collision might result; and -of course the people of the United States could not fail to notice the -abusive and even ferocious treatment accorded to our representative, -against whom no charges were made by the Mexican government, and to -resent still more keenly the insults that were lavished upon the -character and purposes of the American nation. The fact that Poinsett -continued to be an important factor in our public life, even becoming -a member of the Cabinet at a later day, tended to emphasize these -feelings, both official and popular.[3.4] - -Besides all this, official work of his added to the irritation in both -countries. As one of his principal duties, he was instructed to make -a treaty reaffirming the boundary agreed upon with Spain in 1819, or, -if he could, buy a portion at least of Texas. The proposal that our -neighbor should sell us territory has been called by partisan writers -in the United States, insulting, but as we have made purchases from -Spain, France, Russia and Mexico herself, this accusation is evidently -unwarranted. On the other hand the suggestion was reasonable. We for -our part desired the land, aside from its intrinsic value, as a needed -protection to New Orleans and the Mississippi; and Mexico not only -appeared to misprize it, but could have strengthened herself somewhat by -letting it go. Later it became a fashion with her public men to declaim -about its preciousness and beauty; but as late as 1836, according to -Santa Anna himself, many officials did not know where Texas was or what -nation claimed it. Mexico had ten times the area she could people, and -what she needed in that quarter was the means of shielding her northern -settlements from the Indians. Moreover, under contracts already made, -Texas was filling up with men who, as President Victoria saw in 1825, -were not at all likely to assimilate with the Mexicans; and since it was -recognized that a mistake had been made in admitting such colonists, -it might well have seemed the part of wisdom to cut off the infected -section before it should set an example of dissatisfaction, and perhaps -cause trouble also with the United States.[3.5] - -Poinsett, accordingly, taking the matter up in July, 1825, stated -frankly that the treaty of 1819 was recognized by his country as -binding, but expressed a desire to lay it aside, and fix upon a more -satisfactory line. This pleased Victoria and Alamán, for they imagined -they could push the boundary eastward almost to the Mississippi, but -in spite of Poinsett's urgency and his dropping the plan to extend our -territory, a long delay followed. At last, however, on January 12, -1828, a treaty of limits reaffirming the agreement with Spain was duly -signed. In the course of April it reached Washington and was ratified. -On the last day of the month our secretary of state notified the Mexican -representative that he was ready to exchange ratifications, and reminded -him that under the terms of the instrument this would have to be done -by May 12; but Obregón was not prepared to act, and for that reason the -treaty failed.[3.6] - -Yet the Mexicans not only held that the United States caused the -miscarriage in order to prosecute designs upon Texas, but charged -officially as well as on the street, with neither evidence nor -plausibility in favor of the accusation, that our minister stole the -paper--entrusted to him on May 10 for transmission--which would have -authorized Obregón to exchange the ratifications. So we had in 1830 this -extraordinary picture: on the one hand, the United States earnestly -desiring the prosperity and friendship of Mexico, and pursuing a just -and sympathetic policy towards her; and, on the other, Mexico accusing -us of hostile intentions and the basest arts. From that day on, -everything we did was viewed with a jaundiced eye.[3.6] - -The treaty of limits was, however, revived by fresh negotiations, and -in April, 1832, went into effect. By its terms a joint commission to -run the line had to be appointed within a year from this date, and -presently Mexico received notice, both at her own capital and at ours, -that an American commissioner had been named; but she paid no attention -to the matter, and the year expired. Our minister was then directed -to negotiate a new agreement, labored for more than twelve months, -and finally, by addressing strong language personally to the acting -President, carried the point. Yet the United States was officially -denounced for endeavoring--and by wretched artifices--to delay the -fixing of the boundary.[3.7] - -Meanwhile a treaty of amity and commerce, proposed by Poinsett at -about the same time as the treaty of limits, had been pursuing a -checkered career, though a similar agreement between Mexico and England -went rapidly through. At one stage of the proceedings the Mexican -plenipotentiaries kept our minister entirely in the dark about an -important concession made to Great Britain, falsely assuring him that -equally favorable terms were offered to this country. Indeed, Victoria -showed a strong disposition to block the business altogether. July 10, -1826, however, the negotiators reached an agreement, but it did not -prove satisfactory to the American Senate. A second treaty signed in -February, 1828, did not please the Congress of Mexico, and was properly -rejected. At a later date negotiations were again resumed; but in 1831 -that body held the matter in abeyance for more than nine months. At -last, one day before the session was to close, our minister gave notice -that unless the treaty were concluded, he would leave the country. The -government at Washington also exerted some pressure by insisting that -the two matters should fare alike, and postponing the re-ratification of -the treaty of limits; and consequently both treaties became law at the -same time, April 5, 1832. Yet for nearly a year the commercial treaty -was not promulgated by Mexico; and hence, though her citizens residing -in the United States could have the benefit of it, Americans in Mexico -could not, for the local authorities with whom it was necessary to deal -declared they had no knowledge of such an agreement.[3.8] - -Toward the close of 1829 Guerrero, as a desperate throw for popularity, -asked for the recall of Poinsett, merely saying that public opinion -demanded it; and then for about six years the United States had as its -representative a friend of Jackson's named Anthony Butler, whose only -qualifications for the post were an acquaintance with Texas and a strong -desire to see the United States obtain it. In brief, he was a national -disgrace. Besides having been through bankruptcy more than once, if we -may believe the Mexican minister at Washington, and having a financial -interest in the acquisition of this Mexican territory, he was personally -a bully and swashbuckler, ignorant at first of the Spanish language -and even the forms of diplomacy, shamefully careless about legation -affairs, wholly unprincipled as to methods, and, by the testimony of two -American consuls, openly scandalous in his conduct. One virtue, to be -sure, according to his own account he possessed: he never drank spirits; -but one learns of this with regret, for an overdose of alcohol would -sometimes be a welcome excuse for him.[3.9] - -His particular business was to obtain as much of Texas as possible, an -enterprise that lay close to Jackson's heart; and he began by visiting -the province--about whose loyalty and relations with the United States -much concern was already felt at Mexico--when on the way to his post. -This promise of indiscretion in office was admirably fulfilled. -Maintaining a hold on our President by positive assurances of success, -he loafed, schemed, made overtures, threatened, was ignored, rebuffed, -snubbed and cajoled, fancied he could outplay or buy the astute and -hostile Alamán, tried to do "underworking" with Pedraza, plotted bribery -with one Hernández, the confessor of Santa Anna's sister, grossly -violated his conciliatory instructions by engaging in a truculent -personal affair with Tornel, and was finally, after ceasing to represent -us, ordered out of the country. In short he succeeded only in proving -that we had for minister a cantankerous, incompetent rascal, in making -it appear that our government was eager to obtain Mexican territory, -and in suggesting--though explicitly and repeatedly ordered to eschew -all equivocal methods--that we felt no scruples as to means. On the -ground of Butler's connection with disaffected Texas, Mexico politely -asked for his recall near the close of 1835, and in December Powhatan -Ellis, born a Virginian but now a federal judge in Mississippi, was -appointed chargé d'affaires.[3.10] - -[THE TEXAN REVOLUTION] - -A few months later Texas broke away from the mother-country, and her -former lords felt sure that from beginning to end, in the colonization, -rebellion and successful defence of that region, the hand of the -American government could plainly enough be seen. Their state of feeling -seemed to Butler "a perfect tempest of passion," and Ellis believed -that the Cabinet of Mexico discussed seriously the question of an open -rupture with the United States. The Mexican view, however, although -supported by a section of the American public, was radically incorrect. -Essentially the migration of our citizens across the Sabine formed a -part of the great movement that peopled the Mississippi valley. The -causes of the Texan rebellion were provided by Mexico herself. That -step actually crossed the wish and aims of our administration, which -desired to buy the province--not see it become an independent country. -From the very first, our national authorities proclaimed and endeavored -to enforce neutrality; and they gave the Texans no assistance in their -struggle for independence. The British minister at Mexico expressed the -opinion to Santa Anna that our government had done all that could be -expected, and all that lay in its power; and Santa Anna did not venture -to deny this. Individual Americans and sometimes Americans in groups -did, it is true, contribute materially to aid the cause of Texas; but -in most cases their action was entirely lawful, while in the others it -could not be prevented. Moreover, these few trespasses against the law -of neutrality were in substance only just retribution for the tyranny, -misgovernment and atrocities of Mexico. In reality, therefore, our -skirts were as clear as reasonably could have been expected.[3.11] - -One phase of the case, however, which excited special indignation -at Mexico, requires notice. Two streams from the north send their -waters into Sabine Lake, and it was held by some that either of these -could be regarded as the Sabine River and, therefore, as marking the -boundary. In October, 1833, Butler urged that we insist upon the western -stream, commonly called the Neches, and occupy in force the valuable -intermediate region, which included Nacogdoches; and for a time Jackson -felt inclined to do so. Near the close of 1835 Mexico was officially -warned against encroaching upon our territory while fighting the -Texans, and suspected that Secretary of State Forsyth took this action -with a view to the Nacogdoches district. She therefore became alarmed, -and early in 1836 a special minister hastily set out for Washington -to investigate the matter. This minister was Manuel E. de Gorostiza, -a witty, agreeable man of the world, Mexican by birth, Spanish by -education, the author of some clever dramas, but not professionally a -topographer, a lawyer or even a diplomat.[3.12] - -[BOUNDARY DIFFICULTIES] - -Then a delicate matter became suddenly menacing. On both sides of the -Sabine there were Indians, who loved war, whisky and plunder as much -as they hated work and the whites. A paper boundary, particularly one -in dispute, meant nothing to them. Once roused, they were practically -sure, as Gorostiza admitted, to rob and murder wherever they could; -and not only the fighting in Texas but at least one Mexican emissary -enkindled their passions. United States Indians crossed the line and -perpetrated outrages. Homes were abandoned. People fled panic-stricken -from the vicinity of Nacogdoches; citizens of the town implored American -protection against our own Indians; and evidence of an incipient -conflagration was placed in the hands of General E. P. Gaines, who -commanded our troops on the border.[3.12] Now the treaty of amity -required each country to prevent its Indians from ravaging the other; -but, as Mexico did not wish us at this time to keep our savages -from harassing the Texans, and did not request us to act for her in -fulfilling her pledge, which she could not fulfil herself, possibly -the treaty, though often cited by the United States, had technically -no direct bearing. But the American government argued rightly that -substance was more important than form; that the intent of the treaty -was to require both countries to prevent "by all the means in their -power" an Indian war on the frontier; that it was the paramount duty -of the Executive to protect our people, who, as Gorostiza virtually -admitted, were liable to be endangered by the threatened conflagration; -that as it was known to be physically impossible for Mexico to comply -with the treaty, she could not complain of us for doing what she had -agreed ought to be done, and had undertaken to do; that, should it be -necessary to cross what had been commonly assumed to be the boundary -in order to perform our duty--particularly in order to prevent our own -Indians from perpetrating outrages on the other side--common sense and -the spirit of the treaty warranted our doing it; and that, on account -of the distance to the Sabine, it was necessary to give the general -commanding there a certain credence and a certain discretion. Our -government could have reasoned also, and very likely it did, that the -strong desire of the Texans, _de facto_ successors to the Mexicans in -that region, that we should fulfil the obligation which the treaty -created, was an additional ground for so doing.[3.12] - -Accordingly Gaines, while ordered with strong emphasis to maintain a -rigid neutrality, was authorized to advance as far as Nacogdoches--an -excellent point from which to defend the American frontier and prevent -our Indians from operating beyond it--should such a step seem positively -necessary; and then, as measures of precaution, Forsyth not only -explained our views and intentions personally to Gorostiza, but made -in writing what that minister himself described as a "frank and noble" -statement, saying that the occupation of the intermediate region, should -it occur, would be temporary and for the sole purpose indicated, and -would have no significance in regard to the boundary question.[3.12] - -Apparently satisfied by the directness and candor of this policy, -Gorostiza at first admitted the right of the United States to enter -Texas in order to punish actual or prevent intended outrages, and -thus conceded that the frontier could be crossed without offence. But -apparently, when he had taken leave of the secretary of state, his -distrust returned, and his Mexican subtlety imagined all sorts of ugly -possibilities. It disturbed him that Forsyth did not formally commit -himself, in advance of a survey, against the Neches claim. It alarmed -him to find that the state department could not give him early and exact -information as to Gaines's movements in a remote, unsettled region. -He felt angry that Lewis Cass, who was secretary of war but of course -had no control over our foreign relations, looked upon Nacogdoches -as American territory. Various other things also appeared to him -suspicious, when really his lack of judgment was the chief or only -reason. Most important of all, no doubt, he thought of public opinion -in Mexico, which was entirely unacquainted with American directness -as exemplified by Forsyth, intensely suspicious of us, and intensely -hostile.[3.12] - -[DIPLOMATIC CLASHES] - -He retracted, therefore, as much as possible of his concurrence, opened -a war of notes upon our state department, and near the end of the year -1836, on learning from the secretary that in spite of his objections -American troops had gone to Nacogdoches, demanded his passports, and -left our shores in wrath. His conduct in so doing was officially -endorsed by his government, and anti-American feeling in that country -became deeper and hotter than before. Nothing could be seen there except -that "sacred" soil claimed and long occupied by Mexico, though now out -of her control, had been profaned by Gaines's troops, and thus, as all -Mexicans argued, the way opened for limitless aggressions. To make the -case even worse, it was erroneously believed that Houston's victory at -San Jacinto had really been gained by troops then in the service of the -United States, and it was said that we were preparing to attack Mexico -very soon by sea and by land.[3.12] - -Our recognition of Texas, which occurred early in 1837, was entirely in -line with our previous action in similar cases, was less prompt than our -recognition of Mexico herself had been, and seemed not only warranted -but required by the circumstances. That republic had a government in -operation which appeared to be competent, and was thought likely to -endure. Santa Anna, the President of Mexico, admitted that she could not -hope to gain control of the revolted province, even should its troops -be vanquished in the field, and expressed a desire that we should open -the way to a settlement of the controversy by granting recognition. -After 1836, as the Mexican minister of war stated eight years later, -there was no serious talk of attempting to subdue Texas. At the date of -recognition, since war between us and Mexico seemed almost inevitable, -there appeared to be no great need of considering her susceptibilities; -and it was feared that England entertained certain designs, unfavorable -to us, regarding Texas, which could be defeated or at least hindered by -taking this action. As Mexico was totally unable to protect American -vessels in the port of Galveston, we had to establish relations with the -power that could do so, or else conduct an important part of our trade -under hazardous conditions; and no commercial nation willingly accepts -the second alternative in such a case. Finally, the leading powers of -Europe endorsed our course by doing the same thing before any material -change in the situation occurred.[3.13] - -Mexico, however, would see none of these facts. Our earliest moves -toward recognition were looked upon by her, said the British minister, -"as the consummation of a design long since entertained" to rob her -of that valuable territory, and excited, as he remarked, a "bitter -animosity" that no explanation could even mitigate; and our formal -action became one more standing ground of complaint and wrath against -the government and people of the United States.[3.13] - -In 1842 Mexican feeling was intensified. At this time Santa Anna -thought it advisable to rekindle the Texan war, now virtually dormant -for six years. Very likely he did not wish to let the case go by -default; naturally his recollections of Texan hospitality moved him to -reciprocate; and in all probability he believed that any prospect of -fighting Texas or the United States in the name of national honor would -help to make his autocratic military rule more acceptable. Accordingly, -several annoying though ineffective raids beyond the Rio Grande -occurred, and a serious invasion was threatened. Upon this, many Texan -sympathizers in the Unites States and many who thought they saw England -supporting the Mexican operations, held meetings, contributed funds, and -even migrated to Texas with guns on their shoulders, all of which they -could legally do.[3.14] - -In pursuance of Santa Anna's policy--probably also to gratify the strong -and universal sentiment of his fellow-citizens, aid the anti-Texas and -anti-administration party in the United States, neutralize perhaps the -good understanding between the United States and England resulting -from the settlement of our northeastern boundary, and possibly gain -the sympathy not only of Great Britain, but of her friend Louis -Philippe--Bocanegra, the minister of relations, now declared war -upon us in the field of diplomacy. May 12, 1842, he addressed Daniel -Webster, then secretary of state, directly, protesting against the -aid given Texas by our citizens, and asking whether the United States -could injure Mexico any more, if openly at war against her. "Certainly -not," he said, in reply to his own question. Then he issued a circular -to the diplomatic corps at Mexico, in which he charged our government -with tolerating aggressions made upon Mexican territory by "subaltern -and local authorities," and announced that while his country did not -wish to fight the United States, she would certainly do all that was -"imperatively required for her honor and dignity." Still not satisfied, -he wrote again to Webster, though an answer to the first letter was -not yet due, accusing the American Cabinet itself of "conduct openly -at variance with the most sacred principles of the law of nations and -the solemn compacts of amity existing between the two countries," and -threatening that a continuance of this policy would be regarded as "a -positive act of hostility."[3.14] - -In reply to Bocanegra's first despatch, Webster said that the American -government utterly denied and repelled the charges made against it, and -then with characteristic power he discussed and refuted them. We shall -still maintain neutrality, he concluded, "but the continuance of amity -with Mexico cannot be purchased at any higher rate." To Bocanegra's -second letter his reply was no less positive but a great deal briefer. -The President, he wrote, considers the language and tone of that -communication "highly offensive," and orders "that no other answer be -given to it than the declaration that the conduct of the Government of -the United States, in regard to the war between Mexico and Texas, having -been always hitherto governed by a strict and impartial regard to its -neutral obligations, will not be changed or altered in any respect or in -any degree."[3.14] - -This compelled Mexico, as the British minister observed, to accept the -rebuke invited by her imprudent language or begin hostilities. The -former course was chosen; and Bocanegra humbly replied that, relying -upon Webster's "frank declaration" of neutrality, he would not dwell -further upon the subject. Even before Webster was heard from, our -minister described the state of feeling at Mexico as "most bitter"; -and such a correspondence, disagreeable enough to Mexican pride, tended -naturally to bring the two countries nearer to the tented field. -Richtofen, the Prussian envoy at Mexico, said that Bocanegra's note led -to a distinctly hostile state of things. At one time the President of -the United States did not see how war could be avoided; and the Mexican -press did about all it could to create a fighting temper.[3.14] - -An opera bouffe sequel followed. Commodore T. A. C. Jones, lying at -Callao with our Pacific squadron, received some of Bocanegra's effusions -from the American consul at Mazatlán, who added that war seemed "highly -probable." Jones could not believe that a responsible minister would -write so fiercely unless prepared for a conflict, and he felt sure the -United States would not flinch. Anxious to provide a port of refuge for -American vessels, alarmed lest England should now obtain California -under some arrangement with Mexico, as she was thought ready to do, and -satisfied that hostilities would actually break out before he could -reach that coast, he sailed promptly and arrived at Monterey on October -19. Being a rather self-sufficient and hasty person, he investigated -the matter there in but a superficial manner, and the next day politely -occupied the town. He now found that war had not begun; and upon this, -after hauling down his flag and saluting that of Mexico, he sailed -away, while General Micheltorena, the governor, thundered grandiloquent -language at him from a safe distance. Naturally the authorities at -Mexico flared up at this episode; but they soon found that no charge -could be made against our government, and, realizing presently with our -minister's aid that the longest finger pointed toward Bocanegra and the -loudest laugh was at Micheltorena, they willingly allowed the matter to -fade away. It therefore sharpened Mexican hostility far less than might -have been expected, yet no doubt considerably.[3.15] - -Meanwhile fresh trouble arose. The continuance of nominal war between -Mexico and Texas and the constant danger of raids interfered seriously -with our commercial interests. Near the end of June, 1842, therefore, -the American secretary of state, hoping to influence the government of -Mexico, observed to our minister that the war was "not only useless, -but hopeless, without attainable object, injurious to both parties -and likely to be, in its continuance, annoying and vexatious to other -commercial nations"; and this line of policy was followed up in January, -1843. Indeed, Webster gave notice that a formal protest would very -likely be made, unless the state of war should be ended or respectable -forces take the field.[3.14] - -Naturally these remonstrances, however proper, gave much offence; -and the translation of John Quincy Adams's brilliant speech at -Braintree, Massachusetts, which made an eloquent but mistaken attack -upon the American administration, gave the newspapers of Mexico a -fresh opportunity and fresh reason to ventilate their suspicions of -us. A merciless warfare upon Texas was now announced; and Santa Anna -decreed in June, 1843, that all foreigners taken in arms on Texan soil -should be executed. In reply to this, our secretary of state declared -that American citizens could not be prevented from serving abroad, -as Frenchmen and Germans had served in our own revolutionary armies; -and that, if captured in Texas, they must be treated as prisoners of -war. "On this point," he insisted, "there can be no concession or -compromise."[3.14] - -[AMERICAN GRIEVANCES] - -Here our point of view must be shifted. So far we have mainly been -concerned with complaints on the part of Mexico, and it will be admitted -that in those affairs the United States did not materially injure her -in any unlawful way, and exhibited no malicious intentions. We must now -take up certain American grievances; and first in order may be mentioned -the summary execution of twenty-two of our citizens in 1835. Under the -revolutionist Mejía they had left the United States for Texas, but they -were conducted to Tampico and there were captured. The minister of -relations asserted that they were duly tried, and simply experienced the -rigor of the law; but our minister ascertained that no trial took place. -In spite of international law and treaty stipulations the government -ordered them shot, and shot they were--officially murdered. At the edge -of the grave eighteen of them signed a denial, their "dying words," that -any intention to invade Mexico had existed in their minds.[3.16] - -Next may come the systematic endeavor of Mexico, even after signing the -treaty of amity and commerce, to hinder our people from crossing the -boundary, and in particular to keep them out of Texas. Article III of -the treaty said: "The citizens of the two countries shall have liberty -to enter into the same, and to remain and reside in any part of said -territories, respectively." All Mexicans were offered the full benefit -of this agreement in the United States; but a Mexican law, revived by -decree on April 4, 1837, with evident reference to our people, read -thus: "Foreigners are prohibited from settling in those States and -territories of the Confederacy which border on the territories of their -own nations." This was done on the ground that political mischief was -liable to result from their presence. Now some allowance is to be made -for this view. But in reality all international relations involve -danger, and the country that fears it should use precautions. American -sailors make trouble in French ports, but France does not refuse them -admission--she appoints policemen. The danger from Americans in Texas -was doubtless greater, but so were the advantages to be derived from -their coming. Had Mexico governed that region well, their presence -would have benefited her immensely; and to make a treaty sanctioning -foreign intercourse, and then endeavor to keep the main avenue of that -intercourse barred, in order to avoid the legitimate results of her own -misgovernment, was an international system decidedly more novel than -friendly, more ingenious than straightforward.[3.17] - -In April, 1840, under a verbal order from the governor of upper -California, a considerable number of peaceable Americans and other -foreigners, residing at scattered points, were suddenly arrested in a -brutal and even bloody manner on the pretext of a conspiracy, and their -property was confiscated. Even the possession of legal passports did -not protect them. After suffering inhuman treatment, they were sent in -irons to Mexico. There only the charity of strangers preserved their -lives; and at length, after marching under blows and with bleeding feet -as far as Tepic, they were thrust into prisons. No doubt they were rough -in character and behavior, and the presence of such bold, vigorous -foreigners in a weakly governed region obviously involved some dangers; -but they had rights. No evidence justifying the treatment they received -was brought forward, and the government at Mexico, even while ordering -them expelled from the country without compensation, admitted the -illegality of their arrest. Finally, as the British minister demanded, -they were permitted to go home; but Mexico failed to bear the expense of -their journey, as she had promised to do, and paid but a slight, if any, -indemnity. Such conduct when she had millions for the army, the civil -wars and the pockets of officials, was inexcusable. Justly enough this -affair excited the deep indignation of our government and people.[3.18] - -In June, 1841, a Texan expedition set out for Santa Fe, hoping to -bring about the incorporation of New Mexico in the new republic, but -not planning under any circumstances to make war; and a considerable -number of Americans--among them Kendall, editor of the New Orleans -_Picayune_--joined the caravan with commercial or other peaceable -aims. After a while the entire body were made prisoners by the Mexican -governor. Kendall's passport, when duly exhibited under a flag of truce, -was taken from him; and, although the utmost penalty incurred under -Mexican law by the non-combatant Americans was expulsion, they were -driven with instances of extreme brutality to Mexico, and compelled -to work in chains on public roads. For one reason or another a few of -our citizens gained their freedom from time to time; but it was not -until well on in 1842--and then as an act of condescension instead of -justice--that Santa Anna released the main body of them. Of course this -country felt highly incensed again; and the Executive, while disclaiming -all desire to screen Americans from any deserved punishment, ordered our -minister to protest against the treatment of the prisoners, declaring -that Mexico would be required to observe the rules prescribed by modern -public law. On the other side of the Rio Grande still more passion was -aroused, but in the opposite sense.[3.19] - -Beginning in a humble way, a caravan trade between St. Louis, Santa -Fe and Chihuahua grew to large proportions, and eventually interested -even the New York and Philadelphia merchants; but this commerce, though -sanctioned by treaty, was looked upon by Mexico with disfavor from -the very first. Excessive taxes were imposed at the frontier and at -Chihuahua; and finally, in August, 1843, Santa Anna arbitrarily locked -the door. Possibly there was a baseless notion that political designs -upon New Mexico were entertained in the United States; competition with -native traders may have been feared; and it was charged that smuggling -occurred. But competition and smuggling are unavoidable features of -international commerce; and if they afforded an adequate reason for -disregarding a formal agreement, international trade arrangements would -not be worth making. Our citizens and government objected therefore -vigorously and with justice to Santa Anna's course.[3.20] - -One week after this decree went forth, another prohibited the -importation of certain specified articles at any point, and ordered the -forfeiture of such merchandise, already in the hands of dealers, if not -sold within the ensuing twelve months. The list of articles, printed -solidly in small type, filled nearly an octavo page, and apparently was -intended to include almost everything embraced in our trade with Mexico. -Peculiarly harsh seemed the forfeiture provision. Not only was it _ex -post facto_, but our traders by paying the duty had become entitled to -the privilege of selling their goods; and the American secretary of -state could do no less than protest against the law, as "a manifest -violation of the liberty of trade secured by the treaty." Yet something -still more serious followed it, for aliens were soon prohibited from -doing retail business at all. An attempt was made to defend this order -on the ground that Americans residing in the country were subject to its -laws, usages and statutes; but our government replied that a treaty must -be regarded as the supreme law, and that if one solemn agreement with -Mexico could thus be made a nullity, all the other privileges accorded -us could one by one be abrogated.[3.21] - -These commercial grievances, however, were trifles compared with -another of the same halcyon period. In July, 1843, Tornel, the -minister of war, instructed the governors of California and three -other northern departments to expel all citizens of the United States -residing therein, and permit no more of them to enter. Extraordinary -precautions were taken to keep this measure secret, and Waddy Thompson, -our representative at Mexico, first learned of it on December 23. Four -times he inquired in vain whether such an order had been issued; but -when he demanded his passports, Bocanegra attempted to justify Tornel's -instructions, arguing that every government is authorized to protect -itself against seditious aliens. This was an evasion, for the order had -reference to all Americans, however law-abiding. The outcome was that -now, after the order had been in force almost six months and after it -had been executed in at least one department, directions were given -to make it include all foreigners, and apply only to the seditious. -Thompson, strongly disposed to please the Mexicans, accepted this as -satisfactory; but his country did not, for the governors had authority -still to decide what Americans were dangerous, and expel these without -a trial. Besides, even the modified order required them to prevent our -citizens from entering their jurisdictions, and thus plainly violated -the treaty.[3.22] - -All of the grievances thus far mentioned bore directly upon the general -government of Mexico, but there were also many others, primarily -chargeable to minor authorities, in which our national rights were -seriously attacked;[3.23] and next we reach the question of "American -claims"--that is to say, private injuries for which damages were asked. -At once the idea occurs to us that perhaps our citizens brought their -troubles upon themselves by peculiarly obnoxious conduct. This does not -appear likely to have been the rule, however, for the British, although -the Mexicans felt anxious to have their goodwill and assistance, -complained loudly and long, and their government protested in the most -emphatic and sweeping style. Indeed, said Ashburnham, the chargé of -England: "There is scarcely one foreign power with whom they have had -any relation, which has not had more or less cause to complain of the -iniquity and persecution to which its subjects here have been exposed;" -and France, though her claims were much smaller than ours, took up arms -on this account. Bearing in mind, then, how peculiarly inimical were the -people and authorities of Mexico toward us, one can readily imagine what -sort of treatment citizens of ours had to endure.[3.24] - -[THE AMERICAN CLAIMS] - -In the next place one desires to be sure whether our actual claims were -real or, as some American and Mexican writers have asserted, were simply -"trumped-up." That a few of the less important ones had no basis is -apparently true, but it must be remembered that our government was bound -to consider any case resting on _prima facie_ support, and ask for -an investigation. It could not, like the Mexican authorities, examine -the records necessary for the detection of all mistakes and frauds. -Moreover, the existence of unfounded claims, if such there were, does -not matter to us, for the real question is merely whether substantial -sums were justly demanded. On that point one immediately reflects, not -only that our national authorities were scarcely capable of conspiring -with skippers and traders to pick the pocket of Mexico, but that, had -they been silly enough to present a list of imaginary claims, her -quick-witted if not profound officials would have delighted to analyze -and expose the frauds. Coming then to the question, one can answer it -positively in the affirmative. Both national and international tribunals -decided that we had well-founded and substantial claims.[3.25] - -It has been urged, however, that our demands required very difficult -and extensive investigations, which in the midst of her embarrassments -Mexico could not reasonably be expected to enter upon; but many, if not -most, of the claims were in fact simple.[3.26] It has been insisted -that as aggrieved Mexicans in the United States appealed to our courts, -the proper policy for aggrieved Americans was to appeal to the courts -of Mexico;[3.27] but the assumed analogy did not exist. The Mexican -tribunals, in addition to being notoriously bad from every point of -view, were sometimes deliberately used to perpetrate iniquities, and -could not always enforce their fair decisions.[3.28] - -American writers have also argued that it was contemptible for a strong -and rich nation like ours to demand money from a poor neighbor; but -the extent of our national resources had no bearing on the rights of -individual citizens, crippled or impoverished by Mexican injustice. -This, however, is by no means all that should be said. The wisdom -and the equity of the civilized world are embodied in its laws, and -those laws agree that one's debts are to be paid. Spendthrifts are not -exempted from the effects of this rule, and the poverty of the Mexican -treasury was due not only to carelessness but also to crime. Moreover, -if an amiable, "_siempre-alegre_" young man borrows without repaying, -wastes his substance in riotous living, and perpetrates outrages on the -passers-by, it is the duty of some creditor to bring him before the -courts, and convince him in a practical manner that, as a member of -civilized society, he is accountable for his acts. The same principle -holds of international relations. "All political communities are -responsible to other political communities for their conduct," wrote -Canning to the Spanish government; Webster enunciated the same rule; -and it was not only the right but the duty of the United States--as a -fellow nation, a sister republic and a next neighbor--to bring Mexico -to her senses by teaching her what membership in the family of nations -involved. Had this been done at the beginning of her wild career, -she might have put her house in order before bad practices became -habitual.[3.29] - -Again, we shall presently find good reasons to believe, that had -Mexico fairly examined our claims and frankly stated her financial -difficulties, a lenient arrangement regarding what were after all -moderate sums for a nation to pay could readily have been made. Further -still, if Mexico was too poor to discharge her debts promptly, it -was incumbent upon her, besides recognizing them, to show a certain -appreciation of the indulgence accorded her; but instead of so doing she -continued to harass American citizens, and showed, as we shall find, -a distinct lack of good-will and even of straightforwardness in her -dealings with us. - -Finally, it has been repeated over and over again by American and -Mexican writers that our claims were urged aggressively. But the history -of the matter does not read in that way. Our demands for redress began -early in Poinsett's day. In October, 1829, Butler was directed to lay -them before the Mexican government, but at the same time to avoid -"anything like menace or defiance." Morning after morning his table was -covered with fresh American remonstrances against official conduct, -he reported, and for years his efforts met only with rebuffs; yet -his instructions were still to maintain amicable relations, and our -government set him the example.[3.30] - -[OUR CLAIMS CONSIDERATELY URGED] - -In June, 1836, Ellis reported that "daily" acts of "injustice and -oppression" continued to be perpetrated, while every application for -redress was treated with "cold neglect"; yet the next month he was -merely instructed to "make a fresh appeal" to the "sense of honor and -justice" of the Mexican government, asking that our grievances "should -be promptly and properly examined" and "suitable" redress be afforded. -In order, however, to check what the British minister called "their -usual system of evasion," a satisfactory reply of some kind within -three weeks was to be required, and should it not be made without -"unnecessary" delay, Ellis, after giving a fortnight's notice, was to -withdraw. In October Monasterio, after delaying for weeks to answer -Ellis, admitted that his predecessors had neglected this business, and -promised he would give his first attention to our claims, many of which, -as we know, were very simple, very old and very familiar to the foreign -office; but his reply, the following month, was mere evasion. Why, asked -Ellis, have not the claims presented during the past ten years been -either accepted or rejected? But the mystery was not explained, and at -the end of December, 1836--after waiting, not three weeks, but three -months--he withdrew. Meanwhile Gorostiza distributed among the diplomats -at Washington a pamphlet in which he accused our government of grossly -dishonorable conduct in regard to Texas; and the unqualified approval -of his superiors turned this impropriety into a grave international -issue.[3.31] - -President Jackson had originally felt most sympathetic toward Mexico; -and although Butler and Ellis agreed that indulgence was a mistaken -policy, and her official journal described all Americans as villains -and all our claims as the pretexts of smugglers, yet in a Message of -December, 1836, Jackson recommended courtesy and great forbearance. The -evasions practised upon Ellis, however, and still more the approval of -Gorostiza's insulting pamphlet, sharpened his feelings, and early in -February, 1837, he laid the subject of our claims anew before Congress, -as it was his right and his duty to do, proposed to make the next demand -for settlement from the deck of a warship, and asked for authority to -undertake reprisals in case that step also should prove ineffectual. In -the official view of Mexico, Gaines's advance and Gorostiza's withdrawal -from Washington amounted to a formal rupture, even though Castillo, her -ordinary representative, lingered in the United States until March; and -in our own official opinion the endorsement of Gorostiza's conduct, the -refusal to examine our claims, and the return of Ellis could signify -hardly less. Under such circumstances Jackson's February Message was -perfectly normal and proper.[3.32] - -Congress took substantially the same view as the Executive; but -there was some fear of Mexican privateers, a good deal of pity for a -sister republic supposed to be the victim of circumstances, a little -unwillingness to increase Jackson's power, a pronounced wish to comply -exactly with the treaty of amity, which required formal notice in -advance of hostilities, and considerable hope that Santa Anna, who had -now been restored alive to his country through the magnanimity of the -Texans and the Americans, would reciprocate by endeavoring to adjust -our claims. Another consideration, however, was probably still more -potent. The administration party felt that should war be declared, the -opposition would say its real object was the acquisition of Texas; and -so Jackson's well-known desire to obtain that region prevented in large -measure, instead of causing, an outbreak of hostilities. It was decided, -therefore, to make the final demand for redress in a peaceful manner, -and to show full respect for what the House of Representatives described -as our "ancient, though now estranged, friend."[3.33] - -In March, 1837, Van Buren became President, and found it necessary to -take some action. The documents bearing on our claims were critically -examined; fifty-seven cases, apparently free from doubt, were made out -and proved; and in July, Robert Greenhow, interpreter of the state -department, presented them at Mexico with a final demand for redress, -adding that we had no desire to cause embarrassment by pressing for -payment. On one point, however, he insisted: Gorostiza's conduct must -be disavowed. The minister of relations admitted in reply that certain -of the cases did not require long examination, which was indeed true; -but he said the President, while "most anxious" not to cause delay, -wished that "each" of them should be examined "in its turn" and that -"nothing should be left undone" which could promote "the most speedy and -equitable" settlement.[3.34] - -In November Martínez, a new minister to the United States, whom we -received kindly even though Gorostiza's action had not been disavowed, -presented the answer of his government. Instead of the document -officially transmitted by Greenhow, an obsolete, incomplete and -necessarily inaccurate list of our claims, obtained nobody knows how, -had been used; only four of our fifty-seven living cases had even been -considered; and not one of these had been disposed of. Accordingly, -when our Congress assembled in December, 1837, the Executive laid the -whole subject before it anew, analyzed Mexico's evasive reply--so -different from what had been solemnly promised--announced that fresh -outrages of a serious and exasperating sort had been committed, and -plainly intimated that no hope of a peaceful settlement could be -entertained. Evidently the patience of the United States had nearly -come to an end; but before Congress was ready to act, Martínez proposed -a scheme of arbitration, which--though formally decided upon by -Mexico in May, 1837--it had apparently been her deliberate purpose -to hold in reserve until all other dilatory tactics should have been -exhausted.[3.35] - -[ARBITRATION AGREED UPON] - -Naturally our government hesitated to adopt a plan which, as the British -representative at Mexico wrote when he heard of it, was precisely the -one to "gratify the favourite object" of our debtors--"the gaining of -time and postponement of the day of reckoning"; but in April, 1838, -quite unlike France and much to the surprise of Mexico, we accepted -arbitration, and it then appeared that Martínez had no powers to act -in the matter. For months, indeed, although our consul at Mexico was -assuring that government of our fair and friendly disposition, he did -not receive them.[3.36] - -In September, 1838, however, a convention was signed. Martínez stated -that it would not have to be ratified by the Congress of his country, -but her President ruled otherwise, and then with an extremely poor -excuse did not submit it. So the time limit arrived; and, to the intense -disgust of our people and administration, the agreement lapsed. The poor -excuse was accepted by our government, however, and in April, 1839, -after two years had thus been frittered away, another convention was -made, providing that each country should name two commissioners, and the -king of Prussia select a fifth person to be an umpire; and as Mexico -disavowed Gorostiza's conduct in circulating the offensive pamphlet, our -patience appeared to be rewarded.[3.37] - -In the opinion of Pakenham, British minister at Mexico, the arbitration -arrangement was "a very fortunate circumstance" for the debtor nation, -and one that she ought to observe scrupulously; but the minister of -relations, without even a poor excuse, failed to consider seriously the -appointment of commissioners until a few days before the treaty required -them to be in Washington, and consequently the agreement expired. -Mexico, however, could not well take advantage of this fact; the United -States waived it; and on August 25, 1840, nearly two and a half years -after we had accepted arbitration, the joint commission was organized. -The representatives of Mexico were Señores Castillo and León, one of -whom, being unfamiliar with business, fell under the control of his -colleague, while the other was described by Pakenham as conspicuously -dishonest. In eighteen months from that date, according to the treaty, -the labors of this body were to end. To kill time was, therefore, to -kill claims--or at any rate bury them.[3.38] - -When the subject of the commission was discussed in 1838, Forsyth -took the ground that it would be a judicial body, guided solely by -the evidence before it; and this principle was apparently accepted -as fundamental. Webster, now the secretary of state, pointed out -that it was essentially and necessarily such a tribunal. The Mexican -commissioners, however, had been ordered to act, not freely according to -the evidence, but according to the instructions of their government; and -moreover they promptly refused to let the claimants present themselves -either in person, by attorney or in writing. Some four months were -spent in discussing objections raised by them, and finally, in order to -get something done, the American representatives found it necessary to -give way. Yet the sailing was not smooth even then. Castillo and León -resorted not only to dilatory tactics and unfair methods, but even to -express falsehood; and their government violated in a signal manner one -of the most fundamental stipulations of the treaty. In short, if we may -believe the apparently fair statement of the American commissioners, -the Mexicans caused delays that prevented the adjustment of claims -amounting to more than five millions, and pursued a course in general -that excited great indignation throughout this country. Meanwhile, as -our philo-Mexican minister, Thompson, reported, "The rights of American -Citizens of every grade and character" were still subjected to "constant -outrage."[3.39] - -[MEXICAN EVASIONS] - -In spite of everything, however, some two millions--in 1841 a -substantial amount--were awarded, and at once Mexico set at work to -devise a scheme for evading the obligation. Urgent advice from the -British minister discouraged this plan, however; and finally a new -convention was made in January, 1843, expressly for the convenience of -our debtor, by which the amount with interest was to be paid within five -years, counted from the following April, in equal quarterly instalments -of cash. "Such indulgent terms," was Pakenham's description of the -arrangement. Both governments ratified it; and so after these many years -of patience and effort on the one side, evasion and sometimes dishonesty -on the other, compensation for a portion of our grievances began to be -received. But--after all, Mexico paid only three instalments. At that -point she broke her word, and stopped.[3.40] - -For her course in this matter there seem to be only two conceivable -excuses; her embarrassed condition and her irritation over the Texas -affair. With reference to these it must be said that her condition was -itself inexcusable, and at the utmost did not incapacitate her for doing -all that we demanded; while her irritation was essentially unfounded, -and, even had it been reasonable, would not have justified her making -promises and agreements only to break them, or resorting in other ways -to dishonorable methods.[3.41] - - - - - IV - - THE RELATIONS BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES - AND MEXICO - - 1843-1846 - - -In 1843 our decisive difficulty with Mexico began to take shape. The -annexation of Texas to the United States was on legal, moral and -political grounds entirely legitimate. That republic had defied the -arms of the mother-country for nine years. It was recognized as an -independent nation by the leading commercial powers of the world; and -no well-informed person, even in Mexico, dreamed that it would return -to its former connection. To be sure, her pretensions were asserted in -1845 as loudly as ever; but she made them ridiculous by declaring that -never, under any circumstances, would the independence of her rebellious -daughter be conceded. Besides, Mexico had practically acquiesced in the -recognition of Texas by our own and other governments; and, in view of -this fact, as good a lawyer and statesman as Daniel Webster, though -opposed to incorporating that country in the Union, held that our doing -it gave Mexico no ground of complaint.[4.1] - -[TEXAS ANNEXED JUSTLY] - -Annexation was therefore permissible, and grave national interests of -the United States appeared to demand the step. All northern Mexico, -including California, seemed liable to secede, for the people of that -whole region felt profoundly dissatisfied with the administration of -their national affairs, and realized the urgent need of a strong and -orderly government; there was reason to believe that Sam Houston, the -President of Texas, thought of organizing under European auspices a -southwestern empire, absorbing Oregon, and thus offsetting the United -States; as A. J. Donelson, our minister in Texas at that period, wrote -in 1848, "He was not mistaken. This he could have done"; and in that -event we should have had a bold, ambitious rival in the rear. The -anti-slavery agitation in the United States led many of our southern -citizens to long for separation and a union with slaveholding Texas. The -possibilities of Texan cotton production, stimulated by the English, -who were eager to be independent of the American fields, were keenly -dreaded. The logic of the situation seemed likely to render Texas not -only a commercial and industrial competitor and a rancorous political -enemy, but a source of dangerous complications with Mexico, England and -France. Finally, the British, who possessed a powerful influence in -her councils and in those of Mexico, were deliberately endeavoring to -shape matters in such a way as to do very serious harm, it was believed, -to the interests of the United States. Under such conditions no one -could reasonably complain because we undertook, employing as means -only argument and persuasion, to acquire that important and valuable -territory, and ward off these apparently imminent dangers. Albert -Gallatin, who opposed our taking the step, wrote later that it was "both -expedient and natural, indeed ultimately unavoidable."[4.1] - -No doubt it was quite natural that Mexico should take offence. To see -a handful of poor farmers, nearly all of them foreigners by birth, -rebel against their national government, appropriate a large portion -of the nation's territory, rout its army, capture its President, -establish a working political system, and gain recognition abroad, had -been fearfully trying. To believe, not only on the authority of every -Mexican leader but on that of many Europeans and some eminent Americans, -that all this loss and chagrin were largely, if not wholly, due to the -machinations of a neighbor, allied to Mexico by a treaty of amity and -constantly professing friendship, was harder yet. And now to find those -Texans, recently so eager to escape from all outside control, preparing -as if by a preconcerted understanding to join that seemingly perfidious -and aggressive nation, carrying their invaluable territories with them, -and bringing its frontier to the very bank of the Rio Grande--this was -certainly enough to make any citizen, ignorant of the natural steps by -which it had really come about and quite unable to understand American -ways, boil with rage. But the United States had labored to explain the -affair to Mexico, and was not responsible for her blindness. - -For a number of reasons Mexico had anticipated the final outcome of the -Texan difficulties, and on August 23, 1843, Bocanegra, her secretary -of relations, addressed our minister on the subject. The conduct of -the United States regarding that province, he wrote, has "appeared to -afford grounds for doubting the sincerity and frankness" of the American -authorities, and therefore, while hoping that the republic founded by -Washington may be saved "from stain and dishonor," we announce hereby, -"that the Mexican Government will consider equivalent to a declaration -of war against the Mexican Republic the passage of an act [by the -American Congress] for the incorporation of Texas with the territory -of the United States; the certainty of the fact being sufficient for -the immediate proclamation of war." Such a note was of course decidedly -offensive to the honor of this nation. Even Thompson felt compelled to -be indignant.[4.2] - -The following November Almonte, who then represented Mexico at -Washington, informed our secretary of state that should Congress and -the Executive decide upon annexation, he should consider his mission at -an end. "My country," he stated, "is resolved to declare war as soon -as it receives information of such an act." In reply, Upshur asserted -rather sharply the right of the United States to regard Texas as an -independent nation; but early in 1844 he talked the matter over with -Almonte in a very frank and amicable way, and the Mexican minister -concurred substantially in the annexation policy of our government. The -next spring, however, he formally repeated the protests of August and -November, 1843.[4.3] - -[THE UNITED STATES CONCILIATORY] - -Probably to gain time and if possible lead us on to acknowledge in some -way the claim of Mexico, Almonte encouraged Calhoun, who had succeeded -Upshur as the secretary of state, to believe that his government, -looking upon Texas as lost, would accept a pecuniary consideration -in order to minimize the misfortune; and about the middle of April, -1844, a "bearer of despatches" named Thompson left Washington with -certain instructions from the secretary of state to B. E. Green, our -chargé at Mexico. These directed him to inform the Mexican government -that, while intending no disrespect and feeling an "anxious desire" -to maintain friendly relations, the United States had been compelled -by a regard for our own security to negotiate a treaty for the -annexation of Texas without reaching a previous understanding with it, -but had borne its attitude in mind, and was now ready to adjust all -difficulties--particularly that of the boundary, which had purposely -been left an open question--"on the most liberal and satisfactory -terms."[4.4] - -Thompson landed at Vera Cruz on May 14, and proceeded at once to call on -President Santa Anna, then at one of his estates near the coast. He next -went on to the capital, and in company with Green had a conference with -the acting President, who was, of course, entirely under Santa Anna's -control. No good results followed, however, and Calhoun's overture for -an amicable adjustment of the Texan difficulty, which Green presented -officially in a note, was rejected by the Cabinet. The United States, -Bocanegra pretended in his reply, though it had injured and outraged -Mexico by taking steps toward annexation, had now recognized her claim -to the territory; and he not only refused to make any concession, but -formally repeated the declaration of August 23. He then placed the Texas -affair before the diplomatic corps at Mexico; an unsuccessful attempt -was made to obtain from Bankhead, the British minister, some hint of -aid against the United States; Almonte received orders to persist in -his protests; the newspapers, taking their cue from a journal under the -President's direct control, broke out into what Bankhead characterized -as "the most violent strain of invective against the proposed -annexation"; and Santa Anna himself, assuming the reins of government, -called for 30,000 men and a large sum of money.[4.5] - -It is thus clear that while our government positively and rightfully -denied the claims of Mexico to any legal ownership of Texas, it -showed--even to the extent of imprudence--a kindly regard for her -feelings and a willingness to make her, under cover of adjusting the -boundary, a substantial present; and it is equally clear that our -overture, instead of being received in a friendly or even a candid -manner, was twisted and misrepresented, and was used by Santa Anna not -only to advance his personal interests, but even to feed the prevalent -hostility against the United States and increase the danger of war. -Of course Mexico had a perfect right to repulse our advances, but her -method of procedure in the case was unjustifiable. - -Meanwhile, from a variety of causes, among which the merits of the -question had but a small place, the treaty of annexation failed in our -Senate, and the Texans, who had given offence to England, France and -especially Mexico by accepting the overture of our Executive, found -themselves not only slighted by the United States but ferociously -menaced by Santa Anna, and seemed likely, in their resentment and -peril, to swing quite beyond our reach--presumably under the shield of -England. To counteract this tendency somewhat and in a measure safeguard -Texas against the dangers we had brought upon her, Calhoun sent a bold -and even audacious despatch to the American representative at Mexico. -The United States, he said, is responsible for the annexation treaty, -and upon us, not upon Texas, the wrath of Mexico should be visited; -moreover the matter of acquiring that territory, which it has long -been our policy to do, is pending still, and for that reason, as well -as on the score of humanity, we could not allow the question to be -decided by fierce Mexican threats of brutal hostilities; Texas is to be -treated as an independent power; but should annexation be consummated, -the United States will be ready to settle most liberally all resulting -difficulties.[4.6] - -In October, 1844, our minister gave the substance of this despatch to -the Mexican government; and soon the talented, energetic and audacious -Rejón, the successor of Bocanegra, sent him in reply a long but not -wearisome review of the Texas affair, that was absolutely a masterpiece -in its class. Truths, managed so as to give a wrong impression, clever -half-truths and flat falsehoods were skilfully combined, and at last the -United States appeared to stand in the dock as a confessed perjurer and -thief awaiting sentence. As for Calhoun's intervening now between Mexico -and a handful of rebels, protested Rejón, that could not be tolerated, -unless every nation that so chose might fill neighboring territory with -its people, incite them to revolt, aid them to resist, and finally offer -them annexation. Our minister, Shannon, who had been a useful Democratic -stump-speaker in Ohio, blustered, blundered, threatened and undertook to -argue, but only drew from Rejón a still more insulting letter, and still -more embittered the feeling in both countries.[4.7] - -At the beginning of March, 1845, our President signed the joint -resolution of Congress which provided for the annexation of Texas. -Almonte, the Mexican minister, at once protested, giving notice that his -country would maintain the claim to her ancient province "at all times, -by every means ... in her power"; and although James Buchanan, who now -became secretary of state under Polk, replied in a conciliatory manner, -Almonte broke off diplomatic relations and left our shores. At Mexico -the news produced a tremendous commotion, heightened by the report from -California that a revolution, decided by the American settlers, had -occurred in that department. War at once and war to the knife! cried the -press in concert; while the administration, in a note moderated by the -British and French ministers yet sufficiently positive, severed official -relations with Shannon, and insisted upon this policy even after -receiving a conciliatory reply from him. By the action of Mexico there -was, therefore, a complete rupture between the two countries.[4.8] - -[MEXICO PREPARES FOR WAR] - -When it was learned, about the middle of July, that our terms of -annexation had been accepted by Texas, passion burst forth again. The -leash of Mexican eloquence and fury broke. "August Houses! President of -the Republic!" cried _El Amigo del Pueblo_, "The hour of danger for the -country has sounded and she has a right to look to you for salvation. -Union and war!" Not merely Texas but all Mexico, the people were -told, had been marked as its prey by American greed. In order to save -itself before the public the administration, though at heart averse to -hostilities, proposed to Congress a declaration of war. Money was asked -from the Chambers, and full quotas of troops were summoned from the -departments; and by the end of the month, as the agent of our government -duly reported, the course of things pointed strongly toward hostilities. -The archives of Vera Cruz were carried to the interior; new guns were -mounted in the fortress there; steps were taken to raise a loan of -fifteen millions; munitions and provisions were said to be going as -rapidly as possible to Matamoros; and much was heard about the movements -of troops. At the end of July the ministers of Mexico at London and -Paris were notified that an appeal to arms would be made. August 8 the -Mexican consulate at New Orleans closed; and a few days later our consul -at Havana reported that his Mexican colleague had received an official -notification of the existence of war.[4.9] - -To be sure, no public declaration to that effect appeared, but -there were good reasons for considering this fact unimportant. With -Spanish-American subtlety the Mexicans discovered that the threat of -August 23, 1843, repeated later, had rendered such an announcement -unnecessary, and that it would be shrewder to hold that by annexing -Texas we had declared war upon them, since they would then be free to -attack or defer attacking us, as might seem expedient. Besides, it -was argued, Texas was merely a rebellious province, and hence Mexico -could make war there at will, without giving us an excuse for opening -hostilities against her seaboard, and without enabling us to seize -territory by the right of belligerency. Consequently, as large forces -had been ordered to the north, a move across the Rio Grande at any -hour seemed more than possible; and the official journal urged, that -it should be effected at the earliest practicable moment, in order to -prevent the United States from occupying the territory, and making ready -there for hostilities.[4.10] - -[OUR EFFORTS TO RESTORE INTERCOURSE] - -The American government, on the other hand, undertook to restore -friendly relations. The official assurances of good-will given Almonte -were supplemented by private representations conveyed to him through -a mutual friend by a member of our Cabinet; and Polk took also a step -of much greater importance. Before the end of March W. S. Parrott was -appointed a confidential agent of our state department, and ordered -to reach Mexico, which had long been his place of residence, by the -quickest route. Try to convince the Mexican government, ran his -instructions, that it is truly for the interest of that country, "to -restore friendly relations between the two republics." If it is found -willing, you may reveal your official character, and say that the -United States will send a "Minister" on learning that he will be kindly -received. The annexation of Texas cannot be undone; but "you are at -liberty to state your confident belief that in regard to all unsettled -questions, we are prepared to meet Mexico in a most liberal and friendly -spirit."[4.11] - -Thus commissioned, Parrott sought his post without delay, renewed -his acquaintance with members of the Mexican Congress, invited them -frequently to lunch or dinner, and talked, no doubt in the spirit of -his instructions, with all such influential persons as he could reach. -In particular, as he reported, he was "very precise in stating, that -the Government of the United States could never recognize in Mexico the -right to claim an indemnity for the annexation of Texas to the American -Union; but that, in a treaty of _limits_, for the sake of peace and -good neighborhood, the United States would, no doubt, be disposed, as -had been officially stated, to meet Mexico, in a negotiation, upon the -most friendly and _liberal_ terms." No explanation could have been -clearer.[4.12] - -There were good reasons for anticipating a favorable result from this -overture. President Herrera, connected by marriage with a leading -American merchant at the capital, was an honest, reasonable and -patriotic citizen; and, knowing that hostilities with the United States -would at best involve many costly sacrifices, and would very likely -throw California into our hands, he desired to escape by some method -from his public action in favor of war. It was altogether possible, too, -that a reverse on the field might upset his administration and injure -his friends; and, since the movement that had placed him in power had -cost money, his backers, in order to be repaid, felt anxious to curtail -instead of increasing the military expenses. Moreover there was trouble -with both England and France at this time; the more intelligent part of -the nation, cooling a little, were beginning to perceive the advantages -of a peaceful settlement with us; a chance could be seen that in the end -such a policy, reducing the cost of government, would become popular; -and finally it was realized that unless money to pay the troops were -obtained from the United States, their fickle allegiance probably could -not be retained. Accordingly on August 29, 1845, Parrott reported that -in his opinion an envoy from this country would be heartily welcomed; -almost at the same time Black, our consul at Mexico, and Dimond, our -consul at Vera Cruz, expressed the same view; and private advices tended -to confirm these opinions.[4.13] - -Our own reasons for wishing to have diplomatic intercourse restored -were almost equal in strength to Herrera's. Aside from the political -and commercial interests that had always led us to seek the friendship -of Mexico, we desired to collect the unpaid instalments of our awards, -prosecute our claims, guard our citizens residing in that country, -adjust the Texan difficulty, counteract prejudicial movements on the -part of European states, and cultivate the good-will of the Central and -South American peoples, who were sure to be influenced by the sentiments -of their kindred next us. In particular, only two or three months later -Guizot's idea of establishing a balance of power in this hemisphere -was exciting alarm in Congress; and there is reason to believe that -our Executive, already aware of it, desired the support of Mexico in -opposing a design so un-American. Besides, Polk felt sure that European -governments had an eye upon California, and a minister was needed at -the Mexican capital to prevent, if possible, any bargaining on the -subject.[4.14] - -Even more important, there were signs that a monarchy headed by -a European prince might be set up in Mexico, involving dangerous -interference in our commercial and political relations with that -country, sure to increase the gravity of a military contest, should one -arise, and seriously attacking the "Monroe Doctrine." As early as 1838 -our consul at Mexico reported that Alamán and the conservatives were -laboring to establish a monarchy. In 1840 Estrada, one of the ablest and -best of their statesmen, was denounced for openly advocating the change. -Paredes, now at the head of the army, had favored it for years, and in -1841 had initiated a movement in that direction. In January, 1845, two -agents of the Spanish government were said to be laboring in Mexico -for the same cause, and the _Memorial Histórico_ announced that Spain, -France and England had formed an alliance to set up a new government -there. At about the same time the _Picayune_ stated that official -documents relating to the monarchical scheme had been received at New -Orleans; and early in March our diplomatic representative at London -sounded a strong note of warning.[4.15] - -To reinforce all these considerations, England and France felt deeply -offended at our absorption of Texas; Polk, who believed "that no -compromise [in the Oregon affair] to which Great Britain would accede, -could pass the Senate," now regarded a peaceful adjustment of that -controversy as impossible; and Mexico, though as a rule profoundly -influenced by the policy of England, might any day take offence at -some British move, and wish to approach the United States. For these -reasons it was of great importance to have a diplomatic agent near her -government ready to take advantage of any promising turn; and, finally, -one can easily imagine that in Polk's opinion the reception of a United -States minister would of itself, aside from what he might do, render it -more difficult for Mexico to maintain her unfriendly attitude.[4.16] - -[SLIDELL DESPATCHED AS MINISTER] - -Accordingly the letters of Parrott, Black and Dimond were promptly -taken up by the American Cabinet, and after a thorough discussion -of the subject it was unanimously agreed, although the rupture had -been caused by Mexico, to reopen diplomatic relations with her; to -keep this intention profoundly secret, lest European ministers at -Washington should thwart our aims; to despatch as minister John -Slidell of Louisiana, an agreeable man, able lawyer and excellent -Spanish scholar--just the sort of person most likely to gain the ear -of Mexico--and to pay as much as forty millions, if necessary, for -a satisfactory boundary. The next day, however, Polk learned that -Mexico had been taking warlike steps as late as August 21. It was -therefore concluded, in order to make sure that our envoy would not -be rejected, to wait a little for news, and meantime instruct Black -to ascertain "officially" whether a "Minister" would be received. No -further action on the part of the Mexican government appeared necessary -to restore friendly intercourse, for previously, after the withdrawal -of a legation, the broken thread had been mended by sending a new -representative. Nothing less than such action would have answered -our purpose, for only a diplomatic agent of the usual kind, residing -near that government, could have handled the existing problems. In -consequence exactly this, without qualification or ambiguity, was -proposed.[4.17] - -Just at this point a new factor appeared. The British, holding a great -amount of Mexican bonds, enjoying a very profitable trade in that -quarter, and not at all anxious to see us extend our territory by -conquest, did not wish Mexico to challenge the United States; and early -in October Bankhead expressed a desire to confer with Peña y Peña, -her secretary of relations, concerning the situation. This offer was -cordially accepted; and, at an interview between these gentlemen and -the President, Herrera said that the "subjects" which an American envoy -might bring up would be discussed "with every disposition to terminate -them amicably." Moreover, after frequent conversations and a second -formal interview, Peña thanked Bankhead most gratefully in writing for -offering to use his influence with Pakenham, now the British minister -at Washington, "for the purpose of amicably arranging the differences -[_las diferencias_]" existing between the United States and Mexico, and -intimated plainly that Herrera would listen to any "proposals" coming -from the American government.[4.18] - -[SLIDELL'S MISSION UNDERSTOOD BY MEXICO] - -To suppose that such men, discussing a matter of so much gravity, would -not in the course of numerous conversations take up its most obvious and -most important aspects would be absurd. These must have been considered, -and Bankhead reported that not only the annexation of Texas but "the -other points of difference, such as Limits and Indemnity," were to come -up, and in particular he understood that whatever sum the United States -might agree to pay would be "much reduced by claims arising out of the -Convention [of 1839] ... and by others since created." Such was Polk's -view. The questions of boundary compensation and claims compensation, -he said, "naturally and inseparably blended"; and the former existed -only as a consequence of annexation. To suppose after the United States -and Mexico had so long and beautifully illustrated the scene on Keats's -Greek vase--we forever pursuing and she forever eluding us--that we -should hand over to her a large sum without first ascertaining and -subtracting the just value of our claims, would have been ridiculous. -Moreover our claims counted prominently among the "differences" existing -between the two governments, and without a definite adjustment of them a -complete settlement and restoration of harmony, such as this plan aimed -expressly to accomplish, was impossible.[4.19] - -At this point, however, Bankhead's agency ended, for another superseded -it. On October 13, after having gone over the matter informally with -Peña, Consul Black at the minister's request wrote a confidential letter -to him, in which he quoted the following language from his instructions: -Ascertain from the Mexican government whether it will receive "an envoy -from the United States, intrusted with full power to adjust all the -questions in dispute between the two governments"; if so, he will be -"immediately" despatched. The secretary of relations now, if he had -not already done so, laid this matter before the President, and on the -fifteenth he replied thus: My government is "disposed to receive the -representative [_comisionado_] of the United States who may come to -this capital with full powers from his government to settle the present -dispute [_contienda_] in a peaceful, reasonable and honorable manner"; -but, in order to eliminate every sign of coercion, the American fleet -must retire from Vera Cruz. This proposal was sanctioned by the Mexican -Congress in a secret session.[4.20] - -Now the American proposition contemplated "all the questions in -dispute," while Peña said in reply, "the present dispute." But this -was apparently an immaterial variation in phraseology, such as is -customary with men of independent minds. In the first place, it is an -axiom that a whole includes all of its parts, and the American claims -were, as we have just observed, an essential feature of the dispute -between the two countries. In the second place we know that Bankhead -so understood the matter. In the third place this mere difference in -phraseology certainly did not indicate with any clearness a rejection -of the American proposal and the substitution of an essentially -different one, and, if so intended, it involved an ambiguity for which -Mexico was bound to pay the penalty. Fourthly, Black's note was the -sequel to a confidential interview with Peña held expressly for a free -comparison of ideas. Now the consul must have understood the unvarying -refusal of the United States to recognize any Mexican claim to Texas, -and therefore he could see that no envoy would be appointed by us -to treat directly and exclusively regarding the annexation of that -republic. His instructions, moreover, were perfectly distinct; and his -understanding of these matters would have been corrected, had correction -been required, by Parrott, with whom he was ordered to confer. If, -then, it had appeared in his preliminary conversation with Peña that -Mexico insisted upon rejecting the American overture and substituting -an essentially different and essentially unacceptable proposition, he -would have stopped at that point, and reported in substance that Polk's -offer was declined. There would have been no occasion to address the -note of October 13 to Peña. In other words the American offer was -understood, and it was fairly and squarely met. Herrera's government -desired earnestly, as Peña showed Bankhead, to bring about such a -complete settlement as Polk had in mind, and to that end it accepted our -overture.[4.21] - -But there is another point worthy of notice. The word _comisionado_ -used by Peña--the past participle, employed here as a noun, of the verb -"to commission"--has usually been translated "commissioner," and hence -it has often been urged by American writers, that he did not agree to -receive a minister. But by good fortune we have a definition of that -word from a Mexican secretary of relations. "A _comisionado_," wrote -Bocanegra, "is a person charged by any community, or private citizen -to conduct any business," and this definition obviously included -ministers. On comparing the documents we find _minister_, _envoy_, -_plenipotentiary_ and _comisionado_ used as equivalents; and Peña called -Slidell a _comisionado_ after learning that he came as a resident -minister. Besides, the title signified nothing substantial, for the -parties agreed that our agent should have full powers to discuss the -whole business in hand, and so it follows again that, for the purpose of -settling all the points of difference existing between the two nations, -Mexico agreed to receive an American minister. November 6 Polk heard -as much through Commodore Conner, then off Vera Cruz; and three days -later Parrott arrived with Peña's autograph note, which was similarly -understood at the White House.[4.22] - -For good reasons the President felt that no time could be wasted. It was -a critical juncture. The controversy with England over the possession -of Oregon had reached an acute stage, and our minister at London -expressed the opinion that she was trying to make use of Mexico in -connection with it. Our relations with Mexico had dragged long enough. -If it is intended to do anything, a New York merchant had written some -time since to the secretary of the navy, "no time should be lost in -sending a person to Mexico, as you can scarcely conceive the feverish -excitement in our mercantile community," due to the dread of privateers. -Herrera's pacific administration was tottering; and our consul at Vera -Cruz warned the state department to act promptly, since it might go -down at any time. Paredes, the monarchist, was known to be plotting a -revolution; and the London _Times_, then a journal of great importance, -had pronounced emphatically for a Spanish throne in Mexico as a bulwark -against the United States, and had said that it believed no European -power would object. We had promised through Black that a minister would -be despatched "immediately," if he would be received; and Peña not -only had made no objection to this, but had shown impatience for his -arrival. In anticipation of satisfactory news from our consul, Slidell -had been ordered to Pensacola, and instructions for him drafted. By ten -o'clock in the evening of November 10 these were ready; Polk signed -his commission; and Lieutenant Lanier of the navy set out at once for -Pensacola with the documents.[4.23] - -[SLIDELL'S INSTRUCTIONS] - -"To counteract the influence of foreign Powers, exerted against the -United States in Mexico, and to restore those ancient relations of peace -and good will which formerly existed between the Governments and the -citizens of the sister Republics, will be the principal objects of your -mission," read Slidell's instructions; take up the subject of our claims -"in a prudent and friendly spirit," and arrange through an adjustment of -the Texas boundary to cast upon the United States the burden of paying -them; "exert all your energies" to prevent the cession of California to -England or France if it be contemplated, and, if you can do so without -endangering the restoration of amicable relations with Mexico and the -adjustment of the Texas boundary, endeavor to purchase at least the -northern part of California, including San Francisco Bay, but at all -events conciliate the good-will of the Mexicans, even should their -vanity and resentment prove trying. Fully in sympathy with Buchanan's -instructions, the minister proceeded to Vera Cruz as quickly as possible -on a vessel of war, landed there by November 30, and, noting that his -way had already been paved by the retirement of our fleet, set out at -once for the capital.[4.24] - -Unfortunately, though as prompt as possible, Polk had not been prompt -enough. Herrera's administration, as we have learned, had now sunk -to the lowest point in courage, efficiency, prestige and sense of -responsibility. Every morning it looked for a revolution, and every -night for a mutiny. Its one idea was to hold on until the assembling of -Congress on the first of January, in the hope that something favorable -might then occur; and it found this last resource threatened by its -reasonable and pacific policy in regard to the United States. Earlier in -the year it had been denounced for agreeing to recognize Texas on the -condition of her abandoning all thoughts of joining the American Union, -and now it was menaced for listening to Black and Buchanan. A call for -war in the name of honor, territory and independence appeared to be a -serviceable oriflamme for its political enemies. Fierce, unsparing cries -of treason, ignominy and national ruin therefore assailed Herrera; and -under these onslaughts the weak, timid, irresolute administration lost -heart.[4.25] - -On December 3 Peña saw Black at the palace and exclaimed, We hear an -envoy has arrived from the United States; who can he be, and what has -he come for? The consul replied that he supposed he must be the envoy -that Mexico had agreed to receive. This ought not to be, answered Peña -hastily; no envoy was expected before January; we are not prepared to -receive him; the government desires he should not come to the capital or -even disembark; "you know the opposition are calling us traitors, for -entering into this arrangement with you;" his coming now might produce a -fatal revolution. This interview showed that before anything was known -regarding Slidell's quality, credentials or instructions, and purely on -account of domestic politics, the government was anxious to break its -agreement. So Peña admitted later, for he privately sent word to Slidell -that under the circumstances it feared to compromise itself, and would -have acted otherwise had it been free. So the matter was understood -by Bankhead; and so it has been understood by fair-minded Mexican -historians. It only remained to contrive a method of evasion.[4.26] - -The method adopted was to ask the council of state--a quite unnecessary -proceeding--whether it would be proper to receive Slidell. In so doing -Peña expressed a decided opinion in the negative, advancing, besides -arguments of no moment, the more serious objection that receiving a -resident minister would imply the existence of friendly relations -between the two countries, and would thus condone the annexation of -Texas. Even this argument, however, possessed no real value, for, -as Peña recognized, Slidell was explicitly commissioned to "restore" -friendly relations, which indicated that such relations could not -exist until after he should be received and after he should act; and, -besides, Mexico could have received him with a declaration of reserve, -safeguarding all her claims. Moreover this was evidently a point, if of -any importance, which the secretary should have considered before making -the agreement.[4.27] - -To avoid this last difficulty, he alleged in his desperation that -Black had proposed, and he accepted, the plan of sending merely an -envoy _ad hoc_, a special envoy commissioned to settle with Mexico for -the annexation of Texas. His assertion, however, is disproved by the -circumstances and correspondence leading to Slidell's appointment; and -a simple argument reinforces the facts. For the United States to offer -amends for annexation would have been to deny its repeated protestations -that annexation was perfectly proper; would have been to brand upon -its own forehead the heinous charges drawn in vitriol by Rejón. Peña -could see that no country possessing the eyesight of a mole and the -courage of a mouse would so degrade itself. He knew, October 11, that -on such a demand the negotiations would end before beginning; would end -at once in his study with Black's bidding him a respectful good-night; -and since Herrera desired the negotiations, he could not make such a -proposition.[4.28] - -[SLIDELL REJECTED] - -Moreover the council of state, which was a permanent body of notables, -brushed aside this contention of Peña's, and fell back "on the very -nature of the affair and on the state of our relations (_en la -natureleza misma del negocio y en el estado de nuestras relaciones_)." -Assuming plainly that the United States desired to avoid war and restore -friendly diplomatic and commercial intercourse, it declared that we had -set a trap [_lazo_] for Mexico, and undertaken to introduce a regular -minister under false pretences, as it were, in order to compel her to -be amicable against her will. In furtherance of this design the promise -of the Mexican administration cannot be urged, it protested, for the -intention must have been merely to let the Texas affair be settled, as -a preliminary to the restoration of cordial relations, and it would be -an "unexampled humiliation" were Mexico to receive a regular American -minister before being satisfied for the outrage and injury inflicted -upon her. In other words, Mexico had promised to receive Slidell, but -it did not comport with her interest and her dignity to fulfil the -agreement. This decision ensured his rejection. December 20 he was -officially notified of it, and in reply he wrote what seemed to him a -spiritless note, explaining to Buchanan that under his instructions -he did not wish to make war inevitable by closing the door finally to -negotiations. This done, he withdrew as soon as an escort could be -obtained to the city of Jalapa, situated not far from the coast on the -Vera Cruz road, to await instructions.[4.29] - -Daniel Webster, a lawyer of no mean abilities, formerly our secretary -of state, and at the time when he spoke a resolute opponent of Polk, -said, after mature consideration of the matter, that Mexico was "highly -unjustifiable" in thus refusing to hear our minister; and the demand -upon this nation to repudiate its protestations of honesty, and become -the football of Mexican party politics, did seem a bit unreasonable. As -for Polk, it was hard indeed to be charged with ruining by his awkward -statesmanship the pacific administration of Herrera, when in fact the -inherent weakness of that administration ruined his own hopes, and to be -denounced in the United States for trying to force war upon Mexico, when -the Mexicans denounced him for trying to force peace upon them.[4.30] - -But Herrera's amiable inefficiency was near its doom. The aristocratic -elements--Church, army and monarchists--drew together, and this action -forced the Santannistas and the Federalists to overlook their own -differences. Paredes, natural leader of the former combination, hated -and feared the latter, for Santa Anna had worsted him in more than one -clash, and the Federalists aimed not only to reform the Church and -support republican institutions, but also to destroy the military order -by establishing an effective militia system. Professing allegiance to -the administration and extorting from its hopes and fears of him all -the money that could be obtained, he disobeyed the orders to divide his -army or march to the Texas frontier; and about the middle of December, -seeing that the Federalists were likely to control the new Congress, -he revolted. The relations of Mexico to the United States afforded a -battle-cry helpful to the army and hurtful to Herrera's administration; -and hence the President was accused of "seeking to avoid a necessary -and glorious war" and of stooping to negotiate "the ignominious loss of -national integrity" with an American envoy.[4.31] - -[HERRERA OVERTHROWN BY PAREDES] - -Herrera fulminated against the traitorous general who was attacking his -own country. Both houses of Congress fulminated. The city of Mexico -and every department fulminated. But all this was merely eloquence. -The officer despatched to require the immediate surrender of Paredes -accepted a seat in his carriage. Most of the commanders appointed to -defend the capital took their stations under pledges to the enemy. -December 29, when Paredes arrived within about a dozen miles of Mexico, -the garrison of the citadel, instigated by their chief officer, General -Valencia, rose; nearly all the rest of the forces at the capital soon -followed that example; and Herrera, giving up the Presidency without -firing a gun, left the palace with the entire body of his loyal officers -and officials, his mild face and his respectable side-whiskers--in one -hired cab.[4.31] - -The only danger of the revolutionary cause had been from treachery. -Tornel and many of the officers were at work for Santa Anna, and -Valencia, whom nobody would trust, was at work for himself. Paredes, -resembling the one-eyed man among the blind, had a certain reputation -for honesty; and these plotters, misled by his reiterated declarations -that he would accept no office in the new government, thought him simple -enough to be used and then thrown over. Valencia in particular, who was -president of the council of state and therefore legally the successor of -Herrera, felt already triumphant, put on regal style, and helped himself -liberally to the public funds. But he and Tornel had enabled Paredes to -make himself independent of them, and now found themselves dealing with -a master instead of a dupe. The troops at Mexico sided with the majority -of the army, and Paredes notified Valencia that he would shoot every -one opposing him--"archbishop, general, magistrate, or anybody else." -Then with military pomp, accompanied by officials whose signatures -adorned the placards denouncing him, he took possession of Mexico, while -the public, long since weary of the incidental music of revolutionary -professions, looked on in silence.[4.31] - -The classical farce of an electoral junta appointed by the victorious -general was now enacted, and Paredes became temporary President. -Apparently, however, he intended to use this ill-gotten power with -integrity and force. He drew no salary except that of a general, -avoided all display, and surrounded himself with men of the better -class; and when a broker, who had fattened on corrupt dealings with the -government, offered him a loan, he replied with blazing eyes, "I do -not wish money, but I wish to prosecute the robbers of the Treasury." -With equal firmness he took his promised attitude of hostility toward -the United States. On the fourth of January he swore publicly to defend -the integrity of the national territory; and this had reference to -Texas--every foot of Texas to the Sabine--for such was the unqualified -claim of Mexico.[4.31] - -With a government based upon a pledge of war against us and swearing to -carry out that pledge, it seemed as if the United States could have no -amicable dealings; but our authorities were now accustomed to forbear, -and all the reasons for desiring a restoration of diplomatic intercourse -were still in force. Indeed, one of them had become pressingly urgent, -for the European monarchical scheme appeared now to be unmistakable. -Remain in Mexico, Buchanan therefore instructed Slidell, so as to take -advantage of any opening for negotiations; if you deem it wise to do so, -let Paredes know that his financial straits can be relieved by arranging -matters with us; present another formal request for a hearing, and make -"every honorable effort" in your power to avoid a rupture.[4.32] - -[SLIDELL MAKES ANOTHER EFFORT] - -Accordingly, on the first day of March, 1846, our minister addressed -a letter to Castillo, the new minister of relations, summarizing the -negotiations with Peña, placing clearly in view the alternatives -of diplomacy or war as they had now been defined, and asking to be -received. Again the council of state was consulted, and again this -oracle pronounced for rejection. Castillo then tried to frame a reply to -Slidell; but his note, drafted in opposition to his own ideas, proved -so weak and halting that he laid it before the Spanish minister. In -the view of this diplomat the best solution of the imbroglio seemed to -be European arbitration, and therefore he probably thought it well to -show the United States that we could reach no understanding with Mexico -ourselves. It was also desirable to rally the nation round Paredes by -assuming a bold, aggressive tone. And a fiery, offensive note, suited to -these conditions, rejected the second American overture.[4.33] - -Here stands an American minister, answered Slidell, "clothed with full -power to settle all the questions in dispute between the two nations." -Begone, said Mexico once more.[4.34] - - - - - V - - THE MEXICAN ATTITUDE ON THE EVE OF WAR - - -In tracing the mutual relations of the United States and Mexico, we have -often had occasion to note how each nation felt about the other and -about a possible conflict; but it is very desirable now to understand as -completely as possible what those feelings were at about the beginning -of 1846, and this will require the consideration of many additional -facts. - -Already there were influential and wealthy Mexicans, particularly in -the north, who wished or half-wished that the United States would -subjugate their country, so that order and prosperity might come; and -others reflected that at least our assistance might be desired, should -Paredes undertake to set up a European monarchy. But these were selfish -calculations. They seldom implied good-will. Friends we have none at -the capital, Slidell reported; and our consul at the northern city of -Tampico, even though but a faint loyalty to the central government -prevailed in that section, wrote in September, 1845: "The most stubborn -and malignant feeling seems to exist in the mind of every Mexican -against the United States."[5.1] - -[WHY MEXICO DISLIKED THE UNITED STATES] - -The principal cause of this feeling--the supposed misconduct of our -government in the settlement, revolution and successful resistance of -Texas, and in the recognition and annexation of that republic--has -already been explained; but other strong reasons coöperated. All -understood that intense dissatisfaction existed in the northern -departments. Now that our frontier had been advanced so far south, -further peaceful aggression seemed easy; and it was believed that we -intended to pursue the Texas method progressively, until all of Mexico -should little by little become ours. "This first invasion is the threat -of many more," said the official journal. It was alleged that we, -fearing the competition of that country in the markets of the world, -did all we could to hinder its agricultural, industrial and commercial -development, and excited the revolutions that paralyzed it; and it -was even believed that we incited the Indians to ravage the northern -frontiers, and so create discontent against the central government. The -privileged classes dreaded the influence of our democratic ideas. The -clergy were afraid that Protestantism, or at least free thought, might -cross the border, and that so far as Mexican territory should fall under -our sway, secular education, the confiscation of their property, and the -other anti-clerical plans of the Federalists, who appeared to draw their -inspiration and their arguments largely from this country, might be put -into force. The numerous misunderstandings and clashes with the United -States that we have noted had produced an enduring resentment, and in -particular our claims and our efforts to have them settled were commonly -deemed artificial and unjust.[5.1] - -Behind all these facts lay the general anti-foreign prejudice; and this, -we should now observe, was in our case more than a prejudice. Even in -the eyes of the intelligent _El Siglo XIX_, an American was "a being -detestable to the nation on account of the little accord between [him -and] the religion, the language, and the gentle, affable, frank, and -generous character of the Mexican." Our directness of thought, speech -and action, and the brusqueness of manner that naturally accompanied it -appeared inconsiderate and haughty; and no doubt, in dealing with people -who seemed to us deceitful, unreliable and unfriendly, our citizens -often emphasized these characteristics. In habits and customs there was -indeed a profound unlikeness, and below this lay a still more profound -racial antagonism. Finally the politicians of all parties, fearing to -be outdone in the display of patriotism, encouraged the anti-American -feeling. The sharp and rancorous Tornel used every opportunity to speak -against us; and Santa Anna, whose prestige was immense--it must not be -forgotten--as late as 1844, both fearing the influence of our freedom -and wishing his fellow-citizens to consider him essential, represented -the United States as a Minotaur eager to devour them. Few were -enlightened enough to correct the misconceptions regarding us; no one -had the power, courage or wish to do so; and in the end, very naturally, -these dominated the public mind--or, to be more precise, created and -kept alive a general impression. Americans "scarcely have the look of -men," it was gravely asserted.[5.1] - -In regard to an immediate conflict in arms with us, Mexico by no means -felt like the dove threatened by a hawk, as people in this country have -generally supposed. To be sure, the national existence was often said to -be in danger, but such talk was largely for effect. Castillo asserted -that Slidell had been sent in order to obtain a pretext for war; but -this was in all probability a bid for Mexican and European support, -since he knew that we already had grounds enough, and the council of -state evidently believed we did not seek a conflict. Paredes whispered -to the British minister at a banquet, "I hope your government does not -mean to let us be eaten up;" but this was a plea for English assistance. -As we have just said, not American arms but American settlers were the -chief danger, in the opinion of Mexico. The very men who clamored that -the national existence was threatened by the United States were the ones -who called most loudly for war. A circular to the local authorities -issued by the central government in December, 1845, invited attention -to the prevailing opinion that armed resistance could prevent further -usurpations like that of Texas; and another such paper, issued in -November of the following year, dwelt strongly upon this point. From -military force also there was danger, to be sure. Our superiority in -numbers and resources was admitted. But there were many offsets to that -superiority, and the Mexicans closely studied and shrewdly counted upon -them.[5.2] - -[THE UNITED STATES DEEMED FEEBLE] - -Let us review those offsets. In the first place, while the government -of the United States deemed its course honorable and considerate, in -the eyes of many, if not all, Mexicans we had been abject as well as -knavish, stealing her territory and then trying to buy off her anger, -submitting to be gulled, flouted and lashed, and each time going back -for more of the same treatment; and it seemed hardly possible that we -should suddenly adopt a bold, positive, unflinching course. It was even -believed that we dreaded to enter the lists. Almonte, for example, in -reporting that his protest against annexation had caused a heavy fall -on the stock exchange, observed, "The fears of a war with Mexico are -great;" and it was notorious that his departure from the United States -created almost a panic in our money market.[5.3] - -Besides, it was assumed that party feeling would go to about the same -lengths here as in Mexico, and that our differences over the slavery -question and the tariff would probably make it impossible for us to -conduct a war vigorously--perhaps, impossible to wage it at all. "The -northern states, I again repeat to you, will not aid those of the south -in case of war with Mexico," wrote Almonte while minister at Washington -in June, 1844. European journals like _Le Constitutionnel_ of Paris -confirmed this opinion;[5.4] and the London _Times_ remarked, It would -be a war, not of the United States, but of a party that has only a bare -majority, and "odious" to a "large and enlightened minority in the best -States." Moreover, argued the official journal of Mexico, the injustice -of the war would of itself excite American opposition.[5.5] - -From a military as well as a political point of view this country -seemed feeble. Our regular army was understood to be numerically -insignificant and fully occupied with frontier and garrison duties; -our artillery appeared weak in quality as well as in numbers; and our -cavalry was deemed little more than a cipher. As for volunteers, our -citizen-soldiers were represented in Mexico not merely as unwarlike, -but as "totally unfit to operate beyond their frontiers." Indeed, as -competent a judge as Captain Elliot, British minister in Texas--who -knew the United States well, and in the spring of 1845 was in close -touch with Mexican leaders at their capital--said that the greater their -number, the greater would be the difficulty of invading Mexico. "They -could not resist artillery and cavalry in a Country suited to those -arms," he believed; "they are not amenable to discipline, they plunder -the peasantry, they are without steadiness under reverses, they cannot -march on foot." Nor did there exist in this country, added Elliot, -either aptitude or adequate means for a regular military invasion.[5.6] - -"America as an aggressive power is one of the weakest in the world -... fit for nothing but to fight Indians," declared _Britannia_, an -important English weekly; and apparently the war of 1812, to which the -Mexicans referred with peculiar satisfaction, had proved even more than -this. The military operations in a war between Mexico and the United -States would be "contemptible and indecisive," said the London _Times_. -As for our navy, it was undoubtedly small; the Mexican consul at New -Orleans reported that it lacked the discipline commonly attributed to -it; and, however efficient it might really be, Mexico had no commerce to -attack.[5.7] - -The Mexicans, on the other hand, were deemed by many observers decidedly -formidable. "There are no better troops in the world, nor better drilled -and armed, than the Mexicans," asserted Calderón de la Barca, the -Spanish minister at Washington; and some of the generals were thought, -even by foreigners, equal to the most renowned in Europe. The Americans -would be at a vast disadvantage, was Captain Elliot's opinion, "in -rapidity of movement" and ability to endure "continued fatigue on the -hardest food." The soldiers of the tri-color "are superior to those of -the United States," declared the Mexico correspondent of the London -_Times_ flatly in 1845.[5.8] - -[MEXICAN CALCULATIONS OF THE CHANCES] - -If the military power of Mexico was rated in this way by outside -observers of such competence, one can imagine how it was rated at -home. The Mexicans regarded themselves as martial by instinct, and -viewed their troops, inured to war by an almost unceasing course of -revolutions, as remarkably good. Santa Anna once boasted that, if -necessary, he would plant his flag upon the capitol at Washington; and -the results of the wars with Spain and France had tended powerfully to -encourage the self-confidence of his fellow-citizens. "We have numerous -and veteran forces burning with a desire to gain immortal renown," said -the _Boletín Oficial_ of San Luis Potosí. "Not to speak of our approved -infantry," it was argued, "our artillery is excellent, and our cavalry -so superior in men and horses that it would be an injustice not to -recognize the fact;" besides which "our army can be rapidly augmented." -Indeed an officer of reputation told Waddy Thompson that the cavalry -could break infantry squares with the lasso. In November, 1845, the -Mexican minister of war solemnly predicted that his countrymen would -gain the victory, even if one third less numerous than their American -adversaries. To clinch this matter, the feeling of superior power, -which it was known that we entertained, was regarded as an ignorant -over-confidence that would ensure our defeat. In short, "We have -more than enough strength to make war," cried the editors of _La Voz -del Pueblo_; "Let us make it, then, and victory will perch upon our -banners."[5.9] - -The clash, it seemed probable, would come first in Texas, far from our -centres of strength. On that field Tornel, the keenest public man in -the country, insisted that Mexico could triumph over any force we could -bring to bear, and Almonte offered some reasons for entertaining such -an opinion. The Texan troops, he said, would exhaust their supplies -before the campaign would really begin; and consequently, since there -would be no way to subsist a large American force in that extensive, -poor and sparsely settled region, the greater the number coming, the -greater would be their sufferings. Even the cultivated districts, wrote -Elliot, could support only a trifling addition, if any, to the resident -population. Moreover, even should an American army be able to exist -there, a few light troops placed along the frontier would keep it busy -on the defensive, said Pakenham; while it was urged by Mexicans that, -should our line break, their invading host would soon find itself among -the opulent cities of the southern states, where perhaps it could not -only exact money, but free two million slaves, obtain their grateful -and enthusiastic assistance, enroll the Indians of the southwest, who -detested the United States, and draw aid as well as encouragement from -the abolitionists of the north. Almonte himself assured his government -that the blacks, the savages and the anti-slavery extremists could be -reckoned on.[5.10] - -Possibly, of course, their line instead of ours might be the one to give -way; but in that case the Americans, instead of meeting with conditions -like these, would be confronted by immense distances, great deserts, -furious rains, long droughts, and barren, easily defended mountains. -"If the war should be protracted and carried beyond the Rio Grande," -said Captain Elliot, "I believe that it would require very little skill -and scarcely any exposure of the defending force to draw the invading -columns well forward beyond all means of support from their own bases -and depots into situations of almost inextricable difficulty;" and a -correspondent of Calhoun, referring to such natural obstacles, wrote, -"nothing is more certain than your statement that [the] war will have -to become defensive [on our part]."[5.11] - -Moreover it was argued, said the Mexican minister of relations in 1849, -that the invaders would be unable to obtain resources of any description -from the country about them, would be masters of nothing but the -ground actually occupied, and would find the difficulty of maintaining -themselves, at such a distance from their base, "invincible." On the -other hand should invasion by sea be attempted, the Americans would -have to struggle with tempestuous waters, a coast guarded by reefs and -currents, lowlands protected by "a terrible and faithful ally"--as -Cuevas described the yellow fever, more than one tremendous wall of -mountains, and bad roads that could easily be closed; and they would -find no vital point of attack within practicable reach. The United -States cannot hope to conquer Mexico, was the conclusion of the London -_Morning Herald_, commonly regarded as a ministerial organ; while the -Paris _Globe_, reputed to be Guizot's personal voice, went farther, -and predicted that undertaking to do it would be "ruinous, fatal" to -us.[5.12] - -Should we, however, care to make the attempt, Mexico--it was pointed -out--would not only fight on the defensive, and enjoy all the advantages -of knowing the ground, moving on inside lines, and using fortifications, -but would also be able to strike. Nothing would be paid on our claims, -either principal or interest. There was considerable American property -in the country; and while the means of her citizens were being spent in -righteous self-defence, that property could hardly expect exemption. -Above all, one "terrible weapon," as the Mexican consul at New Orleans -termed it, could be wielded night and day, near and far, without expense -and without risk. This was the issuance of commissions to privateers, -for the "nefarious" conduct of the United States in using this weapon, -said the London _Times_, authorized Mexico to do the same. The pursuit -of slavers had been so close of late that many fine Baltimore clippers, -able to outsail anything but a steamer and to go where a steamer could -not, were lying idle in Cuban ports, ready to scour the Gulf and the -Atlantic.[5.13] - -No less vulnerable seemed the United States in the Pacific Ocean, -where--according to the New York _Herald_--American property worth -fifteen or twenty millions was afloat. Should letters of marque be -"actively and prudently distributed on the coasts of the Pacific," wrote -consul Arrangóiz to his government, "the Americans would receive a fatal -blow in the captures [of whalers and merchantmen] that would immediately -be made in the seas of Asia, where the naval forces of the United States -are insignificant and could not promptly be increased"; and he reported -in July, 1845, that owing to the prospect of hostilities the insurance -companies at New Orleans were refusing to take war risks. Tornel and -the other Mexican leaders counted heavily on the value of this weapon. -Our own journals were full of the subject, and could find no remedy. -American commerce was defenceless against such an attack, the London -_Times_ cheerfully admitted.[5.14] - -Under these conditions it was most natural to believe that Mexico -could make the war "obstinate and tedious," as the London _Standard_ -said, and therefore extremely expensive for the United States. She -could "with trifling inconvenience to Herself," Pakenham told Calhoun, -"impose upon this Country the necessity of employing as large a Naval -and Military force as if the War was with a far more powerful enemy." -Obviously a great number of warships would be needed to blockade seven -hundred leagues of coast and patrol two oceans, and the cost of soldiers -could be figured thus, it was thought: During the war of independence -in Mexico eighty thousand royal troops and sixty thousand insurgents -were supported by that country; its population and resources had since -increased; the United States would therefore have to send probably -two hundred and fifty thousand men; and the American soldier was very -expensive.[5.15] - -The people of this nation were looked upon as worshippers of the -dollar, and it was believed that war taxes would not be endured here -long. Consequently, since the United States had no credit--said -European journals--the conflict would soon have to end. "The invasion -and conquest of a vast region by a state which is without an army and -without credit is a novelty in the history of nations," remarked the -London _Times_ in 1845. The war losses were expected to reinforce the -effect of war taxes. "War with the United States would not last long," -wrote Arrangóiz, "because the [American] commerce finding itself -attacked on all seas would beg for peace." When the Mexican corsairs -have captured a few American ships and the Americans have thrown a -few bombs into Vera Cruz, matters will be arranged, predicted _Le -Constitutionnel_ of Paris.[5.16] - -[MEXICO RECKONS ON BENEFITS] - -Evidently, then, Mexico was not likely to suffer disastrously, and -certain benefits of great value could be anticipated. The act of -crossing swords with us would fulfil a patriotic duty and vindicate the -national honor. Glory and the satisfaction of injuring a perfidious -and grasping enemy would more than compensate for the cost. A conflict -would prevent this greedy neighbor, as the London _Times_ argued, -from imagining that Mexico dared not resist spoliation. The American -settlers, whom every effort had been made for many years to keep out -of the country, would be driven away, and the danger of American ideas -averted. Even if the frontier could not be forced back to the Sabine, a -long period of hostilities would render it impossible to practice near -the border our arts of political seduction, and merely a short contest -would tend to re-Mexicanize thoroughly the northern departments. Indeed -the whole country would be re-Mexicanized, for the first effect of the -war would be to cure disunion and baptize the nation anew in the fires -of patriotism. The necessity of meeting a foreign foe would vitalize -the courage of the army, which had grown somewhat lax in battling with -fellow-citizens, restore discipline, and perfect the officers in their -difficult but noble profession. A blockade, many believed with Almonte -and Santa Anna, preventing the exportation of silver and the squandering -of good money on foreign luxuries, would be "the best possible -thing" for the country. Stimulated by exemption from ruinous foreign -competition, the industries would at length flourish, and the boundless -natural resources of the country become fountains of wealth.[5.17] - -War is no doubt a great evil, argued the editors of _La Voz del Pueblo_, -"but we recall what Polybius said, to wit: 'If many empires have been -destroyed by war, by war also have many risen from nothing.'" Prussia -owes her greatness to the Seven Years War, pointed out _El Siglo XIX_. -The conquest of the Moors cost Spain a struggle of centuries, but -what Spaniard would undo it? asked others. "Nations determine their -history only in the most dangerous crises," urged an anonymous but able -pamphlet; "and such a crisis, in which posterity will admire us, has -arrived."[5.17] - -So the matter presented itself to many when studied as an exclusively -Mexican affair. But could it be regarded as exclusively Mexican? -In Central and South America there were countries that naturally -entertained a racial prejudice against the "Anglo-Saxon." They were -fully capable of discovering the claim to monopoly suggested by the name -United States of "America," by our considering none except ourselves -"Americans," and by our "Monroe Doctrine"; and moreover our press -clamored for the entire continent. Mexico had her eye upon them, and she -counted on drawing support from that quarter.[5.18] - -As early as 1836 Cuevas, then minister at Paris, after pointing out to -his government how strongly the country was protected by nature against -the United States, remarked: "Add to this the interest of the republics -of the South to defend Mexico against an always threatening enemy, -which with its ever monstrous greed seems a volcano ready to burst upon -them." The next year a Mexican agent at Lima reported that the alleged -unlawful interference of this country in Texas was the subject of -general conversation and of just alarm in the Spanish-American states. -In 1842 Dorsey, bearer of despatches from our legation at Mexico, stated -at Savannah that Santa Anna had sent envoys to all the South American -republics with this message: "Unless you enable us to resist such -aggression as will be perpetrated by the United States, she will proceed -to embrace in her mighty grasp the whole of the southern continent;" -and Dorsey added that Colombia had already promised financial aid and -two thousand men. At the close of that year, as a letter from Caracas -mentioned, steps were said to have been taken toward forming a league to -support Mexico against American encroachments. In 1843 Almonte made up a -pamphlet of extracts from John Quincy Adams's brilliant though unfounded -speech at Braintree, in which he accused our government of greed and -unrighteousness in the Texas business; and this telling document was -distributed in the principal cities of South America. During the -following years the menace of our ambition to all of the Spanish race -in this hemisphere continued to be discussed in the Mexican press. -"Republics of South America," cried _La Aurora de la Libertad_, for -example, "your existence also is in danger; prepare for the combat;" -and it was easy to believe that official appeals for assistance, in the -event of actual invasion, would not fall upon deaf ears.[5.18] - -[EUROPEAN AID EXPECTED] - -And there were still better grounds, it was reckoned, for expecting aid -from abroad. In the first place, holding more or less honestly that we -had trampled on the law of nations, the Mexicans persuaded themselves -that every civilized country would feel an interest in their cause. The -justice of our case against the United States, declared the official -_Diario_, will be recognized at once by all governments to which "public -faith and honor are not an empty name." This view was encouraged in -Europe. The cause of Mexico, said the Liverpool _Mail_, is that of all -just and honest governments. The Mexicans have good ground to complain, -proclaimed the sympathetic _Journal des Débats_, for "they have been -tricked and robbed."[5.19] - -Covered with so noble a sentiment as devotion to the cause of justice, -more practical considerations could be expected to exert their full -influence. In Mexico as well as in the United States, the monarchies of -Europe were believed to view with jealousy the success of our republican -institutions. Our policy of "America for the Americans," which the -British minister, Ward, had turned against Poinsett at Mexico, was -contrary to the interest of every commercial nation beyond the Atlantic. -The United States, exclaimed _Le Correspondant_ of Paris, assumes to -exclude Europe from the affairs of that continent--as if Europe had not -had rights and possessions there before the United States began to be! -as if the United States did not owe its existence to Europe! as if the -ocean could change the law of nations; and leading journals in London -expressed similar indignation.[5.20] - -As the whole world understood, great Britain had not yet forgiven us for -becoming independent, and viewed with great repugnance our extensions -of territory, our commercial development and our control over raw -cotton; and it was obvious that she would be glad to stop our growth. -Sooner or later, warned the British press, the course of this monster -will have to be checked. Guizot, the premier of France, regarded the -United States as a "young Colossus," and earnestly desired to apply in -this hemisphere the principle of the balance of power. Polk was by no -means popular at the Tuilleries, and the _Journal des Débats_, commonly -regarded as the mouthpiece of the government, courteously described his -Message of December, 1845, as bellicose, passionate, full of vain and -ludicrous bravado, arrogant, detestably hypocritical, brutally selfish -and brutally dishonest.[5.21] - -The plan to annex Texas had greatly disturbed these two governments, -and they had not only exerted to the utmost against it their diplomatic -strength, both separately and in concert, but, as Mexico knew, had -been disposed to take up arms in that cause. Aided by circumstances, -the courage and skill of the United States had completely foiled them, -but they could not be supposed to view the result with satisfaction; -and there was good reason to believe that they contemplated a possible -further extension of this country, not only with alarm, but with a -strong desire to prevent it. Said the London _Morning Herald_ in March, -1845: Mexico will turn to good account the support of her powerful -protectors and their intense repugnance to the annexation of Texas; and -the London _Times_ predicted that our greed in the Texas affair would be -punished.[5.22] - -Gifted at vaticination, the _Times_ predicted also that our next aim -would be the mines of Mexico, and asked the nations of Europe how -they would like to find their monetary circulation "dependent on the -caprice of the President of the United States." In September, 1845, -it printed the assertion of its Mexican correspondent, that England -must interfere or be prepared to see not only those mines but also -California in American hands. There is a general feeling, announced the -London _Standard_, that only the interposition of England and France -can check the United States. The United States will absorb Mexico -unless foreign powers avert this, preached the London _Journal of -Commerce_. "The conquest of Mexico would create perils for the political -balance of the world," said the _Journal des Débats_; and hence "the -immense aggrandizements" contemplated by the United States "could not -take place without giving umbrage to several nations." Europe would -certainly forbid a conquest of Mexico, threatened _Le Constitutionnel_. -The Mexicans were fully capable of seeing all this for themselves. -The _Monitor Constitutional_, for example, gave currency to the idea -that certain powers would prevent the invasion of their country. -Indeed they could see even more. "Enlightened nations of Europe," -exclaimed _La Aurora de la Libertad_, "a people consumed with ambition -and covetousness is already taking up arms to conquer the American -continent, lay down the law to your interests and possessions, and some -day disturb your peace at home."[5.23] - -Another source of possible trouble for the United States abroad was -the idea that any territory obtained from Mexico would be given up to -slavery. This point came out strongly in the _Journal des Débats_, for -example. Considerably more serious was the danger that in coping with -Mexican privateers we should offend other nations. In this way, so the -British minister warned our secretary of state, the Americans were -likely to become involved in "complications of the gravest character"; -and it was believed by the Mexicans that a blockade of their coast, in -addition to being extremely difficult, was almost or quite certain to -have that effect.[5.24] - -To these points they added characteristically that fear of their power, -as well as antipathy to us, might lead foreign nations to espouse their -side; and all the supporters of the monarchical plans now entertained -by the government and the upper classes, felt that if carried out -these would pave the way for European assistance. In fact the British -minister himself believed that such a change of regime would guarantee -Mexico against the United States, and it is reasonable to suppose that -in talking with her public men he disclosed this conviction. Being a -jealous nation, thoroughly given up to politics, and not industrial or -commercial, Mexico could not fail to exaggerate the probable effect of -all these influences upon England and France, and to underestimate the -factors that were tending to keep them at peace with us.[5.25] - -[WAR DESIRED BY MEXICO] - -The strongest basis of hope for effective aid from abroad was, however, -none of these considerations, but our dispute with England over -Oregon. In January, 1846, Bankhead and Slidell agreed that Mexico's -policy toward the United States would depend mainly or wholly upon the -outcome of that issue, and to the Mexican eye the outcome was already -clear. Each country had rejected the proposition of the other, and -Polk's Message of December 2, 1845, committed him afresh to an extreme -position. The course of England tended to confirm the natural inference. -Her perfectly excusable intention was to hold the Mexicans ready to -coöperate with her, should war become her programme, while restraining -them from engaging us alone. Bankhead replied with an encouraging -vagueness to Mexican hints that British assistance was desired, and Lord -Aberdeen talked with the Mexican agent at London of a possible alliance -against us. Indeed that agent reported that he believed Aberdeen would -like to see Mexico fight the United States and win.[5.26] - -For superficial, touch-and-go people here was enough to build upon, and -the long entertained hopes of British aid struck root anew. January -14, 1846, our minister Slidell stated that the idea of an approaching -conflict over the Oregon question was assiduously nursed, and seventeen -days later the correspondent of the London _Times_ reported, that it -had become a general conviction. Aberdeen's possible alliance seemed -therefore like a certainty, and he himself admitted to our minister at -London that Mexico had counted upon a war over Oregon. With France, as -we know, Mexico did not stand on the best of terms at this juncture; but -in addition to the other reasons for looking to her, Guizot and Louis -Philippe were strongly pro-English, and in fact, so Bankhead reported, -Paredes hoped for assistance from that country also.[5.27] - -From high to low, as we have learned, the Mexicans were inveterate -gamblers, passionately fond of calculating probabilities and accepting -chances, and a situation like this appealed most fascinatingly to their -instincts and their habits. But in the eyes of many--indeed most, it is -likely--the outlook seemed more than promising. Vain and superficial, -they did not realize their weaknesses. "We could not be in a better -state for war," the _Diario_ announced in March, 1845. If any one -thought of the empty treasury, he assured himself that patriotism and -the boundless natural wealth of the country would afford resources. -Enthusiasm would supply everything, it was believed. Equally unable were -the Mexicans to perceive the frailty of their hopes for European aid. -With few exceptions they saw through a veil, darkly. Even Almonte, a -military man and better acquainted with the United States than any other -prominent citizen, assured his government that in such a conflict the -triumph of Mexico would be "certain."[5.28] - -Here and there one doubted. Some drew back. But the nation as a -whole--if Mexico really was a nation--felt convinced that pride and -passion could safely be indulged. We shall dictate our own terms, -thought many. At any rate, argued others, our honor will be vindicated -by a brilliant stroke beyond the Rio Grande; European intervention will -then occur; the United States will have to pay a round sum for Texas; -and we shall obtain a fixed boundary, guaranteed by the leading powers -of Europe, that will serve as an everlasting dike against American -aggression. The press clamored for war; the government was deeply -committed to that policy; and the great majority of those who counted -for anything, panting feverishly, though with occasional shivers, to -fight the United States, were passionately determined that no amicable -and fair adjustment of the pending difficulties should be made.[5.28] - -"For us [Mexicans]," Roa Bárcena admitted, "the war was a fact after -Shannon's declarations of October, 1844, and the fact was confirmed -by the admission of Texas to the North-American Union." "Since the -usurpation of Texas no arrangement, no friendly settlement has -been possible," said _La Reforma_. Besides, a faith in eventual -triumph, strong enough to survive a series of disasters, burned in -the heart of the nation. The Mexican correspondent of the Prussian -minister at Washington--regarded by our secretary of war as entirely -trustworthy--reported that the people were bent upon war. But for the -procrastination and vanity of Mexico, no conflict would have occurred, -said J. F. Ramírez, who stood high among the best public men of that -country. "The idea of peace was not popular," states one Mexican -historian; the nation was responsible for the war, confess others. -_Mexico desired it_, admitted Santa Anna in 1847 and the minister of -relations in 1849, both speaking officially.[5.28] - - - - - VI - - THE AMERICAN ATTITUDE ON THE EVE OF WAR - - 1845 - - -In the United States a strong feeling against the dominant elements in -Mexico had been created by events that did not directly concern us. -The atrocious massacres perpetrated at Goliad and the Alamo during the -Texan struggle for independence made an indelible impression on the -public mind. Said Buchanan on the floor of the American Senate: "I -shall never forget the deep, the heart-rending sensations of sorrow and -of indignation" which pervaded this body when we first heard of Santa -Anna's "inhuman butcheries." The decimating of Texan prisoners for -trying to escape from their guards, as they had a perfect right to do, -and the cruelties, or at least excessive hardships, which they were made -to suffer in confinement, deepened the feeling. The official threats -of ruthless war and even extermination against the Texans, and the -belief that Indians were incited to fall upon their women and children, -sharpened it still more. In 1844 one Sentmanat went from New Orleans to -Tabasco on a revolutionary mission but was unsuccessful; and his party -surrendered to the Mexican leader, General Ampudia, on the promise of -good treatment. Most of the men, however, were shot; the rest of them -disappeared in prison; Sentmanat was summarily executed; and his head, -fried in oil to make it last longer, became the chief decoration of the -public square at San Juan Bautista.[6.1] - -Such acts--naturally though incorrectly supposed to represent the -character of the Mexican, and linked with the apparent cowardice of -Santa Anna and his army in the Texan war of independence--caused the -nation in whose name they were perpetrated to be looked upon by not a -few Americans as a nest of poisonous reptiles, fit only to be stamped -upon. Referring to one of the Texan outrages, the Indiana _State -Sentinel_ exclaimed: "Should that blustering, cowardly nation ever -have the temerity to declare war against the United States, think you -not that the remembrance of such scenes will make every soldier feel -himself 'thrice armed'?" When people of our own became the victims, -when they were robbed and deported without cause on the shores of -the Pacific, when they were shot without trial at Tampico, when they -were threatened with the death of pirates for joining the Texans, and -especially when the newspapers told how Americans among the Santa Fe -prisoners were insulted, abused and forced to work in chains on the road -to Santa Anna's palace, so that he might feast his cruel, cowardly eyes -upon their sufferings, fury burned like a flame in many a heart. Time -appeased the fire, but in 1846 the embers were still red.[6.1] - -[AMERICAN FEELING ABOUT MEXICAN OUTRAGES] - -With less poignant but no less real indignation the American public -noted in a general way the entire long series of our grievances: our -flag insulted, our minister traduced and threatened, our consuls -maltreated, our government officially maligned, agreements broken, -treaties ignored or violated, citizens persecuted and imprisoned, -property confiscated, trade hampered and ruined, complaints more or -less politely mocked, positive demands adroitly evaded, valid claims -fraudulently defeated; and heard that such offences were not merely -committed now and then, but repeated over and over again with apparent -deliberation and malice. The highest Mexican authorities were found -encouraging prejudice and ill-will against our citizens, exerting -themselves to make foreign nations distrust and hate us, misrepresenting -our efforts to conciliate them, and describing our honest wish to be on -friendly terms as hypocrisy and craft. Our people saw the legitimate -results of Mexican misgovernment charged against this country; -proceedings of our authorities, fully warranted by the facts, protested -against; threats of war freely made to influence our national conduct; -and measures looking toward hostilities openly advocated and adopted in -the most offensive manner. Just how fully the details were noted by the -public, and how long the incidents were remembered, it would obviously -be impossible to say; but in all probability they sank into the general -consciousness, and produced a certain state of mind. - -In February, 1847, the Virginia House of Delegates declared that the war -had been "most unrighteously provoked ... by a long series of acts of -injustice and outrage towards the United States," and this is only one -of almost countless equivalent expressions, which no doubt were fairly -sincere.[6.2] - -On the other hand certain factors tended to neutralize our indignation. -There was a disposition, traceable to natural good-heartedness, -political expediency and commercial interests, to maintain friendly -relations with our neighbor. Much of what seemed like misconduct was -attributed to circumstances. We had a rather conceited notion that -Mexicans could not be expected to know very much or do very well. More -or less faintly the idea glimmered, that perhaps it was easy for them -to misunderstand the Texas affair, and natural for them to be angry -about it. Many felt inclined on general principles to suspect that our -aggrieved citizens were not entirely exempt from blame. Money was used -by the agents of Mexico to influence our press. Domestic politics warped -public opinion in her favor sometimes; and finally the anti-slavery -people went great lengths in championing her government and accusing -their own, for every suggestion of war upon Mexico was suspected of -aiming at the acquisition of territory and the reinforcement of a hated -institution.[6.3] - -The northeastern states, on account of the strong anti-slavery sentiment -existing there, were not a little disposed to heed these influences, but -elsewhere they signified much less, and were quite unable to offset the -prevalent feeling that Mexico had insulted, outraged and cheated us, and -the growing conviction that, in dealing with her, forbearance had proved -to be a mistake. As early as 1830 Count Lillers wrote from New Orleans: -It would be "impossible" to speak of Mexico with "more bitterness and -desire of vengeance than is done by certain persons whose words must not -be neglected," and by 1837 many agreed with Jackson that satisfaction -ought to be required; yet nothing positive was done, and the impatience -grew. The lenity of our authorities began to be denounced, and the New -Orleans _Picayune_ in particular attacked what it called "the known -imbecility which has for years marked our government at home as regards -its external relations with Mexico."[6.4] - -The proceedings of her claims commissioners had a signally bad effect. -"The conduct of the Mexican government towards the American claimants -under the treaty between the two countries," declared the _Picayune_, -"has been the most infamously perfidious ever practised by one -country and submitted to by another." "Many earnest remonstrances and -complaints," wrote Webster, our secretary of state, officially to the -Mexican commissioners, have been made to me against your proceedings and -those of your government in this affair; and though he refrained from -expressing any opinion as to the justice of them, such a declaration -was evidence of an indignation both deep and general. At the same time -fresh grievances accumulated; and the Mexicans, instead of showing -any appreciation of what our people regarded as kindness toward them, -appeared even less willing to grant effectual redress than ten or -fifteen years before. "Forbearance and lenity toward such creatures," -protested the _Jeffersonian Republican_ of New Orleans in August, 1845, -"are all lost and worse than lost," for they are thought signs of -weakness, and lead to greater atrocities.[6.5] - -The decision of Herrera's administration to reject Slidell, our minister -of peace, was generally regarded--except by the partisan opponents of -our government--as a crowning proof of the vanity of forbearance and -a loud call for action. This nation, said the St. Louis _Republican_, -"owes it to herself and her character, and the just appreciation of her -ministers and her standing in all foreign countries not to suffer so -open an insult to her representative to pass unnoticed." "The indignity -to our Minister requires atonement," was the crisper utterance of the -_Picayune_, which was widely recognized as the best informed authority -on Mexican affairs among our newspapers. The revolution of Paredes -appeared to be a further evidence of hostility. The government of -Mexico, observed the _Delta_ of New Orleans, has been overthrown with no -pretext except the necessity of active war against the United States; -so let war be waged. Finally, the definitive rejection of our peace -overture, announced in Castillo's defiant and offensive note, supplied a -conclusive argument in the opinion of many against further hesitation. -"We have borne and forborne long enough, and a resolute stand should be -taken at once," was the comment of the _Missouri Reporter_. "The United -States," declared the New Orleans _Commercial Bulletin_, "have borne -more insult, abuse, insolence and injury, from Mexico, than one nation -ever before endured from another ... they are now left no alternative -but to extort by arms the respect and justice which Mexico refuses to -any treatment less harsh."[6.6] - -[BELIEF THAT EUROPE WAS BEHIND MEXICO] - -Another consideration that intensified public sentiment was the -suspicion, which in many cases deepened into something more, that -she was to be used against us by the monarchies of Europe, and in -particular by Great Britain. In 1842, when she made forays into Texas -and threatened a serious invasion, it became a very prevalent opinion -in the United States, reported the Mexican consul at New Orleans, that -England stood behind these movements; and later that country was justly -believed to be working in Texas to defeat and injure us. Her influence -at Mexico was understood to be powerful; and the Americans, not aware -what elements of strength Mexico felt able to count upon, thought she -certainly would not defy us unless assured of foreign support. "Our -people are prone to the opinion, whether well or ill-founded," said the -_Commonwealth_ of Lexington, Kentucky, in February, 1846, "that that -ambitious and mischievous government [of Great Britain] is at the bottom -of Mexican hostility towards us." This was provocation enough. "To fight -the Britishers, all the States are one," complained the London _Times_, -and on this point it was doubtless much closer to the fact than in most -of its deliverances on American affairs.[6.7] - -England was not supposed to be alone, however. Our people understood -that France had coöperated with her against the annexation of Texas, -and not a few suspected her of pursuing the same course to bring about -the rejection of Slidell and the anti-American revolution of Paredes. -In February, 1846, the _Courrier des Etats Unis_ of New York, which -could be regarded as of considerable importance, made this rather -startling announcement: "The latest intelligence from Mexico leaves no -doubt that the new Government of that country is resolved to reject all -peaceful overtures from the United States and solicit the intervention -of European powers to obtain from the Union indemnification for the loss -of Texas and a boundary line under the protecting guaranty of France and -Great Britain. We know personally that this was an idea entertained by -General Almonte when he left New York, on his return to Mexico, where -he now occupies an influential place in the government." The statement -that Almonte expressed such a view early in 1845 must have become known -somewhat widely, for apparently it signified much; and the scheme could -not fail to give offence to as many of our people as heard of it. Even -more disagreeable were the plans for a European monarchy now looming -up so boldly south of the Rio Grande, for they defied the "Monroe -Doctrine," and threatened to bring some great power--perhaps more than -one--directly into the lists against us. During February, 1846, the New -Orleans papers, especially the _Picayune_, invited the attention of the -country vigorously to this phase of the situation.[6.8] - -All things considered, it seemed imperative to stop drifting, and to -settle our affairs with Mexico before the monarchs of Europe could -mature plans to injure us; and evidently, from that point of view, no -further delay could be afforded. At this time, therefore, the people -of the southwest, the region most deeply interested in the situation -and consequently best entitled to speak, demanded very seriously and -very positively a definitive adjustment of our relations with Mexico. -As matters were, the thought of armies and privateers appearing on -the horizon as the first announcement of war hardly allowed nervous -people to sleep. Actual fighting, it was often argued, would be less -injurious than passive hostility with its threats and possibilities. -The desirability of Mexican friendship on the score of commercial and -political interests was not forgotten, but many believed that good -relations could not be had without first giving her a lesson. Finally, -urged the _Picayune_ with reference to the monarchical designs of -Paredes, it was now the most critical time since the Spanish colonies -had revolted; the future of republicanism and the independence of -America were at stake; and as matters stood, European powers had the -battlefield, Mexico, wholly to themselves.[6.9] - -These broad views were strongly supported by more limited and often by -less justifiable ones. The trade interests of the entire Mississippi -valley required not only to be freed from danger, but also to have the -plan of non-intercourse, which Mexico had practically put into force, -given up. A Mexican army would march into Texas, it was remarked, "as -avowed abolitionists," and slaveholders may naturally have preferred -to meet this peril in the enemy's territory. Political considerations -of a personal sort, and one especially, doubtless had an influence. -Calhoun, the dominant figure of the South, contemplating a possible -withdrawal from the Union, desired the people of that section to husband -their strength. "We need our young men for other troubles," he said -with reference to their fighting Mexico. Besides, he naturally could -not welcome a great disturbance that would interfere necessarily with -his plans, and lead to political results of an unpredictable sort. Now -there were men, particularly in Mississippi, by no means unwilling to -embarrass and possibly unhorse that overshadowing leader by forcing him -to antagonize a popular movement; and a war with Mexico seemed obviously -well-suited for such a purpose.[6.10] - -[AMERICAN DESIRE FOR TERRITORY] - -A wish to extend the Union was undoubtedly a factor.[6.11] As the -_American Review_ said, Burr had planted in the lower Mississippi -valley the seeds of ambition for southern conquest, and the soil proved -very fit for their germination and growth.[6.12] As early as 1830 the -British consul at New Orleans believed the people would support an -attack upon the territory of Mexico. In 1835 a French visitor of some -prominence concluded that every American held two ideas firmly: that -our prosperity resulted from our republican institutions, and that -Providence intended the new world for the Anglo-Saxon. In 1843 Captain -Elliot, mistaking an instinct for a determination, felt satisfied that -the United States had resolved to push south. By 1845 the appetite for -more territory was pronounced. "There appears to be no limit to the -insatiable lust of territorial acquisition which pervades the minds -of many of our citizens," lamented the New Orleans _Tropic_. When the -annexation of Texas appeared to be certain, the New York _Morning News_ -exclaimed, "Who's the next customer, California or Canada?" To this -question the _Tribune_ replied, that its neighbor had tasted blood and -growled for more. No, we don't growl, retorted the _News_; more "will -come soon enough--come of its own accord," for our destiny is to possess -the whole continent. Believers in this convenient theory felt bound to -go forward, and should Mexico oppose the decree of Heaven, so much the -worse for her.[6.13] - -Behind our voracity and largely responsible for it were a restlessness -and a dissatisfaction resulting from energies that found no adequate -outlet. In all parts of the country this was the case. As a people "we -are restless, fidgety, discontented, anxious for excitement," confessed -the New York _Herald_. In Illinois times were hard. Every attempt at -commercial or industrial enterprise had failed; farmers could not sell -their crops at paying rates; with boundless force in heart and brain -the young man could find nothing worth while to do. The state of mind -in other parts of that section appears to have been similar. Indiana -gave up all attempts to pay interest on her debt as early as 1840. All -over the western border, said the _American Review_, "are great numbers -of bold and restless spirits, men gathered out of all the orderly and -civilized portions of society as its most turbulent members, and ready -for any enterprise that can minister to their reckless manner of life -and love of danger and of change;" and the West was already powerful in -our national affairs. "Our people," wrote Calhoun, "are like a young -man of 18, full of health and vigour, and disposed for adventure of any -description."[6.14] - -[THE POPULAR EYE FIXED ON MEXICO] - -Such an intoxication of animal vitality demanded a fight, of course. -"The multitude cry aloud for war," admitted the New York _Herald_ in -August, 1845. "Nine-tenths of our people, ceteris paribus, would rather -have a little fighting than not," was the opinion of its neighbor, the -_Morning News_. "LET US GO TO WAR," began a leader in the New -York _Journal of Commerce_; "The world has become stale and insipid, -the ships ought to be all captured, and the cities battered down, and -the world burned up, so that we can start again. There would be fun -in that. Some interest,--something to talk about." If such was the -feeling in a high latitude, it must have burned hot at the south; and -the young men of the Mississippi valley had special reasons for their -ardor. The region of western Tennessee had been settled by revolutionary -soldiers, and they had left a rich inheritance of military traditions. -Jackson towered above all other figures at the southwest, and his chief -distinction was that of the sword. Everybody talked still of the war of -1812 and his brilliant exploit at New Orleans. Indeed, when the mind -wearied of the continual hunting, there was little else to fasten its -eye upon. Military glory became the young man's dream. All aspired to -be soldiers, and to win renown by fighting for their country. This was -their inborn and incessantly cultivated ambition; and it need not be -added that all the young ladies felt that only a military hero, or at -least the makings of such a hero, deserved their attention.[6.15] - -Reasons enough why this feeling concentrated upon Mexico have already -been given, but certain others are in order here. That "is indeed the -garden spot of the Americas and presents allurements more tempting than -did the sunny plains and vineyards of Italy, when the northern hordes -swept down and drifted like a snowstorm over the south of Europe"--such -was the picture of "that magnificent region" held up by the _Commercial -Bulletin_ of New Orleans before thousands of young sparks bored nearly -to death by the commonplace. Besides, greatly exaggerated notions of -Mexico's wealth got abroad. Young fellows overstocked with energy were -not willing to hoe corn at five shillings a day, or dig potatoes for -every tenth bushel when the mountains of a near and hostile country were -understood to be packed with silver, and her churches to be radiant -with diamonds and gold. Stronger than all else, perhaps, the vague but -romantic idea of "revelling in the halls of the Montezumas" exercised -a perfect fascination. A letter from New York published in August, -1845, declared that fully twenty thousand volunteers could be raised in -that city alone "without fee or reward, who would jump at the chance -of marching to Mexico" simply to enjoy this diversion. In short, said -the New York _Morning News_, all the "young and ardent spirits that -throng the cities and are spread over the face of the Union want but a -direction to their restless energies, and their attention is already -fixed on Mexico."[6.16] - -What made this outlook peculiarly inviting was the belief that only one -bold, swift dash would be needed--no dull, plodding, grimy campaigning -year after year. Six sevenths of the people in Mexico were said to -be Indians, half-breeds and negroes--"mere slaves," and the rest of -them degenerate Spaniards; and the keepers of that paradise, the -guardians of those treasures, were represented as "a feeble and degraded -soldiery, who would be scattered like chaff by the first volley from -the Anglo-Saxon rifle, the first charge of the Anglo-Saxon bayonet." -"An adventure full of fun and frolic and holding forth the rewards of -opulence and glory," was therefore the _Commercial Bulletin's_ golden -picture of a war with Mexico, and such became the common idea.[6.17] - -In the summer of 1845 this magnificent dream of sport, glory and -opulence appeared to be on the point of realization, and the war spirit -flamed high. Even journals that had stood firmly against annexing Texas -took fire. "What more inspiring strain can strike the ears of freemen," -demanded the Richmond _Enquirer_, "than the trumpet note which summons -our people to the punishment of tyrants?... We utterly mistake the -spirit of republicanism in America, if there be not one voice for a full -and thorough chastisement of Mexican arrogance and folly." The prospect -of "coercing" out of Mexico her "spirit of depredation, perfidy and -aggression" and thus inaugurating the sweet and commercially profitable -reign of peace excited hot zeal. West of the Alleghanies the feeling was -peculiarly strong. At Nashville the _Union_ promised that "any number" -of volunteers the government might call for would be forthcoming. At St. -Louis, in the opinion of the _Reveille_, only a prospect of service in -the field was needed to induce "the most active volunteering" among the -"enthusiastic population." "Go where you will," recorded the _Picayune_, -"'tis war and nothing but war;" and Buchanan wrote, "You can have no -adequate conception of the military ardor which exists" in the west and -southwest; "It will be easy to bring 100,000 volunteers into the field -from those States."[6.18] - -When Mexico seemed to be slow about striking, the New York _Morning -News_ declared that "a feeling of disappointment" began to be shown -by the public, though still, it added, "At every spring of the whelp, -at every mail from the Gulf, the national pulse moves quicker." When -the prospect of immediate hostilities appeared to be over, the Mobile -_Herald and Tribune_ announced, "After all the visions of glory and -honor which have been dancing through the popular brain for the last -six months" nothing has been done. But in reality something had been -done. Such a state of passion could not simply go out of existence, -especially since the causes of it still remained. The people had become -yet more thoroughly inoculated with the idea of fighting Mexico, and -the country had not advanced far into the new year 1846 before all were -again talking about it, said a Mississippi journal. "Sunday editors" in -particular, it added, "shriek out 'War! War! War!'" Will Polk be able to -withstand the clamor? asked the Memphis _Enquirer_; "We fear not." The -final rejection of Slidell naturally intensified the martial feeling. -"The almost unanimous voice of the American people," wrote even Governor -Hammond of South Carolina, insisted upon war. So much for the attitude -of the public.[6.19] - -[THE CHARGE THAT POLK WISHED FOR WAR] - -Turning now to the attitude of the government, we are told at once that -Polk deliberately intended to attack Mexico, and are offered various -reasons for so believing. One accuser says that he was ambitious for -personal glory; another, that he desired to perpetuate the power of -his party; a third, that he felt anxious to cover up the humiliating -result of the Oregon negotiation; still another, that he wished to be -reëlected; and more than one allege that he was determined to obtain -California. For this last view there is just evidence enough to create -a suspicion. For example, Bancroft remarked more than forty years after -the event that Polk said the acquisition of that province would be one -of his aims, and this remark has been cited as if it proved the charge. -But there was not the slightest impropriety in his desiring an immensely -valuable territory that Webster had endeavored a few years before to -acquire, and in 1845 Bancroft himself represented the President's -feeling toward Mexico as "most conciliatory." Indeed, after the conflict -had begun, Bancroft wrote privately to Samuel Hooper, "We were driven -reluctantly to war."[6.20] - -Again, certain facts are cited and aligned: Polk wanted California, a -war occurred, and he promptly took advantage of the war to occupy the -desired territory. But the existence of several points in line does not -prove the existence of a path connecting them, and there is weighty -evidence against the suspicion which these facts naturally excite. -While directing Slidell to obtain the cession of northern California, -if he could, Buchanan intimated, as we have seen, that he should -not press this matter, if so doing would prevent the restoration of -amicable relations with Mexico. In other words, instead of desiring to -precipitate a war for the sake of obtaining California, Polk was ready -to let California go--or at least wait--for the sake of maintaining -peace. Besides, as we shall find when we come to the operations on the -western coast, Polk had a policy for the acquisition of that region, and -this policy did not contemplate war. With nothing solid to stand upon, -then, and much to stand against, this theory must be given up.[6.20] - -The other explanations of Polk's alleged intention to fight Mexico are -evidently mere conjectures, and prove nothing. The idea that contracts -and offices could strengthen the administration and build up the party -is mainly, or perhaps entirely, fallacious. There were not enough to -satisfy more than a small percentage of the hungry patriots, and the -rest were likely to take offence. Moreover, if given to Democrats, these -favors could make no converts; while if given to Whigs, the Democrats -were sure to complain, and few of the recipients could change their -party for such a reason. Many of Polk's chief troubles, as his diary -shows, came from dissatisfied applicants for commissions, and any -person well versed in public affairs could have foreseen that it would -be so.[6.21] And yet, after all, the charge that he purposely brought -on the war has been so commonly believed, or at least so frequently -repeated, that it can fairly demand a more extended examination.[6.22] - -[POLK'S PERSONALITY] - -First of all, then, we must form an estimate of Polk. For this purpose -his diary is extremely useful. No doubt, like other documents of the -sort, it colors some things and omits others; but so extremely busy a -man could not have practised systematic misrepresentation in his daily -record without hopelessly enmeshing and entangling himself and incurring -the risk of detection at many points, while--occupying, as he did, a -position where his every word and act were noted by others--he would -have exposed himself often to documentary refutation. Besides, the -marks of good faith are without number. The diary should therefore be -accepted, and has been accepted, as essentially truthful; and the man -it shows us--revealed also by a large amount of other evidence--is a -cold, narrow, methodical, dogged, plodding, obstinate partisan, deeply -convinced of his importance and responsibility, very wanting in humor, -very wanting in ideality, very wanting in soulfulness, inclined to be -sly, and quite incapable of seeing great things in a great way. All know -the type. It is the leading citizen and schemer of the small town, who -marches up the centre aisle on public occasions with creaking shoes -and a wooden smile, and takes his seat with a backward, all-embracing -glance.[6.23] - -Such a person--lean, stiff, angular, with sharp gray eyes in a sad face, -and long, grizzled hair brushed straight back behind his ears--makes -no appeal to our sympathies, and for that reason is almost sure to be -judged unfairly. For example, Polk has been called the "Mendacious"; but -that is unjust. Many things are done in good society which, if thrown -upon a screen before two thousand people, would be recognized instantly -as mean; and the same is true in the world of affairs. As a lawyer and -politician of Nashville, Polk no doubt resorted to devices of this kind, -and he was not the man to realize the difference between a provincial -town and a nation, and adapt himself to his new position. Compelled to -act, he acted as he could; used the tactics with which he was familiar. -In this manner he deceived men or permitted men to deceive themselves, -and those accustomed to broader and larger and nobler methods thought -he lied. In reality he was not Polk the Mendacious, but simply Polk the -Mediocre.[6.23] - -Yet he was mediocre only as compared with great standards. He could by -no means be called insignificant. George Bancroft, secretary of the -navy, has testified that he surpassed every member of his Cabinet in -ability--not as high a distinction, perhaps, as might have been wished, -but still high. His will-power was ample, and his output of mental -energy large. In seriousness, industry and fidelity he left nothing to -be desired. Though strongly inclined to be positive, he would listen -patiently to others, discuss weighty matters at length, and if convinced -would yield. He reflected long, and yet when the time for decision came, -he did not shrink from taking a stand. He intended to do his duty as he, -Polk, was able to see it, and spent himself liberally in that cause. He -certainly was religious, and no doubt--though blind to the beauty of -uprightness and unresponsive to the delicacy of honor--he fully believed -that he was conscientious.[6.23] - -To regard such a man, uninspired and uninspiring, as capable of playing -the brilliant villain's rôle in a grand international tragedy, of -dreaming the conqueror's dream and sacrificing his fellow-citizens -on the altar of gory but gorgeous ambition, of smelling the battle -from afar like the war-horse and crying, "Ha, ha!"--this is out of -the question. It was not in him. Neither intellect, conscience nor -imagination permitted it. The Cabinet, which he selected with care, -hampered by no preëlection agreements, was much like him; and as Benton -said, it is "impossible to conceive of an administration less warlike, -or more intriguing." "Mr. Polk never dreamed of any other war than a war -upon the Whigs," admitted Robert Toombs, then a Whig member of Congress, -in February, 1846.[6.23] - -A number of circumstances almost committed him to a peaceable course -toward Mexico. During the discussions of the annexation project one of -the strongest objections had been that it would involve the country -in war, and its advocates had strenuously denied this allegation. The -President belonged to that group, and Webster said: "That Mr. Polk -and his Cabinet will desire to keep the peace, there is no doubt. The -responsibility of having provoked war by their scheme of annexation is -what they would greatly dread." Though many plain citizens desired a -fight, an influential body of merchants, financiers and conservatives -did not; and in the view of a still greater number a vital discrepancy -between the predictions of the annexationists and their later conduct -would surely have been damaging. The Oregon question threatened to prove -serious; and it is hardly credible that Polk, even if quite willing to -meet an attack from Mexico, would have desired to attack her before -settling this controversy with England. The secretaries of state, war -and the navy did not hail from fire-eating communities. The head of -the army, General Scott, was a Whig and a recognized candidate for the -Presidency; and the chiefs of the Democratic party had fully sense -enough to understand that a war might enable him to succeed Polk. In -fact the President's diary exhibits painful writhings due to such a -possibility. Finally war, no matter how successful, would mean taxes, -and even those who demanded a fight might not be willing to pay for it. -Certainly Polk was not self-sacrificing enough to desire the odium of -laying war taxes for the sake of bringing Scott into the White House. -Besides, it looked as if war expenses could not fail to strengthen -the tariff system, and that was obnoxious to a great number of the -Democrats.[6.24] - -[POLK'S COURSE PACIFIC] - -Polk's professions were every way most pacific. The assurances conveyed -to Almonte after he made his protest have already been mentioned. In -August, 1845, Polk wrote confidentially to a Senator, "We will not -be the aggressors upon Mexico." A month later Buchanan declared in a -"Private and Personal" letter to our minister at London: "The President -does not intend to proceed beyond a just and righteous self-defence, and -he is ready to present the olive branch to Mexico the moment he knows it -will be accepted." It is hardly supposable that our secretary of state -intended to deceive our most important representative abroad, or that he -was deceived himself by Polk in so vital a matter.[6.25] - -The confidential orders of the government were emphatically unwarlike -in tone. To Conner, commanding in the Gulf, the secretary of the navy -wrote in March, 1845, "The disposition of the President is to maintain -the most friendly relations with the Mexican Republic," and in substance -this declaration was repeated in the following July and August. "Take -special care," the department said to Stockton, who had a few vessels -on the Texas coast, "to avoid every act that can admit of being -construed as inconsistent with our friendly relations" with Mexico. -Commodore Sloat, in the Pacific, was told in "Secret and Confidential" -instructions dated June 24, 1845, "The President hopes, most earnestly, -that the peace of the two countries may not be disturbed ... do -everything consistent with the national honor" to avoid a rupture; and -these instructions to Sloat were most noteworthy, for the commander on -the Pacific station was liable to be out of touch with the government -for a year at a time, and he needed to be sure as to its general -policy.[6.26] - -For the guidance of our chargé in Texas, where many feared a Mexican -invasion and called for American troops, a clear statement of our -intentions was equally necessary, and Buchanan wrote to Donelson at -about the same time, "The Government will studiously refrain from all -acts of hostility towards that republic [Mexico], unless these should -become absolutely necessary in self-defence." Quite in line with all -this was the order cancelling Frémont's second exploring trip to the far -west, because he had equipped his party in a military style--an order -that was decidedly over-strict, since precautions against the Indians -could not be neglected. In his Message to the Senate, March 24, 1846, -the President declared it his "settled purpose" to maintain peace with -Mexico, and it is believed that no expression of his indicating a desire -to provoke a conflict can be found.[6.26] - -The measures of the administration corresponded with its professions. -In the first place this was true negatively. It would not be easy to -deny that Mexico's refusal to pay the instalments of our awards could -have been handled by our government in a way to enrage this nation, -already so eager for the fray, and probably her severance of diplomatic -relations might have been used to precipitate an issue; but no advantage -was taken of either opportunity. Another instance is even more signal. -One can hardly doubt that Polk might have brought on a war in the -summer of 1845, had he so desired. Not only had Mexico grossly insulted -us, refused to pay those awards, and severed relations with us both -at her capital and at our own, but she had solemnly announced that -our annexing Texas would be regarded as equivalent to a declaration -of war, notified her agents privately and the world at large publicly -that she was going to fight, and begun preparations for immediate -hostilities. Had Polk summoned Congress and laid all the facts before -it, a declaration of war, or at least an ultimatum that Mexico would -in all probability have rejected, must certainly, or almost certainly, -have been the response; and if one may judge from the state of mind -existing in the United States at the time, our people would in the main -have supported such a course. "The current of public opinion," said the -St. Louis _Republican_, "seems now strongly inclined in favor of a war -with Mexico." "All the better portions of the press of the country," -was the summary of the New Orleans _Picayune_, "are urgent for the -adoption of the most energetic measures" against that country. Almost -every Democratic journal and a vast majority of the Whig journals, -declared the Washington _Globe_, were for crushing Mexico at once. "The -people will approve" of vigorous action, admitted even the Charleston -_Courier_.[6.27] - -[POLK DID NOT DESIRE THE WAR] - -But Polk did not adopt a course of that sort. He took no such steps -to settle matters with England as a President of ordinary common -sense would have taken, if anxious to fight Mexico; and no serious -measures were adopted to increase our nominal army or our insufficient -fleet. In September, he requested the members of the Cabinet to make -their estimates for the coming year on "the most economical scale," -and in fact only twenty-six hundred additional men were asked for the -army--none for the navy. A note from the secretary of the navy to -Captain Perry--"We are jogging on quietly this winter, not anticipating -war"--well represents our military and naval programme; and a letter to -Conner explains it: "We all hope Mexico will agree to a peace." Knowing, -as Polk must have known, the deep and widespread fear of Mexican -privateers, he would have been prevented by a merely selfish regard for -the good opinion of the public from planning war without making some -dispositions to protect, or at least warn, our millions of floating -property. And apparently even the ardor of our young men for combat did -not seriously move him.[6.28] - -In the second place, Polk's action pointed the same way as his -non-action. No one could think of any rational method to conciliate -Mexico that he did not put into operation. The chief object of Parrott's -mission, which was private and therefore could not have been intended -for effect upon the world, was understood by Parrott himself to be, -"preventing a declaration of war, by Mexico, against the United -States." In appointing Slidell, as even the _American Review_ admitted, -the President was evidently sincere. At the end of March, 1846, Polk -received advices from Slidell which made it seem quite possible that he -would finally be given a hearing, and immediately he set on foot a plan -to furnish Paredes with funds, enable him to keep the army faithful, -and thus encourage him to settle matters amicably. Indeed, all that is -known of this mission from beginning to end, including Slidell's private -letters to Buchanan and numerous details that it would be wearisome -to hear specified, show that Polk strongly desired--as the Mexicans -accused him of desiring--a restoration of friendly intercourse; and when -the purpose had evidently failed, Slidell gave final evidence of that -disposition by writing: "I am greatly mortified at the total failure -of a mission commenced under auspices apparently the most flattering, -but that mortification is much mitigated by the consciousness, that no -fault of omission or commission, can justly be attributed either to the -Government or to the Legation."[6.29] - -In short, then, we find that Polk had the gravest reasons for desiring -friendly intercourse with Mexico, and probably felt none for plotting -war; that a variety of personal and political circumstances naturally -inclined him toward peace; that his declarations, both public and -private, pointed consistently in that direction as long as any hope of -an amicable settlement remained; and that what he did in repeated and -most significant ways, as well as what he refrained from doing, had the -same meaning. We must therefore give up the idea that he desired, and -from the first intended, to have a war with Mexico. - -[A CRISIS] - -All prospects of negotiation came to an end, however, and the -administration found itself confronted by a crisis. The dignity of the -United States had certainly been outraged in a defiant and contemptuous -manner. By the acts of Mexico, diplomatic relations had been completely -severed, and she would not renew them on any terms which the United -States could think of accepting. Commercial intercourse was practically -at an end, and the interests of our citizens were so gravely prejudiced, -that from this point of view even a London paper, the _Examiner_, -admitted reluctantly that the situation was becoming "intolerable to -the United States." Our claims and our awards were still facts. "The -honor of this government is pledged to our own people for the diligent -and proper prosecution of these claims," our secretary of state had -said in 1843, and it was perfectly true. To let them go unpaid, in -addition to being internationally immoral, would have wronged our -aggrieved citizens; and to pay them from our own revenues, besides being -immoral, pusillanimous and ridiculous, would have been unfair to all -of our tax-payers. We had observed no more willingness, although the -Mexican government had nearly always been sufficiently strong, to do us -justice before annexation became an issue than afterwards; and in fact -Ashburnham, a British representative at Mexico, did not exaggerate when -he wrote, "They _will_ not pay but on compulsion." There was therefore -no way to collect our due except by force.[6.30] - -If our long forbearance appeared to American editors a mistake, much -more reason had the administration to entertain that opinion, for -our ministers and consuls in Mexico had repeatedly urged it, and -Slidell had summed up his experience there in the following words, -amply justified by the sequel: "We shall never be able to treat with -her on fair terms until she has been taught to respect us ... here -all amicable advances are considered as indicative either of weakness -or treachery." "Be assured," he added privately to Buchanan, "that -nothing is to be done with these people, until they shall have been -chastised." The solemn declarations of a succession of trusted agents -that our forbearance was a tactical error were facts that our government -was bound to consider; and by way of confirmation it had not only our -complete failure to get on with Mexico, but the success of a power which -seemed to have pursued a very different course, for in October, 1845, -our consul at Vera Cruz had given the state department a specimen of -England's tone. Mexico, said she to the minister of relations, must -fulfil to the letter every contract with a British subject.[6.31] - -Furthermore our government felt seriously concerned about the European -monarchical schemes. Early in January, 1846, the London _Times_ printed -a letter from its correspondent at Mexico in which the opinion was -expressed that a foreign prince, if "seconded by any leading European -power," could gain a Mexican throne. A week later the same journal, -recommending a Spanish king as the only possible cure for the ills -of Mexico, had remarked that the United States could not oppose the -"united policy of the European Powers"; and at about the same time -the _Picayune_ had announced, that it was proposed to give Cuba to -England for her coöperation in the monarchical plan. Our government -had, and could have, no intention of submitting to such European -manoeuvres. Any attempt of England and France to place a king on the -throne of Mexico, wrote Buchanan, "would be resisted by all the power -of the United States;" and the best way to oppose it was to effect a -definitive settlement of our difficulties with Mexico at once--first, -because this of itself would very likely make the development of the -rather complicated scheme appear, in view of the "Monroe Doctrine," -impracticable, and, secondly, because no European power could, with any -show of decency, interfere in the domestic affairs of that country, -while she was actually at war.[6.32] - -Chivalry does not govern international relations even at the present -day, and in 1845 sentiment was perhaps less tender on the subject than -it now is. Vattel, the recognized authority on the law of nations, -wrote thus: "Every nation ... has, therefore, a right ... to preserve -herself from all injuries.... When the evil is done, the same right to -security authorizes the offended party to endeavour to obtain a complete -reparation, and to employ force for that purpose, if necessary."[6.33] - -Moreover, the United States could appeal, not only to strict law, -but still more forcibly to broad equity. To sum up the case in one -sentence, Mexico, our next neighbor, on no grounds that could be -recognized by the United States, repudiated her treaties with us, ended -official relations, aimed to prevent commercial intercourse, planned to -deprive us of all influence on certain issues vitally connected with -our declared foreign policy, seemed likely to sell California to some -European rival of ours, made it impossible for us to urge long-standing -claims or watch over citizens dwelling within her borders, refused to -pay even her admitted debts to us, claimed the privilege of applying to -our government publicly the most opprobrious epithets in the vocabulary -of nations, designed to keep our people in a constant state of -uncertainty and alarm, intended to cause us the expense of maintaining -for defensive purposes a large army and a large navy, planned to destroy -our commerce by commissioning privateers, claimed the right to harry -Texas, a part of the Union, at will, threatened and prepared for war, -and proposed to assume such an attitude that, whenever encouraged by -foreign support or any other circumstances, she could open fire upon -us without even giving notice. She had informed the world that it was -her privilege to keep on harrying Texas from generation to generation; -and on a broader scale, but in a manner precisely analogous, it was now -proposed to hang upon the flank of the United States. Foreign mediation -could not be invoked, for all the American states were naturally -supposed to be prejudiced, and it was contrary to our interest and -avowed policy to allow European intervention in the affairs of this -continent; and no end of what had become truly an intolerable state of -affairs could be seen, for Mexico declared she would never give up her -pretensions until she had recovered Texas, which it was now beyond her -power to do.[6.34] - -[THE CASE URGENT] - -It rested with our government, therefore, as the agent of national -defence and the representative of national dignity and interests, to -apply a remedy. Of course, too, all the pressure of warlike sentiment -among our people, especially in the President's party, and even the -pressure of motives distinctly selfish, had to be recognized more or -less, for such is the nature of popular government. Very likely Polk's -abandoning a part of our Oregon claim rendered it the more necessary -to avoid flinching in the Mexican affair; and accordingly on April 21, -1846, after long consideration of the matter, he informed the Cabinet -that our relations with Mexico "could not be permitted to remain" as -they were, and that he thought he should recommend to Congress the -adoption of energetic measures for the redress of our grievances, -which meant also of course a full settlement of our differences with -that power. In truth no other course would have been patriotic or even -rational.[6.35] - - - - - VII - - THE PRELIMINARIES OF THE CONFLICT - - April, 1845-April, 1846 - - -Strangely enough, although our diplomatic troubles with Mexico would -almost certainly have led to hostilities, the war actually came about in -a totally different way.[7.1] - -During the spring and early summer of 1845, in view of Mexican threats -and of reports from trustworthy sources that an invasion of Texas might -be expected,[7.2] it was decided by our government that when her -people should have accepted our annexation proposal, as they were almost -sure to do, it would become the duty of the United States to defend -her;[7.3] and this decision made the question where her southern -boundary lay a practical matter. It was a thorny subject. In 1834 -Mexico herself did not feel sure about the line; and according to the -chief technical officer in our state department, sole commissioner to -negotiate the treaty of peace with Mexico, if an official demarcation -had existed, the war between Texas and the mother-country had rubbed -it out. The former now claimed the territory as far as the Rio Grande, -but she did not establish her title by occupying completely and -effectively the region south of the Nueces. Only by an agreement with -Mexico, indeed, could limits have been fixed. So far as it concerned the -republic of Texas, this was in effect the situation.[7.4] - -For the United States, however, this was not the whole story. Down -to 1819 our government had insisted that Louisiana extended to the -Rio Grande. In other language, since the southern part of Louisiana -was called Texas, the official view was that Texas bordered on that -stream. Such, then, was in effect the contention of Jefferson, -Madison, Monroe, John Quincy Adams, Pinckney, Livingston and Clay, -who represented three administrations in upholding the claim. By the -treaty of 1819 we did not withdraw from our position, but merely -arranged to "cede" whatever possessions we had west of the Sabine for -certain valuable considerations. From 1819 to 1845, Texas, considered -under its geographical and historical aspects as a district of old -Louisiana, appeared to border on the Rio Grande not less truly than -before, for no other line became established. Hence it seemed evident -from this point of view, that by annexing Texas we revived our old -claim, our old official view, and the testimony of all those eminent -statesmen. Our government so held. November 10, 1845, in explaining to -Slidell the extent of Texas, Buchanan went back to Jefferson, Madison, -Monroe, Pinckney and the discussion of the Louisiana boundary. Polk, -as the head of our government, could not well repudiate, simply on his -own authority, the solemn declarations of Presidents and other high -officials, in which through a term of years the nation had acquiesced. -The fact that for a considerable time the Texans, asserting the Rio -Grande line, had maintained themselves against Mexico perhaps had -some confirmatory value; and Polk was further bound, not only by his -apparently sincere belief in our old claim, but by the pledge he had -given to Texas and the pledge our official representative had given her, -expressly to promote the cause of annexation, that he would maintain the -claim as President. These were grips of steel.[7.5] - -[THE UNITED STATES ARMY] - -To meet the responsibility thus incurred, we had eight regiments of -infantry, four of "artillery" and two of dragoons, including about -7200 men. The "artillery" regiments, which were theoretically expected -to serve in fortifications with heavy guns, were armed, equipped and -drilled as infantry; but one company of each had a field battery, -and under the instruction of excellent officers had reached a high -state of skill in using it. The infantry and cavalry, drilled on the -French system, were in a good condition generally, though division -among coast and frontier stations, besides impairing discipline and -efficiency, had prevented manoeuvring in large bodies; and the infantry -soldiers in particular, inured on the border to hard service, felt now -a reasonable confidence in themselves and their immediate superiors. -The forty-five capable engineer officers understood their duties fairly -well, except that a lack of men to execute operations had left them, -as the head of the corps admitted, too much like theoretical mariners. -A few well-trained topographical engineers, a small medical staff, and -a quartermaster's department rounded out this miniature army. Nearly -all the infantry carried flint-lock muskets, and numerous defects and -deficiencies existed; but probably the forces were better equipped -for service than has generally been supposed. In view of possible -difficulties with Mexico, a disproportionate share of the troops were -placed at or near Fort Jesup on the western border of Louisiana; and in -June, 1845, these included the Third Infantry, eight companies of the -Fourth Infantry, and seven companies of the Second Dragoons.[7.6] - -[GENERAL ZACHARY TAYLOR] - -Their commander was Brevet Brigadier General Zachary Taylor. This child -of destiny, born in 1784, had grown up and gained some rudiments of an -education amidst the Indian troubles of the Kentucky border. At the age -of twenty-three he had been commissioned first lieutenant in the Seventh -Infantry, and after showing remarkable coolness and intrepidity in two -small affairs during our second war with England and the Black Hawk War, -he had won a stubborn fight in 1837 against the Seminoles at the head of -some 1100 soldiers. Three years later he was assigned to a supervising -command in the southwest, and this included Fort Jesup.[7.7] - -Personally Taylor possessed a strong character, a very strong character, -neither exhausted by self-indulgence nor weakened by refinement and -study. He was every inch a man, with a great heart, a mighty will, a -profound belief in himself, and a profound belief in human nature. -The makings of a hero lay in him, and to a large extent the making -had been done. He was gifted, too, with solid common sense, not a -little shrewdness and ambition, a thorough knowledge of men--the sort -of men that he knew at all--a military eye, and a cool, resourceful -intelligence that was always at work in its own rather ponderous -fashion. The sharp gray eyes and the contraction of his brows that made -the upper part of his face look severe were tempered by the benignity -of the lower part; and the occasional glimmer of a twinkle betokened -humor.[7.7] - -On the other hand, everything about him suggested the backwoodsman. His -thick-set and rather corpulent body, mounted on remarkably short legs, -typified barbaric strength. In speech he was rough and ungrammatical, in -dress unkempt and even dirty, and in every external of his profession -unmilitary. He never had seen a real battle nor even a real army. -Ignorance and lack of mental discipline made him proud of his natural -powers and self-mastered attainments, and he saw very distinctly the -weaknesses of school-taught and book-taught men. West Pointers, trim in -person and in mind but inferior to him in strength, practical sense and -familiarity with men and things, he felt strongly inclined to belittle; -and this feeling went so far that he despised, or at any rate frequently -seemed to despise, knowledge itself. He could not, however, fail to -recognize on occasions the professional superiority of his trained -officers, and no doubt found himself unable now and then to defend -his opinions. In such cases, being by temperament extremely firm, he -naturally took refuge in obstinacy; and sometimes he appears to have -been positively mulish, holding to his own view after he must have seen -its incorrectness.[7.7] - -From various logical results of these limitations Taylor was happily -saved by Major General Winfield Scott, the head of the army, who -purposely gave him Captain W. W. S. Bliss as adjutant general. Bliss was -described by a good authority as the peer of any man alive in learning, -statesmanship and military capacity; and he felt willing to give the -General--later his father-in-law--the unstinted benefit of all his -talents and attainments. With him at his elbow Taylor could be sure of -trustworthy information, honest and competent advice, a friendly hand -to supplement or subtract, and a skilful pen to report, explain and, -if necessary, discreetly color the facts. Captain Williams, an able -officer, wrote in 1848 that he could not imagine one man's being more -indebted to another than Taylor was to his assistant. In other words, -"Taylor" in the history of the Mexican War is the name of a double star, -one partner in which was the dominating personality of the General, and -the other a fine, trained intelligence known as Bliss.[7.8] - -Taylor, then, having been warned by a despatch of May 28, 1845, to hold -the troops in readiness, was confidentially ordered on the fifteenth -of June to place them at some port where they could readily embark for -the Texas frontier, and, after learning that our annexation overture -had been accepted, to occupy "on or near the Rio Grande del Norte" -such a position, favorable to the health of the men, as would be "best -adapted to repel invasion." Accordingly he concentrated his infantry at -New Orleans, where official notice that annexation had been accepted by -Texas reached him. Further orders from William L. Marcy, the secretary -of war, enjoined upon him to "avoid any Acts of aggression," and in -particular to refrain from disturbing any Mexican posts on the left -bank of the river "unless an actual state of war should exist"; and -under these instructions the forces left New Orleans toward the end of -July for Aransas Bay, Texas. His troops--counting the dragoons, who set -out by land for San Antonio, about 120 miles from the coast, a little -later--numbered some 1500.[7.9] - -Taylor himself with a part of the command reached his destination on the -twenty-fifth; landed his men, with such rapidity as meagre facilities -and heavy surf would permit, on St. Joseph's Island; and then, with row -boats and small sailing-craft, conveyed them some twenty-five miles -farther to Corpus Christi, a hamlet on the south side of the Nueces -River at its mouth. News that Mexico was on the point of beginning -hostilities caused great alarm presently; but no enemy came, and by the -end of August the General felt secure. The rest of the troops from Fort -Jesup were then on the ground. Seven companies of the Seventh Infantry, -collected laboriously from a number of points, had arrived. Two -volunteer artillery companies from New Orleans had come to the rescue; -and a party of Texan rangers were near him. The Mexicans, on the other -hand, showed no signs of concentrating.[7.10] - -[CONDITIONS AT CORPUS CHRISTI] - -Naturally the public inquired whether the occupation of Corpus Christi, -and especially the words "on or near" the Rio Grande, could be -justified. But, as the London _Times_--a witness by no means prejudiced -in our favor--observed, "When the United States Government, with the -full sanction of the American people, consummated the annexation of -Texas, ... they should, according to all the usages of civilized -Governments, have proceeded to take military means for the protection of -their new frontier." The performance of this duty involved giving the -commander a somewhat liberal discretion, for southern Texas was a region -of which the Washington authorities knew very little, and what steps it -would be proper for the General to take, should the Mexicans launch a -raid at San Antonio, was known there even less. It would have required -about a month to send information and receive orders based upon it. -Authority to occupy such a post as might seem necessary, in view of the -ground, the vicinity and the news, had to be given. Taylor understood -that Corpus Christi, which belonged to Texas by the same right of -effective occupation as Nacogdoches or Galveston, satisfied the terms of -the order; the government accepted that interpretation; and the country -acquiesced.[7.11] - -Gradually his forces assumed rather formidable proportions. Some of -the troops had to come from Detroit, and some from Florida; but it -was feared in all quarters that a heavy Mexican body might cross the -Rio Grande any day, and the reinforcements made quick time. October -13 the army included General W. J. Worth's command, called the first -brigade, which comprised the Eighth Infantry and twelve companies of the -so-called artillery consolidated as a battalion; the second brigade, -consisting of the Fifth and the Seventh Infantry under Lieutenant -Colonel J. S. McIntosh; the third brigade under Colonel William -Whistler, which included the Third and the Fourth Infantry; the Second -Dragoons, commanded by Colonel D. E. Twiggs; some United States and New -Orleans field artillery, and the Texas rangers. In all, officers and -men, there were about 3900.[7.12] - -Taylor, accustomed to frontier conditions, described his troops as -healthy, remarkably well-behaved and very comfortable. But in reality -the tents could scarcely keep out a heavy dew; for weeks together every -article in many of them was thoroughly soaked; and much of the time -water stood three or four feet deep in some. The weather oscillated -sharply between sultry heat and piercing northers, so that one lay down -gasping for breath and woke up freezing. As hardly enough wood could be -obtained for the cooks, camp-fires were usually out of the question; and -only brackish drinking water could be had. At one time nearly twenty -per cent of the men were on the sick list, and half of the others more -or less ill. Taylor knew so little of military evolutions that he could -not get his men properly into line, and few of his chief officers -excelled him very much. Despite orders from the President, military -exercises were given up after a time; a sullen torpor and silence -reigned in the camp, and many deserted. Meanwhile a horde of gamblers -and liquor-sellers opened booths near by; and the soldiers, driven -to desperation, paid what little money they had to be drugged into -insensibility or crazed into brawls and orgies. Some, if not many, of -the officers gave up acting like gentlemen, and one at least even forgot -how to be honest.[7.13] - -Then a dispute regarding precedence brought the camp to the verge of -battle. Twiggs had the honor of seniority as colonel; but Worth, as a -brevet brigadier general, insisted that should Taylor cease to hold the -command, it would fall to him. The question was referred to Washington; -and Scott, directed by Marcy to settle it, gave a ruling in favor of -brevet rank. This decision did not, however, end the controversy. More -than a hundred officers joined in an appeal to Congress, while Worth -declared he would maintain his rights "to any extreme." Taylor, instead -of using his personal and official strength to enforce a _modus vivendi_ -until the issue could be properly decided, or at least refraining from -all accentuation of it, ordered a general review, and in spite of the -ruling announced by his superior officer, assigned Twiggs to command -on that occasion; and then, finding that serious trouble would ensue, -proved himself, by countermanding the review, unable to maintain even -his own authority. After all this, discipline could hardly be said -to exist. Moreover, a general want of confidence in the commander -prevailed. "Whether an idea, strategic or of any other description, has -had the rudeness to invade the mind or imagination of our chief is a -matter of doubt," said Worth; "We are literally a huge body without a -head." If Taylor succeeds, it will be by accident, concluded Lieutenant -Colonel Hitchcock, now commanding the Third Infantry, who had studied -and taught at West Point.[7.14] - -[THE QUESTION OF RIGHT] - -Toward the end of August Marcy wrote: "Should Mexico assemble a large -body of troops on the Rio Grande and cross it with a considerable -force, such a movement must be regarded as an invasion of the United -States and the commencement of hostilities." This declaration called -forth protests, but was quite fair. By stationing troops peaceably in -the "intermediate region" between the Nueces and the Rio Grande we -only placed ourselves on an equality with Mexico; and, as we ordered -Taylor to leave her posts undisturbed, we showed a friendly recognition -of the principle of pacific joint-occupation during negotiations. Our -forces, to be sure, outnumbered hers, but her attitude made it unsafe to -despatch a smaller representation. Unlike us, Mexico had no occasion to -send an army into that region for defensive purposes. The United States -had shown every sign of desiring peace and none of desiring war, and at -this time was endeavoring to bring about a friendly settlement. Such an -army could not have prevented us from entering the intermediate region, -for at Corpus Christi Taylor was already there; and it could not have -saved the Mexican posts and citizens, for they were not menaced. Mexico, -on the other hand, had threatened us and made open preparations to -strike; it was now understood at Washington that no declaration of war -should be expected to precede a blow; her generals had proclaimed that -hostilities were on the point of beginning; and it was only common sense -to assume that, should a Mexican army cross the Rio Grande, it would -come to execute the announced intention of those who sent it.[7.15] - -During the evening of January 12, 1846, despatches from Slidell and -Black arrived at Washington, and made the rejection of our pacific -overture look almost certain. This unexpected turn of affairs gave -new seriousness and fresh urgency to the Mexican issue; and the next -day Taylor was ordered to encamp on the Rio Grande at whatever point -he should consider most advantageous. He was cautioned, however, -against regarding Mexico as an enemy, unless war should be declared -or hostilities be undertaken by her, and against provoking a conflict -by insistence upon the joint navigation of the river, which our claim -implied.[7.16] - -February 3 the General received these instructions, and replied that he -should lose no time. Three days later the army was formally ordered to -"be prepared for a field movement at short notice." But, although Taylor -had been on the ground for six months, he was "utterly ignorant"--said -Hitchcock--of the way to Matamoros, and had now to investigate the -matter. By February 24 he possessed the necessary data, and ordered the -troops to be in readiness to set out "at forty-eight hours notice"; -yet it was not until the eighth of March that his cavalry, led by -the impetuous Twiggs and accompanied by Ringgold's handsome battery, -actually moved off. The infantry brigades followed at intervals of a -day with Duncan's and Bragg's field artillery; and transports prepared -to remove the convalescents, extra baggage and Major Munroe's artillery -company to Point Isabel, near the mouth of the Rio Grande.[7.17] - -[THE ADVANCE TO THE RIO GRANDE] - -Soon after receiving the instructions to advance, Taylor had given -notice of his orders to influential citizens of Matamoros then at Corpus -Christi, explaining that his march would be entirely pacific, and that -he expected the pending questions to be settled by negotiation; and -similar assurances were conveyed to the Mexican customhouse office at -"Brazos Santiago," near Point Isabel. March 8 a more formal announcement -appeared in General Orders No. 30. Taylor here expressed the hope -that his movement would be "beneficial to all concerned," insisted -upon a scrupulous regard for the civil and religious rights of the -people, and commanded that everything required for the use of the army -should be paid for "at the highest market price." These orders, which -merely anticipated instructions then on their way from Washington, -were translated into Spanish, and placed in circulation along the -border.[7.18] - -To the troops the march proved a refreshing and beneficial change. The -weather was now fine, the road almost free from mud, and the breeze -balmy. Frequently the blue lupine, the gay verbena, the saucy marigold -and countless other bright flowers carpeted the ground. The cactus and -the cochineal excited and gratified curiosity. Ducks and geese often -flew up from the line of advance. Many rabbits and many deer scampered -across the plain; and occasionally wolves, catamounts and panthers -were frightened from cover. Wild horses would gaze for an instant at -their cousins in bondage, and then gallop off, tossing their manes -disdainfully; and once a herd of them, spaced as if to allow room -for cannon, were taken for Mexican cavalry. Innumerable centipedes, -tarantulas and rattlesnakes furnished a good deal of interest, if -not of charm. The boundless prairie had somewhat the fascination of -the sea; and occasionally, when a mirage conjured up a range of -blue mountains--clothed with forests and reflected in lakes--that -melted presently into the air, one had a sense of moving on enchanted -ground.[7.19] - -To be sure, the march was not entirely agreeable. For about 196 miles -it stretched on and on, and most of the way it lay through deep, sandy -plains, here glistening with salt, and there varied with briny marshes -or sticky black dirt. In some places Mexicans had burned the herbage; -and the light ashes, raised by the tramp of many feet, settled on the -soldiers' faces till they could scarcely recognize one another. Tortured -with thirst, they would occasionally break ranks pell-mell at the sight -of water; but as a rule they found it brackish. All suffered alike; and -we have a picture of Taylor himself breakfasting at the door of his -tent with a mess-chest for table, his rugged countenance flaming with -sunburn, his long lips cracked and raw, and his long nose white with -peeling skin. But the experience, even at its worst, proved a wholesome -tonic after the degeneration of Corpus Christi.[7.19] - -March 20 the army came to the Arroyo Colorado, a salt lagoon about a -hundred yards wide and three or four feet deep. Here General Mejía, -the commander at Matamoros, who knew all about our troops and their -movements, had intended to win a sheaf of laurels; but orders from -his government, not quite ready for action, arrived in time to curb -this ambition. He concluded then to try the effect of a ruse, and his -officer convinced the Americans, with solemn warnings, bugle-calls here -and there, and a clever showing of heads among the bushes and trees on -the southern side of the lagoon, that a hard fight would result from -attempting to cross it. But without the least hesitation Taylor prepared -for battle. Ringgold's pieces were made ready. Worth dashed into the -stream at the head of an advance party; and on gaining, unopposed, -the opposite bank, he saw--dust in the atmosphere, and far away a -dozen small black specks rapidly growing smaller. But morally it was a -victory; and the troops, though cheated, felt encouraged.[7.20] - -March 23, after making fifteen miles across a clear, dry prairie, the -army came to a road that led to Matamoros, about eighteen miles away -on the right, and to Point Isabel, distant nine or ten on the other -side; and Taylor, ordering Worth and the infantry to camp and watch -for the enemy at a suitable place in the former direction, proceeded -to the coast with his cavalry. There he found the transports in sight -and the wind favorable. Defences were planned at once; and on the 27th, -leaving an engineer, supported by a guard under Munroe, to superintend -the construction of them, the General returned to the army, then some -ten miles from Matamoros. The next morning all advanced, and soon came -to rough defiles. On each side bristled what a soldier described as an -irregular, impenetrable mass of "scraggly, scrubby, crooked, infernally -illegitimate and sin-begotten bushy trees loaded with millions of -thornpins"--that is to say, _chaparral_. Passing this and a few cabins -in the midst of corn, cotton and pomegranates, the troops found -themselves at the end of their march, Río Bravo, the "Bold river of the -North," brown with mud, rolled swift and boiling at their feet; and in -plain view about half a mile distant--black with crowded house-tops, gay -with flags, and noisy with bugles and barking dogs--lay Matamoros. A -rude pole was soon raised; to the music of our national airs the colors -went up; and a small masked battery of field guns was planted near -them.[7.21] - -A singular political game then took place between Taylor and Mejía. -The former did everything possible to convince the Mexican general -that his movement was entirely pacific, and offered to "enter into any -arrangements to secure the peace and harmony of the frontier" during -negotiations between the two governments; but the latter insisted -over and over again that a state of war had been created by the -American advance. In spite of this Taylor reminded his officers of the -"essentially pacific" and "conciliatory" intentions of the army; yet at -the same time he reported the Mexican attitude as distinctly hostile, -asked for reinforcements, mounted four 18-pounders to command the city, -and about April 7 began what came to be known as Fort Brown, a large, -bastioned "field-work" opposite the lower end of the city.[7.22] - -[THE MEXICAN ATTITUDE] - -On April 11 General Ampudia, the assassin of Sentmanat, arrived at -Matamoros to assume the chief command, accompanied by cavalry and -followed, as the Americans understood, by two or three thousand more -troops. The next day he signalized his advent by ordering Taylor to -decamp at once for the other side of the Nueces--a proposal to which -a courteous negative was returned--and by compelling all the Americans -in the city, "under open threats of violence," to leave town within -twenty-four hours. Taylor retaliated by requesting our naval commander -off the Rio Grande to stop the use of that stream. As the Mexican -attitude made it impossible for us to have the joint navigation implied -by our claim, this appeared reasonable; but essentially the measure was -defensive, since without supplies coming by water a large force could -not remain long at Matamoros. When Ampudia complained, the General -pointed out that sealing up the river was only the "natural result of -the state of war so much insisted on by the Mexican authorities as -actually existing," and offered to reopen it if Ampudia would join -him in maintaining an armistice during the negotiations of the two -governments; but this led to no result.[7.23] - -Ampudia's orders and intention had been to attack the Americans as -soon as possible, but his glorious prospects darkened immediately. -Though given the place of Major General Arista, long at the head of -military affairs in this quarter, because he supported the revolution -of Paredes while Arista not only frowned upon it, but seemed to aim -at making northeastern Mexico independent, Ampudia was detested and -thought incompetent--an opinion he did not share--by not a few in the -northern army, whereas Arista stood high in his caste, and, as a person -of wealth and position, had strong friends well able to make trouble -for the central government. Consequently an order dated April 4 made -Arista commander-in-chief with Ampudia as lieutenant. The latter was -immediately forbidden to shine on the field of glory, and, finding his -officers would not support him in disobedience, he submitted.[7.24] - -Arista, however, bearing instructions dated April 4 to attack the -Americans, reached the scene on the 24th, and ordered his cavalry -general, Torrejón, to cross above Matamoros with about 1600 men. Hearing -a rumor of this movement, Taylor sent Captain Thornton and about sixty -dragoons late that afternoon to reconnoitre; and the next morning, some -twenty-eight miles from camp, finding himself completely shut in by -overwhelming forces, the Captain tried to break through, lost several -men killed and wounded, and then with all the rest surrendered. This -was war. "Hostilities have begun," announced Arista on the day of his -arrival. "Hostilities may now be considered as commenced," reported -Taylor on the 26th; and--besides advising Polk to organize twelve-months -volunteers--he at once called upon Texas and Louisiana for about 5000 -men.[7.25] - -[REASONS FOR POLK'S COURSE] - -It was a tragic and most regrettable dénouement; yet, on a close review -of all the data now accessible, one does not find it easy to censure -Polk. If he had wished and meditated war from the first, why did he work -for an amicable settlement through Parrott, Black and Slidell? For the -sake of appearances, many said. But in the first place we have found -that Polk was honest in those negotiations; and, in the second, had -war been his aim and appearances his care, he would not have permitted -the order of January 13 to be issued that day. On January 12 it looked -at Washington as if the question of receiving Slidell would soon be -decided. The President could afford to wait a little, and he would have -done this, for it was clear that an unnecessary military step, taken -while he was extending the olive branch, would needlessly make him -appear either treacherous or ridiculous. Moreover if he sought a war, he -knew on January 12 that matters were shaping themselves to his taste; -that Mexico was almost sure to close the door of negotiation soon; -and consequently that he would soon be able to demand of Congress the -forcible redress of our grievances.[7.26] - -Here lay a _casus belli_ amply endorsed by international law, the -practice of civilized powers, and the general opinion of the world. It -was a ground, too, that Polk himself, as we have seen, felt entirely -satisfied to stand upon, and one that our people, feeling as they did, -would almost certainly have accepted. Having, then, apparently within -his reach a pretext for war that almost everybody thought good, he would -not have exerted himself to obtain one that almost everybody thought -bad; and in fact--evidently expecting no event of decisive importance -to occur near the Rio Grande--he went on day after day with his plan -to lay our grievances before Congress, until news of the attack on -Thornton burst upon Washington like a rocket. On the hypothesis that -he had wished and meditated war from the first and merely stuck at -appearances, his conduct was therefore irrational; and, besides, we have -seen adequate reasons for believing that he desired peace.[7.26] - -Discarding that hypothesis, however, leaves us the important question, -How did the idea of sending Taylor forward present itself to Polk? -First, then, from his point of view it seemed entirely permissible. -A proprietor is not debarred from going where a squatter has built a -cabin; and in the light of our official claim and arguments Mexican -occupation above the Rio Grande was merely by sufferance. The so-called -"provocative act" of pointing guns at Matamoros could not be charged -against the government, for Marcy had suggested other points also for -Taylor's camp, leaving the choice to him. It was a defensive measure -adopted by the General for military reasons in conjunction with pacific -assurances and proposals; and we learn from Arista and others that it -had a sedative effect on the property owners of that flimsily built city -and on the army authorities.[7.27] - -No encroachment upon the powers of Congress appeared to be involved. -Had Polk's aim been, as Calhoun alleged, to establish a boundary, he -could not have tolerated Mexican posts, for the troops of foreign -states cannot be permitted to sojourn within our officially defined -limits. Besides, Polk had sent Slidell to treat on this very question, -and Slidell had not given up the task. Though it rested with Congress -to declare war, a President could legally, in the exercise of his -discretion, take steps liable to bring about hostilities. Moreover -Congress appeared to have authorized Taylor's movement. Corpus Christi, -claimed by Tamaulipas, had been made an American port of delivery. A -collection district had been established in the intermediate region. The -declaration of Polk's Message, December, 1845, that our jurisdiction -had been extended to the Rio Grande, and Marcy's appended report, which -announced that Taylor's instructions were to regard that stream as our -boundary, had raised no storm. For six months, admitted the chief Whig -organ, our doings in this field not only had appeared to be endorsed -by the people, but had gone on openly without calling forth "a single -question from any public authority." Officially notified of the military -occupation of Corpus Christi, Congress, instead of protesting, had -voted supplies for the troops. Finally, Congress had instructed the -Executive, in the resolutions for annexing Texas, to reach an agreement -with Mexico regarding the boundary; it was his duty to persevere in the -attempt until convinced he could not succeed; and Taylor's advance, as -will presently be seen, appeared to him a proper step in the discharge -of this obligation.[7.28] - -Familiar precedents and principles were believed to sanction the -movement of our troops. In 1794 Washington had ordered Wayne to conduct -hostilities in disputed territory, and had threatened to destroy a -British fort there. In accordance with a resolution of Congress, Madison -had seized the "Florida parishes" claimed by Spain. Just before Taylor -was ordered to move, Hilliard informed the House of Representatives that -England had magistrates in the southern part of Oregon; and John Quincy -Adams proposed to take military possession of that disputed territory -before concluding negotiations. If such a method could be employed in -dealing with countries willing to treat, very naturally--in the case -of one that had pronounced for war--pacific occupation, leaving the -competing jurisdiction undisturbed, seemed fully justifiable.[7.29] - -Taylor's advance appeared also to be highly expedient. For one thing, -our claim upon the intermediate region would have been weakened, had -we refrained from sharing with Mexico in the occupation of it. For -another, it seemed wise to place ourselves in a strategic position that -would be of great value, should Mexico's threat of war be carried into -effect. And for a third it was believed that a bold military attitude, -indicating that at last the United States had made up its mind, would -count with Mexico as a strong argument for negotiation. Such was the -opinion of Parrott, Slidell, Worth, Taylor, Scott, Archer, now chairman -of the Senate committee on foreign relations, Brantz Mayer, formerly -secretary of legation at Mexico, Polk himself, the administration -circle in general, and well-informed persons outside it. January 17 -Conner was ordered to assemble all his vessels and exhibit them off -Vera Cruz--evidently in pursuance of this design. The government organ -stated, and opposition writers conceded, that such a purpose was in -view.[7.30] - -But essentially, as already has been suggested, Taylor's advance -rested on the necessity of military defence; and indeed there is reason -to consider Scott the prime factor in the business, for the order of -January 13 was based upon, and in part verbally reproduced, a "projet" -submitted by him, whereas Polk's diary for January 12 and 13 does not -even allude to the subject. Now not only were defensive measures called -for on general principles, as we have just been informed by the London -_Times_, but the Texans actually and urgently needed a sheltering arm. -During the latter part of 1845 the chief Mexican engineers drew detailed -plans for crossing, not only the Rio Grande, but the Sabine. Merely -the refusal of Paredes, growing out of his revolutionary designs, to -reinforce the troops on the frontier with 2400 men prevented an attack -at this time. Almonte, who had particularly recommended incursions into -Texas, held the post of war minister in January, 1846. The Mexican -troops were extremely mobile. Ampudia's main force, at the end of a long -march, did 180 miles in four days. Screened by rancheros and living on -a little corn and jerked beef carried in their pouches, a body of light -cavalry could have reached San Antonio by way of Laredo, ruined the -town, and been well on their way toward home before their movement would -have been suspected at Corpus Christi. The government received warnings -of this danger from Dimond and from Parrott in 1845; Marcy and Polk -feared it; and the probable rejection of Slidell--which meant a triumph -of the war party--seemed likely to accentuate the peril. In fact Mejía -ordered irregulars into Texas on February 16 and March 17, though, as -their commander aspired to execute a revolution with American aid, he -did us no harm.[7.31] - -Nor were only such formal incursions to be guarded against. The war -of 1836 in Texas had shown what outrages Mexicans were capable of -committing, and similar affairs had now begun to occur. In one instance -a party of fifteen, including women, after having been induced to -surrender, were all butchered except a single person, who survived -though seriously wounded. In April, 1846, the Mexicans opposite -Matamoros confessed that bloodthirsty guerillas were abroad. Ampudia, -whose murderous record had been his chief distinction, commanded there. -May 13 the British consul in that city reported that licensed bands of -assassins, "caressed, rewarded, and encouraged" by the authorities, -were committing atrocities near the Rio Grande; and, had the way been -open, such gangs might have robbed and murdered in the settlements of -Texas.[7.32] - -The position selected by Taylor was admirably suited to this emergency. -Scott, though a Whig, wrote out a long explanation, showing that on -the Rio Grande the army had a more healthful camp than before, better -drinking water, more abundant fuel, better grazing and a better port. -Information could be obtained more quickly; the border watched more -closely; an invading force pursued more promptly; and its line of -retreat cut more certainly. Besides, the river amounted to a great -breastwork, for this part of it could be crossed with safety at only -certain points, and a body of men, even though comparatively small, -could not cross anywhere on its lower course without peril. It was -not, however, simply that the Rio Grande position seemed far the best. -The nature of the region made it essential. Taylor had to be in that -vicinity or else near Corpus Christi, and for purposes of defence the -latter point could not be deemed satisfactory. Now the necessity of -defence was entirely due to the threatening conduct of Mexico. Therefore -she could not reasonably complain of our precautions; and if she could -not complain, then no one could do so in her name.[7.33] - -But the challenge was triumphantly thrown out: Can it be denied that -our taking a position on the river did in fact cause the war? In view -of the data it can and should be denied. First, joint occupation of the -disputed region might have gone on peaceably, as occupation of that -character has continued elsewhere, but for a distinctly aggressive step -on the part of Mexico; and, secondly, for her the Rio Grande had no -particular significance. She claimed all of Texas, and intended to drive -us from it, if she could. Furthermore, the crass vanity and ambition of -Mexican generals and the exigencies of domestic politics would probably -have led to an attack upon us, had Taylor remained at Corpus Christi, -or even pitched his camp at San Antonio. In spite of express orders, -Mejía actually attempted an offensive in the intermediate region. When -the Mexican government gave formal notice to England and France in the -summer of 1845 that war had become inevitable, our army lay far from the -Rio Grande. Taylor's advance to the Bold River no more produced the war -than Pitcairn's march to Lexington produced the American revolution. It -was an effect and an occasion, but not a cause.[7.34] - -[MEXICO THE AGGRESSOR] - -Finally, as a matter of fact, the hostilities were deliberately -precipitated by the will and act of Mexico. The circumstances proved -this and testimony illuminates them. In October, 1847, a pamphlet -written by Mariano Otero, editor of _El Siglo XIX_ and Senator from the -state of Jalisco, appeared. His object was by no means to defend the -United States, but he said: "The American forces did not advance to -the Rio Grande until after the war became inevitable, and then only as -an army of observation.... The military rebellion of San Luis [Potosí] -gave rise to a government [that of Paredes] pledged to resist all -accommodation [with the United States] ... which government ... began -hostilities." Arista declared in December, 1847, "I had the pleasure of -being the first to begin the war." In short, Polk told only the truth -when he said the conflict was forced upon us. Mexico wanted it; Mexico -threatened it; Mexico issued orders to wage it; and on April 18 her -President, no doubt in view of his political difficulties, insisted upon -those orders. "It is indispensable," he wrote urgently to Arista, "that -hostilities begin, yourself taking the initiative."[7.35] - -"If in a litigious affair," declared Vattel, "our adversary refuses -the means of bringing the right to proof, or artfully eludes it; if he -does not, with good faith, apply to pacific measures for terminating -the difference, and above all, if he is the first who begins acts of -hostility, he renders just [even] the cause which was before doubtful." -Every condition of this judgment fitted the course of Mexico.[7.36] - - - - - VIII - - PALO ALTO, RESACA DE LA PALMA - - May, 1846 - - -[THE MEXICAN ARMY] - -The Mexico of 1845 had an elaborate military organization. In addition -to the comandantes general--regularly one in each department or -state--there were six generals at the head of the six military Divisions -in which the political divisions of the country had been grouped. -The college at Chapultepec provided a full course of instruction for -officers; and though it seemed hardly worth while to spend three -years there in order to become a second lieutenant, when one could -leap at once into a captaincy or something better by acting as the -tool of a revolting general, there were never less than one hundred -students.[8.1] - -At the head of the army stood a sort of general staff called the -plana mayor; but the duties of this inefficient body fell mostly to -the engineers, some of whom possessed excellent qualifications, while -others--admitted to the corps for political or personal reasons--did -not. The artillery, which included nominally four brigades with fourteen -batteries, suffered from this all-pervading evil and also from defects -of its own. Many of the guns had come down from olden times, though -a large number of the field pieces equalled any the United States -possessed; not a few were honeycombed; and the carriages were mostly -of the old Gribeauval pattern. To convey ammunition, carts had to be -obtained when needed. For the transportation of ordnance, mules or oxen -were usually hired by contract; and, as the drivers had no acquaintance -with artillery drill and tactics, battery evolutions were out of the -question, and guns could be moved but slowly, if at all, during an -engagement.[8.1] - -The so-called Permanent infantry consisted substantially of three Light -(_Ligero_) and twelve Line regiments, and there were also twenty-five -Active (_Activo_) corps, large or small, which, though originally -designed as a sort of reserve to be called out in emergencies, were now -constantly under arms. Owing to the great extent of the country the -regiments were broken into sections, which assumed to be independent; -and for this reason drill, discipline and _esprit de corps_ suffered -greatly. Training and equipment left much to be desired. When four -simple manoeuvres were understood, soldiers were pronounced perfect. For -arms almost all the infantry had flint-lock muskets, many of which had -been discarded by the British army. Firing from the hip to avoid the -recoil marred their aim; and, partly in consequence of using too much -powder, they generally fired high. Of horse there were ten Permanent -and five Activo regiments besides numerous minor units. The cavalry -included also nearly fifty Presidial companies, originally designed to -guard the frontier against Indian raids; but these had almost vanished -except in name, and the remnants were extremely inefficient. The mounted -men carried in general a sword and a sort of blunderbuss called the -_escopeta_, but many used lances instead of swords. About 3000 Coast -Guards are also to be mentioned, but as a rule they were expected merely -to defend the ports where they lived and the immediate vicinity. In all -there may have been 32,000 men under arms in 1845.[8.1] - -The medical corps suffered at all times from the low quality of its -personnel and from its defective equipment; and the accommodations -for surgeons in a campaign were so poor that many found pretexts for -remaining behind when their corps took the field. The commissaries -had peculiar difficulties to meet. A Mexican army drew supplies from -places near it and not from government dépôts; and when money failed, -as it often did, payments had to be made with drafts on the treasury, -which possessed an uncertain value. Hence people often would not part -with supplies, the troops went hungry, and the natural tendency toward -inefficiency and desertion was accentuated. In order to release the -army from service in the interior, when hostilities became imminent in -1845, it was decided to organize volunteer corps; but almost every one, -however anxious to see the United States chastised, preferred to let -somebody else do the work.[8.1] - -Mexico, then, did not exactly rise _en masse_ to sweep Taylor -away,[8.2] yet the forces gathered at Matamoros could be termed -respectable. Arista seems to have had about 175 artillerymen, 3500 -infantry, 1100 cavalry, 425 irregular horse under General Antonio -Canales and some 500 Matamoros volunteers--in all, say, 5700 men -including officers and ineffectives. His first brigade consisted of -infantry led by García, a fine man and officer; the second, also -infantry, had Vega, a brave and patriotic soldier, for commander; and -the third brigade, cavalry, was under Torrejón, who possessed one -excellent quality--the instinct of self-preservation. Canales could be -described succinctly as a border ruffian and conspirator; and Ampudia, -second in general command, was about the same thing plus a cosmopolitan -varnish.[8.3] - -[MEXICAN PREPARATIONS AT MATAMOROS] - -After news of Taylor's intention to advance reached Matamoros, the -Mexicans worked most zealously in constructing fortifications there, -and by the end of April had a series of earthworks. Just above the city -was erected Fort Paredes, laid out in regular style for 800 men, which -guarded the ferry of Las Anacuitas. Two redoubts, crossing their fires, -were planted opposite Fort Brown at a distance of seven or eight hundred -yards; and two or three minor forts commanded approaches. Gabions or -wicker-work strengthened the embrasures, and fascines and sand-bags were -freely used. No guns heavier than 12-pounders defended the works, and -no platforms were laid; but in general the ordnance was of brass, well -cared for though somewhat honeycombed.[8.4] - -For a number of reasons the garrison felt confident. Through deserters -and spies they knew as much as they were capable of understanding about -the American army. To Mejía our general seemed "more contemptible than -the lowest of Mexican tailors," and to Ampudia "an absolute nullity." -The martial Worth, who did impress them, left the front at the beginning -of April because Polk decided against him on the question of brevet -rank. Hitchcock had been compelled to go north on sick leave. For some -good reason every infantry colonel and many others in high positions -were absent. One regiment had not a field officer, and in another only a -single company could boast a captain. Personally the officers in general -were believed to lack harmony and zeal, and the men to be discontented, -hopeless, unwilling to fight, and enfeebled by their hardships and -misbehavior at Corpus Christi. According to Mexican reports our -cavalry could neither shoot nor control their hard-bitted horses, -and our infantry, chiefly composed--except the officers--of needy -foreigners, came short in discipline, training and every other soldierly -qualification save appetite. "Those adventurers cannot withstand the -bayonet charge of our foot," said Mejía, "nor a cavalry charge with the -lance."[8.5] - - [Illustration: MATAMOROS AND FORT BROWN SKETCH MAP - -A Fort Brown B 44-pounders C Traverse D American Infantry E American -Dragoons F American Cannon G Artillery Battalion H Mexican Mortars I -Mexican Batteries J Mexican Infantry K Mexican Cavalry ] - -No very alarming degree of intelligence had appeared to direct the -American operations. Our troops were on a point exposed to a convergent -fire; Fort Brown enfiladed none of the hostile batteries, though it -might have been planned to do this; near the cavalry camp stood thick -groves offering shelter to assailants; behind our main position was a -lagoon forming--with a bend of the river--almost a circle; and the -enemy, once in possession of the single road, which ran for seven or -eight miles through rough country, would have had the army in a bottle. -All the ammunition and provisions were brought by wagon from the coast, -exposed to attack at every step. The imperfectly fortified base at Point -Isabel, stored with indispensable supplies, had a garrison of only two -companies aside from two or three hundred sutlers, clerks, teamsters -and the like; and vessels could approach the landing only by a narrow -passage between two islands, which could have been closed by a few -6-pounders. Yet we should have encouraged Mexico beyond calculation, -and might have been injured greatly in Europe, had we now given up Fort -Brown.[8.6] - -A number of small disasters overtook the Americans. Colonel Cross, -chief of the quartermaster's department, went out and never came -back. April 22 Lieutenant Porter and ten men, operating against the -banditti, allowed their arms to get wet, and were scattered with loss -by a party of Mexicans. Twenty of the Texas rangers commanded by -Captain Walker permitted themselves to be surprised, and half of them -were either killed or driven beyond recall. Taylor attributed these -mishaps to a lack of experience, but the enemy regarded them as proofs -of inferiority; and when Thornton's party succumbed, the enthusiasm -burst all bounds. "Honor and glory a thousand and one times" to the -"brave men" of the army, cried a Tampico leaflet, and a triumph in the -anticipated battle appeared certain.[8.7] - -[MEXICAN CONFIDENCE] - -From another source also the Mexicans drew encouragement. While Taylor's -officers were nearly all West Pointers and perhaps quite all native -Americans, many of the privates were in fact of European birth and a -large percentage Roman Catholics. To these Mejía, Ampudia and Arista -issued moving appeals based upon religious prejudice and alleged -foreign condemnation of our course toward Mexico, gilded with generous -promises of rewards for deserting, supported by the luring voices of -gayly dressed sirens who lined the opposite bank of the river all day, -and reinforced by two captured American dragoons, who were given back, -and reported that deserters received handsome treatment. A considerable -number of men, largely veteran offenders from the British army, stole -across; most of the Seventh Infantry were believed ready to change -sides; and the Mexicans boasted exultingly that "Old Taylor" himself -would soon be over.[8.8] - -Arista, who had spent several years in the United States, did not feel -very sanguine. Ampudia's predictions of glory he regarded as "castles in -the air," or as perhaps intended to raise expectations that Ampudia's -successor would be unable to satisfy. But the officers and the troops -felt impatient for combat. So loudly and so long had the charges of -haughtiness, perfidy, aggressiveness and greed been reiterated against -us, that all believed them true. The Americans were in their eyes -accursed heretics, eager to trample under foot their holy religion: -and they were also barbarians, capable of everything rough and cruel. -In the event of their success the family hearth was to be polluted, -the glorious, dearly-bought independence of the nation crushed, and -the adored accents of the mother-tongue stifled. To the Indian rank -and file the word "patriotism," indeed, meant little; but they loved -their villages, and could imagine even worse tyrants than Mexicans. -The name "foreigner" had a terrible sound in their ears, and fanatical -devotion to the Roman church set their passionate natures aflame. At -the first sight of the "detestable" Stars and Stripes fluttering in -the breeze, they had loudly demanded battle, and later the confident -hope of triumph gave a still keener edge to their enthusiasm. Taylor -evidently despised the enemy, believing there was no fight in them; -but those tawny fellows, though miserably clothed and apparently -spiritless, were trained to "blind obedience," could fight like devils -while their strength and fury lasted, and had now reached a good state -of discipline. Even Captain Hardee of Thornton's command, a prisoner -at large in Matamoros, believed the Mexicans would gain the coming -battle.[8.9] - -One of Taylor's most obvious needs in taking post on the Rio Grande was -a light corps available for scouting, and in ordering him to advance, -Marcy had expressly authorized him to call upon the Texans--by whom legs -were valued chiefly as the means of sticking to a horse--for assistance; -but nothing was done about the matter. On April 11 a friend in Matamoros -warned him that an attempt might be made to cut his line to Point -Isabel, but he did not seem to feel concerned. His troops were merely -drawn beyond the effective range of Ampudia's artillery; the work of -fortifying was quickened; on the 23d he described the fort complacently -as "in a condition of defence"; and a week later he contented himself -with having the road inspected for seven miles. Point Isabel, he said as -early as April 12, could withstand attack.[8.10] - - [Illustration: Fort Brown to Brazos Island] - -Arista, for his part, decided quite naturally, while on his way -to Matamoros, that he would plant himself on the American line of -communication, and prevent our army from receiving ammunition, -provisions and reinforcements. Accordingly the 1600 men under Torrejón, -after disposing of Thornton's command, passed Fort Brown, held the road -for some days without the knowledge of Taylor, and then by a grave -blunder were drawn away, and concentrated on the Rio Grande opposite -Longoreño, eight or ten miles below the city, to protect the crossing -of the other troops, who proceeded to that point by several routes in -order to deceive the Americans. The last day of the month Ampudia with -his brigade and four guns went over; and on May 1 Arista--leaving Mejía -with about 1400 men to hold Matamoros--followed with his other brigade -and eight pieces. Unfortunately for him three scows of little capacity -were the only boats available; and as these had been taken to Longoreño -in carts by a circuitous route nearly fifteen miles in length, so as to -avoid exciting our suspicions, they were not in good order. One or two, -in fact, seem to have been almost useless, and hence many precious hours -were lost; but at any rate the army succeeded in crossing a swift river -without injury almost under the eyes of the Americans.[8.11] - -[TAYLOR ALARMED] - -By about one o'clock in the afternoon on the first of May Taylor heard -that Mexicans were below him, and awoke. He saw now that Fort Brown -required munitions and food, and that Point Isabel could not, even yet, -resist a serious attack. Tents came down in haste; the wagon train was -made ready; and at about half-past three--leaving behind the Seventh -Infantry commanded by Major Brown, with Captain Lowd's four 18-pounders, -Lieutenant Bragg's field battery and the sick, under orders to hold -out as long as possible--Taylor marched for the coast. No time was -lost in getting there. The troops bivouacked that night on the damp, -chilly plain without fires, and early the next morning set out again. -The shallow, greenish-brown lagoons rimmed with broad, flat, oozing -banks of mud, the marshes full of tawny grass, and the low ridges -mottled with patches of herbage and bald surfaces of gleaming dry dirt, -seemed interminable; but as hours passed the now sultry air began to -be streaked with salt odors, and by noon the panting troops caught the -sparkle of blue waves. Fortunately they could not hear the shouts of joy -in Matamoros over what was called their precipitate flight.[8.12] - -As it was necessary to strengthen the defences, all the troops now -exchanged their muskets for picks and shovels. May 6 the engineer in -charge was authorized to continue the work by employing a hundred -laborers; and at about three o'clock the next day, escorting more than -200 loaded wagons, the little army, preceded by a body of dragoons, -moved out on the return march. As the small garrison of Fort Brown had -provisions for at least three weeks, and the Mexicans could not be -expected to attack it seriously with Taylor approaching their rear, -whereas they were practically sure to be met on the road, Taylor's best -officers entreated him to gain freedom of action by leaving the train -behind, which at most would have delayed it only a day or so; but he -would not. No fears disturbed his mind. Reinforced with perhaps 200 -men just landed at the Point, the army now with him numbered 2228, -all told. Recent exercise and drill had left it in a splendid physical -condition. Recollecting how long popular orators had been mocking at the -"regulars," it longed to do something. The attacks upon Cross, Walker, -Porter and Thornton had exasperated its temper; nothing could have -pleased the great majority of the soldiers better than a fight; and the -General felt very much the same way.[8.13] - -When it had made about seven miles the army bivouacked, and early the -next day it resumed the march. Soon after noon, when some ten or twelve -miles more had been covered, a low, dark line could be seen across the -plain in front, some two or three miles away. It was the Mexican army. -As the pond or water-hole of Palo Alto lay near, the tired and thirsty -troops were permitted to halt, rest a little, drink and fill their -canteens; and then Taylor had them posted in order of battle. At the -extreme right the Fifth Infantry led by Lieutenant Colonel McIntosh was -placed, and on its left in succession came Major Ringgold's battery, -the Third Infantry (Captain Morris), two 18-pounders on siege carriages -under Lieutenant Churchill, and the Fourth Infantry (Major Allen). The -Third and Fourth made up a brigade, commanded by Lieutenant Colonel -Garland; and all the troops just mentioned, together with Twiggs's -dragoons, some 250 strong, in two squadrons led by Captains Kerr and -May, formed the right wing. The other wing, known as the first brigade -and commanded by Lieutenant Colonel Belknap, consisted of the Artillery -Battalion under Lieutenant Colonel Childs, Captain Duncan's battery, and -the Eighth Infantry, posted in this order from right to left. The wagons -were then assembled near the pond at the side of some woods, and Kerr -was detached with his squadron to guard them.[8.14] - - [Illustration: BATTLE OF PALO ALTO - May 8, 1846 - - American Forces Black - Mexican Forces Red - Regmental numeral III - Artillery battalion A - Kerr's squadron K - May's squadron M - Ringold's battery R - Duncan's battery D - Churchill's battery C - Tampico Corps T - Zapadores (Sappers) Z - Presidiales P Light Cavalry L - - Infantry-First position - Intermediate position - Final position - Cavalry-First position - Intermediate position - Final position - Artillery-First position - Intermediate position - Final position - Wagon Train-First position - - (The positions of the troops can be indicated only - approximately.) - -[BATTLE OF PALO ALTO] - -During these days Arista had waited for Taylor's return; but, in order -to hasten that and perhaps accomplish direct results, he had ordered -the guns of Matamoros to begin cannonading Fort Brown on the morning of -May 3, and two days later, believing the garrison were near starvation, -sent Ampudia to invest it. For the sake of water and to cover all of -the roads that might be taken by the American army, he placed himself -at Los Tanques del Ramireño; and about noon on the eighth, learning -of Taylor's approach, he set out for Palo Alto, some five miles -away. Shortly before gaining that point he saw through his glass blue -American dragoons in the far distance, and, as quickly as he could, -put his troops in position. At the extreme right were placed about 150 -horse under Noriega, and then came a 4-pounder, a corps of Sappers, the -Second Light Infantry, the Tampico Veteran Company and Coast Guards, -five 4-pounders, the First, the Sixth and the Tenth Infantry, and -finally, beyond an interval of about 400 yards and somewhat in advance, -Torrejón and the rest of the cavalry--their front extended, their right -strengthened with two small guns, and their left reaching beyond the -Point Isabel road to a piece of chaparral on a slight elevation beside a -swamp. In the rear of the line were some thickets; just behind the right -wing an eminence eighteen or twenty feet high rose above chaparral; -protected by this lay a watering-place; and in front there were some -boggy pools and wide fields of stiff grass almost shoulder-high.[8.14] - -As soon as formed, the Americans advanced in silence--the 18-pounders, -drawn by oxen, following the road--while Lieutenant Blake reconnoitred -the Mexican line within musket range to look for artillery. At about -two o'clock Ampudia came in sight with the Fourth Infantry, commanded -by Colonel Uraga, a company of Sappers, two 8-pounders, and about -400 irregular horse under Canales. Upon this Arista and his staff, a -blaze of gold lace, passed rapidly down the line. It seemed strange -to find in his position a tall, raw-boned man with red hair and sandy -whiskers; but he showed the martial bearing of his nation, and harangued -the troops with genuine Mexican eloquence. They were found ready for -battle. Answering him with loud vivas they made ready their arms. The -silken banners fluttered; the bands played; and at about half-past -two or three o'clock, by the General's order, his artillery opened. -The hostile armies were then approximately half a mile apart; and the -Mexicans--drawn out, except the cavalry, only two deep on a front -about a mile in length without reserves--seemed to number 6000, though -probably not more than two thirds as many.[8.14] - -Apparently Taylor's plan had been to force a passage by charging, for -his aim was to reach Fort Brown, and his infantry had been instructed, -the day before, to rely mainly on the bayonet; but he now halted. All -his infantry except the Eighth regiment deployed into line. At strange -words of command--"Haw, Brindle!" "Whoa, Brandy!"--ten yoke of oxen -wheeled each ammunition wagon into its place; and the cannon advanced. -At this juncture Ampudia's column approached the field. Canales led his -men a considerable distance forward into the scattered chaparral on the -Mexican left, probably with a view to cutting off Taylor's retreat, and -thus put himself entirely out of the battlefield; but the rest of the -command proceeded toward their appointed place between Torrejón and the -infantry, and as this movement appeared to mean a charge, the American -fire was turned in that direction. Without faltering, however, they -moved up to the line and deployed, but their route was marked with the -fallen.[8.14] - -Now ensued about an hour of cannonading, supported by our troops with -shouts that often drowned the roar of the guns, and endured by the -Mexicans with unfailing constancy. Arista's pieces, though bravely and -skilfully served, were mostly too light. The balls generally fell short, -and as they ricocheted, our men stepped aside. But the American practice -met every hope. Sometimes a single shot appeared to mow down a whole -platoon of mounted men; and here, there, everywhere gaps opened in the -infantry. With vivas the gaps instantly closed, but they would not stay -closed.[8.14] - -Arista, a bold and experienced officer, expecting Taylor to act on such -a plan as Taylor seems actually to have formed, intended to charge both -flanks of the advancing Americans with cavalry supported by infantry; -but the American artillery surprised him almost as much as if Taylor -had used shooting stars. Probably the right course for him would have -been to attack anyhow, for his men were still eager to fight, a cannon -could be discharged only about once a minute, and our batteries would -not have done much more harm at 70 than at 700 yards. But apparently it -seemed impracticable to wallow slowly for such a distance through the -grass, the sharp edges of which would have cut the legs of his poorly -dressed soldiers badly, under so withering a fire. Something had to be -done, however, for the troops grew impatient. He therefore directed his -right wing to prepare for a charge, and ordered Torrejón and his two -small guns to attack the American right, rear and wagons. Reluctantly -Torrejón obeyed. Passing to the left, his "red lancers"--probably a -thousand strong and "portentous" with trumpets, banners and lance -points--advanced through the scattered chaparral and across a slough, -becoming somewhat broken on the way, and found themselves at another -small morass. Evidently the nature of the ground on which he was likely -to operate had not interested Torrejón.[8.14] - -Taylor, sitting unconcernedly with one leg over the pommel of his -saddle, writing, was notified of this movement and simply replied, "Keep -a bright lookout for them." But some one--probably Twiggs, who commanded -the right wing--had the Fifth Infantry march rapidly more than a quarter -of a mile to the right and rear, and throw itself into a square. -Torrejón awkwardly approached this body in column instead of line with -some of the worthless Presidials in the lead, fired ineffectively, was -answered with a disconcerting though not very injurious volley, and -recoiled some 300 yards. He then sent word to Arista that a morass -rendered his movement impracticable; but on receiving instructions to -persevere, he made a circuit, advanced upon the second front of the -square, and once more exchanged a volley. Now, however, he found our -Third Infantry moving to defend the wagons, and saw two of Ringgold's -cannon hurrying to the scene at a gallop, while his own pieces had -not come up. As rapidly as possible, therefore, and quite willingly, -he retreated, but not without a salute from our two cannon, which he -was unable to return. This unsuccessful manoeuvre exhausted Arista's -ingenuity, and he only waited now for darkness, hoping to get away and -find a better position.[8.14] - -During these operations a wad from Duncan's battery had fired the grass. -The wind from the Gulf, nearly parallel to the American front, drove a -wall of roaring, crackling flame and a cloud of thick smoke across the -plain; and, as the armies could see each other only now and then and -in spots, firing had to be suspended for nearly an hour. Meanwhile, -believing the Mexican left had given way, Taylor shifted his position -behind the screen with a view to advancing. Churchill pushed on by the -road nearly to where Torrejón had been; the Fourth Infantry moved up to -support him; the Fifth went ahead on the extreme right; the rest of the -army made corresponding changes; and as a whole the line diverged now -thirty or forty degrees from its original direction, while the wagons -came nearly up to it.[8.14] - -But the Mexican left had not yielded, and so Taylor found when he sent -a squadron of dragoons to open the way. To avoid being enfiladed, -Arista swung his line forward in excellent order, using the Fourth -Infantry as a pivot, and again it stood firm under an artillery fire -more destructive than at first. Indeed our Fourth Infantry began to -suffer a galling cannonade, and Torrejón again assumed the offensive. -Canister from the 18-pounders checked him, however, and after sharp -musketry exchanges between the Mexican line and our Artillery Battalion, -which had advanced and formed a square, serious infantry operations -in this quarter came to an end. As for the artillery, Arista had now -used up his 650 cannon balls; but the Americans kept at work until -nightfall.[8.14] - -On our left, however, important events occurred. From the first Captain -Duncan's battery, which made two fire-units because handled in sections, -played a brilliant and effective rôle, supported by the Eighth Infantry -and either Kerr's or May's dragoons, and advancing or retiring as the -course of the battle dictated. When Arista's change of front threw his -right forward nearly 700 yards and seemed to threaten a flank attack, -these pieces became more active and more daring than ever, and under -their blasting discharges, aided more or less at this time by the -18-pounders, the Mexicans fell rapidly. Again they grew impatient--not -principally because they were suffering so terribly, but because they -were inactive, and because hints that Arista had sold them began to -arrive from Ampudia's quarter; and finally the extreme right wing -broke.[8.14] - -After a time some of the officers and Arista, who exposed himself -bravely throughout the battle, induced these troops to go back, and as -they were still in much confusion, the remnants of Noriega's corps, -reinforced with 200 men from Torrejón, were ordered to support them. -The cavalry, however, badly demoralized themselves, dashed blindly at -a trot against the infantry; the resulting disorder extended even to -the Tampico men; and these desperate corps, ordered to charge as the -only possible way to prevent them from bolting, moved forward aimlessly -in succession. Duncan, when he saw this large force advance, withdrew -a little, still firing; but soon under cover of the smoke he came up -again, and gained an enfilading position. Suddenly with a sharp crack -his guns opened, and against the fading horizon his shells and shrapnel -could be seen bursting, with almost the regularity of signal rockets, -over those dark masses. Driven like sheep by this fire, the Mexican -right wing turned toward the left and hurried across the entire field, -presenting their flank and to some extent their rear to the Americans at -a distance of 200 paces or even less, while, in a somewhat more orderly -manner, the First Infantry, which stood next in line, followed them. -Now was the time to decide the battle; but, though Taylor had come to -this part of the field, nothing could be done, for it was feared that -should a charge be made, the enemy's cavalry might reach the wagons, and -cripple our army by destroying the provisions. Indeed, the Americans -appear to have drawn back a little toward the train; and the disordered -Mexicans, having reached the extreme left and finally the rear of their -line, were re-formed.[8.14] - -It was now about seven o'clock. The Americans had lost five killed and -forty-three wounded, and the Mexicans probably seven times as many. The -afterglow of sunset lighted up the dun clouds of smoke. Darkness was -close at hand. Necessarily, therefore, the struggle ended; and while -the Mexicans retired through the chaparral to the low eminence behind -the original position of their right wing, and there camped in order -of battle, the Americans bivouacked where they stood, or in the fitful -glare of the still burning grass gave attention to such of both armies -as could be discovered lying on the field. At last the prairie fire -burned out; the smoke of battle drifted away; the full moon appeared; -and the tired troops, watched over by pacing guards, slept between the -stacks of arms like images.[8.14] - -Important moral results had been gained by the Americans, but they -were not aware of the fact, and expected the battle to be resumed. At -about seven o'clock the next morning, however, as the light mist slowly -dissolved, their astonished eyes beheld the Mexican line gliding off -into the road; and presently, like the tail of a huge serpent, its rear -wound away into the chaparral, and vanished. Taylor gazed and reflected, -moved a short distance, waited to ascertain through a party of dragoons -that it was a genuine retreat, consulted with some of his principal -officers, and then decided on pursuit; but the forenoon had to be -spent in erecting breastworks and planting four heavy cannon to defend -the train, which he now saw should be left behind; and he merely sent -forward a composite force of 220 men, under Captain McCall of the Fourth -Infantry, to harass the Mexican rear.[8.15] - - [Illustration: BATTLE OF RESACA DE LA PALMA] - -[ARISTA IN A NEW POSITION] - -Arista turned this delay to good account. The chaparral and woods that -his troops had been seen to enter extended with some interruptions to -the Rio Grande, a distance of approximately seven miles; and two hours -before noon, after marching about halfway through it, he stopped at the -Resaca de Guerrero. The Resaca was an ancient channel of the river, -but it now consisted merely of a shallow, muddy ravine somewhat in -the shape of a bow, several hundred feet wide and three or four feet -deep at the banks, lying substantially east and west across the route, -with its concave side toward Palo Alto. At the bottom of it, both to -the right and to the left of the road, lay narrow ponds, and the space -between the water and the banks was rather closely filled with bushes -and small trees. Facing round here, Arista planted three or four guns -at the right, or east, of the road from Palo Alto where it approached -the Resaca, two at least--hidden with branches of trees--on the southern -bank of the Resaca, and other pieces at suitable points toward his left. -The infantry were placed in two wings divided by the road, with much the -greater weight on the right hand, some of the troops taking position -just in the rear of the ravine, some behind its northern bank, and -some in the chaparral still farther forward. The headquarters tent was -pitched in a small clear space or _placeta_ about 500 paces back on the -left of the road, and Torrejón's cavalry halted in the same road still -farther away; while Canales with two guns, placing himself on the left a -considerable distance back from the Resaca, guarded a cross-road leading -to Arista's rear.[8.16] - -The Mexican position, besides covering every line to Fort Brown, offered -a number of other advantages. It did not call for much use of artillery, -and therefore neutralized Arista's deficiency in cannon ammunition. The -woods made it impossible for the Americans to employ that dreaded arm -effectively. The bank of the Resaca formed a natural breastwork, and -it seemed likely that the troops, protected in this manner, would be -confident and firm. But evidently a bold and enterprising enemy could -take advantage of the woods to conceal his movements; and evidently, -too, Arista's main batteries could fire only in the direction of the -road, since there were Mexicans in advance of the Resaca both to right -and to left. Another handicap lay in the impossibility of surveying the -field and manoeuvring troops--particularly the cavalry; the soldiers, -unable to see far, lacked that sense of union and support which Mexicans -peculiarly needed; and the want of reserves, though to a certain extent -a part of the Fourth Infantry stationed on the right behind the Resaca -could act as such, was an additional source of weakness.[8.16] - -A still more serious feature of Arista's situation was the condition -of his troops. Many, and probably most of them, had not eaten for more -than twenty-four hours. The sufferings they had witnessed and the -neglect of their fallen comrades had worked upon their feelings. The -dreadful effectiveness of the American artillery had been profoundly -discouraging; many of their officers had proved unworthy of confidence; -and above all, accustomed to the duplicity of Mexican leaders and -unable to understand their general's inactivity the day before, many -concluded that Arista, who was accused of seeking American support for -his alleged revolutionary scheme, had betrayed them. This idea, if we -may trust common sense and Mexican intimations, was suggested or at -least encouraged by Ampudia himself; and the coöperation of all these -depressing influences had spread a general conviction through the army -by the forenoon of May 9 that a great disaster would befall it that -day. A few, it was said, broke their weapons in despair; and utter -dejection could be read in the faces of every corps. Some reinforcements -were drawn from the city, but they did not materially improve the -situation.[8.16] - -[BATTLE OF RESACA DE LA PALMA] - -Taylor, then, advancing at about two o'clock, after detaching most -of the Artillery Battalion and perhaps Kerr's dragoons to guard the -train, moved forward to the edge of the woods, and halted at what was -called the Resaca de la Palma to await information. The advance corps -under McCall, which consisted principally of the light companies of -the first brigade under Captain C. F. Smith, was now feeling its way -toward the enemy. At a little after two o'clock, turning a bend in the -road, it found cannon in front. Instantly they fired. About half a -dozen Americans fell, and the rest quickly withdrew. At three o'clock -McCall's report arrived at headquarters. Taylor pushed on immediately, -and in about an hour came up with the advance party. Ringgold's battery, -now commanded by Lieutenant Ridgely, was sent forward on the road, and -McCall's command, thrown into the chaparral on both sides, began a slow -and painful advance through the bushes. Almost immediately it found -itself in contact with the enemy.[8.16] - -Under such circumstances McCall could give the battery no support, of -course, and the only reasonable expectation was that Ridgely's men and -horses would be shot from the woods, and his guns be taken. That, -however, made no difference to him. His orders were to advance, and -advance he would. Once a body of lancers charged his guns, but by a -combination of courage, skill and good luck he routed it. Some of the -Mexican artillery seems to have moved up the road a little way after -McCall retired; but Ridgely, pushing on even into the very smoke of the -enemy's cannon, drove them in spite of stubborn resistance beyond the -edge of the Resaca, and then sent back for troops to help him capture -them. When the battle became more general he continued to fire upon -the Mexican batteries; and, as far as he could without endangering -Americans, he also swept the woods with canister, frightening the -enemy with a terrible noise in the tree-tops that reminded them of the -slaughter at Palo Alto.[8.16] - -To right and to left the battle soon raged. All the Americans on the -ground, numbering about 1700, were put in. No general guidance could -be exercised. "Chance was the lord of all save the good right arms" of -the troops, wrote an officer. In such woods and thickets lines could -not be formed. Even companies found it impossible to remain intact. A -field officer was no more than a captain, and a captain no more than a -subaltern. All got into the work promptly, and all did their best when -there. As fast as they could, singly or in little squads, they pushed -on, cheering and shouting. Often it required one's utmost exertions to -squeeze through or hack through the dense and thorny chaparral under -pelting showers of bullets. Now there was shooting, and now the cold -steel struck fire. "My orders was to make free use of the bayonet," -said the General afterwards, and the orders were borne in mind. Here -Lieutenant Meade, the future victor of Gettysburg, had a chance to win -his spurs; and he was but one of many heroes, though perhaps the most -conspicuous in his quarter.[8.16] - -Nor did the Americans have it all their own way. Those Mexicans who -fought at all this day, fought like tigers. On the right near the -road the Second Light Infantry, which had been placed there in ambush -just before the real battle opened, stood firm; but most of its field -officers were struck down, and it had to give way. A company of Uraga's -regiment did nobly close by, and every man of it, we are told, was -either killed or wounded.[8.16] - -Farther toward Arista's left, however, our men pushed forward rather -easily, though it seemed evident from the firing that Mexicans were in -front. Gaining ground in this direction some Americans probably came -upon a path which led round the western end of the pond, and gave access -to the Mexican flank. Just before the battle began Ampudia learned of -the path, and stationed a company of the Sappers and a company of the -Fourth Infantry in this quarter; and later he sent another detachment -from the Fourth with a gun. Besides these meagre forces probably no -corps guarded the left except a few Tampico troops. These also fought -well; but the splendid silk banner of the Veterans, the bravest corps -in the army, was captured, and only at heavy cost could they fight -their way back. Meantime the rest of Uraga's regiment came over from -beyond the road, but it could not stop the Americans; and brave Captain -Barbour, followed by a small party, soon approached the placeta. The -effect was electrical. Nobody knew how many troops were following him. -Canales took flight. The sense of defeat, already imparted by hurrying -soldiers of the Second Light, spread across the road from the broken -left, and at about half-past five o'clock Arista's right wing, the -strength of the army, crumbled like a sand fort struck by a wave. Except -perhaps one, all the corps dissolved; and in a moment, as it seemed, -nothing was left but a mob of fugitives.[8.16] - -During all this, Taylor, exposing himself as much as any one, had been -fighting at the centre. The proper course to adopt there was to charge -the Mexican guns on the road with infantry, but for some reason he sent -May's dragoons against them. In a way the effort succeeded. Slashing as -they galloped, the horsemen quickly ran over the batteries--more than -a quarter of a mile beyond them, in fact; and then, coming back in a -scattered condition, had a chance to slash again, for the batteries had -been reoccupied. But the thickets on both sides were full of Mexican -infantry. Against their muskets the dragoons were mere targets--broad -ones, too; and before long the squadron, much the worse for its charge, -recrossed the Resaca. Taylor was disgusted. Turning to Belknap and the -Eighth Infantry he exclaimed, "Take those guns, and by ---- keep them!" -A part of the Fifth joined Belknap; and these men, rushing in furiously -all together, yelling like fiends, after a brief though sharp struggle -with the artillerymen--for the supporting infantry had now abandoned -their position--captured the pieces. But the battle had already been -won.[8.16] - -Before McCall had shown himself Arista, dazed perhaps by his reverse -at Palo Alto, valuing too highly his new position, and probably -overestimating the injury inflicted on Taylor the day before, had made -up his mind that no immediate attack was to be expected, and after -placing the army had withdrawn to his tent, and busied himself in -writing. Even when firing began, he said it was only a skirmish; and -after our troops reached his left flank, he merely ordered Ampudia and -the rest of the Fourth Infantry to go and settle things in that quarter. -When Americans appeared at the _placeta_, however, he awoke. Pouring -curses on the cowards of his army, he hurried to the cavalry, and -taking the place of Torrejón, who had refused to charge, dashed up the -road. His men lanced a few lingering American dragoons and helped a few -comrades to escape, but the battle could not be saved. On one side of -the road at least, Americans already held the chaparral, and like May he -could not stand against protected infantry.[8.16] - -At the head of the cavalry he retreated, therefore, and turning to -the left crossed the Rio Grande by one of the lower passages. Other -fugitives got over at various points; and a great number, passing Fort -Brown, which was about three miles from the battlefield, crowded to the -Anacuitas ferry. Here they found a couple of scows; and some troops, -that had been engaged all this time in annoying Fort Brown, stood on -guard. But the fleeing soldiers were panic-stricken, the boats moved -slowly, and the Americans were looked for at every moment. Men fought -for places. Clothing and arms were thrown away. Many tried to swim or -fell accidentally into the water, and an unknown number perished in the -swift current.[8.16] - - "Rio Bravo! Rio Bravo! - Saw men ever such a sight - Since the field of Roncesvalles - Sealed the fate of many a knight?" - -But the Americans did not come. Taylor had scarcely any fresh troops -except those guarding the wagons nearly or quite five miles in the -rear. May's dragoons had been used up. Apparently no effort had been -made to communicate with Fort Brown, and have its defenders--now tired -but not exhausted--sally forth to help reap the fruits of the expected -victory. Taylor only claimed to have captured "a number" of this utterly -broken army facing a difficult river. Even badly wounded men got safely -across, it would seem; and very soon, in spite of everything, nearly -four fifths--that is to say, about 4000 besides those under Canales--of -the troops commanded by Arista on the first of the month appear to -have been in safety on the south shore. He lost on May 9, according to -his official report, 160 killed, 228 wounded and 159 missing, but the -accuracy of the figures may be doubted. Fourteen officers, eight guns -and a large amount of property were captured by the Americans, while -their casualties were only 33 killed and 89 wounded.[8.16] - -During the whole week so dramatically concluded, Fort Brown had been -under attack.[8.17] On May 3 it replied vigorously, though with -trifling results, to the guns of Matamoros; but as Taylor, with more -than a month of good weather and about 300 wagons at his disposal, had -neglected to bring up a stock of ammunition, it fired only occasionally -after that in order to notify both friend and foe that its courage -still held good. On the 4th Canales occupied the road, and on the next -day Ampudia arrived with four guns and nearly a thousand men. Arista, -however, believing his cannon were not heavy enough to breach the wall -and confident that hunger would soon reduce the garrison, forbade -assault. The besiegers made themselves extremely disagreeable; but by -this time the Americans had bomb-proofs and "gopher holes," and, aside -from the death of Major Brown, met with no serious losses. Taylor's -profound silence, after as well as before the battle of Palo Alto, -caused intense anxiety; but when the cannon began to "bark" again on -the 9th, and especially when a throng of panic-stricken fugitives could -be seen rushing past, haggard faces put on smiles. Finally a solitary -messenger approached at a gallop with his reins on the horse's neck, -waving cap and sword, and shouting "Victory!" and the long strain ended -in exultation.[8.18] - -[SITUATION OF THE MEXICANS] - -The Mexican army was now hanging like a plum, overripe, shaken by -the wind and ready to fall. To the British consul it seemed utterly -demoralized, and beyond the possibility of reorganization. Yet there -it was permitted to rest and recuperate undisturbed. The official -explanation said that although a pontoon train had been proposed a long -time before, the dim prospect of hostilities had not seemed to warrant -that expense; but like numerous other official statements put out in the -course of the war, this explanation hid more than it told.[8.19] - -A bridge might have been in readiness; but, though several officers -had been laboring for more than a month to focus Taylor's mind upon -the subject, "the old gentleman," wrote Meade, "would never listen or -give it a moment's attention," Flat-boats and scows, towed by the light -steamers belonging to the army, might have been sent from Point Isabel -into the river, and the troops, reinforcements and light batteries, -crossing at the much-used ferry of Burrita, less than twenty miles from -Matamoras, and by land appearing at the town, say, in early morning, -could probably have taken army, cannon and ammunition substantially -complete. Instead of doing anything of this description, Taylor now sent -down to Point Isabel for mortars and for plank to make into boats, and -went there himself. A slight illness delayed him further; and in eight -days nothing was accomplished in the direction suggested beyond placing -at Burrita a battalion of the First Infantry and some 200 volunteers -just landed at Point Isabel.[8.19] - -Still, though let alone, Arista occupied no enviable position. He -was commonly charged with incompetence, treason or both. Many of the -officers had forsaken their troops in the hour of danger, and were now -viewed with distrust and contempt. The men felt exhausted and profoundly -disheartened. Even the dogs kept still. Provisions, ammunition and funds -were scant. Fierce complaints and recriminations became rife. Panic -brooded over all. Taylor's inaction seemed an encouraging sign, however, -and on the 17th a request for a suspension of hostilities, accompanied -with hints of a peaceful settlement, was made by Arista. This petition -Taylor rejected. But, not aware that a general's first duty in war is to -eliminate the fighting strength of the enemy, he said that Arista might -retire with his army, the sick and the wounded, if he would give up all -public property. In fact, as if anxious to fight these men again after -letting them get nicely rested, he threatened to bring Matamoros down -about their ears, unless they would move to a safer place.[8.20] - -Arista had been ordered to hold the city as long as possible, but a -council of officers pronounced it indefensible; and, besides feeling no -violent wish to sacrifice himself, he doubtless realized that nobody was -ready to stand by him. He therefore ordered now an immediate retreat, -and a wild scramble ensued. The transportation facilities were entirely -inadequate. Some of the guns and ammunition had to be thrown into the -river. The troops of Canales were dismissed. A large number of men -deserted; and the rest, leaving four or five hundred sick and wounded in -the town, hurried away. Fatigues and miseries almost unspeakable were -their lot, and also for some time a terrible fear of pursuit. Heat, -cold, thirst, famine, tempest, sickness, desertion, a route lined with -dead animals, sleep in the mud as profound as the sleep of the grave, -troopers carrying their horse furniture, deaths from exhaustion or -broken hearts, and even suicides--these made up the record. Finally, -almost at the end of the month 2638 men, according to an officer, -crawled painfully into Linares, and a week later Arista received orders -to place Mejía in command.[8.21] - -Taylor, all this while, had been proceeding in his deliberate way. -Boats were made and put on the river two or three miles above the town, -and early on the eighteenth troops began to cross; but when the first -of them were over, a report that Arista had retreated was confirmed, -and the greater part of the army, retracing their steps, used the -regular Anacuitas ferry. As they approached Fort Paredes the city -officials--dressed all in white, bearing white flags and riding white -horses--came forth to surrender Matamoros. No terms of capitulation were -granted, but the General said he would protect persons and property, and -allow the civil laws to continue in force; and already he had promised -to respect the religion of the people. To their surprise the Americans -appeared to find themselves among friends, for the lately implacable -but seldom tactless Mexicans came up smiling, cried "_Amigo, amigo!_" -and with sunny enthusiasm offered their hands; and although a feeble -pursuit of Arista produced only insignificant results, the victors felt -well content. Their superiority as fighting men had been demonstrated. -Their artillery had evidently surpassed the Mexican artillery in both -mechanical and personal qualities. The officers had exhibited the finest -courage, _esprit de corps_ and skill. An army supposed to outnumber ours -three to one had been scattered, and a prestige of the utmost value at -home, in Mexico and in Europe, had been gained.[8.22] - -[EFFECTS OF THE BATTLES] - -Regarding Taylor, thoughtful officers did not feel enthusiastic, -however. The General had shown himself slow, unskilful, wanting in -penetration and foresight, and poorly grounded professionally. Nine -tenths of the regular officers felt that no talents had been displayed -by him, even in the battles. He had shown, said Meade, "perfect -inability to make any use of the information" given him. In the opinion -of another excellent officer he seemed "_utterly, absurdly_ incompetent -to wield a large army." He had failed to realize the difficulties of his -position; had undervalued the enemy; and, as Bliss admitted, had had -"no conception" of the Mexican preparations. This last fact dimmed his -credit, even for courage, in the minds of discerning critics. But, after -all, his resolution had been superb and inspiring. He had succeeded; -and among us Americans "Nothing succeeds like success." The reports -written for him read admirably. Terse remarks of his, often tinged with -soldierly humor, delighted the general taste at home, and mere questions -of tactics or strategy signified in comparison rather less than zero. -Besides, he was so democratic--no military stiffness, no West Point -"aristocracy" about him. A tidal wave of popularity rose in his favor, -and soon Thurlow Weed of New York, the Warwick of the Whig party, came -out for him as Presidential candidate. A commission as brevet major -general and other official honors did not fail to arrive.[8.23] - -At Mexico the news of these events produced utter amazement and -consternation. The public, reported the British minister, had been -assured "in the most inflated Tone that Victory would follow the -steps of the Mexican Army and that annihilation and dishonour would -be the portion of their enemies." Even General Vega, a man of sense, -had predicted a victory that would end the war. Now, alas, the cards -had fallen badly. "Profound and bitter sorrow," as it privately -admitted, was the feeling of the government. Down like a plummet went -expectations, confidence and courage; down went the plausible hope of -Paredes that all the nation, glowing with pride and enthusiasm over a -victory, would rally about him; and down also, reported Bankhead, went -his monarchical scheme, which four out of five on the Congressional -committee appointed to draft a new constitution had favored.[8.24] - - - - - IX - - THE UNITED STATES MEETS THE CRISIS - - May-July, 1846 - - -Polk believed in pursuing "a bold and firm course" toward Mexico. In -this policy--as her character and methods, the comparative success of -England in dealing with her, and the many humiliating failures of the -United States indicated--he was right.[9.1] More and more positive, -during his examination of the case before and after the end of April, -1846, became his intention to place the subject before Congress in a -strong Message; and when he found that Slidell, who called at the White -House on Friday, May 8, held the same opinion, he decided to send that -Message "very soon." The next day he and the Cabinet discussed the -question at length once more. George Bancroft, secretary of the navy, -was not ready to advise the employment of force, unless Mexico should -commit a hostile act; but when, at about six o'clock, Taylor's report -of the Thornton affair presented itself, this difficulty vanished. In -the evening, at the President's request, the Cabinet reassembled, and -after another full discussion all agreed that a war Message should -be delivered to Congress on Monday. Sunday Polk worked on the paper -both before and after going to church, and conferred with leading -Congressmen. The military committee of the House, meeting in haste, -agreed unanimously to recommend 50,000 men and ten million dollars for -the prosecution of hostilities; and the Senators and Representatives -gathering in excited and quickly changing groups, anxiously discussed -and planned.[9.4] - -About noon on Monday the expected Message arrived at the capitol, and -was read to thronged and agitated Houses. Our forbearance has been -misconstrued, said the President. "After reiterated menaces, Mexico has -passed the boundary of the United States, has invaded our territory and -shed American blood upon the American soil.[9.2] She has proclaimed -that hostilities have commenced, and that the two nations are now at war -... war exists, and, notwithstanding all our efforts to avoid it, exists -by the act of Mexico herself." "The most energetic and prompt measures -and the immediate appearance in arms of a large and overpowering -force are recommended to Congress as the most certain and efficient -means of bringing the existing collision with Mexico to a speedy and -successful termination." Volunteers to serve not less than six or twelve -months, with liberal financial provision for the war, were therefore -suggested; but at the same time a desire for an "amicable" as well -as early settlement of the pending difficulties was expressed, and a -pledge was given to negotiate whenever Mexico would either make or hear -proposals.[9.4] - -Objections greeted the Message at once. Calhoun in particular strongly -opposed the President's fundamental idea. Hostilities have occurred, -he said; but as Congress has not acted, there is no war "according -to the sense of our Constitution." Archer, a leading Whig Senator, -concurred in this view, adding that perhaps the Mexican proceedings -had been justifiable, and that first of all a careful investigation of -the facts was requisite. Clayton, another Whig, went farther, and said -that by having Taylor advance to the Rio Grande Polk had made himself -the aggressor. There is no evidence, it was urged, that Mexico has -declared war or sanctioned hostilities. Recognition of a state of war -would extinguish all treaties with that country, jeopardize the persons -and property of our citizens on sea and land, wipe out our claims upon -Mexico, expose the nation to untold evils, and perhaps give offence in -Europe, objected others; hence let us merely authorize the President -to repel invasion. On Benton's motion the Senate divided the subject -of the Message, referring the matter of invasion to the committee on -military affairs and the broad question of waging war to that on foreign -relations.[9.3] Excellent possibilities of delay seemed to lurk in this -decision. Calhoun favored it.[9.4] - -[THE ACTION OF CONGRESS] - -But the House was prompt and positive. Conveniently reposing on the -table there was a bill, presumably growing out of the Oregon issue, -which proposed that Polk should be authorized to accept volunteers -and repel invasion; and this was now modified to fit the President's -recommendations. It was also given a preamble, which stated that "by -the act of the Republic of Mexico, a state of war exists between that -Government and the United States." This phraseology displeased most of -the Whigs; but they were powerless to change it. In the committee of -the whole about an hour and a half were allowed for a partial reading -of the Message and the accompanying documents, and thirty minutes for -debate. Amidst a great uproar the bill was then reported, ordered -without discussion to its third reading, and under the spur of the -"previous question" passed. One hundred and seventy-four supported it -and fourteen--five from Massachusetts, five from Ohio, and one each from -Maine, Rhode Island, New York and Pennsylvania--voted in the negative. -The next morning this bill was reported in the Senate.[9.4] - -Calhoun pleaded now for at least a pause of twenty-four hours, and -this appeared not unreasonable, since the documents that supported the -Message had not yet come from the printer; but the party caucus had -resolved upon a course of action, and Benton and Allen, chairmen of the -committees on military affairs and foreign relations, announcing that -consideration had already been given to both aspects of the war measure, -favored immediate action. Cass made an effective speech in the same -sense; and, although a test showed that eighteen Senators objected to -the preamble, the bill, somewhat amended, was passed finally by a strong -majority--forty against only two. Calhoun, Berrien of Georgia and Evans -of Maine did not vote. Crittenden and Upham answered to their names, -"Aye, except the preamble." Webster and a few others were absent. In the -evening the House accepted the amendments, and the next day at about -one o'clock Polk received and signed the bill. Later some of the Whig -Congressmen pretended that all they had voted for was to save Taylor's -army; but the 50,000 soldiers and ten millions of money were not asked -for a mere rescue party, and it was pointed out in the discussion that -the General's fate would be decided long before the bill would give him -troops. By an overwhelming majority in both houses, then, voting in -full accord with the President and his Cabinet, war on a large scale -was provided for. "The gates of Janus are open," wrote Alexander H. -Stephens.[9.4] - -[THE MOTIVES OF CONGRESS] - -At every stage of these proceedings flowed a tide of real national -feeling, but there were also devious currents that need to be mentioned. -Probably few, if any, of the chief actors expected very serious trouble -with Mexico. Polk for his part assured Benton that if Congress would -recognize the war and provide large forces, he believed the affair -could speedily be terminated; and he promised to use no more funds and -men than should prove "absolutely necessary to bring the present state -of hostilities to an end." Many Congressmen, who talked with members -of the Cabinet, were told that without firing another gun the United -States would have a satisfactory treaty within four months.[9.5] The -Washington correspondent of the New York _Tribune_, an anti-slavery Whig -journal, reported that on learning of the action taken by the House -Polk said, "I shall now give you peace--I have the power." "The war was -declared as the means of peace"--as a part of the President's policy of -intimidating Mexico into making a settlement, wrote the correspondent of -the New York _Journal of Commerce_. So thought the New York _Herald_. -Merely passing the war bill will be enough, it said; and, especially -since Polk's Message exhibited the same combination of sword and olive -branch as his employing Slidell and Taylor jointly, so to speak, one -cannot well reject this view, which is supported also by evidence -previously offered.[9.10] - -The Democrats, being the administration party, naturally stood by the -President,[9.6] and a wish to make the attitude of the United States -impressive and effective was an additional reason for their urgency and -haste. But probably these were not the only inducements. The party was -falling into dissensions. The Van Buren group felt indignant that New -York should occupy a secondary place in the Cabinet, and be represented -there by the Old Hunker, Marcy, while the rest of the Democrats -complained that Van Buren's faction, the Barnburners, were dictating -everything. A short, inexpensive and successful war--especially one -without gunpowder--seemed likely to please the country, provide offices, -consolidate the party, and compel the Whigs to lose prestige by -endorsing the policy of their opponents, or else to sacrifice popularity -by antagonizing it. Moreover it looked as if a discussion of Polk's -course in sending Taylor to the Rio Grande, however correct that course -had been, might prove at such a juncture dampening and vexatious; and -for all of these reasons it seemed expedient that a war bill, with -exactly the preamble already quoted, should be rushed through Congress -at the quickest pace.[9.10] - -The Whigs were no less perspicacious, and they especially hated to lose -the partisan advantage of charging that Polk had been the aggressor. -Mexico has not declared war, they insisted; and with more or less -honesty they complained that a regard for sacred truth forbade them to -endorse the preamble. But their position was exceedingly delicate. Not -only had Mexico long threatened hostilities, prepared openly for them, -and severed her diplomatic relations with us at both capitals, but -she had in effect made a declaration of war. Her only official voice -at this time was that of Paredes; and his agent, Arista, an officer -of the highest rank, had given Taylor formal notice of hostilities. -Arista had been sent but recently to command against the Americans, -and nobody could reasonably suppose that he had proceeded at once to -transgress or ignore deliberately the wishes of his master in so grave -an affair.[9.10] - -Taylor on the other hand had shown the most pacific disposition both in -word and in deed. Nothing serious could be alleged against us except -the peaceable joint-occupation of territory long claimed by the United -States; and in short, unless Jefferson, Madison, Monroe, Pinckney and -John Quincy Adams were to be disavowed, it seemed legitimate for Polk -and for Congress to hold now that Arista's attack upon Thornton had been -the first hostile act.[9.7] The preamble, therefore, could not well be -rejected; and nearly all of the Whigs, having before their eyes the doom -of those who opposed the war of 1812, choked down some honest though -mistaken compunctions and in most cases a probably more troublesome lump -of partisan regret, and voted for the bill.[9.10] - -As already has been suggested, however, there was in Congress a third -party--John C. Calhoun, and for later as well as for present reasons -it is desirable to understand his opinions. To him it seemed highly -advisable to forestall European interference, and quite possible to -avoid a conflict with Mexico, by adjusting the Oregon question before -coming decisively to an issue in the Mexican difficulty, and therefore -he thought the United States ought by all means to limit itself now -to repelling invasion. Personal reasons also led him to deplore the -prospect of a conflict in arms. The culmination of his fiery life, the -fulfilment of his brilliant dream, had seemed in April to be drawing -near. By his convenient method of bending facts and principles to his -purpose, as the sparrow makes a nest for herself, he had found it -possible to coöperate with the West in spending great sums on internal -improvements, and expected in this way to make the Northeast a helpless -minority; but he could easily see that war might empty the treasury and -bring about new political alignments. For the same reason it looked as -if his project of a low tariff also would vanish; and, as we have seen, -contemplating the possibility of secession, he did not wish[9.8] the -youth of the southern states to expend their blood in Mexico.[9.10] - -Before the news of Thornton's encounter arrived he argued with Polk -against sending to Congress the proposed Message on our relations with -Mexico. During the excitement on that eventful Sunday he not only -planned with his partisans in Senate and House to oppose war, but worked -for the same purpose with leading Whigs, urging--for example--that -Mexico should be given more time to consider the risk of a conflict, as -if she had not already been speculating upon it for several years. Then -in the Senate he gravely proclaimed the truism that border hostilities -do not necessarily constitute war, and turned it into a sophism by -applying it in the present case. To compare Arista's attack upon -Thornton to an unmeaning border squabble was truly, in view of the long -series of preliminaries, ridiculous; and equally ridiculous was the -endeavor to support this fallacy with another: that since Congress had -not declared war, a state of war with Mexico could not lawfully exist at -this time.[9.9] "Is not Calhoun deranged?" exclaimed our minister at -Paris on hearing of this.[9.10] - -To be sure, Congress is the only branch of our central government that -can legally declare war; but, for instance, other nations are not -hampered by our Constitution, and might attack us in such a manner as -to prevent Congress--for a time, at least--from acting. None the less -we should fight, and it would be nonsense to describe our resistance -as unconstitutional. As a matter of fact Congress did not declare war -against Mexico, and on Calhoun's theory we had no lawful war with that -country. On that theory, not only our military men, Congress and the -President, but our Supreme Court, which fully recognized the war, acted -unconstitutionally. Indeed, he himself illustrated the untenability of -his idea. In order to avoid the weakness of advocating purely defensive -operations a Whig leader, Senator Crittenden, said that by repelling -invasion he meant pursuing the enemy until we could be sure that no -repetition of the outrage would occur. This programme would have -involved substantially all that we did against Mexico. It would have -meant a war without a declaration; yet Calhoun endorsed it. In short, -even one so acute and so deeply interested as he could not find a real -argument against the war bill, and his "friends" abandoned him on this -issue. By an overwhelming majority Congress rejected his interpretation -of the organic law. War existed. No American who recognized our claim to -the intermediate region, formally made by national authorities and never -withdrawn, and especially none who recognized the claim of Texas, could -logically deny that it existed by the act of Mexico; and in the light -of its antecedents, including Arista's declaration of war and attack -upon Thornton, the war bill committed the nation properly as well as -completely.[9.10] - -[THE CAUSE OF THE WAR] - -We were, then, under arms; but, after all, why? What was the cause of -the war? It was not--as will plainly appear in another chapter, it is -believed--an unholy determination to obtain California at the cost, if -necessary, of fifty thousand lives. It cannot have been a difficulty as -to the boundary of Texas, for two nations do not fight over an issue -that exists for only one of them--and that one not the aggressor; and -for Mexico the question between the Nueces and the Rio Grande had -no international significance except when it could be used, as an -_argumentum ad hominem_, to embarrass Americans.[9.14] - -Nor was it a scheme to extend the field of negro servitude. Even a -cormorant requires time for digestion, and in 1845 the acquisition of -Texas appeared so powerful a bulwark for the peculiar institution, that -no strong and widespread craving for additional areas can be supposed to -have existed at the beginning of 1846. Besides, as pro-slavery Taylor, -Calhoun and Polk, anti-slavery Webster and time-serving Buchanan -agreed, free labor was practically sure to dominate California; and -hence, in view of the slight probability that much cultivable territory -could be obtained in the south against the stubborn opposition of the -free states, the war seemed more likely to diminish than to increase -the relative strength of slavery. Moreover, the soil south and west -of the Rio Grande was unsuitable for cotton, sugar, rice or tobacco. -Rich proprietors already owned the land, and had no thought of parting -with it. The system of peonage was extremely economical, and it held -the ground so firmly that negro slavery, though tried, had been unable -to make headway against it. The free laborers of northeastern Mexico -would have been, admitted the _North American_, particularly hostile to -our southerners and their methods; and the colored population, it was -pointed out, could have escaped gradually from its bonds by amalgamating -with the natives. Now the leaders of the "slavocracy" doubtless inquired -into the conditions; and, as most of our ministers and probably most of -our consuls in Mexico were from their section, they could easily obtain -information. Waddy Thompson and A. J. Donelson, for example, believed -and said, that slavery would not thrive in northern Mexico.[9.14] - -Polk's diary and papers reveal no evidence that he seriously considered -the interest of the peculiar institution in connection with our Mexican -problem. The debates of Congress are equally barren. Soon after the -war opened, as we shall discover, northeastern Mexico seemed ready -to join the United States or accept our protection, and there is no -sign that the slavocracy attempted to improve the opportunity. The -politicians most eager to acquire Mexican territory were Dickinson -of New York, Hannegan of Indiana and Walker, an anti-slavery man. A -northern correspondent of Calhoun wrote that many in New York insisted -on extending that way "to augment the strength of the non-slaveholding -states," while a Mobile correspondent said, "I would let the war -continue forever before I would take 697,000 [square miles] of -territory, which must be free territory." A meeting in Ohio declared -for taking all of that country, and this does not seem to have been -paralleled in the South. South Carolina was preëminently the champion -of slavery, yet Governor Aiken publicly opposed making acquisitions in -that quarter. Calhoun, the leader of the southern ultras there and -elsewhere, did the same. So did Waddy Thompson, Botts, Toombs, Lumpkin, -Campbell and many other southerners. W. R. King said that while the -South would insist--as a point of pride and right--upon sharing the -benefit of any territory gained from Mexico, it was a gross libel to -represent her as desiring to increase in that way the strength of -slavery.[9.14] - -King deplored the war. One of the South Carolina Senators wrote -that it was detested nowhere more than in his state. In Georgia, -too, the conflict was bitterly opposed. The people did not desire -the war, said Toombs. Half of the slaveholders oppose it, admitted -Ritchie, a Virginian, editor of the administration organ. Besides -all other objections, it was pointed out that the southern policy of -conservatism and her stand for a strict construction of the Constitution -would be endangered by absorbing a large area mainly populated by -extremely inferior aliens. To combat all this evidence, we find hardly -anything[9.11] except the characteristic hints, imaginings and -assertions of certain abolitionists.[9.14] - -On the other hand, the evidence that the annexation of Texas was -essentially the cause[9.12] of the war is impressive both in quantity -and in quality.[9.13] Benton, Clay, Robert C. Winthrop, Stephen A. -Douglas, Andrew Johnson and many other public men agreed on this point. -As Van Buren and substantially all the Whig organs had predicted -that immediate annexation would entail war with Mexico, they must -be counted in the same class. Charles Sumner drew up a resolution -declaring that such was the primary cause, and it passed the legislature -of Massachusetts, where the subject was rather closely studied, by -overwhelming majorities. The House committee on foreign affairs took -that ground in its report of February 24, 1847. All agree upon this, -was Winthrop's declaration. Paredes expressed the same view in the most -formal manner. The Mexican minister of war under the government that -overthrew Paredes publicly endorsed it; and at least two well-qualified -foreign observers, Duflot de Mofras and the biographer of Lord Aberdeen, -took the same view. Indeed, the proposition seems demonstrated by the -plain course of events.[9.14] - -The mere annexation of Texas cannot, however, be regarded as the sole -cause of the war. But for the loudly expressed wrath of the Americans, -due mainly to Mexican barbarities in Texas and outrages upon the persons -and property of American citizens, Mexico would have been far less -irritable, and the annexation difficulty, which came so near to being -patched up, might have been adjusted; while, as Polk maintained, if -the policy of the United States regarding our claims had been firm, -consistent and strong from the first, Mexico would not have dared to -risk so much in dealing with us later.[9.14] - -The general cause of hostilities was, therefore, the series of -unpleasant incidents occurring in the mutual relations of the two -countries from the scandalous treatment of Poinsett down to the -scandalous treatment of Slidell, from the first mutterings of discontent -in Texas down to the setting of her one fair star in the broad sea of -the American Union; and in this long series the annexation of Texas was -the chief event.[9.14] - -But one can speak much more definitely. For a term of years, mainly -in consequence of the use made of these affairs by self-seeking -politicians, the people of Mexico had fed on the ideas of despising, -fearing, hating and fighting the United States; Paredes had gained -supreme authority on this basis; public sentiment demanded that he -should pursue the route marked out by his professions; to beat the small -and apparently demoralized American army, led by a backwoods general, -seemed quite feasible; it appeared likely that a victory would confirm -the dictator's power, while a failure to strike would ensure his doom; -and hence an attack upon our army was ordered. This was the precise -cause of the war.[9.14] - -[THE WAR MEASURES] - -Let us now return to Congress. The war bill of May 13 gave the President -authority to use the army, the navy, the militia and not more than -50,000 volunteers--to serve twelve months after reaching the rendezvous -"or to the end of the war, unless sooner discharged"--to expend not more -than $10,000,000, to complete the vessels of war already authorized, -and to purchase additional vessels. By other Acts he was authorized -(May 13) to increase by enlistment the number of privates in the -regular army from sixty-four to not over one hundred per company, thus -bringing the rank and file up to 15,540; a company of sappers, miners -and pontoniers and a regiment of mounted riflemen, originally intended -to protect emigrants and traders on the Oregon route, were created -(May 15 and 19); and numerous details concerning organization were -either prescribed or entrusted to the Executive (June 18 and 26).[9.15] -Under the last head authority was given to appoint all the necessary -general officers.[9.16] Meantime (May 13) the President issued a war -proclamation, modelled upon that of 1812, in which he announced that an -appeal had been made to "the last resort of injured nations"; and the -state department (May 14) sent a confidential circular to our agents -abroad, explaining that we had taken up arms reluctantly, and "solely -for the purpose of conquering an honorable and permanent peace."[9.17] - -"The war sense of the United States," it has been remarked, "seems to -be in inverse ratio to its war spirit;" and in general the military -measures of the government exhibited more zeal than discretion. In -particular they put into action the very system that had proved -disastrous a generation before. For this Taylor was primarily -responsible, for after having seen the war of 1812 and that of Florida -languish and crawl, he strongly urged that volunteers be called out for -one year of service. Polk's Message deepened the mischief by expressing -confidence in raw troops, although in 1838 the secretary of war had -assured him that the difference in expense between volunteers and -regulars was "at least as four to one," besides the waste resulting -from their total ignorance of administration, the cost of marching -to and from distant points for short periods of service, and the -disproportionate growth of the pension list.[9.18] The President was -indeed authorized to increase the number of privates in a regular -company, but the roll of officers remained as before; and enlistment -was not stimulated, as it might have been, by adding something to the -pay.[9.19] - -Having a choice between a definite and an indefinite period, the -volunteers were sure, as Marcy foresaw, to elect the former, -although--as the sequel appeared to show--a sufficient number -would almost certainly have engaged for the war, had that been the -only proposal. The Mexicans were commonly regarded as cowardly and -inefficient. Very few Americans expected them to hold out as long -as they did; and intending volunteers would naturally have counted, -therefore, upon returning soon. There were also the enthusiastic -feelings natural at the opening of a war, and a deep interest resulting -from the supposed peril of Taylor's army. Yet the government chose to -accept gratuitously the risk, which in due time became a certainty, of -embarrassing itself, disappointing the country and encouraging the enemy -by offering a brief term of service.[9.19] - -Instead of retaining control of the organization and officering of the -regiments, it entrusted this work to the states, and as a rule the men -chose their own officers;[9.20] but in these features of the system, as -in our governmental methods generally, there was some advantage as well -as much loss. Webster, for example, held that volunteers ought to have -the right of electing for leaders men whom they knew and could trust; -and if they preferred, to sicken and bleed under captains as ignorant as -themselves, whom they knew and could trust, rather than fare otherwise -under trained officers whom they would have had to obey without fully -understanding them, they were perhaps entitled to the privilege, and no -doubt they learned something from exercising it. Anyhow, said Webster, -the other method would have been degrading; and American citizens must -not be degraded. As for generals, the law of June 18 compelled the -Executive to take them from the militia, although they would be under -no obligation to serve more than three months, and might withdraw in -the midst of a campaign. There was no provision for filling vacancies -resulting from death or discharge; and finally the appropriations were -so poorly arranged that the quartermaster's office had to juggle with -funds as even Polk himself could not lawfully have done.[9.19] - -Such as it was, however, the system went promptly into effect. Beginning -on May 15, the secretary of war sent requisitions for volunteers to the -governors of the states, deeming this method of application advantageous -as well as due to their official position, since they were supposed -to know the troops of their jurisdictions and the best places from -which to draw them. In general the plan was to summon about 25,000 -from the northeastern states, to be enrolled and await orders, and to -call out nearly as many from the other states for immediate service. -The former were all to be infantry; the latter, horse and foot in the -ratio of about one to three. It was expected that existing militia -organizations--regiments or parts of regiments--would offer their -services, and that new men would fill the ranks as they felt moved -to come forward. Not only privates but officers were to approach the -national service by that portal, and then be mustered into the army at -the appointed state rendezvous by a United States officer detailed for -the purpose.[9.21] In four days the calls were nearly all on their -way.[9.24] - -The purpose of distributing requisitions over the whole country was to -interest every state, Polk explained; and to stimulate the executive -officials he urged upon the secretary of war the most prompt and -energetic action and personal attention to each detail, insisting for -his own part upon being kept "constantly advised of every important -step that was taken."[9.22] This charge Marcy accepted with all -seriousness.[9.23] Whether bowing his massive head ponderously over a -big desk, sifting callers with keen glances through shaggy brows, or -giving instructions to subordinates in a voice roughened with snuff, he -devoted his faculties to his task with a rare power of concentration. -But he preferred the quiet of his home; and there, comfortably wrapped -in his dressing gown with a box of the brown powder and an old red -handkerchief on the table, he did his best work.[9.24] - -Polk believed, or tried to believe, that "multitudes" were eager to -volunteer, but others feared it would not be easy to raise troops -after so long a peace. Strong influences were at work, however. Though -evidently the fireside was not in danger, patriotism urged men to take -the field, for did not the nation call? - - "Arm! arm! your country bids you arm! - Fling out your banners free-- - Let drum and trumpet sound alarm, - O'er mountain, plain and sea;" - -thus wrote Park Benjamin the day Polk signed the war bill. A longing to -escape from the dulness of bare existence, ambition to see the world -and test one's powers, a passion for adventure and frolic in a far -clime believed to be all glitter, beauty and romance, the prospect of -revelling in the Halls of Montezuma, a feeling that one who was not -"in it" would have to spend the rest of his days explaining why, the -expectation of honors and popularity that would make success easy in any -pursuit, quarrels with sweethearts or hopes of becoming irresistible -to the "girls," were among the motives. For the high officers it was a -"political tour," said one of them; and with everybody the barbarities -perpetrated by the Mexicans in Texas counted for much. The hardships of -campaigning were unknown. While every one understood that some would -fall, it was practically impossible for an ardent young fellow, well -and strong, to imagine his particular person stretched lifeless on -the ground; or, if such an end was ever contemplated, it appeared as -something quick, unfelt amidst the excitement, and sweetened by the -greatness of one's cause.[9.24] - -Behind all of this lay certain facts too deep for the soldiers -themselves to perceive, but not too deep for them to feel. One -instinctively shunned that "misery of cowardice," which--as Pericles -told the Athenians--is more dreadful to men of spirit than death in -battle. As the ages have demonstrated, man is naturally a fighting -animal, and therefore he finds in war the keenest sense of his vital -selfhood. It is our chief glory to will and to do; and in mortal -combat this glory is more intense, if not more real, than in peaceful -occupations. Besides, if a man comes to his end in being supremely -himself, he triumphs over death, and indeed he wins another victory, -too, for life--so rich in menaces--can threaten him no longer. The -validity of nearly all these motives was more or less transitory. When, -for example, a man had proved that he could face a cannon, it seemed -unnecessary to keep on facing it. But while they lasted, they were -strong.[9.24] - -In almost every section, therefore, except New England, where the -annexation of Texas could not yet be forgiven, the war spirit rose high, -astonishing even the most sanguine. At New York the walls were covered -with placards headed, "Mexico or Death," or "Ho, for the halls of the -Montezumas!" and the streets echoed to the song: - - "Come all ye gallant volunteers - Who fear not life to lose, - The martial drum invites ye come - And join the Hickory Blues: - The gallant Hickory Blues, - The daring Hickory Blues-- - To Mexico they proudly go, - The gallant Hickory Blues." - -[TROOPS COME FORWARD] - -At Philadelphia 20,000 citizens of all parties gathered "to sustain the -country." In the central states banks advanced money without security, -farmers' wives issued free rations, ladies made clothing and flags by -the wholesale, roads turned black with men. Ohio looked with disfavor -on the annexation of Texas and the war with Mexico, regarding them as -measures favorable to slavery; yet in less than two weeks after the -requisition for volunteers arrived, three thousand of her sons were -marching to the rendezvous. At Indianapolis Lew Wallace hung out a flag -and a four-sided transparency inscribed, "For Mexico; fall in"; and -in three days his company was full. "Illinois must rally now and win -a character," James Shields wrote to Koerner; and fourteen regiments -volunteered instead of the four that could be taken.[9.24] - -In Kentucky, said reports, the quota of the state was complete by May -26, and the governor had to stop the volunteering by proclamation. -Tennessee was called upon for about 3000 men, and nearly 30,000 came -forward. None would retire, and the selection was made by lot or ballot. -At Memphis troops organized before the call arrived. "May glory and -honor await them!" cried the _Daily Eagle_. St. Louis began to drill on -May 12, and in a few days the excitement was so deep and universal that -the courts adjourned. North Carolina offered more than three times her -quota.[9.24] - -In the Gulf states many feared that not enough citizens would remain at -home to police the negroes. "Governor, do--if possible--get them into -the service," was the tune in Alabama. Mississippi complained bitterly -that so few of her sons had a chance. At New Orleans the roar of -business was almost drowned by a still more clamorous roar: - - "The drums, the drums, the busy, busy drums, - The drums, the drums, the rattling, battling drums, - The drums, the drums, the merry, merry drums!" - -As rapidly as possible Brigadier General Wool and other officers -mustered the regiments into service; and, leaving the rendezvous and the -crowds of praying, cheering people amidst the saddest good-bys and the -warmest good wishes, the volunteers bravely set out for the war.[9.24] - -Before very long new views of military life began to dawn upon the -soldiers. At the old battlefield below New Orleans, where many of the -troops camped, mud and water covered what was below their boot-tops -while mosquitos covered what was above. Going down the river they -brightened at the sight of sycamores and live-oaks, draped with Spanish -moss, and of the ducks, jays, mocking-birds and Virginia nightingales, -that seemed to find life so merry. But soon the lighthouse of the -Southwest Pass was gleaming astern, the muddy water became blue, and -these landsmen were on the deep. Sharks, diving porpoises, squadrons of -nautili and shoals of little flying-fish gave them some pleasure; but -the motion, especially to men packed like sardines in the dirty holds -of schooners and small brigs or lying spoon-fashion--if there was even -room to do that--on deck, seemed horrible. On the slow voyage the water, -which was often impure, fermented sometimes, and ten cents was the price -of a wholesome drink.[9.25] - -And then the Gulf storms! The wind howled; the sea opened its jaws; -the heavens were now like ink, and now one burst of flame; thunders -rolled; ropes hissed and shrieked; spars cracked, snapped and were swept -away; the vessel tossed from beam-end to beam-end; the maddened horses -almost kicked the planking from the ribs, and the men cursed, prayed -or stolidly awaited their fate. But sooner or later nearly all of them -perceived on the horizon a line of sandy beach spotted with tents. -It was Brazos Island off Point Isabel, and they anchored about four -miles from it in the open sea. Meanwhile Brevet Major General Gaines, -commanding the military department of the West, had begun on May 3 at -his own instance to requisition troops for the relief of Taylor, and a -considerable number of these men also set out for the Point.[9.25] - -[THE CHOICE OF A COMMANDER] - -The question of a commander now had to be decided. Polk felt little -confidence in Taylor. The General's separating his army so far from -his base and exposing both to imminent peril seemed inexcusable; and -furthermore General Scott, not only the head of the army but the famous -hero of Lundy's Lane, was the natural chief of the large forces now -called out. Certain facts, however, injured Scott's chances. He was now -almost exactly sixty years old, and many thought him, as did Senator -Fairfield, "too much of an old granny." In 1839 he had been given 57 -votes at the Whig Presidential convention, and of late the brilliancy -of his political anticipations had made him look "ten feet high," said -Corwin. His want of reverence for the President's decision respecting -brevet rank had led Polk and Benton to think of banishing him to a post -on the northern frontier. General Gaines and his many friends had long -hated him; and Mrs. Gaines insisted that no one was "much," whose lips -could be covered with a button. Finally, he was called vain, and so he -appeared to be.[9.30] - -But the ostentation that won him the nickname "Old Fuss and Feathers," -in addition to being much exaggerated by report, was doubtless -attributable in large measure to military policy and respect for his -rank. No one ever saw it interfere with serious affairs, and one who -could remark on the weak point of his own personal appearance, the point -ridiculed by Mrs. Gaines, was not so extremely vain after all. The -right word for Scott was egotism. Now egotism--in others--is doubtless -a shocking trait; yet merely to seem aware of what everybody knows, -does not, as many think it does, convert merits into demerits. General -Scott had a magnificent presence--fully six feet and four inches of -height and a corresponding weight--the brightest fame as an intrepid -soldier, the honor of a long and eminent career, the first place in our -army, a high social position, superior talents and attainments, unusual -knowledge of the world, charming personal graces, and a character of -rare quality--powerful, gentle and true. That he did not dissemble nor -cloak his value was a fault; but those who felt entitled to censure him, -merely because they had no such merits to be aware of, were somewhat in -error.[9.30] - -Besides, almost every great artist is egotistical, and Scott was a great -artist. In more ways than one this was true. He could instruct the baker -in the mysteries of making bread, and superintend ably the roasting -of a ham; damn his delighted black body-servant for hiding everything -and then hiding himself; rave at an admiring guest for cutting lettuce -instead of rolling it round his fork, or lament in tragic tones at whist -that he had to play against three; and the next moment he would be -analyzing a campaign of Turenne, monologuing inimitably about the great -men he had met in Europe, or criticizing and comparing the best authors -of French prose. His foibles--particularly a sensitiveness of temper, an -ambition for the Presidency and a fondness for relieving heavy thought -with light words, as Marcy did with light snuff--were numerous; the -openness of his large and generous nature, superior to the prudence of -smaller minds, prevented his concealing them; certain peculiarities of -language and manner, from a delicacy about commas to a fondness for -literary effects, were easily ridiculed; and in non-military affairs -his indiscretion was now and then glaring; but he must be described -emphatically as a soldier, a gentleman, a "character," a great general -and a great man.[9.30] - -Distrusting Taylor, and profoundly alarmed about the situation on the -frontier,[9.26] Polk sent for Scott on May 13, and conferred upon him -verbally the chief command in Mexico; yet, while admitting that he saw -proofs of experience in the General's remarks, he pronounced him too -"scientific and visionary," as the master of a difficult business must -always appear to the tyro.[9.27] Probably he knew that a man could not -become a soldier overnight, as he could become a militia colonel or a -"statesman," or--in Santa Anna's opinion--a professor of jurisprudence; -but he believed that, should fighting really need to be done, even an -improvised army would make "a brisk and a short war of it," as the -administration paper neatly said, and, if necessary, dictate a peace "in -the Halls of the Montezumas." Under circumstances like these prevision -and science appeared rather superfluous. The only things needful were to -march now and triumph to-morrow.[9.30] - -Scott, however, felt that waging war might involve military operations. -He undertook to prove by elaborate calculations that the greater part -of the volunteers could not at the best arrive on the Rio Grande before -the first week in August; and, since that would be the rainy season, -when the hoofs of mules and horses would be unfit for hard use, and -various other difficulties would arise, he recommended that most of the -new troops, after remaining under instruction at salubrious points in -the United States during the summer, should be placed upon that river by -September 25, so as to make, with the volunteers and regulars already -there, 25,000 or possibly 30,000 healthy, properly equipped and more or -less trained soldiers, ready to invade Mexico in a decisive manner. In -the execution of this plan he did not intend to shirk or dally.[9.28] -May 15 he gave the chiefs of the general staff directions about throwing -supplies of all kinds upon the various rendezvous in advance of the -volunteers, prompted the quartermaster general to obtain wagons, and -even called attention to the necessity of seasonably obtaining light -boats for the navigation of the Rio Grande.[9.30] - -His feeling was, however, particularly after news of what he called -Taylor's "great and brilliant victories" arrived, that it would not seem -proper--especially to military men--for him to supersede that officer -except with heavy reinforcements; and no doubt he saw it would scarcely -enhance a prestige that was dear to him personally and invaluable to him -as the commander-in-chief, to lie idle in hot mud for several months. He -therefore proposed to leave Washington about May 30, give his personal -attention to the troops and supplies _en route_ and at the rendezvous, -and reach the scene of action a little before them.[9.30] - -Such procrastination disgusted Polk, and such "schemes" annoyed -Marcy, both of whom doubtless had an eye on political considerations. -Democratic members of Congress protested that Scott was slow, and -also that, if successful in Mexico, he would be the ruin of their -party. In short, it seemed necessary to get rid of him.[9.29] May -19, therefore, without saying a word to Scott, the secretary of war -had a provision attached to the bill which finally became the law of -June 18, enabling the Executive to appoint an officer new to the army -as commander-in-chief of the volunteers, and at the end of the war -eliminate Scott entirely. This led to sharp language between Marcy and -Scott.[9.30] - -Marcy, the politician, intimated that the militia, who had gone to -Taylor's assistance and were to serve only three months, must have a -chance to do something, and Scott, the soldier, declined to take the -field if liable to be fired on from the rear. In one of his notes the -General remarked that he had taken for lunch merely "a hasty plate of -soup"--a fact that really proved his extreme devotion to the business in -hand; and in another he specified a number of the reasons why a summer -campaign was not feasible. At this juncture, too, a private note of his, -to the effect that no eastern man, Whig or West Pointer was likely to -be given a commission, turned up at the White House. Polk regarded the -note as disrespectful, and also thought the expression "fire upon my -rear" was a reflection on the Executive. Scott protested that his words -referred to Marcy and the members of Congress, and apparently did all he -could, without sacrificing his professional convictions, to satisfy the -President; but his efforts were in vain.[9.30] - -The army on the Rio Grande was now out of danger; Taylor seemed not -so extremely incompetent after all; and Scott was still a scientific, -visionary schemer and a promising candidate for the chair of state, whom -it was more politic to disgrace than to honor. Polk decided therefore -that he was meddlesome, insubordinate, hostile, foolish, vindictive -and untrustworthy, a procrastinating obstructionist, and above all -a "violent partisan"; and on May 25 he received orders to stay at -Washington and hasten the preparations. His correspondence with Marcy -was published. The big dogs and little--Blanche, Tray and all--began -to bark. He was called a farrier general for speaking of hoofs, and -"Marshal Tureen" for admitting that he took soup. His off-hand remarks -were termed flippant, his close calculations fussy, and his deliberate -plans dilatory. His allusion to the "rear," fully justified by what had -occurred and what was to follow, seemed even to some friendly critics -disrespectful and uncalled for. Political intrigue, not war, was said to -occupy his mind. The General has "committed suicide with a goose-quill," -announced the Boston _Courier_; Marcy himself confided to a friend that -Scott had lost a position he would never be able to regain; and Taylor, -assigned to duty with his new brevet rank,[9.31] was continued in the -chief command.[9.30] - -[THE OREGON ISSUE SETTLED] - -All this while the administration felt extremely anxious, on both -domestic and international grounds, regarding the Oregon issue. The -West, which Representative Graham called "the ruling star" in Congress, -clamored for "fifty-four forty or fight." Cass admitted that he found -it necessary to sacrifice to its demand his preference for a boundary -at the forty-ninth degree, and Polk's yielding to the same pressure -is readily understood.[9.32] It was believed that England's interest -in peace would forbid her fighting the United States for a small area -of unrecognized value, and the Democratic leaders probably had no -expectation of getting into a war. The British Cabinet, however, had -its public to deal with, and felt that it could not live a day should -it appear submissive to American "bullying." Hence on February 4, 1846, -when the United States finally rejected arbitration, the two nations -were almost at the grips.[9.33] - -Yet each contained powerful elements favorable to accommodation. The -strong tone of the American government impressed England, and Polk -realized that while compromising on the lower line would anger the -Northwest, an opposite course might throw upon him the responsibility -of disrupting his party, ruining his administration, and plunging the -country into an abyss. The American Congress, like the people, took -a more and more serious view of the situation; and the roar of the -"fifty-four forty" men subsided into a growl. On a hint from the United -States Great Britain presented in May a compromise practically similar -to that which her minister at Washington had rejected the previous year. -The Senate, whose advice Polk asked in order to escape from his radical -declarations, recommended the acceptance of it on June 12, and the -crisis ended.[9.33] - -During the same anxious period a less public negotiation also was on -foot. There were signs of a revolution in Mexico, and it behooved Polk -to consider who might come to the front. Farías and Almonte had many -partisans, and both were hostile to the United States; but Santa Anna, -now living in exile near Havana and spending his time on gamecocks, -monte and a huge mail from Mexico, seemed quite likely to regain the -power; and it was believed that his intelligence, ambition and knowledge -of his country's weakness, combining in favor of peace, were more than -enough to offset any stirrings of patriotic enthusiasm in his breast. -Reports from trustworthy sources--particularly from Slidell, Consul -Dimond at Vera Cruz, and Consul Black at Mexico--tended to support this -belief;[9.34] and it was understood also that past actions and present -circumstances bound Santa Anna to oppose all European and monarchical -designs upon Mexico. Not having begun the conflict with the United -States, he could pronounce peace a necessity, it was thought, and throw -upon Paredes all the odium of the abortive war. Moreover A. J. Atocha, -a naturalized American citizen, who had been a confidant and tool of -Santa Anna, had assured Polk in February that the General, should he -regain power, would be ready to treat.[9.35] From the despatches of -the Spanish minister at Mexico we know that it was impossible, as Polk -asserted, to prevent a man possessing large resources from landing on -the Mexican coast; and it seemed evident that Santa Anna's presence in -the country, should he fail to regain power and make a treaty, would in -all probability lead to a distracting civil war. On the day Polk signed -the war bill, an order[9.36] to let him pass through our blockading -squadron off Vera Cruz was, therefore, issued to Commodore Conner.[9.38] - -[NEGOTIATIONS WITH SANTA ANNA] - -And this was not all. Though deeply distrustful of Atocha, Polk seems -to have derived from a conversation with him the idea of despatching a -secret emissary to Santa Anna, and on the evening of July 5 Commander -Mackenzie of the United States navy arrived at Havana.[9.37] Two days -later he passed three hours with the ex-dictator, informing him of the -order to let him pass, and giving him the substance of a conversation -with Polk, in which the President had expressed these interesting -sentiments: first, a hope of seeing the General once more in authority; -secondly a desire for peace--on the basis of a boundary _via_ the -Rio Grande and thence west, ample payment in cash for the territory -thus transferred, and permanent friendly relations with Mexico; and, -thirdly, a willingness to stop military operations and send a minister, -should Santa Anna, on regaining his former position, be willing to -negotiate.[9.38] - -In reply the General drew up a note, which was copied by Mackenzie -and then destroyed. In this he professed liberal intentions regarding -commerce and politics, anti-monarchical and anti-European principles, -and a disposition--in case the United States would promote his -"patriotic desires"--to respond with a treaty of the desired sort. -Taylor, he said, must promote the scheme by marching to Saltillo, -forcing Paredes to fight, defeating him, and then advancing perhaps -to San Luis Potosí, so as to constrain the Mexicans of all parties -to recall the Hero of Tampico; and he offered valuable hints about -attacking Tampico and Vera Cruz, which seemed to attest his sincerity. -Mackenzie then took his leave, and, impressed by Santa Anna's military -suggestions, transcended his instructions by visiting Taylor on the way -home--thus rendering himself and his mission unduly conspicuous.[9.38] - -In these ways, combining diplomacy and force as he loved to do, Polk -imagined that our Mexican crisis had been fully met. - - - - - X - - THE LEADERS ADVANCE - - May-September, 1846 - - -On taking possession of Matamoros Taylor pitched his tent in the shade -of a small tree about half a mile from town, and there he remained. -Dressed in attakapas pantaloons and a linen roundabout he sat enthroned -on a box cushioned with an Arkansas blanket, and for dinner-table had a -couple of rough blue chests. The slight pursuit of Arista and the search -for concealed ordnance, arms and munitions did not require his personal -attention. June 6 Lieutenant Colonel Wilson with his four companies of -the First Infantry, Price's company of rangers and two of Bragg's guns -under Lieutenant Thomas, the future "Rock of Chickamauga," marched for -Reynosa, about sixty miles distant by the road, which had asked for -the protection of American troops,[10.1] and on the fifteenth Captain -McCulloch and his company were sent off on a scouting expedition; but -the General had ample time for reflection, and his thoughts were not -entirely agreeable.[10.2] - -Despite newspaper glorification, the low opinion of his abilities that -was entertained by the officers must have impinged somewhat upon his -consciousness. Captain Larnard, in fact, believed that he not only -realized his inadequacy, but longed to retire; and certainly Taylor's -private letters exhibited the profoundest mental discomfort. Scott -should come, he insisted over and over again; the campaign would be a -failure, and the officer conducting it would be ruined. He distrusted -the intentions of the administration, and he condemned its policy. As -early as May 9 he feared too many volunteers--whom he disliked--were -coming; by May 20 he knew what Gaines had done; and Scott's letter of -May 18 informed him that about 20,000 such troops were "to march upon -Mexico."[10.2] - -[THE TROOPS ON THE RIO GRANDE] - -Under this head all his fears were realized. First, three-months -men (militia) sent for by himself in April, then six-months men -called out by Gaines, and then twelve-months men raised under the -war bill poured in. By June 3 his army had risen to nearly 8000. -Three weeks later the First Tennessee Infantry--advance guard of -the Congressional troops--appeared, and it found on the scene six -regiments from Louisiana, one from St. Louis, one from Kentucky, seven -companies from Alabama and twelve or fifteen from Texas. All of these -had come in response to the calls of Taylor or Gaines; and some had -been on the ground more than a month. In all about 8000 of these two -classes arrived, and in accordance with Taylor's desire nearly all of -them--except a very few, who agreed to serve twelve months--were sent -home about the first of August.[10.3] Before they took their leave, -at least 20,000 American soldiers were on the Rio Grande, besides an -inevitable number of American civilians more or less directly connected -with the army or not connected at all; and by far the greater part of -their subsistence had to come, of course, from the United States.[10.4] - -The men were stationed in a series of camps. The best of all these was -probably at Point Isabel, where the dry, undulating ground and fresh -breezes made for health and comfort. Fort Polk, as the station was -now called, included about fifty acres. The shallowness of the harbor -impaired the convenience of the Point somewhat, however; and the primary -camp lay three or four miles away at the north end of Brazos Island, -which consisted of low hills on the side toward the mainland, a swamp in -the centre, a wreck-strewn beach on the outer side, and in general three -blades of grass to fifty square feet of sand, as Lieutenant George B. -McClellan wrote home. Here, too, the air was excellent; but the brackish -water caused many complaints, and the sand blew into everything--hair, -nose, eyes and food. Marching the entire length of the island the -soldiers found themselves, at its southern end, about eighty yards from -the mainland, waded across the bayou or strait known as Boca Chica, and -after going about seven miles farther came to another camp and group of -storehouses, ten miles or so from their point of departure, called Mouth -of the Rio Grande, where the river steamers tied up or anchored.[10.5] -Here, as at Camp Brazos, the ground was "working A live with magotes and -land crabs," as a soldier put it; but the same breezes usually tempered -the heat. Eight miles from the Gulf by land--twenty-five or thirty by -water--one came to Burrita, a cluster of huts on a ridge close to the -stream, and this high ground was made the site of a roomy camp. On the -opposite side of the river and separated from it by a mile of swamp lay -Camp Belknap, a spot fit only for the snakes, tarantulas, centipedes, -fleas, scorpions and ants that infested it. Above this point lay several -more camps,[10.6] and still others enveloped Matamoros.[10.7] - -Except Belknap all of these places were fairly salubrious for men of -reasonable prudence, and several of them distinctly healthful; yet -considerable sickness prevailed. At Brazos Island a sort of dysentery -made trouble, and by some the water of the Rio Grande itself was thought -injurious. Until May 13 no funds available for tents had been within -the reach of Quartermaster General Jesup; and after this difficulty -was removed, feeling that he could not wait for duck, he used, common -muslin, which let the rain through; and many of the troops, even -regulars, had no protection against the weather except a screen of brush -or a blanket thrown over a bush. Measles invaded the camps, and lying -on the damp ground made the disease fatal in many instances. What was -worse, the heedlessness and homesickness of the volunteers caused much -sickness even at Point Isabel. The regulars, however, were comparatively -healthy and contented.[10.7] - -The heat, softened by constant breezes, was thought by many less -oppressive than in Tennessee and Kentucky, though sometimes men fainted -at the drills. Bathing proved a valuable resource; and on the seashore -there were oysters, crabs and a large variety of beautiful fish to catch -and eat. Stately processions of herons and scarlet-winged flamingos -and the chatter of jackdaws and many other birds amused the soldiers; -and some of those addicted to sport discussed the project of crossing -the mosquitos with gamecocks, we are told. The roar of the sea and -the mirages along the river, innumerable flowers, the solemn _burros_ -(donkeys) almost buried by their loads, the Mexicans vending eatables at -exorbitant prices, the long lines of tents where such a luxury as tents -existed, target shooting, and now and then the muffled drum helped -occupy one's attention. On July 5 occurred a Sunday and a sermon--the -last of the campaign. At sunset a tremulous orange haze in the west -was due, followed by the twinkling lights of the camp, that were so -agreeable to view from a distance, and then by the howling of wolves, -the tenor chorus of the swamps, and the agonized baritone fugues of -the donkeys. It was now time for singing, story-telling and, above -all, gambling--perhaps Old Sledge on a blanket, perhaps Chuckle-luck, -perhaps monte, perhaps faro; and now and then came a fandango (dance) -on the hard ground with such American and Mexican women as there were. -The camp life was "a rough furnace and a hot fire," wrote Sergeant -Miller; but the novelty of it soon wore off, and the volunteers grew -discontented.[10.7] - -[THE MORALE OF THE ARMY] - -They had come for glory and a good time, and were having neither. They -wanted to do something, and to do it at once or go home. One at least of -them believed that assignment to garrison duty would have led to general -desertion. Wherever they were, they panted to be somewhere else. Having -come to gamble, with their lives for a stake, they clamored to have the -game begin. If there was no enemy to fight, they were ready to fight -friends; and in one of the many brawls and riots Colonel Baker was shot -in the neck. Four or five months of training under expert officers and -strict discipline were necessary to prepare regulars for the field;[10.8] -and naturally these volunteers, almost wholly alien to the habits, -feelings and efficiency of the real soldier, often felt at liberty to -thwart and even defy their commander, and were unable to coöperate with -him intelligently when really disposed to do so. In spite of positive -orders they wasted ammunition recklessly, and Lieutenant Meade thought a -day passed in his tent no less perilous than a stiff battle.[10.11] - -The officers were very similar. One brigadier general came with a light -buggy, in which he proposed to make the campaign. Another had enlisted -as a private, and, not being deemed worthy to command the company, had -been elected a lieutenant; but the executive fiat provided him with -qualifications. "In the name of God," wrote a soldier to Senator Allen, -don't let Hamer be a brigadier general; he is talented, but doesn't -dare undertake to drill a squad; yet the commission was issued.[10.9] -Pillow, another of the same rank, ambitious to figure but not acquainted -with his proper work, did what was not proper. Some of the volunteer -generals on horseback reminded Lieutenant Jamieson of the line, - - "Woe to the mullein-stalk that came in our way." - -Persons of a mature age, who had bulked large at home, would not stoop -to plod through the rudiments of a new profession. Even good officers -were in fear of the letters written by their men and the revenge that -might be taken later, should real discipline be enforced; while those -less conscientious threatened to resign if kept in the background, stood -in the way of superiors belonging to the opposite political party, in -order to prevent them from making a reputation, or even took part with -the men in the hope of getting into Congress by and by.[10.11] - -In short, the volunteers were all one costly mass of ignorance, -confusion and insubordination, said Meade; while the regular officers -felt discouraged, not merely by discovering that civilians were -preferred to educated soldiers for high appointments, but by finding -themselves in the shadow and even under the command of men who had -been discharged from West Point for incapacity or from the army for -gross misconduct.[10.10] At the height of this, General Taylor, who was -disqualified by lack of experience and mental discipline for organizing -an efficient staff, and therefore needed to use his own eyes and his -own voice, held aloof. "I very seldom leave my tent," he wrote on July -25, adding helplessly, "How it will all end time alone must tell." -Besides, every mail brought letters about the Presidency to distract his -attention.[10.11] - -Probably he saw he had blundered. On April 26 he knew that war had -begun, and called upon Louisiana and Texas for soldiers with a view -to the invasion of Mexico, which he must have believed, under the -circumstances, that his government wished. By the rules of the service -it was then his duty, as he well knew, to make requisitions for -everything the campaign would require,[10.12] and a zealous commander, -gathering--as Taylor had been instructed to do--all the information he -could find regarding the local conditions, might reasonably have sent on -to Washington with it an able officer to assist the department. With a -scorn, however, for science and vision that should have delighted Polk, -Taylor did neither; but, assuming that the Mexicans would not fight--if -at all--north of the mountains beyond Monterey, he determined to advance -with about 6000 men. Unfortunately he neglected to have his engineers -inspect the three steamboats on which his plan depended, and these -proved to be worm-eaten and practically useless.[10.13] - -[TROOPS ADVANCE] - -About the middle of June, boats for the Rio Grande began to be -despatched from New Orleans, but--in addition to mishaps at the coast -resulting from gales and the freaks of the shifting bars--a serious -embarrassment soon occurred above. A direct advance against Monterey by -land was deemed impracticable, because the route lacked water. Taylor -had therefore planned to have his troops march to Camargo, the head of -navigation toward that city, and send their supplies to that point by -the river; but during the first eleven days of July rain fell heavily -and flooded the country. The freshet, however, ensured a sufficient -depth in the Rio Grande, and on July 6 the Seventh Infantry set out -for Camargo. The distance, called about 120 miles by land, was more -than twice as long by water; and the river wandered about so much that -according to humorous natives a bird could never get across--always -alighting on some projection of the bank from which it had risen. It -proved a hard task for the light and feeble steamboats, with only -green wood for the boilers, to stem the fierce current; the pilots -were unacquainted with the difficulties of such navigation;[10.14] and -in making one of the sharp turns a boat was frequently caught by the -current, and swept downstream or against the bank--breaking the rudder -perhaps.[10.16] - -But in one way or another the steamers puffed ahead past great -cornfields, and occasionally there was a small village, where the people -stared in wonder at the strange craft, and the girls laughed and shouted -to see the soldiers throw kisses to them. After some 200 miles of this -came Reynosa on a high limestone point, dominated by a heavy, stunted -church tower like an ancient castle; and, farther along, the mouth of -the Alcantro was passed. The country became still better now, with -fertile valleys running back to the tablelands; and not only corn but -potatoes, wheat, beans, and cotton could be seen. Forty miles of such a -landscape, and the steamboats entered the San Juan; and after struggling -on for three or four more they stopped early on July 14 at Camargo, -where Captain Miles, who commanded the regiment, sent at once for the -alcalde, an official who acted as mayor, judge and _pater familias_ in -a Mexican town, and formally took possession. The rest of the regular -infantry pursued the same route as fast as possible, and on July 30 most -of the volunteers were ordered to do so.[10.16] - - [Illustration: FROM MATAMORE TO MONTEREY] - -August 4 Taylor himself embarked, and the next day artillery and -infantry began to advance by the southern shore of the river. The road -was in places deep with mud or covered with water; thick chaparral cut -off the friendly breeze; the intense heat felled many a soldier, and -thirst tormented all who retained their senses; but after a time the -plan of moving by night lessened the suffering, and at last the painful -march was achieved. The cavalry and wagons also proceeded in due course -to the general rendezvous;[10.15] and meanwhile Mier, a hill town only a -short distance from the Rio Grande, was occupied without resistance on -July 31.[10.16] - -[DREADFUL CAMARGO] - -Camargo, a place of perhaps 5000 inhabitants, was said to be some 400 -miles from the Gulf by water. It stood well up on the right bank of the -river, here about one hundred yards in width; but the recent freshet, -rising to an unprecedented height, had nearly destroyed it, replacing -houses and gardens with about a foot of mud. This was dug away, and the -banks were cleared of vegetation; "acres and acres" of tents rose; and -by the end of August some 15,000 men were encamped along the San Juan -for a distance of three miles or so up and down and several hundred -yards back, while a quantity of stores that dumfounded the Mexicans and -satisfied Taylor, was gradually piled up. Worth, who had returned to -his brigade at the end of May, commanded the place and insisted on firm -discipline. No American trader was tolerated; and all persons caught -smuggling liquor into camp suffered "a punishment cruel to use on tender -skins."[10.17] - -This was well, but it did not redeem the situation. Natives regarded -Camargo as the sickliest point in the region, and the freshets had made -it worse. Every breath of air raised a stifling cloud of dust from the -dried and pulverized mud. Barren hills of limestone cut off the breeze -to a great extent and concentrated the fierce heat, frequently sending -the mercury in "this hottest of all hot places," as a soldier called the -town, to 112 degrees. Scorpions, tarantulas, mosquitos and centipedes -abounded. There was a plague of small frogs. "Last night the ants tried -to carry me off in my sleep," wrote a soldier. The only drinking water -came from the San Juan, and it made trouble. The ignorance of the -volunteers about caring for their health was fairly matched by that of -their officers and medical men. Days of sweltering under a cruel sun, -with nothing to do and apparently nothing to hope for, were followed by -cool nights and heavy dews, the heart-rending groans of the sick, and -the yelping of numberless prairie wolves. In almost all the volunteer -regiments at least one third of the men were ill, wrote Meade, and in -many of them, one half. The three volleys at the graves became well-nigh -a continuous roll; and the "dead march" was played so often that, as an -officer said, the very birds knew it. The First Tennessee, originally -1040 prime young fellows, was reduced by deaths and discharges to less -than 500. "Oh, what a _horror_ I have for Camargo," exclaimed one of the -generals; "it is a Yawning Grave Yard"; a thousand soldiers torn and -mangled on the battlefield would be nothing to its suffering and dying -regiments.[10.17] - -And all this appears to have been unnecessary. As we have seen, Taylor -had no intention of using more than about 6000 men in the near future; -and there were salubrious places not only near the Gulf but near -Camargo. No local maladies prevailed in the Rio Grande valley, said -Meade. "There are no causes for disease," wrote Captain Henry. The -climate of that region, said an Illinois officer, equalled in salubrity -the climate of "any Western state." Reynosa was described by the General -Sedgwick of Civil War days as perfectly healthy. Mier, selected the -following year, with a particular view to salubrity, as the site of a -camp for instruction, lay near by on the road to Monterey; and Cerralvo, -farther along on the same route, was a kind of Eden. The best comment -on what the General did is what the General himself said. His first -duty, he told Senator Crittenden, was to place the troops in a healthful -situation.[10.17] - -[MEXICAN PREPARATIONS] - -During all this while, Mexico, too, had been preparing for the war, and -preparing characteristically. Paredes began with good intentions, a -serious and fairly honorable Cabinet, and sound ideas of economy. Though -he did not seem to be very strong either physically or intellectually, -his many scars and the bull-like expression of his face inspired respect -and caution. He lived quietly and honestly, and the correspondent of -the London _Times_ thought Mexico had a better prospect of being well -governed than at any previous period since 1821. It was the dictator's -hope that such a policy and a bold campaign against the Americans would -rally the country to his banner.[10.20] - -About April 1, as we already know, he gave orders to attack Taylor. In -May he severed all consular relations with the United States.[10.18] June -6 the new Congress met; and Paredes, in opening the session, announced -that the time had come to declare war, and summoned all Mexicans to -the support of the country. Six days later he was elected President -as a matter of course, and the action of the American government -regarding war with Mexico was made known by the official _Diario_. On -the sixteenth Tornel--the enemy of the United States and worse enemy -of his own country, who had now wormed himself into the war department -in place of Almonte--proposed to Congress a declaration of war; and on -July 6 Paredes proclaimed, as Congress had voted five days before, that -Mexico would repel the aggression and invasion of the Americans. It was -further stated that besides completing the Permanent and Active corps, -the government would create additional forces to serve during the war. -A million dollars were supplied by the clergy to pay for a campaign. -Paredes obtained permission to command the army in person, and his -intention to do so was publicly announced.[10.20] - -But as usual the war plans ended mostly in talk. Except at the far -distant north, denunciation of the United States moderated somewhat, and -even at Mexico bragging lost a part of its flavor;[10.19] yet, though -really discouraged, people would, not recognize the war as anything -very serious. After news of Arista's defeat arrived at the capital, -the shiver of astonishment and disgust lasted for a time; but the glib -fellows in the cafés were soon remarking, "Well, that's over; that won't -happen again." Explanations abounded. After all, Arista was only making -a reconnaissance in force, it was pointed out. "Such is the fortune of -war; a defeat to-day and glory to-morrow," remarked one of the generals. -The hour chosen by Providence to give the world a lesson by terribly -punishing the aggressive Americans has not yet arrived, explained the -governor of San Luis Potosí. Reverses have occurred, but they can easily -be repaired and will be, the minister of war assured Congress airily; -and moreover the enemy had suffered most severely, it was believed. -Even the evacuation of Matamoros was eclipsed by domestic politics. -The triangular difficulties between Scott, Gaines and the American -government were cited as illustrating the state of discipline in our -army. The wreck-strewn coast near the mouth of the Rio Grande and the -billows laden with boxes and barrels afforded no little encouragement; -and editorials from the London _Times_, proving in detail the -hopelessness and risk of an American attack upon Mexico, were translated -and printed by the official journal.[10.20] - -So the nation took heart. Its case did not look desperate after all. -Heroics appeared unnecessary. The military men have seized the country, -thoughtful citizens reflected; let them defend it. The people did not -fly to arms. The departments opened their strong boxes by only a chink -or not at all. "A dreadful and cruel lethargy has buried the Republic," -exclaimed _El Indicador_. How the Mexicans could be roused, nobody -knew. To proclaim a _levée en masse_ and place a weapon in every hand -seemed politically dangerous. Paredes, observing that his plan to go -north received the cordial endorsement of his enemies, and fully warned -that his departure would be the signal for an uprising, dared not set -out; and as for the idea of British aid, upon which great expectations -had been erected, the minister of England gave lectures instead of -promises.[10.20] - -[PAREDES IN DIFFICULTIES] - -Indeed, Paredes found himself struggling, not merely to achieve, but -even to survive. Knowing well that his political existence depended -upon paying the army, he devoted all the revenues to it from the first, -and made every exertion to solve the all-important problem of money. In -March he tried to borrow heavily on the security of Church property, but -failed. In May the payment of all treasury obligations was suspended, -and a cut in pensions and salaries made; but the principal results were -to anger multitudes already offended by his economies, destroy credit, -paralyze business, and call forth an emphatic protest from the British -legation. On the principle, perhaps, of setting a thief to catch a -thief, the cynical Iturbe, one of the corrupt jobbers in government -contracts, was appointed minister of the treasury; and extraordinary -powers to raise funds were conferred upon the President by Congress. -But this very law shielded private and Church property, and there was -no help in laying taxes that could not be collected. Besides, the army -was now but a fragile staff. The defeats of the north had smitten its -confidence and prestige; being badly paid it was unreliable; and it -really preferred Santa Anna, the natural chief of its unprincipled -and rapacious officers.[10.22] Paredes counted upon the monarchical -party. Beyond a doubt he aimed to place it in power.[10.21] Alamán, an -avowed advocate of that policy, was not only his principal adviser -but the chief editor of a monarchist newspaper, _El Tiempo_, set up -at this time and protected by the government; and the _convocatoria_ -summoning the new Congress, prepared by Alamán, pointed in the same -direction. But his party had no "substantial plan," as the British -minister well said, and the idea commanded no popular support. To the -army it meant a permanent throne in the place of a Presidential chair -to which every successful general might aspire, and imported troops -instead of Mexicans behind the foreign prince; while the departments, -under the pretence that local interests were neglected but mainly -to facilitate access to the public treasury, turned away from even -the idea of a centralized republic toward a revival of Federalism. -The convocatoria, which denied Congressional representation to six -sevenths of the people, was generally and furiously denounced as an open -rupture with the nation; and Archbishop Posada, the strongest support -of the monarchists, fell sick and passed away. Paredes found it wise, -therefore--in fact, unavoidable--to declare for the Republic. But his -action seemed a confession of weakness, dishonesty and inconsistency; -and this impression was deepened by a futile decree against the freedom -of the press and a vain endeavor to gain the support of Pedraza, who led -the conservative wing of the Federalists.[10.22] - -Numerous other difficulties embarrassed the President. Like all the -successful revolutionary leaders, he found it impossible to keep the -promises he had made. It was complained that he did not protect northern -Mexico against the Indians. His adjustment of the foreign debt raised -a loud clamor. Many charged that his bringing the principal military -forces to the capital had laid the frontier open to the Americans, and -he was accused of using them still as his personal bodyguard. The Army -of Reserve is too much reserved, cried the _Monitor Republicano_; and -over and over again the opposition press demanded that he should take -the field, which nobody believed he intended to do.[10.22] - -By June the spirit of revolt, which had shown itself early in February, -seemed formidable. Almonte, who had left the Cabinet ostensibly because -opposed to monarchical designs, was believed to be at work for himself, -and Santa Anna was known to be plotting. The President's ability fell -conspicuously short of his needs, and he clouded with drink such talents -as he possessed. His weak and vacillating course fortified every enemy, -and estranged almost every sensible friend; and it came to be felt, -even by those hostile to the monarchical idea, that a more energetic -ruler must be found. In short, six months after taking the reins Paredes -had no real strength whatever. The door stood actually ajar for a new -revolution.[10.22] - -Preparations for such a change had then been going on for a long -while. In the London _Times_ of February 10, 1846, its correspondent -at Mexico had said that Santa Anna's coming into power again "would be -regarded by all classes as the greatest affliction that could befall -the nation," and other good observers entertained similar opinions. The -Federalists in particular disliked him. But on February 20 a protest -of his against monarchical schemes appeared in print at Mexico, and -newspapers were soon advocating his return.[10.23] Farías, leader of the -radical Federalists, was easily won over by a patriotic letter full of -penitence and unselfish zeal, and with Rejón as intermediary an alliance -of his faction and the Santannistas, based upon the idea of uniting army -and people, was at length, with much difficulty, brought about. Almonte -joined the combination; by the first of April it planned to "pronounce" -at Vera Cruz; and although disagreement regarding the terms of the plan -and a dispute whether Santa Anna or Almonte should be named the leader -prevented this action, Juan Alvarez, who had been a turbulent partisan -fighter in the Acapulco region ever since 1821, and was cognizant of -this conspiracy, inaugurated a revolution, April 15, in favor of a -provisional triumvirate: Santa Anna, Herrera and Rincón.[10.26] - -Santa Anna insisted upon his own views, and Almonte, whom Paredes -appointed minister to France in order to get rid of him and then -obligingly detained at Havana by withholding funds for the journey, -yielded. In May Paredes put Farías and fifteen other suspected men into -prison, and this enabled them to plot at their leisure. On the twentieth -of that month all the scheming came to a head at Guadalajara, where the -people cried, "_Viva la República!_ Death to the foreign prince!" The -officers despatched against them proved unsuccessful.[10.24] The country -was soon like a tossing sea; and insurrections, attempted or planned, -showed themselves at various places.[10.26] - -[PAREDES OVERTHROWN] - -The government now proceeded to commit suicide. Paredes announced that -he was going to make his long deferred campaign against the Americans. -About 4000 troops marched for the north--really destined, it was -believed, for Guadalajara--and near the end of July Vice President -Bravo reluctantly accepted the reins of government. It was hoped to -rally the conservatives to his support, and to that end he proclaimed -on August 3 the revival of the constitution (_Organic Bases_) that had -been in force during the Presidency of Herrera, while urgent appeals -for union and harmony were put forth by the new ministers. It was hoped -also to conclude the war. Paredes had wished to do this in May, and -a member of the Cabinet had indirectly proposed to Consul Black that -a minister should be sent by the United States; but the government -finally concluded that the matter was "too delicate." The new Executive, -however, had not committed himself in favor of war as the President had, -and it was understood that his administration fully intended to end the -conflict.[10.26] - -Bravo's course alarmed the conspirators, for many of the Federalists, -besides distrusting Santa Anna, believed the Organic Bases could be -made over into a satisfactory constitution. Nobody felt sure, however, -that such was the real intention of Paredes; the new Cabinet did not -please the radicals; the revolution had gone so far it could not -easily be stopped; and when word came on the third of August that the -garrison of Vera Cruz had pronounced for Santa Anna, General Salas, the -comandante general at Mexico, who was believed to be a firm supporter -of the government, declared at the "citadel" the following night--with -the concurrence of Farías--for Santa Anna and federation, citing -particularly as excuses the monarchical designs of the administration -and its failure to prosecute the war. Paredes, who had remained secretly -in town, hastily set off now to bring back his troops; but the second in -command of his escort betrayed him, and, overtaken by a cavalry regiment -despatched by Salas, the man who had boasted that at any rate his fall -would be no comedy, was brought back to town by the ear, so to speak, -like a truant schoolboy.[10.26] - -Bravo, having few men and no artillery, could not resist, and his -retirement on the sixth of August left Salas in supreme _de facto_ -command,[10.25] pledged only to carry on the war against the United -States and assemble Congress, but really destined, as his organ -modestly assured an indifferent public, to open "a new epoch, an epoch -of liberty, of movement and of life, an epoch of deeds and realities -and not of fraudulent and vain promises." "Federation, Santa Anna and -Texas," was his motto. An abundance of reassuring laws, and especially -the annulment of all edicts repressing the liberty of the newspapers, a -restoration of curtailed pensions and salaries, and the proclamation of -a political amnesty relieved anxious minds; and the spring of patriotism -was touched by summoning all Mexicans to unite against the invader. -Salas, however, counted only as a herald; it was time for the hero to -appear.[10.26] - -[SANTA ANNA'S RETURN TO MEXICO] - -Early in the forenoon on the sixteenth of August, a salvo of artillery -from the fortress of Ulúa at Vera Cruz announced the advent of something -unusual. At about nine o'clock a "crack" regiment, the Eleventh -Infantry, marched down to the customhouse, and after manoeuvring for -some hours was formed by dint of cuffing into two lines, which faced -each other and extended to the "Palace"; and finally, at a quarter -before one, a well-groomed and somewhat portly man in the full uniform -of a Mexican major general came up from the wharf between the lines. -He stood about five feet and ten inches in height, looked forty years -old though really fifty-one, seemed capable of great endurance, and -bore himself with an air of blended suavity and command. "The Flower of -Mexico," a very young and very pretty little blonde, his wife, preceded -him on the arm of an officer, and a retinue followed in his wake.