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See + <a href="https://archive.org/details/dialogueinhades00john"> + https://archive.org/details/dialogueinhades00john</a> + </td> + </tr> +</table> +<p> </p> +<hr class="full" /> +<p> </p> +<p> </p> + +<h1 class="vspace"><span class="small">A</span><br /> + +DIALOGUE IN HADES.</h1> + +<p class="p2 center">A PARALLEL OF MILITARY ERRORS, OF WHICH THE FRENCH<br /> +AND ENGLISH ARMIES WERE GUILTY, DURING THE<br /> +CAMPAIGN OF <b>1759</b>, IN CANADA.</p> + +<p class="p2 vspace larger center">ATTRIBUTED TO CHEVALIER JOHNSTONE.</p> +<p> </p> +<p> </p> + +<p class="p2 center vspace">Published under the Auspices of the<br /> + +<span class="large">Literary and Historical Society of Quebec</span></p> + +<p class="p2 center">[REPRINTED.]</p> + +<p class="p2 center vspace">QUEBEC: +<span class="smaller">PRINTED AT THE “MORNING CHRONICLE” OFFICE.</span><br /> +1887.</p> + +<hr /> + +<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_2" id="Page_2">2</a></span></p> + +<p class="p4">[The original of this manuscript is deposited in the French war archives, +in Paris; a copy was, with the permission of the French Government, taken in +1855, and deposited in the Library of the Legislative Assembly of Canada. +The Literary and Historical Society of Quebec, through the kindness of Mr. +Todd, the Librarian, was permitted to have communication thereof. This +document is supposed to have been written about the year 1765, that is five +years after the return to France from Canada of the writer, the Chevalier +Johnstone, a Scottish Jacobite, who had fled to France after the defeat at +Culloden, and obtained from the French monarch, with several other +Scotchmen, commissions in the French armies. In 1748, says <i xml:lang="fr" lang="fr">Francisque +Michel</i>,<a name="FNanchor_A" id="FNanchor_A" href="#Footnote_A" class="fnanchor">A</a> “he sailed from Rochefort as an Ensign with troops going to Cape +Breton; he continued to serve in America until he returned to France, in +December, 1760, having acted during the campaign of 1759, in Canada, as +aide-de-camp to Chevalier de Levis. On Levis being ordered to Montreal, +Johnstone was detached and retained by General Montcalm on his staff, on +account of his thorough knowledge of the environs of Quebec, and particularly +of Beauport, where the principal works of defence stood, and where the whole +army, some 11,000 men, were entrenched, leaving in Quebec merely a garrison +of 1500. The journal is written in English, and is not remarkable for +orthography or purity of diction; either Johnstone had forgotten or had never +thoroughly known the language. The style is prolix, sententious, abounding +in quotations from old writers. This document had first attracted the +attention of one of the late historians of Canada, the Abbé Ferland, who +attached much importance to it, as calculated to supply matters of detail and +incidents unrecorded elsewhere. Colonel Margry, in charge of the French +records, had permitted the venerable writer, then on a visit to Paris, to make +extracts from it; some of which extracts, the abbé published at the time of +the laying of the St. Foy Monument, in 1862. The Chevalier Johnstone differs +<i xml:lang="la" lang="la">in toto</i> from the opinions expressed by several French officers of regulars, +respecting the conduct of the Canadian Militia, in 1759, ascribing to their +valour, on the 13th September, the salvation of a large portion of the French +army. He has chosen the singular, though not unprecedented mode of the +Dialogue, to recapitulate the events of a campaign in which he played a not +inconsiderable part.”​—​<span class="smcap">J. M. LeMoine.]</span> +</p> + +<hr /> + +<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_3" id="Page_3">3</a></span></p> + +<p class="p4 center smaller">[Published under the auspices of the Literary and Historical Society of Quebec.]</p> + +<h2>A DIALOGUE IN HADES.<br /> + +<span class="subhead">A PARALLEL OF MILITARY ERRORS, OF WHICH THE FRENCH +AND ENGLISH ARMIES WERE GUILTY, DURING THE +CAMPAIGN OF 1759, IN CANADA.</span></h2> + +<p><span class="smcap">The Marquis de Montcalm</span>:​—​Having ardently +desired a conversation with you, sir, upon the operations of +a campaign which proved to both of us so fatal, I have +sought you continually amongst the shades ever since I +descended here, where I soon followed you.</p> + +<p><span class="smcap">General Wolfe</span>:​—​I can assure you, sir, I was equally +impatient to meet with you. Some of my countrymen, +arrived here since the battle of the 13th September, informed +me that there was only an interval of a few hours in our +sharing the same hard fate. They gave me some accounts +of that event which joined Canada to the British +dominions; but as they had a very imperfect knowledge of +the circumstances, and entirely ignorant of your plan of +operations, I have little information from them, and I am +heartily glad that chance at last has procured me the +pleasure of seeing you.</p> + +<p><span class="smcap">Montcalm</span>:​—​Will you permit me, sir, before our conversation +becomes serious, to offer some reflections upon +the difference in our destiny. Your nation rendered you +the greatest honours; your body was conveyed to +London, and buried there magnificently in Westminster +Abbey, amongst your kings. Generous Britons erected +to your memory a superb monument over your grave, at<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_4" id="Page_4">4</a></span> +public expense; and your name, most dear to your countrymen, +is ever in their mouths, accompanied with praise and +regret. But in my country what a strange indifference? +What sensation did my death make upon my compatriots? +My conduct denounced and censured without measure, is +the continual subject of conversation for gossiping fools +and knaves, who form the majority in all communities, and +prevail against the infinitely small number to be found of +honest, judicious, impartial men, capable of reflection. The +Canadians and savages who knew the uprightness of my +soul, ever devoted to the interests of my beloved king and +country, they alone rendered me justice, with a few sincere +friends, who, not daring to oppose themselves openly to +the torrent of my enemies, bewailed in secret my unhappy +fate, and shed on my tomb their friendly tears.</p> + +<p><span class="smcap">Wolfe</span>:​—​In this blessed abode, inaccessible to prejudice, +I vow to you, sir, I envy your condition, notwithstanding +the horrible injustice and ingratitude of your countrymen. +What can give more pleasure and self-satisfaction than the +esteem and approbation of honest men? You were +severely regretted and lamented by all those who were +capable of discerning and appreciating your superior merit, +talents, and eminent qualities. Disinterested persons of +probity must respect your virtue. All officers versed in +the art of war will justify your military tactics, and your +operations can be blamed only by the ignorant. Were my +army consulted, they would be as many witnesses in your +favour. Your humanity towards prisoners won you the +heart of all my soldiers. They saw with gratitude and +veneration your continual care and vigilance to snatch +them from out of the hands of the Indians, when those +barbarians were ready to cut their throats, and prepared to +make of human flesh their horrible banquets; refusing me +even tears at my death, they weeped and bewailed your +hard fate; I see in my mausoleum the proof only of<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_5" id="Page_5">5</a></span> +human weakness! What does that block of marble avail +to me in my present state? The monument remains, but +the conqueror has perished. The affection, approbation +and regret of the worthiest part of mankind is greatly +preferable and much above the vain honours conferred by +a blind people, who judge according to the event, and are +incapable to analyse the operations. I was unknown to +them before the expedition which I commanded in Canada; +and if fortune, to whom I entirely owe my success, had +less favoured me, perhaps, like Byng, I would have been +the victim of a furious and unruly populace. The +multitude has and can have success only for the rule of +their judgment.</p> + +<p><span class="smcap">Montcalm</span>:​—​I am much obliged to you, sir, for your +favourable opinion of me. Let us leave weak mortals to +crawl from error to error, and deify to-day what they will +condemn to-morrow. It is at present, when the darkness +is dispelled from before our eyes, that we can contemplate +at leisure the passions of men, who move as the waves of +the sea, push on each other and often break upon the +rocks; and in our present state, when all prejudices are at +an end, let us examine impartially the operations of 1759, +which was the epocha of the loss to France of her northern +colonies in America.</p> + +<p><span class="smcap">Wolfe</span>:​—​Most willingly, sir, and to show my +frankness, I own to you I was greatly surprised on arriving +with the English fleet at Quebec without meeting with +any opposition by the French in the river St. Lawrence.</p> + +<p><span class="smcap">Montcalm</span>:​—​You had reason to be so. It was not +my fault that you did not meet with many obstacles in +your way. I proposed to have a redoubt and battery erected +upon Cape Tourmente, which is a rock above fifty feet +high, facing the Traverse at the <span class="locked">east<a name="FNanchor_B" id="FNanchor_B" href="#Footnote_B" class="fnanchor">B</a></span> end of the Island of<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_6" id="Page_6">6</a></span> +Orleans, where all the vessels cross from the north to the +south side of the St. Lawrence river. They are obliged to +approach very near the Cape before they enter into the +Traverse, and its height above the men-of-war would have +secured it against the effect of the artillery. Besides, this +rock, almost perpendicular, commanding all round it, the +fort would have been impregnable, and not susceptible of +being besieged. Thus the first of your ships which +approached to pass the Traverse would have been raked +by the plunging fire of the battery from stern to bowsprit, +and must have been sunk. I had likewise the project of +placing a battery and a redoubt upon the upper point of +the bay which is opposite to the west end of <i xml:lang="fr" lang="fr">Isle aux +Coudres</i>. The current between this island and the main +land being incredibly rapid at low water, all the vessels +coming up the river must have cast anchor there to wait +until the next tide; and my artillery upon the point of +that bay would have battered your ships at anchor from +fore to aft; have put in a most terrible confusion your +ships, who could not have taken up their anchors without +being instantly dashed to pieces against the rocks by the +violence of the current, forced, as they would have been +by it, to have their bowsprits always pointed to the battery, +without being able to fire at it. Your fleet would have had +no knowledge of the battery until they were at anchor, so +you may easily judge how it would have distressed them. +I proposed this, but I did not command in chief; it was +the Marquis de Vaudreuil, Governor General of Canada, +who should have ordered it to be put into execution.</p> + +<p><span class="smcap">Wolfe</span>:​—​If they had executed your project, it would +have puzzled us, and retarded for some time our +operations.</p> + +<p><span class="smcap">Montcalm</span>:​—​That was all I could wish for, as I was +always sensible of the great advantage, in certain +situations, of gaining time from the enemy, especially in<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_7" id="Page_7">7</a></span> +such a climate as Canada, where the summer is so short +that it is impossible to keep the field longer than from the +month of May till the beginning of October, and your fleet +arrived at <i xml:lang="fr" lang="fr">Isle aux Coudres</i> at the end of June.</p> + +<p><span class="smcap">Wolfe</span>:​—​There is no doubt that you are in the right. +Our fleet arrived in the river St. Lawrence six weeks too +late, which is commonly the fate of all great naval expeditions. +Fleets are seldom ready to sail at the time appointed; +and this often renders fruitless the best concocted enterprise +by sea, from the uncertainty of the arrival of the army +at its destination. The smallest delay is often dangerous, as +it gives the enemy the time to prepare themselves for +defence, without hurry or confusion.</p> + +<p><span class="smcap">Montcalm</span>:​—​I will not conceal from you, sir, that I +always looked upon the distribution you made of your army +upon your landing near Quebec, as diametrically opposed +to the established principles in castrametation. It is a +known axiom in the art of war, that an army ought to be +encamped in such a manner as to have a free and easy communication +with all its parts; that they may unite quickly +without any obstruction, and be able to defend and sustain +each other reciprocally over the whole extent of the camp, +in case any part of it is attacked. You divided your army +in three different camps; one of them upon the Pointe +Levis, another upon the Island of Orleans, and the third at +the Sault de Montmorency. The two branches of the St. +Lawrence river, which forms the Island of Orleans, each of +them about half a mile broad, separated your three camps, +without a possibility of establishing a communication +between them; and your camp upon the Pointe Levis was +at a distance of six miles from your camp at the Sault de +Montmorency. Your position was such that had we fallen +with our army on any of your three camps, we would have +cut them to pieces, before those of your other two camps +could have come to their assistance. The knowledge for<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_8" id="Page_8">8</a></span> +choosing an advantageous ground for encamping an army, +always appears to me to be one of the most essential talents +requisite in a general. How could you remain quietly in +such a dangerous position during two months, without +trembling.</p> + +<p><span class="smcap">Wolfe</span>:​—​What hindered you then, sir, from executing +that which appeared to you so easy?</p> + +<p><span class="smcap">Montcalm</span>:​—​We attempted it, but with very bad success. +Seven days after your landing at the Pointe Levis, +Mr. Dumas, Major of the Colony troops, was sent to attack +your camp at the Pointe Levis, with a body of fifteen hundred +men, who, in the night, crossed the river St. Lawrence +at Quebec, without being discovered by your advanced +guards. But they were no sooner landed and marching, +than, struck with a panic, the utmost disorder suddenly +ensued; their heads turned, and, losing their senses entirely, +they fired at each other, believing themselves attacked +by your army. In short, they immediately fled back to +their boats with the greatest precipitation and confusion. +Discouraged by this bad beginning, M. de Vaudreuil would +never listen to any proposals of further attempts upon your +camps; and it was decided to keep ourselves for the future +upon the defensive.</p> + +<p><span class="smcap">Wolfe</span>:​—​It appears to me, however, that you were +not encamped in a proper manner to be upon the defensive. +Your army did not amount to ten thousand men, and your +camp extended seven or eight miles.</p> + +<p><span class="smcap">Montcalm</span>:​—​I agree with you, and am sensible that +the longer the line, the weaker it is in its several parts. I +am convinced that it is impossible to prevent a line from +being forced; and I believed likewise that, landing on a +coast where there are several leagues of it to be defended, +equally susceptible of descent, is the same case as lines. He +who attacks has all his force concentrated at a single point, +which he may choose as he pleases; anywhere in the extent<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_9" id="Page_9">9</a></span> +of his lines; on the contrary, he who is attacked in his +entrenchments has his force divided over the whole extent +of his lines, and does not know on what part of them the +enemy has the intention to make his real attack, so that he +must be everywhere equally strong and guarded over all +the ground occupied by his army. Thus the head of a +column of a great depth of ranks must infallibly pierce +through lines who have only at most two or three men +deep; and by feint attacks all over the front of a line, you +cannot weaken one part of it by drawing troops from it to +fortify another part of it, unless the point of the enemy’s +principal attack is manifestly known. It is certainly the +same with regard to landings, where all the extent of the +sea coast may be threatened at the same time, although it is +a common opinion that a coast may be defended, and that +an enemy may be repulsed in his attempt to make a descent +by open force.