diff options
Diffstat (limited to '44143-0.txt')
| -rw-r--r-- | 44143-0.txt | 18463 |
1 files changed, 18463 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/44143-0.txt b/44143-0.txt new file mode 100644 index 0000000..f9eec21 --- /dev/null +++ b/44143-0.txt @@ -0,0 +1,18463 @@ +*** START OF THE PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK 44143 *** + + LORD LYONS + + VOLUME II + +[Illustration: _Lord Lyons, at the age of 65._ + +LONDON: EDWARD ARNOLD.] + + + + + LORD LYONS + + A RECORD OF BRITISH DIPLOMACY + + BY + LORD NEWTON + + IN TWO VOLUMES + + VOLUME II + + WITH PORTRAITS + + LONDON + EDWARD ARNOLD + 1913 + + _All rights reserved_ + + + + +CONTENTS OF VOL. II + + + CHAPTER X + + THE THIRD REPUBLIC + + 1871-1873 + PAGE + + Thiers as Chief of the Executive--Negotiations respecting a new + Anglo-French Commercial Treaty--Return of the Princes--Embarrassment + caused by the Comte de Chambord--Question + of voting in the House of Lords--Thiers elected President--State + of parties in France--Irritation in Germany against Thiers--Diplomatic + incident at Constantinople--Signature of Anglo-French + Commercial Treaty--Death of the Emperor Napoleon--Lord + Odo Russell on Bismarck's policy--Fall of Thiers--Bismarck + and Arnim 1 + + + CHAPTER XI + + MARSHAL MACMAHON'S PRESIDENCY + + 1873-1875 + + MacMahon as President of the Republic--Franco-German + relations--Bismarck's confidences to Lord Odo Russell--Political + confusion in France--The war scare of 1875--Rumoured intention + of Khedive to sell his Suez Canal shares--Lord Odo Russell on + Bismarck's Foreign Policy--Purchase of Khedive's shares by H.M. + Government 47 + + + CHAPTER XII + + THE EASTERN QUESTION + + 1876-1878 + + The Powers and Turkey: England and the Andrassy Note--Gambetta + on French Politics--Simplicity of Marshal MacMahon--Political + consequences of French military re-organisation--Struggle + between the Marshal and Parliament--The Constantinople + Conference: Determination of Lord Derby to do nothing--Intrigues + of the Duc Décazes--Constitutional crisis in + France--Defeat of Marshal MacMahon: new Radical Ministry + formed under Dufaure with Waddington as Foreign Minister--Treaty + of San Stefano; nervousness of French Government--Determination + of H.M. Government to secure a Conference--Invitation + to Lord Lyons to be the British representative at + Berlin--Resignation of Lord Derby: appointment of Lord + Salisbury--Lord Salisbury's circular of April 1st, 1878--Inquiry + of Lord Salisbury respecting French desire for Tunis--The Anglo-Turkish + Convention--The Congress of Berlin--Reception in + France of the Anglo-Turkish Convention--Waddington and + Tunis--Sir H. Layard on the Treaty of Berlin 95 + + + CHAPTER XIII + + M. GRÉVY'S PRESIDENCY + + 1878-1879 + + Paris Exhibition of 1878: desire of Queen Victoria to visit it + incognito--Tunis--Resignation of MacMahon: Election of + Grévy--Waddington Prime Minister: his difficulties--Anglo-French + policy in Egypt--Question of deposing the Khedive + Ismail--Differences between British and French Governments + with regard to Egypt--Deposition of the Khedive by the Sultan--Death + of the Prince Imperial: effect in France--Proposed + visit of Gambetta to England: his bias in favour of English + Conservatives--Resignation of Waddington: Freycinet Prime + Minister--Coolness between France and Russia 161 + + + CHAPTER XIV + + THE REVIVAL OF FRANCE + + 1880-1881 + + Change of Government in England and reversal of Foreign Policy--The + French Embassy in London: Freycinet's model Ambassador--Personal + characteristics of Lord Lyons: _On ne lui connait + pas de vice_--The work at the Paris Embassy--The Eastern + Question: Mr. Goschen at Constantinople--The Dulcigno + Demonstration and the difficulties of the European Concert--Proposal + to seize Smyrna--Opportune surrender of the Sultan--H.M. + Government and the Pope: Mission of Mr. Errington, + M.P.--Gambetta on the European situation--French expedition + to Tunis--Ineffectual objections of H.M. Government--Establishment + of French Protectorate over Tunis--Irritation in England + and Italy--Distinction drawn between Tunis and Tripoli--Attempt + to negotiate a new Anglo-French Commercial + Treaty: Question of Retaliation 209 + + + CHAPTER XV + + ARABI'S REBELLION + + 1881-1882 + + Egypt: the _coup d'état_ of the Colonels: joint Anglo-French + action--Gambetta as Prime Minister--His desire to remain on good + terms with England--Egypt: the Dual Note--Gambetta in favour of + a more resolute joint policy--Fall of Gambetta after two months + of office--Ministry formed by Freycinet--French vacillation + with regard to Egypt--Decision of H.M. Government to employ + force--Bombardment of Alexandria--Decision of French Government + to take no part in expedition--Fall of Freycinet--Invitation to + Italy to join in expedition declined--Effect produced in France by + British military success in Egypt--French endeavour to re-establish + the Control in Egypt--Madagascar and Tonquin 258 + + + CHAPTER XVI + + ANGLOPHOBIA + + 1883-1885 + + Death of Gambetta--General discontent in France--Change of + Government: Jules Ferry Prime Minister--Waddington appointed + Ambassador in London--Insult to King of Spain in + Paris--Growth of French ill-will towards English influence in + Egypt--Baron de Billing and General Gordon--Establishment + of French Protectorate over Tonquin--Egyptian Conference + in London--Renewed request to Lord Lyons to vote in House + of Lords--Anti-English combination with regard to Egypt--Jules + Ferry on the necessity of delivering a _coup foudroyant_ upon + China--French reverse in Tonquin: resignation of Jules Ferry--New + Government under Freycinet--Bismarck and the persons + whom he disliked--Funeral of Victor Hugo--Return of Lord + Salisbury to the Foreign Office--Anglophobia in Paris: scurrilities + of Rochefort 305 + + + CHAPTER XVII + + THE LAST YEAR'S WORK + + 1886-1887 + + Lord Rosebery at the Foreign Office--His surprise at + ill-feeling shown by French Government--Proceedings of General + Boulanger--Princes' Exclusion Bill--Boulanger at the Review + of July 14th--Causes of his popularity--General Election + in England: Lord Salisbury Prime Minister--The Foreign + Office offered to Lord Lyons--Egyptian questions raised + by French Government--Apprehension in France of a German + attack--Embarrassment caused by Boulanger--Unofficial attempt + on behalf of French Government to establish better relations + with England--Application by Lord Lyons to be permitted to + resign--Pressed by Lord Salisbury to remain until end of the + year--Desire of French Government to get rid of Boulanger--Lord + Salisbury's complaints as to unfriendly action of the French + Government in various parts of the world--Resignation of Lord + Lyons--Created an Earl--His death 360 + + + APPENDIX + + Lord Lyons in Private Life. By MRS. WILFRID WARD 415 + + INDEX 429 + + + + +LIST OF PLATES IN VOL. II + + + FACING PAGE + + LORD LYONS AT THE AGE OF 65 _Frontispiece_ + + WILLIAM HENRY WADDINGTON 169 + + GENERAL BOULANGER 370 + + THE BRITISH EMBASSY, PARIS 420 + (_Photograph by F. Contet, Paris._) + + + + +LORD LYONS + +A RECORD OF BRITISH DIPLOMACY + + + + +CHAPTER X + +THE THIRD REPUBLIC + +(1871-1873) + + +Strictly speaking, the existence of the National Assembly which had +been summoned to ratify the Preliminaries of Peace, had now[1] come to +an end, but under prevailing circumstances, it was more convenient to +ignore Constitutional technicalities, and the Government proceeded to +carry on the business of the country on the basis of a Republic. Thiers +had been elected Chief of the Executive, and it was astonishing how +rapidly his liking for a Republic increased since he had become the +head of one. It was now part of his task to check the too reactionary +tendencies of the Assembly and to preserve that form of government which +was supposed to divide Frenchmen the least. The feeling against the +Government of National Defence was as strong as ever, and the elections +of some of the Orleans princes gave rise to inconvenient demonstrations +on the part of their political supporters, who pressed for the repeal +of the law disqualifying that family. Thiers realized plainly enough +that the revival of this demand was premature, and would only add to +the general confusion, and had therefore induced the princes to absent +themselves from Bordeaux, but the question could no longer be avoided. + + * * * * * + + _Lord Lyons to Lord Granville._ + + Paris, June 6, 1871. + + Thiers has been hard at work 'lobbying,' as the Americans + say, but could not come to any settlement with the Assembly, + and so begged them to postpone the question of the elections of + the Princes of Orleans till the day after to-morrow. One of the + plans proposed was that the provisional state of things should + be formally continued for two years, by conferring his present + powers on Thiers for that period. This would, it was hoped, keep + the Republicans quiet and allay the impatience of the monarchical + parties, by giving them a fixed time to look forward to. But this, + it seems, the majority in the Assembly would not promise to vote. + On the other hand, Thiers is said to be afraid of having the Duc + d'Aumale and perhaps Prince Napoleon also, speaking against him + in the Assembly, and attacking him and each other outside. Then + comes the doubt as to the extent to which the fusion between the + Comte de Chambord and the other Princes, or rather that between + their respective parties, really goes. Altogether nothing can be + less encouraging than the prospect. The Duc d'Aumale, as Lieutenant + Général du Royaume, to prepare the way for the Comte de Chambord, + is, for the moment, the favourite combination. In the meantime + Thiers has thrown a sop to the majority by putting an Orleanist + into the Home Office. The idea at Versailles yesterday was that + Thiers and the Assembly would come to a compromise on the basis + that the Orleans elections should be confirmed, but with a preamble + repeating that nothing done was to be held to prejudge the question + of the definitive government of France. + +When the question came up, Thiers yielded on the point of the admission +of the Princes, and the majority were highly pleased at having extorted +this concession. Lord Lyons, dining at Thiers's house at Versailles, a +few days after the debate in the Assembly, met there the German General +von Fabrice, the Prince de Joinville, the Duc d'Aumale, and the Duc de +Chartres, and mentions the significant fact that M. and Madame Thiers +and the rest of the company treated these Princes with even more than +the usual respect shown to Royal personages. In private conversation +Thiers expressed great confidence in soon getting the Germans out of the +Paris forts, but both he and Jules Favre complained that Bismarck was a +very bad creditor, and insisted upon having his first half-milliard by +the end of the month: in fact, the Germans were so clamorous for payment +that they hardly seemed to realize how anxious the French were to get +rid of them, and that if the money was not immediately forthcoming, it +was only because it was impossible to produce it. + +What was of more immediate concern to the British Government than either +the payment of the indemnity or the future of the Orleans princes, +was the prospect of a new Commercial Treaty. This was sufficiently +unpromising. Lord Lyons had pointed out during the Empire period, that +under a Constitutional _régime_ in France, we were not likely to enjoy +such favourable commercial conditions as under personal government, +and the more liberal the composition of a French Government, the +more Protectionist appeared to be its policy. Thiers himself was an +ardent Protectionist, quite unamenable to the blandishments of British +Free Traders, who always appear to hold that man was made for Free +Trade, instead of Free Trade for man, and the Finance Minister, Pouyer +Quertier, entertained the same views as his chief. But, even if the +Emperor were to come back, it was more than doubtful whether he would +venture to maintain the existing Commercial Treaty as it stood, and +there was every probability that the Bordeaux wine people and other +so-called French Free Traders would turn Protectionist as soon as they +realized that there was no prospect of British retaliation. What cut +Lord Lyons (an orthodox Free Trader) to the heart, was that, just as the +French manufacturers had got over the shock of the sudden introduction +of Free Trade under the Empire and had adapted themselves to the new +system, everything should be thrown back again. It was likely, indeed, +that there would be some opposition to Thiers's Protectionist taxes, +but he knew well enough that there were not a sufficient number of +Free Traders in the Assembly, or in the country, to make any effective +resistance to the Government. When approached on the subject, the French +Ministers asserted that all they wanted was to increase the revenue, +and that all they demanded from England was to be allowed to raise +their tariff with this view only, whereas, in their hearts, they meant +Protection pure and simple. Lord Lyons's personal view was that England +would be better off if the Treaty was reduced to little more than a +most favoured nation clause. 'The only element for negotiation with the +school of political economy now predominant here,' he sadly remarked, +'would be a threat of retaliation, and this we cannot use.' It will +be found subsequently that this was the one predominant factor in all +commercial negotiations between the two Governments. + +A long conversation with Thiers, who was pressing for a definite reply +from Her Majesty's Government on the subject of a new Treaty showed +that matters from the British point of view were as unsatisfactory +as they well could be. Thiers, whose language respecting England was +courteous and friendly, made it clear that Her Majesty's Government +must choose between the proposed modifications in the tariff and the +unconditional denunciation of the whole Treaty, and that if the Treaty +were denounced, England must not expect, after its expiration, to be +placed upon the footing of the most favoured nation. He considered that +he had a right to denounce the Treaty at once, but had no wish to act +in an unfriendly spirit, and had therefore refrained from doing so, and +although he and his colleagues considered that the existing Treaty was +disadvantageous and even disastrous to France, they had never promoted +any agitation against it, and had confined themselves to proposing +modifications of the tariff, which their financial necessities and the +state of the French manufacturing interests rendered indispensable. +Coal and iron, which were articles of the greatest importance to +England, were not touched, and all that had, in fact, been asked for +was a moderate increase on the duties on textile fabrics. As for the +French Free Traders, whatever misleading views they might put forward in +London, their influence upon the Assembly would be imperceptible, and it +remained therefore for Her Majesty's Government to decide whether they +would agree to the changes he had proposed to them, or would give up +altogether the benefits which England derived from the Treaty. + +Thiers's real motive was disclosed later on, when, whilst asserting +that he should always act in a friendly spirit towards England, he +admitted that 'England was a much more formidable competitor in +commerce than any other nation.' Concessions which might safely be +made to other countries might very reasonably be withheld from her. +For instance, privileges which might be safely granted to the Italian +merchant navy might, if granted to Great Britain, produce a competition +between English and French shipping very disadvantageous to France. +It would also be certainly for the interest of France that she should +furnish herself with colonial articles brought direct to her own ports +rather than resort, as at present, to the depôts of such goods in +Great Britain. Nothing could be further from his intentions than to be +influenced by any spirit of retaliation, nor, if the Treaty should be +denounced, would he, on that account, be less friendly to England in +political matters; but it was evident that, in making his financial and +commercial arrangements, the interests and necessities of France must +be paramount. In conclusion he pressed for an immediate answer from Her +Majesty's Government in order that the French Government might complete +their plans, which were of urgent importance. + +To the impartial observer the opinions expressed by Thiers seem to be +logical, natural, and reasonable, unless the principle of looking after +one's own interests is unreasonable; but to the ardent devotees of Free +Trade, they must have appeared in the light of impiety. Lord Lyons, in +reporting the interview, remarked that 'nothing could have been more +unsatisfactory than Thiers's language,' and added significantly that he +himself had managed to keep his temper. + +Thiers did not get his definite answer, and the wrangle continued until +in February, 1872, the French Government, with the general approval of +the nation, gave notice of the termination of the Commercial Treaty of +1860. + +The Bill abrogating the proscription of the French Royal families had +been passed by the Assembly, and the elections of the Duc d'Aumale and +the Prince de Joinville consequently declared valid, but these princes +having established their rights, wisely remained in the background. Not +so another illustrious Royalist, the Comte de Chambord. This prince, who +was also included in the reversal of the disqualifying law, returned +to France and issued a proclamation from the Château of Chambord in +July which spread consternation in the Royalist camp. After explaining +that his presence was only temporary and that he desired to create no +embarrassment, he declared that he was prepared to govern on a broad +basis of administrative decentralization, but that there were certain +conditions to which he could not submit. If he were summoned to the +throne he would accept, but he should retain his principles, and above +all the White Flag which had been handed down to him by his ancestors. +This announcement seemed, to say the least, premature, and the +supporters of a Republic must have warmly congratulated themselves upon +having to encounter an enemy who played so completely into their hands. + + * * * * * + + _Lord Lyons to Lord Granville._ + + Paris, July 11, 1871. + + The Comte de Chambord seems to have upset the Legitimist + coach. The Legitimist Deputies have been obliged to repudiate + the White Flag, being sure that they could never be elected to a + new Chamber under that Banner, and of course fusion between the + Orleans Princes and their cousin is now out of the question. + + Thiers said to me last night that he did not regard the + Comte de Chambord's declaration in favour of the White Flag as + irrevocable--and that it looked as if it had been made in a moment + of ill-temper. According to Thiers, both the Comte de Chambord and + the Comte de Paris eagerly desire to be kings--most people doubt, + however, whether the Comte de Chambord does really wish it. All + that has occurred tends to strengthen and prolong Thiers's hold on + power, and he is rejoicing accordingly. Indeed, there is hardly a + Frenchman who professes to doubt that Thiers's Government is the + only Government possible at the moment. + + Gambetta is not considered by Thiers to be dangerous; he + declares that he will only maintain a constitutional or legal + opposition so long as the Government is Republican, and if he and + his supporters stick to this, Thiers will certainly have no great + cause to dread them. If Rouher had been elected he would have been + a formidable opponent, though he has been too much accustomed + to lead an applauding and acquiescing majority to be good at + speaking to a hostile audience. Thiers says that the rejection of + Rouher will be a good thing for his own health and repose, as he + should have found it very fatiguing to have to answer the great + Imperialist orator. + + The hurry with which the new duties were rushed through + the Assembly on Saturday is disquieting. Thiers and Jules Favre + protest, however, that they are determined to do nothing irregular + regarding the Commercial Treaties. The Swiss Minister tells me his + Government is determined to insist upon the strict execution of + the Swiss Treaty, without admitting any alteration of the tariffs, + but then the Swiss Treaty does not expire for five or six years. I + take care to give no opinion as to what we shall or shall not do. + Thiers talked again last night of conferring with me soon about the + details of the changes. I am not very anxious that he should do so, + as confusion is much more likely than anything else to arise from + carrying on the discussion in both places at once. + + Half my time is taken up with the affairs of the unfortunate + English prisoners. It is necessary to be cautious, for the French + Authorities are extremely touchy on the subject. There does not + appear to be any danger of their being executed, as fortunately + they are a very insignificant and unimportant set of insurgents, + if insurgents they were; but they are kept a long time without + examination, and some do run the risk of being shipped off to New + Caledonia. + +The Comte de Chambord, having effectually destroyed the chances of +his own party for the time being, now disappeared from the scene, and +nothing more was heard of him or his White Flag for a considerable +period. + +The summer of 1871 did not pass without the old question of voting in +the House of Lords cropping up again. In July, Lord Lyons received +an intimation from the Liberal Whip that his vote was wanted on the +following day, accompanied by a letter from Lord Granville in the same +sense. He declined to come, on the same ground as formerly, viz. that +he considered it advisable that a diplomatist should keep aloof from +home politics, and also because he was extremely reluctant to give +votes on questions of which he had little knowledge. The particular +question involved was presumably a vote of censure on the Government in +connection with the Army Purchase Bill, and he seems to have taken it +for granted that Lord Granville would make no objection. A letter from +the latter showed that he was mistaken. + + * * * * * + + _Lord Granville to Lord Lyons._ + + Foreign Office, July 17, 1871. + + I cannot agree with the principle you lay down--Lord Stuart, + my father, the late Lord Cowley, and Lord Normanby when Ambassador + at Paris used to vote when specially summoned. So did Lord Cowley, + although he served under successive Governments. So did Lord + Westmoreland and others. I find no recommendation of your principle + in the report of the Committee of the House of Commons, and + although Lord Derby may have given evidence in favour of it, his + father gave practical proof in several instances that he entirely + disagreed with it. + + A Foreign Government can hardly believe in the confidential + relations of this Government and her Ambassador, if the latter + being a Peer abstains from supporting them when a vote of want of + confidence, or one amounting to it, is proposed against them. + + Clarendon brought before the Cabinet your disinclination to + vote on the question of the Irish Church. They unanimously decided + that we had a claim upon you, and you were good enough to consent, + stating the grounds you mention in your letter of yesterday. + + It is of course too late for any practical result to our + controversy as regards to-night, but I hope you will consider + that I have a claim on you for the future, when your vote is of + importance. I shall never ask you unnecessarily to come over. + +An intimation of this kind from an official chief could not well be +disregarded, but the reply to Lord Granville's letter is conclusive in +its arguments. + + * * * * * + + Paris, July 27, 1871. + + Your letter of the 17th about my voting in the House of Lords + goes farther than Lord Clarendon did on the previous occasion. + Lord Clarendon originally acquiesced in my not voting on the Irish + Church Bill, and when he subsequently begged me to come over, + unless I objected to the Bill, he founded his request principally + upon a strong opinion of Mr. Gladstone's that it was the duty of + a peer not to abstain from voting, and that every vote was of + consequence. On this ground he expressed a hope that I should come + over unless I was opposed to the Bill. + + Of my predecessors, the only one who was in a position + resembling mine, was the present Lord Cowley; and certainly he will + always be a high authority with me. + + I have been for more than thirty years, and I still am, + devoted to my own profession, and I am sure that if I can be of + any use in my generation, and do myself any credit, it must be + as a diplomatist. I have worked my way up in the regular course + of the profession, and have served under successive Governments, + both before and since I became a peer, without any reference to + home politics. In fact, I received my original appointment to the + service from Lord Palmerston; I was made paid attaché by Lord + Aberdeen; I was sent to Rome by Lord Russell; to Washington by Lord + Malmesbury; to Constantinople by Lord Russell; and finally to Paris + by Lord Derby. The appointment was given to me in the ordinary way + of advancement in my profession, and I was told afterwards by Lord + Clarendon that my being wholly unconnected with any party at home + had been considered to be a recommendation. I have myself always + thought that a regular diplomatist could only impair his efficiency + by taking part in home politics, and I have throughout acted upon + this conviction. During the thirteen years or thereabouts which + have elapsed since I succeeded to my father's peerage, I have given + only one vote in the House of Lords; the question, the Irish Church + vote, was one on which there really did seem to be a possibility + that the decision might turn upon one vote; and the question, as it + stood before the House, was hardly a party question. + + In addition to all this, I must say that while I have a very + great reluctance to give blind votes, I do not wish to be diverted + from my diplomatic duties by having to attend to home questions; + also, I would rather give my whole energies to carrying out the + instructions of the Government abroad, without having continually + to consult my conscience about voting in the House of Lords. + + I did not intend to have given you the trouble of reading + a long answer to your letter, but I have just received another + summons from Lord Bessborough. I hope, however, you will not press + me to come over to vote on Monday. You were at all events good + enough to say that you should never ask me to come unnecessarily; + but if, after considering my reasons, you insist upon my coming, I + must of course defer to your opinion and do what you desire. + +It is difficult to believe that Lord Granville, who was one of the +most amiable and considerate of men, was acting otherwise than under +pressure in thus endeavouring to utilize an Ambassador as a party hack. +His arguments certainly do not bear much investigation. If a foreign +government could not feel any confidence in an Ambassador who failed to +support his party by a vote in Parliament, what confidence could they +possibly feel in him if his party were out of office, and he continued +at his post under the orders of political opponents? If the Clarendon +Cabinet really decided that they had a claim upon diplomatists as party +men it only showed that they were conspicuously wanting in judgment and +a prey to that dementia which occasionally seizes upon British statesmen +when a division is impending. That state of mind is intelligible when +a division in the House of Commons is concerned, but what passes +comprehension is that pressure should be put upon members of the House +of Lords to vote, whose abstention is obviously desirable, whilst scores +of obscure peers are left unmolested. One peer's vote was as good as +another's in 1871, just as it is now; but in the division on the vote of +censure on the Army Purchase Bill only 244 peers voted out of a House +containing about double that number. + +Before long the question of the prolongation of Thiers's powers for a +fixed period became the chief topic of interest. He was infinitely the +most important personage in France, and a large number of members were +desirous of placing him more or less in the position of a constitutional +sovereign, and obliging him to take a Ministry from the majority in +the Assembly. The majority in the Assembly not unnaturally thought +that their ideas ought to prevail in the Government, and they resented +being constantly threatened with the withdrawal of this indispensable +man, an action which, it was thought, would amount to little short of a +revolution. What they wanted, therefore, was to bestow a higher title +upon him than Chief of the Executive Power, which would exclude him from +coming in person to the Assembly; and it was only the difficulty of +finding some one to take his place, and the desire to get the Germans +out of the Paris forts that kept them quiet. Like many other eminent +persons considered to be indispensable, Thiers now began to give out +that he really desired to retire into private life, and that it was +only the country which insisted upon his staying in office, while as a +matter of fact, he was by no means as indifferent to power as he fancied +himself to be. In the Chamber he damaged his reputation to some extent +by displays of temper and threats of resignation, but there was never +much doubt as to the prolongation of his powers. + + * * * * * + + _Lord Lyons to Lord Granville._ + + Paris, Aug. 25, 1871. + + Thiers quitted the Tribune in a pet yesterday, and the whole + series of events in the Assembly has very much lowered his credit. + In the one thing in which he was thought to be pre-eminent, the + art of managing a deliberative body, he completely failed: and his + first threatening to resign, and then coming back and half giving + in, has very much damaged him. Nevertheless the general opinion + is that the prolongation of his powers will pass, upon his making + it a condition, as a vote of confidence, of his remaining. But it + is difficult to believe, even if it be passed by a considerable + majority, that things can go on smoothly between him and the + Assembly very long. If any party had a leader and courage, it might + do almost anything in France at this moment. + + Arnim[2] is expected on Saturday. I knew him years ago at + Rome. I doubt his being a conciliatory negotiator. The French + believe that Bismarck is so anxious to obtain commercial advantages + for Alsace, that he will give them great things in return. He + is supposed to wish, in the first place, to conciliate his new + subjects; and, in the second, to divert for a time from Germany + the torrent of Alsatian manufactures which would pour in if the + outlets into France were stopped up. The French hope to get the + Paris forts evacuated in return for a continuance of the free + entrance of Alsatian goods into France until the 1st of January, + and they even speculate upon getting the Prussians to evacuate + Champagne, and content themselves with keeping the army, which was + to have occupied it, inside the German frontier, the French paying + the expenses, as if it were still in France. All this to be given + in return for a prolongation of commercial privileges for Alsace. + It would be ungenerous of 'most favoured nations' to claim similar + privileges. + + Thiers was too full of the events of the afternoon in the + Assembly to talk about the Commercial Treaty. I don't believe he + has brought the Committee round to his duties on raw materials. + +At the end of August, the Assembly by a very large majority passed a +bill conferring upon Thiers the title of President of the Republic and +confirmed his powers for the duration of the existing Assembly, adopting +at the same time a vote of confidence in him personally. The result +of these proceedings was that the attempt to make a step towards the +definite establishment of a Republic and to place Thiers as President +for a term of years in a position independent of the Assembly, failed. +The bill asserted what the Left had always denied, viz. the constituent +power of the Assembly, and declared that the President was responsible +to it. So far, it expressed the sentiments of the moderate men, and the +minority was composed of extreme Legitimists and extreme Republicans. It +also proved that Thiers was still held to be the indispensable man. + +The Assembly, which had adjourned after the passing of the +above-mentioned bill, met again in December, and was supposed to be +more Conservative than ever, owing to the fear created by Radical +progress in the country. Thiers's Presidential Message did not afford +much satisfaction to the extreme partisans on either side, and it was +evident that he did not desire any prompt solution of the Constitutional +question, preferring to leave himself free, and not to be forced into +taking any premature decision. As for the Legitimist, Orleanist, and +Moderate Republican groups, their vacillation tended only to the +advantage of two parties, the Bonapartists and the Red Republicans. + + * * * * * + + _Lord Lyons to Lord Granville._ + + Paris, Dec. 26. 1871. + + The New Year will open gloomily for France. The Germans appear + to be alarmed, or at all events irritated, by Thiers's military + boasts and military preparations. The boasts are certainly unwise, + and preparations or anything else which encourages the French + to expect to get off paying the three milliards are extremely + imprudent. The Germans mean to have their money and keep the + territory they have taken, and they say that they had better have + it out with France now that she is weak, than wait till she has + got strong again. The irritation of the French against the Germans + seems to grow, and the Germans are angry with the French for not + loving them, which after the conditions of peace, to say nothing of + the events of the war, seems somewhat unreasonable. + + Thiers so far holds his own, and no party seems willing to + displace him, while no party agrees with him. The one thing in + which men of all parties seem to agree is in abusing Thiers, and + I must say that a good deal of the abuse is exceedingly unjust. + But with the members of the Assembly in this inflammable state of + feeling towards him, an unexpected spark may at any moment make + them flare up and turn him out almost before they are aware of + it. The general idea is that the Assembly would appoint the Duc + d'Aumale to succeed him; the acceptance of the Duc d'Aumale by + the country would depend upon the amount of vigour he showed in + putting down illegal opposition by force. There are members of the + Assembly who wish to declare that in case of Thiers's abdication + or dethronement, the President of the Assembly is to exercise the + Executive Power. This is with a view of bringing forward Grévy, who + is an honourable, moderate man, but an old thoroughbred Republican. + The immediate event people are looking forward to with interest + and anxiety is the election of a deputy for Paris on the 7th of + next month. No one will be surprised if a Red is returned, in + consequence of the men of order declining to vote. The Legitimists + and the Orleanists seem to be at daggers drawn again. + + Arnim says that Bismarck's fierce despatch was partly intended + to strengthen Thiers's hands in resisting violence against the + Germans. If this is so, the ferocity went too far beyond the mark + to be successful, great as the provocation on the French side was. + + I will write a mild disclaimer of the accuracy of Jules + Favre's accounts of his communications with me. There is no _malus + animus_, I think, in them. My Russian and Italian colleagues are + very much annoyed by the language he attributes to them. + +The fierce despatch referred was a harsh communication from Bismarck +complaining of the recent acquittal of some Frenchmen who had +assassinated German soldiers of the army of occupation. + +At the close of 1871, the Bonapartist Party, although scarcely +represented in the Assembly, appeared to be that which caused the +Government the most anxiety. That party had undoubtedly made progress +in the country; it held out the hope of a vigorous and determined +maintenance of public order, and a vast number of Frenchmen were so much +out of heart, so wearied and disgusted by the results of the attempts +at political liberty, and so much afraid of the triumph of the Commune, +that they were prepared to sacrifice anything in order to be assured of +peace and tranquillity. The peasants, shopkeepers, and even many of the +workmen in the towns, sighed for the material prosperity of the Empire. +They believed that the Emperor had been betrayed by his Ministers and +Generals, and were willing to excuse his personal share even in the +capitulation of Sedan. If more confidence could have been felt in his +health and personal energy, the advocates of a restoration of the Empire +would have been still more numerous. As it was, a great mass of the +ignorant and the timid were in favour of it, and it was the opinion +of so impartial an observer as the British Ambassador, that if a free +vote could have been taken under universal suffrage a majority would +probably have been obtained for the re-establishment upon the throne of +Napoleon III. If the Imperialists could by any means have seized upon +the executive Government and so directed the operations of a plébiscite, +there was little doubt as to their securing the usual millions of votes +under that process. With them, as with the other parties, the difficulty +lay in bringing about such a crisis as would enable them to act, and the +Emperor himself was disinclined to take any adventurous step. + +The Legitimists had the advantage of holding to a definite principle, +but it was a principle which carried little weight in the country in +general. Their chief, the Comte de Chambord, had shown himself to be so +impracticable, that it really seemed doubtful whether he wished to mount +the throne, and the party had more members in the existing Assembly than +it was likely to obtain if a fresh general election took place; added +to which it had quarrelled with the Orleanists, a union with whom was +essential to the attainment of any practical end. + +The Orleanists were weakened by their dissensions with the Legitimists +and discouraged by what they considered the want of energy and +enterprise of the Princes of the family. The members of the Orleans +party suffered from the want of a definite principle, and consisted +chiefly of educated and enlightened men who held to Constitutional +Monarchy and Parliamentary Government; in reality they were a +fluctuating body willing to accept any Government giving a promise of +order and political liberty. + +The moderate Republicans included in their ranks many honest and +respected men, but they had to contend with the extreme unpopularity of +the Government of National Defence in which they had formed the chief +part, and although the existing Government was nominally based upon +their principles, they did not appear to be gaining ground. The extreme +Republicans endeavoured to make up by violence what they wanted in +numerical strength, and as they saw no prospect of obtaining office in +a regular manner, founded their hopes upon seizing power at a critical +moment with the help of the Paris mob. + +Amidst this collection of parties stood Thiers's Government, supported +heartily by none, but accepted by all. By skilful management, by +yielding where resistance appeared hopeless, and by obtaining votes +sometimes from one side of the Assembly, and sometimes from the other, +Thiers had carried many points to which he attached importance, and +had never yet found himself in a minority. His Government was avowedly +a temporary expedient, resting upon a compromise between all parties, +or rather upon the adjournment of all constitutional questions. To the +monarchical parties which formed the majority of the Assembly, Thiers's +apparent adoption of the Republican system rendered him especially +obnoxious. On the other hand, the Republicans were dissatisfied because, +the whole weight of the Government was not unscrupulously used for the +purpose of establishing a Republic permanently, with or without the +consent of the people. + +On the centralization of the administration, on military organization, +on finance, and on other matters, Thiers's personal views were widely +different from those generally prevalent in the Assembly, and there was +plenty of censure and criticism of him in private; but no one party saw +its way to ensuring its own triumph, and all were weighed down by the +necessity of maintaining endurable relations with Germany. In forming +such relations, Thiers had shown great skill and obtained considerable +success in his arduous task. Bismarck, in imposing the hardest possible +conditions of peace, had acted avowedly on the principle that it was +hopeless to conciliate France, and that the only security for Germany +lay in weakening her as much as possible. This policy having been +carried out, the German public and the German press appeared to be quite +surprised that France was slow to be reconciled to her conquerors, +and even to doubt whether already France was not too strong for their +safety. The apparent recovery of the French finances may well have +surprised them disagreeably, but Thiers was not over careful to avoid +increasing their distrust. His intention to create a larger army than +France had ever maintained before, and his frequent praises of the army +he already possessed, was not reassuring to them. It was, therefore, +not altogether surprising that they should have felt some doubts as to +the consequences of finding themselves confronted by an immense army, +when they called upon France to pay the remaining three milliards in +1874. Nevertheless the German Government had expressed its confidence in +Thiers, and it would have been almost impossible for any new Government +to have placed matters on as tolerable a footing. + +All things considered, therefore, it seemed not improbable that the +existing Government might last for some time, although its life was +somewhat precarious, since it was liable to be upset by commotions +and conspiracies, and having no existence apart from Thiers, its +duration was bound to depend on the health and strength of a man nearly +seventy-four years old. + +In January, 1872, Thiers, in consequence of a dispute in the Chamber +over the question of a tax on raw materials, tendered his resignation, +but was persuaded with some difficulty to reconsider it. 'I have never +known the French so depressed and so out of heart about their internal +affairs,' wrote Lord Lyons. 'They don't believe Thiers can go on +much longer, and they see nothing but confusion if he is turned out. +The Legitimists and Orleanists are now trying for fusion. They are +attempting to draw up a constitution on which they can all agree, and +which, when drawn up, is to be offered to the Comte de Chambord, and if +refused by him, then to the Comte de Paris. I hear they have not yet +been able to come to an understanding on the first article. It all tends +to raise the Bonapartists. Many people expect to hear any morning of a +coup by which Thiers and the Assembly will be deposed, and an _appel au +peuple_, made to end in a restoration of the Empire.' Probably it was +the knowledge of a Bonapartist reaction in the country that led Thiers +to make a singularly foolish complaint against an alleged military +demonstration in England in favour of the ex-Emperor. + + * * * * * + + _Lord Lyons to Lord Granville._ + + Paris, Feb. 9, 1872. + + M. Thiers said to me yesterday at Versailles that he had + been told that a general of the name of Wood had marched 6000 of + Her Majesty's troops to Chislehurst to be reviewed by the Emperor + Napoleon. + + M. Thiers went on to say that no one could appreciate more + highly than he did the noble and generous hospitality which England + extended to political exiles, and that he had indeed profited by + it in his own person. He admired also the jealousy with which the + English nation regarded all attempts from abroad to interfere with + the free exercise of this hospitality. He should never complain + of due respect being shown to a Sovereign Family in adversity. But + he thought that there was some limit to be observed in the matter. + For instance, he himself, while on the best terms with the reigning + dynasty in Spain, still always treated the Queen Isabella, who was + in France, with great respect and deference. Nevertheless, when Her + Majesty had expressed a desire to go to live at Pau, he had felt it + to be his duty to ask her very courteously to select a residence at + a greater distance from the frontier of Spain. In this, as in all + matters, he felt that consideration for the exiles must be tempered + by a due respect for the recognized Government of their country. + Now if the Emperor Napoleon should choose to be present at a review + of British troops, there could be no objection to his being treated + with all the courtesy due to a head which had worn a crown. It was, + however, a different thing to march troops to his residence to hold + a review there in his honour. + +Thiers had not taken the trouble to substantiate his ridiculous +complaint, and his action was an instance of the extreme gullibility +of even the most intelligent French statesmen, where foreign countries +are concerned, and so perturbed was the French Government at the idea +of a Bonapartist restoration, that according to Captain Hotham, British +Consul at Calais, two gunboats, the _Cuvier_ and _Faon_, were at that +time actually employed in patrolling the coast between St. Malo and +Dunkirk with a view to preventing a possible landing of the Emperor +Napoleon. A little later, the Duc de Broglie, French Ambassador in +London, made a tactless remonstrance to Lord Granville with regard to +the presence of the Emperor and Empress at Buckingham Palace, on the +occasion of a National Thanksgiving held to celebrate the recovery of +the Prince of Wales from a dangerous illness. + + * * * * * + + _Lord Granville to Lord Lyons._ + + Foreign Office, March 1, 1872. + + The Duc de Broglie told me to-day that he had been rather + surprised when he heard of the Emperor and Empress having been at + Buckingham Palace on so public an occasion as that of last Tuesday, + that I had not mentioned it to him on Monday afternoon, when we had + had a long conversation. It would have enabled him to write to M. + de Rémusat,[3] and thus have prevented any of the effect which a + sudden announcement in the papers might create in France. + + I told him that I had not been consulted and did not know the + fact of the invitation when I saw him, and that if I had, I should + probably have mentioned it to him, although not a subject about + which I should have written. + + I should have explained to him that it was an act of courtesy + of the Queen to those with whom she had been on friendly relations, + and that it was analogous to many acts of courtesy shown by the + Queen to the Orleanist Princes. + + He laid stress on the publicity of the occasion, and on the + few opportunities which he, as Ambassador, had of seeing the Queen, + of which he made no complaint; but it made any attentions to the + Emperor on public occasions more marked. He was afraid that the + announcement would produce considerable effect, not upon statesmen, + but upon the press in France. + + I repeated that the admission of the Emperor and Empress had + no political significance, but had been in pursuance with the + long-established habit of the Queen to show personal courtesy + to Foreign Princes with whom she had been formerly on friendly + relations. + +The fall of the Finance Minister, Pouyer Quertier, in the spring had +given rise to hopes that the French commercial policy would become more +liberal, but the letters quoted below show how powerless were the +arguments of the British Government and how completely wasted upon the +French Ministers were the lamentations of the British free traders, +and their prognostications of ruin to those who were not sufficiently +enlightened to adopt their policy. + + * * * * * + + _Lord Lyons to Lord Granville._ + + Paris, March 5, 1872. + + I suppose Pouyer Quertier is really out, but we see so many + changes from hour to hour in resolutions here, that I shall not + report it officially until his successor is gazetted. We cannot + have a more Protectionist successor; but, after all, no one is so + bigoted a Protectionist as Thiers himself. + + Nevertheless the change of Minister will give a chance or an + excuse for a change of policy to some extent. I think that with a + view to this some stronger expression of displeasure, or rather + perhaps of regret than we have hitherto ventured upon, might have + a good effect. The new Minister and perhaps even Thiers himself + might be struck by a report from Broglie that you had put strongly + before him the impossibility, whatever efforts the Government might + make, of preventing public opinion in England becoming hostile to + France if the present commercial policy is persisted in. It is in + fact plain that there is no probability of France obtaining the + concessions from the Treaty Powers, on which Thiers professed to + reckon. The result already is that, whatever may have been the + intention, the Mercantile Marine Law is in practice a blow which + falls on England, and not on other European Powers. Unless the + French Government means to give us a real most favoured nation + clause, the result of denouncing our treaty will be to place us, + when it expires, at a special disadvantage as compared with other + nations. And what it now asks us to effect by negotiation, is to + hasten the moment at which it can accomplish this. It is quite idle + to talk of special friendship for us, when its measures practically + treat us much worse than they do the Germans. M. de Rémusat and + some other people are fond of saying that it is quite impossible + that France could bear to see two nations so friendly as Belgium + and England placed exceptionally in a position inferior to Germany. + But France seems to bear this with great equanimity so far as our + merchant navy is concerned. + + The demand we have made to be exempted from the _surtaxes de + pavillon_ under our most favoured nation clause would give the + French Government a means of remedying the injustice _if it wished + to do so_. At any rate some strong expressions of discontent on + our part might increase the disinclination of the Assembly and + some members of the Government to insist on imposing the duties on + the raw materials. It would be very convenient if there were some + retaliatory measures to which we could resort, without injuring + ourselves or departing from our own Free Trade principles. The + French Government grossly abuses, in order to influence the + Assembly, our assurances of unimpaired good will, and reluctance + to retaliate; and so, in my opinion, is preparing the way for the + real diminution of good will which its success in carrying its + protectionist measures, to our special injury, must produce in the + end. + + The present Government of France does not gain strength; far + from it. The Imperialists are gaining strength, as people become + more and more afraid of the Reds, and feel less and less confidence + in the power either of Thiers, or the Comte de Chambord, or the + Comte de Paris, to keep them down. The end will probably be brought + about by some accident when it is least expected. It would not be + wise to leave out of the calculation of possibilities, the chance + of Thiers's Government dragging on for some time yet, and it would + be very difficult to predict what will succeed it. At present the + Legitimists and Orleanists seem to have lost, and to be daily + losing prestige, and naturally enough, to be bringing down with + them the Assembly in which they are or were a majority. + + Perhaps I ought to say that the despatch which I send you + to-day about the sojourn of our Royal Family in the South of + France applies exclusively to them. Everybody knows or ought to + know that affairs are uncertain in France, but I should not think + it necessary or proper to warn private people against coming to + France or staying there. The conspicuous position of members + of the Royal Family increase the risk of their being placed in + awkward circumstances, and circumstances which would be of little + consequence in the case of private people, would be very serious + and embarrassing if they affected members of the Royal Family of + England. + +The last passage referred to a stay at Nice contemplated by the Prince +of Wales. In the event of any change of Government, it was always feared +that disorders would take place in the southern towns of France. + + * * * * * + + _Lord Lyons to Lord Granville._ + + Paris, March 14, 1872. + + The commercial disputes with the French Government which, as + you know, I always apprehended, are coming thick upon us. I foresaw + what was coming and begged Thiers, Rémusat and other members of + the Government over and over again to guard against vexations in + the execution of the Treaty while it lasted. I make little doubt, + notwithstanding, that all these violent and unfair proceedings are + prompted, not checked, from Paris. + + The Spaniards have found out the only way to deal with the + Protectionist spirit here. The slightest hint at retaliation would + have such an effect in the Assembly as to stop the onward career of + illiberality. As things now are, the extortioners have the game in + their own hands. They levy what duty they please, and pay just as + much or as little attention as may suit them, to our remonstrances. + It is a very disagreeable affair for one who, like myself, is + really anxious that there should be good feeling between the two + countries. We are in a fix. On the one hand, we cannot, without + injuring ourselves and abandoning our principles, retaliate; and + on the other hand, while they feel sure we shall do no more than + remonstrate, the Protectionist officials will care very little. + If indeed the general opinion is to be relied upon, the present + Government and its chief may come down with a crash at any moment, + but I don't know whether a change would benefit us commercially. + +Lord Lyons, like Lord Granville and other English public men and +officials of the day, was a Free Trader, as has already been stated. +But it would be difficult for the most ardent Protectionist to make +out a stronger case against the helplessness of a Free Trade policy +when negotiating with a foreign Government than is disclosed in these +letters, and there are any number of others all in the same strain. All +the protestations of goodwill, of sympathy, and benefit to the human +race, etc., were, and presumably are still, a pure waste of time when +addressed to a country about to frame a tariff in accordance with its +own interests, unless the threat of retaliation is used in order to +retain some bargaining power, as apparently the Spaniards had already +discovered. + +It has already been stated that Thiers's plans of military +re-organization and his somewhat imprudent language had caused some +agitation in Germany, and when the German Ambassador, Count Arnim, +returned to his post at Paris in the spring of 1872, it was freely +rumoured that he was the bearer of remarkably unpleasant communications. +These apprehensions turned out to be exaggerated, and Thiers in +conversation always assumed a lamb-like attitude of peace. He denied +that the Germans had addressed any representations to him, said that all +suspicions against him were grossly unjust, that it would be absolute +madness for France to think of going to war, and that, for his part, +the keystone of all his foreign policy was peace. As for his army +reform schemes, he was a much misunderstood man. He was undoubtedly +reorganizing the military forces of France, and it was his duty to place +them upon a respectable footing, and so provide a guarantee for peace. +It was, however, quite false to say that he was arming, for that term +implied that he was making preparations for war, and that he was putting +the army into a condition to pass at once from a state of peace to a +state of war. He was doing nothing of the sort; on the contrary, his +efforts were directed to obtaining the evacuation of the territory, by +providing for the payment of the war indemnity to Germany, and it could +hardly be supposed that if he were meditating a renewal of the contest, +he would begin by making over three milliards to her. + +From Arnim's language, it appeared that the German public was irritated +and alarmed at the perpetual harping of the French upon the word +'Revenge,' and that the German military men (the _militaires_ who were +always so convenient to Bismarck for purposes of argument) conceived +that the best guarantee for peace would be to keep their soldiers as +long as possible within a few days' march of Paris. + +The German fears were, no doubt, greatly exaggerated, but if they +existed at all they were largely due to Thiers's own language, who, +while not talking indeed of immediate revenge, was fond of boasting of +the strength and efficiency of the French army, and even of affirming +that it was at that very moment equal to cope with the Germans. That he +was conscious of having created suspicion may be inferred from the fact +that when the Prince of Wales passed through Paris on his way from Nice +to Germany, he begged H.R.H. to use his influence at the Court of Berlin +to impress upon the Emperor and all who were of importance there, that +the French Government, and the President himself in particular, desired +peace above all things, and were resolved to maintain it. A letter from +the British Ambassador at Berlin throws some light upon the prevalent +German feeling. + + * * * * * + + _Mr. Odo Russell[4] to Lord Lyons._ + + British Embassy, Berlin, April 27, 1872. + + Since your letter of the 9th inst. reached me feelings have + changed in Berlin. + + Thiers's Army bill and Speech have irritated the Emperor, + Bismarck and indeed everybody. + + The Generals tell the Emperor it would be better to fight + France before she is ready than after; but Bismarck, who scorns the + Generals, advises the Emperor to fight France _morally_ through + Rome and the Catholic alliances