[10.28] - -The guns of Ulúa boomed again; such of the soldiers as chose, fired -their muskets or saluted; but not a viva was heard. The young and -pretty woman pouted at the cool reception. The glittering dark-gray -eyes of her husband clouded; his dignified and courtly manner seemed a -little disturbed; and his tawny face, whereon a studied graciousness -and self-control could not hide from a close observer the marks of -duplicity, treachery, avarice and sensuality, seemed to grow black. But -he went on to the palace; and presently, as he sat there surrounded by -officers in more or less brilliant uniforms, a tinman, speaking in the -name of the people, lectured him roundly on his past misdeeds. Such was -the home-coming of "The Illustrious General, Benemérito de la Patria, -the Most Excellent Señor, Don Antonio López de Santa Anna," "Champion of -Independence, Hero of Tampico, Immortal Commander," as he was officially -styled;[10.27] and such was "the most pronounced enthusiasm" with which, -according to Almonte, the people received him.[10.28] - -Santa Anna put forth at once an allocution to the troops, which -exhibited in proper style the ecstatic joy that he experienced on -finding himself among such devoted patriots; and a manifesto, composed -by Rejón, laid his programme before the public. The latter address -rambled somewhat, and even J. F. Ramírez said he could not gather its -meaning; but it declared plainly against monarchy and ecclesiastical -domination. "Habits of passive obedience no longer exist," the paper -said; "and if there remains a sentiment of religion, time has undermined -the power of the directors of consciences." Peace, democracy and "the -concert of the army and the people" were said to be the General's -political principles, and he declared himself "the slave of public -opinion." As for the past, his mistakes as a ruler had been due to -circumstances and errors of judgment; and in regard to the future, -"Mexicans," he exclaimed, "there was a day, and my heart expands with -the recollection, when, leading forward the popular masses and the -army to demand the rights of the nation, I was hailed by you with -the enviable title, Soldier of the People. Allow me again to take -it, nevermore to be given up, and to devote myself, until death, to -the defence of the liberty and independence of the republic." At the -same time, as a pledge of sincerity, he advised restoring the federal -constitution of 1824, and giving the new Congress full control over the -executive.[10.28] - -Having thus placed himself before the country, Santa Anna proceeded to -his pretty house at Manga de Clavo, about sixteen miles from Vera Cruz, -and thence to his more pretentious country-seat, El Encero, a little way -below Jalapa. By this time--so it was reported to excuse the suspension -of his journey and perhaps to remind the public of his part in the war -with France--the stump of his leg had become painful; but in reality he -paused to consider the situation. In that he did well. His position was -extremely critical.[10.28] - -Santa Anna did not merely enjoy an occasional game of chance; he was a -gambler through and through. He did not merely stoop now and then to see -two game birds prove their mettle; he was essentially a "sporting man." -Not without reason did the London _Atlas_ refer to him as "that very -sorry hero but most determined cock-fighter." Possessing the strong, he -possessed also the weak points of this type. He was not only uneducated, -but incapable of study. He could improvise variations on a given theme -with astonishing volubility, throwing back--wonderfully elaborated--an -idea suggested to him; but he was not a thinker. He could shuffle and -deal current political notions most shrewdly, but his only principle, -either political or moral, was that having accidentally proclaimed the -republic of Mexico, he owned it. He understood the shallow and selfish -manoeuvres in the midst of which he lived, but had no deep insight, -and found it much easier to do things than to perceive what needed to -be done. His power to dupe others grew mainly, perhaps, from being a -dupe himself. He was in statesmanship only by force of circumstances; -and he always hated a business like that, for it perplexed and wearied -his passionate, untrained character. In a critical Mexican situation -his narrow but intense perspicacity, his unreflecting but unequalled -quickness, his reckless but ingenious adaptation of means to ends, -and his magnetic skill in "reaching" and combining men governed by -self-interest gave him for the time being an immense advantage, and, -when viewed under the dazzling arc lights of prestige and power, seemed -truly brilliant; but his ability was essentially thin, short-sighted -and weak. Indeed Consul Campbell, who saw him at Havana without his -trappings, declared that in any American village of a thousand persons -he would be thought intellectually feeble. Intellectually undeveloped he -certainly was.[10.29] - -[SANTA ANNA'S POLICY] - -In the present instance he had supposed in the Mexican style that a -phrase was a philosophy, that a catchword was a magical formula, that -an eloquent peroration would be as mighty after he had been found out -as it had been before, that a profession of repentance would erase long -years of deliberate bad conduct;[10.30] and from the hour of setting foot -upon Mexican soil his mistake had been growing every hour more evident. -Only the army felt confidence in him, and that not altogether, for he -now called himself a Federalist, and the Federalists aimed to substitute -for the army a citizen soldiery called the National Guard.[10.31] After -the experience of many sad years, "people" and "army" could no more -unite than oil and water. Owing to suspicions that resembled those of -the army, the moderates also held aloof; and although the country in -general, aware of his preëminent energy and resourcefulness and reduced -to the unhappy necessity of fighting fire with fire, consented to his -resumption of power, it did not, even when somewhat reassured by his -connection with Farías, trust him.[10.32] How can he speak truth who has -no truth in his heart? men asked; and he himself could feel what the -answer was.[10.41] - -As to Farías and his party of extreme democrats, who were good enough in -Santa Anna's opinion for servants but not for masters, they evidently -intended to control him, which could not be tolerated long; and as to -relations with the United States, the people seemed far more bent upon -war than a mere gamester could have supposed. Moreover, to declare -now for peace[10.33] looked very much like playing into the hands of -ex-President Herrera, the champion and martyr of that cause, round -whom an opposition party of citizens, military men and journalists was -gathering at the capital; and to do this appeared even to endanger -Santa Anna's personal safety, for as yet he was only a returning exile, -expelled but yesterday from the country like a felon, and ordered never -to come back. The civil authorities of the nation in general seemed -to be unfriendly; and the second city, Puebla, which lay across his -road to Mexico and had the power to wreck his cause, was found to be -ill-disposed. Not only famous and rich, but hardened by extraordinary -reverses--especially that of December, 1844--he was no longer the -hopeful, daring adventurer. His wish now, as he told an American at this -time, was to play a safe game. At Havana, so Campbell said, he had not -fathomed the crisis, but he now realized that he was treading the crust -of a volcano. His plans collapsed; and when the government,[10.34] which -had become alarmed by accounts of his hesitation, deputed Baranda to act -as his escort or custodian, he refused to move.[10.41] - -He did, however, send Rejón and Almonte forward to help guide Salas, -who did not relish the tutelage of Farías; and on August 22 with proper -solemnities and a lavish ringing of bells the federal constitution of -1824 came forth from its tomb.[10.35] The people then felt a little -more confidence in the future, though Santa Anna, if at all able to -forecast that future, would probably have felt less. About a week -later, at his instance, Rejón was appointed minister of foreign -affairs, Almonte minister of war, Farías minister of the treasury, and -Pacheco minister of justice;[10.36] and a broad scheme of war measures -went into effect.[10.37] A levy of 30,000 troops was assigned to the -states in quotas; Guardians of the Peace were decreed, so that all the -regulars might be able to take the field; every Mexican between the -ages of sixteen and fifty was ordered to be ready for service; and -steps were taken to buy up the weapons belonging to citizens as well -as promote the importation of arms. The apprehensions of the military -class had recently been assuaged by declarations that the army stood -in no danger of abolition; and they now tolerated not only an order to -enroll National Guards, but an offer of pardon to all deserting from the -regular corps within three months.[10.41] - -While these events were taking place, the sort of ability that Santa -Anna possessed and the sort of advice that he could obtain enabled him -to decide firmly upon a policy for the immediate future. He knew that no -way could be seen to meet the present embarrassments of the government; -he knew that the hot-headed radicals, if given a chance, would soon -discredit themselves; he knew that whoever should control the army would -be safe and strong; and he knew that one victory over the Americans -would make him omnipotent. He determined, therefore, to accept no public -share in the government, pose as the single-minded patriot-soldier, and -ask only the privilege of fighting at the head of the troops. At one -time he refused even to enter the capital, but he was notified by the -administration that such marked aloofness from the government would be -regarded as an open breach.[10.41] - -September 14, therefore, after several delays on his part, the bell of -the cathedral and a salvo of artillery announced at half-past one that -the professional saviour of Mexico, who never saved her, had entered -the city. Everything possible was done by the authorities to give an -appearance of concord and enthusiasm.[10.38] Watched as he knew he was -by ostensible friends, Santa Anna played out his distasteful rôle, and -so did the rest of the actors. Emblems abounded. Eloquence overflowed. -The cathedral chanted _Te deums_. "Immense multitudes" (hardly perceived -by ordinary observers) cheered incessantly--in the official journal. -Not only public but private edifices were lavishly decorated--by order. -A hired band perambulated the streets. The General listened patiently -to a lecture from another man of the people, and replied with edifying -humility; and he asked that a well-known statue of himself should be -replaced with the national arms. But it was noticed that he and Farías, -facing each other in the carriage of honor under a huge picture of the -Constitution, looked more like victims than victors; and he would not be -present at the grand banquet.[10.41] - -Having complied with the ultimatum of the government, Santa Anna was -now, September 17, appointed commander-in-chief of "The Liberating -Army." "Every day that passes without fighting at the north is a century -of disgrace for Mexico," he then exclaimed; and although he remained in -Tacubaya, a suburb of the capital, and was said to be ill, he exerted -himself to forward troops, hoping to concentrate 25,000 rapidly at San -Luis Potosí. Tidings from the seat of war foreshadowed a battle at -Monterey, and increased his anxiety. He exhorted the war department -unsparingly.[10.41] - -But the government was exceedingly poor. According to the _Diario_ only -1839 pesos (dollars) lay in its treasury on September 6. Voluntary -offerings for the war took mostly the form of eloquence.[10.39] The -million raised by Paredes had nearly vanished in his preparations and -the Citadel revolution. Pressure was applied to the clergy, and the -_Diario_ asked, Is it not worth while for the merchant to give 100,000 -pesos in order to save 900,000? But both of these classes held back -stubbornly, and managed the affair so as to escape. One brigade formed -on three successive days to march, but had to wait for funds. At length, -however, with extreme difficulty about 90,000 pesos were borrowed; -and on September 28, after piously seeking the Divine Blessing at -Guadalupe,[10.40] Santa Anna with some 2500 men set out. About 3000 were -already on their way, and he expected to find a large force at San Luis -Potosí.[10.41] - -As he rolled along in his coach for about 380 miles, drawn by relays -of fleet mules, the General probably congratulated himself upon his -policy. He was on living terms with the radicals, had been accepted by -the Church, had soothed the army, and through Pedraza--recently his -enemy and still the enemy of Farías--had reached an understanding with -the Moderados. Unquestionably he stood much better with the public than -a month before; and he probably did not perceive that his recent course -had ensured for himself and the nation a series of most unpalatable -surprises.[10.41] - -Through it all, however, the capital managed easily to be gay, and six -"arrogant bulls" were artistically sacrificed in the Plaza de Toros on -one of these anxious days.[10.42] - - - - - XI - - TAYLOR SETS OUT FOR SALTILLO - - June-September, 1846 - - -Arista had scarcely reached Linares when he began, though he knew -his military standing had been destroyed, to rebuild the army. Mejía -followed in his predecessor's footsteps, adopted a policy that was both -conciliatory and stern to check desertion and bring offenders back to -the colors, kept guards out on the roads leading to the Rio Grande, and -exerted himself to improve the morale of his troops. Though Linares -was a central point within easy reach of all the principal towns of -northeastern Mexico, he justly regarded Monterey, a city of twelve or -fifteen thousand inhabitants and capital of Nuevo León, as the vital -spot, and about the ninth of July transferred his army to that place. -Desertion had now ceased, he reported; morale had been restored; and the -troops were described as eager to avenge the disasters of May 8 and 9, -which in their opinion "they had suffered but not caused."[11.1] - -This view of the situation, however, must be described as rather -imaginative and extremely incomplete. It was hard to find money and -hard to find mounts. As late as August 19 Mejía admitted that neither -Mexicans nor foreigners would advance him funds, and even after paying -for horses he could not obtain them. Two of the governors in this -quarter would give him no aid, and still less were the people inclined -to rise for the national defence. Both troops and artillery came far -short of the requirements. Though Arista had called for reinforcements -on April 24, not a man from the south had arrived by August 20. -Including the scattered and almost worthless Presidials, the total -number of soldiers in the region--outside of Tampico--was less than -3000, and about one third of these could not easily be concentrated at -headquarters. Ill-fed, ill-clothed, soured by misfortune, smarting -under the general contempt, some desiring Mejía and some Ampudia for -commander, still more wishing Arista back, and all wrangling bitterly, -even if less bitterly than at first, over the conduct of their generals -and officers, the army had for chief a little, pockmarked man in blue -glasses, who looked like a sot, and thus far in the campaign had been -distinguished only for bad health and a pompous vocabulary.[11.2] - -Mejía's plan was to conduct a guerilla warfare, save the army from -further disgrace in the field, and make a stand at Monterey. General -Canales and the irregulars were, therefore, his first line; but the -"Chaparral Fox," who entertained revolutionary designs for which he -desired American support, had managed so as to do us no harm in the -battles of May 8 and 9, and proposed to continue that policy. Mejía -suspected his intentions, yet could not prove him a traitor, and sent -him funds and horses grudgingly; whereupon Canales, protesting that his -loyal aims were paralyzed by Mejía's personal ill-will and stinginess, -made the cause of Mexico odious by robbing and outraging the people -under cover of her flag. At length, early in August, Mejía concluded to -give him about a thousand men, and ordered him to annoy the Americans in -every possible way; but the General reported that his horses were too -weak to trot three miles, and that he saw little prospect of injuring or -even delaying the enemy. In the northeast, therefore, to all intents and -purposes no aggressive Mexican army existed. The business of the nation -at this time was changing masters.[11.3] - -[TAYLOR'S PROCEEDINGS] - -Taylor intended to invade Mexico, and having been favored by Providence -and the government with enough men and supplies, his next need was -information regarding the enemy, the roads and the towns. Plenty of -this he could easily have obtained, one must believe. A strong feeling -against the government and even in favor of joining hands with the -Americans now prevailed in this quarter; and a large number of the -inhabitants on the border, long engaged in smuggling operations, had -the training, as well as the natural gifts of disloyalty, daring and -secretiveness, needed by the spy. A well-informed Mexican of this region -stated that some of his fellow-citizens were quite ready to serve the -Americans faithfully. Taylor could have made it for their interest to -do so, and in addition the circumstances gave him countless hostages -for their fidelity. Scott advised him to employ a large force of secret -agents in a systematic way. But this was not done, and his information -continued to be meagre.[11.4] - -Another subject of prime importance was, of course, the means of -transportation. Taylor had, as we have seen, a large outfit of -wagons, but not enough of them for the expedition in view. A train -of pack-mules was the natural supplement. Those animals were almost -universally employed in Mexico; the country abounded in them; and it -was the General's obvious duty to use the facilities within his reach. -At Washington the practice of the region was understood, and it could -only be inferred that good wagon roads did not exist. Besides, Taylor -intimated that he expected to follow the usual system, and indeed he -was not aware until August that army wagons could be used where he -intended to go. There is no reason to doubt that by the first of that -month fully 3000 pack-mules could have been at his command. Under such -circumstances, to suppose the war department would expend a million -dollars or so in the manufacture of wagons, without having a requisition -from the army or even definite information as to Taylor's plans, went -beyond reason. But the matter was overlooked at the front; and finally, -gathering barely 1700 of those animals Taylor complained loudly, though -he himself recognized that the fate of the administration depended -upon the success of the war, that departmental neglect had inexcusably -delayed and crippled his advance.[11.5] - -Still, the General decided to move, for he knew the public demanded -action; and he wished--as he said--to sustain the government. Indeed, -he now declared it necessary to go forward immediately, "be the -consequences what they may." "I must attempt something," he wrote -privately. The government, however, had not requested him to support -the administration or to incur such a risk; and Taylor--who stood -conspicuous now in the Whig party, and suspected that "Polk, Marcy and -Co." were aiming to discredit and ruin him--can scarcely have felt a -passionate desire to sustain them. In short, as may be inferred from his -correspondence, he understood that he himself was the person chiefly -blamed by the country for inactivity; and, assuming that no serious -resistance would be encountered, he determined--primarily, it would -appear, for his own sake--to occupy Monterey and Saltillo. For the head -of an invading army, both the motive and the assumption were somewhat -improper.[11.6] - -He understood, however, that resistance might possibly be offered, and -for that his plan seems to have been ready. As early as the middle of -June there were at his disposal ten 18-pound siege guns, two 10-inch -mortars and four 24-pound howitzers; and we know that at least the -mortars and half a dozen of the 18-pounders were then at Fort Brown. -Before July some of the howitzers were certainly at Point Isabel. It -was entirely feasible to carry heavy ordnance to Monterey, for Santa -Anna did a much harder job of the same kind; and Engineer Sanders had -warned Taylor that field pieces would not be effective against the stone -houses of Mexican towns. But, probably quite unaware how much the moral -effect produced by his guns on May 8 had contributed to his victory the -following day, he seems to have retained his low opinion of artillery. -Even while Taylor was protesting against the number of volunteers -thrown upon him, Ridgely complained bitterly that he could not get -enough men for his battery. The cold steel--simple, direct, positive, -unflinching--was a weapon such as Taylor could understand. One required -no book learning to use that. And no doubt he already intended, as we -know he intended later, to overcome resistance at Monterey, should any -be offered, "pretty much with the bayonet."[11.7] - -[ADVANCE OF THE AMERICANS] - -Careful attention was paid to the choice of a route. That through -Cadereita offered the better grazing; but the General wisely determined -to march by way of Mier and Cerralvo, a distance believed to be 140 -miles but in reality only about 125. This route was a little shorter -and better provided with water. The roads were much more satisfactory. -The problem of crossing the San Juan without boats or graded approaches -did not present itself. The groves and ravines where an enemy could -make trouble were few, and but one stream had to be forded. On August -19, therefore, Brevet Brigadier General Worth, commanding the Second -Division of regulars, crossed the river with his first brigade over a -bridge of steamboats, and moved off to establish a dépôt at Cerralvo, -about sixty miles away. All the pack-mules, which were to return under -escort and make a second trip, accompanied the troops. Brigadier General -Persifor F. Smith and the second brigade, Brigadier General Twiggs with -the First Division of regulars and about 180 wagons, and Major General -W. O. Butler with a "Field Division" of volunteers followed. September 5 -headquarters moved, and in a day or two the last of the men belonging to -the expedition set out.[11.8] - -The advance to Cerralvo did not prove entirely agreeable. At first there -was trouble because the mules could not be loaded until after daybreak, -and it was hard for the troops to march during the hot hours; but after -a little experience the troops moved off at about three o'clock in the -morning, and the train proceeded later under escort. The road proved -to be full of sharp stones most of the way; and everything--even the -frogs and the grass--had thorns, reported the soldiers. Although, as -Worth said, there was no dangerous lack of water, the men suffered not -a little during a part of the time. Some almost raved from thirst, and -brushing the yellow scum aside, would drink eagerly from any pool. The -heat baked them, and in spite of wet cotton in their caps a considerable -number were overcome. Mier, the only town of any importance on the -route, proved to be the roughest and gloomiest sort of a place. Gloomy, -too, was the long line of wooden crosses beside the road, for every -one marked a grave, and not a few signified a murder. After a while, -however, came the inspiring sight of distant mountains--the fantastic, -pale-blue summits of the Sierra Madre, which rose higher and stood out -more boldly day by day; and the occasional inhabitants appeared, as -Worth reported, "cordial in the highest degree."[11.9] - -Particularly sunny were the Mexican smiles at beautiful Cerralvo, where -the advance arrived at noon, August 25; and there were still more -substantial reasons for satisfaction. The town, a place of some 1800 -people, was built of stone, and hence formed a strong military position. -It had enough springs of excellent water to supply New York City, -declared Taylor. Standing, all in white, on a ridge at the foot of a -spur from the Sierra Madre, surrounded with groves, pastures and fields, -it gave promise of abundance and kept the promise. Sheep, cattle -and goats, watermelons, pecans, half a dozen delicious fruits, ample -grazing, and large stores of corn were to be had, and plenty of oak, -walnut, ebony, cypress and willow for the cooks' fires. By the morning -of September 15, with the exception of the Texas contingent, which had -marched by way of China and Cadereita, all the troops concentrated -here.[11.10] - -[MEXICAN PLANS] - -Mexico, anticipating Taylor's advance, had now taken steps to meet it. -In July Paredes had sent three brigades of regulars from the capital to -operate against the revolutionists of Guadalajara, and on August 6 these -were ordered to Monterey. Ampudia, who was to supersede Mejía, received -instructions to make haste; and the commander of the third brigade, on -leaving San Luis Potosí, went so far as to destroy all baggage that -could hinder the march. News of the revolution, which overtook these -forces tardily, delayed the advance, for of course many of the officers -felt they must "pronounce"; and almost the whole of one brigade, -abandoning their general, went back to Mexico. The number deserting was -quite serious, for besides the usual reasons for leaving a distasteful -service, the troops were alarmed by the prospect of real fighting, and -the sombre monotony of the deserts that had to be crossed disheartened -them.[11.11] - -But on August 29 the first brigade, about 1400 infantry with three -8-pounders, arrived at Monterey. The second came on September 6, and -the third only a few days later. The garrison was now strong. Mejía -had concentrated some 4000 regulars and auxiliaries, and according to -the detailed official report there were in all, on September 10, 7303 -officers and men. The arrival of the new forces greatly encouraged the -soldiers of Palo Alto and the Resaca--who had felt little desire to meet -the Americans again--and hence checked their deserting. As the cavalry -had now been re-mounted, it seemed likely to be efficient; and when -the Señorita Dosamantes, equipped as a captain, volunteered to fight -the invader, and was exhibited on horseback to the entire army, its -enthusiasm rose high.[11.11] - -From the forced march of Ampudia and his troops one might infer that the -government had positively decided to make a stand at Monterey, but such -was by no means the fact. Before leaving Vera Cruz and again later Santa -Anna warned both Salas and the minister of war emphatically against -this idea, and on August 20 Ampudia was therefore notified that unless -Mejía's troops and the fortifications were certainly of sufficient -strength to check the enemy, he should "on no account risk an action." -Three days later the department informed him that the general-in-chief -was "convinced" that Monterey could not be defended, and that his -forces were "not strong enough to resist the Americans"; and in view of -this opinion he was directed to halt at Saltillo, and order Mejía by -special express to demolish his fortifications, and remove his army and -military effects to that city "without loss of time"--the purpose of the -government being "to gather an army capable of winning a victory without -risking the honor and great interests of the nation."[11.12] - -The new commander at the north, however, was doubtless thinking for -himself. In view of Santa Anna's purpose to organize a grand army -under his personal orders, this was Ampudia's last opportunity to -shine independently, and he did not wish to lose it. On learning the -strength of Mejía's and Taylor's armies and the condition of the -fortifications, he believed he could not only repulse the Americans but -drive them beyond the Rio Grande. Mejía took the ground that it would -be dishonorable to give up Monterey and the pass between that city and -Saltillo without a fight, and that it might be very hard to recover the -road through the mountains after giving the Americans an opportunity -to fortify it. His officers, who met by Ampudia's order in a council -of war, appear to have shared this opinion; and the comandante general -of Nuevo León, "as a Mexican and an officer in the national army," -protested "before God and men" against the instructions to retreat, -leaving twenty guns that could not be taken away, and permitting the -enemy to triumph "without hearing a shot from the Mexican arms." So the -die was cast; and on learning of Ampudia's decision, together with his -reasons, the war department endorsed it.[11.13] - -[MONTEREY MADE READY FOR DEFENCE] - -On reaching the ground, Ampudia proceeded to inspect Mejía's works. The -importance of erecting fortifications at Monterey had been clearly seen. -May 27 the minister of war gave orders accordingly, and Mejía promptly -sent an engineer there to reconnoitre and draw a plan. Since, however, -he could not afford to hire or even feed laborers, only soldiers carried -on the work, and little was accomplished before the end of July; but -people were then required to labor without pay, and the progress became -more rapid. Ampudia now brought men from the neighboring towns also; -and Monterey, excited by the news of Taylor's advance, became a hive of -industry.[11.14] - - [Illustration: BATTLE OF MONTEREY GENERAL PLAN] - -The opportunities for defence were excellent. Lying encompassed--except -on the north and east--with steep, high spurs of the Sierra Madre, where -the Saltillo road and the small but swift Santa Catarina River debouched -from Rinconada Pass, the city formed a sort of rectangle somewhat more -than a mile in length from east to west and about nine squares wide -at the broadest. Only a short distance from the western end rose high -and steep foothills, and some of these were now crowned with redoubts. -Along the southern side the river and its high, rough bank were almost -a sufficient protection; but they were supplemented with fortified -buildings and yard walls, barricades at the ends of the streets, and for -about half the way a solid parapet.[11.15] - -The eastern part of the town was given special attention, for here -entered the principal roads from the north. In the city proper nearly -all the streets ran straight either at right angles or parallel, and -in each of the central ones now rose a double line of overlapping -barricades or breastworks of masonry, provided with embrasures and -with ditches. Outside these a series of redoubts was constructed; and -wherever the enemy seemed likely to come, the houses--almost always -one story high--were loopholed and provided with ammunition. As they -had been constructed very solidly of rubble-work, were protected with -strong doors and iron-barred windows, and had flat roofs (_azoteas_) -defended with sand-bags in addition to their stone parapets, they were -veritable fortresses. At the heart of the town stood the cathedral with -its elaborately carved façade, a chime in one spire and in the other a -clock. This became the general magazine. In front of it was the main -plaza, bounded on the western side by the prison; and beyond the prison -lay the market square.[11.15] - -The north side of the town had even stronger protection. Within -12-pounder range of almost every part of the city stood a solid pile of -masonry, twenty-five or thirty feet high, blackened by time. This was -an unfinished cathedral; and, taking it as a donjon, Mejía's engineers -threw round its columns and buttresses a quadrangular bastioned -earthwork, intended for about thirty guns. The high parapet, eleven and -a half feet thick, was faced on both sides with a soft gray tufa, in -which cannon balls were expected to embed themselves. The ditch, though -not wide enough and not completely excavated, was twelve feet deep. A -garrison of four hundred with eight guns occupied the position; and -although the two small magazines were not adequately protected against -falling projectiles, and still other faults could be pointed out by -an expert, this fort, commonly known as the citadel, was a powerful -work, and, standing on a slight elevation, it could sweep the roads and -the plain east and north of the town. A sort of telegraph enabled its -commander, Colonel Uraga, to communicate with headquarters.[11.16] - -Plenty of ammunition and an adequate store of provisions were -accumulated. General Requena labored indefatigably in repairing -discarded cannon, and about forty guns were found available. American -deserters, who either had been or had become skilful gunners, were on -hand to point some of them. There was one capital, underlying defect in -the whole plan of defence. To hold all the works firmly required a much -larger garrison than Ampudia had. More or less clearly the mistake was -understood; but the active coöperation of the cavalry and the reserves -was expected to offset it.[11.17] - -Santa Anna's policy was not merely to give up indefensible towns, and -he ordered Ampudia to drive away all cattle that the Americans might -otherwise obtain, destroy provisions and make the water supply useless -whenever a place had to be abandoned, besides urging the inhabitants -to leave their homes on Taylor's approach, so as to show the Americans -and the world that Mexico could never be subdued; and Ampudia not only -endeavored to execute these instructions, but adopted measures of his -own to supplement the efforts of his troops. The people were ordered to -intercept messengers and convoys, capture small parties, and in every -possible way imitate the royalists of Spain, who had made the soldiers -of Napoleon so much trouble. Martial law went into effect, and thus -in addition to other advantages the authority of the indifferent or -disloyal governor was obliterated.[11.18] - -Disloyalty and indifference among the people were combated at the -same time, as Ampudia informed the government, by a twofold policy of -"moderation" and "decisive energy," in which the second ingredient -appeared the more conspicuous. All the citizens of the region received -a summons to come and help defend the nation. Notice was publicly given -that any person voluntarily affording the enemy direct or indirect aid -would be shot; everybody was required to denounce offences of this kind; -and all authorities were ordered to inflict the penalty. A circular in -English inviting Americans to desert met our troops, and the inhabitants -were directed to succor and protect all such repentant foes. Taylor -had but a few regulars, Ampudia proclaimed, and the rest of his army -was "a mob of adventurers without valor or discipline." Moreover the -sacred cause of independence itself appealed for support, and could not -be ignored. "Soldiers," he cried, "Victory or death must be our only -motto." Thanks to this vigorous policy and the increased numbers of the -army at Monterey, by the middle of September the temper of the people -towards the Americans noticeably changed.[11.19] - -[AMPUDIA UNDER A CLOUD] - -In other respects, however, the General did not feel so well pleased. -In person large and strong, with a soldierly mustache and goatee and a -martial bearing, he figured well on horseback; but he was really small -and mean, and his measure had been taken. His obtaining the command -of the army--first at Matamoros and again recently--through political -intrigue was fairly well understood. Many attributed the disaster -of May 9 to his machinations against Arista. A dominant regard for -personal safety was known to be one of his characteristics. His chief -distinction, said the British minister at Mexico, arose from acts of -violence done in abuse of power, and he now acted out his disposition. -However the general public might be deceived, such a man could not -impress the officers by talking about a sacred cause and "victory or -death"; and old personal animosities against him supplemented the want -of confidence based on public grounds. One of the officers wrote bluntly -to him that the disgust and discouragement produced by the news of his -appointment could be seen plainly on the faces of nearly all. Complaints -against him were forwarded to the government. The press voiced this -hostile sentiment, and fresh enmities were rapidly engendered.[11.20] - -Nor did military affairs prosper very well. The funds were scanty, and -that state of things could not fail to cause dissatisfaction. Ampudia's -appointing Ramírez, who understood tactics but not engineering, to -supervise the construction of works met with disapproval. Numerous -changes of policy had a similar reception. At first he adopted Mejía's -plan of attempting nothing serious in the field, and then he decided to -meet the enemy at Marín, some twenty miles from the city. A council was -held; and finally, as most of the officers opposed this project, it was -given up. Then another council decided to abandon certain incomplete -fortifications between the citadel and the western defences; and at -the instance of Ramírez a very important fort, the Tenería redoubt at -the eastern end of the town, was demolished. Such vacillation and such -waste, both moral and material, undermined the courage and confidence of -the garrison and stimulated its dissensions.[11.21] - -At Cadereita, August 31, there were a thousand regular cavalry, and -they were ordered to attack five hundred Texan horse then at China; but -they accomplished nothing. The Americans march carelessly and in small -bodies, observers reported; they loosen their arms and stoop down to -drink at the first water; they sleep as if at home; they carry little -ammunition; and their muleteers are hoping the train will be attacked. -With such opportunities the six hundred troopers now under Canales were -expected to do something; but that astute leader merely gave reasons why -they could not. "Nothing, absolutely nothing will either the regular -cavalry or the auxiliaries do against the enemy," exclaimed Ampudia -bitterly; and on September 18 the whole mounted force of about three -thousand meekly retreated to the town, leaving the roads practically -open.[11.21] - -[TAYLOR PRESSES FORWARD] - -Early on September 12 all the pioneers of Taylor's army advanced from -Cerralvo to prepare the road for his artillery and wagons. Ahead of -them went a strange-looking company. Mounted on quick, tough horses -and marching at will, the men were dressed as they pleased; but they -agreed substantially on leggings, trousers belted round the waist, -coarse red or blue shirts, and either a buckskin cap or a soft felt hat. -Each carried a heavy rifle, a pouch of bullets, a large powderhorn and -a bowie knife, and some had Colt revolvers. At every saddle-bow hung -a braided lariat for a tether; and a bag of parched and pounded corn, -together with whatever else the rider thought he needed, was bound to -the saddle with thongs. This company was Captain McCulloch's rangers--a -part of the First Texas regiment--Taylor's finest body of scouts; and -they, assisted by a squadron of dragoons, covered the pioneers. On -the following three days the First, Second and Field Divisions moved -successively, carrying forty rounds of ammunition and rations for eight -days, besides what went as freight; and only the sick, with a guard of -two Mississippi companies, remained at Cerralvo.[11.22] - -The spell of Mexico, that was to charm away so often the pains of a hard -existence, now fell upon the soldiers. The country became more fertile. -One broad plain shone with Spanish dahlias, and curious trees and plants -could be seen on all sides. Every few miles a stream of cool, sparkling -water leaped across the road. In the morning a curtain of gray, thinning -little by little, went slowly up at last, and revealed a world of hills, -edged with burnished gold, where one or two, catching the sun aslant on -a bare, crystalline side, would flash out amidst the lingering shadows -in all the colors of a diamond; while, farther on, lilac mountain rose -above lilac mountain and purple range looked over purple range until the -crowning peaks touched the firmament. In one town after another grapes, -figs and pomegranates delighted the eye, and, as an officer quoted to -himself, - - "The air was heavy with the sighs of orange groves." - -And finally, as night came on, the jagged blue sierras, growing almost -black, were silhouetted perhaps against a pale yellowish-green streaked -with crimson. A spice of danger added zest, for about a thousand Mexican -cavalry hovered constantly in the front, and once near Ramos McCulloch's -rangers got near enough to exchange shots with a party of them. But -Torrejón's men employed themselves principally in driving the Mexicans -from their homes under Santa Anna's and Ampudia's instructions; and -on September 17, after passing through Papagallos, the Americans now -marching with Taylor concentrated near Marín.[11.23] - -Very early the next morning a bugle broke the silence of the camp; other -bugles answered it; the drums awoke; the fifes joined in; the army -sprang to its feet. As soon as possible the advance guard moved off. The -First Division followed at eight o'clock, and the others at intervals of -an hour. After sleeping that night at San Francisco the army, completed -by the arrival of the Texas Division, set out again at about sunrise -on the nineteenth. Since reaching Marín Taylor had rather come to the -conclusion that he would scarcely reach Saltillo on time--that first -he would have something to do at Monterey; and this opinion was now -confirmed. At about nine o'clock, accompanied by his staff and an escort -of Texas mounted men, he came to the edge of the plain, and passed on -down the gentle slope of the San Juan valley.[11.21] - -In front lay a stretch of broken ground. Beyond it cattle were feeding -peacefully in green fields, and corn was ripening under a hot sun. -Farther away still lay Monterey, the holy city of the frontier, as if -in a niche of the vast sierra, its white houses partly hidden with -green and the spires of its cathedral soaring above; and now and then -the music of a bell, a bugle or a drum came faintly across the plain. -A little at the right could be seen the long, low line of the citadel -wall, surmounted by the dark bulk of the "donjon" and its flag of red, -white and green. But suddenly the tranquillity of the scene was broken. -A white puff rose from the fort, and a 12-pound ball tore up the dirt in -front of the General. Another dropped near him, and a body of Mexican -cavalry advanced. Hays's regiment of horse was ordered to charge; but -seeing the enemy retire as if to lure the Americans under the guns of -the fortress, Taylor recalled him.[11.24] - -Meanwhile the rest of our troops, excited by the rolling echoes from -the mountains, pressed on. Some threw away their packs of cards, but -mostly the men joked, laughed, cheered each report from the citadel -guns, and shouted that they were going to a grand fandango at Monterey. -"No one discussed depots of supplies, base of communications, lines -of retreat, or strategic positions," we are told by General S. G. -French, then a lieutenant of artillery; "but every one knew that the -brave old soldier would fight the enemy, wherever he found them, to -the end." The victories at Palo Alto and the Resaca had filled the -men with confidence; and in this happy mood the army encamped about -three miles from the city at Walnut Grove (_Bosque de San Domingo_), -an extensive and beautiful group of pecans and live-oaks, watered by -large, pure springs, where pleasure parties of well-to-do Mexicans were -accustomed to enjoy themselves. The army now consisted, all told, of -some 3080 regulars and 3150 volunteers. About 1350 of the troops were -mounted men; and for artillery there were four field batteries, and -a pair of 24-pound howitzers, but no real siege ordnance except one -10-inch mortar. In the front lay a city of stone, protected with strong -and rather skilfully planned works, and guarded by an army larger than -Taylor's.[11.25] - - - - - XII - - MONTEREY - - September, 1846 - - -[FIRST OPERATIONS AT MONTEREY] - -At once American reconnoitring parties accompanied by engineers hurried -out (September 19), and both ends of the city were examined. Despite -the fire of the citadel, particular attention was paid to the western -fortifications, for the idea of turning them had already presented -itself. By ten o'clock that night Brevet Major Mansfield, the chief -engineer, returned to camp with five prisoners to be questioned and with -satisfactory evidence that the Saltillo road could be gained in spite of -the forts; and then a council decided to make the attempt.[12.1] - - [Illustration: BATTLE OF MONTEREY DETAILED PLAN] - -Evidently, however, this meant a severe struggle. Going three quarters -of a mile west from the main plaza of Monterey by the Saltillo route, -passing a cemetery, and keeping on about a mile and a quarter farther, -one found on a low eminence at the right a dilapidated but massive -stone building known as the Bishop's Palace, close below which stood -now a half-moon battery facing and commanding the town. Beyond this -redoubt, called La Libertad, the eminence became an ascending ridge, -and some three hundred yards from the Palace the ridge ended sharply -as the summit of an extremely steep height known by the Americans as -Independence Hill (_Loma de Independencia_), where a small sand-bag -redoubt had been constructed. Immediately west of this hill, what -was known as the Topo road left the Saltillo highway and struck off -toward one's right, and near the farther edge of this road a spur of -the mountain began to ascend. On the other side of the highway flowed -the Santa Catarina, passing by the city and joining the San Juan -some distance below. Farther to the left and parallel to the river -rose a high, bristling hill named Federation Ridge. At the western -end--the summit--of this ridge, which extended some distance beyond -La Libertad, stood a redoubt occupied by some eighty men; and about -six hundred yards to the east, in a depression of the ridge, was a -substantial masonry fort called El Soldado, armed with two 9-pounders, -which were dragged, before the fighting began, to the redoubt on the -summit.[12.2] - -Meantime the Mexicans also were observing. It was generally believed -that Taylor had thirty guns, which meant a hard fight; but the soldiers -were excited and ready for battle. "The enthusiasm is great, the -determination greater, the desire to sacrifice ourselves for the sacred -rights of the nation unbounded," wrote the comandante general of Nuevo -León. But Ampudia--"the Culinary Knight," as Worth called him, who had -fried Sentmanat's head--already trembled. We have food for barely twenty -days, he reported to the government; the troops at San Luis Potosí -are few in number and little inclined to advance; through spies the -enemy are aware of these facts; they will gain the pass between here -and Saltillo, and from that position "it will be almost impossible to -dislodge them."[12.3] - -Sunday morning all was bustle in the American camp, and at length, -a little before two o'clock, Hays and about 400 mounted Texans rode -away. A long sky-blue line of infantry followed them, and then another -line of men in dark-blue jackets and trousers with a red stripe down -the leg--Lieutenant Colonel Childs's Artillery Battalion. Blanchard's -Company of Louisiana volunteers, dressed in every sort of clothes and -carrying every sort of weapon, and Duncan's and Mackall's batteries with -their gleaming pieces and clattering caissons completed the detachment, -which included some 2000 men, all told. The rest of the army watched -their departure with keen interest, for their design looked well-nigh -desperate, and yet the fate of the campaign was believed to depend upon -it.[12.4] - -Especially they watched the commander. In the usual undress uniform but -on a splendid horse, which he managed with consummate address, rode -Worth. He was a man of average height but noticeably strong, with a -trim figure and a strikingly martial air. Conversing easily with his -staff he seemed the elegant gentleman; but his face was stern, and -his restless dark eyes flashed. In war he found his element; and at -present behind his natural ardor burned a new flame. His withdrawing -from the army in April had injured both his prestige and his relative -position, and his motto now was, "A grade or a grave." His orders were -to turn Independence Hill, occupy the Saltillo highway, and so far as -practicable carry the works in that quarter; and no doubt he intended to -do more rather than less.[12.4] - -Soon taking leave of the road, this command plunged into cornfields -and chaparral. Progress was difficult and slow. For the benefit of the -artillery, ditches had to be bridged or filled and brush fences opened. -The enemy promptly observed and understood the movement, and a body of -cavalry embarrassed it somewhat. Once they nearly surrounded the General -and his staff, who were some distance in advance; but after a time, -fearing his artillery, they withdrew to the citadel. Ampudia himself -rode to Independence Hill, watched the blue line a while, ordered one -hundred infantry to the summit, and had a 12-pounder and a howitzer -planted there.[12.5] - -By six o'clock Worth made nearly or quite seven miles. He was now on -the Topo road; and, halting just beyond the range of the battery on -Independence Hill, he pushed a reconnoitring party toward the Saltillo -highway. Infantry and cavalry had now been posted, however, in that -vicinity. The party was fired upon; and, owing to this, to nightfall -and to the torrents of rain, its purpose was not accomplished until the -lateness of the hour prevented further operations. With great difficulty -the Americans were placed in a fairly defensible position; and without -fires, food, blankets or shelter, they lived through the stormy night as -best they could. By this time the rest of the Mexican cavalry had been -withdrawn from its position between the Bishop's Palace and the citadel, -and a part of it retired into the town.[12.6] - -[AT THE WESTERN GATES] - -Monday, a day of fate, broke heavy, dark and ominous. Dense clouds -covered the sky, and for a time a thick mist cut off the outlook. By -about six o'clock Worth moved, however, and, saluted occasionally -with harmless grape from Independence Hill, advanced by the Topo -road. Anticipating trouble, he arranged the column so as to be ready -for prompt action. The Texans led; Captain C. F. Smith and the light -companies of the Artillery Battalion, deployed as skirmishers, came -next; Lieutenant Colonel Duncan's battery was third; and the rest of the -command followed. Two or three hundred yards or so from the Saltillo -highway, at a turn round the mountain, some two hundred lancers could -be seen approaching. It was a gallant sight. The horses, though small, -showed plenty of spirit; many of the saddles were silver-mounted; the -cavaliers wore brilliant uniforms, and green and red pennons fluttered -gayly from their poised lances. At the head of the advance rode -Lieutenant Colonel Nájera, a tall, fine-looking trooper with a fierce -black mustache. Smith's corps and a part of the Texas riflemen were -thrown behind a strong fence; Duncan halted and unlimbered; and then, -like a whirlwind, Nájera struck McCulloch.[12.7] - -The shock was terrible; and like a lion and a tiger grappling the two -bodies writhed and fought. The weight of the American horses proved -a great advantage, but numbers were on the other side. Nájera, after -running a Texan through with his lance, fell; but a gallant successor -took his place, and the soldiers proved worthy of him. Many lances were -shivered, and others, useless at close quarters, were dropped; but sword -and escopeta served instead. On our part Smith's infantry fired well, -and the Mexicans could not break through the fence.[12.7] - -After recoiling a little they formed to charge again. Other troops of -Worth's came up, took post beside the road, and began work. A minute or -two more and Duncan, on higher ground, was firing over the Americans. By -this time Nájera's squadron was nearly accounted for; but behind it were -the rest of Romero's cavalry brigade and a party of infantry. However, -Mackall's battery was now coöperating with Duncan's and both did -splendidly. The Mexican foot withdrew instead of advancing. A part of -the cavalry soon retreated toward Saltillo and a part into the town; and -the brief but important struggle ended. Probably more than one hundred -Mexicans had been killed or wounded, while our own casualties appear to -have numbered about a dozen, and the way to the Saltillo highway lay -open. By a quarter past eight Worth's command was on this road; and -he reflected with exultation that the Mexican line of communication, -supply, reinforcement and retreat had been cut. Nor was that all or even -the best of it, he believed. "The town is ours," he scrawled in pencil -to the commander-in-chief. The battery on Independence Hill now became -active, however; and as Federation redoubt, of which the Americans had -not heard, began to drop round shot among our troops, they had to be -withdrawn about half a mile in the direction of Saltillo.[12.7] - -Worth's courage and spirit were inflexible, but he was a little wanting -in steadiness. His impetuous, restless mind would leap to a decision -without fully grasping all the facts, and then it was necessary to -reconsider and re-decide. In the face of the present unexpected -situation he changed his plan several times, and fatigued the troops -perhaps with some unnecessary movements; but by noon he concluded to -storm Federation Ridge first, and Captain C. F. Smith was assigned to -this task with four Artillery and five dismounted Texan companies--about -three hundred or three hundred and fifty effectives. Riding up to the -command Worth exclaimed in his bold, magnetic way, which went straight -to the soldier's heart, "Men, you are to take that hill--and I know you -will do it." "We will," they answered, and the detachment, followed by -the most anxious hopes of all the other corps, moved off. It seemed like -charging the clouds, but it had to be done.[12.8] - -The intention was to gain the rear of the fort, and hence a circuitous -route leading to the southern flank of the ridge was chosen. After -hurrying through cornfields and sugarcane to the river and then upstream -a considerable distance to find a crossing place, the men slid down the -rough bank of the Santa Catarina, and plunged in. The swift stream, -waist-deep, was hard to resist, especially as one could not help -slipping on the loose round stones, and the water hissed and boiled -with grape and bullets; but by good luck no casualty occurred, and the -men clambered up the opposite bank. Pushing on then, after pausing -for breath under the cover of thickets, they came at length to a low -eminence, and concealed themselves behind a hedge while the captain -reconnoitred. The main hill, which appeared to be nearly four hundred -feet high, was rough, steep and covered with chaparral. The garrison -seemed to be strong and resolute. The two guns made heavy odds. For -quite a while Smith studied the hard problem, doubting whether it was -practicable to assault the position, but finally he ordered the men -forward; and soon lines of dark blue Mexican skirmishers, descending -from the redoubt, stationed themselves at favorable points to meet -him.[12.8] - -[AMERICAN SUCCESSES] - -Meanwhile, noting this delay and certain preparations of the enemy, -Worth despatched the Seventh Infantry under Captain Miles to support -Smith; and then, worried at the sight of reinforcements on their way to -the redoubt, he sent the Fifth Infantry (Major Scott) and Blanchard's -Company in the same direction, with General Smith to take charge of all -these forces. Miles had not only the voice of a trumpet but the eyes of -a hawk, and striking at once upon a direct line of march, he promptly -reached the main ridge; and soon General Smith found him supporting the -wary but steady charge already launched. Discovering now El Soldado and -believing he would not be needed at the redoubt, General Smith moved -to his right along the southern side of the ridge with all the troops -except Captain Smith's. Like a fiery serpent, these now forced their way -up in a winding but ever advancing line. The hill blazed and smoked. The -sharp crack of the rifles punctuated the duller reports of the muskets. -Soon the Mexican skirmishers were driven back; the 9-pounders could -not be depressed enough to be effective; the Texans and "red-legged -infantry" conquered the slope; and finally, struggling breathlessly to -the redoubt, they found the garrison already in flight, carrying off one -of their guns.[12.8] - -Some of the victors then joined the rest of General Smith's command, -which could be seen winding through a gorge toward the other fort. Those -who did not, quickly remounted the second piece, which the Mexicans -had upset in trying to drag it away, and at the first shot, luckily -knocking the El Soldado gun out of position, sent the garrison flying. -At the double-quick the attacking column reached that position an -instant later, and brave Captain Gillespie, followed by other brave men, -despising the grape from Independence Hill that shrieked above their -heads, clambered over the parapet. The Mexican piece, quickly righted, -saluted the fugitives and then offered its compliments to the Palace -works. The other captured piece was then brought down to El Soldado; -and Miles's command, moving still farther east along the ridge with one -of the guns, took a third fortification; and thus by about the middle -of the afternoon, at a trifling cost, we had three forts, intended to -protect the rear and flank of Monterey, fighting for us.[12.8] - -But a still harder task now confronted the Americans. Shortly before -nightfall three companies of the Artillery Battalion, three of the -Eighth Infantry and some two hundred Texas riflemen--in all about -five hundred--accompanied by Captain Sanders, Lieutenant Meade and a -Mexican guide and commanded by Childs, were sent forward to the skirt of -Independence Hill. The peak before them was almost or quite as high as -the summit of Federation Ridge; and in addition to the redoubt, guns and -garrison on the top, a stronger position, more guns and a larger force -were just below at the Palace. The Mexican generals regarded the point -as unassailable.[12.9] - -The night was tempestuous. The men were tired out. Few had eaten for -thirty-six hours--none since breakfast. The rain fell in torrents, -and they had not even blankets. Small rivers flowed down the slope. -Sometimes heavy stones, loosened by the water, rolled upon them. The -darkness was absolute. Most of them sat up, holding their firearms, -covering the locks, and dozing when they could. At three o'clock the -sleepers were roughly shaken, and a hoarse whisper, "Fall in," passed -along. The storm was still raging. There was a chill in the wet air. -Muscles were stiff. Teeth actually rattled. Strict orders to make -no noise under any circumstances were circulated. Then came another -whisper, "Forward!" and in two columns--one under Childs and the other -under Captain Vinton--the almost vertical climb began.[12.9] - -Feet were placed cautiously but firmly. Despite the thorns, bushes had -to be seized for support. Sometimes the men crawled. Above all, the -gun-locks were to be kept dry. Now and then a stone, pried out by the -rain, would go clattering down; and with beating hearts, expecting to -be challenged, the men would pause. If discovered, they could have been -annihilated with rocks. But the storm drowned all the noise except its -own, and kept the Mexicans under cover. Slowly but steadily the ragged -line mounted. The night began to look grayish. The outline of the summit -could be made out.[12.9] - -Suddenly burst forth a blaze and a roar. It came from a picket-guard -about a hundred yards down, that had been sheltering themselves among -some rocks. The hasty fire was ineffective, except that some of the -Americans were burned. Not a musket answered it--only a yell and a -rush. Finally, sixty feet or so from the top it was time to fire, and -the musket and rifle spoke. Real fighting began now, give and take; and -the Mexicans had the advantage of position. But there were only about -fifty or sixty of them. The line closed in. There was a fierce grapple; -the Mexicans broke, and as the rising sun glimmered faintly through the -clouds, the Stars and Stripes were unfurled. Then the victors cheered -and cheered. Cheers came up from their comrades in the valley. Taylor's -men, who had watched the double line of fire and smoke go higher and -higher till it crowned the top and ceased, cheered and threw their caps -into the air; and the echoing mountain seemed to cheer back.[12.9] - -But the work was not yet done. Indeed the Americans only had the bull -by the horns. Too exhausted to pursue effectively at once, they had to -let the Mexicans escape. Seeing how the fight would end, some of the -garrison had removed the guns of the redoubt--accidentally throwing one -of them down the hill; but the saved piece and two 6-pounders now opened -fire on our men, and a counter-attack from the Palace garrison was to -be expected. That garrison probably numbered two hundred and fifty and -perhaps more. Some fifty dismounted dragoons reinforced it now; and -probably not less than two hundred and fifty horse occupied the slope -below.[12.9] - -But Worth had no intention of losing his prize. Three companies of -the Seventh Infantry were already moving down Federation Ridge, and -they took post near enough the Palace to menace any troops going from -that point against the summit, cheering loudly to attract attention. -The Fifth and Blanchard's Company reinforced Childs; and about noon -"with infinite difficulty," as Worth said, a 12-pound howitzer, taken -apart, was dragged up with straps. As the Palace had no roof and the -windows were poorly barricaded, the interior could be searched with -shrapnel. The Mexicans reciprocated, and desultory fighting continued -all the morning. In the afternoon Mexican reinforcements were seen in -the distance, and a prompt, decisive stroke appeared to be necessary. -One body of Americans therefore went about halfway to the Palace, and -concealed themselves among some rocks and bushes in a small ravine, -while another were placed out of sight on the slope. Then the howitzer -opened, and a force of skirmishers advanced in full view.[12.9] - -Ampudia's policy was a strict defensive, and Lieutenant Colonel -Berra, who commanded at this position, had been forbidden to take the -aggressive. But the howitzer had made itself extremely disagreeable; -his artillery had become disabled; his only chance lay in charging; and -this appeared to be the time. Foot and horse, the Mexicans therefore -sallied out, and gallantly they moved up the ridge, closing their ranks -when the howitzer opened them. Then the signal was given, and the men in -ambush, springing up like a flight of blackbirds, fired. The enemy broke -and ran; many of them did not stop till they reached the city; and the -massive gate of the Palace was closed. The howitzer soon broke the gate, -however, and the Americans poured in. For a time the struggle was fierce -yet indecisive; but suddenly the cry was heard, "Throw yourselves flat!" -and instantly over the prostrate Americans the howitzer belched a double -charge of canister. This was enough; and soon the Mexicans, harassed -with grape by Duncan and Mackall, who arrived now at a gallop, by the -fire of a piece captured at La Libertad and by that of El Soldado, were -fleeing into the city, spreading consternation on every hand. It was now -about four o'clock.[12.9] - -[AT THE EASTERN GATES] - -Leaving Worth and his gallant men thus in full possession of the western -gate of Monterey, we will now trace Taylor's operations at the opposite -end of the town. Sunday afternoon, observing the Mexican reinforcements -hastening to the summit of Independence Hill and fearing Worth might -be overpowered, he displayed most of his troops before the city until -dark as a menace. During the night his 10-inch mortar and two 24-pound -howitzers were planted about seven eighths of a mile from the citadel, -near the forward edge of a depression which screened them from the -enemy, and at seven o'clock the next morning these pieces fired for -twenty minutes, doubtless encouraging rather than alarming the enemy by -their ineffective work.[12.10] - -At the same time, to divert attention from Worth, as a note from that -officer had suggested, all the available infantry were drawn out before -the citadel as if to assault it. The First Division (regulars) stood -at the left of this line; Quitman's brigade--the Tennesseeans under -Campbell and the Mississippi riflemen under Davis--came next it, and -Hamer with the Ohio regiment occupied the extreme right. Meanwhile the -work of reconnoitring continued. Believing that he would meet with no -serious resistance at Monterey, Taylor had apparently felt little or no -anxiety to ascertain how the town had been fortified; but now he may -have realized that such information was desirable.[12.10] - -In a general sense we are already aware what defences had been prepared -in this quarter--particularly the barricaded streets and the stone -houses turned into forts; but the situation must now be investigated -more closely. West of the grand plaza and toward the northern edge of -the city there was a large spring. The outlet of this flowed toward the -east, widened into a pond, then contracted into a stream, passed under -Purísima bridge--a heavy structure of stone by which the Marín road -entered the city proper--veered a little toward the right, and finally -left the town at its northeastern corner. On the inner side of this -watercourse below Purísima bridge there were two simple redans capable -of holding fifty or seventy men each; and some distance farther down, -on the top of a rather steep slope, stood a strong earthwork named El -Rincón del Diablo (The Devil's Corner), commonly known by the Americans -as El Diablo, which had two or three guns, and could accommodate a -garrison of one hundred and fifty or two hundred.[12.10] - -On the outer side of the watercourse an irregular but strong -fortification (_tête de pont_), armed with a 12-pounder, defended -Purísima bridge. East and northeast of this lay a confused suburban -district occupied in part with streets, lanes, houses and huts, and in -part with orchards, gardens and yards enclosed with high stone walls. -Near the edge of it all, some four hundred yards in front of El Diablo, -was the most advanced Mexican position. This, occupied by about two -hundred men, consisted of a stone tannery building, often spoken of by -the Americans as a distillery, the flat roof of which, protected with -sand-bags in addition to the parapet, was held by a competent garrison, -and of an earthwork in front of it called the Tenería (Tannery) -redoubt, which, after having been erected and demolished, was rebuilt -with desperate exertions during Sunday night.[12.10] - -This fortification consisted of two short parallel sides prolonged -and drawn together in front so as to meet at a sharp angle; and the -north side was similarly prolonged and drawn in toward the rear so as -to protect partially the opening or throat. The approaches were not -cleared; the ditch was neither sufficiently deep nor sufficiently wide; -steps used in the process of construction made it easy to scale the face -(scarp); the parapet was completed with sand-bags made with ordinary -cotton cloth; and the guns, mounted in barbette without platforms, were -hard to manage on fresh dirt soaked with rain; but the redoubt, armed -with a 4-pounder and an 8-pounder--its northern side protected by the -guns of the citadel, its southern face by the tannery building, and its -throat by El Diablo--was a serious obstacle for infantry.[12.10] - -Why Taylor did not plant his mortar in front of it Sunday night--for -it was plainly visible and there was a transverse ridge within short -grape-shot range--drive the garrison out with half a dozen well-aimed -bombshells Monday morning, and repeat the operation the following night -and morning with El Diablo, is rather hard to understand. But it must -be remembered that he had probably never seen, and had certainly never -attacked, a scientific earthwork; these "mud-forts," as the soldiers -termed them, did not look impressive; and his plan to capture Monterey -"pretty much with the bayonet" had been determined upon. He was -nothing if not stubborn; and he doubtless believed that his officers -and men, given a chance at the Mexicans, would certainly whip them -somehow.[12.10] - -Accordingly, as Twiggs, commander of the First Division, was too ill -for battle, Taylor gave Lieutenant Colonel Garland this verbal order, -written down by one of Garland's aides: "Colonel lead the head of your -column off to the left, keeping well out of reach of the enemy's Shot, -and if you think (_or_ you find) you can take any of them little Forts -down there with the bay'net you better do it--but consult with Major -Mansfield, you'll find him down there." Garland then advanced with -the First and Third regiments and the Washington-Baltimore Battalion, -about 800 men, and made his way forward a considerable distance over -broken and obstructed ground. He soon came in sight of Mansfield, and -before long that officer galloped back to meet him. Garland no doubt -communicated Taylor's orders at this time; and Mansfield, supported by -some skirmishers, then went forward again.[12.10] - -The responsibility now resting upon the engineer was extremely heavy. -A map prepared by Meade from data brought by a spy probably showed -the Mexican works fairly well, but of course did not fully reveal the -intricacies of the situation. Taylor had seen this map, and must have -known everything thus far discovered by the reconnoitring officers, and -he evidently saw nothing to forbid an infantry attack. Under the fire of -the citadel and other fortifications, a close and detailed examination -of the ground, screened not only by the maze already alluded to but by -hedges, bush fences, trees and cornfields lying just outside the suburb, -was impossible; and to send the troops back without an overwhelming -reason in the face of the two armies, and look "Old Rough and Ready" in -the eye, was unthinkable. Taylor's order was therefore to all intents -and purposes an order, not merely for a demonstration, but for an -assault.[12.10] - -[MONTEREY ASSAULTED] - -So Garland, after marching for some time over and through all manner of -obstructions, as Mansfield directed, kept on for a considerable distance -under the fire of the citadel and redoubts, and at length saw that -officer running ahead on foot at the northeastern angle of the town, and -waving the troops on with his spy-glass. To obey this order involved -turning to the right and then to the left--movements that disconcerted -and scattered the raw Washington-Baltimore corps--and finally charging -at a venture into the maze already described, but it was done; the -Mexicans reinforcing the redoubt meanwhile with 150 men and an -8-pounder. Owing to the trend of the streets the Americans, now greatly -reduced in numbers, took a course that led them to the right instead of -the left, and failed to discover the throat of the redoubt, Mansfield's -objective. Caught in the maze and falling rapidly under an artillery and -musketry fire that seemed to come from everywhere, they found themselves -totally helpless. Bragg's battery was thrown in, but it could accomplish -nothing; and on Mansfield's recommendation Garland fell back.[12.10] - -Shortly before this, judging from the heavy fire that a serious -engagement was on, Taylor had ordered Butler to advance with his Field -Division. By a sad blunder three companies of the Fourth Infantry, which -had been covering the mortar and howitzers, were sent ahead of this -corps against the redoubt, and "almost in a moment"--as the official -report admitted--a third of the men fell. The rest, including Lieutenant -Ulysses S. Grant, then retired; and Quitman's brigade, which now formed -the left of the line, was ordered to support the regulars--in other -words, renew the attack.[12.10] - -With ample courage and enthusiasm the men advanced nearly a mile under -the fire of the citadel--which, as Taylor privately admitted, "done -considerable execution"--and before long under the worse fire of the -redoubt in front; but they staggered in the smashing blast of lead and -iron, their formation became very irregular, and after a time, though -not within effective musket or rifle range, they began to fire at will. -Colonel Davis, then some distance in advance on his iron-gray, Pompey, -grew impatient at the waste of time, ammunition and life, and as the -redoubt stopped firing just then, he cried, "Now is the time. Great -God, if I had fifty men with knives I could take that fort." Then he -waved his sword, and called on his men to charge. Colonel Campbell, -equally ignoring his brigade commander, did the same; and both regiments -hurried on as groups and individuals, each man trying to outstrip the -rest.[12.10] - -Fortunately the time was ripe. Worn down by several hours of excitement -and exertion--for noonday was now approaching--the Mexicans felt a -reaction. The stubborn perseverance of the Americans daunted them. -Captain Backus and about 100 men of the First Infantry, not receiving -the order to withdraw, had climbed to the parapeted roof of a building -about 130 yards from the redoubt and now persistently annoyed them. They -looked for the reserves; but perhaps Garland's operations prevented -sending them, and certainly none came. Ammunition began to fail. The -muskets were hot and foul. The cloth of the sand-bags took fire, and -made the parapet extremely uncomfortable. Carrasco, the commander, who -had run away at the Resaca, now openly took flight again; and a part -of the garrison, formed to charge upon the Americans, were seen, or -at least were supposed, to be retreating. A panic seized the troops, -and almost in an instant the guns were abandoned and the redoubt stood -nearly empty. A few minutes more, and tall, powerful McClung of the -Mississippi Rifles leaped upon the parapet and waved his sword. By the -same way or bursting through the sallyport, equally brave men of both -regiments came close after him. Thirty or thirty-five prisoners were -seized. An American flag went up; and after a brief conflict the tannery -also--practically abandoned by the enemy--was taken.[12.10] - -During Quitman's advance the First Ohio approached the city farther to -the right. It was well officered, for besides its colonel, Brigadier -General Hamer, the Hooker of Chancellorsville, the Johnston of Shiloh, -Major General Butler and Major General Taylor accompanied it; but it -failed to accomplish anything. A second attempt was equally unfortunate, -but when Taylor--evidently despairing of success--had ordered it out -of town, word came of Quitman's achievement. The regiment was then -sent into the fight again. Garland's remnant, still in the outskirts -of the city, came up; Quitman's troops were ordered to coöperate; and -a determined effort was made to gain the rear of El Diablo. Both grand -and pitiful that effort was. As an exhibition of pluck it could hardly -have been surpassed. Taylor, fighting on foot, matched Richard Coeur -de Lion storming Front de Boeuf's castle; and his intrepidity was so -flawless and unforced that courage appeared to all round him the easy -and only way. To die under such a leader seemed the acme of living. It -was not war, but it was grand fighting.[12.10] - - "We were not many, we who stood - Before the iron sleet that day; - Yet many a gallant spirit would - Give half his years if but he could - Have been with us at Monterey. - - And on, still on our column kept - Through walls of flame its withering way; - Where fell the dead, the living stept, - Still charging on the guns which swept - The slippery streets of Monterey." - -But the enemy, seldom visible, appeared to be everywhere. A large part -of the groping Americans got in front of Purísima bridge, and went down -fast under a rain of bullets from the _tête de pont_, while Captain -Gutiérrez, who had now masked his gun on the opposite bank, poured grape -and canister upon them at short range. Ridgely came up and fired several -times at the bridgehead, but without effect. Among our troops, as one -of the surgeons wrote, "All was confusion." Smoke hid the outlook; and -the Mexican shots, breaking the limestone, mortar and adobe, raised a -blinding dust. The assailants did not know where to turn or what to do. -Taylor, Butler, Hamer, Quitman and other officers shouted orders that -few could hear amidst the uproar, and perhaps fewer could reconcile. -It was proposed to cut through from house to house, but the necessary -implements had not been brought. Ridgely's and Bragg's batteries and -the captured Mexican guns fired on El Diablo, and finally the 24-pound -howitzers were brought in; but nothing could be accomplished in that -way. Many of the best and the bravest fell; and eventually, at about -five o'clock, the Americans retreated from all of Monterey except the -Tenería redoubt and a few adjacent buildings.[12.10] - -[A COSTLY AMERICAN TRIUMPH] - -So the fight ended. It had been one long scene of gallantry, confusion, -mistakes and waste. Lieutenant D. H. Hill, afterwards General Hill of -the Confederate army, wrote in his journal on learning the details: "It -seems that every sort of folly was committed." To pitch handfuls of -infantry into an unknown maze of obstacles, fortifications and cannon as -if they had been fighting Indians in a Florida swamp, and to send field -batteries into narrow streets--in the suburb crooked, too--against heavy -stone works and roofs filled with protected marksmen was extraordinary. -And, it was credibly reported, Taylor did more. He ordered Ridgely out -into the open to try conclusions with El Diablo. Ridgely was absolutely -fearless. To satisfy the General he went out himself and reconnoitred, -but he would not lead his battery to destruction. The Tennessee regiment -was needlessly taken back and forth six times within range of the -citadel.[12.10] - -Now--to get shelter, food, ammunition--the troops had to march -separately or in groups all the way to camp, exposed for a long distance -not only to the citadel guns but also to the lancers, who nearly caused -a disaster and might have done so, had all, instead of but a part of -them, obeyed the order to charge. A howitzer, aided by the captured -guns, still exchanged compliments now and then with El Diablo, but -the battle of the day was over. A redoubt had been won, and Worth's -operations against the Federation Ridge redoubts had been assisted; but -these advantages might have been gained far more cheaply.[12.10] - -The Tenería position was garrisoned for the night by Garland's exhausted -command, the Kentucky regiment (Louisville Legion), which had been on -guard at the mortar, and Ridgely's battery. This was not an agreeable -task. The rain fell in torrents, and the interior of the fort was so -thoroughly searched by the guns of El Diablo, that a part of the men had -to lie on their backs in the mud. Some defences were thrown up, however; -Tuesday morning Quitman's brigade relieved the garrison; and Taylor's -men, cheered now by the sight of their comrades taking Independence -Hill, were given a necessary rest. Both sides used their artillery to -some extent, and in spite of the Mexican fire our position was further -strengthened; but on this day nothing was done at the eastern end to -assist Worth.[12.10] - -During Tuesday night the enemy seemed to be in motion. They should -have made an attack; and the Americans--without blankets, overcoats -or food, soaked with rain, and chilled by a north wind--passed the -hours reconnoitring or standing in water behind their breastwork. Far, -however, from Ampudia's mind was the thought of a vigorous offensive. -Dismayed by the cutting of his communications and by the stubborn valor -of the Americans, and weakened by the cowardice of certain officers, he -ordered all the outworks abandoned, and concentrated his forces in and -near the grand plaza. Such a change could not be made at night without -much confusion. Many of the troops, too, were indignant; some refused to -leave their posts; all felt disheartened, and a few broke out in riotous -disorder. The work of fortifying the inner line went on, but the loss of -morale far more than offset this advantage.[12.10] - -At daybreak Wednesday, suspecting that the Mexicans had left or were -leaving El Diablo, Quitman advanced, and found that both men and guns -had been withdrawn; but other works not far distant were still held too -strongly to be captured. Attempts were made to gain ground in various -directions; and finally, an hour or two before noon, with assistance -from the Second Texas regiment, dismounted, and the Third and the -Fourth Infantry, extensive and well-supported operations began to be -undertaken. In particular, a systematic plan of breaking through the -continuous line of houses and firing from the roofs was adopted. At -each cross-street vigorous fighting had to be done, for the Mexicans, -though inferior as marksmen, resisted obstinately at every favorable -point; and the musketry and artillery behind their barricades swept -the approaches fiercely. Five out of the twelve commissioned officers -of the Third Infantry were killed, says General Grant. Two sections of -field artillery came up, but the gunners were shot down rapidly in spite -of all precautions; and at length, finding the pieces too light for -effective service, Taylor ordered them to retire. A gun at the Tenería -redoubt was tried, but after a time the advance of the Americans made it -dangerous to fire toward the plaza.[12.10] - -The infantry pushed on, however, and by three o'clock were only one -square from the grand plaza. Here ammunition began to fail, and -Lieutenant Grant, hanging over the side of his horse by an arm and a -foot, dashed across the streets too swiftly to be fired at, and went in -search of it. With a view to preparing for a general assault, however, -or for some other reason Taylor ordered the troops, now working safely -inside the houses, to withdraw--under fire, of course. Reluctantly, -though many of them had not eaten for thirty-six hours, they marched -back to the redoubts and thence after dark to Walnut Grove; and the Ohio -and Kentucky regiments went on duty at the captured redoubts.[12.10] - -Strangely enough, Taylor seems to have made no effort, after the -storming of the Bishop's Palace, to arrange with General Worth for -concerted action or to give him fresh orders, although he could easily -have done so, and knew that all the work assigned to that division had -been completed. Wednesday morning, therefore, after the long, deep -slumber of exhaustion, Worth's men found themselves mostly in idleness, -and a large part of them, concentrated near the Palace, gazed upon the -city at their leisure as the dissolving mists revealed it. Not far away -in the suburb were General Arista's gardens, full of orange, lemon, -pomegranate and fig trees, bananas, grapes and flowers, watered by -canals that sparkled in the sun. Once in a while a blue-frocked monk, -girded with a white cord and tassel, could be seen; and flashes from -the streams that ran through almost every street were caught here and -there. Beyond lay the white or lightly tinted houses with leafy squares -here and there, dominated by the cathedral spires. At due intervals the -clock bell peacefully tolled the hour or the quarter. On the left the -dark citadel belched occasionally a cloud of white smoke. On the right -the Santa Catarina hurried along between the city and the picturesque -villas on its opposite bank. Farther away, but still near, the twisted -strata and the vast, splintered buttresses, battlements and pinnacles -of the Sierra Madre, thinly draped with soft clouds, towered aloft; -and overhead great birds that seemed to be eagles travelled like dark -planets round their orbits in the blue.[12.10] - -But though they gazed with deep interest, these haggard fellows with -bloodshot eyes were not in a mood to enjoy the scene. No orders came -from Taylor. Hardly a shot had been heard this morning from the lower -town. Mexicans boasted of gaining a victory on that side, and "Your turn -will come next," our men were told. Heavy reinforcements from Saltillo, -it was rumored, would soon arrive by the pass. Worth, nervous and -anxious, climbed to the Palace tower with his glass, and searched every -quarter for news. Meantime the cannon were planted at more commanding -points. A howitzer opened on the town. Preparations to make an assault -were continued; and, as Mexicans from the south were now said to be -approaching, a detachment went about three miles up the Saltillo highway -to a strong position. An hour or two before noon, however, the roar of -battle began to come from the lower town; and Worth, judging that it -meant a serious attack, ordered a column forward by each of the two main -streets.[12.10] - -[WORTH ADVANCES AGAIN] - -With a cheer that sounded like a roar the troops hurried down the slope, -and burst into the suburb. For some time the work was easy, for in fear -of the Libertad guns all the western section had been evacuated; and -raising a fierce cry that afterwards came to be known as the "rebel -yell," which began with a growl and rose to a falsetto scream, the -Americans dashed on at a run. Beyond the cemetery, however, Mexican -troops opened fire, and until some of Duncan's and Mackall's guns came -up, fought like demons. Barricaded streets and garrisoned roofs were -next encountered, and again the Americans dived into the houses. Making -a small hole in the wall that divided two dwellings they would drop -through it a six-inch shell with a three-seconds fuse lighted, and -throw themselves flat. Results followed promptly. The aperture was then -enlarged; and crawling through, they repeated the operation, while the -best marksmen fought from the roof.[12.10] - -Taylor's withdrawal from the city, however, supplied the Mexicans with -reinforcements. The enemy fairly seemed to swarm, and their courage -seemed to rise. "Cannons and small arms flashed, crashed and roared like -one mighty storm of wind, rain, hail, thunder and lightning," wrote a -soldier; while the thud of planks against heavy doors and the blows of -pickaxes on walls of stone swelled the uproar. Once the advance was -halted. But Colonel Hays, a shy man with a broad forehead, a Roman nose, -brilliant, restless hazel eyes, and the courage of twenty lions packed -in his delicate frame, had been a prisoner in the Monterey post-office -once, and had sworn a great oath to sleep this night in the post-office -or in hell, and nothing could stop him. By dark the Americans were -only a square from the market-place, and the Colonel had the postal -accommodations at his command.[12.10] - -Ampudia's case was by no means desperate even now. His losses had been -small--twenty-nine officers and 338 men killed and wounded, according -to his report. There were provisions, ammunition and artillery enough; -the strong buildings round the plaza and market-place, defended with -resolution by a large garrison, could not easily have been taken; and -the division of the Americans into widely separated commands invited a -sortie.[12.10] - -The situation was, however, by no means agreeable. After nightfall the -Americans planted two howitzers and a 6-pounder on the top of a high -building close to the western side of the plaza. Taylor's mortar had -been carried to Worth during the day, and after sunset it began to fire -now and then on the cathedral, where tons of gunpowder were stored. The -citadel undertook to reply, but the mortar, planted behind the stone -wall of the cemetery, was not likely to be struck, and a single one of -its bombs might conceivably have blown the Mexican army to pieces. In -fact so might a shot from Taylor's 24-pound howitzers, which delivered -two shells effectively after dark. On the southern side of the river, -opposite the town, the Fifth Infantry had planted one of the El Soldado -guns at the third work on Federation ridge, where it could at least have -proved annoying. The horses of the cavalry were in the way. The garrison -of the citadel could not promptly coöperate with the troops in town, for -it had sealed up the exit. Ampudia's defensive policy discouraged the -soldiers, for even though some of them flanked the retiring Americans -on Wednesday afternoon, they were not permitted to reoccupy the houses -abandoned by Taylor, and still less to attack the redoubts. Despondency -was general; some of the leading officers urged surrender; and Ampudia, -it was reported, keeping the choicest corps near his person, shut -himself up in the cathedral until a shell dropped near it, and then fled -to a private house.[12.10] - -[NEGOTIATIONS] - -Naturally, then, early on Thursday morning one of his aides carried -to the American general a proposition to give up the city, and retire -with the troops and military material. Taylor replied with a demand for -unconditional surrender, and insisted upon having an answer by noon. -Instead of complying Ampudia sent a request for a personal interview. -The result was a joint commission. Vexatious negotiations followed. The -tedious and wily methods of Mexican diplomacy were thoroughly tried; but -at length an ultimatum from Taylor's representatives ended the affair, -and the terms of capitulation were signed. These provided that the -citadel should be given up immediately, that within a week the Mexican -troops with their arms, accoutrements and six field pieces should -retire--without giving their parole not to fight again--beyond the line -of Rinconada Pass, Linares and San Fernando de Presas, that before this -evacuation of Monterey the town should be occupied by the Americans -for hospital and storage purposes only, and that for eight weeks--"or -until the orders or instructions of the respective governments can be -received"--the Americans would not cross the specified line.[12.11] - -As Polk asserted and the General himself admitted, Taylor violated -his orders in granting such terms, and his excuses for doing so -were signally unconvincing, while some of them involved perhaps the -virtual assumption on his part of a political authority superior to -the President's. But substantial reasons for the terms did exist. -"Considering our situation," explained the General privately, they were -not over-liberal; and that was true. Being very short of ammunition -and provisions, he could only negotiate, assault or retreat. According -to his spokesmen in the Senate, his effectives numbered only some 5000 -and probably they did not reach those figures. About one third of them -had no bayonets. The First Division of regulars had been crippled; the -Second was tired out; and the volunteers had been so far demoralized, -that in Meade's opinion they could no longer be depended upon. Worth, -chief American representative on the joint commission, had not "the -slightest confidence" left in Taylor's leadership, and wrote privately -that "many others" shared his opinion, while a still greater number felt -doubtful.[12.12] - -With such troops, feeble artillery and scant ammunition, to attack an -enemy of proved fighting quality, now at bay in stone houses, fully -supplied with guns and munitions, and comparatively fresh, was not an -inviting proposition. In short, as Crittenden and Clayton stated in -defence of Taylor on the floor of the Senate, it was not feasible to -storm the city; and to retreat with sick and wounded over such a route, -pursued by mobile infantry and sleepless mounted men, and harried by -an exultant population, would have meant ruin. It was a wise course -to escape from this dilemma as he did, and the truth could not be -told.[12.12] - -[MONTEREY OCCUPIED] - -September 25 the citadel was evacuated, and the next day with drums -beating and banners flying the first brigade of Mexicans left the -city--all noting with curious interest the difference between their trim -uniforms and freshly pipe-clayed belts and the unkempt appearance of -the victors, who, as an American said, were as dirty as they could be -without becoming real estate. The second brigade followed on the next -day, and the rest of the troops on the twenty-eighth. Monterey, with -a quantity of indifferent gunpowder and a number of cannon, many of -them bad, was ours, and soon the people of the United States, whom a -costly but valorous battle impressed far more than orderly, scientific -operations could have done, were again acclaiming Taylor. By distance, -by his courage, by his picturesque individuality, and by his very -position as commander of the one American army fighting the Mexicans, -he was idealized. His excellent reports--the work of Bliss--confirmed -every favorable impression; and the writers of the day, fully aware that -he was already a popular hero and anxious to suit the prevailing taste, -colored the facts until these could hardly be recognized. Men on the -ground, in contact with the crude realities, felt otherwise. Taylor's -want of prevision and of generalship was in fact bitterly censured -there. Worth "is the high comb cock of the army," wrote one officer. -He has won all the laurels, though Taylor will have the glory at home, -remarked a surgeon.[12.13] - -As for the conduct of the troops in general, however, there could be -only one opinion. "Three glorious days," was General Scott's description -of the struggle. War is--war. Dreadful things were done, splendid -men were cut down. Yet if there be glory in fidelity and courage, in -meeting extraordinary hardships, and in triumphing over extraordinary -difficulties, then Scott's description was correct.[12.13] - - - - - XIII - - SALTILLO, PARRAS, TAMPICO - - August-December, 1846 - - -For men supposed to have won a splendid victory, Taylor and his army -seem to have been rather low in their spirits after the capture of -Monterey. Taylor admitted that his forces had been "greatly reduced." -Learning that a part of the Second Infantry had arrived on the Rio -Grande, he described this trifling reinforcement as "most welcome." The -Texas troops wished to go home and were discharged. To replace them -he counted on the Tennessee and Kentucky horse; but these regiments, -having been ordered to San Antonio, were long in reaching the front. -October 15 he estimated his aggregate effective strength as less than -12,000.[13.1] Chills and fever, a depressing malady, was extremely -prevalent; and a strong tendency to desert appeared to indicate a -generally unsatisfactory state of things.[13.2] Not only priests but -Mexican officers remaining at Monterey to convalesce or to care for -the sick, stimulated this tendency; and about the middle of November -all such officers, not indispensably needed by the sick and wounded, -received peremptory orders to go south. A little later, it was reported, -the alcalde was imprisoned for the same offence. Moreover bands of -Mexicans, not dismayed by the American triumphs, hung upon Taylor's -lines to rob and kill.[13.6] - -[TAYLOR AND THE GOVERNMENT] - -The General had other troubles also. There was a plan at Washington, -promoted by reports of his inefficiency and by letters from certain -ambitious officers left in the rear, to put in his place one of the new -brigadier generals. Scott, however, protected his interests, and by -having him assigned to duty with his brevet rank, threw a great obstacle -before the schemers. They encountered other difficulties as well, and -finally Polk sent him word confidentially that he need have no fear of -displacement. This, however, did not prevent a serious clash between -him and the administration over another matter. Perceiving that Mexico -could not defend effectively the remote and disaffected provinces -of the north against even our volunteer forces, realizing that the -possession of territory would be an advantage in making a treaty, and -wishing particularly to impress the Mexican Congress, which was to meet -on December 6, Polk felt extremely anxious to extend our occupation as -much as possible at once, and with all this in view it was proposed to -Taylor on September 22 that, should he see fit, he should have General -Patterson,[13.3] who was now the commanding officer at Camargo, occupy -the chief points in Tamaulipas.[13.6] - -As Taylor had bitterly complained of receiving hordes of volunteers for -whom there was nothing to do, it was naturally presumed at Washington -that such an expedition could be organized without interference with his -plans; and, supposing also that Patterson was at Matamoros, far from -Monterey, Marcy instructed that general to begin his preparations while -awaiting definitive orders from Taylor on the subject. Such a movement, -however, not being permissible under the terms of the armistice, a -plan in which the government felt deeply interested came to nothing; -and Taylor, perhaps to divert attention from this aspect of the case, -not only vetoed the expedition, but protested violently against the -course of the government in addressing one of his officers.[13.4] -Polk was naturally and properly incensed, but he believed Taylor was -now in the field for the Whig Presidential nomination, and wanted to -force a quarrel upon the administration; and hence Marcy replied mildly -to the General that the right of the commander-in-chief to offer mere -"suggestions" could hardly be denied.[13.6] - -On another point also there was a clash. Polk and his Cabinet condemned -at once and unanimously the Monterey armistice; but, shrewdly or -charitably suspecting that undisclosed reasons for it might have -existed, they decided to end it in such a manner as to express neither -approval nor censure. Marcy therefore directed on October 13 that it -should be terminated, explaining that it stood in the way of prosecuting -the war vigorously and forcing Mexico to seek peace. As by its terms the -agreement was subject to the approval of the respective governments, no -difficulty stood in the way of cancelling it; and on November 5 Taylor -notified Santa Anna, that since the Washington authorities disapproved -of the armistice, he should consider himself at liberty to resume -offensive operations on the fifteenth, since by that date he reckoned -that his despatch would reach San Luis Potosí.[13.6] - -In reply the wily Mexican attempted to convey an insinuation of bad -faith on the part of the American government. This Taylor properly -noticed in his rejoinder, expressing at the same time a hope that -Mexico would accept the offer of the United States to negotiate, and -that permanent friendly relations between the two republics might -ensue. Santa Anna had now a better opening; and he protested that his -country would do all she could to justify her title to sovereignty and -independence, and would never listen to any proposal of peace, until the -American army should evacuate her soil, and the American vessels lay -aside their hostile attitude.[13.5] The correspondence was published -of course in the _Diario_, and obviously tended to unite the nation, as -well as to enhance the prestige of its leader.[13.6] - -[MOVEMENT AGAINST SALTILLO] - -The termination of the armistice enabled Taylor to occupy Saltillo, -upon which his eye had long been fixed. For several reasons he deemed -the town, a place of some 18,000 souls, important. It was the capital -of the state of Coahuila, a support for Monterey and the chief pass -through the Sierra Madre, a station on the high road to the south, -and the dominating point in a region full of corn, wheat, cattle and -other supplies. At this time the city was entirely without protection. -Mejía had been ordered in May to fortify it, but had not been able to -do so; and Santa Anna's first thought, on learning that Monterey had -capitulated, was to bring Ampudia back to San Luis Potosí with his -demoralized soldiers.[13.10] - -Accordingly General Worth received orders on November 8 to march for -that place four days later with Lieutenant Colonel Duncan's battery, -the Artillery Battalion (eight companies), the Fifth and the Eighth -Infantry, and Blanchard's Company--in all about 1000 men;[13.7] and -Taylor with two squadrons of the Second Dragoons under Lieutenant -Colonel May determined to accompany him. The morning of the twelfth -brought a despatch from Marcy dated October 22, expressing the wish of -the government that, in view of Santa Anna's threatening posture and -the increasing unfriendliness of the people, no attempt should be made -to hold territory beyond Monterey, or at most beyond the mountains; -but the decision was confided to the General, and he set out the next -day.[13.10] - -Advancing, then, by the left bank of the swift Santa Catarina River, at -this time of the year but an insignificant stream, the column ascended -gradually, passed the village of that name, and after marching nearly 28 -miles came to a small bridge and a group of handsome live-oaks. Next the -road descended a little, and, enclosed much of the way by lines of trees -and maguey,[13.8] pursued the same general direction until it reached -the hacienda of Rinconada, a mile or so farther on. Up to this point the -majestic ranges of the Sierra Madre, nearly destitute of vegetation, -though here and there brightened by a white thread of water, had stood -about six miles apart; but now they closed in, and the road, turning -sharply to the left, plunged into a grand and sombre gorge known as the -Pass of Rinconada. For three miles or more it ascended steeply between -gray and frowning walls of stone decorated only with a few hardy and -prickly growths, and sometimes partly hidden by the clouds; but finally -the summit was gained, and before long the farm of Los Muertos (The -Dead) came in sight with its bare, vertical cliffs and its huge cairn of -cobble-stones--probably a memorial to some party of travellers murdered -by robbers--which gave a grim significance to the name.[13.10] - -Here the Americans gazed with special interest at Mexican works -intended to check their advance. Not willing to give up this natural -fastness Ampudia, in spite of the orders to withdraw, had undertaken to -fortify it; but soon, discovering that more extensive defences than he -possessed the means to erect and equip would be needful, to prevent the -position from being turned, he had prudently concluded to dismantle his -fortifications and retreat. The gorge now expanded, and gave place to a -long, wide, open valley extending to Saltillo. Here gardens, fields and -crops were seen once more, but how different! Instead of the orange and -lemon groves, the bananas and figs of Monterey, with the languid smokes -of sugar-houses rising in the distance, the soldiers beheld fields of -wheat and oats, and orchards of cherries and apples. In short, a march -of 65 or 70 miles had transported them to New England.[13.10] - -Gathered with great difficulty on November 15, the legislature of -Coahuila had elected and inaugurated J. M. de Aguirre as governor, and -on approaching Saltillo the following day Taylor received from him a -formal protest against the American advance.[13.9] The General kept -on, however, without replying, and leaving Worth's command in the city -square, pitched his tent on the farther side of the town. There was -little to make the place agreeable. Saltillo lay on the southeastern -side of a slightly concave plain, with mountains close behind it that -looked, in the afternoon of a sunny day, like immense drifts of dusty -snow. The city itself, consisting mostly of low adobe houses--protected -with grated windows--clinging to steep, narrow streets, wore the aspect -of dilapidation and age that was characteristic of provincial Mexico; -and the common people, apparently less intelligent then the populace of -Monterey, probably more dominated by the priests, and certainly more -secluded from contact with Americans, looked sullen and hostile.[13.10] - -Some of better standing attempted to charge exorbitant prices; but the -General promptly seized whatever supplies he could lay hands upon, -ascertained the owners, and proposed to pay what had been the current -rates or nothing. He treated the chief magistrate well, however, -assuring him that his desire was to see peace restored as soon as -possible, and good order preserved meanwhile at Saltillo; and after -ordering certain reconnaissances made in the surrounding region, he -set out for Monterey about the twenty-first. His gruff, unpolished -ways did not entirely please the Mexicans, and they were glad to find -themselves now under the courtly Worth, to whom they ascribed "better -feelings."[13.10] - -[THE CHIHUAHUA EXPEDITION] - -Meanwhile two other American commands, one on each side of Taylor, were -conducting aggressive operations. If the occupation of Tamaulipas was -likely to influence Mexico and facilitate the negotiation of a treaty, -so was that of Chihuahua; and the western as well as the eastern of -these provinces was believed to be disaffected toward the general -government on account of the overthrow of the federal constitution. As -early, therefore, as the middle of May, Polk proposed to the Cabinet -an expedition against Chihuahua, and the suggestion was immediately -accepted. Naturally such a diversion of strength from an effective -line of attack to a remote section, where the people were hardly strong -enough to cope with the savages, occasioned both at the time and later -much criticism; and not only on this, but on other grounds as well, the -President's action in the matter could be criticized fairly.[13.11] - -Indeed, in almost every case that required a thorough comprehension -of the Mexican problem, he blundered. Yet this was not his fault. -He did his best; and one is tempted to lay the charge against a -system of government which confers on politicians, ignorant or poorly -informed regarding vital matters, the honors and responsibilities of -statesmanship. So broad a censure is, however, unjust, as one scarcely -needs to say. At all events we do not place in power, as others have -done, mere _fainéants_ or persons qualified only for social functions -and palace intrigues. Very few Americans reach a high public station -unless they have ability of some kind, a more or less healthful ambition -to achieve, and much force of character; and thus we stand about as -well perhaps as the Chinese, who used to reason that a man who could -surpass a multitude of rivals in memorizing--and thus absorbing more or -less fully--the best thought and language of his race, would be able to -perform the commonplace duties of a magistrate. In reality our troubles -arise from the infirmities of human nature and the defectiveness of all -human institutions, no doubt, and this reflection may help us feel the -proper resignation as we view the blunders of the Mexican war; yet one -cannot quite forget the opinion of Meade: "Well may we be grateful that -we are at war with Mexico! Were it any other power, our gross follies -would have been punished severely."[13.11] - -About the middle of June Brigadier General Wool, then at Louisville, -received instructions to take command at San Antonio, Texas--for which -point certain troops were already under orders--report to Taylor, -and prepare for an expedition against Chihuahua. He proceeded to New -Orleans, accordingly, and from there he wrote on the twenty-eighth of -July that within twenty days, he hoped, the whole of his force would be -at the rendezvous. In this he was disappointed. La Vaca, Texas, about -160 miles from San Antonio, was the chief base on the coast,[13.12] -and wet weather made the so-called roads almost impassable. To get 1112 -heavy loads of supplies through bottomless mud, churned by about 500 -wagons going and returning, was an almost inconceivable task. Though -excessive rains had been falling, the troops, marching under an August -sun, were tormented by thirst; an occasional bunch of delicious grapes -or slice of prime venison could hardly solace them for the abundance of -rattlesnakes, tarantulas, scorpions and centipedes; and sleep was broken -by the screaming of panthers and howling of wolves--positively unearthly -when near, one of the soldiers wrote, and resembling, when distant, the -wail of some terrible monster gasping for life. In spite of hardships -and labors, however, men and wagons finally reached San Antonio, and on -August 14 Wool himself arrived at that point.[13.26] - -Here the troops had time to rest, and they found much of interest. The -old Mexican town--where one could still see now and then a fig tree -spreading itself in the _patio_ (courtyard) of a crumbling house, or -gaze at the heavy, earth-brown or moss-covered walls of the Alamo, -pitted by Santa Anna's cannon balls--looked in their eyes like some -ancient oriental city "just dug up," as one of them said; and the -cactus, the live-oaks, the mocking-birds, the pellucid river and -the many varieties of grapes extinguished soon the memory of past -fatigues.[13.26] - -For Wool, on the other hand, there was no repose. Now, as always -during the Mexican war, operations were unspeakably embarrassed by the -necessity of drawing supplies from so great a distance and by sea, and -naturally San Antonio, a town of only some 2000 persons, could furnish -much less than cities like Vera Cruz or even Matamoros. Each particular -article that would be necessary on the expedition had to be provided -now; and departmental errors, like delaying arms and misdirecting parts -of wagons, were therefore peculiarly unfortunate. But the greatest -difficulty was disorder. The command was a chaotic mass like that on the -Rio Grande, turbulent, impatient, insubordinate. Wool, however, attacked -the problem without shrinking, and what a soldier called "the iron hand" -of military discipline soon began to set things right.[13.26] - -[HARNEY'S ESCAPADE] - -Highly unfortunate, therefore, in this as well as in other regards, was -an escapade of Brevet Colonel Harney, a man as brave as a lion and also -as untamable, who had been occupying San Antonio for some time with -three companies of the Second Dragoons. Obtaining permission to ask -for Texan troops to defend the frontier against the Indians,[13.13] -he called for eight companies, and shortly before Wool's arrival, on -the pretext of a threatened Mexican invasion of which he entertained -little or no fear, he moved off with his entire command, although he -knew of the intended concentration at San Antonio, and advanced to the -Rio Grande.[13.14] Imprudently crossing the river, he was cut off by -one of its quick rises. Only the refusal of his officers to follow him -prevented a ridiculous dash against Monterey. Finally, near the end of -August, he obeyed the order to return, but left three companies behind; -and a part of this detachment, engaged in procuring a large supply of -grain and flour in Mexico, lost the supplies and three of their number, -killed or wounded. The rest of the three companies escaped under fire in -a disgraceful manner, burning public stores to prevent the Mexicans from -taking them; and of course news that Americans had been repulsed flew -like fire through the border.[13.26] - -[WOOL'S MARCH] - -Such presumption on the part of a regular officer, such imprudence, -and above all such disregard of his government's known intentions -were intolerable, and Wool felt them with peculiar intensity. He was -a high-strung person. Being devoutly pious he loathed swearing, for -example; but on special occasions his feelings got the better of his -tongue, and when this occurred he would instantly raise his eyes to -heaven and implore forgiveness. While not a great man, and apparently -incapable of inspiring soldiers or gaining their sympathetic support, -he understood his profession and lived up to it. When campaigning he -seemed to sleep--if he slept at all--with both eyes open, and the -outposts were liable to receive a visit at any hour of the night. Never -sparing himself, he was equally stern with others; and towards officers, -presumably more intelligent and responsible than privates, he seemed -especially exacting. So now he treated Harney with such rigor that some -of the volunteer officers, little disposed to favor strict discipline, -sympathized with the culprit, and Wool came to be regarded by not a -few as a narrow martinet, jealous and harsh in temper and weak in -judgment. Possibly some ground for these opinions could be found, but -substantially they were unjust.[13.15] - -Finally, on September 23, a topographical party went forward to study -routes, inquire about wood, water and forage, and select halting -places; and two days later some 1400 men, the first section of the -"army," advanced into an almost unknown region with about one hundred -and seventy-five wagons and provisions for two months.[13.16] The -distance to Presidio del Rio Grande, a small Mexican town five or -six miles beyond the river, was about 175 or possibly 185 miles. -Much of the country proved to be rough and wild, but there were also -barren prairies, deep "hog-wallows," rich bottom-land and one fine, -broad valley. Several streams had to be crossed, and among these were -counted the Medina and the Leona, not less beautiful than their names. -Population there was almost none, though on the first day's march -Castroville, a German town planted on American soil by a Frenchman -bearing a Spanish name, offered quite cosmopolitan suggestions. A -drought of several weeks had made the roads hard and the streams -fordable, and no serious difficulty was encountered until on October 8 -the advance came to the Rio Grande.[13.26] - -The river was here swift and rather more than four feet in depth; but -with the aid of boats and a pontoon bridge, provided beforehand by -Wool, the troops effected a crossing safely during the next few days, -established a small fort at each end of the bridge--to hold it and to -guard the boats for the second section under Colonel Churchill, which -was still waiting at San Antonio for the means of transportation--and -then camped three or four miles beyond the town for rest and repairs. -Some of the teams had come all the way from La Vaca, 330 miles, without -stopping for a day. As the small Mexican border force had retired and -the citizens were friendly, there was nothing to fear; and Wool's -amicable assurances, reinforced with strict orders to molest no one, -promoted kind relations. The government had left him without specie, and -the people would accept only hard cash; but with private means and by -dint of borrowing he obtained half-rations of corn. This brightened the -outlook noticeably, for subsistence was to be, of course, the greatest -problem; and the arrival here of Brigadier General Shields,[13.17] who -brought not only another body of the troops but news that Monterey -had fallen, and took command of all the infantry, together with a -small force of mounted men, appeared to strengthen the expedition -materially.[13.26] - - [Illustration: WOOL'S MARCH - -Based on Reconnaissances of Capt. Hughes, Lieut. Sitgreaves and Lieut. -Franklin] - -Wool had received no definite instructions from Taylor, and on October -16 with about 1800 men he struck out according to his own judgment -for Monclova, taking a circuitous route practicable for wagons and -artillery. This brought the army soon to San Fernando de Rosas, a garden -of roses lying in a beautiful plain on the cool and limpid Hidden River -(the _Escondido_), surrounded with trees and encompassed at a distance -with superbly grand peaks.[13.18] Here the road turned more toward the -south, and the country soon became broken. Formidable mountains upreared -themselves ahead, and before long the troops were among them, traversing -valley after valley in order to turn their huge flanks.[13.26] - -The San José range, some 4000 feet high, had to be climbed. It was a -hard task; but when the mists dissolved, Wool and his men gazed with -delight over two beautiful valleys, where meandering lines of dark -foliage marked the watercourses, while on the west, like a battlemented -wall, towered the Sierra de Santa Rosa, its precipitous buttresses -festooned with white and purple clouds. Descending then through a gorge -to the plain of San José, the army next encountered the Alamos and -Sabinos Rivers, each about four feet deep and racing like a torrent. To -get the wagons across looked at first impossible; but with incredible -exertions and the aid of ropes and improvised bridges the feat was -accomplished.[13.26] - -At the foot of the next range lay Santa Rosa, a town of some 2500 -people, where the troops arrived on October 24. All were Federalists -here. Their interests had suffered greatly from the dishonesty and -inefficiency of the central government, and the presents of cake, fruit -and confectionery offered to the Americans told their own story. Beyond -this point the road entered a sterile region, where almost the sole -inhabitants were sheep and goats. Now and then water could only be -obtained by scooping it from holes in salty ground, and sometimes there -was hardly fuel enough to boil the coffee. At length coffee and sugar -gave out, but the magnificent range on either side helped the men keep -up their spirits. A protest against the American advance was received, -and some 2500 men gathered under Colonel Blanco to enforce it;[13.19] -but as the loss of Monterey had cowed the people, and there were no -funds to stimulate them, Blanco dissolved his army; and on October -29 Wool formally occupied Monclova without opposition. A week later -Churchill with a hundred wagons and nearly all of the rear section came -up.[13.26] - -At this town, a place of about 5000 population, lying amid hills on the -fine Monclova River, Wool remained almost four weeks, for on account of -the armistice Taylor forbade a further advance toward the south; and the -army, camping a mile or so from the city, had time to drill, recruit, -reconnoitre and make repairs. It was a pleasant sojourn. Rivulets of -pure water freshened the streets; highly cultivated fields, mostly -planted with corn, filled the wide valley, and far mountains clung to -the horizon like azure clouds. Being now almost 600 miles from La Vaca, -Wool sent for the last supplies waiting with escorts at San Antonio, -prepared to break up his communications with that point, and opened a -connection with Camargo, not more than 200 miles distant. At the same -time he collected some local provisions, though most of the surplus had -already been drawn away by Ampudia, and he studied the routes. Strict -rules were made for both officers and men about entering the town; the -sale of liquor to soldiers was prohibited under penalty; and the arrival -of some gold aided materially.[13.26] - -[WOOL'S TRIALS] - -Things went substantially well, in fact, yet they did not go smoothly. -Considerable sickness prevailed among the troops. For a time the daily -ration per man had to be fixed at nine ears of corn, ground in the -portable steel mill of each company; and the soldiers grumbled. Orders -were issued requiring every man to shave, as the regulations provided; -and beardless young fellows, lacerating their faces in order to prove -themselves "men," grumbled again. The volunteers abominated the "tarnal -regulars," who were naturally the chief reliance for enforcing rules, -and when an opportunity came, retaliated. Many of their officers were -outspokenly dissatisfied with the conduct of the expedition. Wool's -bearing was denounced as harsh; but perhaps their own deportment had -something to do with that, for the punctilious Mexicans thought his -manners good. Officers as well as men chafed under the discipline; -but the General could easily reply that good-will on the part of the -Mexicans was essential, and that not a single complaint had yet been -made by the people.[13.20] In all probability it was argued that a -flying column of half Wool's numbers would have been far preferable; -but it could be answered that wastage from disease and battle had been -anticipated, that so small a column would probably have been attacked -by Colonel Blanco's irregulars and by other forces,[13.21] and that -after the conclusion of the armistice Ampudia might have to be reckoned -with.[13.26] - -Certainly the dissatisfied officers ridiculed unmercifully the number -of wagons. Here their ground was somewhat firmer. Jesup himself had -taken the position that such a train could neither reach Chihuahua nor -be sent back to the base. But in this matter Wool stood at the centre -and the quartermaster general stood at the circumference. It seems very -doubtful whether an adequate mule train could have been organized at -San Antonio in season. Without the wagons the army would probably have -been compelled to live more or less upon the country; and this would -have led to the concealment, or even the destruction of supplies, to -bloodshed, to a state of things not compatible with the conciliatory -methods ordered by Taylor and the government, perhaps to a serious lack -of rations, and possibly to the ruin of this isolated command. Moreover -artillery was essential; and Wool may have reasoned that where cannon -could go, wagons could follow.[13.26] - -The wagons and guns were, however, a serious embarrassment, and while -at Monclova Wool satisfied himself that he could not march from -there to Chihuahua by the direct route. A lack of water also was a -grave difficulty. Besides, a large force appeared under the present -circumstances unnecessary. Ampudia retreated to San Luis Potosí; and -although Santa Anna had taken steps, before the American expedition left -the Rio Grande, to prepare for the defence of Chihuahua, the military -forces holding that point had fallen back on Durango. There was indeed -nothing for Wool to conquer now but distance, and he felt that five -or six hundred men could do this as well as more. In his opinion, -therefore, the proper course was to proceed about 180 miles in a -southwesterly direction to Parras, where he would be on a good road to -Chihuahua and only about 90 miles from Saltillo; and indeed he thought -it advisable to join the main army. His views were duly expressed to his -superior officer, and Taylor concurred. The government, concluding that -the revival of the federal system at Mexico would change the sentiment -of the northern states, and that Chihuahua was in effect already in -our grasp, took a similar position;[13.22] and accordingly on the -twenty-fourth of November, leaving four companies to guard the stores at -Monclova, Wool set out for Parras.[13.26] - -The long march, generally through deserts and rugged mountains, was -cheered by a halt at a fine estate belonging to gentlemen who had -received their education in Kentucky, and still cherished the most -cordial recollections of their American experiences; and on December 5 -the army pitched its gray tents in front of the town. By many Parras, -a place of about the same size as Monclova, was called an Eden. It -lay where a wide plain and a long hill met, and most of the streets -were extremely narrow and crooked; but streams of clean water flowed -through them, and most of the residences were buried in gardens or -vineyards. But even amidst the luxury of romantic nature firm discipline -continued. The soldiers were kept at their drills and parades; their -arms and clothing had to be ready at all times for a close inspection; -as at Monclova, a system of calls and signals made surprises -impossible; and Wool busied himself in procuring corn and flour and in -reconnoitring.[13.26] - -[THE CHIHUAHUA EXPEDITION ABANDONED] - -All the while he looked for orders, and finally the summons came. -December 17, at a little before two o'clock in the afternoon, he rode -hastily into town with staff and escort, holding despatches in his hand; -and at once the aides and men hurried through the markets crying out, -"Soldiers, to the camp instantly!" As will appear in due time,[13.23] -the call was urgent. But it found Wool ready as usual, and in two hours -his army--leaving the sick under guard and taking with it 350 wagons, -provisions for 60 days, 400,000 cartridges and 200 rounds for the -cannon--set out. No blundering occurred. Thanks to his reconnaissances -Wool knew which of the routes to pursue. And there was no loitering. -Once the troops made thirty-five miles in twenty-four hours; and in -four days they shook hands with General Worth's brave men, then some -twenty miles beyond Saltillo and 110 or perhaps 120 from Parras.[13.26] - -"An entire failure," was Taylor's comment on Wool's expedition, and in a -sense his judgment appeared to be correct.[13.24] But this was Polk's -fault. Where there is nothing to do, nothing can be done.[13.25] -Before laying out the campaign the government should have seen what -it had now seen--that Saltillo was the key of Chihuahua, and that a -properly equipped expedition could not reach the latter city without -passing rather close to the former. But in reality Wool accomplished -a great deal. He showed how a real soldier, without fear and without -political yearnings, could lead an expedition through an enemy's -country. Nine hundred miles this army marched. Swift rivers were quickly -crossed, ravines filled, hills cut down, mountains climbed. Provisions -never failed. No wreckage marked the route. Not a drop of blood was -shed; not a shot fired. Wool made enemies only among those who were -under obligations to be friends, and made friends among those who were -under obligations to be enemies. And out of a crude, heterogeneous mass -he forged a keen, tough, highly tempered blade, that was to prove its -value soon in a terrible crisis.[13.26] - - [Illustration: Tampico and Its Environs] - -[TAMPICO IN VIEW] - -The other lateral expedition moved against the city of Tampico. This -place, the principal town in the state of Tamaulipas, and after Vera -Cruz the chief port of Mexico on the Gulf coast, was physically -remarkable. Land and water are perhaps nowhere more freakishly -intermingled. But for practical purposes one may describe it adequately -as on a low ridge--with the immense lagoon of Carpintero on the one -hand and the deep, wide, heavy, greenish-brown Pánuco on the other--a -little more than five miles from the Gulf, as the river flows. For ten -years beginning in 1835 political upheavals and vexatious commercial -regulations had militated against its prosperity; but the port was -highly prized by the government, and in April, 1846, was taken into its -particular care.[13.38] - -All the old fortifications having been demolished lest they should -be turned to account by insurgents, Parrodi, the comandante general, -was ordered to prepare the town for defence, and a number of badly -planned and badly constructed works--particularly a redoubt equipped -with two 8-pounders on the north side of the Pánuco at the bar--gave -a semblance of security. Some twenty-five light or fortress guns were -placed; but efforts to obtain additional heavy ordnance from Vera Cruz -were frustrated by the blockade, and when Ampudia, going north in the -summer, was directed to give his first attention to reinforcing the -garrison, circumstances again intervened. The people were spirited, -however; and the daily Eco voiced their sentiments by exclaiming, "With -such officers, with such troops, with such citizens let the Yankees come -whenever they please!"[13.38] - -As a matter of fact the Yankees had thoughts of coming quite soon. -Possession of the town seemed to be desirable, in the first place, -because for some time it was supposed to be the starting-point of a -carriage-road to San Luis Potosí, and apparently could be made a more -convenient base than the Rio Grande for a deep advance into Mexico; but -the war department found before long that wagons and artillery could -not cross the mountains by that route. In the second place occupation -of Tampico appeared to be a logical feature of the Tamaulipas movement, -in which Patterson was expected to play a leading rôle;[13.27] and -moreover, Santa Anna himself had explained to Mackenzie that it would be -advantageous as well as easy to make this conquest.[13.38] - -Conner had his eye upon the place, of course; but, aside from the -question of overcoming its defenders, he felt considerable hesitation. -It was regarded as the most dangerous port on the coast, and vessels -could not ride out a gale at anchor off the shore. The bar, on which -eight feet of water stood normally, had only a fathom in August, 1846; -and as the fleet would have to rendezvous and prepare for battle in the -open roadstead, he was afraid that one of the frequent northers would -assail him before he could assail the town. September 22, however, -when deciding upon the Tamaulipas expedition, Polk and his Cabinet -agreed that Conner should attack Tampico, and the order was issued that -day.[13.38] - -Santa Anna seems to have remembered the advice given to Mackenzie, and -while at Mexico he instructed Parrodi to retire, if attacked, unless -he could be sure of resisting successfully. On his way to San Luis he -evidently received Marcy's intercepted letter of September 2, which -announced that a movement upon Tampico was contemplated.[13.28] Hence -on October 3, with a view to the confirmation of those instructions, he -directed the war office to notify Parrodi of the American plan. Two days -later the comandante general reported to Santa Anna that he could not -defend the town victoriously, and explained in detail why. His garrison, -including some 200 sick, consisted of less than 1200 men besides 200 -available National Guards, ignorant of the use of arms. Only 870 of -these men could be employed, according to a later statement of his, at -the town and the bar, and having but 150 regular gunners he could not -man the numerous and widely separated positions. Indeed he would not be -able to subsist the garrison more than eleven days longer.[13.29] The -enemy, on the other hand, it was said, included a shore party of 3000, -and could attack by water and by land at the same time.[13.38] - -[TAMPICO EVACUATED BY THE MEXICANS] - -In response, Parrodi received from Santa Anna on October 14 an order, -confirmed three days later, that all the heavy guns, the stores, and -his three gunboats, light but effective craft, should be sent up the -river, and that he himself with his troops and what field pieces could -be taken along, should withdraw to Tula, a place behind the mountains. -Parrodi, who did not believe in the war, liked these instructions, and -proceeded to execute them. The government, however, seemed unwilling -to abandon Tampico, and the comandante general, perplexed by this -difference of sentiment and by the protests of the governor, troops, -people and foreign consuls, offered to Santa Anna some arguments -against his instructions: but the latter, annulling without ceremony -the government's action, impatiently ordered immediate evacuation. -His reasons were, in brief, that he could not reinforce the garrison -adequately without dividing the army in a manner incompatible with -his plans; that, even should he undertake to do so, this aid could -not arrive in time; and that, since a victorious defence could not be -expected, it was important not only to save the men and material, but -especially to avoid the moral effect of another American triumph; and no -doubt, on the assumption that Conner was prepared to make a strenuous, -unflinching attack with such forces as Parrodi described, these reasons -were sound.[13.38] - -Excited by the urgency of his instructions, which were received on the -twenty-second, the comandante general now endeavored to atone for the -time lost, and executed a flight instead of an evacuation.[13.30] The -redoubt at the bar was destroyed; large quantities of war material were -thrown into the river; with the aid of the British consul a pretended -sale of the gunboats was effected; and on October 27 and 28 the troops -hastily withdrew.[13.38] - -While these events were taking place, timely notice of them was -forwarded to Conner. Chase, the American consul, had been expelled -and had taken refuge on a blockading vessel; but his wife, who was a -British subject, remained in Tampico, and on October 20 she wrote to -the Commodore that Parrodi would evacuate the town on the following -day, and that no resistance would be made against an American attack. -By November 5 Conner received this news, but a lack of provisions made -it impossible for him to set out the next day, as he desired to do. On -the tenth, eleventh and twelfth, however, eleven vessels made sail from -Antón Lizardo with orders to rendezvous fifteen miles from the shore on -a certain east and west line a little south of Tampico. The frigates -_Raritan_ and _Potomac_ did not appear there; but as the weather was -fine, Conner decided to proceed, and at break of day, November 14, the -_Mississippi_, _Princeton_, _St. Mary's_, three small steamers--the -_Spitfire_, _Vixen_ and _Petrel_--and three schooner-gunboats joined the -blockading vessel off Tampico bar. By this time the Commodore knew that -Parrodi had not evacuated the city on the twenty-first, and, supposing -the garrison was still there, expected some hard work;[13.31] but the -weather looked favorable, and he prepared at once to attack.[13.38] - -Lieutenant Commanding Hunt, the blockading officer, had examined the -bar; and piloted by him the three small steamers towed the gunboats -across it. By ten o'clock the river was entered successfully, and -the Commodore advanced immediately toward the city. The low shores -were covered with rich vegetation; the huts, thatched with palmetto -leaves, appeared cosey if not grand; broad-leaved bananas and loaded -orange-trees grew beside them; tall cocoanut palms languidly waved their -graceful fronds above; and the long line of steamers and schooners, -followed by nine boats from the frigates packed with officers, marines -and sailors, made an impressive spectacle as they moved slowly up the -smooth but rapid Pánuco under an azure sky.[13.38] - -Conner himself was on the _Spitfire_. As he approached the town, he -was met by a deputation from the _ayuntamiento_ (city council), who -stated that having neither the means nor the disposition to resist, they -desired to capitulate. Perry and two other officers then went ashore -with the deputation to arrange terms; but after a long conference, -finding this impossible--though of course the expediency of surrendering -was not in debate--all returned to the _Spitfire_, and at length an -informal agreement was reached. Next morning the chief points of this -were embodied in the following declaration:[13.32] - - "United States Steamer Spitfire. Off the City of Tampico, - November 15, 1846. Commodore Conner declines a Capitulation with - the Authorities of Tampico as he considers it unnecessary. He - accepts the surrender of the City, and takes military possession - of it. He assures the Inhabitants, at the same time, that he will - not interfere with their Municipal Regulations, or their Religion; - and that private property shall be respected, provided that the - public property of all kinds, be delivered up at once, and in good - faith. Should an assault be made by the Inhabitants of the City, - on the American Forces, the Inhabitants will be held responsible - for the consequences. Commodore Conner, so long as the Authorities - and Inhabitants of the City observe good faith towards him, will - consider them under his protection;--a different course will expose - them to serious evils."[13.38] - -The danger of an assault was not imminent, for the National Guards could -find but one hundred serviceable muskets, and all the people of the -town, who usually numbered about 15,000 but were now perhaps half as -many, lined the streets and gazed at the Americans as mere spectators. -All the public property that was movable had been carried away, but the -public buildings were now occupied; and, as the fraudulent sale of the -gunboats was detected, three much needed vessels, built at New York, -were added to our navy.[13.33] Steps were then taken to recover what -Parrodi had transported up the river.[13.34] November 18 Tattnall set -out with the _Spitfire_ and _Petrel_, and the next forenoon he reached -Pánuco town, the head of navigation, some eighty miles from Tampico, -where it was known that heavy guns had been left. Everything had been -concealed but the concealment proved ineffectual. He disabled nine -18-pounders, threw into the river a quantity of balls, and burned some -camp equipage; and a 24-pounder was taken aboard.[13.38] - -[TAMPICO GARRISONED] - -In ordering the capture of Tampico, the American government had intended -that Patterson should be at hand to occupy the town, and as this -calculation had been upset by Taylor, it now became a question how to -retain the prize. The place of the squadron was at sea; without the help -of every man it looked almost impossible to manage the vessels in bad -weather; and officers of nearly all grades were actually wanting. So -Perry in the steamer _Mississippi_ sailed from Tampico on the evening -of November 15 for Brazos Island, and the next day left an officer -there to explain the situation. Without delay the news was forwarded -to Patterson at Camargo, and he directed that men and cannon should -go "forthwith" to the captured city. His instructions were not waited -for, however. Lieutenant Colonel Belton, who occupied Camp Belknap with -six companies of the so-called artillery, embarked for the mouth of -the river on hearing from Perry; and on November 21 Colonel Gates and -about 500 men sailed from the Brazos in the _Neptune_, leaving two more -companies to follow the next day in the _Sea_.[13.35] Both vessels -were driven ashore, but fortunately the troops were saved in both cases. -By the twenty-third Tampico had therefore a garrison of about 650 good -regulars. Some ordnance also arrived; and Conner, besides landing a -pair of carronades, remained in the harbor with four or five gunboats. -Fortunately the only land approaches were by a neck at each end of the -town between Carpintero Lake and the river; and the work of fortifying -these, begun at once, was prosecuted night and day.[13.38] - -Perry, meanwhile, kept at work. November 21 the _Mississippi_, bearing -the red pennant of a vice commodore at the masthead, appeared at New -Orleans.[13.36] Announcing the capture of Tampico, Perry conferred -with General Brooke and the governor of the state, and obtained sixteen -cannon--half of them borrowed from the Louisiana arsenal--and with -these, an engineer officer, 110 regular recruits and a quantity of -ammunition, he arrived off Tampico on the twenty-ninth.[13.37] Before -long the Alabama regiment came from the Rio Grande, and the government, -which heard of the capture of Tampico on November 28, ordered about -460 additional regulars to be sent from the United States. There was -great anxiety at Washington to make the port secure, for, as will soon -be discovered, a particular reason for holding it had now arisen. -Gates issued stringent regulations to govern the citizens in case of -a Mexican attack; and by December 19 Brigadier General Shields was in -command there with an adequate and fairly well-protected garrison. Yet -the Mexicans endeavored to feel cheerful. No battle had been lost, for -none had been fought, said the government with convincing logic; and the -Americans had not triumphed, for they had merely taken what had been -abandoned; but the governor of Tamaulipas recalled bitterly that "in -former times Tampico, almost by herself, had repulsed more than 4000 -veterans."[13.38] - -[TAYLOR'S POLICY] - -Substantially all of northeastern Mexico was now in American hands, -and the question of Taylor's future operations, which had long been -under consideration, became urgent. On that matter the General himself -entertained a definite opinion. He was for adopting a boundary line that -would include enough territory to pay all just American claims, and -standing there on the defensive. As already drawn, the line ran from -Parras, where he expected Wool to remain, and Patos, a rich hacienda -on the Parras route about thirty-five miles from Saltillo, to Saltillo -itself, to Camp Butler, six miles north of that city toward Rinconada -Pass, and to Monterey. Between Monterey and Tampico lay a wide gap, -but the General proposed to fill this now by occupying certain points -in Tamaulipas. Victoria, the capital of that state, was exposed to -attacks proceeding from Tula, and there he planned to have a large -force.[13.41] - -How many troops were available is not precisely known; but according to -Meade, who seems to have been in rather close touch with headquarters, -Worth was to have some 2500 at Saltillo and eight guns, Butler 1500 at -Monterey, Taylor and Patterson about 5000, to be divided between the -posts in Tamaulipas and a new position in advance of Saltillo, and the -commanders on the lines of communication about 2000; which meant that -some 14,500 men, including Wool's 2400 or 2500 and about 1000 occupying -Tampico, were to hold lines approximately 800 miles long in an enemy's -country.[13.39] Over against them stood the Mexicans under Santa -Anna, who in Taylor's opinion were potentially, if not actually, more -than 50,000 in number, and were occupying before Christmas a position -only about sixty miles from the Americans;[13.40] and in addition -to these it was necessary to consider the large bands of irregulars, -like those of Colonel Blanco, who were liable to gather suddenly almost -anywhere.[13.41] - -When Taylor reported his plan to the war department, a good deal of -anxiety and perhaps distress was felt there. To be sure, he pointed -out that artillery could be moved north by way of Saltillo only, and -that water and provisions were scanty on that road, while doubtless he -as well as others considered the Mexicans too deficient in vigor and -enterprise to be feared. How just were these calculations will appear in -the sequel, and they failed now to satisfy the government. Though not -informed by Taylor precisely how many posts he intended to establish -in Tamaulipas, Marcy was afraid that widely separated forces and lines -of communication would be assailed, and it was clear that a small -Mexican success, doing us no actual harm but diminishing our prestige -materially, might rouse the people against us. Even the line to Monterey -was long, the Secretary feared. Taylor evidently had no thorough -knowledge of the passes, for he was now preparing to take a very hasty -look at a few of them. Besides, it had been Marcy's expectation of -late that Wool's column would be drawn back to Monterey; and at the -end of the year, as well as earlier, he said he did not wish to occupy -territory in advance of that city. Polk appealed in his diary to the -General's own opinion that he could not safely advance beyond it. Scott, -as well as Marcy and the President, believed the troops were being -scattered too much. Officers on the ground also held that view; but such -was Taylor's deliberate policy.[13.41] - - - - - XIV - - SANTA FE - - June-September, 1846 - - -[THE STATE OF THINGS IN NEW MEXICO] - -Not only Tamaulipas and Chihuahua but New Mexico lay within the scope of -the government's war policy, and certain features of the situation made -the outlook in that quarter peculiarly inviting. - -The province was cut into an eastern and a western section by the Rio -Grande, which ran approximately north and south; and usage divided -the best settled part of it into the Río Arriba (Upstream) district -near Santa Fe, the capital, which lay some twenty miles east of the -great river, and the Río Abajo (Downstream) district, which had for -its metropolis Albuquerque, a small town on the Rio Grande about -seventy-five miles to the southwest. According to a recent census the -population was 100,000, of which the greater part belonged in the lower -district; and more than half the wealth also was attributed to that -section. The caravan trade, which made its way from Independence,[14.1] -Missouri, to Santa Fe, Chihuahua, Lagos and even Mexico City, gilded -the name of the province, for it had advanced rapidly from the humble -beginnings of 1821, and now employed 1200 men, involved a capital of -some two millions, and usually paid a net profit of thirty or forty per -cent on the goods transported. The favorable climate believed to prevail -in New Mexico was an additional source of interest.[14.2] - -The political situation appeared singularly promising. In March, 1845, -the war department of Mexico admitted publicly that the northern -sections of the country were "abandoned and more than abandoned" by -the general government. Sensible Mexicans held that the connection of -the province with their miserable system involved injury instead of -benefit. The people received no protection against the ravages of the -Indians. The national troops were a constant menace to the citizens. If -a man desired to give his note for $3000, he was compelled to pay eight -dollars for stamped paper. The duties and extortions levied upon the -caravan merchants increased the price of their goods; and of late the -central government had been trying to deprive the provincial authorities -of money and the people of comforts by stopping that business -entirely.[14.2] - -The citizens appeared weary of oppression. They would not pay the -taxes. It was found necessary in 1845 to excuse them from one of -the most profitable but most annoying imposts. Indifference toward -the general government--a natural return for its neglect and its -vexations--prevailed, and the continual changes in that government -aggravated the lack of patriotism. Indeed, there was more than -indifference. A move to follow the example of Texas had been made in -1837, and the idea of joining the United States, which had existed -in that year, became so strong by the early months of 1846 that -representatives of the province in the national Congress openly avowed -it. Finally, a revolution against misgovernment, that had recently -occurred in the neighboring state of Sonora, appeared to offer a strong -hint.[14.2] - -All power, civil and military, lay in the hands of Manuel Armijo, -governor and comandante general; and that of itself was an ample -ground for insurrection. Born of disreputable parents, this precious -adventurer had achieved a career still more disreputable. A man of -unusual energy, though now a mountain of flesh, he could assume at will -an air of ingenuous affability; could threaten, bluster, brag, intrigue -or coax; and when dressed up in his blue frock coat, with blue striped -pantaloons, shoulder straps, a red sash, and plenty of gold lace, could -look--although at heart only a cunning and cowardly robber--quite -impressive. His personal habits were said to be grossly immoral; his -only principle was to succeed; and his type of mind, shrewd though -low, was indicated by one of his favorite sayings, "It is better to be -thought brave than to be so." Such force, cleverness and lack of scruple -had naturally made him rich. His family now owned Albuquerque and the -neighboring estates. His position and close relations with the priests -gave him a firm hold on the ecclesiastical arm; it was believed that -an understanding with the savages enabled him to use them against his -enemies; and he engaged rather deeply in the American trade. Yet his -ambition was not yet satisfied; and he entertained the idea, it would -seem, of making the province an independent country.[14.2] - -At St. Louis, Missouri, the New Mexican situation was doubtless fairly -well understood, and a deep interest in the caravan business existed. -The merchants, it was felt when the war became probable, deserved to be -protected, and many urged the prompt despatch of an expedition for that -purpose. Other arguments for such a step were, that it would forestall -Indian troubles on the border, would incline the enemy--by laying open -their weak side--to make terms, would encourage the people of New -Mexico to rise in our favor, and would secure the key to Chihuahua and -California; and in all probability influential men brought these ideas -to the President's notice.[14.4] - -The occupation of Santa Fe was in fact decided upon as one of the very -earliest war measures--primarily for the sake of the traders, but also -with a view to the permanent retention of the province. The move was -intended to be pacific, however. Polk doubtless expected that no serious -opposition, if any at all, would be offered by the people; and there -seem to have been hopes that Chihuahua and her sister states could be -persuaded by arguments backed with force to let the caravan trade go on -despite the war. In that case the burdensome duties imposed at Santa Fe -would no longer have had to be paid, and the discrimination in favor of -Mexican competitors, that had prevailed there, would have ceased. On -May 13, therefore, the governor of Missouri was directed to raise eight -companies of mounted troops and two of light artillery for an expedition -to New Mexico, and Colonel S. W. Kearny of the First Dragoons was -directed to command them.[14.4] - -[KEARNY'S MARCH] - - [Illustration: GENERAL KEARNY'S MARCH] - -So fine an opportunity for adventure appealed instantly to the bold, -hardy and energetic young fellows of Missouri, and as early as June -6 volunteers were hurrying into the service at Fort Leavenworth--a -square of wooden buildings, with a blockhouse at each corner and a plot -of grass in the middle--which crowned a high bluff on the Missouri -River about 312 miles from St. Louis; and about 1660 troops were soon -assembled at that point. Of Kearny's dragoons there were some 300. The -First Regiment of Missouri Mounted Volunteers--which chose Alexander -W. Doniphan as colonel--numbered about 860. The artillery, including -nearly 250 men, consisted of "Battery A" of St. Louis under Captain -Weightman and a company under Captain Fischer, a graduate of the -Prussian artillery service, and formed a battalion commanded by Major -M. L. Clark, a West Pointer.[14.3] There were also two small companies -of volunteer infantry, a St. Louis mounted body of about one hundred -called the Laclede Rangers, which Kearny attached to his regulars, about -fifty Delaware and Shawnee Indians, and finally, though by no means -last in importance, a Roman Catholic priest familiar with the Spanish -language.[14.4] - -Without lingering to complete the outfit, Kearny sent the command off -by sections. June 5 a detachment of the dragoons advanced. By the -twenty-eighth all of Doniphan's regiment were on the march for Santa Fe -and--none of them cared how much farther; and two days later Weightman's -fine brass cannon, gleaming radiantly in the bright sunshine, wheeled -into the trail. For several days the troops had to break their way -through a rough country, but about fifteen miles south of the Kansas -River they struck the Santa Fe road, a broad, well marked, natural -highway running toward the southwest.[14.6] - -Council Grove, the famous rendezvous of Indians and frontiersmen, was -the last place from which a single person could safely return; and now -for nearly four weeks not one "stick of timber" was to cheer the eye. -After pressing on in the same direction to the Arkansas, the troops -left the main trail, marched wearily along the northern bank of the -river--ascending about seven feet in each mile--till they were beyond -the great bend, and finally, crossing the shallow stream, turned their -faces toward Bent's Fort, a protected trading post, which stood near -the present site of Las Animas, Colorado, about 650 miles from Fort -Leavenworth. Belts had been tightened over and over again by this time. -Drinking water that no horse would touch had sickened many a tough -rider. Mosquitos and buffalo gnats had tormented the flesh day and -night. Faces had been scorched by siroccos, and tongues had swollen -with thirst. Many had become so tired that a rattlesnake in the blanket -seemed hardly worth minding, and so utterly wretched that in blind fury -they sometimes raved and cursed like maniacs. Out of one hundred fine -horses belonging to Battery A sixty had perished. Yet in places there -had been cool breezes, carpets of brilliant and spicy flowers, great -herds of buffalo, curious mirages, and inspiring glimpses of Pike's -Peak, the towering outpost of the Rockies.[14.6] - -At length on July 29 Kearny escorted by Doniphan's regiment gained the -rendezvous, a grassy meadow on the Arkansas about nine miles below the -Fort. There within a few days the Army of the West assembled,[14.5] and -two additional companies of the dragoons, which had made an average of -twenty-eight miles a day from Fort Leavenworth, joined their regiment. -Nor were the troops alone. Several merchants had left Independence about -the first of May. Notified by order of the government that war had -begun, they had stopped here; and the Colonel found under his protection -more than four hundred wagons and merchandise worth upwards of a -million.[14.6] - -Armijo, for his part, had received ample warnings. In March the central -government informed him that war might be expected, and authorized -him to make preparations for defence. By June 17 news of the coming -invasion reached Santa Fe, and nine days later the first caravan of the -season confirmed it. Manuel Alvarez, the American consul, endeavored -now to persuade Armijo that it would "be better for himself and the -people under his government to capitulate, and far preferable" to -become Americans than to be citizens of a country so disordered and so -impotent as Mexico; but while his advisers and subordinates fancied -they could obtain offices under an elective system, and "were rather -easily won over," the governor himself probably could not believe that -people so long robbed and oppressed would choose the wolf as their -shepherd. Besides, he doubtless had some national spirit and some -desire to justify his gratuitous title of general. After confirming -the news further by a spy, he sent south on July 1 an appeal for -aid--representing the Americans as 6000 in number--and began to prepare -for defence. A letter from Ugarte, the comandante general of Chihuahua, -stating that he could set out on a moment's notice with five hundred -cavalry and as many infantry, seemed encouraging, and no doubt Armijo -was aware that Durango, too, had been ordered by the authorities at -Mexico to aid him.[14.7] - -Meanwhile reinforcements for Kearny were gathering in his rear. On the -third of June Marcy informed the governor of Missouri that if Sterling -Price, then a member of the Missouri legislature, and certain other -citizens of the state would raise and organize a thousand mounted -men--that is to say, a regiment and a battalion--to follow Kearny -promptly, they would be appointed to the chief commands. This method of -getting troops aroused considerable opposition among the people, for it -ignored the militia system and the aspirations of the militia officers, -and many felt that a politician like Price was unfit for the command; -but young men were ready to volunteer under any sort of conditions that -promised a chance to reach the front, and about the time Kearny left -Fort Bent this new force, including artillery under regular officers, -was mustered into the service at Fort Leavenworth.[14.8] - -At the same time steps were taken to obtain reinforcements of a totally -different character. A large number of Mormons, recently driven from -Nauvoo, Illinois, had gathered at Council Bluffs, and were planning -to settle in California. It was important that feelings of hostility -toward this country should not prevail among them, and apparently their -assistance, not only on the coast but in New Mexico, might be valuable. -Kearny was therefore authorized to accept a body of these emigrants -not larger than a quarter of his entire force, and about five hundred -of them were enlisted in June and taken to Fort Leavenworth by Captain -Allen of the First Dragoons. Allen soon died, but under Lieutenant Smith -of the same regiment this party marched for Santa Fe.[14.8] - -On July 31 Kearny issued a proclamation, which declared that he was -going to New Mexico "for the purpose of seeking union with, and -ameliorating the condition of its inhabitants," urged them to follow -their usual vocations, and promised that all who should pursue this -course would be protected in their civil and religious rights; and -the next day he addressed Armijo in the same strain, telling him that -resistance would not only be in vain, but would cause the people to -suffer, and adding that submission would be greatly for his interest and -for theirs.[14.9] Captain Cooke of the dragoons was made the bearer -of this communication, and with an escort of twelve picked men he went -forward under a white flag.[14.16] - -August 1 the "long-legged infantry," who were almost able to outmarch -the cavalry, left the rendezvous, and on the following day the so-called -army was all in motion. After crossing the Arkansas a little way above -the Fort, it soon turned off to the southwest, and followed in general -the line of the present Atchison, Topeka and Santa Fe Railroad. Before -long the troops found on the right a high range of mountains, thrusting -up twin peaks into the region of perpetual snow, while the gleaming -wall of the far Rockies came every day nearer; and on the left gazed -over wide plains--broken with ridge, plateau or butte--which stretched -away toward the east, until one could not say where earth and sky met. -Near the present boundary of New Mexico began the ascent of Raton Pass; -and the men, winding up the rugged valley, discovered most beautiful -flowers. But they were hardly in a condition to enjoy them, for the -rations--cut down one half or more--consisted of flour stirred up in -water, fried, and eaten with a little pork; and the implacable Kearny, -an embodiment of energy and resolution, hurried them along by marches -that were almost incredibly hard. What lay ahead nobody knew. It was -not even certain that the present scanty rations would hold out. But -the watchword was always, Forward; and even the magnificent views at -the summit of the Pass, where Raton Mountain upreared a series of -castellated pinnacles somewhat like those of the Ichang gorge on the -upper Yangtse River, attracted but little attention.[14.16] - -[KEARNY'S POLITICAL ACTION] - -August 15, at the new and unimportant village of Las Vegas began -Kearny's political work. From the flat roof of a house the General--for -his commission as brigadier general had now overtaken him--said to -the people substantially this: "For some time the United States has -considered your country a part of our territory, and we have come to -take possession of it. We are among you as friends--not as enemies; -as protectors--not as conquerors; for your benefit--not your injury. -I absolve you from all allegiance to the Mexican government and to -Armijo.[14.10] They have not defended you against the Indians, but -the United States will. All who remain peaceably at home shall be -safeguarded in person and in property. Their religion also shall be -protected. A third of my army are Roman Catholics. I was not brought -up in that faith myself, yet I respect your creed, and so does my -government. But listen! If any one promises to be quiet and is found in -arms against me, I will hang him. Resistance would be useless. There are -my soldiers, and many more are coming. You, then, who are in office will -now take the oath of allegiance to the United States, and I will support -your authority."[14.16] - -Tecolote also, at the bottom of the valley, witnessed a scene of this -kind; and the next day, crossing the swift Pecos, Kearny followed a -similar course at the red adobe town of San Miguel. Here the alcalde -said he would rather wait until after the capture of Santa Fe. "It is -enough for you to know, Sir, that I have captured your town," was the -stern reply. Doubtless, in their muddled way, the people wondered at -this first illustration of liberty; but with characteristic politeness, -timidity and guile they wrinkled their faces as if pleased. In spite of -orders and sentinels the fields of waving corn, full of ears just prime -for roasting, suffered a little; but Kearny paid for the damage, and -that at least was appreciated.[14.16] - -By this time officers sent forward to learn the state of public -sentiment at the city of Taos, an important seat of the Pueblo Indians, -and at Santa Fe had returned with unwelcome reports, and several -American residents had brought warnings of danger. The activity of -Mexican spies--kindly treated when captured, and in some cases released -at once with friendly messages--proved that Armijo was alert; and on -August 14 his reply to the note sent by Cooke, while proposing that -Kearny halt and that negotiations be opened, informed the General that -the people were rising _en masse_ to defend the province, and that -Armijo would place himself at their head.[14.11] Fifteen hundred -dragoons had reached or were near Santa Fe, it was reported; and at a -natural gateway, cutting a ridge about four hundred feet high, a hostile -force was said to be waiting. On hearing this news all the weary men -and their drooping steeds came to life. The banners and guidons were -unfurled. "To horse!" blared the trumpets; "Trot! Gallop! Charge!" And -with sabres glittering under a brilliant sun the troopers dashed round a -sharp turn into the pass, while the artillery thundered after them, and -the infantry scrambled over the ridge. Not an enemy was found; but the -reports agreed that Apache Canyon, some distance farther on, would be -stiffly and strongly defended.[14.16] - -This was extremely serious news. To march nearly 2000 soldiers eight -or nine hundred miles through a wilderness involved fearful risks, -and the expedition was now at the breaking point. The men had become -travel-worn and half-starved; many, if not all, were suffering from -the effects of the water, loaded with acrid salts, which they had been -drinking; the horses generally were on their last legs; and hundreds of -horses and mules actually could not march another day. It had already -been necessary to attach cattle to the ammunition wagons, and the -cannon were now dragged along with extreme difficulty. The provisions -had practically been exhausted. And here lay a defile seven or eight -miles long, guarded by several thousand militia, a force of regulars and -considerable artillery.[14.16] - -[CROSS-CURRENTS] - -As these facts indicate, the New Mexicans did not seem willing to -justify Polk's expectations. Whatever Armijo's own opinions, public -sentiment appeared to demand action. There existed a good deal of -warlike spirit in the province, and naturally the prospect of an armed -invasion excited resentment. The ignorant and suspicious people were -easily persuaded, after their hard experience under Mexican rule, that -the Americans were coming to take their property; and the priests added, -that besides abusing the women these ruffians would brand them on the -cheek as mules were branded. August 8 the governor therefore issued -a proclamation, summoning the people to take up arms in the cause -of "sacred independence"; the prefect of Taos and presumably other -local authorities followed his example; and several thousand of the -people,[14.12] Mexicans or Indians, many of them armed only with bows -and arrows, clubs or lariats, but all apparently eager to fight, were -placed at Apache Canyon under Colonel Manuel Pino.[14.16] - -At this juncture, however, Cooke, a Chihuahua merchant named González -and one James Magoffin, a jovial and rich Kentucky Irishman, prominent -in the caravan trade and long a resident of Chihuahua, arrived at -Santa Fe. Magoffin had been introduced by Senator Benton to Polk, -and after some talk had consented to act as a sort of informal -commissioner to Armijo in the interest of peaceful relations. He now -argued, according to the very reasonable statement of the governor, -that American rule would enhance the price of real estate and make New -Mexico prosperous.[14.13] Undoubtedly he dwelt upon the impossibility -of successful resistance; and probably he suggested--though Armijo's -avarice required no hint on this point--that should cordial feelings -prevail, the duties on the approaching merchandise, a fortune in -themselves, would be paid at the Santa Fe customhouse, where the -governor could handle them.[14.16] - -On the other hand, no aid was coming from the south. The 1500 dragoons -were not even phantasmal. Ugarte's cheering statement that he could -bring 1000 men to New Mexico had no doubt been intended, and no doubt -was understood, as mere stimulation. According to the latest returns, -New Mexico, Chihuahua, Durango and Zacatecas together had less than -2000 poorly equipped and poorly subsisted troops, the greater part of -whom were the scattered and almost worthless Presidials. The general -government, when officially notified of the coming invasion, merely -issued a few nugatory orders and expressed "profound regret." The -people's loyalty to the government and especially to the governor -appeared uncertain. Armijo understood that he was not a general, and -no doubt understood also that he was a coward; and for all these -reasons he decided--though wavering to the end--that hostilities were -to be avoided, should that be possible. Diego Archuleta also, one of -the chief military officers, was approached by Magoffin, and under -genial manipulation proved to be much less bloodthirsty than had been -supposed. Consul Alvarez, it will be recalled, had previously found -the subordinate officials tractable, and it may safely be supposed in -general that very little desire to fight the Americans existed in the -governor's entourage.[14.16] - -Pino seems to have felt differently, however, and when Armijo was on the -road to the canyon, August 16, with two or three hundred soldiers and -about eight guns, he received a message from that officer threatening to -come and fetch him, if he did not join the militia. This augured ill, -and the augury proved correct. The people demanded to be led against -the enemy, but Armijo said the Americans were too strong. Pino offered -to attack if he could have a part of the regulars, but the governor -was determined to keep them all for his own protection. Then he was -called a traitor, and retaliated by calling the people disloyal and -cowardly. They threatened him; and he, more afraid of his own army than -of Kearny's, urged the militia to go home and let the regulars do the -fighting. Threatened again, he forbade the people to come near his camp; -and finally he turned his cannon in their direction.[14.16] - -In reality the people themselves had no great hunger for battle. -Besides detesting Armijo, they were doubtless influenced by much -lurking anti-Mexican or pro-American sentiment; had probably learned to -question the diabolical intentions attributed to Kearny's troops; were -fully aware in a general way of American superiority; and felt deeply -impressed by tales about the great number of the invaders, their long -train, their many guns, their enormous horses and the terrible men -themselves--an army, in short, such as they had never dreamed of before. -The quarrels of their leaders both disgusted and disheartened them; and -they began to think, too, of their lives, families and property. August -17, therefore, they broke up, and went every man his own way. A council -of the regular officers favored retreat. The Presidials deserted or -were dismissed; the cannon were spiked and left in the woods; and in -about two weeks Armijo--though offered personal security and freedom at -Santa Fe--turned up at Chihuahua with ninety dragoons. He had proved not -exactly a traitor, perhaps;[14.14] but certainly not a patriot, and -still more certainly, if that was possible, not a hero.[14.16] - -[OPPOSITION COLLAPSES] - -The result was that on August 17 a fat alcalde rode up to Kearny on his -mule at full speed, and with a roar of laughter cried, "Armijo and his -troops have gone to hell and the Canyon is all clear." The news was -confirmed; and early the next day, instead of turning the pass by a -difficult and circuitous route, of which the General had learned, the -Americans advanced boldly, though still with caution, on their last hard -march--twenty-eight miles to Santa Fe. Just beyond the defile, at a -position that might easily have been made impregnable, were found light -breastworks, a sort of abatis, a spiked cannon, and tracks which guided -some of Clark's men to the rest of Armijo's ordnance. At three o'clock, -after receiving a note of welcome from Vigil, the acting governor, -General Kearny, riding at the head of the troops, came in sight of the -town. Neither man nor beast had been allowed to stop for food that day, -and the column dragged heavily; but the rear was up three hours later, -and then, leaving the artillery on a commanding hill, the rest of the -troops eagerly entered Santa Fe.[14.16] - -Alas, the Mecca of so many dreams and hopes was promptly rechristened -"Mud Town," for it proved to be only a straggling collection of adobe -hovels lying in the flat sandy valley of a mountain stream, where a main -line of the Rockies came to an end amidst a gray-brown, dry and barren -country.[14.15] Even the palace, a long one-story adobe building, had -no floor; and after partaking of refreshments, addressing the people -in his usual tone of mingled courtesy and firmness, and listening to -the salute of thirteen guns which greeted the raising of the Stars and -Stripes, Kearny had to sleep on its carpeted ground, while most of the -troops, too exhausted to eat, camped on the hill.[14.16] - -[NEW MEXICO OCCUPIED] - -The next day Kearny delivered a more formal address, but the style of -his remarks was the same as before; and his kindly, simple, determined -manner produced an excellent impression. Thundering vivas answered him; -and then Vigil, basing his remarks on the conviction that "no one in the -world has resisted successfully the power of the stronger," expressed -a joyless yet hopeful acceptance of the situation. We now belong -to a great and powerful nation, he said, and we are assured that a -prosperous future awaits us. Such of the officials as desired to retain -their places then took an oath of allegiance to the United States. The -following day chiefs of the Pueblo Indians came in and submitted, and on -the twenty-second Kearny issued a proclamation. This embodied the same -assurances and warnings as the addresses, but it added that western as -well as eastern New Mexico was to be occupied, that all the inhabitants -were claimed as American citizens, and that a free government would be -established as soon as possible.[14.17] - -By this time a fort, named after Marcy, had begun to be visible on -the hill. The site was not well adapted for a regular work; but as it -commanded the town perfectly at a distance of about six hundred yards -from the palace, and was not commanded by any eminence, it served the -purpose admirably. One point, however, still caused anxiety. There -seemed to be danger that the Río Abajo district, supported by troops -from the south, might rise against the invaders; and reports came that -pointed toward precisely such an event. Kearny went down the river, -therefore, on September 2 with seven hundred men. But he found no enemy. -The Americans were everywhere well received and entertained. Ugarte -had indeed left El Paso del Norte for New Mexico on August 10, but his -troops numbered only four hundred; they had little ammunition and no -artillery; Armijo discouraged him by saying that 6000 Americans were -on their way south; the prospect of marching eighteen days--a part of -the time in a desert--was not inviting; and so the expedition went -home. Kearny returned to Santa Fe on September 11, and about noon on -the twenty-fifth he set out with his effective dragoons for California, -dreaming of a new conquest.[14.17] - - - - - XV - - CHIHUAHUA - - December, 1846-May, 1847 - - -Foreseeing that more troops would go to Santa Fe than New Mexico -would require, Kearny had written to General Wool on August 22 that -he would have the surplus join that officer at Chihuahua,[15.1] and -shortly before marching for the coast he gave orders that Price with -his command, Clark's artillery, a part of the Laclede Rangers and the -two companies of infantry should hold Santa Fe, and that Doniphan's men -should execute this plan; but on October 6 an order was received from -him that Doniphan should first ensure the security of the people by -settling matters with the Eutaw and Navajo Indians. September 28 Price -arrived, and by the twentieth of October, 1220 new Missouri volunteers -and 500 Mormons were on the scene. The Eutaws had now been reduced, -it was believed, to a peaceable frame of mind; and while the warlike -and superior Navajos proved a harder problem, a remarkable seven-weeks -campaign amid snow and mountains, which ended with a treaty, seemed to -ensure their good behavior. The caravans bound for Chihuahua, becoming -alarmed, had now stopped at Valverde, a point not far south of the -wretched settlement named Socorro, and begged for protection. Without -losing time, therefore, Doniphan concentrated his force at Valverde by -December 12, and with 856 effectives, all mounted and armed with rifles, -prepared to set out on a long, adventurous march into an unknown and -hostile country.[15.6] - -[DONIPHAN AND HIS MEN] - -No less extraordinary than such an undertaking were the commander and -the men who undertook it. Doniphan was a frontier lawyer, entirely -unacquainted with military science, but a born leader. When in -Washington during the civil war he stood back to back with Abraham -Lincoln, it is said, and overtopped that son of Anak by half an -inch. The only distinguished man he had ever met that "came up to -the advertisement," was the President's comment. High cheek bones, a -prominent chin, thinnish and tightly closed lips, a mop of carroty hair -parted well down on the left, a beard of the same hue under his chin, -small, deep-set eyes, a strongly built nose, spare cheeks and a ruddy -complexion told of enterprise, daring, endurance, wary judgment and -kind, sincere impulses. In council he was shrewd and in danger fearless, -with always a twinkle in his eye, a smile on his lips, and a cheering, -well-timed pleasantry on his tongue.[15.6] - -His men, recruited from the rural districts, had felt they were scorned -a little by the St. Louis contingent, and had vowed to show them what -"country boys" were made of; but they proposed to do it in their own -way. While the city men had uniforms and military discipline, the -riflemen neither had nor wanted such embarrassments. As every officer -was a man of their own choice, they felt at liberty to choose also how -far to respect and obey him. Doniphan, who loved his "boys" like a -father, was loved in return, and they were ready to do anything for him; -but a minor authority who meddled with their reserved rights, whatever -these might happen to be, was likely to hear some vigorous cursing. -Any form of manly dissipation was to their taste, as a rule; and they -despised all carefulness, all order, all restraint. Yet they were "good -fellows" at heart, and as full of fight as gamecocks; and now--on half -rations, no salt and no pay[15.2]--they felt ready for whatever Mexico -could offer.[15.6] - -At Valverde Doniphan heard that forces were coming from Chihuahua to -defend El Paso, some two hundred miles from Socorro, and sent an order -to Santa Fe that Major Clark with six guns and one hundred men should -march as soon as possible to his assistance; but without waiting for -him the command advanced in three sections on the fourteenth, sixteenth -and eighteenth of December. Below Valverde the Rio Grande makes a great -bend towards the west, and runs through a wild, mountainous region; and -hence travellers bound for the south left it on the right. Adopting -this course, the Americans now marched for ninety or ninety-five -miles through the dreaded Jornada del Muerto (_Dead Man's Journey_), -where they found no settlements except some prairie-dog towns, little -vegetation except sage brush, and no water at all. At the coldest season -of the year, when sentries at Santa Fe were having their feet frozen, -to make such a march at an elevation of more than a mile and a quarter -without fuel or tents[15.3] was clearly a good beginning. At Dona Ana, -the only settlement between El Paso--sixty or sixty-five miles farther -on--and Valverde, the straggling command was supposed to concentrate; -but the concentration seemed rather nominal. Dirty, unshaven and ragged, -the troops marched almost as they pleased. They were determined to -survive, go ahead and fight, but little else appeared to them requisite. -It was now reported that seven hundred soldiers and six guns were -awaiting them at El Paso; but on December 23 the command moved on.[15.6] - -The likelihood of invasion from the north had long been foreseen by the -authorities of Chihuahua, and the expediency of making a stand at the -threshold was obvious. But the citizens of El Paso, the border town, -who were practical, industrious and thrifty people, had been greatly -influenced, like those of New Mexico, by interest in the caravan -business, contact with American traders and wagoners, and acquaintance -with the ideas and methods of the United States. Almost openly, men -said the town would thrive more under American rule, argued that it was -the intention of the government at Mexico to sacrifice the people for -the aggrandizement of its partisans and the privileged classes, pointed -out that no substantial forces had come north, and asserted that what -soldiers had arrived were under orders to withdraw without fighting, and -leave the citizens to be punished for their loyalty.[15.6] - -Public spirit fell to a low ebb, and there it remained. No one thought -it endangered health to shout "_Viva México!_" But it was believed by -many that in a community so honeycombed with treason, active, determined -efforts in her cause would be liable to bring on an attack of cold steel -or lead in some dorsal area; and when the governor of Chihuahua sent the -prefect instructions on September 19 to retire, on the approach of the -enemy, with all the armed forces, cattle and provisions, collect the -resources of the district, and fight stubbornly on the guerilla system, -no intention of obeying this order could be observed. October 12 an -expedition designed to forestall invasion set out for the north; but at -Dona Ana some of the troops--covertly stimulated by officers--became -insubordinate; the commander understood public sentiment well enough to -take their side; the whole body returned at full speed to El Paso; and -the prefect dared not, or did not wish, to discipline anybody.[15.6] - -There were now on the scene and in arms about four hundred and fifty -troops and apparently about seven hundred National Guards with four -guns.[15.4] In general two accepted schools of thought divided the -soldiery. Some were for not fighting hard, and some--including most -of the Presidials and National Guards--for not fighting at all; while -the few and unpopular zealots felt paralyzed by a want of confidence. -Colonel Cuylti, the commander, belonged to the second school of -thought; and on the evening before he was to move against Doniphan, -whose march had been reported about a week before, he fell sick with a -subjective disability officially diagnosed as brain fever, and set out -for Chihuahua with his accommodating surgeon. Lieutenant Colonel Vidal -succeeded to the command and also, it would seem, to the disability, -for after proclaiming martial law and pitching his camp some three -miles from El Paso, he concluded to halt. The American van, described -as consisting of about three hundred straggling countrymen in tatters -without artillery, could be surrounded and lanced like so many rabbits, -he said; but he was not personally in the mood for sport, and hence -conceded this pleasure to the second in command, Brevet Lieutenant -Colonel Ponce de León, assigning to him at least five hundred men[15.5] -and a 2-pound howitzer.[15.6] - -[SKIRMISH AT EL BRAZITO] - -At about three o'clock on Christmas afternoon Doniphan, with less than -five hundred of his careless, confident volunteers, reached a level spot -on the eastern bank of the Rio Grande named Temascalitos, though often -called El Brazito, approximately thirty miles from El Paso. Pickets and -sentries--but not supper--being superfluous, the men scattered in search -of water, fuel and other conveniences. Mexican scouts were observing -their operations; but, strong in conscious rectitude, the Missourians -neither knew nor cared what the enemy were about. Suddenly armed men -could be seen in fine order on a hill about half a mile distant. The -rally was sounded. The volunteers rushed for their arms, and with all -speed they were loosely formed as a line of infantry, bent back at the -extremities toward the river, and resting at the left on the wagons of -the caravan.[15.6] - -With graceful consideration Ponce gave them time by sending a lieutenant -with a black flag to demand that Doniphan should present himself. -Otherwise, added the messenger, we shall charge and take him, neither -giving nor asking quarter. "Charge and be damned!" was of course the -reply; and the Mexicans then advanced, opening fire at about four -hundred yards from our line. Several volleys were delivered while the -Americans, either lying down or standing firmly with cocked rifles, -withheld their fire. But the powder of the Mexicans was mostly bad, they -shot high, and their little gun was mismanaged.[15.6] - -By this time they had come within easy range. At command the American -volunteers now fired with great effect, and a flanking movement against -the wagons was received with equal spirit by the traders and their men. -Evidently there was a mistake. These fellows were not rabbits; and the -Presidials and El Paso militia, candidly recognizing Vidal's blunder, -retired in disorder, compelling the rest of the body to do the same. -Speed now compensated for any possible want of courage; and a party of -fifteen or twenty mounted Americans, who pursued the enemy for miles, -could not bring any of them to a stand. Doniphan's loss amounted to -seven men slightly wounded; that of the Mexicans to a howitzer captured -and perhaps a hundred men killed or wounded; and this farcical brush, -lasting thirty or forty minutes in all, has figured in American annals -as the "battle" of Brazito.[15.6] - -[EL PASO OCCUPIED] - -The Mexican troops now evacuated the district; the National Guards -disbanded; and presently a humble deputation from El Paso was explaining -to Doniphan that arms had been taken up by the citizens under -compulsion. Two days after the skirmish, therefore, amid a general -appearance of satisfaction, he and his rough troopers concluded they had -reached paradise. Along the Rio Grande, mostly on the southern side, ten -or twelve thousand people occupied settlements extending downstream for -many miles. Above, there was a dam; and artificial streams from that -point not only irrigated the rich fields and vineyards, but watered the -orchards, in which many of the houses were buried, and freshened the -long and regular streets, which not only were shaded by lines of trees -full of lively and tuneful birds, but were kept neat by daily sweeping. -To drill, practice twice a day at the targets, and feast on the abundant -fruits in such a place was a most agreeable change from the Jornada del -Muerto.[15.11] - -El Paso did not prove, however, to be exactly a paradise. Unlimited -self-indulgence led to considerable sickness, and several men died. -It led also to disorders and to outrages on the people, and before -long two lieutenants, both intoxicated, fought with dirks. Moreover it -was now learned that Wool had not gone to Chihuahua,[15.7] that great -preparations for resistance were making there, and that a serious -insurrection--purposely exaggerated by the Mexican reports--had occurred -in the rear.[15.8] The boldest appeared therefore to be the wisest -course--to push forward, and conquer or die.[15.9] But without cannon -only the second alternative was possible, and the artillery did not -arrive. Price was in fact extremely unwilling to part with it, and owing -to this and other difficulties Clark was unable to set out for El Paso -until January 10. Then his men encountered even more painful hardships -than Doniphan's had undergone, for they had to struggle with snow--to -say nothing of almost perishing with hunger, and being nearly buried in -a sandstorm; and it was not until February 5 that men, guns and wagons -joined the impatient command.[15.11] - -Three days afterwards the belated expedition set out on its march for -Chihuahua--nearly three hundred miles distant--with 924 effective -soldiers, besides about three hundred traders and teamsters, who were -sworn into the service by Doniphan and elected a merchant named Owens -as their major. About seven hundred of the troops belonged to the First -Missouri regiment, about one hundred to Clark's artillery, and about -one hundred to a body named the Chihuahua Rangers, made up at Santa -Fe.[15.10] There were four 6-pounders, two 12-pound howitzers, and about -315 goods-wagons besides the wagons belonging to the companies and the -commissary department, each with its quota of attendants; and as the -column, with every banner unfurled, wound into the distance as far as -the eye could see, it made a gallant and picturesque sight. It was -exposed to a rear attack from Sonora; but that state, while alive to the -opportunity, had not the means to take advantage of it.[15.11] - -Troubles enough presented themselves, however. The country was bare -and monotonous, producing little except the crooked mezquite and an -occasional willow. A desert sixty-five miles wide and another nearly -as large had to be crossed. Heat alternated with cold, and one day it -was necessary to kindle fires repeatedly to warm benumbed limbs. Tents -were blown down by storms. More than once no fuel and no water could -be had for days. Antelopes and hares could frequently be seen; but the -tarantulas, rattlesnakes and copperheads were far more numerous, and far -more willing to be intimate. One day, when the army was in camp at a -lake, the grass took fire, and in an instant a small flame went scudding -off, burning a narrow trail. Soon this was driven by a whirlwind up the -mountain side, spreading into a vast blaze; and then, gathering force, -it rolled back upon the camp like a tidal wave. By arts known to the -plainsman almost everything was saved; but with a fearful roaring and -crackling a surge of fire swept over the encampment, proving how great -the danger had been.[15.11] - -The state of things in the country farther south could not easily -be ascertained, for the authorities at Chihuahua had cut off all -communication with the north; but there were hostile spies, and some of -them, taken prisoners, had to give instead of obtaining information. -About seven hundred Mexican cavalry--said to be twice as many--were -discovered in front looking for a favorable opening, which they did -not find. At length, crossing a handsome plain on February 27, the -expedition came at nightfall to the hacienda of El Sauz, and learned -that strong fortifications had been erected at the Sacramento River, -fifteen miles farther on. That was the next watering-place, and -evidently it would have to be fought for; so a halt was made and a plan -devised. "Cheer up, boys," said Doniphan with a twinkle; "To-morrow -evening I intend to have supper with the Mexicans on the banks of a -beautiful spring."[15.11] - -[THE SITUATION AT CHIHUAHUA] - -As early as August, 1846, Chihuahua had expected this visit; and the -governor, saying that Kearny's army had occupied New Mexico "as easily -as it would have pitched its tents in the desert," seemed ready to -let the operation be repeated in his own state. Perhaps he was merely -weak, but the same pro-American influences of a commercial nature that -we have observed at El Paso and Santa Fe were rife about him, and there -was also much sentiment in favor of establishing the northern provinces -as an independent republic under the protection of the United States. -Over against these ideas, however, and possibly because of them, existed -a peculiarly intense hatred of us, exasperated now by the loss of New -Mexico and the fear of American outrages.[15.13] - - [Illustration: EL PASO TO ROSALES] - -Near the end of August the governor was forced out, and Angel Trias, an -active, ambitious man, rich, and most unfriendly to the Americans, took -his place; and the great body of the citizens, either anxious to defend -themselves against invasion or dreading to be thought disloyal, rallied -about him. The central government became interested, ordered several -northern states to aid Chihuahua, and instructed Reyes, comandante -general of Zacatecas, to assume the defence of New Mexico, Chihuahua and -Durango. But embarrassments then arose; delays ensued; and Santa Anna, -according to his policy of concentrating the military strength of the -country under his own command and disregarding non-essential territory, -frowned upon all national efforts to defend the northern frontier. It -was now November; and the government, appointing the unpopular Heredia -comandante general at Chihuahua, yielded to Santa Anna's views.[15.13] - -Trias, however, did not abandon hope. The resources of the state were -scanty indeed. The effective colonial method of protecting the border -had long since been given up, and Indian raids, beginning about 1831, -had fast impoverished the haciendas. During the past year, perhaps -because the savages believed the Mexican troops would be required for -the war, these incursions had been worse than ever before. A single -party of Comanches had numbered more than eight hundred. It was -indispensable, therefore, to employ some of the military forces in the -protection of the settlements; but more than 10,000 men were enrolled -in the National Guard, and Trias felt sure that Chihuahua state was -inherently strong enough to defeat Doniphan, whose approach was duly -reported.[15.13] - -The chief needs were money and armament. Artillery had been practically -unknown in that region, but it was found possible to cast and mount a -number of pieces, and infantry soldiers learned to use them. Arms were -gathered and repaired; ammunition and clothing were manufactured; and by -dint of local borrowing the expenses were met. Santa Anna finally had -255 men sent from Durango; and in the end nearly 1200 mounted troops -(many of them Presidials), some 1500 infantry including about seventy -regulars of the Seventh Regiment, 119 artillery, probably more than -1000 rancheros armed with long knives (_machetes_) and rude lances, ten -brass cannon ranging from 4-pounders to 9-pounders, and nine musketoons -on carriages appear to have been assembled.[15.12] The men were -enthusiastic and eagerly obedient, and the leaders--Heredia for chief -and Trias as second in command--felt proud of their army. As for the -Brazito affair, which had caused much discouragement, it seemed now like -a bad dream.[15.13] - -[THE SACRAMENTO POSITION] - - [Illustration: BATTLE OF SACRAMENTO - Feb. 28, 1847] - -February 10 a portly, handsome officer arrived at Chihuahua. This was -General García Conde, and the next day he and the other chiefs, after -reconnoitring the pass at the Sacramento River, fifteen or eighteen -miles to the north, decided to make a stand at that point. It was a wise -decision. The stream, running here toward the east, was crossed at a -ford by the route from El Paso, which had a north and south direction. -Rather more than two miles north of the river and approximately -parallel with it, there was a broad watercourse, now dry and sandy, -known as the Arroyo Seco, which after crossing the El Paso highway -continued in its easterly course about a mile and a half, turned then -toward the south, and joined the river about a mile and a half below the -ford. Along the northern bank of the Arroyo lay a road, which extended -on the eastern side of the highway to the junction of this watercourse -with the Sacramento, while on the western side, bending toward the -south, it crossed that river three miles or so above the ford, passed -the hacienda of El Torreón, penetrated a defile in the steep and rocky -foothills thrust out here by the western cordillera, and rejoined the -highway about six miles farther on toward Chihuahua. A triangular block -of rugged hills lay thus between this road, the highway and the river, -the northeastern corner of which (called Sacramento Hill) almost reached -the solid adobe buildings of Sacramento hacienda near the ford.[15.13] - -Between the river and the Arroyo lay elevated ground cut straight across -by the highway. The portion west of the highway was a fairly smooth -plateau ascending very gently toward the western cordillera, but the -other part rose immediately east of the highway about fifty feet, and -formed--roughly speaking--a square one and a half miles on a side, with -a broad, smooth hollow in the middle that debouched at the southeastern -corner toward the Sacramento, and a dominating hill called the Cerro -Frijoles at the northeastern corner, toward which the square sloped -up. On the north and west edges of the square the Mexicans constructed -a series of well-planned and well-executed redoubts alternating with -breastworks--which extended from Cerro Frijoles at the northeast to -what we may call Fort N at the southwest--supplemented near the ford -with fortifications on both banks of the river, and finally with a -redoubt halfway up Sacramento Hill; and these works commanded perfectly -the highway, the Arroyo road and the valley of the river. The Torreón -route seemed impracticable for the American wagons, but even here -fortifications were erected; and still others guarded the Arroyo near -its junction with the Sacramento. The principal camp lay in the hollow -of the square, which not only protected the troops but concealed both -their numbers and their movements.[15.13] - -In a word, the position consisted essentially of a tongue of land -crossed near its elevated tip by the El Paso highway, with the -Sacramento River and the Arroyo Seco on its edges, a series of -fortifications round its tip, and an answering fortification beyond the -river on a hill. It seemed to bar the way of the Americans completely. -The Mexicans felt sure that it did so, and on the evening of February -27, jubilant and boastful, they even talked of recovering New Mexico. -Anyhow these presumptuous and contemptible Yankees were to be cut up, -and the booty would include a caravan worth a million. Yet influential -Chihuahuans had a financial interest in that caravan,[15.13] and one may -be sure they were not asleep.[15.14] - -[THE BATTLE OF SACRAMENTO] - -Next morning the Americans awoke early. Already the horses had been -carefully inured to explosions of powder. Now swords were filed, rifles -loaded afresh, straps tested, and even the linch-pins of the wagons -inspected; and by daybreak the command set out. To make it compact, -ready for attack from any quarter and perplexing to hostile observers, -the wagons were formed in four well-separated columns of about one -hundred each; the artillery and most of the troops marched between -these columns, and the companies of Reid, Parsons and Hudson--regarded -as proper cavalry and not simply mounted men--rode in front as advance -guard and screen; and in this formation, with banners and guidons -flaunting to impress the enemy, it rolled forward through a valley -about four miles wide, bounded on each hand by a massive, barren -cordillera,[15.15] until at about half-past one the troops, coming in -sight of the Mexican works, noticed a quick, sharp flash there: the -Mexican cavalry drawing their sabres.[15.17] - -Doniphan and his principal officers now galloped ahead, and at a -distance of two or three miles reconnoitred most carefully with glasses -the Mexican position. It looked impregnable; and when the command was -about a mile and a half distant from it, the Colonel--first ordering his -cavalry screen to keep on advancing--turned the main body sharply to -the right, intending to cross the Arroyo Seco higher up, and gain the -plateau there. It was a brilliant scheme but perilous. Good troops, not -encumbered with artillery or baggage, might undertake such a manoeuvre -even in the face of the enemy, but with four hundred wagons, most of -them extremely heavy, it seemed impossible for untrained volunteers to -cross the Arroyo, and mount the high bank of the plateau; yet not only -was it a chief part of the soldiers' business to protect the wagons, but -it looked as if the wagons might soon be needed to protect the soldiers. -Hence this desperate attempt had to be made. Heredia observed it -immediately; and, concluding that the Americans were aiming, as a last -hope, to avoid his works and follow the Torreón route, he instructed -García Conde, the chief cavalry officer, to hold them in check until the -artillery and infantry could arrive and finish them.[15.17] - -But these Americans were no ordinary men; and while they had little -fear of death, it was their belief that defeat would mean dungeons and -torture. After marching for some distance with all possible speed up -the Arroyo road, they stopped at the point selected. Instantly shovels, -pickaxes, crowbars and ropes were out of the supply wagon, and for a -few moments the sand flew as if electrified. Then the drivers yelled -like Apaches; the mules were stimulated by every art known to drivers; -and the swaying wagons headed for the ravine. At the brink many of the -frightened animals, twisting their necks back till they almost broke, -stopped short; but the men pushed them along, and down they all plunged, -floundering, biting and kicking. Across the deep, sandy bottom they -were driven or dragged amid shouts, curses and "hell let loose," as a -soldier put it; and then came the real struggle--the opposite ascent, -forty or fifty feet high. Wild with excitement, pain and fright, the -animals exerted every nerve, scrambling, jumping, rearing and panting; -the teamsters yelled and flogged; and the soldiers tugged and lifted -at the wheels, or pulled with hundreds of ropes. In a few minutes, as -it seemed, the incredible was done, and the command, forming on the -plateau as before, advanced. Already the Mexican horse were dashing on, -brandishing their lances in the sun, fluttering their bright pennons, -and waving a black flag decorated with a skull and crossbones; but, as -Doniphan did not appear to be making for El Torréon, they concluded to -halt, and let the infantry and artillery overtake them.[15.17] - -It was now a little before three o'clock, and when enough ground had -been gained so that the traders and teamsters could make the caravan -into a fort, Major Clark's trumpeter sounded "Trot!" and Battery A -emerged from the masking wagons. "Form battery, action front, load and -fire at will!" rang out Weightman's clear voice; and at a range of about -half a mile solid shot, chain-shot and shells, perfectly aimed, saluted -the lancers, who had never listened to such music before. Three rounds, -and they broke. With great efforts they were rallied, but the fourth -round sent them flying to the camp; and Ponce de Léon, the hero of El -Brazito, who had led the advance, also led the flight. The infantry, now -exposed to the American fire, caught the panic, and at the sound of the -cannon-balls men crouched or lay down.[15.17] - -An artillery duel followed. Most of the Mexican projectiles, falling -short and bounding once or twice, lost enough velocity to become -visible, and the Americans--laughing till the tears furrowed their dusty -cheeks--quickly became expert in dodging them. After a time, however, -the Mexicans discontinued their fire; and Doniphan, as the last of the -wagons had come up, did the same, wishing to form again and advance. -Heredia now reoccupied his works; but the original defensive attitude -could but very imperfectly be resumed, and the former confidence was -gone. The whole plan of the battle had been blown to pieces, it was -seen. The splendid fortifications now meant very little; the boasted -cavalry were demoralized; the prospect of plundering the wagons had -vanished, and the Brazito rout became a fact once more. Heredia ordered -two guns to occupy the fort on Sacramento Hill, and rake the Americans -from that elevated point; and several other pieces went there without -orders, abandoning the redoubts. A great portion of the infantry leaked -away, and soon Heredia did the same.[15.17] - -The Americans felt correspondingly elated; and, obliquing toward the -right in order to avoid the principal mass of the works and approach the -ford, they moved on toward Forts N and O, into which Trias, observing -their approach, now threw the best of his troops--the regular infantry -and a part of the Second Durango squadron. "Storm the fort, storm the -fort!" shouted the Americans; and at the proper distance Weightman and -the howitzer section were ordered to charge the work at N, supported by -the companies of Reid, Parsons and Hudson.[15.16] This order failed to -reach Parsons and Hudson, but Reid and others advanced all the same. -Unfortunately a deep gully was soon encountered in front of the fort, -and the assailants found themselves at a loss. With a few backers Major -Owens, who seems to have desired to die, rushed across, emptied his -pistols into the midst of the enemy, and fell. Still others dismounted -and skirmished. The howitzers, galloping to the left, succeeded in -turning the gully, and unlimbered within fifty yards of the enemy, while -a part of Reid's troopers, now supported by Hudson's, did the same, and -then charged at O. Entrance to the fort was gained.[15.17] - -But the enemy there and in the adjacent breastworks, proved too strong, -and the Americans, veering again to the left, passed along the front of -the fortifications, drawing their fire and shooting with some effect, -but discovering no place for a serious blow. The fall of Owens, who was -supposed by the Mexicans to be our leader, and the failure of the attack -upon the fort encouraged the enemy. Trias and García Conde managed to -rally some lancers for a charge, and artillerymen with two guns prepared -to follow them. Before such odds a few of our howitzer force gave -way.[15.17] - -The rest did not. A round of canister scattered the lancers, and then a -large body of Americans, rushing in at a gallop, threw themselves from -their horses. Parsons' and Hudson's men joined them, and all pressed up -the slope of O together, firing at will. The Mexicans learned quickly -not to show their heads. Raising their muskets above the parapets at -arm's length and blazing away without effect, they soon used up their -ammunition. By this time the Americans, bravely aided by the howitzers, -were near their goal. Rifles were dropped. A rush was made. "With a -whoop and a yell and a plunge," wrote a soldier, "we were over into -their fort, man to man, grappling in a merciless fray, neither giving -nor receiving quarter." Six-shooters, knives and even stones were made -to serve, and in a moment the fort was taken.[15.17] - -Meantime Clark's guns had repulsed a body of cavalry that were making -for the wagons, and then, in coöperation with Parsons and the force of -dismounted troopers, he silenced and captured the works north of Fort O, -while other troops took N, went down into the valley, and occupied the -fortifications near the river. It was now five o'clock, and the battle -had been gained. Yet not quite. The guns on Sacramento Hill, where many -of the Mexican infantry and cavalry had taken refuge, were annoying, -even though aimed so high as to do no actual harm; and Clark turned some -pieces in that direction. The range was 1225 yards; but the first shot -dismounted a cannon, and, as a soldier remarked, every shell knew its -place. Soon Weightman took the howitzers across the river. A part of -the Americans flanked the redoubt on one side by scaling the mountain, -and then a wild gallop up the road on the other side to its rear ended -the fighting. Pursuit followed, but under the first beams of the moon -Doniphan's command re-assembled on the field of victory. Not a man had -lost his life except Owens, and only five had been wounded. Of the -Mexicans three hundred had been killed, it was thought, and an equal -number wounded. Forty at least were captured, and also great numbers -of horses, mules, sheep and cattle, and quantities of provisions and -ammunition.[15.17] - -[CHIHUAHUA TAKEN] - -Further resistance was out of the question, for the Mexican army -scattered, and the Presidials and National Guards fled to their -homes;[15.18] and the next day Chihuahua, a city of about 14,000 -inhabitants, was peaceably occupied. Obviously, however, this triumph -did not end the difficulties of the Americans. To remain in the enemy's -country with no prospect of reinforcement was perilous, yet the -traders and their merchandise could not be left without protection, -and the Mexicans were said to be in great force near Saltillo. -Doniphan therefore undertook to make an arrangement with the state -and city authorities that would free him from responsibility. But the -negotiations failed, for while the officials did not refuse protection, -they would not promise to remain neutral during the war, as Doniphan -insisted; and Heredia proved no less obstinate.[15.19] - -Doniphan then determined to retaliate and also appeal to their fears -by marching for Durango, and by capturing on his way the town of El -Parral, where Heredia and the state government had taken refuge. April -5, leaving about three hundred men to protect the merchants, he set out -with the rest of his command, and in three days made fifty miles. Then -he received notice that large Mexican forces were approaching, and at -once retraced his steps. Concluding soon, however, that Doniphan had -been hoaxed and no Mexicans were coming, the men grew impatient. Their -term of service was to end on May 31; and as they had been poorly fed -nearly all of the time, and for nine months had received no money from -the government, they naturally felt dissatisfied.[15.19] - -Doniphan seems to have renewed his negotiations, therefore, with the -state authorities; but as large quantities of the merchandise had -already been sold regularly or smuggled into circulation under the -cover of night, he doubtless cared less about the matter than before. A -Missouri trader named John Collins, who had undertaken with a party of -thirteen fearless men to reach Wool and obtain instructions, returned -on April 23 from his daring journey of more than a thousand miles, and -in two sections the command set out for Saltillo a few days later. -May 21, after a series of hardships and perils, a certain amount of -lawlessness, and a little fighting with the Indians, they arrived near -that point.[15.20] The next day Wool reviewed them. In honor of the -occasion they tried to improve their appearance, but it still suggested -a classic line, "The beggars have come to town." Some were dressed like -the Mexicans and some like the Comanches, and all were described by -their commander as "ragged."[15.21] - -A few days later they were greeted by Taylor at Monterey; and -finally, after passing down the Rio Grande and sailing to New -Orleans, they regained Missouri, where they had for rewards a speech -of congratulations from Senator Benton, the unstinted admiration of -their fellow-citizens, a series of banquets and barbecues, and the -consciousness of having aided certain American, Mexican and European -traders to dispose of their wares. They had, however, done more than -promote commerce. They had built a large stone into the edifice of -American prestige in Mexico, and had gained for themselves a notable -place in military history.[15.21] - - - - - XVI - - THE CALIFORNIA QUESTION - - 1836-1846 - - -Under Mexican rule California, the Golden West, was anything but -golden. It was poor, shiftless and pitiful; unprotected, undeveloped, -unenlightened, unconsidered; helpless and almost hopeless. Although the -province extended from the Pacific to the Rocky Mountains, only a strip -some fifty miles wide was occupied by white men, and but a small part of -that fraction consisted of farms regularly owned. The famous missions, -wrecked by the Mexican government, lay in ruins. In ten degrees of -latitude there was but one considerable seaport, Monterey, a village -of about one hundred small houses; and the only other sizable town, -Los Angeles, contained some 1500 persons, with perhaps an equal number -in places depending upon it. The total population in 1845 amounted -probably to something like 10,000 whites, 5000 Indians in the stage of -civilization represented by the breech-clout, and 10,000 other savages. -The real inhabitants were the countless horses and cattle, which roamed -for the most part at will. More than half bore the mark of a branding -iron; but probably the greater number even of these rendered no service -to humanity, and many had not even a technical owner.[16.4] - -[THE CALIFORNIANS] - -The Californians were genial, kindly, hospitable, faithful in their -married life and gracefully polite; but in the view of many, if not the -majority, courage and truthfulness were either follies or luxuries, and -no element of practical efficiency entered into their composition. A man -got up some time before noon. He would not work or even walk. He neither -read nor thought. A monotonous diet of beef, beans, wine, brandy and -chocolate, supplemented with cigarettes and a guitar, satisfied his -appetite perfectly. What he demanded next was a horse. As an infant he -had begun life with a ride to be baptized, and the saddle was his real -home.[16.4] - -Given a dashing steed with a long, flowing mane, an arching neck, a -broad chest, full flanks, slender legs and the gentle but fiery eye -that proved its Arabian descent, the Californian was fairly on the -road to happiness; and when dressed up in his dark, glazed sombrero -with a conical crown, wide brim and betasselled silver cord, his close -blue jacket, flashy shawl (_serape_) and red sash--possibly fringed -with gold--his loose trousers, decorated like his jacket with silver -buttons and slashed below the knee to reveal snow-white drawers, his -buckskin leggins and his mammoth spurs--as big as a small plate--he felt -completely satisfied.[16.4] - - [Illustration: CALIFORNIA COAST - 1846] - -He could lasso the foot of a running steer, ride one hundred and forty -miles a day for a week at a time, or check a full gallop and turn -round on a bullock's hide; and anybody less polite, gaudy, dexterous -and lazy he pitied. That a cow could be milked without the aid of a -calf, he was unable to imagine; but he could ride five hundred miles -to a family reunion, and dance two days and nights without stopping -except for something to eat and drink. A glass window and a board floor -were usually beyond his means; but he could afford to pay 24 per cent -interest, and throw his borrowed money away on cards and horse-races. -The women were counterparts to the men. They were affectionate, loyal, -generous. An orphan had its choice of mothers. But, had you entered -the open door of a California house, you would probably have found its -mistress either smoking on the bed with two or three dirty children -about her, or dressed up with an extravagance that made her lord's game -of monte seem economical.[16.4] - - [Illustration: NORTHERN CALIFORNIA] - -There was, however, a very different element in the population, composed -of several nationalities but commonly named, and naming itself, "the -foreigners." Some French and Germans could be found among them; the -British--almost all of them naturalized--were still more numerous; but -at the end of 1845 about three out of four were Americans. In 1822 a -Boston trading vessel had, so to speak, discovered California, and from -that date the business of collecting hides and bartering for them such -manufactured articles as the people needed or could be induced to buy, -was almost monopolized by New Englanders.[16.1] This naturally led a -few shrewd, enterprising Americans--among whom were Thomas O. Larkin of -Monterey, Abel J. Stearns of Los Angeles and Jacob Leese of Sonoma--to -establish themselves in this new country as traders. Runaway sailors -from the ships, hunters and trappers from the mountains, and occasional -adventurers from almost anywhere, gradually introduced themselves.[16.4] - -By 1836 the foreigners had become an important, if not always highly -esteemed, element. In the autumn of 1840 some two hundred emigrants are -said to have gone there from the Platte country, and in May, 1841, we -know that about one hundred men and thirty women and children set out in -that direction from Independence, Missouri. Many who undertook to settle -in Oregon decided to exchange that wilderness for the more hospitable -region close at hand. By August, 1844, our people were described by -Larkin as "flocking" to California; and Whittier sang, - - "By many a lonely river, and gorge of fir and pine, - On many a wintry hill-top, their nightly camp-fires shine."[16.4] - -[AMERICANS IN CALIFORNIA] - -Probably by the end of 1845 there were about eight hundred American -residents--men, women and children--in the province.[16.2] Quite a -number pushed on to the shore of San Francisco Bay, but most of them -lived in the Sacramento valley, because immigrants from the United -States naturally came to that region first, and because the Mexicans -were too much afraid of the savages to settle there; and as a sort -of base they had the fortified trading post of New Helvetia,[16.3] -situated about a hundred miles from the coast on the site of the present -Sacramento City, where Captain John A. Sutter--a German naturalized -in Switzerland--received the wayfarers with an open purse, an open -countenance and an open, hazy head.[16.4] - -Some of the Americans took the trouble to go through the process of -acquiring citizenship, and so could become the legal owners of land; -but far the greater number were mere squatters, or else hung about -the ranches of other Americans, working a little, hunting or trapping -more, but mainly waiting for something to turn up. They were in general -a rough-looking set: the vicious, devil-may-care sailor, the gaunt, -awkward, ragged immigrant, and the heavily bearded, leather-coated -hunter with his long hair turbaned in a colored handkerchief; and while -some had excellent brains and hearts of gold, the scale ran down to a -very low point. Little work and less law was the motto of not a few. -Some of the lowest were out-and-out for blood and plunder; some of the -best had practically the same thought--regarding California as a new -Canaan, out of which they were appointed by Providence to drive the -new Hittites, Hivites and Jebusites; and probably almost all agreed in -despising the inefficiency of the native, his passion for dress and -dancing, his guitar, his bland smile and his dainty politeness.[16.4] - -With such and so meagre a population, scattered from San Diego to -Sacramento, an air-line distance of about four hundred and fifty miles, -the outlook for progress appeared uncertain enough; and California was -also hampered by a state of chronic misgovernment and rebellion. In 1836 -the people, aided by a few Americans and other foreigners, took up the -same battle-cry as Texas, and raised the same blue flag illumined with a -single star. The Mexican troops were expelled; and J. B. Alvarado, M. G. -Vallejo and José Castro, all of them natives, assumed the control of the -province. Two years later Bustamante recognized their government; but in -1843 Santa Anna sent up General Micheltorena, with soldiers that were -mostly convicts and officers that were mostly debauchees, to restore -the national supremacy. Countenanced and protected by their commander -these men, instead of repressing the savages, harassed the people with -insults, outrages and murders. At length, in November, 1844, Alvarado -and Castro took up the sword;[16.5] and the following February, after -some almost bloodless fighting, the Mexicans were driven out.[16.9] - -Once more the government abjectly accepted a revolutionary situation, -recognizing as governor the senior member of the provincial assembly, -Pio Pico, and as comandante general José Castro, who had appointed -himself to that position; and meantime her destroying the missions and -selling their property (1835-44) seemed to emphasize these hints that -California was virtually to be thrown away. It has practically been -abandoned, wrote the German traveller, Löwenstern, in 1843; and this -fact was rendered still clearer by the proposal of May, 1846, that -England should take military possession of the province, which Bankhead, -the British minister, described as "an indirect offer of sale," and by -an explicit suggestion that Prussia occupy it. Mexico had substantially -abdicated.[16.9] - -In such a state of things the country could not advance. Indeed it was -going backwards. The only source of revenue was the duties collected -at Monterey, and this--amounting to $80,000 or $100,000 a year, and -signifying the virtual confiscation of about one third of all the -property in California--mostly disappeared in official pockets. No -military force able to cope with the savages was maintained. In -consequence of their incursions farms were being abandoned, and they -even raided within the settlements. The laws were openly disregarded. -There were practically no courts and no police, and each man had to -defend his own person and property. No sort of regular postal facilities -existed, and even communication with Mexico was rare and mostly by -chance. The only carriage in the country had been one belonging to -Micheltorena. There were no real schools, not a single newspaper, and of -course hardly any books except in a very few hands.[16.9] - -With gold in sight and actually seen, people did not look for it. In -a region where the wild clover grew several feet high and a single -grapevine would yield a barrel of juice, the government did nothing, and -the citizens could do little, to promote the cultivation of the soil. -With all the boundless coast of the Pacific waiting for horses, beef and -lumber, droves of unbroken colts tossed their manes in a wilderness, -beeves were slaughtered for their hides, and huge trees crashed to the -ground amidst the stillness of an untenanted forest. Six-cent muslins -cost fifty cents, and the coarsest of straw hats paid a duty of three -dollars. If a man wanted a kettle mended, he looked for some one trained -abroad; and even a child's torn skirt could not be patched without first -getting a hank of thread from Boston.[16.9] - -[MEXICAN RULE DETESTED IN CALIFORNIA] - -Naturally the people felt dissatisfied, and their complaints reached -far beyond the misbehaving soldiers. Every official professed -intense loyalty in public, but that signified nothing. The people -were determined to shake off Mexican authority. California will soon -declare its independence, wrote the British minister at Mexico in -1841, while his French colleague, who was in close touch with the -situation, believed it would merely be a question between England and -the United States. California is almost ready to separate from the -mother-country, concluded Sir George Simpson, governor-in-chief of the -Hudson Bay Company, who was there a year later. As a rule the people are -disaffected, it was directly reported in June, 1844. The principal men -have decided, wrote Forbes, the British vice consul, in September, 1844, -that progress under Mexican rule is impossible, and they will not have -it. The Californians are unanimously determined to be rid of the Mexican -military government, declared the British consul at Tepic, under whom -Forbes acted, a few months later; and of course all Mexican rule was -military. A separation is probably inevitable, concluded Lord Aberdeen, -head of the British Foreign Office, at the end of the year. California -"_must_ change owners," said a letter from that coast in July, 1845. -"The people hardly care what Flag is exchanged for their own," stated a -competent American observer two months later, while a Californian was -predicting that the Stars and Stripes would certainly go up there.[16.9] - -"The situation of Upper California will cause its separation from Mexico -before many years," predicted Wilkes's book in 1845. The people of -southern California are agreed to cut loose from Mexico, wrote a British -admiral. "Mexican rule had become intolerable," concluded Walpole, a -British officer in 1846. It had long been "only a shadow," said a young -American, afterwards famous as General William T. Sherman; but it was a -shadow that blighted. Another Mexican expedition would not be tolerated, -said Larkin; and in fact a commissioner from California so notified the -government. To get on at all with the people, a Mexican had to become -Californian in head and in heart, and even then he was less welcome than -an Englishman or an American.[16.9] - -Nor were such opinions merely expressed--they were made known to Mexico. -Many warnings, both official and private, went from California, and -the province maintained commissioners at the capital, who presented -information regarding the wholly unsatisfactory conditions existing -there. That part of the country has been "forgotten for more than twenty -years," wrote one of these commissioners to the war department in 1844; -and the following year he said that it had been "injured by every one of -our administrations." Alarms were sounded publicly in such newspapers -as the London _Times_ and London _Chronicle_. Notices regarding -the danger of American encroachment--particularly by the method of -emigration, a declaration of independence and early annexation--were -received over and over again from the Mexican minister at Washington, -the Mexican consul at New Orleans, Pakenham, the British minister, -and Bankhead, who succeeded him. This peril was notorious, declared -General Mora y Villamil near the close of 1845; and the government -itself recognized the gravity of the situation. In March of that year -the minister of war and the minister of relations admitted publicly -that California had been grossly misgoverned and was liable to slip -away.[16.6] Yet the government did nothing, and confessed that nothing -could be done.[16.9] - -Virtually, we say again, it was abdication. Both morally and physically -Mexico had thrown away and forever lost her control of the province. -She had nothing left except the bare thread of legal proprietorship; -and in certain cases legality is, according to enlightened modern -ideas, nothing. It is our conviction that human welfare is the supreme -test; and the welfare, not merely of California but of all the world, -certainly required that so rich a portion of the earth should be -developed and occupied. In our opinion a child, neglected and abused by -drunken parents who are always fighting each other, has good grounds for -leaving home, though not legally independent. We believe in the right of -revolution, which means that when a country misgoverns persistently a -considerable part of the population, it forfeits all claims to domineer -over them; and California, though her weakness led officials to practice -a lip service that deceived nobody, had more than once rebelled, had -made good her cause, and entertained no thought of accepting Mexican -rule again.[16.9] - -She was, therefore, being in every way unable to establish herself -as an independent nation and gain the recognition of the world as -such, quite adrift. The province is now "at the mercy of whoever may -choose to take possession of it," wrote the nearest British consul in -1845. Californians, Mexicans, Britons, French and Americans, who were -qualified to judge, agreed on that. She was the homeless child, whom any -kind, intelligent and well-to-do person may, and some kind, intelligent -and well-to-do person should, provide for. Any one of the nations then -leading the march of civilization, if disposed to perform a parent's -duty toward California, could rightfully have taken charge of her, and -some one of them was under obligation to do so.[16.7] Of those nations -the United States was more favorably situated than any other to fulfil -the trust,[16.8] and she felt ready to accept it.[16.9] - -[THE AMERICANS INTERESTED IN CALIFORNIA] - -Indeed our people were profoundly interested in the matter. As early as -1839 a Congressional report on Oregon said enough about the territory -farther south to excite attention; and Forbes's history of California, -published the same year, did much to fix it and create the fear that -European powers might encroach there. The seizure of American residents -in 1840, the appearance of Dana's "Two Years Before the Mast," and the -incidents connected with Jones's landing at Monterey deepened these -impressions. By 1842 glowing letters from American settlers began to -appear in our newspapers, and the suspected purposes of England received -ample notice. Gold existed there, it was reported; the country was -attractive, salubrious and rich; the port of San Francisco had a value -that words could not represent, and the British already held a mortgage -on the country. Our Pacific whaling fleet was said by the New Bedford -member of Congress to include before the end of 1844 six hundred and -fifty vessels, which had cost twenty millions and employed 17,000 men; -and not only was this harbor most important, since the bar at the -Columbia River hampered navigation, but American control was needed -there, for the uncertain and vexatious Mexican regulations caused great -annoyance. Besides, it was pointed out, we required a fortified port on -that coast, else in case of war with England our whalers would be unable -to avoid capture.[16.10] - -All these ideas took root, and in the spring of 1845 the press from -New York to St. Louis and New Orleans broke into quite a furore about -California. Its value became a popular subject; the known fact that -English holders of Mexican bonds had their eyes upon it was recalled; -the designs of the British government seemed to be clear; and annexation -was not only urged, but represented as near at hand. So keen became the -fear that England would forestall us, that in January, 1846, the ease -with which she could acquire California was dwelt upon in our national -Senate, while in the House the enormous advantages of our holding the -territory attracted attention.[16.10] - -Our government was even in advance of the people. In 1835 an attempt -was made to purchase the Bay of San Francisco. The next year Ellis, -who represented the United States at Mexico, expressed the opinion -that northern California would be of "immense importance" to us. Four -years later a personal letter to President Van Buren pointed out that -England, as a great creditor of Mexico, was likely to appropriate the -territory, and steps were taken to obtain information regarding it for -the use of Congress and the Cabinet. Daniel Webster felt strongly by -this time that we should acquire it. In 1842, while he was secretary of -state, our minister at Mexico not only expatiated on the value of the -territory, but reported that England had taken steps to anticipate us; -and the minister was instructed to ascertain whether an offer from this -country would be acceptable. Our strained relations with Mexico and -especially Jones's occupation of Monterey made it unwise to follow up -the matter that year; but after an interval, Tyler and Webster planned -an arrangement which--had it been carried through--would have given us -the port of San Francisco.[16.11] - -The expansive course of Great Britain, remarks dropped by English -writers, repeated warnings from our diplomatic and consular agents at -Mexico, and the consensus of opinion in California, Mexico, France and -the United States were quite enough to warrant suspicions of England, -and the circumstances connected with the visit of Duflot de Mofras, -attaché of the French legation at Mexico, to California, and the -publication of his book by order of the king, hinted of danger from -another quarter; but neither country took any positive action, and our -government--doubtless noting that a tide of emigration to the far west -had begun--refrained from every move that could excite the jealousy of -Mexico or Europe. Early in 1843 Larkin, who was deficient in education -but not in shrewdness, activity or patriotism, was appointed consul at -Monterey; but the value of American commerce fully justified the step. -During 1845 he did not receive one letter from the state department, -and for a long time no American war vessel could be seen on the -coast.[16.11] - -[OUR GOVERNMENT INTERESTED] - -Early in 1845, owing to the annexation of Texas, a breach with Mexico -had seemed probable, and the danger that she would somehow dispose of -California in order to place it beyond our reach had been deemed acute. -But our government did not intend to have war, the tide of emigration to -that quarter was rising, and Polk warned off European interference by -re-asserting the "Monroe Doctrine." On July 10, 1845, however, Larkin -wrote that England was maintaining there a vice consul without consular -business, and that, according to the universal belief in his vicinity, -she was promoting a new Mexican expedition to California; and at about -the same time as this letter, news of an extensive British plan to -colonize in that province arrived from London.[16.11] - -The question was then maturely considered at Washington. Apparently the -American emigrants, unless checked, were sure to bring California into -the Union. That was natural and logical; such a peaceful invasion had -given us Texas; and in the opinion of the best qualified observers it -seemed likely to be efficacious again. Larkin, the Californians, the -British vice consul, the Mexican consul at New Orleans, the Mexican -minister at Washington, and Mexican, British, French and American -journals agreed on this. Larkin believed the matter would be settled -in that way by 1848. "Without striking a blow and without incurring -any expense," wrote Vice Consul Forbes, the United States will obtain -a secure foothold in the coveted region. The Americans do not need to -fight for California, said _Le Constitutionnel_ of Paris. "No more -convenient mode of conquest was ever devised," remarked the Baltimore -_American_. To suppose that Polk and the Cabinet failed to see what was -not only obvious but often pointed out, would be absurd. The condition -and political feeling of California, which were quite well known through -Larkin and others, fully warranted a procedure so amicable and so -beneficial; and it only remained to guard against European interference, -which our government now considered a real danger.[16.11] - -On October 17, 1845, therefore, confidential instructions, based upon -the fact that British and French consuls having no commercial business -were maintained in California, were issued to Larkin, who was now -to be confidential agent as well as consul. "The interests of our -commerce and our whale fisheries in the Pacific Ocean demand," he was -informed, "that you should exert the greatest vigilance in discovering -and defeating any attempt, which may be made by foreign governments to -acquire a control over that country," Against such an attempt the United -States would "vigourously interpose"; but "should California assert and -maintain her independence, we shall render her all the kind offices in -our power"; and "whilst the President will make no effort and use no -influence to induce California to become one of the free and independent -states of this Union, yet if the people should desire to unite their -destiny with ours, they would be received as brethren, whenever this can -be done without affording Mexico just cause of complaint. Their true -policy for the present in regard to this question, is to let events -take their course, unless an attempt should be made to transfer them -without their consent either to Great Britain or France." On the same -day instructions to ascertain the designs of those powers were issued -to Commodore Sloat, commanding the Pacific squadron, and Lieutenant -Gillespie of the Marine Corps was ordered to California as a co-agent -with Larkin.[16.11] - -All this has been called an intrigue; but, if that word is in fairness -applicable, the "intrigue" was only designed, so far as it concerned -Mexico and California, to rescue with a gentle hand the neglected, -abused and lost; so far as it concerned England and France, to ward off -an interposition which, if attempted, would probably have led to war; -and, so far as it concerned the United States, to safeguard and advance -most important national interests while promoting the general good of -the world. Such "intrigues" are among the most legitimate achievements -of true statecraft.[16.11] - -This leads us to the more serious charge, that Polk brought upon two -nations the curse of war and endangered the peace of the world, for -the purpose of tearing California from the parent stem; and we find -ourselves here at the best point of view from which to consider it. Not -only, then, have we no sound evidence in support of the charge; not only -was he personally unfitted to play the rôle of conqueror; not only did -he exert himself to restore friendly relations with Mexico; not only -did he virtually forbid Slidell to work for the sale of California, if -so doing would militate against this endeavor; not only did his taking -certain other important steps and refraining from still others imply the -same intentions; but it appears that he looked forward to obtaining the -territory without war, should he be unable to purchase it, by a method -peculiarly suited to his characteristics and to those of Buchanan. We -therefore do not need to consider one of our Presidents a wretch unhung, -as many Americans have seemed eager to do, and should finally dismiss -the charge.[16.12] - -[A CHANGE OF RULE IMMINENT] - -While the instructions to Larkin were on their way, the year 1846 -came in, and to California it brought fresh perplexities. The desire -to escape from what a citizen described as "a positive state of -anarchy" was more pronounced than ever. One plan contemplated a -French protectorate; but the men of that nationality were few, their -government did nothing, and their consul exerted himself only to acquire -unpopularity. A much greater number favored American control. Probably -all of the foreigners thought such a régime preferable to the existing -state of things. Even the British vice consul admitted that his personal -judgment pointed in that direction. Some of the Californians also leaned -our way. They recognized the merits of our institutions and the growth -of our power. The good order maintained by Commodore Jones's forces -had left a favorable impression, and so had the conduct of our naval -officers who went ashore from time to time.[16.16] - -But the participation of Americans in the California revolts had -excited suspicion and fear. Our acquisition of Texas, as described by -Mexicans writers, had been resented, and probably it was known that -Mexicans residing there had fared none too well. American hunters--or -men believed to be such--had sometimes helped themselves to property. -In consequence very likely of misdeeds committed by our sailors the -Americans were generally disliked at Monterey. The constantly increasing -immigration despite Mexican laws appeared intrusive and menacing. All -the faults of our people, who were better known than other foreigners, -came to be understood. Their brusque, overbearing, strenuous ways -impressed the polite, indolent Californians as almost ferocious. -Indeed a natural antipathy--social, religious and racial--made harmony -well-nigh impossible. Finally, doubts were felt whether we should -be able to offer immediate and effective protection against Mexico -and the Indians, and whether our flag would not go down after a time, -as when Jones had raised it, leaving our friends to settle with the -mother-country as best they could.[16.16] - -The British, on the other hand, while in every way as free and as -responsible as the Americans, were comparatively exempt from such -objections; their government had a strong fleet in the Pacific; and -hence, as was natural, most of the substantial citizens--especially in -the south--desired the shelter of her flag. But Forbes could not meet -their views. Warned not to meddle, save to hinder any other nation -from establishing a protectorate, he could make no promises and give -no encouragement. He conveyed to the government of California the -declaration of England that she would feel greatly displeased to have -the province pass under the control of any other power, but his only -advice was to elude American rule by declaring unqualified independence; -and this plan, as all thoughtful men understood, could not be carried -out.[16.16] - -Governor Pico, a fat, swarthy, good-natured farmer of tolerably good -sense but little ability, and educated only about enough to write his -name, was the chief of the British party, and wanted no Americans in the -country. Vallejo--who was now inactive but had great influence--favored -the Americans, for he believed that we held the winning cards, and -foresaw, like many other landowners, that American rule would enhance -the value of real estate. Castro, a man of quick but not profound -intelligence and more ambitious for power and fame than for wealth, -probably desired independence with himself as the autocrat; but he knew -the time had not arrived, and felt that his grip on the customhouse -must not be loosened. For the present, therefore, while he showed -much amiability toward the Americans and occasionally masked his real -views behind cordiality toward France, he posed at Mexico as an ardent -patriot. In order to save his responsibility, whatever might happen, -and perhaps fortify his position, he urged the need of preparing for -war against the United States, and called for plenty of money and a -few soldiers--not more than he could be sure of handling. At the same -time, holding that Pico was only an acting governor, he recommended -that during the crisis, at least, the civil authority should be united -with the military. In March he invited a number of leading citizens to -discuss the situation with him,[16.13] but no agreement on a line of -action could be reached.[16.16] - -Forbes congratulated himself that no American of commanding influence, -familiar with the language, customs and prejudices of the people, -resided in California; but Larkin seems to have been on good terms -with all the officials at least. His firm chin, ample brow and correct -side-whiskers inspired respect, while his notable energy, hospitality -and public spirit gained him esteem; and when Gillespie, after crossing -Mexico to Mazatlán in the guise of a mercantile agent and then sailing -perforce to the Hawaiian Islands,[16.14] arrived at Monterey on -April 17, and repeated to him from memory Buchanan's instructions of -precisely six months before, which it had not been thought safe to -bring in writing, he promptly bestirred himself. The main points of his -instructions were transmitted in confidence to friends at other towns; -here and there an official had an opportunity to see a good argument, -written out in Spanish, for American rule; and Castro was assured -that he and his friends might derive personal advantages from such a -change.[16.16] - -[A CRASH AT HAND] - -As if all these currents and cross-currents did not produce commotion -enough, civil war now loomed up. Both Los Angeles and Monterey desired -to be the capital and possess the customhouse. Herrera had assigned -two thirds of the revenue to Pico and one third to Castro; but Paredes -reversed this arrangement, and Castro improved still further upon it -by taking the whole. In April the comandante general and his officers -repudiated Herrera, on whom Pico's authority depended, came out for -Paredes, and resolved to propose, on the ground of Mexico's threatening -relations with the United States, that the governor should place himself -in Castro's power by coming to Monterey--the latter, in case of a -refusal, to act according to his discretion.[16.16] - -Pico, who doubtless knew as well as others, that Castro was aiming to -upset him, appealed to the people and summoned a general convention, -which was to meet at Santa Barbara on June 15, and avert the "external -and internal disasters" that were threatening California. The promoters -of the scheme intended to audit Castro's use of the public funds, -declare for independence, and invite foreign protection--preferably -that of England. Castro denounced it as treasonable, defeated it by -preventing the northern delegates from going to Santa Barbara,[16.15] -and proclaimed martial law; and about the middle of June Pico advanced -against him with all the forces he could raise. It seemed as if a crash -would have to come; and a crash did come.[16.16] - - - - - XVII - - THE CONQUEST OF CALIFORNIA - - 1846-1847 - - -In December, 1845, Brevet Captain John C. Frémont of the United -States army, who was engaged with a party of about fifty or sixty -men--necessarily armed but not soldiers--in looking for a satisfactory -road to the Pacific, reached New Helvetia, and at the end of January -he presented himself at Monterey to obtain funds and supplies, and -ask for permission to recruit his followers and horses in California. -Castro gave this permission; but unfortunately one of the two men -either misunderstood or violated the terms of the agreement, and when -the surveying party was discovered early in March near Monterey, Castro -denounced Frémont as having invaded Mexican territory and aiming to -excite a revolt.[17.1] - -It was an admirable opportunity to figure at home and at Mexico as a -dauntless patriot, and the comandante general made the most of it. His -narrow but high forehead, framed with curling black hair, seemed to -expand, and his brilliant black eyes darted fire, as he galloped about -the countryside rallying militia. Frémont placed himself in a strong -position, built some fortifications, raised the American flag and -announced that he would perish fighting; but after cannon were seen in -the distance he retired under cover of darkness, and slowly proceeded -toward Oregon. Castro then put out a bombastic proclamation, of course, -declaring that he had driven the American intruder away.[17.1] - -[THE "BEAR" MOVEMENT] - -Far to the north Frémont was overtaken early in May by Gillespie, and -went back to the Sacramento.[17.2] On June 6 he decided to act. At -his instance Americans captured a drove of horses that Castro had sent -for. Some days later a sizable company took Sonoma, a military post -north of San Francisco Bay, seized the cannon, arms and munitions, -appropriated horses, cattle and miscellaneous property, carried away -Vallejo and other leading citizens as prisoners, and raised a home-made -flag decorated with a particularly home-made semblance of a bear. Some -hostilities then occurred; some blood was shed; and early in July the -tragi-comedy reached its climax in a declaration of independence, which -probably not one Californian acclaimed.[17.6] - -What could have precipitated such an astounding performance? Clearly -no directions from our government.[17.3] A policy calculated, not -to outrage and affright, but on the other hand to conciliate and win -the people, had been enjoined upon Sloat, Larkin and Gillespie; and -under Buchanan's order Gillespie had acquainted Frémont with Larkin's -instructions. But Frémont, like the others, was to counteract foreign -designs, and knowing--for Larkin was aware of the fact on April 17 and -hence Gillespie knew it--that Slidell had been rejected, he said and -presumably believed, that war had by this time begun; and he doubtless -feared that England, supposably in collusion with Mexico, would try to -occupy California before the United States could act there. Forbes, on -behalf of the British, could see that a declaration of independence -would keep the Americans out. Hence possibly Frémont argued that such a -step would help to do as much for the British; and evidently a flag put -up by himself could be lowered any day.[17.6] - -Besides, as we learn from the President, Gillespie had secret -instructions; and these, while not contradicting the others, very -possibly stated that Polk was determined to have a complete settlement -with Mexico, and in case of war to acquire California, for such was soon -his policy; and presumably they ordered that Frémont should hover about, -and be ready to coöperate at the proper time. These circumstances, -taken together, presented to his roving imagination a brilliant vista -of achievements and glory; and, as he said, he "resolved to move -forward on the opportunity."[17.4] Moreover many of the Americans -in the Sacramento valley, believing that Castro intended to expel -them shortly from the country, appealed to Frémont for aid;[17.5] -and, finally, that officer probably burned to vindicate himself as a -soldier from the imputation of having run away in March. Hence the -determination to overthrow the government. Cannon, munitions and horses -were logical necessities; and it seemed likely that Vallejo and his -friends could be used to influence the public or possibly at the worst -as hostages.[17.6] - -The Californians, however, did not relish Frémont's total disregard -of their feelings and rights. They viewed the Bear uprising as an -inexcusable outrage--predatory, murderous and cruel, and, since Frémont -was an American army officer, as fully justifying every suspicion and -fear entertained against our government. The exasperation was intense; -the resentment bitter. Who could think his person or property safe -under the law of the rifle enforced by robbers? they asked. To make the -situation worse Frémont, under the pretence that he was getting ready -for the long journey home, obtained munitions and supplies from the -United States vessel of war _Portsmouth_, anchored at San Francisco; and -this fact became publicly known. Larkin was kept entirely in the dark, -but probably not one Californian thought so. In short, the plan of the -government was completely upset. Moreover Frémont's operations tended -to defeat his own aim also, for they enabled Pico to solicit British -protection on a definite and substantial ground.[17.6] - -These events, however, were soon eclipsed. June 24, 1845, instructions -for his guidance, in view of our strained relations with Mexico, had -been issued to Commodore Sloat of the Pacific squadron. He was told -that he should be "assiduously careful to avoid any act, which could -be construed as an act of aggression"; yet, should he ascertain "with -certainty"--"beyond a doubt"--that Mexico had "declared war," he -was to occupy San Francisco and occupy or blockade such other ports -as he could. In consequence of this order Sloat, so he reported in -November, proceeded to Mazatlán as the likeliest place to receive -information;[17.7] and on May 17 he learned from United States -Consul Parrott of Mazatlán, then at Guadalajara, of Thornton's -defeat. Upon this he decided to execute his orders immediately; but -on considering the June instructions again, he thought action was not -warranted.[17.8] May 31 came news of Palo Alto and the Resaca, and on -June 5 confirmation of the news. That hostilities had begun he felt -no doubt; but, "sicklied o'er" with something that resembled thought -"as the mist resembles rain," and with an anxiety about his personal -fortunes that obscured national interests, his resolution still wavered. -On the seventh of June, however, he learned from Surgeon Wood, recently -of the squadron but now on his way home with Parrott _via_ Mexico City, -that the Mexican government admitted the battles had occurred, and -learned also that an American fleet was blockading Vera Cruz. The next -day he sailed; and on July 2 he was in Monterey harbor,[17.9] fourteen -hundred miles to the northwest, where for some strange reason he made -the usual call on the authorities.[17.15] - -Larkin, with whom the Commodore had been instructed to confer, soon -hastened aboard, and opened Sloat's astonished eyes to the situation. -They agreed--for their instructions agreed--that kindness toward the -people was to characterize all action; but Larkin, who did not believe -war had begun, wanted action postponed, hoping that American rule -would be invited, or at least welcomed, by the Californians,[17.10] -while Sloat--though doubtless he now learned of the government's -plan to acquire the province through immigration and a period of -independence--remembered that he was under orders to occupy or blockade -the ports without unnecessary delay, and perceived that the state of -things called upon him to take immediate possession of the interior -also, regarding which no instructions had been given him.[17.11] News -that an American officer, to whom another officer had recently been sent -from Washington, was apparently conducting hostilities at a distance -from the sea appeared like a clue to the maze;[17.12] and, finally, -after several days of anxious and wavering deliberation, the idea that -Sir George Seymour, admiral of the British Pacific fleet, who had seemed -to be watching his movements,[17.13] might appear at any hour and -raise the British flag, drove him into action.[17.15] - -July 7, as the sun rose above the mountains on the east, Monterey -in its amphitheatre of pine-clad hills, with trim-looking white and -balconied houses dotted along its two parallel streets among the trees -and along the waters of the broad cove, which lay rippling at its -very feet, presented a very attractive appearance, but certainly was -insignificant enough. Not so, however, what occurred there. Old Captain -Silva, the commandant, when invited at half-past seven to give up the -town, replied that he and the troops had left the place, and there was -nothing--not even a flag--to surrender; and at about half-past ten -Captain Mervine with some two hundred and fifty sailors and marines -landed from boats.[17.15] - -[SLOAT OCCUPIES MONTEREY] - -Marching to the little customhouse Mervine read a proclamation drawn -by Sloat and Larkin. The United States and Mexico being now at war, I -take possession of upper California, said the Commodore in effect, but -I do so as her best friend; the territory becomes a part of the United -States, and the people shall be protected in all their present rights; -they may stay here as neutrals, or depart; they may choose their own -officials; products of the United States will come in duty-free, and -other articles pay one quarter of the Mexican rate; civil security, -religious freedom and material prosperity will be the fruits of American -rule.[17.14] The Stars and Stripes were then run up on the customhouse -flagstaff, our men--both afloat and ashore--cheered, the boom of -twenty-one guns from the _Savannah_ filled the amphitheatre of hills, -and the great province of California had a future. By July 14 our colors -were flying at every important point, and the Bear ensign had vanished. -Stringent orders to prevent misbehavior and plundering were issued; -measures were adopted to support the flag and repress the Indians; and -Frémont was earnestly invited to coöperate.[17.15] - -Both Sloat and Larkin endeavored to bring Castro in, but he would -not come; and he retorted by demanding an explanation of the Sonoma -affair. Doubtless that episode had thoroughly angered him, and he felt -besides that a man in his official position would not be forgiven by -the people, should he condone it. Alvarado and Pico, both of whom -were cordially addressed, held entirely aloof; and before long the -governor and the comandante general, forced into a reconciliation by -Frémont's operations, united their commands. But as the people of -northern California generally, thankful to escape from the clutches of -the Bear and pleased with Sloat's proclamation, appeared willing to -accept the change of flags, these two leaders withdrew to the vicinity -of Los Angeles, where with about eight hundred men and ten cannon -they supported--or pretended to support--the cause of Mexico; and -the situation was further clarified by Admiral Seymour, who arrived -at Monterey on July 16, and a week later, admitting that he could not -interfere, sailed away.[17.15] - -July 23 Sloat, who felt ill and probably felt worried, turned over -the command on shore to Robert F. Stockton, who had arrived in the -_Congress_ about a week before,[17.16] and some days later, giving up -the squadron also, left the coast. The new Commodore seems to have been -a smart, but vain, selfish, lordly and rampant individual, thirsting for -glory; and little glory could be seen in following after his predecessor -under so mild a policy. Besides, another character was now on the stage. -July 19 about one hundred and sixty horsemen entered Monterey from -the north--men with gaunt bodies, frames of steel, shaggy beards, and -an air of indomitable courage and endurance, armed with a long, heavy -rifle on the shoulder and a big knife on the hip, and speaking a lingo -sometimes hard to understand. These were the youngest and hardiest of -the Sacramento men, reinforced with the pick of the immigrants just -arrived. At their head rode a short, slender, active man in buckskin -blouse, leggings and moccasins, a blue shirt open at the neck, and a -cotton handkerchief in lieu of a hat, with plenty of hair, a small, -bearded face, and therein eyes--"such eyes." This was Frémont.[17.20] - -He was a counsellor far more to Stockton's taste than Larkin; and, -in addition to believing the Californians dangerous and unreliable, -and entertaining deep resentment on account of the March episode, he -doubtless could see that California, reposing contentedly under the -American flag, would make a poor background for his violent operations. -The outcome was a ridiculous address,[17.17] which ranted at length -against Castro, especially for his treatment of Frémont, explained -Sloat's action as due to this, declared that Stockton's only object was -to protect life and property, and announced that when Castro should -be put down and the duties of government be assumed by responsible -officials, he would remove the American forces.[17.20] - -July 23, with a view to the conquest of the whole province, Frémont's -men were taken into the naval service as the California Battalion, with -himself as major and Gillespie as captain; and they sailed promptly for -San Diego to gain Castro's rear. A few days later Stockton followed -in the _Congress_, raised the American flag at Santa Barbara, and -anchored at San Pedro, some eighteen miles from Los Angeles. Larkin, -still most anxious to bring about a peaceful arrangement, came with -him. Believing that war had not been and would not be declared, he -urgently recommended through Stearns of Los Angeles that Pico and the -legislature meet the dubious emergency, prevent the country from falling -a prey to disorder, save the interests of all officials, and ensure -lasting prosperity by declaring California independent under American -protection; and Castro proposed that Stockton halt at San Pedro with a -view to negotiations.[17.20] - -Alvarado said later that a satisfactory arrangement could probably have -been made, but the Commodore haughtily insisted that Castro should -begin by accepting independence and the American flag.[17.18] To do -this would have left him nothing to trade upon; and hence, apparently -overestimating Stockton's military strength, lacking money, and finding -round him no popular enthusiasm or even genuine harmony, he retired -hastily on August 10 with a handful of men toward Sonora, leaving behind -him a cloud of eloquence;[17.19] and the governor also left the -country.[17.20] - -[CALIFORNIA IN AMERICAN HANDS] - -On their disappearance all military opposition vanished. Larkin with -a couple of friends took Los Angeles on the twelfth of August; the -Commodore with his marines and sailors, headed by a brass band, and -Frémont with a part of his battalion arrived the next day; and on the -seventeenth, when positive information that war had begun reached the -town, Stockton issued another proclamation. California now belongs to -the United States, he announced in effect, and is under military law; -all who adhere to the new régime will be protected, but no others may -remain in the country. Some of the Californian leaders were arrested -and a number surrendered, but all of them were given their liberty on -parole. Friends rallied of course to the winning side; the Commodore -became attentive and kindly toward the people; and Larkin soon reported -that matters were settling down.[17.20] - -Stockton realized that under the law of nations and the law of humanity -a conqueror had the right and the duty of softening military rule, -and felt that pursuing such a course here would tend to confirm the -victory. Already, with his assistance, the first schoolhouse and the -first newspaper of California had made their appearance; steps were -now taken to establish postal facilities; and this very proclamation -announced, that officials elected by the people might govern according -to the prevailing usages. In September regular municipal elections took -place, and good results were obtained.[17.20] - -The reign of justice began to dawn. Chaplain Colton, appointed alcalde -of Monterey, gave general satisfaction. American officers recovered a -large number of horses driven off by the Indians, and astonished the -Californians by returning them to their owners. The Commodore, besides -adjusting disputes in a manner that gratified the people, made and -forwarded to Washington for approval what he called laws; announced -that a legislative council would be created, and called himself -governor. This office, however, it was not his intention to hold long. -The fantastic idea of landing at Acapulco and moving upon the capital -had taken possession of his mind. He therefore sent Frémont north to -enlist men for him on the Sacramento, proposed to set out for Mexico in -October, and promised to inaugurate that officer as governor on leaving -California.[17.20] - -But he did not leave so promptly. In arranging for the security of the -country he divided it into three military districts, appointing Frémont -commandant at the north and Gillespie at the south. Gillespie's task -was peculiarly important, because news and troops from Mexico would -arrive first at Los Angeles, and because that section had the largest -percentage of restless people, the smallest percentage of Americans, -and the weakest pro-American sentiment. He seems to have been an -elegant, precise man with a stiff, pointed beard and a temper of the -same description; but at any rate he was a soldier, understood his -responsibility, and knew what military government signified.[17.27] - -Larkin urged that a respectable command should be given him, but -Stockton had neither men nor funds for land service, and only about -fifty of the disdainful and intolerant volunteers, perhaps including -some of the detested Sonoma "brigands," could be spared for Los Angeles. -A garrison of that strength, far from support, was almost an insult -and certainly a provocation to the people. Though told by Stockton -to temper military law, Gillespie doubtless felt that his only safety -lay in maintaining strict order; and if, unfamiliar with Californian -character and ways, he extended his discipline too rigidly over the free -and easy natives, as he seems to have done, the mistake was but natural. -Stockton himself had given the cue, declaring in his proclamation -of August 17 that men found in arms outside their houses were to be -banished, ordering that all must be at home from ten o'clock at night -until sunrise, and indulging in a general tone that has been thought -supercilious. Here were causes enough of trouble; and behind them lay -an inevitable clash of races, temperaments and customs, unavoidable -friction resulting from a forcible change of flags, and a restlessness -due to the ambition of would-be leaders.[17.27] - -[INSURRECTION] - -As the signs of disaffection began to show themselves, Gillespie -naturally arrested suspicious persons, and punished those whom he deemed -conspirators. This precipitated an outburst. In the night of September -22 some turbulent fellows made an attack on the American quarters. In -a military way it was contemptible; but, as such affairs often do, it -crystallized popular sentiment. Within a few days about four hundred -Californians were in arms; and when the surrender of Lieutenant Wilson -with some twenty-five men at the Chino farm to about one hundred -and ten insurgents heightened confidence, the movement spread still -more. Some of the malcontents were persons of standing, who felt that -self-respect called upon them to break a lance against the invader, even -though sure to be defeated; but the great majority appear to have been -irresponsible characters ready for anything except work. Lieutenant -Colonel Flores, the leader, and nearly all of his officers had violated -their paroles, of course; but breaking an oath seemed to them a trivial -matter, for they knew they could make another equally good on a moment's -notice.[17.21] Without fortifications, adequate equipment or supplies, -Gillespie could see no hope of resisting such odds, and September 29 he -capitulated on favorable terms.[17.22] The next day he proceeded to -San Pedro with his men, and they soon embarked there on a merchant ship, -the _Vandalia_.[17.27] - -About the first of October Stockton, then at San Francisco, learned of -the insurrection. By his order Mervine sailed promptly for San Pedro in -the _Savannah_, and on October 7 with sailors, marines and Gillespie's -command--all on foot--the captain marched for Los Angeles. Stockton, -however, had provided him with no artillery, while the Californians were -supported by a small field piece. When the Americans charged, this gun -was hurried beyond their reach by mounted men with lariats; but as soon -as the Americans halted from exhaustion, it was drawn back and set at -work. The case appeared hopeless, and after losing about a dozen men, -killed or wounded, Mervine found it necessary to retreat. Naturally the -Californians felt immensely encouraged, and large numbers gathered on -the hills behind San Pedro.[17.27] - -Late in October Stockton, after lingering a while at San Francisco -to attend a glorification meeting and stopping at Monterey to land -ordnance and men for the defence of that point, arrived at San Pedro and -undertook to accomplish something; but the attempt proved a failure, and -he sailed for San Diego, at that day a small group of adobe houses about -four miles northeast of the present city.[17.23] Insurgents were now -besieging the place, and neither provisions nor horses could be obtained -in the vicinity; but Stockton procured both from lower California, and -began to make ready for land operations.[17.27] - -By this time Flores had been elected provisional governor and comandante -general by the legislature, and martial law had been declared; but the -insurgent leader found himself without adequate resources. Foreigners -aided him with a little money at an exorbitant rate of interest, but on -October 24 he stated that only some forty rounds of cannon ammunition -remained, and a thousand for the muskets of his four hundred men. -Campaigning without supplies or funds and driving stock to the interior -were found extremely irksome by the indolent Californians; a general -discouragement prevailed; and the legislature could not obtain a quorum. -Soon disaffection showed itself; and being a Mexican, Flores dared -not adopt strong measures. Finally, in the night of December 3 he was -imprisoned by malcontents; and although the legislature and people -soon extinguished the revolt, much confusion grew out of it. Moreover, -Stockton's troops outnumbered his; other Americans were gathering in -northern California, he knew; and thousands of immigrants were expected -at New Helvetia, he was informed.[17.27] - -[KEARNEY'S ARRIVAL] - -None of these forces, however, gave him the first blow. May 26 Polk had -proposed an overland expedition to California, and a week later it was -decided upon. Accordingly Kearny was ordered to advance after securing -New Mexico, should the season permit; and on September 25, as we have -seen, he left Santa Fe for the coast. Soon meeting Stockton's bearer -of despatches, he learned that California had been occupied, sent back -all but about one hundred of his dragoons, and with these and a pair of -mountain howitzers marched on. At the beginning of December he reached -Warner's ranch (_Agua Caliente_), the frontier settlement of California, -and, having learned of the insurrection, wrote on to Stockton for aid -and information. Gillespie was therefore sent forward with a brass -4-pounder and thirty-eight men, met him December 5, and told him among -other news that a party of insurgents lay at San Pascual, about eight -miles distant on the road to San Diego. Probably the force numbered -rather less than one hundred. A capable man, however, Andrés Pico, -brother of the ex-governor, commanded them.[17.24] - - [Illustration: Fight at San Pascual] - -Kearny sent off a scouting party, which not only saw but was seen, and -reported to him at two o'clock the next morning. An attack upon the -Californians was highly inadvisable. The Americans and the pack-mules -that many of them rode were almost worn out. Some horses recently bought -or captured were accustomed to the terrible Mexican bits, and could -not be controlled by their new riders. Kearny had had no experience in -fighting lancers or California horsemen, and did not know how many were -before him. It was clear that the enemy were aware of his presence. -The dampness of the night made firearms unreliable, and the men were -so chilled they could not use them quickly. Finally, it would not -have been difficult to hold the insurgents off with his three cannon, -and march safely in a compact body to San Diego, now only about forty -miles distant. Kearny decided, however, to attack before daybreak, and -advanced.[17.24] - -Pico had not desired nor expected a battle; but, perceiving what kind -of troops were in his front, he did not flinch. Kearny's advance guard -fared very badly, and when his main body came into action, the enemy -adopted the familiar ruse of a pretended flight. In pursuing, the -Americans became separated according to the speed of their mounts; -and then Pico turned furiously upon them. The net result was that -Kearny, Gillespie and thirteen other Americans received ugly wounds, -and eighteen were killed, while the enemy's loss appears to have been -trifling. After ten or fifteen minutes, however, the Californians drew -off, expecting guns and large reinforcements, which Flores had promised. -As one consequence of the revolt against his authority, these did not -arrive. Hence Pico, who had not been prepared for either the fight or -the revolt, made no serious efforts to follow up his advantage; and -Kearny, though he lost his cattle, had to live on mule meat, and was -burdened with his wounded, succeeded, with additional aid sent him by -Stockton, in reaching San Diego on December 12.[17.24] - -Stockton's preparations to do something were then resumed. Sailors -felt strongly averse to shore duty, but he overcame their repugnance. -The ships furnished them pikes, carbines and pistols, and shoes were -manufactured out of canvas; and so with Kearny's dragoons, Gillespie's -detachment, some friendly Californians and about four hundred sailors -and marines, drilled somewhat for their new work, the Commodore had a -respectable force.[17.25] It was not, however, his intention to attack -the main body of the insurgents, for he felt afraid the enemy would then -get behind him. His plan was to move up the coast and make a diversion, -expecting Frémont and his riflemen to take the bull by the horns; but -Kearny urged him to march for Los Angeles, about one hundred and forty -miles distant, and at length on December 29, after having brushed away -the Californians operating against San Diego, he set out, greatly -embarrassed by having to drag miserable ox-carts through the deep sand. -Kearny declined the chief command, but finally asked for and was given -the post of lieutenant or executive officer under Stockton.[17.27] - -Flores now found himself in a desperate situation. Naturally officers -who knew they had violated their paroles dreaded to give up; but most -of his troops felt half-hearted, people hid to avoid serving, and some -of the Indians were in arms against him. In order to gain time for a -blow at Frémont, he tried to inveigle Stockton into a truce, holding -out as a reason that Mexico and the United States had probably adjusted -their differences; but the Commodore refused to treat with an officer -guilty of breaking his parole. Then, having some four hundred and fifty -badly armed men, though not enough powder for a long fight, he set an -ambuscade where he supposed the Americans would pass; but Stockton -avoided it by turning to the right, and made for the Bartolo ford of the -San Gabriel River, twelve miles from Los Angeles, where the stream was -only knee-deep. The Californians followed suit, and occupied an eminence -fifty feet high, parallel to the stream and about six hundred yards -beyond it.[17.27] - -As the Americans crossed--the first of them deploying and waiting -behind the bank, here breast-high and masked with trees--Flores greeted -them from the top of the hill with four small guns; but his inferior -powder and sometimes ill-fitting balls proved ineffective.[17.26] -When the Americans were mostly across the river and formed in a square, -he undertook to charge. But the movement seems to have been rather -faint-hearted or badly managed; his left was demoralized by hearing one -of the aides--who seems to have been seized with a panic--shout "Halt!" -as it was advancing; and his right accomplished nothing. Stockton -then cannonaded the hill, particularly with his two 9-pounders, for -about forty minutes, while most of his troops lay down; and finally he -charged. Crying "New Orleans!" in memory of Jackson's great victory, -gained on the same day of the year, January 8, the men rushed on, and -easily took possession of the ground. The Californians made a fruitless -attack on their rear, and then most of them dispersed.[17.27] - -[STOCKTON MOVES AGAINST LOS ANGELES] - -The next morning Stockton, leaving the road in order to avoid the danger -of ambuscades, pushed slowly on toward Los Angeles; and after a time -some three hundred Californians, whom Flores had managed to rally, -placed themselves upon his line of march. An ineffective cannonade from -a ravine used up the rest of their ammunition, while the Americans -replied with equally meagre results. As a last effort, Flores now -ordered a charge, giving the signal for it--as he himself reported--by -sending forward a white flag.[17.27] - - [Illustration: Fight near Los Angeles] - -The attack was made with considerable spirit but no success at all on -both of the American flanks, and then Flores took post at a point on -the road to Mexico, where Pasadena now stands. He admitted losing only -five killed and twenty-two wounded during the two days, but probably -these figures needed to be multiplied by three; while Stockton lost one -killed and fourteen wounded. That night the Americans encamped near Los -Angeles; and the next day, January 10, after a deputation had come to -arrange matters, they took possession of the town--annoyed a little by -drunken bullies--and replaced Gillespie's flag on the government house. -Most of the California troops now scattered, and those who remained were -insubordinate. Flores could see there was no hope; and the following -night, leaving to Andrés Pico the chief command and probably about one -hundred men, he set out hastily with a few others for Sonora.[17.27] - -[FRÉMONT'S OPERATIONS] - -Up to this time nothing had been heard of Frémont's operations during -almost three months. Probably that officer did not wish to take part -in the hostilities. Expecting to be governor and seeing before him -a prospect of brilliant opportunities, he desired to conciliate the -people. Stockton, on learning of the revolt in the south, had ordered -him back from the Sacramento, and about October 12 he sailed for Santa -Barbara with instructions to march from that place to Los Angeles. -Learning on the way, however, that Mervine had been defeated, and that -all the horses and cattle had been driven away from Santa Barbara by -insurgents, he returned on his own responsibility to the Sacramento, -and began to collect not only horses but men.[17.28] By the end of -November he found at his back about four hundred mounted riflemen and at -least three guns, the strongest force in California.[17.32] - -The _Savannah_ had been sent north expressly to assist him;[17.29] -but, with little reference to his army commission or his naval -obligations, he now proceeded slowly by land to San Luis Obispo, where -he fortunately captured Jesús Pico, a cousin of Andrés; and after his -prisoner had been sentenced to death for breaking parole, he assumed -the authority of pardoning him. Then, for no discoverable reason unless -to spare about sixty insurgents, whom he could have scattered in ten -minutes, he led his command through the mountains, where it suffered -terribly in the stormy weather. At Santa Barbara he took a week for -repose; and finally, with a nicety of calculation or felicity of luck -that excites wonder, he arrived near the scene of action--three months -after receiving orders to go there--precisely as the Americans were -entering Los Angeles.[17.30] Then with his devotee, Jesús Pico, he -betook himself to the camp of Andrés, and finally, although he knew that -American forces had beaten the Californians and entered Los Angeles, -and understood that a superior officer was near, he arranged with the -insurgents a capitulation, which Stockton had refused to grant.[17.32] - -This capitulation, the "treaty" of Cahuenga, conceded substantially -all the insurgents could have asked. They promised to give up the -public arms, go home, obey the laws of the United States, and help -restore tranquillity; but on the other hand they and the rest of the -Californians were to be protected in person and property, to enjoy the -same rights as Americans, to be excused from serving under arms or -taking an oath of allegiance during the war, and to leave the country -freely should they wish to do so.[17.31] Naturally such a settlement -was displeasing to Stockton, but he felt extremely anxious to resume -his proper work as a naval officer, and of course was glad to have this -difficult business off his hands; so after hesitating for a time he -confirmed the pact.[17.32] - -It was a singular dénouement. Men defeated, without a hope left, and in -danger of execution for breaking parole, virtually dictated terms to the -conquerors. A brevet captain, just blossoming into a lieutenant colonel, -eclipsed a commodore and a brigadier general; and the arch-ruffian of -the Bear cult reappeared as a fairy godmother to save and bless the -Californians, who detested him. But the ending was after all a happy -one. The Americans felt a new respect for the people, and they were able -to see that, although destitute of gunpowder, the insurgents, if driven -to extremities, could have done much harm with lance, dagger and torch, -and could have sown the seeds of perennial hate.[17.32] - -On the other hand, while the Californians felt well pleased with their -own audacity and valor, they not only realized that it was impossible -to fight the United States, but were thoroughly disgusted with Flores, -who took away hundreds of horses and mules belonging to his friends, and -with Mexico, which in three and a half months had sent neither a man nor -a peso to encourage and sustain them. Indeed, as their agent in Mexico -frankly said, their political attitude had completely changed. Most of -them intended to abide by the terms. They were disposed to look forward -instead of back. And the curtain was already beginning to rise on the -Golden West that we know.[17.32] - - - - - XVIII - - THE GENESIS OF TWO CAMPAIGNS - - July, 1846-February, 1847 - - -The operations described in the preceding chapters were all favorable to -American arms, and they placed under our control a very large portion -of the territory belonging to Mexico; but as they proceeded, it became -evident that she had no thought of consenting to negotiate. Indeed -Santa Anna's course and the utterances of the press were unflinchingly -warlike; and our consul at Mexico wrote, "Nothing but some very severe -blow will ever bring them to their senses." The policy and expectations -of the American government were therefore palpably wrong. The programme -of a short and a brisk war was a mistake and a failure. The nation found -itself in a contest of unforeseen duration and extent.[18.4] - -Heedless enthusiasm was consequently sobered, if not exactly chilled. -By the end of September, 1846, Pakenham, the British minister at -Washington, reported that a growing distaste for the war could be seen -more clearly each day. Large expenses had to be faced, and heavy losses -of men seemed inevitable. Many believed that neither troops nor money -enough could be raised; many, besides deploring the loss of precious -lives, complained that needed laborers had already been drawn away; and -many others asked themselves whether the outlay would be really worth -while. Taylor's famous letter to Gaines expressed the opinion that even -complete success would be of no advantage; and his idea of simply fixing -and holding a boundary north of which there would be enough territory -to pay all fair claims for indemnity, and throwing upon Mexico the -responsibility for offensive operations naturally appealed to not a few. -Moreover, he argued, no other sort of a peace could be made, since the -enemy had no government sufficiently stable to treat with. Calhoun took -up eagerly the defensive idea. Buchanan favored it; and Polk himself, -dreading to alarm the country by demanding great numbers of men and -fearful that the credit of the nation would not bear the strain of -active warfare, did the same.[18.4] - -On the other hand such a plan was clearly unsuited to the enterprising -temper of the American people, and precisely what the Mexicans, whose -ancestors had fought the Moors of Spain for hundreds of years, desired. -It reminded one of the menaces and forays that had been the policy of -Mexico against the Texans. It would have been received by her as a -cheering confession, on our part, of military impotence. Had it been -adopted, her people would have found a chain of profitable markets -established for them; and at any time she could have dashed either -with regular or with irregular troops upon any part of our line, done -what harm she could, and retired like a wave on the beach, to prepare -fresh assaults in a perpetual series. Only one campaign of the sort now -proposed was on record, said Cass--that of Sisyphus. Besides, every mile -of the boundary would have required its guard; even at that a broad -space along the frontier would have become practically uninhabitable; -expenses approaching those of offensive operations would have mounted -up; we could have laid no contributions upon the enemy; national -honor would have been tarnished and national spirit exasperated by a -succession of small defeats; and no progress whatever toward conquering -a peace would have been made.[18.4] - -Politically and commercially the unfavorable condition of things -which the United States had been so anxious to end, would have become -chronic. European nations would soon have gained a monopoly of trade -and influence in Mexico; they would have protested against an endless -blockade; and what further steps they would have taken in regard to -a vexatious and apparently aimless contest it was easy to imagine. -Furthermore, simply to seize and hold, with no legal title, provinces -which Mexico had not been able to protect against the Indians would -have seemed to place the United States in the class of mere pilferers. -Honor--at least military honor--demanded that we should meet the enemy, -whom we had challenged, at the centre of their pride and power. -Finally, the weakness exhibited in "backing out" of a war with Mexico, -begun without a question of triumph, would have excited ridicule abroad, -and compromised our international position. Confronted with such -objections to the defensive plan, Polk was "extremely distressed," said -Pakenham. Evidently some decisive achievement was needed to save the -administration, the party and the country; but he dared not face the -cost nor incur the risk of a still more signal failure.[18.4] - -[BOLDER IDEAS] - -There was, however, no lack of bolder ideas. Not only did every -newspaper come forward with a "cut and dried" plan, as Marcy rather -bitterly said, but the government itself knew what needed to be done. -In fact mere animal instinct was enough to suggest that a blow should -be struck at the enemy's heart, and as the project of maintaining a -line of operations from the Rio Grande to the capital--more than 800 -miles--was out of the question, the idea of attacking Mexico City by the -way of Vera Cruz came forward early. On July 4, 1846, Benton formally -suggested landing beyond the range of Ulúa, the island fortress which -guarded that port, attacking the town in the rear, and after its fall -advancing to the capital. Santa Anna advised through Mackenzie almost -exactly that method of approach, adding that three or four thousand men -could easily capture the port; and at nearly the same time a letter from -Taylor, arguing that a lunge from the Rio Grande base would be unwise, -reinforced this project;[18.1] but there was no certainty that an -army could be placed in the rear of Vera Cruz, and a number of other -difficulties had to be considered.[18.4] - -In 1838 a French squadron had been unable in six hours to injure -Ulúa seriously, though it had been permitted to choose its positions -unmolested. Such an advantage could not be expected now, and besides, as -Conner reported, the number of guns in the fortress had been increased -fourfold. The parapet of the main work had an elevation of forty feet -above the water; three 10-inch guns throwing shells were twenty feet -higher, and there were outworks--connected with the principal fort only -by drawbridges--commanded so thoroughly by the gun and musketry fire -of the garrison that it would be fatal to enter them, reported the -Commodore.[18.2] In short, said that prudent officer, Ulúa could -certainly, if well garrisoned, resist successfully any naval force -brought against it; while in the opinion of Pakenham, formerly the -British minister to Mexico, a combined army and naval attack on Ulùa and -Vera Cruz would be "a very hazardous undertaking," and, in consequence -of "the deadly nature of that Climate to foreign constitutions, success -would probably prove in the end as disastrous as failure." Moreover, -Conner pointed out, Vera Cruz would be of value solely as a dépôt, and -from that point of view he considered Tampico preferable. Consequently, -although at the end of August Polk brought up the subject of attacking -Mexico City by way of Vera Cruz, nothing was done about it save to ask -the Commodore for additional information.[18.4] - -Not long before October 10, however, it was ascertained beyond a doubt -that Vera Cruz could be approached in the rear by a landing force, and -beginning immediately Polk and his advisers, aided by Dimond, recently -our consul at that city, and by other experts, labored on the question -of future operations for nearly two weeks. The result was, first, a -decision that since a farther advance in the north would be hazardous -and would accomplish nothing towards bringing about peace, Monterey and -its vicinity should be the limit of serious operations in that quarter. -Such was the deliberate and unanimous conclusion of the President and -his official family after long discussions. Instructions to General -Taylor were then carefully drafted, studied, amended and agreed upon. To -make sure that he should understand their significance, Major McLane, -son of the minister to England and a graduate from West Point, was taken -into the full confidence of the Executive regarding this matter, and -was then despatched to Monterey with the letter of October 22, which, -as well as the explanations of the envoy, Taylor interpreted, we have -already learned, according to his own ideas. So much for the first -point.[18.4] - -The second was a decision to attack Vera Cruz. This did not mean, -however, a decision to proceed against the capital. Though Scott argued, -as Conner had, that gaining possession of the city and then reducing or -starving out Ulúa would practically be sterile triumphs, unless the army -should go farther, it was intended at this time to do no more in that -quarter, and three or four thousand men were thought sufficient for the -undertaking.[18.4] - -[A NEW PLAN OF CAMPAIGN] - -November 7, however, Benton made an evening call at the White House, -drew the President's attention to the unfavorable results of the -Congressional elections, declared that a bold stroke must be delivered -upon the Mexicans at once, and urged that after capturing Vera Cruz -and Ulúa the army should execute "a rapid crushing movement" against -the capital. Two days later he repeated the lesson, and on the tenth -he amplified it. Polk began to realize now that while it might be -dangerous to call for men and funds, it was even more dangerous not to -do so.[18.4] - -Benton kept on calling, and finally he submitted a written plan. Scott -presented a memorial of the same tenor. Taylor wrote that in order to -strike a decisive blow troops must land at Vera Cruz or near that point; -and Conner reported that a descent could be made under cover of the -fleet, batteries could be planted on sand-hills behind the city, and -Ulúa, if not Vera Cruz also, could probably be reduced by starvation. As -early as November 14 Polk decided to call out 6750 men--that is to say, -nine volunteer regiments--for the duration of the war, and to capture -Vera Cruz immediately.[18.3] Yet even this involved no determination -to strike at the capital. Polk was distinctly in favor of so doing, -should that course be necessary to obtain peace; but Buchanan strongly -opposed it, insisting upon the cost of such an expedition, the chances -of failure, and the danger that by leading to a national, racial and -religious conflict it would militate against a settlement; Marcy had no -faith in the project; others of the Cabinet agreed with him; and hence -this question remained open, to be answered by circumstances.[18.4] - -The next problem was the choice of a commander. In October Patterson, a -good Democrat, had been selected; but it had been found that, as he was -not a native American, he could not be developed into a Presidential -candidate, that his experience had not been adequate, that his -appointment would involve the retiring of both Taylor and Scott, and -that, as Buchanan learned at this time from Slidell, he did not possess -the confidence of the army. Butler, another Democrat, was Polk's next -choice, but he clearly held no titles to the position.[18.9] - -Taylor had to be considered then; but he was regarded by the Executive -and his advisers as professionally unequal to the task and personally -unfitted for it, and both of these opinions were fully warranted. While -events had proved him a born leader of men and a splendid fighter, they -had also demonstrated plainly his lack of generalship and executive -efficiency. He distrusted, loathed and misconstrued the administration, -failed to supply it with plans and information, endeavored to throw upon -it the responsibility for mistakes of his own, lectured it harshly for -misdeeds it had not committed, and frustrated the cardinal intent of its -policy and orders by failing to press the campaign with all possible -vigor during the summer and autumn.[18.5] "I have not the slightest -respect," he wrote, for any member of the Cabinet except the secretary -of the navy. "Evil men bear sway," was another of his remarks.[18.9] - -Indeed, the General's natural kindliness and sober judgment seem to have -become largely perverted by this time. He knew that for several months -friends of his had been at work to gain for him the political place long -occupied by Scott, and to use him as a battering ram against the party -in power;[18.6] and it was easy to assume that he would be repaid -in kind. Stories of intrigues and machinations, doubtless exaggerated -in his mind through inexperience and remoteness from the scene, must -have been a constant subject of thought, and he seems to have fallen -gradually into an abnormal state of sensitiveness and suspicion.[18.9] - -His private correspondence contained the harshest opinions regarding -nearly all of the chief men thus far prominent in the war. Of Commodore -Perry he entertained "a contemptable opinion." Shields, who was a good -man and officer as men and officers went, he described as "without one -particle of principle to restrain him, save the laws of his country -and ready to minister body and soul to the vilest passions of a vile -administration." Quitman, who deserved high respect, appeared to him -unreliable, of mediocre ability and "afflicted with unbounded vanity." -The quartermaster general, he said, was partially deranged. Of Scott -he had written in August, "He means well on all occasions," but now -he was able to view his superior officer as a military "humbug" and -low politician, eager to advance himself and ruin others by the most -nefarious arts; and he could no longer see, what the administration -fully recognized, that it was essentially for its advantage to have -the generals win victories. So far as the government was concerned, -Taylor had some grounds for apprehension, perhaps. In all probability it -entertained by this time unfriendly feelings toward him. The veteran F. -P. Blair had warned Marcy distinctly that, as even the novice could see, -a Democratic administration was waging war to make a Whig President, -and under our system it was legitimate as well as natural to look for -an avenue of escape. Scott, however, seems to have been his friend, -privately exerting a strong influence in his favor on several occasions; -and while the lawful rights of superior rank were made use of by the -commander-in-chief, the same thing was done by Taylor himself with far -less considerateness.[18.9] - -Finally Taylor had a particular moral disability, for he did not -believe in the Vera Cruz expedition actually contemplated. The season -of yellow fever--in his opinion a worse enemy than 100,000 Mexican -bayonets--was now too near, he wrote, and an army besieging that port -would be swept away by the pestilence.[18.7] He lacked, therefore, -some of the most necessary qualifications, and was not in a state of -mind to work harmoniously and effectively with the administration, the -commander-in-chief or his own principal subordinates in the exceedingly -difficult and delicate situations which the proposed expedition was -liable to create.[18.9] - -[A COMMANDER SELECTED] - -Gaines being out of the question, there was but one man left, and -he moreover, as an officer of experience and the head of the army, -possessed exceptional claims to the appointment. Scott seems to have -accepted his professional and political reverses of May very quietly, -illustrating that fine aphorism of King Stanislaus, "A man greater than -his misfortunes shows that he does not deserve them." Friends fell away -rapidly, yet he kept up his courage. To one of them indeed he wrote, -"Perhaps you might do well to imitate the example of that heathen who -touched his hat to the fallen statue of Jupiter--saying, 'Who knows -but he may be replaced upon his pedestal?'" and about the middle of -September, having learned through several channels that his presence in -Mexico had been desired by Taylor, to whom he generously referred as -"that gallant and distinguished commander," he reminded the government -that he was ready still to serve at the front.[18.8] This merely -brought him another curt rebuff; but when the Vera Cruz expedition -became a practical question he took part in the discussion without -pique, and he suggested incidentally that he, as the highest officer in -the service, was the proper individual to divide the troops between the -two fields of activity, and to command personally in the more important -one.[18.9] - -Taylor having pronounced it Scott's duty after the battles of May to -assume the leadership in the field, could not logically object now -to his acting according to his rank; but, though time had vindicated -Scott's military policy and he now was viewed--Marcy admitted--as -politically harmless, Polk still deemed him scientific and visionary, -and still resented his allusion to fire from the rear. Long discussions -were held, but Marcy felt satisfied that Scott was the only fit -commander in sight. By rather cunning management he brought Senator -Benton to that opinion; others of the Cabinet reached the same -conclusion; and finally the President admitted with "reluctance" that -such was "the only alternative." Very likely, too, as many believed, -Polk saw a chance to play one Whig leader against the other. Anyhow, -after demanding "Scott's confidence," which--in view of the intention -to grant his dearest wish--Scott easily gave, he appointed him on -the eighteenth of November to command the expedition. An apparently -heartfelt and complete reconciliation followed. Scott almost shed tears -of emotion, recorded the President; and he received assurances in turn -that his confidence would be reciprocated, and that bygones were to -be considered bygones. A new David and a new Jonathan seemed to have -discovered each other.[18.9] - -[SCOTT'S VIEWS] - -Scott believed that Ulúa, if properly garrisoned, could not be taken -with naval batteries, or even with naval batteries and an escalade, -except at a disproportionate sacrifice of life, and a loss of time -that might subject the troops to the yellow fever, quadruple the -waste of men, and ruin the campaign. He therefore planned to make a -landing near Vera Cruz, capture the town, reduce the fortress--unless, -as appeared quite probable, it could soon be starved out--by naval -operations and land attacks based upon the city, and then escape the -pestilence by advancing promptly toward the capital. In his opinion -the Mexicans were likely to have 20-30,000 troops on the ground, and -therefore he thought 15,000 men desirable. Relying necessarily on -the figures of the adjutant general, he reckoned (November 16) that -7000 regulars and 13,500 volunteers were, or soon would be, under -Taylor's command, making with the new volunteers and recruits for -the regular army over 27,000,[18.10] and he therefore proposed -(November 21) to take about 5000 of these regulars, 6000 of the -volunteers, and the first 4000 of the new regiments. But he deemed -10,000--to be increased later to double that number--an adequate -minimum, and he felt willing, for the sake of gaining time, to launch -the campaign with the first 8000 soldiers that could be set afloat -off Brazos Island. Anticipating a stubborn resistance at the point of -disembarkation, he desired to have 140 surf-boats in order to land -5000 men and eight guns at once, and he made ample requisitions for -transports, ordnance and ordnance stores.[18.11] As for Taylor, -the General proposed that he should retain forces enough to defend -Monterey and his communications,[18.12] and stand for a time on the -defensive.[18.16] - -Scott of course desired official instructions of this tenor, and even -drafted them, but Marcy only wrote as follows (November 23): You have -been ordered by the President himself to go to Mexico, take command -there, and set on foot a Gulf expedition, "if on arriving at the theatre -of action you shall deem it to be practicable. It is not proposed to -control your operations by definite and positive instructions, but you -are left to prosecute them as your judgment, under a full view of all -the circumstances, shall dictate. The work is before you, and the means -provided, or to be provided, for accomplishing it, are committed to you, -in the full confidence that you will use them to the best advantage. The -objects which it is desirable to obtain have been indicated, and it is -hoped that you will have the requisite force to accomplish them. Of this -you must be the judge when the preparations are made, and the time for -action has arrived."[18.16] - -Marcy seldom laughed, but occasionally he shook like a bowlful of jelly, -and as he signed this letter he must have shaken prodigiously. Assuming -no responsibility, making no promises, the government simply unloaded -the whole burden of the expedition upon Scott.[18.13] Should he -succeed, a Democratic administration would reap a great profit; should -he fail, a Whig general would have to bear a great reproach. In order to -obtain the essential troops it would be necessary for him to incur the -odium of taking many of them from Taylor, who in Polk's opinion was not -willing to give them up; and thus not only would Taylor's rising star -become clouded, but a bitter quarrel between these two Whig leaders and -their friends would almost certainly be precipitated. Besides, Taylor -might throw up his command in a fit of temper, and relegate himself to -obscurity. No wonder the President felt remarkably in spirits just after -this.[18.16] - -[TAYLOR'S WINTER OPERATIONS] - -Scott, however, was determined to forestall the danger of a quarrel. -Immediately on suggesting to the government that as head of the army -he was the proper individual to command the Vera Cruz expedition, he -notified Taylor of this action, and only two days after receiving his -appointment he drafted a letter informing that officer about the matter; -but the President, regarding absolute secrecy as a prime requisite, -would not permit him to mention it.[18.14] A few days later (November -25) he wrote from New York to this effect: I am going to Mexico and -shall conduct operations in a new field; where that is to be I cannot -safely state, but with the aid of advices received from Washington you -can imagine; new forces have been called out, yet--as the season of -yellow fever is at hand--I shall have to take most of your troops; your -victories, however, have placed you on such an eminence that you can -afford to act on the defensive for a time, and before spring I think you -will be able to resume active operations; I desire to consult with you, -and plan to be at Camargo for that purpose about the twenty-third of -December.[18.15] The letter was confidential and cordial; and having -now done what he could to conjure the tempest, as well as to prepare for -his work, the General sailed from New York the last day of November. The -voyage to New Orleans, hindered by the weather, took nearly three weeks. -He made a brief and busy stay in that city, and two days after Christmas -he reached Brazos Island.[18.16] - -Certain steps tending to facilitate his enterprise had now been -taken by General Taylor. December 10 the temporary Field Division -organized at Camargo was broken up--the Georgia, Mississippi and First -Tennessee regiments reporting to Quitman, and the Ohio and Kentucky -regiments to Butler; the First Division (regulars) under Twiggs was -reorganized;[18.17] on December 13 and 14, a day apart, this division -and Quitman's brigade set out for Victoria, nearly 200 miles distant; -and on the fifteenth Taylor himself, leaving Butler behind to command at -Monterey, followed them.[18.23] - -It was not pleasant marching, for a long drought had burned everything -up, the sun blazed with intense heat, and the road, when not covered -with small, sharp stones, was ankle-deep in light dust; but the -inspiring Saddle Mountain seemed to keep company with the troops all -day, Cerralvo Mountain hung like a dark shadow on the left, the cool -blue line of the Sierra Madre extended on the right farther than the -eye could see, and the town first reached--Cadereita, about twenty-five -miles from Monterey--burying its white houses in orange groves, looking -out over gardens, and looking down from a low bluff into the clear -waters of the Topo Grande, was delightful. December 17 the infantry -arrived at Montemorelos, a small town at the foot of the sierra, planted -beside a swift, cool stream, full of trout, that watered a beautiful -valley, and suggesting at a distance under the blue sky--wrote a -surgeon--a pearl set in an azure stone. Here the command absorbed the -Second Infantry and the Second Tennessee; and it now amounted to some -3500 men, of whom rather more than a third were regulars.[18.23] - -But Santa Anna was not asleep. Learning of Taylor's proposed march and -believing that Wool had left Parras for Chihuahua, he determined to -advance about December 24, strike at Saltillo and Monterey in person -with 9000 picked infantry, 4000 cavalry and twelve guns, despatch -troops from Tula against the Americans at Victoria, and finally close -in upon Taylor with his own forces; and a large part of these troops -actually set out. Worth got wind of danger, however, on December -16; in accordance with instructions previously given he called for -help;[18.18] and in the evening of the next day four grimy troopers -burst upon Taylor at Montemorelos with the startling intelligence, -that Santa Anna would attack Worth in three days. Ordering Quitman to -proceed, Taylor therefore set out on December 18 with his regulars for -Saltillo. Butler, calling a regiment from Camargo to Monterey, reached -the front with his own forces on December 19, and Wool arrived there -two days later. Santa Anna, discovering Wool's march by December 24, -countermanded his orders; and Taylor, learning on December 20 while -between Monterey and Saltillo, of Wool's advance and the non-appearance -of the Mexicans, and concluding there was no danger, turned -back.[18.23] - -On the twenty-third he again left Monterey, and the next day he received -Scott's New York letter.[18.19] His presence with the forces was -not at all requisite. No serious fight was in prospect, for Quitman -had reported nothing of the sort. There was at least one topographical -engineer in the command, who could make better notes of the country than -he.[18.20] Probably his military engineers also, among whom figured -Robert E. Lee, afterwards the famous Confederate leader, were there; and -as for disposing of the troops, General Scott's letter gave him reason -to believe, that a superior officer was now on the ground with new -plans. His obvious duty was therefore to report at Camargo, the place -mentioned by Scott, or at least await instructions at Monterey. But the -stout old gentleman in the loose olive-brown frock-coat, wool socks and -Mexican sombrero had a temper and several ideas of his own. Probably -he did not wish to arrange matters amicably; and he kept straight on -for ten days, plunging farther and farther toward the remotest portion -of his field, inaccessible from any and every point where Scott might -by any reasonable possibility chance to be. Indeed, Scott's letter was -not answered for two days, and eight more passed before the answer, -which stated that General Taylor was going to Victoria, reached -Camargo.[18.23] - -[TAYLOR'S MARCH TO VICTORIA] - -Beyond Montemorelos a great deal of the country was rough, and it was -intersected with chilly streams, waist-deep, that cut like a knife as -the hot soldiers plunged in; but an incessant variety of novel scenes -kept up their spirits. Groves of ebony sheltered bears and wolves. -Wild turkeys and wild hogs abounded; and almost every evening ten or -twelve deer were brought in. Here flourished pecans, live-oaks and -immense trees of lignum vitæ; there an endless procession of ants -wound along their smoothly worn trail; yonder towered a mountain of -gleaming porphyry set off with dark green foliage, and at all times -fleecy clouds could be seen drifting languidly across the slopes of -the curiously wrought sierra. Finally the troops entered the rich -valley of Linares. On the one hand lay wide cornfields or perhaps a -thousand acres of sugarcane in a single, well-irrigated lot; on the -other apple and peach orchards, orange and lemon groves with tempting -gleams amidst their dark leaves, and half a mile or so of fig-trees. -Then came the gardens and flat houses of the town itself, a dull place, -with some smiling and some tearful eyes looking out from the grated -windows.[18.23] - -Then forward again marched the troops, passing out of the valley into -wild country full of chaparral and mesquite, where sometimes wolves -trotted along the road ahead of them like dogs. The need of water -determined the length of the daily march; but usually there was enough -of it, shaded sometimes by noble cypresses dripping with Spanish moss. -Once a real norther set in, and the troops choked for twenty miles in -a driving cloud of dust;[18.21] but through it they caught glimpses -of a high cliff that looked like an immense pink and yellow dome, and -another cheering bit of color now and then was Señor Don So-and-so, the -alcalde, dressed in white and a red sash, with silver coins all over -his clothing, saddle and bridle. Usually the weather held fair, and a -blanket supported by four stakes answered the purpose of a tent well -enough.[18.23] - -But the faces of the people grew dark occasionally, and once they -muttered something like "_Fandango poco tiempo_," which signified, -"You'll be fighting pretty soon." Then the soldiers cheered till -they were hoarse. Fatigue and supper were forgotten. "Turn out, turn -out!" was the cry. The column formed, and dashed down the hill at a -double quick; but for enemy it found only the trim white cottage of a -Frenchman, planted beside a rippling stream amid laden orange trees -gilded by the setting sun. There had been rumors of Mexican cavalry -ahead, but no cavalry could be seen;[18.22] and as for irregulars, -both funds and arms were lacking, and the close wall of prickly pear -five or ten feet high, which ran on each side of the road almost without -a break for nearly two hundred miles, would have kept them off as it -did the breeze. And so on January 4 Taylor and the regulars entered -Victoria, a small, neat city at the foot of wooded mountains, which -Quitman had occupied with some formality six days before. "Victoria is -taken. It was a bloodless victory. But where is Victoria?" said the New -York _Herald_.[18.23] - -[PATTERSON'S MARCH TO VICTORIA] - -Indeed, Victoria was very much taken.[18.24] October 13, when -ordering Taylor to cut short the armistice, Marcy notified Patterson of -this order, and again directed him to occupy southern Tamaulipas as soon -as he could--before December 6 if possible; but Patterson was not able -to set out until General Taylor gave him definite instructions, on the -twenty-eighth of November, to march with the two Illinois regiments and -the regiment of Tennessee horse, about 1500 men, for Victoria. Further -delays occurred because transportation was not promptly furnished -him, and because vessels conveying supplies were lost; and although a -detachment advanced some fifteen miles about the middle of December, the -movement from the point then reached did not begin until one day before -Christmas.[18.26] - - [Illustration: General Patterson's March] - -The distance to be covered was nearly 210 miles,[18.25] and all -found the march hard. The chief engineer said his task was "to make -an impassable road practicable." Sometimes it seemed to contain every -possible stone. Difficult streams had to be crossed, and once the -only feasible method was to cut a straight ramp on each of the nearly -vertical banks, which stood about one hundred feet high, and get the -wagons down and up again with ropes--a prodigious task. The usual -thorns were peculiarly troublesome, and some of the water contained -salt. Sweat and dust almost hid the skin of men's faces at more than one -time; and not only did soldiers drop far behind from exhaustion, but in -some cases water could be given to the faint only by prying their jaws -open. Once the drinking water was so muddy it could scarcely run, we are -assured--to say nothing of an odor derived from dead horses. On the very -first day the troops were ordered to march without breakfast, and they -went hungry more than once afterwards, with cattle, hogs, and actual -clouds of wild turkeys plainly in sight.[18.26] - -Some of these facts appear to reflect upon the commanding officers, and -other facts point the same way. Patterson had an impressive person, -somewhat in the style of the English squire, it was thought, and certain -very agreeable qualities of his Irish race, when he chose to display -them; but although Polk felt disposed to make him generalissimo, he -seems to have lacked a familiar acquaintance with his profession as -well as experience in practising it. He also lacked initiative, and -he lorded it over the troops, they felt, with all the severity of a -satrap.[18.26] - -Pillow, the second in command, had come to the war like many others for -his personal advantage; and having been the President's partner in a law -office, having contrived through cunning and secret management at the -Baltimore convention in 1844 to secure Polk's nomination, and being now -in confidential correspondence with the White House, he felt specially -authorized to slake his intense ambition. On the score of ill-health -Pillow had left his command at Monterey for a trip to the United States; -but, finding in this expedition a chance of becoming prominent, he -suddenly recovered. No one could fail to see his determination to be -conspicuous, and it was not commended by all. "Ho for the embryo hero! -Great is Diana of the Ephesians!" exclaimed Captain Caswell, a brilliant -officer. Naturally Pillow felt inclined to look upon the soldiers as -merely coal for his furnace, and they in turn generally detested him. -In one stormy scene he called upon them to shoot him, if they dared, -adding grandly, "I'm not afraid to die!" And after that, when angered -by unnecessary harshness on his part, they obtained some comfort by -growling to one another, "_He's_ some!" "_He_ isn't afraid to die"; but -they remembered the scourge none the less, and when Taylor came over on -a mule to visit their camp the very day he and they reached Victoria -(January 4), looking as plain as they and perhaps no less dirty, the -contrast between his democratic simplicity and the pomp and pomposity -they had been contemplating made them burst forth--when they finally -realized that his more impressive orderly was not the General--into an -ecstasy of delight and admiration.[18.26] - -While these marches were taking place, General Scott, leaving the -coast on December 29, proceeded to Camargo in order to arrange matters -amicably with Taylor, if he could; but on January 3, finding it would be -impracticable to get into touch with that officer, he sent instructions -to Butler, carefully explaining why they were given to him directly, -to place at the mouth of the Rio Grande about 4000 regular infantry -under Worth, 4000 volunteer infantry, 500 regular cavalry, the best 500 -volunteer cavalry and two field batteries--deducting, however, from -these numbers the troops then at Victoria, except an escort for Taylor, -all those at Tampico except about 500 for a garrison, and one volunteer -regiment at Matamoros. Scott added that he hoped eight new volunteer -regiments would be at the Brazos by the end of January, and that three -or four of these would remain in northern Mexico.[18.27] - -[SCOTT TAKES TROOPS FROM THE NORTH] - -At the same time he notified Taylor of this action, pointing out that -his inaccessibility and the extreme pressure of time had rendered -necessary the orders given to Butler. Taylor was instructed to -concentrate in Tampico all the troops of Patterson, Quitman and Twiggs -except an escort for himself and, if necessary, a garrison for Victoria, -and return then to Monterey. Scott further explained that on account of -the yellow fever he could not wait for the new volunteers, and stated -plainly that, although he greatly wished the Vera Cruz expedition could -be aided by a diversion in the north, Taylor would have to act "for a -time" on a "strict defensive."[18.27] - -These orders were the inevitable sequel of past occurrences. Taylor had -suggested that it was advisable to transfer serious operations to the -south, and that a large body of regulars would be needed for a campaign -there; the government ordered the Vera Cruz expedition; Scott--not at -all, however, because he so desired--was appointed to command it; he -possessed full authority over all the troops in the field under one -condition proposed by himself--that Taylor must be left sufficiently -strong for defence--and, as Taylor admitted, this condition was met; -Scott could only obtain an adequate army in season by taking a large -part of it from the field; he endeavored to effect the necessary -division in a kind and friendly manner, spending ten days in travel for -that purpose, although extremely pressed for time; and, when Taylor went -deliberately beyond reach, he simply made such use of his authority as -duty required, taking for the offensive a relatively smaller army--in -view of the prospect, recognized by Taylor himself, that Santa Anna -would meet him at the beach--than he left with that officer for a strict -defensive.[18.27] - -Taylor, however, was furious. He alleged that Scott had "wormed himself" -into the command by promising to kill Taylor off as a Presidential -candidate. Of Scott's New York letter he said, "A more contemptible and -insidious communication was never written." Although it was his own -suggestion that volunteers were unfit for the mainstay of an expedition -against Vera Cruz, and that regulars for it should be drawn from the -northern army, he complained now that an underhand "intrigue" had -stripped him of his regulars; and, not satisfied with describing himself -as outraged and degraded "in the most discourteous manner that could be -devised" by "Scott, Marcy and Co." for the purpose of accomplishing his -ruin, he charged, though really not expecting an attack, that he was in -danger of being "sacrificed" on the soil of Mexico. Policy concurred -with fury; political strategy with personal resentment. The idea of -brave Taylor, the People's Pride, thrown to the merciless Mexicans by -partisan Polk and scheming Scott was one to fire the masses; and thus -we see concocted a bit of electioneering melodrama that contributed -powerfully, and perhaps decisively, to bring about one of the chief -consequences of the Mexican war--the overthrow of the Democratic party -and the accession of Taylor to the Presidential chair.[18.27] - -Scott now returned to the Brazos, where he arrived on January 8, about a -week before the date fixed by him for the assembling of his expedition -off that point; and there he was forced to endure nearly six weeks of -what he well termed "cruel uncertainties." To combine in haste the -men and material for such an expedition; to do so when the necessary -elements had to be drawn from distant and widely scattered points; to -do it while the waterways, largely relied upon for transportation, were -to a considerable extent frozen; and to do it without the telegraph -and mainly without railroads--this was a most difficult and hazardous -undertaking; and accidents, misunderstandings and errors of judgment -were additional embarrassments.[18.30] - -[SCOTT DELAYED] - -The prime need was troops; and Worth, acting with notable energy--even -precipitation--placed the first of the regulars at the mouth of the -Rio Grande about three weeks after Scott issued the orders to Butler. -But here the second need, that of vessels, checked them. Scott's -requisitions had been timely and ample; but there was an active -commercial demand for ships, rates were high, and the government, -anxious to economize, did not allow sufficiently for delays and other -contingencies.[18.28] A considerable number of vessels were chartered -at New Orleans, but a month of heavy rains, a scarcity of sailors, a -demand for higher wages from those engaged, a week of fog, and a series -of northers, which were usually only about four days apart, prevented -the first of the vessels from arriving off Brazos Island before February -11, and the storms, frequently very sudden, as well as the loss of -not a few of the indispensable lighters hampered operations there. -"This terrible coast," wrote the General; and for days together ships -would lie off shore, pitching "like mad" and fortunate if they did no -worse, quite unable to communicate with the island. For a week and a -half no mails arrived from New Orleans. As the Rio Grande water proved -unsuitable for the troops, extra casks were ordered to be made and -filled at New Orleans; and this consumed additional time.[18.30] - -Minor affairs, too, created trouble for Scott, and one of these -deserves to be mentioned. Care has been taken to bring out the quality -of Colonel Harney, and it only remains to add that for some time his -feelings toward Scott had been openly and unreasonably hostile. As he -was among the men ordered by Butler to the mouth of the Rio Grande, -he proceeded in that direction; but Scott, who knew of his excursion -to the Rio Grande and preferred to have a more efficient and reliable -man for his chief cavalry officer, and one more disposed to coöperate -heartily with the commander-in-chief, directed him to place at the -orders of Major Sumner the dragoons that had come down with him, and -rejoin those of Taylor's army. Harney refused positively to do so. Upon -this Worth laid a formal charge of disobedience against him, and a -court martial of officers, chosen--as General Scott proposed--by Harney -himself, sentenced him to be reprimanded in orders. Harney then wrote -a submissive letter to Worth; and Scott, remitting the sentence of the -court, gave him the position he coveted.[18.30] - -This was magnanimous, and tended to promote good-will; but there is -more to tell. On learning of Scott's order that Harney should return -to Monterey Polk, though he insisted that his own subordinates in the -army must be in cordial sympathy with him, became very angry that "a -Democrat" and "one of General Jackson's personal friends" should "be -sacrificed to propitiate the personal and political malice of General -Scott," and insisted upon countermanding the order, thereby violating -the confidence promised that general and disregarding the broad -instructions issued to him by the war department.[18.29] However, the -trouble with Harney was comparatively but a pin-prick. What racked the -General was the conviction that Santa Anna must be gathering a great -army to confront him at Vera Cruz; and on February 15, about half of the -surf-boats and a small part of the ordnance and ordnance stores having -been heard from, he sailed for Tampico, leaving Worth to complete the -embarkation as rapidly as he could.[18.30] - -While these events were taking place on the Rio Grande line, the troops -under Taylor lay for ten days at Victoria, growing more and more languid -under the hot sun; and the General realized that his coming to this -remote place had embarrassed himself as well as Scott. Finally something -had to be done, for provisions were becoming short, and on January 12 he -ordered the regular infantry and Patterson's men to set out for Tampico, -supposed to lie about 168 miles distant by the road.[18.31] On the -night of the fourteenth, a duplicate of Scott's despatch of January -3--the original of which had been intercepted by the enemy--arrived, and -then, selecting an escort for himself, Taylor directed Quitman's brigade -to proceed in the same direction as Patterson's. The three bodies, -which marched at intervals of twenty-four hours, beginning on that -day, made an aggregate of 4733, of whom the rank and file numbered 1400 -regulars and 3000 volunteers. The rule was to sound reveille at three -o'clock and set out at dawn--the regiments of each column taking turns -in leading it; and the engineer company, usually known as "the pick and -shovel brigade," marched in advance of all to mend the road.[18.32] - -There was need enough of its work. The meaning of "Tamaulipas" is high -mountains; and while the blue of the Sierra Madre grew daily fainter, -the principal range of the state rose constantly higher in front, -until the summit was crossed, and the troops began to descend into the -tropical region of the coast. Much of the route was boggy or rocky -or steep; the drinking-water often came from stagnant pools; and for -nearly three days the only chance to see human beings outside of one's -own column was when, on surmounting a hilltop, the gleaming steel and -white wagons of another brigade could be made out, one day's march -away--perhaps only six or eight miles--on another eminence.[18.32] - -But as the troops approached their destination they felt repaid for -every hardship and effort. The road became deep sand, indeed, but near -it spread a sunny and many-hued lake full of emerald islets, pirogues -laden with odorous fruits, and myriads of noisy widgeon, teal and -other water-fowl; while on the other hand the live-oak, the bay-tree, -the rubber-tree, the banyan, the palm, the flag-leaved aloe, and many -a nameless tree, bush and vine made a dense forest, illumined with -brilliant orchids and more brilliant parrots and macaws, each of which -seemed like a year of sunsets epitomized. A soft, salubrious breeze -from the Gulf caressed their faces; and when, surmounting the last hill -on the tenth day of their march, they saw the grand, leisurely Pánuco -rolling luxuriously on through fields and forests, a wilderness of spars -and masts filling the harbor of Tampico, and the American flag--dear -emblem of country, home and kindred--waving proudly over white walls and -green gardens, a tear of delight ran down many a tanned cheek.[18.32] - -[SCOTT AT TAMPICO] - -Stationed mostly at some distance above or below the town according to -the usual policy of the American commanders, they now devoted themselves -to drilling and counting the days. "Shall we ever see that big fandango -in the halls of Montezuma?" they had been asking for some time, and to -wait four weeks on the _qui vive_ for Scott seemed very hard. February -19, however, he arrived in town looking very anxious, and, declining -the superb horse made ready for him, walked unpretentiously to his -lodgings. The impatience to be off was now intense, and the General -did all in his power to gratify it; but he found himself in a hornet's -nest. At this time he enjoyed no popularity among the officers, for he -was personally known to very few. One or two attempts to check rather -pushing young men had been resented; and now the suspicion that he would -give regulars the post of honor at Vera Cruz threatened serious results. -At a recent banquet the toast necessarily offered to the name of the -commander-in-chief had been coldly received, and Worth had been ignored. -Indeed, some of the leading volunteer officers were disposed to mutiny -unless assured of "a place in the picture."[18.35] - -Scott diplomatically declared there would be fighting enough for -all, but as the tardiness of the transports threatened to delay a -part of the troops, that assurance failed to give satisfaction; -and apparently only the arrival of an unexpected steamer or two -averted the danger of trouble. One officer, however--a trim, agile -man with a handsome face, quick black eyes, a poorly educated but -most ingenious mind, a ready tongue, and a conscience that gave him -no trouble--was content.[18.33] For him Taylor's harsh rule had -ended; and soon, making the most of his own crafty talents, the urgent -recommendations of Polk and Scott's determination to keep faith with the -President,[18.34] Pillow--for Pillow it was--established himself at -headquarters on a basis of intimacy and importance.[18.35] - -Tampico would have been a delightful resting-place for a while. The -markets were full of good things; it possessed excellent cafés; and the -troops coming from Monterey had brought along a theatrical company; but -Scott tarried there only thirty hours. At New Orleans some information -had been obtained with reference to the Lobos Islands, which lay fifty -or sixty miles to the southeast of Tampico and seven or eight from the -coast, offering a broad, safe anchorage; and Scott had written to Conner -for additional facts. These proved to be favorable, and such of the new -volunteers and freight vessels as could be reached in time had been -ordered to go directly there, instead of sailing to the Brazos. Indeed -these islands were fixed upon as the general rendezvous. Some of the -troops had reached it, and word now came to Scott that an outbreak of -smallpox had occurred among them.[18.37] - -He set sail therefore on February 20, and making a swift voyage in the -midst of a "screaming" norther, found at the rendezvous the First and -the Second Pennsylvania, two thirds of the new Louisiana regiment, -the "Palmettoes" of South Carolina, and parts of the New York and -Mississippi regiments.[18.36] Twiggs followed him when the bar off -Tampico was quiet enough to permit, and the other troops did the same -as rapidly as they could. Patterson got away on the twenty-ninth, but -even on the fourth of March Quitman and Shields were chafing beside the -Pánuco, and the latter at least had no definite notion when they would -be able to sail. "Days are months now," he exclaimed; but he and many -others had still to wait. Worse yet, perhaps, not a few of those who got -off were packed in small trading craft, picked up by good luck and unfit -for the service; and the skeletons of ships rotting near the bar gave -them ample cause for anxiety. Worth's troops meanwhile were embarking at -the Brazos; but when he left that quarter on February 25, six companies -of dragoons were still in want of transports.[18.37] - -Taylor for his part, escorted by a squadron of dragoons under May, the -Mississippi regiment and two field batteries, left Victoria on January -16 and reached Monterey in eight days. His first impulse on receiving -Scott's orders had been to leave the country, but he concluded not -to do so, and soon--apparently satisfied that he now had an issue -on which to challenge both Polk and Scott[18.38]--he distinctly -informed his friend, Senator Crittenden, that he was a candidate for the -Presidency.[18.39] - -[TAYLOR'S POLICY] - -He then shaped his plans accordingly. The government had notified -him quite plainly that it wished him to hold no territory beyond the -vicinity of Monterey, and Scott instructed him to concentrate there. -What these men wished, he believed, was that he should be effaced or -play a humble rôle, and he was determined not to accept their plan. -He would be as prominent as he possibly could be. Though not able to -fight the Mexicans, he would at least seem willing to do so, and throw -upon Scott and Polk all the odium of his inactivity. Hence, instead of -burying himself and his aspirations in Monterey, he advanced at the -end of the month to Saltillo, and a few days later took post, with -nearly all of the troops not required on the line of communication, -still farther toward the enemy. The dictates of prudence recognized by -himself, the advice and order of his commanding officer, and the wishes -and instructions of the government were all disregarded. He showed -himself, in fact, both unwise and insubordinate.[18.39] - - - - - XIX - - SANTA ANNA PREPARES TO STRIKE - - September, 1846-February, 1847 - - -While these events were taking place north of the mountains, the -Americans at Saltillo were having a somewhat agitated experience. At -the end of December a great cloud of dust, raised towards the south by -a drove of Mexican horses, convinced Worth he was again in danger, and -preparations were made at once to conquer or die. Butler, who succeeded -him in command, and even the more experienced Wool felt disturbed by -rumors of impending attack, which considerate Mexicans, anxious to -entertain their American visitors, frequently set afloat, though some -of our officers believed that Scott's movement ensured them against -molestation.[19.4] - -Finally, the rather approved idea of thorough scouting presented itself; -and on January 19 Major Gaines of the First Kentucky cavalry, with -Captain Cassius M. Clay, Lieutenant Davidson and thirty or forty men, -was detached for this purpose by General Butler.[19.1] After making a -circuitous journey and meeting with only bland, inoffensive Mexicans, -from whom--naturally enough--no important news could be obtained, he -found himself on the twenty-first at the hacienda of La Encarnación, -a point on the main road from San Luis Potosí to Saltillo, and about -fifty-three miles distant from the latter place. Here quite unexpectedly -he lighted upon forty or fifty of the Arkansas cavalry under Major -Borland, whose orders from Wool had been to visit the hacienda and -immediately return. If, however, Taylor could do as he pleased about -instructions, why should not Borland? And when obliging Mexicans told -him of a small force lying at El Salado, only thirty-five or forty -miles farther on, he determined to have the glory of capturing it, and -sent back to his colonel for reinforcements. Gaines's party, added -to his own, seemed adequate, however, and early on the night of the -twenty-second the troopers rode gayly forward.[19.4] - -[CARELESSNESS OF TAYLOR'S OFFICERS] - -Before long it appeared that the distance was sixty miles and the -Mexican force mythical--besides, rain began to fall; so the Americans -returned to La Encarnación for the night. "The general and the soldier -of each side should ... be always expecting to fall into danger," as -Thucydides wrote long ago, and of course our officers understood that in -a hostile country picket guards were sometimes deemed advisable; but, -operating on the higher plane of action, they felt that a comfortable -sleep was what all needed most, and accordingly at daybreak they found -themselves in the midst of Miñón's cavalry brigade of, say, 1200 men, -magnified in their opinion--doubtless by the fog--to 3000. The Mexican -general was, however, a most accomplished and elegant gentleman, and -he at once relieved their embarrassment by taking them under his -full--indeed, close--protection.[19.4] - -Not aware of this comforting fact, Brigadier General Lane detached -eighteen men under Captain Heady of the Kentucky cavalry, two days -later, to look up their comrades. These men found liquor at a ranch -and perhaps--as a letter from Saltillo stated--a fandango, too. Firmly -persuaded that joy should be unconfined, they "got drunk," and so -without using up a grain of powder they ascertained by ocular proof the -fate of the other detachments. Apparently there was some ground for -Wool's remark that the volunteers, though now almost eight months old in -the service, could not easily be made to obey instructions on such duty. -Indeed, even after Borland's mishap and in spite of strict orders, two -outposts now went to sleep without a picket or a sentry.[19.4] - -To be sure, the men were ready enough to fight. "Why we have no -more fear of a Mexican than if they were [prairie] Wolves," wrote a -soldier. Wool's men felt particularly keen. On the way from La Vaca -to San Antonio they had passed a spot where about 400 Texans had been -massacred by Santa Anna's order in 1836. A fire had lighted up their -faces that meant, "No mercy," said one of them; and exhausted though -they were after their wonderful march from Parras, they felt very much -dissatisfied on reaching the front, "there being no prospect of a -fight." But the recent disasters had made it seem as if the mountains -were full of the enemy, and one of Gaines's men, who contrived to -escape, brought fearful tales. Even those Americans who did not care -to do picket duty felt little desire to wake up some foggy morning as -prisoners. Signs of a panicky feeling could be observed, and Wool found -it necessary to invoke Taylor's aid.[19.4] - -The General's position in his army was now extraordinary. To the troops, -while they gloried in his courage, his achievements had seemed at the -time commonplace enough; but sentiment at home as exhibited in the -newspapers--reacting from painful anxiety, indulging in the common taste -for exaggeration, and instinctively demanding a national figure for this -national crisis--had not only done justice to his great qualities, but, -partly in order to explain victories clearly marked with errors, made -him out a genius and worker of miracles; and all this laudation, read by -the army, created an impression which both duty and interest forbade the -more discriminating to impair.[19.4] - -[ARMY FEELING TOWARD TAYLOR] - -The General, moreover, though nursing the mammoth conceit that he was -qualified to be President of the United States, was careful to spare -the self-love of all who came in contact with him; and while no one -could enter Scott's presence without feeling himself before a superior -man aware of his superiority, probably most of Taylor's visitors had -an agreeable sense of excelling him in personal appearance, dress, -education and talents, and enjoyed also a flattering conviction of their -insight, because they recognized that he possessed high merits after -all. How the soldiers, oppressed by the lordliness of many generals, -adored his plainness we have seen. They felt they could bow down to such -a man without losing self-respect, since the obeisance was due to their -own choice, not his demand; and when he welcomed one to his unguarded -tent and talked with him about home and friends, or shook a delinquent -by the two ears with a kindly warning not to do so again, he established -a positive dominion over their minds and hearts. It has been said that -no woman loves a man unless she can despise him for something, and the -saying may be extended to the rest of humanity. Taylor had thus a double -hold on his troops. His black body-servant referred to him as "De ole -hoss," but would have died for him; and while the army would probably -have expressed itself about him as lightly as did the street urchins of -Philadelphia: - - "Old Zack's at Monterey, - Bring out your Santa Anner; - For every time we raise a gun, - Down goes a Mexicanner;" - -yet in reality he was now enthroned in the hearts of the soldiers -generally as a father, a hero and almost a fetich.[19.4] - -Invoked by Wool, then, Taylor--instead of drawing him back, as the -government wished--appeared at Saltillo on the first or second of -February with about 700 men, and proceeded to occupy the advanced -position already mentioned. Believing, as we have seen, that a lack -of water on the road from San Luis would prevent any strong body of -Mexicans from coming north at that season, and hearing that a great part -of Santa Anna's troops had gone toward Vera Cruz, he scouted alarms; -and in addition to his other grounds for pushing forward, he thought so -doing would tend to restore confidence among the troops and the people -of Saltillo. Moreover, although he had ridiculed Scott's intimation that -he might be able to manoeuvre toward San Luis in the early spring, he -was now planning to do so.[19.4] - -Scrambling out of Saltillo by the southern route, which makes a short -but sharp ascent as it leaves the town, Taylor found himself on a -rather smooth plateau elevated nearly or quite 6000 feet above the -sea, and after a ride of about five miles discovered on the left, -near the road, four or five mean adobe buildings, headquarters of the -Buena Vista ranch, where Wool's command had recently been in camp. The -southern outlook from this point was desolate but noble. On both sides -rose high, barren mountains. Those on the west, formed of many rather -thin horizontal slabs of rock, slightly concave toward the sky and -separated by thicker deposits of a softer material eroded at the edges, -formed reddish, flat-topped pyramids like the pictured hanging gardens -of Babylon; while those on the other hand were a true sierra, a line -of saw-tooth peaks buttressed with sharp spurs. Descending easily for -about a mile and a half, the General came to a narrow place called by -Mexicans La Angostura (_The Narrows_), and then traversed lengthwise -for a distance of about three and a half miles the approximately -north-and-south valley of Buena Vista. At the end of this came the -windy, dusty farm of La Encantada, where Butler had stationed Wool for a -time; and then began the smiling valley of Agua Nueva, which broadened -gradually for about seven miles, and ended at the farm or hacienda of -that name. This lay near the mountain on the eastern edge of a wide -plain, generously supplied by nature with fuel and water.[19.4] - -Here Taylor pitched his tent on the fifth, and by the fourteenth -substantially all the troops were on the spot--about 650 camping with -him and some 4000 lying with Wool a mile or so away. The General ordered -no scouting, and took about the same precautions against surprise that -Gaines and Borland had taken. On the ground that spies could not be -kept out, he let the Mexicans come and go with perfect freedom. The -engineers, reconnoitring on their own responsibility, concluded that -the mountains were "passable in every direction" by routes familiar to -the enemy but of course blind to the invader.[19.2] Parallel roads lay -beyond the heights on each side. Yet here Taylor decided that he would -meet the enemy, should they care to attack him;[19.3] and he said to -the correspondent of the New York _Tribune_; "Let them come; damned if -they don't go back a good deal faster than they came." In reality the -troops had more reason than ever to feel alarmed; but Dagon was again in -the midst of them, and they stood like mountains. Taylor might be old -and slow and inefficient, and he might know little about the art of war, -but he could stiffen the courage of soldiers. "Every man feels that the -honor of his country is now placed in his hands," wrote Lieutenant Posey -on the nineteenth.[19.4] - -SANTA ANNA'S PLANS] - -This takes us back to Santa Anna, who left the city of Mexico for -the north on September 28. When his carriage had rolled on for about -thirty miles, he received word that Monterey had fallen, and the news -occasioned many bitter reflections; but there were enough other matters -to divert his thoughts. He understood well the superior strength of the -United States; but from Mackenzie's mission and the conviction that war -expenses would be extremely unpopular in this country, he doubtless -felt sure that we earnestly desired peace. It was therefore clear to -him that his problem was to gain one victory. This would so discourage -us, he seems to have calculated, that he could end the war on fairly -satisfactory terms.[19.7] - -To gain this victory, it seemed only necessary to gather large forces, -bar the road from the north with fortifications, make no defence of -outlying sections, worry the Americans perhaps with feints and forays, -await and repulse them should they advance, and at the end of the winter -season, should they not, fall upon some fraction of their army with full -power. One difficulty in this programme was the general hatred which he -must have known the northern provinces entertained for him, because his -policy had always sacrificed their interests; and he thought it wise to -despatch a proclamation to San Luis Potosí, calling upon the people to -see in him only a Mexican soldier fighting for the common country. The -appeal was effectual. A committee met him about a dozen miles from the -city, and on October 8 he entered a town decorated with tapestries and -pots of flowers, and resounding with salvos of artillery, peals of bells -and enthusiastic vivas from the entire population.[19.7] - -A number of circumstances occurring now and later appeared favorable. -The government engaged that he should have an adequate remittance of -funds every month, and instructed the heads of seven states to supply -his general wants. A medal was promised to all taking part in the -campaign. The National Guards, now ordered to obey the central instead -of the state authorities, apparently came within his reach. The fight -at Monterey was pictured as creditable to Mexican arms and costly to -the enemy. Every life sacrificed there on the altar of nationality, -proclaimed the government, called to heaven for vengeance, and the -outrages perpetrated by the insolent invaders proved how they would -trample on the whole country, if they could.[19.7] - -Once more our wicked administration and its horde of "adventurers" were -denounced in the good old blood-curdling style, and once more the forays -of the savage Indians were laid to our charge. Detestable wretches like -the Americans could not wage war long. Their beloved money-bags were -already feeling pinched. Volunteers did not flock to the banner. Noble -orators like Webster were enlightening the better people. The slavery -question could not fail to paralyze the country. Already the elections -had turned against the administration, and signs of a revolution could -be seen. European countries were certainly preparing to interfere. -Merely by uniting, the Mexicans could "tear from the invader's flag the -symbol of Texas," and at last--so it was declared--union had actually -been achieved. On all sides patriotism had burst into flame. The nation -was rising. It would take account of every injury, great or small, -inflicted by the barbarians of the north, and the day of settlement -would soon arrive. In this fashion talked the government, the orators -and the newspapers; and many observers in Europe and the United States -believed the overdue national movement had now begun.[19.7] - -But this radiant picture was only paint-deep. _Don Simplicio_, the -satiric weekly, announced: It is proposed that all give, that all lend, -that all rise, that all go to the field; but "few give, few lend, few -get in motion, few take up arms." The states, restored to a measure of -sovereignty by the adoption of the federal system, became conscious of -their powers. Durango would not help, because threatened by the Indians, -and even denounced the Hero of Tampico. Michoacán held aloof because -Ocampo, her brilliant governor, who could voice his opinions in five -languages, hated Santa Anna even more than he did the Americans. The -great state of Jalisco promised much and did little; and Zacatecas, -which Santa Anna had crushed and robbed in 1835 because it dared to -oppose his ambition,[19.5] not only withheld all aid, but attempted -to form a combination of states against him. A multitude of officials -preferred the triumph of a foreign invader to that of a native tyrant, -and their constituents endorsed their course.[19.7] - -The decree taking the National Guards from state control had to be -substantially qualified. Members of that organization could not be -impressed. The law pardoning--that is to say, authorizing--desertion -from the regular army was extended for three months. A secret society -called The Red Comet, which sprang up among the military men at San -Luis, took for motto, "Nobody is bound to obey one that has no right -to command," and annoyed the General constantly. Requena, one of -the best qualified officers, who entertained little respect for the -Liberator's professional ability or plans, made so much trouble that he -was sent away; and General Valencia, a member of the Red Comet society, -who had been refused permission to attack the Americans at Victoria -and was believed now to covet Santa Anna's place, openly defied the -commander-in-chief and left the army.[19.7] - -[SANTA ANNA'S EMBARRASSMENTS] - -Still more serious were financial difficulties, for the Executive did -not supply the promised funds. The reason was obvious. "Our treasury is -as poor in money as it is rich in obligations," explained the minister. -Santa Anna did not spare the government, however. "I do not consider -myself nor should I be considered by the gentlemen who compose the -provisional administration of the Country as a mere General, commanding -a corps of the army, but as the one leader of the Nation, to whom the -direction of its destinies has been entrusted," he wrote; and in this -tone he conducted the financial correspondence--demanding, reproaching, -protesting, threatening; yet the needful remittances did not arrive. -Popular support was equally unfruitful. "Santa Anna lacks three -things--to wit, money, money and money," announced _Don Simplicio_; -"Very well, let us have a public meeting. What is the result? Nothing." -But somehow, through remittances from the capital and the states, forced -loans, arbitrary seizures and the use of his personal credit, the -General worried along, and built up an army of some 25,000 men.[19.6] -Extensive shops were established for the manufacture of clothing and the -repair of arms; and energetic measures were taken to provide muskets, -ammunition and cannon.[19.7] - -Santa Anna's operations were not, however, entirely sagacious. As was -usual in Mexican armies, number outweighed quality. Consisting mostly -of impressed men and to a considerable extent of criminals, the troops -were unreliable. They were drilled in no larger bodies than brigades; -many had no practice in firing; and most of them were very imperfectly -disciplined. The artillery did no manoeuvring. There was no school -for officers. Persons of a notoriously bad reputation as soldiers -occupied high posts. Santa Anna showed marked favoritism toward certain -regiments and certain men. Never visiting the drill-ground, he could not -estimate the relative qualities of the various corps, and he was too -much engrossed in politics and personal interests to concentrate his -attention upon the work in hand. All of the generals who tried to do -their duty gave too much time to the details, and studied the plans of -campaign too little. What was hardly less important, Santa Anna, instead -of instructing the troops regarding the national issues at stake, -talked much about the booty to be stripped from the Americans, and in -particular about an alleged blue wagon containing their military chest. -Still, the army took shape, and the General looked hopefully toward -spring.[19.7] - -But now came one of those whirls of fortune that always hover about -leaders of dubious antecedents. November 26 an influential newspaper -of the capital, _El Republicano_, copied from the New York _Herald_ a -letter of September 22, written from Mexico City, which stated that -Santa Anna, acting in collusion with the United States, would abandon -the invaded provinces, resist the enemy feebly, satisfy the nation of -its impotence, bring about a peace agreeable to the United States, and -become the dictator of Mexico.[19.8] Already there had been suspicions, -and now they crystallized instantly round this definite accusation. Why -had the Americans allowed the ablest citizen of Mexico to pass through -their fleet? Why had Tampico and Saltillo been evacuated? Why had not -the passes of the Sierra Madre been fortified? And why had Valencia been -forbidden to attack the enemy at Victoria? The government denounced -the story as a scheme to create discord and break down the national -champion. Santa Anna does not need to become a traitor in order to be -the first Mexican, it was said. Had he made such a bargain, the United -States would have kept it secret in order that he might be able to do -his work. Has he not shed his blood for the country? Has he not recently -declined the supreme power? The defence was plausible, but the facts -looked more than plausible.[19.10] - -And the situation had other aspects, too. As Governor Olaguíbel of -México state informed Santa Anna, more things were said against him than -even a long letter could specify. San Luis was described as changing -under his influence into a new Capua, where he was wasting the funds of -the country on his vices--not only gambling, but inducing the officers -to gamble with him. His political attitude was viewed with distrust, -and familiar signs indicating an intention to overthrow the government -were believed to be discernible. Even the correspondent of the London -_Times_ described his policy as "dark and tortuous," and the British -minister deemed it an "enigma." Many said his troops were more dangerous -to Mexico than to the United States. The wide extent of his military -jurisdiction was described in the press as alarming. By January each day -brought fresh rumors of an approaching dictatorship. Olaguíbel's letter -spoke the word frankly. Then came news that the troops at Mazatlán had -pronounced for it, and Santa Anna's repudiation of their course only -convinced the public that he preferred to wait for a time.[19.10] - -The military phase of the situation gave equal offence. "Where now," -it was demanded, "are those great generals of ours, who--covered with -ribbons and crosses from the crown of the head to the sole of the -foot--insulted with their luxuriant splendor the misery of the people?" -"Predictions for 1847," announced _Don Simplicio_: "The officers of -our army will be divided into fugacious and permanent;" and the same -journalistic scorpion asked why the commander-in-chief did not, while -calling for money, "eliminate the superfluous, useless, burdensome, -incapable and cowardly." At the beginning of December Salas had promised -with a flourish that Santa Anna would "very soon" meet the odious -Yankee, and before long the people were inquiring why he did not. "We -are invaded, time presses, and what has Santa Anna done?" demanded a -pamphleteer; "Ah, the silly fellow is waiting for the Americans to -come and hunt him up." At the General's demand, three newspapers were -established to defend him; but the scorpion disposed of them all with -one sting: "Napoleon answered his detractors with victories."[19.10] - -[SANTA ANA FORCED TO MOVE] - -Under these attacks the army shivered with rage and mortification -from top to bottom. The soldiers deserted in astonishing numbers. -The officers and their infuriated commander felt they must either do -something or sink to perdition in a burning lake of distrust, hatred and -contempt; and therefore Santa Anna decided precipitately to hurl himself -against the Americans.[19.9] Scott's intercepted letter of January -3, which probably found its way to the Mexican headquarters, showed -how Taylor's army had been depleted, and Taylor's volunteers, it was -believed by Santa Anna, would hardly resist a single onslaught; while -their inferiority in numbers, their distance from heavy reinforcements, -their scattered condition, and their isolation in the midst of a hostile -people were other factors offsetting the great difficulty of crossing -deserts to reach them.[19.10] - -January 23 Santa Anna ordered the mint of San Luis to work night and -day on ninety-eight bars of silver forcibly appropriated by him. A few -days later, after issuing a manifesto in self-defence, he addressed -the army in eloquent language, pointing out the hardships, the plunder -and the glory that awaited it. On the twenty-eighth, to the plaintive -strains of a popular air called the _Adios_, the troops began to leave -the dust-brown city. The rear guard set out three days later; and on -February 2 headquarters moved.[19.11] Only useless remnants of the -army stayed behind; but on the other hand a great number of adventurers -of both sexes, drawn forward by various motives but especially by the -prospect of booty, accompanied the march.[19.15] - -[SANTA ANNA'S MARCH NORTH] - -For about thirty miles the route lay through a cultivated region; but -after it bade farewell to the heavy old Spanish church that crowned the -hill of Las Bocas, the country became sterile, and between mountains -now lumpy, now conical, usually rich in silver and always poor in -vegetation, each division rolled on in a billowy cloud of dust, at -one time chilled with icy blasts, and at another melting under an -insupportable sun; cheered only by the prickly cactus, the crooked -mesquite and an occasional group of dwarfish palms. Reckless from -fatigue and unaccustomed to such a burden, the soldiers threw away -thousands of sacks containing food.[19.15] - -To Matehuala the distance was about 140 miles, and beyond that point lay -a broad flinty desert. Here provisions and good water began to fail; -and many, though well enough supplied with the poor meat and water -that now composed the rations, grew sick and weak.[19.12] Weather of -unusual severity set in. For several days a storm of snow or chilling -rain buffeted the struggling troops; and at night, destitute of all -shelter, they could only huddle and shiver at a few small fires. Many -died from exposure, and a great number, though expressly warned that -death would be the punishment, risked all the chances of deserting. But -the army as a whole pressed forward, and on February 17-21 arrived at -La Encarnación, nearly 200 miles from San Luis.[19.13] Several thousand -men had been lost from death, sickness or desertion on the way. Others -had been detached at various points, and Miñón had now placed himself at -Potosí hacienda behind the mountains on Taylor's left; but on February -19 the figures for the army were 15,142 officers and men[19.14]--in -general the strongest and most determined that had set out--and a -brilliant review, held the next day, showed no lack of confidence and -enthusiasm. A triumph was considered certain.[19.15] - - [Illustration: MEXICO TO AGUA NUEVA] - -Santa Anna had supposed that a part of the American army occupied La -Vaquería, some eight or ten miles west of Taylor's actual position, and -his intention had been to surprise it; but by February 11 he learned -that all had concentrated at Agua Nueva. He now had the choice of three -routes. One was the direct road to that point; the second would have -taken him _via_ La Hedionda to the rear of Buena Vista; and the third -ran by the way of La Vaquería to the north of Agua Nueva.[19.16] Santa -Anna desired, he said later, to pursue one of the lateral routes, and -place himself between Taylor and Saltillo; but both of these routes were -said to be circuitous, difficult if not impracticable for artillery, -and perhaps inadequately supplied with water and provisions. He decided -therefore to surprise Agua Nueva, believing that should his forces be -seen, they would be regarded as a part of Miñón's brigade.[19.17] - -That general was ordered to proceed _via_ La Hedionda to the American -rear, and a little after noon on February 21--every soldier having been -ordered to drink his fill, carry all the water he could, and take -rations for the next two days--Santa Anna advanced. Agua Nueva was only -some thirty-five miles away, and he expected to overwhelm it early -the next morning. The march continued well into the night. At Carnero -Pass, five or six miles from Taylor, the troops lay down by columns as -they arrived--the cavalry still holding their reins. It was too cold -for sleep, but they rested; and at six in the morning they rose in the -deepest possible silence, and resumed their march.[19.17] - - [Illustration: MONTEREY TO LA ENCARNACIÓN] - -The Americans had at last awakened, however. By February 19 Santa Anna -was expected "hourly," wrote Lieutenant Posey, and the next day Major -McCulloch with his party of Texan scouts was despatched in the direction -of La Encarnación, while Brevet Lieutenant Colonel May with about 400 -dragoons and some field pieces proceeded toward La Hedionda.[19.18] -The latter saw a cloud of dust in the direction of Potosí, fell in with -a Mexican deserter[19.19]--who said Miñón was near and Santa Anna at -La Encarnación--and reported at Agua Nueva before sunrise, February -21. At first his party were taken for Mexicans; and when the alarm -subsided, it was followed by a solemn stillness, amidst which groups -of officers could be seen talking eagerly in low tones with mysterious -gestures.[19.22] - -[TAYLOR DRAWS BACK] - -Suddenly at about noon a solitary horseman on a jaded steed came down -from the mountain, and made straight for the General's tent, bringing -word that a great Mexican army had been seen at La Encarnación. The -combination of this report and May's was understood to mean that Santa -Anna intended to turn Agua Nueva, and before two o'clock the Americans -took flight--that is the polite phrase--for Buena Vista.[19.20] -Colonel Yell with his mounted Arkansas regiment was left behind to -guard the stores, should Santa Anna permit this, until they could be -removed;[19.21] the Second Kentucky and some guns were detached at La -Encantada to support him; and the First Illinois under Colonel Hardin -was posted at La Angostura. About midnight Yell's pickets at Carnero -Pass were driven in. Upon this, firing the buildings and the last of -the stores, and abandoning some wagons, the troops hurried off, lighted -on their way by roaring flames that filled the air with piles of lurid -smoke and the mountains with fantastic shadows; and by morning all -except Hardin's command and the advanced pickets were at Buena Vista. -Taylor, meanwhile, entrusting to Wool the disposition of the troops, -marched with a strong escort of the three arms for Saltillo, to provide -at this late day for the defence of that city against Miñón.[19.22] - - - - - XX - - BUENA VISTA - - February, 1847 - - -[THE MEXICANS NEAR BUENA VISTA] - -Early the next morning (February 22) Santa Anna, hurrying down from -Carnero Pass, learned that Agua Nueva had been evacuated, but on -arriving there he discovered signs, as he justly believed, of a -precipitate flight. Miñón, he thought, was already between Buena Vista -and Saltillo, in a position to hinder the American retreat; the state of -the Mexican supplies, in his opinion, did not allow time for strategic -operations; and therefore, hardly permitting the troops to drink,[20.1] -he dashed ahead with some 2500 horse and a few light battalions of -infantry, swept away the American pickets at La Encantada, and thundered -on down the valley.[20.8] - -By this time Wool knew the enemy were at hand; the long roll sounded; -the soldiers leaped to their work; the camp was cleared; and a section -of Captain Washington's battery hurried down the slope toward La -Angostura. It was a beautiful morning; the mountains on the east flung -long shadows across the valley; a gentle breeze languidly stirred -the flags. What was more to the point, this was the twenty-second of -February. The bands struck up Hail Columbia. The watchword, "Honor of -Washington," passed among the men; and they shouted for joy to see the -great cloud of dust, full of galloping Mexicans, approach. None the less -they were unprepared for combat. Had Santa Anna risked a daring charge, -he would probably have triumphed in short order.[20.8] - -But he found the American position and the guns at La Angostura -impressive. His bugler sounded "Halt!" just beyond range; and after -reconnoitring a long time he decided to wait for infantry. In fact there -seemed to be danger that his van might be attacked and overpowered; -and hence at about eleven o'clock he sent Dr. Vanderlinden, his chief -medical officer, to General Taylor, who had now returned from Saltillo, -with a note inviting him, on the ground that he was now surrounded -by more than 20,000 Mexicans, to lay down his arms, and probably -with secret instructions to amuse the American commander as long as -possible.[20.2] Very likely, as he intimated later, he would have been -glad to retire from what he called a Pass of Thermopylæ, and operate -strategically; but the American retreat had in effect lured him on, his -provisions were scant, and at this point therefore the issue had to be -decided at once.