</p> + +<p>I know not a better method to oppose a descent than to +have bodies of troops in battle, ready to rush upon the enemy, +with their bayonets upon their muskets, attacking the +moment the enemy land, whilst they are yet few and in confusion +from the disorder which must necessarily happen at +their coming out of their boats, and before they can present +a considerable front in battle.</p> + +<p>My project of defence was to encamp on rising ground +at Quebec, called by the French, <i xml:lang="fr" lang="fr">Les Hauteurs d’Abraham</i>, +and make Quebec serve as the centre and pivot to all my +operations, since it was evident that the fate of Canada depended +entirely on its being preserved to us or taken by +you, which decided whether that colony should remain to +its ancient possessors or become your prize.</p> + +<p>With this in view, I intrenched the borders of the St. +Charles river, and remained encamped at Quebec until, receiving +tidings of your fleet having arrived in the St. Lawrence +river, M. de Levis, an officer of great merit and distinction,<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_10" id="Page_10">10</a></span> +proposed to change the position of our camp, by carrying +our left wing to the Sault de Montmorency, and our +right to the St. Charles river: this, as you say, made it six +miles long on the north side of Quebec, and gave us greater +appearance of being on the offensive than on the defensive.</p> + +<p>He pretended that the presenting a great front to the +enemy would give us a bold look, and inspire respect. As +there can be no positive certainty in any military operation, +from unforeseen accidents which often overturn the best +combined project, I readily sacrificed to him my opinion, +without insisting upon it. In this new position M. de Vaudreuil +commanded the right of our camp, near Quebec; M. de +Levis the left, at the Sault de Montmorency; and I commanded +the centre, at Beauport.</p> + +<p><span class="smcap">Wolfe</span>:​—​Had you continued on the heights of Abraham +you would have saved Quebec, but you would have abandoned +to me all the country where I might have destroyed, +burnt and ruined all the settlements at some leagues round +it.</p> + +<p><span class="smcap">Montcalm</span>:​—​That may be, but Canada would not have +been taken, and certainly you durst not penetrate far into +the country, leaving Quebec behind you. Had you attacked me, +I would have had the advantage of the rising ground, +which I would have fortified with intrenchments, and with +a chain of redoubts from Quebec to Cap Rouge, where these +heights terminate in a deep ravine, with a small river at the +bottom of it, overhung with rocks, at three leagues from Quebec. +This advantageous position, not to be successfully attacked +by any number of men, would have been my advanced +post.</p> + +<p>My right would have been applied to Quebec, and +sustained by it. I never could guess, sir, your idea in reducing +that town to ashes as you did, by throwing upon it +continually, from your batteries on the opposite side of the +river, that immense number of carcases and shells.</p> + +<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_11" id="Page_11">11</a></span> +It seems to me that when an army besieges a town, it +is with the intention, on its surrendering, to keep possession +of it, and have houses in it to lodge the troops, instead of +heaps of ruins. This conduct was still more essentially necessary +from the season being advanced, and from the impossibility +of carrying-on any kind of house building during the +winter. Moreover, the utter destruction of that town reduced +to ashes could not hasten its being taken a moment +sooner. You could do no harm to our batteries, which were +much higher than yours; it is not by destroying houses +that towns are taken. You always battered houses, without +reflecting that it is only by ruining the fortifications​—​the +defences​—​and by a breach in the walls, that success +may be hoped for in sieges; and it is certain that you lavished +a prodigious quantity of warlike stores very uselessly.</p> + +<p>What advantages could you expect by ruining and distressing +the inhabitants of Quebec, whose houses you burnt?</p> + +<p>It was destroying alone for the pleasure of doing injury, +without any advantage accruing to you from it.</p> + +<p><span class="smcap">Wolfe</span>:​—​My inaction during the whole summer +should have made you perceive what little hopes I had of +succeeding in my expedition; should it turn out fruitless +after the sum it had cost England, the news of Quebec being +reduced to ashes might blind the extravagant English populace, +and blunt their fanatical fury.</p> + +<p><span class="smcap">Montcalm</span>:​—​The day that you landed at the Sault de +Montmorency, where you encamped immediately with a +body of four thousand men, in all appearance you did not +know that the river Montmorency was fordable in the wood +about a mile to the north of your camp, where fifty men in +front might pass the ford with water only up to their knees. +Had you passed it immediately, you might have fallen upon +the left of our army, cut them to pieces, and pursued +them two miles, as far as the ravine of Beauport, before they +could assemble a sufficient number of men to be able to resist<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_12" id="Page_12">12</a></span> +you. You might have even encamped upon the north +side of that ravine, which, having it before you, would have +been a very advantageous post, and brought you several +miles nearer to Quebec. In this case it is highly probable +that we would have been obliged to abandon to you all the +ground between the St. Charles river and the ravine.</p> + +<p>To return to my first project of encamping upon the +heights of Abraham, our left was in the greatest security, +not knowing that there was a ford in that river until some +hours after your landing at the Sault.</p> + +<p><span class="smcap">Wolfe</span>:​—​Is it then surprising that I should be ignorant +of that ford, since you did not know it yourself? besides, +it is only the inhabitants in the neighbourhood of rivers, +swamps and lakes, who can give positive and sure information +about them. And supposing I had found some of your +Canadians at their houses there, they are so inviolably attached +to their religion, king and country, that they would +sooner have led me into a snare than instruct me in anything +that could be prejudicial to their army.</p> + +<p>Those whom a general sends to examine the <i xml:lang="fr" lang="fr">locale</i> of a +country must do it very superficially upon their own observations, +without consulting or interrogating the peasants in +the neighbourhood.</p> + +<p><span class="smcap">Montcalm</span>:​—​Whilst your soldiers were employed in +making their camp, and pitching their tents, M. de Levis +and his aide-de-camp Johnstone, were looking at you from +the opposite side of the Sault. His aide-de-camp having +asked him if he was positively certain that there was no +ford in the Montmorency river, M. de Levis answering that +there was not, and that he had been himself to examine it +to its source, at a lake in the woods, about ten or twelve +miles from the Sault. An inhabitant who overheard this +conversation, told the aide-de-camp: “The General is mistaken; +there is a ford which the inhabitants thereabouts pass<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_13" id="Page_13">13</a></span> +every day in carrying their corn to a mill;” and he added +that he had crossed it lately, with water not above his knees.</p> + +<p>The aide-de-camp related to M. de Levis immediately +his conversation with the Canadian, who would not believe +there was a ford, and, examining him roughly, the Canadian +was seized with awe, and respect for the General; his tongue +faltered in his mouth, and he durst not boldly assert the +truth. The aide-de-camp, in a whisper to the Canadian, +ordered him to find out a person who had crossed the ford +lately, and bring him immediately to M. de Levis’ lodgings. +The Canadian came to him in a moment, with a man who +had crossed it the night before, with a sack of wheat upon +his back, where he had found only eight inches deep of +water.</p> + +<p>The aide-de-camp being thus assured of the fact, ordered, +in M. de Levis’ name, a detachment to be sent instantly, +with the necessary tools to intrench itself.</p> + +<p><span class="smcap">Wolfe</span>:​—​Had I been so lucky as you, sir, to discover +that ford, there is no doubt I would not have let slip so +favourable an opportunity of distinguishing myself, and +would have fallen like lightning upon that part of your camp. +There can be nothing more dangerous than the neighbourhood +of rivers and swamps, that have not been sounded and +examined with the greatest care and attention. Negligence, +ignorance and headstrong obstinacy are equally fatal in +military affairs; and the misfortune of a Lieutenant-General, +in Scotland, against the Highlanders at the battle of Prestonpans, +made so deep an impression upon me that I am +always on my guard when near such places.</p> + +<p><span class="smcap">Montcalm</span>:​—​How can you, sir, justify your imprudence +in running headlong into the woods opposite to our intrenchments, +with two thousand men, who naturally ought +to have been cut to pieces, and neither you nor any man of +your detachment escape? Nine hundred Indians had invested +you all round at a pistol shot from you, and had<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_14" id="Page_14">14</a></span> +already cut off your retreat, without your perceiving it. So +soon as the Indians had surrounded you in the wood, they +sent their officer Langlade to acquaint M. de Levis that they +had got you in their net, but that your detachment, appearing +to be about two thousand men, greatly superior to them +in number, they begged earnestly of M. de Levis to order +M. de Repentigny to pass the ford with eleven hundred +men, which he commanded in these intrenchments, and +join them; that they would be answerable upon their heads +if a single man of your detachment should get back to your +camp; and they did not think themselves strong enough to +strike upon you without this reinforcement of Canadians. +There were a great many officers at M. de Levis’ lodgings +when Langlade came to him on behalf of the Indians, and +this General having consulted them, after giving his own +opinion on the affair: “that it was dangerous to attack an +army in the wood, as they could not know the number of +men there; that it might be all the English army, which +consequently might bring on a general engagement without +being prepared for it; and that if he happened to be +repulsed, he would be blamed for engaging in an affair, +without holding previously an order from his superiors, +M. de Vaudreuil and M. de Montcalm.” The officers respected +too much the General not to be of his way of thinking, +and it must ever be so from flattery. His aide-de-camp +alone maintained a different opinion, out of a real friendship +for M. de Levis. He told them that there was not the +smallest probability it could be all the English army, since +the Indians, who never fail to magnify the number, computed +them at only two thousand men. That even supposing +it to be the whole English army, it would be the +most lucky thing that could happen to us to have a general +engagement in the woods, where a Canadian is worth +three disciplined soldiers, as a soldier in a plain is worth +three Canadians; and that nothing was more essential than<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_15" id="Page_15">15</a></span> +to select the propitious moment and the way of fighting +for those who composed the two-thirds of the army, which +was the case with the Canadians. On the contrary, the +English army was almost entirely composed of regulars +with very few militia.</p> + +<p>That M. de Levis could not do better than in ordering M. +de Repentigny to cross the river immediately with his detachment +<i xml:lang="fr" lang="fr">en échelon</i>, and join the Indians, without losing +moments very precious; that at the same time he should +send instantly to inform me of his adventure, in order to +make all the army advance towards the ford, each regiment +taking the place of the other marched off; so that the Regiment +Royal Roussillon, the nearest to the ford, should go +off directly to take the post that Repentigny would quit in +crossing the river, and observing the same for the rest of +the army; that by this means the engaging a general affair +was much to be wished for, supposing all the English army +to be in the woods opposite the ford; in short, that if there +was a possibility of our being defeated and repulsed in the +woods, which could scarce happen, according to all human +probability, we had our retreat assured in the depth of +these woods, well known to the Canadians, where the English +troops could not pursue them, so that in no shape +could M. de Levis run the least risk.</p> + +<p>His aide-de-camp added, that when fortune offers her +favours, “they ought to be snatched with avidity.” These +reasons made no impressions on M. de Levis, and Langlade +was sent back to the Indians with a negative reply.</p> + +<p>There was two miles from M. de Levis’ quarters to the +place where the Indians were in ambush. Langlade came +back with new entreaties and earnest solicitations to induce +M. de Levis to make Repentigny cross the ford with his +detachment, but the General could not be prevailed upon +to give a positive order to Repentigny to join the Indians.</p> + +<p>He wrote a letter to Repentigny by Langlade, wherein he +told him “having the greatest confidence in his prudence<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_16" id="Page_16">16</a></span> +and good conduct, he might pass the river with his detachment, +if he saw a certainty of success.” His aide-de-camp +told him, whilst he was sealing the letter, that +Repentigny had too much judgment and good sense to take +upon himself an affair of that importance; and his opinion +of Repentigny was immediately justified by his answer; +he asked M. de Levis to give him a clear and positive +order. After thus loitering about an hour and a half, M. +de Levis resolved at last to go himself to the ford, and give +there his orders verbally; but he had scarce got half way +to it when he heard a brisk fire. The Indians, losing all +patience, after having remained so long hid at a pistol shot +from you, like setter dogs upon wild fowl, at last gave you +a volley, killed about a hundred and fifty of your soldiers, +and then retired without losing a man. It is evident that +had Repentigny passed the river with his detachment of +eleven hundred Canadians, you must have been cut to +pieces, and that affair would have terminated your expedition. +Your army could have no more hopes of succeeding +after such a loss; their spirits would have been damped, +and Canada would have been secure from any further invasion +from Great Britain.</p> + +<p>Fortune was always as favourable to you, as she constantly +frowned upon us. M. de Levis is not to be blamed; an +officer who serves under the orders of others can only be +reproached when he does not execute punctually the orders +he receives from his superiors; and he has always reason +to be cautious and diffident in such cases where his honour +and reputation may be engaged, as none can be positively +certain of the issue of any military enterprise, and if success +does not crown the venture, of which you have voluntarily +burthened yourself, though undertaken from the best of +motives and apparently for the good of the service, thousands +of mouths will open to spit venom against you.</p> + +<p>But of all others, the ignorant amongst the military, and<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_17" id="Page_17">17</a></span> +the knaves, to screen themselves, will surely be violent: +this is so much the more astonishing, in the profession of +arms, where sentiments of honour and honesty ought to be +the foundation.