against United Germany. + + Although he denies it, Bismarck probably caused those violent + articles against Thiers to appear in the English newspapers, and he + tells everybody that Thiers has lost his esteem and may lose his + support. The next grievance they are getting up against him is that + he is supposed to have made offers through Le Flô to Russia against + Germany. + + In short, from having liked him and praised him and wished for + him, they are now tired of him and think him a traitor because he + tries to reform the French Army on too large a scale! + + Gontaut[5] does not appear to do anything beyond play the + agreeable, which he does perfectly, and every one likes him. But + it is said that _Agents_, financial Agents I presume, are employed + by Thiers to communicate through Jewish Bankers here indirectly + with Bismarck. Through these agents Thiers is supposed to propose + arrangements for an early payment of the 3 milliards and an early + withdrawal of the German troops of occupation,--the payment + to be effected by foreign loans and the guarantee of European + Bankers,--in paper not in gold. Bismarck has not yet pronounced + definitely, but the Emperor William won't hear of shortening the + occupation of France. Indeed, he regrets he cannot by Treaty leave + his soldiers longer still as a guarantee of peace while he lives, + for he is most anxious to die at peace with all the world. + + So that nothing is done and nothing will be done before Arnim + returns to Paris. He has no sailing orders yet and seems well + amused here. + + * * * * * + + _Lord Lyons to Mr. Odo Russell._ + + Paris, May 7, 1872. + + Many thanks for your interesting letter. + + Arnim's account of public opinion at Berlin entirely confirms + that which you give, only he says Bismarck would be personally + willing to come to an arrangement with France for payment of the + milliards and the evacuation of the territory, but that he will not + run any risk of injuring his own position by opposing either Moltke + or public opinion on this point. + + I don't think the Germans need the least fear the French + attacking them for many years to come. The notion of coming now + to destroy France utterly, in order to prevent her ever in the + dim future being able to revenge herself, seems simply atrocious. + The French are so foolish in their boasts, and the Germans so + thin-skinned, that I am afraid of mischief. + + I should doubt Bismarck's being wise in setting himself in + open hostility to the Vatican. The favour of the Holy See is seldom + of any practical use, so far as obtaining acts in its favour, to a + Protestant or even to a Roman Catholic Government; but the simple + fact of being notoriously in antagonism to it, brings a vast amount + of opposition and ill-will on a Government that has Catholic + subjects. The fear of this country's being able at this moment + to work the Catholic element in Germany or elsewhere against the + German Emperor appears to me to be chimerical. + + I wish the Germans would get their milliards as fast as they + can, and go: then Europe might settle down, and they need not be + alarmed about French vengeance, or grudge the French the poor + consolation of talking about it. + + Arnim was a good deal struck by the decline in Thiers's + vigour, since he took leave of him before his journey to Rome, but + he saw Thiers some days ago, when the little President was at his + worst. + + * * * * * + + _Mr. Odo Russell to Lord Lyons._ + + British Embassy, Berlin, May 11, 1872. + + I have nothing new to say about the relations of France and + Germany, but my friends here seem so alarmed at the idea that + France cannot pay the much longed for three milliards, that if + Thiers really does pay them, all the rest will be forgiven and + forgotten, and the withdrawal of the German troops will then be + impatiently called for. Like yourself I write the impressions of + the moment and am not answerable for future changes of public + opinion. Clearly the thing to be desired for the peace of the world + is the payment by France and the withdrawal by Germany, after which + a normal state of things can be hoped for--not before. + + The Pope, to my mind, has made a mistake in declining to + receive Hohenlohe. He ought to have accepted and in return sent a + Nuncio to Berlin, thereby selling Bismarck, and controlling his + German Bishops and the Döllinger movement. + + Bismarck is going away on leave to Varzin. He is so irritable + and nervous that he can do no good here at present, and rest is + essential to him. + + Your letter of the 7th is most useful to me, many thanks for + it. I shall not fail to keep you as well informed as I can. + +In reality, the Germans made little difficulty about the arrangements +for the payment of the indemnity and evacuation of French territory, and +early in July Thiers was able to state confidently that he felt certain +of being able to pay the whole of the indemnity by March, 1874, and +that he had only obtained an additional year's grace in order to guard +against accidents. + +A curious incident which occurred in July, 1872, showed how, if +sufficient ingenuity be employed, a trivial personal question may +be turned to important political use. The Comte de Vogué, French +Ambassador at Constantinople, who possessed little or no diplomatic +experience, before proceeding on leave from his post, had an audience +of the Sultan. The Sultan received him standing, and began to talk, +when Vogué interrupted His Majesty, and begged to be allowed to sit +down, as other Ambassadors had been accustomed to do, according to him, +on similar occasions. What the Sultan actually did at the moment was +not disclosed, but he took dire offence, and telegrams began to pour +in upon the Turkish Ambassador at Paris desiring him to represent to +the French Government that if Vogué came back his position would be +very unpleasant--intimating in fact that his return to Constantinople +must be prevented. The French Foreign Minister, however, refused this +satisfaction to the Sultan, and the Turkish Ambassador in his perplexity +sought the advice of Lord Lyons, who preached conciliation, and urged +that, at all events, no steps ought to be taken until Vogué had arrived +at Paris, and was able to give his version of the incident. The French, +naturally enough, were at that moment peculiarly susceptible on all +such matters, and more reluctant to make a concession than if they +were still on their former pinnacle of grandeur at Constantinople, +although Vogué was clearly in the wrong, for Lord Lyons admitted that +he had himself never been asked to sit. The importance of the incident +consisted in the fact that it gave an opportunity of cultivating the +goodwill of Russia, as the traditional enemy of Turkey. No Frenchman +had ever lost sight of the hope that some day or other an ally against +Germany might be found in Russia, and there were not wanting signs of a +reciprocal feeling on the part of the latter. It had, for instance, been +the subject of much remark, that the Russian Ambassador at Paris, Prince +Orloff, had recently been making immense efforts to become popular +with all classes of the French: Legitimists, Orleanists, Imperialists, +Republicans, and especially newspaper writers of all shades of politics. +As it was well known that neither Prince nor Princess Orloff were really +fond of society, these efforts were almost overdone, but nevertheless +they met with a hearty response everywhere, from Thiers downwards, +for all Frenchmen were eagerly hoping for a quarrel between Russia +and Germany, and were ready to throw themselves into the arms of the +former in that hope. Russia, on her side, was clearly not unwilling to +cultivate a friendship which cost nothing, and might conceivably be of +considerable profit. + +On November 5 the new Anglo-French Commercial Treaty was signed, +indignant British Free Traders striving to console themselves with the +thought that France would soon discover the error of her ways and cease +to lag behind the rest of the civilized world in her economic heresy. + + * * * * * + + _Lord Lyons to Lord Granville._ + + Paris, Nov. 12, 1872. + + I saw Thiers on Friday after I wrote to you on that day; and + I dined with him on Saturday. He looked remarkably well, and was + in high spirits and in great good humour, as he ought to be, with + us. He spoke, as indeed he always does, as if he felt quite sure + that he should have his own way with the Assembly in all things. + As regards the organic measures, he talked as if the fight would + be entirely with the Right; but both sections of the Left have + declared against organic changes to be made by this Assembly. I + suppose, however, Thiers is pretty sure to get his own powers + prolonged for four years certain, and this is what he cares about. + + I do not, however, find in my Austrian, German, and Russian + colleagues so unqualified an acquiescence in Thiers remaining + in power as they professed before I went away. It is said that + the three Emperors at Berlin were alarmed at the prospect of the + definitive establishment of any Republic, and still more so at + the apparent tendency of M. Thiers's policy to leave the country + to drift into a Red Republic, whenever he quitted the scene. + However this may be, there is certainly a change in the language + of their Representatives here, not very marked, but nevertheless + quite perceptible. Orloff in particular talks as if an immediate + Imperialist restoration were not only desirable but probable. If he + really thinks it probable, he is almost alone in the opinion. + + The Prince de Joinville, who came to see me yesterday, + said that he had been a great deal about in the country, and + that he found everywhere an absolute indifference to persons + and dynasties, and a simple cry for any Government which would + efficiently protect property. He thought that Thiers would be + supported for this reason, but that whatever institutions might + be nominally established, they would last only as long as Thiers + himself did, and that afterwards everything would be in question, + and the country probably divide itself into two great parties, + Conservatives and Reds, between whom there would be a fierce + struggle notwithstanding the great numerical superiority of the + former. + +In the absence of exciting internal topics, the year closed with a +slight sensation provided by Gramont, who, it might have been supposed, +would have preferred not to court further notoriety. Count Beust had +recently asserted that he had warned France against expecting help +from Austria in the event of a war with Prussia. Gramont replied +by publishing a letter in which the following statement occurred. +'L'Autriche considère la cause de la France comme la sienne, et +contribuera au succès de ses armes dans les limites du possible.' +This quotation was supposed to be taken from a letter from Beust to +Metternich, dated July 20, 1870 (the day after the declaration of war), +and left by Metternich with Gramont, who took a copy and returned the +original. Metternich was believed to have shown the letter also to the +Emperor Napoleon and to Ollivier. The letter was represented as going on +to say that the neutrality proclaimed by Austria was merely a blind to +conceal her armaments, and that she was only waiting till the advance of +winter rendered it impossible for Russia to concentrate her forces. + +It was generally believed that there was plenty of evidence that an +offensive and defensive alliance was in course of negotiation between +France and Austria in 1869, though no treaty was signed, and the record +appears to have consisted in letters exchanged between the two Emperors, +but as Gramont had nothing more than a copy of a letter from Beust to +Metternich his evidence was legally defective, whatever its moral +value, and it was questionable whether as an ex-Minister he had any +right to disclose such secrets. + + * * * * * + + _Lord Lyons to Lord Granville._ + + Paris, Dec. 31, 1872. + + Gramont's further revelations confirm what I told you in my + letter of the 24th. The question is becoming tiresome. I conceive + there is no doubt that Beust at Vienna, and Metternich here, + fanned the flame of French discontent after Sadowa, with a view + to avenging themselves when Austria and France should be ready, + and circumstances favourable. I think also that Gramont came back + from Vienna full of Beust's warlike ideas, and very well inclined + to carry them out. What exchange of letters may have taken place + between the two Emperors, or what record of any kind there may be + of engagements between the two countries to help one another, it is + more difficult to say. + + The assertion is that after war had been declared, Austria + engaged to move on the 15th September. Others say that she also + required that France should have an army in Baden. + + This is not inconsistent with her having dissuaded France from + war in July, 1870, when she knew positively it would be premature + for herself, and probably had some suspicion that France was also + not really prepared. + +Early in January, 1873, the Emperor Napoleon died at Chiselhurst. The +view of Thiers was that this event would render the Bonapartists, for +the time, more turbulent and less dangerous. He believed that the +Emperor's personal influence had been used to quiet the impatience +of his followers, while, on the other hand, his death removed the +only member of the family who was popular enough in France to be a +formidable candidate. Thiers's childish susceptibility with regard to +the Bonapartists showed itself in his expressed hope that the Emperor's +death would be followed by the disappearance of the public sympathy in +England with the family in its misfortunes. + +The opinions of Thiers seem to have been generally prevalent. The +Emperor was remarkably kind and courteous to all who approached him; he +was a firm friend; not, as a rule, an implacable enemy, and he inspired +no small number of people with a warm attachment to him personally. He +was also generally popular, and the glittering prosperity of the early +part of his reign was attributed by a large part of the common people +to his own genius and merits, while they were prone to consider that +its disastrous close was due to treason. No other member of the family +excited feelings of the same kind, and in France a cause was always so +largely identified with an individual that there was no doubt that the +hold of the Imperialists upon the country was largely weakened by the +loss of their chief. + +It is perhaps worth noting that Lord Lyons, although it was notoriously +difficult to extract any such opinions from him, did in after years +admit reluctantly to me, that although he liked Napoleon III. +personally, he had always put a low estimate upon his capacity. + + * * * * * + + _Lord Lyons to Lord Granville._ + + Jan. 31, 1873. + + I cannot say that the political atmosphere grows clearer. The + Right are in their hearts as anxious as ever to depose Thiers. + They believe as firmly as ever that if he makes the new elections, + he will have a Chamber, not only of Republicans, but of very + advanced Republicans. They see that all their little endeavours to + restrain him and to establish ministerial responsibility will have + no political effect. The death of the Emperor has not strengthened + Thiers's position with regard to the Right. On the contrary, + they are less disposed to bear with him since the removal of the + candidate for the Throne of whom they were most afraid, and from + whom they justly thought that Thiers would make every effort to + shield them. They are consequently, even more than they usually + are, employed in casting about for something to put in Thiers's + place. The Fusion is again 'almost' made, and MacMahon is again + talked of as ready to take the Government during the transition + from the Republic to the King. + + Orloff, the Russian Ambassador, propounded to me to-day a plan + of his own for preventing conflicts between Russia and England + in Central Asia. So far as I understood it, it was that England + and Russia should enter into a strict alliance, should encourage + and protect, by force of arms, commerce between their Asiatic + Dominions, and unite them at once by a railroad. He said there + was a Russian company already formed which desired to connect the + Russian railway system with the Anglo-Indian railways. He told me + that Brünnow was always writing that war between England and Russia + was imminent and that England was preparing for it. If Brünnow's + vaticinations are believed, they may perhaps have a not unwholesome + effect upon the Russian Government. + +Prince Orloff seems to have had in contemplation that Trans-Persian +Railway which has met with the approval of the Russian and British +Governments at the present day. The Russian advance in Central Asia +in 1872 and 1873 had been the subject of various perfectly futile +representations on the part of Her Majesty's Government, but Baron +Brünnow must have been a singularly credulous diplomatist if he really +believed that we were making preparations for a war with Russia or any +one else. + +If Orloff with prophetic insight foresaw a Trans-Persian Railway, Thiers +might be acclaimed as being the first person to suggest the project of +the Triple Entente between England, France, and Russia. Strangely enough +it was the affairs of Spain that put this notion into his head, the idea +prevalent in France being that Germany was bent on making that country a +dangerous neighbour to France, and bestowing a Hohenzollern prince upon +her as sovereign. The prospect of an 'Iberic Union,' which was being +discussed at the time, was considered to be exceptionally threatening to +France, and Thiers had had quite enough of united states on the French +frontier. + + * * * * * + + _Lord Lyons to Lord Granville._ + + Paris, March 4, 1873. + + M. Thiers spoke to me last night very confidentially about + Spain and Portugal. The Spanish question was, he said, becoming so + serious that it could hardly be considered an internal question. + Among other things, the independence of Portugal was at stake. Now, + in his opinion, the best chance of avoiding a collision between the + Powers of Europe would be that England, France, and Russia should + come to an understanding on the subject. He did not think that + there would be any difficulty in effecting such an understanding; + and indeed he had reason to believe that Russia was at this moment + particularly well disposed to act in concert with England. He was + far from being so absurd as to propose a new Holy Alliance; indeed, + he desired to avoid all show and ostentation--indeed all publicity. + He simply wished that, without any parade, the three Powers he had + named should concert measures in order to avert events which might + imperil the peace of Europe. After some further conversation, he + observed that it would be impossible to avert a collision, if the + Peninsula were formed into one Iberic state with a Hohenzollern for + a monarch. + + I did not invite M. Thiers to state more definitely in what + form he proposed that the understanding between France, Russia, and + England should be effected, or what combined action he proposed + they should adopt. I thought indeed that it would be very dangerous + for France to enter into any sort of an alliance with Foreign + Powers against Germany at this moment, and that the smallest result + might be to delay the evacuation of French territory. Nor indeed + did I know that there was any evidence that Germany was actively + pursuing designs in Spain in such a way and to such a degree, + as would render it proper or advantageous to try the hazardous + experiment of undertaking to settle a European question without + her, not to say in spite of her. + + I consequently only listened to what M. Thiers said. He + concluded by telling me to treat his idea as most strictly + confidential and to confide it only to your ear in a whisper. + + As regards the state of Spain, M. Thiers said that he believed + the Federal Party was after all the party of order; that at all + events it was predominant in all the outer circumference of + Spain; that the Unitarians existed only in Madrid and the central + provinces, and that the North was Carlist or Federal. This being + the case, his advice to the Government of Madrid had been to make + concessions to the Federals. He did not think that, if properly + managed, their pretensions would go much beyond what was called in + France 'decentralisation administrative.' + + The view of the Federals being the party of order in Spain + was new to me, but M. Thiers was beset by a host of deputies and I + could not continue the conversation. + +A letter from Lord Odo Russell[6] to Lord Lyons admirably defines +the attitude of Germany, and is an exceptionally lucid summary of +Bismarckian policy in general. + + * * * * * + + British Embassy, Berlin, March 14, 1873. + + Thanks for yours of the 4th instant. + + As regards Spain, Thiers, and Bismarck I cannot add anything + more definite or more precise. Bismarck and the Emperor William + are so far satisfied that the Republic will make room for the + Alphonsists so that they can afford to wait and look on. + + What Bismarck intends for Spain later, no one can guess, but + clearly nothing favourable or agreeable to France. + + The two great objects of Bismarck's policy are: + + (1) The supremacy of Germany in Europe and of the German race + in the world. + + (2) The neutralization of the influence and power of the Latin + race in France and elsewhere. + + To obtain these objects he will go any lengths while he lives, + so that we must be prepared for surprises in the future. + + A change has come over the Emperor and his military advisers + in regard to the evacuation of French territory, as you have seen + by his speech on opening the German Parliament. + + His Majesty is now prepared to withdraw his garrison as soon + as the fifth and last milliard shall have been paid by Paris and + received at Berlin. + + So that if it is true that Thiers proposes to pay the fifth + milliard in monthly instalments of 250,000,000 fs. beginning from + the 1st of June, the evacuation might be expected in October and + France be relieved of her nightmare. + + This I look upon as a most desirable object. It appears to + me that the re-establishment of the future balance of power in + Europe on a general peace footing, is _the_ thing Diplomacy should + work for, and that nothing can be done so long as the Germans have + not got their French gold, and the French got rid of their German + soldiers. + + The Germans, as you know, look upon the war of revenge as + unavoidable and are making immense preparations for it. + + Germany is in reality a great camp ready to break up for any + war at a week's notice with a million of men. + + We are out of favour with the Germans for preferring the old + French alliance to a new German one, as our commercial policy is + said to prove, and this impression has been lately confirmed by + Thiers's _exposé des motifs_. + + Thiers is again out of favour at Berlin, because the Russian + Government has warned the German Government that Thiers is working + to draw Russia into the Anglo-French Alliance contrary to their + wishes. I believe myself that the alliance or understanding between + Russia and Germany, Gortschakoff and Bismarck is real, intimate, and + sincere; and that they have agreed to preserve Austria so long as + she obeys and serves them, but woe to Austria if ever she attempts + to be independent! + + Then the German and Slav elements she is composed of, will be + made to gravitate towards their natural centres, leaving Hungary + and her dependencies as a semi-oriental vassal of Germany and + Russia. However, those are things of the future, at present I can + think of nothing but the crisis at home and the deep regret I feel + at losing my kind benefactor Lord Granville as a chief. My only + consolation is that he will the sooner return to power as our + Premier, for he is clearly the man of the future. + + I hope you will write again occasionally. + + * * * * * + + _Lord Lyons to Lord O. Russell._ + + Paris, April 8, 1873. + + Many thanks for your most interesting letter of the 14th. I + entirely agree with you that the one object of diplomacy should be + to re-establish the balance of power in Europe on a peace footing. + The payment of the indemnity and the departure of the German troops + from France are of course necessary to the commencement of anything + like a normal state of things. The French all more or less brood + over the hope of vengeance, and the Germans give them credit for + being even more bent upon revenge than they really are. So Germany + keeps up an enormous army, and France strains every nerve to raise + one; and what can diplomatists do? + + In Germany they seem to attach a great deal more than due + importance to the Commercial Treaty, as a sign of a tendency + towards a renewal of the Anglo-French Alliance. But then the + Germans have always been more angry with us for not helping to blot + France out of Europe than the French have been with us for not + helping them out of the scrape they got into by their own fault. + Germans and French are to my mind alike unreasonable, but we only + suffer the ordinary fate of neutrals. + + Thiers professes to have no thought of forming any alliance at + present; and to consider that it would be absurd of France to try + for more at this moment than to ward off great questions, and live + as harmoniously as she can with all Foreign Powers, without showing + a preference to any. This is no doubt the wise and sensible policy. + Thiers certainly acts upon it so far as England is concerned. Does + he also act upon it as regards Russia? I cannot say. I think there + is a little coquetry between him and the Russians. + +Lord Granville appears to have sent through the Duchesse de Galliera +a private message warning Thiers of the dangers of his advances to +Russia; but the latter asserted that although the French Ambassador at +St. Petersburg had been directed to maintain the most cordial relations +with the Russian Government, matters had not gone further than that, and +that he had made no communications which he should object to Germany +knowing of. Thiers's tenure of power was, however, destined shortly to +come to an end. On May 24, the veteran who had rendered such invaluable +services to the country was defeated by a combination of opponents, and +Marshal MacMahon became President of the Republic in his stead. The +change of Government was received quietly by the country; the elaborate +precautions which had been taken in case of disorder proved superfluous, +and the funds rose on the assumption that the Marshal was to prove to +be the new saviour of society. MacMahon, who had reluctantly accepted +the honour thrust upon him, was generally regarded as a French General +Monk, but which of the three pretenders was to be his Charles the Second +remained a matter of complete uncertainty. The fickle crowd hastened to +prostrate itself before the rising sun, and the first reception held by +the new President at Versailles constituted a veritable triumph; swarms +of people of all sorts attending, particularly those members of smart +society who had long deserted the salons of the Préfecture. Amongst the +throng were particularly noticeable the Duc d'Aumale and his brothers, +wearing uniform and the red ribands which they had never been known to +display before. All looked smooth and tranquil, as it usually did at +the beginning; but the Government so far had not done anything beyond +changing Prefects and Procureurs. The political situation, for the time +being, might be summed up in the phrase that the French preferred to +have at their head a man _qui monte à cheval_, rather than a man _qui +monte à la tribune_. + +Although the dismissal of Thiers savoured of ingratitude, it was not +altogether unfortunate for him that he had quitted office at that +particular moment, for little doubt was felt that, with or without any +error of policy on his own part, the country was gradually drifting +towards communism. At any rate, he could compare with just pride the +state in which he left France to the state in which he found her. +Although the last German soldier had not yet left French soil, the +credit of the liberation of the country was due to him, and by his +financial operations, successful beyond all expectations, he had not +only paid off four milliards, but provided the funds for discharging +the fifth, and so admirably conducted the negotiations that the German +Government was willing to withdraw the rest of the occupying force. + +The fall of Thiers caused searchings of heart at Berlin, and a +conversation with Count Arnim, the German Ambassador at Paris, in June +showed that the German Government regarded MacMahon with anything but +favour. Arnim stated that displeasure had been felt at Berlin, both +at language held by the Marshal before his appointment, and at his +neglect in his former position to act with proper courtesy towards the +Emperor's Ambassador in France. The German Government did not doubt that +the remainder of the indemnity would be paid, but Thiers indulged less +than other Frenchmen in hostile feelings towards Germany, and he and a +few of the people about him seemed to be the only Frenchmen who could +bring themselves to act with propriety and civility in their relations +with Germans. In fact, Thiers's foreign policy had been wise and +conciliatory, but as for his internal policy, he, Count Arnim, avowed +that he entirely concurred in the opinion that it would have thrown the +country in a short time into the hands of the Red Republicans. + +The unfortunate Arnim was apparently at this time unconscious of his +impending doom, although, as the following interesting letter from Lord +Odo Russell to Lord Lyons shows, his fate had been sealed months before. + + * * * * * + + _British Embassy, Berlin, Jan. 18, 1873._ + + What I have to say to-day grieves me to the soul, because it + goes against my excellent friend and landlord Harry Arnim. + + Said friend, it is said, could not resist the temptation of + turning an honest penny in the great War Indemnity Loan at Paris, + and the Jew Banker he employed, called Hanseman, let it out to + Bismarck, who could not understand how Arnim was rich enough to buy + estates in Silesia and houses in Berlin. + + Now Bismarck, who is tired of Arnim, and thinks him a rising + rival, will make use of this discovery with the Emperor whenever he + wants to upset Arnim and send a new man to Paris. + + He thinks him a rising rival because Arnim went to Baden + last autumn and advised the Emperor, behind Bismarck's back, to + go in for an Orleanist Monarchy and drop Thiers, in opposition to + Bismarck's policy, who wishes to drop all Pretenders and uphold + Thiers as long as he lives. + + Besides which Arnim hinted at a readiness to take office at + home if Bismarck came to grief. + + The Emperor is fond of Arnim and listened with complacency and + told Bismarck when he returned from Varzin,--Bismarck has vowed + revenge! I have not written all this home because it would serve + no purpose yet,--but it may be useful to you as a peep behind the + curtain. Meanwhile Bismarck has appointed one of his _secret_ + agents as Commercial Secretary to the Paris Embassy to watch Arnim. + His name is Lindau and as he is a very able man and an old friend + of mine, I have given him a letter to you. He might become useful + some day. + + Let me add _in confidence_ that he corresponds privately and + secretly with Bismarck behind Arnim's back. + + * * * * * + +It will be observed that the views expressed by Arnim to Lord Lyons in +June are not altogether consistent with those attributed to him in the +above letter, but Lord Odo Russell's opinion that his implacable chief +would crush him at the first opportunity was only too well justified +before long. + +FOOTNOTES: + +[Footnote 1: June, 1871.] + +[Footnote 2: German Ambassador at Paris.] + +[Footnote 3: Foreign Minister in succession to M. Jules Favre.] + +[Footnote 4: Subsequently Lord Ampthill.] + +[Footnote 5: French Ambassador at Berlin.] + +[Footnote 6: Formerly Mr. Odo Russell.] + + + + +CHAPTER XI + +MARSHAL MACMAHON'S PRESIDENCY + +(1873-1875) + + +The new French Government had been received with great favour by +the upper classes, while the remainder of the population remained +indifferent, but the Marshal was credited with the wish to place the +Comte de Chambord on the throne, and the language of his entourage was +strongly Legitimist, auguries being drawn from a frequent remark of the +Maréchale, who was supposed to dislike her position: _nous ne sommes pas +à notre place!_ + +As the confused political situation began to clear, it became evident +that everything depended upon the Comte de Chambord himself, and if he +could be brought to adopt anything like a reasonable attitude, it was +generally felt that there would be a large majority in his favour in the +Assembly. The historic White Flag manifesto issued from Salzburg at the +end of October effectually ruined the Legitimist cause. + + * * * * * + + _Lord Lyons to Lord Granville._ + + Paris, Oct. 31, 1873. + + The Royalists were counting up new adhesions and expecting a + letter from the Comte de Chambord which was to be read from the + tribune at the last moment and rally the waiters upon Providence + and the waverers to them, when, to their utter consternation, + the actual letter arrived, and fell like a shell with a violent + explosion in the midst of them. + + I don't know what they are to do. All plans for making the + Comte de Paris or the Duc d'Aumale Regent will be voted against + by the present Legitimists, unless the Comte de Chambord approves + them. It is very doubtful whether any explanation could do away + with the impression the letter will have produced throughout the + country, which was already averse from the idea of the Legitimist + King. + + The maintenance of MacMahon and the present Ministry seems the + best mode of postponing trouble, but it cannot do much more than + postpone. + + * * * * * + + _Lord Lyons to Lord Granville._ + + Paris, Nov. 3, 1873. + + If the Chamber met to-morrow, I suppose it would vote the + prolongation of MacMahon's powers; and though no one can answer + for what a day or an hour may bring forth, I suppose this is what + must be done. It is said that the Marshal himself insists upon a + term of six years, if not ten. This is rather hard to understand, + if, as I believed, he really wished to be out of the thing, and I + doubt its adding practically to the stability of his Government. + On the other hand, the Conservatives want to have the prolongation + voted in such a way as to make it apparent that MacMahon is _their_ + President. It would not suit them that he should be elected + unanimously, or nearly so, as he perhaps might be. This would put + him, they think, in a position too like that which Thiers held. The + preposterous notion of making a Lieutenant General of the Kingdom + to govern in the name of a King of full age and in possession of + all his faculties, who would undoubtedly repudiate and denounce + his representative, has been put an end to by the refusal of the + Princes of Orleans, one and all, it is affirmed, to accept the post. + + Thiers told me the day before yesterday that he did not + intend to oppose the Government this session, and that we might + count on a quiet winter. We shall see. + + The Legitimists are furious with their King, as well they + may be. How long this may last, one cannot say, but the numbers + of those who adore him _quand même_, as a sort of fetish, have + certainly fallen off. + +MacMahon had been as much disappointed with the Chambord manifesto as +the ultra-Legitimists themselves, and had looked forward to retiring +from a position which he found distasteful; but as no king was +available, and he was looked upon as the only guarantee for order, +obviously the best course was to secure the prolongation of his powers +for as long a period as possible. After many long and stormy discussions +MacMahon was declared President of the Republic for seven years, and a +committee of thirty was appointed to consider the Constitutional Laws. +This result was so far satisfactory to the Right, that it enabled them +to retire from the dangerous position in which they were placed by +the attempt to put the Comte de Chambord on the throne, but it failed +to establish a durable Government, and the whole period of MacMahon's +Presidency was marked by a ceaseless struggle with his Republican +opponents, which only terminated with his fall four years later. + +The anxieties of French Ministers were, however, not confined to +internal difficulties. Although the fact was concealed as much as +possible, the anti-Ultramontane campaign of Bismarck created serious +alarm in the beginning of 1874, and in that year may be said to have +originated the long series of panics, well or ill founded, which have +prevailed in France ever since. MacMahon in conversation did not scruple +to express his fear of a country which, according to him, could +place 800,000 men on the Rhine in less than seventeen days, and made +the interesting confession that the French military authorities had +never credited the famous reports of Colonel Stoffel[7] as to Prussian +military efficiency. The Foreign Minister, the Duc Décazes, expressed +the strongest apprehensions. + + * * * * * + + _Lord Lyons to Lord Granville._ + + Paris, Jan. 17, 1874. + + The fall of France has never, I think, been brought so + forcibly home to me, as when I listened yesterday to the humble + deprecation which Décazes was obliged to make with regard to + Bismarck's threats, in the same room in which I had so often heard + the high language with which the Imperial Minister used to speak of + the affairs of Europe. One can only hope that Odo may be right in + thinking that Bismarck's menaces may subside, when he has carried + his Army Bill at home. But may not his eagerness in his contest + with the Ultramontanes continue and carry him on to language and + even to measures against France from which it may be difficult for + him to draw back? and of course there is a limit to the submission + of the French Government, however disastrous it may know the + consequences of resistance to be. It is difficult to persecute + any religion in these days, but it is impossible for the French + Government to set itself in violent opposition to the predominant + religion in France. I do not know what means we may have of getting + pacific and moderate counsels listened to at Berlin, but I do + not think the weakness of France a sufficient safeguard to other + countries against the perils of the present state of things to the + peace of Europe. It may be very easy to bully and to crush France, + but will it be possible to do this without raising a storm in other + quarters? + +What Bismarck wanted was that the French Government should attack the +French bishops; and in order to conciliate him, a circular was issued +by the Minister of the Interior remonstrating with them on the nature +of the language in which their pastoral addresses were couched. The +well-known clerical newspaper the _Univers_ was suppressed, and although +every effort was made to disguise the various acts of subserviency +resorted to, it was perfectly well known to what cause they were due, +and it was not surprising that the French writhed under the necessity +of submitting to such dictation. In view of the military weakness +of France, however, it was useless to think of resistance, the Duc +d'Aumale, who commanded the most vulnerable district, having reported +confidentially that there were neither fortresses nor an army which +would have any chance of repelling a German invasion; added to which, +owing to considerations of economy, the conscription was six months in +arrear. + + * * * * * + + _Lord Lyons to Lord Odo Russell._ + + Paris, Feb. 3, 1874. + + The French want above all things to keep the peace, or, to put + it otherwise, to escape being attacked by Germany in their present + defenceless state. What, in your opinion, should they do? Of course + the temptation to the unprincipled war party in Germany to attack + them while they are unable to defend themselves, is very great; + and that party must know that a war this year would be much less + hazardous than one next year, and so on, as each year passes. + + The next question I want your advice upon is what, if + anything, can other Powers, and particularly England, do to help to + preserve peace? This is a question peculiarly within your province, + as the one thing to be considered in answering it, is the effect + that anything we do may have at Berlin. + + I am not very hopeful, but I think the chances of peace will + be very much increased if we can tide over this year 1874. + + I can see no consolation for a fresh war. I suppose Bismarck + would be ready to buy the neutrality of Russia with Constantinople, + and that France will give Russia _anything_ even for a little help. + + The Emperor Alexander has told General Le Flô[8] at St. + Petersburg that there will not be war. Do you attach much + importance to this? + + You will call this a _questionnaire_ rather than a letter, but + if you have anything to catechise me upon in return, I will answer + to the best of my ability. + + The Lyttons' are, as you may suppose, a very great pleasure to + me, and they have had a great success here. + +No one was better fitted than Lord Odo Russell, who was a _persona +grata_ with Bismarck, to answer these queries. The Emperor Alexander had +been very emphatic in assuring General Le Flô on several occasions that +there would be no war, but Lord Odo was in all probability quite correct +in his opinion that this was no real safeguard. + + * * * * * + + _Lord Odo Russell to Lord Lyons._ + + Berlin, Feb. 20, 1874. + + I was glad after a long interval to see your handwriting + again, and doubly glad to find you inclined to renew our + correspondence. You ask: _Firstly_, What in my opinion should the + French do to escape being attacked by Germany in their present + defenceless state? + + In my opinion nothing can save them _if_ Bismarck is + determined to fight them again; but then, is it France or is it + Austria he is preparing to annihilate? In Bismarck's opinion, + France, to avoid a conflict with him, should gag her press, + imprison her bishops, quarrel with Rome, refrain from making + an army or from seeking alliances with other Powers all out of + deference to Germany. + + _Secondly._ What can other Powers, and particularly England, + do to help to preserve peace? + + A Coalition is impossible; advice or interference adds to + Bismarck's excuses for going to war, so the only course Governments + can follow is to let him do as he pleases and submit to the + consequences, until he dies. + + _Thirdly._ Do I attach any importance to the Emperor of + Russia's pacific assurances? + + None whatever, because Bismarck is prepared to buy his + co-operation with anything he pleases in the East. + + Bismarck is now master of the situation at home and abroad. + The Emperor, the Ministers, the Army, the Press, and the National + majority in Parliament are instruments in his hands, whilst abroad + he can so bribe the great Powers as to prevent a coalition and make + them subservient to his policy. Now, his policy, as you know, is + to mediatize the minor States of Germany and to annex the German + Provinces of Austria, so as to make one great centralized Power + of the German-speaking portions of Europe. To accomplish this he + may require another war, but it may be with Austria and not with + France, which he now puts forward to keep up the war spirit of the + Germans and to remind Europe of his powers. Besides which he has to + pass the unpopular Army Bill and War Budget which he failed in last + summer. + + His anti-Roman policy will serve him to pick a quarrel with + any Power he pleases by declaring that he has discovered an + anti-German conspiracy among the clergy of the country he wishes to + fight. + + Such is the situation, but it does not follow that we shall + have war before another year or two are over or more, nor need we + have war _if_ Bismarck can carry out his plans without it. + + At present the tone of Bismarck and Bülow is quite pacific, + and I notice a great desire for the co-operation of England in + maintaining the peace of Europe generally. + +Lord Lyons's own opinions were in exact agreement with Lord Odo +Russell's, and the general uncertainty as to Bismarck's intentions +continued to preoccupy both the French and the English Governments, +although the Emperor of Russia persisted in assuring General Le Flô that +there would be no war, and it was assumed in some quarters that the +German Emperor disapproved of the Bismarckian policy. + +The general election in England at the beginning of 1874, resulting in +the return of the Conservative party to power, placed Lord Derby again +at the Foreign Office in the room of Lord Granville, and the long letter +which follows was presumably intended to enlighten him on the subject of +French politics generally. It is, at all events, a concise review of the +situation. + + * * * * * + + _Lord Lyons to Lord Derby._ + + Feb. 24, 1874. + + I thank you cordially for your letter of yesterday, and I + resume with very peculiar satisfaction my diplomatic correspondence + with you. I wish the subject of it was as pleasant to me as is the + fact of its renewal; but I cannot help being more than usually + anxious about the prospects of Europe and of France in particular. + This spring and summer are the especially critical seasons for + France. She will be for a long time to come far too weak to indulge + in aggression, except indeed as a secondary ally of some stronger + Power, but even next year, she will not be in the absolutely + helpless condition which is at this moment so strong a temptation + to national hatreds, and to the military thirst for gold and glory + which prevails with a party in Germany. I am afraid the peace of + Europe depends entirely upon the view Bismarck may take of the + easiest means of bringing all German-speaking nations under one + rule. The wolf can always find reasons for quarrelling with the + lamb, and as Bismarck himself told Odo Russell, he has had a good + deal of experience of this kind of thing. The French lamb will not + be skittish, and indeed will hardly venture to bleat, for some + time. For my own part, I am constantly on the watch to forestall + questions which may make difficulties between France and any other + country; for if Bismarck wants war, it would suit him to be able to + appear to be only taking his part in a quarrel already made. + + Italy is the most dangerous neighbour from this point of + view, and the presence of the _Orénoque_ at Civita Vecchia is the + ticklish point. It is a very delicate matter to touch; for if the + question came very prominently into notice, it might raise one of + the storms in the press of all countries, which are so often the + precursors of evil times. The ship is supposed to be at Civita + Vecchia to give the Pope the means of leaving Italy, if he wishes + to do so; and I suppose the Vatican might relieve the French of + embarrassment by saying that she is not wanted. In fact, if the + Italian Government intended to prevent the Pope's going away, they + would of course stop him before he got to Civita Vecchia, and if + they abstained (as would no doubt be the case) from interfering + with his movements, he could get a ship to depart in, whenever he + pleased. + + I do not know that there is any ill-feeling in Switzerland + towards France, but the Ultramontane disputes give Bismarck a lever + to work with. + + I believe the French Government have completely drawn in their + horns about the Armenian Patriarch question and the Protectorate of + the Latin Christians in the East, since Bismarck appeared on the + field at Constantinople. + + In looking out for small beginnings of troubles, I have + thought of Tunis. I suppose we may lay aside all apprehension of + attempts of France to change the frontier or to bring the Regency + into more complete dependency upon her, at the present moment. I + find by a despatch from Mr. Wood, that the German commodore, in his + conversation with the Bey, insisted particularly upon the interests + of German subjects being put upon as good a footing as those of the + subjects of any other country. + + I think Décazes takes the humiliating position in which + France, and he as her Foreign Minister, are placed, with more + equanimity and temper than most Frenchmen would; and so long as + the present, or any other Government, not absolutely unreasonable, + is at the head of affairs, France will be prudent in her foreign + relations. + + Of Marshal MacMahon's seven years' lease of power, only three + months have elapsed; a time too short to give much foundation for + conjecture as to its probable duration. Both he himself and his + Ministers take opportunities of declaring that its continuance + is above discussion, and that they will maintain it against all + comers. There are two things against it. First, the extreme + difficulty of giving it anything like the appearance of permanence + and stability which would rally to it that great majority of + Frenchmen who are ready at all times to worship the powers that + be, if only they look as if they were likely to continue to be. + Secondly, there is the character of the Marshal himself. He is + honest and a brave soldier, but he does not take such a part in + affairs as would increase his personal prestige. The danger, + in fact, is that by degrees he may come to be looked upon as a + _nullité!_ + + The Imperialists are agitating themselves and spending money, + as if they were meditating an immediate coup. The wiser heads + counsel patience, but the old horses, who sorely miss the pampering + they had under the Empire, are getting very hungry, and are afraid + that they themselves may die before the grass has grown. + + The fear of an Imperialist attempt has in some degree brought + back to the Government the support of the Legitimists, and in fact + the Comte de Chambord has quarrelled with his own party. The Fusion + has put an end to the Orleanist Party, as a party for placing + the Comte de Paris on the throne; but the question of appointing + the Duc d'Aumale Vice-President, in order to have some one ready + to succeed MacMahon in case of need, is seriously considered. I + suppose, however, that MacMahon would look upon this as destructive + of the arrangements between him and the Assembly. And then the + whole system depends upon the maintenance by hook or by crook of + a majority, which has not yet ceased to melt away, as seats become + vacant and new elections take place. + +The Duc de Bisaccia, the new French Ambassador in London, even at his +first interview with Lord Derby, did not scruple to avow that he felt +quite certain that the Republican form of government would not last, and +he went on to assert that Bismarck's head had been turned by success, +and that he aimed at nothing less than the conquest of Europe, being +quite indifferent either to the views of his Imperial Master, or of the +Crown Prince. Whatever the prospects of the Republic, the prospects of +Bisaccia's own party (Legitimist) were indisputably gloomy, for the +prevailing sentiment in France at the time was hostility to the White +Flag and to the clerical and aristocratic influences of which it was +held to be the emblem. The great majority of the people were Republican, +and the most numerous party after the Republican was the Imperial, but +the Presidency of Marshal MacMahon was acquiesced in, for the moment, +by all parties, because it was believed to be capable of preserving +order, because it left the question of the definitive government of the +country still undecided, and because no party saw its way to securing +the pre-dominence of its own ideas. + +The existing state of things was accounted for by the history of the +establishment of the seven-years Presidency. + +When the Orleans Princes tendered their allegiance to the Comte de +Chambord in the previous autumn, the fusion, so long talked of, was +complete, and it was supposed that a Parliamentary Monarchy with the +Tricolour Flag, might be established under the legitimate head of +the Bourbons; but the Comte de Chambord struck a fatal blow to these +hopes by his celebrated letter, and the Conservatives felt that there +was no time to be lost in setting up a Government having some sort of +stability. The plan which they adopted was that of conferring power +upon Marshal MacMahon for a fixed and long period. Had a short period +been proposed, it would have been agreed to almost unanimously; but +this was not their object. They wished it to be apparent to the country +that the Marshal was specially the President of the Conservative +majority: they asked for a term of ten years: obtained seven, and +secured from the Marshal a declaration of adherence to their views. The +slight modification of the Ministry which ensued, resulted in placing +the Government more completely in the hands of the party pledged to a +monarchical form of Government, and the Ministry thus reconstituted, set +itself to the task of resisting the progress of Radicalism and Communism +in the country. + +But the suspicion of favouring the White Flag clung to the Government, +and although the latter, following the example of the Empire, had +installed their partisans in office, as mayors, etc., by thousands +throughout the country, the candidates supported by the Government had, +in almost every instance, found themselves at the bottom of the poll +when elections took place; and the results showed that a large accession +of votes had been received by the Republican and Imperialist parties. Of +these the former had gained most, but the latter possessed a backing in +the country which was inadequately represented by their numbers in the +Assembly. + +It should, however, be added that there did not appear on any side a +disposition to embarrass the Government by factious or bitter opposition +with regard to the three departments, Finance, War, and Foreign Affairs, +in which the practical interests of the country were most deeply +involved. The financial policy of M. Magne[9] was generally supported; +and with regard to votes for the Army and Navy, the Government had +rather to resist a pressure to increase the expenditure on these heads, +than to urge the necessity of considerable supplies. + +In the conduct of foreign affairs, the defenceless state of France had +made the avoidance of an attack from Germany the one overwhelming care +of the Government. To effect this object, to give Germany no pretext for +a quarrel, and to make submission to the behests of Bismarck as little +galling and in appearance as little humiliating as possible, had been +the constant occupation of the Foreign Minister. In this effort he was +seconded by the Assembly, and indeed every one in and out of that body, +except a few clerical and Legitimist bigots, felt it to be a patriotic +duty to abstain from embarrassing the Government in its relations with +foreign Powers. Another reassuring feature in the situation was, that +there were no symptoms of attempts to resist by force the authority of +the Assembly, as no party seemed likely to venture to oppose by force +a Government which disposed of the army; and the army in 1874 showed +no prediction for any particular candidate for the throne sufficiently +strong to overcome its habitual obedience to the Constitutional +Government, whatever that Government might be. + +As an instance of the dictation practised by Bismarck towards France in +foreign affairs, it may be mentioned that in January, 1874,[10] Count +Arnim formally announced to the Duc Décazes that the German Government +would not tolerate the assumption by France of the suzerainty of Tunis, +or of a Protectorate over that country. To this Décazes humbly replied +that there had never been the least question of anything of the kind--a +statement which can scarcely be described as accurate. + +Whether Bismarck entertained any designs with regard to Tunis is not +known, but it was in this year that Germany began to show some signs +of interest in the Philippines and other places supposed to be of +some colonial value. The following extract from a letter written on +the subject by the late Lord Lytton, who was at the time Secretary +of Embassy at Paris, is a striking instance of rare and remarkable +political prescience. + + * * * * * + + _Lord Lytton to Lord Lyons._ + + Paris, Oct. 27, 1874. + + * * * * * + + Odo's impression (communicated to you) that Bismarck does + not want colonies rather surprises me. It seems to me a perfectly + natural and quite inevitable ambition on the part of a Power so + strong as Germany not to remain an inland state a moment longer + than it can help, but to get to the sea, and to extend its seaboard + in all possible directions. Is there any case on record of an + inland state suddenly attaining to the military supremacy of Europe + without endeavouring by means of its military strength and prestige + to develop its maritime power? But you can't be a Maritime Power + without colonies, for if you have ships you must have places to + send them to, work for them to do, and a marine Exercier-Platz + for training seamen. That is why I have always thought that the + English school of politicians which advocates getting rid of our + colonies as profitless encumbrances, ought (to be consistent) to + advocate the simultaneous suppression of our navy. Lord Derby says + that though Germany may probably cherish such an ambition, she + will have as much seaboard as she can practically want as long + as she retains possession of the Duchies. But that is not a very + convenient commercial seaboard, and I confess I can't help doubting + the absence of all desire for more and better outlets to the + sea, so long as her military power and prestige remain unbroken. + Anyhow, there seems to be now a pretty general instinct throughout + Europe, and even in America, that a policy of maritime and colonial + development must be the natural result of Germany's present + position: and such instincts, being those of self-preservation, are + generally, I think, what Dizzy calls 'unerring' ones. + +A letter from Lord Odo Russell written about this period throws a +curious light upon Bismarck's imaginary grievances, and the difficulties +which he was prepared to raise upon the slightest provocation. Probably +no Minister of modern times ever uttered so many complaints, threatened +so often to resign, and yet wielded such absolute power. + + * * * * * + + _Lord O. Russell to Lord Derby._ + + Berlin, Nov. 9, 1874. + + I found Prince Bismarck in one of his confidential moods + the other day, and he indulged me in a long talk about his own + interests, past, present, and prospective. + + Among many other things, he said that his life had been + strangely divided into phases or periods of twelve years each. + + Born in 1815, he had left home when he was twelve years old to + begin his studies. At 24 he inherited his small patrimony and his + father's debts, and entered upon the life and duties of a country + gentleman. At 36 (1851) his diplomatic career began, and he was + sent to Frankfort, Vienna, St. Petersburg and Paris. At 48 (1863) + he was recalled to form the present Administration, which in twelve + years had carried on three wars and made the German Empire. He was + now 60 and worn out with the responsibilities and anxieties of + office, and he was resolved to enter upon a new phase (of 12 years + he hoped) by resigning and retiring into private life--a resolution + he begged I would keep to myself for the present. + + I said I could well understand his wish for rest, but I did + not believe the Emperor or the country would allow him to indulge + in it, as he was well enough and strong enough to govern Germany + for many years to come. + + He replied that he felt quite strong enough to govern Germany, + but not to be governed himself any longer by the Emperor, whose + obstinacy and narrow mindedness were more than he could bear. + + I said I had often heard him complain of his Court duties + before, but it appeared to me that he always carried his points, + and that after some resistance the Emperor gave way in the end and + followed his advice. + + He replied that it was that very struggle with his Imperial + Master that had worn him out and that he no longer felt strong + enough to carry on after sixty. He then related to me a series of + very curious anecdotes illustrating his struggles with the Crown, + and what he called the want of confidence and ingratitude of the + Emperor. + + I asked him whether anything had lately occurred calculated to + increase his wish for rest. + + He said that his present difference with the Emperor related + to the new army organization. The Emperor and his generals thought + the sole object of the German Empire was to turn the nation into an + army for the greater glory of the House of Hohenzollern; whilst he + held that there must be some limit to the heavy strain of military + obligations the Crown was ever anxious to impose on the people. + + I asked whether he was alluding to the Landsturm Bill, which + placed every German from the age of 16 to 42 at the disposal of the + War Department. + + He replied that he did not exactly allude to that, but there + were other measures in contemplation, elaborated in the Emperor's + military Cabinet, he could not give his sanction to, and which + would consequently lead to another painful struggle. He considered + that his great task had been completed in 1870 to 1872, and that he + could now retire and leave the internal organization of Germany to + other hands. The Crown Prince, he thought, might possibly govern + on more Constitutional principles than his father, who, born + in the last century, had not yet been able to realize what the + duties of a Constitutional Sovereign were, and thought himself as + King of Prussia above the Constitution, as the Emperor Sigismund + thought himself above grammar when he wrote bad Latin. A danger + to which the Crown Prince would be exposed as Sovereign was his + love for intrigue and backstairs influence--'some one or other + always concealed behind the door or curtain.' The Prince was not as + straightforward as he appeared, and he suffered from the weakness + of obstinacy and the obstinacy of weakness due to unbounded conceit + and self-confidence--but at the same time he meant well. + + After a good deal more talk about his family, his property, + and his longing for country life and pursuits, we parted. + + Without attaching undue importance to Prince Bismarck's + oft-repeated threat of resignation, I do not suppose he would go + out of his way to tell me and others so, without intention. My + impression is that he wants to obtain something or other from the + Emperor which he can make conditional on remaining in office, well + knowing that His Majesty cannot do without him. Besides which, + his retirement from office would have the appearance of a defeat, + consequent on his failure to coerce the Pope and his legions. He is + not the man to admit a defeat while he lives. Time will show what + more he wants to satisfy his gigantic ambition. + +The fear of war with Germany had died away temporarily in the summer, +and the various political parties in France were free to continue their +struggles and to reduce the situation to almost unexampled confusion. +The motives of the Comte de Chambord and his followers were too remote +for ordinary human understanding, and their object appeared to be to +bring about a crisis and a dissolution of the Assembly on the most +disadvantageous terms to themselves. Moderate Republicans were looking +to the Duc d'Aumale as a safeguard against the Imperialists on the one +hand, and the Reds on the other. Republicans of various shades, and the +Reds in particular, were coquetting with Prince Napoleon, and he with +them. Most men and most parties appeared to have particular objects, +which they hated with a hatred more intense than their love for the +object of their affections. Thiers, it was believed, would have rather +seen anything, even a restoration of the Empire, than have the Duc de +Broglie and the Orleanists in power. Notwithstanding the fusion, the +Legitimists would have probably preferred Gambetta (or some one still +more extreme) than an Orleans Prince--and so on. + +'I cannot make head or tail of French internal politics,' Lord Derby +wrote, at the end of the year, 'and presume that most Frenchmen are in +the same condition. It looks as if nobody could see their way till the +present Assembly is dissolved and a new one elected.' + +The beginning of the new year was signalized in Paris by the appearance +of the Lord Mayor of London, who had been invited to attend the opening +of the new Opera House. That functionary has always been invested in +French popular opinion with semi-fabulous attributes, and he seems to +have risen to the level of the occasion. 