[20.8] - -With good reason Santa Anna disliked the field of battle selected by -Wool,[20.3] for it strongly favored the defence. Running north along the -western side of the road there was a creek, which had excavated near -La Angostura an amazing network of gullies with almost vertical banks -twenty feet or so high, that practically vetoed the passage of troops; -and west of this obstruction the ground rose more and more steeply until -it became a line of high hills, parallel to the creek, which resembled -a huge wave ready to break. On the other side, between the road and -the sierra, there was a space varying from three quarters of a mile -to a mile in width, and this was roughly divided by two east-and-west -ravines--the more northern of which may be called the long and the more -southern the broad ravine--into three parts: the north field, as we may -name it, extending to Buena Vista, the middle field or plateau, and the -south field extending to La Encantada.[20.8] - -Of these divisions the plateau was the most distinctive. Along the -base of the sierra there were two or three benches, presumably made of -débris from the mountain; and lighter débris had been washed almost -down to the road, forming a stony plain seamed by a number of minor -ravines--torrents during the rainy season--which grew deeper as they -progressed, until at the western edge of the plateau they descended to -the floor of the valley as ragged gulches, leaving between them several -tongues or spurs, extremely steep and about forty or fifty feet high. -The longest, highest and bluntest of the spurs, which may be called the -first of them, was at La Angostura; and a space of only some forty feet, -through which passed the road, intervened between its point and the -network of gullies. The plateau, some 400 yards wide, north-and-south, -at the base of the mountains, had perhaps twice that width at the -opposite end, toward which it very gradually sloped. Both of the two -main ravines, the long and the broad, were extremely difficult for -cavalry and still more difficult for artillery. Obviously in such a -spot large numbers--and especially large numbers of horse--lost a great -percentage of their value.[20.8] - -[THE BUENA VISTA BATTLEFIELD] - -The centre of the American position was the first spur, on which -Hardin's men threw up a slight breastwork during the night, with Captain -Washington's battery on the road below, protected now with a ditch and -a parapet, that ran from the gullies nearly to the spur;[20.4] and at -this point, or in reserve just north of it, Wool gathered most of the -Americans, who numbered 4759 officers and men, placing near the mountain -under Colonel Marshall the Kentucky and Arkansas horse and Major -Gorman's rifle battalion (four companies) of the Indiana foot.[20.5] -Over against these forces, the principal body of the Mexicans formed two -lines with heavy reserves behind them and cavalry in the rear, while -Mexican artillery was planted on the road and also on the high ground -east of it; and Miñón's brigade, the duty of which was to cut off the -American retreat, showed itself early in the day at the rear of Buena -Vista.[20.6] On each side the engineers reconnoitred actively, and both -Taylor and Wool visited and addressed the various American corps.[20.8] - -Apparently there was an opportunity to outflank our left, and without -waiting for all his tired troops to come up, Santa Anna despatched -Ampudia with a considerable force of light infantry, well supported, -to seize a promising bench at the foot of the mountain. To defeat this -movement the Americans attempted to occupy the point first, but they -blundered and failed. Colonel Marshall then had a part of his force -ascend a spur of the mountain which joined near the summit a spur -leading down to the Mexican position, hoping in this way to outflank the -enemy; but the Mexicans, who were gradually reinforced, adopted the same -tactics.[20.8] - - [Illustration: BATTLE OF BUENA VISTA - - A _La Angostura, Washington's Battery and two companies - 1st Illinois Vols._ - B _Six companies 1st Illinois Regt._ - C _3rd Indiana Regt._ - D _2nd Kentucky Regt. and Sherman's Battery_ (_later - position_) - E _2nd Illinois Regt. and 1st Section Bragg's Battery_ - F _2nd Indiana Regt. and three pieces Washington's - Battery_ - G _Kentucky Horse Regt. and one squadron 2nd Dragoons_ - H _Arkansas Horse Regt. and one squadron 1st Dragoons_ - K _Dismounted Cavalry_, etc. - L _2nd Kentucky Regt., Bragg's Artillery and detachment - of Horse_ (_early position_) - M _2nd Indiana partly rallied here after retreating_ - N _Heaviest Mexican cannon_ - O _Blanco's Column_ - P _Column to force American left_ - Q _Battery_ - R _Light Troops_ - S _Reserve_ - T _Columns turning American left_ - V _Mexican Battery_ - X _Cavalry from head of Column T, attacking Buena - Vista_ - Y _Taylor and Staff_] - -At about three o'clock a shell from a Mexican howitzer planted on the -road gave the signal for combat; and the troops on the mountain opened -fire, climbing higher and higher until finally the Mexicans, getting -the better of Marshall, reached the crest. Meanwhile Captain O'Brien, -with three of Washington's eight guns and the Second Indiana under -Colonel Bowles for support, was posted well forward on the plateau, and -a movement on the left wing of the Mexican army led Taylor to place -the Second Kentucky under Colonel McKee, two guns under Bragg and a -detachment of horse on the opposite side of the valley; but after a -time, concluding that Santa Anna would attempt nothing more that day, he -returned to Saltillo,[20.7] escorted by the Mississippi regiment and a -body of the Second Dragoons.[20.8] - -At nightfall the roar of musketry on the sierra, answered by the sharp -crack of the American rifles, subsided, and Marshall's troops were -recalled to the foot of the mountain. Aside from losing a number of men, -while on our part none were seriously injured, the Mexicans clearly had -the best of it so far. Santa Anna delivered a stirring harangue to his -troops; and the enthusiastic vivas and triumphant music that followed -it, softened by distance, floated down to the Americans on the evening -breeze in wondrously sweet and haunting tones. Pleasure ended, however, -when they died away. Though so many strong men, soon to fight for -their lives, were present, the solitude of the desert seemed to reign. -The night air was bitterly cold. A drizzling rain fell. Except at the -mountain there was no fuel. The tents of the Americans were now in the -wagons, and the Mexicans had none; and long before daybreak the troops -on both sides felt ready for anything that would stop their teeth from -chattering. For our men especially it was a dismal situation, and the -reported statement of a captured Mexican that Santa Anna had 21,000 -troops gave Taylor's army no mental comfort.[20.8] - -[THE BATTLE OF BUENA VISTA] - -Early the next morning, February 23, Santa Anna had the reveille sounded -in his various corps one after another, in order to give an impression -of great numbers. Mass was then celebrated. All his infantry and cavalry -were drawn up in one long line. The bands, massed in front, rendered -the sacred music with grand effect; the smoke of incense mounted to the -clear, radiant sky; and a body of priests in splendid robes passed along -the line, bestowing their benedictions.[20.19] - -The troops then moved to their places with deliberation and precision, -for whether they could shoot or not, Mexican soldiers were always able -to march and wheel. Evolution followed evolution. Eminence beyond -eminence bristled with steel. All the colors of the rainbow--red, green, -yellow, crimson, sky-blue, turkey-blue--clothed the troops. Even the -horses appeared to be in uniform, for those of a corps were alike in -color. Silken banners and plumes of many bright hues floated on the -breeze. Handsomely dressed aides dashed from point to point. Tremendous -vivas rolled in mighty echoes from the mountain. And while Santa Anna -thus built up the morale of his army, most of the dingy Americans -had time enough--as the quartermasters were knocking in the heads of -the cartridge casks and the sergeants gruffly dealing out flints--to -view this grand pageant through the wonderfully clear atmosphere, -and reflect. Out of the desert, as if by magic, had come a great and -brilliant army. It was not what they had expected to see. The mere -breath of its approach had blown the Americans from Agua Nueva like -dust. In comparison with its deliberation and confidence their own hasty -movements appeared ridiculous. The Mexicans had already been successful -at the mountain, and the General was plainly alarmed about the rear. -They began to question his infallibility; and many felt in their hearts -that religion was on the other side.[20.19] - -At an early hour a large part of Marshall's command, supported presently -by Major Traill with two companies of the Second Illinois and Conner's -Texas company, reascended the mountain and, favored by the nature of the -ground, maintained for several hours a brisk fight with Ampudia, who, -reinforced with heavy infantry, succeeded at last in outflanking though -not in repulsing the Americans. To aid his operations in this quarter, -perhaps, by creating a diversion, Santa Anna ordered General Blanco to -advance down the road with a heavy column, strongly backed with cannon -placed in battery near the mouth of the broad ravine; but at every -discharge of Washington's guns whole lines of Mexicans appeared to sink, -and the column, unable to deploy, soon fled for shelter to the hilly -ground on its right.[20.19] - -A stronger attack, however, was now launched. Pacheco and Lombardini -received orders to advance, unite on the plateau, and force the -American left; and a strong battery was planted on the Mexican right -near the head of the broad ravine to coöperate with them.[20.9] -Both infantry and horse marched forward boldly at parade step; and -the Americans could but admire the showy uniforms, the arms which -gleamed like silver, the belts white with pipeclay, and the freshly -polished brasses. Pacheco soon became engaged with the Second Indiana, -which--perhaps half a mile from any support except O'Brien's three guns -on its right--was the corps nearest Marshall and farthest forward on the -plateau; and after about half an hour of gallant fighting General Lane, -in the hope of both driving Pacheco back and relieving the Indianians -from the enfilading fire of the Mexican artillery, determined to have -them and O'Brien advance. The latter did so; but Colonel Bowles gave and -repeated an order to retreat. His retreat soon became flight,[20.10] -and four companies of Arkansas mounted riflemen joined in the -stampede.[20.19] - -O'Brien, though he loaded with double canister, now found himself -compelled to withdraw, sacrificing a 4-pounder--which had neither a -sound man nor a sound horse left--but firing the other pieces as he -drew them back with ropes (prolonges). The Second Illinois, commanded -by Colonel Bissell, a born soldier, which was actively engaged on the -plateau a long distance to O'Brien's right and rear, was then outflanked -by Pacheco, and it had to retire, though in the most orderly manner, -toward the edge of the plateau. Marshall's troops were now entirely -separated from the rest of our army. Discovering their exposed situation -they hurried from the mountain, escaped with considerable difficulty and -some loss from Ampudia and the Mexican cavalry that pressed on with him, -and took refuge at Buena Vista, over three miles from their position. -Here, not long afterwards, a part of them helped other fugitives defeat -a body of lancers under Torrejón, that attempted to raid their asylum -and the wagon train;[20.11] but only a few would return to the field, -and some of them rushed panic-stricken to Saltillo, crying out that all -was lost.[20.19] - -McKee and Bragg now made all speed from the other side of the valley to -the plateau. Blanco having been repulsed, four of Hardin's companies -came from the first spur. The squadron of the First Dragoons arrived; -and Bragg, Sherman and O'Brien, handling their eight guns in a masterly -style, drew a line of fire from the first gulch to the long ravine. La -Angostura and the first spur, the double key to the American position, -were thus well defended; but our left had been crushed, the way to our -rear lay open, and in spite of our incessant fire Ampudia, Pacheco and -Lombardini advanced. "One more charge!" cried the Mexicans. Apparently -Santa Anna was to triumph.[20.19] - -At this point, about nine o'clock, Taylor and his escort appeared most -fortunately on the scene.[20.12] The General, mounted on Old Whitey, -stationed himself conspicuously on the plateau near the first spur with -the dragoons that accompanied him; but the Mississippi men, to whom -Colonel Bowles and a part of his regiment now attached themselves, -marched from the road in their duck trousers with red shirts outside of -them, swinging along with the light step of hunters, threw themselves -against Ampudia and the cavalry with him in the north field, repulsed -them although greatly outnumbered, and, aided by the Third Indiana, -which had been standing in reserve behind Washington, and by one of -Bragg's guns under Lieutenant Kilburn, forced them back by a withering -fire toward the mountain.[20.19] - -By this time a strong Mexican battery had been moved round the head of -the broad ravine by dint of extraordinary exertions, and planted near -the mountain, where it commanded the entire plateau; but in spite of -the skilful San Patricio company--American deserters--who partly or -wholly manned it, the Pacheco-Lombardini column broke almost in the -middle under the American fire, the larger part of it advancing into -the north field and reinforcing Ampudia, while the other part--bearing -with it Santa Anna, whose horse had been killed by a canister ball, and -suffering terribly from our cannon and the close pursuit of Hardin, -Bissell and McKee--shrank back toward the broad ravine. The situation on -the plateau thus became easy. Shelter from the Mexican artillery could -be found in the minor ravines; bread, water and ammunition were brought -up; and the wounded were removed. But there was great danger now that -the large Mexican forces north of the long ravine would either fall upon -Washington's rear or, joining hands with Miñón, capture the American -stores and ammunition at Saltillo. Leaving O'Brien's two guns and one -each of their own on the plateau, therefore, Bragg and Sherman were -ordered to the north field.[20.19] - -Here, soon after noon, a brigade of Mexican cavalry supported by -infantry pushed resolutely forward to gain the Saltillo road near the -long ravine. In order to find a better position and avoid the danger -of being enveloped, the Mississippians retired some distance; but soon -they halted, and with the Indiana men, who now rejoined them, formed an -obtuse angle opening toward the mountain. Upon this obstacle the Mexican -cavalry, drawn up in a close column, rushed down at an easy gallop in -the most beautiful style, drawing small circles in the air with the -glittering points of their lances. These men, too, were brilliantly -uniformed, the horses were lavishly caparisoned, and all the plumes and -flags and pennons were fluttering. Had they maintained their impetus, -they could have carried all before them; but the attitude of the -Americans, who made no attempt to form a square and merely stood still -with shouldered arms, puzzled the Mexican leader. He wondered, probably, -what there might be in the ravine close by them, and slackening speed -he almost halted, about seventy yards away, at the very focus of their -angle.[20.19] - -But suddenly the muskets and rifles were levelled. Each man picked his -target, and at the word "Fire!"--just as the Mexican bugler sounded the -charge--two sheets of flame converged on that splendid brigade. The head -of it fell to the ground, and the rest were thrown into confusion. Then -the Mississippi men leaped forward, yelling wildly, seized horses by the -bits, threw them back on their haunches, and finished many a helpless -rider with the 18-inch bowie-knife, while the Indianians fired and plied -the bayonet, and Sherman, coming up with a howitzer, blasted out wide, -red gaps. The onslaught was irresistible; the whole brigade with its -infantry support recoiled; and the victors pressed on in pursuit.[20.19] - -A deafening thunderstorm of rain and hail now burst upon the contending -armies, but the battle in the north field hardly paused. While Sherman -accompanied the right of the Mississippi and Indiana men, Bragg and -a body of dragoons flanked their left;[20.13] the American artillery -on the plateau, having little to do there, turned its attention upon -the same dense masses; and gradually this whole force of Mexicans was -driven back to the mountain. Retiring then into a recess of the sierra, -they became more and more closely concentrated, and the American fire -more and more destructive; but as the lancers had been stabbing their -wounded enemies, no pity was felt on our side now.[20.19] - -Nothing but annihilation appeared to await the panic-stricken mass; but -precisely at this juncture--about one o'clock--several Mexican officers, -who had been separated from their troops, galloped up to Taylor in the -desperate hope of saving their lives, and asked in the name of Santa -Anna what the American general wanted.[20.14] Upon this Wool himself -rode with a white flag toward the spot where Santa Anna was supposed to -be, in order to ascertain the meaning of this extraordinary question, -and to a considerable extent the American fire ceased. As the Mexican -guns, however, kept at work, Wool returned; but during this lull the -troops imprisoned in the recess passed rapidly along the base of the -mountain, girdling it with a belt of shining steel, toward the San -Patricio battery. Their escape was deeply regretted, but at all events -the north field was now clear of them.[20.19] - -From the first, Santa Anna had been determined to gain the American -rear, doubtless believing that if taken in reverse the volunteers would -certainly give way, and he had succeeded in completely outflanking us; -yet Ampudia's light brigade, the heavy infantry, Torrejón's cavalry, and -the brilliant corps of lancers that attacked the Mississippi and Indiana -troops had all failed. Upset, perhaps, by this disappointment, he threw -away his chance of triumph, for he should have coöperated with his brave -troops in the north field by hurling upon the American centre all the -forces that could be gathered on the south field and the plateau.[20.15] -But now, for a last and crowning effort, he assembled these forces, -placed them under the command of General Pérez, and advanced the battery -on his right flank to an elevated position.[20.19] - -Unwittingly Taylor played into his hands, for now--about four -o'clock--he ordered Hardin to charge;[20.16] and the brave colonel, -whose finely cut, virile face, jet-black eye and tightly closed lips -told what he was, advanced promptly with his six companies. This -movement brought him before long into contact with the Mexicans from -the recess, who, observing the smallness of his command, rallied against -him. Bissell and McKee, seeing that he was overmatched, hastened to -his aid, and all three pushed vigorously forward; but suddenly queer -objects appeared to be moving along the surface of the plateau at their -right, and in another moment out of the ground rose a forest of muskets. -This was the corps of Pérez emerging from the broad ravine. Hardin, -Bissell and McKee poured upon it a hot fire. So did O'Brien with his two -6-pounders, and Chickamauga Thomas with one of Sherman's pieces. But the -fire of the Mexicans, one terrific blaze and roar, was this time low and -true. The air seemed thick with their bullets. Some of the Kentucky men -dropped to the ground to escape them. "Up, up and on!" cried McKee, and -with frantic cheers they sprang again to their work.[20.19] - -But they fought in vain. The odds were too great, and the Americans -too exhausted. "Retreat or you are lost!" was the order; and the three -regiments, enveloped by the left wing of Pérez, rushed and rolled in -headlong flight down the second gulch toward the road. Here the fearless -Hardin, defending himself to the last with a sabre, his only weapon, -sank to the ground. Here the son of Henry Clay, wounded in the thigh, -refused to let his men imperil their lives by trying to carry him -farther, and bravely met his fate; and here fell the gallant McKee, -covered with wounds. Indeed, all seemed to be doomed alike, for lancers -hurried on to close the mouth of the gulch; but suddenly Washington's -guns opened with spherical case shot, and under this driving, hissing -blast of iron the Americans ran breathless to La Angostura.[20.19] - -On the plateau, during this catastrophe, the right wing of Pérez bore -down upon Taylor's position at the centre. Nothing formidable stood in -its way except O'Brien, for Thomas was fully occupied about one hundred -yards to O'Brien's left and rear. Understanding the crisis and ready to -sacrifice everything if he could only gain a little time, O'Brien fired -canister till not one of his gunners was left, and the Mexicans could -almost lay hands on the pieces, and then just managed to hobble away. -The Mexicans now swept on at a run. The fragments at our centre were on -the point of giving way. The day seemed lost.[20.19] - -But by this time Bragg and Sherman, lashing and spurring their tired -horses, came up from the north field; and the Indiana and Mississippi -regiments, hurrying over the ridges and ravines with trailed arms, -appeared on their left some distance away. Without support Bragg whirled -his guns into battery only a few rods from the enemy, and Sherman -followed his example, while the infantry charged the Mexican flank and -rear; and quickly, but none too soon, canister and bullets told. Round -followed round, and volley pursued volley. The infantry shook with -fatigue; the men at the cannon, grimy with powder-stains, gasped for air -as they rammed the charges home; but they all kept at work.[20.19] - -Bravely fought the Mexicans, too; but such a staggering fire could not -be resisted, and soon the dark masses of Pérez's column reeled back -in confusion to the broad ravine. It was now about five o'clock. Our -artillery continued to play for a while on the San Patricio battery, but -even Miñón, who had been making feeble demonstrations against Saltillo, -was by this time thoroughly repulsed,[20.17] and the roar of battle -subsided. The terrible conflict was in fact over. Both armies were too -exhausted to fight longer, and in the narrow valley day was already -waning. - - "The guns still roared at intervals; but silence fell at last, - And on the dead and dying came the evening shadows fast; - And then above the mountains rose the pale moon's silver shield, - And patiently and pitying she looked upon the field."[20.19] - -[THE BATTLE EXTRAORDINARY] - -It was an extraordinary battle. On the part of the Americans it began -in flight and ended in success. Marred by mistakes and failures, it -exhibited even more strikingly both skill and moral grandeur. Taylor -seems to have had but little to do with directing it, and that little -seems to have been poor work; but he did more than engineer success--he -created it. Huddled rather than mounted, a great part of the time, on -Old Whitey, with arms folded and one leg unconcernedly thrown across the -pommel of his saddle, the conspicuous target of the Mexican artillery -yet utterly unmoved even when his clothes were pierced, he was a -fountain of courage and energy.[20.18] In other words, the victory of -Buena Vista was due primarily to Taylor's prestige, valor and gift of -inspiring confidence. Others contributed essentially, however. Wool, -who commanded on our left, played the rôle of the fearless professional -soldier that he was. Many other officers and certain corps exhibited -a heroism of the noblest quality. Our artillery was beyond praise for -both daring and skill. As Wool said in his report, the army could not -have stood for "a single hour" without it; and the batteries served -indispensably, moreover, as rallying-points for the infantry. The -lancers, cantering over the plain and finishing the American wounded, -gave great assistance by exasperating and warning our men; and even -Miñón helped us, for he made it look extremely dangerous, during much of -the time, to set out for Saltillo.[20.19] - -Nor should our foes be undervalued. While it was said afterwards that -a number of the higher officers did badly, the troops earned by their -wonderful march, their endurance of hunger and especially thirst, -and their valiant fighting under the terrible fire of the American -artillery, a liberal mead of praise. In fact, when due allowance is made -for the numbers of their almost valueless cavalry and for the position, -equipment, supplies and comparative freshness of the Americans, one -finds the two armies not very unevenly matched, and so far as fighting -was concerned, the engagement proved almost or perhaps quite a drawn -battle.[20.19] - -Then followed a night almost as hard as the day. In killed and wounded -Taylor had lost 673 officers and men,[20.20] and in spite of his -personal influence 1500 or 1800 appear to have quit the field. Those -who remained, fatigued not only by their exertions but in consequence -of the rarefied atmosphere, found themselves at the end of their -strength, both physical and moral. Evidently the Mexicans were not so -contemptible. Only one of our regiments had kept its face always toward -the enemy. Some of the bravest leaders had fallen. The death of so many -comrades depressed all. In too many cases officers had lost confidence -in their men, or men in their officers. Many home letters were written -that night, and they were all despondent. The howl of the wolf and the -creaking flap of the buzzard reached the very souls of the sleepless men -shivering in the cold. Wool felt compelled to use the flat of his sword -on some of the officers, and even that did not make them stir. Officer -after officer assured Taylor that no more fighting could be done, or -that it would mean defeat if attempted.[20.24] - -Not for a moment, however, would the General admit this. He was -determined to hold the ground, querying only whether Santa Anna would -turn the American position during the night or make another frontal -attack in the morning.[20.21] The Mississippi regiment was ordered to -Saltillo, while most of the troops holding the city were drawn to the -front; and a detachment of the Kentucky mounted volunteers with four -heavy guns, marching that night from Rinconada Pass, thirty-five miles -distant, could be reckoned on. But the General felt deeply mortified by -the skulking, and wondered how many men would give him the slip before -morning.[20.24] - -[SANTA ANNA RETIRES] - -Still more bitter were the reflections of Santa Anna. His passionate -nature ebbed and flowed, and a reverse always depressed him extremely. -He was tired out, and his old wound had begun to make him trouble. -Probably not less than 1800 of his men had been killed or wounded; 294 -had been captured; and he was probably not far from the mark when he -said that more than 4000 had left him during the battle.[20.22] He felt -that the American position, defended by men whose fighting compelled his -admiration, was impregnable. Mexican troops always lacked morale for -long, and especially for unsuccessful, operations; and the troops under -his command were now spent in every way. Confidence in their leader and -in the hope of booty failed them. They remembered how they had been -forced into the ranks and then abused. Surprised by an infantry that -seemed to recognize no defeat, they were dumfounded by an artillery that -seemed to be everywhere at once and always blazing. Hunger, thirst, and -cold tormented them.[20.24] - -Such conditions meant wholesale desertion; and, as a Mexican officer -wrote that evening, it was a grave question whether the troops, if -left overnight in their present loose and scattered state, would not -disband.[20.23] The country would then be without a disciplined army -to oppose either Taylor or Scott; and Santa Anna knew what his enemies -would say in that case. If, on the other hand, he should lead back an -organized force bearing the recognized fruits of victory, two banners -and three cannon, he could claim a success even if not a positive -triumph. So, leaving behind the wounded that were not within easy reach -or could not well be transported, he closed up his ranks not long after -nightfall, and set out for Agua Nueva. At first the march was like a -funeral procession, except that dead men appeared to be celebrating -their own obsequies. Nobody spoke; the bands were silent; the groans of -the wounded and the rumble of the artillery and wagons took the place of -conversation and music. But before long the slender crescent of the moon -sank behind the mountain; and then in the greatest confusion the men -stumbled and hurried along, eager to find a resting place.[20.24] - -Of this movement the American outposts were not aware. A Mexican brigade -kept fires burning along the whole front, and pickets rode steadily to -and fro singing to themselves a strange, sad air. When the first pale -gleam was visible above the sierra, our soldiers bestirred themselves -for another battle. But as the day began to grow, only the backs of -a Mexican rearguard could be seen. A joyous murmur ran from group to -group. Soon it was confirmed; it swelled to a shout; hard-featured, -battle-worn men became boys again; and Taylor and Wool threw themselves, -with moist eyes, into each other's arms.[20.24] - -[THE MEXICAN RETREAT] - -About 860 officers and 9000 men gathered round Santa Anna that forenoon -at Agua Nueva. Temporary supplies of food were available,[20.25] -and the troops were at once reorganized by combining companies from -different corps. Before the day was out Major Bliss arrived to propose -an exchange of prisoners and suggest an end of hostilities.[20.26] To -the former proposition Santa Anna acceded, but he rejected the latter; -and, ordering the eyes of the American commissioner to be unbound, -he exhibited to him an army prepared for battle. In general orders -he stated that his purpose in retiring had been to draw Taylor upon -ground where Mexican cavalry could operate; but, as the prospect of -resuming the offensive was extremely slight, provisions were scanty, the -dysentery had already broken out, and the presence of so many wounded -men--more than 700 poor fellows in the most wretched condition--seemed -liable to produce other diseases, a council of war decided the next -day upon retreat, and February 26 in the afternoon the troops moved -south.[20.27] - -Now came their real defeat. Like Napoleon returning from Russia, -Santa Anna hurried on in advance, and owing to complications there was -actually no general-in-chief. Divisions and corps marched and lived -as they could. Officers obeyed or disobeyed as they chose. Dysentery, -typhus and all sorts of minor distresses prevailed. The condition of -the troops was enough to make nature shudder, wrote an officer; and -the march was "worse than three retreats from Matamoros put together." -Probably not less than 3000 men were lost in one way or another on the -road; and when the miserable survivors--less than half the number that -had left San Luis full of enthusiasm--began to arrive in that city, -the sensation among the people was described by a witness as "most -profound." Santa Anna, however, had already been accorded triumphal -honors there. By this time a wave of jubilation, soon to break in -plaudits on the far-distant shores of Tabasco River, was in motion; -and he took pains to ensure proper testimony by having a cross of -honor decreed to every officer distinguished in the battle, and by -distributing twenty-seven promotions in the three highest grades.[20.27] - -For Taylor also the battle of Buena Vista had a sequel. Impressed, very -likely, by the report of Bliss, he allowed his army to rest where it -was for three days; but late on the twenty-seventh, having ascertained -Santa Anna's retreat through a reconnaissance, he reoccupied Agua Nueva, -where he found a number of Mexican wounded, and on March 1--though his -troops were not yet fresh enough to pursue the enemy or he did not think -it safe to do so--he pushed a detachment on to La Encarnación with a -like result. Provisions and surgical assistance were freely given to the -disabled foemen, but their comrades were evidently beyond reach.[20.29] - -Taylor's rear, however, caused him rather serious trouble. The long -shadow cast by Santa Anna's army had spread alarm and confusion all over -northeastern Mexico, and the approach of troops from Tula deepened it. -Even the people of Monclova and Parras, despite their promises to be -neutral, took up arms. The Americans were now to be driven across the -Rio Grande and perhaps the Sabine, it was threatened. Preparations for -defence were made at all our chief posts, and for this reason they were -hardly molested; but the lines of communication could not be maintained, -detachments en route were menaced or assailed, and on the day following -the battle Urrea, a polished ruffian of the distinctive Spanish-American -type, broke up a large wagon train with signal atrocity.[20.28] The -rancheros coöperated eagerly in this profitable work, and the result of -the battle had little effect upon them, for they had seen the Mexican -army come and go at will, and doubtless thought it might appear again. -Taylor therefore proceeded to Monterey about the eighth of March, and -endeavored to restore order. On the twenty-eighth he reported that quiet -had returned; but three weeks later, though he believed that Urrea and -his regulars had withdrawn beyond the Sierra Madre, he admitted that -bands of robbers were still very numerous.[20.29] - -Nor was the panic limited to this region. Almost equal alarm prevailed -in the United States. "The sympathy of every human being is elicited," -wrote Brooke at New Orleans; and the government itself, hurrying off -recruits and authorizing Brooke to accept new volunteers, awaited in -"painful suspense" the result of Santa Anna's advance. The tidings -of his failure, exaggerated of course into news of a brilliant and -overwhelming triumph won by a general robbed of his troops, caused a -tremendous rebound. Polk, holding that only Taylor's blundering and -violation of orders had created the peril, and that his brave men had -rescued him from it, would not permit a general salute in the army; but -the nation saluted, and the General's nomination for the Presidency -became inevitable.[20.29] - - - - - NOTES - - - KEY TO THE REFERENCES - -In most cases it will not be difficult to determine where the MS. -sources are preserved. Despatches to or from a military or naval -officer, a diplomatic or a consular agent may be understood, if there is -no indication to the contrary, to be in the corresponding archives of -the government addressed. (The connection of the author of a despatch -may be ascertained by looking up his name in the index.) This direction -may seem vague, but the officials at the archives will be found able -to supply the needful details. The principal foreign agents in Mexico -were (U. S.) Poinsett, Butler, Ellis, Thompson, Shannon, Slidell, and -(consuls) Jones, Black, and Dimond; (England) Morier, Ward, Pakenham, -Ashburnham, Bankhead, Doyle, Thornton, and (consul) Giffard; (France) -Cochelet, Martin, Deffaudis, and Cyprey; and (Spain) Bermúdez de Castro -and Lozano. Mexican documents cited in the form "To S. Anna, Apr. 20" -or "S. Anna, Mar. 4," are in the archives of the War Dept. of Mexico, -National Palace. Many unofficial letters can readily be traced by means -of the list of MS. sources. When it has seemed desirable, however, -particularly at the beginning of a chapter, heavy figures referring to -that list have been prefixed to the citation, and also to many citations -of official documents. The MS. sources are given in the appendix of each -volume; the printed sources in the appendix of the second volume. - -A formula like "Ho. 60; 30, 1" means House Executive Document no. 60, -of the Thirtieth Congress, first session; and "_Cong. Globe_, 30, 2" -refers to the _Congressional Globe_, Thirtieth Congress, second session. -In some cases it has been found best to cite a document broadly by -mentioning the first page of it; and the same remark applies to passages -in other publications. The year in the date of a cited document is -omitted when it is the same as that of the events referred to in the -corresponding paragraph of the text. _E.g._ a document dated Oct. 15, -1847, attached to a paragraph dealing with Scott's landing at Vera -Cruz (March, 1847) or capturing Mexico City (Sept., 1847) is cited -as of "Oct. 15," not "Oct. 15, 1847." This is done to save space. -The abbreviations are plain. "Gov." means _governor_; "comte. gen.," -_comandante general_; "comte. mil." _comandante militar_. "Gov. Puebla," -etc., means _governor of Puebla_, etc. "_Diario_" means the official -newspaper. For fuller titles of books the list of sources may be -consulted. - -The want of definiteness and the lack of statistics in numerous cases -(particularly Mexican affairs) may be charged to a dearth of trustworthy -data. - - - - - NOTES - - - PREFACE - -P.1. Another reason for the neglect of the Mexican War has been its -unpopularity. But for that, it would no doubt have been thoroughly -studied sooner. - -P.2. A second reason for preparing this history was that a number of -important topics--such as the conditions existing in the two countries -just before the war, the war in American politics, our conduct and -methods in occupied territory, the finances of the war, its foreign -relations, etc.--had been treated most superficially or not at all. -In the third place it was hoped to handle more carefully the material -previously used. The bound volumes entitled "Archivo de Guerra" in the -Archivo General y Público at Mexico occupy some 200 feet of shelf room, -and the papers examined in the Archivo de Guerra y Marina, which had to -be examined one by one, would probably, if placed one on another, make a -pile sixty feet high. - -As will be seen from the detailed account of the MS. sources (appendix), -the author did not visit the archives of all the Mexican states and -cities. This was because nothing further of local value could be hoped -for, and because the practice of communicating from state to state -copies of important documents made it seem unnecessary to continue in -those directions. The results in Peru and Colombia were negative, but -this fact had a positive significance, for there were reasons to look -for an active sympathy and correspondence with Mexico in those quarters. -The author planned to examine the Prussian archives, but the outbreak -of the great war prevented him from doing so. From other trustworthy -sources, mostly unpublished, he fully understood the attitude of that -government, however (chap. xxxv). The reports of the Prussian -representative at Mexico cannot have been reliable, both because of -his personal characteristics and because for several reasons he did -not stand within the inner circle, and probably, since his government -felt scarcely any interest in the war, they were not full. Hence it -is not believed that anything of material value has been lost through -the impossibility of examining them. Of some of the newspaper files -only scattered portions were found. Many newspapers, as well as many -books and pamphlets, were read to ascertain the general temper, social -state, and political conditions of the two countries, and it appeared -unnecessary to set down references--which would have been almost -innumerable--to such literature. The author contemplated at one time a -critical discussion of the sources, but he soon found that this would -require too much space. It would in fact make a volume. For additional -information regarding the sources one may consult an article of the -author's that appeared in _The Military Historian and Economist_, vol. -i, no. 1. - -P.3. The printed versions of diplomatic and military documents, when -substantially correct, are usually cited in the notes, because they -are easily accessible; but so far as possible they have been collated -with the originals. On the value of official military reports the -author presented some remarks in the _American Historical Review_, vol. -xxi, p. 96. Gen. Worth said privately that Scott's report on the -battle of Cerro Gordo was "a lie from beginning to end," and in a -sense different from what this language would at first sight appear -to mean, it was fairly correct (chap. xxiii, note 33). Subordinate -officers not infrequently brought all possible influence, both personal -and political, to bear upon the general whose report they knew would -be printed. A general naturally favored in his report the regiment and -the officers with whom he had been formerly associated. An undue regard -for rank was often felt. Taylor asked a promotion for Brig Gen. Twiggs -after the capture of Monterey though Twiggs had been ostensibly ill at -the time and had taken no material part in the fight. Captain (later -General) Bragg wrote: "The feelings succeeding a great victory caused -many things to be forgotten and forgiven which would sound badly in -history, and which will never be known except in private correspondence" -(=210=to Gov. Hammond, May 4, 1848). An important document issued -by our government was privately described by the adj. gen. as "full of -inaccuracies" (=117=R.Jones to B. Mayer, Oct. 10, 1848). - -A special reason for leaving no stone unturned has been the -consideration that the omission of a significant fact is even worse than -a positive error, since it is equally misleading and less likely to -be discovered. In many instances an apparently insignificant document -proved to be the keystone of an arch or at least to fill a serious gap, -and the cumulative effect of a number of such documents frequently -established a capital fact. Documents not actually used often prove -helpful by preventing the writer from drawing inferences that look -reasonable but are in fact incorrect (see the last paragraph of the -article in the _Military Historian_ cited above). Even minutiæ enable -one to give life and, so to speak, rotundity to events, and to do this -is to increase the fidelity of the narrative. The more information the -historian possesses, the better he can criticise particular documents. -In consequence of a want of this full acquaintance with the facts, -documents relating to the subject have previously been misunderstood. -Still another valuable fruit of a wide investigation is a higher degree -of confidence on the part of both author and reader that no later -discoveries will upset present conclusions. For Scott's statement see -=65=gen. orders 249, Aug. 6, 1847. - -Naturally the author had little occasion to use previous histories of -the war, and indeed he took care not to consult them while writing -this work. No thorough attempt has been made to point out their errors -and no wish is felt to criticize them in general; but it needs to be -explained that while Ripley, Wilcox, Furber and Roa Bárcena present -statements of minor importance, not found elsewhere, which the author -wished to use, he has seldom felt at liberty to do so. As is well known -those authors were not critical historians. They were also too near the -events. It is frequently impossible to be sure whether their statements -rested upon hearsay, upon trustworthy second-hand information, or upon -personal knowledge. Roa Bárcena spoke as a Mexican. Wilcox aimed to -glorify our officers and men; and Ripley intended to exalt the unworthy -Pillow at the expense of Scott (chap. xxiii, note 29; and, for an -interesting though not wholly correct review of Ripley, _So. Qtrly. -Rev._, Jan., 1851, 149-60). Pillow =185=wrote in reference to Ripley's -book, He has torn Scott "the _man_ and the _officer_ all _to pieces_." -The recent work by Rives contains much that is sound as well as -dignified; but his investigations came far short of the requirements. -The present author has frequently taken pains to write in such a way as -to correct errors without mentioning them, and the reader may feel sure -that he has carefully considered all statements not in agreement with -his own. - -P.4. Particular reasons why a civilian could venture to prepare -the history of this war were that (1) owing largely to the smallness -of the numbers engaged, the operations were simple; (2) the reports -were written for non-military readers; and (3) a large amount of -good criticism was written at the time or soon afterwards--mostly in -a private way--by competent officers who were personally familiar -with the circumstances. As a matter of fact military men's technical -knowledge does not necessarily enable them to reach correct historical -conclusions. This is proved by their radical differences of opinion -(_e.g._ compare the articles on Wilcox's History of the Mexican War, -_Journal of U.S. Artillery_, July and Oct., 1892) and their manifest -errors of judgment. Gen. U. S. Grant pronounced Scott's strategy on Aug. -20, 1847, faultless as a result of the perfect work of his engineer -officers (Pers. Mems., i, 145); but the engineer from whose report -Scott's essential orders regarding the battle of Churubusco resulted -admitted privately that he blundered (<xxvi, notes, remarks on -Churubusco). The dicta of military authorities are not often quoted by -the author, because war cannot be made by rule and it would be necessary -to consider in each case whether the dictum was applicable. - -A very difficult matter was to decide how many military details to -introduce. There is hardly any limit to the names of officers and -commands and the minutiæ of movements that might have been presented. -The principle adopted was to draw the line between historical value and -antiquarian value, to include what was needed to show how the important -results were brought about and allow the curious reader to ascertain the -rest of the details by looking up the references. - -The reader who has given no study to the subject may perhaps welcome -a few informal and obviously incomplete remarks on the principles -of war. One proper aim is the occupation of territory, and this may -possibly be accomplished without fighting; but essentially combat is -presupposed, and the purpose is then to destroy or in some other way -eliminate the enemy's military strength, so that he will feel compelled -to accept our terms. Therefore the general should (1) make all possible -preparations; (2) take the initiative and lose no time; (3) secure -unity in plan and in action; (4) obtain as much information as possible -regarding the enemy and beware of despising him; (5) embarrass him and -break down his morale, while building up your own, through rapidity of -movement, surprises, feints, threats against his communications, etc.; -(6) select for objective a point combining, as far as may be, weakness -and decisiveness--qualities often incompatible, of course; (7) running -no avoidable risk of inadequacy, concentrate near and move upon this -an overpowering force, while diverting the enemy's forces from it; -(8) strike with energy and decision; and (9) if successful, pursue to -the limit of endurance and safety. In a general way it may be said -that an "indirect" or "oblique" (_i.e._ flank) attack is preferable, -but obviously the actual conditions must decide whether to adopt that -method. In view of these principles, strategy determines when, where, -and with what forces a battle shall be fought, and tactics directs the -battle itself. It follows that on the defensive one should protect -one's communications, force the enemy to send out detachments and rout -or annoy these; and, if such methods have no saving effect, retire to -a position strong by nature, art, or both, and, while defending it, -watch for opportunities to strike. One may consult on these points -and on the text to which this note refers Clausewitz, On War, book i, -chap. 7; Jomini, Précis, i, 470-2; Murray, Reality of War, 21, 77; -Donat, Strategical Science, 275-6; Henderson, Science of War, 19-20; -Griepenkerl, Applied Tactics, 116; Goltz, Conduct of War, 10-12; _Jour. -Milit. Serv. Instit._, 1908, p. 31; _Am. Hist. Rev._, xi, 388. - -P.5. As the author was compelled to depart in many cases from the -familiar method of referring to the sources, he feels bound to explain -how these were handled. All the material, condensed as much as it safely -could be, was marked in the margin with Roman figures, indicating to -what chapter each sentence or larger section would belong. Then the -sections were copied into packets, each of which contained all the -material of a chapter. Next the material of each packet was analyzed -into topical items, and the items were numbered with Arabic figures. -In writing a chapter the author placed after each sentence (or, if the -case demanded, after each clause, phrase or word) the Arabic figures -numbering the items upon which it rested. These figures were retained -through the successive revisions until the MS. was ready to print, and -were used in the re-examination of the work. By this routine every -document was considered at least five times. Of course care was taken -at all stages to ensure correct copying; yet in the final revision the -author went back, unless there was a good reason for not doing so, -to originals or to trustworthy copies from the originals--doing this -not merely to verify the references but also to see, in the light of -the completed investigation of the subject, whether he had omitted or -misunderstood anything of importance in making notes and condensations. -The text and remarks as written looked thus: - - "Gen. Patterson once asserted that Volunteers were no worse - than regulars 578, but the evidence of other officers 83-4 340 - 385 564 568 1266 and of the Mexicans 84 87 340 489 582 1236 was - overwhelmingly against him. Regulars committed offences, but these - appear to have been commonly mere pilfering 181 562, and to have - been chargeable mostly to fresh recruits 83 1103. It is probable, - however, that the Volunteer troops often bore the blame 109 for - acts done by soldiers dishonorably discharged 659 981, deserters - 582 601 659 689 945, teamsters and other civilian employees 358 - 1315 and the many "black legs" 377 and "human vultures" 1292 who - followed the army 365 568 639. The great difficulty was to identify - the culprits 1315. Mexicans were often afraid to testify against - our soldiers 1266." - -The saving of space and labor that resulted from the grouping of -citations can easily be illustrated. Take the case of ten statements -resting upon ten documents, which may be represented by the first ten -letters of the alphabet. Were the usual method followed the references -might be: _acj_, _dfghi_, _be_, _adeghj_, _fij_, _bcf_, _adeg_, _cfh_, -_i_, _bdgh_j; whereas by the group method the references would be -_abcdefghij_--in the former case 35, in the latter 10. The higher -cost of the former method might have enforced the omission of all -references from the printed volumes, if indeed the increased labor of -writing, copying, and proof-reading the references had not deterred -the author--as it might well have done--from completing his task. As it -stands, the book probably represents (including the work of clerical -assistants) nearly twenty years of labor. After all, the chief value -of citations is perhaps their effect upon the author. Few look them -up; but, no matter how conscientious he may be, the fact of constantly -giving such pledges of fidelity keeps him wide-awake to the necessity of -accuracy, and indeed compels him to refer to his sources more than he -might otherwise feel obliged to do. - - - I. MEXICO AND THE MEXICANS - -(To the sources mentioned below may be added a residence of more than -a year in Mexico, during which the author met people of numerous -categories and made every possible effort to understand the national -traits.) - -1.1. _Physical Mexico._ U. S. War Dept., Monograph. Bureau of Amer. -Republics, Mexico. Encyclopædia Britannica, "Mexico." Numerous books of -travel mentioned in note 8. - -1.2. _Population._ The census which served as a basis for the -elections of 1841 and some later years gave the population as 7,016,000 -(Dublán, Legislación, v, 152, gives the figures by states). The American -governor of Jalapa, Col. Hughes, =257=wrote, Jan. 28, 1848, that -according to "authentic Mexican official documents" the population -was about 7,500,000, of whom 2,500,000 were under seventeen years of -age, 500,000 were over sixty, and 300,000 were idlers, beggars, etc., -incapable of work. The population of the United States in 1840 was -17,069,453. _Observador Judicial_, 1842. Consideraciones, 5. _Journal -des Débats_, Sept. 9, 1847. =261=Mémoire. Macgregor, Progress, i, -317. Ward, Mexico, i, 28. Mora, Obras, i, 54. México á través, iii, 19; -iv, p. vii. Relaciones, circular, Aug. 9, 1847. =82=Decree, Dec. -16, 1847. _Diario_, May 4, 1847, claimed 8,000,000. - -1.3. _Racial divisions and characteristics._ México á través, iii, -18-21. Humboldt, Essai Polit., i, 367, 381, 411-6; ii, 1-4, 9, 45, -48-52. =52=Poinsett, no. 166, March 10, 1829. Mayer, War, 13, -16. _Commerc. Review_, ii, 165-76. Consideraciones, 5-7. García, -Conquista, 4, 370-2, 397. Thompson, Recolls., 7. Poinsett, Notes, 161. -=13=Hervey, Description of Mexico. =261=Mémoire. Löwenstern, -Le Mexique, 166, 174-89. Mora, Obras, i, 54-6. Cuevas, Porvenir, -12-14. =178=Davis, diary. =162=Conner to wife, Mar. 4, 1846. -Diccionario Universal (_Mexicanos_). =13=Morier, no. 10, Feb. 10, -1825. _Eco del Comercio_, Mar. 22, 1848. - -Technically the child of a Spaniard and an Indian was a "mestizo," the -child of a Spaniard and a mestizo was a "castizo," and the child of a -Spaniard and a castizo was a "criollo" (creole); but "criollo" came to -include all these classes and also pure whites born in Mexico. As very -few Spanish women went to Mexico, the mixture of blood was practically -inevitable. As is well known the Spanish blood itself is a singular -mixture. Hence the Mexican was naturally peculiar. - -1.4. _The class divisions._ Otero, Cuestión, 37, 47-51. -=13=Morier, no. 12, Feb. 10, 1825. Lerdo de Tejada, Apuntes, i, -232. =26l=Mémoire. Humboldt, Essai Polit., i, 391-5, 400-1, 429-31; -ii, 40. Poinsett, Notes, 162. Constituent Cong. of Mex., Address. -Consideraciones, 18, 19. Mora, Obras, i, 54-6. Paredes, Papers, 136. -=52=Poinsett, no. 166. México á través, iii, 18. Löwenstern, Le -Mexique, 188-9. - -1.5. _Church_, _army_, _civil service_. Mayer, War, 20-1, 132. Otero, -Cuestión, 38-46, 59, 60, 71-3. Mora, Obras, i, pp. vii, xcvii-cxviii, -ccxlvii; ii, 122-8. =261=Mémoire. Löwenstern, Le Mexique, 38, -94, 117-28. Humboldt, Polit. Essay (London, 1811), i, 231-2. México á -través, ii, 896; iii, 23; iv, 149, 447, 639. Zavala, Revoluciones, i, -37. Macgregor, Progress, i, 637, 642. Thompson, Recolls., 41, 53, 101-3, -169-74. =52=Poinsett, nos. 2, 12, 36, 55, 166 (May 28; Aug. 5, -1825; Feb. 18; Aug. 26, 1826; March 10, 1829). Consideraciones, 6, 7, -12, 26-30, 37, 39-42. =13=Ashburnham, Oct. 3, 1837; July 26, 1838. -Semmes, Service, 14-5, 21. =11=Martin, Feb. 1; July 20, 1827; Dec. -25, 1828. =11=Cochelet, June 6; Nov. 20, 1829. _Correspondant_, -April 15; July 15, 1846. Calderón, Life, i, 337, 408. =13=Hervey, -Description. _Picayune_, April 22, 1843. Bocanegra, Memorias, i, 32. -Tornel, Reseña, 19-21, 84. =11=Despatch to the French govt., -about June, 1823 (anon.). =13=Morier, no. 13, Feb. 10, 1825. -=13=Morier and Ward, no. 1, April 10, 1825. =13=Ward, no. 37, -Apr. 29, 1826. =13=Pakenham, nos. 17, Jan. 30, 1830; 25, Feb. 26, -1841; 77, Aug. 29, 1842. =13=Bankhead, nos. 73, Aug. 29, 1844; -56, Apr. 29, 1846. Memoria de ... Relaciones, Dec., 1846. Richmond -_Enquirer_, Dec. 30, 1845. Mobile _Commerc. Register_, Aug. 9, 1845. -_Veracruzano Libre_, Dec. 27, 1845. _Revue de Paris_, Dec., 1844. -Memoria de ... Guerra, Nov. 7, 1823, 17, 18. Balbontín, Invasión, 75, -77. _Id._, Estado Militar, 58. =375=Perry to J. Y. Mason, Nov. 16, -1846. Búlnes, Grandes Mentiras, 182. Rivero, Méx. en 1842, 25, 137-9. -Ward, Mexico, i, 307-17, 330-40. London _Times_, Nov. 11, 1845. - -According to Otero, an able editor and statesman, the income of the -Church represented in 1829 a capital of $127,000,000, besides the -buildings, etc., used for worship and for the housing of ecclesiastics; -and practically none of its property was taxed. Of its wealth, large -for any period but huge for that day, $18,000,000 were invested in city -and country real estate; and consequently there was an army of agents -looking after Church interests in all quarters, and a great number of -proprietors and financiers were closely associated with the clericals. -One may say, reported a French diplomatic agent, "that religion does not -exist [in Mexico], for its influence is nowhere felt"; and in truth, as -an ardent Roman Catholic said in _Le Correspondant_ of Paris in 1846, -that country needed to be evangelized anew. Trist: "The lazy, ignorant, -and stupid monks, whose views do not extend beyond the round of purely -animal enjoyments, and include no esprit de corps save pecuniary greed -mixed with an idol worship fanaticism" (=52=no. 18, Oct. 25, -1847). Ramírez, México, 219: Christianity merely gross idolatry here. -The Mexican church stood naturally in opposition to the government, for -both claimed the right of ecclesiastical patronage. The influence of the -Church was lessened by Leo XII, who exhorted the Mexicans to return to -Spain (México á través, iv, 149). - -=350=Weber: "If the Mexican soldier has something to eat, he eats -it; if not, he goes without. That is all." _Diario_, May 20, 1847: The -army has been burdened with enough generals and field officers for the -army Napoleon led against Russia. (24,000 officers) Duflot de Mofras, -Explor., i, 20. ($21,000,000) =52=Slidell to Buchanan, Jan. 14, -1846. Negrete, Invasión, iv, app., 400. _Eco del Comercio_, Mar. 22, -1848. =11=Martin: The army belongs to the first who "gives it money -or promises it plunder" (Dec. 25, 1828). =13=Doyle, no. 81, Oct. -30, 1843. _Don Simplicio_, July 19, 1846. _Nacional_, Jan. 19, 1848. - -1.6. _Justice_, _education_, _the press_. Zavala, Revoluciones, i, 35, -396; ii, 393. Thompson, Recolls., 20-4, 147-52. London _Times_, Jan. 8, -1846. =13=Ward, no. 58, confid., April 18, 1827. =13=Pakenham, -nos. 39, May 27, 1836; 5, Jan. 25, 1841. =13=Bankhead, no. 54, -May 30, 1845. =13=O'Gorman to Pakenham, Jan. 19, 1835. Pakenham, -Nov. 23, 1834, separate; no. 8, March 8, 1835. =56=W. S. Parrott, -Oct. 11, 1845. =52=Jones, June 1, 1837; nos. 168, Oct. 30, 1838; -252, May 5, 1839. Leclerc in _Revue des Deux Mondes_, March 1, 1840, p. -638. =11=French vice-consul, Mex., Aug. 19, 1829; Feb. 3, 1830. -Tornel, Reseña, 288. Consideraciones, 6, 7, 12-4, 43, 48. Memorias de -... Relaciones, Jan., 1825; Feb., 1828; Jan., 1831; May, 1833; Dec, -1846. Memorias, min. of justice, 1833, 1835, 1845. Ward, Mexico, i, -337. =52=Poinsett, no. 166. Constit. Cong, of Mex., Address. -_Liberal Moderado_, Aug. 4, 1846. Mora, Obras, i, pp. clxxxviii-cxcvii. -Löwenstern, Le Mexique, 109-16. Lavalles, Etudes, 31-3. Villar, -Proyecto. Calderón, Life, i, 195, 340-2. Esparza, Informe. Memorias, -min. of treas., May, 1833; July, 1845. Memorias, min. of pub. instr., -Jan., 1844; July, 1844; March, 1845. Macgregor, Progress, i, 637. - -For a long time after 1821 only one slight attempt was made to improve -the old judicial methods, and that was a failure. =11=Vice-consul -of France, Aug. 19, 1829: "Justice is so venal, that with money one -could have the victim arrested and the criminal rewarded." In 1836 the -British minister reported the opinion of an able Mexican lawyer that -certain important court proceedings were nothing but "a conspiracy -authorized and supported by judicial formulas, one more illegal than -another." Mexican minister of justice, 1835: "On all sides is heard a -unanimous outcry against the bad administration of justice" (Memoria). -At a public meeting, Aug. 13, 1846, Pedro Zubieta said: "What have been -thus far the judiciary and the magistracy? A shameful market, in which -those august names have put Justice up at auction" (_Diario_, Sept. 19). -The gov. of Michoacán =76=wrote, Nov. 28, 1845: I am unable to -prevent some judges from favoring criminals. Alamán reported secretly to -Congress in 1830: The tribunals ensure impunity to criminals (Pakenham, -no. 25, Mar. 25, 1830). Ramírez, Mexico, 225: Our magistrates are -usually insignificant (_hombrecitos_), "vigorous to persecute, feeble -to command, and incapable of serving as models of a just and severe -impartiality." The reports of the American ministers and consuls were -full of similar complaints. Once when our consul reminded the minister -of foreign affairs that it was the constitutional duty of the Executive -to have the laws faithfully administered, the latter replied, "Yes, -but it is impossible." In 1838 France took strong ground against the -miscarriages of justice in the Mexican courts. - -The Lancastrian system of pupil helpers was tried in the schools; -but it failed, for nobody understood it practically. The educational -authorities gave ear to bright young men who had merely picked up a few -ideas on the boulevards of Europe, and wasted their time in theorizing -and making projects. We have become, said a thoughtful writer in March, -1848, the most persistent of charlatans, glad to talk on any subject -without understanding it, and ready to try all sorts of theories, which -vanish like smoke as soon as put into practice. - -1.7. _Industries_, _trade_, _means of communication_. _Revista -Económica_, Dec. 14, 31, 1843. Macgregor, Progress, i, 308, 670, 674. -Ward, Mexico, ii, 3-170. México á través, iii, 18. London _Times_, -Aug. 6; Nov. 11; Dec. 6, 1845. =52=Thompson, no. 4, July 30, 1842. -=13=Ward, nos. 45, 99 (May 20; Aug. 20, 1826). =261=Mémoire. -_Gazette d'Etat de Prusse_, Nov. 11, 1823. Consideraciones, 8-12, 14-8. -Otero, Cuestión, 31-4, 46, 49, 50, 97-8. Pakenham, nos. 25, Mar. 25, -1830; 28, June 11, 1833; 61, July 8, 1841; 4, 49, 123, Jan. 6, June 2, -Dec. 25, 1842; 5, Jan. 24, 1843. =13=Ashburnham, no. 3, Jan. 31, -1838. =13=Bankhead, nos. 44, June 29, 1844; 6 Jan. 29, 1845; 8, -Jan. 30, 1846. =261=_a_Mémoire. =52=Poinsett, reply to Mexico -state (with his no. 176, Aug. 7, 1829). Memorias, Relaciones, Feb., -1830; March, 1835; Dec, 1846. Memoria, min. of justice, March, 1845. -Mayer. War. 13. Poinsett, no. 166, March 10, 1829. Constituent Cong., -Address, 1824. Thompson, Recolls., 35. _Journal des Débats_, March 16, -1844; Feb. 18, 1845; April 4; Sept. 9, 1847. Bocanegra, Memorias, ii, -162-3. =52=Dimond, no. 273, Nov. 4, 1845. =11=Martin, Feb. 1, -1827. Banco de Avío, Informe. Memoria, min. of interior, Jan., 1838. -Alamán, Memoria. Robertson, Remins., 88. =76=Mora y Villamil, -report from superior board of engineer corps, Nov. 15, 1845. McSherry, -El Puchero, 147. Lawton, Artill. Officer, 254. _Diario_, July 20-5, 1846 -(report on the state of agriculture). - -The American minister stated in 1829 that the cost of producing crops in -Mexico was double that in the United States and the expense of marketing -them fourfold. Besides, the farmers had suffered blow after blow during -the revolution and the succeeding commotions. The system of "forced -loans," so familiar in Mexico, consisted in assigning to corporations -and individuals--presumably according to their wealth--amounts that -they were required to hand over in exchange for promissory notes, which -the government did not expect to pay. The prohibition of many foreign -articles reduced the public revenues and promoted smuggling. - -1.8. _Country and town: manners and mora's._ Thompson, Recolls., 39, -40, 82, 90, 93, 101-2, 115, 125-8, 132, 135, 160, 163, 217. Calderón, -Life, i, 80, 124, 127, 138, 140, 150-1, 162, 165, 175, 273, 314, 336, -340-5, 395; ii, 126 (Alamán), 137 (village), 237, 247. Ward, no. 52, -secret and confid., Nov. 10, 1825. =52=Thompson, no. 1, 1842. -=52=Poinsett, nos. 2, May 28, 1825; 94, July 8, 1827; 166, Mar. -10, 1829. =52=Butler, July 9, 1834. Arróniz, Manual, 109, 123, -131, 161. Löwenstern, Le Mexique, 36, 47-8, 59, 130, 133, 137, 140, -142, 147-9, 151-4, 159, 163-6, etc. Decaen, México, 22. Rivera, Los -Mexicanos Pintados. _Memorial Histórico_, Jan. 16, 20, 1846. México á -través, iv, 291. Rivera, Gobernantes, ii, 142. _Revue Independante_, -Apr. 25, 1845. _Revue de Paris_, Dec, 1844. _Diario_, Jan. 24, 1841. -Davis, Autobiog., 102. Mayer, War, 14. Bravo in _Boletín Oficial_, Apr. -30, 1846. Ruxton, Adventures (1847), 20, 25, 34-6, 39, 40, 44, 46, 59. -Robertson, Remins., 104-6, 116, 122. Mason, Pictures, i, 17, 19, 110, -201; ii, 23, etc. Vigneaux, Voyage, 286. Orbigny, Voyage, 413, 422, -425, 428. Robertson, Visit, ii, 50, 58, 61-2, 147. _Commerc. Review_, -ii, 165-76. =11=Cochelet, Sept. 29, Nov. 15, 1829. =13=Forbes -(Tepic), July 2, 1846. Kendall, Narrative (1844), ii, 145, 317, 335-6. -Tudor, Tour, ii, 266, 328. Stapp, Prisoners, 133-4. Valois, Le Mexique, -86-7. _Delta_, June 12; Nov. 6, 1847. Sierra, Evolution, _passim_. -=218=Henshaw narrative. (Apathy) Pakenham, no. 15, Mar. 21, 1834. -Morier and Ward, no. 6, Apr. 30, 1825 ("That extraordinary Compound of -Ignorance, Suspicion, and Fanaticism, which now forms the most striking -Feature of the National Character." "Alamán and Esteva represented -that we were dealing with Children, and must suit our Arguments to -their Capacity.") Ward, nos. 20, 60, July 12; Nov. 23, 1825. Zavala, -Revoluciones, ii, 152-3, 365. McSherry, El Puchero, 158. - -A ministerial report submitted to Congress in Jan., 1844, showed how -a Mexican could regard himself: "If the present epoch begins to be -brilliant in Europe, Mexico finds herself still more advanced. She has -learned from the wise men of all the world but has contemned their -errors.... The virtues of the Mexican spring from a heart not withered -by the pleasures of sense, a heart still expanding with generous -enthusiasm. His soul rises to sublime regions; it knows how to feel; it -knows how to understand; it knows the celestial origin of virtue; and it -appreciates all that itself contains of spontaneity and magnanimity.... -This delicious country breathes into our sentiments the suavity of its -climate; this ardent sun kindles the beautiful flame that makes men love -one another; and amid the sweetness of a natural world so magnificent -and sublime the germ of heroic merits is formed within us." - - - II. THE POLITICAL EDUCATION OF MEXICO - -2.1. To sketch the political development of Mexico is by no means -easy. No scientific history of it exists, and all those who have written -on the subject with first-hand knowledge have been party men. The best -basis is the reports of the British ministers, for they were men of -ability near the heart of affairs, comparatively without prejudice, and -anxious to give a true account of what was taking place. With these -reports as a _prima facie_ standard, the author has felt able to use -intelligently the statements of other foreign agents--diplomatic and -consular--Mexican authors, the historical and political writers of -several nationalities and a great number of periodicals. - -For the colonial régime he consulted the following sources. Humboldt, -Polit. Essay, i, _passim_. =52=Poinsett, nos. 94 of 1827; 166 of -1829. Cuevas, Porvenir, 15. Ward, Mexico, i, 91-120. Rivero, México, -24. =261=Mémoire. =11=Serrurier to "the Duke," Apr. 20, -1818. =11=Villevêque, Feb. 3, 1830. Mora, Obras, i, pp. cx-cxiii. -Macgregor, Progress, _passim_. Tornel, Breve Reseña, 4. Consideraciones, -50-1. =11=Mémoire submitted to the king by a Spaniard. Gage, -Voyages, i, 223. Amer. Antiq. Soc., Proceedings, New Series, xxi, -277-83. Latané, Diplom. Rels., 12-20. _Diario de México_, 1810. -_Pensador_, 1812, 45-6, 49, 51, 53. _Gaceta del Gob. de Méx._, 1810. -Priestley, José de Gálvez, chaps. i and ii. _Esperanza_, Mar. 5, 1846. -=296=Poinsett to the Prest., Apr. 26, 1827. - -2.2. _The Revolution._ Cuevas, Porvenir, 15, 17. Ward, Mexico, i, -84, 96, 100, 116-8, 120, 135, 195-6. México á través, ii, pp. x-xiii, -507-8, 525; iii, pp. iv-ix, 30-5, 76, 85-127, 162, 188, 210, 226, -271, 283, 311, 323, 331, 339, 343, 405, 428, 450, 460, 487, 491-2, -656, 661-85, 735-56; iv, pp. iv, vii, 30, 199, 200, 316. Arrangóiz, -México, i, 33-5. Humboldt, Polit. Essay, i. =261=Mémoire. Tornel, -Reseña, 4-6, 162. Otero, Cuestión Social, 51-2. García, Plan. Itúrbide, -Mémoires. Poinsett, Notes, 91; app., 39. Zavala, Revoluciones, i, 65, -68, 78-9, 86, 104, 111, 272, 406. =13=Ward, nos. 37, 114 of 1826. -=52=Poinsett, no. 166 of 1829. Constituent Congress, Address, 1824. -Alamán, México, i-iv. =11=Martin, Feb. 1, 1827. Sierra, Evolution, -i, 126, 149. =13=Morier, no. 10 of 1825. Lerdo de Tejada, Apuntes, -ii, 229-30, 234, 245. Consideraciones, 43, 51-2. Memoria de ... Guerra, -1823, p. 9. Arróñiz, Orizaba. Liceaga, Adiciones, 378. Mora, Obras, -i, p. vii. Mateos, Hist. Parl., ii, 222. Löwenstern, Le Mexique, 293. -S. Anna, Manifiesto, 1823. Suárez y Navarro, Alegato. _Id._, Hist. de -Méx. y del ... S. Anna. Carreño, Jefes, 13. _Sol_, June 15, 24, 1823. -Rivera, Jalapa, ii, 107-26. _Gaceta del Gob. de Méx._, 1810, p. 867 -(decree of the Inquisition summoning Hidalgo). Rivera, Gobernantes, ii, -1-72. Puga y Acal, Documentos, 20. Portrait of Itúrbide: City Hall, -Mexico. - -2.3. _Itúrbide_, _the Triumvirate_, _and the Constitution_. -=13=Ward, secret and confid., July 14, 1825; no. 114 of 1826. -=52=Poinsett, nos. 94 of 1827; 166 of 1829. =11=Villevêque, -Feb. 3, 1830. =11=Martin, Feb. 1, 1827. =13=Morier, no. 10 -of 1825. =11=Cipher despatch to French govt. about July, 1823. -=261=Mémoire. Cuevas, Porvenir, 14, 36, 140-2, 195-206, 211-5, -220-5, 231-3, 239, 245-51, 261, 277, 318-9, 358-9. Bocanegra, Memorias, -i, 13-4, 18, 31-3, 38-40, 49-57, 61-3, 76-82, 97-9, 111-25, 207, 215, -220-4, 226, 231, 241, 284-9, 328-9, 370, 374. Itúrbide, Mémoires. -Tornel, Reseña, 6-15, 18-22, 28, 37. Mora, Obras, i, pp. vii-viii, xii, -xiv. Zavala, Revoluciones, i, 113-23, 152, 173, 176, 211, 214-5, 254-62, -274, 294, 347; ii, 294. Ward, Mexico, i, 202-6, 260-82. Poinsett, Notes, -71. Lerdo de Tejada, Apuntes, ii, 262. Negrete, México, xiii, 296; xiv, -239. Memoria de ... Relaciones, Dec., 1846. Casasus, Deuda. Romero in -_No. Amer. Review_, Jan. 1, 1896. Gutiérrez de Estrada, México. Mata, -Reflecciones. _Arco Iris_, Dec. 7, 1847. _Eco del Comercio_, Mar. -10, 1848. _Cosmopolita_, Aug. 22, 1838. Maza, Código, 263. Rivera, -Jalapa, ii, 225, 228. _Id._, Gobernantes, ii, 73-94. _Esperanza_, Mar. -5, 1846. =208=MS. of the man who proclaimed the empire. Tornel, -Discurso, 17. Alamán, México, v. Constituent Congress, Address, 1824. -Otero, Cuestión Social, 53-5, 75, 108-9. México á través, iv, pp. iv, -vii, 9-21, 26-37, 40-8, 50-9, 65-111, 115, 198, 200-9, 360. Sierra, -Evolution, i, 160-6, 169, 173, 316. F. J. P., Ligeras Reflecciones. -_Reforma_, Jan. 23, 1846. Consideraciones, 46. _Sol_, July 27, 1823. -Mayer, War, 27-8, 135. Richtofen, Zustände, 21. Dictamen of revol. -committee, June 12, 1835. Calderón, Life, i, 336. Löwenstern, Le -Mexique, 294. Thompson, Recolls., 58. Lacombe, Le Mexique, 31. - -2.4. It has recently been denied that our Constitution was imitated, -but this was stated by Poinsett (no. 166, March 10, 1829), Bocanegra -(Mems., i, 329), Tornel (Reseña, 14), Otero (Cuestión Social, 121), and -=261=Mémoire; and the Congress itself, in an address to the nation, -said, "In all our proceedings, we have taken for a model the happy -Republic of the United States of the North." The Spanish constitution -of 1812 and that of the French Republic were also in view. There was -a supreme court, but it had no power to hold the balance between the -states and the central government. - -2.5. _Victoria's administration._ Portrait in city hall, Mexico. -=52=Poinsett, nos. 12, 20, 24, 32, 55, 60, 92, 94, 96-7, 99, -105, 107, 110, 114, 153, 166, 192 (1825-29). =296=_Id._ to King, -May 16, 1826. =13=Hervey, Dec. 15, 1824. =13=Morier, nos. -10, 19, 1825. =13=Ward, nos. 15, 21, 34, 36, 44, 60, 64 and most -private and confid. (Sept. 30) of 1825; 32, 77, 85, 99, 107, 114, 128, -136, secret and most confid. (Oct. 22/25), and private (Oct. 26/27) of -1826; 3, 11, 15, 19, 24, 52, 58 of 1827. =13=Pakenham, nos. 62, -84, 90 of 1827, 1, 107 of 1828; 22, 32, 38 of 1829; 17, 30 of 1830; -and to Vaughan, Jan. 13, 1829. =11=Martin, Feb. 1; Mar. 30; Apr. -25, 1827; Aug. 25; Dec. 25, 1828. =11=Cochelet, Jan. 16, 1830. -=11=Villevêque, Feb. 3, 1830. =11=Paper submitted to the -French Cabinet, 1828. =11=Instructions of Bresson, 1828. Tornel, -Reseña, 16, 19, 24-5, 28-30, 34, 39, 43, 45-8, 80, 83, 85, 87, 129-30, -133-4, 163-4, 177-82, 200, 238. Bocanegra, Mems., i, 113, 231, 286, -374, 390, 444, 463, 467, 522. Zavala, Revoluciones, i, 149, 271, 343, -346-8, 351; ii, 35, 41, 44. México á través, iv, 103-4, 116, 121, 127-9, -131-3, 141, 144-5, 154-67, 170, 172, 193-4, 208-10. Mora, Obras, i, pp. -viii-xii, xiv-xvi. Calderón, Life, i, 42, 96. Richtofen, Zustände, 22. -Löwenstern, Le Mexique, 290. F. J. P., Ligeras Reflecciones. Cuevas, -Porvenir, 268-9, 353, 376, 406, 411-2. Sierra, Evolution, i, 183. -=52=Manifiesto of Vera Cruz legislature, June, 1827. Son Peores -los Gachupines. Ah, Traidores Gachupines. Crimenes de Zavala. Acta del -Pronunciamiento. _Revista Económica_, Dec. 31, 1843. _Cosmopolita_, -Feb. 14, 1838. _Anteojo_, Aug. 1, 1835; and other references in chap. -iii (Poinsett section). Dictamen of revol. committee, June 12, 1835. -=261=Mémoire. Otero, Cuestión Social, 60, 66. Poinsett, Notes, 20. -Rivera, Jalapa, ii, 364. - -The following passage illustrates the pamphleteering of the day: "The -country is threatened; and by whom? The Gachupines. Persons in the -midst of us are working for our ruin; and who? The Gachupines. Persons -are laboring to sow discord among us; and who? The Gachupines. Persons -are looking for hostile troops to reduce us to slavery again; and who? -The Gachupines." The popular party, associated with Masonic lodges of -the York Rite, were commonly called Yorkinos, and the aristocratic -party, associated with the Scotch Rite, Escoceses (_i.e._ Scotch). A -particularly unfortunate fact was that under the Mexican constitution -the arbiter between the nation and the states was a political body, -Congress. - -2.6. _Guerrero's rise and fall._ =52=Poinsett, nos. 60 of -1826; 105, 151-3, 155, 157-60 of 1828; 166, 173 of 1829, and Apr. 3, -15; Sept. 2; Nov. 20; Dec. 23, 1829. =13=Ward, Nov. 10, 1825. -=13=Pakenham, nos. 89, 99, 110, 122, 132, 143-4, 146, 151, 153 -of 1828 ("totally unfit," Aug. 23); 2, 4, 8, 52, 79, 99, 108, 109 -of 1829; 8, 17, 25 of 1830; 62 of 1833; to Vaughan, Jan. 13, 1829. -=11=Martin, June 30, 1827; Aug. 25; Sept. 26; Oct. 31; Dec. 1, 10, -19, 25, 31, 1828; Jan. 4, 13, 1829. =11=Cochelet, June 6; Oct. -20; Nov. 29; Dec. 26, 1829. =231=Butler to Jackson, June 6, 1834. -=52=Butler, Dec. 31, 1829; Jan. 5; Mar. 9, 1830. =52=Cameron, -Feb. 14, 1831. =261=Mémoire. =52=Zavala, Exposición to chamber -of deputies, Apr. 23, 1829. _Id._, Revoluciones, i, 146; ii, 47, 57-8, -77, 147, 150-2, 175, 221. Gaxiola, Invasión, 156. Lerdo de Tejada, -Apuntes, ii, 302-6, 336, 396. Cuevas, Porvenir, 285, 383, 413, 458, -475. Tornel, Reseña, 34-6, 45-6, 237, 309-13, 315-8, 323-4, 333-4, -338, 347-9, 383-6, 392, 407, 423-4. Bocanegra, Mems., i, 375, 473-4, -492, 494; ii, 7, 10-1, 25, 34, 57-9, 120, 135, 144, 150-9, 190, 657. -México á través, ii, 612; iv, 98, 102, 166, 177-94, 197, 209-12, 215, -217-37, 267. Sierra, Evolution, i, 177-8. Juicio Imparcial. El Pueblo -Pide Justicia. F. J. P., Ligeras Reflecciones. Mora, Obras, i, pp. -xvi-xx. Bustamante, Manifiesto, 1830. Derrota del Sr. Guerrero. Mateos, -Hist. Parl., iii, 256, 263. Memoria de ... Relaciones, 1830, 11, 13. -Poinsett in _Commerc. Review_, July, 1846, 34-9. =231=T. H. Ellis, -July 8, 1839. _Anteojo_, Aug. 1, 1835. =52=Guerrero to Poinsett, -Nov. 1, 1827. =11=_Id._, Address on becoming President. Rivera, -Gobernantes, ii, 164. Sosa, Biografías, 429, 1101. _American Sentinel_, -June 15, 1836. The Acordada was a conspicuous building at Mexico made -use of in Zavala's insurrection. - -2.7. _Bustamante and the change of system._ Pakenham, nos. 88, 108 -of 1829; 5, 17, 24-5, 31, 59, 62, 66-7 of 1830; 8 of 1831; 47, 54, 70, -81-3, 87, 96 of 1832; 10, 19, 35, 39, 44, 62, 67, 69, 82-3 of 1833; 15, -22-3, 29, 36, 42, 48, 51, 57, 64 of 1834; 25, 35, 40, 47 of 1835; 24 -of 1837. Poinsett, no. 12 of 1825. =52=Butler, Jan. 5; Mar. 9; -June 29; Aug. 26, 1830; Feb. 19; Aug. 20; Oct. 5; Dec. 6, 1831; Jan. -10; Feb. 27; Mar. 22; July 25; Oct. 7; Dec. 12, 1832; Mar. 16; June -5, 1833; Mar. 2, 8, 28; June 2; July 1, 9; Sept. 1; Oct. 20, 1834; -Feb. 8, 1836. =52=Butler to Jackson, July 22, 1831; June 21; July -18; Aug. 30, 1832; Jan. 2, 1833; Feb. 6; July 9; Dec. 24, 1834; Feb. -26, 1835. =52=Ellis, nos. 2, 3, 1836. =52=Ellis to Jackson, -Aug. 26, 1836. =11=Cochelet, Nov. 21, 1829. =261=Mémoire. -=13=Morier, no. 10, 1825. =13=Ward, secret and confid., -July 14; no. 40, Sept. 25, 1825. =13=Ashburnham, no. 70, 1838. -=52=Jones, no. 71, 1837. =52=W. S. Parrott, no. 15, 1835. -A. Bustamante to Congress, May 23, 1832. C. M. Bustamante, Gobierno, -275. Mora, Obras, i, pp. xx, xxi, xliii-xlvi, xlix, l, lvii, lxi, lxv, -lxxvi-xc, cxii-cxxviii, cxxxix, cxcvii, ccxiv-cclxxxi, cclxv. Lerdo -de Tejada, Apuntes, ii, 393, 396-7, 399, 403, 414, 548. _Crepúsculo_, -May 8, 16, 1835. Rivera, Jalapa, iii, 157-75, 195-202, 225-8. _Id._, -Gobernantes, ii, 151-3, 168-9, 173, 177-8. Tornel, Reseña, 25. Cuevas, -Porvenir, 342. Zavala, Revoluciones, i, 263; ii, 254, 269-70, 289, 365, -367, 369. Zamacois, México, xii, 24-5. Bocanegra, Mems., ii, 150-3, -157, 159, 190, 208, 329-31, 378-85, 417-8, 433-9, 445-60, 546-54, 598. -México á través, iv, 142, 201, 230-1, 235-7, 240, 246-7, 255, 258, -265, 267, 285-6, 289-93, 295, 298-311, 315-9, 321-7, 332-53, 355, 357, -359, 362-82, 386-8, 390-1. Calderón, Life, i, 96; ii, 126. Poinsett in -_Commerc. Review_, July, 1846, 34-9. Thompson, Recolls., 87-8. Sierra, -Evolution, i, 181-2, 184, 187; ii, 494. El Vil y Traidor S. Anna. -Juicio Imparcial. _Imparcial_, June 18, 1906. Búlnes, Grandes Mentiras, -208. Löwenstern, Le Mexique, 284, 287. Aviso á los Estados. S. Anna, -proclam., June 1, 1834. - -When Santa Anna resumed the Presidency in May, 1833, he painted himself -in an address to Congress as the ideal patriot and saint, consecrated -to liberty, enlightenment, morality, and the Christian religion, -"straightforward" and "simple" in principles, "mild and tolerant" in -character. His life, he assured the nation, was "entirely devoted to -the freedom and happiness of the people and the preservation of the -Federal system." Before long his picture was drawn in different colors. -"The Vile and Traitorous Santa Anna wishes to be Emperor," cried one -pamphleteer. "Depravity and ambition make up the character of that -miserable Proteus," responded another. - -2.8. _Centralism._ =13=Ashburnham, nos. 51, 52, 58, 64 of 1837; -7, 21, 23, 24, 37, 70, 111 of 1838. =13=Pakenham, nos. 11, 12, -67, 76 of 1839; 21, 40, 72, 92, 95 of 1840; 42, 53, 94, 101, 116 of -1841. =13=Pakenham to Harvey, July 20, 1839. =52=W. D. Jones, -June 22; July 19; Aug. 29; Sept. 26; Oct. 7, 17; Nov. 4, 11; Dec. 6, -1837; Apr. 10; Sept. 5, 8, 22; Oct. 1, 30; Dec. 7 (anarchy), 1838; Feb. -16, 19; Mar. 23 (Valencia); Apr. 20, 23; May 11, 1839. =52=W. S. -Parrott, July 29, 1837. =52=Black, no. 307, 1840. =52=Ellis, -no. 29, 1840. =52=Ellis to Jackson, Oct. 15, 1839. Bocanegra, -Mems., ii, 807. Giménez, Mems., 70-3. Rivero, México, 75. Otero, -Cuestión, 62-5. Robertson, Visit, i, 317. México á través, iv, 382, 387, -390-2, 395, 397, 399, 404-16, 419, 423, 427, 430-2, 438, 440, 443-4, -446-8, 451-2, 455-74. Calderón, Life, i, 349; ii, 187, 223-6, 232, 246, -250, 254, 274. El Que me Importa. Noticia Extraordinaria. _Republicano_, -Feb. 3, 1847. London _Times_, Nov. 25, 1841. Lara, _Revista Política_, -1840. _Cosmopolita_, Dec. 28, 1836. =56=Greenhow, Aug. 12, 1837. -Löwenstern, Le Mexique, 284. Sierra, Evolution, i, 185. Búlnes, Grandes -Mentiras, 208. - -"I do not believe," wrote the British minister (no. 116, Nov. 8, 1841), -"that history affords an example of the fate of a Country being so -completely dependent upon the will of one man" [as Mexico's now is upon -S. Anna's]. - -2.9. _Santa Anna as Dictator and President._ =13=Pakenham, -nos. 82 of 1833; 119 of 1841; 20, 57, 77, 99, 121 of 1842; 13 of 1843. -=13=Doyle, nos. 47, 72, 76, 81 of 1843. =13=Bankhead, nos. 4, -43, 54, 66, 72, 73, 96, 105, 108, 110 of 1844; 1, 20, 50 of 1845; 57 -of 1846. =231=Butler to Jackson, Dec. 14, 1835. =52=Ellis, -no. 44 of 1841. =52=Thompson, nos. 1, 3 of 1842; 31 of 1843; -40 of 1844. =52=B. E. Green, April 8; May 16; June 7, 21; July -14, 1844. Green to Calhoun, June 15, 1844 (Ho. 2; 28, 2, p. 59). D. -Green to Calhoun, Oct. 28; Nov. 12, 29, 1844 (Jameson, Calh. Corr., -975, 991, 1000). =52=Consul Burroughs to Ellis, Jan. 10, 1837. -=52=Consul Dimond, no. 200, 1843. =52=Shannon, nos. 3, 4, -5, 1844. =52=_Id._, Jan. 9, 1845. =52=B. Mayer, statement, -Dec. 9, 1842. C. M. Bustamante, Gobierno, 1, 11, 22, 65, 94, 106, 247, -287, 289, 298, 322-4, 384. Giménez, Mems., 263. Bocanegra, Mems., -ii, 679. Calderón, Life, i, 337; ii, 195, 272-4, 392. Memoria de ... -Relaciones, Mar. 12, 1845; Dec, 1846. Mem. de ... Hacienda, Feb., 1844. -Mem. de ... Justicia, Jan., 1844. Paredes [Letters], Advertencia, 141. -Jones, Memoranda, 433 (Arista). México á través, iv, 474-80, 484-90, -492-9, 506, 509, 517-30, 532-4, 540, 547. Zamacois, México, xii, 280-1, -283, 285, 330. Löwenstern, Le Mexique, 288. Rivero, México, 90, 94. -_Diario del Gobierno_, Jan. 12, 1845. _Journal des Débats_, Sept. 13, -1842; Mar. 16, 1844; Apr. 29, 1845. _Revue de Paris_, Dec., 1844. -_Constitutionnel_, Jan. 6, 1844. Otero, Cuestión, 69-70. Tornel, Reseña, -74. Zavala, Revoluciones, i, 151. =231=Butler to Jackson, June 6, -1834. =11=Martin, Aug. 25, 1828. =11=Cochelet, Feb. 3, 1830. -=52=Butler, July 9, 1834. Alvarez, Manifiesto, 1845. Ellis, Soul of -Spain, 37. Sierra, Evolution, i, 211. Defensa del Gen. S. Anna. Causa -Criminal. S. Anna, Address, 1846. Rivera, Jalapa, iii, 507, 545, 612, -647-73. Lerdo de Tejada, Apuntes, ii, 502-5, 511. _Texas Register_, Mar. -15, 1845 (Eye-witness). London _Times_, Nov. 15, 1841; Feb. 13; Dec 6, -1845. Thompson, Recolls., 76, 80, 85-6. Tudor, Tour, ii, 164. Proceso -de S. Anna, 1845. =56=W. S. Parrott, Apr. 29, 1845. (S. Anna's -appearance) N. Orl. _Commerc. Bulletin_, July 18, 1836; =52=Consul -Cameron, Feb. 14, 1831; Stapp, Prisoners, 151-2; Mofras, Explor., i, -14; Thompson, Recolls., 66; Ferry, Revols., 253-5; =231=Ellis to -family, July 8, 1839. - -"Genius of evil," cried a pamphleteer to Santa Anna, "demon of avarice -and covetousness, you are, like Attila, the scourge of God. Your power -has been, like that of Satan, a power of corruption, of ruin, and of -destruction. You resemble a fury of hell, blind, devastating, and -bloody. Amid the horrors of civil war, amid lakes of blood and mountains -of dead bodies, you always present yourself like a spectre, inciting all -to devastation, slaughter, and revenge"; and such productions almost -whitened the pavements. - -2.10. _Herrera's administration._ (In Sept., 1845, Herrera became -President by regular election.) =13=Bankhead, nos. 108 of 1844; [ -], 17, 30, 70, 82, 85 of 1845. =56=W. S. Parrott, Apr. 29, 1845; -May 22, 30; June 10, 24; July 12, 15, 26, 30; Aug. 16, 23, 29; Sept. -2, 18, 29; Oct. 11, 1845. =52=Slidell, no. 4, Dec. 27, 1845. -=52=Consul Campbell, June 7, 1845. Memoria de ... Relaciones, Dec, -1846. Memoria de ... Guerra, Dec., 1846. Zavala, Revoluciones, ii, 47. -=52=Dimond, June 11; Dec. 14, 1845. _Siglo XIX_, Oct. 5, 9; Nov. -15, 22, 30; Dec. 6, 9, 1845. _Diario_, Apr. 19; June 7; Sept. 10, 1845. -_Republicano_, Feb. 3, 1847. _Amigo del Pueblo_, Nov. 30, 1845. London -_Times_, Aug. 6; Oct. 6; Nov. 11; Dec. 6, 1845; Jan. 8, 1846. México -á través, iv, 529, 541-5. Smith, Annex. of Texas, 423-4. Importantes -Recuerdos. _National_, Mar. 18, 1845. _Journal des Débats_, Apr. 29; -Aug. 2, 1845. Wash. _Union_, Sept. 29, 1845. Constituent Congress, -Address, 1824. Cuatro Palabras. Consideraciones, 43-5. _Voz del Pueblo_, -Nov. 12, 1845. Rivera, Jalapa, iii, 693-720. Baz, Juárez, 43. Rivera, -Gobernantes, ii, 281-4. - -2.11. A thoughtful Mexican analyzed the situation in substance as -follows: Our people as a whole have forgotten morality, sincerity, -patriotism, disinterestedness, and all the other virtues that upbuild -great nations; only selfishness, base and ruinous passions, hatreds and -vile revenges exist among us, and on all sides discords and rancors -force themselves upon the dullest eye; the country, weakened by the -parties, divided by incompatible interests and claims, has been unable -to obtain order and repose, because interested persons have always -promoted anarchy and disorder in every possible way; the liberty that -the army achieved has been used only as brutal license; and each of us, -regarding himself as a judge in the land, has felt entirely emancipated -from all obligations, and fully at liberty to upset everything at his -will. - - - III. RELATIONS BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND MEXICO, 1825-1843 - -3.1. As was mentioned in chap. ii (p. 30), the Spaniards had -endeavored to keep foreign ideas out of Mexico, and the people of -Protestant countries had been studiously misrepresented--even as having -tails. See Smith, Annex. of Texas, 419; =231=Butler to Jackson, -June 23, 1831; =13=Pakenham, nos. 29, Apr. 26, 1832; 2, Feb. 14, -1835; =11=Cochelet, Sept. 29, 1829. Evidence without limit could be -cited. - -3.2. One does not like to write such things. But (1) if the subject -is to be understood, they must be said; (2) they are not as hard as -things alleged against the United States by the Mexicans; and (3) they -are written of a long past generation. On this point we will confine -ourselves to Mexican testimony and testimony from that nation which -was on the most intimate and friendly terms with Mexico, had the chief -interest there, and enjoyed the lion's share of mercantile profit. -In 1823 the minister of the treasury said that only in the case of -one state could its financial condition be learned even approximately -from the public accounts (=11=despatch to French govt. about -July, 1823). Eleven years later the head of that department announced -that it was impossible to ascertain what the legitimate income of the -government for the previous year had been (Memoria, 1834). In 1838 the -man occupying that post admitted officially that no minister of the -treasury since 1822 had possessed sufficient data to make a satisfactory -report (Memoria, July, 1838), and the British representative stated -that "the most vitally important matters" were "wholly left to chance" -by the government (=13=Ashburnham, no. 37, May 24, 1838). That -the national authorities were evasive and jesuitical, resorting to -subterfuges, shifting their responsibility upon the legislative or the -judicial department, and referring matters repeatedly to distant local -officials, is proved by reports of British ministers from 1825 to 1845 -(_e.g._ =13=Ward, no. 143, 1826; =13=Ashburnham, no. 59, 1837; -=13=Pakenham, no. 96, 1841; =13=Bankhead, nos. 5, 12, 1844). -Once at least money was borrowed by hypothecating a fund which the -government did not possess (Trigueros in =52=Mayer, Dec. 9, 1842). -Mortgaged revenues were spent at will (=52=Zavala to Deputies, -Apr. 23, 1829; Bankhead, no. 103, 1844; see also =52=Mayer, Dec. -9, 1842). Definite arrangements made with foreign representatives -were secretly circumvented (Pakenham, no. 23, 1837; Ashburnham, no. -15, 1838). The Cabinet showed itself capable of breaking a direct -promise and even a definite contract (Pakenham, nos. 9, 1843; 44, 1839; -Bankhead, no. 86, 1845). The highest authorities were untruthful in -word, writing, and print (Pakenham, sep. and confid., Mar. 27, 1828; -_Id._, nos. 32, 1833; 98, 1841; 9, 1843; Bankhead, nos. 12, 1844; 98, -1846. See also Poinsett, no 24, 1825); and they did not scruple to utter -injurious calumnies against friendly nations (Pakenham, no. 98, 1841). - -Changes of system appeared to make little difference, for these were -national characteristics. The most honorable administration of this -entire period broke a direct and solemn pledge given to the French -minister (Bankhead, no. 86, 1845; see also =56=W. S. Parrott, Sept. -4, 1845); and the best journal of the country, _El Siglo XIX_, told only -the truth when it said, December 2, 1845, "All our governments have been -dishonest," adding that dishonest methods had been practiced "not only -from necessity but from favoritism and for speculative reasons." It -should, of course, be remembered that carelessness about truth, justice -and honesty was the shady side of Mexican amiability, and that other -nations are not faultless. - -3.3. For an account of Poinsett's mission and very numerous -citations bearing upon the subject one may refer to a paper by J. H. -Smith in the Proceedings of the Amer. Antiquarian Soc., Apr., 1914. -=52=Poinsett, Contestación. Gamboa, Representación. Causas para -Declarar. (Concessions, etc.) Ho. 351; 25, 2, p. 285 (Poinsett). One -would suppose that the prompt recognition of Mexico by the United -States, our efforts to induce Spain to recognize her (_e.g._ Amer. State -Papers, 2 series, vol. vi, 1006; Ho. 351; 25, 2, pp. 118 (McLane), 119 -(Van Ness), 147, 150 (Forsyth); =77=Livingston to Montoya, Oct. -1, 1831), and the "Monroe Doctrine" would have earned us gratitude. -But these were attributed very generally to a desire on the part of -this country to monopolize the western hemisphere (_Diario_, June 17, -18, 1846), and were offset by our opposition to the cherished Mexican -scheme of driving the Spanish from Cuba and by our proposing to have the -retention of Havana guaranteed to Spain (see particularly Ward, no. 53, -secret and confid., May 29, 1826). Denunciations of Poinsett: _e.g._ -Bravo, Manifiesto, 1828; _Sol_, Jan. 4, 1830; =261=Mémoire; La -Ruina de los Mexicanos; Bocanegra, Mems., i, 379, 382, 390; Pakenham, -no. 152, 1828; =11=Martin, July 26, 1827; =11=Cochelet, Aug. -7, 1829; N. Orl. _Delta_, July 9, 1847. Pakenham (no. 74, Aug. 26, -1829) reported that owing to Poinsett's course and the fact that his -government kept him in Mexico, the feeling toward the United States was -one of "jealousy, suspicion, and dislike." The prevailing belief was -that the United States, fearing Mexican competition, sent him there to -paralyze Mexico by exciting dissension (Poinsett, no. 94, July 8, 1827; -=52=state dept. to Butler, Apr. 1, 1830; _Diario_, Apr. 17, 1847). - -3.4. Poinsett was attacked by the states of Puebla (Pakenham, -no. 98, 1829), Vera Cruz (Manifiesto, 1827), México (Preamble -and resolution, 1829), and Querétaro (Pakenham, no. 73, 1827). -=296=Poinsett to Pres., June 8, 1827. (Protest) =52=Clay to -Poinsett, no. 25, Nov. 19, 1827. (Failure, attitude) Van Buren to -Butler, Oct. 16, 1829 (P. S., Oct. 17). (Sinister, pointedly) Van Buren -to Poinsett, Oct. 16, 1829. (No charges) Van B. to P. and to B. (P. S., -Oct. 17), Oct. 16, 1829; Bocanegra, Mems., ii, 18-20; =77=Montoya, -no. 30, Dec. 10, 1829; =296=Zavala to Poinsett, June 16, 1827. -Poinsett was secretary of war under Van Buren. _So. Qtrly. Rev._, Nov., -1850, 429. Nueva Conspiración. - -3.5. =52=Clay to Poinsett, Mar. 26, 1825; Sept. 24, 1825; -Mar. 15, 1827; Van Buren to Poinsett, Aug. 25, 1829. =231=Butler -to Jackson, June 23, 1831. Poinsett, no. 12, Aug. 5, 1825. -(Officials) =52=Morfit, no. 7, Sept. 6, 1836; Ho. 35; 24, 2, -p. 17. (Ten times) Memoria de ... Relaciones, Dec, 1846, p. 76. -(Indians) =13=Ashburnham to Backhouse, July 26, 1838. (Victoria) -=13=Ward, no. 54, 1825. (Trouble) Clay, _supra_; =135=Jackson, -several letters to Butler. - -3.6. Poinsett's correspondence with Clay, Van Buren, and Alamán: Ho. -42; 25, 1, pp. 19-29. Amer. State Papers: Foreign Relations, vi (folio -ed.). =296=Notes in Poinsett papers. _Commerc. Rev._, July, 1846, -21-4, 27-42 (Poinsett). Poinsett, nos. 12, 1825; 113, 115, 1828; 166, -1829. (Urgency) =52=Tornel to Poinsett, June 27, 1827. (Dropping) -=77=Martínez, Nov. 2, 1837; Poinsett, no. 113, 1828; Adams, -Memoirs, ix, 377-8; =52=Consul Taylor, Nov. 7, 1829. He dropped -the project of buying territory because he saw it would give offence. -Treaties and Conventions (Haswell, ed.), 661-3, 675. Ho. 42; 25, 1, pp. -27-8. (Reached, etc.) Ho. 351; 25, 2, pp. 40 (Van Buren to Butler); 190, -285, etc. (Poinsett). Ho. 42; 25, 1, pp. 8 (Clay); 10 (Van Buren); 38 -(Butler, Dec. 21); 46-8. (Charged) Filisola, Memorias, ii, 602; Tornel, -Reseña, 79, 80; Zavala, Revoluciones, i, 384; Richtofen, Zustände, 44. - -Before the paper was placed in Poinsett's hands he knew it would reach -Washington too late (to Clay, Apr. 24: Ho. 42; 25, 1, p. 28), and hence -it was unnecessary, as it would have been dishonorable and dangerous, -to withhold it. (May 10) Ho. 351; 25, 2, p. 202. As the instructions -to buy territory were repeated in 1829 (note 5) when Mexico was at war -with Spain, it has been urged by some Americans that we showed a mean -disposition to take advantage of a neighbor's difficulties. But it is -rather kind than otherwise to offer even a low price for real estate -when the owner is in straits for cash, and Mexico was free to consult -her own interest about selling. The instructions of 1829 were, however, -wholly inoperative at that time. - -That a people so fond of indirect methods and so destitute of principle -in public affairs were suspicious of the United States was not, however, -surprising. It was known of course that up to 1819 we had claimed the -Rio Grande boundary. When Poinsett found that Victoria and Alamán -intended to reassert the boundary pretensions of Spain, he endeavored -to discourage them by replying that in such a case the old claim of the -United States also would be revived (to Clay, Sept. 20, 1825). - -In 1827 members of the Chamber of Deputies expressed the opinion -in debate that the United States was at least privy to a recent -insurrection in Texas, and a leading newspaper asserted that we had -encouraged it (Poinsett, no. 74, 1827). Among the attacks upon the -unfortunate Guerrero was the charge--based, it was alleged, upon -documents--that he was plotting to sell us territory in that quarter -(Pakenham, no. 18, 1831). Bravo, after a visit to this country, brought -out a pamphlet in 1829, declaring that "the politicians and journalists" -of the United States were "at present occupied about the dismemberment" -of Mexico. The following July Bocanegra, minister of relations, hearing -of our customary militia drills and armed escorts for traders in the far -west, demanded the meaning of these operations, and in spite of sensible -reassurances from the American minister, he felt so much disturbed as to -commit a real offence against him and the United States by repeating his -inquiry (Ho. 351; 25, 2, pp. 288, 292). The next year, when our squadron -set out for a cruise in the Gulf, Alamán represented this to Congress -as a threatening movement (Filisola, Memorias, ii, 601). A pamphlet -issued at New York to point out the value of Texas was attributed to our -government (Pakenham, no. 24, 1830), and the Mexican agent at London -endeavored to excite the British cabinet regarding the supposed peril -of his country (=77=Gorostiza, Apr. 22, 1830). European diplomatic -representatives at Mexico fanned this flame. In particular Ward, the -British minister, did his utmost to increase the alarm regarding Texas -(nos. 32, 54, 64, 1825). See W. R. Manning in _Southwest. Hist. Qtrly._, -Jan., 1914. For American feeling toward Mexico see chap. xxxvi, note 1. - -3.7. Treaties and Conventions: note 6. Treaties in Force (1899), -389-90. =52=McLane to Butler, Jan. 13, 1834. =52=Butler to -García, Sept. 6, 1833. =231=_Id._, to Jackson, Mar. 7, 1834. -Ho. 42; 25, 1, p. 59 (Livingston). Ho. 351; 25, 2, pp. 40-53, 556. -=77=Castillo, no. 71, Dec. 7, 1833. (Denounced) =77=Castillo, -no. 2, res., Jan. 22, 1835. The boundary was not run, for the battle of -S. Jacinto occurred just after the exchange of the ratifications. - -3.8. Ho. 42; 25, 1, pp. 17, 21; 33 (Butler); 49 (Van Buren). -Ho. 351; 25, 2, pp. 190, 210, 287 (Poinsett); 369-70, 410. Foreign -Rels., folio ed., vi, 583-600. (Treaty) Ho. 225; 22, 1. Treaties and -Conventions (Haswell, ed.), 664-74. Sen. Exec. Journ., iii, 568-72, -605-6. (Dark) Ward, [no. 103], Sept. 9, 1826. (Victoria) Poinsett, no. -12, Aug. 5, 1825. =77=Montoya, no. 25, Sept. 19, 1829. - -One of the two objectionable articles in the treaty of 1828 concerned -the returning of fugitive slaves, and has been characterized by certain -writers in the United States as a gross insult to Mexico; but that -country had not yet abolished slavery, and her Cabinet, which possessed -a full share of pride, accepted the article. - -3.9. Sierra, Evolution, i, 178. =77=Montoya, no. 30, Dec. 10, -1829. =52=Van Buren to Butler, Oct. 16 (P. S., Oct. 17), 1829. -(Friend) =77=Tornel, no. 3, res., Mar. 6, 1830; Ho. 351; 25, 2, p. -381; =52=Butler, July 9, 1834. =135=Butler, Notes on Texas. -=135=_Id._ to Jackson, Jan. 4, 1827. =77=Almonte to Mex. -Leg., Washington, July 22, 1834. (Ignorant) Ho. 351; 25, 2, p. 381. -(Careless) =52=Ellis, June 25, private; July 16; Oct. 15, 1836; -=52=Forsyth to Butler, Nov. 9, 1835; to Ellis, Jan. 18, 1837. -(Consuls) =52=Wilcocks, Feb. 15, 1833; =52=W. S. Parrott, Oct. -24, 1835. (Spirits) =52=Butler, Aug. 26, 1833. - -3.10. Poinsett reached the conclusion that endeavoring to buy Texan -territory would anger Mexico and lead her to seek European support -(Ho. 351; 25, 2, p. 286), but Butler stimulated Jackson to take the -matter up. =52=Butler's correspondence, including letters to and -from Mexican officials. Many of these documents were printed with -substantial correctness in Ho. 256; 24, 1; Ho. 42; 25, 1; Ho. 351; -25, 2. =296=Notes from Butler, Wilcocks and Zavala, to Poinsett. -Corresp. with Jackson in =231=Jackson papers and =135=Butler -papers (for deciphering a number of the latter the author is indebted -to Dr. E. C. Burnett of the Dept. of Hist. Research, Carnegie Instit.). -=77=Tornel, no. 3, res., 1830. =77=Castillo, no. 8, res., -1835. Sen. Exec. Journ., iv, 488, 502. =52=Ellis, May 19; June 25; -July 16; Oct. 15, 1836; to Jackson, Aug. 26. Pakenham, nos. 6, 7, 1830; -11, 1836. Barker in _Nation_, xcii, 600-1; in _Amer. Hist. Rev._, July, -1907, 788-809. Filisola, Mems, ii, 590, 612. Adams, Mems., ix, 377-8. -Benton, View, ii, 659. Bankhead, no. 125, 1845. _Mosquito Mex._, Aug. 4, -1835. - -Butler had some excuse for basing hopes on Alamán, for until the war -with Spain ended Alamán wished to be on very good terms with the United -States, and later he was in serious financial troubles. Nothing in the -documents involves Jackson in Butler's dishonor. The American secretary -of state was even less censurable. Our government expressed all due -regrets for Butler's misconduct (Ho. 351; 25, 2, pp. 184, 750; Forsyth -to Ellis, no. 22, Nov. 16, 1836; =77=Castillo, no. 8, res., 1835). -(Recall) =77=Relaciones to Castillo, Oct. 31, 1835; Ho. 351; 25, 2, -p. 719, and =77=Castillo, no. 8, res., 1835. - -3.11. Smith, Annex. of Texas, 11-33. =52=Butler, May 8, 1836. -=231=_Id._ to Jackson, Dec. 14, 1835. Ellis, no. 2, May 19, -1836. Pakenham, nos. 75, 1835; 25, 1836. Ho. 256; 24, 1, pp. 3, 29, -30 (Forsyth); 8 (Castillo); 10 (Monasterio). Sen. 1; 25, 2, pp. 141 -(Monasterio); 149 (Forsyth). Ho. 351; 25, 2, pp. 82 (Livingston); 160 -(Forsyth); 571-2 (Tornel, Monasterio). Memoria de ... Interior, Jan., -1838. Memoria de ... Guerra, Dec., 1846. México á través, iv, 377, -401-3, 512. Löwenstern, Le Mexique, 78. Richtofen, Zustände, 48. The -state of Mexican feeling will come up again. - -3.12. _The Gaines episode._ Van Buren to Poinsett, Aug. 25, 1829. -Butler to Jackson, Sept. 26; Oct. 2, 1833; Feb. 6; Mar. 7, 1834. -=231=Jackson to Butler, Nov. 27, 1833. =58=Dickins to Cass, -Aug. 20, 1836. =77=Castillo, Nov. 10, 1835. =39=Gaines to -gov. Tenn., June 28, 1836. =52=Burrough, nos. 39, 40, 1836. -=77=Martínez, no. 10, res., 1838. =77=Relaciones to Martínez, -Oct. 10, 1838. =77=Gorostiza, Apr. 25, 29; May 30; July 12, 24; -Aug. 18, 19; Oct. 4, 5, 1836. Pakenham, nos. 18, 94, 1836. Sen. 1; -24, 2, pp. 46, 92, 105 (Dickins); 60, 85 (Jackson); 84 (memo.); 32, -44, 68, 89, 91, 100 (Gorostiza); 133-4 (Macomb). Sen. 160; 24, 2, p. -157 (Forsyth). Ho. 256; 24, 1, pp. 3, 28, 29, 31-3, 35, 45 (Forsyth); -6, 11 (Castillo); 15, 21, 23, 25, 27 (Gorostiza); 45 (memo.); 40, 43, -48, 54 (Cass to Gaines); 42, 46-8 (Gaines); 55 (Macomb); 58 (Many); -59 (Green; adj. gen.). Ho. 351; 25, 2, pp. 769-806 (Gaines _et al._); -806 (McCall and documents). Jackson, Message, Dec. 5, 1836. Gorostiza, -Correspondencia. Reply to Gorostiza: Lib. Cong., Mss. Div., "Mex. War, -Miscellaneous." Tex. Dipl. Corr., i, pp. 83 (Carson); 104 (Burnett); -164-5, 177, 202 (Henderson); 175 (Wharton); 156 (Austin); 205 (Catlett). -Brown, Texas, ii, 90. Bocanegra, Mems., ii, 736-69. México á través, iv, -378. Calderón, Life, ii, 123. Kohl, Claims, 24. Barker in _Miss. Valley -Hist. Rev._, i, 1; in _Amer. Hist. Rev._, July, 1907, p. 794 (Jackson -thought the Neches was a branch of the Sabine). N. Y. _Ev. Post_, Aug. -1, 1836. Wash. _Globe_, Aug. 1, 1836 (Cass). Richmond _Enquirer_, -Aug. 12, 1836. Mobile _Commercial Register_, June 27, 1836. _Nat. -Intelligencer_, May 5 (Virginian); July 26, 1836. N. Orl. _Courier_, -Sept. 27, 1836 (Fulton). Sen. 189; 24, 2. (Indorsed) Monasterio to -Gorost., Dec. 21, 1836, in Gor., Correspondencia. (Erroneously) Smith, -Annex. of Texas, 22. - -Gorostiza's view, and no doubt that of the Mexicans generally, amounted -practically to this (see Forsyth in Sen. 160; 24, 2, p. 157): the -essential point was to respect Mexico's territory; by the right -of occupation, at least, her territory extended to the well-known -Sabine River; the United States forces were therefore bound under all -circumstances to remain east of that stream, and should some of our -citizens be robbed and murdered, we could call upon Mexico to pay -compensation and protect the rest; after almost endless evasions it -would appear that she had no power to fulfill her treaty obligations, -and therefore, since that fact was known to all the world, she should -not be expected to comply with our wishes; and then, should we please, -we could declare war. In other words, for the sake, at most, of a -technicality, they would have had us quietly see irreparable injuries -done that we could have prevented and had known Mexico could not -prevent, and then do irreparable injuries ourselves to punish her for -her involuntary helplessness. - -As for the evidence of danger (which Gaines was instructed to examine -carefully), Gorostiza declared it was fabricated in order to excuse the -crossing of the boundary and get American troops into Texas--thus giving -the rebels at least the moral support of their presence and infringing -upon the rights of Mexico (Pakenham, no. 94, 1836; Ho. 256; 24, 1, p. -20; Gor., Correspondencia, xxvii), and he protested that his country was -incapable of stirring up the savages against our border (Sen. 1; 24, -2, p. 84; =77=Gor. to Relaciones, Oct. 4). But there is not the -slightest sign that he made the difficult and extended investigation -requisite as a basis for denying the testimony presented to Gaines, -whereas he was capable of asserting, more than a month after the -battle of San Jacinto, that the news of it was "entirely destitute of -authenticity," and stating that he had "reasons for believing it to have -been expressly forged in Texas" or at least to have been exaggerated -"to the very confines of the ridiculous" (Sen. 1; 24, 2, p. 33). His -contention was therefore valueless, and almost equally so was that of -certain Americans, against the evidence of danger. One such opinion, -however, is entitled to notice. It came from the governor of Louisiana -(Macomb: Ho. 256; 24, 1, p. 55). But (1) the governor, who was far -from the scene, merely expressed a view unsupported by evidence; (2) -there may have been good reasons why he did not wish to have citizens -of Louisiana called out, as Gaines proposed, to do arduous and perhaps -perilous military service; and (3) it may have seemed undesirable to -have the American army, which made a good market in the western part of -the state, move to Nacogdoches and obtain supplies there. Gaines appears -really to have had adequate grounds for crossing the Sabine. A letter -from the Texas secretary of state to the President of Texas (Tex. Dipl. -Corr., i, 84), which no one can imagine was "fabricated," shows that -Gaines insisted upon having the facts, and that strong evidence was -presented to him (see also Bee in Sen. 14; 32, 2, p. 53). May 5, 1836, -the _National Intelligencer_ printed a letter dated April 20, which -stated that the writer heard, when about six miles from Nacogdoches, -that the Indians were coming, felt satisfied the news was correct, and -saw the people fleeing in the utmost alarm. It was deemed necessary to -divert some of the few Texan troops, desperately needed at the front, -in order to ward off the danger from Indians (Brown, Texas, ii, 89, -90). The governor of Arkansas called out forces to protect the frontier -(N. Orl. _Courier_, Sept. 27, 1836). The other evidence cited above in -the references, when taken together and fairly weighed in view of the -circumstances, has also a very substantial value. The part of it most -doubted, probably, is that referring to a Mexican agent engaged in -rousing the Indians against the whites; but we have documentary proof -that early in 1839 Mexicans tried officially to do this, and employed -the very man who was charged with similar activities in 1836 (Sen. 14; -32, 2, pp. 31-6; also 47). See also the =77=reply of Relaciones -to Martínez's despatch of Oct. 10, 1838. It should be remembered (1) -that Gaines, charged with the defence of the frontier against a wily, -treacherous and savage foe, could not afford to take chances; and -(2) that even fabricated evidence, if it possessed all the marks of -credibility, would have been sufficient ground for acting. - -But after all the real issue was the good faith of our government in -authorizing Gaines (while requiring him to maintain our neutrality) -to cross under extreme circumstances the Sabine (Gorostiza in Sen. 1; -24, 2, p. 44; Von Holst, U. S., ii, 584, note 1); and this good faith -was clearly maintained at Washington. In the very letter demanding his -passports Gorostiza admitted that Forsyth's assurances appeared to -dispose of the possibility that Gaines's movement had a bearing on the -boundary question (Sen. 1; 24, 2, p. 104). It has been felt that Forsyth -was sometimes rather curt with him, but Gorostiza was almost, if not -quite, insulting. The Mexicans had some reason to be suspicious and a -full right to be on their guard, but they went farther than right and -reason warranted. - -3.13. See Smith, Annex. of Texas, pp. 52-63, for a discussion of -this subject and references to the sources. Ethel Z. Rather in _Tex. -State Hist. Assoc. Qtrly._, xiii, 155-256. Sen. 1; 25, 2, pp. 133 -(Castillo); 135 (Forsyth); 145 (Monasterio). =52=W. Thompson to -Bocanegra, April 25, 1843. Pakenham, no. 64, 1836. Memoria de ... -Relac., Jan., 1838. Mem. de ... Guerra, Jan., 1844. - -The situation of Texas after 1836 was precisely the same as that of -Mexico from 1821 until recognized by the mother-country in 1836, and -during this period she regarded herself and was regarded generally, -except by Spain, as independent. Mexicans refused to accept this obvious -analogy on the ground that the Mexican revolution was mainly the work of -native-born citizens, while most of the Texans had been born elsewhere. -But an adopted child has all the rights of a natural child. See chap. -iv, note 1. - -3.14. _Diplomatic strife, 1842-3._ Smith, Annex. of Texas, 38. -Bocanegra to Webster, May 12, 31, 1842: Ho. 266; 27, 2, pp. 5, 15. -Webster to Thompson, nos. 9, 11, 1842; Jan. 31, 1843. Thompson -to Webster, nos. 3, 4 and June 2, 1842; Jan. 5 and no. 15, 1843. -=52=_Id._ to dipl. corps, July 30, 1842. =351=Tyler to -Webster, July 10, 1842. =52=W. S. Parrott, private, July 29, -1837. =52=B. E. Green, no. 8, 1844. =13=Bocanegra to Doyle, -April 19, 1843; reply, April 20. =52=S. Anna, decree, June 17, -1843. =52=Upshur to Thompson, no. 43, 1843. =52=Bocanegra -to Thompson, Sept. 10, 1842. =76=_Id._, circular, May 31, 1842. -Pakenham, nos. 49, 75, 1842. Sen. 341; 28, 1, p. 71 (Thompson). Texas -Diplom. Corresp., i; 567 (Reily); ii, 163 (Eve). Memoria de ... -Relaciones, Jan., 1844. _Diario_, Oct. 4, 1842. Thompson, Recolls., 82. -Zavala, Revols., ii, 152-3. Sen. 1; 27, 3, pp. 146, 156 (Thompson); -146, 157 (Bocanegra). Ho. 266; 27, 2, pp. 7, 17 (Webster); 5, 15, 19 -(Bocanegra); 21 (Thompson). Reeves, Amer. Diplom., 97, 99 (Adams). -Smith, Annex. of Texas, 131. (Mexican threats, 1843) _Ibid._, 42. -Richtofen, Zustände, 48. =11=To Deffaudis, no. 28, Apr. 27, 1836. -(The translations of Mexican documents published by our government are -cited, unless there is a particular reason for not doing so. In many -cases they could be better, but they were for the American government -and people the official versions.) - -Oct. 4, 1842, the official journal reprinted this from _El Provisional_: -"Who is not aware of that criminal connivance, that stubborn and -insolent protection, which--in violation of righteous law and in -violation of the treaties with Mexico--is given by the policy of North -America to a Department filled with rebels from every land, who are -determined to ruin it completely and to soil the dignity and honor of a -lawfully constituted government?" Webster made the same protest (against -raids) to the Texans as to the Mexicans. - -3.15. =52=Thompson, Jan. 5, 1843. =52=_Id._ to Bocanegra, -Dec. 30, 1842. Ho. 166; 27, 3, pp. 1-93. Bancroft, Calif., iv, 302-29. -=285=Narváez to Vanderlhinden, Dec. 10, 1842. Richman, California, -273-4. Bandini, California, 136-8. =13=Letter from S. Gabriel, Nov. -11, 1842. _Diario_, Jan. 7, 1843. =47=Jones, Aug. 31; Sept. 1, -1842. Reeves, Amer. Diplomacy, 103-7. =351=Letters from J. Tyler to -Webster. México á través, iv, 493. _Nat. Intelligencer_, Mar. 14, 1843. -Adams, Memoirs, xi, 346. N. Orl. _Bee_, Jan. 13, 1843. Memphis _Eagle_, -Nov. 5, 1845. - -Jones sailed with the frigate _United States_ and the sloop of war -_Cyane_. After leaving Monterey he proceeded to Los Angeles to meet -Micheltorena and explain the affair. Almonte, the Mexican minister at -Washington, demanded that an example should be made of Jones, but he was -merely recalled--a fully sufficient punishment. Indeed, our government -commended his zeal (=47=Jones to Bancroft, Oct. 3, 1845). - -3.16. Ho. 351; 25, 2, p. 576 (Butler). - -3.17. Sen. 390; 28, 1, pp. 6 (Bocanegra; documents); 9 (Thompson, -with extract from treaty). =52=Shannon to Rejón, Sept. 30, 1844. -Tyler, Message, Dec. 3, 1844, in Richardson, Messages, iv, 334. See also -documents cited with reference to the Santa Fe expedition. - -3.18. Ellis, no. 24, June 9, 1840. Forsyth to Ellis, Aug. 21, 1840. -=52=Memorial of the prisoners, May 25, 1840. =52=J. O. Jones -to Ellis, June 23, 1840. =52=Statements of prisoners, particularly -Graham's of May 29, 1840. =52=Larkin, Mar. 22; April 20, 1840. -=52=Legaré to Thompson, no. 36, May 12, 1843. =52=Farnham to -Ellis, June 23, 1840. Richman, California, 266. =13=Palmerston to -Mexican minister, Aug. 11, 1841. =11=Captain of _La Danaide_ to -Cyprey, July 8, 1840. Royce, California, 36. Pakenham, nos. 66, 78, 88, -1840; 37, 118 (merely a scheme to weaken the opposing faction in Cal.), -1841. Memoria de ... Guerra, Jan., 1841. Moore, Internat. Arbit., 3242-3 -(a judicial review of the case and award of damages to victims. One of -them received $38,125). Pakenham obtained a revocation of the order of -expulsion by demanding his passports (no. 88). - -3.19. =45=Ranson to Eve, April 28, 1842. =45=Bee to -Roberts, July 13, 1841. Kendall, Narrative, _passim._ Yoakum, Texas, ii, -321-3. Garrison, Texas, 245-6. Smith, Annex. of Texas, 37. Sen. 325; -27, 2, pp. 3, 6, 8 (Webster); 19, 29 (Ellis); 33, 100 (Bocanegra); 48, -50 (Falconer; Van Ness particularly); 94 (Thompson). Ho. 266; 27, 2, p. -34 (Thompson). Pakenham, no. 15, 1842. Memoria de ... Relaciones, Jan., -1844. =11=To Deffaudis, no. 28, Apr. 27, 1836. - -3.20. Ho. 42; 25, 2, p. 20, 23 (Alamán). Poinsett, June 18, 22, -1825. Martínez, no. 7, 1832. N. Y. _Herald_, Nov. 11, 1843. Boston -_Atlas_, Jan. 26, 1844. =52=Camacho to Poinsett, May 13, 1826. -=231=Butler to Jackson, Jan. 2, 1833. Sen. 1; 28, 1, p. 36. Tyler, -Tyler, ii, 289. Ho. 351; 25, 2, p. 71 (Van Buren, Mar. 1). See also -chap. xiv. - -3.21. Upshur to Thompson, no. 51, Oct. 20, 1843. =13=S. Anna, -proclam., Oct. 5, 1843. Sen. 1; 28, 2, p. 21 (Calhoun). Sen. 1; 28, 1, -pp. 30 (Thompson); 31 (decree); 34 (Upshur). Sen. 390; 28, 1, pp. 16, -18 (Thompson). =52=B. E. Green, April 8, 1844. =52=Bocanegra -to Thompson, Oct. 20, 1843. =52=Thompson to Bocanegra, Nov. 23, -1843. =52=Shannon to Rejón, Oct. 25, 1844. =52=Rejón to -Shannon, Oct. 11, 1844; Nov. 22, 1845. Bankhead, nos. 1, 4, 1844. -=13=Foreign Office to Doyle, no. 30, 1843 (While every independent -nation has, _e.g._, an abstract right to close its ports, "the practical -assertion on the part of any Nation of an extreme abstract right may, -and often does, involve, if not actual hostility, at least a degree of -unfriendliness almost amounting to hostility.") France also protested -(Green, _supra_). - -3.22. =13=Tornel, order. Sen. 390; 28, 1, pp. 3-15. -=52=Bocanegra to Thompson, Dec. 22, 1843. =53=Almonte, Feb. -6, 1844. =52=Shannon to Rejón, Oct. 10, 1844. Sen. 1; 28, 2, p. 21 -(Calhoun). =13=Doyle, nos. 65, 90 (order executed in Sonora), 1843. -=13=E. Barron, no. 10, Oct. 19, 1843. - -Another objection to the modified order was that, as the British -minister maintained in another case, while the general government itself -might with justice banish undesirable foreigners, it had no right to -delegate such a power to distant subordinates practically exempt from -supervision, to be exercised by them as prejudice, caprice, and possibly -avarice might suggest and without giving the victim a chance to defend -himself or settle his affairs (Pakenham, no. 78, 1840). Thompson was -described by his French colleague as inexperienced (=11=no. 108, -1842). - -3.23. These are too numerous to be catalogued here, but a few can be -cited as illustrations. General Terán seized the schooner _Topaz_ and -compelled her to transport some of his troops. During the voyage the -Mexican officers and soldiers killed the master, and, returning to port, -had the crew imprisoned on the charge of having done it. The vessel was -held, and property on board seized (Moore, Intern. Arbit., 2992). The -schooner _Hannah Elizabeth_, stranded on the Texan coast, was fired upon -by a Mexican vessel of war, and her crew and passengers were put in jail -(Sen. 1; 25, 2, p. 85. Ho. 351; 25, 2, p. 167). The Mexicans asserted -that the schooner was carrying contraband of war; but if so, the Mexican -officer did not know this when he opened fire, and anyhow no penalty -except the confiscation of the cargo could rightfully have been exacted. -Our acting consul at Tabasco was arrested and publicly ill-treated, -because he would not legalize documents intended, in his opinion, to -defraud an insurance company (Sen. 1; 25, 2, p. 89). The brig _Fourth -of July_ was sent to Vera Cruz for sale to the Mexican government, and -before the sale was made officers and soldiers took possession of her, -ran up their flag, arrested the captain, and disregarded the protest of -our consul (_ibid._, p. 91). A boat-load of seamen from our sloop-of-war -_Natchez_ landed at Vera Cruz, became intoxicated while the midshipman -in command of them was in conference with our consul, and, as the result -of a quarrel with a fisherman, were severely handled by the Mexican -guard. As they were now unable to manage the boat in the rough sea, -the midshipman, on the advice of the consul, requested the captain -of the port to take charge of them over night. The next morning the -authorities would not give them up to him, nor was our consul permitted -to communicate with them (_ibid._, p. 93). Two Americans were arrested, -maltreated and imprisoned at Matamoros on the baseless suspicion that -they intended to visit Texas, and the premises of our consul were -forcibly entered, searched and robbed (_ibid._, 94; Ho. 351; 25, 2, p. -172). A lieutenant of the American revenue cutter _Jefferson_, going -ashore at Tampico to see our consul, was arrested, and his boat's crew -were imprisoned. For this outrage the Mexican government removed the -responsible officer, General Gómez, but soon afterwards he was given -a better post at Vera Cruz, and showed his unchastened spirit in the -_Natchez_ affair (Sen. 1; 25, 2, p. 98. Sen. 160; 24, 2, p. 70: Ellis). - -3.24. British complaints were almost numberless: _e.g._ Ward, -no. 77, 1826; Pakenham, nos. 48 of 1827, 119 of 1828, 37 of 1830; -=13=Ashburnham, nos. 16 of 1837 and 74 of 1838 (a man persecuted -with a "tissue of iniquities" for years); Bankhead to Bocanegra, July 4, -1844. - -The Foreign Office distinctly stated that contract and treaty rights -were denied (=13=Aberdeen to Mex. min., Nov. 1, 1843; to -Pakenham, no. 19, Aug. 15, 1836). =77=Dec. 31, 1844, it made this -statement: "In Mexico British Subjects have been oppressed, harassed, -and maltreated without redress except that which has been extorted by -unceasing remonstrance.... The expostulations of Great Britain ... have -been with very few exceptions contumeliously set at naught; and the same -illegal exactions which have been the subject of those expostulations -have been repeated, while yet the former grievance was unredressed." The -British minister complained, _e.g._, that the coast officials annoyed -his fellow citizens; that frequently to their injury the constitution -was violated by state authorities; that some of them were persecuted, -imprisoned, or expelled from the country in defiance of law; that -money was extorted from them under threats. A loud =52=protest of -American ship captains, Campeche, May 26, 1835, illustrates well the -tricks and outrages to which our commercial interests were subjected. -What abuse and tyranny our citizens were liable to suffer in the -interior is shown by the memorial of Augustus Storrs and twenty others, -Chihuahua, April 17, 1832, transmitted through C. W. Davis, who was -described by our secretary of state, Nov. 24, 1832, as a respectable -citizen of the U. S. who had long been practising medicine at Chihuahua -(Ho. 351; 25, 2, p. 87). (France) Coxe, Review, 69; Barker in _Texas -Review_, Jan., 1917; Rives, U. S. and Mexico, i, 433. - -3.25. The international tribunal was established under the Claims -Convention of 1839, and the national tribunal under the treaty of 1848 -and a United States Act of 1849. It should be remembered that the -amount of our claims was substantial. The total receipts of the U. S. -government for the fiscal year ending with June, 1845, were less than -$30,000,000. It is true that many of the claims were exaggerated, and -some of them a great deal; but this does not matter, for what the United -States asked was an investigation of the demands, not the payment of -any one at its face. Still, as the inflation of the claims has been -urged as an excuse for inattention to them, a word upon that point is -desirable. The amounts demanded in such cases are always made as great -as possible, and in the instance of Mexico there were special grounds -for exaggeration. Our claimants, so far as just in their demands, were -entitled to as high interest as other creditors of that government, and -the rate it had to pay was very large. In 1832, for instance, this was -four per cent a month (Butler, no. 32, 1832), and in 1844 two per cent a -month besides six per cent for brokerage (Bankhead, no. 112, 1844). At -such rates longstanding claims mounted high, and when the interest was -scaled down to five per cent in the process of adjudication (Sen. 320; -27, 2, p. 237), they naturally seemed to have been exorbitant. Indeed, -the claims were entitled to even a higher interest than loans, for a -good deal of trouble--sometimes an extraordinary deal--was necessary to -prove them. "The authorities here can prove anything," reported even -the philo-Mexican Waddy Thompson (no. 4, 1842); and this was only one -of numerous obstacles. Probably, too, there was more uncertainty as to -eventual payment. Again, if paid at all, the claims were likely to be -settled in treasury notes of little value. In fact, all those accepted -by the international tribunal already mentioned were actually so payable -(Calhoun in Sen. 1; 28, 2, p. 21), and these notes were worth at the -time only about thirty cents on the dollar (Thompson, Recolls., 223). - -Yet the degree of inflation was much less than has been supposed. The -most conspicuous instance was that of W. S. Parrott, who demanded -$454,504.01 as principal (Sen. 320; 27, 2). Thompson declared -(=52=Nov. 20, 1843) that Parrott was hardly entitled to two per -cent of what he asked; but on inquiry a very different conclusion is -reached. Parrott was a sufficiently good man to be employed as consul -and confidential diplomatic agent by the United States, yet for some -reason he was deeply disliked by the Mexican government, and the -courts seemed determined to ruin him (Moore, Intern. Arbit., 3011). -He was therefore entitled to punitive damages, but none were allowed -him. The cost and annoyance of prosecuting his case were excessive. -All the excuses for inflation mentioned above applied in his case. -A considerable amount included in his claim had to be thrown out on -purely technical grounds; and a large part had to be ignored because -(in violation of her agreement) Mexico would not let him have certain -specified papers that were needed to prove it. And yet, after all these -deductions had been made, our own treasury paid him under the treaty -of 1848 the sum of $71,000 as principal (Moore, 1284). In many cases -the percentage of inflation was low. For example, in the case of claims -aggregating $595,462 the tribunal awarded $439,393 after scaling the -interest down to five per cent (Ho. Report 1096; 27, 2, p. 8). In fact -the awards were probably a somewhat uncommonly high percentage of the -amount claimed in such cases. It has commonly been said (_e.g._ Von -Holst, U. S., iii, 205) that on the conclusion of the war we discharged -Mexico from all obligation on account of our claims ($8,491,603) yet -bound ourselves to pay only $3,250,000, thus admitting that our claims -were nearly three times too large; but the second of these two sums -corresponds to only a part of the first (Treaty with Mexico, Arts, -xiii-xv: Stat. at Large, ix, 933). - -3.26. Itúrbide seized the cargo of the _Louisa_, and the Mexican -government not only acknowledged the debt but paid a fraction of it -(Ho. Report 1056; 25, 2). The Mexican supreme court ordered the money -actually realized from the unlawful sale of the _Cossack_ and her cargo -to be paid to her master, but it was not paid (_ibid._). The decree of -the Mexican supreme court of 1821 in favor of this claim was presented -in support of it by the U. S. secretary of state, yet that government -alleged in Nov., 1837, that the claim had just been "for the first time -brought forward" (_ibid._). Cox and Elkins furnished supplies to General -Herrera (Moore, 3430). Chew and Eckford built war vessels for Mexico -(Moore, 3428-9). Parrott made advances on a bill of exchange drawn by -Herrera (Moore, 3429). Green supplied money to a war vessel that put -in at Key West in distress (Moore, 3425). A sum of money on its way to -Peter Harmony, a New York merchant, from his Mexican consignee, was -seized by the government (Moore, 3044). Contrary to law, a forced loan -was extorted from Ducoing (Moore, 3409). Aaron Leggett carried on an -extensive logwood business in Tabasco; but the action of Mexicans in -seizing vessels of his for military use entirely ruined him (Moore, -1275), and even Santa Anna admitted that his claim was just (Butler, -Feb. 8, 1836). Sixteen bales of wax were confiscated as of Spanish -origin, when the fullest certificates, including that of the Mexican -vice-consul at New York, proved that it came from Russia (Poinsett in -Ho. 351; 25, 2, p. 248). Gahagan was inhumanly persecuted and for a time -rendered insane, because in a perfectly lawful and respectful manner -he tried to prevent the authorities from illegally appropriating his -employer's property (Moore, 3240). Santangelo, a naturalized American, -was expelled without trial and thereby ruined, in direct violation of -the treaty of amity (Moore, 3333). A case of which the essentials, at -least, were simple is also worthy of mention. Evidently to drive him -away and get his property, Dr. Baldwin, described by our minister as -"a gentleman of great respectability and intelligence" (Ellis, Nov. -8, 1836), was prosecuted on the basis of depositions which a superior -Mexican court admitted were forgeries, was falsely charged with -murdering a woman and firing on a soldier, was put into the stocks and -then imprisoned while suffering from a freshly broken leg, and in short -was persecuted by the local authorities for a term of years (Moore, -3235-40). Other cases, though less easily stated, were not less clear; -yet Mexico would give no redress. See Forsyth's despatch of May 27, 1837 -(Sen. 1; 25, 2, p. 105). - -3.27. This point was taken advantage of by the clever Mexicans -to the utmost, and it illustrates one of the great embarrassments -encountered in dealing with them. Because they had the words -"constitution," "courts," and "law" they pretended to have the -realities. It was as if they had coined lead at the mint and required us -to accept it as silver, while it passed among themselves for merely what -it was. See also Ashburnham, no. 11, 1838. For the character of Mexican -courts see vol. i, 12-13. - -3.28. The Mexican government demanded that Baldwin (note 26), for -example, should seek redress from the very tribunal that had wronged -him (Ellis in Sen. 160; 24, 2, p. 64). In 1834 Simon McGillivray, a -director of the United Mexican Mining Company, wrote thus to the British -minister: Even when we obtain report after report and decree after -decree against the confiscation, already effected, of our property, "we -never can succeed in obtaining the enforcement of such Decrees, because -the parties against whom they are given are Mexicans of influence or -connexion in the place, and we, the claimants for justice, are only -foreigners"; and three months later the minister (no. 61, 1834) reported -that a letter from the governor of the state "in substance fully admits" -this. Once when Baldwin obtained a verdict, the judge would not execute -it, and the Doctor had to flee for his life (Ellis in Sen. 160; 24, -2, p. 65). Under such circumstances, to deny the right of injured -foreigners, especially the unpopular Americans, to invoke the aid of -their governments was plainly unfair, and so France and England held as -firmly as did the United States. - -3.29. =11=Canning, March 25, 1825. Ho. 266; 27, 2, p. 321 -(Webster). This obligation grows out of the benefits conferred by -recognition. - -3.30. (Early) Ellis in Sen. 160; 24, 2, p. 68. (Avoid) Ho. 351; 25, -2, p. 40 (Van Buren). (Covered) =231=Butler to Jackson, June 23, -1831. (Amicable) Ho. 351; 25, 2, pp. 92 (Livingston); 160 (Forsyth). -As the net result of four years of effort Butler was informed that -full specifications must be given; yet no attention was paid to a -group of cases thus made out and proved (Ho. 351; 25, 2, p. 499). Then -he was told that the claimants must come to the treasury department -in person, that nothing would be done until all the American claims -should have been presented, and that a call from our minister would -not advance matters (_ibid._, 501-3). Evidently all this was to gain -time, and it was fairly characterized by our secretary of state as -a denial of justice (_ibid._, 144). In November, 1832, a bearer of -despatches from Butler to our government was detained on his way to -Vera Cruz by the governor of Perote castle, and was there robbed of -his papers, though a passport from the national government established -his official character. The case was both simple and outrageous. Our -minister insisted upon an investigation; but in February, 1834, he found -that (confessedly "on account of some trifling difficulty") it had been -suspended, and in the following April was merely informed, in reply to -an inquiry, that it was again proceeding (_ibid._, 462, 470, 517, 521). - -3.31. Sen. 160; 24, 2, pp. 62, 112, 156 (Ellis). =52=Forsyth to -Ellis, July 20, 1836. =52=Monasterio to Ellis, Oct. 21; Nov. 15, -1836. Pakenham, no. 96, 1841. (Withdrew) Ellis, no. 46, Jan. 12, 1837. -He gave the fortnight's notice on Nov. 4. Gorostiza, Correspondencia. -(Approval) Sen. 160; 24, 2, p. 84 (Monasterio); Sen. 189; 24, 2. Kohl, -Claims, 18. Even the philo-Mexican Thompson said that a discussion with -that government in writing was as "endless as the web of Penelope" -(Recolls., 228). - -3.32. =58=Jackson, Mar. 12, 1823 (he thought himself too -sympathetic toward Mexico to be our minister there). (Agreed) Ho. 351; -25, 2, pp. 581, 601. _Diario_, Feb. 2, 1836. Messages, Dec. 5, 1836; -Feb. 6, 1837 (Richardson, Messages). Ho. 139; 24, 2, p. 1. Jackson -has been said by a certain school of historians to have used our -claims (in the February Message) as a bludgeon to force Mexico to sell -Texas. But was his temper such that he did not care to assert American -rights unless to gain territory? What cession was he aiming at when he -enforced our claims against France? And if Mexico felt (as she asserted: -_Diario_, _supra_) that baseless grievances of ours were to be used as -a pretext for trouble, why did she not make haste and refute them? From -every sane point of view, indeed, the charge looks absurd. As early -as March, 1833, Butler was urged to settle the boundary negotiation -at once, lest a step toward independence on the part of Texas should -make it impossible to obtain that territory by arrangement with Mexico -(Smith, Annex. of Texas, 21); yet now, after four years have passed, -and after that province has practically effected its independence, -Jackson is accused of trying to compel a cession of it from Mexico. -Moreover he was at this very time rejecting the petition of Texas to -be annexed (_ibid._, 63). Besides, in April, 1836, the envoys of Texas -at Washington had been instructed to enter a "_solemn protest_ ... -against the right of Mexico to sell or the U. S. to purchase [Texas]" -(Tex. Dipl. Corres., i, 76). Even more surprising, the charge is made by -representatives of the anti-slavery historical school, which denounced -Jackson for wickedly conspiring at this precise juncture to help -establish Texas as an independent nation by precipitately recognizing -her. The truth is that while engaged in no conspiracy, he now favored -the recognition of Texas, and hence one could not accept the opposite -and inconsistent view even were it otherwise possible to do so. Probably -the fact that Jackson had settled our long-standing claims against -France by adopting a firm attitude influenced him in regard to Mexico. -(Rupture) Memoria de ... Relaciones, Jan., 1838. - -3.33. Ho. Report 281; 24, 2. Sen. 189; 24, 2. =52=Buchanan to -Slidell, no. 1. Tex. Dipl. Corres., i, 181-3, 187-92 (Wharton); 218-21 -(Catlett); 273-4 (Greyson); 284-8 (Hunt). Ho. Report 7=52=; 29, 1. -Buchanan, Works, iii, 213, 233, 415. - -3.34. Ellis had taken the legation papers to Washington. Sen. -1; 25, 2, pp. 105, 108, 109 (Forsyth). =52=Greenhow, Aug. 12, -1837. Certain historians drawing their views largely from the heated -anti-slavery writers of that period have been led to misrepresent our -relations with Mexico as much as our conduct with reference to Texas. At -this point it has been alleged that the United States required Mexico -to examine and settle a large number of complicated cases within a -week, which our acceptance of the dilatory reply proves that we did not -require. Greenhow was merely directed to say that [for the convenience -of the Mexican government] he would remain seven days and bring back any -communication it should wish to make (=56=Forsyth to Greenhow, May -27, 1837). That country, on the other hand, had decreed in May that all -pending grievances of the two nations might be settled by arbitration, -but that should the United States refuse complete satisfaction of any -demands Mexico should present, or delay it beyond the time fixed under -the arbitration treaty, commercial intercourse with this country should -be cut off and preparations be made for war (Ho. Report, 1056; 25, 2, p. -9; Dublán, Legislación, iii, 392). Sen. 1; 25, 2, p. 111 (Cuevas). - -3.35. Sen. 1; 25, 2, pp. 113-27 (Martínez); 30 (Forsyth). Forsyth -to Ellis, no. 3, May 3, 1839. Ho. Report, 1056; 25, 2. In respect to -one clear case, already many years old, Martínez promised that "every -exertion" should be made to have it taken up by the next regular -Congress; but when that Congress met, the minister of relations -did not even mention it (_ibid._). Mayer, War, 343. Ho. 351; 25, -2, pp. 758 (Forsyth); 759 (Greenhow). Richardson, Messages, iii, -377-9. =53=Martínez to Forsyth, Apr. 7, 1838; reply, Apr. 21. -=77=Martínez, no. 1, res., 1837. Martínez coupled his proposal of -arbitration with a demand that the United States should reaffirm our -neutrality. This was an affront, but Forsyth merely expressed surprise. - -3.36. The plan of arbitration was first brought to the attention of -our government during the latter part of Dec, 1837. Ho. Report, 1056; -25, 2. Ashburnham, no. 42, 1838. (Surprise) =52=W. D. Jones, nos. -132-3, 1838. Mexico proposed arbitration to France also, but met with -a refusal (México á través, iv, 411). Later, Martínez proposed to give -the arbitration a scope that would have included Mexican complaints -regarding Texas. To admit such diplomatic and political questions would -have made the affair practically endless, and thus have nullified it -so far as its essential object, the adjustment of private claims, -was concerned; and our government properly refused to accept this -proposition (Moore, Internat. Arbit., 1217). - -3.37. Ho. 252; 25, 3, pp. 24 (Martínez), 27. Ho. 190; 26, 1. Moore, -Internat. Arbit., 1216-8. Forsyth to Ellis, no. 3, May 3, 1839. To save -time, the United States transported Martínez's courier to Vera Cruz, but -the man spent about three weeks in making the four-days' trip from the -port to the capital (_ibid._). =53=Forsyth to Martínez, Mar. 16, -1839. (Excuse) Ho. 252; 25, 3, p. 21 (Jones, Jan. 10); Ho. Report, 320; -25, 3. (Disavowed) Ho. 252; 25, 3, pp. 2, 14. - -3.38. Pakenham, no. 60, 1840. (Waived) Memoria de ... Relaciones, -Jan., 1841. Moore, Internat. Arbit., 1221-3. Castillo and León declined -to take an oath in the regular way, saying that each had administered -it to the other. The United States was represented by ex-Senator John -Rowan and W. L. Marcy. Rowan was succeeded by H. M. Breckenridge. -=52=Buchanan to Slidell, no. 1, 1845. - -3.39. Ho. 252; 25, 3, p. 11 (Forsyth). Ho. 57; 27, 1. Sen. 320; -27, 2, pp. 185 (Webster); 22-9, 90, 92, etc. Sen. 61; 27, 1 (Marcy and -Rowan, May 26, 1841). Sen. 411; 27, 2 (com. for. rels.). Ho. 269; 27, 2 -(Leggett case). - -Castillo and León insisted that cases should come before the board only -by documents presented through one of the governments--a process likely -to consume much time. When Rowan withdrew in August, 1841, and Marcy -desired to proceed even under this disadvantage, his Mexican colleagues -gained a delay of about six weeks by refusing to do so (Moore, Inter. -Arbit., 1235. Sen. 320; 27, 2, p. 254). They falsely asserted that four -particular claims, three of which were accepted by our commissioners and -the fourth was paid later by our government, had been withdrawn by the -American minister at Mexico, and by thus holding them back for some two -months defeated them (Sen. 320; 27, 2, pp. 179, 251-3). - -Under the treaty, that country was positively bound to furnish the -evidence called for in support of the claims, and W. S. Parrott's -requisition was the first or among the first made out and forwarded. -None of his papers came, however, for seven months, and those received -were taken without leave from the custody of the board by Castillo and -León, and held back for nearly two months more; a part of them had -evidently been mutilated or forged; only about one half of the number -specified were furnished, though it was known that all were under the -control of the government; and more than 2000 pages actually prepared -for transmission seem to have been withheld (Sen. 320; 27, 2, _passim_). -Leggett's case, another of the principal ones, was vitally damaged by -documents afterwards fully proved to be spurious (Moore, Internat. -Arbit., 1277-8), and as the claimant certainly would not have presented -them against himself, they must have come from the Mexican government. - -Ho. Report 1096; 27, 2, p. 22: "For the rest, the Committee, while they -abstain [as was proper in official action] from imputations on the -commissioners of the Mexican Republic, yet cannot but perceive that -the instructions under which those commissioners acted, and the course -they pursued, in the organization, proceedings, and final action of the -commission, were of most questionable validity, and operated to the -serious injury of the parties interested." The American commissioners -expressed the belief that had the board been acting half the time -between Aug. 25 and the day it took up the first case on its merits, -all the cases would have been "finally adjusted" (Sen. 320; 27, 2, -p. 197). The claims left undecided in the umpire's hands amounted to -$1,864,939.56, and those which the board had not time to consider to -$3,336,837.05 (Moore, Internat. Arbit., 1232). - -Mexico has been given great credit for sending many original documents -on a hazardous journey; but, had they been lost, the claimants would -have suffered and she would have profited. She had time enough and -clerks enough to make this risk unnecessary. Also Mexico has been given -great credit for accepting certain indisputable claims growing out -of her revolutionary war, which pro-Mexican Americans have declared -it was outrageous to present; but as she had formally recognized in -1824 all debts of the revolutionists, there was no escape. Numerous -claims failed to be considered because presented too late, but this -was doubtless mainly or wholly due to the attitude of the Mexican -commissioners, which made it appear more than doubtful for a long time -whether it would be worth while to incur the trouble and expense of -making up the cases. In fact the notice of the state dept. (Washington -_Globe_, Apr. 16, 1840) that the commission would meet was falsified -by the non-appearance of Castillo and León in time (Sen. 320; 27, 2, -p. 23). Much time and expense were needed to get papers from Mexico, -etc. The Mexican commissioners took the unreasonable ground that all -undecided claims, considered by the board, were extinguished (Sen. 411; -27, 2, p. 3). - -3.40. Moore, Internat. Arbit., 1232, 1245. Ho. Report 752; 29, 1. -Pakenham, nos. 49, 97, 1842. Ho. 144; 28, 2, p. 20 (Green). Besides the -twenty instalments a preliminary payment, covering the interest that -would be due, April 30, 1843, on the awards, was to be made on that date -(Moore, Internat. Arbit., 1246). - -A forced loan was ordered for the payment of the interest and principal -of the awards (Voss in Ho. 133; 29, 1, p. 7. Sen. 85; 29, 1; Negrete, -Invasión, iv, 327); and the goods of all who would not or could not -meet their assessments were confiscated and sold amid the lamentations -of the owners and general curses against the United States (Bustamante, -Gobierno, 130). Nearly all the proceeds of the forced loan were, -however, used for other purposes (Green in Ho. 19; 28, 2, p. 32). Our -agent was finally given drafts for the next instalments after the third, -and supposing these would be cashed, he receipted for them in full -(Buchanan, Nov. 19 in Ho. 133; 29, 1, p. 3); but the government stopped -all such payments (B. E. Green, Dec. 17, 1844) and refused to give up -the receipts (Ho. 133; 29, 1, p. 11). In short, it pursued a course that -was not only dishonorable but positively fraudulent. To make all this -the more exasperating, the nation was permitting Santa Anna to expend -great amounts. - -In the treaty of January, 1843, Mexico promised to make a new convention -providing for the settlement of all our outstanding claims, including -those not adjudicated by the joint commission. Delay and evasion -followed, of course; but in October of that year the British minister -severed diplomatic relations with Mexico, and in November, 1843, -probably in order to be on good terms with us in case of a war with -England, she signed the proposed convention (Doyle, no. 79, 1843). -The United States accepted the plan of a joint commission, as Mexico -desired, but required that it should meet at Washington. This appears -to have been just. The claimants were all Americans, were numerous, -had a great number of papers which it was not advisable to take abroad -by sea, and could not, without much inconvenience and loss, expatriate -themselves for an indefinite period. Another objection was even more -serious, perhaps. Pakenham (no. 14, 1842) wrote emphatically to his -government that a commission of this kind should not sit at Mexico, -because the pressure of public sentiment would not allow the Mexican -members to act properly on the claims of aliens, and because the foreign -ministers, from whom the actual umpire would almost necessarily be -selected, were more or less entangled in similar cases, and therefore -would not be thought impartial. - -To provide, as Mexico demanded, for the arbitration of private Mexican -grievances, which that government admitted unofficially did not exist, -would have been to cast a gratuitous aspersion upon ourselves; and to -allow the presentation of a national claim on account of Texas (which -also was demanded), besides enabling Mexico to nullify through her -pretensions and endless declamations the essential purpose of the -treaty, would have been to question the good faith of our official -declarations of neutrality, and make it possible for a subject of some -foreign power--the umpire--to impose upon us an immense indemnity, -which would also have been a monumental impeachment of our honor. No -sovereign state would place itself in so dangerous and ridiculous a -position. Accordingly the Senate of the United States eliminated these -features of the agreement signed by Minister Thompson. The justice of -its action Mexico did not undertake seriously to deny, and she promised -immediate attention to the subject; but once more she resorted to -dilatory tactics, and thus her promise of January, 1843, one important -consideration for granting a delay in the payment of our awards, was -evaded. - -One difficulty needs to be faced here. The United States defended -itself for certain breaches of neutrality on the part of American -citizens during the revolutionary war of Texas on the ground that they -could not legally be prevented; why then could not Mexico plead the -legal impossibility of preventing local authorities and citizens from -committing outrages against Americans? In reply it may be said (1) -that there was no analogy between the two cases. While our government -may have asked that such outrages be prevented, its real demand was -that compensation be paid; our breaches of neutrality were political -offences, and therefore called for different treatment than the civil -grievances on which these claims were based; the former could not be -proved (Smith, Annex. of Texas, pp. 23-24), while the latter could be; -and the former, unlike the latter, could not properly be redressed by -the payment of a definite amount of money. (2) We have abundant reason -to believe that if Mexico had been able and had desired to present a -bill for damages on account of such breaches of neutrality, it would -have been examined fairly and promptly by the American government. As a -single illustration of the ability of Mexico to pay our claims, it may -be mentioned that in 1844 Santa Anna and the Lizardi banking house, in -combination, robbed the treasury of about $1,200,000 (Mofras, Explor., -i, 65). - - - IV. RELATIONS BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND MEXICO, 1843-1846 - -4.1. See Smith, Annex. of Texas, text, notes, and index, particularly -pp. 68, 74, 78, 85-7, 94, 99, 194-5, 199, 210, 273, 288-95, 409-31, 464. -Webster: _ibid._, 194. See remarks in chap. iii, note 13. =137=Donelson -to Calhoun, Jan. 8, 1848. =77=Doyle, British chargé, to Bocanegra, -April 20, 1843: "The undersigned must remind His Excellency that Texas -has been recognized as an independent nation by the Government of Her -Majesty, and that treaties have been negotiated with that Republic as -independent." =77=Cyprey, the French minister, to Bocanegra, April 20, -1843: "The Mexican Cabinet has doubtless overlooked the fact that with -respect to France and most of the states of Europe Texas is absolutely -in the same position as that in which Mexico was before her independence -had been recognized by Spain." - -As early as 1839 Gorostiza admitted privately that Mexico had lost -Texas (=11=E. de Lisle, June 21); and in 1840 the French government -notified Mexico that its recognition of Texas was merely the acceptance -of a _fait accompli_ (=11=to Cyprey, no. 4, May 6). Webster, Writings, -ix, 158: "Nothing can exceed, I have always thought, the obstinacy -and senselessness manifested by Mexico in refusing for so many years -to acknowledge the independence of Texas"; xiii, 351: Our annexing -Texas gave Mexico no just ground of complaint (Sept. 29, 1847). In his -Memoria of Jan., 1849, the Mexican minister of relaciones called the -refusal of Mexico to recognize the annexation of Texas a caprice or whim -(capricho). (Never) See note 5. =137=Gallatin to Calhoun, Mar. 3, 1848. - -4.2. Sen. 1; 28, 1, pp. 25 (Bocanegra); 27 (Thompson); 34 (Upshur). - -4.3. Sen. 1; 28, 1, pp. 38, 42 (Almonte); 41, 45 (Upshur). =53=Memo. of -conference between Upshur and Almonte. =53=Almonte to Upshur, Apr. 22, -1844. Smith, Annex. of Texas, 194. - -4.4. Smith, Annex. of Texas, 199, 288. Sen. 341; 28, 1, p. 53 (Calhoun). - -4.5. Smith, Annex. of Texas, 289-295. =77=Relaciones to Almonte, May -30, 1844. According to Santa Anna's published account of the interview, -which doubtless misrepresented the bearer of despatches, Thompson said -the assent of Mexico was an essential preliminary to the annexation of -Texas, and plainly recognized her ownership of the province, and the -President replied that the right of subjugating it would be transmitted -to posterity, and assent would never be given to its absorption in -the United States. In reply to Bocanegra's assertion that the United -States had now recognized Mexico's claim to Texas Calhoun sent word to -the Mexican government that we recognized no such claim, but held that -Texas was an independent nation both in fact and in right (Ho. 2; 28, -2, p. 23). In Tyler, Tyler, ii, 692, is a statement, apparently based -on good authority, that Mexico consented to cede Texas for $15,000,000; -but internal evidence and many facts are decidedly against it, and the -author has not found the slightest evidence in its support. It was made -forty years after the event, and probably was due to a misunderstanding -or defective recollection. - -Out of this affair grew a diplomatic tilting-match (Ho. 2; 28, 2). -Bocanegra, though personally agreeable and officially painstaking, -dignified and courteous (Thompson, Recolls., 82) was not a great -logician; and the son of Duff Green could hardly be regarded as an -intellectual giant. Still, certain points emerged from the discussion. -The Mexican planted himself on the technical theory of ownership, -accused the Texans of stealing the territory which they had been -graciously permitted to occupy, and charged the United States in the -usual manner with violating treaties and international law. Green, -on the other hand, relied upon facts: the fact of actual Texan -independence, the fact that Mexico herself owed her existence to a -revolution, and the fact that she had regarded herself as independent -and had been so regarded by other nations long before the mother-country -would recognize her. But the correspondence as a whole was indecisive, -disagreeable, and exasperating. - -4.6. Smith, Annex. of Texas, 273-9, 365-7. - -4.7. Smith, Annex. of Texas, 416-7. Shannon and Rejón: Sen. 1; 28, 2, -p. 47; Ho. 19; 28, 2. =52=Rejón to Shannon, Nov. 21, 1844. Buchanan to -Shannon, no. 10, 1845. =13=Bankhead, no. 67, 1844. Von Holst, U. S., -ii, 685. Jameson, Calhoun Correspondence, 662. Tyler, Message, Dec. -18, 1844 (Richardson). N. Y. _Eve. Post_, Dec. 18, 1844. (Rejón) Sosa, -Biografías; =52=B. E. Greene, no. 17, 1844. N. Y. _Herald_, Dec. 16, -1844. _Nat. Intelligencer_, Dec. 20, 1844. _Democ. Review_, Feb., 1847, -99, 100. Richtofen, Zustände, 54-6. Rejón, Justificación. - -A recent Mexican author has said that "perfidy," which the Mexicans -loved to charge against the United States at this period, was made -impossible by the publicity of our diplomatic affairs (Búlnes, Mentiras, -167). It should be remembered that we had a perfect right to seek, in -the way we had sought, to acquire Texas--_i.e._ by purchase. - -4.8. Sen. 1; 29, 1, pp. 38 (Almonte); 39 (Buchanan). Smith, Annex. of -Texas, 420-3. Shannon, no. 10, Apr. 6, 1845. Bankhead, nos. 30, 38, -1845. Richardson, Messages, iv, 388. O Se Hace la Guerra. _Diario_, May -12. Memoria de ... Relaciones, Dec., 1846. - -"Is it possible," exclaimed _La Voz del Pueblo_ of March 26, "that -Mexico is a nation of slaves, a wandering tribe, to be the prey of other -nations? Eleven years of war [to gain our independence], all the victims -executed, all the costly sacrifices made,--have these been in vain? War -and only war can save us"--"war without quarter," "extermination and -death." For other references and quotations see Smith, Annex. of Texas, -425-7. =52=Dimond, nos. 244-5, 249, etc., 1845. Min. of treasury to -Deputies, Apr. 19, 1845 (_Diario_, Apr. 20). =56=W. S. Parrott, Apr. 26. - -4.9. _Amigo del Pueblo_, July 17, 1845. Smith, Annex. of Texas, 427. -_Diario_, July 17, 23, 25, 31; Aug. 11; Oct. 11. _Siglo XIX_, Aug. 1. -=52=Dimond, nos. 245, 249, etc., 1845. _Journal des Débats_, Sept. 20. -=56=W. S. Parrott, July 12, 15, 22, 30; Aug. 16. _Patriota Mex._, Nov. -14. =52=Shannon, no. 3, 1844. St. Louis _Republican_, Aug. 18, 1845. -Wash. _Union_, Aug. 1, 14; Sept. 29. =297=Buchanan to McLane, priv. -and pers., Sept. 13. =77=Relaciones to mins., July 30. =52=Campbell, -Havana, Aug. 14. =76=Guerra, circular, July 16. Bankhead, no. 38, 1845. -Bustamante, Nuevo Bernal, i, 43-5. - -July 30, 1845, the Mexican minister of relations wrote to the Mexican -minister at Paris: "Mexico has been left no choice except to fight the -United States"; "The campaign will soon begin"; 14,000 troops are _en -route_; 6000 will soon be organized to join them (=77=Cuevas to Garro, -res.). - -4.10. _Siglo XIX_, July 27. _Picayune_, Sept. 23. St. Louis _Reveille_, -Sept. 14. =52=Black, no. 341, 1845. =56=W. S. Parrott, July 22, 30. -Dimond, nos. 249, 257, 1845. _Diario_, July 31. =297=Polk to Buchanan, -private, Aug. 7. - -Spanish-American subtlety was not the only subtlety at work. Aug. 1, -1845, the Mexican agent at London reported: I have told Aberdeen that -war is inevitable; he suggests that we merely suspend relations with -the U. S., since a declaration of war would lawfully be followed by the -occupation of California, the bombardment of Vera Cruz, and a blockade -(=77=Murphy, no. 9). The view that no declaration of war was necessary -and that an attack might be made at once on Texas was well understood in -the United States, as the preceding citations show. As early as Aug. 5 -the Mexican commander at Matamoros =52=proclaimed: "Comrades, the moment -has arrived to present ourselves on the field of honor." - -4.11. =108=Wikoff to Bancroft, May 10, 1845. =52=Buchanan to Parrott, -Mar. 28, 1845. - -In one respect this was an unfortunate appointment, for the Mexican -authorities hated Parrott; but Buchanan, who probably was not aware of -that fact, regarded him as "a discreet man, well acquainted with public -affairs," and entitled to the confidence of the President (=52=to Black, -Sept. 17). He was familiar with Spanish, had an intimate acquaintance -with Mexican politics and politicians, and was available. It is highly -improbable that any one else combined these necessary qualifications; -and, as his errand called for no public recognition and was mainly to be -executed indirectly, prejudice was likely to be disarmed. =162=Bancroft -to Conner, Nov. 20, 1845. =162=_Id._ to Latimer, Nov. 7, 10. - -4.12. =56=W. S. Parrott, June 24; Sept. 6. His quoted words, added -to other declarations of a similar character, dispose completely of -the assertion, often found in Mexican and American writings, that we -offered to pay for Texas and thus admitted that we had wickedly annexed -it. Baldly and as of right, Mexico's claim could not be recognized by -this nation; but in a spirit of good-will, under cover of paying for a -satisfactory line, we were disposed to soothe her feelings with a gift. - -4.13. Tyler, Tyler, iii, 174 (Green). Slidell, Dec. 17. Shannon, no. -8, 1845. Dimond, nos. 256, 259, 266, 1845. =56=W. S. Parrott, Aug. 16 -(Herrera has said, "If a Minister from the United States should arrive, -he would be well received"), 26, 29. (Black, Aug. 23) Polk, Diary, -Sept. 16. =108=Kemble to Bancroft, Sept. 3: letters from men in daily -intercourse with Herrera, Almonte, and the minister of relations say the -government desires peace; and one says: "We know from good authority -that if a Minister were sent from the United States he would be well -received" (note the word "Minister"). - -4.14. Richmond _Enquirer_, Dec. 9. Buchanan to Larkin, Oct. 17, 1845; to -Slidell, Nov. 10. Dix in _Cong. Globe_, 30, 1, app., 176. See also pp. -136-7. - -4.15. García, Juárez, 9, 12. =52=W. D. Jones, Sept. 22, 1838. (Estrada) -Valencia, proclam., Oct. 22, 1840, in Papeles Varios. London _Times_, -Mar. 13, 1845. _Picayune_, Dec. 30, 1844; Jan. 25, 1846. McLane, March -3, 1845 (Curtis, Buchanan, i, 583). Feb. 28, 1846, the British Foreign -Office transmitted to Bankhead a letter (delivered to it by the Spanish -minister by order of his court) which pointed toward the establishment -of monarchy in Mexico under a Spanish prince. - -4.16. (Believed) =297=Buchanan to McLane, priv. and pers., Sept. 13, -1845. - -4.17. Polk, Diary, Sept. 16, 17, 1845. (Caused) Ho. 60; 30, 1, p. 12 -(Buchanan). Slidell had been born and educated at the north. - -4.18. Bankhead, nos. 94, 101, 104, 1845. The British government censured -Bankhead for going so far in efforts to restore harmony between the -United States and Mexico (=13=to Bankhead, no. 36, 1845. =77=Murphy, no. -2, 1846). =13=Peña to Bankhead, Oct. 15. México á través, iv, 545. Peña -only said that Mexico would be "inclined" to hear the United States, but -of course he would not, on the ground of a passing mood, have expected -two British ministers to act for his nation. - -4.19. Bankhead, nos. 101, 104. _Id._ to Pakenham, Oct. 16. Richardson, -Messages, iv, 437-43. That Mexico knew our claims counted among the -"differences" is proved by the letter of Cuevas to Forsyth, July 29, -1837 (Sen. 1; 25, 2, p. 111): The President is anxious for "that final -and equitable adjustment [of the claims] which is to terminate the -existing difficulties between the two Governments." - -4.20. Ho. 60; 30, 1, pp. 12 (Buchanan); 13, 14, 17 (Black). Peña to -Black, Oct. 14 in Memoria de ... Relaciones, 1846. _Diario_, Nov. 6. -=341=Black, memorial, Dec. 20, 1847. Sen. 12; 30, 1. - -4.21. Ho. 60; 30, 1, p. 12 (Buchanan). Ho. Report 752; 29, 1. _Monitor -Repub._, Aug. 1, 1846 (Herrera had been determined to settle with the -United States). - -4.22. Sen. 325; 27, 2, p. 64. Sen. 337; 29, 1, p. 10. As to Slidell's -Title, cf. together Buchanan to Parrott, Mar. 28; _Id._ to Black, Sept. -17; Peña to council of state; and report of council of state. Polk, -Diary, Nov. 6, 9, 10. - -In Tyler, Tyler, iii, 174, may be found a statement from B. E. Green -to the effect that Herrera sent word to him that a minister of the -usual sort could not be received, and that he transmitted this message -to Polk. But (1), if such was Herrera's attitude, why was it not made -clear to Black, who had been expressly commissioned to ascertain whether -a minister would be received; (2) Green, as a member of the Calhoun -faction, and perhaps as an official who had lost a good post in our -legation at Mexico, was not favorable to Polk, and a statement made -by a prejudiced person from memory forty-four years after the event, -regarding a delicate matter in which precision is essential, cannot be -considered at all authoritative. (3) This statement is out of harmony -with a number of material facts. =256=Marcy to Wetmore, Feb. 1, 1846: -Slidell was sent "on an express agreement that a minister would be -received." - -4.23. =52=McLane, no. 8, Sept. 26, 1845. =108=Kemble to Bancroft, Sept. -3, 1845. Dimond, no. 269, 1845. _Times_, Oct. 14. (Impatience) Ho. 60; -30, 1, p. 17 (Black). Polk, Diary, Nov. 10. - -4.24. Buchanan to Slidell, Nov. 10; Dec. 17. _Veracruzano Libre_, Nov. -30. =52=Comte. princ. to Dimond, Nov. 30. Slidell, Nov. 30; Dec. 17. -Ho. 60; 30, 1, p. 22 (Black). (Fleet) Conner to Dimond, Oct. 23, 1845 -(Wash. _Union_, Dec. 1, 1847). Conner felt so sure of the conciliatory -spirit of his government that he withdrew without waiting for orders. -California was well known to be in a chronic state of rebellion (chap. -xvi), which Mexico had not the power to subdue, and therefore it was -natural for one who knew very little about the Mexicans to suppose they -would be willing to take a price for the practically worthless claim to -that territory. - -The view that Polk explicitly instructed Slidell to give up the plan -to buy California rather than allow that plan to stand in the way of -regaining amicable relations with Mexico does not seem to be correct -(Kelsey, Consulate, 62, note 5). But Buchanan's letter of Dec. 17 to -Slidell lays stress upon his "two last alternatives," which were to -purchase northern California, including (_a_) the Bay of San Francisco -or (_b_) Monterey also; yet he instructs Slidell to drop this matter, -if pressing it would endanger success in endeavoring to obtain the -Rio Grande boundary or a line including all of New Mexico. Now such -a settlement of the Texas-New Mexico boundary would have involved -a restoration of amicable relations with Mexico. The two matters -(boundary and relations) were inextricably interwoven both in fact and -logically. Hence in effect Buchanan instructed Slidell to drop the plan -of purchasing California if pressing it would be liable to prevent the -restoration of amicable relations with Mexico. Rives (U. S. and Mexico, -ii, 69, note 2) takes a different view, but seems to have erred in more -particulars than one. - -4.25. See pp. 55-6. Smith, Annex. of Texas, 423-31. =52=Slidell, Dec. -17, 27. _Amigo del Pueblo_, Nov. 1: "It is hardly possible to believe -such perfidy, such baseness and such audacity ... treason more horrible -has never been seen." _Patriota Mexicano_, Nov. 18: "To listen to -talk of peace from these men [the Americans] is to take the road to -perdition, death, ignominy." _Voz del Pueblo_, Dec. 3: "The treason has -been discovered.... We no longer own the very ground on which we walk." - -4.26. Ho. 60; 30, 1, p. 22 (Black). Slidell, Dec. 29, 1845. Bankhead, -no. 127, 1845. México á través, iv, 545. Roa Bárcena, Recuerdos, 19. -Sierra, Evolution, i, 212. Black, Dec. 18. - -One of Peña's minor points was that it did not appear from Slidell's -credentials that he had been confirmed by the Senate; and in fact, -since the American Congress had not been in session at the time of -his appointment, he had not been. This was not only to inquire into -our domestic affairs, but to hold that the Executive of the United -States could not appoint a diplomatic agent during a recess of the -Senate. Shannon's letter of credence had said nothing regarding his -confirmation, and Murphy had acted as our chargé in Texas for about -nine months before his name went to the Senate. Another point was that -Slidell's letter of credence did not expressly state that he had full -powers for the business in hand; but it was practically absurd, after -the United States had taken so much trouble and shown its good faith by -withdrawing our fleet, to suppose that we would send an agent to Mexico -without giving him the authority to do what we were evidently so anxious -to bring about. When this complaint was brought to his attention, -Slidell replied that his credentials described him as minister -plenipotentiary and envoy extraordinary, and also that it was not usual -to exhibit one's full powers at so early a stage in such negotiations, -adding that he would have done so, however, had any desire to see them -been suggested. Buchanan was doubtless right in calling the objection -a quibble; and one cannot suppose that under different circumstances -it would have been presented. The council of state rejected Peña's -objections in both of these cases. - -4.27. Ho. 60; 30, 1, pp. 31, 58 (Peña); 28 (Black). =52=Slidell, Dec. 17. - -4.28. Ho. 60; 30, 1, p. 58 (Peña). =77=Relaciones, circular to govs., -Dec. 11. Comunicación circular. Memoria de ... Relaciones, Dec., 1848. -Sen. 337; 29, 1, pp. 21, 24, 25, 28, 32 (Slidell); 22 (Black); 25, 30 -(Peña). Slidell, Dec. 17. - -Even the unfriendly Mexican correspondent of the London _Times_ -wrote, "For once" the United States is right, for the documents prove -that Mexico made no _ad hoc_ condition (_Times_, Mar. 13, 1846). The -matter can be viewed in another light also. Peña agreed to receive a -"comisionado"; later he said he had agreed to receive a "comisionado -_ad hoc_." If the words "_ad hoc_" added anything, they indicated a -difference between his earlier and his later positions; if not, why -were they used? Many Americans, doubtless without perceiving what the -significance of the act would have been, have insisted that the United -States ought to have humored poor little Mexico by sending an envoy _ad -hoc_. Aside from the weightier objection to so doing, such a concession -would probably have led to further demands (see note 34). Peña, instead -of recognizing our magnanimity in taking the first step to heal a breach -caused by Mexico, described our overture as "a tacit but clear and -strong confession of the rights of Mexico [and] of the wrongs done to -her" (=77=circular, Dec. 11). Gallatin stated that treaties of peace -were always negotiated by special commissioners, but this was incorrect -(see _e.g._ Jenkinson, Collection, iii, 355). - -4.29. Memoria de ... Relaciones, 1846. The council of state said: From -the language in which the ministry "explains the condition of receiving -the proposed envoy (_enviado_), we cannot draw a satisfactory reason for -not receiving Mr. Slidell." Ho. 60; 30, 1, pp. 28-49, 56. Bankhead, no. -127, 1845. - -In his manifesto of July 26, 1846 (_Diario_, July 30), Paredes -mentioned, as third among the causes of the war, the attempt of the -United States to induce Mexico to receive a resident minister, so as to -restore friendly relations without first making amends for the offence -[annexation of Texas] that had broken off official intercourse. - -4.30. Webster, Writings, iv, 32. R. C. Winthrop, another leading Whig, -took the same ground (_Union_, Mar. 20, 1847). (Awkward) Calhoun in -Benton's Abr. Debates, xvi, 99. - -4.31. _Revolution of Paredes._ Memoria de ... Relaciones, Dec, 1846 -(including documents). Contestaciones (between Paredes, Arista, and the -government, 1845). Carreño, Jefes, clxiii-clxxvii. _Patriota Mex._, Dec. -23, 1845. Ramírez, México, 80-124. =77=Relaciones, circular, Jan. 3, -1846. México á través, iv, 546-56. =56=Mexican corr. of London _Times_ -to W. S. Parrott, Nov. 19; Dec. 18. =76=Guerra, circular, Jan 5. Dimond, -nos. 279, 302, 1845. _Aguila del Norte_, Feb. 11; Mar. 18, 1846. Rivera, -Gobernantes, ii, 281-5, 287-8. Giménez, Mems., 91. =285=Tornel to -Paredes, Nov. 19, 1845. Bankhead, nos. 94, 97, 116, 119, 120, 124, 1845; -2, 1846. Tributo á la Verdad. =56=W. S. Parrott, Aug. 16, 29; Sept. 29, -1845. Black, June 10; Sept. 2, 1845. _Picayune_, Jan. 24, 1846. Portrait -of Herrera: city hall, Mexico. London _Times_, Feb. 10; Mar. 2, 20, -1846. _Monitor Constit._, Jan. 1, 16, 1846. Slidell, Dec. 27, 1845; Jan. -14; Feb. 6, 1846. _Memorial Histórico_, Jan. 14, 1846. - -The condition of Mexico on the eve of this revolution was well described -by the _Revista Económica y Comercial_: "The country wavers, goes -backward, loses courage, and loses hope, because all the systems of -government that it has tried, one by one, have failed to give the fruits -promised by their authors, and, worn out and exhausted by so many and -varied medicines that have been applied in vain, it desires only order, -peace, and some degree of security. Our men of merit, education, and -patriotism are silent, live in retirement and sadness in their houses, -occupied solely with private affairs ... we have become a nation of -soldiers, officials, lawyers, clergymen, and smugglers, where the number -who produce bears a miserable proportion to the number of those who -live by the labor and sweat of the producers, and where the continual -political changes, the disorders, the bad administration of justice, and -the bad commercial and financial system offer more or less sustenance -to those who produce nothing, always at the expense of the toilers and -their allies, the merchants." The political situation was thus explained -by _El Siglo XIX_: "When a long series of civil dissensions, of frauds -upon the public, of treasons against the parties, of perjuries to -principles, have mixed up men and things, blotted out the line between -political groups, and confused all ideas, politics must become a genuine -chaos. Mexico is in precisely that condition." When charged with -upsetting public order Paredes replied, "None existed" (_Esperanza_, -Jan. 8, 1846). As late as Aug. 6, 1846, Texas was called upon, like the -other political divisions of the country, to elect members of Congress. - -4.32. (Scheme) =52=Black, Dec. 30, 1845; =52=Slidell, Dec. 27; -=297=McLane to Polk, private, Jan. 17, 1846; _Memorial Histórico_, Jan. -26, and the Mexican press generally. Slidell saw grounds for hope: the -delay in furnishing him an escort; a possibility that Paredes might -hold that Herrera had committed Mexico; the improbability that money -to pay the troops could be borrowed while war seemed likely (hence he -sent a hint to the government that money could be obtained by accepting -a boundary satisfactory to the United States); Castillo, with whom he -had talked a number of times before he became minister of relations, -was intelligent and averse to a war with the United States. Buchanan to -Slidell, Jan. 20, 28; Mar. 12. - -4.33. Ho. 60; 30, 1, p. 63 (Slidell). Memoria de ... Relaciones, 1846. -The council said that Slidell could not be received on _any_ footing, -unless Taylor (_now at Corpus Christi_) should retire. "The limiting -of the mission of the _comisionado_ to the sole question of Texas," -it remarked, "was a tacit condition (_una condición tácita_)." This -admitted once more that the condition was not stated. The council -admitted also that _comisionado_ was not the proper term for an envoy -_ad hoc_, which refutes again the contention of a certain American -school that Mexico explicitly required us to send a "commissioner" -instead of a minister. Castillo's reply to Slidell (Mar. 12) said: -Mexico cannot have agreed to receive a regular minister, for it would -have been imprudent to do that; by fraud and violence the fair province -of Texas has been stolen; and now, after robbing and outraging Mexico, -your country seeks to obtain a pretext for war by demanding of us the -impossible humiliation of receiving you (Ho. 60; 30, 1, p. 67). At this -time Castillo did not know that Taylor was advancing toward the Rio -Grande (_Diario_, Mar. 15, 1846). =166=Slidell to Conner, Feb. 7; Mar. -15. - -4.34. Mar. 17 Slidell answered Castillo at some length (Ho. 60; 30, -1, p. 72), vindicating the course of the United States in regard to -Texas. All the threats of war, he pointed out, have come from Mexico; -to suppose that the present Mexican administration in particular does -not intend to fight, would be to accuse it of declaring, in order to -overthrow Herrera, what it did not mean; so far as words can produce -war it already exists by the act of Mexico, and is the United States to -remain entirely passive, taking no precautions, till your army "shall -be prepared to strike, with due effect, the threatened blow?" Slidell -at the same time requested his passports. Castillo to Slidell, March 21 -(Memoria de ... Relaciones, 1846) declared the discussion closed and -transmitted passports. April 23 Paredes said in a manifesto that he -rejected Slidell because "the dignity of the nation resented this new -insult" (México á través, iv, 559). In view of the grounds on which his -revolution had been launched (=73=Bermúdez de Castro, no. 200, res., -1846) he could not have received Slidell without grave danger to himself -(Black, May 26, 1846; Slidell, no. 11). See chap. viii, note 24. Slidell -sailed from Vera Cruz on March 31, but at Polk's request he retained his -commission and held himself in readiness to go to Mexico again for about -a year (Moore, Buchanan, vii, 211; =52=Slidell, no. 14, 1847). - - - V. THE MEXICAN ATTITUDE ON THE EVE OF WAR - -5.1. _Mexican feeling_. (Subjugate) =52=Consul Black, no. 349, Oct. -9, 1845; =47=Wood to Bancroft, June 4, 1846. =52=Slidell, nos. 3, 10. -=52=Consul McCall, Tampico, no. 65, Sept. 26, 1845. (All of Mexico) -=52=Shannon, no. 3, Oct. 28, 1844. (Threat) _Diario_, Mar. 25, 1845; -=77=Relaciones, circular, Nov. 27, 1846; _So. Qtrly. Rev._, Apr., -1849, 97, 102; Thompson, Recolls., 238; London _Spectator_, Sept. 26, -1846. (Hinder) =52=Manifiesto of Vera Cruz legislature, [June, 1827]; -Poinsett's reply; =52=Poinsett's reply to Méx. state legisl., Aug., -1829; Shannon, no. 3; La Ruina de los Mexicanos. (Indians) _Mosquito -Mexicano_, Aug. 4, 1835; =75=gov. Durango, Apr. 27, 1846. (Privileged -classes) J. H. Smith in Proceeds. Amer. Antiq. Soc, Apr., 1914, and the -citations there given. (_Siglo XIX_) =56=W. S. Parrott, June 29, 1845. -(Politicians) Green, nos. 8, 103, 1844; Calhoun Corresp., 975; Shannon, -no. 3, 1844, and the Mexican press. - -The following citations, which might be indefinitely extended, bear -upon various aspects of the subject. Pakenham, nos. 74 of 1828; 74 of -1829. Bankhead, nos. 38, 1845; 28, 58, 1846. =345=Ellis, Sept. 20, 1839. -Memoria de ... Relaciones, 1846. _Voz del Pueblo_, Mar. 29; May 3, -1845. _Amigo del Pueblo_, June 26; Oct. 9, 1845. _Orizaveño_, Mar. 30, -1845. _Patriota Mex._, Nov. 14, 1845. _Monitor Repub._, Jan. 28, 1847. -Reflexiones sobre la Memoria. Comunicación circular que. =77=Almonte, -no. 130, priv., 1844. =77=Arrangóiz, no. 50, res., 1845. Decree of Mex. -Cong., June 4, 1845 (broadside). =56=W. S. Parrott, June 29; July 5, -1845. =108=Kemble to Bancroft, Sept. 3, 1845. - -5.2. (Danger) =76= Gov. Ibarra of Puebla, Sept. 5, 1846; _Diario_, Apr. -17, 1846; =77=Relaciones, circular, Nov. 27, 1846; law of June 4, 1845, -in Dublán, Legislación, v, 19; _Monitor Repub._, May 15, 1847; London -_Spectator_, Sept. 26, etc., 1846. C. M. Bustamante, Nuevo Bernal, i, -45. Castillo; council of state (chap. iv). (Paredes) Bankhead, no. 28, -Feb. 27, 1846. (Chief) Shannon, no. 3, 1844; Negrete, Invasión, iv, -app., 182; _Diario_, Mar. 25, 1845; Mar. 25; Sept. 26; Dec. 6, 1846; -=80=legislat. of Méx. state, address, Apr. 26, 1847; _Patriota Mex._, -Nov. 14, 1845; =77=Arrangóiz, no. 50, res., Mar. 13, 1845; _Siglo -XIX_, Nov. 30, 1845. (Clamored) _Amigo del Pueblo_, Oct. 9, 1845; _Voz -del Pueblo_, Mar. 29, 1845. (Superiority) Tornel, Tejas, 95; _Monitor -Repub._, May 12, 1846. - -5.3. (Abject) Jameson, Calhoun Corresp., 993. =77=Almonte, June 19, -priv.; Sept. 20, 1844; Mar. 17, priv., 1845. (Panic) _Amer. Review_, -Sept., 1845, 222. - -5.4. To precisely what extent European journals were read in Mexico -cannot be determined; but it seems probable that few important -expressions escaped notice there, and certainly the leading journals -were quoted freely. - -5.5. (Differences) =77=Almonte, June 19, priv., 1844; =77=Relaciones, -circular, Nov. 27, 1846; Jameson, Calhoun Corresp., 994; -_Constitutionnel_, May 12; Aug. 5, 1845. _Times_, Apr. 15, 1845. -_Diario_, Apr. 3, 1845. - -5.6. Times, Apr. 15, 1845. Negrete, México, xxi, 130. =13=Elliot, July -3, 1845. Gorostiza, Dictamen. Reflexiones sobre la Memoria. Federación -y Tejas. Tornel, Tejas, 95-7. (Elliot in Mex.) Smith, Annex. of Texas, -411-3. =77=Deffa dis, July 29, 1835. - -5.7. _Britannia_, Feb. 15, 1845. (1812) Negrete, México, xxi, 130. -=13=Pakenham to Harvey, July 20, 1839. _Times_, Apr. 5, 1845. -=77=Arrangóiz, no. 65, res., Apr. 23, 1845. - -5.8. =345=Poinsett to Van Buren, May 26, 1846 (Swarms of the best -irregular cavalry that I have ever seen). Watson, Taylor, 113-4 (The -British, Spanish, and Prussian ministers at Washington agreed that Scott -would be beaten; Calderón spoke as quoted in the text). (Generals) Wash. -_Union_, Dec. 18, 1846. Elliot, note 6. _Times_, July 5, 1845. - -Napoleon said, "The first quality of a soldier is constancy in enduring -fatigue and hardship" (Maxims, 47). In this quality the Mexicans -excelled. - -5.9. Requena in _Monitor Repub._, Mar. 9, 1846. Negrete, Mexico, -xxi, 131. (Boasted) =52=W. S. Parrott, Dec. 14, 1835. Memoria de ... -Relaciones, Jan., 1849. _Boletín Oficial_, Apr. 15, 1845. Apuntes, 168. -Thompson, Recolls., 170-1. (Self-confidence) Mofras, Explor., i, 70. -=76=Min. war, circular, Nov. 11. (Ensure) _Diario_, Sept. 25, 1845. -(_Voz del P._) Federación y Tejas. - -5.10. (Texas) Tornel, Tejas, 95-7; =13=Bankhead, no. 125, Dec. 30, -1845. =77=Almonte, no. 72, priv., June 19; Sept. 20, 1844; instructions -to G. de la Vega, Apr. 10, 1844. =13=Pakenham, no. 22, Apr. 14, 1844. -Elliot, note 6. (Urged) Negrete, México, xxi, 131-2. Memoria de ... -Relaciones, Jan., 1849. - -5.11. Requena in _Monitor Repub_., Mar. 9, 1846. London _Times_, June -11, 1846. =345=Poinsett to Van Buren, May 26, 1846. _Britannia_, June -10, 1844. =169=Rives to Crittenden, Feb. 8, 1847. =137=Clemson to -Calhoun, Mar. 28, 1847. Elliot, note 6. - -5.12. Memoria de ... Relaciones, Jan., 1849. =77=Cuevas, no. 67, 1836. -(_Herald_)_Diario_, June 4, 1845. (_Globe_) Charleston _Mercury_, Sept. -8, 1845. Some of the documents quoted above are later than the beginning -of the war, but the opinions must have existed before. - -5.13. (Defensive) Requena, note 11. =77=Arrangóiz, no. 129, res., Nov. -29, 1844. _Times_, Apr. 5, 1845. _Britannia_, June 10, 1844. _Times_ in -_Diario_ of June 8, 1845. - -5.14. _Herald_, May 3, 1845. =77=Arrangóiz, note 13; no. 101, res., -July 8, 1845. (Tornel) =47=Wood to Bancroft, July 4, 1846. (Own) _Nat. -Intelligencer_, Sept. 5; Savannah _Republican_, Aug. 25; N. Y. _Herald_, -Aug. 30, 1845. _Times_ of Apr. 5, 1845, in _Diario_ of June 8. - -5.15. _Standard_, Aug. 12, 1845. =13=Pakenham, no. 22, Apr. 14, 1844. -(Fig red) Búlnes, Grandes Mentiras, 150. - -5.16. (Endured) =73=Bermúdez de Castro, no. 532, res., Sept. 24, -1846; =77=circular, Nov. 27, 1846. (Credit) London _Times_, Apr. 15, -1845; and chap. xxxiii. =77=Arrangóiz, no. 36, res., May 23, 1844. -_Constitutionnel_, Aug. 15, 1845. - -5.17. _Benefits._ =77=Cuevas, no. 67, July 13, 1836. _Diario_, Mar. 25, -1845. =52=Green, Apr. 8, 1844. Reflexiones sobre la Memoria. _Times_, -Apr. 15, 1845. =52=Shannon, no. 3, Oct. 28, 1844. =56=W. S. Parrott, -July 5, 1845. _Siglo XIX_, Aug. 1, 1845. (Baptize) La Verdad Desnuda. -(Blockade) =52=Thompson, Oct. 3, 1843; _Macedonian_, Mar. 28, 1845; -=13=Doyle, no. 79, Oct. 30, 1843. (_Voz del P._) Federación y Tejas. -(Crisis) Reflexiones sobre la Memoria. - -5.18. _Central and South America._ J. M. L. Mora, pamphlet, 1834. -_Diario_, Sept. 25, 1846. (Press) chap, vi, note 13. =77=Cuevas, no. -67, July 13, 1836. =77=Mex. min., Lima, no. 23, Aug. 15, 1837. (Dorsey) -Savannah _Republican_, Aug. 25, 1842. Adams, Mems., xi, 340, 367. -_Imparcial_, June 13, 1844. _Aurora de la Libertad_, Apr. 6, 1845. -Relaciones, circular, Nov. 27, 1846. =80=Legisl. of Méx. state, address, -Apr. 26, 1847. =76=Gov. Ibarra, Sept. 5, 1846. =312=Basadre to S. Anna, -Apr. 9, 1847. Roa Bárcena, Recuerdos, 243, note. - -5.19. _Diario_, Apr. 3, 1845. _Mail_, Aug. 30 in _Diario_, Nov. 1. -London _Times_, Sept. 10, 1845 (War is "clearly the duty" of Mexico). -_Journal des Débats_, Sept. 24, 1845. (The European outlook) Chap xxxv. - -5.20. (Jealousy) Mayer, War, 82; _Amer. Review_, Jan., 1846. (Policy) J. -H. Smith in Proceeds. Am. Antiq. Soc, Apr., 1914. _Correspondant_, Jan. -1, 1846. London _Times_, Jan. 1, 1846. - -5.21. (Cotton) Smith, Annex. of Texas, 89, 90. (Checked) _Ibid._, 382, -389; Tornel, Tejas, 97; London _Standard_, May 2, 1845; _Times_, Sept. -9; Dec. 15, 1845; Jan. 1, 1846. (Guizot) _Niles_, Mar. 14, 1846, pp. -25-6. (_Journal des Débats_) _National_, Dec. 27, 1845. - -5.22. (Texas) Smith, Annex. of Texas, chap, xviii. _Id._ in Mass. -Hist. Soc. Proceeds., June, 1914. _Morning Herald_, Mar. 27, 1845, in -_Diario_, June 4. _Times_, Dec. 15, 1845. - -5.23. _Times_, Aug. 6; Sept. 9, 1845. (It was the Mexico correspondent -of the _Times_ who spoke, but evidently the editor allowed him to be -heard.) _Standard_, May 2, 1845. _Journal of Commerce_, Sept. 6, 1845. -_Journal des Débats_, Feb. 4; Sept. 24, 1845. _Constitutionnel_, May -12, 1845. _Monitor Constit._, supplmt., Dec. 21, 1844. _Aurora de la -Libertad_, Apr. 6, 1845. - -5.24. _Journal des Débats_, Sept. 24, 1845. =13=Pakenham, no. 22, Apr. -14, 1844. (Blockade) =13=Bankhead, no. 162, Oct. 30, 1846. - -5.25. (Fear) _Boletín Oficial_, Apr. 15, 1845. (Guarantee) =13=Bankhead, -no. 117, Nov. 29, 1845. - -5.26. =13=Bankhead, nos. 113, Nov. 29, 1845; 125, Dec. 30, 1845; 14, -Jan. 30, 1846; 28, Feb. 27, 1846; =52=McLane, nos. 8, Sept. 26, 1845; -55, June 18, 1846; =52=Shannon, no. 9, Mar. 27, 1845; =52=Slidell, Jan. -14; Feb. 6, 1846; _Correspondant_, May 1, 1846; _Times_, Mar. 13, 1846; -Ho. 2; 29, 1, pp. 139-92; =52=J. Parrott, June 4, 1846. =52=Dimond, no. -332, Apr. 22, 1846: The Mexican thermometer for peace or war is governed -by the prospects of war between us and England. The contemptuous and -abusive tone of the British journals with reference to the United States -encouraged Mexico. Our minister at London reported that the British -press as a whole represented that the United States could not wage war -successfully against Mexico (=297=McLane to Polk, received, June 21, -1846). =77=Murphy, no. 9, Aug. 1, 1845 (Aberdeen would like to see, -etc.). - -5.27. =52=Slidell, Jan. 14, 1846. _Times_, Mar. 13, 1846. =52=McLane, -no. 55, June 18, 1846. (Hoped) =13=Bankhead, no. 31, Mar. 10, 1846; -Tornel, Tejas, 97. - -5.28. _Diario_, Mar. 25, 1845. (Enthusiasm, veil) Memoria de ... -Relaciones, Jan., 1849. =77=Almonte, no. 72, priv., June 19, 1844. -_Monitor Constit._, supplmt., Dec. 21, 1844. Almonte (who, as recently -minister to the United States, had great influence on the question of -peace or war) held that Mexico ought to fight and protract the war as -long as possible in order to make us so tired of it that we should -never repeat the experiment (=13=Pakenham, no. 119, Sept. 28, 1846). -_Espectador_, Apr. 25, 1846 ("We are profoundly convinced of the triumph -of the Mexican arms"). Reforma, Mar. 9, 1846. =13=Bankhead, nos. 130, -Sept. 7, 1846 ("They cannot be convinced" of their inability to fight -the U. S.); 151, Oct. 10, 1846 (The cry of the government is, "a levy -of 40,000 men and make terms only on the other side of the Nueces"). -(Prussian) =256=Memo. (Historians) Roa Bárcena, Recuerdos, 19-20; -Balbontín, Estado Militar, 58. Ramírez, México, 235. S. Anna, proclam., -Sept. 16, 1847, in _Monitor Repub_., Oct. 2, 1847. Memoria de ... -Relaciones, Jan., 1849. Kenly, Md. Volunteer, 57: After a long stay in -Mexico, I believe the sentiment of the people was "unanimous for war." -Franklin Pierce, speech, Jan. 27, 1848: After conversing with the most -intelligent men in Mexico I was satisfied that the war was unavoidable -(N. Y. _Herald_, Feb. 5, 1848). Other documents, too numerous to be -cited, assisted the author in reaching his conclusions. This condition -of the Mexican mind helps to explain the rejection of Slidell. See also -chap. ix, pp. 221-2. - - - VI. THE AMERICAN ATTITUDE ON THE EVE OF WAR - -6.1. Buchanan in _Cong. Globe_, 28, 1, app., 723. For public sentiment -regarding the Santa Fe prisoners see the New Orleans papers of March, -1842 (_e.g._ _Com. Bulletin_, Mar. 18), and Smith, Annex. of Texas, -31-2. =52=Consul Dimond, Jan. 20, 1843. (Sentmanat) =52=Consul Porter, -July 20, 1844. Sentmanat's party included several Americans. (Reptiles) -=77=Clipping from New Orleans _Bee_. _State Sentinel_, Sept. 27, 1845. -(American prisoners) N. Orl. _Comm. Bull._, Mar. 18, 1844. Ark. Hist. -Comm., Bulletin no. 6, p. 182. - -6.2. The statements regarding American feeling appear to be -self-evident. In the daily press the author has found abundant proof of -them, but it would require a great deal of space to prove inductively -the state of public sentiment. =42=Delegates, Feb. 12, 1847. - -6.3. These statements also are presented as conclusions based upon an -extended examination of the daily press (see Smith, Annex. of Texas, -472), speeches in Congress, etc. For example, the remarks made in -Congress with reference to Jackson's request for authority to adopt -forcible measures (p. 77 of this volume) contained many kind references -to Mexico. This feeling persisted. In the Richmond _Enquirer_, Dec. 9, -1845, its Washington correspondent stated that he found the Democrats of -both houses of Congress sincerely desired the friendship and confidence -of that country. _Id._, Oct. 17, 1845. Note the first page of chap. -xxxvi. For anti-slavery accusations: J. Q. Adams in Boston _Atlas_, -Oct. 17, 1842 (Smith, Annex. of Texas, 131). For the use of money to -influence the American press: _ibid._, 184. - -6.4. (Forbearance) N. Orl. _Bee_, Feb. 19, 1846; _Picayune_, May 5, -1846; _Guard_, May 15, 1846; N. Orl. _Comm. Bull._, Mar. 16, 1846, and -_infra_. =52=Van Buren to Butler, Oct. 16, 1829. =13=Count E. de Lillers -to Gutiérrez [Mar., 1830]. (Jackson) Chap. iii, p. 77. (Imbecility) -_Picayune_, June 23, 1842. - -6.5. _Picayune_, Apr. 6, 1842. (Webster) Sen. 320; 27, 2, p. 205. Sen. -411; 27, 2. (Less willing) Chap. iii, p. 80. _Jeff. Repub._, Aug. 7, -1845. - -6.6. _Republican_, Feb. 2, 1846._Picayune_, Jan. 28, 1846. _Delta_, Jan. -21, 1846. _Mo. Reporter_, Apr. 18, 1846. _Comm. Bulletin_, Mar. 16, 1846. - -6.7. Mex. consul, no. 79, Apr. 1, 1842. (Justly) Smith, Annex. of -Texas, "England" in index. (Influence) _Ibid._, 72, 136, 153; =56=W. S. -Parrott, June 4, 1846 ("Mexico may be said to be completely in the hands -of England"). _Commonwealth_, Feb. 23, 1846. _Times_, Nov. 21, 1845. - -6.8. Natchez _Courier and Journal_, Apr. 14, 1846. _Courrier des E. U._ -in Memphis _Enquirer_, Feb. 24, 1846. _E.g._ _Picayune_, Feb. 5, 1846. -_Cong. Globe_, 29, 1, p. 256 (Hannegan). - -6.9. _Delta_, Mar. 27: the pending difficulties must be settled -effectually. _La. Courier_, Mar. 6: "The time has arrived when the -U. S. must decide to act firmly and put an end to the uncertainty of -our relations with Mexico." _Picayune_, Jan. 24: "While our relations -remain in this miserable condition, our territory is liable to sudden -invasion and our citizens to arbitrary exactions ... the intrigues -of trans-Atlantic states demand to be counteracted, and the hostile -purposes of Mexico need to be met with peremptory measures." St. -Louis _Reporter_, Jan. 31: "Delay on our part to bring to a positive -settlement all existing difficulties with Mexico would be mere madness -and folly." _Picayune_, May 5: "There is no proposition in mathematics -more absolutely demonstrable than the impossibility of having a good -understanding with Mexico before giving her a sound drubbing." (Designs) -_Id._, Dec. 30, 1845; Feb. 5, 1846. =52=Consul Campbell, Jan. 7, 1846. - -6.10. (Abolitionists) N. Orl. _Comm. Bulletin_, Mar. 18, 1842. (Calhoun) -Smith, Annex. of Texas, 209, 211, 213-6. Calhoun's remark was given -to the author by Judge Martin of South Carolina, to whom it was made -in the spring of 1847, and is fully in line with Calhoun's action. -(Mississippi) The author thinks he has heard Dr. Wm. E. Dodd of the -University of Chicago express such an opinion. - -6.11. _E.g._ Ills. _State Register_, Dec. 27, 1844: "If war shall ensue, -let it not close until the empire of Mexico" is added to the Union; -Baker of Illinois in House, Jan. 29, 1846: "We must have California, and -perhaps all Mexico" (_Cong. Globe_, 29, 1, p. 279). Besides this feeling -there was a general territorial ambition, which looked in an indefinite -way to a rather distant future and a peaceful, natural extension. - -6.12. _American Review_, Sept., 1845, 227. No Burr was needed, however, -to plant these seeds. - -6.13. (Consul) =13=Salkeld to Crawford, Feb. 25, 1830. (1835) _Journal -des Débats_, May 25, 1848. =13=Elliot to Pakenham, Apr. 14, 1843. (_News -and Tribune_) Nashville _Union_, Aug. 5, 1845. _Plebeian_, Mar. 1, 1845: -"The whole world cannot resist our onward march, until our proud flag -waves over every inch of territory on the continent of North America." -=253=Sanders to McLean, Dec. 29, 1846: "The people if not wicked are -rapacious and Anglo-Saxon-like prefer conquest to principle." The Oregon -discussion revealed clearly the thirst for territory (_Cong. Globe_, 29, -1, app., _e.g._ Smith, Hunter, Pollock, Rockwell, Toombs, pp. 104, 89, -120, 129, 133. W. H. Seward, Mar. 31, 1846: "The popular passion for -territorial aggrandizement is irresistible" (Works, iii, 409). N. Y. -_Herald_, June 15, 1844. Livermore, War, 12. - -6.14. _Herald_, Aug. 30, 1845. (Illinois) Everett, Recolls., 194. W. -E. Dodd in Ills. State Hist. Soc. Trans., 1912, p. 17. Indiana _State -Sentinel_, 1845, _passim_. (Debt) Green, Repudiation, 13. _American -Review_, Sept., 1845, p. 227. (Calhoun) Jameson, Calhoun Corresp., 692. -Lyell, Second Visit, ii, 257. Livermore, War, 6, 8, 10. Smith, Annex. of -Texas, 49. (Powerful) _New Englander_, v, 318-9; =206=J. Graham to Gov. -G., Jan. 4, 1846. - -6.15. _Herald_, Aug. 30, 1845. _News_ in _Nat. Intelligencer_, Sept. 4, -1845. _Journ. of Comm._, May 21, 1845. Gen. Worth wrote in the autumn -of 1845: "Our people will not rest satisfied without a war with some -power" (N. Y. _Times_, July 16, 1916). Claiborne (Quitman, i, 310): the -people "demanded war and were determined to have it." For information -regarding the state of mind prevailing in western Tennessee and the -adjacent regions the author is greatly indebted to Gov. James D. Porter -of Nashville, who was a young man at the time of the Mexican war. The -fact that hunting occupied the place of work had no little influence. -(Hunting) Rose, McCulloch, 29. - -6.16. _Comm. Bulletin_, Mar. 17, 1842. (Wealth) Smith, Annex. of Texas, -49. (Willing) _Tribune_, May 11, 1845. =210=I. E. Holmes to Hammond, May -10, 1846 (The Westerners want to despoil the churches and plantations). -(Letter) _Globe_, Aug. 25, 1845. _News_ in Mobile _Herald and Tribune_, -Sept. 7, 1845. The Whigs were of course inclined on partisan grounds -to denounce the Democratic party and the administration for every sign -of hostility to Mexico, and to maintain that if the Texas policy of -their candidate for the Presidency, Henry Clay, had been followed there -would have been no danger of war. Indeed, it would seem at first sight -as if they could have found no logical escape from this position. But -they were able to say, particularly in the south: We opposed immediate -annexation; we predicted that it would cause trouble with Mexico; but -the country voted that way, and now as patriotic Americans we accept -the consequences. Sentiment in favor of fighting Mexico was by no means -confined to the Democrats. - -6.17. ("Slaves") N. Orl. _Comm. Bulletin_ in Savannah _Republican_, -Aug. 15, 1845. The popular American idea of a Mexican was a fat face, -a double chin, a muddy complexion, a bloated body, coarse appetites, -a crude organization generally, and no brains to speak of above the -ears--only enough to talk with. Spanish rule and the mixture of Indian -blood had tended naturally to produce something of this sort, but finer -types were very numerous and sometimes brilliant. (Soldiery) N. Y. -_Tribune_, May 11, 1845; =354=Welles papers. (Picture) _Comm. Bulletin_, -Mar. 17, 1842. "_Who's for Mexico?_" ran Colonel Dakin's advertisement -in the New Orleans _Tropic_; "All who may feel disposed to make a -pleasant excursion to the Frontiers of Mexico (and perhaps to explore -some parts of that country) will find all the means and facilities -requisite by enrolling themselves in the Regiment of Louisiana -Volunteers" (Phila. _No. American_, Aug. 27, 1845). - -6.18. _Nat. Intelligencer_, Sept. 4. _Picayune_, Aug. 27. _Enquirer_, -Aug. 10. _Union_, Aug. 21, 1845; Feb. 10, 1847. _Reveille_, Aug. 28. -("Go") _Picayune_, Aug. 17. =297=Buchanan to McLane, Sept. 13. - -6.19. (_News_) Mobile _Herald and Tribune_, Sept. 7; Oct. 22, 1845. Less -was said for a time, but probably no less was felt. Of course the New -Englanders did not share the sentiment very fully. The South Atlantic -states--influenced by Calhoun and, as Poinsett admitted (=192=to Lewis, -Jan. 5, 1846), by the dread of privateers--did not feel sure that the -stake was worth the risk. But the total sentiment in favor of war with -Mexico was tremendous. Calhoun himself recognized that the country stood -that way (Jameson, Cal. Corresp., 704 to T. G. C.). _Correspondent_, -Apr. 15, 1846. _Enquirer_, Jan. 20, 1846. _Mo. Reporter_, Apr. 18, 1846. -=210=Hammond to Simms, Mar. 21, 1847. - -6.20. (Glory) =345=Poinsett to Van Buren, Mar. 9, 1848. (Power) Jameson, -Calhoun Corresp., 728. (Oregon) Pendleton, Stephens, 76. (Re-elected) -Johnston and Browne, Stephens, 200. (Bancroft) Schouler, U. S., iv, 498; -Howe, Bancroft, i, 288, 290. The subject of California will be discussed -fully in chap. xvi, but in order to allay prejudice it is touched upon -here.] - -6.21. See "Office-seekers" in index of Polk's Diary. - -6.22. Anson Jones, the last President of the Texas republic, asserted in -his book that Polk was "pre-determined to have a war" with Mexico (p. -46). As evidence he maintained that Donelson, the United States minister -in Texas, under the pretext of defending Texas against an unreal danger -of invasion, brought into that country American troops in order to -ensure a collision with Mexico; but (1) Donelson fully believed that -Texas was in danger of invasion, and (2) there were ample grounds for -that opinion (Smith, Annex. of Texas, 449). Moreover Donelson, instead -of hurrying our troops into Texas, was very anxious that none should -cross her frontier until after her full acceptance of annexation, which -could not occur before July 4, 1845 (_ibid._, 446, 448, 456); and we -have seen how threatening were the language and movements of Mexico at -that stage. As Texas became to all intents and purposes a part of the -United States on accepting our proposition, the duty to protect her -people was then clear. - -Jones also asserted that agents of Polk urged him to send the Texas -militia against Mexico in the spring of 1845 in order to bring about -a war;but this is misleading (Smith, Annex. of Texas, 446-8). The -confidential orders given to Conner and Stockton of the navy and the -correspondence between the state department and Donelson prove that -Polk's administration had not the least intention of adopting at this -time an aggressive course toward Mexico. - -Finally, Jones stated that he received clear proof of his charge from -Texan agents at Washington. He admitted, however, that (although he does -not appear to have lost any other important documents) he had mislaid -their reports; and his assertion is inconsistent with known facts. -For example, he said (p. 491) that Lee, one of these agents, reported -about September 13 that he found Polk, Marcy, Walker and Ritchie -"excessively angry" with Jones for not consenting, months before, to -an attack upon Mexico; but Lee did in fact report, September 6 and 8, -that he was received "cordially" by Polk, Walker and Ritchie, and that -Polk sent his "sincere regard" to Jones (Jones, Memoranda, 485, 490; -Tex. Dipl. Corres., ii, 398). Again, according to Jones another Texan -agent informed him "of the deep anxiety expressed by Polk for a war -with Mexico." Now of course Polk may have said that a war was needed -to redress American wrongs, but to suppose that a man who kept his own -counsel so closely would have confessed to this comparative stranger a -dishonorable intention concealed from everybody else, and would have -done so knowing that in reality he and Jones were at swords' points on -a vital matter, annexation, is incredible. When Jones wrote his book -he was a ruined man in consequence of the general and well-founded -belief that he had tried to prevent the incorporation of Texas in the -United States, and he was very bitter against Polk. Not long afterward -he committed suicide. His book, apparently prepared as a defence of -himself, is often untrustworthy; and how clear-headed he was at the time -of writing it is shown by his assertion that Texas was in undisputed -possession of the territory to the Rio Grande, yet that by advancing to -that stream Taylor "produced the Mexican war" (p. 68). - -Ashbel Smith, in general a much better witness, stated that agents of -Polk endeavored to have the militia sent against Mexico so as to bring -on a war (Remins., 66-7); but as he was in Europe at the time he had -no personal knowledge regarding the matter, and he also was opposed to -annexation. - -Evidence of Polk's alleged desire to provoke a war may be seen by some -in the language of the _Union_, his organ at Washington, which declared -blatantly that the Rio Grande was the boundary of the United States, -and that Mexico would invite ruin, should her troops cross it (May 1; -September 11, 13, 1845, etc.). But (1) the government had reason to -believe that we had been too mild toward Mexico, and may have wished -to suggest to her the danger of being rash; (2) the purpose may have -been to satisfy the many Americans who complained that our national -authorities lacked spirit; (3) as Polk was officially offering Mexico -the olive branch at this time, the bellicose utterances of the _Union_, -which was not recognized by the administration as its organ, could not -have been regarded by the Mexican government as evidence that he desired -a war, but only at most as a suggestion of what might follow should -the olive branch be rejected. From this point of view they would seem -to have tended toward peace rather than war (cf. his policy of having -Taylor and Conner assume bold attitudes--chap. vii, p. 152). - -6.23. The author's estimate of Polk is based upon a study of his -conduct and all the documents relating to him. One may consult to -advantage the Welles papers; Schouler, Hist. Briefs, 124, 129, 132; -Poore, Perley's Remins., i, 328-9; Howe, Bancroft, i, 294; Claiborne, -Quitman, i, 228; Jenkins, Polk, 330; McLaughlin, Introd. to Polk's -Diary; Meigs, Ingersoll, 273-4; _Id._, Benton, 382; Reeves on Polk's -Diary in _Polit. Science Review_, 1911, 288. =297=H. M. Field to Mrs. -Polk, Mar. 30, 1889 (Bancroft told me yesterday that Polk was abler than -any member of his Cabinet). Benton, View, ii, 680. (Toombs) Phillips, -Toombs, 37. Though Polk seems personally destitute of humor, he had -known how to make an effective use of it on the stump. It must not be -forgotten that he had served fourteen years in the national House and -been Speaker twice. (Fidelity) Polk, Diary, Aug. 14, 1848 (I had not -been three miles from the White House since July, 1847). - -6.24. (Discussions) _E.g._ Smith, Annex. of Texas, p. 264, note -(Benton). =351=Webster to son, Mar. 11, 1845. (Writhings) The reference -is to Polk's anxious and unfriendly expressions about Scott and Taylor, -which grew largely out of political considerations. See chap. ix, pp. -199-200. - -6.25. =297=Polk to Haywood, Aug. 9, 1845, confid. =297=Buchanan to -McLane, Sept. 13, 1845. - -6.26. =48=To Conner, Mar. 29; July 11; Aug. 16. =48=To Sloat, Mar. 21; -June 24. =48=To _Id._, Aug. 30 (orders to "preserve peace if possible"). -The despatch of June 24 to Sloat said further: You and every part of -your squadron "should be assiduously careful to avoid any act which -could be construed as an act of aggression." Dec. 5, 1845, Sloat was -notified that "our relations with Mexico are becoming more friendly." -The instructions to Sloat about occupying San Francisco were made -contingent on _Mexican_ action, indicating that an American declaration -of war was not even contemplated. =52=To Donelson, June 3. (Frémont) -Benton, View, ii, 579. Mrs. Frémont, with the approval of her father, -Senator Benton, held back the order (_ibid._). Richardson, Messages, iv, -427-8. The Washington correspondent of the N. Y. _Sun_ wrote: "It is -the opinion of those best qualified to judge, though not my own, that -the President did not seek or wish the war with Mexico" (_Sun_, June 4, -1846). - -6.27. _Republican_, Aug. 19. _Picayune_, Aug. 27. _Globe_, Aug. 25. -_Courier_ in _Picayune_, Aug. 27. - -6.28. (Scale) Polk, Diary, Sept. 30, 1845. Sen. 1; 29, 1, pp. 209 -(Scott); 649 (Bancroft). Howe, Bancroft, i, 289. (Navy unprepared) -Conner, Home Squadron, 9-10. - -6.29. =56=W. S. Parrott to Buchanan, June 29, 1845. The correspondence -between Buchanan and Slidell contains, to be sure, expressions -indicating a design to influence public opinion in the United States. -January 20, 1846, the minister was directed to conduct himself "with -such wisdom and firmness in the crisis" that the voice of the American -people would be "unanimous in favor of redressing the wrongs of our much -injured and long suffering claimants" (Buchanan, no. 5). But as Herrera -had now refused to receive Slidell and a peaceful settlement had become -extremely improbable, this was obviously a wise and proper injunction, -and by no means implied that a rupture had been desired. No one who goes -open-mindedly through the documents can accept the fine-spun theory -that Polk knew Slidell would not be received, and sent him in order -to make a show of pacific intentions and obtain a pretext for war. He -already had better grounds for war; and had he been determined to fight, -he would have been extremely foolish to offer his intended victim an -opportunity to restore friendly relations, for undeniably it was quite -possible--from the American point of view, considering the comparative -weakness of Mexico, far more than possible--that she would seize upon -it. Polk, Diary, Mar. 28-30; Apr. 3. _American (Whig) Review_, 1847, p. -325. Slidell, no. 13, Apr. 2. _Id._, Apr. 9 (Curtis, Buchanan, i, 599). - -6.30. _Examiner_, June 13. Ho. 158; 28, 2, p. 3 (Upshur). =13=Ashburnham -to Backhouse, July 6, 1838. Santangelo, Address, 31: "Have a number -of American citizens been unjustly injured by Mexico in their persons -and property, or not? Have our government and nation been gratuitously -outraged by Mexico, or not?" - -6.31. Slidell, Mar. 18 (Ho. 60; 30, 1, p. 66). =52=Dimond, no. 265, Oct. -1, 1845. British minister in _Siglo XIX_, Sept. 24, 1845. - -6.32. _Times_, Jan. 8, 15. _Picayune_, Dec. 30, 1845. Buchanan to -Slidell, no. 7, Mar. 12, 1847 (Information received from various -quarters that several European powers may be aiming to establish -monarchy in Mexico). Dec. 1, 1847, Olozaga showed in the Spanish Cortes -a statement of large sums spent by Spain in 1846 to place a Spanish -prince on the throne of Mexico (Dix, Speeches, i, 214, note). See also -chap. x, note 21. - -6.33. Vattel, Law of Nations (Chitty), book ii, chap. iv, secs. 49-51. - -6.34. American trade with Mexico declined from $9,029,221 in 1835 -to $1,152,331 in 1845 (_Niles_, Oct. 17, 1846, p. 104). (Contrary) -=52=Buchanan to Slidell, Nov. 10, 1845. The protest of the Mexican -minister at Washington against the annexation of Texas asserted the -right of his country to recover Texas at any time and by all the means -in her power (_Cong. Globe_, 30, 1, 334). - -6.35. (Oregon) London _Times_, Sept. 30, 1847. Polk, Diary, Apr. 22, -1846. - - - VII. THE PRELIMINARIES OF THE CONFLICT - -7.1. The claims did much to embitter feeling in both countries, were -one reason for Mexico's breaking off and refusing to resume diplomatic -relations, and brought Polk to the point of resolving to recommend -forcible action to Congress (p. 181). The series of diplomatic clashes -led to the danger of a Mexican attack and hence to Taylor's advance; and -his movement, besides exciting further displeasure in Mexico, offered -her a convenient and promising opportunity to strike. - -7.2. Smith, Annex. of Texas, 445, 449. =56=Wickliffe, private, May 21, -1845. =63=Marcy to Taylor, confid., May 28, 1845. Ho. 60; 30, 1, pp. -79, 804. Donelson, June 4, 1845, in Sen. 1; 29, 1, p. 66. =297=Polk to -Dallas, confid., Aug. 23, 1845. - -7.3. Richardson, Messages, iv, 388. =52=J. Y. Mason to Donelson, Aug. 7, -1845. - -7.4. M. B. de Arispe in _Niles_, Aug. 17, 1816. Ho. 60; 30, 1, pp. 130 -(Cárdenas); 140 (Ampudia); 430 (Taylor, no. 93). _Cong. Globe_, 30, 1, -p. 911 (Stephens). =245=Bliss to Lamar, Oct. 15, 1846. =52=Buchanan to -Slidell, Nov. 10, 1845. Wilson, Slave Power, ii, 8. Z. T. Fulmore in -_Tex. State Hist. Assoc. Qtrly._, v, 28. T. M. Marshall, _ibid._, xiv, -277. I. J. Cox, _ibid._, vi, 81. _Aguila del Norte_, Mar. 11, 1846. -_Nat. Intelligencer_, Nov. 5, 1845; Dec. 12, 1846. Ho. Report 70; 29, 2. -Kennedy, Texas, ii, 30. Hitchcock, Fifty Years, 200. Fisher, Memorials. -Bolton, Texas, 1. Bancroft, No. Mex. States, i, 375, 604. Garrison, -Extension, 100, 103-7. Tex. Dipl. Corres., i, 257 (Irion). =52=Consul -Belt, July 5, 1844. Jones, Memoranda, 299 (Hockley). Sen. 18; 30, 1, -p. 8 (Marcy). Garrison, Texas, 262. México á través, iv, 375-6. Sen. -1; 29, 1, p. 90 (Donelson). =351=Storrs to Webster, Oct. 23, 1847. -=52=Woll, proclam., June 20, 1844. Boston _Advertiser_, July 13, 1843. -=64=Ayunt. of Matamoros to Taylor, June 10, 1846. =82=Gov. Tamaul. to -govs., Nov. 27, 1846. South. Hist. Assoc. Pubs., v, 351. - -The mere assertion of a boundary by Texas proved nothing. She claimed -Santa Fe, but the U. S. did not regard the claim as valid (=52=Buchanan -to Slidell, Nov. 10, 1845). Her jurisdiction was not established far -beyond the Nueces. Santa Anna, while a prisoner in her hands, made a -convention with her which appeared to recognize her claim, and the -fact that he was under duress did not signify; but he did not possess -Presidential powers at that time; Texas broke the agreement, and Mexico -repudiated it. England appeared to countenance the claim of Texas by -negotiating with her about the Beales grant, which lay in the disputed -region (Wash. _Union_, Feb. 25, 1847), but this was not at all decisive. -Trist's view that any previously existing boundary had been obliterated -by the war does not seem to have been attacked by the Mexican peace -commissioners (Sen. 52; 30, 1, p. 214). Roa Bárcena argues that if there -was no boundary in Apr., 1846, the United States could not assert that -its territory had been invaded. This is a typically Mexican style of -argument, apparently decisive but not sound. The reply is that while no -_established_ boundary existed, there was a _claimed_ boundary, and that -a serious claim entitles one to act and speak provisionally very much as -if it had been established. Trist made another point: If Mexico does not -consider the wide and swift Bravo a safe boundary, how could Texas feel -satisfied with the little Nueces? The fact that the terms of annexation -specified "the territory rightfully belonging to Texas" was often cited -as evidence that we knew the Nueces-Rio Grande region did not. This was -a mistake. The expression only meant that we were not ready to endorse -all the territorial claims of Texas without investigating them. The most -doubted of her claims had nothing to do with that region; it related to -a part of New Mexico. - -7.5. Clay, Works, v, 213. Amer. State Papers: For. Rels., ii, 662; iv, -424, 430, 468-78. _Cong. Globe_, 25, 2, app., 555 (Preston); 29, 1, p. -817 (Adams). Richardson, Messages, iv, 483. Woodbury, Writings, i, 361. -Wash. _Globe_, Feb. 3, 1844 (Walker). Treaties in Force, 593. Buchanan -to Slidell, Nov. 10, 1845. _Forum_, July, 1901 (Boutwell). Ficklen in -So. Hist. Assoc. Pubs., Sept., 1901. Sato, Land Question. Wash. _Union_, -Apr. 27, 1846. =297=Polk to Houston, June 6, 1845; to Donelson, June -15, 1845. Claiborne, Quitman, ii, 14. Richardson, Messages, iv, 479 -(Texas as a part of old Louisiana). Ho. Report, 752; 29, 1. =52=Donelson -to Mayfield, July 11, 1845. Smith, Annex. of Texas, 140-4, 457-8. -Chase, Polk Admin., 128. Polk assured Houston that he need feel no -apprehensions regarding the Texas boundary in the event of annexation. -It may be said that Polk was inconsistent in offering to negotiate about -the boundary; but people negotiate about claims they believe in and even -about property they clearly own. He had in mind of course to hold the -Rio Grande boundary by satisfying Mexico. - -The aim in this paragraph is to bring out the essential (for the present -purpose) points of a matter that it would require a long article to -discuss fully, and many things have to be left unsaid. Personally the -author regards the American claim and all conclusions based upon it as -unsound. His aim is to show how the matter appeared to Polk. The author -is indebted to Dr. E. C. Barker and Dr. I. J. Cox for assistance in -reference to this statement; but no responsibility rests on them. - -7.6. Sen. 1; 29, 1, pp. 236 (Totten); 193 (Marcy); 208 (Scott). Sen. -378; 29, 1, p. 44 (Cooper). Ho. 60; 30, 1, p. 81 (Bancroft). Wash. -_Globe_, Sept. 4, 1845. _Journal Milit. Serv. Instit._, xvii (Van -Deusen). Ballentine, Eng. Soldier, i, 32, 36-7, 57. Stevens, Campaigns, -12-3. _Commercial Review_, Dec., 1846, 429 (Poinsett). Capt. Willing in -Prof. Memoirs of Corps of Engineers. _Cong. Globe_, 29, 1, 534-5 (Yell -_et al._). Ho. 38; 30, 2 (strength of the regular army, Jan. 1, 1846: -7194). Ho. 24; 31, 1: on Texas frontier, May, 3554 (regulars "present -and absent"). =61=Maynardier, June 15, 1846. Grant, Mems., i, 47-8. Sen. -1; 29, 2, p. 53 (Marcy: May 13, 1846, the entire military force was not -over 7640). In Nov., 1845, the army occupied thirty-seven posts. - -Each regiment comprised ten companies, but for economy the army had -virtually been skeletonized in 1842. After that time a company of -infantry and "artillery" included theoretically forty-two privates, a -company of field artillery sixty-four (_Journ. Milit. Serv. Inst. of U. -S._, iii, 415), and a company of cavalry fifty; but the numbers always -ran ten or twenty per cent below what the law allowed (Sen. 1; 29, 1, -p. 193). One or more "grenadier" companies (tall men) formed the right -of the infantry regiment, and it had also one or more "light" companies -(=180=C. F. Smith, Sept. 30, 1846; J. D. Toll in Mich. Pioneer Soc. -Colls., vii, 112). - -Most of the infantry carried flintlock muskets, which could not be -relied on for more than a hundred yards. Scott preferred that arm -because it had been thoroughly tested (Rowland, Register, 407) and -perhaps also because flints could be obtained more readily and surely -than could percussion caps. Some 38,000 smooth-bore muskets and 10,000 -rifles (calibre 54) were issued during the war. There seem to have been -several models of muzzle-loading rifles: Harper's Ferry (1814), model of -1819, model of 1840 or 1842; and some of Hall's breech-loading rifles -were used (Sen. 54; 30, 1, particularly table C). The First Mississippi -had Whitney rifles (Rowland, Register, 407). The rifles were much more -effective but much slower in operation than the muskets. Some 400,000 -flints and 950,000 percussion caps were issued. Regarding arms, etc., -one may consult Talcott, June 10 (Sen. 54; 30, 1); =39=Maynardier to -gov. Tenn., Sept. 28, 1847; =39=Marcy to _Id._, Sept. 27; Ho. 2; 29, -1, pp. 402, 418, 425; Sen. 1; 29, 2, p. 162; Ho. 41; 29, 2 (Talcott's -report); Sen. 1; 30, 1, p. 683; Norton, Amer. Breech-Loading Small Arms; -and visit the National Museum (Washington), and the museums at West -Point, Colt's factory (Hartford), and U. S. Cartridge Co. (Lowell). - -Our dragoons, who were "light cavalry," were armed with musketoons which -were carried on sling belts except on the march, sabres of the Prussian -dragoon style and horse pistols. The Mounted Rifles had percussion -rifles and Colt's army revolvers but no sabres. The cavalry had sabres, -rifle carbines, and Colt's navy revolvers (Brackett, U. S. Cav., 160). -Some "pepper-box" revolvers were used (Arnold, Jackson, 113). The -regular cartridge (very carefully made) consisted of powder, a bullet, -and three buckshot (=148=Chamberlain, recolls.). - -The field batteries were Companies K (Taylor) of the First regiment, A -(Duncan) of the Second, C (Ringgold) of the Third, and B (Washington) -of the Fourth. E (Bragg) of the Third actually served as light -artillery though not officially recognized as such until June, 1847. -Each of these companies had four or six bronze pieces, which included -two or more 6-pounders and usually one or two 12-pound howitzers. -See particularly =61=Maynardier's statement, June 15, 1846, several -letters in the Duncan papers, and _Journ. Milit. Serv. Instit._, iii, -415. In 1839 Capt. Robert Anderson translated the French "System -of Light Artillery." By 1842 a long course of experimenting gave -us suitable bronze for guns (Sen. 1, 30, 1, p. 679). That year the -commander-in-chief ordered a regular course of practice with field -artillery, and a liberal allowance of ammunition was made (_ibid._, -680). This branch of the service was also greatly improved by sending -three ordnance officers abroad to study the subject. Each head of a -battery was chosen for his special fitness, and Ringgold in particular -devoted himself to developing the arm with remarkable intelligence -and zeal (Henry, Camp. Sketches, 105; _Niles_, May 30, 1846, p. 201; -=259=Ridgely to cits., July 24, 1846; Sen. 1; 30, 1, p. 679; Wynne, -Ringgold; Benet, Ordnance Reports, ii, 158). - -By permission of the French government, Capt. A. J. Swift was sent to -Metz soon after the war with Mexico began to qualify himself to command -and instruct an engineer company. The corps included Swift (who died -before seeing service), G. W. Smith, and G. B. McClellan as officers, -10 sergeants, 10 corporals, 39 artificers, 39 second class privates, -and two musicians (Engineer School, U. S. Army, Occas. Papers no. 16). -The American infantry drill did not differ materially from that of the -British army (Ballentine). Our army was not fully equal to the best -European troops (Poinsett). There had been few opportunities to work the -three arms together. A serious defect of the army was the lack of an -intelligence department. - -The privates wore cloth fatigue caps, jackets and trousers, all of -blue; and the officers wore the same, except that at first they had -single-breasted frock coats (=128=Brackett, diary. _Id._, Lane's -Brigade, 250. Ramsey, Other Side, 424). Later, officers frequently had -jackets like the men's, but differently trimmed. Further remarks on our -army may be found in chap. xxxvi. - -7.7. _Taylor._ Fry and Conrad, Taylor, _passim_. French, Two Wars, 84. -=224=Hitchcock to brother, Aug. 10, 1845. Howard, Taylor, _passim_. -Robinson, Organization, ii, 6. =147=Chamberlain, diary. =332=Tennery, -diary. Scott, Mems., ii, 382-3. Hitchcock, Fifty Years, 198, 203. -Meade, Letters, i, 26. Claiborne, Quitman, i, 253-4. Poore, Perley's -Remins., i, 354. =280=Nunelee, diary. Frost, Taylor, 277. =139=W. B. -to D. Campbell, Apr. 25, 1847. Grant, Mems., i, 100, 139. Donnavan, -Adventures, 21. =180=Pillow to wife, Aug. 8, 1846. Wash. _Union_, Aug. -24, 1846. _Am. Hist. Review_, Apr., 1919, 446, 455-6, 462 (Marcy's -diary). And all of Taylor's correspondence. - -7.8. Scott, Mems., ii, 381-2, 386, 408. _Journ. Milit. Serv. Instit._, -xiv, 444. =224=Williams to Hitchcock, Nov. 8, 1848. Hitchcock, Fifty -Years, 147. Meade, Letters, i, 131. Mrs. W. R. Stauffer of New Orleans, -granddaughter of Gen. Taylor, to whom the author is indebted for -documents and information, told him that the family name for Bliss was -"Perfect Bliss." His precise title was Assistant Adj. Gen., of course. -It is instructive to compare Taylor's autograph letters with the -official reports credited to him. - -7.9. =63=Marcy to Taylor, confid., May 28. Sen. 1; 29, 1, pp. 57, 107 -(Donelson). Ho. 60; 30, 1, pp. 81 (Bancroft); 800-2, 806 (Taylor); -804 (Donelson). Sen. 18; 30, 1, pp. 6 (Donelson); 3 (Taylor); 8, 9 -(Marcy).Sen. 337; 29, 1, pp. 73-5. Sen. 378; 29, 1, p. 44 (Cooper). -_Journ. Milit. Serv. Instit._, 1882, p. 399. _Autograph_, Dec., 1911 -(Taylor). Wash. _Union_, June 25, 1847. Hitchcock, Fifty Years, 193. -_So. Qtrly. Rev._, Apr., 1846, pp. 440-3. _Hist. Mag._, Jan., 1870, 19. -Mexico had an outpost customhouse at Point Isabel, just north of the Rio -Grande. Paredes charged that a Mexican reconnoitring party was disarmed -at Laredo, on the north side of the Rio Grande. We have no other -evidence of such an affair. Taylor instructed Maj. Hays, commanding -Texas Rangers at S. Antonio, to send word of any Mexican movements in -the vicinity of Laredo, "with strict injunctions, however, to molest -no Mexican establishments" (Ho. 60; 30, 1, p. 107), and the orders to -occupy Laredo were not given until Oct. 15, 1846 (=245=Bliss to Lamar). -Possibly a threatening Mexican party may have been disarmed as a measure -of precaution, but the bare statement of Paredes cannot be accepted as -proof. - -7.10. Taylor, gen. orders, 1. Henshaw narrative. _So. Qtrly. Review_, -Apr., 1846, pp. 442-4. =66=Sanders to Taylor, Feb. 15, 1846. =197=Gaines -to R. Jones, Sept. 10. N. Orl. _Tropic_, Oct. 16. =42=Gov. Va. to gen. -assembly, Dec. 7, 1846. Taylor, Letters (Bixby), 173. =224=Hitchcock -to brother, Feb. 10, 1846. =13=Elliot, no. 21, 1845. =13=Kennedy, no. -22, 1845. Ho. 60; 30, 1, pp. 98, 100, 102-3, 802 (Taylor). Richmond -_Enquirer_, Sept. 13, 1845. =52=J. Y. Mason to Donelson, Aug. 7. -=331=Taylor to Conner, July 16. Mayer, War, 91-2. N. Y. _Tribune_, -Sept. 12. French, Two Wars, 34. J. Davis in _Cong. Globe_, 31, 1, app., -1034-41. Polk, Messages, May 11; Dec. 8, 1846 (Richardson, Messages). -Hitchcock, Fifty Years, 194. Meade, Letters, i, 26. Grant, Mems., i, 64. -Henry, Camp. Sketches, 17, 32. Sen. 378; 29, 1, p. 45. - -The Texans were kept at that point as scouts. Corpus Christi had been -held by Texas during her revolutionary contest with Mexico (_Tropic_, -Oct. 25, 1845). The other two companies of the Fourth Infantry were -ordered from Fort Scott to Taylor, and Bragg's artillery came from -Charleston harbor. The New Orleans artillery companies were called out -without authority by Gaines, who commanded the military dept. of the -west. They remained with Taylor the three months for which they engaged -(Sen. 378; 29, 1, p. 3). Taylor planned to go on to S. Patricio, now a -name rather than a place, 25 miles up the Nueces--a plan like that which -he soon executed on the Rio Grande. Lieut. Col. E. A. Hitchcock, who had -taught at West Point and now commanded the Third Infantry, pointed out -that, should he do so, his base would be a fine mark for attack. Taylor -would not see the point but he gave up the plan. (For this episode see: -=224=Hitchcock to brother, Feb. 10, 1846; _Id._, Fifty Years, 48, 196; -Grant, Mems., i, 71-2; Meade, Letters, i, 29.) He thought of Pt. Isabel -also; but, having so small a force, no engineers, and little artillery -(at first none), he deemed it unsafe to go there (Ho. 60; 30, 1, p. 107). - -7.11. London _Times_, May 14, 1846. (Knew) Hitchcock, Fifty Years, 195; -_So. Qtrly. Rev._, Apr., 1846, p. 443; Mayer, War, 91. (Accepted) =52=J. -Y. Mason to Donelson, Aug. 7, 1845. =256=Marcy to Wetmore, May 10, 1846 -(private): A "liberal confidence" was reposed in Taylor; "His positions -in Texas were left very much to his own judgment except they were to be -taken between the Nueces and the Rio del Norte." - -7.12. Henry, Camp. Sketches, 38-9. Ho. 60; 30, 1, p. 110. Wilhelm, -Eighth Inf., i, 257. J. Davis, in _Cong. Globe_, 31, 1, app., 1034-41. -N. Y. _Tribune_, Sept, 12, 1845. - -7.13. =65=Taylor, gen. orders, 2. =61=_Id._ to adj. gen., Feb. 3, -1846, and Scott's comments. =61=Adj. gen. to Taylor, Jan. 5, 1846. -_So. Qtrly. Rev._, Apr., 1846, pp. 440-57 [probably from Bragg]. -_Nat. Intelligencer_, Nov. 20, 1845. =13=Elliot, nos. 3, 14, 1846. -=218=Henshaw narrative. =136=Butterfield, recolls. Ho. 60; 30, 1, pp. -93, 96. =224=Hitchcock to brother, Aug. 10, 1845; Feb. 10, 1846. Mobile -_Commercial Register_, Aug. 23, 1845. _Autograph_, Jan.-Feb., 1912 -(Taylor). =364=Worth to S., Oct. 24; Nov.--, 20, 1845; to daughter, -Nov. 3. _Revue des Deux Mondes_, Aug. 1, 1847, 388-90. Hitchcock, Fifty -Years, 198, 203, 215. Meade, Letters, i, 31, 37. =13=Letter from Corp. -Chr., Nov. 29 (sent by Elliot). =185=Duncan to Bliss, Jan. 5, 1846; -to court of inquiry, Jan. 7. Henry, Camp. Sketches, 45. =213=Hatch to -sister, Oct. 28, etc. The conditions were probably tolerable until -November. - -7.14. Worth to S., Dec. 20, 1845; Jan. 1; Mar. 4, 1846. Meade, Letters, -i, 87. Hitchcock, Fifty Years, 204, 206. =60=Worth to Taylor, Mar. 8, -1846, and Scott's comments. =60=Churchill to Scott, Mar. 2. =69=Twiggs -to Bliss, Feb. 18. =69=Worth to Taylor, Feb. 24. =66=Mansfield to -Totten, Apr. 2. Polk, Diary, Mar. 11, 1846. (Concluded) =224=Hitchcock -to brother, Feb. 10, 1846. - -7.15. =63=Marcy to Taylor, Aug. 23. (No declaration) =297=Polk to -Dallas, Aug. 23; =52=J. Y. Mason to Donelson, Aug. 7, 1845. - -July 30 Marcy =63=instructed Taylor to place some forces south of the -Nueces, but Taylor had anticipated the order. The government was accused -of issuing vague orders with the hope that the General would assume -the responsibility of going to the Rio Grande; but it does not seem to -have shrunk from taking a stand when it had the requisite information. -Mexico did not in fact have all the "posts" north of the Rio Grande that -Marcy seems to have supposed were there, but besides the customs men at -Pt. Isabel, there seem to have been troops at Laredo and soldiers from -Matamoros crossed the river. Aug. 30 Marcy ordered Taylor to drive the -Mexicans beyond the Rio Grande, should they invade Texas (Ho. 60; 30, -1, p. 88). This was proper, for such an invasion would have seemed to -mean war; but the order showed a want of prudence (Upton, Mil. Policy, -197) because (1) Taylor was expected to draw reinforcements from the -states, which could not have provided them in time to save him from the -sudden attack of an overpowering Mexican army, and (2) he was authorized -to cross the river with militia, who could not legally be taken beyond -the border. Oct. 4 Taylor wrote that under his instructions he did not -feel at liberty to go to the Rio Grande. Oct. 16 Marcy directed him to -place his winter quarters (which implied that no aggressive plans were -in mind) as near the Rio Grande as prudence and convenience would permit -(Ho. 60; 30, 1, p. 89). This was judicious, for (as Marcy pointed out) -the troops might have to repel Mexican or Indian incursions, and, at a -season when they would be somewhat unprepared to move quickly, it was -particularly desirable to have them as near as possible to scene of -action. - -7.16. Polk, Diary, Jan. 13, 1846. The despatches were Slidell's Dec. -17 (with copy of _El Siglo XIX_ containing the council's report) and -Black's Dec. 18, which indicated that the administration and the council -of state had decided against Slidell. Polk, Message, Dec. 8, 1846. -_Cong. Globe_, 30, 1, app., 240-1. =63=Marcy to Taylor, Jan. 13. - -7.17. Ho. 60; 30, 1, pp. 103, 108, 111, 116-21 (Taylor); 649, 651-2 -(Cross). W. P. Johnston, Johnston, 131. Hitchcock, Fifty Years, 207. -=224=_Id._ to brother, Feb. 10, 1846. Henry, Camp. Sketches, 52. -=65=Taylor, gen. orders, 13, 20, 26, 30. =69=Sibley, Feb. 21. =69=Hunt -of the _Porpoise_, Mar. 11. =69=Mansfield to Taylor, Mar. 6. =76=Mejía, -Mar. 14. The soldiers were accompanied by about an equal number of -quadrupeds. - -7.18. Ho. 60; 30, 1, pp. 90, 92 (Marcy); 117, 120-4, 127 (Taylor); 651 -(Cross). _Diario_, Mar. 30; Apr. 10. C. Christi _Gazette_, Mar. 12. - -7.19. _The march._ Wilhelm, Eighth Inf., i, 401-4. Henry, Camp. -Sketches, 53-65. Smith, To Mexico, 22-9. French, Two Wars, 37, 41-5. -Henshaw narrative. =69=Twiggs to Bliss, Mar. 15, 1846. Grant, Mems., i, -69. Hitchcock, Fifty Years, 211. - -7.20. _Picayune_, Apr. 7, 1846. Ho. 60; 30, 1, pp. 123 (Taylor); 127 -(Mejía). =65=Taylor, gen. orders 33. Wilhelm, Eighth Inf., i, 404-6. -_Diario_, Apr. 24. =69=Alba to Taylor, Mar. 12. Henshaw narrative. -Smith, To Mexico, 29-31. Grant, Mems., i, 87-8. =69=Statement of -Italian. And from =76=the following. To Mejía, Mar. 1 (Mejía was -forbidden to take the aggressive because the govt. wished first to -gather enough troops to strike a decisive blow: =76=to Vega, Mar. 1). -Mejía, Jan. 18; Feb. 16; Mar. 4, 6, 14, 17, 18. Canales, Feb. 28. Mejía -to Vega, Feb. 16. C. Bravo to Mejía, Mar. 13; reply, Mar. 17. To Vega, -Mar. 1. Mex. officer (spy), Feb. 18. Mejía to Parrodi, Mar. 6; to -Canales, Feb. 16. Ampudia, Mar. 28. - -7.21. =65=Taylor, gen. orders 34-7. Henshaw narrative. Ho. 60; 30, -1, pp. 123, 125, 129, 132 (Taylor); 130 (Cárdenas). =224=Hitchcock, -diary, Mar. 25. =66=Mansfield to Totten, Mar. 25; Apr. 23. Taylor, -Letters (Bixby), 173. Sen. 1; 29, 2, p. 46 (Marcy). =69=Statement of -Italian. _Picayune_, Apr. 7; May 1. Apuntes, 32. _Niles_, Apr. 18, p. -112. Hitchcock, Fifty Years, 211-7. Meade, Letters, i, 59, 100. Nebel -and Kendall, 1. Smith, To Mexico, 32-4. =163=Taylor to Conner, Apr. 3. -Robertson, Remins., July 7. _Monitor Repub._, Apr. 17. _Diario_, Mar. -15. =76=Mejía, Mar. 21, 28. =76=To Mejía, Mar. 21; Apr. 3. - -On his way to Point Isabel Taylor was presented with a formal protest -against his advance by J. Cárdenas, prefect of northern Tamaulipas. -On the approach of his transports the captain of the port, by Mejía's -orders, set fire to the customhouse and the few poor thatched cottages -of the hamlet, and fled with the officials. Mar. 31 Taylor had present -opposite Matamoros and at Point Isabel 248 officers, 3001 rank and file -(=62=R. Jones to Cass, Jan. 21, 1848). - -7.22. Ho. 60; 30, 1, pp. 132-3, 145, 1202 (to Mejía, Mar. 28), 1203 -(Taylor); 134 (minutes); 1203 (Mejía). =65=Taylor, gen. orders 38-9, 45. -=61=_Id._ to adj. gen., Mar. 29. =66=Mansfield to Totten, Apr. 2, 23. -=285=Mejía to Paredes, Apr. 3. =76=_Id._ to Guerra, Mar. 28. Negrete, -Invasión, ii, 120. Smith, To Mexico, 34. =118=Berlandier, diary. -=118=_Id._, memo. Meade, Letters, i, 59. - -Taylor, a few minutes after his arrival, deputed Worth to reach an -understanding with Mejía. This proved impossible. Worth demanded -permission to confer with the American consul residing at Matamoros, -but was not permitted to do so. He notified the Mexicans that crossing -the river in armed force would be viewed as an act of war. Taylor's -field-work was called Fort Texas or sometimes Fort Taylor at first. -Taylor offered to let the people of Matamoros continue to use their port -on Brazos Island, which was north of the Rio Grande. =76=Jan. 6 he had -proposed to the Mexicans to agree on measures to prevent "exasperation -on either side." - -7.23. See p. 117. Ho. 60; 30, 1, pp. 133, 138-9, 142, 145 (Taylor); -140, 144 (Ampudia). (Leave town) =52=Consul Schatzel, July 18. _Niles_, -May 2, p. 132. _Monitor Repub._, Jan. 28, 1847. _Diario_, Apr. 5, -8, 25. =283=Gen. orders, army of the north, Feb. 18; Apr. 3, 14. -Ampudia, To Fellow-Cits. (and docs.). Negrete, Invasión, ii, 154, 157, -160. =52=Black to Castillo, May 1, 9. =52=Castillo to Black, May 5. -=69=Report from spy. And from =76= the following. Mejía, Feb. 4; Mar. -17, 18; Apr. 2. _Id._ to Ampudia, Apr. 5. To Ampudia, Feb. 18; Mar. 28; -Apr. 4. Ampudia, Mar. 28; Apr. 9, 11, 13, 14. _Id._ to gov. Tamaulipas, -Apr. 12. _Id._ to Schatzell, Apr. 11 (order of expulsion; any American -crossing the river to be shot). _Id._ to Mejía, Mar. 30. _Id._ to -Arista, Apr. 14. - -Ampudia was thoroughly Mexican in demanding that he should have all -the advantages and Taylor all the disadvantages of the _quasi_ state -of war that he insisted upon, in protesting against Taylor's action -as a declaration of blockade, which it did not pretend to be, and in -ordering Taylor to go beyond the Nueces, which he knew was regarded by -many Americans (though by no Mexican) as the boundary of Mexico. In two -additional ways he indicated that in his view a state of war existed -(Ho. 60; 30, 1, pp. 144, 147). The American consul, seventy years old, -had to set out on foot and spend the first night in a field during a -norther (_República de Rio Grande_, June 6). - -7.24. (Ampudia's orders) =73=Bermúdez de Castro, no. 218, res., Mar. -29. México á través, iv, 545. Slidell, Jan. 14. Ramírez, México, 79. -=285=Mejía to Paredes, Apr. 3. Carreño, Jefes, ccii, 141 (Ampudia was a -Cuban by birth). =199=Arista to Paredes, Dec. 15, 1845. =13=Bankhead, -no. 56, 1846. Meade, Letters, i, 61. (Aim) Bustamante, N. Bernal, i, -113. Apuntes, 34-5. And from =76= the following. (A.'s plans) Ampudia, -Mar. 28. _Id._, to Arista, Apr. 14. To Ampudia, Feb. 18. To Arista, Feb. -10; Apr. 4, 20, 22. Arista, Apr. 12, 29. Parrodi, Apr. 29. Ampudia, Apr. -13, 14. _Id._, proclam., Apr. 18. Arista to Ampudia, Apr. 10. - -According to Bermúdez de Castro, the Spanish minister, the opposition -writers at Mexico expressed surprise because, after ordering Ampudia -to attack the Americans, the government stated it had not committed -and would not commit an act of aggression against the United States. -Mar. 7 Ampudia ordered Mejía to attack the Americans, but not to risk a -decisive action (=76=Mejía, Mar. 17). The evidence that Ampudia had been -ordered to attack Taylor is supported by the fact that he tried to do so -even after he knew he had been superseded. - -7.25. (Orders) =76=Tornel to Arista, Apr. 4; =76=Arista to Guerra, -Apr. 26; May 7; Washington _Union_, Aug. 27; Bankhead, no. 90, 1846. -=76=Arista to Torrejón, Apr. 24. Ho. 60; 30, 1, pp. 132, 140, 1205 -(Taylor); 290 (Thornton); 291 (Hardie); 1204 (Arista). =76=Testimony -in the court-martial of Arista (Jáuregui, Torrejón, Carrasco, Canales, -Mendoza). Smith, To Mexico, 39-42. _Spirit of the Times_, May 23. -Campaña contra, 4. =69=Court of Inquiry on Hardee, May 26. Wash. -_Union_, May 9. _Niles_, May 16, pp. 165, 176. Negrete, Invasión, ii, -147. =65=Taylor, gen. orders 74. =169=_Id._ to Crittenden, Sept. 1. - -Taylor had called repeatedly for reinforcements to the regular army -(Ho. 60; 30, 1, pp. 102, 114, 132). Up to May 8 he received 56 recruits -(_ibid._, 142). The conciliatory policy of the Americans made it -impossible to take military precautions against spies, and Thornton was -doubtless betrayed. He did his best. Taylor, with a view to the vigorous -prosecution of the war, called on Texas for two regiments of infantry -and two of horse, and on Louisiana for two of infantry. The order to -attack Taylor was doubtless recommended by Tornel, the minister of war, -who hated the United States; but perhaps he had a particular motive. He -had been at work for S. Anna when Paredes seized the Presidency, and he -knew that it would cripple Paredes (thus opening the way for S. Anna) to -provide funds and send troops from Mexico City for a war with the United -States (=52=Black, May 26; Dimond, Jan. 15). - -7.26. Boston _Atlas_, a strong Whig journal, said, Dec. 11, 1846: "There -is no doubt that the conduct of that government [Mexico] towards us has -been such as might have justified the extreme resort to war." Polk, -Diary, Apr. 21, 25, 28; May 3, 5-9. - -7.27. C. J. Ingersoll, chrmn. Ho. com. for affairs (_Cong. Globe_, -29, 2, app., 128): I urged Polk to anticipate invasion by crossing -the Rio Grande, but he would not. (Reasons) _So. Qtrly. Rev._, Nov., -1850, 434-5. =331=Taylor to Conner, Apr. 3. (Effect) =60=Lieut. Irons, -Apr. 20; =76=Arista, Apr. 27; Negrete, Invasión, ii, 120. (Flimsily) -=312=Mejía to Arista, Oct. 6, 1845; =76=Requena in trial of Arista. - -7.28. _Cong. Globe_, 29, 2, p. 498; 30, 1, app., 64. Polk, Message, Dec. -8, 1846 (Richardson, Messages, iv, 484). (Marcy) Sen. 1; 29, 1, p. 194. -=52=Buchanan to Trist, Oct. 25, 1847. Jan. 27, 1847, a bill establishing -post-routes south of the Nueces passed the Senate unanimously (_Cong. -Globe_, 29, 1, p. 251). (Six months) _Nat. Intelligencer_, Sept. 4, -1846. (People) _Mo. Reporter_, Jan. 6, 1846. It is true that no right -to go _to_ the Rio Grande was explicitly asserted; but as everybody -held that either that stream or the Nueces was the boundary, a claim -extending beyond the latter extended practically to the former. See -Lumpkin's speech (_Cong. Globe_, 29, 1, 836). More than a month before -Taylor left Corpus Christi the House voted down a motion to ask the -President whether he had ordered our forces to move against Mexico, and -thus became accomplices of Polk (Von Holst, iii, 214-5). The order of -Jan. 13 soon became known to Congress and the public (_Cong. Globe_, 30, -1, p. 279). Feb. 3 Ashmun of Massachusetts offered a resolution calling -upon the President for information regarding the matter (_ibid._, 280). -Mar. 23 Brinkerhoff stated in the House that Taylor's army must be -supposed to be approaching or already upon the Rio Grande; yet no one -in Congress protested (29, 1, 534). Mar. 26, 1846, while discussing an -appropriation bill, McIlvaine of Penn. said that in sending troops to -the Rio Grande Polk had been "invading Mexico" (_ibid._, 558); yet, -though he made a most urgent appeal to the opponents of slavery--in -behoof of which he intimated the step had been taken--and there were -other objections to the bill, it passed the House by 111 to 38 (_ibid._, -573-4). Note also the vote on Delano's motion (chap, ix, note 4). See -chap. xxxiv, note 16, and the corresponding text. - -7.29. (1794) Ho. Report 752; 29, 1, p. 44; C. J. Ingersoll in _Cong. -Globe_, 29, 2, app., 129; Chase, Polk Admin., 131-2; Schouler, U. S., i, -296-7. (Fla.) Moore, Amer. Diplom., 163; H. Adams, U. S. v, 310-4, 318. -Benton, Abr. Deb., xvi, 77 (Pearce). (Hilliard) _Cong. Globe_, 29, 1, p. -148. (Adams) _Ibid._, p. 127. - -7.30. (Weakened) Wash. _Union_, Jan. 11, 1848 (Reverdy Johnson in -Senate); =256=Marcy to Wetmore. May 10, 1846; _Cong. Globe_, 29, 1, -app., 934; 30, 1, app., 65. (Wise) =52=Buchanan to Slidell, Jan. 20, -1846. (Argument) =56=W. S. Parrott, Aug. 5, 1845; Slidell, Feb. 17, -1846; =364=Worth to S., Oct. 2, 1845; Ho. 60; 30, 1, p. 107 (Taylor, -Oct. 4); _Niles_, July 18, 1846, pp. 313-4; Polk, Diary, Sept. 1, -1845; =108=Mayer to Bancroft, May 22, 1846; London _Times_, May 30, -1846 (Wash. corr.); Calhoun in _Cong. Globe_, 29, 2, p. 499 (Those in -power were confident that the march to the Rio Grande would not bring on -war); M. Brown in _Cong. Globe_, 29, 2, app., 356 (Polk determined to -convince the Mexicans by hostile demonstrations that they must settle -promptly); Hilliard denounced Polk in the House for using a display of -force to intimidate Mexico (_Cong. Globe_, 30, 1, p. 566), and Calhoun -felt somewhat the same (_ibid._, 497); Boston _Atlas_, May 15, 16, 1846 -(Wash. corr.); Howe, Bancroft, i, 282; =345=Poinsett to Van Buren, May -26, 1846; =108=Bradford to Bancroft, Aug. 17, 1845; Coxe, Review, 38. -Public men who talked with Polk probably knew more about his views than -anti-slavery agitators who did not. Calhoun and Brown were criticising, -not defending, Polk. =162=Bancroft to Conner, Jan. 17, 1846. Wash. -_Union_, Oct. 15, 1847. (Conceded) Boston _Atlas_, May 15, 16, 20, 1846. -See also chap. vi, note 22, last paragraph. - -7.31. Wash. _Union_, Oct. 15, 1847. =256=Paper indorsed "Projet--Genl. -Scott." Richardson, Messages, iv, 486. (Sabine) =76=Mora, Nov. 15, 1845. -(Prevented) =81=Arista to troops, July 31, 1845; =76=_Id._ to Parrodi, -Dec. 22. Addressing the nation in denunciation of the revolution of -Paredes, Dec., 1845, the Mexican Chamber of Deputies stated that only -his attitude had prevented war upon the United States that year. -=77=Almonte, Sept. 20, 1844. (Mobile) =66=Sanders to Taylor, Feb. 15, -1846; Elliot, chap. v, note 6; _Nat. Intelligencer_, May 29, 1845; Sept. -10, 1846. (180) Stevens, Campaigns, 18. =52=Dimond, no. 257, 1845. W. S. -Parrott, July 22, 1845. =297=Polk to Dallas, Aug. 23, 1845. (Accentuate) -=256=Marcy to Wetmore, Aug. 12, 1845; Jan. 21, 1846 (Our relations with -Mexico "have worsened by the change which has undoubtedly taken place -in that country"). =76=Mejía to Canales, Feb. 16, 1846; to Guerra, Mar. -17. Art. 1, sec. 10 of our Constitution and the Act of Feb. 28, 1795, -show that not only invasion but danger of invasion authorized military -measures. Authorization implied a corresponding duty. To neglect this -duty and throw the matter into Congress, where partisan complications -and ignorance regarding the region and the circumstances prevailed, -would have caused the delay which the Constitution aimed to prevent. -Note also _Cong. Globe_, 29, 2, app., 209-10, col. 1 (action of com. -for. rels.). Again, had Texas been independent in Jan., 1846, no one -would have censured her for sending troops to the Rio Grande; and the -United States succeeded to all her rights. This right was independent of -our claim to the intermediate region (_Cong. Globe_, 30, 1, app., 425-6). - -7.32. _Picayune_, Dec. 12, 1846. (Confessed) =218=Henshaw narrative. -=13=Giffard to Bankhead, May 13, 1846. Henry, Camp. Sketches, 106. - -7.33. =297=Scott, memo., undated. - -7.34. Von Holst, U. S., iii, 245, note. _Autograph_, Jan.-Feb., 1912 -(Taylor, Apr. 7). The proof that Mexico claimed still to the Sabine is -voluminous: _e.g._ Paredes, proclamation, Mar. 21, 1846 (Mexico "does -not acknowledge the right of the American flag on the soil of Texas, and -she will defend her invaded territory"); =76=Gen. Mora, Nov. 15, 1845 -("the contest in which the Republic is engaged with the United States -for the possession of the territory of Texas"); _Diario_, Mar. 25; Sept. -18, 26 (the Sabine "is the boundary"), 1846; _Monitor Repub._, June 28, -1847 (Mexico "neither recognizes nor has recognized any boundary except -the Sabine"); Peña, Comunicación circular, Dec. 11, 1845 (indicates -repeatedly that the object of the war would be the recovery of Texas); -Otero, Comunicación. (After Herrera's fall "reconquest [of Texas] again -became our policy"); Memoria de ... Relaciones, Jan., 1849. Wash. -_Union_, Nov. 10, 1847. (Probably) =69=Alba to Taylor, Mar. 6, 1846; -=76=Mejía, Jan. 21; Mar. 28; =76=Mora, May 4; Bankhead, no. 47, 1846: -note Mejía's action in Feb. and March, 1846, _supra_; and Ampudia's -orders to him before Taylor left Corpus Christi (note 24). (Notice) -=76=Relaciones to ministers at London and Paris, July 30, 1845. Benton -in _Cong. Globe_, 29, 2, p. 497 (the causes of the war existed before -Taylor advanced, and his advance resulted from them). See also the next -note. - -7.35. Otero, Comunicación. Negrete, Invasión, iii, app., 486, 490. -_Monitor Repub._, Oct. 29, 1847. (Arista) Suárez y Navarro, Alegato, 48. -Polk, Message, Dec. 8, 1846 (Richardson, Messages). Paredes to Arista, -Apr. 18 (captured in A.'s baggage, May 9, 1846) in Wash. _Union_, -Aug. 27, 1847, and in _Tex. Democrat_, Nov. 11, 1846. The reader will -not fail to note the decisive bearing of the letter of Apr. 18 on the -question discussed in the preceding paragraph. - -7.36. Vattel, Law of Nations, 352. If any substantial arguments against -Polk's course existed, Calhoun, Webster or the _American (Whig) Review_ -should have been able to find them. Calhoun (_Cong. Globe_, 29, 2, p. -500) said Polk should have refrained from sending Taylor to the Rio -Grande and have referred to Congress or the Senate the question of -the boundary. But (1) he forgot that as to the boundary near the east -(the only part of it now under consideration) our government stood -committed; (2) he did not seem to know whether Congress or the Senate -was the proper authority on the subject; (3) he refuted his criticism -by saying that Polk should have referred the question on finding he -could not settle it by negotiation; and Polk, instead of having found -he could not do so, had Taylor advance with the hope of thus inducing -Mexico to negotiate; (4) Calhoun had thought it right in 1844 to place -our military forces virtually at the orders of Texas for defensive uses -(Smith, Annex. of Texas, 367), and she would very likely have sent them -to that river (see Wash. _Union_, Feb. 22, 1847); (5) reference of the -question to Congress would almost certainly have caused long delay and -paralyzed the Executive, for about fifteen unsuccessful attempts were -made in the business of annexing Texas to determine the boundary, and -after the war that subject vexed Congress for nearly two years. (See -also the text.) Calhoun's fundamental objection against the President's -policy, however, was that Polk should have let the Mexican difficulties -alone until after settling the Oregon question (_Cong. Globe_, 29, 2, -p. 498). But (1) it was not certain that the Oregon question could be -settled amicably; at one time, as we have noted, Polk believed it could -not be; and therefore it may well have seemed prudent to get rid of -a smaller but annoying affair before the greater one should reach a -crisis; (2) other important reasons for settling with Mexico have been -given on pp. 118, 120-2, 134-7. - -Webster, after thinking on the subject for more than half a year, took -it up in a long speech at Philadelphia (Writings, iv), and said: Polk -ordered the occupation of territory to which we had "no ascertained -title" (p. 26). [But a serious claim may be an adequate basis for -pacific joint occupation.] Polk viewed the Rio Grande as the boundary -[being committed to that position], and "intended to extinguish the -Mexican title by force" (p. 27). [Polk desired to extinguish it through -negotiation, and had not abandoned the effort to do so when he ordered -Taylor to advance. Mexican jurisdiction was not to be attacked. There -were other grounds than that alleged by Webster for the instructions -given to our general.] Taylor was ordered to treat every Mexican -assertion of title as an act of hostility (p. 29). [By no means. Taylor -was ordered not to molest the Mexican posts.] Why did not Polk consult -Congress before ordering Taylor to the Rio Grande (p. 29)? [The matter -could not be laid in definite shape before Congress until the fate of -Slidell's mission should have been decided. Polk's diary shows that he -desired to present the matter to Congress as promptly as he could.] Only -"self-defence" could justify sending troops into a territory claimed -and occupied by a power with which at that time no war existed (p. 29). -[This can hardly be admitted. We claimed the territory; Mexico was -believed to have troops there; it was only fair to place ourselves on an -equality with her.] And "there was, I think, no case of such necessity -for self-defence" (p. 30). [Webster admits that for self-defence -(_i.e._ defence of the Texans, now virtually American citizens) we -had a right to send the troops, and it is believed that the necessity -of such defence has been established in the text.] Taylor's letters -prove that there was no danger of a Mexican invasion (p. 30). [Taylor's -outlook extended, and his letters had reference only, to the immediate -frontier, and even to little of that except Matamoros. He could furnish -no opinion regarding the intentions of the Mexican government. Of the -orders actually given to the Mexican generals he was in total ignorance -until after May 9, 1846. The outlook of the authorities at Washington -was broader and clearer than his, and as the text shows they were -warned officially that Mexico was liable to make secret preparations -and a sudden invasion.] "Ordering the army to the Rio Grande was a step -naturally, if not necessarily, tending to provoke hostilities" (p. -31). [Of course the assertion of a claim denied by another power tends -naturally in the direction of hostilities, but no nation can for that -reason forbear to assert its claims. Webster's suggestion that sending -the troops did not necessarily produce hostilities is noteworthy. If the -President can declare war, what becomes of the Constitution, which gives -that power to Congress (p. 32)? [The President may take steps logically -leading to war; but in this case there was reason to believe that -Taylor's advance might tend toward peace.] Was it Polk's object to force -Mexico to treat? If so, it was an "idle hope" (p. 32). [Here Webster -seems to admit that such might have been Polk's intention. The fact that -Polk failed does not prove that such was not his design. Webster failed -to acquire northern California, but he certainly attempted to do so.] It -will be said that Polk's course was sanctioned by "the act of May 11th," -1846 (the virtual declaration of war against Mexico, the preamble of -which stated that Mexico had brought on the war), but neither a preamble -nor an act of Congress can "create a fact" (p. 32). [But a preamble can -state an opinion; and Congress thus expressed an opinion justifying the -President's course.] "I hardly suppose" Congress by that act "meant more -than to enable the President to defend the country, to the extent of the -limit claimed by him" (p. 32). [He claimed the Rio Grande as the limit; -and if Congress believed the country was to be defended to that river, -it believed the country extended to it, and consequently that Polk had a -right to send troops thus far. - -The most plausible criticisms made by the _American (Whig) Review_ -(July, 1846) were the following: Buchanan informed Slidell that the army -had been ordered to advance in view of his probable rejection, and -hence Taylor's advance was not, as Polk asserted, due to the urgent -necessity of defending Texas. [But the probable rejection of Slidell -meant probable fighting of a more or less serious nature north of the -Rio Grande.] Attempts were made from time to time, by throwing out -hints, to induce Taylor to advance on his own responsibility to the Rio -Grande [note 15]. As he did not, Slidell was sent to precipitate the -issue. [There is no evidence in support of this theory and much evidence -against it, as we have seen.] As Slidell failed to do so, Taylor was -positively ordered to the Rio Grande. [January 13 there was every reason -to believe that Slidell would be rejected, and that thus an issue would -be precipitated. December 20 Peña y Peña wrote to Slidell that unless -the pending difficulties were settled by negotiation there must be war. - -In January, 1847, the _Review_ repeated Webster's argument that Taylor -reported no danger of invasion. [Note the comment made above.] October -16, Marcy wrote to Taylor that no serious danger from Mexico was -feared, yet gave him authority to advance to the river. [A foray would -not be considered a serious military operation, but it was necessary -to guard against forays.] On January 13, Polk had no reason to expect -that Paredes intended to open hostilities. [He had grave reasons for -expecting hostilities. See p. 100.] He had Slidell's despatch of -December 17, which intimated that it might be more possible to negotiate -with Paredes than with Herrera. [Slidell only said that he might -have greater chances of accomplishing something with a less friendly -but more efficient government.] Besides, it was known that war would -have to proceed from the Congress, not from the President of Mexico. -[Holding that Texas was a part of Mexico and the presence of American -troops there an invasion, Paredes took the ground that attacking us -would not be making war, but merely defending the country as it was -his duty to do. (See his manifesto of April 23, 1846.) Consequently -no action by Congress was necessary.] Polk says the Mexicans did not -place their hostilities on the ground of our occupying non-Texan -territory, but they did do so. [Certain Mexicans took this ground for -the purpose of embarrassing the Americans, among whom there was known -to be a difference of opinion on this point; but the national Mexican -authorities regarded as our essential offence the presence of our troops -on Texan soil: note 34. - -In February, 1847, the _Review_ said that on January 13, 1846, Polk did -not know Slidell would be rejected. [Polk carefully avoided stating that -at that date Slidell's rejection was certain. He spoke of it as "highly -probable," which was rather less than could have been said.] April 6, -Taylor referred to the Mexicans of Matamoros as "the enemy." [As the -word occurred in a report to our government it did no harm, even if not -well chosen; but at that date Taylor had been given by the Mexicans -sufficient ground for using it.] Taylor pointed guns at Matamoros for -the purpose of stinging the Mexicans into hostility. [See p. 151.] The -intention of the American government was to manage things so as to make -Taylor the scapegoat if matters should go ill, and take the credit if -they should go well. [The orders of the war department were probably as -definite as they could safely be made. See p. 142.] Polk ordered Taylor -to advance because he did not believe the failure of Slidell would be a -pretext for war that Congress would accept. [This does not agree with -the charge made by Polk's enemies (_e.g. supra_) that he sent Slidell in -order to have him rejected and thus bring about a war. It is also wide -of the mark. In Polk's mind the essential ground for action was not the -rejection of Slidell but our grievances, and his diary shows that he -believed this ground would be accepted by Congress, or at least believed -so to such an extent as to decide upon raising the issue squarely. - -In October, 1847, the _Review_ stated the policy which it said Polk -should have adopted: to issue a statement that we would defend Texas, -that Mexico must pay the claims of our citizens, and that we desired -no Mexican territory; next, to take a defensive position in Texas, -perhaps occupy a Pacific port as security for our claims, and then -await developments. [As a military programme this plan of standing on -the defensive was seriously considered by the government and, as we -shall see, was condemned for both political and military reasons. To -say we desired no Mexican territory would have been meaningless unless -we pledged ourselves to take none, and to issue such a promise on the -eve of a war the course of which could not be predicted, and especially -in view of the fact that Mexico could pay no large indemnity except -with territory, would certainly have been imprudent, and the _Review's_ -proposition to seize a port as security for our claims suggests as much. -This proposition, by the way, was less justifiable than going to the Rio -Grande, for we had a claim to the intermediate territory and no claim to -a Mexican port. To take a defensive attitude in Texas signified either -going to the Rio Grande in order to obtain a good strategic position, -or maintaining at great expense for an indefinite period an army large -enough to guarantee the Texans against attack at any and every point. -The first of these plans was the one adopted by Polk; the second, on -account of the expense, would have been unjust to our own people, and in -the end would have compelled us to increase our demands for indemnity -against Mexico. Moreover, there were strong objections to waiting -(p. 136); and, had Mexico simply adhered to the policy of passive -resistance, all our trouble and expense would have brought us no nearer -a settlement. Still other objections to the plan of the _Review_ could -be offered. - - - VIII. PALO ALTO, RESACA DE LA PALMA - -8.1. The account of the Mexican army is based upon Memorias de ... -Guerra, 1844; Mar., 1845; Dec., 1846; =152=Claiborne, Mems.; _Diario_, -May 30, 1845; Balbontín, Estado Militar; Paz, Invasión; =5=Anaya, -Memoria; Peña, Comunicación circular; _Siglo XIX_, Aug. 19, 21, 1845; -S. Miguel, Repúb. Mex., 133-4, 136; Wash. _Globe_, Oct. 15, 1845; -Molina, recolls.; _Hist. Mag._, Feb., 1870 (Deas); Zirckel, Tagebuch, -13, 111; Semmes, Service, 441, note; =75=Memorias drawn up by war -dept. chiefs, Nov., 1847; =81=_Seminario Polít. del Gob. de N. León_; -Moore, Scott's Camp., 19; =76=Report of superior engineer board, Nov. -15, 1845; Balbontín, Invasión, 77-8; _Monitor Repub._, Nov. 30, 1847; -=148=Chamberlain, recolls.; =69=report of spy, Apr. 5, 1846; N. Orl. -_Commerc. Bulletin_, May 21, 1846; =76=Carrera, report on artillery, -Dec, 1847; =76=reports of the powder mills at Zacatecas and Santa Fé. - -Dec., 1843, a special school of application for artillery and engineer -officers was decreed, but lack of money prevented its establishment. -There was a normal school, intended to convey the rudiments of military -knowledge to the privates through the corporals and sergeants, but it -signified little or nothing. Attached to the engineer corps was a body -of sappers, miners, and pontoniers; but, owing to lack of funds to equip -it with, it served as infantry. The poorest cannon, especially at first, -were kept at the fortresses. What horses could be had for artillery -service were too light and frisky. Paredes reorganized this arm, and -assigned to it about 250 officers, 5000 privates, and 200 clerks and -workmen. The bronze cannon manufactured in Mexico during 1846-47 were -not satisfactory, and the grape-shot was so poorly made that its range -was considerably reduced. The importance of artillery had never been -appreciated in that country. There was a good arsenal at Mexico, and -there were old-fashioned powder-mills at Santa Fe (near that city) and -Zacatecas. The latter blew up early in 1845, and, though repaired, -worked at a disadvantage. Mexican powder was usually of an inferior -quality. The Active corps contained fewer men than the Permanent. The -infantry musket carried an ounce ball; and the escopeta bullet was even -heavier and went farther. In both cases the very liberal charge of -powder increased the normal range. Many of the escopetas were merely -sawed-off muskets. The shaft of the lance was usually about six feet -long and the head about one foot. The Line infantry included light -companies (_cazadores_), which sometimes had rifles and sometimes -deserved to be called sharpshooters. There were mounted cazadores also. - -Each cavalry regiment consisted of four squadrons, and each infantry -regiment included two battalions, one commanded by the lieutenant -colonel, and the other by the major (_comandante de batallón_). There -were mounted corps called hussars, etc., but the difference of name -signified little or nothing, practically. Owing to the smallness of the -horses, the cavalry had not much shock-value. There were 635 cannon on -hand at the end of 1845, 25,789 muskets, 8155 swords, 100,000 artillery -projectiles, and more than 400,000 bullets. Tornel imported 104 new -cannon early in 1846. Differences of caliber interfered greatly with the -usefulness of the muskets. March 9, 1846, the departments were urged to -complete their legal quotas of troops as soon as possible. - -8.2. On the first day when volunteers were to enlist only eleven came -forward at Mexico. - -8.3. The figures are based upon the =76=official return of April 17 -supplemented by a large number of Mexican and American statements. -Most of the latter were exaggerated. The Americans were doubtless -misled often by the statements of prisoners, who wished to please -their captors. "The information obtained from prisoners ought to be -estimated at its proper value" (Napoleon, Maxims, 53). Mejía, the -regular commander of the first brigade, gave way temporarily to García -on account of ill health. - -8.4. =69=Reports of spies. _República de Rio Grande_, June 27. -=118=Berlandier, memo., undated. =66=Mansfield to Totten, May 4. -=217=Henshaw papers. =76=Testimony at the trial of Arista. =76=Mejía, -Feb. 28; Mar. 18. =76=Commander of zapadores, Apr. 8. Henry, Camp. -Sketches, 68, 70. México á través, iv, 561. Campaña contra, 4. - -8.5. _Monitor Repub._, Mar. 17. Negrete, Invasión, ii, 113, 117. _Revue -des Deux Mondes_, Aug. 1, 1847, 388-93. =13=Elliot, nos. 12, 14, etc., -1846. =66=Mansfield to Totten, Apr. 2, 23. =61=Worth to Taylor, Apr. 2. -=61=Scott to Marcy, May 7. =65=Taylor, gen. orders 42. =65=Marcy, gen. -orders 5. Sen. 230; 29, 1. =224=Hitchcock, diary. =62=Twiggs to Davis, -May 4. The principal causes of the absenteeism were assignment to higher -duties elsewhere and the impossibility (owing to the lack of a retired -list) of replacing invalided or superannuated officers. _Locomotor_, -Mar. 27. Campaña contra, 4. Henry, Camp. Sketches, 129-30. Upton, Mil. -Policy. 206. =285=Mejía to Paredes, Apr. 3. =76=Comte. of Zapadores, -Apr. 8. =76=Mejía, Mar. 14, 28; Apr. 2. =76=_Id._ to Arista, Apr. 30. -=76=Ampudia to Arista, Apr. 30. - -8.6. =66=Sanders to Totten, Apr. 10 (Ft. B. badly placed). =185=_Id._ to -Duncan, Apr. 27. =69=Requena to Arista, Apr. 30 (might have enfiladed). -Hitchcock, Fifty Years, 217. _República de Rio Grande_, June 27. -_Picayune_, May 10. =118=Berlandier, memo. (Groves) Ampudia, Address -(1846). =52=Wickliffe to Buchanan, May 21, 1845. Giddings, Camp., 36. -_Niles_, May 16, p. 165; 23, p. 179. Kenly, Md. Vol., 42. Polk, Diary, -Apr. 1, 1847. =218=Henshaw narrative. Apuntes, 35. =66=Sanders to -Taylor, May 2. Wash. _Union_, May 9; June 6. Meade, Letters, i, 59-60. -_Journal U. S. Artill._, July, 1892, p. 293. =132=King to Buchanan, June -1. =69=Spy to Taylor, Apr. 11. - -Taylor's army lay on the Pt. Isabel road, which connected here with the -principal Matamoros ferry (_Paso Real_). Fort Brown was about a mile and -a half from the site of the present fort. The line of the fort at Pt. -Isabel enclosed about fifty acres, and could not be properly fortified -with the means at hand in the time allowed. May 2 the works were far -from complete. Some at least of the disadvantages of his position were -pointed out to Taylor, but he seemed to feel no concern. Marcy was -surprised that the Mexicans did not cross the Rio Grande near its mouth -and capture Pt. Isabel. The explanation probably was that they believed -the plan they acted upon was better. - -8.7. =217=Henshaw papers. =61=Crossman to ... Apr. 23. =66=Mansfield to -Totten, Apr. 23. Ho. 60; 30, 1, pp. 133, 138, 142, 288 (Taylor). _Spirit -of the Times_, May 23. Meade, Letters, i, 66 (the murder of Cross caused -intense resentment). México á través, iv, 561. Campaña contra, 4. -=69=Walker to Taylor, May 2. Walker was absent on service when the men -were surprised. =52=Consul Chase, Tampico, May 1. _National_, June 18. - -8.8. Ho. 60; 30, 1, pp. 133, 302 (Taylor). (West Pointers) =224=Bliss -to Hitchcock, June 7. =76=Mejía, Apr. 9. =76=_Id._ to Arista, Apr. 30. -=76=Ampudia, Mar. 28. _Tropic_, May 7 (proclam. of Ampudia). Ballentine, -Eng. Soldier, i, 57-9. Kenly, Md. Vol., 39, 40. (Promises, etc.) -=69=Arista, "Advice," Apr. 20. =69=Report of spy, Apr. 5. Wilhelm, -Eighth Inf., i, 408. Meade, Letters, i, 53. London _Times_, June 8. Ho. -194; 29, 1 (Jones, May 5). _Spirit of the Times_, May 16. _Esperanza_, -Apr. 18. Bustamante, N. Bernal, ii, 11. =69=Mier y Terán to Mejía, May -4. Taylor gave orders to shoot soldiers attempting to cross the river. -Later, British deserters were not accepted. - -8.9. =76=Arista, May 1, 7. So. _Advocate_, June 10, 1846. =76=Ampudia -to Arista, Apr. 30. =76=Parrodi, Apr. 8. =69=Arista, "Advice," Apr. -20. =76=Mejía proclam., Mar. 18. (Lasted) Donnavan, Adventures, 102. -=76=Comte. gen. S. L. Potosí, proclam., Mar. 27. =76=Comte. gen. -Zacatecas to troops, Apr. 1. The Mexican press teemed with the ideas -here suggested. To an Indian anything as foreign as a neighboring -estate seemed dreadful. =76=Ampudia, Mar. 28. Apuntes, 33. (Despised) -=162=Conner to wife, May 9; Henshaw narrative; _Niles_, May 16, p. 165; -Sept. 12, p. 22. (Hardee) =224=Bliss to Hitchcock, June 7. Ampudia's -troops had mutinied on the way, but an appeal to their patriotism -had brought them round. There had been, as was usual, a good deal of -desertion; but to a certain extent those who stood by the colors were -for this reason above the average (=76=Ampudia, Mar. 10, 11, 12). -Taylor's method--uniformly despising the enemy and teaching his troops -to do so--was contrary to the practice of Cæsar, Napoleon and the Duke -of Wellington (Napol., Maxims, 49, note). - -8.10. (Obvious) Henshaw narrative. =63=Marcy, Jan. 13. =69=Friend, [Apr. -11]. Ho. 60; 30, 1, pp. 138, 140, 142 (Taylor). =65=Taylor, gen. orders -45. (Seven) =69=McCall, report, Apr. 30. May 3 Taylor reported that his -lack of light troops had helped to keep him in ignorance of the enemy's -movements as if that lack had been due to some one else. He did not call -on Texas for troops until Apr. 26. Ripley (War with Mexico, i, 133) says -he did not call in February because such troops could serve only three -months. But had a call been issued then, the troops would probably not -have begun to serve for a month or two; and later he could have called -for a second small body. - -8.11. México á través, iv, 561. =76=Arista, Apr. 27; May 1. =76=_Id._ -to Ampudia, May 5. _Revue des Deux Mondes_, Aug. 1, 1847, 394-6. -_Republicano_, June 5. Campaña contra. =76=Arista to Mejía, May 1, 2. -=76=Mejía to Arista, May 1, 3. =69=Diary captured in Arista's papers. -=76=Plana mayor diary. Apuntes, 35-7. Bustamante, N. Bernal, ii, 16. -=76=Testimony at trial of Arista. People in the United States could not -believe Taylor would permit the enemy to get between him and his base -(_e.g._ Mobile _Herald and Tribune_, May 3). At first Arista left only -1007 men at Matamoros, but, becoming anxious about the town, he sent -back the Morelia battalion. - -8.12. Henshaw narrative. Mansfield, Mex. War, 35. Ho. 60; 30, 1, p. 288 -(Taylor). Taylor, Letters (Bixby), 175. _Picayune_, May 12. Nebel and -Kendall, 1. _Niles_, May 23, p. 178. Ho. 1; 30, 2, p. 1161 (Conner). -=62=Twiggs to Davis, May 4. (Lowd, etc.) Meade, Letters, i, 74-5. -Appleton's Biog. Dict. (art. by J. Davis on Taylor). _Autograph_, -May-June, 1912 (Taylor). Smith, To Mexico, 44. Fry and Conrad, Taylor, -109-10. Henry, Camp. Sketches, 86. =76=Diary of plana mayor. =76=To -Arista, May 15. - -Mejía notified Arista that Taylor was preparing to move, but the news -arrived so late that the guns of Matamoros did not open fire upon him. -Arista pursued the Americans but could not overtake them; and a body of -dragoons that he ordered on was equally unsuccessful. On the morning -of May 3 the boom of heavy guns in the direction of Fort Brown (Grant, -Mems., i, 92; Henry, Camp. Sketches, 88) alarmed Taylor, and he gave -orders to set out at one o'clock (Henry, Camp. Sketches, 88; Smith, -To Mexico, 44), which showed that he felt no great confidence in its -defensibility even then; but he desired to strengthen the base and to -receive some ordnance and reinforcements that he then expected (Ho. -60; 30, 1, p. 288), and hence sent Capt. Walker with a small party to -communicate with Brown (Henshaw narrative). This was a hard task; but -after some fighting, Walker reached the fort, stated that Taylor would -return as soon as possible, obtained a reassuring report (Ho. 60; 30, 1, -p. 293), and with great difficulty made his way back (Henshaw papers; -Ho. 60; 30, 1, pp. 289, 293). May 1 Pt. Isabel had a force, including -civilians who took up arms, of 400-500 (_Niles_, May 16, p. 165; 23, p. -179; _Picayune_, May 10; Wash. _Union_, May 9). - -8.13. Meade, Letters, i, 74-8, 93. =65=Taylor, gen. orders 56, 58. -_Journ. Mil. Serv. Instit._, xli, 94. Ho. 60; 30, 1, pp. 288, 292-4 -(Taylor); 527 (spec. orders 60). _Autograph_, May-June, 1912 (Taylor). -Nebel and Kendall, 2. Grant, Mems., i, 167-8. Henry, Camp. Sketches, -88-9. (Leaving train, etc.) =224=Larnard to Hitchcock, June 13. Wash. -_Union_, May 9, 29, 30. _Niles_, May 16, p. 162. =62=Twiggs to Davis, -May 4. French, Two Wars, 49. Some of the officers were anxious to wait -for larger reinforcements (=185=L. C. to Duncan, Nov. 21), but Taylor -feared Fort Brown was getting short of ammunition. - -8.14. _The battle of Palo Alto._ Sen. 388; 29, 1 (Taylor and officers). -=65=Taylor, gen. orders 58. _Id._, Letters (Bixby), 1. Campaña contra. -México á través, iv, 561-3, 566. =224=Bliss to Hitchcock, July 23. -=61=Arthur to brother, May 10. Meade, Letters, i, 79, 80. =13=Pakenham, -no. 54, 1846. McCall, Letters, 449-54. =224=Larnard to Hitchcock, -June 13. Eyewitness, Complete History, 23. =210=Alvord to Hammond, -May 22. Wash. _Union_, May 30. Map in Map Div., Lib. of Cong. _Nat. -Intelligencer_, May 11, 18; Sept. 3, 10. N. Y. _Journ. of Commerce_, -Feb. 24, 1847. _Diario_, May 29. _Tex. Democrat_, June 24. _Spirit of -the Times_, May 30. Portrait of Arista, city hall, Mex. =350=Weber, -recolls. =213=Hatch, letters. _Picayune_, Aug. 1, 1845; Sept. 24, 1846. -_Delta_, May 24. =118=Berlandier, diary and map. =185=Duncan to adj. -gen., June 19. =185=Marcy to Duncan, July 27. Nebel and Kendall, 2-3. -Smith, To Mexico, 45, 47-9. Fallo Definitivo del Supremo Tribunal [_re_ -Arista's conduct]. Sedgwick, Corresp., i, 16. _Niles_, June 6, pp. -215-16; Oct. 24, p. 122. Frost, Taylor, 81. _Hist. Mag._, Feb., 1870, -101-2. Haskin, First Artill., 80. _Journ. Milit. Serv. Instit._, xli, -96. Ampudia ante ... la Opinión Pública. (Stepped aside) Grant, Mems., -95. Sen. 378; 29, 1, p. 57. Sierra, Evolution, i, 214. _Esperanza_, May -23. _Monitor Repub._, June 2. _Autograph_, May-June, 1912 (Taylor). -Ampudia to Fellow-cits. =285=Arista to Paredes, May 14. =285=Segura -to Escudero, June 4. Ramsey, Other Side, 39, note, 48. (Losses) Ho. -24; 31, 1. Ho. 60; 30, 1, pp. 295, 393 (Taylor); 392 (Marcy); 1102 -(McIntosh); 403. =185=Duncan to Belknap, May 12. French, Two Wars, 49, -50. =364=Worth to S., June 13. Donnavan, Adventures, 102. Henry, Camp. -Sketches, 90-3, 95. Roa Bárcena, Recuerdos, 36, 39. Sumaria mandada -formar ... J. L. Uraga. Negrete, Invasión, ii, 233. Wilhelm, Eighth -Inf., i, 414-9. Apuntes, 38-41. _So. Qtrly. Rev_., Nov., 1850, p. 446. -And from =76= the following. Testimony at the court-martial of Arista. -To Arista, May 17. Arista, May 7, 8, 13, 1846; July 12, 1847. Ampudia, -May 14. Requena to Arista, May 8. Vázquez to sister, May 25. Arista to -Ampudia, May 5; to Parrodi, May 9. Ampudia to Arista, May 11. Plana -mayor diary. - -REMARKS. When first seen, the Mexicans were probably two or -three miles from the Palo Alto pond, but they advanced until about a -mile and a half from that point. Both lines of battle were too long. The -batteries on both sides used solid shot mostly. On the placing of our -gunners in advance of the troops, see Napoleon, Maxims, 45. The Mexican -gunners fired mostly at the American artillery, but the American gunners -mostly at the Mexican infantry. It was said that not more than a dozen -Mexicans were killed with bullets. Many of the Americans were ordered to -sit down or lie down (particularly the Eighth Infantry); and as most of -the Mexican balls approached at a ricochet it was not very difficult to -dodge them. Whatever the Americans accomplished was almost wholly due to -their cannon. Not only the excellence of the ammunition and the accurate -fire, but the boldness and rapidity of the manoeuvres astonished the -Mexicans. It is not known why Taylor decided to rely on artillery, to -which (it was stated) he had referred contemptuously on the morning -of the battle as mere "gun wagons"; but presumably, as the field was -peculiarly well suited for that arm, Ringgold and Duncan, supported -by Bliss, urged him to let it have a chance. The American officers, -though they had not over-much confidence in Taylor, felt a great deal -in one another, and so had a vast advantage over the Mexicans (México -á través, iv, 566). Ringgold was mortally wounded, but would not let -his men leave their work to care for him. During the intermission the -Americans removed their wounded, replenished caissons, and made repairs. -Commodore Conner, hearing Taylor was likely to be attacked, sailed for -that quarter, and on May 8 and 9 landed 500 seamen and marines at Point -Isabel (=166=Conner Letter-book. See also =65=Taylor, gen. orders 60.). -The chief Mexican surgeon and a number of assistants made an early and -rapid retreat. The Mexican loss was estimated by Taylor as 200 killed -and 400 wounded; by Arista as 252 killed, wounded, and missing. - -8.15. (May 8 indecisive) =224=Larnard to Hitchcock, June 13; Giffard to -Pakenham, May 28; McCall, Letters, 454; Meade, Letters, i, 80; Wilhelm, -Eighth Inf., i, 416-7. Sen. 388; 29, 1. Taylor, Letters (Bixby), -1. (Consulted) Wilhelm, Eighth Inf., i, 418; Stevens, Campaigns, -20; Sedgwick, Corresp., i, 16; _Journ. Milit. Serv. Instit._, xli, -98; =185=L. C. to Duncan, Nov. 24; Article by J. Davis on Taylor in -Appleton's Biog. Dict. Accounts of this conference differ so much that -little can be said of it. Some of the officers were for entrenching and -awaiting reinforcements. It was known that Conner's fleet had arrived -(note 14). (Defend) Taylor, _supra_; Henry, Camp. Sketches, 94; map -of P. Alto in Map Div., Lib. of Cong. Churchill's 18-pounders and two -12-pounders taken from the baggage were left here. The wounded were sent -to Pt. Isabel. Rives (U. S. and Mexico, ii, 153) states that Taylor -marched early May 9 to Resaca de la Palma and parked the train there, -but this is incorrect (Taylor in Sen. 388; 29, 1, p. 6; Henry, Camp. -Sketches, 94; =369=map of Palo Alto; Ripley, War with Mexico, i, 124; -etc.). The point is important because troops were left with the train to -protect the wagons--not as a rear guard (Rives). Rives (p. 154) states -incorrectly that the Eighth Infantry was left with the train. - -8.16. _The battle of May 9._ Sen. 388; 29, 1 (Taylor and officers). -Apuntes, 42-7. Suárez y Navarro, Alegato. Campaña contra. Negrete, -Invasión, ii, 230, 233. Ho. 60; 30, 1, pp. 295, 393, 396, 403 (Taylor); -392, 395 (Marcy); 1104 (McIntosh). =69=Canales to Arista, May 9. -=13=Giffard to Bankhead, May 13. Henshaw narrative. =147=Chamberlain, -diary. Taylor, Letters (Bixby), 1. =210=Alvord to Hammond, May 22. -=210=Hammond to Simms, Apr. 1, 1847. =213=Hatch, letters. Wash. -_Union_, July 25, 1846. =369=Map of P. Alto. _Spirit of the Times_, -May 30; June 20. _Picayune_, May 19; June 3. Berlandier, diary and -map. Nebel and Kendall, 3-4. México á través, iv, 564, 566. Fallo -Definitivo del Supremo Tribunal, 19. Sen. 4; 29, 2. Ho. 1; 30, 2, p. -1162. Claiborne, Quitman, i, 253. _Journ. Mil. Serv. Instit._, xvii -(Van Deusen); xli, 98. =370=Taylor to ----, June 18. Taylor, Letters -(Bixby), 175. Ampudia ante ... la Opin. Púb. (Uraga). McCall, Letters, -455. Sen. 378; 29, 1, p. 57 (Bliss). Grant, Mems., i, 93, 96-8. Meade, -Letters, i, 81-2, 149. =72=Reales Ordenes, Serie de Gobernación, leg. -43. Appleton's Biog. Dict. (art. by J. Davis on Taylor). (Losses) Ho. -24; 31, 1. =285=Arista to Paredes, May 9, 14. French, Two Wars, 51-4. -_Autograph_, May-June, 1912 (Taylor). =210=Bragg to Hammond, Dec. 20, -1847. Ampudia to Fellow-cits. =285=Segura to Escudero, June 4. Smith, -To Mexico, 49-52. =185=Duncan to Belknap, May 10. Eyewitness, Complete -Hist., 25-6. Wilhelm, Eighth Inf., i, 422-3. _Niles_, June 6, pp. 211-7; -July 4, p. 277; Sept. 26, p. 57. =224=Larnard to Hitchcock, June 13. -Henry, Camp. Sketches, 96-9. =61=Arthur to brother. _Puritano Mex._, -May 26. =224=Bliss to Hitchcock, June 7. =61=Patton to Polk, July 18, -and enclosure. México á través, iv, 564, 566. Roa Bárcena, Recuerdos, -48. The verse is by José de Saltillo, trans. by C. F. Hoffman. And from -=76= the following. Arista, May 9, 10, 13, 1846; July 12, 1847. _Id._ to -Mateos, May 31; to Parrodi, May 13; to Taylor, May 10. Carrera, May 25. -Requena to Arista, May 10. Testimony at the court-martial of Arista. R. -Vázquez to sister, May 25. Plana mayor diary. Ampudia to Arista, May 11, -14. Canales to Tornel, May 10. - -REMARKS. It would be unsafe to give fuller information than that of -the text with reference to the positions of the Mexican corps. All -the accounts are unsatisfactory. Owing to the nature of the ground -and the irregular shifting of the troops, this was natural. The -Mexican leaders thought their position would ensure victory. Horses -were unsaddled and mules relieved of their packs. The chief danger to -Ridgely's battery was from Mexicans ambushed--as Taylor had reason -to suppose they would be--on both sides of the road. May, very tall -and straight, with long black hair and a black beard that reached to -his waist, became a newspaper hero, and for reasons that are rather -hard to understand, was promoted several times during the war; but he -seems clearly to have been essentially a cowardly sham. In this fight -he seized a cannon, but only the infantry prevented the enemy from -recapturing it. He claimed the credit of making Gen. Vega his prisoner, -but the real captor was a bugler. By his own account, he could rally -only six of his men after running through the batteries. The horses -appear to have "run away" with the men. Taylor's report laid stress -upon what occurred at the road, and he does not seem to have known--at -that time, to say the least--what mainly caused the sudden collapse of -the enemy; but an abundance of Mexican evidence, partly given under -oath, makes the matter clear. See also Henry, Camp. Sketches, 98. After -Americans were seen at the _placeta_ Arista's secretary went to where -the road crossed the resaca, and found May's dragoons there. This fixes -the order of events. Duncan's battery did nothing during the battle, -for Ridgely had the only opportunity to use artillery without injuring -Americans. Duncan and Kerr followed the Mexicans at some distance; the -Third Infantry coöperated; and so did the Artillery Battalion, after it -reached the scene; but the Mexicans were not aware of any real pursuit. -Fort Brown fired on the throngs of fugitives, but no sally was made. -One might imagine the garrison feared the guns of Matamoros; but they -watched the Mexican fugitives from the parapet. Mejía's ammunition had -been almost used up. Paredes informed Congress, June 6, that after May -9 Arista had 4000 regulars (Memoria de ... Relaciones, Dec., 1846). -May 13 Arista gave the number as 3758 "men." Arista's chief of staff -estimated the captured, drowned, and dispersed as 500. Arista informed -Parrodi, May 13, that the total number of men, including the wounded, -taken by Taylor was less than 200, and this seems to have been true. -May 11 prisoners were exchanged. Arista reported the number in American -hands as 144, including the wounded. - -8.17. When Taylor set out for Point Isabel, though he described the -fort as "in a good state of defense," one side was still open, and the -drawbridge and interior defences had not been begun (=66=Mansfield to -Totten, June 23; diary in _Nat. Intelligencer_, Sept. 3); and not before -the night of the third was the position considered by its defenders -even comparatively secure. The fort had six bastion fronts, which made a -perimeter of 800 yards, a strongly designed wall of earth 9½ feet high -from the natural ground, a parapet 15 feet thick, a ditch about 8 feet -deep and from 15 to 22 feet wide, a gate and a drawbridge (mostly from -=66=Mansfield to Totten, Apr. 23). For about 4 feet from the base the -inside of the wall was fortified with a sort of basket work of willow -twigs. The magazine was made of pork barrels filled with sand, seven -tiers thick and four tiers high, with a timber roof covered with 10 -or 12 feet of sand. The fort was a "child of circumstance," admitted -Engineer Mansfield (=66=_supra_), and in addition to the faults of -position already mentioned, the ground was irregular and the defence was -made difficult by the extent of the walls, for as considerable portions -were allowed to remain covered with thick chaparral (=66=Mansfield, -_supra_), its area was evidently too large for the 500 men which it -had been intended to cover; but it was after all a strong work, and in -comparison with it Mansfield regarded the Mexican forts as "trifling" -(=66=to Totten, May 4). Near the end of April the four 18-pounders -were removed from the battery to a bastion of the fort looking toward -Matamoras, where they were protected with merlons faced with sand-bags, -and so attack as well as defence was provided for; but there were only -150 rounds of ammunition for each of these guns. For this note: Henshaw -narrative and papers; =66=Mansfield to Totten, Apr. 23; May 4; June 23; -=65=Taylor, gen. orders 39, 45, 53; Mobile _Herald and Tribune_, May 6; -_Journal of U. S. Artil._, July, 1892, p. 293; Taylor in _Autograph_, -May-June, 1912; _Nat. Intelligencer_, Sept. 3; Robinson, Organization, -ii, 49; _Niles_, June 13, p. 230; McCall, Letters, 441, 443; (300 -wagons) Ho. 60; 30, 1, p. 651 (Cross). - -8.18. Sen. 388; 29, 1, pp. 31, 35 (Hawkins); 35 (Arista); 36 -(Mansfield). Fry and Conrad, Taylor, 109. Taylor, Letters (Bixby), 175. -Apuntes, 37-8. Henshaw narrative and papers. Ho. 60; 30, 1, pp. 288, -296 (Taylor); 293 (Brown). Campaña contra. _Picayune_, May 19, 21; Aug. -28. =69=Diary captured with Arista's papers. =69=Ampudia to Arista, May -5-6. =69=Canales to Arista, May 5, 7. México á través, iv, 561. (Losses) -Ho. 24; 31, 1. =66=Mansfield to Totten, May 4; June 23. =13=Giffard -to Pakenham, May 28. =76=Ampudia to Arista, May 11. =76=Mejía, May -4, 14. =76=Mier y Terán to Mejía, May 3, 4, 5, 7; to Requena, May 4. -=76=Testimony given at the court-martial of Arista. =76=Arista, May -7. =76=_Id._ to Ampudia, May 5. =76=Mejía to Arista, May 3. _Nat. -Intelligencer_, Sept. 3. =76=Requena to Arista, May 5. N. Orl. _Commerc. -Bulletin_, May 18. =364=Worth to S., July 25. Johnson, Thomas, 23. -=76=Canales, May 5. =76=Diary, Apr. 30-May 6. - -REMARKS. May 6 the fort was summoned, with an intimation that no -quarter would be given, should the garrison hold out longer (Henshaw). -Brown was mortally wounded by a bomb-shell. He was succeeded by Captain -Hawkins. In all one man was killed; nine officers and men wounded (Ho. -24; 31, 1). An attempt was made to burn Matamoros, but the balls could -not be heated sufficiently (Ho. 60; 30, 1, p. 293). Perhaps a general -more farseeing than Taylor would have provided a furnace. Ampudia -had about 830 men at first and later drew others from the city. When -Arista called him to Palo Alto on May 8, a small force remained behind -to continue the siege. Ripley (War with Mexico, i, 140) says that -Arista should have reduced the fort. But Arista judged rightly that, -if he should defeat Taylor, the fort would have to fall, and therefore -it would be unwise to risk heavy losses; and probably he did not wish -Ampudia to have the glory of capturing it. - -8.19. =13=Giffard to Bankhead, May 13; to Pakenham, May 28. -=118=Berlandier to Arista, undated draft. Sen. I; 29, 2, p. 46 (Marcy, -report). Ho. 60; 30, 1, p. 297 (Taylor). Taylor, Letters (Bixby), 3. -(Bridge, plank, etc.) Meade, Letters, i, 101-2. Apuntes, 46. =69=Sanders -to Taylor, May 10 ("the scows and flats of the Quarter-Masters Dept. -would give us the means of crossing the river at once"). _Niles_, May -30, p. 202. N. Orl. _Commerc. Bulletin_, May 18. _Nat. Intell._, May -18. =165=Conner to Bancroft, May 28; to Aulick, May 18. Henry, Camp. -Sketches, 132. =166=Wilson to Conner, May 15. =166=Bliss to Wilson, -May 14. Ho. 1; 30, 2, pp. 1161-2 (Conner). Parkers Recolls., 56. -(Steamers) Ho. 60; 30, 1, p. 522; Henry, Camp. Sketches, 115 (the _Neva_ -at Matamoros May 24); _Niles_, May 30, p. 203; =166=Munroe to Conner, -May 9; N. Y. _Herald_, June 11. =65=Taylor, gen. orders 59. Ho. 60; -30, 1, pp. 297, 300 (Taylor). Wash. _Union_, May 18, 30; June 17. N. -Y. _Herald_, June 10. =364=Worth to S., June 1. =166=Wilson to Conner, -May 15. =166=Bliss to Munroe, May 9. =166=Sanders to Bliss, May 16. -=166=Bliss to Wilson, May 14. Giddings, Camp., 36. - -There was additional help at hand. =69=May 10 Captain Sanders, the -engineer officer at Point Isabel, conferred with Conner about crossing -the river, and Conner said he was "perfectly ready and willing to go -into the river and proceed up as far as Burita," where he would place -all his men and boats at Taylor's disposal. (In fact Conner did assist -in the Burrita expedition actually executed.) This was reported to -Taylor at once. Matamoros had no defences except toward the river. - -8.20. Ho. 60; 30, 1, pp. 297 (Taylor); 1206 (Arista). Taylor, Letters -(Bixby), 3. Campaña contra. =69=Arista to Taylor, May 10. =76=Parrodi, -May 22. =76=Plana mayor diary. =13=Giffard to Pakenham, May 28. -=61=Spanish letter to Taylor, undated. =285=Ampudia to Paredes, May 14. -=76=Arista, May 13, 16. (Duty) Jomini, Précis, i, 475; Wagner, Strategy, -45; Henderson, Science of War, 42. Apuntes, 47. Henry, Camp. Sketches, -107. =76=Testimony at court-martial of Arista. Fallo Definitivo (Arista -was entirely exonerated, and at a later day he became President). - -8.21. Ho. 60; 30, 1, p. 298 (Taylor). Taylor, Letters (Bixby), 3. -Apuntes, 47-51. Campaña contra. =76=Arista, May 16, 18, 29; June 4. -=76=Prefect of No. Tamaulipas to gov., May 29. =76=Plana mayor diary. -=285=Torrejón to Paredes, June 3. =76=To Arista, May 27; June 9. -=76=Parrodi, May 22-3, 31. Negrete, Invasión, ii, 219. =76=Testimony -at the court-martial of Arista. =76=Ampudia, Sept. 9. =224=Bliss to -Hitchcock, June 7. Fallo Definitivo. Meade, Letters, i, 85, 95. =76=Gen. -orders, June 15, 1848. Arista had a choice between two routes--one -through a settled region, the other through a desert--and for strategic -reasons chose the latter. - -8.22. =65=Taylor, gen. orders, 59-61, 78-9, 83. Ho. 60; 30, 1, p. 297, -300-1 (Taylor). Taylor, Letters (Bixby), 3, 175. Wilhelm, Eighth Inf., -i, 425-6. Reid, Scouting Expeds., 43. =66=Mansfield to Totten, June 23. -=370=Taylor to ... June 18. Henshaw papers. Smith, To Mexico, 52-4. -=76=Parrodi, May 31. Murray, Reality, 75. =69=Garland to ... May 24. -Henry, Camp. Sketches, 106-9, 113. Meade, Letters i, 88. As Roa Bárcena -says (Recuerdos, 40), the Americans were physically stronger than the -Mexicans, had better arms, cannon, artillery horses, and ammunition, -plenty of food, ample and well-served ambulances, were quicker and more -forceful in their movements, and were more obedient; and the officers -had more confidence in one another. They were also cooler and more -intelligent, and had greater reserves of will-power, and the men felt -more confidence in their superiors. - -8.23. Meade, Letters, i, 98, 101. _Metrop. Mag._, Dec, 1907 (Hamilton, -July 29, 1846). =139=Campbell to Martin, July 29; (nine tenths) to D. -Campbell, Aug. 9. Polk, Diary, Apr. 1, 1847. =224=Larnard to Hitchcock, -June 13. Ho. 60; 30, 1, p. 283. =224=Bliss to Hitchcock, June 7. -Schouler, U. S., v, 248. Weed, Autobiography, 571-2. Albany _Evening -Journal_, June 18. Scott, Mems., ii, 389. - -Larnard, an excellent officer, wrote to Hitchcock that Taylor did not -give an order to the artillery on May 8 nor a material order to any -one, and that he was no more responsible for winning the two battles -than a rock rolling down a hill for crushing what is before it. This -was intended, no doubt, to be taken with a grain of salt. The editor of -_Niles' Register_ said: Owing to an error in estimating the capacities -of the enemy, the army under Gen. Taylor made a narrow escape from -almost utter annihilation (July 18, p. 309); and, considering the ardor -of the Mexicans as well as the embarrassment caused by the American -wagons, one must believe that had the General carried out the plan -which he seems to have formed, the results would have been unfortunate. -See Semmes, Service, 70. Meade (Letters, i, 99) remarked that Taylor's -neglect of precautions probably helped induce the Mexicans to fight. -This was not true, for Arista's orders were express; but, even had it -been so, one could not excuse a general for really (not seemingly, -as a ruse) neglecting precautions and preparations demanded by the -circumstances. "Boldness is the acme of wisdom" in war, the German -general staff has said (Donat, Russo-Japanese War, 255); but the -distinction between boldness and rashness is real and vital. No doubt -graduates of West Point felt a prejudice against men of antecedents like -Taylor's, but they showed in the course of the war a willingness to -recognize merit. The popular enthusiasm over Taylor's "victories" was -the greater because he had been supposed to be in extreme peril. - -8.24. =52=J. Parrott, June 4. Bankhead, nos. 71, 90, 1846. =285=Vega to -Paredes, Apr. 3. =76=Tornel to Arista, May 27. The London _Times_, Feb. -24, 1847, quoted the _Journal des Débats_ as saying in effect that the -Mexican War prevented the establishment of a monarchy in Mexico. Paredes -had no doubt been encouraged by the reports of Mejía regarding the state -of things at Corpus Christi, and very likely these reports helped decide -him to reject Slidell. - - - IX. THE UNITED STATES MEETS THE CRISIS - -9.1. Our policy did not permit us to accept a European arbitrator, and -an arbitrator from Central or South America would not have been thought -impartial. - -9.2. Polk's Message was based upon the view that the left bank of the -Rio Grande belonged to the United States (p. 139), and this was said -by some to be inconsistent with the idea (involved in the resolutions -annexing Texas and in Slidell's mission) that the boundary was an -open question. But Polk's language amounted only to an assertion of -the American claim; and a claim, however just, may be a subject of -negotiation. His expression (taken from the Washington _Union_ of May -9), "shed American blood upon the American soil," though denounced as -a falsehood, was merely another assertion of the same claim, and was -entirely in accord with the language of Madison, Jefferson, Monroe, -Pinckney, and J. Q. Adams. A claimant, convinced that his cause is just, -declares roundly, "This is mine," even though aware that his contention -is disputed. A more conservative statement would have been: Mexico has -invaded a region that I hold to be ours, and shed American blood on what -I regard as American soil; but Polk seems to have felt no doubts, and in -a trumpet-call to arms qualifications would have appeared out of place. - -9.3. Benton, however, reported the House bill, which did not divide the -subject. - -9.4. _Incidents preceding and attending the passage of the war bill_ -(_May 13_). Richardson, Messages, iv, 388-92, 437-43. Benton, View, -ii, 679. Polk, Diary, Apr. 18, 21, 25, 28; May 3, 5, 8, 9-13, 1846. -=260=Extracts from _National Intelligencer_. =315=Winthrop to Schouler, -Mar. 20, 1848. Webster, Writings, iv, 138. =260=Winthrop, The Mex. -War Bill. =210=Holmes to Hammond, May 10, 1846. =354=Welles papers. -Proceedings of Senate and House in _Cong. Globe_, 29, 1, p. 257, and -May 11-13; app., 912; Feb. 24, 1847 (Calhoun). Boston _Courier_, May -14. Boston _Atlas_, May 15. N. Y. _Tribune_, Dec. 9, 1847. Calhoun to -A. P. C, May 14; to J. E. C, May 29, 1846: Jameson, C. Corresp., 690, -692. Benton, Abr. Debates, xvi, 99. =345=Dix to Van Buren, May 16, -1846. Wash. _Union_, May 15, 1846; Jan. 2, 1848. Greeley, Am. Conflict, -i, 187. Foster, Am. Diplom., 315. Johnston and Browne, Stephens, 203. -_Nat. Intelligencer_, Dec. 27, 1847. Winthrop, Speeches, i, 573. _Pub. -Ledger_, Dec. 4, 1846. =132=Buchanan, memo. Certain incidents (_Cong. -Globe_, 30, 1, app., 231) emphasize the fact that a regular war was -contemplated by Congress. _E.g._ Holmes moved that the war bill should -apply southwest of the Nueces only for the withdrawal or rescue of our -army; voted down by 8--122. See also notes 9 and 10. - -9.5. Benton states that Polk relied for peace upon the project of -replacing Paredes with Santa Anna, which will be mentioned later in -this chapter (View, ii, 680). He also charges (_ibid._) that the -administration--particularly Walker--was influenced by a wish to bring -about the payment of American claims and make good certain speculations -in Texas lands; but it was proper that the claims should be paid, and -there is no proof of the second point. - -9.6. Benton hesitated, and May 11 Polk counted on his opposition -(Diary). In the debates on the annexation of Texas the Senator had -denied that her territory extended to the Rio Grande (Smith, Annex. -of Texas, 264, note), and he did not approve of Taylor's going there. -Besides, he desired to see the Oregon issue settled before coming to an -issue with Mexico. Possibly Calhoun's anxiety to prevent or defer war -helped to drive Benton to the opposite side (=354=Welles papers; Polk, -Diary, May 3, 11, 1846). - -9.7. One may also view the matter at a slightly different angle. It -was possible for Mexico, on learning that General Taylor had advanced -peaceably to the Rio Grande, to say, Very well, he may occupy the -disputed district jointly with us for the present. England and the -United States maintained a peaceable joint occupation of Oregon for -years. Taylor's advancing, therefore, did not _per se_ and necessarily -create a state of war. Now the United States did nothing else that could -fairly be termed aggressive; but Mexico, by attacking American troops -engaged in peaceful reconnoitring, destroyed the state of potential -harmony, and consequently the state of war that ensued existed by -her act. C. J. Ingersoll stated later (_Cong. Globe_, 29, 2, app., -125) that the language of the preamble was adopted for the purpose of -conciliating, not offending, the Whigs; and one can see that it might -seem likely to be easier for them to accept the war as an accomplished -fact than to vote for a declaration. - -9.8. From what is known of Calhoun's designs (Smith, Annex. of Texas, -209-216) this statement seems reasonable, and it is supported by -positive evidence (chap, vi, note 10). =232=Calhoun to ----, Nov. 7, -1846: The triumph of abolitionism at the north would cause disunion, for -the southern people are determined to defend their rights. - -9.9. To justify Calhoun's theory the Constitution should have been -made to read: "Congress shall have power to declare war, and without -such a declaration the United States shall never be at war," which -would have been manifestly ridiculous; and the provision in article -i, sect. 10, that a state, when in imminent danger, might begin war, -should have been cancelled. Doubtless for partisan reasons, Webster -(Curtis, Webster, ii, 301) took the same position as Calhoun, saying -that Congress could not "create a fact"--_i.e._ could not state that -war existed before it had declared war. Von Holst on the other hand, -in order to face the tolerably evident certainty that we had a legal -war with Mexico, says (United States, iii, 253) that Congress made -Polk's lie [that war existed] into a fact! Many members of Congress had -too little confidence (Calhoun to Thompson: _Am. Hist. Rev._, i, 314) -in their knowledge of the situation to feel positive as to the full -justice of the American cause, but this did not affect the validity of -their action. Particularly noticeable was the rejection (27 to 97) of -Delano's proposition that nothing in the war bill should be construed as -approving of the President's conduct in taking armed possession of the -intermediate region. Thus a much discussed question was formally raised -and formally decided. =132=King to Buchanan, June 1. - -9.10. _Discussion of the proceedings._ (Feeling) =354=Welles papers. -(Assured) Polk, Diary, May 11, 1846. (Congressmen) Meigs, Benton, 360; -Benton, View, ii, 680. _Tribune_, May 15. _Journal of Commerce_, July -1, 1847. Weekly _Herald_, May 16, 1846. (Dissensions) Boston _Atlas_, -May 18, 1846; Jameson, Calh. Corresp., 1038 (Harris); Polk, Diary, Apr. -30; =345=Polk to Van Buren, Jan. 4; Feb. 22, 25, 1845; =345=Wright -to V. B., Jan. 17, 1845; =345=Butler to Polk, Feb. 27, 1845; =345=V. -B. to Polk, Feb. 27, 1845; =345=S. T. Van Buren to M. V. B., Mar. 2, -3, 4, 1845; =297=Cave Johnson to Polk, June 13, 1844; and see chap, -xxxiv. (Offices) Polk, Diary, May 10; June 22, 1846, and _passim_. -=210=Holmes to Hammond, May 10, 1846. Lalor, Cyclop., iii, 1105. (Whig -vote) =260=Winthrop, Mex. War Bill, 108; _Nat. Intelligencer_, May 16, -1846; N. Y. _Journal of Comm._, Dec. 11, 1847; Wheeler, Hist, of Cong., -i, 411; Von Holst, U. S., iii, 251. Calhoun to Clemson, Jan. 29, 1846; -to A. P. C, May 14; to J. E. C, May 29; to Clemson, July 11; to J. -E. C, July 29, in Calhoun Corres., 679, 691, 693-4, 700-1; also 707. -=345=Welles to Van Buren, July 28, 1846. Polk, Diary, Apr. 18, 21, 1846. -Calhoun in Sen., Feb. 24, 1847: _Cong. Globe_, 29, 2, p. 501. Hunt, -Calhoun, 279. _Niles_, May 16, 1846, p. 162. (Endorsed, etc.) _Cong. -Globe_, 29, 1, p. 802 (Crittenden). _Cong. Globe_, 30, 1, app., 367 -(Stanton). Johnston and Browne, Stephens, 210. =132=King to Buchanan, -June 1, 1846. Pierce, Sumner, iii, 108, 139. =132=Buchanan, memo. Holmes -of New York proposed in the House, May 11, that sect. one of the war -bill should not apply southwest of the Nueces except for the rescue -of our army. This was rejected by 8--122. May 12 Senator Crittenden, -one of the foremost Whigs, proposed to substitute in the war bill the -words "for the purpose of repelling the invasion" in place of the words -"prosecute said war, etc." This recognized the territory as American. -His proposal was supported by twenty senators (_Cong. Globe_, 29, 1, p. -803). - -9.11. Livermore, for example, argued in this way (War, 15): Texas was -annexed for the protection of Southern institutions; the war with Mexico -resulted from the annexation of Texas; therefore the war with Mexico was -due to the slaveholders' interest in slavery. But both of his premises -need qualification; and the conclusion, so far as it suggests that the -war was the necessary and designed consequence of the slaveholders' -action in the Texas matter, does not follow. The abolitionists were -enthusiastic, earnest, and on the outside of things. Hence they were -naturally and almost unavoidably over-suspicious. Von Holst (U. S., iii, -302) says that the radical wing of the southern Democratic party openly -avowed that the war with Mexico was a southern war; but was not Calhoun -the leader and prophet of that wing? A few public men, the Charleston -_Patriot_ and _Courier_, and the _Federal Union_ of Alabama looked upon -the war as for the interest of the South; but it does not appear that -they had any appreciable influence in bringing it about. - -9.12. The occasion of the war was Taylor's going to the Rio Grande; but -see chap, vii, p. 154. - -9.13. Apparently one might say that--since Polk intended to recommend -redress of our grievances--war was sure, without reference to the -annexation of Texas, to come. But we are tracing the cause of an actual, -not of a possible, war; and the President's recommendation might not -have proved effectual. Benton (View, ii, 679) said that without the -clash of arms it would have been difficult, perhaps impossible, to bring -about war. Calhoun (Sen., Feb. 24, 1847: note 10) said it could not have -been done. This opinion, however, was biased. - -9.14. _The cause of the war._ Polk, Diary, Dec. 19, 23, 1846; Jan. 5, -23, 1847. Webster, Private Corresp., ii, 283. =370=Taylor to Davis, Apr. -18, 1848. =32=Buchanan to Shields, April 23, 1847. (Bulwark) Smith, -Annex. of Texas, 132, 134-5, 204-8. (Unsuitable) =132=Donelson to -Buchanan, May 15, 1847. _No. Amer._, Feb. 10, 1847; Thompson in Wash. -_Union_, Oct. 25, 1847, and Greenville (S. C.) _Mountaineer_, Oct. 21. -Bourne, Essays, 227, 235. Charleston _Mercury_, Dec. 30, 1847 (long -argument against annexing Mexican territory). W. Thompson to Calhoun, -Dec. 18, 1847 in Jameson, Calhoun Correspondence, 1149 (slavery will -not exist in Mexico). =137=Fisher to Calhoun, Aug. 22, 1847. =137=J. -A. Campbell to Calhoun, Mar. 1, 1848. (Aiken) Boston _Courier_, Dec. -2, 1847; Mar. 9, 1848. =132=King to Buchanan, June 11, 1847. N. Y. -_Tribune_, Nov. 26, 1847. =157=Lamar to Cobb, June 24, 1846. (Toombs) -_Cong. Globe_, 29, 1, app., 133. _So. Qtrly. Rev._, Nov., 1850, 427-34. -(Benton) Abr. Deb., xvi, 87; Benton, View, ii, 678. (Clay) Schurz, -Clay, ii, 290. (Winthrop) Wash. _Union_, Sept. 30, 1846; Oct. 25, 1847; -Winthrop, Winthrop, 59. (Douglas) Cutts, Questions, 154. (Johnson) -Brown, _Cong. Globe_, 29, 2, app., 354. (Van B.) Wilson, Rise and Fall, -ii, 9; Smith, Annex. of Texas, 243. Amer. Historical Association Rep., -1911, ii, 95 (Glenn). (Organs) Mr. Winthrop's Vote. (Sumner) Sumner, -report, 30. (Report) Wash. _Union_, Feb. 25, 1847. (Agree) Winthrop -in Wash. _Union_, Sept. 30, 1846. (Paredes) _Diario_, July 30, 1846. -(Almonte) N. Y. _Sun_, Nov. 26, 1846 (Caractacus); _Monitor Repub._, -May 9, 1847. Gordon, Aberdeen, 183. Mofras, Expédition, 8. Polk, -Message, May 11, 1846 (Richardson). Cole, Whig Party, 121. See also the -conclusion of chap. v. - -At the end of March Paredes said: "Peace is not compatible with the -maintenance of the rights and independence of the nation" (Roa Bárcena, -Recuerdos, 22). - -9.15. The dates are those of approval. - -9.16. The action of Congress was promulgated by the adj. gen. in -=65=gen. orders 14, 18, 21, 34. See an article on the engineer company -by Captain Willing, published by the U. S. engineer school, Washington -Barracks. See also U. S. Statutes at Large, ix, 9-13, 17, 20; Upton, -Milit. Pol., 204; Richardson, Messages, iv, 603-4. - -9.17. Polk, Diary, May 13, 1846. Wash. _Union_, May 21. =65=Gen. orders -12. =59=Circular. With the freedom that has commonly marked authors -dealing with the unpopular Polk Von Holst says (U. S., iii, 339) that -his profession of seeking only a peace was a "falsehood." But Polk meant -of course a peace satisfactory to the American government, for a peace -satisfactory to Mexico would not have had to be "conquered," and this -implied in general about the terms that we actually imposed. - -9.18. "Germanicus" stated in the N. Y. _Commercial Advertiser_ that in -the Florida war the ratio of expense between regulars and militia was 1 -to 6; of efficiency, 1 to 0 (_Nat. Intell._, Nov. 7, 1846). Of course -the volunteers, who wished and expected to fight, were in general better -than the militia, who wished and expected to remain at home. Had the -regular army been increased to 50,000 privates (giving, say, 30,000 in -the field), there would no doubt have been a great saving of time, blood -and treasure (Stevens, Campaigns, 14). Taylor's position gave him a -special responsibility. He should have pointed out the disadvantages of -the volunteer system, recommended enlisting such troops (if at all) for -the duration of the war, and continued to demand regulars. - -9.19. _The military measures._ Ho. 60; 30, 1, p. 141. =65=Gen. orders -57, Dec. 22, 1846. Upton, Mil. Pol, 195, 202, 204 (sequel showed). -(1838) R. Johnson in Sen., Jan. 11, 1848 (Wash. _Union_, Jan. 12). _Nat. -Intelligencer_, Nov. 7, 1846. (Cowardly, etc.) =354=Welles papers. -=63=Marcy to Wright, June 3, 1846. =63=Circ. letter, May 19, 1846. -Webster, Letters, 346. Sen. 1; 29, 2, pp. 46-7. Wash. _Union_, June -25, 1846. (Stimulated) Sen. 4; 29, 2, p. 53. Johnson, Douglas, 114. -Polk, Diary, June 20, 22, 1846. (Vacancies) Richardson, Messages, iv, -513-7. Ho. 60; 30, 1, p. 554 (Jesup). (Might have been) Taylor, Letters -(Bixby), 75. - -The authorized maximum of the army was 16,998 officers and men (Sen. -1; 29, 2, p. 53). The volunteer service was more attractive than the -regular because it was easier to get rank there and the discipline was -less severe; and something to offset this difference was needed. - -9.20. Many of the volunteer regiments were in fact, owing to the -appreciation of a West Point education shown by some of the states, -commanded by trained men (Henry, Camp. Sketches, 127). - -9.21. For numerous details on the subject of this paragraph see an -article by the author in _The Military Historian and Economist_, Jan., -1917, p. 30, note 12. - -9.22. The executive staff of the war dept. consisted of Bvt. Brig. Gen. -R. Jones, adj. gen.; Lieut. Col. George Talcott, head of the ordnance -bureau; Maj. Gen. T. S. Jesup, quartermaster gen.; Brig. Gen. N. Towson, -paymaster gen.; Dr. T. Lawson, surgeon gen.; Bvt. Brig. Gen. G. Gibson, -commissary gen. of subsistence; Col. J. G. Totten, chief engineer; Col. -J. J. Abert, chief topog. engineer (Ho. 143; 29, 1. Ho. 60; 30, 1 p. -547). - -9.23. The following remark from J. D. McPherson (in "General Grant's -Political Myth"), who was close to Marcy in the war dept., seems worth -quoting: "His massive intellect, his calm wisdom, his uncalculating -integrity, the justness of all his purposes, the purity of his private -life, and the goodness of his heart inspired me with admiration and -reverence." Marcy loved books, too. Still he was, as Welles said, a -keen, wary and adroit politician, well taught by a wide experience -and fully acquainted with human nature of the sort with which he had -to deal. He had faltered at one juncture in his devotion to orthodox -Democratic principles, and probably felt that he could never regain the -position thus lost. - -9.24. _Raising and forwarding Volunteers._ =60=Marcy to Giles, May 19, -1846. For the corresp. with govs., May 15-19, see =60=, =61=, =63=. -=63=Marcy to govs. of Ala., etc., June 5. =63=_Id._ to Wright, June 3. -=65=Gen. orders 15, Wash., May 29. Marcy, report, Dec. 5, in Sen. 1; -29, 2. =61=Memo., May 18. Polk (insists upon energy), Diary, May 19; -June 23-4; Sept. 22, 24. (Marcy) Poore, Perley's Remins., i, 333; Wise, -Seven Decades, 235. (Multitudes) =63=Marcy to govs., May 19. =354=Welles -papers. (Motives) Trans. Ills. State Hist. Soc., 1904, p. 283; 1905, -pp. 194-6; 1906, 174-5; Robertson, Remins., 59, 62-7; =146=Caswell, -diary, Jan. 26, 1847; Lyell, Second Visit, ii, 257; =139=Campbell to D. -C, Nov. 9, 1846; Carleton at mtg. of Mex. veterans; Prickett in Madison -_Record_, 1850; Jamieson, Campaign, 73, 78. (High) _Public Ledger_, -May 18, 1846. Quitman in _Cong. Globe_, 35, 1, p. 970. Lyell, Second -Visit, ii, 343-5. N. Y. _Herald_, June 20, 1846. (Song) N. Y. _Globe_, -June 1, 1846. Cameron in _Cong. Globe_, 29, 1, p. 826. =149=L'Hommedieu -to Chase, May 20, 1846. Wash. _Union_, May 27; June 12, 1846. Ohio -Arch. and Hist. Qtrly., 1912, p. 280. Ills. State Hist. Lib. Pubs., -ix, 38. Ark. Hist. Commission, Bulletin no. 6, p. 181. Perry, Indiana, -4-13, 17. I. Smith, Remins., 5. =239=Kemper to daughter, May 30. St. -Louis weekly _Reveille_, May 10. Everett, Recolls., 194-9. McCormack, -Koerner, i, 495-7. Wallace, Autob., 114. Davis, Autob., 94-5. Iowa -adj. gen., Roster, vi, 788-9. Quisenberry, Taylor, 22. =216=Heiman, -Services. Ex-gov. Porter of Tenn. to the author. Memphis _Eagle_, May -15. _Niles_, June 13, p. 227; July 4, p. 288; July 18, p. 313. Scharf, -St. Louis, i, 362-8. =206=Graham, Message, Nov. 17. =14=Fair to Martin, -June 4. =14=Martin to Marcy, May 31. =61=Bullock to war dept., May -8. =14=Placard, May 7. =29=Brown to Duffield, May 11; to Marcy, June -3. Claiborne, Quitman, i, 223-4, 228. =63=Marcy to Brown, June 16. -=225=Cooke to Holt, May 17. (The drums) Poem by W. R. Benjamin, by -permission. Polk, Diary, May 26. =189=Evans, letter. =110=Barbour, -diary. Bishop, Journal, _passim_. For additional details see _The -Military Historian and Economist_, Jan., 1917, p. 32, note 14. - -As was natural, many complications arose in preparing the regiments -for the field. The volunteers themselves, as a rule, did not know what -they needed nor even what they wanted. They were ignorant and helpless -regarding all military matters. Such officers as understood the business -were compelled to work almost night and day. Everything had to be -provided, and many of the things had to be made; and the men were -usually ahead of the supplies. Two Tennessee regiments were able to move -south about June 1, but it was not until about July 23 that the last -Illinois regiments advanced in that direction. - -9.25. _To Brazos Island._ =300=Prickett, letter, July 30. Robertson, -Remins., June 11, 17, 23. =332=Tennery, diary, Aug. 13. Houstoun, Texas -(1845), 68, 91-2, 147, 255-6. Oswandel, Notes, 31, 38, 44-8. =190=Ewing, -diary, July 12, 19, 21. Perry, Indiana, 83. Everett, Recolls., 197-8. -=274=Neeld, letter. French, Two Wars, 33. =272=Memoir of Gen. Morgan. -=110=Barbour, diary, July 23. Bishop, Journal. =193=Foster to mother, -June 16. - -"Brazos Island" is the name on the U. S. Coast Survey map. Gens. Butler, -Marshall, Quitman, Pillow and Shields left New Orleans on the steamer -_New York_, and arrived at the island Aug. 4 (Claiborne, Quitman, -i, 239). The strait between Brazos Id. and Padre Id. on the north -was called the Brazos de Santiago (Giddings, Sketches, 27). Gaines's -proceedings led to great expense, and embarrassed the government very -much. He kept on even after he knew of Taylor's victories, and the total -number called out by him perhaps exceeded 12,000. For most of these -forces there was no place under the law of May 13, and the government -did not regard them as necessary. A few who had actually left their -states were accepted for three months under a law of 1795; but the -requisitions were countermanded, Gaines was peremptorily ordered (May -28) to suspend his operations in this regard, was relieved of his -command, and was placed before a court of inquiry. His intentions were -unquestionably good, and hence the court recommended that no further -action should be taken. The best information on this subject is given -in the record of the court (=68=judge advocate general's office) and in -=65=gen. orders no. 39, Washington, Aug. 20, 1846, which presents the -facts, the conclusions of the court, and the remarks of the President -thereon. See also Polk, Diary, June 5, 20; Aug. 15. =63=Marcy to govs., -June 5, 1846. =69=_Id._ to Gaines, May 28. Ho. 60; 30, 1, p. 308. Docs. -in Sen. 378; 29, 1, pp. 50-81. Gaines to Marcy, June 7: Sen. 402; 29, 1. -Sen. 415; 29, 1. =65=Gen. orders (Wash.) 16, 23. =63=Marcy to Taylor, -May 23. Wash. _Union_, June 9. Sen. proceeds., June 24. Gaines was -succeeded by General Brooke. The headquarters of this military dept. -were at New Orleans. - -9.26. Scott, a Whig, testified that Polk was "in great alarm" (Coleman, -Crittenden, i, 244). =256=Marcy privately called the state of things -"adverse" (to Wetmore). Holmes of South Carolina said the administration -was prostrated (=210=to Hammond, May 10). Charleston _Mercury_, May 19: -At the first symptom of actual fighting our government is taken all -aback. Had Polk sent Taylor to the Rio Grande to bring on a war, he -would have been rejoicing. - -9.27. Polk, whose principal interview with Scott occurred on May 14, did -not at that time believe that 20,000 volunteers would be needed (Diary). - -9.28. Scott's information about the region was derived from Anthony -Butler, formerly our minister to Mexico, and Gen. J. T. Mason (Scott -in Sen. 378; 29, 1, p. 11), both of whom had been on the ground, and -it led him to think the inactive season somewhat longer than it really -was. Although Taylor with competent engineers had been for about seven -months, while at Corpus Christi, in touch with a stream of traders -and other persons from Matamoros, and might have sent out spies and -reconnoitring parties, and had been on the river nearly two months, -he does not seem to have supplied, despite urgent requests from the -war dept. (_e.g._ Ho. 60; 30, 1, pp. 87, 88, 90, 91, 92), any adequate -ideas about conducting a campaign in that quarter or even to have formed -any for himself. Marcy, May 28, 1846 (_ibid._, 282), said, "I wish to -be favored with your views as to what should be the future operations -of the army on the Rio Grande." In submitting such views the General -would have had to present information regarding topographical and other -conditions, about which he seems to have left the government in the dark. - -9.29. One should not be in haste to condemn the administration and the -Democratic politicians, for ours is a party system and Scott was in -politics. He should have realized that, standing at the head of the -army, he was bound to serve the country as a whole, and should have -refrained from seeking party honors that evidently might (as they now -did) interfere with the fulfilment of that prime duty. - -9.30. _The question of general-in-chief._ (It is believed that later -events render a somewhat full treatment of this topic desirable.) -=191=Fairfield to wife, Apr. 14. Stanwood, Presidency, 195. (Politics) -=13=Pakenham, no. 74, June 13. =253=Peters to McLean, June 26. -Gaines, Sept. 10, 1845 in Sen. 378; 29, 1, p. 38. _So. Advocate_, -Apr. 3 (Sanderson). Gaines, June 7 in Sen. 402; 29, 1. (Scott's -personality) Scott, Mems., _passim_; F. Lee, Lee, 49; =354=Welles -papers; =252=Mackall, Dec. 29, 1847; _Mag. of Amer. Hist._, xiv, 562 -(Scammon, one of Scott's aides, here says that he never knew a man of -the world less given to vanity than Scott); Mass. Hist. Soc. Proceeds., -1st ser., ix, 234-9; Sedgwick, Corresp., i, 182; Corwin to Follett, -Mar. 13, 1845, in Ohio Hist. and Phil. Soc. Publics., July-Sept., 1914; -Semmes, Service, 280-1; Grant, Mems., i, 41, 139; Grone, Briefe, 80; -Keyes, Fifty Years, 1-82; =335=Trist on Scott. Sen. 378; 29, 1, pp. -2-4. Richardson, Messages, iv, 448. Wash. _Union_, May 18. Scott-Marcy -correspondence in Sen. 378; 29, 1, pp. 4-18; and in =256=. =60=Scott, -memoranda for gen. staff. Coleman, Crittenden, i, 243-4. Polk, Diary, -Mar. 28; May 13, 14, 19, 21-3, 25-6, 1846; Apr. 1, 1847. _Niles_, June -6, 1846, p. 214. _Nat. Intelligencer_, Aug. 29. Grant, Mems., i, 119. N. -Orl. _Commerc. Bulletin_, June 18. Watson, Taylor, 121. Boston _Atlas_, -June 12. N. Y. _Herald_, June 13. Welles papers. N. Orl. _Picayune_, -June 17. =253=Reed to McLean, Oct. 26. Boston _Courier_, June 15. -=139=W. B. Campbell to D. C., July 3, 1846. =256=Marcy to Wetmore, April -22, 1847. - -La Bruyère said, "There is in some men a certain mediocrity of mind that -helps to make them wise." This was not at all true of Scott. It was -characteristic of him that he blamed Marcy for only a want of candor and -nerve, regarding him as merely the instrument of the party (Coleman, -Crittenden, i, 244-6). - -Rives (U. S. and Mexico, ii, 204) remarks that the private note of -Scott (addressed to Senator Archer) "was enough to rouse the meekest -of Presidents." But (1) the note charged only what was charged -commonly--that the administration was making its appointments in a -partisan, political way; (2) it was private; and (3) Scott had a -legitimate reason for writing it--to explain why he did not intend to -recommend men for commissions, as Archer probably expected him to do. -In taking cognizance of a private note Polk acted as an eavesdropper, -and he should have recalled the saying, "Eavesdroppers never hear -anything good of themselves." Rives says also (ii, 413) that "for more -than fourteen months before war was actually declared it was evident to -every observer that war was highly probable, but Scott made no plans, -collected no information, and did nothing to prepare for the coming -strain upon the head-quarters organization of the army." But (1) war -was not deemed highly probable, as Rives states, by the President, the -Cabinet, Congress, Wall Street, Taylor or competent observers in general -(see p. 133, etc.); (2) it is a rather bold assertion that Scott "did -nothing to prepare," etc., and the present author, who intended to -examine every war dept. paper relating to the subject, saw no proof of -it; (3) as Rives states (ii, 582), the army had no intelligence bureau, -and Scott possessed no authority to establish one; (4) to collect -reliable data regarding Mexico and our frontier even informally would -have cost a great deal, and the government was so economical that it -would not provide even a pontoon train that was asked for (see p. 177); -(5) before Jan. 13, 1846, Scott had studied the frontier and planned -for Taylor's advance to the Rio Grande (p. 153); (6) May 14 he was -ready with plans so elaborate and far-reaching that Polk thought him -"scientific and visionary," and the next day he issued orders to the -chiefs of the general staff (p. 199). Such plans and orders implied -knowledge. - -9.31. May 30, Taylor was brevetted major general and assigned to duty -with that rank (Ho. 119; 29, 2, p. 12. Also Ho. 60; 30, 1, p. 283). - -9.32. Anti-slavery theorizers represented (see Lalor, Cyclopædia, -iii, 1091) that Polk brought the Oregon issue to the verge of war so -that Mexico should dare--with the expectation of having England for -an ally--to fight us, and when hostilities had begun, made peace with -England at a sacrifice of our claim; but this view has little or nothing -except its ingenuity for support, and has a great number of facts -against it. - -9.33. _The Oregon affair._ =206=J. Graham to Gov. G., Jan. 4, 1846. Dr. -Bacon: "The ascendancy of the West is a fact" (_New Englander_, v, 319). -(Cass) =1=---- to Allen, Sept. 1, 1846. =210=Hammond, diary, Feb. 19. -Jameson, Calhoun Corresp., 653, 697-8. Polk, Diary, Oct. 21-3, 1845; -Feb. 24-5; Apr. 18; June 3, 1846. Lodge, Webster, 260. =256=Marcy to -Wetmore, Apr. 30, 1845. Johnson, Douglas, 105. (Cabinet) =354=Welles -papers. A. Smith, Remins., 41. Garrison, Extension, 170. _Polit. Sci. -Qtrly._, xxvi, 443-61 (Schuyler). _Amer. Hist. Rev._, xvi, 298-9 -(Schafer). Reeves, Amer. Diplom., 243-64. London _Times_, Jan. 26, 1846. -Hume in Ho. Commons, Jan. 23. - -9.34. For Santa Anna's banishment see vol. i, p. 53. In May it was -believed at Mexico that Santa Anna's return would mean peace (=56=W. S. -Parrott, June 4, 9); and as late as July 31 and August 12 =166=Pommarès, -a secret agent of Conner at Vera Cruz, said that such was the prevalent -opinion there. - -9.35. Atocha, Statement. _Nat. Intelligencer_, June 10, 1845. -=13=Bankhead, no. 41, 1846. =73=Bermúdez de Castro, no. 444, res., 1847. -_Monitor Repub._, Feb. 16, 1847. - -9.36. Apparently Conner was to obey this order or not as the -circumstances of the moment should render expedient. Consul Campbell of -Havana was directed in June to write often to Conner and express his -opinion on the propriety of allowing Santa Anna to enter Mexico (=166=to -Conner, July 9); at the time Santa Anna sailed for Vera Cruz Campbell -wrote (=166=Aug. 7) to Conner arguing that he should be permitted to -land; and Conner, in a =162=letter to his wife (Aug. 19), explained why -he had thought it best to let him pass. The _Journal des Débats_ (Oct. -6, 1846) believed that the American government had reason to count upon -Santa Anna's intentions though not upon his word; this was no doubt -Polk's view. Those who, in the usual fashion, have charged that Polk's -Message of Dec. 8, 1846, lied about his relations with Santa Anna have -failed to observe that it referred exclusively to the events preceding -the order of May 13 to Conner (Richardson, iv, 491-2). Before Mackenzie -was sent to Havana stronger and more definite information to the effect -that Santa Anna was likely to regain power was received--particularly -from Consul Black (Sen. 1; 29, 2, p. 34). - -9.37. The United States appears (Consul Campbell, May 25, 1846) to -have sent an earlier agent, who passed at Havana by the name of Brown, -and was commonly said there to have brought proposals to Santa Anna. -Mackenzie's ostensible mission--real enough, too, probably--was to -ascertain whether privateers had been commissioned in Cuba (Polk, Diary, -Jan. 8, 1848). He spoke Spanish fluently. Santa Anna took care to put -out an explanation of Mackenzie's visit. - -9.38. _The negotiation with Santa Anna._ Polk, Message, Dec. 8 -(Richardson, iv. 492). London _Times_, Oct. 6, 1845; Jan. 31; July -6, 1846. Semmes, Service, 117-8. =52=Dimond, nos. 324-6, 329, 1846. -=52=Campbell, June 9, 1846; April 9, 1847. =166=Campbell to Conner, -May 10. Von Holst, U. S., iii, 282-3. =52=Slidell, Mar. 18; April -2. =166=Dimond to Conner, Sept. 14, 1845. =166=Pommarès to Conner, -July 2; Aug. 12. Chase, Polk Admin., 163. _Monitor Repub._, Feb. 20, -1846. Wash. _Union_, June 21, 1847. _Scribner's Monthly_, xvii, 299. -_Constitutionnel_, Sept. 20, 1846. =73=Bermúdez de Castro, no. 441, -1847. Polk, Diary, Feb. 13, 14, 16, 1846; Jan. 8, 1848. _Id._ to Ho. -Repres., Jan. 12, 1848 (Richardson). =46=Bancroft to Conner, May 13, -1846. =297=Mackenzie to Buchanan, July 7, 11; Aug. 15, 1846. =335=_Id._ -to Trist, Jan. 2; June 8; Aug. 17, 1846. _Courrier des Etats Unis_, Aug. -11, 1846. (Conspicuous) Benton, View, ii, 680. _Journ. Milit. Serv. -Instit._, xli, 105. Meade, Letters, i, 116. - -Polk stated in his diary, Jan. 8, 1848, that Mackenzie "wholly exceeded -his authority" by writing out his recollection of the conversation -with Polk and giving this to S. Anna as a message from the President. -Mackenzie's report reached Washington Aug. 3, and was immediately -followed up by Polk with a request for two million dollars to facilitate -a settlement with Mexico (chap, xxvii). - - - X. THE LEADERS ADVANCE - -10.1. Comanches were making raids near Reynosa (=69=Worth to Bliss, -July 28), and the freebooter and cut-throat, Canales, was living on the -country not far away with a band that he said consisted of more than 600 -mounted men (June 16). - -10.2. Taylor to daughter, June 9, in _Autograph_, July-Aug., 1912. _Nat. -Intelligencer_, Sept. 16, 1848. =76=Berlandier to Mejía, June 9, 1846. -(Reynosa) Ho. 60; 30, 1, pp. 299, 305, 306, 397, 522-3, 550; Henry, -Camp. Sketches, 117; =76=Mejía, June 20; Smith, To Mexico, 57; Henshaw -narrative; Meade, Letters, i, 98; =76=Spanish consul, Matamoros, June -7, 1846; =76=Canales, May 20; June 4, 7, 16, 1846. (McCulloch) Reid, -Scouting Expeds., 43; _Picayune_, June 24; Aug. 15; Ho. 60; 30, 1, p. -551. =139=Campbell to D. C, July 3; Aug. 9. =224=Larnard to Hitchcock, -June 13. Weed, Autobiog., 573. Taylor, Letters (Bixby), 4, 6-10, 13-15, -17-20, 31. =370=_Id._ to ----, June 18 (draft): The war dept. has -been "mean and contemptable to the last degree." =375=_Id._ to E. G. -W. Butler, July 1: Madigan, catalogue no. 2, 1914. (Disliked) Meade, -Letters, i, 103. Scott, May 18 in Sen. 378; 29, 1, p. 17. This letter -was acknowledged by Taylor July 2 (Ho. 60; 30, 1, p. 329). He wrote -the substance of it to Dr. Wood on June 12 (Bixby). By May 28 U. S. -newspapers stating that 30,000 volunteers were coming reached the Rio -Grande (Meade, Letters, i, 95). "Licking" so many volunteers into shape -involved an immense amount of work, but Taylor did not have to do this -personally. - -10.3. The laws recognized only the regulars, the militia (who could -be required to serve but three months: Ho. 60; 30, 1, p. 282) and the -twelve-months volunteers. The six-months men, therefore, had to join -one of the other classes or be discharged. Marcy enforced this plain -legal requirement and was roundly abused for so doing. For the case of -the Louisiana men see Ho. 60; 30, 1, pp. 307, 309, 311, 315-20; Taylor, -Letters (Bixby), 176-7; _La. Courier_, Aug. 6; gen. orders 61 (_Niles_, -Aug. 15); N. Orl. _Bee_, Aug. 3. For the St. Louis men see Scharf, St. -Louis, i, 377. - -One has to be extremely careful here about making assertions regarding -dates and numbers. Affairs were in such confusion that even headquarters -would seem to have been to a considerable extent in the dark. Marcy, -June 8, did not know how many troops Taylor had (Ho. 60; 30, 1, p. 323), -and the statements that one finds are nearly always wanting in precision -or completeness. The facts given in the text are believed, however, to -be adequate for the history of the operations. One may refer also to: -Taylor, Letters (Bixby), 13; Matamoros _News_, July 8; =76=Parrodi, July -8; Hamer in Wash. _Union_, Aug. 18; and Ho. 60; 30, 1, p. 547. - -The facts about the Texan troops are particularly confused, but it is -plain that while unexpectedly late--none arriving until on or about -June 10--a regiment of foot, under Albert Sydney Johnston, and two -regiments of horse finally appeared in response to Taylor's call for -four regiments. Henderson, who commanded these men, claimed the rank of -a major general, and--apparently because mounted men were particularly -needed--his claim was allowed. See Ho. 60; 30, 1, pp. 299, 307, 321-2; -Henry, Camp. Sketches, 118; Rose, McCulloch, 69; Henshaw narrative; -Johnston, Johnston, 133; Meade, Letters, i, 104. Scott (Ho. 60; 30, 1, -p. 325) supposed that Taylor would receive about 16,280 twelve-months -volunteers and enough recruits for the regular regiments to make his -aggregate 23,070, besides the three-months and six-months men who would -engage for a longer term. June 14 Meade (Letters, i, 105) thought -Taylor had 10,000 men. By July 30 substantially all the twelve-months -foot intended for Taylor, except those from Illinois and Missouri, had -arrived (Ho. 60; 30, 1, p. 401). - -10.4. Meade, Letters, i, 114-5. =224=Bliss to Hitchcock, June 7. -Robertson, Remins., 76. =139=Campbell to D. C, July 3. =308=Shields to -R. J. Walker, Aug. 3. Ho. 60; 30, 1, pp. 301, 305, 307, 315, 320-1, -329, 550 (Taylor). Taylor, Letters (Bixby), 176-7. Marcy, report, Dec. -5, 1846 in Sen. 1; 29, 2, p. 46. Nearly 1000 Louisiana vols. arrived at -Brazos Id. or Pt. Isabel on May 13 (Conner in Ho. 1; 30, 2, p. 1162). - -10.5. Later (Sen. 1; 30, 1, p. 546) Boca Chica was bridged. - -10.6. Camp Lomita, a hill of about eight acres in extent, was five miles -by water above Burrita; and above that lay Camp Patterson. Camp Palo -Alto was on elevated ground near what was called Arista's Crossing. -There was also a Camp Lane. Few troops were quartered at Matamoros. It -is hard to understand why the well-behaved regulars were not permitted -to occupy the many vacant houses there (_Picayune_, July 9, 14, 1846). -This town, which looked attractive from the opposite side of the Rio -Grande, dated from 1820. It had prospered for a time, but had been -greatly injured by a hurricane in 1844, and was now falling to pieces -(Meade, Letters, i, 86; "Matamoros" in Diccionario Univ.; =60=Irons, -April 20; _República de Rio Grande_, June 27; Robertson, Remins., 104-6; -=217=Henshaw papers; London _Times_, Oct. 16, 1844; Smith, Remins., -34-5). - -10.7. _The camps and soldier life._ _Picayune_, Apr. 7; May 30; June 14, -24; July 9, 26. Perry, Indiana, 84-5, 87, 97, 100-2. Ho. 60; 30, 1, p. -697 (Thomas). Brackett, Lane's Brigade, 18, 22, 33. Robertson, Remins., -76-97. Giddings, Sketches, 27, 36-40. =254=McClellan to sister, Oct. 8. -=274=Neeld, letter. =139=Campbell to D. C, July 11, 19, 29, 31; Aug. 9. -=280=Nunelee, diary, July 5; Dec. 10. Meade, Letters, i, 59 (nine feet -of water on Brazos bar; six feet to Pt. Isabel). =218=Henshaw narrative. -Ho. 60; 30, 1, p. 571 (Jesup). =332=Tennery, diary, Aug. 12; Sept. 18. -=190=Ewing, diary, July 21-Aug. 17. Wash. _Union_, June 10; Aug. 3, 18; -Sept. 1 (letters). =322=W. B. Smith, diary. Special orders 71 in Ho. 60; -30, 1, p. 528. Reid, Scouting Expeditions, 20. I. Smith, Remins., 9, 25, -34. Matamoros _News_, July 8. =69=Shields, Aug. 28. _Niles_, July 4, p. -288; Sept. 12, pp. 21, 22. (Funds) Ho. 60; 30, 1, pp. 560-1. Taylor, -Letters (Bixby), 176. =61=Carlin to Polk, May 19. Henry, Sketches, 121. -_Nat. Intelligencer_, Aug. 3. Sedgwick, Corresp., i, 4. =69=Miller to -sister. =291=C. Cushing to Pierce, May 4, 1847. Bishop, Journal. Allen, -Pencillings, 25. - -10.8. In the N. Y. _Sun_ of Dec. 12, 1915, Major William Wallace showed -why time is needed to make a soldier. - -10.9. Hamer was, however, a man of strength and sound judgment, and for -this reason proved very useful to the volunteers. - -10.10. =252=Lieut. Mackall wrote with reference to this matter, "I am -determined, with God's aid, to do my duty cheerfully and show no sign of -impatience." The letters and diaries of =6=Robert Anderson and others -give us reason to believe that such a spirit was not uncommon among the -regular officers. - -10.11. _Morale of the army._ Taylor, Letters (Bixby), 7, 23, 42. Ewing, -diary, Aug. 17; Sept. 7. "A Soldier's Honor," 22-3. Meade, Letters i, -91, 102-3, 108-10, 115-6, etc. (Brawls, etc.) Henry, Camp. Sketches, -124, 128, 137. W. B. Smith, diary, Aug. 13. Ewing, diary, Sept. 7. -_Niles_, Sept. 19, p. 40. (Months) =69=Bankhead, Apr. 7. St. Louis -_Republican_, Aug. 5. _Vedette_, ix, no. 1 (officer, Aug. 22). =1=Woll -to Allen, July 2. Wilhelm, Eighth Inf., i, 425. =139=Campbell to D. C, -July 3; Aug. 28; Nov. 9; Dec. 7. Lawton, Artillery Off., 276. Jamieson, -Campaign, 71. Scott, Mems., ii, 392. =148=Chamberlain, recolls. -=224=Bliss to Hitchcock, July 23 (cf. =139=Campbell to D. C, Aug. 9). -=252=Mackall, Aug. 4. =218=Henshaw narrative. =13=Giffard to Bankhead, -June 9. The fundamental idea of military discipline is that each man is -a factor in a great organization, and must do his part in coöperation -with all the rest. Time is necessary to bring a man to this point of -view. More will be said about the morale of the troops in chap. xxxi. - -10.12. Taylor attempted to defend himself (Ho. 60; 30, 1, p. 558) by -citing his letter of April 26 to the department, in which he said that -he trusted it would "give the necessary orders to the staff department -for the supply" of the new troops from Louisiana and Texas; but this -was by no means what he was bound to do in the premises (see note 13); -and, in particular, river steamboats of an unknown description and -number not only did not come under the head of army supplies, but were -almost certainly not even in his own mind when he wrote that letter. - -10.13. _The question of boats._ (View) Ho. 60; 30, 1, pp. 329-32 -(Taylor); Taylor to Butler, July 1, 1846 in =375=Madigan, catalogue no. -2, 1914. (Rules) =61=Adj. gen. to Kearny, May 14; Ho. 60; 30, 1, pp. -560, 751 (Jesup). Dec. 26, 1913, the chief clerk of the quartermaster -general's office, Washington, stated to the author (for publication) -that under the regulations in force in 1846 Taylor was bound to specify -the kind and amount of supplies that he wanted. (Knew) Ho. 60; 30, 1, p. -685 (Whiting, Nov. 30). (Assuming) Taylor to Butler, July 1, _supra_. -(Depended) _Ibid._ (Useless) _Ibid._; Taylor in Ho. 60; 30, 1, p. 547. -(Denunciations) Taylor in Ho. 60; 30, 1, pp. 547-8, 558, etc. - -Marcy to Taylor, June 8, 1846: You are expected to "push your advantages -to the utmost extent it can be done with the means at your command" (Ho. -60; 30, 1, p. 325). - -As late as May 24 Taylor knew little about the depth of the river. It -was then being studied (Thomas in Ho. 60; 30, 1, p. 654). May 18 he -called for only one steamboat (_ibid._, 653), and May 28 for only three -more (_ibid._, 656). By August 11 about twenty were said to be on the -river. The documents appear to show that the quartermaster's department, -notwithstanding Taylor's complaints against it, did about all in this -matter that could reasonably have been expected under the circumstances -(_ibid._, 549, 763). It was difficult to find light-draught boats that -were strong enough to risk a voyage across the Gulf. It should be borne -in mind here and elsewhere that the war bill of May 13 threw suddenly -upon the war department a very extensive and complicated business, -such as it requires years to build up in civil life. Many of Jesup's -subordinates were doubtless old, lazy or fond of "red tape"; others -lacked the necessary capacity; still others were political henchmen; -but they seem in general to have been willing. Taylor said he did not -like the plan of campaign (to Butler, July 1, _supra_), but had not been -willing to obtrude his ideas upon the government. On this point consult -note 28 of chapter ix. - -When Taylor found himself in trouble about boats, he undertook to cover -his lack of foresight by denouncing (Ho. 60; 30, 1, pp. 547-8, 558, -etc.) the government for sending a flood of volunteers without supplying -the means of transportation. But evidently, in the first place, if -Taylor, who had been near the Rio Grande for about seven months and then -upon it for nearly two, did not feel sure as late as May 21 whether it -could be made to serve (_ibid._, 300), Jesup, who possessed no definite -and reliable information on the subject of the river (_ibid._, 560) -could not very well know whether Taylor could and would use it, how many -boats he would need, and how much water they should draw. In the second -place, if the General had provided transportation for his regulars and -the men he called out on April 26, he would have been able to establish -the dépôt, leave about 1000 men to guard it, and advance with as many -troops (some 6000) as he planned to throw forward at first (Ho. 60; 30, -1, p. 330 (Taylor), 561 (Jesup); Madigan, cat. no. 2, 1914 (Taylor, -July 1); Taylor, Letters (Bixby) 40, 44; =370=_Id._ to ----, draft, -June 18; Smith, Remins., 14). Thirdly, even if a flood of twelve-months -volunteers came, those he did not require for the forward movement -could have been left at healthy camps in the rear, as he himself pointed -out (Ho. 60; 30, 1, p. 330), to drill and prepare. Fourthly, instead -of complaining that a lack of boats prevented his advancing (_ibid._, -305, 307), he might--for aught that we know--have pushed forward his -regulars promptly by land, having for this operation a month of good -weather and a wagon train ample for twice that number of men (_ibid._, -560, 651). And, finally, it is worth mention that Scott's letter of -May 18 was probably as early an official notification of the coming -volunteer forces as could prudently have been given. Rives observes (U. -S. and Mexico, ii, 252), "Taylor was thus obviously disabled for some -time [by the sickness of the volunteers resulting from the rainy season -from making any extensive forward movement." But (1) Taylor had a month -of good weather after the capture of Matamoros; (2) the regulars were -not sickly, and might have been pushed forward with little delay; (3) -the sickness near and below Matamoros was not such as to prevent him -from completing his expeditionary force with volunteers; (4) the boats, -which began to arrive about the first of July, would have enabled the -necessary number of volunteers to move promptly; (5) and even the severe -sickliness at Camargo did not prevent advancing with fair promptness -after Taylor had decided to move. Of course it must be remembered that -Taylor had much to think about, and lacked experience. - -10.14. There was also a notable want of order and energy, said Worth, in -the control of the steamboats (=69=to Bliss, July 27). - -10.15. By August 4 substantially all of the regulars except the cavalry -and two or three batteries set out. June 16, the adj. gen. (Ho. 60; 30, -1, p. 454) estimated that Taylor would have under his immediate command -about 11,840 twelve-months volunteers and would soon receive nearly 800 -regulars. This left out of account a regiment and a half from Texas and -some other small corps. Taylor may, then, have had at about this time -(not allowing for discharges) 15,500 men. An account printed in the -Cincinnati _Chronicle_ of Sept. 6 gave him 15,810. Lieut. Col. Clarke, -Eighth Infantry, remained in command at Matamoros, and Major Gardner, -Fourth Artillery, at Point Isabel and Brazos Island (Ho. 60; 30, 1, p. -533). The rank of these officers indicates that but few soldiers were -left behind, and at Reynosa and Mier there were only detachments. During -July Capt. Gillespie with a company of Texas Rangers marched from San -Antonio and passed through Laredo, Guerrero and Mier, finding the people -quiet in those towns (Ho. 60; 30, 1, p. 402). - -10.16. _Occupation of Camargo, etc._ The distance from the Gulf to -Camargo by water was also called 450 miles (Smith, To Mexico, 92). -Ho. 60; 30, 1, p. 690-1 (Hunt). (Mishaps) =76=Letter from Matamoros, -July 13; Whiting, Aug. 3 in Ho. 60; 30, 1, p. 675; _Gaceta de Ciudad -Victoria_, July 21; Matamoros _Reveille_, June 24 ("The channel [of -the river] shifts and fills with incredible rapidity"); _Niles_, July -18, p. 310; Aug. 1, p. 341. Ho. 60; 30, 1, pp. 300, 336-8, 397-402, -408. Henry, Camp. Sketches, 120, 123, 125, 132-151. =69=Smith to Bliss, -July 8. Donnavan, Adventures. =180=Pillow to wife, Aug. 8. Meade, -Letters, i, 106-7, 118. Henshaw narrative. Claiborne, Quitman, i, 239. -Robertson, Remins., 107-9. Brackett, Lane's Brig., 23-4. Tilden, Notes, -10. =69=Miles to Bliss, July 8, 14. (Alcalde) Encarnacion Prisoners, 25. -=76=Comte. gen., Saltillo, July 20. =76=Mejía, July 19. _Picayune_, July -26; Aug. 1, 6, 9, 14, 15. Wilhelm, Eighth Infantry, ii, 279. Taylor, -Letters (Bixby), 25, 30, 39, 40. =65=_Id._, gen. orders 93, July 30. -Ewing, diary, Aug. 20-31, 1846. =76=García to Parrodi, Aug. 10. Grant, -Mems., i, 104. =267=Memo. [apparently from Maj. Smith]. Kenly, Md. Vol., -61-4. French, Two Wars, 59. _Niles_, Sept. 5, p. 1; 19, p. 56. Sanders, -June 5 in Ho. 60; 30, 1, p. 551. (Mier) =69=Vinton to Lee, Aug. 1; -Smith, To Mexico, 66; Green, Journal, 82. - -10.17. _At Camargo._ =99=Gov. Tamaul. to Tampico ayunt., July 23. -=80=Gov. N. León, July 2, 1846. _Picayune_, Aug. 1, 6, 9, 14, 15; Sept. -12. Smith, Remins., 35. Sanders, June 5 in Ho. 60; 30, 1, p. 551. -McClellan, diary. Henshaw narrative. Meade, Letters, i, 119, 121. Ewing, -diary, Aug. 31-Sept. 19. Robertson, Remins., 109-11. Wash. _Union_, -Sept. 14; Oct. 5. Bishop, Journal. =185=Worth to Duncan, July 30. -(Worth) Wilhelm, Eighth Inf., ii, 278; Special orders 72 in Ho. 60; 30, -1, p. 529; =61=W. to adj. gen., May 9; =61=Marcy to W., May 11. Henry, -Camp. Sketches, 121, 152-4. Giddings, Sketches, 83. Taylor, Letters -(Bixby), 42, 176. Trans. Ills. State Hist. Soc., 1906, pp. 176-7. -_Vedette_, ix, no. 10. Tennery, diary, Oct. 28. =139=Campbell to D. C., -Aug. 28. Nashville _Union_, Oct. 17. _Niles_, Sept. 12, p. 23; Jan. 2, -1847, p. 286. =117=Pillow to wife, Sept. 6; Dec. 24. Sedgwick, Corres., -i, 13, 30. =169=Taylor to Crittenden, Sept. 1, 1846. (Mier) Ho. 60; 30, -1, p. 1180 (Taylor). - -Camargo was the proper place for Taylor's dépôt, but no Americans were -needed there except the quartermaster's force and a guard of regulars. -For these there was sufficient elevated ground. The regulars occupied -this ground (_Picayune_, Aug. 15), and suffered comparatively little; -but we know enough of the conditions existing at Camargo to pronounce -the place unfit for the number of men encamped there. - -10.18. May 9 Paredes decided that all the American consuls should cease -to exercise their functions, and four days later orders were issued that -wherever a U. S. war vessel should appear, the Americans should embark -or go twenty leagues into the interior. Mexican consuls in the United -States were soon directed to close their offices. =52=B. E. Green, Apr. -25, 1844: Tornel "hates us with a most envenomed spite." =52=Ellis, -Sept. 20, 1839: Tornel shows a bitter and unrelenting hostility toward -the United States. - -10.19. Feb. 4, 1846, _El Tiempo_, the favorite journal of Paredes, had -said: "We are not a people of traders and adventurers, the scum and -dregs of all countries, whose only mission is to rob the Indians of -their land and then seize the fertile regions opened to civilization -by the Spanish race." June 13 _La Esperanza_, of Tampico, close to the -field of war, printed the Address of a Patriotic Junta [Committee] to -raise funds for the campaign, which used the following language about -the Americans: "People without morality, composed of the scum of all -nations; people without honesty, who count their bankruptcies by the -numberless number of their enterprises; people without religion, who -tolerate all beliefs and mock at the most sacred things; people for whom -probity is not a virtue, who value money and know nothing of glory, a -monstrous collection of the most heterogeneous elements united by the -double bond of crime and fear, etc." - -10.20. _Paredes, Mexico and the war._ (Paredes' appearance) Portrait, -City Hall, Mexico; _Aguila del Norte_, Mar. 18. London _Times_, Mar. 13, -1846. Bankhead, nos. 13, 45, 72, 92, 100, 1846. =52=Slidell, Feb. 6, -17. México á través, iv, 567-8. Dublán, Legislación, v, 134-6. Apuntes, -68. _Diario_, May 18; June 2, 7, 12, 17, 26-30; July 2, 4, 6, 21, 23, -25, 26, 28, 30. Memoria de ... Relaciones, 1846. Bustamante, Nuevo -Bernal, ii, 58. =52=Black, no. 379, July 4. _Monitor Repub._, June 1, -4, 30, 1846. _Imparcial_, July 15, 1846. _Indicador_, June 4; July 24, -1846. _Esperanza_, May 30, 1846. _Pregonero_, June 18, 1846. =84=S. L. -Potosí assembly, procl., May 22, 1846. Wash. _Union_, June 18, 1846. -Balbontín, Estado Militar. =13=Foreign Office to Bankhead, June 1, 1846. -=76=Parrodi, June 8, 1846. - -10.21. Mar. 31, 1846 (no. 8), the British Foreign Office wrote to -Bankhead, the minister at Mexico, that according to the British minister -at Madrid the project of setting up a monarch in Mexico was entertained -in Spain. See also chap. iv, note 15 and chap. vi, note 32. - -10.22. _The political situation of Paredes._ =52=Slidell, Jan. 14; Feb. -6, 17; Mar. 1, 18, 27; Apr. 2, 1846. =13=Bankhead, nos. 12, 15, 22, 27, -34, 45, 49, 57, 62, 63, 80, 92, 98, 111, 1846. Conner, Mar. 2 in Ho. -60; 30, 1, p. 121. Dublán, Legislación, v, 134-6. _Diario_, April 19; -May 4, 13; June 7, 28, 1846. Tributo á la Verdad. =52=Black, June 1; -July 29; Aug. 12. London _Times_, Mar. 13; Apr. 11; Aug. 7; Sept. 5, 9; -Oct. 7. Gov. Durango to Dur. cong., Nov. 8, 1846 (pamphlet). =47=Wood -to Bancroft, June 4. Bermúdez de Castro, no. 316, res., Aug. 28, 1846. -=76=Acta, Mazatlán, May 7, 1846. =52=Dimond, no. 317, Feb. 2, 1846. -Paredes, Papers (García, ed.), 43, 46. México á través, iv, 556, 558. -=75=Gov. Jalisco, Feb. 24, 1846. =75=Circular, Apr. 18, 1846. _Monitor -Constit._, Jan. 9, 1846. _Boletín de Noticias_, June 1, 1846. _Monitor -Repub._, May 23; June 6, 7, 9, 22; July 5, 14, 1846. _Republicano_, June -27, 1846. =80=Gov. Jalisco, decree, May 25, 1846. Bustamante, Nuevo -Bernal, ii, 15. =76=Paredes, manifiesto, Mar. 21. Memoria de ... Guerra, -Dec., 1846. =76=Comte. gen. Méx., Aug. 2, 1846. _Niles_, June 6, p. -211; June 20, p. 242. =80=Gov. Méx., April 20, 1846. Lerdo de Tejada, -Apuntes, ii, 524, 530, 531, 536. Sierra, Evolution, i, 215. =13=Forbes -to Bankhead, July 2, 1846. - -A pamphlet said, "_¡A las armas, Mexicanos!_ People, a horrible treason, -an infamous treason threatens our independence, our adored independence, -for which our fathers gave their lives"; Paredes and his coterie of -wretches are aiming to hand us over, manacled, to the foreigners; -"this is a fact, Mexicans; read, read that newspaper, protected by the -government, called _El Tiempo_." - -10.23. _E.g. El Telégrafo_ said in capitals on March 31: "Many a -nation would like to take by the hand" one of the heroes who helped -to establish it, and "the silence of the majestic tomb replies, 'He -no longer lives'; but Santa Anna does live, and his voice proclaims, -'Mexico shall be great, free and happy.'" - -10.24. A revolt in favor of Santa Anna occurred at Mazatlán on May 7, -but it was not an integral part of the movement. - -10.25. Paredes was imprisoned in the fortress of Ulúa, transferred to -Perote castle, and early in October permitted to leave the country. In -this revolution Tornel miscalculated and stood out against Santa Anna. -The Puebla garrison also was hostile at first. The title of Salas was, -"Most Excellent Señor, General-in-Chief of the Liberating Republican -Army exercising the Supreme Executive Power." - -10.26. _The downfall of Paredes._ London _Times_, Aug. 6, 1845; Feb. 10; -May 13; Oct. 7, 1846. W. S. Parrott, June 4. =52=Campbell, Apr. 8, 1845. -Slidell, Mar. 27, 1846. _Imparcial_, June 18, 1906. Dimond, nos. 324-7, -329, 331, Mar. 18, 22, 31; Apr. 1, 5, 17, 1846. Santa Anna's "Plan," -etc., in Sen. 1; 29, 2, pp. 34-6. Sierra, Evolution, i, 215-7. Suárez -y Navarro, Causas, 82. Mora, Papeles Ined., 59. Bankhead, nos. 57, 78, -88, 100, 110, 111, 149, 1846. =13=Giffard, April 1; Aug. 1. Memoria -de ... Relaciones, Dec., 1846 (and documents). Giménez, Memorias, 92. -Acta, Guadalajara, May 22, 1846 (pamphlet). México á través, iv, 555, -569-76. _Picayune_, April 21. _Diario_, May 4; July 31; Aug. 1-9, -26. =285=Montoya to Paredes, April 1. =285=Parrodi to Paredes, July -25. =182=Almonte to ----, May 13. _Monitor Repub._, June 22; Aug. 4. -=52=Black, Apr. 26; May 21; July 29; Aug. 6, 22, 27; Sept. 17; Oct. 8. -_Plan Salvador_, Feb. 11, 1847. =47=Conner, July 16, 28; Aug. 12., 1846. -=166=Pommarès to Conner, July 31. _Monitor Repub._, Aug. 4. =73=Bermúdez -de Castro, no. 316, res., Aug. 28, 1846. Lerdo de Tejada, Apuntes, ii, -531-5. Memoria ... de Guerra, Dec., 1846. Dublán, Legislación, v, 146, -155. Bustamante, Nuevo Bernal, ii, 63, 67-74. =94=Circular of Hacienda, -Aug. 15. Also from =76= the following. Letter to Guerra, Acapulco, -Apr. 15. To Garay and Falcon, April 7. To Bravo, April 13. Rea, June -5. Comte. gen. Oaxaca, June 15. Yáñez, Aug. 31. _Id._ to troops, May -20. _Id._, address, June 7. _Id._, proclam., July 16. Acta, Mazatlán, -May 7. Acta, Tepic, May 12. Yáñez to Reyes, May 22. To Morales, Aug. -7. To Parrodi, July 31. Acta, Coatepec, July 20. Comte. gen. V. Cruz, -July 1, 9, 21. Rebolledo to Echagaray, July 20. Paredes, Sept. 12. To -comte. gen. Vera Cruz, Sept. 18. Acta, Jalapa, Aug. 2. Salas to Mora, -Aug. 4. To Paredes, Aug. 4. Agreement, Aug. 6. Salas, proclam., Aug. -6. Circulars, July 27; Aug. 3, 4, 6, 7, 9, 15, 17. The Guerra archives -contain a great number of documents relating to internal troubles at -this time. For the Organic Bases see chap, ii, p. 52. - -10.27. The captain general of Cuba had been ordered--evidently in the -interest of the Mexican monarchical party--to prevent Santa Anna from -returning to Mexico, but was friendly to him, and gave him a passport on -the grounds that he could not be prevented from going, that an attempt -to hold him (contrary to the rules of neutrality and hospitality) might -be made an excuse for misusing the Spanish residing in that country, and -that, even should the monarchical plan be carried out, its results would -probably not be stable (=72=Reales Ordenes, Serie de Gobernación, legajo -43). He went in a hired vessel called the _Arab_, under British colors. -Near Vera Cruz the _Arab_ was hailed by the U. S. sloop-of-war _St. -Mary's_ and boarded, but was permitted to proceed (S. Anna, Apelación, -17; Semmes, Service, 118; Taylor, Broad Pennant, 254-5). Conner stated -that the _Arab_ was not boarded, but apparently he wrote this before -receiving a report from the _St. Mary's_. The city of Vera Cruz had not -declared for Santa Anna, and did not do so for some time. In fact the -city government appeared so unsympathetic that an effort was immediately -made to overthrow it. Santa Anna was accompanied by Almonte, Rejón and -other partisans. See _Courrier des Etats Unis_, Aug. 22; =313=Letters in -Saunders papers; =297=Mackenzie, July 11; =166=Campbell to Conner, Aug. -7; =166=Conner, Aug. 17; ("Flower") Kenly, Md. Vol., 392-3; =76=comte. -gen. V. Cruz, Aug. 16, 22; Tributo á la Verdad; Semmes, Service, 118-9; -=100=Landero and Pérez, July 31; Bankhead, nos. 121, 122, Aug. 29; -=47=Conner, Aug. 16; _Diario_, Aug. 28; Memoria de ... Guerra, Dec., -1846. - -10.28. _Santa Anna till he reaches El Encero._ Ruxton, Adventures -(1849 ed.), 17, 18, 20, 47. =76=Comte. gen. V. Cruz, Aug. 14, 16, 22. -Encarnacion Prisoners, 45. Stapp, Prisoners, 89, 90, 95. Calderón, Life, -i, 48-50; ii, 121. S. Anna, Apelación, 16-8. Kendall, Narrative, ii, -364. _Am. Sentinel_, June 15, 1836. =297=Mackenzie, July 11. =76=S. -Anna, Aug. 16. Rivera, Gobernantes, ii, 183, 186, 221. London _Times_, -June 25, 1836. Thompson, Recolls., 66. Ferry, Revolutions, 175-206. -=231=Powhatan Ellis, July 8, 1839. =76=Comte. gen. Zacatecas, Aug. -28. =76=Comte. gen. Oaxaca, Aug. 28. =76=Comte. gen. Tamaul., Aug. -26. =76=Comte. gen. Sinaloa, Oct. 14. =13=Bankhead, nos. 120-2, Aug. -29. Taylor, Broad Pennant, 254-5. Semmes, Service, 118-9. Memoria -de ... Relaciones, Dec., 1846. Lerdo de Tejada, Apuntes, ii, 536. -=47=Conner, Aug. 16 (unofficial), 25, 30; Sept. 5. =166=Conner, Aug. 17. -=76=Circular, Aug. 19. Memoria de ... Guerra, Dec., 1846. _Indicador_, -Aug. 16. Ramírez, México, 134, 137, 139-40. Ho. 60; 30, 1, p. 777 -(S. Anna). Bustamante, Nuevo Bernal, ii, 86-7. =76=S. Anna, Sept. 7. -_Diario_, Aug. 27-8. =162=Conner to wife, Aug. 19. =52=Campbell, Nov. 10. - -10.29. This account is based upon a study of his career and a wide -range of reading. A few sources may be specified: _Atlas_, Feb. 1, -1845. Bankhead, nos. 66, 110, 1844. Calderón, Life, ii, 121. Sierra, -Evolution, i, 190, 198, 203, 210, 216. Mofras, Exploration, i, 14. -Negrete, México, xiii, 370. León, Historia, 480. Defensa de S. Anna. -_Nacional_, Dec 22, 1847. _Arco Iris_, Dec. 7, 1847. _Monitor Repub._, -Oct. 12; Dec. 12, 1847. =166=Campbell to Conner, July 9, 1846. Noticias -Importantes. =73=Reports of the Spanish legation (which give striking -evidence of S. Anna's intellectual qualities and volubility). Proceso -del Gral. S. Anna. Biog. del Gral. S. Anna. - -10.30. No doubt Santa Anna had felt at an earlier period and possibly -felt even now an occasional emotion of patriotism inundate his soul, -as a Mexican proclamation would have said. Few are so utterly selfish -as never to bestow a kind wish upon their fellow-creatures, and Santa -Anna was bad in a spontaneous, human way, not in that of cold villainy. -Probably he was largely guided by worse men than himself, who had more -ability to think but needed him to execute their designs. - -10.31. The army sent agents to question Santa Anna with reference to -his intentions. It may safely be assumed that he reassured the military -chiefs regarding his real aims. - -10.32. The _Boletín Oficial_ of S. L. Potosí said on July 31: "And -liberty! Oh liberty! There also we meet with fine phrases. How beautiful -are phrases! How they fill the heart! Santa Anna instead of Paredes -..., is not this liberty, I ask? A prince from abroad, a dictator from -Mexico,--is not this also liberty, I ask?" - -10.33. =47=Conner reported that on August 28 an American urged upon -Santa Anna the necessity of making peace with the United States, and -that Santa Anna replied in substance as follows: I am convinced of that -but will not assume the responsibility of proposing it; I am old; I have -money enough; I will not run the risk of dying in exile; I will assemble -Congress as soon as possible and act as the majority shall decide; -meanwhile I will attempt the arduous task of repelling the invaders. -This American was Hargous, a merchant of Vera Cruz (see Bustamante, -Nuevo Bernal, ii, 90; =166=Pommarès to Conner, Aug. 29). The British -minister believed that Santa Anna had made an arrangement with the -United States at Havana, but was prevented by the unpopularity of his -return from carrying out the agreement (Bankhead, no. 128, Sept. 7). - -10.34. A striking glimpse into the situation is given by the fact that -for some time the government could not communicate confidentially with -Santa Anna because there was nobody it dared trust with such a mission, -and no person of importance dared absent himself from the centre of -intrigue (Ramírez, México, 145). - -10.35. A series of acts concluded on October 23 restored fully the -externals of the federal system (Ramírez, Memorias, 33-4). This change -metamorphosed departments into states. - -10.36. The constitution of 1824 was revived _so far_ as it did not -conflict with the revolution of Aug. 4. Salas was a weak man and longed -to escape from his difficult and trying situation (Bankhead, no. 140, -Sept. 29; Bustamante, Nuevo Bernal, ii, 101; México á través, iv, 577). - -10.37. Other war measures were: (Aug. 28) free importation of arms; -(Aug. 31) severe penalties for civil and military officers refusing to -obey orders during the war; (Sept. 3) the free manufacture and sale -of gunpowder; (Sept. 4) a commission to provide lands for American -deserters; (Sept. 10) naturalization to be gained by entering the army -or navy; (Sept. 10) reëstablishment of the Military Normal School at -Chapultepec under the name Military College; (Sept. 11) regulations for -the National Guard. The purpose of offering a pardon to deserters from -the regular army was probably to transfer men from it to the National -Guards (Bankhead, no. 126, Sept. 7). - -10.38. The attitude of the best citizens was probably stated by the -_Monitor Republicano_ of Aug. 25: "We will say to Santa Anna: ... if -you recognize your errors, promote the welfare of the country, pursue -a course entirely different from your former policy, and prove by -acts--not words--that your misdeeds were not crimes but errors, then -Mexico will forget the past and reward liberally the citizen conferring -upon her so marked a benefit." - -10.39. Thirteen municipalities of Oaxaca contributed a total of 75 pesos. - -10.40. Guadalupe Hidalgo, a suburb on the northern side of Mexico, -contained a deeply venerated shrine of the Virgin. - -10.41. _The situation and Santa Anna's course._ =47=Conner, July 28; -Aug. 12, 16 (unofficial), 25; Sept. 5, 13, 22; Oct. 4. =73=Bermúdez de -Castro, no. 316, res., Aug. 28; nos. 345-6, Sept. 28. Ramírez, México, -131-5, 137, 145, 149. =52=Black, Aug. 22, 27; Sept. 12, 22, 28; Oct. 8. -Mora, Papeles Ined., 60. =162=Conner to wife, Aug. 29. Heller, Reisen, -195-6. Sierra, Evolution, i, 215. Tributo á la Verdad. =70=Degrees, -Aug. 22, 28. =76=Salas, proclams., Aug. 28; decrees, Sept. 10, 27. -=13=Gutiérrez de Estrada to Palmerston, Mar. 1, 1847. =76=Circular, -Aug. 28 ("infamous" reports that the govt. aims to destroy the army). -=13=Bankhead, nos. 111, 120-2, 126, 128, 136, 140, 142, 1846. Rivera, -Jalapa, iii, 787-9. =166=Campbell to Conner, July 9, 13. =166=Pommarès -to Conner, Aug. 29; Sept. 23. _Amer. Sentinel_, June 15, 1836. _Revue -des Deux Mondes_, Aug. 1, 1847, p. 404. México á través, iv, 577-9, -590, 628. _Diario_, Aug. 27-Sept. 6, 9, 11-20, 23, 25-30. =47=Black to -Conner, Sept. 24. _Eco de Tampico_, Nov. 4 (If S. Anna beats the enemy -he will be the idol of the Mexicans). =76=Circulars, Aug. 17, 22, 28, -31; Sept. 3, 15, 17, 20, 25, 28. Memoria de ... Guerra, Dec. García, -Revol. de Ayutla, 15. Memoria de ... Relaciones, Dec. =77=Circular, -Sept. 10; Nov. 27. Dublán, Legislación, v, 155-61. _Republicano_, Sept. -15, 29; Nov. 5. =76=To Almonte, Aug. 28. =76=S. Anna, Sept. 7, 13, 14, -21, 24, 25, 26. Apuntes, 67, 115. Tributo á la Verdad. Bustamante, -Nuevo Bernal, ii, 94, 96, 101, 111. =76=Comte. gen. Puebla, Sept. 6. -_Diario_, supplem. to no. 39. =70=Almonte to comte. gen. Méx., Sept. -15. =76=Comte. gen. V. Cr., procl., Oct. 1. _Monitor Repub._, Aug. -25; Sept. 14-15, 18, 25. Ruxton, Advent. (1847), 47, 49. _Imparcial_, -June 18, 1906. =76=Comte. gen. Querétaro, procl., Sept. 29. S. Anna, -Apelación, 20. London _Times_, Oct. 7; Nov. 6. (380) Ho. 60; 30, 1, p. -1046 (Scott). - -10.42. (Bulls) =121=Handbill. - - - XI. TAYLOR SETS OUT FOR SALTILLO - -11.1. =76=Arista, May 25, 29. =76=To Mejía, May 27. (Monterey) -=169=Taylor to Crittenden, Oct. 9. Apuntes, 50-3. =76=Mejía, June 9, -19; July 2. =76=_Id._, proclam., July 6. The number of officers, each -of whom required baggage and servants, was excessive. Arista eliminated -more than half of them. The cavalry were afoot, and he took steps to -remount them. Contracts were made for mules to draw the cannon, and the -work of putting the artillery in order began. Owing to Mejía's illness, -Requena assumed the actual command in June (Carreño, Jefes, ccii). - -11.2. Apuntes, 51, 53. =285=Letter to Paredes, July 13. =285=Segura -to Escudero, June 4. Balbontín, Invasión, 26. =76=Arista, Apr. 24. -=76=Mejía, June 9, 19, 20; July 19, 29; Aug. 19, 21. =76=_Id._ to Baz, -July 29. =76=Ampudia, Aug. 28. =76=Mejía to Ampudia, Aug. 31. =69=Spy to -Taylor, Apr. 5. In addition to their lack of patriotism, the people had -no arms (=76=gov. N. León, May 24). - -11.3. =69=Vinton to Worth, Aug. 19. =285=Mejía to Paredes, July 20. -And from =76= the following. Mejía, June 14 ("The loss of the immense -territory divided by the Sierra is inevitable"); July 9, 19; Aug. 10, -17, 21. _Id._ to Canales, Aug. 10. Gargollo to second alcalde of S. -Fernando, June 5. S. Fernando ayunt. to gov. of Tamaulipas, June 8. -Canales, June 18. _Id._ to Mejía, June 14; June 14, personal. Gov. of N. -León, June 24. - -Mejía reported that the officers at Monterey agreed to make no -pronunciamiento and to obey the established authorities, whoever they -might be; but a spy reported "utter confusion" in the public mind there -(Vinton, _supra_) in consequence of the revolution of August 4, and -Worth heard that a state of things existed which might have been taken -advantage of by Taylor (=69=to Bliss, Aug. 27). - -11.4. (Intended) June 24 Taylor wrote: "If the gov. think proper to -entrust me with this command for the purpose of carrying the war into -the enemies country I do not feel authorized to decline the same" -(Letters (Bixby), 18). The context shows that Taylor then knew (p. 17) -that he _was_ to have the command. The orders to that effect had been -issued June 8. In fact the orders of Jan. 13 directed Taylor to assume -the offensive, should Mexico begin hostilities, and his report of Apr. -26 recommended operating beyond the Rio Grande (Ho. 60; 30, 1, pp. 91, -141). All that he did and failed to do must therefore be viewed in the -light of the fact that he knew, or should have known, that he ought -to wage a vigorous and aggressive campaign. (Smuggling) Henry, Camp. -Sketches, 19. The smuggling on this border was a familiar theme in the -Mexican press. =76=Arleji to Ampudia, Aug. 31 (some Mexicans are led by -self-interest to serve the Americans more faithfully than they would -serve their own country). =76=Mejía (July 19) classed the people of the -border generally as enemies. Taylor seems to have neglected persistently -the duty of obtaining information (_Niles_, Sept. 12, p. 22; _So. Qtrly. -Rev._, Nov., 1850, p. 457). Apparently he tried interrogating Mexicans -here and there, and was disgusted to find their statements disagreed. -What he should have had was, as Scott recommended (Ho. 60; 30, 1, -p. 327) many carefully selected agents (spies), whose accounts could -have been sifted by comparison. No evidence can be found that he even -attempted to follow this advice, though Worth realized the value of -information, and did something of real utility. Taylor's lack of data -will appear later. Meade, who was in a position to be well-informed, -wrote on Sept. 17 near Marín that the Americans knew no more of the -numbers or defences at Monterey than when they were at Matamoros -(Letters, i, 130). Ripley (War with Mexico, i, 156-60) endeavors to -show that Scott interfered unwarrantably and caused confusion by giving -Taylor instructions on June 12 that were at variance with those given by -Marcy on June 8 (Ho. 60; 30, 1, pp. 323, 325). But (1) Marcy knew of and -endorsed Scott's "interference" (_ibid._, p. 328); and (2) there was no -practical variance. Marcy and Scott agreed that Taylor was to advance. -Scott said Taylor would make the high road toward the capital one of his -lines, which was (as Scott said) a matter "of course." Marcy said it had -not been decided whether he should advance _to_ the capital. - -11.5. Polk, Diary, Sept. 5, 1846; Mar. 20, 1847. Sen. 1; 30, 1, p. 545 -(Jesup). =76=Gov. Tamaulipas, Aug. 5 (Taylor obtained 1000 mules through -the alcalde of Reynosa). Upton, Military Policy, 215 (not known at -Washington that wagons could be used). Taylor, Letter to Gaines. Ho. 60; -30, 1, pp. 559, 565-6 (Jesup). Smith, Remins., 13-15. Taylor, Letters -(Bixby), 177-8. =61=Worth to alcalde, Aug. 24. Henry, Camp. Sketches, -164. N. Y. _Commerc. Advertiser_, Mar. 29, 1847. May 21 Taylor wrote -that the means of transportation might be pack-mules "chiefly" (Ho. 60; -30, 1, p. 300). (Taylor's plans not known) Sen. 1; 30, 1, 546 (Jesup). -(Complained) =169=Taylor to Crittenden, Sept. 1; =61=to adj. gen., Sept. -10; Letter to Gaines; Ho. 60; 30, 1, p. 557. - -Wagons (drawn usually by eight mules) were more convenient, where they -could be used, than pack-mules; but Santa Anna showed, six months later, -that with no such wagons 24-pound cannon and an army three times as -large as Taylor proposed to take could be moved about twice the distance -from Camargo to Monterey by a route that passed through, not a populated -region like that where Taylor was, but a virtual desert. Taylor not only -knew that Arista had depended upon mules, but captured that general's -entire outfit. It was easy to obtain large numbers of mules through the -alcaldes. Experience proved that unbroken mules could be made fit for -the work in three days (Smith, Remins., 18). The first call for wagons -(May 18) proceeded from a quartermaster at Pt. Isabel, who called for -seventy. There is no evidence that Taylor prompted this requisition, -and it was wholly inadequate for his professed needs. His indifference -about such matters was illustrated by Col. Cross, at the time his chief -quartermaster, who said, "With respect to the means of transportation to -be provided, or other preparations in my branch of the service, I have -never received a line of instructions or any order whatever from Gen. -Taylor" (Ho. 60; 30, 1, p. 650). It was his duty to call seasonably for -the desired number of wagons, and he did not do it. - -When the department found that wagons were wanted, it displayed much -energy in having them purchased or built (Ho. 60; 30, 1, pp. 546-764). -In fact, on an intimation from Scott (May 15), it ordered 200 to be -constructed at Philadelphia as soon as they could be thoroughly made, -and eleven days later sent an agent to Cincinnati for 300 more. Later -the field of operations extended as far as Boston. But much time was -required to find suitable lumber and skilled workmen, build the wagons -properly, and transport them to Mexico. None reached the front in time -for the fall campaign; and indeed, after they arrived, pack-mules -continued to be used (Whiting: Ho. 60; 30, 1, p. 688). Taylor complained -particularly (Bixby collection, 185) because 100-150 wagons intended for -him went to Wool, whose expedition will be described in chap. xiii; but -Wool was under Taylor's orders, and the latter neglected to regulate -the matter, while the former was alert and active. Taylor complained -also of lacking mules, harness, pack-saddles, horseshoe nails, etc.; -but, as in the cases of boats and wagons, the fault seems chargeable to -the head of the army. He conceived the absurd idea that the government -was endeavoring to ruin him by crippling his operations, as if success -had not been fully as important for the government as for him. Worth -privately said that any lack of transportation was chargeable to -Taylor, and described the General's complaints as intended to ward off -responsibility in case of failure and augment glory in case of success -(=364=to Capt. S., Sept. 5); and on the maturest consideration this -judgment appears to be substantially correct. For a statement of the -chief clerk, quartermaster's office, Washington, see chap. x, note -13. The practical conclusion is that Taylor, with nearly 300 wagons -and numberless mules at command, was able to move with reasonable -promptness. Jesup, after reaching the scene, contracted for 2000 mules -in one day, and said that Taylor might have collected 10,000 (Ho. 60; -30, 1, p. 567). - -One must be extremely cautious about asserting what a general might -have done; but it seems quite clear that Taylor could and should have -organized a systematic spy service that would have given him adequate -information regarding the Mexican army and the defences of Monterey; -have advanced his regulars, about 1000 at least of his best volunteers, -a large supply of provisions, at least six 18-pounders, entrenching -tools, etc. to Camargo in June; have had at least 3000 mules collected -there by August 1; have placed, say, 2000 regulars and 1000 volunteers -at Cerralvo by Aug. 15, and gathered the large stocks of subsistence -available in that district; and have reached Monterey with 9000 men, -heavy guns and ample supplies by Sept. 15. Or Taylor might have gone -to Saltillo _via_ Monclova. The distance would have been considerably -greater, but the Mexicans would have had to abandon Monterey and -Rinconada Pass, and Taylor and Wool would have been able to coöperate. -Both Santa Anna and Mejía feared he would adopt this plan. In reply to -all this it may be said that on pp. 198-9 the author mentioned without -disapproval Scott's plan to begin the campaign about Sept. 25. But the -two cases were not parallel. Taylor was already in the "hot mud" and -needed to bestir himself; and he planned but a small movement, whereas -Scott, not yet in touch with the conditions, planned a large and -decisive one, which probably would not have advanced _via_ Monterey. - -11.6. (Knew) Taylor, Letters (Bixby), 46, 51, 177; N. Y. _Herald_, July -25; _Niles_, July 18, p. 309; Scott, Mems., ii, 391-2; _Cong. Globe_, -29, 2, app., 125 (Ingersoll). A resolution was introduced in Congress -asking the reason for the inactivity of the army (_Niles_, July 18, p. -309). One newspaper called Taylor "Gen. Delay." (Sustain) Taylor, Letter -to Gaines. (Consequences) Taylor, Letters (Bixby), 46. (Suspected) -Taylor, _ibid._, 13, 20. (Resistance) Taylor to Crittenden, Sept. 1 -("I hope to be in possession of Monterey and Saltillo, as soon as our -legs can carry us there"); Bliss, Aug. 14, in Ho. 60; 30, 1, p. 411 -(Taylor "anticipates no serious difficulty in reaching and occupying -Saltillo"); =135=Taylor to Butler, Aug. 26; _Hist. Mag._, x, 207-8 -(Backus); =180=Pillow to wife, Aug. 16 (Taylor says he does not think -we shall have to fire another gun in all northern Mexico). Robertson, -Remins., 125. - -It has been said that Taylor knew of Polk's negotiations with Santa -Anna, and therefore had good reason to expect no resistance. But this -was a matter for his government to act upon, and the government had -said nothing of that kind to him. As we shall see, Scott, although -negotiating himself later with Santa Anna, did not relax his military -activity in the least. This was the only proper course for a general -in the field under orders to press the war. =185=Aug. 5 Worth ordered -Duncan to make a thorough examination of the routes. Aug. 8 Duncan -reported that the Mexicans were said to be fortifying Monterey. Sept. -3 Taylor wrote (Bixby coll., 51): "The country ... shall not be -disappointed; even if it should turn out to be a disaster." One does -not readily see how Taylor could have supposed that the government -wished to be, or was likely to be, supported by an admittedly inadequate -expedition. - -11.7. =61=Ordnance bureau, memo., June 15. See pp. 148, 164, 177. Benet, -Ordnance Reports, 1880, ii, 158. Ho. 60; 30, 1, pp. 329, 417 (Taylor). -For S. Anna's task see note 5 and chap. xix. =66=Sanders to Taylor, Feb. -15. =61=Ridgely to adj. gen., Aug. 2. (Bayonet) Taylor, Letters (Bixby), -178. - -11.8. Robertson, Remins., 118. =69=Vinton to Worth, Aug. 19. =69=Wolf -to Bliss, Aug. 10. =69=Duncan to Worth, Aug. 8. =65=Taylor, gen. orders -98-9, 105, 108, 110. =76=Canales to Mejía, Aug. 20. Ho. 60; 30, 1, pp. -411-2, 417 (Taylor), 534 (spec. orders 119). =76=Aldrete to Mejía, Aug. -30. _Picayune_, Aug. 25. Meade, Letters, i, 123. _Niles_, Sept. 5, p. 2. -=69=P. F. Smith, memoir, Oct. 14. Rowles, Allen, 93. U. S. Military maps -(War College, Washington). Duncan and also Hays explored the routes. - -The army was organized as follows: REGULARS (mostly). A battery of -two 24-pound howitzers and a 10-inch mortar (100 men) from the First -Artillery. _First Division_ (Brig. Gen. Twiggs). Cavalry: Second -Dragoons. Ridgely's battery. Third Brigade (Lieut. Col. Garland): -Bragg's battery, Third and Fourth Infantry, Capt. Shiver's volunteer -company. Fourth Brigade (Lieut. Col. Wilson): First Infantry, -Washington and Baltimore battalion. _Second Division_ (Brevet Brig. -Gen. Worth). First Brigade (Lieut. Col. Staniford): Duncan's battery, -Artillery Battalion, Eighth Infantry. Second Brigade ([G]Brig. Gen. P. -F. Smith): Taylor's (Mackall's) battery, Fifth and Seventh Infantry, -Blanchard's Louisiana volunteer company. VOLUNTEERS. _Field Division_ -(Maj. Gen. Butler). First Brigade (Brig. Gen. Hamer): First Kentucky -and First Ohio regiments. Second Brigade (Brig. Gen. Quitman): First -Tennessee and First Mississippi regiments (Ho. 60; 30, 1, p. 417). -Each of these four regiments was reduced to a strength of about 500 -privates by leaving behind the physically unfit. Sept. 20, the numbers -were respectively (aside from 43 sick) 482, 524, 459, 452; also 37 -artillery. _Texas Division_ (Maj. Gen. Henderson) First and Second -regiments of mounted volunteers. These and the First Mississippi -were riflemen. About Aug. 13 a regiment of Texas riflemen commanded -by Albert Sidney Johnston decided (except some who formed a company -under Shiver) to go home. Johnston was soon attached to Butler's staff -as acting inspector general (Ho. 60; 30, 1, p. 536). "Field Division" -simply meant those volunteers (except Texans) selected to make the -present campaign. It was a temporary and local organization. Sept. 11 -Meade (Letters, i, 126) analyzed the army as follows: 8 regiments of -regular infantry (2500); 4 regiments of volunteer infantry (2000); -4 light batteries, each of 4 6-pounders (280); one heavy battery -(100); 2 squadrons of regular cavalry (200); one squadron of volunteer -cavalry (150); 2 regiments of volunteer cavalry (1000); total, 6230 -men and 4-500 teamsters, hospital attendants, etc., mostly armed. Aug. -15 a man from Monterey said Taylor should not move against the city -without 12,000 well disciplined men. For the assignment of wagons and -pack-mules to the various corps see Ho. 60; 30, 1, p. 501. - -[G] Smith was colonel of the Mounted Rifles; but, as he had been -brigadier general of Louisiana volunteers and now commanded a brigade, -he was commonly given the higher title. In August, 1847, he was a -regular brevet brigadier general. - -A pack-mule (_mula de carga_) was expected to carry 300 pounds. Not a -little skill was required to load the animal quickly in such a manner -that its burden would be secure and would not chafe; but the Mexican -mule-driver was a master of the art. The subject is rather interesting. -One may consult Inman, Old S. Fe Trail (1897), 56-8; Robertson, -Remins., 269; _Picayune_, Mar. 6, 1847 (Hughes); Robertson, Visit, i, -274; Claiborne, Quitman, i, 279 (Holt); Henshaw narrative. The troops -not taken to Monterey were probably distributed about as follows: at -Camargo, 2100 under Brig. Gens. Pillow and Marshall; at Matamoros, 1100 -under Col. Clarke; below that city on the Rio Grande, 4500; at Pt. -Isabel, 120 under Maj. Gardner; in hospitals, 1400. Maj. Gen. Patterson -commanded all these forces. - -11.9. Henshaw narrative. Claiborne, Quitman, ii, 306 (Taylor). Taylor, -Letters (Bixby), 56. Robertson, Remins., 119-22. =69=P. F. Smith to -Bliss, Aug. 26. =69=Worth to Bliss, Aug. 25. =148=Chamberlain, recolls. -Ho. 60; 30, 1, p. 679 (Whiting). Giddings, Sketches, 108. Henry, Camp. -Sketches, 161-77. - -11.10. Taylor, Letters (Bixby), 54, 56. Robertson, Remins., 122. -Velasco, Geografía, iv, 121. =69=Duncan to Worth, Aug. 8. =69=Worth to -Bliss, Aug. 25. Ho. 60; 30, 1, p. 419 (Worth), 421 (Taylor). Wilhelm, -Eighth Inf., ii, 281. =76=Arleji to Ampudia, Aug. 31. Henry, Camp. -Sketches, 154, 177-9. Grant, Mems., i, 107. _Picayune_, Sept. 22; Oct. -6. Meade, Letters, i, 124. Kenly, Md. Vol., 85. _Metrop. Mag._, Dec, -1907, p. 316. - -Worth wrote on Sept. 3 that he could have bought 5000 bushels of corn -here (Ho. 60; 30, 1, p. 420). Taylor stated that he found beef, goats, -sheep and corn in abundance at Cerralvo (=180=Pillow to wife, Sept. -20). These facts bear upon Taylor's complaint that the government's -failure to send wagons caused a shortage of provisions and therefore of -men, especially since the wagons used for the transportation of water -as far as Cerralvo were no longer required for that service (=65=gen. -orders. 