</p> + +<p><span class="smcap">Wolfe</span>:​—​My intention in approaching so near your post +at the ford was to examine it carefully, as I then had formed +the design to attack it, little imagining that such a considerable +detachment as I had with me would have been +exposed to be set on by your Indians. Accustomed to +European warfare, I could never have thought that a body +of men should have been so long, so close to me without +discovering them. Your intrenchments there appeared to +be very trifling, but the sight of earth thrown up is respectable, +and not to be despised.</p> + +<p><span class="smcap">Montcalm</span>:​—​Your attack of the 31st of July, at the only +place of our camp which was inaccessible, appeared to me +unaccountable. From Quebec to Beauport, which was +about four miles, it is a marshy ground, very little higher +than the surface of the St. Lawrence at full tide. The +heights begin at the ravine at Beauport, and rise gradually +all along the border of the river, until at Johnstone’s redoubt +and battery​—​where you made your descent and +attack​—​they become a steep high hill, which ends in a +deep precipice at the Sault de Montmorency. Opposite to +Johnstone’s redoubt it is so steep that your soldiers could +scarce be able to climb it, even without the encumbrance +of their arms.</p> + +<p>Besides this natural fortification, we had a continued +intrenchment all along the edge of the hill, from Beauport +to the Sault, so traced and conducted by M. Johnstone that +it was everywhere flanked, and the sloping of it served as +a glacis; thus the fire from the front and flanks would +have destroyed the three-fourths of your army before they +could reach the top of the hill.</p> + +<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_18" id="Page_18">18</a></span> +But supposing that some of your troops had reached the +top of the hill, up to our trenches, after surmounting these +difficulties, my grenadiers were drawn up in battle behind +them, ready to charge upon them, with their bayonets upon +their muskets, the instant any of your soldiers should +appear at the trenches.</p> + +<p>The swampy, sinking ground, from the redoubt to the foot +of the hill, was not one of the smallest difficulties you had +in your way to come at us.</p> + +<p>It is true the Scotch Highlanders, who were your forlorn +hope, had got over it and had reached the foot of the hill, +though certainly very few returned; but these turfy swamps, +when a certain number of men have passed them, become +at last impassible, and your soldiers must have sunk down +in it above the head, multitudes of them perishing there in +the most useless and disagreeable manner. Thus, sir, I hope +you see clearly the folly and rashness of that attack, and +that your army must have been totally destroyed, without +hope, had not heaven wrought a miracle in your favor, after +a long cessation of them, which alone could save you.</p> + +<p>You were no sooner hotly engaged in the attack, without +a possibility of withdrawing yourself out of the scrape, when +from a clear sunshine there fell in that most critical juncture, +of a sudden, the most violent even, down pour of rain +from a cloud, which, as the cloud that saved Eneas from +the fury of Diomed, placed you immediately out of our +sight, so that in an instant we could not see half way down +the hill. You profited, as a wise man, of this event to make +good your retreat. When the shower was over and we +could see you, we found, to our sorrow, that you had escaped +us, and that you were then out of the reach of our fire, +marching, in a well-formed column, back to your camp at +the Sault, well satisfied to have got out of that adventure +with the loss only of between five and six hundred men.</p> + +<p>It was a long time before I could be persuaded that you<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_19" id="Page_19">19</a></span> +were in earnest. I had always expected your descent and +attack would have been betwixt the St. Charles river and +the ravine of Beauport. All that tract of ground, about four +miles extent, was everywhere favourable to you, if you had +made your real descent in the middle of it, opposite to M. +Vaudreuil’s lodging, with feint attacks at Johnstone’s redoubt, +and at the Canardière near the river St. Charles, +forcing our intrenchments there, which could not resist an +instant a well-formed column. The head of it, composed of +the Scotch Highlanders, might have easily penetrated into +the plain, separating our army into two parts by the centre, +having lodged yourself in the south side of the ravine of +Beauport, and have taken the hornwork upon the St. +Charles river, sword in hand, without much difficulty or loss +of men. In short, all this might have been effected in an +hour’s time, without meeting with any considerable resistance +from our army, thus divided and opened by the +centre; and a complete victory, which would have crushed +us to pieces without hope, would have crowned you with +justly merited laurels.</p> + +<p><span class="smcap">Wolfe</span>:​—​I own to you, sir, I was greatly deceived with +regard to the height and steepness of the hill, which did +not appear considerable, even with a telescope, from the +river St. Lawrence; it was only when I got to the redoubt +that I saw it such as it really is. I began at seven in the +morning to fire at your camp from my battery at the Sault +(of forty cannons) mostly four-and-twenty pounders. The +<i>Centurion</i>, a man-of-war of sixty guns, did the same, as also +the <i>Two Cats</i>, which had on board all the tools necessary +for the workmen. They gave you continually their broadsides, +firing upon your camp, as I did from my battery, like +platoons of infantry.</p> + +<p>I dare say you never saw artillery better served and kept +up until six in the evening when I began my landing at +low water. I imagined that this terrible cannonade all<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_20" id="Page_20">20</a></span> +that day, without a moment’s intermission, would have intimidated +your Canadians and make them quit the trenches; +my battery at the Sault being thirty or forty feet higher +than your camp, we saw them down at the shore. Certainly +you must have lost a great number of men.</p> + +<p><span class="smcap">Montcalm</span>:​—​That brave militia deserves justly the +greatest praise. Not a man of them stirred from his post, +and they showed as much ardour, courage and resolution as +my regular troops. I had no more than fifty men killed +and wounded by your furious cannonade, which proves +how little cannons are hurtful in comparison to the dread +and respect they inspire. Permit me, sir, to tell you that +your countrymen, the English, appear to me, from their conduct +in Canada, to be as rash, inconsiderate and hot-headed +as the French, who have ever enjoyed that character, notwithstanding +your countrymen’s reputation for coolness and +phlegmatic bravery, since I have seen several examples of +their attacking us before they had examined the <i xml:lang="fr" lang="fr">locale</i>, or +known our position; and if the two nations are compared +impartially, I am persuaded that you will do us the justice +to own that in our operations in Canada we have shown +much more circumspection and coolness than your English +generals. Your attack of the 31st July, without having +procured beforehand an exact knowledge of the hill and of +the places adjacent, is not the first example of great temerity +and impatience on their part.</p> + +<p>The proximity of your camp to this hill might have furnished +you the means to have a thorough knowledge of our +position, by sending proper persons to cross over the ford of +the river Montmorency where it falls into the river St. Lawrence, +and where it is fordable at low water.</p> + +<p>They might, in a dark night and bad weather, have not +only examined the steepness of the height, but have even +gone over all our camp without being discovered; I always +imagined you did so until the day of your attack, which<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_21" id="Page_21">21</a></span> +soon convinced me of the contrary. Your brother in arms, +Abercrombie, your predecessor in the command of the army, +committed the same fault at Ticonderoga as you did the +31st of July; but it cost him much dearer, the clouds which +saved you not having come to his assistance.</p> + +<p>I set out from Montreal on the 5th of May, 1758, to go to +Ticonderoga, with all my regular troops​—​the regiments of +La Sarre, La Reine, Royal Rousillon, Berne, Guienne, +Languedoc, Berry of two battalions, and the independent +companies of the marine detached in Canada; the regiments +from France not being recruited, the whole amounted to +only about four thousand men.</p> + +<p>I had no positive information that the English army had +formed the design to come by the lake St. Sacrament in order +to attack Ticonderoga (Carillon), and from thence to go to +Montreal​—​but I suspected it, from the proximity of this ford +to your settlement upon lake St. Sacrament; nor did I cease +beseeching continually M. Vaudreuil, who was then at Quebec, +to send me with all possible diligence the Canadian +militia, which was the principal force for the defence of the +colony.</p> + +<p>M. Vaudreuil, who has neither common sense, nor judgment, +could not find out that my military conjectures were +grounded; and instead of sending me the Canadians, he gave +them permission to remain at Montreal, sixty leagues from +Ticonderoga, to attend to their agricultural pursuits.</p> + +<p>I dare not allege that he was informed, by the Indians of +the Iroquois nation, that the object of the English was to +invade Canada; that their army was on their way to lake +St. Sacrament; that it was with the view of sacrificing me, +and making me the victim of a cabal, who led him and +governed him blindly, that he kept from me the Canadians.</p> + +<p>The 7th of July my conjectures were verified by the arrival +of the English army at the Chûte, where lake St. Sacrament +terminates, about four miles from Ticonderoga, consisting<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_22" id="Page_22">22</a></span> +of six thousand three hundred men, commanded by +General Abercrombie, who had succeeded to General Braddock, +killed the year before at the river Ohio.</p> + +<p>The return of a detachment which I had placed at the +Chûte, as an advanced post, who had lost an hundred and +fifty men, killed by the English on their arrival there, was +a sad confirmation of the bad news. It is scarce possible to +imagine a more dangerous and critical situation than mine​—​without +the aid of Canadians, whose way of fighting was +so essential to me in the woods​—​more useful in those countries +than regular troops. Fort Carillon, or Ticonderoga, +was a square, regularly fortified, each face of it about seventy +fathoms in length.</p> + +<p>It had four bastions​—​the walls of masonry, doubled with +a rampart, as likewise a ditch, covered way, and glacis. M. +de Bourlamarque, an officer of great merit and intelligence, +had added a half moon to it.</p> + +<p>To retire with my four thousand troops would have been +abandoning the colony to General Abercrombie, as the fort +could not hold out long against so considerable an army; +and being on that side the key of Canada, with the possession +of it in the hands of the English, they might go directly +to Montreal, and be there in fifteen days, without finding +on their way the least obstruction; on the other hand, +the match was very unequal in opposing four thousand +men to thirteen thousand. There was, however, no room +for hesitating, in the choice, and I was soon resolved to +save the colony by a bold and desperate stroke or die, gloriously, +sword in hand. I made everybody work hard all +the night between the 7th and 8th July, cutting down +trees to make an intrenchment (CCCC), which, when finished, +was very weak, trifling, and could scarce serve as a +breast-work to cover the troops.</p> + +<p>The engineers, having cut off the branches, laid the trees +upon a line on the heights, three or four of them placed<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_23" id="Page_23">23</a></span> +horizontally one upon the other, which scarce made it +above three feet high​—​so low that your soldiers might +easily have jumped over it;​—​they made a line of the +branches, at two paces distance, on the outside of the +trenches (HH). It is certain that if the engineers had only +thrown the trees with their heads outwards, and their +branches sharpened in pricking points at their ends, it +would have made a much stronger intrenchment, more +difficult to be forced, and built much <span class="locked">sooner.<a name="FNanchor_C" id="FNanchor_C" href="#Footnote_C" class="fnanchor">C</a></span> I had not +the time to continue the trenches down to the hollow (DD), +at the foot of the height, and I placed there two companies +of grenadiers.</p> + +<p>The hollow upon the right of the height, where the intrenchment +was the worst of all my lines, was the post of +the companies of marines (C); the regiments lined the rest +of the trenches. Next day, the 8th of July, the English +army appeared on the borders of the woods, about three +hundred fathoms from the front of our intrenchment on the +height, and instantly advanced to the attack, formed in +three columns (EE), without halting a moment to examine +the <i xml:lang="fr" lang="fr">locale</i>. Two of the columns attacked the height with +the utmost impetuosity, but being very soon entangled +among the branches, on the outside of the trenches, and +impeded by them, they lost there a great many men; some +few got through and, jumping into our trenches, were killed +by our soldiers with their bayonets.</p> + +<p>The American riflemen were posted on two heights (GG), +which commanded our trenches, from whence they saw +sideways in some parts of them, and in others the rear of +the soldiers (K).</p> + +<p>The regiment of Berry was, above all others, worried and +tormented by their fire​—​one of these heights being scarce +above eighty paces from the intrenchments. The third<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_24" id="Page_24">24</a></span> +column attacked the hollow upon our right; but receiving +a brisk fire at its front from the colony troops, and at the +same time upon its right flank from the regiments on the +height, the column soon wavered, wheeled to the right, +and, presenting its front to the height, got out of the reach +of the fire from the right of the colony troops; upon which +M. Raymond, who commanded them, went out of the +trenches with the right wing of these troops, and attacked +the left flank of the column, whilst its head and right flank +were fired at from the height and from the left of the colony +troops in the trenches.</p> + +<p>The column, distressed by this firing, yet, nevertheless, +keeping firm at the foot of the height, put in disorder the +regiment of Berry, who abandoned that part of the intrenchment +(II) above it.</p> + +<p>The moment I perceived the disorder, I ran there, encouraged +the soldiers of the regiment, made them return to +their post, and supported them by the grenadiers, whom I +had kept in order of battle, at a small distance from the +trenches, as a reserve, to be employed wherever the line +might be forced by your troops, to charge upon them headlong, +their bayonets upon their muskets, without firing: +having neglected nothing that the short time allowed me +to do, in order to make a vigorous defence​—​without aught +to reproach myself with​—​had I been overpowered by your +army; and having always preserved coolness and presence +of mind so as to be able to remedy immediately any disorders +during this long and well disputed attack.</p> + +<p>General Abercrombie was at last obliged to retire, after +having continued for some hours, with the greatest obstinacy, +his attempt to force our intrenchments,​—​with the loss +of two thousand <span class="locked">men.<a name="FNanchor_D" id="FNanchor_D" href="#Footnote_D" class="fnanchor">D</a></span></p> + +<p>I acquitted myself of my duty: this always affords a +sweet satisfaction in all the events of life; and, even to the<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_25" id="Page_25">25</a></span> +vanquished and unfortunate, it must yield great comfort +and consolation. I had only twelve hours to prepare to +defend myself with five thousand men against thirteen +thousand.