'The Lord Mayor,' wrote the +unimpressionable Lord Lyons, 'is astonishing the Parisians with his +sword, mace, trumpeters, and State coaches. So far, however, I think the +disposition here is to be pleased with it all, and I keep no countenance +and do what I have to do with becoming gravity.' A little later, +however, he was constrained to add:-- + + I am afraid the Lord Mayor's head has been turned by the + fuss which was made with him here, for he seems to have made a + very foolish speech on his return to England. Strange to say the + Parisians continued to be amused and pleased with his pomps and + vanities to the end, although the narrow limits between the sublime + and the ridiculous were always on the point of being over passed. + I abstained from going to the banquets given to him, or by him, + except a private dinner at the Elysée; but I had him to dinner + here, and, I think, sent him away pleased with the Embassy, which + it is always as well to do, and if so, I have reaped the reward of + my diplomatic command over my risible muscles. + +It was not perhaps surprising that the Lord Mayor should have been +thrown off his intellectual balance, for the honours accorded to him +far surpassed those paid to ordinary mortals and resembled rather those +habitually reserved for crowned heads. When he visited the opera the +ex-Imperial box was reserved for his use; the audience rose at his +entry, and the orchestra played the English National Anthem. Twice he +dined with the President of the Republic; the Prefect of the Seine gave +a banquet in his honour; so did the authorities at Boulogne; and to +crown all, the Tribunal of Commerce struck a medal in commemoration of +his visit. + +The one thing that was fairly clear in French politics, besides +abhorrence of the White Flag, was the gradual progress of Bonapartism +which was beginning to frighten Conservatives as well as Republicans, +and the Bonapartists themselves were inclined to regret having helped +to turn Thiers out of office, because the army was becoming more and +more anti-Republican, and it would be much easier to turn it against a +civilian than against its natural head, a Marshal of France. + + * * * * * + + _Lord Lyons to Lord Derby._ + + Jan. 26, 1875. + + Bonapartism is still in the ascendant, and certainly the + Assembly is doing everything to give weight to the assertion that + France is unfit for Parliamentary Government. No one believes in + a moderate Republic, as a self-supporting institution unconnected + with some particular individual. The 'Conservative Republic' + was devised for M. Thiers. The Septennate Republic, if it be a + Republic, would be scouted if MacMahon were not at the head of + it. The Comte de Chambord is impossible. The Orleanists have cast + in their lot with his, and besides, the Government they represent + being constitutional or Parliamentary, is exactly what is most + out of favour, with the exception of the White Flag. As I have + said all along, the dispute is between a very advanced Republic + and the Empire, and _confugiendum est ad imperium_ is becoming + more and more the cry of those who dread Communism. Those who have + personal reasons for fearing the Empire are already taking their + precautions. Friends of the Orleans Princes are believed to have + seriously conferred (not with the knowledge or consent of the + Princes themselves, so far as I have heard) with the Bonaparte + leaders, in order to ascertain what the Orleans family would + have to expect if the Prince Imperial returned. At any rate the + Bonapartist papers have been insinuating that they would be allowed + to stay in France and keep their property; and these insinuations + are of course intended to relieve tender Orleanist consciences of + scruples in coming round to the Imperial cause. + + The officers in the army are becoming more and more averse + from all idea of a permanent Republic. They would willingly wait to + the end of MacMahon's time, but they are beginning to talk of the + possibility of his being so much disgusted by the way in which he + is worried by the Assembly, as to throw the Presidency up. + + In short France is at this moment in a fear of Bonapartism. + It may, and very probably will, subside this time, but it differs + from most intermittent fevers in this, that the attacks recur at + shorter and shorter intervals, and increase instead of diminish in + intensity. + +Fear of the Imperialists drove Conservatives into voting with Gambetta +and other advanced Republicans; a ministerial crisis took place; the +Assembly gave contradictory decisions and generally discredited itself, +and the confusion grew so great that it seemed impossible to unravel it. + + 'I have spent three afternoons at Versailles,' wrote Lord + Lyons on February 26th, 'and have seen a Constitution made there. + I have seen also such a confusion of parties and principles as I + hope never to witness again. I found Décazes, Broglie, and a great + number of Right Centre deputies at the MacMahons' last evening. + They all, and particularly Décazes, looked to me very unhappy, + and indeed they did not affect to be at all satisfied with the + occurrences in the Assembly. Like the horse in the fable who + invited the man to get on his back, the Right Centre have let the + Left get on their backs to attack Bonapartism, and don't know how + to shake them off again.' + +The ceaseless struggles between the various political parties in France, +which were of little interest to the outside world, were temporarily +interrupted in the spring of 1875 by the war scare which so greatly +agitated Europe at the time, but which subsequently became an almost +annual phenomenon. Unfortunately, Lord Lyons was in England during +the greater portion of this critical period, and there are wanting, +consequently, documents which might have thrown light upon what has +always been a somewhat mysterious episode, but it would appear that the +symptoms of alarm on the part of the French first showed themselves +about March 11. On that day the Duc Décazes drew the attention of the +British Ambassador to three incidents which ought to engage the serious +attention of those Governments who were desirous of maintaining peace +in Europe. These were the threatening representation made by the German +Minister at Brussels to the Belgian Government respecting the language +and conduct of the Ultramontane Party in that country; the pointed +communication to the French Government of this representation; and the +prohibition of the export of horses from Germany. Prince Bismarck, +said Décazes, seemed to become more and more inclined to revive old +grievances and to require of foreign countries the exercise of an +unreasonable and impossible control over the prelates and even over +the lay members of the Roman Catholic Church, and as for the decree +forbidding the export of horses, it was so inexplicable that it could +only add to uneasiness. It might be easy for England, and for some other +nations, to regard these things calmly, but to France they constituted +a serious and immediate peril. In spite of the steps taken during the +past year to conciliate Germany on the subject of the Bishop's charges, +the German Government had never officially intimated that it considered +the question to be closed, and Count Arnim had used the significant +expression to him, that it was only closed 'so far as any question +between you and us can ever be looked upon as closed.' He believed that +it was only owing to the influence of other Powers, and of England in +particular, that the danger had been averted in 1874; and he now hoped +that the same influence would be exerted in the same way. Décazes added +a somewhat surprising piece of information which had been imparted to +him in January, 1874, by Prince Orloff, the Russian Ambassador, viz. +that in that month an order to occupy Nancy had absolutely been issued +by the German Government to its troops, and that there were strong +grounds for believing that this order has been rescinded chiefly owing +to influence exerted at Berlin by Russia. So far as is known, there is +no corroboration of this story, and it would appear that Prince Orloff +was so anxious to convince France of the goodwill of Russia that he +thought it advisable to drag England into the question, but it was not +surprising that France should be sensitively alive to the danger she +incurred, if Bismarck, irritated by his Ultramontane difficulties, +should choose to throw the blame upon the Roman Catholics of other +countries, or should resort to quarrels with foreign nations as a means +of diverting public opinion in Germany from inconvenient questions at +home. + +Prince Hohenlohe, the new German Ambassador, who also saw Lord Lyons on +the same day, volunteered no opinion upon the representation to Belgium +which had excited so much perturbation, but remarked with regard to the +exportation of horses that the 'agriculturists might have been alarmed +by the prospect of a drain of horses for foreign countries. He had no +reason to suppose that purchases of horses had been made in Germany by +the French Government for military purposes; but he had heard that a +considerable number had lately been brought there for the Paris fiacres.' + +It will not have escaped notice that the German Government--or rather +Bismarck--was fortunate in always having excellent reasons available, +either for not complying with inconvenient requests, or for explaining +away disquieting symptoms; thus, in 1870, the insuperable difficulty to +disarmament was the King of Prussia; during the peace negotiations, all +harsh conditions were due to _les militaires_, and in 1875 the German +agriculturists and the Paris cabs were responsible for any uneasiness +that might be felt temporarily. + + * * * * * + + _Lord Lyons to Lord Derby._ + + Paris, March 16, 1875. + + I saw Décazes last night and found him in a greater state of + alarm about the intentions of Germany than anything specific he + told me seemed to warrant. The retirement of Bismarck to Varzin + will not reassure the French, because they remember that he was + there when the war broke out in 1870. + + There is observable here, and not least among the Russians, a + sort of impression that there is to be a movement of some kind in + the East. + + In short, there is a great deal of vague uneasiness and fear + that peace is in danger. + + The German Embassy here has certainly been taking great pains + to put it about that the prohibition to export horses has been + decreed solely from economical, and not from military motives. + That Embassy keeps up very close relations with the _Times_ + correspondent[11] here, and his subordinates. Of course the trouble + it has taken has increased instead of allaying alarm. Décazes + constantly harps on the string of the influence of England at + Berlin, and the consolation it affords him to feel sure that it is + exercised quietly on the side of peace. The position is a painful + one. Without particular friendships and alliances, France is + absolutely at the mercy of Germany, and if she tries to form such + friendships and alliances, she may bring the wrath of the great + Chancellor down upon her instantly. + + * * * * * + + _Lord Derby to Lord Lyons._ + + Foreign Office, March 16, 1875. + + I do not know and cannot conjecture the cause of Décazes's + anxiety. Nothing has passed or is passing in any part of Europe to + justify alarm as to an early disturbance of general peace. But I + hear of a similar feeling of uneasiness at Berlin; and the Russian + Government is credited with designs as to the nature of which no + two persons agree. Until we hear more, I shall be inclined to set + down all these rumours of wars to the time of year, and to the + absence of any exciting questions (so far as foreign relations are + concerned) to occupy men's minds. + + I may tell you confidentially that Bismarck has given us + through Odo Russell a serious warning against the unfriendly + feelings of the Russian Government towards England. He may be only + trying to stir up jealousy, a game which he often plays, or he may + be sincere. I take his hint as one not to be slighted, yet not + infallibly trusted. Gortschakoff is no doubt much disgusted about + the Conference; the Czar also to some extent; and probably they + both feel that they had miscalculated the effect of the Russian + marriage on English policy. But beyond this I know no cause of + quarrel. Dead calm for the moment. I cannot conceive any reason why + you should not take your leave when you wish it. Paris is always + within reach if anything new turns up. + +It is obvious from the above that neither Lord Derby nor Lord Lyons felt +any very serious apprehensions, and the latter was permitted to go home +on leave at the beginning of April. On April 10, Lord Odo Russell wrote +to Lord Derby:-- + + Bismarck is at his old tricks again--alarming the Germans + through the officious Press, and intimating that the French are + going to attack them, and that Austria and Italy are conspiring + in favour of the Pope, etc. Now he has succeeded in making the + Emperor and the Crown Prince believe that France is meditating an + invasion of Germany through Belgium! And, not knowing any better, + they are in despair and have ordered the War Department to make + ready for defence. This crisis will blow over like so many others, + but Bismarck's sensational policy is very wearisome at times. Half + the Diplomatic Body have been here since yesterday to tell me that + war was imminent, and when I seek to calm their nerves and disprove + their anticipations, they think that I am thoroughly bamboozled by + Bismarck. + +In the middle of April there appeared in the _Berlin Post_ the +celebrated article entitled: 'Is War in Sight?' and as it was well known +that such articles were not written except under official inspiration, +something akin to a real panic took place, more especially when other +German papers began to write in a similar strain. Letters from Mr. +Adams, who had been left as Chargé d'Affaires at Paris, show the +pitiable condition of terror to which the French Government was reduced, +and the efforts made by Décazes to obtain British support. Décazes urged +that England ought to take an active part in protesting against the +new theory that one nation was justified in falling upon another for +no other reason than that the latter might possibly prove troublesome +in the future. He said that he had protested to the German Ambassador +against the attitude of the German Government, after all the assurances +that it had received from the French Government, and added that if war +took place in August, as he feared, he should advise MacMahon to retire +with his army beyond the Loire without firing a shot and wait there +'until the justice of Europe should speak out in favour of France.' The +idea of openly identifying England with the French cause did not commend +itself apparently to Mr. Disraeli. + + 'I had a rather long conversation about French politics with + Mr. Disraeli,' Lord Lyons wrote to Mr. Adams on April 21st, 'and I + found him thoroughly well up in the subject. He wishes to encourage + confidence and goodwill on the part of France towards England, + but sees the danger to France herself of any such appearance of a + special and separate understanding as would arouse the jealousy of + Bismarck. + + * * * * * + + 'With a little variation in the illustrations, Décazes's + language to you was just what he used to me before I left Paris. + Germany can, I suppose, overrun France whenever she pleases, a + fortnight after she determines to do so; and no one can tell how + suddenly she may come to this determination. Whether Décazes is + wise in perpetually crying "wolf" I cannot say. He is naturally + anxious to keep Europe on the alert, but I am not sure that the + repetition of these cries does not produce the contrary effect.' + +During the second half of April the tension began to diminish, but Lord +Odo Russell, who was certainly no alarmist, felt convinced that, so long +as Bismarck remained in office, the peace of Europe was in jeopardy, +for his power had now become absolute, and neither the Emperor nor the +Crown Prince were capable of withstanding him. Writing on April 24, he +remarks: 'The prospect of another war fills me with horror and disgust, +and if Bismarck lives a few years longer I do not see how it can be +prevented. The Emperor's powers of resistance are over; he does what +Bismarck wishes, and the Crown Prince, peace-loving as he is, has not +sufficient independence of character to resist Bismarck's all-powerful +mind and will.' + +A few days later the Belgian Minister at Berlin reported to Lord Odo +Russell an alarming communication made to him by Count Moltke. + + * * * * * + + _Lord O. Russell to Lord Derby._ + + Berlin, May 1, 1875. + + Since writing to you to-day, at this late hour my Belgian + colleague Baron Nothomb has called to tell me that he had a long + conversation with Moltke yesterday fully confirming what is said + in my despatch. Moltke added that, much as he hated war, he did + not see how Germany could avoid it _next year_, unless the Great + Powers 'coalesced' to persuade France to reduce her armaments to a + reasonable peace establishment. + + Then Nothomb told me that Bismarck had sent Bülow to him with + the following confidential message: 'Tell your King to get his army + ready for defence, because Belgium may be invaded by France sooner + than we expect.' + + This message Nothomb writes to Brussels to-day. He is under + an impression that in the event of war, Bismarck intends to occupy + Belgium, as Frederick the Great occupied Saxony when he suspected + Maria Theresa of wanting to take her revenge for the loss of + Silesia. This is curious, and you will probably hear more about it + from Brussels. I write in haste for the Messenger. + +The evident desire of Bismarck to fasten a quarrel upon France aroused +the indignation of Lord Derby, who realized that the intervention of +Russia was the best method of preventing it. + + * * * * * + + _Lord Derby to Lord O. Russell._ + + Foreign Office, May 3, 1875. + + You seem reassured as to the immediate prospect, and the panic + in Paris has subsided, but great uneasiness remains. Lumley[12] + writes to me that the state of things seems to him most critical, + and the language which you report as held by Moltke is unpleasant + enough. Münster[13] has not called for the last few days: when last + I saw him, his language about French armaments tallied exactly + with that which you and others report as being held by German + representatives throughout Europe. + + Is there no hope of Russian interference to maintain peace? + It cannot be the interest of Russia to have France destroyed and + Germany omnipotent. If the Czar were to say that a new war must not + take place, and that he would not allow it, Bismarck would hardly + undertake to fight Russia and France combined. I see little other + prospect of averting mischief, and if it begins, where is it to end? + + Even here, and notwithstanding the sympathy felt in the + main for the Protestant German Empire, the outrageous injustice + of picking a quarrel with France, because she does not choose to + remain disarmed, would produce its effect. There would be a great + revulsion of feeling; not unlike that which took place when the + first Napoleon had begun to show his real character and objects. + The English public knows little about foreign concerns, but it does + understand that hitting a man when he is down is not fair play, and + I think in the rest of Europe fear and jealousy of the predominant + Power would give France many adherents. + + I do what I can to point this out in a quiet and friendly way; + but without being sanguine. + + * * * * * + + May 4. The conversation about Belgium in the House of Lords + last night led to no result. I think I see a growing feeling, + indicated by the language of the press, that the German demands are + not necessarily unreasonable, and that we should at least hear more + of the case before pronouncing judgment. + + To judge by the reports which Nothomb sends to his own + Government, he has been thoroughly frightened, and is ready to + advise unconditional acceptance of German proposals. Is he disposed + to be an alarmist? Or has Bismarck established a personal hold over + him? + + We are quiet at this office, busy in Parliament; the Session + threatens to be long, but it will not be eventful. + +On May 6, Lord Odo Russell reported that Count Schouvaloff, the Russian +Ambassador in London, had just arrived at Berlin from St. Petersburg, +and was the bearer of important tidings. + + The good news he brought respecting our relations with Russia + filled me with delight after the dark allusions made to me here + at Court and by the Chancellor during the winter. As regards + Germany and the war rumours, Count Schouvaloff gave me the most + satisfactory and welcome news that the Emperor of Russia is coming + to Berlin on Monday next, will insist on the maintenance of peace + in Europe, even at the cost of a rupture with Germany, and that he + can reckon on the support of Austria in doing so. + + How Bismarck will meet the humiliating blow of being told by + his allies, Russia and Austria, that he must keep the peace with + France, when he has proclaimed to the world that France is ready to + take her revenge, it is difficult to foretell. But we must not be + surprised if it hastens on the outburst it is intended to prevent. + I hope not, and do not expect it, but I shall not be surprised if + it does, because Austria has really joined Russia. She has become + an obstacle in the way of German development, which Bismarck will + try to remove. + +It had, of course, been the object of Bismarck to sow dissension between +England and Russia, and he had taken elaborate pains to convince +the British Government that Russia was animated by the most hostile +feelings. Consequently the extremely frank and friendly sentiments +expressed by Count Schouvaloff were in the nature of an agreeable +surprise, but the effusion of the Russian Envoy was so great that he +seems to have slightly overdone the part. + + * * * * * + + _Lord O. Russell to Lord Derby._ + + Berlin, May 8, 1875. + + I did not report Schouvaloff's conversation because he was + going to tell you all he had to say in great detail as soon as he + reached London. His frankness is fascinating, but on reflection it + does not inspire absolute confidence. I feel at first inclined to + believe all he says; but when I think it over, it appears too good + to be true. + + If all he represents himself to have said to Bismarck about + the power of Russia to coerce Germany under certain circumstances + be strictly true, Bismarck would scarcely want him to succeed + Gortschakoff, as he does, if he did not feel that he could make a + tool of him (Schouvaloff). + + According to Schouvaloff, the Czar and Gortschakoff are + to tell Bismarck next week that a new war must not take place, + and that if he does not submit and agree, Russia, with the + concurrence of Austria, is prepared to side with France to render + war impossible. In all probability, their conferences will end + in mutual assurances of peace and good will, and we shall hear + no more of war rumours and French armaments until those of + Germany are ready; and as Bismarck is a match both for the Czar + and Gortschakoff, I shall not be surprised to hear that he has + persuaded them to let him have his own way in the end. But this is + mere conjecture; we shall know more about it all a week hence. + + The whole of Bismarck's policy now tends to produce a + coalition of the peaceful Powers against Germany, and his Church + policy, to produce dissensions in Germany and arrest the progress + of unification. It is therefore evident that he seeks a conflict + for purposes of his own. + + I may be wrong, but I cannot but think that he wants to + mediatize the smaller German Powers and weaken Austria so as to + render her alliance useless to Russia, France, and Italy. + + If I understand Schouvaloff correctly, Bismarck endeavoured to + set Russia against us, as he attempted to set us against Russia, + and he seemed to expect that Bismarck would make Gortschakoff + various offers in return for Russian co-operation or neutrality. + Indeed, he insinuated that he thought Bismarck a little out of his + mind at times. + + The importance of the Czar's language and attitude at Berlin + is so great that I look forward with anxious interest to the + results of next week's conferences. For my part I have been careful + to hold the language you tell me you hold at home on these matters + in a friendly spirit to Germany and in the interest of European + Peace. + +On the same date (May 8), the Emperor Alexander and Prince Gortschakoff +started on the journey to Berlin from which so much was anticipated, +and the British Government addressed a despatch to Lord Odo Russell +which was also circulated at Paris, Vienna, St. Petersburg, and +Rome, instructing him to use all his power to put an end to the +misunderstanding which had arisen between France and Germany. It is +worthy of note that when this despatch was communicated to the Austrian +Government, that Government alone declined to instruct their Ambassador +at Berlin in the sense desired, on the ground that it would irritate +Bismarck. + +The Emperor Alexander and Gortschakoff arrived at Berlin on May 10, +and the question of peace or war must have been decided with extreme +rapidity, for Lord Odo Russell dined with Bismarck on that night, and +the latter took the opportunity to express his thanks 'for the very +friendly offer, which he highly appreciated, as a proof of good will +and confidence on the part of Her Majesty's Government.' At the same +time he expressed some naïve surprise at the offer, maintaining that +all his efforts tended in the direction of peace; that the war rumours +were the work of the stockjobbers and the press, and that France and +Germany were on excellent terms! Under the circumstances, it is highly +creditable to Lord Odo Russell that he received this communication with +becoming gravity. + +Gortschakoff who made his appearance after the dinner professed great +satisfaction at Bismarck's language; but in conversation with Lord +Odo Russell on the following day (May 11), Bismarck spoke with much +irritation of Gortschakoff's intervention, which he attributed to senile +vanity, and stated that he had refused Gortschakoff's request for a +categorical promise not to go to war, because such a promise would have +implied the existence of an intention which he repudiated. + +On May 12, Gortschakoff sent a telegram to St. Petersburg which gave +dire offence: _La paix est assurée:_ and the Emperor of Russia requested +Lord Odo to inform Her Majesty's Government that he felt certain of the +maintenance of peace. Bismarck, secretly furious at the frustration of +his plans, outwardly betrayed no ill-humour and put a good face upon his +failure. + + * * * * * + + _Lord O. Russell to Lord Derby._ + + Berlin, May 15, 1875. + + Although Bismarck is as civil, confidential, and amiable + to me as ever, I fancy that he must be frantic at our combined + action with Russia in favour of peace, which took him by surprise. + However that matters little, and he will get over it, as he wishes + to keep well with us. But he will seek an opportunity of paying + out Gortschakoff for having come the Peacemaker and Dictator over + Germany again. + + For my part, I was delighted at the course pursued by Her + Majesty's Government and at the instructions you sent me, which I + feel sure will do good, both at home and abroad. + + The old Emperor William, whose bodily health is wonderful, but + whose mental powers are declining, will have been surprised and + grieved at the Queen writing to the Czar instead of to himself. + Bismarck thinks it is due to an intrigue of the Empress Augusta + to spite him. His hatred and abuse of the Empress is a perfect + mania. The Crown Prince sent for me to talk the incident over. He + asked many questions, but was himself reserved, beyond deploring + Bismarck's nervous state and policy which had been the cause of + such useless alarm. He asked whether I saw any likely successor to + Bismarck if his health broke down. I said plenty would be found + in Germany when there was a demand for them, which Bismarck's + popularity at present excluded. The Prince, though reserved, was + very cordial and very anxious for information. + + Your conversation with Schouvaloff is word for word what he + said to me. I note one mistake on his part. He spoke with certainty + of Austrian co-operation, which failed us at the last moment. + + I was much impressed by the warmth and eloquence of the + Czar's utterances of friendship for England. He seemed really + to feel deeply what he said, and to wish with all his heart for + an alliance with us. Gortschakoff was less ardent: it is not in + his nature; but he was persuasive and consistent in his friendly + assurances. Schouvaloff's attitude and language will show whether + my impressions are correct or not. + + Münster's assurances to you in regard to the German army are + quite correct, I believe; only it is better prepared for war than + any other army in the world, and at ten days' notice. But when + Bismarck tells him to lament the alarm he has created himself, and + to ascribe it to Ultramontane influences in the press, Münster must + feel rather ashamed of his master. + + We may certainly reckon on peace for this year. Next year + peace must depend on the state of Bismarck's combinations for + the completion of his task--the unification of Germany--Russia + permitting. He left for Varzin this morning, which will do him + good; but he returns on the 27th instant to receive the King and + Queen of Sweden who stay three days in Berlin. + + I did not mention in my official report that the Czar asked + me to tell him frankly, if I was at liberty to do so, whether I + thought Bismarck had designs on Austria. I told him what the wishes + of the National Party were, and what they expected of Bismarck + their leader, and that I believed he contemplated weakening Austria + to strengthen Germany. The Czar thanked me and said that although + suspicion had been suggested to him from many sides, he could not + get himself to believe in so much perfidy. + +Such then in brief is the story of the great war scare of 1875, a tale +which has been told by many writers with embellishments suggested by +either Anglophil or Russophil proclivities. Which of the two countries, +England or Russia, contributed most towards the preservation of peace +will probably always remain a subject of discussion, but Bismarck at +all events never forgave Gortschakoff his vainglorious telegram, and +he used afterwards to maintain that, whereas the English had 'behaved +like gentlemen,' the conduct of the Russian Government came under a +distinctly opposite category. It is a remarkable fact that in spite +of the indisputable evidence furnished not only by the foregoing +correspondence, but from other sources, Bismarck subsequently had the +hardihood to assert that the war scare of 1875 was a myth invented +partly by Décazes for stockjobbing purposes and partly by the +Ultramontane press--even the English press being according to his +assertions under Ultramontane influence. In the authoritative work +'Bismarck: his Reflections and Reminiscences' it is lightly dismissed +as an elaborate fiction. 'So far was I from entertaining any such idea +at the time, or afterwards, that I would rather have resigned than +lent a hand in picking a quarrel which would have had no other motive +than preventing France from recovering her breath and her strength.' +Busch, in his better-known narrative, is also discreetly reticent on +the subject, and the only reference to it occurs in some notes dictated +to him by Bismarck in 1879. 'As far back as 1874 the threads of the +Gortschakoff-Jomini policy are to be found in the foreign press--oglings +and advances towards an intimacy between Russia and France of _la +revanche_. The rejection of these addresses is due rather to France +than to Russia. This policy does not appear to have originated with the +Emperor Alexander. It culminated in the period 1875-77, when the rumour +was circulated that Gortschakoff had saved France from us, and when he +began one of his circular despatches with the words, _Maintenant la +paix est assurée_. You remember Blowitz's report in the _Times_. Read +it again and mention the matter. His account was correct, except when +he spoke of an anti-French military party in Prussia. No such party +existed.' + +It is instructive to compare with these passages the statements made in +the 'Memoirs and Letters of Sir Robert Morier.' + +The crisis was definitely passed when Lord Lyons returned to Paris, +and he found the French overflowing with gratitude for the exertions +of Her Majesty's Government in favour of peace. Both Marshal MacMahon +and the Duc Décazes were profuse in their expressions, and the latter, +in particular, said that he attached immense importance to the fact +that the same sentiments in favour of peace had been expressed +simultaneously at Berlin by England and Russia. At the same time, while +much encouraged at the thought that the danger of an attack from Germany +had been averted, he affirmed very positively that he should not on +this account relax his endeavours to avoid giving umbrage to the German +Government. On its being pointed out to him that it was obvious that +the vast and increasing sums which figured in the Budget of the French +War Department had produced in Germany a very general impression that +France was preparing for an immediate retaliatory war, he gave the +somewhat unconvincing assurance that a vote for clothing the reserve +would be struck out, but would be replaced by a supplementary vote +introduced in the winter, when a vote for clothing might seem 'natural +and unimportant.' According to Décazes, both the Emperor of Russia and +Gortschakoff had, on more than one occasion, used language which showed +that they viewed with satisfaction the efforts of France to restore her +military power, and he endeavoured to impress upon the Ambassador that +Holland first, and then Belgium, were next to France most in danger from +German ambition. Finally, he pointed out with great satisfaction that +Russia had not lent an ear to the offers which had, he presumed, been +made to her at Berlin, to forward any ambitious views she might have in +the East, and he said that he considered this particularly important, +because it removed the only obstacle which might have interfered +with a cordial co-operation, on the part of the British and Russian +Governments, for the preservation of the peace of Europe. Whether any +such offers were made or refused is not known, but as the next few years +were to show, Décazes's conclusion was about as faulty a one as could +well be imagined. + + 'As regards public opinion in this country,' said Lord Lyons. + 'I find no diminution of the conviction that at the present moment + a war with Germany would be fatal to France, and that very many + years must elapse before France will be able to undertake such + a war with any prospect of success. All Frenchmen are earnestly + desirous that their army should be as speedily as possible placed + upon such a footing as to give them some security against attack, + and some influence in the world--but few look forward to there + being a time when they can contend with Germany, unless they have a + powerful ally to fight beside them in the field. + + 'In the meantime I must confess that the gratitude towards + England, which I hear expressed by men of all parties, far exceeds + anything that I could have expected. On the one hand it shows + perhaps the greatness of the terror from which the French have just + been relieved; but on the other, it is, I think, an indication of a + sincere disposition to accept heartily and ungrudgingly any proof + of good will from England.' + +The insurrection in Bosnia and Herzegovina, which broke out in the +summer of 1875, and the Turkish bankruptcy which followed a little +later, provided the French with fresh cause for apprehension, as it +was realized that the Eastern Question was once again reopened, and +that any differences that might arise between England and Russia would +be to the disadvantage of France. The French, who now saw the hand of +Bismarck in everything, believed that he had a plan of sending the +Austrian army into the Herzegovina, and the Russian army into some other +part of Turkey, with a view to sending the German army into France, and +much as the Government would have liked to have done something for the +French bondholders, and at the same time to have recovered some of the +influence formerly enjoyed at Constantinople, it was afraid to take any +action which might irritate the omnipotent chancellor. Perhaps this +was just as well, as far as England was concerned. The project of a +European Conference at Constantinople, which had been already mooted, +did not appear in any way to be conducive to British interests. Austria +and Russia were not in agreement as to the policy to be pursued. The +former had every reason to fear a Slav development on the frontier. +On the other hand, the Emperor of Russia could not, even if he wished +it, afford to disregard the feeling of the Russians in favour of +their fellows in race and in religion. Both Andrassy and Gortschakoff +foreseeing that neither could obtain a solution entirely acceptable to +opinion in his own country, desired apparently to throw a part of the +responsibility on a European Conference. But in such a Conference Russia +would be supreme. France and Germany would bid against each other for +her favour. Austria would be afraid to set herself against her, and if +England had any different views, she would always be outvoted. + +Attention was shortly, however, diverted to another quarter. On November +17, Lord Derby learnt that it was absolutely necessary for the Khedive +to procure between three and four millions sterling before the end of +the month, and that he was preparing to sell his Suez Canal Shares. + + * * * * * + + _Lord Derby to Lord Lyons._ + + 10, Downing Street, Whitehall, Nov. 17, 1875. + + I am not quite easy in my mind about a story I hear, to the + effect that the Khedive is negotiating with a French Company for + the sale of his interest in the Suez Canal. If the telegram has not + been sent to you officially, I will enclose it. Now his bias has + always hitherto been against the pretensions of Lesseps, and he has + been of use to us in keeping that rather irrepressible gentleman in + order. If he withdraws from the concern, and a French Company takes + his place in it, our position will be very unfavourably altered. + Have you heard anything of the negotiations in question? I really + think the matter very serious, and it is one of which the English + public will fully understand the importance. + + I think I am not violating any confidence in enclosing to you + for your personal use only an extract from Odo Russell's letter to + me received on Monday which seems to throw light on the situation. + I can add to it nothing in the way of comment. + + Your information as to the position of the French Government + is satisfactory. It looks as if the worst of their troubles were + over. + + P.S.--Since I began this note I have received further details, + which I send you, and, I may add in strict confidence that we are + prepared ourselves to take over the Viceroy's interest, if it + cannot be kept out of French hands by other means. + + I find Lord Odo's letter is with the Prime Minister, so the + extract I promised must wait till next messenger. + +The result of Lord Lyons's inquiries, which had to be made very +discreetly, so as not to create suspicion, was the discovery that the +Khedive was actively negotiating with a French Company, but it was +believed that he wanted to mortgage, and not to sell the shares. Lord +Derby's next letter to Lord Lyons shows how reluctantly he took action. + + * * * * * + + Nov. 19, 1875. + + From General Stanton's[14] telegrams it appears that the + Khedive has no intention of selling his interest in the Suez Canal, + though he may be obliged to mortgage it for a time. He has promised + to give us notice, if, from any cause, he should change his mind, + and to give us the option of purchase. + + I sincerely hope we may not be driven to that expedient. The + acquisition would be a bad one financially, and the affair might + involve us in disagreeable correspondence both with France and + the Porte. But there is a strong feeling here about not letting + the Canal go still more exclusively into French hands, and as we + contribute nearly four-fifths of the traffic, it cannot be said + that this jealousy is unreasonable. There are intrigues of all + sorts going on at Cairo, but I think we may reckon on the Khedive + being true to us, if not tempted too strongly. I rely on you to + tell me all you hear on the subject. + +The memorandum of Lord Odo Russell referred to by Lord Derby is a lucid +exposition of the European situation at the time and of Bismarck's +attitude with regard to the other Powers, more especially Russia. + + * * * * * + + Berlin, Nov. 12, 1875. + + Bülow is loquacious and straightforward on most subjects; but + his reticence on Oriental affairs is remarkable. I have repeatedly + tried the experiment of talking over what the newspapers say, to + draw him out, but he becomes silent and embarrassed, and seeks to + change the subject, and when questioned, replies that he has not + lately received any information from Constantinople. + + I have in consequence tried to find out through confidential + sources what it all means, and putting two and two together, I + make out that Bismarck feels uncertain of Russia, and does not + wish to be committed too soon. Since Gortschakoff assumed the post + of peacemaker between France and Germany, Bismarck has failed to + re-establish confidential relations with Russia. In regard to + Oriental affairs, Gortschakoff, instead of being satisfied to act + with his German and Austrian allies exclusively, has sought to + keep up an equally balanced understanding with England, France and + Italy: from which Bismarck suspects that Gortschakoff does not mean + to let him have his own way and wishes to control Germany through + the united action and agreement of the other European Powers. This + does not suit his book, and above all, he fears that Russia wishes + to keep on good terms with England and France; which would, in his + opinion, neutralize the exclusive action of the three Northern + Powers, over which he hoped to establish his own influence to the + exclusion of all other Governments. By lending his assistance to + Russia in the East, he calculated on Russian neutrality in regard + to his own plans, as was the case during the late war with France. + + The joint action of Russia and England last May, in the + interest of peace, took him by surprise, destroyed his fondest + calculations, and left him isolated and disappointed to reflect + on the possibility of a peace coalition against Germany, which he + could not break up without the certainty of Russian neutrality + or assistance. He feels that Gortschakoff has abandoned him for + the time being, that he has lost the confidence of the Emperor + Alexander, and that while they live, there is but little hope of + a change of policy in Russia, favourable to his plans--viz. the + breaking up of Austria and the neutralization of the minor German + sovereignties. + + Bismarck reckoned much on his friend Schouvaloff, but + Schouvaloff turned traitor last May, and is less German in England + than he was in Russia, which Bismarck cynically attributed to the + influence of wine and women. + + Now Bismarck, I am told, affects honest indignation at the + manner in which Russia is deceiving and misleading Austria in + regard to Turkey; but in what that consists, I do not yet clearly + understand. + + When he returns to Berlin he may possibly speak to me on these + subjects, and I should be glad to know whether there is anything in + particular which you may wish me to say, or not to say. + + On the whole the present situation of affairs seems to me + favourable to the maintenance of peace. + + Of course we must be prepared for an occupation of some + portions of European Turkey by Austria and Russia, but that need + not necessarily lead to war. + + I have also endeavoured to find out what the views of + the National Party in regard to the East really are, and I + find that the breaking up of European Turkey would be received + with satisfaction, for the Turk has no friends in Germany. The + German provinces of Austria are looked upon as the natural and + inevitable inheritance, sooner or later, of the German Empire, + for which Austria might be compensated in Turkey, with or without + Constantinople. Some people talk wildly of giving Constantinople + to Greece, as less likely to be objected to by the Western Powers. + But even Russia might take possession of Constantinople without + objection on the part of Germany. Anything calculated to break the + influence of France in the East, which is still thought to be too + great, would be popular in Germany, and more especially if the + interests of the Latin Church could be injured by it. + + England may have Egypt if she likes. Germany will graciously + not object. + + Since May it has become manifest that Russia has the power + to hamper the movements of Germany and arrest her progress + effectually, and that Germany can undertake nothing new without + the passive consent of Russia. This power must be so intolerable + to Bismarck that he is sure to exercise all his skill in drawing + Russia out of the combined arms of the Great Powers, back into + his own exclusive embrace. This, a difference between Russia and + Austria about Turkey, might enable him to achieve. + + Bismarck's endeavours last winter to make us suspicious of + Russia, and _vice versâ_, are now fully explained. His failure must + add to the general irritation he suffers from. + + The situation will become clearer when he returns to Berlin in + the course of the winter. + +Lord Odo Russell's view of the situation tallied with what Gortschakoff +had said to Décazes, Thiers, and other people at Vevey, earlier in the +year. The preservation of peace seemed, therefore, to rest largely on +Russia, and it was unfortunate that the Eastern Question presented +itself in a form which certainly favoured Bismarck's efforts to create +differences between Russia and Austria, and between Russia and England. + +Further inquiries in Paris with regard to the Khedive's action seemed to +confirm the view that he was seeking to mortgage the shares, but to whom +they were to be mortgaged was unknown. On November 27, there arrived +through Lord Tenterden, Under-Secretary at the Foreign Office, the +intelligence that Her Majesty's Government had bought the shares. + + * * * * * + + _Lord Tenterden to Lord Lyons._ + + Foreign Office, Nov. 25, 1875. + + Lord Derby is ill and at home. I am not sure therefore whether + he is writing to you to-night to tell you about the Suez Canal. + General Stanton telegraphed that Lesseps (supposed to be backed + by French Government) was offering four millions sterling (fr. + 100,000,000) for the Khedive's shares, but that the Khedive would + sell them to England for the same sum. Thereupon he was instructed + to offer this amount, and the Khedive accepted this morning. The + contract was signed to-day, as we have just heard by telegram. + Messrs. Rothschild advance the money on the security of the shares, + £1,000,000 in December, and the rest by instalments, the Khedive + to pay 5 per cent. on the shares while they remain without bearing + interest (the interest being hypothecated for the next twenty + years). + + Her Majesty's Government are to apply to Parliament to take + the bargain off the Rothschilds' hands. + + Practically, therefore, subject to Parliament's assent, Her + Majesty's Government have bought the shares. + + I am writing in the greatest hurry but the above is a correct + outline of the case. + + I suppose the French will make an ugly face. + + P.S. It has all been kept very secret so far, so pray be + supposed to be ignorant till Lord Derby tells you. + +The action of Her Majesty's Government was taken none too soon, for +as Lord Lyons reported, the shares very nearly fell into the hands of +the French. On November 26 the purchase of the shares was publicly +announced, and on the following day Lord Derby had an interview with the +French Ambassador on the subject. + + * * * * * + + _Lord Derby to Lord Lyons._ + + Foreign Office, Nov. 27, 1875. + + I have seen d'Harcourt. He came to hear what I could tell him + about the Suez affair, and I told him the whole story exactly as it + is. + + He says that there will be some soreness in France, and I am + afraid he is right. You know the facts, and I need not therefore + repeat them. The points which I dwelt on were these: + + We did not wish that the Khedive would sell, nor was there on + our part the slightest desire to alter the _status quo_. But we + could not help his selling, and as he had decided on doing so, we + took the only effectual steps to prevent the possibility of the + shares falling into hands whose possession of them might not be + favourable to our interests. The suddenness of the whole affair was + not our doing. If we had delayed, other purchasers would have come + forward. We had to take the opportunity as it offered itself or + lose it altogether. + + It is not in the power of the British Government to act + as Continental Governments can, through third parties--banks, + financial companies, and the like. What we do, we must do openly, + and in our own names, so that Parliament may judge of the whole + transaction. This I said in answer to a remark made by d'Harcourt, + that the act would have had less political significance if done + through some company, or otherwise, and not directly in the name of + the State. + + We hold even now a minority of the canal shares. The question + for us is not one of establishing an exclusive interest, but of + preventing an exclusive interest from being established as against + us. + + I have always expressed my opinion that the best arrangement + for all the world would be the placing of the Canal under an + International Commission, like that of the Danube; and I think so + still. I knew, I said, that the French Government were not prepared + to entertain any such idea, and I therefore did not put it forward; + but if France and other Governments altered their way of thinking, + I did not think any difficulties would be made by England. + + M. d'Harcourt expressed some fear, or at least thought that + some would be felt, lest the Khedive should be unable to pay his + promised £200,000 a year, and we in consequence should use some + means to coerce him, which would practically establish England in + authority in Egypt. I assured him that nothing was further from our + thoughts. We wanted the passage through Egypt as free for ourselves + as for the rest of the world, and we wanted nothing more. + +The purchase of the Suez Canal shares has always been surrounded +with much glamour and mystery, but in reality it seems to have been +a perfectly straightforward and business-like proceeding, to which +no reasonable objection could be taken. So far from being a profound +political _coup_ long calculated in advance, the action of Her +Majesty's Government was totally unpremeditated, and as far as Lord +Derby was concerned, it was undertaken with reluctance, and under the +conviction that England was making a bad bargain. So little confidence +did Lord Derby feel, and so averse was he from incurring any further +responsibility in Egypt, that he unhesitatingly declined a new +proposal of the Khedive that he should sell to the British Government +his contingent interest in the profits of the Suez Canal above five +per cent., and informed the French of the fact. The British public, +which warmly approved the transaction, seems to have been a better +judge of the Foreign Secretary's action than he was himself. The four +millions' worth of shares acquired by the British Government represented +nine-twentieths of the entire amount, and it is interesting to compare +these figures with the estimate put upon the value of the Canal by +Lesseps. On July 11, 1874, the latter called upon Lord Lyons and said +that two persons from England had sounded him about the sale of the +Canal; one a member of the English branch of the Rothschild family, and +the other a Baron Emile d'Erlanger, a well-known banker living in Paris. + + The Rothschild was no doubt Nathaniel,[15] M.P. for Aylesbury, + who was here in the beginning of June. Lesseps said that on being + pressed by him to state a sum, for which the Canal might be + purchased, he had said a milliard (£40,000,000) and he declared + that although this sum had startled even a Rothschild, it was only + a fair one. His object with me seemed to be to give the impression + that the shareholders would not sell the Canal for any sum.