115). On learning of the corn Taylor might, so far as concerned -subsistence, have brought on another volunteer brigade. One cannot -see why he did not push some troops on to Cerralvo instead of letting -them die at Camargo. One soldier wrote in his diary that there were -unwholesome swamps at Cerralvo, but the statement appears doubtful. -Worth's command remained at this point nearly three weeks and was still -in excellent health. If there were swamps, the camps could no doubt have -been pitched on ground above them, for a fine stream came from a gorge -in the mountain. - -11.11. Balbontín, Invasión, 10-24. Apuntes, 54. Negrete, Invasión, ii, -304-5. =93=Memoranda. Memoria de ... Guerra, Dec., 1846. And from =76= -the following. To Ramírez, Aug. 17. Comte. gen. S. L. P., Aug. 15, -28; Sept. 2, 16. Ramírez, Aug. 17. Galindo, Aug. 24. Mejía, Aug. 17, -19. Romero, Aug. 24. To Ampudia, Aug. 17. Ampudia, Aug. 26; Sept. 2, -3, 9. Ponce de León, Sept. 19, 22. _Id._ to Ampudia, Sept. 15. Mejía -to Ampudia, Aug. 31. Returns, Sept. 10, 11. Pacheco, Aug. 25. Ampudia -reported that the First Brigade made about forty-eight miles one day. -This statement, were it not supported by similar facts, would not be -believed. The Fourth Brigade marched for Monterey, but did not arrive. -It was very poorly equipped. It reached S. L. Potosí Aug. 29, was halted -there to maintain order, and did not leave until Sept. 22. - -Ampudia organized his infantry as four brigades under Gen. Ramírez, Gen. -Mejía, Col. Uraga, and Col. Mendoza, and his cavalry as two brigades -under Gens. Torrejón and Romero, the former commanding by right of -seniority all the mounted troops. The name of the señorita might excite -suspicion, but there were others who bore it. - -The Mexican archives give very few complete, properly attested returns, -but we have one here, and it seems worth while to summarize it in -order to show the fragmentary character of the Mexican armies. The -attached numbers are the rank and file. Staff; a section of engineers; -do. of Plana Mayor; do. of surgeons, 10; sappers, 118; artillery, 211. -Infantry: Second Ligero regt., 220; Third do., 512; Fourth do., 397; -First Line regt., 186; Third do., 345; Fourth do., 187; detachments of -Sixth and Eighth do., 89; Seventh do., 129; Activo Battalion (First) -of Mexico, 136; Do. of Morelia, 77; Do. of S. L. Potosí, 340; Do. of -Querétaro, 340; Do. of Aguascalientes, 383; Auxiliary battalion of -Monterey, 349. Cavalry: Ligero, 80; First Line, 93; Third do., 140; -Eighth do., 99; Jalisco Lancers, 146; Activo of Guanajuato, 132; Do. -of S. L. Potosí, 123; Auxiliary Squadron of Béjar, 68; First Permanent -Co. of Tamaulipas, 41; Second do., 9; Permanent Co. of Lampazos, 23; -Do. of Béjar, 22; Do. of La Bahía, 1; First Activo Co. of N. León, 56; -Defensores [militia] of N. León, 625. Total, 5836. This was duly signed -by Ampudia and J. G. Conde. A party of deserters (mostly Irish) from the -American army, which served at Monterey, was presumably included in the -above return. They became the nucleus of the "San Patricio" corps. - -11.12. From =76= the following. To Ampudia, Aug. 20, 23, 24, 28 (four -despatches), 31. Comte. gen. N. León, Aug. 26. S. Anna, Sept. 29. Aug. -24 Ampudia was told to have Mejía suspend his retreat, unless Taylor -had advanced in full force. Aug. 28 he was ordered to destroy the -fortifications and retire, leaving a strong body of cavalry to screen -Monterey and observe the Americans until the latter should arrive within -a few leagues of the town. Aug. 31 Ampudia's decision to hold the city -was endorsed. Evidently the minister of war did not agree with Santa -Anna, and on finding an excuse disregarded the latter's advice. The -comandante general was especially anxious to have the Americans attacked -during their march. He described the garrison as enthusiastic. - -11.13. From =76=Mejía to Ampudia, Aug. 31. Comte. gen. N. León, Aug. 26. -Ampudia to Mejía, Aug. 24, 26. Ampudia, Aug. 26; Sept. 9. To Ampudia, -Aug. 31. - -Ampudia's reasons were: 1. It would take a month to demolish the -fortifications, and during that time the enemy could attack on -advantageous terms; 2. The matériel could not be saved; 3. The -abandonment of Monterey would lead the people to declare their -independence and unite with Taylor, enabling him to hold the mountains -so strongly that 50,000 men could not dislodge him; 4. Public opinion -would blame Ampudia and the government; 5. The effect on the morale -of all the troops concerned in the affair would be fatal. His plan was -to attack the Americans in detail on their march; and then, should he -find them too strong for him, retreat with his artillery and infantry, -leaving the cavalry to fight rear-guard actions. - -11.14. Apuntes, 54. From =76= the following. To Mejía, May 27. Mejía, -June 19 (two despatches); July 25. Comte. gen. N. León, Aug. 12. -Ampudia, Sept. 9. Mejía to Ampudia, Aug. 31. - -11.15. =307=Roberts, diary, Nov. 27. Meade, Letters, i, 133, 136. -Richmond _Enquirer_, Oct. 20. =169=Taylor to Crittenden, Oct. 9. Henshaw -narrative. Apuntes, 53-4; =176=Davis to Brown, Sept. 20. Balbontín, -Invasión, 24. =92=Map and plan of defence. Negrete, Invasión, ii, -327 (Ampudia). _Picayune_, Nov. 4. Eyewitness, Complete History, 45. -Numerous maps, published and in MS. - -11.16. Apuntes, 53-4. Meade, Letters, i, 138 (evidently in error about -the citadel garrison). _Picayune_, Oct. 21. _Nat. Intelligencer_, Nov. -20. Henry, Camp. Sketches, 216. Henshaw narrative. Robertson, Remins., -126-8. =69=Mansfield, report. =66=_Id._ to Totten, June 30, 1847. -=147=Chamberlain, diary. Balbontín, Invasión, 43. =76=Comte. gen. N. -León, Sept. 20. =76=Ampudia, Sept. 9. The Americans often spoke of -the citadel as the "Black Fort" or the "Old Colored Gentleman." Its -Mexican name was Fort Independencia, but it must not be confounded with -the redoubt on Independence Hill. It stood about 1000 yards from the -densely-built part of the city. - -11.17. =69=Mansfield, report. Balbontín, Invasión, 27, 38, 42. =76=Mejía -to Ampudia, Aug. 31. Ho. 60; 30, 1, p. 424 (Taylor). =364=Worth to ----, -Oct. 2. Sen. 1; 29, 2, p. 46 (Marcy, report). =221=Hill, diary. Henry, -Camp. Sketches, 217. - -11.18. From =76=. S. Anna to Ampudia, Aug. 13. Ampudia to Gov. -Tamaulipas, Aug. 23. Relaciones (to Guerra), Sept. 23. Ampudia, Aug. 28. -To Ampudia, Sept. 4. Mejía to Ampudia, Aug. 31. - -11.19. _Diario_, July 4; Sept. 21. _Monitor Repub._, Sept. 25. Reid, -Scouting Expeds., 120. _Picayune_, Sept. 22. Negrete, Invasión, ii, 326. -N. Orl. _Commerc. Bulletin_, Sept. 22. =76=Ampudia, proc., Aug. 31. -=76=Proc. in English, Sept. 15. =76=Circular, Sept. 15. - -11.20. _Monitor Repub._, Sept. 18; Oct. 29 (Jáuregui). =13=Bankhead, -no. 155, 1846. Apuntes, 54, 57. Balbontín, Invasión, 26. =76=Nevia to -Ampudia, Aug. 26. - -11.21. Tampico _Eco_, Sept. 24. Gov. of Tamaulipas, Aug. 20. Rose, -McCulloch, 73. Mejía to Paredes, July 20. Balbontín, Invasión, 26. -Apuntes, 55-8. Ho. 60; 30, 1, p. 526 (spec. orders 129). And from =76= -the following. Ampudia, Aug. 31; Sept. 2, res., 15, res. _Id._ to -Torrejón, Sept. 1. Mejía to Ampudia, Aug. 31. Canales, Aug. 30. _Id._ to -Ampudia, Aug. 30-1. Mejía to comte. gen. S. L. P., Aug. 17. - -Canales said in substance: The spare horses of the enemy cannot be -taken, for they are not turned loose; the roads cannot be broken up, for -they run across stony plains; the woods cannot be fired, for no great -fields of dry grass are near them; the watering places cannot be made -useless, for they are streams coming from the mountains; the wagons and -pack-mules cannot be captured, for my horses are unserviceable. - -11.22. Meade, Letters, i, 129. =147=Chamberlain, diary. Giddings, -Sketches, 97. =139=W. B. to D. Campbell, Aug. 28. Nebel and Kendall, -5. Mayer, Mex. War, 159-61. _Picayune_, Nov. 13. =65=Gen. orders 115. -Smith, Chile con Carne, 94, note. Accounts of the costumes naturally -varied. - -11.23. _Picayune_, Oct. 6. Greensborough _Morn. Post_, Apr. 5, 1903. -=349=Patridge to Miss W., July 21, 1847. _Metrop. Mag._, Dec., 1907, -316-7. _Spirit of the Times_, Oct. 14. Henry, Camp. Sketches, 183-6, -244. =364=Worth to S., Sept. 16. McCall, Letters, 470. Reid, Scouting -Expeds., 128. =190=Ewing, diary, Nov. 18. Robertson, Remins., 123-4. -Taylor, Letters (Bixby), 57. =69=Duncan to Worth, Aug. 8. Ho. 60; 30, 1, -p. 421-2 (Taylor). - -One small mountain in this region had a bare side composed of -crystallized sulphate of lime. Here, as generally, the author draws upon -his own observations of Mexican scenery. There were a number of defiles -between Cerralvo and Monterey and a great deal of rough, bushy country, -where the Mexicans could have made Taylor no little trouble. In all -probability he could have been delayed five to seven days. See _Monitor_ -_Repub._, Oct. 20, _remitido_. - -11.24. =169=Taylor to Crittenden, Oct. 9. _Id._, Letters (Bixby), 57, -59. Henshaw narrative. Claiborne, Quitman, i, 277. Robertson, Remins., -125-6. =65=Taylor, gen. orders 119-20. Apuntes, 54, 58. Wilhelm, Eighth -Inf., ii, 288. =76=Comte. gen. N. León, Sept. 20. Reid, Scouting -Expeds., 142. _Picayune_, Oct. 6. Rose, McCulloch, 100. _Niles_, Oct. -17, p. 103. =244=Chandler to Lakin, Nov. 23. Henry, Camp. Sketches, -189-91. - -Wilhelm, who wrote the history of Worth's old regt. and had the use -of Worth's papers, states that, after arriving at Marín, Taylor was -"firm" in the opinion that he would meet with no serious resistance at -Monterey. Certainly he then estimated Ampudia's regulars at only about -3000 (Ho. 60; 30, 1, p. 422). - -11.25. =169=Taylor to Crittenden, Sept. 15, 1847. _Id._, Letter to -Gaines. _Id._, Letters (Bixby), 178. Thorpe, Our Army at Monterey, -46. Robertson, Remins., 124. Henshaw narrative. French, Two Wars, 67. -Apuntes, 58. Chávez, July 29, 1848. =76=Ampudia, Sept. 19. _Monitor -Repub._, Oct. 20. Henry, Camp. Sketches, 190-2. - -Taylor's =61=field return, Sept. 21 (the first of two numbers -represents officers): Hdqtrs. and staff, 22; 23. Webster's battery -(24-lb. howitzers), 3; 24. 1st Div. Hdqtrs. and staff, 3; 10. Ridgely's -batt., 3; 75. 2 Drags. (4 Cos.), 10; 228. Bragg's batt., 2; 64. 3 Inf. -(6 Cos.), 18; 284. 4 Inf. (6 Cos.), 16; 287. Shiver's Co., 3; 55. 1 -Inf. (4 Cos.), 12; 179. Balt. and Wash. Battal. (6 Cos.), 20; 314. 2D -DIV. (see below), 93; 1558. FIELD DIV. (see below), 148; 1781. TEX. -DIV. Hdqtrs. and staff, 5 offs. 1st Regt. (10 Cos.), 32; 376. 2d Regt. -(10 Cos.), 35; 527. Surgeons, 5. Sick, 3; 143. 2D DIV. (Sept. 17). -Staffs, 5. _1st brig._: Duncan's batt., 68; Artill. Battal., 532; 8 -Inf., 331. _2d brig._: Mackall's batt., 70; 5 Inf., 280; 7 Inf., 282; -Blanchard's Co., 83. (These figures include 88 com. offs.) Sick, 7; -45. 5 Inf., 7 Inf. and 8 Inf. had 6 Cos. each. Art. Battal. had 9 Cos. -FIELD DIV. (Sept. 20). Staff, 12. Artill., 37. Ky. (10 Cos.), 482; -Ohio (10 Cos.), 524; Miss. (8 Cos.), 452; Tenn. (10 Cos.), 459. (These -figures include 139 com. offs.) Sick, 1; 42. Grand totals (Sept. 21), -425; 5795 = 6220. - -Taylor's formal report counted the officers twice. Ripley made the same -mistake (War with Mexico, i, 199). The 24-lb. howitzers appear to have -been classed as heavy field guns (=69=memo., ordnance office, June 15). - - - XII. MONTEREY - -12.1. =66=Mansfield to Totten, Feb. 1, 1847. Ho. 4; 29, 2, pp. 76, -83 (Taylor). Wilhelm, Eighth Inf., ii, 289. =76=Comte. gen. N. León, -Sept. 20. Stevens, Campaigns, 22. Henry, Camp. Sketches, 192. Nebel and -Kendall, 5, 6. Apuntes, 58. - -12.2. Apuntes, 59. _Monitor Repub._, Oct. 31 (Berra). Nebel and -Kendall, 6. _Nat. Intelligencer_, Nov. 20. J. Davis in _Cong. Globe_, -31, 1, app., 1034-41. _Picayune_, Oct. 4; Nov. 13. =221=Hill, diary. -Smith, To Mexico, 73-4. =69=Worth to Bliss, Sept. 21, 8:15 A.M. -=147=Chamberlain, diary. Balbontín, Invasión, 25, 36. Ho. 4; 29, 2, p. -102 (Worth). - -The Federation 9-pdrs. were classed by the Mexicans as 8-pdrs. The -half-moon battery was designed to come into play after the capture of -the city, annoying the captors and defending the line of retreat to -Saltillo. - -12.3. =76=Comte. gen. N. León, Sept. 20. =69=Worth to Bliss, Aug. 28. -=76=Ampudia, Sept. 19, res. - -12.4. =221=Hill, diary. =277=Staniford to Pemberton, Sept. 26. -Robertson, Remins., 130. Nebel and Kendall, 6. Chamberlain, diary. -Ho. 4; 29, 2, pp. 83 (Taylor), 102 (Worth). =76=Comte. gen. N. León, -Sept. 20. _Picayune_, Nov. 13. =245=Hays to Henderson, undated. -_Pennsylvanian_, Nov. 2. Meade, Letters, i, 133. _Metropol. Mag._, Dec, -1907 (Hamilton). _Spirit of the Times_, Nov. 7. (Worth) Robertson, -Remins., Sept. 20; =185=J. Van Buren, oration; Chase, Polk Admin., 156; -=185=W. to Duncan, Apr. 15; Jacksonville (Ala.) _Republican_, Nov. 25; -Grone, Briefe, 83; Semmes, Service, 282; =327=Sutherland to father, Aug. ---. - -A part of Hays's four hundred did not march until a little later. It -seems clear, although neither Taylor nor Worth mentions the fact, that -a party of dragoons accompanied the expedition (Chamberlain, diary; -Haskin, First Artillery, 307). It will be recalled that most of our -"artillery" served as infantry. Blanchard's company was made up of -men who did not wish to leave when most of the Louisiana infantry was -ordered home (p. 205). - -Worth's movement was in principle extremely hazardous (Halleck, Mil. -Art, 414). Napoleon (Maxims, p. 24): "Nothing is more rash or more -opposed to the principles of war, than a flank march in the presence -of an army in position, especially when that army occupies heights at -the foot of which you must defile." This maxim seems to fit the case -precisely. Stevens (Campaigns, 28) defended the movement on the ground -that Taylor knew what could be expected of Worth's command and of the -Mexicans; but as Ampudia had shown no conspicuous want of ability and -courage on May 8 and 9, Taylor had no reason to suppose he would act -here as badly as he did. Indeed the struggle at Monterey showed that if -Taylor assumed the Mexicans would not fight, he erred. It was doubtless -realized by Taylor and Worth that the small American army, without siege -artillery or adequate supplies, could escape ruin only through extreme -boldness. Apparently the plan originated with Worth, for he knew more -about the terrain than Taylor did. Wilhelm so states, and the N. Y. -_Sun_ also, the editor of which was close to Worth, gave him that credit -(Aug. 14, 1847). Bragg (=210=to Hammond, May 4, 1848) ascribed the plan -to Taylor; but, as Taylor was the commander-in-chief, this was the -natural presumption. - -12.5. Meade, Letters, i, 133. Ho. 4; 29, 2, p. 83 (Taylor). _Picayune_, -Nov. 13. _Monitor Repub._, Oct. 29 (Jáuregui), 31 (Berra). =245=Hays to -Henderson, undated. Reid, Scouting Expeds., 152. =218=Henshaw narrative. -Ampudia, Manifiesto. Robertson, Remins., 130-1. =69=Worth to Bliss, -Sept. 20, 9:30 P.M. - -12.6. Ho. 4; 29, 2, pp. 83 (Taylor), 102 (Worth). _Monitor Repub._, Oct. -29. =76=Vázquez, Sept. 23. Balbontín, Invasión, 27. =69=Worth to Bliss, -Sept. 20, 9:30 P.M. Meade, Letters, i, 133. Robertson, Remins., -131-2. - -12.7. Ho. 4; 29, 2, pp. 83 (Taylor), 102 (Worth). =185=Duncan to Worth, -Sept. 28. Henshaw narrative. Chamberlain, diary. Apuntes, 59. González, -Aguascalientes, 152. =185=Worth to Marcy, July 14, 1847. =69=Worth to -Bliss, Sept. 21, 8:15 A.M.; 3:40 P.M. _Picayune_, Nov. 13, 1846; Feb. -17, 1847. Meade, Letters, i, 133. Wash. _Union_, Nov. 20. =252=Mackall -to father, Sept. 27. N. Y. _Sun_, Oct. 14. _Monitor Repub._, Oct. 17, -31; Nov. 15. =245=Hays to Henderson, undated. Haskin, First Artillery, -309. =180=C. F. Smith to Pemberton, Sept. 30. =277=Staniford to -Pemberton, Sept. 26. Henry, Camp. Sketches, 201. Prieto, Memorias, 205. -Reid, Scouting Expeds., 157-9. - -McCulloch, being in advance, did not receive the order to take post -behind the fence, and hence fought in the road. - -12.8. _The operations on Federation Ridge._ =69=Worth to Bliss, Sept. -21, 3:40 P.M. Ho. 4; 29, 2, p. 102 (Worth). =245=Hays to -Henderson, undated. =180=C. F. Smith to Pemberton, Sept. 30. =277=P. -F. Smith to _Id._, Sept. 27. _Monitor Repub._, Oct. 31 (Berra). -=252=Mackall to father, Sept. 27. Henry, Camp. Sketches, 201-3. Nebel -and Kendall, 6-7. _Hist. Mag._, Mar., 1874, p. 138. Wash. _Union_, Nov. -12, 20. Chamberlain, diary and recolls. =278=Niehenke, statement. Meade, -Letters, i, 134. _Picayune_, Oct. 4; Nov. 13. Henshaw narrative. Reid, -Scouting Expeds., 162-6. Hill, diary. - -Meade (Letters, i, 88) wrote: Worth "has the great misfortune of being -most rash and impetuous, and of constantly doing things which cooler -reflection causes him to repent. This infirmity, in my opinion, renders -him unfit to command, but on the field of battle, under another, his -gallantry and bravery are well known and most conspicuous." U. S. Grant -(Mems., i, 123) said: Worth "was nervous, impatient and restless on the -march, or when important or responsible duty confronted him." - -Miles set out about forty-five minutes later than C. F. Smith. On -reaching the ridge he sent off detachments in order to divert attention -from Smith. Still restless, Worth sent Col. Hays and more Texans to the -ridge, but these did not arrive in time to do anything of consequence. -Gen. Smith's attack upon El Soldado, made on his own responsibility, -had a very important bearing upon the movement against Independence -Hill and the Bishop's Palace. Hitchcock said Gen. Smith not only aided -Worth materially but saved his reputation (Sen. 65; 30, 1, p. 528). The -summit and El Soldado continued to be held by the Americans. Scott and -Blanchard (who was under Scott's orders) were recalled from No. 3 to -El Soldado the next morning to coöperate in the attack on the Palace. -According to some Americans three guns were captured. This mistake -probably arose because one piece was used by the Americans at the summit -and then moved to El Soldado. According to the Mexicans there seem to -have been only 175 of them on the ridge. On both sides the loss of men -on Federation Ridge was insignificant. Worth had 15 or 20 killed and -wounded. Some thought the summit of Federation Ridge not less than 800 -feet high. As the Monterey plans are unavoidably based to a large -extent upon sketches and estimates, it has not been thought best to give -a scale of miles. - -12.9. _The capture of Independence Hill._ Ho. 4; 29, 2, p. 102 -(Worth). Ampudia, Manifiesto. =69=Worth to Bliss, Sept. 22, 8:30 A.M., -5 P.M. French, Two Wars, 64-5. =147=Chamberlain, diary. =148=_Id._, -recolls. Balbontín, Invasión, 38-9. Apuntes, 61-2. =190=Ewing, diary. -=218=Henshaw narrative; =221=Hill, diary. _Picayune_, Nov. 13. -=252=Mackall to father, Sept. 27. Meade, Letters, i, 135-6. Wash. -_Union_, Nov. 20. _Diario_, Sept. 30. _Monitor Repub._, Oct. 31 -(Berra). =245=Hays to Henderson, undated. Henry, Camp. Sketches, 205. -Nebel and Kendall, 6. =185=Duncan to Worth, Sept. 28. Reid, Scouting -Expeds., 183-5. Ampudia to the People. Some officers thought the hill -nearly 600 feet high, Ampudia tardily ordered reinforcements to the -hill, but they did not arrive. Worth's loss, Sept. 22, was only about a -dozen killed and wounded. - -12.10. _Taylor's and Ampudia's operations, Sept. 20-3_; _Worth's, -Sept. 23_. Ho. 4; 29, 2, pp. 76-109 (reports of Taylor and officers). -Ho. 17; 30, 1 (reports of officers). =169=Taylor to Crittenden, Oct. -9, 1846; Jan. 26, 1847. =190=Ewing, diary. =218=Henshaw narrative. -Coleman, Crittenden, i, 309. Claiborne, Quitman, ii, 303-7. =221=Hill, -diary. Numerous reports and letters in =174= and =176=. Smith, Chile -con Carne, 82-97. Thorpe, Our Army at Monterey, 55, 59. Ampudia, -Manifiesto. _Id._ to Fellow-citizens. Robertson, Reminiscences, -136-50. =61=Graham to Polk, April --, 18.7. =61=Quitman to Hamer, -Sept. 28. =69=Capt. Vinton to Worth, Aug. 19. Taylor, gen. orders -115. =69=Worth to Bliss, Sept. 23, 11 P.M. =69=Trowbridge to Stewart, -Feb. 8, 1848. French, Two Wars, 62, 64-6. =66=Mansfield to Totten, -Feb. 1, 1847. =69=Backus to Brady, Sept. 22, 1848. =147=Chamberlain, -diary. =148=_Id._, recolls. Balbontín, Invasión, 24, 27-35, 40-3. -Roa Bárcena, Recuerdos, 72. Apuntes, 53, 60-4. Ho. 60; 30, 1, pp. -419 (Worth), 424 (Taylor). Roberts, diary. _Hist. Mag._, Jan., 1874, -pp. 8-9. _Picayune_, Oct. 23; Nov. 4, 13. Meade, Letters, i, 134-5, -137-8, 163-5. =185=Duncan to Worth, Sept. 28. =242=Kingsbury to -mother, Oct. 14. Lawton, Artill. Officer, 29, 30. Stevens, Camps., -23-9. =73=Bermúdez de Castro, no. 371, res., 1846. _Hist. Mag._, x, -207-13, 255-7. Johnston, A. S. Johnston, 136-40. J. Davis: note 2. -_Pennsylvanian_, Nov. 2 (Peyton). Wash. _Union_, Nov. 20, 1846; Mar. -2, 1847. Balt. _Sun_, Nov. 6. _Monitor Repub._, Nov. 15. _Spirit of -the Times_, Nov. 7, 28, 1846; Jan. 9, 1847. =245=Wood to Henderson, -Sept. 24. =245=Hays to _Id._, undated. _Niles_, Nov. 28, p. 201. -=244=Chandler to Lakin, Nov. 23. =175=Russell, to Davis, Sept. 26; Oct. -18. =175=Cooper to Davis, Sept. --. Wilcox, Mex. War, 119. Kenly, Md. -Vol., 77, 107-27, etc. =139=W. B. to D. Campbell, Sept. 28; Nov. 2, 9, -1846; Feb. 19, 1847. Henry, Camp. Sketches, 193-201, 203-4, 206-12, -221. =130=Brichta, Letter. Nebel and Kendall, 7-10. =139=Campbell to -Quitman, Sept. 27; to wife, Oct. 1. =150=Cheatham to son, Oct. 6; -to sister, Oct. 16. =277=P. F. Smith to Pemberton, Sept. 27. Reid, -Scouting Expeds., 108, 152, 170, 173, 190. =76=Ampudia, Sept. 22, 25. -=76=_Id._ to comte. gen. S. L. P., Sept. 28. =76=Head of Ampudia's -medical service, Sept. 24. The author of the verse was C. F. Hoffman. - -REMARKS. Taylor's lack of interest in studying the topography and -fortifications is illustrated by the fact that Butler, second in -command, does not seem to have been shown the map drawn by Meade from -information obtained by Worth, though Taylor certainly saw it (Wilhelm, -Eighth Infantry, ii, 283). Butler stated officially that when he -attacked the city he knew nothing about the locality. Capt. Henry said -Garland's charge was made in "utter ignorance" regarding it (Camp. -Sketches, 194). It has been said that Taylor lacked entrenching tools; -but he had tools for building roads, planting the mortar and howitzers, -and erecting new defences at the Tenería redoubt. Stevens (Campaigns, -29) undertook to defend Taylor's operations on Sept. 21 by saying that -the ardor of Garland's men brought them into action before Mansfield's -reconnaissance had been completed; but (1) Garland was virtually -instructed to follow Mansfield's directions and did so, and (2) Oct. -24 Taylor said he would have pursued the same course, had he known all -that he learned later about the situation--_i.e._ Garland executed -Taylor's ideas and wishes (=61=Graham to Polk, Apr. --, [1847]). -Waiting for a fuller reconnaissance, therefore, would have consumed -time without giving any advantage. It follows, too, from this statement -of Taylor's that he would not have excused Mansfield, had Mansfield -instructed Garland not to charge. Taylor did not recommend a brevet for -Garland. This was an implied censure. Capt. G. M. Graham of Garland's -command therefore addressed a letter to Polk, giving a full account of -Garland's proceedings. This letter was presented to Polk by Gen. George -Gibson, who gave the writer "a high character." It may be added, that -it was impossible for Mansfield to make a complete reconnaissance under -the circumstances. He would not have lived to finish it. - -The Fourth Infantry, having been detached to cover the battery, was not -in Garland's charge. The mortar does not seem to have been effective on -Sept. 21 (Giddings, Sketches, 202); had it been so, it would not have -been put out of commission for a considerable time by being sent to -Worth, who does not seem to have asked for it. It appears to have been -used by Taylor only twenty minutes, which suggests that its inefficiency -was speedily discovered. Had the cause been merely the lack of a -platform (Ripley, War with Mexico, i, 206), it could have been removed. -There was timber enough at Walnut Grove. The statements regarding the -number of guns in Tenería redoubt cannot be wholly reconciled. This may -arise from the fact that not all the pieces could be used. The statement -in the text seems to be safe. - -The author feels some scepticism about the doings of Backus. No -unanimity prevailed then about him. He is rather too precise in his own -statement. He says (_Historical Magazine_, x, 255) that the distance -from the building he occupied to the tannery was found to be 117-3/4 -yards. One can hardly understand how so exact a measurement can have -been made in such a locality. The distance from his position to Tenería -redoubt was considerably more than this. Henry estimated it at 130 yards -(Campaign Sketches, 195). Muskets were not reliable at this distance. -His claims were not accepted by all at the time. Still, many believed -that he contributed materially to the capture of the redoubt. After the -capture of this redoubt Col. Davis undertook to storm El Diablo, but -was recalled. There was a sharp clash between Taylor and Butler in the -course of the operations, Sept. 21. Taylor should, of course, have kept -out of the street fighting (Griepenkerl, Applied Tactics, 187). There -was sufficient demand for head work at that time to absorb his full -attention. It was stated that after the repulse of the Americans, Sept. -21, Mejía asked to have both infantry and cavalry charge them. Had this -been done the results might have been very serious. - -The American artillery when in the town was handled as cautiously as -possible. For example, a gun would be loaded and leveled behind a -corner, drawn out by ropes, fired, and drawn back by the ropes (French, -Two Wars, 66). Yet even in a case of this kind four out of the five -gunners were killed. Taylor does not mention the presence of the Fourth -Infantry, Sept. 23, but U. S. Grant does (Mems., i, 115-6); and as he -belonged to that corps, it seems hardly possible that he was mistaken. -It had been so much reduced the day before, that perhaps Taylor did not -think it worth mention. According to Taylor's report the reason for -withdrawing his men from the city on the afternoon of Sept. 23 was to -prepare for a general assault. But considerable time would have been -necessary to do this in concert with Worth, and it is hard to see why -they were withdrawn under fire when they were doing good work in safety, -and night was not far distant. Apparently the best way to arrange for -such concerted operations would have been to leave these troops where -they were, and open a line of communication through the northern part of -the city (Ripley, _op. cit._, i, 264). The rumors that Mexican forces -were approaching by the Saltillo road were correct, but Ampudia sent -them an order to retire. They were not strong enough to accomplish -anything. - -When Worth attacked the city, Sept. 23, his right-hand column, headed by -Texan riflemen, dismounted, under Col. Hays, took the Calle de Monterey; -the left-hand column, headed by similar troops under Lieut. Col. Walker, -took the Calle de Itúrbide. Besides the Texans and the field batteries, -the Seventh and Eighth Infantry and the Artillery Battalion joined in -the attack. The detachment that had been sent up the Saltillo road was -recalled and acted as a reserve. The American shells thrown during the -night of Sept. 23 seem to have injured nothing except Ampudia's courage. -Purísima Bridge was about 2300 feet from the cathedral. - -It is probably true that Taylor's operations at the eastern end of the -town and the disregard of life exhibited by his troops tended to dismay -Ampudia. But Taylor had no reason to suppose that operations so badly -planned, so ineffective and so costly would have that effect; they were -wasteful; and they demoralized his own men. The Mexicans fought in most -cases with a courage and tenacity deserving of high praise (Henry, Camp. -Sketches, 209). So far as one can see, nothing saved Taylor from a -disaster that would have meant the ruin of his army but the poltroonery -of one man, Ampudia; and as we have remarked, he had no reason to expect -that. The head of Ampudia's medical service reported, Sept. 24, that -only sixty privates had been seriously wounded. - -12.11. Ho. 4; 29, 2, p. 78 (Taylor). =364=Worth to S., Oct. 2. García, -Revolución, 16. Claiborne, Quitman, i, 262-9. Ampudia, Manifiesto. -Apuntes, 64. =13=Pakenham, no. 122, 1846. Balbontín, Invasión, 50-2. Ho. -60; 30, 1, p. 348 (Ampudia), 348 (Taylor), 349 (terms). =76=Ampudia, -Sept. 29. _Nat. Intelligencer_, Oct. 26; Nov. 7. Wash. _Union_, Jan. -18 (Ampudia); Feb. 18, 1847. _Niles_, Nov. 28, p. 197. _Epoca_, Feb. -9, 1847 (Ampudia). _Observador Zacatecano_, Dec. 27, 1846, supplement -(Requena). _Diario_, Oct. 2 (Ampudia). _Republicano_, May 28, 1847. - -Worth's cannon were prevented by a fog from opening fire early Thursday -morning. Worth's =364=reasons, as explained privately to a friend, for -giving liberal terms were: (1) Owing to the feelings of the Texans and -resentment occasioned by the American losses in the battle, an assault -would have been attended with the slaughter of many women; (2) The -numbers and the position of the Mexicans rendered them formidable; -(3) "Neither myself nor many others had the slightest confidence in -the _intelligence that directed_" the American operations; (4) Our -government wanted peace. The Mexicans were allowed twenty-one rounds for -their battery. - -The principal excuses alleged by Ampudia for surrendering were the -failure to injure the Americans on their march, the lack of the Fourth -Brigade, a want of funds, provisions and artillery ammunition, the -inefficiency and cowardice of a part of his army, the hostility of -the superior officers, and their failure to support him. According to -a Mexican letter from S. Luis Potosí dated October 3, 1846, the loss -of the city was attributed wholly to his cowardice. A number of his -chief officers appear to have been no more courageous than he, but the -decision did not rest with them. Perhaps he thought it necessary to save -the one veteran army of Mexico, but a successful or even heroic defence -of Monterey would have probably been more beneficial to his cause. -There were provisions enough and a large stock of ammunition; but we -are not sure that his supply of artillery ammunition was adequate. The -commission consisted of Worth, Henderson, J. Davis, Requena, Ortega, -Llano. The Mexicans actually carried away three 12-pounders and three -8-pounders (Requena). The British minister at Washington reported: The -armistice seems to be "in direct opposition to the rule laid down in -Mr. Buchanan's letter to Commodore Conner of the 27th July" [Sen. 107; -29, 2, p. 3], by which it was determined that no armistice should be -agreed to until a treaty of peace should have been actually concluded -(=13=Pakenham, no. 122, Oct. 16, 1846). San Fernando de Presas was east -of Linares near the Gulf. See note 12. - -12.12. Polk, Diary, Oct. 11, 12. Ho. 4; 29, 2, pp. 79 (Taylor), 106 -(Worth). (Instructions) Ho. 60; 30, 1, pp. 323, 333, 355 (Marcy). -Henshaw narrative. Nunelee, diary. Taylor, Letters (Bixby), 62. -=364=Worth to S., Oct. 2. Meade, Letters, i, 138. Taylor, Letter to -Gaines. _Pennsylvanian_, Nov. 2 (Peyton). =139=W. B. to D. Campbell, -Nov. 2. Robertson, Remins., 157. =13=Pakenham, no. 127, 1846 (Taylor's -ammunition would not have lasted many hours longer). _Cong. Globe_, 29, -2, p. 316 (Clayton). - -Worth: Twiggs's division and the volunteers "were taken into action -without order, direction, support, or command; in fact murdered" -(=364=to S., Oct. 2). Col. Campbell: Taylor showed little generalship -in the handling of my regiment; took too great a risk in coming to -Monterey without more transportation (=139=to D. Campbell, Sept. 28; -Nov. 9). Capt. Cheatham (Campbell's regiment): "I consider, that old -Taylor committed one of the greatest blunders that ever a General was -guilty of, in coming here to attack one of the strongest fortified towns -in Mexico, with nothing in the world but small Artillery, for open -field fighting" (=50=to son, Oct. 6). _Id._: "We were rushed headlong -into the fight and our Generals did not know where we were going" -(=150=to sister, Oct. 16). Capt. Henry (Garland's brigade): "I look -upon the exposure of the field artillery in the streets as perfectly -useless" (_Spirit of the Times_, Nov. 7). Capt. Backus (Garland's -brigade): The Third and Fourth Infantry were "entirely inadequate to -the duty required" of them; "this hazardous and useless enterprize" -(_Hist. Mag._, x, 212). Baltimore Captain: Sept. 21 I was under first -one general and then another till I and my men "became completely worn -out" (_Picayune_, Nov. 7). Engineer Stevens: The eastern attack was -marked by rash and headlong movements; the mortar, instead of being -sent to Worth, should have been placed in Tenería redoubt; Taylor -should not have withdrawn his troops on Wednesday, etc. (Campaigns, -27). Officer: Garland's charge a fatal mistake (Balt. _Sun_, Nov. 6). -Officer: The eastern attack very injudicious (_Nat. Intelligencer_, -Nov. 20). Lieut. Hamilton (West Pointer): The officers who fell at -the east end were "a sacrifice to the blind folly and ignorance of -our general-in-chief" (_Metrop. Mag._, Dec., 1907, p. 321). C. M. -Wilcox, who arrived at Monterey not long after the battle: "Harsh and -unfavorable criticism" of the operations at the east end was "universal" -there (Mex. War, 120). Robertson: The lack of a siege train was due -to Taylor's misunderstanding the intentions of the enemy; the cannon -could easily have been transported (Remins., 129, 160). Smith: Only -Ampudia's personal unfitness saved Taylor from deserved ruin (Remins., -18). Monterey letter, Oct. 11: 6-pounders were sent to batter down -fortifications that 24-pounders would not have affected. Gen. Requena, -probably the best Mexican officer: Worth made the real attack; Taylor -blundered (_Observador Zacatecano_, Dec. 27, supplem.). G. Ferry: -Prudence forbade Taylor, in view of the too evident discouragement of -his army, to press his advantage; by negotiating he changed almost -certain defeat into victory (_Revue des Deux Mondes_, Aug. 1, 1847, -410). An editorial in _Niles' Register_ of July 18, 1846, is curiously -interesting: "Owing to an error in estimating the capacities of the -enemy" Taylor "made a narrow escape from almost utter annihilation" -in May. "One lesson of this kind, we venture to predict, will be a -sufficient admonition to" Taylor.... "He will be cautious to keep his -troops within reach of supplies, and to have at hand the means of -transportation." The editor proved to be mistaken in every point. - -One of Taylor's excuses for the terms was consideration for the -non-combatants (=169=to Crittenden, Oct. 9), and it may have counted -for something; but he had just refused these non-combatants permission -to leave the town (Ho. 4; 29, 2, p. 78). Another (_ibid._) was the -propinquity of the citadel, and the impossibility of taking it without -a siege of twenty or thirty days or else a large expenditure of life; -but the citadel had not been able to injure the Americans materially -while they were fighting in the town, and could not injure them at -all in Walnut Grove; and, as Taylor admitted that he would hardly be -able to advance for six weeks (Bixby coll., 62), there was no lack of -time. In point of fact, as could easily have been surmised, the citadel -had neither water nor provisions enough to stand a siege (Balbontín, -Invasión, 46). - -The gallant defence of the city was another excuse (Ho. 4; 29, 2, p. -79; Bixby coll., 61); but while that is a just reason for doing honor -to a garrison, it is none for relinquishing the substantial fruits of -a dearly bought victory. It would have cost the lives of fifty or one -hundred soldiers, besides the wounded, to take the city by storm, said -Taylor (=169=to Crittenden, Oct. 9). But this would have been a low -price for the elimination of an army that he said was rated at 7200 -besides 2000 irregulars (Bixby coll., 61)--the only army possessed by -Mexico--with its arms, accoutrements, artillery and horses. The moral -effect of such a victory would probably, in the unanimous opinion of -Polk and his Cabinet (Polk, Diary, Oct. 12), have ended the war; and -the desperate fury displayed by Santa Anna when he supposed that such -had been the outcome (=52=Black, Sept. 26; =76=S. Anna, Sept. 29) -tends to support this view. The Mexicans could have escaped, "done -what we might," Taylor urged (_cf._ Ho. 60; 30, 1, 359). But if he -could have captured the city so easily, entrenched as the garrison -were in the strong buildings near the main plaza, he could certainly -have scattered them and captured a large number, had they attempted to -flee with artillery, ammunition and provisions through those narrow -streets commanded by low, flat houses; and indeed no road available for -artillery crossed the mountains except the one (held by Worth) through -Rinconada Pass. Ampudia wrote to his government that even if he could -have cut his way out, his forces would have been dispersed and his -military material captured (Sept. 25). (Taylor seems to have taken no -steps to prevent the Mexicans from escaping during the night of the -twenty-fourth, though their protracting the negotiations until late in -the day might have suggested a design to do this.) - -But, suggested Taylor, magnanimous terms were favorable to peace (Bixby -coll., 61). On the other hand the United States had used in vain with -Mexico every method except hostilities; our national authorities had now -instructed him to try vigorous warfare (Ho. 60; 30, 1, p. 324); and it -was for them to say whether this deliberately adopted policy should--on -a political ground--be abandoned. To meet this obvious view the General -said that a change of régime had occurred at Mexico since the date -of his orders. That was true; but it would be singular indeed if a -political change in the enemy's country--of which nothing definite was -heard except from an enemy notorious for subterfuges--could authorize a -general in the field to violate his instructions. Taylor himself stated -(Ho. 60; 30, 1, p. 360) that his "grand motive" in advancing from the -Rio Grande was "to increase the inducements of the Mexican government to -negotiate for peace"--_i.e._ by showing that otherwise it would suffer -the rigors of war; how then could he believe that acting gently and -indulgently would have the desired effect? - -Finally, and upon this aspect of the matter Taylor laid great stress -(Ho. 60; 30, 1, p. 360), Ampudia stated that his government was now -favorable to peace. But Ampudia transmitted no official proposition, -could present no evidence; and it is impossible to believe that a -shrewd American like Taylor can have taken this argument seriously. -Taylor seems to have had no respect for the Mexicans, and therefore had -no confidence in them; and what he must have heard about Ampudia was -calculated to make him distrust that man peculiarly. Besides, Scott's -letters of June 12 and 15 had intimated (Ho. 60; 30, 1, pp. 326, 328) -that he was not to grant even a short armistice unless met with a -definite formal offer of the Mexicans to treat; and on July 27 Marcy -instructed Taylor to pursue, under similar circumstances, the course -recommended at that time to Conner (Sen. 107; 29, 2, p. 3)--_i.e._ -not to grant an armistice even should the Mexican government consent -to negotiate (=256=to Taylor confid.). If a knowledge of Mackenzie's -negotiations with Santa Anna was enough to justify Taylor for violating -such instructions, he should not have attacked Monterey. Moreover, -he did not consider the government of Mexico stable enough to treat -with (=169=to Crittenden, Oct. 9). Taylor defended the armistice on -the ground also that he needed time to bring up cannon, ammunition -and provisions (=169=to Crittenden, Oct. 9); but had he captured or -dispersed the Mexican army he would have had time, cannon, ammunition -and provisions enough. Col. Davis and Taylor also argued that the -explosion of the cathedral by an American shell would have caused great -loss of life (Ho. 60; 30, 1, p. 359); but if Taylor knew the cathedral -was liable to explode, this was a reason for pressing unconditional -surrender upon Ampudia, since the Mexicans would have been the principal -sufferers. - -All the arguments put forth in Taylor's despatches to the government -were formally pronounced unsatisfactory by Polk and the Cabinet (Polk, -Diary, Oct. 12), since the terms made it possible for a Mexican army, -which Taylor said he could have beaten completely without severe loss, -to reorganize and make another stand. The simple facts were that, in -order to escape from the blame due to his inefficiency, Taylor advanced -from Camargo with an inadequate expedition, and, when the result -convicted him of bad judgment, endeavored to excuse himself without -letting the truth be known. - -A particularly imprudent point in the terms was that they did not -require the Mexicans to retire well beyond Rinconada Pass. It was -left possible for them to fortify the pass, which was supposed to be -impregnable or almost so, and thus make an advance from Monterey to -Saltillo costly, if not impracticable. Taylor's course in this matter -was not due to an expectation that Wool's column (chap. xiii) would -render Rinconada Pass untenable, for he wrote on Oct. 15 that it formed -"no element" in his calculations (Ho. 60; 30, 1, p. 351). There was -another singular oversight. Taylor argued in favor of the armistice -that it bound the hands of the Mexicans during the time needed by him -for preparations to advance (Ho. 60; 30, 1, p. 359); but in fact, -since either government could disallow the armistice and the Mexican -authorities were within easy reach, its terms bound him for six weeks -but bound them for only, say, a fortnight or, as he admitted (Bixby -coll., 62), twenty days. Scott said privately--and one can easily -believe him--that only Taylor's popularity saved him from removal at -this time (=169=to Crittenden, Oct. 19). - -When Monterey yielded, according to Taylor, his provisions were -sufficient for "not more" than ten days; but Worth had written privately -on Sept. 16 (four days after the advance from Cerralvo began) that -the army had provisions then for only about ten days (=364=to S.). -According to the Washington correspondent of the Boston _Atlas_ (Feb. 8, -1847) Clayton stated in the Senate, February 3, 1847, that Taylor had -provisions for but three days when Monterey fell. A letter, probably -from Gen. P. F. Smith, said that the provisions would have lasted only -through Sept. 26, and that during the engagement Taylor had to send to -Cerralvo for supplies, of which a sufficient quantity could scarcely -have arrived in time (_Littell's Living Age_, no. 141, p. 191). Col. -Davis stated later that the hope of supplies, when Monterey yielded, -rested on the return of the mule-teams already despatched north for this -purpose (=73=Address). Col. Campbell wrote privately that on the morning -of Sept. 21 Taylor's supply of ammunition was very limited and the -supply of provisions still more so (=139=to D. C, Nov. 2). - -The loss of men that Taylor admitted was 488 killed and wounded (later -487: Ho. 24; 31,1), but it must have been considerably more. Lieut. -Hill said in his diary that the losses would never be revealed; but -the inaccuracy of the official statement is evident. A writer quoted -in _Niles_, Nov. 7, 1846, p. 148, said it was "generally supposed" at -Washington that Taylor might have lost more than 1000. A South Carolina -officer, who must have had many opportunities to talk with men who had -been at Monterey, gave the loss as about 950 (Cowan, Cond. Hist., 7). -Kendall, editor of the New Orleans _Picayune_, who was on the ground, -wrote that about 300 (including wounded men finished by the Mexicans) -were killed or mortally wounded, Haile, a trustworthy correspondent of -the same paper, expressed the same opinion. A letter in _Niles_, Oct. -17, 1846, p. 104 gives nearly the same figures. A Tennessee captain -reported the number of killed as 200. To look at the matter more in -detail, Meade (Letters, i, 165) wrote that Garland lost some 265 killed -and wounded. Butler admitted his own division lost about 250. A. S. -Johnston (Johnston, Johnston, 138) wrote that its loss was "perhaps -many more" than that. Bliss admitted that it lost 225, killed, wounded -and missing, on Sept. 21 alone (McCall, Letters, 461). Worth's loss -seems to have been about 70. The Texas division lost not less than 27 -(Ho. 24; 31, 1). Here we get at least 612. But Garland did not have the -Fourth Infantry (303 officers and men), which Bliss stated was "almost -destroyed" (McCall, Letters, 461). This must mean a loss (killed and -wounded) of at least one half; yet the official return was 36 (Ho. 24; -31, 1). - -Taylor began the fighting with nearly 250 sick, and after three such -days of excitement, fatigue and hardship, this number was probably -quite 400. The guard at the camp--one company from each infantry -regiment--probably amounted to at least 300, and, as some Mexican -cavalry were looking for a chance to strike there, could not safely be -reduced. A considerable number of men were needed to hold the captured -forts, escort supplies of provisions and ammunition and perform other -special services. If we call Taylor's loss 800, deduct 350 for the sick -and allow 400 for guards and others detached on duty, we have about 4650 -tired and considerably demoralized men (many of them horse and many -without bayonets) as perhaps available for an assault. - -The simple fact that Taylor himself believed he could not, in less -than about six weeks (Bixby coll., 62), be in a condition to resume -his advance, indicated what his situation now was. Finally, it should -be mentioned, he entertained still the false idea of strategy shown at -Matamoros. He only cared to get Monterey, he said, for he could beat -the Mexicans at any time (Coleman, Crittenden, 309). The fact that it -would cost the lives of soldiers to beat the Mexicans did not appear to -signify. - -12.13. =147=Chamberlain, diary. Ho. 4; 29, 2, pp. 82 (Taylor), 106 -(Worth). =169=Scott to Crittenden, Oct. 19. _Delta_, Feb. 14, 1847. -=169=Peyton to Crittenden, Oct. 2. Grant, Mems., i, 117-8. Welles -papers. Griffis, Perry, 218. Smith, Chile con Carne, 97. Lane, -Adventures, 42. _Spirit of the Times_, Nov. 7. (Hardly) Ripley, War, -268-9. =76=Ampudia, Sept. 28. - -As Welles remarked, the people took delight in thinking and talking -about the details of the fight. The capture of Monterey had no strategic -bearing on the aim of the war (Scott, Mems., ii, 412). The demonstration -of our fighting ability (which, however, had already been proved) had a -moral value; but one may well question whether this was not fully offset -by the blundering of Taylor and other officers, our losses and the terms -granted to Ampudia. Many of superior intelligence in the United States -criticised Taylor sharply. - - - XIII. SALTILLO, PARRAS, TAMPICO - -13.1. Probably he did not include Wool's troops. A Mexican reported -that on Oct. 14 Taylor had not over 4000 in camp near Monterey, 600 -regulars in that city and 1080 men in the hospitals there, and that 600 -volunteers, who had arrived Oct. 15, marched with 400 from the camp to -other points. According to Gen. Patterson, commanding, there were in -the Camargo region, Oct. 8, about 7000 effectives, but by Oct. 31 these -numbered only 5700, viz., Second Dragoons, 150; Second Infantry and -Mounted Rifles, 500; Kentucky horse, 450; Tennessee horse, 450; Second -Kentucky, 400; Second Ohio, 500; First Indiana, 550; Second Indiana, -600; Third Indiana, 650; Second Tennessee, 350; Alabama, 400; Third -Illinois, 370; Fourth Illinois, 330. The Mounted Rifles were classed as -cavalry, but had no horses. Nov. 10 the sick at Camargo numbered 1400 -or 1500, said a letter. Below Camargo there were troops now at Reynosa, -Matamoros, Camp Belknap, mouth of the river, Point Isabel and Brazos -Island. Nov. 2 Capt. W. S. Henry, a very good regular officer, doubted -whether Taylor had more than 10,000 effectives (Camp. Sketches, 239). -The returns showed only 13,000, he said. - -13.2. It was stated, Dec. 1, that fully 120 had deserted. (Priests) -Henry, Camp. Sketches, 240; Roberts, diary, Nov. 27. The Mexican -government went so far as to pay the expense of sending a British -subject named Sinnott to the north for the express purpose of seducing -Taylor's Irish (Roman Catholic) soldiers (=76=Sinnott, Oct. 12; -=76=Guerra to Santa Anna, Dec. 5; =76=to Hacienda, Dec. 2; =76=S. Anna, -Jan. 1, 1847). - -13.3. =61=July 21, 1846, Patterson wrote to the war department that he -was born in Ireland and entered the army as a first lieutenant in 1813. -He was then hardly more than a boy. Apparently he did not see much -service. Later he became rather active in the Philadelphia militia. - -13.4. Taylor protested twice, and demanded that his subordinates should -be compelled "to keep in their proper places." Due retribution soon -followed. He sent an order to Col. Baker, one of Patterson's officers, -upon which that general demanded sharply that correspondence with his -subordinates should go by the usual channel (Ho. 60; 30, 1, pp. 381, -384). Nov. 5 Taylor wrote a long and studied letter to Gen. Gaines, -defending himself and attacking the administration, and this was -published in the N. Y. _Herald_, Jan. 24, 1847. Evidently it was not a -mere bit of friendly correspondence. To many it seemed to be the opening -gun of a Presidential campaign, and certainty it was improper, for the -writer presented information and opinions about the American military -operations, and said that success would be worth little to the United -States--a view evidently calculated to discourage the Americans and -stimulate the enemy. Taylor was neatly punished for this imprudence by -a public revival of paragraph 650 of the army regulations of March 1, -1825, which forbade private letters or reports from officers regarding -military operations. Doubtless Polk was to a large extent right in -believing that Taylor was now in the hands of political tutors, and he -regarded him as "a vindictive and ignorant political partisan." See -Marcy to Taylor, Jan. 27, 1847, and reply (Ho. 60; 30, 1, pp. 391, 809); -=108=Marcy to Bancroft, April 28; =256=_Id._ to Wetmore, Apr. 25; adj. -gen., gen. orders 3, 1847; Polk, Diary, Jan. 25-7; Phila. _Pub. Ledger_, -Jan. 26-7; Ho. 37; 30, 1. - -13.5. A pleasanter outcome of the correspondence was the release of -seven American and a number of Mexican prisoners. - -13.6. _Preliminary incidents._ Ho. 60; 30, 1, pp. 424 (Wool); 341, -344, 355, 367, 369, 391 (Marcy); 472-3 (Jones); 635 (Jesup); 325, 1270 -(Scott); 682 (Whiting); 386, 439, 442 (S. Anna); 350-1, 358, 361, 381, -424, 437-40, 444, 526, 809 (Taylor); 384 (Patterson). =69=Patterson to -Marcy, Oct. 8; to Bliss, Oct. 8, 31; Nov. 23. Meade, Letters, i, 145-6, -152. _Morning News_, New London, Conn., Dec. 10. Henry, Camp. Sketches, -240. =307=Roberts, diary, Nov. 27. =69=Wool to Bliss, Nov. 2. =69=Riley -to Bliss, Dec. 14, 1846. _Niles_, Jan. 9, 1847, p. 290. =65=Patterson, -orders 1, 6, Sept. 5, 29. =169=Scott to Taylor, Sept. 26. =169=Taylor -to Crittenden, Jan. 26, 1847. Sen. 32; 31, 1 (Hughes). Wash. _Union_, -Sept. 26. Polk, Diary, May 14; Sept. 19-22, 24, 26; Oct. 12, 13, 20; -Nov. 21. =69=Patterson to Marcy, Oct. 8. =234=A. Johnson to ----, Dec. -2. Claiborne, Quitman, i, 273-4. Marcy, report in Sen. 1; 30, 1, p. 45. -Eyewitness, Complete Hist., 48. =205=Graham, mem. book. _Diario_, Nov. -14, 29; Dec. 15. Taylor, Letters (Bixby), 178. =65=_Id._, gen. orders, -no. 139, Nov. 8. =69=González, Sept. --. Negrete, Invasión, ii, 346, -354, 356. Also the following from =76=: Comte. gen. Oaxaca, Dec. 3. -Circular, Nov. 28. S. Anna to Taylor, Dec. 17. S. Anna, Nov. 28; Dec. -12. Sinnott, Oct. 12. Ordóñez to Worth, Nov. 12; to P. F. Smith, Nov. -20, Worth to Ordóñez, Nov. 12. Smith to O., Nov. 20. Ampudia, Oct. 4. J. -F. Rada, Oct. 17. Parrodi, Sept. 16. Worth to alcalde, Nov. 5. On the -origin of the proposed Tamaulipas expedition see chap. xxvii, note 4. - -13.7. Lieut. Mackall's battery, the Seventh Infantry, and one company of -the Artillery Battalion were left at Monterey under P. F. Smith. - -13.8. The maguey (_agave Americana_) is the century plant, and produces -the liquid known as _pulque_ which, after it ferments, is about as -intoxicating as beer, and is consumed liberally by the common people -of Mexico. The stiff, thick, wide-spreading leaves are protected with -thorns. - -13.9. The governor expected a reply, and on finding that none was to be -made he retired to Parras. - -13.10. _The occupation of Saltillo._ =65=Gen. orders 139. Ho. 60; 30, 1, -pp. 361, 374, 377, 436, 543, 545 (Taylor); 362-3 (Marcy); 378 (Aguirre). -Sen. 1; 30, 1, p. 45. =364=Worth to S., Nov. 20. Taylor, Letters -(Bixby), 71. =267=Memo. (probably from Major Smith). Meade, Letters, i, -144, 152, 155, 157-8. Wilhelm, 8th Inf., ii, 295-9. Balbontín, Invasión, -24. Apuntes, 65. Sen. 32; 31, 1, p. 59. Calendario de Ontiveros, 1847. -=69=Worth to Arnold and Deas, Nov. 19. Smith, Chile con Carne, 175, 192, -195. Henry, Campaign Sketches, 245. Smith, To Mexico, 77. Eyewitness, -Complete History, 48. =299=Posey to Gordon, Feb. 19, 1847. The following -are from =76=. S. Anna to Ampudia, Sept. 30. S. Anna, Sept. 29; Oct. -3; Nov. 21. González, Nov. 19. _Id._ to R. Vázquez, Saltillo, Nov. -16; to S. Anna, Nov. 21; to Mejía, May 27. Mejía, June 9. _Id._ to -Ampudia, Aug. 31. Worth to alcalde, Nov. 17. Memo., dated Nov. 22, -of a conference with Taylor. Wool's advance may have helped to cause -Ampudia's abandonment of Rinconada Pass. The distance from Monterey to -Saltillo by the railroad is about 68 miles, and that by road must be -about the same. (Marcy, Oct. 22) see p. 350. - -13.11. The celebrated military writer, Clausewitz, on whose work our -present views of strategy are principally founded, recognized two -distinct kinds of war: that aiming to overthrow the enemy's forces, -and that aiming to make conquests on the frontier, either to be held -permanently or to be used in exchanges on the settlement of peace -(Clausewitz, Vom Kriege, nachricht, par. 1; Donat, Strat. Science, 112). -Polk aimed to accomplish both ends by having the main army bring Mexico -to terms, and at the same time taking possession of territory; but he -did not apply the principle understandingly. He overrated the influence -that the occupation of the northern provinces would have on the Mexican -government; he thought peace was near at hand, and was figuring on the -terms of a treaty when he should have been taking steps to bring Mexico -speedily to the point of making a treaty; and he ordered this expedition -without knowing the conditions under which it would have to be conducted -in Mexico, and without asking proper expert advice. The occupation of -the frontier provinces would have been sagacious had it been part of -a strong coercive military policy. Quotation at the end of the second -paragraph: Meade, Letters, i, 152. - -13.12. La Vaca, now Port Lavaca, is on Matagorda Bay. - -13.13. In view of the Mexican charge that the Americans incited the -Indians to ravage the southern side of the border, it should be -mentioned that not only Taylor, but Wool, exerted himself to prevent -such raids (Ho. 60; 30, 1, p. 425). - -13.14. Harney committed a further impropriety by raising a company of -Indians for the U. S. service. It was not our policy to employ Indian -troops. - -13.15. The author's description of Wool is based largely on the -=147=diary and =148=recollections of Gen. S. E. Chamberlain, who served -as his orderly for a time in the Mexican War; also on =257=Hughes to -Markoe, Dec. 13, 1847; _Niles_, May 8, 1847, p. 156; =61=Horton, Dec. -3; Sen. 32; 31, 1 (Hughes); =371=Mitchell, statement; =316=Bragg to -Sherman, March 1, 1848. Wool was a spare man of medium height, light -complexion and brown hair. His manner was reserved and gentlemanly. - -13.16. Buhoup says this section set out with 1244 effectives. Wool soon -joined it with 144 men. At the Rio Grande, Oct. 12, eight companies -(aggregate, 574) of the First Illinois came up. The second section -(not over 1200) did not leave San Antonio until Oct. 14, and some of -the men were detained there still longer. The whole force consisted of -Washington's six-gun battery, to which were attached two small guns -taken by the Texans from the Mexicans years before and destined to be -lost at Buena Vista and recovered at Contreras; a squadron of the First -Dragoons, a squadron of the Second Dragoons, a regiment of Arkansas -horse, three companies of the Sixth Infantry, one company of Kentucky -foot and the First and Second Illinois regiments. The aggregate was -given by Capt. Hughes of the Topog. Engineers as 3400, of whom about 600 -were regulars. Wool's route to Monclova was in general that of the So. -Pacific and Mexican International railroads. - -13.17. Shields, Irish by birth, practised law in Illinois, became a -judge of the state supreme court and was then appointed commissioner -of the General Land Office, Washington. He became discontented under -Wool's command, and sent Davis, his aide, to Washington in the hope of -obtaining command of the Illinois regiments or possibly of displacing -Wool. - -13.18. Frequently not all of the troops arrived at a place on the same -date. - -13.19. Possibly news of the restoration of the constitution had reached -Monclova but not Santa Rosa. - -13.20. The authorities of Monclova stated that Wool kept every pledge, -and they complained only that the Americans ate up provisions needed -for the people. The officers who criticised Wool most appear to have -been Shields, who--besides being notably egotistical (Ill. State -Hist. Soc. Trans., ix, pp. 36-8)--had been appointed by Polk on a -confidential basis (Davis, Autobiog., 96) and therefore felt entitled -to be ambitious; Harney, whose characteristics have been explained; -Bonneville, who proved himself later incompetent or worse; and Yell, -whose men were soon to disgrace themselves at Buena Vista in consequence -of lacking discipline. Nov. 10 Taylor issued orders detaching Shields -and Harney from Wool's command (Ho. 60; 30, 1, p. 542). This change -doubtless tended to promote harmony. In December Harney brought charges -against Wool, asserting that his "extreme imbecility and manifest -incapacity" ruined the expedition. The judge advocate general advised -that the charges should be ignored (=61=Horton, Dec. 3). - -13.21. Just after leaving Parras Wool learned that 2700 Mexicans -with four guns had moved from Zacatecas against him. One fault of -the expedition was that it could neither support nor be supported by -Taylor's army (see Halleck, Mil. Art, 410 and chap. xi, note 5, of this -history). One asks why Ampudia was not ordered to attack Wool. With -Blanco's irregulars he would have been formidable. The explanation -probably is that Santa Anna wished to build up at S. L. Potosí as large -an army as possible under his own command. Besides, he expected Wool to -turn west. - -13.22. Wool received on Nov. 14 Taylor's instructions to give up the -expedition, and on Nov. 26 his instructions to go to Parras and await -orders (=61=Wool, Jan. 17, 1847). He moved, however, in anticipation of -the latter instructions (=61=Wool, Dec. 7). Nov. 16 he reported that he -expected three mounted and two infantry companies as escorts to the last -wagons, and after their arrival would have about 2750 in all. =60=Marcy -to Taylor, May 6, 1847: It is not important to hold Chihuahua, for you -are in advance of it. Ripley (War with Mexico, i, 337), probably to have -a fling at Wool, says Wool "only" wished to give up the expedition in -order to go toward Durango and Zacatecas in pursuit of glory; but the -document he cites does not so state, and Taylor wrote that Wool proposed -to join him (Bixby coll., 71). - -13.23. In chap. xix. - -13.24. July 2 Taylor had expressed the opinion that the expedition might -prove very important (Ho. 60; 30, 1, p. 329), but suggested that only -mounted men should be employed. - -13.25. Marcy said that the expedition prevented a considerable part of -Mexico from sharing in the campaign against Scott, and to some extent -this was doubtless true. - -13.26. _Wool's expedition._ Polk, Diary, May 14, 16; Oct. 20. -=164=Conner to Bancroft, May 31. N. Orl. _Commerc. Bulletin_, Aug. -17. Meade, Letters, i, 152. Ho. 60; 30, 1, pp. 323, 363 (Marcy); -325 (Scott); 458 (Freeman); 328, 454, 466 (Jones); 424, 426 (Wool); -428 (Thomas); 305, 329, 351, 361, 374, 377, 400, 409, 418, 424, 433 -(Taylor); 410 (Bliss); 567 (Jesup). =254=Mansfield, report, Apr. 19. -=61=Wool, July 28; Aug. 5, 15; Sept. 2, 15, 28; Oct. 15, 19; Nov. 4; -Dec. 16. =256=Wool, July 29. Sen. 1; 30, 1, pp. 45, 545. Sen. 32; 31, -1 (Hughes and others). =65=Adj. gen., gen. orders 19. Wash. _Union_, -Oct. 19; Nov. 20, 21, 28, 1846 Feb. 8; Mar. 23, 1847. =61=Maynadier, -Aug. 25. =61=Horton, June 23; Aug. 8; Oct. 20; Dec. 3. =69=Harney, Aug. -12. Reavis, Harney, 155. Sen. 178; 29, 2. _Diario_, Sept. 11. =68=P. -F. Smith, Oct. 2. =245=Duvall to Lamar, June 27. Buhoup, Narrative. -Davis, Autobiog., 105-19. =61=Shields, Aug. 28. _Niles_, Oct. 24, p. -118; Dec. 26, p. 263; May 8, 1847, p. 156. =61=Kingsbury to Wool, Oct. -13. Sen. 64; 31, 1. _National Intelligencer_, Nov. 3, 21. Carleton, -Buena Vista, 161-76. Balbontín, Invasión, 76. =65=Wool, orders 89, 117, -121, 126, 143, 144, 148, 155. =61=Wool to Taylor, Jan. 17, 1847. N. Y. -_Eve. Post_, Jan. 4, 1849. =180=McDowell to Newton, Sept. 16, 1846. -=132=Butler, Dec. 10. Wool in Ceremonies. Bishop, Journal. =69=Duncan -to Worth, Aug. 8. Taylor, Letters (Bixby), 71. =63=Marcy to Kearny, -Dec. 10. _Picayune_, Mar. 4, 6, 17, 1847. =69=Wood to Taylor, Dec. 7. -=66=Lee to Totten, Dec. 5. Donnavan, Adventures, 41. Wallace, Wallace, -21-9. =69=Wool to Taylor, Dec. 24, 1846; Jan. 20, 1847 Baylies, Wool's -Camp. _Journ. Milit. Serv. Instit._, xiv, 443. Wilhelm, 8th Inf., ii, -301. =82=S. Anna to comte. gen. Zacatecas, Dec. 6. Neville, diary. The -following are from =76=: Gov. Coahuila, Sept. 7, Oct. 8. Gefe Partido -del Rio Grande, Aug. 28; Oct. 2. Comte. gen. Zacatecas to comte. gen. -Durango, Oct. 14; to S. Anna, Oct. 21. Gefe político, Monclova, to -Wool, Oct. 24; reply, Oct. 26. Comte. gen. Durango, Dec. 11. Heredia -to comte. gen. Durango, Dec. 10. Gov. Coahuila to _Id._, Nov. 30. R. -Vázquez to S. Anna, Oct. 1. Castañeda to Vázquez, Sept. 24. S. Anna, -Sept. 29; Nov. 4; Dec. 19, 24. Wool to Arziniega _et al._, Oct. 9. -Aldrete to Mejía, Aug. 30. Ugarte, Sept. 26. Comte. gen. Zacatecas, -Dec. 31. Lobo to R. Vázquez, Nov. 2. Comte. gen. Zacatecas to S. Anna, -Dec. 17. Gov. Coahuila to _Id._, Nov. 30. Comte. gen. Coahuila, Sept. -7. Gefe político, Parras, to S. Anna, Dec. 17. Ampudia, Aug. 25. Rives -(U. S. and Mexico, ii, 208) places Polk in a rather absurd position -with reference to the expedition. He misunderstands a statement in -Polk's Diary, May 28, 1846. The orders to Wool there mentioned had prime -reference to getting volunteers in motion to Taylor (_Military Historian -and Economist_, ii, 32 and note on p. 33). - -13.27. The idea that the occupation of Tampico would mask and aid the -expedition against Vera Cruz came forward a little later (Sen. 1; 30, 1, -p. 949). - -13.28. This is inferred from the fact that Marcy's letter, which was -published in the _Diario_ of Oct. 6, would naturally have met Santa Anna -about Oct. 3, and from the character of Santa Anna's letter of that date. - -13.29. None of these statements should be taken too literally. The -various accounts, which come mainly from Parrodi and Santa Anna, differ -considerably though not essentially, and both men had reasons for -exaggerating the weakness of Tampico. - -13.30. Parrodi and the court that tried him declared that he threw away -nothing of value. But many did not believe this, and it is hard to see -why he should have taken the trouble, when in such haste, to transport -a large quantity of material to the river, if it was worthless. The -government naturally wished the evacuation to appear inexpensive. - -13.31. This sentence is inferential. Writing to his wife, Nov. 17, -=162=Conner stated that he was much surprised to find the city -evacuated, and that, had the garrison been there, he would have had hard -work. Why Mrs. Chase did not give notice of the evacuation cannot be -explained. No doubt there was a high state of popular excitement and, as -she had been suspected of playing the spy, the people perhaps cut her -off more effectually than the military men had done. Later she presented -a claim to Congress, and it was supported by letters from some of -Conner's officers but by none from himself. This fact may be a hint that -he was not pleased with her course. It seems to have been from her that -Parrodi heard the imaginary tale of Conner's heavy landing force, which -probably counted for a great deal in bringing about the evacuation. -Chase had sent a sketch of Tampico to Conner in June, and later his -wife forwarded a plan with a description of the forts, the number of -guns, etc. We do not know, however, that Conner received these papers. -Taylor belittled the capture of Tampico, saying that Santa Anna's order -to evacuate the town had been printed in the Mexican papers, and that -Conner must have been aware of the fact; but Conner was on a ship at -some distance from any town, and his letter of Nov. 17 shows that he -was not aware of it. The names of the captured gunboats were _Nonata_, -_Bonita_ and _Reefer_. - -13.32. Signed by Tattnall and Ingraham; approved by Conner; accepted by -the deputation of the ayuntamiento. The Americans felt that formal terms -would bind them yet could be repudiated by the Mexican government. - -13.33. Two merchant vessels also were captured. - -13.34. According to Apuntes, pp. 82-6, Dr. Francisco Marchante of the -Mexican medical service, who had charge of other public property, was -not far away, but the Mexicans persuaded Tattnall that he could not be -overtaken. On Tattnall's return to the port, however, a Mexican declared -this could not have been true, and hence a second expedition set out in -all haste. It was unavoidably delayed; and finally, as the Americans -learned that a Mexican force had been sent forward to protect Marchante, -the chase was abandoned. A large amount of ammunition was thrown into -the river at Pánuco by Marchante. The total loss of material was thus of -considerable moment. Some of the ammunition was saved by sending it to -Tuxpán. - -13.35. Gates had two companies of his own (Third Artillery). The other -five were Belton's. A steamer carrying ordnance and ordnance stores was -lost. - -13.36. Perry flew the pennant of a vice commodore (Conner, Home -Squadron, 12). - -13.37. Brooke had at first intended to send also four companies of -Mounted Rifles; and Taylor, on hearing of this, protested sharply to -the government that "a large and efficient force of cavalry," on which -he counted, had been diverted to a place where they were not needed -(Ho. 60; 30, 1, pp. 382, 388), overlooking the fact that this corps had -no horses (orders no. 149: _ibid._, 512). Now that Tampico had been -captured by the navy, Taylor said it was of no consequence (Letters -(Bixby), 78). These points are mentioned to show his state of mind, -which will need to be understood when we come to Scott's operations. The -Alabama regiment was ordered to Tampico by Patterson (Bliss: Ho. 60; 30, -1, p. 383). - -13.38. _Occupation of Tampico. Eco_, June 9; Sept. 12; Oct. 29; Nov. -18, 19, 25. =303=Juanito del Bosque, Jan. 6, 1847. Apuntes, 78-86. -=61=Gates to Barnard, May 4, 1849. =69=Prout to Patterson, Oct. 28. -=164=Chase to Conner, June 4. Parrodi, Memoria (including letters to -and from S. Anna and others). Ampudia, To Fellow-citizens, July 10. -_Commerc. Review_, 1846, p. 165. =47=Conner, Oct. 7; Nov. 5, 21; Dec. -1. Polk, Diary, Sept. 19-22. =297=Mackenzie to Buchanan, July 7. Ho. -60; 30, 1, pp. 480-1 (Jones); 339, 341 (Marcy); 378-9, 387 (Taylor); -252 (Mason); 270 (Conner); 271 (Tattnall and Ingraham); 271 (Cervantes -_et al._). =162=Morris to Conner, Sept. 21. =162=Tattnall to Conner, -Nov. 20. Parker, Recolls., 68. Conner, Home Squad, 11 (Conner), -12. =48=Bancroft to Conner, Aug. 29. =48=Mason to _Id._, Sept. 22. -Balbontín, Estado, 52. _Diario_, Sept. 22; Oct. 6; Nov. 28. S. Anna, -Apelación, 29-31. =99=S. Anna to Tampico ayunt., Oct. 27. =245=_Bee_ -to Lamar, Dec. 5. =99=Parrodi to Tamp. ayunt., Oct. 26. =99=Urrea to -_id._, Oct. 29. =99=Gov. Tamaul. to _id._, Oct. 25. =99=Gov. Tamaul., -circular, Nov. 17. Vindicación del Gen. Parrodi. =69=Worth to Bliss, -Dec. 4. Steele, Amer. Camps., 125. =226=Beauregard to Totten, Nov. 27. -=69=Chase, Dec. 3, 1845. =313=_Id._ to Saunders, May 26, 31. _Public -Ledger_, Jan. 7, 1847 (Mrs. Chase). =52=Mrs. Chase to Conner, Oct. 20. -=316=Judd to Sherman, Feb. 26, 1848. Ballentine, Eng. Sold., i, 267. -=69=Shields to Bliss, Jan. 13, 1847. =60=_Id._ to Barnard, Apr. 20, -1849. Meade, Letters, i, 159-60. =46=Perry to Mason, Nov. 15, 19. -=46=Declaration, Nov. 15. N. Y. _Eve. Post_, Nov. 18, 1847. =165=Conner -letter book, Nov. 13-Dec. 4. Taylor, Letters (Bixby), 77-8. Negrete, -Invasión, iii, 170-3. Balbontín, Invasión, 54. Ho. 1; 30, 2, pp. 1171, -1173 (Conner); 1174-5 (Tattnall). Ho. 4; 29, 2, p. 381. =69=Perry, -memo., [Nov. 16]. =61=Gardner, Dec. 2. =61=Gates, Nov. 20. =61=Brooke, -Nov. 21. =69=Gates, Nov. 26. =163=Perry to Mason, Nov. 16. =61=Patterson -to Marcy, Nov. 23. =162=Tattnall to alcalde, Nov. 19. Bennett, Steam -Navy, 93. _Monitor Repub._, Dec. 2. =166=Patterson to Perry, Nov. 22. -=166=Perry to Conner [about Nov. 30]. =166=Tattnall to _Id._, Nov. -22. =313=Saunders to Taylor, June 5. =61=Jones to Scott, Nov. 28, 30; -to Patterson, Nov. 29; to Taylor, Nov. 30. =313=Letters from Conner -to Saunders, Nov. =61=Gardner to Taylor, Nov. 17. Smith, Remins., 28. -=61=Shields, Dec. 23. _Espía de la Frontera_, no. 7. =76=Gov. Tamaul., -address, Nov. 27. Memoria de ... Relaciones, 1846 (circular, Nov. -21). _Picayune_, Jan. 2, 1847. =112=Barnard, Dec. 20, notes on the -fortifications. =112=_Id._ to Gates, Dec. 11; to Shields, Dec. 28. -=112=Beauregard to Totten, Feb. 2, 1847; to Gates, Feb. 24. =61=Gates -to Barnard, May 4, 1849. =66=Beauregard to Totten, Jan. 9, 1847. The -following are from =76=. Parrodi, Oct. 17. S. Anna to Urrea, Oct. 18. -Prefect Huejutla, Nov. 23, 30. Múñoz, Nov. 21, 23, 26; Dec. 1. Order, -April 24. Gov. Guanajuato, Nov. 27. Gov. Michoacán, Nov. 26. Múñoz to -Gov. Tamaul., Nov. 14. Tampico ayunt. to Conner, Nov. 14. Parrodi, -proclam., June 9. To Parrodi, June 3; Aug. 28. Circular, Nov. 21. To -Bravo, May 14. Bravo, May 18. Mejía, June 9. To comte. gen. Querétaro, -Nov. 21. Parrodi, May 20; June 17; July 8; Sept. 2, 5. Múñoz to Parrodi, -Nov. 14. S. Anna to Parrodi, Oct. 12. To S. Anna, Oct. 15; Nov. 8. -Ampudia, Sept. 29. S. Anna, Oct. 3, 10, 12; Nov. 4, 12, 21. Affidavit -of M. Dorante, Dec. 23. Comte. Nat. Gd., Tampico, to Urrea, Nov. 4. To -Ampudia, Aug. 28. When Perry reached Brazos Id. the weather was so bad -that he could only leave an officer on an anchored vessel. - -13.39. An estimate of Taylor's strength on Dec. 9 was 14,000 for the -entire field (_Picayune_, Dec. 27). One of Wool's companies was still -at San Antonio, one on the Rio Grande, and four at Monclova on Dec. 16, -he stated; several were left behind when he marched from Parras, and -he probably had 200 sick. Dec. 24 he reported about 2000 effectives -as with him. At Camargo and doubtless elsewhere in that region there -was considerable sickness. See a letter (probably from P. F. Smith) in -_Littell_, no. 141, p. 191. One may doubt whether Taylor had a fighting -force of over 12,000 at this time. The lines are reckoned as from Point -Isabel or the mouth of the Rio Grande to Camargo, Saltillo and Parras, -and from Monterey to Tampico. They were soon longer, because Taylor -advanced beyond Saltillo. His advance to Victoria began Dec. 13 (chap. -xviii, p. 357). - -13.40. Opinions as to the number of men under Santa Anna at this time -differed. Taylor's report on Dec. 4 (Ho. 60; 30, 1, p. 441) was 20,000 -infantry and a large cavalry force; Meade, Nov. 24, 35,000; Meade, Dec. -8, 30,000. =69=Wool wrote on Dec. 24 that according to spies sent out -from Parras Santa Anna had 12,000 at San Luis Potosí, 30,000 at some -distance from there, and 9000 on their way from Guadalajara. =69=Butler -wrote from Saltillo on Dec. 20 that Santa Anna appeared to have 35,000 -at S. L. P. and 9000 at Tula. - -13.41. _Taylor's military policy._ Taylor, Letter to Gaines, Nov. 5 -(and in _Picayune_, Feb. 2, 1847). =169=_Id._ to Crittenden, Oct. 9. -=370=_Id._ to Davis, April 18, 1848. Ho. 60; 30, 1, pp. 351-4, 377, -379-82, 441, 514-5 (Taylor); 389-91 (Marcy). =256=Marcy to Wetmore, -Jan. 24; Mar. 29, 1847. Scribner, Campaign, 55. Meade, Letters, i, -152, 168-9. Polk, Diary, Jan. 5, 1847. =61=Wool, Dec. 16. =69=_Id._ -to Taylor, Dec. 24. _Journ. Milit. Serv. Instit._, xiv, 443. Taylor, -Letters (Bixby), 71-2. =330=_Id._ to brother, Dec. 12. =256=Scott to -Marcy, Dec. 27, priv. _Morning News_, New London, Conn., Dec. 10. -=267=Memo. (probably from Maj. Smith). P. F. Smith, Memoir, Oct. 15. - -There was also the difficulty of supervising lines so extended. At -this very time Taylor was afraid things were going badly in his rear -(=330=to brother, Dec. 12). It is particularly hard to find any good -reason for posting a (necessarily large) force at Victoria, so very far -from support. The pass between that point and Tula was not practicable -for artillery, and was not the only pass by which infantry and cavalry -could cross the mountains. Taylor (Ho. 60; 30, 1, p. 380) argued that -from Victoria he could threaten the Mexican flank, should Santa Anna -advance. But he would have had to force the pass, and without artillery -he could not have accomplished much. In case of Santa Anna's advancing -and succeeding, this flanking force would have been in great peril, -while in case of his failing it would have been useless. Anyhow it would -have been more useful with the main army. Not only were the Americans -scattered at posts, but they moved about in parties of only 200 or 300 -with a carelessness that astounded the Mexicans (Camargo letter: N. Y. -_Journal of Commerce_, Jan. 8, 1847). Taylor could not safely count upon -coöperation between Wool and Worth in the case of an advance of the -Mexicans, for it was likely that Santa Anna's first care would be to -block the road, as probably he could have done. - - - XIV. SANTA FE - -14.1. Independence is ten miles east of Kansas City and about -thirty-five from Fort Leavenworth. - -14.2. _Conditions in New Mexico; Armijo._ =13=Bankhead, no. 148, 1846. -St. Louis _Weekly Reveille_, May 23. St. Louis _Republican_, Aug. 25. -Sen. 7; 30, 1 (Emory). =60=Leitensdorfer, June 7. Sen. Misc. 26; 30, 1 -(Wislizenus). Inman, Old S. Fe Trail, 27-54, 67-92. =75=Armijo, Jan. 12. -=75=Hacienda to Relaciones, Mar. 16. _Monitor Repub._, Apr. 15. Memoria -de ... Guerra, March, 1845. _Picayune_, March 18. Dublán, Legislación, -v, 10. _Niles_, Sept. 26, p. 52. =52=Alvarez, Feb. 2, 1842; Sept. 4, -1846. =52=Jones, Sept. 20, 1837. =13=Ashburnham, no. 50, 1837. Sen. -90; 22, 1, pp. 30-41. Captain of Vols., Conquest. Pacheco, Exposición. -Ruxton, Adventures (London, 1847), 110, 185-6. Cooke, Conquest, 60. -Kendall, Narrative, i, 295, 314-5, 346-60. _Amigo del Pueblo_, Aug. -19, 1845. México á través, iv, 403. Wash. _Globe_, Sept. 2, 1845. N. -Orl. _Courier_, July 5, 1845. Houston _Telegraph_, Jan. 24, 1844. -=77=Arrangóiz, no. 63, res., 1843. =77=Almonte, no. 4, 1844. Amer. -Antiquarian Soc. Proceeds., new series, viii, 324-41. And the following -from =76=. Assembly of N. Méx., Feb., 1846 (petition for comte. gen.). -Re-extracto on N. Méx. (Sambrano). Ayunt., Hermosillo, Son., proclam. -Comte. gen. N. Méx., May 17, 1845. Tornel, Mar. 10, 1846. To Hacienda, -Mar. 6. Trial of Magoffin (testimony). A merchant's estimate of Santa Fe -caravan business for 1846 was that the first cost of the goods amounted -to $937,500 (Captain of Vols., Conquest, 11). - -14.3. The text includes two companies of dragoons that joined Kearny on -the march. On account of the scarcity of grass at Santa Fe and because -he considered infantry the chief reliance, Kearny did not wish so large -a proportion of mounted men. Fischer's company enlisted to serve as -horse. The artillery had twelve brass 6-pounders and four 12-pound -howitzers. Kearny's army, being near states abounding in resources, was -more readily set in motion than Taylor's or Wool's, but on account of -its long march 459 horses, 3658 mules, 14,904 oxen, 1556 wagons, and -516 pack mules were required to transport it, its reinforcements, and -its supplies. (This account is not complete, but on the other hand it -refers not only to Kearny's expedition but to troops that followed him. -Rives's account in U.S. and Mexico, ii, 214-5, is therefore misleading, -and makes the short rations endured on the march seem incredible.) The -Indians drove off many of the cattle, robbed trains and killed not a few -drivers (Sen. 1; 30, 1, p. 545). - -14.4. _S. Fe expedition ordered and organized._ S. Louis _Weekly -Reveille_, May 11, 23. Polk, Diary, May 13, 14, 16, 30. =69=Jones to -Kearny, May 13. =63=Marcy to Kearny, May 27. =240=Kennerly, Narrative. -Sen. 7; 30, 1 (Emory). =69=Kearny, orders, June 19; July 31. Richardson, -Journal, 3-6. =61=Kearny to gov. Mo., June 16; to Cummins, June -20. =60=Marcy to gov. Mo., May 13. Wash. _Union_, Sept. 24. _Nat. -Intelligencer_, Oct. 2. _Monitor Repub._, Mar. 27, 1847. Scharf, St. -Louis, i, 369, 372-3. St. Louis _Republican_, May 13, 22, 30; June 26. -Sen. 1; 30, 1, p. 545. _Niles_, July 4, 1846, p. 281; July 3, 1847, p. -279. Ho. 60; 30, 1, p. 326. Elliott, Notes, 217, 221. Ruxton, Adventures -(1849), 312-3. St. Louis _New Era_, Aug. 20. Mo. Hist. Soc. Colls., -ii, no. 4. =212=Hastings, diary. =256=Penn, Jr., [May 23]. Bancroft, -Pac. States, xii, 410, note (names of officers). Hughes, Doniphan's -Expedition, 24-7. Cooke, Conquest, 2. - -14.5. The route taken by Kearny was not the shortest but it seemed -the best for his purpose (Cooke, Conquest, 13). Distances from Fort -Leavenworth: to Council Grove, 126 miles; to the Arkansas River, 393; to -Bent's Fort, 564; to S. Fe, 873 (Ho. 1; 30, 2, p. 236). - -14.6. _To and at Bent's Fort._ Mexico in 1842, 128. Sen. 7; 30, 1. -=63=Marcy to Howard, May 13, 1846. Ho. 41; 30, 1. =61=Kearny, June 5; -Aug. 1. =61=Kearny, orders, June 27; July 31. =61=Capt. Johnston, diary. -=201=Gibson, diary. Prince, Concise Hist., 164-74, 178. _Niles_, Aug. 1, -1846, p. 343. Cooke, Conquest, 3-4. Elliott, Notes, 222-3. =58=Cooke, -Map of S. Fe Trace. Captain of Vols., Conquest. Ho. 45; 31, 1. Sen. -23; 30, 1. Mo. Hist. Soc. Colls., ii, no. 4. Richardson, Journal. -Sen. Misc. 26; 30, 1, pp. 5-13. Connelley, Doniphan's Exped., 179-81. -=212=Hastings, diary. Ho. 60; 30, 1, pp. 151, 168. Ruxton, Far West, -189. =69=Kearny, July 17. Hughes, Doniphan's Exped., 30-59. =76=Kearny -to Armijo, Aug. 1. =76=Heredia to S. Anna, Dec. 31, 1846. Bent's Fort -lay about fifteen miles above the mouth of Las Animas River (Cooke, -Conquest, 12). - -14.7. _Armijo's motives and preparations._ Sen. 7; 30, 1 (Emory). -Gibson, diary, Sept. 5. _Republicano_, Jan. 13; Feb. 5, 1847 (Armijo). -Twitchell, Milit. Occup., 60. Read, Guerra, 219. Prince, Concise Hist., -179. =52=Alvarez, Sept. 4, 1846. From =76= the following. M. E. to F. -Pino. N. to F. Pino. J. F. to J. E. Ortiz. J. F. Ortiz to P. Armendaris. -M. Ramírez to Señora Casanoba. N. Quintanar to L. Téllez. D. Vigil to -J. F. Zubia. Decision of the _mesa_. Testimony given at the trial of -Magoffin. S. Anna, Dec. 8, 1846. Summary of four packets of letters, -and conclusion of the _mesa_. Armijo, Sept. 8, 1846; Jan. 20; Mar. 30, -1847. Tornel, Mar. 10, 1846. _Id._ to Ugarte, Mar. 10; June 25; July 25. -Segundo cabo, Chihuahua, July 10. Armijo to Ugarte, July 1. To Armijo, -July 25. Comte. gen. Durango, July 16. Ugarte, July 17; Aug. 23. Letter -from El Paso, Aug. 9. - -14.8. The regiment under Price numbered at first about 1000, and the -battalion, commanded by Lieut. Col. Willock, about 300. In July a third -force (infantry) was ordered to take the same route but it was found -unnecessary, and the plans were given up (Ho. 60; 30, 1, p. 162). - -_The second (Price's; Mormons) and third (abortive) expeditions._ Polk, -Diary, May 30; June 2, 3, 5; July 18, 1846; Apr. 28, 1847. =62=Marcy to -gov. Mo., May 11, 1847. =62=Jones to Price, May 18, 22, 1847. =63=Marcy -to gov. Mo., Apr. 28; May 6, 11, 1847. =69=Jones to Scott, Apr. 20, -1847. =61=Doniphan to Marcy, Oct. 20, 1846. =61=Shields, Aug. 9, 1846. -=62=Marcy to gov. Mo., July 18, 1846. Wash. _Union_, Sept. 24, 1846. -Scharf, St. Louis, i, 375-6. _Niles_, July 18, 1846, p. 312. =2=Allred, -recolls. Sen. 439; 29, 1, p. 2. Sen. 1; 29, 2, p. 49. Ho. 60; 30, 1, p. -171. Bancroft, Pac. States, xii, 410, note (names of officers). Cooke, -Conquest, 2. Hughes, Doniphan's Exped., 134, 137-8. - -14.9. Kearny's letter to Armijo, found in the Mexican archives, is -stated to have been translated by the American consul from a certified -copy of the original. A little later an American trader, who had married -a Santa Fe woman, was despatched to distribute the proclamation and -sound the people at Taos. A scouting party under Bent went forward to -examine the route. - -14.10. Kearny was criticised for undertaking to release the people from -their allegiance to Mexico; but since, as our Supreme Court decided in -the Castine case, the inhabitants of conquered territories pass under -at least a temporary allegiance to the conquering power, they must -necessarily be absolved from their former obligations. See Washington -_Union_, August 21, 1847. - -14.11. Kearny returned a conciliatory message by the bearer of Armijo's -letter. See note 13. - -14.12. Estimates of the number of the people in arms vary from about -1800 (=76=Armijo) to 4-5000 (Cooke). Armijo's reports minified all his -means of defence. Apparently there were about 3000. So Magoffin stated -on his =76=trial, and this was the conclusion of the war department at -Mexico. Probably Armijo felt surprised and embarrassed by the response -of the people. - -14.13. It was charged by Mexicans that Armijo was bought by American -agents. But Kearny had no money to use in this way, and in the absence -of substantial evidence there seems to be no good ground to suppose -that the merchants had a sufficient reason for buying him. Armijo sent -Dr. Henry Connelly back with Cooke to treat in his behalf with Kearny -(Cooke, Conquest, 31, 33), but nothing seems to have been accomplished. -Kearny probably desired (=76=Connelly to Armijo, Aug. 19) that Armijo -should surrender with his troops, and presumably Armijo asked for -impossible concessions. Magoffin went on to Chihuahua, was arrested, -tried, and imprisoned until the end of the war, and later was paid -$30,000 by the U.S. government for his services and losses (Benton, -View, ii, 683). There is little reason to suppose that his services were -of much value. - -14.14. The Mexican archives contain many letters from New Mexico bearing -upon Armijo's conduct and motives. Most of the writers called him a -traitor; and a war department board (_mesa_), after reviewing the -evidence, decided that he ought to be tried. But of course this was -the opportunity for his enemies to turn upon him. The popular party -naturally insisted that the people wanted to fight, and were betrayed -by him. But he denied this, demanding why, in that case, they did not -select some other chief, and hold their ground. Armijo hovered about for -a time, pretending to coöperate with Ugarte; but, not being permitted to -remain in Chihuahua, he went south with a train of wagons filled with -American merchandise and guarded by Missourians, and finally, making his -way to the capital under an order to come and answer for his conduct, he -repeatedly demanded to be put on trial. - -14.15. The population of Santa Fe was about 3000. - -14.16. _Events from Aug. 1 to 18 inclusive._ Mexico in 1842, p. 128. -Sen. 7; 30, 1. Polk, Diary, June 15, 17, 1846. Sen. Misc. 26; 30, 1, pp. -17-20. Sen. 18; 31, 1, p. 237. =61=Kearny, Aug. 1. =61=Capt. Johnston, -diary. =62=Marcy to Kearny, June 18. =201=Gibson, diary. _Republicano_, -Sept. 10, 1846; Jan. 13; Feb. 5, 1847. Bustamante, Nuevo Bernal, ii, -104. Connelley, Doniphan's Exped., 181, 184. _Anzeiger des Westens_, -Aug. 6; Sept. 5, 7, 24, 1846. Ho. 60; 30, 1, pp. 168-70. Wash. _Union_, -Sept. 14; Oct. 2, 27, 1846; July 12, 1847. _Diario_, Sept. 9, 10; Oct. -5. Read, Guerra, 220. Prince, Concise Hist., 179-80. _Niles_, Oct. 10, -pp. 90-2. Robinson, Sketches, 20-1. Elliott, Notes, 225, 231, 234-5, -237, 241. =52=Alvarez, Sept. 4. Sen. 23; 30, 1. Ruxton, Adventures -(London, 1847), 110. Benton, View, ii, 683. Mo. Hist. Soc. Colls., -ii, no. 4. =212=Hastings, diary. =268=Kearny, letter book. =337=Capt. -Turner, diary. Cutts, Conquest, 44. Cooke, Conquest, 5-43. Richardson, -Journal. Hughes, Doniphan's Exped., 59-87. From =76= the following. -Letters from N. Mex. (undated letters in note 7). Testimony at trial -of Magoffin. S. Anna, Dec. 8. Summary of four packets of letters and -conclusion of the _mesa_. Armijo, Sept. 8. Armijo to Kearny, Aug. 12. -Connelly to Armijo, Aug. 19. Armijo, Jan. 20; Mar. 30, 1847. Re-extracto -from statement of Sambrano. Reyes, Aug. 25, 1846. Ugarte, Aug. 23; Sept. -5. Kearny to Armijo, Aug. 1. Estados of troops in Zac., Dur., Chih., and -N. Mex. - -14.17. _Events from Aug. 19 to Sept. 25 inclusive._ =61=Wooster, Sept. -25. Ho. 60; 30, 1, pp. 169-74 (Kearny). Sen. 7; 30, 1. Sen. Misc. 26; -30, 1, pp. 55, etc. =61=Kearny, Aug. 30; Sept. 24. =69=Kearny, orders, -Aug. 27; Sept. 12. =201=Gibson, diary. _Anzeiger des Westens_, Sept. -26; Nov. 16. =243=Kribben, home letter, Aug. 28. Wash. _Union_, Oct. -27. Prince, Concise Hist., 180, 182. _Niles_, Oct. 10, p. 90. Hastings, -diary. Ho. 60; 30, 1, pp. 169-70. Hughes, Doniphan's Exped., 100-19. -=76=Vigil, reply to Kearny, Aug. 19. =76=Letter from El Paso, Aug. 9. -=76=Heredia, Oct. 17. Some of the force did not set out until Sept. 26 -(Cooke, Conquest, 71). - - - XV. CHIHUAHUA - -15.1. Willock's battalion was under Price's command. The Mormons were -intended for California. Kearny's order to Doniphan anticipated a -suggestion made independently by Scott and by Benton in November, and -forwarded, with Polk's approval, to Kearny on December 10 by Marcy. -Doniphan was anxious to be ordered to Wool, and his men, reacting from -the atrocious conditions prevailing at Santa Fe--of which quite enough -will be heard in chapter xxxi--were eager to be off. - -15.2. Arriving at Santa Fe without provisions, the soldiers soon ate up -what supplies could be obtained there, and as the people were declared -to be American citizens, nothing could be taken without the consent -of the owners. Besides, Kearny had no adequate funds. By a surprising -blunder the contracts for the supplies that followed him called for -delivery, not at Santa Fe, but at Bent's Fort. Doniphan's setting out -for the south was delayed by a lack of provisions. The description of -his men is based upon a large number of documents (particularly the -diaries of Gibson and Hastings and Ruxton's Adventures) which will be -cited when the occupation of New Mexico comes to be considered (chap. -xxxi). - -15.3. Ruxton speaks of tents, but perhaps he was thinking of Clark's -men. Doniphan stated that they marched across the Jornada without tents -(St. Louis _Republican_, July 3, 1847). - -15.4. December 19 Heredia reported to Santa Anna that there were 108 -infantry and 320 cavalry at El Paso. There is no reason to suspect the -honesty of this report, and none of the other troops in the state had -time to reach that town before Christmas. Some ex-soldiers, however, are -said in Apuntes, 141, to have joined the colors, making some 1200 in -all, including militia. - -15.5. It is impossible to state positively how many men Ponce de León -had. The American accounts run as high as 1300 (Hughes), but evidently -they were not based on reliable information, and very likely the -writers assumed that all of Vidal's troops were under Ponce. From the -Mexican accounts it would appear that such was not the case. Vidal -would naturally keep men back to act as a reserve, hold what he called -his "line of defence," and guard his person; and this probability is -strengthened by the fact that three of his four guns were not used in -the fight. The figures of several Mexican accounts are about 500. The -reports of the details of the skirmish are equally irreconcilable. El -Brazito (The Little Arm) was the smaller (eastern) of the two channels -into which the river was here divided by an island. - -15.6. _Doniphan's operations to Dec. 25 inclusive; Mex. preparations -at the Chihuahua frontier._ =61=Wooster, Sept. 25. =268=Portrait of -Doniphan. =240=Kennerly, narrative. =61=Kearny, special orders 11. Sen. -7; 30, 1. Richardson, Journal. Sen. Misc. 26; 30, 1, p. 61. =61=Kearny, -orders, Sept. 23. =61=Doniphan, Oct. 20. =61=Price, Feb. 26, 1847. -=61=Scott, Nov. 24 and Marcy's endorsement, Dec. 9. Cooke, Conquest, 51. -=201=Gibson, diary. _Republicano_, Jan. 26; Apr. 10, 1847. _Picayune_, -Mar. 6, 18, 1847. Bustamante, Nuevo Bernal, ii, 105. _Anzeiger des -Westens_, Apr. 11, 14; May 17, 18, 1847. =243=Kribben, letters, Oct. 20, -etc., 1846. Wash. =Union=, Mar. 18, 21, 1847. St. Louis _Republican_, -July 3, 1847. _Niles_, Mar. 6, 1847, p. 7; Apr. 3, p. 71; July 3, p. -279. Sen. 1; 30, 1, pp. 496-7 (Don.). Ho. 60; 30, 1, pp. 171, 1128. -Apuntes, 141-3. Elliott, Notes, 227, 229. Sen. 23; 30, 1, pp. 90-6. Sen. -439; 29, 1, p. 2. (Loss) Ho. 24; 31, 1. Ruxton, Adventures (London, -1847), 171-2, 176, 178, 183. Statement _re_ Doniphan from Hon. Champ -Clark, Jan. 27, 1906. Benton, View, ii, 686-8. Mo. Hist. Soc. Colls., -ii, no. 4. =212=Hastings, diary. Cooke, Conquest, 39. Hughes, Doniphan's -Exped., 256-67. Connelley, Doniphan's Exped., 589. From =76= the -following. Trias, proclam., Nov. 19, 1846. _Id._, Nov. 23; Dec. 18. -Balmúdez, El Paso, Oct. 28. Vidal, proclam., Dec. 21. _Id._, Dec. 26. -Heredia, Dec. 25. Ponce to Vidal, Dec. 26. Gov. Chih. to prefect El -Paso, Sept. 19. - -15.7. October 22 Marcy, learning from Kearny that surplus troops might -be ordered to report to Wool at Chihuahua, directed Taylor to notify -and instruct any such detachment in case he (Taylor) should decide to -have Wool join him (Ho. 60; 30, 1, p. 365). It was probably possible to -have a Mexican spy go from Parras to Chihuahua and thence north to meet -Doniphan, but so far as we are aware no attempt to do this was made. - -15.8. The insurrection will be described in chap. xxxi. - -15.9. During the stay at El Paso some of the traders stole away, went to -Chihuahua, and sold ammunition to the enemy. - -15.10. Lieut. Col. Mitchell had been ordered south by Price in December -to open communication with Wool, who was believed to be approaching -Chihuahua, and Mitchell had organized the Rangers as an escort. -Christian Kribben, who commanded one of the two companies, wrote (Nov. -30) that Mitchell selected the best men then at S. Fe. The commander was -named Hudson. (See also Richardson, Journal.) Mitchell nearly reached -El Paso while Doniphan was engaged with the Indians; but, alarmed by -reports of Mexican troops, he returned and joined Doniphan. There was no -engineer in Doniphan's command. - -15.11. _Events from Dec. 26 to Feb. 27 inclusive._ Sen. Misc. 26; 30, -1, p. 61. =61=Price, Feb. 26, 1847. =61=Wooster, Mar. 7. Gibson, diary. -_Picayune_, Mar. 18. Bustamante, Nuevo Bernal, ii, 105. Wash. _Union_, -Mar. 18. Richardson, Journal. =228=Hughes to Miller, Jan. 26. _Id._ -to war dept., Jan. 25. Sen. 1; 30, 1, pp. 498-9 (Don.), 503 (Gilpin). -Apuntes, 143. Ho. 60; 30, 1, pp. 365, 1128. Elliott, Notes, 245. -Ruxton, Adventures (London, 1847), 156, 158, 168. Kendall, Narrative, -ii, 35. Mo. Hist. Soc. Colls., ii, no. 4. Hastings, diary. Hughes, -Doniphan's Exped., 256, 269, 271-4, 280, 286, 289-95, 301-2. From =76= -the following. García Conde, Apr. 5. Comte. gen. Chih., Oct. 10, 1846. -Heredia, Jan. 9, 1847. _Id._ to S. Anna, Dec. 31, 1846; Jan. 5, 1847. -Gov. Sonora to Bustamante, Feb. 28, 1847. Trias, Feb. 7. The artillery -arrived on Feb. 1, but the baggage and provision train not until Feb. 5. - -15.12. After the battle the Mexicans represented their forces as small; -but, as Trias himself wrote on February 20 that he would set out the -next day from Chihuahua City with 2000 troops (it is not probable that -he looked upon the rancheros as troops), and García Conde was then north -of the Sacramento with about 800 cavalry, it seems impossible to reduce -the total given in the text. - -15.13. _Mexican preparations to defend Chihuahua; the ground and -the fortifications._ Sen. Misc. 26; 30, 1, p. 53. Gibson, diary. -_Republicano_, Mar. 25; Apr. 10; June 8. _Anzeiger des Westens_, May -17, 18. _Diario_, Nov. 5, 1846. Edwards, Campaign, 127. Sen. 1; 30, 1, -pp. 498-513. Apuntes, 143-6. Ruxton, Adventures (London, 1847), 159. -=47=Conner, May 31, 1846. Memoria de ... Guerra, Mar., 1845, p. 28. -Kendall, Narrative, ii, 63. Hastings, diary. Hughes, Doniphan's Exped., -303-5. From =76= the following. García Conde, Apr. 5, 1847. Martínez, -Oct. 10, 1846. Reyes, Oct. 9, 1846. J. M. Conde, Feb. 24; Mar. 15, 1847. -S. Anna, Oct. 12; Nov. 11; Dec. 24, 1846; Jan. 4, 1847. Tornel, June -25, 1846. Gov. Durango, July 27; Sept. 3, 1846. Re-extracto of Sambrano -letter. Boletín no. 8, Chih. Reyes to Trias, Oct. 7, 1846. Comte. gen. -Durango, Aug. 22; Sept. 3; Oct. 30, 1846. To Reyes, Aug. 31; Sept. 9, -18, 25, 1846. Reyes, Aug. 25; Sept. 14; Oct. 2, 6, 1846. Memo., Sept 9. -To director gen. of artill., Sept. 18. Patriotic junta, plan, July 27, -1846 (reported upon by generals, Sept. 4). Comte. gen. Chih., [Sept.] -15, 1846. Trias, Sept. 19; Dec. 26, 1846; Feb. 20; Oct. 26, 1847. Gov. -Chih., July 23, 1846. Comte. gen. Zacatecas, July 31. Segundo cabo, -Chih., July 18, res., 21, 25; Aug. 17. Estados of troops in Zac., Dur., -Chih. and N. Mex. Heredia to S. Anna, Dec. 31, 1846; Jan. 5; Feb. 13, -20, 1847. To Heredia, Mar. 13, 1847. Memo, on defence of Chih. Heredia, -Oct. 10; Nov. 2; Dec. 7, 1846; Jan. 19, 26, 30; Feb. 20; Mar. 2, 22, -1847. Estado of Dur. troops sent to Chih., dated Feb. 20, 1847. To -comte. gen. Dur., Sept. 9, 1846. And many others. - -15.14. A letter of May 18, 1847, from Chihuahua said that in the opinion -of sensible persons commercial interest in the caravan had much to do -with Doniphan's victories, and that certain extraordinary events could -be explained in no other way (_Republicano_, June 8). =76=Heredia -suspected that Chihuahua merchants were secretly working to bring about -the arrival of the caravan. - -15.15. Doniphan might have crossed the cordillera bounding the eastern -side of the valley and turned the Mexican position entirely, wrote -=76=García Conde; but he did not say that the wagons could have gone -that way. If they could not, the plan was impracticable. - -15.16. Doniphan said later: "There was no particular generalship at -the battle. You were marched within the proper distance, when you were -turned loose. The enemy first recoiled, then gave way, then fled." To -a great extent this was true. Doniphan knew that he was not a general, -and did not try to play the part. For a time at least he merely watched -and whittled (Edwards, Campaign, 112). Affairs were mostly in the hands -of his subordinates. But he gave some directions. Lieut. Wooster of the -Fourth Artillery, who had arrived at Santa Fe on August 28, was on the -ground, and according to his own report was mainly responsible for the -conduct of the battle. - -15.17. _Events of Feb. 28._ Sen. 1; 30, 1, pp. 498 (Doniphan), -502 (Mitchell), 503 (Gilpin), 508 (Clark). (Loss) Ho. 24; 31, 1. -=201=Gibson, diary. =212=Hastings, diary. _American Eagle_, V. Cruz, May -26. Richardson, Journal, 61-4. Polk, Diary, May 4. =188=Edwards, diary. -Sen. Misc. 26; 30, 1, p. 53. =61=Wooster, Mar. 7. _Republicano_, Mar. -25; Apr. 10. México á través, iv, 644. _Anzeiger des Westens_, May 18 -(Kribben). Wash. _Union_, July 12. _Diario_, Mar. 17; Apr. 8. Edwards, -Campaign, 111-2, 117. _Niles_, July 3, 1847, p. 279. Robinson, Sketches, -57-8. Apuntes, 146-9. Elliott, Notes, 245. =13=Bankhead, no. 29, 1847. -Captain of Vols., Conquest, 38. Ruxton, Adventures (1847), 159. Mo. -Hist. Soc. Colls., ii, no. 4. Benton, View, ii, 686. Cooke, Conquest, -89. =240=Kennerly, narrative. Hughes, Doniphan's Exped., 306-13. -Connelley, Doniphan's Exped., 418, 590. From =76= the following. García -Conde, Apr. 5. J. M. Conde, Mar. 15. Yáñez, Mar. 23. To Heredia, Mar. -2, 13. Heredia, Mar. 2; Apr. 1. Ugarte, Mar. 10. It is hardly necessary -to point out that howitzers and cavalry should not ordinarily be used -in storming entrenched positions. Ibarra's list of officers killed -during the war (p. 8) mentions but one as falling here. This fact seems -to suggest the true character of the battle. Drawing the fire of the -Mexican fortifications by sweeping to the left prepared the way for our -decisive charge. - -15.18. Trias made active efforts but in vain. Heredia had only 200 men -on April 10; and Ugarte on April 15 merely expected to have two small -parties afoot before long. Arlégui, comandante general of Durango, -was anxious to protect his own state by recovering Chihuahua, but the -governor showed no interest in that project. - -15.19. Sen. Misc. 26; 30, 1, pp. 61-2. Frost, Taylor, 304. =61=Wooster, -Mar. 7. Gibson, diary. _Republicano_, Apr. 10; June 8. Wash. _Union_, -July 12. Sen. 1; 30, 1, pp. 501 (Doniphan); 503 (Mitchell). Apuntes, -149. Robinson, Sketches, 62. Ho. 60; 30, 1, pp. 1088 (Mora); 1128 -(Doniphan). Rondé, Voyage, 136. Hastings, diary. Hughes, Doniphan's -Exped., 316, 327, 335. Richardson, Journal. From =76= the following. -Ugarte, Mar. 15; Apr. 8, 15. To comtes. gen. in Jalisco, Zacat., Guanaj. -and Dur., Mar. 13. To Filisola, Apr. 1, 30. Gov. Dur. to comte. gen., -Mar. 7; Apr. 3. Arlégui, Mar. 31. _Id._, proclam., Apr. 11. Heredia, -Mar. 2, 18; Apr. 8. Trias, May 26. Olivares and Maceyra to Doniphan, -Mar. 5. Gov. Zacatecas, Mar. 18. The news that Mexican forces were -coming was not without foundation. Gen. Filisola, a veteran officer, had -now been given Heredia's place, the comandantes general of three states -had been ordered to the north, and the governor of Durango was expecting -1000 men. - -15.20. About sixty-five Comanches had raided Parras just before the -Americans arrived there, killing eight or ten persons. As the people of -the town had been friendly to Wool, Captain Reid with about thirty-five -men pursued the Indians, and without losing a life killed seventeen, -wounded at least twenty-five, and recaptured nineteen boys and girls -besides hundreds of horses and mules. Doniphan's men were reviewed by -Wool at Buena Vista. - -15.21. _The return home._ Ho. 60; 30, 1, pp. 1127, 1131, 1136, 1143, -1170 (Taylor); 1128 (Doniphan); 1144 (Reid). Richardson, Journal. -Hughes, Doniphan's Exped., 339-51, 359, 363-5, etc. Sen. Misc. 26; -30, 1, pp. 62-82. =61=Wooster, Mar. 7. =65=Wool, gen. orders 293. -Cutts, Conquest, 89. _Republicano_, June 8. Richardson, Journal. -_Independiente_, May 29. Wash. _Union_, July 12. Scharf, St. Louis, i, -379. Connelley, Doniphan's Exped., 591. Sen. 1; 30, 1, p. 502. Captain -of Vols., Conquest, 37, 39. Cooke, Conquest, 90, note. =148=Chamberlain, -recolls. =65=Taylor, gen. orders 59. S. Anna, Apelación, app., -15-7. Connelley, Doniphan's Exped., 596. Mo. Hist. Soc. Colls., ii, -no. 4. Hastings, diary. _Niles_, July 3, 1847, p. 279; July 17, p. -316; Aug. 14, p. 372. Robinson, Sketches, 64-71. =76=Ugarte, May 3. -=76=Relaciones, May 20. =76=Arlégui, May 7, 14. =76=Aguirre, May 14. -=76=Jefe político, Mapimi, May 10. The distance from Chihuahua to -Saltillo was called 675 miles. Doniphan resumed the practice of law, -managed his fine farm, and served in the Missouri senate. When the Civil -War broke out, he supported the Union; but apparently he felt too much -tenderness for his neighbors to take up arms. - - - XVI. THE CALIFORNIA QUESTION - -16.1. In 1845 there entered at Monterey, the only port of entry, -twenty-seven American vessels (9435 tons), eighteen Mexican (2620), four -British (966), three French (756) and three German (525). - -16.2. Mexico tried to keep the emigrants out with proclamations and -orders to the California authorities, but the Americans appealed -successfully to the treaty of amity and commerce and (it may be -presumed) to the self-interest of local authorities. - -16.3. The Mexican government was urged to buy New Helvetia, and -negotiations began; but it was said that the Americans in the valley -declared they would not permit Sutter to sell, and it seemed doubtful -whether Mexico could hold the place even if she purchased it. - -16.4. _California and its population._ =13=Pakenham, nos. 66, 78, 1840; -1, 1842. =13=Capt. Jones to Pakenham, Nov. 30, 1841. _Revue de Paris_, -Jan., 1849. =13=Forbes, no. 2, 1846. _Nat. Intelligencer_, Apr. 26, -1842; Nov. 5, 1844. _Madisonian_, Dec. 24, 1842. =77=To gov. Calif., -June 1, 1842. =77=Almonte, no. 84, 1844. =13=Barron, May 5, 1837; Jan. -20, 1844. _Id._ to Seymour, Jan. 28, 1845. =12=Blake to Seymour, July -5, 1846. =52=Vessels entering at Monterey, 1845. Forbes, Calif., 155, -225, 276. Bulletin de la Soc. de Géog., no. 77, May, 1844, 99-102. Dana, -Two Years, 83-8, 90-3, 200. Colton, Three Years, 19-22, 37-8, 45, 68, -111, 118, 155, 158, 172-3, 231. Whittier, "The Crisis." =61=R. B. Mason, -Sept. 18, 1847. Sherman Letters, 43. Duflot de Mofras, Explor., i, 319, -402; ii, 24. Wise, Gringos, 42, 49. Ho. 70; 30, 1, pp. 7-8. =61=Kearny, -Mar. 15; Apr. 28, 1847. =77=Covarrubias, Apr. 5, 1846. =247=March to -Larkin. =247=Sutter to Larkin, Oct. 3, 1845. Bidwell, Calif., 157, -161. _Revue des Deux Mondes_, Dec. 15, 1845, p. 1039. Sherman, Sloat, -xv, xxxix. St. Amant, Voyages, 513. Richman, Calif., 265, 267, 276. -=13=Forbes to Barron, Jan. 27, 1845. =13=Elliott, July 3, 1845. Royce, -Bidwell. Boston _Post_, Nov. 27, 1845. Jameson, Calhoun Corres., 946. -=247=Sutter to Larkin, Oct. 3, 1845. =372=Hyde, statement, 6. Farnham, -Life, 358-60. _Diario_, Mar. 21, 1846. Soulé, Annals, 168, 201. Sherman, -Home Letters, 114. _Niles_, June 6, 1846, p. 211. Schafer, Pac. Slope, -231. Simpson, Narrative, i, 287, 297. Sen. 33; 30, 1, p. 97. Revere, -Tour, 70. Sen. Rep. 75; 30, 1, p. 50. Sherman, Mems., i, 20. Bryant, -What I Saw, 447. Royce, Calif., 31-2, 38-9, 41. =123=Bidwell, statement. -Sen. 7; 30, 1 (Emory). Larkin, Calif. prior to 1846 (=52=Cons. letters, -Monterey, i, 1). Letter from S. Fe, July 29, 1841; Mex. in 1842, p. 128. -London _Times_, June 18, 1841. Phila. _No. American_, Oct. 31, 1843. -=52=Larkin, nos. 7, June 20; 9, Aug. 18, 1844; 12, Mar. 22; 22, June 6; -26, Sept. 29, 1845. - -16.5. Startled by this affair, the Mexican government now proposed -to send 1200 men to California with the idea of establishing them as -military colonists; and in May, 1845, Ignacio Iniestra, a Mexican -educated at Paris and regarded as a competent officer, was appointed -to the chief command. No such number of troops was, however, provided; -Iniestra refused to set out until sure his men would be paid and fed; -and the requisite money was not supplied. In August U. S. Consul Parrott -and the _Amigo del Pueblo_ of Mexico stated that a commissioner had -come from California to inform the government that the troops would not -be admitted. About this time the lack of funds caused a mutiny; but -that was suppressed, and the dwindling forces lingered on until, at -the end of the year, a large part of them were swept by Paredes into -the vortex of his revolution. For nearly two months they were cantoned -near Mexico; but finally another sham effort was put forth. Though -Iniestra died, the men proceeded under various embarrassments--receiving -accessions _en route_ from the prisons of Guadalajara--to the port of -Mazatlán, and the arms, munitions and provisions made their way under -equal difficulties to Acapulco, where seven small vessels were gathered -to receive them. But the restless Juan Alvarez, called "The Tiger of -the South," seized the effects of the expedition, giving his brigandage -a color of respectability by pronouncing, as we have seen, against -Paredes, and three weeks later the troops at Mazatlán, commanded now -by Col. Rafael Téllez, took a similar step--being determined on the -one hand not to go to California, and quite willing on the other to -live riotously on the funds of the expedition and the ample revenues -of the customhouse. They pronounced for Santa Anna; and soon after the -revolution of the citadel took place, August 4, 1846, the government, -promising to make up his command to 1000, ordered Téllez to sail, but -the necessary reinforcements were not provided. Téllez advised giving up -the expedition, and on Sept. 7 the government expressed its concurrence -in this recommendation. Thus ended even the pretence of taking the -California situation in hand. Téllez stated that according to documents -in his possession Paredes never intended to have the expedition sail; -and it is certain that secret instructions were given to Iniestra, -which the government was extremely anxious to keep from the knowledge -of the public. In all probability the real purpose of proposing the -expedition was merely to make people feel that something was to be -done. (=13=Bankhead, nos. 13, 1845; 74, 1846. _Diario_, May 4, 1846. -London _Times_, Jan. 8, 1846. =47=Wood to Bancroft, June 4, 1846. -Comunicación Circular que ... Peña. _Amigo del Pueblo_, Aug. 14, 1845. -Of the author's very numerous =76=documents relating to the expedition -the following are enough to cite. Bustamante to Moreno, Mar. 26, 1847. -Tornel to gov. Calif., May 13, 1846. N. Flores, Mar. 8, 1846. Yáñez, -Mar. 10, 23, 1846. Alvarez, Mar. 17; Apr. 7, 1846. M. Gutiérrez, May 19; -June 16, 1846. To J. I. Gutiérrez, May 13, 1846. Téllez to prest. of -consejo de gob., July 25, 1846; reply, Aug. 18. J. I. Gutiérrez, May 9, -1846. To Iniestra, Mar. 31; May 9, 1845. Iniestra, July 31; Aug. 24, 29; -Sept. 23; Dec. 2, 24, 1845; Jan. 5, 18, 24; Feb. 28, 1846. Castañares, -Oct. 27, 1845. To Monterde, Apr. 10, 1846. T. Moreno, Mar. 3, 1846. -Baneneli to Téllez, May 7, 1846. Moreno to Gutiérrez, Apr. 16, 24, 1846. -Téllez, Feb. 9, 27; Mar. 2; Apr. 11; Aug. 24, 26; Sept. 2, 1846. To -Téllez, Sept. 7, 1846. See also chap. xxx, note 27.) - -16.6. _Mexico fully warned._ London _Times_, June 18, 1841; Aug. 6; -Oct. 6, 1845. =77=Almonte, no. 84, P., July 16; 153, P., Dec. 12, 1844. -=13=Pakenham, no. 2, Jan. 6, 1842. =13=Bankhead, nos. 31, Mar. 31, 1845; -42, 1846. =77=Arrangóiz, Sept. 17, 1842; nos. 64, res., June 28, 1844; -41, res., Feb. 28; 70, res., May 7; 101, res., July 8, 1845. London -_Chronicle_, Aug. 13, 1845. Castañares, Documentos. =75=Sánchez, Apr. -2, 1846. Bancroft, Pac. States, xvii, 32. =76=Mora y Villamil, Nov. 15, -1845. =76=Bustamante, Nov. 13, 1845. =76=Mil. comte., Acapulco, July -22, 1845. =76=J. Castro to Castañares, Oct. 6, 1845. =76=_Id._, May 30, -1845. =76=Bustamante to Moreno, Mar. 26, 1847. In November, 1845, the -Mexican minister of relations told Bankhead that Castro could not be -punished for revolting (=13=Bankhead, no. 113). - -16.7. If anyone doubts this, let him look at the present populous, rich, -happy state of California, think how much it contributes to the world, -and consider what it would now be, had it remained a part of Mexico, and -suffered from the anarchy, devastations and massacres of recent years. - -16.8. France had at one time cast longing glances at California. In the -early forties Duflot de Mofras made a visit there, and according to the -British vice consul in California a formal offer of protection was made -by him, Admiral Du Petit Thouars and Capt. Laplace in the name of their -government (=13=Forbes to Barron, Sept. 5, 1844); but the time for such -a move was not then ripe, and France, aside from maintaining a consular -representative on the ground, became inactive. England was even less -responsive. While many British subjects, particularly the correspondent -of the London _Times_ at Mexico (_e.g._ _Times_, Sept. 9, 1845), felt -that England should take California, the British government, though -doubtless extremely anxious that the territory should not fall into the -possession of the United States, refused to move or countenance any move -in that direction. December 31, 1844, the Foreign Office wrote to Consul -Barron at Tepic, Mexico, who had charge of Vice Consul Forbes at San -Francisco, that in the California agitation the British agents were to -be entirely passive, and that the idea of a British protectorate could -not be countenanced, adding that the authorities of California "should -be clearly made to understand that Great Britain would view with much -dissatisfaction the establishment of a protectoral power over California -by any other foreign State." Other documents bearing on the subject are -the following. =13=Forbes to Barron, Sept. 5, 1844. Kennedy in London -_Times_, June 18, 1841. =13=Pakenham, nos. 91, Aug. 30, 1841; 61, July -21, 1842. =13=To _Id._, Dec. 15, 1841. Bankhead, nos. 74, July 30, 1845; -73, May 30, 1846. =13=To Bankhead (exactly in line with the despatch -addressed to Barron on the same day), nos. 53, Dec. 31, 1844; 18, May -31, 1845; 16, June 1; 4, Aug. 15, 1846. =108=Ashburton to Sturgis, Apr. -2, 1845 ("we certainly do not want colonies, and least of all such as -would be unmanageable from this distance, and only serve to embroil us -with our neighbours"). =13=Mora to Palmerston, Dec. 15, 1847. London -_Times_, Oct. 6, 1845. =12=For. Off. to Admty., June 19, 1846. Webster, -Writings, xviii, 192. =12=Seymour to Admty., Apr. 27, 1846. _Monitor -Repub._, Apr. 16, 1846. =52=Everett, Mar. 28, 1845. Gordon, Aberdeen, -183. Smith, Annex. of Texas, 155, 230, 417. Mackintosh, Brit. consul -at Mex., proposed to place 500,000 European colonists in California in -twenty years (=13=to Bankhead, July 26, 1845) with a view to turning -over to England the control of the province (=13=Bankhead, no. 73, -May 30, 1846). Paredes promised to give "every possible facility" for -the execution of this plan (=13=Bankhead, no. 73), but the British -government would not take it up. - -16.9. _Mexican rule to the end of 1845._ =13=Forbes, nos. 1, Oct. 19, -1843; 2, Jan. 26, 1846. Boston _Advertiser_, Sept. 26, 1842. _Nat. -Intelligencer_, May 11, 1844. London _Times_, Aug. 6; Oct. 6; Nov. 11, -1845; Mar. 13, 1846. _Revue de Paris_, Jan., 1849. =77=Almonte, nos. 84, -P., July 16; 153, P., Dec. 12, 1844. =13=Barron, May 5, 1837; Feb. 18, -1845. =13=_Id._ to Seymour, Jan. 28, 1845. =13=Pakenham, nos. 13, 1837; -66, 1840; 91, 1841; 2, 1842. =13=Doyle, no. 79, 1843. =13=Bankhead, nos. -108, 1844; 31, 52, 113, 1845; 73, 1846. Paredes, address on opening -Cong., June 6, 1846 (_Diario_). Mobile _Commercial Register_, June 13, -1843. _Diario_, Mar. 27; June 3; Aug. 21, 1845. Wash. _Globe_, May -29; Oct. 21, 1845. _Amigo del Pueblo_, Aug. 14, 1845. St. Louis _New -Era_, Aug. 20, 1845. Memphis _Eagle_, Oct. 1; Nov. 5, 1845. =52=Black, -Sept. 2, 1845. _Britannia_, May 15, 1847. =52=Virmond to Jones, Feb. -4, 1837. =52=Larkin, nos. 9, Aug. 18; 11, Oct. 30; 12, Dec. 9, 1844; -16, Jan. 1; 1, Mar. 22; 2, Mar. 22; 20, Mar. 24; 25, July 10; 26, Sept. -29, 1845. =247=Stearns to Larkin, May 14, 1846. =52=Parrott, Aug. 26, -1845. =12=Blake to Seymour, July 5, 1846. =12=Seymour, June 13. Otero, -Cuestión Social, 117. Giménez, Memorias, 90. México á través, iv, 404. -=52=Burroughs to Ellis, Jan. 10, 1837. =77=Castillo, no. 119, 1835. -(Simpson) _Amer. Hist. Rev._, xiv, pp. 88-9. Memoria de ... Relaciones, -Mar., 1845. Royce, Calif., 202. Memoria de ... Guerra, Jan., 1844; -Mar., 1845. Mateos, Hist. Parl., v, 98. Bandini, Calif., 138. =13=Jones -to Pakenham, Nov. 30, 1841. Löwenstern, Le Mexique, 84. =13=Diaz to -Barron, Sept. 29, 1845. London _Chronicle_, Aug. 13, 1845. =47=Wood to -Bancroft, June 4, 1846. St. Louis _Reveille_ (weekly), May 18, 1846. -=77=Arrangóiz, Jan. 9; Sept. 17, 1842; nos. 64, res., 1844; 70, res., -76, res., 101, res., 1845. Gordon, Aberdeen, 183. Forbes, Calif., -146-52. Bulletin de la Soc. de Géog., no. 77, p. 186. Castañares, -Documentos. Colton, Three Years, 20, 22, 32. _Argonaut_, Feb. 2, 1878 -(Sutter's diary). Sherman Letters, 43-4. =13=Forbes to Barron, Aug. -9; Sept. 5, 1844; Jan. 27; Mar. 10, 1845. Ho. 70; 30, 1, pp. 7-8, 42. -=75=P. Pico, July 1, 1845; Feb. 13, 1846. =75=Covarrubias, Apr. 5, -1846. =75=Sánchez, Apr. 2, 1846. =75=Calif. Commission, Aug. 10, 1846. -_Reforma_, Feb. 10, 1846. =122=Bidwell, Calif., 119, 123. =3=Alvarado, -Calif., v, 129. _Revue des Deux Mondes_, Dec. 15, 1845, p. 1037. -Richman, Calif., 273-9. =334=Torres, Peripecias, 49. Blackmar, Span. -Instits., 10-12. Walpole, Four Years, ii, 205. N. Y. _Journ. Commerce_, -Dec. 30, 1846. =11=Cyprey to Guizot, no. 58, 1841. Wilkes, Narrative, v, -171. =13=Aberdeen to Bankhead, no. 53, 1844. Sen. 7; 30, 1. =52=Larkin, -Calif, prior to 1846 (Cons. letters, Monterey, i, 1). Dana, Two Years, -90-1, 200. (Prussia) =52=Everett, no. 284, confid., Mar. 28, 1845. And -from =76= the following. To gov. Calif., Apr. 1, 1845; May 9, 1846. -Téllez, Mar. 23, 1846. Alvarez, Mar. 17, 1846. Guerra, circular, Apr. -1, 1845. Comte. gen. Iguala, Mar. 13, 1846. Mora y Villamil, Nov. 15, -1845. Bustamante, Nov. 13, 1845. J. Castro, memo., undated. _Id._, Oct. -6, 1845. Castañares, Jan. 27, 1846. Estado, Monterey, June 15, 1845. -Castro and Alvarado, May 30, 1845. Sutter to Mex. commr., Nov. 19, 1845. -Castañeda to P. Pico, Feb. 10, 1846. Carrera, Apr. 8, 1846. - -16.10. _Interest of the American people in California._ =13=Pakenham, -no. 63, 1841. N. Orl. _Commercial Bulletin_, Feb. 19, 1840; May 21; -Oct. 12, 1841. London _Times_, June 18, 1841; Aug. 1, 1845. N. Y. -_Journ. Commerce_, Oct. 9, 1841; Feb. 23, 1842. St. Louis _Reveille_, -Sept. 17, 1845. Wash. _Globe_, Feb. 27; Aug. 23; Oct. 21; Nov. 4, 1845. -Nashville _Union_, Mar. 13, 1845. Memphis _Eagle_, May 2; Nov. 5, -1845. N. Orl. _Picayune_, Apr. 21, 1842; Apr. 5, 1844; Nov. 25, 1845; -Mar. 31, 1846. =13=Bankhead, no. 113, 1845. Savannah _Republican_, -Apr. 25, 1845. N. Orl. _Courier_, Feb. 17, 1840; Apr. 26; July 10, -1845. _American Review_, Jan., 1846, 82-99. _Diario_, Nov. 3, 1845. -Charleston _Courier_, July 11, 1845. _Journal des Débats_, June 1, 1846. -Richmond _Enquirer_, Sept. 12, 1845. Balt. _Clipper_, Mar. 2, 1840. -N. Y. _Herald_, Feb. 22, 1845. (Regulations) =52=Larkin, no. 8, June -24, 1844. Charleston _Mercury_, Feb. 24, 1845. N. Orl. _Bee_, Apr. 19, -1842. Phila. _North American_, Nov. 1, 1845. N. Y. _Tribune_, Apr. 5, -1845. Forbes, Calif., 147-8. Dana, Two Years, 200. _Southwestern Hist. -Qtrly._, xviii, nos. 1-3 (R. G. Cleland). (Whalers) _Hunt's Merchants' -Mag._, Jan., 1845. _Cong. Globe_, 29, 1, p. 197 (Allen); app., Hunter, -Jan. 10, 1846. Sen. 33; 30, 1, p. 98. =77=Almonte, no. 84, P., July 16, -1844. =77=Arrangóiz, 71, res., May 12, 1845. - -16.11. _Views and policy of U. S. government._ Ho. 42; 25, 1, p. -18 (Forsyth, Aug. 6, 1835). =52=Ellis, Sept. 24, 1836. =108=Hooper -to Bancroft, June 25, 1846. =52=Slidell, no. 3, Dec. 17, 1845. -=13=Pakenham, nos. 43, 1833; 63, 91, 1841. =13=Forbes, no. 2, Jan. 26, -1846. London _Times_, June 18, 1841; Aug. 6; Sept. 9; Oct. 6; Nov. 19, -1845; Apr. 11, 1846. =77=Mex. commrs., Feb. 16, 1842. =52=Larkin to -Stearns et al., Apr. 17, 1846. _Journal des_ _Débats_, July 10, 1843; -Jan. 12; June 1, 1846. México á través, iv, 399. Wash. _Globe_, Feb. -27, 1845. =52=Everett, no. 284, confid., Mar. 28, 1845. =52=Shannon, -Jan. 9, 1845. Gilmer in U. S. Ho. Repres., Jan. 28, 1843. N. Y. -_Courier and Enquirer_, Nov. 17, 1845. =77=Almonte, no. 4, res., Jan. -10, 1843; 84, P., July 16, 1844. =52=Thompson, nos. 1, Apr. 29; 4 July -30, 1842. =56=W. S. Parrott, May 13; Sept. 2, 1845. _Constitutionnel_, -Oct. 13, 1844; Mar. 29, 1845; July 9, 1846. _National_, Sept. 4, 1845. -=52=Wickliffe to Buchanan, private, [June] 3, 1845. N. Y. _Journ. -Commerce_, Feb. 23, 1842. Harvey, Webster, 203-4. =52=Buchanan to -Slidell, no. 1, Nov. 10, 1845. Adams, Mems., xi, 346, 355. Curtis, -Webster, ii, 250. Forbes to Barron, Mar. 10, 1845. _Nat. Intelligencer_, -Apr. 19. Buchanan to Larkin, Oct. 17, 1845. Charleston _Mercury_, July -12, 1845. Charleston _Courier_, Nov. 12, 1845. Forbes, Calif., 149. -Mofras, Exploration, i, 517. Smith, Annex. of Texas, 109. Polk, Diary, -Oct. 24, 1845. St. Louis _Reveille_, Apr. 29, 1846. Bustamante, Nuevo -Bernal, i, 45. =247=Hastings to Larkin, Mar. 3, 1846. =247=Allerton to -Larkin, Mar. 4, 1846. =247=Sutter to Larkin, Oct. 3, 1845. =1=Allen in -U. S. Sen., Aug. 6, 1846. _Revue des Deux Mondes_, Dec. 15, 1845, pp. -1037, 1043. Vallejo, Documentos. Van Tyne, Letters of Webster, 269. -_Texas Review_, Jan., 1917, p. 217 (Barker). Schafer, Pac. Slope, 229. -Reeves, Amer. Diplomacy, 280-1. =52=Flower to Van Buren, Feb. 8, 1840. -=52=Kelley to Webster, Jan. 2, 1842. Kelsey, Consulate, 7, 35, etc. -=52=Larkin, nos. 8, June 24; 9, Aug. 18, 1844; Mar. 22; 25, July 10; 26, -Sept. 29; 29, Dec. 31, 1845; 37, Mar. 9; 42, Apr. 17; 44, June 1, 1846. -Webster, Writings, xviii, 203-4. N. Orl. _Picayune_, Nov. 25, 1845. -Jameson, Calhoun Corres., 978. =351=Thompson to Webster, Jan. 30, 1843. -_Monitor Repub._, Apr. 16, 1846. Royce, Calif., 38-9. =122=Bidwell, -Calif., 138. Richardson, Messages, iv, 398, 539-40. Richmond _Enquirer_, -Sept. 12, 1845. =77=Arrangóiz, no. 41, res., Feb. 28, 1845. =13=Crampton -to Palmerston, no. 63, 1848. London _Chronicle_, Aug. 13, 1845. -_Democratic Review_, July, 1845, p. 9. =48=Bancroft to Sloat, Mar. 21, -secret and confid., Oct. 17, 1845. _Southwestern Hist. Qtrly._, xviii, -nos. 1-3 (R. G. Cleland). Meade, Letters, i, 65. - -16.12. For the facts merely alluded to here see pp. 127-8, 130-4. -(Virtually forbid) chap. iv, note 24. Polk's announcement that he -should endeavor to obtain California (Schouler, United States, iv, -498) is sufficiently explained by his attempts to purchase it. When he -determined to lay our grievances before Congress, it is not certain -that he expected war to result. He seems to have felt that a determined -stand on our part might bring Mexico to terms. And his promptly taking -advantage of the rights conferred by the state of war to occupy the -territory and bar out foreign interference counts for nothing as proof -that he brought on the war for the alleged purpose. See _e.g._ Von -Holst, U. S., iii, 266. - -[16.13. Bancroft's history of California, which at times is rather free -in its conclusions, denies that such a meeting was held (Pacific States, -xvii, 61-2). His principal reasons are lack of corroborative evidence, -the silence of Larkin, and the inconsistencies in the accounts of it. -But (1) we have corroborative evidence from several persons; (2) Larkin -may not have wished to mention a confidential talk held under his own -roof--especially as it accomplished nothing; and (3) inconsistencies are -found in the accounts of many events. On the other hand some accounts of -the meeting have no doubt been exaggerated and embellished. - -16.14. Bancroft (Pacific States, xvii, 200) says there is no evidence -that Gillespie had official relations with Sloat; but Sloat's -=47=report, February 25, 1846, said that in accordance with "the verbal -orders he delivered me," Gillespie was immediately sent forward. - -<p>16.15. Although no formal meeting took place at Santa Barbara, Capt. -Blake, of the British warship _Juno_, who went there, was appealed -to for protection on the ground that Mexico and England were allied -nations (=12=Seymour to Admiralty, Aug. 27, 1846). Some proposed, -should England refuse it, to address France. About this time an Irish -priest named McNamara arrived in a British vessel with a grand scheme -of colonization, and obtained an immense grant of land. The scheme -was much talked about, but signified nothing. The grant was illegally -made. Mexico, though she treated McNamara pleasantly did not endorse -the plan, and in all probability would not have confirmed such a grant, -had California remained under her jurisdiction, for she was extremely -suspicious of England, and could see that 10,000 British colonists would -be a dangerous element. Indeed, McNamara was suspected at Mexico of -acting in the interest of England. A few of the documents bearing on -this subject are: Ramírez, Méx., 246; Ho. 17; 31, 1 (Halleck, Cuevas, -Castillo y Lanzas); Bancroft, Pac. States, xvii, 215-23; Sen. Report 75; -30, 1 (testimony of Frémont and others; the McNamara papers); Royce, -California, 166; =52=Larkin, no. 56, Aug. 22, 1846; =335=McNamara, -proposition, May 17, 1845. - -16.16. _Politics in California, Jan.-June, 1846._ =13=Jones to Pakenham, -Nov. 30, 1841. =108=Hooper to Bancroft, June 25, 1846. =13=Forbes, no. -2, Jan. 26, 1846. Boston _Advertiser_, May 27, 1843. =13=Forbes to -Barron, Sept. 5, 1844; Jan. 27; Mar. 10, 1845. =13=To Barron, Dec. 31, -1844. _Diario_, Aug. 21, 1845. =52=J. Castro to P. Pico, June 8, 1846. -=12=Blake to Seymour, July 5, 1846. =52=Larkin to Stearns _et al._, Apr. -17, 1846. =13=To Bankhead, no. 53, 1844. =47=Sloat to Bancroft, Feb. -25, 1846. =47=Wood to Bancroft, June 4, 1846. =12=Seymour to admty., -Aug. 27, 1846. Colton, Three Years, 429. =247=Stearns to Larkin, May -14, 1846. =13=Forbes to Calif. govt., Jan. 28, 1846. =13=Seymour to -Bankhead, June 13, 1846. =13=Pico to Forbes, June 29, 1846. =13=Barron, -Aug. 12, 1846. =52=Military junta, Monterey, Apr. 11, 1846. =52=Larkin -to Gillespie, Apr. 23, 1846. =52=Larkin, circular (in Spanish). -Sherman Letters, 43. =13=J. A. to A. Forbes, July 9, 1846. Sen. 18; -31, 1, p. 574 (Stevenson). =75=P. Pico to Relaciones, Feb. 13, 1846. -=75=Covarrubias to Relaciones, Apr. 5, 1846. =75=Sánchez to Relac., Apr. -2, 1846. Bancroft, Pacific States, xvii, 41-75, 215-22. =247=Allerton -to Larkin, Mar. 4, 1846. =247=Larkin to Bennett, May 26, 1846; to -Stearns, May 24, 1846. =247=Stearns to Larkin, June 12, 1846. Revere, -Tour, 24. Buchanan to Larkin, Oct. 17, 1845. =122=Bidwell, Calif., -138, 147, 151. Alvarado, Calif., v, 129-43, 222, 241. =126=Botello, -Anales, 133, 136. Phelps, Fore and Aft, 284. _Amer. Hist. Rev._, xiv, -88-9. Richman, Calif., 316, 474. Ramírez, México, 246. Lancey, Cruise. -=343=Vallejo, Documentos. =334=Torres, Peripecias, 48-9. Walpole, Four -Years, ii, 208. Ho. 17; 31, 1, p. 121. Hall, S. José 143. Sen. 33; 30, -1, p. 377. McGroarty, Calif., 190-1. Sen. Report, 75; 30, 1, pp. 12, -16 (Frémont), 19, 31, 33 (Gillespie), 37 (Hensley), 44 (Minor), 46 -(Childs). Sherman, Sloat, 56, xv. =263=Mervine to Sloat, July 1, 1846. -Swasey, Early Days, 57, 81. _Cong. Globe_, 30, 1, pp. 604-7 (Benton). -Willey, Transition Period, 19. Kelsey, Consulate, 45, 51. Royce, Calif., -36, 166. =123=Bidwell, statement. =52=Larkin, Calif. prior to 1846 -(Consular letters, Monterey, i, 1). =52=_Id>._, nos. 4, Apr. 16; 9, -Aug. 18, 1844; 20, Mar. 24; 26, Sept. 29, 1845; 39, Apr. 2; 42, Apr. -17; 44, June 1; 48, June 18; 54, July 20; 56, Aug. 22, 1846; 63, Jan. -14, 1847. =13=Crampton to Palmerston, nos. 35, 63, 1848. =76=P. Pico to -Relac., June 29, 1846. =76=_Id._, proclams., May [13]; June 23, 1846. -=76=Vallejo, Nov. 24, 1845. =76=Pico, May 25, 1846. =76=J. Castro, Mar. -5; Apr. 1, 2; May 30, 1846. =76=Castro and Alvarado, May 30, 1845. - - - XVII. THE CONQUEST OF CALIFORNIA - -17.1. _Frémont's clash with Castro._ =13=Forbes to Barron, -Jan. 26. Sen. 1; 29, 2, pp. 50-1. Benton, View, ii, 580, 688. -=67=Abert to Frémont, Feb. 12, 1845. =13=Pakenham, no. -130, 1846. =13=Forbes to Calif. govt., Feb. 28. =62=Adj. -gen. to Benton, Nov. 2, 1847. =75=J. Castro to P. Pico, Jan. -30, 1846. =75=Frémont to J. Castro, Jan. 29. =247=Larkin's -memoranda and correspondence with Frémont and others on the subject. -=52=_Id._, nos. 36, 38, Mar. 5, 27; 41, Apr. 17, 1846; 63, Jan. 14, -1847. =3=Alvarado, Hist. de Calif., 239. Phelps, Fore and Aft, 279. -Bancroft, Pac. States, xvii, 4-23. Frémont, Mems., i, 454-70. _Id._, -Geog. Memoir. _Niles_, Nov. 21, 1846, pp. 188-9. _Diario_, Apr. 24. Sen. -33; 30, 1, pp. 372-4 (Frémont here states that he was given permission -to explore south of the Colorado, and was on his way to do so when -stopped by Castro. This permission does not appear in the documents of -March, 1846. It may have been given very incidentally, and this may have -been the cause of the trouble). Bandini, Calif., 139. Sen. Report 75; -30, 1, pp. 12, 16. Richman, Calif., 308. Tuthill, Calif., 163. Sherman, -Sloat, xv. _Cong. Globe_, 30, 1, pp. 604-5. Kelsey, Consulate, 96. -=76=Castro, Mar. 6; Apr. 1. =76=Larkin to alcalde, Mar. 10. -_Journ. Mil. Serv. Instit._, xxxi, 711. - -Rives (U. S. and Mexico, ii, 172-3) decides roundly against Frémont, -and cites for support a letter from the prefect to Larkin demanding the -reason for Frémont's movements; but it was perfectly in accord with -Mexican methods that such a letter should have been written purely to -satisfy the authorities at Mexico. - -17.2. _Gillespie's mission._ _Cong. Globe_, 30, 1, p. 605. -=247=Gillespie to Larkin, May 24. =13=J. A. to A. Forbes, July -9. Polk, Diary, Oct. 30, 1845. =247=Leidesdorff to Larkin, Apr. -25, 1846. Buchanan to Larkin, Oct. 17, 1845. _Atlantic Monthly_, Oct., -1890, pp. 548, etc. Sen. 33; 30, 1, 373. Ho. Report 817; 30, 1. Sen. -Report 75; 30, 1, pp. 12, 30. Frémont, Mems., i, 489. _Century Mag._, -N. S., xix, 923. Calif. Hist. Soc. Papers, i, pt. 1 (1887), pp. 69-72. -=52=Larkin, no. 44, June 1. =52=_Id._ to Stearns _et al._, -Apr. 17. Benton, View, ii, 689. Cooke, Conquest, 203-4. Royce, Bidwell. - -Gillespie took to Frémont a letter of introduction from Buchanan and -letters from Frémont's father-in-law, Senator Benton. The former -was entirely non-committal; and the latter, while very likely they -contained veiled allusions to conversations in which the desire of the -administration to acquire California had been mentioned, must have been -like it in that respect, else Gillespie would not have dared to carry -them through Mexico. - -17.3. The evidence on this point, including Frémont's positive -statements made not long after the event, is conclusive (Polk, Diary, -March 21, 1848; Senate Report 75; 30, 1, pp. 13, 32; =132=Benton, -Feb. 18, 1848; Ho. Report 817; 30, 1, p. 4; =52=Larkin to P. Pico, -July 5, 1846. Speaking in the Senate, April 10, 1848 (_Cong. Globe_, -30, 1, p. 604), Benton, though feeling extremely bitter toward Polk -and no doubt fully informed by his son-in-law and client regarding all -the facts, did not intimate that any instructions inconsistent with -the instructions of Larkin were sent to Frémont. Indeed he stated the -contrary. See also his Thirty Years View, ii, 689. - -17.4. Frémont stated before a committee of the Senate that he had -learned from Bancroft that Polk's plan, in case of war, contemplated the -occupation of California; but Frémont wrote to Capt. Montgomery of the -_Portsmouth_, June 16, 1846, that even in the case of war he was not -expected to prosecute "active hostilities." In 1886 Bancroft stated that -Gillespie was to inform Frémont of the President's intentions. - -17.5. First, many of the settlers had ample reasons to feel -alarmed: the illegality of their presence; Castro's sudden and cruel -seizure of Americans in 1840; his attack upon Frémont in violation -(the Americans believed) of a promise; official notices, issued about -May 1, to the effect that the majority of the Americans were liable to -be expelled at the convenience of the authorities; Castro's warlike -preparations; his talk of moving against the immigrants with armed -forces (=52=Larkin, no. 42, April 17); and reports, more or less -authentic and reliable, from various persons regarding what he said or -intended. Secondly, the contemporary testimony of Frémont, Gillespie and -other Americans--some of it given under oath--that alarm was actually -felt is too strong to be rejected (see note 6). Much has been made of -Bidwell, a clerk of Sutter's, who tells us that alarm was not felt. But -(1) his =123=Statement was made thirty years after the events; (2) -he admits that he was not on good terms with Frémont, and the Statement -aims to show that Frémont invented the story of alarm as an excuse for -his conduct; (3) his Statement is in other respects clearly inaccurate; -(4) it assumes that he knew the sentiments of all the persons on the -Sacramento, yet proves that an important fact may have been known to -but few; (5) it shows that at the critical time he was absent in the -mountains; (6) it says, "Californians were always talking of expelling -Americans" [and therefore were talking of it in April, 1846]; (7) -his book mentions that in 1845 an attack upon New Helvetia was so -confidently expected that he rode day and night to warn Sutter; (8) he -undertakes to disprove positive testimony with negative. The legitimate -settlers had no direct occasion to feel alarmed; but, as Bidwell himself -points out, they could not have held aloof, had an attempt been made to -expel their fellow-countrymen. It would be a mistake to suppose that the -Americans who joined Frémont in these operations were actuated solely by -patriotism and the idea of self-defence. - -17.6. _The Bear movement._ (Starred citations refer, among other -facts, to the alarm felt by Americans.) *=12=Blake of _Juno_ to -Seymour, July 5. Benton, View, ii, 691. =12=Seymour to admty., -Aug. 27, 1846. =75=M. Castro to Calif. govt., Jan. 29. _Niles_, -Nov. 21, 1846, p. 191; Oct. 16, 1847, p. 110. Colton, Three Years, -175. Cooke, Conquest, 204-11. =13=J. A. to A. Forbes, July 9, -14. =13=P. Pico to J. A. Forbes, June 29. =52=M. Castro to -----, [Apr. 30]. =52=Larkin to M. Castro, June 14. *=52=Ide, -proclams., June 15, 18. =52=J. Castro, proclams., June 17. -=52=P. Pico, proclam., June 23. =52=_Id_. to Larkin, June 29. -Sen. 1; 29, 2, pp. 51-2. Buchanan to Larkin, Oct. 17, 1845. =52=J. -Castro to Larkin, undated. =247=Larkin to Stearns, Apr. 17. -=52=Larkin to Pico, July 5. =48=Bancroft to Sloat, June 24; -Oct. 17, 1845. =123=Bidwell, statement. Royce, Bidwell. Willey, -Thirty Years, 10. =256=Marcy to Wetmore, Dec. 5, 12. McGroarty, -Calif., 192. Bancroft, Pac. States, xvii, 39-48, 101-86, 199. Apuntes, -353-4. =247=Gillespie to Larkin, May 24; June 7. =247=Larkin -to Mott, Talbot & Co., June 18. Peters, Kit Carson, 269. -=247=Leidesdorff to Larkin, Mar. 19; June 19. =247=Montgomery -to Larkin, July 2. =247=Vallejo to Larkin, Sept. 15; to J. Castro, -July 23. =122=Bidwell, Calif., *141-2, 161, etc. *=3=Alvarado, -Calif., 184. *Phelps, Fore and Aft, 279, 284, 291. Oakland (Cal.) -_Tribune_, June 30, 1914. *Richman, California, 308-14. =249=Leese, -Bear Flag Papers, 9. =105=Baldridge, Days of 1846. _Diario_, -Dec. 27, 1846. *Colton, Deck and Port, 389. =247=Guerrero to -Leidesdorff, Apr. 30. =314=Sawyer papers. Polk, Diary, Sept. 1. -_Niles_, Nov. 14, 1846, p. 174; Nov. 21, p. 191 (Frémont to Benton, -July "25"); Oct. 16, 1847, p. 110 (Frémont's declaration of June 6). -*Upham, Frémont, 228. _Century Mag._, N. S., xix, 1917 (Mrs. F.), 780 -(Royce), 782. Schafer, Pacific Slope, 258. =263=Mervine to Sloat, -July 1. _Cong. Globe_, 30, 1, p. 606 (Benton). =52=Larkin, Calif, -prior to 1846. *Sen. 33; 30, 1, p. 374. Ho. Report, 817, 30, 1, p. 4. -Bandini, Calif., 142. Revere, Tour, 64. *Sen. Report, 75; 30, 1, pp. -12, 13, 25-9, 32-4, 38-40. *Sherman, Sloat, xv (Gillespie's note). -*Swasey, Early Days, 49. _Nat. Intelligencer_, Nov. 11. *Willey, -Transition Period, 39, 42. Kelsey, Consulate, 15, 72. Royce, Calif., -132. _Atlantic Monthly_, Oct., 1890, pp. 548-57. =52=Larkin, nos. -*41, Apr. 17; *48, June 18; 53, July 18; 54, July 20, 1846; 63, Jan. -14, 1847. *Californian, i, nos. 3-5. =76=Pico to Relac., June 29. -=76=Pico, procl., June 23. =76=M. Castro to Pico, June 19. -=76=Alvarado, June 28. =76=Narváez (undated). *_Journ. Mil. -Serv. Instit._, xxxi, 715. - -17.7. As Sloat was in personal intercourse with Gillespie about Feb. -20-22, he probably learned from him something more about the intentions -of our government. - -17.8. =48=Oct. 17, 1845, Bancroft wrote to Sloat, "In the event -of actual hostilities between the Mexican Government and our own," you -will carry out "the instructions [of June 24] forwarded to you from -the Dept. in view of such a contingency." Rives (U. S. and Mexico, ii, -168) draws a sharp distinction between the "actual hostilities" of this -order and the "declaration of war" of June 24. But (1) Bancroft said, -Oct. 17, "actual hostilities" [not between forces in the field but -between the two governments; and (2) in his last quoted words above he -indicated that the two orders contemplated precisely the same [not, as -Rives holds, a different] contingency. As, therefore, the order of June -24 was the formal and fundamental one, Sloat had a technical ground for -falling back upon it, whereas an officer of broad, clear views, decided -character and unselfish loyalty would have acted more promptly, even -at a slight personal risk. To do him justice, the reader should recall -that many Senators refused to believe that the border hostilities were -hostilities between the two governments (p. 182); and also that Sloat -was old and not robust, and that he had the case of T. A. C. Jones -before his eyes. - -17.9. We find both July 1 and 2 given as the date of his arrival. -The log book of his vessel says that she anchored at Monterey July 1, -and that Larkin came aboard July 2. As he would have gone aboard as soon -as possible, it seems probable that the vessel arrived July 1 at night. - -17.10. Capt. Mervine wrote, July 6, to Capt. Montgomery that Larkin -believed Castro, Pico and others would meet the following day to -deliberate about declaring independence and hoisting the American flag. - -17.11. Sloat stated later that he acted on his own responsibility in -taking possession of California; and in fact the orders of May 13 did -not reach their destination until about August 28 (Ho. 60; 30, 1, p. -229). - -17.12. It has been said (Bancroft, Pacific States, xvii, 250) -that Sloat merely pretended to have based his action on Frémont's -operations, so as to have a way of escape should he be blamed; but (1) -we should not without evidence accuse him of lying, (2) he showed strong -feeling when he learned that Frémont had acted without authority (_e.g._ -Baldridge, Days of 1846; Sen. 33; 30, 1, p. 178), and (3) as a rational -man he could not fail to be influenced greatly. Bancroft says (_ibid._, -227) that Sloat learned from Larkin that Frémont's coöperation with the -insurgents was not certain; but he admits (_ibid._, 228-9) that on July -5 a launch from the _Portsmouth_, then lying at San Francisco, brought -proof that Frémont was so doing; and the next day Sloat and Larkin, -according to the log book of the _Savannah_, were busy preparing the -proclamation, etc. Royce (California, 158) places against Frémont's -testimony (that Sloat said his action had resulted from Frémont's) the -fact that Larkin did not so state; but silence is not equal in strength -to assertion, and Frémont is supported by Gillespie (Sen. Report 75; -30, 1, p. 32), by Wilson of the _Savannah_ (_ibid._, 41), by Sloat's -private secretary (Baldridge, Days of 1846), by Sloat's anxiety to -obtain Frémont's coöperation, and by the resentment that he exhibited -on finding that Frémont had acted without authority (Sen. 33; 30, 1, p. -178). See also Benton, Abr. Deb., xvi, 17. - -17.13. August 27, 1846, =12=Seymour wrote to the Admiralty: "My -principal object has been, for many months, to be at hand to prevent -or retard it [the American occupation of California], if I should be -directed to take any proceedings for these purposes." It was presumably -to wait for orders that he placed himself at San Blas. What led him -to sail for Monterey, however, as he did on June 14, was not Sloat's -leaving Mazatlán, but news that the Santa Barbara convention was likely -to declare for independence (=13=Seymour to Bankhead, June 13). -Had that been done, he would have felt that he had a ground on which -to oppose American occupation, though he thought that a large body of -reliable colonists would be necessary to establish British ascendancy -(=12=_Id._, Aug. 27). When he arrived at Monterey he was aware that -the United States and Mexico were at war, and this was in his opinion -an additional reason for inaction (=12=_Id._, Aug. 27); but he -wrote to Pico that American occupation should be regarded as merely -provisional (=12=to Pico, July 23). Sir Thomas Johnson, commanding -a British sloop-of-war off Mazatlán, showed his sympathies by constantly -giving the Mexicans information about our vessels (=76=Gutiérrez, -Apr. 8, 1846, res.). - -17.14. Sloat also guaranteed land titles. This was impracticable. In -annexing California he exceeded his authority. - -17.15. _Sloat's operations, etc._ =47=Sloat, Nov. 19; Dec. 3, 1845; -Feb. 25; Mar. 17; Apr. 8, 30; May 31; June 6, 1846. =47=_Id._ to -Howison, Apr. 1, 1846; to Montgomery, Apr. 1. =47=Wood to Bancroft, -June 4. Benton, View, ii, 692. Bulletin de la Soc. de Géog., no. -77. =12=Seymour to admty., no. 47, Aug. 27, 1846; to Pico, July 23. -Dana, Two Years, 78-9, 90. Sherman, Address. Wise, Gringos, 47. Ho. -60; 30, 1, pp. 258-64. =247=Sloat to Larkin, May 18. =247=Larkin to -Stearns, Aug. --. N. Y. _Herald_, Mar. 4, 1880. Davis, Sixty Years, -196. Hist. Soc. of So. Calif., viii, 77 (Barrows). =47=Conner, Oct. -9, 1846. =13=Seymour to Bankhead, June 13. =13=A. Forbes to Bankhead, -Aug. 1. =13=J. A. Forbes to A. Forbes, July 14. =52=J. Parrott, June -4. =13=Letter from Mazatlán, Aug. 4. =13=Seymour to J. A. Forbes, -July 22. =52=Larkin to J. Castro, July 8; reply July 9. =52=_Id._ -to Alvarado, July 8; reply, July 9. =142=Carson, recolls. =52=Sloat, -gen. orders, July 14. =47=Conner, Aug. 26. =48-9=Bancroft to Sloat, -June 24; Oct. 17, 1845; May 13, 15; June 8; July 12; Aug. 13 (two), -1846. =108=J. Parrott to Buchanan, private, July 23, 1846. Duflot de -Mofras, Explor., i, 400-6. Sen. 1; 29, 2, pp. 378-9. Bancroft, Pac. -States, xvii, 204, etc. =247=Larkin to Ten Eyck, Sept. 19. =247=Frazer -to Larkin, Aug. 27. =4=Amador, mems., 169. =247=Atherton to Larkin, -Dec. 3. =3=Alvarado, Hist., 214-9. Proceeds. U. S. Naval Institute, -1888, pp. 539-40. Bennett, Steam Navy, 91. N. Orl. _Picayune_, Oct. -23, 1848. Sherman, Sloat, _passim_. =120=Fauntleroy to Biddle, Mar. -12, 1847. Phelps, Fore and Aft, 291. Richman, Calif., 315. México á -través, iv, 643-4. _Diario_, Aug. 16; Oct. 16, 1846. =106=Lancey, -cruise (logbook of _Savannah_). =105=Baldridge, Days of 1846. Walpole, -Four Years, ii, 204. Wash. _Union_, Sept. 24; Oct. 3, 26. Ho. 1; 30, 2, -pp. 1013-4, 1019-20. Dunbar, Romance, 38. Sherman, Home Letters, 85. -_Niles_, Oct. 10, 1846, p. 87. Sen. Report 75; 30, 1, pp. 13, 32, 40, -44, 70-4. _Century Mag._, N. S., xviii, 794. N. Y. _Nation_, xlviii, -141. Hittell, Calif., ii, 466. =295=Pinto, Apuntaciones, 104. Sen. 33; -30, 1, pp. 374, 377. Ho. Rep. 817; 30, 1, pp. 4-5. Ho. 4; 29, 2, pp. -649-67. Revere, Tour, 55, 77. Frémont, Mems., 534, 539. =172=_Cyane_ -log book. =263=Mervine, letter book. Swasey, Early Days, 60. _Cong. -Globe_, 30, 1, pp. 606-7. Royce, Calif., 157-61. =52=Larkin, nos. 1 -(descript. of Calif.); 52, July 10; 53, July 18; 54 and 55, July 20. -=76=Gutiérrez, no. 42, res., Apr. 8. =76=To Castro, May 9; July 25. -=76=To comte. gen. Sonora, July 25. =76=To min. of eccles. affrs., July -25. =76=Monterey estado, Apr. 1. =76=S. Anna, Oct. 30. - -17.16. Stockton sailed from Norfolk on the _Congress_ in October, -1845. Some mystery has been attached to his sealed orders (Bancroft, -Pacific States, xvii, 251); but they were merely to sail _via_ the -Sandwich Islands for Monterey, deliver the original of the despatch of -October 17 to Larkin, and then join Sloat's squadron. For his character -see _e.g._ Royce, California, 179; =330=Taylor to brother, January -19, 1848; =108=Appleton to Bancroft, April 27, 1847; Porter, -Kearny, 6, 7; Sherman, Home Letters, 108; Quincy, Figures, 230-40. - -17.17. One aim of the proclamation was doubtless to provide a way -of escape for the United States and its agents in case there should -be no war, but even from this point of view it was ridiculous. Sloat -repudiated the reasons for his action that were ascribed to him by -Stockton. - -17.18. Castro and the Californians generally did not believe that -war had been declared, and of course Larkin's letter to Stearns tended -to confirm their opinion. Had it proved correct, Stockton would soon -have been making apologies like T. A. C. Jones. This may help to explain -Castro's firm attitude. The Life of Stockton attempts to explain his -haughty and menacing language as due to Castro's military preponderance -and the necessity of intimidating him. Stockton himself said later that, -as Castro had no authority from the central government to make terms, it -would have been useless to treat with him; but Castro could have laid -down his arms, and that was the vital point just then. Stockton's other -reasons (Ho. 1; 30, 2, pp. 1041-2) are equally unsatisfactory. Bancroft -(Pacific States, xvii, 269) expresses the belief that Stockton did not -wish to make terms with Castro and the other officials, but to eliminate -them. This is quite possible. Probably temperament and thirst for glory -counted. Stockton's pretence (in his reply to Castro) that since the two -countries were at war, he could not suspend hostilities until Castro -should raise the American flag, was absurd. Truces have often been made -during war, and never during peace. This was enough--especially as it -came after Larkin's overture--to show Castro he could expect nothing -from Stockton. - -17.19. =76=Later Castro complained bitterly that after -forsaking all for Mexico he had to beg for bread. - -17.20. _Stockton's régime to Sept._ 30. Memoria de ... Relaciones, -Dec., 1846. Colton, Three Years, 16, 25, 28-9, 32, 56, 175, 180. -Cooke, Conquest, 213-6. Ho. 60; 30, 1, pp. 265-8. =247=Larkin to -Stearns, Aug.--, 1846. =61=R. B. Mason, Sept. 23, 1847. Sec. navy -to Stockton, Aug. 18, 1846. =13=J. A. to A. Forbes, July 14; Sept. -22, 1846. =13=Seymour to Bankhead, July 22, 1846. _Californian_, -i, no. 1. =47=Stockton, proclam., Aug. 22. =47=_Id._ to -Frémont, July 23; Aug. 24, 1846. =47=Flores to Stockton, Aug. 7. -=47=Stockton to Bancroft, July 25; Aug. 22; Sept. 19; Oct. 1; Nov. -23. _Id._ to Mervine, Sept. 19. Bancroft to Sloat, Aug. 13. Mason to -Stockton, Nov. 5, 1846; Jan. 11, 1847. Bancroft to Stockton, Oct. 17, -1845. =108=Appleton to Bancroft, Apr. 27, 1847. Wise, Gringos, -50, 70. Royce, Bidwell. Sen. 1; 29, 2, pp. 52, 379. Sen. 31; 30, 2, -pp. 1-3. Bancroft, Pacific States, xvii, 143. =4=Amador, mems., -169. =115=Belden, statement, 48. =3=Alvarado, Calif., v, -239-41. =161=Journal of the _Congress_, 1846. =171=Journal -of the _Cyane_, 1846. Cutts, Conquest, 125. Phelps, Fore and Aft, 299, -300. Richman, Calif., 318. =109=Bandini, documentos. Walpole, -Four Years, ii, 215. Sen. 31; 30, 2, pp. 9-14. Wash. _Union_, Oct. 26; -Dec. 4, 1846. =295=Pinto, Apuntaciones, 104. _Diario_, Oct. 16. -Statement to the author by Asst. Sec. of the navy Roosevelt. Sherman, -Home Letters, 108. Du Pont, Official Despatches, 1. Quincy, Figures, -230, etc. _Proceeds. of U. S. Naval_ _Instit._, xxiv., pt. 1, 270 -(Neeser). Sen. 33; 30, 1, pp. 10, 83, 109-10, 118-9, 175, 178-83, 374, -377. Ho. 70; 30, 1, pp. 36-41, 43-5. Ho. 4; 29, 2, pp. 657-8. Ho. 1; -30, 2, pp. 1034-42. Ho. 19; 29, 2, p. 104. McGroarty, Calif., 199. -Bandini, Calif., 143. Revere, Tour, 55, 77-80. Sen. Report 75; 30, -1, pp. 17, 47, 51. Ho. Report 817; 30, 1, p. 9. =263=Mervine to -Stockton, Sept. 16. Swasey, Early Days, 73. Porter, Kearny, 6-7. Life -of Stockton, 120-3, 157-8. Bryant, What I Saw, 330, 366. Royce, Calif., -177-84. =123=Bidwell, statement. =52=Larkin, nos. 54, 55, 58, -1846. And the following from =76=. J. Castro, July 13; Sept. 9, -1846; June 5, 1847. To comte. gen. Calif., May 9; July 25. To comte. -gen. Sonora, July 25. Stockton to Castro, Aug. 7. Castro to Stockton, -Aug. 7. _Id._, procls., Aug. 9, 10. _Id._ to consuls, Aug. 9. Moreno to -Bustamante, Mar. 20, 1847. Castañeda to Pico, Feb. 10, 1846. Bustamante -to Castro, June 23, 1847. - -17.21. In a proclamation of October 1 Flores charged that the -Americans were dictating "arbitrary and despotic laws" and crushing -the people with exactions intended to ruin them. His aim was announced -as the expulsion of the Americans. All Mexicans and Californians -15-60 years old, not joining the insurgents, were declared to be -traitors and under penalty of death. All Americans acting directly -or indirectly against the insurgents were to lose their property -and be sent into Mexico as prisoners. It cannot be denied that many -Californians, especially in the north, had been deprived of their -property--particularly horses and saddles--by Frémont's men in the -name of the United States, and that many had suffered personal abuse -(Sen. 33; 30, 1; pp. 97, etc.; Ho. Report, 817; 30, 1; Sen. Report 75; -30, 1; Colton, Three Years, 155). Colton estimated that in all 1200 -Californians were in arms at one time. - -17.22. Flores charged that Gillespie violated the terms and -Gillespie denied this vigorously. Gillespie seems to have interpreted -the terms, which were loosely drawn, with a view to the advantage of his -side, and Flores to have judged largely, if not entirely, from what he -supposed to be Gillespie's intentions. We have not sufficient data to -say more. A misunderstanding was very natural, and possibly Gillespie, -since he was dealing with perjured men, thought it right to take every -advantage he could. Flores sent parties to San Diego and Santa Barbara, -and captured those places. Capt. Merritt of the California Battalion, -commanding at the former place, took refuge on a whale-ship. Lieut. -Talbot, commanding at Santa Barbara, refused to surrender, and with his -eight or ten men made an extremely brave escape through the mountains. - -17.23. At this point Mervine's log book was extremely bitter with -reference to Stockton, whom it described as vain, selfish, cowardly, -false and ignorant of naval life and duties. The Captain was doubtless -smarting under his repulse, due (he asserted) to Stockton's selfishness -in retaining all his field pieces. Stockton explained his going to San -Diego by saying that San Pedro was not a good base, and there was force -in this view; but it was much nearer to Los Angeles, and certainly he -should have decided whether it was a good base before attempting to -use it as such. San Diego had been recovered by Merritt and others -(_Proceeds. U. S. Naval Instit._, 1888, p. 544). Lieut. Minor of the -navy now commanded there. - -17.24. _Kearny's march; battle of S. Pascual._ Colton, Three -Years, 153, 180. Cooke, Conquest, 84-6. Ho. 60; 30, 1, pp. 153, 242. -Hist. Soc. So. Calif., iii, pt. 2, pp. 55-66. =337=Turner, diary. -=61=Kearny to adj. gen., Oct. 3, 11. =62=Marcy to gov. Mo., -June 3. Ho. 41; 30, 1, pp. 551-63, 567-614. =47=Stockton, Feb. 4, -1847. Polk, Diary, May 25, 30; June 2, 1846. =61=Emory to adj. -gen., Feb. 2, 1847. Hughes, Doniphan's Exped., 204-30. =61=Wooster -to adj. gen., Sept. 25, 1846. Apuntes, 359-60. Bidwell, Calif., -200. =126=Botello, Anales, 154-6. Phelps, Fore and Aft, 315. -=177=Davis, statement. =290=Pico, documentos, 105, 115. _Nat. -Intelligencer_, Apr. 23, 1847. _Journal U. S. Artillery_, July, 1892, p. -294; Oct., 1892, p. 413. Sen. 1; 30, 1, pp. 513-6. Sen. 33; 30, 1, pp. -31, 41, 46, 64-5, 129-33, 161, 186-9, 204, 272, 331. McGroarty, Calif., -261. Sen. 7; 30, 1 (Emory). Ho. 1; 30, 2, pp. 236, 1049-50. Sen. 31; 30, -2, pp. 24-7. (Losses) Ho. 24; 31, 1. Peters, Kit Carson, 281. Porter, -Kearny, 14-23. Life of Stockton, 134-6. =76=Flores, Dec. 11, 1846; -Mar. 31, 1847. =207=Griffin, journal. - -Including servants and quartermaster's men, Kearny probably had at -least 150; but precisely how many took part in the fighting one cannot -say--perhaps not more than 80. Some of the men had to guard the baggage -and manage the howitzers, and probably others did not reach the front -in time. The howitzers were tied up with rawhide; when made ready -they could not fire at first because the two parties were mixed in a -hand-to-hand struggle; and when they were preparing to do so later, one -was carried away by frightened mules and captured by the enemy. Botello, -who talked with Pico after the fight, says that Pico was afraid forces -from San Diego would attack him, should he continue to operate against -Kearny, and also that Pico's horses were now too much exhausted to be -serviceable. =207=Griffin thought the Californians drew off to make -sure of keeping the howitzer. It seems clear that Pico did not retire -from fear of Kearny--unless possibly from fear of his guns. Dec. 7 -Kearny advanced a short distance, drove some Californians from a rocky -hill near San Bernardo, and occupied it. In the night of Dec. 10-11 -Lieut. Gray and about 215 men from San Diego reinforced him. Lieut. -Beale of the navy and the scout Christopher ("Kit") Carson made their -way past the enemy with remarkable courage and endurance, to inform -Stockton of Kearny's desperate situation, and arrived just as Gray was -setting out. - -17.25. The troops were all on foot except Gillespie's men. Stockton -had two 9-pounders and four smaller pieces. - -17.26. Only six shells were captured with the howitzer at San -Pascual, and owing to its construction the gun could use no other -ammunition. Flores reported that he had also a 6-pounder, a 3-pounder, -and a 2-pounder (=76=Mar. 31). - -17.27. _The insurrection in the south._ =330=Taylor to brother, -Jan. 19, 1848. Ho. 60; 30, 1, pp. 266-8. Hist. Soc. So. Calif., iii, -pt. 1, pp. 47-54; ix, p. 19. =237=Kearny to Stockton, [Jan. -13, 1847]. =47=Flores, procl., Oct., 1846. =47=_Id._ to -Stockton, Jan. 1, 1847. =47=Stockton to Bancroft, Nov. 23, 1845; -Jan. 11, 15; Feb. 4, 5, 1846. =51=Queen to Henderson, Apr. 30, -1848. =61=R. B. Mason, Oct. 7, 1847. =61=Emory, Feb. 2, -1847. =373=Evans, narrative. =376=Nicholson, recolls. Kell, -Recolls., 29, 80. =12=Admty. records, class 1, 5577, enclosure in -Y 93. Apuntes, 355-61. =247=Gillespie to Larkin, Nov. 29, 1846. -=247=Larkin to wife, Dec. 14, 1846. =115=Belden, statement. -=3=Alvarado, Calif., v, 220, 240, 267-8. =126=Botello, Anales, -140, 158-61. Colton, Three Years, 64, 74, 78, 82, 95, 98, 123, 131, -169-70, 201. _Proceeds. U. S. Naval Instit._, 1888, pp. 139, 539-49. -Phelps, Fore and Aft, 311, 316-19. Parker, Recolls., 50. Richman, -Calif., 317. =334=Torres, Peripecias, 49. =103=Avila, notas. -=258=Marshall, recolls. Upham, Frémont, 258. Morrell, Four Voyages, -201. =171=Journal of the _Cyane_. Wash. _Union_, Apr. 23; May 7; -July 24, 1847. N. Y. _Journ. Commerce_, Apr. 2, 1847. _Diario_, Dec. -1, 1846; Jan. 24, 1847. Sherman, Home Letters, 100. Schafer, Pacific -Slope, 266. Sen. 33; 30, 1, pp. 47-323. Ho. 70; 30, 1, p. 45. Sen. 1; -30, 1, pp. 516-7. Ho. 1; 30, 2, pp. 1045-54, 1065-70. McGroarty, Calif., -246-52. Bandini, Calif., 143, 146. Revere, Tour, 164-6. Sen. 7; 30, 1 -(Emory). Sen. Report 75; 30, 1, pp. 49-52. Sen. 31; 30, 2, pp. 15-20, -22-4, 30-6 (Stockton). =207=Griffin, diary. (Losses) Ho. 24; 31, -1. =172=_Cyane_ log book. =263=Mervine to Stockton, Oct. 25 -(2). _Cong. Globe_, 30, 1, p. 608 (Benton). Porter, Kearny, 7-9, 25-9. -Life of Stockton, 129-48 and appendices. Cutts, Conquest, 156, 197, 203, -207. Bryant, What I Saw, 330. Royce, Calif., 185-94. =47=Stockton -to Bancroft, July 25, 1846. =52=Larkin, no. 63, Jan. 14, 1847. -And from =76= the following. Flores, Sept. 30; Oct. 7, 9, 24, -25, 1846; undated; Jan. 2; Mar. 31 (2), 1847. Carrillo, Oct. 8, 1846. -Gillespie to Flores, Oct. 2 (2), 3 (2), 4. Flores to Gillespie, Oct. -4 (2). Flores-Gillespie, terms of capitulation, Sept. 29. Carrillo to -Flores, Oct. 9. To Flores, Feb. 6, 1847. Bustamante, Mar. 8, 13, 1847. -Moreno to Bust., Mar. 20, 1847. Stockton, procl., Jan. 5, 1847. Flores -to Stockton, Jan. 1, 1847. And others of minor importance. Jan. 9 some -Mexicans charged our front. - -17.28. Frémont's methods were unscrupulous. He promised the men -large pay, and took horses, saddles, etc., where he could get them (Sen. -Report 75; 30, 1, particularly Wilson, p. 42). Probably he intended to -pacify the owners later by paying liberally. Apparently one must accept -the explanation of his policy proposed in the text, or ascribe to him a -tenderness not suggested by his choice of a profession and his conduct -in June, or accuse him--as did many at the time--of a cowardice that -would explain, after all, only a part of the facts. - -17.29. It is particularly singular that Frémont did not use the -_Savannah_ to communicate with Stockton. - -17.30. The reports of Flores show that Frémont's approach -embarrassed the insurgents. Frémont now had six guns. January 10 Kearny -wrote a note to Frémont stating that the Americans were entering Los -Angeles. - -17.31. For later events see chap. xxxi. Disturbances, resulting -partly from the insurrection in the south and partly from depredations -committed by Americans, occurred in the north. Monterey was threatened, -and some fighting occurred near San Francisco Bay; but those who had -taken up arms to protect their property gladly laid them down (about -the time Stockton entered Los Angeles) when satisfied there would be -no more plundering, and the treaty of Cahuenga quieted those still -acting in sympathy with Flores. (See particularly Colton, Three Years, -73-6, 86, 152, 155, 158, 170; Bancroft, Pacific States, xvii, 378-383; -=10=Aram, statement; =4=Amador, memorias, 175; Aldrich, Marine -Corps, 95.) During these troubles Larkin was made a prisoner, and but -for the fear of reprisals might have suffered severely for what the -Californians regarded as double-dealing. Just before leaving California -Flores released him. (See particularly =52=Larkin, no. 63, January -14, 1847; Bryant, What I Saw, 361; =263=Mervine to Frémont, Nov. -21.) - -17.32. _Frémont's operations._ =316=Fulsom to Sherman, Jan. -9, 1848. =47=Stockton to Bancroft, Nov. 23, 1846; Jan. 11, 15, -1847. Colton, Three Years, 98. =47=Frémont, orders, Jan. 12, 1847. -=122=Bidwell, Calif., 203. =258=Marshall, recolls. Bryant, -What I Saw, 365-94. Sen. 33; 30, 1, pp. 6, 73-7, 119-21, 131, 184, -194, 260, 377-9, 405. Ho. 1; 30, 2, pp. 1045, 1052, 1067-9. Revere, -Tour, 78. Sen. Report 75; 30, 1, pp. 40-2 (Wilson), 50 (Russell). Sen. -31; 30, 2, pp. 18, 21-2. Tuthill, Calif., 222. Porter, Kearny, 29. -Life of Stockton, 148-9. Royce, Calif., 194. Sen. 7; 30, 1 (Emory). -=76=Flores, Mar. 31, 1847 (2). =76=Moreno to Bustamante, Mar. -20, 1847. Cutts, Conquest, 156-64. Sherman, Home Letters, 113. - - - XVIII. THE GENESIS OF TWO CAMPAIGNS - -18.1. As early as August 16 Pillow wrote to his wife that Taylor -thought it would be necessary to attack the city of Mexico by way of -Vera Cruz. - -18.2. The fortress of San Juan de Ulúa stood on a reef about -three-quarters of a mile from the strong fort which guarded the north -end of Vera Cruz at the water line. U. S. Consul Campbell of Havana -informed Conner before June 10, 1846, that the defences of Ulúa on the -side facing the city were partially undermined and poorly armed, and -that, as all the Mexican preparations had been founded on the belief -that future assailants would adopt the French plan of attack, he could -place his vessels on that side at night with little or no injury, and -easily take the fortress by escalade; but Conner does not appear to have -endorsed this opinion. An American named Jobson, who resided at Vera -Cruz, wrote to the war department, Feb. 14, 1847, that nobody except -the Americans was afraid of Ulúa; that in September, 1846, it had been -garrisoned by only 180 men, who, being neither paid nor fed, ran up -the American flag on the night of Sept. 17; and that Conner might have -passed in by the south channel, put 500 men ashore, and captured the -fortress in half an hour. See chap. xxx, note 20. - -18.3. These regiments were to come from Mass., New York, Penn., -Va., No. and So. Carolina, Miss., La. and Texas (mounted men)--one from -each; and in December a second regiment was invited from Penn. There -was considerable hesitation about calling on Massachusetts, but it was -concluded that should she fail to supply her quota, the country would -take note of her attitude. Marcy issued the calls on Nov. 16 (Nov. 27 -Florida was asked for a company), and the abruptness of the change -wrought by Benton is shown by the fact that only five days earlier Marcy -had stated that the volunteers then in service were "deemed sufficient -for the prosecution of the war" (Wash. _Union_, May 28, 1847). The field -and staff officers were to be a colonel, a lieutenant colonel, a major, -an adjutant (a lieutenant from one of the companies), a sergeant major, -a quartermaster sergeant and two principal musicians. Each of the ten -companies of a regiment was to have a captain, a lieutenant, two second -lieutenants, four sergeants, four corporals, two musicians and eighty -privates, but a company including sixty-four effective privates was to -be accepted. These privates were to be in physical vigor and apparently -18-45 (inclusive) years of age. The field and company officers were to -be men appointed and commissioned under the laws of their state. The -rendezvous of the infantry were to be Boston, New York, Pittsburgh, -Guiandotte (Va.), Wilmington, Charleston, Vicksburg, New Orleans. Most -of the regiments were made up rather slowly, and there was so much -difficulty in Virginia that her recruiting officers went into Maryland. -This difficulty appears to have been due to a lack of enthusiasm for -the war (first part of chap. xxxiv). The supposedly brilliant victory -at Monterey had exercised a favorable influence, but the obligation to -serve the war out had a contrary effect, and the terms of the law, which -required the independent action of the state governments, caused delay -in some instances. The First Pennsylvania reached New Orleans Dec. 29 -and 30, and at that time the Mississippi regiment was expected to arrive -there by Jan. 10. The South Carolina regiment was ready on Dec. 22. - -Special efforts were made at the same time to bring the regular army up -to 15,000 men. The authorized maximum was at this time 16,998 (including -780 commissioned officers), but in spite of energetic recruiting only -10,381 were actually serving in the two regiments of dragoons, one of -Mounted Riflemen, four of "artillery," eight of infantry, and a co. -of engineer soldiers (Sen. 1; 29, 2, pp. 62-3). Nov. 3 the recruiting -officers were authorized to pay a citizen, non-commissioned officer, -or soldier $2.00 for each accepted man brought to the rendezvous -(=65=gen. orders 48). The minimum height was reduced to five feet -and three inches (=65=gen. orders 51). Men desiring to enlist had -probably felt more drawn to the briefer volunteer service, and had -waited for a second call. Besides, the widows and orphans of volunteers -(but not of regulars) were to be pensioned, and the prevailing high -wages for labor deterred many from wishing to enlist. The lack of -officers in the regular army still continued serious. On July 30, 1846, -less than one third of the regimental field officers were available. The -regiments in Mexico did not average one field officer apiece. - -According to the report of the adjutant general dated Dec. 5, 1846, -Taylor had (including the garrison at Tampico and troops en route, -but subject to some deductions) 7406 regulars and 10,926 volunteers, -besides 621 and 2039 respectively under Wool. Adding to these 446 and -3546 respectively under Kearny, and the New York regiment en route -to California, one finds that the land forces amounted to 25,750 men -before the November calls were issued; but subtractions of an unknown -magnitude needed to be made from these figures so far as availability -was concerned. These and further details may be found in Sen. 1; 29, 2. -See also the following. =62=Marcy to govs., Nov. 16. Sen. 1; 29, 2, -p. 46 (Marcy, report). =61=Bowman to Jones, Dec. 4; to Polk, Dec. -29. =61=Brooke to Jones, Dec. 29. Wash. _Union_, Nov. 30, 1846; -May 28, 1847. =61=Jones to Scott, Dec. 17. Polk, Diary, Nov. 7, -10, 14-16. =62=Marcy to gov. Fla., Dec. 27. =63=Marcy to gov. -Mass., Nov. 16; to gov. Tex., Nov. 20; to gov. Iowa, Nov. 25. _Niles_, -Nov. 21, 1846, p. 179; Jan. 16, 1847, p. 308. =29=Brown to Marcy, -Oct. 6. Sen. 1; 29, 2, p. 62. =13=Pakenham, no. 132, Nov. 23. -_Cong. Globe_, 30, 1, p. 428 (Cabell). Ho. 60; 30, 1, pp. 478 (Freeman), -873 (Marcy). West Va. dept. arch. and hist., report, 1910, p. 186. - -18.4. _Genesis of the Vera Cruz expedition._ Sen. 1; 30, 1, p. 45 -(Marcy, report). =52=Black, Oct. 29. Benton, Abr. Deb., xvi, 63. -=13=Pakenham, nos. 119, 130, 132, 140, 150. =228=G. Flagg to -A. Flagg, Dec. 17. _Picayune_, Apr. 30; Oct. 5; Dec. 11, 1846; Feb. 2, -1847 (Taylor to Gaines). (Calhoun) _Cong. Globe_, 29, 2, app., 323. -Polk, Diary, July 2; Aug. 29; Oct. 10, 17-22; Nov. 7-17; Dec. 1, 2, -1846; Jan. 2, 1847. Meigs, Benton, 361. =108=Bancroft to Polk, Dec. -3. Benton; View, ii, 693-4. =108=Buchanan to Bancroft, priv., Dec. -29. Claiborne, Quitman, i, 273. =335=Letter from P. F. Smith (with -Trist's letter to Buchanan, Sept. 28, 1847, private). Wash. _Union_, -Sept. 29; Oct. 2. _Niles_, Mar. 13, 1847, p. 20. =206=James Graham -to Gov. Graham, Jan. 10, 1847. =256=Marcy to Wetmore, Nov. 1. -Scott, Mems., ii, 404. Johnston, A. S. Johnston, 134. Ho. 60; 30, 1, pp. -333, 355, 363, 1231 (Marcy); 1268-1270, 1273-4 (Scott); 351 (Taylor). -=297=Benton, memo., July 4. =297=Mackenzie to Buchanan, July -7. =47=Conner, June 11; July 22; Oct. 4. Meade, Letters, i, 148. -=52=Campbell, June 9. Schouler, Hist. Briefs, 155. =58=Jobson, -Feb. 14, 1847. Sen. 52; 30, 1, p. 170. Bancroft to Conner, May 30. -Conner, Castle of Ulloa. =256=Totten to Marcy, Nov. 23, 1847. -=180=Pillow to wife, Aug. 16. =169=Taylor to Crittenden, Sept. -1. =13=Doyle, no. 79, 1843. =69=P. F. Smith, memoir, Oct. 14. -=354=Welles papers. =152=Mason to Conner, Nov. 29, priv. and -confid. _Journal des Débats_, Nov. 4. Boston _Atlas_, Dec. 17. Buchanan, -Works, viii, 365. Diccionario Universal (_Ulúa_). _Cong. Globe_, 29, 2, -app., 191. (Ulúa) See chaps. xxii, p. 21, xxx. - -18.5. It is believed that the preceding text and notes afford ample -support for this sentence. Note 27 contains additional references; -and see Ripley, War with Mexico, i, 361-2. Taylor seems never to have -perceived that Polk could have superseded him with a Democrat by -merely sending Jesup or Wool to the army with reinforcements before -brevetting him major general and ordering him to serve with his -brevet rank. Nov. 10 Polk asserted in his diary that he had known no -politics with reference to Taylor. The diary shows that he was aware -how Taylor felt about him. This was not at all surprising. Pillow's -letters indicate plainly that he understood the matter and he was in -confidential correspondence with the President. Pillow wrote to his -wife that Taylor systematically proscribed Polk's friends, and this may -offset some of Taylor's assertions that he himself was persecuted by the -administration. - -18.6. Dec. 10 (Bixby) Taylor wrote to his son-in-law that he would -not say he would refuse to serve, if elected President. This meant -of course that he was a candidate. His formal announcement came the -following month. - -18.7. It is probable that the administration knew how Taylor felt -about the Vera Cruz expedition, for he was outspoken, and Polk had more -than one correspondent in his camp. - -18.8. Scott, like nearly all the Whigs, disapproved of a war -made by a Democratic administration for (as the Whigs generally -alleged) party reasons, but was ready to do his duty as a soldier -(=13=Pakenham, separate and confidential, Sept. 28). - -18.9. _The selection of the commander._ Ho. 60; 30, 1, pp. -363, 367, 369, 373 (Marcy); 372, 1268-70 (Scott); 383 (Bliss); 384 -(Patterson). =169=Scott to Taylor, Sept. 26 ("I never, for a -moment, ceased to watch over your fame and interests with the liveliest -solicitude"). Polk, Diary, Sept. 5, 15; Oct. 22; Nov. 10, 14, 17-19, -21, 1846; May 6, 1847; Jan. 4, 1848. Scott, Mems., ii, 386, 399. -London _Times_, June 30, 1847. =132=Slidell to Buchanan, Nov. 5. -=169=Scott to Crittenden, Sept. 17. =169=Taylor to Crittenden, -Jan. 26; Mar. 25, 1847. =354=Welles papers. Note particularly -Taylor's political exchanges with. =169=Crittenden and Wood (Bixby -coll.) during the summer and autumn. =180=Pillow to wife, Oct. -27; Dec. 8. =330=Taylor to brother, Dec. 12, 1846; Jan. 19, 1848. -_Id._, Letters (Bixby), June 3; Aug. 23; Nov. 26; Dec. 10, 13, 1846; -Jan. 26; Feb. 9; May 9; Aug. 29, 1847. =345=Blair to Van Buren, -July 7. Coleman, Crittenden, i, 243-4. =169=Scott to Marcy, Sept. -12. =62=Marcy to Scott, Sept. 14. =256=_Id._ to Wetmore, June -28. Watson, In Memoriam, 115. Grant, Mems., i, 120. Meade, Letters, i, -175. _Nat. Intelligencer_, Aug. 29. Garrison, Extension, 242. Bancroft, -Pacific States, viii, 375. _Mag. of Amer. Hist._, xiv, 564. Slidell to -Buchanan, Nov. 5, 1846, private: "The fate of the Administration depends -on the successful conduct of the war" (Curtis, Buchanan, i, 601). - -18.10. Scott's figures were slightly below the adjutant general's. -Possibly the latter used returns of later dates. Taylor did not have -so many available troops, and accused Scott of stating what he knew or -should have known to be false (Bixby coll., 181); but if the adjutant -general was incorrectly informed as to the strength of the forces, the -fault was Taylor's. See note 3. - -18.11. Scott was severely criticised by Marcy (Ho. 60; 30, 1, p. -1239) and others for ordering so many boats, guns and shells, and it was -triumphantly proclaimed that, as the result proved, he did not need so -large an outfit. But this argument was not sound. He had to reckon on a -failure to produce and deliver at the point of shipment in season all -that he specified, on a heavy loss through wreckage and other accidents, -on the probability that his landing would be opposed, and on the -expected necessity of reducing Ulúa; nor did he know that naval guns (to -which he actually was compelled to have recourse) would be available. -It has been said, too, that the army could have landed in the boats of -the blockading squadron, but Scott found on inquiry that only about 500 -could go ashore in them at a single trip (Ho. 60; 30, 1, p. 1274). Scott -on the other hand was unreasonably bitter in charging the war department -with negligence. More could have been done by the government, and -errors were committed, but shortcomings and mistakes were inevitable. -Marcy's reply to Scott's charges (Ho. 60; 30, 1, pp. 1218, 1227) needs -to be scrutinized carefully. Ripley (War with Mexico, ii, 14) ridicules -Scott (for asking for a pontoon train) on the ground that every stream -between Vera Cruz and Mexico was fordable. But (1) Scott could not be -sure his operations would be confined to that line; (2) he operated in -fact on the lower Alvarado River, where it was not fordable; (3) had the -national bridge been blown up, pontoons might have been useful there for -wagons and heavy guns. Río del Plan was a small stream, but the enemy -caused the Americans much trouble by destroying the bridge at Plan del -Río. See Ripley, _op. cit._, ii, 165. - -18.12. The proof that Scott and the administration intended that -Taylor should not be placed in jeopardy is superabundant: Ho. 60; 30, 1, -pp. 357, 366, 389 (Marcy); 844, 1272, 1276 (Scott). Scott even intended -to give Taylor his personal aid, should the Mexicans attack him in -force; and this was one of his reasons for going to Camargo (_ibid._, -844; =61=Scott to Brooke, Dec. 28). - -18.13. As late as Jan. 2, 1847, every member of the Cabinet except -Clifford was opposed to Scott's marching against the city of Mexico, -though Polk favored taking that step should it be necessary in order to -obtain peace (Polk, Diary). - -18.14. Taylor alleged bitterly (Bixby, 182) that discourtesy -and injury were done him by the failure to notify him promptly of -the expedition, but Polk's precaution was wise. Some despatches were -intercepted or lost, and soon a most important letter from Scott to -Taylor, marked "confidential" both outside and within, was opened by a -subordinate at Monterey and publicly discussed (Scott, Mems., ii, 402). -See note 15. - -18.15. Nov. 25 Marcy wrote guardedly to Taylor with reference to -the new expedition, but the despatch went astray (=62=adj. gen. -to Taylor, May 5, 1847). It is surprising that cipher was not used. It -seems as if a ciphered letter giving the necessary explanations and -ordering Taylor to place the required forces at specified points by -specified dates should have been sent to Taylor in triplicate by trusty -messengers not later than Nov. 30. - -18.16. _Scott's operations, etc., up to Dec. 27._ Ho. 60; 30, -1, pp. 373, 838-41, 1218, 1268, 1270, 1273-5 (Scott); 369, 372, 873, -1231 (Marcy); 1253 (Jesup); 1100 (Taylor). Taylor, Letters (Bixby), -95, 181. Senex, Myth. Wise, Seven Decades, 235. Polk, Diary, Nov. -10, 20, 1846; Jan. 2, 1847. Jameson, Calhoun Corres., 727-8. _Journ. -of Milit. Serv. Instit._, xiv, 442. =234=A. Johnson to ----, -Dec. 2. =191=Fairfield to wife, Dec. 13. Scott, Mems., ii, 402. -=256=_Id._ to Marcy, Dec. 27, private. =61=H. L. Scott, Nov. -24. =61=W. Scott, memo., Nov. 29. =62=Jones to Taylor, May 5, -1847. =164=Scott to Conner, Dec. 26 (P. S. Dec. 27). _Picayune_, -Dec. 24. "The Brazos" signified loosely a region comprising Brazos -_Id._, Pt. Isabel, and sometimes the mouth of the Rio Grande. - -Scott blamed Marcy for permitting him to spend only four days at -Washington in preparatory work (Ho. 60; 30, 1, p. 1218). Marcy replied -that Scott passed twenty-six days in going from the capital to New -Orleans _via_ New York when he might have reached that place in seven -(_ibid._, 1228). The reply looks effective but does not cover the -ground. Marcy said Scott was not needed at the war department, where the -initial work had to be done; and hence the General did well to fortify -himself for the campaign and gain time for reflection by choosing the -sea route. The voyage took nineteen days instead of twelve on account of -head winds. - -While he was at New Orleans a newspaper published there stated that the -expedition (which Scott intimated was bound for San Luis Potosí) would -strike at Vera Cruz, and Polk showed what he meant in promising Scott -his full confidence by charging that he had betrayed the secret (Diary, -Jan. 14; Feb. 27). The secret was out at New Orleans in reality about -two weeks before Scott arrived there, and the newspaper stated later -that its information did not come from any person connected with the -army (_Niles_, Feb. 13, 1847, p. 370). (See =256=Scott to Marcy, -Jan. 27, priv.) Polk also complained--another mark of confidence--that -Scott's vanity was causing him to make "extravagant preparations," as -if Taylor had not shown at Monterey the consequences of failing to -prepare adequately. In fact Scott, instead of insisting upon extravagant -preparations, wrote Dec. 23 that he would move against Vera Cruz if he -could land even 5000 men there early in February (=374=to Conner). - -18.17. The new First Division included Harney's (Third) Brigade, -now consisting of Co. C (Bragg's light battery) of the Third Artillery, -companies B, C, D and E of the Second Dragoons, the Second Infantry and -the Third Infantry; and P. F. Smith's (Fourth) Brigade, now consisting -of Co. E (Sherman's light battery) of the Third Artillery, two companies -of the Mounted Riflemen (without horses), the First and the Seventh -Infantry. The rest of the Second Dragoons were to be assigned whenever -they should join. Five companies of the Second Infantry had been for -some weeks at Montemorelos; the rest, like the Second Tennessee, marched -to that point from Camargo. The Fourth Infantry and two companies of the -First Artillery were to occupy the citadel. The Washington and Baltimore -battalion, which had belonged to the First Division, was now attached -to Quitman's brigade. It will be noted that Taylor, who was incorrectly -said to have been exposed with inadequate forces to Mexican attack, now -treated Worth in precisely that way, exposing also Saltillo, which he -himself called "our most important point" in that region (Ho. 60; 30, 1, -p. 381). Taylor overtook Quitman Dec. 16. Nearly 2000 wagons were now -under Taylor's orders, yet pack-mules were used mainly for the train. By -the railroad Victoria is 284 kilometers from Monterey. - -18.18. As the Americans had no positive information regarding Santa -Anna's intentions and movements, Worth was blamed for giving a false -alarm. Rives (U. S. and Mexico, ii, 304) says S. Anna was unable to -leave S. L. Potosí. Worth really did expect the Mexicans to reach him -considerably sooner than they could have done. Major Gaines with three -companies of Kentucky cavalry, previously ordered to Saltillo, seems to -have arrived there on Dec. 17. Butler was now ordered to take command at -that point. - -18.19. In one letter Taylor stated that he received Scott's note -when two days from Monterey, but this must mean "second day." Dec. 20 -Scott had written to him from New Orleans, explaining his plans more -fully, but this letter did not reach him until January 16 (Ho. 60; 30, -1, 1101). - -18.20. From Montemorelos Taylor sent a topographical engineer, -escorted by a squadron of dragoons under May, to examine Santa Rosa Pass -and rejoin the command at Linares. Ten men of May's rear guard and the -baggage were cut off in the pass (Ho. 60; 30, 1, pp. 387-8, 1095. Maury, -Recolls., 31. Henry, Camp. Sketches, 284). - -18.21. "Norther" was the name given to an extremely violent wind -which blew at frequent intervals from October to April, lasting usually -about three days. During Scott's operations one lasted seventy-six -hours. It grew more violent as one went south toward Vera Cruz, -probably because the cordillera approached the coast and produced -somewhat the effect of a funnel. Its merit was that it prevented yellow -fever. - -18.22. The real Mexican cavalry numbered about 1000 under Gen. -Romero, who was sent by Valencia, now commanding at Tula, because the -governor of Tamaulipas had asked for 1000 infantry. The cavalry arrived -at Victoria on Dec. 24. Only 200 were regulars. The rest were badly -armed and munitioned, and cavalry were not suitable for a region covered -with woods and intersected with rivers. The people, however, prepared -to coöperate with them; but arms were lacking, and the revenues of the -state had mostly been cut off by the occupation of Matamoros and Tampico -(_Gaceta de C. Victoria_, July 23, 1846). Valencia was very anxious to -attack the Americans, but Santa Anna would not permit this--probably -because he did not wish Valencia either to be defeated or to win éclat -by succeeding. December 26 Romero received positive orders not to risk -an action, and two days later he retired (=82=gov. Tamaul. to gov. -Puebla, Jan. 6, 1847. =77=_Id._ to Relaciones, Apr. 23). Taylor -strongly desired to capture Valencia (Roberts, diary). - -18.23. _Taylor's march to Victoria (including Worth's alarm)._ -Ho. 60; 30, 1, pp. 513 (orders 156); 361, 379, 381, 385, 387-8, 848, -1100 (Taylor); 839, 851, 1156 (Scott). Meade, Letters, i, 170, 172. -_Autograph_, July-Aug., Nov.-Dec., 1912 (Taylor). Diccionario Universal -(_Itinerario_). =307=Roberts, diary. Sen. 32; 31, 1, p. 8, note. -Henshaw narrative. Velasco, Geog., iv, 150. Claiborne, Quitman, i, 277 -(Holt's journal). Henry, Camp. Sketches, 262-287. Robertson, Remins., -185-198. _Vedette_, ii, no. 9 (Townes). =193=Foster to father, Dec. -10. =139=W. B. Campbell to D. C., Jan. 2, 1847. =69=Worth -to Bliss, Dec. 16; to Butler, Dec. 18. =69=Butler to Bliss, Dec. -20. =69=Wool to Worth, Dec. 24. =69=Riley to Bliss, Dec. -10. =69=Quitman to Bliss, Dec. 30. =69=Worth to Bliss, Dec. -4. =65=Taylor, gen. orders 160, Dec. 22. =169=_Id._ to -Crittenden, Jan. 26, 1847. _Id._, Letters (Bixby), 180. Wilhelm, Eighth -Inf., ii, 300-1. =61=Clarke to McCall, Dec. 27. Apuntes, 86-7. -Scott, Mems., ii, 402. =69=Wool to Butler, Dec. 25. _Delta_, Jan. -24; Feb. 13, 1847. =52=Black, Oct. 8. =299=Posey to Gordon, -Feb. 19, 1847. N. Y. _Herald_, Feb. 6, 1847. Scott wrote privately -(=256=Jan. 16) that "friend Taylor ... turned his back upon the -appointment I gave him ... saying he would be back, at Monterey, in -36 days, the 1st of February!!" Taylor actually wrote that he _might_ -return "early in Feb." (Ho. 60; 30, 1, p. 848). Also the following -from =76=. S. Anna, Dec. 22, muy priv. _Id._, Dec. 24; Jan. 1. -Gov. Tamaul., Oct. 22; Dec. 3. E. González, Dec. 29. Comte. Nat. Gd., -Catorce, Dec. 30. Instead of admitting that his journey to Victoria -delayed the receipt of Scott's letter of Jan. 3 to him, Taylor -complained in his characteristic fashion that it should have been sent -by a special messenger (Ho. 60; 30, 1, p. 1101). - -18.24. One naturally inquires why Taylor concentrated more than -5000 men at Victoria. He stated that he went in that direction to -examine the passes and establish one or more posts, and that he sent -Patterson's command there because Mexican parties were going from Tula -to that point; but he had been ordered, Oct. 22, to have 4000 men ready -to embark for Vera Cruz, if he could spare them (Ho. 60; 30, 1, p. 366), -and presumably had this in mind. But see his letter, Bixby coll., 72. - -18.25. Such was the regular Mexican measure. In this as in some -other cases the American estimates were higher. - -18.26. _Patterson's march to Victoria._ Ho. 60; 30, 1, pp. 358 -(Marcy); 379, 387-8 (Taylor); 383 (Bliss); 383-4 (Patterson); 569, -571 (Jesup). =60=Patterson, Dec. 8. =292=Pillow to wife, -Dec. 15. _Amer. Flag_, Matamoros, Dec. 26. =332=Tennery, diary. -=254=McClellan, diary. =322=Smith, diary. Diccionario -Universal (_Itinerario_). Ho. 13; 31, 2 (G. W. Smith). Engineer School, -U. S. A., Occasional Papers, no. 16 (G. W. Smith). =60=Belknap, -memo, (with Patterson, Nov. 1). =193=Heiman to Mrs. Foster, Feb. -28. Lawton, Artillery Officer, 16. Furber, Twelve Months Vol., 275-318. -=335=Trist, draft of address. Welles papers (Pol. Hist. of U. S.). -=139=Campbell to D. C., Nov. 2, 1846; Jan. 2; Feb. 19, 1847. Scott, -Mems., ii, 423. =159=Collins, diary. _Hist. Teacher's Mag._, Apr., -1912, p. 75. Smith, Annex. of Texas, 250-1. N. Y. _Herald_, Nov. 3, -1857 (Scott). =146=Caswell, diary. =275=Nelson to Coe, Oct. -14, 1846 ("The General in making a speech to us a day or two ago said -that we should go on, or if it so happened that we _had_ to stay that he -(Pillow) would remain with us. This would make our situation _deplorable -indeed_. Our Brigadier General I am sorry to say is universally -unpopular"). Two soldiers wrote: "We do not charge Gen. Pillow with -that wholesale abuse that has been heaped upon him by many. It is his -misfortune to be cursed with unalloyed selfishness" (McLean County Hist. -Soc. Trans., i, 24). =280=Nunelee, diary. Claiborne, Quitman, i, -277 (Holt's journal). =180=Pillow to wife, Oct. 27. Taylor, Letters -(Bixby), 180. Trans. Ills. State Hist. Soc., 1906, 177-8. McCall, -Letters, 474. =273=Mullan, diary. Bishop, Journal. - -18.27. _Scott's operations, Dec. 27-Jan. 7, including the division -of the troops._ =61=H. L. Scott, Dec. 28. Ho. 60; 30, 1, pp. 842, -844, 848, 851, 853, 875, 1156 (Scott); 858-9 (Butler); 860-1 (Worth). -=61=Butler, Jan. 8, 1847. Wash. _Union_, Jan. 13, 1847. (Suggested) -Ho. 60; 30, 1, p. 353; Taylor, Letter to Gaines. (Ordered) Polk, Diary, -Nov. 17-19. (Appointed) Ho. 60; 30, 1, p. 372 (Marcy). (Authority) -Polk, Diary, Mar. 21, 1847; _Cong. Globe_, 30, 1, p. 502 (Douglas). -(Condition) Ho. 60; 30, 1, pp. 390, 1276. (Admitted) _Ibid._, 1102. -(Manner) _Ibid._, 373, 839, 848, 851. (Purpose) _Ibid._, 373, 839; -Scott, Mems., ii, 403. (Reach) Ho. 60; 30, 1, pp. 848, 852. (Required) -_Ibid._, 864; Sen. 1; 30, 1, p. 47. (Recognized) =169=Taylor to -Crittenden, Jan. 26, 1847. ("Wormed") _Ibid._; =370=Taylor to -Davis, Apr. 18, 1848. (Kill) =330=Taylor to brother, May 29, 1847. -("Contemptible") Taylor, Letters (Bixby), 180. (Suggestion) Ho. 60; -30, 1, pp. 337, 375 (Taylor). ("Intrigue") Taylor, Letters (Bixby), -84. (Outraged) _Ibid._, 180. (Degraded) _Ibid._, 181. ("Discourteous") -_Ibid._, 179. (Ruin) _Ibid._, 90, 95. (Expecting) =169=Taylor -to Crittenden, Jan. 26, 1847; Ho. 60; 30, 1, pp. 890, 1109-10, 1113. -("Sacrificed") _Ibid._, 863; Bixby coll., 114. The New Orleans _Comm. -Bulletin_ said a fearful responsibility rested on the government for -exposing Taylor. See also =330=Taylor to brother, Feb. 8; Apr. 5, -22; May 29, 1847; Jan. 19, 1848. - -For a particular reason both Scott and Taylor (=169=to Crittenden, -Jan. 26) felt sure that Santa Anna would go to Vera Cruz promptly. This -reason was the capture of Scott's original letter of Jan. 3 to Taylor, -borne by Lieut. Richey (French, Two Wars, 71; Ho. 60; 30, 1, pp. 876, -890; Meade, Letters, i, 182; Taylor, Letters (Bixby), 82). It was -believed that the letter was in Santa Anna's hands by about Jan. 15. For -this reason and the tardiness of the new volunteer regiments Scott felt -that he needed more and Taylor fewer troops than he otherwise would have -estimated (Ho. 60; 30, 1, p. 893). Indeed, Taylor wrote to Scott on Jan. -26 that Santa Anna had already left the north (Ho. 60; 30, 1, p. 890). -Scott was so confident that he would meet serious opposition at Vera -Cruz that he employed five or six agents to obtain information about the -forces assembling there. Marcy entertained the same expectation (Ho. 60; -30, 1, p. 369). Ripley (_op. cit._, i, 358) argues that S. Anna had a -better chance of success in attacking Taylor than he would have had in -attacking Scott, and therefore Scott should not have believed that S. -Anna would oppose his debarkation. But Ripley could not have proved his -premise; and, even were that true, the additional advantage that would -have been gained by guarding the route from Vera Cruz to Mexico City -looked like a decisive consideration. S. Anna's moving against Taylor -was largely due to political considerations not understood by either -Scott or Ripley. - -Taylor gradually settled down upon the idea that the aim of Polk and -Scott was to cause him to leave Mexico in disgust (=330=to brother, -Feb. 8; Apr. 5). Later he changed "Scott, Marcy & Co." to "Scott, Polk & -Co." (=330=to brother, Jan. 19, 1848), thus smiting at one stroke a -rival in his own party (see =330=letter to brother, Apr. 5, 1848) -and a supposed rival in the other. - -The number of troops left with Taylor for defence against an enemy -who was not expected to advance was about 800 regulars and 6-7000 -well seasoned and respectably trained volunteers (=169=Taylor -to Crittenden, March 25, 1847) besides several regiments of new -volunteers--say 2400-2800 men--who were expected to arrive soon; while -Scott had less than 13,000 to face (with all the disadvantages of -debarking) the garrisons of Vera Cruz and Ulúa, the army that Santa Anna -was believed to be leading against him, and all such reinforcements -as the Mexican government could raise when threatened at the vital -point. Moreover Scott's new volunteers were to land with practically -no training whatever, and could hardly be counted on for the initial -fighting. Taylor said that for a blow at the capital 25,000 men (10,000 -of them regulars) would be required (Ho. 60; 30, 1, p. 353). As Scott -pointed out, Taylor now had really nothing to do except defend Texas -(Memoirs, ii, 409) and, should it be practicable, aid Scott's offensive -by threatening to advance. Scott took Robert E. Lee from Taylor's army. - -On receiving Scott's orders of Jan. 3 Taylor replied in a style -corresponding to his state of mind (Ho. 60; 30, 1, p. 863). Scott -answered: "There are some expressions in those letters [of Jan. 15 -which, as I shall wish to forget them, I shall not specify or recall" -(_ibid._, 864); and to Marcy Scott wrote privately: "However, he -[Taylor] is still the same excellent man" (=256=Jan. 23). In his -correspondence on this subject Taylor appeared to regard the troops -placed under his command as his personal property. The battle of Buena -Vista has commonly been cited as the cause of Taylor's election, but it -was the idea that he had been deliberately exposed to the Mexicans which -gave that victory its remarkable political effect (=210=Simms to -Hammond, Jan. 15, 1847; _So. Qtrly. Review_, Jan., 1851, p. 37). It may -be observed further that for the government to sacrifice him, his army -and all the public property in northern Mexico, and give Santa Anna an -opportunity to ravage Texas would have been to commit suicide. The idea -was unreasonable. - -18.28. Scott, who was a great soldier but not a great lawyer, had -the imprudence to attack Marcy, a master of fence, in regard to the -supply of vessels, and he fared rather badly. Marcy's defence was, -however, by no means wholly sound. He himself called it privately a -"special plea" (=256=to Wetmore, Apr. 11, 1848). For example, Dec. -15, 1846, he notified Scott (and also Jesup, who had gone to the front) -that he was ordering ten transports in ballast to the Brazos, but later, -on receiving a letter dated Jan. 27 from Jesup (then at the Brazos) -which over-confidently stated that all needed vessels could be chartered -there, he countermanded the order; and this looks like a satisfactory -defence against Scott's complaint that none of the ten transports -specified by him in his requisition appeared. But Marcy neglected to -inform Jesup or Scott that the order had been countermanded, and, as -Jesup's letter could not have reached Washington before about Jan. 7, -Jesup naturally assumed that the ten transports had got under way. -Indeed, Jan. 23 the adjutant general wrote what Scott understood to -mean that the latter might soon expect ten ships in ballast (Ho. 60; -30, 1, p. 897). Therefore Jesup and Scott counted upon them (_ibid._, -896), and naturally did not exert themselves to obtain shipping (when -disappointed about vessels already engaged) as otherwise they doubtless -would have done. (See Scott, Marcy, Jesup, Hetzel in Ho. 60; 30, 1, pp. -894, 1218, 1227, 1253.) Besides, it was found necessary to send a number -of the Brazos vessels to Tampico for the troops of Patterson, Twiggs and -Quitman. Jesup (_supra_) charged Scott with causing delay by changing -the assignation of certain regiments; but Scott certainly did not desire -to waste time, and it is only fair to suppose that he made the changes -for adequate reasons. Jesup complained that many of his officers were -inefficient, and Marcy with well feigned naïveté replied that their -names had been presented to Polk [by politicians] with "the highest -testimonials." - -18.29. Harney soon disobeyed Scott's positive orders at Medellín -bridge (chap. xxii, note 25), and his biographer admits that he might -justly have been shot (Reavis, Harney, 186). Scott, however, merely -refrained from reporting the affair, whereupon Harney complained that -he had been unjustly ignored. One of the best reasons for studying the -Mexican war is to observe how political considerations interfered with -military affairs. The Harney episode was enough to justify Scott's -apprehensions of a fire from the rear, but it was not the only instance -of executive meddling (=213=Hatch to sister, Feb. 11, 1847). -Another incident also, which occurred at this time, illustrates his -magnanimity and good sense. Lieut. Col. Ethan Allen Hitchcock, a man of -notable talents and attainments and formerly instructor in tactics at -West Point, was admirably qualified to act as inspector general, and -Scott gave him the post although Hitchcock had repeatedly opposed him, -and was personally unfriendly to him. Experience soon made Hitchcock -one of Scott's firmest admirers and partisans (Hitchcock, Fifty Years, -234-6). - -18.30. _Scott's operations, Jan. 8-Feb. 15._ Ho. 60; 30, 1, pp. -844, 855-6, 866, 875, 880, 882, 890-1, 893, 896, 1218, 1273 (Scott); -874, 1227 (Marcy); 568, 571, 1253 (Jesup); 884, 894 (Hetzel); 868, 870, -887-9, 893, 1164-6 (H. L. Scott); 867, 869, 888 (Harney); 860-1, 870 -(Worth); 858-9 (Butler). _Niles_, Feb. 13, p. 369; Feb. 27, p. 401. -=63=Marcy to qtrmr. officer, Dec. 11, 15, 1846. Lawton, Artillery -Officer, 42-3. =358=Williams to father, Jan. 17. Ballentine, -English Soldier, i, 257. _Picayune_, Feb. 3; Mar. 12. =180=Pillow -to wife, Feb. 14. =65=Scott, gen. orders. 8, 11. Polk, Diary, -Dec. 14, 1846; Feb. 20, 1847. Reavis, Harney, 186. Grant, Mems., i, -123-4. =61=Worth to adj. gen., Feb. 17. Meade, Letters, i, 176. -=60=Scott to Marcy, April 5, 1847. =256=_Id._ to _Id._, Jan. -23, 1847, private. _Amer. Flag_, Matamoros, Feb. 17. Oswandel, Notes, -48. =62=Stanton, Nov. 29; Dec. 7, 13, 20, 1846; Jan. 5; Feb. -16, 1847; Sen. 65; 30, 1, p. 91 (Hitchcock). =322=Smith, diary. -=364=Worth to S., Feb. 17; to wife, Feb. 18. Smith, To Mexico, -84-103 (Worth's march from Saltillo). - -18.31. An American estimate was 130 miles. This is partially -explained perhaps by the fact that the pioneers made some "short cuts" -(mule paths) available. Meade (Letters, i, 159) even cut the distance to -about 100 miles, but this appears to have been little more than a guess. -By the railroad the distance is about 141 miles. - -18.32. _From Victoria to Tampico._ =146=Caswell, diary. -Ho. 60; 30, 1, pp. 1097 (Taylor); 879 (Patterson). Diccionario -Universal (_Itinerario_). =303=Orders 3, Jan. 12. Robertson, -Remins., 199-207. Taylor, Letters (Bixby), 181. U. S. Engineer School, -Occasional Papers, no. 16 (G. W. Smith). Ho. 13; 31, 2 (_Id._). Prieto, -Tamaulipas, 229. =332=Tennery, diary. =273=Mullan, diary. -Lawton, Artillery Officer, 27. =322=Smith, diary. =169=Taylor -to Crittenden, Jan. 26. =69=Colección de Itinerarios. -=307=Roberts, diary. Meade, Letters, i, 174-5. _Defensor de -Tamaul._, Jan. 18. =76=Cos, Feb. 1. =218=Henshaw narrative. -=139=W. B. Campbell to wife, Jan. 25. Furber, Twelve Months Vol., -342-93. - -18.33. The author's opinion of Pillow is based upon his letters to -his wife, Polk, Scott, Duncan and others, the Trist papers, the Campbell -papers, the records of two courts of inquiry regarding his conduct, and -a large number of additional documents, most of which will be cited -later, particularly in chaps. xxvi and xxix. An army correspondent of W. -T. (_later_ Gen.) Sherman described Pillow, Feb. 26, 1848, as "a mass -of vanity, conceit, ignorance, ambition and want of truth." There was -good warrant for this characterization, but one should add plausibility, -cunning, energy and a genial disposition. For his personal appearance: -Semmes, Service, 165. - -18.34. Scott had not yet heard from Washington regarding Harney. - -18.35. _At Tampico._ =332=Tennery, diary. =273=Mullan, -diary. Lawton, Artillery Officer, 10-64. =146=Caswell, diary. -Ho. 60; 30, 1, pp. 896, 899, 900, 1169 (Scott); 901 (Totten); -850 (Clarke); 896 (Hetzel). Robertson, Remins., 207-13. Bishop, -Journal. =180=Pillow to wife, Dec. 8, 1846; Feb. 23, 1847. -=111=Beauregard to Totten, Jan. 9, 14; to Gates, Feb. 24. -Kenly, Md. Vol., 241-5. =330=J. T. Taylor to Scott, Feb. 12. -=280=Nunelee, diary. Apuntes, 88. Meade, Letters, i, 177, 184-5. -=218=Henshaw narrative, Feb. 20. =254=McClellan, diary. -=303=Shields to Quitman, Mar. 4. =159=Collins, diary, Feb. -19, 25. Davis, Autobiog., 121-3. =65=Scott, gen. orders 21, Feb. -19. =76=Cos, Feb. 19. =76=Anon. letters to Garay, Jan. 25, -28, etc. =139=Campbell to wife, Feb. 3, 7, 16. Mason, Lee, 37. -Furber, Twelve Months Vol., 394-415. Works defending the two land -approaches to Tampico were now ready, and Col. Gates of the Third -Artillery with a company of artillery, the Md. and D. C. battalion -and the new Louisiana regiment--about 1200 men in all--were detached -as a garrison. Rumors came that Taylor was in danger, but the air -was full of rumors about the enemy, and Scott had ample ground for -disregarding these, though criticised for doing so. Von Moltke said -(Franco-German War, 71): "It would have been unjustifiable to entirely -change the line of march on the ground of rumors that might, after all, -prove unfounded." Feb. 19 Scott announced his staff appointments. The -possession of Tampico was extremely useful to him. Fresh provisions -abounded there, and the embarking of about 5000 men on the dangerous -coast at the Brazos was avoided. - -18.36. The Louisiana men went from Lobos Islands to Tampico. Col. -De Russey and the other part of the regiment were wrecked about Feb. 6 -on the coast nearly opposite those islands, but after some hardships and -considerable danger of being captured by Gen. Cos, commanding at Tuxpán -about forty miles distant, they made their way to Tampico, meeting en -route an expedition sent to rescue them (Meade, Letters, i, 179; Lawton, -Artillery Officer, 32-5; =270=Moore, diary; =76=F. de Garay, -Mar. 5). - -18.37. _To Lobos Islands._ Ho. 60; 30, 1, pp. 1256 (Hetzel); 1259 -(Babbitt); 878 (Conner); 568 (Jesup); 840, 841, 846, 880, 891, 896 -(Scott). =65=Scott, gen. orders 1, 6, 8, Jan. 15, 30, 30. Lawton, -Artillery Officer, 23, 65. =61=Brooke to Munroe, Jan. 11; to Scott, -Jan. 9, 21. =62=Stanton to Jesup, Feb. 16. Scott, Mems., ii, 413. -=298=Porter, diary. =254=McClellan, Feb. 23. =193=Foster -to mother, Feb. 26. Ho. 59; 30, 1, p. 41. Smith, To Mexico, 105, 108. -=164=Scott to Conner, Dec. 26, 1846. _Niles_, Mar. 13, p. 21; 20, -p. 48. Hartman, Journal, 6. Oswandel, Notes, 54-6. _Picayune_, Feb. 18. -=159=Collins, diary. =146=Caswell, diary. Ballentine, English -Soldier, i, 266. Bishop, Journal. - -18.38. Polk and Marcy felt that he was looking for an issue -(=256=Marcy to Wetmore, April 25, 1847), and his course warrants -that supposition. - -18.39. _Taylor's movements._ Ho. 60; 30, 1, pp. 861, 890, 1097 -(Taylor), 875 (Scott). Taylor, Letters (Bixby), 72, 85, 87, 180-2. -=169=_Id._ to Crittenden, Jan. 26. Polk, Diary, Oct. 20, 1846; -Jan. 5; Mar. 21-23; Apr. 1, 1847. =256=Marcy to Wetmore, Mar. 11. -_Journ. Mil. Serv. Instit._ xiv, 443. - -Jan. 26 Scott wrote to Taylor: "I must ask you to abandon Saltillo, -and to make no detachments, except for _reconnaisances_ and immediate -defence, much beyond Monterey. I know this to be the wish of the -government, founded on reasons in which I concur" (Ho. 60; 30, 1, p. -864). In reply Taylor wrote on Feb. 7 that he was going to remain at -his advanced position unless "positively ordered to fall back by the -government at Washington" (_ibid._, 1162). In addressing the government -on the same day (_ibid._, 1110) he referred to Scott's instructions as -advice. But such language from a superior officer was clearly an order -courteously phrased, and this interpretation is confirmed by the fact -that Scott deemed it necessary to give Taylor express authority later to -make a diversion toward San Luis Potosí (_ibid._, p. 876). Polk (Diary, -April 7, 1847, and elsewhere) remarked that Taylor had violated his -orders by taking his advanced position. - -Taylor's ostensible reasons for so doing as given by himself (Bixby -coll., 182) were these: 1. It would be safest to fight, should the -Mexicans advance, immediately on their getting across the desert region -that lay between San Luis Potosí and the advanced American position, -rather than let them recuperate and use Saltillo as a base. 2. Had the -Americans fallen back to Monterey, Santa Anna would have invested it, -the Mexicans of that section would have risen, every animal at Monterey -would have starved or been destroyed, the troops--disheartened by -retreating, and beyond succor--would have surrendered or been cut to -pieces, and every American dépôt in the rear would have been abandoned -or captured. 3. Doniphan would have been ruined. But (1), as we have -seen (note 27), Taylor believed on Jan. 26, Feb. 4, 7, and 14 (_i.e._ -both before and after taking the advanced position) that he was in no -real danger of being attacked by Santa Anna, and hence had not the -warrant of a supposed emergency for disregarding his instructions. (2) -This advanced position was not, as his explanation assumes, a good -place at which to meet the Mexicans, and he retired from it before the -battle of Buena Vista. (3) Rinconada Pass, on the other hand, could -probably have been made virtually impregnable toward the south, and, -if properly defended, could at least have held out for a considerable -time. (4) It was not reasonable to suppose that Santa Anna, learning -that Scott was about to strike at the vitals of Mexico, would undertake -to carry the Pass and besiege a city like Monterey, prepared in all -ways--as Marcy had instructed Taylor on Oct. 13, 22 (Ho. 60; 30, 1, pp. -356, 364) to prepare it--for a stubborn resistance (Howard, Taylor, -238). (5) If, however, Santa Anna were going to do so, as Taylor's -explanation assumes, the policy of Scott and the administration was -certainly the true one, since it would have contributed to a triumph -on the line from Vera Cruz to the capital. (6) Taylor's retirement -to Monterey and vicinity would have entailed no loss of prestige or -confidence on the part of the Americans, since it would have formed one -part of a bold offensive plan; but would only have diminished somewhat -Taylor's personal effulgence. (7) It was not reasonable to believe that -the men with whom Taylor (Bixby coll., 86) was ready to meet Santa -Anna in the field could not hold their own against him in strong works -(Meade, Letters, i, 179), and a success at Monterey would have been not -only more certain but more decisive and less costly than at Buena Vista -(Scott, Mems., ii, 412). Moreover Taylor would have had the Monterey -garrison as well as the troops who actually fought at Buena Vista. (8) -Taylor represented that he could not transport siege guns from Camargo -to Monterey, and how could he have expected Santa Anna to bring them to -Monterey from San Luis Potosí? (9) If Monterey did not contain ample -forage for the animals, the fault was Taylor's; and, if he was to stand -a siege, most of the animals could have been sent to the Rio Grande -(Ripley, War with Mex., i, 435). (10) Reinforcements from the north -were _en route_, and succor from Scott could have reached Monterey more -easily than a position far in advance. (11) Doniphan could have retired -from Chihuahua by the way he had gone there or (like a party of only -forty men: _Hughes, Doniphan's Exped._, 335) _via_ Presidio del Rio -Grande; and before moving toward Saltillo it was his duty to ascertain, -as he actually did, whether he could safely go there. - -Another point brought forward by Taylor was that had he remained at -Monterey, the Mexicans could more effectually have annoyed his flanks -and lines of communication (Ho. 60; 30, 1, p. 1110); but (1) evidently, -had he remained at Monterey, his flanks and lines of communication -would have been less extended and more easily protected than when he -was about eighty-five miles farther on (Polk, Diary, Mar. 23, 1847), -and (2) as a matter of fact his flanks were effectually annoyed and his -communications entirely cut off. (For certain points in this discussion -the author is indebted to Ripley's "War with Mexico.") In short, -the only rational explanation of Taylor's course appears to be that -suggested in the text. Oct. 15 Taylor wrote: Every day's march beyond -Saltillo will weaken our position and strengthen the enemy's (Ho. 60; -30, 1, p. 352). Nov. 26 he wrote: "We have advanced as far from our base -in this quarter as we ought to venture" (Bixby coll., 72). - -The troops that Taylor now had were: _regulars_--two squadrons of -cavalry, four batteries (16 guns), and at Monterey one company of -artillery; _volunteers_--two regiments of horse, eight regiments of -foot, and two guns at Monterey, Saltillo and beyond Saltillo; and three -regts. of volunteer foot holding the line to Camargo and down the river -(Ho. 60; 30, 1, p. 1098). - - - XIX. SANTA ANNA PREPARES TO STRIKE - -19.1. Butler returned to Monterey about the first of February. - -19.2. The statements regarding Taylor's negligence are from -Gen. Benham, who was on the ground as an engineer officer. His -"Recollections" was published in 1871, and whether it was based on -documents is not known. But, being an engineer, he was a man of clear -and trained intelligence; he possessed superior ability; and on careful -inquiry the author was told by Major Lukesh, director of the engineer -school, Washington Barracks, that in 1878 his faculties appeared to -be entirely sound. Moreover his account shows internal evidences of -credibility. The alleged negligence of Taylor was in accordance with -his temperament and previous record, and he probably thought it would -reassure the troops. - -19.3. Taylor wrote nothing and did nothing indicating an intention -to make his stand at Carnero Pass, and the evidence that he intended -to fight at Agua Nueva seems to be decisive. He might, however, have -endeavored to annoy the enemy at the Pass. - -19.4. _Affairs with Taylor up to Feb. 20._ Carleton, Buena Vista, -2-8, 50, 179-80. =190=Ewing, diary. =330=Taylor to brother, -Feb. 8. Raleigh (N. C.) _Star_, Aug. 18, 1847. Taylor, Letters (Bixby), -86, 182. =69=Wool to Taylor, Jan. 20, 29. =69=Warren to Wool, -Feb. 14. =147=Chamberlain, diary. =148=_Id._, recollections. -=61=Am. offs. to S. Anna, Mar. 24. =61=Heady to Marshall, -Aug. 30, 1848. =61=Gaines to Scott, May 3, 1847. =65=Wool, -orders 222. C. M. Clay, Mems., i, 143. _Vedette_, ii, no. 2 (Oury); -no. 8 (Lee). =61=[Wool] to adj. gen., Jan. 17. Article on Taylor -(by J. Davis) in Appleton's Biog. Dict. Henry, Camp. Sketches, 248-9. -=185=Bragg to Duncan, Apr. 4. =299=Posey to friend, Feb. -19. Smith, Chile con Carne, 161. Smith, Remins., 41-5. Upton, Mil. -Policy, 209. _Amer. Flag_, Matamoros, Feb. 17. N. Y. _Tribune_, Mar. -29. =367=Yell to ----, Jan. 19. Ho. Report 413; 30, 1. Encarnacion -Prisoners, 35-8, 92-4. Meade, Letters, i, 169, 182. =300=Prickett, -letters. Bishop, Journal. =8=Anon. diary. =245=Bee to -Lamar, Dec. 5, 1846. Rápida Ojeada, 6, 8. Coleman, Critt., i, 308-10. -Balbontín, Invasión, 70. Benham, Recollections. =253=Harney to -McLean, June 13. =349=Pattridge to Miss W., July 21. _Spirit of -the Times_, May 1 (H. von S.). _Hist. Teacher's Mag._, Apr., 1912., -p. 75. N. Y. _Eve. Post_, Jan. 4, 1849. =316=Bragg to Sherman, -Mar. 4, 1848. =146=Caswell, diary, Jan. 12. =139=Campbell -to D. C., Nov. 2, 9, 1846. Senex, Myth. N. Y. _Sun_, Jan. 28. (Urrea) -_Delta_, Jan. 16. _Picayune_, Mar. 11; Apr. 14 (Taylor); June 25. -_Niles_, Mar. 20, p. 60; May 8, p. 156. Ho. 60; 30, 1, pp. 441, 1098, -1106-10, 1162 (Taylor); 864, 876 (Scott); 1108 (Wool); 1111-2, 1182 -(lists). _Monitor Repub._, Jan. 14. =76=S. Anna, Jan. 26; Feb. 27. -=76=Zambonino, Jan. 23. =76=Auxil. inspector of N. León to -Canales, Jan. 20. - -Col. Campbell (First Tenn. regt.): "Old Zack's" manners are such that he -excites no jealousy; "no one feels that he [Taylor] is his superior, but -his equal or inferior, and each thinks he can control and manage such a -mind" (=139=to D. Campbell, Apr. 25, 1847). U. S. Grant: We thought -the battles on the Rio Grande pretty important, but had "only a faint -conception of their magnitude until they were fought over in the North -by the Press and the reports came back to us" (Mems., i, 99). It will be -noted that Taylor pursued now the same anti-Cæsarean, anti-Napoleonic -policy of teaching his troops to despise the enemy that had been -followed by him before the battles of May, 1846 (chap. viii, note 9). -The distance by rail from Saltillo to Agua Nueva station is eighteen -miles. Rives (U. S. and Mexico, ii, 350) speaks of the buildings at -Buena Vista as "laid out in regular streets"; but, as the text states, -Buena Vista was only a poor farm, not a rich hacienda. A soldier, there -present, called it an "insignificant, dirty little rancho." - -19.5. _El Crepusculo_, May 16, 1835, said that Santa Anna triumphed -over Zacatecas "with the tranquillity of the tiger, which, sated with -the flesh of its prey, lies down on what it does not wish to devour." -During December, 1846, very sharp =76=letters were exchanged by -Governor González and Santa Anna. - -19.6. This estimate is based upon about thirty statements, none of -them official. About the middle of August Salas ordered to the north the -troops that had been fighting in Jalisco. About 5500 regulars preceded -or accompanied Santa Anna's journey to the north, and later he called -other troops from the capital and the states. Though accounts varied, -Ampudia seems to have brought nearly 6000; the Fourth Brigade, which -had failed to reach Monterey, and the former garrison of Tampico were -substantial additions; Guanajuato state, roused personally by Valencia, -contributed more than 5000; the Jalisco regiment, which arrived at -the end of October, numbered 1345 foot; the state of S. Luis Potosí -did well, and other states did more or less; and an artillery company -was made up from American deserters, mostly Irishmen, under the name -of San Patricio (see chap. xi, note 11); but desertion--due to the -inborn distaste of the masses for war, to bad treatment and to poor -subsistence--was constantly unraveling the work of accumulation. - -It seems to have been a mistake to draw Ampudia's army to San Luis at -so early a date. It was in no danger before the end of the armistice; -it could have encouraged the people near Saltillo to act as guerillas; -and it needed time to regain its morale. Besides, this backward movement -had a bad effect on the other troops, and so much was said at San Luis -by Ampudia's men about the prowess of the Americans, that a general -order forbidding such talk had to be issued. Ampudia and a number of -his officers were put on trial; but the trials were suspended, and -most of the accused were exonerated in orders. Several thousand men -(successively under Urrea, Valencia and Vázquez) were kept at Tula, -about 125 miles northeast of San Luis. Santa Anna knew the Americans -could not bring artillery _via_ Tula, and did not fear them without it; -but he looked forward to operating _via_ Victoria against Taylor's line -of communication. Another body was kept at Matehuala. Smaller forces -were echeloned in the same general direction; and Miñón's brigade was -thrown still farther forward as a screen, corps of observation and means -of annoying the enemy. In order to prevent the Americans from learning -about his operations, Santa Anna gave orders to the cavalry at his front -that no one should be permitted to go to Saltillo or Monterey without a -pass signed by himself. - -19.7. _Santa Anna's arrival, plans and operations at S. L. P.; his -financial difficulties there._ _Amer. Eagle_, Apr. 8. =52=J. -Parrott, Feb. 6. =52=Black, Nov. 17, 1846. London _Times_, Dec. 18, -1846; Mar. 11; Apr. 20, 1847. Matamoros _Amer. Flag_, Mar. 13. Giménez, -Mems., 96-7, 264. _Journal des Débats_, Feb. 22. _Constitutionnel_, -Dec. 5, 12, 1846; Jan. 17, 31, 1847. =69=Worth to Bliss, Nov. 29, -1846. =69=Shields to Bliss, Jan. 13, 1847. =58=Jobson, Feb. -14. =61=Shields to adj. gen., Jan. 19. =47=Black to Conner, -Sept. 24, 1846. =47=Conner, Oct. 26; Nov. 5; Dec. 1. Memoria de ... -Guerra, Dec., 1846. Doblado, Memoria que contiene. =70=Canalizo to -S. Anna, Jan. 7. Henry, Camp. Sketches, 249, 271. Gamboa, Impug., 26. -Negrete, Invasión, ii, 351; iii, app., 444; iv, app., 177, 417. Ramírez, -México, 9, 10, 12. México á través, iv, 579, 591-2. _Don Simplicio_, -Oct. 10, 1846; Jan. 9, 30; Feb. 17, 1847. _Observador Zacat._, Dec. -27, 1846, suplem. =100=Jefe dept. of V. Cruz to ayunt., Dec. 21, -1846. _Eco de Tampico_, Oct. 8, 14, 1846. Escudero, Mems., 6. Durango -congress, Dec. 11, 1846. _Republicano_, Oct. 15, 1846; Feb. 2, 1847. -=80=Méx. state, decree, Nov. 26, 1846. _Epoca_, Sept. 26; Oct. 13, -1846; Jan. 19, 26, 30; Feb. 16. =77=_Relaciones_, circulars, Sept. -30; Oct. 6, 19, 20, 22, 1846. =75=_a_Hacienda, circular, Oct. 14, -1846. =83=Gov. Querétaro to other govs., Oct. 16, 1846; to Farías, -Oct. 18; to S. Anna, Nov. 21; Dec. 21. Rivera, Gobernantes, ii, 309. -Balbontín, Invasión, 53-4, 58, 61. Apuntes, 69, 70, 73, 75. Defensa de -... Estrada. Donnavan, Adventures, 51, 76. =13=Bankhead, nos. 140, -144, 151, 173, 178, 1846. Muro, Miscelánea, 65, 68, 70. García, Revol. -de Ayutla, 27. Sierra, Evolution, i, 217. _Crepúsculo_, May 16, 1835. -Puga y Acal, Docs., 57. García, Juárez, 65. Bustamante, Apuntes ... -S. Anna, 289. S. Anna, Apelación, 24-5; app., 3, 14, 18-24, 30, 30-9, -66-7. =80=_Id._ to gov. Méx. state, Nov. 26, 1846; Jan. 31, 1847. -_Picayune_, Mar. 10. _Delta_, Jan. 22. _Independiente_, May 22. Wash. -_Union_, Nov. 16, 30, 1846; Mar. 17, 1847. N. Y. _Journ. of Commerce_, -Jan. 8. =80=Gov. to legislature, Feb. 15, 1847. _Diario_, Oct. -1, 2, 6, 7, 16, 21, 22, 24; Nov. 2, 14, 19, 27; Dec. 4, 6, 8, 16, -20, 24, 25, 28, 1846; Jan. 30; Feb. 15, 17, 1847. _Monitor Repub._, -Oct. 18, 31; Nov. 17, 18, 20, 21; Dec. 21, 1846; Jan. 8, 29; Feb. 11, -16; Apr. 22; Nov. 30, 1847. Mora, Papeles, 64, 66. =162=Conner, -Dec. 1, 1846 =166=Black to Conner. Sept. 24, 1846. _Niles_, -Mar. 27, p. 57. Meade, Letters, i, 160. =52=J. Parrott, June 4, -1846. =73=Bermúdez de Castro, nos. 343, 346, 1846. =75=Gov. -Michoacán to Relaciones: circ. no. 252 of Relac. Parrodi, Memoria (S. -Anna, Oct. 18). Ho. 60; 30, 1, p. 776, no. 4. =366=Letters from -S. Anna to gov. S. L. P., Nov. 1. And from =76= the following. -Carrera, Nov. 10. Plana mayor, Dec. 1. Valencia, addresses, Oct. 6, 30. -Gov. to cong. Durango, Nov. 8. M. Escandón, July 21. Salas, proclams., -Aug. 28; Nov. 11. Piña to Carrera, Dec. 10. Decrees, Sept. 27; Dec. 2. -Memo, of artill. sent to S. L. P. Circular, Aug. 4. Report on artillery, -Nov. 13. Comte. gen. Chiapas, Oct. 3. Comisario gen. to S. Anna, Nov. -30; Dec. 5. Juan Morales, Nov. 2. Comte. gen. Durango, address, Oct. 16. -Guerra, circulars, Oct. 1, 2, 3, 4, 5; Nov. 30; Dec. 2, 1846. S. Anna, -Sept. 29; Oct. 3, 4, 10, 14, 17, 19, 22, 22, res., 25, res., 28, 30, -31; Nov. 2, 4, 5, 7, 9, 16, 18, 19, 28, 30; Dec. 3, 4, 7, 9, 11, 14, -19, 22, 28, 30, 1846; Jan. 1, 4, 7, 15, 19, 20; Feb. 27, 1847. Mora, -Apr. 22, 1847. Comte. gen. Guanajuato, Oct. 30; Nov. 13; Dec. 28, 1846. -S. L. P. assembly, decree, June 17, 1846. Ampudia to S. Anna, Oct. 18. -Relaciones, Jan. 11. J. G. P. Garay, June 8, 1846. Valencia, proclam., -Dec., 1844. Yáñez, Oct. 9; Nov. 6, 1846. Ampudia, Oct. 1, 1846. -Valencia, Nov. 8. To S. Anna, Oct. 17. S. Anna to gov. Zacatecas, Dec. -17. - -19.8. Copies of the _Herald_ containing this letter arrived at Vera -Cruz, but were seized. Later Santa Anna denied flatly that he had had -any dealings with the United States (Apelación, 16). - -19.9. As Santa Anna's movement rested essentially upon non-military -reasons, Scott's forecast of his operations naturally proved incorrect. -The American attack upon Vera Cruz, though known to be planned, was not -yet known certainly to be coming. Santa Anna defended himself later for -not going to Vera Cruz by saying that he was merely commander of the -northern army, but in fact he did not so regard himself. The truth is -that he urged and expected the government to provide for Vera Cruz, that -the government assured him it had been provided for, and that, had it -been tenaciously defended, it could have held out until he could have -arrived in that vicinity (=76=S. Anna, Oct. 14, 20, 1846; Jan. 14, -18, 1847. _Id._, Apelación, 33. =76=To S. Anna, Jan. 30, 1847). -Taylor's moving away from Scott caused the intercepting of Scott's -letter of January 3, which revealed Taylor's weakness, and thus may have -been the cause of the battle of Buena Vista. - -19.10. _Why Santa Anna marched north_ (_complaints of his conduct_). -=52=Black, Aug. 27; Oct. 8; Nov. 17, 1846; Jan. 28, 1847. Sierra, -Evolution, 218. _Soldado de la Patria_, no. 13. London _Times_, Jan. -28. Memoria de ... Relaciones, Dec., 1846. _Courrier des Etats Unis_, -June 20; July 9, 1846. =335=Mackenzie to Trist, Nov. 25, 1846. -Gamboa, Impug., 15-19, 21-2. Kenly, Md. Vol., 390. Ramírez, Mexico, -173, 192. _Don Simplicio_, Jan. 9, 20, 27; Feb. 3. =82=MS. -apparently written in Jan., 1847. =77=Relaciones, circular, Nov. -27, 1846. _Republicano_, Jan. 21, 31. =13=Pakenham, no. 127, 1846. -=83=Gov. Querétaro to S. Anna, Nov. 21, 1846. Biog. del Gen. S. -Anna, 1847. =13=Pakenham to Palmerston, Oct. 29, 1846. Negrete, -Invasión, iii, app., 483 (Otero); iv, app., 177. Balbontín, Invasión, -59. Apuntes, 77. Pacheco, Exposición. =13=Bankhead, nos. 121, -140, 141, 157, 169, 1846; 5, 1847. García, Juárez, 65. Tributo á la -Verdad, 27. S. Anna, Manifiesto, Méx., 1847, 6. _Id._, Apelación, 16, -23. _Picayune_, Mar. 9, 10. Acta, Mazatlán, Jan. 18. =80=Olaguíbel -to S. Anna, Jan. --, 1847. Wash. _Union_, Oct. 10, 1846 (from _La -Patria_); Mar. 17, 1847. _Nat. Intelligencer_, Sept. 5, 1846. Richmond -_Times_, Sept. 2, 1846. _Diario_, Nov. 24; Dec. 6, 8, 1846; Jan. 30, -1847. _Monitor Repub._, Oct. 22; Nov. 20, 29; Dec. 28, 1846; Jan. 4, -6, 8, 14, 19, 22 (calling attention to the scattered state of Taylor's -forces), 26, 29, 1847. Mora, Papeles, 70. _Niles_, Mar. 27, p. 57. -=73=Bermúdez de Castro, nos. 343, res., 410, 1846. Bustamante, -Nuevo Bernal, ii, 90. =76=Relaciones, Jan. 11. =76=S. Anna, -Feb. 27. =76=_Id._, Manifiesto, Jan. 26. - -Rives (U. S. and Mexico, ii, 341) doubts whether S. Anna had learned -from Richey's despatches (chap. xviii, note 27) that Taylor's forces had -been depleted, and cites in evidence S. Anna's declaration in defence -of himself for going against Taylor when Scott was about to attack -Vera Cruz (Apelación, 32). But (1) S. Anna was not a person to admit -unnecessarily the strongest point of an accusation against him, and in -fact the other point of his defence, cited by Rives, was not honest; (2) -S. Anna here representing that he feared Scott was coming from Tampico -to S. Luis Potosí shows again the disingenuousness of his defence, for -he must have known that such a movement was impracticable; (3) it is -hardly conceivable that Scott's intercepted letter of Jan. 3 did not, -like Marcy's of Sept. 2, find its way to headquarters. - -19.11. The forces taking part in the campaign seem to have been 9500 -infantry from San Luis, 4000 (under Mejía) stationed at Matehuala, and -1000 (under Parrodi) from Tula, 6000 cavalry in four brigades (Torrejón -at Las Bocas near S. L. P., Juvera at Venado, Andrade at Cedral, and -Miñón at La Encarnación), and 900 engineers, artillery and sappers--a -total of 21,400 including officers. These numbers are taken from Rápida -Ojeada and from a San Luis letter (the figures of which were stated -positively to have come from a member of Santa Anna's staff) printed in -_El Republicano_ of February 12, which substantially agree. Santa Anna's -figures were smaller but perhaps did not include Miñón's and Parrodi's -troops. Those of the Spanish minister were somewhat larger. There seem -to have been seventeen guns (three 24-pounders and three 16's, all of -which were siege or fortress guns, and for field pieces five 12's, five -8's and a 7-inch howitzer) which, as well as most of the ammunition, -appear to have gone forward January 27. Urrea was at the same time to -pass from Tula into Tamaulipas, strike at Taylor's communications and -threaten Monterey. Probably there were bodies of irregulars at points -not named above. - -It occurs to the author at this point to remark that consistency in the -use of the article in geographical names is hardly practicable. Even -Mexican maps have not been consistent; and for us it would (_e.g._) be -an affectation to use the article with such well-known names as Puebla -and Saltillo. - -19.12. At certain points in the desert there were large wells; and in -each of these a wide wheel, carrying buckets, was turned by mule power. - -19.13. The main part of the army arrived Feb. 17-19 (Apuntes, 96). -Taylor thought he could not move more than about 6000 men some 125 -miles (supposed to be about 140) from a well-stocked base, Camargo, -through a region supplied with water, subsistence and forage, and could -not transport 18-pounders (chap. xi, note 5). After Miñón advanced to -Potosí, Andrade occupied La Encarnación (night of Feb. 11). The wheel -pumps were then set in operation, but by Feb. 19 they were worn out. The -only ample supply of water was then seven or eight miles away, but it -had to be used for the animals. The distance from S. L. Potosí to Agua -Nueva by rail is about 223 miles. - -19.14. Feb. 19 two brigades of cavalry had not arrived. The figures -may or may not have included these and Miñón's force. Probably they did -include many whose duties kept them from the firing line (_Republicano_, -May 3, 1847). The original reports of the officers regarding numbers and -operations have disappeared from =76=. - -19.15. _To and at La Encarnación._ Carleton, Buena Vista, 23, 229. -León, Méx., 474. García, Juárez, 67. London _Times_, May 10. _Journal -Milit. Serv. Instit._, xiv, 443. Giménez, Mems., 98. Sierra, Evolution, -219. Le Clercq, Voyage, 31-49. Calendario de Ontiveros, 1847. Sen. 32; -31, 1, p. 8, note. Rápida Ojeada, 4, 7-9, etc. Ordóñez, Refutación, -5, 8, etc. =61=Lamar to Bliss, Apr. 21. Rodríguez, Breve Reseña, -1848, 57. _Republicano_, Feb. 12; Mar. 24; May 3. =80=S. Anna to -gov. México state, Jan. 27. _Epoca_, Jan. 19, 26; Feb. 25. Negrete, -Invasión, ii, 389. Balbontín, Invasión, 60-9, 78. Apuntes, 88, 91-7. -S. Anna, Manifiesto, Mar., 1848. _Id._, Apelación, 24-7, 32; app., 67. -Muro, Miscelánea, 73-5. Sen. 1; 30, 1, pp. 153-8. De Peyster, Kearny, -127. _Diario_, June 13. _Monitor Repub._, Nov. 30. _Journal of U. S. -Artillery_, July, 1892, p. 294. Rápida Ojeada, ii, 4, 6, 7. _Niles_, -Mar. 27, p. 62. =73=Bermúdez de Castro, no. 445, 1846. Encarnacion -Prisoners, 43. Steele, Amer. Campaigns, i, 125. =76=S. Anna, Jan. -19, 26; Feb. 2, 11, 17, 27. The author has been over the greater part of -the route. - -19.16. One cannot be sure enough now regarding the truth of the -various allegations regarding the lateral routes to say what Santa Anna -might have done. If he had reason (as he seems to have had) to believe -that he could surprise Agua Nueva, it would have been unwise to choose a -circuitous route of doubtful practicability. No Mexican came to give him -information about the ground (=76=Mora, April 23, 1847). - -19.17. _From La Encarnación to Carnero Pass._ Carleton, Buena Vista, -232. Semmes, Service, 121. Gamboa, Impug., 23. _Epoca_, Feb. 25. -Balbontín, Invasión, 69, 70, 79. Apuntes, 97. S. Anna, Apelación, 25. -Ordóñez, Refutación. _Republicano_, Mar. 24. Sen. 1; 30, 1, pp. 156-8. -_Diario_, June 13 (Ordóñez). Diccionario Universal (_Itinerarios_). -=76=Mora, Feb. 25. =76=S. Anna, Feb. 27. - -19.18. McCulloch had made a previous expedition to La Encarnación and -found cavalry there. - -19.19. Santa Anna attributed to a deserter named Váldez the failure -of his plan to surprise Taylor (Apelación, 26), but the story of -Váldez in itself probably would not have had much effect on Taylor. At -La Hedionda May sent Lieut. Sturgis on a scouting expedition. Firing -was heard later, and Sturgis, being captured, did not return. This La -Hedionda was often called La Hedionda Grande. - -19.20. Chamberlain's =147=diary states in detail, quoting the -remarks made, how Wool, supported by the officers, forced the withdrawal -from Agua Nueva by threatening to lead the troops back himself rather -than see them sacrificed. This is startling, but cannot easily be -rejected. Of all the military men known to the author Chamberlain -was the most sternly soldierlike. He rose from the ranks to a brevet -brigadier-generalship, and he vouched for the correctness of his diary, -which had been kept strictly for himself. When not acting as Wool's -orderly he served as one of May's dragoons, who were commonly used by -Taylor as a sort of bodyguard. The reason given by Taylor for retreating -(Sen. 1; 30, 1, p. 132) was that his position could be turned on either -side; but he knew that long before, or should have known it. - -As the route _via_ La Hedionda debouched in the rear of Buena Vista, -one asks why the reason which seems mainly to have caused the retreat -did not veto the stand actually taken. Wool must have seen this point; -and one suspects that he used the alarm produced by the reports of -the scouts to bring about a withdrawal to the position he had long -preferred, reckoning also that, should it prove necessary to retire -farther, this could much more easily be done from Buena Vista than from -Agua Nueva. Evidently the sudden retreat fatigued the troops as well as -discouraged them; and not having become acquainted with the peculiar -ground on which they were to fight, they were repeatedly taken by -surprise during the battle that followed. By retreating Taylor gave up -the advantage, on which he had insisted, of forcing S. Anna to fight at -the very edge of a desert (chap. xviii, note 39). - -19.21. At night wagons were sent to Agua Nueva for the stores, but -the Gentlemen-Volunteers under Yell refused to load them. Hence the -First Dragoons (regulars), who had slept only some three hours in as -many days, were sent up to do the work (Chamberlain, diary). Marshall's -Kentucky horse reinforced Yell. The haste of the Americans was such -that corn and beans, instead of being loaded into waiting wagons or -destroyed, were thrown into a spring, where the Mexicans found them -(officer's diary in _Republicano_, May 3, 1847). Yell's instructions -were to retire before midnight, taking the Second Kentucky with him from -La Encantada. - -19.22. _Taylor's operations Feb. 20-21 (including night of Feb. 21)._ -=299=Posey to friend, Feb. 19. =69=Wool to Bliss, Feb. 7. -=147=Chamberlain, diary. =148=_Id._, recollections. Madison -_Record_, 1850 (Prickett). =300=Prickett, letters. Semmes, Service, -121-2. Tampico _Sentinel_, Mar. 27. Scribner, Camp., 59. Smith, Remins., -37, 42. _Picayune_, Apr. 14 (Taylor). Sen. 1; 30, 1, pp. 97, 99, 132 -(Taylor); 144 (Wool). J. Davis in _Cong. Globe_, 31, 1, app., 1034-41. -=173=_Id._, Address. Benham, Recolls. _Journ. U. S. Artillery_, -July, 1892, p. 294. Davis, J. Davis, i, 336. Ho. 60; 30, 1, pp. 1168, -1176 (Taylor). Carleton, Buena Vista, 4, 12-21, 24-6, 45. _Journ. Milit. -Serv. Instit._, xiv, 199 (No one can tell why Taylor did not fortify -Saltillo before the battle), 443. N. Y. _Eve. Post_, Jan. 4, 1849. -=76=Mora, Feb. 25. - -The reason that led Taylor to neglect preparing Saltillo was no doubt -the same that had led him previously to neglect preparations when the -circumstances called for them. - - - XX. BUENA VISTA - -20.1. Many of the Mexicans marched nearly forty-five miles in less -than twenty-four hours. See Stevens, Camps., 18. - -20.2. The statements regarding the time of day differ, but the account -of the text appears to rest upon the most reliable evidence. See -Wallace, Wallace, 40. Taylor's verbal reply to the summons of Santa Anna -is said to have been more forcible than elegant, but a courteous answer -in writing was sent by Bliss. - -20.3. Several officers seem to have noted the advantages of this -battlefield, but Wool recommended it near the end of December and is -entitled to the credit of the choice. The author visited the ground -twice, and found that a good route for infantry and cavalry ran from -La Encantada behind the hills west of Buena Vista valley, and entered -this valley north of La Angostura. Apparently it could have been made -practicable for cannon easily, and could have been used effectively by -either general for a feint at least. Engineer Mansfield had a picket -guard it during the afternoon and night of February 22. - -20.4. This space was to be closed, if necessary, with two wagons -loaded with stone. The parapet was occupied by two companies of the -First Illinois under Lieut. Col. Weatherford. The main American position -was over-manned. S. Anna could not have carried it against Washington's -guns and infantry flanking fire from the edge of the plateau, and men -were urgently needed for the American left. - -20.5. =330=The American forces in action at Buena Vista were as -follows: Dragoons under Bvt. Lieut. Col. May (First, 133; Second, 76), -209; Third Artillery (Co. C under Capt. Bragg, three guns--the fourth -being at Saltillo; Co. E under Capt. Sherman, four guns), 150; Fourth -Artillery, Capt. Washington, eight guns, 117; Arkansas horse, Col. Yell, -479; First Kentucky (two squadrons of cavalry and a battalion of mounted -riflemen), Col. Marshall, 330; Second Kentucky, Col. McKee, 571; First -Mississippi, Col. Davis, 368; Indiana Brigade (Second regt. under Col. -Bowles and Third under Col. Lane), Gen. Lane, 1253, including a rifle -battalion of four companies under Major Gorman; First Illinois, Col. -Hardin, 580; Second Illinois, Col. Bissell, 573; Texas volunteer company -(attached to Second Illinois), Capt. Conner, 61; Major McCulloch's Texan -scouts, 27. The figures include officers and men. The general staff -numbered forty-one. Three hundred and sixty-four of the men were on the -sick list. A company of the First Artillery, a few men of the Third -Artillery, two Mississippi companies and four Illinois companies were at -Saltillo. All except the dragoons and artillery were volunteers. Only -the artillery, dragoons, Mississippi regiment, and Conner's company had -been under fire, and some of these men were raw recruits; but Col. Davis -and all the field officers of the Second Kentucky were West Pointers. -Mostly Wool's men had been well trained. McCulloch's company probably -served under May. All the corps not otherwise described were infantry. -In the volunteer horse certain companies appear to have been regarded as -true cavalry and certain others as only mounted infantry. A similar fact -was noted in connection with the battle of Sacramento (p. 309). - -20.6. Miñón issued from the Palomas de Adentro pass. - -20.7. No satisfactory explanation of Taylor's trips to Saltillo was -made. The city had been in greater danger of attack from Miñón while -the Americans were eighteen miles away at Agua Nueva than after they -retired. Taylor should have ascertained seasonably that Palomas Pass -was practicable for cavalry, and have done whatever was necessary. Wool -appears to have barricaded the streets of Saltillo before going to Agua -Nueva (N. Y. _Eve. Post_, Jan. 4, 1849), and Butler began a redoubt, -which seems to have been the only external defence. Taylor's escort were -not needed as laborers. Major Warren, the governor of Saltillo, Capt. -Webster of the First Artillery, who had charge of the redoubt, and First -Lieut. Shover, of the Third Artillery, stationed not far away in the -old camp, were competent officers; and the first two made no allusion -in their reports to Taylor's visits, while the third only said that -the General ordered him to watch Miñón, and, if attacked, defend his -post to the last extremity--which were his obvious duties. There seems -to have been no particular reason to anticipate a night attack. Taylor -did not suggest this as a reason for going to the city. Especially is -it surprising that he left his work at Saltillo, whatever it was, so -incomplete on the morning of February 22 that he had to return in the -evening. Santa Anna, after the exhausting march just made, could not -be expected to strike decisively that day, whereas such an attack was -almost certain to be made the next morning, and it was Taylor's duty to -be on the ground at that time. - -20.8. _Events of Feb. 22; the battlefield._ Sen. 1; 30, 1, pp. -97-9 (Taylor); 98 (S. Anna); 144 (Wool); 163 (Marshall); 169 (Fry); -171 (Roane); 174 (Weatherford); 175 (Bissell); 181 (Gen. Lane); 186 -(Col. Lane); 189 (Gorman); 197 (May); 203 (Sherman); 205 (Warren); -206 (Webster); 207 (Shover). Carleton, B. Vista, 5-9, 27-49, 177-86. -González, Aguascalientes, 158. French, Two Wars, 77-8. _Journ. Milit. -Serv. Instit._, xiv, 443. =190=Ewing, diary. Raleigh _Star_, Aug. -18. =276=Neville diary. _Delta_, Mar. 14, 1848. =69=Wool to -Taylor, Jan. 20. =147=Chamberlain, diary. =148=_Id._, recolls. -=110=Barbour, diary. _Vedette_, iv, no. 8 (Lee). =8=Anon. -diary. =61=[Wool] to Jones, Jan. 17. =300=Prickett, letters. -Rápida Ojeada. _Diario_, Apr. 17. Matamoros _Amer. Flag_, Mar. 20. -_Republicano_, May 3. =80=Ampudia to gov. Méx. state, Oct. 10. -Balbontín, Invasión, 71-3. Apuntes, 98-100. Taylor and his Generals, -166. S. Anna, Apelación, 25-7. Eyewitness, Complete Hist., 55. -Scribner, Camp., 62, note. Smith, Chile con Carne, 214-5. Smith, -Remins., 37, 48. _Picayune_, Apr. 14 (Taylor); May 21; Sept. 7; Oct. -19; Dec. 3. _Delta_, July 11. _Revue des Deux Mondes_, Aug. 1, 413-4. -Benham, Recolls. _Nat. Intelligencer_, Apr. 7. _Spirit of the Times_, -May 1. Napoleon, Maxims, p. 26. Wallace, Wallace, 40. Davis, J. Davis, -i, 340. Profess. Memoirs corps of engineers, no. 31, p. 110. Stevens, -I. I. Stevens, i, 145. Carreño, Jefes, ccxxxii. Ho. 60; 30, 1, p. 1168 -(Taylor). Stevens, Camps., 18. Encarnacion Prisoners, 34, 38-9. N. Y. -_Eve. Post_, Jan. 4, 1849. _Littell_ no. 155. Romero, Geog. and Stat. -Notes. =76=Reports of S. Anna, Uraga, Memontesdeoca, Zamara, Mig. -Andrade, Guzman, Trejo, Juvera, Mora. - -20.9. The data relating to the Mexican batteries, when collated, -cannot be fully harmonized. _E.g._ Carleton puts the 24-pounders on -the American left near the mountain, but from Mexican sources it seems -clear that they remained near the road, and Wallace (Wallace, 50) says -the same. Washington states that he was most of the time under the fire -of heavy guns. Of course the Mexican left had to be protected, and it -would have been very hard to move these clumsy iron pieces on the rough -ground. Gen. Pérez stated after the battle that from lack of forage the -draught animals had been too weak to draw the artillery up the hills. - -20.10. Bowles was personally brave, but had been away much of the -time and did not understand his work (=65=orders 281). His men -keenly realized this (Perry, Indiana, 292), and hence went into the -battle shaky. Lane knew how they felt (Scribner, Camp., 62); and -apparently he should not have placed them far in advance and alone to -meet overwhelming numbers. It should be added, however, that (1) he -intended to give his personal attention to the regiment (Scribner, -Camp., 62), and (2) the Mississippi Rifles (to whom a position had -been assigned the previous evening) were expected to join the Second -Indiana at an early hour (Barbour, diary). Had they not been absent -with Taylor, one may fairly say, Bowles would not have given his fatal -order, and the American flank would in all probability not have been -turned; or, had the order been given, the Second Indiana would almost -certainly have rallied upon the Mississippians, and the virtual loss -of Marshall's troops would have been avoided. The gap created by the -absence of the Mississippi regiment should have been filled by recalling -McKee and Bragg from the west side as soon as the formation of Santa -Anna's columns indicated where he intended to strike and by ordering the -reserved artillery to the plateau. The cause of Bowles's order is not -certain; but O'Brien's horses, when attached to the guns for the purpose -of advancing, faced of course to the rear, and it seems probable that -Bowles misunderstood this as a sign of withdrawal. The worst feature of -his order was that he specified no place to stop. - -Lieut. Col. Haddon of the Second Indiana stated in 1848 that the -regiment was rallied on the south edge of a ravine, but was ordered by -Taylor himself, who had then arrived, to cross to the other side of -it, and, as a body of Mexicans charged it just then, it broke and ran -(Perry, Indiana, 292). Certainly Taylor exhibited a peculiar resentment -toward the regiment, opposed having the affair investigated (_ibid._, -163, 313) and endeavored to hush it up (_ibid._, 276). Other officers -were doubtless as censurable as Bowles, but he was the most conspicuous -delinquent and became the scapegoat. - -20.11. The failure of this attack on Buena Vista was said by a Mexican -officer to have been due to Gen. Andrade, who failed to coöperate, -and prevented a large force of infantry from doing so -(_Republicano_, May 3, 1847). Yell was a gallant but negligent officer. -He did not know how to manoeuvre his men, and only a portion of them -fought here (_Niles_, May 8, 1847, p. 157; _Spirit of the Times_, May -1). He was far in advance of them when he fell (Carleton, B. Vista, 93). -American guns came up and also some dragoons, and helped complete the -repulse of the enemy. The skirmish lasted only a few minutes. - -What the Arkansas men lacked was not courage, but the discipline (and -the resulting skill and confidence) against which they had protested -while on the Chihuahua expedition (p. 274). Benham states that Marshall -would not go back to the field though urged by Taylor personally to -do so (Recolls.). All this resulted from a mistake of Wool's. He -understood that the bench was an extremely valuable position, and should -therefore have occupied it in advance, and thrown up a breastwork -there, dismounting the volunteer cavalry, and placing them behind this -and other works (Chamberlain). One part of the lancers ("cuirassiers") -retreated; the other part crossed to the opposite side of the valley, -and returned behind the hills (see note 3) to Santa Anna's position. -On reappearing they were taken for Americans and caused great alarm -(Balbontín, Invasión, 87). This suggests what the effect might have been -had either Santa Anna or Taylor used this route for a feint or attack. - -20.12. A bitterly contested question was whether Wool advised retreat -during the battle. The truth appears to be that, as Benham fully -explains, he advised preparing to retire, that Taylor gave an order -accordingly to Washington, and that a zealous subaltern began to move; -but that Taylor, almost instantly reflecting on the moral effect that a -sign of retreat would have on the volunteers, countermanded the order. -Wool would not have advised retreating from what he considered the best -position, except in the case of absolute necessity. - -20.13. Bragg now had three guns, for the one that had been under -Lieut. Kilburn had rejoined him. It is worth mention that Bragg gives -his ammunition expenditure, Feb. 23, as about 250 rounds per gun (Sen. -1; 30, 1, p. 202), an unparalleled record for muzzle-loading cannon. - -20.14. The Americans looked upon this as a ruse of Santa Anna, -designed to save the men in the recess of the mountain; but the Mexicans -give the view of the text (_e.g._ Apuntes, 102), and a field officer -(probably Col. Bissell), who went with Hardin and McKee to meet the -Mexican officers, stated that they had no white flag (Littell, no. 155, -p. 234). The fact that so much consideration was paid to their absurd -question suggests that Taylor was not averse to a parley. Many of the -Mexicans in the recess endeavored to escape by scaling the mountain -(Carleton, B. Vista, 105). - -20.15. As the Mexican artillery could not cross the long ravine, the -Mexicans in the north field were almost predestined to fail, but had -Santa Anna attacked the centre vigorously at this time with all his -remaining forces, the American artillery would have had to stay on -the plateau, and hence in that respect the two sides would have been -equal in the north field. Santa Anna's critics charged that he simply -threw his troops into the battle, and left them without guidance or -support. Not knowing how much he was hampered by misconduct on the part -of subordinates one must be cautious, but the criticism seems mainly -just. He should have concentrated on the American left and centre, -sending merely a small force to amuse Washington, and making feints on -the west side of the road and from behind the western hills. Again, -as we see from the Mexican reports, he gave too much attention to the -details of the operations, and he was unable to adapt his plans to the -quick manoeuvring of the American artillery. He attributed his defeat -to Miñón's failing to attack Taylor's rear (Negrete, Invasión, ii, -378); but Miñón had not force enough to do this effectively, and such -a duty had not been assigned to him (Balbontín, Invasión, 71). Giménez -(Memorias) charged it to the want of subordination, precision and morale -on the part of the officers and the effect of their criticisms of Santa -Anna upon the soldiers. - -20.16. Benham (Recollections, 24) states that (as he learned from -Mansfield) Chilton, Taylor's aide, told Mansfield that he carried -this order, and was cautioned by Mansfield not to mention the fact. -Wallace (Wallace, 47) says Chilton carried the order, and gives his -language. Wool states that this final affair occurred under Taylor's -eye and direction (Sen. 1; 30, 1, p. 149). W. A. Richardson, a captain -in one of these regiments, and also Col. Bissell stated that the order -emanated from Taylor (Charleston _Courier_, Jan. 20, 1854). Weatherford, -who succeeded Hardin, gives the language of the order in his report. -Lombardini, general-in-chief of the Mexican infantry, had been wounded, -and hence Pérez, second in that command, took his place. It has been -said that Santa Anna should have led the charge, but he stated that his -old wound had reopened (=76=Feb. 23). - -20.17. The redoubt at Saltillo commanded most of the approaches. It -was held by Capt. Webster with two 24-pound howitzers, a company of the -First Artillery, and an Illinois company. At the train and headquarters -camp on the right of the redoubt Lieut. Shover had one of Bragg's -6-pounders and two Mississippi companies. The three remaining Illinois -companies (two having been detached from each of the regiments) remained -in the city. Miñón found that on account of the broken ground he could -do nothing (Miñón in _Delta_, June 16, 1847), and soon retired. Shover -pursued him for some distance with his gun, the Mississippians and a -yelling crowd of stragglers and teamsters, followed by Lieut. Donaldson -of Webster's company with one of the howitzers. It was believed that -Miñón lost fifty or sixty men. Many Mexican irregulars gathered near -Saltillo but they accomplished nothing. - -20.18. Once, it was said, Col. McKee sent his adjutant to inform -the General that he was surrounded, and to ask what should be done. -With convincing energy Taylor replied, "Go and tell your Colonel that -he has got them just where he wants them, and now is the time to give -them Jesse"; upon which the adjutant, whose face had been a picture -of despair, clapped spurs to his horse, rushed back and delivered the -message at the top of his voice with a spirit that every soldier caught -instantly. Whether the story is literally true or not, it doubtless -represents the most important part played by Taylor, and this was -invaluable. If Taylor made the remark, however, he doubtless used a -stronger Biblical word than "Jesse." According to Gen. Chamberlain, -instead of saying, "Give them a little more grape, Mr. Bragg," he -exclaimed, "Double-shot your guns and give 'em hell!" Rev. Theodore -Parker said (Sermon) that the following anecdote appeared to be "very -well authenticated." Seeing McKee's regiment stagger, Taylor cried as -if the men could hear him, "By God, this will not do; this is not the -way for Kentuckians to behave." Then they rallied, and rising in his -stirrups he shouted, "Hurrah for Old Kentuck! That's the way to do it. -Give 'em hell, damn 'em!" There is ample reason to believe that such -Taylor could be on the battlefield. - -20.19. _The battle of Feb. 23_. The reports of Taylor and his officers -in Sen. 1; 30, 1, pp. 97-209. =267=Reports of Miss. captains. -Perry, Indiana, contains numerous letters. Carleton, Buena Vista, -_passim_. Calderón, Rectif. Ceballos, Capítulos, 122-3. González, -Aguascalientes, 159-60. Puga y Acal, Doc., 59. Rápida Ojeada, Segunda -Parte, 9. Zarco, Historia, i, 259. French, Two Wars, 78-83. _Journ. -Milit. Serv. Instit._, xiv, 443-4; xvii (Van Deusen). Neville, diary. -Sierra, Evolution, i, 219. _Delta_, Mar. 14. Claiborne, Quitman, i, -291. Taylor, Letters (Bixby), 182. =69=Wool to Taylor, Mar. 30. -=147=Chamberlain, diary. =148=_Id._, recolls. =69=Bragg -to [Bliss], Mar. 5. =190=Ewing, diary. Davis, Recolls., 212-3. Dix, -Speeches, i, 210. =330=Taylor to brother, Mar. 27; Apr. 25; Sept. ---. Raleigh _Star_, Apr. 28; July 21; Aug. 18. Charleston _Mercury_, -Apr. 8. Rowland, Register, 407, 410-12. Ills. State Hist. Soc. Trans., -1904, pp. 49-50, 53-6; 1905, p. 209. =61=Gorman, report, Mar. -2. =61=O'Brien court of inquiry. =61=Gen. Lane, statement, -May 19, 1849. =65=Gen. Lane court of inquiry. =65=Bowles -court of inquiry. Eyewitness, Complete Hist., 63. =110=Barbour, -diary. Greensborough (N. C.) _Morn. Post_, Apr. 5, 1903 (O. R. Smith). -=8=Anon. diary. =61=[Wool] to Jones, Jan. 17. Madison -_Record_, 1850 (Prickett). =300=Prickett, letters. Sen. 32; 31, -1 (Hughes). Zirckel, Tagebuch, 9. Appleton's Biog. Dict. (_Taylor_ by -J. Davis). Johnson, Thomas, 24. McCormack, Koerner, i, 499, 504-5. -Parker, Sermon. =256=Gen. Lane to Wool, May 20. =256=Wool to -Marcy, June 12. =277=Taylor to Coombs, May 23. Wallace, Wallace, -44-51. Nebel and Kendall, The War Illustrated, 11-16. Semmes, Service, -120-2. Rápida Ojeada, i. =5=Anaya, memoria, [Nov., 1847]. S. -Anna, Mi Historia, 60-5. _Id._, Apelación, 28. Gamboa, Impug., 24-5. -=185=Bragg to Duncan, Apr. 4, 1847; Jan. 13, 1848. Kenly, Md. Vol., -264. Tampico _Sentinel_, Mar. 27. _Diario_, Apr. 16. _Republicano_, -Mar. 24; Apr. 17; May 3; June 20. =80=Ampudia to gov. Méx., Oct. -10. =208=Herran to Acal, Mar. 6. Noticia hist. de todos los -Cuerpos. =212=Hastings, diary. Negrete, Invasión, iii, app., 33-5. -Balbontín, Invasión, 80-8. Apuntes, 100-4. Taylor and his Generals, 166. -Scribner, Campaign, 21, 59-71. Ordóñez, Refutación, i, ii. Hitchcock, -Fifty Years, 349. Grant, Memoirs, i, 138. Muro, Miscelánea, 75. Smith, -Chile con Carne, 215-49. Smith, Reminiscences, 6, 50, 112. N. Orl. -_Picayune_, Mar. 27; Apr. 14, 22; May 21; June 24. _Delta_, Apr. 4; -May 30; June 6, 16; July 11. _Tropic_, Mar. 31. Upton, Milit. Policy, -209-10. _Boletín de la Democracia_, no. 11. Buhoup, Narrative, 120, -123. =210=Bragg to Hammond, May 4; Dec. 20. =349=Pattridge -to Miss W., Aug. 25. Piatt, Thomas, 69. Quisenberry, Taylor, 34-5. -_Revue des Deux Mondes_, Aug. 1, pp. 413-7. Benham, Recolls. Wash. -_Union_, Apr. 6, 7; June 16; Aug. 25. _Nat. Intelligencer_, Apr. 7, -23; May 7, 21, 1847; Mar. 23, 1848. N. Y. _Journ. of Commerce_, Apr. -16. _Monitor Repub._, May 6, 16; Nov. 30. _Spirit of the Times_ (H. -von S.), May 1. _Journ. of U. S. Artillery_, July, 1892, p. 296; -Oct., 1892, pp. 415-8. Halleck, Milit. Art, i, p. 415. Dodd, Davis, -87. Charleston _Courier_, Apr. 20, 1847; Jan. 20, 1854. N. Y. _Eve. -Post_, Jan. 4, 1849. Ceremonies. =367=Moore to Moore, Apr. 15. -Davis, J. Davis, i, 341-50. Stevens, I. I. Stevens, i, 145. Carreño, -Jefes, ccxxxiv-v. _Niles_, Apr. 3, p. 80; Apr. 10, pp. 83-4; Apr. 24, -p. 117; May 8, p. 156. =92=Accusación del Gral. S. Anna. Ho. 60; -30, 1, pp. 1115, 1169, 1181. Dix, Dix, i, 210-3. Madigan, cat. no. 2, -1914 (Bragg). =210=Alvord to Hammond, Feb. 24, 1848. Griepenkerl, -Applied Tactics, 187. Ills. State Hist. Soc. Trans. ix, 50. _South. -Qtrly. Rev._, Jan., 1851, 169-89. _Littell_, no. 155, pp. 233-5. -=251=Lowry, narrative. Albert Pike, poem. =76=S. Anna, Feb. -23. =76=_Id._ to Adame, Feb. 26. =76=Mora, Mar. 31, res. - -A German ex-officer under Taylor said the battle was won, in spite of -an unexampled ignorance of all tactical rules on the part of field -officers, by the lion-like courage of the soldiers of certain regiments -assisted by other fortunate circumstances (Zirckel, Tagebuch, 9). W. H. -L. Wallace, adjutant of First Illinois, wrote: "I've no doubt--_inter -nos_--had it been just as convenient for us, as for Santa Anna, to -_vamos_ [_i.e._ retreat] we would have been off for Monterey"; but we -knew Miñón was in our rear, and believed that larger Mexican forces -had been sent toward Monterey, and that the mountains were full of -irregulars (Wallace, Wallace, 51; see also Balbontín, Invasión, 84). - -20.20. Killed, 265; wounded, 408 (Ho. 24; 31, 1). Missing, 6. The -Mississippi regiment lost more heavily than any other--one out of 3.75 -men (Carleton, B. Vista, 212). - -20.21. Aside from pluck and patriotism Taylor had a good reason -for not giving up. Had he been defeated, he would probably have been -punished for disobeying orders in advancing so far (see Polk, Diary, -March 23, 1847). (Querying) =173=J. Davis, Address. - -20.22. The greater part of the deserters appear to have gone to Agua -Nueva (Balbontín, Invasión, 83), where they hoped to find provisions -and water. Santa Anna should have had a guard on the road to check and -reorganize these men. His policy of holding out expectations of booty -reacted now, for many men left the ranks to rob the dead and wounded -(Uraga in _Monitor Repub._, Nov. 30, 1847). - -20.23. Balbontín (Invasión, 89) said that the troops felt confident -of triumphing the next day, and therefore would not have deserted; but -while this may have been true of the artillery (always a superior body) -to which he belonged, it cannot have been true of the army in general. -Thousands had deserted already. - -20.24. _The night of Feb. 23._ Semmes, Service, 122. Ceballos, -Capítulos, 122. Ho. 60; 30, 1, p. 1115 (Taylor). =69=Wool to -Taylor, Mar. 30. Chamberlain, diary. _Id._, recolls. Barbour, diary. -Prickett, letters. Sen. 1; 30, 1, pp. 99, 137 (Taylor); 144 (Wool). -_Delta_, June 16; July 11. Benham, Recolls. Rápida Ojeada, i, ii. -Ordóñez, Refutación, i, ii. =5=Anaya, Memoria. =185=Bragg -to Duncan, Apr. 4. _Republicano_, Mar. 24; May 3. Carleton, B. Vista, -125-31, 191. French, Two Wars, 81-2. _Journ. Milit. Serv. Instit._, xiv, -443-4. Ewing, diary. Dix, Speeches, i, 213. =330=Memo. in Taylor's -letters to his brother. =330=Taylor to brother, Mar. 27. Nebel and -Kendall, 13. =267=Bradford to J. Davis, Mar. 2. Perry, Indiana, -178, etc. Polk, Diary, Mar. 23. Sierra, Evolution, etc., i, 219. -_Independiente_, Apr. 10. Balbontín, Invasión, 83, 89, 90-1, 93, 100-1. -Apuntes, 104-7. =118=Berlandier, journal. S. Anna, Apelación, 29, -32, etc. Gamboa, Impug., 23-5. Scribner, Camp., 66. =52=Black, -Mar. 6. _Picayune_, Mar. 24 (_Sold. de la Patria_); Apr. 11. _Monitor -Repub._, May 6; Nov. 30. _Niles_, Apr. 10, p. 83. N. Y. _Eve. Post_, -Jan. 4, 1849. Ills. State Hist. Soc. Trans., ix, 50. =316=Bragg to -Sherman, Mar. 1, 1848. =76=S. Anna, Feb. 23, 26, 27. =76=_Id._ -to Adame, Feb. 26. =76=J. M. Aguirre, Jan. 27, 1848. Wallace, -Wallace, 40. - -The Kentucky horse and the guns (First Artillery) should have been -ordered up from Rinconada Pass as soon as Taylor found there was to be -a battle (Ripley, War with Mex., i, 437-8). They could have guarded La -Angostura, and Washington's field pieces would have been invaluable on -the plateau. - -20.25. The Mexicans were not driven away by hunger. Statements from -persons knowing the facts regarding the provisions available at Agua -Nueva differ so radically that we can reach no precise conclusion on -that point; but certainly there were enough to support the army more -than two days, and then enable it to move. Whatever provisions were -at that place could have been brought to the battlefield (Balbontín, -Invasión, 89). It seems as if there must also have been supplies at -Patos and La Vaquería; and Miñón asserted later that, as he sent word to -Santa Anna, he had plenty of provisions for the army (_Delta_, June 16). -The question of water is more difficult; but there were many wagons, and -enough could have been transported for say 6000 picked men. Apparently -some water must have been brought up on Feb. 22 and 23. In short, had -Santa Anna felt any assurance of being able to rout the Americans on -Feb. 24, he would have tried to do so, knowing that abundant supplies -lay at Saltillo. Possibly he might have remained in the vicinity and -prepared for another battle, even if he could not fight again the next -day; but probably he remembered Scott, and he had not counted upon -remaining long at the north. - -20.26. Taylor doubtless expected to obtain the men captured at La -Encarnación, but they had gone south (see Encarnacion Prisoners). Santa -Anna had very few to give up, for almost all Americans who had been -or might have been captured were killed by his excited troops (Rápida -Ojeada; Balbontín, Invasión, 81; _Republicano_, March 24, 1847). - -20.27. _The Mexican sequel._ Rápida Ojeada, i, ii. Gamboa, Impug., -23-5, 27-9. Otero, Comunicación, 11. _Republicano_, Mar. 24; May 3. -_Epoca_, Mar. 2, 11. =208=Herran to Acal, Mar. 6, 13. Balbontín, -Invasión, 95-100. Apuntes, 108-15. S. Anna, Apelación, app., 39-55, 67. -Ordóñez, Refutación, i, ii. Muro, Miscelánea, 77-8. =52=Black, Mar. -6. _Picayune_, Mar. 24 (_Sold. de la Patria_). _Independiente_, Apr. -10. _Boletín de la Democracia_, no. 21. Sen. 1; 30, 1, p. 99 (Taylor). -_Diario_, Mar. 31 (S. Anna); June 13. _Monitor Repub._, Mar. 31; May -6; Nov. 30. Carreño, Jefes, ccxlii. Ho. 60; 30, 1, p. 1115 (Taylor); -1125 (S. Anna). Dublán, Legislación, v, 267. =82=Gil to Ruano, -Mar. 6. =76=S. Anna, Feb. 26, 27. =76=_Id._ to Adame, Feb. -26. =76=Comte. gen. Puebla, Mar. 3. =76=Comte. gen. Tabasco, -proclam., Mar. 11. =76=Mora, Mar. 31, res. =76=Comte. gen. S. -L. Potosí, Mar. 6. =76=A. Bustamante, Mar. 9. =76=Comte. gen. -V. Cruz, Mar. 4. =76=Guerra, circular, Mar. 1. - -20.28. The fortifications of Monterey had already been greatly -improved. Col. Morgan, Lieut. Col. Irwin and Major Wall of the Second -Ohio occupied respectively Cerralvo, Marín and Punta Aguda (Ho. 60; 30, -1, p. 1123). Morgan distinguished himself by a march executed in the -face of great odds, and Irwin went to his aid (_ibid._). Urrea attacked -at least one other train (Mar. 6), and did a large amount of damage. So -great became the alarm of the Americans that Col. Curtis, now in charge -at Camargo, sent an officer to Washington with a requisition for 50,000 -volunteers (_Nat. Intelligencer_, Mar. 23). - -20.29. _The American sequel._ =330=J. T. Taylor to Scott, Feb. -12. =330=Taylor to brother, Mar. 27. Perry, Indiana, 127-8, 137, -149. Taylor, Letters (Bixby), 95. Polk, Diary, Jan. 5; Mar. 21-3; Apr. -1, 7. =69=Mesa to Trist, Mar. 3. =169=Taylor to Crittenden, -Mar. 25; May 15. =251=Lowry, narrative. _Amer. Pioneer_, Mar. -8. =272=Memoir of Morgan. Henry, Camp. Sketches, 327-9. Rápida -Ojeada, 9. =139=Campbell to D. C., Mar. 20. Meade, Letters, i, 143, -182. =69=Wool to Taylor, Mar. 7. =60=Marcy to Brooke, Mar. -22. _Picayune_, Feb. 18; Mar. 13, 28; Apr. 8. Kenly, Md. Vol., 263-4. -Tampico _Sentinel_, Mar. 27. Carleton, B. Vista, 153-4. =60=Marcy, -Mar. 22, to Pierce; to Brooke; to Scott; to govs. Grant, Mems., i, -123. Smith, Chile con Carne, 151-71. _Delta_, Jan. 19. Matamoros -_Amer. Flag_, Feb. 13, 17. Ho. 60; 30, 1, pp. 1118-9, 1123-5, 1131 -(Taylor). Wash. _Union_, Mar. 23. N. Y. _Journ. of Commerce_, Jan. 8. -_Nat. Intelligencer_, Mar. 23. _Niles_, Mar. 27, p. 59; May 1, p. 131; -May 8, pp. 151-2. =185=Thomas to Duncan, Mar. 18. Sen. 32; 31, 1 -(Hughes). Parrodi, Memoria. Benham, Recolls. =76=S. Anna, Feb. 27. -=76=Carbajal to Urrea, Mar. 8. =76=Mora to S. Anna, Mar. 17. -Sen. 1; 30, 1, pp. 49, 99, 210-5. =245=Curtis to Lamar, Mar. 1. -=108=Buchanan to Bancroft, June 14. - - - - - APPENDIX--THE SOURCES - - - A. MANUSCRIPT AND PERSONAL SOURCES - -As a number of the owners or holders of MSS. (whose names are preceded -below by colons) did not desire to receive applications for the use of -their papers, it has been thought best to omit all addresses. - -Some documents belonging to large collections are, for convenience of -citation, listed separately. A few verbal statements (so described) are -included. The numbers preceding collections, etc., correspond to numbers -preceding citations of MS. documents in the notes. - -The complete Appendix follows the Notes of volume ii. - - Allen, William. =1=Papers: Library of Congress. - - Allred, R. N. =2=Recollections: R. R. Allred, Esq. - - Alvarado, J. B. =3=Hist. de California: Bancroft Coll., - Univ. of California. - - Amador, J. M. =4=Memorias sobre la Hist. de California: - Bancroft Coll. - - Anaya, P. M. =5=Memoria: Señ. Lic. D. Genaro García. - - Anderson, Robert. =6=Papers: Mrs. James M. Lawton. - - Anderson, W. E. =7=Document. - - Anonymous. =8=Soldier's Diary sent anonymously to the - author. - - Antrim, Jay. =9=Sketches: Library of Congress. - - Aram, Joseph. =10=Narrative: Mrs. Grace Aram. - - Archives of France. =11=Dépt. des Affaires Etrangères, - Paris. - - Archives of Great Britain. =12=Admiralty Papers; - =13=Foreign Office Papers: Public Record Office, London. - - Archives of States. =14=Alabama, =15=Arkansas, - =16=Connecticut, =17=Delaware, =18=Georgia, - =19=Florida, =20=Illinois, =21=Indiana, - =22=Iowa, =23=Kentucky, =24=Louisiana, - =25=Maine, =26=Maryland, =27=Massachusetts, - =28=Michigan, =29=Mississippi, =30=Missouri, - =31=New Hampshire, =32=New Jersey, =33=New York, - =34=North Carolina, =35=Ohio, =36=Pennsylvania, - =37=Rhode Island, =38=South Carolina, =39=Tennessee, - =40=Texas, =41=Vermont, =42=Virginia, - =43=Wisconsin. - - Archives of the =44=U. S. Embassy at Mexico. - - Archives of the =45=U. S. Legation in Texas: State Dept., - Washington. - - Archives of U. S. Navy Dept. =46=Captain's Letters; - =47=Squadron Letters; =48=Confidential Letter Books; - =49=Orders; =50=Executive Letters; =51=Marine Corps. - - Archives of U. S. State Dept. =52=Correspondence (and - enclosures) with diplomatic and consular agents in Mexico, Great - Britain, France, Spain, Prussia and Texas; =53=Notes to and - from the legations of those countries; =54=Report Books; - =55=Confidential Report Books; =56=Special Missions - and Correspondence with confidential agents in Mexico, Texas and - California; =57=Domestic Letter Books; =58=Miscellaneous - Letters and Replies; =59=Circulars issued to diplomatic and - consular agents. See also Claims Commission. - - Archives of U. S. War Dept. =60=Secretary of War's - files; =61=Adjutant General's files; =62=Quartermaster - General's files; =63=Military Book; =64=Adjutant - General, Miscellany; =65=Orders; =66=Engineer's - office; =67=Bureau of Topog. Engineers; =68=Judge - Advocate General's office, courts martial, courts of inquiry; - =69=Discontinued Commands, etc. - - Archivo =69a=del Distrito Federal, Mexico. - - Archivo =70=General y Público (particularly "Guerra"), - Mexico. - - Archivo =71=Histórico-Nacional, Madrid. - - Archivo =72=Nacional de Cuba. - - Archivo =73=Particular del Ministerio de Estado, Madrid. - - Archivos (_National_) de =74=Fomento (Maps); - =75=Gobernación (formerly called "Relaciones Interiores"); - =75a=Hacienda; =76=Guerra y Marina; =77=Relaciones - (_i.e._, Exteriores). At Mexico City. - - Archivos (_State_) de =78=Coahuila, =79=Jalisco, - =80=México, =81=Nuevo León, =82=Puebla, - =83=Querétaro, =84=San Luis Potosí, =85=Tamaulipas, - =86=Vera Cruz, =87=Zacatecas. At the state capitals. - - Archivos (_Municipal_) de =88=Córdoba, - =89=Guadalajara, =90=Jalapa, =91=Matamoros, - =92=México, =93=Monterey, =94=Orizaba, - =95=Puebla, =96=Querétaro, =97=Saltillo, - =98=San Luis Potosí, =99=Tampico, =100=Vera Cruz, - =101=Victoria, =102=Zacatecas. - - Avila, Juan. =103=Notas Californianas: Bancroft Coll. - - Ayer =104=Collection: Newberry Library, Chicago. - - Baldridge, William. =105=The Days of 1846: Bancroft Coll. - - Bancroft =106=Collection: Univ. of California. - - Bancroft =107=Papers: New York City Public Library. - - Bancroft, George. =108=Papers: Massachusetts Hist. Soc. - - Bandini, Juan. =109=Documentos para la Hist. de - California: Bancroft Coll. - - Barbour, H. H. =110=Diary: Mrs. Barbour. - - Beauregard, P. G. T. =111=Papers: C. S. Hook, Esq. - - Beauregard, P. G. T. =112=Papers: Justin H. Smith. - - Beauregard, P. G. T. =113=Reminiscences (done by him from - diary and notes): Claiborne papers, Mississippi Dept. of Hist. - - Beeler, Louis F. =114=Recollections. - - Belden, Josiah. =115=Statement: Bancroft Coll. - - Bell, A. N. =116=Document. - - Benjamin, W. R. =117=Collection. - - Berlandier, Luis. =118=Papers: Library of Congress. - - Bevan, William. =119=Statement. - - Biddle, James. =120=Papers: Library of Congress. - - Biddle, Charles J. =121=Papers: Charles Biddle, Esq. - - Bidwell, John. =122=California, 1841-8: Bancroft Coll. - - Bidwell, John. =123=Statement: Harvard Univ. Library. - - Blocklenger, Benjamin. =124=Letter. - - Bonham, Milledge L. =125=Letters: Dr. Milledge Lake - Bonham, Ill. - - Botello, Narciso. =126=Anales del Sur de la California: - Bancroft Coll. - - Boyle, John. =127=Letter: Miss Esmeralda Boyle. - - Brackett, A. G. =128=Diary: Mrs. Brackett. - - Breckenridge, Robert J. =129=Papers: Library of Congress. - - Brichta, A. C. =130=Letter: belonging to the family. - - Brindle, William. =131=Statement: J. D. Parrish, Esq. - - Buchanan, James. =132=Papers: Pennsylvania Hist. Soc. - - Buck, Dr. Solon J. =133=Collection. - - Burton, C. M. =134=Collection, Public Library, Detroit. - - Butler, Anthony. =135=Papers: Univ. of Texas. - - Butterfield, James. =136=Recollections. - - Calhoun, John C. =137=Papers: Clemson Coll. - - Calhoun, John C. =137a=Papers: Library of Congress. - - Campbell, William B. =138=Letters: John DeWitt, Esq. - - Campbell, William B. (and David). =139=Papers: Lemuel R. - Campbell, Esq.; Mrs. James S. Pilcher. - - Cantwell, John L. P. =140=Letter: Miss Jessica R. Smith. - - Carson, J. C. =141=Statement: Bancroft Coll. - - Carson, J. H. =142=Gold Mines of 1848: Bancroft Coll. - - Cary, T. G. =143=California Papers: Boston Public Library. - - Cassidy, P. A. =144=Recollections. - - Castro, Manuel. =145=Documentos para la Hist. de - California: Bancroft Coll. - - Caswell, William R. =146=Diary and Letters: Massachusetts - Hist. Soc. - - Chamberlain, S. E. =147=Diary: loaned by the writer. - - Chamberlain, S. E. =148=Recollections (verbal). - - Chase, Salmon P. =149=Papers: Library of Congress. - - Cheatham, B. F. =150=Diary and Papers: Mrs. Telfair - Hodgson. - - Claiborne, J. F. H. =151=Papers: State of Mississippi, - Dept. of Hist. - - Claiborne, Thomas. =152=Memoirs: belonging to the family. - - Claims Commission of 1849. =153=Book of Awards; - =154=Book of Opinions; =155=Journal: U. S. State - Dept. - - Clay, Henry. =156=Papers: Library of Congress. - - Cobb, Howell. =157=Papers (printed later by the Amer. - Hist. Assoc.): Dr. U. B. Phillips. - - Cobb, Howell. =158=Papers: Dr. R. P. Brooks. - - Collins, Francis. =159=Papers (published later in the - Qtrly. Publication of the Hist. and Philos. Soc. of Ohio, - 1915, Nos. 2-3). - - _Columbus_. =160=Record of Punishments, 1846-7: U. S. - Naval Academy Library. - - _Congress_. =161=Journal of a Cruise, 1846: U. S. Naval - Academy Library. - - Conner, David. =162=Papers: Hon. Franklin D. Roosevelt. - - Conner, David. =163=Papers: P. F. Madigan, Esq. - - Conner, David. =164=Papers: Library of Congress. - - Conner, David. =165=Papers: Navy Dept. Library. - - Conner, David. =166=Papers: New York City Library. - - Coutts. =167=Diary of a March to California: Bancroft - Coll. - - Crallé, R. K. =168=Papers: Library of Congress. - - Crittenden, J. J. =169=Papers: Library of Congress. - - Crooker Family (of South Carolina). =170=Papers: Dr. E. - M. Shealy. - - _Cyane._ =171=Journal of a Cruise; Abstract of Journal: - U. S. Naval Academy Library. - - _Cyane._ =172=Log Book: Library, U. S. Navy Dept. - - Davis, Jefferson. =173=Address: Library of Congress - (reading-room desk). - - Davis, Jefferson. =174=Papers: Confederate Memorial, New - Orleans. - - Davis, Jefferson. =175=Papers: Library of Congress. - - Davis, Jefferson. =176=Papers: State of Mississippi, - Dept. of Hist. - - Davis, John W. =177=Statement of the Battle of San - Pascual: Bancroft Coll. - - Davis, T. F. =178=Diary: belonging to the family. - - Diario =179=Esactísimo de lo ocurrido en México, etc.: - Bancroft Coll. - - Dreer =180=Collection: Pennsylvania Hist. Soc. - - Donelson, A. J. =181=Papers: Mrs. Wm. A. Donelson (now in - the Library of Congress). - - Dormitzer, Walter. =182=Collection. - - Drum, R. C. =183=Recollections (verbal). - - Duke, Moses S. =184=Letters: Miss Winnie V. Lynch. - - Duncan, James. =185=Papers: U. S. Military Academy. - - Duncan, W. L. =186=Notes on Bishop's Journal: McLean - County (Ill.) Hist. Soc. - - Eddy =187=Manuscripts: Charles Carroll, Esq. - - Edwards, Marcellus B. =188=Diary: Missouri Hist. Soc. - - Evans, Mrs. Lucy. =189=Letter: belonging to the family. - - Ewing, J. C. =190=Diary: belonging to the family. - - Fairfield, John. =191=Papers: Library of Congress. - - Ford. =192=Collection: New York City Public Library. - - Foster, R. C. =193=Letters: Mrs. Edward W. Foster. - - Fourth (Mexican) Infantry. =194=Book of Accounts: New - York Hist. Soc. - - Fowler, W. P. =195=Collection. - - Frémont, John C. =196=Statement: Library of Harvard Univ. - - Gaines, E. P. =197=Papers: Library of Congress. - - Gallatin, Albert. =198=Papers: New York Hist. Soc. - - García, Señ. Lic. D. Genaro. =199=Collection. - - Gibbes, W. H. =200=Collection. - - Gibson, George R. =201=Diary: Missouri Hist. Soc. - - Giménez, M. M. =202=Papers: Señ. Lic. D. Genaro García. - - Gleason, James. =203=Letter. - - Gouverneur, S. L. =204=Diary: Mrs. Rose Gouverneur Hoes. - - Graham, L. P. =205=Memorandum Book: E. W. McGlenen, Esq. - - Graham, W. A. =206=Papers: A. W. Graham, Esq. - - Griffin, John S. =207=Journal of 1846: Bancroft Coll. - - Guadalajara (Public Library) =208=Collection. - - Guitar, Aldon. =209=Letter. - - Hammond, J. H. =210=Diary and Papers: Library of Congress. - - Hardie, James A. =211=Papers: Library of Congress. - - Hastings, D. H. =212=Diary: loaned by the writer. - - Hatch, John P. =213=Letters: Library of Congress. - - Hays, John C., and Caperton, John. =214=Life and - Adventures of John C. Hays: Bancroft Coll. - - Heald, Nathan. =215=Papers: Univ. of Wisconsin Library. - - Heiman, A. =216=Services of the First Regt. of Tennessee: - Tennessee Hist. Soc. - - Henshaw, J. C. =217=Papers: Massachusetts Hist. Soc. - - Henshaw, J. C. =218=Narrative, prepared by Mrs. Henshaw - from his papers: Massachusetts Hist. Soc. - - Heráldica =219=del Ejército Mex., etc.: Biblioteca - Nacional. - - Higgins, H. H. =220=Plans and letters: Mrs. T. M. Coxe. - - Hill, D. H. =221=Diary: Pres. D. H. Hill. - - Hiney, E. F. =222=Diary. - - Hirschorn, Jacob. =223=Recollections: Justin H. Smith. - - Hitchcock, E. A. =224=Diary and Papers: Mrs. E. A. - Hitchcock (now in the Library of Congress). - - Holt, Joseph. =225=Papers: Library of Congress. - - Hook, C. S. =226=Collection. - - Hoyle, E. D. =227=Recollections. - - Illinois University. =228=Collection. - - Indiana State Library. =229=Collection. - - Itúrbide, Agustín de. =230=Papers: Library of Congress. - - Jackson, Andrew. =231=Papers: Library of Congress. - - Jameson, J. Franklin. =232=Collection. - - Janssens, Agustín. =233=Documentos para la Hist. de - California: Bancroft Coll. - - Johnson, Andrew. =234=Papers: Library of Congress. - - Jones, Roger. =235=Papers: W. R. Benjamin, Esq. - - Judah, H. M. =236=Diary: Library of Congress. - - Kearny, S. W. =237=Letter Book: Missouri Hist. Soc. - - Keating, E. H. =238=Map of Monterey, Mex.: Monterey City - Govt. - - Kemper, Jackson. =239=Papers: Univ. of Wisconsin Library. - - Kennerly, W. C. =240=Narrative. - - Kent, James. =241=Papers: Library of Congress. - - Kingsbury, D. M. =242=Letters to his Mother. - - Kribben, Christian. =243=Home Letters: B. D. Kribben, Esq. - - Lakin, George W. =244=Papers: Univ. of Wisconsin Library. - - Lamar, M. B. =245=Papers: Texas State Library. - - Lane, Joseph. =246=Autobiography: Bancroft Coll. - - Larkin, T. O. =247=Papers: Bancroft Coll. - - Lasselle, Stanislaus. =248=Papers: Indiana State Library. - - Leese, Jacob P. =249=Bear Flag Papers: Bancroft Coll. - - Lieber, Francis. =250=Papers: Library of Congress. - - Lowry, Robert. =251=Narrative. - - Mackall, W. W. =252=Letters: belonging to the family. - - McLean, John. =253=Papers: Library of Congress. - - McClellan, Geo. B. =254=Diary and Papers: Library of - Congress. - - Mangum, W. P. =255=Papers: A. W. Graham, Esq. - - Marcy, W. L. =256=Papers: Library of Congress. - - Markoe and Maxcy. =257=Papers: Library of Congress. - - Marshall, Henry. =258=Recollections: Bancroft Coll. - - Maryland Hist. Soc. =259=Collection. - - Massachusetts Hist. Soc. =260=Collection. - - Mémoires. =261=I, Apparently prepared by the French agent - in Mexico; =261a=II, Sur les Revolutions du Mexique: - Dépt. des Affaires Etrangères, Paris. - - Memorias. =262=Reports issued under this title by - Depts. of the Mexican government (see also "Memorias" under - the head of Books and Pamphlets. A number of the Memorias were - not published--unless in newspapers--but exist in MS. in the - library of the Sría. de Relaciones). - - Mervine, William. =263=Letter Books and Papers: Navy - Dept. Library. - - Mexican Hist. =264=Documents: Museo Nacional, Mexico. - - Miller, N. C. =265=Letter. - - Miller, W. D. =266=Papers: belonging to the family. - - Mississippi Dept. of Hist. =267=Collections (Dr. Dunbar - Rowland, Director). - - Missouri Hist. Soc. =268=Collection. - - Molina, Señ. D. Ignacio. =269=Recollections (verbal). - - Moore, H. Judge. =270=Diary. - - Morales, J. B. =271=Papers: Library of Congress. - - Morgan, George. =272=Memoir of: Col. J. M. Morgan. - - Mullan, James. =273=Diary: belonging to the family. - - Neeld, Peter C. =274=Letter. - - Nelson, T. B., Jr. =275=Letter: Mrs. Annie J. Holland. - - Neville, Harvey. =276=Diary: Chicago Hist. Soc. - - New York Hist. Soc. =277=Collection. - - Niehenke, R. =278=Statement. - - Notes. =279=Sur les Possessions Espagnoles en Amérique: - Dépt. des Affaires Etrangères, Paris. - - Nunelee, S. F. =280=Diary: James Howell Nunelee, Esq. - - O'Keefe, Michael. =281=Statement: Justin H. Smith. - - Olivera, Agustín. =282=Documentos para la Hist. de - California: Bancroft Coll. - - Orders (General and Special). =283=Army of the North - under Mejía, Ampudia and Arista: New York Hist. Soc. - - Otero, M. =284=Comunicación que sobre las Negoc. Diplom., - etc.: Yale Univ. Library. - - Paredes y Arrillaga, Mariano. =285=Papers: Señ. Lic. D. - Genaro García. - - Parker, James. =286=Statement. - - Parrish, P. C. =287=Diary. - - Pennsylvania Hist. Soc. =288=Collection. - - Pérez de Acal. =289=Papers: Guadalajara Public Library. - - Pico, Pio (_Familia Pico_). =290=Documentos para la Hist. - de California: Bancroft Coll. - - Pierce, Franklin. =291=Papers: Library of Congress. - - Pillow, Gideon J. =292=Letters: W. R. Benjamin Collection. - - Pillow, Gideon J. =293=Letters: Library of Congress. - - Pillow, Gideon J. =294=Letters: Pennsylvania Hist. Soc. - - Pinto, Rafael. =295=Apuntaciones para la Hist. de - California: Bancroft Coll. - - Poinsett, Joel R. =296=Papers: Pennsylvania Hist. Soc. - - Polk, James K. =297=Papers: Library of Congress - (including the Polk papers examined by the author at the - Chicago Hist. Soc.). - - Porter, Andrew. =298=Papers: Major John Biddle Porter. - - Posey, Carnot. =299=Letters: Dr. Walter L. Fleming. - - Pricket, John A. =300=Letters. - - Primer Battn. Activo de Oaxaca. =301=Libro de Servicios: - Rhode Island Hist. Soc. - - Puryear, J. F. =302=Document. - - Quitman, John A. =303=Papers: in possession of the family. - - Quitman, John A. =304=Papers in the Claiborne Papers. - - Richardson, C. T. =305=Recollections: Justin H. Smith. - - Riser, J. J. =306=Recollections (Mormon Battalion). - - Roberts, B. S. =307=Diary and letters: Brigadier General - B. K. Roberts. - - Roberts, Charles. =308=Autograph Collection: Haverford - Coll. - - Roessler, Edward. =309=Diary: belonging to the family. - - Roque, J. K. =310=Document. - - Santa Anna, A. L. de. =311=Papers: Señ. Lic. D. Genaro - García. - - Santa Anna, A. L. de. =312=Papers: Library of Congress. - - Saunders, J. L. =313=Papers: Library of Congress. - - Sawyer, Charles H. =314=Documents for the Hist. of the - Conquest of California: Bancroft Coll. - - Schouler, William. =315=Papers: Massachusetts Hist. Soc. - - Sherman, W. T. =316=Papers: Library of Congress. - - Sibley, H. H. =317=Papers: Minnesota Hist. Soc. - - Smith, C. B. =318=Papers: Library of Congress. - - Smith, George. =319=Diary: belonging to the family. - - Smith, Persifor F. =320=Papers: State Normal School, West - Chester, Pa. - - Smith, T. F. =321=Diary: belonging to the writer. - - Smith, W. B. =322=Diary: belonging to the family. - - Stevenson, J. D. =323=Letter Book; =324=General - Order Book; =325=Regimental Order Book: New York Hist. - Soc. - - Sumner, Charles. =326=Papers: Harvard Univ. Library. - - Sutherland, D. H. =327=Letters: belonging to the family. - - Sweet, G. N. =328=Statement. - - Taliaferro, William B. =329=Papers: Miss L. S. Taliaferro. - - Taylor, Zachary. =330=Papers: Library of Congress. - - Taylor, Zachary. =331=Papers: Henkels catalogue. - - Tennery, Thomas D. =332=Diary: Rev. John S. Cook, D.D. - - Tlacotálpam, Mex. =333=Judicial Archives. - - Torres, Manuel. =334=Peripecias de la Vida California: - Bancroft Coll. - - Trist, Nicholas P. =335=Papers: Library of Congress. - - Turner, C. B. =336=Letter: belonging to the family. - - Turner, H. S. =337=Diary: Missouri Hist. Soc. - - U. S. House of Representatives. =338=Files: Capitol, - Washington. - - U. S. House of Representatives. =339=Papers: Library of - Congress. - - U. S. Military Academy (West Point). =340=Collection. - - U. S. Senate. =341=Files: Capitol, Washington. - - University of Illinois. =342=Collection. - - Vallejo, M. G. =343=Documentos para la Hist. de - California: Bancroft Coll. - - Vallejo, M. G. =344=Recuerdos Hist. y Personales: - Bancroft Coll. - - Van Buren, Martin. =345=Papers: Library of Congress. - - Wade, W. P. =346=Document: belonging to the family. - - Washburne, Elihu B. =347=Papers: Library of Congress. - - Watterston, George. =348=Notes on U. S. History: Library - of Congress. - - Watterston, George. =349=Papers: Library of Congress. - - Weber, Juan L. =350=Recollections (verbal). - - Webster, Daniel. =351=Papers: Library of Congress. - - Weeks, J. W. =352=Reminiscences: Bancroft Coll. - - Welles, Edgar T. =353=Collection: Connecticut Hist. Soc. - - Welles, Gideon. =354=Papers: Library of Congress. - - Wheaton, Henry. =355=Papers: Massachusetts Hist. Soc. - - Whitcomb, T. M. =356=Diary: T. J. Whitcomb, Esq. - - Wilcox, C. M. =357=Diary (portions copied by him): - Claiborne papers, Mississippi Dept. of History. - - Williams, Thomas. =358=Letters: Rt. Rev. G. Mott Williams. - - Winthrop-Clifford. =359=Correspondence: Massachusetts - Hist. Soc. - - Winthrop-Kennedy. =360=Correspondence: Massachusetts - Hist. Soc. - - Woods, William. =361=Recollections. - - Worth, G. A. =362=Papers: Library of Congress. - - Worth, W. J. =363=Papers: W. R. Benjamin Collection. - - Worth, W. J. =364=Papers: Mrs. K. S. Hubbell. - - Wyse, F. O. =365=Papers: Miss Mary Wyse. - - Yale University. =366=Collection (University Library). - - Yell, Archibald. =367=Papers: Mrs. R. H. Fitzgerald. - - Map Division, Library of Congress. =369=Map of Palo Alto. - - Taylor, Zachary. =370=Papers: Mrs. W. R. Stauffer. - - Mitchell, W. I. =371=Statement. - - Hyde, George. =372=Statement of Hist. Facts on - California: Bancroft Coll. - - Evans, Joseph. =373=Narrative: Justin H. Smith. - - Conner, David. =374=Letters: Henkels catalogue. - - Madigan, P. F. =375=Collection. - - Nicholson, A. S. =376=Recollections (verbal). - - Willing, Wildurr. =377=Paper on Scott's operations - (published later). - - Winthrop, R. C. =378=The Mexican War Bill (Massachusetts - Hist. Soc.) - - De Witt, John. =379=Collection (see also No. 138). - - - Transcriber's Note - -There are three types of notes in the text. The lettered notes -(originally asterisks) were printed as standard footnotes on each page. -References to these notes now appear in brackets as [A], [B] and so on. -The notes themselves have been moved to directly follow the paragraph -within which they are referenced. Occasionally, an asterisk is used for -some other purpose, usually preceding rather than following a word or -phrase, and remain asterisks. - -Numeric references referring to the extensive Notes section of the text -appear as bracketed numbers, e.g., [1.3]. Unlike standard footnotes, -the references to those notes in the text are themselves not necessarily -consecutive, nor are they unique. To assist in consulting those notes -using search features, the chapter number has been prefixed to each, -using Arabic numerals, as [2.1], [2.2], [3.3], etc. Notes for the -Preface are prefixed with 'P'. Any internal references directing -attention to another note have also been changed. - -Within the Notes, there are =bold= numbers prefixed to key words (e.g., -'=123=keyword') which serve as references to sources, to be found -in the Appendix. There may be multiple references to the same source. - -The logic behind this system is explained by the author in his Preface, -and in more detail in [P.5] of the Notes to that Preface. - -In general, Spanish names, when used in English phrases, are printed -without accents. The country is referred to as 'México' when the -language is Spanish, and 'Mexico', without the accent, when in English. -On occasion, the printer fails to observe this distinction, as on p. -xviii: "and a plan in [Mexico] á través de los Siglos". These are -considered as printer's errors, and have been corrected here. - -Where variants in spelling occur in quoted passages, they are always -retained. - -The name of the town of Matamoros is spelled, occasionally (pp. 177, -468), as 'Matamoras'. The variants are retained. - -The word 'manoeuvre' is sometimes printed with an 'oe' ligature. In this -text, as noted above, no distinction can be made. - -At the end of the final paragraph of Chapter III, there is a reference -to Note 41 of that chapter, which does not exist. Either the note was -not included, or the reference was misnumbered. The anchor is retained. - -The following table describes other textual issues, and the resolution -of each. The [x/y] annotations mark the additions, deletions or -substitutions made to the text. Minor inconsistencies of punctuation in -the Notes have been silently corrected. On several occasions, letters -or numbers have gone missing from the images used to prepare this text. -Where no reasonable conjecture is supportable, an empty bracket [ ] -indicates the spot. - -p. xviii [9]. Battles of Monterey. Central '9' is missing. - Operations - - and a plan in M[e/é]xico á través de los Corrected. - Siglos - -p. 57 to accomplish anything[.] Added. - -p. 91 extend our ter[r]itory by conquest Corrected. - -p. 95 the minister proce[e]ded to Vera Cruz Added missing 'e'. - -p. 99 "the i[n]gnominious loss of national Removed spurious - integrity" 'n'. - -p. 149 made Arista commander[-]in-chief The hyphen is - missing on the - line break. - -p. 177 rei[e]nforcements Removed extraneous - 'e'. - - could probably h[o/a]ave taken Corrected. - -p. 301 seven hundred National [oe/G]uards Corrected printer's - error. - -p. 372 tha[t] he might be able Added missing 't'. - -p. 402 Coch[e]let Added missing 'e'. - -p. 412 dates given as 'fractions' - -p. 415 Bankhead, nos. 108 of 1844; [ ], 17, The first numeral - is indistinct, - may be 2, 3, 8. - -p. 424 (_[i]bid._, 94; Ho. 351; 25, 2, Added missing 'i'. - -p. 431 to cast a gratuit[u]ous aspersion Removed gratuitous - 'u'. - -p. 438 Carreño, Je[f]es Added missing 'f'. - -p. 440 Watson, Taylo[e/r], 113-4 A reference to - Watson, Taylor - appears earlier. - None to 'Tayloe'. - -p. 476 Housto[u]n, Texas May refer to - 'Houston', but is - retained. - - - - - -End of the Project Gutenberg EBook of The War With Mexico, Volume I (of 2), by -Justin H. 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You may copy it, give it away or -re-use it under the terms of the Project Gutenberg License included -with this eBook or online at www.gutenberg.org - - -Title: The War With Mexico, Volume I (of 2) - -Author: Justin H. Smith - -Release Date: December 16, 2013 [EBook #44437] - -Language: English - -Character set encoding: ASCII - -*** START OF THIS PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK THE WAR WITH MEXICO, VOLUME I *** - - - - -Produced by KD Weeks, David Edwards and the Online -Distributed Proofreading Team at http://www.pgdp.net (This -file was produced from images generously made available -by The Internet Archive) - - - - - -Transcriber's Note - -For this version of the text, italics are denoted with _underscore_ -characters, and bold text with =equal= signs. The ligature for 'oe' is -separated into its two letters, e.g., 'manoeuvre'. - -Please consult the notes at the end of this text for a detailed -discussion of the various footnotes, endnotes, and navigation through -this text, as well as any other textual issues. - -Right-side page headers contained descriptions of the current topics -covered by the two open pages. These were retained and are placed on -separate lines prior to the paragraph where the topic is introduced, and -enclosed in brackets, as [Sidenotes]. The choice of that position is -not always obvious and should be regarded as approximate. Should the -topic persist over multiple pages, any redundant headers have been -removed. - -Illustrations, all but one of them maps, are denoted with square -brackets as [Illustration: <caption>] at approximately the point -where they were printed. The captions are usually printed on the maps -themselves. Where there is no obvious title to the map, the caption -has been provided from the table of illustrations. - - - - - THE WAR WITH MEXICO - - - - - +----------------------------------------+ - | BY THE SAME AUTHOR | - | | - | The | - | Annexation of Texas | - | | - | _Octavo ix + 496 pages_ | - | | - | _By mail, postpaid, $3.00_ | - | | - | ------------------------ | - | This is the only work attempting to | - | deal thoroughly with an affair that | - | was intrinsically far more important | - | than had previously been supposed, | - | and was also of no little significance | - | on account of its relation to the war | - | with Mexico. | - | ------------------------ | - | | - | THE MACMILLAN COMPANY | - | _PUBLISHERS_ | - +----------------------------------------+ - - - - - THE - - WAR WITH MEXICO - - BY - - JUSTIN H. SMITH - - FORMERLY PROFESSOR OF MODERN HISTORY - AT DARTMOUTH COLLEGE - AUTHOR OF "THE ANNEXATION OF TEXAS," "OUR - STRUGGLE FOR THE FOURTEENTH COLONY," - "ARNOLD'S MARCH FROM - CAMBRIDGE TO QUEBEC," - ETC. - - - VOLUME I - - New York - - THE MACMILLAN COMPANY - 1919 - - _All rights reserved_ - - COPYRIGHT, 1919, - BY THE MACMILLAN COMPANY. - - Set up and printed. Published December, 1919. - - Norwood Press - J. S. Cushing Co.--Berwick & Smith Co. - Norwood, Mass., U.S.A. - - - - - TO - - HENRY CABOT LODGE, LL.D. - - SENATOR OF THE UNITED STATES - HISTORIAN - PRESIDENT OF THE MASSACHUSETTS HISTORICAL SOCIETY - WHO GAVE THE AUTHOR INVALUABLE ASSISTANCE - IN THE COLLECTION OF MATERIAL RELATING - TO THE WAR WITH MEXICO - THIS WORK - IS VERY RESPECTFULLY INSCRIBED - - - - - PREFACE - - -As every one understands, our conflict with Mexico has been almost -entirely eclipsed by the greater wars following it. But in the field -of thought mere size does not count for much; and while the number of -troops and the lists of casualties give the present subject little -comparative importance, it has ample grounds for claiming attention. As -a territorial stake New Mexico, Arizona and California were of immense -value. National honor was involved, and not a few of the Mexicans -thought their national existence imperilled. Some of the diplomatic -questions were of the utmost difficulty and interest. The clash of North -and South, American and Mexican, produced extraordinary lights and -shades, and in both countries the politics that lay behind the military -operations made a dramatic and continual by-play. The military conduct -of the governments--especially our own--and the behavior of our troops -on foreign soil afforded instruction worthy to be pondered. While vast -concentrations of forces and complicated tactical operations on a great -scale were out of the question, the handling of even small armies at a -long distance from home and in a region that was not only foreign but -strange, created problems of a peculiar interest and afforded lessons of -a peculiar value, such as no earlier or later war of ours has provided; -and the examples of courage, honor and heroism exhibited in a conflict -not only against man but against nature merited correct appreciation and -lasting remembrance.[P.1][A] - - [A] The notes to which this and the other "superior figures" invite - attention will be found immediately after the text of the volume. - In the notes only brief titles of books are given, but these may be - supplemented by reference to the list of printed sources given in - the appendix of the second volume. Citations (in the notes) - preceded by a number in black type refer to the list of MS. sources - standing at the end of the notes. - -The warrant for offering another work on the subject rests primarily -on the extent and results of the author's investigations. His -intention was to obtain substantially all the valuable information -regarding it that is in existence, and no effort was spared to reach -his end. The appendix of volume II gives a detailed account of the -sources. By special authorization from the Presidents of the United -States and Mexico it was possible to examine every pertinent document -belonging to the two governments. The search extended to the archives -of Great Britain, France, Spain, Cuba, Colombia and Peru, those of -the American and Mexican states, and those of Mexican cities. The -principal libraries here, in Mexico and in Europe, the collections of -our historical societies, and papers belonging to many individuals in -this country and elsewhere were sifted. It may safely be estimated that -the author examined personally more than 100,000 manuscripts bearing -upon the subject, more than 1200 books and pamphlets, and also more -than 200 periodicals, the most important of which were studied, issue -by issue, for the entire period.[B] Almost exclusively the book is -based upon first-hand sources, printed matter having been found of -little use except for the original material it contains or for data -regarding biography, geography, customs, industries and other ancillary -subjects.[P.2] - - [B] These figures cover also the author's "Annexation of Texas," which - is virtually an introduction to the present work. - -The author also talked or corresponded with as many of the veterans as -he could reach, and he spent more than a year, all told, in Mexico, -where he not only studied the chief battlefields but endeavored, through -conversations with Mexicans of all grades and by the aid of foreigners -long resident in the country, to become well acquainted with the -character and psychology of the people. As the war was fought almost -exclusively among them, and its inception, course and results depended -in large part upon these factors, the author attaches not a little -importance to his opportunities for such personal investigations and to -his Mexican data in general.[P.2] - -Probably more than nine tenths of the material used in the preparation -of this work is in fact new. No previous writer on the subject had been -through the diplomatic and military archives of either belligerent -nation, for example. Virtually a still larger percentage is new, for -the published documents needed to be compared with the originals. In -the printed American reports relating to the battles of September 8 and -13, 1847, for instance, over fifty departures from the manuscripts, -that seemed worth noting, were found. Nor did the additional documents -prove by any means to supply mere details. A great number of unprinted -statements from subordinate officers, who were nearer to the facts than -their superiors could be, were discovered. The major official reports -needed both to be supplemented and to be corrected. Such reports were in -most instances colored more or less, and in some radically distorted, -for personal reasons or from a justifiable desire to produce an effect -on the subordinates concerned, the army in general, the writer's -government, the enemy, and the public at home and abroad; while, as -General Scott stated in orders, unintentional omissions and mistakes -were "common." Taylor's account of the battle of May 9, 1846, for -example, failed completely to explain his victory. It has been only by -obtaining and comparing a large number of statements that approximate -verity has been reached. The same has been true of the diplomatic and -political aspects of the subject. The reports of the British, French and -Spanish ministers residing at Mexico, to cite one illustration, proved -indispensable. In reality, therefore, aside from its broader outlines -the field presented ample opportunities for study; and while no doubt -so extended an investigation included many facts of slight value, La -Rochefoucauld was right when he said, "To know things perfectly, one -should know them in detail."[P.3] - -As a particular consequence of this full inquiry, an episode that has -been regarded both in the United States and abroad as discreditable to -us, appears now to wear quite a different complexion. Such a result, it -may be presumed, will gratify patriotic Americans, but the author must -candidly admit that he began with no purpose or even thought of reaching -it. His view of the war at the outset of his special inquiries coincided -substantially with that prevailing in New England, and the subject was -taken up simply because he felt convinced that it had not been studied -thoroughly. This conviction, indeed, has seemed to be gaining ground -rapidly for some time, and hence it is believed that new opinions, -resting upon facts, will be acceptable now in place of opinions resting -largely upon traditional prejudices and misinformation. - -Some might suggest that only a military man could properly write this -work. But, in the first place, the author did not wish to prepare a -technical military account of the war. His aim was to offer a correct -and complete view of it suitable for all interested in American history, -and it will be found that politics, diplomacy and other phases of the -subject required as full investigation as did its military aspects. - -Secondly, the author took pains to qualify himself for his task. The -real difficulty of the commanding general consists in applying the -principles of war under complicated, obscure and changeful conditions, -and in overcoming "friction" of many sorts. The intellectual side of the -art is readily enough understood. "In war everything is very simple," -wrote Clausewitz, the fountainhead of the modern system. "The theory of -the great speculative combinations of war is simple enough in itself," -said Jomini; "it only requires intelligence and attentive reflection." -"Strategy is the application of common sense to the conduct of war," -declared Von Moltke. Arnold in his Lectures on Modern History said: "An -unprofessional person may, without blame, speak or write on military -subjects, and may judge of them sufficiently;" and the eminent military -authority, G. F. R. Henderson, endorsed this view. "The theory of war -is simple," wrote another expert, "and there is no reason why any man -who chooses to take the trouble to read and reflect carefully on one or -two of the acknowledged best books thereon, should not attain to a fair -knowledge thereof." As may be seen from the list of printed sources, -the present author--beginning with the volumes recommended by a board -of officers to the graduates of the United States Military Academy--did -much more than is here proposed. - -Finally, during the entire time occupied in writing this work he -fortunately enjoyed the advantage of corresponding and occasionally -conferring with Brigadier General Oliver L. Spaulding, Jr., of the -United States Field Artillery, formerly instructor at the Army Service -Schools, Fort Leavenworth, and more recently Assistant Commandant of the -School of Fire, Fort Sill, who had distinguished himself not only in the -service but as a writer on professional subjects. General Spaulding has -kindly discussed with the author such military questions as have arisen, -and has read critically all the battle chapters. No responsibility -should, however, be attached to him, if a mistake is detected.[P.4] - -A word must be added with reference to the notes. These have been placed -at the ends of the volumes because the author believes the best plan -will be to read the text of each chapter before looking at the notes -that bear upon it, and also in part because he did not wish any one -to feel that he was parading his discussions and citations. The notes -contain supplementary material designed to make the work a critical -as well as a narrative history, and contain also specific references -to the sources on which the text is based. These references involved -a most annoying problem. When one's citations are limited in number -and proceed in single file, as it were, they can be handled easily. -But in the present instance as many as 1800 documents were used for a -chapter, not a few of which were cited more than once; and each sentence -of the text--to speak broadly--resulted from comparing a number of -sources. Under these conditions the usual method would have produced a -repellent mass of references, perhaps greater in extent than the text -itself, which would have been very expensive to print and from their -multiplicity would have been extremely inconvenient. Where that method -appeared feasible it was adopted, but as a rule the references have -been grouped by paragraphs or topics. In many cases, however, pains -have been taken to indicate in the text itself the basis of important -statements, and further hints will be found in the notes. The reader can -thus always ascertain in general the basis of the text, and will find -specific references wherever the author has thought it likely they would -be desired. The special student will wish to look up all the citations -bearing on any topic that interests him. No doubt the plan is somewhat -unsatisfactory, but after studying the subject for a dozen years the -author feels sure that any other would have been more so.[P.5] - -To thank all who kindly assisted the author to obtain material is -practically impossible; but a number of names appear in the list of -MS. sources, and others must be mentioned here. Without the cordial -support of Presidents Theodore Roosevelt and Porfirio Diaz, Secretary of -State Elihu Root, Minister of Relations Ignacio Mariscal, and Senator -Henry Cabot Lodge this history could not have been written; and the -author acknowledges with no less pleasure his special obligations to -Whitelaw Reid, American Ambassador to Great Britain, Joseph E. Willard, -Ambassador to Spain; Henri Vignaux, First Secretary of our embassy at -Paris; J. J. Limantour, Minister of Hacienda, Mexico; Major General -J. Franklin Bell, Chief of Staff; Major General F. C. Ainsworth, Adj. -Gen.; Admiral Alfred T. Mahan; Admiral French E. Chadwick; Brigadier -General J. E. Kuhn, Head of the War College, Washington; Dr. J. Franklin -Jameson, Director of the Department of Historical Research, Carnegie -Institution; Dr. Gaillard Hunt, Chief of the Division of MSS., Library -of Congress; Dr. St. George L. Sioussat, Brown University; Dr. Eugene -C. Barker, University of Texas; Dr. Herbert E. Bolton, Professor -Frederick J. Teggart and Dr. H. I. Priestley of the University of -California; Dr. R. W. Kelsey of Haverford College; Dr. J. W. Jordan, -Pennsylvania Historical Society; Dr. Worthington C. Ford, Editor for the -Massachusetts Historical Society; Dr. Solon J. Buck of the Minnesota -Historical Society; R. D. W. Connor, Secretary of the Historical -Commission of North Carolina; Dr. R. P. Brooks of the University of -Georgia; Dr. Dunbar Rowland, Director of the Archives and Historical -Department of Mississippi; T. M. Owen, Director of the Historical -Department of Alabama; Dr. George M. Philips, State Normal School, West -Chester, Pa.; Waldo G. Leland, Secretary of the American Historical -Association; W. B. Douglas and Miss Stella M. Drumm, Librarian, of the -Missouri Historical Society; Dr. Clarence E. Alvord of the University of -Illinois and Mrs. Alvord (formerly Miss Idress Head, Librarian of the -Missouri Historical Society); Ignacio Molina, Head of the Cartography -Section, Department of Fomento, Mexico; Charles W. Stewart, Librarian -of the Navy Department; James W. Cheney, long the Librarian of the War -Department; Major Gustave R. Lukesh, Director, and Henry E. Haferkorn, -Librarian of the United States Engineer School, Washington Barracks; D. -C. Brown, Librarian of the Indiana State Library; Victor H. Paltsits, -Department of MSS., New York Public Library; W. L. Ostrander of the -library at West Point; Lieutenant James R. Jacobs, 28th United States -Infantry; Dr. Katherine J. Gallagher; Dr. Martha L. Edwards. To the -widow of Admiral Charles S. Sperry and their son, Professor Charles -S. Sperry, the author is particularly indebted for an opportunity to -examine important papers left by William L. Marcy. Valuable suggestions -were most kindly given by Dr. William A. Dunning of Columbia University -and Dr. Davis R. Dewey of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, who -read portions of the text, by Francis W. Halsey, Esq., of New York, who -read nearly all of it, and by Dr. Edward Channing of Harvard University, -who was so good as to look over more or less closely all of the proofs. -To the helpers not mentioned by name the author begs leave to offer -thanks no less sincere. - -Finally, the author desires to mention the enterprise and public spirit -shown by the publishers in bringing out so expensive a work at this time -of uncertainty. - - THE CENTURY CLUB, NEW YORK, - September, 1919. - - - - - CONTENTS OF VOLUME I - - - PAGE - - MAPS AND PLANS IN VOLUME I xvii - - CONSPECTUS OF EVENTS xix - - PRONUNCIATION OF SPANISH xxi - - CHAPTER - - I. MEXICO AND THE MEXICANS 1 - - II. THE POLITICAL EDUCATION OF MEXICO 29 - - III. THE RELATIONS BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND - MEXICO, 1825-1843 58 - - IV. THE RELATIONS BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND - MEXICO, 1843-1846 82 - - V. THE MEXICAN ATTITUDE ON THE EVE OF WAR 102 - - VI. THE AMERICAN ATTITUDE ON THE EVE OF WAR 117 - - VII. THE PRELIMINARIES OF THE CONFLICT 138 - - VIII. PALO ALTO AND RESACA DE GUERRERO 156 - - IX. THE UNITED STATES MEETS THE CRISIS 181 - - X. THE CHOSEN LEADERS ADVANCE 204 - - XI. TAYLOR SETS OUT FOR SALTILLO 225 - - XII. MONTEREY 239 - - XIII. SALTILLO, PARRAS, AND TAMPICO 262 - - XIV. SANTA FE 284 - - XV. CHIHUAHUA 298 - - XVI. THE CALIFORNIA QUESTION 315 - - XVII. THE CONQUEST OF CALIFORNIA 331 - - XVIII. THE GENESIS OF TWO CAMPAIGNS 347 - - XIX. SANTA ANNA PREPARES TO STRIKE 370 - - XX. BUENA VISTA 384 - - NOTES ON VOLUME I 402 - - APPENDIX (MANUSCRIPT SOURCES) 565 - - - - - MAPS AND PLANS IN VOLUME ONE - -As equally good sources disagree sometimes, a few inconsistencies are -unavoidable. Numerous errors have been corrected. An asterisk indicates -an unpublished original. Statements, cited in the notes, have also been -used. - - - PAGE - - 1. Mexico in 1919. Based upon standard maps xxii - - 2. Profile of the Route between Vera Cruz and Mexico 2 - - Drawn by Lieut. Hardcastle (Sen. Ex. Doc. 1; 30 Cong., - 1 sess.). - - 3. Matamoros and Fort Brown 159 - - Sketch map based on a *map drawn by Luis Berlandier, - Arista's chief engineer (War Dept., Mexico); Meade, - Letters, i, 73; McCall, Letters, 444; New Orleans - _Picayune_, June 28, 1846; *sketch by Mansfield, - Taylor's chief engineer (War Dept., Washington); and - an anonymous plan (Mass. Hist. Society). - - 4. Fort Brown to Brazos Island 162 - - Sketch map based principally upon the map in Apuntes para - la Historia de la Guerra entre Mexico y los Estados-Unidos - and a map by Eaton of Third Infantry (Ho. Ex. Doc. 209; - 29 Cong., 1 sess.). - - 5. Battle of Palo Alto 164 - - Sketch map drawn by a U. S. army officer. Based on Eaton's - plan (Ho. Ex. Doc., 209; 29 Cong., 1 sess.); a *sketch by - Berlandier (War Dept., Mexico); Apuntes; Mexico a traves - de los Siglos, iv, 562; _El Republicano_ (Berlandier); - a map in Campana contra los Norte-Americanos; a map by - Lieut. Dobbins in Life of General Taylor; and _Journal of - Milit. Service Institution_, xli, 96. - - 6. Battle of Resaca de la Palma (_i.e._ Resaca de Guerrero) 170 - - Sketch map based on Apuntes; New Orleans _Picayune_, - June 25, 1846, from official drawings; a plan by Dobbins - in Life of General Taylor; a map in Campana contra, _etc._; - a plan by Berlandier in _El Republicano_; a plan by - Eaton (Ho. Ex. Doc. 209; 29 Cong., 1 sess.); French, Two Wars, - 52; and _Journal of Milit. Service Instit._, xli, 100. - - 7. From Matamoros to Monterey 210 - - Based on an official Mexican map prepared by the Fomento - Dept. and on Gen. Arista's map. - - 8. Battles of Monterey: General Map 232 - - Based on *three plans drawn by Lieut. Gardner from surveys - of Lieut. Scarritt (War Dept., Washington); _Picayune_ - Extra, Nov. 19, 1846 (Lieut. Benjamin); a *drawing by - Adjutant Heiman (Tennessee Hist. Society); a map in - Apuntes; and a plan by Balbontin (Invasion Americana). - - 9. Battles of Monterey. Central Operations 240 - - Based on the same sources as No. 8 _supra_. - - 10. General Wool's March 271 - - Based on reconnaissances of Capt. Hughes, Lieut. Sitgreaves, - and Lieut. Franklin (Sen. Ex. Doc. 32; 31 Cong., 1 sess.). - - 11. Tampico and Its Environs 276 - - Based on a sketch by Lee and Gilmer (War Dept., - Washington); and a Fomento Dept. Map (_see_ No. 7 - _supra_). - - 12. General Kearny's March to Santa Fe 287 - - From a sketch drawn by A. Wislizenus (Sen. Misc. Doc. - 26; 30 Cong., 1 sess.). - - 13. El Paso to Rosales, Mexico 305 - - From a U. S. War College map, Washington. - - 14. Battle of Sacramento 307 - - Based on a map in Sen. Ex. Doc. 1; 30 Cong., 1 sess.; and - a plan in Mexico a traves de los Siglos, iv, 644. - - 15. California in 1846 316 - - Based on a map in Sen. Ex. Doc. 1; 30 Cong., 1 sess. - - 16. Northern California 317 - - From a sketch by Lieut. Derby (Sen. Ex. Doc. 18; 31 Cong., - 1 sess.) and recent maps. - - 17. Fight at San Pascual 341 - - From a plan in Sen. Ex. Doc. 1; 30 Cong., 1 sess. - - 18. Fight near Los Angeles 344 - - From a plan in Sen. Ex. Doc. 1; 30 Cong., 1 sess. - - 19. General Patterson's March 360 - - From a map in Ho. Ex. Doc. 13; 31 Cong., 2 sess. - - 20. From Mexico City to Agua Nueva 381 - - From a Fomento Dept. map. - - 21. From Monterey to La Encarnacion 382 - - Based on a map in Rapida Ojeada sobre la Campana, _etc._; - and a *sketch by Lee and Gilmer (War Dept., Washington). - - 22. Battle of Buena Vista 387 - - Based on a map drawn by Capt. Linnard from the surveys of - Capt. Linnard and Lieuts. Pope and Franklin (Sen. Ex. Doc. 1; - 30 Cong., 1 sess.); *two plans by the same officers (War - Dept., Washington); a *map based on a sketch by Dr. - Vanderlinden, chief Mexican surgeon (War Dept., Mexico); - a map by Balbontin (Invasion Americana); a *map drawn by - Stanislaus Lasselle (Indiana State Library); a plan by Lieut. - Green (Scribner, Campaign in Mexico); *Croquis para la - intelligencia de la Batalla de la Angostura (War Dept., - Washington). - - - - - CONSPECTUS OF EVENTS - - - 1845 - - March. The United States determines to annex Texas; W. S. Parrott - sent to conciliate Mexico. - - July. Texas consents; Taylor proceeds to Corpus Christi. - - Oct. 17. Larkin appointed a confidential agent in California. - - Nov. 10. Slidell ordered to Mexico. - - Dec. 20. Slidell rejected by Herrera. - - 1846 - - Jan. 13. Taylor ordered to the Rio Grande. - - Mar. 8. Taylor marches from Corpus Christi. - - 21. Slidell finally rejected by Paredes. - - 28. Taylor reaches the Rio Grande. - - Apr. 25. Thornton attacked. - - May 8. Battle of Palo Alto. - - 9. Battle of Resaca de la Palma. - - 13. The war bill becomes a law. - - June 5. Kearny's march to Santa Fe begins. - - July 7. Monterey, California, occupied. - - 14. Camargo occupied. - - Aug. 4. Paredes overthrown. - - 7. First attack on Alvarado. - - 13. Los Angeles, California, occupied. - - 16. Santa Anna lands at Vera Cruz. - - 18. Kearny takes Santa Fe. - - 19. Taylor advances from Camargo. - - Sept. 14. Santa Anna enters Mexico City. - - 20-24. Operations at Monterey, Mex. - - 22-23. Insurrection in California precipitated. - - 23. Wool's advance from San Antonio begins. - - 25. Kearny leaves Santa Fe for California. - - Oct. 8. Santa Anna arrives at San Luis Potosi. - - Oct. 15. Second attack on Alvarado. - - 24. San Juan Bautista captured by Perry. - - 28. Tampico evacuated by Parrodi. - - 29. Wool occupies Monclova. - - Nov. 15. Tampico captured by Conner. - - 16. Saltillo occupied by Taylor. - - 18. Scott appointed to command the Vera Cruz expedition. - - Dec. 5. Wool occupies Parras. - - 6. Kearny's fight at San Pascual. - - 25. Doniphan's skirmish at El Brazito. - - 27. Scott reaches Brazos Id. - - 29. Victoria occupied. - - 1847 - - Jan. 3. Scott orders troops from Taylor. - - 8. Fight at the San Gabriel, Calif. - - 9. Fight near Los Angeles, Calif. - - 11. Mexican law regarding Church property. - - 28. Santa Anna's march against Taylor begins. - - Feb. 5. Taylor places himself at Agua Nueva. - - 19. Scott reaches Tampico. - - 22-23. Battle of Buena Vista. - - 27. Insurrection at Mexico begins. - - 28. Battle of Sacramento. - - Mar. 9. Scott lands near Vera Cruz. - - 29. Vera Cruz occupied. - - 30. Operations in Lower California opened. - - Apr. 8. Scott's advance from Vera Cruz begins. - - 18. Battle of Cerro Gordo; Tuxpan captured by Perry. - - 19. Jalapa occupied. - - May 15. Worth enters Puebla. - - June 6. Trist opens negotiations through the British legation. - - 16. San Juan Bautista again taken. - - Aug. 7. The advance from Puebla begins. - - 20. Battles of Contreras and Churubusco. - - Aug. 24-Sept. 7. Armistice. - - Sept. 8. Battle of Molino del Rey. - - 13. Battle of Chapultepec; the "siege" of Puebla begins. - - 14. Mexico City occupied. - - 22. Pena y Pena assumes the Presidency. - - Oct. 9. Fight at Huamantla. - - 20. Trist reopens negotiations. - - Nov. 11. Mazatlan occupied by Shubrick. - - - 1848 - - Feb. 2. Treaty of peace signed. - - Mar. 4-5. Armistice ratified. - - 10. Treaty accepted by U. S. Senate. - - May 19, 24. Treaty accepted by Mexican Congress. - - 30. Ratifications of the treaty exchanged. - - June 12. Mexico City evacuated. - - July 4. Treaty proclaimed by President Polk. - - - THE PRONUNCIATION OF SPANISH - -The niceties of the matter would be out of place here, but a few general -rules may prove helpful. - -_A_ as in English "ah"; _e_, at the end of a syllable, like _a_ in -"fame," otherwise like _e_ in "let"; _i_ like _i_ in "machine"; _o_, at -the end of a syllable, like _o_ in "go," otherwise somewhat like _o_ in -"lot"; _u_ like _u_ in "rude" (but, unless marked with two dots, silent -between _g_ or _q_ and _e_ or _i_); _y_ like _ee_ in "feet." - -_C_ like _k_ (but, before _e_ and _i,_ like [C]_th_ in "thin"); _ch_ as -in "child"; _g_ as in "go" (but, before _e_ and _i_, like a harsh _h_); -_h_ silent; _j_ like a harsh _h_; _ll_ like [D]_lli_ in "million"; _n_ -like _ni_ in "onion"; _qu_ like _k_; _r_ is sounded with a vibration -(trill) of the tip of the tongue (_rr_ a longer and more forcible sound -of the same kind); _s_ as in "sun"; _x_ like _x_ in "box" (but, in -"Mexico" and a few other names, like Spanish _j_); _z_ like [C]_th_ in -"thin." - -Words bearing no mark of accentuation are stressed on the last syllable -if they end in any consonant except _n_ or _s_, but on the syllable next -to the last if they end in _n_, _s_ or a vowel. - - [C] In Mexico, however, usually like _s_ in "sun." - - [D] In Mexico usually like _y_. - - - [Illustration: MEXICO IN 1919] - - - - - THE WAR WITH MEXICO - - - - - I - - MEXICO AND THE MEXICANS - - 1800-1845 - - -Mexico, an immense cornucopia, hangs upon the Tropic of Cancer and opens -toward the north pole. The distance across its mouth is about the same -as that between Boston and Omaha, and the line of its western coast -would probably reach from New York to Salt Lake City. Nearly twenty -states like Ohio could be laid down within its limits, and in 1845 it -included also New Mexico, Arizona, Utah, Nevada, California and portions -of Colorado and Wyoming.[1.1] - -On its eastern side the ground rises almost imperceptibly from the Gulf -of Mexico for a distance varying from ten to one hundred miles, and -ascends then into hills that soon become lofty ranges, while on the -western coast series of cordilleras tower close to the ocean. Between -the two mountain systems lies a plateau varying in height from 4000 to -8000 feet, so level--we are told--that one could drive, except where -deep gullies make trouble, from the capital of Montezuma to Santa Fe, -New Mexico. The country is thus divided into three climatic zones, in -one or another of which, it has been said, every plant may be found that -grows between the pole and the equator.[1.1][E] - - [E] It will be seen that occasionally the same "superior figure" is - attached to several paragraphs, and that sometimes these reference - numbers are not in consecutive order. The reasons will be - discovered when the reader consults the notes, which follow the - text of each volume. - -Except near the United States the coast lands are tropical or -semi-tropical; and the products of the soil, which in many quarters is -extraordinarily deep and rich, are those which naturally result from -extreme humidity and heat. Next comes an intermediate zone varying in -general height from about 2000 to about 4000 feet, where the rainfall, -though less abundant than on the coast, is ample, and the climate far -more salubrious than below. Here, in view of superb mountains and even -of perpetual snows, one finds a sort of eternal spring and a certain -blending of the tropical and the temperate zones. Wheat and sugar -sometimes grow on the same plantation, and both of them luxuriantly; -while strawberries and coffee are not far apart.[1.1] - - [Illustration: PROFILE OF THE ROUTE BETWEEN MEXICO AND VERA CRUZ] - -The central plateau lacks moisture and at present lacks trees. The -greater part of it is indeed a semi-desert, though a garden wherever -water can be supplied. During the wet season--June to October--it is -covered with wild growths, but the rains merely dig huge gullies or -_barrancas_, and almost as soon as they are over, most of the vegetation -begins to wither away. The climate of the plateau is quite equable, -never hot and never cold. Wheat, Indian corn and maguey--the plant from -which _pulque_, the drink of the common people, is made--are the most -important products; and at the north great herds of cattle roam. In the -mountains, finally, numberless mines yield large quantities of silver, -some gold, and a considerable amount of copper and lead.[1.1] - -The principal cities on the eastern coast are Vera Cruz, the chief -seaport, and Tampico, not far south of the Rio Grande River. In the -temperate zone between Vera Cruz and Mexico lie Jalapa and Orizaba, -and behind Tampico lies Monterey. On the central plateau one finds the -capital reposing at an elevation of about eight thousand feet and, about -seventy miles toward the southeast, Puebla; while on the other side of -the capital are the smaller towns of Queretaro and San Luis Potosi -toward the north, and Zacatecas and Chihuahua toward the northwest. -In the middle zone of the Pacific slope rises the large city of -Guadalajara, capital of Jalisco state; and along the coast below may be -found a number of seaports, the most important of which are Guaymas, far -to the north, Mazatlan opposite the point of Lower California, San Blas -a little farther down, and Acapulco in the south.[1.1] - -[THE PEOPLE] - -Exactly how large the population of Mexico was in 1845 one cannot -be sure, and it included quite a number of racial mixtures; but for -the present inquiry we may suppose it consisted of 1,000,000 whites, -4,000,000 Indians, and 2,000,000 of mixed white and Indian blood.[1.2] -The Spaniards from Europe, called Gachupines in Mexico, were of two -principal classes during her colonial days. Many had been favorites of -the Spanish court, or the proteges of such favorites, and had exiled -themselves to occupy for a longer or shorter time high and lucrative -posts; but by far the greater number were men who had left home in -their youth--poor, but robust, energetic and shrewd--to work their way -up. With little difficulty such immigrants found places in mercantile -establishments or on the large estates. Merciless in pursuit of gain yet -kind to their families, faithful to every agreement, and honest when -they could afford to be, they were intrinsically the strongest element -of the population, and almost always they became wealthy.[1.3] - -Their sons, poorly educated, lacking the spur of poverty, and finding -themselves in a situation where idleness and self-indulgence were their -logical habits, commonly took "_Siempre alegre_" (Ever light-hearted) -for their motto, and spent their energy in debauchery and gambling. -To this result their own fathers, while disgusted with it, usually -contributed. Spanish pride revolted at the ladder of subordination by -which these very men had climbed. They felt ambitious to make gentlemen -of their sons, and some easy position in the army, church or civil -service--or, in default of it, idleness--was the career towards which -they pointed; and naturally the heirs to their wealth, whose ignoble -propensities had prevented them from acquiring efficiency or sense of -responsibility, made haste, on getting hold of the paternal wealth, -to squander it. If the pure whites, with some exceptions of course, -fell into this condition, nothing better could fairly be expected of -those who were partly Indian; and before the revolution it was almost -universally felt in Spain and among the influential class of colonials -themselves, that nothing of much value could be expected of Creoles, as -the whites born in Mexico and the half-breeds were generally called. -The achievement of independence naturally tended to increase their -self-respect, broaden their views and stimulate their ambition; but the -less than twenty-five years that elapsed between 1821 and 1846, when -the war between Mexico and the United States began, were not enough to -transform principles, reverse traditions and uproot habits.[1.3] - -The pure-blooded Indians--of whom there were many tribes, little -affiliated if at all--had changed for the worse considerably since -the arrival of the whites. In their struggles against conquest and -oppression the most intelligent, spirited and energetic had succumbed, -and the rest, deprived of strength, happiness, consolation and even -hope, and aware that they existed merely to fill the purses or sate -the passions of their masters, had rapidly degenerated. Their natural -apathy, reticence and intensity were at the same time deepened. While -apparently stupid and indifferent, they were capable of volcanic -outbursts. Though fanatically Christian in appearance, they seem to -have practiced often a vague nature worship under the names and forms -of Catholicism. Indeed they were themselves almost a part of the soil, -bound in soul to the spot where they were born; and, although their -women could put on silk slippers to honor a church festival and every -hut could boast a crucifix or a holy image, they lived and often slept -beside their domestic animals with a brutish disregard for dirt.[1.3] - -Legally they had the rights of freemen and were even the wards of the -government, and a very few acquired education and property; but as -a rule they had to live by themselves in little villages under the -headship of lazy, ignorant caciques and the more effective domination -of the priests. As the state levied a small tax upon them and the -Church several heavy ones, their scanty earnings melted fast, and if -any surplus accumulated they made a fiesta in honor of their patron -saint, and spent it in masses, fireworks, drink, gluttony and gambling. -When sickness or accident came they had to borrow of the landowner -to whose estate they were attached; and then, as they could not leave -his employ until the debt had been discharged, they not only became -serfs, but in many cases bequeathed their miserable condition to -their children. Silent and sad, apparently frail but capable of great -exertion, trotting barefooted to and from their huts with their coarse -black hair flowing loosely or gathered in two straight braids, watching -everything with eyes that seemed fixed on the ground, loving flowers -much but a dagger more, fond of melody but preferring songs that were -melancholy and wild, always tricky, obstinate, indolent, peevish and -careless yet affectionate and hospitable, often extracting a dry humor -from life as their donkeys got nourishment from the thistles, they went -their wretched ways as patient and inscrutable as the sepoy or the -cat--infants with devils inside.[1.3] - -[THE CLASSES] - -At the head of the social world stood a titled aristocracy maintained by -the custom of primogeniture. But as the nobles were few in number, and -for a long time had possessed no feudal authority, their influence at -the period we are studying depended mainly upon their wealth. Next these -came aristocrats of other kinds. Some claimed the honor of tracing their -pedigree to the conquerors, and with it enjoyed great possessions; and -others had the riches without the descent. The two most approved sources -of wealth were the ownership of immense estates and the ownership of -productive mines. On a lower level stood certain of the rich merchants, -and lower still, if they were lucky enough to gain social recognition, -a few of those who acquired property by dealing in the malodorous -government contracts. To these must be added in general the high -dignitaries of the church, the foreign ministers, the principal generals -and statesmen and the most notable doctors and lawyers. Such was the -upper class.[1.4] - -A sort of middle class included the lesser professional men, prelates, -military officers and civil officials, journalists, a few teachers, -business men of importance and some fairly well-to-do citizens without -occupations. Of small farms and small mines there were practically -none, and the inferior clergy signified little. The smaller importing -and wholesale merchants came to be almost entirely British, French -and German soon after independence was achieved, and the retailers -were mostly too low in the scale to rank anywhere. The case of those -engaged in the industries was even more peculiar. Working at a trade -seemed menial to the Spaniard, especially since the idea of labor was -associated with the despised Indians, and most of the half-breeds and -Indians lacked the necessary intelligence. Skilled workers at the -trades were therefore few, and these few mostly high-priced foreigners. -Articles of luxury could be had but not comforts; pastries and ices -but not good bread; saddles covered with gold and embroidery, but not -serviceable wagons; and the highly important factor of intelligent, -self-respecting handicraftsmen was thus well-nigh missing.[1.4] - -The laboring class consisted almost entirely of half-breeds and -Indians. In public affairs they were not considered, and their own -degraded state made them despise their tasks. Finally, the dregs of the -population, especially in the large cities, formed a vicious, brutal and -semi-savage populace. At the capital there were said to be nearly 20,000 -of the _leperos_, as they were called, working a little now and then, -but mainly occupied in watching the religious processions, begging, -thieving, drinking and gambling. In all, Humboldt estimated at 200,000 -or 300,000 the number of these creatures, whose law was lawlessness and -whose heaven would have been a hell.[1.4] - -[THE CHURCH] - -The only church legally tolerated was that of Rome; and this, as the -unchallenged authority in the school and the pulpit, the keeper of -confessional secrets and family skeletons, and the sole dispenser -of organized charity, long wielded a tremendous power. The clerical -_fuero_, which exempted all ecclesiastics from the jurisdiction of the -civil courts, reinforced it, and the wealth and financial connections -of the Church did the same. In certain respects, however, the strength -of the organization began to diminish early in the nineteenth century; -and in particular the Inquisition was abolished in Mexico, as it was -in Spain. Soon after the colony became independent, a disposition to -bar ecclesiastics from legislative bodies, to philosophize on religious -matters and to view Protestants with some toleration manifested itself. -Ten years more, and the urgent need of public schools led to certain -steps, as we shall see, toward secular education. Political commotions, -the exactions of powerful civil authorities under the name of loans, -and various other circumstances cut into the wealth of the Church; and -the practical impossibility of selling the numberless estates upon which -it had mortgages or finding good reinvestments in the case of sales, -compelled it, as the country became less and less prosperous, to put up -with delays and losses of interest.[1.5] - -Moreover the Church was to no slight extent a house divided against -itself. Under Spanish rule and substantially down to 1848, all the high -dignities fell to Gachupines, who naturally faced toward Spain, whereas -the parish priests were mainly Creoles with Mexican sympathies; and -while the bishops and other managers had the incomes of princes, nearly -all of the monks and ordinary priests lived in poverty. There was, -therefore, but little in common between the two ranks except the bare -fact of being churchmen, which was largely cancelled on the one side by -contempt and on the other side by envy; and the common priests, having -generally sided against Spain during the revolution and always been -closely in touch with the people, exercised, in spite of their pecuniary -exactions, an influence that largely balanced the authority of their -heads. Finally, the ignorance of most ecclesiastics and the immorality -of nearly all greatly diminished their moral force. A large number, -even among the higher clergy, were unable to read the mass; and the -monks, who in the early days of the colony had rendered good service as -missionaries, were now recruited--wrote an American minister--from "the -very dregs of the people," and constituted a public scandal.[1.5] - -Still, the Church wielded immense power as late as 1845, and this was -reinforced by the type of religion that it offered. High and low alike, -the Mexicans, with some exceptions, lived in the senses, differing -mainly in the refinement of the gratifications they sought; and the -priests offered them a sensuous worship. Sometimes, almost crazed by -superstitious fears, men would put out the lights in some church, -strip themselves naked, and ply the scourge till every blow fell with -a splash. It was pleasanter, however, and usually edifying enough, to -kneel at the mass, gaze upon the extraordinary display of gold and -silver, gorgeous vestments, costly images and elaborately carved and -gilded woodwork, follow the smoke of the incense rolling upward from -golden censers, listen to sonorous incantations called prayers, and -confess to some fat priest well qualified to sympathize with every -earthy desire. A man who played this game according to the rule was -good and safe. A brigand counting the chances of a fray could touch his -scapularies with pious confidence, and the intending murderer solicit a -benediction on his knife. Enlightened Catholics as well as enlightened -non-Catholics deplored the state of religion in Mexico.[1.5] - -Next after the Church came the "army," which meant a social order, a -body of professional military men--that is to say, officers--exempted -by their fuero from the jurisdiction of the civil law and almost -exclusively devoted to the traditions, principles and interests of their -particular group. As the Church held the invisible power, the army held -the visible; and whenever the bells ceased to ring, the roll of the drum -could be heard. Every President and almost every other high official -down to the close of our Mexican war was a soldier, and sympathized -with his class; and as almost every family of any importance included -members of the organization, its peculiar interests had a strong social -backing. By force of numbers, too, this body was influential, for at -one time, when the army contained scarcely 20,000 soldiers, it had -24,000 officers; and so powerful became the group that in 1845, when -the real net revenue of the government did not exceed $12,000,000, its -appropriation was more than $21,000,000.[1.5] - -Under Spanish rule, although the army enjoyed great privileges, it -had been kept in strict subordination, and usefully employed on the -frontiers; but independence changed the situation. Apparently the -revolution was effected by the military men, and they not merely claimed -but commonly received the full credit. Not only did a large number of -unfit persons, who pretended to have commanded men during the struggle, -win commissions, but wholesale promotions were made in order to gain -the favor of the officers; and in these ways the organization was both -demoralized and strengthened. Over and over again military men learned -to forswear their allegiance, and at one time the government actually -set before the army, as a standard of merit, success in inducing -soldiers of the opposite party to change sides.[1.5] - -[THE ARMY] - -In the course of political commotions, to be reviewed in the next -chapter, the armed forces were more and more stationed at the cities, -where they lost discipline and became the agents of political schemers; -and naturally, when the government admitted their right to take part as -organized bodies in political affairs, the barracks came to supersede -the legislative halls, bullets took the place of arguments, and the -military men, becoming the arbiters on disputed points, regarded -themselves as supreme. Moreover, every administration felt it must have -the support of this organization, and, not being able to dominate it, -had to be dominated by it. Political trickery could therefore bring the -officer far greater rewards than professional merit, and success in a -revolt not only wiped away all stains of insubordination, cowardice and -embezzlement, but ensured promotion. A second lieutenant who figured -in six affairs of that sort became almost necessarily a general, and -frequently civilians who rendered base but valuable services on such -occasions were given high army rank. No doubt some risk was involved, -but it was really the nation as a whole that paid the penalties; and -anyhow one could be bold for a day far more easily than be courageous, -patient, studious, honest and loyal for a lifetime. All true military -standards were thus turned bottom-side up, and some of the worst -crimes a soldier can perpetrate became in Mexico the brightest of -distinctions.[1.5] - -Of course the discovery that rank and pay did not depend upon deserving -them set every corrupt officer at work to get advanced, while it drove -from the service, or at least discouraged, the few men of talents and -honor; and as all subordination ceased, a general not only preferred -officers willing to further his dishonorable interests, but actually -dreaded to have strong and able men serve in his command. In 1823 the -Mexican minister of war reported to Congress, "Almost the whole army -must be replaced, for it has contracted vices that will not be removed -radically in any other way," and four years later a militia system -was theoretically established with a view to that end; but the old -organization continued to flourish, and in April, 1846, the British -minister said, "The Officers ... are, as a Corps, the worst perhaps to -be found in any part of the world. They are totally ignorant of their -duty, ... and their personal courage, I fear, is of a very negative -character."[1.5] - -In 1838, a German visitor stated there were a hundred and sixty generals -for an army of thirty thousand, and this was perhaps a fair estimate -of the usual proportion; but out of all these, every one of whom could -issue a glowing proclamation, probably not a single "Excellency" -could properly handle a small division, while few out of thousands -of colonels could lead a regiment on the field, and some were not -qualified to command a patrol. A battle was almost always a mob fight -ending in a cavalry charge; and Waddy Thompson, an American minister to -Mexico, said he did not believe a manoeuvre in the face of the enemy -was ever attempted. Naturally the general administration of military -affairs became a chaos; and, worst of all, a self-respecting general -thought it almost a disgrace to obey an order--even an order from the -President.[1.5] - -The privates and non-commissioned officers, on the other hand, mainly -Indians with a sprinkling of half-breeds, were not bad material. The -Indians in particular could be described as naturally among the best -soldiers in the world, for they were almost incredibly frugal, docile -and enduring, able to make astonishing marches, and quite ready--from -animal courage, racial apathy or indifference about their miserable -lives--to die on the field. But usually they were seized by force, -herded up in barracks as prisoners, liberally cudgelled but scantily -fed, and after a time driven off to the capital, chained, in a double -file, with distracted women beside them wailing to every saint. When -drilled enough to march fairly well through the street in column, -clothed in a serge uniform or a coarse linen suit, and equipped with -an old English musket and some bad powder, they were called soldiers, -and were exhorted to earn immortal glory; but naturally they got -away if they could, and frequently on a long expedition half a corps -deserted.[1.5] - -Such men were by no means "thinking bayonets," and as a rule they -shot very badly, often firing with their guns at the hip in order to -avoid the heavy recoil. Not only did they lack the inspiration of good -officers, but in pressing times it was customary to empty the prisons, -and place their inmates in the ranks to inculcate vice. The government -furnished their wages, upon which as a rule they had to live from day -to day, even more irregularly than it paid the officers, and the latter -frequently embezzled the money; so that it became a common practice to -sell one's arms and accoutrements, if possible, for what they would -bring. Finally, the duty always enjoined upon the troops was "blind -obedience," not the use of what little intelligence they possessed; -and their bravery, like that of such officers as had any, was mainly -of the impulsive, passionate and therefore transient sort, whereas -Anglo-Saxon courage is cool, calculating, resolute and comparatively -inexhaustible.[1.5] - -The special pride of all military men was the cavalry; but the horses -were small, and the riders badly trained and led. "The regular Mexican -cavalry is worth nothing," wrote the British minister early in 1846; and -as the mounts were quite commonly hired merely for the parades, just as -the rolls of the whole army were stuffed with fictitious names on which -the officers drew pay, it was never certain how much of the nominal -force could be set in motion. As for the artillery, Waddy Thompson -remarked that in a battle of 1841 between the foremost generals of the -country, not one ball in a thousand reached the enemy. On the other hand -there were excellent military bands, and one of them dispensed lively -selections every afternoon in front of the palace at Mexico.[1.5] - -[THE CIVIL OFFICIALS] - -Third in the official order of precedence and in the actual control of -affairs came the government officials, and these, like the army and -the clergy, formed a special group with a similar fuero, a similar -self-interest and a similar disregard for the general good. Once -appointed to an office one had a vested right therein, and could not -legally be removed without a prosecution. To eliminate a person in -that manner was extremely difficult; and when the government, in a few -notorious instances, tried ejectment, the newspapers of the opposition -hastened to raise an outcry against it for attacking property rights, -and the culprits were soon reinstated.[1.5] - -Offering such permanence of tenure, a "genteel" status, idleness even -beyond the verge of ennui, a perfect exemption from the burden of -initiative, and occasional opportunities for illegitimate profits, -government offices appealed strongly to the Mexicans, and a greed for -them--dignified with the name of aspirantism when it aimed at the -higher positions--was a recognized malady of the nation. To get places, -all the tricks and schemes employed in the army and, if possible, still -more degrading intrigues were put in play; and offices had to be created -by the wholesale to satisfy an appetite that grew by what it fed upon. -The clerks became so numerous that work room--or rather desk room--could -not be provided for all of them. Only a favored portion had actual -employment and received full pay--if they received any--while the rest -were laid off on barely enough to support life. Some were competent -and willing to be faithful; but when they saw ignorance, laziness, -disloyalty and fraud given the precedence, they naturally asked, Why do -right? Idleness is the mother of vice; and so there was a very large -body of depraved and discontented fellows, wriggling incessantly for -preferment, fawning, backbiting, grabbing at any scheme that would -advance their interests, intensely jealous of one another, but ready to -make common cause against any purification of the civil service.[1.5] - -How justice was administered in Mexico one is now able to surmise. The -laws, not codified for centuries, were a chaos. Owing to numberless -intricacies and inconsistencies, the simplest case could be made almost -eternal, especially as all proceedings were slow and tedious. A litigant -prepared to spend money seldom needed to lose a suit. Some cases lasted -three generations. The methods of administering justice, reported the -British representative in 1835, "afford every facility" for "artifices -and manoeuvres."[1.6] - -Another difficulty was that the courts lacked prestige. During the -revolution the magistrates, practically all of them Gachupines, -committed so many acts of injustice in behalf of the government, that -people forgot the proper connection between crime and retribution. -Punishment seemed like a disease that any one might get. In 1833 the -minister of this department complained that for five years Congress -had almost ignored the administration of justice; and in 1845, the -head of the same department said that for a long time the government -had systematically reduced the dignity and influence of the judges and -magistrates. Their pay was not only diminished but often withheld; and -the official journal once remarked, that the authorities had more -important business in hand than paying legal functionaries.[1.6] - -This was obviously wrong, but in a sense the judges merited such -treatment, for they seem to have lacked even the most necessary -qualifications. To make the situation still worse, the executive -authorities had a way of stepping in and perverting justice arbitrarily. -Even the Mexicans were accustomed to say, "A bad compromise is better -than a good case at law"; but it was naturally aliens who suffered -most. "The great and positive evil which His Majesty's subjects, in -common with other Foreigners, have to complain of in this country is the -corrupt and perverse administration of justice," reported the minister -of England in 1834.[1.6] - -Criminal law was executed no better than civil. The police of the city -are a complete nullity, stated the American representative in 1845. A -fault, a vice and a crime were treated alike; and the prisons, always -crowded with wrongdoers of every class, became schools in depravity, -from which nearly all, however bad, escaped in the end to prey upon -society. Well-known robbers not only went about in safety, but were -treated with kindly attentions even by their late victims, for all -understood that if denounced and punished, they would sooner or later go -free, and have their revenge.[1.6] - -[EDUCATION] - -Adverting formally before Congress in 1841 to the "notoriously -defective" administration of justice, the Mexican President said, "the -root of the evil lies in the deplorable corruption which pervades -all classes of society and in the absence of any corrective arising -from public opinion." In large measure this condition of things was -chargeable to the low state of religion, but in part it could be -attributed to the want of education. Spain had required people to think -as little as possible, keep still and obey orders; and for such a role -enlightenment seemed unnecessary and even dangerous. To read and write a -little and keep accounts fairly well was about enough secular knowledge -for anybody, and the catechism of Father Ripalda, which enjoined the -duty of blind obedience to the King and the Pope, completed the circle -of useful erudition. In the small towns, as there were few elementary -schools, even these attainments could not easily be gained; and as for -the Indians they were merely taught--with a whip at the church door, if -necessary--to fear God, the priest and the magistrate. Religion gave no -help; and the ceremonies of worship benumbed the intellect as much as -they fascinated the senses.[1.6] - -When independence arrived, however, there sprang up not a little -enthusiasm for the education of the people, and the states moved quite -generally in that direction. But there were scarcely any good teachers, -few schoolhouses and only the most inadequate books and appliances; -money could not be found; and the prelates, now chiefly absorbed in -their political avocations, not only failed to promote the cause, but -stood in the way of every step toward secular schools. A few of the -leaders--notably Santa Anna--professed great zeal, but this was all for -effect, and they took for very different uses whatever funds could be -extorted from the nation. In 1843 a general scheme of public instruction -was decreed, but no means were provided to carry it into effect. The -budget for 1846 assigned $29,613 to this field, of which $8000 was -intended for elementary schools, while for the army and navy it required -nearly twenty-two millions. In short, though of course a limited number -of boys and a few girls acquired the rudiments--and occasionally -more--in one way or another, no system of popular education existed.[1.6] - -Higher instruction was in some respects more flourishing. Before the -revolution the School of Mines, occupying a noble and costly edifice, -gave distinction to the country; the university was respectable; an -Academy of Fine Arts did good work; and botany received much attention. -But at the university mediaeval Latin, scholastic and polemic theology, -Aristotle and arid comments on his writings were the staples, and even -these innocent subjects had to be investigated under the awful eye of -the Inquisition. Speculation on matters of no practical significance -formed the substance of the work, and the young men learned that worst -of lessons--to discourse volubly and plausibly on matters of which they -knew nothing. This course of discipline, emphasizing the natural bent -of the Creoles, turned out a set of conceited rhetoricians, ignorant -of history and the real world, but eager to distinguish themselves by -some brilliant experiment. When the yoke of Spain had been cast off, -all these institutions declined greatly, and the university became so -unimportant that in 1843 it was virtually destroyed; but the view that -speculation was better than inquiry, theory better than knowledge, -and talk better than anything--a view that suited Mexican lightness, -indolence and vanity so well, and had so long been taught by precept and -example--still throve despite a few objectors. Of foreign countries, in -particular, very little was commonly known. While elementary education, -then, was nothing, higher education was perhaps worse than nothing.[1.6] - -Nor could the printed page do much to supply the lack. Only a few had -the taste for reading books or opportunities to gratify the taste, if -they possessed it. Great numbers of catchy pamphlets on the topics -of the day flew about the streets; newspapers had a great vogue; and -there were poor echoes of European speeches, articles and books; but -most of the printed material was shockingly partisan, irresponsible -and misleading. "Unfortunately for us," observed the minister of the -interior in 1838, "the abuse of the liberty of the press among us is so -great, general and constant, that it has only served our citizens as the -light of the meteor to one travelling in a dark night, misguiding him -and precipitating him into an abyss of evils."[1.6] - -[THE INDUSTRIES] - -Only some 300,000 out of 3,000,000 white and mixed people were actual -producers--three times as many being clericals, military men, civil -officials, lawyers, doctors and idlers, and the rest old men, women -and children. The most brilliant of their industries was mining, the -annual output of which was about $18,000,000 in 1790, fell during the -revolution to $5,000,000, and by 1845 rose again--despite the unwise -policy of the government--to about the earlier level. During the period -of depression most of the old proprietors and many of their properties -were ruined; but English companies took up the work, and although -for some time their liberal expenditures went largely to waste, they -gradually learned the business, and their example encouraged some -Germans to enter the field. How greatly the nation profited from the -mines was not entirely clear. About as much silver went abroad each -year as they produced, paying interest on loans that should not have -been made, and buying goods for which substitutes could usually have -been manufactured at home. But the government laid valuable taxes -on the extraction and export of the precious metals, and there was -also a profit in the compulsory minting of them--though, as all the -inventiveness of the nation expended itself in politics, the processes -at the mints were about as tedious and costly in 1845 as while Cortez -ruled the country.[1.7] - -Little more can be said for the cultivation of the soil. When Mexico -separated from Spain, the vine and the olive, flax and certain other -plants formerly prohibited were acquired, and coffee soon became -important; but on the other hand agriculture had met with disaster -after disaster in the course of the revolution. "Up to the present," -said a ministerial report in December, 1843, "agriculture among us has -not departed from the routine established at the time of the conquest." -A cart-wheel consisted still of boards nailed together crosswise, cut -into a circular shape and bored at the centre; a pointed stick, shod -sometimes with iron, was still the plough; a short pole with a spike -driven through one end served as the hoe; the corn, instead of going -to a mill, was ground on a smooth stone with a hand roller; and no -adequate means existed of transporting such products as were raised -to such markets as could be found. Most of the "roads" made so much -trouble even for donkeys and pack-mules that it was seriously proposed -to introduce camels; and the most important road of all, the National -Highway from the capital to Jalapa and Vera Cruz, was allowed to become -almost impassable in spots. Besides poor methods, bad roads, brigands, -revolutions and a great number of holidays, there were customhouses -everywhere and a system of almost numberless formalities, the accidental -neglect of which might involve, if nothing worse, the confiscation of -one's goods. In short, how could agriculture prosper, said a memorial on -the subject, when he that sowed was not permitted to gather, and he that -gathered could reach no market?[1.7] - -[COMMERCE] - -However, more could be produced than used. The prime requisite was -population. So much appeared to be clear; and for that reason, as well -as to obtain the profits of the industries and prevent money from -going abroad, great efforts were made by independent Mexico to develop -manufacturing, which had been prohibited--though not with entire -success--by Spain. The year 1830 was a time of golden hopes in this -regard. At the instance of Lucas Alaman a grand industrial scheme went -into effect, and a bank was founded to promote it by lending public -money to intending manufacturers. Cotton fields were to whiten the -plains; merino sheep and Kashmir goats to cover the hillsides; mulberry -trees to support colonies of silk-worms; imported bees to produce the -tons of wax needed for candles; and ubiquitous factories to work up the -raw materials. A few men honestly tried to establish plants, but the -industry chiefly promoted by the law and the bank was that of prying -funds from the national treasury; and when this income failed, as it -did in a few years, many half-built mills came to a stop, and much -half-installed machinery began to rust. Alaman himself, partner in a -cotton factory, became bankrupt in 1841, and the bubble soon burst.[1.7] - -The manufacturers formed, however, a strong political clique, and in -their interest a system not only of protection, but of absolutely -prohibiting the importation of numerous articles, was adopted by law. -This had the effect of making the people pay dearly for many of their -purchases. The farmers, who wished raw materials kept out, had influence -too, and were always blocking the scheme of the manufacturers to let raw -materials in; and, as the cost of producing and transporting made native -goods dear, smuggled merchandise undersold Mexican articles even after -paying for the necessary bribery and other expenses. In a word, although -certain coarse and bulky things continued to be made in the country, the -endeavor to build up an industrial population, support agriculture, and -thus doubly strengthen the nation was very superficially planned and -very unsuccessfully carried out. Nearly all the better manufactures, a -large part of the food, most of the clothing, and substantially all the -luxuries came from abroad.[1.7] - -The business of importing continued to be mainly in Spanish hands for -some years after Mexico became independent, but for reasons that will -appear in the next chapter the Spaniard had to retire about 1830. The -British then obtained the lion's share; and as they were Protestants -they could not, even when they so desired, identify themselves with the -nation, and take a responsible share in public affairs. Commerce was -not, in fact, a source of strength. A few raw products were exported, -but essentially commerce consisted, as was natural, in merely receiving -goods from foreigners and letting the foreigners have money in return. -Moreover the volume of commerce dwindled notably, like that of all other -business. As for retail trade, when the Spaniards had to retire, it fell -mainly into Mexican hands; but it was conducted in a small way, the -profits were narrow, and the failures were many.[1.7] - -[LIFE IN THE COUNTRY] - -Even more significant for us, however, than such details were the life -and character of the people, and it may be helpful to call back the year -1845 and visit Mexico for a couple of days. First we will stroll along -a country road in a fairly typical region. The general aspect is one of -semi-wildness, but soon the tops of well-bleached ruins amid the soft -green indicate decrepitude instead, suggesting as the national character -decay preceding maturity. A long mule team approaches in a waving line, -and on a finely equipped horse at the head of it we observe a swarthy -man in green broadcloth trousers open on the outside from the knee down, -with bright silver buttons in a double row from hip to ankle, and loose -linen drawers visible where the trousers open. A closely fitting jacket, -adorned with many such buttons and much braid, is turned back at the -chin enough to reveal an embroidered shirt; and the costume reaches a -climax in a huge sombrero with a wide, rounding brim and high sugar-loaf -crown, adorned with tassels and a wide band of silver braid. This -gentleman, the _arriero_, is the railroad king of Mexico, for he and -others of his class transport the freight and express. Trust him with -anything you please, and it will surely be delivered; but should he be -unlucky at cards and out of work, he might rob you the next day.[1.8] - -A group of Indians meet us, little more human in appearance than the -donkeys they drive; and we observe how easily they carry loads on their -backs, and how quickly and lightly they march. Yonder we see their -huts--pigpens, Americans would suppose; and a little apart from these -we notice a stone or adobe house. Certainly there is nothing grand -about this dwelling, for it contains only a single room, and that half -full of implements, horse furniture, charcoal, provisions and what -not; but it affords a home for six or eight persons of the two sexes. -Presently the master, though not the owner, of the establishment rides -up, prodding his active but light and stubby horse with blunt steel -spurs almost as large as the palm of one's hand, to make a dash for our -benefit. Swinging his wife from the saddle-bow the _ranchero_ alights, -and we find him to be a short, wiry, muscular person, with a bronzed -and rather saturnine countenance but friendly and respectful manners. -He wears tough leggings, leather trousers, a small rectangular shawl -(_serape_) that falls over his back and breast, allowing his head to -protrude through a hole in the middle, and a wide sombrero, while at -the saddle-bow hang the inevitable lasso and a bag of corn and jerked -beef, one meal a day from which is all he requires. Apparently he does -not feel quite at home on the ground, and that is natural, for he -spends about half of his waking hours in the saddle. Herdsman, farmer -or brigand, according to circumstances, he is also cavalryman at need; -and a corps of such fellows, if properly trained and led, would make the -best light horse in the world, perhaps. His chief interests in life, -however, are gambling and cock-fighting, and he is quite capable of -losing all his worldly goods, his wife and even his pony at the national -game of monte, and then of lighting a cigarette and sauntering off -without a sign of regret.[1.8] - -Now we approach what may be called a village, but one extremely -different from a village in the United States. The great things are a -handsome grove and in the midst of it one old church of gray stone, full -of saints and relics and ancient plate, with a ragged, stupid Indian -crouching on the floor. Near by are two or three ranchero cottages with -a group of Indian huts in the distance, and yonder stands a large, -rambling edifice of stone with a mighty door and heavily barred windows. -From the ends of the building run high walls inclosing several acres, -and within the protected space may be seen a number of substantial -dwellings and what appear to be storehouses and stables, while far -away over hill and plain spreads the _hacienda_, an estate as large -as a county. Finally, on a gentle slope not far distant we observe a -monastery with a rich garden behind it, and a fat, contented prior -riding sleepily up to its arched gateway through a dozen or two of -kneeling aborigines.[1.8] - -Toward evening we reach the state capital, and as we cross a bridge -on the outskirts, we see a crowd of people bathing. Both sexes are -splashing and swimming, all as happy as ducks and all entirely nude. -Even the presence of strangers does not embarrass the young women, -some of whom are decidedly good-looking; and they even try to draw our -attention by extra displays of skill. Looking for an inn we discover -two lines of low, rickety buildings alternating with heaps of rubbish, -fodder and harness. After some efforts a waiter is found and we obtain a -room, with a mule already slumbering in one corner of it and all sorts -of household litter thrown about. A wretched cot with a rope bottom, a -dirty table and an abundance of saints portrayed in Mexican dress help -to make the place homelike. The waiter is amiable, and ejects the mule -with a great show of indignation; but when we ask for water and a towel -his good nature fails. "Oh, what a man," he cries, flinging up his -hands; "What a lunatic, Ave Maria Purisima; Ha! Ha! Ha! He wants water, -he wants a towel; what the devil--! Good-by." The dining-room is a hot, -steamy cell, fitted up with charcoal furnaces; and for viands we are -offered plenty of hard beef, _chile_ (pepper) and _tortillas_ (flapjacks -of a sort), besides a number of dishes that only a native could either -describe or eat. Chile and tortillas appear, however, to be the -essentials; and the latter, partly rolled up, serve also as spoons.[1.8] - -After dinner we look about the town. All is monotonous and sombre. The -houses, mostly of one story, form a continuous wall along the street--or -along the sidewalk, if there be one--and their projecting, heavily -barred windows, in front of which the young fellows have to do their -courting, suggest prisons more than homes. Now we come to the massive, -crumbling, gloomy church, and wonder where the priest keeps the family -which everybody knows he has. Here is the government house, and we stop -to picture the wily politicians, who--with noble exceptions--obtain the -offices of local grandeur, and the little horde of clerks, many of them -rendered prematurely decrepit by their vices, that fawn but cannot be -made to work at the nod of authority. In vain we look for a book-store, -though somewhere that name doubtless appears on a sign; but we do find -the office of the comandante general, an officer who represents the -central power, has charge of the military, and often is mining and -counter-mining in a sharp struggle with the governor. How intolerably -dull it must be to live here! Business of a large sort there is none. -The little newspapers are scarcely more than echoes from partisan -sheets at Mexico. Religion is a subject that one must let alone, and -education a subject that it is useless to discuss. Of science, history, -art, nothing is known. The small men in power brook no criticism except -from enemies. Affairs in other states, even a famine or a flood, -excite little interest. Not much is left except petty intriguing and -the gratification of coarse appetites. A revolution is about the only -possible escape from this more deadly ennui.[1.8] - -[LIFE AT MEXICO] - -Our second day shall be given to the metropolis. The suburbs of Mexico -are mostly ragged and unclean, but some broad avenues lined with fine -trees run through them, and entering the city by one of these we make -our way to the great central plaza. On the eastern side of this extends -the palace, a very long two-storied building of little distinction, and -on the northern side towers the huge cathedral, quite in the grand, -heavy, Spanish style, seamed with earthquake scars and pockmarked by -revolutionary bullets. It is a Sunday morning and still rather early, -but the plaza is alive. The usual nightly crop of dead and wounded is -being carried to the morgue or the hospital. Sick men, cripples and -stalwart beggars are beginning to pose for alms. Prisoners in chains -are pretending to put the streets in order; but their guards, with that -mixture of good nature and indolence that characterizes the Mexican -unless his passions are excited, let them do about as they please, and -they take their cue for street-cleaning from the Book of Revelation: -They that be filthy, let them be filthy still.[1.8] - -Indians in various tribal costumes, mostly picturesque and all dirty, -patter through the square with loads of provisions or babies. As -no stoves or fireplaces exist, the charcoal man's loud "Carbosiu!" -(_Carbon, senor!_) resounds through the streets. So does the plaintive -cry of the water-carrier, bending under his great earthen jar, for the -houses are all supplied from a few public fountains, the termini of -aqueducts. "Orchata, lemon, pineapple, tamarind!" calls out a shrill -voice; "What will you take, my darling? This way for refreshment:" -and we see a good-looking girl in a short skirt expanded wide with -hoops, her arms bare and her bodice cut low enough for a ball, selling -"temperance" drinks. Here is a dingy cell stuffed with chin-basins, -razors, dental implements, boxes of pomade, a guitar, a fighting-cock -tethered in a corner, and sundry pictures of saints, parrots and -battles; and there a cigar shop with a slender, black-eyed girl behind -the counter, bold enough and handsome enough, even without the red rose -in her hair, to tempt St. Anthony. Observe the _evangelista_, or public -letter-writer, with two quills and an inkstand ready on his little desk -under a canopy of straw matting; and observe, too, that lepero with his -back against a donkey's pannier, robbing the pannier while he pretends -to be buying a knife.[1.8] - -Priests in long shovel hats; lousy soldiers in ragged, ill-fitting -uniforms; gaudy officers chatting and smoking; jugglers with snakes and -balls; cynical dandies retailing love affairs; half-naked leperos in the -corners sleeping off their pulque; lottery venders with long strings -of tickets; sellers of flowers, toys, candy, glass, wax-work, mock -jewellery, cheap cutlery, and a thousand other things; closed carriages -taking ladies to church; more beggars and still more--these and many -other sights keep us too busy for reflection; but we cannot help -noticing that seven out of ten persons are social drones or parasites, -and that vice of one sort or another dims the face and weakens the step -of almost every one. Suddenly a light bell tinkles, and the crowd is -instantly grave and still. "God is coming," they whisper, or in other -words the viatic is going to a sick man. A coach drawn by two mules -and followed by a dozen slovenly friars holding lighted candles and -chanting, comes slowly down a street. All uncover and kneel, and we must -do likewise or very likely get a pummelling.[1.8] - -This reminds us of duty; and, electing the cathedral in preference to -sixty other churches, we enter. Before us is a great throng, chiefly -women and leperos, of most devout worshippers. The finest ladies in -the city are here, dressed all in black, with no ornaments except -a silk mantilla, edged with lace, and a high tortoise-shell comb; -and they kneel humbly beside the drudge or the beggar. The church -itself--designed in the Spanish style, which places the choir in the -middle of the nave and a balustraded walk between that and the great -altar--with a cloud of incense filling the air and many hundreds -of candles gleaming murkily from the shrines, is most mysterious -and impressive. The gorgeousness of the sacred ornaments amazes us. -Literally tons of silver are in sight; gold, precious stones and gems -abound; and magnificent vestments try to hide the vulgar priests. But -the splendor is oppressive, and the stench of the leperos intolerable; -let us return to the light of day.[1.8] - -All the streets are laid out at right angles, and most of the houses -that line them are in two stories, of which the lower one is reserved -for horses, carriages, servants, cows and storage; and the walls, built -of rough stone, are very thick. The outside is usually frescoed in -white, orange, blue, red or pale green, and often adorned with pious -verses or biblical texts. Entering the big double gateway, we find -ourselves in a courtyard, upon which doors and grated windows open; and -we observe that a covered balcony of wrought iron or possibly bronze, -reached by a central stairway and giving access to the rooms of the -second story, is built round it. In many courtyards there are flowers -and a fountain, and sometimes there are trees. Occasionally we find -what looks like a grandee's residence, for Mexico was called in the -Spanish time a city of palaces, and some of these residences, built of -superior stone, equipped with gilded balconies and stairs, adorned with -artistic sculptures, and perhaps decorated with Dutch tiles in blue and -white, have survived in a fair condition the ruin of fortunes and the -disappearance of titles; but at their best they were always imperfect, -reminding one of the golden image with clay feet, and now most of them -are dilapidated.[1.8] - -Here is a gambling place, well filled; but it is only the usual monte, -and if we care to watch a game, there will be something like a thousand -more opportunities. Already, people are making for the bull-fight; but -the upper classes mostly ignore that sport, and we may well follow -their example. On the other hand let us drop in at the cock-pit. "Hail, -immaculate Mary, the cocks are coming!" the herald is proclaiming. On -the benches one may see the most delicate and fashionable young ladies -of the city as well as the sharpest gamblers, and everything is quiet -and orderly. But a glance is enough; and now as the "quality" will soon -have dined, we will stroll on past the stately trees of the Alameda to -the New Promenade, and be ready for them.[1.8] - -Here, every afternoon at about five o'clock, and especially on Sunday, -may be seen the Mexican elite. About a thousand carriages are in line -to-day, many of them heavy, grand affairs from Europe, but some very -antiquated and shabby, for the lady, however poor, must have a carriage -of some sort. Here one sees the fair sex at their best. Clad in the -most sumptuous and brilliant costumes they can possibly obtain and -well covered with diamonds--for everybody above the rank of a lepero -has diamonds--they sit up straight and handsome, and many of them -look almost regal. More horses than mules are to be seen, and many of -them have been imported. Guided by postilions instead of drivers, the -carriages roll sedately along with an exchange of mutual salutes but -not a word of conversation, and after a turn or two draw up and stop -side by side, so that the ladies may review some four or five thousand -cavaliers, who now ride past.