</p> + +<p>How can General Abercrombie’s rash and blind conduct +be accounted for, for attacking us without examining or +knowing our position? It is astonishing.</p> + +<p>During twelve hours that he remained at the Chûte after +landing there, he had time to send and examine the ground +round the fort Ticonderoga; and they might have had a +perfect knowledge of our position from a hill, covered +with big trees, on the opposite side of the river of the +Chûte (P);<a name="FNanchor_E" id="FNanchor_E" href="#Footnote_E" class="fnanchor">E</a> this hill was much higher than any part of +our intrenchments, and not a musket shot from them; he +might have gone there himself with safety, having that +river between us.</p> + +<p>Had he halted only a short time after his arrival on the +borders of the wood, about six hundred paces from our +trenches, he might, even from thence, have examined the +<i xml:lang="fr" lang="fr">locale</i> at his leisure. But, seized with impatience, he hurried +to the attack without stopping there a moment​—​and +it is not when an action is engaged that one can then examine +the enemy’s position; or, if he had advanced upon +us the moment of his landing at the Chûte, the 7th instant, +instead of loitering there twelve hours, he would not have +found even those shabby intrenchments; and having so +few (regular) troops, irrespective of the Canadians, I would +have been obliged, on his appearing, to abandon to him all +that part of the country, and retire to Montreal, leaving +only a garrison at Fort Carillon. It was certainly through +his ignorance of the <i xml:lang="fr" lang="fr">locale</i> that I repulsed him, instead of +being myself cut to pieces; nor had I any means of retreat, +and my troops must have been all killed or taken prisoners,<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_26" id="Page_26">26</a></span> +if his third column had marched along the borders of the +wood upon their left; this would have put them out of the +reach of the fire from the height, they could fall upon the +right flank of the trenches of the colony troops, who could +not have resisted a moment the impulse of the column; +instead of wheeling and changing its plan of attack by +presenting its head to the height, had he always advanced +forward to attack the centre of the intrenchments of the +marine, he would have easily pierced through it; then, +wheeling to the right, go up the height, which is there of +an easy ascent, and fire upon the rear of the troops, who +opposed your other two columns, they must have been put +to flight, the trenches abandoned, and, even upon the sight +of your third column coming up the height, I must, of necessity, +have instantly retreated to the fort the best way I +could; there to embark my army in my boats and carry it +down Lake Champlain, without being able to make a resistance +at Fort Frederic, as it is commanded by hills behind +it, about the distance of two hundred paces from its +walls, which makes it a very advantageous post. What +would have been still worse for me, if my trenches had +been forced, there is a space of five leagues between Fort +Frederic and Ticonderoga, by the river St. Frederic, which, +about half way, is scarce above fifty or sixty fathoms broad, +and is a most advantageous post, where not a boat would +pass by, and must cut off entirely the communication with +Lake Champlain, as it is an equal distance from the Chûte +or from Ticonderoga.</p> + +<p>General Abercrombie might have sent a body of troops to +establish there a post, in which case we must have laid down +our arms and surrendered ourselves prisoners to him, for +want of subsistence, and from the impossibility of retreating +by land.</p> + +<p>General Abercrombie might have likewise penetrated +easily at the hollow, which I had not the time to intrench,<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_27" id="Page_27">27</a></span> +where I had placed two companies of volunteers; and this +would have had equally fatal consequences for me, as the +third column might have been on the other side of the height, +the ascent there not being steep or of difficult access.</p> + +<p>But his attacks were always obstinately directed at the +most difficult places of the height, as if there had been a +cloud before his eyes to hinder him from seeing to his right +and left what was visible to the most ignorant officer.</p> + +<p><span class="smcap">Wolfe</span>:​—​That was a most glorious day for you, sir,​—​worthy +of the ambition of a great man. Our columns were +only at ten steps distance from your intrenchments, and all +our army saw you perfectly well, constantly at work encouraging +and exciting the ardour of your soldiers, hurrying +over your lines perpetually some paces from your trenches; +exposing your person too rashly compared to the custom of +our army, your eye glancing over the whole, with the attitude +of a lion. General Abercrombie perceived, clearly, the +disorder upon your right when the regiment of Berry was +about to retire, and redoubled his efforts to profit by it. But +you were everywhere, travelling from place to place with +the swiftness of the eagle; never at a loss; reforming the +smallest disorder so soon as it was visible, and preventing +it from spreading, as it generally does, like a flash of lightning. +This affair won you so great a reputation in England +for capacity and talent, that I own to you, sir, the idea of +having an antagonist of your knowledge and merit, made +me during the campaign always irresolute, vacillating in +my opinions and undecided in my projects. I cannot condemn +my predecessors who had the command of the English +armies in Canada. The way of fighting of the Canadians +and Indians in the woods is so different from that practised +in Europe, that I readily believe the most able General, +with an army of the best disciplined troops, in following +exactly the rules of the art of war,​—​whose principles are +sure, fixed and demonstrable in European warfare,​—​may<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_28" id="Page_28">28</a></span> +be easily cut to pieces in those vast forests by a very few +Indians. There was an outcry in England against General +Braddock, for allowing his army of four thousand men to +be cut to pieces at the river <span class="locked">Ohio,<a name="FNanchor_F" id="FNanchor_F" href="#Footnote_F" class="fnanchor">F</a></span> in the year 1755, by six +hundred and fifty Canadians and Indians only, much more +than they blame General Abercrombie.</p> + +<p>The reason of it is clear. Abercrombie lived to return +to England: the living always find means to justify themselves. +But Braddock was killed: the dead are always in +the wrong, and never find disinterested advocates to plead +their cause. Braddock’s order of march​—​criticised by your +French Generals​—​may, at first sight, appear singular; and +may pretend that he must of necessity have been beat, in +consequence of the bad disposition of it. But analize it, +and you will find nothing else than the common rule practised +through all Europe in passing through a wood: an +army formed in three columns​—​the artillery, baggage, +waggons and cavalry being the column of the centre, between +the other two columns of infantry; half of the Grenadiers +at their head to support the Pioneers employed in +opening a road through the wood for the passage of the +carts and artillery, and the rest in the rear, to close of +march. Braddock was invested on all sides by the Canadians, +and dispersed in the wood, each of them behind a +tree, marking out his victim; so that every musket-shot +brought down a soldier, and at every discharge they flew from +tree to tree. What can regular troops do in such a case? +Close their ranks and files each moment, as did Braddock, +direct a continual fire at the woods, without perceiving a +man, and be cut to pieces without seeing an enemy. There<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_29" id="Page_29">29</a></span> +is no other method for troops to defend themselves against +the Indians than what I practised, with success, when I +was surprised by them at the ford of the River Montmorency: +the soldiers, with fixed bayonets, dispersed themselves, +rushed on in disorder towards the places where they +perceived the smoke of the Indians’ discharge; and by +these means my detachment in the woods chased away your +nine hundred Indians, who in a moment disappeared entirely, +and suffered me to retire at my leisure to my camp.</p> + +<p><span class="smcap">Montcalm</span>:​—​I verily believe, sir, that your idea is just. +The Indians told me, on their return, that it was now no +more possible to fight you as formerly, since the English +had learned their (the Indians’) way of fighting. There cannot +be a greater advantage for a General than the entire +knowledge of the country​—​the seat of war: without this, +he must always grope in the dark​—​be foiled in his operations​—​rest +often inactive, uncertain in his projects; and +be only inactive and on the defensive, as you were all the +summer as much as me. You were absolutely master of +the River St. Lawrence by your men-of-war, who had ascended +it, passing by Quebec with incredible boldness, and +scorning the most murderous fire from the batteries of the +town so near them. You had an infinite number of boats +at your disposal, with all the sailors of your fleet for rowers. +What, then, could hinder you from sending a body of +twelve or fifteen hundred men in different detachments, +with engineers and able officers, in order to be continually +landing, to get a thorough knowledge of the country, draw +plans of all the advantageous positions which abound there; +and this detachment, if well led, might have gone even to +Montreal without finding any opposition in their course. +Their descriptions and plans of the country would have enlightened +you, and furnished the means of destroying and +crushing our army without fighting: this is the touchstone +to prove superior talents and capacity in a General. The<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_30" id="Page_30">30</a></span> +gaining of a battle is very often the effect of mere chance. +But reducing an enemy without fighting must be the result +of well-combined operations,​—​is the essence of military +science, and was always the most radient and distinctive +<em>trait</em> in the conduct and character of the great men whom +history has handed down to us. Grounded upon the instructions +received from the engineers and officers of their +detachments, you might have verified their observations by +your prisoners, who say always more than they intend, +when examined with kindness, coolness, and with a seeming +indifference. The only achievement which you performed +during two months that you lay constantly loitering +in your camps, looking at us, was your attack of the +31st of July; and your expedition to Deschambault, where +you sent a body of two thousand men, fourteen leagues up +the river from Quebec, to burn and pillage a poor, miserable +peasant’s house, in which was the baggage of some French +regiments! But the detachment had no intention of examining +the <i xml:lang="fr" lang="fr">locale</i> of the country. Had they gone to Jacques +Cartier, only three leagues from Deschambault, they would +have discovered there a post strong by nature, which certainly +cannot be inferior to the Thermopylæ so celebrated +by the Greeks, and capable of being defended​—​you being +the masters of the River St. Lawrence​—​by as few men as +Leonidas had with him against the most numerous army. +But your detachment at Deschambault, upon the appearance +of my cavalry, composed merely of two hundred undisciplined +Canadians on horseback, commanded by the +Chevalier de LaRochebeaucourt, ran to their boats and embarked +with great disorder and confusion, as if our army +had been at their heels, without having remained there +above two hours. Jacques Cartier​—​which takes its name +from he who first discovered the River St. Lawrence, and +who, having lost his ship, passed there the winter amongst +the Indians​—​in an immense ravine, with a rapid, shaggy<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_31" id="Page_31">31</a></span> +river full of large rocks, that runs between the two heights, +whose tops are about two hundred fathoms distant from +each other; their sides are as glacis, with a view from their +tops to the bottom​—​four or five hundred feet deep​—​which +strikes the eyes with horror on looking down that vast +precipice. Its side, facing the River St. Lawrence, is a +steep perpendicular rock; and the ground to the north is +impracticable from the lakes, swamps, and sinking turf, +where at each step a person must plunge over the head and +perish. It must be impossible to turn round it and leave +it behind, since the Canadians and the Indians never discovered +a passage through the woods. Thus the only +means of approaching this fort must have been by landing +at Deschambault. From thence to Jacques Cartier, it is an +easy and gradually rising ascent. Had you seized this extraordinary +fort, you would have cut off my communication +with Montreal, from whence I drew daily my supplies for +the army: in this event, I had no other alternative than +allowing my army to perish of famine, or surrender the +colony. But as we had been sent from Europe, not to +destroy the inhabitants, but, on the contrary, to save and +defend them, I must have immediately concluded by capitulating +for Canada upon the best terms I could obtain +from you. I hope I have demonstrated clearly to you that, +had you been acquainted with the <i xml:lang="fr" lang="fr">locale</i>, you could have +made the glorious conquest of Canada without shedding a +drop of blood.</p> + +<p><span class="smcap">Wolfe</span>:​—​You argue, sir, at your ease! How was it +possible to examine and know the <i xml:lang="fr" lang="fr">locale</i> of that country, +your bloodhounds​—​the Indians and Canadians​—​being +constantly at our heels: one cannot send out scouts in Canada, +as is done in Europe.</p> + +<p><span class="smcap">Montcalm</span>:​—​Why not? Men cannot be in two places +at the same time; and you managed to find everywhere +Indians and Canadians in your way! There are many<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_32" id="Page_32">32</a></span> +kinds of irregular troops in Europe as bad to deal with as +the Indians in woods and in wooded countries. But your +army was always so struck with terror and dread, that, +constantly blinded with fear, the shadow of an Indian set +them a trembling. Nevertheless, the New England independent +companies, formed by Roger, who afterwards beat +the Indians with equal numbers in their own way of fighting +behind trees, should have removed the formidable impression +they have always made upon the English. Self-preservation +is natural to all mankind, and the hour of death +must strike with horror the bravest man. But fear is pardonable +amongst soldiers only when there exists a real +cause for fear; and is not to be tolerated when groundless: +this is so much the case of your soldiers with regard to the +Indians, that, demoralized by fear, they suffer themselves to +be butchered by a vastly inferior number of Indians, without +ever thinking of defending themselves, even when +they know they will have no quarter. In any danger, +soldiers ought to be accustomed to look coolly death in +the face,​—​they, whose duty is to die when the Sovereign +demands it: such is the contract they sign with the latter +on their entering into his service.</p> + +<p>These sentiments may be often the means of one’s preserving +life instead of losing it. Nothing is more incomprehensible +to me, in all your conduct in Canada, than +your landing at <i xml:lang="fr" lang="fr">Anse des Mères</i> on the 13th September (the +fatal day which deprived us both of our existence, but +freed us from mortal folly), at the foot of a steep hill, where +a few men at the top of it, with sticks and stones only, +must have easily beaten you back on your attempt to climb +it, and where we had three posts of one hundred men +each: one of them commanded by Douglas, captain in the +regiment of Languedoc; another by Rimini, captain in the +regiment La Sarre; and the third by De Vergor, captain in<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_33" id="Page_33">33</a></span> +the Colony troops, at whose <span class="locked">post<a name="FNanchor_G" id="FNanchor_G" href="#Footnote_G" class="fnanchor">G</a></span> you made your descent. +These three hundred men, had they done their duty, +should have been more than sufficient to have repulsed +you ignominiously at this steep hill; and you never would +have got to the top had you met with the smallest resistance. +I own that your daring surpasses my conception.