[16] + +Although the French could hardly be expected to approve of the action +of the British Government, which, if it had occurred some years earlier, +would have caused a storm of indignation, they were, under existing +circumstances, forced to accept it with tolerable equanimity, as it was +of no use to add a coolness with England to their other difficulties; +and, in addition, they gained a great deal by the rise which took place +in Canal shares and Egyptian securities. Lesseps professed himself to +be delighted and Bismarck sent a message to say that the policy adopted +by Her Majesty's Government had met with the support of the German +Government. + +FOOTNOTES: + +[Footnote 7: French Military Attaché at Berlin before the war of 1870.] + +[Footnote 8: French Ambassador at St. Petersburg.] + +[Footnote 9: Finance Minister.] + +[Footnote 10: Lord Lyons to Lord Granville, Jan. 16, 1874.] + +[Footnote 11: Blowitz.] + +[Footnote 12: British Minister at Brussels.] + +[Footnote 13: German Ambassador at London.] + +[Footnote 14: British Consul-General at Cairo.] + +[Footnote 15: Now Lord Rothschild.] + +[Footnote 16: Lord Lyons to Lord Derby, July 11, 1874.] + + + + +CHAPTER XII + +THE EASTERN QUESTION + +(1876-1878) + + +In January, 1876, the gradual spread of the insurrection in Turkey +led to the concoction by the three Imperial Powers of the so-called +'Andrassy Note,' and the great question was whether England would +consent to take part in its presentation, in view of her traditional +attitude towards Turkey. Lord Derby, in a letter to Lord Lyons, stated +that Bismarck was very anxious that we should do so, and explained that +although 'one can trust none of these Governments, it is as well to give +them credit for acting honestly until the reverse is proved,' and he was +therefore in favour of such a course himself. In a letter[17] addressed +to Mr. Disraeli, asking for his views on the subject, Lord Derby +remarked that: "It is too late to stand on the dignity and independence +of the Sultan; a Sovereign who can neither keep the peace at home, nor +pay his debts, must expect to submit to some disagreeable consequences." +Lord Lyons, on being consulted, concurred with Lord Derby's views. + + * * * * * + + _Lord Lyons to Lord Derby._ + + Paris, Jan. 14, 1876. + + I hardly see how England is to avoid supporting the Andrassy + Note. If we stand aloof we shall stand alone. If our secession + produces no effect and the Turks still accept, we shall be in + the same foolish position France was in 1840; with this serious + inconvenience, that if the Andrassy plan fails in pacifying the + Herzegovina, we shall be blamed for the failure, as having caused + it by breaking up the unanimity of Europe. If the Turks do not + accept, they will be ready enough to throw the responsibility upon + us, and to call upon us to get them out of the scrape into which + they will get with the other Powers. I think that by consenting we + should leave the Powers least excuse for attacking Turkey, or at + all events, least excuse for pushing on without consulting us. I + should not be for qualifying our support too much, for, if we do, + the failure of the plan, which is in my opinion more than probable, + will still be attributed to us, and a support, given as it were + against our will, and restricted to the least possible amount, will + be treated very much as opposition. I say all this because you ask + me to tell you what I think: but there are two important elements + for forming an opinion which I lack. I mean a knowledge of public + opinion in England, and a knowledge of the real feelings of the + three Empires towards each other. + + The despatch from Odo Russell looks as if Bismarck was + preparing for the possibility of a quarrel with Russia. Ever since + 1870 he has been very naturally trying to turn every opportunity + of dividing England from France to account. But since you joined + Russia in insisting upon peace last year, and still more since + the purchase of the Suez Canal shares, he has no doubt formed a + higher opinion of England, and conceived the idea that she still + has the will and the means to play a foremost part in European + politics. Like everybody else, he feels sure that if there is a + quarrel between Russia and Germany, France will side with Russia. + In order to prevent his enemy being all powerful at sea, he must + have the English fleet not merely neutral, but on his side. The + only advantage he can offer to England is support on the Eastern + Question, and it is on this question that he would have the best + chance of embroiling her with Russia. What part he means Austria to + play, I find it more difficult to guess. That he intends some day, + and by some means, to annex German Austria to the German Empire I + make no doubt, but I suppose he is in no hurry to add so large a + Roman Catholic and Southern population to the electors of the Diet + of the Empire. + + The worst service we could render France at present would + be to set up a separate understanding with her in opposition to + Germany. + +The French Government was desperately anxious that England should not +separate herself from the other Powers, partly from fear that such +action would cause European complications, and partly because it was +particularly desirous of getting credit with Russia for having brought +English opinion round to Russian views. Her Majesty's Government finally +decided to join in the Andrassy Note, although it would appear from Lord +Derby's language, that the Cabinet were not unanimous on the question. + +Meanwhile French internal politics remained in the same confused and +unsatisfactory state which had prevailed for so long. The divisions +amongst the Conservatives had made Monarchical Government in any form +impossible, and yet they refused to acquiesce, even temporarily, in the +moderate form of Republic which had been established, and seemed bent +upon doing all they could to exchange their King Log for a King Stork +in the shape of a Red Republic. The elections which took place in the +beginning of the year 1876 resulted in large Republican majorities both +in the Senate and in the Chamber, and in the case of the former, this +result was singularly unfortunate for Marshal MacMahon, as it deprived +him of the power of forcing a dissolution. A letter from Lord Lyons to +the Prince of Wales, who was on his way back from India, summarizes the +French internal situation. + + * * * * * + + Paris, March 7, 1876. + + I cannot give your Royal Highness a very satisfactory + account of French politics, although I do not take so gloomy a + view of them as many Frenchmen do. The large number of advanced + Republicans in the new Chamber of Deputies, the not inconsiderable + number of Ultra-Radicals, and the complete defeat of the Moderate + Conservatives in the Elections not unnaturally frighten the upper + classes of Frenchmen. But in fact so many of the members are quite + new men, that one cannot foresee how parties will group themselves. + The Chambers meet to-morrow, and in about a month's time it will + be possible to form an opinion as to how things are likely to go. + So long as Marshal MacMahon is at the head of the State and of the + army, there can be no fear of any serious disturbance of material + order; and if he is at the same time firm and conciliatory with the + new Chamber, and willing to take a Ministry from the more moderate + members of the majority, he will very probably be rewarded by + finding how tame demagogues can become in office. I understand the + Marshal insists upon having Ministers of War and Foreign Affairs + whom he knows and in whom he has confidence, but that he is willing + to let the other Departments be filled by men taken in the ordinary + way from the majority. + + So far we have not this year been disturbed, as we were + last spring, by rumours of war, and agriculture and commerce are + flourishing in France, and the revenue goes on increasing. + + Of the Egyptian Financial Question Your Royal Highness + will learn all particulars on the spot. Neither that, nor the + Herzegovina question are settled at this moment, but we must hope + that they are on the eve of being settled. + +One of the new features in the French political situation was the +recovery by Gambetta of his former influence, and as he was now a person +of considerable influence, Sheffield was utilized for the purpose of +eliciting his views. The late Mr. George Sheffield, who acted as Lord +Lyons's private secretary for over twenty years, was a well-known +figure in the political and social world of Paris, and included in +his acquaintance most people both there and in London who were worth +knowing. Not only did he enjoy much personal popularity, but as he was +known to be completely in Lord Lyons's confidence, he was the recipient +of much confidential information, and generally believed to be a model +of discretion. One of his peculiarities was that, in spite of much +practice, he spoke very imperfect French with an atrocious accent, but +this circumstance never appeared to prejudice him in any way, and it +may incidentally be noted that the possession of what is called a good +French accent is a much overrated accomplishment in France itself. +Frenchmen rarely wish to listen; they desire to talk themselves and +to be listened to; to them, as a rule, a foreigner is a foreigner and +nothing more, and whether he speaks French well or ill, they seldom +notice and rarely care. + +Gambetta, having secured a listener in the person of Sheffield, was no +doubt delighted to expound his views on the situation. First of all, +speaking on the subject of Bonapartist successes at the elections, he +said that Bonapartism would die out as soon as it was realized that a +moderate Republic was firmly established. He expressed great delight at +the fall of Thiers (Thiers had once described him as a _fou furieux_), +and said that under him no real self-acting Republic could ever have +been formed, that it would have fallen to pieces at his death, and +indeed that the best thing Thiers could do for the Republic would be to +die. For Marshal MacMahon's entourage he had a great dislike, but for +the Marshal himself much respect, and he aspired to be Prime Minister +under him--a post to which he considered that he was fully entitled, +but which the Décazes, Broglie, the Marshal's secretaries and the +Maréchale and her friends would do their best to prevent him obtaining. +He professed confidence in being able to keep the extreme Radicals in +order; said that the Red Flag was as obnoxious to him as the White Flag; +that he was not inclined to grant a general amnesty to the Communists, +and that he would not agree to the re-establishment of the National +Guard. He also professed himself to be in favour of Free Trade, and +asserted that the commercial Treaty concluded by Napoleon III. accounted +for many of the Bonapartist successes. + +Gambetta's aspiration of serving under the Marshal was never fulfilled, +the above-mentioned entourage being presumably too strong for him; but +the upper classes in France continued to look forward to the future +with undiminished apprehension. French capital, reversing the present +process, began to pour steadily into England, and it was stated that the +rich Radicals were not the last in sending their money abroad. + + 'Marshal MacMahon's position,' wrote Lord Lyons at the end + of March, 'does not improve. He has so little political knowledge + or ability that, as events have shown, he exercises little or no + personal influence in politics. There is also a jealousy springing + up with regard to Emmanuel d'Harcourt and other people about him + who are supposed to direct his political conduct. The officers + now at the head of the army would follow the Marshal very far in + any Conservative direction, but it may be questioned whether they + would submit patiently to being placed under a Radical Minister + of War--Gambetta for instance. It is the Marshal's political + intelligence that is doubted. No one has a word to say against his + disinterestedness, his honour, or his courage.' + +Marshal MacMahon, a simple and amiable soldier, who knew nothing about +politics, was credited with an overwhelming admiration for the capacity +of his private secretary, Emmanuel d'Harcourt. Upon one occasion, the +question of applying for the extradition of a criminal who had fled to +America was being discussed in his presence. 'Well,' said the Marshal, +'we must telegraph at once to San Francisco.' 'Pardon, M. le Maréchal,' +interposed d'Harcourt, 'Washington, not San Francisco, is the capital of +the United States.' The Marshal was so astounded at the profundity of +his private secretary's knowledge that he was only able to ejaculate: +'_Ce diable d'Harcourt! il sait tout!_' + +Many stories were told of his engaging simplicity of character, of +which the following will serve as an instance. Upon one occasion he was +inspecting a military academy, and was informed that there was present +a young Arab chieftain of distinguished lineage to whom it would be +desirable to address some words of encouragement. The young man was +brought up, whereupon the following brief colloquy ensued:-- + + Marshal: '_Ah! c'est vous qui êtes le nègre?_' + + Arab Chief: '_Oui, M. le Maréchal._' + + Marshal: '_Eh bien, mon garçon, continuez!_' + +By a curious combination of circumstances, Marshal MacMahon, with his +inadequate political and intellectual equipment, was still able for some +time to fill the place of a constitutional sovereign, and virtually the +French were living under a constitutional Monarchy, with an Executive +possessing large powers, rather than under a Republic. This state of +things, however, could not last for long, and it seemed as if the choice +lay between the youthful Prince Imperial and the establishment of a +really Radical Republic. + +In one respect the French had every reason to congratulate themselves, +namely, upon the re-organization of their army, and some of the +political consequences which were likely to result from this increased +and increasing military strength are pointed out in the following letter. + + * * * * * + + _Lord Lyons to Lord Derby._ + + Paris, Sept. 26, 1876. + + As soon as General Conolly finishes his visits to the Autumn + Manoeuvres and makes his reports, it may perhaps be desirable for + me to send you some observations on the political consequences of + the great progress the French Army is making. All the officers of + Foreign Armies and the English officers especially who have been + out with the French troops this autumn, seem to agree in regarding + the improvement as being undoubted and very considerable. In short, + it may not unreasonably be expected that in about three years from + this time, the French Army will be in such a state, that France + will count for as much or nearly as much, in the balance of power + in Europe, as she did before 1870. + + The different phases of public opinion since the peace of + 1871 may be described as follows. At first, rage and mortification + produced a wild and unreasoning cry for revenge. This was followed + by a depression almost amounting to despair. In this state of + things the rumours of an intended attack by Germany in 1875 + produced nearly a panic. Since that time hope and confidence have + gradually returned. The general sentiment now is that France is + safely 'biding her time.' + + Under the influence of this sentiment, the French acquiesce + patiently in the present apparent eclipse of French power; they + disapprove of any attempt on the part of the Government to put + itself prominently forward in European politics; they desire to + preserve peace and tranquillity in Europe at almost any price; they + wish to disarm suspicion, and to be allowed three or four years + more to recruit their strength. Their policy consequently is to + adjourn as far as possible all questions. + + Their ultimate object in all they do, is to recover their lost + Provinces; but however confident they may be of recovering in a + few years their old position in the world, I do not believe that + they contemplate, as the immediate result, an attack upon Germany. + I do not think that they at all foresee a time at which they could + run the risk of making such an attack singlehanded. What they do + intend, is to put forward with vigour their own views with regard + to the numerous questions they now leave more or less in abeyance, + and to contract if possible foreign alliances on equal terms. + + One of the questions with regard to which they will be + disposed to change their tone very considerably will be that of + Egypt. + + Another may possibly be that of the Newfoundland Fisheries, if + we do not succeed in effecting some sort of settlement of it in the + meantime. + + A third may be the extension of their possessions in Cochin + China, and of their protectorate of Annam. + + With regard to alliances, that which they will first seek + will no doubt be the alliance of Russia, and in a case of great + emergency, they would make great sacrifices of Western interests to + obtain it. + + They will desire to keep on good terms with England, so far + at all events as to avoid throwing her into the arms of Germany, + but as they are not likely to conceive hopes of obtaining effectual + assistance from England towards recovering Alsace and Lorraine, + they will not be so eager for an English as a Russian alliance. + + Another contingency to be kept in view is that a new President + or a new Dynasty, desirous of consolidating themselves by a little + military glory, may be led to direct an attack upon whatever + quarter it may be easiest to do so. + + I will not however go on with mere speculations of this kind. + Of the truth of the conclusions to which I have come, I entertain + very little doubt. In two or three years France will not be in the + same accommodating frame of mind in which she is now, and will + have very much more powerful means than she has now of enforcing + attention to her wishes. All questions therefore in which the + influence of France is hostile, should be settled as quickly as + possible. The restoration of the strength of France may be found + useful in redressing the balance of power, but, anyhow, it should + be taken into account in all political calculations. + +It was not long before these anticipations were justified, but for the +present, relations between England and France remained on a friendly +footing, no doubt much to Bismarck's displeasure, who, at this period, +was continually urging us to take Egypt and not to do anything else. +As a matter of fact, if we had seized Egypt in 1876, it would not have +had the immediate effect of embroiling us with France. On the contrary, +all those who had a pecuniary interest in Egypt thought that they would +gain by our taking possession of the county, while the great majority +of Frenchmen looked upon the thing as inevitable, and thought it better +to put a good face upon the matter. Any contradiction of the supposed +English designs upon Egypt, however sincere and positive, met with no +credence at all. + +There is an instructive extract on the subject, contained in a letter of +Lord Derby of December 6, 1876. + + It is evidently useless to say that we don't want Egypt and + don't intend to take it: we must leave our friends to be convinced + by the event. I have no doubt that everybody out of France would + be glad that we should seize the country. Russia would like it, as + making us an accomplice in her plans. Germany would like it still + more, as ensuring our being on uncomfortable terms with France + for some years to come. Italy would see in it a precedent and a + justification for seizing Tunis; Spain, the same, in regard to + Morocco. But you may be assured that we have no such designs and + are not going to run into adventures of this kind. + +There can be no possible doubt as to Lord Derby's sincerity; indeed, +he was so constitutionally averse from an adventurous foreign policy, +that a year or two later, Lord Salisbury said of his ex-colleague +that he could never have brought himself to annex the Isle of Man. It +is interesting to note that, in the above forecast of international +brigandage, Tunis and not Tripoli was allotted to Italy, the designs of +France in the former direction not apparently being suspected. + +Before the end of 1876 the experiment of trying to work the institutions +of a Constitutional Monarchy in France under an elective chief +magistrate had very nearly come to a deadlock. The Left were determined +to get real power into their hands and not to allow themselves to be +thwarted by the conservative tendencies of the Marshal and his personal +friends. On the one hand, the Marshal stoutly maintained that he would +have Ministers of his own choice in the Departments of War and Foreign +Affairs, whereas the Left, so long as they had a majority in the +Chamber of Deputies, were, under Constitutional Government, clearly +entitled to decide the matter. But the question was complicated, because +the Marshal, as well as the Ministers, was in a position to resort +to resignation of office, and a severe Ministerial crisis ensued. +Ultimately, the Marshal succeeded in keeping his Minister of War and +his Minister for Foreign Affairs, but he was forced to accept, as Prime +Minister, M. Jules Simon. The latter, although an able and conciliatory +man, had been a member of the Revolutionary Government of National +Defence, and having been forced to yield so far to his opponents, it +seemed not improbable that the Marshal before long would be obliged to +have recourse to Gambetta himself. Gambetta, as has been shown, had +lately become much more moderate in his views, but in the opinion of +many people he still represented the Red Spectre, and it was believed +that his assumption of office would mean Communism, Socialism, equal +division of property, judges appointed by election for short periods, +the prohibition of marriage, and the suppression of religion. The +desire of the Bonapartists was that the Government should fall into +the hands of the extreme Left, in the hope that the people, from fear +of the above contingencies, would clamour for the Empire; but what +was more remarkable was, that many Orleanists as well as moderate and +timid Conservatives wished to drive the Marshal to a dissolution in +the hope of a reaction. There could have been no better proof of their +short-sightedness and incapacity, for the mass of the electors were not +in the least likely to make fine distinctions, and if really afraid of +the Republic would certainly vote for nothing short of the Empire. + +The Conference which had assembled at Constantinople in the autumn in +the hope of settling the Eastern Question, with Lord Salisbury as one of +the British representatives, broke up in January, 1877, and it became +clear that war between Russia and Turkey was unavoidable. Lord Derby, +who was the reverse of sanguine by temperament, had never entertained +any hopes of its success, and was quite determined that, whatever +happened, there should be no British intervention. 'I am amused,' he +wrote to Lord Odo Russell,[18] 'by your description of the Russo-German +suspicions entertained against us; these fellows make us act as they +would act in our place. They can neither deal straightforwardly +themselves, nor give anybody else credit for doing so. + +'If you are asked what steps England is going to take next, your true +answer should be "none." We shall wait, say little, and pledge ourselves +to nothing.' + +The break up of the Conference filled the French with alarm. + + * * * * * + + _Lord Lyons to Lord Derby._ + + Paris, Feb. 5, 1877. + + It is believed here that Bismarck is determined to produce at + least such a scare as he did two years ago, if not to do more. The + idea provokes some anger, but more fear. Nevertheless, the danger + is greater now than it was last time; for although France is very + far from being ready for even a defensive war, she does feel so + much stronger than she did in 1875, as not to be willing to bear + quite as much from Germany as she would have borne then. + + The impressions prevalent here are: + + That Bismarck is very much disappointed by the result of the + Constantinople Conference, which he had hoped would have ended by + setting all Europe by the ears. + + That he is very much irritated by the cordiality which existed + between the English, French, and Russian Plenipotentiaries, and by + the considerable part taken by Chaudordy in the proceedings. + + That he is very much annoyed by the number of Socialist votes + given in the recent German elections, and is eager to destroy Paris + as the hotbed of socialism. + + That he wants a cry to make the Germans pay their taxes + willingly. + + That he looks with an evil eye upon the material prosperity of + France. + + That he considers the Exhibition of 1878 as a sort of defiance + of Germany, and is ready to go great lengths to prevent its taking + place. + + These are French views, not mine; but I do agree with the + conclusion which the greater and the wiser part of the French + nation draw from them: namely that it behoves France to be more + than ever prudent and cautious, and more than ever careful not to + give Germany any pretext for a quarrel. + + France is certainly not at all likely to oppose Russia in + anything that country may undertake in the East; but she is still + less likely to give her any military assistance there. She might + not be able to resist the bait, if Russia held it out, of an + offensive and defensive alliance against Germany, but in that + case she would more than ever want her own forces on this side of + Germany. This contingency, however, is too improbable to be worth + considering. + + It is quite true that France has a large force on her Eastern + Frontier, and that she is hard at work there, but considering the + difficulty of guarding that frontier, such as it has been left by + the Treaty of 1871, her objects may well be supposed to be purely + defensive. + + Lord Salisbury is to arrive this evening and to go on to + London without stopping. + +It is interesting to note that Lord Salisbury, while at Constantinople, +formed a very poor opinion of the capacity of Sultan Abdul Hamid--an +opinion which he must have had occasion to revise later on. 'Salisbury +reports ill of the new Sultan; calls him a poor weak creature, from whom +no help is to be expected. But his judgment is the result of a single +interview.' So wrote Lord Derby to Lord Odo Russell. + +The French representative, Chaudordy, had been very active; his zeal +had alarmed his own countrymen, and was supposed to have aroused +the indignation of Bismarck, but one of the singular features of +the Constantinople Conference seems to have been the action of the +representatives of the small Powers such as Spain, Belgium, and Holland, +who did their utmost, and not entirely without effect, to spirit the +Turks up to resistance. In March there was much coming and going at +Paris on the part of Ignatieff and Schouvaloff, who were thought to be +endeavouring to secure what Russia wanted without war, and the former +proceeded on a special mission to London, but the negotiations with the +Turks broke down, and war was declared before the end of April. Letters +from Lord Derby describing the state of feeling in England dwell upon +the action of Gladstone, who, according to Schouvaloff, 'was much more +Russian than the Russian Government,' and whose language was, 'only +suited to a Panslavonic Society.' + +The outbreak of the war between Russia and Turkey was extremely +distasteful to the French for various reasons. They were convinced that +it had been instigated by Bismarck, and that it would result in the +overwhelming preponderance of Germany on the continent, and were equally +convinced that it would lead to a great extension of English influence +in the Mediterranean including an occupation of Egypt; consequently, +Décazes, who was anything but a straightforward politician, and anxious +beyond everything to hunt with the Russian hounds, and run with the +English hare, was constantly expressing fears that if an English +force was sent to the East, the opportunity would at once be seized +by Bismarck for falling upon France. A congenial opportunity for this +intriguer arose over the question whether Egypt should be called upon to +render pecuniary and military assistance to Turkey, and an unsuccessful +attempt was made to persuade the Khedive that if he refused to comply, +he would be protected. By these means Décazes would have secured the +treble advantage of making himself agreeable to Russia, of pleasing the +French bondholders, and, to a certain degree, of thwarting England in +Egypt. Unluckily for him, the scheme miscarried; but in spite of ardent +professions of neutrality, he contrived to render services to Russia +which were of some considerable service. + +He used his influence to obtain a loan for her in Paris; his agents in +Egypt supported the Russian threats to blockade the Suez Canal, and +the effect of the Franco-Russian understanding was to force Germany to +make greater sacrifices in order to retain the friendship of Russia by +furthering Russian policy in the East. One of the methods by which the +Germans sought to ingratiate themselves with Russia took the remarkable +form of insisting (as the British Ambassador at Constantinople pointed +out) that Russian subjects who remained in Turkey during the war, should +not only be entitled to remain there undisturbed, but permitted to enjoy +all the privileges of the capitulations, this being apparently the +German conception of neutrality. + +The double game which Décazes was playing was not, however, popular in +France. It was felt that his intrigues with Russia tended to throw +England into the arms of Germany, and his enemies asserted that he +was too fond of speculation to be a thoroughly satisfactory Minister. +However, an internal political crisis of an exceptionally important +nature in May diverted French attention from all foreign questions for +the time being. + + * * * * * + + _Lord Lyons to Lord Derby._ + + Paris, May 16, 1877. + + The Marshal has been getting more and more uncomfortable about + M. Jules Simon's giving way in the Chamber of Deputies to the more + advanced Left, and now, as you will have learnt from my telegrams, + he has turned him out. It is believed that if matters came to + extremities, the Marshal will bring out a thoroughly reactionary + Ministry which he has _in petto_. The Duc de Broglie, Prime + Minister, General Ducrot, Minister of War, and so on. This would + necessitate a dissolution, for which the consent of the Senate + would be necessary. But it is very doubtful whether the country is + ripe for anything of the kind, and whether the result might not be + the return of a still more radical Chamber than the present; and + then either the Marshal must retire and hand the Government over to + Gambetta or some one still more advanced in opinion, or make a real + _coup d'état_ by means of the army. + + However he will no doubt try to form a Ministry rather more + Conservative than the last and still able to get on somehow with + the present Chamber of Deputies; but this will be difficult. + + One of the Marshal's grounds of dissatisfaction with M. Jules + Simon was that he would not, or could not, get from the Chamber + powers which would enable the Government to restrain the press from + attacking Germany in the dangerous manner in which it has written + against that country lately. + +The action of the Marshal in turning out Jules Simon, who was supported +by a majority in a recently elected Chamber, and replacing him by the +Duc de Broglie, who was extremely unpopular, might well be described +as a very strong measure. Décazes, who was supposed to be in the plot, +remained in office, and there was therefore not much probability of a +change in foreign policy; but it was evident that there were now only +two real parties in France--the Republicans and the Bonapartists. The +possible restoration of the Empire filled with dismay Lord Derby, who +considered that the last six years had witnessed a great purification +both of public and private life in France, and that if the French were +going back to a 'Government of adventurers, adventuresses, and priests,' +it would be a grave misfortune for Europe; and he was most anxious to +let it be known that there was no sympathy in England for Bonapartist +intrigues. + + * * * * * + + _Lord Lyons to Lord Derby._ + + Paris, May 18, 1877. + + There are of course among the Right, many who, wisely or + unwisely, rejoice that Marshal MacMahon has broken with the Left, + but there is hardly any one who does not think the moment ill + chosen, the reasons assigned insufficient, and the mode adopted + unskilful. Décazes is represented, or misrepresented, as having + been at the bottom of the whole thing. + + He came up to me last night, and asked if I had not something + to say to him about the sentiments he had expressed to me with + regard to the dangers to English interests in Western Europe. He + also expressed anxiety to know how the question of the wine duties + was getting on in England. He is, I suppose, anxious to have + something to show that he is successful in cultivating intimate + relations with England. + + While he seems so desirous of frightening us about Holland, + he shows no inclination to admit that we have any interests at + all in the East. In fact his plan seems to be to involve us in a + quarrel with Germany, while he keeps safely aloof: to curry favour + with Russia by taking to himself the credit of keeping our forces + out of the East; to prevent any increase of our power in the + Mediterranean, and to be well with us, but, if possible, better + still with Russia. Still, on the whole, I am glad he remains in. + I should not have been sorry to have Broglie himself as Minister + for Foreign Affairs, but we might have a much more embarrassing + Minister than Décazes, and he is easy going and conciliatory in + most matters. Only we must not be surprised if he repeats to + Russia, and Russia repeats to Germany, anything likely to impair + our relations with Germany. + + The other Ministers would almost seem to have been chosen + for the express purpose of defying the majority of the Chamber. + Broglie, of whom I have a high opinion, is especially unpopular. + I suppose the notion has been to put as far as possible + representatives of all shades of the Right into the Cabinet, in + order to be able to form a coalition strong enough to obtain a vote + in the Senate for dissolution. It is not certain that such a vote + could be carried, the Conservative majority in the Senate being + only 2 or 3 on ordinary occasions. + +Décazes took advantage of the occasion actually to suggest a secret +alliance with England for the protection of Holland and Belgium, and +stated that if it were ever signed, he should communicate to no single +person except the Marshal himself. It is hardly credible that he could +have been in earnest in making this suggestion, for not only are Foreign +Secretaries not in the habit of making secret treaties unknown to their +chiefs and colleagues, but Lord Derby was the last person who would be +likely to enter into an enterprise of this description. In the meanwhile +Bismarck, as an impartial friend, was warning Lord Odo Russell that +Décazes was only waiting for an opportunity to throw England over, in +order to prove his devotion to Russia, and there was little doubt as to +which alliance he would prefer if he could have his choice. + +Exercising his right, Marshal MacMahon prorogued the Chambers, and it +being foreseen that there would be a general election in the autumn, his +Government set to work at once in preparing for the fight by getting +rid of as many Republican functionaries as possible, in accordance with +well-established custom. + + * * * * * + + _Lord Lyons to Lord Derby._ + + Paris, May 25, 1877. + + Neither the private history of the dismissal of Jules Simon, + nor the attitude of the successful party, is calculated to give one + good hope for the future. + + The Marshal is supposed to have been mainly influenced by M. + de St. Paul, a Bonapartist and intimate friend of his, of whom + he sees a great deal; by Monsignor Dupanloup, Bishop of Orleans; + by the aides-de-camp and people about him, and (it is whispered) + by Madame la Maréchale. Fourtou may have been in the plot, but I + believe Broglie was taken by surprise. Décazes wanted to get rid + of Jules Simon and Martel, but to put temporarily in their places + some members of the Left, who would have got on for a time with + the Chamber. Jules Simon had proved a complete failure as Prime + Minister; he had neither the confidence of the Marshal nor even + that of the Cabinet, and he had lost all influence in the Chamber. + He would very soon have fallen of himself if he had been left alone. + + The language of the Right tends to accredit the supposition + which will be most fatal to them in the country. They speak and + act as if the question was one between the aristocracy and the + canaille. In fact they wound the sentiment of equality which is + the strongest political and social sentiment in France, and + consequently the present crisis is beginning to be looked upon as + the last struggle of the old society against the new. + + As regards the great question as to what is to be done when + the Marshal finds himself finally defeated by the Chamber, the + party now triumphant talk of the use of military force. The Marshal + has often declared to his friends that nothing shall induce him to + resort to an extralegal use of force, but the wilder spirits of the + party say that if the Marshal will not use the army, a general will + be found with less scruple, and they hint at Ducrot. But this would + be falling into the most fatal of all systems, that of military + _pronunciamentos_. The Marshal himself might do a great deal with + the army, and would probably keep it together, but it does not + by any means follow that any one general seizing power in Paris + would be submitted to by the rest. It is believed that even now, + General Berthaut, the Minister of War, was with difficulty induced + to remain in office, and yielded only to the Marshal's special + request, on condition that he should be relieved in the autumn. + + It is however to be hoped that all this talk about military + _coups d'état_ is simply talk; and that we shall get out of this + difficulty quietly at last. In the meantime the upper ten thousand + in Paris are indulging themselves in all sorts of illusions, and + the Paris shopkeepers are dreaming of the restoration of a Court + and of a great expenditure on luxuries. + +The Chambers met again in June, and although the country was perfectly +quiet, the scenes which took place in the Chamber of Deputies were a +sufficient indication of the fury with which the politicians regarded +each other. The violent and disorderly conduct was chiefly on the side +of the Right, there being a certain number of Bonapartists who provoked +disturbances with the object of discrediting Parliamentary Government as +much as possible. + +On the other hand even the moderate men on the Left began to talk +of revolutionary measures to be adopted when they got back into +power again, such as the suspension of the irremovability of judges, +the impeachment of Ministers, and the dissolution of religious +congregations. On June 22, the dissolution was voted by the Senate +by a majority of twenty. It was decided that the elections should be +held in three months' time, and both parties made their preparations +for an uncompromising fight, Marshal MacMahon beginning the campaign +with an order of the day to the army which smacked disagreeably of a +_coup d'état_, not to say a _pronunciamento_. Subsequently, having been +assured of the support of the Comte de Chambord--a somewhat questionable +advantage--he proceeded on an electoral tour in the South. + +The general election took place in October, and resulted in the crushing +defeat of the Marshal and his Ministers in spite of the labours of +prefects, magistrates, mayors, policemen, and priests, who had all been +temporarily converted into electioneering agents. The exasperation of +parties reached an almost unprecedented point, and Décazes admitted +that the country was in a state of moral civil war. The partisans of +the Government talked of a second dissolution, of proclaiming a state +of siege during the new elections and conducting them with even more +administrative vigour than the last. The Republicans announced their +determination to annul the elections of all the official candidates and +to impeach the Ministers and even the Marshal himself, if he did not +retire or name a Ministry having their confidence. As for the Marshal +himself, he found little support at this crisis from the monarchical +parties, except on the part of the Orleanists, who saw that he must +be kept in at all hazards; but the Orleanists had recognized that +France, for the moment at least, was Republican, and their press owned +openly that to persist in Personal Government instead of reverting to +Constitutional Government was to march to certain disaster. The Marshal, +in fact, found himself confronted with two alternatives: either he must +accept Gambetta's demand to submit or resign; or he must run the risk of +getting rid of his difficulties by means of a _coup d'état_. + + * * * * * + + _Lord Lyons to Lord Derby._ + + Paris, Oct. 26, 1877. + + The prospect does not grow clearer, though I see, or at all + events like to fancy I see, a cooling down of the fury which + prevailed a week ago. + + The Marshal is supposed to be a man of one idea, and his one + idea at the present moment is said to be that he is bound to remain + at his post. + + This idea might lead him to name a Ministry from the majority, + but then he would have to dismiss all the Fourtou prefects, whom he + solemnly promised to stand by. + + On the other hand, the idea might carry him on to a _coup + d'état_. + + The plan devised by his opponents, and indeed by some of his + friends, for getting him out of the scrape, is that the Senate + should refuse to support him in extreme measures, and that he + should then declare (which would indeed be true) that he had never + promised to stay in opposition to both branches of the Legislature. + + Communications which have been going on between the Elysée + and the Duc d'Audiffret Pasquier, the President of the Senate, are + said to have shown that the Senate cannot be depended upon either + to vote a second dissolution, or to carry on the Government in + conjunction with the Marshal, and without the Chamber of Deputies. + + I register as rumours, strongly requiring confirmation, that + the Marshal has summoned the Chasseurs d'Afrique to reinforce the + garrison of Paris; that in consequence of disagreements between + Grévy and Gambetta, the Republicans offer the Presidency of the + Republic to General Chanzy, the Governor-General of Algeria; that + the more moderate Liberals have hopes of bringing in the Duc + d'Aumale as President, if MacMahon should actually retire. + + As the population is disarmed and there is no National Guard, + there can be no need to increase the numbers of the garrison of + Paris. If any fresh troops were really brought up, it would be from + mistrust of the spirit of those already here. + + Gambetta must have departed very far from his usual political + tact, if he has set up claims in opposition to Grévy. Grévy would + be quite alarming enough, and to establish the doctrine that the + President must be a general would bring France to the level of a + South American Republic. + + It would be a curious result of an election, in which the + Orleans or Right Centre Party has met with a signal defeat, that an + Orleans Prince should be placed at the head of the State. + +The proper course for the Marshal to have adopted was to have accepted +the position of a Constitutional President; to have appointed a +Ministry which would have obtained a majority in the Chamber; and to +have restrained it from excesses by the exercise of his legitimate +authority, and by means of the power of the Senate. Instead of this, +however, he first attempted to form a Ministry of the same colour as +the old one; then tried to meet the Chamber with his old Ministers, and +finally fell back upon perfectly unknown people who carried no weight +at all, and who professed to represent no party. To this Ministry the +Chamber refused to pay any attention, and after many threats in the +Elysée organs to violate all laws; to collect and spend money without +the sanction of Parliament, to suppress newspapers, and to proclaim +a state of siege, the Marshal surrendered ignominiously in December, +and accepted a Ministry in which M. Dufaure was President of the +Council, and M. Waddington, Minister for Foreign Affairs. Thus, what +should have been a natural and proper consequence of the elections was +converted into an humiliating defeat, and there had been such a series +of solemn declarations, none of them adhered to, that all confidence +in the Marshal had disappeared. Of the more important members of the +new Government, M. Dufaure was a lawyer with Conservative leanings. M. +Waddington, who had been educated at Rugby and Cambridge, was intimate +with Lord Lyons and the Embassy generally, but it was doubtful whether +his connection with England would prove an advantage, as he might +find it necessary to demonstrate that he was not too English. M. Léon +Say, the Minister of Finance, was supposed to be a Free Trader; and +M. de Freycinet, who was destined to take part in many subsequent +administrations, had been Gambetta's Under-Secretary of State for War, +and was looked upon as Gambetta's representative in the Cabinet. + +On December 17, MacMahon gave Lord Lyons his version of the history of +the crisis. + + * * * * * + + _Lord Lyons to Lord Derby._ + + Dec. 18, 1877. + + I went to the weekly evening party at the Elysée last + Saturday. The Marshal took me aside, saying: 'I want to tell you + why I did it.' He proceeded to tell me that he had been led to + remain in office and make a Parliamentary Ministry, by a warning he + had received from abroad that if he retired, or if he established + a clerical Ministry, war would be the inevitable consequence. + + So far the Marshal: what follows may be mere gossip. + + On the afternoon of December 12, the Marshal had quite + determined _d'aller jusqu'au bout_; either to obtain from the + Senate a dissolution of the Chamber of Deputies, or to give in his + resignation. He was in consultation with General Rochebouet, who + was at the time Prime Minister, about drawing up a message in this + sense, when a letter was brought in, the bearer of which sent in + a message begging that the Marshal would receive him at once. The + letter was either written by the German Emperor, or at all events + it convinced the Marshal that the bearer was sent to give him a + message direct from His Imperial Majesty. The Marshal accordingly + received him alone, and he said he was a Prussian officer who had + been sent by the Emperor to entreat the Marshal to remain at the + head of the Republic, at all risks, and on any conditions; and + not to establish a Government which could be represented as being + clerical. The message is said to have represented that the Emperor + himself was most anxious for peace, but that he should not be able + to restrain 'other people,' if a clerical or a radical Government + were allowed to be established in France. + + This sounds so like gossip that I should hardly have thought + it worth while to repeat it, if it had not tallied rather curiously + with the statement the Marshal himself volunteered to make to me + about his motives. + + The 'other people' are supposed to be neither more nor + less than one other person--Prince Bismarck--and the message is + represented as having been sent by the Emperor William without the + knowledge of the Chancellor, or of the German Ambassador here. + + Prince Bismarck's enemies, and they are of course numerous + enough here, like to argue from appearances that he has quite lost + the confidence of the Emperor, and some of them, who profess to + have peculiar means of obtaining information, say that he made + three conditions with the Emperor, as those on which alone he could + continue to serve him. 1st, that he should have _carte blanche_ in + the Government; 2nd, that the Empress should reside at Coblentz + or Baden rather than at Berlin; and 3rd, that certain people, of + whom he gave a list, should be removed from Court. As a natural + consequence, Bismarck's illness is attributed to his not having + obtained the consent of his Imperial Master to his conditions; and + it is said that he will not recover until his terms are complied + with. This story of the conditions appears to me to be a very + outrageous one, and I am quite unable to say whether there is any + admixture of truth in it. Those who recount it, love to draw from + it prognostications of the fall of the Great Chancellor. + +Whether the story of the Marshal's mysterious visitor was true or not, +his defeat marked a decisive epoch in French internal politics; the +Republic was now firmly established and cannot be said to have been in +any dangers since, unless the vagaries of the impostor Boulanger be +excepted. + +Ever since the beginning of the war between Russia and Turkey, Lord +Derby had continually asserted that it was practically no concern +of ours, and that he was quite determined not to be drawn into any +intervention whatsoever. But as the Turkish resistance collapsed, and +as it became more and more evident that there was nothing to prevent +the Russians from exacting any terms they chose, unless some form of +intervention took place, Her Majesty's Government decided to call +Parliament together. Lord Derby was anxious to explain that this action +had no sinister significance. + + * * * * * + + _Lord Derby to Lord Lyons._ + + Dec. 21, 1877. + + You are not unlikely to be asked the meaning of Parliament + being called together earlier than usual. The explanation is + simple. We see a growing excitement on the question of the war; we + are menaced by an agitation friendly but troublesome, having for + object to drive us into war, and with a counter movement on the + other side. We think that much useless talk will be stopped; the + real opinion of the country be tested, and the Ministry relieved + from the annoyance of perpetual criticism which it cannot reply + to, if every peer and M.P. can say what he has got to say at + Westminster, rather than at a county dinner or borough meeting. + + Those who have confidence in us will not be sorry to hear our + views explained by ourselves; those who have not, will have no + further opportunity of talking mysteriously about the country being + committed to this, that, or the other, without Parliament having a + voice in the matter. For it is clear that if we meant to act on our + own responsibility, and leave Parliament no choice except to ratify + or to condemn what we had done, we should not shorten by one-half + the interval that remains during which only such action is possible. + + It is possible that there may be in France some renewal of + suspicions as to English designs on Egypt. If so, you may dispel + them by the most decided language you can use. We want nothing and + will take nothing from Egypt except what we have already, and what + other Powers share equally with us. We shall continue to work in + harmony with the French, and hope and expect the same from them. + +Lord Derby was the most cautious and unenterprising of men, and he +already perhaps felt some suspicions as to the soundness of his +colleagues in the Cabinet; but the assurance to be given to the French +Government with regard to Egypt seems, on the face of it, somewhat +gratuitous, if not rash. The situation in Turkey might have resulted in +our being forced to go to Egypt at short notice, and only five years +later he, Lord Derby, found himself a member of a Liberal Government +which had been forced to adopt that very course. + +When the British Parliament met in January, the war was already +practically ended, and the commissioners were treating for an armistice +and for the preliminaries of peace. The Queen's Speech announced that +although neither the Russians nor the Turks had infringed the conditions +on which the neutrality of England depended, it might be necessary +to ask for money and to take precautions, and on January 23, the +Mediterranean fleet was ordered to pass the Dardanelles and to proceed +to Constantinople. This action brought about the resignation of both +Lord Derby and Lord Carnarvon, but upon the countermanding of the order +to the fleet, Lord Derby resumed office. On January 28, the basis of the +peace negotiations having been communicated, the Government asked for +a vote of six millions, and in consequence of alarming intelligence, +received from Mr. Layard the British Ambassador at Constantinople, the +fleet was again ordered definitely to proceed to that city. Political +excitement reached its climax, and light-hearted Jingoes, quite +incapable of realizing the inadequacy of British military resources, +proclaimed their readiness to fight any possible adversary. + +If it eventually became necessary for England to take active steps to +secure her interests in the East, it was quite clear that no assistance +whatever could be expected from France. M. Waddington took an early +opportunity to assure Lord Lyons most emphatically that France wanted +nothing for herself, and that she desired no acquisition of territory +either in the Mediterranean or elsewhere; but whilst he disclaimed any +desire of this nature, he showed in a most unmistakeable manner that +an occupation of Egypt by England would create a bitter feeling in +France which would long impair the friendly relations between the two +countries. Speaking most confidentially, M. Waddington said that it was +all important to France that England and Russia should not be involved +in hostilities, and that France should not be left _tête-à-tête_ with +Prince Bismarck, whether the latter played the part of an enemy or a +tempter. In fact, the French Government, like its predecessor, was +disquieted by a notion that Bismarck intended to propose to France +some arrangement respecting Belgium and Holland, which would dismember +those States, assigning of course to Germany the lion's share of the +spoils, and it seemed to be apprehended that France would be called +upon to choose between acquiescing in such an arrangement or incurring +the active enmity of Germany. The fear of the French that they might +become involved was so strong that Waddington was alarmed even at the +idea of committing his Government to the British declaration as to +the invalidity of treaties concluded without the participation of the +Powers; but, in spite of this timorous spirit, and although the Treaty +of San Stefano was not signed until March 3, Lord Derby informed Lord +Lyons on February 2, that, the support of Austria having been obtained, +Her Majesty's Government were determined to secure a Conference, and +it was hoped that Italy and France would also exercise at least a +benevolent neutrality. The uncertainty of the position was shown in Lord +Derby's language with regard to Constantinople. 