[1.8] - -Each gallant, without appearing to notice the carriage of his choice, -pays court to an adored occupant of it by a special show of grace and -horsemanship as he goes by. Small fortunes in silver and gold are -lavished on the equipment of the steed, and the cavalier is resplendent -in his tightly fitting trousers, short jacket, huge sombrero, gilded -spurs, silver buttons, silk braid and gold lace. For us the impression -is impaired considerably by his manner of riding, for he leans forward, -puts barely his toes into the stirrup, and carries his heels far back; -but he can ride very showily after all, curvetting and prancing, and the -Mexicans are fully satisfied that no other horsemen in the world are -their equals.[1.8] - -The promenade over, all go to the play--not that anybody of fashion -cares for it, but because that is the style, and few have any other way -to pass the time. Let us have a look ourselves at the principal theatre, -which travellers have pronounced--after one at Naples--the finest -edifice of the kind. It accommodates more than eight thousand persons, -and the rent of the best boxes is about $3000 a year. But almost every -man and many of the women appear to be smoking; one can hardly see -the actors; the noise of conversation is distracting; and as we are -not adepts in the play of glances and fans which keep so many ladies -in the boxes and so many gallants in the pit fully occupied, we shall -find it pleasanter at the British legation ball. _Allons!_ Why, what a -clangor the church bells are making! To be sure that opens the gates of -purgatory for a while and gives the inmates a respite, but it certainly -bears rather hard on the living.[1.8] - -While by nature the most sociable of people, the Mexicans are the least -so in practice, wrote an American minister at that capital. This is -partly because many of social rank now lack the means to entertain, and -partly because society is cut up by intrigues, jealousies and bitter -memories; but at a foreign legation one has no expenses, and all meet on -neutral ground. As we enter, everything seems fine and even brilliant. -Diamonds are in profusion again, and the lustre of the great pearls -matches them. But in Mexico it is never wise to look closely, for gross -imperfections are sure to be discovered; and here, as we soon observe, -the gowns are not really in style, and the musicians are only unshaven, -half-blind, tatterdemalion scrapers.[1.8] - -However, the people are what we care for, and they are certainly most -interesting. Again we see the dignified ladies; they move now, and with -a decided though rather ponderous grace. Conversation is not their -forte, for they seldom read and never think; but all have beautiful -eyes, teeth and hair; all have small hands and feet; and all are -amiable, sincerely kind and by no means wanting in tact. The older -ones appear stout and rather phlegmatic, it is true, but those of an -earlier age are often fascinating. Look for instance at the girl under -the chandelier, plainly all sentiment and senses, not really tall but -slender enough to appear so, with a profile of carved ivory, pale cheeks -just warmed with crimson, large, dark, languorous eyes, and a voluptuous -figure disguised with no stays; and all this poised seemingly on the toe -of a dainty satin slipper. What matters it if she and the rest of the -ladies passed their day in gazing idly out of windows, smoking, nibbling -sweetmeats and chattering trifles, and did not put on their stockings or -do up their hair until dinner-time?[1.8] - -But for us the men are more important. That short individual in -spectacles, who looks erudite and speaks in a low tone with a -gravity and reserve that emphasize his remarks, is Alaman, the most -distinguished of the conservatives. The thin-featured, sharp-nosed -person, so elegant and cynical, is Tornel, posing now in his favorite -attitude as the patron of learning. Smooth-faced Bocanegra, an honorable -if not very able statesman, is talking yonder to the British minister -with the easy courtliness of a genuine hidalgo. Handsome and brave -Almonte--"a good boy," as Santa Anna calls him--is laying siege to the -belle under the chandelier; and Pena y Pena, seemingly rather dry and -uninspired, is debating somewhat laboriously with a brother judge.[1.8] - -Let us join a group. How strong, genial, easy, ready and gay, yet -dignified and reposeful, they all are! Few indeed of our own countrymen -could be so charming. Some one approaches, and they grasp him warmly by -the hand, throwing the left arm at the same time round his shoulder and -softly patting his back. "Friend," "Comrade," are frequent salutations. -We are presented to the group, and find ourselves at once among devoted -intimates. "My house is yours," exclaims one with a look that carries -conviction. "Remember, I exist only to serve you," says another. "Only -command me and all that are mine," exclaims a third.[1.8] - -Mexico, however, reported a British minister, "judged merely by outward -Appearances, is a perfectly different thing from Mexico seen in the -Interior." One might be presented with a dozen houses and all their -contents, yet go to bed on the sidewalk hungry. These friends and -comrades are daily intriguing and conspiring against one another. Talk -with an eloquent declaimer, and you will find his beautiful ideas vague -and impracticable. Discuss them with him, and you will either excite -wrath by demolishing his opinions or earn contempt--since he suspects -in his heart that he is an ignoramus--by letting him vanquish you. -Notice how lightly they speak of religion. That is considered good -form. The Church is to be regarded as an institution for the women. -But at bottom almost every one is mortally afraid of the hereafter, -as a child is afraid of the dark, and when seriously ill is ready to -grovel before a priest. The apparent robustness of these men, largely -due to their indolence, is too often undermined by Cyprian accidents, -which are confessed without hesitation. Hardly one of the husbands is -loyal to his vows, while the other sex care only to elude numberless -watchful eyes, and observe a strict regard for appearances; and in -the lower walks a mother will quite readily sell her daughter's good -name. However, courtesy is delightful whatever lies behind it, and if -a person will try to eat a picture of grapes, he should blame himself -for his disappointment. Temperament, environment and education make -sangfroid and intellectual mastery impossible here; and in a world -where passionate men and women grow up in traditions of idleness and -self-indulgence they can hardly be expected, especially with the -bad example of their priests before them, to be distinguished for -self-restraint.[1.8] - -Meanwhile, are the common people at home knitting? Let us walk back to -the cathedral. The full moon is out. Almost above us rise the powerful -towers against the clear firmament, and on our left is the palace, -filling one whole side of the square with its numberless balconies -and windows, while in front spreads the great plaza, glittering with -innumerable lights against the shadowy arcades that fill the opposite -side. The sky is a soft, pale blue; and the stars, fading near the -brilliant moon, appear like dust raised by her chariot wheels. Under the -trees on our right a huge serpent, the scales of which are human beings, -turns, winds, bends, parts and rejoins in a circular promenade.[1.8] - -Some occupy themselves with prosaic thoughts,--business, politics -or social events--and a few talk of science and poetry. Yonder goes -a millionaire, a real king of gold, at sight of whom all hats come -off, while all eyes court his glance; but another, who passes with -a triumphant step and bold gestures, appears to the crowd a greater -man, for he is the king of the sword, the king of the bull-ring, the -_matador_. But most, perhaps, are talking and thinking of love and of -pleasure. Furtive but meaning glances are often exchanged; occasionally -hand presses hand under the folds of the cloak; at times a few -mysterious words pass quickly; now and then one sees a pretty woman -on the arm of her bold lover, showing herself proudly to the world, -while the husband follows on behind as best he can; and here and there -a scowling, discarded friend looks out from behind a post with a knife -clutched behind him. - -Would you like to see a little more? Then visit the Barrio Santa Anna, -and watch men with bloodshot eyes and women in red petticoats and loose, -open chemisettes dancing a wild fandango, or plunge into a lepero's -dive and watch the pariahs gambling sedately with a bloody knife on the -table before them, while down in one corner a crouching woman moans and -mutters over a prostrate figure. But how lightly all is done, even the -tragedies, compared with northern depth and seriousness. In a sense we -feel we are observing children.[1.8] - -Of course in so brief a space the subject of this chapter could not be -thoroughly treated, but our inquiry seems to make certain facts plain. -Little in the material, mental and moral spheres was really sound in -the Mexico of 1845. Her population was insufficient, and was badly -welded together, so far as it had been welded at all; and while the -lower orders of the people lay deep in ignorance, laziness and vice, the -upper class, if we ignore exceptions, were soft, superficial, indolent -and lax, urbane, plausible and eloquent, apathetic but passionate, -amiable and kind though cruel when excited, generous but untrustworthy, -wasteful but athirst for gain, suspicious and subtle but not sagacious, -personally inclined to be pompous and nationally afflicted with a -provincial vanity, greatly enamoured of the formalities of life, -greatly wanting in the cool, steady resolution for which occasional -obstinacy is a poor substitute, and still more wanting in that simple, -straightforward, sober and solid common sense which is the true -foundation of personal and national strength. In particular, the Mexican -was intensely personal. This made him and his politics very interesting -yet was really unfortunate, for in such men principles and institutions -could have but feeble roots. Finally, as one result of this awareness -of self, every man of any strength had the instincts of a dictator. -Authority he instinctively resented; but on the other hand, when some -one appeared to be dominant, a consciousness of this inner recalcitrancy -and a fear of its being detected, combining with a hope of favors, -produced adulation and apparent slavishness. - -Evidently, then, Mexico was not intrinsically a strong country. -Evidently her people had few qualifications for self-government. -Evidently, too, they were unlikely to handle in the best manner a grave -and complicated question requiring all possible sanity of judgment and -perfect self-control; and, in particular, misunderstandings between them -and a nation like the United States were not only sure to arise but sure -to prove troublesome. - - - - - II - - THE POLITICAL EDUCATION OF MEXICO - - 1800-1845 - - -It was of course the political side of Mexican civilization that had the -most direct bearing on our relations with that country, and this can -best be explained by approaching it historically. At the same time we -shall be aided in studying, not only some of the principal figures in -the war and their mutual attitudes, but some of its most important and -mysterious events. - -The colonial regime of Spain was intended and carefully planned to -ensure the safety, prosperity and contentment of her distant subjects, -but for certain reasons it worked badly. Like all nations of that -period, she believed that her colonies existed for the good of the -mother-country, and aimed first of all to control and exploit them. She -had to depend upon very human agents that were practically beyond her -reach. While theoretically all Mexicans, except the aborigines, enjoyed -an equality before the law, the government felt that emigrants from the -Peninsula were especially worthy of confidence; and at the same time -not a few of these men had friends industriously scheming for them at -court. The consequences were, first, the establishment of a powerful -Gachupine oligarchy, largely dependent on the royal will, the lowest -member of which, even if penniless, felt superior to every Creole, -and, secondly, the enthronement of privilege, often gained by ignoble -means, in government, army, church and business. The Creoles--overawed -by the almost divine prestige of the king, trembling before his power, -and convinced that only his troops could protect them against the -Indians--submitted; but they hated their insolent oppressors, and the -Indians hated both groups. On the principle of "Divide and conquer" -the government fomented these dissensions; and, supported by the -intolerance of the Church, it did its utmost to bar out foreigners and -foreign ideas in order to ensure an unreasoning subordination.[1.1] - -What Mexico owed to Spain, therefore, aside from the remembrance and -fruits of an efficiency that she could not hope to equal, was a settled -tradition of arbitrary rule based on force, of authority selfishly -and often corruptly used, of the government as possessing the sole -initiative, of social disunion resulting from privilege and monopoly, -of personal successes frequently due to intrigue or purchased favor, of -political indifference except among the controlling or aspiring cliques, -of apathy concerning all high interests, of ignorance, inertness, -fanaticism, hard oppression, blind obedience, passionate feuds and gross -pleasures.[2.1] - -[THE REVOLUTION AGAINST SPAIN] - -Little by little new ideas reached a few of the more intelligent, -however. The American Declaration of Independence became known, and also -the fact that Spain, by supporting England's rebellious colonies, had -cooperated with heretics long pictured as infidels and fiends. Echoes -from Diderot's encyclopaedia and reports of the French revolution crept -in; and the natural desire both to share on equal terms in the offices -and in business, and to escape from the extra cost of living due to the -monopolies, quickened thought. When war with England led to the raising -of Mexican troops, a new sense of power began to be felt; when the -Spanish monarchy crumbled before Napoleon in 1808, the illusion of the -king's divinity and invincibility faded; when the royal family exhorted -the Mexicans to accept the heir of the French revolution as their -master, loyalty quivered to its base; and when the people of Spain took -up arms to defend their betrayed nationality, the principle of popular -sovereignty loomed up as greater than royal prerogatives. Finally the -mass of the people, though too apathetic to realize the full meaning of -these facts, were roused by a thunder-clap at home.[2.2] - -Struggling with the crisis precipitated by events in the Peninsula, -the viceroy--partly to gain support for himself, it is probable, and -partly to gain support for the monarchy--showed a disposition to give -the Creoles a voice in the government, upon which the leaders of the -oligarchy were so amazingly foolish as to depose him by force, and usurp -his authority. This conduct proved that much of their boasted loyalty -and supposed ability had been shams, that what they really meant was to -enjoy the wealth and power, that the cause of the Creoles was not one -of subjects against their king, but one of subjects against subjects, -and that only force could settle the issue. Dreams of independence -immediately crystallized into schemes of insurrection.[2.2] - -Foremost among the conspirators was Hidalgo, commonly described by the -Mexicans as a Washington, but in reality a kindly, public-spirited, -mockingly irreligious and frankly immoral priest. His plans were -discovered; and so on the sixteenth of September, 1810, in the -desperate hope of saving himself and his associates, he called upon -the Indians, rabid with fanaticism and hatred of their oppressors, to -rise against the Spanish, who, he declared, had now allied themselves -with infidel Frenchmen against their holy religion. What followed was -like the bursting of reservoirs filled with blood and fire. Scarcely -a trace of statesmanship was exhibited by the leaders; most of their -disciples acted like fiends let loose; and their enemies did little -better. Soon many common priests, many Creole military men, and not a -few other persons who felt sore under the heel of wealth and power and -were ambitious to rise, embraced the cause, and so many of the rest -sympathized with Hidalgo's demand for independence, that probably by -good management he could have succeeded; but against a campaign like -his the substantial elements of society found it necessary to combine, -and when the heads of the insurrection were betrayed, captured and shot -in 1811, little of it remained except horrible memories and lessons in -conspiracy, treachery, hate, folly, wholesale destruction and wholesale -murder.[2.2] - -In a new form, however, the cause of independence lived on. Instead of -wild hordes crying, "Death to the Gachupines!" there were now for the -most part stealthy but merciless bands of guerillas, and the government -soldiers followed close behind them in daring and ruthlessness. On the -coast near Vera Cruz an officer named Antonio Lopez de Santa Anna won a -captaincy about this time by hunting down insurgents, and on the plateau -a handsome, dashing man with brown hair and reddish side-whiskers named -Agustin de Iturbide, who had negotiated with Hidalgo about accepting -the lieutenant generalship of the revolutionary army, distinguished -himself on the royal side for greed and bloodthirstiness. In 1814 he -wrote to the viceroy one Good Friday, "In honor of the day, I have just -ordered three hundred excommunicated wretches to be shot," and the women -among his prisoners fared no better than the men. On the other side -Nicolas Bravo, whose father had been taken and executed, won a noble -distinction by releasing about three hundred captives despite orders -to kill them; Guadalupe Victoria, as he named himself, earned renown -by living in caves like a wild beast rather than give up; and Vicente -Guerrero, operating at the south in unexplored mountains, exhibited -great resourcefulness, remarkable knowledge of men and extraordinary -courage. The principal hero of this period, however, was Morelos, an -Indian priest, who showed himself a consummate partisan leader.[2.2] - -So successful were these and the many other chiefs in terrorism, -robbery, slaughter and sack, and so deep a sentiment in favor of -independence now existed, that with a little sagacity in counsel and a -little concert in action the cause might have triumphed; but ambitions, -jealousies, insubordination, disloyalty and political incompetence -ruined everything, and by the end of 1819, although Guerrero still made -head a little, the second phase also of the revolution was substantially -at an end, leaving behind it hot embers of turmoil, fighting, treachery -and massacre, and countless examples of making pillage a livelihood, -selfishly disregarding the common cause, and grossly blundering in -political management. Thought and feeling in Mexico had, however, been -so educated by reflection, experience, discussion and foreign comments -during the past nine or ten years, that a longer acceptance of the -old regime could not be expected. Absolutism, though triumphant, was -doomed.[2.2] - -[ITURBIDE] - -The fatal blow came from its champions. In 1820 a revolution in Spain -revived the liberal constitution that had been adopted eight years -before and then had been abolished by Ferdinand VII; and Apodaca, -now viceroy of Mexico, felt compelled to proclaim the new law. The -troops and the people began to dread another civil war; and the -oligarchy, especially the Church dignitaries, concluding at once that -only separation from the mother-country could save their privileges, -looked about for an instrument. One was easily found. Iturbide's greed -had finally driven him from his post, his fortune had been wasted in -self-indulgence, and he was now desperate. Long since, his active mind -had seen that if the Creole troops could be seduced, they--supported -by the revolutionary sentiment of the people--could overmatch about -half their number of Spanish regiments; and he agreed readily to become -the champion of autocracy in order to betray it. Cleverly deceiving -the government, he obtained a command through the aid of his backers, -and, in order to clear the field, attacked Guerrero. To dispose of that -wary foe proved, however, no easy task; so he negotiated privately -with a public enemy, described himself as "destitute of ambition and -self-interest," and finally inveigled the insurgent leader into joining -the conspiracy. Victoria followed that example. Santa Anna, though -recently made a lieutenant colonel by the viceroy, came over with his -men. Other leaders did the same; and on February 24, 1821, Iturbide felt -strong enough to announce a programme, the famous Plan of Iguala.[2.2] - -This declared for independence, a limited monarchy under a Bourbon -king, the Roman Catholic church as the sole form of religion, the -old _fueros_, the right of office-holders to retain their posts, the -fraternal union and political equality of Gachupines, Creoles and -Indians, and the appointment of a committee (_junta_) to govern Mexico -provisionally. No scheme could have seemed more inviting, and none could -have been more delusive, for it ignored insurmountable difficulties -and promised incompatible advantages. In all probability Iturbide knew -this; but prelates, troops, officials and people took the shining bait; -O'Donoju, the new Spanish general, deciding it would be useless to -fight, made a treaty with the revolutionary chief; and on September 27, -1821, Iturbide carried the tricolor through the gate of the capital, -stopped his gallant black charger at the convent of San Francisco, -and received the golden keys of the city. Obedience, the sole basis -of Mexican society, had been swept away; treachery and perjury had -triumphed; and yet the unthinking multitude hurrahed.[2.2] - -The generalisimo, violating the principle of popular sovereignty, now -appointed the junta himself, excluding all the old revolutionists; that -body in turn elected him and four associates to exercise the executive -power as regents; and a Constituent Congress was prematurely summoned -to draw up an organic law. The situation soon proved to be extremely -difficult. Resentments needed to be healed, jealousies appeased, -commerce and the industries put in motion, and the whole edifice of -society and politics rebuilt on new foundations out of incongruous -elements. Peculiarly urgent was the demand for money--the more so as -some of the taxes were abolished in order to sweeten the revolution, -while the expenses grew. On entering Mexico Iturbide had proclaimed, -"You see me in the most opulent of capitals;" and every one expected the -new government--an independent, Mexican, popular government--to bear -an open purse. In October, 1821, some fourteen thousand claims were -presented to it.[2.3] - -Iturbide, whatever his aims and whatever his faults, was the sole -Mexican of recognized preeminence, the sole possible rallying point; -and patriotism called upon all to support his prestige and patiently -correct his errors until society could take shape. Nothing of the sort -occurred, however. The army idolized him; the civil officials counted -on him; the prelates feared him less than they did his enemies; and -the masses, ignorant of what went on below the surface, revered him as -the Father of Independence; but the cheated absolutists, disappointed -borbonistas, cajoled insurgents, distanced comrades, eclipsed leaders -and unsuccessful claimants, the patriots, indignant that a cruel -royalist should be the heir of the revolution, the republicans, few -in number but increasingly influential, the friends of those he had -massacred or plundered, and behind all the Scottish Rite Freemasons, who -were liberals yet partisans of Spain--all these hated and dogged him. -Honors and emoluments were heaped upon him to excite envy and odium; his -weaknesses were baited; his strength was provoked; his administrative -blundering was stimulated instead of corrected. When financial -necessities compelled him to decree a forced loan, paper money and other -arbitrary measures, many began to denounce him as a tyrant. Plausibly -enough he was accused of disloyalty to his pledges and of aiming to be -king. Finally his enemies, making the most of certain indiscretions that -he committed, undertook to remove him from the command of the army. -Whatever had been his purpose, he now found it necessary to strike; and -a mutiny of the troops--endorsed later by the Congress under military -and mob pressure--declared him emperor.[2.3] - -Expenses then increased still more. Jealousies and enmities were -embittered. Public sentiment veered sharply. Time, strength and -funds were swallowed up in pomps that created no more illusion than -a college student in a toga. Encompassed with flatterers, foes and -traitors, financially and politically incompetent himself and guided by -incompetent advisers, well enough aware that after deceiving everybody -he could expect no one to be true, Iturbide lost his head, sometimes -wavered and sometimes tyrannized. Finally he thought it necessary to -deprive Santa Anna of an authority that had no doubt been abused; and -this interesting young man, who had recently proclaimed that he welcomed -Iturbide's elevation with a positively uncontrollable exuberance of -joy, "pronounced" for a republic, knowing scarcely anything about that -system, but knowing a great deal about the Emperor's unpopularity. This -precipitated a revolution; and the movement, soon taken up by Victoria, -Guerrero and Bravo, spread rapidly. Iturbide's most intimate and trusted -general was despatched against the insurgents, but betrayed him. The -army went over. The people, who revered the Liberator but not the -Emperor, concurred. With bad faith and gratuitous outrages his enemies -crowded savagely upon him. Early in 1823 he abdicated; and in May, -forsaken by every one of the many he had benefited, the discredited hero -sailed for Europe, leaving behind him examples and suggestions of the -most demoralizing kind.[2.3] - -The junta, meanwhile, had disgusted the nation with its frivolities, -political and fiscal incompetence and usurpation of powers, and there -was a feeling of relief when it dissolved in February, 1822, the next -day after Congress met. Congress, however, did no better and fared even -worse, for it earned much contempt by sanctioning under pressure the -elevation of Iturbide; and then Iturbide made Congress, and made all -popular government, quite ridiculous in the eyes of the people and the -army by forcibly sending the members home. When at his wit's end, he -recalled it as if inviting the _coup de grace_, and soon it not only -earned more contempt by pronouncing his elevation illegal and punishing -every mark of condolence for the fallen chief, but undertook to outrank -omnipotence by pretending that no empire had existed. Soon, too, all the -selfish ambitions that had combined against Iturbide in this body showed -themselves so clearly as to add further discredit; and worse yet the -Congress, though chosen merely to frame a constitution under the Plan of -Iguala, held on after the refusal of Spain to cooperate had put an end -to that scheme.[2.3] - -The republicans, who were gaining ground because evidently no other -Mexican could stand where Iturbide had fallen, and the Iturbidistas, who -desired to create anarchy in order to force the recall of their hero, -clamored for new elections. Five provinces demanded them formally; and -at length, despised by every one, Congress, the firstfruit of popular -government, fell to the ground. Almost every institution that should -have enjoyed respect was now discredited--even the Church, for it had -crowned the emperor and shed its benedictions liberally on Congress. The -army, however, stood, for it had shown its power both to elevate and to -overthrow.[2.3] - -The next Congress, which met November 7, 1823, had a more democratic -basis; but the members were personally inferior, intrigue and -self-seeking again prevailed, and the young orators--convinced -that winning applause from the galleries was the true object of -speaking--launched forth on all occasions with that fatal fluency -which their intoxicating idiom encouraged. After centuries of enforced -silence, men to whom liberty could only mean license were called upon -to decide the gravest questions of statesmanship. Naturally they were -eager to build before laying foundations; and naturally, too, where -nine tenths of the people could not read, it seemed like genuine -statesmanship to flourish the novel vocabulary of independence.[2.3] - -Frivolous, fickle, now torpid and now running amuck, Congress found -itself compelled eventually to frame a constitution. Under Spanish rule -the provinces, each governed by an intendant, had known little and -cared less about one another; and now, stimulated by the centrifugal -tendency of the Iberian character and the dread of a tyrant, inflamed -by transcendental doctrines of liberty, disgusted with the proceedings -of the national authorities, and captivated by the thought of offices -for all, they began to claim sovereignty; and something had to be -done at once. A republic, though alien to all the habits and feelings -of the nation, seemed evidently necessary, because no possible monarch -existed, and because no other system could make it the interest of a -sufficient number of persons to maintain the government; but this did -not end the difficulties. The centralized type of republic was ardently -desired by the oligarchy as likely to prove controllable, and by all -the monarchists as a sloping path toward their goal; but the friends of -Iturbide and the enemies of privilege--strongest at a distance from the -capital--fought against it, and at length, as the federal system, about -which only the vaguest notions were entertained, promised more offices -and seemed more likely to hold the country together, it was decided -upon.[2.3] - -To meet the crisis one individual, taking the constitution of the -United States as a basis,[2.4] drafted the required instrument in -three days; and so an untrained and uneducated nation found itself -provided with a complicated mixture of democracy and privilege, liberty -and intolerance, progress and reaction, which paralyzed itself by -combining such antagonistic elements, omitted the safeguard of a supreme -court like ours, and showed its own inadequacy by providing that in -emergencies the President might be given "extraordinary powers," or in -other words become a dictator. In short, the government was organized -as a permanent revolution. There was much enthusiasm, however, over -this triumph of nationality, and on New Year's day, 1825, the first -constitutional Congress assembled. The treasury was now full of borrowed -English gold; and--as every one hoped the new system might be developed -in the direction he preferred--all agreed that an era of peace, joy and -prosperity had at length arrived.[2.3] - -[VICTORIA'S ADMINISTRATION] - -Victoria was elected President. His frank, ruddy, bronzed face, peering -out of gray whiskers and curly gray hair, looked happy and encouraging, -but soon the mass of the nation felt once more cheated; for although -Bravo had been the candidate of the oligarchy, Victoria--yielding to the -pressure of that element--gave it a preponderance in the administration. -A multitude of people were exasperated to find the old privileged -classes again in control, and the execution of Iturbide under an illegal -law--for he had returned to Mexico--infuriated his partisans. Worse -yet, the oligarchy denied the practicability of the federal system for -so unwieldy a country, where the states felt so independent, where so -many men aspired to hold office and where so few were qualified, and -plotted to set up the centralized regime, with monarchy--preferably -under a Spanish prince--as the ultimate aim of many; and Victoria, a -polite, weak, indolent, easily-flattered man of small abilities, little -education and immense vanity, who idolized his country but felt she -would always need him as chief-priest, fell in with this plan, because -without a change of the constitution he could not be President a second -time.[2.5] - -Disgusted and alarmed, the Federalists, who included the Iturbidistas, -began therefore to scheme gropingly for a new revolution, a new war of -independence; but at length, realizing that under the constitution a -majority could rule, they established Masonic lodges of the York Rite, -and with great skill, activity and perseverance organized their forces. -Before long their power showed itself at the voting-urns, and the -President, recognizing the logic of events and perceiving he could never -supplant Bravo in the favor of the aristocracy, changed the complexion -of the government. This in turn angered the faction displaced, and most -unwisely--being physically much the weaker side--it massed its power -in December, 1827, and revolted under a certain Montano. Bravo, though -Vice-President, placed himself at the head of the insurgents; but the -government forces under Guerrero, attacking him during a truce, quickly -ended the revolt.[2.5] - -Peace, however, did not return. The newspapers unearthed or invented so -many unsavory tales about the leading citizens that, besides proving -those men unworthy of confidence, they excited lasting resentments. The -Federalists--particularly the Iturbidistas--harshly avenged their past -sufferings, for the Mexican idea of justice meant a chance to persecute -the oppressor; and every thinking mind saw with dismay that whereas -previous insurrections had occurred in a natural revolutionary period, -the government legally established by the nation had now been defied by -a great party led by the Vice-President himself. This was the letting -out of waters, and to palliate it as chargeable to circumstances would -be to excuse all political crimes.[2.5] - -Meanwhile another storm had been gathering. The Spanish element, which -not only was superior but felt so, had given much offence; and, quite -aside from grudges, many thought it unsafe to have so large a number of -Gachupines in the country--many of them active and able, not a few of -them soldiers, and some occupying high civil and military positions--at -a time when Spain was preparing to reassert her authority over Mexico. -Others argued that should the Spaniards go, their places in business -and the public service would be available for Mexicans. Still others -considered this a good way to enfeeble the oligarchy, so as to curtail -its privileges. Many demagogues perceived that here lay a splendid -opportunity to acquire a following; and the Spaniards, for their -part, long accustomed to despise and lord it over the Mexicans, often -exasperated the public by offensive and imprudent conduct. The natural -consequences followed. Many insurrections, benevolently treated by the -government, demanded the expulsion of the Gachupines; some of the states -passed laws in that sense; and finally, in 1827 and 1828, Congress -did the same. A very large number of Gachupines actually departed and -carried away their money. This drew out the strongest fibres of public -life, the army, finance, trade and the industries; while the injustice -and impolicy of these decrees and the bloody vengeance taken upon a few -silly Spanish conspirators embittered feeling in Mexico, and greatly -injured Mexican credit in Europe, where few except the Spanish merchants -enjoyed any financial standing.[2.5] - -By the time Victoria's administration drew near its end, Mexico -had marked out her downward route. The parties faced each other as -implacable foes. Each perpetrated as much electoral fraud and violence -as it could; each kept up a savage press; and each worked in the dark -through secret societies. Owing to extravagance, peculation, bad -management, the backwardness of the states in paying their quotas, and -the failure of an English banking house, the treasury was empty in spite -of lavish borrowing. "Liberty" had become a by-word, for Victoria had -wielded the extraordinary powers for a year and a half, punishments had -gone beyond the laws, and the government had been given authority, not -only to expel foreigners at will, but even to banish citizens from their -states. Corruption was general and profound, commerce feeble, credit -extinct, justice perverted, reported the French agent; and, as his -British colleague added, the "Name of Patriotism" was used as a "Cloak -to cover the greatest Excesses."[2.5] - -And now came something worse. Well aware they could not elect one of -their own number President against the popular candidate, Guerrero, the -Centralists looked about for an acceptable Federalist. Gomez Pedraza, -Victoria's minister of war, though narrow, harsh and passionate, was a -strict and honest man, a laborious official and a thoughtful, effective -orator. He had fought on the Spanish side in the revolution, and -naturally favored a conservative, aristocratic regime. He, therefore, -was secretly adopted in place of Bravo, now in exile. All those who -detested unseemly party strife preferred him, and as the moderate wing -of the Federalists also took that side, quite unaware that Centralism -lurked in the shadow, Guerrero's noisy and overconfident supporters -found themselves beaten. This result and the open exultation, threats -and hostilities of their old enemies, who still controlled the senate -and the supreme court, enraged them, for they perceived they had been -duped once more, and they hotly charged--no doubt with some reason--that -money and Pedraza's power as head of the war department had frustrated -the will of the people; while it disgusted Victoria to be superseded by -a man he had looked down upon as merely a useful clerk.[2.6] - -[SANTA ANNA] - -Another individual also took offence. After setting the ball in motion -against Iturbide, Santa Anna had been eclipsed by larger figures, and -to shine again he took up arms as Protector of the People; but this -enterprise collapsed at once, and he issued a very humble proclamation, -closing with the words, "Permit me, permit me to dig myself an obscure -grave that my ashes and my memory may disappear." A fairly comfortable -grave was, however, dug for him by removing His Penitence to Yucatan -as military commandant, and he proceeded at once to gild its interior -by permitting illicit commerce with Cuba. Returning after a while to -the proper field of ambition, he was more than suspected of complicity -in two insurrections; but in each case he read the omens in season to -extricate himself, and virtuously offered his sword to the government. -Now, however, he took a bold stand. Not only were he and the successful -candidate personal enemies, but he felt that little would be left of -himself after four years of Pedraza's rule; and he knew that Guerrero, -in addition to being favored by the army, really had a majority of the -people on his side. Accordingly he unfurled his flag in September, 1828, -for Guerrero, popular rights and a total expulsion of the Gachupines. In -this contest he showed amazing quickness, audacity and resourcefulness, -keeping up his motley troops principally by brigandage; but very soon -his cause appeared to be doomed.[2.6] - -At this point Lorenzo de Zavala, one of those human meteors that rarely -illuminate Anglo-Saxon skies, came forward. His political relations were -extremely intense; and now, believing the Centralists intended to place -him before a firing-squad, he organized at Mexico, in the hope of saving -himself and Santa Anna, the woeful insurrection of the Acordada, which -fixed the example of party revolution. Victoria had an understanding -with him, though after betraying the government and letting the handful -of rioters get a safe start, he lost his nerve and betrayed them also; -and in the end, at the cost of some bloodshed and extensive robberies, -the insurrection triumphed; "the vile and unnatural Pedraza"--as his -foes called him--fled to the United States, and Congress, after having -declared Pedraza elected, pronounced Guerrero President on the express -ground that revolts had occurred in his favor. In reality this was a -revolution of numbers and popular ideas against privilege and oligarchy, -and before long the country accepted the situation.[2.6] - -[A NEW REVOLUTION] - -Santa Anna was now a popular hero, the saviour of the nation; and he -proceeded to confirm his title. In 1829 came the long expected blow from -Spain, and having calmly assumed the military authority at Vera Cruz, -he advanced to meet it. Near Tampico the invading army, stricken with -fever, desired to lay down its arms; but Santa Anna, eager for laurels, -attacked it. Spanish valor accepted the challenge; the Mexicans were -repulsed; and their ambitious leader left the field before the battle -ended. The invaders were then permitted to surrender, and soon a new cry -was echoing through the streets of Mexico, "Viva Santa Anna, the Victor -of Tampico!" Clothing himself with modesty and grace he now posed as a -sort of benevolent divinity. Rather tall, thin, apparently feeble but -capable of great exertions on occasion, with a head that bulged at the -top, a swarthy complexion, brilliant and restless eyes, a very clear-cut -voice and a voluble tongue, he moved about his estate at Manga de Clavo -and the near-by city of Vera Cruz in an easy, affable way, accumulating -popularity. "Can read somewhat," reported our consul in that city; but -his thoughts were above literature. "Were I made God," it was said that -he once remarked, "I should wish to be something more."[2.6] - -Meantime, April 1, 1829, Guerrero assumed the Presidency. In his green -jacket edged with fur, red waistcoat bound with a blue sash, brown -mantle and heavy sabre, with his thick hair bristling toward all -points of the compass, he was a picturesque figure, and as candidate -had answered very well. For the role of chief magistrate, however, the -British minister justly described him as "totally unfit." Being mostly -of Indian and partly--it was stated--of negro blood, he instinctively -distrusted the whites, while the latter utterly despised the class to -which he belonged. Though his intuitive judgment was quick and within -the range of his experience remarkably correct, he knew nothing whatever -of letters and politics, necessarily depended upon the self-seeking -flatterers of his party, and veered about like the wind. In military -emergencies he could burst his bonds like a Samson, but the things he -really cared for were a wench, a bottle, a game of monte and a nap -under some spreading tree. Without ideas, knowledge, experience or -high character, he faced a terrible inheritance: the laws ignored, the -authorities despised, the administration disorganized, the treasury -worse than empty, the country in distress and turmoil.[2.6] - -Professions of loyalty to the "sacred" constitution and the laws could -not blot out the fact that his authority was based upon a riot; and -others would not feel satisfied merely because he was content. The -extraordinary powers of the Executive, granted in view of the Spanish -invasion, were used oppressively. A multitude of persons clamored for -money and he could give them none; a multitude clamored for reforms, and -he scarcely knew what they were talking about. As far as possible the -rest of the Gachupines were driven out, but this merely added to the -confusion. President and nation simply drifted, and the rocks were near. -Before long the general government was practically ignored except at the -capital, and the heads of the secret societies wielded the real power. -Guerrero even allowed the oligarchy, his deadliest foe, to alienate him -from the common people, the source of his strength. He became almost -as isolated as Mahomet's coffin; and then--as soon as ambition could -disguise itself with a programme--he fell.[2.6] - -Mainly owing to the good-will of Guerrero, the Vice-President was -General Anastasio Bustamante, a heavy, dull, rather kindly and fairly -honest aristocrat, though nominally a moderate Federalist. When -appointed by Guerrero to command the army of reserve at Jalapa, the -principal military force in the country, he exclaimed on taking leave -of the President, "Never will I unsheathe my sword against General -Guerrero," but within a year (December, 1829) he did it; and, though a -beneficiary of the Acordada riot, he revolted against the government -in the name of the constitution. As a matter of fact his rebellion was -merely another effort of the privileged classes, a revised edition of -Montano's, and the army received its pay from the money chests of the -oligarchs. Little opposition was encountered, for Guerrero had let -Delilah shear him, the Acordada episode and much other misconduct had -completely discredited the radical Federalists, and the Federalists in -general--who had raised Bustamante from a political prison to the second -place in the nation--could not believe, after his fresh protestations of -loyalty to the constitution, that he would betray them. The President, -finding nobody to lean upon, fled to his old haunts in the south, -was treacherously captured and was shot; and meanwhile, on the first -of January, 1830, Bustamante took up the reins. Greed, corruption, -imprudence, evil passions and lawlessness had ruined the cause of -democracy, and Victoria's experiment of letting aristocrats administer a -professedly popular system had to be tried again.[2.6] - -Bustamante opened Congress with a bit of the fashionable hypocrisy, -asserting that a "sacred Constitution" had placed him in power; but he -showed that what interested him was "the wishes of the army," and the -army reciprocated this affection. Alaman, who had been Victoria's chief -adviser at first, now became the real head of the government. More -than any other man in Mexico he could claim to be called a statesman, -for he knew some history, had observed politics in Europe, and in a -superficial yet impressive way could reason; but he was a statesman of -the Metternich school, wily and insincere, wholly unable to sympathize -with democracy, and profoundly in love with force. Whatever did not suit -the government he demolished without regard to law; whoever opposed it -was crushed. In administration the government did well, but--attempting -to represent democracy and privilege, progress and reaction, the past -and the future, a self-governing state and an all-controlling church at -one and the same time--it undertook to perform an impossible task by -impossible means. Consequently it satisfied neither of the parties and -offended both. King Stork proved worse than King Log.[2.7] - -Santa Anna, incensed because Guerrero would not appoint him minister -of war, had at first coquetted with Bustamante's movement; but soon, -overshadowed at Jalapa by the Vice-President and by Bravo, whom -Guerrero had pardoned, he retired to his estate. On the outbreak of -the revolution he took up arms for Guerrero; but when his chief gave -up, he followed that example, and patiently awaited, crouching, the -time to spring. Now he saw the tide of passion rising, and saw also -the best citizens agreeing that Mier y Teran,[F] an able and honorable -man, should be the next chief magistrate. Accordingly, to prevent an -election if nothing more, he "pronounced" in the name of Federalism -at the beginning of 1832, and called for a change of Cabinet, though -four years earlier he had battled for the principle that nobody should -interfere with a President's choice of ministers; and then he required -that Bustamante should give up his place to Pedraza as the rightful head -of the state, though Santa Anna himself had been the cause of Pedraza's -exclusion on the ground of illegal election. Supported by the Vera Cruz -customhouse and defended by the pestilence of the coast, he occupied a -most advantageous position; and consistency did not signify.[2.7] - - [F] A Mexican sometimes chose to bear the family name of his mother - as well as that of his father. The former was connected to the - latter with the word "and" (_y_). Paredes y Arrillaga, Pena y - Pena, Mora y Villamil are instances. In referring to such - persons, however, it was customary to use only the first of the - names. Thus one finds much more often "Paredes" than "Paredes y - Arrillaga." - -Near the close of the year the two chiefs, brought together by Pedraza, -adjusted the affairs of the nation--that is to say, the offices--as -private business, and the troops on both sides were liberally rewarded. -Congress protested, but was utterly powerless. Bustamante soon found it -wise to give up the Presidency; and as the elections were not general -enough, at the proper time, to create a Congress, constitutional -government vanished. However, though Pedraza had resigned and even -left the country, which no President could legally do, Santa Anna and -Bustamante now hoisted him into power to complete the term interrupted -by Guerrero, while the "best citizens" fell out over offices and -personal issues, and so dissipated the brightest prospect seen as yet in -Mexican public life.[2.7] - -[SANTA ANNA PRESIDENT] - -Under these circumstances, of course, the dominant general, Santa Anna, -was elected President. For Vice-President the choice fell upon Valentin -Gomez Farias, leader of the radical Federalists. In many ways Farias -deserved warm admiration. He was active, indefatigable, fearless, -thoroughly honest, and willing--perhaps a little more than willing--to -serve the public in the humblest or the highest office. He loved -Mexico ardently, and he believed in the supremacy of law and the civil -authority. Unfortunately, however, his education was inadequate for the -work he undertook to do; and he lacked prudence, patience and common -sense. In short, he may be characterized as a fanatical democrat and -political idealist.[2.7] - -Santa Anna now had the army at his back, but he desired to have also -the privileged classes there, and they had been exasperated by his -overthrowing Bustamante. He therefore decided to let them see they -needed him; and, retiring early in 1833 to his estate--which in fact he -enjoyed much more than bearing the burdens of administration--he left -the Vice-President in power. Farias then undertook to transform Mexico, -by merely saying "Open Sesame!" to the Federalist majority in Congress, -into a modern, liberal, orderly and prosperous nation; and reform -projects made their appearance at once. The privileges of the army -were boldly attacked and still more those of the Church, which aimed -to be _in_ the social order enough to dominate it, yet enough outside -to escape from all obligations. Farias proposed, therefore, without -having a well-digested plan, to reassert the supreme authority formerly -exercised by the king, abolish the clerical fuero and the compulsory -tithes, provide for popular, lay education, and bring into productive -circulation the immense wealth controlled by the Church; and Congress, -fully aware that reforms were necessary, dazzled by the boldness and -novelty of his programme, and misled by the Mexican faith in theories -and formulae, supported him.[2.7] - -Naturally such projects and their foreseen consequences roused the -clericals and all in that camp to fury, and the proprietors of great -estates also grew alarmed. The President felt his time had come, and -in May, therefore, he resumed his functions. The progress of reform -promptly halted, and soon it was announced that Santa Anna, ingeniously -made a prisoner by his own troops, had been proclaimed dictator. -Undoubtedly he expected the mutiny that now broke out at the capital -to overthrow the government; but Farias, again in power during the -President's absence, quelled the revolt, and Santa Anna found it -necessary to "escape" and resume his office.[2.7] - -[A CHANGE OF REGIME] - -Pretending still with consummate address to favor both parties--though -really a Centralist now--he made both of them court and fear him, and -proved his power by breaking down and then restoring the army. Of -course, however, these manoeuvres excited suspicion. The privileged -classes, though anxious for his support, hesitated to pledge him theirs, -and so he returned on a six months' leave of absence to his figurative -plow, leaving Tornel, whom an American minister described as "a very bad -man," to scheme in his interest. The now embittered and excited forces -of reform were thus unleashed, and before long the Church and the rich -proprietors offered the Cincinnatus of Manga de Clavo absolute power on -condition that he should protect them. In April, 1834, therefore, two -months before his leave was to expire, he took possession of the supreme -power again, and was hailed by the clergy as a new Messiah. Supported -soon by the revolutionary "plan" of Cuernavaca, he made himself in -effect a dictator. The cause of reform was harshly checked and turned -back. Congress found the door of its hall barred; and Farias, covered -with abuse, was driven from the country.[2.7] - -Secretly encouraging reactionary insurrections and instigating demands -for a centralized regime, though still professing publicly the other -creed, Santa Anna ordered the people to surrender their weapons, and -crushed with a ruthless hand the state of Zacatecas, which dared to -oppose his will. "Worthy son of the father of lies," "unrivalled -chameleon," "shameless hypocrite," "atheist and blasphemer," shrieked -his opponents. "With the tranquility of a tiger, which, sated with the -flesh of its prey, reposes on what it does not wish to devour, Santa -Anna reports his victory," cried _El Crepusculo_. But resentment counted -for nothing; Mexico was prostrate. Late in 1835, therefore, a packed -Congress of self-seeking politicians decided upon centralization, and -it was understood that Santa Anna would be chosen President for ten -years, with a longer term and a higher title in prospect. But now the -scene was tragically shifted. In March, 1836, the Texans declared their -independence. The Napoleon of the West fell into their hands at San -Jacinto, where they defeated his army; and, as an inkling got abroad -of the unpatriotic agreements made with his captors while in fear of -revenge for his cruelties, he thought it wise to announce, on returning -to Mexico in 1837, a definitive retirement from public life.[2.7] - -According to the organic law, any proposed constitutional change had to -remain under consideration for two years; but the Congress of 1835, not -minding a trifle like this, drew up as fast as possible what it named -the Seven Laws--called by others the Seven Plagues. By December, 1836, -despite the resistance and threats of the Federalists, the new regime -was fully organized, and Bustamante soon held the reins again. The -Church and the wealthy were now satisfied. The army also felt pleased, -for the Federalists denounced its privileges, the cost of the many state -offices created by them reduced the amount of money it could get, and -an aristocratic government seemed likely to need it constantly and pay -it with some regularity; and so the prospect was, especially with Santa -Anna eliminated, that the new regime would be stable.[2.7] - -But among the aristocrats it had become unfashionable by this time to -meddle with politics. The groups that made up the dominant party, -though united against the democrats, had little else in common. Each -group desired to enjoy privileges and shun burdens; each aimed to -exploit the nation; and there was not enough to satisfy all. The -expulsion of the Spaniards had weakened the numbers, ability, energy -and wealth of the party; and now, as after every revolution, it proved -so impossible to fulfill the promises made to win support, that soon -disappointed friends were allying themselves with open enemies.[2.8] - -A new difficulty, too, arose, for under a centralized system the -government had to assume financial responsibilities previously borne -by the states. A strong treasury was therefore essential; yet the -rich, and in particular the clergy, would not pay enough to carry on -the government they had established. Consequently funds had to be -borrowed, Church property being the only available security; and the -clergy, instead of meeting the terms of the money-lenders, busily hid or -exported their wealth. Every dollar that could be raised had to be given -the army as the price of its allegiance, and for six months not one -civil employe, from the President down, received a salary. In October, -1837, the ministry resigned in a body, and would not return to their -desks, for nobody cared to support so heavy a load when there was no -chance to steal or even to get paid.[2.8] - -Early in November the British representative, although the legation -had all along sympathized with the aristocratic party, reported -that Centralism had completely failed; and it was notorious that -Bustamante himself desired a restoration of Federalism as the only -possible expedient. Seeing their enemies divided, the liberals took -heart, and petitions for a change of system were soon pouring in -from the departments, which had now taken the places of the states. -Dissatisfaction spread. Pronunciamientos began, and only the popularity -of Bustamante, who had mellowed with age and foreign travel during his -period of eclipse, maintained the government. Yet Federalism could not -act, for at this juncture the French minister was pressing claims, -and the two wings of the party--the moderates led by Pedraza and the -radicals led by Farias--disagreed passionately on this foreign issue. -A complete state of anarchy prevails, reported our consul at Mexico in -December, 1838.[2.8] - -[FALL OF BUSTAMANTE] - -Santa Anna all this time was quietly at work, though he had called -heaven to witness that he would be loyal to the existing regime; and, -as often happened, chance came to his aid. A French fleet captured the -fortress of Ulua, off Vera Cruz, at this time, and a party of marines -landed at the town, destroyed some war material, and then marched -back to reembark. Santa Anna commanded there, and, being wounded in -attacking these troops, had to undergo amputation at the knee. This was -his opportunity, and he at once issued a most eloquent address. Already -he had outdone opera bouffe, and now he outdid himself. "Probably this -will be the last victory I shall give my country," he said; "I die happy -that Divine Providence has permitted me to devote to her every drop -of my blood.... May all my fellow-citizens, forgetting my political -errors, concede to me the one title that I would leave my children, -that of a Good Mexican." There had been no victory, for the French -drove him out of Vera Cruz before he could dictate the address, and he -did not dream of dying; but the Mexicans are tender-hearted, and the -episode--particularly in contrast with the inaction of the government, -which could not afford an efficient regular army and dared not arm the -people--gave him a fresh hold on the nation, even though all capable of -thinking felt by this time profoundly skeptical about him.[2.8] - -Accordingly he became the power behind the tottering throne in December, -1838, and when Bustamante took the field early the next year to put -down an insurgent named Mejia, the Centralist leaders had Santa Anna -made temporary President as a bulwark against Federalism. The quality -of his penitence quickly showed itself. His power was audaciously used -to cripple Bustamante, suppress liberty, gain partisans and benefit -himself and his friends. In a word, he achieved the most lawless and -shameless administration yet witnessed, and though universally feared, -was now execrated by almost all except his personal followers. In July, -1839, the President resumed his functions, but matters only went on from -worse to worst--corruption rampant in the administration, public spirit -dead. In July, 1840, rioters actually made him their prisoner for a -time. False advisers, particularly Tornel, drew him farther and farther -into Santa Anna's net. Corpulent and aging rapidly, he fell into a sort -of mental stupor; and in August, 1841, the British minister reported -that the government, if left to itself, would soon expire of inanition. -As for the nation, it was not merely in anarchy but in chaos. Even the -conservatives admitted that the Seven Laws would not do.[2.8] - -This very month rang the bell for the next scene. General Mariano -Paredes, another important figure in the history of our war with Mexico, -was a brave but rather besotted officer, more honest but less clever -than his leading contemporaries. On a mere pretext, though he owed much -to Bustamante, he revolted; more or less in collusion with him Santa -Anna pronounced as mediator; and General Valencia, correctly described -by an American consul as "destitute of every principle of honor or -honesty," treacherously getting hold of what was called the citadel -at Mexico, rebelled on his own account: check from two knights and a -castle, as Senora Calderon wittily described the situation. Weary, -disgusted, indifferent, cynical, men heard unmoved the "Quien vive?" and -"Centinela alerte!" of the insurgents at the capital, and between two -puffs of their cigarettes gossiped about the revolution as if it had -occurred in Europe. It was only a game of chess, and the public were -spectators. They understood now that nearly all the pompous phrases of -the politicians had meant, as Lara's _Revista Politica_ of 1840 put it, -"Move, and let me have your place."[2.8] - -In this confusion Santa Anna, whom the conservatives had now decided -to support instead of the inefficient Bustamante, came rapidly to the -front. His triumph was soon foreseen, and the nation acquiesced. Most -people knew he was a villain, but felt that at any rate he possessed -energy. Probably he could keep order, they said, and perhaps, if -entirely trusted, would act well. If not, one big rascal could not be -so bad as many little ones; and at the very least any change must be an -improvement. In reality this bold, cunning, hungry, sharp adventurer, -who knew what he wanted and got it, dazzled the average Mexicans. They -saw in him a fulfilment of themselves, and in letting him rule they had -the feeling of success without the trouble.[2.8] - -For a while Bustamante, whose government practically faded out in -September, 1841, resisted with dignity though with no chance of -survival; but at length, in a fit of desperation, he cut the ground -of legality from under his own feet by pronouncing for Federalism, and -on October 7, Santa Anna, driving rapidly through Mexico behind four -white horses belonging to a stockbroker, with a retinue of splendid -coaches and an immense escort of cavalry, took up his quarters at the -palace in Tacubaya, a few miles beyond. Yet not a single viva greeted -his magnificent entry or his address to Congress. Memory paralyzed -admiration. In despair, not love, Mexico consented to be his.[2.8] - -[SANTA ANNA VIRTUALLY DICTATOR] - -By the new arrangement, called the Bases of Tacubaya, a new Congress was -to draw a new constitution. Meantime some one, the choice of a junta -appointed by the successful chief, was to have the powers "necessary for -the organization of all branches of the public service," and naturally -Santa Anna himself received the votes of his junta. This arrangement -was regarded by the nation as a mere parenthesis, but the General -held a different idea. On October 10, the gloomy old cathedral was as -bright as gold, silver, gems and hundreds of candles could make it. -Troops entered the sacred precincts, and formed to the music of drums -and cornets. The archbishop proceeded to the main entrance in cope and -mitre, holding in his hands a crucifix equally beautiful and precious, -and there he waited for about three quarters of an hour, when a military -officer, who had not even deigned to put on full dress, marched in and -seated himself on a splendid throne. A large suite of generals followed, -but none of them ventured to sit, though the _Te Deum_ lasted an hour; -and finally the man on the throne rose and took this oath: I swear to -God--to do as I please; for such was the meaning of the Bases. Hardened -by seeing his superior astuteness, audacity and energy balked so many -times by circumstances and a lack of confidence in his honor, Santa Anna -proposed, now that he once more had the power, to grip it with a hand of -steel.[2.9] - -As dictator he indulged himself by running through the entire diapason -from childishness to omnipotence, announcing impossibilities and -attempting absurdities. The freedom of the press and the freedom of -speech were violated. The tariff was juggled with for selfish pecuniary -reasons. He ordered the university to give one of his friends a degree -and a chair--that is to say, learning and a profession. He closed a -bank without allowing it the time to liquidate. He put up a cheap -building of rubble work that was merely an eyesore--though Tornel -compared it to the Simplon road of Napoleon--and the city government -had to fall down and worship it. His amputated foot was dug up and -reinterred with extraordinary pomp. On the top of a monument was erected -a gilded statue of him pointing toward Texas, though some said it was -pointing at the mint. The Church, now governed by the soft Archbishop -Posada, drowsy with satisfaction and carelessly fattening on sweetmeats -presented to him by adoring nuns, was forced to make "loans"; and -payments on public debts, for which revenues had been solemnly pledged, -were suspended.[2.9] - -Nothing, one might almost say, was too great or too small for Santa -Anna, if it looked auriferous. No coach wheel could turn without first -paying a tax. Anybody with a promising scheme to get national funds -could find a partner at the palace. Brokers and contractors took the -places of politicians; wealthy merchants, able to loan great sums at -great percentages, took the places of statesmen. Corruption was rampant -everywhere, of course. "An arbitrary system, indeed, must always be a -corrupt one," as Burke said; "there never was a man who thought he had -no law but his own will, who did not soon find that he had no end but -his own profit." These words describe Santa Anna's course. And when his -chest was full enough and his army big enough, putting a substitute in -his place and shaking off the cares of state, he went down to enjoy his -gambling and cockfighting and plan his next political move at Manga -de Clavo, secure from observation and protected by troops. Hints of a -formal dictatorship began to be heard.[2.9] - -To keep up appearances, however, he summoned the proposed Congress. A -majority of the members were Federalists, but he promptly informed it -that Federalism would not do, and when they insisted on their notion, -Tornel, the minister of war, who was glad to be his lackey and wear -the livery of the house, barred Congress out of its hall. Presently, -without a sign of protest from any one, it was dissolved by decree; -and then eighty persons, chosen by the administration, drew up a new -constitution called the Organic Bases. Valencia was president of this -junta; and both he and Paredes began to plot against the dictator. -Santa Anna forced them to swallow their ambitions for the time being, -however, and by dint of military interference--though his enemies were -bestirring themselves and he was now increasingly unpopular--he became -President in January, 1844, under the new constitution. This appeared -like a concession to legality, but no doubt it was intended as a recoil -for another spring. His dream of empire still went on, it was fully -believed.[2.9] - -Although the minister of justice described this period as "an epoch of -glory" and an "era of absolute felicity," the new Congress manifested -a disposition to antagonize the President; but an almost supernatural -dread of him paralyzed even his enemies, and he readily bowled them -over. Then he was given a special sum of four millions for war with -Texas; and after that sum was promptly absorbed, he demanded not only -ten millions more but "extraordinary powers" to lay taxes. This meant -that he wanted to have every man's property at his disposal, and it -was generally believed that with a foreign war as excuse he would soon -try to make himself autocrat. Congress resisted, and before long was -suspended.[2.9] - -[DOWNFALL OF SANTA ANNA] - -But now the people took fire. They had trusted Santa Anna completely, -and their confidence had been as completely abused. It was felt that -he had shown a deliberate intention to ignore the public interest and -feed upon the nation--disregarding all personal rights, threatening -all fortunes and contradicting all principles. Paredes, who had never -forgiven Santa Anna for running him off the track in 1841, pronounced. -In November, 1844, war began. The President attempted both to cajole -and to terrorize his enemies, and moved against the insurgents with a -powerful army; but on December 6 the troops at the capital revolted, and -the nation concurred. In the departments he was particularly hated, for -he had impoverished them with taxes and spent the money elsewhere; but -Mexico itself blazed. "Death to the lame man!" shouted the populace, -dragging his foot round the streets. Dazed and overwhelmed, Santa Anna, -after moving about irresolutely with his dwindling army, left it with -a small escort early in January, 1845, and then took to his heels with -only four servants. Before long some peasants captured him, and later in -the year he was banished.[2.9] - -At first sight this collapse amazes us. It seems impossible that -Santa Anna, whose particular talent lay in discovering the direction -of political currents, should have lost so suddenly his tremendous -power. But the explanation is readily found. Without a doubt he was -the foremost Mexican of his time. Seen at the head of a ragged, -undisciplined mob called a regiment, inspiring them with eye, gesture -and words, and leading them on with almost electrical energy; seen at -a banquet, where he could show himself--despite the six colonels erect -and stiff behind his chair--merely a prince of good fellows, dignified -but cordial, courtly but unrestrained, brilliant yet apparently simple; -seen at the council board, seizing upon a shrewd idea expressed by one -of his associates and developing, illustrating and applying it in a way -that made its real author marvel at his chief's wisdom; seen in one of -his outbursts of Jacksonian rage, as when he threatened at a diplomatic -reception to run the boundary line between Mexico and the United -States at the cannon's mouth; seen at the opera house, in a crimson -and gold box with a retinue of crimson and gold officers, dressed in -the plainest of costumes himself, and wearing on his countenance an -interesting expression of gentle melancholy and resignation, as if he -were sacrificing himself for the nation and shrank from the gaze of an -adoring public--seen in these and other phases he appeared remarkable, -and even, as combining them, extraordinary.[2.9] - -But in reality he was a charlatan. Though head of an army, he knew -nothing of military science; though head of a nation, he knew nothing -of statesmanship. By right of superiority and by right of conquest -Mexico seemed to be his; and, with what Burke described as "the generous -rapacity of the princely eagle," he proposed to take the chief share of -wealth, power, honor and pleasure, leaving to others the remnants of -these as a compensation for doing the work. It was a cardinal principle -with him that the masses could be ignored; and in 1844, having reduced -the Church to subservience and formed a combination with the military -and the financial men, based on a community of interest in exploiting -the national revenues, he deemed himself invulnerable, the more so -because the coterie of base flatterers that he loved to have about -him reflected this conviction. Of a true national uprising he had no -conception; and when this came, finding himself in the presence of a -power that amazed and overawed him, seeing his axioms disproved and his -pillars going down, he lost heart, and plunged from the zenith to the -nadir of his essentially emotional nature.[2.9] - -[HERRERA BECOMES PRESIDENT] - -Santa Anna's legal successor was General J. J. Herrera, president of -the council of state, a fair, pacific, reasonable and honest man; and -the new ministry commanded respect. For a time the halcyon days of -1825 returned. This was the first great popular movement since Mexico -had become independent. All had united in it, and therefore all were -in harmony; every one had assisted, and therefore every one felt an -agreeable expectation of reward. Factions laid down their arms. For -a few weeks all remembered they were Mexicans. But the situation was -extremely difficult. Santa Anna's constitution, which commanded no -respect because neither authorized by the people nor endorsed by good -results, was still in force. All who believed in his system, including -twenty thousand half-pay--or rather no-pay--officers, dissipated, hungry -and reckless, began at once to plot for his return or for some one of -the same kind to succeed him. Herrera's aim to introduce reforms, both -civil and military, gave great offence. Paredes, representing the Church -and the aristocracy, stood at the head of the main army, and soon showed -a disposition to hold aloof. Indeed every prominent man had a busily -scheming clique.[2.10] - -The correct course for the new President would have been to declare -for the constitution of 1824, and throw himself upon the Federalists; -but, fearing that such a step would excite a revolution, he adopted -the timid and hopeless policy of trying to balance one party against -another. Owing to fear of the army, though he knew he could not rely -upon it, he dared not organize militia; and before long a body of troops -were allowed to revolt with impunity. Soon, therefore, the government -had no prestige and no substantial backing. Every sort of a complaint -was made against it. The financial troubles became acute. Confusion and -uncertainty reigned, and the President was physically incapable of a -hard day's work.[2.10] - -In March a conspiracy that indicated an ominous combination of -Federalists and Santannistas came to light. In May, under strenuous -pressure from England and France, the government shrinkingly agreed -to recognize Texas if she would bind herself not to join the United -States; and this wise though tardy move brought an avalanche of abuse -upon it. In June the Federalists rose, but the affair was badly managed -and failed. Tornel, the arch-plotter, a general who never had a command, -was sent to the northern army; and other turbulent men were imprisoned. -But still the government merely drifted--blind, irresolute, vacillating, -moribund; and the general public looked on with complete indifference. -Going to sleep red and waking up green--for revolutions usually began at -night--was no longer a novelty.[2.10] - -In August the ministers resigned; "the chief offices of state were -begging in the streets," wrote the correspondent of the London _Times;_ -and the men who finally took them, while personally well enough, had -little strength and less prestige. By September the government stood -in hourly fear of a revolution; but so little booty could be seen, -that although the plots thickened, they were lazily developed, and -amounted to nothing. Paredes, the Santannistas and the Federalists -became constantly more threatening, however, and the administration -more and more afraid to take any step whatever, good or bad. Nobody -could guess what it would do to-day from what it did yesterday. The -anarchy of weakness constituted the government. A triumvirate of -Paredes, Tornel and Valencia was much talked of. Many prayed for some -respectable despot, many for a foreign prince; and some of the more -thoughtful suggested cautiously an American protectorate. "Sterile, -deplorably sterile" has been the movement against Santa Anna, exclaimed -the friendly _Siglo XIX_ in October, describing it as "a moment of -happy illusion." By this time the administration was powerless even at -the capital; and on November 30 _El Amigo del Pueblo_, an opposition -sheet, announced, "There is no government in Mexico." This, however, was -premature. Before the denouement of this tragi-farce the United States -was to enter upon the scene; and as this new phase of the drama requires -to be prepared for, we must here leave Herrera, for a brief space, in -the midst of his difficulties.[2.10] - -[DEPLORABLE STATE OF MEXICO] - -Sterile indeed and most deplorable was the whole series of events that -we have now followed. One is glad to pass on; but let it be noted first -that while circumstances promoted, they did not produce it. The Mexicans -knew better, far better, than they acted. In 1824 the Constituent -Congress pointed out distinctly in a solemn address to the nation, that -without virtue liberal institutions would fail, revolution would follow -revolution, anarchy would ensue; and as time went on editors and orators -frequently traced the causes of Mexico's downfall in vivid and truthful -sentences. The trouble was that a great majority of those who might -have advanced her welfare preferred ease to effort, guile to wisdom, -self-indulgence to self-control, private advantage to the public weal, -partisan victory to national success; and naturally, in such a state -of things, the few honorable, public-spirited citizens could seldom -command a sufficient following to accomplish anything. Our leading -public men, said a contemporary, having been for one reason or another -contemptible, have learned to despise and distrust one another, and the -public, sick to death of their manoeuvres, have learned to despise and -distrust them all; yet such persons--demagogues and soldiers--were still -permitted to lead. Paper constitutions and paper laws, naturally of -little validity in the eyes of such a wilful, passionate race, had been -rendered by experience contemptible. - -For the consequences, if there be such a principle as national -responsibility, the people as a body were responsible; and so they -were for the results of this deplorable schooling as it affected the -relations between their country and ours. The inheritance from Spain had -been unfortunate, but there had been time enough to recover from it; and -instead of improving, the Mexicans had even degenerated.[2.11] - - - - - III - - THE RELATIONS BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND MEXICO - - 1825-1843 - - -In turning from the domestic to the foreign affairs of Mexico we must -beware of carrying prejudice with us. Our minds must be open to all -the facts, and see them exactly as they were. But it is right and even -necessary, for our guidance in interpreting these facts, to presume that -aliens, traditionally disliked by the Mexicans,[3.1] were treated -no more kindly, fairly and honestly than fellow-citizens; and the -evidence is conclusive that even the highest authorities were generally -unbusinesslike, often unjust or tricky, and on too many occasions -positively dishonorable in their dealings with foreigners.[3.2] - -Our first minister to Mexico, received there on June 1, 1825, was Joel -R. Poinsett. Apparently a better man for the office could not have been -chosen or even created; and the warm interest of the United States in -the cause of Spanish-American independence, our prompt recognition of -Mexico, and the fact that her political institutions had been modeled -upon ours, were additional auguries for the success of his mission. -But duty required him to stand for a Protestant power in a country -intensely Roman Catholic, to represent democracy where the dominant -element consisted of aristocrats hoping more or less generally for a -Bourbon king, to support Monroe's doctrine of America for the Americans -against the strength of Europe and the European affiliations of Mexico, -to vindicate the equal position of the United States where Great Britain -had established a virtual protectorate, to insist upon full commercial -privileges when the Spanish-American states favored mutual concessions, -and to antagonize other influences possessing no little strength.[3.3] - -[FRICTION BETWEEN THE TWO COUNTRIES] - -His only feasible course was to affiliate with men of the popular, -democratic, Federalist party. Largely through his advice they abandoned -their plan of rebelling, placed their confidence in organization and the -ballot, and so gained the ascendency. They soon fell into excesses of -their own, however, which they were glad to charge against a Protestant -and foreigner; all the other elements antagonized by him joined in the -accusations; envy of the recognized prosperity of the United States -assisted; and in the end he came to be almost universally denounced -by the Mexicans as the diabolical agent of a jealous, hypocritical, -designing government.[3.3] - -Of course, the Poinsett affair planted a root of bitterness in the -United States. Our national authorities could but protest against the -attacks upon our minister that were made by state legislatures in -contempt of all diplomatic usage, against the neglect of the Mexican -Executive to shield him, and against the general attitude of distrust -and ill-will exhibited by that country. Indeed, our government fully -believed that baseless popular clamor had been permitted to exert "a -sinister influence" against the Americans in its councils, and pointedly -informed Guerrero that unless "a marked change" in the temper of his -administration should "speedily" occur, a collision might result; and -of course the people of the United States could not fail to notice the -abusive and even ferocious treatment accorded to our representative, -against whom no charges were made by the Mexican government, and to -resent still more keenly the insults that were lavished upon the -character and purposes of the American nation. The fact that Poinsett -continued to be an important factor in our public life, even becoming -a member of the Cabinet at a later day, tended to emphasize these -feelings, both official and popular.[3.4] - -Besides all this, official work of his added to the irritation in both -countries. As one of his principal duties, he was instructed to make -a treaty reaffirming the boundary agreed upon with Spain in 1819, or, -if he could, buy a portion at least of Texas. The proposal that our -neighbor should sell us territory has been called by partisan writers -in the United States, insulting, but as we have made purchases from -Spain, France, Russia and Mexico herself, this accusation is evidently -unwarranted. On the other hand the suggestion was reasonable. We for -our part desired the land, aside from its intrinsic value, as a needed -protection to New Orleans and the Mississippi; and Mexico not only -appeared to misprize it, but could have strengthened herself somewhat by -letting it go. Later it became a fashion with her public men to declaim -about its preciousness and beauty; but as late as 1836, according to -Santa Anna himself, many officials did not know where Texas was or what -nation claimed it. Mexico had ten times the area she could people, and -what she needed in that quarter was the means of shielding her northern -settlements from the Indians. Moreover, under contracts already made, -Texas was filling up with men who, as President Victoria saw in 1825, -were not at all likely to assimilate with the Mexicans; and since it was -recognized that a mistake had been made in admitting such colonists, -it might well have seemed the part of wisdom to cut off the infected -section before it should set an example of dissatisfaction, and perhaps -cause trouble also with the United States.[3.5] - -Poinsett, accordingly, taking the matter up in July, 1825, stated -frankly that the treaty of 1819 was recognized by his country as -binding, but expressed a desire to lay it aside, and fix upon a more -satisfactory line. This pleased Victoria and Alaman, for they imagined -they could push the boundary eastward almost to the Mississippi, but -in spite of Poinsett's urgency and his dropping the plan to extend our -territory, a long delay followed. At last, however, on January 12, -1828, a treaty of limits reaffirming the agreement with Spain was duly -signed. In the course of April it reached Washington and was ratified. -On the last day of the month our secretary of state notified the Mexican -representative that he was ready to exchange ratifications, and reminded -him that under the terms of the instrument this would have to be done -by May 12; but Obregon was not prepared to act, and for that reason the -treaty failed.[3.6] - -Yet the Mexicans not only held that the United States caused the -miscarriage in order to prosecute designs upon Texas, but charged -officially as well as on the street, with neither evidence nor -plausibility in favor of the accusation, that our minister stole the -paper--entrusted to him on May 10 for transmission--which would have -authorized Obregon to exchange the ratifications. So we had in 1830 this -extraordinary picture: on the one hand, the United States earnestly -desiring the prosperity and friendship of Mexico, and pursuing a just -and sympathetic policy towards her; and, on the other, Mexico accusing -us of hostile intentions and the basest arts. From that day on, -everything we did was viewed with a jaundiced eye.[3.6] - -The treaty of limits was, however, revived by fresh negotiations, and -in April, 1832, went into effect. By its terms a joint commission to -run the line had to be appointed within a year from this date, and -presently Mexico received notice, both at her own capital and at ours, -that an American commissioner had been named; but she paid no attention -to the matter, and the year expired. Our minister was then directed -to negotiate a new agreement, labored for more than twelve months, -and finally, by addressing strong language personally to the acting -President, carried the point. Yet the United States was officially -denounced for endeavoring--and by wretched artifices--to delay the -fixing of the boundary.[3.7] - -Meanwhile a treaty of amity and commerce, proposed by Poinsett at -about the same time as the treaty of limits, had been pursuing a -checkered career, though a similar agreement between Mexico and England -went rapidly through. At one stage of the proceedings the Mexican -plenipotentiaries kept our minister entirely in the dark about an -important concession made to Great Britain, falsely assuring him that -equally favorable terms were offered to this country. Indeed, Victoria -showed a strong disposition to block the business altogether. July 10, -1826, however, the negotiators reached an agreement, but it did not -prove satisfactory to the American Senate. A second treaty signed in -February, 1828, did not please the Congress of Mexico, and was properly -rejected. At a later date negotiations were again resumed; but in 1831 -that body held the matter in abeyance for more than nine months. At -last, one day before the session was to close, our minister gave notice -that unless the treaty were concluded, he would leave the country. The -government at Washington also exerted some pressure by insisting that -the two matters should fare alike, and postponing the re-ratification of -the treaty of limits; and consequently both treaties became law at the -same time, April 5, 1832. Yet for nearly a year the commercial treaty -was not promulgated by Mexico; and hence, though her citizens residing -in the United States could have the benefit of it, Americans in Mexico -could not, for the local authorities with whom it was necessary to deal -declared they had no knowledge of such an agreement.[3.8] - -Toward the close of 1829 Guerrero, as a desperate throw for popularity, -asked for the recall of Poinsett, merely saying that public opinion -demanded it; and then for about six years the United States had as its -representative a friend of Jackson's named Anthony Butler, whose only -qualifications for the post were an acquaintance with Texas and a strong -desire to see the United States obtain it. In brief, he was a national -disgrace. Besides having been through bankruptcy more than once, if we -may believe the Mexican minister at Washington, and having a financial -interest in the acquisition of this Mexican territory, he was personally -a bully and swashbuckler, ignorant at first of the Spanish language -and even the forms of diplomacy, shamefully careless about legation -affairs, wholly unprincipled as to methods, and, by the testimony of two -American consuls, openly scandalous in his conduct. One virtue, to be -sure, according to his own account he possessed: he never drank spirits; -but one learns of this with regret, for an overdose of alcohol would -sometimes be a welcome excuse for him.[3.9] - -His particular business was to obtain as much of Texas as possible, an -enterprise that lay close to Jackson's heart; and he began by visiting -the province--about whose loyalty and relations with the United States -much concern was already felt at Mexico--when on the way to his post. -This promise of indiscretion in office was admirably fulfilled. -Maintaining a hold on our President by positive assurances of success, -he loafed, schemed, made overtures, threatened, was ignored, rebuffed, -snubbed and cajoled, fancied he could outplay or buy the astute and -hostile Alaman, tried to do "underworking" with Pedraza, plotted bribery -with one Hernandez, the confessor of Santa Anna's sister, grossly -violated his conciliatory instructions by engaging in a truculent -personal affair with Tornel, and was finally, after ceasing to represent -us, ordered out of the country. In short he succeeded only in proving -that we had for minister a cantankerous, incompetent rascal, in making -it appear that our government was eager to obtain Mexican territory, -and in suggesting--though explicitly and repeatedly ordered to eschew -all equivocal methods--that we felt no scruples as to means. On the -ground of Butler's connection with disaffected Texas, Mexico politely -asked for his recall near the close of 1835, and in December Powhatan -Ellis, born a Virginian but now a federal judge in Mississippi, was -appointed charge d'affaires.[3.10] - -[THE TEXAN REVOLUTION] - -A few months later Texas broke away from the mother-country, and her -former lords felt sure that from beginning to end, in the colonization, -rebellion and successful defence of that region, the hand of the -American government could plainly enough be seen. Their state of feeling -seemed to Butler "a perfect tempest of passion," and Ellis believed -that the Cabinet of Mexico discussed seriously the question of an open -rupture with the United States. The Mexican view, however, although -supported by a section of the American public, was radically incorrect. -Essentially the migration of our citizens across the Sabine formed a -part of the great movement that peopled the Mississippi valley. The -causes of the Texan rebellion were provided by Mexico herself. That -step actually crossed the wish and aims of our administration, which -desired to buy the province--not see it become an independent country. -From the very first, our national authorities proclaimed and endeavored -to enforce neutrality; and they gave the Texans no assistance in their -struggle for independence. The British minister at Mexico expressed the -opinion to Santa Anna that our government had done all that could be -expected, and all that lay in its power; and Santa Anna did not venture -to deny this. Individual Americans and sometimes Americans in groups -did, it is true, contribute materially to aid the cause of Texas; but -in most cases their action was entirely lawful, while in the others it -could not be prevented. Moreover, these few trespasses against the law -of neutrality were in substance only just retribution for the tyranny, -misgovernment and atrocities of Mexico. In reality, therefore, our -skirts were as clear as reasonably could have been expected.[3.11] - -One phase of the case, however, which excited special indignation -at Mexico, requires notice. Two streams from the north send their -waters into Sabine Lake, and it was held by some that either of these -could be regarded as the Sabine River and, therefore, as marking the -boundary. In October, 1833, Butler urged that we insist upon the western -stream, commonly called the Neches, and occupy in force the valuable -intermediate region, which included Nacogdoches; and for a time Jackson -felt inclined to do so. Near the close of 1835 Mexico was officially -warned against encroaching upon our territory while fighting the -Texans, and suspected that Secretary of State Forsyth took this action -with a view to the Nacogdoches district. She therefore became alarmed, -and early in 1836 a special minister hastily set out for Washington -to investigate the matter. This minister was Manuel E. de Gorostiza, -a witty, agreeable man of the world, Mexican by birth, Spanish by -education, the author of some clever dramas, but not professionally a -topographer, a lawyer or even a diplomat.[3.12] - -[BOUNDARY DIFFICULTIES] - -Then a delicate matter became suddenly menacing. On both sides of the -Sabine there were Indians, who loved war, whisky and plunder as much -as they hated work and the whites. A paper boundary, particularly one -in dispute, meant nothing to them. Once roused, they were practically -sure, as Gorostiza admitted, to rob and murder wherever they could; -and not only the fighting in Texas but at least one Mexican emissary -enkindled their passions. United States Indians crossed the line and -perpetrated outrages. Homes were abandoned. People fled panic-stricken -from the vicinity of Nacogdoches; citizens of the town implored American -protection against our own Indians; and evidence of an incipient -conflagration was placed in the hands of General E. P. Gaines, who -commanded our troops on the border.[3.12] Now the treaty of amity -required each country to prevent its Indians from ravaging the other; -but, as Mexico did not wish us at this time to keep our savages -from harassing the Texans, and did not request us to act for her in -fulfilling her pledge, which she could not fulfil herself, possibly -the treaty, though often cited by the United States, had technically -no direct bearing. But the American government argued rightly that -substance was more important than form; that the intent of the treaty -was to require both countries to prevent "by all the means in their -power" an Indian war on the frontier; that it was the paramount duty -of the Executive to protect our people, who, as Gorostiza virtually -admitted, were liable to be endangered by the threatened conflagration; -that as it was known to be physically impossible for Mexico to comply -with the treaty, she could not complain of us for doing what she had -agreed ought to be done, and had undertaken to do; that, should it be -necessary to cross what had been commonly assumed to be the boundary -in order to perform our duty--particularly in order to prevent our own -Indians from perpetrating outrages on the other side--common sense and -the spirit of the treaty warranted our doing it; and that, on account -of the distance to the Sabine, it was necessary to give the general -commanding there a certain credence and a certain discretion. Our -government could have reasoned also, and very likely it did, that the -strong desire of the Texans, _de facto_ successors to the Mexicans in -that region, that we should fulfil the obligation which the treaty -created, was an additional ground for so doing.[3.12] - -Accordingly Gaines, while ordered with strong emphasis to maintain a -rigid neutrality, was authorized to advance as far as Nacogdoches--an -excellent point from which to defend the American frontier and prevent -our Indians from operating beyond it--should such a step seem positively -necessary; and then, as measures of precaution, Forsyth not only -explained our views and intentions personally to Gorostiza, but made -in writing what that minister himself described as a "frank and noble" -statement, saying that the occupation of the intermediate region, should -it occur, would be temporary and for the sole purpose indicated, and -would have no significance in regard to the boundary question.[3.12] - -Apparently satisfied by the directness and candor of this policy, -Gorostiza at first admitted the right of the United States to enter -Texas in order to punish actual or prevent intended outrages, and -thus conceded that the frontier could be crossed without offence. But -apparently, when he had taken leave of the secretary of state, his -distrust returned, and his Mexican subtlety imagined all sorts of ugly -possibilities. It disturbed him that Forsyth did not formally commit -himself, in advance of a survey, against the Neches claim. It alarmed -him to find that the state department could not give him early and exact -information as to Gaines's movements in a remote, unsettled region. -He felt angry that Lewis Cass, who was secretary of war but of course -had no control over our foreign relations, looked upon Nacogdoches -as American territory. Various other things also appeared to him -suspicious, when really his lack of judgment was the chief or only -reason. Most important of all, no doubt, he thought of public opinion -in Mexico, which was entirely unacquainted with American directness -as exemplified by Forsyth, intensely suspicious of us, and intensely -hostile.[3.12] - -[DIPLOMATIC CLASHES] - -He retracted, therefore, as much as possible of his concurrence, opened -a war of notes upon our state department, and near the end of the year -1836, on learning from the secretary that in spite of his objections -American troops had gone to Nacogdoches, demanded his passports, and -left our shores in wrath. His conduct in so doing was officially -endorsed by his government, and anti-American feeling in that country -became deeper and hotter than before. Nothing could be seen there except -that "sacred" soil claimed and long occupied by Mexico, though now out -of her control, had been profaned by Gaines's troops, and thus, as all -Mexicans argued, the way opened for limitless aggressions. To make the -case even worse, it was erroneously believed that Houston's victory at -San Jacinto had really been gained by troops then in the service of the -United States, and it was said that we were preparing to attack Mexico -very soon by sea and by land.[3.12] - -Our recognition of Texas, which occurred early in 1837, was entirely in -line with our previous action in similar cases, was less prompt than our -recognition of Mexico herself had been, and seemed not only warranted -but required by the circumstances. That republic had a government in -operation which appeared to be competent, and was thought likely to -endure. Santa Anna, the President of Mexico, admitted that she could not -hope to gain control of the revolted province, even should its troops -be vanquished in the field, and expressed a desire that we should open -the way to a settlement of the controversy by granting recognition. -After 1836, as the Mexican minister of war stated eight years later, -there was no serious talk of attempting to subdue Texas. At the date of -recognition, since war between us and Mexico seemed almost inevitable, -there appeared to be no great need of considering her susceptibilities; -and it was feared that England entertained certain designs, unfavorable -to us, regarding Texas, which could be defeated or at least hindered by -taking this action. As Mexico was totally unable to protect American -vessels in the port of Galveston, we had to establish relations with the -power that could do so, or else conduct an important part of our trade -under hazardous conditions; and no commercial nation willingly accepts -the second alternative in such a case. Finally, the leading powers of -Europe endorsed our course by doing the same thing before any material -change in the situation occurred.[3.13] - -Mexico, however, would see none of these facts. Our earliest moves -toward recognition were looked upon by her, said the British minister, -"as the consummation of a design long since entertained" to rob her -of that valuable territory, and excited, as he remarked, a "bitter -animosity" that no explanation could even mitigate; and our formal -action became one more standing ground of complaint and wrath against -the government and people of the United States.[3.13] - -In 1842 Mexican feeling was intensified. At this time Santa Anna -thought it advisable to rekindle the Texan war, now virtually dormant -for six years. Very likely he did not wish to let the case go by -default; naturally his recollections of Texan hospitality moved him to -reciprocate; and in all probability he believed that any prospect of -fighting Texas or the United States in the name of national honor would -help to make his autocratic military rule more acceptable. Accordingly, -several annoying though ineffective raids beyond the Rio Grande -occurred, and a serious invasion was threatened. Upon this, many Texan -sympathizers in the Unites States and many who thought they saw England -supporting the Mexican operations, held meetings, contributed funds, and -even migrated to Texas with guns on their shoulders, all of which they -could legally do.[3.14] - -In pursuance of Santa Anna's policy--probably also to gratify the strong -and universal sentiment of his fellow-citizens, aid the anti-Texas and -anti-administration party in the United States, neutralize perhaps the -good understanding between the United States and England resulting -from the settlement of our northeastern boundary, and possibly gain -the sympathy not only of Great Britain, but of her friend Louis -Philippe--Bocanegra, the minister of relations, now declared war -upon us in the field of diplomacy. May 12, 1842, he addressed Daniel -Webster, then secretary of state, directly, protesting against the -aid given Texas by our citizens, and asking whether the United States -could injure Mexico any more, if openly at war against her. "Certainly -not," he said, in reply to his own question. Then he issued a circular -to the diplomatic corps at Mexico, in which he charged our government -with tolerating aggressions made upon Mexican territory by "subaltern -and local authorities," and announced that while his country did not -wish to fight the United States, she would certainly do all that was -"imperatively required for her honor and dignity." Still not satisfied, -he wrote again to Webster, though an answer to the first letter was -not yet due, accusing the American Cabinet itself of "conduct openly -at variance with the most sacred principles of the law of nations and -the solemn compacts of amity existing between the two countries," and -threatening that a continuance of this policy would be regarded as "a -positive act of hostility."[3.14] - -In reply to Bocanegra's first despatch, Webster said that the American -government utterly denied and repelled the charges made against it, and -then with characteristic power he discussed and refuted them. We shall -still maintain neutrality, he concluded, "but the continuance of amity -with Mexico cannot be purchased at any higher rate." To Bocanegra's -second letter his reply was no less positive but a great deal briefer. -The President, he wrote, considers the language and tone of that -communication "highly offensive," and orders "that no other answer be -given to it than the declaration that the conduct of the Government of -the United States, in regard to the war between Mexico and Texas, having -been always hitherto governed by a strict and impartial regard to its -neutral obligations, will not be changed or altered in any respect or in -any degree."[3.14] - -This compelled Mexico, as the British minister observed, to accept the -rebuke invited by her imprudent language or begin hostilities. The -former course was chosen; and Bocanegra humbly replied that, relying -upon Webster's "frank declaration" of neutrality, he would not dwell -further upon the subject. Even before Webster was heard from, our -minister described the state of feeling at Mexico as "most bitter"; -and such a correspondence, disagreeable enough to Mexican pride, tended -naturally to bring the two countries nearer to the tented field. -Richtofen, the Prussian envoy at Mexico, said that Bocanegra's note led -to a distinctly hostile state of things. At one time the President of -the United States did not see how war could be avoided; and the Mexican -press did about all it could to create a fighting temper.[3.14] - -An opera bouffe sequel followed. Commodore T. A. C. Jones, lying at -Callao with our Pacific squadron, received some of Bocanegra's effusions -from the American consul at Mazatlan, who added that war seemed "highly -probable." Jones could not believe that a responsible minister would -write so fiercely unless prepared for a conflict, and he felt sure the -United States would not flinch. Anxious to provide a port of refuge for -American vessels, alarmed lest England should now obtain California -under some arrangement with Mexico, as she was thought ready to do, and -satisfied that hostilities would actually break out before he could -reach that coast, he sailed promptly and arrived at Monterey on October -19. Being a rather self-sufficient and hasty person, he investigated -the matter there in but a superficial manner, and the next day politely -occupied the town. He now found that war had not begun; and upon this, -after hauling down his flag and saluting that of Mexico, he sailed -away, while General Micheltorena, the governor, thundered grandiloquent -language at him from a safe distance. Naturally the authorities at -Mexico flared up at this episode; but they soon found that no charge -could be made against our government, and, realizing presently with our -minister's aid that the longest finger pointed toward Bocanegra and the -loudest laugh was at Micheltorena, they willingly allowed the matter to -fade away. It therefore sharpened Mexican hostility far less than might -have been expected, yet no doubt considerably.[3.15] - -Meanwhile fresh trouble arose. The continuance of nominal war between -Mexico and Texas and the constant danger of raids interfered seriously -with our commercial interests. Near the end of June, 1842, therefore, -the American secretary of state, hoping to influence the government of -Mexico, observed to our minister that the war was "not only useless, -but hopeless, without attainable object, injurious to both parties -and likely to be, in its continuance, annoying and vexatious to other -commercial nations"; and this line of policy was followed up in January, -1843. Indeed, Webster gave notice that a formal protest would very -likely be made, unless the state of war should be ended or respectable -forces take the field.[3.14] - -Naturally these remonstrances, however proper, gave much offence; -and the translation of John Quincy Adams's brilliant speech at -Braintree, Massachusetts, which made an eloquent but mistaken attack -upon the American administration, gave the newspapers of Mexico a -fresh opportunity and fresh reason to ventilate their suspicions of -us. A merciless warfare upon Texas was now announced; and Santa Anna -decreed in June, 1843, that all foreigners taken in arms on Texan soil -should be executed. In reply to this, our secretary of state declared -that American citizens could not be prevented from serving abroad, -as Frenchmen and Germans had served in our own revolutionary armies; -and that, if captured in Texas, they must be treated as prisoners of -war. "On this point," he insisted, "there can be no concession or -compromise."[3.14] - -[AMERICAN GRIEVANCES] - -Here our point of view must be shifted. So far we have mainly been -concerned with complaints on the part of Mexico, and it will be admitted -that in those affairs the United States did not materially injure her -in any unlawful way, and exhibited no malicious intentions. We must now -take up certain American grievances; and first in order may be mentioned -the summary execution of twenty-two of our citizens in 1835. Under the -revolutionist Mejia they had left the United States for Texas, but they -were conducted to Tampico and there were captured. The minister of -relations asserted that they were duly tried, and simply experienced the -rigor of the law; but our minister ascertained that no trial took place. -In spite of international law and treaty stipulations the government -ordered them shot, and shot they were--officially murdered. At the edge -of the grave eighteen of them signed a denial, their "dying words," that -any intention to invade Mexico had existed in their minds.[3.16] - -Next may come the systematic endeavor of Mexico, even after signing the -treaty of amity and commerce, to hinder our people from crossing the -boundary, and in particular to keep them out of Texas. Article III of -the treaty said: "The citizens of the two countries shall have liberty -to enter into the same, and to remain and reside in any part of said -territories, respectively." All Mexicans were offered the full benefit -of this agreement in the United States; but a Mexican law, revived by -decree on April 4, 1837, with evident reference to our people, read -thus: "Foreigners are prohibited from settling in those States and -territories of the Confederacy which border on the territories of their -own nations." This was done on the ground that political mischief was -liable to result from their presence. Now some allowance is to be made -for this view. But in reality all international relations involve -danger, and the country that fears it should use precautions. American -sailors make trouble in French ports, but France does not refuse them -admission--she appoints policemen. The danger from Americans in Texas -was doubtless greater, but so were the advantages to be derived from -their coming. Had Mexico governed that region well, their presence -would have benefited her immensely; and to make a treaty sanctioning -foreign intercourse, and then endeavor to keep the main avenue of that -intercourse barred, in order to avoid the legitimate results of her own -misgovernment, was an international system decidedly more novel than -friendly, more ingenious than straightforward.[3.17] - -In April, 1840, under a verbal order from the governor of upper -California, a considerable number of peaceable Americans and other -foreigners, residing at scattered points, were suddenly arrested in a -brutal and even bloody manner on the pretext of a conspiracy, and their -property was confiscated. Even the possession of legal passports did -not protect them. After suffering inhuman treatment, they were sent in -irons to Mexico. There only the charity of strangers preserved their -lives; and at length, after marching under blows and with bleeding feet -as far as Tepic, they were thrust into prisons. No doubt they were rough -in character and behavior, and the presence of such bold, vigorous -foreigners in a weakly governed region obviously involved some dangers; -but they had rights. No evidence justifying the treatment they received -was brought forward, and the government at Mexico, even while ordering -them expelled from the country without compensation, admitted the -illegality of their arrest. Finally, as the British minister demanded, -they were permitted to go home; but Mexico failed to bear the expense of -their journey, as she had promised to do, and paid but a slight, if any, -indemnity. Such conduct when she had millions for the army, the civil -wars and the pockets of officials, was inexcusable. Justly enough this -affair excited the deep indignation of our government and people.[3.18] - -In June, 1841, a Texan expedition set out for Santa Fe, hoping to -bring about the incorporation of New Mexico in the new republic, but -not planning under any circumstances to make war; and a considerable -number of Americans--among them Kendall, editor of the New Orleans -_Picayune_--joined the caravan with commercial or other peaceable -aims. After a while the entire body were made prisoners by the Mexican -governor. Kendall's passport, when duly exhibited under a flag of truce, -was taken from him; and, although the utmost penalty incurred under -Mexican law by the non-combatant Americans was expulsion, they were -driven with instances of extreme brutality to Mexico, and compelled -to work in chains on public roads. For one reason or another a few of -our citizens gained their freedom from time to time; but it was not -until well on in 1842--and then as an act of condescension instead of -justice--that Santa Anna released the main body of them. Of course this -country felt highly incensed again; and the Executive, while disclaiming -all desire to screen Americans from any deserved punishment, ordered our -minister to protest against the treatment of the prisoners, declaring -that Mexico would be required to observe the rules prescribed by modern -public law. On the other side of the Rio Grande still more passion was -aroused, but in the opposite sense.[3.19] - -Beginning in a humble way, a caravan trade between St. Louis, Santa -Fe and Chihuahua grew to large proportions, and eventually interested -even the New York and Philadelphia merchants; but this commerce, though -sanctioned by treaty, was looked upon by Mexico with disfavor from -the very first. Excessive taxes were imposed at the frontier and at -Chihuahua; and finally, in August, 1843, Santa Anna arbitrarily locked -the door. Possibly there was a baseless notion that political designs -upon New Mexico were entertained in the United States; competition with -native traders may have been feared; and it was charged that smuggling -occurred. But competition and smuggling are unavoidable features of -international commerce; and if they afforded an adequate reason for -disregarding a formal agreement, international trade arrangements would -not be worth making. Our citizens and government objected therefore -vigorously and with justice to Santa Anna's course.[3.20] - -One week after this decree went forth, another prohibited the -importation of certain specified articles at any point, and ordered the -forfeiture of such merchandise, already in the hands of dealers, if not -sold within the ensuing twelve months. The list of articles, printed -solidly in small type, filled nearly an octavo page, and apparently was -intended to include almost everything embraced in our trade with Mexico. -Peculiarly harsh seemed the forfeiture provision. Not only was it _ex -post facto_, but our traders by paying the duty had become entitled to -the privilege of selling their goods; and the American secretary of -state could do no less than protest against the law, as "a manifest -violation of the liberty of trade secured by the treaty." Yet something -still more serious followed it, for aliens were soon prohibited from -doing retail business at all. An attempt was made to defend this order -on the ground that Americans residing in the country were subject to its -laws, usages and statutes; but our government replied that a treaty must -be regarded as the supreme law, and that if one solemn agreement with -Mexico could thus be made a nullity, all the other privileges accorded -us could one by one be abrogated.[3.21] - -These commercial grievances, however, were trifles compared with -another of the same halcyon period. In July, 1843, Tornel, the -minister of war, instructed the governors of California and three -other northern departments to expel all citizens of the United States -residing therein, and permit no more of them to enter. Extraordinary -precautions were taken to keep this measure secret, and Waddy Thompson, -our representative at Mexico, first learned of it on December 23. Four -times he inquired in vain whether such an order had been issued; but -when he demanded his passports, Bocanegra attempted to justify Tornel's -instructions, arguing that every government is authorized to protect -itself against seditious aliens. This was an evasion, for the order had -reference to all Americans, however law-abiding. The outcome was that -now, after the order had been in force almost six months and after it -had been executed in at least one department, directions were given -to make it include all foreigners, and apply only to the seditious. -Thompson, strongly disposed to please the Mexicans, accepted this as -satisfactory; but his country did not, for the governors had authority -still to decide what Americans were dangerous, and expel these without -a trial. Besides, even the modified order required them to prevent our -citizens from entering their jurisdictions, and thus plainly violated -the treaty.[3.22] - -All of the grievances thus far mentioned bore directly upon the general -government of Mexico, but there were also many others, primarily -chargeable to minor authorities, in which our national rights were -seriously attacked;[3.23] and next we reach the question of "American -claims"--that is to say, private injuries for which damages were asked. -At once the idea occurs to us that perhaps our citizens brought their -troubles upon themselves by peculiarly obnoxious conduct. This does not -appear likely to have been the rule, however, for the British, although -the Mexicans felt anxious to have their goodwill and assistance, -complained loudly and long, and their government protested in the most -emphatic and sweeping style. Indeed, said Ashburnham, the charge of -England: "There is scarcely one foreign power with whom they have had -any relation, which has not had more or less cause to complain of the -iniquity and persecution to which its subjects here have been exposed;" -and France, though her claims were much smaller than ours, took up arms -on this account. Bearing in mind, then, how peculiarly inimical were the -people and authorities of Mexico toward us, one can readily imagine what -sort of treatment citizens of ours had to endure.[3.24] - -[THE AMERICAN CLAIMS] - -In the next place one desires to be sure whether our actual claims were -real or, as some American and Mexican writers have asserted, were simply -"trumped-up." That a few of the less important ones had no basis is -apparently true, but it must be remembered that our government was bound -to consider any case resting on _prima facie_ support, and ask for -an investigation. It could not, like the Mexican authorities, examine -the records necessary for the detection of all mistakes and frauds. -Moreover, the existence of unfounded claims, if such there were, does -not matter to us, for the real question is merely whether substantial -sums were justly demanded. On that point one immediately reflects, not -only that our national authorities were scarcely capable of conspiring -with skippers and traders to pick the pocket of Mexico, but that, had -they been silly enough to present a list of imaginary claims, her -quick-witted if not profound officials would have delighted to analyze -and expose the frauds. Coming then to the question, one can answer it -positively in the affirmative. Both national and international tribunals -decided that we had well-founded and substantial claims.[3.25] - -It has been urged, however, that our demands required very difficult -and extensive investigations, which in the midst of her embarrassments -Mexico could not reasonably be expected to enter upon; but many, if not -most, of the claims were in fact simple.[3.26] It has been insisted -that as aggrieved Mexicans in the United States appealed to our courts, -the proper policy for aggrieved Americans was to appeal to the courts -of Mexico;[3.27] but the assumed analogy did not exist. The Mexican -tribunals, in addition to being notoriously bad from every point of -view, were sometimes deliberately used to perpetrate iniquities, and -could not always enforce their fair decisions.[3.28] - -American writers have also argued that it was contemptible for a strong -and rich nation like ours to demand money from a poor neighbor; but -the extent of our national resources had no bearing on the rights of -individual citizens, crippled or impoverished by Mexican injustice. -This, however, is by no means all that should be said. The wisdom -and the equity of the civilized world are embodied in its laws, and -those laws agree that one's debts are to be paid. Spendthrifts are not -exempted from the effects of this rule, and the poverty of the Mexican -treasury was due not only to carelessness but also to crime. Moreover, -if an amiable, "_siempre-alegre_" young man borrows without repaying, -wastes his substance in riotous living, and perpetrates outrages on the -passers-by, it is the duty of some creditor to bring him before the -courts, and convince him in a practical manner that, as a member of -civilized society, he is accountable for his acts. The same principle -holds of international relations. "All political communities are -responsible to other political communities for their conduct," wrote -Canning to the Spanish government; Webster enunciated the same rule; -and it was not only the right but the duty of the United States--as a -fellow nation, a sister republic and a next neighbor--to bring Mexico -to her senses by teaching her what membership in the family of nations -involved. Had this been done at the beginning of her wild career, -she might have put her house in order before bad practices became -habitual.[3.29] - -Again, we shall presently find good reasons to believe, that had -Mexico fairly examined our claims and frankly stated her financial -difficulties, a lenient arrangement regarding what were after all -moderate sums for a nation to pay could readily have been made. Further -still, if Mexico was too poor to discharge her debts promptly, it -was incumbent upon her, besides recognizing them, to show a certain -appreciation of the indulgence accorded her; but instead of so doing she -continued to harass American citizens, and showed, as we shall find, -a distinct lack of good-will and even of straightforwardness in her -dealings with us. - -Finally, it has been repeated over and over again by American and -Mexican writers that our claims were urged aggressively. But the history -of the matter does not read in that way. Our demands for redress began -early in Poinsett's day. In October, 1829, Butler was directed to lay -them before the Mexican government, but at the same time to avoid -"anything like menace or defiance." Morning after morning his table was -covered with fresh American remonstrances against official conduct, -he reported, and for years his efforts met only with rebuffs; yet -his instructions were still to maintain amicable relations, and our -government set him the example.[3.30] - -[OUR CLAIMS CONSIDERATELY URGED] - -In June, 1836, Ellis reported that "daily" acts of "injustice and -oppression" continued to be perpetrated, while every application for -redress was treated with "cold neglect"; yet the next month he was -merely instructed to "make a fresh appeal" to the "sense of honor and -justice" of the Mexican government, asking that our grievances "should -be promptly and properly examined" and "suitable" redress be afforded. -In order, however, to check what the British minister called "their -usual system of evasion," a satisfactory reply of some kind within -three weeks was to be required, and should it not be made without -"unnecessary" delay, Ellis, after giving a fortnight's notice, was to -withdraw. In October Monasterio, after delaying for weeks to answer -Ellis, admitted that his predecessors had neglected this business, and -promised he would give his first attention to our claims, many of which, -as we know, were very simple, very old and very familiar to the foreign -office; but his reply, the following month, was mere evasion. Why, asked -Ellis, have not the claims presented during the past ten years been -either accepted or rejected? But the mystery was not explained, and at -the end of December, 1836--after waiting, not three weeks, but three -months--he withdrew. Meanwhile Gorostiza distributed among the diplomats -at Washington a pamphlet in which he accused our government of grossly -dishonorable conduct in regard to Texas; and the unqualified approval -of his superiors turned this impropriety into a grave international -issue.[3.31] - -President Jackson had originally felt most sympathetic toward Mexico; -and although Butler and Ellis agreed that indulgence was a mistaken -policy, and her official journal described all Americans as villains -and all our claims as the pretexts of smugglers, yet in a Message of -December, 1836, Jackson recommended courtesy and great forbearance. The -evasions practised upon Ellis, however, and still more the approval of -Gorostiza's insulting pamphlet, sharpened his feelings, and early in -February, 1837, he laid the subject of our claims anew before Congress, -as it was his right and his duty to do, proposed to make the next demand -for settlement from the deck of a warship, and asked for authority to -undertake reprisals in case that step also should prove ineffectual. In -the official view of Mexico, Gaines's advance and Gorostiza's withdrawal -from Washington amounted to a formal rupture, even though Castillo, her -ordinary representative, lingered in the United States until March; and -in our own official opinion the endorsement of Gorostiza's conduct, the -refusal to examine our claims, and the return of Ellis could signify -hardly less. Under such circumstances Jackson's February Message was -perfectly normal and proper.[3.32] - -Congress took substantially the same view as the Executive; but -there was some fear of Mexican privateers, a good deal of pity for a -sister republic supposed to be the victim of circumstances, a little -unwillingness to increase Jackson's power, a pronounced wish to comply -exactly with the treaty of amity, which required formal notice in -advance of hostilities, and considerable hope that Santa Anna, who had -now been restored alive to his country through the magnanimity of the -Texans and the Americans, would reciprocate by endeavoring to adjust -our claims. Another consideration, however, was probably still more -potent. The administration party felt that should war be declared, the -opposition would say its real object was the acquisition of Texas; and -so Jackson's well-known desire to obtain that region prevented in large -measure, instead of causing, an outbreak of hostilities. It was decided, -therefore, to make the final demand for redress in a peaceful manner, -and to show full respect for what the House of Representatives described -as our "ancient, though now estranged, friend."[3.33] - -In March, 1837, Van Buren became President, and found it necessary to -take some action. The documents bearing on our claims were critically -examined; fifty-seven cases, apparently free from doubt, were made out -and proved; and in July, Robert Greenhow, interpreter of the state -department, presented them at Mexico with a final demand for redress, -adding that we had no desire to cause embarrassment by pressing for -payment. On one point, however, he insisted: Gorostiza's conduct must -be disavowed. The minister of relations admitted in reply that certain -of the cases did not require long examination, which was indeed true; -but he said the President, while "most anxious" not to cause delay, -wished that "each" of them should be examined "in its turn" and that -"nothing should be left undone" which could promote "the most speedy and -equitable" settlement.[3.34] - -In November Martinez, a new minister to the United States, whom we -received kindly even though Gorostiza's action had not been disavowed, -presented the answer of his government. Instead of the document -officially transmitted by Greenhow, an obsolete, incomplete and -necessarily inaccurate list of our claims, obtained nobody knows how, -had been used; only four of our fifty-seven living cases had even been -considered; and not one of these had been disposed of. Accordingly, -when our Congress assembled in December, 1837, the Executive laid the -whole subject before it anew, analyzed Mexico's evasive reply--so -different from what had been solemnly promised--announced that fresh -outrages of a serious and exasperating sort had been committed, and -plainly intimated that no hope of a peaceful settlement could be -entertained. Evidently the patience of the United States had nearly -come to an end; but before Congress was ready to act, Martinez proposed -a scheme of arbitration, which--though formally decided upon by -Mexico in May, 1837--it had apparently been her deliberate purpose -to hold in reserve until all other dilatory tactics should have been -exhausted.[3.35] - -[ARBITRATION AGREED UPON] - -Naturally our government hesitated to adopt a plan which, as the British -representative at Mexico wrote when he heard of it, was precisely the -one to "gratify the favourite object" of our debtors--"the gaining of -time and postponement of the day of reckoning"; but in April, 1838, -quite unlike France and much to the surprise of Mexico, we accepted -arbitration, and it then appeared that Martinez had no powers to act -in the matter. For months, indeed, although our consul at Mexico was -assuring that government of our fair and friendly disposition, he did -not receive them.[3.36] - -In September, 1838, however, a convention was signed. Martinez stated -that it would not have to be ratified by the Congress of his country, -but her President ruled otherwise, and then with an extremely poor -excuse did not submit it. So the time limit arrived; and, to the intense -disgust of our people and administration, the agreement lapsed. The poor -excuse was accepted by our government, however, and in April, 1839, -after two years had thus been frittered away, another convention was -made, providing that each country should name two commissioners, and the -king of Prussia select a fifth person to be an umpire; and as Mexico -disavowed Gorostiza's conduct in circulating the offensive pamphlet, our -patience appeared to be rewarded.[3.37] - -In the opinion of Pakenham, British minister at Mexico, the arbitration -arrangement was "a very fortunate circumstance" for the debtor nation, -and one that she ought to observe scrupulously; but the minister of -relations, without even a poor excuse, failed to consider seriously the -appointment of commissioners until a few days before the treaty required -them to be in Washington, and consequently the agreement expired. -Mexico, however, could not well take advantage of this fact; the United -States waived it; and on August 25, 1840, nearly two and a half years -after we had accepted arbitration, the joint commission was organized. -The representatives of Mexico were Senores Castillo and Leon, one of -whom, being unfamiliar with business, fell under the control of his -colleague, while the other was described by Pakenham as conspicuously -dishonest. In eighteen months from that date, according to the treaty, -the labors of this body were to end. To kill time was, therefore, to -kill claims--or at any rate bury them.[3.38] - -When the subject of the commission was discussed in 1838, Forsyth -took the ground that it would be a judicial body, guided solely by -the evidence before it; and this principle was apparently accepted -as fundamental. Webster, now the secretary of state, pointed out -that it was essentially and necessarily such a tribunal. The Mexican -commissioners, however, had been ordered to act, not freely according to -the evidence, but according to the instructions of their government; and -moreover they promptly refused to let the claimants present themselves -either in person, by attorney or in writing. Some four months were -spent in discussing objections raised by them, and finally, in order to -get something done, the American representatives found it necessary to -give way. Yet the sailing was not smooth even then. Castillo and Leon -resorted not only to dilatory tactics and unfair methods, but even to -express falsehood; and their government violated in a signal manner one -of the most fundamental stipulations of the treaty. In short, if we may -believe the apparently fair statement of the American commissioners, -the Mexicans caused delays that prevented the adjustment of claims -amounting to more than five millions, and pursued a course in general -that excited great indignation throughout this country. Meanwhile, as -our philo-Mexican minister, Thompson, reported, "The rights of American -Citizens of every grade and character" were still subjected to "constant -outrage."[3.39] - -[MEXICAN EVASIONS] - -In spite of everything, however, some two millions--in 1841 a -substantial amount--were awarded, and at once Mexico set at work to -devise a scheme for evading the obligation. Urgent advice from the -British minister discouraged this plan, however; and finally a new -convention was made in January, 1843, expressly for the convenience of -our debtor, by which the amount with interest was to be paid within five -years, counted from the following April, in equal quarterly instalments -of cash. "Such indulgent terms," was Pakenham's description of the -arrangement. Both governments ratified it; and so after these many years -of patience and effort on the one side, evasion and sometimes dishonesty -on the other, compensation for a portion of our grievances began to be -received. But--after all, Mexico paid only three instalments. At that -point she broke her word, and stopped.[3.40] - -For her course in this matter there seem to be only two conceivable -excuses; her embarrassed condition and her irritation over the Texas -affair. With reference to these it must be said that her condition was -itself inexcusable, and at the utmost did not incapacitate her for doing -all that we demanded; while her irritation was essentially unfounded, -and, even had it been reasonable, would not have justified her making -promises and agreements only to break them, or resorting in other ways -to dishonorable methods.[3.41] - - - - - IV - - THE RELATIONS BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES - AND MEXICO - - 1843-1846 - - -In 1843 our decisive difficulty with Mexico began to take shape. The -annexation of Texas to the United States was on legal, moral and -political grounds entirely legitimate. That republic had defied the -arms of the mother-country for nine years. It was recognized as an -independent nation by the leading commercial powers of the world; and -no well-informed person, even in Mexico, dreamed that it would return -to its former connection. To be sure, her pretensions were asserted in -1845 as loudly as ever; but she made them ridiculous by declaring that -never, under any circumstances, would the independence of her rebellious -daughter be conceded. Besides, Mexico had practically acquiesced in the -recognition of Texas by our own and other governments; and, in view of -this fact, as good a lawyer and statesman as Daniel Webster, though -opposed to incorporating that country in the Union, held that our doing -it gave Mexico no ground of complaint.[4.1] - -[TEXAS ANNEXED JUSTLY] - -Annexation was therefore permissible, and grave national interests of -the United States appeared to demand the step. All northern Mexico, -including California, seemed liable to secede, for the people of that -whole region felt profoundly dissatisfied with the administration of -their national affairs, and realized the urgent need of a strong and -orderly government; there was reason to believe that Sam Houston, the -President of Texas, thought of organizing under European auspices a -southwestern empire, absorbing Oregon, and thus offsetting the United -States; as A. J. Donelson, our minister in Texas at that period, wrote -in 1848, "He was not mistaken. This he could have done"; and in that -event we should have had a bold, ambitious rival in the rear. The -anti-slavery agitation in the United States led many of our southern -citizens to long for separation and a union with slaveholding Texas. The -possibilities of Texan cotton production, stimulated by the English, -who were eager to be independent of the American fields, were keenly -dreaded. The logic of the situation seemed likely to render Texas not -only a commercial and industrial competitor and a rancorous political -enemy, but a source of dangerous complications with Mexico, England and -France. Finally, the British, who possessed a powerful influence in -her councils and in those of Mexico, were deliberately endeavoring to -shape matters in such a way as to do very serious harm, it was believed, -to the interests of the United States. Under such conditions no one -could reasonably complain because we undertook, employing as means -only argument and persuasion, to acquire that important and valuable -territory, and ward off these apparently imminent dangers. Albert -Gallatin, who opposed our taking the step, wrote later that it was "both -expedient and natural, indeed ultimately unavoidable."[4.1] - -No doubt it was quite natural that Mexico should take offence. To see -a handful of poor farmers, nearly all of them foreigners by birth, -rebel against their national government, appropriate a large portion -of the nation's territory, rout its army, capture its President, -establish a working political system, and gain recognition abroad, had -been fearfully trying. To believe, not only on the authority of every -Mexican leader but on that of many Europeans and some eminent Americans, -that all this loss and chagrin were largely, if not wholly, due to the -machinations of a neighbor, allied to Mexico by a treaty of amity and -constantly professing friendship, was harder yet. And now to find those -Texans, recently so eager to escape from all outside control, preparing -as if by a preconcerted understanding to join that seemingly perfidious -and aggressive nation, carrying their invaluable territories with them, -and bringing its frontier to the very bank of the Rio Grande--this was -certainly enough to make any citizen, ignorant of the natural steps by -which it had really come about and quite unable to understand American -ways, boil with rage. But the United States had labored to explain the -affair to Mexico, and was not responsible for her blindness. - -For a number of reasons Mexico had anticipated the final outcome of the -Texan difficulties, and on August 23, 1843, Bocanegra, her secretary -of relations, addressed our minister on the subject. The conduct of -the United States regarding that province, he wrote, has "appeared to -afford grounds for doubting the sincerity and frankness" of the American -authorities, and therefore, while hoping that the republic founded by -Washington may be saved "from stain and dishonor," we announce hereby, -"that the Mexican Government will consider equivalent to a declaration -of war against the Mexican Republic the passage of an act [by the -American Congress] for the incorporation of Texas with the territory -of the United States; the certainty of the fact being sufficient for -the immediate proclamation of war." Such a note was of course decidedly -offensive to the honor of this nation. Even Thompson felt compelled to -be indignant.[4.2] - -The following November Almonte, who then represented Mexico at -Washington, informed our secretary of state that should Congress and -the Executive decide upon annexation, he should consider his mission at -an end. "My country," he stated, "is resolved to declare war as soon -as it receives information of such an act." In reply, Upshur asserted -rather sharply the right of the United States to regard Texas as an -independent nation; but early in 1844 he talked the matter over with -Almonte in a very frank and amicable way, and the Mexican minister -concurred substantially in the annexation policy of our government. The -next spring, however, he formally repeated the protests of August and -November, 1843.[4.3] - -[THE UNITED STATES CONCILIATORY] - -Probably to gain time and if possible lead us on to acknowledge in some -way the claim of Mexico, Almonte encouraged Calhoun, who had succeeded -Upshur as the secretary of state, to believe that his government, -looking upon Texas as lost, would accept a pecuniary consideration -in order to minimize the misfortune; and about the middle of April, -1844, a "bearer of despatches" named Thompson left Washington with -certain instructions from the secretary of state to B. E. Green, our -charge at Mexico. These directed him to inform the Mexican government -that, while intending no disrespect and feeling an "anxious desire" -to maintain friendly relations, the United States had been compelled -by a regard for our own security to negotiate a treaty for the -annexation of Texas without reaching a previous understanding with it, -but had borne its attitude in mind, and was now ready to adjust all -difficulties--particularly that of the boundary, which had purposely -been left an open question--"on the most liberal and satisfactory -terms."[4.4] - -Thompson landed at Vera Cruz on May 14, and proceeded at once to call on -President Santa Anna, then at one of his estates near the coast. He next -went on to the capital, and in company with Green had a conference with -the acting President, who was, of course, entirely under Santa Anna's -control. No good results followed, however, and Calhoun's overture for -an amicable adjustment of the Texan difficulty, which Green presented -officially in a note, was rejected by the Cabinet. The United States, -Bocanegra pretended in his reply, though it had injured and outraged -Mexico by taking steps toward annexation, had now recognized her claim -to the territory; and he not only refused to make any concession, but -formally repeated the declaration of August 23. He then placed the Texas -affair before the diplomatic corps at Mexico; an unsuccessful attempt -was made to obtain from Bankhead, the British minister, some hint of -aid against the United States; Almonte received orders to persist in -his protests; the newspapers, taking their cue from a journal under the -President's direct control, broke out into what Bankhead characterized -as "the most violent strain of invective against the proposed -annexation"; and Santa Anna himself, assuming the reins of government, -called for 30,000 men and a large sum of money.[4.5] - -It is thus clear that while our government positively and rightfully -denied the claims of Mexico to any legal ownership of Texas, it -showed--even to the extent of imprudence--a kindly regard for her -feelings and a willingness to make her, under cover of adjusting the -boundary, a substantial present; and it is equally clear that our -overture, instead of being received in a friendly or even a candid -manner, was twisted and misrepresented, and was used by Santa Anna not -only to advance his personal interests, but even to feed the prevalent -hostility against the United States and increase the danger of war. -Of course Mexico had a perfect right to repulse our advances, but her -method of procedure in the case was unjustifiable. - -Meanwhile, from a variety of causes, among which the merits of the -question had but a small place, the treaty of annexation failed in our -Senate, and the Texans, who had given offence to England, France and -especially Mexico by accepting the overture of our Executive, found -themselves not only slighted by the United States but ferociously -menaced by Santa Anna, and seemed likely, in their resentment and -peril, to swing quite beyond our reach--presumably under the shield of -England. To counteract this tendency somewhat and in a measure safeguard -Texas against the dangers we had brought upon her, Calhoun sent a bold -and even audacious despatch to the American representative at Mexico. -The United States, he said, is responsible for the annexation treaty, -and upon us, not upon Texas, the wrath of Mexico should be visited; -moreover the matter of acquiring that territory, which it has long -been our policy to do, is pending still, and for that reason, as well -as on the score of humanity, we could not allow the question to be -decided by fierce Mexican threats of brutal hostilities; Texas is to be -treated as an independent power; but should annexation be consummated, -the United States will be ready to settle most liberally all resulting -difficulties.[4.6] - -In October, 1844, our minister gave the substance of this despatch to -the Mexican government; and soon the talented, energetic and audacious -Rejon, the successor of Bocanegra, sent him in reply a long but not -wearisome review of the Texas affair, that was absolutely a masterpiece -in its class. Truths, managed so as to give a wrong impression, clever -half-truths and flat falsehoods were skilfully combined, and at last the -United States appeared to stand in the dock as a confessed perjurer and -thief awaiting sentence. As for Calhoun's intervening now between Mexico -and a handful of rebels, protested Rejon, that could not be tolerated, -unless every nation that so chose might fill neighboring territory with -its people, incite them to revolt, aid them to resist, and finally offer -them annexation. Our minister, Shannon, who had been a useful Democratic -stump-speaker in Ohio, blustered, blundered, threatened and undertook to -argue, but only drew from Rejon a still more insulting letter, and still -more embittered the feeling in both countries.[4.7] - -At the beginning of March, 1845, our President signed the joint -resolution of Congress which provided for the annexation of Texas. -Almonte, the Mexican minister, at once protested, giving notice that his -country would maintain the claim to her ancient province "at all times, -by every means ... in her power"; and although James Buchanan, who now -became secretary of state under Polk, replied in a conciliatory manner, -Almonte broke off diplomatic relations and left our shores. At Mexico -the news produced a tremendous commotion, heightened by the report from -California that a revolution, decided by the American settlers, had -occurred in that department. War at once and war to the knife! cried the -press in concert; while the administration, in a note moderated by the -British and French ministers yet sufficiently positive, severed official -relations with Shannon, and insisted upon this policy even after -receiving a conciliatory reply from him. By the action of Mexico there -was, therefore, a complete rupture between the two countries.[4.8] - -[MEXICO PREPARES FOR WAR] - -When it was learned, about the middle of July, that our terms of -annexation had been accepted by Texas, passion burst forth again. The -leash of Mexican eloquence and fury broke. "August Houses! President of -the Republic!" cried _El Amigo del Pueblo_, "The hour of danger for the -country has sounded and she has a right to look to you for salvation. -Union and war!" Not merely Texas but all Mexico, the people were -told, had been marked as its prey by American greed. In order to save -itself before the public the administration, though at heart averse to -hostilities, proposed to Congress a declaration of war. Money was asked -from the Chambers, and full quotas of troops were summoned from the -departments; and by the end of the month, as the agent of our government -duly reported, the course of things pointed strongly toward hostilities. -The archives of Vera Cruz were carried to the interior; new guns were -mounted in the fortress there; steps were taken to raise a loan of -fifteen millions; munitions and provisions were said to be going as -rapidly as possible to Matamoros; and much was heard about the movements -of troops. At the end of July the ministers of Mexico at London and -Paris were notified that an appeal to arms would be made. August 8 the -Mexican consulate at New Orleans closed; and a few days later our consul -at Havana reported that his Mexican colleague had received an official -notification of the existence of war.[4.9] - -To be sure, no public declaration to that effect appeared, but -there were good reasons for considering this fact unimportant. With -Spanish-American subtlety the Mexicans discovered that the threat of -August 23, 1843, repeated later, had rendered such an announcement -unnecessary, and that it would be shrewder to hold that by annexing -Texas we had declared war upon them, since they would then be free to -attack or defer attacking us, as might seem expedient. Besides, it -was argued, Texas was merely a rebellious province, and hence Mexico -could make war there at will, without giving us an excuse for opening -hostilities against her seaboard, and without enabling us to seize -territory by the right of belligerency. Consequently, as large forces -had been ordered to the north, a move across the Rio Grande at any -hour seemed more than possible; and the official journal urged, that -it should be effected at the earliest practicable moment, in order to -prevent the United States from occupying the territory, and making ready -there for hostilities.[4.10] - -[OUR EFFORTS TO RESTORE INTERCOURSE] - -The American government, on the other hand, undertook to restore -friendly relations. The official assurances of good-will given Almonte -were supplemented by private representations conveyed to him through -a mutual friend by a member of our Cabinet; and Polk took also a step -of much greater importance. Before the end of March W. S. Parrott was -appointed a confidential agent of our state department, and ordered -to reach Mexico, which had long been his place of residence, by the -quickest route. Try to convince the Mexican government, ran his -instructions, that it is truly for the interest of that country, "to -restore friendly relations between the two republics." If it is found -willing, you may reveal your official character, and say that the -United States will send a "Minister" on learning that he will be kindly -received. The annexation of Texas cannot be undone; but "you are at -liberty to state your confident belief that in regard to all unsettled -questions, we are prepared to meet Mexico in a most liberal and friendly -spirit."[4.11] - -Thus commissioned, Parrott sought his post without delay, renewed -his acquaintance with members of the Mexican Congress, invited them -frequently to lunch or dinner, and talked, no doubt in the spirit of -his instructions, with all such influential persons as he could reach. -In particular, as he reported, he was "very precise in stating, that -the Government of the United States could never recognize in Mexico the -right to claim an indemnity for the annexation of Texas to the American -Union; but that, in a treaty of _limits_, for the sake of peace and -good neighborhood, the United States would, no doubt, be disposed, as -had been officially stated, to meet Mexico, in a negotiation, upon the -most friendly and _liberal_ terms." No explanation could have been -clearer.[4.12] - -There were good reasons for anticipating a favorable result from this -overture. President Herrera, connected by marriage with a leading -American merchant at the capital, was an honest, reasonable and -patriotic citizen; and, knowing that hostilities with the United States -would at best involve many costly sacrifices, and would very likely -throw California into our hands, he desired to escape by some method -from his public action in favor of war. It was altogether possible, too, -that a reverse on the field might upset his administration and injure -his friends; and, since the movement that had placed him in power had -cost money, his backers, in order to be repaid, felt anxious to curtail -instead of increasing the military expenses. Moreover there was trouble -with both England and France at this time; the more intelligent part of -the nation, cooling a little, were beginning to perceive the advantages -of a peaceful settlement with us; a chance could be seen that in the end -such a policy, reducing the cost of government, would become popular; -and finally it was realized that unless money to pay the troops were -obtained from the United States, their fickle allegiance probably could -not be retained. Accordingly on August 29, 1845, Parrott reported that -in his opinion an envoy from this country would be heartily welcomed; -almost at the same time Black, our consul at Mexico, and Dimond, our -consul at Vera Cruz, expressed the same view; and private advices tended -to confirm these opinions.[4.13] - -Our own reasons for wishing to have diplomatic intercourse restored -were almost equal in strength to Herrera's. Aside from the political -and commercial interests that had always led us to seek the friendship -of Mexico, we desired to collect the unpaid instalments of our awards, -prosecute our claims, guard our citizens residing in that country, -adjust the Texan difficulty, counteract prejudicial movements on the -part of European states, and cultivate the good-will of the Central and -South American peoples, who were sure to be influenced by the sentiments -of their kindred next us. In particular, only two or three months later -Guizot's idea of establishing a balance of power in this hemisphere -was exciting alarm in Congress; and there is reason to believe that -our Executive, already aware of it, desired the support of Mexico in -opposing a design so un-American. Besides, Polk felt sure that European -governments had an eye upon California, and a minister was needed at -the Mexican capital to prevent, if possible, any bargaining on the -subject.[4.14] - -Even more important, there were signs that a monarchy headed by -a European prince might be set up in Mexico, involving dangerous -interference in our commercial and political relations with that -country, sure to increase the gravity of a military contest, should one -arise, and seriously attacking the "Monroe Doctrine." As early as 1838 -our consul at Mexico reported that Alaman and the conservatives were -laboring to establish a monarchy. In 1840 Estrada, one of the ablest and -best of their statesmen, was denounced for openly advocating the change. -Paredes, now at the head of the army, had favored it for years, and in -1841 had initiated a movement in that direction. In January, 1845, two -agents of the Spanish government were said to be laboring in Mexico -for the same cause, and the _Memorial Historico_ announced that Spain, -France and England had formed an alliance to set up a new government -there. At about the same time the _Picayune_ stated that official -documents relating to the monarchical scheme had been received at New -Orleans; and early in March our diplomatic representative at London -sounded a strong note of warning.[4.15] - -To reinforce all these considerations, England and France felt deeply -offended at our absorption of Texas; Polk, who believed "that no -compromise [in the Oregon affair] to which Great Britain would accede, -could pass the Senate," now regarded a peaceful adjustment of that -controversy as impossible; and Mexico, though as a rule profoundly -influenced by the policy of England, might any day take offence at -some British move, and wish to approach the United States. For these -reasons it was of great importance to have a diplomatic agent near her -government ready to take advantage of any promising turn; and, finally, -one can easily imagine that in Polk's opinion the reception of a United -States minister would of itself, aside from what he might do, render it -more difficult for Mexico to maintain her unfriendly attitude.[4.16] - -[SLIDELL DESPATCHED AS MINISTER] - -Accordingly the letters of Parrott, Black and Dimond were promptly -taken up by the American Cabinet, and after a thorough discussion -of the subject it was unanimously agreed, although the rupture had -been caused by Mexico, to reopen diplomatic relations with her; to -keep this intention profoundly secret, lest European ministers at -Washington should thwart our aims; to despatch as minister John -Slidell of Louisiana, an agreeable man, able lawyer and excellent -Spanish scholar--just the sort of person most likely to gain the ear -of Mexico--and to pay as much as forty millions, if necessary, for -a satisfactory boundary. The next day, however, Polk learned that -Mexico had been taking warlike steps as late as August 21. It was -therefore concluded, in order to make sure that our envoy would not -be rejected, to wait a little for news, and meantime instruct Black -to ascertain "officially" whether a "Minister" would be received. No -further action on the part of the Mexican government appeared necessary -to restore friendly intercourse, for previously, after the withdrawal -of a legation, the broken thread had been mended by sending a new -representative. Nothing less than such action would have answered -our purpose, for only a diplomatic agent of the usual kind, residing -near that government, could have handled the existing problems. In -consequence exactly this, without qualification or ambiguity, was -proposed.[4.17] - -Just at this point a new factor appeared. The British, holding a great -amount of Mexican bonds, enjoying a very profitable trade in that -quarter, and not at all anxious to see us extend our territory by -conquest, did not wish Mexico to challenge the United States; and early -in October Bankhead expressed a desire to confer with Pena y Pena, -her secretary of relations, concerning the situation. This offer was -cordially accepted; and, at an interview between these gentlemen and -the President, Herrera said that the "subjects" which an American envoy -might bring up would be discussed "with every disposition to terminate -them amicably." Moreover, after frequent conversations and a second -formal interview, Pena thanked Bankhead most gratefully in writing for -offering to use his influence with Pakenham, now the British minister -at Washington, "for the purpose of amicably arranging the differences -[_las diferencias_]" existing between the United States and Mexico, and -intimated plainly that Herrera would listen to any "proposals" coming -from the American government.[4.18] - -[SLIDELL'S MISSION UNDERSTOOD BY MEXICO] - -To suppose that such men, discussing a matter of so much gravity, would -not in the course of numerous conversations take up its most obvious and -most important aspects would be absurd. These must have been considered, -and Bankhead reported that not only the annexation of Texas but "the -other points of difference, such as Limits and Indemnity," were to come -up, and in particular he understood that whatever sum the United States -might agree to pay would be "much reduced by claims arising out of the -Convention [of 1839] ... and by others since created." Such was Polk's -view. The questions of boundary compensation and claims compensation, -he said, "naturally and inseparably blended"; and the former existed -only as a consequence of annexation. To suppose after the United States -and Mexico had so long and beautifully illustrated the scene on Keats's -Greek vase--we forever pursuing and she forever eluding us--that we -should hand over to her a large sum without first ascertaining and -subtracting the just value of our claims, would have been ridiculous. -Moreover our claims counted prominently among the "differences" existing -between the two governments, and without a definite adjustment of them a -complete settlement and restoration of harmony, such as this plan aimed -expressly to accomplish, was impossible.[4.19] - -At this point, however, Bankhead's agency ended, for another superseded -it. On October 13, after having gone over the matter informally with -Pena, Consul Black at the minister's request wrote a confidential letter -to him, in which he quoted the following language from his instructions: -Ascertain from the Mexican government whether it will receive "an envoy -from the United States, intrusted with full power to adjust all the -questions in dispute between the two governments"; if so, he will be -"immediately" despatched. The secretary of relations now, if he had -not already done so, laid this matter before the President, and on the -fifteenth he replied thus: My government is "disposed to receive the -representative [_comisionado_] of the United States who may come to -this capital with full powers from his government to settle the present -dispute [_contienda_] in a peaceful, reasonable and honorable manner"; -but, in order to eliminate every sign of coercion, the American fleet -must retire from Vera Cruz. This proposal was sanctioned by the Mexican -Congress in a secret session.[4.20] - -Now the American proposition contemplated "all the questions in -dispute," while Pena said in reply, "the present dispute." But this -was apparently an immaterial variation in phraseology, such as is -customary with men of independent minds. In the first place, it is an -axiom that a whole includes all of its parts, and the American claims -were, as we have just observed, an essential feature of the dispute -between the two countries. In the second place we know that Bankhead -so understood the matter. In the third place this mere difference in -phraseology certainly did not indicate with any clearness a rejection -of the American proposal and the substitution of an essentially -different one, and, if so intended, it involved an ambiguity for which -Mexico was bound to pay the penalty. Fourthly, Black's note was the -sequel to a confidential interview with Pena held expressly for a free -comparison of ideas. Now the consul must have understood the unvarying -refusal of the United States to recognize any Mexican claim to Texas, -and therefore he could see that no envoy would be appointed by us -to treat directly and exclusively regarding the annexation of that -republic. His instructions, moreover, were perfectly distinct; and his -understanding of these matters would have been corrected, had correction -been required, by Parrott, with whom he was ordered to confer. If, -then, it had appeared in his preliminary conversation with Pena that -Mexico insisted upon rejecting the American overture and substituting -an essentially different and essentially unacceptable proposition, he -would have stopped at that point, and reported in substance that Polk's -offer was declined. There would have been no occasion to address the -note of October 13 to Pena. In other words the American offer was -understood, and it was fairly and squarely met. Herrera's government -desired earnestly, as Pena showed Bankhead, to bring about such a -complete settlement as Polk had in mind, and to that end it accepted our -overture.[4.21] - -But there is another point worthy of notice. The word _comisionado_ -used by Pena--the past participle, employed here as a noun, of the verb -"to commission"--has usually been translated "commissioner," and hence -it has often been urged by American writers, that he did not agree to -receive a minister. But by good fortune we have a definition of that -word from a Mexican secretary of relations. "A _comisionado_," wrote -Bocanegra, "is a person charged by any community, or private citizen -to conduct any business," and this definition obviously included -ministers. On comparing the documents we find _minister_, _envoy_, -_plenipotentiary_ and _comisionado_ used as equivalents; and Pena called -Slidell a _comisionado_ after learning that he came as a resident -minister. Besides, the title signified nothing substantial, for the -parties agreed that our agent should have full powers to discuss the -whole business in hand, and so it follows again that, for the purpose of -settling all the points of difference existing between the two nations, -Mexico agreed to receive an American minister. November 6 Polk heard -as much through Commodore Conner, then off Vera Cruz; and three days -later Parrott arrived with Pena's autograph note, which was similarly -understood at the White House.[4.22] - -For good reasons the President felt that no time could be wasted. It was -a critical juncture. The controversy with England over the possession -of Oregon had reached an acute stage, and our minister at London -expressed the opinion that she was trying to make use of Mexico in -connection with it. Our relations with Mexico had dragged long enough. -If it is intended to do anything, a New York merchant had written some -time since to the secretary of the navy, "no time should be lost in -sending a person to Mexico, as you can scarcely conceive the feverish -excitement in our mercantile community," due to the dread of privateers. -Herrera's pacific administration was tottering; and our consul at Vera -Cruz warned the state department to act promptly, since it might go -down at any time. Paredes, the monarchist, was known to be plotting a -revolution; and the London _Times_, then a journal of great importance, -had pronounced emphatically for a Spanish throne in Mexico as a bulwark -against the United States, and had said that it believed no European -power would object. We had promised through Black that a minister would -be despatched "immediately," if he would be received; and Pena not -only had made no objection to this, but had shown impatience for his -arrival. In anticipation of satisfactory news from our consul, Slidell -had been ordered to Pensacola, and instructions for him drafted. By ten -o'clock in the evening of November 10 these were ready; Polk signed -his commission; and Lieutenant Lanier of the navy set out at once for -Pensacola with the documents.[4.23] - -[SLIDELL'S INSTRUCTIONS] - -"To counteract the influence of foreign Powers, exerted against the -United States in Mexico, and to restore those ancient relations of peace -and good will which formerly existed between the Governments and the -citizens of the sister Republics, will be the principal objects of your -mission," read Slidell's instructions; take up the subject of our claims -"in a prudent and friendly spirit," and arrange through an adjustment of -the Texas boundary to cast upon the United States the burden of paying -them; "exert all your energies" to prevent the cession of California to -England or France if it be contemplated, and, if you can do so without -endangering the restoration of amicable relations with Mexico and the -adjustment of the Texas boundary, endeavor to purchase at least the -northern part of California, including San Francisco Bay, but at all -events conciliate the good-will of the Mexicans, even should their -vanity and resentment prove trying. Fully in sympathy with Buchanan's -instructions, the minister proceeded to Vera Cruz as quickly as possible -on a vessel of war, landed there by November 30, and, noting that his -way had already been paved by the retirement of our fleet, set out at -once for the capital.[4.24] - -Unfortunately, though as prompt as possible, Polk had not been prompt -enough. Herrera's administration, as we have learned, had now sunk -to the lowest point in courage, efficiency, prestige and sense of -responsibility. Every morning it looked for a revolution, and every -night for a mutiny. Its one idea was to hold on until the assembling of -Congress on the first of January, in the hope that something favorable -might then occur; and it found this last resource threatened by its -reasonable and pacific policy in regard to the United States. Earlier in -the year it had been denounced for agreeing to recognize Texas on the -condition of her abandoning all thoughts of joining the American Union, -and now it was menaced for listening to Black and Buchanan. A call for -war in the name of honor, territory and independence appeared to be a -serviceable oriflamme for its political enemies. Fierce, unsparing cries -of treason, ignominy and national ruin therefore assailed Herrera; and -under these onslaughts the weak, timid, irresolute administration lost -heart.[4.25] - -On December 3 Pena saw Black at the palace and exclaimed, We hear an -envoy has arrived from the United States; who can he be, and what has -he come for? The consul replied that he supposed he must be the envoy -that Mexico had agreed to receive. This ought not to be, answered Pena -hastily; no envoy was expected before January; we are not prepared to -receive him; the government desires he should not come to the capital or -even disembark; "you know the opposition are calling us traitors, for -entering into this arrangement with you;" his coming now might produce a -fatal revolution. This interview showed that before anything was known -regarding Slidell's quality, credentials or instructions, and purely on -account of domestic politics, the government was anxious to break its -agreement. So Pena admitted later, for he privately sent word to Slidell -that under the circumstances it feared to compromise itself, and would -have acted otherwise had it been free. So the matter was understood -by Bankhead; and so it has been understood by fair-minded Mexican -historians. It only remained to contrive a method of evasion.[4.26] - -The method adopted was to ask the council of state--a quite unnecessary -proceeding--whether it would be proper to receive Slidell. In so doing -Pena expressed a decided opinion in the negative, advancing, besides -arguments of no moment, the more serious objection that receiving a -resident minister would imply the existence of friendly relations -between the two countries, and would thus condone the annexation of -Texas. Even this argument, however, possessed no real value, for, -as Pena recognized, Slidell was explicitly commissioned to "restore" -friendly relations, which indicated that such relations could not -exist until after he should be received and after he should act; and, -besides, Mexico could have received him with a declaration of reserve, -safeguarding all her claims. Moreover this was evidently a point, if of -any importance, which the secretary should have considered before making -the agreement.[4.27] - -To avoid this last difficulty, he alleged in his desperation that -Black had proposed, and he accepted, the plan of sending merely an -envoy _ad hoc_, a special envoy commissioned to settle with Mexico for -the annexation of Texas. His assertion, however, is disproved by the -circumstances and correspondence leading to Slidell's appointment; and -a simple argument reinforces the facts. For the United States to offer -amends for annexation would have been to deny its repeated protestations -that annexation was perfectly proper; would have been to brand upon -its own forehead the heinous charges drawn in vitriol by Rejon. Pena -could see that no country possessing the eyesight of a mole and the -courage of a mouse would so degrade itself. He knew, October 11, that -on such a demand the negotiations would end before beginning; would end -at once in his study with Black's bidding him a respectful good-night; -and since Herrera desired the negotiations, he could not make such a -proposition.[4.28] - -[SLIDELL REJECTED] - -Moreover the council of state, which was a permanent body of notables, -brushed aside this contention of Pena's, and fell back "on the very -nature of the affair and on the state of our relations (_en la -natureleza misma del negocio y en el estado de nuestras relaciones_)." -Assuming plainly that the United States desired to avoid war and restore -friendly diplomatic and commercial intercourse, it declared that we had -set a trap [_lazo_] for Mexico, and undertaken to introduce a regular -minister under false pretences, as it were, in order to compel her to -be amicable against her will. In furtherance of this design the promise -of the Mexican administration cannot be urged, it protested, for the -intention must have been merely to let the Texas affair be settled, as -a preliminary to the restoration of cordial relations, and it would be -an "unexampled humiliation" were Mexico to receive a regular American -minister before being satisfied for the outrage and injury inflicted -upon her. In other words, Mexico had promised to receive Slidell, but -it did not comport with her interest and her dignity to fulfil the -agreement. This decision ensured his rejection. December 20 he was -officially notified of it, and in reply he wrote what seemed to him a -spiritless note, explaining to Buchanan that under his instructions -he did not wish to make war inevitable by closing the door finally to -negotiations. This done, he withdrew as soon as an escort could be -obtained to the city of Jalapa, situated not far from the coast on the -Vera Cruz road, to await instructions.[4.29] - -Daniel Webster, a lawyer of no mean abilities, formerly our secretary -of state, and at the time when he spoke a resolute opponent of Polk, -said, after mature consideration of the matter, that Mexico was "highly -unjustifiable" in thus refusing to hear our minister; and the demand -upon this nation to repudiate its protestations of honesty, and become -the football of Mexican party politics, did seem a bit unreasonable. As -for Polk, it was hard indeed to be charged with ruining by his awkward -statesmanship the pacific administration of Herrera, when in fact the -inherent weakness of that administration ruined his own hopes, and to be -denounced in the United States for trying to force war upon Mexico, when -the Mexicans denounced him for trying to force peace upon them.[4.30] - -But Herrera's amiable inefficiency was near its doom. The aristocratic -elements--Church, army and monarchists--drew together, and this action -forced the Santannistas and the Federalists to overlook their own -differences. Paredes, natural leader of the former combination, hated -and feared the latter, for Santa Anna had worsted him in more than one -clash, and the Federalists aimed not only to reform the Church and -support republican institutions, but also to destroy the military order -by establishing an effective militia system. Professing allegiance to -the administration and extorting from its hopes and fears of him all -the money that could be obtained, he disobeyed the orders to divide his -army or march to the Texas frontier; and about the middle of December, -seeing that the Federalists were likely to control the new Congress, -he revolted. The relations of Mexico to the United States afforded a -battle-cry helpful to the army and hurtful to Herrera's administration; -and hence the President was accused of "seeking to avoid a necessary -and glorious war" and of stooping to negotiate "the ignominious loss of -national integrity" with an American envoy.[4.31] - -[HERRERA OVERTHROWN BY PAREDES] - -Herrera fulminated against the traitorous general who was attacking his -own country. Both houses of Congress fulminated. The city of Mexico -and every department fulminated. But all this was merely eloquence. -The officer despatched to require the immediate surrender of Paredes -accepted a seat in his carriage. Most of the commanders appointed to -defend the capital took their stations under pledges to the enemy. -December 29, when Paredes arrived within about a dozen miles of Mexico, -the garrison of the citadel, instigated by their chief officer, General -Valencia, rose; nearly all the rest of the forces at the capital soon -followed that example; and Herrera, giving up the Presidency without -firing a gun, left the palace with the entire body of his loyal officers -and officials, his mild face and his respectable side-whiskers--in one -hired cab.[4.31] - -The only danger of the revolutionary cause had been from treachery. -Tornel and many of the officers were at work for Santa Anna, and -Valencia, whom nobody would trust, was at work for himself. Paredes, -resembling the one-eyed man among the blind, had a certain reputation -for honesty; and these plotters, misled by his reiterated declarations -that he would accept no office in the new government, thought him simple -enough to be used and then thrown over. Valencia in particular, who was -president of the council of state and therefore legally the successor of -Herrera, felt already triumphant, put on regal style, and helped himself -liberally to the public funds. But he and Tornel had enabled Paredes to -make himself independent of them, and now found themselves dealing with -a master instead of a dupe. The troops at Mexico sided with the majority -of the army, and Paredes notified Valencia that he would shoot every -one opposing him--"archbishop, general, magistrate, or anybody else." -Then with military pomp, accompanied by officials whose signatures -adorned the placards denouncing him, he took possession of Mexico, while -the public, long since weary of the incidental music of revolutionary -professions, looked on in silence.[4.31] - -The classical farce of an electoral junta appointed by the victorious -general was now enacted, and Paredes became temporary President. -Apparently, however, he intended to use this ill-gotten power with -integrity and force. He drew no salary except that of a general, -avoided all display, and surrounded himself with men of the better -class; and when a broker, who had fattened on corrupt dealings with the -government, offered him a loan, he replied with blazing eyes, "I do -not wish money, but I wish to prosecute the robbers of the Treasury." -With equal firmness he took his promised attitude of hostility toward -the United States. On the fourth of January he swore publicly to defend -the integrity of the national territory; and this had reference to -Texas--every foot of Texas to the Sabine--for such was the unqualified -claim of Mexico.[4.31] - -With a government based upon a pledge of war against us and swearing to -carry out that pledge, it seemed as if the United States could have no -amicable dealings; but our authorities were now accustomed to forbear, -and all the reasons for desiring a restoration of diplomatic intercourse -were still in force. Indeed, one of them had become pressingly urgent, -for the European monarchical scheme appeared now to be unmistakable. -Remain in Mexico, Buchanan therefore instructed Slidell, so as to take -advantage of any opening for negotiations; if you deem it wise to do so, -let Paredes know that his financial straits can be relieved by arranging -matters with us; present another formal request for a hearing, and make -"every honorable effort" in your power to avoid a rupture.[4.32] - -[SLIDELL MAKES ANOTHER EFFORT] - -Accordingly, on the first day of March, 1846, our minister addressed -a letter to Castillo, the new minister of relations, summarizing the -negotiations with Pena, placing clearly in view the alternatives -of diplomacy or war as they had now been defined, and asking to be -received. Again the council of state was consulted, and again this -oracle pronounced for rejection. Castillo then tried to frame a reply to -Slidell; but his note, drafted in opposition to his own ideas, proved -so weak and halting that he laid it before the Spanish minister. In -the view of this diplomat the best solution of the imbroglio seemed to -be European arbitration, and therefore he probably thought it well to -show the United States that we could reach no understanding with Mexico -ourselves. It was also desirable to rally the nation round Paredes by -assuming a bold, aggressive tone. And a fiery, offensive note, suited to -these conditions, rejected the second American overture.[4.33] - -Here stands an American minister, answered Slidell, "clothed with full -power to settle all the questions in dispute between the two nations." -Begone, said Mexico once more.[4.34] - - - - - V - - THE MEXICAN ATTITUDE ON THE EVE OF WAR - - -In tracing the mutual relations of the United States and Mexico, we have -often had occasion to note how each nation felt about the other and -about a possible conflict; but it is very desirable now to understand as -completely as possible what those feelings were at about the beginning -of 1846, and this will require the consideration of many additional -facts. - -Already there were influential and wealthy Mexicans, particularly in -the north, who wished or half-wished that the United States would -subjugate their country, so that order and prosperity might come; and -others reflected that at least our assistance might be desired, should -Paredes undertake to set up a European monarchy. But these were selfish -calculations. They seldom implied good-will. Friends we have none at -the capital, Slidell reported; and our consul at the northern city of -Tampico, even though but a faint loyalty to the central government -prevailed in that section, wrote in September, 1845: "The most stubborn -and malignant feeling seems to exist in the mind of every Mexican -against the United States."[5.1] - -[WHY MEXICO DISLIKED THE UNITED STATES] - -The principal cause of this feeling--the supposed misconduct of our -government in the settlement, revolution and successful resistance of -Texas, and in the recognition and annexation of that republic--has -already been explained; but other strong reasons cooperated. All -understood that intense dissatisfaction existed in the northern -departments. Now that our frontier had been advanced so far south, -further peaceful aggression seemed easy; and it was believed that we -intended to pursue the Texas method progressively, until all of Mexico -should little by little become ours. "This first invasion is the threat -of many more," said the official journal. It was alleged that we, -fearing the competition of that country in the markets of the world, -did all we could to hinder its agricultural, industrial and commercial -development, and excited the revolutions that paralyzed it; and it -was even believed that we incited the Indians to ravage the northern -frontiers, and so create discontent against the central government. The -privileged classes dreaded the influence of our democratic ideas. The -clergy were afraid that Protestantism, or at least free thought, might -cross the border, and that so far as Mexican territory should fall under -our sway, secular education, the confiscation of their property, and the -other anti-clerical plans of the Federalists, who appeared to draw their -inspiration and their arguments largely from this country, might be put -into force. The numerous misunderstandings and clashes with the United -States that we have noted had produced an enduring resentment, and in -particular our claims and our efforts to have them settled were commonly -deemed artificial and unjust.[5.1] - -Behind all these facts lay the general anti-foreign prejudice; and this, -we should now observe, was in our case more than a prejudice. Even in -the eyes of the intelligent _El Siglo XIX_, an American was "a being -detestable to the nation on account of the little accord between [him -and] the religion, the language, and the gentle, affable, frank, and -generous character of the Mexican." Our directness of thought, speech -and action, and the brusqueness of manner that naturally accompanied it -appeared inconsiderate and haughty; and no doubt, in dealing with people -who seemed to us deceitful, unreliable and unfriendly, our citizens -often emphasized these characteristics. In habits and customs there was -indeed a profound unlikeness, and below this lay a still more profound -racial antagonism. Finally the politicians of all parties, fearing to -be outdone in the display of patriotism, encouraged the anti-American -feeling. The sharp and rancorous Tornel used every opportunity to speak -against us; and Santa Anna, whose prestige was immense--it must not be -forgotten--as late as 1844, both fearing the influence of our freedom -and wishing his fellow-citizens to consider him essential, represented -the United States as a Minotaur eager to devour them. Few were -enlightened enough to correct the misconceptions regarding us; no one -had the power, courage or wish to do so; and in the end, very naturally, -these dominated the public mind--or, to be more precise, created and -kept alive a general impression. Americans "scarcely have the look of -men," it was gravely asserted.[5.1] - -In regard to an immediate conflict in arms with us, Mexico by no means -felt like the dove threatened by a hawk, as people in this country have -generally supposed. To be sure, the national existence was often said to -be in danger, but such talk was largely for effect. Castillo asserted -that Slidell had been sent in order to obtain a pretext for war; but -this was in all probability a bid for Mexican and European support, -since he knew that we already had grounds enough, and the council of -state evidently believed we did not seek a conflict. Paredes whispered -to the British minister at a banquet, "I hope your government does not -mean to let us be eaten up;" but this was a plea for English assistance. -As we have just said, not American arms but American settlers were the -chief danger, in the opinion of Mexico. The very men who clamored that -the national existence was threatened by the United States were the ones -who called most loudly for war. A circular to the local authorities -issued by the central government in December, 1845, invited attention -to the prevailing opinion that armed resistance could prevent further -usurpations like that of Texas; and another such paper, issued in -November of the following year, dwelt strongly upon this point. From -military force also there was danger, to be sure. Our superiority in -numbers and resources was admitted. But there were many offsets to that -superiority, and the Mexicans closely studied and shrewdly counted upon -them.[5.2] - -[THE UNITED STATES DEEMED FEEBLE] - -Let us review those offsets. In the first place, while the government -of the United States deemed its course honorable and considerate, in -the eyes of many, if not all, Mexicans we had been abject as well as -knavish, stealing her territory and then trying to buy off her anger, -submitting to be gulled, flouted and lashed, and each time going back -for more of the same treatment; and it seemed hardly possible that we -should suddenly adopt a bold, positive, unflinching course. It was even -believed that we dreaded to enter the lists. Almonte, for example, in -reporting that his protest against annexation had caused a heavy fall -on the stock exchange, observed, "The fears of a war with Mexico are -great;" and it was notorious that his departure from the United States -created almost a panic in our money market.[5.3] - -Besides, it was assumed that party feeling would go to about the same -lengths here as in Mexico, and that our differences over the slavery -question and the tariff would probably make it impossible for us to -conduct a war vigorously--perhaps, impossible to wage it at all. "The -northern states, I again repeat to you, will not aid those of the south -in case of war with Mexico," wrote Almonte while minister at Washington -in June, 1844. European journals like _Le Constitutionnel_ of Paris -confirmed this opinion;[5.4] and the London _Times_ remarked, It would -be a war, not of the United States, but of a party that has only a bare -majority, and "odious" to a "large and enlightened minority in the best -States." Moreover, argued the official journal of Mexico, the injustice -of the war would of itself excite American opposition.[5.5] - -From a military as well as a political point of view this country -seemed feeble. Our regular army was understood to be numerically -insignificant and fully occupied with frontier and garrison duties; -our artillery appeared weak in quality as well as in numbers; and our -cavalry was deemed little more than a cipher. As for volunteers, our -citizen-soldiers were represented in Mexico not merely as unwarlike, -but as "totally unfit to operate beyond their frontiers." Indeed, as -competent a judge as Captain Elliot, British minister in Texas--who -knew the United States well, and in the spring of 1845 was in close -touch with Mexican leaders at their capital--said that the greater their -number, the greater would be the difficulty of invading Mexico. "They -could not resist artillery and cavalry in a Country suited to those -arms," he believed; "they are not amenable to discipline, they plunder -the peasantry, they are without steadiness under reverses, they cannot -march on foot." Nor did there exist in this country, added Elliot, -either aptitude or adequate means for a regular military invasion.[5.6] - -"America as an aggressive power is one of the weakest in the world -... fit for nothing but to fight Indians," declared _Britannia_, an -important English weekly; and apparently the war of 1812, to which the -Mexicans referred with peculiar satisfaction, had proved even more than -this. The military operations in a war between Mexico and the United -States would be "contemptible and indecisive," said the London _Times_. -As for our navy, it was undoubtedly small; the Mexican consul at New -Orleans reported that it lacked the discipline commonly attributed to -it; and, however efficient it might really be, Mexico had no commerce to -attack.[5.7] - -The Mexicans, on the other hand, were deemed by many observers decidedly -formidable. "There are no better troops in the world, nor better drilled -and armed, than the Mexicans," asserted Calderon de la Barca, the -Spanish minister at Washington; and some of the generals were thought, -even by foreigners, equal to the most renowned in Europe. The Americans -would be at a vast disadvantage, was Captain Elliot's opinion, "in -rapidity of movement" and ability to endure "continued fatigue on the -hardest food." The soldiers of the tri-color "are superior to those of -the United States," declared the Mexico correspondent of the London -_Times_ flatly in 1845.[5.8] - -[MEXICAN CALCULATIONS OF THE CHANCES] - -If the military power of Mexico was rated in this way by outside -observers of such competence, one can imagine how it was rated at -home. The Mexicans regarded themselves as martial by instinct, and -viewed their troops, inured to war by an almost unceasing course of -revolutions, as remarkably good. Santa Anna once boasted that, if -necessary, he would plant his flag upon the capitol at Washington; and -the results of the wars with Spain and France had tended powerfully to -encourage the self-confidence of his fellow-citizens. "We have numerous -and veteran forces burning with a desire to gain immortal renown," said -the _Boletin Oficial_ of San Luis Potosi. "Not to speak of our approved -infantry," it was argued, "our artillery is excellent, and our cavalry -so superior in men and horses that it would be an injustice not to -recognize the fact;" besides which "our army can be rapidly augmented." -Indeed an officer of reputation told Waddy Thompson that the cavalry -could break infantry squares with the lasso. In November, 1845, the -Mexican minister of war solemnly predicted that his countrymen would -gain the victory, even if one third less numerous than their American -adversaries. To clinch this matter, the feeling of superior power, -which it was known that we entertained, was regarded as an ignorant -over-confidence that would ensure our defeat. In short, "We have -more than enough strength to make war," cried the editors of _La Voz -del Pueblo_; "Let us make it, then, and victory will perch upon our -banners."[5.9] - -The clash, it seemed probable, would come first in Texas, far from our -centres of strength. On that field Tornel, the keenest public man in -the country, insisted that Mexico could triumph over any force we could -bring to bear, and Almonte offered some reasons for entertaining such -an opinion. The Texan troops, he said, would exhaust their supplies -before the campaign would really begin; and consequently, since there -would be no way to subsist a large American force in that extensive, -poor and sparsely settled region, the greater the number coming, the -greater would be their sufferings. Even the cultivated districts, wrote -Elliot, could support only a trifling addition, if any, to the resident -population. Moreover, even should an American army be able to exist -there, a few light troops placed along the frontier would keep it busy -on the defensive, said Pakenham; while it was urged by Mexicans that, -should our line break, their invading host would soon find itself among -the opulent cities of the southern states, where perhaps it could not -only exact money, but free two million slaves, obtain their grateful -and enthusiastic assistance, enroll the Indians of the southwest, who -detested the United States, and draw aid as well as encouragement from -the abolitionists of the north. Almonte himself assured his government -that the blacks, the savages and the anti-slavery extremists could be -reckoned on.[5.10] - -Possibly, of course, their line instead of ours might be the one to give -way; but in that case the Americans, instead of meeting with conditions -like these, would be confronted by immense distances, great deserts, -furious rains, long droughts, and barren, easily defended mountains. -"If the war should be protracted and carried beyond the Rio Grande," -said Captain Elliot, "I believe that it would require very little skill -and scarcely any exposure of the defending force to draw the invading -columns well forward beyond all means of support from their own bases -and depots into situations of almost inextricable difficulty;" and a -correspondent of Calhoun, referring to such natural obstacles, wrote, -"nothing is more certain than your statement that [the] war will have -to become defensive [on our part]."[5.11] - -Moreover it was argued, said the Mexican minister of relations in 1849, -that the invaders would be unable to obtain resources of any description -from the country about them, would be masters of nothing but the -ground actually occupied, and would find the difficulty of maintaining -themselves, at such a distance from their base, "invincible." On the -other hand should invasion by sea be attempted, the Americans would -have to struggle with tempestuous waters, a coast guarded by reefs and -currents, lowlands protected by "a terrible and faithful ally"--as -Cuevas described the yellow fever, more than one tremendous wall of -mountains, and bad roads that could easily be closed; and they would -find no vital point of attack within practicable reach. The United -States cannot hope to conquer Mexico, was the conclusion of the London -_Morning Herald_, commonly regarded as a ministerial organ; while the -Paris _Globe_, reputed to be Guizot's personal voice, went farther, -and predicted that undertaking to do it would be "ruinous, fatal" to -us.[5.12] - -Should we, however, care to make the attempt, Mexico--it was pointed -out--would not only fight on the defensive, and enjoy all the advantages -of knowing the ground, moving on inside lines, and using fortifications, -but would also be able to strike. Nothing would be paid on our claims, -either principal or interest. There was considerable American property -in the country; and while the means of her citizens were being spent in -righteous self-defence, that property could hardly expect exemption. -Above all, one "terrible weapon," as the Mexican consul at New Orleans -termed it, could be wielded night and day, near and far, without expense -and without risk. This was the issuance of commissions to privateers, -for the "nefarious" conduct of the United States in using this weapon, -said the London _Times_, authorized Mexico to do the same. The pursuit -of slavers had been so close of late that many fine Baltimore clippers, -able to outsail anything but a steamer and to go where a steamer could -not, were lying idle in Cuban ports, ready to scour the Gulf and the -Atlantic.[5.13] - -No less vulnerable seemed the United States in the Pacific Ocean, -where--according to the New York _Herald_--American property worth -fifteen or twenty millions was afloat. Should letters of marque be -"actively and prudently distributed on the coasts of the Pacific," wrote -consul Arrangoiz to his government, "the Americans would receive a fatal -blow in the captures [of whalers and merchantmen] that would immediately -be made in the seas of Asia, where the naval forces of the United States -are insignificant and could not promptly be increased"; and he reported -in July, 1845, that owing to the prospect of hostilities the insurance -companies at New Orleans were refusing to take war risks. Tornel and -the other Mexican leaders counted heavily on the value of this weapon. -Our own journals were full of the subject, and could find no remedy. -American commerce was defenceless against such an attack, the London -_Times_ cheerfully admitted.[5.14] - -Under these conditions it was most natural to believe that Mexico -could make the war "obstinate and tedious," as the London _Standard_ -said, and therefore extremely expensive for the United States. She -could "with trifling inconvenience to Herself," Pakenham told Calhoun, -"impose upon this Country the necessity of employing as large a Naval -and Military force as if the War was with a far more powerful enemy." -Obviously a great number of warships would be needed to blockade seven -hundred leagues of coast and patrol two oceans, and the cost of soldiers -could be figured thus, it was thought: During the war of independence -in Mexico eighty thousand royal troops and sixty thousand insurgents -were supported by that country; its population and resources had since -increased; the United States would therefore have to send probably -two hundred and fifty thousand men; and the American soldier was very -expensive.[5.15] - -The people of this nation were looked upon as worshippers of the -dollar, and it was believed that war taxes would not be endured here -long. Consequently, since the United States had no credit--said -European journals--the conflict would soon have to end. "The invasion -and conquest of a vast region by a state which is without an army and -without credit is a novelty in the history of nations," remarked the -London _Times_ in 1845. The war losses were expected to reinforce the -effect of war taxes. "War with the United States would not last long," -wrote Arrangoiz, "because the [American] commerce finding itself -attacked on all seas would beg for peace." When the Mexican corsairs -have captured a few American ships and the Americans have thrown a -few bombs into Vera Cruz, matters will be arranged, predicted _Le -Constitutionnel_ of Paris.[5.16] - -[MEXICO RECKONS ON BENEFITS] - -Evidently, then, Mexico was not likely to suffer disastrously, and -certain benefits of great value could be anticipated. The act of -crossing swords with us would fulfil a patriotic duty and vindicate the -national honor. Glory and the satisfaction of injuring a perfidious -and grasping enemy would more than compensate for the cost. A conflict -would prevent this greedy neighbor, as the London _Times_ argued, -from imagining that Mexico dared not resist spoliation. The American -settlers, whom every effort had been made for many years to keep out -of the country, would be driven away, and the danger of American ideas -averted. Even if the frontier could not be forced back to the Sabine, a -long period of hostilities would render it impossible to practice near -the border our arts of political seduction, and merely a short contest -would tend to re-Mexicanize thoroughly the northern departments. Indeed -the whole country would be re-Mexicanized, for the first effect of the -war would be to cure disunion and baptize the nation anew in the fires -of patriotism. The necessity of meeting a foreign foe would vitalize -the courage of the army, which had grown somewhat lax in battling with -fellow-citizens, restore discipline, and perfect the officers in their -difficult but noble profession. A blockade, many believed with Almonte -and Santa Anna, preventing the exportation of silver and the squandering -of good money on foreign luxuries, would be "the best possible -thing" for the country. Stimulated by exemption from ruinous foreign -competition, the industries would at length flourish, and the boundless -natural resources of the country become fountains of wealth.[5.17] - -War is no doubt a great evil, argued the editors of _La Voz del Pueblo_, -"but we recall what Polybius said, to wit: 'If many empires have been -destroyed by war, by war also have many risen from nothing.'" Prussia -owes her greatness to the Seven Years War, pointed out _El Siglo XIX_. -The conquest of the Moors cost Spain a struggle of centuries, but -what Spaniard would undo it? asked others. "Nations determine their -history only in the most dangerous crises," urged an anonymous but able -pamphlet; "and such a crisis, in which posterity will admire us, has -arrived."[5.17] - -So the matter presented itself to many when studied as an exclusively -Mexican affair. But could it be regarded as exclusively Mexican? -In Central and South America there were countries that naturally -entertained a racial prejudice against the "Anglo-Saxon." They were -fully capable of discovering the claim to monopoly suggested by the name -United States of "America," by our considering none except ourselves -"Americans," and by our "Monroe Doctrine"; and moreover our press -clamored for the entire continent. Mexico had her eye upon them, and she -counted on drawing support from that quarter.[5.18] - -As early as 1836 Cuevas, then minister at Paris, after pointing out to -his government how strongly the country was protected by nature against -the United States, remarked: "Add to this the interest of the republics -of the South to defend Mexico against an always threatening enemy, -which with its ever monstrous greed seems a volcano ready to burst upon -them." The next year a Mexican agent at Lima reported that the alleged -unlawful interference of this country in Texas was the subject of -general conversation and of just alarm in the Spanish-American states. -In 1842 Dorsey, bearer of despatches from our legation at Mexico, stated -at Savannah that Santa Anna had sent envoys to all the South American -republics with this message: "Unless you enable us to resist such -aggression as will be perpetrated by the United States, she will proceed -to embrace in her mighty grasp the whole of the southern continent;" -and Dorsey added that Colombia had already promised financial aid and -two thousand men. At the close of that year, as a letter from Caracas -mentioned, steps were said to have been taken toward forming a league to -support Mexico against American encroachments. In 1843 Almonte made up a -pamphlet of extracts from John Quincy Adams's brilliant though unfounded -speech at Braintree, in which he accused our government of greed and -unrighteousness in the Texas business; and this telling document was -distributed in the principal cities of South America. During the -following years the menace of our ambition to all of the Spanish race -in this hemisphere continued to be discussed in the Mexican press. -"Republics of South America," cried _La Aurora de la Libertad_, for -example, "your existence also is in danger; prepare for the combat;" -and it was easy to believe that official appeals for assistance, in the -event of actual invasion, would not fall upon deaf ears.[5.18] - -[EUROPEAN AID EXPECTED] - -And there were still better grounds, it was reckoned, for expecting aid -from abroad. In the first place, holding more or less honestly that we -had trampled on the law of nations, the Mexicans persuaded themselves -that every civilized country would feel an interest in their cause. The -justice of our case against the United States, declared the official -_Diario_, will be recognized at once by all governments to which "public -faith and honor are not an empty name." This view was encouraged in -Europe. The cause of Mexico, said the Liverpool _Mail_, is that of all -just and honest governments. The Mexicans have good ground to complain, -proclaimed the sympathetic _Journal des Debats_, for "they have been -tricked and robbed."[5.19] - -Covered with so noble a sentiment as devotion to the cause of justice, -more practical considerations could be expected to exert their full -influence. In Mexico as well as in the United States, the monarchies of -Europe were believed to view with jealousy the success of our republican -institutions. Our policy of "America for the Americans," which the -British minister, Ward, had turned against Poinsett at Mexico, was -contrary to the interest of every commercial nation beyond the Atlantic. -The United States, exclaimed _Le Correspondant_ of Paris, assumes to -exclude Europe from the affairs of that continent--as if Europe had not -had rights and possessions there before the United States began to be! -as if the United States did not owe its existence to Europe! as if the -ocean could change the law of nations; and leading journals in London -expressed similar indignation.[5.20] - -As the whole world understood, great Britain had not yet forgiven us for -becoming independent, and viewed with great repugnance our extensions -of territory, our commercial development and our control over raw -cotton; and it was obvious that she would be glad to stop our growth. -Sooner or later, warned the British press, the course of this monster -will have to be checked. Guizot, the premier of France, regarded the -United States as a "young Colossus," and earnestly desired to apply in -this hemisphere the principle of the balance of power. Polk was by no -means popular at the Tuilleries, and the _Journal des Debats_, commonly -regarded as the mouthpiece of the government, courteously described his -Message of December, 1845, as bellicose, passionate, full of vain and -ludicrous bravado, arrogant, detestably hypocritical, brutally selfish -and brutally dishonest.[5.21] - -The plan to annex Texas had greatly disturbed these two governments, -and they had not only exerted to the utmost against it their diplomatic -strength, both separately and in concert, but, as Mexico knew, had -been disposed to take up arms in that cause. Aided by circumstances, -the courage and skill of the United States had completely foiled them, -but they could not be supposed to view the result with satisfaction; -and there was good reason to believe that they contemplated a possible -further extension of this country, not only with alarm, but with a -strong desire to prevent it. Said the London _Morning Herald_ in March, -1845: Mexico will turn to good account the support of her powerful -protectors and their intense repugnance to the annexation of Texas; and -the London _Times_ predicted that our greed in the Texas affair would be -punished.[5.22] - -Gifted at vaticination, the _Times_ predicted also that our next aim -would be the mines of Mexico, and asked the nations of Europe how -they would like to find their monetary circulation "dependent on the -caprice of the President of the United States." In September, 1845, -it printed the assertion of its Mexican correspondent, that England -must interfere or be prepared to see not only those mines but also -California in American hands. There is a general feeling, announced the -London _Standard_, that only the interposition of England and France -can check the United States. The United States will absorb Mexico -unless foreign powers avert this, preached the London _Journal of -Commerce_. "The conquest of Mexico would create perils for the political -balance of the world," said the _Journal des Debats_; and hence "the -immense aggrandizements" contemplated by the United States "could not -take place without giving umbrage to several nations." Europe would -certainly forbid a conquest of Mexico, threatened _Le Constitutionnel_. -The Mexicans were fully capable of seeing all this for themselves. -The _Monitor Constitutional_, for example, gave currency to the idea -that certain powers would prevent the invasion of their country. -Indeed they could see even more. "Enlightened nations of Europe," -exclaimed _La Aurora de la Libertad_, "a people consumed with ambition -and covetousness is already taking up arms to conquer the American -continent, lay down the law to your interests and possessions, and some -day disturb your peace at home."[5.23] - -Another source of possible trouble for the United States abroad was -the idea that any territory obtained from Mexico would be given up to -slavery. This point came out strongly in the _Journal des Debats_, for -example. Considerably more serious was the danger that in coping with -Mexican privateers we should offend other nations. In this way, so the -British minister warned our secretary of state, the Americans were -likely to become involved in "complications of the gravest character"; -and it was believed by the Mexicans that a blockade of their coast, in -addition to being extremely difficult, was almost or quite certain to -have that effect.[5.24] - -To these points they added characteristically that fear of their power, -as well as antipathy to us, might lead foreign nations to espouse their -side; and all the supporters of the monarchical plans now entertained -by the government and the upper classes, felt that if carried out -these would pave the way for European assistance. In fact the British -minister himself believed that such a change of regime would guarantee -Mexico against the United States, and it is reasonable to suppose that -in talking with her public men he disclosed this conviction. Being a -jealous nation, thoroughly given up to politics, and not industrial or -commercial, Mexico could not fail to exaggerate the probable effect of -all these influences upon England and France, and to underestimate the -factors that were tending to keep them at peace with us.[5.25] - -[WAR DESIRED BY MEXICO] - -The strongest basis of hope for effective aid from abroad was, however, -none of these considerations, but our dispute with England over -Oregon. In January, 1846, Bankhead and Slidell agreed that Mexico's -policy toward the United States would depend mainly or wholly upon the -outcome of that issue, and to the Mexican eye the outcome was already -clear. Each country had rejected the proposition of the other, and -Polk's Message of December 2, 1845, committed him afresh to an extreme -position. The course of England tended to confirm the natural inference. -Her perfectly excusable intention was to hold the Mexicans ready to -cooperate with her, should war become her programme, while restraining -them from engaging us alone. Bankhead replied with an encouraging -vagueness to Mexican hints that British assistance was desired, and Lord -Aberdeen talked with the Mexican agent at London of a possible alliance -against us. Indeed that agent reported that he believed Aberdeen would -like to see Mexico fight the United States and win.[5.26] - -For superficial, touch-and-go people here was enough to build upon, and -the long entertained hopes of British aid struck root anew. January -14, 1846, our minister Slidell stated that the idea of an approaching -conflict over the Oregon question was assiduously nursed, and seventeen -days later the correspondent of the London _Times_ reported, that it -had become a general conviction. Aberdeen's possible alliance seemed -therefore like a certainty, and he himself admitted to our minister at -London that Mexico had counted upon a war over Oregon. With France, as -we know, Mexico did not stand on the best of terms at this juncture; but -in addition to the other reasons for looking to her, Guizot and Louis -Philippe were strongly pro-English, and in fact, so Bankhead reported, -Paredes hoped for assistance from that country also.[5.27] - -From high to low, as we have learned, the Mexicans were inveterate -gamblers, passionately fond of calculating probabilities and accepting -chances, and a situation like this appealed most fascinatingly to their -instincts and their habits. But in the eyes of many--indeed most, it is -likely--the outlook seemed more than promising. Vain and superficial, -they did not realize their weaknesses. "We could not be in a better -state for war," the _Diario_ announced in March, 1845. If any one -thought of the empty treasury, he assured himself that patriotism and -the boundless natural wealth of the country would afford resources. -Enthusiasm would supply everything, it was believed. Equally unable were -the Mexicans to perceive the frailty of their hopes for European aid. -With few exceptions they saw through a veil, darkly. Even Almonte, a -military man and better acquainted with the United States than any other -prominent citizen, assured his government that in such a conflict the -triumph of Mexico would be "certain."[5.28] - -Here and there one doubted. Some drew back. But the nation as a -whole--if Mexico really was a nation--felt convinced that pride and -passion could safely be indulged. We shall dictate our own terms, -thought many. At any rate, argued others, our honor will be vindicated -by a brilliant stroke beyond the Rio Grande; European intervention will -then occur; the United States will have to pay a round sum for Texas; -and we shall obtain a fixed boundary, guaranteed by the leading powers -of Europe, that will serve as an everlasting dike against American -aggression. The press clamored for war; the government was deeply -committed to that policy; and the great majority of those who counted -for anything, panting feverishly, though with occasional shivers, to -fight the United States, were passionately determined that no amicable -and fair adjustment of the pending difficulties should be made.[5.28] - -"For us [Mexicans]," Roa Barcena admitted, "the war was a fact after -Shannon's declarations of October, 1844, and the fact was confirmed -by the admission of Texas to the North-American Union." "Since the -usurpation of Texas no arrangement, no friendly settlement has -been possible," said _La Reforma_. Besides, a faith in eventual -triumph, strong enough to survive a series of disasters, burned in -the heart of the nation. The Mexican correspondent of the Prussian -minister at Washington--regarded by our secretary of war as entirely -trustworthy--reported that the people were bent upon war. But for the -procrastination and vanity of Mexico, no conflict would have occurred, -said J. F. Ramirez, who stood high among the best public men of that -country. "The idea of peace was not popular," states one Mexican -historian; the nation was responsible for the war, confess others. -_Mexico desired it_, admitted Santa Anna in 1847 and the minister of -relations in 1849, both speaking officially.[5.28] - - - - - VI - - THE AMERICAN ATTITUDE ON THE EVE OF WAR - - 1845 - - -In the United States a strong feeling against the dominant elements in -Mexico had been created by events that did not directly concern us. -The atrocious massacres perpetrated at Goliad and the Alamo during the -Texan struggle for independence made an indelible impression on the -public mind. Said Buchanan on the floor of the American Senate: "I -shall never forget the deep, the heart-rending sensations of sorrow and -of indignation" which pervaded this body when we first heard of Santa -Anna's "inhuman butcheries." The decimating of Texan prisoners for -trying to escape from their guards, as they had a perfect right to do, -and the cruelties, or at least excessive hardships, which they were made -to suffer in confinement, deepened the feeling. The official threats -of ruthless war and even extermination against the Texans, and the -belief that Indians were incited to fall upon their women and children, -sharpened it still more. In 1844 one Sentmanat went from New Orleans to -Tabasco on a revolutionary mission but was unsuccessful; and his party -surrendered to the Mexican leader, General Ampudia, on the promise of -good treatment. Most of the men, however, were shot; the rest of them -disappeared in prison; Sentmanat was summarily executed; and his head, -fried in oil to make it last longer, became the chief decoration of the -public square at San Juan Bautista.[6.1] - -Such acts--naturally though incorrectly supposed to represent the -character of the Mexican, and linked with the apparent cowardice of -Santa Anna and his army in the Texan war of independence--caused the -nation in whose name they were perpetrated to be looked upon by not a -few Americans as a nest of poisonous reptiles, fit only to be stamped -upon. Referring to one of the Texan outrages, the Indiana _State -Sentinel_ exclaimed: "Should that blustering, cowardly nation ever -have the temerity to declare war against the United States, think you -not that the remembrance of such scenes will make every soldier feel -himself 'thrice armed'?" When people of our own became the victims, -when they were robbed and deported without cause on the shores of -the Pacific, when they were shot without trial at Tampico, when they -were threatened with the death of pirates for joining the Texans, and -especially when the newspapers told how Americans among the Santa Fe -prisoners were insulted, abused and forced to work in chains on the road -to Santa Anna's palace, so that he might feast his cruel, cowardly eyes -upon their sufferings, fury burned like a flame in many a heart. Time -appeased the fire, but in 1846 the embers were still red.[6.1] - -[AMERICAN FEELING ABOUT MEXICAN OUTRAGES] - -With less poignant but no less real indignation the American public -noted in a general way the entire long series of our grievances: our -flag insulted, our minister traduced and threatened, our consuls -maltreated, our government officially maligned, agreements broken, -treaties ignored or violated, citizens persecuted and imprisoned, -property confiscated, trade hampered and ruined, complaints more or -less politely mocked, positive demands adroitly evaded, valid claims -fraudulently defeated; and heard that such offences were not merely -committed now and then, but repeated over and over again with apparent -deliberation and malice. The highest Mexican authorities were found -encouraging prejudice and ill-will against our citizens, exerting -themselves to make foreign nations distrust and hate us, misrepresenting -our efforts to conciliate them, and describing our honest wish to be on -friendly terms as hypocrisy and craft. Our people saw the legitimate -results of Mexican misgovernment charged against this country; -proceedings of our authorities, fully warranted by the facts, protested -against; threats of war freely made to influence our national conduct; -and measures looking toward hostilities openly advocated and adopted in -the most offensive manner. Just how fully the details were noted by the -public, and how long the incidents were remembered, it would obviously -be impossible to say; but in all probability they sank into the general -consciousness, and produced a certain state of mind. - -In February, 1847, the Virginia House of Delegates declared that the war -had been "most unrighteously provoked ... by a long series of acts of -injustice and outrage towards the United States," and this is only one -of almost countless equivalent expressions, which no doubt were fairly -sincere.[6.2] - -On the other hand certain factors tended to neutralize our indignation. -There was a disposition, traceable to natural good-heartedness, -political expediency and commercial interests, to maintain friendly -relations with our neighbor. Much of what seemed like misconduct was -attributed to circumstances. We had a rather conceited notion that -Mexicans could not be expected to know very much or do very well. More -or less faintly the idea glimmered, that perhaps it was easy for them -to misunderstand the Texas affair, and natural for them to be angry -about it. Many felt inclined on general principles to suspect that our -aggrieved citizens were not entirely exempt from blame. Money was used -by the agents of Mexico to influence our press. Domestic politics warped -public opinion in her favor sometimes; and finally the anti-slavery -people went great lengths in championing her government and accusing -their own, for every suggestion of war upon Mexico was suspected of -aiming at the acquisition of territory and the reinforcement of a hated -institution.[6.3] - -The northeastern states, on account of the strong anti-slavery sentiment -existing there, were not a little disposed to heed these influences, but -elsewhere they signified much less, and were quite unable to offset the -prevalent feeling that Mexico had insulted, outraged and cheated us, and -the growing conviction that, in dealing with her, forbearance had proved -to be a mistake. As early as 1830 Count Lillers wrote from New Orleans: -It would be "impossible" to speak of Mexico with "more bitterness and -desire of vengeance than is done by certain persons whose words must not -be neglected," and by 1837 many agreed with Jackson that satisfaction -ought to be required; yet nothing positive was done, and the impatience -grew. The lenity of our authorities began to be denounced, and the New -Orleans _Picayune_ in particular attacked what it called "the known -imbecility which has for years marked our government at home as regards -its external relations with Mexico."[6.4] - -The proceedings of her claims commissioners had a signally bad effect. -"The conduct of the Mexican government towards the American claimants -under the treaty between the two countries," declared the _Picayune_, -"has been the most infamously perfidious ever practised by one -country and submitted to by another." "Many earnest remonstrances and -complaints," wrote Webster, our secretary of state, officially to the -Mexican commissioners, have been made to me against your proceedings and -those of your government in this affair; and though he refrained from -expressing any opinion as to the justice of them, such a declaration -was evidence of an indignation both deep and general. At the same time -fresh grievances accumulated; and the Mexicans, instead of showing -any appreciation of what our people regarded as kindness toward them, -appeared even less willing to grant effectual redress than ten or -fifteen years before. "Forbearance and lenity toward such creatures," -protested the _Jeffersonian Republican_ of New Orleans in August, 1845, -"are all lost and worse than lost," for they are thought signs of -weakness, and lead to greater atrocities.[6.5] - -The decision of Herrera's administration to reject Slidell, our minister -of peace, was generally regarded--except by the partisan opponents of -our government--as a crowning proof of the vanity of forbearance and -a loud call for action. This nation, said the St. Louis _Republican_, -"owes it to herself and her character, and the just appreciation of her -ministers and her standing in all foreign countries not to suffer so -open an insult to her representative to pass unnoticed." "The indignity -to our Minister requires atonement," was the crisper utterance of the -_Picayune_, which was widely recognized as the best informed authority -on Mexican affairs among our newspapers. The revolution of Paredes -appeared to be a further evidence of hostility. The government of -Mexico, observed the _Delta_ of New Orleans, has been overthrown with no -pretext except the necessity of active war against the United States; -so let war be waged. Finally, the definitive rejection of our peace -overture, announced in Castillo's defiant and offensive note, supplied a -conclusive argument in the opinion of many against further hesitation. -"We have borne and forborne long enough, and a resolute stand should be -taken at once," was the comment of the _Missouri Reporter_. "The United -States," declared the New Orleans _Commercial Bulletin_, "have borne -more insult, abuse, insolence and injury, from Mexico, than one nation -ever before endured from another ... they are now left no alternative -but to extort by arms the respect and justice which Mexico refuses to -any treatment less harsh."[6.6] - -[BELIEF THAT EUROPE WAS BEHIND MEXICO] - -Another consideration that intensified public sentiment was the -suspicion, which in many cases deepened into something more, that -she was to be used against us by the monarchies of Europe, and in -particular by Great Britain. In 1842, when she made forays into Texas -and threatened a serious invasion, it became a very prevalent opinion -in the United States, reported the Mexican consul at New Orleans, that -England stood behind these movements; and later that country was justly -believed to be working in Texas to defeat and injure us. Her influence -at Mexico was understood to be powerful; and the Americans, not aware -what elements of strength Mexico felt able to count upon, thought she -certainly would not defy us unless assured of foreign support. "Our -people are prone to the opinion, whether well or ill-founded," said the -_Commonwealth_ of Lexington, Kentucky, in February, 1846, "that that -ambitious and mischievous government [of Great Britain] is at the bottom -of Mexican hostility towards us." This was provocation enough. "To fight -the Britishers, all the States are one," complained the London _Times_, -and on this point it was doubtless much closer to the fact than in most -of its deliverances on American affairs.[6.7] - -England was not supposed to be alone, however. Our people understood -that France had cooperated with her against the annexation of Texas, -and not a few suspected her of pursuing the same course to bring about -the rejection of Slidell and the anti-American revolution of Paredes. -In February, 1846, the _Courrier des Etats Unis_ of New York, which -could be regarded as of considerable importance, made this rather -startling announcement: "The latest intelligence from Mexico leaves no -doubt that the new Government of that country is resolved to reject all -peaceful overtures from the United States and solicit the intervention -of European powers to obtain from the Union indemnification for the loss -of Texas and a boundary line under the protecting guaranty of France and -Great Britain. We know personally that this was an idea entertained by -General Almonte when he left New York, on his return to Mexico, where -he now occupies an influential place in the government." The statement -that Almonte expressed such a view early in 1845 must have become known -somewhat widely, for apparently it signified much; and the scheme could -not fail to give offence to as many of our people as heard of it. Even -more disagreeable were the plans for a European monarchy now looming -up so boldly south of the Rio Grande, for they defied the "Monroe -Doctrine," and threatened to bring some great power--perhaps more than -one--directly into the lists against us. During February, 1846, the New -Orleans papers, especially the _Picayune_, invited the attention of the -country vigorously to this phase of the situation.[6.8] - -All things considered, it seemed imperative to stop drifting, and to -settle our affairs with Mexico before the monarchs of Europe could -mature plans to injure us; and evidently, from that point of view, no -further delay could be afforded. At this time, therefore, the people -of the southwest, the region most deeply interested in the situation -and consequently best entitled to speak, demanded very seriously and -very positively a definitive adjustment of our relations with Mexico. -As matters were, the thought of armies and privateers appearing on -the horizon as the first announcement of war hardly allowed nervous -people to sleep. Actual fighting, it was often argued, would be less -injurious than passive hostility with its threats and possibilities. -The desirability of Mexican friendship on the score of commercial and -political interests was not forgotten, but many believed that good -relations could not be had without first giving her a lesson. Finally, -urged the _Picayune_ with reference to the monarchical designs of -Paredes, it was now the most critical time since the Spanish colonies -had revolted; the future of republicanism and the independence of -America were at stake; and as matters stood, European powers had the -battlefield, Mexico, wholly to themselves.[6.9] - -These broad views were strongly supported by more limited and often by -less justifiable ones. The trade interests of the entire Mississippi -valley required not only to be freed from danger, but also to have the -plan of non-intercourse, which Mexico had practically put into force, -given up. A Mexican army would march into Texas, it was remarked, "as -avowed abolitionists," and slaveholders may naturally have preferred -to meet this peril in the enemy's territory. Political considerations -of a personal sort, and one especially, doubtless had an influence. -Calhoun, the dominant figure of the South, contemplating a possible -withdrawal from the Union, desired the people of that section to husband -their strength. "We need our young men for other troubles," he said -with reference to their fighting Mexico. Besides, he naturally could -not welcome a great disturbance that would interfere necessarily with -his plans, and lead to political results of an unpredictable sort. Now -there were men, particularly in Mississippi, by no means unwilling to -embarrass and possibly unhorse that overshadowing leader by forcing him -to antagonize a popular movement; and a war with Mexico seemed obviously -well-suited for such a purpose.[6.10] - -[AMERICAN DESIRE FOR TERRITORY] - -A wish to extend the Union was undoubtedly a factor.[6.11] As the -_American Review_ said, Burr had planted in the lower Mississippi -valley the seeds of ambition for southern conquest, and the soil proved -very fit for their germination and growth.[6.12] As early as 1830 the -British consul at New Orleans believed the people would support an -attack upon the territory of Mexico. In 1835 a French visitor of some -prominence concluded that every American held two ideas firmly: that -our prosperity resulted from our republican institutions, and that -Providence intended the new world for the Anglo-Saxon. In 1843 Captain -Elliot, mistaking an instinct for a determination, felt satisfied that -the United States had resolved to push south. By 1845 the appetite for -more territory was pronounced. "There appears to be no limit to the -insatiable lust of territorial acquisition which pervades the minds -of many of our citizens," lamented the New Orleans _Tropic_. When the -annexation of Texas appeared to be certain, the New York _Morning News_ -exclaimed, "Who's the next customer, California or Canada?" To this -question the _Tribune_ replied, that its neighbor had tasted blood and -growled for more. No, we don't growl, retorted the _News_; more "will -come soon enough--come of its own accord," for our destiny is to possess -the whole continent. Believers in this convenient theory felt bound to -go forward, and should Mexico oppose the decree of Heaven, so much the -worse for her.[6.13] - -Behind our voracity and largely responsible for it were a restlessness -and a dissatisfaction resulting from energies that found no adequate -outlet. In all parts of the country this was the case. As a people "we -are restless, fidgety, discontented, anxious for excitement," confessed -the New York _Herald_. In Illinois times were hard. Every attempt at -commercial or industrial enterprise had failed; farmers could not sell -their crops at paying rates; with boundless force in heart and brain -the young man could find nothing worth while to do. The state of mind -in other parts of that section appears to have been similar. Indiana -gave up all attempts to pay interest on her debt as early as 1840. All -over the western border, said the _American Review_, "are great numbers -of bold and restless spirits, men gathered out of all the orderly and -civilized portions of society as its most turbulent members, and ready -for any enterprise that can minister to their reckless manner of life -and love of danger and of change;" and the West was already powerful in -our national affairs. "Our people," wrote Calhoun, "are like a young -man of 18, full of health and vigour, and disposed for adventure of any -description."[6.14] - -[THE POPULAR EYE FIXED ON MEXICO] - -Such an intoxication of animal vitality demanded a fight, of course. -"The multitude cry aloud for war," admitted the New York _Herald_ in -August, 1845. "Nine-tenths of our people, ceteris paribus, would rather -have a little fighting than not," was the opinion of its neighbor, the -_Morning News_. "LET US GO TO WAR," began a leader in the New -York _Journal of Commerce_; "The world has become stale and insipid, -the ships ought to be all captured, and the cities battered down, and -the world burned up, so that we can start again. There would be fun -in that. Some interest,--something to talk about." If such was the -feeling in a high latitude, it must have burned hot at the south; and -the young men of the Mississippi valley had special reasons for their -ardor. The region of western Tennessee had been settled by revolutionary -soldiers, and they had left a rich inheritance of military traditions. -Jackson towered above all other figures at the southwest, and his chief -distinction was that of the sword. Everybody talked still of the war of -1812 and his brilliant exploit at New Orleans. Indeed, when the mind -wearied of the continual hunting, there was little else to fasten its -eye upon. Military glory became the young man's dream. All aspired to -be soldiers, and to win renown by fighting for their country. This was -their inborn and incessantly cultivated ambition; and it need not be -added that all the young ladies felt that only a military hero, or at -least the makings of such a hero, deserved their attention.[6.15] - -Reasons enough why this feeling concentrated upon Mexico have already -been given, but certain others are in order here. That "is indeed the -garden spot of the Americas and presents allurements more tempting than -did the sunny plains and vineyards of Italy, when the northern hordes -swept down and drifted like a snowstorm over the south of Europe"--such -was the picture of "that magnificent region" held up by the _Commercial -Bulletin_ of New Orleans before thousands of young sparks bored nearly -to death by the commonplace. Besides, greatly exaggerated notions of -Mexico's wealth got abroad. Young fellows overstocked with energy were -not willing to hoe corn at five shillings a day, or dig potatoes for -every tenth bushel when the mountains of a near and hostile country were -understood to be packed with silver, and her churches to be radiant -with diamonds and gold. Stronger than all else, perhaps, the vague but -romantic idea of "revelling in the halls of the Montezumas" exercised -a perfect fascination. A letter from New York published in August, -1845, declared that fully twenty thousand volunteers could be raised in -that city alone "without fee or reward, who would jump at the chance -of marching to Mexico" simply to enjoy this diversion. In short, said -the New York _Morning News_, all the "young and ardent spirits that -throng the cities and are spread over the face of the Union want but a -direction to their restless energies, and their attention is already -fixed on Mexico."[6.16] - -What made this outlook peculiarly inviting was the belief that only one -bold, swift dash would be needed--no dull, plodding, grimy campaigning -year after year. Six sevenths of the people in Mexico were said to -be Indians, half-breeds and negroes--"mere slaves," and the rest of -them degenerate Spaniards; and the keepers of that paradise, the -guardians of those treasures, were represented as "a feeble and degraded -soldiery, who would be scattered like chaff by the first volley from -the Anglo-Saxon rifle, the first charge of the Anglo-Saxon bayonet." -"An adventure full of fun and frolic and holding forth the rewards of -opulence and glory," was therefore the _Commercial Bulletin's_ golden -picture of a war with Mexico, and such became the common idea.[6.17] - -In the summer of 1845 this magnificent dream of sport, glory and -opulence appeared to be on the point of realization, and the war spirit -flamed high. Even journals that had stood firmly against annexing Texas -took fire. "What more inspiring strain can strike the ears of freemen," -demanded the Richmond _Enquirer_, "than the trumpet note which summons -our people to the punishment of tyrants?... We utterly mistake the -spirit of republicanism in America, if there be not one voice for a full -and thorough chastisement of Mexican arrogance and folly." The prospect -of "coercing" out of Mexico her "spirit of depredation, perfidy and -aggression" and thus inaugurating the sweet and commercially profitable -reign of peace excited hot zeal. West of the Alleghanies the feeling was -peculiarly strong. At Nashville the _Union_ promised that "any number" -of volunteers the government might call for would be forthcoming. At St. -Louis, in the opinion of the _Reveille_, only a prospect of service in -the field was needed to induce "the most active volunteering" among the -"enthusiastic population." "Go where you will," recorded the _Picayune_, -"'tis war and nothing but war;" and Buchanan wrote, "You can have no -adequate conception of the military ardor which exists" in the west and -southwest; "It will be easy to bring 100,000 volunteers into the field -from those States."[6.18] - -When Mexico seemed to be slow about striking, the New York _Morning -News_ declared that "a feeling of disappointment" began to be shown -by the public, though still, it added, "At every spring of the whelp, -at every mail from the Gulf, the national pulse moves quicker." When -the prospect of immediate hostilities appeared to be over, the Mobile -_Herald and Tribune_ announced, "After all the visions of glory and -honor which have been dancing through the popular brain for the last -six months" nothing has been done. But in reality something had been -done. Such a state of passion could not simply go out of existence, -especially since the causes of it still remained. The people had become -yet more thoroughly inoculated with the idea of fighting Mexico, and -the country had not advanced far into the new year 1846 before all were -again talking about it, said a Mississippi journal. "Sunday editors" in -particular, it added, "shriek out 'War! War! War!'" Will Polk be able to -withstand the clamor? asked the Memphis _Enquirer_; "We fear not." The -final rejection of Slidell naturally intensified the martial feeling. -"The almost unanimous voice of the American people," wrote even Governor -Hammond of South Carolina, insisted upon war. So much for the attitude -of the public.[6.19] - -[THE CHARGE THAT POLK WISHED FOR WAR] - -Turning now to the attitude of the government, we are told at once that -Polk deliberately intended to attack Mexico, and are offered various -reasons for so believing. One accuser says that he was ambitious for -personal glory; another, that he desired to perpetuate the power of -his party; a third, that he felt anxious to cover up the humiliating -result of the Oregon negotiation; still another, that he wished to be -reelected; and more than one allege that he was determined to obtain -California. For this last view there is just evidence enough to create -a suspicion. For example, Bancroft remarked more than forty years after -the event that Polk said the acquisition of that province would be one -of his aims, and this remark has been cited as if it proved the charge. -But there was not the slightest impropriety in his desiring an immensely -valuable territory that Webster had endeavored a few years before to -acquire, and in 1845 Bancroft himself represented the President's -feeling toward Mexico as "most conciliatory." Indeed, after the conflict -had begun, Bancroft wrote privately to Samuel Hooper, "We were driven -reluctantly to war."[6.20] - -Again, certain facts are cited and aligned: Polk wanted California, a -war occurred, and he promptly took advantage of the war to occupy the -desired territory. But the existence of several points in line does not -prove the existence of a path connecting them, and there is weighty -evidence against the suspicion which these facts naturally excite. -While directing Slidell to obtain the cession of northern California, -if he could, Buchanan intimated, as we have seen, that he should -not press this matter, if so doing would prevent the restoration of -amicable relations with Mexico. In other words, instead of desiring to -precipitate a war for the sake of obtaining California, Polk was ready -to let California go--or at least wait--for the sake of maintaining -peace. Besides, as we shall find when we come to the operations on the -western coast, Polk had a policy for the acquisition of that region, and -this policy did not contemplate war. With nothing solid to stand upon, -then, and much to stand against, this theory must be given up.[6.20] - -The other explanations of Polk's alleged intention to fight Mexico are -evidently mere conjectures, and prove nothing. The idea that contracts -and offices could strengthen the administration and build up the party -is mainly, or perhaps entirely, fallacious. There were not enough to -satisfy more than a small percentage of the hungry patriots, and the -rest were likely to take offence. Moreover, if given to Democrats, these -favors could make no converts; while if given to Whigs, the Democrats -were sure to complain, and few of the recipients could change their -party for such a reason. Many of Polk's chief troubles, as his diary -shows, came from dissatisfied applicants for commissions, and any -person well versed in public affairs could have foreseen that it would -be so.[6.21] And yet, after all, the charge that he purposely brought -on the war has been so commonly believed, or at least so frequently -repeated, that it can fairly demand a more extended examination.[6.22] - -[POLK'S PERSONALITY] - -First of all, then, we must form an estimate of Polk. For this purpose -his diary is extremely useful. No doubt, like other documents of the -sort, it colors some things and omits others; but so extremely busy a -man could not have practised systematic misrepresentation in his daily -record without hopelessly enmeshing and entangling himself and incurring -the risk of detection at many points, while--occupying, as he did, a -position where his every word and act were noted by others--he would -have exposed himself often to documentary refutation. Besides, the -marks of good faith are without number. The diary should therefore be -accepted, and has been accepted, as essentially truthful; and the man -it shows us--revealed also by a large amount of other evidence--is a -cold, narrow, methodical, dogged, plodding, obstinate partisan, deeply -convinced of his importance and responsibility, very wanting in humor, -very wanting in ideality, very wanting in soulfulness, inclined to be -sly, and quite incapable of seeing great things in a great way. All know -the type. It is the leading citizen and schemer of the small town, who -marches up the centre aisle on public occasions with creaking shoes -and a wooden smile, and takes his seat with a backward, all-embracing -glance.[6.23] - -Such a person--lean, stiff, angular, with sharp gray eyes in a sad face, -and long, grizzled hair brushed straight back behind his ears--makes -no appeal to our sympathies, and for that reason is almost sure to be -judged unfairly. For example, Polk has been called the "Mendacious"; but -that is unjust. Many things are done in good society which, if thrown -upon a screen before two thousand people, would be recognized instantly -as mean; and the same is true in the world of affairs. As a lawyer and -politician of Nashville, Polk no doubt resorted to devices of this kind, -and he was not the man to realize the difference between a provincial -town and a nation, and adapt himself to his new position. Compelled to -act, he acted as he could; used the tactics with which he was familiar. -In this manner he deceived men or permitted men to deceive themselves, -and those accustomed to broader and larger and nobler methods thought -he lied. In reality he was not Polk the Mendacious, but simply Polk the -Mediocre.[6.23] - -Yet he was mediocre only as compared with great standards. He could by -no means be called insignificant. George Bancroft, secretary of the -navy, has testified that he surpassed every member of his Cabinet in -ability--not as high a distinction, perhaps, as might have been wished, -but still high. His will-power was ample, and his output of mental -energy large. In seriousness, industry and fidelity he left nothing to -be desired. Though strongly inclined to be positive, he would listen -patiently to others, discuss weighty matters at length, and if convinced -would yield. He reflected long, and yet when the time for decision came, -he did not shrink from taking a stand. He intended to do his duty as he, -Polk, was able to see it, and spent himself liberally in that cause. He -certainly was religious, and no doubt--though blind to the beauty of -uprightness and unresponsive to the delicacy of honor--he fully believed -that he was conscientious.[6.23] - -To regard such a man, uninspired and uninspiring, as capable of playing -the brilliant villain's role in a grand international tragedy, of -dreaming the conqueror's dream and sacrificing his fellow-citizens -on the altar of gory but gorgeous ambition, of smelling the battle -from afar like the war-horse and crying, "Ha, ha!"--this is out of -the question. It was not in him. Neither intellect, conscience nor -imagination permitted it. The Cabinet, which he selected with care, -hampered by no preelection agreements, was much like him; and as Benton -said, it is "impossible to conceive of an administration less warlike, -or more intriguing." "Mr. Polk never dreamed of any other war than a war -upon the Whigs," admitted Robert Toombs, then a Whig member of Congress, -in February, 1846.[6.23] - -A number of circumstances almost committed him to a peaceable course -toward Mexico. During the discussions of the annexation project one of -the strongest objections had been that it would involve the country -in war, and its advocates had strenuously denied this allegation. The -President belonged to that group, and Webster said: "That Mr. Polk -and his Cabinet will desire to keep the peace, there is no doubt. The -responsibility of having provoked war by their scheme of annexation is -what they would greatly dread." Though many plain citizens desired a -fight, an influential body of merchants, financiers and conservatives -did not; and in the view of a still greater number a vital discrepancy -between the predictions of the annexationists and their later conduct -would surely have been damaging. The Oregon question threatened to prove -serious; and it is hardly credible that Polk, even if quite willing to -meet an attack from Mexico, would have desired to attack her before -settling this controversy with England. The secretaries of state, war -and the navy did not hail from fire-eating communities. The head of -the army, General Scott, was a Whig and a recognized candidate for the -Presidency; and the chiefs of the Democratic party had fully sense -enough to understand that a war might enable him to succeed Polk. In -fact the President's diary exhibits painful writhings due to such a -possibility. Finally war, no matter how successful, would mean taxes, -and even those who demanded a fight might not be willing to pay for it. -Certainly Polk was not self-sacrificing enough to desire the odium of -laying war taxes for the sake of bringing Scott into the White House. -Besides, it looked as if war expenses could not fail to strengthen -the tariff system, and that was obnoxious to a great number of the -Democrats.[6.24] - -[POLK'S COURSE PACIFIC] - -Polk's professions were every way most pacific. The assurances conveyed -to Almonte after he made his protest have already been mentioned. In -August, 1845, Polk wrote confidentially to a Senator, "We will not -be the aggressors upon Mexico." A month later Buchanan declared in a -"Private and Personal" letter to our minister at London: "The President -does not intend to proceed beyond a just and righteous self-defence, and -he is ready to present the olive branch to Mexico the moment he knows it -will be accepted." It is hardly supposable that our secretary of state -intended to deceive our most important representative abroad, or that he -was deceived himself by Polk in so vital a matter.[6.25] - -The confidential orders of the government were emphatically unwarlike -in tone. To Conner, commanding in the Gulf, the secretary of the navy -wrote in March, 1845, "The disposition of the President is to maintain -the most friendly relations with the Mexican Republic," and in substance -this declaration was repeated in the following July and August. "Take -special care," the department said to Stockton, who had a few vessels -on the Texas coast, "to avoid every act that can admit of being -construed as inconsistent with our friendly relations" with Mexico. -Commodore Sloat, in the Pacific, was told in "Secret and Confidential" -instructions dated June 24, 1845, "The President hopes, most earnestly, -that the peace of the two countries may not be disturbed ... do -everything consistent with the national honor" to avoid a rupture; and -these instructions to Sloat were most noteworthy, for the commander on -the Pacific station was liable to be out of touch with the government -for a year at a time, and he needed to be sure as to its general -policy.[6.26] - -For the guidance of our charge in Texas, where many feared a Mexican -invasion and called for American troops, a clear statement of our -intentions was equally necessary, and Buchanan wrote to Donelson at -about the same time, "The Government will studiously refrain from all -acts of hostility towards that republic [Mexico], unless these should -become absolutely necessary in self-defence." Quite in line with all -this was the order cancelling Fremont's second exploring trip to the far -west, because he had equipped his party in a military style--an order -that was decidedly over-strict, since precautions against the Indians -could not be neglected. In his Message to the Senate, March 24, 1846, -the President declared it his "settled purpose" to maintain peace with -Mexico, and it is believed that no expression of his indicating a desire -to provoke a conflict can be found.[6.26] - -The measures of the administration corresponded with its professions. -In the first place this was true negatively. It would not be easy to -deny that Mexico's refusal to pay the instalments of our awards could -have been handled by our government in a way to enrage this nation, -already so eager for the fray, and probably her severance of diplomatic -relations might have been used to precipitate an issue; but no advantage -was taken of either opportunity. Another instance is even more signal. -One can hardly doubt that Polk might have brought on a war in the -summer of 1845, had he so desired. Not only had Mexico grossly insulted -us, refused to pay those awards, and severed relations with us both -at her capital and at our own, but she had solemnly announced that -our annexing Texas would be regarded as equivalent to a declaration -of war, notified her agents privately and the world at large publicly -that she was going to fight, and begun preparations for immediate -hostilities. Had Polk summoned Congress and laid all the facts before -it, a declaration of war, or at least an ultimatum that Mexico would -in all probability have rejected, must certainly, or almost certainly, -have been the response; and if one may judge from the state of mind -existing in the United States at the time, our people would in the main -have supported such a course. "The current of public opinion," said the -St. Louis _Republican_, "seems now strongly inclined in favor of a war -with Mexico." "All the better portions of the press of the country," -was the summary of the New Orleans _Picayune_, "are urgent for the -adoption of the most energetic measures" against that country. Almost -every Democratic journal and a vast majority of the Whig journals, -declared the Washington _Globe_, were for crushing Mexico at once. "The -people will approve" of vigorous action, admitted even the Charleston -_Courier_.[6.27] - -[POLK DID NOT DESIRE THE WAR] - -But Polk did not adopt a course of that sort. He took no such steps -to settle matters with England as a President of ordinary common -sense would have taken, if anxious to fight Mexico; and no serious -measures were adopted to increase our nominal army or our insufficient -fleet. In September, he requested the members of the Cabinet to make -their estimates for the coming year on "the most economical scale," -and in fact only twenty-six hundred additional men were asked for the -army--none for the navy. A note from the secretary of the navy to -Captain Perry--"We are jogging on quietly this winter, not anticipating -war"--well represents our military and naval programme; and a letter to -Conner explains it: "We all hope Mexico will agree to a peace." Knowing, -as Polk must have known, the deep and widespread fear of Mexican -privateers, he would have been prevented by a merely selfish regard for -the good opinion of the public from planning war without making some -dispositions to protect, or at least warn, our millions of floating -property. And apparently even the ardor of our young men for combat did -not seriously move him.[6.28] - -In the second place, Polk's action pointed the same way as his -non-action. No one could think of any rational method to conciliate -Mexico that he did not put into operation. The chief object of Parrott's -mission, which was private and therefore could not have been intended -for effect upon the world, was understood by Parrott himself to be, -"preventing a declaration of war, by Mexico, against the United -States." In appointing Slidell, as even the _American Review_ admitted, -the President was evidently sincere. At the end of March, 1846, Polk -received advices from Slidell which made it seem quite possible that he -would finally be given a hearing, and immediately he set on foot a plan -to furnish Paredes with funds, enable him to keep the army faithful, -and thus encourage him to settle matters amicably. Indeed, all that is -known of this mission from beginning to end, including Slidell's private -letters to Buchanan and numerous details that it would be wearisome -to hear specified, show that Polk strongly desired--as the Mexicans -accused him of desiring--a restoration of friendly intercourse; and when -the purpose had evidently failed, Slidell gave final evidence of that -disposition by writing: "I am greatly mortified at the total failure -of a mission commenced under auspices apparently the most flattering, -but that mortification is much mitigated by the consciousness, that no -fault of omission or commission, can justly be attributed either to the -Government or to the Legation."[6.29] - -In short, then, we find that Polk had the gravest reasons for desiring -friendly intercourse with Mexico, and probably felt none for plotting -war; that a variety of personal and political circumstances naturally -inclined him toward peace; that his declarations, both public and -private, pointed consistently in that direction as long as any hope of -an amicable settlement remained; and that what he did in repeated and -most significant ways, as well as what he refrained from doing, had the -same meaning. We must therefore give up the idea that he desired, and -from the first intended, to have a war with Mexico. - -[A CRISIS] - -All prospects of negotiation came to an end, however, and the -administration found itself confronted by a crisis. The dignity of the -United States had certainly been outraged in a defiant and contemptuous -manner. By the acts of Mexico, diplomatic relations had been completely -severed, and she would not renew them on any terms which the United -States could think of accepting. Commercial intercourse was practically -at an end, and the interests of our citizens were so gravely prejudiced, -that from this point of view even a London paper, the _Examiner_, -admitted reluctantly that the situation was becoming "intolerable to -the United States." Our claims and our awards were still facts. "The -honor of this government is pledged to our own people for the diligent -and proper prosecution of these claims," our secretary of state had -said in 1843, and it was perfectly true. To let them go unpaid, in -addition to being internationally immoral, would have wronged our -aggrieved citizens; and to pay them from our own revenues, besides being -immoral, pusillanimous and ridiculous, would have been unfair to all -of our tax-payers. We had observed no more willingness, although the -Mexican government had nearly always been sufficiently strong, to do us -justice before annexation became an issue than afterwards; and in fact -Ashburnham, a British representative at Mexico, did not exaggerate when -he wrote, "They _will_ not pay but on compulsion." There was therefore -no way to collect our due except by force.[6.30] - -If our long forbearance appeared to American editors a mistake, much -more reason had the administration to entertain that opinion, for -our ministers and consuls in Mexico had repeatedly urged it, and -Slidell had summed up his experience there in the following words, -amply justified by the sequel: "We shall never be able to treat with -her on fair terms until she has been taught to respect us ... here -all amicable advances are considered as indicative either of weakness -or treachery." "Be assured," he added privately to Buchanan, "that -nothing is to be done with these people, until they shall have been -chastised." The solemn declarations of a succession of trusted agents -that our forbearance was a tactical error were facts that our government -was bound to consider; and by way of confirmation it had not only our -complete failure to get on with Mexico, but the success of a power which -seemed to have pursued a very different course, for in October, 1845, -our consul at Vera Cruz had given the state department a specimen of -England's tone. Mexico, said she to the minister of relations, must -fulfil to the letter every contract with a British subject.[6.31] - -Furthermore our government felt seriously concerned about the European -monarchical schemes. Early in January, 1846, the London _Times_ printed -a letter from its correspondent at Mexico in which the opinion was -expressed that a foreign prince, if "seconded by any leading European -power," could gain a Mexican throne. A week later the same journal, -recommending a Spanish king as the only possible cure for the ills -of Mexico, had remarked that the United States could not oppose the -"united policy of the European Powers"; and at about the same time -the _Picayune_ had announced, that it was proposed to give Cuba to -England for her cooperation in the monarchical plan. Our government -had, and could have, no intention of submitting to such European -manoeuvres. Any attempt of England and France to place a king on the -throne of Mexico, wrote Buchanan, "would be resisted by all the power -of the United States;" and the best way to oppose it was to effect a -definitive settlement of our difficulties with Mexico at once--first, -because this of itself would very likely make the development of the -rather complicated scheme appear, in view of the "Monroe Doctrine," -impracticable, and, secondly, because no European power could, with any -show of decency, interfere in the domestic affairs of that country, -while she was actually at war.[6.32] - -Chivalry does not govern international relations even at the present -day, and in 1845 sentiment was perhaps less tender on the subject than -it now is. Vattel, the recognized authority on the law of nations, -wrote thus: "Every nation ... has, therefore, a right ... to preserve -herself from all injuries.... When the evil is done, the same right to -security authorizes the offended party to endeavour to obtain a complete -reparation, and to employ force for that purpose, if necessary."[6.33] - -Moreover, the United States could appeal, not only to strict law, -but still more forcibly to broad equity. To sum up the case in one -sentence, Mexico, our next neighbor, on no grounds that could be -recognized by the United States, repudiated her treaties with us, ended -official relations, aimed to prevent commercial intercourse, planned to -deprive us of all influence on certain issues vitally connected with -our declared foreign policy, seemed likely to sell California to some -European rival of ours, made it impossible for us to urge long-standing -claims or watch over citizens dwelling within her borders, refused to -pay even her admitted debts to us, claimed the privilege of applying to -our government publicly the most opprobrious epithets in the vocabulary -of nations, designed to keep our people in a constant state of -uncertainty and alarm, intended to cause us the expense of maintaining -for defensive purposes a large army and a large navy, planned to destroy -our commerce by commissioning privateers, claimed the right to harry -Texas, a part of the Union, at will, threatened and prepared for war, -and proposed to assume such an attitude that, whenever encouraged by -foreign support or any other circumstances, she could open fire upon -us without even giving notice. She had informed the world that it was -her privilege to keep on harrying Texas from generation to generation; -and on a broader scale, but in a manner precisely analogous, it was now -proposed to hang upon the flank of the United States. Foreign mediation -could not be invoked, for all the American states were naturally -supposed to be prejudiced, and it was contrary to our interest and -avowed policy to allow European intervention in the affairs of this -continent; and no end of what had become truly an intolerable state of -affairs could be seen, for Mexico declared she would never give up her -pretensions until she had recovered Texas, which it was now beyond her -power to do.[6.34] - -[THE CASE URGENT] - -It rested with our government, therefore, as the agent of national -defence and the representative of national dignity and interests, to -apply a remedy. Of course, too, all the pressure of warlike sentiment -among our people, especially in the President's party, and even the -pressure of motives distinctly selfish, had to be recognized more or -less, for such is the nature of popular government. Very likely Polk's -abandoning a part of our Oregon claim rendered it the more necessary -to avoid flinching in the Mexican affair; and accordingly on April 21, -1846, after long consideration of the matter, he informed the Cabinet -that our relations with Mexico "could not be permitted to remain" as -they were, and that he thought he should recommend to Congress the -adoption of energetic measures for the redress of our grievances, -which meant also of course a full settlement of our differences with -that power. In truth no other course would have been patriotic or even -rational.[6.35] - - - - - VII - - THE PRELIMINARIES OF THE CONFLICT - - April, 1845-April, 1846 - - -Strangely enough, although our diplomatic troubles with Mexico would -almost certainly have led to hostilities, the war actually came about in -a totally different way.[7.1] - -During the spring and early summer of 1845, in view of Mexican threats -and of reports from trustworthy sources that an invasion of Texas might -be expected,[7.2] it was decided by our government that when her -people should have accepted our annexation proposal, as they were almost -sure to do, it would become the duty of the United States to defend -her;[7.3] and this decision made the question where her southern -boundary lay a practical matter. It was a thorny subject. In 1834 -Mexico herself did not feel sure about the line; and according to the -chief technical officer in our state department, sole commissioner to -negotiate the treaty of peace with Mexico, if an official demarcation -had existed, the war between Texas and the mother-country had rubbed -it out. The former now claimed the territory as far as the Rio Grande, -but she did not establish her title by occupying completely and -effectively the region south of the Nueces. Only by an agreement with -Mexico, indeed, could limits have been fixed. So far as it concerned the -republic of Texas, this was in effect the situation.[7.4] - -For the United States, however, this was not the whole story. Down -to 1819 our government had insisted that Louisiana extended to the -Rio Grande. In other language, since the southern part of Louisiana -was called Texas, the official view was that Texas bordered on that -stream. Such, then, was in effect the contention of Jefferson, -Madison, Monroe, John Quincy Adams, Pinckney, Livingston and Clay, -who represented three administrations in upholding the claim. By the -treaty of 1819 we did not withdraw from our position, but merely -arranged to "cede" whatever possessions we had west of the Sabine for -certain valuable considerations. From 1819 to 1845, Texas, considered -under its geographical and historical aspects as a district of old -Louisiana, appeared to border on the Rio Grande not less truly than -before, for no other line became established. Hence it seemed evident -from this point of view, that by annexing Texas we revived our old -claim, our old official view, and the testimony of all those eminent -statesmen. Our government so held. November 10, 1845, in explaining to -Slidell the extent of Texas, Buchanan went back to Jefferson, Madison, -Monroe, Pinckney and the discussion of the Louisiana boundary. Polk, -as the head of our government, could not well repudiate, simply on his -own authority, the solemn declarations of Presidents and other high -officials, in which through a term of years the nation had acquiesced. -The fact that for a considerable time the Texans, asserting the Rio -Grande line, had maintained themselves against Mexico perhaps had -some confirmatory value; and Polk was further bound, not only by his -apparently sincere belief in our old claim, but by the pledge he had -given to Texas and the pledge our official representative had given her, -expressly to promote the cause of annexation, that he would maintain the -claim as President. These were grips of steel.[7.5] - -[THE UNITED STATES ARMY] - -To meet the responsibility thus incurred, we had eight regiments of -infantry, four of "artillery" and two of dragoons, including about -7200 men. The "artillery" regiments, which were theoretically expected -to serve in fortifications with heavy guns, were armed, equipped and -drilled as infantry; but one company of each had a field battery, -and under the instruction of excellent officers had reached a high -state of skill in using it. The infantry and cavalry, drilled on the -French system, were in a good condition generally, though division -among coast and frontier stations, besides impairing discipline and -efficiency, had prevented manoeuvring in large bodies; and the infantry -soldiers in particular, inured on the border to hard service, felt now -a reasonable confidence in themselves and their immediate superiors. -The forty-five capable engineer officers understood their duties fairly -well, except that a lack of men to execute operations had left them, -as the head of the corps admitted, too much like theoretical mariners. -A few well-trained topographical engineers, a small medical staff, and -a quartermaster's department rounded out this miniature army. Nearly -all the infantry carried flint-lock muskets, and numerous defects and -deficiencies existed; but probably the forces were better equipped -for service than has generally been supposed. In view of possible -difficulties with Mexico, a disproportionate share of the troops were -placed at or near Fort Jesup on the western border of Louisiana; and in -June, 1845, these included the Third Infantry, eight companies of the -Fourth Infantry, and seven companies of the Second Dragoons.[7.6] - -[GENERAL ZACHARY TAYLOR] - -Their commander was Brevet Brigadier General Zachary Taylor. This child -of destiny, born in 1784, had grown up and gained some rudiments of an -education amidst the Indian troubles of the Kentucky border. At the age -of twenty-three he had been commissioned first lieutenant in the Seventh -Infantry, and after showing remarkable coolness and intrepidity in two -small affairs during our second war with England and the Black Hawk War, -he had won a stubborn fight in 1837 against the Seminoles at the head of -some 1100 soldiers. Three years later he was assigned to a supervising -command in the southwest, and this included Fort Jesup.[7.7] - -Personally Taylor possessed a strong character, a very strong character, -neither exhausted by self-indulgence nor weakened by refinement and -study. He was every inch a man, with a great heart, a mighty will, a -profound belief in himself, and a profound belief in human nature. -The makings of a hero lay in him, and to a large extent the making -had been done. He was gifted, too, with solid common sense, not a -little shrewdness and ambition, a thorough knowledge of men--the sort -of men that he knew at all--a military eye, and a cool, resourceful -intelligence that was always at work in its own rather ponderous -fashion. The sharp gray eyes and the contraction of his brows that made -the upper part of his face look severe were tempered by the benignity -of the lower part; and the occasional glimmer of a twinkle betokened -humor.[7.7] - -On the other hand, everything about him suggested the backwoodsman. His -thick-set and rather corpulent body, mounted on remarkably short legs, -typified barbaric strength. In speech he was rough and ungrammatical, in -dress unkempt and even dirty, and in every external of his profession -unmilitary. He never had seen a real battle nor even a real army. -Ignorance and lack of mental discipline made him proud of his natural -powers and self-mastered attainments, and he saw very distinctly the -weaknesses of school-taught and book-taught men. West Pointers, trim in -person and in mind but inferior to him in strength, practical sense and -familiarity with men and things, he felt strongly inclined to belittle; -and this feeling went so far that he despised, or at any rate frequently -seemed to despise, knowledge itself. He could not, however, fail to -recognize on occasions the professional superiority of his trained -officers, and no doubt found himself unable now and then to defend -his opinions. In such cases, being by temperament extremely firm, he -naturally took refuge in obstinacy; and sometimes he appears to have -been positively mulish, holding to his own view after he must have seen -its incorrectness.[7.7] - -From various logical results of these limitations Taylor was happily -saved by Major General Winfield Scott, the head of the army, who -purposely gave him Captain W. W. S. Bliss as adjutant general. Bliss was -described by a good authority as the peer of any man alive in learning, -statesmanship and military capacity; and he felt willing to give the -General--later his father-in-law--the unstinted benefit of all his -talents and attainments. With him at his elbow Taylor could be sure of -trustworthy information, honest and competent advice, a friendly hand -to supplement or subtract, and a skilful pen to report, explain and, -if necessary, discreetly color the facts. Captain Williams, an able -officer, wrote in 1848 that he could not imagine one man's being more -indebted to another than Taylor was to his assistant. In other words, -"Taylor" in the history of the Mexican War is the name of a double star, -one partner in which was the dominating personality of the General, and -the other a fine, trained intelligence known as Bliss.[7.8] - -Taylor, then, having been warned by a despatch of May 28, 1845, to hold -the troops in readiness, was confidentially ordered on the fifteenth -of June to place them at some port where they could readily embark for -the Texas frontier, and, after learning that our annexation overture -had been accepted, to occupy "on or near the Rio Grande del Norte" -such a position, favorable to the health of the men, as would be "best -adapted to repel invasion." Accordingly he concentrated his infantry at -New Orleans, where official notice that annexation had been accepted by -Texas reached him. Further orders from William L. Marcy, the secretary -of war, enjoined upon him to "avoid any Acts of aggression," and in -particular to refrain from disturbing any Mexican posts on the left -bank of the river "unless an actual state of war should exist"; and -under these instructions the forces left New Orleans toward the end of -July for Aransas Bay, Texas. His troops--counting the dragoons, who set -out by land for San Antonio, about 120 miles from the coast, a little -later--numbered some 1500.[7.9] - -Taylor himself with a part of the command reached his destination on the -twenty-fifth; landed his men, with such rapidity as meagre facilities -and heavy surf would permit, on St. Joseph's Island; and then, with row -boats and small sailing-craft, conveyed them some twenty-five miles -farther to Corpus Christi, a hamlet on the south side of the Nueces -River at its mouth. News that Mexico was on the point of beginning -hostilities caused great alarm presently; but no enemy came, and by the -end of August the General felt secure. The rest of the troops from Fort -Jesup were then on the ground. Seven companies of the Seventh Infantry, -collected laboriously from a number of points, had arrived. Two -volunteer artillery companies from New Orleans had come to the rescue; -and a party of Texan rangers were near him. The Mexicans, on the other -hand, showed no signs of concentrating.[7.10] - -[CONDITIONS AT CORPUS CHRISTI] - -Naturally the public inquired whether the occupation of Corpus Christi, -and especially the words "on or near" the Rio Grande, could be -justified. But, as the London _Times_--a witness by no means prejudiced -in our favor--observed, "When the United States Government, with the -full sanction of the American people, consummated the annexation of -Texas, ... they should, according to all the usages of civilized -Governments, have proceeded to take military means for the protection of -their new frontier." The performance of this duty involved giving the -commander a somewhat liberal discretion, for southern Texas was a region -of which the Washington authorities knew very little, and what steps it -would be proper for the General to take, should the Mexicans launch a -raid at San Antonio, was known there even less. It would have required -about a month to send information and receive orders based upon it. -Authority to occupy such a post as might seem necessary, in view of the -ground, the vicinity and the news, had to be given. Taylor understood -that Corpus Christi, which belonged to Texas by the same right of -effective occupation as Nacogdoches or Galveston, satisfied the terms of -the order; the government accepted that interpretation; and the country -acquiesced.[7.11] - -Gradually his forces assumed rather formidable proportions. Some of -the troops had to come from Detroit, and some from Florida; but it -was feared in all quarters that a heavy Mexican body might cross the -Rio Grande any day, and the reinforcements made quick time. October -13 the army included General W. J. Worth's command, called the first -brigade, which comprised the Eighth Infantry and twelve companies of the -so-called artillery consolidated as a battalion; the second brigade, -consisting of the Fifth and the Seventh Infantry under Lieutenant -Colonel J. S. McIntosh; the third brigade under Colonel William -Whistler, which included the Third and the Fourth Infantry; the Second -Dragoons, commanded by Colonel D. E. Twiggs; some United States and New -Orleans field artillery, and the Texas rangers. In all, officers and -men, there were about 3900.[7.12] - -Taylor, accustomed to frontier conditions, described his troops as -healthy, remarkably well-behaved and very comfortable. But in reality -the tents could scarcely keep out a heavy dew; for weeks together every -article in many of them was thoroughly soaked; and much of the time -water stood three or four feet deep in some. The weather oscillated -sharply between sultry heat and piercing northers, so that one lay down -gasping for breath and woke up freezing. As hardly enough wood could be -obtained for the cooks, camp-fires were usually out of the question; and -only brackish drinking water could be had. At one time nearly twenty -per cent of the men were on the sick list, and half of the others more -or less ill. Taylor knew so little of military evolutions that he could -not get his men properly into line, and few of his chief officers -excelled him very much. Despite orders from the President, military -exercises were given up after a time; a sullen torpor and silence -reigned in the camp, and many deserted. Meanwhile a horde of gamblers -and liquor-sellers opened booths near by; and the soldiers, driven -to desperation, paid what little money they had to be drugged into -insensibility or crazed into brawls and orgies. Some, if not many, of -the officers gave up acting like gentlemen, and one at least even forgot -how to be honest.[7.13] - -Then a dispute regarding precedence brought the camp to the verge of -battle. Twiggs had the honor of seniority as colonel; but Worth, as a -brevet brigadier general, insisted that should Taylor cease to hold the -command, it would fall to him. The question was referred to Washington; -and Scott, directed by Marcy to settle it, gave a ruling in favor of -brevet rank. This decision did not, however, end the controversy. More -than a hundred officers joined in an appeal to Congress, while Worth -declared he would maintain his rights "to any extreme." Taylor, instead -of using his personal and official strength to enforce a _modus vivendi_ -until the issue could be properly decided, or at least refraining from -all accentuation of it, ordered a general review, and in spite of the -ruling announced by his superior officer, assigned Twiggs to command -on that occasion; and then, finding that serious trouble would ensue, -proved himself, by countermanding the review, unable to maintain even -his own authority. After all this, discipline could hardly be said -to exist. Moreover, a general want of confidence in the commander -prevailed. "Whether an idea, strategic or of any other description, has -had the rudeness to invade the mind or imagination of our chief is a -matter of doubt," said Worth; "We are literally a huge body without a -head." If Taylor succeeds, it will be by accident, concluded Lieutenant -Colonel Hitchcock, now commanding the Third Infantry, who had studied -and taught at West Point.[7.14] - -[THE QUESTION OF RIGHT] - -Toward the end of August Marcy wrote: "Should Mexico assemble a large -body of troops on the Rio Grande and cross it with a considerable -force, such a movement must be regarded as an invasion of the United -States and the commencement of hostilities." This declaration called -forth protests, but was quite fair. By stationing troops peaceably in -the "intermediate region" between the Nueces and the Rio Grande we -only placed ourselves on an equality with Mexico; and, as we ordered -Taylor to leave her posts undisturbed, we showed a friendly recognition -of the principle of pacific joint-occupation during negotiations. Our -forces, to be sure, outnumbered hers, but her attitude made it unsafe to -despatch a smaller representation. Unlike us, Mexico had no occasion to -send an army into that region for defensive purposes. The United States -had shown every sign of desiring peace and none of desiring war, and at -this time was endeavoring to bring about a friendly settlement. Such an -army could not have prevented us from entering the intermediate region, -for at Corpus Christi Taylor was already there; and it could not have -saved the Mexican posts and citizens, for they were not menaced. Mexico, -on the other hand, had threatened us and made open preparations to -strike; it was now understood at Washington that no declaration of war -should be expected to precede a blow; her generals had proclaimed that -hostilities were on the point of beginning; and it was only common sense -to assume that, should a Mexican army cross the Rio Grande, it would -come to execute the announced intention of those who sent it.[7.15] - -During the evening of January 12, 1846, despatches from Slidell and -Black arrived at Washington, and made the rejection of our pacific -overture look almost certain. This unexpected turn of affairs gave -new seriousness and fresh urgency to the Mexican issue; and the next -day Taylor was ordered to encamp on the Rio Grande at whatever point -he should consider most advantageous. He was cautioned, however, -against regarding Mexico as an enemy, unless war should be declared -or hostilities be undertaken by her, and against provoking a conflict -by insistence upon the joint navigation of the river, which our claim -implied.[7.16] - -February 3 the General received these instructions, and replied that he -should lose no time. Three days later the army was formally ordered to -"be prepared for a field movement at short notice." But, although Taylor -had been on the ground for six months, he was "utterly ignorant"--said -Hitchcock--of the way to Matamoros, and had now to investigate the -matter. By February 24 he possessed the necessary data, and ordered the -troops to be in readiness to set out "at forty-eight hours notice"; -yet it was not until the eighth of March that his cavalry, led by -the impetuous Twiggs and accompanied by Ringgold's handsome battery, -actually moved off. The infantry brigades followed at intervals of a -day with Duncan's and Bragg's field artillery; and transports prepared -to remove the convalescents, extra baggage and Major Munroe's artillery -company to Point Isabel, near the mouth of the Rio Grande.[7.17] - -[THE ADVANCE TO THE RIO GRANDE] - -Soon after receiving the instructions to advance, Taylor had given -notice of his orders to influential citizens of Matamoros then at Corpus -Christi, explaining that his march would be entirely pacific, and that -he expected the pending questions to be settled by negotiation; and -similar assurances were conveyed to the Mexican customhouse office at -"Brazos Santiago," near Point Isabel. March 8 a more formal announcement -appeared in General Orders No. 30. Taylor here expressed the hope -that his movement would be "beneficial to all concerned," insisted -upon a scrupulous regard for the civil and religious rights of the -people, and commanded that everything required for the use of the army -should be paid for "at the highest market price." These orders, which -merely anticipated instructions then on their way from Washington, -were translated into Spanish, and placed in circulation along the -border.[7.18] - -To the troops the march proved a refreshing and beneficial change. The -weather was now fine, the road almost free from mud, and the breeze -balmy. Frequently the blue lupine, the gay verbena, the saucy marigold -and countless other bright flowers carpeted the ground. The cactus and -the cochineal excited and gratified curiosity. Ducks and geese often -flew up from the line of advance. Many rabbits and many deer scampered -across the plain; and occasionally wolves, catamounts and panthers -were frightened from cover. Wild horses would gaze for an instant at -their cousins in bondage, and then gallop off, tossing their manes -disdainfully; and once a herd of them, spaced as if to allow room -for cannon, were taken for Mexican cavalry. Innumerable centipedes, -tarantulas and rattlesnakes furnished a good deal of interest, if -not of charm. The boundless prairie had somewhat the fascination of -the sea; and occasionally, when a mirage conjured up a range of -blue mountains--clothed with forests and reflected in lakes--that -melted presently into the air, one had a sense of moving on enchanted -ground.[7.19] - -To be sure, the march was not entirely agreeable. For about 196 miles -it stretched on and on, and most of the way it lay through deep, sandy -plains, here glistening with salt, and there varied with briny marshes -or sticky black dirt. In some places Mexicans had burned the herbage; -and the light ashes, raised by the tramp of many feet, settled on the -soldiers' faces till they could scarcely recognize one another. Tortured -with thirst, they would occasionally break ranks pell-mell at the sight -of water; but as a rule they found it brackish. All suffered alike; and -we have a picture of Taylor himself breakfasting at the door of his -tent with a mess-chest for table, his rugged countenance flaming with -sunburn, his long lips cracked and raw, and his long nose white with -peeling skin. But the experience, even at its worst, proved a wholesome -tonic after the degeneration of Corpus Christi.[7.19] - -March 20 the army came to the Arroyo Colorado, a salt lagoon about a -hundred yards wide and three or four feet deep. Here General Mejia, -the commander at Matamoros, who knew all about our troops and their -movements, had intended to win a sheaf of laurels; but orders from -his government, not quite ready for action, arrived in time to curb -this ambition. He concluded then to try the effect of a ruse, and his -officer convinced the Americans, with solemn warnings, bugle-calls here -and there, and a clever showing of heads among the bushes and trees on -the southern side of the lagoon, that a hard fight would result from -attempting to cross it. But without the least hesitation Taylor prepared -for battle. Ringgold's pieces were made ready. Worth dashed into the -stream at the head of an advance party; and on gaining, unopposed, -the opposite bank, he saw--dust in the atmosphere, and far away a -dozen small black specks rapidly growing smaller. But morally it was a -victory; and the troops, though cheated, felt encouraged.[7.20] - -March 23, after making fifteen miles across a clear, dry prairie, the -army came to a road that led to Matamoros, about eighteen miles away -on the right, and to Point Isabel, distant nine or ten on the other -side; and Taylor, ordering Worth and the infantry to camp and watch -for the enemy at a suitable place in the former direction, proceeded -to the coast with his cavalry. There he found the transports in sight -and the wind favorable. Defences were planned at once; and on the 27th, -leaving an engineer, supported by a guard under Munroe, to superintend -the construction of them, the General returned to the army, then some -ten miles from Matamoros. The next morning all advanced, and soon came -to rough defiles. On each side bristled what a soldier described as an -irregular, impenetrable mass of "scraggly, scrubby, crooked, infernally -illegitimate and sin-begotten bushy trees loaded with millions of -thornpins"--that is to say, _chaparral_. Passing this and a few cabins -in the midst of corn, cotton and pomegranates, the troops found -themselves at the end of their march, Rio Bravo, the "Bold river of the -North," brown with mud, rolled swift and boiling at their feet; and in -plain view about half a mile distant--black with crowded house-tops, gay -with flags, and noisy with bugles and barking dogs--lay Matamoros. A -rude pole was soon raised; to the music of our national airs the colors -went up; and a small masked battery of field guns was planted near -them.[7.21] - -A singular political game then took place between Taylor and Mejia. -The former did everything possible to convince the Mexican general -that his movement was entirely pacific, and offered to "enter into any -arrangements to secure the peace and harmony of the frontier" during -negotiations between the two governments; but the latter insisted -over and over again that a state of war had been created by the -American advance. In spite of this Taylor reminded his officers of the -"essentially pacific" and "conciliatory" intentions of the army; yet at -the same time he reported the Mexican attitude as distinctly hostile, -asked for reinforcements, mounted four 18-pounders to command the city, -and about April 7 began what came to be known as Fort Brown, a large, -bastioned "field-work" opposite the lower end of the city.[7.22] - -[THE MEXICAN ATTITUDE] - -On April 11 General Ampudia, the assassin of Sentmanat, arrived at -Matamoros to assume the chief command, accompanied by cavalry and -followed, as the Americans understood, by two or three thousand more -troops. The next day he signalized his advent by ordering Taylor to -decamp at once for the other side of the Nueces--a proposal to which -a courteous negative was returned--and by compelling all the Americans -in the city, "under open threats of violence," to leave town within -twenty-four hours. Taylor retaliated by requesting our naval commander -off the Rio Grande to stop the use of that stream. As the Mexican -attitude made it impossible for us to have the joint navigation implied -by our claim, this appeared reasonable; but essentially the measure was -defensive, since without supplies coming by water a large force could -not remain long at Matamoros. When Ampudia complained, the General -pointed out that sealing up the river was only the "natural result of -the state of war so much insisted on by the Mexican authorities as -actually existing," and offered to reopen it if Ampudia would join -him in maintaining an armistice during the negotiations of the two -governments; but this led to no result.[7.23] - -Ampudia's orders and intention had been to attack the Americans as -soon as possible, but his glorious prospects darkened immediately. -Though given the place of Major General Arista, long at the head of -military affairs in this quarter, because he supported the revolution -of Paredes while Arista not only frowned upon it, but seemed to aim -at making northeastern Mexico independent, Ampudia was detested and -thought incompetent--an opinion he did not share--by not a few in the -northern army, whereas Arista stood high in his caste, and, as a person -of wealth and position, had strong friends well able to make trouble -for the central government. Consequently an order dated April 4 made -Arista commander-in-chief with Ampudia as lieutenant. The latter was -immediately forbidden to shine on the field of glory, and, finding his -officers would not support him in disobedience, he submitted.[7.24] - -Arista, however, bearing instructions dated April 4 to attack the -Americans, reached the scene on the 24th, and ordered his cavalry -general, Torrejon, to cross above Matamoros with about 1600 men. Hearing -a rumor of this movement, Taylor sent Captain Thornton and about sixty -dragoons late that afternoon to reconnoitre; and the next morning, some -twenty-eight miles from camp, finding himself completely shut in by -overwhelming forces, the Captain tried to break through, lost several -men killed and wounded, and then with all the rest surrendered. This -was war. "Hostilities have begun," announced Arista on the day of his -arrival. "Hostilities may now be considered as commenced," reported -Taylor on the 26th; and--besides advising Polk to organize twelve-months -volunteers--he at once called upon Texas and Louisiana for about 5000 -men.[7.25] - -[REASONS FOR POLK'S COURSE] - -It was a tragic and most regrettable denouement; yet, on a close review -of all the data now accessible, one does not find it easy to censure -Polk. If he had wished and meditated war from the first, why did he work -for an amicable settlement through Parrott, Black and Slidell? For the -sake of appearances, many said. But in the first place we have found -that Polk was honest in those negotiations; and, in the second, had -war been his aim and appearances his care, he would not have permitted -the order of January 13 to be issued that day. On January 12 it looked -at Washington as if the question of receiving Slidell would soon be -decided. The President could afford to wait a little, and he would have -done this, for it was clear that an unnecessary military step, taken -while he was extending the olive branch, would needlessly make him -appear either treacherous or ridiculous. Moreover if he sought a war, he -knew on January 12 that matters were shaping themselves to his taste; -that Mexico was almost sure to close the door of negotiation soon; -and consequently that he would soon be able to demand of Congress the -forcible redress of our grievances.[7.26] - -Here lay a _casus belli_ amply endorsed by international law, the -practice of civilized powers, and the general opinion of the world. It -was a ground, too, that Polk himself, as we have seen, felt entirely -satisfied to stand upon, and one that our people, feeling as they did, -would almost certainly have accepted. Having, then, apparently within -his reach a pretext for war that almost everybody thought good, he would -not have exerted himself to obtain one that almost everybody thought -bad; and in fact--evidently expecting no event of decisive importance -to occur near the Rio Grande--he went on day after day with his plan -to lay our grievances before Congress, until news of the attack on -Thornton burst upon Washington like a rocket. On the hypothesis that -he had wished and meditated war from the first and merely stuck at -appearances, his conduct was therefore irrational; and, besides, we have -seen adequate reasons for believing that he desired peace.[7.26] - -Discarding that hypothesis, however, leaves us the important question, -How did the idea of sending Taylor forward present itself to Polk? -First, then, from his point of view it seemed entirely permissible. -A proprietor is not debarred from going where a squatter has built a -cabin; and in the light of our official claim and arguments Mexican -occupation above the Rio Grande was merely by sufferance. The so-called -"provocative act" of pointing guns at Matamoros could not be charged -against the government, for Marcy had suggested other points also for -Taylor's camp, leaving the choice to him. It was a defensive measure -adopted by the General for military reasons in conjunction with pacific -assurances and proposals; and we learn from Arista and others that it -had a sedative effect on the property owners of that flimsily built city -and on the army authorities.[7.27] - -No encroachment upon the powers of Congress appeared to be involved. -Had Polk's aim been, as Calhoun alleged, to establish a boundary, he -could not have tolerated Mexican posts, for the troops of foreign -states cannot be permitted to sojourn within our officially defined -limits. Besides, Polk had sent Slidell to treat on this very question, -and Slidell had not given up the task. Though it rested with Congress -to declare war, a President could legally, in the exercise of his -discretion, take steps liable to bring about hostilities. Moreover -Congress appeared to have authorized Taylor's movement. Corpus Christi, -claimed by Tamaulipas, had been made an American port of delivery. A -collection district had been established in the intermediate region. The -declaration of Polk's Message, December, 1845, that our jurisdiction -had been extended to the Rio Grande, and Marcy's appended report, which -announced that Taylor's instructions were to regard that stream as our -boundary, had raised no storm. For six months, admitted the chief Whig -organ, our doings in this field not only had appeared to be endorsed -by the people, but had gone on openly without calling forth "a single -question from any public authority." Officially notified of the military -occupation of Corpus Christi, Congress, instead of protesting, had -voted supplies for the troops. Finally, Congress had instructed the -Executive, in the resolutions for annexing Texas, to reach an agreement -with Mexico regarding the boundary; it was his duty to persevere in the -attempt until convinced he could not succeed; and Taylor's advance, as -will presently be seen, appeared to him a proper step in the discharge -of this obligation.[7.28] - -Familiar precedents and principles were believed to sanction the -movement of our troops. In 1794 Washington had ordered Wayne to conduct -hostilities in disputed territory, and had threatened to destroy a -British fort there. In accordance with a resolution of Congress, Madison -had seized the "Florida parishes" claimed by Spain. Just before Taylor -was ordered to move, Hilliard informed the House of Representatives that -England had magistrates in the southern part of Oregon; and John Quincy -Adams proposed to take military possession of that disputed territory -before concluding negotiations. If such a method could be employed in -dealing with countries willing to treat, very naturally--in the case -of one that had pronounced for war--pacific occupation, leaving the -competing jurisdiction undisturbed, seemed fully justifiable.[7.29] - -Taylor's advance appeared also to be highly expedient. For one thing, -our claim upon the intermediate region would have been weakened, had -we refrained from sharing with Mexico in the occupation of it. For -another, it seemed wise to place ourselves in a strategic position that -would be of great value, should Mexico's threat of war be carried into -effect. And for a third it was believed that a bold military attitude, -indicating that at last the United States had made up its mind, would -count with Mexico as a strong argument for negotiation. Such was the -opinion of Parrott, Slidell, Worth, Taylor, Scott, Archer, now chairman -of the Senate committee on foreign relations, Brantz Mayer, formerly -secretary of legation at Mexico, Polk himself, the administration -circle in general, and well-informed persons outside it. January 17 -Conner was ordered to assemble all his vessels and exhibit them off -Vera Cruz--evidently in pursuance of this design. The government organ -stated, and opposition writers conceded, that such a purpose was in -view.[7.30] - -But essentially, as already has been suggested, Taylor's advance -rested on the necessity of military defence; and indeed there is reason -to consider Scott the prime factor in the business, for the order of -January 13 was based upon, and in part verbally reproduced, a "projet" -submitted by him, whereas Polk's diary for January 12 and 13 does not -even allude to the subject. Now not only were defensive measures called -for on general principles, as we have just been informed by the London -_Times_, but the Texans actually and urgently needed a sheltering arm. -During the latter part of 1845 the chief Mexican engineers drew detailed -plans for crossing, not only the Rio Grande, but the Sabine. Merely -the refusal of Paredes, growing out of his revolutionary designs, to -reinforce the troops on the frontier with 2400 men prevented an attack -at this time. Almonte, who had particularly recommended incursions into -Texas, held the post of war minister in January, 1846. The Mexican -troops were extremely mobile. Ampudia's main force, at the end of a long -march, did 180 miles in four days. Screened by rancheros and living on -a little corn and jerked beef carried in their pouches, a body of light -cavalry could have reached San Antonio by way of Laredo, ruined the -town, and been well on their way toward home before their movement would -have been suspected at Corpus Christi. The government received warnings -of this danger from Dimond and from Parrott in 1845; Marcy and Polk -feared it; and the probable rejection of Slidell--which meant a triumph -of the war party--seemed likely to accentuate the peril. In fact Mejia -ordered irregulars into Texas on February 16 and March 17, though, as -their commander aspired to execute a revolution with American aid, he -did us no harm.[7.31] - -Nor were only such formal incursions to be guarded against. The war -of 1836 in Texas had shown what outrages Mexicans were capable of -committing, and similar affairs had now begun to occur. In one instance -a party of fifteen, including women, after having been induced to -surrender, were all butchered except a single person, who survived -though seriously wounded. In April, 1846, the Mexicans opposite -Matamoros confessed that bloodthirsty guerillas were abroad. Ampudia, -whose murderous record had been his chief distinction, commanded there. -May 13 the British consul in that city reported that licensed bands of -assassins, "caressed, rewarded, and encouraged" by the authorities, -were committing atrocities near the Rio Grande; and, had the way been -open, such gangs might have robbed and murdered in the settlements of -Texas.[7.32] - -The position selected by Taylor was admirably suited to this emergency. -Scott, though a Whig, wrote out a long explanation, showing that on -the Rio Grande the army had a more healthful camp than before, better -drinking water, more abundant fuel, better grazing and a better port. -Information could be obtained more quickly; the border watched more -closely; an invading force pursued more promptly; and its line of -retreat cut more certainly. Besides, the river amounted to a great -breastwork, for this part of it could be crossed with safety at only -certain points, and a body of men, even though comparatively small, -could not cross anywhere on its lower course without peril. It was -not, however, simply that the Rio Grande position seemed far the best. -The nature of the region made it essential. Taylor had to be in that -vicinity or else near Corpus Christi, and for purposes of defence the -latter point could not be deemed satisfactory. Now the necessity of -defence was entirely due to the threatening conduct of Mexico. Therefore -she could not reasonably complain of our precautions; and if she could -not complain, then no one could do so in her name.[7.33] - -But the challenge was triumphantly thrown out: Can it be denied that -our taking a position on the river did in fact cause the war? In view -of the data it can and should be denied. First, joint occupation of the -disputed region might have gone on peaceably, as occupation of that -character has continued elsewhere, but for a distinctly aggressive step -on the part of Mexico; and, secondly, for her the Rio Grande had no -particular significance. She claimed all of Texas, and intended to drive -us from it, if she could. Furthermore, the crass vanity and ambition of -Mexican generals and the exigencies of domestic politics would probably -have led to an attack upon us, had Taylor remained at Corpus Christi, -or even pitched his camp at San Antonio. In spite of express orders, -Mejia actually attempted an offensive in the intermediate region. When -the Mexican government gave formal notice to England and France in the -summer of 1845 that war had become inevitable, our army lay far from the -Rio Grande. Taylor's advance to the Bold River no more produced the war -than Pitcairn's march to Lexington produced the American revolution. It -was an effect and an occasion, but not a cause.[7.34] - -[MEXICO THE AGGRESSOR] - -Finally, as a matter of fact, the hostilities were deliberately -precipitated by the will and act of Mexico. The circumstances proved -this and testimony illuminates them. In October, 1847, a pamphlet -written by Mariano Otero, editor of _El Siglo XIX_ and Senator from the -state of Jalisco, appeared. His object was by no means to defend the -United States, but he said: "The American forces did not advance to -the Rio Grande until after the war became inevitable, and then only as -an army of observation.... The military rebellion of San Luis [Potosi] -gave rise to a government [that of Paredes] pledged to resist all -accommodation [with the United States] ... which government ... began -hostilities." Arista declared in December, 1847, "I had the pleasure of -being the first to begin the war." In short, Polk told only the truth -when he said the conflict was forced upon us. Mexico wanted it; Mexico -threatened it; Mexico issued orders to wage it; and on April 18 her -President, no doubt in view of his political difficulties, insisted upon -those orders. "It is indispensable," he wrote urgently to Arista, "that -hostilities begin, yourself taking the initiative."[7.35] - -"If in a litigious affair," declared Vattel, "our adversary refuses -the means of bringing the right to proof, or artfully eludes it; if he -does not, with good faith, apply to pacific measures for terminating -the difference, and above all, if he is the first who begins acts of -hostility, he renders just [even] the cause which was before doubtful." -Every condition of this judgment fitted the course of Mexico.[7.36] - - - - - VIII - - PALO ALTO, RESACA DE LA PALMA - - May, 1846 - - -[THE MEXICAN ARMY] - -The Mexico of 1845 had an elaborate military organization. In addition -to the comandantes general--regularly one in each department or -state--there were six generals at the head of the six military Divisions -in which the political divisions of the country had been grouped. -The college at Chapultepec provided a full course of instruction for -officers; and though it seemed hardly worth while to spend three -years there in order to become a second lieutenant, when one could -leap at once into a captaincy or something better by acting as the -tool of a revolting general, there were never less than one hundred -students.[8.1] - -At the head of the army stood a sort of general staff called the -plana mayor; but the duties of this inefficient body fell mostly to -the engineers, some of whom possessed excellent qualifications, while -others--admitted to the corps for political or personal reasons--did -not. The artillery, which included nominally four brigades with fourteen -batteries, suffered from this all-pervading evil and also from defects -of its own. Many of the guns had come down from olden times, though -a large number of the field pieces equalled any the United States -possessed; not a few were honeycombed; and the carriages were mostly -of the old Gribeauval pattern. To convey ammunition, carts had to be -obtained when needed. For the transportation of ordnance, mules or oxen -were usually hired by contract; and, as the drivers had no acquaintance -with artillery drill and tactics, battery evolutions were out of the -question, and guns could be moved but slowly, if at all, during an -engagement.[8.1] - -The so-called Permanent infantry consisted substantially of three Light -(_Ligero_) and twelve Line regiments, and there were also twenty-five -Active (_Activo_) corps, large or small, which, though originally -designed as a sort of reserve to be called out in emergencies, were now -constantly under arms. Owing to the great extent of the country the -regiments were broken into sections, which assumed to be independent; -and for this reason drill, discipline and _esprit de corps_ suffered -greatly. Training and equipment left much to be desired. When four -simple manoeuvres were understood, soldiers were pronounced perfect. For -arms almost all the infantry had flint-lock muskets, many of which had -been discarded by the British army. Firing from the hip to avoid the -recoil marred their aim; and, partly in consequence of using too much -powder, they generally fired high. Of horse there were ten Permanent -and five Activo regiments besides numerous minor units. The cavalry -included also nearly fifty Presidial companies, originally designed to -guard the frontier against Indian raids; but these had almost vanished -except in name, and the remnants were extremely inefficient. The mounted -men carried in general a sword and a sort of blunderbuss called the -_escopeta_, but many used lances instead of swords. About 3000 Coast -Guards are also to be mentioned, but as a rule they were expected merely -to defend the ports where they lived and the immediate vicinity. In all -there may have been 32,000 men under arms in 1845.[8.1] - -The medical corps suffered at all times from the low quality of its -personnel and from its defective equipment; and the accommodations -for surgeons in a campaign were so poor that many found pretexts for -remaining behind when their corps took the field. The commissaries -had peculiar difficulties to meet. A Mexican army drew supplies from -places near it and not from government depots; and when money failed, -as it often did, payments had to be made with drafts on the treasury, -which possessed an uncertain value. Hence people often would not part -with supplies, the troops went hungry, and the natural tendency toward -inefficiency and desertion was accentuated. In order to release the -army from service in the interior, when hostilities became imminent in -1845, it was decided to organize volunteer corps; but almost every one, -however anxious to see the United States chastised, preferred to let -somebody else do the work.[8.1] - -Mexico, then, did not exactly rise _en masse_ to sweep Taylor -away,[8.2] yet the forces gathered at Matamoros could be termed -respectable. Arista seems to have had about 175 artillerymen, 3500 -infantry, 1100 cavalry, 425 irregular horse under General Antonio -Canales and some 500 Matamoros volunteers--in all, say, 5700 men -including officers and ineffectives. His first brigade consisted of -infantry led by Garcia, a fine man and officer; the second, also -infantry, had Vega, a brave and patriotic soldier, for commander; and -the third brigade, cavalry, was under Torrejon, who possessed one -excellent quality--the instinct of self-preservation. Canales could be -described succinctly as a border ruffian and conspirator; and Ampudia, -second in general command, was about the same thing plus a cosmopolitan -varnish.[8.3] - -[MEXICAN PREPARATIONS AT MATAMOROS] - -After news of Taylor's intention to advance reached Matamoros, the -Mexicans worked most zealously in constructing fortifications there, -and by the end of April had a series of earthworks. Just above the city -was erected Fort Paredes, laid out in regular style for 800 men, which -guarded the ferry of Las Anacuitas. Two redoubts, crossing their fires, -were planted opposite Fort Brown at a distance of seven or eight hundred -yards; and two or three minor forts commanded approaches. Gabions or -wicker-work strengthened the embrasures, and fascines and sand-bags were -freely used. No guns heavier than 12-pounders defended the works, and -no platforms were laid; but in general the ordnance was of brass, well -cared for though somewhat honeycombed.[8.4] - -For a number of reasons the garrison felt confident. Through deserters -and spies they knew as much as they were capable of understanding about -the American army. To Mejia our general seemed "more contemptible than -the lowest of Mexican tailors," and to Ampudia "an absolute nullity." -The martial Worth, who did impress them, left the front at the beginning -of April because Polk decided against him on the question of brevet -rank. Hitchcock had been compelled to go north on sick leave. For some -good reason every infantry colonel and many others in high positions -were absent. One regiment had not a field officer, and in another only a -single company could boast a captain. Personally the officers in general -were believed to lack harmony and zeal, and the men to be discontented, -hopeless, unwilling to fight, and enfeebled by their hardships and -misbehavior at Corpus Christi. According to Mexican reports our -cavalry could neither shoot nor control their hard-bitted horses, -and our infantry, chiefly composed--except the officers--of needy -foreigners, came short in discipline, training and every other soldierly -qualification save appetite. "Those adventurers cannot withstand the -bayonet charge of our foot," said Mejia, "nor a cavalry charge with the -lance."[8.5] - - [Illustration: MATAMOROS AND FORT BROWN SKETCH MAP - -A Fort Brown B 44-pounders C Traverse D American Infantry E American -Dragoons F American Cannon G Artillery Battalion H Mexican Mortars I -Mexican Batteries J Mexican Infantry K Mexican Cavalry ] - -No very alarming degree of intelligence had appeared to direct the -American operations. Our troops were on a point exposed to a convergent -fire; Fort Brown enfiladed none of the hostile batteries, though it -might have been planned to do this; near the cavalry camp stood thick -groves offering shelter to assailants; behind our main position was a -lagoon forming--with a bend of the river--almost a circle; and the -enemy, once in possession of the single road, which ran for seven or -eight miles through rough country, would have had the army in a bottle. -All the ammunition and provisions were brought by wagon from the coast, -exposed to attack at every step. The imperfectly fortified base at Point -Isabel, stored with indispensable supplies, had a garrison of only two -companies aside from two or three hundred sutlers, clerks, teamsters -and the like; and vessels could approach the landing only by a narrow -passage between two islands, which could have been closed by a few -6-pounders. Yet we should have encouraged Mexico beyond calculation, -and might have been injured greatly in Europe, had we now given up Fort -Brown.[8.6] - -A number of small disasters overtook the Americans. Colonel Cross, -chief of the quartermaster's department, went out and never came -back. April 22 Lieutenant Porter and ten men, operating against the -banditti, allowed their arms to get wet, and were scattered with loss -by a party of Mexicans. Twenty of the Texas rangers commanded by -Captain Walker permitted themselves to be surprised, and half of them -were either killed or driven beyond recall. Taylor attributed these -mishaps to a lack of experience, but the enemy regarded them as proofs -of inferiority; and when Thornton's party succumbed, the enthusiasm -burst all bounds. "Honor and glory a thousand and one times" to the -"brave men" of the army, cried a Tampico leaflet, and a triumph in the -anticipated battle appeared certain.[8.7] - -[MEXICAN CONFIDENCE] - -From another source also the Mexicans drew encouragement. While Taylor's -officers were nearly all West Pointers and perhaps quite all native -Americans, many of the privates were in fact of European birth and a -large percentage Roman Catholics. To these Mejia, Ampudia and Arista -issued moving appeals based upon religious prejudice and alleged -foreign condemnation of our course toward Mexico, gilded with generous -promises of rewards for deserting, supported by the luring voices of -gayly dressed sirens who lined the opposite bank of the river all day, -and reinforced by two captured American dragoons, who were given back, -and reported that deserters received handsome treatment. A considerable -number of men, largely veteran offenders from the British army, stole -across; most of the Seventh Infantry were believed ready to change -sides; and the Mexicans boasted exultingly that "Old Taylor" himself -would soon be over.[8.8] - -Arista, who had spent several years in the United States, did not feel -very sanguine. Ampudia's predictions of glory he regarded as "castles in -the air," or as perhaps intended to raise expectations that Ampudia's -successor would be unable to satisfy. But the officers and the troops -felt impatient for combat. So loudly and so long had the charges of -haughtiness, perfidy, aggressiveness and greed been reiterated against -us, that all believed them true. The Americans were in their eyes -accursed heretics, eager to trample under foot their holy religion: -and they were also barbarians, capable of everything rough and cruel. -In the event of their success the family hearth was to be polluted, -the glorious, dearly-bought independence of the nation crushed, and -the adored accents of the mother-tongue stifled. To the Indian rank -and file the word "patriotism," indeed, meant little; but they loved -their villages, and could imagine even worse tyrants than Mexicans. -The name "foreigner" had a terrible sound in their ears, and fanatical -devotion to the Roman church set their passionate natures aflame. At -the first sight of the "detestable" Stars and Stripes fluttering in -the breeze, they had loudly demanded battle, and later the confident -hope of triumph gave a still keener edge to their enthusiasm. Taylor -evidently despised the enemy, believing there was no fight in them; -but those tawny fellows, though miserably clothed and apparently -spiritless, were trained to "blind obedience," could fight like devils -while their strength and fury lasted, and had now reached a good state -of discipline. Even Captain Hardee of Thornton's command, a prisoner -at large in Matamoros, believed the Mexicans would gain the coming -battle.[8.9] - -One of Taylor's most obvious needs in taking post on the Rio Grande was -a light corps available for scouting, and in ordering him to advance, -Marcy had expressly authorized him to call upon the Texans--by whom legs -were valued chiefly as the means of sticking to a horse--for assistance; -but nothing was done about the matter. On April 11 a friend in Matamoros -warned him that an attempt might be made to cut his line to Point -Isabel, but he did not seem to feel concerned. His troops were merely -drawn beyond the effective range of Ampudia's artillery; the work of -fortifying was quickened; on the 23d he described the fort complacently -as "in a condition of defence"; and a week later he contented himself -with having the road inspected for seven miles. Point Isabel, he said as -early as April 12, could withstand attack.[8.10] - - [Illustration: Fort Brown to Brazos Island] - -Arista, for his part, decided quite naturally, while on his way -to Matamoros, that he would plant himself on the American line of -communication, and prevent our army from receiving ammunition, -provisions and reinforcements. Accordingly the 1600 men under Torrejon, -after disposing of Thornton's command, passed Fort Brown, held the road -for some days without the knowledge of Taylor, and then by a grave -blunder were drawn away, and concentrated on the Rio Grande opposite -Longoreno, eight or ten miles below the city, to protect the crossing -of the other troops, who proceeded to that point by several routes in -order to deceive the Americans. The last day of the month Ampudia with -his brigade and four guns went over; and on May 1 Arista--leaving Mejia -with about 1400 men to hold Matamoros--followed with his other brigade -and eight pieces. Unfortunately for him three scows of little capacity -were the only boats available; and as these had been taken to Longoreno -in carts by a circuitous route nearly fifteen miles in length, so as to -avoid exciting our suspicions, they were not in good order. One or two, -in fact, seem to have been almost useless, and hence many precious hours -were lost; but at any rate the army succeeded in crossing a swift river -without injury almost under the eyes of the Americans.[8.11] - -[TAYLOR ALARMED] - -By about one o'clock in the afternoon on the first of May Taylor heard -that Mexicans were below him, and awoke. He saw now that Fort Brown -required munitions and food, and that Point Isabel could not, even yet, -resist a serious attack. Tents came down in haste; the wagon train was -made ready; and at about half-past three--leaving behind the Seventh -Infantry commanded by Major Brown, with Captain Lowd's four 18-pounders, -Lieutenant Bragg's field battery and the sick, under orders to hold -out as long as possible--Taylor marched for the coast. No time was -lost in getting there. The troops bivouacked that night on the damp, -chilly plain without fires, and early the next morning set out again. -The shallow, greenish-brown lagoons rimmed with broad, flat, oozing -banks of mud, the marshes full of tawny grass, and the low ridges -mottled with patches of herbage and bald surfaces of gleaming dry dirt, -seemed interminable; but as hours passed the now sultry air began to -be streaked with salt odors, and by noon the panting troops caught the -sparkle of blue waves. Fortunately they could not hear the shouts of joy -in Matamoros over what was called their precipitate flight.[8.12] - -As it was necessary to strengthen the defences, all the troops now -exchanged their muskets for picks and shovels. May 6 the engineer in -charge was authorized to continue the work by employing a hundred -laborers; and at about three o'clock the next day, escorting more than -200 loaded wagons, the little army, preceded by a body of dragoons, -moved out on the return march. As the small garrison of Fort Brown had -provisions for at least three weeks, and the Mexicans could not be -expected to attack it seriously with Taylor approaching their rear, -whereas they were practically sure to be met on the road, Taylor's best -officers entreated him to gain freedom of action by leaving the train -behind, which at most would have delayed it only a day or so; but he -would not. No fears disturbed his mind. Reinforced with perhaps 200 -men just landed at the Point, the army now with him numbered 2228, -all told. Recent exercise and drill had left it in a splendid physical -condition. Recollecting how long popular orators had been mocking at the -"regulars," it longed to do something. The attacks upon Cross, Walker, -Porter and Thornton had exasperated its temper; nothing could have -pleased the great majority of the soldiers better than a fight; and the -General felt very much the same way.[8.13] - -When it had made about seven miles the army bivouacked, and early the -next day it resumed the march. Soon after noon, when some ten or twelve -miles more had been covered, a low, dark line could be seen across the -plain in front, some two or three miles away. It was the Mexican army. -As the pond or water-hole of Palo Alto lay near, the tired and thirsty -troops were permitted to halt, rest a little, drink and fill their -canteens; and then Taylor had them posted in order of battle. At the -extreme right the Fifth Infantry led by Lieutenant Colonel McIntosh was -placed, and on its left in succession came Major Ringgold's battery, -the Third Infantry (Captain Morris), two 18-pounders on siege carriages -under Lieutenant Churchill, and the Fourth Infantry (Major Allen). The -Third and Fourth made up a brigade, commanded by Lieutenant Colonel -Garland; and all the troops just mentioned, together with Twiggs's -dragoons, some 250 strong, in two squadrons led by Captains Kerr and -May, formed the right wing. The other wing, known as the first brigade -and commanded by Lieutenant Colonel Belknap, consisted of the Artillery -Battalion under Lieutenant Colonel Childs, Captain Duncan's battery, and -the Eighth Infantry, posted in this order from right to left. The wagons -were then assembled near the pond at the side of some woods, and Kerr -was detached with his squadron to guard them.[8.14] - - [Illustration: BATTLE OF PALO ALTO - May 8, 1846 - - American Forces Black - Mexican Forces Red - Regmental numeral III - Artillery battalion A - Kerr's squadron K - May's squadron M - Ringold's battery R - Duncan's battery D - Churchill's battery C - Tampico Corps T - Zapadores (Sappers) Z - Presidiales P Light Cavalry L - - Infantry-First position - Intermediate position - Final position - Cavalry-First position - Intermediate position - Final position - Artillery-First position - Intermediate position - Final position - Wagon Train-First position - - (The positions of the troops can be indicated only - approximately.) - -[BATTLE OF PALO ALTO] - -During these days Arista had waited for Taylor's return; but, in order -to hasten that and perhaps accomplish direct results, he had ordered -the guns of Matamoros to begin cannonading Fort Brown on the morning of -May 3, and two days later, believing the garrison were near starvation, -sent Ampudia to invest it. For the sake of water and to cover all of -the roads that might be taken by the American army, he placed himself -at Los Tanques del Ramireno; and about noon on the eighth, learning -of Taylor's approach, he set out for Palo Alto, some five miles -away. Shortly before gaining that point he saw through his glass blue -American dragoons in the far distance, and, as quickly as he could, -put his troops in position. At the extreme right were placed about 150 -horse under Noriega, and then came a 4-pounder, a corps of Sappers, the -Second Light Infantry, the Tampico Veteran Company and Coast Guards, -five 4-pounders, the First, the Sixth and the Tenth Infantry, and -finally, beyond an interval of about 400 yards and somewhat in advance, -Torrejon and the rest of the cavalry--their front extended, their right -strengthened with two small guns, and their left reaching beyond the -Point Isabel road to a piece of chaparral on a slight elevation beside a -swamp. In the rear of the line were some thickets; just behind the right -wing an eminence eighteen or twenty feet high rose above chaparral; -protected by this lay a watering-place; and in front there were some -boggy pools and wide fields of stiff grass almost shoulder-high.[8.14] - -As soon as formed, the Americans advanced in silence--the 18-pounders, -drawn by oxen, following the road--while Lieutenant Blake reconnoitred -the Mexican line within musket range to look for artillery. At about -two o'clock Ampudia came in sight with the Fourth Infantry, commanded -by Colonel Uraga, a company of Sappers, two 8-pounders, and about -400 irregular horse under Canales. Upon this Arista and his staff, a -blaze of gold lace, passed rapidly down the line. It seemed strange -to find in his position a tall, raw-boned man with red hair and sandy -whiskers; but he showed the martial bearing of his nation, and harangued -the troops with genuine Mexican eloquence. They were found ready for -battle. Answering him with loud vivas they made ready their arms. The -silken banners fluttered; the bands played; and at about half-past -two or three o'clock, by the General's order, his artillery opened. -The hostile armies were then approximately half a mile apart; and the -Mexicans--drawn out, except the cavalry, only two deep on a front -about a mile in length without reserves--seemed to number 6000, though -probably not more than two thirds as many.[8.14] - -Apparently Taylor's plan had been to force a passage by charging, for -his aim was to reach Fort Brown, and his infantry had been instructed, -the day before, to rely mainly on the bayonet; but he now halted. All -his infantry except the Eighth regiment deployed into line. At strange -words of command--"Haw, Brindle!" "Whoa, Brandy!"--ten yoke of oxen -wheeled each ammunition wagon into its place; and the cannon advanced. -At this juncture Ampudia's column approached the field. Canales led his -men a considerable distance forward into the scattered chaparral on the -Mexican left, probably with a view to cutting off Taylor's retreat, and -thus put himself entirely out of the battlefield; but the rest of the -command proceeded toward their appointed place between Torrejon and the -infantry, and as this movement appeared to mean a charge, the American -fire was turned in that direction. Without faltering, however, they -moved up to the line and deployed, but their route was marked with the -fallen.[8.14] - -Now ensued about an hour of cannonading, supported by our troops with -shouts that often drowned the roar of the guns, and endured by the -Mexicans with unfailing constancy. Arista's pieces, though bravely and -skilfully served, were mostly too light. The balls generally fell short, -and as they ricocheted, our men stepped aside. But the American practice -met every hope. Sometimes a single shot appeared to mow down a whole -platoon of mounted men; and here, there, everywhere gaps opened in the -infantry. With vivas the gaps instantly closed, but they would not stay -closed.[8.14] - -Arista, a bold and experienced officer, expecting Taylor to act on such -a plan as Taylor seems actually to have formed, intended to charge both -flanks of the advancing Americans with cavalry supported by infantry; -but the American artillery surprised him almost as much as if Taylor -had used shooting stars. Probably the right course for him would have -been to attack anyhow, for his men were still eager to fight, a cannon -could be discharged only about once a minute, and our batteries would -not have done much more harm at 70 than at 700 yards. But apparently it -seemed impracticable to wallow slowly for such a distance through the -grass, the sharp edges of which would have cut the legs of his poorly -dressed soldiers badly, under so withering a fire. Something had to be -done, however, for the troops grew impatient. He therefore directed his -right wing to prepare for a charge, and ordered Torrejon and his two -small guns to attack the American right, rear and wagons. Reluctantly -Torrejon obeyed. Passing to the left, his "red lancers"--probably a -thousand strong and "portentous" with trumpets, banners and lance -points--advanced through the scattered chaparral and across a slough, -becoming somewhat broken on the way, and found themselves at another -small morass. Evidently the nature of the ground on which he was likely -to operate had not interested Torrejon.[8.14] - -Taylor, sitting unconcernedly with one leg over the pommel of his -saddle, writing, was notified of this movement and simply replied, "Keep -a bright lookout for them." But some one--probably Twiggs, who commanded -the right wing--had the Fifth Infantry march rapidly more than a quarter -of a mile to the right and rear, and throw itself into a square. -Torrejon awkwardly approached this body in column instead of line with -some of the worthless Presidials in the lead, fired ineffectively, was -answered with a disconcerting though not very injurious volley, and -recoiled some 300 yards. He then sent word to Arista that a morass -rendered his movement impracticable; but on receiving instructions to -persevere, he made a circuit, advanced upon the second front of the -square, and once more exchanged a volley. Now, however, he found our -Third Infantry moving to defend the wagons, and saw two of Ringgold's -cannon hurrying to the scene at a gallop, while his own pieces had -not come up. As rapidly as possible, therefore, and quite willingly, -he retreated, but not without a salute from our two cannon, which he -was unable to return. This unsuccessful manoeuvre exhausted Arista's -ingenuity, and he only waited now for darkness, hoping to get away and -find a better position.[8.14] - -During these operations a wad from Duncan's battery had fired the grass. -The wind from the Gulf, nearly parallel to the American front, drove a -wall of roaring, crackling flame and a cloud of thick smoke across the -plain; and, as the armies could see each other only now and then and -in spots, firing had to be suspended for nearly an hour. Meanwhile, -believing the Mexican left had given way, Taylor shifted his position -behind the screen with a view to advancing. Churchill pushed on by the -road nearly to where Torrejon had been; the Fourth Infantry moved up to -support him; the Fifth went ahead on the extreme right; the rest of the -army made corresponding changes; and as a whole the line diverged now -thirty or forty degrees from its original direction, while the wagons -came nearly up to it.[8.14] - -But the Mexican left had not yielded, and so Taylor found when he sent -a squadron of dragoons to open the way. To avoid being enfiladed, -Arista swung his line forward in excellent order, using the Fourth -Infantry as a pivot, and again it stood firm under an artillery fire -more destructive than at first. Indeed our Fourth Infantry began to -suffer a galling cannonade, and Torrejon again assumed the offensive. -Canister from the 18-pounders checked him, however, and after sharp -musketry exchanges between the Mexican line and our Artillery Battalion, -which had advanced and formed a square, serious infantry operations -in this quarter came to an end. As for the artillery, Arista had now -used up his 650 cannon balls; but the Americans kept at work until -nightfall.[8.14] - -On our left, however, important events occurred. From the first Captain -Duncan's battery, which made two fire-units because handled in sections, -played a brilliant and effective role, supported by the Eighth Infantry -and either Kerr's or May's dragoons, and advancing or retiring as the -course of the battle dictated. When Arista's change of front threw his -right forward nearly 700 yards and seemed to threaten a flank attack, -these pieces became more active and more daring than ever, and under -their blasting discharges, aided more or less at this time by the -18-pounders, the Mexicans fell rapidly. Again they grew impatient--not -principally because they were suffering so terribly, but because they -were inactive, and because hints that Arista had sold them began to -arrive from Ampudia's quarter; and finally the extreme right wing -broke.[8.14] - -After a time some of the officers and Arista, who exposed himself -bravely throughout the battle, induced these troops to go back, and as -they were still in much confusion, the remnants of Noriega's corps, -reinforced with 200 men from Torrejon, were ordered to support them. -The cavalry, however, badly demoralized themselves, dashed blindly at -a trot against the infantry; the resulting disorder extended even to -the Tampico men; and these desperate corps, ordered to charge as the -only possible way to prevent them from bolting, moved forward aimlessly -in succession. Duncan, when he saw this large force advance, withdrew -a little, still firing; but soon under cover of the smoke he came up -again, and gained an enfilading position. Suddenly with a sharp crack -his guns opened, and against the fading horizon his shells and shrapnel -could be seen bursting, with almost the regularity of signal rockets, -over those dark masses. Driven like sheep by this fire, the Mexican -right wing turned toward the left and hurried across the entire field, -presenting their flank and to some extent their rear to the Americans at -a distance of 200 paces or even less, while, in a somewhat more orderly -manner, the First Infantry, which stood next in line, followed them. -Now was the time to decide the battle; but, though Taylor had come to -this part of the field, nothing could be done, for it was feared that -should a charge be made, the enemy's cavalry might reach the wagons, and -cripple our army by destroying the provisions. Indeed, the Americans -appear to have drawn back a little toward the train; and the disordered -Mexicans, having reached the extreme left and finally the rear of their -line, were re-formed.[8.14] - -It was now about seven o'clock. The Americans had lost five killed and -forty-three wounded, and the Mexicans probably seven times as many. The -afterglow of sunset lighted up the dun clouds of smoke. Darkness was -close at hand. Necessarily, therefore, the struggle ended; and while -the Mexicans retired through the chaparral to the low eminence behind -the original position of their right wing, and there camped in order -of battle, the Americans bivouacked where they stood, or in the fitful -glare of the still burning grass gave attention to such of both armies -as could be discovered lying on the field. At last the prairie fire -burned out; the smoke of battle drifted away; the full moon appeared; -and the tired troops, watched over by pacing guards, slept between the -stacks of arms like images.[8.14] - -Important moral results had been gained by the Americans, but they -were not aware of the fact, and expected the battle to be resumed. At -about seven o'clock the next morning, however, as the light mist slowly -dissolved, their astonished eyes beheld the Mexican line gliding off -into the road; and presently, like the tail of a huge serpent, its rear -wound away into the chaparral, and vanished. Taylor gazed and reflected, -moved a short distance, waited to ascertain through a party of dragoons -that it was a genuine retreat, consulted with some of his principal -officers, and then decided on pursuit; but the forenoon had to be -spent in erecting breastworks and planting four heavy cannon to defend -the train, which he now saw should be left behind; and he merely sent -forward a composite force of 220 men, under Captain McCall of the Fourth -Infantry, to harass the Mexican rear.[8.15] - - [Illustration: BATTLE OF RESACA DE LA PALMA] - -[ARISTA IN A NEW POSITION] - -Arista turned this delay to good account. The chaparral and woods that -his troops had been seen to enter extended with some interruptions to -the Rio Grande, a distance of approximately seven miles; and two hours -before noon, after marching about halfway through it, he stopped at the -Resaca de Guerrero. The Resaca was an ancient channel of the river, -but it now consisted merely of a shallow, muddy ravine somewhat in -the shape of a bow, several hundred feet wide and three or four feet -deep at the banks, lying substantially east and west across the route, -with its concave side toward Palo Alto. At the bottom of it, both to -the right and to the left of the road, lay narrow ponds, and the space -between the water and the banks was rather closely filled with bushes -and small trees. Facing round here, Arista planted three or four guns -at the right, or east, of the road from Palo Alto where it approached -the Resaca, two at least--hidden with branches of trees--on the southern -bank of the Resaca, and other pieces at suitable points toward his left. -The infantry were placed in two wings divided by the road, with much the -greater weight on the right hand, some of the troops taking position -just in the rear of the ravine, some behind its northern bank, and -some in the chaparral still farther forward. The headquarters tent was -pitched in a small clear space or _placeta_ about 500 paces back on the -left of the road, and Torrejon's cavalry halted in the same road still -farther away; while Canales with two guns, placing himself on the left a -considerable distance back from the Resaca, guarded a cross-road leading -to Arista's rear.[8.16] - -The Mexican position, besides covering every line to Fort Brown, offered -a number of other advantages. It did not call for much use of artillery, -and therefore neutralized Arista's deficiency in cannon ammunition. The -woods made it impossible for the Americans to employ that dreaded arm -effectively. The bank of the Resaca formed a natural breastwork, and -it seemed likely that the troops, protected in this manner, would be -confident and firm. But evidently a bold and enterprising enemy could -take advantage of the woods to conceal his movements; and evidently, -too, Arista's main batteries could fire only in the direction of the -road, since there were Mexicans in advance of the Resaca both to right -and to left. Another handicap lay in the impossibility of surveying the -field and manoeuvring troops--particularly the cavalry; the soldiers, -unable to see far, lacked that sense of union and support which Mexicans -peculiarly needed; and the want of reserves, though to a certain extent -a part of the Fourth Infantry stationed on the right behind the Resaca -could act as such, was an additional source of weakness.[8.16] - -A still more serious feature of Arista's situation was the condition -of his troops. Many, and probably most of them, had not eaten for more -than twenty-four hours. The sufferings they had witnessed and the -neglect of their fallen comrades had worked upon their feelings. The -dreadful effectiveness of the American artillery had been profoundly -discouraging; many of their officers had proved unworthy of confidence; -and above all, accustomed to the duplicity of Mexican leaders and -unable to understand their general's inactivity the day before, many -concluded that Arista, who was accused of seeking American support for -his alleged revolutionary scheme, had betrayed them. This idea, if we -may trust common sense and Mexican intimations, was suggested or at -least encouraged by Ampudia himself; and the cooperation of all these -depressing influences had spread a general conviction through the army -by the forenoon of May 9 that a great disaster would befall it that -day. A few, it was said, broke their weapons in despair; and utter -dejection could be read in the faces of every corps. Some reinforcements -were drawn from the city, but they did not materially improve the -situation.[8.16] - -[BATTLE OF RESACA DE LA PALMA] - -Taylor, then, advancing at about two o'clock, after detaching most -of the Artillery Battalion and perhaps Kerr's dragoons to guard the -train, moved forward to the edge of the woods, and halted at what was -called the Resaca de la Palma to await information. The advance corps -under McCall, which consisted principally of the light companies of -the first brigade under Captain C. F. Smith, was now feeling its way -toward the enemy. At a little after two o'clock, turning a bend in the -road, it found cannon in front. Instantly they fired. About half a -dozen Americans fell, and the rest quickly withdrew. At three o'clock -McCall's report arrived at headquarters. Taylor pushed on immediately, -and in about an hour came up with the advance party. Ringgold's battery, -now commanded by Lieutenant Ridgely, was sent forward on the road, and -McCall's command, thrown into the chaparral on both sides, began a slow -and painful advance through the bushes. Almost immediately it found -itself in contact with the enemy.[8.16] - -Under such circumstances McCall could give the battery no support, of -course, and the only reasonable expectation was that Ridgely's men and -horses would be shot from the woods, and his guns be taken. That, -however, made no difference to him. His orders were to advance, and -advance he would. Once a body of lancers charged his guns, but by a -combination of courage, skill and good luck he routed it. Some of the -Mexican artillery seems to have moved up the road a little way after -McCall retired; but Ridgely, pushing on even into the very smoke of the -enemy's cannon, drove them in spite of stubborn resistance beyond the -edge of the Resaca, and then sent back for troops to help him capture -them. When the battle became more general he continued to fire upon -the Mexican batteries; and, as far as he could without endangering -Americans, he also swept the woods with canister, frightening the -enemy with a terrible noise in the tree-tops that reminded them of the -slaughter at Palo Alto.[8.16] - -To right and to left the battle soon raged. All the Americans on the -ground, numbering about 1700, were put in. No general guidance could -be exercised. "Chance was the lord of all save the good right arms" of -the troops, wrote an officer. In such woods and thickets lines could -not be formed. Even companies found it impossible to remain intact. A -field officer was no more than a captain, and a captain no more than a -subaltern. All got into the work promptly, and all did their best when -there. As fast as they could, singly or in little squads, they pushed -on, cheering and shouting. Often it required one's utmost exertions to -squeeze through or hack through the dense and thorny chaparral under -pelting showers of bullets. Now there was shooting, and now the cold -steel struck fire. "My orders was to make free use of the bayonet," -said the General afterwards, and the orders were borne in mind. Here -Lieutenant Meade, the future victor of Gettysburg, had a chance to win -his spurs; and he was but one of many heroes, though perhaps the most -conspicuous in his quarter.[8.16] - -Nor did the Americans have it all their own way. Those Mexicans who -fought at all this day, fought like tigers. On the right near the -road the Second Light Infantry, which had been placed there in ambush -just before the real battle opened, stood firm; but most of its field -officers were struck down, and it had to give way. A company of Uraga's -regiment did nobly close by, and every man of it, we are told, was -either killed or wounded.[8.16] - -Farther toward Arista's left, however, our men pushed forward rather -easily, though it seemed evident from the firing that Mexicans were in -front. Gaining ground in this direction some Americans probably came -upon a path which led round the western end of the pond, and gave access -to the Mexican flank. Just before the battle began Ampudia learned of -the path, and stationed a company of the Sappers and a company of the -Fourth Infantry in this quarter; and later he sent another detachment -from the Fourth with a gun. Besides these meagre forces probably no -corps guarded the left except a few Tampico troops. These also fought -well; but the splendid silk banner of the Veterans, the bravest corps -in the army, was captured, and only at heavy cost could they fight -their way back. Meantime the rest of Uraga's regiment came over from -beyond the road, but it could not stop the Americans; and brave Captain -Barbour, followed by a small party, soon approached the placeta. The -effect was electrical. Nobody knew how many troops were following him. -Canales took flight. The sense of defeat, already imparted by hurrying -soldiers of the Second Light, spread across the road from the broken -left, and at about half-past five o'clock Arista's right wing, the -strength of the army, crumbled like a sand fort struck by a wave. Except -perhaps one, all the corps dissolved; and in a moment, as it seemed, -nothing was left but a mob of fugitives.[8.16] - -During all this, Taylor, exposing himself as much as any one, had been -fighting at the centre. The proper course to adopt there was to charge -the Mexican guns on the road with infantry, but for some reason he sent -May's dragoons against them. In a way the effort succeeded. Slashing as -they galloped, the horsemen quickly ran over the batteries--more than -a quarter of a mile beyond them, in fact; and then, coming back in a -scattered condition, had a chance to slash again, for the batteries had -been reoccupied. But the thickets on both sides were full of Mexican -infantry. Against their muskets the dragoons were mere targets--broad -ones, too; and before long the squadron, much the worse for its charge, -recrossed the Resaca. Taylor was disgusted. Turning to Belknap and the -Eighth Infantry he exclaimed, "Take those guns, and by ---- keep them!" -A part of the Fifth joined Belknap; and these men, rushing in furiously -all together, yelling like fiends, after a brief though sharp struggle -with the artillerymen--for the supporting infantry had now abandoned -their position--captured the pieces. But the battle had already been -won.[8.16] - -Before McCall had shown himself Arista, dazed perhaps by his reverse -at Palo Alto, valuing too highly his new position, and probably -overestimating the injury inflicted on Taylor the day before, had made -up his mind that no immediate attack was to be expected, and after -placing the army had withdrawn to his tent, and busied himself in -writing. Even when firing began, he said it was only a skirmish; and -after our troops reached his left flank, he merely ordered Ampudia and -the rest of the Fourth Infantry to go and settle things in that quarter. -When Americans appeared at the _placeta_, however, he awoke. Pouring -curses on the cowards of his army, he hurried to the cavalry, and -taking the place of Torrejon, who had refused to charge, dashed up the -road. His men lanced a few lingering American dragoons and helped a few -comrades to escape, but the battle could not be saved. On one side of -the road at least, Americans already held the chaparral, and like May he -could not stand against protected infantry.[8.16] - -At the head of the cavalry he retreated, therefore, and turning to -the left crossed the Rio Grande by one of the lower passages. Other -fugitives got over at various points; and a great number, passing Fort -Brown, which was about three miles from the battlefield, crowded to the -Anacuitas ferry. Here they found a couple of scows; and some troops, -that had been engaged all this time in annoying Fort Brown, stood on -guard. But the fleeing soldiers were panic-stricken, the boats moved -slowly, and the Americans were looked for at every moment. Men fought -for places. Clothing and arms were thrown away. Many tried to swim or -fell accidentally into the water, and an unknown number perished in the -swift current.[8.16] - - "Rio Bravo! Rio Bravo! - Saw men ever such a sight - Since the field of Roncesvalles - Sealed the fate of many a knight?" - -But the Americans did not come. Taylor had scarcely any fresh troops -except those guarding the wagons nearly or quite five miles in the -rear. May's dragoons had been used up. Apparently no effort had been -made to communicate with Fort Brown, and have its defenders--now tired -but not exhausted--sally forth to help reap the fruits of the expected -victory. Taylor only claimed to have captured "a number" of this utterly -broken army facing a difficult river. Even badly wounded men got safely -across, it would seem; and very soon, in spite of everything, nearly -four fifths--that is to say, about 4000 besides those under Canales--of -the troops commanded by Arista on the first of the month appear to -have been in safety on the south shore. He lost on May 9, according to -his official report, 160 killed, 228 wounded and 159 missing, but the -accuracy of the figures may be doubted. Fourteen officers, eight guns -and a large amount of property were captured by the Americans, while -their casualties were only 33 killed and 89 wounded.[8.16] - -During the whole week so dramatically concluded, Fort Brown had been -under attack.[8.17] On May 3 it replied vigorously, though with -trifling results, to the guns of Matamoros; but as Taylor, with more -than a month of good weather and about 300 wagons at his disposal, had -neglected to bring up a stock of ammunition, it fired only occasionally -after that in order to notify both friend and foe that its courage -still held good. On the 4th Canales occupied the road, and on the next -day Ampudia arrived with four guns and nearly a thousand men. Arista, -however, believing his cannon were not heavy enough to breach the wall -and confident that hunger would soon reduce the garrison, forbade -assault. The besiegers made themselves extremely disagreeable; but by -this time the Americans had bomb-proofs and "gopher holes," and, aside -from the death of Major Brown, met with no serious losses. Taylor's -profound silence, after as well as before the battle of Palo Alto, -caused intense anxiety; but when the cannon began to "bark" again on -the 9th, and especially when a throng of panic-stricken fugitives could -be seen rushing past, haggard faces put on smiles. Finally a solitary -messenger approached at a gallop with his reins on the horse's neck, -waving cap and sword, and shouting "Victory!" and the long strain ended -in exultation.[8.18] - -[SITUATION OF THE MEXICANS] - -The Mexican army was now hanging like a plum, overripe, shaken by -the wind and ready to fall. To the British consul it seemed utterly -demoralized, and beyond the possibility of reorganization. Yet there -it was permitted to rest and recuperate undisturbed. The official -explanation said that although a pontoon train had been proposed a long -time before, the dim prospect of hostilities had not seemed to warrant -that expense; but like numerous other official statements put out in the -course of the war, this explanation hid more than it told.[8.19] - -A bridge might have been in readiness; but, though several officers -had been laboring for more than a month to focus Taylor's mind upon -the subject, "the old gentleman," wrote Meade, "would never listen or -give it a moment's attention," Flat-boats and scows, towed by the light -steamers belonging to the army, might have been sent from Point Isabel -into the river, and the troops, reinforcements and light batteries, -crossing at the much-used ferry of Burrita, less than twenty miles from -Matamoras, and by land appearing at the town, say, in early morning, -could probably have taken army, cannon and ammunition substantially -complete. Instead of doing anything of this description, Taylor now sent -down to Point Isabel for mortars and for plank to make into boats, and -went there himself. A slight illness delayed him further; and in eight -days nothing was accomplished in the direction suggested beyond placing -at Burrita a battalion of the First Infantry and some 200 volunteers -just landed at Point Isabel.[8.19] - -Still, though let alone, Arista occupied no enviable position. He -was commonly charged with incompetence, treason or both. Many of the -officers had forsaken their troops in the hour of danger, and were now -viewed with distrust and contempt. The men felt exhausted and profoundly -disheartened. Even the dogs kept still. Provisions, ammunition and funds -were scant. Fierce complaints and recriminations became rife. Panic -brooded over all. Taylor's inaction seemed an encouraging sign, however, -and on the 17th a request for a suspension of hostilities, accompanied -with hints of a peaceful settlement, was made by Arista. This petition -Taylor rejected. But, not aware that a general's first duty in war is to -eliminate the fighting strength of the enemy, he said that Arista might -retire with his army, the sick and the wounded, if he would give up all -public property. In fact, as if anxious to fight these men again after -letting them get nicely rested, he threatened to bring Matamoros down -about their ears, unless they would move to a safer place.[8.20] - -Arista had been ordered to hold the city as long as possible, but a -council of officers pronounced it indefensible; and, besides feeling no -violent wish to sacrifice himself, he doubtless realized that nobody was -ready to stand by him. He therefore ordered now an immediate retreat, -and a wild scramble ensued. The transportation facilities were entirely -inadequate. Some of the guns and ammunition had to be thrown into the -river. The troops of Canales were dismissed. A large number of men -deserted; and the rest, leaving four or five hundred sick and wounded in -the town, hurried away. Fatigues and miseries almost unspeakable were -their lot, and also for some time a terrible fear of pursuit. Heat, -cold, thirst, famine, tempest, sickness, desertion, a route lined with -dead animals, sleep in the mud as profound as the sleep of the grave, -troopers carrying their horse furniture, deaths from exhaustion or -broken hearts, and even suicides--these made up the record. Finally, -almost at the end of the month 2638 men, according to an officer, -crawled painfully into Linares, and a week later Arista received orders -to place Mejia in command.[8.21] - -Taylor, all this while, had been proceeding in his deliberate way. -Boats were made and put on the river two or three miles above the town, -and early on the eighteenth troops began to cross; but when the first -of them were over, a report that Arista had retreated was confirmed, -and the greater part of the army, retracing their steps, used the -regular Anacuitas ferry. As they approached Fort Paredes the city -officials--dressed all in white, bearing white flags and riding white -horses--came forth to surrender Matamoros. No terms of capitulation were -granted, but the General said he would protect persons and property, and -allow the civil laws to continue in force; and already he had promised -to respect the religion of the people. To their surprise the Americans -appeared to find themselves among friends, for the lately implacable -but seldom tactless Mexicans came up smiling, cried "_Amigo, amigo!_" -and with sunny enthusiasm offered their hands; and although a feeble -pursuit of Arista produced only insignificant results, the victors felt -well content. Their superiority as fighting men had been demonstrated. -Their artillery had evidently surpassed the Mexican artillery in both -mechanical and personal qualities. The officers had exhibited the finest -courage, _esprit de corps_ and skill. An army supposed to outnumber ours -three to one had been scattered, and a prestige of the utmost value at -home, in Mexico and in Europe, had been gained.[8.22] - -[EFFECTS OF THE BATTLES] - -Regarding Taylor, thoughtful officers did not feel enthusiastic, -however. The General had shown himself slow, unskilful, wanting in -penetration and foresight, and poorly grounded professionally. Nine -tenths of the regular officers felt that no talents had been displayed -by him, even in the battles. He had shown, said Meade, "perfect -inability to make any use of the information" given him. In the opinion -of another excellent officer he seemed "_utterly, absurdly_ incompetent -to wield a large army." He had failed to realize the difficulties of his -position; had undervalued the enemy; and, as Bliss admitted, had had -"no conception" of the Mexican preparations. This last fact dimmed his -credit, even for courage, in the minds of discerning critics. But, after -all, his resolution had been superb and inspiring. He had succeeded; -and among us Americans "Nothing succeeds like success." The reports -written for him read admirably. Terse remarks of his, often tinged with -soldierly humor, delighted the general taste at home, and mere questions -of tactics or strategy signified in comparison rather less than zero. -Besides, he was so democratic--no military stiffness, no West Point -"aristocracy" about him. A tidal wave of popularity rose in his favor, -and soon Thurlow Weed of New York, the Warwick of the Whig party, came -out for him as Presidential candidate. A commission as brevet major -general and other official honors did not fail to arrive.[8.23] - -At Mexico the news of these events produced utter amazement and -consternation. The public, reported the British minister, had been -assured "in the most inflated Tone that Victory would follow the -steps of the Mexican Army and that annihilation and dishonour would -be the portion of their enemies." Even General Vega, a man of sense, -had predicted a victory that would end the war. Now, alas, the cards -had fallen badly. "Profound and bitter sorrow," as it privately -admitted, was the feeling of the government. Down like a plummet went -expectations, confidence and courage; down went the plausible hope of -Paredes that all the nation, glowing with pride and enthusiasm over a -victory, would rally about him; and down also, reported Bankhead, went -his monarchical scheme, which four out of five on the Congressional -committee appointed to draft a new constitution had favored.[8.24] - - - - - IX - - THE UNITED STATES MEETS THE CRISIS - - May-July, 1846 - - -Polk believed in pursuing "a bold and firm course" toward Mexico. In -this policy--as her character and methods, the comparative success of -England in dealing with her, and the many humiliating failures of the -United States indicated--he was right.[9.1] More and more positive, -during his examination of the case before and after the end of April, -1846, became his intention to place the subject before Congress in a -strong Message; and when he found that Slidell, who called at the White -House on Friday, May 8, held the same opinion, he decided to send that -Message "very soon." The next day he and the Cabinet discussed the -question at length once more. George Bancroft, secretary of the navy, -was not ready to advise the employment of force, unless Mexico should -commit a hostile act; but when, at about six o'clock, Taylor's report -of the Thornton affair presented itself, this difficulty vanished. In -the evening, at the President's request, the Cabinet reassembled, and -after another full discussion all agreed that a war Message should -be delivered to Congress on Monday. Sunday Polk worked on the paper -both before and after going to church, and conferred with leading -Congressmen. The military committee of the House, meeting in haste, -agreed unanimously to recommend 50,000 men and ten million dollars for -the prosecution of hostilities; and the Senators and Representatives -gathering in excited and quickly changing groups, anxiously discussed -and planned.[9.4] - -About noon on Monday the expected Message arrived at the capitol, and -was read to thronged and agitated Houses. Our forbearance has been -misconstrued, said the President. "After reiterated menaces, Mexico has -passed the boundary of the United States, has invaded our territory and -shed American blood upon the American soil.[9.2] She has proclaimed -that hostilities have commenced, and that the two nations are now at war -... war exists, and, notwithstanding all our efforts to avoid it, exists -by the act of Mexico herself." "The most energetic and prompt measures -and the immediate appearance in arms of a large and overpowering -force are recommended to Congress as the most certain and efficient -means of bringing the existing collision with Mexico to a speedy and -successful termination." Volunteers to serve not less than six or twelve -months, with liberal financial provision for the war, were therefore -suggested; but at the same time a desire for an "amicable" as well -as early settlement of the pending difficulties was expressed, and a -pledge was given to negotiate whenever Mexico would either make or hear -proposals.