</p> + +<p><span class="smcap">Wolfe</span>:​—​I do not pretend to justify my project by its +success, but by my combinations, which answered exactly +as I had foreseen, and which demonstrate my scheme to +have been well concerted. In giving you this account of +it, I am persuaded that you will not blame me for undertaking +an attempt so absurd in appearance, and yet most +reasonable when examined impartially. In all expeditions +composed of sea and land forces, it seldom fails that disputes, +animosities, jealousies and quarrels arise between +the different commanders equal in authority; and it is a +miracle if you see the Admiral and the General unanimously +of the same opinion with regard to operations. The sea +and the land service are sciences whose principles are entirely +different; as certainly there can be no analogy between +the working of a ship and the drill of a regiment. +Nevertheless, the Admiral meddles continually with the +land operations, and the General will have the fleets do +things that are impossible​—​both of them equally ignorant +of each other’s service; from whence results a clashing discord +in their operations, when sent out with equal power. +If each of them would confine himself to that part of the +art of war which he has studied, and have only in his soul +the good and welfare of his King and Country, these mixed +expeditions of land and sea would succeed much better +than they generally do. The naval officers tormented me +a great deal, and were still more troublesome as the season +advanced. They held a council of war on board the flagship<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_34" id="Page_34">34</a></span> +on the 10th September, when it was determined to set +sail immediately for Europe, seeing the imminent dangers +to which His Majesty’s fleet would be exposed in those +tempestuous seas by remaining any longer before Quebec; +and, in consequence of this decision, orders were given to +some men-of-war to take up their anchors and fall down +the river, while orders were issued at the same time to begin +the general preparations for the immediate departure +of all the fleet. The 12th, there came two deserters to me +from one of your three posts you just now mentioned, who +belonged to the French regiments, and were well informed. +Upon examining them, I discovered that your posts were +guarded very negligently; that de Bougainville, who was +at Cap Rouge, proposed to send down, the night following, +some boats loaded with provisions, and that your three +posts had their orders to let these boats pass unmolested. +The idea instantly occurred to me to profit by this discovery; +and I ran to the Admiral, communicated to him what I had +learned from the French deserters, begged him most +earnestly to suffer me to make a last attempt before the +embarkation of my army. I promised him that if there +were twenty muskets fired from your posts, I would then +desist immediately without further thought than to embark +speedily in order to return to England. The council +consented to my demand, and I began my landing at +eleven at night. When my boats approached the two +posts of Douglas and Rimini, upon their sentinels calling +“<i xml:lang="fr" lang="fr">Qui vive!</i>” my soldiers answered them in French, +“<i xml:lang="fr" lang="fr">Bateaux des vivres</i>,” upon which they suffered them to +go on without stopping them, as they might have done, in +order to receive the password. Not finding a sentry at +your third post, commanded by De Vergor, I landed there +with diligence, and all my army was ashore before this +post perceived our men, without firing but one musket, +which wounded De Vergor in the heel, who was immediately<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_35" id="Page_35">35</a></span> +taken prisoner without finding any man of his +detachment with <span class="locked">him.<a name="FNanchor_H" id="FNanchor_H" href="#Footnote_H" class="fnanchor">H</a></span> I began my operation by landing +there a Sergeant with ten Grenadiers, ordering him to +advance always straight before him briskly, with long +steps, and not to halt unless he was discovered by the +enemy. A Lieutenant, with a detachment of Grenadiers, +followed him, having the same orders, to halt instantly if +they fired at him. The silence continuing, I then landed +all my Grenadiers, who followed the Sergeant and the +Lieutenant; and by degrees all my army landed without +the least noise, disorder or confusion. The silence soon +convinced me that they were not discovered; dissipated +my fears, and assured me of the success of my enterprise. +The head of the column, which was the guide to the rest +of the army, got up the hill with difficulty, the others +following them at their heels. If your guards had been +vigilant and done their duty, all I risked was the Sergeant +and Lieutenant, with a few Grenadiers. I would have +stopped at the first discharge, as it would have been +madness and unpardonable to attack by main force a hill +so inaccessible that, even without an enemy at the top to +repel them, my men had much difficulty to climb it. +Moreover, I was assured by your deserters you had no +troops on the heights of Abraham. You see now, sir, that +it was not a heedless, ill-concerted project,​—​but a sure +operation, without risking much. An invariable principle +with me has ever been to make an attack where it appears +the most difficult; and it generally meets with success, as +the point is commonly ill-guarded, frequently entirely +neglected, and scarcely comprehended in the plan of +defence. I am not alone of this opinion. Cardinal Ximenes +says, that “Ferdinand, King of Arragon, fitted out two<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_36" id="Page_36">36</a></span> +armies against the Moors, under the conduct of Count +D’Aguilar, and ordered them to enter into the mountains +of Grenada at the same time, by the places the most +difficult,” and consequently the least guarded. He gained +a most complete victory over the Moors. The most difficult +gorges of mountains, when not guarded where only a +single man can pass, a hundred thousand may do the +same. It is then an easy operation, by forming your men +in battle as soon as they get through the passage, and +provided that they are not immediately discovered by the +enemy. When once you have a front capable to oppose +and stand firm, it increases every instant, as you may be +convinced that the soldiers go through the dangerous +passage with great quickness. Besides, the enemy is always +disconcerted by a surprise; demoralized by an unforeseen +incident, he becomes timid and alarmed, and may be +looked upon as already vanquished before the action +begins. The landing at Cap Breton was executed according +to my system. The enemy does not expect you at +a place of difficult access; it is where he does not +expect me that I would make my principal attack. Commonly, +men suffer most where they are most <span class="locked">seen.<a name="FNanchor_I" id="FNanchor_I" href="#Footnote_I" class="fnanchor">I</a></span> But +if they are entirely neglected​—​as it happened at Louisbourg​—​it +is a fault of the General, who should be answerable +for it. But the General having placed upon them a +sufficient number of troops in proportion to their difficulties, +can he be blamed if the officers of these posts do not do +their duty?</p> + +<p><span class="smcap">Montcalm</span>:​—​Can there be any divine or human law to +punish a man for the faults of others? Should they not +answer personally? It has often happened that the safety +of a whole army has depended upon a subaltern’s guard!<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_37" id="Page_37">37</a></span> +You see that the deserters caused you to make a last +attempt​—​prevented your embarking your army for England​—​your +giving up your enterprise​—​and, in short, ended in +adding Canada to the British dominions; and perhaps a +vigilant officer at that post (Wolfe’s Cove) might have +hindered the soldiers from deserting, which would at once +have removed a first cause which produced so many +extraordinary effects. Your system may be good, if executed +with great prudence and precaution. But should the +enemy be informed of your design, which he may be by a +deserter acquainted with your great preparations, as you +were with the negligence of our posts, it is an excellent +opportunity to have your army cut to pieces and catch a +tartar; as it must have been your case at the Sault de +Montmorency (on the 31st July), had it not been for that +sudden shower of rain, which came to your rescue in the +critical moment, when your destruction was otherwise +inevitable. At least, sir, confess the injustice of mankind. +They reproach me with being the cause of your success! +They accuse me of having sacrificed the welfare of my +army through jealousy and ill-feeling! My king and +country​—​for whom I would have shed, with pleasure, +every drop of my blood​—​and those who view my case +the most favourably, look on me as a giddy, ignorant +officer! All these scandalous, atrocious lies and calumnies +were spread everywhere by a <span class="locked">set<a name="FNanchor_J" id="FNanchor_J" href="#Footnote_J" class="fnanchor">J</a></span> of men who, from their +immoderate thirst of riches, would, to serve their interest, +have betrayed their king and country. Those vile, mercenary +souls knew that I detested them as much as I constantly +cherished honest men, whose noble sentiments endeared +them to me. My death was happy for them. Had I lived +to return to Europe, I would have had no difficulty to +justify all my conduct, and crush these wretches like +vermin. Covetousness and avarice carried them to Canada;<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_38" id="Page_38">38</a></span> +they left their honour and honesty in France on embarking, +easily forgetting what it is to be just and patriotic. I would +have soon confounded them. Truth supports oppressed +innocence, and, sooner or later, dispels the clouds which +too often overshadow it. I shall give you a faithful and +exact account of my conduct with regard to the operations +of the 13th September, following scrupulously truth, which +has always been the rule of my actions and is held in great +veneration by me; and I hope to demonstrate to you that +if the end of that campaign covered you with glory, Fortune +was the chief agent, who reunited in your power a great +number of circumstances, the absence of any one of which +sufficed to render your expedition fruitless.</p> + +<p>Some days after the action of the 31st of July, M. de +Levis was sent by M. Vaudreuil to command at Montreal, +upon a false report that a body of English was coming to +attack Canada by Lake Champlain​—​a story trumped up by +my enemies to deprive me of M. de Levis, in whom I had +the greatest confidence, on account of his talents: I cannot +say he made me a just acknowledgment of my sentiments +towards him. I went to his lodgings a few hours before +his departure, which was kept a secret from the army; +and as I was little acquainted with his plan of defence for +the left of our camp, at the Sault de Montmorency, I begged +of him, as a favour, to leave me his aide-de-camp, M. +Johnstone, who had a perfect knowledge of the <i xml:lang="fr" lang="fr">locale</i> of +that part of the country. Your boats having caused us an +alarm in the night between the 10th and 11th of September, +by their appearance opposite to the ravine of Beauport, I +remained at M. Vaudreuil’s until one in the morning, +when I left him in order that I might return to my lodging​—​having +with me M. Montreuil, Major-General of the +army, and M. Johnstone. On my sending away M. de +Vaudreuil, after giving him my orders, I related immediately +to M. Johnstone all the measures I had concerted with M.<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_39" id="Page_39">39</a></span> +de Vaudreuil, in case you (Gen. Wolfe) made a descent at +daybreak. He answered me, that your army being now +assembled at Point Levi, and part of it gone above Quebec, +on the south side of the River St. Lawrence, it appeared +very doubtful where you might attempt a descent​—​whether +above the town, or below it towards the <i>Canardière</i>; +he added, that he believed a body of troops might be +advantageously placed upon the heights of Abraham, where +they could with certainty confront you whenever you +landed. I approved greatly of his idea. I called back +Montreuil​—​who was as yet not far from us​—​and I ordered +him to send the Regiment of Guienne​—​which was encamped +near the hornwork at the River St. Charles​—​to pass the +night upon the heights of Abraham. Next morning​—​the +11th​—​I wrote to Montreuil, ordering him to make this +regiment encamp upon the heights of Abraham, and +remain there until further orders. Thus, in consequence +of my repeated orders, I had all the reason possible to +believe that this regiment constitued a permanent post +there; so that the declaration of the deserters from the +three posts, who could not know this, might have led you +into a dangerous snare, worse than that of the 31st July. +Why this regiment continued the 12th in this camp at the +hornwork, in spite of my express orders to encamp upon +the heights, I know not; and can only attribute Montreuil’s +disobedience of my orders to the weakness of his judgment +and understanding. It is nevertheless evident that, if you +had found the Regiment of Guienne upon the top of the +hill​—​where it ought to have been, had my orders been +obeyed​—​you would have been repulsed shamefully with a +much greater loss than you met with on the 31st July at +the Sault; the height where you made your descent, the +13th of September, being infinitely steeper than that there +which obliged you to make a speedy retreat, favoured by +the <em>providential shower</em>. Or, perhaps you would have<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_40" id="Page_40">40</a></span> +embarked immediately your army, without any further +attempt, to return to England, after a most ruinous and +fruitless expedition​—​the campaign ending with an incredible +expense to your nation​—​fruitless; and, by this means, the +colony of Canada would have been for ever delivered from +such formidable armies.</p> + +<p>As soon as your army was reunited in a single camp at +Pointe Levi, after having been so long separated, upon you +sending a body of troops up the River St. Lawrence, I +detached M. de Bougainville, with fifteen hundred of my +best troops​—​composed of all my Grenadiers, of the +Volunteers from the French Regiments, of my best Canadians +and Indians; and I likewise gave him some small +guns. I ordered him strictly to follow all your movements, +by ascending the river when you went up, and descending +as you did the same: in short, to be an army of observation, +with only the river between you​—​never to lose sight of +you​—​ever ready to oppose your passage up the river, and +to fall on you with the swiftness of the eagle the moment +you attempted to land on our side of it. He sent to inform +me, the 13th of September, that all your army had descended +to your camp at Pointe Levi. But he remained loitering +with his detachment at Cap Rouge​—​three leagues from +Quebec! Why did he not follow you to the heights of +Abraham, according to his orders? Why did he not send +me back my Grenadiers and Volunteers​—​the very flower +of their Regiments? informing me, as also the posts of +Douglas and Rimini, that he would send down that night. +I cannot conceive the reasons for such conduct: it is beyond +all conception! He was informed, between seven and +eight in the morning, by the fugitives from the three posts, +that your army was landed and drawn up in battle upon +the heights of Abraham; upon which he left Cap Rouge +with his detachment, no doubt with the intention to join +me. But, instead of taking the road to Lorette, or to the<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_41" id="Page_41">41</a></span> +General Hospital along the borders of the River St. Charles, +which led both of them to our camp, he followed the heights +of Abraham, where he was evidently certain by his information +to find there your army to intercept him; and it +could never be his design to fight you with fifteen hundred +men! He found a house on his way, with three or four +hundred of your troops barricading it, and was very desirous +to take them prisoners. M. le Noir, Captain in the Regiment +La Sarre​—​having more bravery than prudence and +knowledge of the art of war​—​attacked the house with the +most astonishing boldness, and had more than half of his +company of Volunteers killed: he received himself two +wounds​—​one of them by a ball through the body, and the +other in his hand. De Bougainville, intent on taking the +house, waited there the arrival of the cannon, to force it; +but when the cannon arrived, it unluckily happened that +the balls had been forgotten at Cap Rouge, which obliged +him to return there, abandoning the house without a +moment’s reflection. How much more important it would +have been to direct his march towards the General Hospital, +in order to join my army! Thus were precious moments +wasted ridiculously in the most trifling manner. De +Bougainville​—​who has a great deal of wit, good sense, +many good qualities​—​was protected by a very great person +at Court; he is personally brave, has but little knowledge +in the military science, having never studied it.