'I hardly know what will +happen if the Russians insist on showing themselves at Constantinople. +It is not a case we could make a _casus belli_ of, but I think it would +in that case be desirable that the Neutral Powers should be present +too--that is their fleets--both as a demonstration, and to keep order +if necessary. The war being over, such a proceeding could not be +misconstrued, as it certainly would have been before. All this, however, +is uncertain.' + +Judging by subsequent experiences, Lord Derby would have spent a +long time in securing the presence of the International fleets at +Constantinople, and would have experienced still more trouble in +persuading them to take any action. The Russians fortunately stopped +short of Constantinople, and a Conference being now a practical +certainty, Lord Lyons was invited to act as the British representative. + + * * * * * + + _Lord Derby to Lord Lyons._ + + February 6, 1878. + + The Conference will probably come off, and it may come off + soon, though there is a chance of delay from differences as to the + place of meeting. + + I find the feeling of the Cabinet unanimous, and I fully share + it, that you are the fittest person to attend the Conference on + our behalf. Indeed, I know of no one in whom I should have equal + confidence for a duty of that kind. Nothing has been said to the + Queen, but I have no doubt of Her Majesty's consent. + + May I ask you if, considering the importance and difficulty + of the work, you will be prepared to sacrifice your personal + convenience so far as to accept the office if offered? I fear the + sacrifice will be considerable, but let up hope that the result + will repay your trouble. + +To most people, an invitation of this character, conveyed in so +flattering a manner, would have had an irresistible attraction; but Lord +Lyons was one of those persons to whom notoriety was indifferent, if not +obnoxious, and who much preferred to confine himself to doing his own +business in a practical and unostentatious spirit. He, however, felt it +his duty to accept, hoping vainly all the time that the Conference would +never take place at all. + + * * * * * + + _Lord Lyons to Lord Derby._ + + Paris, Feb. 8, 1878. + + I wish to offer you my best thanks for your letter of the day + before yesterday. Your proposal to appoint me to represent England + at the Conference is very flattering in itself, and nothing could + be more gratifying than the terms in which it is made. + + You were so kind as to speak of the sacrifice of my personal + convenience, but that consideration I will set entirely aside. + There are feelings of much greater weight which make me shrink from + the task, and it appears to me to be a task peculiarly difficult, + and one of which the result is, to say the least, extremely + doubtful. I may say, too, without any affectation of modesty, that + I do not think myself well qualified for it. + + Still these are after all personal considerations which I + ought not to allow to interfere with any public duty which I may be + called upon to discharge. If therefore the Queen and the Government + should determine upon entrusting this mission to me, I should + undertake it heartily and zealously, and do my best to justify + their confidence. + + Of course nothing can be settled until we know the rank and + number of the Plenipotentiaries of other Powers, the place of + meeting, and other particulars, which may have a material influence + in the selection of the Representative or Representatives of Her + Majesty. + + If however the progress of events should ultimately lead to my + being chosen, I should be very grateful if you would allow me the + opportunity of conferring with you upon various matters, before any + definite arrangements are made. There is one to which I attach so + much importance that I will mention it at once. I trust that you + will allow me to choose myself the staff to accompany me on the + occasion. My efficiency and comfort would depend mainly on this. + +Apart from a disinclination to leave his own work, Lord Lyons probably +considered that the outlook for England at a Conference was by no +means reassuring. The issue of the Conference really depended upon the +military position in which England and Austria would apparently stand, +should the Conference itself break up _rê infectâ_, and at the end of +February the English position looked to be none too favourable, for +it depended upon the fleet having access to the Black Sea. If we were +able to stop the Russian communications by sea, the Russians would be +at the mercy of Austria by land, supposing Andrassy's boasts to be +well founded; but we had no absolute security against the Russians +occupying Gallipoli at any moment, and no semblance of a security of +their not occupying the Black Sea exit of the Bosphorus, for the Turks +were at their mercy, and, as pointed out by Mr. Layard, they were quite +capable of making any arrangement with Russia, since they considered +that they had been betrayed and abandoned by England. Neither, it might +be added, was there any security that Austria would stand firm, for +there was always the chance of her being bought off with Bosnia and the +Herzegovina. + + * * * * * + + _Lord Lyons to Lord Derby._ + + Paris, Feb. 26, 1878. + + As to the Conference itself all seems more than ever in doubt. + Unless the Austrians are determined to go to war and are visibly + ready, and unless we are equally determined and equally ready on + our side, and unless the Russians are convinced of this, there can + be no chance of their making any concessions. Then, what will the + Austrians want? To bolster up the Turks, to waste energy in trying + to place under them again this or that district delivered by the + Russians, would be a very losing game. There must, I suppose, + be some new Principality or Principalities. If anything like a + national feeling and a national Government can be established in + them, their danger will be from Russia, and Russia will become + their natural enemy, unless they are thrown into her arms by a + hostility on the part of Austria, which will make them feel that + Russia alone is their defence against Turkey. Then there are the + Straits, and the difficulty of placing the Turks, or whoever is + to hold them, in a position to guard them against a Russian _coup + de main_ at least. Ignatieff seems to be already working the + connection between Egypt and the Porte, with a view to getting + money out of Egypt for Russia. I am inclined to think that the more + radically Egypt is severed from the Porte, and the less our free + action with regard to it is hampered by collective guarantees or + collective Protectorates the safer we shall be. + +The correctness of these views has since been amply demonstrated by the +history of the Balkan States. The opinion about Egypt, however, was +probably not at all to the taste of Lord Derby, who appeared to rejoice +in divided responsibility. + +Lord Lyons himself was summoned to London early in March in order to +confer with the Government respecting his procedure at Berlin, and +judging from his letters to various correspondents, the course which Her +Majesty's Government proposed to adopt was in a state of considerable +uncertainty. It was, however, a source of much satisfaction to him that +he would have the co-operation of Lord Odo Russell, who was an intimate +friend, and in whose judgment he felt complete confidence. He also got +his way about his staff, which was to include amongst others, Malet, +Sheffield, and Mr. (now Sir William) Barrington. + + * * * * * + + _Lord Lyons to Lord Odo Russell._ + + London, March 13, 1878. + + My only comfort about this awful Congress or Conference is + that you will be my partner in it. I hope, if it does come off + after all, that we may get over it without doing harm to our + country or to ourselves. I wanted them to set me aside and take + advantage of the transfer to Berlin to put it into your hands; + and I still think this would be the best plan; but they say that + after their announcement of my appointment to Parliament, they + cannot cancel it. Sir Robert Peel has moved a resolution that I am + not a fit person to represent England at the Conference. I shall + console myself if he carries it. He grounds his motion upon 'my + well-known opinions.' I suppose he takes my opinions from a wholly + unauthorized and incorrect account of them which appeared in a + letter in the _Daily Telegraph_ yesterday. Some people suppose he + wrote the letter himself in order to have a peg to hang his motion + on. I don't think your difficulties at the Conference will arise + from strong preconceived opinions of mine. I shall try and get our + instructions made as precise as possible. Could you give me some + hints as to the particular points which should be decided before we + begin? You will know how far certain solutions in our sense will be + feasible or not. It is worse than useless that we should be told to + aim at impossibilities, and have to yield: though there may be of + course conditions, which if not admitted, will render it necessary + for us to retire from the Conference altogether. + + I am sure you will be the greatest help and comfort to me, and + I hope I may be a help to you. Please tell me anything you wish me + to do or say here. + +Lord Odo Russell appears to have been equally in the dark as to the +intended policy of Her Majesty's Government. + + * * * * * + + _Lord Odo Russell to Lord Lyons._ + + Berlin, March 16, 1878. + + The feelings you express concerning the Conference are so + entirely my own that I need say no more, and only hope that Lord + Derby will give you a better qualified assistant than I can be with + regard to Oriental Affairs, of which I do not really know enough to + be of any use to you or to the country, beside such authorities as + Ignatieff, Lobanoff, Calice, Radowitz, Busch, etc., etc. + + You ask if I could give you some hints as to the particular + points which should be decided before you begin. + + I would do so with the greatest pleasure, if I only knew what + the policy of Her Majesty's Government is likely to be in Congress. + All I know about it at present is contained in Lord Derby's + despatch of May 6, and as far as Constantinople and the Straits are + concerned, I fancy Russia will be conciliatory. + + You ask further how far certain solutions in our sense will be + feasible or not. + + I wish I could answer your question, but can only beg of + you to tell me first whether we accept the consequences of our + neutrality, or whether we contest them: whether we are going + to reject the Turko-Russian Treaty, as we rejected the Berlin + Memorandum, or whether we are going to accept now what we refused + then. + + Russia is now in possession of Turkey. Germany supports Russia. + + France and Italy have no wish to quarrel with Russia or + Germany, and will not offer any serious opposition to the + Turko-Russian Treaty. + + Austria may object to two things: the proposed limits of + Bulgaria, and the prolonged occupation of Russian troops. + + If Russia is well disposed, she will consent to a smaller + Bulgaria and to a shorter occupation. + + If she doesn't, Austria must choose between a diplomatic + defeat, a compromise, or war to turn Russia out of Bulgaria. + Bismarck will exert all his personal influence in favour of a + compromise to keep the three Emperors' Alliance together before + Europe in Conference assembled. + + The annexation of Armenia and the war indemnity are questions + which Russia will scarcely consent to submit to the Congress at all. + + What then is our attitude to be? Please let me know as soon as + you can, and I will do my best to answer your questions. + + If we go in for Greek interests we shall have the cordial + support of Germany and Austria, I think--but Greek interests are + in direct opposition to Turkish interests, if I am not greatly + mistaken. + + On hearing of your appointment I wrote to you to congratulate + myself and to beg of you to grant us the happiness of taking up + your quarters at the Embassy, and also to advise you to bring a + numerous and efficient staff, as I have not hands enough at Berlin + for an emergency. + +The letters of Lord Odo Russell at this period show that he was +completely in the dark as to the intentions of Her Majesty's Government, +and that he was quite unable to get any answer as to what was to be +their policy with regard to the Treaty of San Stefano. He himself was +convinced that the three Empires had already settled what the result of +the Congress was to be, and that they simply intended to communicate it +to Greece, Roumania, and other Powers for whom they wished to manifest +their contempt, such as France and England, _à prendre ou à laisser_. +Under these circumstances, it became doubtful whether it was worth +while for England to go into a Conference at all and court unnecessary +humiliation, serious as the responsibility would be if such a course +were decided upon. + +There can be no doubt that much of the prevailing uncertainty was due to +Lord Derby, who with great difficulty had contrived to keep pace with +his more enterprising colleagues, and whose over-cautious temperament +had prevented the adoption of any really definite policy. But Lord +Derby, unable to stand the shock of seeing a few thousand Indian troops +sent to the Mediterranean, resigned office on March 28, and the advent +of Lord Salisbury at the Foreign Office marked a new departure in +British Foreign Policy. + +Lord Salisbury's circular of April 1, 1878, was intended to show that +the Treaty of San Stefano threatened the interests of Europe, and +that the whole, and not parts of it, as proposed by Russia, should be +submitted to the Congress. It pointed out that the creation of a big +Bulgaria, stretching over the greater part of the Balkan Peninsula, +and with ports on the Black Sea and the Ægean, would give Russia a +predominant influence; that the proposed annexations in Asia Minor would +give Russia control over political and commercial conditions in that +region, and that the exaction of an indemnity which it was impossible +for Turkey to provide, would enable Russia either to exact further +cessions of territory or to impose any other conditions which might be +thought advisable. The logic was sound, and at all events Lord Salisbury +succeeded in producing a definite British policy, which his predecessor +had signally failed to do. + +When Lord Lyons returned to Paris at the beginning of April the question +of whether there was to be a Congress or not was still in suspense. +French opinion was rather more in favour of England on the Eastern +Question than had been expected, but there was no sign of anything more +than passive sympathy, and Waddington, who was particularly sensitive +on the subject, intimated, not obscurely, that the good will of France +depended upon England not acting independently of her in Egypt. It +looked, in fact, as if England would be left to bell the cat, although +Lord Salisbury's circular, as was generally admitted, had immensely +raised British prestige on the continent. The suspicion felt in France +as to Russian intentions was shown by the failure of agents of the +Russian Government to negotiate a loan at Paris for thirty millions +sterling, and Lord Salisbury's letters in the early part of April show +that, while there were symptoms of yielding in Europe, there appeared to +be no prospect of those concessions with regard to Asia Minor to which +Her Majesty's Government attached great importance. + +On the whole, the French Government was apparently anxious to act as +far as possible with England, without committing itself too much, since +the idea of a Russian naval station in the Mediterranean was highly +obnoxious; but Waddington was hampered, amongst other causes, by the +proceedings of Gambetta, who was disporting himself in some of the +European capitals with the object of forming, or appearing to form, +relations with foreign statesmen, which would enable him to put forward +a claim to become eventually Minister for Foreign Affairs. Waddington +always in private repudiated responsibility for what Gambetta said +or did, but the latter was now so important a personage that it was +necessary to keep on good terms with him and to submit to a patronage +which must have been irksome to French Ministers. + + * * * * * + + _Lord Salisbury to Lord Lyons._ + + Foreign Office, April 24, 1878. + + The negotiations for the simultaneous withdrawal of the fleet + and army from Constantinople proceed very slowly. We are making + no difficulties, but the Russians cannot make up their minds about + details, and are probably trying to screw some concessions out of + the luckless Turks. I shall be very glad to see the arrangement + succeed, because our fleet is doing no possible good there at this + moment. Whatever value it had, disappeared as soon as the peace was + signed. But as the Russians seem to be afraid of it, we must make + the most of it. Possibly, in their secret hearts, they entertain + very much the same opinion as to the position of their armies. + + The general negotiations do not improve. Russia gives me the + impression of a Government desperately anxious for peace, and + driven on by some fate towards war. Andrassy undoubtedly means to + have Bosnia; but whether he will be satisfied with that I am not + so certain. It is a possible policy for him to throw the Danube + over altogether; to secure an outlet for his produce by a railway + to Salonika, and to accept a simultaneous extension southward in + parallel lines of Austrian and Russian possession--whether in the + form of actual territory, or of vassal states. In that case, he + will throw us over, and his course will be easy enough if he can + square the Hungarians. But that may be a difficulty. Do you gather + any information about his objects? + + Is it your impression--as it is mine--that the French are + supremely anxious to push us into war? + +Lord Lyons's reply to these inquiries gives the reasons why the French +views with regard to an Anglo-Russian conflict had undergone an +alteration. + + * * * * * + + Paris, April 26, 1878. + + I owe you many thanks for your letter of the day before + yesterday. + + You ask me whether it is my impression that the French are + extremely anxious to push us into war. + + Confidence in their returning military strength, and the + apparent success of their endeavours to conciliate Germany have + calmed their fears of Bismarck. They are no longer nervously + desirous that the forces of England should be kept in the west, + as a necessary check upon the great Chancellor's supposed designs + upon Holland, upon Belgium, or upon France herself. On the other + hand, they have given up counting upon Russia as an ally against + Germany, and have abandoned Décazes's policy of courting her and + espousing her interests. The result of all this is that they are + willing enough that the main force of England should be employed at + a distance from home. + + They have been reassured about Egypt, and they think that if + England is engaged in hostilities with Russia, she will be less + disposed and less able to interfere with France or to separate from + her in Egyptian affairs. They have lost their great fear, which was + that England, instead of opposing Russia, would seek a compensation + for herself in the annexation of Egypt. Thus another of the reasons + which made them desire that England should abstain from all action + has disappeared. + + There are, moreover, the patriots, who look far ahead, who do + positively desire that England should go to war with Russia. Their + calculation is that Austria and Italy would sooner or later be + drawn into the war on the English side, and that then, Germany and + Russia being isolated, France might join the rest of Europe against + them, and recover Alsace and Lorraine. These are said to be the + views of Gambetta and his friends. + + There is, however, one feeling which pervades the great + mass of Frenchmen. They wish England to take the chestnuts out + of the fire for them. They are quite determined not to go to war + themselves for anything less than Alsace and Lorraine, but they do + wish to exclude Russia from the Mediterranean, and they are very + willing that the danger and the burthen of effecting this should be + incurred by England. + + With these views their newspapers go on patting us on the + back, and may continue to do so, as long as we seem to be ready to + act alone; but they would change their note, if they saw any risk + of France being drawn into the war with us, until _after_ Austria + and Italy had joined us. + + I know of nothing to confirm Odo Russell's information that + in return for the consent of Germany and Russia to exclude Egypt, + etc., from the deliberations of the Congress, Waddington engaged to + support Germany and Russia in everything else. What appeared on the + surface was that this exclusion was made openly by France a _sine + qua non_ of her attending the Congress, that she communicated the + condition simultaneously to all the Powers, and did not at all ask + for the assent to it as a concession. If there is only Bismarckian + authority for the bargain stated to have been made by Waddington + with Germany and Russia, I think it _mérite confirmation_. The one + object of Bismarck seems always to be to sow dissensions between + France and any other Power that she may seem to be approaching. + + Notwithstanding the Comte de St. Vallier's assertion to Odo + Russell, Mr. Adams is quite certain that it was M. de St. Vallier + himself who reported to Mr. Waddington that Odo had communicated + to the Emperor William, Prince Bismarck, etc., a telegram from Mr. + Adams on the subject of the sympathies of France with England. + In fact Mr. Waddington who is an old schoolfellow and friend of + Mr. Adams, read to him parts of the private letter from M. de St. + Vallier in which the report was contained, and indeed one of the + phrases he cited from the letter was _le telegramme Adams_ as the + source of the communication made by Odo Russell. + + The Prince of Wales arrived this morning and I have been all + the afternoon at the Exhibition with him, which obliges me to write + in such haste, that I cannot be brief. + + I have just seen Hobart Pasha, who goes on to England + to-morrow morning and will try to see you. + + I doubt whether Waddington or the Austrian Ambassador here get + any information about Andrassy's real views and objects. + + The Russians seem to be hard at work trying to make the + execution of the Treaty of San Stefano a _fait accompli_. _Beati + possidentes._ + +Lord Salisbury's suspicions as to the pressure being put upon the +unfortunate Turks by the Russians were confirmed by an interesting +letter from Mr. Layard to Lord Lyons, in which the much-denounced Abdul +Hamid appears in quite a new light. + + * * * * * + + Constantinople, May 1, 1878. + + I am not surprised that Waddington should care nothing about + Armenia. The question is a purely English one, but to us a vital + one. The Treaty of San Stefano puts the whole of Asia Minor + virtually at the mercy of Russia and insures her influence over + Mesopotamia and perhaps ultimately over Syria, which would probably + not be pleasant to the French. This immense addition to the power + of Russia in Asia, and the command that she obtains, if the Treaty + be carried out, of routes to India and Central Asia, is a matter + of serious import to England. But probably there is no European + Power which does not envy us the possession of India, and would + not secretly rejoice at the prospect of our losing it. I believe + this feeling to be particularly strong with Frenchmen. But if we + intend to preserve our Empire as it now is, we must be prepared to + deal with this question of Russian aggrandisement in Asia Minor and + drive them back. Our only way of doing so, is by making use of the + Mussulman population. The idea of an autonomous Christian Armenia + to form a barrier to Russian advance is one of those absurdities + which are cropping up daily amongst our sentimental politicians, + who know nothing of the matters upon which they pretend to lay down + the law. + + The Grand Duke Nicholas, before going, made an ultimate + attempt to bully the Sultan into surrendering Shumla, Varna and + Batoum; but His Majesty held firm and His Imperial Highness failed + to get a promise out of him on the subject. It is curious that + whilst our ignorant and unscrupulous newspaper correspondents are + systematically writing down the Sultan and denouncing him as a poor + weak creature incapable of having an opinion of his own, he has + shown far more firmness than any of his Ministers. Had it not been + for him, it is highly probable that the ironclads would have been + given over to the Russians, and more than probable that the Grand + Duke would have been allowed to occupy Buyuk Dere and the entrance + to the Bosphorus. The Russians threaten to seize Varna, Shumla + and Batoum by force, but I much doubt whether they will venture + to do so, as right is not on their side. Shumla and Varna are not + to be given up to Russia, but to the Bulgarian Principality when + constituted: and the arrangements for the final settlement of the + Russian frontier in Asia are to be made within six months of the + conclusion of the 'definitive' not the 'preliminary' Treaty. + + I am anxiously waiting to hear whether the simultaneous + withdrawal of our fleet and the Russian forces can be arranged. It + is of the utmost importance to the Turks to get the Russians away + from San Stefano, but I cannot understand how the Russians could + consent to give up so advantageous a position, unless they found + that if they remained there they would be exposed to considerable + danger from a joint attack by the English fleet and the Turkish + forces. + +Layard, who was a fighting diplomatist, and possessed the rare quality +of knowing what he wanted, had long chafed at the irresolute action +of the British Government, and was all in favour of making a resolute +stand against Russian aggression. Throughout the war, he had continually +complained of the apathy and indecision of the British Cabinet, and +attributed these deficiencies to divided counsels and to the advanced +age of Lord Beaconsfield. Now, with Lord Salisbury installed at the +Foreign Office, he plucked up hope again. + + 'Salisbury,' he wrote to Lord Lyons, 'seems to know what he + wants--which is a great contrast to his predecessor. If he is firm, + we shall, I think, triumph in the end, and remove a great danger + from Europe and ourselves. Were it not for that double-dealing, + untrustworthy fellow Andrassy, we might perhaps accomplish all + that we require without war. Andrassy's proceedings give rise to a + strong suspicion that the secret understanding between the three + Emperors still exists. The Sultan is persuaded of it, and I have + found that his instinct in such matters is usually right.' + +On May 11, Lord Salisbury wrote to Lord Lyons saying that Count Münster +(German Ambassador in London) had assured him that the object upon +which the French were bent in the Mediterranean was Tunis. 'Do you +hear anything of the sort?' he asked Lord Lyons, and added the highly +important statement: 'It is of course an extension of French territory +and influence of which we should not have the slightest jealousy or +fear. But I am not assuming in any way that the Porte would wish to give +it up. I should only like to have your opinion how far France would wish +to have it.' + +To this Lord Lyons replied:-- + + Ever since I can remember, the Italians have suspected the + French, and the French have suspected the Italians of designs upon + Tunis. Bismarck's mention of it at this moment is probably only + one of his usual devices to sow distrust of France. I have never + found that the acquisition of Tunis recommended itself to French + imagination, and I don't believe it would be taken as anything like + a set-off against English acquisitions in Egypt or Syria. I believe + our principal interest in Tunis arises from its being a source + of supply of provisions to Malta. When Décazes wished to set us + against the supposed Italian designs upon it, he used to talk of + its being dangerous to us to have Malta in a vice between Sicily + and an Italian Tunis, but it never seemed to me that the peril was + very clear. + + * * * * * + + England is very popular here at this moment, and the Prince of + Wales's visit has been a principal cause of this, but the French + have no intention to fight with us or for us. They back us up in + asserting the sanctity of Treaties, and they certainly desire that + the _status quo_ may be maintained in the Mediterranean, until + France is a little stronger. + +It will be remembered that only a few years earlier the German +Government had informed the French Government through Count Arnim that +it would not tolerate the establishment of anything in the nature of +a French Protectorate in Tunis; so that if the French were now really +entertaining any designs of that nature, it was pretty obvious that it +could only be the result of a hint from Berlin. The question of Tunis, +however, was shortly overshadowed by greater issues. On May 16, Lord +Salisbury transmitted to Paris a long document which formed the basis +of the so-called Anglo-Turkish Convention. The proposals embodied +subsequently in the convention were contained in a private letter to +Mr. Layard, dated May 10, and the latter was directed not to proceed +with the negotiations until further instructions were received, as the +necessity for the convention depended upon the nature of the reply which +Count Schouvaloff was to bring back from St. Petersburg. Whatever may +have been said at the time in denunciation of the occupation of Cyprus +and the Asia Minor Protectorate, it can hardly be denied that Lord +Salisbury had a good case logically, as is shown by the following letter. + + * * * * * + + _Lord Salisbury to Lord Lyons._ + + May 22, 1878. + + Until I see Schouvaloff to-morrow I shall know little of the + probabilities of our acting on that private letter to Layard of + last week, of which I sent you a copy. If, however, we do so, it + seems to me that we have a very good logical case--Is logic any use + in diplomacy?--against any objections the French may raise. + + By the Tripartite Treaty of April 25, 1856, we had a right to + call on them to help us in restraining Russia from appropriating + Turkish territory. They have loudly and constantly asserted that + no military action is to be expected on their part. In Europe we + can meet the consequences of that desertion by the help of Austria, + Greece, the Rhodope mountaineers and others. But in Asia we are + abandoned wholly to ourselves. The French have left us to face and + guard against the consequences of that Russian encroachment which + they undertook to join with us in resisting. Does it lie in their + mouth, if we say that such encroachments, if persisted in, require + special precautions? that we cannot turn the Russians out by + ourselves, and that abandoned by our ally, who should have made the + task easy to us, we have no choice except to mount guard over the + endangered territory and take up the positions requisite for doing + so with effect? I do not see what answer the French would have. + + But you will probably reply that my reasoning is idle trouble, + because logic is of _no_ use in diplomacy. + +The French would have had no real cause for complaint if they had +discovered the contents of the proposed Anglo-Turkish Convention, for +as Lord Salisbury had already pointed out, he had been careful 'to turn +the eyes of desire away from Syria,' the only portion of Asia Minor in +which France was interested; but Waddington had been making declarations +against any of the Powers helping themselves to Turkish territory, and +although these declarations were meant only to apply to Bosnia and +Herzegovina, he would probably have used much the same language if he +had learnt that England was thinking of occupying any portion of the +Turkish Empire. Logic may not be of much use in diplomacy, but it is +of still less use in influencing public opinion, and an appeal to the +Tripartite Treaty, after it had been set aside so long, would have come +rather late in the day. As, however, the necessity for providing for +British interests and British safety in Asia was indisputable, Lord +Salisbury was justified in contending that those Powers who disliked the +only methods which were within our reach, should give us such help as +would enable us to dispense with them. + +Upon the return of Schouvaloff from St. Petersburg, it turned out, +as Lord Salisbury had anticipated, that Russia was prepared to make +concessions in Europe, but scarcely any in Asia. Layard was, therefore, +directed to negotiate the Anglo-Turkish Convention. + + * * * * * + + _Lord Salisbury to Lord Lyons._ + + Foreign Office, May 29, 1878. + + I send you two memoranda, or rather two separate versions + of the same paper, which will explain fully the nature of the + propositions which Schouvaloff brought back to me, and the extent + to which we have been able to accept his proposals. The upshot of + the matter has been that the Czar yields substantially all we want + in Bulgaria and as to the Greek provinces, but sticks to his text + as to Montenegro, Bessarabia, and the Armenian conquests, except + Bayazid. + + I have informed Schouvaloff that against these Asiatic + acquisitions it will be necessary for us to take precautions; and + while taking from him a formal engagement that Russia will not + extend her position in Turkey in Asia, we shall ourselves give to + Turkey a guarantee to the same effect. We shall accept these terms + as soon as he receives from St. Petersburg authority to take them + in the redaction on which we have ultimately agreed. At the same + time we have taken our measures to secure ourselves against the + consequences of the Asiatic advance. Layard received on Saturday + telegraphic directions in the sense of the private letter which I + addressed to him a fortnight ago, and of which I sent you a copy, + and with great vigour and skill he procured the signature of an + agreement on Sunday last. We do not intend that this fact shall be + made public until the Congress, as the agreement is made wholly + conditional on the retention of Batoum and Kars. But whether we + shall succeed in these good intentions remains to be seen. Our past + performances in that line do not justify any very sanguine hope. + + As there seems no chance of the Porte ceding Bosnia, and as + it is necessary to keep Austria with us in the Congress, we have + offered to support her in any proposal she makes in Congress on the + subject of Bosnia, if she will support us in questions concerning + the limits of occupation and organization of Bulgaria. It is not + necessary to tell Waddington this, but, as we have advanced a step + since he last asked us the question, it is important to avoid + language inconsistent with it. + +One cannot help suspecting Lord Salisbury's sense of humour as being +responsible for the stipulation, that, if the Russians abandoned to the +Turks their conquests from them in Asia Minor, the occupation of Cyprus +should come to an end and the Anglo-Turkish Convention become null +and void. On the following day (May 30), the so-called Anglo-Russian +agreement was signed, and the enterprising Mr. Marvin, who had been +temporarily employed at the Foreign Office on the cheap, handed it over +to the _Globe_ newspaper, thus creating a political sensation of the +first order. + +The agreement with Russia being now completed, and an invitation to the +Congress in suitable terms having been accepted, Lord Beaconsfield and +Lord Salisbury decided to go to Berlin themselves, instead of sending +Lord Lyons. + + * * * * * + + _Lord Salisbury to Lord Lyons._ + + June 5, 1878. + + I feel that I owe you many apologies for my rudeness in not + writing to you on Saturday night to announce to you the decision + of the Cabinet--and to thank you for the very kind and cordial + way you had placed yourself at our disposition in the spring to + perform what was a very ugly duty. The Cabinet was rushed to the + decision which it took, partly by the consideration to which you + advert, that the threads of the last two months' negociations were + more completely in our hands than by any process of communication + they could be in yours--but also by the fact that we have dangerous + questions looming at Paris--and we cannot afford to have you absent + from your post. + + My excuse for my negligence is the prosaic one that I had + not a moment of time. The agonies of a man who has to finish a + difficult negociation, and at the same time to entertain four + royalties in a country house can be better imagined than described. + + The Convention at Constantinople has been signed with + expression of lively gratitude on the Sultan's part. I am sorry + that your impressions of the mood in which the French are likely + to receive the news when published, are still so gloomy. However, + we must hope for the best. We have assembled a powerful fleet at + Portsmouth and we shall have six or seven first-rate ironclads to + do what may be necessary in the Mediterranean, besides smaller + ships. And our relations with Bismarck are particularly good. So I + hope our friends at Paris will confine themselves to epigram. + + If we can, we shall keep the matter secret till we get at + Congress to the part of the Treaty of San Stefano (Art. XIX) which + concerns the Asiatic annexations. I do not know whether d'Harcourt + has any inkling, but ever since his return from Paris his manner + has changed. + +Lord Lyons hailed the decision of Lords Beaconsfield and Salisbury as a +'deliverance from a nightmare which had weighed upon him since March,' +and found a sympathizer in Lord Odo Russell, who had never expected +much good from the Congress if the Three Emperors' League was revived, +and who doubted whether the British public would be contented with an +amended San Stefano Treaty. The probable action of Waddington, who +was to be the French representative at Berlin, is foreshadowed in the +following letter. + + * * * * * + + _Lord Lyons to Lord Salisbury._ + + Paris, June 4, 1878. + + I am very glad that you and Lord Beaconsfield have determined + to go yourselves to the Congress. The matters to be treated are too + grave to be left to subordinates, and they could hardly be treated + properly by any one who had not had a minute acquaintance day by + day with the recent communications with Russia and Austria. + + Waddington will, I think, be a satisfactory colleague in some + respects, but in others I am afraid you will have difficulties with + him. His English blood and his English education tell both ways. + On the one hand, he is more straightforward than most Frenchmen; + he understands and shares many English feelings, and he sees the + force of English arguments, or perhaps I should rather say, of + arguments put forward in an English way. But, on the other hand, he + feels strongly the necessity of guarding against the tendency in + France to suspect him of an English bias. He will be disposed to + join in resistance to exaggerated Russian pretensions with regard + to Roumelia and the Danube. His personal sentiments are strongly + in favour of Greece. He has a certain sympathy with Christian as + against Mussulman, but he does not carry this to an immoderate or + unpractical extent. There is, however, one point on which you may + find him very stiff. He is most strongly opposed to any change in + the relative position of the Great Powers in the Mediterranean, + and he would, I am afraid, be quite as unwilling to see England + extend her influence in that sea, as he would be to see Russia do + so. It is in order to prevent any alteration in the _statu quo_ in + the Mediterranean, more than from any other reason, that he has + made the participation of France in the Congress conditional on + the exclusion of all questions not directly arising out of the war + between Russia and Turkey, and has positively mentioned Syria and + Egypt as countries to be excluded from the discussion. He would + not perhaps be disinclined to let these questions come up, if he + thought he should obtain the support of other Powers in resisting + any change made outside of the Congress. + + At any rate, public feeling in France would probably be too + strong to allow him to acquiesce in any redistribution of territory + or influence in favour of England. But I expressed my opinion on + this point so fully to you and Lord Beaconsfield in the interview I + had with you just before I left England, that I have nothing more + to say about it. The horrible event[19] which took place at Berlin + the day before yesterday has, however, thrown so strong a light + upon one phase of French opinion, that I feel bound to direct your + attention to it. It seems very shocking that while the Emperor + William is suffering from the wounds so wickedly inflicted, people + here should be speculating upon the consequences of their being + fatal, but so it is. The French believe that the maintenance of + the present military system in Germany depends upon the Emperor + William, and that even if His Majesty's successor had the same + determination as His Majesty himself to keep it up, public opinion + in the country would make it impossible for him to do so. What + foundation there may be for this supposition, I do not pretend to + determine; but that it influences the French is certain. Anything + which makes them believe the life of the Emperor to be precarious, + diminishes the restraint which the fear of Germany imposes upon + them, and renders them more stiff in asserting their own views and + pretensions, and less averse from contemplating the possibility of + supporting them by more than words. + + There are, in my opinion, strong arguments to be brought in + favour of our taking measures to be in a position to resist Russia + by our own means, if other Powers will give us no help in doing + so; but as you said in a former letter, logic is perhaps not of + much use in diplomacy, and seems to me to be of still less use + in influencing public opinion. I doubt our logic doing much to + reconcile the French to our exercising a separate protection over + Turkey in Asia, or occupying a Turkish island in the Mediterranean. + I am afraid you will think I have become more nervous than + ever, and more prone to the common error among diplomatists of + exaggerating the importance of the country in which they are + themselves stationed, but anyhow I have not seen any reason to + change my views as to the feelings prevalent in France. + + The Parliamentary session at Versailles is about to close. + Thanks to the Exhibition, it has been a very tranquil one, but we + must be on the look-out for squalls when the Chamber meets again + in the autumn. Gambetta has hitherto restrained his followers from + opposing the Ministry, and from proposing radical measures, but it + is doubtful whether he will be able, even if willing, to restrain + them after the end of the Exhibition. Some unexpected incident + might even produce a crisis before. At any rate the elections of + a portion of the Senate, which will take place early next year, + may remove the check which the Conservative majority in that House + has hitherto put upon the Chamber of Deputies. The Marshal does + not talk of making any more attempts at resisting the will of the + majority, but I understand that he does not talk very seriously of + retiring as soon as the election is over. + + It may perhaps be worth while to mention that Waddington finds + the influence of Gambetta over the Government very irksome, and is + not fond of having it alluded to. + +The Congress met at Berlin in the middle of June, and the awkward +question of whether Waddington should be informed of the Anglo-Turkish +Convention or not was debated. Lord Lyons knew perfectly well that the +French would be furious when they heard of it, and that the greater the +surprise, the greater would be their indignation. The lines laid down +for Waddington's guidance at the Congress were that France desired: + +1. Peace. + +2. Neutrality. + +3. The necessity of the consent of all the Powers to any modifications +of the Treaties. + +4. The exclusion of Egypt, Syria, the Holy Places, and other topics +foreign to the Russo-Turkish War. + +These points were certainly not favourable to England receiving any +support from France in defending her menaced interests in Asia Minor, +as the absolute neutrality of France was the point most insisted upon. +In fact France was so obviously anxious to stand aloof, that one +suggestion was made that she should be asked to co-operate with us in +Asia Minor on the assumption that such co-operation was sure to be +refused. This, however, was considered to be too hazardous a course, +and it was eventually decided to say nothing to Waddington for the time +being, lest he should make the Anglo-Turkish Convention an excuse for +not attending the Congress at all. The secret, unlike the Anglo-Russian +agreement, seems to have been well kept, and cannot have been known to +the Russians, or they would have utilized it for the purpose of sowing +discord between the British and French representatives. Finally, on July +6, Lord Salisbury told the whole story to Waddington in a private letter. + +In this letter Lord Salisbury pointed out that, as far as the Russian +annexations in Asia Minor were concerned, we were in a completely +isolated condition, since Austria was only willing to take part in +restoring the Porte to a certain independence in Europe, while France +had clearly intimated that she had no intention of engaging in war for +the purpose of maintaining the stipulations of the Treaty of 1856. The +result was that England was compelled to act alone, as her interests +were too great to allow the _status quo_ in Asia Minor to be completely +destroyed, and consequently the onerous obligation of a defensive +alliance with Turkey had been undertaken in order to provide against +future Russian annexations beyond the frontier assigned under the +present negotiations at Berlin. As this engagement could not be carried +out from such a distance as Malta, the Sultan had made over Cyprus to +England during such period as the defensive alliance might last. The +conditional nature of the Convention, and the restraint shown by Her +Majesty's Government in rejecting more tempting and advantageous offers +are dealt with in the following passages. + + We have entered into an agreement which is now embodied in a + formal Convention at Constantinople, that whenever the Russians + shall, for whatever reason, return to their Asiatic frontier as + it existed before the last war, we will immediately evacuate + the island; and that intermediately we will annually pay the + Sultan whatever is ascertained to be the surplus of revenue over + expenditure. + + I am telling Your Excellency no secret when I say that we have + been very earnestly pressed, by advisers of no mean authority, to + occupy Egypt--or at least to take the borders of the Suez Canal. + Such an operation might have been very suitable for our interests + and would have presented no material difficulties. + + No policy of this kind however was entertained by Her + Majesty's Government. We had received an intimation from the French + Government that any such proceeding would be very unwelcome to the + French people, and we could not but feel the reasonableness of + their objection under existing circumstances. + + We have therefore turned a deaf ear to all suggestions of that + kind. + + We have been likewise recommended to occupy some port on the + coast of Syria, such as Alexandretta, but we felt that, however + carefully guarded, such a proceeding might, in the present + condition of opinion with respect to the Ottoman Empire, be + construed as indicating an intention to acquire territory on the + mainland of Western Asia; and we did not desire to be suspected + of designs which will be wholly absent from our thoughts. We have + therefore preferred to accept from the Sultan the provisional + occupation of a position less advantageous indeed, but still + sufficient for the purpose, and not exposed to the inconveniences + I have mentioned. How long we shall stay there I cannot tell. But + I think there is just ground of hope that the Russians will find + in a short time that the territory they have acquired is costly + and unproductive; that the chances of making it a stepping-stone + to further conquests is cut off, and that they will abandon it as + a useless acquisition. In that case our _raison d'être_ at Cyprus + will be gone and we shall retire. + + I have adopted this form of conveying the matter to you, as + the Convention being entirely within the Treaty competence of + the two Powers, requires no official communication. But it would + have been inconsistent with the feelings of friendship existing + between our two countries, and with my gratitude for your courteous + procedure towards me personally, to have allowed you to hear it + first from any other source. + +There can be little doubt as to the identity of the 'advisers of no +mean authority,' for Bismarck had been urging upon England for some +time the occupation of Egypt, obviously with the main intention of +creating discord with France, and Her Majesty's Government deserved all +the credit claimed by Lord Salisbury for resisting these overtures. It +is, however, somewhat difficult to follow Lord Salisbury's reasonings +for preferring Cyprus to Alexandretta. It was plain that the occupation +of either of these places would cause irritation, and as subsequent +events have shown, Cyprus has never been of much use to us, and besides +being crushed under the burden of the tribute annually paid to the +Turkish Government, is inhabited chiefly by Greeks who do not appear to +thoroughly appreciate British rule. Alexandretta, on the other hand, +might, under our control, have developed into a highly important seaport +and become the starting-place for the Bagdad railway; whereas, as a +matter of fact, it has now practically passed into the hands of the +Germans. + +M. Waddington did not remain long in sole possession of his exclusive +information, for on July 8, the Anglo-Turkish Convention was made +known to the world, and the general impression produced was that Lords +Beaconsfield and Salisbury had effected a brilliant _coup_. In France, +however, the news caused quite unjustifiable indignation, and the +prudent Lord Lyons telegraphed to Lord Salisbury on July 10, advising +him to get the final acts of the Congress signed as quickly as possible, +lest Waddington should be directed to come away without putting his name +to anything. + + * * * * * + + _Lord Lyons to Lord Salisbury._ + + Paris, July 12, 1878. + + Your telegram of last night was a great relief to me, but I + shall not feel quite happy till I hear that all is actually signed. + I am happy to find that Gambetta and the Ministerial Parties, who + are violent on the subject of the Convention, are not having things + all their own way in the press. No newspaper can be said to defend + England altogether, but the more sensible papers are against any + active opposition on the part of France. Gambetta and Waddington + are not friends, and Gambetta will no doubt attack Waddington and + try to upset him. This may lead to serious difficulties in France. + + It is no use to shut one's eyes to the fact that at this + moment, there is a great and general irritation in France against + England. It is too soon to foresee what turn public opinion will + take eventually, but at the present moment, we must not forget to + take this irritation into account in our dealings with this country. + +The general feeling was so unsatisfactory, that he felt compelled to +write to Mr. Knollys[20] urging that the Prince of Wales, who was acting +as President of the British Section of the International Exhibition, +should postpone a contemplated visit to Paris, and enclosing articles +in the press of an abominable character directed against His Royal +Highness. Irritation over the Anglo-Turkish Convention was not confined +to one party, but existed in every class from the _haute société_ +downwards. The Conservatives and their press utilized it as a means +of attacking the Republic, complained of the effacement of France, +and asserted that she had been duped by her former ally, while the +Republican opposition, headed by Gambetta, charged Waddington with +having made a shameful surrender to England. + + * * * * * + + _Lord Lyons to Lord Salisbury._ + + Paris, July 16, 1878. + + The first explosion of French wrath, on the appearance of + the Convention of the 4th of June, was even more violent than I + anticipated. It was well that you had the Minister for Foreign + Affairs under _your_ influence, and at a distance from that of + the excited spirits here. Now the first force of the eruption is + spent and the lava cooled down. I am afraid only on the surface, + but any way, it must be the surface which cools first. At all + events the strong language is in great measure abandoned. In the + first place, as no one now recommends any immediate action on the + part of France, the French are beginning to see that they cut a + sorry figure by barking without biting. In the second place, they + conceive that the alliance of the Three Empires is as close as + ever, and they think that if they quarrel with England, they will + be giving a triumph to Bismarck and find themselves face to face + with him without any friend on their side. Lastly, I would fain + hope that some of them are beginning to take a really reasonable + view of things, and to see that we had absolutely nothing left for + it, but to act for ourselves, as they would not or could not help + us. + + Still we shall have some trouble with them, and shall probably + find them for some time suspicious, jealous, and hard to deal with. + + Egypt may be our first difficulty. With or without a hint + from home, French agents there will be seeking to trip us up. It + seems to me that our task there will be a delicate one. On the one + hand, it will no doubt be desirable to soothe French vanity as far + as possible; but, on the other hand, anything like a defeat or a + retreat in Egypt, might very much impair the prestige which the + position which we have taken with regard to Asia has given us. + I wish Rivers Wilson had already been installed as Minister of + Finance when the Convention of the 4th June was made public. + + Another ticklish question is that of the Newfoundland + Fisheries. I am very anxious to know what, if anything, passed + between you and Waddington on the subject at Berlin. The present + moment does not seem a very happy one for resuming negotiations, + and at all events it might be well to keep the matter, if possible, + in the calm atmosphere of London, and at a distance from the heat + of the political weather here. + + I have been indirectly in communication with Gambetta, and + have reason to hope he is being brought, or is coming of himself, + round about the Convention. What I am immediately afraid of is + his nevertheless trying to upset Waddington. I should regret + Waddington's fall on all grounds, and it would be extremely awkward + to have a successor in the office brought in on the pretext that + Waddington had not been stiff enough with regard to England. The + candidates for his place are said to be Freycinet, the present + Minister of Public Works, who was Gambetta's Sub-Minister for War + in 1870 and 1871; M. Duclerc, one of the Vice-Presidents of the + Senate, who passes for a moderate man, but who has no knowledge of + foreign affairs, and Gambetta himself. I suppose, however, Gambetta + would be an impossibility with the Marshal, and that he himself + would feel that he was compromising his prospect of greater things + hereafter, by taking a subordinate office now. + +M. Waddington, upon his return from Berlin, realizing doubtless that his +position had been shaken, though from no fault of his own, intimated +his intention of writing a despatch in which Her Majesty's Government +would be called upon to give to the French certain assurances with +regard to Egypt and Tunis. As it was desirable that this request should +not be made in too peremptory a manner, he was exhorted to make his +communication in such a way as would make it easy for Her Majesty's +Government to return a cordial answer. The difficulty about giving the +assurances was pointed out by Lord Salisbury. + + * * * * * + + _Lord Salisbury to Lord Lyons._ + + Foreign Office, July 20, 1878. + + What M. Waddington said to you is very much what he said to me + at Berlin, though the lurid touches about war have been filled in + afterwards. + + The precise answer to be given to his promised despatch must + of course depend very much on the terms in which it is framed. But + he may be certain that we shall answer it not only with the desire + of cultivating to the utmost possible extent our good relations + with France, but also with the aim of making his own personal task + more easy, as far as it is in our power to contribute to that + result. + + The matter to which he has called your attention, as he did + ours at Berlin, was difficult to make the subject of binding + assurances, because the contingencies under which those assurances + would receive a practical application are difficult to foresee. + + If France occupied Tunis to-morrow, we should not even + remonstrate. But to promise that publicly would be a little + difficult, because we must avoid giving away other people's + property without their consent, and also because it is no business + of ours to pronounce beforehand on the considerations which Italy + would probably advance upon that subject. In the same way, with + respect to Egypt, we have stated distinctly more than once that we + do not entertain any intention of occupying it; and that statement + we are perfectly willing to renew. But, having done that, and + having expressed our anxiety to work with France in Egypt, we + have said as much as would be seemly or possible. We can hardly + pledge the Khedive as to what he means to do, without in reality + assuming a voice in his concerns which we do not, according to any + international right, possess. + + These considerations make me rather anxious that M. Waddington + in his proposed despatch should avoid putting categorical questions + which we might not be able to answer precisely as he wishes, + and yet which we could not avoid answering without seeming to + exhibit precisely that coolness which he very properly and justly + deprecates, and any appearance of which we are as anxious as he is + to avoid. I think that his despatch--if I might suggest it--would + more properly take the form of a statement, in general terms, of + the territorial points on the African coast in which France takes + an interest, leaving us to make such assurances as we think we can + properly give, and which we will certainly make as cordial as we + can. + + To French influence in Egypt we do not offer any objection; + and we have never taken any step calculated to oust it. But any + detailed engagements as to questions of administration could + not be taken without imprudence; for each step must be taken as + the necessity for it arises. The two great points are to keep + the Khedive on the throne, and to get the financial obligations + satisfied. For these objects, the two countries will, I hope, + co-operate heartily. + + I am a little anxious as to the form he gives his despatch, + for if he makes it too peremptory, he may produce that very + appearance of estrangement which it is our common object to avoid. + + I will write to you more fully about the Newfoundland + Fisheries when I have had time to study the papers. My + conversations with him have put me fully in possession of the + French case. I am not so certain that I know all the points of the + English case. + +An opportunity fortunately occurred of conciliating one personage who +might have given a great deal of trouble, and afforded an instance of +the influence which can occasionally be brought to bear upon advanced +democrats when judiciously applied. + + * * * * * + + _Lord Lyons to Lord Salisbury._ + + Paris, July 21, 1878. + + The Prince of Wales leaves Paris for London to-night. As his + arrival at Paris to attend the English concerts at the Exhibition + had been publicly announced, I did not think that it would be + advisable that it should be postponed, but I have been a little + nervous about it. So far however there has been no contretemps, and + the visit has been politically useful. + + The Prince invited Gambetta to breakfast with him yesterday. + It was His Royal Highness's own idea, but I thought it judicious. + I have not the least doubt that if the Prince of Wales had not + been civil to Gambetta, the Russian Embassy would have asked any + Grand Duke who came here to show him particular attention, in order + to bring him over to Russia. The success of such a manoeuvre has I + think been effectually guarded against. + + Gambetta appears to have spoken to the Prince strongly in + favour of an alliance