[9.4] - -Objections greeted the Message at once. Calhoun in particular strongly -opposed the President's fundamental idea. Hostilities have occurred, -he said; but as Congress has not acted, there is no war "according -to the sense of our Constitution." Archer, a leading Whig Senator, -concurred in this view, adding that perhaps the Mexican proceedings -had been justifiable, and that first of all a careful investigation of -the facts was requisite. Clayton, another Whig, went farther, and said -that by having Taylor advance to the Rio Grande Polk had made himself -the aggressor. There is no evidence, it was urged, that Mexico has -declared war or sanctioned hostilities. Recognition of a state of war -would extinguish all treaties with that country, jeopardize the persons -and property of our citizens on sea and land, wipe out our claims upon -Mexico, expose the nation to untold evils, and perhaps give offence in -Europe, objected others; hence let us merely authorize the President -to repel invasion. On Benton's motion the Senate divided the subject -of the Message, referring the matter of invasion to the committee on -military affairs and the broad question of waging war to that on foreign -relations.[9.3] Excellent possibilities of delay seemed to lurk in this -decision. Calhoun favored it.[9.4] - -[THE ACTION OF CONGRESS] - -But the House was prompt and positive. Conveniently reposing on the -table there was a bill, presumably growing out of the Oregon issue, -which proposed that Polk should be authorized to accept volunteers -and repel invasion; and this was now modified to fit the President's -recommendations. It was also given a preamble, which stated that "by -the act of the Republic of Mexico, a state of war exists between that -Government and the United States." This phraseology displeased most of -the Whigs; but they were powerless to change it. In the committee of -the whole about an hour and a half were allowed for a partial reading -of the Message and the accompanying documents, and thirty minutes for -debate. Amidst a great uproar the bill was then reported, ordered -without discussion to its third reading, and under the spur of the -"previous question" passed. One hundred and seventy-four supported it -and fourteen--five from Massachusetts, five from Ohio, and one each from -Maine, Rhode Island, New York and Pennsylvania--voted in the negative. -The next morning this bill was reported in the Senate.[9.4] - -Calhoun pleaded now for at least a pause of twenty-four hours, and -this appeared not unreasonable, since the documents that supported the -Message had not yet come from the printer; but the party caucus had -resolved upon a course of action, and Benton and Allen, chairmen of the -committees on military affairs and foreign relations, announcing that -consideration had already been given to both aspects of the war measure, -favored immediate action. Cass made an effective speech in the same -sense; and, although a test showed that eighteen Senators objected to -the preamble, the bill, somewhat amended, was passed finally by a strong -majority--forty against only two. Calhoun, Berrien of Georgia and Evans -of Maine did not vote. Crittenden and Upham answered to their names, -"Aye, except the preamble." Webster and a few others were absent. In the -evening the House accepted the amendments, and the next day at about -one o'clock Polk received and signed the bill. Later some of the Whig -Congressmen pretended that all they had voted for was to save Taylor's -army; but the 50,000 soldiers and ten millions of money were not asked -for a mere rescue party, and it was pointed out in the discussion that -the General's fate would be decided long before the bill would give him -troops. By an overwhelming majority in both houses, then, voting in -full accord with the President and his Cabinet, war on a large scale -was provided for. "The gates of Janus are open," wrote Alexander H. -Stephens.[9.4] - -[THE MOTIVES OF CONGRESS] - -At every stage of these proceedings flowed a tide of real national -feeling, but there were also devious currents that need to be mentioned. -Probably few, if any, of the chief actors expected very serious trouble -with Mexico. Polk for his part assured Benton that if Congress would -recognize the war and provide large forces, he believed the affair -could speedily be terminated; and he promised to use no more funds and -men than should prove "absolutely necessary to bring the present state -of hostilities to an end." Many Congressmen, who talked with members -of the Cabinet, were told that without firing another gun the United -States would have a satisfactory treaty within four months.[9.5] The -Washington correspondent of the New York _Tribune_, an anti-slavery Whig -journal, reported that on learning of the action taken by the House -Polk said, "I shall now give you peace--I have the power." "The war was -declared as the means of peace"--as a part of the President's policy of -intimidating Mexico into making a settlement, wrote the correspondent of -the New York _Journal of Commerce_. So thought the New York _Herald_. -Merely passing the war bill will be enough, it said; and, especially -since Polk's Message exhibited the same combination of sword and olive -branch as his employing Slidell and Taylor jointly, so to speak, one -cannot well reject this view, which is supported also by evidence -previously offered.[9.10] - -The Democrats, being the administration party, naturally stood by the -President,[9.6] and a wish to make the attitude of the United States -impressive and effective was an additional reason for their urgency and -haste. But probably these were not the only inducements. The party was -falling into dissensions. The Van Buren group felt indignant that New -York should occupy a secondary place in the Cabinet, and be represented -there by the Old Hunker, Marcy, while the rest of the Democrats -complained that Van Buren's faction, the Barnburners, were dictating -everything. A short, inexpensive and successful war--especially one -without gunpowder--seemed likely to please the country, provide offices, -consolidate the party, and compel the Whigs to lose prestige by -endorsing the policy of their opponents, or else to sacrifice popularity -by antagonizing it. Moreover it looked as if a discussion of Polk's -course in sending Taylor to the Rio Grande, however correct that course -had been, might prove at such a juncture dampening and vexatious; and -for all of these reasons it seemed expedient that a war bill, with -exactly the preamble already quoted, should be rushed through Congress -at the quickest pace.[9.10] - -The Whigs were no less perspicacious, and they especially hated to lose -the partisan advantage of charging that Polk had been the aggressor. -Mexico has not declared war, they insisted; and with more or less -honesty they complained that a regard for sacred truth forbade them to -endorse the preamble. But their position was exceedingly delicate. Not -only had Mexico long threatened hostilities, prepared openly for them, -and severed her diplomatic relations with us at both capitals, but -she had in effect made a declaration of war. Her only official voice -at this time was that of Paredes; and his agent, Arista, an officer -of the highest rank, had given Taylor formal notice of hostilities. -Arista had been sent but recently to command against the Americans, -and nobody could reasonably suppose that he had proceeded at once to -transgress or ignore deliberately the wishes of his master in so grave -an affair.[9.10] - -Taylor on the other hand had shown the most pacific disposition both in -word and in deed. Nothing serious could be alleged against us except -the peaceable joint-occupation of territory long claimed by the United -States; and in short, unless Jefferson, Madison, Monroe, Pinckney and -John Quincy Adams were to be disavowed, it seemed legitimate for Polk -and for Congress to hold now that Arista's attack upon Thornton had been -the first hostile act.[9.7] The preamble, therefore, could not well be -rejected; and nearly all of the Whigs, having before their eyes the doom -of those who opposed the war of 1812, choked down some honest though -mistaken compunctions and in most cases a probably more troublesome lump -of partisan regret, and voted for the bill.[9.10] - -As already has been suggested, however, there was in Congress a third -party--John C. Calhoun, and for later as well as for present reasons -it is desirable to understand his opinions. To him it seemed highly -advisable to forestall European interference, and quite possible to -avoid a conflict with Mexico, by adjusting the Oregon question before -coming decisively to an issue in the Mexican difficulty, and therefore -he thought the United States ought by all means to limit itself now -to repelling invasion. Personal reasons also led him to deplore the -prospect of a conflict in arms. The culmination of his fiery life, the -fulfilment of his brilliant dream, had seemed in April to be drawing -near. By his convenient method of bending facts and principles to his -purpose, as the sparrow makes a nest for herself, he had found it -possible to cooperate with the West in spending great sums on internal -improvements, and expected in this way to make the Northeast a helpless -minority; but he could easily see that war might empty the treasury and -bring about new political alignments. For the same reason it looked as -if his project of a low tariff also would vanish; and, as we have seen, -contemplating the possibility of secession, he did not wish[9.8] the -youth of the southern states to expend their blood in Mexico.[9.10] - -Before the news of Thornton's encounter arrived he argued with Polk -against sending to Congress the proposed Message on our relations with -Mexico. During the excitement on that eventful Sunday he not only -planned with his partisans in Senate and House to oppose war, but worked -for the same purpose with leading Whigs, urging--for example--that -Mexico should be given more time to consider the risk of a conflict, as -if she had not already been speculating upon it for several years. Then -in the Senate he gravely proclaimed the truism that border hostilities -do not necessarily constitute war, and turned it into a sophism by -applying it in the present case. To compare Arista's attack upon -Thornton to an unmeaning border squabble was truly, in view of the long -series of preliminaries, ridiculous; and equally ridiculous was the -endeavor to support this fallacy with another: that since Congress had -not declared war, a state of war with Mexico could not lawfully exist at -this time.[9.9] "Is not Calhoun deranged?" exclaimed our minister at -Paris on hearing of this.[9.10] - -To be sure, Congress is the only branch of our central government that -can legally declare war; but, for instance, other nations are not -hampered by our Constitution, and might attack us in such a manner as -to prevent Congress--for a time, at least--from acting. None the less -we should fight, and it would be nonsense to describe our resistance -as unconstitutional. As a matter of fact Congress did not declare war -against Mexico, and on Calhoun's theory we had no lawful war with that -country. On that theory, not only our military men, Congress and the -President, but our Supreme Court, which fully recognized the war, acted -unconstitutionally. Indeed, he himself illustrated the untenability of -his idea. In order to avoid the weakness of advocating purely defensive -operations a Whig leader, Senator Crittenden, said that by repelling -invasion he meant pursuing the enemy until we could be sure that no -repetition of the outrage would occur. This programme would have -involved substantially all that we did against Mexico. It would have -meant a war without a declaration; yet Calhoun endorsed it. In short, -even one so acute and so deeply interested as he could not find a real -argument against the war bill, and his "friends" abandoned him on this -issue. By an overwhelming majority Congress rejected his interpretation -of the organic law. War existed. No American who recognized our claim to -the intermediate region, formally made by national authorities and never -withdrawn, and especially none who recognized the claim of Texas, could -logically deny that it existed by the act of Mexico; and in the light -of its antecedents, including Arista's declaration of war and attack -upon Thornton, the war bill committed the nation properly as well as -completely.[9.10] - -[THE CAUSE OF THE WAR] - -We were, then, under arms; but, after all, why? What was the cause of -the war? It was not--as will plainly appear in another chapter, it is -believed--an unholy determination to obtain California at the cost, if -necessary, of fifty thousand lives. It cannot have been a difficulty as -to the boundary of Texas, for two nations do not fight over an issue -that exists for only one of them--and that one not the aggressor; and -for Mexico the question between the Nueces and the Rio Grande had -no international significance except when it could be used, as an -_argumentum ad hominem_, to embarrass Americans.[9.14] - -Nor was it a scheme to extend the field of negro servitude. Even a -cormorant requires time for digestion, and in 1845 the acquisition of -Texas appeared so powerful a bulwark for the peculiar institution, that -no strong and widespread craving for additional areas can be supposed to -have existed at the beginning of 1846. Besides, as pro-slavery Taylor, -Calhoun and Polk, anti-slavery Webster and time-serving Buchanan -agreed, free labor was practically sure to dominate California; and -hence, in view of the slight probability that much cultivable territory -could be obtained in the south against the stubborn opposition of the -free states, the war seemed more likely to diminish than to increase -the relative strength of slavery. Moreover, the soil south and west -of the Rio Grande was unsuitable for cotton, sugar, rice or tobacco. -Rich proprietors already owned the land, and had no thought of parting -with it. The system of peonage was extremely economical, and it held -the ground so firmly that negro slavery, though tried, had been unable -to make headway against it. The free laborers of northeastern Mexico -would have been, admitted the _North American_, particularly hostile to -our southerners and their methods; and the colored population, it was -pointed out, could have escaped gradually from its bonds by amalgamating -with the natives. Now the leaders of the "slavocracy" doubtless inquired -into the conditions; and, as most of our ministers and probably most of -our consuls in Mexico were from their section, they could easily obtain -information. Waddy Thompson and A. J. Donelson, for example, believed -and said, that slavery would not thrive in northern Mexico.[9.14] - -Polk's diary and papers reveal no evidence that he seriously considered -the interest of the peculiar institution in connection with our Mexican -problem. The debates of Congress are equally barren. Soon after the -war opened, as we shall discover, northeastern Mexico seemed ready -to join the United States or accept our protection, and there is no -sign that the slavocracy attempted to improve the opportunity. The -politicians most eager to acquire Mexican territory were Dickinson -of New York, Hannegan of Indiana and Walker, an anti-slavery man. A -northern correspondent of Calhoun wrote that many in New York insisted -on extending that way "to augment the strength of the non-slaveholding -states," while a Mobile correspondent said, "I would let the war -continue forever before I would take 697,000 [square miles] of -territory, which must be free territory." A meeting in Ohio declared -for taking all of that country, and this does not seem to have been -paralleled in the South. South Carolina was preeminently the champion -of slavery, yet Governor Aiken publicly opposed making acquisitions in -that quarter. Calhoun, the leader of the southern ultras there and -elsewhere, did the same. So did Waddy Thompson, Botts, Toombs, Lumpkin, -Campbell and many other southerners. W. R. King said that while the -South would insist--as a point of pride and right--upon sharing the -benefit of any territory gained from Mexico, it was a gross libel to -represent her as desiring to increase in that way the strength of -slavery.[9.14] - -King deplored the war. One of the South Carolina Senators wrote -that it was detested nowhere more than in his state. In Georgia, -too, the conflict was bitterly opposed. The people did not desire -the war, said Toombs. Half of the slaveholders oppose it, admitted -Ritchie, a Virginian, editor of the administration organ. Besides -all other objections, it was pointed out that the southern policy of -conservatism and her stand for a strict construction of the Constitution -would be endangered by absorbing a large area mainly populated by -extremely inferior aliens. To combat all this evidence, we find hardly -anything[9.11] except the characteristic hints, imaginings and -assertions of certain abolitionists.[9.14] - -On the other hand, the evidence that the annexation of Texas was -essentially the cause[9.12] of the war is impressive both in quantity -and in quality.[9.13] Benton, Clay, Robert C. Winthrop, Stephen A. -Douglas, Andrew Johnson and many other public men agreed on this point. -As Van Buren and substantially all the Whig organs had predicted -that immediate annexation would entail war with Mexico, they must -be counted in the same class. Charles Sumner drew up a resolution -declaring that such was the primary cause, and it passed the legislature -of Massachusetts, where the subject was rather closely studied, by -overwhelming majorities. The House committee on foreign affairs took -that ground in its report of February 24, 1847. All agree upon this, -was Winthrop's declaration. Paredes expressed the same view in the most -formal manner. The Mexican minister of war under the government that -overthrew Paredes publicly endorsed it; and at least two well-qualified -foreign observers, Duflot de Mofras and the biographer of Lord Aberdeen, -took the same view. Indeed, the proposition seems demonstrated by the -plain course of events.[9.14] - -The mere annexation of Texas cannot, however, be regarded as the sole -cause of the war. But for the loudly expressed wrath of the Americans, -due mainly to Mexican barbarities in Texas and outrages upon the persons -and property of American citizens, Mexico would have been far less -irritable, and the annexation difficulty, which came so near to being -patched up, might have been adjusted; while, as Polk maintained, if -the policy of the United States regarding our claims had been firm, -consistent and strong from the first, Mexico would not have dared to -risk so much in dealing with us later.[9.14] - -The general cause of hostilities was, therefore, the series of -unpleasant incidents occurring in the mutual relations of the two -countries from the scandalous treatment of Poinsett down to the -scandalous treatment of Slidell, from the first mutterings of discontent -in Texas down to the setting of her one fair star in the broad sea of -the American Union; and in this long series the annexation of Texas was -the chief event.[9.14] - -But one can speak much more definitely. For a term of years, mainly -in consequence of the use made of these affairs by self-seeking -politicians, the people of Mexico had fed on the ideas of despising, -fearing, hating and fighting the United States; Paredes had gained -supreme authority on this basis; public sentiment demanded that he -should pursue the route marked out by his professions; to beat the small -and apparently demoralized American army, led by a backwoods general, -seemed quite feasible; it appeared likely that a victory would confirm -the dictator's power, while a failure to strike would ensure his doom; -and hence an attack upon our army was ordered. This was the precise -cause of the war.[9.14] - -[THE WAR MEASURES] - -Let us now return to Congress. The war bill of May 13 gave the President -authority to use the army, the navy, the militia and not more than -50,000 volunteers--to serve twelve months after reaching the rendezvous -"or to the end of the war, unless sooner discharged"--to expend not more -than $10,000,000, to complete the vessels of war already authorized, -and to purchase additional vessels. By other Acts he was authorized -(May 13) to increase by enlistment the number of privates in the -regular army from sixty-four to not over one hundred per company, thus -bringing the rank and file up to 15,540; a company of sappers, miners -and pontoniers and a regiment of mounted riflemen, originally intended -to protect emigrants and traders on the Oregon route, were created -(May 15 and 19); and numerous details concerning organization were -either prescribed or entrusted to the Executive (June 18 and 26).[9.15] -Under the last head authority was given to appoint all the necessary -general officers.[9.16] Meantime (May 13) the President issued a war -proclamation, modelled upon that of 1812, in which he announced that an -appeal had been made to "the last resort of injured nations"; and the -state department (May 14) sent a confidential circular to our agents -abroad, explaining that we had taken up arms reluctantly, and "solely -for the purpose of conquering an honorable and permanent peace."[9.17] - -"The war sense of the United States," it has been remarked, "seems to -be in inverse ratio to its war spirit;" and in general the military -measures of the government exhibited more zeal than discretion. In -particular they put into action the very system that had proved -disastrous a generation before. For this Taylor was primarily -responsible, for after having seen the war of 1812 and that of Florida -languish and crawl, he strongly urged that volunteers be called out for -one year of service. Polk's Message deepened the mischief by expressing -confidence in raw troops, although in 1838 the secretary of war had -assured him that the difference in expense between volunteers and -regulars was "at least as four to one," besides the waste resulting -from their total ignorance of administration, the cost of marching -to and from distant points for short periods of service, and the -disproportionate growth of the pension list.[9.18] The President was -indeed authorized to increase the number of privates in a regular -company, but the roll of officers remained as before; and enlistment -was not stimulated, as it might have been, by adding something to the -pay.[9.19] - -Having a choice between a definite and an indefinite period, the -volunteers were sure, as Marcy foresaw, to elect the former, -although--as the sequel appeared to show--a sufficient number -would almost certainly have engaged for the war, had that been the -only proposal. The Mexicans were commonly regarded as cowardly and -inefficient. Very few Americans expected them to hold out as long -as they did; and intending volunteers would naturally have counted, -therefore, upon returning soon. There were also the enthusiastic -feelings natural at the opening of a war, and a deep interest resulting -from the supposed peril of Taylor's army. Yet the government chose to -accept gratuitously the risk, which in due time became a certainty, of -embarrassing itself, disappointing the country and encouraging the enemy -by offering a brief term of service.[9.19] - -Instead of retaining control of the organization and officering of the -regiments, it entrusted this work to the states, and as a rule the men -chose their own officers;[9.20] but in these features of the system, as -in our governmental methods generally, there was some advantage as well -as much loss. Webster, for example, held that volunteers ought to have -the right of electing for leaders men whom they knew and could trust; -and if they preferred, to sicken and bleed under captains as ignorant as -themselves, whom they knew and could trust, rather than fare otherwise -under trained officers whom they would have had to obey without fully -understanding them, they were perhaps entitled to the privilege, and no -doubt they learned something from exercising it. Anyhow, said Webster, -the other method would have been degrading; and American citizens must -not be degraded. As for generals, the law of June 18 compelled the -Executive to take them from the militia, although they would be under -no obligation to serve more than three months, and might withdraw in -the midst of a campaign. There was no provision for filling vacancies -resulting from death or discharge; and finally the appropriations were -so poorly arranged that the quartermaster's office had to juggle with -funds as even Polk himself could not lawfully have done.[9.19] - -Such as it was, however, the system went promptly into effect. Beginning -on May 15, the secretary of war sent requisitions for volunteers to the -governors of the states, deeming this method of application advantageous -as well as due to their official position, since they were supposed -to know the troops of their jurisdictions and the best places from -which to draw them. In general the plan was to summon about 25,000 -from the northeastern states, to be enrolled and await orders, and to -call out nearly as many from the other states for immediate service. -The former were all to be infantry; the latter, horse and foot in the -ratio of about one to three. It was expected that existing militia -organizations--regiments or parts of regiments--would offer their -services, and that new men would fill the ranks as they felt moved -to come forward. Not only privates but officers were to approach the -national service by that portal, and then be mustered into the army at -the appointed state rendezvous by a United States officer detailed for -the purpose.[9.21] In four days the calls were nearly all on their -way.[9.24] - -The purpose of distributing requisitions over the whole country was to -interest every state, Polk explained; and to stimulate the executive -officials he urged upon the secretary of war the most prompt and -energetic action and personal attention to each detail, insisting for -his own part upon being kept "constantly advised of every important -step that was taken."[9.22] This charge Marcy accepted with all -seriousness.[9.23] Whether bowing his massive head ponderously over a -big desk, sifting callers with keen glances through shaggy brows, or -giving instructions to subordinates in a voice roughened with snuff, he -devoted his faculties to his task with a rare power of concentration. -But he preferred the quiet of his home; and there, comfortably wrapped -in his dressing gown with a box of the brown powder and an old red -handkerchief on the table, he did his best work.[9.24] - -Polk believed, or tried to believe, that "multitudes" were eager to -volunteer, but others feared it would not be easy to raise troops -after so long a peace. Strong influences were at work, however. Though -evidently the fireside was not in danger, patriotism urged men to take -the field, for did not the nation call? - - "Arm! arm! your country bids you arm! - Fling out your banners free-- - Let drum and trumpet sound alarm, - O'er mountain, plain and sea;" - -thus wrote Park Benjamin the day Polk signed the war bill. A longing to -escape from the dulness of bare existence, ambition to see the world -and test one's powers, a passion for adventure and frolic in a far -clime believed to be all glitter, beauty and romance, the prospect of -revelling in the Halls of Montezuma, a feeling that one who was not -"in it" would have to spend the rest of his days explaining why, the -expectation of honors and popularity that would make success easy in any -pursuit, quarrels with sweethearts or hopes of becoming irresistible -to the "girls," were among the motives. For the high officers it was a -"political tour," said one of them; and with everybody the barbarities -perpetrated by the Mexicans in Texas counted for much. The hardships of -campaigning were unknown. While every one understood that some would -fall, it was practically impossible for an ardent young fellow, well -and strong, to imagine his particular person stretched lifeless on -the ground; or, if such an end was ever contemplated, it appeared as -something quick, unfelt amidst the excitement, and sweetened by the -greatness of one's cause.[9.24] - -Behind all of this lay certain facts too deep for the soldiers -themselves to perceive, but not too deep for them to feel. One -instinctively shunned that "misery of cowardice," which--as Pericles -told the Athenians--is more dreadful to men of spirit than death in -battle. As the ages have demonstrated, man is naturally a fighting -animal, and therefore he finds in war the keenest sense of his vital -selfhood. It is our chief glory to will and to do; and in mortal -combat this glory is more intense, if not more real, than in peaceful -occupations. Besides, if a man comes to his end in being supremely -himself, he triumphs over death, and indeed he wins another victory, -too, for life--so rich in menaces--can threaten him no longer. The -validity of nearly all these motives was more or less transitory. When, -for example, a man had proved that he could face a cannon, it seemed -unnecessary to keep on facing it. But while they lasted, they were -strong.[9.24] - -In almost every section, therefore, except New England, where the -annexation of Texas could not yet be forgiven, the war spirit rose high, -astonishing even the most sanguine. At New York the walls were covered -with placards headed, "Mexico or Death," or "Ho, for the halls of the -Montezumas!" and the streets echoed to the song: - - "Come all ye gallant volunteers - Who fear not life to lose, - The martial drum invites ye come - And join the Hickory Blues: - The gallant Hickory Blues, - The daring Hickory Blues-- - To Mexico they proudly go, - The gallant Hickory Blues." - -[TROOPS COME FORWARD] - -At Philadelphia 20,000 citizens of all parties gathered "to sustain the -country." In the central states banks advanced money without security, -farmers' wives issued free rations, ladies made clothing and flags by -the wholesale, roads turned black with men. Ohio looked with disfavor -on the annexation of Texas and the war with Mexico, regarding them as -measures favorable to slavery; yet in less than two weeks after the -requisition for volunteers arrived, three thousand of her sons were -marching to the rendezvous. At Indianapolis Lew Wallace hung out a flag -and a four-sided transparency inscribed, "For Mexico; fall in"; and -in three days his company was full. "Illinois must rally now and win -a character," James Shields wrote to Koerner; and fourteen regiments -volunteered instead of the four that could be taken.[9.24] - -In Kentucky, said reports, the quota of the state was complete by May -26, and the governor had to stop the volunteering by proclamation. -Tennessee was called upon for about 3000 men, and nearly 30,000 came -forward. None would retire, and the selection was made by lot or ballot. -At Memphis troops organized before the call arrived. "May glory and -honor await them!" cried the _Daily Eagle_. St. Louis began to drill on -May 12, and in a few days the excitement was so deep and universal that -the courts adjourned. North Carolina offered more than three times her -quota.[9.24] - -In the Gulf states many feared that not enough citizens would remain at -home to police the negroes. "Governor, do--if possible--get them into -the service," was the tune in Alabama. Mississippi complained bitterly -that so few of her sons had a chance. At New Orleans the roar of -business was almost drowned by a still more clamorous roar: - - "The drums, the drums, the busy, busy drums, - The drums, the drums, the rattling, battling drums, - The drums, the drums, the merry, merry drums!" - -As rapidly as possible Brigadier General Wool and other officers -mustered the regiments into service; and, leaving the rendezvous and the -crowds of praying, cheering people amidst the saddest good-bys and the -warmest good wishes, the volunteers bravely set out for the war.[9.24] - -Before very long new views of military life began to dawn upon the -soldiers. At the old battlefield below New Orleans, where many of the -troops camped, mud and water covered what was below their boot-tops -while mosquitos covered what was above. Going down the river they -brightened at the sight of sycamores and live-oaks, draped with Spanish -moss, and of the ducks, jays, mocking-birds and Virginia nightingales, -that seemed to find life so merry. But soon the lighthouse of the -Southwest Pass was gleaming astern, the muddy water became blue, and -these landsmen were on the deep. Sharks, diving porpoises, squadrons of -nautili and shoals of little flying-fish gave them some pleasure; but -the motion, especially to men packed like sardines in the dirty holds -of schooners and small brigs or lying spoon-fashion--if there was even -room to do that--on deck, seemed horrible. On the slow voyage the water, -which was often impure, fermented sometimes, and ten cents was the price -of a wholesome drink.[9.25] - -And then the Gulf storms! The wind howled; the sea opened its jaws; -the heavens were now like ink, and now one burst of flame; thunders -rolled; ropes hissed and shrieked; spars cracked, snapped and were swept -away; the vessel tossed from beam-end to beam-end; the maddened horses -almost kicked the planking from the ribs, and the men cursed, prayed -or stolidly awaited their fate. But sooner or later nearly all of them -perceived on the horizon a line of sandy beach spotted with tents. -It was Brazos Island off Point Isabel, and they anchored about four -miles from it in the open sea. Meanwhile Brevet Major General Gaines, -commanding the military department of the West, had begun on May 3 at -his own instance to requisition troops for the relief of Taylor, and a -considerable number of these men also set out for the Point.[9.25] - -[THE CHOICE OF A COMMANDER] - -The question of a commander now had to be decided. Polk felt little -confidence in Taylor. The General's separating his army so far from -his base and exposing both to imminent peril seemed inexcusable; and -furthermore General Scott, not only the head of the army but the famous -hero of Lundy's Lane, was the natural chief of the large forces now -called out. Certain facts, however, injured Scott's chances. He was now -almost exactly sixty years old, and many thought him, as did Senator -Fairfield, "too much of an old granny." In 1839 he had been given 57 -votes at the Whig Presidential convention, and of late the brilliancy -of his political anticipations had made him look "ten feet high," said -Corwin. His want of reverence for the President's decision respecting -brevet rank had led Polk and Benton to think of banishing him to a post -on the northern frontier. General Gaines and his many friends had long -hated him; and Mrs. Gaines insisted that no one was "much," whose lips -could be covered with a button. Finally, he was called vain, and so he -appeared to be.[9.30] - -But the ostentation that won him the nickname "Old Fuss and Feathers," -in addition to being much exaggerated by report, was doubtless -attributable in large measure to military policy and respect for his -rank. No one ever saw it interfere with serious affairs, and one who -could remark on the weak point of his own personal appearance, the point -ridiculed by Mrs. Gaines, was not so extremely vain after all. The -right word for Scott was egotism. Now egotism--in others--is doubtless -a shocking trait; yet merely to seem aware of what everybody knows, -does not, as many think it does, convert merits into demerits. General -Scott had a magnificent presence--fully six feet and four inches of -height and a corresponding weight--the brightest fame as an intrepid -soldier, the honor of a long and eminent career, the first place in our -army, a high social position, superior talents and attainments, unusual -knowledge of the world, charming personal graces, and a character of -rare quality--powerful, gentle and true. That he did not dissemble nor -cloak his value was a fault; but those who felt entitled to censure him, -merely because they had no such merits to be aware of, were somewhat in -error.[9.30] - -Besides, almost every great artist is egotistical, and Scott was a great -artist. In more ways than one this was true. He could instruct the baker -in the mysteries of making bread, and superintend ably the roasting -of a ham; damn his delighted black body-servant for hiding everything -and then hiding himself; rave at an admiring guest for cutting lettuce -instead of rolling it round his fork, or lament in tragic tones at whist -that he had to play against three; and the next moment he would be -analyzing a campaign of Turenne, monologuing inimitably about the great -men he had met in Europe, or criticizing and comparing the best authors -of French prose. His foibles--particularly a sensitiveness of temper, an -ambition for the Presidency and a fondness for relieving heavy thought -with light words, as Marcy did with light snuff--were numerous; the -openness of his large and generous nature, superior to the prudence of -smaller minds, prevented his concealing them; certain peculiarities of -language and manner, from a delicacy about commas to a fondness for -literary effects, were easily ridiculed; and in non-military affairs -his indiscretion was now and then glaring; but he must be described -emphatically as a soldier, a gentleman, a "character," a great general -and a great man.[9.30] - -Distrusting Taylor, and profoundly alarmed about the situation on the -frontier,[9.26] Polk sent for Scott on May 13, and conferred upon him -verbally the chief command in Mexico; yet, while admitting that he saw -proofs of experience in the General's remarks, he pronounced him too -"scientific and visionary," as the master of a difficult business must -always appear to the tyro.[9.27] Probably he knew that a man could not -become a soldier overnight, as he could become a militia colonel or a -"statesman," or--in Santa Anna's opinion--a professor of jurisprudence; -but he believed that, should fighting really need to be done, even an -improvised army would make "a brisk and a short war of it," as the -administration paper neatly said, and, if necessary, dictate a peace "in -the Halls of the Montezumas." Under circumstances like these prevision -and science appeared rather superfluous. The only things needful were to -march now and triumph to-morrow.[9.30] - -Scott, however, felt that waging war might involve military operations. -He undertook to prove by elaborate calculations that the greater part -of the volunteers could not at the best arrive on the Rio Grande before -the first week in August; and, since that would be the rainy season, -when the hoofs of mules and horses would be unfit for hard use, and -various other difficulties would arise, he recommended that most of the -new troops, after remaining under instruction at salubrious points in -the United States during the summer, should be placed upon that river by -September 25, so as to make, with the volunteers and regulars already -there, 25,000 or possibly 30,000 healthy, properly equipped and more or -less trained soldiers, ready to invade Mexico in a decisive manner. In -the execution of this plan he did not intend to shirk or dally.[9.28] -May 15 he gave the chiefs of the general staff directions about throwing -supplies of all kinds upon the various rendezvous in advance of the -volunteers, prompted the quartermaster general to obtain wagons, and -even called attention to the necessity of seasonably obtaining light -boats for the navigation of the Rio Grande.[9.30] - -His feeling was, however, particularly after news of what he called -Taylor's "great and brilliant victories" arrived, that it would not seem -proper--especially to military men--for him to supersede that officer -except with heavy reinforcements; and no doubt he saw it would scarcely -enhance a prestige that was dear to him personally and invaluable to him -as the commander-in-chief, to lie idle in hot mud for several months. He -therefore proposed to leave Washington about May 30, give his personal -attention to the troops and supplies _en route_ and at the rendezvous, -and reach the scene of action a little before them.[9.30] - -Such procrastination disgusted Polk, and such "schemes" annoyed -Marcy, both of whom doubtless had an eye on political considerations. -Democratic members of Congress protested that Scott was slow, and -also that, if successful in Mexico, he would be the ruin of their -party. In short, it seemed necessary to get rid of him.[9.29] May -19, therefore, without saying a word to Scott, the secretary of war -had a provision attached to the bill which finally became the law of -June 18, enabling the Executive to appoint an officer new to the army -as commander-in-chief of the volunteers, and at the end of the war -eliminate Scott entirely. This led to sharp language between Marcy and -Scott.[9.30] - -Marcy, the politician, intimated that the militia, who had gone to -Taylor's assistance and were to serve only three months, must have a -chance to do something, and Scott, the soldier, declined to take the -field if liable to be fired on from the rear. In one of his notes the -General remarked that he had taken for lunch merely "a hasty plate of -soup"--a fact that really proved his extreme devotion to the business in -hand; and in another he specified a number of the reasons why a summer -campaign was not feasible. At this juncture, too, a private note of his, -to the effect that no eastern man, Whig or West Pointer was likely to -be given a commission, turned up at the White House. Polk regarded the -note as disrespectful, and also thought the expression "fire upon my -rear" was a reflection on the Executive. Scott protested that his words -referred to Marcy and the members of Congress, and apparently did all he -could, without sacrificing his professional convictions, to satisfy the -President; but his efforts were in vain.[9.30] - -The army on the Rio Grande was now out of danger; Taylor seemed not -so extremely incompetent after all; and Scott was still a scientific, -visionary schemer and a promising candidate for the chair of state, whom -it was more politic to disgrace than to honor. Polk decided therefore -that he was meddlesome, insubordinate, hostile, foolish, vindictive -and untrustworthy, a procrastinating obstructionist, and above all -a "violent partisan"; and on May 25 he received orders to stay at -Washington and hasten the preparations. His correspondence with Marcy -was published. The big dogs and little--Blanche, Tray and all--began -to bark. He was called a farrier general for speaking of hoofs, and -"Marshal Tureen" for admitting that he took soup. His off-hand remarks -were termed flippant, his close calculations fussy, and his deliberate -plans dilatory. His allusion to the "rear," fully justified by what had -occurred and what was to follow, seemed even to some friendly critics -disrespectful and uncalled for. Political intrigue, not war, was said to -occupy his mind. The General has "committed suicide with a goose-quill," -announced the Boston _Courier_; Marcy himself confided to a friend that -Scott had lost a position he would never be able to regain; and Taylor, -assigned to duty with his new brevet rank,[9.31] was continued in the -chief command.[9.30] - -[THE OREGON ISSUE SETTLED] - -All this while the administration felt extremely anxious, on both -domestic and international grounds, regarding the Oregon issue. The -West, which Representative Graham called "the ruling star" in Congress, -clamored for "fifty-four forty or fight." Cass admitted that he found -it necessary to sacrifice to its demand his preference for a boundary -at the forty-ninth degree, and Polk's yielding to the same pressure -is readily understood.[9.32] It was believed that England's interest -in peace would forbid her fighting the United States for a small area -of unrecognized value, and the Democratic leaders probably had no -expectation of getting into a war. The British Cabinet, however, had -its public to deal with, and felt that it could not live a day should -it appear submissive to American "bullying." Hence on February 4, 1846, -when the United States finally rejected arbitration, the two nations -were almost at the grips.[9.33] - -Yet each contained powerful elements favorable to accommodation. The -strong tone of the American government impressed England, and Polk -realized that while compromising on the lower line would anger the -Northwest, an opposite course might throw upon him the responsibility -of disrupting his party, ruining his administration, and plunging the -country into an abyss. The American Congress, like the people, took -a more and more serious view of the situation; and the roar of the -"fifty-four forty" men subsided into a growl. On a hint from the United -States Great Britain presented in May a compromise practically similar -to that which her minister at Washington had rejected the previous year. -The Senate, whose advice Polk asked in order to escape from his radical -declarations, recommended the acceptance of it on June 12, and the -crisis ended.[9.33] - -During the same anxious period a less public negotiation also was on -foot. There were signs of a revolution in Mexico, and it behooved Polk -to consider who might come to the front. Farias and Almonte had many -partisans, and both were hostile to the United States; but Santa Anna, -now living in exile near Havana and spending his time on gamecocks, -monte and a huge mail from Mexico, seemed quite likely to regain the -power; and it was believed that his intelligence, ambition and knowledge -of his country's weakness, combining in favor of peace, were more than -enough to offset any stirrings of patriotic enthusiasm in his breast. -Reports from trustworthy sources--particularly from Slidell, Consul -Dimond at Vera Cruz, and Consul Black at Mexico--tended to support this -belief;[9.34] and it was understood also that past actions and present -circumstances bound Santa Anna to oppose all European and monarchical -designs upon Mexico. Not having begun the conflict with the United -States, he could pronounce peace a necessity, it was thought, and throw -upon Paredes all the odium of the abortive war. Moreover A. J. Atocha, -a naturalized American citizen, who had been a confidant and tool of -Santa Anna, had assured Polk in February that the General, should he -regain power, would be ready to treat.[9.35] From the despatches of -the Spanish minister at Mexico we know that it was impossible, as Polk -asserted, to prevent a man possessing large resources from landing on -the Mexican coast; and it seemed evident that Santa Anna's presence in -the country, should he fail to regain power and make a treaty, would in -all probability lead to a distracting civil war. On the day Polk signed -the war bill, an order[9.36] to let him pass through our blockading -squadron off Vera Cruz was, therefore, issued to Commodore Conner.[9.38] - -[NEGOTIATIONS WITH SANTA ANNA] - -And this was not all. Though deeply distrustful of Atocha, Polk seems -to have derived from a conversation with him the idea of despatching a -secret emissary to Santa Anna, and on the evening of July 5 Commander -Mackenzie of the United States navy arrived at Havana.[9.37] Two days -later he passed three hours with the ex-dictator, informing him of the -order to let him pass, and giving him the substance of a conversation -with Polk, in which the President had expressed these interesting -sentiments: first, a hope of seeing the General once more in authority; -secondly a desire for peace--on the basis of a boundary _via_ the -Rio Grande and thence west, ample payment in cash for the territory -thus transferred, and permanent friendly relations with Mexico; and, -thirdly, a willingness to stop military operations and send a minister, -should Santa Anna, on regaining his former position, be willing to -negotiate.[9.38] - -In reply the General drew up a note, which was copied by Mackenzie -and then destroyed. In this he professed liberal intentions regarding -commerce and politics, anti-monarchical and anti-European principles, -and a disposition--in case the United States would promote his -"patriotic desires"--to respond with a treaty of the desired sort. -Taylor, he said, must promote the scheme by marching to Saltillo, -forcing Paredes to fight, defeating him, and then advancing perhaps -to San Luis Potosi, so as to constrain the Mexicans of all parties -to recall the Hero of Tampico; and he offered valuable hints about -attacking Tampico and Vera Cruz, which seemed to attest his sincerity. -Mackenzie then took his leave, and, impressed by Santa Anna's military -suggestions, transcended his instructions by visiting Taylor on the way -home--thus rendering himself and his mission unduly conspicuous.[9.38] - -In these ways, combining diplomacy and force as he loved to do, Polk -imagined that our Mexican crisis had been fully met. - - - - - X - - THE LEADERS ADVANCE - - May-September, 1846 - - -On taking possession of Matamoros Taylor pitched his tent in the shade -of a small tree about half a mile from town, and there he remained. -Dressed in attakapas pantaloons and a linen roundabout he sat enthroned -on a box cushioned with an Arkansas blanket, and for dinner-table had a -couple of rough blue chests. The slight pursuit of Arista and the search -for concealed ordnance, arms and munitions did not require his personal -attention. June 6 Lieutenant Colonel Wilson with his four companies of -the First Infantry, Price's company of rangers and two of Bragg's guns -under Lieutenant Thomas, the future "Rock of Chickamauga," marched for -Reynosa, about sixty miles distant by the road, which had asked for -the protection of American troops,[10.1] and on the fifteenth Captain -McCulloch and his company were sent off on a scouting expedition; but -the General had ample time for reflection, and his thoughts were not -entirely agreeable.[10.2] - -Despite newspaper glorification, the low opinion of his abilities that -was entertained by the officers must have impinged somewhat upon his -consciousness. Captain Larnard, in fact, believed that he not only -realized his inadequacy, but longed to retire; and certainly Taylor's -private letters exhibited the profoundest mental discomfort. Scott -should come, he insisted over and over again; the campaign would be a -failure, and the officer conducting it would be ruined. He distrusted -the intentions of the administration, and he condemned its policy. As -early as May 9 he feared too many volunteers--whom he disliked--were -coming; by May 20 he knew what Gaines had done; and Scott's letter of -May 18 informed him that about 20,000 such troops were "to march upon -Mexico."[10.2] - -[THE TROOPS ON THE RIO GRANDE] - -Under this head all his fears were realized. First, three-months -men (militia) sent for by himself in April, then six-months men -called out by Gaines, and then twelve-months men raised under the -war bill poured in. By June 3 his army had risen to nearly 8000. -Three weeks later the First Tennessee Infantry--advance guard of -the Congressional troops--appeared, and it found on the scene six -regiments from Louisiana, one from St. Louis, one from Kentucky, seven -companies from Alabama and twelve or fifteen from Texas. All of these -had come in response to the calls of Taylor or Gaines; and some had -been on the ground more than a month. In all about 8000 of these two -classes arrived, and in accordance with Taylor's desire nearly all of -them--except a very few, who agreed to serve twelve months--were sent -home about the first of August.[10.3] Before they took their leave, -at least 20,000 American soldiers were on the Rio Grande, besides an -inevitable number of American civilians more or less directly connected -with the army or not connected at all; and by far the greater part of -their subsistence had to come, of course, from the United States.[10.4] - -The men were stationed in a series of camps. The best of all these was -probably at Point Isabel, where the dry, undulating ground and fresh -breezes made for health and comfort. Fort Polk, as the station was -now called, included about fifty acres. The shallowness of the harbor -impaired the convenience of the Point somewhat, however; and the primary -camp lay three or four miles away at the north end of Brazos Island, -which consisted of low hills on the side toward the mainland, a swamp in -the centre, a wreck-strewn beach on the outer side, and in general three -blades of grass to fifty square feet of sand, as Lieutenant George B. -McClellan wrote home. Here, too, the air was excellent; but the brackish -water caused many complaints, and the sand blew into everything--hair, -nose, eyes and food. Marching the entire length of the island the -soldiers found themselves, at its southern end, about eighty yards from -the mainland, waded across the bayou or strait known as Boca Chica, and -after going about seven miles farther came to another camp and group of -storehouses, ten miles or so from their point of departure, called Mouth -of the Rio Grande, where the river steamers tied up or anchored.[10.5] -Here, as at Camp Brazos, the ground was "working A live with magotes and -land crabs," as a soldier put it; but the same breezes usually tempered -the heat. Eight miles from the Gulf by land--twenty-five or thirty by -water--one came to Burrita, a cluster of huts on a ridge close to the -stream, and this high ground was made the site of a roomy camp. On the -opposite side of the river and separated from it by a mile of swamp lay -Camp Belknap, a spot fit only for the snakes, tarantulas, centipedes, -fleas, scorpions and ants that infested it. Above this point lay several -more camps,[10.6] and still others enveloped Matamoros.[10.7] - -Except Belknap all of these places were fairly salubrious for men of -reasonable prudence, and several of them distinctly healthful; yet -considerable sickness prevailed. At Brazos Island a sort of dysentery -made trouble, and by some the water of the Rio Grande itself was thought -injurious. Until May 13 no funds available for tents had been within -the reach of Quartermaster General Jesup; and after this difficulty -was removed, feeling that he could not wait for duck, he used, common -muslin, which let the rain through; and many of the troops, even -regulars, had no protection against the weather except a screen of brush -or a blanket thrown over a bush. Measles invaded the camps, and lying -on the damp ground made the disease fatal in many instances. What was -worse, the heedlessness and homesickness of the volunteers caused much -sickness even at Point Isabel. The regulars, however, were comparatively -healthy and contented.[10.7] - -The heat, softened by constant breezes, was thought by many less -oppressive than in Tennessee and Kentucky, though sometimes men fainted -at the drills. Bathing proved a valuable resource; and on the seashore -there were oysters, crabs and a large variety of beautiful fish to catch -and eat. Stately processions of herons and scarlet-winged flamingos -and the chatter of jackdaws and many other birds amused the soldiers; -and some of those addicted to sport discussed the project of crossing -the mosquitos with gamecocks, we are told. The roar of the sea and -the mirages along the river, innumerable flowers, the solemn _burros_ -(donkeys) almost buried by their loads, the Mexicans vending eatables at -exorbitant prices, the long lines of tents where such a luxury as tents -existed, target shooting, and now and then the muffled drum helped -occupy one's attention. On July 5 occurred a Sunday and a sermon--the -last of the campaign. At sunset a tremulous orange haze in the west -was due, followed by the twinkling lights of the camp, that were so -agreeable to view from a distance, and then by the howling of wolves, -the tenor chorus of the swamps, and the agonized baritone fugues of -the donkeys. It was now time for singing, story-telling and, above -all, gambling--perhaps Old Sledge on a blanket, perhaps Chuckle-luck, -perhaps monte, perhaps faro; and now and then came a fandango (dance) -on the hard ground with such American and Mexican women as there were. -The camp life was "a rough furnace and a hot fire," wrote Sergeant -Miller; but the novelty of it soon wore off, and the volunteers grew -discontented.[10.7] - -[THE MORALE OF THE ARMY] - -They had come for glory and a good time, and were having neither. They -wanted to do something, and to do it at once or go home. One at least of -them believed that assignment to garrison duty would have led to general -desertion. Wherever they were, they panted to be somewhere else. Having -come to gamble, with their lives for a stake, they clamored to have the -game begin. If there was no enemy to fight, they were ready to fight -friends; and in one of the many brawls and riots Colonel Baker was shot -in the neck. Four or five months of training under expert officers and -strict discipline were necessary to prepare regulars for the field;[10.8] -and naturally these volunteers, almost wholly alien to the habits, -feelings and efficiency of the real soldier, often felt at liberty to -thwart and even defy their commander, and were unable to cooperate with -him intelligently when really disposed to do so. In spite of positive -orders they wasted ammunition recklessly, and Lieutenant Meade thought a -day passed in his tent no less perilous than a stiff battle.[10.11] - -The officers were very similar. One brigadier general came with a light -buggy, in which he proposed to make the campaign. Another had enlisted -as a private, and, not being deemed worthy to command the company, had -been elected a lieutenant; but the executive fiat provided him with -qualifications. "In the name of God," wrote a soldier to Senator Allen, -don't let Hamer be a brigadier general; he is talented, but doesn't -dare undertake to drill a squad; yet the commission was issued.[10.9] -Pillow, another of the same rank, ambitious to figure but not acquainted -with his proper work, did what was not proper. Some of the volunteer -generals on horseback reminded Lieutenant Jamieson of the line, - - "Woe to the mullein-stalk that came in our way." - -Persons of a mature age, who had bulked large at home, would not stoop -to plod through the rudiments of a new profession. Even good officers -were in fear of the letters written by their men and the revenge that -might be taken later, should real discipline be enforced; while those -less conscientious threatened to resign if kept in the background, stood -in the way of superiors belonging to the opposite political party, in -order to prevent them from making a reputation, or even took part with -the men in the hope of getting into Congress by and by.[10.11] - -In short, the volunteers were all one costly mass of ignorance, -confusion and insubordination, said Meade; while the regular officers -felt discouraged, not merely by discovering that civilians were -preferred to educated soldiers for high appointments, but by finding -themselves in the shadow and even under the command of men who had -been discharged from West Point for incapacity or from the army for -gross misconduct.[10.10] At the height of this, General Taylor, who was -disqualified by lack of experience and mental discipline for organizing -an efficient staff, and therefore needed to use his own eyes and his -own voice, held aloof. "I very seldom leave my tent," he wrote on July -25, adding helplessly, "How it will all end time alone must tell." -Besides, every mail brought letters about the Presidency to distract his -attention.[10.11] - -Probably he saw he had blundered. On April 26 he knew that war had -begun, and called upon Louisiana and Texas for soldiers with a view -to the invasion of Mexico, which he must have believed, under the -circumstances, that his government wished. By the rules of the service -it was then his duty, as he well knew, to make requisitions for -everything the campaign would require,[10.12] and a zealous commander, -gathering--as Taylor had been instructed to do--all the information he -could find regarding the local conditions, might reasonably have sent on -to Washington with it an able officer to assist the department. With a -scorn, however, for science and vision that should have delighted Polk, -Taylor did neither; but, assuming that the Mexicans would not fight--if -at all--north of the mountains beyond Monterey, he determined to advance -with about 6000 men. Unfortunately he neglected to have his engineers -inspect the three steamboats on which his plan depended, and these -proved to be worm-eaten and practically useless.[10.13] - -[TROOPS ADVANCE] - -About the middle of June, boats for the Rio Grande began to be -despatched from New Orleans, but--in addition to mishaps at the coast -resulting from gales and the freaks of the shifting bars--a serious -embarrassment soon occurred above. A direct advance against Monterey by -land was deemed impracticable, because the route lacked water. Taylor -had therefore planned to have his troops march to Camargo, the head of -navigation toward that city, and send their supplies to that point by -the river; but during the first eleven days of July rain fell heavily -and flooded the country. The freshet, however, ensured a sufficient -depth in the Rio Grande, and on July 6 the Seventh Infantry set out -for Camargo. The distance, called about 120 miles by land, was more -than twice as long by water; and the river wandered about so much that -according to humorous natives a bird could never get across--always -alighting on some projection of the bank from which it had risen. It -proved a hard task for the light and feeble steamboats, with only -green wood for the boilers, to stem the fierce current; the pilots -were unacquainted with the difficulties of such navigation;[10.14] and -in making one of the sharp turns a boat was frequently caught by the -current, and swept downstream or against the bank--breaking the rudder -perhaps.[10.16] - -But in one way or another the steamers puffed ahead past great -cornfields, and occasionally there was a small village, where the people -stared in wonder at the strange craft, and the girls laughed and shouted -to see the soldiers throw kisses to them. After some 200 miles of this -came Reynosa on a high limestone point, dominated by a heavy, stunted -church tower like an ancient castle; and, farther along, the mouth of -the Alcantro was passed. The country became still better now, with -fertile valleys running back to the tablelands; and not only corn but -potatoes, wheat, beans, and cotton could be seen. Forty miles of such a -landscape, and the steamboats entered the San Juan; and after struggling -on for three or four more they stopped early on July 14 at Camargo, -where Captain Miles, who commanded the regiment, sent at once for the -alcalde, an official who acted as mayor, judge and _pater familias_ in -a Mexican town, and formally took possession. The rest of the regular -infantry pursued the same route as fast as possible, and on July 30 most -of the volunteers were ordered to do so.[10.16] - - [Illustration: FROM MATAMORE TO MONTEREY] - -August 4 Taylor himself embarked, and the next day artillery and -infantry began to advance by the southern shore of the river. The road -was in places deep with mud or covered with water; thick chaparral cut -off the friendly breeze; the intense heat felled many a soldier, and -thirst tormented all who retained their senses; but after a time the -plan of moving by night lessened the suffering, and at last the painful -march was achieved. The cavalry and wagons also proceeded in due course -to the general rendezvous;[10.15] and meanwhile Mier, a hill town only a -short distance from the Rio Grande, was occupied without resistance on -July 31.[10.16] - -[DREADFUL CAMARGO] - -Camargo, a place of perhaps 5000 inhabitants, was said to be some 400 -miles from the Gulf by water. It stood well up on the right bank of the -river, here about one hundred yards in width; but the recent freshet, -rising to an unprecedented height, had nearly destroyed it, replacing -houses and gardens with about a foot of mud. This was dug away, and the -banks were cleared of vegetation; "acres and acres" of tents rose; and -by the end of August some 15,000 men were encamped along the San Juan -for a distance of three miles or so up and down and several hundred -yards back, while a quantity of stores that dumfounded the Mexicans and -satisfied Taylor, was gradually piled up. Worth, who had returned to -his brigade at the end of May, commanded the place and insisted on firm -discipline. No American trader was tolerated; and all persons caught -smuggling liquor into camp suffered "a punishment cruel to use on tender -skins."[10.17] - -This was well, but it did not redeem the situation. Natives regarded -Camargo as the sickliest point in the region, and the freshets had made -it worse. Every breath of air raised a stifling cloud of dust from the -dried and pulverized mud. Barren hills of limestone cut off the breeze -to a great extent and concentrated the fierce heat, frequently sending -the mercury in "this hottest of all hot places," as a soldier called the -town, to 112 degrees. Scorpions, tarantulas, mosquitos and centipedes -abounded. There was a plague of small frogs. "Last night the ants tried -to carry me off in my sleep," wrote a soldier. The only drinking water -came from the San Juan, and it made trouble. The ignorance of the -volunteers about caring for their health was fairly matched by that of -their officers and medical men. Days of sweltering under a cruel sun, -with nothing to do and apparently nothing to hope for, were followed by -cool nights and heavy dews, the heart-rending groans of the sick, and -the yelping of numberless prairie wolves. In almost all the volunteer -regiments at least one third of the men were ill, wrote Meade, and in -many of them, one half. The three volleys at the graves became well-nigh -a continuous roll; and the "dead march" was played so often that, as an -officer said, the very birds knew it. The First Tennessee, originally -1040 prime young fellows, was reduced by deaths and discharges to less -than 500. "Oh, what a _horror_ I have for Camargo," exclaimed one of the -generals; "it is a Yawning Grave Yard"; a thousand soldiers torn and -mangled on the battlefield would be nothing to its suffering and dying -regiments.[10.17] - -And all this appears to have been unnecessary. As we have seen, Taylor -had no intention of using more than about 6000 men in the near future; -and there were salubrious places not only near the Gulf but near -Camargo. No local maladies prevailed in the Rio Grande valley, said -Meade. "There are no causes for disease," wrote Captain Henry. The -climate of that region, said an Illinois officer, equalled in salubrity -the climate of "any Western state." Reynosa was described by the General -Sedgwick of Civil War days as perfectly healthy. Mier, selected the -following year, with a particular view to salubrity, as the site of a -camp for instruction, lay near by on the road to Monterey; and Cerralvo, -farther along on the same route, was a kind of Eden. The best comment -on what the General did is what the General himself said. His first -duty, he told Senator Crittenden, was to place the troops in a healthful -situation.[10.17] - -[MEXICAN PREPARATIONS] - -During all this while, Mexico, too, had been preparing for the war, and -preparing characteristically. Paredes began with good intentions, a -serious and fairly honorable Cabinet, and sound ideas of economy. Though -he did not seem to be very strong either physically or intellectually, -his many scars and the bull-like expression of his face inspired respect -and caution. He lived quietly and honestly, and the correspondent of -the London _Times_ thought Mexico had a better prospect of being well -governed than at any previous period since 1821. It was the dictator's -hope that such a policy and a bold campaign against the Americans would -rally the country to his banner.[10.20] - -About April 1, as we already know, he gave orders to attack Taylor. In -May he severed all consular relations with the United States.[10.18] June -6 the new Congress met; and Paredes, in opening the session, announced -that the time had come to declare war, and summoned all Mexicans to -the support of the country. Six days later he was elected President -as a matter of course, and the action of the American government -regarding war with Mexico was made known by the official _Diario_. On -the sixteenth Tornel--the enemy of the United States and worse enemy -of his own country, who had now wormed himself into the war department -in place of Almonte--proposed to Congress a declaration of war; and on -July 6 Paredes proclaimed, as Congress had voted five days before, that -Mexico would repel the aggression and invasion of the Americans. It was -further stated that besides completing the Permanent and Active corps, -the government would create additional forces to serve during the war. -A million dollars were supplied by the clergy to pay for a campaign. -Paredes obtained permission to command the army in person, and his -intention to do so was publicly announced.[10.20] - -But as usual the war plans ended mostly in talk. Except at the far -distant north, denunciation of the United States moderated somewhat, and -even at Mexico bragging lost a part of its flavor;[10.19] yet, though -really discouraged, people would, not recognize the war as anything -very serious. After news of Arista's defeat arrived at the capital, -the shiver of astonishment and disgust lasted for a time; but the glib -fellows in the cafes were soon remarking, "Well, that's over; that won't -happen again." Explanations abounded. After all, Arista was only making -a reconnaissance in force, it was pointed out. "Such is the fortune of -war; a defeat to-day and glory to-morrow," remarked one of the generals. -The hour chosen by Providence to give the world a lesson by terribly -punishing the aggressive Americans has not yet arrived, explained the -governor of San Luis Potosi. Reverses have occurred, but they can easily -be repaired and will be, the minister of war assured Congress airily; -and moreover the enemy had suffered most severely, it was believed. -Even the evacuation of Matamoros was eclipsed by domestic politics. -The triangular difficulties between Scott, Gaines and the American -government were cited as illustrating the state of discipline in our -army. The wreck-strewn coast near the mouth of the Rio Grande and the -billows laden with boxes and barrels afforded no little encouragement; -and editorials from the London _Times_, proving in detail the -hopelessness and risk of an American attack upon Mexico, were translated -and printed by the official journal.[10.20] - -So the nation took heart. Its case did not look desperate after all. -Heroics appeared unnecessary. The military men have seized the country, -thoughtful citizens reflected; let them defend it. The people did not -fly to arms. The departments opened their strong boxes by only a chink -or not at all. "A dreadful and cruel lethargy has buried the Republic," -exclaimed _El Indicador_. How the Mexicans could be roused, nobody -knew. To proclaim a _levee en masse_ and place a weapon in every hand -seemed politically dangerous. Paredes, observing that his plan to go -north received the cordial endorsement of his enemies, and fully warned -that his departure would be the signal for an uprising, dared not set -out; and as for the idea of British aid, upon which great expectations -had been erected, the minister of England gave lectures instead of -promises.[10.20] - -[PAREDES IN DIFFICULTIES] - -Indeed, Paredes found himself struggling, not merely to achieve, but -even to survive. Knowing well that his political existence depended -upon paying the army, he devoted all the revenues to it from the first, -and made every exertion to solve the all-important problem of money. In -March he tried to borrow heavily on the security of Church property, but -failed. In May the payment of all treasury obligations was suspended, -and a cut in pensions and salaries made; but the principal results were -to anger multitudes already offended by his economies, destroy credit, -paralyze business, and call forth an emphatic protest from the British -legation. On the principle, perhaps, of setting a thief to catch a -thief, the cynical Iturbe, one of the corrupt jobbers in government -contracts, was appointed minister of the treasury; and extraordinary -powers to raise funds were conferred upon the President by Congress. -But this very law shielded private and Church property, and there was -no help in laying taxes that could not be collected. Besides, the army -was now but a fragile staff. The defeats of the north had smitten its -confidence and prestige; being badly paid it was unreliable; and it -really preferred Santa Anna, the natural chief of its unprincipled -and rapacious officers.[10.22] Paredes counted upon the monarchical -party. Beyond a doubt he aimed to place it in power.[10.21] Alaman, an -avowed advocate of that policy, was not only his principal adviser -but the chief editor of a monarchist newspaper, _El Tiempo_, set up -at this time and protected by the government; and the _convocatoria_ -summoning the new Congress, prepared by Alaman, pointed in the same -direction. But his party had no "substantial plan," as the British -minister well said, and the idea commanded no popular support. To the -army it meant a permanent throne in the place of a Presidential chair -to which every successful general might aspire, and imported troops -instead of Mexicans behind the foreign prince; while the departments, -under the pretence that local interests were neglected but mainly -to facilitate access to the public treasury, turned away from even -the idea of a centralized republic toward a revival of Federalism. -The convocatoria, which denied Congressional representation to six -sevenths of the people, was generally and furiously denounced as an open -rupture with the nation; and Archbishop Posada, the strongest support -of the monarchists, fell sick and passed away. Paredes found it wise, -therefore--in fact, unavoidable--to declare for the Republic. But his -action seemed a confession of weakness, dishonesty and inconsistency; -and this impression was deepened by a futile decree against the freedom -of the press and a vain endeavor to gain the support of Pedraza, who led -the conservative wing of the Federalists.[10.22] - -Numerous other difficulties embarrassed the President. Like all the -successful revolutionary leaders, he found it impossible to keep the -promises he had made. It was complained that he did not protect northern -Mexico against the Indians. His adjustment of the foreign debt raised -a loud clamor. Many charged that his bringing the principal military -forces to the capital had laid the frontier open to the Americans, and -he was accused of using them still as his personal bodyguard. The Army -of Reserve is too much reserved, cried the _Monitor Republicano_; and -over and over again the opposition press demanded that he should take -the field, which nobody believed he intended to do.[10.22] - -By June the spirit of revolt, which had shown itself early in February, -seemed formidable. Almonte, who had left the Cabinet ostensibly because -opposed to monarchical designs, was believed to be at work for himself, -and Santa Anna was known to be plotting. The President's ability fell -conspicuously short of his needs, and he clouded with drink such talents -as he possessed. His weak and vacillating course fortified every enemy, -and estranged almost every sensible friend; and it came to be felt, -even by those hostile to the monarchical idea, that a more energetic -ruler must be found. In short, six months after taking the reins Paredes -had no real strength whatever. The door stood actually ajar for a new -revolution.[10.22] - -Preparations for such a change had then been going on for a long -while. In the London _Times_ of February 10, 1846, its correspondent -at Mexico had said that Santa Anna's coming into power again "would be -regarded by all classes as the greatest affliction that could befall -the nation," and other good observers entertained similar opinions. The -Federalists in particular disliked him. But on February 20 a protest -of his against monarchical schemes appeared in print at Mexico, and -newspapers were soon advocating his return.[10.23] Farias, leader of the -radical Federalists, was easily won over by a patriotic letter full of -penitence and unselfish zeal, and with Rejon as intermediary an alliance -of his faction and the Santannistas, based upon the idea of uniting army -and people, was at length, with much difficulty, brought about. Almonte -joined the combination; by the first of April it planned to "pronounce" -at Vera Cruz; and although disagreement regarding the terms of the plan -and a dispute whether Santa Anna or Almonte should be named the leader -prevented this action, Juan Alvarez, who had been a turbulent partisan -fighter in the Acapulco region ever since 1821, and was cognizant of -this conspiracy, inaugurated a revolution, April 15, in favor of a -provisional triumvirate: Santa Anna, Herrera and Rincon.[10.26] - -Santa Anna insisted upon his own views, and Almonte, whom Paredes -appointed minister to France in order to get rid of him and then -obligingly detained at Havana by withholding funds for the journey, -yielded. In May Paredes put Farias and fifteen other suspected men into -prison, and this enabled them to plot at their leisure. On the twentieth -of that month all the scheming came to a head at Guadalajara, where the -people cried, "_Viva la Republica!_ Death to the foreign prince!" The -officers despatched against them proved unsuccessful.[10.24] The country -was soon like a tossing sea; and insurrections, attempted or planned, -showed themselves at various places.[10.26] - -[PAREDES OVERTHROWN] - -The government now proceeded to commit suicide. Paredes announced that -he was going to make his long deferred campaign against the Americans. -About 4000 troops marched for the north--really destined, it was -believed, for Guadalajara--and near the end of July Vice President -Bravo reluctantly accepted the reins of government. It was hoped to -rally the conservatives to his support, and to that end he proclaimed -on August 3 the revival of the constitution (_Organic Bases_) that had -been in force during the Presidency of Herrera, while urgent appeals -for union and harmony were put forth by the new ministers. It was hoped -also to conclude the war. Paredes had wished to do this in May, and -a member of the Cabinet had indirectly proposed to Consul Black that -a minister should be sent by the United States; but the government -finally concluded that the matter was "too delicate." The new Executive, -however, had not committed himself in favor of war as the President had, -and it was understood that his administration fully intended to end the -conflict.[10.26] - -Bravo's course alarmed the conspirators, for many of the Federalists, -besides distrusting Santa Anna, believed the Organic Bases could be -made over into a satisfactory constitution. Nobody felt sure, however, -that such was the real intention of Paredes; the new Cabinet did not -please the radicals; the revolution had gone so far it could not -easily be stopped; and when word came on the third of August that the -garrison of Vera Cruz had pronounced for Santa Anna, General Salas, the -comandante general at Mexico, who was believed to be a firm supporter -of the government, declared at the "citadel" the following night--with -the concurrence of Farias--for Santa Anna and federation, citing -particularly as excuses the monarchical designs of the administration -and its failure to prosecute the war. Paredes, who had remained secretly -in town, hastily set off now to bring back his troops; but the second in -command of his escort betrayed him, and, overtaken by a cavalry regiment -despatched by Salas, the man who had boasted that at any rate his fall -would be no comedy, was brought back to town by the ear, so to speak, -like a truant schoolboy.[10.26] - -Bravo, having few men and no artillery, could not resist, and his -retirement on the sixth of August left Salas in supreme _de facto_ -command,[10.25] pledged only to carry on the war against the United -States and assemble Congress, but really destined, as his organ -modestly assured an indifferent public, to open "a new epoch, an epoch -of liberty, of movement and of life, an epoch of deeds and realities -and not of fraudulent and vain promises." "Federation, Santa Anna and -Texas," was his motto. An abundance of reassuring laws, and especially -the annulment of all edicts repressing the liberty of the newspapers, a -restoration of curtailed pensions and salaries, and the proclamation of -a political amnesty relieved anxious minds; and the spring of patriotism -was touched by summoning all Mexicans to unite against the invader. -Salas, however, counted only as a herald; it was time for the hero to -appear.[10.26] - -[SANTA ANNA'S RETURN TO MEXICO] - -Early in the forenoon on the sixteenth of August, a salvo of artillery -from the fortress of Ulua at Vera Cruz announced the advent of something -unusual. At about nine o'clock a "crack" regiment, the Eleventh -Infantry, marched down to the customhouse, and after manoeuvring for -some hours was formed by dint of cuffing into two lines, which faced -each other and extended to the "Palace"; and finally, at a quarter -before one, a well-groomed and somewhat portly man in the full uniform -of a Mexican major general came up from the wharf between the lines. -He stood about five feet and ten inches in height, looked forty years -old though really fifty-one, seemed capable of great endurance, and -bore himself with an air of blended suavity and command. "The Flower of -Mexico," a very young and very pretty little blonde, his wife, preceded -him on the arm of an officer, and a retinue followed in his wake.[10.28] - -The guns of Ulua boomed again; such of the soldiers as chose, fired -their muskets or saluted; but not a viva was heard. The young and -pretty woman pouted at the cool reception. The glittering dark-gray -eyes of her husband clouded; his dignified and courtly manner seemed a -little disturbed; and his tawny face, whereon a studied graciousness -and self-control could not hide from a close observer the marks of -duplicity, treachery, avarice and sensuality, seemed to grow black. But -he went on to the palace; and presently, as he sat there surrounded by -officers in more or less brilliant uniforms, a tinman, speaking in the -name of the people, lectured him roundly on his past misdeeds. Such was -the home-coming of "The Illustrious General, Benemerito de la Patria, -the Most Excellent Senor, Don Antonio Lopez de Santa Anna," "Champion of -Independence, Hero of Tampico, Immortal Commander," as he was officially -styled;[10.27] and such was "the most pronounced enthusiasm" with which, -according to Almonte, the people received him.[10.28] - -Santa Anna put forth at once an allocution to the troops, which -exhibited in proper style the ecstatic joy that he experienced on -finding himself among such devoted patriots; and a manifesto, composed -by Rejon, laid his programme before the public. The latter address -rambled somewhat, and even J. F. Ramirez said he could not gather its -meaning; but it declared plainly against monarchy and ecclesiastical -domination. "Habits of passive obedience no longer exist," the paper -said; "and if there remains a sentiment of religion, time has undermined -the power of the directors of consciences." Peace, democracy and "the -concert of the army and the people" were said to be the General's -political principles, and he declared himself "the slave of public -opinion." As for the past, his mistakes as a ruler had been due to -circumstances and errors of judgment; and in regard to the future, -"Mexicans," he exclaimed, "there was a day, and my heart expands with -the recollection, when, leading forward the popular masses and the -army to demand the rights of the nation, I was hailed by you with -the enviable title, Soldier of the People. Allow me again to take -it, nevermore to be given up, and to devote myself, until death, to -the defence of the liberty and independence of the republic." At the -same time, as a pledge of sincerity, he advised restoring the federal -constitution of 1824, and giving the new Congress full control over the -executive.[10.28] - -Having thus placed himself before the country, Santa Anna proceeded to -his pretty house at Manga de Clavo, about sixteen miles from Vera Cruz, -and thence to his more pretentious country-seat, El Encero, a little way -below Jalapa. By this time--so it was reported to excuse the suspension -of his journey and perhaps to remind the public of his part in the war -with France--the stump of his leg had become painful; but in reality he -paused to consider the situation. In that he did well. His position was -extremely critical.[10.28] - -Santa Anna did not merely enjoy an occasional game of chance; he was a -gambler through and through. He did not merely stoop now and then to see -two game birds prove their mettle; he was essentially a "sporting man." -Not without reason did the London _Atlas_ refer to him as "that very -sorry hero but most determined cock-fighter." Possessing the strong, he -possessed also the weak points of this type. He was not only uneducated, -but incapable of study. He could improvise variations on a given theme -with astonishing volubility, throwing back--wonderfully elaborated--an -idea suggested to him; but he was not a thinker. He could shuffle and -deal current political notions most shrewdly, but his only principle, -either political or moral, was that having accidentally proclaimed the -republic of Mexico, he owned it. He understood the shallow and selfish -manoeuvres in the midst of which he lived, but had no deep insight, -and found it much easier to do things than to perceive what needed to -be done. His power to dupe others grew mainly, perhaps, from being a -dupe himself. He was in statesmanship only by force of circumstances; -and he always hated a business like that, for it perplexed and wearied -his passionate, untrained character. In a critical Mexican situation -his narrow but intense perspicacity, his unreflecting but unequalled -quickness, his reckless but ingenious adaptation of means to ends, -and his magnetic skill in "reaching" and combining men governed by -self-interest gave him for the time being an immense advantage, and, -when viewed under the dazzling arc lights of prestige and power, seemed -truly brilliant; but his ability was essentially thin, short-sighted -and weak. Indeed Consul Campbell, who saw him at Havana without his -trappings, declared that in any American village of a thousand persons -he would be thought intellectually feeble. Intellectually undeveloped he -certainly was.[10.29] - -[SANTA ANNA'S POLICY] - -In the present instance he had supposed in the Mexican style that a -phrase was a philosophy, that a catchword was a magical formula, that -an eloquent peroration would be as mighty after he had been found out -as it had been before, that a profession of repentance would erase long -years of deliberate bad conduct;[10.30] and from the hour of setting foot -upon Mexican soil his mistake had been growing every hour more evident. -Only the army felt confidence in him, and that not altogether, for he -now called himself a Federalist, and the Federalists aimed to substitute -for the army a citizen soldiery called the National Guard.[10.31] After -the experience of many sad years, "people" and "army" could no more -unite than oil and water. Owing to suspicions that resembled those of -the army, the moderates also held aloof; and although the country in -general, aware of his preeminent energy and resourcefulness and reduced -to the unhappy necessity of fighting fire with fire, consented to his -resumption of power, it did not, even when somewhat reassured by his -connection with Farias, trust him.[10.32] How can he speak truth who has -no truth in his heart? men asked; and he himself could feel what the -answer was.[10.41] - -As to Farias and his party of extreme democrats, who were good enough in -Santa Anna's opinion for servants but not for masters, they evidently -intended to control him, which could not be tolerated long; and as to -relations with the United States, the people seemed far more bent upon -war than a mere gamester could have supposed. Moreover, to declare -now for peace[10.33] looked very much like playing into the hands of -ex-President Herrera, the champion and martyr of that cause, round -whom an opposition party of citizens, military men and journalists was -gathering at the capital; and to do this appeared even to endanger -Santa Anna's personal safety, for as yet he was only a returning exile, -expelled but yesterday from the country like a felon, and ordered never -to come back. The civil authorities of the nation in general seemed -to be unfriendly; and the second city, Puebla, which lay across his -road to Mexico and had the power to wreck his cause, was found to be -ill-disposed. Not only famous and rich, but hardened by extraordinary -reverses--especially that of December, 1844--he was no longer the -hopeful, daring adventurer. His wish now, as he told an American at this -time, was to play a safe game. At Havana, so Campbell said, he had not -fathomed the crisis, but he now realized that he was treading the crust -of a volcano. His plans collapsed; and when the government,[10.34] which -had become alarmed by accounts of his hesitation, deputed Baranda to act -as his escort or custodian, he refused to move.[10.41] - -He did, however, send Rejon and Almonte forward to help guide Salas, -who did not relish the tutelage of Farias; and on August 22 with proper -solemnities and a lavish ringing of bells the federal constitution of -1824 came forth from its tomb.[10.35] The people then felt a little -more confidence in the future, though Santa Anna, if at all able to -forecast that future, would probably have felt less. About a week -later, at his instance, Rejon was appointed minister of foreign -affairs, Almonte minister of war, Farias minister of the treasury, and -Pacheco minister of justice;[10.36] and a broad scheme of war measures -went into effect.[10.37] A levy of 30,000 troops was assigned to the -states in quotas; Guardians of the Peace were decreed, so that all the -regulars might be able to take the field; every Mexican between the -ages of sixteen and fifty was ordered to be ready for service; and -steps were taken to buy up the weapons belonging to citizens as well -as promote the importation of arms. The apprehensions of the military -class had recently been assuaged by declarations that the army stood -in no danger of abolition; and they now tolerated not only an order to -enroll National Guards, but an offer of pardon to all deserting from the -regular corps within three months.[10.41] - -While these events were taking place, the sort of ability that Santa -Anna possessed and the sort of advice that he could obtain enabled him -to decide firmly upon a policy for the immediate future. He knew that no -way could be seen to meet the present embarrassments of the government; -he knew that the hot-headed radicals, if given a chance, would soon -discredit themselves; he knew that whoever should control the army would -be safe and strong; and he knew that one victory over the Americans -would make him omnipotent. He determined, therefore, to accept no public -share in the government, pose as the single-minded patriot-soldier, and -ask only the privilege of fighting at the head of the troops. At one -time he refused even to enter the capital, but he was notified by the -administration that such marked aloofness from the government would be -regarded as an open breach.[10.41] - -September 14, therefore, after several delays on his part, the bell of -the cathedral and a salvo of artillery announced at half-past one that -the professional saviour of Mexico, who never saved her, had entered -the city. Everything possible was done by the authorities to give an -appearance of concord and enthusiasm.[10.38] Watched as he knew he was -by ostensible friends, Santa Anna played out his distasteful role, and -so did the rest of the actors. Emblems abounded. Eloquence overflowed. -The cathedral chanted _Te deums_. "Immense multitudes" (hardly perceived -by ordinary observers) cheered incessantly--in the official journal. -Not only public but private edifices were lavishly decorated--by order. -A hired band perambulated the streets. The General listened patiently -to a lecture from another man of the people, and replied with edifying -humility; and he asked that a well-known statue of himself should be -replaced with the national arms. But it was noticed that he and Farias, -facing each other in the carriage of honor under a huge picture of the -Constitution, looked more like victims than victors; and he would not be -present at the grand banquet.[10.41] - -Having complied with the ultimatum of the government, Santa Anna was -now, September 17, appointed commander-in-chief of "The Liberating -Army." "Every day that passes without fighting at the north is a century -of disgrace for Mexico," he then exclaimed; and although he remained in -Tacubaya, a suburb of the capital, and was said to be ill, he exerted -himself to forward troops, hoping to concentrate 25,000 rapidly at San -Luis Potosi. Tidings from the seat of war foreshadowed a battle at -Monterey, and increased his anxiety. He exhorted the war department -unsparingly.[10.41] - -But the government was exceedingly poor. According to the _Diario_ only -1839 pesos (dollars) lay in its treasury on September 6. Voluntary -offerings for the war took mostly the form of eloquence.[10.39] The -million raised by Paredes had nearly vanished in his preparations and -the Citadel revolution. Pressure was applied to the clergy, and the -_Diario_ asked, Is it not worth while for the merchant to give 100,000 -pesos in order to save 900,000? But both of these classes held back -stubbornly, and managed the affair so as to escape. One brigade formed -on three successive days to march, but had to wait for funds. At length, -however, with extreme difficulty about 90,000 pesos were borrowed; -and on September 28, after piously seeking the Divine Blessing at -Guadalupe,[10.40] Santa Anna with some 2500 men set out. About 3000 were -already on their way, and he expected to find a large force at San Luis -Potosi.[10.41] - -As he rolled along in his coach for about 380 miles, drawn by relays -of fleet mules, the General probably congratulated himself upon his -policy. He was on living terms with the radicals, had been accepted by -the Church, had soothed the army, and through Pedraza--recently his -enemy and still the enemy of Farias--had reached an understanding with -the Moderados. Unquestionably he stood much better with the public than -a month before; and he probably did not perceive that his recent course -had ensured for himself and the nation a series of most unpalatable -surprises.[10.41] - -Through it all, however, the capital managed easily to be gay, and six -"arrogant bulls" were artistically sacrificed in the Plaza de Toros on -one of these anxious days.[10.42] - - - - - XI - - TAYLOR SETS OUT FOR SALTILLO - - June-September, 1846 - - -Arista had scarcely reached Linares when he began, though he knew -his military standing had been destroyed, to rebuild the army. Mejia -followed in his predecessor's footsteps, adopted a policy that was both -conciliatory and stern to check desertion and bring offenders back to -the colors, kept guards out on the roads leading to the Rio Grande, and -exerted himself to improve the morale of his troops. Though Linares -was a central point within easy reach of all the principal towns of -northeastern Mexico, he justly regarded Monterey, a city of twelve or -fifteen thousand inhabitants and capital of Nuevo Leon, as the vital -spot, and about the ninth of July transferred his army to that place. -Desertion had now ceased, he reported; morale had been restored; and the -troops were described as eager to avenge the disasters of May 8 and 9, -which in their opinion "they had suffered but not caused."[11.1] - -This view of the situation, however, must be described as rather -imaginative and extremely incomplete. It was hard to find money and -hard to find mounts. As late as August 19 Mejia admitted that neither -Mexicans nor foreigners would advance him funds, and even after paying -for horses he could not obtain them. Two of the governors in this -quarter would give him no aid, and still less were the people inclined -to rise for the national defence. Both troops and artillery came far -short of the requirements. Though Arista had called for reinforcements -on April 24, not a man from the south had arrived by August 20. -Including the scattered and almost worthless Presidials, the total -number of soldiers in the region--outside of Tampico--was less than -3000, and about one third of these could not easily be concentrated at -headquarters. Ill-fed, ill-clothed, soured by misfortune, smarting -under the general contempt, some desiring Mejia and some Ampudia for -commander, still more wishing Arista back, and all wrangling bitterly, -even if less bitterly than at first, over the conduct of their generals -and officers, the army had for chief a little, pockmarked man in blue -glasses, who looked like a sot, and thus far in the campaign had been -distinguished only for bad health and a pompous vocabulary.[11.2] - -Mejia's plan was to conduct a guerilla warfare, save the army from -further disgrace in the field, and make a stand at Monterey. General -Canales and the irregulars were, therefore, his first line; but the -"Chaparral Fox," who entertained revolutionary designs for which he -desired American support, had managed so as to do us no harm in the -battles of May 8 and 9, and proposed to continue that policy. Mejia -suspected his intentions, yet could not prove him a traitor, and sent -him funds and horses grudgingly; whereupon Canales, protesting that his -loyal aims were paralyzed by Mejia's personal ill-will and stinginess, -made the cause of Mexico odious by robbing and outraging the people -under cover of her flag. At length, early in August, Mejia concluded to -give him about a thousand men, and ordered him to annoy the Americans in -every possible way; but the General reported that his horses were too -weak to trot three miles, and that he saw little prospect of injuring or -even delaying the enemy. In the northeast, therefore, to all intents and -purposes no aggressive Mexican army existed. The business of the nation -at this time was changing masters.[11.3] - -[TAYLOR'S PROCEEDINGS] - -Taylor intended to invade Mexico, and having been favored by Providence -and the government with enough men and supplies, his next need was -information regarding the enemy, the roads and the towns. Plenty of -this he could easily have obtained, one must believe. A strong feeling -against the government and even in favor of joining hands with the -Americans now prevailed in this quarter; and a large number of the -inhabitants on the border, long engaged in smuggling operations, had -the training, as well as the natural gifts of disloyalty, daring and -secretiveness, needed by the spy. A well-informed Mexican of this region -stated that some of his fellow-citizens were quite ready to serve the -Americans faithfully. Taylor could have made it for their interest to -do so, and in addition the circumstances gave him countless hostages -for their fidelity. Scott advised him to employ a large force of secret -agents in a systematic way. But this was not done, and his information -continued to be meagre.[11.4] - -Another subject of prime importance was, of course, the means of -transportation. Taylor had, as we have seen, a large outfit of -wagons, but not enough of them for the expedition in view. A train -of pack-mules was the natural supplement. Those animals were almost -universally employed in Mexico; the country abounded in them; and it -was the General's obvious duty to use the facilities within his reach. -At Washington the practice of the region was understood, and it could -only be inferred that good wagon roads did not exist. Besides, Taylor -intimated that he expected to follow the usual system, and indeed he -was not aware until August that army wagons could be used where he -intended to go. There is no reason to doubt that by the first of that -month fully 3000 pack-mules could have been at his command. Under such -circumstances, to suppose the war department would expend a million -dollars or so in the manufacture of wagons, without having a requisition -from the army or even definite information as to Taylor's plans, went -beyond reason. But the matter was overlooked at the front; and finally, -gathering barely 1700 of those animals Taylor complained loudly, though -he himself recognized that the fate of the administration depended -upon the success of the war, that departmental neglect had inexcusably -delayed and crippled his advance.[11.5] - -Still, the General decided to move, for he knew the public demanded -action; and he wished--as he said--to sustain the government. Indeed, -he now declared it necessary to go forward immediately, "be the -consequences what they may." "I must attempt something," he wrote -privately. The government, however, had not requested him to support -the administration or to incur such a risk; and Taylor--who stood -conspicuous now in the Whig party, and suspected that "Polk, Marcy and -Co." were aiming to discredit and ruin him--can scarcely have felt a -passionate desire to sustain them. In short, as may be inferred from his -correspondence, he understood that he himself was the person chiefly -blamed by the country for inactivity; and, assuming that no serious -resistance would be encountered, he determined--primarily, it would -appear, for his own sake--to occupy Monterey and Saltillo. For the head -of an invading army, both the motive and the assumption were somewhat -improper.[11.6] - -He understood, however, that resistance might possibly be offered, and -for that his plan seems to have been ready. As early as the middle of -June there were at his disposal ten 18-pound siege guns, two 10-inch -mortars and four 24-pound howitzers; and we know that at least the -mortars and half a dozen of the 18-pounders were then at Fort Brown. -Before July some of the howitzers were certainly at Point Isabel. It -was entirely feasible to carry heavy ordnance to Monterey, for Santa -Anna did a much harder job of the same kind; and Engineer Sanders had -warned Taylor that field pieces would not be effective against the stone -houses of Mexican towns. But, probably quite unaware how much the moral -effect produced by his guns on May 8 had contributed to his victory the -following day, he seems to have retained his low opinion of artillery. -Even while Taylor was protesting against the number of volunteers -thrown upon him, Ridgely complained bitterly that he could not get -enough men for his battery. The cold steel--simple, direct, positive, -unflinching--was a weapon such as Taylor could understand. One required -no book learning to use that. And no doubt he already intended, as we -know he intended later, to overcome resistance at Monterey, should any -be offered, "pretty much with the bayonet."[11.7] - -[ADVANCE OF THE AMERICANS] - -Careful attention was paid to the choice of a route. That through -Cadereita offered the better grazing; but the General wisely determined -to march by way of Mier and Cerralvo, a distance believed to be 140 -miles but in reality only about 125. This route was a little shorter -and better provided with water. The roads were much more satisfactory. -The problem of crossing the San Juan without boats or graded approaches -did not present itself. The groves and ravines where an enemy could -make trouble were few, and but one stream had to be forded. On August -19, therefore, Brevet Brigadier General Worth, commanding the Second -Division of regulars, crossed the river with his first brigade over a -bridge of steamboats, and moved off to establish a depot at Cerralvo, -about sixty miles away. All the pack-mules, which were to return under -escort and make a second trip, accompanied the troops. Brigadier General -Persifor F. Smith and the second brigade, Brigadier General Twiggs with -the First Division of regulars and about 180 wagons, and Major General -W. O. Butler with a "Field Division" of volunteers followed. September 5 -headquarters moved, and in a day or two the last of the men belonging to -the expedition set out.[11.8] - -The advance to Cerralvo did not prove entirely agreeable. At first there -was trouble because the mules could not be loaded until after daybreak, -and it was hard for the troops to march during the hot hours; but after -a little experience the troops moved off at about three o'clock in the -morning, and the train proceeded later under escort. The road proved -to be full of sharp stones most of the way; and everything--even the -frogs and the grass--had thorns, reported the soldiers. Although, as -Worth said, there was no dangerous lack of water, the men suffered not -a little during a part of the time. Some almost raved from thirst, and -brushing the yellow scum aside, would drink eagerly from any pool. The -heat baked them, and in spite of wet cotton in their caps a considerable -number were overcome. Mier, the only town of any importance on the -route, proved to be the roughest and gloomiest sort of a place. Gloomy, -too, was the long line of wooden crosses beside the road, for every -one marked a grave, and not a few signified a murder. After a while, -however, came the inspiring sight of distant mountains--the fantastic, -pale-blue summits of the Sierra Madre, which rose higher and stood out -more boldly day by day; and the occasional inhabitants appeared, as -Worth reported, "cordial in the highest degree."[11.9] - -Particularly sunny were the Mexican smiles at beautiful Cerralvo, where -the advance arrived at noon, August 25; and there were still more -substantial reasons for satisfaction. The town, a place of some 1800 -people, was built of stone, and hence formed a strong military position. -It had enough springs of excellent water to supply New York City, -declared Taylor. Standing, all in white, on a ridge at the foot of a -spur from the Sierra Madre, surrounded with groves, pastures and fields, -it gave promise of abundance and kept the promise. Sheep, cattle -and goats, watermelons, pecans, half a dozen delicious fruits, ample -grazing, and large stores of corn were to be had, and plenty of oak, -walnut, ebony, cypress and willow for the cooks' fires. By the morning -of September 15, with the exception of the Texas contingent, which had -marched by way of China and Cadereita, all the troops concentrated -here.[11.10] - -[MEXICAN PLANS] - -Mexico, anticipating Taylor's advance, had now taken steps to meet it. -In July Paredes had sent three brigades of regulars from the capital to -operate against the revolutionists of Guadalajara, and on August 6 these -were ordered to Monterey. Ampudia, who was to supersede Mejia, received -instructions to make haste; and the commander of the third brigade, on -leaving San Luis Potosi, went so far as to destroy all baggage that -could hinder the march. News of the revolution, which overtook these -forces tardily, delayed the advance, for of course many of the officers -felt they must "pronounce"; and almost the whole of one brigade, -abandoning their general, went back to Mexico. The number deserting was -quite serious, for besides the usual reasons for leaving a distasteful -service, the troops were alarmed by the prospect of real fighting, and -the sombre monotony of the deserts that had to be crossed disheartened -them.[11.11] - -But on August 29 the first brigade, about 1400 infantry with three -8-pounders, arrived at Monterey. The second came on September 6, and -the third only a few days later. The garrison was now strong. Mejia -had concentrated some 4000 regulars and auxiliaries, and according to -the detailed official report there were in all, on September 10, 7303 -officers and men. The arrival of the new forces greatly encouraged the -soldiers of Palo Alto and the Resaca--who had felt little desire to meet -the Americans again--and hence checked their deserting. As the cavalry -had now been re-mounted, it seemed likely to be efficient; and when -the Senorita Dosamantes, equipped as a captain, volunteered to fight -the invader, and was exhibited on horseback to the entire army, its -enthusiasm rose high.[11.11] - -From the forced march of Ampudia and his troops one might infer that the -government had positively decided to make a stand at Monterey, but such -was by no means the fact. Before leaving Vera Cruz and again later Santa -Anna warned both Salas and the minister of war emphatically against -this idea, and on August 20 Ampudia was therefore notified that unless -Mejia's troops and the fortifications were certainly of sufficient -strength to check the enemy, he should "on no account risk an action." -Three days later the department informed him that the general-in-chief -was "convinced" that Monterey could not be defended, and that his -forces were "not strong enough to resist the Americans"; and in view of -this opinion he was directed to halt at Saltillo, and order Mejia by -special express to demolish his fortifications, and remove his army and -military effects to that city "without loss of time"--the purpose of the -government being "to gather an army capable of winning a victory without -risking the honor and great interests of the nation."[11.12] - -The new commander at the north, however, was doubtless thinking for -himself. In view of Santa Anna's purpose to organize a grand army -under his personal orders, this was Ampudia's last opportunity to -shine independently, and he did not wish to lose it. On learning the -strength of Mejia's and Taylor's armies and the condition of the -fortifications, he believed he could not only repulse the Americans but -drive them beyond the Rio Grande. Mejia took the ground that it would -be dishonorable to give up Monterey and the pass between that city and -Saltillo without a fight, and that it might be very hard to recover the -road through the mountains after giving the Americans an opportunity -to fortify it. His officers, who met by Ampudia's order in a council -of war, appear to have shared this opinion; and the comandante general -of Nuevo Leon, "as a Mexican and an officer in the national army," -protested "before God and men" against the instructions to retreat, -leaving twenty guns that could not be taken away, and permitting the -enemy to triumph "without hearing a shot from the Mexican arms." So the -die was cast; and on learning of Ampudia's decision, together with his -reasons, the war department endorsed it.[11.13] - -[MONTEREY MADE READY FOR DEFENCE] - -On reaching the ground, Ampudia proceeded to inspect Mejia's works. The -importance of erecting fortifications at Monterey had been clearly seen. -May 27 the minister of war gave orders accordingly, and Mejia promptly -sent an engineer there to reconnoitre and draw a plan. Since, however, -he could not afford to hire or even feed laborers, only soldiers carried -on the work, and little was accomplished before the end of July; but -people were then required to labor without pay, and the progress became -more rapid. Ampudia now brought men from the neighboring towns also; -and Monterey, excited by the news of Taylor's advance, became a hive of -industry.[11.14] - - [Illustration: BATTLE OF MONTEREY GENERAL PLAN] - -The opportunities for defence were excellent. Lying encompassed--except -on the north and east--with steep, high spurs of the Sierra Madre, where -the Saltillo road and the small but swift Santa Catarina River debouched -from Rinconada Pass, the city formed a sort of rectangle somewhat more -than a mile in length from east to west and about nine squares wide -at the broadest. Only a short distance from the western end rose high -and steep foothills, and some of these were now crowned with redoubts. -Along the southern side the river and its high, rough bank were almost -a sufficient protection; but they were supplemented with fortified -buildings and yard walls, barricades at the ends of the streets, and for -about half the way a solid parapet.[11.15] - -The eastern part of the town was given special attention, for here -entered the principal roads from the north. In the city proper nearly -all the streets ran straight either at right angles or parallel, and -in each of the central ones now rose a double line of overlapping -barricades or breastworks of masonry, provided with embrasures and -with ditches. Outside these a series of redoubts was constructed; and -wherever the enemy seemed likely to come, the houses--almost always -one story high--were loopholed and provided with ammunition. As they -had been constructed very solidly of rubble-work, were protected with -strong doors and iron-barred windows, and had flat roofs (_azoteas_) -defended with sand-bags in addition to their stone parapets, they were -veritable fortresses. At the heart of the town stood the cathedral with -its elaborately carved facade, a chime in one spire and in the other a -clock. This became the general magazine. In front of it was the main -plaza, bounded on the western side by the prison; and beyond the prison -lay the market square.[11.15] - -The north side of the town had even stronger protection. Within -12-pounder range of almost every part of the city stood a solid pile of -masonry, twenty-five or thirty feet high, blackened by time. This was -an unfinished cathedral; and, taking it as a donjon, Mejia's engineers -threw round its columns and buttresses a quadrangular bastioned -earthwork, intended for about thirty guns. The high parapet, eleven and -a half feet thick, was faced on both sides with a soft gray tufa, in -which cannon balls were expected to embed themselves. The ditch, though -not wide enough and not completely excavated, was twelve feet deep. A -garrison of four hundred with eight guns occupied the position; and -although the two small magazines were not adequately protected against -falling projectiles, and still other faults could be pointed out by -an expert, this fort, commonly known as the citadel, was a powerful -work, and, standing on a slight elevation, it could sweep the roads and -the plain east and north of the town. A sort of telegraph enabled its -commander, Colonel Uraga, to communicate with headquarters.[11.16] - -Plenty of ammunition and an adequate store of provisions were -accumulated. General Requena labored indefatigably in repairing -discarded cannon, and about forty guns were found available. American -deserters, who either had been or had become skilful gunners, were on -hand to point some of them. There was one capital, underlying defect in -the whole plan of defence. To hold all the works firmly required a much -larger garrison than Ampudia had. More or less clearly the mistake was -understood; but the active cooperation of the cavalry and the reserves -was expected to offset it.[11.17] - -Santa Anna's policy was not merely to give up indefensible towns, and -he ordered Ampudia to drive away all cattle that the Americans might -otherwise obtain, destroy provisions and make the water supply useless -whenever a place had to be abandoned, besides urging the inhabitants -to leave their homes on Taylor's approach, so as to show the Americans -and the world that Mexico could never be subdued; and Ampudia not only -endeavored to execute these instructions, but adopted measures of his -own to supplement the efforts of his troops. The people were ordered to -intercept messengers and convoys, capture small parties, and in every -possible way imitate the royalists of Spain, who had made the soldiers -of Napoleon so much trouble. Martial law went into effect, and thus -in addition to other advantages the authority of the indifferent or -disloyal governor was obliterated.[11.18] - -Disloyalty and indifference among the people were combated at the -same time, as Ampudia informed the government, by a twofold policy of -"moderation" and "decisive energy," in which the second ingredient -appeared the more conspicuous. All the citizens of the region received -a summons to come and help defend the nation. Notice was publicly given -that any person voluntarily affording the enemy direct or indirect aid -would be shot; everybody was required to denounce offences of this kind; -and all authorities were ordered to inflict the penalty. A circular in -English inviting Americans to desert met our troops, and the inhabitants -were directed to succor and protect all such repentant foes. Taylor -had but a few regulars, Ampudia proclaimed, and the rest of his army -was "a mob of adventurers without valor or discipline." Moreover the -sacred cause of independence itself appealed for support, and could not -be ignored. "Soldiers," he cried, "Victory or death must be our only -motto." Thanks to this vigorous policy and the increased numbers of the -army at Monterey, by the middle of September the temper of the people -towards the Americans noticeably changed.[11.19] - -[AMPUDIA UNDER A CLOUD] - -In other respects, however, the General did not feel so well pleased. -In person large and strong, with a soldierly mustache and goatee and a -martial bearing, he figured well on horseback; but he was really small -and mean, and his measure had been taken. His obtaining the command -of the army--first at Matamoros and again recently--through political -intrigue was fairly well understood. Many attributed the disaster -of May 9 to his machinations against Arista. A dominant regard for -personal safety was known to be one of his characteristics. His chief -distinction, said the British minister at Mexico, arose from acts of -violence done in abuse of power, and he now acted out his disposition. -However the general public might be deceived, such a man could not -impress the officers by talking about a sacred cause and "victory or -death"; and old personal animosities against him supplemented the want -of confidence based on public grounds. One of the officers wrote bluntly -to him that the disgust and discouragement produced by the news of his -appointment could be seen plainly on the faces of nearly all. Complaints -against him were forwarded to the government. The press voiced this -hostile sentiment, and fresh enmities were rapidly engendered.[11.20] - -Nor did military affairs prosper very well. The funds were scanty, and -that state of things could not fail to cause dissatisfaction. Ampudia's -appointing Ramirez, who understood tactics but not engineering, to -supervise the construction of works met with disapproval. Numerous -changes of policy had a similar reception. At first he adopted Mejia's -plan of attempting nothing serious in the field, and then he decided to -meet the enemy at Marin, some twenty miles from the city. A council was -held; and finally, as most of the officers opposed this project, it was -given up. Then another council decided to abandon certain incomplete -fortifications between the citadel and the western defences; and at -the instance of Ramirez a very important fort, the Teneria redoubt at -the eastern end of the town, was demolished. Such vacillation and such -waste, both moral and material, undermined the courage and confidence of -the garrison and stimulated its dissensions.[11.21] - -At Cadereita, August 31, there were a thousand regular cavalry, and -they were ordered to attack five hundred Texan horse then at China; but -they accomplished nothing. The Americans march carelessly and in small -bodies, observers reported; they loosen their arms and stoop down to -drink at the first water; they sleep as if at home; they carry little -ammunition; and their muleteers are hoping the train will be attacked. -With such opportunities the six hundred troopers now under Canales were -expected to do something; but that astute leader merely gave reasons why -they could not. "Nothing, absolutely nothing will either the regular -cavalry or the auxiliaries do against the enemy," exclaimed Ampudia -bitterly; and on September 18 the whole mounted force of about three -thousand meekly retreated to the town, leaving the roads practically -open.[11.21] - -[TAYLOR PRESSES FORWARD] - -Early on September 12 all the pioneers of Taylor's army advanced from -Cerralvo to prepare the road for his artillery and wagons. Ahead of -them went a strange-looking company. Mounted on quick, tough horses -and marching at will, the men were dressed as they pleased; but they -agreed substantially on leggings, trousers belted round the waist, -coarse red or blue shirts, and either a buckskin cap or a soft felt hat. -Each carried a heavy rifle, a pouch of bullets, a large powderhorn and -a bowie knife, and some had Colt revolvers. At every saddle-bow hung -a braided lariat for a tether; and a bag of parched and pounded corn, -together with whatever else the rider thought he needed, was bound to -the saddle with thongs. This company was Captain McCulloch's rangers--a -part of the First Texas regiment--Taylor's finest body of scouts; and -they, assisted by a squadron of dragoons, covered the pioneers. On -the following three days the First, Second and Field Divisions moved -successively, carrying forty rounds of ammunition and rations for eight -days, besides what went as freight; and only the sick, with a guard of -two Mississippi companies, remained at Cerralvo.[11.22] - -The spell of Mexico, that was to charm away so often the pains of a hard -existence, now fell upon the soldiers. The country became more fertile. -One broad plain shone with Spanish dahlias, and curious trees and plants -could be seen on all sides. Every few miles a stream of cool, sparkling -water leaped across the road. In the morning a curtain of gray, thinning -little by little, went slowly up at last, and revealed a world of hills, -edged with burnished gold, where one or two, catching the sun aslant on -a bare, crystalline side, would flash out amidst the lingering shadows -in all the colors of a diamond; while, farther on, lilac mountain rose -above lilac mountain and purple range looked over purple range until the -crowning peaks touched the firmament. In one town after another grapes, -figs and pomegranates delighted the eye, and, as an officer quoted to -himself, - - "The air was heavy with the sighs of orange groves." - -And finally, as night came on, the jagged blue sierras, growing almost -black, were silhouetted perhaps against a pale yellowish-green streaked -with crimson. A spice of danger added zest, for about a thousand Mexican -cavalry hovered constantly in the front, and once near Ramos McCulloch's -rangers got near enough to exchange shots with a party of them. But -Torrejon's men employed themselves principally in driving the Mexicans -from their homes under Santa Anna's and Ampudia's instructions; and -on September 17, after passing through Papagallos, the Americans now -marching with Taylor concentrated near Marin.[11.23] - -Very early the next morning a bugle broke the silence of the camp; other -bugles answered it; the drums awoke; the fifes joined in; the army -sprang to its feet. As soon as possible the advance guard moved off. The -First Division followed at eight o'clock, and the others at intervals of -an hour. After sleeping that night at San Francisco the army, completed -by the arrival of the Texas Division, set out again at about sunrise -on the nineteenth. Since reaching Marin Taylor had rather come to the -conclusion that he would scarcely reach Saltillo on time--that first -he would have something to do at Monterey; and this opinion was now -confirmed. At about nine o'clock, accompanied by his staff and an escort -of Texas mounted men, he came to the edge of the plain, and passed on -down the gentle slope of the San Juan valley.[11.21] - -In front lay a stretch of broken ground. Beyond it cattle were feeding -peacefully in green fields, and corn was ripening under a hot sun. -Farther away still lay Monterey, the holy city of the frontier, as if -in a niche of the vast sierra, its white houses partly hidden with -green and the spires of its cathedral soaring above; and now and then -the music of a bell, a bugle or a drum came faintly across the plain. -A little at the right could be seen the long, low line of the citadel -wall, surmounted by the dark bulk of the "donjon" and its flag of red, -white and green. But suddenly the tranquillity of the scene was broken. -A white puff rose from the fort, and a 12-pound ball tore up the dirt in -front of the General. Another dropped near him, and a body of Mexican -cavalry advanced. Hays's regiment of horse was ordered to charge; but -seeing the enemy retire as if to lure the Americans under the guns of -the fortress, Taylor recalled him.[11.24] - -Meanwhile the rest of our troops, excited by the rolling echoes from -the mountains, pressed on. Some threw away their packs of cards, but -mostly the men joked, laughed, cheered each report from the citadel -guns, and shouted that they were going to a grand fandango at Monterey. -"No one discussed depots of supplies, base of communications, lines -of retreat, or strategic positions," we are told by General S. G. -French, then a lieutenant of artillery; "but every one knew that the -brave old soldier would fight the enemy, wherever he found them, to -the end." The victories at Palo Alto and the Resaca had filled the -men with confidence; and in this happy mood the army encamped about -three miles from the city at Walnut Grove (_Bosque de San Domingo_), -an extensive and beautiful group of pecans and live-oaks, watered by -large, pure springs, where pleasure parties of well-to-do Mexicans were -accustomed to enjoy themselves. The army now consisted, all told, of -some 3080 regulars and 3150 volunteers. About 1350 of the troops were -mounted men; and for artillery there were four field batteries, and -a pair of 24-pound howitzers, but no real siege ordnance except one -10-inch mortar. In the front lay a city of stone, protected with strong -and rather skilfully planned works, and guarded by an army larger than -Taylor's.[11.25] - - - - - XII - - MONTEREY - - September, 1846 - - -[FIRST OPERATIONS AT MONTEREY] - -At once American reconnoitring parties accompanied by engineers hurried -out (September 19), and both ends of the city were examined. Despite -the fire of the citadel, particular attention was paid to the western -fortifications, for the idea of turning them had already presented -itself. By ten o'clock that night Brevet Major Mansfield, the chief -engineer, returned to camp with five prisoners to be questioned and with -satisfactory evidence that the Saltillo road could be gained in spite of -the forts; and then a council decided to make the attempt.[12.1] - - [Illustration: BATTLE OF MONTEREY DETAILED PLAN] - -Evidently, however, this meant a severe struggle. Going three quarters -of a mile west from the main plaza of Monterey by the Saltillo route, -passing a cemetery, and keeping on about a mile and a quarter farther, -one found on a low eminence at the right a dilapidated but massive -stone building known as the Bishop's Palace, close below which stood -now a half-moon battery facing and commanding the town. Beyond this -redoubt, called La Libertad, the eminence became an ascending ridge, -and some three hundred yards from the Palace the ridge ended sharply -as the summit of an extremely steep height known by the Americans as -Independence Hill (_Loma de Independencia_), where a small sand-bag -redoubt had been constructed. Immediately west of this hill, what -was known as the Topo road left the Saltillo highway and struck off -toward one's right, and near the farther edge of this road a spur of -the mountain began to ascend. On the other side of the highway flowed -the Santa Catarina, passing by the city and joining the San Juan -some distance below. Farther to the left and parallel to the river -rose a high, bristling hill named Federation Ridge. At the western -end--the summit--of this ridge, which extended some distance beyond -La Libertad, stood a redoubt occupied by some eighty men; and about -six hundred yards to the east, in a depression of the ridge, was a -substantial masonry fort called El Soldado, armed with two 9-pounders, -which were dragged, before the fighting began, to the redoubt on the -summit.[12.2] - -Meantime the Mexicans also were observing. It was generally believed -that Taylor had thirty guns, which meant a hard fight; but the soldiers -were excited and ready for battle. "The enthusiasm is great, the -determination greater, the desire to sacrifice ourselves for the sacred -rights of the nation unbounded," wrote the comandante general of Nuevo -Leon. But Ampudia--"the Culinary Knight," as Worth called him, who had -fried Sentmanat's head--already trembled. We have food for barely twenty -days, he reported to the government; the troops at San Luis Potosi -are few in number and little inclined to advance; through spies the -enemy are aware of these facts; they will gain the pass between here -and Saltillo, and from that position "it will be almost impossible to -dislodge them."[12.3] - -Sunday morning all was bustle in the American camp, and at length, -a little before two o'clock, Hays and about 400 mounted Texans rode -away. A long sky-blue line of infantry followed them, and then another -line of men in dark-blue jackets and trousers with a red stripe down -the leg--Lieutenant Colonel Childs's Artillery Battalion. Blanchard's -Company of Louisiana volunteers, dressed in every sort of clothes and -carrying every sort of weapon, and Duncan's and Mackall's batteries with -their gleaming pieces and clattering caissons completed the detachment, -which included some 2000 men, all told. The rest of the army watched -their departure with keen interest, for their design looked well-nigh -desperate, and yet the fate of the campaign was believed to depend upon -it.[12.4] - -Especially they watched the commander. In the usual undress uniform but -on a splendid horse, which he managed with consummate address, rode -Worth. He was a man of average height but noticeably strong, with a -trim figure and a strikingly martial air. Conversing easily with his -staff he seemed the elegant gentleman; but his face was stern, and -his restless dark eyes flashed. In war he found his element; and at -present behind his natural ardor burned a new flame. His withdrawing -from the army in April had injured both his prestige and his relative -position, and his motto now was, "A grade or a grave." His orders were -to turn Independence Hill, occupy the Saltillo highway, and so far as -practicable carry the works in that quarter; and no doubt he intended to -do more rather than less.[12.4] - -Soon taking leave of the road, this command plunged into cornfields -and chaparral. Progress was difficult and slow. For the benefit of the -artillery, ditches had to be bridged or filled and brush fences opened. -The enemy promptly observed and understood the movement, and a body of -cavalry embarrassed it somewhat. Once they nearly surrounded the General -and his staff, who were some distance in advance; but after a time, -fearing his artillery, they withdrew to the citadel. Ampudia himself -rode to Independence Hill, watched the blue line a while, ordered one -hundred infantry to the summit, and had a 12-pounder and a howitzer -planted there.[12.5] - -By six o'clock Worth made nearly or quite seven miles. He was now on -the Topo road; and, halting just beyond the range of the battery on -Independence Hill, he pushed a reconnoitring party toward the Saltillo -highway. Infantry and cavalry had now been posted, however, in that -vicinity. The party was fired upon; and, owing to this, to nightfall -and to the torrents of rain, its purpose was not accomplished until the -lateness of the hour prevented further operations. With great difficulty -the Americans were placed in a fairly defensible position; and without -fires, food, blankets or shelter, they lived through the stormy night as -best they could. By this time the rest of the Mexican cavalry had been -withdrawn from its position between the Bishop's Palace and the citadel, -and a part of it retired into the town.[12.6] - -[AT THE WESTERN GATES] - -Monday, a day of fate, broke heavy, dark and ominous. Dense clouds -covered the sky, and for a time a thick mist cut off the outlook. By -about six o'clock Worth moved, however, and, saluted occasionally -with harmless grape from Independence Hill, advanced by the Topo -road. Anticipating trouble, he arranged the column so as to be ready -for prompt action. The Texans led; Captain C. F. Smith and the light -companies of the Artillery Battalion, deployed as skirmishers, came -next; Lieutenant Colonel Duncan's battery was third; and the rest of the -command followed. Two or three hundred yards or so from the Saltillo -highway, at a turn round the mountain, some two hundred lancers could -be seen approaching. It was a gallant sight. The horses, though small, -showed plenty of spirit; many of the saddles were silver-mounted; the -cavaliers wore brilliant uniforms, and green and red pennons fluttered -gayly from their poised lances. At the head of the advance rode -Lieutenant Colonel Najera, a tall, fine-looking trooper with a fierce -black mustache. Smith's corps and a part of the Texas riflemen were -thrown behind a strong fence; Duncan halted and unlimbered; and then, -like a whirlwind, Najera struck McCulloch.[12.7] - -The shock was terrible; and like a lion and a tiger grappling the two -bodies writhed and fought. The weight of the American horses proved -a great advantage, but numbers were on the other side. Najera, after -running a Texan through with his lance, fell; but a gallant successor -took his place, and the soldiers proved worthy of him. Many lances were -shivered, and others, useless at close quarters, were dropped; but sword -and escopeta served instead. On our part Smith's infantry fired well, -and the Mexicans could not break through the fence.[12.7] - -After recoiling a little they formed to charge again. Other troops of -Worth's came up, took post beside the road, and began work. A minute or -two more and Duncan, on higher ground, was firing over the Americans. By -this time Najera's squadron was nearly accounted for; but behind it were -the rest of Romero's cavalry brigade and a party of infantry. However, -Mackall's battery was now cooperating with Duncan's and both did -splendidly. The Mexican foot withdrew instead of advancing. A part of -the cavalry soon retreated toward Saltillo and a part into the town; and -the brief but important struggle ended. Probably more than one hundred -Mexicans had been killed or wounded, while our own casualties appear to -have numbered about a dozen, and the way to the Saltillo highway lay -open. By a quarter past eight Worth's command was on this road; and -he reflected with exultation that the Mexican line of communication, -supply, reinforcement and retreat had been cut. Nor was that all or even -the best of it, he believed. "The town is ours," he scrawled in pencil -to the commander-in-chief. The battery on Independence Hill now became -active, however; and as Federation redoubt, of which the Americans had -not heard, began to drop round shot among our troops, they had to be -withdrawn about half a mile in the direction of Saltillo.[12.7] - -Worth's courage and spirit were inflexible, but he was a little wanting -in steadiness. His impetuous, restless mind would leap to a decision -without fully grasping all the facts, and then it was necessary to -reconsider and re-decide. In the face of the present unexpected -situation he changed his plan several times, and fatigued the troops -perhaps with some unnecessary movements; but by noon he concluded to -storm Federation Ridge first, and Captain C. F. Smith was assigned to -this task with four Artillery and five dismounted Texan companies--about -three hundred or three hundred and fifty effectives. Riding up to the -command Worth exclaimed in his bold, magnetic way, which went straight -to the soldier's heart, "Men, you are to take that hill--and I know you -will do it." "We will," they answered, and the detachment, followed by -the most anxious hopes of all the other corps, moved off. It seemed like -charging the clouds, but it had to be done.[12.8] - -The intention was to gain the rear of the fort, and hence a circuitous -route leading to the southern flank of the ridge was chosen. After -hurrying through cornfields and sugarcane to the river and then upstream -a considerable distance to find a crossing place, the men slid down the -rough bank of the Santa Catarina, and plunged in. The swift stream, -waist-deep, was hard to resist, especially as one could not help -slipping on the loose round stones, and the water hissed and boiled -with grape and bullets; but by good luck no casualty occurred, and the -men clambered up the opposite bank. Pushing on then, after pausing -for breath under the cover of thickets, they came at length to a low -eminence, and concealed themselves behind a hedge while the captain -reconnoitred. The main hill, which appeared to be nearly four hundred -feet high, was rough, steep and covered with chaparral. The garrison -seemed to be strong and resolute. The two guns made heavy odds. For -quite a while Smith studied the hard problem, doubting whether it was -practicable to assault the position, but finally he ordered the men -forward; and soon lines of dark blue Mexican skirmishers, descending -from the redoubt, stationed themselves at favorable points to meet -him.[12.8] - -[AMERICAN SUCCESSES] - -Meanwhile, noting this delay and certain preparations of the enemy, -Worth despatched the Seventh Infantry under Captain Miles to support -Smith; and then, worried at the sight of reinforcements on their way to -the redoubt, he sent the Fifth Infantry (Major Scott) and Blanchard's -Company in the same direction, with General Smith to take charge of all -these forces. Miles had not only the voice of a trumpet but the eyes of -a hawk, and striking at once upon a direct line of march, he promptly -reached the main ridge; and soon General Smith found him supporting the -wary but steady charge already launched. Discovering now El Soldado and -believing he would not be needed at the redoubt, General Smith moved -to his right along the southern side of the ridge with all the troops -except Captain Smith's. Like a fiery serpent, these now forced their way -up in a winding but ever advancing line. The hill blazed and smoked. The -sharp crack of the rifles punctuated the duller reports of the muskets. -Soon the Mexican skirmishers were driven back; the 9-pounders could -not be depressed enough to be effective; the Texans and "red-legged -infantry" conquered the slope; and finally, struggling breathlessly to -the redoubt, they found the garrison already in flight, carrying off one -of their guns.[12.8] - -Some of the victors then joined the rest of General Smith's command, -which could be seen winding through a gorge toward the other fort. Those -who did not, quickly remounted the second piece, which the Mexicans -had upset in trying to drag it away, and at the first shot, luckily -knocking the El Soldado gun out of position, sent the garrison flying. -At the double-quick the attacking column reached that position an -instant later, and brave Captain Gillespie, followed by other brave men, -despising the grape from Independence Hill that shrieked above their -heads, clambered over the parapet. The Mexican piece, quickly righted, -saluted the fugitives and then offered its compliments to the Palace -works. The other captured piece was then brought down to El Soldado; -and Miles's command, moving still farther east along the ridge with one -of the guns, took a third fortification; and thus by about the middle -of the afternoon, at a trifling cost, we had three forts, intended to -protect the rear and flank of Monterey, fighting for us.[12.8] - -But a still harder task now confronted the Americans. Shortly before -nightfall three companies of the Artillery Battalion, three of the -Eighth Infantry and some two hundred Texas riflemen--in all about -five hundred--accompanied by Captain Sanders, Lieutenant Meade and a -Mexican guide and commanded by Childs, were sent forward to the skirt of -Independence Hill. The peak before them was almost or quite as high as -the summit of Federation Ridge; and in addition to the redoubt, guns and -garrison on the top, a stronger position, more guns and a larger force -were just below at the Palace. The Mexican generals regarded the point -as unassailable.[12.9] - -The night was tempestuous. The men were tired out. Few had eaten for -thirty-six hours--none since breakfast. The rain fell in torrents, -and they had not even blankets. Small rivers flowed down the slope. -Sometimes heavy stones, loosened by the water, rolled upon them. The -darkness was absolute. Most of them sat up, holding their firearms, -covering the locks, and dozing when they could. At three o'clock the -sleepers were roughly shaken, and a hoarse whisper, "Fall in," passed -along. The storm was still raging. There was a chill in the wet air. -Muscles were stiff. Teeth actually rattled. Strict orders to make -no noise under any circumstances were circulated. Then came another -whisper, "Forward!" and in two columns--one under Childs and the other -under Captain Vinton--the almost vertical climb began.[12.9] - -Feet were placed cautiously but firmly. Despite the thorns, bushes had -to be seized for support. Sometimes the men crawled. Above all, the -gun-locks were to be kept dry. Now and then a stone, pried out by the -rain, would go clattering down; and with beating hearts, expecting to -be challenged, the men would pause. If discovered, they could have been -annihilated with rocks. But the storm drowned all the noise except its -own, and kept the Mexicans under cover. Slowly but steadily the ragged -line mounted. The night began to look grayish. The outline of the summit -could be made out.[12.9] - -Suddenly burst forth a blaze and a roar. It came from a picket-guard -about a hundred yards down, that had been sheltering themselves among -some rocks. The hasty fire was ineffective, except that some of the -Americans were burned. Not a musket answered it--only a yell and a -rush. Finally, sixty feet or so from the top it was time to fire, and -the musket and rifle spoke. Real fighting began now, give and take; and -the Mexicans had the advantage of position. But there were only about -fifty or sixty of them. The line closed in. There was a fierce grapple; -the Mexicans broke, and as the rising sun glimmered faintly through the -clouds, the Stars and Stripes were unfurled. Then the victors cheered -and cheered. Cheers came up from their comrades in the valley. Taylor's -men, who had watched the double line of fire and smoke go higher and -higher till it crowned the top and ceased, cheered and threw their caps -into the air; and the echoing mountain seemed to cheer back.[12.9] - -But the work was not yet done. Indeed the Americans only had the bull -by the horns. Too exhausted to pursue effectively at once, they had to -let the Mexicans escape. Seeing how the fight would end, some of the -garrison had removed the guns of the redoubt--accidentally throwing one -of them down the hill; but the saved piece and two 6-pounders now opened -fire on our men, and a counter-attack from the Palace garrison was to -be expected. That garrison probably numbered two hundred and fifty and -perhaps more. Some fifty dismounted dragoons reinforced it now; and -probably not less than two hundred and fifty horse occupied the slope -below.[12.9] - -But Worth had no intention of losing his prize. Three companies of -the Seventh Infantry were already moving down Federation Ridge, and -they took post near enough the Palace to menace any troops going from -that point against the summit, cheering loudly to attract attention. -The Fifth and Blanchard's Company reinforced Childs; and about noon -"with infinite difficulty," as Worth said, a 12-pound howitzer, taken -apart, was dragged up with straps. As the Palace had no roof and the -windows were poorly barricaded, the interior could be searched with -shrapnel. The Mexicans reciprocated, and desultory fighting continued -all the morning. In the afternoon Mexican reinforcements were seen in -the distance, and a prompt, decisive stroke appeared to be necessary. -One body of Americans therefore went about halfway to the Palace, and -concealed themselves among some rocks and bushes in a small ravine, -while another were placed out of sight on the slope. Then the howitzer -opened, and a force of skirmishers advanced in full view.[12.9] - -Ampudia's policy was a strict defensive, and Lieutenant Colonel -Berra, who commanded at this position, had been forbidden to take the -aggressive. But the howitzer had made itself extremely disagreeable; -his artillery had become disabled; his only chance lay in charging; and -this appeared to be the time. Foot and horse, the Mexicans therefore -sallied out, and gallantly they moved up the ridge, closing their ranks -when the howitzer opened them. Then the signal was given, and the men in -ambush, springing up like a flight of blackbirds, fired. The enemy broke -and ran; many of them did not stop till they reached the city; and the -massive gate of the Palace was closed. The howitzer soon broke the gate, -however, and the Americans poured in. For a time the struggle was fierce -yet indecisive; but suddenly the cry was heard, "Throw yourselves flat!" -and instantly over the prostrate Americans the howitzer belched a double -charge of canister. This was enough; and soon the Mexicans, harassed -with grape by Duncan and Mackall, who arrived now at a gallop, by the -fire of a piece captured at La Libertad and by that of El Soldado, were -fleeing into the city, spreading consternation on every hand. It was now -about four o'clock.[12.9] - -[AT THE EASTERN GATES] - -Leaving Worth and his gallant men thus in full possession of the western -gate of Monterey, we will now trace Taylor's operations at the opposite -end of the town. Sunday afternoon, observing the Mexican reinforcements -hastening to the summit of Independence Hill and fearing Worth might -be overpowered, he displayed most of his troops before the city until -dark as a menace. During the night his 10-inch mortar and two 24-pound -howitzers were planted about seven eighths of a mile from the citadel, -near the forward edge of a depression which screened them from the -enemy, and at seven o'clock the next morning these pieces fired for -twenty minutes, doubtless encouraging rather than alarming the enemy by -their ineffective work.[12.10] - -At the same time, to divert attention from Worth, as a note from that -officer had suggested, all the available infantry were drawn out before -the citadel as if to assault it. The First Division (regulars) stood -at the left of this line; Quitman's brigade--the Tennesseeans under -Campbell and the Mississippi riflemen under Davis--came next it, and -Hamer with the Ohio regiment occupied the extreme right. Meanwhile the -work of reconnoitring continued. Believing that he would meet with no -serious resistance at Monterey, Taylor had apparently felt little or no -anxiety to ascertain how the town had been fortified; but now he may -have realized that such information was desirable.[12.10] - -In a general sense we are already aware what defences had been prepared -in this quarter--particularly the barricaded streets and the stone -houses turned into forts; but the situation must now be investigated -more closely. West of the grand plaza and toward the northern edge of -the city there was a large spring. The outlet of this flowed toward the -east, widened into a pond, then contracted into a stream, passed under -Purisima bridge--a heavy structure of stone by which the Marin road -entered the city proper--veered a little toward the right, and finally -left the town at its northeastern corner. On the inner side of this -watercourse below Purisima bridge there were two simple redans capable -of holding fifty or seventy men each; and some distance farther down, -on the top of a rather steep slope, stood a strong earthwork named El -Rincon del Diablo (The Devil's Corner), commonly known by the Americans -as El Diablo, which had two or three guns, and could accommodate a -garrison of one hundred and fifty or two hundred.[12.10] - -On the outer side of the watercourse an irregular but strong -fortification (_tete de pont_), armed with a 12-pounder, defended -Purisima bridge. East and northeast of this lay a confused suburban -district occupied in part with streets, lanes, houses and huts, and in -part with orchards, gardens and yards enclosed with high stone walls. -Near the edge of it all, some four hundred yards in front of El Diablo, -was the most advanced Mexican position. This, occupied by about two -hundred men, consisted of a stone tannery building, often spoken of by -the Americans as a distillery, the flat roof of which, protected with -sand-bags in addition to the parapet, was held by a competent garrison, -and of an earthwork in front of it called the Teneria (Tannery) -redoubt, which, after having been erected and demolished, was rebuilt -with desperate exertions during Sunday night.[12.10] - -This fortification consisted of two short parallel sides prolonged -and drawn together in front so as to meet at a sharp angle; and the -north side was similarly prolonged and drawn in toward the rear so as -to protect partially the opening or throat. The approaches were not -cleared; the ditch was neither sufficiently deep nor sufficiently wide; -steps used in the process of construction made it easy to scale the face -(scarp); the parapet was completed with sand-bags made with ordinary -cotton cloth; and the guns, mounted in barbette without platforms, were -hard to manage on fresh dirt soaked with rain; but the redoubt, armed -with a 4-pounder and an 8-pounder--its northern side protected by the -guns of the citadel, its southern face by the tannery building, and its -throat by El Diablo--was a serious obstacle for infantry.[12.10] - -Why Taylor did not plant his mortar in front of it Sunday night--for -it was plainly visible and there was a transverse ridge within short -grape-shot range--drive the garrison out with half a dozen well-aimed -bombshells Monday morning, and repeat the operation the following night -and morning with El Diablo, is rather hard to understand. But it must -be remembered that he had probably never seen, and had certainly never -attacked, a scientific earthwork; these "mud-forts," as the soldiers -termed them, did not look impressive; and his plan to capture Monterey -"pretty much with the bayonet" had been determined upon. He was -nothing if not stubborn; and he doubtless believed that his officers -and men, given a chance at the Mexicans, would certainly whip them -somehow.[12.10] - -Accordingly, as Twiggs, commander of the First Division, was too ill -for battle, Taylor gave Lieutenant Colonel Garland this verbal order, -written down by one of Garland's aides: "Colonel lead the head of your -column off to the left, keeping well out of reach of the enemy's Shot, -and if you think (_or_ you find) you can take any of them little Forts -down there with the bay'net you better do it--but consult with Major -Mansfield, you'll find him down there." Garland then advanced with -the First and Third regiments and the Washington-Baltimore Battalion, -about 800 men, and made his way forward a considerable distance over -broken and obstructed ground. He soon came in sight of Mansfield, and -before long that officer galloped back to meet him. Garland no doubt -communicated Taylor's orders at this time; and Mansfield, supported by -some skirmishers, then went forward again.[12.10] - -The responsibility now resting upon the engineer was extremely heavy. -A map prepared by Meade from data brought by a spy probably showed -the Mexican works fairly well, but of course did not fully reveal the -intricacies of the situation. Taylor had seen this map, and must have -known everything thus far discovered by the reconnoitring officers, and -he evidently saw nothing to forbid an infantry attack. Under the fire of -the citadel and other fortifications, a close and detailed examination -of the ground, screened not only by the maze already alluded to but by -hedges, bush fences, trees and cornfields lying just outside the suburb, -was impossible; and to send the troops back without an overwhelming -reason in the face of the two armies, and look "Old Rough and Ready" in -the eye, was unthinkable. Taylor's order was therefore to all intents -and purposes an order, not merely for a demonstration, but for an -assault.[12.10] - -[MONTEREY ASSAULTED] - -So Garland, after marching for some time over and through all manner of -obstructions, as Mansfield directed, kept on for a considerable distance -under the fire of the citadel and redoubts, and at length saw that -officer running ahead on foot at the northeastern angle of the town, and -waving the troops on with his spy-glass. To obey this order involved -turning to the right and then to the left--movements that disconcerted -and scattered the raw Washington-Baltimore corps--and finally charging -at a venture into the maze already described, but it was done; the -Mexicans reinforcing the redoubt meanwhile with 150 men and an -8-pounder. Owing to the trend of the streets the Americans, now greatly -reduced in numbers, took a course that led them to the right instead of -the left, and failed to discover the throat of the redoubt, Mansfield's -objective. Caught in the maze and falling rapidly under an artillery and -musketry fire that seemed to come from everywhere, they found themselves -totally helpless. Bragg's battery was thrown in, but it could accomplish -nothing; and on Mansfield's recommendation Garland fell back.[12.10] - -Shortly before this, judging from the heavy fire that a serious -engagement was on, Taylor had ordered Butler to advance with his Field -Division. By a sad blunder three companies of the Fourth Infantry, which -had been covering the mortar and howitzers, were sent ahead of this -corps against the redoubt, and "almost in a moment"--as the official -report admitted--a third of the men fell. The rest, including Lieutenant -Ulysses S. Grant, then retired; and Quitman's brigade, which now formed -the left of the line, was ordered to support the regulars--in other -words, renew the attack.[12.10] - -With ample courage and enthusiasm the men advanced nearly a mile under -the fire of the citadel--which, as Taylor privately admitted, "done -considerable execution"--and before long under the worse fire of the -redoubt in front; but they staggered in the smashing blast of lead and -iron, their formation became very irregular, and after a time, though -not within effective musket or rifle range, they began to fire at will. -Colonel Davis, then some distance in advance on his iron-gray, Pompey, -grew impatient at the waste of time, ammunition and life, and as the -redoubt stopped firing just then, he cried, "Now is the time. Great -God, if I had fifty men with knives I could take that fort." Then he -waved his sword, and called on his men to charge. Colonel Campbell, -equally ignoring his brigade commander, did the same; and both regiments -hurried on as groups and individuals, each man trying to outstrip the -rest.[12.10] - -Fortunately the time was ripe. Worn down by several hours of excitement -and exertion--for noonday was now approaching--the Mexicans felt a -reaction. The stubborn perseverance of the Americans daunted them. -Captain Backus and about 100 men of the First Infantry, not receiving -the order to withdraw, had climbed to the parapeted roof of a building -about 130 yards from the redoubt and now persistently annoyed them. They -looked for the reserves; but perhaps Garland's operations prevented -sending them, and certainly none came. Ammunition began to fail. The -muskets were hot and foul. The cloth of the sand-bags took fire, and -made the parapet extremely uncomfortable. Carrasco, the commander, who -had run away at the Resaca, now openly took flight again; and a part -of the garrison, formed to charge upon the Americans, were seen, or -at least were supposed, to be retreating. A panic seized the troops, -and almost in an instant the guns were abandoned and the redoubt stood -nearly empty. A few minutes more, and tall, powerful McClung of the -Mississippi Rifles leaped upon the parapet and waved his sword. By the -same way or bursting through the sallyport, equally brave men of both -regiments came close after him. Thirty or thirty-five prisoners were -seized. An American flag went up; and after a brief conflict the tannery -also--practically abandoned by the enemy--was taken.[12.10] - -During Quitman's advance the First Ohio approached the city farther to -the right. It was well officered, for besides its colonel, Brigadier -General Hamer, the Hooker of Chancellorsville, the Johnston of Shiloh, -Major General Butler and Major General Taylor accompanied it; but it -failed to accomplish anything. A second attempt was equally unfortunate, -but when Taylor--evidently despairing of success--had ordered it out -of town, word came of Quitman's achievement. The regiment was then -sent into the fight again. Garland's remnant, still in the outskirts -of the city, came up; Quitman's troops were ordered to cooperate; and -a determined effort was made to gain the rear of El Diablo. Both grand -and pitiful that effort was. As an exhibition of pluck it could hardly -have been surpassed. Taylor, fighting on foot, matched Richard Coeur -de Lion storming Front de Boeuf's castle; and his intrepidity was so -flawless and unforced that courage appeared to all round him the easy -and only way. To die under such a leader seemed the acme of living. It -was not war, but it was grand fighting.[12.10] - - "We were not many, we who stood - Before the iron sleet that day; - Yet many a gallant spirit would - Give half his years if but he could - Have been with us at Monterey. - - And on, still on our column kept - Through walls of flame its withering way; - Where fell the dead, the living stept, - Still charging on the guns which swept - The slippery streets of Monterey." - -But the enemy, seldom visible, appeared to be everywhere. A large part -of the groping Americans got in front of Purisima bridge, and went down -fast under a rain of bullets from the _tete de pont_, while Captain -Gutierrez, who had now masked his gun on the opposite bank, poured grape -and canister upon them at short range. Ridgely came up and fired several -times at the bridgehead, but without effect. Among our troops, as one -of the surgeons wrote, "All was confusion." Smoke hid the outlook; and -the Mexican shots, breaking the limestone, mortar and adobe, raised a -blinding dust. The assailants did not know where to turn or what to do. -Taylor, Butler, Hamer, Quitman and other officers shouted orders that -few could hear amidst the uproar, and perhaps fewer could reconcile. -It was proposed to cut through from house to house, but the necessary -implements had not been brought. Ridgely's and Bragg's batteries and -the captured Mexican guns fired on El Diablo, and finally the 24-pound -howitzers were brought in; but nothing could be accomplished in that -way. Many of the best and the bravest fell; and eventually, at about -five o'clock, the Americans retreated from all of Monterey except the -Teneria redoubt and a few adjacent buildings.[12.10] - -[A COSTLY AMERICAN TRIUMPH] - -So the fight ended. It had been one long scene of gallantry, confusion, -mistakes and waste. Lieutenant D. H. Hill, afterwards General Hill of -the Confederate army, wrote in his journal on learning the details: "It -seems that every sort of folly was committed." To pitch handfuls of -infantry into an unknown maze of obstacles, fortifications and cannon as -if they had been fighting Indians in a Florida swamp, and to send field -batteries into narrow streets--in the suburb crooked, too--against heavy -stone works and roofs filled with protected marksmen was extraordinary. -And, it was credibly reported, Taylor did more. He ordered Ridgely out -into the open to try conclusions with El Diablo. Ridgely was absolutely -fearless. To satisfy the General he went out himself and reconnoitred, -but he would not lead his battery to destruction. The Tennessee regiment -was needlessly taken back and forth six times within range of the -citadel.[12.10] - -Now--to get shelter, food, ammunition--the troops had to march -separately or in groups all the way to camp, exposed for a long distance -not only to the citadel guns but also to the lancers, who nearly caused -a disaster and might have done so, had all, instead of but a part of -them, obeyed the order to charge. A howitzer, aided by the captured -guns, still exchanged compliments now and then with El Diablo, but -the battle of the day was over. A redoubt had been won, and Worth's -operations against the Federation Ridge redoubts had been assisted; but -these advantages might have been gained far more cheaply.[12.10] - -The Teneria position was garrisoned for the night by Garland's exhausted -command, the Kentucky regiment (Louisville Legion), which had been on -guard at the mortar, and Ridgely's battery. This was not an agreeable -task. The rain fell in torrents, and the interior of the fort was so -thoroughly searched by the guns of El Diablo, that a part of the men had -to lie on their backs in the mud. Some defences were thrown up, however; -Tuesday morning Quitman's brigade relieved the garrison; and Taylor's -men, cheered now by the sight of their comrades taking Independence -Hill, were given a necessary rest. Both sides used their artillery to -some extent, and in spite of the Mexican fire our position was further -strengthened; but on this day nothing was done at the eastern end to -assist Worth.[12.10] - -During Tuesday night the enemy seemed to be in motion. They should -have made an attack; and the Americans--without blankets, overcoats -or food, soaked with rain, and chilled by a north wind--passed the -hours reconnoitring or standing in water behind their breastwork. Far, -however, from Ampudia's mind was the thought of a vigorous offensive. -Dismayed by the cutting of his communications and by the stubborn valor -of the Americans, and weakened by the cowardice of certain officers, he -ordered all the outworks abandoned, and concentrated his forces in and -near the grand plaza. Such a change could not be made at night without -much confusion. Many of the troops, too, were indignant; some refused to -leave their posts; all felt disheartened, and a few broke out in riotous -disorder. The work of fortifying the inner line went on, but the loss of -morale far more than offset this advantage.[12.10] - -At daybreak Wednesday, suspecting that the Mexicans had left or were -leaving El Diablo, Quitman advanced, and found that both men and guns -had been withdrawn; but other works not far distant were still held too -strongly to be captured. Attempts were made to gain ground in various -directions; and finally, an hour or two before noon, with assistance -from the Second Texas regiment, dismounted, and the Third and the -Fourth Infantry, extensive and well-supported operations began to be -undertaken. In particular, a systematic plan of breaking through the -continuous line of houses and firing from the roofs was adopted. At -each cross-street vigorous fighting had to be done, for the Mexicans, -though inferior as marksmen, resisted obstinately at every favorable -point; and the musketry and artillery behind their barricades swept -the approaches fiercely. Five out of the twelve commissioned officers -of the Third Infantry were killed, says General Grant. Two sections of -field artillery came up, but the gunners were shot down rapidly in spite -of all precautions; and at length, finding the pieces too light for -effective service, Taylor ordered them to retire. A gun at the Teneria -redoubt was tried, but after a time the advance of the Americans made it -dangerous to fire toward the plaza.[12.10] - -The infantry pushed on, however, and by three o'clock were only one -square from the grand plaza. Here ammunition began to fail, and -Lieutenant Grant, hanging over the side of his horse by an arm and a -foot, dashed across the streets too swiftly to be fired at, and went in -search of it. With a view to preparing for a general assault, however, -or for some other reason Taylor ordered the troops, now working safely -inside the houses, to withdraw--under fire, of course. Reluctantly, -though many of them had not eaten for thirty-six hours, they marched -back to the redoubts and thence after dark to Walnut Grove; and the Ohio -and Kentucky regiments went on duty at the captured redoubts.[12.10] - -Strangely enough, Taylor seems to have made no effort, after the -storming of the Bishop's Palace, to arrange with General Worth for -concerted action or to give him fresh orders, although he could easily -have done so, and knew that all the work assigned to that division had -been completed. Wednesday morning, therefore, after the long, deep -slumber of exhaustion, Worth's men found themselves mostly in idleness, -and a large part of them, concentrated near the Palace, gazed upon the -city at their leisure as the dissolving mists revealed it. Not far away -in the suburb were General Arista's gardens, full of orange, lemon, -pomegranate and fig trees, bananas, grapes and flowers, watered by -canals that sparkled in the sun. Once in a while a blue-frocked monk, -girded with a white cord and tassel, could be seen; and flashes from -the streams that ran through almost every street were caught here and -there. Beyond lay the white or lightly tinted houses with leafy squares -here and there, dominated by the cathedral spires. At due intervals the -clock bell peacefully tolled the hour or the quarter. On the left the -dark citadel belched occasionally a cloud of white smoke. On the right -the Santa Catarina hurried along between the city and the picturesque -villas on its opposite bank. Farther away, but still near, the twisted -strata and the vast, splintered buttresses, battlements and pinnacles -of the Sierra Madre, thinly draped with soft clouds, towered aloft; -and overhead great birds that seemed to be eagles travelled like dark -planets round their orbits in the blue.[12.10] - -But though they gazed with deep interest, these haggard fellows with -bloodshot eyes were not in a mood to enjoy the scene. No orders came -from Taylor. Hardly a shot had been heard this morning from the lower -town. Mexicans boasted of gaining a victory on that side, and "Your turn -will come next," our men were told. Heavy reinforcements from Saltillo, -it was rumored, would soon arrive by the pass. Worth, nervous and -anxious, climbed to the Palace tower with his glass, and searched every -quarter for news. Meantime the cannon were planted at more commanding -points. A howitzer opened on the town. Preparations to make an assault -were continued; and, as Mexicans from the south were now said to be -approaching, a detachment went about three miles up the Saltillo highway -to a strong position. An hour or two before noon, however, the roar of -battle began to come from the lower town; and Worth, judging that it -meant a serious attack, ordered a column forward by each of the two main -streets.[12.10] - -[WORTH ADVANCES AGAIN] - -With a cheer that sounded like a roar the troops hurried down the slope, -and burst into the suburb. For some time the work was easy, for in fear -of the Libertad guns all the western section had been evacuated; and -raising a fierce cry that afterwards came to be known as the "rebel -yell," which began with a growl and rose to a falsetto scream, the -Americans dashed on at a run. Beyond the cemetery, however, Mexican -troops opened fire, and until some of Duncan's and Mackall's guns came -up, fought like demons. Barricaded streets and garrisoned roofs were -next encountered, and again the Americans dived into the houses. Making -a small hole in the wall that divided two dwellings they would drop -through it a six-inch shell with a three-seconds fuse lighted, and -throw themselves flat. Results followed promptly. The aperture was then -enlarged; and crawling through, they repeated the operation, while the -best marksmen fought from the roof.[12.10] - -Taylor's withdrawal from the city, however, supplied the Mexicans with -reinforcements. The enemy fairly seemed to swarm, and their courage -seemed to rise. "Cannons and small arms flashed, crashed and roared like -one mighty storm of wind, rain, hail, thunder and lightning," wrote a -soldier; while the thud of planks against heavy doors and the blows of -pickaxes on walls of stone swelled the uproar. Once the advance was -halted. But Colonel Hays, a shy man with a broad forehead, a Roman nose, -brilliant, restless hazel eyes, and the courage of twenty lions packed -in his delicate frame, had been a prisoner in the Monterey post-office -once, and had sworn a great oath to sleep this night in the post-office -or in hell, and nothing could stop him. By dark the Americans were -only a square from the market-place, and the Colonel had the postal -accommodations at his command.[12.10] - -Ampudia's case was by no means desperate even now. His losses had been -small--twenty-nine officers and 338 men killed and wounded, according -to his report. There were provisions, ammunition and artillery enough; -the strong buildings round the plaza and market-place, defended with -resolution by a large garrison, could not easily have been taken; and -the division of the Americans into widely separated commands invited a -sortie.[12.10] - -The situation was, however, by no means agreeable. After nightfall the -Americans planted two howitzers and a 6-pounder on the top of a high -building close to the western side of the plaza. Taylor's mortar had -been carried to Worth during the day, and after sunset it began to fire -now and then on the cathedral, where tons of gunpowder were stored. The -citadel undertook to reply, but the mortar, planted behind the stone -wall of the cemetery, was not likely to be struck, and a single one of -its bombs might conceivably have blown the Mexican army to pieces. In -fact so might a shot from Taylor's 24-pound howitzers, which delivered -two shells effectively after dark. On the southern side of the river, -opposite the town, the Fifth Infantry had planted one of the El Soldado -guns at the third work on Federation ridge, where it could at least have -proved annoying. The horses of the cavalry were in the way. The garrison -of the citadel could not promptly cooperate with the troops in town, for -it had sealed up the exit. Ampudia's defensive policy discouraged the -soldiers, for even though some of them flanked the retiring Americans -on Wednesday afternoon, they were not permitted to reoccupy the houses -abandoned by Taylor, and still less to attack the redoubts. Despondency -was general; some of the leading officers urged surrender; and Ampudia, -it was reported, keeping the choicest corps near his person, shut -himself up in the cathedral until a shell dropped near it, and then fled -to a private house.[12.10] - -[NEGOTIATIONS] - -Naturally, then, early on Thursday morning one of his aides carried -to the American general a proposition to give up the city, and retire -with the troops and military material. Taylor replied with a demand for -unconditional surrender, and insisted upon having an answer by noon. -Instead of complying Ampudia sent a request for a personal interview. -The result was a joint commission. Vexatious negotiations followed. The -tedious and wily methods of Mexican diplomacy were thoroughly tried; but -at length an ultimatum from Taylor's representatives ended the affair, -and the terms of capitulation were signed. These provided that the -citadel should be given up immediately, that within a week the Mexican -troops with their arms, accoutrements and six field pieces should -retire--without giving their parole not to fight again--beyond the line -of Rinconada Pass, Linares and San Fernando de Presas, that before this -evacuation of Monterey the town should be occupied by the Americans -for hospital and storage purposes only, and that for eight weeks--"or -until the orders or instructions of the respective governments can be -received"--the Americans would not cross the specified line.[12.11] - -As Polk asserted and the General himself admitted, Taylor violated -his orders in granting such terms, and his excuses for doing so -were signally unconvincing, while some of them involved perhaps the -virtual assumption on his part of a political authority superior to -the President's. But substantial reasons for the terms did exist. -"Considering our situation," explained the General privately, they were -not over-liberal; and that was true. Being very short of ammunition -and provisions, he could only negotiate, assault or retreat. According -to his spokesmen in the Senate, his effectives numbered only some 5000 -and probably they did not reach those figures. About one third of them -had no bayonets. The First Division of regulars had been crippled; the -Second was tired out; and the volunteers had been so far demoralized, -that in Meade's opinion they could no longer be depended upon. Worth, -chief American representative on the joint commission, had not "the -slightest confidence" left in Taylor's leadership, and wrote privately -that "many others" shared his opinion, while a still greater number felt -doubtful.[12.12] - -With such troops, feeble artillery and scant ammunition, to attack an -enemy of proved fighting quality, now at bay in stone houses, fully -supplied with guns and munitions, and comparatively fresh, was not an -inviting proposition. In short, as Crittenden and Clayton stated in -defence of Taylor on the floor of the Senate, it was not feasible to -storm the city; and to retreat with sick and wounded over such a route, -pursued by mobile infantry and sleepless mounted men, and harried by -an exultant population, would have meant ruin. It was a wise course -to escape from this dilemma as he did, and the truth could not be -told.[12.12] - -[MONTEREY OCCUPIED] - -September 25 the citadel was evacuated, and the next day with drums -beating and banners flying the first brigade of Mexicans left the -city--all noting with curious interest the difference between their trim -uniforms and freshly pipe-clayed belts and the unkempt appearance of -the victors, who, as an American said, were as dirty as they could be -without becoming real estate. The second brigade followed on the next -day, and the rest of the troops on the twenty-eighth. Monterey, with -a quantity of indifferent gunpowder and a number of cannon, many of -them bad, was ours, and soon the people of the United States, whom a -costly but valorous battle impressed far more than orderly, scientific -operations could have done, were again acclaiming Taylor. By distance, -by his courage, by his picturesque individuality, and by his very -position as commander of the one American army fighting the Mexicans, -he was idealized. His excellent reports--the work of Bliss--confirmed -every favorable impression; and the writers of the day, fully aware that -he was already a popular hero and anxious to suit the prevailing taste, -colored the facts until these could hardly be recognized. Men on the -ground, in contact with the crude realities, felt otherwise. Taylor's -want of prevision and of generalship was in fact bitterly censured -there. Worth "is the high comb cock of the army," wrote one officer. -He has won all the laurels, though Taylor will have the glory at home, -remarked a surgeon.[12.13] - -As for the conduct of the troops in general, however, there could be -only one opinion. "Three glorious days," was General Scott's description -of the struggle. War is--war. Dreadful things were done, splendid -men were cut down. Yet if there be glory in fidelity and courage, in -meeting extraordinary hardships, and in triumphing over extraordinary -difficulties, then Scott's description was correct.[12.13] - - - - - XIII - - SALTILLO, PARRAS, TAMPICO - - August-December, 1846 - - -For men supposed to have won a splendid victory, Taylor and his army -seem to have been rather low in their spirits after the capture of -Monterey. Taylor admitted that his forces had been "greatly reduced." -Learning that a part of the Second Infantry had arrived on the Rio -Grande, he described this trifling reinforcement as "most welcome." The -Texas troops wished to go home and were discharged. To replace them -he counted on the Tennessee and Kentucky horse; but these regiments, -having been ordered to San Antonio, were long in reaching the front. -October 15 he estimated his aggregate effective strength as less than -12,000.[13.1] Chills and fever, a depressing malady, was extremely -prevalent; and a strong tendency to desert appeared to indicate a -generally unsatisfactory state of things.[13.2] Not only priests but -Mexican officers remaining at Monterey to convalesce or to care for -the sick, stimulated this tendency; and about the middle of November -all such officers, not indispensably needed by the sick and wounded, -received peremptory orders to go south. A little later, it was reported, -the alcalde was imprisoned for the same offence. Moreover bands of -Mexicans, not dismayed by the American triumphs, hung upon Taylor's -lines to rob and kill.[13.6] - -[TAYLOR AND THE GOVERNMENT] - -The General had other troubles also. There was a plan at Washington, -promoted by reports of his inefficiency and by letters from certain -ambitious officers left in the rear, to put in his place one of the new -brigadier generals. Scott, however, protected his interests, and by -having him assigned to duty with his brevet rank, threw a great obstacle -before the schemers. They encountered other difficulties as well, and -finally Polk sent him word confidentially that he need have no fear of -displacement. This, however, did not prevent a serious clash between -him and the administration over another matter. Perceiving that Mexico -could not defend effectively the remote and disaffected provinces -of the north against even our volunteer forces, realizing that the -possession of territory would be an advantage in making a treaty, and -wishing particularly to impress the Mexican Congress, which was to meet -on December 6, Polk felt extremely anxious to extend our occupation as -much as possible at once, and with all this in view it was proposed to -Taylor on September 22 that, should he see fit, he should have General -Patterson,[13.3] who was now the commanding officer at Camargo, occupy -the chief points in Tamaulipas.[13.6] - -As Taylor had bitterly complained of receiving hordes of volunteers for -whom there was nothing to do, it was naturally presumed at Washington -that such an expedition could be organized without interference with his -plans; and, supposing also that Patterson was at Matamoros, far from -Monterey, Marcy instructed that general to begin his preparations while -awaiting definitive orders from Taylor on the subject. Such a movement, -however, not being permissible under the terms of the armistice, a -plan in which the government felt deeply interested came to nothing; -and Taylor, perhaps to divert attention from this aspect of the case, -not only vetoed the expedition, but protested violently against the -course of the government in addressing one of his officers.[13.4] -Polk was naturally and properly incensed, but he believed Taylor was -now in the field for the Whig Presidential nomination, and wanted to -force a quarrel upon the administration; and hence Marcy replied mildly -to the General that the right of the commander-in-chief to offer mere -"suggestions" could hardly be denied.[13.6] - -On another point also there was a clash. Polk and his Cabinet condemned -at once and unanimously the Monterey armistice; but, shrewdly or -charitably suspecting that undisclosed reasons for it might have -existed, they decided to end it in such a manner as to express neither -approval nor censure. Marcy therefore directed on October 13 that it -should be terminated, explaining that it stood in the way of prosecuting -the war vigorously and forcing Mexico to seek peace. As by its terms the -agreement was subject to the approval of the respective governments, no -difficulty stood in the way of cancelling it; and on November 5 Taylor -notified Santa Anna, that since the Washington authorities disapproved -of the armistice, he should consider himself at liberty to resume -offensive operations on the fifteenth, since by that date he reckoned -that his despatch would reach San Luis Potosi.[13.6] - -In reply the wily Mexican attempted to convey an insinuation of bad -faith on the part of the American government. This Taylor properly -noticed in his rejoinder, expressing at the same time a hope that -Mexico would accept the offer of the United States to negotiate, and -that permanent friendly relations between the two republics might -ensue. Santa Anna had now a better opening; and he protested that his -country would do all she could to justify her title to sovereignty and -independence, and would never listen to any proposal of peace, until the -American army should evacuate her soil, and the American vessels lay -aside their hostile attitude.[13.5] The correspondence was published -of course in the _Diario_, and obviously tended to unite the nation, as -well as to enhance the prestige of its leader.[13.6] - -[MOVEMENT AGAINST SALTILLO] - -The termination of the armistice enabled Taylor to occupy Saltillo, -upon which his eye had long been fixed. For several reasons he deemed -the town, a place of some 18,000 souls, important. It was the capital -of the state of Coahuila, a support for Monterey and the chief pass -through the Sierra Madre, a station on the high road to the south, -and the dominating point in a region full of corn, wheat, cattle and -other supplies. At this time the city was entirely without protection. -Mejia had been ordered in May to fortify it, but had not been able to -do so; and Santa Anna's first thought, on learning that Monterey had -capitulated, was to bring Ampudia back to San Luis Potosi with his -demoralized soldiers.[13.10] - -Accordingly General Worth received orders on November 8 to march for -that place four days later with Lieutenant Colonel Duncan's battery, -the Artillery Battalion (eight companies), the Fifth and the Eighth -Infantry, and Blanchard's Company--in all about 1000 men;[13.7] and -Taylor with two squadrons of the Second Dragoons under Lieutenant -Colonel May determined to accompany him. The morning of the twelfth -brought a despatch from Marcy dated October 22, expressing the wish of -the government that, in view of Santa Anna's threatening posture and -the increasing unfriendliness of the people, no attempt should be made -to hold territory beyond Monterey, or at most beyond the mountains; -but the decision was confided to the General, and he set out the next -day.[13.10] - -Advancing, then, by the left bank of the swift Santa Catarina River, at -this time of the year but an insignificant stream, the column ascended -gradually, passed the village of that name, and after marching nearly 28 -miles came to a small bridge and a group of handsome live-oaks. Next the -road descended a little, and, enclosed much of the way by lines of trees -and maguey,[13.8] pursued the same general direction until it reached -the hacienda of Rinconada, a mile or so farther on. Up to this point the -majestic ranges of the Sierra Madre, nearly destitute of vegetation, -though here and there brightened by a white thread of water, had stood -about six miles apart; but now they closed in, and the road, turning -sharply to the left, plunged into a grand and sombre gorge known as the -Pass of Rinconada. For three miles or more it ascended steeply between -gray and frowning walls of stone decorated only with a few hardy and -prickly growths, and sometimes partly hidden by the clouds; but finally -the summit was gained, and before long the farm of Los Muertos (The -Dead) came in sight with its bare, vertical cliffs and its huge cairn of -cobble-stones--probably a memorial to some party of travellers murdered -by robbers--which gave a grim significance to the name.[13.10] - -Here the Americans gazed with special interest at Mexican works -intended to check their advance. Not willing to give up this natural -fastness Ampudia, in spite of the orders to withdraw, had undertaken to -fortify it; but soon, discovering that more extensive defences than he -possessed the means to erect and equip would be needful, to prevent the -position from being turned, he had prudently concluded to dismantle his -fortifications and retreat. The gorge now expanded, and gave place to a -long, wide, open valley extending to Saltillo. Here gardens, fields and -crops were seen once more, but how different! Instead of the orange and -lemon groves, the bananas and figs of Monterey, with the languid smokes -of sugar-houses rising in the distance, the soldiers beheld fields of -wheat and oats, and orchards of cherries and apples. In short, a march -of 65 or 70 miles had transported them to New England.[13.10] - -Gathered with great difficulty on November 15, the legislature of -Coahuila had elected and inaugurated J. M. de Aguirre as governor, and -on approaching Saltillo the following day Taylor received from him a -formal protest against the American advance.[13.9] The General kept -on, however, without replying, and leaving Worth's command in the city -square, pitched his tent on the farther side of the town. There was -little to make the place agreeable. Saltillo lay on the southeastern -side of a slightly concave plain, with mountains close behind it that -looked, in the afternoon of a sunny day, like immense drifts of dusty -snow. The city itself, consisting mostly of low adobe houses--protected -with grated windows--clinging to steep, narrow streets, wore the aspect -of dilapidation and age that was characteristic of provincial Mexico; -and the common people, apparently less intelligent then the populace of -Monterey, probably more dominated by the priests, and certainly more -secluded from contact with Americans, looked sullen and hostile.[13.10] - -Some of better standing attempted to charge exorbitant prices; but the -General promptly seized whatever supplies he could lay hands upon, -ascertained the owners, and proposed to pay what had been the current -rates or nothing. He treated the chief magistrate well, however, -assuring him that his desire was to see peace restored as soon as -possible, and good order preserved meanwhile at Saltillo; and after -ordering certain reconnaissances made in the surrounding region, he -set out for Monterey about the twenty-first. His gruff, unpolished -ways did not entirely please the Mexicans, and they were glad to find -themselves now under the courtly Worth, to whom they ascribed "better -feelings."[13.10] - -[THE CHIHUAHUA EXPEDITION] - -Meanwhile two other American commands, one on each side of Taylor, were -conducting aggressive operations. If the occupation of Tamaulipas was -likely to influence Mexico and facilitate the negotiation of a treaty, -so was that of Chihuahua; and the western as well as the eastern of -these provinces was believed to be disaffected toward the general -government on account of the overthrow of the federal constitution. As -early, therefore, as the middle of May, Polk proposed to the Cabinet -an expedition against Chihuahua, and the suggestion was immediately -accepted. Naturally such a diversion of strength from an effective -line of attack to a remote section, where the people were hardly strong -enough to cope with the savages, occasioned both at the time and later -much criticism; and not only on this, but on other grounds as well, the -President's action in the matter could be criticized fairly.[13.11] - -Indeed, in almost every case that required a thorough comprehension -of the Mexican problem, he blundered. Yet this was not his fault. -He did his best; and one is tempted to lay the charge against a -system of government which confers on politicians, ignorant or poorly -informed regarding vital matters, the honors and responsibilities of -statesmanship. So broad a censure is, however, unjust, as one scarcely -needs to say. At all events we do not place in power, as others have -done, mere _faineants_ or persons qualified only for social functions -and palace intrigues. Very few Americans reach a high public station -unless they have ability of some kind, a more or less healthful ambition -to achieve, and much force of character; and thus we stand about as -well perhaps as the Chinese, who used to reason that a man who could -surpass a multitude of rivals in memorizing--and thus absorbing more or -less fully--the best thought and language of his race, would be able to -perform the commonplace duties of a magistrate. In reality our troubles -arise from the infirmities of human nature and the defectiveness of all -human institutions, no doubt, and this reflection may help us feel the -proper resignation as we view the blunders of the Mexican war; yet one -cannot quite forget the opinion of Meade: "Well may we be grateful that -we are at war with Mexico! Were it any other power, our gross follies -would have been punished severely."[13.11] - -About the middle of June Brigadier General Wool, then at Louisville, -received instructions to take command at San Antonio, Texas--for which -point certain troops were already under orders--report to Taylor, -and prepare for an expedition against Chihuahua. He proceeded to New -Orleans, accordingly, and from there he wrote on the twenty-eighth of -July that within twenty days, he hoped, the whole of his force would be -at the rendezvous. In this he was disappointed. La Vaca, Texas, about -160 miles from San Antonio, was the chief base on the coast,[13.12] -and wet weather made the so-called roads almost impassable. To get 1112 -heavy loads of supplies through bottomless mud, churned by about 500 -wagons going and returning, was an almost inconceivable task. Though -excessive rains had been falling, the troops, marching under an August -sun, were tormented by thirst; an occasional bunch of delicious grapes -or slice of prime venison could hardly solace them for the abundance of -rattlesnakes, tarantulas, scorpions and centipedes; and sleep was broken -by the screaming of panthers and howling of wolves--positively unearthly -when near, one of the soldiers wrote, and resembling, when distant, the -wail of some terrible monster gasping for life. In spite of hardships -and labors, however, men and wagons finally reached San Antonio, and on -August 14 Wool himself arrived at that point.[13.26] - -Here the troops had time to rest, and they found much of interest. The -old Mexican town--where one could still see now and then a fig tree -spreading itself in the _patio_ (courtyard) of a crumbling house, or -gaze at the heavy, earth-brown or moss-covered walls of the Alamo, -pitted by Santa Anna's cannon balls--looked in their eyes like some -ancient oriental city "just dug up," as one of them said; and the -cactus, the live-oaks, the mocking-birds, the pellucid river and -the many varieties of grapes extinguished soon the memory of past -fatigues.[13.26] - -For Wool, on the other hand, there was no repose. Now, as always -during the Mexican war, operations were unspeakably embarrassed by the -necessity of drawing supplies from so great a distance and by sea, and -naturally San Antonio, a town of only some 2000 persons, could furnish -much less than cities like Vera Cruz or even Matamoros. Each particular -article that would be necessary on the expedition had to be provided -now; and departmental errors, like delaying arms and misdirecting parts -of wagons, were therefore peculiarly unfortunate. But the greatest -difficulty was disorder. The command was a chaotic mass like that on the -Rio Grande, turbulent, impatient, insubordinate. Wool, however, attacked -the problem without shrinking, and what a soldier called "the iron hand" -of military discipline soon began to set things right.[13.26] - -[HARNEY'S ESCAPADE] - -Highly unfortunate, therefore, in this as well as in other regards, was -an escapade of Brevet Colonel Harney, a man as brave as a lion and also -as untamable, who had been occupying San Antonio for some time with -three companies of the Second Dragoons. Obtaining permission to ask -for Texan troops to defend the frontier against the Indians,[13.13] -he called for eight companies, and shortly before Wool's arrival, on -the pretext of a threatened Mexican invasion of which he entertained -little or no fear, he moved off with his entire command, although he -knew of the intended concentration at San Antonio, and advanced to the -Rio Grande.[13.14] Imprudently crossing the river, he was cut off by -one of its quick rises. Only the refusal of his officers to follow him -prevented a ridiculous dash against Monterey. Finally, near the end of -August, he obeyed the order to return, but left three companies behind; -and a part of this detachment, engaged in procuring a large supply of -grain and flour in Mexico, lost the supplies and three of their number, -killed or wounded. The rest of the three companies escaped under fire in -a disgraceful manner, burning public stores to prevent the Mexicans from -taking them; and of course news that Americans had been repulsed flew -like fire through the border.[13.26] - -[WOOL'S MARCH] - -Such presumption on the part of a regular officer, such imprudence, -and above all such disregard of his government's known intentions -were intolerable, and Wool felt them with peculiar intensity. He was -a high-strung person. Being devoutly pious he loathed swearing, for -example; but on special occasions his feelings got the better of his -tongue, and when this occurred he would instantly raise his eyes to -heaven and implore forgiveness. While not a great man, and apparently -incapable of inspiring soldiers or gaining their sympathetic support, -he understood his profession and lived up to it. When campaigning he -seemed to sleep--if he slept at all--with both eyes open, and the -outposts were liable to receive a visit at any hour of the night. Never -sparing himself, he was equally stern with others; and towards officers, -presumably more intelligent and responsible than privates, he seemed -especially exacting. So now he treated Harney with such rigor that some -of the volunteer officers, little disposed to favor strict discipline, -sympathized with the culprit, and Wool came to be regarded by not a -few as a narrow martinet, jealous and harsh in temper and weak in -judgment. Possibly some ground for these opinions could be found, but -substantially they were unjust.[13.15] - -Finally, on September 23, a topographical party went forward to study -routes, inquire about wood, water and forage, and select halting -places; and two days later some 1400 men, the first section of the -"army," advanced into an almost unknown region with about one hundred -and seventy-five wagons and provisions for two months.[13.16] The -distance to Presidio del Rio Grande, a small Mexican town five or -six miles beyond the river, was about 175 or possibly 185 miles. -Much of the country proved to be rough and wild, but there were also -barren prairies, deep "hog-wallows," rich bottom-land and one fine, -broad valley. Several streams had to be crossed, and among these were -counted the Medina and the Leona, not less beautiful than their names. -Population there was almost none, though on the first day's march -Castroville, a German town planted on American soil by a Frenchman -bearing a Spanish name, offered quite cosmopolitan suggestions. A -drought of several weeks had made the roads hard and the streams -fordable, and no serious difficulty was encountered until on October 8 -the advance came to the Rio Grande.[13.26] - -The river was here swift and rather more than four feet in depth; but -with the aid of boats and a pontoon bridge, provided beforehand by -Wool, the troops effected a crossing safely during the next few days, -established a small fort at each end of the bridge--to hold it and to -guard the boats for the second section under Colonel Churchill, which -was still waiting at San Antonio for the means of transportation--and -then camped three or four miles beyond the town for rest and repairs. -Some of the teams had come all the way from La Vaca, 330 miles, without -stopping for a day. As the small Mexican border force had retired and -the citizens were friendly, there was nothing to fear; and Wool's -amicable assurances, reinforced with strict orders to molest no one, -promoted kind relations. The government had left him without specie, and -the people would accept only hard cash; but with private means and by -dint of borrowing he obtained half-rations of corn. This brightened the -outlook noticeably, for subsistence was to be, of course, the greatest -problem; and the arrival here of Brigadier General Shields,[13.17] who -brought not only another body of the troops but news that Monterey -had fallen, and took command of all the infantry, together with a -small force of mounted men, appeared to strengthen the expedition -materially.[13.26] - - [Illustration: WOOL'S MARCH - -Based on Reconnaissances of Capt. Hughes, Lieut. Sitgreaves and Lieut. -Franklin] - -Wool had received no definite instructions from Taylor, and on October -16 with about 1800 men he struck out according to his own judgment -for Monclova, taking a circuitous route practicable for wagons and -artillery. This brought the army soon to San Fernando de Rosas, a garden -of roses lying in a beautiful plain on the cool and limpid Hidden River -(the _Escondido_), surrounded with trees and encompassed at a distance -with superbly grand peaks.[13.18] Here the road turned more toward the -south, and the country soon became broken. Formidable mountains upreared -themselves ahead, and before long the troops were among them, traversing -valley after valley in order to turn their huge flanks.[13.26] - -The San Jose range, some 4000 feet high, had to be climbed. It was a -hard task; but when the mists dissolved, Wool and his men gazed with -delight over two beautiful valleys, where meandering lines of dark -foliage marked the watercourses, while on the west, like a battlemented -wall, towered the Sierra de Santa Rosa, its precipitous buttresses -festooned with white and purple clouds. Descending then through a gorge -to the plain of San Jose, the army next encountered the Alamos and -Sabinos Rivers, each about four feet deep and racing like a torrent. To -get the wagons across looked at first impossible; but with incredible -exertions and the aid of ropes and improvised bridges the feat was -accomplished.[13.26] - -At the foot of the next range lay Santa Rosa, a town of some 2500 -people, where the troops arrived on October 24. All were Federalists -here. Their interests had suffered greatly from the dishonesty and -inefficiency of the central government, and the presents of cake, fruit -and confectionery offered to the Americans told their own story. Beyond -this point the road entered a sterile region, where almost the sole -inhabitants were sheep and goats. Now and then water could only be -obtained by scooping it from holes in salty ground, and sometimes there -was hardly fuel enough to boil the coffee. At length coffee and sugar -gave out, but the magnificent range on either side helped the men keep -up their spirits. A protest against the American advance was received, -and some 2500 men gathered under Colonel Blanco to enforce it;[13.19] -but as the loss of Monterey had cowed the people, and there were no -funds to stimulate them, Blanco dissolved his army; and on October -29 Wool formally occupied Monclova without opposition. A week later -Churchill with a hundred wagons and nearly all of the rear section came -up.[13.26] - -At this town, a place of about 5000 population, lying amid hills on the -fine Monclova River, Wool remained almost four weeks, for on account of -the armistice Taylor forbade a further advance toward the south; and the -army, camping a mile or so from the city, had time to drill, recruit, -reconnoitre and make repairs. It was a pleasant sojourn. Rivulets of -pure water freshened the streets; highly cultivated fields, mostly -planted with corn, filled the wide valley, and far mountains clung to -the horizon like azure clouds. Being now almost 600 miles from La Vaca, -Wool sent for the last supplies waiting with escorts at San Antonio, -prepared to break up his communications with that point, and opened a -connection with Camargo, not more than 200 miles distant. At the same -time he collected some local provisions, though most of the surplus had -already been drawn away by Ampudia, and he studied the routes. Strict -rules were made for both officers and men about entering the town; the -sale of liquor to soldiers was prohibited under penalty; and the arrival -of some gold aided materially.[13.26] - -[WOOL'S TRIALS] - -Things went substantially well, in fact, yet they did not go smoothly. -Considerable sickness prevailed among the troops. For a time the daily -ration per man had to be fixed at nine ears of corn, ground in the -portable steel mill of each company; and the soldiers grumbled. Orders -were issued requiring every man to shave, as the regulations provided; -and beardless young fellows, lacerating their faces in order to prove -themselves "men," grumbled again. The volunteers abominated the "tarnal -regulars," who were naturally the chief reliance for enforcing rules, -and when an opportunity came, retaliated. Many of their officers were -outspokenly dissatisfied with the conduct of the expedition. Wool's -bearing was denounced as harsh; but perhaps their own deportment had -something to do with that, for the punctilious Mexicans thought his -manners good. Officers as well as men chafed under the discipline; -but the General could easily reply that good-will on the part of the -Mexicans was essential, and that not a single complaint had yet been -made by the people.[13.20] In all probability it was argued that a -flying column of half Wool's numbers would have been far preferable; -but it could be answered that wastage from disease and battle had been -anticipated, that so small a column would probably have been attacked -by Colonel Blanco's irregulars and by other forces,[13.21] and that -after the conclusion of the armistice Ampudia might have to be reckoned -with.[13.26] - -Certainly the dissatisfied officers ridiculed unmercifully the number -of wagons. Here their ground was somewhat firmer. Jesup himself had -taken the position that such a train could neither reach Chihuahua nor -be sent back to the base. But in this matter Wool stood at the centre -and the quartermaster general stood at the circumference. It seems very -doubtful whether an adequate mule train could have been organized at -San Antonio in season. Without the wagons the army would probably have -been compelled to live more or less upon the country; and this would -have led to the concealment, or even the destruction of supplies, to -bloodshed, to a state of things not compatible with the conciliatory -methods ordered by Taylor and the government, perhaps to a serious lack -of rations, and possibly to the ruin of this isolated command. Moreover -artillery was essential; and Wool may have reasoned that where cannon -could go, wagons could follow.[13.26] - -The wagons and guns were, however, a serious embarrassment, and while -at Monclova Wool satisfied himself that he could not march from -there to Chihuahua by the direct route. A lack of water also was a -grave difficulty. Besides, a large force appeared under the present -circumstances unnecessary. Ampudia retreated to San Luis Potosi; and -although Santa Anna had taken steps, before the American expedition left -the Rio Grande, to prepare for the defence of Chihuahua, the military -forces holding that point had fallen back on Durango. There was indeed -nothing for Wool to conquer now but distance, and he felt that five -or six hundred men could do this as well as more. In his opinion, -therefore, the proper course was to proceed about 180 miles in a -southwesterly direction to Parras, where he would be on a good road to -Chihuahua and only about 90 miles from Saltillo; and indeed he thought -it advisable to join the main army. His views were duly expressed to his -superior officer, and Taylor concurred. The government, concluding that -the revival of the federal system at Mexico would change the sentiment -of the northern states, and that Chihuahua was in effect already in -our grasp, took a similar position;[13.22] and accordingly on the -twenty-fourth of November, leaving four companies to guard the stores at -Monclova, Wool set out for Parras.[13.26] - -The long march, generally through deserts and rugged mountains, was -cheered by a halt at a fine estate belonging to gentlemen who had -received their education in Kentucky, and still cherished the most -cordial recollections of their American experiences; and on December 5 -the army pitched its gray tents in front of the town. By many Parras, -a place of about the same size as Monclova, was called an Eden. It -lay where a wide plain and a long hill met, and most of the streets -were extremely narrow and crooked; but streams of clean water flowed -through them, and most of the residences were buried in gardens or -vineyards. But even amidst the luxury of romantic nature firm discipline -continued. The soldiers were kept at their drills and parades; their -arms and clothing had to be ready at all times for a close inspection; -as at Monclova, a system of calls and signals made surprises -impossible; and Wool busied himself in procuring corn and flour and in -reconnoitring.[13.26] - -[THE CHIHUAHUA EXPEDITION ABANDONED] - -All the while he looked for orders, and finally the summons came. -December 17, at a little before two o'clock in the afternoon, he rode -hastily into town with staff and escort, holding despatches in his hand; -and at once the aides and men hurried through the markets crying out, -"Soldiers, to the camp instantly!" As will appear in due time,[13.23] -the call was urgent. But it found Wool ready as usual, and in two hours -his army--leaving the sick under guard and taking with it 350 wagons, -provisions for 60 days, 400,000 cartridges and 200 rounds for the -cannon--set out. No blundering occurred. Thanks to his reconnaissances -Wool knew which of the routes to pursue. And there was no loitering. -Once the troops made thirty-five miles in twenty-four hours; and in -four days they shook hands with General Worth's brave men, then some -twenty miles beyond Saltillo and 110 or perhaps 120 from Parras.[13.26] - -"An entire failure," was Taylor's comment on Wool's expedition, and in a -sense his judgment appeared to be correct.[13.24] But this was Polk's -fault. Where there is nothing to do, nothing can be done.[13.25] -Before laying out the campaign the government should have seen what -it had now seen--that Saltillo was the key of Chihuahua, and that a -properly equipped expedition could not reach the latter city without -passing rather close to the former. But in reality Wool accomplished -a great deal. He showed how a real soldier, without fear and without -political yearnings, could lead an expedition through an enemy's -country. Nine hundred miles this army marched. Swift rivers were quickly -crossed, ravines filled, hills cut down, mountains climbed. Provisions -never failed. No wreckage marked the route. Not a drop of blood was -shed; not a shot fired. Wool made enemies only among those who were -under obligations to be friends, and made friends among those who were -under obligations to be enemies. And out of a crude, heterogeneous mass -he forged a keen, tough, highly tempered blade, that was to prove its -value soon in a terrible crisis.[13.26] - - [Illustration: Tampico and Its Environs] - -[TAMPICO IN VIEW] - -The other lateral expedition moved against the city of Tampico. This -place, the principal town in the state of Tamaulipas, and after Vera -Cruz the chief port of Mexico on the Gulf coast, was physically -remarkable. Land and water are perhaps nowhere more freakishly -intermingled. But for practical purposes one may describe it adequately -as on a low ridge--with the immense lagoon of Carpintero on the one -hand and the deep, wide, heavy, greenish-brown Panuco on the other--a -little more than five miles from the Gulf, as the river flows. For ten -years beginning in 1835 political upheavals and vexatious commercial -regulations had militated against its prosperity; but the port was -highly prized by the government, and in April, 1846, was taken into its -particular care.[13.38] - -All the old fortifications having been demolished lest they should -be turned to account by insurgents, Parrodi, the comandante general, -was ordered to prepare the town for defence, and a number of badly -planned and badly constructed works--particularly a redoubt equipped -with two 8-pounders on the north side of the Panuco at the bar--gave -a semblance of security. Some twenty-five light or fortress guns were -placed; but efforts to obtain additional heavy ordnance from Vera Cruz -were frustrated by the blockade, and when Ampudia, going north in the -summer, was directed to give his first attention to reinforcing the -garrison, circumstances again intervened. The people were spirited, -however; and the daily Eco voiced their sentiments by exclaiming, "With -such officers, with such troops, with such citizens let the Yankees come -whenever they please!"[13.38] - -As a matter of fact the Yankees had thoughts of coming quite soon. -Possession of the town seemed to be desirable, in the first place, -because for some time it was supposed to be the starting-point of a -carriage-road to San Luis Potosi, and apparently could be made a more -convenient base than the Rio Grande for a deep advance into Mexico; but -the war department found before long that wagons and artillery could -not cross the mountains by that route. In the second place occupation -of Tampico appeared to be a logical feature of the Tamaulipas movement, -in which Patterson was expected to play a leading role;[13.27] and -moreover, Santa Anna himself had explained to Mackenzie that it would be -advantageous as well as easy to make this conquest.[13.38] - -Conner had his eye upon the place, of course; but, aside from the -question of overcoming its defenders, he felt considerable hesitation. -It was regarded as the most dangerous port on the coast, and vessels -could not ride out a gale at anchor off the shore. The bar, on which -eight feet of water stood normally, had only a fathom in August, 1846; -and as the fleet would have to rendezvous and prepare for battle in the -open roadstead, he was afraid that one of the frequent northers would -assail him before he could assail the town. September 22, however, -when deciding upon the Tamaulipas expedition, Polk and his Cabinet -agreed that Conner should attack Tampico, and the order was issued that -day.[13.38] - -Santa Anna seems to have remembered the advice given to Mackenzie, and -while at Mexico he instructed Parrodi to retire, if attacked, unless -he could be sure of resisting successfully. On his way to San Luis he -evidently received Marcy's intercepted letter of September 2, which -announced that a movement upon Tampico was contemplated.[13.28] Hence -on October 3, with a view to the confirmation of those instructions, he -directed the war office to notify Parrodi of the American plan. Two days -later the comandante general reported to Santa Anna that he could not -defend the town victoriously, and explained in detail why. His garrison, -including some 200 sick, consisted of less than 1200 men besides 200 -available National Guards, ignorant of the use of arms. Only 870 of -these men could be employed, according to a later statement of his, at -the town and the bar, and having but 150 regular gunners he could not -man the numerous and widely separated positions. Indeed he would not be -able to subsist the garrison more than eleven days longer.[13.29] The -enemy, on the other hand, it was said, included a shore party of 3000, -and could attack by water and by land at the same time.[13.38] - -[TAMPICO EVACUATED BY THE MEXICANS] - -In response, Parrodi received from Santa Anna on October 14 an order, -confirmed three days later, that all the heavy guns, the stores, and -his three gunboats, light but effective craft, should be sent up the -river, and that he himself with his troops and what field pieces could -be taken along, should withdraw to Tula, a place behind the mountains. -Parrodi, who did not believe in the war, liked these instructions, and -proceeded to execute them. The government, however, seemed unwilling -to abandon Tampico, and the comandante general, perplexed by this -difference of sentiment and by the protests of the governor, troops, -people and foreign consuls, offered to Santa Anna some arguments -against his instructions: but the latter, annulling without ceremony -the government's action, impatiently ordered immediate evacuation. -His reasons were, in brief, that he could not reinforce the garrison -adequately without dividing the army in a manner incompatible with -his plans; that, even should he undertake to do so, this aid could -not arrive in time; and that, since a victorious defence could not be -expected, it was important not only to save the men and material, but -especially to avoid the moral effect of another American triumph; and no -doubt, on the assumption that Conner was prepared to make a strenuous, -unflinching attack with such forces as Parrodi described, these reasons -were sound.[13.38] - -Excited by the urgency of his instructions, which were received on the -twenty-second, the comandante general now endeavored to atone for the -time lost, and executed a flight instead of an evacuation.[13.30] The -redoubt at the bar was destroyed; large quantities of war material were -thrown into the river; with the aid of the British consul a pretended -sale of the gunboats was effected; and on October 27 and 28 the troops -hastily withdrew.[13.38] - -While these events were taking place, timely notice of them was -forwarded to Conner. Chase, the American consul, had been expelled -and had taken refuge on a blockading vessel; but his wife, who was a -British subject, remained in Tampico, and on October 20 she wrote to -the Commodore that Parrodi would evacuate the town on the following -day, and that no resistance would be made against an American attack. -By November 5 Conner received this news, but a lack of provisions made -it impossible for him to set out the next day, as he desired to do. On -the tenth, eleventh and twelfth, however, eleven vessels made sail from -Anton Lizardo with orders to rendezvous fifteen miles from the shore on -a certain east and west line a little south of Tampico. The frigates -_Raritan_ and _Potomac_ did not appear there; but as the weather was -fine, Conner decided to proceed, and at break of day, November 14, the -_Mississippi_, _Princeton_, _St. Mary's_, three small steamers--the -_Spitfire_, _Vixen_ and _Petrel_--and three schooner-gunboats joined the -blockading vessel off Tampico bar. By this time the Commodore knew that -Parrodi had not evacuated the city on the twenty-first, and, supposing -the garrison was still there, expected some hard work;[13.31] but the -weather looked favorable, and he prepared at once to attack.[13.38] - -Lieutenant Commanding Hunt, the blockading officer, had examined the -bar; and piloted by him the three small steamers towed the gunboats -across it. By ten o'clock the river was entered successfully, and -the Commodore advanced immediately toward the city. The low shores -were covered with rich vegetation; the huts, thatched with palmetto -leaves, appeared cosey if not grand; broad-leaved bananas and loaded -orange-trees grew beside them; tall cocoanut palms languidly waved their -graceful fronds above; and the long line of steamers and schooners, -followed by nine boats from the frigates packed with officers, marines -and sailors, made an impressive spectacle as they moved slowly up the -smooth but rapid Panuco under an azure sky.[13.38] - -Conner himself was on the _Spitfire_. As he approached the town, he -was met by a deputation from the _ayuntamiento_ (city council), who -stated that having neither the means nor the disposition to resist, they -desired to capitulate. Perry and two other officers then went ashore -with the deputation to arrange terms; but after a long conference, -finding this impossible--though of course the expediency of surrendering -was not in debate--all returned to the _Spitfire_, and at length an -informal agreement was reached. Next morning the chief points of this -were embodied in the following declaration:[13.32] - - "United States Steamer Spitfire. Off the City of Tampico, - November 15, 1846. Commodore Conner declines a Capitulation with - the Authorities of Tampico as he considers it unnecessary. He - accepts the surrender of the City, and takes military possession - of it. He assures the Inhabitants, at the same time, that he will - not interfere with their Municipal Regulations, or their Religion; - and that private property shall be respected, provided that the - public property of all kinds, be delivered up at once, and in good - faith. Should an assault be made by the Inhabitants of the City, - on the American Forces, the Inhabitants will be held responsible - for the consequences. Commodore Conner, so long as the Authorities - and Inhabitants of the City observe good faith towards him, will - consider them under his protection;--a different course will expose - them to serious evils."[13.38] - -The danger of an assault was not imminent, for the National Guards could -find but one hundred serviceable muskets, and all the people of the -town, who usually numbered about 15,000 but were now perhaps half as -many, lined the streets and gazed at the Americans as mere spectators. -All the public property that was movable had been carried away, but the -public buildings were now occupied; and, as the fraudulent sale of the -gunboats was detected, three much needed vessels, built at New York, -were added to our navy.[13.33] Steps were then taken to recover what -Parrodi had transported up the river.[13.34] November 18 Tattnall set -out with the _Spitfire_ and _Petrel_, and the next forenoon he reached -Panuco town, the head of navigation, some eighty miles from Tampico, -where it was known that heavy guns had been left. Everything had been -concealed but the concealment proved ineffectual. He disabled nine -18-pounders, threw into the river a quantity of balls, and burned some -camp equipage; and a 24-pounder was taken aboard.[13.38] - -[TAMPICO GARRISONED] - -In ordering the capture of Tampico, the American government had intended -that Patterson should be at hand to occupy the town, and as this -calculation had been upset by Taylor, it now became a question how to -retain the prize. The place of the squadron was at sea; without the help -of every man it looked almost impossible to manage the vessels in bad -weather; and officers of nearly all grades were actually wanting. So -Perry in the steamer _Mississippi_ sailed from Tampico on the evening -of November 15 for Brazos Island, and the next day left an officer -there to explain the situation. Without delay the news was forwarded -to Patterson at Camargo, and he directed that men and cannon should -go "forthwith" to the captured city. His instructions were not waited -for, however. Lieutenant Colonel Belton, who occupied Camp Belknap with -six companies of the so-called artillery, embarked for the mouth of -the river on hearing from Perry; and on November 21 Colonel Gates and -about 500 men sailed from the Brazos in the _Neptune_, leaving two more -companies to follow the next day in the _Sea_.[13.35] Both vessels -were driven ashore, but fortunately the troops were saved in both cases. -By the twenty-third Tampico had therefore a garrison of about 650 good -regulars. Some ordnance also arrived; and Conner, besides landing a -pair of carronades, remained in the harbor with four or five gunboats. -Fortunately the only land approaches were by a neck at each end of the -town between Carpintero Lake and the river; and the work of fortifying -these, begun at once, was prosecuted night and day.[13.38] - -Perry, meanwhile, kept at work. November 21 the _Mississippi_, bearing -the red pennant of a vice commodore at the masthead, appeared at New -Orleans.[13.36] Announcing the capture of Tampico, Perry conferred -with General Brooke and the governor of the state, and obtained sixteen -cannon--half of them borrowed from the Louisiana arsenal--and with -these, an engineer officer, 110 regular recruits and a quantity of -ammunition, he arrived off Tampico on the twenty-ninth.[13.37] Before -long the Alabama regiment came from the Rio Grande, and the government, -which heard of the capture of Tampico on November 28, ordered about -460 additional regulars to be sent from the United States. There was -great anxiety at Washington to make the port secure, for, as will soon -be discovered, a particular reason for holding it had now arisen. -Gates issued stringent regulations to govern the citizens in case of -a Mexican attack; and by December 19 Brigadier General Shields was in -command there with an adequate and fairly well-protected garrison. Yet -the Mexicans endeavored to feel cheerful. No battle had been lost, for -none had been fought, said the government with convincing logic; and the -Americans had not triumphed, for they had merely taken what had been -abandoned; but the governor of Tamaulipas recalled bitterly that "in -former times Tampico, almost by herself, had repulsed more than 4000 -veterans."[13.38] - -[TAYLOR'S POLICY] - -Substantially all of northeastern Mexico was now in American hands, -and the question of Taylor's future operations, which had long been -under consideration, became urgent. On that matter the General himself -entertained a definite opinion. He was for adopting a boundary line that -would include enough territory to pay all just American claims, and -standing there on the defensive. As already drawn, the line ran from -Parras, where he expected Wool to remain, and Patos, a rich hacienda -on the Parras route about thirty-five miles from Saltillo, to Saltillo -itself, to Camp Butler, six miles north of that city toward Rinconada -Pass, and to Monterey. Between Monterey and Tampico lay a wide gap, -but the General proposed to fill this now by occupying certain points -in Tamaulipas. Victoria, the capital of that state, was exposed to -attacks proceeding from Tula, and there he planned to have a large -force.[13.41] - -How many troops were available is not precisely known; but according to -Meade, who seems to have been in rather close touch with headquarters, -Worth was to have some 2500 at Saltillo and eight guns, Butler 1500 at -Monterey, Taylor and Patterson about 5000, to be divided between the -posts in Tamaulipas and a new position in advance of Saltillo, and the -commanders on the lines of communication about 2000; which meant that -some 14,500 men, including Wool's 2400 or 2500 and about 1000 occupying -Tampico, were to hold lines approximately 800 miles long in an enemy's -country.[13.39] Over against them stood the Mexicans under Santa -Anna, who in Taylor's opinion were potentially, if not actually, more -than 50,000 in number, and were occupying before Christmas a position -only about sixty miles from the Americans;[13.40] and in addition -to these it was necessary to consider the large bands of irregulars, -like those of Colonel Blanco, who were liable to gather suddenly almost -anywhere.[13.41] - -When Taylor reported his plan to the war department, a good deal of -anxiety and perhaps distress was felt there. To be sure, he pointed -out that artillery could be moved north by way of Saltillo only, and -that water and provisions were scanty on that road, while doubtless he -as well as others considered the Mexicans too deficient in vigor and -enterprise to be feared. How just were these calculations will appear in -the sequel, and they failed now to satisfy the government. Though not -informed by Taylor precisely how many posts he intended to establish -in Tamaulipas, Marcy was afraid that widely separated forces and lines -of communication would be assailed, and it was clear that a small -Mexican success, doing us no actual harm but diminishing our prestige -materially, might rouse the people against us. Even the line to Monterey -was long, the Secretary feared. Taylor evidently had no thorough -knowledge of the passes, for he was now preparing to take a very hasty -look at a few of them. Besides, it had been Marcy's expectation of -late that Wool's column would be drawn back to Monterey; and at the -end of the year, as well as earlier, he said he did not wish to occupy -territory in advance of that city. Polk appealed in his diary to the -General's own opinion that he could not safely advance beyond it. Scott, -as well as Marcy and the President, believed the troops were being -scattered too much. Officers on the ground also held that view; but such -was Taylor's deliberate policy.[13.41] - - - - - XIV - - SANTA FE - - June-September, 1846 - - -[THE STATE OF THINGS IN NEW MEXICO] - -Not only Tamaulipas and Chihuahua but New Mexico lay within the scope of -the government's war policy, and certain features of the situation made -the outlook in that quarter peculiarly inviting. - -The province was cut into an eastern and a western section by the Rio -Grande, which ran approximately north and south; and usage divided -the best settled part of it into the Rio Arriba (Upstream) district -near Santa Fe, the capital, which lay some twenty miles east of the -great river, and the Rio Abajo (Downstream) district, which had for -its metropolis Albuquerque, a small town on the Rio Grande about -seventy-five miles to the southwest. According to a recent census the -population was 100,000, of which the greater part belonged in the lower -district; and more than half the wealth also was attributed to that -section. The caravan trade, which made its way from Independence,[14.1] -Missouri, to Santa Fe, Chihuahua, Lagos and even Mexico City, gilded -the name of the province, for it had advanced rapidly from the humble -beginnings of 1821, and now employed 1200 men, involved a capital of -some two millions, and usually paid a net profit of thirty or forty per -cent on the goods transported. The favorable climate believed to prevail -in New Mexico was an additional source of interest.[14.2] - -The political situation appeared singularly promising. In March, 1845, -the war department of Mexico admitted publicly that the northern -sections of the country were "abandoned and more than abandoned" by -the general government. Sensible Mexicans held that the connection of -the province with their miserable system involved injury instead of -benefit. The people received no protection against the ravages of the -Indians. The national troops were a constant menace to the citizens. If -a man desired to give his note for $3000, he was compelled to pay eight -dollars for stamped paper. The duties and extortions levied upon the -caravan merchants increased the price of their goods; and of late the -central government had been trying to deprive the provincial authorities -of money and the people of comforts by stopping that business -entirely.[14.2] - -The citizens appeared weary of oppression. They would not pay the -taxes. It was found necessary in 1845 to excuse them from one of -the most profitable but most annoying imposts. Indifference toward -the general government--a natural return for its neglect and its -vexations--prevailed, and the continual changes in that government -aggravated the lack of patriotism. Indeed, there was more than -indifference. A move to follow the example of Texas had been made in -1837, and the idea of joining the United States, which had existed -in that year, became so strong by the early months of 1846 that -representatives of the province in the national Congress openly avowed -it. Finally, a revolution against misgovernment, that had recently -occurred in the neighboring state of Sonora, appeared to offer a strong -hint.[14.2] - -All power, civil and military, lay in the hands of Manuel Armijo, -governor and comandante general; and that of itself was an ample -ground for insurrection. Born of disreputable parents, this precious -adventurer had achieved a career still more disreputable. A man of -unusual energy, though now a mountain of flesh, he could assume at will -an air of ingenuous affability; could threaten, bluster, brag, intrigue -or coax; and when dressed up in his blue frock coat, with blue striped -pantaloons, shoulder straps, a red sash, and plenty of gold lace, could -look--although at heart only a cunning and cowardly robber--quite -impressive. His personal habits were said to be grossly immoral; his -only principle was to succeed; and his type of mind, shrewd though -low, was indicated by one of his favorite sayings, "It is better to be -thought brave than to be so." Such force, cleverness and lack of scruple -had naturally made him rich. His family now owned Albuquerque and the -neighboring estates. His position and close relations with the priests -gave him a firm hold on the ecclesiastical arm; it was believed that -an understanding with the savages enabled him to use them against his -enemies; and he engaged rather deeply in the American trade. Yet his -ambition was not yet satisfied; and he entertained the idea, it would -seem, of making the province an independent country.[14.2] - -At St. Louis, Missouri, the New Mexican situation was doubtless fairly -well understood, and a deep interest in the caravan business existed. -The merchants, it was felt when the war became probable, deserved to be -protected, and many urged the prompt despatch of an expedition for that -purpose. Other arguments for such a step were, that it would forestall -Indian troubles on the border, would incline the enemy--by laying open -their weak side--to make terms, would encourage the people of New -Mexico to rise in our favor, and would secure the key to Chihuahua and -California; and in all probability influential men brought these ideas -to the President's notice.[14.4] - -The occupation of Santa Fe was in fact decided upon as one of the very -earliest war measures--primarily for the sake of the traders, but also -with a view to the permanent retention of the province. The move was -intended to be pacific, however. Polk doubtless expected that no serious -opposition, if any at all, would be offered by the people; and there -seem to have been hopes that Chihuahua and her sister states could be -persuaded by arguments backed with force to let the caravan trade go on -despite the war. In that case the burdensome duties imposed at Santa Fe -would no longer have had to be paid, and the discrimination in favor of -Mexican competitors, that had prevailed there, would have ceased. On -May 13, therefore, the governor of Missouri was directed to raise eight -companies of mounted troops and two of light artillery for an expedition -to New Mexico, and Colonel S. W. Kearny of the First Dragoons was -directed to command them.[14.4] - -[KEARNY'S MARCH] - - [Illustration: GENERAL KEARNY'S MARCH] - -So fine an opportunity for adventure appealed instantly to the bold, -hardy and energetic young fellows of Missouri, and as early as June -6 volunteers were hurrying into the service at Fort Leavenworth--a -square of wooden buildings, with a blockhouse at each corner and a plot -of grass in the middle--which crowned a high bluff on the Missouri -River about 312 miles from St. Louis; and about 1660 troops were soon -assembled at that point. Of Kearny's dragoons there were some 300. The -First Regiment of Missouri Mounted Volunteers--which chose Alexander -W. Doniphan as colonel--numbered about 860. The artillery, including -nearly 250 men, consisted of "Battery A" of St. Louis under Captain -Weightman and a company under Captain Fischer, a graduate of the -Prussian artillery service, and formed a battalion commanded by Major -M. L. Clark, a West Pointer.[14.3] There were also two small companies -of volunteer infantry, a St. Louis mounted body of about one hundred -called the Laclede Rangers, which Kearny attached to his regulars, about -fifty Delaware and Shawnee Indians, and finally, though by no means -last in importance, a Roman Catholic priest familiar with the Spanish -language.[14.4] - -Without lingering to complete the outfit, Kearny sent the command off -by sections. June 5 a detachment of the dragoons advanced. By the -twenty-eighth all of Doniphan's regiment were on the march for Santa Fe -and--none of them cared how much farther; and two days later Weightman's -fine brass cannon, gleaming radiantly in the bright sunshine, wheeled -into the trail. For several days the troops had to break their way -through a rough country, but about fifteen miles south of the Kansas -River they struck the Santa Fe road, a broad, well marked, natural -highway running toward the southwest.[14.6] - -Council Grove, the famous rendezvous of Indians and frontiersmen, was -the last place from which a single person could safely return; and now -for nearly four weeks not one "stick of timber" was to cheer the eye. -After pressing on in the same direction to the Arkansas, the troops -left the main trail, marched wearily along the northern bank of the -river--ascending about seven feet in each mile--till they were beyond -the great bend, and finally, crossing the shallow stream, turned their -faces toward Bent's Fort, a protected trading post, which stood near -the present site of Las Animas, Colorado, about 650 miles from Fort -Leavenworth. Belts had been tightened over and over again by this time. -Drinking water that no horse would touch had sickened many a tough -rider. Mosquitos and buffalo gnats had tormented the flesh day and -night. Faces had been scorched by siroccos, and tongues had swollen -with thirst. Many had become so tired that a rattlesnake in the blanket -seemed hardly worth minding, and so utterly wretched that in blind fury -they sometimes raved and cursed like maniacs. Out of one hundred fine -horses belonging to Battery A sixty had perished. Yet in places there -had been cool breezes, carpets of brilliant and spicy flowers, great -herds of buffalo, curious mirages, and inspiring glimpses of Pike's -Peak, the towering outpost of the Rockies.[14.6] - -At length on July 29 Kearny escorted by Doniphan's regiment gained the -rendezvous, a grassy meadow on the Arkansas about nine miles below the -Fort. There within a few days the Army of the West assembled,[14.5] and -two additional companies of the dragoons, which had made an average of -twenty-eight miles a day from Fort Leavenworth, joined their regiment. -Nor were the troops alone. Several merchants had left Independence about -the first of May. Notified by order of the government that war had -begun, they had stopped here; and the Colonel found under his protection -more than four hundred wagons and merchandise worth upwards of a -million.[14.6] - -Armijo, for his part, had received ample warnings. In March the central -government informed him that war might be expected, and authorized -him to make preparations for defence. By June 17 news of the coming -invasion reached Santa Fe, and nine days later the first caravan of the -season confirmed it. Manuel Alvarez, the American consul, endeavored -now to persuade Armijo that it would "be better for himself and the -people under his government to capitulate, and far preferable" to -become Americans than to be citizens of a country so disordered and so -impotent as Mexico; but while his advisers and subordinates fancied -they could obtain offices under an elective system, and "were rather -easily won over," the governor himself probably could not believe that -people so long robbed and oppressed would choose the wolf as their -shepherd. Besides, he doubtless had some national spirit and some -desire to justify his gratuitous title of general. After confirming -the news further by a spy, he sent south on July 1 an appeal for -aid--representing the Americans as 6000 in number--and began to prepare -for defence. A letter from Ugarte, the comandante general of Chihuahua, -stating that he could set out on a moment's notice with five hundred -cavalry and as many infantry, seemed encouraging, and no doubt Armijo -was aware that Durango, too, had been ordered by the authorities at -Mexico to aid him.[14.7] - -Meanwhile reinforcements for Kearny were gathering in his rear. On the -third of June Marcy informed the governor of Missouri that if Sterling -Price, then a member of the Missouri legislature, and certain other -citizens of the state would raise and organize a thousand mounted -men--that is to say, a regiment and a battalion--to follow Kearny -promptly, they would be appointed to the chief commands. This method of -getting troops aroused considerable opposition among the people, for it -ignored the militia system and the aspirations of the militia officers, -and many felt that a politician like Price was unfit for the command; -but young men were ready to volunteer under any sort of conditions that -promised a chance to reach the front, and about the time Kearny left -Fort Bent this new force, including artillery under regular officers, -was mustered into the service at Fort Leavenworth.[14.8] - -At the same time steps were taken to obtain reinforcements of a totally -different character. A large number of Mormons, recently driven from -Nauvoo, Illinois, had gathered at Council Bluffs, and were planning -to settle in California. It was important that feelings of hostility -toward this country should not prevail among them, and apparently their -assistance, not only on the coast but in New Mexico, might be valuable. -Kearny was therefore authorized to accept a body of these emigrants -not larger than a quarter of his entire force, and about five hundred -of them were enlisted in June and taken to Fort Leavenworth by Captain -Allen of the First Dragoons. Allen soon died, but under Lieutenant Smith -of the same regiment this party marched for Santa Fe.[14.8] - -On July 31 Kearny issued a proclamation, which declared that he was -going to New Mexico "for the purpose of seeking union with, and -ameliorating the condition of its inhabitants," urged them to follow -their usual vocations, and promised that all who should pursue this -course would be protected in their civil and religious rights; and -the next day he addressed Armijo in the same strain, telling him that -resistance would not only be in vain, but would cause the people to -suffer, and adding that submission would be greatly for his interest and -for theirs.[14.9] Captain Cooke of the dragoons was made the bearer -of this communication, and with an escort of twelve picked men he went -forward under a white flag.[14.16] - -August 1 the "long-legged infantry," who were almost able to outmarch -the cavalry, left the rendezvous, and on the following day the so-called -army was all in motion. After crossing the Arkansas a little way above -the Fort, it soon turned off to the southwest, and followed in general -the line of the present Atchison, Topeka and Santa Fe Railroad. Before -long the troops found on the right a high range of mountains, thrusting -up twin peaks into the region of perpetual snow, while the gleaming -wall of the far Rockies came every day nearer; and on the left gazed -over wide plains--broken with ridge, plateau or butte--which stretched -away toward the east, until one could not say where earth and sky met. -Near the present boundary of New Mexico began the ascent of Raton Pass; -and the men, winding up the rugged valley, discovered most beautiful -flowers. But they were hardly in a condition to enjoy them, for the -rations--cut down one half or more--consisted of flour stirred up in -water, fried, and eaten with a little pork; and the implacable Kearny, -an embodiment of energy and resolution, hurried them along by marches -that were almost incredibly hard. What lay ahead nobody knew. It was -not even certain that the present scanty rations would hold out. But -the watchword was always, Forward; and even the magnificent views at -the summit of the Pass, where Raton Mountain upreared a series of -castellated pinnacles somewhat like those of the Ichang gorge on the -upper Yangtse River, attracted but little attention.[14.16] - -[KEARNY'S POLITICAL ACTION] - -August 15, at the new and unimportant village of Las Vegas began -Kearny's political work. From the flat roof of a house the General--for -his commission as brigadier general had now overtaken him--said to -the people substantially this: "For some time the United States has -considered your country a part of our territory, and we have come to -take possession of it. We are among you as friends--not as enemies; -as protectors--not as conquerors; for your benefit--not your injury. -I absolve you from all allegiance to the Mexican government and to -Armijo.[14.10] They have not defended you against the Indians, but -the United States will. All who remain peaceably at home shall be -safeguarded in person and in property. Their religion also shall be -protected. A third of my army are Roman Catholics. I was not brought -up in that faith myself, yet I respect your creed, and so does my -government. But listen! If any one promises to be quiet and is found in -arms against me, I will hang him. Resistance would be useless. There are -my soldiers, and many more are coming. You, then, who are in office will -now take the oath of allegiance to the United States, and I will support -your authority."[14.16] - -Tecolote also, at the bottom of the valley, witnessed a scene of this -kind; and the next day, crossing the swift Pecos, Kearny followed a -similar course at the red adobe town of San Miguel. Here the alcalde -said he would rather wait until after the capture of Santa Fe. "It is -enough for you to know, Sir, that I have captured your town," was the -stern reply. Doubtless, in their muddled way, the people wondered at -this first illustration of liberty; but with characteristic politeness, -timidity and guile they wrinkled their faces as if pleased. In spite of -orders and sentinels the fields of waving corn, full of ears just prime -for roasting, suffered a little; but Kearny paid for the damage, and -that at least was appreciated.[14.16] - -By this time officers sent forward to learn the state of public -sentiment at the city of Taos, an important seat of the Pueblo Indians, -and at Santa Fe had returned with unwelcome reports, and several -American residents had brought warnings of danger. The activity of -Mexican spies--kindly treated when captured, and in some cases released -at once with friendly messages--proved that Armijo was alert; and on -August 14 his reply to the note sent by Cooke, while proposing that -Kearny halt and that negotiations be opened, informed the General that -the people were rising _en masse_ to defend the province, and that -Armijo would place himself at their head.[14.11] Fifteen hundred -dragoons had reached or were near Santa Fe, it was reported; and at a -natural gateway, cutting a ridge about four hundred feet high, a hostile -force was said to be waiting. On hearing this news all the weary men -and their drooping steeds came to life. The banners and guidons were -unfurled. "To horse!" blared the trumpets; "Trot! Gallop! Charge!" And -with sabres glittering under a brilliant sun the troopers dashed round a -sharp turn into the pass, while the artillery thundered after them, and -the infantry scrambled over the ridge. Not an enemy was found; but the -reports agreed that Apache Canyon, some distance farther on, would be -stiffly and strongly defended.[14.16] - -This was extremely serious news. To march nearly 2000 soldiers eight -or nine hundred miles through a wilderness involved fearful risks, -and the expedition was now at the breaking point. The men had become -travel-worn and half-starved; many, if not all, were suffering from -the effects of the water, loaded with acrid salts, which they had been -drinking; the horses generally were on their last legs; and hundreds of -horses and mules actually could not march another day. It had already -been necessary to attach cattle to the ammunition wagons, and the -cannon were now dragged along with extreme difficulty. The provisions -had practically been exhausted. And here lay a defile seven or eight -miles long, guarded by several thousand militia, a force of regulars and -considerable artillery.[14.16] - -[CROSS-CURRENTS] - -As these facts indicate, the New Mexicans did not seem willing to -justify Polk's expectations. Whatever Armijo's own opinions, public -sentiment appeared to demand action. There existed a good deal of -warlike spirit in the province, and naturally the prospect of an armed -invasion excited resentment. The ignorant and suspicious people were -easily persuaded, after their hard experience under Mexican rule, that -the Americans were coming to take their property; and the priests added, -that besides abusing the women these ruffians would brand them on the -cheek as mules were branded. August 8 the governor therefore issued -a proclamation, summoning the people to take up arms in the cause -of "sacred independence"; the prefect of Taos and presumably other -local authorities followed his example; and several thousand of the -people,[14.12] Mexicans or Indians, many of them armed only with bows -and arrows, clubs or lariats, but all apparently eager to fight, were -placed at Apache Canyon under Colonel Manuel Pino.[14.16] - -At this juncture, however, Cooke, a Chihuahua merchant named Gonzalez -and one James Magoffin, a jovial and rich Kentucky Irishman, prominent -in the caravan trade and long a resident of Chihuahua, arrived at -Santa Fe. Magoffin had been introduced by Senator Benton to Polk, -and after some talk had consented to act as a sort of informal -commissioner to Armijo in the interest of peaceful relations. He now -argued, according to the very reasonable statement of the governor, -that American rule would enhance the price of real estate and make New -Mexico prosperous.[14.13] Undoubtedly he dwelt upon the impossibility -of successful resistance; and probably he suggested--though Armijo's -avarice required no hint on this point--that should cordial feelings -prevail, the duties on the approaching merchandise, a fortune in -themselves, would be paid at the Santa Fe customhouse, where the -governor could handle them.[14.16] - -On the other hand, no aid was coming from the south. The 1500 dragoons -were not even phantasmal. Ugarte's cheering statement that he could -bring 1000 men to New Mexico had no doubt been intended, and no doubt -was understood, as mere stimulation. According to the latest returns, -New Mexico, Chihuahua, Durango and Zacatecas together had less than -2000 poorly equipped and poorly subsisted troops, the greater part of -whom were the scattered and almost worthless Presidials. The general -government, when officially notified of the coming invasion, merely -issued a few nugatory orders and expressed "profound regret." The -people's loyalty to the government and especially to the governor -appeared uncertain. Armijo understood that he was not a general, and -no doubt understood also that he was a coward; and for all these -reasons he decided--though wavering to the end--that hostilities were -to be avoided, should that be possible. Diego Archuleta also, one of -the chief military officers, was approached by Magoffin, and under -genial manipulation proved to be much less bloodthirsty than had been -supposed. Consul Alvarez, it will be recalled, had previously found -the subordinate officials tractable, and it may safely be supposed in -general that very little desire to fight the Americans existed in the -governor's entourage.[14.16] - -Pino seems to have felt differently, however, and when Armijo was on the -road to the canyon, August 16, with two or three hundred soldiers and -about eight guns, he received a message from that officer threatening to -come and fetch him, if he did not join the militia. This augured ill, -and the augury proved correct. The people demanded to be led against -the enemy, but Armijo said the Americans were too strong. Pino offered -to attack if he could have a part of the regulars, but the governor -was determined to keep them all for his own protection. Then he was -called a traitor, and retaliated by calling the people disloyal and -cowardly. They threatened him; and he, more afraid of his own army than -of Kearny's, urged the militia to go home and let the regulars do the -fighting. Threatened again, he forbade the people to come near his camp; -and finally he turned his cannon in their direction.[14.16] - -In reality the people themselves had no great hunger for battle. -Besides detesting Armijo, they were doubtless influenced by much -lurking anti-Mexican or pro-American sentiment; had probably learned to -question the diabolical intentions attributed to Kearny's troops; were -fully aware in a general way of American superiority; and felt deeply -impressed by tales about the great number of the invaders, their long -train, their many guns, their enormous horses and the terrible men -themselves--an army, in short, such as they had never dreamed of before. -The quarrels of their leaders both disgusted and disheartened them; and -they began to think, too, of their lives, families and property. August -17, therefore, they broke up, and went every man his own way. A council -of the regular officers favored retreat. The Presidials deserted or -were dismissed; the cannon were spiked and left in the woods; and in -about two weeks Armijo--though offered personal security and freedom at -Santa Fe--turned up at Chihuahua with ninety dragoons. He had proved not -exactly a traitor, perhaps;[14.14] but certainly not a patriot, and -still more certainly, if that was possible, not a hero.[14.16] - -[OPPOSITION COLLAPSES] - -The result was that on August 17 a fat alcalde rode up to Kearny on his -mule at full speed, and with a roar of laughter cried, "Armijo and his -troops have gone to hell and the Canyon is all clear." The news was -confirmed; and early the next day, instead of turning the pass by a -difficult and circuitous route, of which the General had learned, the -Americans advanced boldly, though still with caution, on their last hard -march--twenty-eight miles to Santa Fe. Just beyond the defile, at a -position that might easily have been made impregnable, were found light -breastworks, a sort of abatis, a spiked cannon, and tracks which guided -some of Clark's men to the rest of Armijo's ordnance. At three o'clock, -after receiving a note of welcome from Vigil, the acting governor, -General Kearny, riding at the head of the troops, came in sight of the -town. Neither man nor beast had been allowed to stop for food that day, -and the column dragged heavily; but the rear was up three hours later, -and then, leaving the artillery on a commanding hill, the rest of the -troops eagerly entered Santa Fe.[14.16] - -Alas, the Mecca of so many dreams and hopes was promptly rechristened -"Mud Town," for it proved to be only a straggling collection of adobe -hovels lying in the flat sandy valley of a mountain stream, where a main -line of the Rockies came to an end amidst a gray-brown, dry and barren -country.[14.15] Even the palace, a long one-story adobe building, had -no floor; and after partaking of refreshments, addressing the people -in his usual tone of mingled courtesy and firmness, and listening to -the salute of thirteen guns which greeted the raising of the Stars and -Stripes, Kearny had to sleep on its carpeted ground, while most of the -troops, too exhausted to eat, camped on the hill.[14.16] - -[NEW MEXICO OCCUPIED] - -The next day Kearny delivered a more formal address, but the style of -his remarks was the same as before; and his kindly, simple, determined -manner produced an excellent impression. Thundering vivas answered him; -and then Vigil, basing his remarks on the conviction that "no one in the -world has resisted successfully the power of the stronger," expressed -a joyless yet hopeful acceptance of the situation. We now belong -to a great and powerful nation, he said, and we are assured that a -prosperous future awaits us. Such of the officials as desired to retain -their places then took an oath of allegiance to the United States. The -following day chiefs of the Pueblo Indians came in and submitted, and on -the twenty-second Kearny issued a proclamation. This embodied the same -assurances and warnings as the addresses, but it added that western as -well as eastern New Mexico was to be occupied, that all the inhabitants -were claimed as American citizens, and that a free government would be -established as soon as possible.[14.17] - -By this time a fort, named after Marcy, had begun to be visible on -the hill. The site was not well adapted for a regular work; but as it -commanded the town perfectly at a distance of about six hundred yards -from the palace, and was not commanded by any eminence, it served the -purpose admirably. One point, however, still caused anxiety. There -seemed to be danger that the Rio Abajo district, supported by troops -from the south, might rise against the invaders; and reports came that -pointed toward precisely such an event. Kearny went down the river, -therefore, on September 2 with seven hundred men. But he found no enemy. -The Americans were everywhere well received and entertained. Ugarte -had indeed left El Paso del Norte for New Mexico on August 10, but his -troops numbered only four hundred; they had little ammunition and no -artillery; Armijo discouraged him by saying that 6000 Americans were -on their way south; the prospect of marching eighteen days--a part of -the time in a desert--was not inviting; and so the expedition went -home. Kearny returned to Santa Fe on September 11, and about noon on -the twenty-fifth he set out with his effective dragoons for California, -dreaming of a new conquest.[14.17] - - - - - XV - - CHIHUAHUA - - December, 1846-May, 1847 - - -Foreseeing that more troops would go to Santa Fe than New Mexico -would require, Kearny had written to General Wool on August 22 that -he would have the surplus join that officer at Chihuahua,[15.1] and -shortly before marching for the coast he gave orders that Price with -his command, Clark's artillery, a part of the Laclede Rangers and the -two companies of infantry should hold Santa Fe, and that Doniphan's men -should execute this plan; but on October 6 an order was received from -him that Doniphan should first ensure the security of the people by -settling matters with the Eutaw and Navajo Indians. September 28 Price -arrived, and by the twentieth of October, 1220 new Missouri volunteers -and 500 Mormons were on the scene. The Eutaws had now been reduced, -it was believed, to a peaceable frame of mind; and while the warlike -and superior Navajos proved a harder problem, a remarkable seven-weeks -campaign amid snow and mountains, which ended with a treaty, seemed to -ensure their good behavior. The caravans bound for Chihuahua, becoming -alarmed, had now stopped at Valverde, a point not far south of the -wretched settlement named Socorro, and begged for protection. Without -losing time, therefore, Doniphan concentrated his force at Valverde by -December 12, and with 856 effectives, all mounted and armed with rifles, -prepared to set out on a long, adventurous march into an unknown and -hostile country.[15.6] - -[DONIPHAN AND HIS MEN] - -No less extraordinary than such an undertaking were the commander and -the men who undertook it. Doniphan was a frontier lawyer, entirely -unacquainted with military science, but a born leader. When in -Washington during the civil war he stood back to back with Abraham -Lincoln, it is said, and overtopped that son of Anak by half an -inch. The only distinguished man he had ever met that "came up to -the advertisement," was the President's comment. High cheek bones, a -prominent chin, thinnish and tightly closed lips, a mop of carroty hair -parted well down on the left, a beard of the same hue under his chin, -small, deep-set eyes, a strongly built nose, spare cheeks and a ruddy -complexion told of enterprise, daring, endurance, wary judgment and -kind, sincere impulses. In council he was shrewd and in danger fearless, -with always a twinkle in his eye, a smile on his lips, and a cheering, -well-timed pleasantry on his tongue.[15.6] - -His men, recruited from the rural districts, had felt they were scorned -a little by the St. Louis contingent, and had vowed to show them what -"country boys" were made of; but they proposed to do it in their own -way. While the city men had uniforms and military discipline, the -riflemen neither had nor wanted such embarrassments. As every officer -was a man of their own choice, they felt at liberty to choose also how -far to respect and obey him. Doniphan, who loved his "boys" like a -father, was loved in return, and they were ready to do anything for him; -but a minor authority who meddled with their reserved rights, whatever -these might happen to be, was likely to hear some vigorous cursing. -Any form of manly dissipation was to their taste, as a rule; and they -despised all carefulness, all order, all restraint. Yet they were "good -fellows" at heart, and as full of fight as gamecocks; and now--on half -rations, no salt and no pay[15.2]--they felt ready for whatever Mexico -could offer.[15.6] - -At Valverde Doniphan heard that forces were coming from Chihuahua to -defend El Paso, some two hundred miles from Socorro, and sent an order -to Santa Fe that Major Clark with six guns and one hundred men should -march as soon as possible to his assistance; but without waiting for -him the command advanced in three sections on the fourteenth, sixteenth -and eighteenth of December. Below Valverde the Rio Grande makes a great -bend towards the west, and runs through a wild, mountainous region; and -hence travellers bound for the south left it on the right. Adopting -this course, the Americans now marched for ninety or ninety-five -miles through the dreaded Jornada del Muerto (_Dead Man's Journey_), -where they found no settlements except some prairie-dog towns, little -vegetation except sage brush, and no water at all. At the coldest season -of the year, when sentries at Santa Fe were having their feet frozen, -to make such a march at an elevation of more than a mile and a quarter -without fuel or tents[15.3] was clearly a good beginning. At Dona Ana, -the only settlement between El Paso--sixty or sixty-five miles farther -on--and Valverde, the straggling command was supposed to concentrate; -but the concentration seemed rather nominal. Dirty, unshaven and ragged, -the troops marched almost as they pleased. They were determined to -survive, go ahead and fight, but little else appeared to them requisite. -It was now reported that seven hundred soldiers and six guns were -awaiting them at El Paso; but on December 23 the command moved on.[15.6] - -The likelihood of invasion from the north had long been foreseen by the -authorities of Chihuahua, and the expediency of making a stand at the -threshold was obvious. But the citizens of El Paso, the border town, -who were practical, industrious and thrifty people, had been greatly -influenced, like those of New Mexico, by interest in the caravan -business, contact with American traders and wagoners, and acquaintance -with the ideas and methods of the United States. Almost openly, men -said the town would thrive more under American rule, argued that it was -the intention of the government at Mexico to sacrifice the people for -the aggrandizement of its partisans and the privileged classes, pointed -out that no substantial forces had come north, and asserted that what -soldiers had arrived were under orders to withdraw without fighting, and -leave the citizens to be punished for their loyalty.[15.6] - -Public spirit fell to a low ebb, and there it remained. No one thought -it endangered health to shout "_Viva Mexico!_" But it was believed by -many that in a community so honeycombed with treason, active, determined -efforts in her cause would be liable to bring on an attack of cold steel -or lead in some dorsal area; and when the governor of Chihuahua sent the -prefect instructions on September 19 to retire, on the approach of the -enemy, with all the armed forces, cattle and provisions, collect the -resources of the district, and fight stubbornly on the guerilla system, -no intention of obeying this order could be observed. October 12 an -expedition designed to forestall invasion set out for the north; but at -Dona Ana some of the troops--covertly stimulated by officers--became -insubordinate; the commander understood public sentiment well enough to -take their side; the whole body returned at full speed to El Paso; and -the prefect dared not, or did not wish, to discipline anybody.[15.6] - -There were now on the scene and in arms about four hundred and fifty -troops and apparently about seven hundred National Guards with four -guns.[15.4] In general two accepted schools of thought divided the -soldiery. Some were for not fighting hard, and some--including most -of the Presidials and National Guards--for not fighting at all; while -the few and unpopular zealots felt paralyzed by a want of confidence. -Colonel Cuylti, the commander, belonged to the second school of -thought; and on the evening before he was to move against Doniphan, -whose march had been reported about a week before, he fell sick with a -subjective disability officially diagnosed as brain fever, and set out -for Chihuahua with his accommodating surgeon. Lieutenant Colonel Vidal -succeeded to the command and also, it would seem, to the disability, -for after proclaiming martial law and pitching his camp some three -miles from El Paso, he concluded to halt. The American van, described -as consisting of about three hundred straggling countrymen in tatters -without artillery, could be surrounded and lanced like so many rabbits, -he said; but he was not personally in the mood for sport, and hence -conceded this pleasure to the second in command, Brevet Lieutenant -Colonel Ponce de Leon, assigning to him at least five hundred men[15.5] -and a 2-pound howitzer.[15.6] - -[SKIRMISH AT EL BRAZITO] - -At about three o'clock on Christmas afternoon Doniphan, with less than -five hundred of his careless, confident volunteers, reached a level spot -on the eastern bank of the Rio Grande named Temascalitos, though often -called El Brazito, approximately thirty miles from El Paso. Pickets and -sentries--but not supper--being superfluous, the men scattered in search -of water, fuel and other conveniences. Mexican scouts were observing -their operations; but, strong in conscious rectitude, the Missourians -neither knew nor cared what the enemy were about. Suddenly armed men -could be seen in fine order on a hill about half a mile distant. The -rally was sounded. The volunteers rushed for their arms, and with all -speed they were loosely formed as a line of infantry, bent back at the -extremities toward the river, and resting at the left on the wagons of -the caravan.[15.6] - -With graceful consideration Ponce gave them time by sending a lieutenant -with a black flag to demand that Doniphan should present himself. -Otherwise, added the messenger, we shall charge and take him, neither -giving nor asking quarter. "Charge and be damned!" was of course the -reply; and the Mexicans then advanced, opening fire at about four -hundred yards from our line. Several volleys were delivered while the -Americans, either lying down or standing firmly with cocked rifles, -withheld their fire. But the powder of the Mexicans was mostly bad, they -shot high, and their little gun was mismanaged.[15.6] - -By this time they had come within easy range. At command the American -volunteers now fired with great effect, and a flanking movement against -the wagons was received with equal spirit by the traders and their men. -Evidently there was a mistake. These fellows were not rabbits; and the -Presidials and El Paso militia, candidly recognizing Vidal's blunder, -retired in disorder, compelling the rest of the body to do the same. -Speed now compensated for any possible want of courage; and a party of -fifteen or twenty mounted Americans, who pursued the enemy for miles, -could not bring any of them to a stand. Doniphan's loss amounted to -seven men slightly wounded; that of the Mexicans to a howitzer captured -and perhaps a hundred men killed or wounded; and this farcical brush, -lasting thirty or forty minutes in all, has figured in American annals -as the "battle" of Brazito.[15.6] - -[EL PASO OCCUPIED] - -The Mexican troops now evacuated the district; the National Guards -disbanded; and presently a humble deputation from El Paso was explaining -to Doniphan that arms had been taken up by the citizens under -compulsion. Two days after the skirmish, therefore, amid a general -appearance of satisfaction, he and his rough troopers concluded they had -reached paradise. Along the Rio Grande, mostly on the southern side, ten -or twelve thousand people occupied settlements extending downstream for -many miles. Above, there was a dam; and artificial streams from that -point not only irrigated the rich fields and vineyards, but watered the -orchards, in which many of the houses were buried, and freshened the -long and regular streets, which not only were shaded by lines of trees -full of lively and tuneful birds, but were kept neat by daily sweeping. -To drill, practice twice a day at the targets, and feast on the abundant -fruits in such a place was a most agreeable change from the Jornada del -Muerto.[15.11] - -El Paso did not prove, however, to be exactly a paradise. Unlimited -self-indulgence led to considerable sickness, and several men died. -It led also to disorders and to outrages on the people, and before -long two lieutenants, both intoxicated, fought with dirks. Moreover it -was now learned that Wool had not gone to Chihuahua,[15.7] that great -preparations for resistance were making there, and that a serious -insurrection--purposely exaggerated by the Mexican reports--had occurred -in the rear.[15.8] The boldest appeared therefore to be the wisest -course--to push forward, and conquer or die.[15.9] But without cannon -only the second alternative was possible, and the artillery did not -arrive. Price was in fact extremely unwilling to part with it, and owing -to this and other difficulties Clark was unable to set out for El Paso -until January 10. Then his men encountered even more painful hardships -than Doniphan's had undergone, for they had to struggle with snow--to -say nothing of almost perishing with hunger, and being nearly buried in -a sandstorm; and it was not until February 5 that men, guns and wagons -joined the impatient command.[15.11] - -Three days afterwards the belated expedition set out on its march for -Chihuahua--nearly three hundred miles distant--with 924 effective -soldiers, besides about three hundred traders and teamsters, who were -sworn into the service by Doniphan and elected a merchant named Owens -as their major. About seven hundred of the troops belonged to the First -Missouri regiment, about one hundred to Clark's artillery, and about -one hundred to a body named the Chihuahua Rangers, made up at Santa -Fe.[15.10] There were four 6-pounders, two 12-pound howitzers, and about -315 goods-wagons besides the wagons belonging to the companies and the -commissary department, each with its quota of attendants; and as the -column, with every banner unfurled, wound into the distance as far as -the eye could see, it made a gallant and picturesque sight. It was -exposed to a rear attack from Sonora; but that state, while alive to the -opportunity, had not the means to take advantage of it.[15.11] - -Troubles enough presented themselves, however. The country was bare -and monotonous, producing little except the crooked mezquite and an -occasional willow. A desert sixty-five miles wide and another nearly -as large had to be crossed. Heat alternated with cold, and one day it -was necessary to kindle fires repeatedly to warm benumbed limbs. Tents -were blown down by storms. More than once no fuel and no water could -be had for days. Antelopes and hares could frequently be seen; but the -tarantulas, rattlesnakes and copperheads were far more numerous, and far -more willing to be intimate. One day, when the army was in camp at a -lake, the grass took fire, and in an instant a small flame went scudding -off, burning a narrow trail. Soon this was driven by a whirlwind up the -mountain side, spreading into a vast blaze; and then, gathering force, -it rolled back upon the camp like a tidal wave. By arts known to the -plainsman almost everything was saved; but with a fearful roaring and -crackling a surge of fire swept over the encampment, proving how great -the danger had been.[15.11] - -The state of things in the country farther south could not easily -be ascertained, for the authorities at Chihuahua had cut off all -communication with the north; but there were hostile spies, and some of -them, taken prisoners, had to give instead of obtaining information. -About seven hundred Mexican cavalry--said to be twice as many--were -discovered in front looking for a favorable opening, which they did -not find. At length, crossing a handsome plain on February 27, the -expedition came at nightfall to the hacienda of El Sauz, and learned -that strong fortifications had been erected at the Sacramento River, -fifteen miles farther on. That was the next watering-place, and -evidently it would have to be fought for; so a halt was made and a plan -devised. "Cheer up, boys," said Doniphan with a twinkle; "To-morrow -evening I intend to have supper with the Mexicans on the banks of a -beautiful spring."[15.11] - -[THE SITUATION AT CHIHUAHUA] - -As early as August, 1846, Chihuahua had expected this visit; and the -governor, saying that Kearny's army had occupied New Mexico "as easily -as it would have pitched its tents in the desert," seemed ready to -let the operation be repeated in his own state. Perhaps he was merely -weak, but the same pro-American influences of a commercial nature that -we have observed at El Paso and Santa Fe were rife about him, and there -was also much sentiment in favor of establishing the northern provinces -as an independent republic under the protection of the United States. -Over against these ideas, however, and possibly because of them, existed -a peculiarly intense hatred of us, exasperated now by the loss of New -Mexico and the fear of American outrages.[15.13] - - [Illustration: EL PASO TO ROSALES] - -Near the end of August the governor was forced out, and Angel Trias, an -active, ambitious man, rich, and most unfriendly to the Americans, took -his place; and the great body of the citizens, either anxious to defend -themselves against invasion or dreading to be thought disloyal, rallied -about him. The central government became interested, ordered several -northern states to aid Chihuahua, and instructed Reyes, comandante -general of Zacatecas, to assume the defence of New Mexico, Chihuahua and -Durango. But embarrassments then arose; delays ensued; and Santa Anna, -according to his policy of concentrating the military strength of the -country under his own command and disregarding non-essential territory, -frowned upon all national efforts to defend the northern frontier. It -was now November; and the government, appointing the unpopular Heredia -comandante general at Chihuahua, yielded to Santa Anna's views.[15.13] - -Trias, however, did not abandon hope. The resources of the state were -scanty indeed. The effective colonial method of protecting the border -had long since been given up, and Indian raids, beginning about 1831, -had fast impoverished the haciendas. During the past year, perhaps -because the savages believed the Mexican troops would be required for -the war, these incursions had been worse than ever before. A single -party of Comanches had numbered more than eight hundred. It was -indispensable, therefore, to employ some of the military forces in the -protection of the settlements; but more than 10,000 men were enrolled -in the National Guard, and Trias felt sure that Chihuahua state was -inherently strong enough to defeat Doniphan, whose approach was duly -reported.[15.13] - -The chief needs were money and armament. Artillery had been practically -unknown in that region, but it was found possible to cast and mount a -number of pieces, and infantry soldiers learned to use them. Arms were -gathered and repaired; ammunition and clothing were manufactured; and by -dint of local borrowing the expenses were met. Santa Anna finally had -255 men sent from Durango; and in the end nearly 1200 mounted troops -(many of them Presidials), some 1500 infantry including about seventy -regulars of the Seventh Regiment, 119 artillery, probably more than -1000 rancheros armed with long knives (_machetes_) and rude lances, ten -brass cannon ranging from 4-pounders to 9-pounders, and nine musketoons -on carriages appear to have been assembled.[15.12] The men were -enthusiastic and eagerly obedient, and the leaders--Heredia for chief -and Trias as second in command--felt proud of their army. As for the -Brazito affair, which had caused much discouragement, it seemed now like -a bad dream.[15.13] - -[THE SACRAMENTO POSITION] - - [Illustration: BATTLE OF SACRAMENTO - Feb. 28, 1847] - -February 10 a portly, handsome officer arrived at Chihuahua. This was -General Garcia Conde, and the next day he and the other chiefs, after -reconnoitring the pass at the Sacramento River, fifteen or eighteen -miles to the north, decided to make a stand at that point. It was a wise -decision. The stream, running here toward the east, was crossed at a -ford by the route from El Paso, which had a north and south direction. -Rather more than two miles north of the river and approximately -parallel with it, there was a broad watercourse, now dry and sandy, -known as the Arroyo Seco, which after crossing the El Paso highway -continued in its easterly course about a mile and a half, turned then -toward the south, and joined the river about a mile and a half below the -ford. Along the northern bank of the Arroyo lay a road, which extended -on the eastern side of the highway to the junction of this watercourse -with the Sacramento, while on the western side, bending toward the -south, it crossed that river three miles or so above the ford, passed -the hacienda of El Torreon, penetrated a defile in the steep and rocky -foothills thrust out here by the western cordillera, and rejoined the -highway about six miles farther on toward Chihuahua. A triangular block -of rugged hills lay thus between this road, the highway and the river, -the northeastern corner of which (called Sacramento Hill) almost reached -the solid adobe buildings of Sacramento hacienda near the ford.[15.13] - -Between the river and the Arroyo lay elevated ground cut straight across -by the highway. The portion west of the highway was a fairly smooth -plateau ascending very gently toward the western cordillera, but the -other part rose immediately east of the highway about fifty feet, and -formed--roughly speaking--a square one and a half miles on a side, with -a broad, smooth hollow in the middle that debouched at the southeastern -corner toward the Sacramento, and a dominating hill called the Cerro -Frijoles at the northeastern corner, toward which the square sloped -up. On the north and west edges of the square the Mexicans constructed -a series of well-planned and well-executed redoubts alternating with -breastworks--which extended from Cerro Frijoles at the northeast to -what we may call Fort N at the southwest--supplemented near the ford -with fortifications on both banks of the river, and finally with a -redoubt halfway up Sacramento Hill; and these works commanded perfectly -the highway, the Arroyo road and the valley of the river. The Torreon -route seemed impracticable for the American wagons, but even here -fortifications were erected; and still others guarded the Arroyo near -its junction with the Sacramento. The principal camp lay in the hollow -of the square, which not only protected the troops but concealed both -their numbers and their movements.[15.13] - -In a word, the position consisted essentially of a tongue of land -crossed near its elevated tip by the El Paso highway, with the -Sacramento River and the Arroyo Seco on its edges, a series of -fortifications round its tip, and an answering fortification beyond the -river on a hill. It seemed to bar the way of the Americans completely. -The Mexicans felt sure that it did so, and on the evening of February -27, jubilant and boastful, they even talked of recovering New Mexico. -Anyhow these presumptuous and contemptible Yankees were to be cut up, -and the booty would include a caravan worth a million. Yet influential -Chihuahuans had a financial interest in that caravan,[15.13] and one may -be sure they were not asleep.[15.14] - -[THE BATTLE OF SACRAMENTO] - -Next morning the Americans awoke early. Already the horses had been -carefully inured to explosions of powder. Now swords were filed, rifles -loaded afresh, straps tested, and even the linch-pins of the wagons -inspected; and by daybreak the command set out. To make it compact, -ready for attack from any quarter and perplexing to hostile observers, -the wagons were formed in four well-separated columns of about one -hundred each; the artillery and most of the troops marched between -these columns, and the companies of Reid, Parsons and Hudson--regarded -as proper cavalry and not simply mounted men--rode in front as advance -guard and screen; and in this formation, with banners and guidons -flaunting to impress the enemy, it rolled forward through a valley -about four miles wide, bounded on each hand by a massive, barren -cordillera,[15.15] until at about half-past one the troops, coming in -sight of the Mexican works, noticed a quick, sharp flash there: the -Mexican cavalry drawing their sabres.[15.17] - -Doniphan and his principal officers now galloped ahead, and at a -distance of two or three miles reconnoitred most carefully with glasses -the Mexican position. It looked impregnable; and when the command was -about a mile and a half distant from it, the Colonel--first ordering his -cavalry screen to keep on advancing--turned the main body sharply to -the right, intending to cross the Arroyo Seco higher up, and gain the -plateau there. It was a brilliant scheme but perilous. Good troops, not -encumbered with artillery or baggage, might undertake such a manoeuvre -even in the face of the enemy, but with four hundred wagons, most of -them extremely heavy, it seemed impossible for untrained volunteers to -cross the Arroyo, and mount the high bank of the plateau; yet not only -was it a chief part of the soldiers' business to protect the wagons, but -it looked as if the wagons might soon be needed to protect the soldiers. -Hence this desperate attempt had to be made. Heredia observed it -immediately; and, concluding that the Americans were aiming, as a last -hope, to avoid his works and follow the Torreon route, he instructed -Garcia Conde, the chief cavalry officer, to hold them in check until the -artillery and infantry could arrive and finish them.[15.17] - -But these Americans were no ordinary men; and while they had little -fear of death, it was their belief that defeat would mean dungeons and -torture. After marching for some distance with all possible speed up -the Arroyo road, they stopped at the point selected. Instantly shovels, -pickaxes, crowbars and ropes were out of the supply wagon, and for a -few moments the sand flew as if electrified. Then the drivers yelled -like Apaches; the mules were stimulated by every art known to drivers; -and the swaying wagons headed for the ravine. At the brink many of the -frightened animals, twisting their necks back till they almost broke, -stopped short; but the men pushed them along, and down they all plunged, -floundering, biting and kicking. Across the deep, sandy bottom they -were driven or dragged amid shouts, curses and "hell let loose," as a -soldier put it; and then came the real struggle--the opposite ascent, -forty or fifty feet high. Wild with excitement, pain and fright, the -animals exerted every nerve, scrambling, jumping, rearing and panting; -the teamsters yelled and flogged; and the soldiers tugged and lifted -at the wheels, or pulled with hundreds of ropes. In a few minutes, as -it seemed, the incredible was done, and the command, forming on the -plateau as before, advanced. Already the Mexican horse were dashing on, -brandishing their lances in the sun, fluttering their bright pennons, -and waving a black flag decorated with a skull and crossbones; but, as -Doniphan did not appear to be making for El Torreon, they concluded to -halt, and let the infantry and artillery overtake them.[15.17] - -It was now a little before three o'clock, and when enough ground had -been gained so that the traders and teamsters could make the caravan -into a fort, Major Clark's trumpeter sounded "Trot!" and Battery A -emerged from the masking wagons. "Form battery, action front, load and -fire at will!" rang out Weightman's clear voice; and at a range of about -half a mile solid shot, chain-shot and shells, perfectly aimed, saluted -the lancers, who had never listened to such music before. Three rounds, -and they broke. With great efforts they were rallied, but the fourth -round sent them flying to the camp; and Ponce de Leon, the hero of El -Brazito, who had led the advance, also led the flight. The infantry, now -exposed to the American fire, caught the panic, and at the sound of the -cannon-balls men crouched or lay down.[15.17] - -An artillery duel followed. Most of the Mexican projectiles, falling -short and bounding once or twice, lost enough velocity to become -visible, and the Americans--laughing till the tears furrowed their dusty -cheeks--quickly became expert in dodging them. After a time, however, -the Mexicans discontinued their fire; and Doniphan, as the last of the -wagons had come up, did the same, wishing to form again and advance. -Heredia now reoccupied his works; but the original defensive attitude -could but very imperfectly be resumed, and the former confidence was -gone. The whole plan of the battle had been blown to pieces, it was -seen. The splendid fortifications now meant very little; the boasted -cavalry were demoralized; the prospect of plundering the wagons had -vanished, and the Brazito rout became a fact once more. Heredia ordered -two guns to occupy the fort on Sacramento Hill, and rake the Americans -from that elevated point; and several other pieces went there without -orders, abandoning the redoubts. A great portion of the infantry leaked -away, and soon Heredia did the same.[15.17] - -The Americans felt correspondingly elated; and, obliquing toward the -right in order to avoid the principal mass of the works and approach the -ford, they moved on toward Forts N and O, into which Trias, observing -their approach, now threw the best of his troops--the regular infantry -and a part of the Second Durango squadron. "Storm the fort, storm the -fort!" shouted the Americans; and at the proper distance Weightman and -the howitzer section were ordered to charge the work at N, supported by -the companies of Reid, Parsons and Hudson.[15.16] This order failed to -reach Parsons and Hudson, but Reid and others advanced all the same. -Unfortunately a deep gully was soon encountered in front of the fort, -and the assailants found themselves at a loss. With a few backers Major -Owens, who seems to have desired to die, rushed across, emptied his -pistols into the midst of the enemy, and fell. Still others dismounted -and skirmished. The howitzers, galloping to the left, succeeded in -turning the gully, and unlimbered within fifty yards of the enemy, while -a part of Reid's troopers, now supported by Hudson's, did the same, and -then charged at O. Entrance to the fort was gained.[15.17] - -But the enemy there and in the adjacent breastworks, proved too strong, -and the Americans, veering again to the left, passed along the front of -the fortifications, drawing their fire and shooting with some effect, -but discovering no place for a serious blow. The fall of Owens, who was -supposed by the Mexicans to be our leader, and the failure of the attack -upon the fort encouraged the enemy. Trias and Garcia Conde managed to -rally some lancers for a charge, and artillerymen with two guns prepared -to follow them. Before such odds a few of our howitzer force gave -way.[15.17] - -The rest did not. A round of canister scattered the lancers, and then a -large body of Americans, rushing in at a gallop, threw themselves from -their horses. Parsons' and Hudson's men joined them, and all pressed up -the slope of O together, firing at will. The Mexicans learned quickly -not to show their heads. Raising their muskets above the parapets at -arm's length and blazing away without effect, they soon used up their -ammunition. By this time the Americans, bravely aided by the howitzers, -were near their goal. Rifles were dropped. A rush was made. "With a -whoop and a yell and a plunge," wrote a soldier, "we were over into -their fort, man to man, grappling in a merciless fray, neither giving -nor receiving quarter." Six-shooters, knives and even stones were made -to serve, and in a moment the fort was taken.[15.17] - -Meantime Clark's guns had repulsed a body of cavalry that were making -for the wagons, and then, in cooperation with Parsons and the force of -dismounted troopers, he silenced and captured the works north of Fort O, -while other troops took N, went down into the valley, and occupied the -fortifications near the river. It was now five o'clock, and the battle -had been gained. Yet not quite. The guns on Sacramento Hill, where many -of the Mexican infantry and cavalry had taken refuge, were annoying, -even though aimed so high as to do no actual harm; and Clark turned some -pieces in that direction. The range was 1225 yards; but the first shot -dismounted a cannon, and, as a soldier remarked, every shell knew its -place. Soon Weightman took the howitzers across the river. A part of -the Americans flanked the redoubt on one side by scaling the mountain, -and then a wild gallop up the road on the other side to its rear ended -the fighting. Pursuit followed, but under the first beams of the moon -Doniphan's command re-assembled on the field of victory. Not a man had -lost his life except Owens, and only five had been wounded. Of the -Mexicans three hundred had been killed, it was thought, and an equal -number wounded. Forty at least were captured, and also great numbers -of horses, mules, sheep and cattle, and quantities of provisions and -ammunition.[15.17] - -[CHIHUAHUA TAKEN] - -Further resistance was out of the question, for the Mexican army -scattered, and the Presidials and National Guards fled to their -homes;[15.18] and the next day Chihuahua, a city of about 14,000 -inhabitants, was peaceably occupied. Obviously, however, this triumph -did not end the difficulties of the Americans. To remain in the enemy's -country with no prospect of reinforcement was perilous, yet the -traders and their merchandise could not be left without protection, -and the Mexicans were said to be in great force near Saltillo. -Doniphan therefore undertook to make an arrangement with the state -and city authorities that would free him from responsibility. But the -negotiations failed, for while the officials did not refuse protection, -they would not promise to remain neutral during the war, as Doniphan -insisted; and Heredia proved no less obstinate.[15.19] - -Doniphan then determined to retaliate and also appeal to their fears -by marching for Durango, and by capturing on his way the town of El -Parral, where Heredia and the state government had taken refuge. April -5, leaving about three hundred men to protect the merchants, he set out -with the rest of his command, and in three days made fifty miles. Then -he received notice that large Mexican forces were approaching, and at -once retraced his steps. Concluding soon, however, that Doniphan had -been hoaxed and no Mexicans were coming, the men grew impatient. Their -term of service was to end on May 31; and as they had been poorly fed -nearly all of the time, and for nine months had received no money from -the government, they naturally felt dissatisfied.[15.19] - -Doniphan seems to have renewed his negotiations, therefore, with the -state authorities; but as large quantities of the merchandise had -already been sold regularly or smuggled into circulation under the -cover of night, he doubtless cared less about the matter than before. A -Missouri trader named John Collins, who had undertaken with a party of -thirteen fearless men to reach Wool and obtain instructions, returned -on April 23 from his daring journey of more than a thousand miles, and -in two sections the command set out for Saltillo a few days later. -May 21, after a series of hardships and perils, a certain amount of -lawlessness, and a little fighting with the Indians, they arrived near -that point.[15.20] The next day Wool reviewed them. In honor of the -occasion they tried to improve their appearance, but it still suggested -a classic line, "The beggars have come to town." Some were dressed like -the Mexicans and some like the Comanches, and all were described by -their commander as "ragged."[15.21] - -A few days later they were greeted by Taylor at Monterey; and -finally, after passing down the Rio Grande and sailing to New -Orleans, they regained Missouri, where they had for rewards a speech -of congratulations from Senator Benton, the unstinted admiration of -their fellow-citizens, a series of banquets and barbecues, and the -consciousness of having aided certain American, Mexican and European -traders to dispose of their wares. They had, however, done more than -promote commerce. They had built a large stone into the edifice of -American prestige in Mexico, and had gained for themselves a notable -place in military history.[15.21] - - - - - XVI - - THE CALIFORNIA QUESTION - - 1836-1846 - - -Under Mexican rule California, the Golden West, was anything but -golden. It was poor, shiftless and pitiful; unprotected, undeveloped, -unenlightened, unconsidered; helpless and almost hopeless. Although the -province extended from the Pacific to the Rocky Mountains, only a strip -some fifty miles wide was occupied by white men, and but a small part of -that fraction consisted of farms regularly owned. The famous missions, -wrecked by the Mexican government, lay in ruins. In ten degrees of -latitude there was but one considerable seaport, Monterey, a village -of about one hundred small houses; and the only other sizable town, -Los Angeles, contained some 1500 persons, with perhaps an equal number -in places depending upon it. The total population in 1845 amounted -probably to something like 10,000 whites, 5000 Indians in the stage of -civilization represented by the breech-clout, and 10,000 other savages. -The real inhabitants were the countless horses and cattle, which roamed -for the most part at will. More than half bore the mark of a branding -iron; but probably the greater number even of these rendered no service -to humanity, and many had not even a technical owner.[16.4] - -[THE CALIFORNIANS] - -The Californians were genial, kindly, hospitable, faithful in their -married life and gracefully polite; but in the view of many, if not the -majority, courage and truthfulness were either follies or luxuries, and -no element of practical efficiency entered into their composition. A man -got up some time before noon. He would not work or even walk. He neither -read nor thought. A monotonous diet of beef, beans, wine, brandy and -chocolate, supplemented with cigarettes and a guitar, satisfied his -appetite perfectly. What he demanded next was a horse. As an infant he -had begun life with a ride to be baptized, and the saddle was his real -home.[16.4] - -Given a dashing steed with a long, flowing mane, an arching neck, a -broad chest, full flanks, slender legs and the gentle but fiery eye -that proved its Arabian descent, the Californian was fairly on the -road to happiness; and when dressed up in his dark, glazed sombrero -with a conical crown, wide brim and betasselled silver cord, his close -blue jacket, flashy shawl (_serape_) and red sash--possibly fringed -with gold--his loose trousers, decorated like his jacket with silver -buttons and slashed below the knee to reveal snow-white drawers, his -buckskin leggins and his mammoth spurs--as big as a small plate--he felt -completely satisfied.[16.4] - - [Illustration: CALIFORNIA COAST - 1846] - -He could lasso the foot of a running steer, ride one hundred and forty -miles a day for a week at a time, or check a full gallop and turn -round on a bullock's hide; and anybody less polite, gaudy, dexterous -and lazy he pitied. That a cow could be milked without the aid of a -calf, he was unable to imagine; but he could ride five hundred miles -to a family reunion, and dance two days and nights without stopping -except for something to eat and drink. A glass window and a board floor -were usually beyond his means; but he could afford to pay 24 per cent -interest, and throw his borrowed money away on cards and horse-races. -The women were counterparts to the men. They were affectionate, loyal, -generous. An orphan had its choice of mothers. But, had you entered -the open door of a California house, you would probably have found its -mistress either smoking on the bed with two or three dirty children -about her, or dressed up with an extravagance that made her lord's game -of monte seem economical.[16.4] - - [Illustration: NORTHERN CALIFORNIA] - -There was, however, a very different element in the population, composed -of several nationalities but commonly named, and naming itself, "the -foreigners." Some French and Germans could be found among them; the -British--almost all of them naturalized--were still more numerous; but -at the end of 1845 about three out of four were Americans. In 1822 a -Boston trading vessel had, so to speak, discovered California, and from -that date the business of collecting hides and bartering for them such -manufactured articles as the people needed or could be induced to buy, -was almost monopolized by New Englanders.[16.1] This naturally led a -few shrewd, enterprising Americans--among whom were Thomas O. Larkin of -Monterey, Abel J. Stearns of Los Angeles and Jacob Leese of Sonoma--to -establish themselves in this new country as traders. Runaway sailors -from the ships, hunters and trappers from the mountains, and occasional -adventurers from almost anywhere, gradually introduced themselves.[16.4] - -By 1836 the foreigners had become an important, if not always highly -esteemed, element. In the autumn of 1840 some two hundred emigrants are -said to have gone there from the Platte country, and in May, 1841, we -know that about one hundred men and thirty women and children set out in -that direction from Independence, Missouri. Many who undertook to settle -in Oregon decided to exchange that wilderness for the more hospitable -region close at hand. By August, 1844, our people were described by -Larkin as "flocking" to California; and Whittier sang, - - "By many a lonely river, and gorge of fir and pine, - On many a wintry hill-top, their nightly camp-fires shine."[16.4] - -[AMERICANS IN CALIFORNIA] - -Probably by the end of 1845 there were about eight hundred American -residents--men, women and children--in the province.[16.2] Quite a -number pushed on to the shore of San Francisco Bay, but most of them -lived in the Sacramento valley, because immigrants from the United -States naturally came to that region first, and because the Mexicans -were too much afraid of the savages to settle there; and as a sort -of base they had the fortified trading post of New Helvetia,[16.3] -situated about a hundred miles from the coast on the site of the present -Sacramento City, where Captain John A. Sutter--a German naturalized -in Switzerland--received the wayfarers with an open purse, an open -countenance and an open, hazy head.[16.4] - -Some of the Americans took the trouble to go through the process of -acquiring citizenship, and so could become the legal owners of land; -but far the greater number were mere squatters, or else hung about -the ranches of other Americans, working a little, hunting or trapping -more, but mainly waiting for something to turn up. They were in general -a rough-looking set: the vicious, devil-may-care sailor, the gaunt, -awkward, ragged immigrant, and the heavily bearded, leather-coated -hunter with his long hair turbaned in a colored handkerchief; and while -some had excellent brains and hearts of gold, the scale ran down to a -very low point. Little work and less law was the motto of not a few. -Some of the lowest were out-and-out for blood and plunder; some of the -best had practically the same thought--regarding California as a new -Canaan, out of which they were appointed by Providence to drive the -new Hittites, Hivites and Jebusites; and probably almost all agreed in -despising the inefficiency of the native, his passion for dress and -dancing, his guitar, his bland smile and his dainty politeness.[16.4] - -With such and so meagre a population, scattered from San Diego to -Sacramento, an air-line distance of about four hundred and fifty miles, -the outlook for progress appeared uncertain enough; and California was -also hampered by a state of chronic misgovernment and rebellion. In 1836 -the people, aided by a few Americans and other foreigners, took up the -same battle-cry as Texas, and raised the same blue flag illumined with a -single star. The Mexican troops were expelled; and J. B. Alvarado, M. G. -Vallejo and Jose Castro, all of them natives, assumed the control of the -province. Two years later Bustamante recognized their government; but in -1843 Santa Anna sent up General Micheltorena, with soldiers that were -mostly convicts and officers that were mostly debauchees, to restore -the national supremacy. Countenanced and protected by their commander -these men, instead of repressing the savages, harassed the people with -insults, outrages and murders. At length, in November, 1844, Alvarado -and Castro took up the sword;[16.5] and the following February, after -some almost bloodless fighting, the Mexicans were driven out.[16.9] - -Once more the government abjectly accepted a revolutionary situation, -recognizing as governor the senior member of the provincial assembly, -Pio Pico, and as comandante general Jose Castro, who had appointed -himself to that position; and meantime her destroying the missions and -selling their property (1835-44) seemed to emphasize these hints that -California was virtually to be thrown away. It has practically been -abandoned, wrote the German traveller, Loewenstern, in 1843; and this -fact was rendered still clearer by the proposal of May, 1846, that -England should take military possession of the province, which Bankhead, -the British minister, described as "an indirect offer of sale," and by -an explicit suggestion that Prussia occupy it. Mexico had substantially -abdicated.[16.9] - -In such a state of things the country could not advance. Indeed it was -going backwards. The only source of revenue was the duties collected -at Monterey, and this--amounting to $80,000 or $100,000 a year, and -signifying the virtual confiscation of about one third of all the -property in California--mostly disappeared in official pockets. No -military force able to cope with the savages was maintained. In -consequence of their incursions farms were being abandoned, and they -even raided within the settlements. The laws were openly disregarded. -There were practically no courts and no police, and each man had to -defend his own person and property. No sort of regular postal facilities -existed, and even communication with Mexico was rare and mostly by -chance. The only carriage in the country had been one belonging to -Micheltorena. There were no real schools, not a single newspaper, and of -course hardly any books except in a very few hands.[16.9] - -With gold in sight and actually seen, people did not look for it. In -a region where the wild clover grew several feet high and a single -grapevine would yield a barrel of juice, the government did nothing, and -the citizens could do little, to promote the cultivation of the soil. -With all the boundless coast of the Pacific waiting for horses, beef and -lumber, droves of unbroken colts tossed their manes in a wilderness, -beeves were slaughtered for their hides, and huge trees crashed to the -ground amidst the stillness of an untenanted forest. Six-cent muslins -cost fifty cents, and the coarsest of straw hats paid a duty of three -dollars. If a man wanted a kettle mended, he looked for some one trained -abroad; and even a child's torn skirt could not be patched without first -getting a hank of thread from Boston.[16.9] - -[MEXICAN RULE DETESTED IN CALIFORNIA] - -Naturally the people felt dissatisfied, and their complaints reached -far beyond the misbehaving soldiers. Every official professed -intense loyalty in public, but that signified nothing. The people -were determined to shake off Mexican authority. California will soon -declare its independence, wrote the British minister at Mexico in -1841, while his French colleague, who was in close touch with the -situation, believed it would merely be a question between England and -the United States. California is almost ready to separate from the -mother-country, concluded Sir George Simpson, governor-in-chief of the -Hudson Bay Company, who was there a year later. As a rule the people are -disaffected, it was directly reported in June, 1844. The principal men -have decided, wrote Forbes, the British vice consul, in September, 1844, -that progress under Mexican rule is impossible, and they will not have -it. The Californians are unanimously determined to be rid of the Mexican -military government, declared the British consul at Tepic, under whom -Forbes acted, a few months later; and of course all Mexican rule was -military. A separation is probably inevitable, concluded Lord Aberdeen, -head of the British Foreign Office, at the end of the year. California -"_must_ change owners," said a letter from that coast in July, 1845. -"The people hardly care what Flag is exchanged for their own," stated a -competent American observer two months later, while a Californian was -predicting that the Stars and Stripes would certainly go up there.[16.9] - -"The situation of Upper California will cause its separation from Mexico -before many years," predicted Wilkes's book in 1845. The people of -southern California are agreed to cut loose from Mexico, wrote a British -admiral. "Mexican rule had become intolerable," concluded Walpole, a -British officer in 1846. It had long been "only a shadow," said a young -American, afterwards famous as General William T. Sherman; but it was a -shadow that blighted. Another Mexican expedition would not be tolerated, -said Larkin; and in fact a commissioner from California so notified the -government. To get on at all with the people, a Mexican had to become -Californian in head and in heart, and even then he was less welcome than -an Englishman or an American.[16.9] - -Nor were such opinions merely expressed--they were made known to Mexico. -Many warnings, both official and private, went from California, and -the province maintained commissioners at the capital, who presented -information regarding the wholly unsatisfactory conditions existing -there. That part of the country has been "forgotten for more than twenty -years," wrote one of these commissioners to the war department in 1844; -and the following year he said that it had been "injured by every one of -our administrations." Alarms were sounded publicly in such newspapers -as the London _Times_ and London _Chronicle_. Notices regarding -the danger of American encroachment--particularly by the method of -emigration, a declaration of independence and early annexation--were -received over and over again from the Mexican minister at Washington, -the Mexican consul at New Orleans, Pakenham, the British minister, -and Bankhead, who succeeded him. This peril was notorious, declared -General Mora y Villamil near the close of 1845; and the government -itself recognized the gravity of the situation. In March of that year -the minister of war and the minister of relations admitted publicly -that California had been grossly misgoverned and was liable to slip -away.[16.6] Yet the government did nothing, and confessed that nothing -could be done.[16.9] - -Virtually, we say again, it was abdication. Both morally and physically -Mexico had thrown away and forever lost her control of the province. -She had nothing left except the bare thread of legal proprietorship; -and in certain cases legality is, according to enlightened modern -ideas, nothing. It is our conviction that human welfare is the supreme -test; and the welfare, not merely of California but of all the world, -certainly required that so rich a portion of the earth should be -developed and occupied. In our opinion a child, neglected and abused by -drunken parents who are always fighting each other, has good grounds for -leaving home, though not legally independent. We believe in the right of -revolution, which means that when a country misgoverns persistently a -considerable part of the population, it forfeits all claims to domineer -over them; and California, though her weakness led officials to practice -a lip service that deceived nobody, had more than once rebelled, had -made good her cause, and entertained no thought of accepting Mexican -rule again.[16.9] - -She was, therefore, being in every way unable to establish herself -as an independent nation and gain the recognition of the world as -such, quite adrift. The province is now "at the mercy of whoever may -choose to take possession of it," wrote the nearest British consul in -1845. Californians, Mexicans, Britons, French and Americans, who were -qualified to judge, agreed on that. She was the homeless child, whom any -kind, intelligent and well-to-do person may, and some kind, intelligent -and well-to-do person should, provide for. Any one of the nations then -leading the march of civilization, if disposed to perform a parent's -duty toward California, could rightfully have taken charge of her, and -some one of them was under obligation to do so.[16.7] Of those nations -the United States was more favorably situated than any other to fulfil -the trust,[16.8] and she felt ready to accept it.[16.9] - -[THE AMERICANS INTERESTED IN CALIFORNIA] - -Indeed our people were profoundly interested in the matter. As early as -1839 a Congressional report on Oregon said enough about the territory -farther south to excite attention; and Forbes's history of California, -published the same year, did much to fix it and create the fear that -European powers might encroach there. The seizure of American residents -in 1840, the appearance of Dana's "Two Years Before the Mast," and the -incidents connected with Jones's landing at Monterey deepened these -impressions. By 1842 glowing letters from American settlers began to -appear in our newspapers, and the suspected purposes of England received -ample notice. Gold existed there, it was reported; the country was -attractive, salubrious and rich; the port of San Francisco had a value -that words could not represent, and the British already held a mortgage -on the country. Our Pacific whaling fleet was said by the New Bedford -member of Congress to include before the end of 1844 six hundred and -fifty vessels, which had cost twenty millions and employed 17,000 men; -and not only was this harbor most important, since the bar at the -Columbia River hampered navigation, but American control was needed -there, for the uncertain and vexatious Mexican regulations caused great -annoyance. Besides, it was pointed out, we required a fortified port on -that coast, else in case of war with England our whalers would be unable -to avoid capture.[16.10] - -All these ideas took root, and in the spring of 1845 the press from -New York to St. Louis and New Orleans broke into quite a furore about -California. Its value became a popular subject; the known fact that -English holders of Mexican bonds had their eyes upon it was recalled; -the designs of the British government seemed to be clear; and annexation -was not only urged, but represented as near at hand. So keen became the -fear that England would forestall us, that in January, 1846, the ease -with which she could acquire California was dwelt upon in our national -Senate, while in the House the enormous advantages of our holding the -territory attracted attention.[16.10] - -Our government was even in advance of the people. In 1835 an attempt -was made to purchase the Bay of San Francisco. The next year Ellis, -who represented the United States at Mexico, expressed the opinion -that northern California would be of "immense importance" to us. Four -years later a personal letter to President Van Buren pointed out that -England, as a great creditor of Mexico, was likely to appropriate the -territory, and steps were taken to obtain information regarding it for -the use of Congress and the Cabinet. Daniel Webster felt strongly by -this time that we should acquire it. In 1842, while he was secretary of -state, our minister at Mexico not only expatiated on the value of the -territory, but reported that England had taken steps to anticipate us; -and the minister was instructed to ascertain whether an offer from this -country would be acceptable. Our strained relations with Mexico and -especially Jones's occupation of Monterey made it unwise to follow up -the matter that year; but after an interval, Tyler and Webster planned -an arrangement which--had it been carried through--would have given us -the port of San Francisco.[16.11] - -The expansive course of Great Britain, remarks dropped by English -writers, repeated warnings from our diplomatic and consular agents at -Mexico, and the consensus of opinion in California, Mexico, France and -the United States were quite enough to warrant suspicions of England, -and the circumstances connected with the visit of Duflot de Mofras, -attache of the French legation at Mexico, to California, and the -publication of his book by order of the king, hinted of danger from -another quarter; but neither country took any positive action, and our -government--doubtless noting that a tide of emigration to the far west -had begun--refrained from every move that could excite the jealousy of -Mexico or Europe. Early in 1843 Larkin, who was deficient in education -but not in shrewdness, activity or patriotism, was appointed consul at -Monterey; but the value of American commerce fully justified the step. -During 1845 he did not receive one letter from the state department, -and for a long time no American war vessel could be seen on the -coast.[16.11] - -[OUR GOVERNMENT INTERESTED] - -Early in 1845, owing to the annexation of Texas, a breach with Mexico -had seemed probable, and the danger that she would somehow dispose of -California in order to place it beyond our reach had been deemed acute. -But our government did not intend to have war, the tide of emigration to -that quarter was rising, and Polk warned off European interference by -re-asserting the "Monroe Doctrine." On July 10, 1845, however, Larkin -wrote that England was maintaining there a vice consul without consular -business, and that, according to the universal belief in his vicinity, -she was promoting a new Mexican expedition to California; and at about -the same time as this letter, news of an extensive British plan to -colonize in that province arrived from London.[16.11] - -The question was then maturely considered at Washington. Apparently the -American emigrants, unless checked, were sure to bring California into -the Union. That was natural and logical; such a peaceful invasion had -given us Texas; and in the opinion of the best qualified observers it -seemed likely to be efficacious again. Larkin, the Californians, the -British vice consul, the Mexican consul at New Orleans, the Mexican -minister at Washington, and Mexican, British, French and American -journals agreed on this. Larkin believed the matter would be settled -in that way by 1848. "Without striking a blow and without incurring -any expense," wrote Vice Consul Forbes, the United States will obtain -a secure foothold in the coveted region. The Americans do not need to -fight for California, said _Le Constitutionnel_ of Paris. "No more -convenient mode of conquest was ever devised," remarked the Baltimore -_American_. To suppose that Polk and the Cabinet failed to see what was -not only obvious but often pointed out, would be absurd. The condition -and political feeling of California, which were quite well known through -Larkin and others, fully warranted a procedure so amicable and so -beneficial; and it only remained to guard against European interference, -which our government now considered a real danger.[16.11] - -On October 17, 1845, therefore, confidential instructions, based upon -the fact that British and French consuls having no commercial business -were maintained in California, were issued to Larkin, who was now -to be confidential agent as well as consul. "The interests of our -commerce and our whale fisheries in the Pacific Ocean demand," he was -informed, "that you should exert the greatest vigilance in discovering -and defeating any attempt, which may be made by foreign governments to -acquire a control over that country," Against such an attempt the United -States would "vigourously interpose"; but "should California assert and -maintain her independence, we shall render her all the kind offices in -our power"; and "whilst the President will make no effort and use no -influence to induce California to become one of the free and independent -states of this Union, yet if the people should desire to unite their -destiny with ours, they would be received as brethren, whenever this can -be done without affording Mexico just cause of complaint. Their true -policy for the present in regard to this question, is to let events -take their course, unless an attempt should be made to transfer them -without their consent either to Great Britain or France." On the same -day instructions to ascertain the designs of those powers were issued -to Commodore Sloat, commanding the Pacific squadron, and Lieutenant -Gillespie of the Marine Corps was ordered to California as a co-agent -with Larkin.[16.11] - -All this has been called an intrigue; but, if that word is in fairness -applicable, the "intrigue" was only designed, so far as it concerned -Mexico and California, to rescue with a gentle hand the neglected, -abused and lost; so far as it concerned England and France, to ward off -an interposition which, if attempted, would probably have led to war; -and, so far as it concerned the United States, to safeguard and advance -most important national interests while promoting the general good of -the world. Such "intrigues" are among the most legitimate achievements -of true statecraft.[16.11] - -This leads us to the more serious charge, that Polk brought upon two -nations the curse of war and endangered the peace of the world, for -the purpose of tearing California from the parent stem; and we find -ourselves here at the best point of view from which to consider it. Not -only, then, have we no sound evidence in support of the charge; not only -was he personally unfitted to play the role of conqueror; not only did -he exert himself to restore friendly relations with Mexico; not only -did he virtually forbid Slidell to work for the sale of California, if -so doing would militate against this endeavor; not only did his taking -certain other important steps and refraining from still others imply the -same intentions; but it appears that he looked forward to obtaining the -territory without war, should he be unable to purchase it, by a method -peculiarly suited to his characteristics and to those of Buchanan. We -therefore do not need to consider one of our Presidents a wretch unhung, -as many Americans have seemed eager to do, and should finally dismiss -the charge.[16.12] - -[A CHANGE OF RULE IMMINENT] - -While the instructions to Larkin were on their way, the year 1846 -came in, and to California it brought fresh perplexities. The desire -to escape from what a citizen described as "a positive state of -anarchy" was more pronounced than ever. One plan contemplated a -French protectorate; but the men of that nationality were few, their -government did nothing, and their consul exerted himself only to acquire -unpopularity. A much greater number favored American control. Probably -all of the foreigners thought such a regime preferable to the existing -state of things. Even the British vice consul admitted that his personal -judgment pointed in that direction. Some of the Californians also leaned -our way. They recognized the merits of our institutions and the growth -of our power. The good order maintained by Commodore Jones's forces -had left a favorable impression, and so had the conduct of our naval -officers who went ashore from time to time.[16.16] - -But the participation of Americans in the California revolts had -excited suspicion and fear. Our acquisition of Texas, as described by -Mexicans writers, had been resented, and probably it was known that -Mexicans residing there had fared none too well. American hunters--or -men believed to be such--had sometimes helped themselves to property. -In consequence very likely of misdeeds committed by our sailors the -Americans were generally disliked at Monterey. The constantly increasing -immigration despite Mexican laws appeared intrusive and menacing. All -the faults of our people, who were better known than other foreigners, -came to be understood. Their brusque, overbearing, strenuous ways -impressed the polite, indolent Californians as almost ferocious. -Indeed a natural antipathy--social, religious and racial--made harmony -well-nigh impossible. Finally, doubts were felt whether we should -be able to offer immediate and effective protection against Mexico -and the Indians, and whether our flag would not go down after a time, -as when Jones had raised it, leaving our friends to settle with the -mother-country as best they could.[16.16] - -The British, on the other hand, while in every way as free and as -responsible as the Americans, were comparatively exempt from such -objections; their government had a strong fleet in the Pacific; and -hence, as was natural, most of the substantial citizens--especially in -the south--desired the shelter of her flag. But Forbes could not meet -their views. Warned not to meddle, save to hinder any other nation -from establishing a protectorate, he could make no promises and give -no encouragement. He conveyed to the government of California the -declaration of England that she would feel greatly displeased to have -the province pass under the control of any other power, but his only -advice was to elude American rule by declaring unqualified independence; -and this plan, as all thoughtful men understood, could not be carried -out.[16.16] - -Governor Pico, a fat, swarthy, good-natured farmer of tolerably good -sense but little ability, and educated only about enough to write his -name, was the chief of the British party, and wanted no Americans in the -country. Vallejo--who was now inactive but had great influence--favored -the Americans, for he believed that we held the winning cards, and -foresaw, like many other landowners, that American rule would enhance -the value of real estate. Castro, a man of quick but not profound -intelligence and more ambitious for power and fame than for wealth, -probably desired independence with himself as the autocrat; but he knew -the time had not arrived, and felt that his grip on the customhouse -must not be loosened. For the present, therefore, while he showed -much amiability toward the Americans and occasionally masked his real -views behind cordiality toward France, he posed at Mexico as an ardent -patriot. In order to save his responsibility, whatever might happen, -and perhaps fortify his position, he urged the need of preparing for -war against the United States, and called for plenty of money and a -few soldiers--not more than he could be sure of handling. At the same -time, holding that Pico was only an acting governor, he recommended -that during the crisis, at least, the civil authority should be united -with the military. In March he invited a number of leading citizens to -discuss the situation with him,[16.13] but no agreement on a line of -action could be reached.[16.16] - -Forbes congratulated himself that no American of commanding influence, -familiar with the language, customs and prejudices of the people, -resided in California; but Larkin seems to have been on good terms -with all the officials at least. His firm chin, ample brow and correct -side-whiskers inspired respect, while his notable energy, hospitality -and public spirit gained him esteem; and when Gillespie, after crossing -Mexico to Mazatlan in the guise of a mercantile agent and then sailing -perforce to the Hawaiian Islands,[16.14] arrived at Monterey on -April 17, and repeated to him from memory Buchanan's instructions of -precisely six months before, which it had not been thought safe to -bring in writing, he promptly bestirred himself. The main points of his -instructions were transmitted in confidence to friends at other towns; -here and there an official had an opportunity to see a good argument, -written out in Spanish, for American rule; and Castro was assured -that he and his friends might derive personal advantages from such a -change.[16.16] - -[A CRASH AT HAND] - -As if all these currents and cross-currents did not produce commotion -enough, civil war now loomed up. Both Los Angeles and Monterey desired -to be the capital and possess the customhouse. Herrera had assigned -two thirds of the revenue to Pico and one third to Castro; but Paredes -reversed this arrangement, and Castro improved still further upon it -by taking the whole. In April the comandante general and his officers -repudiated Herrera, on whom Pico's authority depended, came out for -Paredes, and resolved to propose, on the ground of Mexico's threatening -relations with the United States, that the governor should place himself -in Castro's power by coming to Monterey--the latter, in case of a -refusal, to act according to his discretion.[16.16] - -Pico, who doubtless knew as well as others, that Castro was aiming to -upset him, appealed to the people and summoned a general convention, -which was to meet at Santa Barbara on June 15, and avert the "external -and internal disasters" that were threatening California. The promoters -of the scheme intended to audit Castro's use of the public funds, -declare for independence, and invite foreign protection--preferably -that of England. Castro denounced it as treasonable, defeated it by -preventing the northern delegates from going to Santa Barbara,[16.15] -and proclaimed martial law; and about the middle of June Pico advanced -against him with all the forces he could raise. It seemed as if a crash -would have to come; and a crash did come.[16.16] - - - - - XVII - - THE CONQUEST OF CALIFORNIA - - 1846-1847 - - -In December, 1845, Brevet Captain John C. Fremont of the United -States army, who was engaged with a party of about fifty or sixty -men--necessarily armed but not soldiers--in looking for a satisfactory -road to the Pacific, reached New Helvetia, and at the end of January -he presented himself at Monterey to obtain funds and supplies, and -ask for permission to recruit his followers and horses in California. -Castro gave this permission; but unfortunately one of the two men -either misunderstood or violated the terms of the agreement, and when -the surveying party was discovered early in March near Monterey, Castro -denounced Fremont as having invaded Mexican territory and aiming to -excite a revolt.[17.1] - -It was an admirable opportunity to figure at home and at Mexico as a -dauntless patriot, and the comandante general made the most of it. His -narrow but high forehead, framed with curling black hair, seemed to -expand, and his brilliant black eyes darted fire, as he galloped about -the countryside rallying militia. Fremont placed himself in a strong -position, built some fortifications, raised the American flag and -announced that he would perish fighting; but after cannon were seen in -the distance he retired under cover of darkness, and slowly proceeded -toward Oregon. Castro then put out a bombastic proclamation, of course, -declaring that he had driven the American intruder away.[17.1] - -[THE "BEAR" MOVEMENT] - -Far to the north Fremont was overtaken early in May by Gillespie, and -went back to the Sacramento.[17.2] On June 6 he decided to act. At -his instance Americans captured a drove of horses that Castro had sent -for. Some days later a sizable company took Sonoma, a military post -north of San Francisco Bay, seized the cannon, arms and munitions, -appropriated horses, cattle and miscellaneous property, carried away -Vallejo and other leading citizens as prisoners, and raised a home-made -flag decorated with a particularly home-made semblance of a bear. Some -hostilities then occurred; some blood was shed; and early in July the -tragi-comedy reached its climax in a declaration of independence, which -probably not one Californian acclaimed.[17.6] - -What could have precipitated such an astounding performance? Clearly -no directions from our government.[17.3] A policy calculated, not -to outrage and affright, but on the other hand to conciliate and win -the people, had been enjoined upon Sloat, Larkin and Gillespie; and -under Buchanan's order Gillespie had acquainted Fremont with Larkin's -instructions. But Fremont, like the others, was to counteract foreign -designs, and knowing--for Larkin was aware of the fact on April 17 and -hence Gillespie knew it--that Slidell had been rejected, he said and -presumably believed, that war had by this time begun; and he doubtless -feared that England, supposably in collusion with Mexico, would try to -occupy California before the United States could act there. Forbes, on -behalf of the British, could see that a declaration of independence -would keep the Americans out. Hence possibly Fremont argued that such a -step would help to do as much for the British; and evidently a flag put -up by himself could be lowered any day.[17.6] - -Besides, as we learn from the President, Gillespie had secret -instructions; and these, while not contradicting the others, very -possibly stated that Polk was determined to have a complete settlement -with Mexico, and in case of war to acquire California, for such was soon -his policy; and presumably they ordered that Fremont should hover about, -and be ready to cooperate at the proper time. These circumstances, -taken together, presented to his roving imagination a brilliant vista -of achievements and glory; and, as he said, he "resolved to move -forward on the opportunity."[17.4] Moreover many of the Americans -in the Sacramento valley, believing that Castro intended to expel -them shortly from the country, appealed to Fremont for aid;[17.5] -and, finally, that officer probably burned to vindicate himself as a -soldier from the imputation of having run away in March. Hence the -determination to overthrow the government. Cannon, munitions and horses -were logical necessities; and it seemed likely that Vallejo and his -friends could be used to influence the public or possibly at the worst -as hostages.[17.6] - -The Californians, however, did not relish Fremont's total disregard -of their feelings and rights. They viewed the Bear uprising as an -inexcusable outrage--predatory, murderous and cruel, and, since Fremont -was an American army officer, as fully justifying every suspicion and -fear entertained against our government. The exasperation was intense; -the resentment bitter. Who could think his person or property safe -under the law of the rifle enforced by robbers? they asked. To make the -situation worse Fremont, under the pretence that he was getting ready -for the long journey home, obtained munitions and supplies from the -United States vessel of war _Portsmouth_, anchored at San Francisco; and -this fact became publicly known. Larkin was kept entirely in the dark, -but probably not one Californian thought so. In short, the plan of the -government was completely upset. Moreover Fremont's operations tended -to defeat his own aim also, for they enabled Pico to solicit British -protection on a definite and substantial ground.[17.6] - -These events, however, were soon eclipsed. June 24, 1845, instructions -for his guidance, in view of our strained relations with Mexico, had -been issued to Commodore Sloat of the Pacific squadron. He was told -that he should be "assiduously careful to avoid any act, which could -be construed as an act of aggression"; yet, should he ascertain "with -certainty"--"beyond a doubt"--that Mexico had "declared war," he -was to occupy San Francisco and occupy or blockade such other ports -as he could. In consequence of this order Sloat, so he reported in -November, proceeded to Mazatlan as the likeliest place to receive -information;[17.7] and on May 17 he learned from United States -Consul Parrott of Mazatlan, then at Guadalajara, of Thornton's -defeat. Upon this he decided to execute his orders immediately; but -on considering the June instructions again, he thought action was not -warranted.[17.8] May 31 came news of Palo Alto and the Resaca, and on -June 5 confirmation of the news. That hostilities had begun he felt -no doubt; but, "sicklied o'er" with something that resembled thought -"as the mist resembles rain," and with an anxiety about his personal -fortunes that obscured national interests, his resolution still wavered. -On the seventh of June, however, he learned from Surgeon Wood, recently -of the squadron but now on his way home with Parrott _via_ Mexico City, -that the Mexican government admitted the battles had occurred, and -learned also that an American fleet was blockading Vera Cruz. The next -day he sailed; and on July 2 he was in Monterey harbor,[17.9] fourteen -hundred miles to the northwest, where for some strange reason he made -the usual call on the authorities.[17.15] - -Larkin, with whom the Commodore had been instructed to confer, soon -hastened aboard, and opened Sloat's astonished eyes to the situation. -They agreed--for their instructions agreed--that kindness toward the -people was to characterize all action; but Larkin, who did not believe -war had begun, wanted action postponed, hoping that American rule -would be invited, or at least welcomed, by the Californians,[17.10] -while Sloat--though doubtless he now learned of the government's -plan to acquire the province through immigration and a period of -independence--remembered that he was under orders to occupy or blockade -the ports without unnecessary delay, and perceived that the state of -things called upon him to take immediate possession of the interior -also, regarding which no instructions had been given him.[17.11] News -that an American officer, to whom another officer had recently been sent -from Washington, was apparently conducting hostilities at a distance -from the sea appeared like a clue to the maze;[17.12] and, finally, -after several days of anxious and wavering deliberation, the idea that -Sir George Seymour, admiral of the British Pacific fleet, who had seemed -to be watching his movements,[17.13] might appear at any hour and -raise the British flag, drove him into action.[17.15] - -July 7, as the sun rose above the mountains on the east, Monterey -in its amphitheatre of pine-clad hills, with trim-looking white and -balconied houses dotted along its two parallel streets among the trees -and along the waters of the broad cove, which lay rippling at its -very feet, presented a very attractive appearance, but certainly was -insignificant enough. Not so, however, what occurred there. Old Captain -Silva, the commandant, when invited at half-past seven to give up the -town, replied that he and the troops had left the place, and there was -nothing--not even a flag--to surrender; and at about half-past ten -Captain Mervine with some two hundred and fifty sailors and marines -landed from boats.[17.15] - -[SLOAT OCCUPIES MONTEREY] - -Marching to the little customhouse Mervine read a proclamation drawn -by Sloat and Larkin. The United States and Mexico being now at war, I -take possession of upper California, said the Commodore in effect, but -I do so as her best friend; the territory becomes a part of the United -States, and the people shall be protected in all their present rights; -they may stay here as neutrals, or depart; they may choose their own -officials; products of the United States will come in duty-free, and -other articles pay one quarter of the Mexican rate; civil security, -religious freedom and material prosperity will be the fruits of American -rule.[17.14] The Stars and Stripes were then run up on the customhouse -flagstaff, our men--both afloat and ashore--cheered, the boom of -twenty-one guns from the _Savannah_ filled the amphitheatre of hills, -and the great province of California had a future. By July 14 our colors -were flying at every important point, and the Bear ensign had vanished. -Stringent orders to prevent misbehavior and plundering were issued; -measures were adopted to support the flag and repress the Indians; and -Fremont was earnestly invited to cooperate.[17.15] - -Both Sloat and Larkin endeavored to bring Castro in, but he would -not come; and he retorted by demanding an explanation of the Sonoma -affair. Doubtless that episode had thoroughly angered him, and he felt -besides that a man in his official position would not be forgiven by -the people, should he condone it. Alvarado and Pico, both of whom -were cordially addressed, held entirely aloof; and before long the -governor and the comandante general, forced into a reconciliation by -Fremont's operations, united their commands. But as the people of -northern California generally, thankful to escape from the clutches of -the Bear and pleased with Sloat's proclamation, appeared willing to -accept the change of flags, these two leaders withdrew to the vicinity -of Los Angeles, where with about eight hundred men and ten cannon -they supported--or pretended to support--the cause of Mexico; and -the situation was further clarified by Admiral Seymour, who arrived -at Monterey on July 16, and a week later, admitting that he could not -interfere, sailed away.[17.15] - -July 23 Sloat, who felt ill and probably felt worried, turned over -the command on shore to Robert F. Stockton, who had arrived in the -_Congress_ about a week before,[17.16] and some days later, giving up -the squadron also, left the coast. The new Commodore seems to have been -a smart, but vain, selfish, lordly and rampant individual, thirsting for -glory; and little glory could be seen in following after his predecessor -under so mild a policy. Besides, another character was now on the stage. -July 19 about one hundred and sixty horsemen entered Monterey from -the north--men with gaunt bodies, frames of steel, shaggy beards, and -an air of indomitable courage and endurance, armed with a long, heavy -rifle on the shoulder and a big knife on the hip, and speaking a lingo -sometimes hard to understand. These were the youngest and hardiest of -the Sacramento men, reinforced with the pick of the immigrants just -arrived. At their head rode a short, slender, active man in buckskin -blouse, leggings and moccasins, a blue shirt open at the neck, and a -cotton handkerchief in lieu of a hat, with plenty of hair, a small, -bearded face, and therein eyes--"such eyes." This was Fremont.[17.20] - -He was a counsellor far more to Stockton's taste than Larkin; and, -in addition to believing the Californians dangerous and unreliable, -and entertaining deep resentment on account of the March episode, he -doubtless could see that California, reposing contentedly under the -American flag, would make a poor background for his violent operations. -The outcome was a ridiculous address,[17.17] which ranted at length -against Castro, especially for his treatment of Fremont, explained -Sloat's action as due to this, declared that Stockton's only object was -to protect life and property, and announced that when Castro should -be put down and the duties of government be assumed by responsible -officials, he would remove the American forces.[17.20] - -July 23, with a view to the conquest of the whole province, Fremont's -men were taken into the naval service as the California Battalion, with -himself as major and Gillespie as captain; and they sailed promptly for -San Diego to gain Castro's rear. A few days later Stockton followed -in the _Congress_, raised the American flag at Santa Barbara, and -anchored at San Pedro, some eighteen miles from Los Angeles. Larkin, -still most anxious to bring about a peaceful arrangement, came with -him. Believing that war had not been and would not be declared, he -urgently recommended through Stearns of Los Angeles that Pico and the -legislature meet the dubious emergency, prevent the country from falling -a prey to disorder, save the interests of all officials, and ensure -lasting prosperity by declaring California independent under American -protection; and Castro proposed that Stockton halt at San Pedro with a -view to negotiations.[17.20] - -Alvarado said later that a satisfactory arrangement could probably have -been made, but the Commodore haughtily insisted that Castro should -begin by accepting independence and the American flag.[17.18] To do -this would have left him nothing to trade upon; and hence, apparently -overestimating Stockton's military strength, lacking money, and finding -round him no popular enthusiasm or even genuine harmony, he retired -hastily on August 10 with a handful of men toward Sonora, leaving behind -him a cloud of eloquence;[17.19] and the governor also left the -country.[17.20] - -[CALIFORNIA IN AMERICAN HANDS] - -On their disappearance all military opposition vanished. Larkin with -a couple of friends took Los Angeles on the twelfth of August; the -Commodore with his marines and sailors, headed by a brass band, and -Fremont with a part of his battalion arrived the next day; and on the -seventeenth, when positive information that war had begun reached the -town, Stockton issued another proclamation. California now belongs to -the United States, he announced in effect, and is under military law; -all who adhere to the new regime will be protected, but no others may -remain in the country. Some of the Californian leaders were arrested -and a number surrendered, but all of them were given their liberty on -parole. Friends rallied of course to the winning side; the Commodore -became attentive and kindly toward the people; and Larkin soon reported -that matters were settling down.[17.20] - -Stockton realized that under the law of nations and the law of humanity -a conqueror had the right and the duty of softening military rule, -and felt that pursuing such a course here would tend to confirm the -victory. Already, with his assistance, the first schoolhouse and the -first newspaper of California had made their appearance; steps were -now taken to establish postal facilities; and this very proclamation -announced, that officials elected by the people might govern according -to the prevailing usages. In September regular municipal elections took -place, and good results were obtained.[17.20] - -The reign of justice began to dawn. Chaplain Colton, appointed alcalde -of Monterey, gave general satisfaction. American officers recovered a -large number of horses driven off by the Indians, and astonished the -Californians by returning them to their owners. The Commodore, besides -adjusting disputes in a manner that gratified the people, made and -forwarded to Washington for approval what he called laws; announced -that a legislative council would be created, and called himself -governor. This office, however, it was not his intention to hold long. -The fantastic idea of landing at Acapulco and moving upon the capital -had taken possession of his mind. He therefore sent Fremont north to -enlist men for him on the Sacramento, proposed to set out for Mexico in -October, and promised to inaugurate that officer as governor on leaving -California.[17.20] - -But he did not leave so promptly. In arranging for the security of the -country he divided it into three military districts, appointing Fremont -commandant at the north and Gillespie at the south. Gillespie's task -was peculiarly important, because news and troops from Mexico would -arrive first at Los Angeles, and because that section had the largest -percentage of restless people, the smallest percentage of Americans, -and the weakest pro-American sentiment. He seems to have been an -elegant, precise man with a stiff, pointed beard and a temper of the -same description; but at any rate he was a soldier, understood his -responsibility, and knew what military government signified.[17.27] - -Larkin urged that a respectable command should be given him, but -Stockton had neither men nor funds for land service, and only about -fifty of the disdainful and intolerant volunteers, perhaps including -some of the detested Sonoma "brigands," could be spared for Los Angeles. -A garrison of that strength, far from support, was almost an insult -and certainly a provocation to the people. Though told by Stockton -to temper military law, Gillespie doubtless felt that his only safety -lay in maintaining strict order; and if, unfamiliar with Californian -character and ways, he extended his discipline too rigidly over the free -and easy natives, as he seems to have done, the mistake was but natural. -Stockton himself had given the cue, declaring in his proclamation -of August 17 that men found in arms outside their houses were to be -banished, ordering that all must be at home from ten o'clock at night -until sunrise, and indulging in a general tone that has been thought -supercilious. Here were causes enough of trouble; and behind them lay -an inevitable clash of races, temperaments and customs, unavoidable -friction resulting from a forcible change of flags, and a restlessness -due to the ambition of would-be leaders.[17.27] - -[INSURRECTION] - -As the signs of disaffection began to show themselves, Gillespie -naturally arrested suspicious persons, and punished those whom he deemed -conspirators. This precipitated an outburst. In the night of September -22 some turbulent fellows made an attack on the American quarters. In -a military way it was contemptible; but, as such affairs often do, it -crystallized popular sentiment. Within a few days about four hundred -Californians were in arms; and when the surrender of Lieutenant Wilson -with some twenty-five men at the Chino farm to about one hundred -and ten insurgents heightened confidence, the movement spread still -more. Some of the malcontents were persons of standing, who felt that -self-respect called upon them to break a lance against the invader, even -though sure to be defeated; but the great majority appear to have been -irresponsible characters ready for anything except work. Lieutenant -Colonel Flores, the leader, and nearly all of his officers had violated -their paroles, of course; but breaking an oath seemed to them a trivial -matter, for they knew they could make another equally good on a moment's -notice.[17.21] Without fortifications, adequate equipment or supplies, -Gillespie could see no hope of resisting such odds, and September 29 he -capitulated on favorable terms.[17.22] The next day he proceeded to -San Pedro with his men, and they soon embarked there on a merchant ship, -the _Vandalia_.[17.27] - -About the first of October Stockton, then at San Francisco, learned of -the insurrection. By his order Mervine sailed promptly for San Pedro in -the _Savannah_, and on October 7 with sailors, marines and Gillespie's -command--all on foot--the captain marched for Los Angeles. Stockton, -however, had provided him with no artillery, while the Californians were -supported by a small field piece. When the Americans charged, this gun -was hurried beyond their reach by mounted men with lariats; but as soon -as the Americans halted from exhaustion, it was drawn back and set at -work. The case appeared hopeless, and after losing about a dozen men, -killed or wounded, Mervine found it necessary to retreat. Naturally the -Californians felt immensely encouraged, and large numbers gathered on -the hills behind San Pedro.[17.27] - -Late in October Stockton, after lingering a while at San Francisco -to attend a glorification meeting and stopping at Monterey to land -ordnance and men for the defence of that point, arrived at San Pedro and -undertook to accomplish something; but the attempt proved a failure, and -he sailed for San Diego, at that day a small group of adobe houses about -four miles northeast of the present city.[17.23] Insurgents were now -besieging the place, and neither provisions nor horses could be obtained -in the vicinity; but Stockton procured both from lower California, and -began to make ready for land operations.[17.27] - -By this time Flores had been elected provisional governor and comandante -general by the legislature, and martial law had been declared; but the -insurgent leader found himself without adequate resources. Foreigners -aided him with a little money at an exorbitant rate of interest, but on -October 24 he stated that only some forty rounds of cannon ammunition -remained, and a thousand for the muskets of his four hundred men. -Campaigning without supplies or funds and driving stock to the interior -were found extremely irksome by the indolent Californians; a general -discouragement prevailed; and the legislature could not obtain a quorum. -Soon disaffection showed itself; and being a Mexican, Flores dared -not adopt strong measures. Finally, in the night of December 3 he was -imprisoned by malcontents; and although the legislature and people -soon extinguished the revolt, much confusion grew out of it. Moreover, -Stockton's troops outnumbered his; other Americans were gathering in -northern California, he knew; and thousands of immigrants were expected -at New Helvetia, he was informed.[17.27] - -[KEARNEY'S ARRIVAL] - -None of these forces, however, gave him the first blow. May 26 Polk had -proposed an overland expedition to California, and a week later it was -decided upon. Accordingly Kearny was ordered to advance after securing -New Mexico, should the season permit; and on September 25, as we have -seen, he left Santa Fe for the coast. Soon meeting Stockton's bearer -of despatches, he learned that California had been occupied, sent back -all but about one hundred of his dragoons, and with these and a pair of -mountain howitzers marched on. At the beginning of December he reached -Warner's ranch (_Agua Caliente_), the frontier settlement of California, -and, having learned of the insurrection, wrote on to Stockton for aid -and information. Gillespie was therefore sent forward with a brass -4-pounder and thirty-eight men, met him December 5, and told him among -other news that a party of insurgents lay at San Pascual, about eight -miles distant on the road to San Diego. Probably the force numbered -rather less than one hundred. A capable man, however, Andres Pico, -brother of the ex-governor, commanded them.[17.24] - - [Illustration: Fight at San Pascual] - -Kearny sent off a scouting party, which not only saw but was seen, and -reported to him at two o'clock the next morning. An attack upon the -Californians was highly inadvisable. The Americans and the pack-mules -that many of them rode were almost worn out. Some horses recently bought -or captured were accustomed to the terrible Mexican bits, and could -not be controlled by their new riders. Kearny had had no experience in -fighting lancers or California horsemen, and did not know how many were -before him. It was clear that the enemy were aware of his presence. -The dampness of the night made firearms unreliable, and the men were -so chilled they could not use them quickly. Finally, it would not -have been difficult to hold the insurgents off with his three cannon, -and march safely in a compact body to San Diego, now only about forty -miles distant. Kearny decided, however, to attack before daybreak, and -advanced.[17.24] - -Pico had not desired nor expected a battle; but, perceiving what kind -of troops were in his front, he did not flinch. Kearny's advance guard -fared very badly, and when his main body came into action, the enemy -adopted the familiar ruse of a pretended flight. In pursuing, the -Americans became separated according to the speed of their mounts; -and then Pico turned furiously upon them. The net result was that -Kearny, Gillespie and thirteen other Americans received ugly wounds, -and eighteen were killed, while the enemy's loss appears to have been -trifling. After ten or fifteen minutes, however, the Californians drew -off, expecting guns and large reinforcements, which Flores had promised. -As one consequence of the revolt against his authority, these did not -arrive. Hence Pico, who had not been prepared for either the fight or -the revolt, made no serious efforts to follow up his advantage; and -Kearny, though he lost his cattle, had to live on mule meat, and was -burdened with his wounded, succeeded, with additional aid sent him by -Stockton, in reaching San Diego on December 12.[17.24] - -Stockton's preparations to do something were then resumed. Sailors -felt strongly averse to shore duty, but he overcame their repugnance. -The ships furnished them pikes, carbines and pistols, and shoes were -manufactured out of canvas; and so with Kearny's dragoons, Gillespie's -detachment, some friendly Californians and about four hundred sailors -and marines, drilled somewhat for their new work, the Commodore had a -respectable force.[17.25] It was not, however, his intention to attack -the main body of the insurgents, for he felt afraid the enemy would then -get behind him. His plan was to move up the coast and make a diversion, -expecting Fremont and his riflemen to take the bull by the horns; but -Kearny urged him to march for Los Angeles, about one hundred and forty -miles distant, and at length on December 29, after having brushed away -the Californians operating against San Diego, he set out, greatly -embarrassed by having to drag miserable ox-carts through the deep sand. -Kearny declined the chief command, but finally asked for and was given -the post of lieutenant or executive officer under Stockton.[17.27] - -Flores now found himself in a desperate situation. Naturally officers -who knew they had violated their paroles dreaded to give up; but most -of his troops felt half-hearted, people hid to avoid serving, and some -of the Indians were in arms against him. In order to gain time for a -blow at Fremont, he tried to inveigle Stockton into a truce, holding -out as a reason that Mexico and the United States had probably adjusted -their differences; but the Commodore refused to treat with an officer -guilty of breaking his parole. Then, having some four hundred and fifty -badly armed men, though not enough powder for a long fight, he set an -ambuscade where he supposed the Americans would pass; but Stockton -avoided it by turning to the right, and made for the Bartolo ford of the -San Gabriel River, twelve miles from Los Angeles, where the stream was -only knee-deep. The Californians followed suit, and occupied an eminence -fifty feet high, parallel to the stream and about six hundred yards -beyond it.[17.27] - -As the Americans crossed--the first of them deploying and waiting -behind the bank, here breast-high and masked with trees--Flores greeted -them from the top of the hill with four small guns; but his inferior -powder and sometimes ill-fitting balls proved ineffective.[17.26] -When the Americans were mostly across the river and formed in a square, -he undertook to charge. But the movement seems to have been rather -faint-hearted or badly managed; his left was demoralized by hearing one -of the aides--who seems to have been seized with a panic--shout "Halt!" -as it was advancing; and his right accomplished nothing. Stockton -then cannonaded the hill, particularly with his two 9-pounders, for -about forty minutes, while most of his troops lay down; and finally he -charged. Crying "New Orleans!" in memory of Jackson's great victory, -gained on the same day of the year, January 8, the men rushed on, and -easily took possession of the ground. The Californians made a fruitless -attack on their rear, and then most of them dispersed.[17.27] - -[STOCKTON MOVES AGAINST LOS ANGELES] - -The next morning Stockton, leaving the road in order to avoid the danger -of ambuscades, pushed slowly on toward Los Angeles; and after a time -some three hundred Californians, whom Flores had managed to rally, -placed themselves upon his line of march. An ineffective cannonade from -a ravine used up the rest of their ammunition, while the Americans -replied with equally meagre results. As a last effort, Flores now -ordered a charge, giving the signal for it--as he himself reported--by -sending forward a white flag.[17.27] - - [Illustration: Fight near Los Angeles] - -The attack was made with considerable spirit but no success at all on -both of the American flanks, and then Flores took post at a point on -the road to Mexico, where Pasadena now stands. He admitted losing only -five killed and twenty-two wounded during the two days, but probably -these figures needed to be multiplied by three; while Stockton lost one -killed and fourteen wounded. That night the Americans encamped near Los -Angeles; and the next day, January 10, after a deputation had come to -arrange matters, they took possession of the town--annoyed a little by -drunken bullies--and replaced Gillespie's flag on the government house. -Most of the California troops now scattered, and those who remained were -insubordinate. Flores could see there was no hope; and the following -night, leaving to Andres Pico the chief command and probably about one -hundred men, he set out hastily with a few others for Sonora.[17.27] - -[FREMONT'S OPERATIONS] - -Up to this time nothing had been heard of Fremont's operations during -almost three months. Probably that officer did not wish to take part -in the hostilities. Expecting to be governor and seeing before him -a prospect of brilliant opportunities, he desired to conciliate the -people. Stockton, on learning of the revolt in the south, had ordered -him back from the Sacramento, and about October 12 he sailed for Santa -Barbara with instructions to march from that place to Los Angeles. -Learning on the way, however, that Mervine had been defeated, and that -all the horses and cattle had been driven away from Santa Barbara by -insurgents, he returned on his own responsibility to the Sacramento, -and began to collect not only horses but men.[17.28] By the end of -November he found at his back about four hundred mounted riflemen and at -least three guns, the strongest force in California.[17.32] - -The _Savannah_ had been sent north expressly to assist him;[17.29] -but, with little reference to his army commission or his naval -obligations, he now proceeded slowly by land to San Luis Obispo, where -he fortunately captured Jesus Pico, a cousin of Andres; and after his -prisoner had been sentenced to death for breaking parole, he assumed -the authority of pardoning him. Then, for no discoverable reason unless -to spare about sixty insurgents, whom he could have scattered in ten -minutes, he led his command through the mountains, where it suffered -terribly in the stormy weather. At Santa Barbara he took a week for -repose; and finally, with a nicety of calculation or felicity of luck -that excites wonder, he arrived near the scene of action--three months -after receiving orders to go there--precisely as the Americans were -entering Los Angeles.[17.30] Then with his devotee, Jesus Pico, he -betook himself to the camp of Andres, and finally, although he knew that -American forces had beaten the Californians and entered Los Angeles, -and understood that a superior officer was near, he arranged with the -insurgents a capitulation, which Stockton had refused to grant.[17.32] - -This capitulation, the "treaty" of Cahuenga, conceded substantially -all the insurgents could have asked. They promised to give up the -public arms, go home, obey the laws of the United States, and help -restore tranquillity; but on the other hand they and the rest of the -Californians were to be protected in person and property, to enjoy the -same rights as Americans, to be excused from serving under arms or -taking an oath of allegiance during the war, and to leave the country -freely should they wish to do so.[17.31] Naturally such a settlement -was displeasing to Stockton, but he felt extremely anxious to resume -his proper work as a naval officer, and of course was glad to have this -difficult business off his hands; so after hesitating for a time he -confirmed the pact.[17.32] - -It was a singular denouement. Men defeated, without a hope left, and in -danger of execution for breaking parole, virtually dictated terms to the -conquerors. A brevet captain, just blossoming into a lieutenant colonel, -eclipsed a commodore and a brigadier general; and the arch-ruffian of -the Bear cult reappeared as a fairy godmother to save and bless the -Californians, who detested him. But the ending was after all a happy -one. The Americans felt a new respect for the people, and they were able -to see that, although destitute of gunpowder, the insurgents, if driven -to extremities, could have done much harm with lance, dagger and torch, -and could have sown the seeds of perennial hate.[17.32] - -On the other hand, while the Californians felt well pleased with their -own audacity and valor, they not only realized that it was impossible -to fight the United States, but were thoroughly disgusted with Flores, -who took away hundreds of horses and mules belonging to his friends, and -with Mexico, which in three and a half months had sent neither a man nor -a peso to encourage and sustain them. Indeed, as their agent in Mexico -frankly said, their political attitude had completely changed. Most of -them intended to abide by the terms. They were disposed to look forward -instead of back. And the curtain was already beginning to rise on the -Golden West that we know.[17.32] - - - - - XVIII - - THE GENESIS OF TWO CAMPAIGNS - - July, 1846-February, 1847 - - -The operations described in the preceding chapters were all favorable to -American arms, and they placed under our control a very large portion -of the territory belonging to Mexico; but as they proceeded, it became -evident that she had no thought of consenting to negotiate. Indeed -Santa Anna's course and the utterances of the press were unflinchingly -warlike; and our consul at Mexico wrote, "Nothing but some very severe -blow will ever bring them to their senses." The policy and expectations -of the American government were therefore palpably wrong. The programme -of a short and a brisk war was a mistake and a failure. The nation found -itself in a contest of unforeseen duration and extent.[18.4] - -Heedless enthusiasm was consequently sobered, if not exactly chilled. -By the end of September, 1846, Pakenham, the British minister at -Washington, reported that a growing distaste for the war could be seen -more clearly each day. Large expenses had to be faced, and heavy losses -of men seemed inevitable. Many believed that neither troops nor money -enough could be raised; many, besides deploring the loss of precious -lives, complained that needed laborers had already been drawn away; and -many others asked themselves whether the outlay would be really worth -while. Taylor's famous letter to Gaines expressed the opinion that even -complete success would be of no advantage; and his idea of simply fixing -and holding a boundary north of which there would be enough territory -to pay all fair claims for indemnity, and throwing upon Mexico the -responsibility for offensive operations naturally appealed to not a few. -Moreover, he argued, no other sort of a peace could be made, since the -enemy had no government sufficiently stable to treat with. Calhoun took -up eagerly the defensive idea. Buchanan favored it; and Polk himself, -dreading to alarm the country by demanding great numbers of men and -fearful that the credit of the nation would not bear the strain of -active warfare, did the same.