</p> + +<p>The night between the 12th and 13th of September, when +you made your descent, M. Poularies, Commander of the +Regiment Royal Roussillon, who encamped behind my lodgings +at Beauport, came to me, at midnight, to inform me that +they saw boats opposite to his regiment. Upon which I immediately +ordered all the army to line the trenches; and I +sent Marcel​—​who served me as Secretary and aid-de-camp​—​to +pass the night at M. de Vaudreuil’s, giving him one of +my Cavaliers of Ordnance, ordering Marcel, if there was anything<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_42" id="Page_42">42</a></span> +extraordinary in that quarter, to inform me of it speedily +by the Cavalier. I was out and walked with Poularies +and Johnstone, between my house and the ravine of Beauport, +until one in the morning, when I sent Poularies to his +regiment, and I continued there with Johnstone. All night +my mind was in the most violent agitation, which I believe +proceeded from my uneasiness for the boats and provisions +that de Bougainville had acquainted me, would be sent down +the river that night; and I repeated often to Johnstone, that +I trembled lest they should be taken, “that loss would ruin +us without resource, having provisions only for two days’ +subsistence to our army.” It appears to me that my extraordinary +sufferings that night were a presage of my cruel +fate some hours afterwards. At daybreak they fired some +cannon from our battery at Samos, near Sillery. I then had +no more doubts of our boats being taken by you. Alas! I +would never have imagined that my provisions were in +safety at Cap Rouge with de Bougainville, and that you were +upon the heights of Abraham since midnight, without my +being informed of an event of so great importance, and which +was known through all the right of our camp.</p> + +<p>The day clearing up, having news from Marcel at M. de +Vaudreuil’s, who had always my Cavalier of Ordnance with +him, and perceiving no changes in your camp at Point Levis, +my mind was more composed on reflecting that, if anything +extraordinary had happened, I would certainly have been +informed of it. I then sent Johnstone to order all the army +to their tents, having passed the night in the trenches, and +retired to my lodgings after drinking some dishes of tea with +Johnstone. I desired him to order the servants to saddle +the horses, in order to go to M. de Vaudreuil’s and be informed +of the cause of the firing from our battery at Samos. Not +a soul having come to me from the right of our camp since +midnight when I sent there Marcel, I set out with Johnstone +between six and seven in the morning. Heavens, what was +my surprise! when opposite to M. de Vaudreuil’s lodgings,<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_43" id="Page_43">43</a></span> +the first news of what had passed during the night was the +sight of your army upon the heights of Abraham, firing at +the Canadians scattered amongst the bushes. I met at the +same time M. de Vaudreuil coming out of his lodgings, and +having spoke to him an instant, I turned away to Johnstone, +and told him: “the affair is serious! run with the greatest +speed to Beauport; order Poularies to remain there at the +Ravine with two hundred men, and to send me all the rest +of the left to the heights of Abraham with the utmost diligence.”</p> + +<p>Johnstone having delivered my orders to Poularies, he +quitted him an instant to give some instructions to my servants +at my lodgings; returning to rejoin me, he found +Poularies in the Ravine with M. de Sennezergue, Brigadier-General +and Lieutenant-Colonel of the Regiment of La Sarre, +and de Lotbinière, Captain of the Colony troops and aide-de-camp +to M. de Vaudreuil. Poularies stopped Johnstone to +make him repeat to them my orders, which he did; and at +the same time advised Poularies, as a friend, to disobey them, +by coming himself to the heights of Abraham with every +man of the left, since it was evident that the English army​—​already +landed near Quebec​—​could never think of making +a second descent at Beauport; and that it was manifest +there would be in a few hours an engagement upon the +heights which would immediately decide the fate of the +Colony. Poularies then showed Johnstone a written order​—​signed +“Montreuil”​—​which Lotbinière had brought to him +from M. de Vaudreuil, “That not a man of the left should +stir from the camp!” Johnstone declared to them, upon his +honour, that it was word for word my orders and my intentions; +and he entreated Poularies, in the most pressing +manner, to have no regard for that order signed “Montreuil,” +as the want of two thousand men, which formed the left of +our camp, must be of the greatest consequence in the battle. +M. de Sennezergue​—​an officer of the greatest worth and<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_44" id="Page_44">44</a></span> +honour, who fell a few hours afterwards​—​told Johnstone: +“That he (Johnstone) should take it upon him to make all +the left march of immediately.” Johnstone answered: +“That, being only the bearer of my orders, he could take +nothing upon him. But if he was in M. de Sennezergue’s +place, Brigadier-General, and, by M. de Levis’ absence, the +next in command of the army, he would not hesitate a moment +to make the left march, without any regard whatsoever +to any order that might be hurtful to the King’s service, +in that critical juncture.” Johnstone left them irresolute +and doubtful how to act, clapped spurs to his horse, +and rejoined me immediately upon the heights.</p> + +<p>I don’t know, any more than a thousand others, the particulars +relative to the action of the 13th of September. I +am ignorant of who it was that made our army take their +abominable and senseless position, by thrusting it betwixt +your army and Quebec, where there were no provisions, and +the best of our troops absent with de Bougainville; it certainly +must have been dictated by an ignorant and stupid +blockhead! I certainly had no hand in it: the piquets and +part of the troops were already marched up the heights before +I came to the Canardière, or ever knew that you were +landed; and all the right of our army was marching after +them when I arrived at their encampment. The only proper +course to be taken in our position, and which would +have been apparent to any man of common sense who had +the least knowledge of the art of war, was to quit our camp +coolly​—​calmly​—​without disorder or confusion, and march +to Lorette; from thence cross over to St. Foix​—​which is two +leagues from Quebec and a league from Cap Rouge​—​and +when joined there by M. de Bougainville’s detachment, to +advance then and attack you as soon as possible. By these +means you would have found yourself between two fires, by +a sally from the town the moment that I attacked you on +the other side. I was no sooner upon the heights than I<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_45" id="Page_45">45</a></span> +perceived our horrible position,​—​pressed against the town-walls, +without provisions for four-and-twenty hours, and a +moral impossibility for us to retire, being drawn up in battle +at the distance of a musket-shot from your army. Had +I made an attempt to go down the heights, in order to repass +the River St. Charles and return to my camp, I would have +exposed my left flank to you, and my rear would have been +cut to pieces without being able to protect and support it. +Had I entered into the town, in an instant you would have +invested us in it, without provisions, by carrying down your +left wing to the River St. Charles​—​an easy movement of a +few minutes. I saw no remedy other for us than to worry +your army by a cannonade, having the advantage over you +of a rising ground suitable for batteries of cannon, hoping, +by thus harassing you, that you might retire in the night, +as certainly you could never be so rash as to think of attacking +us under the guns of the town; at least I would have +made my retreat, taking advantage of the darkness of the +night, to get myself out of the scrape where the ignorance +of others had thrown me. I sent several persons with orders +to M. de Ramsay, King’s Lieutenant (Deputy Governor), +who was in command at Quebec, to send me, with all possible +haste, the five-and-twenty brass field pieces that were +in position on the palace battery, near our army; and precisely +at the same instant when Johnstone came to me on +the heights, with the news of the order which prevented +the left of our army to join me, a sergeant arrived from M. +de Ramsay​—​the fourth person I had sent to him with my +orders​—​with a categorical answer from him: “That he had +already sent me three pieces of artillery; and that he could +not send me any more, having his town to defend!” What +could be de Ramsay’s reasons for such a monstrous conduct, +or who it was who inspired him with such a daring disobedience, +I know not?</p> + +<p>1. “His town”​—​as he called it​—​was defended by our<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_46" id="Page_46">46</a></span> +army which covered it, being drawn up in battle about two +hundred fathoms from it; and its safety depended entirely +upon the event of a battle.</p> + +<p>2. There were in Quebec about two hundred pieces of +cannon, most of them twenty-four and thirty-six pounders.</p> + +<p>3. Small field-pieces, two or three pounders​—​such as the +palace battery​—​could they be of the least service for the defence +of a town?</p> + +<p>4. A commander of Quebec, as King’s Lieutenant or sub-Lieutenant, +such as de Ramsay was​—​not Governor,​—​or +even M. de Vaudreuil himself, Governor General of Canada, +at that moment in the town,​—​could they have any authority +to refuse me all the assistance I could desire from Quebec, +by my particular commission of Commander-in-Chief of the +troops in Canada, when my army was at the gates of the town, +and your army deployed ready to fight? A thousand other +queries suggest themselves; but of what avail?</p> + +<p>I assembled immediately a council of war, composed of all +the commanding officers of the several regiments, to hear +their opinion as to what was to be done in our critical situation. +Some of them maintained you were busy throwing +up breastworks. Others, that you appeared bent on descending +in the valley, in order to seize the bridge of boats on the +St. Charles river with the hornwork, with the object of cutting +off our communication with the left wing of our army, +which remained at Beauport pursuant to the order signed by +Montreuil. In effect, a movement your army made in that +moment towards the windmill and Borgia’s house, upon the +edge of the height, seemed to favour this conjecture. But +an instant afterwards, the Canadians having set fire to that +house and chased you from it, you retook your former position. +Others alleged, that the more we delayed attacking +you, the more your army would be strong​—​imagining that +your troops had not yet all landed. In short, there was +not a single member of the war council who was not of<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_47" id="Page_47">47</a></span> +opinion to charge upon you immediately. Can it be credited +that these officers​—​to the dishonour of mankind​—​who +were the most violent to attack you, denied it afterwards, +and became the most ardent censors of my conduct +in not deferring the battle! What could I do in my desperate +situation? Even a Marshal Turenne would have +been much puzzled to get out of such a dilemma, in which +they had entangled me either through design or ignorance. +I listened with attention to their opinion, without opening +my lips, and at last answered them:​—​“It appears to me, +gentlemen, that you are unanimous for giving battle; +and that the only question now is, how to charge the +enemy?” Montreuil said it would be better to attack in +columns. I answered him: “That we would be beat before +our columns could be formed so near to the enemy; +and, besides, that our columns must be very weak, not +having Grenadiers to place at their heads.” I added, that +“since it is decided to attack, it must be in Front Baudière(?)” +I sent all the officers to their posts, and ordered +the drummers to beat the charge.</p> + +<p>Our onset was neither brisk nor long. We went on in +confusion​—​were repulsed in an instant; and it could not +naturally be otherwise from the absence of our Volunteers +and Grenadiers, and de Bougainville at Cap Rouge with +the best of our Canadians; the Montreal regiments with +Poularies at Beauport, a league and a half from the battle-field. +The example of the bravest soldiers in a regiment​—​the +Grenadiers and Volunteers​—​suffices to infuse courage +in the most timid, who can follow the road shown to them, +but cannot lead the way. The brave Canadian Militia saw +us with heavy hearts, grief and despair, from the other side +of the St. Charles river, cut to pieces upon the heights, +stopped, as they were, in the hornwork, and prevented by +superior orders from rushing to our assistance. About two +hundred brave and resolute Canadians rallied in the hollow<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_48" id="Page_48">48</a></span> +at the bakehouse, and returned upon the heights. They +fell instantly upon your left wing with incredible rage; +stopped your army for some minutes from pursuing our +soldiers in their flight, by attracting your attention to them; +resisted, undaunted, the shock of your left; and, when repulsed, +they disputed the ground inch by inch from the +top to the bottom of the height, pursued by your troops +down to the valley at the bakehouse, opposite to the hornwork. +These unfortunate heroes​—​who were most of them +cut to pieces​—​saved your army the loss of a great many +men, by not being hotly pursued; and if your left, who +followed these two hundred Canadians down to the plain, +had crossed it from the bakehouse to the River St. Charles, +only three or four hundred paces, they would have cut off +the retreat of our army, invested the three-fourths of them +in Quebec, without provisions, and M. de Vaudreuil, next +day, must have surrendered the town and asked to capitulate +for the colony. But your conduct cannot be blamed, +as it is always wise and prudent in giving​—​as Pyrrhus +advises​—​a golden bridge to one’s enemy in flight.</p> + +<p>You see, sir, by this true and faithful account of the +battle of the 13th September, and of what preceded it, how +many different and unforeseen events, fortune was obliged +to unite in your favour to render you successful in your +expedition against Canada; the failure of any one of which +would have sufficed to frustrate your enterprise. It would +appear that heaven had decreed that France should lose +this colony. Let us now conclude, sir, that I have as little +deserved the blame, scorn, contempt and injustice which +my country heaped on my memory, as you do the excessive +honours they lavished on your’s in England; and that the +ablest General in Europe, placed in my circumstances, +could not have acted otherwise than I did. Moreover, I +was under M. de Vaudreuil​—​the weakest man alive, although +a most obstinate automaton​—​and could not freely<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_49" id="Page_49">49</a></span> +follow my ideas as if I had been Commander-in-Chief. In +my country the law is equal: we neither punish, nor recompense.