between France and England--to have declared + himself more or less reconciled to the Convention of June 4th--and + to have spoken in the most disparaging terms, not so much of the + Foreign Policy of Russia, as of the institutions, the Government, + and the administration of that country. I hear from other quarters + that Gambetta was extremely pleased with the interview. I am + assured also that the Prince of Wales acquitted himself with great + skill. The Prince thought, and so did I, that it was better that + I should not be at the breakfast. The Embassy was represented by + Sheffield. The occasion of the invitation to Gambetta was his + having been very obliging and useful in matters connected with the + Exhibition. + + To-day Waddington met the Prince of Wales at luncheon at the + Embassy. + + So far, then, things look well, but I am assured the calm + does not extend far below the surface. Gambetta has the southern + temperament, and his language is a good deal influenced by the + impression of the moment. He has postponed, but he has not really + given up, his attack on Waddington. He will still, if he continues + in his present mood, try to turn him out in October, when the + Chambers reassemble. + + The thing which would have most effect in reconciling the + French to our acquisition and protectorate, would be to make them + practically advantageous to the holders of Turkish and Egyptian + Bonds. + +When M. Waddington eventually presented his despatch, or rather +despatches, for there were two, they were apparently found +unobjectionable in tone; but on the ground that the one referring to +Tunis was not 'couched in more diplomatic language,' it was suggested to +him that he should rewrite it in language more suitable for publication +subsequently; this he declined to do, but promised not to publish it at +all. The chief object presumably of these communications was: in the +first place to obtain assurances from England with regard to Egypt, +and in the second place to make Lord Salisbury's statement about Tunis +appear as an invitation to the French to appropriate that country. M. +Waddington, quite naturally, did not wish it to be thought that he had +come back empty handed from Berlin at a time when the Great Christian +Powers were helping themselves liberally at the Turk's expense. + + * * * * * + + _Lord Salisbury to Lord Lyons._ + + July 24, 1878. + + Waddington's two despatches were left with me yesterday. They + are very friendly in tone and will not, I think, be difficult to + answer. The answers however must be delayed some days, as the + Cabinet does not meet till Saturday. + + Intermediately, I demur a little to the quotations that he + makes from my conversation. The general tenor is quite accurate, + but his vivacious French by no means renders the tone of my + communication, and what is of more importance, to the rights and + claims of other Powers, Turkey and Italy especially. What I told + him was that if a state of things should arise in which there was + no other obstacle to his occupying Tunis but our objection, that + objection would not be made. I made the observation for the purpose + of showing him that we had no Mediterranean aspirations--and did + not desire to disturb the balance of power in that sea. Our eyes + were bent wholly on the East. But he makes me talk of Tunis and + Carthage as if they had been my own personal property and I was + making him a liberal wedding present. + + I do not know whether he will be inclined to put his + quotations from my conversations into a more general form. I think + it will save the possibility of misunderstanding later; and will + also dispense with the necessity of a correction on my part, as he + has reported the general drift and terms of my observations with + perfect fidelity. + +The reception of the Anglo-Turkish Convention in France may be said to +have been the first of a series of difficulties which unfortunately +impaired the relations between France and England during many years, +but which have now happily almost entirely disappeared. The irritation +aroused in France was completely unjustified, and almost incapable of +explanation, unless the secrecy which surrounded the negotiation of the +Convention may be considered an adequate cause. No French interests were +prejudicially affected; and the maintenance of secrecy really relieved +France from a considerable difficulty, for a premature disclosure might +have prevented the participation of France in the Congress; but oddly +enough, the Anglo-Turkish Convention appeared to be the only matter +relating to the Congress in which the French took any interest, and +so much indignation did some patriots show that it was even seriously +suggested that by way of inflicting a surprise upon England, France +should seize Chios, or Rhodes, or Crete. In fact, at one time, Crete +appeared to possess considerably greater attractions than Tunis, in +spite of the latter's proximity to Algeria. + +Probably the real explanation of this display of temper was that the +French felt their strength to be returning, and were in no mood to +put up with what they erroneously considered to be a slight, whether +intentional or unintentional. + +One frantic jeremiad from Constantinople over the Treaty of Berlin may +be quoted before the subject is dismissed. Layard, who had been already +greatly scandalized by the publication of the Anglo-Russian agreement, +wrote:-- + + What do you think of the Treaty of Berlin? It appears to + me that if ever an apple of discord was thrown amongst nations, + this is the one. I see in it the elements of future wars and + disorders without number, and an upsetting of all the principles + of justice and right which have hitherto governed the relations + and intercourse of states. Force and fraud have triumphed, and + when Turkey has been completely destroyed and cut up under the new + system, it will probably be applied with similar successful results + to other countries. Russia has gained, with the assistance of + Germany, all and more than she wanted, and the interests of England + and of other Powers were sacrificed in order to enable Bismarck + to recruit his beery stomach by drinking some mineral waters. + It is all very well to sit round a green table and to cut up an + Empire on a map. It is a very different thing to put what has been + so easily settled into execution. I anticipate no end of trouble + and bloodshed for years to come in this unhappy country. We have + not yet recovered here from the effect of the publication of the + unfortunate memorandum which so completely destroyed the great and + commanding position that we had acquired. + +There is not much here about Peace with Honour. + +FOOTNOTES: + +[Footnote 17: Jan. 7, 1876.] + +[Footnote 18: Jan. 24, 1877.] + +[Footnote 19: Nobiling's attempt to assassinate the German Emperor.] + +[Footnote 20: Now Viscount Knollys.] + + + + +CHAPTER XIII + +M. GRÉVY'S PRESIDENCY + +(1878-1879) + + +The event in 1878 which aroused more interest in France than the Berlin +Congress or anything else, was the holding of the great Exhibition +in Paris, which not only demonstrated to the world the recovery of +France from the disasters of 1870-71, but had the beneficial effect +of improving Anglo-French relations. It was universally acknowledged +that nothing had contributed more to the success of the Exhibition +than the hearty co-operation given from first to last by England, and +in this connection the services rendered by the Prince of Wales were +of conspicuous value. His Royal Highness had come to Paris early in +the year to press forward the preparations of the British section; he +was present at each important phase of the Exhibition; he attended +unremittingly at the office of the British Royal Commission, and was +assiduous in transacting business there with the French Exhibition +authorities as well as with the British and Colonial Commissioners and +exhibitors. These visible proofs of the Prince's interest in their great +undertaking were by no means lost upon the French, and the judgment and +tact which he displayed, whenever opportunities arose for impressing +upon the French people the cordial feeling entertained by himself and +by his country towards France, produced an excellent political effect. + +The Exhibition naturally threw upon the Embassy an immense amount of +extra labour, consisting largely of social work, and one of the most +brilliant social functions of the year was a ball at the British Embassy +attended by the Prince and Princess of Wales, at which the various +hostile sections of the French political world met, on that occasion +only, in temporary harmony. + +The general success of the Exhibition and the prominence of English +participation inspired Queen Victoria with the desire to pay a very +private visit to Paris, accompanied by Princess Beatrice and a small +suite, towards the beginning of August. So anxious was she to maintain +secrecy that the only person in England to whom her intention was +confided, was Lord Beaconsfield, and Lord Lyons was enjoined not to say +a word about it to any one, but to inform her confidentially whether she +could visit the Exhibition without being mobbed; whether the heat was +likely to be intense; and whether there was any danger to be apprehended +from Socialists--the term Socialist doubtless including, in the Royal +vocabulary, Anarchists, Terrorists, and Revolutionaries in general. +Incidentally, too, she expressed a wish to hear the Ambassador's opinion +of the Treaty of Berlin. + +Lord Lyons answered the first queries satisfactorily, but it was +characteristic of him that, even to his sovereign, he declined to commit +himself to an opinion on the policy of his official chief. 'Lord Lyons +was always of opinion that Your Majesty's Representative at the Congress +should be a Cabinet Minister, and he rejoiced very much when he heard +that Lord Beaconsfield and Lord Salisbury had been appointed. He has no +detailed or authentic information of the proceedings of the Congress, +but so far as he can judge at present, he has every hope that the +results will be satisfactory to Your Majesty.' + +A long series of letters followed, and after much hesitation, the +Queen finally abandoned her intention, the prospect of hot weather +apparently proving to be too great a deterrent. One singular incident in +the correspondence, which was conducted with much secrecy, was that a +letter from Lord Lyons went all the way to New York before reaching its +destination at Balmoral--an error for which some one presumably suffered. + +During the autumn and winter of 1878, constant discussions took +place between the English and French Governments on the subject of +questions connected with Egypt and Tunis, and it was again thought +at one time that a French _coup_ was in contemplation as a reply to +the Anglo-Turkish Convention. The New Year was signalized by the +denunciation of the Commercial Treaty. In announcing this intelligence, +Lord Lyons said that his only surprise was that the existing Treaty had +lasted so long, and that he did not consider it advisable to make any +attempt to conceal annoyance about it. The treaty of 1860 had been made +from political motives, and our best chance of being decently treated +commercially lay in the dislike of the French to placing themselves on +bad terms with us. 'This is the policy Gambetta avows. As for any Free +Trade feeling in France, that is absolutely a broken reed for us to lean +upon.' + +In January, 1879, senatorial elections took place which resulted in +large Republican gains, and it seemed probable that the existing +Moderate Ministry might not last much longer. It was generally expected +that when the Chambers met, there would be a great struggle on the +part of the advanced Left for all the lucrative and important posts, +and there were the usual fears of mob rule which prevailed whenever +a partial or entire change of Ministry was imminent. The prospect +of losing Waddington as Foreign Minister drew from Lord Salisbury a +characteristic expression of regret: 'I suppose M. Waddington is likely +to be a transitory phenomenon, if the papers are to be believed. I am +sorry for it; for he suits us much better than some converted Legitimist +with an historic name, whose policy I suppose will be a compound of +Louis XIV. and 1791.' + +Waddington was not to go yet, however, and Lord Lyons complained that +he made his life a burden to him in connection with the proceedings +of the British Consul General at Tunis--an aged official who did not +view the spirited French policy there with any friendly eye, and whose +removal the French Government ardently desired. As a general massacre of +aged official innocents was contemplated shortly by the British Foreign +Office, a somewhat ignominious compromise was offered in the shape of +an early retirement of this particular official under an age limit. The +French intentions with regard to Tunis had by this time become quite +evident, and the unfortunate Bey found it extremely difficult to prevent +excuses being found for active intervention in the shape of naval +demonstrations and so forth; it being well known that Marshal MacMahon +and other military men were extremely eager to annex the country at the +first opportunity. + + * * * * * + + _Lord Lyons to Lord Salisbury._ + + Paris, Jan. 14, 1879. + + I should be very sorry to do anything disagreeable to the + French with regard to Tunis. It is the place about which they are + most susceptible at this moment, and the irritation they would feel + at any interference with them there, would overpower, at all events + for the time, all considerations of the general advantages of being + well with England. + + When I said that I saw no reason for hiding any displeasure we + might feel at the denunciation of the Commercial Treaties and at + the manner in which it was done, I meant that we should not abstain + from direct expressions of dissatisfaction at the thing itself. + + My notion is that if we take it too quietly, the + Protectionists will be able to make the Chambers believe that they + can do what they like about the Tariff, and need not fear any + resentment from England. I think that if it can be managed, it + will be advisable to put it out of the power of the ministers to + say that the denunciation has been well received by the English + Government, and has produced no bad impression upon it. In order to + effect this, I should be glad that something unmistakable on the + point should be said in a written communication. If, as I suppose, + Montebello's[21] answer to your note declares that the intention + is to denounce the Treaties one and all, then the rejoinder which + you must make in order to _prendre acte_ of the denunciation + would afford a natural opportunity of expressing annoyance and + apprehension. This is what was in my mind when I wrote. + + There are many members in the Chamber who would deprecate + anything likely to produce coolness between France and England, + and it is not desirable to leave the Protectionists the means + of asserting that there is no danger that a restrictive tariff + would do this. But the feeling is a vague one, and it would be + weakened by endeavours to define it sharply, or to appeal to it too + pointedly. + + Gambetta holds that the true policy of France is to cultivate + the friendship of England and not to loosen the tie of France upon + her by instructions injurious to her commerce. He is in particular + very much afraid of the feeling in favour of the Empire which would + be revived in the wine-growing districts, if under the Republic the + English wine duties became less favourable to French wines. + + The game of the Protectionists is to put the duties in the + general tariff as high as they dare, without provoking retaliation; + and the general tariff once passed, to declare that it is the + latest expression of the will of the country, and that the + Government has no right to relax it by treaty, unless by way of + barter, in return for great concessions made to France. + + In the mean time matters may possibly in some measure + be modified, as regards commercial policy by changes in the + Government, but the modification in this respect would scarcely be + very great. + + The 'groups,' as they are called, of the Left have been + endeavouring to get the ministers to negotiate with them before + the Chambers met. They want, now the Chambers have met, to reduce + the Ministers to absolute dependence on Parliamentary Committees. + The Ministers are acting properly and constitutionally. They + decline to be dictated to by groups and committees, and they intend + to announce their programme from the Tribune, and to call for a + vote of confidence or want of confidence, from both Chambers. + Waddington, when I saw him yesterday, was very confident of + success. They have found it necessary to sacrifice the Minister + of War, who, among other defects was entirely inefficient in the + Tribune, but Waddington did not anticipate any other changes in the + Cabinet. He said that Gambetta had promised the Government his full + and cordial support. + + To pass from Paris, or rather from Versailles to + Constantinople, I will give you for what it may be worth, a story + which has been brought to the Embassy by a person who has sometimes + shown himself to be well informed with regard to what is passing + at the Porte. He affirms that a compact has been made between + Khaireddin and Osman Pashas to dethrone Sultan Abdul Hamid and set + aside the Othman family altogether as effete and half insane. This + being done, a member of a family established at Konia is, according + to my informant, to be declared Sultan. + + I have often heard of the Konia family as having a sort of + pretention to the throne, as descending from Seljuk Sultans or some + other dynasty overthrown by Othman or his successors. + + Abdul Hamid does not generally leave his Grand Viziers in + office long enough for them to be able to mature a 'conspiracy + against him.' + +In January a prolonged struggle took place between the Ministry and the +Left, chiefly over the burning question of Government officials, and +the alleged unwillingness to introduce really Republican measures; and +before the end of the month Marshal MacMahon and his Prime Minister, +M. Dufaure tendered their resignations. It was well known that the +Marshal was anxious to take this course, and he followed the advice of +his friends in choosing, as his reason for resigning, his inability +to concur in a measure which deprived some officers of high rank of +their military commands. When, therefore, he was confronted with the +alternative of signing the decree removing his old companions in arms, +or of resigning himself, he replied that Ministers would have to look +out for another President, and M. Grévy, a comparatively moderate +Liberal, was elected in his place by a large majority. The 'transitory +phenomenon,' M. Waddington, however, remained in office and indeed +became head of a new Administration, but it was felt that this +arrangement was merely temporary. Power had really passed into the hands +of Gambetta, and although he contented himself, for the time being, with +the Presidency of the Chamber of Deputies, there was nothing to prevent +him from establishing himself in office, whenever he should think that +the opportune moment had arrived; since, unlike the Speakership in +England, the Presidency of the Chamber is looked upon in France as the +road to the highest Ministerial rank. + +In consequence of the election of a new President of the Republic in +the person of M. Grévy, the question arose as to whether the Foreign +Representatives should receive fresh credentials, and the action of +Prince Bismarck in this connection caused fresh discord amongst leading +French politicians. When M. Waddington was at Berlin, he had made a +very favourable impression upon the Chancellor, and as he himself +subsequently informed me, Bismarck had taken great pains to be civil +to him, and to manifest that especial confidence which takes the form +of abusing other people--notably Prince Gortschakoff. He now took the +opportunity to inform M. Waddington that he entertained such remarkable +esteem for him, that he had advised the Emperor to dispense with any new +letter of credence, a proceeding which infuriated Gambetta and disposed +him to upset Waddington at an early date. 'Altogether there seems an +impression,' wrote Lord Lyons, 'that the new Ministry will not last +long. Gambetta does not like either Grévy or Waddington. Waddington has +yet to show that he has the staff of a Prime Minister in him. He has +not hitherto been a very ready or a very effective speaker. He is +even said to have a slight English accent in speaking French. I don't +believe any one ever perceived this who did not know beforehand that he +had had an English education. But this English education certainly has +had the effect of preventing him having exactly French modes of thought +and French ways, and thus he is not always completely in tune with the +feelings of his hearers in Parliament.' + +[Illustration: _J Russell & Sons, Phot._ + +_William Henry Waddington_ + +LONDON: EDWARD ARNOLD] + +It was a common charge made against the late M. Waddington by his +opponents that he spoke French with an English, and English with a +French accent. As a matter of fact, he was a perfect specimen of a +bilinguist, and would have passed as a native of either nation. + + * * * * * + + _Lord Lyons to Lord Salisbury._ + + Feb. 11, 1879. + + Fournier's[22] vagaries are becoming very dangerous, but we + are in a state of anarchy here. The Ministry is composed in general + of men of respectable character and respectable abilities; but + there is no one of them who has hitherto obtained any great hold + on the Chambers or on the country. Their proper game would be to + try and form a Liberal-Conservative party of the Centre Gauche, + the Centre Droit, and the Gauche Républicaine, with whose support + and that of the country at large, they might keep the Ultra Reds + in check. Hitherto they have not shown that there is stuff enough + in them for this, but then they have hardly had a chance. They + have made a weak compromise on the Amnesty Question, but if they + get a good majority on that question, they might start afresh and + show what is in them. So far they are looked upon by most people + as warming pans for Gambetta and his followers: and I have been + assured that some of the French Representatives abroad do not + hesitate to communicate with Gambetta behind Waddington's back. + + I must confess that, contrary to my wont, I am rather gloomy + about the state of things here. The relaxation of the efficiency + of the police is undeniable. This was one of the symptoms of the + decay of the Empire. The Gendarmerie is being tampered with. Recent + measures seem to increase the opportunities for disturbances, and + diminish the means of dealing with them. I do not see where, in + the present Government, resistance to disorder is to come from in + an emergency. But I will not croak. Waddington and his colleagues + may steady themselves in office and restore authority yet, but they + have not much time to lose. + + Waddington would be the safest Minister we could have in + Eastern Affairs, if he made his subordinates abroad obey him. + Gambetta might be more friendly in commercial matters and more + ready to be an active ally in the East, but he would expect a + recompense in the West, and might be a dangerous friend who would + require careful 'watching.' + +Poor M. Waddington's prospects were not improved by a trivial but +untoward incident in the Chamber. In the course of one of his first +speeches as Prime Minister 'a great deal of laughter is said to have +been produced by his dropping some of the sheets of his written speech +over the edge of the Tribune, and having to wait till they were picked +up'--an incident which serves to show the more generous spirit of the +British politician, since a recent Prime Minister was in the habit of +delivering soul-stirring orations by the same method, without evoking +any disrespectful criticism on the part of his opponents. + +Towards the end of February a crisis in Egypt rendered it necessary for +the British and French Governments to have recourse to joint action for +the purpose of protecting their interests. + +As the result of a Commission of Inquiry in 1878, the Khedive Ismail, +who had long boasted that Egypt was practically a European state, +accepted the position of a Constitutional Ruler, with Nubar Pasha as +his Prime Minister, Mr. Rivers Wilson[23] as Minister of Finance, and a +Frenchman, M. de Blignières, as Minister of Public Works. It was in the +highest degree improbable that a man of his intriguing and ambitious +character would submit permanently to any such restraint, and before +long he succeeded in working upon the disaffection of those persons +whose privileges were threatened or affected by European control, to +such an extent that, by organizing a military riot, he was able to force +Nubar Pasha to resign on February 20, 1879. At the same time he demanded +much greater powers for himself, including the right to preside over the +Cabinet, and to have all measures submitted to his approval--demands +which were strongly resisted by his European Ministers, who invoked the +support of their Governments. + + * * * * * + + _Lord Lyons to Lord Salisbury._ + + Paris, Feb. 21, 1879. + + I have just received your telegram announcing your concurrence + in Waddington's draft instructions to Cairo, and I shall + communicate it to him forthwith. + + Waddington seemed quite firm on the point of not allowing + the Khedive to resume his personal power, and would no doubt be + ready to join in any practical steps for that purpose; but in + the meantime it may be feared that His Highness is consolidating + his resumption of power. Waddington looks upon the whole affair + as a simple manoevre of the Khedive to upset the new system of + government. It does not in fact seem likely that so arrant a + coward would have risked his own precious person, if he had not + had a pretty good understanding with the rioters. Public opinion + in France would, I think, support Waddington in taking strong + measures. There does not seem to be any one but Nubar of position + enough to be a Prime Minister of any independence; Waddington + seemed fully aware that if the Khedive is present at the council of + Ministers, no Egyptian Minister will open his lips. + + Godeaux telegraphed last night that order having been + restored, the presence of a ship of war at Alexandria might not be + necessary, but Waddington thought on the contrary that it would + be 'essential in order to produce a salutary impression on the + Khedive, and keep him in some check.' + +Nubar Pasha was regarded as English and anti-French, and his fall was, +therefore, received at Paris with some degree of complacency; but the +feeling was not sufficiently strong to make the Government hold out +against his restoration to office, should that be considered necessary +for the purpose of checking the Khedive, and the tendency was to make +no suggestions and to wait for the lead of England, it being understood +that both Governments were resolved not to consent to any change of the +political system in Egypt. + + _Lord Salisbury to Lord Lyons._ + + March 1, 1879. + + * * * * * + + As to Egypt, I gather from your telegram to-day that + Waddington looks on our message to Vivian[24] as in the nature of + an ultimatum, and he is puzzled what we are to do next if it should + be rejected. We do not in the least look on it as an ultimatum, and + it is not so phrased. We may well receive either from the Khedive + or the Agents some alternative proposal which may be discussed, + and perhaps hammered into an acceptable arrangement at least for + a time. But in any case our position cannot be worse here than if + we had acquiesced at once in the results of the conspiracy against + Nubar; while the chances are that it will enable us to arrive at + some plan for partially curbing the Khedive, which at all events + shall partially disguise the check we have undoubtedly received. + The causes are obscure. It is evident there has been imprudence. I + wish I could be quite satisfied there has been perfect loyalty. + +Writing a day or two later, Lord Salisbury explained that he was in some +difficulty, as Mr. Vivian and Mr. Rivers Wilson held different opinions. +The former wanted to conciliate the Khedive by not forcing upon him the +restoration of Nubar, while Mr. Rivers Wilson strongly insisted upon his +return. Lord Salisbury himself was inclined to the latter course because +'otherwise the Khedive will be like a horse who has succeeded in beating +his rider, and will never be safe for that rider to mount again,' but +eventually decided against it. From the following letter it looks as +if the retirement of the hapless British Representative at Tunis was +intended as a peace offering to the cause of Anglo-French joint action +in Egypt. + + * * * * * + + _Lord Salisbury to Lord Lyons._ + + March 6, 1879. + + It is better always to get the credit of one's good actions, + which are naturally few. Will you kindly tell M. Waddington in the + most unofficial way in the world that----having returned himself as + 67 years of age (he entered the service 55 years ago, and therefore + must have begun his public labours at a precocious age) we have + suppressed the Consulate General of Tunis, and that there will + henceforth be a man on reduced salary, a consul or agent, after the + close of this month. + + I think the French will find difficulties enough with Italy if + they ever try to increase their influence in Tunis; but that is no + affair of ours. We have hot water enough elsewhere without desiring + to boil any in Tunis. + + One good turn deserves another, and I hope Waddington will + feel himself bound to keep his agents from Anglophobia in Turkey. + + The Egyptian compromise will do very well for the time. It + seems doubtful whether Nubar is worth anything now. An Oriental + does not easily pluck up a spirit when he has once been beaten, and + Nubar is reported to have told friends in England that he knew that + whenever the Khedive had done with him there was a cup of coffee + waiting for him. + +The compromise referred to took the form of a new Egyptian Ministry +containing the two English and French representatives, and nominally +presided over by the Khedive's eldest son, Prince Tewfik. The +experiment, however, of trying to keep a Ministry in office in spite of +the opposition of the chief of the State did not last long, for in April +the irrepressible Khedive dismissed his Ministers and installed Cherif +Pasha as Prime Minister. This spirited action caused M. Waddington +much perplexity, as he did not believe that French public opinion +would allow him to take a slap in the face quietly from the Khedive. +The French bondholders were too influential to think of throwing them +over, and then there was the Crédit Foncier, a more or less Government +establishment, which no French Government could allow to come to grief. +There was a keen desire to maintain the concert between England and +France on Egyptian affairs, but if the bondholders suspected that +England was likely to be lukewarm on their behalf, there was a strong +probability that the French Government might be forced to act alone +in the enforcement of French claims. Lord Salisbury on his side was +naturally reluctant to be identified with the bondholders' cause. + + * * * * * + + _Lord Salisbury to Lord Lyons._ + + April 10, 1879. + + I see by your telegrams which have arrived to-day that M. + Waddington suggests as a means of coercion against the Khedive that + MM. Rothschild should refuse to pay him the balance of the loan. + Mr. Rivers Wilson had made the same suggestion to the Baron. But + the latter, in a message sent yesterday through his son, repudiated + any idea of such a proceeding as dishonourable, and attributed the + suggestion to momentary excitement. + + With respect to the second idea, the only question is whether + the Sultan will ever summon up courage to take such a step, and + if he does, whether he can enforce it. If it can be done quite + smoothly, _perhaps_ it would be the best course; but I speak with + some doubt. + + It may be quite tolerable and even agreeable to the French + Government to go into partnership with the bondholders; or rather + to act as sheriffs' officer for them. But to us it is a new and + very embarrassing sensation. Egypt never can prosper so long as + some 25 per cent. of her revenue goes in paying interest on her + debt. We have no wish to part company with France: still less do we + mean that France should acquire in Egypt any special ascendency; + but subject to these two considerations I should be glad to be free + of the companionship of the bondholders. + +M. Waddington's 'second idea' evidently referred to the deposing of the +Khedive by means of the Sultan; but his difficulty lay in the old French +jealousy of the Porte exercising influence over the internal affairs +of Egypt, and during the reign of Sultan Abdul Aziz the consequence of +that influence had certainly been a constant drain of money from Cairo +to Constantinople. One suggestion was that the Sultan should summon the +Khedive to come to Constantinople to do homage, a ceremony which he +had never yet performed, and a refusal to obey would have made him a +rebel in the Sultan's eyes; but the objection to this course was that +the Khedive might, if he went, take large sums of money with him and so +propitiate his suzerain. + + * * * * * + + _Lord Salisbury to Lord Lyons._ + + April 16, 1879. + + Waddington's policy is not very intelligible. I suppose it + is a compromise between a sense of the danger of doing anything + strong, and of the necessity of satisfying the Crédit Foncier. + In the despatch which you will receive we have done our best to + accommodate ourselves to Waddington's view, without taking up a + wholly untenable position. + + There is one thing which it is necessary not to forget, though + I could not mention it in the despatch. We have very different + audiences to please; and though we may agree upon the actual + intimation to be given to the Khedive and the Sultan respectively, + the argument leading up to those communications cannot in both + cases be precisely the same. We must lay stress on separate points, + and the argument derived from the Khedive's application for a + European Minister must be treated differently by the two Powers, + as the circumstances were not similar. We should therefore avoid + identic notes, though we may make a concerted representation. + + The communication to the Porte had better be indiscreetly + communicated to the Khedive's agent there, who is an intelligent + man. It may only result in producing a very heavy payment to the + Porte. But that, under existing circumstances, will itself be of + advantage. + + I suppose that Waddington means to upset the Ottoman Bank + project as a retort for the failure of Tocqueville's. + + What does he think of Martino's share in the recent Egyptian + crisis? Italy is likely to be a plague to all of us. + +In France there was a violent party, more or less supported by Gambetta, +which desired to send some energetic Agent to Egypt who would bully +the Khedive successfully. Unfortunately, such energetic agents were +extremely likely to quarrel with their British colleagues, whereas M. +Waddington, who was peaceably disposed, wished to appoint quiet and +unobtrusive representatives who would work harmoniously, and implicitly +follow their instructions. There was, however, some excuse for the men +of action, as a very well-founded suspicion prevailed in Paris that the +Russians, and even the Germans, were busy at Rome inciting the Italians +to make trouble for England and France at Cairo. Moreover, Gambetta and +his friends believed, probably with reason, that the Khedive would never +have gone so far in defying England and France if he had not felt that +he was backed up by other Powers, as well as by Italy. + +Mr. Vivian, the British agent in Cairo, who had been summoned to London, +returned to his post at the end of April bearing a note, the gist of +which was, that the two Governments, in view of the iniquities of the +Khedive, 'reserved to themselves an entire liberty of appreciation +and action in defending their interests in Egypt, and in seeking +the arrangements best calculated to secure the good government and +prosperity of the country.' In other words, the Khedive was warned that +he had better be careful; but there was, so far, no hint of deposition. + +In Lord Salisbury's letter to Lord Lyons, enclosing a copy of the above +note, there is an interesting personal opinion on the question of +governing Orientals by Europeans. 'With all these Oriental populations I +suspect that the _rôle_ of Europeans should in the main be confined to +positions of criticism and control. They can only govern after absolute +conquest, and then expensively. The difficulty of governing without +conquest is, of course, enormously increased when two nationalities have +to be provided for, and two Governments to be consulted.' + +The period following the return of Mr. Vivian to his post was marked +by a violent and entirely unreasonable campaign against England in the +French press, it being thought, for some unknown reason, that France had +been abandoned, and M. Waddington took the somewhat unusual course of +sending a message to Lord Salisbury through Mr. Rivers Wilson, instead +of communicating in the ordinary manner. + + * * * * * + + _Lord Salisbury to Lord Lyons._ + + May 21, 1879. + + On Monday Rivers Wilson sent me word that he had a message + to deliver to me from Waddington. Accordingly I asked him to come + and see me yesterday to deliver it. It was to the effect that + Waddington was willing and anxious to move the Porte to dethrone + the Khedive, if England would join in this step. I represented + that there were three difficulties. The Sultan might not assent: + if he did, the Khedive might not yield. If the latter did yield, + the successor might be either feeble or bad, and we should be + called upon to support him in one case, and replace him in the + other. To the first objection Wilson replied that Waddington had no + apprehensions as to the Sultan's consent; to the second he (Wilson) + and every person who knew Egypt well, did not doubt that the moment + a Firman was issued, the Khedive would fall; as to the third, he + could only say that Prince Tewfik was a compendium of the cardinal + virtues. + + If Waddington did not communicate his proposal to you, I am + obliged to consider what possible motive he could have had for + taking this circuitous route, unless he meant to disavow the offer + later on. If he says nothing to you about it, it may be worth while + to sound him. + + If there were no France in the way, I should be disposed to + give no reply to the Khedive's note we received by the last mail, + or at least only to say that since the dismissal of the English + Minister, the Khedive's finance had become so hopelessly tangled, + partly owing to his extravagance, partly to the conflict with + other Powers into which the decree of April 22nd has brought him, + that we must reserve our judgment with respect to all questions + of financial control till the position of affairs had become + more intelligible. I think that on some such plea as that we + might stand by and look on for a few months till the Khedive + has knocked himself to pieces, which he inevitably will do. The + fiscal condition is now so hopeless that I am rather grateful to + the Khedive for refusing to put it into the hands of an English + Minister. I doubt whether any European can now undertake it + without discredit, until the country has gone into liquidation. + The disproportion between the debt and the revenue--joined to + the difficulties which have now been raised by the action of the + courts and the attitude of the other Powers, makes effective or + even humane government hopeless till there has been a bankruptcy. + But then that would not suit a purely Bourse policy like that of + France. We must take notice of this difference of the French view, + and we may have to modify our policy accordingly; for we cannot + allow France to go on alone, and we will not part company with her + if we can possibly help it. But in this state of our relative views + and wishes, it is already for us to wait, and for her to propose. + If left alone, our disposition would be to find an excuse for + waiting, and if we move it will be because France is urging us. We + should therefore naturally wait till France made a proposal to us, + and should be inclined to cross-examine her as to what will be + her next move after that, in the various contingencies which may + result from the course they propose. I think, however, you might + open communications by mentioning, quite unofficially, how much + pain the articles in the _République Française_ and the _Débuts_ + have given us. To ordinary papers we should of course have paid no + attention; but one of them is, or was till very recently, edited + by a gentleman in the French Foreign Office; the other is in part + the property of a Minister. We are utterly unable to understand on + what foundation the reproaches rest that we have shown reserves + and hesitations in the pursuit of the joint Egyptian policy. On + the contrary, if we had occupied towards France the position which + Servia occupies towards Russia, our compliance could hardly have + been more exact. But this outbreak of causeless wrath justifies us + in asking what France wants, and what she complains of. + + You will of course say as much of this, or as much more as + you may think wise. But it may be as well to show that we are + not insensible to this attempt to work Parliament against us + by revelations or communications on matters which the French + Government themselves have charged us to treat as confidential. + +The attacks on England in the French press were not inspired, as Lord +Salisbury supposed, by the French Foreign Office, but by Gambetta, who +desired a strong policy in Egypt and seized the opportunity to fall upon +Waddington. The latter, however, by this time had made up his mind as to +what should be done. + + * * * * * + + _Lord Lyons to Lord Salisbury._ + + Paris, May 22, 1879. + + As you will have seen by my telegram, what Waddington said + to me yesterday was, that there appeared to him to be only two + alternatives with regard to the Egyptian question--to depose the + Khedive or to establish a Control. He talked a good deal more + about the Control than the deposition; but when I asked him if + this meant that the Control was the alternative he preferred, he + declined to express any preference for the one or the other. If we + are to wait until he has devised measures (and this is what he told + me he was about) for establishing an efficacious control we need + not fear being called upon to act in a hurry. I quite agree with + you that we cannot let France go on alone in Egypt; for if we do, + she may go lengths which will produce something a great deal more + dangerous than a mere coolness between us. French power and French + feeling are very different from what they were some years ago, + when the French would have let us do almost anything we chose in + Egypt, if we would have taken care of the interests of the French + bondholders. + +Nothing can be plainer than Lord Salisbury's desire to act in concert +with France, and to have regard to French interests in Egypt, but the +constant attacks made upon British policy and the persistent hostility +of French agents, not only in Egypt, but elsewhere, rendered the task +anything but easy. Gambetta's hostility was partly due to the fact that +he was an enthusiastic Phil-Hellene, and considered that not enough was +being done for Greece in the way of procuring for her accessions of +territory at the expense of Turkey. It is as well to point out that, +whereas the Turks had been compelled to cede territory to States with +which they had been at war, they were at this time being pressed to cede +territory to Greece because that Power had remained at peace. + + * * * * * + + _Lord Salisbury to Lord Lyons._ + + June 6, 1879. + + The recent course of the French newspapers which have the + credit of being inspired by Gambetta and Léon Say is certainly a + puzzle. Looking over the course of negotiations between us and + Waddington on Egypt, I should find it very difficult to say which + of the two Governments had pulled the other on, and which had + dragged the other back. As far as any important negotiations go, + I should say that we had been a shade more in favour of active + measures than the other side. The two newspapers in question + are evidently well informed; and therefore their assumption + that we have prevented the French from acting must be put on + for a purpose; what purpose it is difficult to say. The most + obvious solution--bearing in mind the English friendships of the + two statesmen concerned--is that the whole movement is meant + to operate on English internal politics, and not on European + politics at all: and this view is supported by the use which has + actually been made of the controversy here. The incident is common + enough in diplomatic history: but it has always been bitterly + resented by the Government which is the subject of that species + of attack. But in this case there is some doubt as to how far + Waddington is implicated. Nothing is more difficult to deal with + than a 'Marionette Government,' because the marionettes are not + responsible, and you cannot get at the man who pulls the strings. + There is one spot in the diplomatic battlefield--almost the only + one--where we have been exposed to risk, and have consequently + been anxious--the Balkan Peninsula: and on this we have been + systematically opposed by France. Ring, Coutouly and Fournier have + played us every kind of trick. But all the time, nothing could + have been more unexceptionable than Waddington's language and + instructions. So it is with this newspaper warfare. The secondary + agents, who are popularly supposed to act from inspiration are + undisguisedly hostile. Waddington's demeanour all the time is + imperturbably friendly. Is it helplessness, or bad faith? The + question is one of considerable practical importance: for if we are + to measure the co-operation of France by the action of Fournier and + Gambetta, we shall do wisely to retire, gently but effectually, + from a perilous partnership. And it is impossible to ignore this + aspect of the case in considering the precise line to be pursued in + the two pending questions of Greece and Egypt. + + Our object in Egypt, ever since we promised some four years + ago not to take it, is to see that our own interests are not + injured and that French interests receive adequate, but not + excessive consideration. If, however, Gambetta means mischief, it + may be wise for us to seek the protection of English interests + only, and leave the French to take care of themselves. This would + be done by pushing forward the other Powers. Their interference + would be fatal to Egyptian solvency, and consequently to + French bondholders. But it would be as fatal a bar to French + preponderance as the plan of duplicating all appointments, and + as none of these great Powers are naval, we could look after + the Canal just as easily if they were masters in Egypt, as + under the present Anglo-French system. If the French are really + friends, the Anglo-French system may be maintained in spite of + many inconveniences in order to cement that friendship. But if + Gambetta and Fournier are to be taken as the directing force in + French politics, the Anglo-French system is merely a make-believe, + and will only draw us into a succession of crises in which we + shall probably be outwitted. This dilemma merits very careful + consideration. Greece is a less important and more transitory + affair. In order to avoid division in the Congress we went rather + further than we thought quite wise; and we have no wish to go + further still. Of course, abstractedly, it would be much better + that all the Hellenic populations should be under a Hellenic ruler. + But Turkey is still a fact of which account must be taken; and the + danger of Turkey resisting is very serious. The fact that Greece + has not won this territory as prize of war, nor earned it as the + consideration of any service done, but is to gain it merely by her + skill in singing diplomatic dithyrambics, appears to irritate the + Turks intensely. It is not our present policy to adopt a course + which shall induce the Sultan to listen to the Russian proposals + which are so freely placed before him. We would not therefore, + in any case, take a leading part in pressing the cession on him. + But we doubt extremely the wisdom of exciting anew the Moslem + fanaticism, by demanding a town to which the Albanians attach so + much importance as Janina. However, in this question we should + have been a good deal influenced by the wishes of France, if we + could have thought that by exalting the influence of Fournier we + were strengthening a friend. But can we do so? + +There was, in reality, no foundation for Lord Salisbury's suspicions +that Gambetta and his allies were seeking to interfere in British +internal politics. The objectionable articles were written under an +erroneous impression that France had been outwitted, and that Mr. +Vivian, in pursuance of secret instructions from his Government, was +working for the failure of the joint Anglo-French administration in +Egypt and for the establishment of exclusive British influence. But as +the attacks in the French press mainly took the form of abusing England +for not agreeing to energetic proposals made by the French Government, +it was a legitimate grievance against M. Waddington that he never took +any steps whatever to contradict this perfectly baseless accusation. +As for the conduct of French agents who were continually intriguing +against their English colleagues, it is probable that M. Waddington was +able to exercise little or no control over them, and it has already +been mentioned that some of them were in the habit of corresponding +directly with Gambetta behind the back of their official chief. Lord +Lyons, who naturally was anxious to make things as easy for the French +as possible, recommended that the vanity and susceptibility of French +diplomatists abroad and of the public at home, should be studied as +much as possible, since there was a universal feeling that France was +now too strong to play a secondary part anywhere, and that sacrifices +on our part were preferable to allowing her to throw herself into the +arms of Russia. Lord Salisbury therefore persevered in the difficult +task of endeavouring to co-operate cordially with the French Government, +and M. Waddington applied himself to elaborating the scheme of Dual +Control which was eventually adopted. Meanwhile it had become apparent +that, in order to obtain anything like a successful result, the Khedive +Ismail must be got rid of somehow, a course which was urged not only by +Gambetta, but by the French Agent at Cairo. Joint efforts were made by +the French and British Agents to induce him to abdicate in favour of +Prince Tewfik, which were seconded by the representations of Germany +and Austria; but these were of no avail, and the Gordian knot was +not cut until the Sultan suddenly intervened on June 26. On that day +a telegram arrived from Constantinople, deposing Ismail by Imperial +Iradé, and conferring the Government of Egypt upon his eldest son Prince +Tewfik, who was at once proclaimed Khedive without any disturbance of +tranquillity. + +The action of the Sultan was not only sudden but unexpected, and Lord +Salisbury at once took steps to assure the French Government that it was +not due to the instigation of Her Majesty's Government. + + * * * * * + + _Lord Salisbury to Lord Lyons._ + + June 26, 1879. + + Pray assure M. Waddington that the Turkish move reported + to-day does not proceed in any way from our suggestion. We have + only urged in the very strongest terms that the Sultan should not + interfere with what we were doing in Cairo. But the Sultan seems to + have been perfectly resolved to have a finger in the pie; and as he + was not allowed to interfere to save the Khedive, he indemnified + himself by interfering to upset him. + + I am not specially in love with the Firman of 1873, which + I see the Sultan has revoked. But I am afraid it will annoy + Waddington, and therefore I am anxious he should be well convinced + we had no hand in it. + + Now it is done, the wisest course we can take is to accept it, + and devote our energies to procuring any new Firman that may be + necessary to the present state of Egyptian finances. I don't think + it will be any great evil if their power of raising armaments is + limited. But on all this I should like to have Waddington's opinion. + +M. Waddington was a sensible man, and therefore there was no difficulty +in convincing him that England was not responsible for the Sultan's +action; but French opinion generally was incredulous, and it was +believed that the deposition of Ismail was the result of the rivalry at +Constantinople between the French and British Ambassadors. The latter +was unjustly suspected of a desire to reduce Egypt to the condition +of a Turkish Pashalic, and it was obvious that the revocation of the +Firman indicated the intention of the Sultan to reassert his influence +over Egypt in a manner which French policy had consistently opposed. +Although, therefore, the Sultan's action had delivered both England +and France from a highly embarrassing situation, and had been taken +at a most opportune moment, it was considered advisable, instead of +expressing gratitude, to criticise adversely the form of the Imperial +Iradé, and to insist upon the issue of another. + +What was, however, of really more essential importance than the somewhat +remote fear of Turkish interference was the question of how the Dual +Control was to be effectively established. + + * * * * * + + _Lord Salisbury to Lord Lyons._ + + July 7, 1879. + + Our perplexity as to the effect of the Firman has received + a rather comical solution. No such Firman exists. An 'Iradé' is + merely the Sultan's signature; and that was only given to the + telegraphic message deposing Ismail. So that the revocation of the + Firman of 1873 has not taken place, and the discussion as to the + exact meaning of such a revocation seems to be premature. All that + we now have to do is to prevent, if we can, any Firman at all being + issued to Tewfik, and then every one will be happy. + + Tewfik is resolved to begin the Liquidation at once; and if + it be true that interest is rolling up at the rate of £80,000 a + month, there is good cause for his desire to hurry it. But the + Controllers will hardly be enough. We want to have some hold over + the government of Egypt, though we do not want to assume any + overt responsibility. The great object seems to me to be to have + representatives inside the offices who shall be able to report + what the Government are doing to the Agents, and shall be able to + give advice to the Government in accordance with the instructions + of the Agents. If you have a European Minister, the Agent must + be suppressed. I despair of making two talented Englishmen work + side by side, without subordinating one to the other; and if we + must choose between Agent and Minister as a vehicle of English + influence, the former seems to me the easier to work with. He is + not quasi-independent, and therefore will obey orders. He occupies + a recognized and traditional position and therefore excites no + jealousy either among Moslems or other Christian Powers; and he + cannot be dismissed; and if his advice is not taken, or applied + badly, the country he serves is not in the eyes of the world + primarily responsible. The case on the other side is that the + European Minister has more power. But has he? What power did Wilson + enjoy? The only power Europeans can enjoy at Cairo rests on the + fear which their Governments may happen to inspire, and this fear + will operate as strongly through an Agent as through a Minister. + We do not put European Ministers even into the Governments of + dependent Indian Provinces: and there we have, what we cannot have + in Egypt for a long time, 'bayonets to sit upon.' + + We have made the mistake in Egypt and elsewhere, of + underrating the vitality of the Moslem feeling. I am afraid M. + Waddington is doing so with respect to Greece. + +Another letter deals further with the question of Control, and contains +some interesting reflections on moral influence. + + * * * * * + + _Lord Salisbury to Lord Lyons._ + + July 15, 1879. + + I am very much of the opinion that the Control should take + the form of inspection. It is the only form of Control likely to + be effective. Actual authority we cannot exercise. We tried to do + it through the European Ministers, but when the stress came, the + disbanded officers proved to us that two pairs of arms are not much + use against two thousand. The only form of Control we have is that + which is called moral influence--which in practice is a combination + of menace, objurgation, and worry. In this we are still supreme + and have many modes of applying it--diplomatic notes, consular + interviews, newspapers, blue books. We must devote ourselves to the + perfecting of this weapon. And, obviously, the first condition of + its use is complete knowledge of what is going in. + + The exchange, therefore, of nominal authority for real + inspectionship is a step in the right direction. It is facing + facts. We must exert ourselves to open to these inspectors every + avenue of information; and we must have a certain number of + sub-inspectors paid by Egypt, who shall travel about, collecting + information. It is essential, of course, that these last should + know the language. + + The division of the jurisdiction of the two inspectors is + a serious puzzle. Upper and Lower Egypt certainly will not do, + unless we have Lower Egypt. I had thought of a North and South + division--the Nile--starting at Damietta. But I know Vivian does + not like this; moreover I see difficulties about handing over + Alexandria to the French. + + Waddington's proposal for a rotatory jurisdiction sounds odd. + What would he think of it as applied to any other department of + life--Ambassadors, Bishops, or Ministers? I suppose the frequency + of what they call a 'Prefectoral Movement' in France has put it + into his head. + + Would it be possible to fuse them into a board, giving them + a native