[18.4] - -On the other hand such a plan was clearly unsuited to the enterprising -temper of the American people, and precisely what the Mexicans, whose -ancestors had fought the Moors of Spain for hundreds of years, desired. -It reminded one of the menaces and forays that had been the policy of -Mexico against the Texans. It would have been received by her as a -cheering confession, on our part, of military impotence. Had it been -adopted, her people would have found a chain of profitable markets -established for them; and at any time she could have dashed either -with regular or with irregular troops upon any part of our line, done -what harm she could, and retired like a wave on the beach, to prepare -fresh assaults in a perpetual series. Only one campaign of the sort now -proposed was on record, said Cass--that of Sisyphus. Besides, every mile -of the boundary would have required its guard; even at that a broad -space along the frontier would have become practically uninhabitable; -expenses approaching those of offensive operations would have mounted -up; we could have laid no contributions upon the enemy; national -honor would have been tarnished and national spirit exasperated by a -succession of small defeats; and no progress whatever toward conquering -a peace would have been made.[18.4] - -Politically and commercially the unfavorable condition of things -which the United States had been so anxious to end, would have become -chronic. European nations would soon have gained a monopoly of trade -and influence in Mexico; they would have protested against an endless -blockade; and what further steps they would have taken in regard to -a vexatious and apparently aimless contest it was easy to imagine. -Furthermore, simply to seize and hold, with no legal title, provinces -which Mexico had not been able to protect against the Indians would -have seemed to place the United States in the class of mere pilferers. -Honor--at least military honor--demanded that we should meet the enemy, -whom we had challenged, at the centre of their pride and power. -Finally, the weakness exhibited in "backing out" of a war with Mexico, -begun without a question of triumph, would have excited ridicule abroad, -and compromised our international position. Confronted with such -objections to the defensive plan, Polk was "extremely distressed," said -Pakenham. Evidently some decisive achievement was needed to save the -administration, the party and the country; but he dared not face the -cost nor incur the risk of a still more signal failure.[18.4] - -[BOLDER IDEAS] - -There was, however, no lack of bolder ideas. Not only did every -newspaper come forward with a "cut and dried" plan, as Marcy rather -bitterly said, but the government itself knew what needed to be done. -In fact mere animal instinct was enough to suggest that a blow should -be struck at the enemy's heart, and as the project of maintaining a -line of operations from the Rio Grande to the capital--more than 800 -miles--was out of the question, the idea of attacking Mexico City by the -way of Vera Cruz came forward early. On July 4, 1846, Benton formally -suggested landing beyond the range of Ulua, the island fortress which -guarded that port, attacking the town in the rear, and after its fall -advancing to the capital. Santa Anna advised through Mackenzie almost -exactly that method of approach, adding that three or four thousand men -could easily capture the port; and at nearly the same time a letter from -Taylor, arguing that a lunge from the Rio Grande base would be unwise, -reinforced this project;[18.1] but there was no certainty that an -army could be placed in the rear of Vera Cruz, and a number of other -difficulties had to be considered.[18.4] - -In 1838 a French squadron had been unable in six hours to injure -Ulua seriously, though it had been permitted to choose its positions -unmolested. Such an advantage could not be expected now, and besides, as -Conner reported, the number of guns in the fortress had been increased -fourfold. The parapet of the main work had an elevation of forty feet -above the water; three 10-inch guns throwing shells were twenty feet -higher, and there were outworks--connected with the principal fort only -by drawbridges--commanded so thoroughly by the gun and musketry fire -of the garrison that it would be fatal to enter them, reported the -Commodore.[18.2] In short, said that prudent officer, Ulua could -certainly, if well garrisoned, resist successfully any naval force -brought against it; while in the opinion of Pakenham, formerly the -British minister to Mexico, a combined army and naval attack on Ulua and -Vera Cruz would be "a very hazardous undertaking," and, in consequence -of "the deadly nature of that Climate to foreign constitutions, success -would probably prove in the end as disastrous as failure." Moreover, -Conner pointed out, Vera Cruz would be of value solely as a depot, and -from that point of view he considered Tampico preferable. Consequently, -although at the end of August Polk brought up the subject of attacking -Mexico City by way of Vera Cruz, nothing was done about it save to ask -the Commodore for additional information.[18.4] - -Not long before October 10, however, it was ascertained beyond a doubt -that Vera Cruz could be approached in the rear by a landing force, and -beginning immediately Polk and his advisers, aided by Dimond, recently -our consul at that city, and by other experts, labored on the question -of future operations for nearly two weeks. The result was, first, a -decision that since a farther advance in the north would be hazardous -and would accomplish nothing towards bringing about peace, Monterey and -its vicinity should be the limit of serious operations in that quarter. -Such was the deliberate and unanimous conclusion of the President and -his official family after long discussions. Instructions to General -Taylor were then carefully drafted, studied, amended and agreed upon. To -make sure that he should understand their significance, Major McLane, -son of the minister to England and a graduate from West Point, was taken -into the full confidence of the Executive regarding this matter, and -was then despatched to Monterey with the letter of October 22, which, -as well as the explanations of the envoy, Taylor interpreted, we have -already learned, according to his own ideas. So much for the first -point.[18.4] - -The second was a decision to attack Vera Cruz. This did not mean, -however, a decision to proceed against the capital. Though Scott argued, -as Conner had, that gaining possession of the city and then reducing or -starving out Ulua would practically be sterile triumphs, unless the army -should go farther, it was intended at this time to do no more in that -quarter, and three or four thousand men were thought sufficient for the -undertaking.[18.4] - -[A NEW PLAN OF CAMPAIGN] - -November 7, however, Benton made an evening call at the White House, -drew the President's attention to the unfavorable results of the -Congressional elections, declared that a bold stroke must be delivered -upon the Mexicans at once, and urged that after capturing Vera Cruz -and Ulua the army should execute "a rapid crushing movement" against -the capital. Two days later he repeated the lesson, and on the tenth -he amplified it. Polk began to realize now that while it might be -dangerous to call for men and funds, it was even more dangerous not to -do so.[18.4] - -Benton kept on calling, and finally he submitted a written plan. Scott -presented a memorial of the same tenor. Taylor wrote that in order to -strike a decisive blow troops must land at Vera Cruz or near that point; -and Conner reported that a descent could be made under cover of the -fleet, batteries could be planted on sand-hills behind the city, and -Ulua, if not Vera Cruz also, could probably be reduced by starvation. As -early as November 14 Polk decided to call out 6750 men--that is to say, -nine volunteer regiments--for the duration of the war, and to capture -Vera Cruz immediately.[18.3] Yet even this involved no determination -to strike at the capital. Polk was distinctly in favor of so doing, -should that course be necessary to obtain peace; but Buchanan strongly -opposed it, insisting upon the cost of such an expedition, the chances -of failure, and the danger that by leading to a national, racial and -religious conflict it would militate against a settlement; Marcy had no -faith in the project; others of the Cabinet agreed with him; and hence -this question remained open, to be answered by circumstances.[18.4] - -The next problem was the choice of a commander. In October Patterson, a -good Democrat, had been selected; but it had been found that, as he was -not a native American, he could not be developed into a Presidential -candidate, that his experience had not been adequate, that his -appointment would involve the retiring of both Taylor and Scott, and -that, as Buchanan learned at this time from Slidell, he did not possess -the confidence of the army. Butler, another Democrat, was Polk's next -choice, but he clearly held no titles to the position.[18.9] - -Taylor had to be considered then; but he was regarded by the Executive -and his advisers as professionally unequal to the task and personally -unfitted for it, and both of these opinions were fully warranted. While -events had proved him a born leader of men and a splendid fighter, they -had also demonstrated plainly his lack of generalship and executive -efficiency. He distrusted, loathed and misconstrued the administration, -failed to supply it with plans and information, endeavored to throw upon -it the responsibility for mistakes of his own, lectured it harshly for -misdeeds it had not committed, and frustrated the cardinal intent of its -policy and orders by failing to press the campaign with all possible -vigor during the summer and autumn.[18.5] "I have not the slightest -respect," he wrote, for any member of the Cabinet except the secretary -of the navy. "Evil men bear sway," was another of his remarks.[18.9] - -Indeed, the General's natural kindliness and sober judgment seem to have -become largely perverted by this time. He knew that for several months -friends of his had been at work to gain for him the political place long -occupied by Scott, and to use him as a battering ram against the party -in power;[18.6] and it was easy to assume that he would be repaid -in kind. Stories of intrigues and machinations, doubtless exaggerated -in his mind through inexperience and remoteness from the scene, must -have been a constant subject of thought, and he seems to have fallen -gradually into an abnormal state of sensitiveness and suspicion.[18.9] - -His private correspondence contained the harshest opinions regarding -nearly all of the chief men thus far prominent in the war. Of Commodore -Perry he entertained "a contemptable opinion." Shields, who was a good -man and officer as men and officers went, he described as "without one -particle of principle to restrain him, save the laws of his country -and ready to minister body and soul to the vilest passions of a vile -administration." Quitman, who deserved high respect, appeared to him -unreliable, of mediocre ability and "afflicted with unbounded vanity." -The quartermaster general, he said, was partially deranged. Of Scott -he had written in August, "He means well on all occasions," but now -he was able to view his superior officer as a military "humbug" and -low politician, eager to advance himself and ruin others by the most -nefarious arts; and he could no longer see, what the administration -fully recognized, that it was essentially for its advantage to have -the generals win victories. So far as the government was concerned, -Taylor had some grounds for apprehension, perhaps. In all probability it -entertained by this time unfriendly feelings toward him. The veteran F. -P. Blair had warned Marcy distinctly that, as even the novice could see, -a Democratic administration was waging war to make a Whig President, -and under our system it was legitimate as well as natural to look for -an avenue of escape. Scott, however, seems to have been his friend, -privately exerting a strong influence in his favor on several occasions; -and while the lawful rights of superior rank were made use of by the -commander-in-chief, the same thing was done by Taylor himself with far -less considerateness.[18.9] - -Finally Taylor had a particular moral disability, for he did not -believe in the Vera Cruz expedition actually contemplated. The season -of yellow fever--in his opinion a worse enemy than 100,000 Mexican -bayonets--was now too near, he wrote, and an army besieging that port -would be swept away by the pestilence.[18.7] He lacked, therefore, -some of the most necessary qualifications, and was not in a state of -mind to work harmoniously and effectively with the administration, the -commander-in-chief or his own principal subordinates in the exceedingly -difficult and delicate situations which the proposed expedition was -liable to create.[18.9] - -[A COMMANDER SELECTED] - -Gaines being out of the question, there was but one man left, and -he moreover, as an officer of experience and the head of the army, -possessed exceptional claims to the appointment. Scott seems to have -accepted his professional and political reverses of May very quietly, -illustrating that fine aphorism of King Stanislaus, "A man greater than -his misfortunes shows that he does not deserve them." Friends fell away -rapidly, yet he kept up his courage. To one of them indeed he wrote, -"Perhaps you might do well to imitate the example of that heathen who -touched his hat to the fallen statue of Jupiter--saying, 'Who knows -but he may be replaced upon his pedestal?'" and about the middle of -September, having learned through several channels that his presence in -Mexico had been desired by Taylor, to whom he generously referred as -"that gallant and distinguished commander," he reminded the government -that he was ready still to serve at the front.[18.8] This merely -brought him another curt rebuff; but when the Vera Cruz expedition -became a practical question he took part in the discussion without -pique, and he suggested incidentally that he, as the highest officer in -the service, was the proper individual to divide the troops between the -two fields of activity, and to command personally in the more important -one.[18.9] - -Taylor having pronounced it Scott's duty after the battles of May to -assume the leadership in the field, could not logically object now -to his acting according to his rank; but, though time had vindicated -Scott's military policy and he now was viewed--Marcy admitted--as -politically harmless, Polk still deemed him scientific and visionary, -and still resented his allusion to fire from the rear. Long discussions -were held, but Marcy felt satisfied that Scott was the only fit -commander in sight. By rather cunning management he brought Senator -Benton to that opinion; others of the Cabinet reached the same -conclusion; and finally the President admitted with "reluctance" that -such was "the only alternative." Very likely, too, as many believed, -Polk saw a chance to play one Whig leader against the other. Anyhow, -after demanding "Scott's confidence," which--in view of the intention -to grant his dearest wish--Scott easily gave, he appointed him on -the eighteenth of November to command the expedition. An apparently -heartfelt and complete reconciliation followed. Scott almost shed tears -of emotion, recorded the President; and he received assurances in turn -that his confidence would be reciprocated, and that bygones were to -be considered bygones. A new David and a new Jonathan seemed to have -discovered each other.[18.9] - -[SCOTT'S VIEWS] - -Scott believed that Ulua, if properly garrisoned, could not be taken -with naval batteries, or even with naval batteries and an escalade, -except at a disproportionate sacrifice of life, and a loss of time -that might subject the troops to the yellow fever, quadruple the -waste of men, and ruin the campaign. He therefore planned to make a -landing near Vera Cruz, capture the town, reduce the fortress--unless, -as appeared quite probable, it could soon be starved out--by naval -operations and land attacks based upon the city, and then escape the -pestilence by advancing promptly toward the capital. In his opinion -the Mexicans were likely to have 20-30,000 troops on the ground, and -therefore he thought 15,000 men desirable. Relying necessarily on -the figures of the adjutant general, he reckoned (November 16) that -7000 regulars and 13,500 volunteers were, or soon would be, under -Taylor's command, making with the new volunteers and recruits for -the regular army over 27,000,[18.10] and he therefore proposed -(November 21) to take about 5000 of these regulars, 6000 of the -volunteers, and the first 4000 of the new regiments. But he deemed -10,000--to be increased later to double that number--an adequate -minimum, and he felt willing, for the sake of gaining time, to launch -the campaign with the first 8000 soldiers that could be set afloat -off Brazos Island. Anticipating a stubborn resistance at the point of -disembarkation, he desired to have 140 surf-boats in order to land -5000 men and eight guns at once, and he made ample requisitions for -transports, ordnance and ordnance stores.[18.11] As for Taylor, -the General proposed that he should retain forces enough to defend -Monterey and his communications,[18.12] and stand for a time on the -defensive.[18.16] - -Scott of course desired official instructions of this tenor, and even -drafted them, but Marcy only wrote as follows (November 23): You have -been ordered by the President himself to go to Mexico, take command -there, and set on foot a Gulf expedition, "if on arriving at the theatre -of action you shall deem it to be practicable. It is not proposed to -control your operations by definite and positive instructions, but you -are left to prosecute them as your judgment, under a full view of all -the circumstances, shall dictate. The work is before you, and the means -provided, or to be provided, for accomplishing it, are committed to you, -in the full confidence that you will use them to the best advantage. The -objects which it is desirable to obtain have been indicated, and it is -hoped that you will have the requisite force to accomplish them. Of this -you must be the judge when the preparations are made, and the time for -action has arrived."[18.16] - -Marcy seldom laughed, but occasionally he shook like a bowlful of jelly, -and as he signed this letter he must have shaken prodigiously. Assuming -no responsibility, making no promises, the government simply unloaded -the whole burden of the expedition upon Scott.[18.13] Should he -succeed, a Democratic administration would reap a great profit; should -he fail, a Whig general would have to bear a great reproach. In order to -obtain the essential troops it would be necessary for him to incur the -odium of taking many of them from Taylor, who in Polk's opinion was not -willing to give them up; and thus not only would Taylor's rising star -become clouded, but a bitter quarrel between these two Whig leaders and -their friends would almost certainly be precipitated. Besides, Taylor -might throw up his command in a fit of temper, and relegate himself to -obscurity. No wonder the President felt remarkably in spirits just after -this.[18.16] - -[TAYLOR'S WINTER OPERATIONS] - -Scott, however, was determined to forestall the danger of a quarrel. -Immediately on suggesting to the government that as head of the army -he was the proper individual to command the Vera Cruz expedition, he -notified Taylor of this action, and only two days after receiving his -appointment he drafted a letter informing that officer about the matter; -but the President, regarding absolute secrecy as a prime requisite, -would not permit him to mention it.[18.14] A few days later (November -25) he wrote from New York to this effect: I am going to Mexico and -shall conduct operations in a new field; where that is to be I cannot -safely state, but with the aid of advices received from Washington you -can imagine; new forces have been called out, yet--as the season of -yellow fever is at hand--I shall have to take most of your troops; your -victories, however, have placed you on such an eminence that you can -afford to act on the defensive for a time, and before spring I think you -will be able to resume active operations; I desire to consult with you, -and plan to be at Camargo for that purpose about the twenty-third of -December.[18.15] The letter was confidential and cordial; and having -now done what he could to conjure the tempest, as well as to prepare for -his work, the General sailed from New York the last day of November. The -voyage to New Orleans, hindered by the weather, took nearly three weeks. -He made a brief and busy stay in that city, and two days after Christmas -he reached Brazos Island.[18.16] - -Certain steps tending to facilitate his enterprise had now been -taken by General Taylor. December 10 the temporary Field Division -organized at Camargo was broken up--the Georgia, Mississippi and First -Tennessee regiments reporting to Quitman, and the Ohio and Kentucky -regiments to Butler; the First Division (regulars) under Twiggs was -reorganized;[18.17] on December 13 and 14, a day apart, this division -and Quitman's brigade set out for Victoria, nearly 200 miles distant; -and on the fifteenth Taylor himself, leaving Butler behind to command at -Monterey, followed them.[18.23] - -It was not pleasant marching, for a long drought had burned everything -up, the sun blazed with intense heat, and the road, when not covered -with small, sharp stones, was ankle-deep in light dust; but the -inspiring Saddle Mountain seemed to keep company with the troops all -day, Cerralvo Mountain hung like a dark shadow on the left, the cool -blue line of the Sierra Madre extended on the right farther than the -eye could see, and the town first reached--Cadereita, about twenty-five -miles from Monterey--burying its white houses in orange groves, looking -out over gardens, and looking down from a low bluff into the clear -waters of the Topo Grande, was delightful. December 17 the infantry -arrived at Montemorelos, a small town at the foot of the sierra, planted -beside a swift, cool stream, full of trout, that watered a beautiful -valley, and suggesting at a distance under the blue sky--wrote a -surgeon--a pearl set in an azure stone. Here the command absorbed the -Second Infantry and the Second Tennessee; and it now amounted to some -3500 men, of whom rather more than a third were regulars.[18.23] - -But Santa Anna was not asleep. Learning of Taylor's proposed march and -believing that Wool had left Parras for Chihuahua, he determined to -advance about December 24, strike at Saltillo and Monterey in person -with 9000 picked infantry, 4000 cavalry and twelve guns, despatch -troops from Tula against the Americans at Victoria, and finally close -in upon Taylor with his own forces; and a large part of these troops -actually set out. Worth got wind of danger, however, on December -16; in accordance with instructions previously given he called for -help;[18.18] and in the evening of the next day four grimy troopers -burst upon Taylor at Montemorelos with the startling intelligence, -that Santa Anna would attack Worth in three days. Ordering Quitman to -proceed, Taylor therefore set out on December 18 with his regulars for -Saltillo. Butler, calling a regiment from Camargo to Monterey, reached -the front with his own forces on December 19, and Wool arrived there -two days later. Santa Anna, discovering Wool's march by December 24, -countermanded his orders; and Taylor, learning on December 20 while -between Monterey and Saltillo, of Wool's advance and the non-appearance -of the Mexicans, and concluding there was no danger, turned -back.[18.23] - -On the twenty-third he again left Monterey, and the next day he received -Scott's New York letter.[18.19] His presence with the forces was -not at all requisite. No serious fight was in prospect, for Quitman -had reported nothing of the sort. There was at least one topographical -engineer in the command, who could make better notes of the country than -he.[18.20] Probably his military engineers also, among whom figured -Robert E. Lee, afterwards the famous Confederate leader, were there; and -as for disposing of the troops, General Scott's letter gave him reason -to believe, that a superior officer was now on the ground with new -plans. His obvious duty was therefore to report at Camargo, the place -mentioned by Scott, or at least await instructions at Monterey. But the -stout old gentleman in the loose olive-brown frock-coat, wool socks and -Mexican sombrero had a temper and several ideas of his own. Probably -he did not wish to arrange matters amicably; and he kept straight on -for ten days, plunging farther and farther toward the remotest portion -of his field, inaccessible from any and every point where Scott might -by any reasonable possibility chance to be. Indeed, Scott's letter was -not answered for two days, and eight more passed before the answer, -which stated that General Taylor was going to Victoria, reached -Camargo.[18.23] - -[TAYLOR'S MARCH TO VICTORIA] - -Beyond Montemorelos a great deal of the country was rough, and it was -intersected with chilly streams, waist-deep, that cut like a knife as -the hot soldiers plunged in; but an incessant variety of novel scenes -kept up their spirits. Groves of ebony sheltered bears and wolves. -Wild turkeys and wild hogs abounded; and almost every evening ten or -twelve deer were brought in. Here flourished pecans, live-oaks and -immense trees of lignum vitae; there an endless procession of ants -wound along their smoothly worn trail; yonder towered a mountain of -gleaming porphyry set off with dark green foliage, and at all times -fleecy clouds could be seen drifting languidly across the slopes of -the curiously wrought sierra. Finally the troops entered the rich -valley of Linares. On the one hand lay wide cornfields or perhaps a -thousand acres of sugarcane in a single, well-irrigated lot; on the -other apple and peach orchards, orange and lemon groves with tempting -gleams amidst their dark leaves, and half a mile or so of fig-trees. -Then came the gardens and flat houses of the town itself, a dull place, -with some smiling and some tearful eyes looking out from the grated -windows.[18.23] - -Then forward again marched the troops, passing out of the valley into -wild country full of chaparral and mesquite, where sometimes wolves -trotted along the road ahead of them like dogs. The need of water -determined the length of the daily march; but usually there was enough -of it, shaded sometimes by noble cypresses dripping with Spanish moss. -Once a real norther set in, and the troops choked for twenty miles in -a driving cloud of dust;[18.21] but through it they caught glimpses -of a high cliff that looked like an immense pink and yellow dome, and -another cheering bit of color now and then was Senor Don So-and-so, the -alcalde, dressed in white and a red sash, with silver coins all over -his clothing, saddle and bridle. Usually the weather held fair, and a -blanket supported by four stakes answered the purpose of a tent well -enough.[18.23] - -But the faces of the people grew dark occasionally, and once they -muttered something like "_Fandango poco tiempo_," which signified, -"You'll be fighting pretty soon." Then the soldiers cheered till -they were hoarse. Fatigue and supper were forgotten. "Turn out, turn -out!" was the cry. The column formed, and dashed down the hill at a -double quick; but for enemy it found only the trim white cottage of a -Frenchman, planted beside a rippling stream amid laden orange trees -gilded by the setting sun. There had been rumors of Mexican cavalry -ahead, but no cavalry could be seen;[18.22] and as for irregulars, -both funds and arms were lacking, and the close wall of prickly pear -five or ten feet high, which ran on each side of the road almost without -a break for nearly two hundred miles, would have kept them off as it -did the breeze. And so on January 4 Taylor and the regulars entered -Victoria, a small, neat city at the foot of wooded mountains, which -Quitman had occupied with some formality six days before. "Victoria is -taken. It was a bloodless victory. But where is Victoria?" said the New -York _Herald_.[18.23] - -[PATTERSON'S MARCH TO VICTORIA] - -Indeed, Victoria was very much taken.[18.24] October 13, when -ordering Taylor to cut short the armistice, Marcy notified Patterson of -this order, and again directed him to occupy southern Tamaulipas as soon -as he could--before December 6 if possible; but Patterson was not able -to set out until General Taylor gave him definite instructions, on the -twenty-eighth of November, to march with the two Illinois regiments and -the regiment of Tennessee horse, about 1500 men, for Victoria. Further -delays occurred because transportation was not promptly furnished -him, and because vessels conveying supplies were lost; and although a -detachment advanced some fifteen miles about the middle of December, the -movement from the point then reached did not begin until one day before -Christmas.[18.26] - - [Illustration: General Patterson's March] - -The distance to be covered was nearly 210 miles,[18.25] and all -found the march hard. The chief engineer said his task was "to make -an impassable road practicable." Sometimes it seemed to contain every -possible stone. Difficult streams had to be crossed, and once the -only feasible method was to cut a straight ramp on each of the nearly -vertical banks, which stood about one hundred feet high, and get the -wagons down and up again with ropes--a prodigious task. The usual -thorns were peculiarly troublesome, and some of the water contained -salt. Sweat and dust almost hid the skin of men's faces at more than one -time; and not only did soldiers drop far behind from exhaustion, but in -some cases water could be given to the faint only by prying their jaws -open. Once the drinking water was so muddy it could scarcely run, we are -assured--to say nothing of an odor derived from dead horses. On the very -first day the troops were ordered to march without breakfast, and they -went hungry more than once afterwards, with cattle, hogs, and actual -clouds of wild turkeys plainly in sight.[18.26] - -Some of these facts appear to reflect upon the commanding officers, and -other facts point the same way. Patterson had an impressive person, -somewhat in the style of the English squire, it was thought, and certain -very agreeable qualities of his Irish race, when he chose to display -them; but although Polk felt disposed to make him generalissimo, he -seems to have lacked a familiar acquaintance with his profession as -well as experience in practising it. He also lacked initiative, and -he lorded it over the troops, they felt, with all the severity of a -satrap.[18.26] - -Pillow, the second in command, had come to the war like many others for -his personal advantage; and having been the President's partner in a law -office, having contrived through cunning and secret management at the -Baltimore convention in 1844 to secure Polk's nomination, and being now -in confidential correspondence with the White House, he felt specially -authorized to slake his intense ambition. On the score of ill-health -Pillow had left his command at Monterey for a trip to the United States; -but, finding in this expedition a chance of becoming prominent, he -suddenly recovered. No one could fail to see his determination to be -conspicuous, and it was not commended by all. "Ho for the embryo hero! -Great is Diana of the Ephesians!" exclaimed Captain Caswell, a brilliant -officer. Naturally Pillow felt inclined to look upon the soldiers as -merely coal for his furnace, and they in turn generally detested him. -In one stormy scene he called upon them to shoot him, if they dared, -adding grandly, "I'm not afraid to die!" And after that, when angered -by unnecessary harshness on his part, they obtained some comfort by -growling to one another, "_He's_ some!" "_He_ isn't afraid to die"; but -they remembered the scourge none the less, and when Taylor came over on -a mule to visit their camp the very day he and they reached Victoria -(January 4), looking as plain as they and perhaps no less dirty, the -contrast between his democratic simplicity and the pomp and pomposity -they had been contemplating made them burst forth--when they finally -realized that his more impressive orderly was not the General--into an -ecstasy of delight and admiration.[18.26] - -While these marches were taking place, General Scott, leaving the -coast on December 29, proceeded to Camargo in order to arrange matters -amicably with Taylor, if he could; but on January 3, finding it would be -impracticable to get into touch with that officer, he sent instructions -to Butler, carefully explaining why they were given to him directly, -to place at the mouth of the Rio Grande about 4000 regular infantry -under Worth, 4000 volunteer infantry, 500 regular cavalry, the best 500 -volunteer cavalry and two field batteries--deducting, however, from -these numbers the troops then at Victoria, except an escort for Taylor, -all those at Tampico except about 500 for a garrison, and one volunteer -regiment at Matamoros. Scott added that he hoped eight new volunteer -regiments would be at the Brazos by the end of January, and that three -or four of these would remain in northern Mexico.[18.27] - -[SCOTT TAKES TROOPS FROM THE NORTH] - -At the same time he notified Taylor of this action, pointing out that -his inaccessibility and the extreme pressure of time had rendered -necessary the orders given to Butler. Taylor was instructed to -concentrate in Tampico all the troops of Patterson, Quitman and Twiggs -except an escort for himself and, if necessary, a garrison for Victoria, -and return then to Monterey. Scott further explained that on account of -the yellow fever he could not wait for the new volunteers, and stated -plainly that, although he greatly wished the Vera Cruz expedition could -be aided by a diversion in the north, Taylor would have to act "for a -time" on a "strict defensive."[18.27] - -These orders were the inevitable sequel of past occurrences. Taylor had -suggested that it was advisable to transfer serious operations to the -south, and that a large body of regulars would be needed for a campaign -there; the government ordered the Vera Cruz expedition; Scott--not at -all, however, because he so desired--was appointed to command it; he -possessed full authority over all the troops in the field under one -condition proposed by himself--that Taylor must be left sufficiently -strong for defence--and, as Taylor admitted, this condition was met; -Scott could only obtain an adequate army in season by taking a large -part of it from the field; he endeavored to effect the necessary -division in a kind and friendly manner, spending ten days in travel for -that purpose, although extremely pressed for time; and, when Taylor went -deliberately beyond reach, he simply made such use of his authority as -duty required, taking for the offensive a relatively smaller army--in -view of the prospect, recognized by Taylor himself, that Santa Anna -would meet him at the beach--than he left with that officer for a strict -defensive.[18.27] - -Taylor, however, was furious. He alleged that Scott had "wormed himself" -into the command by promising to kill Taylor off as a Presidential -candidate. Of Scott's New York letter he said, "A more contemptible and -insidious communication was never written." Although it was his own -suggestion that volunteers were unfit for the mainstay of an expedition -against Vera Cruz, and that regulars for it should be drawn from the -northern army, he complained now that an underhand "intrigue" had -stripped him of his regulars; and, not satisfied with describing himself -as outraged and degraded "in the most discourteous manner that could be -devised" by "Scott, Marcy and Co." for the purpose of accomplishing his -ruin, he charged, though really not expecting an attack, that he was in -danger of being "sacrificed" on the soil of Mexico. Policy concurred -with fury; political strategy with personal resentment. The idea of -brave Taylor, the People's Pride, thrown to the merciless Mexicans by -partisan Polk and scheming Scott was one to fire the masses; and thus -we see concocted a bit of electioneering melodrama that contributed -powerfully, and perhaps decisively, to bring about one of the chief -consequences of the Mexican war--the overthrow of the Democratic party -and the accession of Taylor to the Presidential chair.[18.27] - -Scott now returned to the Brazos, where he arrived on January 8, about a -week before the date fixed by him for the assembling of his expedition -off that point; and there he was forced to endure nearly six weeks of -what he well termed "cruel uncertainties." To combine in haste the -men and material for such an expedition; to do so when the necessary -elements had to be drawn from distant and widely scattered points; to -do it while the waterways, largely relied upon for transportation, were -to a considerable extent frozen; and to do it without the telegraph -and mainly without railroads--this was a most difficult and hazardous -undertaking; and accidents, misunderstandings and errors of judgment -were additional embarrassments.[18.30] - -[SCOTT DELAYED] - -The prime need was troops; and Worth, acting with notable energy--even -precipitation--placed the first of the regulars at the mouth of the -Rio Grande about three weeks after Scott issued the orders to Butler. -But here the second need, that of vessels, checked them. Scott's -requisitions had been timely and ample; but there was an active -commercial demand for ships, rates were high, and the government, -anxious to economize, did not allow sufficiently for delays and other -contingencies.[18.28] A considerable number of vessels were chartered -at New Orleans, but a month of heavy rains, a scarcity of sailors, a -demand for higher wages from those engaged, a week of fog, and a series -of northers, which were usually only about four days apart, prevented -the first of the vessels from arriving off Brazos Island before February -11, and the storms, frequently very sudden, as well as the loss of -not a few of the indispensable lighters hampered operations there. -"This terrible coast," wrote the General; and for days together ships -would lie off shore, pitching "like mad" and fortunate if they did no -worse, quite unable to communicate with the island. For a week and a -half no mails arrived from New Orleans. As the Rio Grande water proved -unsuitable for the troops, extra casks were ordered to be made and -filled at New Orleans; and this consumed additional time.[18.30] - -Minor affairs, too, created trouble for Scott, and one of these -deserves to be mentioned. Care has been taken to bring out the quality -of Colonel Harney, and it only remains to add that for some time his -feelings toward Scott had been openly and unreasonably hostile. As he -was among the men ordered by Butler to the mouth of the Rio Grande, -he proceeded in that direction; but Scott, who knew of his excursion -to the Rio Grande and preferred to have a more efficient and reliable -man for his chief cavalry officer, and one more disposed to cooperate -heartily with the commander-in-chief, directed him to place at the -orders of Major Sumner the dragoons that had come down with him, and -rejoin those of Taylor's army. Harney refused positively to do so. Upon -this Worth laid a formal charge of disobedience against him, and a -court martial of officers, chosen--as General Scott proposed--by Harney -himself, sentenced him to be reprimanded in orders. Harney then wrote -a submissive letter to Worth; and Scott, remitting the sentence of the -court, gave him the position he coveted.[18.30] - -This was magnanimous, and tended to promote good-will; but there is -more to tell. On learning of Scott's order that Harney should return -to Monterey Polk, though he insisted that his own subordinates in the -army must be in cordial sympathy with him, became very angry that "a -Democrat" and "one of General Jackson's personal friends" should "be -sacrificed to propitiate the personal and political malice of General -Scott," and insisted upon countermanding the order, thereby violating -the confidence promised that general and disregarding the broad -instructions issued to him by the war department.[18.29] However, the -trouble with Harney was comparatively but a pin-prick. What racked the -General was the conviction that Santa Anna must be gathering a great -army to confront him at Vera Cruz; and on February 15, about half of the -surf-boats and a small part of the ordnance and ordnance stores having -been heard from, he sailed for Tampico, leaving Worth to complete the -embarkation as rapidly as he could.[18.30] - -While these events were taking place on the Rio Grande line, the troops -under Taylor lay for ten days at Victoria, growing more and more languid -under the hot sun; and the General realized that his coming to this -remote place had embarrassed himself as well as Scott. Finally something -had to be done, for provisions were becoming short, and on January 12 he -ordered the regular infantry and Patterson's men to set out for Tampico, -supposed to lie about 168 miles distant by the road.[18.31] On the -night of the fourteenth, a duplicate of Scott's despatch of January -3--the original of which had been intercepted by the enemy--arrived, and -then, selecting an escort for himself, Taylor directed Quitman's brigade -to proceed in the same direction as Patterson's. The three bodies, -which marched at intervals of twenty-four hours, beginning on that -day, made an aggregate of 4733, of whom the rank and file numbered 1400 -regulars and 3000 volunteers. The rule was to sound reveille at three -o'clock and set out at dawn--the regiments of each column taking turns -in leading it; and the engineer company, usually known as "the pick and -shovel brigade," marched in advance of all to mend the road.[18.32] - -There was need enough of its work. The meaning of "Tamaulipas" is high -mountains; and while the blue of the Sierra Madre grew daily fainter, -the principal range of the state rose constantly higher in front, -until the summit was crossed, and the troops began to descend into the -tropical region of the coast. Much of the route was boggy or rocky -or steep; the drinking-water often came from stagnant pools; and for -nearly three days the only chance to see human beings outside of one's -own column was when, on surmounting a hilltop, the gleaming steel and -white wagons of another brigade could be made out, one day's march -away--perhaps only six or eight miles--on another eminence.[18.32] - -But as the troops approached their destination they felt repaid for -every hardship and effort. The road became deep sand, indeed, but near -it spread a sunny and many-hued lake full of emerald islets, pirogues -laden with odorous fruits, and myriads of noisy widgeon, teal and -other water-fowl; while on the other hand the live-oak, the bay-tree, -the rubber-tree, the banyan, the palm, the flag-leaved aloe, and many -a nameless tree, bush and vine made a dense forest, illumined with -brilliant orchids and more brilliant parrots and macaws, each of which -seemed like a year of sunsets epitomized. A soft, salubrious breeze -from the Gulf caressed their faces; and when, surmounting the last hill -on the tenth day of their march, they saw the grand, leisurely Panuco -rolling luxuriously on through fields and forests, a wilderness of spars -and masts filling the harbor of Tampico, and the American flag--dear -emblem of country, home and kindred--waving proudly over white walls and -green gardens, a tear of delight ran down many a tanned cheek.[18.32] - -[SCOTT AT TAMPICO] - -Stationed mostly at some distance above or below the town according to -the usual policy of the American commanders, they now devoted themselves -to drilling and counting the days. "Shall we ever see that big fandango -in the halls of Montezuma?" they had been asking for some time, and to -wait four weeks on the _qui vive_ for Scott seemed very hard. February -19, however, he arrived in town looking very anxious, and, declining -the superb horse made ready for him, walked unpretentiously to his -lodgings. The impatience to be off was now intense, and the General -did all in his power to gratify it; but he found himself in a hornet's -nest. At this time he enjoyed no popularity among the officers, for he -was personally known to very few. One or two attempts to check rather -pushing young men had been resented; and now the suspicion that he would -give regulars the post of honor at Vera Cruz threatened serious results. -At a recent banquet the toast necessarily offered to the name of the -commander-in-chief had been coldly received, and Worth had been ignored. -Indeed, some of the leading volunteer officers were disposed to mutiny -unless assured of "a place in the picture."[18.35] - -Scott diplomatically declared there would be fighting enough for -all, but as the tardiness of the transports threatened to delay a -part of the troops, that assurance failed to give satisfaction; -and apparently only the arrival of an unexpected steamer or two -averted the danger of trouble. One officer, however--a trim, agile -man with a handsome face, quick black eyes, a poorly educated but -most ingenious mind, a ready tongue, and a conscience that gave him -no trouble--was content.[18.33] For him Taylor's harsh rule had -ended; and soon, making the most of his own crafty talents, the urgent -recommendations of Polk and Scott's determination to keep faith with the -President,[18.34] Pillow--for Pillow it was--established himself at -headquarters on a basis of intimacy and importance.[18.35] - -Tampico would have been a delightful resting-place for a while. The -markets were full of good things; it possessed excellent cafes; and the -troops coming from Monterey had brought along a theatrical company; but -Scott tarried there only thirty hours. At New Orleans some information -had been obtained with reference to the Lobos Islands, which lay fifty -or sixty miles to the southeast of Tampico and seven or eight from the -coast, offering a broad, safe anchorage; and Scott had written to Conner -for additional facts. These proved to be favorable, and such of the new -volunteers and freight vessels as could be reached in time had been -ordered to go directly there, instead of sailing to the Brazos. Indeed -these islands were fixed upon as the general rendezvous. Some of the -troops had reached it, and word now came to Scott that an outbreak of -smallpox had occurred among them.[18.37] - -He set sail therefore on February 20, and making a swift voyage in the -midst of a "screaming" norther, found at the rendezvous the First and -the Second Pennsylvania, two thirds of the new Louisiana regiment, -the "Palmettoes" of South Carolina, and parts of the New York and -Mississippi regiments.[18.36] Twiggs followed him when the bar off -Tampico was quiet enough to permit, and the other troops did the same -as rapidly as they could. Patterson got away on the twenty-ninth, but -even on the fourth of March Quitman and Shields were chafing beside the -Panuco, and the latter at least had no definite notion when they would -be able to sail. "Days are months now," he exclaimed; but he and many -others had still to wait. Worse yet, perhaps, not a few of those who got -off were packed in small trading craft, picked up by good luck and unfit -for the service; and the skeletons of ships rotting near the bar gave -them ample cause for anxiety. Worth's troops meanwhile were embarking at -the Brazos; but when he left that quarter on February 25, six companies -of dragoons were still in want of transports.[18.37] - -Taylor for his part, escorted by a squadron of dragoons under May, the -Mississippi regiment and two field batteries, left Victoria on January -16 and reached Monterey in eight days. His first impulse on receiving -Scott's orders had been to leave the country, but he concluded not -to do so, and soon--apparently satisfied that he now had an issue -on which to challenge both Polk and Scott[18.38]--he distinctly -informed his friend, Senator Crittenden, that he was a candidate for the -Presidency.[18.39] - -[TAYLOR'S POLICY] - -He then shaped his plans accordingly. The government had notified -him quite plainly that it wished him to hold no territory beyond the -vicinity of Monterey, and Scott instructed him to concentrate there. -What these men wished, he believed, was that he should be effaced or -play a humble role, and he was determined not to accept their plan. -He would be as prominent as he possibly could be. Though not able to -fight the Mexicans, he would at least seem willing to do so, and throw -upon Scott and Polk all the odium of his inactivity. Hence, instead of -burying himself and his aspirations in Monterey, he advanced at the -end of the month to Saltillo, and a few days later took post, with -nearly all of the troops not required on the line of communication, -still farther toward the enemy. The dictates of prudence recognized by -himself, the advice and order of his commanding officer, and the wishes -and instructions of the government were all disregarded. He showed -himself, in fact, both unwise and insubordinate.[18.39] - - - - - XIX - - SANTA ANNA PREPARES TO STRIKE - - September, 1846-February, 1847 - - -While these events were taking place north of the mountains, the -Americans at Saltillo were having a somewhat agitated experience. At -the end of December a great cloud of dust, raised towards the south by -a drove of Mexican horses, convinced Worth he was again in danger, and -preparations were made at once to conquer or die. Butler, who succeeded -him in command, and even the more experienced Wool felt disturbed by -rumors of impending attack, which considerate Mexicans, anxious to -entertain their American visitors, frequently set afloat, though some -of our officers believed that Scott's movement ensured them against -molestation.[19.4] - -Finally, the rather approved idea of thorough scouting presented itself; -and on January 19 Major Gaines of the First Kentucky cavalry, with -Captain Cassius M. Clay, Lieutenant Davidson and thirty or forty men, -was detached for this purpose by General Butler.[19.1] After making a -circuitous journey and meeting with only bland, inoffensive Mexicans, -from whom--naturally enough--no important news could be obtained, he -found himself on the twenty-first at the hacienda of La Encarnacion, -a point on the main road from San Luis Potosi to Saltillo, and about -fifty-three miles distant from the latter place. Here quite unexpectedly -he lighted upon forty or fifty of the Arkansas cavalry under Major -Borland, whose orders from Wool had been to visit the hacienda and -immediately return. If, however, Taylor could do as he pleased about -instructions, why should not Borland? And when obliging Mexicans told -him of a small force lying at El Salado, only thirty-five or forty -miles farther on, he determined to have the glory of capturing it, and -sent back to his colonel for reinforcements. Gaines's party, added -to his own, seemed adequate, however, and early on the night of the -twenty-second the troopers rode gayly forward.[19.4] - -[CARELESSNESS OF TAYLOR'S OFFICERS] - -Before long it appeared that the distance was sixty miles and the -Mexican force mythical--besides, rain began to fall; so the Americans -returned to La Encarnacion for the night. "The general and the soldier -of each side should ... be always expecting to fall into danger," as -Thucydides wrote long ago, and of course our officers understood that in -a hostile country picket guards were sometimes deemed advisable; but, -operating on the higher plane of action, they felt that a comfortable -sleep was what all needed most, and accordingly at daybreak they found -themselves in the midst of Minon's cavalry brigade of, say, 1200 men, -magnified in their opinion--doubtless by the fog--to 3000. The Mexican -general was, however, a most accomplished and elegant gentleman, and -he at once relieved their embarrassment by taking them under his -full--indeed, close--protection.[19.4] - -Not aware of this comforting fact, Brigadier General Lane detached -eighteen men under Captain Heady of the Kentucky cavalry, two days -later, to look up their comrades. These men found liquor at a ranch -and perhaps--as a letter from Saltillo stated--a fandango, too. Firmly -persuaded that joy should be unconfined, they "got drunk," and so -without using up a grain of powder they ascertained by ocular proof the -fate of the other detachments. Apparently there was some ground for -Wool's remark that the volunteers, though now almost eight months old in -the service, could not easily be made to obey instructions on such duty. -Indeed, even after Borland's mishap and in spite of strict orders, two -outposts now went to sleep without a picket or a sentry.[19.4] - -To be sure, the men were ready enough to fight. "Why we have no -more fear of a Mexican than if they were [prairie] Wolves," wrote a -soldier. Wool's men felt particularly keen. On the way from La Vaca -to San Antonio they had passed a spot where about 400 Texans had been -massacred by Santa Anna's order in 1836. A fire had lighted up their -faces that meant, "No mercy," said one of them; and exhausted though -they were after their wonderful march from Parras, they felt very much -dissatisfied on reaching the front, "there being no prospect of a -fight." But the recent disasters had made it seem as if the mountains -were full of the enemy, and one of Gaines's men, who contrived to -escape, brought fearful tales. Even those Americans who did not care -to do picket duty felt little desire to wake up some foggy morning as -prisoners. Signs of a panicky feeling could be observed, and Wool found -it necessary to invoke Taylor's aid.[19.4] - -The General's position in his army was now extraordinary. To the troops, -while they gloried in his courage, his achievements had seemed at the -time commonplace enough; but sentiment at home as exhibited in the -newspapers--reacting from painful anxiety, indulging in the common taste -for exaggeration, and instinctively demanding a national figure for this -national crisis--had not only done justice to his great qualities, but, -partly in order to explain victories clearly marked with errors, made -him out a genius and worker of miracles; and all this laudation, read by -the army, created an impression which both duty and interest forbade the -more discriminating to impair.[19.4] - -[ARMY FEELING TOWARD TAYLOR] - -The General, moreover, though nursing the mammoth conceit that he was -qualified to be President of the United States, was careful to spare -the self-love of all who came in contact with him; and while no one -could enter Scott's presence without feeling himself before a superior -man aware of his superiority, probably most of Taylor's visitors had -an agreeable sense of excelling him in personal appearance, dress, -education and talents, and enjoyed also a flattering conviction of their -insight, because they recognized that he possessed high merits after -all. How the soldiers, oppressed by the lordliness of many generals, -adored his plainness we have seen. They felt they could bow down to such -a man without losing self-respect, since the obeisance was due to their -own choice, not his demand; and when he welcomed one to his unguarded -tent and talked with him about home and friends, or shook a delinquent -by the two ears with a kindly warning not to do so again, he established -a positive dominion over their minds and hearts. It has been said that -no woman loves a man unless she can despise him for something, and the -saying may be extended to the rest of humanity. Taylor had thus a double -hold on his troops. His black body-servant referred to him as "De ole -hoss," but would have died for him; and while the army would probably -have expressed itself about him as lightly as did the street urchins of -Philadelphia: - - "Old Zack's at Monterey, - Bring out your Santa Anner; - For every time we raise a gun, - Down goes a Mexicanner;" - -yet in reality he was now enthroned in the hearts of the soldiers -generally as a father, a hero and almost a fetich.[19.4] - -Invoked by Wool, then, Taylor--instead of drawing him back, as the -government wished--appeared at Saltillo on the first or second of -February with about 700 men, and proceeded to occupy the advanced -position already mentioned. Believing, as we have seen, that a lack -of water on the road from San Luis would prevent any strong body of -Mexicans from coming north at that season, and hearing that a great part -of Santa Anna's troops had gone toward Vera Cruz, he scouted alarms; -and in addition to his other grounds for pushing forward, he thought so -doing would tend to restore confidence among the troops and the people -of Saltillo. Moreover, although he had ridiculed Scott's intimation that -he might be able to manoeuvre toward San Luis in the early spring, he -was now planning to do so.[19.4] - -Scrambling out of Saltillo by the southern route, which makes a short -but sharp ascent as it leaves the town, Taylor found himself on a -rather smooth plateau elevated nearly or quite 6000 feet above the -sea, and after a ride of about five miles discovered on the left, -near the road, four or five mean adobe buildings, headquarters of the -Buena Vista ranch, where Wool's command had recently been in camp. The -southern outlook from this point was desolate but noble. On both sides -rose high, barren mountains. Those on the west, formed of many rather -thin horizontal slabs of rock, slightly concave toward the sky and -separated by thicker deposits of a softer material eroded at the edges, -formed reddish, flat-topped pyramids like the pictured hanging gardens -of Babylon; while those on the other hand were a true sierra, a line -of saw-tooth peaks buttressed with sharp spurs. Descending easily for -about a mile and a half, the General came to a narrow place called by -Mexicans La Angostura (_The Narrows_), and then traversed lengthwise -for a distance of about three and a half miles the approximately -north-and-south valley of Buena Vista. At the end of this came the -windy, dusty farm of La Encantada, where Butler had stationed Wool for a -time; and then began the smiling valley of Agua Nueva, which broadened -gradually for about seven miles, and ended at the farm or hacienda of -that name. This lay near the mountain on the eastern edge of a wide -plain, generously supplied by nature with fuel and water.[19.4] - -Here Taylor pitched his tent on the fifth, and by the fourteenth -substantially all the troops were on the spot--about 650 camping with -him and some 4000 lying with Wool a mile or so away. The General ordered -no scouting, and took about the same precautions against surprise that -Gaines and Borland had taken. On the ground that spies could not be -kept out, he let the Mexicans come and go with perfect freedom. The -engineers, reconnoitring on their own responsibility, concluded that -the mountains were "passable in every direction" by routes familiar to -the enemy but of course blind to the invader.[19.2] Parallel roads lay -beyond the heights on each side. Yet here Taylor decided that he would -meet the enemy, should they care to attack him;[19.3] and he said to -the correspondent of the New York _Tribune_; "Let them come; damned if -they don't go back a good deal faster than they came." In reality the -troops had more reason than ever to feel alarmed; but Dagon was again in -the midst of them, and they stood like mountains. Taylor might be old -and slow and inefficient, and he might know little about the art of war, -but he could stiffen the courage of soldiers. "Every man feels that the -honor of his country is now placed in his hands," wrote Lieutenant Posey -on the nineteenth.[19.4] - -SANTA ANNA'S PLANS] - -This takes us back to Santa Anna, who left the city of Mexico for -the north on September 28. When his carriage had rolled on for about -thirty miles, he received word that Monterey had fallen, and the news -occasioned many bitter reflections; but there were enough other matters -to divert his thoughts. He understood well the superior strength of the -United States; but from Mackenzie's mission and the conviction that war -expenses would be extremely unpopular in this country, he doubtless -felt sure that we earnestly desired peace. It was therefore clear to -him that his problem was to gain one victory. This would so discourage -us, he seems to have calculated, that he could end the war on fairly -satisfactory terms.[19.7] - -To gain this victory, it seemed only necessary to gather large forces, -bar the road from the north with fortifications, make no defence of -outlying sections, worry the Americans perhaps with feints and forays, -await and repulse them should they advance, and at the end of the winter -season, should they not, fall upon some fraction of their army with full -power. One difficulty in this programme was the general hatred which he -must have known the northern provinces entertained for him, because his -policy had always sacrificed their interests; and he thought it wise to -despatch a proclamation to San Luis Potosi, calling upon the people to -see in him only a Mexican soldier fighting for the common country. The -appeal was effectual. A committee met him about a dozen miles from the -city, and on October 8 he entered a town decorated with tapestries and -pots of flowers, and resounding with salvos of artillery, peals of bells -and enthusiastic vivas from the entire population.[19.7] - -A number of circumstances occurring now and later appeared favorable. -The government engaged that he should have an adequate remittance of -funds every month, and instructed the heads of seven states to supply -his general wants. A medal was promised to all taking part in the -campaign. The National Guards, now ordered to obey the central instead -of the state authorities, apparently came within his reach. The fight -at Monterey was pictured as creditable to Mexican arms and costly to -the enemy. Every life sacrificed there on the altar of nationality, -proclaimed the government, called to heaven for vengeance, and the -outrages perpetrated by the insolent invaders proved how they would -trample on the whole country, if they could.[19.7] - -Once more our wicked administration and its horde of "adventurers" were -denounced in the good old blood-curdling style, and once more the forays -of the savage Indians were laid to our charge. Detestable wretches like -the Americans could not wage war long. Their beloved money-bags were -already feeling pinched. Volunteers did not flock to the banner. Noble -orators like Webster were enlightening the better people. The slavery -question could not fail to paralyze the country. Already the elections -had turned against the administration, and signs of a revolution could -be seen. European countries were certainly preparing to interfere. -Merely by uniting, the Mexicans could "tear from the invader's flag the -symbol of Texas," and at last--so it was declared--union had actually -been achieved. On all sides patriotism had burst into flame. The nation -was rising. It would take account of every injury, great or small, -inflicted by the barbarians of the north, and the day of settlement -would soon arrive. In this fashion talked the government, the orators -and the newspapers; and many observers in Europe and the United States -believed the overdue national movement had now begun.[19.7] - -But this radiant picture was only paint-deep. _Don Simplicio_, the -satiric weekly, announced: It is proposed that all give, that all lend, -that all rise, that all go to the field; but "few give, few lend, few -get in motion, few take up arms." The states, restored to a measure of -sovereignty by the adoption of the federal system, became conscious of -their powers. Durango would not help, because threatened by the Indians, -and even denounced the Hero of Tampico. Michoacan held aloof because -Ocampo, her brilliant governor, who could voice his opinions in five -languages, hated Santa Anna even more than he did the Americans. The -great state of Jalisco promised much and did little; and Zacatecas, -which Santa Anna had crushed and robbed in 1835 because it dared to -oppose his ambition,[19.5] not only withheld all aid, but attempted -to form a combination of states against him. A multitude of officials -preferred the triumph of a foreign invader to that of a native tyrant, -and their constituents endorsed their course.[19.7] - -The decree taking the National Guards from state control had to be -substantially qualified. Members of that organization could not be -impressed. The law pardoning--that is to say, authorizing--desertion -from the regular army was extended for three months. A secret society -called The Red Comet, which sprang up among the military men at San -Luis, took for motto, "Nobody is bound to obey one that has no right -to command," and annoyed the General constantly. Requena, one of -the best qualified officers, who entertained little respect for the -Liberator's professional ability or plans, made so much trouble that he -was sent away; and General Valencia, a member of the Red Comet society, -who had been refused permission to attack the Americans at Victoria -and was believed now to covet Santa Anna's place, openly defied the -commander-in-chief and left the army.[19.7] - -[SANTA ANNA'S EMBARRASSMENTS] - -Still more serious were financial difficulties, for the Executive did -not supply the promised funds. The reason was obvious. "Our treasury is -as poor in money as it is rich in obligations," explained the minister. -Santa Anna did not spare the government, however. "I do not consider -myself nor should I be considered by the gentlemen who compose the -provisional administration of the Country as a mere General, commanding -a corps of the army, but as the one leader of the Nation, to whom the -direction of its destinies has been entrusted," he wrote; and in this -tone he conducted the financial correspondence--demanding, reproaching, -protesting, threatening; yet the needful remittances did not arrive. -Popular support was equally unfruitful. "Santa Anna lacks three -things--to wit, money, money and money," announced _Don Simplicio_; -"Very well, let us have a public meeting. What is the result? Nothing." -But somehow, through remittances from the capital and the states, forced -loans, arbitrary seizures and the use of his personal credit, the -General worried along, and built up an army of some 25,000 men.[19.6] -Extensive shops were established for the manufacture of clothing and the -repair of arms; and energetic measures were taken to provide muskets, -ammunition and cannon.[19.7] - -Santa Anna's operations were not, however, entirely sagacious. As was -usual in Mexican armies, number outweighed quality. Consisting mostly -of impressed men and to a considerable extent of criminals, the troops -were unreliable. They were drilled in no larger bodies than brigades; -many had no practice in firing; and most of them were very imperfectly -disciplined. The artillery did no manoeuvring. There was no school -for officers. Persons of a notoriously bad reputation as soldiers -occupied high posts. Santa Anna showed marked favoritism toward certain -regiments and certain men. Never visiting the drill-ground, he could not -estimate the relative qualities of the various corps, and he was too -much engrossed in politics and personal interests to concentrate his -attention upon the work in hand. All of the generals who tried to do -their duty gave too much time to the details, and studied the plans of -campaign too little. What was hardly less important, Santa Anna, instead -of instructing the troops regarding the national issues at stake, -talked much about the booty to be stripped from the Americans, and in -particular about an alleged blue wagon containing their military chest. -Still, the army took shape, and the General looked hopefully toward -spring.[19.7] - -But now came one of those whirls of fortune that always hover about -leaders of dubious antecedents. November 26 an influential newspaper -of the capital, _El Republicano_, copied from the New York _Herald_ a -letter of September 22, written from Mexico City, which stated that -Santa Anna, acting in collusion with the United States, would abandon -the invaded provinces, resist the enemy feebly, satisfy the nation of -its impotence, bring about a peace agreeable to the United States, and -become the dictator of Mexico.[19.8] Already there had been suspicions, -and now they crystallized instantly round this definite accusation. Why -had the Americans allowed the ablest citizen of Mexico to pass through -their fleet? Why had Tampico and Saltillo been evacuated? Why had not -the passes of the Sierra Madre been fortified? And why had Valencia been -forbidden to attack the enemy at Victoria? The government denounced -the story as a scheme to create discord and break down the national -champion. Santa Anna does not need to become a traitor in order to be -the first Mexican, it was said. Had he made such a bargain, the United -States would have kept it secret in order that he might be able to do -his work. Has he not shed his blood for the country? Has he not recently -declined the supreme power? The defence was plausible, but the facts -looked more than plausible.[19.10] - -And the situation had other aspects, too. As Governor Olaguibel of -Mexico state informed Santa Anna, more things were said against him than -even a long letter could specify. San Luis was described as changing -under his influence into a new Capua, where he was wasting the funds of -the country on his vices--not only gambling, but inducing the officers -to gamble with him. His political attitude was viewed with distrust, -and familiar signs indicating an intention to overthrow the government -were believed to be discernible. Even the correspondent of the London -_Times_ described his policy as "dark and tortuous," and the British -minister deemed it an "enigma." Many said his troops were more dangerous -to Mexico than to the United States. The wide extent of his military -jurisdiction was described in the press as alarming. By January each day -brought fresh rumors of an approaching dictatorship. Olaguibel's letter -spoke the word frankly. Then came news that the troops at Mazatlan had -pronounced for it, and Santa Anna's repudiation of their course only -convinced the public that he preferred to wait for a time.[19.10] - -The military phase of the situation gave equal offence. "Where now," -it was demanded, "are those great generals of ours, who--covered with -ribbons and crosses from the crown of the head to the sole of the -foot--insulted with their luxuriant splendor the misery of the people?" -"Predictions for 1847," announced _Don Simplicio_: "The officers of -our army will be divided into fugacious and permanent;" and the same -journalistic scorpion asked why the commander-in-chief did not, while -calling for money, "eliminate the superfluous, useless, burdensome, -incapable and cowardly." At the beginning of December Salas had promised -with a flourish that Santa Anna would "very soon" meet the odious -Yankee, and before long the people were inquiring why he did not. "We -are invaded, time presses, and what has Santa Anna done?" demanded a -pamphleteer; "Ah, the silly fellow is waiting for the Americans to -come and hunt him up." At the General's demand, three newspapers were -established to defend him; but the scorpion disposed of them all with -one sting: "Napoleon answered his detractors with victories."[19.10] - -[SANTA ANA FORCED TO MOVE] - -Under these attacks the army shivered with rage and mortification -from top to bottom. The soldiers deserted in astonishing numbers. -The officers and their infuriated commander felt they must either do -something or sink to perdition in a burning lake of distrust, hatred and -contempt; and therefore Santa Anna decided precipitately to hurl himself -against the Americans.[19.9] Scott's intercepted letter of January -3, which probably found its way to the Mexican headquarters, showed -how Taylor's army had been depleted, and Taylor's volunteers, it was -believed by Santa Anna, would hardly resist a single onslaught; while -their inferiority in numbers, their distance from heavy reinforcements, -their scattered condition, and their isolation in the midst of a hostile -people were other factors offsetting the great difficulty of crossing -deserts to reach them.[19.10] - -January 23 Santa Anna ordered the mint of San Luis to work night and -day on ninety-eight bars of silver forcibly appropriated by him. A few -days later, after issuing a manifesto in self-defence, he addressed -the army in eloquent language, pointing out the hardships, the plunder -and the glory that awaited it. On the twenty-eighth, to the plaintive -strains of a popular air called the _Adios_, the troops began to leave -the dust-brown city. The rear guard set out three days later; and on -February 2 headquarters moved.[19.11] Only useless remnants of the -army stayed behind; but on the other hand a great number of adventurers -of both sexes, drawn forward by various motives but especially by the -prospect of booty, accompanied the march.[19.15] - -[SANTA ANNA'S MARCH NORTH] - -For about thirty miles the route lay through a cultivated region; but -after it bade farewell to the heavy old Spanish church that crowned the -hill of Las Bocas, the country became sterile, and between mountains -now lumpy, now conical, usually rich in silver and always poor in -vegetation, each division rolled on in a billowy cloud of dust, at -one time chilled with icy blasts, and at another melting under an -insupportable sun; cheered only by the prickly cactus, the crooked -mesquite and an occasional group of dwarfish palms. Reckless from -fatigue and unaccustomed to such a burden, the soldiers threw away -thousands of sacks containing food.[19.15] - -To Matehuala the distance was about 140 miles, and beyond that point lay -a broad flinty desert. Here provisions and good water began to fail; -and many, though well enough supplied with the poor meat and water -that now composed the rations, grew sick and weak.[19.12] Weather of -unusual severity set in. For several days a storm of snow or chilling -rain buffeted the struggling troops; and at night, destitute of all -shelter, they could only huddle and shiver at a few small fires. Many -died from exposure, and a great number, though expressly warned that -death would be the punishment, risked all the chances of deserting. But -the army as a whole pressed forward, and on February 17-21 arrived at -La Encarnacion, nearly 200 miles from San Luis.[19.13] Several thousand -men had been lost from death, sickness or desertion on the way. Others -had been detached at various points, and Minon had now placed himself at -Potosi hacienda behind the mountains on Taylor's left; but on February -19 the figures for the army were 15,142 officers and men[19.14]--in -general the strongest and most determined that had set out--and a -brilliant review, held the next day, showed no lack of confidence and -enthusiasm. A triumph was considered certain.[19.15] - - [Illustration: MEXICO TO AGUA NUEVA] - -Santa Anna had supposed that a part of the American army occupied La -Vaqueria, some eight or ten miles west of Taylor's actual position, and -his intention had been to surprise it; but by February 11 he learned -that all had concentrated at Agua Nueva. He now had the choice of three -routes. One was the direct road to that point; the second would have -taken him _via_ La Hedionda to the rear of Buena Vista; and the third -ran by the way of La Vaqueria to the north of Agua Nueva.[19.16] Santa -Anna desired, he said later, to pursue one of the lateral routes, and -place himself between Taylor and Saltillo; but both of these routes were -said to be circuitous, difficult if not impracticable for artillery, -and perhaps inadequately supplied with water and provisions. He decided -therefore to surprise Agua Nueva, believing that should his forces be -seen, they would be regarded as a part of Minon's brigade.[19.17] - -That general was ordered to proceed _via_ La Hedionda to the American -rear, and a little after noon on February 21--every soldier having been -ordered to drink his fill, carry all the water he could, and take -rations for the next two days--Santa Anna advanced. Agua Nueva was only -some thirty-five miles away, and he expected to overwhelm it early -the next morning. The march continued well into the night. At Carnero -Pass, five or six miles from Taylor, the troops lay down by columns as -they arrived--the cavalry still holding their reins. It was too cold -for sleep, but they rested; and at six in the morning they rose in the -deepest possible silence, and resumed their march.[19.17] - - [Illustration: MONTEREY TO LA ENCARNACION] - -The Americans had at last awakened, however. By February 19 Santa Anna -was expected "hourly," wrote Lieutenant Posey, and the next day Major -McCulloch with his party of Texan scouts was despatched in the direction -of La Encarnacion, while Brevet Lieutenant Colonel May with about 400 -dragoons and some field pieces proceeded toward La Hedionda.[19.18] -The latter saw a cloud of dust in the direction of Potosi, fell in with -a Mexican deserter[19.19]--who said Minon was near and Santa Anna at -La Encarnacion--and reported at Agua Nueva before sunrise, February -21. At first his party were taken for Mexicans; and when the alarm -subsided, it was followed by a solemn stillness, amidst which groups -of officers could be seen talking eagerly in low tones with mysterious -gestures.[19.22] - -[TAYLOR DRAWS BACK] - -Suddenly at about noon a solitary horseman on a jaded steed came down -from the mountain, and made straight for the General's tent, bringing -word that a great Mexican army had been seen at La Encarnacion. The -combination of this report and May's was understood to mean that Santa -Anna intended to turn Agua Nueva, and before two o'clock the Americans -took flight--that is the polite phrase--for Buena Vista.[19.20] -Colonel Yell with his mounted Arkansas regiment was left behind to -guard the stores, should Santa Anna permit this, until they could be -removed;[19.21] the Second Kentucky and some guns were detached at La -Encantada to support him; and the First Illinois under Colonel Hardin -was posted at La Angostura. About midnight Yell's pickets at Carnero -Pass were driven in. Upon this, firing the buildings and the last of -the stores, and abandoning some wagons, the troops hurried off, lighted -on their way by roaring flames that filled the air with piles of lurid -smoke and the mountains with fantastic shadows; and by morning all -except Hardin's command and the advanced pickets were at Buena Vista. -Taylor, meanwhile, entrusting to Wool the disposition of the troops, -marched with a strong escort of the three arms for Saltillo, to provide -at this late day for the defence of that city against Minon.[19.22] - - - - - XX - - BUENA VISTA - - February, 1847 - - -[THE MEXICANS NEAR BUENA VISTA] - -Early the next morning (February 22) Santa Anna, hurrying down from -Carnero Pass, learned that Agua Nueva had been evacuated, but on -arriving there he discovered signs, as he justly believed, of a -precipitate flight. Minon, he thought, was already between Buena Vista -and Saltillo, in a position to hinder the American retreat; the state of -the Mexican supplies, in his opinion, did not allow time for strategic -operations; and therefore, hardly permitting the troops to drink,[20.1] -he dashed ahead with some 2500 horse and a few light battalions of -infantry, swept away the American pickets at La Encantada, and thundered -on down the valley.[20.8] - -By this time Wool knew the enemy were at hand; the long roll sounded; -the soldiers leaped to their work; the camp was cleared; and a section -of Captain Washington's battery hurried down the slope toward La -Angostura. It was a beautiful morning; the mountains on the east flung -long shadows across the valley; a gentle breeze languidly stirred -the flags. What was more to the point, this was the twenty-second of -February. The bands struck up Hail Columbia. The watchword, "Honor of -Washington," passed among the men; and they shouted for joy to see the -great cloud of dust, full of galloping Mexicans, approach. None the less -they were unprepared for combat. Had Santa Anna risked a daring charge, -he would probably have triumphed in short order.[20.8] - -But he found the American position and the guns at La Angostura -impressive. His bugler sounded "Halt!" just beyond range; and after -reconnoitring a long time he decided to wait for infantry. In fact there -seemed to be danger that his van might be attacked and overpowered; -and hence at about eleven o'clock he sent Dr. Vanderlinden, his chief -medical officer, to General Taylor, who had now returned from Saltillo, -with a note inviting him, on the ground that he was now surrounded -by more than 20,000 Mexicans, to lay down his arms, and probably -with secret instructions to amuse the American commander as long as -possible.[20.2] Very likely, as he intimated later, he would have been -glad to retire from what he called a Pass of Thermopylae, and operate -strategically; but the American retreat had in effect lured him on, his -provisions were scant, and at this point therefore the issue had to be -decided at once.[20.8] - -With good reason Santa Anna disliked the field of battle selected by -Wool,[20.3] for it strongly favored the defence. Running north along the -western side of the road there was a creek, which had excavated near -La Angostura an amazing network of gullies with almost vertical banks -twenty feet or so high, that practically vetoed the passage of troops; -and west of this obstruction the ground rose more and more steeply until -it became a line of high hills, parallel to the creek, which resembled -a huge wave ready to break. On the other side, between the road and -the sierra, there was a space varying from three quarters of a mile -to a mile in width, and this was roughly divided by two east-and-west -ravines--the more northern of which may be called the long and the more -southern the broad ravine--into three parts: the north field, as we may -name it, extending to Buena Vista, the middle field or plateau, and the -south field extending to La Encantada.[20.8] - -Of these divisions the plateau was the most distinctive. Along the -base of the sierra there were two or three benches, presumably made of -debris from the mountain; and lighter debris had been washed almost -down to the road, forming a stony plain seamed by a number of minor -ravines--torrents during the rainy season--which grew deeper as they -progressed, until at the western edge of the plateau they descended to -the floor of the valley as ragged gulches, leaving between them several -tongues or spurs, extremely steep and about forty or fifty feet high. -The longest, highest and bluntest of the spurs, which may be called the -first of them, was at La Angostura; and a space of only some forty feet, -through which passed the road, intervened between its point and the -network of gullies. The plateau, some 400 yards wide, north-and-south, -at the base of the mountains, had perhaps twice that width at the -opposite end, toward which it very gradually sloped. Both of the two -main ravines, the long and the broad, were extremely difficult for -cavalry and still more difficult for artillery. Obviously in such a -spot large numbers--and especially large numbers of horse--lost a great -percentage of their value.[20.8] - -[THE BUENA VISTA BATTLEFIELD] - -The centre of the American position was the first spur, on which -Hardin's men threw up a slight breastwork during the night, with Captain -Washington's battery on the road below, protected now with a ditch and -a parapet, that ran from the gullies nearly to the spur;[20.4] and at -this point, or in reserve just north of it, Wool gathered most of the -Americans, who numbered 4759 officers and men, placing near the mountain -under Colonel Marshall the Kentucky and Arkansas horse and Major -Gorman's rifle battalion (four companies) of the Indiana foot.[20.5] -Over against these forces, the principal body of the Mexicans formed two -lines with heavy reserves behind them and cavalry in the rear, while -Mexican artillery was planted on the road and also on the high ground -east of it; and Minon's brigade, the duty of which was to cut off the -American retreat, showed itself early in the day at the rear of Buena -Vista.[20.6] On each side the engineers reconnoitred actively, and both -Taylor and Wool visited and addressed the various American corps.[20.8] - -Apparently there was an opportunity to outflank our left, and without -waiting for all his tired troops to come up, Santa Anna despatched -Ampudia with a considerable force of light infantry, well supported, -to seize a promising bench at the foot of the mountain. To defeat this -movement the Americans attempted to occupy the point first, but they -blundered and failed. Colonel Marshall then had a part of his force -ascend a spur of the mountain which joined near the summit a spur -leading down to the Mexican position, hoping in this way to outflank the -enemy; but the Mexicans, who were gradually reinforced, adopted the same -tactics.[20.8] - - [Illustration: BATTLE OF BUENA VISTA - - A _La Angostura, Washington's Battery and two companies - 1st Illinois Vols._ - B _Six companies 1st Illinois Regt._ - C _3rd Indiana Regt._ - D _2nd Kentucky Regt. and Sherman's Battery_ (_later - position_) - E _2nd Illinois Regt. and 1st Section Bragg's Battery_ - F _2nd Indiana Regt. and three pieces Washington's - Battery_ - G _Kentucky Horse Regt. and one squadron 2nd Dragoons_ - H _Arkansas Horse Regt. and one squadron 1st Dragoons_ - K _Dismounted Cavalry_, etc. - L _2nd Kentucky Regt., Bragg's Artillery and detachment - of Horse_ (_early position_) - M _2nd Indiana partly rallied here after retreating_ - N _Heaviest Mexican cannon_ - O _Blanco's Column_ - P _Column to force American left_ - Q _Battery_ - R _Light Troops_ - S _Reserve_ - T _Columns turning American left_ - V _Mexican Battery_ - X _Cavalry from head of Column T, attacking Buena - Vista_ - Y _Taylor and Staff_] - -At about three o'clock a shell from a Mexican howitzer planted on the -road gave the signal for combat; and the troops on the mountain opened -fire, climbing higher and higher until finally the Mexicans, getting -the better of Marshall, reached the crest. Meanwhile Captain O'Brien, -with three of Washington's eight guns and the Second Indiana under -Colonel Bowles for support, was posted well forward on the plateau, and -a movement on the left wing of the Mexican army led Taylor to place -the Second Kentucky under Colonel McKee, two guns under Bragg and a -detachment of horse on the opposite side of the valley; but after a -time, concluding that Santa Anna would attempt nothing more that day, he -returned to Saltillo,[20.7] escorted by the Mississippi regiment and a -body of the Second Dragoons.[20.8] - -At nightfall the roar of musketry on the sierra, answered by the sharp -crack of the American rifles, subsided, and Marshall's troops were -recalled to the foot of the mountain. Aside from losing a number of men, -while on our part none were seriously injured, the Mexicans clearly had -the best of it so far. Santa Anna delivered a stirring harangue to his -troops; and the enthusiastic vivas and triumphant music that followed -it, softened by distance, floated down to the Americans on the evening -breeze in wondrously sweet and haunting tones. Pleasure ended, however, -when they died away. Though so many strong men, soon to fight for -their lives, were present, the solitude of the desert seemed to reign. -The night air was bitterly cold. A drizzling rain fell. Except at the -mountain there was no fuel. The tents of the Americans were now in the -wagons, and the Mexicans had none; and long before daybreak the troops -on both sides felt ready for anything that would stop their teeth from -chattering. For our men especially it was a dismal situation, and the -reported statement of a captured Mexican that Santa Anna had 21,000 -troops gave Taylor's army no mental comfort.[20.8] - -[THE BATTLE OF BUENA VISTA] - -Early the next morning, February 23, Santa Anna had the reveille sounded -in his various corps one after another, in order to give an impression -of great numbers. Mass was then celebrated. All his infantry and cavalry -were drawn up in one long line. The bands, massed in front, rendered -the sacred music with grand effect; the smoke of incense mounted to the -clear, radiant sky; and a body of priests in splendid robes passed along -the line, bestowing their benedictions.[20.19] - -The troops then moved to their places with deliberation and precision, -for whether they could shoot or not, Mexican soldiers were always able -to march and wheel. Evolution followed evolution. Eminence beyond -eminence bristled with steel. All the colors of the rainbow--red, green, -yellow, crimson, sky-blue, turkey-blue--clothed the troops. Even the -horses appeared to be in uniform, for those of a corps were alike in -color. Silken banners and plumes of many bright hues floated on the -breeze. Handsomely dressed aides dashed from point to point. Tremendous -vivas rolled in mighty echoes from the mountain. And while Santa Anna -thus built up the morale of his army, most of the dingy Americans -had time enough--as the quartermasters were knocking in the heads of -the cartridge casks and the sergeants gruffly dealing out flints--to -view this grand pageant through the wonderfully clear atmosphere, -and reflect. Out of the desert, as if by magic, had come a great and -brilliant army. It was not what they had expected to see. The mere -breath of its approach had blown the Americans from Agua Nueva like -dust. In comparison with its deliberation and confidence their own hasty -movements appeared ridiculous. The Mexicans had already been successful -at the mountain, and the General was plainly alarmed about the rear. -They began to question his infallibility; and many felt in their hearts -that religion was on the other side.[20.19] - -At an early hour a large part of Marshall's command, supported presently -by Major Traill with two companies of the Second Illinois and Conner's -Texas company, reascended the mountain and, favored by the nature of the -ground, maintained for several hours a brisk fight with Ampudia, who, -reinforced with heavy infantry, succeeded at last in outflanking though -not in repulsing the Americans. To aid his operations in this quarter, -perhaps, by creating a diversion, Santa Anna ordered General Blanco to -advance down the road with a heavy column, strongly backed with cannon -placed in battery near the mouth of the broad ravine; but at every -discharge of Washington's guns whole lines of Mexicans appeared to sink, -and the column, unable to deploy, soon fled for shelter to the hilly -ground on its right.[20.19] - -A stronger attack, however, was now launched. Pacheco and Lombardini -received orders to advance, unite on the plateau, and force the -American left; and a strong battery was planted on the Mexican right -near the head of the broad ravine to cooperate with them.[20.9] -Both infantry and horse marched forward boldly at parade step; and -the Americans could but admire the showy uniforms, the arms which -gleamed like silver, the belts white with pipeclay, and the freshly -polished brasses. Pacheco soon became engaged with the Second Indiana, -which--perhaps half a mile from any support except O'Brien's three guns -on its right--was the corps nearest Marshall and farthest forward on the -plateau; and after about half an hour of gallant fighting General Lane, -in the hope of both driving Pacheco back and relieving the Indianians -from the enfilading fire of the Mexican artillery, determined to have -them and O'Brien advance. The latter did so; but Colonel Bowles gave and -repeated an order to retreat. His retreat soon became flight,[20.10] -and four companies of Arkansas mounted riflemen joined in the -stampede.[20.19] - -O'Brien, though he loaded with double canister, now found himself -compelled to withdraw, sacrificing a 4-pounder--which had neither a -sound man nor a sound horse left--but firing the other pieces as he -drew them back with ropes (prolonges). The Second Illinois, commanded -by Colonel Bissell, a born soldier, which was actively engaged on the -plateau a long distance to O'Brien's right and rear, was then outflanked -by Pacheco, and it had to retire, though in the most orderly manner, -toward the edge of the plateau. Marshall's troops were now entirely -separated from the rest of our army. Discovering their exposed situation -they hurried from the mountain, escaped with considerable difficulty and -some loss from Ampudia and the Mexican cavalry that pressed on with him, -and took refuge at Buena Vista, over three miles from their position. -Here, not long afterwards, a part of them helped other fugitives defeat -a body of lancers under Torrejon, that attempted to raid their asylum -and the wagon train;[20.11] but only a few would return to the field, -and some of them rushed panic-stricken to Saltillo, crying out that all -was lost.[20.19] - -McKee and Bragg now made all speed from the other side of the valley to -the plateau. Blanco having been repulsed, four of Hardin's companies -came from the first spur. The squadron of the First Dragoons arrived; -and Bragg, Sherman and O'Brien, handling their eight guns in a masterly -style, drew a line of fire from the first gulch to the long ravine. La -Angostura and the first spur, the double key to the American position, -were thus well defended; but our left had been crushed, the way to our -rear lay open, and in spite of our incessant fire Ampudia, Pacheco and -Lombardini advanced. "One more charge!" cried the Mexicans. Apparently -Santa Anna was to triumph.[20.19] - -At this point, about nine o'clock, Taylor and his escort appeared most -fortunately on the scene.[20.12] The General, mounted on Old Whitey, -stationed himself conspicuously on the plateau near the first spur with -the dragoons that accompanied him; but the Mississippi men, to whom -Colonel Bowles and a part of his regiment now attached themselves, -marched from the road in their duck trousers with red shirts outside of -them, swinging along with the light step of hunters, threw themselves -against Ampudia and the cavalry with him in the north field, repulsed -them although greatly outnumbered, and, aided by the Third Indiana, -which had been standing in reserve behind Washington, and by one of -Bragg's guns under Lieutenant Kilburn, forced them back by a withering -fire toward the mountain.[20.19] - -By this time a strong Mexican battery had been moved round the head of -the broad ravine by dint of extraordinary exertions, and planted near -the mountain, where it commanded the entire plateau; but in spite of -the skilful San Patricio company--American deserters--who partly or -wholly manned it, the Pacheco-Lombardini column broke almost in the -middle under the American fire, the larger part of it advancing into -the north field and reinforcing Ampudia, while the other part--bearing -with it Santa Anna, whose horse had been killed by a canister ball, and -suffering terribly from our cannon and the close pursuit of Hardin, -Bissell and McKee--shrank back toward the broad ravine. The situation on -the plateau thus became easy. Shelter from the Mexican artillery could -be found in the minor ravines; bread, water and ammunition were brought -up; and the wounded were removed. But there was great danger now that -the large Mexican forces north of the long ravine would either fall upon -Washington's rear or, joining hands with Minon, capture the American -stores and ammunition at Saltillo. Leaving O'Brien's two guns and one -each of their own on the plateau, therefore, Bragg and Sherman were -ordered to the north field.[20.19] - -Here, soon after noon, a brigade of Mexican cavalry supported by -infantry pushed resolutely forward to gain the Saltillo road near the -long ravine. In order to find a better position and avoid the danger -of being enveloped, the Mississippians retired some distance; but soon -they halted, and with the Indiana men, who now rejoined them, formed an -obtuse angle opening toward the mountain. Upon this obstacle the Mexican -cavalry, drawn up in a close column, rushed down at an easy gallop in -the most beautiful style, drawing small circles in the air with the -glittering points of their lances. These men, too, were brilliantly -uniformed, the horses were lavishly caparisoned, and all the plumes and -flags and pennons were fluttering. Had they maintained their impetus, -they could have carried all before them; but the attitude of the -Americans, who made no attempt to form a square and merely stood still -with shouldered arms, puzzled the Mexican leader. He wondered, probably, -what there might be in the ravine close by them, and slackening speed -he almost halted, about seventy yards away, at the very focus of their -angle.[20.19] - -But suddenly the muskets and rifles were levelled. Each man picked his -target, and at the word "Fire!"--just as the Mexican bugler sounded the -charge--two sheets of flame converged on that splendid brigade. The head -of it fell to the ground, and the rest were thrown into confusion. Then -the Mississippi men leaped forward, yelling wildly, seized horses by the -bits, threw them back on their haunches, and finished many a helpless -rider with the 18-inch bowie-knife, while the Indianians fired and plied -the bayonet, and Sherman, coming up with a howitzer, blasted out wide, -red gaps. The onslaught was irresistible; the whole brigade with its -infantry support recoiled; and the victors pressed on in pursuit.[20.19] - -A deafening thunderstorm of rain and hail now burst upon the contending -armies, but the battle in the north field hardly paused. While Sherman -accompanied the right of the Mississippi and Indiana men, Bragg and -a body of dragoons flanked their left;[20.13] the American artillery -on the plateau, having little to do there, turned its attention upon -the same dense masses; and gradually this whole force of Mexicans was -driven back to the mountain. Retiring then into a recess of the sierra, -they became more and more closely concentrated, and the American fire -more and more destructive; but as the lancers had been stabbing their -wounded enemies, no pity was felt on our side now.[20.19] - -Nothing but annihilation appeared to await the panic-stricken mass; but -precisely at this juncture--about one o'clock--several Mexican officers, -who had been separated from their troops, galloped up to Taylor in the -desperate hope of saving their lives, and asked in the name of Santa -Anna what the American general wanted.[20.14] Upon this Wool himself -rode with a white flag toward the spot where Santa Anna was supposed to -be, in order to ascertain the meaning of this extraordinary question, -and to a considerable extent the American fire ceased. As the Mexican -guns, however, kept at work, Wool returned; but during this lull the -troops imprisoned in the recess passed rapidly along the base of the -mountain, girdling it with a belt of shining steel, toward the San -Patricio battery. Their escape was deeply regretted, but at all events -the north field was now clear of them.[20.19] - -From the first, Santa Anna had been determined to gain the American -rear, doubtless believing that if taken in reverse the volunteers would -certainly give way, and he had succeeded in completely outflanking us; -yet Ampudia's light brigade, the heavy infantry, Torrejon's cavalry, and -the brilliant corps of lancers that attacked the Mississippi and Indiana -troops had all failed. Upset, perhaps, by this disappointment, he threw -away his chance of triumph, for he should have cooperated with his brave -troops in the north field by hurling upon the American centre all the -forces that could be gathered on the south field and the plateau.[20.15] -But now, for a last and crowning effort, he assembled these forces, -placed them under the command of General Perez, and advanced the battery -on his right flank to an elevated position.[20.19] - -Unwittingly Taylor played into his hands, for now--about four -o'clock--he ordered Hardin to charge;[20.16] and the brave colonel, -whose finely cut, virile face, jet-black eye and tightly closed lips -told what he was, advanced promptly with his six companies. This -movement brought him before long into contact with the Mexicans from -the recess, who, observing the smallness of his command, rallied against -him. Bissell and McKee, seeing that he was overmatched, hastened to -his aid, and all three pushed vigorously forward; but suddenly queer -objects appeared to be moving along the surface of the plateau at their -right, and in another moment out of the ground rose a forest of muskets. -This was the corps of Perez emerging from the broad ravine. Hardin, -Bissell and McKee poured upon it a hot fire. So did O'Brien with his two -6-pounders, and Chickamauga Thomas with one of Sherman's pieces. But the -fire of the Mexicans, one terrific blaze and roar, was this time low and -true. The air seemed thick with their bullets. Some of the Kentucky men -dropped to the ground to escape them. "Up, up and on!" cried McKee, and -with frantic cheers they sprang again to their work.[20.19] - -But they fought in vain. The odds were too great, and the Americans -too exhausted. "Retreat or you are lost!" was the order; and the three -regiments, enveloped by the left wing of Perez, rushed and rolled in -headlong flight down the second gulch toward the road. Here the fearless -Hardin, defending himself to the last with a sabre, his only weapon, -sank to the ground. Here the son of Henry Clay, wounded in the thigh, -refused to let his men imperil their lives by trying to carry him -farther, and bravely met his fate; and here fell the gallant McKee, -covered with wounds. Indeed, all seemed to be doomed alike, for lancers -hurried on to close the mouth of the gulch; but suddenly Washington's -guns opened with spherical case shot, and under this driving, hissing -blast of iron the Americans ran breathless to La Angostura.[20.19] - -On the plateau, during this catastrophe, the right wing of Perez bore -down upon Taylor's position at the centre. Nothing formidable stood in -its way except O'Brien, for Thomas was fully occupied about one hundred -yards to O'Brien's left and rear. Understanding the crisis and ready to -sacrifice everything if he could only gain a little time, O'Brien fired -canister till not one of his gunners was left, and the Mexicans could -almost lay hands on the pieces, and then just managed to hobble away. -The Mexicans now swept on at a run. The fragments at our centre were on -the point of giving way. The day seemed lost.[20.19] - -But by this time Bragg and Sherman, lashing and spurring their tired -horses, came up from the north field; and the Indiana and Mississippi -regiments, hurrying over the ridges and ravines with trailed arms, -appeared on their left some distance away. Without support Bragg whirled -his guns into battery only a few rods from the enemy, and Sherman -followed his example, while the infantry charged the Mexican flank and -rear; and quickly, but none too soon, canister and bullets told. Round -followed round, and volley pursued volley. The infantry shook with -fatigue; the men at the cannon, grimy with powder-stains, gasped for air -as they rammed the charges home; but they all kept at work.[20.19] - -Bravely fought the Mexicans, too; but such a staggering fire could not -be resisted, and soon the dark masses of Perez's column reeled back -in confusion to the broad ravine. It was now about five o'clock. Our -artillery continued to play for a while on the San Patricio battery, but -even Minon, who had been making feeble demonstrations against Saltillo, -was by this time thoroughly repulsed,[20.17] and the roar of battle -subsided. The terrible conflict was in fact over. Both armies were too -exhausted to fight longer, and in the narrow valley day was already -waning. - - "The guns still roared at intervals; but silence fell at last, - And on the dead and dying came the evening shadows fast; - And then above the mountains rose the pale moon's silver shield, - And patiently and pitying she looked upon the field."[20.19] - -[THE BATTLE EXTRAORDINARY] - -It was an extraordinary battle. On the part of the Americans it began -in flight and ended in success. Marred by mistakes and failures, it -exhibited even more strikingly both skill and moral grandeur. Taylor -seems to have had but little to do with directing it, and that little -seems to have been poor work; but he did more than engineer success--he -created it. Huddled rather than mounted, a great part of the time, on -Old Whitey, with arms folded and one leg unconcernedly thrown across the -pommel of his saddle, the conspicuous target of the Mexican artillery -yet utterly unmoved even when his clothes were pierced, he was a -fountain of courage and energy.[20.18] In other words, the victory of -Buena Vista was due primarily to Taylor's prestige, valor and gift of -inspiring confidence. Others contributed essentially, however. Wool, -who commanded on our left, played the role of the fearless professional -soldier that he was. Many other officers and certain corps exhibited -a heroism of the noblest quality. Our artillery was beyond praise for -both daring and skill. As Wool said in his report, the army could not -have stood for "a single hour" without it; and the batteries served -indispensably, moreover, as rallying-points for the infantry. The -lancers, cantering over the plain and finishing the American wounded, -gave great assistance by exasperating and warning our men; and even -Minon helped us, for he made it look extremely dangerous, during much of -the time, to set out for Saltillo.[20.19] - -Nor should our foes be undervalued. While it was said afterwards that -a number of the higher officers did badly, the troops earned by their -wonderful march, their endurance of hunger and especially thirst, -and their valiant fighting under the terrible fire of the American -artillery, a liberal mead of praise. In fact, when due allowance is made -for the numbers of their almost valueless cavalry and for the position, -equipment, supplies and comparative freshness of the Americans, one -finds the two armies not very unevenly matched, and so far as fighting -was concerned, the engagement proved almost or perhaps quite a drawn -battle.[20.19] - -Then followed a night almost as hard as the day. In killed and wounded -Taylor had lost 673 officers and men,[20.20] and in spite of his -personal influence 1500 or 1800 appear to have quit the field. Those -who remained, fatigued not only by their exertions but in consequence -of the rarefied atmosphere, found themselves at the end of their -strength, both physical and moral. Evidently the Mexicans were not so -contemptible. Only one of our regiments had kept its face always toward -the enemy. Some of the bravest leaders had fallen. The death of so many -comrades depressed all. In too many cases officers had lost confidence -in their men, or men in their officers. Many home letters were written -that night, and they were all despondent. The howl of the wolf and the -creaking flap of the buzzard reached the very souls of the sleepless men -shivering in the cold. Wool felt compelled to use the flat of his sword -on some of the officers, and even that did not make them stir. Officer -after officer assured Taylor that no more fighting could be done, or -that it would mean defeat if attempted.[20.24] - -Not for a moment, however, would the General admit this. He was -determined to hold the ground, querying only whether Santa Anna would -turn the American position during the night or make another frontal -attack in the morning.[20.21] The Mississippi regiment was ordered to -Saltillo, while most of the troops holding the city were drawn to the -front; and a detachment of the Kentucky mounted volunteers with four -heavy guns, marching that night from Rinconada Pass, thirty-five miles -distant, could be reckoned on. But the General felt deeply mortified by -the skulking, and wondered how many men would give him the slip before -morning.[20.24] - -[SANTA ANNA RETIRES] - -Still more bitter were the reflections of Santa Anna. His passionate -nature ebbed and flowed, and a reverse always depressed him extremely. -He was tired out, and his old wound had begun to make him trouble. -Probably not less than 1800 of his men had been killed or wounded; 294 -had been captured; and he was probably not far from the mark when he -said that more than 4000 had left him during the battle.[20.22] He felt -that the American position, defended by men whose fighting compelled his -admiration, was impregnable. Mexican troops always lacked morale for -long, and especially for unsuccessful, operations; and the troops under -his command were now spent in every way. Confidence in their leader and -in the hope of booty failed them. They remembered how they had been -forced into the ranks and then abused. Surprised by an infantry that -seemed to recognize no defeat, they were dumfounded by an artillery that -seemed to be everywhere at once and always blazing. Hunger, thirst, and -cold tormented them.[20.24] - -Such conditions meant wholesale desertion; and, as a Mexican officer -wrote that evening, it was a grave question whether the troops, if -left overnight in their present loose and scattered state, would not -disband.[20.23] The country would then be without a disciplined army -to oppose either Taylor or Scott; and Santa Anna knew what his enemies -would say in that case. If, on the other hand, he should lead back an -organized force bearing the recognized fruits of victory, two banners -and three cannon, he could claim a success even if not a positive -triumph. So, leaving behind the wounded that were not within easy reach -or could not well be transported, he closed up his ranks not long after -nightfall, and set out for Agua Nueva. At first the march was like a -funeral procession, except that dead men appeared to be celebrating -their own obsequies. Nobody spoke; the bands were silent; the groans of -the wounded and the rumble of the artillery and wagons took the place of -conversation and music. But before long the slender crescent of the moon -sank behind the mountain; and then in the greatest confusion the men -stumbled and hurried along, eager to find a resting place.[20.24] - -Of this movement the American outposts were not aware. A Mexican brigade -kept fires burning along the whole front, and pickets rode steadily to -and fro singing to themselves a strange, sad air. When the first pale -gleam was visible above the sierra, our soldiers bestirred themselves -for another battle. But as the day began to grow, only the backs of -a Mexican rearguard could be seen. A joyous murmur ran from group to -group. Soon it was confirmed; it swelled to a shout; hard-featured, -battle-worn men became boys again; and Taylor and Wool threw themselves, -with moist eyes, into each other's arms.[20.24] - -[THE MEXICAN RETREAT] - -About 860 officers and 9000 men gathered round Santa Anna that forenoon -at Agua Nueva. Temporary supplies of food were available,[20.25] -and the troops were at once reorganized by combining companies from -different corps. Before the day was out Major Bliss arrived to propose -an exchange of prisoners and suggest an end of hostilities.[20.26] To -the former proposition Santa Anna acceded, but he rejected the latter; -and, ordering the eyes of the American commissioner to be unbound, -he exhibited to him an army prepared for battle. In general orders -he stated that his purpose in retiring had been to draw Taylor upon -ground where Mexican cavalry could operate; but, as the prospect of -resuming the offensive was extremely slight, provisions were scanty, the -dysentery had already broken out, and the presence of so many wounded -men--more than 700 poor fellows in the most wretched condition--seemed -liable to produce other diseases, a council of war decided the next -day upon retreat, and February 26 in the afternoon the troops moved -south.[20.27] - -Now came their real defeat. Like Napoleon returning from Russia, -Santa Anna hurried on in advance, and owing to complications there was -actually no general-in-chief. Divisions and corps marched and lived -as they could. Officers obeyed or disobeyed as they chose. Dysentery, -typhus and all sorts of minor distresses prevailed. The condition of -the troops was enough to make nature shudder, wrote an officer; and -the march was "worse than three retreats from Matamoros put together." -Probably not less than 3000 men were lost in one way or another on the -road; and when the miserable survivors--less than half the number that -had left San Luis full of enthusiasm--began to arrive in that city, -the sensation among the people was described by a witness as "most -profound." Santa Anna, however, had already been accorded triumphal -honors there. By this time a wave of jubilation, soon to break in -plaudits on the far-distant shores of Tabasco River, was in motion; -and he took pains to ensure proper testimony by having a cross of -honor decreed to every officer distinguished in the battle, and by -distributing twenty-seven promotions in the three highest grades.[20.27] - -For Taylor also the battle of Buena Vista had a sequel. Impressed, very -likely, by the report of Bliss, he allowed his army to rest where it -was for three days; but late on the twenty-seventh, having ascertained -Santa Anna's retreat through a reconnaissance, he reoccupied Agua Nueva, -where he found a number of Mexican wounded, and on March 1--though his -troops were not yet fresh enough to pursue the enemy or he did not think -it safe to do so--he pushed a detachment on to La Encarnacion with a -like result. Provisions and surgical assistance were freely given to the -disabled foemen, but their comrades were evidently beyond reach.[20.29] - -Taylor's rear, however, caused him rather serious trouble. The long -shadow cast by Santa Anna's army had spread alarm and confusion all over -northeastern Mexico, and the approach of troops from Tula deepened it. -Even the people of Monclova and Parras, despite their promises to be -neutral, took up arms. The Americans were now to be driven across the -Rio Grande and perhaps the Sabine, it was threatened. Preparations for -defence were made at all our chief posts, and for this reason they were -hardly molested; but the lines of communication could not be maintained, -detachments en route were menaced or assailed, and on the day following -the battle Urrea, a polished ruffian of the distinctive Spanish-American -type, broke up a large wagon train with signal atrocity.[20.28] The -rancheros cooperated eagerly in this profitable work, and the result of -the battle had little effect upon them, for they had seen the Mexican -army come and go at will, and doubtless thought it might appear again. -Taylor therefore proceeded to Monterey about the eighth of March, and -endeavored to restore order. On the twenty-eighth he reported that quiet -had returned; but three weeks later, though he believed that Urrea and -his regulars had withdrawn beyond the Sierra Madre, he admitted that -bands of robbers were still very numerous.[20.29] - -Nor was the panic limited to this region. Almost equal alarm prevailed -in the United States. "The sympathy of every human being is elicited," -wrote Brooke at New Orleans; and the government itself, hurrying off -recruits and authorizing Brooke to accept new volunteers, awaited in -"painful suspense" the result of Santa Anna's advance. The tidings -of his failure, exaggerated of course into news of a brilliant and -overwhelming triumph won by a general robbed of his troops, caused a -tremendous rebound. Polk, holding that only Taylor's blundering and -violation of orders had created the peril, and that his brave men had -rescued him from it, would not permit a general salute in the army; but -the nation saluted, and the General's nomination for the Presidency -became inevitable.[20.29] - - - - - NOTES - - - KEY TO THE REFERENCES - -In most cases it will not be difficult to determine where the MS. -sources are preserved. Despatches to or from a military or naval -officer, a diplomatic or a consular agent may be understood, if there is -no indication to the contrary, to be in the corresponding archives of -the government addressed. (The connection of the author of a despatch -may be ascertained by looking up his name in the index.) This direction -may seem vague, but the officials at the archives will be found able -to supply the needful details. The principal foreign agents in Mexico -were (U. S.) Poinsett, Butler, Ellis, Thompson, Shannon, Slidell, and -(consuls) Jones, Black, and Dimond; (England) Morier, Ward, Pakenham, -Ashburnham, Bankhead, Doyle, Thornton, and (consul) Giffard; (France) -Cochelet, Martin, Deffaudis, and Cyprey; and (Spain) Bermudez de Castro -and Lozano. Mexican documents cited in the form "To S. Anna, Apr. 20" -or "S. Anna, Mar. 4," are in the archives of the War Dept. of Mexico, -National Palace. Many unofficial letters can readily be traced by means -of the list of MS. sources. When it has seemed desirable, however, -particularly at the beginning of a chapter, heavy figures referring to -that list have been prefixed to the citation, and also to many citations -of official documents. The MS. sources are given in the appendix of each -volume; the printed sources in the appendix of the second volume. - -A formula like "Ho. 60; 30, 1" means House Executive Document no. 60, -of the Thirtieth Congress, first session; and "_Cong. Globe_, 30, 2" -refers to the _Congressional Globe_, Thirtieth Congress, second session. -In some cases it has been found best to cite a document broadly by -mentioning the first page of it; and the same remark applies to passages -in other publications. The year in the date of a cited document is -omitted when it is the same as that of the events referred to in the -corresponding paragraph of the text. _E.g._ a document dated Oct. 15, -1847, attached to a paragraph dealing with Scott's landing at Vera -Cruz (March, 1847) or capturing Mexico City (Sept., 1847) is cited -as of "Oct. 15," not "Oct. 15, 1847." This is done to save space. -The abbreviations are plain. "Gov." means _governor_; "comte. gen.," -_comandante general_; "comte. mil." _comandante militar_. "Gov. Puebla," -etc., means _governor of Puebla_, etc. "_Diario_" means the official -newspaper. For fuller titles of books the list of sources may be -consulted. - -The want of definiteness and the lack of statistics in numerous cases -(particularly Mexican affairs) may be charged to a dearth of trustworthy -data. - - - - - NOTES - - - PREFACE - -P.1. Another reason for the neglect of the Mexican War has been its -unpopularity. But for that, it would no doubt have been thoroughly -studied sooner. - -P.2. A second reason for preparing this history was that a number of -important topics--such as the conditions existing in the two countries -just before the war, the war in American politics, our conduct and -methods in occupied territory, the finances of the war, its foreign -relations, etc.--had been treated most superficially or not at all. -In the third place it was hoped to handle more carefully the material -previously used. The bound volumes entitled "Archivo de Guerra" in the -Archivo General y Publico at Mexico occupy some 200 feet of shelf room, -and the papers examined in the Archivo de Guerra y Marina, which had to -be examined one by one, would probably, if placed one on another, make a -pile sixty feet high. - -As will be seen from the detailed account of the MS. sources (appendix), -the author did not visit the archives of all the Mexican states and -cities. This was because nothing further of local value could be hoped -for, and because the practice of communicating from state to state -copies of important documents made it seem unnecessary to continue in -those directions. The results in Peru and Colombia were negative, but -this fact had a positive significance, for there were reasons to look -for an active sympathy and correspondence with Mexico in those quarters. -The author planned to examine the Prussian archives, but the outbreak -of the great war prevented him from doing so. From other trustworthy -sources, mostly unpublished, he fully understood the attitude of that -government, however (chap. xxxv). The reports of the Prussian -representative at Mexico cannot have been reliable, both because of -his personal characteristics and because for several reasons he did -not stand within the inner circle, and probably, since his government -felt scarcely any interest in the war, they were not full. Hence it -is not believed that anything of material value has been lost through -the impossibility of examining them. Of some of the newspaper files -only scattered portions were found. Many newspapers, as well as many -books and pamphlets, were read to ascertain the general temper, social -state, and political conditions of the two countries, and it appeared -unnecessary to set down references--which would have been almost -innumerable--to such literature. The author contemplated at one time a -critical discussion of the sources, but he soon found that this would -require too much space. It would in fact make a volume. For additional -information regarding the sources one may consult an article of the -author's that appeared in _The Military Historian and Economist_, vol. -i, no. 1. - -P.3. The printed versions of diplomatic and military documents, when -substantially correct, are usually cited in the notes, because they -are easily accessible; but so far as possible they have been collated -with the originals. On the value of official military reports the -author presented some remarks in the _American Historical Review_, vol. -xxi, p. 96. Gen. Worth said privately that Scott's report on the -battle of Cerro Gordo was "a lie from beginning to end," and in a -sense different from what this language would at first sight appear -to mean, it was fairly correct (chap. xxiii, note 33). Subordinate -officers not infrequently brought all possible influence, both personal -and political, to bear upon the general whose report they knew would -be printed. A general naturally favored in his report the regiment and -the officers with whom he had been formerly associated. An undue regard -for rank was often felt. Taylor asked a promotion for Brig Gen. Twiggs -after the capture of Monterey though Twiggs had been ostensibly ill at -the time and had taken no material part in the fight. Captain (later -General) Bragg wrote: "The feelings succeeding a great victory caused -many things to be forgotten and forgiven which would sound badly in -history, and which will never be known except in private correspondence" -(=210=to Gov. Hammond, May 4, 1848). An important document issued -by our government was privately described by the adj. gen. as "full of -inaccuracies" (=117=R.Jones to B. Mayer, Oct. 10, 1848). - -A special reason for leaving no stone unturned has been the -consideration that the omission of a significant fact is even worse than -a positive error, since it is equally misleading and less likely to -be discovered. In many instances an apparently insignificant document -proved to be the keystone of an arch or at least to fill a serious gap, -and the cumulative effect of a number of such documents frequently -established a capital fact. Documents not actually used often prove -helpful by preventing the writer from drawing inferences that look -reasonable but are in fact incorrect (see the last paragraph of the -article in the _Military Historian_ cited above). Even minutiae enable -one to give life and, so to speak, rotundity to events, and to do this -is to increase the fidelity of the narrative. The more information the -historian possesses, the better he can criticise particular documents. -In consequence of a want of this full acquaintance with the facts, -documents relating to the subject have previously been misunderstood. -Still another valuable fruit of a wide investigation is a higher degree -of confidence on the part of both author and reader that no later -discoveries will upset present conclusions. For Scott's statement see -=65=gen. orders 249, Aug. 6, 1847. - -Naturally the author had little occasion to use previous histories of -the war, and indeed he took care not to consult them while writing -this work. No thorough attempt has been made to point out their errors -and no wish is felt to criticize them in general; but it needs to be -explained that while Ripley, Wilcox, Furber and Roa Barcena present -statements of minor importance, not found elsewhere, which the author -wished to use, he has seldom felt at liberty to do so. As is well known -those authors were not critical historians. They were also too near the -events. It is frequently impossible to be sure whether their statements -rested upon hearsay, upon trustworthy second-hand information, or upon -personal knowledge. Roa Barcena spoke as a Mexican. Wilcox aimed to -glorify our officers and men; and Ripley intended to exalt the unworthy -Pillow at the expense of Scott (chap. xxiii, note 29; and, for an -interesting though not wholly correct review of Ripley, _So. Qtrly. -Rev._, Jan., 1851, 149-60). Pillow =185=wrote in reference to Ripley's -book, He has torn Scott "the _man_ and the _officer_ all _to pieces_." -The recent work by Rives contains much that is sound as well as -dignified; but his investigations came far short of the requirements. -The present author has frequently taken pains to write in such a way as -to correct errors without mentioning them, and the reader may feel sure -that he has carefully considered all statements not in agreement with -his own. - -P.4. Particular reasons why a civilian could venture to prepare -the history of this war were that (1) owing largely to the smallness -of the numbers engaged, the operations were simple; (2) the reports -were written for non-military readers; and (3) a large amount of -good criticism was written at the time or soon afterwards--mostly in -a private way--by competent officers who were personally familiar -with the circumstances. As a matter of fact military men's technical -knowledge does not necessarily enable them to reach correct historical -conclusions. This is proved by their radical differences of opinion -(_e.g._ compare the articles on Wilcox's History of the Mexican War, -_Journal of U.S. Artillery_, July and Oct., 1892) and their manifest -errors of judgment. Gen. U. S. Grant pronounced Scott's strategy on Aug. -20, 1847, faultless as a result of the perfect work of his engineer -officers (Pers. Mems., i, 145); but the engineer from whose report -Scott's essential orders regarding the battle of Churubusco resulted -admitted privately that he blundered (<xxvi, notes, remarks on -Churubusco). The dicta of military authorities are not often quoted by -the author, because war cannot be made by rule and it would be necessary -to consider in each case whether the dictum was applicable. - -A very difficult matter was to decide how many military details to -introduce. There is hardly any limit to the names of officers and -commands and the minutiae of movements that might have been presented. -The principle adopted was to draw the line between historical value and -antiquarian value, to include what was needed to show how the important -results were brought about and allow the curious reader to ascertain the -rest of the details by looking up the references. - -The reader who has given no study to the subject may perhaps welcome -a few informal and obviously incomplete remarks on the principles -of war. One proper aim is the occupation of territory, and this may -possibly be accomplished without fighting; but essentially combat is -presupposed, and the purpose is then to destroy or in some other way -eliminate the enemy's military strength, so that he will feel compelled -to accept our terms. Therefore the general should (1) make all possible -preparations; (2) take the initiative and lose no time; (3) secure -unity in plan and in action; (4) obtain as much information as possible -regarding the enemy and beware of despising him; (5) embarrass him and -break down his morale, while building up your own, through rapidity of -movement, surprises, feints, threats against his communications, etc.; -(6) select for objective a point combining, as far as may be, weakness -and decisiveness--qualities often incompatible, of course; (7) running -no avoidable risk of inadequacy, concentrate near and move upon this -an overpowering force, while diverting the enemy's forces from it; -(8) strike with energy and decision; and (9) if successful, pursue to -the limit of endurance and safety. In a general way it may be said -that an "indirect" or "oblique" (_i.e._ flank) attack is preferable, -but obviously the actual conditions must decide whether to adopt that -method. In view of these principles, strategy determines when, where, -and with what forces a battle shall be fought, and tactics directs the -battle itself. It follows that on the defensive one should protect -one's communications, force the enemy to send out detachments and rout -or annoy these; and, if such methods have no saving effect, retire to -a position strong by nature, art, or both, and, while defending it, -watch for opportunities to strike. One may consult on these points -and on the text to which this note refers Clausewitz, On War, book i, -chap. 7; Jomini, Precis, i, 470-2; Murray, Reality of War, 21, 77; -Donat, Strategical Science, 275-6; Henderson, Science of War, 19-20; -Griepenkerl, Applied Tactics, 116; Goltz, Conduct of War, 10-12; _Jour. -Milit. Serv. Instit._, 1908, p. 31; _Am. Hist. Rev._, xi, 388. - -P.5. As the author was compelled to depart in many cases from the -familiar method of referring to the sources, he feels bound to explain -how these were handled. All the material, condensed as much as it safely -could be, was marked in the margin with Roman figures, indicating to -what chapter each sentence or larger section would belong. Then the -sections were copied into packets, each of which contained all the -material of a chapter. Next the material of each packet was analyzed -into topical items, and the items were numbered with Arabic figures. -In writing a chapter the author placed after each sentence (or, if the -case demanded, after each clause, phrase or word) the Arabic figures -numbering the items upon which it rested. These figures were retained -through the successive revisions until the MS. was ready to print, and -were used in the re-examination of the work. By this routine every -document was considered at least five times. Of course care was taken -at all stages to ensure correct copying; yet in the final revision the -author went back, unless there was a good reason for not doing so, -to originals or to trustworthy copies from the originals--doing this -not merely to verify the references but also to see, in the light of -the completed investigation of the subject, whether he had omitted or -misunderstood anything of importance in making notes and condensations. -The text and remarks as written looked thus: - - "Gen. Patterson once asserted that Volunteers were no worse - than regulars 578, but the evidence of other officers 83-4 340 - 385 564 568 1266 and of the Mexicans 84 87 340 489 582 1236 was - overwhelmingly against him. Regulars committed offences, but these - appear to have been commonly mere pilfering 181 562, and to have - been chargeable mostly to fresh recruits 83 1103. It is probable, - however, that the Volunteer troops often bore the blame 109 for - acts done by soldiers dishonorably discharged 659 981, deserters - 582 601 659 689 945, teamsters and other civilian employees 358 - 1315 and the many "black legs" 377 and "human vultures" 1292 who - followed the army 365 568 639. The great difficulty was to identify - the culprits 1315. Mexicans were often afraid to testify against - our soldiers 1266." - -The saving of space and labor that resulted from the grouping of -citations can easily be illustrated. Take the case of ten statements -resting upon ten documents, which may be represented by the first ten -letters of the alphabet. Were the usual method followed the references -might be: _acj_, _dfghi_, _be_, _adeghj_, _fij_, _bcf_, _adeg_, _cfh_, -_i_, _bdgh_j; whereas by the group method the references would be -_abcdefghij_--in the former case 35, in the latter 10. The higher -cost of the former method might have enforced the omission of all -references from the printed volumes, if indeed the increased labor of -writing, copying, and proof-reading the references had not deterred -the author--as it might well have done--from completing his task. As it -stands, the book probably represents (including the work of clerical -assistants) nearly twenty years of labor. After all, the chief value -of citations is perhaps their effect upon the author. Few look them -up; but, no matter how conscientious he may be, the fact of constantly -giving such pledges of fidelity keeps him wide-awake to the necessity of -accuracy, and indeed compels him to refer to his sources more than he -might otherwise feel obliged to do. - - - I. MEXICO AND THE MEXICANS - -(To the sources mentioned below may be added a residence of more than -a year in Mexico, during which the author met people of numerous -categories and made every possible effort to understand the national -traits.) - -1.1. _Physical Mexico._ U. S. War Dept., Monograph. Bureau of Amer. -Republics, Mexico. Encyclopaedia Britannica, "Mexico." Numerous books of -travel mentioned in note 8. - -1.2. _Population._ The census which served as a basis for the -elections of 1841 and some later years gave the population as 7,016,000 -(Dublan, Legislacion, v, 152, gives the figures by states). The American -governor of Jalapa, Col. Hughes, =257=wrote, Jan. 28, 1848, that -according to "authentic Mexican official documents" the population -was about 7,500,000, of whom 2,500,000 were under seventeen years of -age, 500,000 were over sixty, and 300,000 were idlers, beggars, etc., -incapable of work. The population of the United States in 1840 was -17,069,453. _Observador Judicial_, 1842. Consideraciones, 5. _Journal -des Debats_, Sept. 9, 1847. =261=Memoire. Macgregor, Progress, i, -317. Ward, Mexico, i, 28. Mora, Obras, i, 54. Mexico a traves, iii, 19; -iv, p. vii. Relaciones, circular, Aug. 9, 1847. =82=Decree, Dec. -16, 1847. _Diario_, May 4, 1847, claimed 8,000,000. - -1.3. _Racial divisions and characteristics._ Mexico a traves, iii, -18-21. Humboldt, Essai Polit., i, 367, 381, 411-6; ii, 1-4, 9, 45, -48-52. =52=Poinsett, no. 166, March 10, 1829. Mayer, War, 13, -16. _Commerc. Review_, ii, 165-76. Consideraciones, 5-7. Garcia, -Conquista, 4, 370-2, 397. Thompson, Recolls., 7. Poinsett, Notes, 161. -=13=Hervey, Description of Mexico. =261=Memoire. Loewenstern, -Le Mexique, 166, 174-89. Mora, Obras, i, 54-6. Cuevas, Porvenir, -12-14. =178=Davis, diary. =162=Conner to wife, Mar. 4, 1846. -Diccionario Universal (_Mexicanos_). =13=Morier, no. 10, Feb. 10, -1825. _Eco del Comercio_, Mar. 22, 1848. - -Technically the child of a Spaniard and an Indian was a "mestizo," the -child of a Spaniard and a mestizo was a "castizo," and the child of a -Spaniard and a castizo was a "criollo" (creole); but "criollo" came to -include all these classes and also pure whites born in Mexico. As very -few Spanish women went to Mexico, the mixture of blood was practically -inevitable. As is well known the Spanish blood itself is a singular -mixture. Hence the Mexican was naturally peculiar. - -1.4. _The class divisions._ Otero, Cuestion, 37, 47-51. -=13=Morier, no. 12, Feb. 10, 1825. Lerdo de Tejada, Apuntes, i, -232. =26l=Memoire. Humboldt, Essai Polit., i, 391-5, 400-1, 429-31; -ii, 40. Poinsett, Notes, 162. Constituent Cong. of Mex., Address. -Consideraciones, 18, 19. Mora, Obras, i, 54-6. Paredes, Papers, 136. -=52=Poinsett, no. 166. Mexico a traves, iii, 18. Loewenstern, Le -Mexique, 188-9. - -1.5. _Church_, _army_, _civil service_. Mayer, War, 20-1, 132. Otero, -Cuestion, 38-46, 59, 60, 71-3. Mora, Obras, i, pp. vii, xcvii-cxviii, -ccxlvii; ii, 122-8. =261=Memoire. Loewenstern, Le Mexique, 38, -94, 117-28. Humboldt, Polit. Essay (London, 1811), i, 231-2. Mexico a -traves, ii, 896; iii, 23; iv, 149, 447, 639. Zavala, Revoluciones, i, -37. Macgregor, Progress, i, 637, 642. Thompson, Recolls., 41, 53, 101-3, -169-74. =52=Poinsett, nos. 2, 12, 36, 55, 166 (May 28; Aug. 5, -1825; Feb. 18; Aug. 26, 1826; March 10, 1829). Consideraciones, 6, 7, -12, 26-30, 37, 39-42. =13=Ashburnham, Oct. 3, 1837; July 26, 1838. -Semmes, Service, 14-5, 21. =11=Martin, Feb. 1; July 20, 1827; Dec. -25, 1828. =11=Cochelet, June 6; Nov. 20, 1829. _Correspondant_, -April 15; July 15, 1846. Calderon, Life, i, 337, 408. =13=Hervey, -Description. _Picayune_, April 22, 1843. Bocanegra, Memorias, i, 32. -Tornel, Resena, 19-21, 84. =11=Despatch to the French govt., -about June, 1823 (anon.). =13=Morier, no. 13, Feb. 10, 1825. -=13=Morier and Ward, no. 1, April 10, 1825. =13=Ward, no. 37, -Apr. 29, 1826. =13=Pakenham, nos. 17, Jan. 30, 1830; 25, Feb. 26, -1841; 77, Aug. 29, 1842. =13=Bankhead, nos. 73, Aug. 29, 1844; -56, Apr. 29, 1846. Memoria de ... Relaciones, Dec., 1846. Richmond -_Enquirer_, Dec. 30, 1845. Mobile _Commerc. Register_, Aug. 9, 1845. -_Veracruzano Libre_, Dec. 27, 1845. _Revue de Paris_, Dec., 1844. -Memoria de ... Guerra, Nov. 7, 1823, 17, 18. Balbontin, Invasion, 75, -77. _Id._, Estado Militar, 58. =375=Perry to J. Y. Mason, Nov. 16, -1846. Bulnes, Grandes Mentiras, 182. Rivero, Mex. en 1842, 25, 137-9. -Ward, Mexico, i, 307-17, 330-40. London _Times_, Nov. 11, 1845. - -According to Otero, an able editor and statesman, the income of the -Church represented in 1829 a capital of $127,000,000, besides the -buildings, etc., used for worship and for the housing of ecclesiastics; -and practically none of its property was taxed. Of its wealth, large -for any period but huge for that day, $18,000,000 were invested in city -and country real estate; and consequently there was an army of agents -looking after Church interests in all quarters, and a great number of -proprietors and financiers were closely associated with the clericals. -One may say, reported a French diplomatic agent, "that religion does not -exist [in Mexico], for its influence is nowhere felt"; and in truth, as -an ardent Roman Catholic said in _Le Correspondant_ of Paris in 1846, -that country needed to be evangelized anew. Trist: "The lazy, ignorant, -and stupid monks, whose views do not extend beyond the round of purely -animal enjoyments, and include no esprit de corps save pecuniary greed -mixed with an idol worship fanaticism" (=52=no. 18, Oct. 25, -1847). Ramirez, Mexico, 219: Christianity merely gross idolatry here. -The Mexican church stood naturally in opposition to the government, for -both claimed the right of ecclesiastical patronage. The influence of the -Church was lessened by Leo XII, who exhorted the Mexicans to return to -Spain (Mexico a traves, iv, 149). - -=350=Weber: "If the Mexican soldier has something to eat, he eats -it; if not, he goes without. That is all." _Diario_, May 20, 1847: The -army has been burdened with enough generals and field officers for the -army Napoleon led against Russia. (24,000 officers) Duflot de Mofras, -Explor., i, 20. ($21,000,000) =52=Slidell to Buchanan, Jan. 14, -1846. Negrete, Invasion, iv, app., 400. _Eco del Comercio_, Mar. 22, -1848. =11=Martin: The army belongs to the first who "gives it money -or promises it plunder" (Dec. 25, 1828). =13=Doyle, no. 81, Oct. -30, 1843. _Don Simplicio_, July 19, 1846. _Nacional_, Jan. 19, 1848. - -1.6. _Justice_, _education_, _the press_. Zavala, Revoluciones, i, 35, -396; ii, 393. Thompson, Recolls., 20-4, 147-52. London _Times_, Jan. 8, -1846. =13=Ward, no. 58, confid., April 18, 1827. =13=Pakenham, -nos. 39, May 27, 1836; 5, Jan. 25, 1841. =13=Bankhead, no. 54, -May 30, 1845. =13=O'Gorman to Pakenham, Jan. 19, 1835. Pakenham, -Nov. 23, 1834, separate; no. 8, March 8, 1835. =56=W. S. Parrott, -Oct. 11, 1845. =52=Jones, June 1, 1837; nos. 168, Oct. 30, 1838; -252, May 5, 1839. Leclerc in _Revue des Deux Mondes_, March 1, 1840, p. -638. =11=French vice-consul, Mex., Aug. 19, 1829; Feb. 3, 1830. -Tornel, Resena, 288. Consideraciones, 6, 7, 12-4, 43, 48. Memorias de -... Relaciones, Jan., 1825; Feb., 1828; Jan., 1831; May, 1833; Dec, -1846. Memorias, min. of justice, 1833, 1835, 1845. Ward, Mexico, i, -337. =52=Poinsett, no. 166. Constit. Cong, of Mex., Address. -_Liberal Moderado_, Aug. 4, 1846. Mora, Obras, i, pp. clxxxviii-cxcvii. -Loewenstern, Le Mexique, 109-16. Lavalles, Etudes, 31-3. Villar, -Proyecto. Calderon, Life, i, 195, 340-2. Esparza, Informe. Memorias, -min. of treas., May, 1833; July, 1845. Memorias, min. of pub. instr., -Jan., 1844; July, 1844; March, 1845. Macgregor, Progress, i, 637. - -For a long time after 1821 only one slight attempt was made to improve -the old judicial methods, and that was a failure. =11=Vice-consul -of France, Aug. 19, 1829: "Justice is so venal, that with money one -could have the victim arrested and the criminal rewarded." In 1836 the -British minister reported the opinion of an able Mexican lawyer that -certain important court proceedings were nothing but "a conspiracy -authorized and supported by judicial formulas, one more illegal than -another." Mexican minister of justice, 1835: "On all sides is heard a -unanimous outcry against the bad administration of justice" (Memoria). -At a public meeting, Aug. 13, 1846, Pedro Zubieta said: "What have been -thus far the judiciary and the magistracy? A shameful market, in which -those august names have put Justice up at auction" (_Diario_, Sept. 19). -The gov. of Michoacan =76=wrote, Nov. 28, 1845: I am unable to -prevent some judges from favoring criminals. Alaman reported secretly to -Congress in 1830: The tribunals ensure impunity to criminals (Pakenham, -no. 25, Mar. 25, 1830). Ramirez, Mexico, 225: Our magistrates are -usually insignificant (_hombrecitos_), "vigorous to persecute, feeble -to command, and incapable of serving as models of a just and severe -impartiality." The reports of the American ministers and consuls were -full of similar complaints. Once when our consul reminded the minister -of foreign affairs that it was the constitutional duty of the Executive -to have the laws faithfully administered, the latter replied, "Yes, -but it is impossible." In 1838 France took strong ground against the -miscarriages of justice in the Mexican courts. - -The Lancastrian system of pupil helpers was tried in the schools; -but it failed, for nobody understood it practically. The educational -authorities gave ear to bright young men who had merely picked up a few -ideas on the boulevards of Europe, and wasted their time in theorizing -and making projects. We have become, said a thoughtful writer in March, -1848, the most persistent of charlatans, glad to talk on any subject -without understanding it, and ready to try all sorts of theories, which -vanish like smoke as soon as put into practice. - -1.7. _Industries_, _trade_, _means of communication_. _Revista -Economica_, Dec. 14, 31, 1843. Macgregor, Progress, i, 308, 670, 674. -Ward, Mexico, ii, 3-170. Mexico a traves, iii, 18. London _Times_, -Aug. 6; Nov. 11; Dec. 6, 1845. =52=Thompson, no. 4, July 30, 1842. -=13=Ward, nos. 45, 99 (May 20; Aug. 20, 1826). =261=Memoire. -_Gazette d'Etat de Prusse_, Nov. 11, 1823. Consideraciones, 8-12, 14-8. -Otero, Cuestion, 31-4, 46, 49, 50, 97-8. Pakenham, nos. 25, Mar. 25, -1830; 28, June 11, 1833; 61, July 8, 1841; 4, 49, 123, Jan. 6, June 2, -Dec. 25, 1842; 5, Jan. 24, 1843. =13=Ashburnham, no. 3, Jan. 31, -1838. =13=Bankhead, nos. 44, June 29, 1844; 6 Jan. 29, 1845; 8, -Jan. 30, 1846. =261=_a_Memoire. =52=Poinsett, reply to Mexico -state (with his no. 176, Aug. 7, 1829). Memorias, Relaciones, Feb., -1830; March, 1835; Dec, 1846. Memoria, min. of justice, March, 1845. -Mayer. War. 13. Poinsett, no. 166, March 10, 1829. Constituent Cong., -Address, 1824. Thompson, Recolls., 35. _Journal des Debats_, March 16, -1844; Feb. 18, 1845; April 4; Sept. 9, 1847. Bocanegra, Memorias, ii, -162-3. =52=Dimond, no. 273, Nov. 4, 1845. =11=Martin, Feb. 1, -1827. Banco de Avio, Informe. Memoria, min. of interior, Jan., 1838. -Alaman, Memoria. Robertson, Remins., 88. =76=Mora y Villamil, -report from superior board of engineer corps, Nov. 15, 1845. McSherry, -El Puchero, 147. Lawton, Artill. Officer, 254. _Diario_, July 20-5, 1846 -(report on the state of agriculture). - -The American minister stated in 1829 that the cost of producing crops in -Mexico was double that in the United States and the expense of marketing -them fourfold. Besides, the farmers had suffered blow after blow during -the revolution and the succeeding commotions. The system of "forced -loans," so familiar in Mexico, consisted in assigning to corporations -and individuals--presumably according to their wealth--amounts that -they were required to hand over in exchange for promissory notes, which -the government did not expect to pay. The prohibition of many foreign -articles reduced the public revenues and promoted smuggling. - -1.8. _Country and town: manners and mora's._ Thompson, Recolls., 39, -40, 82, 90, 93, 101-2, 115, 125-8, 132, 135, 160, 163, 217. Calderon, -Life, i, 80, 124, 127, 138, 140, 150-1, 162, 165, 175, 273, 314, 336, -340-5, 395; ii, 126 (Alaman), 137 (village), 237, 247. Ward, no. 52, -secret and confid., Nov. 10, 1825. =52=Thompson, no. 1, 1842. -=52=Poinsett, nos. 2, May 28, 1825; 94, July 8, 1827; 166, Mar. -10, 1829. =52=Butler, July 9, 1834. Arroniz, Manual, 109, 123, -131, 161. Loewenstern, Le Mexique, 36, 47-8, 59, 130, 133, 137, 140, -142, 147-9, 151-4, 159, 163-6, etc. Decaen, Mexico, 22. Rivera, Los -Mexicanos Pintados. _Memorial Historico_, Jan. 16, 20, 1846. Mexico a -traves, iv, 291. Rivera, Gobernantes, ii, 142. _Revue Independante_, -Apr. 25, 1845. _Revue de Paris_, Dec, 1844. _Diario_, Jan. 24, 1841. -Davis, Autobiog., 102. Mayer, War, 14. Bravo in _Boletin Oficial_, Apr. -30, 1846. Ruxton, Adventures (1847), 20, 25, 34-6, 39, 40, 44, 46, 59. -Robertson, Remins., 104-6, 116, 122. Mason, Pictures, i, 17, 19, 110, -201; ii, 23, etc. Vigneaux, Voyage, 286. Orbigny, Voyage, 413, 422, -425, 428. Robertson, Visit, ii, 50, 58, 61-2, 147. _Commerc. Review_, -ii, 165-76. =11=Cochelet, Sept. 29, Nov. 15, 1829. =13=Forbes -(Tepic), July 2, 1846. Kendall, Narrative (1844), ii, 145, 317, 335-6. -Tudor, Tour, ii, 266, 328. Stapp, Prisoners, 133-4. Valois, Le Mexique, -86-7. _Delta_, June 12; Nov. 6, 1847. Sierra, Evolution, _passim_. -=218=Henshaw narrative. (Apathy) Pakenham, no. 15, Mar. 21, 1834. -Morier and Ward, no. 6, Apr. 30, 1825 ("That extraordinary Compound of -Ignorance, Suspicion, and Fanaticism, which now forms the most striking -Feature of the National Character." "Alaman and Esteva represented -that we were dealing with Children, and must suit our Arguments to -their Capacity.") Ward, nos. 20, 60, July 12; Nov. 23, 1825. Zavala, -Revoluciones, ii, 152-3, 365. McSherry, El Puchero, 158. - -A ministerial report submitted to Congress in Jan., 1844, showed how -a Mexican could regard himself: "If the present epoch begins to be -brilliant in Europe, Mexico finds herself still more advanced. She has -learned from the wise men of all the world but has contemned their -errors.... The virtues of the Mexican spring from a heart not withered -by the pleasures of sense, a heart still expanding with generous -enthusiasm. His soul rises to sublime regions; it knows how to feel; it -knows how to understand; it knows the celestial origin of virtue; and it -appreciates all that itself contains of spontaneity and magnanimity.... -This delicious country breathes into our sentiments the suavity of its -climate; this ardent sun kindles the beautiful flame that makes men love -one another; and amid the sweetness of a natural world so magnificent -and sublime the germ of heroic merits is formed within us." - - - II. THE POLITICAL EDUCATION OF MEXICO - -2.1. To sketch the political development of Mexico is by no means -easy. No scientific history of it exists, and all those who have written -on the subject with first-hand knowledge have been party men. The best -basis is the reports of the British ministers, for they were men of -ability near the heart of affairs, comparatively without prejudice, and -anxious to give a true account of what was taking place. With these -reports as a _prima facie_ standard, the author has felt able to use -intelligently the statements of other foreign agents--diplomatic and -consular--Mexican authors, the historical and political writers of -several nationalities and a great number of periodicals. - -For the colonial regime he consulted the following sources. Humboldt, -Polit. Essay, i, _passim_. =52=Poinsett, nos. 94 of 1827; 166 of -1829. Cuevas, Porvenir, 15. Ward, Mexico, i, 91-120. Rivero, Mexico, -24. =261=Memoire. =11=Serrurier to "the Duke," Apr. 20, -1818. =11=Villeveque, Feb. 3, 1830. Mora, Obras, i, pp. cx-cxiii. -Macgregor, Progress, _passim_. Tornel, Breve Resena, 4. Consideraciones, -50-1. =11=Memoire submitted to the king by a Spaniard. Gage, -Voyages, i, 223. Amer. Antiq. Soc., Proceedings, New Series, xxi, -277-83. Latane, Diplom. Rels., 12-20. _Diario de Mexico_, 1810. -_Pensador_, 1812, 45-6, 49, 51, 53. _Gaceta del Gob. de Mex._, 1810. -Priestley, Jose de Galvez, chaps. i and ii. _Esperanza_, Mar. 5, 1846. -=296=Poinsett to the Prest., Apr. 26, 1827. - -2.2. _The Revolution._ Cuevas, Porvenir, 15, 17. Ward, Mexico, i, -84, 96, 100, 116-8, 120, 135, 195-6. Mexico a traves, ii, pp. x-xiii, -507-8, 525; iii, pp. iv-ix, 30-5, 76, 85-127, 162, 188, 210, 226, -271, 283, 311, 323, 331, 339, 343, 405, 428, 450, 460, 487, 491-2, -656, 661-85, 735-56; iv, pp. iv, vii, 30, 199, 200, 316. Arrangoiz, -Mexico, i, 33-5. Humboldt, Polit. Essay, i. =261=Memoire. Tornel, -Resena, 4-6, 162. Otero, Cuestion Social, 51-2. Garcia, Plan. Iturbide, -Memoires. Poinsett, Notes, 91; app., 39. Zavala, Revoluciones, i, 65, -68, 78-9, 86, 104, 111, 272, 406. =13=Ward, nos. 37, 114 of 1826. -=52=Poinsett, no. 166 of 1829. Constituent Congress, Address, 1824. -Alaman, Mexico, i-iv. =11=Martin, Feb. 1, 1827. Sierra, Evolution, -i, 126, 149. =13=Morier, no. 10 of 1825. Lerdo de Tejada, Apuntes, -ii, 229-30, 234, 245. Consideraciones, 43, 51-2. Memoria de ... Guerra, -1823, p. 9. Arroniz, Orizaba. Liceaga, Adiciones, 378. Mora, Obras, -i, p. vii. Mateos, Hist. Parl., ii, 222. Loewenstern, Le Mexique, 293. -S. Anna, Manifiesto, 1823. Suarez y Navarro, Alegato. _Id._, Hist. de -Mex. y del ... S. Anna. Carreno, Jefes, 13. _Sol_, June 15, 24, 1823. -Rivera, Jalapa, ii, 107-26. _Gaceta del Gob. de Mex._, 1810, p. 867 -(decree of the Inquisition summoning Hidalgo). Rivera, Gobernantes, ii, -1-72. Puga y Acal, Documentos, 20. Portrait of Iturbide: City Hall, -Mexico. - -2.3. _Iturbide_, _the Triumvirate_, _and the Constitution_. -=13=Ward, secret and confid., July 14, 1825; no. 114 of 1826. -=52=Poinsett, nos. 94 of 1827; 166 of 1829. =11=Villeveque, -Feb. 3, 1830. =11=Martin, Feb. 1, 1827. =13=Morier, no. 10 -of 1825. =11=Cipher despatch to French govt. about July, 1823. -=261=Memoire. Cuevas, Porvenir, 14, 36, 140-2, 195-206, 211-5, -220-5, 231-3, 239, 245-51, 261, 277, 318-9, 358-9. Bocanegra, Memorias, -i, 13-4, 18, 31-3, 38-40, 49-57, 61-3, 76-82, 97-9, 111-25, 207, 215, -220-4, 226, 231, 241, 284-9, 328-9, 370, 374. Iturbide, Memoires. -Tornel, Resena, 6-15, 18-22, 28, 37. Mora, Obras, i, pp. vii-viii, xii, -xiv. Zavala, Revoluciones, i, 113-23, 152, 173, 176, 211, 214-5, 254-62, -274, 294, 347; ii, 294. Ward, Mexico, i, 202-6, 260-82. Poinsett, Notes, -71. Lerdo de Tejada, Apuntes, ii, 262. Negrete, Mexico, xiii, 296; xiv, -239. Memoria de ... Relaciones, Dec., 1846. Casasus, Deuda. Romero in -_No. Amer. Review_, Jan. 1, 1896. Gutierrez de Estrada, Mexico. Mata, -Reflecciones. _Arco Iris_, Dec. 7, 1847. _Eco del Comercio_, Mar. -10, 1848. _Cosmopolita_, Aug. 22, 1838. Maza, Codigo, 263. Rivera, -Jalapa, ii, 225, 228. _Id._, Gobernantes, ii, 73-94. _Esperanza_, Mar. -5, 1846. =208=MS. of the man who proclaimed the empire. Tornel, -Discurso, 17. Alaman, Mexico, v. Constituent Congress, Address, 1824. -Otero, Cuestion Social, 53-5, 75, 108-9. Mexico a traves, iv, pp. iv, -vii, 9-21, 26-37, 40-8, 50-9, 65-111, 115, 198, 200-9, 360. Sierra, -Evolution, i, 160-6, 169, 173, 316. F. J. P., Ligeras Reflecciones. -_Reforma_, Jan. 23, 1846. Consideraciones, 46. _Sol_, July 27, 1823. -Mayer, War, 27-8, 135. Richtofen, Zustaende, 21. Dictamen of revol. -committee, June 12, 1835. Calderon, Life, i, 336. Loewenstern, Le -Mexique, 294. Thompson, Recolls., 58. Lacombe, Le Mexique, 31. - -2.4. It has recently been denied that our Constitution was imitated, -but this was stated by Poinsett (no. 166, March 10, 1829), Bocanegra -(Mems., i, 329), Tornel (Resena, 14), Otero (Cuestion Social, 121), and -=261=Memoire; and the Congress itself, in an address to the nation, -said, "In all our proceedings, we have taken for a model the happy -Republic of the United States of the North." The Spanish constitution -of 1812 and that of the French Republic were also in view. There was -a supreme court, but it had no power to hold the balance between the -states and the central government. - -2.5. _Victoria's administration._ Portrait in city hall, Mexico. -=52=Poinsett, nos. 12, 20, 24, 32, 55, 60, 92, 94, 96-7, 99, -105, 107, 110, 114, 153, 166, 192 (1825-29). =296=_Id._ to King, -May 16, 1826. =13=Hervey, Dec. 15, 1824. =13=Morier, nos. -10, 19, 1825. =13=Ward, nos. 15, 21, 34, 36, 44, 60, 64 and most -private and confid. (Sept. 30) of 1825; 32, 77, 85, 99, 107, 114, 128, -136, secret and most confid. (Oct. 22/25), and private (Oct. 26/27) of -1826; 3, 11, 15, 19, 24, 52, 58 of 1827. =13=Pakenham, nos. 62, -84, 90 of 1827, 1, 107 of 1828; 22, 32, 38 of 1829; 17, 30 of 1830; -and to Vaughan, Jan. 13, 1829. =11=Martin, Feb. 1; Mar. 30; Apr. -25, 1827; Aug. 25; Dec. 25, 1828. =11=Cochelet, Jan. 16, 1830. -=11=Villeveque, Feb. 3, 1830. =11=Paper submitted to the -French Cabinet, 1828. =11=Instructions of Bresson, 1828. Tornel, -Resena, 16, 19, 24-5, 28-30, 34, 39, 43, 45-8, 80, 83, 85, 87, 129-30, -133-4, 163-4, 177-82, 200, 238. Bocanegra, Mems., i, 113, 231, 286, -374, 390, 444, 463, 467, 522. Zavala, Revoluciones, i, 149, 271, 343, -346-8, 351; ii, 35, 41, 44. Mexico a traves, iv, 103-4, 116, 121, 127-9, -131-3, 141, 144-5, 154-67, 170, 172, 193-4, 208-10. Mora, Obras, i, pp. -viii-xii, xiv-xvi. Calderon, Life, i, 42, 96. Richtofen, Zustaende, 22. -Loewenstern, Le Mexique, 290. F. J. P., Ligeras Reflecciones. Cuevas, -Porvenir, 268-9, 353, 376, 406, 411-2. Sierra, Evolution, i, 183. -=52=Manifiesto of Vera Cruz legislature, June, 1827. Son Peores -los Gachupines. Ah, Traidores Gachupines. Crimenes de Zavala. Acta del -Pronunciamiento. _Revista Economica_, Dec. 31, 1843. _Cosmopolita_, -Feb. 14, 1838. _Anteojo_, Aug. 1, 1835; and other references in chap. -iii (Poinsett section). Dictamen of revol. committee, June 12, 1835. -=261=Memoire. Otero, Cuestion Social, 60, 66. Poinsett, Notes, 20. -Rivera, Jalapa, ii, 364. - -The following passage illustrates the pamphleteering of the day: "The -country is threatened; and by whom? The Gachupines. Persons in the -midst of us are working for our ruin; and who? The Gachupines. Persons -are laboring to sow discord among us; and who? The Gachupines. Persons -are looking for hostile troops to reduce us to slavery again; and who? -The Gachupines." The popular party, associated with Masonic lodges of -the York Rite, were commonly called Yorkinos, and the aristocratic -party, associated with the Scotch Rite, Escoceses (_i.e._ Scotch). A -particularly unfortunate fact was that under the Mexican constitution -the arbiter between the nation and the states was a political body, -Congress. - -2.6. _Guerrero's rise and fall._ =52=Poinsett, nos. 60 of -1826; 105, 151-3, 155, 157-60 of 1828; 166, 173 of 1829, and Apr. 3, -15; Sept. 2; Nov. 20; Dec. 23, 1829. =13=Ward, Nov. 10, 1825. -=13=Pakenham, nos. 89, 99, 110, 122, 132, 143-4, 146, 151, 153 -of 1828 ("totally unfit," Aug. 23); 2, 4, 8, 52, 79, 99, 108, 109 -of 1829; 8, 17, 25 of 1830; 62 of 1833; to Vaughan, Jan. 13, 1829. -=11=Martin, June 30, 1827; Aug. 25; Sept. 26; Oct. 31; Dec. 1, 10, -19, 25, 31, 1828; Jan. 4, 13, 1829. =11=Cochelet, June 6; Oct. -20; Nov. 29; Dec. 26, 1829. =231=Butler to Jackson, June 6, 1834. -=52=Butler, Dec. 31, 1829; Jan. 5; Mar. 9, 1830. =52=Cameron, -Feb. 14, 1831. =261=Memoire. =52=Zavala, Exposicion to chamber -of deputies, Apr. 23, 1829. _Id._, Revoluciones, i, 146; ii, 47, 57-8, -77, 147, 150-2, 175, 221. Gaxiola, Invasion, 156. Lerdo de Tejada, -Apuntes, ii, 302-6, 336, 396. Cuevas, Porvenir, 285, 383, 413, 458, -475. Tornel, Resena, 34-6, 45-6, 237, 309-13, 315-8, 323-4, 333-4, -338, 347-9, 383-6, 392, 407, 423-4. Bocanegra, Mems., i, 375, 473-4, -492, 494; ii, 7, 10-1, 25, 34, 57-9, 120, 135, 144, 150-9, 190, 657. -Mexico a traves, ii, 612; iv, 98, 102, 166, 177-94, 197, 209-12, 215, -217-37, 267. Sierra, Evolution, i, 177-8. Juicio Imparcial. El Pueblo -Pide Justicia. F. J. P., Ligeras Reflecciones. Mora, Obras, i, pp. -xvi-xx. Bustamante, Manifiesto, 1830. Derrota del Sr. Guerrero. Mateos, -Hist. Parl., iii, 256, 263. Memoria de ... Relaciones, 1830, 11, 13. -Poinsett in _Commerc. Review_, July, 1846, 34-9. =231=T. H. Ellis, -July 8, 1839. _Anteojo_, Aug. 1, 1835. =52=Guerrero to Poinsett, -Nov. 1, 1827. =11=_Id._, Address on becoming President. Rivera, -Gobernantes, ii, 164. Sosa, Biografias, 429, 1101. _American Sentinel_, -June 15, 1836. The Acordada was a conspicuous building at Mexico made -use of in Zavala's insurrection. - -2.7. _Bustamante and the change of system._ Pakenham, nos. 88, 108 -of 1829; 5, 17, 24-5, 31, 59, 62, 66-7 of 1830; 8 of 1831; 47, 54, 70, -81-3, 87, 96 of 1832; 10, 19, 35, 39, 44, 62, 67, 69, 82-3 of 1833; 15, -22-3, 29, 36, 42, 48, 51, 57, 64 of 1834; 25, 35, 40, 47 of 1835; 24 -of 1837. Poinsett, no. 12 of 1825. =52=Butler, Jan. 5; Mar. 9; -June 29; Aug. 26, 1830; Feb. 19; Aug. 20; Oct. 5; Dec. 6, 1831; Jan. -10; Feb. 27; Mar. 22; July 25; Oct. 7; Dec. 12, 1832; Mar. 16; June -5, 1833; Mar. 2, 8, 28; June 2; July 1, 9; Sept. 1; Oct. 20, 1834; -Feb. 8, 1836. =52=Butler to Jackson, July 22, 1831; June 21; July -18; Aug. 30, 1832; Jan. 2, 1833; Feb. 6; July 9; Dec. 24, 1834; Feb. -26, 1835. =52=Ellis, nos. 2, 3, 1836. =52=Ellis to Jackson, -Aug. 26, 1836. =11=Cochelet, Nov. 21, 1829. =261=Memoire. -=13=Morier, no. 10, 1825. =13=Ward, secret and confid., -July 14; no. 40, Sept. 25, 1825. =13=Ashburnham, no. 70, 1838. -=52=Jones, no. 71, 1837. =52=W. S. Parrott, no. 15, 1835. -A. Bustamante to Congress, May 23, 1832. C. M. Bustamante, Gobierno, -275. Mora, Obras, i, pp. xx, xxi, xliii-xlvi, xlix, l, lvii, lxi, lxv, -lxxvi-xc, cxii-cxxviii, cxxxix, cxcvii, ccxiv-cclxxxi, cclxv. Lerdo -de Tejada, Apuntes, ii, 393, 396-7, 399, 403, 414, 548. _Crepusculo_, -May 8, 16, 1835. Rivera, Jalapa, iii, 157-75, 195-202, 225-8. _Id._, -Gobernantes, ii, 151-3, 168-9, 173, 177-8. Tornel, Resena, 25. Cuevas, -Porvenir, 342. Zavala, Revoluciones, i, 263; ii, 254, 269-70, 289, 365, -367, 369. Zamacois, Mexico, xii, 24-5. Bocanegra, Mems., ii, 150-3, -157, 159, 190, 208, 329-31, 378-85, 417-8, 433-9, 445-60, 546-54, 598. -Mexico a traves, iv, 142, 201, 230-1, 235-7, 240, 246-7, 255, 258, -265, 267, 285-6, 289-93, 295, 298-311, 315-9, 321-7, 332-53, 355, 357, -359, 362-82, 386-8, 390-1. Calderon, Life, i, 96; ii, 126. Poinsett in -_Commerc. Review_, July, 1846, 34-9. Thompson, Recolls., 87-8. Sierra, -Evolution, i, 181-2, 184, 187; ii, 494. El Vil y Traidor S. Anna. -Juicio Imparcial. _Imparcial_, June 18, 1906. Bulnes, Grandes Mentiras, -208. Loewenstern, Le Mexique, 284, 287. Aviso a los Estados. S. Anna, -proclam., June 1, 1834. - -When Santa Anna resumed the Presidency in May, 1833, he painted himself -in an address to Congress as the ideal patriot and saint, consecrated -to liberty, enlightenment, morality, and the Christian religion, -"straightforward" and "simple" in principles, "mild and tolerant" in -character. His life, he assured the nation, was "entirely devoted to -the freedom and happiness of the people and the preservation of the -Federal system." Before long his picture was drawn in different colors. -"The Vile and Traitorous Santa Anna wishes to be Emperor," cried one -pamphleteer. "Depravity and ambition make up the character of that -miserable Proteus," responded another. - -2.8. _Centralism._ =13=Ashburnham, nos. 51, 52, 58, 64 of 1837; -7, 21, 23, 24, 37, 70, 111 of 1838. =13=Pakenham, nos. 11, 12, -67, 76 of 1839; 21, 40, 72, 92, 95 of 1840; 42, 53, 94, 101, 116 of -1841. =13=Pakenham to Harvey, July 20, 1839. =52=W. D. Jones, -June 22; July 19; Aug. 29; Sept. 26; Oct. 7, 17; Nov. 4, 11; Dec. 6, -1837; Apr. 10; Sept. 5, 8, 22; Oct. 1, 30; Dec. 7 (anarchy), 1838; Feb. -16, 19; Mar. 23 (Valencia); Apr. 20, 23; May 11, 1839. =52=W. S. -Parrott, July 29, 1837. =52=Black, no. 307, 1840. =52=Ellis, -no. 29, 1840. =52=Ellis to Jackson, Oct. 15, 1839. Bocanegra, -Mems., ii, 807. Gimenez, Mems., 70-3. Rivero, Mexico, 75. Otero, -Cuestion, 62-5. Robertson, Visit, i, 317. Mexico a traves, iv, 382, 387, -390-2, 395, 397, 399, 404-16, 419, 423, 427, 430-2, 438, 440, 443-4, -446-8, 451-2, 455-74. Calderon, Life, i, 349; ii, 187, 223-6, 232, 246, -250, 254, 274. El Que me Importa. Noticia Extraordinaria. _Republicano_, -Feb. 3, 1847. London _Times_, Nov. 25, 1841. Lara, _Revista Politica_, -1840. _Cosmopolita_, Dec. 28, 1836. =56=Greenhow, Aug. 12, 1837. -Loewenstern, Le Mexique, 284. Sierra, Evolution, i, 185. Bulnes, Grandes -Mentiras, 208. - -"I do not believe," wrote the British minister (no. 116, Nov. 8, 1841), -"that history affords an example of the fate of a Country being so -completely dependent upon the will of one man" [as Mexico's now is upon -S. Anna's]. - -2.9. _Santa Anna as Dictator and President._ =13=Pakenham, -nos. 82 of 1833; 119 of 1841; 20, 57, 77, 99, 121 of 1842; 13 of 1843. -=13=Doyle, nos. 47, 72, 76, 81 of 1843. =13=Bankhead, nos. 4, -43, 54, 66, 72, 73, 96, 105, 108, 110 of 1844; 1, 20, 50 of 1845; 57 -of 1846. =231=Butler to Jackson, Dec. 14, 1835. =52=Ellis, -no. 44 of 1841. =52=Thompson, nos. 1, 3 of 1842; 31 of 1843; -40 of 1844. =52=B. E. Green, April 8; May 16; June 7, 21; July -14, 1844. Green to Calhoun, June 15, 1844 (Ho. 2; 28, 2, p. 59). D. -Green to Calhoun, Oct. 28; Nov. 12, 29, 1844 (Jameson, Calh. Corr., -975, 991, 1000). =52=Consul Burroughs to Ellis, Jan. 10, 1837. -=52=Consul Dimond, no. 200, 1843. =52=Shannon, nos. 3, 4, -5, 1844. =52=_Id._, Jan. 9, 1845. =52=B. Mayer, statement, -Dec. 9, 1842. C. M. Bustamante, Gobierno, 1, 11, 22, 65, 94, 106, 247, -287, 289, 298, 322-4, 384. Gimenez, Mems., 263. Bocanegra, Mems., -ii, 679. Calderon, Life, i, 337; ii, 195, 272-4, 392. Memoria de ... -Relaciones, Mar. 12, 1845; Dec, 1846. Mem. de ... Hacienda, Feb., 1844. -Mem. de ... Justicia, Jan., 1844. Paredes [Letters], Advertencia, 141. -Jones, Memoranda, 433 (Arista). Mexico a traves, iv, 474-80, 484-90, -492-9, 506, 509, 517-30, 532-4, 540, 547. Zamacois, Mexico, xii, 280-1, -283, 285, 330. Loewenstern, Le Mexique, 288. Rivero, Mexico, 90, 94. -_Diario del Gobierno_, Jan. 12, 1845. _Journal des Debats_, Sept. 13, -1842; Mar. 16, 1844; Apr. 29, 1845. _Revue de Paris_, Dec., 1844. -_Constitutionnel_, Jan. 6, 1844. Otero, Cuestion, 69-70. Tornel, Resena, -74. Zavala, Revoluciones, i, 151. =231=Butler to Jackson, June 6, -1834. =11=Martin, Aug. 25, 1828. =11=Cochelet, Feb. 3, 1830. -=52=Butler, July 9, 1834. Alvarez, Manifiesto, 1845. Ellis, Soul of -Spain, 37. Sierra, Evolution, i, 211. Defensa del Gen. S. Anna. Causa -Criminal. S. Anna, Address, 1846. Rivera, Jalapa, iii, 507, 545, 612, -647-73. Lerdo de Tejada, Apuntes, ii, 502-5, 511. _Texas Register_, Mar. -15, 1845 (Eye-witness). London _Times_, Nov. 15, 1841; Feb. 13; Dec 6, -1845. Thompson, Recolls., 76, 80, 85-6. Tudor, Tour, ii, 164. Proceso -de S. Anna, 1845. =56=W. S. Parrott, Apr. 29, 1845. (S. Anna's -appearance) N. Orl. _Commerc. Bulletin_, July 18, 1836; =52=Consul -Cameron, Feb. 14, 1831; Stapp, Prisoners, 151-2; Mofras, Explor., i, -14; Thompson, Recolls., 66; Ferry, Revols., 253-5; =231=Ellis to -family, July 8, 1839. - -"Genius of evil," cried a pamphleteer to Santa Anna, "demon of avarice -and covetousness, you are, like Attila, the scourge of God. Your power -has been, like that of Satan, a power of corruption, of ruin, and of -destruction. You resemble a fury of hell, blind, devastating, and -bloody. Amid the horrors of civil war, amid lakes of blood and mountains -of dead bodies, you always present yourself like a spectre, inciting all -to devastation, slaughter, and revenge"; and such productions almost -whitened the pavements. - -2.10. _Herrera's administration._ (In Sept., 1845, Herrera became -President by regular election.) =13=Bankhead, nos. 108 of 1844; [ -], 17, 30, 70, 82, 85 of 1845. =56=W. S. Parrott, Apr. 29, 1845; -May 22, 30; June 10, 24; July 12, 15, 26, 30; Aug. 16, 23, 29; Sept. -2, 18, 29; Oct. 11, 1845. =52=Slidell, no. 4, Dec. 27, 1845. -=52=Consul Campbell, June 7, 1845. Memoria de ... Relaciones, Dec, -1846. Memoria de ... Guerra, Dec., 1846. Zavala, Revoluciones, ii, 47. -=52=Dimond, June 11; Dec. 14, 1845. _Siglo XIX_, Oct. 5, 9; Nov. -15, 22, 30; Dec. 6, 9, 1845. _Diario_, Apr. 19; June 7; Sept. 10, 1845. -_Republicano_, Feb. 3, 1847. _Amigo del Pueblo_, Nov. 30, 1845. London -_Times_, Aug. 6; Oct. 6; Nov. 11; Dec. 6, 1845; Jan. 8, 1846. Mexico -a traves, iv, 529, 541-5. Smith, Annex. of Texas, 423-4. Importantes -Recuerdos. _National_, Mar. 18, 1845. _Journal des Debats_, Apr. 29; -Aug. 2, 1845. Wash. _Union_, Sept. 29, 1845. Constituent Congress, -Address, 1824. Cuatro Palabras. Consideraciones, 43-5. _Voz del Pueblo_, -Nov. 12, 1845. Rivera, Jalapa, iii, 693-720. Baz, Juarez, 43. Rivera, -Gobernantes, ii, 281-4. - -2.11. A thoughtful Mexican analyzed the situation in substance as -follows: Our people as a whole have forgotten morality, sincerity, -patriotism, disinterestedness, and all the other virtues that upbuild -great nations; only selfishness, base and ruinous passions, hatreds and -vile revenges exist among us, and on all sides discords and rancors -force themselves upon the dullest eye; the country, weakened by the -parties, divided by incompatible interests and claims, has been unable -to obtain order and repose, because interested persons have always -promoted anarchy and disorder in every possible way; the liberty that -the army achieved has been used only as brutal license; and each of us, -regarding himself as a judge in the land, has felt entirely emancipated -from all obligations, and fully at liberty to upset everything at his -will. - - - III. RELATIONS BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND MEXICO, 1825-1843 - -3.1. As was mentioned in chap. ii (p. 30), the Spaniards had -endeavored to keep foreign ideas out of Mexico, and the people of -Protestant countries had been studiously misrepresented--even as having -tails. See Smith, Annex. of Texas, 419; =231=Butler to Jackson, -June 23, 1831; =13=Pakenham, nos. 29, Apr. 26, 1832; 2, Feb. 14, -1835; =11=Cochelet, Sept. 29, 1829. Evidence without limit could be -cited. - -3.2. One does not like to write such things. But (1) if the subject -is to be understood, they must be said; (2) they are not as hard as -things alleged against the United States by the Mexicans; and (3) they -are written of a long past generation. On this point we will confine -ourselves to Mexican testimony and testimony from that nation which -was on the most intimate and friendly terms with Mexico, had the chief -interest there, and enjoyed the lion's share of mercantile profit. -In 1823 the minister of the treasury said that only in the case of -one state could its financial condition be learned even approximately -from the public accounts (=11=despatch to French govt. about -July, 1823). Eleven years later the head of that department announced -that it was impossible to ascertain what the legitimate income of the -government for the previous year had been (Memoria, 1834). In 1838 the -man occupying that post admitted officially that no minister of the -treasury since 1822 had possessed sufficient data to make a satisfactory -report (Memoria, July, 1838), and the British representative stated -that "the most vitally important matters" were "wholly left to chance" -by the government (=13=Ashburnham, no. 37, May 24, 1838). That -the national authorities were evasive and jesuitical, resorting to -subterfuges, shifting their responsibility upon the legislative or the -judicial department, and referring matters repeatedly to distant local -officials, is proved by reports of British ministers from 1825 to 1845 -(_e.g._ =13=Ward, no. 143, 1826; =13=Ashburnham, no. 59, 1837; -=13=Pakenham, no. 96, 1841; =13=Bankhead, nos. 5, 12, 1844). -Once at least money was borrowed by hypothecating a fund which the -government did not possess (Trigueros in =52=Mayer, Dec. 9, 1842). -Mortgaged revenues were spent at will (=52=Zavala to Deputies, -Apr. 23, 1829; Bankhead, no. 103, 1844; see also =52=Mayer, Dec. -9, 1842). Definite arrangements made with foreign representatives -were secretly circumvented (Pakenham, no. 23, 1837; Ashburnham, no. -15, 1838). The Cabinet showed itself capable of breaking a direct -promise and even a definite contract (Pakenham, nos. 9, 1843; 44, 1839; -Bankhead, no. 86, 1845). The highest authorities were untruthful in -word, writing, and print (Pakenham, sep. and confid., Mar. 27, 1828; -_Id._, nos. 32, 1833; 98, 1841; 9, 1843; Bankhead, nos. 12, 1844; 98, -1846. See also Poinsett, no 24, 1825); and they did not scruple to utter -injurious calumnies against friendly nations (Pakenham, no. 98, 1841). - -Changes of system appeared to make little difference, for these were -national characteristics. The most honorable administration of this -entire period broke a direct and solemn pledge given to the French -minister (Bankhead, no. 86, 1845; see also =56=W. S. Parrott, Sept. -4, 1845); and the best journal of the country, _El Siglo XIX_, told only -the truth when it said, December 2, 1845, "All our governments have been -dishonest," adding that dishonest methods had been practiced "not only -from necessity but from favoritism and for speculative reasons." It -should, of course, be remembered that carelessness about truth, justice -and honesty was the shady side of Mexican amiability, and that other -nations are not faultless. - -3.3. For an account of Poinsett's mission and very numerous -citations bearing upon the subject one may refer to a paper by J. H. -Smith in the Proceedings of the Amer. Antiquarian Soc., Apr., 1914. -=52=Poinsett, Contestacion. Gamboa, Representacion. Causas para -Declarar. (Concessions, etc.) Ho. 351; 25, 2, p. 285 (Poinsett). One -would suppose that the prompt recognition of Mexico by the United -States, our efforts to induce Spain to recognize her (_e.g._ Amer. State -Papers, 2 series, vol. vi, 1006; Ho. 351; 25, 2, pp. 118 (McLane), 119 -(Van Ness), 147, 150 (Forsyth); =77=Livingston to Montoya, Oct. -1, 1831), and the "Monroe Doctrine" would have earned us gratitude. -But these were attributed very generally to a desire on the part of -this country to monopolize the western hemisphere (_Diario_, June 17, -18, 1846), and were offset by our opposition to the cherished Mexican -scheme of driving the Spanish from Cuba and by our proposing to have the -retention of Havana guaranteed to Spain (see particularly Ward, no. 53, -secret and confid., May 29, 1826). Denunciations of Poinsett: _e.g._ -Bravo, Manifiesto, 1828; _Sol_, Jan. 4, 1830; =261=Memoire; La -Ruina de los Mexicanos; Bocanegra, Mems., i, 379, 382, 390; Pakenham, -no. 152, 1828; =11=Martin, July 26, 1827; =11=Cochelet, Aug. -7, 1829; N. Orl. _Delta_, July 9, 1847. Pakenham (no. 74, Aug. 26, -1829) reported that owing to Poinsett's course and the fact that his -government kept him in Mexico, the feeling toward the United States was -one of "jealousy, suspicion, and dislike." The prevailing belief was -that the United States, fearing Mexican competition, sent him there to -paralyze Mexico by exciting dissension (Poinsett, no. 94, July 8, 1827; -=52=state dept. to Butler, Apr. 1, 1830; _Diario_, Apr. 17, 1847). - -3.4. Poinsett was attacked by the states of Puebla (Pakenham, -no. 98, 1829), Vera Cruz (Manifiesto, 1827), Mexico (Preamble -and resolution, 1829), and Queretaro (Pakenham, no. 73, 1827). -=296=Poinsett to Pres., June 8, 1827. (Protest) =52=Clay to -Poinsett, no. 25, Nov. 19, 1827. (Failure, attitude) Van Buren to -Butler, Oct. 16, 1829 (P. S., Oct. 17). (Sinister, pointedly) Van Buren -to Poinsett, Oct. 16, 1829. (No charges) Van B. to P. and to B. (P. S., -Oct. 17), Oct. 16, 1829; Bocanegra, Mems., ii, 18-20; =77=Montoya, -no. 30, Dec. 10, 1829; =296=Zavala to Poinsett, June 16, 1827. -Poinsett was secretary of war under Van Buren. _So. Qtrly. Rev._, Nov., -1850, 429. Nueva Conspiracion. - -3.5. =52=Clay to Poinsett, Mar. 26, 1825; Sept. 24, 1825; -Mar. 15, 1827; Van Buren to Poinsett, Aug. 25, 1829. =231=Butler -to Jackson, June 23, 1831. Poinsett, no. 12, Aug. 5, 1825. -(Officials) =52=Morfit, no. 7, Sept. 6, 1836; Ho. 35; 24, 2, -p. 17. (Ten times) Memoria de ... Relaciones, Dec, 1846, p. 76. -(Indians) =13=Ashburnham to Backhouse, July 26, 1838. (Victoria) -=13=Ward, no. 54, 1825. (Trouble) Clay, _supra_; =135=Jackson, -several letters to Butler. - -3.6. Poinsett's correspondence with Clay, Van Buren, and Alaman: Ho. -42; 25, 1, pp. 19-29. Amer. State Papers: Foreign Relations, vi (folio -ed.). =296=Notes in Poinsett papers. _Commerc. Rev._, July, 1846, -21-4, 27-42 (Poinsett). Poinsett, nos. 12, 1825; 113, 115, 1828; 166, -1829. (Urgency) =52=Tornel to Poinsett, June 27, 1827. (Dropping) -=77=Martinez, Nov. 2, 1837; Poinsett, no. 113, 1828; Adams, -Memoirs, ix, 377-8; =52=Consul Taylor, Nov. 7, 1829. He dropped -the project of buying territory because he saw it would give offence. -Treaties and Conventions (Haswell, ed.), 661-3, 675. Ho. 42; 25, 1, pp. -27-8. (Reached, etc.) Ho. 351; 25, 2, pp. 40 (Van Buren to Butler); 190, -285, etc. (Poinsett). Ho. 42; 25, 1, pp. 8 (Clay); 10 (Van Buren); 38 -(Butler, Dec. 21); 46-8. (Charged) Filisola, Memorias, ii, 602; Tornel, -Resena, 79, 80; Zavala, Revoluciones, i, 384; Richtofen, Zustaende, 44. - -Before the paper was placed in Poinsett's hands he knew it would reach -Washington too late (to Clay, Apr. 24: Ho. 42; 25, 1, p. 28), and hence -it was unnecessary, as it would have been dishonorable and dangerous, -to withhold it. (May 10) Ho. 351; 25, 2, p. 202. As the instructions -to buy territory were repeated in 1829 (note 5) when Mexico was at war -with Spain, it has been urged by some Americans that we showed a mean -disposition to take advantage of a neighbor's difficulties. But it is -rather kind than otherwise to offer even a low price for real estate -when the owner is in straits for cash, and Mexico was free to consult -her own interest about selling. The instructions of 1829 were, however, -wholly inoperative at that time. - -That a people so fond of indirect methods and so destitute of principle -in public affairs were suspicious of the United States was not, however, -surprising. It was known of course that up to 1819 we had claimed the -Rio Grande boundary. When Poinsett found that Victoria and Alaman -intended to reassert the boundary pretensions of Spain, he endeavored -to discourage them by replying that in such a case the old claim of the -United States also would be revived (to Clay, Sept. 20, 1825). - -In 1827 members of the Chamber of Deputies expressed the opinion -in debate that the United States was at least privy to a recent -insurrection in Texas, and a leading newspaper asserted that we had -encouraged it (Poinsett, no. 74, 1827). Among the attacks upon the -unfortunate Guerrero was the charge--based, it was alleged, upon -documents--that he was plotting to sell us territory in that quarter -(Pakenham, no. 18, 1831). Bravo, after a visit to this country, brought -out a pamphlet in 1829, declaring that "the politicians and journalists" -of the United States were "at present occupied about the dismemberment" -of Mexico. The following July Bocanegra, minister of relations, hearing -of our customary militia drills and armed escorts for traders in the far -west, demanded the meaning of these operations, and in spite of sensible -reassurances from the American minister, he felt so much disturbed as to -commit a real offence against him and the United States by repeating his -inquiry (Ho. 351; 25, 2, pp. 288, 292). The next year, when our squadron -set out for a cruise in the Gulf, Alaman represented this to Congress -as a threatening movement (Filisola, Memorias, ii, 601). A pamphlet -issued at New York to point out the value of Texas was attributed to our -government (Pakenham, no. 24, 1830), and the Mexican agent at London -endeavored to excite the British cabinet regarding the supposed peril -of his country (=77=Gorostiza, Apr. 22, 1830). European diplomatic -representatives at Mexico fanned this flame. In particular Ward, the -British minister, did his utmost to increase the alarm regarding Texas -(nos. 32, 54, 64, 1825). See W. R. Manning in _Southwest. Hist. Qtrly._, -Jan., 1914. For American feeling toward Mexico see chap. xxxvi, note 1. - -3.7. Treaties and Conventions: note 6. Treaties in Force (1899), -389-90. =52=McLane to Butler, Jan. 13, 1834. =52=Butler to -Garcia, Sept. 6, 1833. =231=_Id._, to Jackson, Mar. 7, 1834. -Ho. 42; 25, 1, p. 59 (Livingston). Ho. 351; 25, 2, pp. 40-53, 556. -=77=Castillo, no. 71, Dec. 7, 1833. (Denounced) =77=Castillo, -no. 2, res., Jan. 22, 1835. The boundary was not run, for the battle of -S. Jacinto occurred just after the exchange of the ratifications. - -3.8. Ho. 42; 25, 1, pp. 17, 21; 33 (Butler); 49 (Van Buren). -Ho. 351; 25, 2, pp. 190, 210, 287 (Poinsett); 369-70, 410. Foreign -Rels., folio ed., vi, 583-600. (Treaty) Ho. 225; 22, 1. Treaties and -Conventions (Haswell, ed.), 664-74. Sen. Exec. Journ., iii, 568-72, -605-6. (Dark) Ward, [no. 103], Sept. 9, 1826. (Victoria) Poinsett, no. -12, Aug. 5, 1825. =77=Montoya, no. 25, Sept. 19, 1829. - -One of the two objectionable articles in the treaty of 1828 concerned -the returning of fugitive slaves, and has been characterized by certain -writers in the United States as a gross insult to Mexico; but that -country had not yet abolished slavery, and her Cabinet, which possessed -a full share of pride, accepted the article. - -3.9. Sierra, Evolution, i, 178. =77=Montoya, no. 30, Dec. 10, -1829. =52=Van Buren to Butler, Oct. 16 (P. S., Oct. 17), 1829. -(Friend) =77=Tornel, no. 3, res., Mar. 6, 1830; Ho. 351; 25, 2, p. -381; =52=Butler, July 9, 1834. =135=Butler, Notes on Texas. -=135=_Id._ to Jackson, Jan. 4, 1827. =77=Almonte to Mex. -Leg., Washington, July 22, 1834. (Ignorant) Ho. 351; 25, 2, p. 381. -(Careless) =52=Ellis, June 25, private; July 16; Oct. 15, 1836; -=52=Forsyth to Butler, Nov. 9, 1835; to Ellis, Jan. 18, 1837. -(Consuls) =52=Wilcocks, Feb. 15, 1833; =52=W. S. Parrott, Oct. -24, 1835. (Spirits) =52=Butler, Aug. 26, 1833. - -3.10. Poinsett reached the conclusion that endeavoring to buy Texan -territory would anger Mexico and lead her to seek European support -(Ho. 351; 25, 2, p. 286), but Butler stimulated Jackson to take the -matter up. =52=Butler's correspondence, including letters to and -from Mexican officials. Many of these documents were printed with -substantial correctness in Ho. 256; 24, 1; Ho. 42; 25, 1; Ho. 351; -25, 2. =296=Notes from Butler, Wilcocks and Zavala, to Poinsett. -Corresp. with Jackson in =231=Jackson papers and =135=Butler -papers (for deciphering a number of the latter the author is indebted -to Dr. E. C. Burnett of the Dept. of Hist. Research, Carnegie Instit.). -=77=Tornel, no. 3, res., 1830. =77=Castillo, no. 8, res., -1835. Sen. Exec. Journ., iv, 488, 502. =52=Ellis, May 19; June 25; -July 16; Oct. 15, 1836; to Jackson, Aug. 26. Pakenham, nos. 6, 7, 1830; -11, 1836. Barker in _Nation_, xcii, 600-1; in _Amer. Hist. Rev._, July, -1907, 788-809. Filisola, Mems, ii, 590, 612. Adams, Mems., ix, 377-8. -Benton, View, ii, 659. Bankhead, no. 125, 1845. _Mosquito Mex._, Aug. 4, -1835. - -Butler had some excuse for basing hopes on Alaman, for until the war -with Spain ended Alaman wished to be on very good terms with the United -States, and later he was in serious financial troubles. Nothing in the -documents involves Jackson in Butler's dishonor. The American secretary -of state was even less censurable. Our government expressed all due -regrets for Butler's misconduct (Ho. 351; 25, 2, pp. 184, 750; Forsyth -to Ellis, no. 22, Nov. 16, 1836; =77=Castillo, no. 8, res., 1835). -(Recall) =77=Relaciones to Castillo, Oct. 31, 1835; Ho. 351; 25, 2, -p. 719, and =77=Castillo, no. 8, res., 1835. - -3.11. Smith, Annex. of Texas, 11-33. =52=Butler, May 8, 1836. -=231=_Id._ to Jackson, Dec. 14, 1835. Ellis, no. 2, May 19, -1836. Pakenham, nos. 75, 1835; 25, 1836. Ho. 256; 24, 1, pp. 3, 29, -30 (Forsyth); 8 (Castillo); 10 (Monasterio). Sen. 1; 25, 2, pp. 141 -(Monasterio); 149 (Forsyth). Ho. 351; 25, 2, pp. 82 (Livingston); 160 -(Forsyth); 571-2 (Tornel, Monasterio). Memoria de ... Interior, Jan., -1838. Memoria de ... Guerra, Dec., 1846. Mexico a traves, iv, 377, -401-3, 512. Loewenstern, Le Mexique, 78. Richtofen, Zustaende, 48. The -state of Mexican feeling will come up again. - -3.12. _The Gaines episode._ Van Buren to Poinsett, Aug. 25, 1829. -Butler to Jackson, Sept. 26; Oct. 2, 1833; Feb. 6; Mar. 7, 1834. -=231=Jackson to Butler, Nov. 27, 1833. =58=Dickins to Cass, -Aug. 20, 1836. =77=Castillo, Nov. 10, 1835. =39=Gaines to -gov. Tenn., June 28, 1836. =52=Burrough, nos. 39, 40, 1836. -=77=Martinez, no. 10, res., 1838. =77=Relaciones to Martinez, -Oct. 10, 1838. =77=Gorostiza, Apr. 25, 29; May 30; July 12, 24; -Aug. 18, 19; Oct. 4, 5, 1836. Pakenham, nos. 18, 94, 1836. Sen. 1; -24, 2, pp. 46, 92, 105 (Dickins); 60, 85 (Jackson); 84 (memo.); 32, -44, 68, 89, 91, 100 (Gorostiza); 133-4 (Macomb). Sen. 160; 24, 2, p. -157 (Forsyth). Ho. 256; 24, 1, pp. 3, 28, 29, 31-3, 35, 45 (Forsyth); -6, 11 (Castillo); 15, 21, 23, 25, 27 (Gorostiza); 45 (memo.); 40, 43, -48, 54 (Cass to Gaines); 42, 46-8 (Gaines); 55 (Macomb); 58 (Many); -59 (Green; adj. gen.). Ho. 351; 25, 2, pp. 769-806 (Gaines _et al._); -806 (McCall and documents). Jackson, Message, Dec. 5, 1836. Gorostiza, -Correspondencia. Reply to Gorostiza: Lib. Cong., Mss. Div., "Mex. War, -Miscellaneous." Tex. Dipl. Corr., i, pp. 83 (Carson); 104 (Burnett); -164-5, 177, 202 (Henderson); 175 (Wharton); 156 (Austin); 205 (Catlett). -Brown, Texas, ii, 90. Bocanegra, Mems., ii, 736-69. Mexico a traves, iv, -378. Calderon, Life, ii, 123. Kohl, Claims, 24. Barker in _Miss. Valley -Hist. Rev._, i, 1; in _Amer. Hist. Rev._, July, 1907, p. 794 (Jackson -thought the Neches was a branch of the Sabine). N. Y. _Ev. Post_, Aug. -1, 1836. Wash. _Globe_, Aug. 1, 1836 (Cass). Richmond _Enquirer_, -Aug. 12, 1836. Mobile _Commercial Register_, June 27, 1836. _Nat. -Intelligencer_, May 5 (Virginian); July 26, 1836. N. Orl. _Courier_, -Sept. 27, 1836 (Fulton). Sen. 189; 24, 2. (Indorsed) Monasterio to -Gorost., Dec. 21, 1836, in Gor., Correspondencia. (Erroneously) Smith, -Annex. of Texas, 22. - -Gorostiza's view, and no doubt that of the Mexicans generally, amounted -practically to this (see Forsyth in Sen. 160; 24, 2, p. 157): the -essential point was to respect Mexico's territory; by the right -of occupation, at least, her territory extended to the well-known -Sabine River; the United States forces were therefore bound under all -circumstances to remain east of that stream, and should some of our -citizens be robbed and murdered, we could call upon Mexico to pay -compensation and protect the rest; after almost endless evasions it -would appear that she had no power to fulfill her treaty obligations, -and therefore, since that fact was known to all the world, she should -not be expected to comply with our wishes; and then, should we please, -we could declare war. In other words, for the sake, at most, of a -technicality, they would have had us quietly see irreparable injuries -done that we could have prevented and had known Mexico could not -prevent, and then do irreparable injuries ourselves to punish her for -her involuntary helplessness. - -As for the evidence of danger (which Gaines was instructed to examine -carefully), Gorostiza declared it was fabricated in order to excuse the -crossing of the boundary and get American troops into Texas--thus giving -the rebels at least the moral support of their presence and infringing -upon the rights of Mexico (Pakenham, no. 94, 1836; Ho. 256; 24, 1, p. -20; Gor., Correspondencia, xxvii), and he protested that his country was -incapable of stirring up the savages against our border (Sen. 1; 24, -2, p. 84; =77=Gor. to Relaciones, Oct. 4). But there is not the -slightest sign that he made the difficult and extended investigation -requisite as a basis for denying the testimony presented to Gaines, -whereas he was capable of asserting, more than a month after the -battle of San Jacinto, that the news of it was "entirely destitute of -authenticity," and stating that he had "reasons for believing it to have -been expressly forged in Texas" or at least to have been exaggerated -"to the very confines of the ridiculous" (Sen. 1; 24, 2, p. 33). His -contention was therefore valueless, and almost equally so was that of -certain Americans, against the evidence of danger. One such opinion, -however, is entitled to notice. It came from the governor of Louisiana -(Macomb: Ho. 256; 24, 1, p. 55). But (1) the governor, who was far -from the scene, merely expressed a view unsupported by evidence; (2) -there may have been good reasons why he did not wish to have citizens -of Louisiana called out, as Gaines proposed, to do arduous and perhaps -perilous military service; and (3) it may have seemed undesirable to -have the American army, which made a good market in the western part of -the state, move to Nacogdoches and obtain supplies there. Gaines appears -really to have had adequate grounds for crossing the Sabine. A letter -from the Texas secretary of state to the President of Texas (Tex. Dipl. -Corr., i, 84), which no one can imagine was "fabricated," shows that -Gaines insisted upon having the facts, and that strong evidence was -presented to him (see also Bee in Sen. 14; 32, 2, p. 53). May 5, 1836, -the _National Intelligencer_ printed a letter dated April 20, which -stated that the writer heard, when about six miles from Nacogdoches, -that the Indians were coming, felt satisfied the news was correct, and -saw the people fleeing in the utmost alarm. It was deemed necessary to -divert some of the few Texan troops, desperately needed at the front, -in order to ward off the danger from Indians (Brown, Texas, ii, 89, -90). The governor of Arkansas called out forces to protect the frontier -(N. Orl. _Courier_, Sept. 27, 1836). The other evidence cited above in -the references, when taken together and fairly weighed in view of the -circumstances, has also a very substantial value. The part of it most -doubted, probably, is that referring to a Mexican agent engaged in -rousing the Indians against the whites; but we have documentary proof -that early in 1839 Mexicans tried officially to do this, and employed -the very man who was charged with similar activities in 1836 (Sen. 14; -32, 2, pp. 31-6; also 47). See also the =77=reply of Relaciones -to Martinez's despatch of Oct. 10, 1838. It should be remembered (1) -that Gaines, charged with the defence of the frontier against a wily, -treacherous and savage foe, could not afford to take chances; and -(2) that even fabricated evidence, if it possessed all the marks of -credibility, would have been sufficient ground for acting. - -But after all the real issue was the good faith of our government in -authorizing Gaines (while requiring him to maintain our neutrality) -to cross under extreme circumstances the Sabine (Gorostiza in Sen. 1; -24, 2, p. 44; Von Holst, U. S., ii, 584, note 1); and this good faith -was clearly maintained at Washington. In the very letter demanding his -passports Gorostiza admitted that Forsyth's assurances appeared to -dispose of the possibility that Gaines's movement had a bearing on the -boundary question (Sen. 1; 24, 2, p. 104). It has been felt that Forsyth -was sometimes rather curt with him, but Gorostiza was almost, if not -quite, insulting. The Mexicans had some reason to be suspicious and a -full right to be on their guard, but they went farther than right and -reason warranted. - -3.13. See Smith, Annex. of Texas, pp. 52-63, for a discussion of -this subject and references to the sources. Ethel Z. Rather in _Tex. -State Hist. Assoc. Qtrly._, xiii, 155-256. Sen. 1; 25, 2, pp. 133 -(Castillo); 135 (Forsyth); 145 (Monasterio). =52=W. Thompson to -Bocanegra, April 25, 1843. Pakenham, no. 64, 1836. Memoria de ... -Relac., Jan., 1838. Mem. de ... Guerra, Jan., 1844. - -The situation of Texas after 1836 was precisely the same as that of -Mexico from 1821 until recognized by the mother-country in 1836, and -during this period she regarded herself and was regarded generally, -except by Spain, as independent. Mexicans refused to accept this obvious -analogy on the ground that the Mexican revolution was mainly the work of -native-born citizens, while most of the Texans had been born elsewhere. -But an adopted child has all the rights of a natural child. See chap. -iv, note 1. - -3.14. _Diplomatic strife, 1842-3._ Smith, Annex. of Texas, 38. -Bocanegra to Webster, May 12, 31, 1842: Ho. 266; 27, 2, pp. 5, 15. -Webster to Thompson, nos. 9, 11, 1842; Jan. 31, 1843. Thompson -to Webster, nos. 3, 4 and June 2, 1842; Jan. 5 and no. 15, 1843. -=52=_Id._ to dipl. corps, July 30, 1842. =351=Tyler to -Webster, July 10, 1842. =52=W. S. Parrott, private, July 29, -1837. =52=B. E. Green, no. 8, 1844. =13=Bocanegra to Doyle, -April 19, 1843; reply, April 20. =52=S. Anna, decree, June 17, -1843. =52=Upshur to Thompson, no. 43, 1843. =52=Bocanegra -to Thompson, Sept. 10, 1842. =76=_Id._, circular, May 31, 1842. -Pakenham, nos. 49, 75, 1842. Sen. 341; 28, 1, p. 71 (Thompson). Texas -Diplom. Corresp., i; 567 (Reily); ii, 163 (Eve). Memoria de ... -Relaciones, Jan., 1844. _Diario_, Oct. 4, 1842. Thompson, Recolls., 82. -Zavala, Revols., ii, 152-3. Sen. 1; 27, 3, pp. 146, 156 (Thompson); -146, 157 (Bocanegra). Ho. 266; 27, 2, pp. 7, 17 (Webster); 5, 15, 19 -(Bocanegra); 21 (Thompson). Reeves, Amer. Diplom., 97, 99 (Adams). -Smith, Annex. of Texas, 131. (Mexican threats, 1843) _Ibid._, 42. -Richtofen, Zustaende, 48. =11=To Deffaudis, no. 28, Apr. 27, 1836. -(The translations of Mexican documents published by our government are -cited, unless there is a particular reason for not doing so. In many -cases they could be better, but they were for the American government -and people the official versions.) - -Oct. 4, 1842, the official journal reprinted this from _El Provisional_: -"Who is not aware of that criminal connivance, that stubborn and -insolent protection, which--in violation of righteous law and in -violation of the treaties with Mexico--is given by the policy of North -America to a Department filled with rebels from every land, who are -determined to ruin it completely and to soil the dignity and honor of a -lawfully constituted government?" Webster made the same protest (against -raids) to the Texans as to the Mexicans. - -3.15. =52=Thompson, Jan. 5, 1843. =52=_Id._ to Bocanegra, -Dec. 30, 1842. Ho. 166; 27, 3, pp. 1-93. Bancroft, Calif., iv, 302-29. -=285=Narvaez to Vanderlhinden, Dec. 10, 1842. Richman, California, -273-4. Bandini, California, 136-8. =13=Letter from S. Gabriel, Nov. -11, 1842. _Diario_, Jan. 7, 1843. =47=Jones, Aug. 31; Sept. 1, -1842. Reeves, Amer. Diplomacy, 103-7. =351=Letters from J. Tyler to -Webster. Mexico a traves, iv, 493. _Nat. Intelligencer_, Mar. 14, 1843. -Adams, Memoirs, xi, 346. N. Orl. _Bee_, Jan. 13, 1843. Memphis _Eagle_, -Nov. 5, 1845. - -Jones sailed with the frigate _United States_ and the sloop of war -_Cyane_. After leaving Monterey he proceeded to Los Angeles to meet -Micheltorena and explain the affair. Almonte, the Mexican minister at -Washington, demanded that an example should be made of Jones, but he was -merely recalled--a fully sufficient punishment. Indeed, our government -commended his zeal (=47=Jones to Bancroft, Oct. 3, 1845). - -3.16. Ho. 351; 25, 2, p. 576 (Butler). - -3.17. Sen. 390; 28, 1, pp. 6 (Bocanegra; documents); 9 (Thompson, -with extract from treaty). =52=Shannon to Rejon, Sept. 30, 1844. -Tyler, Message, Dec. 3, 1844, in Richardson, Messages, iv, 334. See also -documents cited with reference to the Santa Fe expedition. - -3.18. Ellis, no. 24, June 9, 1840. Forsyth to Ellis, Aug. 21, 1840. -=52=Memorial of the prisoners, May 25, 1840. =52=J. O. Jones -to Ellis, June 23, 1840. =52=Statements of prisoners, particularly -Graham's of May 29, 1840. =52=Larkin, Mar. 22; April 20, 1840. -=52=Legare to Thompson, no. 36, May 12, 1843. =52=Farnham to -Ellis, June 23, 1840. Richman, California, 266. =13=Palmerston to -Mexican minister, Aug. 11, 1841. =11=Captain of _La Danaide_ to -Cyprey, July 8, 1840. Royce, California, 36. Pakenham, nos. 66, 78, 88, -1840; 37, 118 (merely a scheme to weaken the opposing faction in Cal.), -1841. Memoria de ... Guerra, Jan., 1841. Moore, Internat. Arbit., 3242-3 -(a judicial review of the case and award of damages to victims. One of -them received $38,125). Pakenham obtained a revocation of the order of -expulsion by demanding his passports (no. 88). - -3.19. =45=Ranson to Eve, April 28, 1842. =45=Bee to -Roberts, July 13, 1841. Kendall, Narrative, _passim._ Yoakum, Texas, ii, -321-3. Garrison, Texas, 245-6. Smith, Annex. of Texas, 37. Sen. 325; -27, 2, pp. 3, 6, 8 (Webster); 19, 29 (Ellis); 33, 100 (Bocanegra); 48, -50 (Falconer; Van Ness particularly); 94 (Thompson). Ho. 266; 27, 2, p. -34 (Thompson). Pakenham, no. 15, 1842. Memoria de ... Relaciones, Jan., -1844. =11=To Deffaudis, no. 28, Apr. 27, 1836. - -3.20. Ho. 42; 25, 2, p. 20, 23 (Alaman). Poinsett, June 18, 22, -1825. Martinez, no. 7, 1832. N. Y. _Herald_, Nov. 11, 1843. Boston -_Atlas_, Jan. 26, 1844. =52=Camacho to Poinsett, May 13, 1826. -=231=Butler to Jackson, Jan. 2, 1833. Sen. 1; 28, 1, p. 36. Tyler, -Tyler, ii, 289. Ho. 351; 25, 2, p. 71 (Van Buren, Mar. 1). See also -chap. xiv. - -3.21. Upshur to Thompson, no. 51, Oct. 20, 1843. =13=S. Anna, -proclam., Oct. 5, 1843. Sen. 1; 28, 2, p. 21 (Calhoun). Sen. 1; 28, 1, -pp. 30 (Thompson); 31 (decree); 34 (Upshur). Sen. 390; 28, 1, pp. 16, -18 (Thompson). =52=B. E. Green, April 8, 1844. =52=Bocanegra -to Thompson, Oct. 20, 1843. =52=Thompson to Bocanegra, Nov. 23, -1843. =52=Shannon to Rejon, Oct. 25, 1844. =52=Rejon to -Shannon, Oct. 11, 1844; Nov. 22, 1845. Bankhead, nos. 1, 4, 1844. -=13=Foreign Office to Doyle, no. 30, 1843 (While every independent -nation has, _e.g._, an abstract right to close its ports, "the practical -assertion on the part of any Nation of an extreme abstract right may, -and often does, involve, if not actual hostility, at least a degree of -unfriendliness almost amounting to hostility.") France also protested -(Green, _supra_). - -3.22. =13=Tornel, order. Sen. 390; 28, 1, pp. 3-15. -=52=Bocanegra to Thompson, Dec. 22, 1843. =53=Almonte, Feb. -6, 1844. =52=Shannon to Rejon, Oct. 10, 1844. Sen. 1; 28, 2, p. 21 -(Calhoun). =13=Doyle, nos. 65, 90 (order executed in Sonora), 1843. -=13=E. Barron, no. 10, Oct. 19, 1843. - -Another objection to the modified order was that, as the British -minister maintained in another case, while the general government itself -might with justice banish undesirable foreigners, it had no right to -delegate such a power to distant subordinates practically exempt from -supervision, to be exercised by them as prejudice, caprice, and possibly -avarice might suggest and without giving the victim a chance to defend -himself or settle his affairs (Pakenham, no. 78, 1840). Thompson was -described by his French colleague as inexperienced (=11=no. 108, -1842). - -3.23. These are too numerous to be catalogued here, but a few can be -cited as illustrations. General Teran seized the schooner _Topaz_ and -compelled her to transport some of his troops. During the voyage the -Mexican officers and soldiers killed the master, and, returning to port, -had the crew imprisoned on the charge of having done it. The vessel was -held, and property on board seized (Moore, Intern. Arbit., 2992). The -schooner _Hannah Elizabeth_, stranded on the Texan coast, was fired upon -by a Mexican vessel of war, and her crew and passengers were put in jail -(Sen. 1; 25, 2, p. 85. Ho. 351; 25, 2, p. 167). The Mexicans asserted -that the schooner was carrying contraband of war; but if so, the Mexican -officer did not know this when he opened fire, and anyhow no penalty -except the confiscation of the cargo could rightfully have been exacted. -Our acting consul at Tabasco was arrested and publicly ill-treated, -because he would not legalize documents intended, in his opinion, to -defraud an insurance company (Sen. 1; 25, 2, p. 89). The brig _Fourth -of July_ was sent to Vera Cruz for sale to the Mexican government, and -before the sale was made officers and soldiers took possession of her, -ran up their flag, arrested the captain, and disregarded the protest of -our consul (_ibid._, p. 91). A boat-load of seamen from our sloop-of-war -_Natchez_ landed at Vera Cruz, became intoxicated while the midshipman -in command of them was in conference with our consul, and, as the result -of a quarrel with a fisherman, were severely handled by the Mexican -guard. As they were now unable to manage the boat in the rough sea, -the midshipman, on the advice of the consul, requested the captain -of the port to take charge of them over night. The next morning the -authorities would not give them up to him, nor was our consul permitted -to communicate with them (_ibid._, p. 93). Two Americans were arrested, -maltreated and imprisoned at Matamoros on the baseless suspicion that -they intended to visit Texas, and the premises of our consul were -forcibly entered, searched and robbed (_ibid._, 94; Ho. 351; 25, 2, p. -172). A lieutenant of the American revenue cutter _Jefferson_, going -ashore at Tampico to see our consul, was arrested, and his boat's crew -were imprisoned. For this outrage the Mexican government removed the -responsible officer, General Gomez, but soon afterwards he was given -a better post at Vera Cruz, and showed his unchastened spirit in the -_Natchez_ affair (Sen. 1; 25, 2, p. 98. Sen. 160; 24, 2, p. 70: Ellis). - -3.24. British complaints were almost numberless: _e.g._ Ward, -no. 77, 1826; Pakenham, nos. 48 of 1827, 119 of 1828, 37 of 1830; -=13=Ashburnham, nos. 16 of 1837 and 74 of 1838 (a man persecuted -with a "tissue of iniquities" for years); Bankhead to Bocanegra, July 4, -1844. - -The Foreign Office distinctly stated that contract and treaty rights -were denied (=13=Aberdeen to Mex. min., Nov. 1, 1843; to -Pakenham, no. 19, Aug. 15, 1836). =77=Dec. 31, 1844, it made this -statement: "In Mexico British Subjects have been oppressed, harassed, -and maltreated without redress except that which has been extorted by -unceasing remonstrance.... The expostulations of Great Britain ... have -been with very few exceptions contumeliously set at naught; and the same -illegal exactions which have been the subject of those expostulations -have been repeated, while yet the former grievance was unredressed." The -British minister complained, _e.g._, that the coast officials annoyed -his fellow citizens; that frequently to their injury the constitution -was violated by state authorities; that some of them were persecuted, -imprisoned, or expelled from the country in defiance of law; that -money was extorted from them under threats. A loud =52=protest of -American ship captains, Campeche, May 26, 1835, illustrates well the -tricks and outrages to which our commercial interests were subjected. -What abuse and tyranny our citizens were liable to suffer in the -interior is shown by the memorial of Augustus Storrs and twenty others, -Chihuahua, April 17, 1832, transmitted through C. W. Davis, who was -described by our secretary of state, Nov. 24, 1832, as a respectable -citizen of the U. S. who had long been practising medicine at Chihuahua -(Ho. 351; 25, 2, p. 87). (France) Coxe, Review, 69; Barker in _Texas -Review_, Jan., 1917; Rives, U. S. and Mexico, i, 433. - -3.25. The international tribunal was established under the Claims -Convention of 1839, and the national tribunal under the treaty of 1848 -and a United States Act of 1849. It should be remembered that the -amount of our claims was substantial. The total receipts of the U. S. -government for the fiscal year ending with June, 1845, were less than -$30,000,000. It is true that many of the claims were exaggerated, and -some of them a great deal; but this does not matter, for what the United -States asked was an investigation of the demands, not the payment of -any one at its face. Still, as the inflation of the claims has been -urged as an excuse for inattention to them, a word upon that point is -desirable. The amounts demanded in such cases are always made as great -as possible, and in the instance of Mexico there were special grounds -for exaggeration. Our claimants, so far as just in their demands, were -entitled to as high interest as other creditors of that government, and -the rate it had to pay was very large. In 1832, for instance, this was -four per cent a month (Butler, no. 32, 1832), and in 1844 two per cent a -month besides six per cent for brokerage (Bankhead, no. 112, 1844). At -such rates longstanding claims mounted high, and when the interest was -scaled down to five per cent in the process of adjudication (Sen. 320; -27, 2, p. 237), they naturally seemed to have been exorbitant. Indeed, -the claims were entitled to even a higher interest than loans, for a -good deal of trouble--sometimes an extraordinary deal--was necessary to -prove them. "The authorities here can prove anything," reported even -the philo-Mexican Waddy Thompson (no. 4, 1842); and this was only one -of numerous obstacles. Probably, too, there was more uncertainty as to -eventual payment. Again, if paid at all, the claims were likely to be -settled in treasury notes of little value. In fact, all those accepted -by the international tribunal already mentioned were actually so payable -(Calhoun in Sen. 1; 28, 2, p. 21), and these notes were worth at the -time only about thirty cents on the dollar (Thompson, Recolls., 223). - -Yet the degree of inflation was much less than has been supposed. The -most conspicuous instance was that of W. S. Parrott, who demanded -$454,504.01 as principal (Sen. 320; 27, 2). Thompson declared -(=52=Nov. 20, 1843) that Parrott was hardly entitled to two per -cent of what he asked; but on inquiry a very different conclusion is -reached. Parrott was a sufficiently good man to be employed as consul -and confidential diplomatic agent by the United States, yet for some -reason he was deeply disliked by the Mexican government, and the -courts seemed determined to ruin him (Moore, Intern. Arbit., 3011). -He was therefore entitled to punitive damages, but none were allowed -him. The cost and annoyance of prosecuting his case were excessive. -All the excuses for inflation mentioned above applied in his case. -A considerable amount included in his claim had to be thrown out on -purely technical grounds; and a large part had to be ignored because -(in violation of her agreement) Mexico would not let him have certain -specified papers that were needed to prove it. And yet, after all these -deductions had been made, our own treasury paid him under the treaty -of 1848 the sum of $71,000 as principal (Moore, 1284). In many cases -the percentage of inflation was low. For example, in the case of claims -aggregating $595,462 the tribunal awarded $439,393 after scaling the -interest down to five per cent (Ho. Report 1096; 27, 2, p. 8). In fact -the awards were probably a somewhat uncommonly high percentage of the -amount claimed in such cases. It has commonly been said (_e.g._ Von -Holst, U. S., iii, 205) that on the conclusion of the war we discharged -Mexico from all obligation on account of our claims ($8,491,603) yet -bound ourselves to pay only $3,250,000, thus admitting that our claims -were nearly three times too large; but the second of these two sums -corresponds to only a part of the first (Treaty with Mexico, Arts, -xiii-xv: Stat. at Large, ix, 933). - -3.26. Iturbide seized the cargo of the _Louisa_, and the Mexican -government not only acknowledged the debt but paid a fraction of it -(Ho. Report 1056; 25, 2). The Mexican supreme court ordered the money -actually realized from the unlawful sale of the _Cossack_ and her cargo -to be paid to her master, but it was not paid (_ibid._). The decree of -the Mexican supreme court of 1821 in favor of this claim was presented -in support of it by the U. S. secretary of state, yet that government -alleged in Nov., 1837, that the claim had just been "for the first time -brought forward" (_ibid._). Cox and Elkins furnished supplies to General -Herrera (Moore, 3430). Chew and Eckford built war vessels for Mexico -(Moore, 3428-9). Parrott made advances on a bill of exchange drawn by -Herrera (Moore, 3429). Green supplied money to a war vessel that put -in at Key West in distress (Moore, 3425). A sum of money on its way to -Peter Harmony, a New York merchant, from his Mexican consignee, was -seized by the government (Moore, 3044). Contrary to law, a forced loan -was extorted from Ducoing (Moore, 3409). Aaron Leggett carried on an -extensive logwood business in Tabasco; but the action of Mexicans in -seizing vessels of his for military use entirely ruined him (Moore, -1275), and even Santa Anna admitted that his claim was just (Butler, -Feb. 8, 1836). Sixteen bales of wax were confiscated as of Spanish -origin, when the fullest certificates, including that of the Mexican -vice-consul at New York, proved that it came from Russia (Poinsett in -Ho. 351; 25, 2, p. 248). Gahagan was inhumanly persecuted and for a time -rendered insane, because in a perfectly lawful and respectful manner -he tried to prevent the authorities from illegally appropriating his -employer's property (Moore, 3240). Santangelo, a naturalized American, -was expelled without trial and thereby ruined, in direct violation of -the treaty of amity (Moore, 3333). A case of which the essentials, at -least, were simple is also worthy of mention. Evidently to drive him -away and get his property, Dr. Baldwin, described by our minister as -"a gentleman of great respectability and intelligence" (Ellis, Nov. -8, 1836), was prosecuted on the basis of depositions which a superior -Mexican court admitted were forgeries, was falsely charged with -murdering a woman and firing on a soldier, was put into the stocks and -then imprisoned while suffering from a freshly broken leg, and in short -was persecuted by the local authorities for a term of years (Moore, -3235-40). Other cases, though less easily stated, were not less clear; -yet Mexico would give no redress. See Forsyth's despatch of May 27, 1837 -(Sen. 1; 25, 2, p. 105). - -3.27. This point was taken advantage of by the clever Mexicans -to the utmost, and it illustrates one of the great embarrassments -encountered in dealing with them. Because they had the words -"constitution," "courts," and "law" they pretended to have the -realities. It was as if they had coined lead at the mint and required us -to accept it as silver, while it passed among themselves for merely what -it was. See also Ashburnham, no. 11, 1838. For the character of Mexican -courts see vol. i, 12-13. - -3.28. The Mexican government demanded that Baldwin (note 26), for -example, should seek redress from the very tribunal that had wronged -him (Ellis in Sen. 160; 24, 2, p. 64). In 1834 Simon McGillivray, a -director of the United Mexican Mining Company, wrote thus to the British -minister: Even when we obtain report after report and decree after -decree against the confiscation, already effected, of our property, "we -never can succeed in obtaining the enforcement of such Decrees, because -the parties against whom they are given are Mexicans of influence or -connexion in the place, and we, the claimants for justice, are only -foreigners"; and three months later the minister (no. 61, 1834) reported -that a letter from the governor of the state "in substance fully admits" -this. Once when Baldwin obtained a verdict, the judge would not execute -it, and the Doctor had to flee for his life (Ellis in Sen. 160; 24, -2, p. 65). Under such circumstances, to deny the right of injured -foreigners, especially the unpopular Americans, to invoke the aid of -their governments was plainly unfair, and so France and England held as -firmly as did the United States. - -3.29. =11=Canning, March 25, 1825. Ho. 266; 27, 2, p. 321 -(Webster). This obligation grows out of the benefits conferred by -recognition. - -3.30. (Early) Ellis in Sen. 160; 24, 2, p. 68. (Avoid) Ho. 351; 25, -2, p. 40 (Van Buren). (Covered) =231=Butler to Jackson, June 23, -1831. (Amicable) Ho. 351; 25, 2, pp. 92 (Livingston); 160 (Forsyth). -As the net result of four years of effort Butler was informed that -full specifications must be given; yet no attention was paid to a -group of cases thus made out and proved (Ho. 351; 25, 2, p. 499). Then -he was told that the claimants must come to the treasury department -in person, that nothing would be done until all the American claims -should have been presented, and that a call from our minister would -not advance matters (_ibid._, 501-3). Evidently all this was to gain -time, and it was fairly characterized by our secretary of state as -a denial of justice (_ibid._, 144). In November, 1832, a bearer of -despatches from Butler to our government was detained on his way to -Vera Cruz by the governor of Perote castle, and was there robbed of -his papers, though a passport from the national government established -his official character. The case was both simple and outrageous. Our -minister insisted upon an investigation; but in February, 1834, he found -that (confessedly "on account of some trifling difficulty") it had been -suspended, and in the following April was merely informed, in reply to -an inquiry, that it was again proceeding (_ibid._, 462, 470, 517, 521). - -3.31. Sen. 160; 24, 2, pp. 62, 112, 156 (Ellis). =52=Forsyth to -Ellis, July 20, 1836. =52=Monasterio to Ellis, Oct. 21; Nov. 15, -1836. Pakenham, no. 96, 1841. (Withdrew) Ellis, no. 46, Jan. 12, 1837. -He gave the fortnight's notice on Nov. 4. Gorostiza, Correspondencia. -(Approval) Sen. 160; 24, 2, p. 84 (Monasterio); Sen. 189; 24, 2. Kohl, -Claims, 18. Even the philo-Mexican Thompson said that a discussion with -that government in writing was as "endless as the web of Penelope" -(Recolls., 228). - -3.32. =58=Jackson, Mar. 12, 1823 (he thought himself too -sympathetic toward Mexico to be our minister there). (Agreed) Ho. 351; -25, 2, pp. 581, 601. _Diario_, Feb. 2, 1836. Messages, Dec. 5, 1836; -Feb. 6, 1837 (Richardson, Messages). Ho. 139; 24, 2, p. 1. Jackson -has been said by a certain school of historians to have used our -claims (in the February Message) as a bludgeon to force Mexico to sell -Texas. But was his temper such that he did not care to assert American -rights unless to gain territory? What cession was he aiming at when he -enforced our claims against France? And if Mexico felt (as she asserted: -_Diario_, _supra_) that baseless grievances of ours were to be used as -a pretext for trouble, why did she not make haste and refute them? From -every sane point of view, indeed, the charge looks absurd. As early -as March, 1833, Butler was urged to settle the boundary negotiation -at once, lest a step toward independence on the part of Texas should -make it impossible to obtain that territory by arrangement with Mexico -(Smith, Annex. of Texas, 21); yet now, after four years have passed, -and after that province has practically effected its independence, -Jackson is accused of trying to compel a cession of it from Mexico. -Moreover he was at this very time rejecting the petition of Texas to -be annexed (_ibid._, 63). Besides, in April, 1836, the envoys of Texas -at Washington had been instructed to enter a "_solemn protest_ ... -against the right of Mexico to sell or the U. S. to purchase [Texas]" -(Tex. Dipl. Corres., i, 76). Even more surprising, the charge is made by -representatives of the anti-slavery historical school, which denounced -Jackson for wickedly conspiring at this precise juncture to help -establish Texas as an independent nation by precipitately recognizing -her. The truth is that while engaged in no conspiracy, he now favored -the recognition of Texas, and hence one could not accept the opposite -and inconsistent view even were it otherwise possible to do so. Probably -the fact that Jackson had settled our long-standing claims against -France by adopting a firm attitude influenced him in regard to Mexico. -(Rupture) Memoria de ... Relaciones, Jan., 1838. - -3.33. Ho. Report 281; 24, 2. Sen. 189; 24, 2. =52=Buchanan to -Slidell, no. 1. Tex. Dipl. Corres., i, 181-3, 187-92 (Wharton); 218-21 -(Catlett); 273-4 (Greyson); 284-8 (Hunt). Ho. Report 7=52=; 29, 1. -Buchanan, Works, iii, 213, 233, 415. - -3.34. Ellis had taken the legation papers to Washington. Sen. -1; 25, 2, pp. 105, 108, 109 (Forsyth). =52=Greenhow, Aug. 12, -1837. Certain historians drawing their views largely from the heated -anti-slavery writers of that period have been led to misrepresent our -relations with Mexico as much as our conduct with reference to Texas. At -this point it has been alleged that the United States required Mexico -to examine and settle a large number of complicated cases within a -week, which our acceptance of the dilatory reply proves that we did not -require. Greenhow was merely directed to say that [for the convenience -of the Mexican government] he would remain seven days and bring back any -communication it should wish to make (=56=Forsyth to Greenhow, May -27, 1837). That country, on the other hand, had decreed in May that all -pending grievances of the two nations might be settled by arbitration, -but that should the United States refuse complete satisfaction of any -demands Mexico should present, or delay it beyond the time fixed under -the arbitration treaty, commercial intercourse with this country should -be cut off and preparations be made for war (Ho. Report, 1056; 25, 2, p. -9; Dublan, Legislacion, iii, 392). Sen. 1; 25, 2, p. 111 (Cuevas). - -3.35. Sen. 1; 25, 2, pp. 113-27 (Martinez); 30 (Forsyth). Forsyth -to Ellis, no. 3, May 3, 1839. Ho. Report, 1056; 25, 2. In respect to -one clear case, already many years old, Martinez promised that "every -exertion" should be made to have it taken up by the next regular -Congress; but when that Congress met, the minister of relations -did not even mention it (_ibid._). Mayer, War, 343. Ho. 351; 25, -2, pp. 758 (Forsyth); 759 (Greenhow). Richardson, Messages, iii, -377-9. =53=Martinez to Forsyth, Apr. 7, 1838; reply, Apr. 21. -=77=Martinez, no. 1, res., 1837. Martinez coupled his proposal of -arbitration with a demand that the United States should reaffirm our -neutrality. This was an affront, but Forsyth merely expressed surprise. - -3.36. The plan of arbitration was first brought to the attention of -our government during the latter part of Dec, 1837. Ho. Report, 1056; -25, 2. Ashburnham, no. 42, 1838. (Surprise) =52=W. D. Jones, nos. -132-3, 1838. Mexico proposed arbitration to France also, but met with -a refusal (Mexico a traves, iv, 411). Later, Martinez proposed to give -the arbitration a scope that would have included Mexican complaints -regarding Texas. To admit such diplomatic and political questions would -have made the affair practically endless, and thus have nullified it -so far as its essential object, the adjustment of private claims, -was concerned; and our government properly refused to accept this -proposition (Moore, Internat. Arbit., 1217). - -3.37. Ho. 252; 25, 3, pp. 24 (Martinez), 27. Ho. 190; 26, 1. Moore, -Internat. Arbit., 1216-8. Forsyth to Ellis, no. 3, May 3, 1839. To save -time, the United States transported Martinez's courier to Vera Cruz, but -the man spent about three weeks in making the four-days' trip from the -port to the capital (_ibid._). =53=Forsyth to Martinez, Mar. 16, -1839. (Excuse) Ho. 252; 25, 3, p. 21 (Jones, Jan. 10); Ho. Report, 320; -25, 3. (Disavowed) Ho. 252; 25, 3, pp. 2, 14. - -3.38. Pakenham, no. 60, 1840. (Waived) Memoria de ... Relaciones, -Jan., 1841. Moore, Internat. Arbit., 1221-3. Castillo and Leon declined -to take an oath in the regular way, saying that each had administered -it to the other. The United States was represented by ex-Senator John -Rowan and W. L. Marcy. Rowan was succeeded by H. M. Breckenridge. -=52=Buchanan to Slidell, no. 1, 1845. - -3.39. Ho. 252; 25, 3, p. 11 (Forsyth). Ho. 57; 27, 1. Sen. 320; -27, 2, pp. 185 (Webster); 22-9, 90, 92, etc. Sen. 61; 27, 1 (Marcy and -Rowan, May 26, 1841). Sen. 411; 27, 2 (com. for. rels.). Ho. 269; 27, 2 -(Leggett case). - -Castillo and Leon insisted that cases should come before the board only -by documents presented through one of the governments--a process likely -to consume much time. When Rowan withdrew in August, 1841, and Marcy -desired to proceed even under this disadvantage, his Mexican colleagues -gained a delay of about six weeks by refusing to do so (Moore, Inter. -Arbit., 1235. Sen. 320; 27, 2, p. 254). They falsely asserted that four -particular claims, three of which were accepted by our commissioners and -the fourth was paid later by our government, had been withdrawn by the -American minister at Mexico, and by thus holding them back for some two -months defeated them (Sen. 320; 27, 2, pp. 179, 251-3). - -Under the treaty, that country was positively bound to furnish the -evidence called for in support of the claims, and W. S. Parrott's -requisition was the first or among the first made out and forwarded. -None of his papers came, however, for seven months, and those received -were taken without leave from the custody of the board by Castillo and -Leon, and held back for nearly two months more; a part of them had -evidently been mutilated or forged; only about one half of the number -specified were furnished, though it was known that all were under the -control of the government; and more than 2000 pages actually prepared -for transmission seem to have been withheld (Sen. 320; 27, 2, _passim_). -Leggett's case, another of the principal ones, was vitally damaged by -documents afterwards fully proved to be spurious (Moore, Internat. -Arbit., 1277-8), and as the claimant certainly would not have presented -them against himself, they must have come from the Mexican government. - -Ho. Report 1096; 27, 2, p. 22: "For the rest, the Committee, while they -abstain [as was proper in official action] from imputations on the -commissioners of the Mexican Republic, yet cannot but perceive that -the instructions under which those commissioners acted, and the course -they pursued, in the organization, proceedings, and final action of the -commission, were of most questionable validity, and operated to the -serious injury of the parties interested." The American commissioners -expressed the belief that had the board been acting half the time -between Aug. 25 and the day it took up the first case on its merits, -all the cases would have been "finally adjusted" (Sen. 320; 27, 2, -p. 197). The claims left undecided in the umpire's hands amounted to -$1,864,939.56, and those which the board had not time to consider to -$3,336,837.05 (Moore, Internat. Arbit., 1232). - -Mexico has been given great credit for sending many original documents -on a hazardous journey; but, had they been lost, the claimants would -have suffered and she would have profited. She had time enough and -clerks enough to make this risk unnecessary. Also Mexico has been given -great credit for accepting certain indisputable claims growing out -of her revolutionary war, which pro-Mexican Americans have declared -it was outrageous to present; but as she had formally recognized in -1824 all debts of the revolutionists, there was no escape. Numerous -claims failed to be considered because presented too late, but this -was doubtless mainly or wholly due to the attitude of the Mexican -commissioners, which made it appear more than doubtful for a long time -whether it would be worth while to incur the trouble and expense of -making up the cases. In fact the notice of the state dept. (Washington -_Globe_, Apr. 16, 1840) that the commission would meet was falsified -by the non-appearance of Castillo and Leon in time (Sen. 320; 27, 2, -p. 23). Much time and expense were needed to get papers from Mexico, -etc. The Mexican commissioners took the unreasonable ground that all -undecided claims, considered by the board, were extinguished (Sen. 411; -27, 2, p. 3). - -3.40. Moore, Internat. Arbit., 1232, 1245. Ho. Report 752; 29, 1. -Pakenham, nos. 49, 97, 1842. Ho. 144; 28, 2, p. 20 (Green). Besides the -twenty instalments a preliminary payment, covering the interest that -would be due, April 30, 1843, on the awards, was to be made on that date -(Moore, Internat. Arbit., 1246). - -A forced loan was ordered for the payment of the interest and principal -of the awards (Voss in Ho. 133; 29, 1, p. 7. Sen. 85; 29, 1; Negrete, -Invasion, iv, 327); and the goods of all who would not or could not -meet their assessments were confiscated and sold amid the lamentations -of the owners and general curses against the United States (Bustamante, -Gobierno, 130). Nearly all the proceeds of the forced loan were, -however, used for other purposes (Green in Ho. 19; 28, 2, p. 32). Our -agent was finally given drafts for the next instalments after the third, -and supposing these would be cashed, he receipted for them in full -(Buchanan, Nov. 19 in Ho. 133; 29, 1, p. 3); but the government stopped -all such payments (B. E. Green, Dec. 17, 1844) and refused to give up -the receipts (Ho. 133; 29, 1, p. 11). In short, it pursued a course that -was not only dishonorable but positively fraudulent. To make all this -the more exasperating, the nation was permitting Santa Anna to expend -great amounts. - -In the treaty of January, 1843, Mexico promised to make a new convention -providing for the settlement of all our outstanding claims, including -those not adjudicated by the joint commission. Delay and evasion -followed, of course; but in October of that year the British minister -severed diplomatic relations with Mexico, and in November, 1843, -probably in order to be on good terms with us in case of a war with -England, she signed the proposed convention (Doyle, no. 79, 1843). -The United States accepted the plan of a joint commission, as Mexico -desired, but required that it should meet at Washington. This appears -to have been just. The claimants were all Americans, were numerous, -had a great number of papers which it was not advisable to take abroad -by sea, and could not, without much inconvenience and loss, expatriate -themselves for an indefinite period. Another objection was even more -serious, perhaps. Pakenham (no. 14, 1842) wrote emphatically to his -government that a commission of this kind should not sit at Mexico, -because the pressure of public sentiment would not allow the Mexican -members to act properly on the claims of aliens, and because the foreign -ministers, from whom the actual umpire would almost necessarily be -selected, were more or less entangled in similar cases, and therefore -would not be thought impartial. - -To provide, as Mexico demanded, for the arbitration of private Mexican -grievances, which that government admitted unofficially did not exist, -would have been to cast a gratuitous aspersion upon ourselves; and to -allow the presentation of a national claim on account of Texas (which -also was demanded), besides enabling Mexico to nullify through her -pretensions and endless declamations the essential purpose of the -treaty, would have been to question the good faith of our official -declarations of neutrality, and make it possible for a subject of some -foreign power--the umpire--to impose upon us an immense indemnity, -which would also have been a monumental impeachment of our honor. No -sovereign state would place itself in so dangerous and ridiculous a -position. Accordingly the Senate of the United States eliminated these -features of the agreement signed by Minister Thompson. The justice of -its action Mexico did not undertake seriously to deny, and she promised -immediate attention to the subject; but once more she resorted to -dilatory tactics, and thus her promise of January, 1843, one important -consideration for granting a delay in the payment of our awards, was -evaded. - -One difficulty needs to be faced here. The United States defended -itself for certain breaches of neutrality on the part of American -citizens during the revolutionary war of Texas on the ground that they -could not legally be prevented; why then could not Mexico plead the -legal impossibility of preventing local authorities and citizens from -committing outrages against Americans? In reply it may be said (1) -that there was no analogy between the two cases. While our government -may have asked that such outrages be prevented, its real demand was -that compensation be paid; our breaches of neutrality were political -offences, and therefore called for different treatment than the civil -grievances on which these claims were based; the former could not be -proved (Smith, Annex. of Texas, pp. 23-24), while the latter could be; -and the former, unlike the latter, could not properly be redressed by -the payment of a definite amount of money. (2) We have abundant reason -to believe that if Mexico had been able and had desired to present a -bill for damages on account of such breaches of neutrality, it would -have been examined fairly and promptly by the American government. As a -single illustration of the ability of Mexico to pay our claims, it may -be mentioned that in 1844 Santa Anna and the Lizardi banking house, in -combination, robbed the treasury of about $1,200,000 (Mofras, Explor., -i, 65). - - - IV. RELATIONS BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND MEXICO, 1843-1846 - -4.1. See Smith, Annex. of Texas, text, notes, and index, particularly -pp. 68, 74, 78, 85-7, 94, 99, 194-5, 199, 210, 273, 288-95, 409-31, 464. -Webster: _ibid._, 194. See remarks in chap. iii, note 13. =137=Donelson -to Calhoun, Jan. 8, 1848. =77=Doyle, British charge, to Bocanegra, -April 20, 1843: "The undersigned must remind His Excellency that Texas -has been recognized as an independent nation by the Government of Her -Majesty, and that treaties have been negotiated with that Republic as -independent." =77=Cyprey, the French minister, to Bocanegra, April 20, -1843: "The Mexican Cabinet has doubtless overlooked the fact that with -respect to France and most of the states of Europe Texas is absolutely -in the same position as that in which Mexico was before her independence -had been recognized by Spain." - -As early as 1839 Gorostiza admitted privately that Mexico had lost -Texas (=11=E. de Lisle, June 21); and in 1840 the French government -notified Mexico that its recognition of Texas was merely the acceptance -of a _fait accompli_ (=11=to Cyprey, no. 4, May 6). Webster, Writings, -ix, 158: "Nothing can exceed, I have always thought, the obstinacy -and senselessness manifested by Mexico in refusing for so many years -to acknowledge the independence of Texas"; xiii, 351: Our annexing -Texas gave Mexico no just ground of complaint (Sept. 29, 1847). In his -Memoria of Jan., 1849, the Mexican minister of relaciones called the -refusal of Mexico to recognize the annexation of Texas a caprice or whim -(capricho). (Never) See note 5. =137=Gallatin to Calhoun, Mar. 3, 1848. - -4.2. Sen. 1; 28, 1, pp. 25 (Bocanegra); 27 (Thompson); 34 (Upshur). - -4.3. Sen. 1; 28, 1, pp. 38, 42 (Almonte); 41, 45 (Upshur). =53=Memo. of -conference between Upshur and Almonte. =53=Almonte to Upshur, Apr. 22, -1844. Smith, Annex. of Texas, 194. - -4.4. Smith, Annex. of Texas, 199, 288. Sen. 341; 28, 1, p. 53 (Calhoun). - -4.5. Smith, Annex. of Texas, 289-295. =77=Relaciones to Almonte, May -30, 1844. According to Santa Anna's published account of the interview, -which doubtless misrepresented the bearer of despatches, Thompson said -the assent of Mexico was an essential preliminary to the annexation of -Texas, and plainly recognized her ownership of the province, and the -President replied that the right of subjugating it would be transmitted -to posterity, and assent would never be given to its absorption in -the United States. In reply to Bocanegra's assertion that the United -States had now recognized Mexico's claim to Texas Calhoun sent word to -the Mexican government that we recognized no such claim, but held that -Texas was an independent nation both in fact and in right (Ho. 2; 28, -2, p. 23). In Tyler, Tyler, ii, 692, is a statement, apparently based -on good authority, that Mexico consented to cede Texas for $15,000,000; -but internal evidence and many facts are decidedly against it, and the -author has not found the slightest evidence in its support. It was made -forty years after the event, and probably was due to a misunderstanding -or defective recollection. - -Out of this affair grew a diplomatic tilting-match (Ho. 2; 28, 2). -Bocanegra, though personally agreeable and officially painstaking, -dignified and courteous (Thompson, Recolls., 82) was not a great -logician; and the son of Duff Green could hardly be regarded as an -intellectual giant. Still, certain points emerged from the discussion. -The Mexican planted himself on the technical theory of ownership, -accused the Texans of stealing the territory which they had been -graciously permitted to occupy, and charged the United States in the -usual manner with violating treaties and international law. Green, -on the other hand, relied upon facts: the fact of actual Texan -independence, the fact that Mexico herself owed her existence to a -revolution, and the fact that she had regarded herself as independent -and had been so regarded by other nations long before the mother-country -would recognize her. But the correspondence as a whole was indecisive, -disagreeable, and exasperating. - -4.6. Smith, Annex. of Texas, 273-9, 365-7. - -4.7. Smith, Annex. of Texas, 416-7. Shannon and Rejon: Sen. 1; 28, 2, -p. 47; Ho. 19; 28, 2. =52=Rejon to Shannon, Nov. 21, 1844. Buchanan to -Shannon, no. 10, 1845. =13=Bankhead, no. 67, 1844. Von Holst, U. S., -ii, 685. Jameson, Calhoun Correspondence, 662. Tyler, Message, Dec. -18, 1844 (Richardson). N. Y. _Eve. Post_, Dec. 18, 1844. (Rejon) Sosa, -Biografias; =52=B. E. Greene, no. 17, 1844. N. Y. _Herald_, Dec. 16, -1844. _Nat. Intelligencer_, Dec. 20, 1844. _Democ. Review_, Feb., 1847, -99, 100. Richtofen, Zustaende, 54-6. Rejon, Justificacion. - -A recent Mexican author has said that "perfidy," which the Mexicans -loved to charge against the United States at this period, was made -impossible by the publicity of our diplomatic affairs (Bulnes, Mentiras, -167). It should be remembered that we had a perfect right to seek, in -the way we had sought, to acquire Texas--_i.e._ by purchase. - -4.8. Sen. 1; 29, 1, pp. 38 (Almonte); 39 (Buchanan). Smith, Annex. of -Texas, 420-3. Shannon, no. 10, Apr. 6, 1845. Bankhead, nos. 30, 38, -1845. Richardson, Messages, iv, 388. O Se Hace la Guerra. _Diario_, May -12. Memoria de ... Relaciones, Dec., 1846. - -"Is it possible," exclaimed _La Voz del Pueblo_ of March 26, "that -Mexico is a nation of slaves, a wandering tribe, to be the prey of other -nations? Eleven years of war [to gain our independence], all the victims -executed, all the costly sacrifices made,--have these been in vain? War -and only war can save us"--"war without quarter," "extermination and -death." For other references and quotations see Smith, Annex. of Texas, -425-7. =52=Dimond, nos. 244-5, 249, etc., 1845. Min. of treasury to -Deputies, Apr. 19, 1845 (_Diario_, Apr. 20). =56=W. S. Parrott, Apr. 26. - -4.9. _Amigo del Pueblo_, July 17, 1845. Smith, Annex. of Texas, 427. -_Diario_, July 17, 23, 25, 31; Aug. 11; Oct. 11. _Siglo XIX_, Aug. 1. -=52=Dimond, nos. 245, 249, etc., 1845. _Journal des Debats_, Sept. 20. -=56=W. S. Parrott, July 12, 15, 22, 30; Aug. 16. _Patriota Mex._, Nov. -14. =52=Shannon, no. 3, 1844. St. Louis _Republican_, Aug. 18, 1845. -Wash. _Union_, Aug. 1, 14; Sept. 29. =297=Buchanan to McLane, priv. -and pers., Sept. 13. =77=Relaciones to mins., July 30. =52=Campbell, -Havana, Aug. 14. =76=Guerra, circular, July 16. Bankhead, no. 38, 1845. -Bustamante, Nuevo Bernal, i, 43-5. - -July 30, 1845, the Mexican minister of relations wrote to the Mexican -minister at Paris: "Mexico has been left no choice except to fight the -United States"; "The campaign will soon begin"; 14,000 troops are _en -route_; 6000 will soon be organized to join them (=77=Cuevas to Garro, -res.). - -4.10. _Siglo XIX_, July 27. _Picayune_, Sept. 23. St. Louis _Reveille_, -Sept. 14. =52=Black, no. 341, 1845. =56=W. S. Parrott, July 22, 30. -Dimond, nos. 249, 257, 1845. _Diario_, July 31. =297=Polk to Buchanan, -private, Aug. 7. - -Spanish-American subtlety was not the only subtlety at work. Aug. 1, -1845, the Mexican agent at London reported: I have told Aberdeen that -war is inevitable; he suggests that we merely suspend relations with -the U. S., since a declaration of war would lawfully be followed by the -occupation of California, the bombardment of Vera Cruz, and a blockade -(=77=Murphy, no. 9). The view that no declaration of war was necessary -and that an attack might be made at once on Texas was well understood in -the United States, as the preceding citations show. As early as Aug. 5 -the Mexican commander at Matamoros =52=proclaimed: "Comrades, the moment -has arrived to present ourselves on the field of honor." - -4.11. =108=Wikoff to Bancroft, May 10, 1845. =52=Buchanan to Parrott, -Mar. 28, 1845. - -In one respect this was an unfortunate appointment, for the Mexican -authorities hated Parrott; but Buchanan, who probably was not aware of -that fact, regarded him as "a discreet man, well acquainted with public -affairs," and entitled to the confidence of the President (=52=to Black, -Sept. 17). He was familiar with Spanish, had an intimate acquaintance -with Mexican politics and politicians, and was available. It is highly -improbable that any one else combined these necessary qualifications; -and, as his errand called for no public recognition and was mainly to be -executed indirectly, prejudice was likely to be disarmed. =162=Bancroft -to Conner, Nov. 20, 1845. =162=_Id._ to Latimer, Nov. 7, 10. - -4.12. =56=W. S. Parrott, June 24; Sept. 6. His quoted words, added -to other declarations of a similar character, dispose completely of -the assertion, often found in Mexican and American writings, that we -offered to pay for Texas and thus admitted that we had wickedly annexed -it. Baldly and as of right, Mexico's claim could not be recognized by -this nation; but in a spirit of good-will, under cover of paying for a -satisfactory line, we were disposed to soothe her feelings with a gift. - -4.13. Tyler, Tyler, iii, 174 (Green). Slidell, Dec. 17. Shannon, no. -8, 1845. Dimond, nos. 256, 259, 266, 1845. =56=W. S. Parrott, Aug. 16 -(Herrera has said, "If a Minister from the United States should arrive, -he would be well received"), 26, 29. (Black, Aug. 23) Polk, Diary, -Sept. 16. =108=Kemble to Bancroft, Sept. 3: letters from men in daily -intercourse with Herrera, Almonte, and the minister of relations say the -government desires peace; and one says: "We know from good authority -that if a Minister were sent from the United States he would be well -received" (note the word "Minister"). - -4.14. Richmond _Enquirer_, Dec. 9. Buchanan to Larkin, Oct. 17, 1845; to -Slidell, Nov. 10. Dix in _Cong. Globe_, 30, 1, app., 176. See also pp. -136-7. - -4.15. Garcia, Juarez, 9, 12. =52=W. D. Jones, Sept. 22, 1838. (Estrada) -Valencia, proclam., Oct. 22, 1840, in Papeles Varios. London _Times_, -Mar. 13, 1845. _Picayune_, Dec. 30, 1844; Jan. 25, 1846. McLane, March -3, 1845 (Curtis, Buchanan, i, 583). Feb. 28, 1846, the British Foreign -Office transmitted to Bankhead a letter (delivered to it by the Spanish -minister by order of his court) which pointed toward the establishment -of monarchy in Mexico under a Spanish prince. - -4.16. (Believed) =297=Buchanan to McLane, priv. and pers., Sept. 13, -1845. - -4.17. Polk, Diary, Sept. 16, 17, 1845. (Caused) Ho. 60; 30, 1, p. 12 -(Buchanan). Slidell had been born and educated at the north. - -4.18. Bankhead, nos. 94, 101, 104, 1845. The British government censured -Bankhead for going so far in efforts to restore harmony between the -United States and Mexico (=13=to Bankhead, no. 36, 1845. =77=Murphy, no. -2, 1846). =13=Pena to Bankhead, Oct. 15. Mexico a traves, iv, 545. Pena -only said that Mexico would be "inclined" to hear the United States, but -of course he would not, on the ground of a passing mood, have expected -two British ministers to act for his nation. - -4.19. Bankhead, nos. 101, 104. _Id._ to Pakenham, Oct. 16. Richardson, -Messages, iv, 437-43. That Mexico knew our claims counted among the -"differences" is proved by the letter of Cuevas to Forsyth, July 29, -1837 (Sen. 1; 25, 2, p. 111): The President is anxious for "that final -and equitable adjustment [of the claims] which is to terminate the -existing difficulties between the two Governments." - -4.20. Ho. 60; 30, 1, pp. 12 (Buchanan); 13, 14, 17 (Black). Pena to -Black, Oct. 14 in Memoria de ... Relaciones, 1846. _Diario_, Nov. 6. -=341=Black, memorial, Dec. 20, 1847. Sen. 12; 30, 1. - -4.21. Ho. 60; 30, 1, p. 12 (Buchanan). Ho. Report 752; 29, 1. _Monitor -Repub._, Aug. 1, 1846 (Herrera had been determined to settle with the -United States). - -4.22. Sen. 325; 27, 2, p. 64. Sen. 337; 29, 1, p. 10. As to Slidell's -Title, cf. together Buchanan to Parrott, Mar. 28; _Id._ to Black, Sept. -17; Pena to council of state; and report of council of state. Polk, -Diary, Nov. 6, 9, 10. - -In Tyler, Tyler, iii, 174, may be found a statement from B. E. Green -to the effect that Herrera sent word to him that a minister of the -usual sort could not be received, and that he transmitted this message -to Polk. But (1), if such was Herrera's attitude, why was it not made -clear to Black, who had been expressly commissioned to ascertain whether -a minister would be received; (2) Green, as a member of the Calhoun -faction, and perhaps as an official who had lost a good post in our -legation at Mexico, was not favorable to Polk, and a statement made -by a prejudiced person from memory forty-four years after the event, -regarding a delicate matter in which precision is essential, cannot be -considered at all authoritative. (3) This statement is out of harmony -with a number of material facts. =256=Marcy to Wetmore, Feb. 1, 1846: -Slidell was sent "on an express agreement that a minister would be -received." - -4.23. =52=McLane, no. 8, Sept. 26, 1845. =108=Kemble to Bancroft, Sept. -3, 1845. Dimond, no. 269, 1845. _Times_, Oct. 14. (Impatience) Ho. 60; -30, 1, p. 17 (Black). Polk, Diary, Nov. 10. - -4.24. Buchanan to Slidell, Nov. 10; Dec. 17. _Veracruzano Libre_, Nov. -30. =52=Comte. princ. to Dimond, Nov. 30. Slidell, Nov. 30; Dec. 17. -Ho. 60; 30, 1, p. 22 (Black). (Fleet) Conner to Dimond, Oct. 23, 1845 -(Wash. _Union_, Dec. 1, 1847). Conner felt so sure of the conciliatory -spirit of his government that he withdrew without waiting for orders. -California was well known to be in a chronic state of rebellion (chap. -xvi), which Mexico had not the power to subdue, and therefore it was -natural for one who knew very little about the Mexicans to suppose they -would be willing to take a price for the practically worthless claim to -that territory. - -The view that Polk explicitly instructed Slidell to give up the plan -to buy California rather than allow that plan to stand in the way of -regaining amicable relations with Mexico does not seem to be correct -(Kelsey, Consulate, 62, note 5). But Buchanan's letter of Dec. 17 to -Slidell lays stress upon his "two last alternatives," which were to -purchase northern California, including (_a_) the Bay of San Francisco -or (_b_) Monterey also; yet he instructs Slidell to drop this matter, -if pressing it would endanger success in endeavoring to obtain the -Rio Grande boundary or a line including all of New Mexico. Now such -a settlement of the Texas-New Mexico boundary would have involved -a restoration of amicable relations with Mexico. The two matters -(boundary and relations) were inextricably interwoven both in fact and -logically. Hence in effect Buchanan instructed Slidell to drop the plan -of purchasing California if pressing it would be liable to prevent the -restoration of amicable relations with Mexico. Rives (U. S. and Mexico, -ii, 69, note 2) takes a different view, but seems to have erred in more -particulars than one. - -4.25. See pp. 55-6. Smith, Annex. of Texas, 423-31. =52=Slidell, Dec. -17, 27. _Amigo del Pueblo_, Nov. 1: "It is hardly possible to believe -such perfidy, such baseness and such audacity ... treason more horrible -has never been seen." _Patriota Mexicano_, Nov. 18: "To listen to -talk of peace from these men [the Americans] is to take the road to -perdition, death, ignominy." _Voz del Pueblo_, Dec. 3: "The treason has -been discovered.... We no longer own the very ground on which we walk." - -4.26. Ho. 60; 30, 1, p. 22 (Black). Slidell, Dec. 29, 1845. Bankhead, -no. 127, 1845. Mexico a traves, iv, 545. Roa Barcena, Recuerdos, 19. -Sierra, Evolution, i, 212. Black, Dec. 18. - -One of Pena's minor points was that it did not appear from Slidell's -credentials that he had been confirmed by the Senate; and in fact, -since the American Congress had not been in session at the time of -his appointment, he had not been. This was not only to inquire into -our domestic affairs, but to hold that the Executive of the United -States could not appoint a diplomatic agent during a recess of the -Senate. Shannon's letter of credence had said nothing regarding his -confirmation, and Murphy had acted as our charge in Texas for about -nine months before his name went to the Senate. Another point was that -Slidell's letter of credence did not expressly state that he had full -powers for the business in hand; but it was practically absurd, after -the United States had taken so much trouble and shown its good faith by -withdrawing our fleet, to suppose that we would send an agent to Mexico -without giving him the authority to do what we were evidently so anxious -to bring about. When this complaint was brought to his attention, -Slidell replied that his credentials described him as minister -plenipotentiary and envoy extraordinary, and also that it was not usual -to exhibit one's full powers at so early a stage in such negotiations, -adding that he would have done so, however, had any desire to see them -been suggested. Buchanan was doubtless right in calling the objection -a quibble; and one cannot suppose that under different circumstances -it would have been presented. The council of state rejected Pena's -objections in both of these cases. - -4.27. Ho. 60; 30, 1, pp. 31, 58 (Pena); 28 (Black). =52=Slidell, Dec. 17. - -4.28. Ho. 60; 30, 1, p. 58 (Pena). =77=Relaciones, circular to govs., -Dec. 11. Comunicacion circular. Memoria de ... Relaciones, Dec., 1848. -Sen. 337; 29, 1, pp. 21, 24, 25, 28, 32 (Slidell); 22 (Black); 25, 30 -(Pena). Slidell, Dec. 17. - -Even the unfriendly Mexican correspondent of the London _Times_ -wrote, "For once" the United States is right, for the documents prove -that Mexico made no _ad hoc_ condition (_Times_, Mar. 13, 1846). The -matter can be viewed in another light also. Pena agreed to receive a -"comisionado"; later he said he had agreed to receive a "comisionado -_ad hoc_." If the words "_ad hoc_" added anything, they indicated a -difference between his earlier and his later positions; if not, why -were they used? Many Americans, doubtless without perceiving what the -significance of the act would have been, have insisted that the United -States ought to have humored poor little Mexico by sending an envoy _ad -hoc_. Aside from the weightier objection to so doing, such a concession -would probably have led to further demands (see note 34). Pena, instead -of recognizing our magnanimity in taking the first step to heal a breach -caused by Mexico, described our overture as "a tacit but clear and -strong confession of the rights of Mexico [and] of the wrongs done to -her" (=77=circular, Dec. 11). Gallatin stated that treaties of peace -were always negotiated by special commissioners, but this was incorrect -(see _e.g._ Jenkinson, Collection, iii, 355). - -4.29. Memoria de ... Relaciones, 1846. The council of state said: From -the language in which the ministry "explains the condition of receiving -the proposed envoy (_enviado_), we cannot draw a satisfactory reason for -not receiving Mr. Slidell." Ho. 60; 30, 1, pp. 28-49, 56. Bankhead, no. -127, 1845. - -In his manifesto of July 26, 1846 (_Diario_, July 30), Paredes -mentioned, as third among the causes of the war, the attempt of the -United States to induce Mexico to receive a resident minister, so as to -restore friendly relations without first making amends for the offence -[annexation of Texas] that had broken off official intercourse. - -4.30. Webster, Writings, iv, 32. R. C. Winthrop, another leading Whig, -took the same ground (_Union_, Mar. 20, 1847). (Awkward) Calhoun in -Benton's Abr. Debates, xvi, 99. - -4.31. _Revolution of Paredes._ Memoria de ... Relaciones, Dec, 1846 -(including documents). Contestaciones (between Paredes, Arista, and the -government, 1845). Carreno, Jefes, clxiii-clxxvii. _Patriota Mex._, Dec. -23, 1845. Ramirez, Mexico, 80-124. =77=Relaciones, circular, Jan. 3, -1846. Mexico a traves, iv, 546-56. =56=Mexican corr. of London _Times_ -to W. S. Parrott, Nov. 19; Dec. 18. =76=Guerra, circular, Jan 5. Dimond, -nos. 279, 302, 1845. _Aguila del Norte_, Feb. 11; Mar. 18, 1846. Rivera, -Gobernantes, ii, 281-5, 287-8. Gimenez, Mems., 91. =285=Tornel to -Paredes, Nov. 19, 1845. Bankhead, nos. 94, 97, 116, 119, 120, 124, 1845; -2, 1846. Tributo a la Verdad. =56=W. S. Parrott, Aug. 16, 29; Sept. 29, -1845. Black, June 10; Sept. 2, 1845. _Picayune_, Jan. 24, 1846. Portrait -of Herrera: city hall, Mexico. London _Times_, Feb. 10; Mar. 2, 20, -1846. _Monitor Constit._, Jan. 1, 16, 1846. Slidell, Dec. 27, 1845; Jan. -14; Feb. 6, 1846. _Memorial Historico_, Jan. 14, 1846. - -The condition of Mexico on the eve of this revolution was well described -by the _Revista Economica y Comercial_: "The country wavers, goes -backward, loses courage, and loses hope, because all the systems of -government that it has tried, one by one, have failed to give the fruits -promised by their authors, and, worn out and exhausted by so many and -varied medicines that have been applied in vain, it desires only order, -peace, and some degree of security. Our men of merit, education, and -patriotism are silent, live in retirement and sadness in their houses, -occupied solely with private affairs ... we have become a nation of -soldiers, officials, lawyers, clergymen, and smugglers, where the number -who produce bears a miserable proportion to the number of those who -live by the labor and sweat of the producers, and where the continual -political changes, the disorders, the bad administration of justice, and -the bad commercial and financial system offer more or less sustenance -to those who produce nothing, always at the expense of the toilers and -their allies, the merchants." The political situation was thus explained -by _El Siglo XIX_: "When a long series of civil dissensions, of frauds -upon the public, of treasons against the parties, of perjuries to -principles, have mixed up men and things, blotted out the line between -political groups, and confused all ideas, politics must become a genuine -chaos. Mexico is in precisely that condition." When charged with -upsetting public order Paredes replied, "None existed" (_Esperanza_, -Jan. 8, 1846). As late as Aug. 6, 1846, Texas was called upon, like the -other political divisions of the country, to elect members of Congress. - -4.32. (Scheme) =52=Black, Dec. 30, 1845; =52=Slidell, Dec. 27; -=297=McLane to Polk, private, Jan. 17, 1846; _Memorial Historico_, Jan. -26, and the Mexican press generally. Slidell saw grounds for hope: the -delay in furnishing him an escort; a possibility that Paredes might -hold that Herrera had committed Mexico; the improbability that money -to pay the troops could be borrowed while war seemed likely (hence he -sent a hint to the government that money could be obtained by accepting -a boundary satisfactory to the United States); Castillo, with whom he -had talked a number of times before he became minister of relations, -was intelligent and averse to a war with the United States. Buchanan to -Slidell, Jan. 20, 28; Mar. 12. - -4.33. Ho. 60; 30, 1, p. 63 (Slidell). Memoria de ... Relaciones, 1846. -The council said that Slidell could not be received on _any_ footing, -unless Taylor (_now at Corpus Christi_) should retire. "The limiting -of the mission of the _comisionado_ to the sole question of Texas," -it remarked, "was a tacit condition (_una condicion tacita_)." This -admitted once more that the condition was not stated. The council -admitted also that _comisionado_ was not the proper term for an envoy -_ad hoc_, which refutes again the contention of a certain American -school that Mexico explicitly required us to send a "commissioner" -instead of a minister. Castillo's reply to Slidell (Mar. 12) said: -Mexico cannot have agreed to receive a regular minister, for it would -have been imprudent to do that; by fraud and violence the fair province -of Texas has been stolen; and now, after robbing and outraging Mexico, -your country seeks to obtain a pretext for war by demanding of us the -impossible humiliation of receiving you (Ho. 60; 30, 1, p. 67). At this -time Castillo did not know that Taylor was advancing toward the Rio -Grande (_Diario_, Mar. 15, 1846). =166=Slidell to Conner, Feb. 7; Mar. -15. - -4.34. Mar. 17 Slidell answered Castillo at some length (Ho. 60; 30, -1, p. 72), vindicating the course of the United States in regard to -Texas. All the threats of war, he pointed out, have come from Mexico; -to suppose that the present Mexican administration in particular does -not intend to fight, would be to accuse it of declaring, in order to -overthrow Herrera, what it did not mean; so far as words can produce -war it already exists by the act of Mexico, and is the United States to -remain entirely passive, taking no precautions, till your army "shall -be prepared to strike, with due effect, the threatened blow?" Slidell -at the same time requested his passports. Castillo to Slidell, March 21 -(Memoria de ... Relaciones, 1846) declared the discussion closed and -transmitted passports. April 23 Paredes said in a manifesto that he -rejected Slidell because "the dignity of the nation resented this new -insult" (Mexico a traves, iv, 559). In view of the grounds on which his -revolution had been launched (=73=Bermudez de Castro, no. 200, res., -1846) he could not have received Slidell without grave danger to himself -(Black, May 26, 1846; Slidell, no. 11). See chap. viii, note 24. Slidell -sailed from Vera Cruz on March 31, but at Polk's request he retained his -commission and held himself in readiness to go to Mexico again for about -a year (Moore, Buchanan, vii, 211; =52=Slidell, no. 14, 1847). - - - V. THE MEXICAN ATTITUDE ON THE EVE OF WAR - -5.1. _Mexican feeling_. (Subjugate) =52=Consul Black, no. 349, Oct. -9, 1845; =47=Wood to Bancroft, June 4, 1846. =52=Slidell, nos. 3, 10. -=52=Consul McCall, Tampico, no. 65, Sept. 26, 1845. (All of Mexico) -=52=Shannon, no. 3, Oct. 28, 1844. (Threat) _Diario_, Mar. 25, 1845; -=77=Relaciones, circular, Nov. 27, 1846; _So. Qtrly. Rev._, Apr., -1849, 97, 102; Thompson, Recolls., 238; London _Spectator_, Sept. 26, -1846. (Hinder) =52=Manifiesto of Vera Cruz legislature, [June, 1827]; -Poinsett's reply; =52=Poinsett's reply to Mex. state legisl., Aug., -1829; Shannon, no. 3; La Ruina de los Mexicanos. (Indians) _Mosquito -Mexicano_, Aug. 4, 1835; =75=gov. Durango, Apr. 27, 1846. (Privileged -classes) J. H. Smith in Proceeds. Amer. Antiq. Soc, Apr., 1914, and the -citations there given. (_Siglo XIX_) =56=W. S. Parrott, June 29, 1845. -(Politicians) Green, nos. 8, 103, 1844; Calhoun Corresp., 975; Shannon, -no. 3, 1844, and the Mexican press. - -The following citations, which might be indefinitely extended, bear -upon various aspects of the subject. Pakenham, nos. 74 of 1828; 74 of -1829. Bankhead, nos. 38, 1845; 28, 58, 1846. =345=Ellis, Sept. 20, 1839. -Memoria de ... Relaciones, 1846. _Voz del Pueblo_, Mar. 29; May 3, -1845. _Amigo del Pueblo_, June 26; Oct. 9, 1845. _Orizaveno_, Mar. 30, -1845. _Patriota Mex._, Nov. 14, 1845. _Monitor Repub._, Jan. 28, 1847. -Reflexiones sobre la Memoria. Comunicacion circular que. =77=Almonte, -no. 130, priv., 1844. =77=Arrangoiz, no. 50, res., 1845. Decree of Mex. -Cong., June 4, 1845 (broadside). =56=W. S. Parrott, June 29; July 5, -1845. =108=Kemble to Bancroft, Sept. 3, 1845. - -5.2. (Danger) =76= Gov. Ibarra of Puebla, Sept. 5, 1846; _Diario_, Apr. -17, 1846; =77=Relaciones, circular, Nov. 27, 1846; law of June 4, 1845, -in Dublan, Legislacion, v, 19; _Monitor Repub._, May 15, 1847; London -_Spectator_, Sept. 26, etc., 1846. C. M. Bustamante, Nuevo Bernal, i, -45. Castillo; council of state (chap. iv). (Paredes) Bankhead, no. 28, -Feb. 27, 1846. (Chief) Shannon, no. 3, 1844; Negrete, Invasion, iv, -app., 182; _Diario_, Mar. 25, 1845; Mar. 25; Sept. 26; Dec. 6, 1846; -=80=legislat. of Mex. state, address, Apr. 26, 1847; _Patriota Mex._, -Nov. 14, 1845; =77=Arrangoiz, no. 50, res., Mar. 13, 1845; _Siglo -XIX_, Nov. 30, 1845. (Clamored) _Amigo del Pueblo_, Oct. 9, 1845; _Voz -del Pueblo_, Mar. 29, 1845. (Superiority) Tornel, Tejas, 95; _Monitor -Repub._, May 12, 1846. - -5.3. (Abject) Jameson, Calhoun Corresp., 993. =77=Almonte, June 19, -priv.; Sept. 20, 1844; Mar. 17, priv., 1845. (Panic) _Amer. Review_, -Sept., 1845, 222. - -5.4. To precisely what extent European journals were read in Mexico -cannot be determined; but it seems probable that few important -expressions escaped notice there, and certainly the leading journals -were quoted freely. - -5.5. (Differences) =77=Almonte, June 19, priv., 1844; =77=Relaciones, -circular, Nov. 27, 1846; Jameson, Calhoun Corresp., 994; -_Constitutionnel_, May 12; Aug. 5, 1845. _Times_, Apr. 15, 1845. -_Diario_, Apr. 3, 1845. - -5.6. Times, Apr. 15, 1845. Negrete, Mexico, xxi, 130. =13=Elliot, July -3, 1845. Gorostiza, Dictamen. Reflexiones sobre la Memoria. Federacion -y Tejas. Tornel, Tejas, 95-7. (Elliot in Mex.) Smith, Annex. of Texas, -411-3. =77=Deffa dis, July 29, 1835. - -5.7. _Britannia_, Feb. 15, 1845. (1812) Negrete, Mexico, xxi, 130. -=13=Pakenham to Harvey, July 20, 1839. _Times_, Apr. 5, 1845. -=77=Arrangoiz, no. 65, res., Apr. 23, 1845. - -5.8. =345=Poinsett to Van Buren, May 26, 1846 (Swarms of the best -irregular cavalry that I have ever seen). Watson, Taylor, 113-4 (The -British, Spanish, and Prussian ministers at Washington agreed that Scott -would be beaten; Calderon spoke as quoted in the text). (Generals) Wash. -_Union_, Dec. 18, 1846. Elliot, note 6. _Times_, July 5, 1845. - -Napoleon said, "The first quality of a soldier is constancy in enduring -fatigue and hardship" (Maxims, 47). In this quality the Mexicans -excelled. - -5.9. Requena in _Monitor Repub._, Mar. 9, 1846. Negrete, Mexico, -xxi, 131. (Boasted) =52=W. S. Parrott, Dec. 14, 1835. Memoria de ... -Relaciones, Jan., 1849. _Boletin Oficial_, Apr. 15, 1845. Apuntes, 168. -Thompson, Recolls., 170-1. (Self-confidence) Mofras, Explor., i, 70. -=76=Min. war, circular, Nov. 11. (Ensure) _Diario_, Sept. 25, 1845. -(_Voz del P._) Federacion y Tejas. - -5.10. (Texas) Tornel, Tejas, 95-7; =13=Bankhead, no. 125, Dec. 30, -1845. =77=Almonte, no. 72, priv., June 19; Sept. 20, 1844; instructions -to G. de la Vega, Apr. 10, 1844. =13=Pakenham, no. 22, Apr. 14, 1844. -Elliot, note 6. (Urged) Negrete, Mexico, xxi, 131-2. Memoria de ... -Relaciones, Jan., 1849. - -5.11. Requena in _Monitor Repub_., Mar. 9, 1846. London _Times_, June -11, 1846. =345=Poinsett to Van Buren, May 26, 1846. _Britannia_, June -10, 1844. =169=Rives to Crittenden, Feb. 8, 1847. =137=Clemson to -Calhoun, Mar. 28, 1847. Elliot, note 6. - -5.12. Memoria de ... Relaciones, Jan., 1849. =77=Cuevas, no. 67, 1836. -(_Herald_)_Diario_, June 4, 1845. (_Globe_) Charleston _Mercury_, Sept. -8, 1845. Some of the documents quoted above are later than the beginning -of the war, but the opinions must have existed before. - -5.13. (Defensive) Requena, note 11. =77=Arrangoiz, no. 129, res., Nov. -29, 1844. _Times_, Apr. 5, 1845. _Britannia_, June 10, 1844. _Times_ in -_Diario_ of June 8, 1845. - -5.14. _Herald_, May 3, 1845. =77=Arrangoiz, note 13; no. 101, res., -July 8, 1845. (Tornel) =47=Wood to Bancroft, July 4, 1846. (Own) _Nat. -Intelligencer_, Sept. 5; Savannah _Republican_, Aug. 25; N. Y. _Herald_, -Aug. 30, 1845. _Times_ of Apr. 5, 1845, in _Diario_ of June 8. - -5.15. _Standard_, Aug. 12, 1845. =13=Pakenham, no. 22, Apr. 14, 1844. -(Fig red) Bulnes, Grandes Mentiras, 150. - -5.16. (Endured) =73=Bermudez de Castro, no. 532, res., Sept. 24, -1846; =77=circular, Nov. 27, 1846. (Credit) London _Times_, Apr. 15, -1845; and chap. xxxiii. =77=Arrangoiz, no. 36, res., May 23, 1844. -_Constitutionnel_, Aug. 15, 1845. - -5.17. _Benefits._ =77=Cuevas, no. 67, July 13, 1836. _Diario_, Mar. 25, -1845. =52=Green, Apr. 8, 1844. Reflexiones sobre la Memoria. _Times_, -Apr. 15, 1845. =52=Shannon, no. 3, Oct. 28, 1844. =56=W. S. Parrott, -July 5, 1845. _Siglo XIX_, Aug. 1, 1845. (Baptize) La Verdad Desnuda. -(Blockade) =52=Thompson, Oct. 3, 1843; _Macedonian_, Mar. 28, 1845; -=13=Doyle, no. 79, Oct. 30, 1843. (_Voz del P._) Federacion y Tejas. -(Crisis) Reflexiones sobre la Memoria. - -5.18. _Central and South America._ J. M. L. Mora, pamphlet, 1834. -_Diario_, Sept. 25, 1846. (Press) chap, vi, note 13. =77=Cuevas, no. -67, July 13, 1836. =77=Mex. min., Lima, no. 23, Aug. 15, 1837. (Dorsey) -Savannah _Republican_, Aug. 25, 1842. Adams, Mems., xi, 340, 367. -_Imparcial_, June 13, 1844. _Aurora de la Libertad_, Apr. 6, 1845. -Relaciones, circular, Nov. 27, 1846. =80=Legisl. of Mex. state, address, -Apr. 26, 1847. =76=Gov. Ibarra, Sept. 5, 1846. =312=Basadre to S. Anna, -Apr. 9, 1847. Roa Barcena, Recuerdos, 243, note. - -5.19. _Diario_, Apr. 3, 1845. _Mail_, Aug. 30 in _Diario_, Nov. 1. -London _Times_, Sept. 10, 1845 (War is "clearly the duty" of Mexico). -_Journal des Debats_, Sept. 24, 1845. (The European outlook) Chap xxxv. - -5.20. (Jealousy) Mayer, War, 82; _Amer. Review_, Jan., 1846. (Policy) J. -H. Smith in Proceeds. Am. Antiq. Soc, Apr., 1914. _Correspondant_, Jan. -1, 1846. London _Times_, Jan. 1, 1846. - -5.21. (Cotton) Smith, Annex. of Texas, 89, 90. (Checked) _Ibid._, 382, -389; Tornel, Tejas, 97; London _Standard_, May 2, 1845; _Times_, Sept. -9; Dec. 15, 1845; Jan. 1, 1846. (Guizot) _Niles_, Mar. 14, 1846, pp. -25-6. (_Journal des Debats_) _National_, Dec. 27, 1845. - -5.22. (Texas) Smith, Annex. of Texas, chap, xviii. _Id._ in Mass. -Hist. Soc. Proceeds., June, 1914. _Morning Herald_, Mar. 27, 1845, in -_Diario_, June 4. _Times_, Dec. 15, 1845. - -5.23. _Times_, Aug. 6; Sept. 9, 1845. (It was the Mexico correspondent -of the _Times_ who spoke, but evidently the editor allowed him to be -heard.) _Standard_, May 2, 1845. _Journal of Commerce_, Sept. 6, 1845. -_Journal des Debats_, Feb. 4; Sept. 24, 1845. _Constitutionnel_, May -12, 1845. _Monitor Constit._, supplmt., Dec. 21, 1844. _Aurora de la -Libertad_, Apr. 6, 1845. - -5.24. _Journal des Debats_, Sept. 24, 1845. =13=Pakenham, no. 22, Apr. -14, 1844. (Blockade) =13=Bankhead, no. 162, Oct. 30, 1846. - -5.25. (Fear) _Boletin Oficial_, Apr. 15, 1845. (Guarantee) =13=Bankhead, -no. 117, Nov. 29, 1845. - -5.26. =13=Bankhead, nos. 113, Nov. 29, 1845; 125, Dec. 30, 1845; 14, -Jan. 30, 1846; 28, Feb. 27, 1846; =52=McLane, nos. 8, Sept. 26, 1845; -55, June 18, 1846; =52=Shannon, no. 9, Mar. 27, 1845; =52=Slidell, Jan. -14; Feb. 6, 1846; _Correspondant_, May 1, 1846; _Times_, Mar. 13, 1846; -Ho. 2; 29, 1, pp. 139-92; =52=J. Parrott, June 4, 1846. =52=Dimond, no. -332, Apr. 22, 1846: The Mexican thermometer for peace or war is governed -by the prospects of war between us and England. The contemptuous and -abusive tone of the British journals with reference to the United States -encouraged Mexico. Our minister at London reported that the British -press as a whole represented that the United States could not wage war -successfully against Mexico (=297=McLane to Polk, received, June 21, -1846). =77=Murphy, no. 9, Aug. 1, 1845 (Aberdeen would like to see, -etc.). - -5.27. =52=Slidell, Jan. 14, 1846. _Times_, Mar. 13, 1846. =52=McLane, -no. 55, June 18, 1846. (Hoped) =13=Bankhead, no. 31, Mar. 10, 1846; -Tornel, Tejas, 97. - -5.28. _Diario_, Mar. 25, 1845. (Enthusiasm, veil) Memoria de ... -Relaciones, Jan., 1849. =77=Almonte, no. 72, priv., June 19, 1844. -_Monitor Constit._, supplmt., Dec. 21, 1844. Almonte (who, as recently -minister to the United States, had great influence on the question of -peace or war) held that Mexico ought to fight and protract the war as -long as possible in order to make us so tired of it that we should -never repeat the experiment (=13=Pakenham, no. 119, Sept. 28, 1846). -_Espectador_, Apr. 25, 1846 ("We are profoundly convinced of the triumph -of the Mexican arms"). Reforma, Mar. 9, 1846. =13=Bankhead, nos. 130, -Sept. 7, 1846 ("They cannot be convinced" of their inability to fight -the U. S.); 151, Oct. 10, 1846 (The cry of the government is, "a levy -of 40,000 men and make terms only on the other side of the Nueces"). -(Prussian) =256=Memo. (Historians) Roa Barcena, Recuerdos, 19-20; -Balbontin, Estado Militar, 58. Ramirez, Mexico, 235. S. Anna, proclam., -Sept. 16, 1847, in _Monitor Repub_., Oct. 2, 1847. Memoria de ... -Relaciones, Jan., 1849. Kenly, Md. Volunteer, 57: After a long stay in -Mexico, I believe the sentiment of the people was "unanimous for war." -Franklin Pierce, speech, Jan. 27, 1848: After conversing with the most -intelligent men in Mexico I was satisfied that the war was unavoidable -(N. Y. _Herald_, Feb. 5, 1848). Other documents, too numerous to be -cited, assisted the author in reaching his conclusions. This condition -of the Mexican mind helps to explain the rejection of Slidell. See also -chap. ix, pp. 221-2. - - - VI. THE AMERICAN ATTITUDE ON THE EVE OF WAR - -6.1. Buchanan in _Cong. Globe_, 28, 1, app., 723. For public sentiment -regarding the Santa Fe prisoners see the New Orleans papers of March, -1842 (_e.g._ _Com. Bulletin_, Mar. 18), and Smith, Annex. of Texas, -31-2. =52=Consul Dimond, Jan. 20, 1843. (Sentmanat) =52=Consul Porter, -July 20, 1844. Sentmanat's party included several Americans. (Reptiles) -=77=Clipping from New Orleans _Bee_. _State Sentinel_, Sept. 27, 1845. -(American prisoners) N. Orl. _Comm. Bull._, Mar. 18, 1844. Ark. Hist. -Comm., Bulletin no. 6, p. 182. - -6.2. The statements regarding American feeling appear to be -self-evident. In the daily press the author has found abundant proof of -them, but it would require a great deal of space to prove inductively -the state of public sentiment. =42=Delegates, Feb. 12, 1847. - -6.3. These statements also are presented as conclusions based upon an -extended examination of the daily press (see Smith, Annex. of Texas, -472), speeches in Congress, etc. For example, the remarks made in -Congress with reference to Jackson's request for authority to adopt -forcible measures (p. 77 of this volume) contained many kind references -to Mexico. This feeling persisted. In the Richmond _Enquirer_, Dec. 9, -1845, its Washington correspondent stated that he found the Democrats of -both houses of Congress sincerely desired the friendship and confidence -of that country. _Id._, Oct. 17, 1845. Note the first page of chap. -xxxvi. For anti-slavery accusations: J. Q. Adams in Boston _Atlas_, -Oct. 17, 1842 (Smith, Annex. of Texas, 131). For the use of money to -influence the American press: _ibid._, 184. - -6.4. (Forbearance) N. Orl. _Bee_, Feb. 19, 1846; _Picayune_, May 5, -1846; _Guard_, May 15, 1846; N. Orl. _Comm. Bull._, Mar. 16, 1846, and -_infra_. =52=Van Buren to Butler, Oct. 16, 1829. =13=Count E. de Lillers -to Gutierrez [Mar., 1830]. (Jackson) Chap. iii, p. 77. (Imbecility) -_Picayune_, June 23, 1842. - -6.5. _Picayune_, Apr. 6, 1842. (Webster) Sen. 320; 27, 2, p. 205. Sen. -411; 27, 2. (Less willing) Chap. iii, p. 80. _Jeff. Repub._, Aug. 7, -1845. - -6.6. _Republican_, Feb. 2, 1846._Picayune_, Jan. 28, 1846. _Delta_, Jan. -21, 1846. _Mo. Reporter_, Apr. 18, 1846. _Comm. Bulletin_, Mar. 16, 1846. - -6.7. Mex. consul, no. 79, Apr. 1, 1842. (Justly) Smith, Annex. of -Texas, "England" in index. (Influence) _Ibid._, 72, 136, 153; =56=W. S. -Parrott, June 4, 1846 ("Mexico may be said to be completely in the hands -of England"). _Commonwealth_, Feb. 23, 1846. _Times_, Nov. 21, 1845. - -6.8. Natchez _Courier and Journal_, Apr. 14, 1846. _Courrier des E. U._ -in Memphis _Enquirer_, Feb. 24, 1846. _E.g._ _Picayune_, Feb. 5, 1846. -_Cong. Globe_, 29, 1, p. 256 (Hannegan). - -6.9. _Delta_, Mar. 27: the pending difficulties must be settled -effectually. _La. Courier_, Mar. 6: "The time has arrived when the -U. S. must decide to act firmly and put an end to the uncertainty of -our relations with Mexico." _Picayune_, Jan. 24: "While our relations -remain in this miserable condition, our territory is liable to sudden -invasion and our citizens to arbitrary exactions ... the intrigues -of trans-Atlantic states demand to be counteracted, and the hostile -purposes of Mexico need to be met with peremptory measures." St. -Louis _Reporter_, Jan. 31: "Delay on our part to bring to a positive -settlement all existing difficulties with Mexico would be mere madness -and folly." _Picayune_, May 5: "There is no proposition in mathematics -more absolutely demonstrable than the impossibility of having a good -understanding with Mexico before giving her a sound drubbing." (Designs) -_Id._, Dec. 30, 1845; Feb. 5, 1846. =52=Consul Campbell, Jan. 7, 1846. - -6.10. (Abolitionists) N. Orl. _Comm. Bulletin_, Mar. 18, 1842. (Calhoun) -Smith, Annex. of Texas, 209, 211, 213-6. Calhoun's remark was given -to the author by Judge Martin of South Carolina, to whom it was made -in the spring of 1847, and is fully in line with Calhoun's action. -(Mississippi) The author thinks he has heard Dr. Wm. E. Dodd of the -University of Chicago express such an opinion. - -6.11. _E.g._ Ills. _State Register_, Dec. 27, 1844: "If war shall ensue, -let it not close until the empire of Mexico" is added to the Union; -Baker of Illinois in House, Jan. 29, 1846: "We must have California, and -perhaps all Mexico" (_Cong. Globe_, 29, 1, p. 279). Besides this feeling -there was a general territorial ambition, which looked in an indefinite -way to a rather distant future and a peaceful, natural extension. - -6.12. _American Review_, Sept., 1845, 227. No Burr was needed, however, -to plant these seeds. - -6.13. (Consul) =13=Salkeld to Crawford, Feb. 25, 1830. (1835) _Journal -des Debats_, May 25, 1848. =13=Elliot to Pakenham, Apr. 14, 1843. (_News -and Tribune_) Nashville _Union_, Aug. 5, 1845. _Plebeian_, Mar. 1, 1845: -"The whole world cannot resist our onward march, until our proud flag -waves over every inch of territory on the continent of North America." -=253=Sanders to McLean, Dec. 29, 1846: "The people if not wicked are -rapacious and Anglo-Saxon-like prefer conquest to principle." The Oregon -discussion revealed clearly the thirst for territory (_Cong. Globe_, 29, -1, app., _e.g._ Smith, Hunter, Pollock, Rockwell, Toombs, pp. 104, 89, -120, 129, 133. W. H. Seward, Mar. 31, 1846: "The popular passion for -territorial aggrandizement is irresistible" (Works, iii, 409). N. Y. -_Herald_, June 15, 1844. Livermore, War, 12. - -6.14. _Herald_, Aug. 30, 1845. (Illinois) Everett, Recolls., 194. W. -E. Dodd in Ills. State Hist. Soc. Trans., 1912, p. 17. Indiana _State -Sentinel_, 1845, _passim_. (Debt) Green, Repudiation, 13. _American -Review_, Sept., 1845, p. 227. (Calhoun) Jameson, Calhoun Corresp., 692. -Lyell, Second Visit, ii, 257. Livermore, War, 6, 8, 10. Smith, Annex. of -Texas, 49. (Powerful) _New Englander_, v, 318-9; =206=J. Graham to Gov. -G., Jan. 4, 1846. - -6.15. _Herald_, Aug. 30, 1845. _News_ in _Nat. Intelligencer_, Sept. 4, -1845. _Journ. of Comm._, May 21, 1845. Gen. Worth wrote in the autumn -of 1845: "Our people will not rest satisfied without a war with some -power" (N. Y. _Times_, July 16, 1916). Claiborne (Quitman, i, 310): the -people "demanded war and were determined to have it." For information -regarding the state of mind prevailing in western Tennessee and the -adjacent regions the author is greatly indebted to Gov. James D. Porter -of Nashville, who was a young man at the time of the Mexican war. The -fact that hunting occupied the place of work had no little influence. -(Hunting) Rose, McCulloch, 29. - -6.16. _Comm. Bulletin_, Mar. 17, 1842. (Wealth) Smith, Annex. of Texas, -49. (Willing) _Tribune_, May 11, 1845. =210=I. E. Holmes to Hammond, May -10, 1846 (The Westerners want to despoil the churches and plantations). -(Letter) _Globe_, Aug. 25, 1845. _News_ in Mobile _Herald and Tribune_, -Sept. 7, 1845. The Whigs were of course inclined on partisan grounds -to denounce the Democratic party and the administration for every sign -of hostility to Mexico, and to maintain that if the Texas policy of -their candidate for the Presidency, Henry Clay, had been followed there -would have been no danger of war. Indeed, it would seem at first sight -as if they could have found no logical escape from this position. But -they were able to say, particularly in the south: We opposed immediate -annexation; we predicted that it would cause trouble with Mexico; but -the country voted that way, and now as patriotic Americans we accept -the consequences. Sentiment in favor of fighting Mexico was by no means -confined to the Democrats. - -6.17. ("Slaves") N. Orl. _Comm. Bulletin_ in Savannah _Republican_, -Aug. 15, 1845. The popular American idea of a Mexican was a fat face, -a double chin, a muddy complexion, a bloated body, coarse appetites, -a crude organization generally, and no brains to speak of above the -ears--only enough to talk with. Spanish rule and the mixture of Indian -blood had tended naturally to produce something of this sort, but finer -types were very numerous and sometimes brilliant. (Soldiery) N. Y. -_Tribune_, May 11, 1845; =354=Welles papers. (Picture) _Comm. Bulletin_, -Mar. 17, 1842. "_Who's for Mexico?_" ran Colonel Dakin's advertisement -in the New Orleans _Tropic_; "All who may feel disposed to make a -pleasant excursion to the Frontiers of Mexico (and perhaps to explore -some parts of that country) will find all the means and facilities -requisite by enrolling themselves in the Regiment of Louisiana -Volunteers" (Phila. _No. American_, Aug. 27, 1845). - -6.18. _Nat. Intelligencer_, Sept. 4. _Picayune_, Aug. 27. _Enquirer_, -Aug. 10. _Union_, Aug. 21, 1845; Feb. 10, 1847. _Reveille_, Aug. 28. -("Go") _Picayune_, Aug. 17. =297=Buchanan to McLane, Sept. 13. - -6.19. (_News_) Mobile _Herald and Tribune_, Sept. 7; Oct. 22, 1845. Less -was said for a time, but probably no less was felt. Of course the New -Englanders did not share the sentiment very fully. The South Atlantic -states--influenced by Calhoun and, as Poinsett admitted (=192=to Lewis, -Jan. 5, 1846), by the dread of privateers--did not feel sure that the -stake was worth the risk. But the total sentiment in favor of war with -Mexico was tremendous. Calhoun himself recognized that the country stood -that way (Jameson, Cal. Corresp., 704 to T. G. C.). _Correspondent_, -Apr. 15, 1846. _Enquirer_, Jan. 20, 1846. _Mo. Reporter_, Apr. 18, 1846. -=210=Hammond to Simms, Mar. 21, 1847. - -6.20. (Glory) =345=Poinsett to Van Buren, Mar. 9, 1848. (Power) Jameson, -Calhoun Corresp., 728. (Oregon) Pendleton, Stephens, 76. (Re-elected) -Johnston and Browne, Stephens, 200. (Bancroft) Schouler, U. S., iv, 498; -Howe, Bancroft, i, 288, 290. The subject of California will be discussed -fully in chap. xvi, but in order to allay prejudice it is touched upon -here.] - -6.21. See "Office-seekers" in index of Polk's Diary. - -6.22. Anson Jones, the last President of the Texas republic, asserted in -his book that Polk was "pre-determined to have a war" with Mexico (p. -46). As evidence he maintained that Donelson, the United States minister -in Texas, under the pretext of defending Texas against an unreal danger -of invasion, brought into that country American troops in order to -ensure a collision with Mexico; but (1) Donelson fully believed that -Texas was in danger of invasion, and (2) there were ample grounds for -that opinion (Smith, Annex. of Texas, 449). Moreover Donelson, instead -of hurrying our troops into Texas, was very anxious that none should -cross her frontier until after her full acceptance of annexation, which -could not occur before July 4, 1845 (_ibid._, 446, 448, 456); and we -have seen how threatening were the language and movements of Mexico at -that stage. As Texas became to all intents and purposes a part of the -United States on accepting our proposition, the duty to protect her -people was then clear. - -Jones also asserted that agents of Polk urged him to send the Texas -militia against Mexico in the spring of 1845 in order to bring about -a war;but this is misleading (Smith, Annex. of Texas, 446-8). The -confidential orders given to Conner and Stockton of the navy and the -correspondence between the state department and Donelson prove that -Polk's administration had not the least intention of adopting at this -time an aggressive course toward Mexico. - -Finally, Jones stated that he received clear proof of his charge from -Texan agents at Washington. He admitted, however, that (although he does -not appear to have lost any other important documents) he had mislaid -their reports; and his assertion is inconsistent with known facts. -For example, he said (p. 491) that Lee, one of these agents, reported -about September 13 that he found Polk, Marcy, Walker and Ritchie -"excessively angry" with Jones for not consenting, months before, to -an attack upon Mexico; but Lee did in fact report, September 6 and 8, -that he was received "cordially" by Polk, Walker and Ritchie, and that -Polk sent his "sincere regard" to Jones (Jones, Memoranda, 485, 490; -Tex. Dipl. Corres., ii, 398). Again, according to Jones another Texan -agent informed him "of the deep anxiety expressed by Polk for a war -with Mexico." Now of course Polk may have said that a war was needed -to redress American wrongs, but to suppose that a man who kept his own -counsel so closely would have confessed to this comparative stranger a -dishonorable intention concealed from everybody else, and would have -done so knowing that in reality he and Jones were at swords' points on -a vital matter, annexation, is incredible. When Jones wrote his book -he was a ruined man in consequence of the general and well-founded -belief that he had tried to prevent the incorporation of Texas in the -United States, and he was very bitter against Polk. Not long afterward -he committed suicide. His book, apparently prepared as a defence of -himself, is often untrustworthy; and how clear-headed he was at the time -of writing it is shown by his assertion that Texas was in undisputed -possession of the territory to the Rio Grande, yet that by advancing to -that stream Taylor "produced the Mexican war" (p. 68). - -Ashbel Smith, in general a much better witness, stated that agents of -Polk endeavored to have the militia sent against Mexico so as to bring -on a war (Remins., 66-7); but as he was in Europe at the time he had -no personal knowledge regarding the matter, and he also was opposed to -annexation. - -Evidence of Polk's alleged desire to provoke a war may be seen by some -in the language of the _Union_, his organ at Washington, which declared -blatantly that the Rio Grande was the boundary of the United States, -and that Mexico would invite ruin, should her troops cross it (May 1; -September 11, 13, 1845, etc.). But (1) the government had reason to -believe that we had been too mild toward Mexico, and may have wished -to suggest to her the danger of being rash; (2) the purpose may have -been to satisfy the many Americans who complained that our national -authorities lacked spirit; (3) as Polk was officially offering Mexico -the olive branch at this time, the bellicose utterances of the _Union_, -which was not recognized by the administration as its organ, could not -have been regarded by the Mexican government as evidence that he desired -a war, but only at most as a suggestion of what might follow should -the olive branch be rejected. From this point of view they would seem -to have tended toward peace rather than war (cf. his policy of having -Taylor and Conner assume bold attitudes--chap. vii, p. 152). - -6.23. The author's estimate of Polk is based upon a study of his -conduct and all the documents relating to him. One may consult to -advantage the Welles papers; Schouler, Hist. Briefs, 124, 129, 132; -Poore, Perley's Remins., i, 328-9; Howe, Bancroft, i, 294; Claiborne, -Quitman, i, 228; Jenkins, Polk, 330; McLaughlin, Introd. to Polk's -Diary; Meigs, Ingersoll, 273-4; _Id._, Benton, 382; Reeves on Polk's -Diary in _Polit. Science Review_, 1911, 288. =297=H. M. Field to Mrs. -Polk, Mar. 30, 1889 (Bancroft told me yesterday that Polk was abler than -any member of his Cabinet). Benton, View, ii, 680. (Toombs) Phillips, -Toombs, 37. Though Polk seems personally destitute of humor, he had -known how to make an effective use of it on the stump. It must not be -forgotten that he had served fourteen years in the national House and -been Speaker twice. (Fidelity) Polk, Diary, Aug. 14, 1848 (I had not -been three miles from the White House since July, 1847). - -6.24. (Discussions) _E.g._ Smith, Annex. of Texas, p. 264, note -(Benton). =351=Webster to son, Mar. 11, 1845. (Writhings) The reference -is to Polk's anxious and unfriendly expressions about Scott and Taylor, -which grew largely out of political considerations. See chap. ix, pp. -199-200. - -6.25. =297=Polk to Haywood, Aug. 9, 1845, confid. =297=Buchanan to -McLane, Sept. 13, 1845. - -6.26. =48=To Conner, Mar. 29; July 11; Aug. 16. =48=To Sloat, Mar. 21; -June 24. =48=To _Id._, Aug. 30 (orders to "preserve peace if possible"). -The despatch of June 24 to Sloat said further: You and every part of -your squadron "should be assiduously careful to avoid any act which -could be construed as an act of aggression." Dec. 5, 1845, Sloat was -notified that "our relations with Mexico are becoming more friendly." -The instructions to Sloat about occupying San Francisco were made -contingent on _Mexican_ action, indicating that an American declaration -of war was not even contemplated. =52=To Donelson, June 3. (Fremont) -Benton, View, ii, 579. Mrs. Fremont, with the approval of her father, -Senator Benton, held back the order (_ibid._). Richardson, Messages, iv, -427-8. The Washington correspondent of the N. Y. _Sun_ wrote: "It is -the opinion of those best qualified to judge, though not my own, that -the President did not seek or wish the war with Mexico" (_Sun_, June 4, -1846). - -6.27. _Republican_, Aug. 19. _Picayune_, Aug. 27. _Globe_, Aug. 25. -_Courier_ in _Picayune_, Aug. 27. - -6.28. (Scale) Polk, Diary, Sept. 30, 1845. Sen. 1; 29, 1, pp. 209 -(Scott); 649 (Bancroft). Howe, Bancroft, i, 289. (Navy unprepared) -Conner, Home Squadron, 9-10. - -6.29. =56=W. S. Parrott to Buchanan, June 29, 1845. The correspondence -between Buchanan and Slidell contains, to be sure, expressions -indicating a design to influence public opinion in the United States. -January 20, 1846, the minister was directed to conduct himself "with -such wisdom and firmness in the crisis" that the voice of the American -people would be "unanimous in favor of redressing the wrongs of our much -injured and long suffering claimants" (Buchanan, no. 5). But as Herrera -had now refused to receive Slidell and a peaceful settlement had become -extremely improbable, this was obviously a wise and proper injunction, -and by no means implied that a rupture had been desired. No one who goes -open-mindedly through the documents can accept the fine-spun theory -that Polk knew Slidell would not be received, and sent him in order -to make a show of pacific intentions and obtain a pretext for war. He -already had better grounds for war; and had he been determined to fight, -he would have been extremely foolish to offer his intended victim an -opportunity to restore friendly relations, for undeniably it was quite -possible--from the American point of view, considering the comparative -weakness of Mexico, far more than possible--that she would seize upon -it. Polk, Diary, Mar. 28-30; Apr. 3. _American (Whig) Review_, 1847, p. -325. Slidell, no. 13, Apr. 2. _Id._, Apr. 9 (Curtis, Buchanan, i, 599). - -6.30. _Examiner_, June 13. Ho. 158; 28, 2, p. 3 (Upshur). =13=Ashburnham -to Backhouse, July 6, 1838. Santangelo, Address, 31: "Have a number -of American citizens been unjustly injured by Mexico in their persons -and property, or not? Have our government and nation been gratuitously -outraged by Mexico, or not?" - -6.31. Slidell, Mar. 18 (Ho. 60; 30, 1, p. 66). =52=Dimond, no. 265, Oct. -1, 1845. British minister in _Siglo XIX_, Sept. 24, 1845. - -6.32. _Times_, Jan. 8, 15. _Picayune_, Dec. 30, 1845. Buchanan to -Slidell, no. 7, Mar. 12, 1847 (Information received from various -quarters that several European powers may be aiming to establish -monarchy in Mexico). Dec. 1, 1847, Olozaga showed in the Spanish Cortes -a statement of large sums spent by Spain in 1846 to place a Spanish -prince on the throne of Mexico (Dix, Speeches, i, 214, note). See also -chap. x, note 21. - -6.33. Vattel, Law of Nations (Chitty), book ii, chap. iv, secs. 49-51. - -6.34. American trade with Mexico declined from $9,029,221 in 1835 -to $1,152,331 in 1845 (_Niles_, Oct. 17, 1846, p. 104). (Contrary) -=52=Buchanan to Slidell, Nov. 10, 1845. The protest of the Mexican -minister at Washington against the annexation of Texas asserted the -right of his country to recover Texas at any time and by all the means -in her power (_Cong. Globe_, 30, 1, 334). - -6.35. (Oregon) London _Times_, Sept. 30, 1847. Polk, Diary, Apr. 22, -1846. - - - VII. THE PRELIMINARIES OF THE CONFLICT - -7.1. The claims did much to embitter feeling in both countries, were -one reason for Mexico's breaking off and refusing to resume diplomatic -relations, and brought Polk to the point of resolving to recommend -forcible action to Congress (p. 181). The series of diplomatic clashes -led to the danger of a Mexican attack and hence to Taylor's advance; and -his movement, besides exciting further displeasure in Mexico, offered -her a convenient and promising opportunity to strike. - -7.2. Smith, Annex. of Texas, 445, 449. =56=Wickliffe, private, May 21, -1845. =63=Marcy to Taylor, confid., May 28, 1845. Ho. 60; 30, 1, pp. -79, 804. Donelson, June 4, 1845, in Sen. 1; 29, 1, p. 66. =297=Polk to -Dallas, confid., Aug. 23, 1845. - -7.3. Richardson, Messages, iv, 388. =52=J. Y. Mason to Donelson, Aug. 7, -1845. - -7.4. M. B. de Arispe in _Niles_, Aug. 17, 1816. Ho. 60; 30, 1, pp. 130 -(Cardenas); 140 (Ampudia); 430 (Taylor, no. 93). _Cong. Globe_, 30, 1, -p. 911 (Stephens). =245=Bliss to Lamar, Oct. 15, 1846. =52=Buchanan to -Slidell, Nov. 10, 1845. Wilson, Slave Power, ii, 8. Z. T. Fulmore in -_Tex. State Hist. Assoc. Qtrly._, v, 28. T. M. Marshall, _ibid._, xiv, -277. I. J. Cox, _ibid._, vi, 81. _Aguila del Norte_, Mar. 11, 1846. -_Nat. Intelligencer_, Nov. 5, 1845; Dec. 12, 1846. Ho. Report 70; 29, 2. -Kennedy, Texas, ii, 30. Hitchcock, Fifty Years, 200. Fisher, Memorials. -Bolton, Texas, 1. Bancroft, No. Mex. States, i, 375, 604. Garrison, -Extension, 100, 103-7. Tex. Dipl. Corres., i, 257 (Irion). =52=Consul -Belt, July 5, 1844. Jones, Memoranda, 299 (Hockley). Sen. 18; 30, 1, -p. 8 (Marcy). Garrison, Texas, 262. Mexico a traves, iv, 375-6. Sen. -1; 29, 1, p. 90 (Donelson). =351=Storrs to Webster, Oct. 23, 1847. -=52=Woll, proclam., June 20, 1844. Boston _Advertiser_, July 13, 1843. -=64=Ayunt. of Matamoros to Taylor, June 10, 1846. =82=Gov. Tamaul. to -govs., Nov. 27, 1846. South. Hist. Assoc. Pubs., v, 351. - -The mere assertion of a boundary by Texas proved nothing. She claimed -Santa Fe, but the U. S. did not regard the claim as valid (=52=Buchanan -to Slidell, Nov. 10, 1845). Her jurisdiction was not established far -beyond the Nueces. Santa Anna, while a prisoner in her hands, made a -convention with her which appeared to recognize her claim, and the -fact that he was under duress did not signify; but he did not possess -Presidential powers at that time; Texas broke the agreement, and Mexico -repudiated it. England appeared to countenance the claim of Texas by -negotiating with her about the Beales grant, which lay in the disputed -region (Wash. _Union_, Feb. 25, 1847), but this was not at all decisive. -Trist's view that any previously existing boundary had been obliterated -by the war does not seem to have been attacked by the Mexican peace -commissioners (Sen. 52; 30, 1, p. 214). Roa Barcena argues that if there -was no boundary in Apr., 1846, the United States could not assert that -its territory had been invaded. This is a typically Mexican style of -argument, apparently decisive but not sound. The reply is that while no -_established_ boundary existed, there was a _claimed_ boundary, and that -a serious claim entitles one to act and speak provisionally very much as -if it had been established. Trist made another point: If Mexico does not -consider the wide and swift Bravo a safe boundary, how could Texas feel -satisfied with the little Nueces? The fact that the terms of annexation -specified "the territory rightfully belonging to Texas" was often cited -as evidence that we knew the Nueces-Rio Grande region did not. This was -a mistake. The expression only meant that we were not ready to endorse -all the territorial claims of Texas without investigating them. The most -doubted of her claims had nothing to do with that region; it related to -a part of New Mexico. - -7.5. Clay, Works, v, 213. Amer. State Papers: For. Rels., ii, 662; iv, -424, 430, 468-78. _Cong. Globe_, 25, 2, app., 555 (Preston); 29, 1, p. -817 (Adams). Richardson, Messages, iv, 483. Woodbury, Writings, i, 361. -Wash. _Globe_, Feb. 3, 1844 (Walker). Treaties in Force, 593. Buchanan -to Slidell, Nov. 10, 1845. _Forum_, July, 1901 (Boutwell). Ficklen in -So. Hist. Assoc. Pubs., Sept., 1901. Sato, Land Question. Wash. _Union_, -Apr. 27, 1846. =297=Polk to Houston, June 6, 1845; to Donelson, June -15, 1845. Claiborne, Quitman, ii, 14. Richardson, Messages, iv, 479 -(Texas as a part of old Louisiana). Ho. Report, 752; 29, 1. =52=Donelson -to Mayfield, July 11, 1845. Smith, Annex. of Texas, 140-4, 457-8. -Chase, Polk Admin., 128. Polk assured Houston that he need feel no -apprehensions regarding the Texas boundary in the event of annexation. -It may be said that Polk was inconsistent in offering to negotiate about -the boundary; but people negotiate about claims they believe in and even -about property they clearly own. He had in mind of course to hold the -Rio Grande boundary by satisfying Mexico. - -The aim in this paragraph is to bring out the essential (for the present -purpose) points of a matter that it would require a long article to -discuss fully, and many things have to be left unsaid. Personally the -author regards the American claim and all conclusions based upon it as -unsound. His aim is to show how the matter appeared to Polk. The author -is indebted to Dr. E. C. Barker and Dr. I. J. Cox for assistance in -reference to this statement; but no responsibility rests on them. - -7.6. Sen. 1; 29, 1, pp. 236 (Totten); 193 (Marcy); 208 (Scott). Sen. -378; 29, 1, p. 44 (Cooper). Ho. 60; 30, 1, p. 81 (Bancroft). Wash. -_Globe_, Sept. 4, 1845. _Journal Milit. Serv. Instit._, xvii (Van -Deusen). Ballentine, Eng. Soldier, i, 32, 36-7, 57. Stevens, Campaigns, -12-3. _Commercial Review_, Dec., 1846, 429 (Poinsett). Capt. Willing in -Prof. Memoirs of Corps of Engineers. _Cong. Globe_, 29, 1, 534-5 (Yell -_et al._). Ho. 38; 30, 2 (strength of the regular army, Jan. 1, 1846: -7194). Ho. 24; 31, 1: on Texas frontier, May, 3554 (regulars "present -and absent"). =61=Maynardier, June 15, 1846. Grant, Mems., i, 47-8. Sen. -1; 29, 2, p. 53 (Marcy: May 13, 1846, the entire military force was not -over 7640). In Nov., 1845, the army occupied thirty-seven posts. - -Each regiment comprised ten companies, but for economy the army had -virtually been skeletonized in 1842. After that time a company of -infantry and "artillery" included theoretically forty-two privates, a -company of field artillery sixty-four (_Journ. Milit. Serv. Inst. of U. -S._, iii, 415), and a company of cavalry fifty; but the numbers always -ran ten or twenty per cent below what the law allowed (Sen. 1; 29, 1, -p. 193). One or more "grenadier" companies (tall men) formed the right -of the infantry regiment, and it had also one or more "light" companies -(=180=C. F. Smith, Sept. 30, 1846; J. D. Toll in Mich. Pioneer Soc. -Colls., vii, 112). - -Most of the infantry carried flintlock muskets, which could not be -relied on for more than a hundred yards. Scott preferred that arm -because it had been thoroughly tested (Rowland, Register, 407) and -perhaps also because flints could be obtained more readily and surely -than could percussion caps. Some 38,000 smooth-bore muskets and 10,000 -rifles (calibre 54) were issued during the war. There seem to have been -several models of muzzle-loading rifles: Harper's Ferry (1814), model of -1819, model of 1840 or 1842; and some of Hall's breech-loading rifles -were used (Sen. 54; 30, 1, particularly table C). The First Mississippi -had Whitney rifles (Rowland, Register, 407). The rifles were much more -effective but much slower in operation than the muskets. Some 400,000 -flints and 950,000 percussion caps were issued. Regarding arms, etc., -one may consult Talcott, June 10 (Sen. 54; 30, 1); =39=Maynardier to -gov. Tenn., Sept. 28, 1847; =39=Marcy to _Id._, Sept. 27; Ho. 2; 29, -1, pp. 402, 418, 425; Sen. 1; 29, 2, p. 162; Ho. 41; 29, 2 (Talcott's -report); Sen. 1; 30, 1, p. 683; Norton, Amer. Breech-Loading Small Arms; -and visit the National Museum (Washington), and the museums at West -Point, Colt's factory (Hartford), and U. S. Cartridge Co. (Lowell). - -Our dragoons, who were "light cavalry," were armed with musketoons which -were carried on sling belts except on the march, sabres of the Prussian -dragoon style and horse pistols. The Mounted Rifles had percussion -rifles and Colt's army revolvers but no sabres. The cavalry had sabres, -rifle carbines, and Colt's navy revolvers (Brackett, U. S. Cav., 160). -Some "pepper-box" revolvers were used (Arnold, Jackson, 113). The -regular cartridge (very carefully made) consisted of powder, a bullet, -and three buckshot (=148=Chamberlain, recolls.). - -The field batteries were Companies K (Taylor) of the First regiment, A -(Duncan) of the Second, C (Ringgold) of the Third, and B (Washington) -of the Fourth. E (Bragg) of the Third actually served as light -artillery though not officially recognized as such until June, 1847. -Each of these companies had four or six bronze pieces, which included -two or more 6-pounders and usually one or two 12-pound howitzers. -See particularly =61=Maynardier's statement, June 15, 1846, several -letters in the Duncan papers, and _Journ. Milit. Serv. Instit._, iii, -415. In 1839 Capt. Robert Anderson translated the French "System -of Light Artillery." By 1842 a long course of experimenting gave -us suitable bronze for guns (Sen. 1, 30, 1, p. 679). That year the -commander-in-chief ordered a regular course of practice with field -artillery, and a liberal allowance of ammunition was made (_ibid._, -680). This branch of the service was also greatly improved by sending -three ordnance officers abroad to study the subject. Each head of a -battery was chosen for his special fitness, and Ringgold in particular -devoted himself to developing the arm with remarkable intelligence -and zeal (Henry, Camp. Sketches, 105; _Niles_, May 30, 1846, p. 201; -=259=Ridgely to cits., July 24, 1846; Sen. 1; 30, 1, p. 679; Wynne, -Ringgold; Benet, Ordnance Reports, ii, 158). - -By permission of the French government, Capt. A. J. Swift was sent to -Metz soon after the war with Mexico began to qualify himself to command -and instruct an engineer company. The corps included Swift (who died -before seeing service), G. W. Smith, and G. B. McClellan as officers, -10 sergeants, 10 corporals, 39 artificers, 39 second class privates, -and two musicians (Engineer School, U. S. Army, Occas. Papers no. 16). -The American infantry drill did not differ materially from that of the -British army (Ballentine). Our army was not fully equal to the best -European troops (Poinsett). There had been few opportunities to work the -three arms together. A serious defect of the army was the lack of an -intelligence department. - -The privates wore cloth fatigue caps, jackets and trousers, all of -blue; and the officers wore the same, except that at first they had -single-breasted frock coats (=128=Brackett, diary. _Id._, Lane's -Brigade, 250. Ramsey, Other Side, 424). Later, officers frequently had -jackets like the men's, but differently trimmed. Further remarks on our -army may be found in chap. xxxvi. - -7.7. _Taylor._ Fry and Conrad, Taylor, _passim_. French, Two Wars, 84. -=224=Hitchcock to brother, Aug. 10, 1845. Howard, Taylor, _passim_. -Robinson, Organization, ii, 6. =147=Chamberlain, diary. =332=Tennery, -diary. Scott, Mems., ii, 382-3. Hitchcock, Fifty Years, 198, 203. -Meade, Letters, i, 26. Claiborne, Quitman, i, 253-4. Poore, Perley's -Remins., i, 354. =280=Nunelee, diary. Frost, Taylor, 277. =139=W. B. -to D. Campbell, Apr. 25, 1847. Grant, Mems., i, 100, 139. Donnavan, -Adventures, 21. =180=Pillow to wife, Aug. 8, 1846. Wash. _Union_, Aug. -24, 1846. _Am. Hist. Review_, Apr., 1919, 446, 455-6, 462 (Marcy's -diary). And all of Taylor's correspondence. - -7.8. Scott, Mems., ii, 381-2, 386, 408. _Journ. Milit. Serv. Instit._, -xiv, 444. =224=Williams to Hitchcock, Nov. 8, 1848. Hitchcock, Fifty -Years, 147. Meade, Letters, i, 131. Mrs. W. R. Stauffer of New Orleans, -granddaughter of Gen. Taylor, to whom the author is indebted for -documents and information, told him that the family name for Bliss was -"Perfect Bliss." His precise title was Assistant Adj. Gen., of course. -It is instructive to compare Taylor's autograph letters with the -official reports credited to him. - -7.9. =63=Marcy to Taylor, confid., May 28. Sen. 1; 29, 1, pp. 57, 107 -(Donelson). Ho. 60; 30, 1, pp. 81 (Bancroft); 800-2, 806 (Taylor); -804 (Donelson). Sen. 18; 30, 1, pp. 6 (Donelson); 3 (Taylor); 8, 9 -(Marcy).Sen. 337; 29, 1, pp. 73-5. Sen. 378; 29, 1, p. 44 (Cooper). -_Journ. Milit. Serv. Instit._, 1882, p. 399. _Autograph_, Dec., 1911 -(Taylor). Wash. _Union_, June 25, 1847. Hitchcock, Fifty Years, 193. -_So. Qtrly. Rev._, Apr., 1846, pp. 440-3. _Hist. Mag._, Jan., 1870, 19. -Mexico had an outpost customhouse at Point Isabel, just north of the Rio -Grande. Paredes charged that a Mexican reconnoitring party was disarmed -at Laredo, on the north side of the Rio Grande. We have no other -evidence of such an affair. Taylor instructed Maj. Hays, commanding -Texas Rangers at S. Antonio, to send word of any Mexican movements in -the vicinity of Laredo, "with strict injunctions, however, to molest -no Mexican establishments" (Ho. 60; 30, 1, p. 107), and the orders to -occupy Laredo were not given until Oct. 15, 1846 (=245=Bliss to Lamar). -Possibly a threatening Mexican party may have been disarmed as a measure -of precaution, but the bare statement of Paredes cannot be accepted as -proof. - -7.10. Taylor, gen. orders, 1. Henshaw narrative. _So. Qtrly. Review_, -Apr., 1846, pp. 442-4. =66=Sanders to Taylor, Feb. 15, 1846. =197=Gaines -to R. Jones, Sept. 10. N. Orl. _Tropic_, Oct. 16. =42=Gov. Va. to gen. -assembly, Dec. 7, 1846. Taylor, Letters (Bixby), 173. =224=Hitchcock -to brother, Feb. 10, 1846. =13=Elliot, no. 21, 1845. =13=Kennedy, no. -22, 1845. Ho. 60; 30, 1, pp. 98, 100, 102-3, 802 (Taylor). Richmond -_Enquirer_, Sept. 13, 1845. =52=J. Y. Mason to Donelson, Aug. 7. -=331=Taylor to Conner, July 16. Mayer, War, 91-2. N. Y. _Tribune_, -Sept. 12. French, Two Wars, 34. J. Davis in _Cong. Globe_, 31, 1, app., -1034-41. Polk, Messages, May 11; Dec. 8, 1846 (Richardson, Messages). -Hitchcock, Fifty Years, 194. Meade, Letters, i, 26. Grant, Mems., i, 64. -Henry, Camp. Sketches, 17, 32. Sen. 378; 29, 1, p. 45. - -The Texans were kept at that point as scouts. Corpus Christi had been -held by Texas during her revolutionary contest with Mexico (_Tropic_, -Oct. 25, 1845). The other two companies of the Fourth Infantry were -ordered from Fort Scott to Taylor, and Bragg's artillery came from -Charleston harbor. The New Orleans artillery companies were called out -without authority by Gaines, who commanded the military dept. of the -west. They remained with Taylor the three months for which they engaged -(Sen. 378; 29, 1, p. 3). Taylor planned to go on to S. Patricio, now a -name rather than a place, 25 miles up the Nueces--a plan like that which -he soon executed on the Rio Grande. Lieut. Col. E. A. Hitchcock, who had -taught at West Point and now commanded the Third Infantry, pointed out -that, should he do so, his base would be a fine mark for attack. Taylor -would not see the point but he gave up the plan. (For this episode see: -=224=Hitchcock to brother, Feb. 10, 1846; _Id._, Fifty Years, 48, 196; -Grant, Mems., i, 71-2; Meade, Letters, i, 29.) He thought of Pt. Isabel -also; but, having so small a force, no engineers, and little artillery -(at first none), he deemed it unsafe to go there (Ho. 60; 30, 1, p. 107). - -7.11. London _Times_, May 14, 1846. (Knew) Hitchcock, Fifty Years, 195; -_So. Qtrly. Rev._, Apr., 1846, p. 443; Mayer, War, 91. (Accepted) =52=J. -Y. Mason to Donelson, Aug. 7, 1845. =256=Marcy to Wetmore, May 10, 1846 -(private): A "liberal confidence" was reposed in Taylor; "His positions -in Texas were left very much to his own judgment except they were to be -taken between the Nueces and the Rio del Norte." - -7.12. Henry, Camp. Sketches, 38-9. Ho. 60; 30, 1, p. 110. Wilhelm, -Eighth Inf., i, 257. J. Davis, in _Cong. Globe_, 31, 1, app., 1034-41. -N. Y. _Tribune_, Sept, 12, 1845. - -7.13. =65=Taylor, gen. orders, 2. =61=_Id._ to adj. gen., Feb. 3, -1846, and Scott's comments. =61=Adj. gen. to Taylor, Jan. 5, 1846. -_So. Qtrly. Rev._, Apr., 1846, pp. 440-57 [probably from Bragg]. -_Nat. Intelligencer_, Nov. 20, 1845. =13=Elliot, nos. 3, 14, 1846. -=218=Henshaw narrative. =136=Butterfield, recolls. Ho. 60; 30, 1, pp. -93, 96. =224=Hitchcock to brother, Aug. 10, 1845; Feb. 10, 1846. Mobile -_Commercial Register_, Aug. 23, 1845. _Autograph_, Jan.-Feb., 1912 -(Taylor). =364=Worth to S., Oct. 24; Nov.--, 20, 1845; to daughter, -Nov. 3. _Revue des Deux Mondes_, Aug. 1, 1847, 388-90. Hitchcock, Fifty -Years, 198, 203, 215. Meade, Letters, i, 31, 37. =13=Letter from Corp. -Chr., Nov. 29 (sent by Elliot). =185=Duncan to Bliss, Jan. 5, 1846; -to court of inquiry, Jan. 7. Henry, Camp. Sketches, 45. =213=Hatch to -sister, Oct. 28, etc. The conditions were probably tolerable until -November. - -7.14. Worth to S., Dec. 20, 1845; Jan. 1; Mar. 4, 1846. Meade, Letters, -i, 87. Hitchcock, Fifty Years, 204, 206. =60=Worth to Taylor, Mar. 8, -1846, and Scott's comments. =60=Churchill to Scott, Mar. 2. =69=Twiggs -to Bliss, Feb. 18. =69=Worth to Taylor, Feb. 24. =66=Mansfield to -Totten, Apr. 2. Polk, Diary, Mar. 11, 1846. (Concluded) =224=Hitchcock -to brother, Feb. 10, 1846. - -7.15. =63=Marcy to Taylor, Aug. 23. (No declaration) =297=Polk to -Dallas, Aug. 23; =52=J. Y. Mason to Donelson, Aug. 7, 1845. - -July 30 Marcy =63=instructed Taylor to place some forces south of the -Nueces, but Taylor had anticipated the order. The government was accused -of issuing vague orders with the hope that the General would assume -the responsibility of going to the Rio Grande; but it does not seem to -have shrunk from taking a stand when it had the requisite information. -Mexico did not in fact have all the "posts" north of the Rio Grande that -Marcy seems to have supposed were there, but besides the customs men at -Pt. Isabel, there seem to have been troops at Laredo and soldiers from -Matamoros crossed the river. Aug. 30 Marcy ordered Taylor to drive the -Mexicans beyond the Rio Grande, should they invade Texas (Ho. 60; 30, -1, p. 88). This was proper, for such an invasion would have seemed to -mean war; but the order showed a want of prudence (Upton, Mil. Policy, -197) because (1) Taylor was expected to draw reinforcements from the -states, which could not have provided them in time to save him from the -sudden attack of an overpowering Mexican army, and (2) he was authorized -to cross the river with militia, who could not legally be taken beyond -the border. Oct. 4 Taylor wrote that under his instructions he did not -feel at liberty to go to the Rio Grande. Oct. 16 Marcy directed him to -place his winter quarters (which implied that no aggressive plans were -in mind) as near the Rio Grande as prudence and convenience would permit -(Ho. 60; 30, 1, p. 89). This was judicious, for (as Marcy pointed out) -the troops might have to repel Mexican or Indian incursions, and, at a -season when they would be somewhat unprepared to move quickly, it was -particularly desirable to have them as near as possible to scene of -action. - -7.16. Polk, Diary, Jan. 13, 1846. The despatches were Slidell's Dec. -17 (with copy of _El Siglo XIX_ containing the council's report) and -Black's Dec. 18, which indicated that the administration and the council -of state had decided against Slidell. Polk, Message, Dec. 8, 1846. -_Cong. Globe_, 30, 1, app., 240-1. =63=Marcy to Taylor, Jan. 13. - -7.17. Ho. 60; 30, 1, pp. 103, 108, 111, 116-21 (Taylor); 649, 651-2 -(Cross). W. P. Johnston, Johnston, 131. Hitchcock, Fifty Years, 207. -=224=_Id._ to brother, Feb. 10, 1846. Henry, Camp. Sketches, 52. -=65=Taylor, gen. orders, 13, 20, 26, 30. =69=Sibley, Feb. 21. =69=Hunt -of the _Porpoise_, Mar. 11. =69=Mansfield to Taylor, Mar. 6. =76=Mejia, -Mar. 14. The soldiers were accompanied by about an equal number of -quadrupeds. - -7.18. Ho. 60; 30, 1, pp. 90, 92 (Marcy); 117, 120-4, 127 (Taylor); 651 -(Cross). _Diario_, Mar. 30; Apr. 10. C. Christi _Gazette_, Mar. 12. - -7.19. _The march._ Wilhelm, Eighth Inf., i, 401-4. Henry, Camp. -Sketches, 53-65. Smith, To Mexico, 22-9. French, Two Wars, 37, 41-5. -Henshaw narrative. =69=Twiggs to Bliss, Mar. 15, 1846. Grant, Mems., i, -69. Hitchcock, Fifty Years, 211. - -7.20. _Picayune_, Apr. 7, 1846. Ho. 60; 30, 1, pp. 123 (Taylor); 127 -(Mejia). =65=Taylor, gen. orders 33. Wilhelm, Eighth Inf., i, 404-6. -_Diario_, Apr. 24. =69=Alba to Taylor, Mar. 12. Henshaw narrative. -Smith, To Mexico, 29-31. Grant, Mems., i, 87-8. =69=Statement of -Italian. And from =76=the following. To Mejia, Mar. 1 (Mejia was -forbidden to take the aggressive because the govt. wished first to -gather enough troops to strike a decisive blow: =76=to Vega, Mar. 1). -Mejia, Jan. 18; Feb. 16; Mar. 4, 6, 14, 17, 18. Canales, Feb. 28. Mejia -to Vega, Feb. 16. C. Bravo to Mejia, Mar. 13; reply, Mar. 17. To Vega, -Mar. 1. Mex. officer (spy), Feb. 18. Mejia to Parrodi, Mar. 6; to -Canales, Feb. 16. Ampudia, Mar. 28. - -7.21. =65=Taylor, gen. orders 34-7. Henshaw narrative. Ho. 60; 30, -1, pp. 123, 125, 129, 132 (Taylor); 130 (Cardenas). =224=Hitchcock, -diary, Mar. 25. =66=Mansfield to Totten, Mar. 25; Apr. 23. Taylor, -Letters (Bixby), 173. Sen. 1; 29, 2, p. 46 (Marcy). =69=Statement of -Italian. _Picayune_, Apr. 7; May 1. Apuntes, 32. _Niles_, Apr. 18, p. -112. Hitchcock, Fifty Years, 211-7. Meade, Letters, i, 59, 100. Nebel -and Kendall, 1. Smith, To Mexico, 32-4. =163=Taylor to Conner, Apr. 3. -Robertson, Remins., July 7. _Monitor Repub._, Apr. 17. _Diario_, Mar. -15. =76=Mejia, Mar. 21, 28. =76=To Mejia, Mar. 21; Apr. 3. - -On his way to Point Isabel Taylor was presented with a formal protest -against his advance by J. Cardenas, prefect of northern Tamaulipas. -On the approach of his transports the captain of the port, by Mejia's -orders, set fire to the customhouse and the few poor thatched cottages -of the hamlet, and fled with the officials. Mar. 31 Taylor had present -opposite Matamoros and at Point Isabel 248 officers, 3001 rank and file -(=62=R. Jones to Cass, Jan. 21, 1848). - -7.22. Ho. 60; 30, 1, pp. 132-3, 145, 1202 (to Mejia, Mar. 28), 1203 -(Taylor); 134 (minutes); 1203 (Mejia). =65=Taylor, gen. orders 38-9, 45. -=61=_Id._ to adj. gen., Mar. 29. =66=Mansfield to Totten, Apr. 2, 23. -=285=Mejia to Paredes, Apr. 3. =76=_Id._ to Guerra, Mar. 28. Negrete, -Invasion, ii, 120. Smith, To Mexico, 34. =118=Berlandier, diary. -=118=_Id._, memo. Meade, Letters, i, 59. - -Taylor, a few minutes after his arrival, deputed Worth to reach an -understanding with Mejia. This proved impossible. Worth demanded -permission to confer with the American consul residing at Matamoros, -but was not permitted to do so. He notified the Mexicans that crossing -the river in armed force would be viewed as an act of war. Taylor's -field-work was called Fort Texas or sometimes Fort Taylor at first. -Taylor offered to let the people of Matamoros continue to use their port -on Brazos Island, which was north of the Rio Grande. =76=Jan. 6 he had -proposed to the Mexicans to agree on measures to prevent "exasperation -on either side." - -7.23. See p. 117. Ho. 60; 30, 1, pp. 133, 138-9, 142, 145 (Taylor); -140, 144 (Ampudia). (Leave town) =52=Consul Schatzel, July 18. _Niles_, -May 2, p. 132. _Monitor Repub._, Jan. 28, 1847. _Diario_, Apr. 5, -8, 25. =283=Gen. orders, army of the north, Feb. 18; Apr. 3, 14. -Ampudia, To Fellow-Cits. (and docs.). Negrete, Invasion, ii, 154, 157, -160. =52=Black to Castillo, May 1, 9. =52=Castillo to Black, May 5. -=69=Report from spy. And from =76= the following. Mejia, Feb. 4; Mar. -17, 18; Apr. 2. _Id._ to Ampudia, Apr. 5. To Ampudia, Feb. 18; Mar. 28; -Apr. 4. Ampudia, Mar. 28; Apr. 9, 11, 13, 14. _Id._ to gov. Tamaulipas, -Apr. 12. _Id._ to Schatzell, Apr. 11 (order of expulsion; any American -crossing the river to be shot). _Id._ to Mejia, Mar. 30. _Id._ to -Arista, Apr. 14. - -Ampudia was thoroughly Mexican in demanding that he should have all -the advantages and Taylor all the disadvantages of the _quasi_ state -of war that he insisted upon, in protesting against Taylor's action -as a declaration of blockade, which it did not pretend to be, and in -ordering Taylor to go beyond the Nueces, which he knew was regarded by -many Americans (though by no Mexican) as the boundary of Mexico. In two -additional ways he indicated that in his view a state of war existed -(Ho. 60; 30, 1, pp. 144, 147). The American consul, seventy years old, -had to set out on foot and spend the first night in a field during a -norther (_Republica de Rio Grande_, June 6). - -7.24. (Ampudia's orders) =73=Bermudez de Castro, no. 218, res., Mar. -29. Mexico a traves, iv, 545. Slidell, Jan. 14. Ramirez, Mexico, 79. -=285=Mejia to Paredes, Apr. 3. Carreno, Jefes, ccii, 141 (Ampudia was a -Cuban by birth). =199=Arista to Paredes, Dec. 15, 1845. =13=Bankhead, -no. 56, 1846. Meade, Letters, i, 61. (Aim) Bustamante, N. Bernal, i, -113. Apuntes, 34-5. And from =76= the following. (A.'s plans) Ampudia, -Mar. 28. _Id._, to Arista, Apr. 14. To Ampudia, Feb. 18. To Arista, Feb. -10; Apr. 4, 20, 22. Arista, Apr. 12, 29. Parrodi, Apr. 29. Ampudia, Apr. -13, 14. _Id._, proclam., Apr. 18. Arista to Ampudia, Apr. 10. - -According to Bermudez de Castro, the Spanish minister, the opposition -writers at Mexico expressed surprise because, after ordering Ampudia -to attack the Americans, the government stated it had not committed -and would not commit an act of aggression against the United States. -Mar. 7 Ampudia ordered Mejia to attack the Americans, but not to risk a -decisive action (=76=Mejia, Mar. 17). The evidence that Ampudia had been -ordered to attack Taylor is supported by the fact that he tried to do so -even after he knew he had been superseded. - -7.25. (Orders) =76=Tornel to Arista, Apr. 4; =76=Arista to Guerra, -Apr. 26; May 7; Washington _Union_, Aug. 27; Bankhead, no. 90, 1846. -=76=Arista to Torrejon, Apr. 24. Ho. 60; 30, 1, pp. 132, 140, 1205 -(Taylor); 290 (Thornton); 291 (Hardie); 1204 (Arista). =76=Testimony -in the court-martial of Arista (Jauregui, Torrejon, Carrasco, Canales, -Mendoza). Smith, To Mexico, 39-42. _Spirit of the Times_, May 23. -Campana contra, 4. =69=Court of Inquiry on Hardee, May 26. Wash. -_Union_, May 9. _Niles_, May 16, pp. 165, 176. Negrete, Invasion, ii, -147. =65=Taylor, gen. orders 74. =169=_Id._ to Crittenden, Sept. 1. - -Taylor had called repeatedly for reinforcements to the regular army -(Ho. 60; 30, 1, pp. 102, 114, 132). Up to May 8 he received 56 recruits -(_ibid._, 142). The conciliatory policy of the Americans made it -impossible to take military precautions against spies, and Thornton was -doubtless betrayed. He did his best. Taylor, with a view to the vigorous -prosecution of the war, called on Texas for two regiments of infantry -and two of horse, and on Louisiana for two of infantry. The order to -attack Taylor was doubtless recommended by Tornel, the minister of war, -who hated the United States; but perhaps he had a particular motive. He -had been at work for S. Anna when Paredes seized the Presidency, and he -knew that it would cripple Paredes (thus opening the way for S. Anna) to -provide funds and send troops from Mexico City for a war with the United -States (=52=Black, May 26; Dimond, Jan. 15). - -7.26. Boston _Atlas_, a strong Whig journal, said, Dec. 11, 1846: "There -is no doubt that the conduct of that government [Mexico] towards us has -been such as might have justified the extreme resort to war." Polk, -Diary, Apr. 21, 25, 28; May 3, 5-9. - -7.27. C. J. Ingersoll, chrmn. Ho. com. for affairs (_Cong. Globe_, -29, 2, app., 128): I urged Polk to anticipate invasion by crossing -the Rio Grande, but he would not. (Reasons) _So. Qtrly. Rev._, Nov., -1850, 434-5. =331=Taylor to Conner, Apr. 3. (Effect) =60=Lieut. Irons, -Apr. 20; =76=Arista, Apr. 27; Negrete, Invasion, ii, 120. (Flimsily) -=312=Mejia to Arista, Oct. 6, 1845; =76=Requena in trial of Arista. - -7.28. _Cong. Globe_, 29, 2, p. 498; 30, 1, app., 64. Polk, Message, Dec. -8, 1846 (Richardson, Messages, iv, 484). (Marcy) Sen. 1; 29, 1, p. 194. -=52=Buchanan to Trist, Oct. 25, 1847. Jan. 27, 1847, a bill establishing -post-routes south of the Nueces passed the Senate unanimously (_Cong. -Globe_, 29, 1, p. 251). (Six months) _Nat. Intelligencer_, Sept. 4, -1846. (People) _Mo. Reporter_, Jan. 6, 1846. It is true that no right -to go _to_ the Rio Grande was explicitly asserted; but as everybody -held that either that stream or the Nueces was the boundary, a claim -extending beyond the latter extended practically to the former. See -Lumpkin's speech (_Cong. Globe_, 29, 1, 836). More than a month before -Taylor left Corpus Christi the House voted down a motion to ask the -President whether he had ordered our forces to move against Mexico, and -thus became accomplices of Polk (Von Holst, iii, 214-5). The order of -Jan. 13 soon became known to Congress and the public (_Cong. Globe_, 30, -1, p. 279). Feb. 3 Ashmun of Massachusetts offered a resolution calling -upon the President for information regarding the matter (_ibid._, 280). -Mar. 23 Brinkerhoff stated in the House that Taylor's army must be -supposed to be approaching or already upon the Rio Grande; yet no one -in Congress protested (29, 1, 534). Mar. 26, 1846, while discussing an -appropriation bill, McIlvaine of Penn. said that in sending troops to -the Rio Grande Polk had been "invading Mexico" (_ibid._, 558); yet, -though he made a most urgent appeal to the opponents of slavery--in -behoof of which he intimated the step had been taken--and there were -other objections to the bill, it passed the House by 111 to 38 (_ibid._, -573-4). Note also the vote on Delano's motion (chap, ix, note 4). See -chap. xxxiv, note 16, and the corresponding text. - -7.29. (1794) Ho. Report 752; 29, 1, p. 44; C. J. Ingersoll in _Cong. -Globe_, 29, 2, app., 129; Chase, Polk Admin., 131-2; Schouler, U. S., i, -296-7. (Fla.) Moore, Amer. Diplom., 163; H. Adams, U. S. v, 310-4, 318. -Benton, Abr. Deb., xvi, 77 (Pearce). (Hilliard) _Cong. Globe_, 29, 1, p. -148. (Adams) _Ibid._, p. 127. - -7.30. (Weakened) Wash. _Union_, Jan. 11, 1848 (Reverdy Johnson in -Senate); =256=Marcy to Wetmore. May 10, 1846; _Cong. Globe_, 29, 1, -app., 934; 30, 1, app., 65. (Wise) =52=Buchanan to Slidell, Jan. 20, -1846. (Argument) =56=W. S. Parrott, Aug. 5, 1845; Slidell, Feb. 17, -1846; =364=Worth to S., Oct. 2, 1845; Ho. 60; 30, 1, p. 107 (Taylor, -Oct. 4); _Niles_, July 18, 1846, pp. 313-4; Polk, Diary, Sept. 1, -1845; =108=Mayer to Bancroft, May 22, 1846; London _Times_, May 30, -1846 (Wash. corr.); Calhoun in _Cong. Globe_, 29, 2, p. 499 (Those in -power were confident that the march to the Rio Grande would not bring on -war); M. Brown in _Cong. Globe_, 29, 2, app., 356 (Polk determined to -convince the Mexicans by hostile demonstrations that they must settle -promptly); Hilliard denounced Polk in the House for using a display of -force to intimidate Mexico (_Cong. Globe_, 30, 1, p. 566), and Calhoun -felt somewhat the same (_ibid._, 497); Boston _Atlas_, May 15, 16, 1846 -(Wash. corr.); Howe, Bancroft, i, 282; =345=Poinsett to Van Buren, May -26, 1846; =108=Bradford to Bancroft, Aug. 17, 1845; Coxe, Review, 38. -Public men who talked with Polk probably knew more about his views than -anti-slavery agitators who did not. Calhoun and Brown were criticising, -not defending, Polk. =162=Bancroft to Conner, Jan. 17, 1846. Wash. -_Union_, Oct. 15, 1847. (Conceded) Boston _Atlas_, May 15, 16, 20, 1846. -See also chap. vi, note 22, last paragraph. - -7.31. Wash. _Union_, Oct. 15, 1847. =256=Paper indorsed "Projet--Genl. -Scott." Richardson, Messages, iv, 486. (Sabine) =76=Mora, Nov. 15, 1845. -(Prevented) =81=Arista to troops, July 31, 1845; =76=_Id._ to Parrodi, -Dec. 22. Addressing the nation in denunciation of the revolution of -Paredes, Dec., 1845, the Mexican Chamber of Deputies stated that only -his attitude had prevented war upon the United States that year. -=77=Almonte, Sept. 20, 1844. (Mobile) =66=Sanders to Taylor, Feb. 15, -1846; Elliot, chap. v, note 6; _Nat. Intelligencer_, May 29, 1845; Sept. -10, 1846. (180) Stevens, Campaigns, 18. =52=Dimond, no. 257, 1845. W. S. -Parrott, July 22, 1845. =297=Polk to Dallas, Aug. 23, 1845. (Accentuate) -=256=Marcy to Wetmore, Aug. 12, 1845; Jan. 21, 1846 (Our relations with -Mexico "have worsened by the change which has undoubtedly taken place -in that country"). =76=Mejia to Canales, Feb. 16, 1846; to Guerra, Mar. -17. Art. 1, sec. 10 of our Constitution and the Act of Feb. 28, 1795, -show that not only invasion but danger of invasion authorized military -measures. Authorization implied a corresponding duty. To neglect this -duty and throw the matter into Congress, where partisan complications -and ignorance regarding the region and the circumstances prevailed, -would have caused the delay which the Constitution aimed to prevent. -Note also _Cong. Globe_, 29, 2, app., 209-10, col. 1 (action of com. -for. rels.). Again, had Texas been independent in Jan., 1846, no one -would have censured her for sending troops to the Rio Grande; and the -United States succeeded to all her rights. This right was independent of -our claim to the intermediate region (_Cong. Globe_, 30, 1, app., 425-6). - -7.32. _Picayune_, Dec. 12, 1846. (Confessed) =218=Henshaw narrative. -=13=Giffard to Bankhead, May 13, 1846. Henry, Camp. Sketches, 106. - -7.33. =297=Scott, memo., undated. - -7.34. Von Holst, U. S., iii, 245, note. _Autograph_, Jan.-Feb., 1912 -(Taylor, Apr. 7). The proof that Mexico claimed still to the Sabine is -voluminous: _e.g._ Paredes, proclamation, Mar. 21, 1846 (Mexico "does -not acknowledge the right of the American flag on the soil of Texas, and -she will defend her invaded territory"); =76=Gen. Mora, Nov. 15, 1845 -("the contest in which the Republic is engaged with the United States -for the possession of the territory of Texas"); _Diario_, Mar. 25; Sept. -18, 26 (the Sabine "is the boundary"), 1846; _Monitor Repub._, June 28, -1847 (Mexico "neither recognizes nor has recognized any boundary except -the Sabine"); Pena, Comunicacion circular, Dec. 11, 1845 (indicates -repeatedly that the object of the war would be the recovery of Texas); -Otero, Comunicacion. (After Herrera's fall "reconquest [of Texas] again -became our policy"); Memoria de ... Relaciones, Jan., 1849. Wash. -_Union_, Nov. 10, 1847. (Probably) =69=Alba to Taylor, Mar. 6, 1846; -=76=Mejia, Jan. 21; Mar. 28; =76=Mora, May 4; Bankhead, no. 47, 1846: -note Mejia's action in Feb. and March, 1846, _supra_; and Ampudia's -orders to him before Taylor left Corpus Christi (note 24). (Notice) -=76=Relaciones to ministers at London and Paris, July 30, 1845. Benton -in _Cong. Globe_, 29, 2, p. 497 (the causes of the war existed before -Taylor advanced, and his advance resulted from them). See also the next -note. - -7.35. Otero, Comunicacion. Negrete, Invasion, iii, app., 486, 490. -_Monitor Repub._, Oct. 29, 1847. (Arista) Suarez y Navarro, Alegato, 48. -Polk, Message, Dec. 8, 1846 (Richardson, Messages). Paredes to Arista, -Apr. 18 (captured in A.'s baggage, May 9, 1846) in Wash. _Union_, -Aug. 27, 1847, and in _Tex. Democrat_, Nov. 11, 1846. The reader will -not fail to note the decisive bearing of the letter of Apr. 18 on the -question discussed in the preceding paragraph. - -7.36. Vattel, Law of Nations, 352. If any substantial arguments against -Polk's course existed, Calhoun, Webster or the _American (Whig) Review_ -should have been able to find them. Calhoun (_Cong. Globe_, 29, 2, p. -500) said Polk should have refrained from sending Taylor to the Rio -Grande and have referred to Congress or the Senate the question of -the boundary. But (1) he forgot that as to the boundary near the east -(the only part of it now under consideration) our government stood -committed; (2) he did not seem to know whether Congress or the Senate -was the proper authority on the subject; (3) he refuted his criticism -by saying that Polk should have referred the question on finding he -could not settle it by negotiation; and Polk, instead of having found -he could not do so, had Taylor advance with the hope of thus inducing -Mexico to negotiate; (4) Calhoun had thought it right in 1844 to place -our military forces virtually at the orders of Texas for defensive uses -(Smith, Annex. of Texas, 367), and she would very likely have sent them -to that river (see Wash. _Union_, Feb. 22, 1847); (5) reference of the -question to Congress would almost certainly have caused long delay and -paralyzed the Executive, for about fifteen unsuccessful attempts were -made in the business of annexing Texas to determine the boundary, and -after the war that subject vexed Congress for nearly two years. (See -also the text.) Calhoun's fundamental objection against the President's -policy, however, was that Polk should have let the Mexican difficulties -alone until after settling the Oregon question (_Cong. Globe_, 29, 2, -p. 498). But (1) it was not certain that the Oregon question could be -settled amicably; at one time, as we have noted, Polk believed it could -not be; and therefore it may well have seemed prudent to get rid of -a smaller but annoying affair before the greater one should reach a -crisis; (2) other important reasons for settling with Mexico have been -given on pp. 118, 120-2, 134-7. - -Webster, after thinking on the subject for more than half a year, took -it up in a long speech at Philadelphia (Writings, iv), and said: Polk -ordered the occupation of territory to which we had "no ascertained -title" (p. 26). [But a serious claim may be an adequate basis for -pacific joint occupation.] Polk viewed the Rio Grande as the boundary -[being committed to that position], and "intended to extinguish the -Mexican title by force" (p. 27). [Polk desired to extinguish it through -negotiation, and had not abandoned the effort to do so when he ordered -Taylor to advance. Mexican jurisdiction was not to be attacked. There -were other grounds than that alleged by Webster for the instructions -given to our general.] Taylor was ordered to treat every Mexican -assertion of title as an act of hostility (p. 29). [By no means. Taylor -was ordered not to molest the Mexican posts.] Why did not Polk consult -Congress before ordering Taylor to the Rio Grande (p. 29)? [The matter -could not be laid in definite shape before Congress until the fate of -Slidell's mission should have been decided. Polk's diary shows that he -desired to present the matter to Congress as promptly as he could.] Only -"self-defence" could justify sending troops into a territory claimed -and occupied by a power with which at that time no war existed (p. 29). -[This can hardly be admitted. We claimed the territory; Mexico was -believed to have troops there; it was only fair to place ourselves on an -equality with her.] And "there was, I think, no case of such necessity -for self-defence" (p. 30). [Webster admits that for self-defence -(_i.e._ defence of the Texans, now virtually American citizens) we -had a right to send the troops, and it is believed that the necessity -of such defence has been established in the text.] Taylor's letters -prove that there was no danger of a Mexican invasion (p. 30). [Taylor's -outlook extended, and his letters had reference only, to the immediate -frontier, and even to little of that except Matamoros. He could furnish -no opinion regarding the intentions of the Mexican government. Of the -orders actually given to the Mexican generals he was in total ignorance -until after May 9, 1846. The outlook of the authorities at Washington -was broader and clearer than his, and as the text shows they were -warned officially that Mexico was liable to make secret preparations -and a sudden invasion.] "Ordering the army to the Rio Grande was a step -naturally, if not necessarily, tending to provoke hostilities" (p. -31). [Of course the assertion of a claim denied by another power tends -naturally in the direction of hostilities, but no nation can for that -reason forbear to assert its claims. Webster's suggestion that sending -the troops did not necessarily produce hostilities is noteworthy. If the -President can declare war, what becomes of the Constitution, which gives -that power to Congress (p. 32)? [The President may take steps logically -leading to war; but in this case there was reason to believe that -Taylor's advance might tend toward peace.] Was it Polk's object to force -Mexico to treat? If so, it was an "idle hope" (p. 32). [Here Webster -seems to admit that such might have been Polk's intention. The fact that -Polk failed does not prove that such was not his design. Webster failed -to acquire northern California, but he certainly attempted to do so.] It -will be said that Polk's course was sanctioned by "the act of May 11th," -1846 (the virtual declaration of war against Mexico, the preamble of -which stated that Mexico had brought on the war), but neither a preamble -nor an act of Congress can "create a fact" (p. 32). [But a preamble can -state an opinion; and Congress thus expressed an opinion justifying the -President's course.] "I hardly suppose" Congress by that act "meant more -than to enable the President to defend the country, to the extent of the -limit claimed by him" (p. 32). [He claimed the Rio Grande as the limit; -and if Congress believed the country was to be defended to that river, -it believed the country extended to it, and consequently that Polk had a -right to send troops thus far. - -The most plausible criticisms made by the _American (Whig) Review_ -(July, 1846) were the following: Buchanan informed Slidell that the army -had been ordered to advance in view of his probable rejection, and -hence Taylor's advance was not, as Polk asserted, due to the urgent -necessity of defending Texas. [But the probable rejection of Slidell -meant probable fighting of a more or less serious nature north of the -Rio Grande.] Attempts were made from time to time, by throwing out -hints, to induce Taylor to advance on his own responsibility to the Rio -Grande [note 15]. As he did not, Slidell was sent to precipitate the -issue. [There is no evidence in support of this theory and much evidence -against it, as we have seen.] As Slidell failed to do so, Taylor was -positively ordered to the Rio Grande. [January 13 there was every reason -to believe that Slidell would be rejected, and that thus an issue would -be precipitated. December 20 Pena y Pena wrote to Slidell that unless -the pending difficulties were settled by negotiation there must be war. - -In January, 1847, the _Review_ repeated Webster's argument that Taylor -reported no danger of invasion. [Note the comment made above.] October -16, Marcy wrote to Taylor that no serious danger from Mexico was -feared, yet gave him authority to advance to the river. [A foray would -not be considered a serious military operation, but it was necessary -to guard against forays.] On January 13, Polk had no reason to expect -that Paredes intended to open hostilities. [He had grave reasons for -expecting hostilities. See p. 100.] He had Slidell's despatch of -December 17, which intimated that it might be more possible to negotiate -with Paredes than with Herrera. [Slidell only said that he might -have greater chances of accomplishing something with a less friendly -but more efficient government.] Besides, it was known that war would -have to proceed from the Congress, not from the President of Mexico. -[Holding that Texas was a part of Mexico and the presence of American -troops there an invasion, Paredes took the ground that attacking us -would not be making war, but merely defending the country as it was -his duty to do. (See his manifesto of April 23, 1846.) Consequently -no action by Congress was necessary.] Polk says the Mexicans did not -place their hostilities on the ground of our occupying non-Texan -territory, but they did do so. [Certain Mexicans took this ground for -the purpose of embarrassing the Americans, among whom there was known -to be a difference of opinion on this point; but the national Mexican -authorities regarded as our essential offence the presence of our troops -on Texan soil: note 34. - -In February, 1847, the _Review_ said that on January 13, 1846, Polk did -not know Slidell would be rejected. [Polk carefully avoided stating that -at that date Slidell's rejection was certain. He spoke of it as "highly -probable," which was rather less than could have been said.] April 6, -Taylor referred to the Mexicans of Matamoros as "the enemy." [As the -word occurred in a report to our government it did no harm, even if not -well chosen; but at that date Taylor had been given by the Mexicans -sufficient ground for using it.] Taylor pointed guns at Matamoros for -the purpose of stinging the Mexicans into hostility. [See p. 151.] The -intention of the American government was to manage things so as to make -Taylor the scapegoat if matters should go ill, and take the credit if -they should go well. [The orders of the war department were probably as -definite as they could safely be made. See p. 142.] Polk ordered Taylor -to advance because he did not believe the failure of Slidell would be a -pretext for war that Congress would accept. [This does not agree with -the charge made by Polk's enemies (_e.g. supra_) that he sent Slidell in -order to have him rejected and thus bring about a war. It is also wide -of the mark. In Polk's mind the essential ground for action was not the -rejection of Slidell but our grievances, and his diary shows that he -believed this ground would be accepted by Congress, or at least believed -so to such an extent as to decide upon raising the issue squarely. - -In October, 1847, the _Review_ stated the policy which it said Polk -should have adopted: to issue a statement that we would defend Texas, -that Mexico must pay the claims of our citizens, and that we desired -no Mexican territory; next, to take a defensive position in Texas, -perhaps occupy a Pacific port as security for our claims, and then -await developments. [As a military programme this plan of standing on -the defensive was seriously considered by the government and, as we -shall see, was condemned for both political and military reasons. To -say we desired no Mexican territory would have been meaningless unless -we pledged ourselves to take none, and to issue such a promise on the -eve of a war the course of which could not be predicted, and especially -in view of the fact that Mexico could pay no large indemnity except -with territory, would certainly have been imprudent, and the _Review's_ -proposition to seize a port as security for our claims suggests as much. -This proposition, by the way, was less justifiable than going to the Rio -Grande, for we had a claim to the intermediate territory and no claim to -a Mexican port. To take a defensive attitude in Texas signified either -going to the Rio Grande in order to obtain a good strategic position, -or maintaining at great expense for an indefinite period an army large -enough to guarantee the Texans against attack at any and every point. -The first of these plans was the one adopted by Polk; the second, on -account of the expense, would have been unjust to our own people, and in -the end would have compelled us to increase our demands for indemnity -against Mexico. Moreover, there were strong objections to waiting -(p. 136); and, had Mexico simply adhered to the policy of passive -resistance, all our trouble and expense would have brought us no nearer -a settlement. Still other objections to the plan of the _Review_ could -be offered. - - - VIII. PALO ALTO, RESACA DE LA PALMA - -8.1. The account of the Mexican army is based upon Memorias de ... -Guerra, 1844; Mar., 1845; Dec., 1846; =152=Claiborne, Mems.; _Diario_, -May 30, 1845; Balbontin, Estado Militar; Paz, Invasion; =5=Anaya, -Memoria; Pena, Comunicacion circular; _Siglo XIX_, Aug. 19, 21, 1845; -S. Miguel, Repub. Mex., 133-4, 136; Wash. _Globe_, Oct. 15, 1845; -Molina, recolls.; _Hist. Mag._, Feb., 1870 (Deas); Zirckel, Tagebuch, -13, 111; Semmes, Service, 441, note; =75=Memorias drawn up by war -dept. chiefs, Nov., 1847; =81=_Seminario Polit. del Gob. de N. Leon_; -Moore, Scott's Camp., 19; =76=Report of superior engineer board, Nov. -15, 1845; Balbontin, Invasion, 77-8; _Monitor Repub._, Nov. 30, 1847; -=148=Chamberlain, recolls.; =69=report of spy, Apr. 5, 1846; N. Orl. -_Commerc. Bulletin_, May 21, 1846; =76=Carrera, report on artillery, -Dec, 1847; =76=reports of the powder mills at Zacatecas and Santa Fe. - -Dec., 1843, a special school of application for artillery and engineer -officers was decreed, but lack of money prevented its establishment. -There was a normal school, intended to convey the rudiments of military -knowledge to the privates through the corporals and sergeants, but it -signified little or nothing. Attached to the engineer corps was a body -of sappers, miners, and pontoniers; but, owing to lack of funds to equip -it with, it served as infantry. The poorest cannon, especially at first, -were kept at the fortresses. What horses could be had for artillery -service were too light and frisky. Paredes reorganized this arm, and -assigned to it about 250 officers, 5000 privates, and 200 clerks and -workmen. The bronze cannon manufactured in Mexico during 1846-47 were -not satisfactory, and the grape-shot was so poorly made that its range -was considerably reduced. The importance of artillery had never been -appreciated in that country. There was a good arsenal at Mexico, and -there were old-fashioned powder-mills at Santa Fe (near that city) and -Zacatecas. The latter blew up early in 1845, and, though repaired, -worked at a disadvantage. Mexican powder was usually of an inferior -quality. The Active corps contained fewer men than the Permanent. The -infantry musket carried an ounce ball; and the escopeta bullet was even -heavier and went farther. In both cases the very liberal charge of -powder increased the normal range. Many of the escopetas were merely -sawed-off muskets. The shaft of the lance was usually about six feet -long and the head about one foot. The Line infantry included light -companies (_cazadores_), which sometimes had rifles and sometimes -deserved to be called sharpshooters. There were mounted cazadores also. - -Each cavalry regiment consisted of four squadrons, and each infantry -regiment included two battalions, one commanded by the lieutenant -colonel, and the other by the major (_comandante de batallon_). There -were mounted corps called hussars, etc., but the difference of name -signified little or nothing, practically. Owing to the smallness of the -horses, the cavalry had not much shock-value. There were 635 cannon on -hand at the end of 1845, 25,789 muskets, 8155 swords, 100,000 artillery -projectiles, and more than 400,000 bullets. Tornel imported 104 new -cannon early in 1846. Differences of caliber interfered greatly with the -usefulness of the muskets. March 9, 1846, the departments were urged to -complete their legal quotas of troops as soon as possible. - -8.2. On the first day when volunteers were to enlist only eleven came -forward at Mexico. - -8.3. The figures are based upon the =76=official return of April 17 -supplemented by a large number of Mexican and American statements. -Most of the latter were exaggerated. The Americans were doubtless -misled often by the statements of prisoners, who wished to please -their captors. "The information obtained from prisoners ought to be -estimated at its proper value" (Napoleon, Maxims, 53). Mejia, the -regular commander of the first brigade, gave way temporarily to Garcia -on account of ill health. - -8.4. =69=Reports of spies. _Republica de Rio Grande_, June 27. -=118=Berlandier, memo., undated. =66=Mansfield to Totten, May 4. -=217=Henshaw papers. =76=Testimony at the trial of Arista. =76=Mejia, -Feb. 28; Mar. 18. =76=Commander of zapadores, Apr. 8. Henry, Camp. -Sketches, 68, 70. Mexico a traves, iv, 561. Campana contra, 4. - -8.5. _Monitor Repub._, Mar. 17. Negrete, Invasion, ii, 113, 117. _Revue -des Deux Mondes_, Aug. 1, 1847, 388-93. =13=Elliot, nos. 12, 14, etc., -1846. =66=Mansfield to Totten, Apr. 2, 23. =61=Worth to Taylor, Apr. 2. -=61=Scott to Marcy, May 7. =65=Taylor, gen. orders 42. =65=Marcy, gen. -orders 5. Sen. 230; 29, 1. =224=Hitchcock, diary. =62=Twiggs to Davis, -May 4. The principal causes of the absenteeism were assignment to higher -duties elsewhere and the impossibility (owing to the lack of a retired -list) of replacing invalided or superannuated officers. _Locomotor_, -Mar. 27. Campana contra, 4. Henry, Camp. Sketches, 129-30. Upton, Mil. -Policy. 