</p> + +<p>The Marquis of Montcalm, endeavouring to rally the +troops in their disorderly flight, was wounded in the lower +part of the <span class="locked">belly.<a name="FNanchor_K" id="FNanchor_K" href="#Footnote_K" class="fnanchor">K</a></span> He was conveyed immediately to Quebec, +and lodged in the house of M. Arnoux, the King’s surgeon, +who was absent with M. de Bourlamarque: his +brother​—​the younger Arnoux​—​having viewed the wound, +declared it mortal. This truly great and worthy man heard +<span class="locked">Arnoux<a name="FNanchor_L" id="FNanchor_L" href="#Footnote_L" class="fnanchor">L</a></span> pronounce his sentence of death with a firm and +undaunted soul: his mind calm and serene; his countenance +soft and pleasing; and with a look of indifference +whether he lived or died. He begged of Arnoux to be so +kind and outspoken as to tell him how many hours he +thought he might yet live? Arnoux answered him, that +he might hold out until three in the morning. He spent +that short period of life in conversing with a few officers +upon indifferent subjects with great coolness and presence +of mind, and ended his days about the hour Arnoux had +foretold him. His last words were:​—​“I <span class="locked">die<a name="FNanchor_M" id="FNanchor_M" href="#Footnote_M" class="fnanchor">M</a></span> content,<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_50" id="Page_50">50</a></span> +since I leave the affairs of the King, my dear master, in +good hands: I always had a high opinion of the talents +of M. de Levis.” I will not undertake the panegyric of +this great man: a true patriot and lover of his king and +country, possessing many rare and good qualities. Had he +by chance been born in England, his memory would have +been celebrated, and transmitted with honour to posterity. +Illustrious by his virtue and genius, he deserves to live in +history; he was an unfortunate victim to the insatiable +avarice of some men, and a prey to the immoderate ambition +of others. His ashes, mingled with those of Indians, +repose neglected far from his native country, without a<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_51" id="Page_51">51</a></span> +magnificent tomb or altars; General Wolfe has statues in +England in commemoration of the many faults he committed +during his expedition in Canada. “How many obscure +dead,” says a modern author, “have received the greatest +honours by titles yet more vain? O injustice of mankind! +The mausolea adorn the temples to repeat continually false +praise; and history, which ought to be the sacred asylum +of truth, shows that statues and panegyrics are almost always +the monuments of prejudice, and that flattery seeks to +immortalise unjust reputations.”</p> + +<p>When I was informed of M. de Montcalm’s misfortune, I +sent him immediately his servant Joseph, begging him to +acquaint me if I could be of any service to him, and in that +case I would be with him at Quebec immediately. Joseph +came back in a moment to the hornwork, and grieved me +to the inmost of my soul by M. de Montcalm’s answer: +“that it was needless to come to him, as he had only a few +hours to live, and he advised me to keep with Poularies +until the arrival of M. de Levis at the army.” Thus perished +a great man, generally unknown and unregretted by +his countrymen​—​a man who would have become the idol +and ornament of any other country in Europe.</p> + +<p>The French army in flight, scattered and entirely dispersed, +rushed towards the town. Few of them entered +Quebec; they went down the heights of Abraham, opposite +to the Intendant’s Palace (past St. John’s gate) directing +their course to the hornwork, and following the borders of +the River St. Charles. Seeing the impossibility of rallying +our troops, I determined myself to go down the hill at the +windmill, near the <span class="locked">bakehouse,<a name="FNanchor_P" id="FNanchor_P" href="#Footnote_P" class="fnanchor">P</a></span> and from thence across +over the meadows to the hornwork, resolved not to approach +Quebec, from my apprehension of being shut up there with +a part of our army, which might have been the case if the<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_52" id="Page_52">52</a></span> +victors had drawn all the advantage they could have reaped +from our defeat. It is true the death of the general-in-chief​—​an +event which never fails to create the greatest disorder +and confusion in an army​—​may plead as an excuse +for the English neglecting so easy an operation as to take +all our army prisoners.</p> + +<p>But, instead of following immediately my ideas, I was +carried off by the flow of the fugitives, without being +able to stop them or myself until I got to a hollow swampy +ground, where some gunners were endeavouring to save a +field-piece which stuck there, and I stayed an instant with +them to encourage them to draw it to the town. Returning +back upon the rising ground, I was astonished to find +myself in the centre of the English army, who had advanced +whilst I was in the hollow with the gunners, and taking +me for a general, on account of my fine black horse, +they treated me as such by saluting me with a thousand +musket shots from half of the front of their army, which +had formed a crescent. I was, nevertheless, bent on reaching +the windmill, and I escaped their terrible fire without +any other harm than four balls through my clothes, which +shattered them; a ball lodged in the pommel of my saddle, +and four balls in my horse’s body, who lived, notwithstanding +his wounds, until he had carried me to the hornwork.</p> + +<p>It is impossible to imagine the disorder and confusion +that I found in the <span class="locked">hornwork.<a name="FNanchor_Q" id="FNanchor_Q" href="#Footnote_Q" class="fnanchor">Q</a></span> The dread and consternation +was general. M. de Vaudreuil listened to everybody, +and was always of the advice of he who spoke last. No +order was given with reflection and with coolness, none +knowing what to order or what to do. When the English +had repulsed the two hundred Canadians that had gone up +the height at the same time that I came down from it, pursuing<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_53" id="Page_53">53</a></span> +them down to the bakehouse, our men lost their +heads entirely; they became demoralized, imagining that +the English troops, then at the bakehouse, would in an +instant cross the plain and fly over the St. Charles river +into the hornwork as with wings. It is certain that when +fear once seizes hold of men it not only deprives them totally +of their judgment and reflection, but also of the use +of their eyes and their ears, and they become a thousand +times worse than the brute creation, guided by instinct +only, or by that small portion of reason which the author +of nature has assigned it, since it preserves the use of it on +all occasions. How much inferior to them do the greater +portion of mankind appear, with their boasted reason, when +reduced to madness and automata, on occasions when they +require the more the use of their reason.</p> + +<p>The hornwork had the River St. Charles before it, about +seventy paces broad, which served it better than an artificial +ditch; its front, facing the river and the heights, was +composed of strong, thick, and high palisades, planted perpendicularly, +with gunholes pierced for several pieces of +large cannon in it; the river is deep and only fordable at +low water, at a musket shot before the fort. This made it +more difficult to be forced on that side than on its other +side of earthworks facing Beauport, which had a more +formidable appearance; and the hornwork certainly on +that side was not in the least danger of being taken by the +English, by an assault from the other side of the river. On +the appearance of the English troops on the plain of the +bakehouse, Montguet and La Motte, two old captains in +the Regiment of Bearn, cried out with vehemence to M. de +Vaudreuil, “that the hornwork would be taken in an instant, +by an assault, sword in hand; that we would be all +cut to pieces without quarter, and that nothing else would +save us but an immediate and general capitulation of Canada, +giving it up to the English.”</p> + +<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_54" id="Page_54">54</a></span> +Montreuil told them that “a fortification such as the +hornwork was not to be taken so easily.” In short, there +arose a general cry in the hornwork to cut the bridge of +<span class="locked">boats.<a name="FNanchor_R" id="FNanchor_R" href="#Footnote_R" class="fnanchor">R</a></span> It is worthy of remark, that not a fourth of our +army had yet arrived at it, and the remainder, by cutting +the bridge, would have been left on the other side of the +river as victims to the victors. The regiment ‘Royal Roussillon’ +was at that moment at the distance of a musket shot +from the hornwork, approaching to pass the bridge. As I +had already been in such adventures, I did not lose my +presence of mind, and having still a shadow remaining of +that regard, which the army accorded me on account of +the esteem and confidence which M. de Levis and M. de +Montcalm had always shown me publicly, I called to M. +Hugon, who commanded, for a pass in the hornwork, and +begged of him to accompany me to the bridge. We ran +there, and without asking who had given the order to cut +it, we chased away the soldiers with their uplifted axes +ready to execute that extravagant and wicked operation.</p> + +<p>M. de Vaudreuil was closeted in a house in the inside of +the hornwork with the Intendant and with some other persons. +I suspected they were busy drafting the articles for +a general capitulation, and I entered the house, where I had +only time to see the Intendant with a pen in his hand +writing upon a sheet of paper, when M. de Vaudreuil told +me I had no business there. Having answered him that +what he said was true, I retired immediately, in wrath, to +see them intent on giving up so scandalously a dependency +for the preservation of which so much blood and treasure +had been expended. On leaving the house, I met M. +Dalquier, an old, brave, downright honest man, commander +of the regiment of Bearn, with the true character +of a good officer​—​the marks of Mars all over his body. I<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_55" id="Page_55">55</a></span> +told him it was being debated within the house, to give +up Canada to the English by a capitulation, and I hurried +him in to stand up for the King’s cause, and advocate the +welfare of his country. I then quitted the hornwork to +join Poularies at the <span class="locked">Ravine<a name="FNanchor_S" id="FNanchor_S" href="#Footnote_S" class="fnanchor">S</a></span> of Beauport; but having met +him about three or four hundred paces from the hornwork, +on his way to it, I told him what was being discussed +there. He answered me, that sooner than consent to a capitulation, +he would shed the last drop of his blood. He +told me to look on his table and house as my own, advised +me to go there directly to repose myself, and clapping spurs +to his horse, he flew like lightning to the hornwork.</p> + +<p>As Poularies was an officer of great bravery, full of honour +and of rare merit, I was then certain that he and Dalquier +would break up the measures of designing men. +Many motives induced me to act strenuously for the good of +the service; amongst others, my gratitude for the Sovereign +who had given me bread; also, my affection and inviolable +friendship for M. de Levis in his absence, who +was now Commander-in-Chief of the French armies in +Canada by the death of M. de Montcalm. I continued sorrowfully +jogging on to Beauport, with a very heavy heart +for the loss of my dear friend, M. de Montcalm, sinking +with weariness and lost in reflection upon the changes +which Providence had brought about in the space of three +or four hours.</p> + +<p>Poularies came back to his lodgings at Beauport about two +in the afternoon, and he brought me the agreeable news of +having converted the project of a capitulation into a retreat +to Jacques-Cartier, there to wait the arrival of M. de Levis; +and they despatched a courier immediately to Montreal to +inform him of our misfortune at Quebec, which, to all appearance, +would not have happened to us if M. de Vaudreuil<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_56" id="Page_56">56</a></span> +had not sent him away, through some political reason, to +command there, without troops except those who were +with M. de Bourlamarque at L’Isle aux Noix​—​an officer of +great knowledge. The departure of the army was agreed +upon to be at night, and all the regiments were ordered to +their respective encampments until further orders. The +decision for a retreat was to be kept a great secret, and not +even communicated to the officers. I passed the afternoon +with Poularies, hoping each moment to receive from Montreuil​—​Major-General +of the army​—​the order of the retreat +for the regiment Royal Roussillon; but having no word of +it at eight o’clock in the evening, and it being a dark night, +Poularies sent his Adjutant to M. de Vaudreuil to receive his +orders for the left. Poularies instantly returned to inform +him that the right of our army was gone away with M. de +Vaudreuil without his having given any orders concerning +the retreat, and that they followed the highway to the hornwork. +Castaigné, his Adjutant, could give no further account +of this famous retreat, only that all the troops on our +right were marched off. It can be easily imagined how +much we were confounded by this ignorant and stupid conduct, +which can scarce appear credible to the most ignorant +military man.</p> + +<p>Poularies sent immediately to inform the post next to his +regiment of the retreat, with orders to acquaint all the left +of it, from post to post, between Beauport and the Sault de +Montmorency.</p> + +<p>I then set out with him and his regiment, following those +before us as the other posts to our left followed us, without +any other guides, orders or instructions with regard to the +roads we should take, or where we should go to; this was +left to chance, or at least was a secret which M. de Vaudreuil +kept to himself <i xml:lang="la" lang="la">in petto</i>. It was a march entirely in +the Indian manner; not a retreat, but a horrid, abominable +flight, a thousand times worse than that in the morning upon<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_57" id="Page_57">57</a></span> +the heights of Abraham, with such disorder and confusion +that, had the English known it, three hundred men +sent after us would have been sufficient to destroy and cut +all our army to pieces. Except the regiment Royal Roussillon, +which Poularies, always a rigid and severe disciplinarian, +kept together in order, there were not to be seen thirty +soldiers together of any other regiment. They were all mixed, +scattered, dispersed, and running as hard as they could, +as if the English army was at their heels. There never was +a more favourable position to make a beautiful, well-combined +retreat, in bright day, and in sight of the English +Army looking at us, without having the smallest reason to +fear anything within their power to oppose it, as I had obtained +a perfect knowledge of the <i xml:lang="fr" lang="fr">locale</i> from Beauport to +the Sault de Montmorency during some months that I was +there constantly with M. de Levis and M. de Montcalm. I +thought myself in a position to foretell to Poularies the +probable order of retreat, and the route which would be assigned +to each regiment for their march to the Lorette village. +I was greatly deceived, and indeed could never have +foreseen the route which our entire army followed to reach +Lorette, and which prolonged our march prodigiously for +the centre of our army, and still more for our left at the +Sault de Montmorency. There is a highway in a straight +line from the Sault de Montmorency to Lorette, which +makes a side of a triangle formed by another highway from +the Sault to Quebec, and by another road from Lorette to +the hornwork, which formed the base. In the highway +from the Sault to the hornwork there are eight or nine cross +roads of communication from it to the road from the Sault +to Lorette, which are shorter as they approach to the point +of the angle at the Sault. Thus it was natural to believe +that our army, being encamped all along the road from the +Sault to the hornwork, each regiment would have taken +one of these cross roads, the nearest to his encampment, in +order to take the straight road from the Sault to Lorette,<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_58" id="Page_58">58</a></span> +instead of coming to the hornwork to take there the road +from Quebec to Lorette, by which the left had double the +distance to march, besides being more liable by approaching +the hornwork so near to the English, to make them discover +the retreat.