colleague to be chosen by themselves, and then decide + by majority? I have spoken to Baring[25] about the Commission of + Liquidation. I doubt his accepting the Control, though I think he + would the Liquidation. + + As to the Firman, we are agreed as to the limitation of + armaments. I should be glad to see loans forbidden altogether. + To an Oriental ruler they are like firewater to the Red Indians. + I should be glad to see a declaration that the Powers would not + recognize or encourage the payment of any loan contracted by the + Egyptian Government after this date. They are not wanted to meet + any present stress; but the fellaheen are already loaded with quite + as heavy a weight as they can bear. + +The question of appointing the Controllers and deciding what their +functions were to be, gave rise to more difficulties, caused by the +obvious desire of many Frenchmen to get the Egyptian finances entirely +into French hands. Ultimately Major Baring and M. de Blignières +were appointed, but their powers were not formally defined until +November. By the decree of November 15, 1879, it was laid down that +the Controllers should have full rights of inquiring into all branches +of the administration; the rank of Ministers and seats in the Cabinet, +although restricted to making suggestions; the power of appointing and +dismissing subordinate officials; and it was further enacted that they +were irremovable without the consent of their respective Governments. By +this action the British and the French Governments practically assumed +the responsibility of Government, and for some time to come Egypt ceased +to give trouble. + +In the month of June, 1879, an event had occurred which was of profound +importance to all political parties in France. The Prince Imperial +had perished in Zululand, and with him had vanished the hopes of a +resuscitated Empire. The tragedy of the Prince's death is heightened +by the fact that it was only owing to an unfortunate misunderstanding +that he was ever allowed to accompany the expedition. On March 1, +Lord Salisbury writing to Lord Lyons stated that the departure of the +Prince Imperial was: _'a mal entendu_ which we are unable to understand +even here. The Government had very distinctly negatived it, but in +consequence of some misapprehensions, our orders were not attended to +by the military men, and he received encouragement which could not +afterwards be withdrawn. If you think Waddington is at all sore on the +matter, you are authorized to explain this fully to him. But I rather +expect to hear from you that no importance is attached by the French +Government to what has taken place.' + +Two days later he again wrote:-- + + I am very sorry to hear that so painful an impression was + created in Paris. We have never been able to discover exactly + how it was done, or why our already clearly expressed objection + was disregarded. He was of course at liberty to go, and people + who ought to have known better were at liberty to write private + letters and go to railway stations. Of course nothing official has + been done, but the border line between official and private has + been very closely trenched upon. However, all we can do now is to + express our sincere regret. + +At Lord Lyons's next interview with M. Waddington, the latter asked (not +in a complaining manner) how the Prince's expedition to Zululand had +been brought about, and was told in reply that the Prince had settled it +himself through personal friends and that Her Majesty's Government had +by no means approved of it. President Grévy alluded to the matter in the +course of a conversation with the Prince of Wales, who happened to be in +Paris, and also expressed no disapproval; in fact, he went so far as to +remark: _qu'il avait très bien fait_. Thus the principal personages in +France evidently did not consider the matter of much importance; but, +on the other hand, the Republican press showed considerable irritation, +which, under the circumstances, was perhaps not entirely unnatural, as +it did not seem credible that the Prince could have started without the +approval of the British Government. When the news of his death arrived, +it was felt that, for the time being at all events, Bonapartism had been +practically crushed out of existence. + + * * * * * + + _Lord Lyons to Lord Salisbury._ + + Paris, June 20, 1879. + + In hearing of the sad end of the short life of the Prince + Imperial, one's first thought is for the Empress, whose bitter cup + of sorrows is now full. + + The immediate political result is the utter disorganization + of the Imperial Party. It was far from strong, but still it was + the most efficacious element of opposition to the Republicans, and + they will now have things still more their own way. The Fleurys, + Rouhers, and the old Imperial following can never hope to live to + recover from the blow. I suppose Prince Napoleon will hardly put + himself forward in the position of a pretender to the Imperial + Crown, and he would have no party with him if he did. In the + more remote future his eldest son may prove a more formidable + candidate than poor Prince Louis could have been. He is said to be + a remarkably clever, attractive youth, and a thorough Bonaparte + in appearance. No hereditary responsibility for Sedan can be cast + upon him; he is undoubtedly of the Bonaparte race, and he has been + brought up in France. For the present, however, Prince Louis's + melancholy death is a decided accession to Republican strength. + +The death of the Prince excited the sympathies of all classes in France +with the stricken Empress, but when in July, preparations were being +made for the funeral in England, the bitterness of French party politics +displayed itself in that hostility which, carried beyond the grave, it +is the least possible to condone. + + * * * * * + + _Lord Lyons to Lord Salisbury._ + + Paris, July 10, 1879. + + The susceptibility the French Government is showing about + the funeral of the Prince Imperial is neither wise nor dignified. + If ever there was an occasion on which political animosities + might be left in abeyance, surely this is one. The death of the + Prince Imperial has put an end to many hopes and aspirations, + and has inclined numerous adherents of the family to acquiesce + in the present state of things. It is certainly not politic to + require of people in this frame of mind an overt manifestation + of heartlessness and ingratitude to the dynasty which has had so + mournful an end. The ceremony so manifestly relates to the past + and not to the future that there can be no reasonable objection + to allowing the old adherents of the family, whether Marshals and + Generals, or merely civilians to go over to attend it. I fancy + that Grévy himself and the Republicans _de la vieille_ cannot get + over, even on such an occasion as this, their old hostility to the + Empire. + +These almost incredibly vindictive feelings again manifested themselves +when a proposal was made that a monument to the unfortunate Prince +should be placed in Westminster Abbey. M. Waddington, who must have +been heartily ashamed of the part he was forced to play, remonstrated +privately against the project, and intimated to Lord Lyons that he +thought of writing to Dean Stanley, whom he happened to know, and of +urging him not to consent to it. + + * * * * * + + _Lord Salisbury to Lord Lyons._ + + July 22, 1879. + + I think, on the whole, I had better not answer your despatch + officially about the Prince Imperial's statue; but you can tell + Waddington unofficially as much of the following as you may + think useful. As soon as I got it, I communicated with the Prime + Minister, who sent to the Dean of Westminster. The Dean, when the + message reached him, had already forwarded to all the newspapers + a letter which you have read in the issues of this morning. On + reading it we came to the conclusion that the matter had gone too + far to be recalled. + + On historical considerations the Dean proposes to put the + monument into Henry the Seventh's chapel, and for that purpose, + undoubtedly, the Queen's permission must be obtained. But as + regards the Abbey in general he is absolutely supreme. He might + put up a statue of Nana Sahib, if he chose. So we must decline to + accept any responsibility for his proceedings. As he has publicly + made the announcement that it is his intention, if not interfered + with, to give the requisite permission, it is clearly impossible + for us to 'apply pressure' to induce him to give way. The motive + for doing so would have to be confessed and would cause much + misapprehension. + + I have expressed a wish to see the inscription before it is + put up, and I have no doubt I shall be allowed to do so. I think I + can assure M. Waddington that there is not the slightest danger of + anything about Napoleon IV. being contained in it. + + * * * * * + +The monument was never erected, the project meeting with much opposition +in Parliament as calculated to offend the susceptibilities of the French +Government. + +It must be admitted that the circumstances surrounding the death of this +unfortunate Prince reflect discredit, though in an unequal degree, upon +both the French and the British Governments. If the French Government +showed a petty and vindictive spirit totally unworthy of a great and +powerful nation, the misunderstanding which enabled the Prince to go +to South Africa; his vague and indefinite status with respect to the +expeditionary force; the equally vague conditions attaching to his +relations with Captain Carey, which were partly responsible for his +death; the unhappy suggestion of the Abbey monument; the helpless +attitude of the Government in the face of an enterprising ecclesiastic; +and the subsequent unseemly discussion in the House of Commons, are +eloquent of slipshod and careless methods which are discreditable to +British administration and constitute a somewhat humiliating page in the +national history. + +The autumn of 1879 was marked by the conclusion of the Austro-German +alliance, hailed at the time by Lord Salisbury as 'glad tidings of +great joy,' and destined profoundly to influence European politics for +many years to come. In spite of assurances given by Bismarck himself, +by Andrassy, and by Haymerle, this new grouping of two first-class +military Powers caused much perturbation at Paris, which was certainly +not allayed by Lord Salisbury's benediction, and provided convenient +material for an attack upon the tottering Waddington administration. + + * * * * * + + _Lord Lyons to Lord Salisbury._ + + Paris, Nov. 14, 1879. + + * * * * * + + As to French internal politics, the most striking feature is + the somewhat vague but almost universal feeling of uneasiness about + the future which pervades France. It is impossible not to see that + this feeling has increased even during the few weeks that have + elapsed since I went away on leave in August. I suppose that the + immediate fear is that the Waddington Ministry will be succeeded by + one more Radical, and that thus, step by step, the Ultra-Reds will + get the Government into their hands. + + When I first saw Waddington on my return, he was in good + spirits, thinking that the threatened attacks upon him about + the amnesty, the Government, and especially the diplomatic + appointments, had blown over. Now, however, he is menaced with + an interpellation on the Austro-German understanding. This + understanding is, of course, extremely unpalatable to the French, + and among them the general belief is that it binds Austria to + assist Germany, in case of need, to defend Alsace and Lorraine + against France. Waddington has the most positive assurances from + Bismarck, Andrassy and Haymerle that there is nothing against + France in it, but this is not enough to reassure the cavillers. + The intention seems to be to reproach Waddington with this + understanding generally, as indicating the failure of his Foreign + Policy, and in particular to blame him for having an Ambassador at + Vienna who neither prevented, nor found it out, and an Ambassador + in London who did not make the French policy on the subject + properly understood by the English Government. It seems that + it is intended to argue that you would not have spoken of the + understanding in the terms you used at Manchester, if you had + known the painful impression it had made in France. + + There are two opinions in France on the Foreign Policy to be + now adopted. Perhaps the general, unreflecting public are inclined + to throw themselves into the arms of Russia. The wise heads (and + there is some reason to hope that Gambetta may be among them) look + rather to England, and are willing to conciliate her by supporting + her views in the East. It may be worth while to take this feeling + into account, and perhaps with that view rather to put forward the + reinstatement of Khaireddin and Midhat as the objects in view, than + exclusively English appointments. + +It seems to be a more or less established rule that when an English +Foreign Secretary makes a speech, Ambassadors should write and expatiate +upon the admirable effect which has been produced abroad, and Lord +Lyons's comment upon Lord Salisbury's Manchester speech approaches more +nearly to criticism than appears elsewhere in his correspondence. The +charge of ignorance brought against the French Ambassador at Vienna +was probably quite correct, but the British Embassy at Vienna must +have been in the same case, for the existence of the Austro-German +alliance was first discovered by that extremely able public servant, +the late Sir Joseph Crowe, K.C.M.G.[26] As for the alleged inaction of +the French Ambassador at London, that official was a retired admiral, +whom apparently Waddington seldom seems to have consulted, and over +whose unconscious head business was habitually transacted by the French +Foreign Office. + + * * * * * + + _Lord Lyons to Lord Salisbury._ + + Paris, Nov. 21, 1879. + + We are within a week of the opening of the session, but the + situation has not become more clear. Gambetta and Waddington have + a personal dislike to each other, and no doubt Gambetta would be + glad to oust Waddington, and to put in his place some new Minister + for Foreign Affairs, such as the Marquis de Noailles, with some + creature of his own, such as Spüller as adlatus or Under Secretary + of State. But then Gambetta would find it difficult to do this + without bringing about such a break up of the Ministry as would + raise the question of his own taking office. But if those who ought + to know him well judge aright, he does not wish to come into power + until he sees his way to doing something very great--in fact to + getting back Alsace and Lorraine. + + Gambetta professes to be strongly in favour of the English + Alliance, and for that and for other reasons, to make a liberal + treaty of commerce with us. I do not, however, imagine that his + ideas of a liberal treaty go beyond maintaining, or nearly so, the + tariffs as they stand in the existing Anglo-French Treaties. + + I imagine he has thought of going to England himself whenever + he has a good opportunity, not with a view to putting himself into + the hands of Sir Charles Dilke and taking part in any Ultra-Radical + demonstration, but rather with a desire of conciliating the + moderate public opinion in England, and showing that he has no + desire to promote a Republican Propaganda abroad. He seems to have + a decidedly friendly feeling towards the present English Ministry. + + I have heard that the Russian Grand Dukes had been led by + General Chanzy to expect a much more warm and cordial reception at + Paris than they actually met with, and that consequently they were + by no means pleased. + + Waddington seems to be as little prepared to go into the + Newfoundland question as he was two months ago. The impression + he makes upon me is the same that he made upon you. The Navy + Department keep him in awe of them and prevent his acting upon the + reasonable views he expressed to you at Berlin. + +The various difficulties in all parts of the world which were before +long to trouble Anglo-French relations for many years, had now +begun to manifest themselves in such places as Newfoundland, Tahiti, +Réunion, the Gambia, and elsewhere. All these troublesome questions +fell under the Marine Department, and their accumulation was productive +of an irritation which hampered M. Waddington, whose position was +also weakened by a rabid demand made upon the Ministry for Government +appointments. In fact it was difficult to see how any French Ministry +could last, if the American system of a fresh division of the spoils +was to take place whenever a change occurred. In America the Executive +is safe for four years, but in France, directly the places had been +distributed, the disappointed combined to overthrow the unhappy +Ministers responsible for the distribution. + +Meanwhile his most formidable opponent, the ex-Democrat, Gambetta, had +assumed the _rôle_ of a grand seigneur, and gave sumptuous Parliamentary +banquets which were pronounced by the highest gastronomic authorities to +be exquisite in every respect. He contemplated a visit to London, and it +is somewhat surprising to learn that the Democrat showed a very obvious +prepossession in favour of the English Conservative Party. + + * * * * * + + _Lord Lyons to Lord Salisbury._ + + Paris, Dec. 12, 1879. + + Gambetta has heard with very great satisfaction that you and + Lord Beaconsfield would be very glad of the opportunity of seeing + him, which will be afforded if he carries into effect his idea + of going to England. He feels that it would be essential that + he should not make himself the guest or place himself under the + special guidance of any political person on one side or the other. + He would probably go to an hotel. As to the time of his visit, + he does not seem to have formed any definite plan. It seems to be + connected in his mind with the Treaty of Commerce, and he seems + inclined to secure himself a good reception by contributing first + to making a favourable Treaty of Commerce. I suppose he and his + countrymen would consider a Treaty simply renewing the arrangements + of 1860 as very favourable to us. He absolutely repudiates all + notion of anything like Republican propagandism. He has a strong + bias in favour of the Conservatives in England. His sympathies are + with an active Foreign Policy, and he has a grudge against the + Liberals because they did not come to the assistance of France in + the Franco-German war. He seems to follow English home politics + very carefully. He wishes England and France to act together in + the East, but considers that things have got into a horrid mess at + Constantinople, and expresses regret that the French and English + Embassies there do not pull more together. + + I think one of his objects in going to England would be to + show people in France that he is considered a person of sufficient + importance to be admitted into the society of people of rank and + station in aristocratic England. + + He has also no doubt the higher object of making France and + himself popular in England, so as to avert all risk of England's + joining the Austro-German Alliance to the detriment of France. + + The danger would be that he would form too great expectations + of obtaining a positive alliance with England, and that if we did + not come up to his expectations in this respect, he might in his + disappointment, turn to Russia. But from this point of view, the + most dangerous thing would be to _froisser_ his susceptibility by + showing any coldness beforehand about his visit. + + He undertakes to let us know whenever he comes to any + resolution about going to England. + +From the above letter it will be seen how much importance was attached +to Gambetta's views, and how desirable it was considered to secure his +goodwill; but apparently the visit to London from which so much was +expected, never took place--perhaps because his English Conservative +friends were shortly afterwards turned out of office. + +The threatened attack upon the Waddington administration took the +form of a vote of want of confidence which was moved in the month of +December, but successfully rejected. The Ministerial success, however, +was of a somewhat fictitious nature, as the Left Groups when united, +outnumbered the Right, and the Government was, therefore, liable +to be turned out by a combination. M. Waddington himself professed +satisfaction, and affirmed with pride that he had been congratulated +upon his majority by the British Government; while from Berlin, Vienna, +and even from St. Petersburg, where he was not in favour, assurances had +been received of the satisfaction felt at the prospect of his continuing +in office. The result, too, of the vote enabled him to carry out an +intention he had long had in his mind, of abandoning the Presidency of +the Council, and of retaining the office of Minister of Foreign Affairs. +His own wish was to see M. Léon Say Prime Minister, but as that was out +of the question, he favoured the appointment of M. de Freycinet, who, in +addition to other qualifications, possessed the confidence of Gambetta, +and would therefore render it difficult for the latter to attack the +Government. The proposed transformation of the Ministry, however, was +found difficult to effect, chiefly owing to the animosity of Gambetta +against Waddington; the former being credited with the intention of +upsetting any Ministry in which the latter remained. Gambetta was in +fact pursuing a systematic dog-in-the-manger policy which was little +to his credit, for while continually attacking and threatening the +Government he was unwilling to take office himself, with the Chamber +then in existence, since he realized that the Ultra-Radicals were trying +to force him into a position in which he would have either to accept +responsibility or to abandon the leadership of the Republican Party. +The object, in short, of Clémenceau and the extreme party was to use +Gambetta up in order to make room eventually for themselves. Neither +President Grévy or Freycinet showed any accommodating spirit with +regard to Waddington's plans, and when Freycinet laid down conditions +which were unacceptable, the President tried to persuade Waddington to +remain on as Prime Minister; but Waddington's position had been further +impaired by imprudent representation on the part of President Grévy +and others, that he was highly acceptable to Bismarck as a Minister, +and Waddington admitted openly himself that he was wanting in the +qualifications of a French Parliamentary leader. Consequently the upshot +of it all was that he resigned, and Freycinet was allowed to form a new +administration on his own terms. 'I part with Waddington with great +regret,' wrote Lord Lyons. 'He had the greatest of all recommendations, +that you could believe him, and feel sure of him.' These regrets were +shared by Lord Salisbury. 'I am very sorry for the loss of Waddington. +It was a luxury to have a French Minister who worked on principles +intelligible to the English mind.' + + * * * * * + + _Lord Lyons to Lord Salisbury._ + + Paris, Dec. 30, 1879. + + With the new Ministry I suppose Gambetta's reign is to begin. + The Cabinet was almost ostensibly formed by him. He did not, and + probably could not, put in any of the chief men of his own party. + They are kept, or keep themselves, in reserve to come into power + with Gambetta himself. The present Ministers are personally to a + certain extent Moderate, and altogether, so far as they are known, + mediocre. Freycinet is said to have some inclination to assert + independence, but he has not hitherto rebelled against his old + master Gambetta. + + The man who appears to have lost most reputation in the affair + is President Grévy. He knows well enough that it is Gambetta's + intention to supplant him, but he has allowed himself to be + circumvented with his eyes open, from lack of resolution and lack + of energy, and has apparently let his rival obtain complete control + of the Government. + + I do not suppose that we shall see at present any marked + change in the Foreign Policy of the French Government. Freycinet + knows nothing whatever of Foreign Affairs. Gambetta has strong + general notions, but seems more inclined to insist upon disposing + of the patronage of the Foreign Office than to go into the details + of the business. At home I suppose the first measure will be a + wholesale redistribution of places. _Aux situations nouvelles, + il faut des hommes nouveaux_, was the principle proclaimed by + Clémenceau. Beust[27] turns the phrase round and says: _Aux hommes + nouveaux il faut des situations._ + + At all events the centre Gauche is dead, and with it the + Thiers' policy, which was to preserve as far as possible the + institutions, the laws and the administrative system in France, + with the simple change of having an elective President, instead + of an hereditary sovereign at the head. The policy could not last + long unless it was directed by a really able energetic President. + France is now about to try real democratic and republican + government, and it will be a dangerous experiment in a country like + this. It would be a still more dangerous experiment if the old + warlike spirit had survived in the people. Happily for peace, they + are more intent upon making and enjoying money than upon obtaining + military glory, or even upon recovering their lost provinces. + Gambetta will try for the recovery of the Provinces if he preserves + his energies and fortune seems to give him a chance. + + I have just seen Pothuau[28] who seems very indignant at his + place in London having been offered to Waddington, and declares + that he has no intention of giving it up. + +Lord Lyons was destined to witness many more changes of Government in +France before his final departure; most of them accurately described by +the hackneyed phrase: _Plus cela change, plus c'est la même chose._ + +A letter from Major Baring written at the close of the year is worth +quoting as evidence of the improved and hopeful condition of Egypt, +and also of the harmony prevailing at the time between the English and +French Controllers. + + * * * * * + + _Major Baring to Lord Lyons_. + + Cairo, Dec. 29, 1879. + + You may like to hear what I think of the state of things here, + so I venture to write this line. + + There is a very decided improvement. Since I have been + connected with Egyptian affairs I never remember matters going so + smoothly. I like what I see of the Khedive, and I see a great deal + of him, for he frequently presides at the Council, and besides this + I often go to see him on business. Riaz's head is rather turned by + the decorations he has received, but he is very well disposed and + will always follow our advice, if we insist. He is oppressed with + the fear that Nubar will return to office; as, without doubt, he + will sooner or later; but it is not at all to be desired that he + should return just yet. What we want is _time_. If we can get along + for six months, or better, a year, without any considerable change + I really believe that the financial crisis which has now lasted so + long may be brought to a close. + + Cherif and the Turks made overtures to Nubar the other day, + but he was wise enough to decline so unnatural a coalition. + + Before long our financial scheme will be ready to launch, and + if, as I hope, it is accepted, the Commission of Liquidation will + no longer be necessary. This is perhaps the best solution of the + matter. + + We shall reduce Unified to 4 per cent, and leave Preference + alone. + + Blignières is behaving most loyally in everything which + concerns English interests. The Khedive and his Ministers have, I + think, got over the prejudice they entertained against him. + +M. de Freycinet took over the Foreign Office as well as the Presidency +of the Council; as has already been stated, he was quite ignorant of +all foreign questions, and was also looked upon as less reliable than +M. Waddington. The first official interview with him, however, produced +a favourable impression, all the more because he did not let out a +flood of common-places about devotion to England, and so forth; but the +important question was to know what line Gambetta was inclined to take +in Foreign Policy, and Sheffield was deputed to find out. + + * * * * * + + _Lord Lyons to Lord Salisbury._ + + Paris, Jan. 17, 1880. + + Gambetta has expressed confidentially to Sheffield to-day his + views as to the Foreign Policy of France; with the intention of + course that they should be communicated to me only in the strictest + privacy. + + He considered that the Austro-German Alliance had been made + against France; that it entered into Prince Bismarck's calculations + that it might throw France into the arms of Russia, but that His + Highness thought that there would be more than a compensation for + this if in consequence of it England were completely detached from + France. Gambetta declared that France had not fallen into this trap + and would not fall into it--that she would never make an alliance + with Russia, but that if Russia were attacked by Germany, France + would have to take care of her own safety. He had information which + convinced him that there was no foundation for the assertions that + Russian troops were being massed on the frontier of Germany, and + he believed that these rumours were spread from Berlin to afford a + pretext for an attack on Russia, to be made so suddenly as to be + successful at once and to enable Germany to turn towards France + without any fear of Russia in her rear. + + In order to disconcert this plan Gambetta thought it highly + important that a good understanding should be established between + England and Russia both with regard to Turkey and to India. He + held that it was the interest of France to urge in every way the + Russian Government to come to such an understanding with England. + He looked upon the state of things at Constantinople as very + bad, and attributed it to the disagreements between the French + and English Ambassadors; while in order to promote the accord + which he wished to see between England and Russia he desired that + the best feeling should exist between the French and English + Representatives at Constantinople. It was evident, however, from + what he said that any complaint against Fournier by England would + be met by counter-complaints on the part of France against Layard. + If Fournier resigned, Tissot the French Minister at Athens would be + Gambetta's candidate for the Embassy in Turkey. + + Gambetta denied most positively that there was any truth + whatever in the rumours that he had been in communication with + Bismarck about the restoration of Lorraine to France or anything + of the kind. As to the insinuation that it was proposed that + while Lorraine should be restored, France should receive a slice + of Belgium in compensation for Alsace, Gambetta said that it + was plain that this could only have been put about to produce + ill-will between England and France. After the Benedetti affair, no + Frenchman in his senses would enter into secret arrangements with + Bismarck about Belgium, and the French Republic had certainly no + desire under any circumstances to despoil its neighbours. + + Gambetta expressed a desire that a liberal Treaty of Commerce + should be made with England and he was eloquent on the importance + of a close and cordial union between the two countries. + + Gambetta impressed upon Sheffield that he was speaking to him + simply as a friend, and quite privately. I think it is interesting + and important to know what sentiments he expresses in this way: + but, of course, if he was quoted, or if what he said was allowed to + transpire, he would feel bitterly towards us and at once put an end + to all communications of the kind. His tone appears to have been + quite that of a man who felt that he would have the power to carry + into effect the policy he recommended in this country. + + Freycinet has just been to see me, but I did not find him + equally communicative on the general Foreign Policy of France. + +As Freycinet was occupied at that moment, _more Gallico_, in clearing +the old officials out of the Foreign Office, and as he admittedly +possessed little knowledge himself, his reticence under the +circumstances was not surprising; but, so far as could be gathered, it +was the intention of the new Ministry to follow the prudent course of +their predecessors, a profession of faith evidently intended especially +for Berlin. As regards the so-called Eastern Question, interest had +temporarily shifted from Egypt to Greece, and the various Powers were +endeavouring without much success to negotiate the cession of Turkish +territory to that country. The usual spring war scare had taken a +different shape, and, without any foundation whatever, Bismarck was +credited with the extraordinary intention of suddenly falling upon +Russia, while a coolness had sprung up between the French and Russian +Governments owing to the refusal of the former to surrender the Nihilist +Hartmann, who was implicated in an attempt to wreck a train in which the +Russian Emperor was travelling. + +This refusal annoyed the Emperor so much that he withdrew his +Ambassador, Prince Orloff, from Paris, the French consoling themselves +with the thought that if they lost the favour of the Russian Emperor +they would, on the other hand, ingratiate themselves with Bismarck. + +Upon the Greek Frontier question, which in consequence of an English +proposal had been referred to an International Commission, there was, +for some unknown reason, a disposition to blame the British Government. + + * * * * * + + _Lord Lyons to Sir H. Layard._ + + Paris, March 19, 1880. + + The withdrawal of Orloff, on account of the refusal of the + French Government to give up Hartmann, is of course the topic of + the day here. The form adopted is that which was used when normal + relations between Russia and the Pope were suspended some years + ago. The Emperor Alexander is, I understand, very angry; but I do + not know how long this _mouvement d'humeur_ will hold out against + the obvious political interest which both Russia and France have in + not being on bad terms with each other. There was a strong feeling + on the Left of the Chamber against giving Hartmann up, and as to + foreign relations, I suppose the French set pleasing Bismarck + against displeasing the European Alexander. + + Freycinet is decidedly against the admission of Turkey to the + Greek Frontier Commission. It might have been politic to admit her, + though I don't see how she could have been asked to engage to be + bound by the votes of the majority. + + I think things in the East are indeed looking serious. How + Turkey is to be kept going, in spite of herself, much longer, + passes my comprehension. I should be sorry to make a fourth in an + alliance between France, Russia and Turkey. If France and Russia + did unite for any serious purpose, I should think the last thing + they would wish would be to tie such a clog as Turkey to their + wheels. If there is any truth in the proverb, _Quem deus vult + perdere si_, etc., I am afraid that there can be very little doubt + that the ruin of Abdul Hamid is in the hands of Allah. + +FOOTNOTES: + +[Footnote 21: French Secretary of Embassy at London.] + +[Footnote 22: French Ambassador at Constantinople.] + +[Footnote 23: Sir Charles Rivers Wilson, G.C.M.G.] + +[Footnote 24: H.B.M. Agent and Consul General at Cairo.] + +[Footnote 25: Now Earl of Cromer.] + +[Footnote 26: At that period British Consul-General at Düsseldorf.] + +[Footnote 27: Austrian Ambassador at Paris.] + +[Footnote 28: French Ambassador at London.] + + + + +CHAPTER XIV + +THE REVIVAL OF FRANCE + +(1880-1881) + + +The General Election in England which took place in March, 1880, +resulted not only in the rout of the Conservative Party, but in the +reversal of the Foreign Policy of Lord Beaconsfield and Lord Salisbury, +and necessitated the withdrawal of Sir Henry Layard from Constantinople, +while Lord Lytton, whose Afghan policy had been furiously denounced by +the Liberal Party, sent in his resignation. It is worthy of note that +Lord Lyons, whom no one could accuse of Jingo tendencies, and whose +opinion was certainly a very much better one than that of most of Lord +Lytton's critics, was emphatically in favour of the latter's Afghan +policy. Writing to Lady Lytton on January 8, 1879, he had expressed +himself as follows:-- + + I have never had the least misgiving about Lytton's policy + with regard to Afghanistan, and I was always sure it would be + wisely carried into execution. I am only too thankful that we + have a spirited Viceroy. You can hardly form an idea of the + advantage our reputation has derived, all over Europe, from the + Afghan campaign, and you have seen enough of diplomacy to know how + much success in all questions of Foreign Policy depends upon the + prestige of the country one represents. + +Sir Henry Layard had incurred even greater execration than Lord Lytton +in the eyes of the Liberal Party, because he was considered to have +been deeply committed to what was described as the Pro-Turkish policy +of the Conservative Government, although his inexpiable offence +seems to have consisted chiefly in strenuous and unavailing efforts +to induce the Turks to put their house in order. During his stay at +Constantinople he had been greatly hampered by the consistent opposition +of his French colleague, M. Fournier, whose great object it appeared +to be to thwart English action whenever opportunity occurred. The +French Government, which professed great anxiety to act in harmony with +England, upon ascertaining that Sir Henry Layard was to be replaced by +Mr. Goschen,[29] withdrew Fournier and appointed M. Tissot in his place. + +A change in the French Embassy in London was also imminent, and the +circumstances attending the appointment of a new Ambassador were not +devoid of humour. + +Admiral Pothuau, the Ambassador under the Waddington régime, had been +forced to retire, probably much against his inclination, and it was +considered that M. Léon Say would make an excellent representative, more +especially as he passed as that _rara avis_, a French Free Trader; but +M. Say shortly after accepting the appointment was elected President +of the Senate, and therefore forced to resign. To find a satisfactory +successor was apparently not so simple a matter as might have been +assumed. Nothing could have been more correct than M. de Freycinet's +ideal of a French Ambassador in London: 'a man possessing the full +confidence and sharing the sentiments of his Government; not so much of +a politician as to be thinking more of establishing his own political +position at home than of following his instructions: a man who would +stay long at the post, and desire to stay there; who would form personal +friendships with English Statesmen, and improve good relations and +soften asperities by personal influence. A man calculated to take a part +in a society like that of London, and who would not be out of place at a +Court--a man who would have a wife with the same qualities--finally, a +man not unaccustomed to diplomatic business and diligent and accurate in +transacting it.' When, however, the question passed from the abstract to +the concrete, M. de Freycinet's ideas ceased to flow so freely, and he +seemed utterly at a loss to find the ideal being which his imagination +had sketched, although he mentioned M. Challemel Lacour--as a man who +would not do. In spite, however, of M. Challemel Lacour being in M. +de Freycinet's opinion a man 'who would not do,' it was evident that +he had a powerful backing, for an emissary from the French Foreign +Office shortly made his appearance at the Embassy and intimated in +so many words that the appointment of M. Challemel Lacour would be +agreeable to Gambetta. That no doubt was a considerable advantage, but +M. Challemel Lacour by no means corresponded to M. de Freycinet's ideal +representative, being a man of unconciliatory character and particularly +notorious on account of a speech which he had once made, in which, +alluding to political opponents, he had used the words _Fusillez moi ces +gens là!_ an expression which was continually being quoted against him. +In the meanwhile, however, M. de Freycinet had had an inspiration, and +sent for Lord Lyons to tell him that he had discovered just the right +man for the place. Unfortunately, this personage was married to a lady +whose antecedents were not considered to be satisfactory, and it became +necessary to intimate that under the circumstances the appointment would +not be favourably received in England. + + 'Freycinet was dreadfully put out,' wrote Lord Lyons, 'when he + found that the appointment was impossible. He complained chiefly + of Léon Say for having brought him into the difficulty, by first + accepting the London Embassy and then standing for the Presidency + of the Senate. + + 'Léon Say's picture of the lady is about as much like what she + was when I last saw her a few years ago, as Challemel Lacour is + like Freycinet's ideal of a French Ambassador in London.' + +The appointment of M. Challemel Lacour was persisted in, and gave rise +to some very disagreeable discussions in the House of Commons. Doubtless +much of the abuse of M. Challemel Lacour was undeserved, but whatever +his political capacity, he was not remarkable for urbanity. + +On the occasion of a big official dinner at the Paris Embassy, when +requested to take in the absolutely unexceptionable and agreeable wife +of one of his principal ministerial colleagues, he replied with an +emphatic '_Jamais!_' which precluded any further discussion. + +The question of diplomatic appointments recalls the fact that it was +about this time that my connection with Lord Lyons first began, through +becoming a member of his staff, and that it may be appropriate to say +something about his habits and personal characteristics. + +Lord Lyons, who was then more than sixty years of age, was a big, +heavily built man, whose appearance in no respect suggested the +diplomatist of fiction, and who rather resembled the conventional +British squire as depicted by Leech; and the chief characteristic of his +somewhat homely features was a small piercing eye which nothing seemed +to escape, from the most unimportant clerical error to a minute detail +in a lady's dress. As compared with the ordinary English diplomatist, +his knowledge of foreign languages, without being exceptional, was +thoroughly adequate. He, of course, spoke French with perfect facility, +and it is probable that he wrote it with greater correctness than many +Frenchmen, having a complete mastery both of the grammar and of all +the complicated expressions which are made use of in correspondence. +He was also equally at home in Italian; had a knowledge of German, +and was well acquainted with modern Greek. In addition, he was a fair +classical scholar, and a peculiarly retentive memory enabled him, +unlike most people, to remember much of what he had read. His manner, +at first sight, seemed somewhat alarming, and he was altogether a +person with whom no one would have felt disposed to take a liberty, +but the alarming impression, which was solely due to shyness, wore off +with closer acquaintance as the natural kindliness of his disposition +revealed itself, and one of the excellent traits in his character was, +that he never formed a favourable or unfavourable opinion of any one +in a hurry, but invariably waited for the test of time. The result +was, in almost every case, that the more he saw of people the more +he liked them and the more reluctant he became to part with men who +had been associated with him for any length of time. The position +which he occupied in British diplomacy during the twenty years which +he spent at Paris may, without exaggeration be described as unique. +No other man stood on quite the same footing, though it would be idle +to deny that there were some who were perhaps more brilliant. But the +implicit confidence which successive Foreign Secretaries placed in Lord +Lyons's judgment was based upon the knowledge that his opinions were +sound, unprejudiced, disinterested, and only formed after the most +conscientious investigations. 'I never volunteer advice,' he used to +remark, and it was perhaps for that very reason that his opinion was +so frequently sought by the Foreign Office. In fact so much importance +was attached to his views that he was occasionally asked to give his +opinion upon subjects of which he had no knowledge whatever, ranging +from the defence of Canada to the minimum dress allowance required +by the wife of a British Ambassador at Paris. As he had no intention +of seeking a consort himself, and as he had no intention, either, of +resigning his post, the latter inquiry (which was made in 1870) appears +somewhat superfluous; but, it may be worth noting, that as the result of +conscientious researches, he reported that £1000 a year was considered +to be necessary. + +As to his merits as a chief, every one who had ever been associated +with him was of the same opinion, and it was generally held at the +Foreign Office that service under him at the Paris Embassy was a +liberal education in itself. It may be doubted, however, whether his +capacity and love of work were not to some extent a disadvantage to +his subordinates, since his industry was so great that it left them +comparatively little responsible work to do. At the Paris Embassy the +ordinary routine work is probably greater than at any other Embassy +with the exception of Constantinople, but there was scarcely anything, +however trivial, which he did not attend to himself. It is believed +in some quarters that an Ambassador leads a dignified, luxurious and +comparatively unoccupied life, but that was emphatically not the case +with Lord Lyons. He rose early and began the day by carefully studying +the more serious French newspapers; the whole of the time up to luncheon +was spent in writing or reading despatches, or attending to the various +small questions which were continually occurring. In the afternoon he +worked again until about 3 or 4 p.m., and then usually went to see +the French Foreign Minister or paid official calls in connection with +current business. Upon his return he worked again until dinner unless +interrupted by visitors, who were often of a tedious and uninteresting +type, and it not infrequently happened that telegrams would arrive at a +comparatively late hour of the night which it was necessary to deal with +immediately. All correspondence which arrived at the Embassy, no matter +from how insignificant a source, was attended to by him personally, +and elaborate directions given with regard to the replies, which were +invariably sent with the least possible delay. His industry was only +equalled by an almost preternatural caution, which showed itself in +a variety of ways. The reluctance to give advice has already been +noticed, but his excessive caution showed itself not only in writing, +but in conversation, and even amongst intimates he rarely expressed +opinions on men or things which it would have been unsafe to quote in +public, although his conversation was marked by much dry and original +humour of that elusive character which cannot be described on paper. It +was practically impossible to catch him napping. 'The Juarez (Mexican +Revolutionary) Minister having left his card upon me without any +official designation, I have returned a card also without an official +designation,' he wrote from Washington in 1859. His reticence during the +prolonged _Trent_ crisis has already been commented upon. 'I received +by the last mail,' he wrote to Sir Henry Elliot in 1867, 'a letter from +Hussein Khan, containing nothing but complimentary expressions. Not +wishing to be outdone in civility, I have written a reply in the same +strain. It has, however, occurred to me as just possible that Hussein +Khan may desire to appear to be in correspondence with me for some +particular object, and that there may be something which has occurred +since I saw him, which might render it advisable that he should not be +in correspondence with me. Accordingly I send my letter herewith open +to you. If you see any reason, however slight, for not forwarding it, +please destroy it, and take an opportunity of telling Hussein Khan that +I asked you to thank him for his letter to me.' It will be remembered +that even Queen Victoria was unable to draw him successfully on the +subject of the Treaty of Berlin. Similar instances might be quoted +indefinitely, and as an illustration of his caution in private life it +may be mentioned that he never stirred a yard outside the house without +a passport. A man of this temperament was not likely to make mistakes, +and it is a remarkable fact that throughout a correspondence extending +over something like forty years, there is not to be found a single +expression in any official communication addressed to him which could by +any stretch of the imagination be described as a censure or even as a +criticism of his proceedings. + +As for the pleasures of the world, they hardly seemed to exist for him, +but the ordinary human weaknesses, which were chiefly non-existent in +his case, he regarded with an indulgent and even benevolent eye. He +used to repeat with much glee that the chief entry upon his _dossier_ +at the Paris Préfecture de Police consisted of the words: _On ne lui +connait pas de vice_, and this concise statement may be said to have +been literally true. He had never been in debt, never gambled, never +quarrelled, never, as far as was known, ever been in love, although it +was a mistake to suppose that the opposite sex possessed no attractions +for him. Nor did he possess the resources available to the ordinary man, +for he cared nothing for sport, had probably never played a game in his +life, and detested exercise and outdoor life. The surprising thing was +that he contrived to keep his health, as although a total abstainer, +he was a large eater, and never took the slightest exercise. In fact, +during the last five or six years of his life he probably never walked +further than the English Church in the Rue d'Aguesseau, which was within +a hundred yards of the Embassy. 'Abstinence and exercise,' he used to +say, 'were the only two things that disagreed with him.' + +The natural shyness of his disposition prevented him from deriving much +real enjoyment from what is generally described as society, but all the +social duties of an Ambassador were discharged in a manner which evoked +universal approval. The entertainments at the Embassy consisted chiefly +of dinners, which were remarkable for their excellence, and invitations +to which were highly prized by all sections of French society. Nothing, +in fact, could exceed the dignity or the faultless taste of the Embassy +arrangements, and not only were Lord Lyons's entertainments renowned, +but his horses and carriages were, even in Paris, noticeably amongst +the very best, it being one of his strongest convictions that the +British representative should always make an imposing appearance. But +his hospitality was no matter of mere show; every night the unmarried +secretaries were asked to dine with him unless otherwise engaged; and it +was upon these occasions that he used to appear at his best; obviously +finding more pleasure in their society than in that of any one else with +the exception of his own relatives. Affection, indeed, for his relatives +was one of his most marked characteristics, and it is highly probable +that his devotion to his sister, the Duchess of Norfolk, and to her sons +and daughters, was one of the causes of his not marrying; anyhow there +was no further question of marrying after the failure of the determined +attempt made upon him by an exalted personage, which has already been +mentioned. + +His temper was singularly equable, and during his long stay in Paris +it was said that upon two occasions only was he known to have broken +out; once, when at a review at Longchamps, the Diplomatic Corps were +allotted an inferior position, and once upon an occasion when his +coachman appeared wearing trousers instead of top boots and breeches. +These ebullitions were due to the fact that he attached enormous +importance to all the outward signs of official representation, and +strongly resented anything which bore in any degree the nature of a +slight. In his capacity as a private individual he was the most modest +and unostentatious of men, and it is recorded, as an instance of his +shyness, that he once passed a week at Woburn without ever leaving the +precincts of the garden, because he was so much embarrassed by the +salutations of an adjacent lodge keeper. + +It might have been supposed that a man of this unimaginative and +eminently judicial character would have failed to secure the regard +of his subordinates, however highly he might be esteemed by Cabinets +and Foreign Secretaries. As a matter of fact, probably no chief ever +enjoyed greater popularity, which was due to a variety of causes. He +was essentially a kind-hearted man, his correspondence abounds with +instances of help given to persons who had been in his employment in +any capacity, however humble; of opportune assistance rendered to +other persons who had been unlucky in their public careers, and of +recommendations of men whose services appeared to deserve recognition. +And in spite of his apparently detached nature, he took the warmest +interest in all those who were connected with him officially, and +invariably showed the utmost consideration, not only for their feelings, +but for their personal convenience. Thus, unlike some distinguished +diplomatists, one of his great objects was to save his staff unnecessary +work; he never put obstacles in the way of persons desiring leave, and +every afternoon at the earliest possible moment, in order to release +the Chancery, he used to send across the welcome written message: 'I +have nothing more for to-day,' although that by no means signified that +his own labours were concluded. Hardworking himself, he expected his +secretaries and attachés to do their share, and it was only when they +conspicuously failed, that he showed any sign of severity. During his +long career it fell to his lot to administer many reprimands, but these +were invariably so just and unavoidable, that the culprits seldom, +if ever, felt any sense of resentment, and he always made a point of +obliterating as soon as possible, any disagreeable incident of this +nature. The consequence was that he had no enemies, and no one who was +ever associated with him, has, so far as is known, ever had anything +but good to say of him. Another excellent feature in his character was +that he always made the best of his subordinates instead of searching +for their weak points; however unpromising the material, he generally +succeeded in effecting a marked improvement, and whenever any one who +had been with him left for another post, he never failed to draw special +attention to such good qualities as he appeared to possess with the view +of assisting him in his future career. Perhaps I may be pardoned for +interposing a personal testimonial, upon the occasion of a temporary +transfer to Berne, which may serve as an example amongst many others. + + * * * * * + + Paris, May 15, 1883. + + MY DEAR ADAMS,[30] + + I have settled that Legh is to be at Berne on the 28th, and I + hope you will like him. He is clever and well informed, though some + people think he does not look it. + +It need scarcely be added that many of the communications of this +nature are of a more elaborate character, and refer to persons who now +occupy distinguished positions in the British Diplomatic Service. As +Lord Lyons grew older he became more and more reluctant to part with men +whom he knew well, and it was pathetic to witness the obvious sorrow +which he felt at their departure. + +Paris has always been the most coveted post on the Continent, and in +addition to the social attractions of the place, the Embassy enjoyed +the reputation of carrying on its business in an efficient manner +chiefly owing to the qualities of the Ambassador. The reputation was +well deserved, and I can only recall one serious _lâche_, not devoid, +however, of humour, as to which I was unjustly alleged to be the +culprit. At a moment when critical negotiations respecting intervention +in Egypt were proceeding with the French Government, a member of the +Embassy had an extremely confidential conversation with an important +French Cabinet Minister, in the course of which the Minister criticized +in very uncomplimentary terms his Ministerial colleagues, and the +conversation was immediately embodied in a confidential despatch to +the British Foreign Office. The following morning a much agitated +Chef de Cabinet appeared at the Chancery, bearing the despatch, and +announced that he 'thought that some mistake had occurred, as the +despatch had been received by the French Minister for Foreign Affairs.' +To the general consternation, it now became evident that the despatch, +instead of being placed in the Foreign Office bag, had found its way +into a lithographed envelope addressed to the _Ministre des Affaires +Etrangères_, and the whole horrid mystery was laid bare. The question +arose whether Lord Lyons should be told or not; the arguments of fear +prevailed; the French Minister behaved in an honourable manner and kept +silence, and Lord Lyons, fortunately for all concerned, never heard +of an incident which he would have looked upon as little short of a +calamity. + +The only possible criticism that could be brought against Lord Lyons +as an Ambassador would be that he led too narrow a life, and moved in +too restricted a circle. Day after day and week after week he led the +same existence; even his holidays were laid out on the same mechanical +principle; every year he left his post, much about the same date, took +the waters at some spa, and then proceeded on a round of visits in +England, chiefly at the country houses of the governing families, such +as Knowsley, Chatsworth, Woburn, and Hatfield, but always including +a prolonged stay with his relatives at Arundel. He was essentially a +diplomatist of the old type, consorting entirely in Paris with the +official classes, the Faubourg, and the Haute Finance; keeping the +press at arm's length, avoiding everything which did not come within +the scope of his duties, and confining himself strictly to his own +business. The modern developments of diplomacy; the use of the press, +the hasty missions of amateur diplomatists, the gushing speeches which +are apparently now considered to be obligatory upon the professional +diplomatist--all this would have been hateful and perhaps impossible to +a man who could boast that he had spent five years in America without +making a speech or taking a drink. But in an impartial survey of the +twenty-eight years which Lord Lyons spent at Washington, Constantinople, +and Paris, it would be rash to assert that any other man would, under +similar circumstances, have retained to an equal extent the confidence +of successive British Governments and the esteem and friendship of +the long series of Foreign Ministers with whom he was called upon to +negotiate questions often of the most vital importance.