206. =285=Mejia to Paredes, Apr. 3. =76=Comte. of Zapadores, -Apr. 8. =76=Mejia, Mar. 14, 28; Apr. 2. =76=_Id._ to Arista, Apr. 30. -=76=Ampudia to Arista, Apr. 30. - -8.6. =66=Sanders to Totten, Apr. 10 (Ft. B. badly placed). =185=_Id._ to -Duncan, Apr. 27. =69=Requena to Arista, Apr. 30 (might have enfiladed). -Hitchcock, Fifty Years, 217. _Republica de Rio Grande_, June 27. -_Picayune_, May 10. =118=Berlandier, memo. (Groves) Ampudia, Address -(1846). =52=Wickliffe to Buchanan, May 21, 1845. Giddings, Camp., 36. -_Niles_, May 16, p. 165; 23, p. 179. Kenly, Md. Vol., 42. Polk, Diary, -Apr. 1, 1847. =218=Henshaw narrative. Apuntes, 35. =66=Sanders to -Taylor, May 2. Wash. _Union_, May 9; June 6. Meade, Letters, i, 59-60. -_Journal U. S. Artill._, July, 1892, p. 293. =132=King to Buchanan, June -1. =69=Spy to Taylor, Apr. 11. - -Taylor's army lay on the Pt. Isabel road, which connected here with the -principal Matamoros ferry (_Paso Real_). Fort Brown was about a mile and -a half from the site of the present fort. The line of the fort at Pt. -Isabel enclosed about fifty acres, and could not be properly fortified -with the means at hand in the time allowed. May 2 the works were far -from complete. Some at least of the disadvantages of his position were -pointed out to Taylor, but he seemed to feel no concern. Marcy was -surprised that the Mexicans did not cross the Rio Grande near its mouth -and capture Pt. Isabel. The explanation probably was that they believed -the plan they acted upon was better. - -8.7. =217=Henshaw papers. =61=Crossman to ... Apr. 23. =66=Mansfield to -Totten, Apr. 23. Ho. 60; 30, 1, pp. 133, 138, 142, 288 (Taylor). _Spirit -of the Times_, May 23. Meade, Letters, i, 66 (the murder of Cross caused -intense resentment). Mexico a traves, iv, 561. Campana contra, 4. -=69=Walker to Taylor, May 2. Walker was absent on service when the men -were surprised. =52=Consul Chase, Tampico, May 1. _National_, June 18. - -8.8. Ho. 60; 30, 1, pp. 133, 302 (Taylor). (West Pointers) =224=Bliss -to Hitchcock, June 7. =76=Mejia, Apr. 9. =76=_Id._ to Arista, Apr. 30. -=76=Ampudia, Mar. 28. _Tropic_, May 7 (proclam. of Ampudia). Ballentine, -Eng. Soldier, i, 57-9. Kenly, Md. Vol., 39, 40. (Promises, etc.) -=69=Arista, "Advice," Apr. 20. =69=Report of spy, Apr. 5. Wilhelm, -Eighth Inf., i, 408. Meade, Letters, i, 53. London _Times_, June 8. Ho. -194; 29, 1 (Jones, May 5). _Spirit of the Times_, May 16. _Esperanza_, -Apr. 18. Bustamante, N. Bernal, ii, 11. =69=Mier y Teran to Mejia, May -4. Taylor gave orders to shoot soldiers attempting to cross the river. -Later, British deserters were not accepted. - -8.9. =76=Arista, May 1, 7. So. _Advocate_, June 10, 1846. =76=Ampudia -to Arista, Apr. 30. =76=Parrodi, Apr. 8. =69=Arista, "Advice," Apr. -20. =76=Mejia proclam., Mar. 18. (Lasted) Donnavan, Adventures, 102. -=76=Comte. gen. S. L. Potosi, proclam., Mar. 27. =76=Comte. gen. -Zacatecas to troops, Apr. 1. The Mexican press teemed with the ideas -here suggested. To an Indian anything as foreign as a neighboring -estate seemed dreadful. =76=Ampudia, Mar. 28. Apuntes, 33. (Despised) -=162=Conner to wife, May 9; Henshaw narrative; _Niles_, May 16, p. 165; -Sept. 12, p. 22. (Hardee) =224=Bliss to Hitchcock, June 7. Ampudia's -troops had mutinied on the way, but an appeal to their patriotism -had brought them round. There had been, as was usual, a good deal of -desertion; but to a certain extent those who stood by the colors were -for this reason above the average (=76=Ampudia, Mar. 10, 11, 12). -Taylor's method--uniformly despising the enemy and teaching his troops -to do so--was contrary to the practice of Caesar, Napoleon and the Duke -of Wellington (Napol., Maxims, 49, note). - -8.10. (Obvious) Henshaw narrative. =63=Marcy, Jan. 13. =69=Friend, [Apr. -11]. Ho. 60; 30, 1, pp. 138, 140, 142 (Taylor). =65=Taylor, gen. orders -45. (Seven) =69=McCall, report, Apr. 30. May 3 Taylor reported that his -lack of light troops had helped to keep him in ignorance of the enemy's -movements as if that lack had been due to some one else. He did not call -on Texas for troops until Apr. 26. Ripley (War with Mexico, i, 133) says -he did not call in February because such troops could serve only three -months. But had a call been issued then, the troops would probably not -have begun to serve for a month or two; and later he could have called -for a second small body. - -8.11. Mexico a traves, iv, 561. =76=Arista, Apr. 27; May 1. =76=_Id._ -to Ampudia, May 5. _Revue des Deux Mondes_, Aug. 1, 1847, 394-6. -_Republicano_, June 5. Campana contra. =76=Arista to Mejia, May 1, 2. -=76=Mejia to Arista, May 1, 3. =69=Diary captured in Arista's papers. -=76=Plana mayor diary. Apuntes, 35-7. Bustamante, N. Bernal, ii, 16. -=76=Testimony at trial of Arista. People in the United States could not -believe Taylor would permit the enemy to get between him and his base -(_e.g._ Mobile _Herald and Tribune_, May 3). At first Arista left only -1007 men at Matamoros, but, becoming anxious about the town, he sent -back the Morelia battalion. - -8.12. Henshaw narrative. Mansfield, Mex. War, 35. Ho. 60; 30, 1, p. 288 -(Taylor). Taylor, Letters (Bixby), 175. _Picayune_, May 12. Nebel and -Kendall, 1. _Niles_, May 23, p. 178. Ho. 1; 30, 2, p. 1161 (Conner). -=62=Twiggs to Davis, May 4. (Lowd, etc.) Meade, Letters, i, 74-5. -Appleton's Biog. Dict. (art. by J. Davis on Taylor). _Autograph_, -May-June, 1912 (Taylor). Smith, To Mexico, 44. Fry and Conrad, Taylor, -109-10. Henry, Camp. Sketches, 86. =76=Diary of plana mayor. =76=To -Arista, May 15. - -Mejia notified Arista that Taylor was preparing to move, but the news -arrived so late that the guns of Matamoros did not open fire upon him. -Arista pursued the Americans but could not overtake them; and a body of -dragoons that he ordered on was equally unsuccessful. On the morning -of May 3 the boom of heavy guns in the direction of Fort Brown (Grant, -Mems., i, 92; Henry, Camp. Sketches, 88) alarmed Taylor, and he gave -orders to set out at one o'clock (Henry, Camp. Sketches, 88; Smith, -To Mexico, 44), which showed that he felt no great confidence in its -defensibility even then; but he desired to strengthen the base and to -receive some ordnance and reinforcements that he then expected (Ho. -60; 30, 1, p. 288), and hence sent Capt. Walker with a small party to -communicate with Brown (Henshaw narrative). This was a hard task; but -after some fighting, Walker reached the fort, stated that Taylor would -return as soon as possible, obtained a reassuring report (Ho. 60; 30, 1, -p. 293), and with great difficulty made his way back (Henshaw papers; -Ho. 60; 30, 1, pp. 289, 293). May 1 Pt. Isabel had a force, including -civilians who took up arms, of 400-500 (_Niles_, May 16, p. 165; 23, p. -179; _Picayune_, May 10; Wash. _Union_, May 9). - -8.13. Meade, Letters, i, 74-8, 93. =65=Taylor, gen. orders 56, 58. -_Journ. Mil. Serv. Instit._, xli, 94. Ho. 60; 30, 1, pp. 288, 292-4 -(Taylor); 527 (spec. orders 60). _Autograph_, May-June, 1912 (Taylor). -Nebel and Kendall, 2. Grant, Mems., i, 167-8. Henry, Camp. Sketches, -88-9. (Leaving train, etc.) =224=Larnard to Hitchcock, June 13. Wash. -_Union_, May 9, 29, 30. _Niles_, May 16, p. 162. =62=Twiggs to Davis, -May 4. French, Two Wars, 49. Some of the officers were anxious to wait -for larger reinforcements (=185=L. C. to Duncan, Nov. 21), but Taylor -feared Fort Brown was getting short of ammunition. - -8.14. _The battle of Palo Alto._ Sen. 388; 29, 1 (Taylor and officers). -=65=Taylor, gen. orders 58. _Id._, Letters (Bixby), 1. Campana contra. -Mexico a traves, iv, 561-3, 566. =224=Bliss to Hitchcock, July 23. -=61=Arthur to brother, May 10. Meade, Letters, i, 79, 80. =13=Pakenham, -no. 54, 1846. McCall, Letters, 449-54. =224=Larnard to Hitchcock, -June 13. Eyewitness, Complete History, 23. =210=Alvord to Hammond, -May 22. Wash. _Union_, May 30. Map in Map Div., Lib. of Cong. _Nat. -Intelligencer_, May 11, 18; Sept. 3, 10. N. Y. _Journ. of Commerce_, -Feb. 24, 1847. _Diario_, May 29. _Tex. Democrat_, June 24. _Spirit of -the Times_, May 30. Portrait of Arista, city hall, Mex. =350=Weber, -recolls. =213=Hatch, letters. _Picayune_, Aug. 1, 1845; Sept. 24, 1846. -_Delta_, May 24. =118=Berlandier, diary and map. =185=Duncan to adj. -gen., June 19. =185=Marcy to Duncan, July 27. Nebel and Kendall, 2-3. -Smith, To Mexico, 45, 47-9. Fallo Definitivo del Supremo Tribunal [_re_ -Arista's conduct]. Sedgwick, Corresp., i, 16. _Niles_, June 6, pp. -215-16; Oct. 24, p. 122. Frost, Taylor, 81. _Hist. Mag._, Feb., 1870, -101-2. Haskin, First Artill., 80. _Journ. Milit. Serv. Instit._, xli, -96. Ampudia ante ... la Opinion Publica. (Stepped aside) Grant, Mems., -95. Sen. 378; 29, 1, p. 57. Sierra, Evolution, i, 214. _Esperanza_, May -23. _Monitor Repub._, June 2. _Autograph_, May-June, 1912 (Taylor). -Ampudia to Fellow-cits. =285=Arista to Paredes, May 14. =285=Segura -to Escudero, June 4. Ramsey, Other Side, 39, note, 48. (Losses) Ho. -24; 31, 1. Ho. 60; 30, 1, pp. 295, 393 (Taylor); 392 (Marcy); 1102 -(McIntosh); 403. =185=Duncan to Belknap, May 12. French, Two Wars, 49, -50. =364=Worth to S., June 13. Donnavan, Adventures, 102. Henry, Camp. -Sketches, 90-3, 95. Roa Barcena, Recuerdos, 36, 39. Sumaria mandada -formar ... J. L. Uraga. Negrete, Invasion, ii, 233. Wilhelm, Eighth -Inf., i, 414-9. Apuntes, 38-41. _So. Qtrly. Rev_., Nov., 1850, p. 446. -And from =76= the following. Testimony at the court-martial of Arista. -To Arista, May 17. Arista, May 7, 8, 13, 1846; July 12, 1847. Ampudia, -May 14. Requena to Arista, May 8. Vazquez to sister, May 25. Arista to -Ampudia, May 5; to Parrodi, May 9. Ampudia to Arista, May 11. Plana -mayor diary. - -REMARKS. When first seen, the Mexicans were probably two or -three miles from the Palo Alto pond, but they advanced until about a -mile and a half from that point. Both lines of battle were too long. The -batteries on both sides used solid shot mostly. On the placing of our -gunners in advance of the troops, see Napoleon, Maxims, 45. The Mexican -gunners fired mostly at the American artillery, but the American gunners -mostly at the Mexican infantry. It was said that not more than a dozen -Mexicans were killed with bullets. Many of the Americans were ordered to -sit down or lie down (particularly the Eighth Infantry); and as most of -the Mexican balls approached at a ricochet it was not very difficult to -dodge them. Whatever the Americans accomplished was almost wholly due to -their cannon. Not only the excellence of the ammunition and the accurate -fire, but the boldness and rapidity of the manoeuvres astonished the -Mexicans. It is not known why Taylor decided to rely on artillery, to -which (it was stated) he had referred contemptuously on the morning -of the battle as mere "gun wagons"; but presumably, as the field was -peculiarly well suited for that arm, Ringgold and Duncan, supported -by Bliss, urged him to let it have a chance. The American officers, -though they had not over-much confidence in Taylor, felt a great deal -in one another, and so had a vast advantage over the Mexicans (Mexico -a traves, iv, 566). Ringgold was mortally wounded, but would not let -his men leave their work to care for him. During the intermission the -Americans removed their wounded, replenished caissons, and made repairs. -Commodore Conner, hearing Taylor was likely to be attacked, sailed for -that quarter, and on May 8 and 9 landed 500 seamen and marines at Point -Isabel (=166=Conner Letter-book. See also =65=Taylor, gen. orders 60.). -The chief Mexican surgeon and a number of assistants made an early and -rapid retreat. The Mexican loss was estimated by Taylor as 200 killed -and 400 wounded; by Arista as 252 killed, wounded, and missing. - -8.15. (May 8 indecisive) =224=Larnard to Hitchcock, June 13; Giffard to -Pakenham, May 28; McCall, Letters, 454; Meade, Letters, i, 80; Wilhelm, -Eighth Inf., i, 416-7. Sen. 388; 29, 1. Taylor, Letters (Bixby), -1. (Consulted) Wilhelm, Eighth Inf., i, 418; Stevens, Campaigns, -20; Sedgwick, Corresp., i, 16; _Journ. Milit. Serv. Instit._, xli, -98; =185=L. C. to Duncan, Nov. 24; Article by J. Davis on Taylor in -Appleton's Biog. Dict. Accounts of this conference differ so much that -little can be said of it. Some of the officers were for entrenching and -awaiting reinforcements. It was known that Conner's fleet had arrived -(note 14). (Defend) Taylor, _supra_; Henry, Camp. Sketches, 94; map -of P. Alto in Map Div., Lib. of Cong. Churchill's 18-pounders and two -12-pounders taken from the baggage were left here. The wounded were sent -to Pt. Isabel. Rives (U. S. and Mexico, ii, 153) states that Taylor -marched early May 9 to Resaca de la Palma and parked the train there, -but this is incorrect (Taylor in Sen. 388; 29, 1, p. 6; Henry, Camp. -Sketches, 94; =369=map of Palo Alto; Ripley, War with Mexico, i, 124; -etc.). The point is important because troops were left with the train to -protect the wagons--not as a rear guard (Rives). Rives (p. 154) states -incorrectly that the Eighth Infantry was left with the train. - -8.16. _The battle of May 9._ Sen. 388; 29, 1 (Taylor and officers). -Apuntes, 42-7. Suarez y Navarro, Alegato. Campana contra. Negrete, -Invasion, ii, 230, 233. Ho. 60; 30, 1, pp. 295, 393, 396, 403 (Taylor); -392, 395 (Marcy); 1104 (McIntosh). =69=Canales to Arista, May 9. -=13=Giffard to Bankhead, May 13. Henshaw narrative. =147=Chamberlain, -diary. Taylor, Letters (Bixby), 1. =210=Alvord to Hammond, May 22. -=210=Hammond to Simms, Apr. 1, 1847. =213=Hatch, letters. Wash. -_Union_, July 25, 1846. =369=Map of P. Alto. _Spirit of the Times_, -May 30; June 20. _Picayune_, May 19; June 3. Berlandier, diary and -map. Nebel and Kendall, 3-4. Mexico a traves, iv, 564, 566. Fallo -Definitivo del Supremo Tribunal, 19. Sen. 4; 29, 2. Ho. 1; 30, 2, p. -1162. Claiborne, Quitman, i, 253. _Journ. Mil. Serv. Instit._, xvii -(Van Deusen); xli, 98. =370=Taylor to ----, June 18. Taylor, Letters -(Bixby), 175. Ampudia ante ... la Opin. Pub. (Uraga). McCall, Letters, -455. Sen. 378; 29, 1, p. 57 (Bliss). Grant, Mems., i, 93, 96-8. Meade, -Letters, i, 81-2, 149. =72=Reales Ordenes, Serie de Gobernacion, leg. -43. Appleton's Biog. Dict. (art. by J. Davis on Taylor). (Losses) Ho. -24; 31, 1. =285=Arista to Paredes, May 9, 14. French, Two Wars, 51-4. -_Autograph_, May-June, 1912 (Taylor). =210=Bragg to Hammond, Dec. 20, -1847. Ampudia to Fellow-cits. =285=Segura to Escudero, June 4. Smith, -To Mexico, 49-52. =185=Duncan to Belknap, May 10. Eyewitness, Complete -Hist., 25-6. Wilhelm, Eighth Inf., i, 422-3. _Niles_, June 6, pp. 211-7; -July 4, p. 277; Sept. 26, p. 57. =224=Larnard to Hitchcock, June 13. -Henry, Camp. Sketches, 96-9. =61=Arthur to brother. _Puritano Mex._, -May 26. =224=Bliss to Hitchcock, June 7. =61=Patton to Polk, July 18, -and enclosure. Mexico a traves, iv, 564, 566. Roa Barcena, Recuerdos, -48. The verse is by Jose de Saltillo, trans. by C. F. Hoffman. And from -=76= the following. Arista, May 9, 10, 13, 1846; July 12, 1847. _Id._ to -Mateos, May 31; to Parrodi, May 13; to Taylor, May 10. Carrera, May 25. -Requena to Arista, May 10. Testimony at the court-martial of Arista. R. -Vazquez to sister, May 25. Plana mayor diary. Ampudia to Arista, May 11, -14. Canales to Tornel, May 10. - -REMARKS. It would be unsafe to give fuller information than that of -the text with reference to the positions of the Mexican corps. All -the accounts are unsatisfactory. Owing to the nature of the ground -and the irregular shifting of the troops, this was natural. The -Mexican leaders thought their position would ensure victory. Horses -were unsaddled and mules relieved of their packs. The chief danger to -Ridgely's battery was from Mexicans ambushed--as Taylor had reason -to suppose they would be--on both sides of the road. May, very tall -and straight, with long black hair and a black beard that reached to -his waist, became a newspaper hero, and for reasons that are rather -hard to understand, was promoted several times during the war; but he -seems clearly to have been essentially a cowardly sham. In this fight -he seized a cannon, but only the infantry prevented the enemy from -recapturing it. He claimed the credit of making Gen. Vega his prisoner, -but the real captor was a bugler. By his own account, he could rally -only six of his men after running through the batteries. The horses -appear to have "run away" with the men. Taylor's report laid stress -upon what occurred at the road, and he does not seem to have known--at -that time, to say the least--what mainly caused the sudden collapse of -the enemy; but an abundance of Mexican evidence, partly given under -oath, makes the matter clear. See also Henry, Camp. Sketches, 98. After -Americans were seen at the _placeta_ Arista's secretary went to where -the road crossed the resaca, and found May's dragoons there. This fixes -the order of events. Duncan's battery did nothing during the battle, -for Ridgely had the only opportunity to use artillery without injuring -Americans. Duncan and Kerr followed the Mexicans at some distance; the -Third Infantry cooperated; and so did the Artillery Battalion, after it -reached the scene; but the Mexicans were not aware of any real pursuit. -Fort Brown fired on the throngs of fugitives, but no sally was made. -One might imagine the garrison feared the guns of Matamoros; but they -watched the Mexican fugitives from the parapet. Mejia's ammunition had -been almost used up. Paredes informed Congress, June 6, that after May -9 Arista had 4000 regulars (Memoria de ... Relaciones, Dec., 1846). -May 13 Arista gave the number as 3758 "men." Arista's chief of staff -estimated the captured, drowned, and dispersed as 500. Arista informed -Parrodi, May 13, that the total number of men, including the wounded, -taken by Taylor was less than 200, and this seems to have been true. -May 11 prisoners were exchanged. Arista reported the number in American -hands as 144, including the wounded. - -8.17. When Taylor set out for Point Isabel, though he described the -fort as "in a good state of defense," one side was still open, and the -drawbridge and interior defences had not been begun (=66=Mansfield to -Totten, June 23; diary in _Nat. Intelligencer_, Sept. 3); and not before -the night of the third was the position considered by its defenders -even comparatively secure. The fort had six bastion fronts, which made a -perimeter of 800 yards, a strongly designed wall of earth 91/2 feet high -from the natural ground, a parapet 15 feet thick, a ditch about 8 feet -deep and from 15 to 22 feet wide, a gate and a drawbridge (mostly from -=66=Mansfield to Totten, Apr. 23). For about 4 feet from the base the -inside of the wall was fortified with a sort of basket work of willow -twigs. The magazine was made of pork barrels filled with sand, seven -tiers thick and four tiers high, with a timber roof covered with 10 -or 12 feet of sand. The fort was a "child of circumstance," admitted -Engineer Mansfield (=66=_supra_), and in addition to the faults of -position already mentioned, the ground was irregular and the defence was -made difficult by the extent of the walls, for as considerable portions -were allowed to remain covered with thick chaparral (=66=Mansfield, -_supra_), its area was evidently too large for the 500 men which it -had been intended to cover; but it was after all a strong work, and in -comparison with it Mansfield regarded the Mexican forts as "trifling" -(=66=to Totten, May 4). Near the end of April the four 18-pounders -were removed from the battery to a bastion of the fort looking toward -Matamoras, where they were protected with merlons faced with sand-bags, -and so attack as well as defence was provided for; but there were only -150 rounds of ammunition for each of these guns. For this note: Henshaw -narrative and papers; =66=Mansfield to Totten, Apr. 23; May 4; June 23; -=65=Taylor, gen. orders 39, 45, 53; Mobile _Herald and Tribune_, May 6; -_Journal of U. S. Artil._, July, 1892, p. 293; Taylor in _Autograph_, -May-June, 1912; _Nat. Intelligencer_, Sept. 3; Robinson, Organization, -ii, 49; _Niles_, June 13, p. 230; McCall, Letters, 441, 443; (300 -wagons) Ho. 60; 30, 1, p. 651 (Cross). - -8.18. Sen. 388; 29, 1, pp. 31, 35 (Hawkins); 35 (Arista); 36 -(Mansfield). Fry and Conrad, Taylor, 109. Taylor, Letters (Bixby), 175. -Apuntes, 37-8. Henshaw narrative and papers. Ho. 60; 30, 1, pp. 288, -296 (Taylor); 293 (Brown). Campana contra. _Picayune_, May 19, 21; Aug. -28. =69=Diary captured with Arista's papers. =69=Ampudia to Arista, May -5-6. =69=Canales to Arista, May 5, 7. Mexico a traves, iv, 561. (Losses) -Ho. 24; 31, 1. =66=Mansfield to Totten, May 4; June 23. =13=Giffard -to Pakenham, May 28. =76=Ampudia to Arista, May 11. =76=Mejia, May -4, 14. =76=Mier y Teran to Mejia, May 3, 4, 5, 7; to Requena, May 4. -=76=Testimony given at the court-martial of Arista. =76=Arista, May -7. =76=_Id._ to Ampudia, May 5. =76=Mejia to Arista, May 3. _Nat. -Intelligencer_, Sept. 3. =76=Requena to Arista, May 5. N. Orl. _Commerc. -Bulletin_, May 18. =364=Worth to S., July 25. Johnson, Thomas, 23. -=76=Canales, May 5. =76=Diary, Apr. 30-May 6. - -REMARKS. May 6 the fort was summoned, with an intimation that no -quarter would be given, should the garrison hold out longer (Henshaw). -Brown was mortally wounded by a bomb-shell. He was succeeded by Captain -Hawkins. In all one man was killed; nine officers and men wounded (Ho. -24; 31, 1). An attempt was made to burn Matamoros, but the balls could -not be heated sufficiently (Ho. 60; 30, 1, p. 293). Perhaps a general -more farseeing than Taylor would have provided a furnace. Ampudia -had about 830 men at first and later drew others from the city. When -Arista called him to Palo Alto on May 8, a small force remained behind -to continue the siege. Ripley (War with Mexico, i, 140) says that -Arista should have reduced the fort. But Arista judged rightly that, -if he should defeat Taylor, the fort would have to fall, and therefore -it would be unwise to risk heavy losses; and probably he did not wish -Ampudia to have the glory of capturing it. - -8.19. =13=Giffard to Bankhead, May 13; to Pakenham, May 28. -=118=Berlandier to Arista, undated draft. Sen. I; 29, 2, p. 46 (Marcy, -report). Ho. 60; 30, 1, p. 297 (Taylor). Taylor, Letters (Bixby), 3. -(Bridge, plank, etc.) Meade, Letters, i, 101-2. Apuntes, 46. =69=Sanders -to Taylor, May 10 ("the scows and flats of the Quarter-Masters Dept. -would give us the means of crossing the river at once"). _Niles_, May -30, p. 202. N. Orl. _Commerc. Bulletin_, May 18. _Nat. Intell._, May -18. =165=Conner to Bancroft, May 28; to Aulick, May 18. Henry, Camp. -Sketches, 132. =166=Wilson to Conner, May 15. =166=Bliss to Wilson, -May 14. Ho. 1; 30, 2, pp. 1161-2 (Conner). Parkers Recolls., 56. -(Steamers) Ho. 60; 30, 1, p. 522; Henry, Camp. Sketches, 115 (the _Neva_ -at Matamoros May 24); _Niles_, May 30, p. 203; =166=Munroe to Conner, -May 9; N. Y. _Herald_, June 11. =65=Taylor, gen. orders 59. Ho. 60; -30, 1, pp. 297, 300 (Taylor). Wash. _Union_, May 18, 30; June 17. N. -Y. _Herald_, June 10. =364=Worth to S., June 1. =166=Wilson to Conner, -May 15. =166=Bliss to Munroe, May 9. =166=Sanders to Bliss, May 16. -=166=Bliss to Wilson, May 14. Giddings, Camp., 36. - -There was additional help at hand. =69=May 10 Captain Sanders, the -engineer officer at Point Isabel, conferred with Conner about crossing -the river, and Conner said he was "perfectly ready and willing to go -into the river and proceed up as far as Burita," where he would place -all his men and boats at Taylor's disposal. (In fact Conner did assist -in the Burrita expedition actually executed.) This was reported to -Taylor at once. Matamoros had no defences except toward the river. - -8.20. Ho. 60; 30, 1, pp. 297 (Taylor); 1206 (Arista). Taylor, Letters -(Bixby), 3. Campana contra. =69=Arista to Taylor, May 10. =76=Parrodi, -May 22. =76=Plana mayor diary. =13=Giffard to Pakenham, May 28. -=61=Spanish letter to Taylor, undated. =285=Ampudia to Paredes, May 14. -=76=Arista, May 13, 16. (Duty) Jomini, Precis, i, 475; Wagner, Strategy, -45; Henderson, Science of War, 42. Apuntes, 47. Henry, Camp. Sketches, -107. =76=Testimony at court-martial of Arista. Fallo Definitivo (Arista -was entirely exonerated, and at a later day he became President). - -8.21. Ho. 60; 30, 1, p. 298 (Taylor). Taylor, Letters (Bixby), 3. -Apuntes, 47-51. Campana contra. =76=Arista, May 16, 18, 29; June 4. -=76=Prefect of No. Tamaulipas to gov., May 29. =76=Plana mayor diary. -=285=Torrejon to Paredes, June 3. =76=To Arista, May 27; June 9. -=76=Parrodi, May 22-3, 31. Negrete, Invasion, ii, 219. =76=Testimony -at the court-martial of Arista. =76=Ampudia, Sept. 9. =224=Bliss to -Hitchcock, June 7. Fallo Definitivo. Meade, Letters, i, 85, 95. =76=Gen. -orders, June 15, 1848. Arista had a choice between two routes--one -through a settled region, the other through a desert--and for strategic -reasons chose the latter. - -8.22. =65=Taylor, gen. orders, 59-61, 78-9, 83. Ho. 60; 30, 1, p. 297, -300-1 (Taylor). Taylor, Letters (Bixby), 3, 175. Wilhelm, Eighth Inf., -i, 425-6. Reid, Scouting Expeds., 43. =66=Mansfield to Totten, June 23. -=370=Taylor to ... June 18. Henshaw papers. Smith, To Mexico, 52-4. -=76=Parrodi, May 31. Murray, Reality, 75. =69=Garland to ... May 24. -Henry, Camp. Sketches, 106-9, 113. Meade, Letters i, 88. As Roa Barcena -says (Recuerdos, 40), the Americans were physically stronger than the -Mexicans, had better arms, cannon, artillery horses, and ammunition, -plenty of food, ample and well-served ambulances, were quicker and more -forceful in their movements, and were more obedient; and the officers -had more confidence in one another. They were also cooler and more -intelligent, and had greater reserves of will-power, and the men felt -more confidence in their superiors. - -8.23. Meade, Letters, i, 98, 101. _Metrop. Mag._, Dec, 1907 (Hamilton, -July 29, 1846). =139=Campbell to Martin, July 29; (nine tenths) to D. -Campbell, Aug. 9. Polk, Diary, Apr. 1, 1847. =224=Larnard to Hitchcock, -June 13. Ho. 60; 30, 1, p. 283. =224=Bliss to Hitchcock, June 7. -Schouler, U. S., v, 248. Weed, Autobiography, 571-2. Albany _Evening -Journal_, June 18. Scott, Mems., ii, 389. - -Larnard, an excellent officer, wrote to Hitchcock that Taylor did not -give an order to the artillery on May 8 nor a material order to any -one, and that he was no more responsible for winning the two battles -than a rock rolling down a hill for crushing what is before it. This -was intended, no doubt, to be taken with a grain of salt. The editor of -_Niles' Register_ said: Owing to an error in estimating the capacities -of the enemy, the army under Gen. Taylor made a narrow escape from -almost utter annihilation (July 18, p. 309); and, considering the ardor -of the Mexicans as well as the embarrassment caused by the American -wagons, one must believe that had the General carried out the plan -which he seems to have formed, the results would have been unfortunate. -See Semmes, Service, 70. Meade (Letters, i, 99) remarked that Taylor's -neglect of precautions probably helped induce the Mexicans to fight. -This was not true, for Arista's orders were express; but, even had it -been so, one could not excuse a general for really (not seemingly, -as a ruse) neglecting precautions and preparations demanded by the -circumstances. "Boldness is the acme of wisdom" in war, the German -general staff has said (Donat, Russo-Japanese War, 255); but the -distinction between boldness and rashness is real and vital. No doubt -graduates of West Point felt a prejudice against men of antecedents like -Taylor's, but they showed in the course of the war a willingness to -recognize merit. The popular enthusiasm over Taylor's "victories" was -the greater because he had been supposed to be in extreme peril. - -8.24. =52=J. Parrott, June 4. Bankhead, nos. 71, 90, 1846. =285=Vega to -Paredes, Apr. 3. =76=Tornel to Arista, May 27. The London _Times_, Feb. -24, 1847, quoted the _Journal des Debats_ as saying in effect that the -Mexican War prevented the establishment of a monarchy in Mexico. Paredes -had no doubt been encouraged by the reports of Mejia regarding the state -of things at Corpus Christi, and very likely these reports helped decide -him to reject Slidell. - - - IX. THE UNITED STATES MEETS THE CRISIS - -9.1. Our policy did not permit us to accept a European arbitrator, and -an arbitrator from Central or South America would not have been thought -impartial. - -9.2. Polk's Message was based upon the view that the left bank of the -Rio Grande belonged to the United States (p. 139), and this was said -by some to be inconsistent with the idea (involved in the resolutions -annexing Texas and in Slidell's mission) that the boundary was an -open question. But Polk's language amounted only to an assertion of -the American claim; and a claim, however just, may be a subject of -negotiation. His expression (taken from the Washington _Union_ of May -9), "shed American blood upon the American soil," though denounced as -a falsehood, was merely another assertion of the same claim, and was -entirely in accord with the language of Madison, Jefferson, Monroe, -Pinckney, and J. Q. Adams. A claimant, convinced that his cause is just, -declares roundly, "This is mine," even though aware that his contention -is disputed. A more conservative statement would have been: Mexico has -invaded a region that I hold to be ours, and shed American blood on what -I regard as American soil; but Polk seems to have felt no doubts, and in -a trumpet-call to arms qualifications would have appeared out of place. - -9.3. Benton, however, reported the House bill, which did not divide the -subject. - -9.4. _Incidents preceding and attending the passage of the war bill_ -(_May 13_). Richardson, Messages, iv, 388-92, 437-43. Benton, View, -ii, 679. Polk, Diary, Apr. 18, 21, 25, 28; May 3, 5, 8, 9-13, 1846. -=260=Extracts from _National Intelligencer_. =315=Winthrop to Schouler, -Mar. 20, 1848. Webster, Writings, iv, 138. =260=Winthrop, The Mex. -War Bill. =210=Holmes to Hammond, May 10, 1846. =354=Welles papers. -Proceedings of Senate and House in _Cong. Globe_, 29, 1, p. 257, and -May 11-13; app., 912; Feb. 24, 1847 (Calhoun). Boston _Courier_, May -14. Boston _Atlas_, May 15. N. Y. _Tribune_, Dec. 9, 1847. Calhoun to -A. P. C, May 14; to J. E. C, May 29, 1846: Jameson, C. Corresp., 690, -692. Benton, Abr. Debates, xvi, 99. =345=Dix to Van Buren, May 16, -1846. Wash. _Union_, May 15, 1846; Jan. 2, 1848. Greeley, Am. Conflict, -i, 187. Foster, Am. Diplom., 315. Johnston and Browne, Stephens, 203. -_Nat. Intelligencer_, Dec. 27, 1847. Winthrop, Speeches, i, 573. _Pub. -Ledger_, Dec. 4, 1846. =132=Buchanan, memo. Certain incidents (_Cong. -Globe_, 30, 1, app., 231) emphasize the fact that a regular war was -contemplated by Congress. _E.g._ Holmes moved that the war bill should -apply southwest of the Nueces only for the withdrawal or rescue of our -army; voted down by 8--122. See also notes 9 and 10. - -9.5. Benton states that Polk relied for peace upon the project of -replacing Paredes with Santa Anna, which will be mentioned later in -this chapter (View, ii, 680). He also charges (_ibid._) that the -administration--particularly Walker--was influenced by a wish to bring -about the payment of American claims and make good certain speculations -in Texas lands; but it was proper that the claims should be paid, and -there is no proof of the second point. - -9.6. Benton hesitated, and May 11 Polk counted on his opposition -(Diary). In the debates on the annexation of Texas the Senator had -denied that her territory extended to the Rio Grande (Smith, Annex. -of Texas, 264, note), and he did not approve of Taylor's going there. -Besides, he desired to see the Oregon issue settled before coming to an -issue with Mexico. Possibly Calhoun's anxiety to prevent or defer war -helped to drive Benton to the opposite side (=354=Welles papers; Polk, -Diary, May 3, 11, 1846). - -9.7. One may also view the matter at a slightly different angle. It -was possible for Mexico, on learning that General Taylor had advanced -peaceably to the Rio Grande, to say, Very well, he may occupy the -disputed district jointly with us for the present. England and the -United States maintained a peaceable joint occupation of Oregon for -years. Taylor's advancing, therefore, did not _per se_ and necessarily -create a state of war. Now the United States did nothing else that could -fairly be termed aggressive; but Mexico, by attacking American troops -engaged in peaceful reconnoitring, destroyed the state of potential -harmony, and consequently the state of war that ensued existed by -her act. C. J. Ingersoll stated later (_Cong. Globe_, 29, 2, app., -125) that the language of the preamble was adopted for the purpose of -conciliating, not offending, the Whigs; and one can see that it might -seem likely to be easier for them to accept the war as an accomplished -fact than to vote for a declaration. - -9.8. From what is known of Calhoun's designs (Smith, Annex. of Texas, -209-216) this statement seems reasonable, and it is supported by -positive evidence (chap, vi, note 10). =232=Calhoun to ----, Nov. 7, -1846: The triumph of abolitionism at the north would cause disunion, for -the southern people are determined to defend their rights. - -9.9. To justify Calhoun's theory the Constitution should have been -made to read: "Congress shall have power to declare war, and without -such a declaration the United States shall never be at war," which -would have been manifestly ridiculous; and the provision in article -i, sect. 10, that a state, when in imminent danger, might begin war, -should have been cancelled. Doubtless for partisan reasons, Webster -(Curtis, Webster, ii, 301) took the same position as Calhoun, saying -that Congress could not "create a fact"--_i.e._ could not state that -war existed before it had declared war. Von Holst on the other hand, -in order to face the tolerably evident certainty that we had a legal -war with Mexico, says (United States, iii, 253) that Congress made -Polk's lie [that war existed] into a fact! Many members of Congress had -too little confidence (Calhoun to Thompson: _Am. Hist. Rev._, i, 314) -in their knowledge of the situation to feel positive as to the full -justice of the American cause, but this did not affect the validity of -their action. Particularly noticeable was the rejection (27 to 97) of -Delano's proposition that nothing in the war bill should be construed as -approving of the President's conduct in taking armed possession of the -intermediate region. Thus a much discussed question was formally raised -and formally decided. =132=King to Buchanan, June 1. - -9.10. _Discussion of the proceedings._ (Feeling) =354=Welles papers. -(Assured) Polk, Diary, May 11, 1846. (Congressmen) Meigs, Benton, 360; -Benton, View, ii, 680. _Tribune_, May 15. _Journal of Commerce_, July -1, 1847. Weekly _Herald_, May 16, 1846. (Dissensions) Boston _Atlas_, -May 18, 1846; Jameson, Calh. Corresp., 1038 (Harris); Polk, Diary, Apr. -30; =345=Polk to Van Buren, Jan. 4; Feb. 22, 25, 1845; =345=Wright -to V. B., Jan. 17, 1845; =345=Butler to Polk, Feb. 27, 1845; =345=V. -B. to Polk, Feb. 27, 1845; =345=S. T. Van Buren to M. V. B., Mar. 2, -3, 4, 1845; =297=Cave Johnson to Polk, June 13, 1844; and see chap, -xxxiv. (Offices) Polk, Diary, May 10; June 22, 1846, and _passim_. -=210=Holmes to Hammond, May 10, 1846. Lalor, Cyclop., iii, 1105. (Whig -vote) =260=Winthrop, Mex. War Bill, 108; _Nat. Intelligencer_, May 16, -1846; N. Y. _Journal of Comm._, Dec. 11, 1847; Wheeler, Hist, of Cong., -i, 411; Von Holst, U. S., iii, 251. Calhoun to Clemson, Jan. 29, 1846; -to A. P. C, May 14; to J. E. C, May 29; to Clemson, July 11; to J. -E. C, July 29, in Calhoun Corres., 679, 691, 693-4, 700-1; also 707. -=345=Welles to Van Buren, July 28, 1846. Polk, Diary, Apr. 18, 21, 1846. -Calhoun in Sen., Feb. 24, 1847: _Cong. Globe_, 29, 2, p. 501. Hunt, -Calhoun, 279. _Niles_, May 16, 1846, p. 162. (Endorsed, etc.) _Cong. -Globe_, 29, 1, p. 802 (Crittenden). _Cong. Globe_, 30, 1, app., 367 -(Stanton). Johnston and Browne, Stephens, 210. =132=King to Buchanan, -June 1, 1846. Pierce, Sumner, iii, 108, 139. =132=Buchanan, memo. Holmes -of New York proposed in the House, May 11, that sect. one of the war -bill should not apply southwest of the Nueces except for the rescue -of our army. This was rejected by 8--122. May 12 Senator Crittenden, -one of the foremost Whigs, proposed to substitute in the war bill the -words "for the purpose of repelling the invasion" in place of the words -"prosecute said war, etc." This recognized the territory as American. -His proposal was supported by twenty senators (_Cong. Globe_, 29, 1, p. -803). - -9.11. Livermore, for example, argued in this way (War, 15): Texas was -annexed for the protection of Southern institutions; the war with Mexico -resulted from the annexation of Texas; therefore the war with Mexico was -due to the slaveholders' interest in slavery. But both of his premises -need qualification; and the conclusion, so far as it suggests that the -war was the necessary and designed consequence of the slaveholders' -action in the Texas matter, does not follow. The abolitionists were -enthusiastic, earnest, and on the outside of things. Hence they were -naturally and almost unavoidably over-suspicious. Von Holst (U. S., iii, -302) says that the radical wing of the southern Democratic party openly -avowed that the war with Mexico was a southern war; but was not Calhoun -the leader and prophet of that wing? A few public men, the Charleston -_Patriot_ and _Courier_, and the _Federal Union_ of Alabama looked upon -the war as for the interest of the South; but it does not appear that -they had any appreciable influence in bringing it about. - -9.12. The occasion of the war was Taylor's going to the Rio Grande; but -see chap, vii, p. 154. - -9.13. Apparently one might say that--since Polk intended to recommend -redress of our grievances--war was sure, without reference to the -annexation of Texas, to come. But we are tracing the cause of an actual, -not of a possible, war; and the President's recommendation might not -have proved effectual. Benton (View, ii, 679) said that without the -clash of arms it would have been difficult, perhaps impossible, to bring -about war. Calhoun (Sen., Feb. 24, 1847: note 10) said it could not have -been done. This opinion, however, was biased. - -9.14. _The cause of the war._ Polk, Diary, Dec. 19, 23, 1846; Jan. 5, -23, 1847. Webster, Private Corresp., ii, 283. =370=Taylor to Davis, Apr. -18, 1848. =32=Buchanan to Shields, April 23, 1847. (Bulwark) Smith, -Annex. of Texas, 132, 134-5, 204-8. (Unsuitable) =132=Donelson to -Buchanan, May 15, 1847. _No. Amer._, Feb. 10, 1847; Thompson in Wash. -_Union_, Oct. 25, 1847, and Greenville (S. C.) _Mountaineer_, Oct. 21. -Bourne, Essays, 227, 235. Charleston _Mercury_, Dec. 30, 1847 (long -argument against annexing Mexican territory). W. Thompson to Calhoun, -Dec. 18, 1847 in Jameson, Calhoun Correspondence, 1149 (slavery will -not exist in Mexico). =137=Fisher to Calhoun, Aug. 22, 1847. =137=J. -A. Campbell to Calhoun, Mar. 1, 1848. (Aiken) Boston _Courier_, Dec. -2, 1847; Mar. 9, 1848. =132=King to Buchanan, June 11, 1847. N. Y. -_Tribune_, Nov. 26, 1847. =157=Lamar to Cobb, June 24, 1846. (Toombs) -_Cong. Globe_, 29, 1, app., 133. _So. Qtrly. Rev._, Nov., 1850, 427-34. -(Benton) Abr. Deb., xvi, 87; Benton, View, ii, 678. (Clay) Schurz, -Clay, ii, 290. (Winthrop) Wash. _Union_, Sept. 30, 1846; Oct. 25, 1847; -Winthrop, Winthrop, 59. (Douglas) Cutts, Questions, 154. (Johnson) -Brown, _Cong. Globe_, 29, 2, app., 354. (Van B.) Wilson, Rise and Fall, -ii, 9; Smith, Annex. of Texas, 243. Amer. Historical Association Rep., -1911, ii, 95 (Glenn). (Organs) Mr. Winthrop's Vote. (Sumner) Sumner, -report, 30. (Report) Wash. _Union_, Feb. 25, 1847. (Agree) Winthrop -in Wash. _Union_, Sept. 30, 1846. (Paredes) _Diario_, July 30, 1846. -(Almonte) N. Y. _Sun_, Nov. 26, 1846 (Caractacus); _Monitor Repub._, -May 9, 1847. Gordon, Aberdeen, 183. Mofras, Expedition, 8. Polk, -Message, May 11, 1846 (Richardson). Cole, Whig Party, 121. See also the -conclusion of chap. v. - -At the end of March Paredes said: "Peace is not compatible with the -maintenance of the rights and independence of the nation" (Roa Barcena, -Recuerdos, 22). - -9.15. The dates are those of approval. - -9.16. The action of Congress was promulgated by the adj. gen. in -=65=gen. orders 14, 18, 21, 34. See an article on the engineer company -by Captain Willing, published by the U. S. engineer school, Washington -Barracks. See also U. S. Statutes at Large, ix, 9-13, 17, 20; Upton, -Milit. Pol., 204; Richardson, Messages, iv, 603-4. - -9.17. Polk, Diary, May 13, 1846. Wash. _Union_, May 21. =65=Gen. orders -12. =59=Circular. With the freedom that has commonly marked authors -dealing with the unpopular Polk Von Holst says (U. S., iii, 339) that -his profession of seeking only a peace was a "falsehood." But Polk meant -of course a peace satisfactory to the American government, for a peace -satisfactory to Mexico would not have had to be "conquered," and this -implied in general about the terms that we actually imposed. - -9.18. "Germanicus" stated in the N. Y. _Commercial Advertiser_ that in -the Florida war the ratio of expense between regulars and militia was 1 -to 6; of efficiency, 1 to 0 (_Nat. Intell._, Nov. 7, 1846). Of course -the volunteers, who wished and expected to fight, were in general better -than the militia, who wished and expected to remain at home. Had the -regular army been increased to 50,000 privates (giving, say, 30,000 in -the field), there would no doubt have been a great saving of time, blood -and treasure (Stevens, Campaigns, 14). Taylor's position gave him a -special responsibility. He should have pointed out the disadvantages of -the volunteer system, recommended enlisting such troops (if at all) for -the duration of the war, and continued to demand regulars. - -9.19. _The military measures._ Ho. 60; 30, 1, p. 141. =65=Gen. orders -57, Dec. 22, 1846. Upton, Mil. Pol, 195, 202, 204 (sequel showed). -(1838) R. Johnson in Sen., Jan. 11, 1848 (Wash. _Union_, Jan. 12). _Nat. -Intelligencer_, Nov. 7, 1846. (Cowardly, etc.) =354=Welles papers. -=63=Marcy to Wright, June 3, 1846. =63=Circ. letter, May 19, 1846. -Webster, Letters, 346. Sen. 1; 29, 2, pp. 46-7. Wash. _Union_, June -25, 1846. (Stimulated) Sen. 4; 29, 2, p. 53. Johnson, Douglas, 114. -Polk, Diary, June 20, 22, 1846. (Vacancies) Richardson, Messages, iv, -513-7. Ho. 60; 30, 1, p. 554 (Jesup). (Might have been) Taylor, Letters -(Bixby), 75. - -The authorized maximum of the army was 16,998 officers and men (Sen. -1; 29, 2, p. 53). The volunteer service was more attractive than the -regular because it was easier to get rank there and the discipline was -less severe; and something to offset this difference was needed. - -9.20. Many of the volunteer regiments were in fact, owing to the -appreciation of a West Point education shown by some of the states, -commanded by trained men (Henry, Camp. Sketches, 127). - -9.21. For numerous details on the subject of this paragraph see an -article by the author in _The Military Historian and Economist_, Jan., -1917, p. 30, note 12. - -9.22. The executive staff of the war dept. consisted of Bvt. Brig. Gen. -R. Jones, adj. gen.; Lieut. Col. George Talcott, head of the ordnance -bureau; Maj. Gen. T. S. Jesup, quartermaster gen.; Brig. Gen. N. Towson, -paymaster gen.; Dr. T. Lawson, surgeon gen.; Bvt. Brig. Gen. G. Gibson, -commissary gen. of subsistence; Col. J. G. Totten, chief engineer; Col. -J. J. Abert, chief topog. engineer (Ho. 143; 29, 1. Ho. 60; 30, 1 p. -547). - -9.23. The following remark from J. D. McPherson (in "General Grant's -Political Myth"), who was close to Marcy in the war dept., seems worth -quoting: "His massive intellect, his calm wisdom, his uncalculating -integrity, the justness of all his purposes, the purity of his private -life, and the goodness of his heart inspired me with admiration and -reverence." Marcy loved books, too. Still he was, as Welles said, a -keen, wary and adroit politician, well taught by a wide experience -and fully acquainted with human nature of the sort with which he had -to deal. He had faltered at one juncture in his devotion to orthodox -Democratic principles, and probably felt that he could never regain the -position thus lost. - -9.24. _Raising and forwarding Volunteers._ =60=Marcy to Giles, May 19, -1846. For the corresp. with govs., May 15-19, see =60=, =61=, =63=. -=63=Marcy to govs. of Ala., etc., June 5. =63=_Id._ to Wright, June 3. -=65=Gen. orders 15, Wash., May 29. Marcy, report, Dec. 5, in Sen. 1; -29, 2. =61=Memo., May 18. Polk (insists upon energy), Diary, May 19; -June 23-4; Sept. 22, 24. (Marcy) Poore, Perley's Remins., i, 333; Wise, -Seven Decades, 235. (Multitudes) =63=Marcy to govs., May 19. =354=Welles -papers. (Motives) Trans. Ills. State Hist. Soc., 1904, p. 283; 1905, -pp. 194-6; 1906, 174-5; Robertson, Remins., 59, 62-7; =146=Caswell, -diary, Jan. 26, 1847; Lyell, Second Visit, ii, 257; =139=Campbell to D. -C, Nov. 9, 1846; Carleton at mtg. of Mex. veterans; Prickett in Madison -_Record_, 1850; Jamieson, Campaign, 73, 78. (High) _Public Ledger_, -May 18, 1846. Quitman in _Cong. Globe_, 35, 1, p. 970. Lyell, Second -Visit, ii, 343-5. N. Y. _Herald_, June 20, 1846. (Song) N. Y. _Globe_, -June 1, 1846. Cameron in _Cong. Globe_, 29, 1, p. 826. =149=L'Hommedieu -to Chase, May 20, 1846. Wash. _Union_, May 27; June 12, 1846. Ohio -Arch. and Hist. Qtrly., 1912, p. 280. Ills. State Hist. Lib. Pubs., -ix, 38. Ark. Hist. Commission, Bulletin no. 6, p. 181. Perry, Indiana, -4-13, 17. I. Smith, Remins., 5. =239=Kemper to daughter, May 30. St. -Louis weekly _Reveille_, May 10. Everett, Recolls., 194-9. McCormack, -Koerner, i, 495-7. Wallace, Autob., 114. Davis, Autob., 94-5. Iowa -adj. gen., Roster, vi, 788-9. Quisenberry, Taylor, 22. =216=Heiman, -Services. Ex-gov. Porter of Tenn. to the author. Memphis _Eagle_, May -15. _Niles_, June 13, p. 227; July 4, p. 288; July 18, p. 313. Scharf, -St. Louis, i, 362-8. =206=Graham, Message, Nov. 17. =14=Fair to Martin, -June 4. =14=Martin to Marcy, May 31. =61=Bullock to war dept., May -8. =14=Placard, May 7. =29=Brown to Duffield, May 11; to Marcy, June -3. Claiborne, Quitman, i, 223-4, 228. =63=Marcy to Brown, June 16. -=225=Cooke to Holt, May 17. (The drums) Poem by W. R. Benjamin, by -permission. Polk, Diary, May 26. =189=Evans, letter. =110=Barbour, -diary. Bishop, Journal, _passim_. For additional details see _The -Military Historian and Economist_, Jan., 1917, p. 32, note 14. - -As was natural, many complications arose in preparing the regiments -for the field. The volunteers themselves, as a rule, did not know what -they needed nor even what they wanted. They were ignorant and helpless -regarding all military matters. Such officers as understood the business -were compelled to work almost night and day. Everything had to be -provided, and many of the things had to be made; and the men were -usually ahead of the supplies. Two Tennessee regiments were able to move -south about June 1, but it was not until about July 23 that the last -Illinois regiments advanced in that direction. - -9.25. _To Brazos Island._ =300=Prickett, letter, July 30. Robertson, -Remins., June 11, 17, 23. =332=Tennery, diary, Aug. 13. Houstoun, Texas -(1845), 68, 91-2, 147, 255-6. Oswandel, Notes, 31, 38, 44-8. =190=Ewing, -diary, July 12, 19, 21. Perry, Indiana, 83. Everett, Recolls., 197-8. -=274=Neeld, letter. French, Two Wars, 33. =272=Memoir of Gen. Morgan. -=110=Barbour, diary, July 23. Bishop, Journal. =193=Foster to mother, -June 16. - -"Brazos Island" is the name on the U. S. Coast Survey map. Gens. Butler, -Marshall, Quitman, Pillow and Shields left New Orleans on the steamer -_New York_, and arrived at the island Aug. 4 (Claiborne, Quitman, -i, 239). The strait between Brazos Id. and Padre Id. on the north -was called the Brazos de Santiago (Giddings, Sketches, 27). Gaines's -proceedings led to great expense, and embarrassed the government very -much. He kept on even after he knew of Taylor's victories, and the total -number called out by him perhaps exceeded 12,000. For most of these -forces there was no place under the law of May 13, and the government -did not regard them as necessary. A few who had actually left their -states were accepted for three months under a law of 1795; but the -requisitions were countermanded, Gaines was peremptorily ordered (May -28) to suspend his operations in this regard, was relieved of his -command, and was placed before a court of inquiry. His intentions were -unquestionably good, and hence the court recommended that no further -action should be taken. The best information on this subject is given -in the record of the court (=68=judge advocate general's office) and in -=65=gen. orders no. 39, Washington, Aug. 20, 1846, which presents the -facts, the conclusions of the court, and the remarks of the President -thereon. See also Polk, Diary, June 5, 20; Aug. 15. =63=Marcy to govs., -June 5, 1846. =69=_Id._ to Gaines, May 28. Ho. 60; 30, 1, p. 308. Docs. -in Sen. 378; 29, 1, pp. 50-81. Gaines to Marcy, June 7: Sen. 402; 29, 1. -Sen. 415; 29, 1. =65=Gen. orders (Wash.) 16, 23. =63=Marcy to Taylor, -May 23. Wash. _Union_, June 9. Sen. proceeds., June 24. Gaines was -succeeded by General Brooke. The headquarters of this military dept. -were at New Orleans. - -9.26. Scott, a Whig, testified that Polk was "in great alarm" (Coleman, -Crittenden, i, 244). =256=Marcy privately called the state of things -"adverse" (to Wetmore). Holmes of South Carolina said the administration -was prostrated (=210=to Hammond, May 10). Charleston _Mercury_, May 19: -At the first symptom of actual fighting our government is taken all -aback. Had Polk sent Taylor to the Rio Grande to bring on a war, he -would have been rejoicing. - -9.27. Polk, whose principal interview with Scott occurred on May 14, did -not at that time believe that 20,000 volunteers would be needed (Diary). - -9.28. Scott's information about the region was derived from Anthony -Butler, formerly our minister to Mexico, and Gen. J. T. Mason (Scott -in Sen. 378; 29, 1, p. 11), both of whom had been on the ground, and -it led him to think the inactive season somewhat longer than it really -was. Although Taylor with competent engineers had been for about seven -months, while at Corpus Christi, in touch with a stream of traders -and other persons from Matamoros, and might have sent out spies and -reconnoitring parties, and had been on the river nearly two months, -he does not seem to have supplied, despite urgent requests from the -war dept. (_e.g._ Ho. 60; 30, 1, pp. 87, 88, 90, 91, 92), any adequate -ideas about conducting a campaign in that quarter or even to have formed -any for himself. Marcy, May 28, 1846 (_ibid._, 282), said, "I wish to -be favored with your views as to what should be the future operations -of the army on the Rio Grande." In submitting such views the General -would have had to present information regarding topographical and other -conditions, about which he seems to have left the government in the dark. - -9.29. One should not be in haste to condemn the administration and the -Democratic politicians, for ours is a party system and Scott was in -politics. He should have realized that, standing at the head of the -army, he was bound to serve the country as a whole, and should have -refrained from seeking party honors that evidently might (as they now -did) interfere with the fulfilment of that prime duty. - -9.30. _The question of general-in-chief._ (It is believed that later -events render a somewhat full treatment of this topic desirable.) -=191=Fairfield to wife, Apr. 14. Stanwood, Presidency, 195. (Politics) -=13=Pakenham, no. 74, June 13. =253=Peters to McLean, June 26. -Gaines, Sept. 10, 1845 in Sen. 378; 29, 1, p. 38. _So. Advocate_, -Apr. 3 (Sanderson). Gaines, June 7 in Sen. 402; 29, 1. (Scott's -personality) Scott, Mems., _passim_; F. Lee, Lee, 49; =354=Welles -papers; =252=Mackall, Dec. 29, 1847; _Mag. of Amer. Hist._, xiv, 562 -(Scammon, one of Scott's aides, here says that he never knew a man of -the world less given to vanity than Scott); Mass. Hist. Soc. Proceeds., -1st ser., ix, 234-9; Sedgwick, Corresp., i, 182; Corwin to Follett, -Mar. 13, 1845, in Ohio Hist. and Phil. Soc. Publics., July-Sept., 1914; -Semmes, Service, 280-1; Grant, Mems., i, 41, 139; Grone, Briefe, 80; -Keyes, Fifty Years, 1-82; =335=Trist on Scott. Sen. 378; 29, 1, pp. -2-4. Richardson, Messages, iv, 448. Wash. _Union_, May 18. Scott-Marcy -correspondence in Sen. 378; 29, 1, pp. 4-18; and in =256=. =60=Scott, -memoranda for gen. staff. Coleman, Crittenden, i, 243-4. Polk, Diary, -Mar. 28; May 13, 14, 19, 21-3, 25-6, 1846; Apr. 1, 1847. _Niles_, June -6, 1846, p. 214. _Nat. Intelligencer_, Aug. 29. Grant, Mems., i, 119. N. -Orl. _Commerc. Bulletin_, June 18. Watson, Taylor, 121. Boston _Atlas_, -June 12. N. Y. _Herald_, June 13. Welles papers. N. Orl. _Picayune_, -June 17. =253=Reed to McLean, Oct. 26. Boston _Courier_, June 15. -=139=W. B. Campbell to D. C., July 3, 1846. =256=Marcy to Wetmore, April -22, 1847. - -La Bruyere said, "There is in some men a certain mediocrity of mind that -helps to make them wise." This was not at all true of Scott. It was -characteristic of him that he blamed Marcy for only a want of candor and -nerve, regarding him as merely the instrument of the party (Coleman, -Crittenden, i, 244-6). - -Rives (U. S. and Mexico, ii, 204) remarks that the private note of -Scott (addressed to Senator Archer) "was enough to rouse the meekest -of Presidents." But (1) the note charged only what was charged -commonly--that the administration was making its appointments in a -partisan, political way; (2) it was private; and (3) Scott had a -legitimate reason for writing it--to explain why he did not intend to -recommend men for commissions, as Archer probably expected him to do. -In taking cognizance of a private note Polk acted as an eavesdropper, -and he should have recalled the saying, "Eavesdroppers never hear -anything good of themselves." Rives says also (ii, 413) that "for more -than fourteen months before war was actually declared it was evident to -every observer that war was highly probable, but Scott made no plans, -collected no information, and did nothing to prepare for the coming -strain upon the head-quarters organization of the army." But (1) war -was not deemed highly probable, as Rives states, by the President, the -Cabinet, Congress, Wall Street, Taylor or competent observers in general -(see p. 133, etc.); (2) it is a rather bold assertion that Scott "did -nothing to prepare," etc., and the present author, who intended to -examine every war dept. paper relating to the subject, saw no proof of -it; (3) as Rives states (ii, 582), the army had no intelligence bureau, -and Scott possessed no authority to establish one; (4) to collect -reliable data regarding Mexico and our frontier even informally would -have cost a great deal, and the government was so economical that it -would not provide even a pontoon train that was asked for (see p. 177); -(5) before Jan. 13, 1846, Scott had studied the frontier and planned -for Taylor's advance to the Rio Grande (p. 153); (6) May 14 he was -ready with plans so elaborate and far-reaching that Polk thought him -"scientific and visionary," and the next day he issued orders to the -chiefs of the general staff (p. 199). Such plans and orders implied -knowledge. - -9.31. May 30, Taylor was brevetted major general and assigned to duty -with that rank (Ho. 119; 29, 2, p. 12. Also Ho. 60; 30, 1, p. 283). - -9.32. Anti-slavery theorizers represented (see Lalor, Cyclopaedia, -iii, 1091) that Polk brought the Oregon issue to the verge of war so -that Mexico should dare--with the expectation of having England for -an ally--to fight us, and when hostilities had begun, made peace with -England at a sacrifice of our claim; but this view has little or nothing -except its ingenuity for support, and has a great number of facts -against it. - -9.33. _The Oregon affair._ =206=J. Graham to Gov. G., Jan. 4, 1846. Dr. -Bacon: "The ascendancy of the West is a fact" (_New Englander_, v, 319). -(Cass) =1=---- to Allen, Sept. 1, 1846. =210=Hammond, diary, Feb. 19. -Jameson, Calhoun Corresp., 653, 697-8. Polk, Diary, Oct. 21-3, 1845; -Feb. 24-5; Apr. 18; June 3, 1846. Lodge, Webster, 260. =256=Marcy to -Wetmore, Apr. 30, 1845. Johnson, Douglas, 105. (Cabinet) =354=Welles -papers. A. Smith, Remins., 41. Garrison, Extension, 170. _Polit. Sci. -Qtrly._, xxvi, 443-61 (Schuyler). _Amer. Hist. Rev._, xvi, 298-9 -(Schafer). Reeves, Amer. Diplom., 243-64. London _Times_, Jan. 26, 1846. -Hume in Ho. Commons, Jan. 23. - -9.34. For Santa Anna's banishment see vol. i, p. 53. In May it was -believed at Mexico that Santa Anna's return would mean peace (=56=W. S. -Parrott, June 4, 9); and as late as July 31 and August 12 =166=Pommares, -a secret agent of Conner at Vera Cruz, said that such was the prevalent -opinion there. - -9.35. Atocha, Statement. _Nat. Intelligencer_, June 10, 1845. -=13=Bankhead, no. 41, 1846. =73=Bermudez de Castro, no. 444, res., 1847. -_Monitor Repub._, Feb. 16, 1847. - -9.36. Apparently Conner was to obey this order or not as the -circumstances of the moment should render expedient. Consul Campbell of -Havana was directed in June to write often to Conner and express his -opinion on the propriety of allowing Santa Anna to enter Mexico (=166=to -Conner, July 9); at the time Santa Anna sailed for Vera Cruz Campbell -wrote (=166=Aug. 7) to Conner arguing that he should be permitted to -land; and Conner, in a =162=letter to his wife (Aug. 19), explained why -he had thought it best to let him pass. The _Journal des Debats_ (Oct. -6, 1846) believed that the American government had reason to count upon -Santa Anna's intentions though not upon his word; this was no doubt -Polk's view. Those who, in the usual fashion, have charged that Polk's -Message of Dec. 8, 1846, lied about his relations with Santa Anna have -failed to observe that it referred exclusively to the events preceding -the order of May 13 to Conner (Richardson, iv, 491-2). Before Mackenzie -was sent to Havana stronger and more definite information to the effect -that Santa Anna was likely to regain power was received--particularly -from Consul Black (Sen. 1; 29, 2, p. 34). - -9.37. The United States appears (Consul Campbell, May 25, 1846) to -have sent an earlier agent, who passed at Havana by the name of Brown, -and was commonly said there to have brought proposals to Santa Anna. -Mackenzie's ostensible mission--real enough, too, probably--was to -ascertain whether privateers had been commissioned in Cuba (Polk, Diary, -Jan. 8, 1848). He spoke Spanish fluently. Santa Anna took care to put -out an explanation of Mackenzie's visit. - -9.38. _The negotiation with Santa Anna._ Polk, Message, Dec. 8 -(Richardson, iv. 492). London _Times_, Oct. 6, 1845; Jan. 31; July -6, 1846. Semmes, Service, 117-8. =52=Dimond, nos. 324-6, 329, 1846. -=52=Campbell, June 9, 1846; April 9, 1847. =166=Campbell to Conner, -May 10. Von Holst, U. S., iii, 282-3. =52=Slidell, Mar. 18; April -2. =166=Dimond to Conner, Sept. 14, 1845. =166=Pommares to Conner, -July 2; Aug. 12. Chase, Polk Admin., 163. _Monitor Repub._, Feb. 20, -1846. Wash. _Union_, June 21, 1847. _Scribner's Monthly_, xvii, 299. -_Constitutionnel_, Sept. 20, 1846. =73=Bermudez de Castro, no. 441, -1847. Polk, Diary, Feb. 13, 14, 16, 1846; Jan. 8, 1848. _Id._ to Ho. -Repres., Jan. 12, 1848 (Richardson). =46=Bancroft to Conner, May 13, -1846. =297=Mackenzie to Buchanan, July 7, 11; Aug. 15, 1846. =335=_Id._ -to Trist, Jan. 2; June 8; Aug. 17, 1846. _Courrier des Etats Unis_, Aug. -11, 1846. (Conspicuous) Benton, View, ii, 680. _Journ. Milit. Serv. -Instit._, xli, 105. Meade, Letters, i, 116. - -Polk stated in his diary, Jan. 8, 1848, that Mackenzie "wholly exceeded -his authority" by writing out his recollection of the conversation -with Polk and giving this to S. Anna as a message from the President. -Mackenzie's report reached Washington Aug. 3, and was immediately -followed up by Polk with a request for two million dollars to facilitate -a settlement with Mexico (chap, xxvii). - - - X. THE LEADERS ADVANCE - -10.1. Comanches were making raids near Reynosa (=69=Worth to Bliss, -July 28), and the freebooter and cut-throat, Canales, was living on the -country not far away with a band that he said consisted of more than 600 -mounted men (June 16). - -10.2. Taylor to daughter, June 9, in _Autograph_, July-Aug., 1912. _Nat. -Intelligencer_, Sept. 16, 1848. =76=Berlandier to Mejia, June 9, 1846. -(Reynosa) Ho. 60; 30, 1, pp. 299, 305, 306, 397, 522-3, 550; Henry, -Camp. Sketches, 117; =76=Mejia, June 20; Smith, To Mexico, 57; Henshaw -narrative; Meade, Letters, i, 98; =76=Spanish consul, Matamoros, June -7, 1846; =76=Canales, May 20; June 4, 7, 16, 1846. (McCulloch) Reid, -Scouting Expeds., 43; _Picayune_, June 24; Aug. 15; Ho. 60; 30, 1, p. -551. =139=Campbell to D. C, July 3; Aug. 9. =224=Larnard to Hitchcock, -June 13. Weed, Autobiog., 573. Taylor, Letters (Bixby), 4, 6-10, 13-15, -17-20, 31. =370=_Id._ to ----, June 18 (draft): The war dept. has -been "mean and contemptable to the last degree." =375=_Id._ to E. G. -W. Butler, July 1: Madigan, catalogue no. 2, 1914. (Disliked) Meade, -Letters, i, 103. Scott, May 18 in Sen. 378; 29, 1, p. 17. This letter -was acknowledged by Taylor July 2 (Ho. 60; 30, 1, p. 329). He wrote -the substance of it to Dr. Wood on June 12 (Bixby). By May 28 U. S. -newspapers stating that 30,000 volunteers were coming reached the Rio -Grande (Meade, Letters, i, 95). "Licking" so many volunteers into shape -involved an immense amount of work, but Taylor did not have to do this -personally. - -10.3. The laws recognized only the regulars, the militia (who could -be required to serve but three months: Ho. 60; 30, 1, p. 282) and the -twelve-months volunteers. The six-months men, therefore, had to join -one of the other classes or be discharged. Marcy enforced this plain -legal requirement and was roundly abused for so doing. For the case of -the Louisiana men see Ho. 60; 30, 1, pp. 307, 309, 311, 315-20; Taylor, -Letters (Bixby), 176-7; _La. Courier_, Aug. 6; gen. orders 61 (_Niles_, -Aug. 15); N. Orl. _Bee_, Aug. 3. For the St. Louis men see Scharf, St. -Louis, i, 377. - -One has to be extremely careful here about making assertions regarding -dates and numbers. Affairs were in such confusion that even headquarters -would seem to have been to a considerable extent in the dark. Marcy, -June 8, did not know how many troops Taylor had (Ho. 60; 30, 1, p. 323), -and the statements that one finds are nearly always wanting in precision -or completeness. The facts given in the text are believed, however, to -be adequate for the history of the operations. One may refer also to: -Taylor, Letters (Bixby), 13; Matamoros _News_, July 8; =76=Parrodi, July -8; Hamer in Wash. _Union_, Aug. 18; and Ho. 60; 30, 1, p. 547. - -The facts about the Texan troops are particularly confused, but it is -plain that while unexpectedly late--none arriving until on or about -June 10--a regiment of foot, under Albert Sydney Johnston, and two -regiments of horse finally appeared in response to Taylor's call for -four regiments. Henderson, who commanded these men, claimed the rank of -a major general, and--apparently because mounted men were particularly -needed--his claim was allowed. See Ho. 60; 30, 1, pp. 299, 307, 321-2; -Henry, Camp. Sketches, 118; Rose, McCulloch, 69; Henshaw narrative; -Johnston, Johnston, 133; Meade, Letters, i, 104. Scott (Ho. 60; 30, 1, -p. 325) supposed that Taylor would receive about 16,280 twelve-months -volunteers and enough recruits for the regular regiments to make his -aggregate 23,070, besides the three-months and six-months men who would -engage for a longer term. June 14 Meade (Letters, i, 105) thought -Taylor had 10,000 men. By July 30 substantially all the twelve-months -foot intended for Taylor, except those from Illinois and Missouri, had -arrived (Ho. 60; 30, 1, p. 401). - -10.4. Meade, Letters, i, 114-5. =224=Bliss to Hitchcock, June 7. -Robertson, Remins., 76. =139=Campbell to D. C, July 3. =308=Shields to -R. J. Walker, Aug. 3. Ho. 60; 30, 1, pp. 301, 305, 307, 315, 320-1, -329, 550 (Taylor). Taylor, Letters (Bixby), 176-7. Marcy, report, Dec. -5, 1846 in Sen. 1; 29, 2, p. 46. Nearly 1000 Louisiana vols. arrived at -Brazos Id. or Pt. Isabel on May 13 (Conner in Ho. 1; 30, 2, p. 1162). - -10.5. Later (Sen. 1; 30, 1, p. 546) Boca Chica was bridged. - -10.6. Camp Lomita, a hill of about eight acres in extent, was five miles -by water above Burrita; and above that lay Camp Patterson. Camp Palo -Alto was on elevated ground near what was called Arista's Crossing. -There was also a Camp Lane. Few troops were quartered at Matamoros. It -is hard to understand why the well-behaved regulars were not permitted -to occupy the many vacant houses there (_Picayune_, July 9, 14, 1846). -This town, which looked attractive from the opposite side of the Rio -Grande, dated from 1820. It had prospered for a time, but had been -greatly injured by a hurricane in 1844, and was now falling to pieces -(Meade, Letters, i, 86; "Matamoros" in Diccionario Univ.; =60=Irons, -April 20; _Republica de Rio Grande_, June 27; Robertson, Remins., 104-6; -=217=Henshaw papers; London _Times_, Oct. 16, 1844; Smith, Remins., -34-5). - -10.7. _The camps and soldier life._ _Picayune_, Apr. 7; May 30; June 14, -24; July 9, 26. Perry, Indiana, 84-5, 87, 97, 100-2. Ho. 60; 30, 1, p. -697 (Thomas). Brackett, Lane's Brigade, 18, 22, 33. Robertson, Remins., -76-97. Giddings, Sketches, 27, 36-40. =254=McClellan to sister, Oct. 8. -=274=Neeld, letter. =139=Campbell to D. C, July 11, 19, 29, 31; Aug. 9. -=280=Nunelee, diary, July 5; Dec. 10. Meade, Letters, i, 59 (nine feet -of water on Brazos bar; six feet to Pt. Isabel). =218=Henshaw narrative. -Ho. 60; 30, 1, p. 571 (Jesup). =332=Tennery, diary, Aug. 12; Sept. 18. -=190=Ewing, diary, July 21-Aug. 17. Wash. _Union_, June 10; Aug. 3, 18; -Sept. 1 (letters). =322=W. B. Smith, diary. Special orders 71 in Ho. 60; -30, 1, p. 528. Reid, Scouting Expeditions, 20. I. Smith, Remins., 9, 25, -34. Matamoros _News_, July 8. =69=Shields, Aug. 28. _Niles_, July 4, p. -288; Sept. 12, pp. 21, 22. (Funds) Ho. 60; 30, 1, pp. 560-1. Taylor, -Letters (Bixby), 176. =61=Carlin to Polk, May 19. Henry, Sketches, 121. -_Nat. Intelligencer_, Aug. 3. Sedgwick, Corresp., i, 4. =69=Miller to -sister. =291=C. Cushing to Pierce, May 4, 1847. Bishop, Journal. Allen, -Pencillings, 25. - -10.8. In the N. Y. _Sun_ of Dec. 12, 1915, Major William Wallace showed -why time is needed to make a soldier. - -10.9. Hamer was, however, a man of strength and sound judgment, and for -this reason proved very useful to the volunteers. - -10.10. =252=Lieut. Mackall wrote with reference to this matter, "I am -determined, with God's aid, to do my duty cheerfully and show no sign of -impatience." The letters and diaries of =6=Robert Anderson and others -give us reason to believe that such a spirit was not uncommon among the -regular officers. - -10.11. _Morale of the army._ Taylor, Letters (Bixby), 7, 23, 42. Ewing, -diary, Aug. 17; Sept. 7. "A Soldier's Honor," 22-3. Meade, Letters i, -91, 102-3, 108-10, 115-6, etc. (Brawls, etc.) Henry, Camp. Sketches, -124, 128, 137. W. B. Smith, diary, Aug. 13. Ewing, diary, Sept. 7. -_Niles_, Sept. 19, p. 40. (Months) =69=Bankhead, Apr. 7. St. Louis -_Republican_, Aug. 5. _Vedette_, ix, no. 1 (officer, Aug. 22). =1=Woll -to Allen, July 2. Wilhelm, Eighth Inf., i, 425. =139=Campbell to D. C, -July 3; Aug. 28; Nov. 9; Dec. 7. Lawton, Artillery Off., 276. Jamieson, -Campaign, 71. Scott, Mems., ii, 392. =148=Chamberlain, recolls. -=224=Bliss to Hitchcock, July 23 (cf. =139=Campbell to D. C, Aug. 9). -=252=Mackall, Aug. 4. =218=Henshaw narrative. =13=Giffard to Bankhead, -June 9. The fundamental idea of military discipline is that each man is -a factor in a great organization, and must do his part in cooperation -with all the rest. Time is necessary to bring a man to this point of -view. More will be said about the morale of the troops in chap. xxxi. - -10.12. Taylor attempted to defend himself (Ho. 60; 30, 1, p. 558) by -citing his letter of April 26 to the department, in which he said that -he trusted it would "give the necessary orders to the staff department -for the supply" of the new troops from Louisiana and Texas; but this -was by no means what he was bound to do in the premises (see note 13); -and, in particular, river steamboats of an unknown description and -number not only did not come under the head of army supplies, but were -almost certainly not even in his own mind when he wrote that letter. - -10.13. _The question of boats._ (View) Ho. 60; 30, 1, pp. 329-32 -(Taylor); Taylor to Butler, July 1, 1846 in =375=Madigan, catalogue no. -2, 1914. (Rules) =61=Adj. gen. to Kearny, May 14; Ho. 60; 30, 1, pp. -560, 751 (Jesup). Dec. 26, 1913, the chief clerk of the quartermaster -general's office, Washington, stated to the author (for publication) -that under the regulations in force in 1846 Taylor was bound to specify -the kind and amount of supplies that he wanted. (Knew) Ho. 60; 30, 1, p. -685 (Whiting, Nov. 30). (Assuming) Taylor to Butler, July 1, _supra_. -(Depended) _Ibid._ (Useless) _Ibid._; Taylor in Ho. 60; 30, 1, p. 547. -(Denunciations) Taylor in Ho. 60; 30, 1, pp. 547-8, 558, etc. - -Marcy to Taylor, June 8, 1846: You are expected to "push your advantages -to the utmost extent it can be done with the means at your command" (Ho. -60; 30, 1, p. 325). - -As late as May 24 Taylor knew little about the depth of the river. It -was then being studied (Thomas in Ho. 60; 30, 1, p. 654). May 18 he -called for only one steamboat (_ibid._, 653), and May 28 for only three -more (_ibid._, 656). By August 11 about twenty were said to be on the -river. The documents appear to show that the quartermaster's department, -notwithstanding Taylor's complaints against it, did about all in this -matter that could reasonably have been expected under the circumstances -(_ibid._, 549, 763). It was difficult to find light-draught boats that -were strong enough to risk a voyage across the Gulf. It should be borne -in mind here and elsewhere that the war bill of May 13 threw suddenly -upon the war department a very extensive and complicated business, -such as it requires years to build up in civil life. Many of Jesup's -subordinates were doubtless old, lazy or fond of "red tape"; others -lacked the necessary capacity; still others were political henchmen; -but they seem in general to have been willing. Taylor said he did not -like the plan of campaign (to Butler, July 1, _supra_), but had not been -willing to obtrude his ideas upon the government. On this point consult -note 28 of chapter ix. - -When Taylor found himself in trouble about boats, he undertook to cover -his lack of foresight by denouncing (Ho. 60; 30, 1, pp. 547-8, 558, -etc.) the government for sending a flood of volunteers without supplying -the means of transportation. But evidently, in the first place, if -Taylor, who had been near the Rio Grande for about seven months and then -upon it for nearly two, did not feel sure as late as May 21 whether it -could be made to serve (_ibid._, 300), Jesup, who possessed no definite -and reliable information on the subject of the river (_ibid._, 560) -could not very well know whether Taylor could and would use it, how many -boats he would need, and how much water they should draw. In the second -place, if the General had provided transportation for his regulars and -the men he called out on April 26, he would have been able to establish -the depot, leave about 1000 men to guard it, and advance with as many -troops (some 6000) as he planned to throw forward at first (Ho. 60; 30, -1, p. 330 (Taylor), 561 (Jesup); Madigan, cat. no. 2, 1914 (Taylor, -July 1); Taylor, Letters (Bixby) 40, 44; =370=_Id._ to ----, draft, -June 18; Smith, Remins., 14). Thirdly, even if a flood of twelve-months -volunteers came, those he did not require for the forward movement -could have been left at healthy camps in the rear, as he himself pointed -out (Ho. 60; 30, 1, p. 330), to drill and prepare. Fourthly, instead -of complaining that a lack of boats prevented his advancing (_ibid._, -305, 307), he might--for aught that we know--have pushed forward his -regulars promptly by land, having for this operation a month of good -weather and a wagon train ample for twice that number of men (_ibid._, -560, 651). And, finally, it is worth mention that Scott's letter of -May 18 was probably as early an official notification of the coming -volunteer forces as could prudently have been given. Rives observes (U. -S. and Mexico, ii, 252), "Taylor was thus obviously disabled for some -time [by the sickness of the volunteers resulting from the rainy season -from making any extensive forward movement." But (1) Taylor had a month -of good weather after the capture of Matamoros; (2) the regulars were -not sickly, and might have been pushed forward with little delay; (3) -the sickness near and below Matamoros was not such as to prevent him -from completing his expeditionary force with volunteers; (4) the boats, -which began to arrive about the first of July, would have enabled the -necessary number of volunteers to move promptly; (5) and even the severe -sickliness at Camargo did not prevent advancing with fair promptness -after Taylor had decided to move. Of course it must be remembered that -Taylor had much to think about, and lacked experience. - -10.14. There was also a notable want of order and energy, said Worth, in -the control of the steamboats (=69=to Bliss, July 27). - -10.15. By August 4 substantially all of the regulars except the cavalry -and two or three batteries set out. June 16, the adj. gen. (Ho. 60; 30, -1, p. 454) estimated that Taylor would have under his immediate command -about 11,840 twelve-months volunteers and would soon receive nearly 800 -regulars. This left out of account a regiment and a half from Texas and -some other small corps. Taylor may, then, have had at about this time -(not allowing for discharges) 15,500 men. An account printed in the -Cincinnati _Chronicle_ of Sept. 6 gave him 15,810. Lieut. Col. Clarke, -Eighth Infantry, remained in command at Matamoros, and Major Gardner, -Fourth Artillery, at Point Isabel and Brazos Island (Ho. 60; 30, 1, p. -533). The rank of these officers indicates that but few soldiers were -left behind, and at Reynosa and Mier there were only detachments. During -July Capt. Gillespie with a company of Texas Rangers marched from San -Antonio and passed through Laredo, Guerrero and Mier, finding the people -quiet in those towns (Ho. 60; 30, 1, p. 402). - -10.16. _Occupation of Camargo, etc._ The distance from the Gulf to -Camargo by water was also called 450 miles (Smith, To Mexico, 92). -Ho. 60; 30, 1, p. 690-1 (Hunt). (Mishaps) =76=Letter from Matamoros, -July 13; Whiting, Aug. 3 in Ho. 60; 30, 1, p. 675; _Gaceta de Ciudad -Victoria_, July 21; Matamoros _Reveille_, June 24 ("The channel [of -the river] shifts and fills with incredible rapidity"); _Niles_, July -18, p. 310; Aug. 1, p. 341. Ho. 60; 30, 1, pp. 300, 336-8, 397-402, -408. Henry, Camp. Sketches, 120, 123, 125, 132-151. =69=Smith to Bliss, -July 8. Donnavan, Adventures. =180=Pillow to wife, Aug. 8. Meade, -Letters, i, 106-7, 118. Henshaw narrative. Claiborne, Quitman, i, 239. -Robertson, Remins., 107-9. Brackett, Lane's Brig., 23-4. Tilden, Notes, -10. =69=Miles to Bliss, July 8, 14. (Alcalde) Encarnacion Prisoners, 25. -=76=Comte. gen., Saltillo, July 20. =76=Mejia, July 19. _Picayune_, July -26; Aug. 1, 6, 9, 14, 15. Wilhelm, Eighth Infantry, ii, 279. Taylor, -Letters (Bixby), 25, 30, 39, 40. =65=_Id._, gen. orders 93, July 30. -Ewing, diary, Aug. 20-31, 1846. =76=Garcia to Parrodi, Aug. 10. Grant, -Mems., i, 104. =267=Memo. [apparently from Maj. Smith]. Kenly, Md. Vol., -61-4. French, Two Wars, 59. _Niles_, Sept. 5, p. 1; 19, p. 56. Sanders, -June 5 in Ho. 60; 30, 1, p. 551. (Mier) =69=Vinton to Lee, Aug. 1; -Smith, To Mexico, 66; Green, Journal, 82. - -10.17. _At Camargo._ =99=Gov. Tamaul. to Tampico ayunt., July 23. -=80=Gov. N. Leon, July 2, 1846. _Picayune_, Aug. 1, 6, 9, 14, 15; Sept. -12. Smith, Remins., 35. Sanders, June 5 in Ho. 60; 30, 1, p. 551. -McClellan, diary. Henshaw narrative. Meade, Letters, i, 119, 121. Ewing, -diary, Aug. 31-Sept. 19. Robertson, Remins., 109-11. Wash. _Union_, -Sept. 14; Oct. 5. Bishop, Journal. =185=Worth to Duncan, July 30. -(Worth) Wilhelm, Eighth Inf., ii, 278; Special orders 72 in Ho. 60; 30, -1, p. 529; =61=W. to adj. gen., May 9; =61=Marcy to W., May 11. Henry, -Camp. Sketches, 121, 152-4. Giddings, Sketches, 83. Taylor, Letters -(Bixby), 42, 176. Trans. Ills. State Hist. Soc., 1906, pp. 176-7. -_Vedette_, ix, no. 10. Tennery, diary, Oct. 28. =139=Campbell to D. C., -Aug. 28. Nashville _Union_, Oct. 17. _Niles_, Sept. 12, p. 23; Jan. 2, -1847, p. 286. =117=Pillow to wife, Sept. 6; Dec. 24. Sedgwick, Corres., -i, 13, 30. =169=Taylor to Crittenden, Sept. 1, 1846. (Mier) Ho. 60; 30, -1, p. 1180 (Taylor). - -Camargo was the proper place for Taylor's depot, but no Americans were -needed there except the quartermaster's force and a guard of regulars. -For these there was sufficient elevated ground. The regulars occupied -this ground (_Picayune_, Aug. 15), and suffered comparatively little; -but we know enough of the conditions existing at Camargo to pronounce -the place unfit for the number of men encamped there. - -10.18. May 9 Paredes decided that all the American consuls should cease -to exercise their functions, and four days later orders were issued that -wherever a U. S. war vessel should appear, the Americans should embark -or go twenty leagues into the interior. Mexican consuls in the United -States were soon directed to close their offices. =52=B. E. Green, Apr. -25, 1844: Tornel "hates us with a most envenomed spite." =52=Ellis, -Sept. 20, 1839: Tornel shows a bitter and unrelenting hostility toward -the United States. - -10.19. Feb. 4, 1846, _El Tiempo_, the favorite journal of Paredes, had -said: "We are not a people of traders and adventurers, the scum and -dregs of all countries, whose only mission is to rob the Indians of -their land and then seize the fertile regions opened to civilization -by the Spanish race." June 13 _La Esperanza_, of Tampico, close to the -field of war, printed the Address of a Patriotic Junta [Committee] to -raise funds for the campaign, which used the following language about -the Americans: "People without morality, composed of the scum of all -nations; people without honesty, who count their bankruptcies by the -numberless number of their enterprises; people without religion, who -tolerate all beliefs and mock at the most sacred things; people for whom -probity is not a virtue, who value money and know nothing of glory, a -monstrous collection of the most heterogeneous elements united by the -double bond of crime and fear, etc." - -10.20. _Paredes, Mexico and the war._ (Paredes' appearance) Portrait, -City Hall, Mexico; _Aguila del Norte_, Mar. 18. London _Times_, Mar. 13, -1846. Bankhead, nos. 13, 45, 72, 92, 100, 1846. =52=Slidell, Feb. 6, -17. Mexico a traves, iv, 567-8. Dublan, Legislacion, v, 134-6. Apuntes, -68. _Diario_, May 18; June 2, 7, 12, 17, 26-30; July 2, 4, 6, 21, 23, -25, 26, 28, 30. Memoria de ... Relaciones, 1846. Bustamante, Nuevo -Bernal, ii, 58. =52=Black, no. 379, July 4. _Monitor Repub._, June 1, -4, 30, 1846. _Imparcial_, July 15, 1846. _Indicador_, June 4; July 24, -1846. _Esperanza_, May 30, 1846. _Pregonero_, June 18, 1846. =84=S. L. -Potosi assembly, procl., May 22, 1846. Wash. _Union_, June 18, 1846. -Balbontin, Estado Militar. =13=Foreign Office to Bankhead, June 1, 1846. -=76=Parrodi, June 8, 1846. - -10.21. Mar. 31, 1846 (no. 8), the British Foreign Office wrote to -Bankhead, the minister at Mexico, that according to the British minister -at Madrid the project of setting up a monarch in Mexico was entertained -in Spain. See also chap. iv, note 15 and chap. vi, note 32. - -10.22. _The political situation of Paredes._ =52=Slidell, Jan. 14; Feb. -6, 17; Mar. 1, 18, 27; Apr. 2, 1846. =13=Bankhead, nos. 12, 15, 22, 27, -34, 45, 49, 57, 62, 63, 80, 92, 98, 111, 1846. Conner, Mar. 2 in Ho. -60; 30, 1, p. 121. Dublan, Legislacion, v, 134-6. _Diario_, April 19; -May 4, 13; June 7, 28, 1846. Tributo a la Verdad. =52=Black, June 1; -July 29; Aug. 12. London _Times_, Mar. 13; Apr. 11; Aug. 7; Sept. 5, 9; -Oct. 7. Gov. Durango to Dur. cong., Nov. 8, 1846 (pamphlet). =47=Wood -to Bancroft, June 4. Bermudez de Castro, no. 316, res., Aug. 28, 1846. -=76=Acta, Mazatlan, May 7, 1846. =52=Dimond, no. 317, Feb. 2, 1846. -Paredes, Papers (Garcia, ed.), 43, 46. Mexico a traves, iv, 556, 558. -=75=Gov. Jalisco, Feb. 24, 1846. =75=Circular, Apr. 18, 1846. _Monitor -Constit._, Jan. 9, 1846. _Boletin de Noticias_, June 1, 1846. _Monitor -Repub._, May 23; June 6, 7, 9, 22; July 5, 14, 1846. _Republicano_, June -27, 1846. =80=Gov. Jalisco, decree, May 25, 1846. Bustamante, Nuevo -Bernal, ii, 15. =76=Paredes, manifiesto, Mar. 21. Memoria de ... Guerra, -Dec., 1846. =76=Comte. gen. Mex., Aug. 2, 1846. _Niles_, June 6, p. -211; June 20, p. 242. =80=Gov. Mex., April 20, 1846. Lerdo de Tejada, -Apuntes, ii, 524, 530, 531, 536. Sierra, Evolution, i, 215. =13=Forbes -to Bankhead, July 2, 1846. - -A pamphlet said, "_iA las armas, Mexicanos!_ People, a horrible treason, -an infamous treason threatens our independence, our adored independence, -for which our fathers gave their lives"; Paredes and his coterie of -wretches are aiming to hand us over, manacled, to the foreigners; -"this is a fact, Mexicans; read, read that newspaper, protected by the -government, called _El Tiempo_." - -10.23. _E.g. El Telegrafo_ said in capitals on March 31: "Many a -nation would like to take by the hand" one of the heroes who helped -to establish it, and "the silence of the majestic tomb replies, 'He -no longer lives'; but Santa Anna does live, and his voice proclaims, -'Mexico shall be great, free and happy.'" - -10.24. A revolt in favor of Santa Anna occurred at Mazatlan on May 7, -but it was not an integral part of the movement. - -10.25. Paredes was imprisoned in the fortress of Ulua, transferred to -Perote castle, and early in October permitted to leave the country. In -this revolution Tornel miscalculated and stood out against Santa Anna. -The Puebla garrison also was hostile at first. The title of Salas was, -"Most Excellent Senor, General-in-Chief of the Liberating Republican -Army exercising the Supreme Executive Power." - -10.26. _The downfall of Paredes._ London _Times_, Aug. 6, 1845; Feb. 10; -May 13; Oct. 7, 1846. W. S. Parrott, June 4. =52=Campbell, Apr. 8, 1845. -Slidell, Mar. 27, 1846. _Imparcial_, June 18, 1906. Dimond, nos. 324-7, -329, 331, Mar. 18, 22, 31; Apr. 1, 5, 17, 1846. Santa Anna's "Plan," -etc., in Sen. 1; 29, 2, pp. 34-6. Sierra, Evolution, i, 215-7. Suarez -y Navarro, Causas, 82. Mora, Papeles Ined., 59. Bankhead, nos. 57, 78, -88, 100, 110, 111, 149, 1846. =13=Giffard, April 1; Aug. 1. Memoria -de ... Relaciones, Dec., 1846 (and documents). Gimenez, Memorias, 92. -Acta, Guadalajara, May 22, 1846 (pamphlet). Mexico a traves, iv, 555, -569-76. _Picayune_, April 21. _Diario_, May 4; July 31; Aug. 1-9, -26. =285=Montoya to Paredes, April 1. =285=Parrodi to Paredes, July -25. =182=Almonte to ----, May 13. _Monitor Repub._, June 22; Aug. 4. -=52=Black, Apr. 26; May 21; July 29; Aug. 6, 22, 27; Sept. 17; Oct. 8. -_Plan Salvador_, Feb. 11, 1847. =47=Conner, July 16, 28; Aug. 12., 1846. -=166=Pommares to Conner, July 31. _Monitor Repub._, Aug. 4. =73=Bermudez -de Castro, no. 316, res., Aug. 28, 1846. Lerdo de Tejada, Apuntes, ii, -531-5. Memoria ... de Guerra, Dec., 1846. Dublan, Legislacion, v, 146, -155. Bustamante, Nuevo Bernal, ii, 63, 67-74. =94=Circular of Hacienda, -Aug. 15. Also from =76= the following. Letter to Guerra, Acapulco, -Apr. 15. To Garay and Falcon, April 7. To Bravo, April 13. Rea, June -5. Comte. gen. Oaxaca, June 15. Yanez, Aug. 31. _Id._ to troops, May -20. _Id._, address, June 7. _Id._, proclam., July 16. Acta, Mazatlan, -May 7. Acta, Tepic, May 12. Yanez to Reyes, May 22. To Morales, Aug. -7. To Parrodi, July 31. Acta, Coatepec, July 20. Comte. gen. V. Cruz, -July 1, 9, 21. Rebolledo to Echagaray, July 20. Paredes, Sept. 12. To -comte. gen. Vera Cruz, Sept. 18. Acta, Jalapa, Aug. 2. Salas to Mora, -Aug. 4. To Paredes, Aug. 4. Agreement, Aug. 6. Salas, proclam., Aug. -6. Circulars, July 27; Aug. 3, 4, 6, 7, 9, 15, 17. The Guerra archives -contain a great number of documents relating to internal troubles at -this time. For the Organic Bases see chap, ii, p. 52. - -10.27. The captain general of Cuba had been ordered--evidently in the -interest of the Mexican monarchical party--to prevent Santa Anna from -returning to Mexico, but was friendly to him, and gave him a passport on -the grounds that he could not be prevented from going, that an attempt -to hold him (contrary to the rules of neutrality and hospitality) might -be made an excuse for misusing the Spanish residing in that country, and -that, even should the monarchical plan be carried out, its results would -probably not be stable (=72=Reales Ordenes, Serie de Gobernacion, legajo -43). He went in a hired vessel called the _Arab_, under British colors. -Near Vera Cruz the _Arab_ was hailed by the U. S. sloop-of-war _St. -Mary's_ and boarded, but was permitted to proceed (S. Anna, Apelacion, -17; Semmes, Service, 118; Taylor, Broad Pennant, 254-5). Conner stated -that the _Arab_ was not boarded, but apparently he wrote this before -receiving a report from the _St. Mary's_. The city of Vera Cruz had not -declared for Santa Anna, and did not do so for some time. In fact the -city government appeared so unsympathetic that an effort was immediately -made to overthrow it. Santa Anna was accompanied by Almonte, Rejon and -other partisans. See _Courrier des Etats Unis_, Aug. 22; =313=Letters in -Saunders papers; =297=Mackenzie, July 11; =166=Campbell to Conner, Aug. -7; =166=Conner, Aug. 17; ("Flower") Kenly, Md. Vol., 392-3; =76=comte. -gen. V. Cruz, Aug. 16, 22; Tributo a la Verdad; Semmes, Service, 118-9; -=100=Landero and Perez, July 31; Bankhead, nos. 121, 122, Aug. 29; -=47=Conner, Aug. 16; _Diario_, Aug. 28; Memoria de ... Guerra, Dec., -1846. - -10.28. _Santa Anna till he reaches El Encero._ Ruxton, Adventures -(1849 ed.), 17, 18, 20, 47. =76=Comte. gen. V. Cruz, Aug. 14, 16, 22. -Encarnacion Prisoners, 45. Stapp, Prisoners, 89, 90, 95. Calderon, Life, -i, 48-50; ii, 121. S. Anna, Apelacion, 16-8. Kendall, Narrative, ii, -364. _Am. Sentinel_, June 15, 1836. =297=Mackenzie, July 11. =76=S. -Anna, Aug. 16. Rivera, Gobernantes, ii, 183, 186, 221. London _Times_, -June 25, 1836. Thompson, Recolls., 66. Ferry, Revolutions, 175-206. -=231=Powhatan Ellis, July 8, 1839. =76=Comte. gen. Zacatecas, Aug. -28. =76=Comte. gen. Oaxaca, Aug. 28. =76=Comte. gen. Tamaul., Aug. -26. =76=Comte. gen. Sinaloa, Oct. 14. =13=Bankhead, nos. 120-2, Aug. -29. Taylor, Broad Pennant, 254-5. Semmes, Service, 118-9. Memoria -de ... Relaciones, Dec., 1846. Lerdo de Tejada, Apuntes, ii, 536. -=47=Conner, Aug. 16 (unofficial), 25, 30; Sept. 5. =166=Conner, Aug. 17. -=76=Circular, Aug. 19. Memoria de ... Guerra, Dec., 1846. _Indicador_, -Aug. 16. Ramirez, Mexico, 134, 137, 139-40. Ho. 60; 30, 1, p. 777 -(S. Anna). Bustamante, Nuevo Bernal, ii, 86-7. =76=S. Anna, Sept. 7. -_Diario_, Aug. 27-8. =162=Conner to wife, Aug. 19. =52=Campbell, Nov. 10. - -10.29. This account is based upon a study of his career and a wide -range of reading. A few sources may be specified: _Atlas_, Feb. 1, -1845. Bankhead, nos. 66, 110, 1844. Calderon, Life, ii, 121. Sierra, -Evolution, i, 190, 198, 203, 210, 216. Mofras, Exploration, i, 14. -Negrete, Mexico, xiii, 370. Leon, Historia, 480. Defensa de S. Anna. -_Nacional_, Dec 22, 1847. _Arco Iris_, Dec. 7, 1847. _Monitor Repub._, -Oct. 12; Dec. 12, 1847. =166=Campbell to Conner, July 9, 1846. Noticias -Importantes. =73=Reports of the Spanish legation (which give striking -evidence of S. Anna's intellectual qualities and volubility). Proceso -del Gral. S. Anna. Biog. del Gral. S. Anna. - -10.30. No doubt Santa Anna had felt at an earlier period and possibly -felt even now an occasional emotion of patriotism inundate his soul, -as a Mexican proclamation would have said. Few are so utterly selfish -as never to bestow a kind wish upon their fellow-creatures, and Santa -Anna was bad in a spontaneous, human way, not in that of cold villainy. -Probably he was largely guided by worse men than himself, who had more -ability to think but needed him to execute their designs. - -10.31. The army sent agents to question Santa Anna with reference to -his intentions. It may safely be assumed that he reassured the military -chiefs regarding his real aims. - -10.32. The _Boletin Oficial_ of S. L. Potosi said on July 31: "And -liberty! Oh liberty! There also we meet with fine phrases. How beautiful -are phrases! How they fill the heart! Santa Anna instead of Paredes -..., is not this liberty, I ask? A prince from abroad, a dictator from -Mexico,--is not this also liberty, I ask?" - -10.33. =47=Conner reported that on August 28 an American urged upon -Santa Anna the necessity of making peace with the United States, and -that Santa Anna replied in substance as follows: I am convinced of that -but will not assume the responsibility of proposing it; I am old; I have -money enough; I will not run the risk of dying in exile; I will assemble -Congress as soon as possible and act as the majority shall decide; -meanwhile I will attempt the arduous task of repelling the invaders. -This American was Hargous, a merchant of Vera Cruz (see Bustamante, -Nuevo Bernal, ii, 90; =166=Pommares to Conner, Aug. 29). The British -minister believed that Santa Anna had made an arrangement with the -United States at Havana, but was prevented by the unpopularity of his -return from carrying out the agreement (Bankhead, no. 128, Sept. 7). - -10.34. A striking glimpse into the situation is given by the fact that -for some time the government could not communicate confidentially with -Santa Anna because there was nobody it dared trust with such a mission, -and no person of importance dared absent himself from the centre of -intrigue (Ramirez, Mexico, 145). - -10.35. A series of acts concluded on October 23 restored fully the -externals of the federal system (Ramirez, Memorias, 33-4). This change -metamorphosed departments into states. - -10.36. The constitution of 1824 was revived _so far_ as it did not -conflict with the revolution of Aug. 4. Salas was a weak man and longed -to escape from his difficult and trying situation (Bankhead, no. 140, -Sept. 29; Bustamante, Nuevo Bernal, ii, 101; Mexico a traves, iv, 577). - -10.37. Other war measures were: (Aug. 28) free importation of arms; -(Aug. 31) severe penalties for civil and military officers refusing to -obey orders during the war; (Sept. 3) the free manufacture and sale -of gunpowder; (Sept. 4) a commission to provide lands for American -deserters; (Sept. 10) naturalization to be gained by entering the army -or navy; (Sept. 10) reestablishment of the Military Normal School at -Chapultepec under the name Military College; (Sept. 11) regulations for -the National Guard. The purpose of offering a pardon to deserters from -the regular army was probably to transfer men from it to the National -Guards (Bankhead, no. 126, Sept. 7). - -10.38. The attitude of the best citizens was probably stated by the -_Monitor Republicano_ of Aug. 25: "We will say to Santa Anna: ... if -you recognize your errors, promote the welfare of the country, pursue -a course entirely different from your former policy, and prove by -acts--not words--that your misdeeds were not crimes but errors, then -Mexico will forget the past and reward liberally the citizen conferring -upon her so marked a benefit." - -10.39. Thirteen municipalities of Oaxaca contributed a total of 75 pesos. - -10.40. Guadalupe Hidalgo, a suburb on the northern side of Mexico, -contained a deeply venerated shrine of the Virgin. - -10.41. _The situation and Santa Anna's course._ =47=Conner, July 28; -Aug. 12, 16 (unofficial), 25; Sept. 5, 13, 22; Oct. 4. =73=Bermudez de -Castro, no. 316, res., Aug. 28; nos. 345-6, Sept. 28. Ramirez, Mexico, -131-5, 137, 145, 149. =52=Black, Aug. 22, 27; Sept. 12, 22, 28; Oct. 8. -Mora, Papeles Ined., 60. =162=Conner to wife, Aug. 29. Heller, Reisen, -195-6. Sierra, Evolution, i, 215. Tributo a la Verdad. =70=Degrees, -Aug. 22, 28. =76=Salas, proclams., Aug. 28; decrees, Sept. 10, 27. -=13=Gutierrez de Estrada to Palmerston, Mar. 1, 1847. =76=Circular, -Aug. 28 ("infamous" reports that the govt. aims to destroy the army). -=13=Bankhead, nos. 111, 120-2, 126, 128, 136, 140, 142, 1846. Rivera, -Jalapa, iii, 787-9. =166=Campbell to Conner, July 9, 13. =166=Pommares -to Conner, Aug. 29; Sept. 23. _Amer. Sentinel_, June 15, 1836. _Revue -des Deux Mondes_, Aug. 1, 1847, p. 404. Mexico a traves, iv, 577-9, -590, 628. _Diario_, Aug. 27-Sept. 6, 9, 11-20, 23, 25-30. =47=Black to -Conner, Sept. 24. _Eco de Tampico_, Nov. 4 (If S. Anna beats the enemy -he will be the idol of the Mexicans). =76=Circulars, Aug. 17, 22, 28, -31; Sept. 3, 15, 17, 20, 25, 28. Memoria de ... Guerra, Dec. Garcia, -Revol. de Ayutla, 15. Memoria de ... Relaciones, Dec. =77=Circular, -Sept. 10; Nov. 27. Dublan, Legislacion, v, 155-61. _Republicano_, Sept. -15, 29; Nov. 5. =76=To Almonte, Aug. 28. =76=S. Anna, Sept. 7, 13, 14, -21, 24, 25, 26. Apuntes, 67, 115. Tributo a la Verdad. Bustamante, -Nuevo Bernal, ii, 94, 96, 101, 111. =76=Comte. gen. Puebla, Sept. 6. -_Diario_, supplem. to no. 39. =70=Almonte to comte. gen. Mex., Sept. -15. =76=Comte. gen. V. Cr., procl., Oct. 1. _Monitor Repub._, Aug. -25; Sept. 14-15, 18, 25. Ruxton, Advent. (1847), 47, 49. _Imparcial_, -June 18, 1906. =76=Comte. gen. Queretaro, procl., Sept. 29. S. Anna, -Apelacion, 20. London _Times_, Oct. 7; Nov. 6. (380) Ho. 60; 30, 1, p. -1046 (Scott). - -10.42. (Bulls) =121=Handbill. - - - XI. TAYLOR SETS OUT FOR SALTILLO - -11.1. =76=Arista, May 25, 29. =76=To Mejia, May 27. (Monterey) -=169=Taylor to Crittenden, Oct. 9. Apuntes, 50-3. =76=Mejia, June 9, -19; July 2. =76=_Id._, proclam., July 6. The number of officers, each -of whom required baggage and servants, was excessive. Arista eliminated -more than half of them. The cavalry were afoot, and he took steps to -remount them. Contracts were made for mules to draw the cannon, and the -work of putting the artillery in order began. Owing to Mejia's illness, -Requena assumed the actual command in June (Carreno, Jefes, ccii). - -11.2. Apuntes, 51, 53. =285=Letter to Paredes, July 13. =285=Segura -to Escudero, June 4. Balbontin, Invasion, 26. =76=Arista, Apr. 24. -=76=Mejia, June 9, 19, 20; July 19, 29; Aug. 19, 21. =76=_Id._ to Baz, -July 29. =76=Ampudia, Aug. 28. =76=Mejia to Ampudia, Aug. 31. =69=Spy to -Taylor, Apr. 5. In addition to their lack of patriotism, the people had -no arms (=76=gov. N. Leon, May 24). - -11.3. =69=Vinton to Worth, Aug. 19. =285=Mejia to Paredes, July 20. -And from =76= the following. Mejia, June 14 ("The loss of the immense -territory divided by the Sierra is inevitable"); July 9, 19; Aug. 10, -17, 21. _Id._ to Canales, Aug. 10. Gargollo to second alcalde of S. -Fernando, June 5. S. Fernando ayunt. to gov. of Tamaulipas, June 8. -Canales, June 18. _Id._ to Mejia, June 14; June 14, personal. Gov. of N. -Leon, June 24. - -Mejia reported that the officers at Monterey agreed to make no -pronunciamiento and to obey the established authorities, whoever they -might be; but a spy reported "utter confusion" in the public mind there -(Vinton, _supra_) in consequence of the revolution of August 4, and -Worth heard that a state of things existed which might have been taken -advantage of by Taylor (=69=to Bliss, Aug. 27). - -11.4. (Intended) June 24 Taylor wrote: "If the gov. think proper to -entrust me with this command for the purpose of carrying the war into -the enemies country I do not feel authorized to decline the same" -(Letters (Bixby), 18). The context shows that Taylor then knew (p. 17) -that he _was_ to have the command. The orders to that effect had been -issued June 8. In fact the orders of Jan. 13 directed Taylor to assume -the offensive, should Mexico begin hostilities, and his report of Apr. -26 recommended operating beyond the Rio Grande (Ho. 60; 30, 1, pp. 91, -141). All that he did and failed to do must therefore be viewed in the -light of the fact that he knew, or should have known, that he ought -to wage a vigorous and aggressive campaign. (Smuggling) Henry, Camp. -Sketches, 19. The smuggling on this border was a familiar theme in the -Mexican press. =76=Arleji to Ampudia, Aug. 31 (some Mexicans are led by -self-interest to serve the Americans more faithfully than they would -serve their own country). =76=Mejia (July 19) classed the people of the -border generally as enemies. Taylor seems to have neglected persistently -the duty of obtaining information (_Niles_, Sept. 12, p. 22; _So. Qtrly. -Rev._, Nov., 1850, p. 457). Apparently he tried interrogating Mexicans -here and there, and was disgusted to find their statements disagreed. -What he should have had was, as Scott recommended (Ho. 60; 30, 1, -p. 327) many carefully selected agents (spies), whose accounts could -have been sifted by comparison. No evidence can be found that he even -attempted to follow this advice, though Worth realized the value of -information, and did something of real utility. Taylor's lack of data -will appear later. Meade, who was in a position to be well-informed, -wrote on Sept. 17 near Marin that the Americans knew no more of the -numbers or defences at Monterey than when they were at Matamoros -(Letters, i, 130). Ripley (War with Mexico, i, 156-60) endeavors to -show that Scott interfered unwarrantably and caused confusion by giving -Taylor instructions on June 12 that were at variance with those given by -Marcy on June 8 (Ho. 60; 30, 1, pp. 323, 325). But (1) Marcy knew of and -endorsed Scott's "interference" (_ibid._, p. 328); and (2) there was no -practical variance. Marcy and Scott agreed that Taylor was to advance. -Scott said Taylor would make the high road toward the capital one of his -lines, which was (as Scott said) a matter "of course." Marcy said it had -not been decided whether he should advance _to_ the capital. - -11.5. Polk, Diary, Sept. 5, 1846; Mar. 20, 1847. Sen. 1; 30, 1, p. 545 -(Jesup). =76=Gov. Tamaulipas, Aug. 5 (Taylor obtained 1000 mules through -the alcalde of Reynosa). Upton, Military Policy, 215 (not known at -Washington that wagons could be used). Taylor, Letter to Gaines. Ho. 60; -30, 1, pp. 559, 565-6 (Jesup). Smith, Remins., 13-15. Taylor, Letters -(Bixby), 177-8. =61=Worth to alcalde, Aug. 24. Henry, Camp. Sketches, -164. N. Y. _Commerc. Advertiser_, Mar. 29, 1847. May 21 Taylor wrote -that the means of transportation might be pack-mules "chiefly" (Ho. 60; -30, 1, p. 300). (Taylor's plans not known) Sen. 1; 30, 1, 546 (Jesup). -(Complained) =169=Taylor to Crittenden, Sept. 1; =61=to adj. gen., Sept. -10; Letter to Gaines; Ho. 60; 30, 1, p. 557. - -Wagons (drawn usually by eight mules) were more convenient, where they -could be used, than pack-mules; but Santa Anna showed, six months later, -that with no such wagons 24-pound cannon and an army three times as -large as Taylor proposed to take could be moved about twice the distance -from Camargo to Monterey by a route that passed through, not a populated -region like that where Taylor was, but a virtual desert. Taylor not only -knew that Arista had depended upon mules, but captured that general's -entire outfit. It was easy to obtain large numbers of mules through the -alcaldes. Experience proved that unbroken mules could be made fit for -the work in three days (Smith, Remins., 18). The first call for wagons -(May 18) proceeded from a quartermaster at Pt. Isabel, who called for -seventy. There is no evidence that Taylor prompted this requisition, -and it was wholly inadequate for his professed needs. His indifference -about such matters was illustrated by Col. Cross, at the time his chief -quartermaster, who said, "With respect to the means of transportation to -be provided, or other preparations in my branch of the service, I have -never received a line of instructions or any order whatever from Gen. -Taylor" (Ho. 60; 30, 1, p. 650). It was his duty to call seasonably for -the desired number of wagons, and he did not do it. - -When the department found that wagons were wanted, it displayed much -energy in having them purchased or built (Ho. 60; 30, 1, pp. 546-764). -In fact, on an intimation from Scott (May 15), it ordered 200 to be -constructed at Philadelphia as soon as they could be thoroughly made, -and eleven days later sent an agent to Cincinnati for 300 more. Later -the field of operations extended as far as Boston. But much time was -required to find suitable lumber and skilled workmen, build the wagons -properly, and transport them to Mexico. None reached the front in time -for the fall campaign; and indeed, after they arrived, pack-mules -continued to be used (Whiting: Ho. 60; 30, 1, p. 688). Taylor complained -particularly (Bixby collection, 185) because 100-150 wagons intended for -him went to Wool, whose expedition will be described in chap. xiii; but -Wool was under Taylor's orders, and the latter neglected to regulate -the matter, while the former was alert and active. Taylor complained -also of lacking mules, harness, pack-saddles, horseshoe nails, etc.; -but, as in the cases of boats and wagons, the fault seems chargeable to -the head of the army. He conceived the absurd idea that the government -was endeavoring to ruin him by crippling his operations, as if success -had not been fully as important for the government as for him. Worth -privately said that any lack of transportation was chargeable to -Taylor, and described the General's complaints as intended to ward off -responsibility in case of failure and augment glory in case of success -(=364=to Capt. S., Sept. 5); and on the maturest consideration this -judgment appears to be substantially correct. For a statement of the -chief clerk, quartermaster's office, Washington, see chap. x, note -13. The practical conclusion is that Taylor, with nearly 300 wagons -and numberless mules at command, was able to move with reasonable -promptness. Jesup, after reaching the scene, contracted for 2000 mules -in one day, and said that Taylor might have collected 10,000 (Ho. 60; -30, 1, p. 567). - -One must be extremely cautious about asserting what a general might -have done; but it seems quite clear that Taylor could and should have -organized a systematic spy service that would have given him adequate -information regarding the Mexican army and the defences of Monterey; -have advanced his regulars, about 1000 at least of his best volunteers, -a large supply of provisions, at least six 18-pounders, entrenching -tools, etc. to Camargo in June; have had at least 3000 mules collected -there by August 1; have placed, say, 2000 regulars and 1000 volunteers -at Cerralvo by Aug. 15, and gathered the large stocks of subsistence -available in that district; and have reached Monterey with 9000 men, -heavy guns and ample supplies by Sept. 15. Or Taylor might have gone -to Saltillo _via_ Monclova. The distance would have been considerably -greater, but the Mexicans would have had to abandon Monterey and -Rinconada Pass, and Taylor and Wool would have been able to cooperate. -Both Santa Anna and Mejia feared he would adopt this plan. In reply to -all this it may be said that on pp. 198-9 the author mentioned without -disapproval Scott's plan to begin the campaign about Sept. 25. But the -two cases were not parallel. Taylor was already in the "hot mud" and -needed to bestir himself; and he planned but a small movement, whereas -Scott, not yet in touch with the conditions, planned a large and -decisive one, which probably would not have advanced _via_ Monterey. - -11.6. (Knew) Taylor, Letters (Bixby), 46, 51, 177; N. Y. _Herald_, July -25; _Niles_, July 18, p. 309; Scott, Mems., ii, 391-2; _Cong. Globe_, -29, 2, app., 125 (Ingersoll). A resolution was introduced in Congress -asking the reason for the inactivity of the army (_Niles_, July 18, p. -309). One newspaper called Taylor "Gen. Delay." (Sustain) Taylor, Letter -to Gaines. (Consequences) Taylor, Letters (Bixby), 46. (Suspected) -Taylor, _ibid._, 13, 20. (Resistance) Taylor to Crittenden, Sept. 1 -("I hope to be in possession of Monterey and Saltillo, as soon as our -legs can carry us there"); Bliss, Aug. 14, in Ho. 60; 30, 1, p. 411 -(Taylor "anticipates no serious difficulty in reaching and occupying -Saltillo"); =135=Taylor to Butler, Aug. 26; _Hist. Mag._, x, 207-8 -(Backus); =180=Pillow to wife, Aug. 16 (Taylor says he does not think -we shall have to fire another gun in all northern Mexico). Robertson, -Remins., 125. - -It has been said that Taylor knew of Polk's negotiations with Santa -Anna, and therefore had good reason to expect no resistance. But this -was a matter for his government to act upon, and the government had -said nothing of that kind to him. As we shall see, Scott, although -negotiating himself later with Santa Anna, did not relax his military -activity in the least. This was the only proper course for a general -in the field under orders to press the war. =185=Aug. 5 Worth ordered -Duncan to make a thorough examination of the routes. Aug. 8 Duncan -reported that the Mexicans were said to be fortifying Monterey. Sept. -3 Taylor wrote (Bixby coll., 51): "The country ... shall not be -disappointed; even if it should turn out to be a disaster." One does -not readily see how Taylor could have supposed that the government -wished to be, or was likely to be, supported by an admittedly inadequate -expedition. - -11.7. =61=Ordnance bureau, memo., June 15. See pp. 148, 164, 177. Benet, -Ordnance Reports, 1880, ii, 158. Ho. 60; 30, 1, pp. 329, 417 (Taylor). -For S. Anna's task see note 5 and chap. xix. =66=Sanders to Taylor, Feb. -15. =61=Ridgely to adj. gen., Aug. 2. (Bayonet) Taylor, Letters (Bixby), -178. - -11.8. Robertson, Remins., 118. =69=Vinton to Worth, Aug. 19. =69=Wolf -to Bliss, Aug. 10. =69=Duncan to Worth, Aug. 8. =65=Taylor, gen. orders -98-9, 105, 108, 110. =76=Canales to Mejia, Aug. 20. Ho. 60; 30, 1, pp. -411-2, 417 (Taylor), 534 (spec. orders 119). =76=Aldrete to Mejia, Aug. -30. _Picayune_, Aug. 25. Meade, Letters, i, 123. _Niles_, Sept. 5, p. 2. -=69=P. F. Smith, memoir, Oct. 14. Rowles, Allen, 93. U. S. Military maps -(War College, Washington). Duncan and also Hays explored the routes. - -The army was organized as follows: REGULARS (mostly). A battery of -two 24-pound howitzers and a 10-inch mortar (100 men) from the First -Artillery. _First Division_ (Brig. Gen. Twiggs). Cavalry: Second -Dragoons. Ridgely's battery. Third Brigade (Lieut. Col. Garland): -Bragg's battery, Third and Fourth Infantry, Capt. Shiver's volunteer -company. Fourth Brigade (Lieut. Col. Wilson): First Infantry, -Washington and Baltimore battalion. _Second Division_ (Brevet Brig. -Gen. Worth). First Brigade (Lieut. Col. Staniford): Duncan's battery, -Artillery Battalion, Eighth Infantry. Second Brigade ([G]Brig. Gen. P. -F. Smith): Taylor's (Mackall's) battery, Fifth and Seventh Infantry, -Blanchard's Louisiana volunteer company. VOLUNTEERS. _Field Division_ -(Maj. Gen. Butler). First Brigade (Brig. Gen. Hamer): First Kentucky -and First Ohio regiments. Second Brigade (Brig. Gen. Quitman): First -Tennessee and First Mississippi regiments (Ho. 60; 30, 1, p. 417). -Each of these four regiments was reduced to a strength of about 500 -privates by leaving behind the physically unfit. Sept. 20, the numbers -were respectively (aside from 43 sick) 482, 524, 459, 452; also 37 -artillery. _Texas Division_ (Maj. Gen. Henderson) First and Second -regiments of mounted volunteers. These and the First Mississippi -were riflemen. About Aug. 13 a regiment of Texas riflemen commanded -by Albert Sidney Johnston decided (except some who formed a company -under Shiver) to go home. Johnston was soon attached to Butler's staff -as acting inspector general (Ho. 60; 30, 1, p. 536). "Field Division" -simply meant those volunteers (except Texans) selected to make the -present campaign. It was a temporary and local organization. Sept. 11 -Meade (Letters, i, 126) analyzed the army as follows: 8 regiments of -regular infantry (2500); 4 regiments of volunteer infantry (2000); -4 light batteries, each of 4 6-pounders (280); one heavy battery -(100); 2 squadrons of regular cavalry (200); one squadron of volunteer -cavalry (150); 2 regiments of volunteer cavalry (1000); total, 6230 -men and 4-500 teamsters, hospital attendants, etc., mostly armed. Aug. -15 a man from Monterey said Taylor should not move against the city -without 12,000 well disciplined men. For the assignment of wagons and -pack-mules to the various corps see Ho. 60; 30, 1, p. 501. - -[G] Smith was colonel of the Mounted Rifles; but, as he had been -brigadier general of Louisiana volunteers and now commanded a brigade, -he was commonly given the higher title. In August, 1847, he was a -regular brevet brigadier general. - -A pack-mule (_mula de carga_) was expected to carry 300 pounds. Not a -little skill was required to load the animal quickly in such a manner -that its burden would be secure and would not chafe; but the Mexican -mule-driver was a master of the art. The subject is rather interesting. -One may consult Inman, Old S. Fe Trail (1897), 56-8; Robertson, -Remins., 269; _Picayune_, Mar. 6, 1847 (Hughes); Robertson, Visit, i, -274; Claiborne, Quitman, i, 279 (Holt); Henshaw narrative. The troops -not taken to Monterey were probably distributed about as follows: at -Camargo, 2100 under Brig. Gens. Pillow and Marshall; at Matamoros, 1100 -under Col. Clarke; below that city on the Rio Grande, 4500; at Pt. -Isabel, 120 under Maj. Gardner; in hospitals, 1400. Maj. Gen. Patterson -commanded all these forces. - -11.9. Henshaw narrative. Claiborne, Quitman, ii, 306 (Taylor). Taylor, -Letters (Bixby), 56. Robertson, Remins., 119-22. =69=P. F. Smith to -Bliss, Aug. 26. =69=Worth to Bliss, Aug. 25. =148=Chamberlain, recolls. -Ho. 60; 30, 1, p. 679 (Whiting). Giddings, Sketches, 108. Henry, Camp. -Sketches, 161-77. - -11.10. Taylor, Letters (Bixby), 54, 56. Robertson, Remins., 122. -Velasco, Geografia, iv, 121. =69=Duncan to Worth, Aug. 8. =69=Worth to -Bliss, Aug. 25. Ho. 60; 30, 1, p. 419 (Worth), 421 (Taylor). Wilhelm, -Eighth Inf., ii, 281. =76=Arleji to Ampudia, Aug. 31. Henry, Camp. -Sketches, 154, 177-9. Grant, Mems., i, 107. _Picayune_, Sept. 22; Oct. -6. Meade, Letters, i, 124. Kenly, Md. Vol., 85. _Metrop. Mag._, Dec, -1907, p. 316. - -Worth wrote on Sept. 3 that he could have bought 5000 bushels of corn -here (Ho. 60; 30, 1, p. 420). Taylor stated that he found beef, goats, -sheep and corn in abundance at Cerralvo (=180=Pillow to wife, Sept. -20). These facts bear upon Taylor's complaint that the government's -failure to send wagons caused a shortage of provisions and therefore of -men, especially since the wagons used for the transportation of water -as far as Cerralvo were no longer required for that service (=65=gen. -orders. 115). On learning of the corn Taylor might, so far as concerned -subsistence, have brought on another volunteer brigade. One cannot -see why he did not push some troops on to Cerralvo instead of letting -them die at Camargo. One soldier wrote in his diary that there were -unwholesome swamps at Cerralvo, but the statement appears doubtful. -Worth's command remained at this point nearly three weeks and was still -in excellent health. If there were swamps, the camps could no doubt have -been pitched on ground above them, for a fine stream came from a gorge -in the mountain. - -11.11. Balbontin, Invasion, 10-24. Apuntes, 54. Negrete, Invasion, ii, -304-5. =93=Memoranda. Memoria de ... Guerra, Dec., 1846. And from =76= -the following. To Ramirez, Aug. 17. Comte. gen. S. L. P., Aug. 15, -28; Sept. 2, 16. Ramirez, Aug. 17. Galindo, Aug. 24. Mejia, Aug. 17, -19. Romero, Aug. 24. To Ampudia, Aug. 17. Ampudia, Aug. 26; Sept. 2, -3, 9. Ponce de Leon, Sept. 19, 22. _Id._ to Ampudia, Sept. 15. Mejia -to Ampudia, Aug. 31. Returns, Sept. 10, 11. Pacheco, Aug. 25. Ampudia -reported that the First Brigade made about forty-eight miles one day. -This statement, were it not supported by similar facts, would not be -believed. The Fourth Brigade marched for Monterey, but did not arrive. -It was very poorly equipped. It reached S. L. Potosi Aug. 29, was halted -there to maintain order, and did not leave until Sept. 22. - -Ampudia organized his infantry as four brigades under Gen. Ramirez, Gen. -Mejia, Col. Uraga, and Col. Mendoza, and his cavalry as two brigades -under Gens. Torrejon and Romero, the former commanding by right of -seniority all the mounted troops. The name of the senorita might excite -suspicion, but there were others who bore it. - -The Mexican archives give very few complete, properly attested returns, -but we have one here, and it seems worth while to summarize it in -order to show the fragmentary character of the Mexican armies. The -attached numbers are the rank and file. Staff; a section of engineers; -do. of Plana Mayor; do. of surgeons, 10; sappers, 118; artillery, 211. -Infantry: Second Ligero regt., 220; Third do., 512; Fourth do., 397; -First Line regt., 186; Third do., 345; Fourth do., 187; detachments of -Sixth and Eighth do., 89; Seventh do., 129; Activo Battalion (First) -of Mexico, 136; Do. of Morelia, 77; Do. of S. L. Potosi, 340; Do. of -Queretaro, 340; Do. of Aguascalientes, 383; Auxiliary battalion of -Monterey, 349. Cavalry: Ligero, 80; First Line, 93; Third do., 140; -Eighth do., 99; Jalisco Lancers, 146; Activo of Guanajuato, 132; Do. -of S. L. Potosi, 123; Auxiliary Squadron of Bejar, 68; First Permanent -Co. of Tamaulipas, 41; Second do., 9; Permanent Co. of Lampazos, 23; -Do. of Bejar, 22; Do. of La Bahia, 1; First Activo Co. of N. Leon, 56; -Defensores [militia] of N. Leon, 625. Total, 5836. This was duly signed -by Ampudia and J. G. Conde. A party of deserters (mostly Irish) from the -American army, which served at Monterey, was presumably included in the -above return. They became the nucleus of the "San Patricio" corps. - -11.12. From =76= the following. To Ampudia, Aug. 20, 23, 24, 28 (four -despatches), 31. Comte. gen. N. Leon, Aug. 26. S. Anna, Sept. 29. Aug. -24 Ampudia was told to have Mejia suspend his retreat, unless Taylor -had advanced in full force. Aug. 28 he was ordered to destroy the -fortifications and retire, leaving a strong body of cavalry to screen -Monterey and observe the Americans until the latter should arrive within -a few leagues of the town. Aug. 31 Ampudia's decision to hold the city -was endorsed. Evidently the minister of war did not agree with Santa -Anna, and on finding an excuse disregarded the latter's advice. The -comandante general was especially anxious to have the Americans attacked -during their march. He described the garrison as enthusiastic. - -11.13. From =76=Mejia to Ampudia, Aug. 31. Comte. gen. N. Leon, Aug. 26. -Ampudia to Mejia, Aug. 24, 26. Ampudia, Aug. 26; Sept. 9. To Ampudia, -Aug. 31. - -Ampudia's reasons were: 1. It would take a month to demolish the -fortifications, and during that time the enemy could attack on -advantageous terms; 2. The materiel could not be saved; 3. The -abandonment of Monterey would lead the people to declare their -independence and unite with Taylor, enabling him to hold the mountains -so strongly that 50,000 men could not dislodge him; 4. Public opinion -would blame Ampudia and the government; 5. The effect on the morale -of all the troops concerned in the affair would be fatal. His plan was -to attack the Americans in detail on their march; and then, should he -find them too strong for him, retreat with his artillery and infantry, -leaving the cavalry to fight rear-guard actions. - -11.14. Apuntes, 54. From =76= the following. To Mejia, May 27. Mejia, -June 19 (two despatches); July 25. Comte. gen. N. Leon, Aug. 12. -Ampudia, Sept. 9. Mejia to Ampudia, Aug. 31. - -11.15. =307=Roberts, diary, Nov. 27. Meade, Letters, i, 133, 136. -Richmond _Enquirer_, Oct. 20. =169=Taylor to Crittenden, Oct. 9. Henshaw -narrative. Apuntes, 53-4; =176=Davis to Brown, Sept. 20. Balbontin, -Invasion, 24. =92=Map and plan of defence. Negrete, Invasion, ii, -327 (Ampudia). _Picayune_, Nov. 4. Eyewitness, Complete History, 45. -Numerous maps, published and in MS. - -11.16. Apuntes, 53-4. Meade, Letters, i, 138 (evidently in error about -the citadel garrison). _Picayune_, Oct. 21. _Nat. Intelligencer_, Nov. -20. Henry, Camp. Sketches, 216. Henshaw narrative. Robertson, Remins., -126-8. =69=Mansfield, report. =66=_Id._ to Totten, June 30, 1847. -=147=Chamberlain, diary. Balbontin, Invasion, 43. =76=Comte. gen. N. -Leon, Sept. 20. =76=Ampudia, Sept. 9. The Americans often spoke of -the citadel as the "Black Fort" or the "Old Colored Gentleman." Its -Mexican name was Fort Independencia, but it must not be confounded with -the redoubt on Independence Hill. It stood about 1000 yards from the -densely-built part of the city. - -11.17. =69=Mansfield, report. Balbontin, Invasion, 27, 38, 42. =76=Mejia -to Ampudia, Aug. 31. Ho. 60; 30, 1, p. 424 (Taylor). =364=Worth to ----, -Oct. 2. Sen. 1; 29, 2, p. 46 (Marcy, report). =221=Hill, diary. Henry, -Camp. Sketches, 217. - -11.18. From =76=. S. Anna to Ampudia, Aug. 13. Ampudia to Gov. -Tamaulipas, Aug. 23. Relaciones (to Guerra), Sept. 23. Ampudia, Aug. 28. -To Ampudia, Sept. 4. Mejia to Ampudia, Aug. 31. - -11.19. _Diario_, July 4; Sept. 21. _Monitor Repub._, Sept. 25. Reid, -Scouting Expeds., 120. _Picayune_, Sept. 22. Negrete, Invasion, ii, 326. -N. Orl. _Commerc. Bulletin_, Sept. 22. =76=Ampudia, proc., Aug. 31. -=76=Proc. in English, Sept. 15. =76=Circular, Sept. 15. - -11.20. _Monitor Repub._, Sept. 18; Oct. 29 (Jauregui). =13=Bankhead, -no. 155, 1846. Apuntes, 54, 57. Balbontin, Invasion, 26. =76=Nevia to -Ampudia, Aug. 26. - -11.21. Tampico _Eco_, Sept. 24. Gov. of Tamaulipas, Aug. 20. Rose, -McCulloch, 73. Mejia to Paredes, July 20. Balbontin, Invasion, 26. -Apuntes, 55-8. Ho. 60; 30, 1, p. 526 (spec. orders 129). And from =76= -the following. Ampudia, Aug. 31; Sept. 2, res., 15, res. _Id._ to -Torrejon, Sept. 1. Mejia to Ampudia, Aug. 31. Canales, Aug. 30. _Id._ to -Ampudia, Aug. 30-1. Mejia to comte. gen. S. L. P., Aug. 17. - -Canales said in substance: The spare horses of the enemy cannot be -taken, for they are not turned loose; the roads cannot be broken up, for -they run across stony plains; the woods cannot be fired, for no great -fields of dry grass are near them; the watering places cannot be made -useless, for they are streams coming from the mountains; the wagons and -pack-mules cannot be captured, for my horses are unserviceable. - -11.22. Meade, Letters, i, 129. =147=Chamberlain, diary. Giddings, -Sketches, 97. =139=W. B. to D. Campbell, Aug. 28. Nebel and Kendall, -5. Mayer, Mex. War, 159-61. _Picayune_, Nov. 13. =65=Gen. orders 115. -Smith, Chile con Carne, 94, note. Accounts of the costumes naturally -varied. - -11.23. _Picayune_, Oct. 6. Greensborough _Morn. Post_, Apr. 5, 1903. -=349=Patridge to Miss W., July 21, 1847. _Metrop. Mag._, Dec., 1907, -316-7. _Spirit of the Times_, Oct. 14. Henry, Camp. Sketches, 183-6, -244. =364=Worth to S., Sept. 16. McCall, Letters, 470. Reid, Scouting -Expeds., 128. =190=Ewing, diary, Nov. 18. Robertson, Remins., 123-4. -Taylor, Letters (Bixby), 57. =69=Duncan to Worth, Aug. 8. Ho. 60; 30, 1, -p. 421-2 (Taylor). - -One small mountain in this region had a bare side composed of -crystallized sulphate of lime. Here, as generally, the author draws upon -his own observations of Mexican scenery. There were a number of defiles -between Cerralvo and Monterey and a great deal of rough, bushy country, -where the Mexicans could have made Taylor no little trouble. In all -probability he could have been delayed five to seven days. See _Monitor_ -_Repub._, Oct. 20, _remitido_. - -11.24. =169=Taylor to Crittenden, Oct. 9. _Id._, Letters (Bixby), 57, -59. Henshaw narrative. Claiborne, Quitman, i, 277. Robertson, Remins., -125-6. =65=Taylor, gen. orders 119-20. Apuntes, 54, 58. Wilhelm, Eighth -Inf., ii, 288. =76=Comte. gen. N. Leon, Sept. 20. Reid, Scouting -Expeds., 142. _Picayune_, Oct. 6. Rose, McCulloch, 100. _Niles_, Oct. -17, p. 103. =244=Chandler to Lakin, Nov. 23. Henry, Camp. Sketches, -189-91. - -Wilhelm, who wrote the history of Worth's old regt. and had the use -of Worth's papers, states that, after arriving at Marin, Taylor was -"firm" in the opinion that he would meet with no serious resistance at -Monterey. Certainly he then estimated Ampudia's regulars at only about -3000 (Ho. 60; 30, 1, p. 422). - -11.25. =169=Taylor to Crittenden, Sept. 15, 1847. _Id._, Letter to -Gaines. _Id._, Letters (Bixby), 178. Thorpe, Our Army at Monterey, -46. Robertson, Remins., 124. Henshaw narrative. French, Two Wars, 67. -Apuntes, 58. Chavez, July 29, 1848. =76=Ampudia, Sept. 19. _Monitor -Repub._, Oct. 20. Henry, Camp. Sketches, 190-2. - -Taylor's =61=field return, Sept. 21 (the first of two numbers -represents officers): Hdqtrs. and staff, 22; 23. Webster's battery -(24-lb. howitzers), 3; 24. 1st Div. Hdqtrs. and staff, 3; 10. Ridgely's -batt., 3; 75. 2 Drags. (4 Cos.), 10; 228. Bragg's batt., 2; 64. 3 Inf. -(6 Cos.), 18; 284. 4 Inf. (6 Cos.), 16; 287. Shiver's Co., 3; 55. 1 -Inf. (4 Cos.), 12; 179. Balt. and Wash. Battal. (6 Cos.), 20; 314. 2D -DIV. (see below), 93; 1558. FIELD DIV. (see below), 148; 1781. TEX. -DIV. Hdqtrs. and staff, 5 offs. 1st Regt. (10 Cos.), 32; 376. 2d Regt. -(10 Cos.), 35; 527. Surgeons, 5. Sick, 3; 143. 2D DIV. (Sept. 17). -Staffs, 5. _1st brig._: Duncan's batt., 68; Artill. Battal., 532; 8 -Inf., 331. _2d brig._: Mackall's batt., 70; 5 Inf., 280; 7 Inf., 282; -Blanchard's Co., 83. (These figures include 88 com. offs.) Sick, 7; -45. 5 Inf., 7 Inf. and 8 Inf. had 6 Cos. each. Art. Battal. had 9 Cos. -FIELD DIV. (Sept. 20). Staff, 12. Artill., 37. Ky. (10 Cos.), 482; -Ohio (10 Cos.), 524; Miss. (8 Cos.), 452; Tenn. (10 Cos.), 459. (These -figures include 139 com. offs.) Sick, 1; 42. Grand totals (Sept. 21), -425; 5795 = 6220. - -Taylor's formal report counted the officers twice. Ripley made the same -mistake (War with Mexico, i, 199). The 24-lb. howitzers appear to have -been classed as heavy field guns (=69=memo., ordnance office, June 15). - - - XII. MONTEREY - -12.1. =66=Mansfield to Totten, Feb. 1, 1847. Ho. 4; 29, 2, pp. 76, -83 (Taylor). Wilhelm, Eighth Inf., ii, 289. =76=Comte. gen. N. Leon, -Sept. 20. Stevens, Campaigns, 22. Henry, Camp. Sketches, 192. Nebel and -Kendall, 5, 6. Apuntes, 58. - -12.2. Apuntes, 59. _Monitor Repub._, Oct. 31 (Berra). Nebel and -Kendall, 6. _Nat. Intelligencer_, Nov. 20. J. Davis in _Cong. Globe_, -31, 1, app., 1034-41. _Picayune_, Oct. 4; Nov. 13. =221=Hill, diary. -Smith, To Mexico, 73-4. =69=Worth to Bliss, Sept. 21, 8:15 A.M. -=147=Chamberlain, diary. Balbontin, Invasion, 25, 36. Ho. 4; 29, 2, p. -102 (Worth). - -The Federation 9-pdrs. were classed by the Mexicans as 8-pdrs. The -half-moon battery was designed to come into play after the capture of -the city, annoying the captors and defending the line of retreat to -Saltillo. - -12.3. =76=Comte. gen. N. Leon, Sept. 20. =69=Worth to Bliss, Aug. 28. -=76=Ampudia, Sept. 19, res. - -12.4. =221=Hill, diary. =277=Staniford to Pemberton, Sept. 26. -Robertson, Remins., 130. Nebel and Kendall, 6. Chamberlain, diary. -Ho. 4; 29, 2, pp. 83 (Taylor), 102 (Worth). =76=Comte. gen. N. Leon, -Sept. 20. _Picayune_, Nov. 13. =245=Hays to Henderson, undated. -_Pennsylvanian_, Nov. 2. Meade, Letters, i, 133. _Metropol. Mag._, Dec, -1907 (Hamilton). _Spirit of the Times_, Nov. 7. (Worth) Robertson, -Remins., Sept. 20; =185=J. Van Buren, oration; Chase, Polk Admin., 156; -=185=W. to Duncan, Apr. 15; Jacksonville (Ala.) _Republican_, Nov. 25; -Grone, Briefe, 83; Semmes, Service, 282; =327=Sutherland to father, Aug. ---. - -A part of Hays's four hundred did not march until a little later. It -seems clear, although neither Taylor nor Worth mentions the fact, that -a party of dragoons accompanied the expedition (Chamberlain, diary; -Haskin, First Artillery, 307). It will be recalled that most of our -"artillery" served as infantry. Blanchard's company was made up of -men who did not wish to leave when most of the Louisiana infantry was -ordered home (p. 205). - -Worth's movement was in principle extremely hazardous (Halleck, Mil. -Art, 414). Napoleon (Maxims, p. 24): "Nothing is more rash or more -opposed to the principles of war, than a flank march in the presence -of an army in position, especially when that army occupies heights at -the foot of which you must defile." This maxim seems to fit the case -precisely. Stevens (Campaigns, 28) defended the movement on the ground -that Taylor knew what could be expected of Worth's command and of the -Mexicans; but as Ampudia had shown no conspicuous want of ability and -courage on May 8 and 9, Taylor had no reason to suppose he would act -here as badly as he did. Indeed the struggle at Monterey showed that if -Taylor assumed the Mexicans would not fight, he erred. It was doubtless -realized by Taylor and Worth that the small American army, without siege -artillery or adequate supplies, could escape ruin only through extreme -boldness. Apparently the plan originated with Worth, for he knew more -about the terrain than Taylor did. Wilhelm so states, and the N. Y. -_Sun_ also, the editor of which was close to Worth, gave him that credit -(Aug. 14, 1847). Bragg (=210=to Hammond, May 4, 1848) ascribed the plan -to Taylor; but, as Taylor was the commander-in-chief, this was the -natural presumption. - -12.5. Meade, Letters, i, 133. Ho. 4; 29, 2, p. 83 (Taylor). _Picayune_, -Nov. 13. _Monitor Repub._, Oct. 29 (Jauregui), 31 (Berra). =245=Hays to -Henderson, undated. Reid, Scouting Expeds., 152. =218=Henshaw narrative. -Ampudia, Manifiesto. Robertson, Remins., 130-1. =69=Worth to Bliss, -Sept. 20, 9:30 P.M. - -12.6. Ho. 4; 29, 2, pp. 83 (Taylor), 102 (Worth). _Monitor Repub._, Oct. -29. =76=Vazquez, Sept. 23. Balbontin, Invasion, 27. =69=Worth to Bliss, -Sept. 20, 9:30 P.M. Meade, Letters, i, 133. Robertson, Remins., -131-2. - -12.7. Ho. 4; 29, 2, pp. 83 (Taylor), 102 (Worth). =185=Duncan to Worth, -Sept. 28. Henshaw narrative. Chamberlain, diary. Apuntes, 59. Gonzalez, -Aguascalientes, 152. =185=Worth to Marcy, July 14, 1847. =69=Worth to -Bliss, Sept. 21, 8:15 A.M.; 3:40 P.M. _Picayune_, Nov. 13, 1846; Feb. -17, 1847. Meade, Letters, i, 133. Wash. _Union_, Nov. 20. =252=Mackall -to father, Sept. 27. N. Y. _Sun_, Oct. 14. _Monitor Repub._, Oct. 17, -31; Nov. 15. =245=Hays to Henderson, undated. Haskin, First Artillery, -309. =180=C. F. Smith to Pemberton, Sept. 30. =277=Staniford to -Pemberton, Sept. 26. Henry, Camp. Sketches, 201. Prieto, Memorias, 205. -Reid, Scouting Expeds., 157-9. - -McCulloch, being in advance, did not receive the order to take post -behind the fence, and hence fought in the road. - -12.8. _The operations on Federation Ridge._ =69=Worth to Bliss, Sept. -21, 3:40 P.M. Ho. 4; 29, 2, p. 102 (Worth). =245=Hays to -Henderson, undated. =180=C. F. Smith to Pemberton, Sept. 30. =277=P. -F. Smith to _Id._, Sept. 27. _Monitor Repub._, Oct. 31 (Berra). -=252=Mackall to father, Sept. 27. Henry, Camp. Sketches, 201-3. Nebel -and Kendall, 6-7. _Hist. Mag._, Mar., 1874, p. 138. Wash. _Union_, Nov. -12, 20. Chamberlain, diary and recolls. =278=Niehenke, statement. Meade, -Letters, i, 134. _Picayune_, Oct. 4; Nov. 13. Henshaw narrative. Reid, -Scouting Expeds., 162-6. Hill, diary. - -Meade (Letters, i, 88) wrote: Worth "has the great misfortune of being -most rash and impetuous, and of constantly doing things which cooler -reflection causes him to repent. This infirmity, in my opinion, renders -him unfit to command, but on the field of battle, under another, his -gallantry and bravery are well known and most conspicuous." U. S. Grant -(Mems., i, 123) said: Worth "was nervous, impatient and restless on the -march, or when important or responsible duty confronted him." - -Miles set out about forty-five minutes later than C. F. Smith. On -reaching the ridge he sent off detachments in order to divert attention -from Smith. Still restless, Worth sent Col. Hays and more Texans to the -ridge, but these did not arrive in time to do anything of consequence. -Gen. Smith's attack upon El Soldado, made on his own responsibility, -had a very important bearing upon the movement against Independence -Hill and the Bishop's Palace. Hitchcock said Gen. Smith not only aided -Worth materially but saved his reputation (Sen. 65; 30, 1, p. 528). The -summit and El Soldado continued to be held by the Americans. Scott and -Blanchard (who was under Scott's orders) were recalled from No. 3 to -El Soldado the next morning to cooperate in the attack on the Palace. -According to some Americans three guns were captured. This mistake -probably arose because one piece was used by the Americans at the summit -and then moved to El Soldado. According to the Mexicans there seem to -have been only 175 of them on the ridge. On both sides the loss of men -on Federation Ridge was insignificant. Worth had 15 or 20 killed and -wounded. Some thought the summit of Federation Ridge not less than 800 -feet high. As the Monterey plans are unavoidably based to a large -extent upon sketches and estimates, it has not been thought best to give -a scale of miles. - -12.9. _The capture of Independence Hill._ Ho. 4; 29, 2, p. 102 -(Worth). Ampudia, Manifiesto. =69=Worth to Bliss, Sept. 22, 8:30 A.M., -5 P.M. French, Two Wars, 64-5. =147=Chamberlain, diary. =148=_Id._, -recolls. Balbontin, Invasion, 38-9. Apuntes, 61-2. =190=Ewing, diary. -=218=Henshaw narrative; =221=Hill, diary. _Picayune_, Nov. 13. -=252=Mackall to father, Sept. 27. Meade, Letters, i, 135-6. Wash. -_Union_, Nov. 20. _Diario_, Sept. 30. _Monitor Repub._, Oct. 31 -(Berra). =245=Hays to Henderson, undated. Henry, Camp. Sketches, 205. -Nebel and Kendall, 6. =185=Duncan to Worth, Sept. 28. Reid, Scouting -Expeds., 183-5. Ampudia to the People. Some officers thought the hill -nearly 600 feet high, Ampudia tardily ordered reinforcements to the -hill, but they did not arrive. Worth's loss, Sept. 22, was only about a -dozen killed and wounded. - -12.10. _Taylor's and Ampudia's operations, Sept. 20-3_; _Worth's, -Sept. 23_. Ho. 4; 29, 2, pp. 76-109 (reports of Taylor and officers). -Ho. 17; 30, 1 (reports of officers). =169=Taylor to Crittenden, Oct. -9, 1846; Jan. 26, 1847. =190=Ewing, diary. =218=Henshaw narrative. -Coleman, Crittenden, i, 309. Claiborne, Quitman, ii, 303-7. =221=Hill, -diary. Numerous reports and letters in =174= and =176=. Smith, Chile -con Carne, 82-97. Thorpe, Our Army at Monterey, 55, 59. Ampudia, -Manifiesto. _Id._ to Fellow-citizens. Robertson, Reminiscences, -136-50. =61=Graham to Polk, April --, 18.7. =61=Quitman to Hamer, -Sept. 28. =69=Capt. Vinton to Worth, Aug. 19. Taylor, gen. orders -115. =69=Worth to Bliss, Sept. 23, 11 P.M. =69=Trowbridge to Stewart, -Feb. 8, 1848. French, Two Wars, 62, 64-6. =66=Mansfield to Totten, -Feb. 1, 1847. =69=Backus to Brady, Sept. 22, 1848. =147=Chamberlain, -diary. =148=_Id._, recolls. Balbontin, Invasion, 24, 27-35, 40-3. -Roa Barcena, Recuerdos, 72. Apuntes, 53, 60-4. Ho. 60; 30, 1, pp. -419 (Worth), 424 (Taylor). Roberts, diary. _Hist. Mag._, Jan., 1874, -pp. 8-9. _Picayune_, Oct. 23; Nov. 4, 13. Meade, Letters, i, 134-5, -137-8, 163-5. =185=Duncan to Worth, Sept. 28. =242=Kingsbury to -mother, Oct. 14. Lawton, Artill. Officer, 29, 30. Stevens, Camps., -23-9. =73=Bermudez de Castro, no. 371, res., 1846. _Hist. Mag._, x, -207-13, 255-7. Johnston, A. S. Johnston, 136-40. J. Davis: note 2. -_Pennsylvanian_, Nov. 2 (Peyton). Wash. _Union_, Nov. 20, 1846; Mar. -2, 1847. Balt. _Sun_, Nov. 6. _Monitor Repub._, Nov. 15. _Spirit of -the Times_, Nov. 7, 28, 1846; Jan. 9, 1847. =245=Wood to Henderson, -Sept. 24. =245=Hays to _Id._, undated. _Niles_, Nov. 28, p. 201. -=244=Chandler to Lakin, Nov. 23. =175=Russell, to Davis, Sept. 26; Oct. -18. =175=Cooper to Davis, Sept. --. Wilcox, Mex. War, 119. Kenly, Md. -Vol., 77, 107-27, etc. =139=W. B. to D. Campbell, Sept. 28; Nov. 2, 9, -1846; Feb. 19, 1847. Henry, Camp. Sketches, 193-201, 203-4, 206-12, -221. =130=Brichta, Letter. Nebel and Kendall, 7-10. =139=Campbell to -Quitman, Sept. 27; to wife, Oct. 1. =150=Cheatham to son, Oct. 6; -to sister, Oct. 16. =277=P. F. Smith to Pemberton, Sept. 27. Reid, -Scouting Expeds., 108, 152, 170, 173, 190. =76=Ampudia, Sept. 22, 25. -=76=_Id._ to comte. gen. S. L. P., Sept. 28. =76=Head of Ampudia's -medical service, Sept. 24. The author of the verse was C. F. Hoffman. - -REMARKS. Taylor's lack of interest in studying the topography and -fortifications is illustrated by the fact that Butler, second in -command, does not seem to have been shown the map drawn by Meade from -information obtained by Worth, though Taylor certainly saw it (Wilhelm, -Eighth Infantry, ii, 283). Butler stated officially that when he -attacked the city he knew nothing about the locality. Capt. Henry said -Garland's charge was made in "utter ignorance" regarding it (Camp. -Sketches, 194). It has been said that Taylor lacked entrenching tools; -but he had tools for building roads, planting the mortar and howitzers, -and erecting new defences at the Teneria redoubt. Stevens (Campaigns, -29) undertook to defend Taylor's operations on Sept. 21 by saying that -the ardor of Garland's men brought them into action before Mansfield's -reconnaissance had been completed; but (1) Garland was virtually -instructed to follow Mansfield's directions and did so, and (2) Oct. -24 Taylor said he would have pursued the same course, had he known all -that he learned later about the situation--_i.e._ Garland executed -Taylor's ideas and wishes (=61=Graham to Polk, Apr. --, [1847]). -Waiting for a fuller reconnaissance, therefore, would have consumed -time without giving any advantage. It follows, too, from this statement -of Taylor's that he would not have excused Mansfield, had Mansfield -instructed Garland not to charge. Taylor did not recommend a brevet for -Garland. This was an implied censure. Capt. G. M. Graham of Garland's -command therefore addressed a letter to Polk, giving a full account of -Garland's proceedings. This letter was presented to Polk by Gen. George -Gibson, who gave the writer "a high character." It may be added, that -it was impossible for Mansfield to make a complete reconnaissance under -the circumstances. He would not have lived to finish it. - -The Fourth Infantry, having been detached to cover the battery, was not -in Garland's charge. The mortar does not seem to have been effective on -Sept. 21 (Giddings, Sketches, 202); had it been so, it would not have -been put out of commission for a considerable time by being sent to -Worth, who does not seem to have asked for it. It appears to have been -used by Taylor only twenty minutes, which suggests that its inefficiency -was speedily discovered. Had the cause been merely the lack of a -platform (Ripley, War with Mexico, i, 206), it could have been removed. -There was timber enough at Walnut Grove. The statements regarding the -number of guns in Teneria redoubt cannot be wholly reconciled. This may -arise from the fact that not all the pieces could be used. The statement -in the text seems to be safe. - -The author feels some scepticism about the doings of Backus. No -unanimity prevailed then about him. He is rather too precise in his own -statement. He says (_Historical Magazine_, x, 255) that the distance -from the building he occupied to the tannery was found to be 117-3/4 -yards. One can hardly understand how so exact a measurement can have -been made in such a locality. The distance from his position to Teneria -redoubt was considerably more than this. Henry estimated it at 130 yards -(Campaign Sketches, 195). Muskets were not reliable at this distance. -His claims were not accepted by all at the time. Still, many believed -that he contributed materially to the capture of the redoubt. After the -capture of this redoubt Col. Davis undertook to storm El Diablo, but -was recalled. There was a sharp clash between Taylor and Butler in the -course of the operations, Sept. 21. Taylor should, of course, have kept -out of the street fighting (Griepenkerl, Applied Tactics, 187). There -was sufficient demand for head work at that time to absorb his full -attention. It was stated that after the repulse of the Americans, Sept. -21, Mejia asked to have both infantry and cavalry charge them. Had this -been done the results might have been very serious. - -The American artillery when in the town was handled as cautiously as -possible. For example, a gun would be loaded and leveled behind a -corner, drawn out by ropes, fired, and drawn back by the ropes (French, -Two Wars, 66). Yet even in a case of this kind four out of the five -gunners were killed. Taylor does not mention the presence of the Fourth -Infantry, Sept. 23, but U. S. Grant does (Mems., i, 115-6); and as he -belonged to that corps, it seems hardly possible that he was mistaken. -It had been so much reduced the day before, that perhaps Taylor did not -think it worth mention. According to Taylor's report the reason for -withdrawing his men from the city on the afternoon of Sept. 23 was to -prepare for a general assault. But considerable time would have been -necessary to do this in concert with Worth, and it is hard to see why -they were withdrawn under fire when they were doing good work in safety, -and night was not far distant. Apparently the best way to arrange for -such concerted operations would have been to leave these troops where -they were, and open a line of communication through the northern part of -the city (Ripley, _op. cit._, i, 264). The rumors that Mexican forces -were approaching by the Saltillo road were correct, but Ampudia sent -them an order to retire. They were not strong enough to accomplish -anything. - -When Worth attacked the city, Sept. 23, his right-hand column, headed by -Texan riflemen, dismounted, under Col. Hays, took the Calle de Monterey; -the left-hand column, headed by similar troops under Lieut. Col. Walker, -took the Calle de Iturbide. Besides the Texans and the field batteries, -the Seventh and Eighth Infantry and the Artillery Battalion joined in -the attack. The detachment that had been sent up the Saltillo road was -recalled and acted as a reserve. The American shells thrown during the -night of Sept. 23 seem to have injured nothing except Ampudia's courage. -Purisima Bridge was about 2300 feet from the cathedral. - -It is probably true that Taylor's operations at the eastern end of the -town and the disregard of life exhibited by his troops tended to dismay -Ampudia. But Taylor had no reason to suppose that operations so badly -planned, so ineffective and so costly would have that effect; they were -wasteful; and they demoralized his own men. The Mexicans fought in most -cases with a courage and tenacity deserving of high praise (Henry, Camp. -Sketches, 209). So far as one can see, nothing saved Taylor from a -disaster that would have meant the ruin of his army but the poltroonery -of one man, Ampudia; and as we have remarked, he had no reason to expect -that. The head of Ampudia's medical service reported, Sept. 24, that -only sixty privates had been seriously wounded. - -12.11. Ho. 4; 29, 2, p. 78 (Taylor). =364=Worth to S., Oct. 2. Garcia, -Revolucion, 16. Claiborne, Quitman, i, 262-9. Ampudia, Manifiesto. -Apuntes, 64. =13=Pakenham, no. 122, 1846. Balbontin, Invasion, 50-2. Ho. -60; 30, 1, p. 348 (Ampudia), 348 (Taylor), 349 (terms). =76=Ampudia, -Sept. 29. _Nat. Intelligencer_, Oct. 26; Nov. 7. Wash. _Union_, Jan. -18 (Ampudia); Feb. 18, 1847. _Niles_, Nov. 28, p. 197. _Epoca_, Feb. -9, 1847 (Ampudia). _Observador Zacatecano_, Dec. 27, 1846, supplement -(Requena). _Diario_, Oct. 2 (Ampudia). _Republicano_, May 28, 1847. - -Worth's cannon were prevented by a fog from opening fire early Thursday -morning. Worth's =364=reasons, as explained privately to a friend, for -giving liberal terms were: (1) Owing to the feelings of the Texans and -resentment occasioned by the American losses in the battle, an assault -would have been attended with the slaughter of many women; (2) The -numbers and the position of the Mexicans rendered them formidable; -(3) "Neither myself nor many others had the slightest confidence in -the _intelligence that directed_" the American operations; (4) Our -government wanted peace. The Mexicans were allowed twenty-one rounds for -their battery. - -The principal excuses alleged by Ampudia for surrendering were the -failure to injure the Americans on their march, the lack of the Fourth -Brigade, a want of funds, provisions and artillery ammunition, the -inefficiency and cowardice of a part of his army, the hostility of -the superior officers, and their failure to support him. According to -a Mexican letter from S. Luis Potosi dated October 3, 1846, the loss -of the city was attributed wholly to his cowardice. A number of his -chief officers appear to have been no more courageous than he, but the -decision did not rest with them. Perhaps he thought it necessary to save -the one veteran army of Mexico, but a successful or even heroic defence -of Monterey would have probably been more beneficial to his cause. -There were provisions enough and a large stock of ammunition; but we -are not sure that his supply of artillery ammunition was adequate. The -commission consisted of Worth, Henderson, J. Davis, Requena, Ortega, -Llano. The Mexicans actually carried away three 12-pounders and three -8-pounders (Requena). The British minister at Washington reported: The -armistice seems to be "in direct opposition to the rule laid down in -Mr. Buchanan's letter to Commodore Conner of the 27th July" [Sen. 107; -29, 2, p. 3], by which it was determined that no armistice should be -agreed to until a treaty of peace should have been actually concluded -(=13=Pakenham, no. 122, Oct. 16, 1846). San Fernando de Presas was east -of Linares near the Gulf. See note 12. - -12.12. Polk, Diary, Oct. 11, 12. Ho. 4; 29, 2, pp. 79 (Taylor), 106 -(Worth). (Instructions) Ho. 60; 30, 1, pp. 323, 333, 355 (Marcy). -Henshaw narrative. Nunelee, diary. Taylor, Letters (Bixby), 62. -=364=Worth to S., Oct. 2. Meade, Letters, i, 138. Taylor, Letter to -Gaines. _Pennsylvanian_, Nov. 2 (Peyton). =139=W. B. to D. Campbell, -Nov. 2. Robertson, Remins., 157. =13=Pakenham, no. 127, 1846 (Taylor's -ammunition would not have lasted many hours longer). _Cong. Globe_, 29, -2, p. 316 (Clayton). - -Worth: Twiggs's division and the volunteers "were taken into action -without order, direction, support, or command; in fact murdered" -(=364=to S., Oct. 2). Col. Campbell: Taylor showed little generalship -in the handling of my regiment; took too great a risk in coming to -Monterey without more transportation (=139=to D. Campbell, Sept. 28; -Nov. 9). Capt. Cheatham (Campbell's regiment): "I consider, that old -Taylor committed one of the greatest blunders that ever a General was -guilty of, in coming here to attack one of the strongest fortified towns -in Mexico, with nothing in the world but small Artillery, for open -field fighting" (=50=to son, Oct. 6). _Id._: "We were rushed headlong -into the fight and our Generals did not know where we were going" -(=150=to sister, Oct. 16). Capt. Henry (Garland's brigade): "I look -upon the exposure of the field artillery in the streets as perfectly -useless" (_Spirit of the Times_, Nov. 7). Capt. Backus (Garland's -brigade): The Third and Fourth Infantry were "entirely inadequate to -the duty required" of them; "this hazardous and useless enterprize" -(_Hist. Mag._, x, 212). Baltimore Captain: Sept. 21 I was under first -one general and then another till I and my men "became completely worn -out" (_Picayune_, Nov. 7). Engineer Stevens: The eastern attack was -marked by rash and headlong movements; the mortar, instead of being -sent to Worth, should have been placed in Teneria redoubt; Taylor -should not have withdrawn his troops on Wednesday, etc. (Campaigns, -27). Officer: Garland's charge a fatal mistake (Balt. _Sun_, Nov. 6). -Officer: The eastern attack very injudicious (_Nat. Intelligencer_, -Nov. 20). Lieut. Hamilton (West Pointer): The officers who fell at -the east end were "a sacrifice to the blind folly and ignorance of -our general-in-chief" (_Metrop. Mag._, Dec., 1907, p. 321). C. M. -Wilcox, who arrived at Monterey not long after the battle: "Harsh and -unfavorable criticism" of the operations at the east end was "universal" -there (Mex. War, 120). Robertson: The lack of a siege train was due -to Taylor's misunderstanding the intentions of the enemy; the cannon -could easily have been transported (Remins., 129, 160). Smith: Only -Ampudia's personal unfitness saved Taylor from deserved ruin (Remins., -18). Monterey letter, Oct. 11: 6-pounders were sent to batter down -fortifications that 24-pounders would not have affected. Gen. Requena, -probably the best Mexican officer: Worth made the real attack; Taylor -blundered (_Observador Zacatecano_, Dec. 27, supplem.). G. Ferry: -Prudence forbade Taylor, in view of the too evident discouragement of -his army, to press his advantage; by negotiating he changed almost -certain defeat into victory (_Revue des Deux Mondes_, Aug. 1, 1847, -410). An editorial in _Niles' Register_ of July 18, 1846, is curiously -interesting: "Owing to an error in estimating the capacities of the -enemy" Taylor "made a narrow escape from almost utter annihilation" -in May. "One lesson of this kind, we venture to predict, will be a -sufficient admonition to" Taylor.... "He will be cautious to keep his -troops within reach of supplies, and to have at hand the means of -transportation." The editor proved to be mistaken in every point. - -One of Taylor's excuses for the terms was consideration for the -non-combatants (=169=to Crittenden, Oct. 9), and it may have counted -for something; but he had just refused these non-combatants permission -to leave the town (Ho. 4; 29, 2, p. 78). Another (_ibid._) was the -propinquity of the citadel, and the impossibility of taking it without -a siege of twenty or thirty days or else a large expenditure of life; -but the citadel had not been able to injure the Americans materially -while they were fighting in the town, and could not injure them at -all in Walnut Grove; and, as Taylor admitted that he would hardly be -able to advance for six weeks (Bixby coll., 62), there was no lack of -time. In point of fact, as could easily have been surmised, the citadel -had neither water nor provisions enough to stand a siege (Balbontin, -Invasion, 46). - -The gallant defence of the city was another excuse (Ho. 4; 29, 2, p. -79; Bixby coll., 61); but while that is a just reason for doing honor -to a garrison, it is none for relinquishing the substantial fruits of -a dearly bought victory. It would have cost the lives of fifty or one -hundred soldiers, besides the wounded, to take the city by storm, said -Taylor (=169=to Crittenden, Oct. 9). But this would have been a low -price for the elimination of an army that he said was rated at 7200 -besides 2000 irregulars (Bixby coll., 61)--the only army possessed by -Mexico--with its arms, accoutrements, artillery and horses. The moral -effect of such a victory would probably, in the unanimous opinion of -Polk and his Cabinet (Polk, Diary, Oct. 12), have ended the war; and -the desperate fury displayed by Santa Anna when he supposed that such -had been the outcome (=52=Black, Sept. 26; =76=S. Anna, Sept. 29) -tends to support this view. The Mexicans could have escaped, "done -what we might," Taylor urged (_cf._ Ho. 60; 30, 1, 359). But if he -could have captured the city so easily, entrenched as the garrison -were in the strong buildings near the main plaza, he could certainly -have scattered them and captured a large number, had they attempted to -flee with artillery, ammunition and provisions through those narrow -streets commanded by low, flat houses; and indeed no road available for -artillery crossed the mountains except the one (held by Worth) through -Rinconada Pass. Ampudia wrote to his government that even if he could -have cut his way out, his forces would have been dispersed and his -military material captured (Sept. 25). (Taylor seems to have taken no -steps to prevent the Mexicans from escaping during the night of the -twenty-fourth, though their protracting the negotiations until late in -the day might have suggested a design to do this.) - -But, suggested Taylor, magnanimous terms were favorable to peace (Bixby -coll., 61). On the other hand the United States had used in vain with -Mexico every method except hostilities; our national authorities had now -instructed him to try vigorous warfare (Ho. 60; 30, 1, p. 324); and it -was for them to say whether this deliberately adopted policy should--on -a political ground--be abandoned. To meet this obvious view the General -said that a change of regime had occurred at Mexico since the date -of his orders. That was true; but it would be singular indeed if a -political change in the enemy's country--of which nothing definite was -heard except from an enemy notorious for subterfuges--could authorize a -general in the field to violate his instructions. Taylor himself stated -(Ho. 60; 30, 1, p. 360) that his "grand motive" in advancing from the -Rio Grande was "to increase the inducements of the Mexican government to -negotiate for peace"--_i.e._ by showing that otherwise it would suffer -the rigors of war; how then could he believe that acting gently and -indulgently would have the desired effect? - -Finally, and upon this aspect of the matter Taylor laid great stress -(Ho. 60; 30, 1, p. 360), Ampudia stated that his government was now -favorable to peace. But Ampudia transmitted no official proposition, -could present no evidence; and it is impossible to believe that a -shrewd American like Taylor can have taken this argument seriously. -Taylor seems to have had no respect for the Mexicans, and therefore had -no confidence in them; and what he must have heard about Ampudia was -calculated to make him distrust that man peculiarly. Besides, Scott's -letters of June 12 and 15 had intimated (Ho. 60; 30, 1, pp. 326, 328) -that he was not to grant even a short armistice unless met with a -definite formal offer of the Mexicans to treat; and on July 27 Marcy -instructed Taylor to pursue, under similar circumstances, the course -recommended at that time to Conner (Sen. 107; 29, 2, p. 3)--_i.e._ -not to grant an armistice even should the Mexican government consent -to negotiate (=256=to Taylor confid.). If a knowledge of Mackenzie's -negotiations with Santa Anna was enough to justify Taylor for violating -such instructions, he should not have attacked Monterey. Moreover, -he did not consider the government of Mexico stable enough to treat -with (=169=to Crittenden, Oct. 9). Taylor defended the armistice on -the ground also that he needed time to bring up cannon, ammunition -and provisions (=169=to Crittenden, Oct. 9); but had he captured or -dispersed the Mexican army he would have had time, cannon, ammunition -and provisions enough. Col. Davis and Taylor also argued that the -explosion of the cathedral by an American shell would have caused great -loss of life (Ho. 60; 30, 1, p. 359); but if Taylor knew the cathedral -was liable to explode, this was a reason for pressing unconditional -surrender upon Ampudia, since the Mexicans would have been the principal -sufferers. - -All the arguments put forth in Taylor's despatches to the government -were formally pronounced unsatisfactory by Polk and the Cabinet (Polk, -Diary, Oct. 12), since the terms made it possible for a Mexican army, -which Taylor said he could have beaten completely without severe loss, -to reorganize and make another stand. The simple facts were that, in -order to escape from the blame due to his inefficiency, Taylor advanced -from Camargo with an inadequate expedition, and, when the result -convicted him of bad judgment, endeavored to excuse himself without -letting the truth be known. - -A particularly imprudent point in the terms was that they did not -require the Mexicans to retire well beyond Rinconada Pass. It was -left possible for them to fortify the pass, which was supposed to be -impregnable or almost so, and thus make an advance from Monterey to -Saltillo costly, if not impracticable. Taylor's course in this matter -was not due to an expectation that Wool's column (chap. xiii) would -render Rinconada Pass untenable, for he wrote on Oct. 15 that it formed -"no element" in his calculations (Ho. 60; 30, 1, p. 351). There was -another singular oversight. Taylor argued in favor of the armistice -that it bound the hands of the Mexicans during the time needed by him -for preparations to advance (Ho. 60; 30, 1, p. 359); but in fact, -since either government could disallow the armistice and the Mexican -authorities were within easy reach, its terms bound him for six weeks -but bound them for only, say, a fortnight or, as he admitted (Bixby -coll., 62), twenty days. Scott said privately--and one can easily -believe him--that only Taylor's popularity saved him from removal at -this time (=169=to Crittenden, Oct. 19). - -When Monterey yielded, according to Taylor, his provisions were -sufficient for "not more" than ten days; but Worth had written privately -on Sept. 16 (four days after the advance from Cerralvo began) that -the army had provisions then for only about ten days (=364=to S.). -According to the Washington correspondent of the Boston _Atlas_ (Feb. 8, -1847) Clayton stated in the Senate, February 3, 1847, that Taylor had -provisions for but three days when Monterey fell. A letter, probably -from Gen. P. F. Smith, said that the provisions would have lasted only -through Sept. 26, and that during the engagement Taylor had to send to -Cerralvo for supplies, of which a sufficient quantity could scarcely -have arrived in time (_Littell's Living Age_, no. 141, p. 191). Col. -Davis stated later that the hope of supplies, when Monterey yielded, -rested on the return of the mule-teams already despatched north for this -purpose (=73=Address). Col. Campbell wrote privately that on the morning -of Sept. 21 Taylor's supply of ammunition was very limited and the -supply of provisions still more so (=139=to D. C, Nov. 2). - -The loss of men that Taylor admitted was 488 killed and wounded (later -487: Ho. 24; 31,1), but it must have been considerably more. Lieut. -Hill said in his diary that the losses would never be revealed; but -the inaccuracy of the official statement is evident. A writer quoted -in _Niles_, Nov. 7, 1846, p. 148, said it was "generally supposed" at -Washington that Taylor might have lost more than 1000. A South Carolina -officer, who must have had many opportunities to talk with men who had -been at Monterey, gave the loss as about 950 (Cowan, Cond. Hist., 7). -Kendall, editor of the New Orleans _Picayune_, who was on the ground, -wrote that about 300 (including wounded men finished by the Mexicans) -were killed or mortally wounded, Haile, a trustworthy correspondent of -the same paper, expressed the same opinion. A letter in _Niles_, Oct. -17, 1846, p. 104 gives nearly the same figures. A Tennessee captain -reported the number of killed as 200. To look at the matter more in -detail, Meade (Letters, i, 165) wrote that Garland lost some 265 killed -and wounded. Butler admitted his own division lost about 250. A. S. -Johnston (Johnston, Johnston, 138) wrote that its loss was "perhaps -many more" than that. Bliss admitted that it lost 225, killed, wounded -and missing, on Sept. 21 alone (McCall, Letters, 461). Worth's loss -seems to have been about 70. The Texas division lost not less than 27 -(Ho. 24; 31, 1). Here we get at least 612. But Garland did not have the -Fourth Infantry (303 officers and men), which Bliss stated was "almost -destroyed" (McCall, Letters, 461). This must mean a loss (killed and -wounded) of at least one half; yet the official return was 36 (Ho. 24; -31, 1). - -Taylor began the fighting with nearly 250 sick, and after three such -days of excitement, fatigue and hardship, this number was probably -quite 400. The guard at the camp--one company from each infantry -regiment--probably amounted to at least 300, and, as some Mexican -cavalry were looking for a chance to strike there, could not safely be -reduced. A considerable number of men were needed to hold the captured -forts, escort supplies of provisions and ammunition and perform other -special services. If we call Taylor's loss 800, deduct 350 for the sick -and allow 400 for guards and others detached on duty, we have about 4650 -tired and considerably demoralized men (many of them horse and many -without bayonets) as perhaps available for an assault. - -The simple fact that Taylor himself believed he could not, in less -than about six weeks (Bixby coll., 62), be in a condition to resume -his advance, indicated what his situation now was. Finally, it should -be mentioned, he entertained still the false idea of strategy shown at -Matamoros. He only cared to get Monterey, he said, for he could beat -the Mexicans at any time (Coleman, Crittenden, 309). The fact that it -would cost the lives of soldiers to beat the Mexicans did not appear to -signify. - -12.13. =147=Chamberlain, diary. Ho. 4; 29, 2, pp. 82 (Taylor), 106 -(Worth). =169=Scott to Crittenden, Oct. 19. _Delta_, Feb. 14, 1847. -=169=Peyton to Crittenden, Oct. 2. Grant, Mems., i, 117-8. Welles -papers. Griffis, Perry, 218. Smith, Chile con Carne, 97. Lane, -Adventures, 42. _Spirit of the Times_, Nov. 7. (Hardly) Ripley, War, -268-9. =76=Ampudia, Sept. 28. - -As Welles remarked, the people took delight in thinking and talking -about the details of the fight. The capture of Monterey had no strategic -bearing on the aim of the war (Scott, Mems., ii, 412). The demonstration -of our fighting ability (which, however, had already been proved) had a -moral value; but one may well question whether this was not fully offset -by the blundering of Taylor and other officers, our losses and the terms -granted to Ampudia. Many of superior intelligence in the United States -criticised Taylor sharply. - - - XIII. SALTILLO, PARRAS, TAMPICO - -13.1. Probably he did not include Wool's troops. A Mexican reported -that on Oct. 14 Taylor had not over 4000 in camp near Monterey, 600 -regulars in that city and 1080 men in the hospitals there, and that 600 -volunteers, who had arrived Oct. 15, marched with 400 from the camp to -other points. According to Gen. Patterson, commanding, there were in -the Camargo region, Oct. 8, about 7000 effectives, but by Oct. 31 these -numbered only 5700, viz., Second Dragoons, 150; Second Infantry and -Mounted Rifles, 500; Kentucky horse, 450; Tennessee horse, 450; Second -Kentucky, 400; Second Ohio, 500; First Indiana, 550; Second Indiana, -600; Third Indiana, 650; Second Tennessee, 350; Alabama, 400; Third -Illinois, 370; Fourth Illinois, 330. The Mounted Rifles were classed as -cavalry, but had no horses. Nov. 10 the sick at Camargo numbered 1400 -or 1500, said a letter. Below Camargo there were troops now at Reynosa, -Matamoros, Camp Belknap, mouth of the river, Point Isabel and Brazos -Island. Nov. 2 Capt. W. S. Henry, a very good regular officer, doubted -whether Taylor had more than 10,000 effectives (Camp. Sketches, 239). -The returns showed only 13,000, he said. - -13.2. It was stated, Dec. 1, that fully 120 had deserted. (Priests) -Henry, Camp. Sketches, 240; Roberts, diary, Nov. 27. The Mexican -government went so far as to pay the expense of sending a British -subject named Sinnott to the north for the express purpose of seducing -Taylor's Irish (Roman Catholic) soldiers (=76=Sinnott, Oct. 12; -=76=Guerra to Santa Anna, Dec. 5; =76=to Hacienda, Dec. 2; =76=S. Anna, -Jan. 1, 1847). - -13.3. =61=July 21, 1846, Patterson wrote to the war department that he -was born in Ireland and entered the army as a first lieutenant in 1813. -He was then hardly more than a boy. Apparently he did not see much -service. Later he became rather active in the Philadelphia militia. - -13.4. Taylor protested twice, and demanded that his subordinates should -be compelled "to keep in their proper places." Due retribution soon -followed. He sent an order to Col. Baker, one of Patterson's officers, -upon which that general demanded sharply that correspondence with his -subordinates should go by the usual channel (Ho. 60; 30, 1, pp. 381, -384). Nov. 5 Taylor wrote a long and studied letter to Gen. Gaines, -defending himself and attacking the administration, and this was -published in the N. Y. _Herald_, Jan. 24, 1847. Evidently it was not a -mere bit of friendly correspondence. To many it seemed to be the opening -gun of a Presidential campaign, and certainty it was improper, for the -writer presented information and opinions about the American military -operations, and said that success would be worth little to the United -States--a view evidently calculated to discourage the Americans and -stimulate the enemy. Taylor was neatly punished for this imprudence by -a public revival of paragraph 650 of the army regulations of March 1, -1825, which forbade private letters or reports from officers regarding -military operations. Doubtless Polk was to a large extent right in -believing that Taylor was now in the hands of political tutors, and he -regarded him as "a vindictive and ignorant political partisan." See -Marcy to Taylor, Jan. 27, 1847, and reply (Ho. 60; 30, 1, pp. 391, 809); -=108=Marcy to Bancroft, April 28; =256=_Id._ to Wetmore, Apr. 25; adj. -gen., gen. orders 3, 1847; Polk, Diary, Jan. 25-7; Phila. _Pub. Ledger_, -Jan. 26-7; Ho. 37; 30, 1. - -13.5. A pleasanter outcome of the correspondence was the release of -seven American and a number of Mexican prisoners. - -13.6. _Preliminary incidents._ Ho. 60; 30, 1, pp. 424 (Wool); 341, -344, 355, 367, 369, 391 (Marcy); 472-3 (Jones); 635 (Jesup); 325, 1270 -(Scott); 682 (Whiting); 386, 439, 442 (S. Anna); 350-1, 358, 361, 381, -424, 437-40, 444, 526, 809 (Taylor); 384 (Patterson). =69=Patterson to -Marcy, Oct. 8; to Bliss, Oct. 8, 31; Nov. 23. Meade, Letters, i, 145-6, -152. _Morning News_, New London, Conn., Dec. 10. Henry, Camp. Sketches, -240. =307=Roberts, diary, Nov. 27. =69=Wool to Bliss, Nov. 2. =69=Riley -to Bliss, Dec. 14, 1846. _Niles_, Jan. 9, 1847, p. 290. =65=Patterson, -orders 1, 6, Sept. 5, 29. =169=Scott to Taylor, Sept. 26. =169=Taylor -to Crittenden, Jan. 26, 1847. Sen. 32; 31, 1 (Hughes). Wash. _Union_, -Sept. 26. Polk, Diary, May 14; Sept. 19-22, 24, 26; Oct. 12, 13, 20; -Nov. 21. =69=Patterson to Marcy, Oct. 8. =234=A. Johnson to ----, Dec. -2. Claiborne, Quitman, i, 273-4. Marcy, report in Sen. 1; 30, 1, p. 45. -Eyewitness, Complete Hist., 48. =205=Graham, mem. book. _Diario_, Nov. -14, 29; Dec. 15. Taylor, Letters (Bixby), 178. =65=_Id._, gen. orders, -no. 139, Nov. 8. =69=Gonzalez, Sept. --. Negrete, Invasion, ii, 346, -354, 356. Also the following from =76=: Comte. gen. Oaxaca, Dec. 3. -Circular, Nov. 28. S. Anna to Taylor, Dec. 17. S. Anna, Nov. 28; Dec. -12. Sinnott, Oct. 12. Ordonez to Worth, Nov. 12; to P. F. Smith, Nov. -20, Worth to Ordonez, Nov. 12. Smith to O., Nov. 20. Ampudia, Oct. 4. J. -F. Rada, Oct. 17. Parrodi, Sept. 16. Worth to alcalde, Nov. 5. On the -origin of the proposed Tamaulipas expedition see chap. xxvii, note 4. - -13.7. Lieut. Mackall's battery, the Seventh Infantry, and one company of -the Artillery Battalion were left at Monterey under P. F. Smith. - -13.8. The maguey (_agave Americana_) is the century plant, and produces -the liquid known as _pulque_ which, after it ferments, is about as -intoxicating as beer, and is consumed liberally by the common people -of Mexico. The stiff, thick, wide-spreading leaves are protected with -thorns. - -13.9. The governor expected a reply, and on finding that none was to be -made he retired to Parras. - -13.10. _The occupation of Saltillo._ =65=Gen. orders 139. Ho. 60; 30, 1, -pp. 361, 374, 377, 436, 543, 545 (Taylor); 362-3 (Marcy); 378 (Aguirre). -Sen. 1; 30, 1, p. 45. =364=Worth to S., Nov. 20. Taylor, Letters -(Bixby), 71. =267=Memo. (probably from Major Smith). Meade, Letters, i, -144, 152, 155, 157-8. Wilhelm, 8th Inf., ii, 295-9. Balbontin, Invasion, -24. Apuntes, 65. Sen. 32; 31, 1, p. 59. Calendario de Ontiveros, 1847. -=69=Worth to Arnold and Deas, Nov. 19. Smith, Chile con Carne, 175, 192, -195. Henry, Campaign Sketches, 245. Smith, To Mexico, 77. Eyewitness, -Complete History, 48. =299=Posey to Gordon, Feb. 19, 1847. The following -are from =76=. S. Anna to Ampudia, Sept. 30. S. Anna, Sept. 29; Oct. -3; Nov. 21. Gonzalez, Nov. 19. _Id._ to R. Vazquez, Saltillo, Nov. -16; to S. Anna, Nov. 21; to Mejia, May 27. Mejia, June 9. _Id._ to -Ampudia, Aug. 31. Worth to alcalde, Nov. 17. Memo., dated Nov. 22, -of a conference with Taylor. Wool's advance may have helped to cause -Ampudia's abandonment of Rinconada Pass. The distance from Monterey to -Saltillo by the railroad is about 68 miles, and that by road must be -about the same. (Marcy, Oct. 22) see p. 350. - -13.11. The celebrated military writer, Clausewitz, on whose work our -present views of strategy are principally founded, recognized two -distinct kinds of war: that aiming to overthrow the enemy's forces, -and that aiming to make conquests on the frontier, either to be held -permanently or to be used in exchanges on the settlement of peace -(Clausewitz, Vom Kriege, nachricht, par. 1; Donat, Strat. Science, 112). -Polk aimed to accomplish both ends by having the main army bring Mexico -to terms, and at the same time taking possession of territory; but he -did not apply the principle understandingly. He overrated the influence -that the occupation of the northern provinces would have on the Mexican -government; he thought peace was near at hand, and was figuring on the -terms of a treaty when he should have been taking steps to bring Mexico -speedily to the point of making a treaty; and he ordered this expedition -without knowing the conditions under which it would have to be conducted -in Mexico, and without asking proper expert advice. The occupation of -the frontier provinces would have been sagacious had it been part of -a strong coercive military policy. Quotation at the end of the second -paragraph: Meade, Letters, i, 152. - -13.12. La Vaca, now Port Lavaca, is on Matagorda Bay. - -13.13. In view of the Mexican charge that the Americans incited the -Indians to ravage the southern side of the border, it should be -mentioned that not only Taylor, but Wool, exerted himself to prevent -such raids (Ho. 60; 30, 1, p. 425). - -13.14. Harney committed a further impropriety by raising a company of -Indians for the U. S. service. It was not our policy to employ Indian -troops. - -13.15. The author's description of Wool is based largely on the -=147=diary and =148=recollections of Gen. S. E. Chamberlain, who served -as his orderly for a time in the Mexican War; also on =257=Hughes to -Markoe, Dec. 13, 1847; _Niles_, May 8, 1847, p. 156; =61=Horton, Dec. -3; Sen. 32; 31, 1 (Hughes); =371=Mitchell, statement; =316=Bragg to -Sherman, March 1, 1848. Wool was a spare man of medium height, light -complexion and brown hair. His manner was reserved and gentlemanly. - -13.16. Buhoup says this section set out with 1244 effectives. Wool soon -joined it with 144 men. At the Rio Grande, Oct. 12, eight companies -(aggregate, 574) of the First Illinois came up. The second section -(not over 1200) did not leave San Antonio until Oct. 14, and some of -the men were detained there still longer. The whole force consisted of -Washington's six-gun battery, to which were attached two small guns -taken by the Texans from the Mexicans years before and destined to be -lost at Buena Vista and recovered at Contreras; a squadron of the First -Dragoons, a squadron of the Second Dragoons, a regiment of Arkansas -horse, three companies of the Sixth Infantry, one company of Kentucky -foot and the First and Second Illinois regiments. The aggregate was -given by Capt. Hughes of the Topog. Engineers as 3400, of whom about 600 -were regulars. Wool's route to Monclova was in general that of the So. -Pacific and Mexican International railroads. - -13.17. Shields, Irish by birth, practised law in Illinois, became a -judge of the state supreme court and was then appointed commissioner -of the General Land Office, Washington. He became discontented under -Wool's command, and sent Davis, his aide, to Washington in the hope of -obtaining command of the Illinois regiments or possibly of displacing -Wool. - -13.18. Frequently not all of the troops arrived at a place on the same -date. - -13.19. Possibly news of the restoration of the constitution had reached -Monclova but not Santa Rosa. - -13.20. The authorities of Monclova stated that Wool kept every pledge, -and they complained only that the Americans ate up provisions needed -for the people. The officers who criticised Wool most appear to have -been Shields, who--besides being notably egotistical (Ill. State -Hist. Soc. Trans., ix, pp. 36-8)--had been appointed by Polk on a -confidential basis (Davis, Autobiog., 96) and therefore felt entitled -to be ambitious; Harney, whose characteristics have been explained; -Bonneville, who proved himself later incompetent or worse; and Yell, -whose men were soon to disgrace themselves at Buena Vista in consequence -of lacking discipline. Nov. 10 Taylor issued orders detaching Shields -and Harney from Wool's command (Ho. 60; 30, 1, p. 542). This change -doubtless tended to promote harmony. In December Harney brought charges -against Wool, asserting that his "extreme imbecility and manifest -incapacity" ruined the expedition. The judge advocate general advised -that the charges should be ignored (=61=Horton, Dec. 3). - -13.21. Just after leaving Parras Wool learned that 2700 Mexicans -with four guns had moved from Zacatecas against him. One fault of -the expedition was that it could neither support nor be supported by -Taylor's army (see Halleck, Mil. Art, 410 and chap. xi, note 5, of this -history). One asks why Ampudia was not ordered to attack Wool. With -Blanco's irregulars he would have been formidable. The explanation -probably is that Santa Anna wished to build up at S. L. Potosi as large -an army as possible under his own command. Besides, he expected Wool to -turn west. - -13.22. Wool received on Nov. 14 Taylor's instructions to give up the -expedition, and on Nov. 26 his instructions to go to Parras and await -orders (=61=Wool, Jan. 17, 1847). He moved, however, in anticipation of -the latter instructions (=61=Wool, Dec. 7). Nov. 16 he reported that he -expected three mounted and two infantry companies as escorts to the last -wagons, and after their arrival would have about 2750 in all. =60=Marcy -to Taylor, May 6, 1847: It is not important to hold Chihuahua, for you -are in advance of it. Ripley (War with Mexico, i, 337), probably to have -a fling at Wool, says Wool "only" wished to give up the expedition in -order to go toward Durango and Zacatecas in pursuit of glory; but the -document he cites does not so state, and Taylor wrote that Wool proposed -to join him (Bixby coll., 71). - -13.23. In chap. xix. - -13.24. July 2 Taylor had expressed the opinion that the expedition might -prove very important (Ho. 60; 30, 1, p. 329), but suggested that only -mounted men should be employed. - -13.25. Marcy said that the expedition prevented a considerable part of -Mexico from sharing in the campaign against Scott, and to some extent -this was doubtless true. - -13.26. _Wool's expedition._ Polk, Diary, May 14, 16; Oct. 20. -=164=Conner to Bancroft, May 31. N. Orl. _Commerc. Bulletin_, Aug. -17. Meade, Letters, i, 152. Ho. 60; 30, 1, pp. 323, 363 (Marcy); -325 (Scott); 458 (Freeman); 328, 454, 466 (Jones); 424, 426 (Wool); -428 (Thomas); 305, 329, 351, 361, 374, 377, 400, 409, 418, 424, 433 -(Taylor); 410 (Bliss); 567 (Jesup). =254=Mansfield, report, Apr. 19. -=61=Wool, July 28; Aug. 5, 15; Sept. 2, 15, 28; Oct. 15, 19; Nov. 4; -Dec. 16. =256=Wool, July 29. Sen. 1; 30, 1, pp. 45, 545. Sen. 32; 31, -1 (Hughes and others). =65=Adj. gen., gen. orders 19. Wash. _Union_, -Oct. 19; Nov. 20, 21, 28, 1846 Feb. 8; Mar. 23, 1847. =61=Maynadier, -Aug. 25. =61=Horton, June 23; Aug. 8; Oct. 20; Dec. 3. =69=Harney, Aug. -12. Reavis, Harney, 155. Sen. 178; 29, 2. _Diario_, Sept. 11. =68=P. -F. Smith, Oct. 2. =245=Duvall to Lamar, June 27. Buhoup, Narrative. -Davis, Autobiog., 105-19. =61=Shields, Aug. 28. _Niles_, Oct. 24, p. -118; Dec. 26, p. 263; May 8, 1847, p. 156. =61=Kingsbury to Wool, Oct. -13. Sen. 64; 31, 1. _National Intelligencer_, Nov. 3, 21. Carleton, -Buena Vista, 161-76. Balbontin, Invasion, 76. =65=Wool, orders 89, 117, -121, 126, 143, 144, 148, 155. =61=Wool to Taylor, Jan. 17, 1847. N. Y. -_Eve. Post_, Jan. 4, 1849. =180=McDowell to Newton, Sept. 16, 1846. -=132=Butler, Dec. 10. Wool in Ceremonies. Bishop, Journal. =69=Duncan -to Worth, Aug. 8. Taylor, Letters (Bixby), 71. =63=Marcy to Kearny, -Dec. 10. _Picayune_, Mar. 4, 6, 17, 1847. =69=Wood to Taylor, Dec. 7. -=66=Lee to Totten, Dec. 5. Donnavan, Adventures, 41. Wallace, Wallace, -21-9. =69=Wool to Taylor, Dec. 24, 1846; Jan. 20, 1847 Baylies, Wool's -Camp. _Journ. Milit. Serv. Instit._, xiv, 443. Wilhelm, 8th Inf., ii, -301. =82=S. Anna to comte. gen. Zacatecas, Dec. 6. Neville, diary. The -following are from =76=: Gov. Coahuila, Sept. 7, Oct. 8. Gefe Partido -del Rio Grande, Aug. 28; Oct. 2. Comte. gen. Zacatecas to comte. gen. -Durango, Oct. 14; to S. Anna, Oct. 21. Gefe politico, Monclova, to -Wool, Oct. 24; reply, Oct. 26. Comte. gen. Durango, Dec. 11. Heredia -to comte. gen. Durango, Dec. 10. Gov. Coahuila to _Id._, Nov. 30. R. -Vazquez to S. Anna, Oct. 1. Castaneda to Vazquez, Sept. 24. S. Anna, -Sept. 29; Nov. 4; Dec. 19, 24. Wool to Arziniega _et al._, Oct. 9. -Aldrete to Mejia, Aug. 30. Ugarte, Sept. 26. Comte. gen. Zacatecas, -Dec. 31. Lobo to R. Vazquez, Nov. 2. Comte. gen. Zacatecas to S. Anna, -Dec. 17. Gov. Coahuila to _Id._, Nov. 30. Comte. gen. Coahuila, Sept. -7. Gefe politico, Parras, to S. Anna, Dec. 17. Ampudia, Aug. 25. Rives -(U. S. and Mexico, ii, 208) places Polk in a rather absurd position -with reference to the expedition. He misunderstands a statement in -Polk's Diary, May 28, 1846. The orders to Wool there mentioned had prime -reference to getting volunteers in motion to Taylor (_Military Historian -and Economist_, ii, 32 and note on p. 33). - -13.27. The idea that the occupation of Tampico would mask and aid the -expedition against Vera Cruz came forward a little later (Sen. 1; 30, 1, -p. 949). - -13.28. This is inferred from the fact that Marcy's letter, which was -published in the _Diario_ of Oct. 6, would naturally have met Santa Anna -about Oct. 3, and from the character of Santa Anna's letter of that date. - -13.29. None of these statements should be taken too literally. The -various accounts, which come mainly from Parrodi and Santa Anna, differ -considerably though not essentially, and both men had reasons for -exaggerating the weakness of Tampico. - -13.30. Parrodi and the court that tried him declared that he threw away -nothing of value. But many did not believe this, and it is hard to see -why he should have taken the trouble, when in such haste, to transport -a large quantity of material to the river, if it was worthless. The -government naturally wished the evacuation to appear inexpensive. - -13.31. This sentence is inferential. Writing to his wife, Nov. 17, -=162=Conner stated that he was much surprised to find the city -evacuated, and that, had the garrison been there, he would have had hard -work. Why Mrs. Chase did not give notice of the evacuation cannot be -explained. No doubt there was a high state of popular excitement and, as -she had been suspected of playing the spy, the people perhaps cut her -off more effectually than the military men had done. Later she presented -a claim to Congress, and it was supported by letters from some of -Conner's officers but by none from himself. This fact may be a hint that -he was not pleased with her course. It seems to have been from her that -Parrodi heard the imaginary tale of Conner's heavy landing force, which -probably counted for a great deal in bringing about the evacuation. -Chase had sent a sketch of Tampico to Conner in June, and later his -wife forwarded a plan with a description of the forts, the number of -guns, etc. We do not know, however, that Conner received these papers. -Taylor belittled the capture of Tampico, saying that Santa Anna's order -to evacuate the town had been printed in the Mexican papers, and that -Conner must have been aware of the fact; but Conner was on a ship at -some distance from any town, and his letter of Nov. 17 shows that he -was not aware of it. The names of the captured gunboats were _Nonata_, -_Bonita_ and _Reefer_. - -13.32. Signed by Tattnall and Ingraham; approved by Conner; accepted by -the deputation of the ayuntamiento. The Americans felt that formal terms -would bind them yet could be repudiated by the Mexican government. - -13.33. Two merchant vessels also were captured. - -13.34. According to Apuntes, pp. 82-6, Dr. Francisco Marchante of the -Mexican medical service, who had charge of other public property, was -not far away, but the Mexicans persuaded Tattnall that he could not be -overtaken. On Tattnall's return to the port, however, a Mexican declared -this could not have been true, and hence a second expedition set out in -all haste. It was unavoidably delayed; and finally, as the Americans -learned that a Mexican force had been sent forward to protect Marchante, -the chase was abandoned. A large amount of ammunition was thrown into -the river at Panuco by Marchante. The total loss of material was thus of -considerable moment. Some of the ammunition was saved by sending it to -Tuxpan. - -13.35. Gates had two companies of his own (Third Artillery). The other -five were Belton's. A steamer carrying ordnance and ordnance stores was -lost. - -13.36. Perry flew the pennant of a vice commodore (Conner, Home -Squadron, 12). - -13.37. Brooke had at first intended to send also four companies of -Mounted Rifles; and Taylor, on hearing of this, protested sharply to -the government that "a large and efficient force of cavalry," on which -he counted, had been diverted to a place where they were not needed -(Ho. 60; 30, 1, pp. 382, 388), overlooking the fact that this corps had -no horses (orders no. 149: _ibid._, 512). Now that Tampico had been -captured by the navy, Taylor said it was of no consequence (Letters -(Bixby), 78). These points are mentioned to show his state of mind, -which will need to be understood when we come to Scott's operations. The -Alabama regiment was ordered to Tampico by Patterson (Bliss: Ho. 60; 30, -1, p. 383). - -13.38. _Occupation of Tampico. Eco_, June 9; Sept. 12; Oct. 29; Nov. -18, 19, 25. =303=Juanito del Bosque, Jan. 6, 1847. Apuntes, 78-86. -=61=Gates to Barnard, May 4, 1849. =69=Prout to Patterson, Oct. 28. -=164=Chase to Conner, June 4. Parrodi, Memoria (including letters to -and from S. Anna and others). Ampudia, To Fellow-citizens, July 10. -_Commerc. Review_, 1846, p. 165. =47=Conner, Oct. 7; Nov. 5, 21; Dec. -1. Polk, Diary, Sept. 19-22. =297=Mackenzie to Buchanan, July 7. Ho. -60; 30, 1, pp. 480-1 (Jones); 339, 341 (Marcy); 378-9, 387 (Taylor); -252 (Mason); 270 (Conner); 271 (Tattnall and Ingraham); 271 (Cervantes -_et al._). =162=Morris to Conner, Sept. 21. =162=Tattnall to Conner, -Nov. 20. Parker, Recolls., 68. Conner, Home Squad, 11 (Conner), -12. =48=Bancroft to Conner, Aug. 29. =48=Mason to _Id._, Sept. 22. -Balbontin, Estado, 52. _Diario_, Sept. 22; Oct. 6; Nov. 28. S. Anna, -Apelacion, 29-31. =99=S. Anna to Tampico ayunt., Oct. 27. =245=_Bee_ -to Lamar, Dec. 5. =99=Parrodi to Tamp. ayunt., Oct. 26. =99=Urrea to -_id._, Oct. 29. =99=Gov. Tamaul. to _id._, Oct. 25. =99=Gov. Tamaul., -circular, Nov. 17. Vindicacion del Gen. Parrodi. =69=Worth to Bliss, -Dec. 4. Steele, Amer. Camps., 125. =226=Beauregard to Totten, Nov. 27. -=69=Chase, Dec. 3, 1845. =313=_Id._ to Saunders, May 26, 31. _Public -Ledger_, Jan. 7, 1847 (Mrs. Chase). =52=Mrs. Chase to Conner, Oct. 20. -=316=Judd to Sherman, Feb. 26, 1848. Ballentine, Eng. Sold., i, 267. -=69=Shields to Bliss, Jan. 13, 1847. =60=_Id._ to Barnard, Apr. 20, -1849. Meade, Letters, i, 159-60. =46=Perry to Mason, Nov. 15, 19. -=46=Declaration, Nov. 15. N. Y. _Eve. Post_, Nov. 18, 1847. =165=Conner -letter book, Nov. 13-Dec. 4. Taylor, Letters (Bixby), 77-8. Negrete, -Invasion, iii, 170-3. Balbontin, Invasion, 54. Ho. 1; 30, 2, pp. 1171, -1173 (Conner); 1174-5 (Tattnall). Ho. 4; 29, 2, p. 381. =69=Perry, -memo., [Nov. 16]. =61=Gardner, Dec. 2. =61=Gates, Nov. 20. =61=Brooke, -Nov. 21. =69=Gates, Nov. 26. =163=Perry to Mason, Nov. 16. =61=Patterson -to Marcy, Nov. 23. =162=Tattnall to alcalde, Nov. 19. Bennett, Steam -Navy, 93. _Monitor Repub._, Dec. 2. =166=Patterson to Perry, Nov. 22. -=166=Perry to Conner [about Nov. 30]. =166=Tattnall to _Id._, Nov. -22. =313=Saunders to Taylor, June 5. =61=Jones to Scott, Nov. 28, 30; -to Patterson, Nov. 29; to Taylor, Nov. 30. =313=Letters from Conner -to Saunders, Nov. =61=Gardner to Taylor, Nov. 17. Smith, Remins., 28. -=61=Shields, Dec. 23. _Espia de la Frontera_, no. 7. =76=Gov. Tamaul., -address, Nov. 27. Memoria de ... Relaciones, 1846 (circular, Nov. -21). _Picayune_, Jan. 2, 1847. =112=Barnard, Dec. 20, notes on the -fortifications. =112=_Id._ to Gates, Dec. 11; to Shields, Dec. 28. -=112=Beauregard to Totten, Feb. 2, 1847; to Gates, Feb. 24. =61=Gates -to Barnard, May 4, 1849. =66=Beauregard to Totten, Jan. 9, 1847. The -following are from =76=. Parrodi, Oct. 17. S. Anna to Urrea, Oct. 18. -Prefect Huejutla, Nov. 23, 30. Munoz, Nov. 21, 23, 26; Dec. 1. Order, -April 24. Gov. Guanajuato, Nov. 27. Gov. Michoacan, Nov. 26. Munoz to -Gov. Tamaul., Nov. 14. Tampico ayunt. to Conner, Nov. 14. Parrodi, -proclam., June 9. To Parrodi, June 3; Aug. 28. Circular, Nov. 21. To -Bravo, May 14. Bravo, May 18. Mejia, June 9. To comte. gen. Queretaro, -Nov. 21. Parrodi, May 20; June 17; July 8; Sept. 2, 5. Munoz to Parrodi, -Nov. 14. S. Anna to Parrodi, Oct. 12. To S. Anna, Oct. 15; Nov. 8. -Ampudia, Sept. 29. S. Anna, Oct. 3, 10, 12; Nov. 4, 12, 21. Affidavit -of M. Dorante, Dec. 23. Comte. Nat. Gd., Tampico, to Urrea, Nov. 4. To -Ampudia, Aug. 28. When Perry reached Brazos Id. the weather was so bad -that he could only leave an officer on an anchored vessel. - -13.39. An estimate of Taylor's strength on Dec. 9 was 14,000 for the -entire field (_Picayune_, Dec. 27). One of Wool's companies was still -at San Antonio, one on the Rio Grande, and four at Monclova on Dec. 16, -he stated; several were left behind when he marched from Parras, and -he probably had 200 sick. Dec. 24 he reported about 2000 effectives -as with him. At Camargo and doubtless elsewhere in that region there -was considerable sickness. See a letter (probably from P. F. Smith) in -_Littell_, no. 141, p. 191. One may doubt whether Taylor had a fighting -force of over 12,000 at this time. The lines are reckoned as from Point -Isabel or the mouth of the Rio Grande to Camargo, Saltillo and Parras, -and from Monterey to Tampico. They were soon longer, because Taylor -advanced beyond Saltillo. His advance to Victoria began Dec. 13 (chap. -xviii, p. 357). - -13.40. Opinions as to the number of men under Santa Anna at this time -differed. Taylor's report on Dec. 4 (Ho. 60; 30, 1, p. 441) was 20,000 -infantry and a large cavalry force; Meade, Nov. 24, 35,000; Meade, Dec. -8, 30,000. =69=Wool wrote on Dec. 24 that according to spies sent out -from Parras Santa Anna had 12,000 at San Luis Potosi, 30,000 at some -distance from there, and 9000 on their way from Guadalajara. =69=Butler -wrote from Saltillo on Dec. 20 that Santa Anna appeared to have 35,000 -at S. L. P. and 9000 at Tula. - -13.41. _Taylor's military policy._ Taylor, Letter to Gaines, Nov. 5 -(and in _Picayune_, Feb. 2, 1847). =169=_Id._ to Crittenden, Oct. 9. -=370=_Id._ to Davis, April 18, 1848. Ho. 60; 30, 1, pp. 351-4, 377, -379-82, 441, 514-5 (Taylor); 389-91 (Marcy). =256=Marcy to Wetmore, -Jan. 24; Mar. 29, 1847. Scribner, Campaign, 55. Meade, Letters, i, -152, 168-9. Polk, Diary, Jan. 5, 1847. =61=Wool, Dec. 16. =69=_Id._ -to Taylor, Dec. 24. _Journ. Milit. Serv. Instit._, xiv, 443. Taylor, -Letters (Bixby), 71-2. =330=_Id._ to brother, Dec. 12. =256=Scott to -Marcy, Dec. 27, priv. _Morning News_, New London, Conn., Dec. 10. -=267=Memo. (probably from Maj. Smith). P. F. Smith, Memoir, Oct. 15. - -There was also the difficulty of supervising lines so extended. At -this very time Taylor was afraid things were going badly in his rear -(=330=to brother, Dec. 12). It is particularly hard to find any good -reason for posting a (necessarily large) force at Victoria, so very far -from support. The pass between that point and Tula was not practicable -for artillery, and was not the only pass by which infantry and cavalry -could cross the mountains. Taylor (Ho. 60; 30, 1, p. 380) argued that -from Victoria he could threaten the Mexican flank, should Santa Anna -advance. But he would have had to force the pass, and without artillery -he could not have accomplished much. In case of Santa Anna's advancing -and succeeding, this flanking force would have been in great peril, -while in case of his failing it would have been useless. Anyhow it would -have been more useful with the main army. Not only were the Americans -scattered at posts, but they moved about in parties of only 200 or 300 -with a carelessness that astounded the Mexicans (Camargo letter: N. Y. -_Journal of Commerce_, Jan. 8, 1847). Taylor could not safely count upon -cooperation between Wool and Worth in the case of an advance of the -Mexicans, for it was likely that Santa Anna's first care would be to -block the road, as probably he could have done. - - - XIV. SANTA FE - -14.1. Independence is ten miles east of Kansas City and about -thirty-five from Fort Leavenworth. - -14.2. _Conditions in New Mexico; Armijo._ =13=Bankhead, no. 148, 1846. -St. Louis _Weekly Reveille_, May 23. St. Louis _Republican_, Aug. 25. -Sen. 7; 30, 1 (Emory). =60=Leitensdorfer, June 7. Sen. Misc. 26; 30, 1 -(Wislizenus). Inman, Old S. Fe Trail, 27-54, 67-92. =75=Armijo, Jan. 12. -=75=Hacienda to Relaciones, Mar. 16. _Monitor Repub._, Apr. 15. Memoria -de ... Guerra, March, 1845. _Picayune_, March 18. Dublan, Legislacion, -v, 10. _Niles_, Sept. 26, p. 52. =52=Alvarez, Feb. 2, 1842; Sept. 4, -1846. =52=Jones, Sept. 20, 1837. =13=Ashburnham, no. 50, 1837. Sen. -90; 22, 1, pp. 30-41. Captain of Vols., Conquest. Pacheco, Exposicion. -Ruxton, Adventures (London, 1847), 110, 185-6. Cooke, Conquest, 60. -Kendall, Narrative, i, 295, 314-5, 346-60. _Amigo del Pueblo_, Aug. -19, 1845. Mexico a traves, iv, 403. Wash. _Globe_, Sept. 2, 1845. N. -Orl. _Courier_, July 5, 1845. Houston _Telegraph_, Jan. 24, 1844. -=77=Arrangoiz, no. 63, res., 1843. =77=Almonte, no. 4, 1844. Amer. -Antiquarian Soc. Proceeds., new series, viii, 324-41. And the following -from =76=. Assembly of N. Mex., Feb., 1846 (petition for comte. gen.). -Re-extracto on N. Mex. (Sambrano). Ayunt., Hermosillo, Son., proclam. -Comte. gen. N. Mex., May 17, 1845. Tornel, Mar. 10, 1846. To Hacienda, -Mar. 6. Trial of Magoffin (testimony). A merchant's estimate of Santa Fe -caravan business for 1846 was that the first cost of the goods amounted -to $937,500 (Captain of Vols., Conquest, 11). - -14.3. The text includes two companies of dragoons that joined Kearny on -the march. On account of the scarcity of grass at Santa Fe and because -he considered infantry the chief reliance, Kearny did not wish so large -a proportion of mounted men. Fischer's company enlisted to serve as -horse. The artillery had twelve brass 6-pounders and four 12-pound -howitzers. Kearny's army, being near states abounding in resources, was -more readily set in motion than Taylor's or Wool's, but on account of -its long march 459 horses, 3658 mules, 14,904 oxen, 1556 wagons, and -516 pack mules were required to transport it, its reinforcements, and -its supplies. (This account is not complete, but on the other hand it -refers not only to Kearny's expedition but to troops that followed him. -Rives's account in U.S. and Mexico, ii, 214-5, is therefore misleading, -and makes the short rations endured on the march seem incredible.) The -Indians drove off many of the cattle, robbed trains and killed not a few -drivers (Sen. 1; 30, 1, p. 545). - -14.4. _S. Fe expedition ordered and organized._ S. Louis _Weekly -Reveille_, May 11, 23. Polk, Diary, May 13, 14, 16, 30. =69=Jones to -Kearny, May 13. =63=Marcy to Kearny, May 27. =240=Kennerly, Narrative. -Sen. 7; 30, 1 (Emory). =69=Kearny, orders, June 19; July 31. Richardson, -Journal, 3-6. =61=Kearny to gov. Mo., June 16; to Cummins, June -20. =60=Marcy to gov. Mo., May 13. Wash. _Union_, Sept. 24. _Nat. -Intelligencer_, Oct. 2. _Monitor Repub._, Mar. 27, 1847. Scharf, St. -Louis, i, 369, 372-3. St. Louis _Republican_, May 13, 22, 30; June 26. -Sen. 1; 30, 1, p. 545. _Niles_, July 4, 1846, p. 281; July 3, 1847, p. -279. Ho. 60; 30, 1, p. 326. Elliott, Notes, 217, 221. Ruxton, Adventures -(1849), 312-3. St. Louis _New Era_, Aug. 20. Mo. Hist. Soc. Colls., -ii, no. 4. =212=Hastings, diary. =256=Penn, Jr., [May 23]. Bancroft, -Pac. States, xii, 410, note (names of officers). Hughes, Doniphan's -Expedition, 24-7. Cooke, Conquest, 2. - -14.5. The route taken by Kearny was not the shortest but it seemed -the best for his purpose (Cooke, Conquest, 13). Distances from Fort -Leavenworth: to Council Grove, 126 miles; to the Arkansas River, 393; to -Bent's Fort, 564; to S. Fe, 873 (Ho. 1; 30, 2, p. 236). - -14.6. _To and at Bent's Fort._ Mexico in 1842, 128. Sen. 7; 30, 1. -=63=Marcy to Howard, May 13, 1846. Ho. 41; 30, 1. =61=Kearny, June 5; -Aug. 1. =61=Kearny, orders, June 27; July 31. =61=Capt. Johnston, diary. -=201=Gibson, diary. Prince, Concise Hist., 164-74, 178. _Niles_, Aug. 1, -1846, p. 343. Cooke, Conquest, 3-4. Elliott, Notes, 222-3. =58=Cooke, -Map of S. Fe Trace. Captain of Vols., Conquest. Ho. 45; 31, 1. Sen. -23; 30, 1. Mo. Hist. Soc. Colls., ii, no. 4. Richardson, Journal. -Sen. Misc. 26; 30, 1, pp. 5-13. Connelley, Doniphan's Exped., 179-81. -=212=Hastings, diary. Ho. 60; 30, 1, pp. 151, 168. Ruxton, Far West, -189. =69=Kearny, July 17. Hughes, Doniphan's Exped., 30-59. =76=Kearny -to Armijo, Aug. 1. =76=Heredia to S. Anna, Dec. 31, 1846. Bent's Fort -lay about fifteen miles above the mouth of Las Animas River (Cooke, -Conquest, 12). - -14.7. _Armijo's motives and preparations._ Sen. 7; 30, 1 (Emory). -Gibson, diary, Sept. 5. _Republicano_, Jan. 13; Feb. 5, 1847 (Armijo). -Twitchell, Milit. Occup., 60. Read, Guerra, 219. Prince, Concise Hist., -179. =52=Alvarez, Sept. 4, 1846. From =76= the following. M. E. to F. -Pino. N. to F. Pino. J. F. to J. E. Ortiz. J. F. Ortiz to P. Armendaris. -M. Ramirez to Senora Casanoba. N. Quintanar to L. Tellez. D. Vigil to -J. F. Zubia. Decision of the _mesa_. Testimony given at the trial of -Magoffin. S. Anna, Dec. 8, 1846. Summary of four packets of letters, -and conclusion of the _mesa_. Armijo, Sept. 8, 1846; Jan. 20; Mar. 30, -1847. Tornel, Mar. 10, 1846. _Id._ to Ugarte, Mar. 10; June 25; July 25. -Segundo cabo, Chihuahua, July 10. Armijo to Ugarte, July 1. To Armijo, -July 25. Comte. gen. Durango, July 16. Ugarte, July 17; Aug. 23. Letter -from El Paso, Aug. 9. - -14.8. The regiment under Price numbered at first about 1000, and the -battalion, commanded by Lieut. Col. Willock, about 300. In July a third -force (infantry) was ordered to take the same route but it was found -unnecessary, and the plans were given up (Ho. 60; 30, 1, p. 162). - -_The second (Price's; Mormons) and third (abortive) expeditions._ Polk, -Diary, May 30; June 2, 3, 5; July 18, 1846; Apr. 28, 1847. =62=Marcy to -gov. Mo., May 11, 1847. =62=Jones to Price, May 18, 22, 1847. =63=Marcy -to gov. Mo., Apr. 28; May 6, 11, 1847. =69=Jones to Scott, Apr. 20, -1847. =61=Doniphan to Marcy, Oct. 20, 1846. =61=Shields, Aug. 9, 1846. -=62=Marcy to gov. Mo., July 18, 1846. Wash. _Union_, Sept. 24, 1846. -Scharf, St. Louis, i, 375-6. _Niles_, July 18, 1846, p. 312. =2=Allred, -recolls. Sen. 439; 29, 1, p. 2. Sen. 1; 29, 2, p. 49. Ho. 60; 30, 1, p. -171. Bancroft, Pac. States, xii, 410, note (names of officers). Cooke, -Conquest, 2. Hughes, Doniphan's Exped., 134, 137-8. - -14.9. Kearny's letter to Armijo, found in the Mexican archives, is -stated to have been translated by the American consul from a certified -copy of the original. A little later an American trader, who had married -a Santa Fe woman, was despatched to distribute the proclamation and -sound the people at Taos. A scouting party under Bent went forward to -examine the route. - -14.10. Kearny was criticised for undertaking to release the people from -their allegiance to Mexico; but since, as our Supreme Court decided in -the Castine case, the inhabitants of conquered territories pass under -at least a temporary allegiance to the conquering power, they must -necessarily be absolved from their former obligations. See Washington -_Union_, August 21, 1847. - -14.11. Kearny returned a conciliatory message by the bearer of Armijo's -letter. See note 13. - -14.12. Estimates of the number of the people in arms vary from about -1800 (=76=Armijo) to 4-5000 (Cooke). Armijo's reports minified all his -means of defence. Apparently there were about 3000. So Magoffin stated -on his =76=trial, and this was the conclusion of the war department at -Mexico. Probably Armijo felt surprised and embarrassed by the response -of the people. - -14.13. It was charged by Mexicans that Armijo was bought by American -agents. But Kearny had no money to use in this way, and in the absence -of substantial evidence there seems to be no good ground to suppose -that the merchants had a sufficient reason for buying him. Armijo sent -Dr. Henry Connelly back with Cooke to treat in his behalf with Kearny -(Cooke, Conquest, 31, 33), but nothing seems to have been accomplished. -Kearny probably desired (=76=Connelly to Armijo, Aug. 19) that Armijo -should surrender with his troops, and presumably Armijo asked for -impossible concessions. Magoffin went on to Chihuahua, was arrested, -tried, and imprisoned until the end of the war, and later was paid -$30,000 by the U.S. government for his services and losses (Benton, -View, ii, 683). There is little reason to suppose that his services were -of much value. - -14.14. The Mexican archives contain many letters from New Mexico bearing -upon Armijo's conduct and motives. Most of the writers called him a -traitor; and a war department board (_mesa_), after reviewing the -evidence, decided that he ought to be tried. But of course this was -the opportunity for his enemies to turn upon him. The popular party -naturally insisted that the people wanted to fight, and were betrayed -by him. But he denied this, demanding why, in that case, they did not -select some other chief, and hold their ground. Armijo hovered about for -a time, pretending to cooperate with Ugarte; but, not being permitted to -remain in Chihuahua, he went south with a train of wagons filled with -American merchandise and guarded by Missourians, and finally, making his -way to the capital under an order to come and answer for his conduct, he -repeatedly demanded to be put on trial. - -14.15. The population of Santa Fe was about 3000. - -14.16. _Events from Aug. 1 to 18 inclusive._ Mexico in 1842, p. 128. -Sen. 7; 30, 1. Polk, Diary, June 15, 17, 1846. Sen. Misc. 26; 30, 1, pp. -17-20. Sen. 18; 31, 1, p. 237. =61=Kearny, Aug. 1. =61=Capt. Johnston, -diary. =62=Marcy to Kearny, June 18. =201=Gibson, diary. _Republicano_, -Sept. 10, 1846; Jan. 13; Feb. 5, 1847. Bustamante, Nuevo Bernal, ii, -104. Connelley, Doniphan's Exped., 181, 184. _Anzeiger des Westens_, -Aug. 6; Sept. 5, 7, 24, 1846. Ho. 60; 30, 1, pp. 168-70. Wash. _Union_, -Sept. 14; Oct. 2, 27, 1846; July 12, 1847. _Diario_, Sept. 9, 10; Oct. -5. Read, Guerra, 220. Prince, Concise Hist., 179-80. _Niles_, Oct. 10, -pp. 90-2. Robinson, Sketches, 20-1. Elliott, Notes, 225, 231, 234-5, -237, 241. =52=Alvarez, Sept. 4. Sen. 23; 30, 1. Ruxton, Adventures -(London, 1847), 110. Benton, View, ii, 683. Mo. Hist. Soc. Colls., -ii, no. 4. =212=Hastings, diary. =268=Kearny, letter book. =337=Capt. -Turner, diary. Cutts, Conquest, 44. Cooke, Conquest, 5-43. Richardson, -Journal. Hughes, Doniphan's Exped., 59-87. From =76= the following. -Letters from N. Mex. (undated letters in note 7). Testimony at trial -of Magoffin. S. Anna, Dec. 8. Summary of four packets of letters and -conclusion of the _mesa_. Armijo, Sept. 8. Armijo to Kearny, Aug. 12. -Connelly to Armijo, Aug. 19. Armijo, Jan. 20; Mar. 30, 1847. Re-extracto -from statement of Sambrano. Reyes, Aug. 25, 1846. Ugarte, Aug. 23; Sept. -5. Kearny to Armijo, Aug. 1. Estados of troops in Zac., Dur., Chih., and -N. Mex. - -14.17. _Events from Aug. 19 to Sept. 25 inclusive._ =61=Wooster, Sept. -25. Ho. 60; 30, 1, pp. 169-74 (Kearny). Sen. 7; 30, 1. Sen. Misc. 26; -30, 1, pp. 55, etc. =61=Kearny, Aug. 30; Sept. 24. =69=Kearny, orders, -Aug. 27; Sept. 12. =201=Gibson, diary. _Anzeiger des Westens_, Sept. -26; Nov. 16. =243=Kribben, home letter, Aug. 28. Wash. _Union_, Oct. -27. Prince, Concise Hist., 180, 182. _Niles_, Oct. 10, p. 90. Hastings, -diary. Ho. 60; 30, 1, pp. 169-70. Hughes, Doniphan's Exped., 100-19. -=76=Vigil, reply to Kearny, Aug. 19. =76=Letter from El Paso, Aug. 9. -=76=Heredia, Oct. 17. Some of the force did not set out until Sept. 26 -(Cooke, Conquest, 71). - - - XV. CHIHUAHUA - -15.1. Willock's battalion was under Price's command. The Mormons were -intended for California. Kearny's order to Doniphan anticipated a -suggestion made independently by Scott and by Benton in November, and -forwarded, with Polk's approval, to Kearny on December 10 by Marcy. -Doniphan was anxious to be ordered to Wool, and his men, reacting from -the atrocious conditions prevailing at Santa Fe--of which quite enough -will be heard in chapter xxxi--were eager to be off. - -15.2. Arriving at Santa Fe without provisions, the soldiers soon ate up -what supplies could be obtained there, and as the people were declared -to be American citizens, nothing could be taken without the consent -of the owners. Besides, Kearny had no adequate funds. By a surprising -blunder the contracts for the supplies that followed him called for -delivery, not at Santa Fe, but at Bent's Fort. Doniphan's setting out -for the south was delayed by a lack of provisions. The description of -his men is based upon a large number of documents (particularly the -diaries of Gibson and Hastings and Ruxton's Adventures) which will be -cited when the occupation of New Mexico comes to be considered (chap. -xxxi). - -15.3. Ruxton speaks of tents, but perhaps he was thinking of Clark's -men. Doniphan stated that they marched across the Jornada without tents -(St. Louis _Republican_, July 3, 1847). - -15.4. December 19 Heredia reported to Santa Anna that there were 108 -infantry and 320 cavalry at El Paso. There is no reason to suspect the -honesty of this report, and none of the other troops in the state had -time to reach that town before Christmas. Some ex-soldiers, however, are -said in Apuntes, 141, to have joined the colors, making some 1200 in -all, including militia. - -15.5. It is impossible to state positively how many men Ponce de Leon -had. The American accounts run as high as 1300 (Hughes), but evidently -they were not based on reliable information, and very likely the -writers assumed that all of Vidal's troops were under Ponce. From the -Mexican accounts it would appear that such was not the case. Vidal -would naturally keep men back to act as a reserve, hold what he called -his "line of defence," and guard his person; and this probability is -strengthened by the fact that three of his four guns were not used in -the fight. The figures of several Mexican accounts are about 500. The -reports of the details of the skirmish are equally irreconcilable. El -Brazito (The Little Arm) was the smaller (eastern) of the two channels -into which the river was here divided by an island. - -15.6. _Doniphan's operations to Dec. 25 inclusive; Mex. preparations -at the Chihuahua frontier._ =61=Wooster, Sept. 25. =268=Portrait of -Doniphan. =240=Kennerly, narrative. =61=Kearny, special orders 11. Sen. -7; 30, 1. Richardson, Journal. Sen. Misc. 26; 30, 1, p. 61. =61=Kearny, -orders, Sept. 23. =61=Doniphan, Oct. 20. =61=Price, Feb. 26, 1847. -=61=Scott, Nov. 24 and Marcy's endorsement, Dec. 9. Cooke, Conquest, 51. -=201=Gibson, diary. _Republicano_, Jan. 26; Apr. 10, 1847. _Picayune_, -Mar. 6, 18, 1847. Bustamante, Nuevo Bernal, ii, 105. _Anzeiger des -Westens_, Apr. 11, 14; May 17, 18, 1847. =243=Kribben, letters, Oct. 20, -etc., 1846. Wash. =Union=, Mar. 18, 21, 1847. St. Louis _Republican_, -July 3, 1847. _Niles_, Mar. 6, 1847, p. 7; Apr. 3, p. 71; July 3, p. -279. Sen. 1; 30, 1, pp. 496-7 (Don.). Ho. 60; 30, 1, pp. 171, 1128. -Apuntes, 141-3. Elliott, Notes, 227, 229. Sen. 23; 30, 1, pp. 90-6. Sen. -439; 29, 1, p. 2. (Loss) Ho. 24; 31, 1. Ruxton, Adventures (London, -1847), 171-2, 176, 178, 183. Statement _re_ Doniphan from Hon. Champ -Clark, Jan. 27, 1906. Benton, View, ii, 686-8. Mo. Hist. Soc. Colls., -ii, no. 4. =212=Hastings, diary. Cooke, Conquest, 39. Hughes, Doniphan's -Exped., 256-67. Connelley, Doniphan's Exped., 589. From =76= the -following. Trias, proclam., Nov. 19, 1846. _Id._, Nov. 23; Dec. 18. -Balmudez, El Paso, Oct. 28. Vidal, proclam., Dec. 21. _Id._, Dec. 26. -Heredia, Dec. 25. Ponce to Vidal, Dec. 26. Gov. Chih. to prefect El -Paso, Sept. 19. - -15.7. October 22 Marcy, learning from Kearny that surplus troops might -be ordered to report to Wool at Chihuahua, directed Taylor to notify -and instruct any such detachment in case he (Taylor) should decide to -have Wool join him (Ho. 60; 30, 1, p. 365). It was probably possible to -have a Mexican spy go from Parras to Chihuahua and thence north to meet -Doniphan, but so far as we are aware no attempt to do this was made. - -15.8. The insurrection will be described in chap. xxxi. - -15.9. During the stay at El Paso some of the traders stole away, went to -Chihuahua, and sold ammunition to the enemy. - -15.10. Lieut. Col. Mitchell had been ordered south by Price in December -to open communication with Wool, who was believed to be approaching -Chihuahua, and Mitchell had organized the Rangers as an escort. -Christian Kribben, who commanded one of the two companies, wrote (Nov. -30) that Mitchell selected the best men then at S. Fe. The commander was -named Hudson. (See also Richardson, Journal.) Mitchell nearly reached -El Paso while Doniphan was engaged with the Indians; but, alarmed by -reports of Mexican troops, he returned and joined Doniphan. There was no -engineer in Doniphan's command. - -15.11. _Events from Dec. 26 to Feb. 27 inclusive._ Sen. Misc. 26; 30, -1, p. 61. =61=Price, Feb. 26, 1847. =61=Wooster, Mar. 7. Gibson, diary. -_Picayune_, Mar. 18. Bustamante, Nuevo Bernal, ii, 105. Wash. _Union_, -Mar. 18. Richardson, Journal. =228=Hughes to Miller, Jan. 26. _Id._ -to war dept., Jan. 25. Sen. 1; 30, 1, pp. 498-9 (Don.), 503 (Gilpin). -Apuntes, 143. Ho. 60; 30, 1, pp. 365, 1128. Elliott, Notes, 245. -Ruxton, Adventures (London, 1847), 156, 158, 168. Kendall, Narrative, -ii, 35. Mo. Hist. Soc. Colls., ii, no. 4. Hastings, diary. Hughes, -Doniphan's Exped., 256, 269, 271-4, 280, 286, 289-95, 301-2. From =76= -the following. Garcia Conde, Apr. 5. Comte. gen. Chih., Oct. 10, 1846. -Heredia, Jan. 9, 1847. _Id._ to S. Anna, Dec. 31, 1846; Jan. 5, 1847. -Gov. Sonora to Bustamante, Feb. 28, 1847. Trias, Feb. 7. The artillery -arrived on Feb. 1, but the baggage and provision train not until Feb. 5. - -15.12. After the battle the Mexicans represented their forces as small; -but, as Trias himself wrote on February 20 that he would set out the -next day from Chihuahua City with 2000 troops (it is not probable that -he looked upon the rancheros as troops), and Garcia Conde was then north -of the Sacramento with about 800 cavalry, it seems impossible to reduce -the total given in the text. - -15.13. _Mexican preparations to defend Chihuahua; the ground and -the fortifications._ Sen. Misc. 26; 30, 1, p. 53. Gibson, diary. -_Republicano_, Mar. 25; Apr. 10; June 8. _Anzeiger des Westens_, May -17, 18. _Diario_, Nov. 5, 1846. Edwards, Campaign, 127. Sen. 1; 30, 1, -pp. 498-513. Apuntes, 143-6. Ruxton, Adventures (London, 1847), 159. -=47=Conner, May 31, 1846. Memoria de ... Guerra, Mar., 1845, p. 28. -Kendall, Narrative, ii, 63. Hastings, diary. Hughes, Doniphan's Exped., -303-5. From =76= the following. Garcia Conde, Apr. 5, 1847. Martinez, -Oct. 10, 1846. Reyes, Oct. 9, 1846. J. M. Conde, Feb. 24; Mar. 15, 1847. -S. Anna, Oct. 12; Nov. 11; Dec. 24, 1846; Jan. 4, 1847. Tornel, June -25, 1846. Gov. Durango, July 27; Sept. 3, 1846. Re-extracto of Sambrano -letter. Boletin no. 8, Chih. Reyes to Trias, Oct. 7, 1846. Comte. gen. -Durango, Aug. 22; Sept. 3; Oct. 30, 1846. To Reyes, Aug. 31; Sept. 9, -18, 25, 1846. Reyes, Aug. 25; Sept. 14; Oct. 2, 6, 1846. Memo., Sept 9. -To director gen. of artill., Sept. 18. Patriotic junta, plan, July 27, -1846 (reported upon by generals, Sept. 4). Comte. gen. Chih., [Sept.] -15, 1846. Trias, Sept. 19; Dec. 26, 1846; Feb. 20; Oct. 26, 1847. Gov. -Chih., July 23, 1846. Comte. gen. Zacatecas, July 31. Segundo cabo, -Chih., July 18, res., 21, 25; Aug. 17. Estados of troops in Zac., Dur., -Chih. and N. Mex. Heredia to S. Anna, Dec. 31, 1846; Jan. 5; Feb. 13, -20, 1847. To Heredia, Mar. 13, 1847. Memo, on defence of Chih. Heredia, -Oct. 10; Nov. 2; Dec. 7, 1846; Jan. 19, 26, 30; Feb. 20; Mar. 2, 22, -1847. Estado of Dur. troops sent to Chih., dated Feb. 20, 1847. To -comte. gen. Dur., Sept. 9, 1846. And many others. - -15.14. A letter of May 18, 1847, from Chihuahua said that in the opinion -of sensible persons commercial interest in the caravan had much to do -with Doniphan's victories, and that certain extraordinary events could -be explained in no other way (_Republicano_, June 8). =76=Heredia -suspected that Chihuahua merchants were secretly working to bring about -the arrival of the caravan. - -15.15. Doniphan might have crossed the cordillera bounding the eastern -side of the valley and turned the Mexican position entirely, wrote -=76=Garcia Conde; but he did not say that the wagons could have gone -that way. If they could not, the plan was impracticable. - -15.16. Doniphan said later: "There was no particular generalship at -the battle. You were marched within the proper distance, when you were -turned loose. The enemy first recoiled, then gave way, then fled." To -a great extent this was true. Doniphan knew that he was not a general, -and did not try to play the part. For a time at least he merely watched -and whittled (Edwards, Campaign, 112). Affairs were mostly in the hands -of his subordinates. But he gave some directions. Lieut. Wooster of the -Fourth Artillery, who had arrived at Santa Fe on August 28, was on the -ground, and according to his own report was mainly responsible for the -conduct of the battle. - -15.17. _Events of Feb. 28._ Sen. 1; 30, 1, pp. 498 (Doniphan), -502 (Mitchell), 503 (Gilpin), 508 (Clark). (Loss) Ho. 24; 31, 1. -=201=Gibson, diary. =212=Hastings, diary. _American Eagle_, V. Cruz, May -26. Richardson, Journal, 61-4. Polk, Diary, May 4. =188=Edwards, diary. -Sen. Misc. 26; 30, 1, p. 53. =61=Wooster, Mar. 7. _Republicano_, Mar. -25; Apr. 10. Mexico a traves, iv, 644. _Anzeiger des Westens_, May 18 -(Kribben). Wash. _Union_, July 12. _Diario_, Mar. 17; Apr. 8. Edwards, -Campaign, 111-2, 117. _Niles_, July 3, 1847, p. 279. Robinson, Sketches, -57-8. Apuntes, 146-9. Elliott, Notes, 245. =13=Bankhead, no. 29, 1847. -Captain of Vols., Conquest, 38. Ruxton, Adventures (1847), 159. Mo. -Hist. Soc. Colls., ii, no. 4. Benton, View, ii, 686. Cooke, Conquest, -89. =240=Kennerly, narrative. Hughes, Doniphan's Exped., 306-13. -Connelley, Doniphan's Exped., 418, 590. From =76= the following. Garcia -Conde, Apr. 5. J. M. Conde, Mar. 15. Yanez, Mar. 23. To Heredia, Mar. -2, 13. Heredia, Mar. 2; Apr. 1. Ugarte, Mar. 10. It is hardly necessary -to point out that howitzers and cavalry should not ordinarily be used -in storming entrenched positions. Ibarra's list of officers killed -during the war (p. 8) mentions but one as falling here. This fact seems -to suggest the true character of the battle. Drawing the fire of the -Mexican fortifications by sweeping to the left prepared the way for our -decisive charge. - -15.18. Trias made active efforts but in vain. Heredia had only 200 men -on April 10; and Ugarte on April 15 merely expected to have two small -parties afoot before long. Arlegui, comandante general of Durango, -was anxious to protect his own state by recovering Chihuahua, but the -governor showed no interest in that project. - -15.19. Sen. Misc. 26; 30, 1, pp. 61-2. Frost, Taylor, 304. =61=Wooster, -Mar. 7. Gibson, diary. _Republicano_, Apr. 10; June 8. Wash. _Union_, -July 12. Sen. 1; 30, 1, pp. 501 (Doniphan); 503 (Mitchell). Apuntes, -149. Robinson, Sketches, 62. Ho. 60; 30, 1, pp. 1088 (Mora); 1128 -(Doniphan). Ronde, Voyage, 136. Hastings, diary. Hughes, Doniphan's -Exped., 316, 327, 335. Richardson, Journal. From =76= the following. -Ugarte, Mar. 15; Apr. 8, 15. To comtes. gen. in Jalisco, Zacat., Guanaj. -and Dur., Mar. 13. To Filisola, Apr. 1, 30. Gov. Dur. to comte. gen., -Mar. 7; Apr. 3. Arlegui, Mar. 31. _Id._, proclam., Apr. 11. Heredia, -Mar. 2, 18; Apr. 8. Trias, May 26. Olivares and Maceyra to Doniphan, -Mar. 5. Gov. Zacatecas, Mar. 18. The news that Mexican forces were -coming was not without foundation. Gen. Filisola, a veteran officer, had -now been given Heredia's place, the comandantes general of three states -had been ordered to the north, and the governor of Durango was expecting -1000 men. - -15.20. About sixty-five Comanches had raided Parras just before the -Americans arrived there, killing eight or ten persons. As the people of -the town had been friendly to Wool, Captain Reid with about thirty-five -men pursued the Indians, and without losing a life killed seventeen, -wounded at least twenty-five, and recaptured nineteen boys and girls -besides hundreds of horses and mules. Doniphan's men were reviewed by -Wool at Buena Vista. - -15.21. _The return home._ Ho. 60; 30, 1, pp. 1127, 1131, 1136, 1143, -1170 (Taylor); 1128 (Doniphan); 1144 (Reid). Richardson, Journal. -Hughes, Doniphan's Exped., 339-51, 359, 363-5, etc. Sen. Misc. 26; -30, 1, pp. 62-82. =61=Wooster, Mar. 7. =65=Wool, gen. orders 293. -Cutts, Conquest, 89. _Republicano_, June 8. Richardson, Journal. -_Independiente_, May 29. Wash. _Union_, July 12. Scharf, St. Louis, i, -379. Connelley, Doniphan's Exped., 591. Sen. 1; 30, 1, p. 502. Captain -of Vols., Conquest, 37, 39. Cooke, Conquest, 90, note. =148=Chamberlain, -recolls. =65=Taylor, gen. orders 59. S. Anna, Apelacion, app., -15-7. Connelley, Doniphan's Exped., 596. Mo. Hist. Soc. Colls., ii, -no. 4. Hastings, diary. _Niles_, July 3, 1847, p. 279; July 17, p. -316; Aug. 14, p. 372. Robinson, Sketches, 64-71. =76=Ugarte, May 3. -=76=Relaciones, May 20. =76=Arlegui, May 7, 14. =76=Aguirre, May 14. -=76=Jefe politico, Mapimi, May 10. The distance from Chihuahua to -Saltillo was called 675 miles. Doniphan resumed the practice of law, -managed his fine farm, and served in the Missouri senate. When the Civil -War broke out, he supported the Union; but apparently he felt too much -tenderness for his neighbors to take up arms. - - - XVI. THE CALIFORNIA QUESTION - -16.1. In 1845 there entered at Monterey, the only port of entry, -twenty-seven American vessels (9435 tons), eighteen Mexican (2620), four -British (966), three French (756) and three German (525). - -16.2. Mexico tried to keep the emigrants out with proclamations and -orders to the California authorities, but the Americans appealed -successfully to the treaty of amity and commerce and (it may be -presumed) to the self-interest of local authorities. - -16.3. The Mexican government was urged to buy New Helvetia, and -negotiations began; but it was said that the Americans in the valley -declared they would not permit Sutter to sell, and it seemed doubtful -whether Mexico could hold the place even if she purchased it. - -16.4. _California and its population._ =13=Pakenham, nos. 66, 78, 1840; -1, 1842. =13=Capt. Jones to Pakenham, Nov. 30, 1841. _Revue de Paris_, -Jan., 1849. =13=Forbes, no. 2, 1846. _Nat. Intelligencer_, Apr. 26, -1842; Nov. 5, 1844. _Madisonian_, Dec. 24, 1842. =77=To gov. Calif., -June 1, 1842. =77=Almonte, no. 84, 1844. =13=Barron, May 5, 1837; Jan. -20, 1844. _Id._ to Seymour, Jan. 28, 1845. =12=Blake to Seymour, July -5, 1846. =52=Vessels entering at Monterey, 1845. Forbes, Calif., 155, -225, 276. Bulletin de la Soc. de Geog., no. 77, May, 1844, 99-102. Dana, -Two Years, 83-8, 90-3, 200. Colton, Three Years, 19-22, 37-8, 45, 68, -111, 118, 155, 158, 172-3, 231. Whittier, "The Crisis." =61=R. B. Mason, -Sept. 18, 1847. Sherman Letters, 43. Duflot de Mofras, Explor., i, 319, -402; ii, 24. Wise, Gringos, 42, 49. Ho. 70; 30, 1, pp. 7-8. =61=Kearny, -Mar. 15; Apr. 28, 1847. =77=Covarrubias, Apr. 5, 1846. =247=March to -Larkin. =247=Sutter to Larkin, Oct. 3, 1845. Bidwell, Calif., 157, -161. _Revue des Deux Mondes_, Dec. 15, 1845, p. 1039. Sherman, Sloat, -xv, xxxix. St. Amant, Voyages, 513. Richman, Calif., 265, 267, 276. -=13=Forbes to Barron, Jan. 27, 1845. =13=Elliott, July 3, 1845. Royce, -Bidwell. Boston _Post_, Nov. 27, 1845. Jameson, Calhoun Corres., 946. -=247=Sutter to Larkin, Oct. 3, 1845. =372=Hyde, statement, 6. Farnham, -Life, 358-60. _Diario_, Mar. 21, 1846. Soule, Annals, 168, 201. Sherman, -Home Letters, 114. _Niles_, June 6, 1846, p. 211. Schafer, Pac. Slope, -231. Simpson, Narrative, i, 287, 297. Sen. 33; 30, 1, p. 97. Revere, -Tour, 70. Sen. Rep. 75; 30, 1, p. 50. Sherman, Mems., i, 20. Bryant, -What I Saw, 447. Royce, Calif., 31-2, 38-9, 41. =123=Bidwell, statement. -Sen. 7; 30, 1 (Emory). Larkin, Calif. prior to 1846 (=52=Cons. letters, -Monterey, i, 1). Letter from S. Fe, July 29, 1841; Mex. in 1842, p. 128. -London _Times_, June 18, 1841. Phila. _No. American_, Oct. 31, 1843. -=52=Larkin, nos. 7, June 20; 9, Aug. 18, 1844; 12, Mar. 22; 22, June 6; -26, Sept. 29, 1845. - -16.5. Startled by this affair, the Mexican government now proposed -to send 1200 men to California with the idea of establishing them as -military colonists; and in May, 1845, Ignacio Iniestra, a Mexican -educated at Paris and regarded as a competent officer, was appointed -to the chief command. No such number of troops was, however, provided; -Iniestra refused to set out until sure his men would be paid and fed; -and the requisite money was not supplied. In August U. S. Consul Parrott -and the _Amigo del Pueblo_ of Mexico stated that a commissioner had -come from California to inform the government that the troops would not -be admitted. About this time the lack of funds caused a mutiny; but -that was suppressed, and the dwindling forces lingered on until, at -the end of the year, a large part of them were swept by Paredes into -the vortex of his revolution. For nearly two months they were cantoned -near Mexico; but finally another sham effort was put forth. Though -Iniestra died, the men proceeded under various embarrassments--receiving -accessions _en route_ from the prisons of Guadalajara--to the port of -Mazatlan, and the arms, munitions and provisions made their way under -equal difficulties to Acapulco, where seven small vessels were gathered -to receive them. But the restless Juan Alvarez, called "The Tiger of -the South," seized the effects of the expedition, giving his brigandage -a color of respectability by pronouncing, as we have seen, against -Paredes, and three weeks later the troops at Mazatlan, commanded now -by Col. Rafael Tellez, took a similar step--being determined on the -one hand not to go to California, and quite willing on the other to -live riotously on the funds of the expedition and the ample revenues -of the customhouse. They pronounced for Santa Anna; and soon after the -revolution of the citadel took place, August 4, 1846, the government, -promising to make up his command to 1000, ordered Tellez to sail, but -the necessary reinforcements were not provided. Tellez advised giving up -the expedition, and on Sept. 7 the government expressed its concurrence -in this recommendation. Thus ended even the pretence of taking the -California situation in hand. Tellez stated that according to documents -in his possession Paredes never intended to have the expedition sail; -and it is certain that secret instructions were given to Iniestra, -which the government was extremely anxious to keep from the knowledge -of the public. In all probability the real purpose of proposing the -expedition was merely to make people feel that something was to be -done. (=13=Bankhead, nos. 13, 1845; 74, 1846. _Diario_, May 4, 1846. -London _Times_, Jan. 8, 1846. =47=Wood to Bancroft, June 4, 1846. -Comunicacion Circular que ... Pena. _Amigo del Pueblo_, Aug. 14, 1845. -Of the author's very numerous =76=documents relating to the expedition -the following are enough to cite. Bustamante to Moreno, Mar. 26, 1847. -Tornel to gov. Calif., May 13, 1846. N. Flores, Mar. 8, 1846. Yanez, -Mar. 10, 23, 1846. Alvarez, Mar. 17; Apr. 7, 1846. M. Gutierrez, May 19; -June 16, 1846. To J. I. Gutierrez, May 13, 1846. Tellez to prest. of -consejo de gob., July 25, 1846; reply, Aug. 18. J. I. Gutierrez, May 9, -1846. To Iniestra, Mar. 31; May 9, 1845. Iniestra, July 31; Aug. 24, 29; -Sept. 23; Dec. 2, 24, 1845; Jan. 5, 18, 24; Feb. 28, 1846. Castanares, -Oct. 27, 1845. To Monterde, Apr. 10, 1846. T. Moreno, Mar. 3, 1846. -Baneneli to Tellez, May 7, 1846. Moreno to Gutierrez, Apr. 16, 24, 1846. -Tellez, Feb. 9, 27; Mar. 2; Apr. 11; Aug. 24, 26; Sept. 2, 1846. To -Tellez, Sept. 7, 1846. See also chap. xxx, note 27.) - -16.6. _Mexico fully warned._ London _Times_, June 18, 1841; Aug. 6; -Oct. 6, 1845. =77=Almonte, no. 84, P., July 16; 153, P., Dec. 12, 1844. -=13=Pakenham, no. 2, Jan. 6, 1842. =13=Bankhead, nos. 31, Mar. 31, 1845; -42, 1846. =77=Arrangoiz, Sept. 17, 1842; nos. 64, res., June 28, 1844; -41, res., Feb. 28; 70, res., May 7; 101, res., July 8, 1845. London -_Chronicle_, Aug. 13, 1845. Castanares, Documentos. =75=Sanchez, Apr. -2, 1846. Bancroft, Pac. States, xvii, 32. =76=Mora y Villamil, Nov. 15, -1845. =76=Bustamante, Nov. 13, 1845. =76=Mil. comte., Acapulco, July -22, 1845. =76=J. Castro to Castanares, Oct. 6, 1845. =76=_Id._, May 30, -1845. =76=Bustamante to Moreno, Mar. 26, 1847. In November, 1845, the -Mexican minister of relations told Bankhead that Castro could not be -punished for revolting (=13=Bankhead, no. 113). - -16.7. If anyone doubts this, let him look at the present populous, rich, -happy state of California, think how much it contributes to the world, -and consider what it would now be, had it remained a part of Mexico, and -suffered from the anarchy, devastations and massacres of recent years. - -16.8. France had at one time cast longing glances at California. In the -early forties Duflot de Mofras made a visit there, and according to the -British vice consul in California a formal offer of protection was made -by him, Admiral Du Petit Thouars and Capt. Laplace in the name of their -government (=13=Forbes to Barron, Sept. 5, 1844); but the time for such -a move was not then ripe, and France, aside from maintaining a consular -representative on the ground, became inactive. England was even less -responsive. While many British subjects, particularly the correspondent -of the London _Times_ at Mexico (_e.g._ _Times_, Sept. 9, 1845), felt -that England should take California, the British government, though -doubtless extremely anxious that the territory should not fall into the -possession of the United States, refused to move or countenance any move -in that direction. December 31, 1844, the Foreign Office wrote to Consul -Barron at Tepic, Mexico, who had charge of Vice Consul Forbes at San -Francisco, that in the California agitation the British agents were to -be entirely passive, and that the idea of a British protectorate could -not be countenanced, adding that the authorities of California "should -be clearly made to understand that Great Britain would view with much -dissatisfaction the establishment of a protectoral power over California -by any other foreign State." Other documents bearing on the subject are -the following. =13=Forbes to Barron, Sept. 5, 1844. Kennedy in London -_Times_, June 18, 1841. =13=Pakenham, nos. 91, Aug. 30, 1841; 61, July -21, 1842. =13=To _Id._, Dec. 15, 1841. Bankhead, nos. 74, July 30, 1845; -73, May 30, 1846. =13=To Bankhead (exactly in line with the despatch -addressed to Barron on the same day), nos. 53, Dec. 31, 1844; 18, May -31, 1845; 16, June 1; 4, Aug. 15, 1846. =108=Ashburton to Sturgis, Apr. -2, 1845 ("we certainly do not want colonies, and least of all such as -would be unmanageable from this distance, and only serve to embroil us -with our neighbours"). =13=Mora to Palmerston, Dec. 15, 1847. London -_Times_, Oct. 6, 1845. =12=For. Off. to Admty., June 19, 1846. Webster, -Writings, xviii, 192. =12=Seymour to Admty., Apr. 27, 1846. _Monitor -Repub._, Apr. 16, 1846. =52=Everett, Mar. 28, 1845. Gordon, Aberdeen, -183. Smith, Annex. of Texas, 155, 230, 417. Mackintosh, Brit. consul -at Mex., proposed to place 500,000 European colonists in California in -twenty years (=13=to Bankhead, July 26, 1845) with a view to turning -over to England the control of the province (=13=Bankhead, no. 73, -May 30, 1846). Paredes promised to give "every possible facility" for -the execution of this plan (=13=Bankhead, no. 73), but the British -government would not take it up. - -16.9. _Mexican rule to the end of 1845._ =13=Forbes, nos. 1, Oct. 19, -1843; 2, Jan. 26, 1846. Boston _Advertiser_, Sept. 26, 1842. _Nat. -Intelligencer_, May 11, 1844. London _Times_, Aug. 6; Oct. 6; Nov. 11, -1845; Mar. 13, 1846. _Revue de Paris_, Jan., 1849. =77=Almonte, nos. 84, -P., July 16; 153, P., Dec. 12, 1844. =13=Barron, May 5, 1837; Feb. 18, -1845. =13=_Id._ to Seymour, Jan. 28, 1845. =13=Pakenham, nos. 13, 1837; -66, 1840; 91, 1841; 2, 1842. =13=Doyle, no. 79, 1843. =13=Bankhead, nos. -108, 1844; 31, 52, 113, 1845; 73, 1846. Paredes, address on opening -Cong., June 6, 1846 (_Diario_). Mobile _Commercial Register_, June 13, -1843. _Diario_, Mar. 27; June 3; Aug. 21, 1845. Wash. _Globe_, May -29; Oct. 21, 1845. _Amigo del Pueblo_, Aug. 14, 1845. St. Louis _New -Era_, Aug. 20, 1845. Memphis _Eagle_, Oct. 1; Nov. 5, 1845. =52=Black, -Sept. 2, 1845. _Britannia_, May 15, 1847. =52=Virmond to Jones, Feb. -4, 1837. =52=Larkin, nos. 9, Aug. 18; 11, Oct. 30; 12, Dec. 9, 1844; -16, Jan. 1; 1, Mar. 22; 2, Mar. 22; 20, Mar. 24; 25, July 10; 26, Sept. -29, 1845. =247=Stearns to Larkin, May 14, 1846. =52=Parrott, Aug. 26, -1845. =12=Blake to Seymour, July 5, 1846. =12=Seymour, June 13. Otero, -Cuestion Social, 117. Gimenez, Memorias, 90. Mexico a traves, iv, 404. -=52=Burroughs to Ellis, Jan. 10, 1837. =77=Castillo, no. 119, 1835. -(Simpson) _Amer. Hist. Rev._, xiv, pp. 88-9. Memoria de ... Relaciones, -Mar., 1845. Royce, Calif., 202. Memoria de ... Guerra, Jan., 1844; -Mar., 1845. Mateos, Hist. Parl., v, 98. Bandini, Calif., 138. =13=Jones -to Pakenham, Nov. 30, 1841. Loewenstern, Le Mexique, 84. =13=Diaz to -Barron, Sept. 29, 1845. London _Chronicle_, Aug. 13, 1845. =47=Wood to -Bancroft, June 4, 1846. St. Louis _Reveille_ (weekly), May 18, 1846. -=77=Arrangoiz, Jan. 9; Sept. 17, 1842; nos. 64, res., 1844; 70, res., -76, res., 101, res., 1845. Gordon, Aberdeen, 183. Forbes, Calif., -146-52. Bulletin de la Soc. de Geog., no. 77, p. 186. Castanares, -Documentos. Colton, Three Years, 20, 22, 32. _Argonaut_, Feb. 2, 1878 -(Sutter's diary). Sherman Letters, 43-4. =13=Forbes to Barron, Aug. -9; Sept. 5, 1844; Jan. 27; Mar. 10, 1845. Ho. 70; 30, 1, pp. 7-8, 42. -=75=P. Pico, July 1, 1845; Feb. 13, 1846. =75=Covarrubias, Apr. 5, -1846. =75=Sanchez, Apr. 2, 1846. =75=Calif. Commission, Aug. 10, 1846. -_Reforma_, Feb. 10, 1846. =122=Bidwell, Calif., 119, 123. =3=Alvarado, -Calif., v, 129. _Revue des Deux Mondes_, Dec. 15, 1845, p. 1037. -Richman, Calif., 273-9. =334=Torres, Peripecias, 49. Blackmar, Span. -Instits., 10-12. Walpole, Four Years, ii, 205. N. Y. _Journ. Commerce_, -Dec. 30, 1846. =11=Cyprey to Guizot, no. 58, 1841. Wilkes, Narrative, v, -171. =13=Aberdeen to Bankhead, no. 53, 1844. Sen. 7; 30, 1. =52=Larkin, -Calif, prior to 1846 (Cons. letters, Monterey, i, 1). Dana, Two Years, -90-1, 200. (Prussia) =52=Everett, no. 284, confid., Mar. 28, 1845. And -from =76= the following. To gov. Calif., Apr. 1, 1845; May 9, 1846. -Tellez, Mar. 23, 1846. Alvarez, Mar. 17, 1846. Guerra, circular, Apr. -1, 1845. Comte. gen. Iguala, Mar. 13, 1846. Mora y Villamil, Nov. 15, -1845. Bustamante, Nov. 13, 1845. J. Castro, memo., undated. _Id._, Oct. -6, 1845. Castanares, Jan. 27, 1846. Estado, Monterey, June 15, 1845. -Castro and Alvarado, May 30, 1845. Sutter to Mex. commr., Nov. 19, 1845. -Castaneda to P. Pico, Feb. 10, 1846. Carrera, Apr. 8, 1846. - -16.10. _Interest of the American people in California._ =13=Pakenham, -no. 63, 1841. N. Orl. _Commercial Bulletin_, Feb. 19, 1840; May 21; -Oct. 12, 1841. London _Times_, June 18, 1841; Aug. 1, 1845. N. Y. -_Journ. Commerce_, Oct. 9, 1841; Feb. 23, 1842. St. Louis _Reveille_, -Sept. 17, 1845. Wash. _Globe_, Feb. 27; Aug. 23; Oct. 21; Nov. 4, 1845. -Nashville _Union_, Mar. 13, 1845. Memphis _Eagle_, May 2; Nov. 5, -1845. N. Orl. _Picayune_, Apr. 21, 1842; Apr. 5, 1844; Nov. 25, 1845; -Mar. 31, 1846. =13=Bankhead, no. 113, 1845. Savannah _Republican_, -Apr. 25, 1845. N. Orl. _Courier_, Feb. 17, 1840; Apr. 26; July 10, -1845. _American Review_, Jan., 1846, 82-99. _Diario_, Nov. 3, 1845. -Charleston _Courier_, July 11, 1845. _Journal des Debats_, June 1, 1846. -Richmond _Enquirer_, Sept. 12, 1845. Balt. _Clipper_, Mar. 2, 1840. -N. Y. _Herald_, Feb. 22, 1845. (Regulations) =52=Larkin, no. 8, June -24, 1844. Charleston _Mercury_, Feb. 24, 1845. N. Orl. _Bee_, Apr. 19, -1842. Phila. _North American_, Nov. 1, 1845. N. Y. _Tribune_, Apr. 5, -1845. Forbes, Calif., 147-8. Dana, Two Years, 200. _Southwestern Hist. -Qtrly._, xviii, nos. 1-3 (R. G. Cleland). (Whalers) _Hunt's Merchants' -Mag._, Jan., 1845. _Cong. Globe_, 29, 1, p. 197 (Allen); app., Hunter, -Jan. 10, 1846. Sen. 33; 30, 1, p. 98. =77=Almonte, no. 84, P., July 16, -1844. =77=Arrangoiz, 71, res., May 12, 1845. - -16.11. _Views and policy of U. S. government._ Ho. 42; 25, 1, p. -18 (Forsyth, Aug. 6, 1835). =52=Ellis, Sept. 24, 1836. =108=Hooper -to Bancroft, June 25, 1846. =52=Slidell, no. 3, Dec. 17, 1845. -=13=Pakenham, nos. 43, 1833; 63, 91, 1841. =13=Forbes, no. 2, Jan. 26, -1846. London _Times_, June 18, 1841; Aug. 6; Sept. 9; Oct. 6; Nov. 19, -1845; Apr. 11, 1846. =77=Mex. commrs., Feb. 16, 1842. =52=Larkin to -Stearns et al., Apr. 17, 1846. _Journal des_ _Debats_, July 10, 1843; -Jan. 12; June 1, 1846. Mexico a traves, iv, 399. Wash. _Globe_, Feb. -27, 1845. =52=Everett, no. 284, confid., Mar. 28, 1845. =52=Shannon, -Jan. 9, 1845. Gilmer in U. S. Ho. Repres., Jan. 28, 1843. N. Y. -_Courier and Enquirer_, Nov. 17, 1845. =77=Almonte, no. 4, res., Jan. -10, 1843; 84, P., July 16, 1844. =52=Thompson, nos. 1, Apr. 29; 4 July -30, 1842. =56=W. S. Parrott, May 13; Sept. 2, 1845. _Constitutionnel_, -Oct. 13, 1844; Mar. 29, 1845; July 9, 1846. _National_, Sept. 4, 1845. -=52=Wickliffe to Buchanan, private, [June] 3, 1845. N. Y. _Journ. -Commerce_, Feb. 23, 1842. Harvey, Webster, 203-4. =52=Buchanan to -Slidell, no. 1, Nov. 10, 1845. Adams, Mems., xi, 346, 355. Curtis, -Webster, ii, 250. Forbes to Barron, Mar. 10, 1845. _Nat. Intelligencer_, -Apr. 19. Buchanan to Larkin, Oct. 17, 1845. Charleston _Mercury_, July -12, 1845. Charleston _Courier_, Nov. 12, 1845. Forbes, Calif., 149. -Mofras, Exploration, i, 517. Smith, Annex. of Texas, 109. Polk, Diary, -Oct. 24, 1845. St. Louis _Reveille_, Apr. 29, 1846. Bustamante, Nuevo -Bernal, i, 45. =247=Hastings to Larkin, Mar. 3, 1846. =247=Allerton to -Larkin, Mar. 4, 1846. =247=Sutter to Larkin, Oct. 3, 1845. =1=Allen in -U. S. Sen., Aug. 6, 1846. _Revue des Deux Mondes_, Dec. 15, 1845, pp. -1037, 1043. Vallejo, Documentos. Van Tyne, Letters of Webster, 269. -_Texas Review_, Jan., 1917, p. 217 (Barker). Schafer, Pac. Slope, 229. -Reeves, Amer. Diplomacy, 280-1. =52=Flower to Van Buren, Feb. 8, 1840. -=52=Kelley to Webster, Jan. 2, 1842. Kelsey, Consulate, 7, 35, etc. -=52=Larkin, nos. 8, June 24; 9, Aug. 18, 1844; Mar. 22; 25, July 10; 26, -Sept. 29; 29, Dec. 31, 1845; 37, Mar. 9; 42, Apr. 17; 44, June 1, 1846. -Webster, Writings, xviii, 203-4. N. Orl. _Picayune_, Nov. 25, 1845. -Jameson, Calhoun Corres., 978. =351=Thompson to Webster, Jan. 30, 1843. -_Monitor Repub._, Apr. 16, 1846. Royce, Calif., 38-9. =122=Bidwell, -Calif., 138. Richardson, Messages, iv, 398, 539-40. Richmond _Enquirer_, -Sept. 12, 1845. =77=Arrangoiz, no. 41, res., Feb. 28, 1845. =13=Crampton -to Palmerston, no. 63, 1848. London _Chronicle_, Aug. 13, 1845. -_Democratic Review_, July, 1845, p. 9. =48=Bancroft to Sloat, Mar. 21, -secret and confid., Oct. 17, 1845. _Southwestern Hist. Qtrly._, xviii, -nos. 1-3 (R. G. Cleland). Meade, Letters, i, 65. - -16.12. For the facts merely alluded to here see pp. 127-8, 130-4. -(Virtually forbid) chap. iv, note 24. Polk's announcement that he -should endeavor to obtain California (Schouler, United States, iv, -498) is sufficiently explained by his attempts to purchase it. When he -determined to lay our grievances before Congress, it is not certain -that he expected war to result. He seems to have felt that a determined -stand on our part might bring Mexico to terms. And his promptly taking -advantage of the rights conferred by the state of war to occupy the -territory and bar out foreign interference counts for nothing as proof -that he brought on the war for the alleged purpose. See _e.g._ Von -Holst, U. S., iii, 266. - -[16.13. Bancroft's history of California, which at times is rather free -in its conclusions, denies that such a meeting was held (Pacific States, -xvii, 61-2). His principal reasons are lack of corroborative evidence, -the silence of Larkin, and the inconsistencies in the accounts of it. -But (1) we have corroborative evidence from several persons; (2) Larkin -may not have wished to mention a confidential talk held under his own -roof--especially as it accomplished nothing; and (3) inconsistencies are -found in the accounts of many events. On the other hand some accounts of -the meeting have no doubt been exaggerated and embellished. - -16.14. Bancroft (Pacific States, xvii, 200) says there is no evidence -that Gillespie had official relations with Sloat; but Sloat's -=47=report, February 25, 1846, said that in accordance with "the verbal -orders he delivered me," Gillespie was immediately sent forward. - -<p>16.15. Although no formal meeting took place at Santa Barbara, Capt. -Blake, of the British warship _Juno_, who went there, was appealed -to for protection on the ground that Mexico and England were allied -nations (=12=Seymour to Admiralty, Aug. 27, 1846). Some proposed, -should England refuse it, to address France. About this time an Irish -priest named McNamara arrived in a British vessel with a grand scheme -of colonization, and obtained an immense grant of land. The scheme -was much talked about, but signified nothing. The grant was illegally -made. Mexico, though she treated McNamara pleasantly did not endorse -the plan, and in all probability would not have confirmed such a grant, -had California remained under her jurisdiction, for she was extremely -suspicious of England, and could see that 10,000 British colonists would -be a dangerous element. Indeed, McNamara was suspected at Mexico of -acting in the interest of England. A few of the documents bearing on -this subject are: Ramirez, Mex., 246; Ho. 17; 31, 1 (Halleck, Cuevas, -Castillo y Lanzas); Bancroft, Pac. States, xvii, 215-23; Sen. Report 75; -30, 1 (testimony of Fremont and others; the McNamara papers); Royce, -California, 166; =52=Larkin, no. 56, Aug. 22, 1846; =335=McNamara, -proposition, May 17, 1845. - -16.16. _Politics in California, Jan.-June, 1846._ =13=Jones to Pakenham, -Nov. 30, 1841. =108=Hooper to Bancroft, June 25, 1846. =13=Forbes, no. -2, Jan. 26, 1846. Boston _Advertiser_, May 27, 1843. =13=Forbes to -Barron, Sept. 5, 1844; Jan. 27; Mar. 10, 1845. =13=To Barron, Dec. 31, -1844. _Diario_, Aug. 21, 1845. =52=J. Castro to P. Pico, June 8, 1846. -=12=Blake to Seymour, July 5, 1846. =52=Larkin to Stearns _et al._, Apr. -17, 1846. =13=To Bankhead, no. 53, 1844. =47=Sloat to Bancroft, Feb. -25, 1846. =47=Wood to Bancroft, June 4, 1846. =12=Seymour to admty., -Aug. 27, 1846. Colton, Three Years, 429. =247=Stearns to Larkin, May -14, 1846. =13=Forbes to Calif. govt., Jan. 28, 1846. =13=Seymour to -Bankhead, June 13, 1846. =13=Pico to Forbes, June 29, 1846. =13=Barron, -Aug. 12, 1846. =52=Military junta, Monterey, Apr. 11, 1846. =52=Larkin -to Gillespie, Apr. 23, 1846. =52=Larkin, circular (in Spanish). -Sherman Letters, 43. =13=J. A. to A. Forbes, July 9, 1846. Sen. 18; -31, 1, p. 574 (Stevenson). =75=P. Pico to Relaciones, Feb. 13, 1846. -=75=Covarrubias to Relaciones, Apr. 5, 1846. =75=Sanchez to Relac., Apr. -2, 1846. Bancroft, Pacific States, xvii, 41-75, 215-22. =247=Allerton -to Larkin, Mar. 4, 1846. =247=Larkin to Bennett, May 26, 1846; to -Stearns, May 24, 1846. =247=Stearns to Larkin, June 12, 1846. Revere, -Tour, 24. Buchanan to Larkin, Oct. 17, 1845. =122=Bidwell, Calif., -138, 147, 151. Alvarado, Calif., v, 129-43, 222, 241. =126=Botello, -Anales, 133, 136. Phelps, Fore and Aft, 284. _Amer. Hist. Rev._, xiv, -88-9. Richman, Calif., 316, 474. Ramirez, Mexico, 246. Lancey, Cruise. -=343=Vallejo, Documentos. =334=Torres, Peripecias, 48-9. Walpole, Four -Years, ii, 208. Ho. 17; 31, 1, p. 121. Hall, S. Jose 143. Sen. 33; 30, -1, p. 377. McGroarty, Calif., 190-1. Sen. Report, 75; 30, 1, pp. 12, -16 (Fremont), 19, 31, 33 (Gillespie), 37 (Hensley), 44 (Minor), 46 -(Childs). Sherman, Sloat, 56, xv. =263=Mervine to Sloat, July 1, 1846. -Swasey, Early Days, 57, 81. _Cong. Globe_, 30, 1, pp. 604-7 (Benton). -Willey, Transition Period, 19. Kelsey, Consulate, 45, 51. Royce, Calif., -36, 166. =123=Bidwell, statement. =52=Larkin, Calif. prior to 1846 -(Consular letters, Monterey, i, 1). =52=_Id>._, nos. 4, Apr. 16; 9, -Aug. 18, 1844; 20, Mar. 24; 26, Sept. 29, 1845; 39, Apr. 2; 42, Apr. -17; 44, June 1; 48, June 18; 54, July 20; 56, Aug. 22, 1846; 63, Jan. -14, 1847. =13=Crampton to Palmerston, nos. 35, 63, 1848. =76=P. Pico to -Relac., June 29, 1846. =76=_Id._, proclams., May [13]; June 23, 1846. -=76=Vallejo, Nov. 24, 1845. =76=Pico, May 25, 1846. =76=J. Castro, Mar. -5; Apr. 1, 2; May 30, 1846. =76=Castro and Alvarado, May 30, 1845. - - - XVII. THE CONQUEST OF CALIFORNIA - -17.1. _Fremont's clash with Castro._ =13=Forbes to Barron, -Jan. 26. Sen. 1; 29, 2, pp. 50-1. Benton, View, ii, 580, 688. -=67=Abert to Fremont, Feb. 12, 1845. =13=Pakenham, no. -130, 1846. =13=Forbes to Calif. govt., Feb. 28. =62=Adj. -gen. to Benton, Nov. 2, 1847. =75=J. Castro to P. Pico, Jan. -30, 1846. =75=Fremont to J. Castro, Jan. 29. =247=Larkin's -memoranda and correspondence with Fremont and others on the subject. -=52=_Id._, nos. 36, 38, Mar. 5, 27; 41, Apr. 17, 1846; 63, Jan. 14, -1847. =3=Alvarado, Hist. de Calif., 239. Phelps, Fore and Aft, 279. -Bancroft, Pac. States, xvii, 4-23. Fremont, Mems., i, 454-70. _Id._, -Geog. Memoir. _Niles_, Nov. 21, 1846, pp. 188-9. _Diario_, Apr. 24. Sen. -33; 30, 1, pp. 372-4 (Fremont here states that he was given permission -to explore south of the Colorado, and was on his way to do so when -stopped by Castro. This permission does not appear in the documents of -March, 1846. It may have been given very incidentally, and this may have -been the cause of the trouble). Bandini, Calif., 139. Sen. Report 75; -30, 1, pp. 12, 16. Richman, Calif., 308. Tuthill, Calif., 163. Sherman, -Sloat, xv. _Cong. Globe_, 30, 1, pp. 604-5. Kelsey, Consulate, 96. -=76=Castro, Mar. 6; Apr. 1. =76=Larkin to alcalde, Mar. 10. -_Journ. Mil. Serv. Instit._, xxxi, 711. - -Rives (U. S. and Mexico, ii, 172-3) decides roundly against Fremont, -and cites for support a letter from the prefect to Larkin demanding the -reason for Fremont's movements; but it was perfectly in accord with -Mexican methods that such a letter should have been written purely to -satisfy the authorities at Mexico. - -17.2. _Gillespie's mission._ _Cong. Globe_, 30, 1, p. 605. -=247=Gillespie to Larkin, May 24. =13=J. A. to A. Forbes, July -9. Polk, Diary, Oct. 30, 1845. =247=Leidesdorff to Larkin, Apr. -25, 1846. Buchanan to Larkin, Oct. 17, 1845. _Atlantic Monthly_, Oct., -1890, pp. 548, etc. Sen. 33; 30, 1, 373. Ho. Report 817; 30, 1. Sen. -Report 75; 30, 1, pp. 12, 30. Fremont, Mems., i, 489. _Century Mag._, -N. S., xix, 923. Calif. Hist. Soc. Papers, i, pt. 1 (1887), pp. 69-72. -=52=Larkin, no. 44, June 1. =52=_Id._ to Stearns _et al._, -Apr. 17. Benton, View, ii, 689. Cooke, Conquest, 203-4. Royce, Bidwell. - -Gillespie took to Fremont a letter of introduction from Buchanan and -letters from Fremont's father-in-law, Senator Benton. The former -was entirely non-committal; and the latter, while very likely they -contained veiled allusions to conversations in which the desire of the -administration to acquire California had been mentioned, must have been -like it in that respect, else Gillespie would not have dared to carry -them through Mexico. - -17.3. The evidence on this point, including Fremont's positive -statements made not long after the event, is conclusive (Polk, Diary, -March 21, 1848; Senate Report 75; 30, 1, pp. 13, 32; =132=Benton, -Feb. 18, 1848; Ho. Report 817; 30, 1, p. 4; =52=Larkin to P. Pico, -July 5, 1846. Speaking in the Senate, April 10, 1848 (_Cong. Globe_, -30, 1, p. 604), Benton, though feeling extremely bitter toward Polk -and no doubt fully informed by his son-in-law and client regarding all -the facts, did not intimate that any instructions inconsistent with -the instructions of Larkin were sent to Fremont. Indeed he stated the -contrary. See also his Thirty Years View, ii, 689. - -17.4. Fremont stated before a committee of the Senate that he had -learned from Bancroft that Polk's plan, in case of war, contemplated the -occupation of California; but Fremont wrote to Capt. Montgomery of the -_Portsmouth_, June 16, 1846, that even in the case of war he was not -expected to prosecute "active hostilities." In 1886 Bancroft stated that -Gillespie was to inform Fremont of the President's intentions. - -17.5. First, many of the settlers had ample reasons to feel -alarmed: the illegality of their presence; Castro's sudden and cruel -seizure of Americans in 1840; his attack upon Fremont in violation -(the Americans believed) of a promise; official notices, issued about -May 1, to the effect that the majority of the Americans were liable to -be expelled at the convenience of the authorities; Castro's warlike -preparations; his talk of moving against the immigrants with armed -forces (=52=Larkin, no. 42, April 17); and reports, more or less -authentic and reliable, from various persons regarding what he said or -intended. Secondly, the contemporary testimony of Fremont, Gillespie and -other Americans--some of it given under oath--that alarm was actually -felt is too strong to be rejected (see note 6). Much has been made of -Bidwell, a clerk of Sutter's, who tells us that alarm was not felt. But -(1) his =123=Statement was made thirty years after the events; (2) -he admits that he was not on good terms with Fremont, and the Statement -aims to show that Fremont invented the story of alarm as an excuse for -his conduct; (3) his Statement is in other respects clearly inaccurate; -(4) it assumes that he knew the sentiments of all the persons on the -Sacramento, yet proves that an important fact may have been known to -but few; (5) it shows that at the critical time he was absent in the -mountains; (6) it says, "Californians were always talking of expelling -Americans" [and therefore were talking of it in April, 1846]; (7) -his book mentions that in 1845 an attack upon New Helvetia was so -confidently expected that he rode day and night to warn Sutter; (8) he -undertakes to disprove positive testimony with negative. The legitimate -settlers had no direct occasion to feel alarmed; but, as Bidwell himself -points out, they could not have held aloof, had an attempt been made to -expel their fellow-countrymen. It would be a mistake to suppose that the -Americans who joined Fremont in these operations were actuated solely by -patriotism and the idea of self-defence. - -17.6. _The Bear movement._ (Starred citations refer, among other -facts, to the alarm felt by Americans.) *=12=Blake of _Juno_ to -Seymour, July 5. Benton, View, ii, 691. =12=Seymour to admty., -Aug. 27, 1846. =75=M. Castro to Calif. govt., Jan. 29. _Niles_, -Nov. 21, 1846, p. 191; Oct. 16, 1847, p. 110. Colton, Three Years, -175. Cooke, Conquest, 204-11. =13=J. A. to A. Forbes, July 9, -14. =13=P. Pico to J. A. Forbes, June 29. =52=M. Castro to -----, [Apr. 30]. =52=Larkin to M. Castro, June 14. *=52=Ide, -proclams., June 15, 18. =52=J. Castro, proclams., June 17. -=52=P. Pico, proclam., June 23. =52=_Id_. to Larkin, June 29. -Sen. 1; 29, 2, pp. 51-2. Buchanan to Larkin, Oct. 17, 1845. =52=J. -Castro to Larkin, undated. =247=Larkin to Stearns, Apr. 17. -=52=Larkin to Pico, July 5. =48=Bancroft to Sloat, June 24; -Oct. 17, 1845. =123=Bidwell, statement. Royce, Bidwell. Willey, -Thirty Years, 10. =256=Marcy to Wetmore, Dec. 5, 12. McGroarty, -Calif., 192. Bancroft, Pac. States, xvii, 39-48, 101-86, 199. Apuntes, -353-4. =247=Gillespie to Larkin, May 24; June 7. =247=Larkin -to Mott, Talbot & Co., June 18. Peters, Kit Carson, 269. -=247=Leidesdorff to Larkin, Mar. 19; June 19. =247=Montgomery -to Larkin, July 2. =247=Vallejo to Larkin, Sept. 15; to J. Castro, -July 23. =122=Bidwell, Calif., *141-2, 161, etc. *=3=Alvarado, -Calif., 184. *Phelps, Fore and Aft, 279, 284, 291. Oakland (Cal.) -_Tribune_, June 30, 1914. *Richman, California, 308-14. =249=Leese, -Bear Flag Papers, 9. =105=Baldridge, Days of 1846. _Diario_, -Dec. 27, 1846. *Colton, Deck and Port, 389. =247=Guerrero to -Leidesdorff, Apr. 30. =314=Sawyer papers. Polk, Diary, Sept. 1. -_Niles_, Nov. 14, 1846, p. 174; Nov. 21, p. 191 (Fremont to Benton, -July "25"); Oct. 16, 1847, p. 110 (Fremont's declaration of June 6). -*Upham, Fremont, 228. _Century Mag._, N. S., xix, 1917 (Mrs. F.), 780 -(Royce), 782. Schafer, Pacific Slope, 258. =263=Mervine to Sloat, -July 1. _Cong. Globe_, 30, 1, p. 606 (Benton). =52=Larkin, Calif, -prior to 1846. *Sen. 33; 30, 1, p. 374. Ho. Report, 817, 30, 1, p. 4. -Bandini, Calif., 142. Revere, Tour, 64. *Sen. Report, 75; 30, 1, pp. -12, 13, 25-9, 32-4, 38-40. *Sherman, Sloat, xv (Gillespie's note). -*Swasey, Early Days, 49. _Nat. Intelligencer_, Nov. 11. *Willey, -Transition Period, 39, 42. Kelsey, Consulate, 15, 72. Royce, Calif., -132. _Atlantic Monthly_, Oct., 1890, pp. 548-57. =52=Larkin, nos. -*41, Apr. 17; *48, June 18; 53, July 18; 54, July 20, 1846; 63, Jan. -14, 1847. *Californian, i, nos. 3-5. =76=Pico to Relac., June 29. -=76=Pico, procl., June 23. =76=M. Castro to Pico, June 19. -=76=Alvarado, June 28. =76=Narvaez (undated). *_Journ. Mil. -Serv. Instit._, xxxi, 715. - -17.7. As Sloat was in personal intercourse with Gillespie about Feb. -20-22, he probably learned from him something more about the intentions -of our government. - -17.8. =48=Oct. 17, 1845, Bancroft wrote to Sloat, "In the event -of actual hostilities between the Mexican Government and our own," you -will carry out "the instructions [of June 24] forwarded to you from -the Dept. in view of such a contingency." Rives (U. S. and Mexico, ii, -168) draws a sharp distinction between the "actual hostilities" of this -order and the "declaration of war" of June 24. But (1) Bancroft said, -Oct. 17, "actual hostilities" [not between forces in the field but -between the two governments; and (2) in his last quoted words above he -indicated that the two orders contemplated precisely the same [not, as -Rives holds, a different] contingency. As, therefore, the order of June -24 was the formal and fundamental one, Sloat had a technical ground for -falling back upon it, whereas an officer of broad, clear views, decided -character and unselfish loyalty would have acted more promptly, even -at a slight personal risk. To do him justice, the reader should recall -that many Senators refused to believe that the border hostilities were -hostilities between the two governments (p. 182); and also that Sloat -was old and not robust, and that he had the case of T. A. C. Jones -before his eyes. - -17.9. We find both July 1 and 2 given as the date of his arrival. -The log book of his vessel says that she anchored at Monterey July 1, -and that Larkin came aboard July 2. As he would have gone aboard as soon -as possible, it seems probable that the vessel arrived July 1 at night. - -17.10. Capt. Mervine wrote, July 6, to Capt. Montgomery that Larkin -believed Castro, Pico and others would meet the following day to -deliberate about declaring independence and hoisting the American flag. - -17.11. Sloat stated later that he acted on his own responsibility in -taking possession of California; and in fact the orders of May 13 did -not reach their destination until about August 28 (Ho. 60; 30, 1, p. -229). - -17.12. It has been said (Bancroft, Pacific States, xvii, 250) -that Sloat merely pretended to have based his action on Fremont's -operations, so as to have a way of escape should he be blamed; but (1) -we should not without evidence accuse him of lying, (2) he showed strong -feeling when he learned that Fremont had acted without authority (_e.g._ -Baldridge, Days of 1846; Sen. 33; 30, 1, p. 178), and (3) as a rational -man he could not fail to be influenced greatly. Bancroft says (_ibid._, -227) that Sloat learned from Larkin that Fremont's cooperation with the -insurgents was not certain; but he admits (_ibid._, 228-9) that on July -5 a launch from the _Portsmouth_, then lying at San Francisco, brought -proof that Fremont was so doing; and the next day Sloat and Larkin, -according to the log book of the _Savannah_, were busy preparing the -proclamation, etc. Royce (California, 158) places against Fremont's -testimony (that Sloat said his action had resulted from Fremont's) the -fact that Larkin did not so state; but silence is not equal in strength -to assertion, and Fremont is supported by Gillespie (Sen. Report 75; -30, 1, p. 32), by Wilson of the _Savannah_ (_ibid._, 41), by Sloat's -private secretary (Baldridge, Days of 1846), by Sloat's anxiety to -obtain Fremont's cooperation, and by the resentment that he exhibited -on finding that Fremont had acted without authority (Sen. 33; 30, 1, p. -178). See also Benton, Abr. Deb., xvi, 17. - -17.13. August 27, 1846, =12=Seymour wrote to the Admiralty: "My -principal object has been, for many months, to be at hand to prevent -or retard it [the American occupation of California], if I should be -directed to take any proceedings for these purposes." It was presumably -to wait for orders that he placed himself at San Blas. What led him -to sail for Monterey, however, as he did on June 14, was not Sloat's -leaving Mazatlan, but news that the Santa Barbara convention was likely -to declare for independence (=13=Seymour to Bankhead, June 13). -Had that been done, he would have felt that he had a ground on which -to oppose American occupation, though he thought that a large body of -reliable colonists would be necessary to establish British ascendancy -(=12=_Id._, Aug. 27). When he arrived at Monterey he was aware that -the United States and Mexico were at war, and this was in his opinion -an additional reason for inaction (=12=_Id._, Aug. 27); but he -wrote to Pico that American occupation should be regarded as merely -provisional (=12=to Pico, July 23). Sir Thomas Johnson, commanding -a British sloop-of-war off Mazatlan, showed his sympathies by constantly -giving the Mexicans information about our vessels (=76=Gutierrez, -Apr. 8, 1846, res.). - -17.14. Sloat also guaranteed land titles. This was impracticable. In -annexing California he exceeded his authority. - -17.15. _Sloat's operations, etc._ =47=Sloat, Nov. 19; Dec. 3, 1845; -Feb. 25; Mar. 17; Apr. 8, 30; May 31; June 6, 1846. =47=_Id._ to -Howison, Apr. 1, 1846; to Montgomery, Apr. 1. =47=Wood to Bancroft, -June 4. Benton, View, ii, 692. Bulletin de la Soc. de Geog., no. -77. =12=Seymour to admty., no. 47, Aug. 27, 1846; to Pico, July 23. -Dana, Two Years, 78-9, 90. Sherman, Address. Wise, Gringos, 47. Ho. -60; 30, 1, pp. 258-64. =247=Sloat to Larkin, May 18. =247=Larkin to -Stearns, Aug. --. N. Y. _Herald_, Mar. 4, 1880. Davis, Sixty Years, -196. Hist. Soc. of So. Calif., viii, 77 (Barrows). =47=Conner, Oct. -9, 1846. =13=Seymour to Bankhead, June 13. =13=A. Forbes to Bankhead, -Aug. 1. =13=J. A. Forbes to A. Forbes, July 14. =52=J. Parrott, June -4. =13=Letter from Mazatlan, Aug. 4. =13=Seymour to J. A. Forbes, -July 22. =52=Larkin to J. Castro, July 8; reply July 9. =52=_Id._ -to Alvarado, July 8; reply, July 9. =142=Carson, recolls. =52=Sloat, -gen. orders, July 14. =47=Conner, Aug. 26. =48-9=Bancroft to Sloat, -June 24; Oct. 17, 1845; May 13, 15; June 8; July 12; Aug. 13 (two), -1846. =108=J. Parrott to Buchanan, private, July 23, 1846. Duflot de -Mofras, Explor., i, 400-6. Sen. 1; 29, 2, pp. 378-9. Bancroft, Pac. -States, xvii, 204, etc. =247=Larkin to Ten Eyck, Sept. 19. =247=Frazer -to Larkin, Aug. 27. =4=Amador, mems., 169. =247=Atherton to Larkin, -Dec. 3. =3=Alvarado, Hist., 214-9. Proceeds. U. S. Naval Institute, -1888, pp. 539-40. Bennett, Steam Navy, 91. N. Orl. _Picayune_, Oct. -23, 1848. Sherman, Sloat, _passim_. =120=Fauntleroy to Biddle, Mar. -12, 1847. Phelps, Fore and Aft, 291. Richman, Calif., 315. Mexico a -traves, iv, 643-4. _Diario_, Aug. 16; Oct. 16, 1846. =106=Lancey, -cruise (logbook of _Savannah_). =105=Baldridge, Days of 1846. Walpole, -Four Years, ii, 204. Wash. _Union_, Sept. 24; Oct. 3, 26. Ho. 1; 30, 2, -pp. 1013-4, 1019-20. Dunbar, Romance, 38. Sherman, Home Letters, 85. -_Niles_, Oct. 10, 1846, p. 87. Sen. Report 75; 30, 1, pp. 13, 32, 40, -44, 70-4. _Century Mag._, N. S., xviii, 794. N. Y. _Nation_, xlviii, -141. Hittell, Calif., ii, 466. =295=Pinto, Apuntaciones, 104. Sen. 33; -30, 1, pp. 374, 377. Ho. Rep. 817; 30, 1, pp. 4-5. Ho. 4; 29, 2, pp. -649-67. Revere, Tour, 55, 77. Fremont, Mems., 534, 539. =172=_Cyane_ -log book. =263=Mervine, letter book. Swasey, Early Days, 60. _Cong. -Globe_, 30, 1, pp. 606-7. Royce, Calif., 157-61. =52=Larkin, nos. 1 -(descript. of Calif.); 52, July 10; 53, July 18; 54 and 55, July 20. -=76=Gutierrez, no. 42, res., Apr. 8. =76=To Castro, May 9; July 25. -=76=To comte. gen. Sonora, July 25. =76=To min. of eccles. affrs., July -25. =76=Monterey estado, Apr. 1. =76=S. Anna, Oct. 30. - -17.16. Stockton sailed from Norfolk on the _Congress_ in October, -1845. Some mystery has been attached to his sealed orders (Bancroft, -Pacific States, xvii, 251); but they were merely to sail _via_ the -Sandwich Islands for Monterey, deliver the original of the despatch of -October 17 to Larkin, and then join Sloat's squadron. For his character -see _e.g._ Royce, California, 179; =330=Taylor to brother, January -19, 1848; =108=Appleton to Bancroft, April 27, 1847; Porter, -Kearny, 6, 7; Sherman, Home Letters, 108; Quincy, Figures, 230-40. - -17.17. One aim of the proclamation was doubtless to provide a way -of escape for the United States and its agents in case there should -be no war, but even from this point of view it was ridiculous. Sloat -repudiated the reasons for his action that were ascribed to him by -Stockton. - -17.18. Castro and the Californians generally did not believe that -war had been declared, and of course Larkin's letter to Stearns tended -to confirm their opinion. Had it proved correct, Stockton would soon -have been making apologies like T. A. C. Jones. This may help to explain -Castro's firm attitude. The Life of Stockton attempts to explain his -haughty and menacing language as due to Castro's military preponderance -and the necessity of intimidating him. Stockton himself said later that, -as Castro had no authority from the central government to make terms, it -would have been useless to treat with him; but Castro could have laid -down his arms, and that was the vital point just then. Stockton's other -reasons (Ho. 1; 30, 2, pp. 1041-2) are equally unsatisfactory. Bancroft -(Pacific States, xvii, 269) expresses the belief that Stockton did not -wish to make terms with Castro and the other officials, but to eliminate -them. This is quite possible. Probably temperament and thirst for glory -counted. Stockton's pretence (in his reply to Castro) that since the two -countries were at war, he could not suspend hostilities until Castro -should raise the American flag, was absurd. Truces have often been made -during war, and never during peace. This was enough--especially as it -came after Larkin's overture--to show Castro he could expect nothing -from Stockton. - -17.19. =76=Later Castro complained bitterly that after -forsaking all for Mexico he had to beg for bread. - -17.20. _Stockton's regime to Sept._ 30. Memoria de ... Relaciones, -Dec., 1846. Colton, Three Years, 16, 25, 28-9, 32, 56, 175, 180. -Cooke, Conquest, 213-6. Ho. 60; 30, 1, pp. 265-8. =247=Larkin to -Stearns, Aug.--, 1846. =61=R. B. Mason, Sept. 23, 1847. Sec. navy -to Stockton, Aug. 18, 1846. =13=J. A. to A. Forbes, July 14; Sept. -22, 1846. =13=Seymour to Bankhead, July 22, 1846. _Californian_, -i, no. 1. =47=Stockton, proclam., Aug. 22. =47=_Id._ to -Fremont, July 23; Aug. 24, 1846. =47=Flores to Stockton, Aug. 7. -=47=Stockton to Bancroft, July 25; Aug. 22; Sept. 19; Oct. 1; Nov. -23. _Id._ to Mervine, Sept. 19. Bancroft to Sloat, Aug. 13. Mason to -Stockton, Nov. 5, 1846; Jan. 11, 1847. Bancroft to Stockton, Oct. 17, -1845. =108=Appleton to Bancroft, Apr. 27, 1847. Wise, Gringos, -50, 70. Royce, Bidwell. Sen. 1; 29, 2, pp. 52, 379. Sen. 31; 30, 2, -pp. 1-3. Bancroft, Pacific States, xvii, 143. =4=Amador, mems., -169. =115=Belden, statement, 48. =3=Alvarado, Calif., v, -239-41. =161=Journal of the _Congress_, 1846. =171=Journal -of the _Cyane_, 1846. Cutts, Conquest, 125. Phelps, Fore and Aft, 299, -300. Richman, Calif., 318. =109=Bandini, documentos. Walpole, -Four Years, ii, 215. Sen. 31; 30, 2, pp. 9-14. Wash. _Union_, Oct. 26; -Dec. 4, 1846. =295=Pinto, Apuntaciones, 104. _Diario_, Oct. 16. -Statement to the author by Asst. Sec. of the navy Roosevelt. Sherman, -Home Letters, 108. Du Pont, Official Despatches, 1. Quincy, Figures, -230, etc. _Proceeds. of U. S. Naval_ _Instit._, xxiv., pt. 1, 270 -(Neeser). Sen. 33; 30, 1, pp. 10, 83, 109-10, 118-9, 175, 178-83, 374, -377. Ho. 70; 30, 1, pp. 36-41, 43-5. Ho. 4; 29, 2, pp. 657-8. Ho. 1; -30, 2, pp. 1034-42. Ho. 19; 29, 2, p. 104. McGroarty, Calif., 199. -Bandini, Calif., 143. Revere, Tour, 55, 77-80. Sen. Report 75; 30, -1, pp. 17, 47, 51. Ho. Report 817; 30, 1, p. 9. =263=Mervine to -Stockton, Sept. 16. Swasey, Early Days, 73. Porter, Kearny, 6-7. Life -of Stockton, 120-3, 157-8. Bryant, What I Saw, 330, 366. Royce, Calif., -177-84. =123=Bidwell, statement. =52=Larkin, nos. 54, 55, 58, -1846. And the following from =76=. J. Castro, July 13; Sept. 9, -1846; June 5, 1847. To comte. gen. Calif., May 9; July 25. To comte. -gen. Sonora, July 25. Stockton to Castro, Aug. 7. Castro to Stockton, -Aug. 7. _Id._, procls., Aug. 9, 10. _Id._ to consuls, Aug. 9. Moreno to -Bustamante, Mar. 20, 1847. Castaneda to Pico, Feb. 10, 1846. Bustamante -to Castro, June 23, 1847. - -17.21. In a proclamation of October 1 Flores charged that the -Americans were dictating "arbitrary and despotic laws" and crushing -the people with exactions intended to ruin them. His aim was announced -as the expulsion of the Americans. All Mexicans and Californians -15-60 years old, not joining the insurgents, were declared to be -traitors and under penalty of death. All Americans acting directly -or indirectly against the insurgents were to lose their property -and be sent into Mexico as prisoners. It cannot be denied that many -Californians, especially in the north, had been deprived of their -property--particularly horses and saddles--by Fremont's men in the -name of the United States, and that many had suffered personal abuse -(Sen. 33; 30, 1; pp. 97, etc.; Ho. Report, 817; 30, 1; Sen. Report 75; -30, 1; Colton, Three Years, 155). Colton estimated that in all 1200 -Californians were in arms at one time. - -17.22. Flores charged that Gillespie violated the terms and -Gillespie denied this vigorously. Gillespie seems to have interpreted -the terms, which were loosely drawn, with a view to the advantage of his -side, and Flores to have judged largely, if not entirely, from what he -supposed to be Gillespie's intentions. We have not sufficient data to -say more. A misunderstanding was very natural, and possibly Gillespie, -since he was dealing with perjured men, thought it right to take every -advantage he could. Flores sent parties to San Diego and Santa Barbara, -and captured those places. Capt. Merritt of the California Battalion, -commanding at the former place, took refuge on a whale-ship. Lieut. -Talbot, commanding at Santa Barbara, refused to surrender, and with his -eight or ten men made an extremely brave escape through the mountains. - -17.23. At this point Mervine's log book was extremely bitter with -reference to Stockton, whom it described as vain, selfish, cowardly, -false and ignorant of naval life and duties. The Captain was doubtless -smarting under his repulse, due (he asserted) to Stockton's selfishness -in retaining all his field pieces. Stockton explained his going to San -Diego by saying that San Pedro was not a good base, and there was force -in this view; but it was much nearer to Los Angeles, and certainly he -should have decided whether it was a good base before attempting to -use it as such. San Diego had been recovered by Merritt and others -(_Proceeds. U. S. Naval Instit._, 1888, p. 544). Lieut. Minor of the -navy now commanded there. - -17.24. _Kearny's march; battle of S. Pascual._ Colton, Three -Years, 153, 180. Cooke, Conquest, 84-6. Ho. 60; 30, 1, pp. 153, 242. -Hist. Soc. So. Calif., iii, pt. 2, pp. 55-66. =337=Turner, diary. -=61=Kearny to adj. gen., Oct. 3, 11. =62=Marcy to gov. Mo., -June 3. Ho. 41; 30, 1, pp. 551-63, 567-614. =47=Stockton, Feb. 4, -1847. Polk, Diary, May 25, 30; June 2, 1846. =61=Emory to adj. -gen., Feb. 2, 1847. Hughes, Doniphan's Exped., 204-30. =61=Wooster -to adj. gen., Sept. 25, 1846. Apuntes, 359-60. Bidwell, Calif., -200. =126=Botello, Anales, 154-6. Phelps, Fore and Aft, 315. -=177=Davis, statement. =290=Pico, documentos, 105, 115. _Nat. -Intelligencer_, Apr. 23, 1847. _Journal U. S. Artillery_, July, 1892, p. -294; Oct., 1892, p. 413. Sen. 1; 30, 1, pp. 513-6. Sen. 33; 30, 1, pp. -31, 41, 46, 64-5, 129-33, 161, 186-9, 204, 272, 331. McGroarty, Calif., -261. Sen. 7; 30, 1 (Emory). Ho. 1; 30, 2, pp. 236, 1049-50. Sen. 31; 30, -2, pp. 24-7. (Losses) Ho. 24; 31, 1. Peters, Kit Carson, 281. Porter, -Kearny, 14-23. Life of Stockton, 134-6. =76=Flores, Dec. 11, 1846; -Mar. 31, 1847. =207=Griffin, journal. - -Including servants and quartermaster's men, Kearny probably had at -least 150; but precisely how many took part in the fighting one cannot -say--perhaps not more than 80. Some of the men had to guard the baggage -and manage the howitzers, and probably others did not reach the front -in time. The howitzers were tied up with rawhide; when made ready -they could not fire at first because the two parties were mixed in a -hand-to-hand struggle; and when they were preparing to do so later, one -was carried away by frightened mules and captured by the enemy. Botello, -who talked with Pico after the fight, says that Pico was afraid forces -from San Diego would attack him, should he continue to operate against -Kearny, and also that Pico's horses were now too much exhausted to be -serviceable. =207=Griffin thought the Californians drew off to make -sure of keeping the howitzer. It seems clear that Pico did not retire -from fear of Kearny--unless possibly from fear of his guns. Dec. 7 -Kearny advanced a short distance, drove some Californians from a rocky -hill near San Bernardo, and occupied it. In the night of Dec. 10-11 -Lieut. Gray and about 215 men from San Diego reinforced him. Lieut. -Beale of the navy and the scout Christopher ("Kit") Carson made their -way past the enemy with remarkable courage and endurance, to inform -Stockton of Kearny's desperate situation, and arrived just as Gray was -setting out. - -17.25. The troops were all on foot except Gillespie's men. Stockton -had two 9-pounders and four smaller pieces. - -17.26. Only six shells were captured with the howitzer at San -Pascual, and owing to its construction the gun could use no other -ammunition. Flores reported that he had also a 6-pounder, a 3-pounder, -and a 2-pounder (=76=Mar. 31). - -17.27. _The insurrection in the south._ =330=Taylor to brother, -Jan. 19, 1848. Ho. 60; 30, 1, pp. 266-8. Hist. Soc. So. Calif., iii, -pt. 1, pp. 47-54; ix, p. 19. =237=Kearny to Stockton, [Jan. -13, 1847]. =47=Flores, procl., Oct., 1846. =47=_Id._ to -Stockton, Jan. 1, 1847. =47=Stockton to Bancroft, Nov. 23, 1845; -Jan. 11, 15; Feb. 4, 5, 1846. =51=Queen to Henderson, Apr. 30, -1848. =61=R. B. Mason, Oct. 7, 1847. =61=Emory, Feb. 2, -1847. =373=Evans, narrative. =376=Nicholson, recolls. Kell, -Recolls., 29, 80. =12=Admty. records, class 1, 5577, enclosure in -Y 93. Apuntes, 355-61. =247=Gillespie to Larkin, Nov. 29, 1846. -=247=Larkin to wife, Dec. 14, 1846. =115=Belden, statement. -=3=Alvarado, Calif., v, 220, 240, 267-8. =126=Botello, Anales, -140, 158-61. Colton, Three Years, 64, 74, 78, 82, 95, 98, 123, 131, -169-70, 201. _Proceeds. U. S. Naval Instit._, 1888, pp. 139, 539-49. -Phelps, Fore and Aft, 311, 316-19. Parker, Recolls., 50. Richman, -Calif., 317. =334=Torres, Peripecias, 49. =103=Avila, notas. -=258=Marshall, recolls. Upham, Fremont, 258. Morrell, Four Voyages, -201. =171=Journal of the _Cyane_. Wash. _Union_, Apr. 23; May 7; -July 24, 1847. N. Y. _Journ. Commerce_, Apr. 2, 1847. _Diario_, Dec. -1, 1846; Jan. 24, 1847. Sherman, Home Letters, 100. Schafer, Pacific -Slope, 266. Sen. 33; 30, 1, pp. 47-323. Ho. 70; 30, 1, p. 45. Sen. 1; -30, 1, pp. 516-7. Ho. 1; 30, 2, pp. 1045-54, 1065-70. McGroarty, Calif., -246-52. Bandini, Calif., 143, 146. Revere, Tour, 164-6. Sen. 7; 30, 1 -(Emory). Sen. Report 75; 30, 1, pp. 49-52. Sen. 31; 30, 2, pp. 15-20, -22-4, 30-6 (Stockton). =207=Griffin, diary. (Losses) Ho. 24; 31, -1. =172=_Cyane_ log book. =263=Mervine to Stockton, Oct. 25 -(2). _Cong. Globe_, 30, 1, p. 608 (Benton). Porter, Kearny, 7-9, 25-9. -Life of Stockton, 129-48 and appendices. Cutts, Conquest, 156, 197, 203, -207. Bryant, What I Saw, 330. Royce, Calif., 185-94. =47=Stockton -to Bancroft, July 25, 1846. =52=Larkin, no. 63, Jan. 14, 1847. -And from =76= the following. Flores, Sept. 30; Oct. 7, 9, 24, -25, 1846; undated; Jan. 2; Mar. 31 (2), 1847. Carrillo, Oct. 8, 1846. -Gillespie to Flores, Oct. 2 (2), 3 (2), 4. Flores to Gillespie, Oct. -4 (2). Flores-Gillespie, terms of capitulation, Sept. 29. Carrillo to -Flores, Oct. 9. To Flores, Feb. 6, 1847. Bustamante, Mar. 8, 13, 1847. -Moreno to Bust., Mar. 20, 1847. Stockton, procl., Jan. 5, 1847. Flores -to Stockton, Jan. 1, 1847. And others of minor importance. Jan. 9 some -Mexicans charged our front. - -17.28. Fremont's methods were unscrupulous. He promised the men -large pay, and took horses, saddles, etc., where he could get them (Sen. -Report 75; 30, 1, particularly Wilson, p. 42). Probably he intended to -pacify the owners later by paying liberally. Apparently one must accept -the explanation of his policy proposed in the text, or ascribe to him a -tenderness not suggested by his choice of a profession and his conduct -in June, or accuse him--as did many at the time--of a cowardice that -would explain, after all, only a part of the facts. - -17.29. It is particularly singular that Fremont did not use the -_Savannah_ to communicate with Stockton. - -17.30. The reports of Flores show that Fremont's approach -embarrassed the insurgents. Fremont now had six guns. January 10 Kearny -wrote a note to Fremont stating that the Americans were entering Los -Angeles. - -17.31. For later events see chap. xxxi. Disturbances, resulting -partly from the insurrection in the south and partly from depredations -committed by Americans, occurred in the north. Monterey was threatened, -and some fighting occurred near San Francisco Bay; but those who had -taken up arms to protect their property gladly laid them down (about -the time Stockton entered Los Angeles) when satisfied there would be -no more plundering, and the treaty of Cahuenga quieted those still -acting in sympathy with Flores. (See particularly Colton, Three Years, -73-6, 86, 152, 155, 158, 170; Bancroft, Pacific States, xvii, 378-383; -=10=Aram, statement; =4=Amador, memorias, 175; Aldrich, Marine -Corps, 95.) During these troubles Larkin was made a prisoner, and but -for the fear of reprisals might have suffered severely for what the -Californians regarded as double-dealing. Just before leaving California -Flores released him. (See particularly =52=Larkin, no. 63, January -14, 1847; Bryant, What I Saw, 361; =263=Mervine to Fremont, Nov. -21.) - -17.32. _Fremont's operations._ =316=Fulsom to Sherman, Jan. -9, 1848. =47=Stockton to Bancroft, Nov. 23, 1846; Jan. 11, 15, -1847. Colton, Three Years, 98. =47=Fremont, orders, Jan. 12, 1847. -=122=Bidwell, Calif., 203. =258=Marshall, recolls. Bryant, -What I Saw, 365-94. Sen. 33; 30, 1, pp. 6, 73-7, 119-21, 131, 184, -194, 260, 377-9, 405. Ho. 1; 30, 2, pp. 1045, 1052, 1067-9. Revere, -Tour, 78. Sen. Report 75; 30, 1, pp. 40-2 (Wilson), 50 (Russell). Sen. -31; 30, 2, pp. 18, 21-2. Tuthill, Calif., 222. Porter, Kearny, 29. -Life of Stockton, 148-9. Royce, Calif., 194. Sen. 7; 30, 1 (Emory). -=76=Flores, Mar. 31, 1847 (2). =76=Moreno to Bustamante, Mar. -20, 1847. Cutts, Conquest, 156-64. Sherman, Home Letters, 113. - - - XVIII. THE GENESIS OF TWO CAMPAIGNS - -18.1. As early as August 16 Pillow wrote to his wife that Taylor -thought it would be necessary to attack the city of Mexico by way of -Vera Cruz. - -18.2. The fortress of San Juan de Ulua stood on a reef about -three-quarters of a mile from the strong fort which guarded the north -end of Vera Cruz at the water line. U. S. Consul Campbell of Havana -informed Conner before June 10, 1846, that the defences of Ulua on the -side facing the city were partially undermined and poorly armed, and -that, as all the Mexican preparations had been founded on the belief -that future assailants would adopt the French plan of attack, he could -place his vessels on that side at night with little or no injury, and -easily take the fortress by escalade; but Conner does not appear to have -endorsed this opinion. An American named Jobson, who resided at Vera -Cruz, wrote to the war department, Feb. 14, 1847, that nobody except -the Americans was afraid of Ulua; that in September, 1846, it had been -garrisoned by only 180 men, who, being neither paid nor fed, ran up -the American flag on the night of Sept. 17; and that Conner might have -passed in by the south channel, put 500 men ashore, and captured the -fortress in half an hour. See chap. xxx, note 20. - -18.3. These regiments were to come from Mass., New York, Penn., -Va., No. and So. Carolina, Miss., La. and Texas (mounted men)--one from -each; and in December a second regiment was invited from Penn. There -was considerable hesitation about calling on Massachusetts, but it was -concluded that should she fail to supply her quota, the country would -take note of her attitude. Marcy issued the calls on Nov. 16 (Nov. 27 -Florida was asked for a company), and the abruptness of the change -wrought by Benton is shown by the fact that only five days earlier Marcy -had stated that the volunteers then in service were "deemed sufficient -for the prosecution of the war" (Wash. _Union_, May 28, 1847). The field -and staff officers were to be a colonel, a lieutenant colonel, a major, -an adjutant (a lieutenant from one of the companies), a sergeant major, -a quartermaster sergeant and two principal musicians. Each of the ten -companies of a regiment was to have a captain, a lieutenant, two second -lieutenants, four sergeants, four corporals, two musicians and eighty -privates, but a company including sixty-four effective privates was to -be accepted. These privates were to be in physical vigor and apparently -18-45 (inclusive) years of age. The field and company officers were to -be men appointed and commissioned under the laws of their state. The -rendezvous of the infantry were to be Boston, New York, Pittsburgh, -Guiandotte (Va.), Wilmington, Charleston, Vicksburg, New Orleans. Most -of the regiments were made up rather slowly, and there was so much -difficulty in Virginia that her recruiting officers went into Maryland. -This difficulty appears to have been due to a lack of enthusiasm for -the war (first part of chap. xxxiv). The supposedly brilliant victory -at Monterey had exercised a favorable influence, but the obligation to -serve the war out had a contrary effect, and the terms of the law, which -required the independent action of the state governments, caused delay -in some instances. The First Pennsylvania reached New Orleans Dec. 29 -and 30, and at that time the Mississippi regiment was expected to arrive -there by Jan. 10. The South Carolina regiment was ready on Dec. 22. - -Special efforts were made at the same time to bring the regular army up -to 15,000 men. The authorized maximum was at this time 16,998 (including -780 commissioned officers), but in spite of energetic recruiting only -10,381 were actually serving in the two regiments of dragoons, one of -Mounted Riflemen, four of "artillery," eight of infantry, and a co. -of engineer soldiers (Sen. 1; 29, 2, pp. 62-3). Nov. 3 the recruiting -officers were authorized to pay a citizen, non-commissioned officer, -or soldier $2.00 for each accepted man brought to the rendezvous -(=65=gen. orders 48). The minimum height was reduced to five feet -and three inches (=65=gen. orders 51). Men desiring to enlist had -probably felt more drawn to the briefer volunteer service, and had -waited for a second call. Besides, the widows and orphans of volunteers -(but not of regulars) were to be pensioned, and the prevailing high -wages for labor deterred many from wishing to enlist. The lack of -officers in the regular army still continued serious. On July 30, 1846, -less than one third of the regimental field officers were available. The -regiments in Mexico did not average one field officer apiece. - -According to the report of the adjutant general dated Dec. 5, 1846, -Taylor had (including the garrison at Tampico and troops en route, -but subject to some deductions) 7406 regulars and 10,926 volunteers, -besides 621 and 2039 respectively under Wool. Adding to these 446 and -3546 respectively under Kearny, and the New York regiment en route -to California, one finds that the land forces amounted to 25,750 men -before the November calls were issued; but subtractions of an unknown -magnitude needed to be made from these figures so far as availability -was concerned. These and further details may be found in Sen. 1; 29, 2. -See also the following. =62=Marcy to govs., Nov. 16. Sen. 1; 29, 2, -p. 46 (Marcy, report). =61=Bowman to Jones, Dec. 4; to Polk, Dec. -29. =61=Brooke to Jones, Dec. 29. Wash. _Union_, Nov. 30, 1846; -May 28, 1847. =61=Jones to Scott, Dec. 17. Polk, Diary, Nov. 7, -10, 14-16. =62=Marcy to gov. Fla., Dec. 27. =63=Marcy to gov. -Mass., Nov. 16; to gov. Tex., Nov. 20; to gov. Iowa, Nov. 25. _Niles_, -Nov. 21, 1846, p. 179; Jan. 16, 1847, p. 308. =29=Brown to Marcy, -Oct. 6. Sen. 1; 29, 2, p. 62. =13=Pakenham, no. 132, Nov. 23. -_Cong. Globe_, 30, 1, p. 428 (Cabell). Ho. 60; 30, 1, pp. 478 (Freeman), -873 (Marcy). West Va. dept. arch. and hist., report, 1910, p. 186. - -18.4. _Genesis of the Vera Cruz expedition._ Sen. 1; 30, 1, p. 45 -(Marcy, report). =52=Black, Oct. 29. Benton, Abr. Deb., xvi, 63. -=13=Pakenham, nos. 119, 130, 132, 140, 150. =228=G. Flagg to -A. Flagg, Dec. 17. _Picayune_, Apr. 30; Oct. 5; Dec. 11, 1846; Feb. 2, -1847 (Taylor to Gaines). (Calhoun) _Cong. Globe_, 29, 2, app., 323. -Polk, Diary, July 2; Aug. 29; Oct. 10, 17-22; Nov. 7-17; Dec. 1, 2, -1846; Jan. 2, 1847. Meigs, Benton, 361. =108=Bancroft to Polk, Dec. -3. Benton; View, ii, 693-4. =108=Buchanan to Bancroft, priv., Dec. -29. Claiborne, Quitman, i, 273. =335=Letter from P. F. Smith (with -Trist's letter to Buchanan, Sept. 28, 1847, private). Wash. _Union_, -Sept. 29; Oct. 2. _Niles_, Mar. 13, 1847, p. 20. =206=James Graham -to Gov. Graham, Jan. 10, 1847. =256=Marcy to Wetmore, Nov. 1. -Scott, Mems., ii, 404. Johnston, A. S. Johnston, 134. Ho. 60; 30, 1, pp. -333, 355, 363, 1231 (Marcy); 1268-1270, 1273-4 (Scott); 351 (Taylor). -=297=Benton, memo., July 4. =297=Mackenzie to Buchanan, July -7. =47=Conner, June 11; July 22; Oct. 4. Meade, Letters, i, 148. -=52=Campbell, June 9. Schouler, Hist. Briefs, 155. =58=Jobson, -Feb. 14, 1847. Sen. 52; 30, 1, p. 170. Bancroft to Conner, May 30. -Conner, Castle of Ulloa. =256=Totten to Marcy, Nov. 23, 1847. -=180=Pillow to wife, Aug. 16. =169=Taylor to Crittenden, Sept. -1. =13=Doyle, no. 79, 1843. =69=P. F. Smith, memoir, Oct. 14. -=354=Welles papers. =152=Mason to Conner, Nov. 29, priv. and -confid. _Journal des Debats_, Nov. 4. Boston _Atlas_, Dec. 17. Buchanan, -Works, viii, 365. Diccionario Universal (_Ulua_). _Cong. Globe_, 29, 2, -app., 191. (Ulua) See chaps. xxii, p. 21, xxx. - -18.5. It is believed that the preceding text and notes afford ample -support for this sentence. Note 27 contains additional references; -and see Ripley, War with Mexico, i, 361-2. Taylor seems never to have -perceived that Polk could have superseded him with a Democrat by -merely sending Jesup or Wool to the army with reinforcements before -brevetting him major general and ordering him to serve with his -brevet rank. Nov. 10 Polk asserted in his diary that he had known no -politics with reference to Taylor. The diary shows that he was aware -how Taylor felt about him. This was not at all surprising. Pillow's -letters indicate plainly that he understood the matter and he was in -confidential correspondence with the President. Pillow wrote to his -wife that Taylor systematically proscribed Polk's friends, and this may -offset some of Taylor's assertions that he himself was persecuted by the -administration. - -18.6. Dec. 10 (Bixby) Taylor wrote to his son-in-law that he would -not say he would refuse to serve, if elected President. This meant -of course that he was a candidate. His formal announcement came the -following month. - -18.7. It is probable that the administration knew how Taylor felt -about the Vera Cruz expedition, for he was outspoken, and Polk had more -than one correspondent in his camp. - -18.8. Scott, like nearly all the Whigs, disapproved of a war -made by a Democratic administration for (as the Whigs generally -alleged) party reasons, but was ready to do his duty as a soldier -(=13=Pakenham, separate and confidential, Sept. 28). - -18.9. _The selection of the commander._ Ho. 60; 30, 1, pp. -363, 367, 369, 373 (Marcy); 372, 1268-70 (Scott); 383 (Bliss); 384 -(Patterson). =169=Scott to Taylor, Sept. 26 ("I never, for a -moment, ceased to watch over your fame and interests with the liveliest -solicitude"). Polk, Diary, Sept. 5, 15; Oct. 22; Nov. 10, 14, 17-19, -21, 1846; May 6, 1847; Jan. 4, 1848. Scott, Mems., ii, 386, 399. -London _Times_, June 30, 1847. =132=Slidell to Buchanan, Nov. 5. -=169=Scott to Crittenden, Sept. 17. =169=Taylor to Crittenden, -Jan. 26; Mar. 25, 1847. =354=Welles papers. Note particularly -Taylor's political exchanges with. =169=Crittenden and Wood (Bixby -coll.) during the summer and autumn. =180=Pillow to wife, Oct. -27; Dec. 8. =330=Taylor to brother, Dec. 12, 1846; Jan. 19, 1848. -_Id._, Letters (Bixby), June 3; Aug. 23; Nov. 26; Dec. 10, 13, 1846; -Jan. 26; Feb. 9; May 9; Aug. 29, 1847. =345=Blair to Van Buren, -July 7. Coleman, Crittenden, i, 243-4. =169=Scott to Marcy, Sept. -12. =62=Marcy to Scott, Sept. 14. =256=_Id._ to Wetmore, June -28. Watson, In Memoriam, 115. Grant, Mems., i, 120. Meade, Letters, i, -175. _Nat. Intelligencer_, Aug. 29. Garrison, Extension, 242. Bancroft, -Pacific States, viii, 375. _Mag. of Amer. Hist._, xiv, 564. Slidell to -Buchanan, Nov. 5, 1846, private: "The fate of the Administration depends -on the successful conduct of the war" (Curtis, Buchanan, i, 601). - -18.10. Scott's figures were slightly below the adjutant general's. -Possibly the latter used returns of later dates. Taylor did not have -so many available troops, and accused Scott of stating what he knew or -should have known to be false (Bixby coll., 181); but if the adjutant -general was incorrectly informed as to the strength of the forces, the -fault was Taylor's. See note 3. - -18.11. Scott was severely criticised by Marcy (Ho. 60; 30, 1, p. -1239) and others for ordering so many boats, guns and shells, and it was -triumphantly proclaimed that, as the result proved, he did not need so -large an outfit. But this argument was not sound. He had to reckon on a -failure to produce and deliver at the point of shipment in season all -that he specified, on a heavy loss through wreckage and other accidents, -on the probability that his landing would be opposed, and on the -expected necessity of reducing Ulua; nor did he know that naval guns (to -which he actually was compelled to have recourse) would be available. -It has been said, too, that the army could have landed in the boats of -the blockading squadron, but Scott found on inquiry that only about 500 -could go ashore in them at a single trip (Ho. 60; 30, 1, p. 1274). Scott -on the other hand was unreasonably bitter in charging the war department -with negligence. More could have been done by the government, and -errors were committed, but shortcomings and mistakes were inevitable. -Marcy's reply to Scott's charges (Ho. 60; 30, 1, pp. 1218, 1227) needs -to be scrutinized carefully. Ripley (War with Mexico, ii, 14) ridicules -Scott (for asking for a pontoon train) on the ground that every stream -between Vera Cruz and Mexico was fordable. But (1) Scott could not be -sure his operations would be confined to that line; (2) he operated in -fact on the lower Alvarado River, where it was not fordable; (3) had the -national bridge been blown up, pontoons might have been useful there for -wagons and heavy guns. Rio del Plan was a small stream, but the enemy -caused the Americans much trouble by destroying the bridge at Plan del -Rio. See Ripley, _op. cit._, ii, 165. - -18.12. The proof that Scott and the administration intended that -Taylor should not be placed in jeopardy is superabundant: Ho. 60; 30, 1, -pp. 357, 366, 389 (Marcy); 844, 1272, 1276 (Scott). Scott even intended -to give Taylor his personal aid, should the Mexicans attack him in -force; and this was one of his reasons for going to Camargo (_ibid._, -844; =61=Scott to Brooke, Dec. 28). - -18.13. As late as Jan. 2, 1847, every member of the Cabinet except -Clifford was opposed to Scott's marching against the city of Mexico, -though Polk favored taking that step should it be necessary in order to -obtain peace (Polk, Diary). - -18.14. Taylor alleged bitterly (Bixby, 182) that discourtesy -and injury were done him by the failure to notify him promptly of -the expedition, but Polk's precaution was wise. Some despatches were -intercepted or lost, and soon a most important letter from Scott to -Taylor, marked "confidential" both outside and within, was opened by a -subordinate at Monterey and publicly discussed (Scott, Mems., ii, 402). -See note 15. - -18.15. Nov. 25 Marcy wrote guardedly to Taylor with reference to -the new expedition, but the despatch went astray (=62=adj. gen. -to Taylor, May 5, 1847). It is surprising that cipher was not used. It -seems as if a ciphered letter giving the necessary explanations and -ordering Taylor to place the required forces at specified points by -specified dates should have been sent to Taylor in triplicate by trusty -messengers not later than Nov. 30. - -18.16. _Scott's operations, etc., up to Dec. 27._ Ho. 60; 30, -1, pp. 373, 838-41, 1218, 1268, 1270, 1273-5 (Scott); 369, 372, 873, -1231 (Marcy); 1253 (Jesup); 1100 (Taylor). Taylor, Letters (Bixby), -95, 181. Senex, Myth. Wise, Seven Decades, 235. Polk, Diary, Nov. -10, 20, 1846; Jan. 2, 1847. Jameson, Calhoun Corres., 727-8. _Journ. -of Milit. Serv. Instit._, xiv, 442. =234=A. Johnson to ----, -Dec. 2. =191=Fairfield to wife, Dec. 13. Scott, Mems., ii, 402. -=256=_Id._ to Marcy, Dec. 27, private. =61=H. L. Scott, Nov. -24. =61=W. Scott, memo., Nov. 29. =62=Jones to Taylor, May 5, -1847. =164=Scott to Conner, Dec. 26 (P. S. Dec. 27). _Picayune_, -Dec. 24. "The Brazos" signified loosely a region comprising Brazos -_Id._, Pt. Isabel, and sometimes the mouth of the Rio Grande. - -Scott blamed Marcy for permitting him to spend only four days at -Washington in preparatory work (Ho. 60; 30, 1, p. 1218). Marcy replied -that Scott passed twenty-six days in going from the capital to New -Orleans _via_ New York when he might have reached that place in seven -(_ibid._, 1228). The reply looks effective but does not cover the -ground. Marcy said Scott was not needed at the war department, where the -initial work had to be done; and hence the General did well to fortify -himself for the campaign and gain time for reflection by choosing the -sea route. The voyage took nineteen days instead of twelve on account of -head winds. - -While he was at New Orleans a newspaper published there stated that the -expedition (which Scott intimated was bound for San Luis Potosi) would -strike at Vera Cruz, and Polk showed what he meant in promising Scott -his full confidence by charging that he had betrayed the secret (Diary, -Jan. 14; Feb. 27). The secret was out at New Orleans in reality about -two weeks before Scott arrived there, and the newspaper stated later -that its information did not come from any person connected with the -army (_Niles_, Feb. 13, 1847, p. 370). (See =256=Scott to Marcy, -Jan. 27, priv.) Polk also complained--another mark of confidence--that -Scott's vanity was causing him to make "extravagant preparations," as -if Taylor had not shown at Monterey the consequences of failing to -prepare adequately. In fact Scott, instead of insisting upon extravagant -preparations, wrote Dec. 23 that he would move against Vera Cruz if he -could land even 5000 men there early in February (=374=to Conner). - -18.17. The new First Division included Harney's (Third) Brigade, -now consisting of Co. C (Bragg's light battery) of the Third Artillery, -companies B, C, D and E of the Second Dragoons, the Second Infantry and -the Third Infantry; and P. F. Smith's (Fourth) Brigade, now consisting -of Co. E (Sherman's light battery) of the Third Artillery, two companies -of the Mounted Riflemen (without horses), the First and the Seventh -Infantry. The rest of the Second Dragoons were to be assigned whenever -they should join. Five companies of the Second Infantry had been for -some weeks at Montemorelos; the rest, like the Second Tennessee, marched -to that point from Camargo. The Fourth Infantry and two companies of the -First Artillery were to occupy the citadel. The Washington and Baltimore -battalion, which had belonged to the First Division, was now attached -to Quitman's brigade. It will be noted that Taylor, who was incorrectly -said to have been exposed with inadequate forces to Mexican attack, now -treated Worth in precisely that way, exposing also Saltillo, which he -himself called "our most important point" in that region (Ho. 60; 30, 1, -p. 381). Taylor overtook Quitman Dec. 16. Nearly 2000 wagons were now -under Taylor's orders, yet pack-mules were used mainly for the train. By -the railroad Victoria is 284 kilometers from Monterey. - -18.18. As the Americans had no positive information regarding Santa -Anna's intentions and movements, Worth was blamed for giving a false -alarm. Rives (U. S. and Mexico, ii, 304) says S. Anna was unable to -leave S. L. Potosi. Worth really did expect the Mexicans to reach him -considerably sooner than they could have done. Major Gaines with three -companies of Kentucky cavalry, previously ordered to Saltillo, seems to -have arrived there on Dec. 17. Butler was now ordered to take command at -that point. - -18.19. In one letter Taylor stated that he received Scott's note -when two days from Monterey, but this must mean "second day." Dec. 20 -Scott had written to him from New Orleans, explaining his plans more -fully, but this letter did not reach him until January 16 (Ho. 60; 30, -1, 1101). - -18.20. From Montemorelos Taylor sent a topographical engineer, -escorted by a squadron of dragoons under May, to examine Santa Rosa Pass -and rejoin the command at Linares. Ten men of May's rear guard and the -baggage were cut off in the pass (Ho. 60; 30, 1, pp. 387-8, 1095. Maury, -Recolls., 31. Henry, Camp. Sketches, 284). - -18.21. "Norther" was the name given to an extremely violent wind -which blew at frequent intervals from October to April, lasting usually -about three days. During Scott's operations one lasted seventy-six -hours. It grew more violent as one went south toward Vera Cruz, -probably because the cordillera approached the coast and produced -somewhat the effect of a funnel. Its merit was that it prevented yellow -fever. - -18.22. The real Mexican cavalry numbered about 1000 under Gen. -Romero, who was sent by Valencia, now commanding at Tula, because the -governor of Tamaulipas had asked for 1000 infantry. The cavalry arrived -at Victoria on Dec. 24. Only 200 were regulars. The rest were badly -armed and munitioned, and cavalry were not suitable for a region covered -with woods and intersected with rivers. The people, however, prepared -to cooperate with them; but arms were lacking, and the revenues of the -state had mostly been cut off by the occupation of Matamoros and Tampico -(_Gaceta de C. Victoria_, July 23, 1846). Valencia was very anxious to -attack the Americans, but Santa Anna would not permit this--probably -because he did not wish Valencia either to be defeated or to win eclat -by succeeding. December 26 Romero received positive orders not to risk -an action, and two days later he retired (=82=gov. Tamaul. to gov. -Puebla, Jan. 6, 1847. =77=_Id._ to Relaciones, Apr. 23). Taylor -strongly desired to capture Valencia (Roberts, diary). - -18.23. _Taylor's march to Victoria (including Worth's alarm)._ -Ho. 60; 30, 1, pp. 513 (orders 156); 361, 379, 381, 385, 387-8, 848, -1100 (Taylor); 839, 851, 1156 (Scott). Meade, Letters, i, 170, 172. -_Autograph_, July-Aug., Nov.-Dec., 1912 (Taylor). Diccionario Universal -(_Itinerario_). =307=Roberts, diary. Sen. 32; 31, 1, p. 8, note. -Henshaw narrative. Velasco, Geog., iv, 150. Claiborne, Quitman, i, 277 -(Holt's journal). Henry, Camp. Sketches, 262-287. Robertson, Remins., -185-198. _Vedette_, ii, no. 9 (Townes). =193=Foster to father, Dec. -10. =139=W. B. Campbell to D. C., Jan. 2, 1847. =69=Worth -to Bliss, Dec. 16; to Butler, Dec. 18. =69=Butler to Bliss, Dec. -20. =69=Wool to Worth, Dec. 24. =69=Riley to Bliss, Dec. -10. =69=Quitman to Bliss, Dec. 30. =69=Worth to Bliss, Dec. -4. =65=Taylor, gen. orders 160, Dec. 22. =169=_Id._ to -Crittenden, Jan. 26, 1847. _Id._, Letters (Bixby), 180. Wilhelm, Eighth -Inf., ii, 300-1. =61=Clarke to McCall, Dec. 27. Apuntes, 86-7. -Scott, Mems., ii, 402. =69=Wool to Butler, Dec. 25. _Delta_, Jan. -24; Feb. 13, 1847. =52=Black, Oct. 8. =299=Posey to Gordon, -Feb. 19, 1847. N. Y. _Herald_, Feb. 6, 1847. Scott wrote privately -(=256=Jan. 16) that "friend Taylor ... turned his back upon the -appointment I gave him ... saying he would be back, at Monterey, in -36 days, the 1st of February!!" Taylor actually wrote that he _might_ -return "early in Feb." (Ho. 60; 30, 1, p. 848). Also the following -from =76=. S. Anna, Dec. 22, muy priv. _Id._, Dec. 24; Jan. 1. -Gov. Tamaul., Oct. 22; Dec. 3. E. Gonzalez, Dec. 29. Comte. Nat. Gd., -Catorce, Dec. 30. Instead of admitting that his journey to Victoria -delayed the receipt of Scott's letter of Jan. 3 to him, Taylor -complained in his characteristic fashion that it should have been sent -by a special messenger (Ho. 60; 30, 1, p. 1101). - -18.24. One naturally inquires why Taylor concentrated more than -5000 men at Victoria. He stated that he went in that direction to -examine the passes and establish one or more posts, and that he sent -Patterson's command there because Mexican parties were going from Tula -to that point; but he had been ordered, Oct. 22, to have 4000 men ready -to embark for Vera Cruz, if he could spare them (Ho. 60; 30, 1, p. 366), -and presumably had this in mind. But see his letter, Bixby coll., 72. - -18.25. Such was the regular Mexican measure. In this as in some -other cases the American estimates were higher. - -18.26. _Patterson's march to Victoria._ Ho. 60; 30, 1, pp. 358 -(Marcy); 379, 387-8 (Taylor); 383 (Bliss); 383-4 (Patterson); 569, -571 (Jesup). =60=Patterson, Dec. 8. =292=Pillow to wife, -Dec. 15. _Amer. Flag_, Matamoros, Dec. 26. =332=Tennery, diary. -=254=McClellan, diary. =322=Smith, diary. Diccionario -Universal (_Itinerario_). Ho. 13; 31, 2 (G. W. Smith). Engineer School, -U. S. A., Occasional Papers, no. 16 (G. W. Smith). =60=Belknap, -memo, (with Patterson, Nov. 1). =193=Heiman to Mrs. Foster, Feb. -28. Lawton, Artillery Officer, 16. Furber, Twelve Months Vol., 275-318. -=335=Trist, draft of address. Welles papers (Pol. Hist. of U. S.). -=139=Campbell to D. C., Nov. 2, 1846; Jan. 2; Feb. 19, 1847. Scott, -Mems., ii, 423. =159=Collins, diary. _Hist. Teacher's Mag._, Apr., -1912, p. 75. Smith, Annex. of Texas, 250-1. N. Y. _Herald_, Nov. 3, -1857 (Scott). =146=Caswell, diary. =275=Nelson to Coe, Oct. -14, 1846 ("The General in making a speech to us a day or two ago said -that we should go on, or if it so happened that we _had_ to stay that he -(Pillow) would remain with us. This would make our situation _deplorable -indeed_. Our Brigadier General I am sorry to say is universally -unpopular"). Two soldiers wrote: "We do not charge Gen. Pillow with -that wholesale abuse that has been heaped upon him by many. It is his -misfortune to be cursed with unalloyed selfishness" (McLean County Hist. -Soc. Trans., i, 24). =280=Nunelee, diary. Claiborne, Quitman, i, -277 (Holt's journal). =180=Pillow to wife, Oct. 27. Taylor, Letters -(Bixby), 180. Trans. Ills. State Hist. Soc., 1906, 177-8. McCall, -Letters, 474. =273=Mullan, diary. Bishop, Journal. - -18.27. _Scott's operations, Dec. 27-Jan. 7, including the division -of the troops._ =61=H. L. Scott, Dec. 28. Ho. 60; 30, 1, pp. 842, -844, 848, 851, 853, 875, 1156 (Scott); 858-9 (Butler); 860-1 (Worth). -=61=Butler, Jan. 8, 1847. Wash. _Union_, Jan. 13, 1847. (Suggested) -Ho. 60; 30, 1, p. 353; Taylor, Letter to Gaines. (Ordered) Polk, Diary, -Nov. 17-19. (Appointed) Ho. 60; 30, 1, p. 372 (Marcy). (Authority) -Polk, Diary, Mar. 21, 1847; _Cong. Globe_, 30, 1, p. 502 (Douglas). -(Condition) Ho. 60; 30, 1, pp. 390, 1276. (Admitted) _Ibid._, 1102. -(Manner) _Ibid._, 373, 839, 848, 851. (Purpose) _Ibid._, 373, 839; -Scott, Mems., ii, 403. (Reach) Ho. 60; 30, 1, pp. 848, 852. (Required) -_Ibid._, 864; Sen. 1; 30, 1, p. 47. (Recognized) =169=Taylor to -Crittenden, Jan. 26, 1847. ("Wormed") _Ibid._; =370=Taylor to -Davis, Apr. 18, 1848. (Kill) =330=Taylor to brother, May 29, 1847. -("Contemptible") Taylor, Letters (Bixby), 180. (Suggestion) Ho. 60; -30, 1, pp. 337, 375 (Taylor). ("Intrigue") Taylor, Letters (Bixby), -84. (Outraged) _Ibid._, 180. (Degraded) _Ibid._, 181. ("Discourteous") -_Ibid._, 179. (Ruin) _Ibid._, 90, 95. (Expecting) =169=Taylor -to Crittenden, Jan. 26, 1847; Ho. 60; 30, 1, pp. 890, 1109-10, 1113. -("Sacrificed") _Ibid._, 863; Bixby coll., 114. The New Orleans _Comm. -Bulletin_ said a fearful responsibility rested on the government for -exposing Taylor. See also =330=Taylor to brother, Feb. 8; Apr. 5, -22; May 29, 1847; Jan. 19, 1848. - -For a particular reason both Scott and Taylor (=169=to Crittenden, -Jan. 26) felt sure that Santa Anna would go to Vera Cruz promptly. This -reason was the capture of Scott's original letter of Jan. 3 to Taylor, -borne by Lieut. Richey (French, Two Wars, 71; Ho. 60; 30, 1, pp. 876, -890; Meade, Letters, i, 182; Taylor, Letters (Bixby), 82). It was -believed that the letter was in Santa Anna's hands by about Jan. 15. For -this reason and the tardiness of the new volunteer regiments Scott felt -that he needed more and Taylor fewer troops than he otherwise would have -estimated (Ho. 60; 30, 1, p. 893). Indeed, Taylor wrote to Scott on Jan. -26 that Santa Anna had already left the north (Ho. 60; 30, 1, p. 890). -Scott was so confident that he would meet serious opposition at Vera -Cruz that he employed five or six agents to obtain information about the -forces assembling there. Marcy entertained the same expectation (Ho. 60; -30, 1, p. 369). Ripley (_op. cit._, i, 358) argues that S. Anna had a -better chance of success in attacking Taylor than he would have had in -attacking Scott, and therefore Scott should not have believed that S. -Anna would oppose his debarkation. But Ripley could not have proved his -premise; and, even were that true, the additional advantage that would -have been gained by guarding the route from Vera Cruz to Mexico City -looked like a decisive consideration. S. Anna's moving against Taylor -was largely due to political considerations not understood by either -Scott or Ripley. - -Taylor gradually settled down upon the idea that the aim of Polk and -Scott was to cause him to leave Mexico in disgust (=330=to brother, -Feb. 8; Apr. 5). Later he changed "Scott, Marcy & Co." to "Scott, Polk & -Co." (=330=to brother, Jan. 19, 1848), thus smiting at one stroke a -rival in his own party (see =330=letter to brother, Apr. 5, 1848) -and a supposed rival in the other. - -The number of troops left with Taylor for defence against an enemy -who was not expected to advance was about 800 regulars and 6-7000 -well seasoned and respectably trained volunteers (=169=Taylor -to Crittenden, March 25, 1847) besides several regiments of new -volunteers--say 2400-2800 men--who were expected to arrive soon; while -Scott had less than 13,000 to face (with all the disadvantages of -debarking) the garrisons of Vera Cruz and Ulua, the army that Santa Anna -was believed to be leading against him, and all such reinforcements -as the Mexican government could raise when threatened at the vital -point. Moreover Scott's new volunteers were to land with practically -no training whatever, and could hardly be counted on for the initial -fighting. Taylor said that for a blow at the capital 25,000 men (10,000 -of them regulars) would be required (Ho. 60; 30, 1, p. 353). As Scott -pointed out, Taylor now had really nothing to do except defend Texas -(Memoirs, ii, 409) and, should it be practicable, aid Scott's offensive -by threatening to advance. Scott took Robert E. Lee from Taylor's army. - -On receiving Scott's orders of Jan. 3 Taylor replied in a style -corresponding to his state of mind (Ho. 60; 30, 1, p. 863). Scott -answered: "There are some expressions in those letters [of Jan. 15 -which, as I shall wish to forget them, I shall not specify or recall" -(_ibid._, 864); and to Marcy Scott wrote privately: "However, he -[Taylor] is still the same excellent man" (=256=Jan. 23). In his -correspondence on this subject Taylor appeared to regard the troops -placed under his command as his personal property. The battle of Buena -Vista has commonly been cited as the cause of Taylor's election, but it -was the idea that he had been deliberately exposed to the Mexicans which -gave that victory its remarkable political effect (=210=Simms to -Hammond, Jan. 15, 1847; _So. Qtrly. Review_, Jan., 1851, p. 37). It may -be observed further that for the government to sacrifice him, his army -and all the public property in northern Mexico, and give Santa Anna an -opportunity to ravage Texas would have been to commit suicide. The idea -was unreasonable. - -18.28. Scott, who was a great soldier but not a great lawyer, had -the imprudence to attack Marcy, a master of fence, in regard to the -supply of vessels, and he fared rather badly. Marcy's defence was, -however, by no means wholly sound. He himself called it privately a -"special plea" (=256=to Wetmore, Apr. 11, 1848). For example, Dec. -15, 1846, he notified Scott (and also Jesup, who had gone to the front) -that he was ordering ten transports in ballast to the Brazos, but later, -on receiving a letter dated Jan. 27 from Jesup (then at the Brazos) -which over-confidently stated that all needed vessels could be chartered -there, he countermanded the order; and this looks like a satisfactory -defence against Scott's complaint that none of the ten transports -specified by him in his requisition appeared. But Marcy neglected to -inform Jesup or Scott that the order had been countermanded, and, as -Jesup's letter could not have reached Washington before about Jan. 7, -Jesup naturally assumed that the ten transports had got under way. -Indeed, Jan. 23 the adjutant general wrote what Scott understood to -mean that the latter might soon expect ten ships in ballast (Ho. 60; -30, 1, p. 897). Therefore Jesup and Scott counted upon them (_ibid._, -896), and naturally did not exert themselves to obtain shipping (when -disappointed about vessels already engaged) as otherwise they doubtless -would have done. (See Scott, Marcy, Jesup, Hetzel in Ho. 60; 30, 1, pp. -894, 1218, 1227, 1253.) Besides, it was found necessary to send a number -of the Brazos vessels to Tampico for the troops of Patterson, Twiggs and -Quitman. Jesup (_supra_) charged Scott with causing delay by changing -the assignation of certain regiments; but Scott certainly did not desire -to waste time, and it is only fair to suppose that he made the changes -for adequate reasons. Jesup complained that many of his officers were -inefficient, and Marcy with well feigned naivete replied that their -names had been presented to Polk [by politicians] with "the highest -testimonials." - -18.29. Harney soon disobeyed Scott's positive orders at Medellin -bridge (chap. xxii, note 25), and his biographer admits that he might -justly have been shot (Reavis, Harney, 186). Scott, however, merely -refrained from reporting the affair, whereupon Harney complained that -he had been unjustly ignored. One of the best reasons for studying the -Mexican war is to observe how political considerations interfered with -military affairs. The Harney episode was enough to justify Scott's -apprehensions of a fire from the rear, but it was not the only instance -of executive meddling (=213=Hatch to sister, Feb. 11, 1847). -Another incident also, which occurred at this time, illustrates his -magnanimity and good sense. Lieut. Col. Ethan Allen Hitchcock, a man of -notable talents and attainments and formerly instructor in tactics at -West Point, was admirably qualified to act as inspector general, and -Scott gave him the post although Hitchcock had repeatedly opposed him, -and was personally unfriendly to him. Experience soon made Hitchcock -one of Scott's firmest admirers and partisans (Hitchcock, Fifty Years, -234-6). - -18.30. _Scott's operations, Jan. 8-Feb. 15._ Ho. 60; 30, 1, pp. -844, 855-6, 866, 875, 880, 882, 890-1, 893, 896, 1218, 1273 (Scott); -874, 1227 (Marcy); 568, 571, 1253 (Jesup); 884, 894 (Hetzel); 868, 870, -887-9, 893, 1164-6 (H. L. Scott); 867, 869, 888 (Harney); 860-1, 870 -(Worth); 858-9 (Butler). _Niles_, Feb. 13, p. 369; Feb. 27, p. 401. -=63=Marcy to qtrmr. officer, Dec. 11, 15, 1846. Lawton, Artillery -Officer, 42-3. =358=Williams to father, Jan. 17. Ballentine, -English Soldier, i, 257. _Picayune_, Feb. 3; Mar. 12. =180=Pillow -to wife, Feb. 14. =65=Scott, gen. orders. 8, 11. Polk, Diary, -Dec. 14, 1846; Feb. 20, 1847. Reavis, Harney, 186. Grant, Mems., i, -123-4. =61=Worth to adj. gen., Feb. 17. Meade, Letters, i, 176. -=60=Scott to Marcy, April 5, 1847. =256=_Id._ to _Id._, Jan. -23, 1847, private. _Amer. Flag_, Matamoros, Feb. 17. Oswandel, Notes, -48. =62=Stanton, Nov. 29; Dec. 7, 13, 20, 1846; Jan. 5; Feb. -16, 1847; Sen. 65; 30, 1, p. 91 (Hitchcock). =322=Smith, diary. -=364=Worth to S., Feb. 17; to wife, Feb. 18. Smith, To Mexico, -84-103 (Worth's march from Saltillo). - -18.31. An American estimate was 130 miles. This is partially -explained perhaps by the fact that the pioneers made some "short cuts" -(mule paths) available. Meade (Letters, i, 159) even cut the distance to -about 100 miles, but this appears to have been little more than a guess. -By the railroad the distance is about 141 miles. - -18.32. _From Victoria to Tampico._ =146=Caswell, diary. -Ho. 60; 30, 1, pp. 1097 (Taylor); 879 (Patterson). Diccionario -Universal (_Itinerario_). =303=Orders 3, Jan. 12. Robertson, -Remins., 199-207. Taylor, Letters (Bixby), 181. U. S. Engineer School, -Occasional Papers, no. 16 (G. W. Smith). Ho. 13; 31, 2 (_Id._). Prieto, -Tamaulipas, 229. =332=Tennery, diary. =273=Mullan, diary. -Lawton, Artillery Officer, 27. =322=Smith, diary. =169=Taylor -to Crittenden, Jan. 26. =69=Coleccion de Itinerarios. -=307=Roberts, diary. Meade, Letters, i, 174-5. _Defensor de -Tamaul._, Jan. 18. =76=Cos, Feb. 1. =218=Henshaw narrative. -=139=W. B. Campbell to wife, Jan. 25. Furber, Twelve Months Vol., -342-93. - -18.33. The author's opinion of Pillow is based upon his letters to -his wife, Polk, Scott, Duncan and others, the Trist papers, the Campbell -papers, the records of two courts of inquiry regarding his conduct, and -a large number of additional documents, most of which will be cited -later, particularly in chaps. xxvi and xxix. An army correspondent of W. -T. (_later_ Gen.) Sherman described Pillow, Feb. 26, 1848, as "a mass -of vanity, conceit, ignorance, ambition and want of truth." There was -good warrant for this characterization, but one should add plausibility, -cunning, energy and a genial disposition. For his personal appearance: -Semmes, Service, 165. - -18.34. Scott had not yet heard from Washington regarding Harney. - -18.35. _At Tampico._ =332=Tennery, diary. =273=Mullan, -diary. Lawton, Artillery Officer, 10-64. =146=Caswell, diary. -Ho. 60; 30, 1, pp. 896, 899, 900, 1169 (Scott); 901 (Totten); -850 (Clarke); 896 (Hetzel). Robertson, Remins., 207-13. Bishop, -Journal. =180=Pillow to wife, Dec. 8, 1846; Feb. 23, 1847. -=111=Beauregard to Totten, Jan. 9, 14; to Gates, Feb. 24. -Kenly, Md. Vol., 241-5. =330=J. T. Taylor to Scott, Feb. 12. -=280=Nunelee, diary. Apuntes, 88. Meade, Letters, i, 177, 184-5. -=218=Henshaw narrative, Feb. 20. =254=McClellan, diary. -=303=Shields to Quitman, Mar. 4. =159=Collins, diary, Feb. -19, 25. Davis, Autobiog., 121-3. =65=Scott, gen. orders 21, Feb. -19. =76=Cos, Feb. 19. =76=Anon. letters to Garay, Jan. 25, -28, etc. =139=Campbell to wife, Feb. 3, 7, 16. Mason, Lee, 37. -Furber, Twelve Months Vol., 394-415. Works defending the two land -approaches to Tampico were now ready, and Col. Gates of the Third -Artillery with a company of artillery, the Md. and D. C. battalion -and the new Louisiana regiment--about 1200 men in all--were detached -as a garrison. Rumors came that Taylor was in danger, but the air -was full of rumors about the enemy, and Scott had ample ground for -disregarding these, though criticised for doing so. Von Moltke said -(Franco-German War, 71): "It would have been unjustifiable to entirely -change the line of march on the ground of rumors that might, after all, -prove unfounded." Feb. 19 Scott announced his staff appointments. The -possession of Tampico was extremely useful to him. Fresh provisions -abounded there, and the embarking of about 5000 men on the dangerous -coast at the Brazos was avoided. - -18.36. The Louisiana men went from Lobos Islands to Tampico. Col. -De Russey and the other part of the regiment were wrecked about Feb. 6 -on the coast nearly opposite those islands, but after some hardships and -considerable danger of being captured by Gen. Cos, commanding at Tuxpan -about forty miles distant, they made their way to Tampico, meeting en -route an expedition sent to rescue them (Meade, Letters, i, 179; Lawton, -Artillery Officer, 32-5; =270=Moore, diary; =76=F. de Garay, -Mar. 5). - -18.37. _To Lobos Islands._ Ho. 60; 30, 1, pp. 1256 (Hetzel); 1259 -(Babbitt); 878 (Conner); 568 (Jesup); 840, 841, 846, 880, 891, 896 -(Scott). =65=Scott, gen. orders 1, 6, 8, Jan. 15, 30, 30. Lawton, -Artillery Officer, 23, 65. =61=Brooke to Munroe, Jan. 11; to Scott, -Jan. 9, 21. =62=Stanton to Jesup, Feb. 16. Scott, Mems., ii, 413. -=298=Porter, diary. =254=McClellan, Feb. 23. =193=Foster -to mother, Feb. 26. Ho. 59; 30, 1, p. 41. Smith, To Mexico, 105, 108. -=164=Scott to Conner, Dec. 26, 1846. _Niles_, Mar. 13, p. 21; 20, -p. 48. Hartman, Journal, 6. Oswandel, Notes, 54-6. _Picayune_, Feb. 18. -=159=Collins, diary. =146=Caswell, diary. Ballentine, English -Soldier, i, 266. Bishop, Journal. - -18.38. Polk and Marcy felt that he was looking for an issue -(=256=Marcy to Wetmore, April 25, 1847), and his course warrants -that supposition. - -18.39. _Taylor's movements._ Ho. 60; 30, 1, pp. 861, 890, 1097 -(Taylor), 875 (Scott). Taylor, Letters (Bixby), 72, 85, 87, 180-2. -=169=_Id._ to Crittenden, Jan. 26. Polk, Diary, Oct. 20, 1846; -Jan. 5; Mar. 21-23; Apr. 1, 1847. =256=Marcy to Wetmore, Mar. 11. -_Journ. Mil. Serv. Instit._ xiv, 443. - -Jan. 26 Scott wrote to Taylor: "I must ask you to abandon Saltillo, -and to make no detachments, except for _reconnaisances_ and immediate -defence, much beyond Monterey. I know this to be the wish of the -government, founded on reasons in which I concur" (Ho. 60; 30, 1, p. -864). In reply Taylor wrote on Feb. 7 that he was going to remain at -his advanced position unless "positively ordered to fall back by the -government at Washington" (_ibid._, 1162). In addressing the government -on the same day (_ibid._, 1110) he referred to Scott's instructions as -advice. But such language from a superior officer was clearly an order -courteously phrased, and this interpretation is confirmed by the fact -that Scott deemed it necessary to give Taylor express authority later to -make a diversion toward San Luis Potosi (_ibid._, p. 876). Polk (Diary, -April 7, 1847, and elsewhere) remarked that Taylor had violated his -orders by taking his advanced position. - -Taylor's ostensible reasons for so doing as given by himself (Bixby -coll., 182) were these: 1. It would be safest to fight, should the -Mexicans advance, immediately on their getting across the desert region -that lay between San Luis Potosi and the advanced American position, -rather than let them recuperate and use Saltillo as a base. 2. Had the -Americans fallen back to Monterey, Santa Anna would have invested it, -the Mexicans of that section would have risen, every animal at Monterey -would have starved or been destroyed, the troops--disheartened by -retreating, and beyond succor--would have surrendered or been cut to -pieces, and every American depot in the rear would have been abandoned -or captured. 3. Doniphan would have been ruined. But (1), as we have -seen (note 27), Taylor believed on Jan. 26, Feb. 4, 7, and 14 (_i.e._ -both before and after taking the advanced position) that he was in no -real danger of being attacked by Santa Anna, and hence had not the -warrant of a supposed emergency for disregarding his instructions. (2) -This advanced position was not, as his explanation assumes, a good -place at which to meet the Mexicans, and he retired from it before the -battle of Buena Vista. (3) Rinconada Pass, on the other hand, could -probably have been made virtually impregnable toward the south, and, -if properly defended, could at least have held out for a considerable -time. (4) It was not reasonable to suppose that Santa Anna, learning -that Scott was about to strike at the vitals of Mexico, would undertake -to carry the Pass and besiege a city like Monterey, prepared in all -ways--as Marcy had instructed Taylor on Oct. 13, 22 (Ho. 60; 30, 1, pp. -356, 364) to prepare it--for a stubborn resistance (Howard, Taylor, -238). (5) If, however, Santa Anna were going to do so, as Taylor's -explanation assumes, the policy of Scott and the administration was -certainly the true one, since it would have contributed to a triumph -on the line from Vera Cruz to the capital. (6) Taylor's retirement -to Monterey and vicinity would have entailed no loss of prestige or -confidence on the part of the Americans, since it would have formed one -part of a bold offensive plan; but would only have diminished somewhat -Taylor's personal effulgence. (7) It was not reasonable to believe that -the men with whom Taylor (Bixby coll., 86) was ready to meet Santa -Anna in the field could not hold their own against him in strong works -(Meade, Letters, i, 179), and a success at Monterey would have been not -only more certain but more decisive and less costly than at Buena Vista -(Scott, Mems., ii, 412). Moreover Taylor would have had the Monterey -garrison as well as the troops who actually fought at Buena Vista. (8) -Taylor represented that he could not transport siege guns from Camargo -to Monterey, and how could he have expected Santa Anna to bring them to -Monterey from San Luis Potosi? (9) If Monterey did not contain ample -forage for the animals, the fault was Taylor's; and, if he was to stand -a siege, most of the animals could have been sent to the Rio Grande -(Ripley, War with Mex., i, 435). (10) Reinforcements from the north -were _en route_, and succor from Scott could have reached Monterey more -easily than a position far in advance. (11) Doniphan could have retired -from Chihuahua by the way he had gone there or (like a party of only -forty men: _Hughes, Doniphan's Exped._, 335) _via_ Presidio del Rio -Grande; and before moving toward Saltillo it was his duty to ascertain, -as he actually did, whether he could safely go there. - -Another point brought forward by Taylor was that had he remained at -Monterey, the Mexicans could more effectually have annoyed his flanks -and lines of communication (Ho. 60; 30, 1, p. 1110); but (1) evidently, -had he remained at Monterey, his flanks and lines of communication -would have been less extended and more easily protected than when he -was about eighty-five miles farther on (Polk, Diary, Mar. 23, 1847), -and (2) as a matter of fact his flanks were effectually annoyed and his -communications entirely cut off. (For certain points in this discussion -the author is indebted to Ripley's "War with Mexico.") In short, -the only rational explanation of Taylor's course appears to be that -suggested in the text. Oct. 15 Taylor wrote: Every day's march beyond -Saltillo will weaken our position and strengthen the enemy's (Ho. 60; -30, 1, p. 352). Nov. 26 he wrote: "We have advanced as far from our base -in this quarter as we ought to venture" (Bixby coll., 72). - -The troops that Taylor now had were: _regulars_--two squadrons of -cavalry, four batteries (16 guns), and at Monterey one company of -artillery; _volunteers_--two regiments of horse, eight regiments of -foot, and two guns at Monterey, Saltillo and beyond Saltillo; and three -regts. of volunteer foot holding the line to Camargo and down the river -(Ho. 60; 30, 1, p. 1098). - - - XIX. SANTA ANNA PREPARES TO STRIKE - -19.1. Butler returned to Monterey about the first of February. - -19.2. The statements regarding Taylor's negligence are from -Gen. Benham, who was on the ground as an engineer officer. His -"Recollections" was published in 1871, and whether it was based on -documents is not known. But, being an engineer, he was a man of clear -and trained intelligence; he possessed superior ability; and on careful -inquiry the author was told by Major Lukesh, director of the engineer -school, Washington Barracks, that in 1878 his faculties appeared to -be entirely sound. Moreover his account shows internal evidences of -credibility. The alleged negligence of Taylor was in accordance with -his temperament and previous record, and he probably thought it would -reassure the troops. - -19.3. Taylor wrote nothing and did nothing indicating an intention -to make his stand at Carnero Pass, and the evidence that he intended -to fight at Agua Nueva seems to be decisive. He might, however, have -endeavored to annoy the enemy at the Pass. - -19.4. _Affairs with Taylor up to Feb. 20._ Carleton, Buena Vista, -2-8, 50, 179-80. =190=Ewing, diary. =330=Taylor to brother, -Feb. 8. Raleigh (N. C.) _Star_, Aug. 18, 1847. Taylor, Letters (Bixby), -86, 182. =69=Wool to Taylor, Jan. 20, 29. =69=Warren to Wool, -Feb. 14. =147=Chamberlain, diary. =148=_Id._, recollections. -=61=Am. offs. to S. Anna, Mar. 24. =61=Heady to Marshall, -Aug. 30, 1848. =61=Gaines to Scott, May 3, 1847. =65=Wool, -orders 222. C. M. Clay, Mems., i, 143. _Vedette_, ii, no. 2 (Oury); -no. 8 (Lee). =61=[Wool] to adj. gen., Jan. 17. Article on Taylor -(by J. Davis) in Appleton's Biog. Dict. Henry, Camp. Sketches, 248-9. -=185=Bragg to Duncan, Apr. 4. =299=Posey to friend, Feb. -19. Smith, Chile con Carne, 161. Smith, Remins., 41-5. Upton, Mil. -Policy, 209. _Amer. Flag_, Matamoros, Feb. 17. N. Y. _Tribune_, Mar. -29. =367=Yell to ----, Jan. 19. Ho. Report 413; 30, 1. Encarnacion -Prisoners, 35-8, 92-4. Meade, Letters, i, 169, 182. =300=Prickett, -letters. Bishop, Journal. =8=Anon. diary. =245=Bee to -Lamar, Dec. 5, 1846. Rapida Ojeada, 6, 8. Coleman, Critt., i, 308-10. -Balbontin, Invasion, 70. Benham, Recollections. =253=Harney to -McLean, June 13. =349=Pattridge to Miss W., July 21. _Spirit of -the Times_, May 1 (H. von S.). _Hist. Teacher's Mag._, Apr., 1912., -p. 75. N. Y. _Eve. Post_, Jan. 4, 1849. =316=Bragg to Sherman, -Mar. 4, 1848. =146=Caswell, diary, Jan. 12. =139=Campbell -to D. C., Nov. 2, 9, 1846. Senex, Myth. N. Y. _Sun_, Jan. 28. (Urrea) -_Delta_, Jan. 16. _Picayune_, Mar. 11; Apr. 14 (Taylor); June 25. -_Niles_, Mar. 20, p. 60; May 8, p. 156. Ho. 60; 30, 1, pp. 441, 1098, -1106-10, 1162 (Taylor); 864, 876 (Scott); 1108 (Wool); 1111-2, 1182 -(lists). _Monitor Repub._, Jan. 14. =76=S. Anna, Jan. 26; Feb. 27. -=76=Zambonino, Jan. 23. =76=Auxil. inspector of N. Leon to -Canales, Jan. 20. - -Col. Campbell (First Tenn. regt.): "Old Zack's" manners are such that he -excites no jealousy; "no one feels that he [Taylor] is his superior, but -his equal or inferior, and each thinks he can control and manage such a -mind" (=139=to D. Campbell, Apr. 25, 1847). U. S. Grant: We thought -the battles on the Rio Grande pretty important, but had "only a faint -conception of their magnitude until they were fought over in the North -by the Press and the reports came back to us" (Mems., i, 99). It will be -noted that Taylor pursued now the same anti-Caesarean, anti-Napoleonic -policy of teaching his troops to despise the enemy that had been -followed by him before the battles of May, 1846 (chap. viii, note 9). -The distance by rail from Saltillo to Agua Nueva station is eighteen -miles. Rives (U. S. and Mexico, ii, 350) speaks of the buildings at -Buena Vista as "laid out in regular streets"; but, as the text states, -Buena Vista was only a poor farm, not a rich hacienda. A soldier, there -present, called it an "insignificant, dirty little rancho." - -19.5. _El Crepusculo_, May 16, 1835, said that Santa Anna triumphed -over Zacatecas "with the tranquillity of the tiger, which, sated with -the flesh of its prey, lies down on what it does not wish to devour." -During December, 1846, very sharp =76=letters were exchanged by -Governor Gonzalez and Santa Anna. - -19.6. This estimate is based upon about thirty statements, none of -them official. About the middle of August Salas ordered to the north the -troops that had been fighting in Jalisco. About 5500 regulars preceded -or accompanied Santa Anna's journey to the north, and later he called -other troops from the capital and the states. Though accounts varied, -Ampudia seems to have brought nearly 6000; the Fourth Brigade, which -had failed to reach Monterey, and the former garrison of Tampico were -substantial additions; Guanajuato state, roused personally by Valencia, -contributed more than 5000; the Jalisco regiment, which arrived at -the end of October, numbered 1345 foot; the state of S. Luis Potosi -did well, and other states did more or less; and an artillery company -was made up from American deserters, mostly Irishmen, under the name -of San Patricio (see chap. xi, note 11); but desertion--due to the -inborn distaste of the masses for war, to bad treatment and to poor -subsistence--was constantly unraveling the work of accumulation. - -It seems to have been a mistake to draw Ampudia's army to San Luis at -so early a date. It was in no danger before the end of the armistice; -it could have encouraged the people near Saltillo to act as guerillas; -and it needed time to regain its morale. Besides, this backward movement -had a bad effect on the other troops, and so much was said at San Luis -by Ampudia's men about the prowess of the Americans, that a general -order forbidding such talk had to be issued. Ampudia and a number of -his officers were put on trial; but the trials were suspended, and -most of the accused were exonerated in orders. Several thousand men -(successively under Urrea, Valencia and Vazquez) were kept at Tula, -about 125 miles northeast of San Luis. Santa Anna knew the Americans -could not bring artillery _via_ Tula, and did not fear them without it; -but he looked forward to operating _via_ Victoria against Taylor's line -of communication. Another body was kept at Matehuala. Smaller forces -were echeloned in the same general direction; and Minon's brigade was -thrown still farther forward as a screen, corps of observation and means -of annoying the enemy. In order to prevent the Americans from learning -about his operations, Santa Anna gave orders to the cavalry at his front -that no one should be permitted to go to Saltillo or Monterey without a -pass signed by himself. - -19.7. _Santa Anna's arrival, plans and operations at S. L. P.; his -financial difficulties there._ _Amer. Eagle_, Apr. 8. =52=J. -Parrott, Feb. 6. =52=Black, Nov. 17, 1846. London _Times_, Dec. 18, -1846; Mar. 11; Apr. 20, 1847. Matamoros _Amer. Flag_, Mar. 13. Gimenez, -Mems., 96-7, 264. _Journal des Debats_, Feb. 22. _Constitutionnel_, -Dec. 5, 12, 1846; Jan. 17, 31, 1847. =69=Worth to Bliss, Nov. 29, -1846. =69=Shields to Bliss, Jan. 13, 1847. =58=Jobson, Feb. -14. =61=Shields to adj. gen., Jan. 19. =47=Black to Conner, -Sept. 24, 1846. =47=Conner, Oct. 26; Nov. 5; Dec. 1. Memoria de ... -Guerra, Dec., 1846. Doblado, Memoria que contiene. =70=Canalizo to -S. Anna, Jan. 7. Henry, Camp. Sketches, 249, 271. Gamboa, Impug., 26. -Negrete, Invasion, ii, 351; iii, app., 444; iv, app., 177, 417. Ramirez, -Mexico, 9, 10, 12. Mexico a traves, iv, 579, 591-2. _Don Simplicio_, -Oct. 10, 1846; Jan. 9, 30; Feb. 17, 1847. _Observador Zacat._, Dec. -27, 1846, suplem. =100=Jefe dept. of V. Cruz to ayunt., Dec. 21, -1846. _Eco de Tampico_, Oct. 8, 14, 1846. Escudero, Mems., 6. Durango -congress, Dec. 11, 1846. _Republicano_, Oct. 15, 1846; Feb. 2, 1847. -=80=Mex. state, decree, Nov. 26, 1846. _Epoca_, Sept. 26; Oct. 13, -1846; Jan. 19, 26, 30; Feb. 16. =77=_Relaciones_, circulars, Sept. -30; Oct. 6, 19, 20, 22, 1846. =75=_a_Hacienda, circular, Oct. 14, -1846. =83=Gov. Queretaro to other govs., Oct. 16, 1846; to Farias, -Oct. 18; to S. Anna, Nov. 21; Dec. 21. Rivera, Gobernantes, ii, 309. -Balbontin, Invasion, 53-4, 58, 61. Apuntes, 69, 70, 73, 75. Defensa de -... Estrada. Donnavan, Adventures, 51, 76. =13=Bankhead, nos. 140, -144, 151, 173, 178, 1846. Muro, Miscelanea, 65, 68, 70. Garcia, Revol. -de Ayutla, 27. Sierra, Evolution, i, 217. _Crepusculo_, May 16, 1835. -Puga y Acal, Docs., 57. Garcia, Juarez, 65. Bustamante, Apuntes ... -S. Anna, 289. S. Anna, Apelacion, 24-5; app., 3, 14, 18-24, 30, 30-9, -66-7. =80=_Id._ to gov. Mex. state, Nov. 26, 1846; Jan. 31, 1847. -_Picayune_, Mar. 10. _Delta_, Jan. 22. _Independiente_, May 22. Wash. -_Union_, Nov. 16, 30, 1846; Mar. 17, 1847. N. Y. _Journ. of Commerce_, -Jan. 8. =80=Gov. to legislature, Feb. 15, 1847. _Diario_, Oct. -1, 2, 6, 7, 16, 21, 22, 24; Nov. 2, 14, 19, 27; Dec. 4, 6, 8, 16, -20, 24, 25, 28, 1846; Jan. 30; Feb. 15, 17, 1847. _Monitor Repub._, -Oct. 18, 31; Nov. 17, 18, 20, 21; Dec. 21, 1846; Jan. 8, 29; Feb. 11, -16; Apr. 22; Nov. 30, 1847. Mora, Papeles, 64, 66. =162=Conner, -Dec. 1, 1846 =166=Black to Conner. Sept. 24, 1846. _Niles_, -Mar. 27, p. 57. Meade, Letters, i, 160. =52=J. Parrott, June 4, -1846. =73=Bermudez de Castro, nos. 343, 346, 1846. =75=Gov. -Michoacan to Relaciones: circ. no. 252 of Relac. Parrodi, Memoria (S. -Anna, Oct. 18). Ho. 60; 30, 1, p. 776, no. 4. =366=Letters from -S. Anna to gov. S. L. P., Nov. 1. And from =76= the following. -Carrera, Nov. 10. Plana mayor, Dec. 1. Valencia, addresses, Oct. 6, 30. -Gov. to cong. Durango, Nov. 8. M. Escandon, July 21. Salas, proclams., -Aug. 28; Nov. 11. Pina to Carrera, Dec. 10. Decrees, Sept. 27; Dec. 2. -Memo, of artill. sent to S. L. P. Circular, Aug. 4. Report on artillery, -Nov. 13. Comte. gen. Chiapas, Oct. 3. Comisario gen. to S. Anna, Nov. -30; Dec. 5. Juan Morales, Nov. 2. Comte. gen. Durango, address, Oct. 16. -Guerra, circulars, Oct. 1, 2, 3, 4, 5; Nov. 30; Dec. 2, 1846. S. Anna, -Sept. 29; Oct. 3, 4, 10, 14, 17, 19, 22, 22, res., 25, res., 28, 30, -31; Nov. 2, 4, 5, 7, 9, 16, 18, 19, 28, 30; Dec. 3, 4, 7, 9, 11, 14, -19, 22, 28, 30, 1846; Jan. 1, 4, 7, 15, 19, 20; Feb. 27, 1847. Mora, -Apr. 22, 1847. Comte. gen. Guanajuato, Oct. 30; Nov. 13; Dec. 28, 1846. -S. L. P. assembly, decree, June 17, 1846. Ampudia to S. Anna, Oct. 18. -Relaciones, Jan. 11. J. G. P. Garay, June 8, 1846. Valencia, proclam., -Dec., 1844. Yanez, Oct. 9; Nov. 6, 1846. Ampudia, Oct. 1, 1846. -Valencia, Nov. 8. To S. Anna, Oct. 17. S. Anna to gov. Zacatecas, Dec. -17. - -19.8. Copies of the _Herald_ containing this letter arrived at Vera -Cruz, but were seized. Later Santa Anna denied flatly that he had had -any dealings with the United States (Apelacion, 16). - -19.9. As Santa Anna's movement rested essentially upon non-military -reasons, Scott's forecast of his operations naturally proved incorrect. -The American attack upon Vera Cruz, though known to be planned, was not -yet known certainly to be coming. Santa Anna defended himself later for -not going to Vera Cruz by saying that he was merely commander of the -northern army, but in fact he did not so regard himself. The truth is -that he urged and expected the government to provide for Vera Cruz, that -the government assured him it had been provided for, and that, had it -been tenaciously defended, it could have held out until he could have -arrived in that vicinity (=76=S. Anna, Oct. 14, 20, 1846; Jan. 14, -18, 1847. _Id._, Apelacion, 33. =76=To S. Anna, Jan. 30, 1847). -Taylor's moving away from Scott caused the intercepting of Scott's -letter of January 3, which revealed Taylor's weakness, and thus may have -been the cause of the battle of Buena Vista. - -19.10. _Why Santa Anna marched north_ (_complaints of his conduct_). -=52=Black, Aug. 27; Oct. 8; Nov. 17, 1846; Jan. 28, 1847. Sierra, -Evolution, 218. _Soldado de la Patria_, no. 13. London _Times_, Jan. -28. Memoria de ... Relaciones, Dec., 1846. _Courrier des Etats Unis_, -June 20; July 9, 1846. =335=Mackenzie to Trist, Nov. 25, 1846. -Gamboa, Impug., 15-19, 21-2. Kenly, Md. Vol., 390. Ramirez, Mexico, -173, 192. _Don Simplicio_, Jan. 9, 20, 27; Feb. 3. =82=MS. -apparently written in Jan., 1847. =77=Relaciones, circular, Nov. -27, 1846. _Republicano_, Jan. 21, 31. =13=Pakenham, no. 127, 1846. -=83=Gov. Queretaro to S. Anna, Nov. 21, 1846. Biog. del Gen. S. -Anna, 1847. =13=Pakenham to Palmerston, Oct. 29, 1846. Negrete, -Invasion, iii, app., 483 (Otero); iv, app., 177. Balbontin, Invasion, -59. Apuntes, 77. Pacheco, Exposicion. =13=Bankhead, nos. 121, -140, 141, 157, 169, 1846; 5, 1847. Garcia, Juarez, 65. Tributo a la -Verdad, 27. S. Anna, Manifiesto, Mex., 1847, 6. _Id._, Apelacion, 16, -23. _Picayune_, Mar. 9, 10. Acta, Mazatlan, Jan. 18. =80=Olaguibel -to S. Anna, Jan. --, 1847. Wash. _Union_, Oct. 10, 1846 (from _La -Patria_); Mar. 17, 1847. _Nat. Intelligencer_, Sept. 5, 1846. Richmond -_Times_, Sept. 2, 1846. _Diario_, Nov. 24; Dec. 6, 8, 1846; Jan. 30, -1847. _Monitor Repub._, Oct. 22; Nov. 20, 29; Dec. 28, 1846; Jan. 4, -6, 8, 14, 19, 22 (calling attention to the scattered state of Taylor's -forces), 26, 29, 1847. Mora, Papeles, 70. _Niles_, Mar. 27, p. 57. -=73=Bermudez de Castro, nos. 343, res., 410, 1846. Bustamante, -Nuevo Bernal, ii, 90. =76=Relaciones, Jan. 11. =76=S. Anna, -Feb. 27. =76=_Id._, Manifiesto, Jan. 26. - -Rives (U. S. and Mexico, ii, 341) doubts whether S. Anna had learned -from Richey's despatches (chap. xviii, note 27) that Taylor's forces had -been depleted, and cites in evidence S. Anna's declaration in defence -of himself for going against Taylor when Scott was about to attack -Vera Cruz (Apelacion, 32). But (1) S. Anna was not a person to admit -unnecessarily the strongest point of an accusation against him, and in -fact the other point of his defence, cited by Rives, was not honest; (2) -S. Anna here representing that he feared Scott was coming from Tampico -to S. Luis Potosi shows again the disingenuousness of his defence, for -he must have known that such a movement was impracticable; (3) it is -hardly conceivable that Scott's intercepted letter of Jan. 3 did not, -like Marcy's of Sept. 2, find its way to headquarters. - -19.11. The forces taking part in the campaign seem to have been 9500 -infantry from San Luis, 4000 (under Mejia) stationed at Matehuala, and -1000 (under Parrodi) from Tula, 6000 cavalry in four brigades (Torrejon -at Las Bocas near S. L. P., Juvera at Venado, Andrade at Cedral, and -Minon at La Encarnacion), and 900 engineers, artillery and sappers--a -total of 21,400 including officers. These numbers are taken from Rapida -Ojeada and from a San Luis letter (the figures of which were stated -positively to have come from a member of Santa Anna's staff) printed in -_El Republicano_ of February 12, which substantially agree. Santa Anna's -figures were smaller but perhaps did not include Minon's and Parrodi's -troops. Those of the Spanish minister were somewhat larger. There seem -to have been seventeen guns (three 24-pounders and three 16's, all of -which were siege or fortress guns, and for field pieces five 12's, five -8's and a 7-inch howitzer) which, as well as most of the ammunition, -appear to have gone forward January 27. Urrea was at the same time to -pass from Tula into Tamaulipas, strike at Taylor's communications and -threaten Monterey. Probably there were bodies of irregulars at points -not named above. - -It occurs to the author at this point to remark that consistency in the -use of the article in geographical names is hardly practicable. Even -Mexican maps have not been consistent; and for us it would (_e.g._) be -an affectation to use the article with such well-known names as Puebla -and Saltillo. - -19.12. At certain points in the desert there were large wells; and in -each of these a wide wheel, carrying buckets, was turned by mule power. - -19.13. The main part of the army arrived Feb. 17-19 (Apuntes, 96). -Taylor thought he could not move more than about 6000 men some 125 -miles (supposed to be about 140) from a well-stocked base, Camargo, -through a region supplied with water, subsistence and forage, and could -not transport 18-pounders (chap. xi, note 5). After Minon advanced to -Potosi, Andrade occupied La Encarnacion (night of Feb. 11). The wheel -pumps were then set in operation, but by Feb. 19 they were worn out. The -only ample supply of water was then seven or eight miles away, but it -had to be used for the animals. The distance from S. L. Potosi to Agua -Nueva by rail is about 223 miles. - -19.14. Feb. 19 two brigades of cavalry had not arrived. The figures -may or may not have included these and Minon's force. Probably they did -include many whose duties kept them from the firing line (_Republicano_, -May 3, 1847). The original reports of the officers regarding numbers and -operations have disappeared from =76=. - -19.15. _To and at La Encarnacion._ Carleton, Buena Vista, 23, 229. -Leon, Mex., 474. Garcia, Juarez, 67. London _Times_, May 10. _Journal -Milit. Serv. Instit._, xiv, 443. Gimenez, Mems., 98. Sierra, Evolution, -219. Le Clercq, Voyage, 31-49. Calendario de Ontiveros, 1847. Sen. 32; -31, 1, p. 8, note. Rapida Ojeada, 4, 7-9, etc. Ordonez, Refutacion, -5, 8, etc. =61=Lamar to Bliss, Apr. 21. Rodriguez, Breve Resena, -1848, 57. _Republicano_, Feb. 12; Mar. 24; May 3. =80=S. Anna to -gov. Mexico state, Jan. 27. _Epoca_, Jan. 19, 26; Feb. 25. Negrete, -Invasion, ii, 389. Balbontin, Invasion, 60-9, 78. Apuntes, 88, 91-7. -S. Anna, Manifiesto, Mar., 1848. _Id._, Apelacion, 24-7, 32; app., 67. -Muro, Miscelanea, 73-5. Sen. 1; 30, 1, pp. 153-8. De Peyster, Kearny, -127. _Diario_, June 13. _Monitor Repub._, Nov. 30. _Journal of U. S. -Artillery_, July, 1892, p. 294. Rapida Ojeada, ii, 4, 6, 7. _Niles_, -Mar. 27, p. 62. =73=Bermudez de Castro, no. 445, 1846. Encarnacion -Prisoners, 43. Steele, Amer. Campaigns, i, 125. =76=S. Anna, Jan. -19, 26; Feb. 2, 11, 17, 27. The author has been over the greater part of -the route. - -19.16. One cannot be sure enough now regarding the truth of the -various allegations regarding the lateral routes to say what Santa Anna -might have done. If he had reason (as he seems to have had) to believe -that he could surprise Agua Nueva, it would have been unwise to choose a -circuitous route of doubtful practicability. No Mexican came to give him -information about the ground (=76=Mora, April 23, 1847). - -19.17. _From La Encarnacion to Carnero Pass._ Carleton, Buena Vista, -232. Semmes, Service, 121. Gamboa, Impug., 23. _Epoca_, Feb. 25. -Balbontin, Invasion, 69, 70, 79. Apuntes, 97. S. Anna, Apelacion, 25. -Ordonez, Refutacion. _Republicano_, Mar. 24. Sen. 1; 30, 1, pp. 156-8. -_Diario_, June 13 (Ordonez). Diccionario Universal (_Itinerarios_). -=76=Mora, Feb. 25. =76=S. Anna, Feb. 27. - -19.18. McCulloch had made a previous expedition to La Encarnacion and -found cavalry there. - -19.19. Santa Anna attributed to a deserter named Valdez the failure -of his plan to surprise Taylor (Apelacion, 26), but the story of -Valdez in itself probably would not have had much effect on Taylor. At -La Hedionda May sent Lieut. Sturgis on a scouting expedition. Firing -was heard later, and Sturgis, being captured, did not return. This La -Hedionda was often called La Hedionda Grande. - -19.20. Chamberlain's =147=diary states in detail, quoting the -remarks made, how Wool, supported by the officers, forced the withdrawal -from Agua Nueva by threatening to lead the troops back himself rather -than see them sacrificed. This is startling, but cannot easily be -rejected. Of all the military men known to the author Chamberlain -was the most sternly soldierlike. He rose from the ranks to a brevet -brigadier-generalship, and he vouched for the correctness of his diary, -which had been kept strictly for himself. When not acting as Wool's -orderly he served as one of May's dragoons, who were commonly used by -Taylor as a sort of bodyguard. The reason given by Taylor for retreating -(Sen. 1; 30, 1, p. 132) was that his position could be turned on either -side; but he knew that long before, or should have known it. - -As the route _via_ La Hedionda debouched in the rear of Buena Vista, -one asks why the reason which seems mainly to have caused the retreat -did not veto the stand actually taken. Wool must have seen this point; -and one suspects that he used the alarm produced by the reports of -the scouts to bring about a withdrawal to the position he had long -preferred, reckoning also that, should it prove necessary to retire -farther, this could much more easily be done from Buena Vista than from -Agua Nueva. Evidently the sudden retreat fatigued the troops as well as -discouraged them; and not having become acquainted with the peculiar -ground on which they were to fight, they were repeatedly taken by -surprise during the battle that followed. By retreating Taylor gave up -the advantage, on which he had insisted, of forcing S. Anna to fight at -the very edge of a desert (chap. xviii, note 39). - -19.21. At night wagons were sent to Agua Nueva for the stores, but -the Gentlemen-Volunteers under Yell refused to load them. Hence the -First Dragoons (regulars), who had slept only some three hours in as -many days, were sent up to do the work (Chamberlain, diary). Marshall's -Kentucky horse reinforced Yell. The haste of the Americans was such -that corn and beans, instead of being loaded into waiting wagons or -destroyed, were thrown into a spring, where the Mexicans found them -(officer's diary in _Republicano_, May 3, 1847). Yell's instructions -were to retire before midnight, taking the Second Kentucky with him from -La Encantada. - -19.22. _Taylor's operations Feb. 20-21 (including night of Feb. 21)._ -=299=Posey to friend, Feb. 19. =69=Wool to Bliss, Feb. 7. -=147=Chamberlain, diary. =148=_Id._, recollections. Madison -_Record_, 1850 (Prickett). =300=Prickett, letters. Semmes, Service, -121-2. Tampico _Sentinel_, Mar. 27. Scribner, Camp., 59. Smith, Remins., -37, 42. _Picayune_, Apr. 14 (Taylor). Sen. 1; 30, 1, pp. 97, 99, 132 -(Taylor); 144 (Wool). J. Davis in _Cong. Globe_, 31, 1, app., 1034-41. -=173=_Id._, Address. Benham, Recolls. _Journ. U. S. Artillery_, -July, 1892, p. 294. Davis, J. Davis, i, 336. Ho. 60; 30, 1, pp. 1168, -1176 (Taylor). Carleton, Buena Vista, 4, 12-21, 24-6, 45. _Journ. Milit. -Serv. Instit._, xiv, 199 (No one can tell why Taylor did not fortify -Saltillo before the battle), 443. N. Y. _Eve. Post_, Jan. 4, 1849. -=76=Mora, Feb. 25. - -The reason that led Taylor to neglect preparing Saltillo was no doubt -the same that had led him previously to neglect preparations when the -circumstances called for them. - - - XX. BUENA VISTA - -20.1. Many of the Mexicans marched nearly forty-five miles in less -than twenty-four hours. See Stevens, Camps., 18. - -20.2. The statements regarding the time of day differ, but the account -of the text appears to rest upon the most reliable evidence. See -Wallace, Wallace, 40. Taylor's verbal reply to the summons of Santa Anna -is said to have been more forcible than elegant, but a courteous answer -in writing was sent by Bliss. - -20.3. Several officers seem to have noted the advantages of this -battlefield, but Wool recommended it near the end of December and is -entitled to the credit of the choice. The author visited the ground -twice, and found that a good route for infantry and cavalry ran from -La Encantada behind the hills west of Buena Vista valley, and entered -this valley north of La Angostura. Apparently it could have been made -practicable for cannon easily, and could have been used effectively by -either general for a feint at least. Engineer Mansfield had a picket -guard it during the afternoon and night of February 22. - -20.4. This space was to be closed, if necessary, with two wagons -loaded with stone. The parapet was occupied by two companies of the -First Illinois under Lieut. Col. Weatherford. The main American position -was over-manned. S. Anna could not have carried it against Washington's -guns and infantry flanking fire from the edge of the plateau, and men -were urgently needed for the American left. - -20.5. =330=The American forces in action at Buena Vista were as -follows: Dragoons under Bvt. Lieut. Col. May (First, 133; Second, 76), -209; Third Artillery (Co. C under Capt. Bragg, three guns--the fourth -being at Saltillo; Co. E under Capt. Sherman, four guns), 150; Fourth -Artillery, Capt. Washington, eight guns, 117; Arkansas horse, Col. Yell, -479; First Kentucky (two squadrons of cavalry and a battalion of mounted -riflemen), Col. Marshall, 330; Second Kentucky, Col. McKee, 571; First -Mississippi, Col. Davis, 368; Indiana Brigade (Second regt. under Col. -Bowles and Third under Col. Lane), Gen. Lane, 1253, including a rifle -battalion of four companies under Major Gorman; First Illinois, Col. -Hardin, 580; Second Illinois, Col. Bissell, 573; Texas volunteer company -(attached to Second Illinois), Capt. Conner, 61; Major McCulloch's Texan -scouts, 27. The figures include officers and men. The general staff -numbered forty-one. Three hundred and sixty-four of the men were on the -sick list. A company of the First Artillery, a few men of the Third -Artillery, two Mississippi companies and four Illinois companies were at -Saltillo. All except the dragoons and artillery were volunteers. Only -the artillery, dragoons, Mississippi regiment, and Conner's company had -been under fire, and some of these men were raw recruits; but Col. Davis -and all the field officers of the Second Kentucky were West Pointers. -Mostly Wool's men had been well trained. McCulloch's company probably -served under May. All the corps not otherwise described were infantry. -In the volunteer horse certain companies appear to have been regarded as -true cavalry and certain others as only mounted infantry. A similar fact -was noted in connection with the battle of Sacramento (p. 309). - -20.6. Minon issued from the Palomas de Adentro pass. - -20.7. No satisfactory explanation of Taylor's trips to Saltillo was -made. The city had been in greater danger of attack from Minon while -the Americans were eighteen miles away at Agua Nueva than after they -retired. Taylor should have ascertained seasonably that Palomas Pass -was practicable for cavalry, and have done whatever was necessary. Wool -appears to have barricaded the streets of Saltillo before going to Agua -Nueva (N. Y. _Eve. Post_, Jan. 4, 1849), and Butler began a redoubt, -which seems to have been the only external defence. Taylor's escort were -not needed as laborers. Major Warren, the governor of Saltillo, Capt. -Webster of the First Artillery, who had charge of the redoubt, and First -Lieut. Shover, of the Third Artillery, stationed not far away in the -old camp, were competent officers; and the first two made no allusion -in their reports to Taylor's visits, while the third only said that -the General ordered him to watch Minon, and, if attacked, defend his -post to the last extremity--which were his obvious duties. There seems -to have been no particular reason to anticipate a night attack. Taylor -did not suggest this as a reason for going to the city. Especially is -it surprising that he left his work at Saltillo, whatever it was, so -incomplete on the morning of February 22 that he had to return in the -evening. Santa Anna, after the exhausting march just made, could not -be expected to strike decisively that day, whereas such an attack was -almost certain to be made the next morning, and it was Taylor's duty to -be on the ground at that time. - -20.8. _Events of Feb. 22; the battlefield._ Sen. 1; 30, 1, pp. -97-9 (Taylor); 98 (S. Anna); 144 (Wool); 163 (Marshall); 169 (Fry); -171 (Roane); 174 (Weatherford); 175 (Bissell); 181 (Gen. Lane); 186 -(Col. Lane); 189 (Gorman); 197 (May); 203 (Sherman); 205 (Warren); -206 (Webster); 207 (Shover). Carleton, B. Vista, 5-9, 27-49, 177-86. -Gonzalez, Aguascalientes, 158. French, Two Wars, 77-8. _Journ. Milit. -Serv. Instit._, xiv, 443. =190=Ewing, diary. Raleigh _Star_, Aug. -18. =276=Neville diary. _Delta_, Mar. 14, 1848. =69=Wool to -Taylor, Jan. 20. =147=Chamberlain, diary. =148=_Id._, recolls. -=110=Barbour, diary. _Vedette_, iv, no. 8 (Lee). =8=Anon. -diary. =61=[Wool] to Jones, Jan. 17. =300=Prickett, letters. -Rapida Ojeada. _Diario_, Apr. 17. Matamoros _Amer. Flag_, Mar. 20. -_Republicano_, May 3. =80=Ampudia to gov. Mex. state, Oct. 10. -Balbontin, Invasion, 71-3. Apuntes, 98-100. Taylor and his Generals, -166. S. Anna, Apelacion, 25-7. Eyewitness, Complete Hist., 55. -Scribner, Camp., 62, note. Smith, Chile con Carne, 214-5. Smith, -Remins., 37, 48. _Picayune_, Apr. 14 (Taylor); May 21; Sept. 7; Oct. -19; Dec. 3. _Delta_, July 11. _Revue des Deux Mondes_, Aug. 1, 413-4. -Benham, Recolls. _Nat. Intelligencer_, Apr. 7. _Spirit of the Times_, -May 1. Napoleon, Maxims, p. 26. Wallace, Wallace, 40. Davis, J. Davis, -i, 340. Profess. Memoirs corps of engineers, no. 31, p. 110. Stevens, -I. I. Stevens, i, 145. Carreno, Jefes, ccxxxii. Ho. 60; 30, 1, p. 1168 -(Taylor). Stevens, Camps., 18. Encarnacion Prisoners, 34, 38-9. N. Y. -_Eve. Post_, Jan. 4, 1849. _Littell_ no. 155. Romero, Geog. and Stat. -Notes. =76=Reports of S. Anna, Uraga, Memontesdeoca, Zamara, Mig. -Andrade, Guzman, Trejo, Juvera, Mora. - -20.9. The data relating to the Mexican batteries, when collated, -cannot be fully harmonized. _E.g._ Carleton puts the 24-pounders on -the American left near the mountain, but from Mexican sources it seems -clear that they remained near the road, and Wallace (Wallace, 50) says -the same. Washington states that he was most of the time under the fire -of heavy guns. Of course the Mexican left had to be protected, and it -would have been very hard to move these clumsy iron pieces on the rough -ground. Gen. Perez stated after the battle that from lack of forage the -draught animals had been too weak to draw the artillery up the hills. - -20.10. Bowles was personally brave, but had been away much of the -time and did not understand his work (=65=orders 281). His men -keenly realized this (Perry, Indiana, 292), and hence went into the -battle shaky. Lane knew how they felt (Scribner, Camp., 62); and -apparently he should not have placed them far in advance and alone to -meet overwhelming numbers. It should be added, however, that (1) he -intended to give his personal attention to the regiment (Scribner, -Camp., 62), and (2) the Mississippi Rifles (to whom a position had -been assigned the previous evening) were expected to join the Second -Indiana at an early hour (Barbour, diary). Had they not been absent -with Taylor, one may fairly say, Bowles would not have given his fatal -order, and the American flank would in all probability not have been -turned; or, had the order been given, the Second Indiana would almost -certainly have rallied upon the Mississippians, and the virtual loss -of Marshall's troops would have been avoided. The gap created by the -absence of the Mississippi regiment should have been filled by recalling -McKee and Bragg from the west side as soon as the formation of Santa -Anna's columns indicated where he intended to strike and by ordering the -reserved artillery to the plateau. The cause of Bowles's order is not -certain; but O'Brien's horses, when attached to the guns for the purpose -of advancing, faced of course to the rear, and it seems probable that -Bowles misunderstood this as a sign of withdrawal. The worst feature of -his order was that he specified no place to stop. - -Lieut. Col. Haddon of the Second Indiana stated in 1848 that the -regiment was rallied on the south edge of a ravine, but was ordered by -Taylor himself, who had then arrived, to cross to the other side of -it, and, as a body of Mexicans charged it just then, it broke and ran -(Perry, Indiana, 292). Certainly Taylor exhibited a peculiar resentment -toward the regiment, opposed having the affair investigated (_ibid._, -163, 313) and endeavored to hush it up (_ibid._, 276). Other officers -were doubtless as censurable as Bowles, but he was the most conspicuous -delinquent and became the scapegoat. - -20.11. The failure of this attack on Buena Vista was said by a Mexican -officer to have been due to Gen. Andrade, who failed to cooperate, -and prevented a large force of infantry from doing so -(_Republicano_, May 3, 1847). Yell was a gallant but negligent officer. -He did not know how to manoeuvre his men, and only a portion of them -fought here (_Niles_, May 8, 1847, p. 157; _Spirit of the Times_, May -1). He was far in advance of them when he fell (Carleton, B. Vista, 93). -American guns came up and also some dragoons, and helped complete the -repulse of the enemy. The skirmish lasted only a few minutes. - -What the Arkansas men lacked was not courage, but the discipline (and -the resulting skill and confidence) against which they had protested -while on the Chihuahua expedition (p. 274). Benham states that Marshall -would not go back to the field though urged by Taylor personally to -do so (Recolls.). All this resulted from a mistake of Wool's. He -understood that the bench was an extremely valuable position, and should -therefore have occupied it in advance, and thrown up a breastwork -there, dismounting the volunteer cavalry, and placing them behind this -and other works (Chamberlain). One part of the lancers ("cuirassiers") -retreated; the other part crossed to the opposite side of the valley, -and returned behind the hills (see note 3) to Santa Anna's position. -On reappearing they were taken for Americans and caused great alarm -(Balbontin, Invasion, 87). This suggests what the effect might have been -had either Santa Anna or Taylor used this route for a feint or attack. - -20.12. A bitterly contested question was whether Wool advised retreat -during the battle. The truth appears to be that, as Benham fully -explains, he advised preparing to retire, that Taylor gave an order -accordingly to Washington, and that a zealous subaltern began to move; -but that Taylor, almost instantly reflecting on the moral effect that a -sign of retreat would have on the volunteers, countermanded the order. -Wool would not have advised retreating from what he considered the best -position, except in the case of absolute necessity. - -20.13. Bragg now had three guns, for the one that had been under -Lieut. Kilburn had rejoined him. It is worth mention that Bragg gives -his ammunition expenditure, Feb. 23, as about 250 rounds per gun (Sen. -1; 30, 1, p. 202), an unparalleled record for muzzle-loading cannon. - -20.14. The Americans looked upon this as a ruse of Santa Anna, -designed to save the men in the recess of the mountain; but the Mexicans -give the view of the text (_e.g._ Apuntes, 102), and a field officer -(probably Col. Bissell), who went with Hardin and McKee to meet the -Mexican officers, stated that they had no white flag (Littell, no. 155, -p. 234). The fact that so much consideration was paid to their absurd -question suggests that Taylor was not averse to a parley. Many of the -Mexicans in the recess endeavored to escape by scaling the mountain -(Carleton, B. Vista, 105). - -20.15. As the Mexican artillery could not cross the long ravine, the -Mexicans in the north field were almost predestined to fail, but had -Santa Anna attacked the centre vigorously at this time with all his -remaining forces, the American artillery would have had to stay on -the plateau, and hence in that respect the two sides would have been -equal in the north field. Santa Anna's critics charged that he simply -threw his troops into the battle, and left them without guidance or -support. Not knowing how much he was hampered by misconduct on the part -of subordinates one must be cautious, but the criticism seems mainly -just. He should have concentrated on the American left and centre, -sending merely a small force to amuse Washington, and making feints on -the west side of the road and from behind the western hills. Again, -as we see from the Mexican reports, he gave too much attention to the -details of the operations, and he was unable to adapt his plans to the -quick manoeuvring of the American artillery. He attributed his defeat -to Minon's failing to attack Taylor's rear (Negrete, Invasion, ii, -378); but Minon had not force enough to do this effectively, and such -a duty had not been assigned to him (Balbontin, Invasion, 71). Gimenez -(Memorias) charged it to the want of subordination, precision and morale -on the part of the officers and the effect of their criticisms of Santa -Anna upon the soldiers. - -20.16. Benham (Recollections, 24) states that (as he learned from -Mansfield) Chilton, Taylor's aide, told Mansfield that he carried -this order, and was cautioned by Mansfield not to mention the fact. -Wallace (Wallace, 47) says Chilton carried the order, and gives his -language. Wool states that this final affair occurred under Taylor's -eye and direction (Sen. 1; 30, 1, p. 149). W. A. Richardson, a captain -in one of these regiments, and also Col. Bissell stated that the order -emanated from Taylor (Charleston _Courier_, Jan. 20, 1854). Weatherford, -who succeeded Hardin, gives the language of the order in his report. -Lombardini, general-in-chief of the Mexican infantry, had been wounded, -and hence Perez, second in that command, took his place. It has been -said that Santa Anna should have led the charge, but he stated that his -old wound had reopened (=76=Feb. 23). - -20.17. The redoubt at Saltillo commanded most of the approaches. It -was held by Capt. Webster with two 24-pound howitzers, a company of the -First Artillery, and an Illinois company. At the train and headquarters -camp on the right of the redoubt Lieut. Shover had one of Bragg's -6-pounders and two Mississippi companies. The three remaining Illinois -companies (two having been detached from each of the regiments) remained -in the city. Minon found that on account of the broken ground he could -do nothing (Minon in _Delta_, June 16, 1847), and soon retired. Shover -pursued him for some distance with his gun, the Mississippians and a -yelling crowd of stragglers and teamsters, followed by Lieut. Donaldson -of Webster's company with one of the howitzers. It was believed that -Minon lost fifty or sixty men. Many Mexican irregulars gathered near -Saltillo but they accomplished nothing. - -20.18. Once, it was said, Col. McKee sent his adjutant to inform -the General that he was surrounded, and to ask what should be done. -With convincing energy Taylor replied, "Go and tell your Colonel that -he has got them just where he wants them, and now is the time to give -them Jesse"; upon which the adjutant, whose face had been a picture -of despair, clapped spurs to his horse, rushed back and delivered the -message at the top of his voice with a spirit that every soldier caught -instantly. Whether the story is literally true or not, it doubtless -represents the most important part played by Taylor, and this was -invaluable. If Taylor made the remark, however, he doubtless used a -stronger Biblical word than "Jesse." According to Gen. Chamberlain, -instead of saying, "Give them a little more grape, Mr. Bragg," he -exclaimed, "Double-shot your guns and give 'em hell!" Rev. Theodore -Parker said (Sermon) that the following anecdote appeared to be "very -well authenticated." Seeing McKee's regiment stagger, Taylor cried as -if the men could hear him, "By God, this will not do; this is not the -way for Kentuckians to behave." Then they rallied, and rising in his -stirrups he shouted, "Hurrah for Old Kentuck! That's the way to do it. -Give 'em hell, damn 'em!" There is ample reason to believe that such -Taylor could be on the battlefield. - -20.19. _The battle of Feb. 23_. The reports of Taylor and his officers -in Sen. 1; 30, 1, pp. 97-209. =267=Reports of Miss. captains. -Perry, Indiana, contains numerous letters. Carleton, Buena Vista, -_passim_. Calderon, Rectif. Ceballos, Capitulos, 122-3. Gonzalez, -Aguascalientes, 159-60. Puga y Acal, Doc., 59. Rapida Ojeada, Segunda -Parte, 9. Zarco, Historia, i, 259. French, Two Wars, 78-83. _Journ. -Milit. Serv. Instit._, xiv, 443-4; xvii (Van Deusen). Neville, diary. -Sierra, Evolution, i, 219. _Delta_, Mar. 14. Claiborne, Quitman, i, -291. Taylor, Letters (Bixby), 182. =69=Wool to Taylor, Mar. 30. -=147=Chamberlain, diary. =148=_Id._, recolls. =69=Bragg -to [Bliss], Mar. 5. =190=Ewing, diary. Davis, Recolls., 212-3. Dix, -Speeches, i, 210. =330=Taylor to brother, Mar. 27; Apr. 25; Sept. ---. Raleigh _Star_, Apr. 28; July 21; Aug. 18. Charleston _Mercury_, -Apr. 8. Rowland, Register, 407, 410-12. Ills. State Hist. Soc. Trans., -1904, pp. 49-50, 53-6; 1905, p. 209. =61=Gorman, report, Mar. -2. =61=O'Brien court of inquiry. =61=Gen. Lane, statement, -May 19, 1849. =65=Gen. Lane court of inquiry. =65=Bowles -court of inquiry. Eyewitness, Complete Hist., 63. =110=Barbour, -diary. Greensborough (N. C.) _Morn. Post_, Apr. 5, 1903 (O. R. Smith). -=8=Anon. diary. =61=[Wool] to Jones, Jan. 17. Madison -_Record_, 1850 (Prickett). =300=Prickett, letters. Sen. 32; 31, -1 (Hughes). Zirckel, Tagebuch, 9. Appleton's Biog. Dict. (_Taylor_ by -J. Davis). Johnson, Thomas, 24. McCormack, Koerner, i, 499, 504-5. -Parker, Sermon. =256=Gen. Lane to Wool, May 20. =256=Wool to -Marcy, June 12. =277=Taylor to Coombs, May 23. Wallace, Wallace, -44-51. Nebel and Kendall, The War Illustrated, 11-16. Semmes, Service, -120-2. Rapida Ojeada, i. =5=Anaya, memoria, [Nov., 1847]. S. -Anna, Mi Historia, 60-5. _Id._, Apelacion, 28. Gamboa, Impug., 24-5. -=185=Bragg to Duncan, Apr. 4, 1847; Jan. 13, 1848. Kenly, Md. Vol., -264. Tampico _Sentinel_, Mar. 27. _Diario_, Apr. 16. _Republicano_, -Mar. 24; Apr. 17; May 3; June 20. =80=Ampudia to gov. Mex., Oct. -10. =208=Herran to Acal, Mar. 6. Noticia hist. de todos los -Cuerpos. =212=Hastings, diary. Negrete, Invasion, iii, app., 33-5. -Balbontin, Invasion, 80-8. Apuntes, 100-4. Taylor and his Generals, 166. -Scribner, Campaign, 21, 59-71. Ordonez, Refutacion, i, ii. Hitchcock, -Fifty Years, 349. Grant, Memoirs, i, 138. Muro, Miscelanea, 75. Smith, -Chile con Carne, 215-49. Smith, Reminiscences, 6, 50, 112. N. Orl. -_Picayune_, Mar. 27; Apr. 14, 22; May 21; June 24. _Delta_, Apr. 4; -May 30; June 6, 16; July 11. _Tropic_, Mar. 31. Upton, Milit. Policy, -209-10. _Boletin de la Democracia_, no. 11. Buhoup, Narrative, 120, -123. =210=Bragg to Hammond, May 4; Dec. 20. =349=Pattridge -to Miss W., Aug. 25. Piatt, Thomas, 69. Quisenberry, Taylor, 34-5. -_Revue des Deux Mondes_, Aug. 1, pp. 413-7. Benham, Recolls. Wash. -_Union_, Apr. 6, 7; June 16; Aug. 25. _Nat. Intelligencer_, Apr. 7, -23; May 7, 21, 1847; Mar. 23, 1848. N. Y. _Journ. of Commerce_, Apr. -16. _Monitor Repub._, May 6, 16; Nov. 30. _Spirit of the Times_ (H. -von S.), May 1. _Journ. of U. S. Artillery_, July, 1892, p. 296; -Oct., 1892, pp. 415-8. Halleck, Milit. Art, i, p. 415. Dodd, Davis, -87. Charleston _Courier_, Apr. 20, 1847; Jan. 20, 1854. N. Y. _Eve. -Post_, Jan. 4, 1849. Ceremonies. =367=Moore to Moore, Apr. 15. -Davis, J. Davis, i, 341-50. Stevens, I. I. Stevens, i, 145. Carreno, -Jefes, ccxxxiv-v. _Niles_, Apr. 3, p. 80; Apr. 10, pp. 83-4; Apr. 24, -p. 117; May 8, p. 156. =92=Accusacion del Gral. S. Anna. Ho. 60; -30, 1, pp. 1115, 1169, 1181. Dix, Dix, i, 210-3. Madigan, cat. no. 2, -1914 (Bragg). =210=Alvord to Hammond, Feb. 24, 1848. Griepenkerl, -Applied Tactics, 187. Ills. State Hist. Soc. Trans. ix, 50. _South. -Qtrly. Rev._, Jan., 1851, 169-89. _Littell_, no. 155, pp. 233-5. -=251=Lowry, narrative. Albert Pike, poem. =76=S. Anna, Feb. -23. =76=_Id._ to Adame, Feb. 26. =76=Mora, Mar. 31, res. - -A German ex-officer under Taylor said the battle was won, in spite of -an unexampled ignorance of all tactical rules on the part of field -officers, by the lion-like courage of the soldiers of certain regiments -assisted by other fortunate circumstances (Zirckel, Tagebuch, 9). W. H. -L. Wallace, adjutant of First Illinois, wrote: "I've no doubt--_inter -nos_--had it been just as convenient for us, as for Santa Anna, to -_vamos_ [_i.e._ retreat] we would have been off for Monterey"; but we -knew Minon was in our rear, and believed that larger Mexican forces -had been sent toward Monterey, and that the mountains were full of -irregulars (Wallace, Wallace, 51; see also Balbontin, Invasion, 84). - -20.20. Killed, 265; wounded, 408 (Ho. 24; 31, 1). Missing, 6. The -Mississippi regiment lost more heavily than any other--one out of 3.75 -men (Carleton, B. Vista, 212). - -20.21. Aside from pluck and patriotism Taylor had a good reason -for not giving up. Had he been defeated, he would probably have been -punished for disobeying orders in advancing so far (see Polk, Diary, -March 23, 1847). (Querying) =173=J. Davis, Address. - -20.22. The greater part of the deserters appear to have gone to Agua -Nueva (Balbontin, Invasion, 83), where they hoped to find provisions -and water. Santa Anna should have had a guard on the road to check and -reorganize these men. His policy of holding out expectations of booty -reacted now, for many men left the ranks to rob the dead and wounded -(Uraga in _Monitor Repub._, Nov. 30, 1847). - -20.23. Balbontin (Invasion, 89) said that the troops felt confident -of triumphing the next day, and therefore would not have deserted; but -while this may have been true of the artillery (always a superior body) -to which he belonged, it cannot have been true of the army in general. -Thousands had deserted already. - -20.24. _The night of Feb. 23._ Semmes, Service, 122. Ceballos, -Capitulos, 122. Ho. 60; 30, 1, p. 1115 (Taylor). =69=Wool to -Taylor, Mar. 30. Chamberlain, diary. _Id._, recolls. Barbour, diary. -Prickett, letters. Sen. 1; 30, 1, pp. 99, 137 (Taylor); 144 (Wool). -_Delta_, June 16; July 11. Benham, Recolls. Rapida Ojeada, i, ii. -Ordonez, Refutacion, i, ii. =5=Anaya, Memoria. =185=Bragg -to Duncan, Apr. 4. _Republicano_, Mar. 24; May 3. Carleton, B. Vista, -125-31, 191. French, Two Wars, 81-2. _Journ. Milit. Serv. Instit._, xiv, -443-4. Ewing, diary. Dix, Speeches, i, 213. =330=Memo. in Taylor's -letters to his brother. =330=Taylor to brother, Mar. 27. Nebel and -Kendall, 13. =267=Bradford to J. Davis, Mar. 2. Perry, Indiana, -178, etc. Polk, Diary, Mar. 23. Sierra, Evolution, etc., i, 219. -_Independiente_, Apr. 10. Balbontin, Invasion, 83, 89, 90-1, 93, 100-1. -Apuntes, 104-7. =118=Berlandier, journal. S. Anna, Apelacion, 29, -32, etc. Gamboa, Impug., 23-5. Scribner, Camp., 66. =52=Black, -Mar. 6. _Picayune_, Mar. 24 (_Sold. de la Patria_); Apr. 11. _Monitor -Repub._, May 6; Nov. 30. _Niles_, Apr. 10, p. 83. N. Y. _Eve. Post_, -Jan. 4, 1849. Ills. State Hist. Soc. Trans., ix, 50. =316=Bragg to -Sherman, Mar. 1, 1848. =76=S. Anna, Feb. 23, 26, 27. =76=_Id._ -to Adame, Feb. 26. =76=J. M. Aguirre, Jan. 27, 1848. Wallace, -Wallace, 40. - -The Kentucky horse and the guns (First Artillery) should have been -ordered up from Rinconada Pass as soon as Taylor found there was to be -a battle (Ripley, War with Mex., i, 437-8). They could have guarded La -Angostura, and Washington's field pieces would have been invaluable on -the plateau. - -20.25. The Mexicans were not driven away by hunger. Statements from -persons knowing the facts regarding the provisions available at Agua -Nueva differ so radically that we can reach no precise conclusion on -that point; but certainly there were enough to support the army more -than two days, and then enable it to move. Whatever provisions were -at that place could have been brought to the battlefield (Balbontin, -Invasion, 89). It seems as if there must also have been supplies at -Patos and La Vaqueria; and Minon asserted later that, as he sent word to -Santa Anna, he had plenty of provisions for the army (_Delta_, June 16). -The question of water is more difficult; but there were many wagons, and -enough could have been transported for say 6000 picked men. Apparently -some water must have been brought up on Feb. 22 and 23. In short, had -Santa Anna felt any assurance of being able to rout the Americans on -Feb. 24, he would have tried to do so, knowing that abundant supplies -lay at Saltillo. Possibly he might have remained in the vicinity and -prepared for another battle, even if he could not fight again the next -day; but probably he remembered Scott, and he had not counted upon -remaining long at the north. - -20.26. Taylor doubtless expected to obtain the men captured at La -Encarnacion, but they had gone south (see Encarnacion Prisoners). Santa -Anna had very few to give up, for almost all Americans who had been -or might have been captured were killed by his excited troops (Rapida -Ojeada; Balbontin, Invasion, 81; _Republicano_, March 24, 1847). - -20.27. _The Mexican sequel._ Rapida Ojeada, i, ii. Gamboa, Impug., -23-5, 27-9. Otero, Comunicacion, 11. _Republicano_, Mar. 24; May 3. -_Epoca_, Mar. 2, 11. =208=Herran to Acal, Mar. 6, 13. Balbontin, -Invasion, 95-100. Apuntes, 108-15. S. Anna, Apelacion, app., 39-55, 67. -Ordonez, Refutacion, i, ii. Muro, Miscelanea, 77-8. =52=Black, Mar. -6. _Picayune_, Mar. 24 (_Sold. de la Patria_). _Independiente_, Apr. -10. _Boletin de la Democracia_, no. 21. Sen. 1; 30, 1, p. 99 (Taylor). -_Diario_, Mar. 31 (S. Anna); June 13. _Monitor Repub._, Mar. 31; May -6; Nov. 30. Carreno, Jefes, ccxlii. Ho. 60; 30, 1, p. 1115 (Taylor); -1125 (S. Anna). Dublan, Legislacion, v, 267. =82=Gil to Ruano, -Mar. 6. =76=S. Anna, Feb. 26, 27. =76=_Id._ to Adame, Feb. -26. =76=Comte. gen. Puebla, Mar. 3. =76=Comte. gen. Tabasco, -proclam., Mar. 11. =76=Mora, Mar. 31, res. =76=Comte. gen. S. -L. Potosi, Mar. 6. =76=A. Bustamante, Mar. 9. =76=Comte. gen. -V. Cruz, Mar. 4. =76=Guerra, circular, Mar. 1. - -20.28. The fortifications of Monterey had already been greatly -improved. Col. Morgan, Lieut. Col. Irwin and Major Wall of the Second -Ohio occupied respectively Cerralvo, Marin and Punta Aguda (Ho. 60; 30, -1, p. 1123). Morgan distinguished himself by a march executed in the -face of great odds, and Irwin went to his aid (_ibid._). Urrea attacked -at least one other train (Mar. 6), and did a large amount of damage. So -great became the alarm of the Americans that Col. Curtis, now in charge -at Camargo, sent an officer to Washington with a requisition for 50,000 -volunteers (_Nat. Intelligencer_, Mar. 23). - -20.29. _The American sequel._ =330=J. T. Taylor to Scott, Feb. -12. =330=Taylor to brother, Mar. 27. Perry, Indiana, 127-8, 137, -149. Taylor, Letters (Bixby), 95. Polk, Diary, Jan. 5; Mar. 21-3; Apr. -1, 7. =69=Mesa to Trist, Mar. 3. =169=Taylor to Crittenden, -Mar. 25; May 15. =251=Lowry, narrative. _Amer. Pioneer_, Mar. -8. =272=Memoir of Morgan. Henry, Camp. Sketches, 327-9. Rapida -Ojeada, 9. =139=Campbell to D. C., Mar. 20. Meade, Letters, i, 143, -182. =69=Wool to Taylor, Mar. 7. =60=Marcy to Brooke, Mar. -22. _Picayune_, Feb. 18; Mar. 13, 28; Apr. 8. Kenly, Md. Vol., 263-4. -Tampico _Sentinel_, Mar. 27. Carleton, B. Vista, 153-4. =60=Marcy, -Mar. 22, to Pierce; to Brooke; to Scott; to govs. Grant, Mems., i, -123. Smith, Chile con Carne, 151-71. _Delta_, Jan. 19. Matamoros -_Amer. Flag_, Feb. 13, 17. Ho. 60; 30, 1, pp. 1118-9, 1123-5, 1131 -(Taylor). Wash. _Union_, Mar. 23. N. Y. _Journ. of Commerce_, Jan. 8. -_Nat. Intelligencer_, Mar. 23. _Niles_, Mar. 27, p. 59; May 1, p. 131; -May 8, pp. 151-2. =185=Thomas to Duncan, Mar. 18. Sen. 32; 31, 1 -(Hughes). Parrodi, Memoria. Benham, Recolls. =76=S. Anna, Feb. 27. -=76=Carbajal to Urrea, Mar. 8. =76=Mora to S. Anna, Mar. 17. -Sen. 1; 30, 1, pp. 49, 99, 210-5. =245=Curtis to Lamar, Mar. 1. -=108=Buchanan to Bancroft, June 14. - - - - - APPENDIX--THE SOURCES - - - A. MANUSCRIPT AND PERSONAL SOURCES - -As a number of the owners or holders of MSS. (whose names are preceded -below by colons) did not desire to receive applications for the use of -their papers, it has been thought best to omit all addresses. - -Some documents belonging to large collections are, for convenience of -citation, listed separately. A few verbal statements (so described) are -included. The numbers preceding collections, etc., correspond to numbers -preceding citations of MS. documents in the notes. - -The complete Appendix follows the Notes of volume ii. - - Allen, William. =1=Papers: Library of Congress. - - Allred, R. N. =2=Recollections: R. R. Allred, Esq. - - Alvarado, J. B. =3=Hist. de California: Bancroft Coll., - Univ. of California. - - Amador, J. M. =4=Memorias sobre la Hist. de California: - Bancroft Coll. - - Anaya, P. M. =5=Memoria: Sen. Lic. D. Genaro Garcia. - - Anderson, Robert. =6=Papers: Mrs. James M. Lawton. - - Anderson, W. E. =7=Document. - - Anonymous. =8=Soldier's Diary sent anonymously to the - author. - - Antrim, Jay. =9=Sketches: Library of Congress. - - Aram, Joseph. =10=Narrative: Mrs. Grace Aram. - - Archives of France. =11=Dept. des Affaires Etrangeres, - Paris. - - Archives of Great Britain. =12=Admiralty Papers; - =13=Foreign Office Papers: Public Record Office, London. - - Archives of States. =14=Alabama, =15=Arkansas, - =16=Connecticut, =17=Delaware, =18=Georgia, - =19=Florida, =20=Illinois, =21=Indiana, - =22=Iowa, =23=Kentucky, =24=Louisiana, - =25=Maine, =26=Maryland, =27=Massachusetts, - =28=Michigan, =29=Mississippi, =30=Missouri, - =31=New Hampshire, =32=New Jersey, =33=New York, - =34=North Carolina, =35=Ohio, =36=Pennsylvania, - =37=Rhode Island, =38=South Carolina, =39=Tennessee, - =40=Texas, =41=Vermont, =42=Virginia, - =43=Wisconsin. - - Archives of the =44=U. S. Embassy at Mexico. - - Archives of the =45=U. S. Legation in Texas: State Dept., - Washington. - - Archives of U. S. Navy Dept. =46=Captain's Letters; - =47=Squadron Letters; =48=Confidential Letter Books; - =49=Orders; =50=Executive Letters; =51=Marine Corps. - - Archives of U. S. State Dept. =52=Correspondence (and - enclosures) with diplomatic and consular agents in Mexico, Great - Britain, France, Spain, Prussia and Texas; =53=Notes to and - from the legations of those countries; =54=Report Books; - =55=Confidential Report Books; =56=Special Missions - and Correspondence with confidential agents in Mexico, Texas and - California; =57=Domestic Letter Books; =58=Miscellaneous - Letters and Replies; =59=Circulars issued to diplomatic and - consular agents. See also Claims Commission. - - Archives of U. S. War Dept. =60=Secretary of War's - files; =61=Adjutant General's files; =62=Quartermaster - General's files; =63=Military Book; =64=Adjutant - General, Miscellany; =65=Orders; =66=Engineer's - office; =67=Bureau of Topog. Engineers; =68=Judge - Advocate General's office, courts martial, courts of inquiry; - =69=Discontinued Commands, etc. - - Archivo =69a=del Distrito Federal, Mexico. - - Archivo =70=General y Publico (particularly "Guerra"), - Mexico. - - Archivo =71=Historico-Nacional, Madrid. - - Archivo =72=Nacional de Cuba. - - Archivo =73=Particular del Ministerio de Estado, Madrid. - - Archivos (_National_) de =74=Fomento (Maps); - =75=Gobernacion (formerly called "Relaciones Interiores"); - =75a=Hacienda; =76=Guerra y Marina; =77=Relaciones - (_i.e._, Exteriores). At Mexico City. - - Archivos (_State_) de =78=Coahuila, =79=Jalisco, - =80=Mexico, =81=Nuevo Leon, =82=Puebla, - =83=Queretaro, =84=San Luis Potosi, =85=Tamaulipas, - =86=Vera Cruz, =87=Zacatecas. At the state capitals. - - Archivos (_Municipal_) de =88=Cordoba, - =89=Guadalajara, =90=Jalapa, =91=Matamoros, - =92=Mexico, =93=Monterey, =94=Orizaba, - =95=Puebla, =96=Queretaro, =97=Saltillo, - =98=San Luis Potosi, =99=Tampico, =100=Vera Cruz, - =101=Victoria, =102=Zacatecas. - - Avila, Juan. =103=Notas Californianas: Bancroft Coll. - - Ayer =104=Collection: Newberry Library, Chicago. - - Baldridge, William. =105=The Days of 1846: Bancroft Coll. - - Bancroft =106=Collection: Univ. of California. - - Bancroft =107=Papers: New York City Public Library. - - Bancroft, George. =108=Papers: Massachusetts Hist. Soc. - - Bandini, Juan. =109=Documentos para la Hist. de - California: Bancroft Coll. - - Barbour, H. H. =110=Diary: Mrs. Barbour. - - Beauregard, P. G. T. =111=Papers: C. S. Hook, Esq. - - Beauregard, P. G. T. =112=Papers: Justin H. Smith. - - Beauregard, P. G. T. =113=Reminiscences (done by him from - diary and notes): Claiborne papers, Mississippi Dept. of Hist. - - Beeler, Louis F. =114=Recollections. - - Belden, Josiah. =115=Statement: Bancroft Coll. - - Bell, A. N. =116=Document. - - Benjamin, W. R. =117=Collection. - - Berlandier, Luis. =118=Papers: Library of Congress. - - Bevan, William. =119=Statement. - - Biddle, James. =120=Papers: Library of Congress. - - Biddle, Charles J. =121=Papers: Charles Biddle, Esq. - - Bidwell, John. =122=California, 1841-8: Bancroft Coll. - - Bidwell, John. =123=Statement: Harvard Univ. Library. - - Blocklenger, Benjamin. =124=Letter. - - Bonham, Milledge L. =125=Letters: Dr. Milledge Lake - Bonham, Ill. - - Botello, Narciso. =126=Anales del Sur de la California: - Bancroft Coll. - - Boyle, John. =127=Letter: Miss Esmeralda Boyle. - - Brackett, A. G. =128=Diary: Mrs. Brackett. - - Breckenridge, Robert J. =129=Papers: Library of Congress. - - Brichta, A. C. =130=Letter: belonging to the family. - - Brindle, William. =131=Statement: J. D. Parrish, Esq. - - Buchanan, James. =132=Papers: Pennsylvania Hist. Soc. - - Buck, Dr. Solon J. =133=Collection. - - Burton, C. M. =134=Collection, Public Library, Detroit. - - Butler, Anthony. =135=Papers: Univ. of Texas. - - Butterfield, James. =136=Recollections. - - Calhoun, John C. =137=Papers: Clemson Coll. - - Calhoun, John C. =137a=Papers: Library of Congress. - - Campbell, William B. =138=Letters: John DeWitt, Esq. - - Campbell, William B. (and David). =139=Papers: Lemuel R. - Campbell, Esq.; Mrs. James S. Pilcher. - - Cantwell, John L. P. =140=Letter: Miss Jessica R. Smith. - - Carson, J. C. =141=Statement: Bancroft Coll. - - Carson, J. H. =142=Gold Mines of 1848: Bancroft Coll. - - Cary, T. G. =143=California Papers: Boston Public Library. - - Cassidy, P. A. =144=Recollections. - - Castro, Manuel. =145=Documentos para la Hist. de - California: Bancroft Coll. - - Caswell, William R. =146=Diary and Letters: Massachusetts - Hist. Soc. - - Chamberlain, S. E. =147=Diary: loaned by the writer. - - Chamberlain, S. E. =148=Recollections (verbal). - - Chase, Salmon P. =149=Papers: Library of Congress. - - Cheatham, B. F. =150=Diary and Papers: Mrs. Telfair - Hodgson. - - Claiborne, J. F. H. =151=Papers: State of Mississippi, - Dept. of Hist. - - Claiborne, Thomas. =152=Memoirs: belonging to the family. - - Claims Commission of 1849. =153=Book of Awards; - =154=Book of Opinions; =155=Journal: U. S. State - Dept. - - Clay, Henry. =156=Papers: Library of Congress. - - Cobb, Howell. =157=Papers (printed later by the Amer. - Hist. Assoc.): Dr. U. B. Phillips. - - Cobb, Howell. =158=Papers: Dr. R. P. Brooks. - - Collins, Francis. =159=Papers (published later in the - Qtrly. Publication of the Hist. and Philos. Soc. of Ohio, - 1915, Nos. 2-3). - - _Columbus_. =160=Record of Punishments, 1846-7: U. S. - Naval Academy Library. - - _Congress_. =161=Journal of a Cruise, 1846: U. S. Naval - Academy Library. - - Conner, David. =162=Papers: Hon. Franklin D. Roosevelt. - - Conner, David. =163=Papers: P. F. Madigan, Esq. - - Conner, David. =164=Papers: Library of Congress. - - Conner, David. =165=Papers: Navy Dept. Library. - - Conner, David. =166=Papers: New York City Library. - - Coutts. =167=Diary of a March to California: Bancroft - Coll. - - Cralle, R. K. =168=Papers: Library of Congress. - - Crittenden, J. J. =169=Papers: Library of Congress. - - Crooker Family (of South Carolina). =170=Papers: Dr. E. - M. Shealy. - - _Cyane._ =171=Journal of a Cruise; Abstract of Journal: - U. S. Naval Academy Library. - - _Cyane._ =172=Log Book: Library, U. S. Navy Dept. - - Davis, Jefferson. =173=Address: Library of Congress - (reading-room desk). - - Davis, Jefferson. =174=Papers: Confederate Memorial, New - Orleans. - - Davis, Jefferson. =175=Papers: Library of Congress. - - Davis, Jefferson. =176=Papers: State of Mississippi, - Dept. of Hist. - - Davis, John W. =177=Statement of the Battle of San - Pascual: Bancroft Coll. - - Davis, T. F. =178=Diary: belonging to the family. - - Diario =179=Esactisimo de lo ocurrido en Mexico, etc.: - Bancroft Coll. - - Dreer =180=Collection: Pennsylvania Hist. Soc. - - Donelson, A. J. =181=Papers: Mrs. Wm. A. Donelson (now in - the Library of Congress). - - Dormitzer, Walter. =182=Collection. - - Drum, R. C. =183=Recollections (verbal). - - Duke, Moses S. =184=Letters: Miss Winnie V. Lynch. - - Duncan, James. =185=Papers: U. S. Military Academy. - - Duncan, W. L. =186=Notes on Bishop's Journal: McLean - County (Ill.) Hist. Soc. - - Eddy =187=Manuscripts: Charles Carroll, Esq. - - Edwards, Marcellus B. =188=Diary: Missouri Hist. Soc. - - Evans, Mrs. Lucy. =189=Letter: belonging to the family. - - Ewing, J. C. =190=Diary: belonging to the family. - - Fairfield, John. =191=Papers: Library of Congress. - - Ford. =192=Collection: New York City Public Library. - - Foster, R. C. =193=Letters: Mrs. Edward W. Foster. - - Fourth (Mexican) Infantry. =194=Book of Accounts: New - York Hist. Soc. - - Fowler, W. P. =195=Collection. - - Fremont, John C. =196=Statement: Library of Harvard Univ. - - Gaines, E. P. =197=Papers: Library of Congress. - - Gallatin, Albert. =198=Papers: New York Hist. Soc. - - Garcia, Sen. Lic. D. Genaro. =199=Collection. - - Gibbes, W. H. =200=Collection. - - Gibson, George R. =201=Diary: Missouri Hist. Soc. - - Gimenez, M. M. =202=Papers: Sen. Lic. D. Genaro Garcia. - - Gleason, James. =203=Letter. - - Gouverneur, S. L. =204=Diary: Mrs. Rose Gouverneur Hoes. - - Graham, L. P. =205=Memorandum Book: E. W. McGlenen, Esq. - - Graham, W. A. =206=Papers: A. W. Graham, Esq. - - Griffin, John S. =207=Journal of 1846: Bancroft Coll. - - Guadalajara (Public Library) =208=Collection. - - Guitar, Aldon. =209=Letter. - - Hammond, J. H. =210=Diary and Papers: Library of Congress. - - Hardie, James A. =211=Papers: Library of Congress. - - Hastings, D. H. =212=Diary: loaned by the writer. - - Hatch, John P. =213=Letters: Library of Congress. - - Hays, John C., and Caperton, John. =214=Life and - Adventures of John C. Hays: Bancroft Coll. - - Heald, Nathan. =215=Papers: Univ. of Wisconsin Library. - - Heiman, A. =216=Services of the First Regt. of Tennessee: - Tennessee Hist. Soc. - - Henshaw, J. C. =217=Papers: Massachusetts Hist. Soc. - - Henshaw, J. C. =218=Narrative, prepared by Mrs. Henshaw - from his papers: Massachusetts Hist. Soc. - - Heraldica =219=del Ejercito Mex., etc.: Biblioteca - Nacional. - - Higgins, H. H. =220=Plans and letters: Mrs. T. M. Coxe. - - Hill, D. H. =221=Diary: Pres. D. H. Hill. - - Hiney, E. F. =222=Diary. - - Hirschorn, Jacob. =223=Recollections: Justin H. Smith. - - Hitchcock, E. A. =224=Diary and Papers: Mrs. E. A. - Hitchcock (now in the Library of Congress). - - Holt, Joseph. =225=Papers: Library of Congress. - - Hook, C. S. =226=Collection. - - Hoyle, E. D. =227=Recollections. - - Illinois University. =228=Collection. - - Indiana State Library. =229=Collection. - - Iturbide, Agustin de. =230=Papers: Library of Congress. - - Jackson, Andrew. =231=Papers: Library of Congress. - - Jameson, J. Franklin. =232=Collection. - - Janssens, Agustin. =233=Documentos para la Hist. de - California: Bancroft Coll. - - Johnson, Andrew. =234=Papers: Library of Congress. - - Jones, Roger. =235=Papers: W. R. Benjamin, Esq. - - Judah, H. M. =236=Diary: Library of Congress. - - Kearny, S. W. =237=Letter Book: Missouri Hist. Soc. - - Keating, E. H. =238=Map of Monterey, Mex.: Monterey City - Govt. - - Kemper, Jackson. =239=Papers: Univ. of Wisconsin Library. - - Kennerly, W. C. =240=Narrative. - - Kent, James. =241=Papers: Library of Congress. - - Kingsbury, D. M. =242=Letters to his Mother. - - Kribben, Christian. =243=Home Letters: B. D. Kribben, Esq. - - Lakin, George W. =244=Papers: Univ. of Wisconsin Library. - - Lamar, M. B. =245=Papers: Texas State Library. - - Lane, Joseph. =246=Autobiography: Bancroft Coll. - - Larkin, T. O. =247=Papers: Bancroft Coll. - - Lasselle, Stanislaus. =248=Papers: Indiana State Library. - - Leese, Jacob P. =249=Bear Flag Papers: Bancroft Coll. - - Lieber, Francis. =250=Papers: Library of Congress. - - Lowry, Robert. =251=Narrative. - - Mackall, W. W. =252=Letters: belonging to the family. - - McLean, John. =253=Papers: Library of Congress. - - McClellan, Geo. B. =254=Diary and Papers: Library of - Congress. - - Mangum, W. P. =255=Papers: A. W. Graham, Esq. - - Marcy, W. L. =256=Papers: Library of Congress. - - Markoe and Maxcy. =257=Papers: Library of Congress. - - Marshall, Henry. =258=Recollections: Bancroft Coll. - - Maryland Hist. Soc. =259=Collection. - - Massachusetts Hist. Soc. =260=Collection. - - Memoires. =261=I, Apparently prepared by the French agent - in Mexico; =261a=II, Sur les Revolutions du Mexique: - Dept. des Affaires Etrangeres, Paris. - - Memorias. =262=Reports issued under this title by - Depts. of the Mexican government (see also "Memorias" under - the head of Books and Pamphlets. A number of the Memorias were - not published--unless in newspapers--but exist in MS. in the - library of the Sria. de Relaciones). - - Mervine, William. =263=Letter Books and Papers: Navy - Dept. Library. - - Mexican Hist. =264=Documents: Museo Nacional, Mexico. - - Miller, N. C. =265=Letter. - - Miller, W. D. =266=Papers: belonging to the family. - - Mississippi Dept. of Hist. =267=Collections (Dr. Dunbar - Rowland, Director). - - Missouri Hist. Soc. =268=Collection. - - Molina, Sen. D. Ignacio. =269=Recollections (verbal). - - Moore, H. Judge. =270=Diary. - - Morales, J. B. =271=Papers: Library of Congress. - - Morgan, George. =272=Memoir of: Col. J. M. Morgan. - - Mullan, James. =273=Diary: belonging to the family. - - Neeld, Peter C. =274=Letter. - - Nelson, T. B., Jr. =275=Letter: Mrs. Annie J. Holland. - - Neville, Harvey. =276=Diary: Chicago Hist. Soc. - - New York Hist. Soc. =277=Collection. - - Niehenke, R. =278=Statement. - - Notes. =279=Sur les Possessions Espagnoles en Amerique: - Dept. des Affaires Etrangeres, Paris. - - Nunelee, S. F. =280=Diary: James Howell Nunelee, Esq. - - O'Keefe, Michael. =281=Statement: Justin H. Smith. - - Olivera, Agustin. =282=Documentos para la Hist. de - California: Bancroft Coll. - - Orders (General and Special). =283=Army of the North - under Mejia, Ampudia and Arista: New York Hist. Soc. - - Otero, M. =284=Comunicacion que sobre las Negoc. Diplom., - etc.: Yale Univ. Library. - - Paredes y Arrillaga, Mariano. =285=Papers: Sen. Lic. D. - Genaro Garcia. - - Parker, James. =286=Statement. - - Parrish, P. C. =287=Diary. - - Pennsylvania Hist. Soc. =288=Collection. - - Perez de Acal. =289=Papers: Guadalajara Public Library. - - Pico, Pio (_Familia Pico_). =290=Documentos para la Hist. - de California: Bancroft Coll. - - Pierce, Franklin. =291=Papers: Library of Congress. - - Pillow, Gideon J. =292=Letters: W. R. Benjamin Collection. - - Pillow, Gideon J. =293=Letters: Library of Congress. - - Pillow, Gideon J. =294=Letters: Pennsylvania Hist. Soc. - - Pinto, Rafael. =295=Apuntaciones para la Hist. de - California: Bancroft Coll. - - Poinsett, Joel R. =296=Papers: Pennsylvania Hist. Soc. - - Polk, James K. =297=Papers: Library of Congress - (including the Polk papers examined by the author at the - Chicago Hist. Soc.). - - Porter, Andrew. =298=Papers: Major John Biddle Porter. - - Posey, Carnot. =299=Letters: Dr. Walter L. Fleming. - - Pricket, John A. =300=Letters. - - Primer Battn. Activo de Oaxaca. =301=Libro de Servicios: - Rhode Island Hist. Soc. - - Puryear, J. F. =302=Document. - - Quitman, John A. =303=Papers: in possession of the family. - - Quitman, John A. =304=Papers in the Claiborne Papers. - - Richardson, C. T. =305=Recollections: Justin H. Smith. - - Riser, J. J. =306=Recollections (Mormon Battalion). - - Roberts, B. S. =307=Diary and letters: Brigadier General - B. K. Roberts. - - Roberts, Charles. =308=Autograph Collection: Haverford - Coll. - - Roessler, Edward. =309=Diary: belonging to the family. - - Roque, J. K. =310=Document. - - Santa Anna, A. L. de. =311=Papers: Sen. Lic. D. Genaro - Garcia. - - Santa Anna, A. L. de. =312=Papers: Library of Congress. - - Saunders, J. L. =313=Papers: Library of Congress. - - Sawyer, Charles H. =314=Documents for the Hist. of the - Conquest of California: Bancroft Coll. - - Schouler, William. =315=Papers: Massachusetts Hist. Soc. - - Sherman, W. T. =316=Papers: Library of Congress. - - Sibley, H. H. =317=Papers: Minnesota Hist. Soc. - - Smith, C. B. =318=Papers: Library of Congress. - - Smith, George. =319=Diary: belonging to the family. - - Smith, Persifor F. =320=Papers: State Normal School, West - Chester, Pa. - - Smith, T. F. =321=Diary: belonging to the writer. - - Smith, W. B. =322=Diary: belonging to the family. - - Stevenson, J. D. =323=Letter Book; =324=General - Order Book; =325=Regimental Order Book: New York Hist. - Soc. - - Sumner, Charles. =326=Papers: Harvard Univ. Library. - - Sutherland, D. H. =327=Letters: belonging to the family. - - Sweet, G. N. =328=Statement. - - Taliaferro, William B. =329=Papers: Miss L. S. Taliaferro. - - Taylor, Zachary. =330=Papers: Library of Congress. - - Taylor, Zachary. =331=Papers: Henkels catalogue. - - Tennery, Thomas D. =332=Diary: Rev. John S. Cook, D.D. - - Tlacotalpam, Mex. =333=Judicial Archives. - - Torres, Manuel. =334=Peripecias de la Vida California: - Bancroft Coll. - - Trist, Nicholas P. =335=Papers: Library of Congress. - - Turner, C. B. =336=Letter: belonging to the family. - - Turner, H. S. =337=Diary: Missouri Hist. Soc. - - U. S. House of Representatives. =338=Files: Capitol, - Washington. - - U. S. House of Representatives. =339=Papers: Library of - Congress. - - U. S. Military Academy (West Point). =340=Collection. - - U. S. Senate. =341=Files: Capitol, Washington. - - University of Illinois. =342=Collection. - - Vallejo, M. G. =343=Documentos para la Hist. de - California: Bancroft Coll. - - Vallejo, M. G. =344=Recuerdos Hist. y Personales: - Bancroft Coll. - - Van Buren, Martin. =345=Papers: Library of Congress. - - Wade, W. P. =346=Document: belonging to the family. - - Washburne, Elihu B. =347=Papers: Library of Congress. - - Watterston, George. =348=Notes on U. S. History: Library - of Congress. - - Watterston, George. =349=Papers: Library of Congress. - - Weber, Juan L. =350=Recollections (verbal). - - Webster, Daniel. =351=Papers: Library of Congress. - - Weeks, J. W. =352=Reminiscences: Bancroft Coll. - - Welles, Edgar T. =353=Collection: Connecticut Hist. Soc. - - Welles, Gideon. =354=Papers: Library of Congress. - - Wheaton, Henry. =355=Papers: Massachusetts Hist. Soc. - - Whitcomb, T. M. =356=Diary: T. J. Whitcomb, Esq. - - Wilcox, C. M. =357=Diary (portions copied by him): - Claiborne papers, Mississippi Dept. of History. - - Williams, Thomas. =358=Letters: Rt. Rev. G. Mott Williams. - - Winthrop-Clifford. =359=Correspondence: Massachusetts - Hist. Soc. - - Winthrop-Kennedy. =360=Correspondence: Massachusetts - Hist. Soc. - - Woods, William. =361=Recollections. - - Worth, G. A. =362=Papers: Library of Congress. - - Worth, W. J. =363=Papers: W. R. Benjamin Collection. - - Worth, W. J. =364=Papers: Mrs. K. S. Hubbell. - - Wyse, F. O. =365=Papers: Miss Mary Wyse. - - Yale University. =366=Collection (University Library). - - Yell, Archibald. =367=Papers: Mrs. R. H. Fitzgerald. - - Map Division, Library of Congress. =369=Map of Palo Alto. - - Taylor, Zachary. =370=Papers: Mrs. W. R. Stauffer. - - Mitchell, W. I. =371=Statement. - - Hyde, George. =372=Statement of Hist. Facts on - California: Bancroft Coll. - - Evans, Joseph. =373=Narrative: Justin H. Smith. - - Conner, David. =374=Letters: Henkels catalogue. - - Madigan, P. F. =375=Collection. - - Nicholson, A. S. =376=Recollections (verbal). - - Willing, Wildurr. =377=Paper on Scott's operations - (published later). - - Winthrop, R. C. =378=The Mexican War Bill (Massachusetts - Hist. Soc.) - - De Witt, John. =379=Collection (see also No. 138). - - - Transcriber's Note - -There are three types of notes in the text. The lettered notes -(originally asterisks) were printed as standard footnotes on each page. -References to these notes now appear in brackets as [A], [B] and so on. -The notes themselves have been moved to directly follow the paragraph -within which they are referenced. Occasionally, an asterisk is used for -some other purpose, usually preceding rather than following a word or -phrase, and remain asterisks. - -Numeric references referring to the extensive Notes section of the text -appear as bracketed numbers, e.g., [1.3]. Unlike standard footnotes, -the references to those notes in the text are themselves not necessarily -consecutive, nor are they unique. To assist in consulting those notes -using search features, the chapter number has been prefixed to each, -using Arabic numerals, as [2.1], [2.2], [3.3], etc. Notes for the -Preface are prefixed with 'P'. Any internal references directing -attention to another note have also been changed. - -Within the Notes, there are =bold= numbers prefixed to key words (e.g., -'=123=keyword') which serve as references to sources, to be found -in the Appendix. There may be multiple references to the same source. - -The logic behind this system is explained by the author in his Preface, -and in more detail in [P.5] of the Notes to that Preface. - -In general, Spanish names, when used in English phrases, are printed -without accents. The country is referred to as 'Mexico' when the -language is Spanish, and 'Mexico', without the accent, when in English. -On occasion, the printer fails to observe this distinction, as on p. -xviii: "and a plan in [Mexico] a traves de los Siglos". These are -considered as printer's errors, and have been corrected here. - -Where variants in spelling occur in quoted passages, they are always -retained. - -The name of the town of Matamoros is spelled, occasionally (pp. 177, -468), as 'Matamoras'. The variants are retained. - -The word 'manoeuvre' is sometimes printed with an 'oe' ligature. In this -text, as noted above, no distinction can be made. - -At the end of the final paragraph of Chapter III, there is a reference -to Note 41 of that chapter, which does not exist. Either the note was -not included, or the reference was misnumbered. The anchor is retained. - -The following table describes other textual issues, and the resolution -of each. The [x/y] annotations mark the additions, deletions or -substitutions made to the text. Minor inconsistencies of punctuation in -the Notes have been silently corrected. On several occasions, letters -or numbers have gone missing from the images used to prepare this text. -Where no reasonable conjecture is supportable, an empty bracket [ ] -indicates the spot. - -p. xviii [9]. Battles of Monterey. Central '9' is missing. - Operations - - and a plan in M[e/e]xico a traves de los Corrected. - Siglos - -p. 57 to accomplish anything[.] Added. - -p. 91 extend our ter[r]itory by conquest Corrected. - -p. 95 the minister proce[e]ded to Vera Cruz Added missing 'e'. - -p. 99 "the i[n]gnominious loss of national Removed spurious - integrity" 'n'. - -p. 149 made Arista commander[-]in-chief The hyphen is - missing on the - line break. - -p. 177 rei[e]nforcements Removed extraneous - 'e'. - - could probably h[o/a]ave taken Corrected. - -p. 301 seven hundred National [oe/G]uards Corrected printer's - error. - -p. 372 tha[t] he might be able Added missing 't'. - -p. 402 Coch[e]let Added missing 'e'. - -p. 412 dates given as 'fractions' - -p. 415 Bankhead, nos. 108 of 1844; [ ], 17, The first numeral - is indistinct, - may be 2, 3, 8. - -p. 424 (_[i]bid._, 94; Ho. 351; 25, 2, Added missing 'i'. - -p. 431 to cast a gratuit[u]ous aspersion Removed gratuitous - 'u'. - -p. 438 Carreno, Je[f]es Added missing 'f'. - -p. 440 Watson, Taylo[e/r], 113-4 A reference to - Watson, Taylor - appears earlier. - None to 'Tayloe'. - -p. 476 Housto[u]n, Texas May refer to - 'Houston', but is - retained. - - - - - -End of the Project Gutenberg EBook of The War With Mexico, Volume I (of 2), by -Justin H. 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