</p> + +<p>The army, by this operation, would have arrived all at +the same time in the road from the Sault to Lorette by the +difference in the length of these cross roads, and would have +naturally formed a column all along that road; and as it +was not a forced retreat, they had the time from twelve at +noon until eight at night to send off all the baggage by +cross roads to Lorette, without the English perceiving it; +but supposing them even fully aware of our design, which +might have been executed in open day, they no way could +disturb our operations without attacking the hornwork, +and attempting the passage of the river St. Charles​—​a very +difficult and dangerous affair​—​where they might be easily +repulsed, exposing themselves in a moment to lose the +fruits of their victory, without enjoying it; and consequently +they would have been insane had they ventured on such +a rash enterprise. Instead of these wise measures, which +common sense alone might have dictated, tents, artillery, the +military stores, baggage, and all other effects, were left as a +present to the English; the officers saved only a few shirts, +or what they could carry in their pockets: the rest was lost. +In fact, it would appear, by this strange conduct, that a +class of men there, from interested views, were furiously +bent on giving up the colony to the English, so soon as they +could have a plausible pretext to colour their designs,​—​by +lopping off gradually all the means possible to defend it any +longer. M. de Vaudreuil had still other kind offices in +reserve for the English. He wrote to de Ramsay, King’s +Lieutenant and Commander in <span class="locked">Quebec,<a name="FNanchor_T" id="FNanchor_T" href="#Footnote_T" class="fnanchor">T</a></span> as soon as the retreat<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_59" id="Page_59">59</a></span> +was decided:​—​“That he might propose a capitulation +for the town eight-and-forty hours after the departure +of our army from our camp at Beauport, upon the best +conditions he could obtain from the English.” We ran +along in flight all night; and at daybreak M. de Bougainville, +with his detachment, joined us near Cap Rouge. In +the evening, our army arrived at Pointe-aux-Trembles​—​five +leagues from Quebec​—​where it passed the night, and next +day came to Jacques-Cartier. The English had so little +suspicion of our retreat, seeing our tents standing without +any change at our camp, that Belcour​—​an officer of La +Rochebaucourt’s cavalry​—​having returned to it with a detachment, +two days after our flight, he found everything +the same as when we left it. He went into the hornwork +with his detachment, and fired the guns (pointed) at the +heights of Abraham towards the English camp, which +greatly alarmed them.</p> + +<p class="p2 center">FINIS.</p> + +<p>[The remainder of the manuscript alludes more particularly +to the campaign conducted by Chevalier de Levis, +which ended, in 1760, by the capitulation of Montreal.]</p> + +<h3>ADDENDA.</h3> + +<blockquote> + +<p class="p2 hang"><i>Extract of the Register of Marriages, Baptisms and Deaths of the French Cathedral +at Quebec, for 1759</i>:​—​</p> + +<p xml:lang="fr" lang="fr">“L’an mil sept cens cinquante-neuf, le quatorzième du mois de Septembre, +a été inhumé dans l’Eglise des Religieuses Ursulines de Québec, haut et puissant +Seigneur Louis Joseph Marquis de Montcalm, Lieutenant Général des +armées du Roy, Commandeur de l’ordre Royal et militaire de St. Louis, Commandant +en chef des troupes de terre en l’Amérique Septentrionale, décédé le +même jour de ses blessures au combat de la veille, muni des sacrements qu’il a +reçus avec beaucoup de piété et de Religion. Etoient présents à son inhumation +MM. Resche, Cugnet et Collet, chanoines de la Cathédrale, M. de Ramezay, +Commandant de la Place, et tout le corps des officiers.</p> + +<div class="p1 sig-container"><div class="sig"> +(Signé,)<br /> +<span class="in4">“RESCHE, Ptre. Chan.</span><br /> +<span class="in4">“COLLET, Chne.”</span> +</div></div></blockquote> + +<div class="footnotes"> + +<h2>FOOTNOTES</h2> + +<div class="footnote"> + +<p><a name="Footnote_A" id="Footnote_A" href="#FNanchor_A" class="fnanchor">A</a> Les Ecossais en France, Vol. II., P. 449.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"> + +<p><a name="Footnote_B" id="Footnote_B" href="#FNanchor_B" class="fnanchor">B</a> Formerly, inward bound ships, instead of taking the south channel lower +down than Goose Island, struck over from Cape Tourmente, and took the +south channel between Madame Island and Pointe Argentenay.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"> + +<p><a name="Footnote_C" id="Footnote_C" href="#FNanchor_C" class="fnanchor">C</a> General Abercrombie’s army consisted of 6,000 regular troops and 7,000 +provincials, according to the English; but the French gave them out to be +6,300 troops, and 13,000 provincials​—​in all 19,300 men.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"> + +<p><a name="Footnote_D" id="Footnote_D" href="#FNanchor_D" class="fnanchor">D</a> The French say the English lost between four and five thousand men.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"> + +<p><a name="Footnote_E" id="Footnote_E" href="#FNanchor_E" class="fnanchor">E</a> Unfortunately, the plans here alluded to do not accompany the manuscript.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"> + +<p><a name="Footnote_F" id="Footnote_F" href="#FNanchor_F" class="fnanchor">F</a> This contest is generally denominated the Battle of the Monongahela. +Capt. Daniel Liénard de Beaujeu commanded the Canadians, and achieved a +most brilliant victory over General Braddock and George Washington; the +English losing their provisions, baggage, fifteen cannon, many small arms, the +military chest, Braddock’s papers. Washington, after the battle, wrote: +“We have been beaten, shamefully beaten, by a handful of French.”​—​(J. M. L.)</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"> + +<p><a name="Footnote_G" id="Footnote_G" href="#FNanchor_G" class="fnanchor">G</a> De Vergor’s post apparently stood about a 100 yards to the east of the +spot on which Wolfe’s Field-cottage has since been built. The ruins still exist.​—​(J. +M. L.)</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"> + +<p><a name="Footnote_H" id="Footnote_H" href="#FNanchor_H" class="fnanchor">H</a> De Vergor’s guard was composed chiefly of Militiamen from Lorette, +who on that day had obtained leave to go and work on their farms, provided +they also worked on a farm Captain De Vergor owned.​—​“<i xml:lang="fr" lang="fr">Mémoires sur les +Affaires de la Colonie de 1749–60.</i>” Some historians have intimated that De +Vergor​—​a <i xml:lang="fr" lang="fr">protége</i> of Bigot’s​—​was a traitor to his King.​—​(J. M. L.)</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"> + +<p><a name="Footnote_I" id="Footnote_I" href="#FNanchor_I" class="fnanchor">I</a> I incline more to General Wolfe’s opinion than what Voltaire reports in +the war of 1781, to have been the King of Prussia’s maxim:​—​“That we +ought always to do what the enemy is afraid of.” Where the enemy is afraid +of anything in particular, he has there his largest force, and is there more on +his guard than anywhere else.​—​(<span class="smcap">Manuscript Note.</span>)</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"> + +<p><a name="Footnote_J" id="Footnote_J" href="#FNanchor_J" class="fnanchor">J</a> Bigot’s coterie.​—​(J. M. L.)</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"> + +<p><a name="Footnote_K" id="Footnote_K" href="#FNanchor_K" class="fnanchor">K</a> It was reported in Canada, that the ball which killed that great, good +and honest man, was not fired by an English musket. But I never credited +this.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"> + +<p><a name="Footnote_L" id="Footnote_L" href="#FNanchor_L" class="fnanchor">L</a> Arnoux gave me this account of his last moments.​—​<span class="smcap">Manuscript Notes.</span></p></div> + +<div class="footnote"> + +<p><a name="Footnote_M" id="Footnote_M" href="#FNanchor_M" class="fnanchor">M</a> The place where Montcalm died appears yet shrouded in doubt. It is +stated, in Knox’s Journal, that, on being wounded, Montcalm was conveyed +to the General Hospital, towards which the French squadrons in retreat had to +pass to regain, over the bridge of boats, their camp at Beauport. The General +Hospital was also the head-quarters of the wounded​—​both English and French. +It has been supposed that Arnoux’s house, where Montcalm was conveyed, +stood in St. Louis street. No where does it appear that Montcalm was conveyed +to his own residence on the ramparts (on which now stands the residence +of R. H. Wurtele, Esquire). As the city surrendered five days after the +great battle, it was likely to be bombarded​—​and, moreover, one-third of the +houses in it had been burnt and destroyed​—​we do not see why the wounded +General should have been conveyed from the battle-field to the Château St. +Louis​—​certainly an exposed situation in the event of a new bombardment; +and, moreover, the city itself, after and during the battle, was considered so +insecure that the French army, instead of retreating to it for shelter, hurried +past the General Hospital, over the bridge, to their camp at Beauport. There +is a passage in Lieutenant-Colonel Beatson’s Notes on the Plains of Abraham, +which we give:​—​“The valiant Frenchman (Montcalm), regardless of pain, relaxed +not his efforts to rally his broken battalions in their hurried retreat +towards the city until he was shot through the loins, when within a few +hundred yards of St. Louis <span class="locked">Gate.<a name="FNanchor_N" id="FNanchor_N" href="#Footnote_N" class="fnanchor">N</a></span> And so invincible was his fortitude +that not even the severity of this mortal stroke could abate his gallant spirit +or alter his intrepid bearing. Supported by two grenadiers​—​one at each +side of his horse​—​he re-entered the city; and in reply to some women who, +on seeing blood flow from his wounds as he rode down St. Louis street, on +his way to the Château, exclaimed: <i xml:lang="fr" lang="fr">Oh, mon Dieu! mon Dieu! le Marquis +est tuê!!!</i> he courteously assured them that he was not seriously hurt, and +begged of them not to distress themselves on his account.​—​<i xml:lang="fr" lang="fr">Ce n’est rien! ce +n’est rien! Ne vous affligez pas pour moi, mes bonnes amies.</i>”<a name="FNanchor_O" id="FNanchor_O" href="#Footnote_O" class="fnanchor">O</a></p></div> + +<div class="footnote"> + +<p><a name="Footnote_N" id="Footnote_N" href="#FNanchor_N" class="fnanchor">N</a> <span class="smcap">M. Garneau</span>, in his <i xml:lang="fr" lang="fr">Histoire du Canada</i>, says:​—​“The two Brigadier-Generals, M. +de Semezergues and the Baron de St. Ours, fell mortally wounded; and <span class="smcap">Montcalm</span> (who +had already received two wounds), while exerting himself to the utmost to rally his +troops and preserve order in the retreat, was also mortally wounded in the loins by a +musket-ball. He was at that moment between <i xml:lang="fr" lang="fr">Les Buttes-a-Neveu</i> and St. Louis Gate.” +From the city, on the one side, and from the battle-field, on the other, the ground rises until +the two slopes meet and form a ridge; the summit of which was formerly occupied by a +windmill belonging to a man named <i>Neveu</i> or <i>Nepveu</i>. About midway between this ridge +and St. Louis Gate, and to the southward of the St. Louis Road, are some slight eminences, +still known by the older French residents as <i xml:lang="fr" lang="fr">Les Buttes-a-Nepveu</i> or <i>Neveu’s hillocks</i>, and +about three-quarters of a mile distant from the spot where the British line charged.​—​<span class="smcap">R. S. +Beatson.</span></p></div> + +<div class="footnote"> + +<p><a name="Footnote_O" id="Footnote_O" href="#FNanchor_O" class="fnanchor">O</a> For these particulars I am indebted to my friend Mr. G. B. Faribault​—​a gentleman +well known in Canada for his researches into the history of the Colony; whose information +on this subject was derived from his much respected fellow-citizen the Hon. John Malcolm +Frazer​—​grandson of one of <span class="smcap">Wolfe’s</span> officers, and now (1854) one of the oldest inhabitants of +Quebec; where, in his childhood and youth, he had the facts, as above narrated, often described +to him by an elderly woman who, when about eighteen years of age, was an eye-witness +of the scene.​—​<span class="smcap">R. S. Beatson.</span></p></div> + +<div class="footnote"> + +<p><a name="Footnote_P" id="Footnote_P" href="#FNanchor_P" class="fnanchor">P</a> This bakehouse appears to have been some where at the foot of Abraham’s +hill.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"> + +<p><a name="Footnote_Q" id="Footnote_Q" href="#FNanchor_Q" class="fnanchor">Q</a> The excavations of these French works are very visible to this day behind +Mr. G. H. Parke’s residence, Ringfield, Charlesbourg road. The hornwork +appears to have covered about twelve acres of ground, surrounded by a +ditch.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"> + +<p><a name="Footnote_R" id="Footnote_R" href="#FNanchor_R" class="fnanchor">R</a> It crossed the St. Charles a little higher up than the Marine Hospital, at +the foot of Crown street.​—​(J. M. L.)</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"> + +<p><a name="Footnote_S" id="Footnote_S" href="#FNanchor_S" class="fnanchor">S</a> A small bridge supported on masonry has since been built at this spot, +exactly across the main road at Brown’s mills.​—​(J. M. L.)</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"> + +<p><a name="Footnote_T" id="Footnote_T" href="#FNanchor_T" class="fnanchor">T</a> The deliberations of the council of war, called at M. Daine’s, Mayor of +Quebec, on the 15th September, 1759, published in de Ramsay’s Memoires, in +1861, by the Literary and Historical Society, have done an effective, though a +tardy, justice to de Ramsay’s memory.​—​(J. M. L.)</p></div> +</div> + +<div class="transnote"> + +<h2>Transcriber’s Note</h2> + +<p>Simple typographical errors were corrected.</p> + +<p>Punctuation and spelling were made consistent when a predominant +preference was found in this book; otherwise they were not changed.</p> + +<p>Text contains apparent parenthesized references to a map, but this +book contained no maps, diagrams, or illustrations.</p> + +<p>Page <a href="#Page_3">3</a>: “heartily” was misprinted as “heartly”.</p> + +<p>Page <a href="#Page_3">3</a>: “buried there magnificently” was misprinted as “their”.</p> + +<p>Page <a href="#Page_8">8</a>: “without trembling.” should be punctuated with a question mark.</p> + +<p>Page <a href="#Page_28">28</a>: “analize” was printed that way.</p> + +<p>Page <a href="#Page_30">30</a>: “radient” was printed that way.</p> + +<p>Page <a href="#Page_30">30</a>: “LaRochebeaucourt” is printed as “La Rochebaucourt” +on page <a href="#Page_59">59</a>.</p> + +<p>Page <a href="#Page_50">50</a>: Footnote <a href="#Footnote_M">M</a> has two footnotes of its own (<a href="#Footnote_N">N</a> and <a href="#Footnote_O">O</a>). In this +eBook, they’ve been resequenced as normal footnotes.</p> + +<p>Page <a href="#Page_59">59</a>: “La Rochebaucourt” is printed as “La Rochebeaucourt” +on page <a href="#Page_30">30</a>.</p> +</div> + +<p> </p> +<p> </p> +<div>*** END OF THE PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK 44381 ***</div> +</body> +</html> |