[31] + +The main interest in foreign politics in the summer of 1880 lay in +the Balkan Peninsula. Mr. Goschen had been sent out to Constantinople +in the place of Sir Henry Layard, and Her Majesty's Government were +endeavouring energetically to force the Porte to carry out the +provisions of the Treaty of Berlin with regard to the rectification of +the Montenegrin and Greek frontiers. The Greek Frontier Question made +little way, and the Gladstone Government in their diplomatic campaign on +behalf of the Greeks met with little encouragement or support from the +other Powers, not even excepting France, who had always been the leading +advocate of Greek claims. When M. de Freycinet was asked what he was +prepared to do if the Turks resolved to defy the Conference which was +then sitting, nothing more satisfactory could be got out of him than: +_nous marcherons avec vous_, or _nous ne marcherons pas sans vous_, and +to the question whether he would go far if necessary, he only made the +cryptic reply, _peut-être bien_. The British Government were hankering +after a naval demonstration, and it was disheartening to work with so +pusillanimous a comrade. + + * * * * * + + _Lord Lyons to Lord Granville._ + + Paris, June 21, 1880. + + In answer to your private and personal letter of the day + before yesterday, I may say that I am not much afraid of the + French not being willing to go as far as we are willing to go in + coercing the Turks, if they set Europe at defiance about the Greek + Frontier. Freycinet seems to shrink from the idea that actual + coercion may be required, but his only distinct limit to the action + of France is that she will not do more than England. + + I myself very much doubt whether the Turks will yield anything + to naval or other demonstrations, unless they are quite sure that + these demonstrations are the prelude to the actual use of force, + and it will not be easy to get them to believe this, unless we are + ourselves quite sure that that is what we mean. + + Supposing we pushed demonstrations to the point of forcing + the Dardanelles, and sending the allied fleets to Constantinople, + we might produce a revolution, without obtaining the cession of + the territory to Greece. If the populations are in parts really + unwilling, the central government may be truly unable to compel + them to give in. + + Supposing the Greek troops (_par impossible_) be defeated + either by the Turkish troops or by recalcitrant Albanians, the + ships of the Powers might not be able to do much to get them out of + the scrape. + + I am very far from meaning to say, in answer to your question + as to the mildest and safest form of coercion, that it would + consist in moving troops to occupy the territory. To do so would + be neither mild nor safe, nor easy to arrange. But I am afraid + we shall find that in the end the treatment must be topical, and + that if the Greeks cannot take possession for themselves, we shall + hardly be able to obtain it for them by pressure exercised at + Constantinople only. + + A rendezvous of the fleets at Corfu might have a good effect + on the Albanians, and perhaps increase the chance of the Greeks not + being seriously resisted. + + I see Goschen suggests that the decision of the Conference + should be announced to the Porte by an identic note. I think a + collective note would have more effect and be more appropriate. + +The Turks, however dense they may be in other respects, are usually +intelligent enough to perceive whether the Powers are in earnest or not, +and as no Government except the British felt much enthusiasm for either +the Greek or the Montenegrin cause, they showed no signs of giving way. + + * * * * * + + _Lord Lyons to Lord Granville._ + + Paris, July 2, 1880. + + I am afraid it does not look as if the Turks were going to + yield to the moral force of United Europe. Léon Say and Montebello + seem to hold even less resolute language to you than Freycinet + does to me. Did the King of Greece understand Gambetta to say + that France, with or without the co-operation of other Powers, + would support Greece with troops? Freycinet will no doubt do + whatever Gambetta tells him, but one of the inconveniences of the + power behind the Government greater than the Government, is that + Gambetta does not talk as cautiously as he would if he felt direct + responsibility. No power except Russia seems to be willing to bell + the cat. France seems to be the only one that has in abundance the + three elements--men, ships, and money. Freycinet always says he + will do anything with us, but nothing alone, and does not seem much + more willing than Austria to look the chance of having to use force + in the face. + + I do not see much prospect of an immediate diplomatic lull, + and I very much want one because it is of importance to my health + (at least the doctors say so) to get away, but I conclude that I + ought not to shrink from going through the national Festival of the + 14th July, and that I should do what is to be done at least as well + as any of my colleagues. + +Reviews, it may be said, were functions which he abhorred beyond all +others. + +The King of Greece was in Paris at the time, vainly trying to stir up +Gambetta to come to his assistance, although Gambetta in conversation +with Sheffield expressed strong opinions as to the desirability +of France and England acting energetically in concert, and even +professed himself in favour of their making a joint demonstration +at Constantinople, and landing troops there if necessary. Upon the +same occasion he betrayed his gross ignorance of English politics by +lamenting that Lord Beaconsfield had not postponed the dissolution until +the autumn, 'when he would have been certain of success.' + +Freycinet, however, remained deaf to Lord Granville's appeals, even when +the latter reproached him with the humiliating position in which France +would be placed by abandoning a question which she had made her own, and +when the British Government proposed a naval demonstration in favour of +the Prince of Montenegro, made all sorts of excuses for evading it if +possible. + + * * * * * + + _Lord Lyons to Lord Granville._ + + Paris, July 13, 1880. + + I was more displeased than disappointed by the refusal of + the French to join in the naval demonstration in favour of the + Prince of Montenegro. They always try to act with Germany and + have a horror of sending away a ship or a man unless Germany does + the same: such is their confidence in the friendship they profess + to believe in, that they want always to be ready at the shortest + notice to attack their friend or to defend themselves from him. + They are also, no doubt, jealous of any separate help to Montenegro + which does not explicitly pledge the Powers to action in the Greek + Question also. + + I quite agree with you that separate threats from the + French to the Porte about Greece (however incorrect their acting + separately may be) are more likely to do good than harm. One Power + in earnest would frighten the Porte more than the six, if the + Porte were convinced that the five others would not restrain the + energetic one. + +During the next three months the Sultan, single handed, conducted a +campaign against the six Great Powers, which, as will be seen, nearly +ended in success; and it must, in fairness, be admitted that there was +a good deal to be said from the Turkish point of view. The Powers were +engaged in endeavouring to force the Porte to comply with conditions +directly or indirectly resulting from the provisions of the Treaty of +Berlin. But no steps whatever were taken, or ever have been taken, to +force other States to comply with stipulations which appeared to be +disagreeable to them. The right of the Sultan, which had been secured to +him under the Treaty, to occupy Eastern Roumelia, remained in reality +an empty phrase: the Bulgarian fortresses which were to have been +demolished, remained untouched, the tribute due from Bulgaria remained +unpaid, and there was no indication of an intention to reinstate the +unfortunate Mussulmans who, as the result of the war, had been driven +away from their homes, and had been despoiled of their property by +their new Christian masters. Neither could it be justly maintained +that, in agreeing to a rectification of the Greek frontier at Berlin, +the Turks had recognized the right of the Greeks to annex a territory +equal in extent to half of the Greek Kingdom. Added to this, were the +difficulty and the humiliation involved in surrendering against their +will, a large number of Mussulman subjects. The difficulty had in fact +proved insurmountable in the case of Montenegro, and the Albanians +who were in the first instance allotted to Montenegro offered so +successful a resistance that the original plan was abandoned, and after +much negotiation, the Porte accepted 'in principle' the cession of the +Dulcigno district as an alternative. But the concession of anything 'in +principle' by the Turks, usually means something quite different from +the usual interpretation of that expression, and the Sultan succeeded +in organizing a highly successful so-called Albanian League, and ably +supported by a resourceful local Pasha, contrived by various expedients +to delay the surrender of Dulcigno for so long that it began to look +as if it would never take place at all. Finally, the resources of +diplomacy becoming exhausted, a policy of coercion was decided upon, and +an international fleet assembled off the coast of Albania in the month +of September, under the command of Admiral Sir Beauchamp Seymour.[32] +Each power signed a declaration of disinterestedness and a pledge not to +acquire territory, but the hollow nature of this imposing manifestation +was betrayed by a provision that no troops were to be landed, and the +Sultan, who probably had some inkling of the situation, still refused +to give way. A bombardment of Dulcigno would presumably have left him +philosophically indifferent. + +As the Dulcigno demonstration did not appear likely to produce any +satisfactory result, the British Government decided upon the hazardous +step of proposing the seizure of Smyrna, that being considered the most +efficacious means of coercing the Turks and of preventing the concert of +the Great Powers from becoming the laughing stock of Europe. This step +was evidently taken chiefly at the instigation of Mr. Gladstone, and the +letters of Lord Granville bear witness to the extreme anxiety which +he felt as to the result. No encouragement whatever was received from +France; the timorous Freycinet having in the meanwhile been succeeded at +the Foreign Office by the equally timorous Barthélemy St. Hilaire, an +aged survival of the Louis Philippe period. + + * * * * * + + _Lord Lyons to Lord Granville._ + + Paris, Oct. 4, 1880. + + Barthélemy St. Hilaire's answer about the Greek Frontier does + not look as if we should receive any energetic help from France + towards obtaining the settlement of that or any other question + in the East. The answer was all ready cut and dried, and the + declaration as to France sticking to the Concert, but not taking + any initiative, had been made before to my colleagues. A more + experienced diplomatist would have acknowledged more elaborately + your courtesy in offering to communicate first with France, before + addressing the other cabinets on the Greek Frontier affair. + + The fact is that the present Cabinet is still more frightened + than the last by the disapproval which has been manifested by + all parties in France of even the little that has already been + done. With regard to this, M. St. Hilaire made a remark to me + yesterday which seems to be true enough. France, he said, has quite + recovered her financial strength, and in great measure her military + strength, but the _moral_ of the people is not yet _relevé_. + They are horribly afraid of another war and consequently utterly + averse from anything like a risky or energetic policy. Another + popular sentiment, which is extremely inconvenient just now, is the + feeling that France made the Crimean War _pour les beaux yeux de + l'Angleterre_ and had better not repeat the experiment. Altogether + I am afraid France will be a trouble, not a help to us, and I am a + good deal put out about it. + + Barthélemy St. Hilaire talked to me a long time about + Gambetta, with whom he described himself as very intimate. He + described Gambetta as having a naturally generous nature, as being + somewhat impulsive and incautious, but at the same time somewhat + 'Genoese.' He said that if I took opportunities of associating with + him, I should find his character an interesting study. The study + will not be a new one to me, and I am not sure that too apparent an + intimacy between me and Gambetta would be viewed without jealousy. + +M. Jules Ferry, the new Prime Minister, was no more amenable than his +colleague. + + * * * * * + + _Lord Lyons to Lord Granville._ + + Paris, Oct. 8, 1880. + + As to the French agreeing to the Smyrna proposal, I cannot + prognosticate favourably. I had a long conversation yesterday + with Jules Ferry, the Prime Minister. I seemed to make some + impression by urging that to break up the European Concert now + would be to keep the questions open, with all their inconveniences + and all their dangers, for an indefinite time. He also admitted + the many advantages of the Smyrna plan, and was quite unable to + suggest any other course of action so likely to bring the Sultan + to reason without inconvenient consequences. But he perpetually + reverted to the argument that it would be going too near war to be + admissible under the French Constitution, and that the Chambers + on that account would call the Ministers severely to task. The + argument from the Constitution seems to me almost absurd, but it + is constantly used already in the press, and will no doubt be used + hereafter in the Chambers. The fact is that Jules Ferry and his + colleagues are horribly afraid of the effect which they believe any + action on their part would produce on public opinion and on the + Chamber. + + I have seen B. St. Hilaire this afternoon. I went over with + him the same ground I had gone over with Jules Ferry yesterday, but + with much the same result. He told me that the question had been + discussed in the Cabinet this morning and was to be discussed in + another Cabinet to-morrow. Perhaps they would not like to stay out + in the cold if Germany and Austria came in, but I am afraid they + will certainly not say 'yes,' though they may say 'no' before those + Powers have given their answer. They seem to argue from the delay + of the German Government, that Bismarck is against the proposal. + Orloff, my Russian colleague, tells me that he is strongly urging + the French to agree. Beust and Radowitz (the German) talk as if + they themselves thought well of the Smyrna plan, but say they have + heard nothing from their Governments. + + I spoke to B. St. Hilaire about your reasons for communicating + first with him about the Greek Question, and he sent with effusion + the message of thanks which he ought to have sent at first. + + Choiseul is applying with vigour the _épuration_ system to + the Foreign Office and the Diplomatic Service. He seems to have + dismissed some very good men in both. Des Michels is one of his + victims, and to-day he has decapitated the head of the Commercial + Department. + + I think it better not to communicate at present the draft + instructions to the Admiral. They would, I think, be seized upon as + arguments that the occupation of Smyrna would be an act of war. + +Her Majesty's Government were in effect in a very bad mess. The Smyrna +proposal had received no real support from any Power. Bismarck had +announced that the so-called Eastern Question was not worth the bones +of a Pomeranian Grenadier, and nothing was to be expected from him. +The same thing applied to Austria; neither Italy nor Russia were to be +relied upon, and France was unwilling and unenterprising. No wonder +that Lord Granville felt singularly uncomfortable: the Concert of +Europe, as he expressed it, had 'gone to the devil,' no one was going to +help him, and unless within a few days the Turks yielded, the British +Government would be confronted with the alternatives of seizing Smyrna +single handed or of confessing defeat and abandoning the contest. Lord +Granville himself was in favour of the latter course, as being logical, +and the natural consequence of the action of the other Powers, who would +neither agree to the English proposals nor propose anything themselves. +Mr. Gladstone, on the other hand, was apparently all for going on and +acting as the mandatory of Europe, and as he usually got his way, it +is possible that this dangerous course might have been adopted; but in +the very nick of time, just at the moment when the situation looked +to be at its worst, the Sultan suddenly gave way and announced that +Dulcigno should be handed over to the Montenegrins. What brought about +this sudden decision has always remained more or less of a mystery, but +there is no proof that the proposed seizure of Smyrna (which would have +probably inconvenienced European interests quite as much as the Sultan) +was the deciding factor. According to the late Lord Goschen, who was in +as good a position to know the real facts as any one else, the sudden +surrender of the Sultan was caused by a Havas Agency telegram from +Paris; but the contents of this communication have never been divulged, +and Lord Goschen himself never ascertained what they were. The surrender +of Dulcigno, which took place in November, terminated the crisis and +enabled the Gladstone Government to claim a striking if lucky success +for their own particular sample of spirited Foreign Policy. + +In the year 1880 the relations between the Liberal Government and +the Irish Nationalists were the reverse of cordial, and a good many +inquiries used to come from the Foreign Office respecting alleged Irish +plots and conspiracies at Paris with requests that the French police +authorities should be asked to give their assistance. These requests +Lord Lyons was in the habit of discouraging as much as possible, +partly from an ingrained dislike to being involved in any secret and +equivocal transactions, and partly because he knew that if the French +police gave their assistance in tracking down Irish conspirators, they +would certainly expect reciprocity in regard to Bonapartists and other +opponents of the existing system of Government at that time residing +in England. For these reasons he always urged that the English police +authorities should communicate direct with the French police authorities +without using the Embassy as an intermediary. But the efforts of the +Gladstone Government were not confined to endeavouring to check Irish +plot by means of the police, and an attempt was made to restrain the +turbulent bishops and priests engaged in the Home Rule agitation by +applying pressure upon them from Rome. The credit of this expedient +seems to have been chiefly due to the active and enterprising cleric, +Monsignor Czacki, who was acting as Nuncio at Paris, and who appears +to have conceived the idea that if the Pope could be persuaded to +intervene on the side of the British Government, it might be possible +to re-establish regular diplomatic relations between England and the +Papacy. As far back as December, 1879, Monsignor Czacki had made certain +overtures, but they met with no attention from Lord Salisbury. + + * * * * * + + _Lord Lyons to Lord Granville._ + + Paris, June 18, 1880. + + Last October a very quiet, not to say dull, old Italian + prelate was succeeded here as Papal Nuncio by a very active, + talkative and agreeable Pole, Monsignor Czacki. + + At the beginning of December Monsignor Czacki came to me and + told me that he had received a letter from Ireland accompanied by, + or referring to, letters from very important people, among which + was, he said, one from you. He had in consequence written to the + Pope, and the Pope had written to the Irish Bishops to exhort them + to do all in their power to restrain their flocks from taking + part in violent or seditious proceedings. Monsignor Czacki asked + me whether the state of affairs in Ireland was at the moment so + serious as to render it advisable that the Pope should repeat these + exhortations to the Irish Bishops. I made a somewhat banal answer + to the effect that though there were no grounds for feeling alarm + as to the ultimate issue of what was going on, there was good + reason that those who possessed influence there should use it for + the prevention of crime and outrage, and also of turbulence and + disorder. + + I reported what has passed in a private letter to Lord + Salisbury, but I received no answer from him, and I heard no more + of the matter till yesterday. + + Yesterday, however, Monsignor Czacki came to see me and + showed me a letter he had received a few days before from Lord + Emly. The letter said that previous intervention had produced the + best results, that several Bishops had denounced the agitation in + the strongest terms, but that unfortunately the Socialists were + publicly supported by various Bishops. It mentioned that the Roman + Catholic Bishop of Meath, and the Roman Catholic Archbishop of + Cashel had manifested their sympathy with Mr. Parnell, and that the + Roman Catholic Bishop of Kilmore had himself recommended Mr. Biggar + to the electors as a candidate. The letter begged Monsignor Czacki + to intervene again, but it made the request only from Lord Emly + himself, without any allusion to you or to any other person, as + being cognizant of it. + + Monsignor Czacki said that he entirely sympathized with the + views of the writer and intended to send the letter to Rome; and he + proceeded to ask me whether I would authorize him to say that he + had shown it to me and that he sent it with my approval. + + It seemed to me that this would be bringing the thing much too + near Her Majesty's Government for it to be right for me to assent + to it without knowing your wishes. + + I confess this mode of communicating with the Vatican does + not commend itself to my judgment, and that it seems to me that it + might lead to awkwardness and interfere with better means you have + of communicating with the Pope, if you wish to communicate with + His Holiness at all. At the same time I was not absolutely sure + that you might not think there might be some convenience in having + this channel open. I did not therefore rebuff Monsignor Czacki, but + without giving any hint that I should refer to you, said simply + that I would think about what he had said. + + He is very fond of enlarging academically upon the advantages + England would derive from entering into regular diplomatic + relations with the Holy See, or if that were impossible, from + re-establishing an unofficial agent at Rome. + + You will gather from all this that Monsignor Czacki is not + altogether disinclined to be busy. + +The energetic Nuncio returned to the subject at the close of the year. + + * * * * * + + _Lord Lyons to Lord Granville._ + + Dec. 31, 1880. + + You may remember that in June last I gave you in a private + letter a long account of a conversation which Monsignor Czacki, the + Papal Nuncio here, had volunteered to have with me on Irish affairs. + + Monsignor Czacki came to see me three days ago, and enlarged + on the great advantage to the cause of order and tranquillity in + Ireland it would be for the Pope to pronounce an authoritative + condemnation of the wicked acts perpetrated in that country. He + hinted that the Pope had been misled by some of the Irish Bishops + who had recently been at Rome, and he dwelt on the inconvenience + which arose from the British Government's having no channel of its + own through which to communicate direct with His Holiness. + + On the last occasion Monsignor Czacki offered to be himself + a channel of communication. He did not repeat this offer, but + his object in what he had said appeared to be to lead up again + to the question of the establishment of regular diplomatic + relations between England and the Vatican, or if that could not be + immediately, then to the return to Rome of an unofficial agent, in + the same position that was occupied by Odo Russell, and before him, + by me. He told me he spoke entirely of his own accord, but that he + was sure that Pope Leo XIII. would most willingly receive even an + unofficial agent. + + Monsignor Czacki is a very great talker, which makes it easy + to say very little in answer to him, and I took full advantage of + the facility for being conveniently silent which this afforded me. + + The impression he left upon me was that for some reason or + other the authorities at the Vatican decidedly wish to have some + sort of agent there, from whom they could receive information + respecting the views of the British Government upon the accuracy of + which they could fully rely. + + I don't think that if it had depended on me I should have + discontinued the unofficial agent, awkward as the position had been + made by the presence of the Italian Government and of a regular + British Embassy. But to establish one now would be a question of + far greater difficulty than to have kept one going. + +Whether influenced by Monsignor Czacki or not, Her Majesty's Government +sent Mr. Errington, a Liberal Member of Parliament, to Rome in an +ambiguous capacity which was loudly denounced in the House of Commons +both by Home Rulers and by fervent Protestants, and in the course +of one of the discussions on the subject, Mr. Gladstone informed an +astonished audience that there was all the difference in the world +between an Agent and an 'Agente.' + +The French Municipal Elections which took place in January, 1881, +produced a reassuring impression throughout the country, as both the +extreme parties were decisively defeated, and the effect was largely +to increase the power and influence of Gambetta, who was now in the +enviable position of being able to make or unmake Ministries, and who +at the opening of the Chambers made a kind of 'speech from the throne' +which considerably perturbed the uninspiring President Grévy. + +Everything that Gambetta now said was of importance, and his views on +the European situation were ascertained in the usual manner through +Sheffield. + + * * * * * + + _Lord Lyons to Lord Granville._ + + Feb. 8, 1881. + + Gambetta asked Sheffield to breakfast on Saturday, and as + usual talked freely to him. + + He appeared to think that the three Emperors had come to + an understanding with each other, and that whatever might be + their plans, it was certain that they would not be beneficial + to French interests. According to him, it was with the Emperors + not a question of the position of their Empires, but of their + own individual positions. They were opposed to liberal views and + liberal institutions. They were intent upon doing whatever would be + most hurtful to the prestige and success of the Republic in France. + They were, in fact, reconstituting the Holy Alliance. + + At this moment France was unfortunately powerless. Until the + General Election had taken place, her destinies must be at the + mercy of any old women who were employed as stopgaps in ephemeral + ministries. Since Barthélemy St. Hilaire had been in office he had + only seen him once. He knew nothing or next to nothing of what went + on at the Ministère des Affaires Étrangères, and what little he did + know, he disapproved. 'Que voulez vous,' he said: 'nobody will do + anything to commit himself in any way, pending the uncertainty of + the elections.' + + He seemed well informed about Egyptian affairs. He praised + Malet and said de Ring was entirely in the wrong in his quarrel + with de Blignières, which was very injurious to the calm direction + of Egyptian affairs. He expressed an intention to urge the + immediate recall of de Ring. + + I mark this letter private because we should get into a great + scrape and close a very convenient channel of communication if + Gambetta found that he was quoted or that his sayings transpired in + any way. + +The interest of the year 1881 lies in the fact that it makes a fresh +departure in French foreign policy and the abandonment of the retiring +and timorous attitude which had prevailed ever since the war with +Germany. The first State to experience the inconvenience of this new +development was Tunis, and early in the year it became evident that +a very acute Tunis question was imminent. The trouble began over a +large property known as the Enfida Estate. This property was sold to +an important French financial association, but upon the sale becoming +known, a certain Mr. Levy, a Maltese British subject, put in a claim of +pre-emption under Tunisian Law, and it was believed by the French that +he had been instigated by the Italians, and was merely utilized by them +as a convenient means of obstructing French enterprise. The dispute over +the Enfida Estate rose to such proportions that a French ironclad, the +_Friedland_, was sent to Tunis in February, and the British Government, +who were bound to make a show of defending the interests of Mr. Levy, +in spite of his dubious position, followed suit with H.M.S. _Thunderer_. +Both vessels were soon withdrawn, but before long it was generally +believed that a French invasion of the country was contemplated. + + * * * * * + + _Lord Lyons to Lord Granville._ + + Paris, Feb. 25, 1881. + + The French public are getting very cross about Tunis. + Reasonable people see that we cannot allow our own subject to be + bullied, but the French in general do not distinguish between + the Enfida case and the Tunisian questions regarding predominant + influence, Italy, and so forth. Drummond Wolff's question last + night was very mischievous. It was his own party which gave the + assurances at Berlin which have made Tunis so very delicate a + matter between the French and us, and which dispose the French to + allege that the present Government is less friendly to them about + that country than the late. Anyhow, Tunis is the point on which + above all others the French are susceptible and irritable; and + the Italians, and, however unconsciously, our own Consul too, I + am afraid, are always stirring up awkward questions on the spot. + I should be heartily glad to be rid of the Enfida question in any + creditable manner. I so strongly suspect that Levy is simply put + forward by the Tunisians for their own gain, and supported by the + local enemies of goodwill between France and England, in order + to make mischief, that I only wish we could wash our hands of + the whole affair. There seems to me to be no evidence that he is + a _bona fide_ purchaser on his own account. Tunis is the really + ticklish point in our relations with France. + +The Enfida Estate case was not only unsatisfactory on account of Mr. +Levy not being a very desirable _protégé_, but because it enabled +the French to manufacture a grievance against the Bey, and gave the +Italians an opportunity to encourage that unfortunate potentate in the +belief that he would receive foreign support in the event of French +aggression. + +The intentions of the French Government were disclosed before long. +Shortly after the wretched Bey had protested against a memorial +containing a long list of alleged French grievances against the +Government of Tunis, M. Jules Ferry, on the ever convenient plea of the +necessity of chastising hostile frontier tribes, asked for votes of +credit for both the army and the navy, which were unanimously agreed to. +Before the expedition actually started, the French agent at Tunis, M. +Roustan, visited the Bey and informed him that the French preparations +were intended to protect him against the Sultan of Turkey, who desired +to convert Tunis into a Turkish Pashalic, and that, under these +circumstances, it was very desirable that Tunis should be placed under +a French Protectorate. It was quite in vain that the unhappy Bey urged +that he had no reason to suspect the Sultan of any such intention and +that he had not the slightest desire for a French Protectorate; he was +informed that he was not the best judge of his own interest, and that +French troops would shortly enter his country to chastise the Kroumirs, +a race of whom nobody had yet heard, but who apparently constituted a +serious menace to the French Republic. + +The obvious design of the French drew from Lord Granville an opinion +that they could not be allowed to seize upon Tunis without the consent +of Turkey, and the permission of other Powers; but to this opinion not +much attention seems to have been paid. + + * * * * * + + _Lord Granville to Lord Lyons._ + + April 5, 1881. + + I have thought it necessary to instruct you to inquire into + the state of affairs at Tunis. You are not likely to do so in an + unnecessarily offensive manner. + + I am told that the French are determined to establish their + Protectorate. This will be very awkward at the moment. + + Pray look as mysterious as you can, as to what might be our + attitude. + + We do not wish to follow the example of the foolish opposition + made to Algiers, but the French cannot be allowed to seize Tunis + without the consent of Turkey and communication with the rest of + Europe. + + The Italians wish us to move vigorously in the matter; the + Italian Government seems alarmed at the excitement of their chamber. + +It was all very well to say that the 'French cannot be allowed to seize +Tunis,' but when a big European Power decides to pounce upon a weak and +decaying Oriental State, it is not of the slightest use to employ such +language if merely moral suasion is contemplated. The recent action +of the Italian Government with regard to Tripoli[33] was the exact +repetition of French action with regard to Tunis, and remonstrances were +of no more avail in one case than in the other. The Bey sent piteous +protests and appeals for justice to all the Great Powers, but as Italy, +the only Power which really objected, was not prepared to fight, his +lamentations fell upon deaf ears. Meanwhile, in an attempt to justify +their bare-faced aggression, the French Government apparently handed to +M. Blowitz, the _Times_ correspondent at Paris, a despatch from Lord +Salisbury written in 1878, which it had been agreed should be treated as +confidential, and it was intimated in the press that further private +and confidential communications would appear in a forthcoming Yellow +Book. This produced a very justifiable remonstrance from Lord Salisbury. + + * * * * * + + _Lord Salisbury to Lord Lyons._ + + Hatfield, April 24, 1881. + + I am not sure that I am not irregular in addressing to you any + communication on public affairs. But I think I have been told that + a certain license is accorded to disembodied Foreign Secretaries, + of haunting the scenes of their former misdeeds. + + My cause of writing is this. My eye caught a statement in one + or two English papers that St. Hilaire intended to print in the + forthcoming Yellow Book, Waddington's first despatch to d'Harcourt + on coming back from Berlin. I had a dim recollection that it was + undiplomatically phrased and had been withdrawn: but I could + remember no more. + + Is it not rather a strong measure for a Government to withdraw + a despatch to which objection is taken at the time, when it might + be answered, and then to publish it three years later, when the + materials for answering it no longer exist? However, perhaps I am + wrong in assuming that the newspaper report is correct. + +Lord Salisbury was quite correct in his recollection, and the intention +of publishing the despatch referred to was not carried out, but various +attempts were made to fix upon him the responsibility for French action +in Tunis. + +Lord Granville, although he confessed to disliking the process, had to +content himself with ineffectual barking. + + * * * * * + + _Lord Granville to Lord Lyons._ + + April 22, 1881. + + You will not like a despatch I send you, and I am rather sorry + to send it. But I do not see how we are to give France _carte + blanche_. + + I dislike barking without biting, but if the result of not + barking (in contradistinction to all that was done under Louis + Philippe and Napoleon, when English remonstrances certainly stopped + the French) is the annexation of Tunis, or the creation of the + great port of Bizerta impregnable by naval force and neutralizing + Malta, we should look rather foolish. + + Notwithstanding the present Chauvinism about Tunis, it would + not be a sweetmeat for the French to have England, Italy and the + Arabs inside and outside Algeria against her. + + It is as well that she should not imagine that this is + perfectly impossible. + + But, of course, I wish to ruffle her as little as possible, + and nobody will wrap up the warning of our doctrine as to the + Ottoman Empire better than you will. + +Undeterred by Lord Granville's just remonstrances and equally undeterred +by the Sultan's assertion of his suzerainty claims, the French entered +Tunis and occupied the capital on May 11, after little more than a +mere promenade. On the following day the Treaty of the Bardo, which +practically established a French Protectorate over the country, was +extorted from the Bey, and declarations by the French Government made it +clear that no intervention, direct or indirect, would be tolerated. + + * * * * * + + _Lord Lyons to Lord Granville._ + + Paris, May 13, 1881. + + Barthélemy St. Hilaire certainly foreshadowed the Tunisian + Treaty accurately when he said that it would very much resemble a + Protectorate. It is so like one that it would be difficult to point + out a difference. The guaranteeing the execution of the Treaties of + the European Powers is sufficiently impertinent. As in all these + French expeditions, there is a vast amount of dirty pecuniary + stockjobbing interests at the bottom, which have been the real + motive power. + + The whole affair is of very bad augury. It will inspire the + French Public with a love of resorting to high-handed proceedings + which can be indulged in without any real risk. Gambetta said to + Dilke that his Cherbourg speech was the first glass of wine given + to the Convalescent France, good for her but somewhat startling to + her system. This Tunis expedition is the second. The patient has + swallowed it so complacently that she may soon wish for another, + and perhaps a stronger stimulant. They got Bismarck's leave for + this, and it will perhaps be a long time before they do anything + of the kind without his leave. But then he will be sure to push + them on to any undertakings which will occupy their minds and their + forces, and tend to put them on bad terms with other Powers. And + this is disquieting, for there are not wanting all over the globe + places and questions in which the French might make themselves very + inconvenient and disagreeable to us, and might, if encouraged by + Bismarck, come at last to a downright quarrel with us. + + Add to this the state of feeling in the English manufacturing + districts which is likely to be produced by the Commercial + proceedings of the French, and their virulent Protectionism, and + the prospect looks gloomy enough. + +The actual proceedings of the French in Tunis were in reality of less +importance as regards England than the spirit which they betrayed, for +their reception by the French public indicated a state of feeling which +might have dangerous consequences. The preparations for the expedition +were not considered by impartial critics as particularly creditable +to the skill or efficiency of the French military administration, and +there had been nothing like serious fighting in the short campaign. The +question had simply been one of bullying a defenceless ruler, and of +carrying on a high-handed policy in the face of Europe. Nevertheless +the whole affair was hailed with almost unanimous delight by the French +people. Nor, apparently, was this delight diminished by the reflection +that the expedition had not been undertaken without the approval and +encouragement of the German Government, and that the favour had been +acknowledged with almost humiliating gratitude. + +Gambetta had represented that his object was to emancipate France +from the humiliation of having to consult Bismarck confidentially +beforehand upon every step she took, but this humiliating precaution was +certainly not neglected in the case of Tunis, and if there had been the +slightest suspicion that the expedition would have involved France in +any difficulty with Germany, public opinion would at once have declared +against it. From the German point of view this was satisfactory enough, +but scarcely reassuring as far as other Powers were concerned. + +The French had shown that they rejoiced in any high-handed proceedings +which did not bring them into collision with Germany, and whilst it was +not improbable that their rulers would seek popularity by gratifying +this feeling, it seemed not unlikely that the policy pursued by +Germany with regard to the Tunis expedition would be persevered in. To +disseminate the forces of France and to divert the minds of the French +from Alsace and Lorraine by encouraging them to undertake distant +enterprises for the gratification of their vanity, was an obvious means +of increasing the safety of Germany, and the more such enterprises +tended to alienate from France the sympathies of other Powers, the more +they would contribute to the security of Germany. Unfortunately there +were scattered over the globe, numerous islands and other territories, +the annexation of which by France might be prejudicial to English +material interests or objectionable to English feeling; and there were, +moreover, various countries in which the undue extension of French +influence might be dangerous to England, and where France, if tempted +or encouraged to resort to arbitrary proceedings, might, without +deliberately intending it, become involved in a downright quarrel with +England. These considerations made it desirable that especial caution +should be exercised in the case of Egypt. The effect of the Tunis +expedition upon Egypt had been twofold. On the one hand, it increased +Egyptian suspicions of the insincerity and rapacity of European Powers; +on the other hand, it increased the reputation of France in Egypt at the +expense of the other Powers and of England in particular, and diminished +any confidence in being effectively protected from French encroachments. +The lesson of the Tunis expedition was obvious; it would clearly be +folly, either by withholding the tribute or by any other step to weaken +the connexion of Egypt with the Porte, for the French Government had +taken elaborate pains to show that in dealing with Tunis it was dealing +with an independent Power. This contention had naturally been resisted +by the Porte, and there was little difficulty in proving that suzerainty +had been effectually established by a Firman of 1871. But the Sultan of +Turkey, who in the past had enjoyed the possession of more suzerainties +than any other potentate, had seldom derived anything but embarrassment +from this particular attribute, and in the case of Tunis it proved +to be singularly inconvenient. Encountering no opposition from other +Powers, the French flouted the claims of Abdul Hamid, and in order to +signify their new position, announced that the French representative +would thenceforth take charge of all foreign questions. In spite, +however, of the flexibility of the European conscience with regard to +the general principle of the Sultan's suzerainty, it was recognized +that under certain circumstances that principle must be conscientiously +upheld; and it was, therefore, intimated, more or less directly to the +French Government, that although the Sultan's suzerainty in Tunis was a +negligible quantity, the situation in Tripoli was quite different, and +so, in a far greater degree, was that of Egypt. + + * * * * * + + _Lord Lyons to Lord Granville._ + + Paris, June 17, 1881. + + It is most true that the danger of bad relations between us + and the French arises from their proceedings not ours, and that + this makes the great difficulty in meeting it. + + The change of their position with regard to Bismarck is + another great difficulty. A little while ago dread of Germany + made them unwilling to send a regiment or a ship to a distance + from France, but since the Tunis affair, they have gone into the + trap he has set for them with their eyes open. They feel sure of + his support and encouragement in any distant enterprises, and the + surer of it in proportion to the hostility which such enterprises + may provoke in England and Italy. They thus find a cheap way of + gratifying their vanity, and of advancing some of their apparent + interests. This coquetting with Bismarck does, moreover, divert + their thoughts from Alsace and Lorraine. + + I don't think it would be prudent to make any special advances + to Gambetta at this moment. We might not please him and we should + very probably offend Grévy and Barthélémy St. Hilaire, and so + interfere with the practical treatment of present questions, such + as the Commercial Treaty, the West Coast of Africa, Newfoundland, + etc. + + The anomalous position of the French in Tunis, and the + proceedings of Roustan[34] there, will keep up irritation in + England and Italy--and I suppose the French, annuente Bismarck, + will cut the Gordian knot, sooner or later, by annexing it. They + ought in consequence to acquiesce in some improvement of the + position of England in Egypt, but this is dangerous ground. + +The overbearing attitude of the French officials in Tunis caused +considerable irritation in England, and something akin to exasperation +in Italy. The Italians, had they felt strong enough to do so, would have +resisted the French pretensions by force, but being without an ally at +the time, had to content themselves with violent ebullitions in the +press. The ill-feeling between the two countries was marked by serious +riots at Marseilles and other towns in the South of France. + + * * * * * + + _Lord Lyons to Lord Granville._ + + Paris, June 24, 1881. + + I did my best to impress upon B. St. Hilaire yesterday that + there was real bitterness of feeling among the public in England, + and that if the French Government and its agents persisted in a + series of irritating measures, the consequences might be very + inconvenient. The French had got all they could want, I said, and + I could not help wondering that it did not strike them that their + policy should now be to let the new system settle down quietly, + to avoid occasions of controversy about it, and in short, to let + Tunis be as little heard of as possible at present. It was an ill + return, I observed, for the great patience and friendliness shown + by our Government, to be perpetually springing upon them surprises + unpalatable to English public opinion. He professed to _abonder + dans mon sens_. I entreated him to keep his subordinates in order. + + The French seem to have an unpleasant business in Western + Algeria, and there is beginning to be an outcry against the + military and civil management of the troubles there. + + Good feeling between French and Italians will not be promoted + by late events at Marseilles. The feelings of the French towards + the Italians there are like those of the American workman towards + the Chinese at San Francisco, or of the Irish towards the negroes + at New York. There are said to be more than 50,000 Italians at + Marseilles, and they are apt to use their knives. + + There are symptoms of a growing antagonism between Jules Ferry + and Gambetta, signs of the feeling between the Elysée and the + Palais Bourbon. + +After all, the Tunis expedition turned out to be a rather more +troublesome affair than had appeared probable at first. At the end of +June insurrections broke out at Sfax and other places, necessitating the +recall of French troops who had been sent back to France; bombardments, +and other severe measures of repression. The insurrection spread into +Algiers on the western side, and on the eastern side the disturbances +created the possibility of a violation of the frontier of Tripoli by the +French troops. + + * * * * * + + _Lord Lyons to Lord Granville._ + + Paris, July 5, 1881. + + Retribution has come quickly upon the French for their + hypocritical seizure of Tunis. The Arabs seem to be upon them + in all directions. Although this serves them right, it is, I + think, much to be regretted for political reasons, independently + of the suffering it causes to un-offending Europeans of various + nationalities in Africa. + + If the French have to send a large force to Tunis, they will + very probably, formally as well as virtually, annex the Regency. + Tripoli will then stand exactly in the same relation to them + that Tunis did before the assumption of the Protectorate. After + Tripoli would come Egypt; but happily there is, I believe, a very + impracticable desert tract between them. + + How great must be the complacency of those who desire to + occupy French troops in distant countries, and to involve France in + difficulties with other Powers. + +If the action of the French in seizing Tunis was hypocritical, the +contention that the case of Tripoli stood on an entirely different +footing was equally unconvincing. The real truth, of course, was that, +with the exception of the Italians, no one really objected to the French +going to Tunis. They went there, under distinctly false professions, +announcing that the expedition was intended solely to punish refractory +tribes, and that the occupation was merely temporary. The disclosure +of their real objects naturally caused irritation in England as well +as in Italy, but all hostile criticism was met by the assertion of the +Liberal Government that Lord Salisbury had himself invited the French +to take Tunis at the time of the Berlin Congress. The French themselves +were careful to represent that they had only followed Lord Salisbury's +advice, and Lord Granville, in defence of his own policy, always +maintained that the phrase attributed to Lord Salisbury, _Carthage ne +doit pas rester aux barbares_, had cut the ground from beneath his +feet, and rendered remonstrance useless. But to make Lord Salisbury +responsible for this act of flagrant immorality seems, in the face of +such evidence as is available, unjustifiable. All that he had done was +to intimate that he had heard that the French were extremely anxious +to go to Tunis; that if they did so, British interests would not be +endangered, and that he should consequently look on with indifference. +When M. Waddington, in 1878, construed this opinion as an invitation to +France to appropriate Tunis, Lord Salisbury felt bound to remonstrate, +and he wrote to Lord Lyons, as has been already shown. 'He (Waddington) +makes me talk of Tunis and Carthage as if they had been my own personal +property, and I was making him a liberal wedding present.' The real +instigator of the Tunis expedition was not Lord Salisbury, but Bismarck. +The latter, who was omnipotent in Europe at the time, could have stopped +French action at any moment he pleased, but instead of doing so, he +naturally encouraged an enterprise which was certain to lead eventually +to difficulties between France, Italy, and England. + +While, however, it was convenient to overlook any French illegality +with reference to Tunis and to its connection with the Turkish Empire, +it would have been, as has already been shown, manifestly imprudent +to allow Tripoli, which stood in a precisely similar position, to be +menaced with a similar fate: besides which, Italy had already marked +Tripoli down as her own prey. Accordingly the French Government were +informed that 'in view of the unquestioned incorporation of Tripoli in +the Turkish Empire, as well as its proximity to Egypt, Her Majesty's +Government could not regard interference of whatever description on +the part of the French Government in that province in the same manner +as they viewed the recent occurrences at Tunis. That Her Majesty's +Government should take this view of the question of Tripoli cannot, they +feel assured, be a source of surprise to that of France, since they +have, on all occasions when the question of the extension of French +influence in the direction of Egypt has been under discussion, been +perfectly frank in their explanations with the French Government on the +subject.' In his reply to this communication, M. B. St. Hilaire (who +had previously announced that to annex Tunis would be a great mistake), +effusively stated that the French Government looked upon Tripoli as +an integral part of the Ottoman Empire, over which it did not pretend +to exercise a predominant or exclusive influence, and gave a formal +denial to all rumours which attributed to France any designs upon that +country. The British Government professed itself quite satisfied with +these assurances, and the Porte, for once in a way, showed sufficient +intelligence to make its suzerainty quite clear, by despatching troops +to garrison the country, and by other precautionary measures. In +consequence of these steps Tripoli remained immune from attack for +another thirty-two years, and when, in 1912, the Italians, following +the French example of 1881, fell suddenly upon it without any serious +attempt at justification, they did not allege that they were attacking a +semi or wholly-independent State, but declared war upon Turkey itself, +and incidentally brought about the destruction of Turkish power in +Europe. The future of Tripoli under Italian rule is still obscure, while +the numerous prophecies of failure which attended the seizure of Tunis +by the French have not been fulfilled, but in either case it would be +difficult to justify the morality of the enterprise or to defend the +policy of these two Great Christian Powers. + +The year 1881 witnessed the renewal of negotiations for a new Commercial +Treaty between France and England, and in consequence of opinions +expressed by M. Tirard, the French Minister of Commerce, it was +determined to take the negotiations out of the hands of diplomatists. +M. Tirard had declared that he believed that an understanding could be +effected if the question could be freed from diplomatic dilatoriness, +and that if he were brought face to face with a 'competent and +well-disposed man,' the whole matter would be settled within a week +by making a few mutual concessions. To meet these views, the late Sir +Charles Dilke, M.P., was appointed principal British Commissioner with +the late Sir Joseph Crowe, Sir Alfred Bateman, and other distinguished +experts as his colleagues or assistants, but M. Tirard's prognostication +turned out to be entirely incorrect. In spite of the great ability +and indefatigable industry of Sir Charles Dilke and the other British +Commissioners, the negotiations made a very unsatisfactory start, +were constantly broken off, and were not even concluded by the end +of the year, so that it must have been impressed upon M. Tirard that +dilatoriness was not necessarily due to diplomacy. From the first, the +negotiations were unpromising, for Free Trade had continually receded in +France since the Empire, and the necessity of cultivating good political +relations with England was evidently less in 1881 than it had been upon +the last occasion. + +The representatives of the two nations met in London in June, and an +inauspicious beginning was made by the French Commissioners repudiating +the bases signed in 1880 by Lord Granville and M. Léon Say. By the +middle of the month the breaking off of the negotiations was already +being considered. + + * * * * * + + _Lord Lyons to Sir C. Dilke, M.P._ + + Paris, June 14, 1881. + + I received last evening your letter of the day before, asking + me whether I had anything to say on the policy of breaking off the + commercial negotiations when you get to work. + + I don't think we should lose sight of the fact that there will + in all probability be a thorough change of Government in France in + the autumn. We might _perhaps_ get a decent treaty from the new + Government if they found the negotiations in progress. It might + not be so easy to get negotiations reopened if they had once been + broken off, and the French had become accustomed to the idea of + having the general tariff applied to British goods. + + Politically, it would, I think, be a great pity to begin + ill with the new Government, and I don't think we could possibly + begin well, in the state of feeling which would be produced in + this country, and still more I suppose in England, by a commercial + rupture. + + The majority of the French would be very glad that the general + tariff, or still higher duties, should be enforced against English + goods, but they would none the less be irritated by our breaking + with them. + + I confess, too, that I am alarmed, perhaps without sufficient + reason, at the effect which may be produced both at home and abroad + by the cry in England for retaliation. + + My own plan would be, for the present, to pursue the + negotiation as seriously and as steadily as is compatible with + not committing ourselves to any decidedly objectionable duties so + definitely as to be hampered in subsequent negotiations if we find + the new Government more fairly disposed towards us. + + If there was ever any possibility of concluding a Treaty in + time for it to be passed by the Chambers this Session, there is + certainly none now. Gambetta wanted to get the question out of the + way before the elections; but even if the Treaty were signed, I + don't think the Chambers could be induced to consider it under + present circumstances. Nor would they, I should think, pass a bill + to prolong the existing Treaties. + + To my mind, our most prudent course would be to let the new + Chambers find the negotiations going on when they meet in the + autumn. I don't of course mean that you should go on sitting every + week from this time to the autumn: it would suffice that there + should not be any adjournment _sine die_, and that we should not + give any ground for an assertion that we are not really willing to + conclude even a moderately fair treaty. + +Lord Lyons, as has already been stated, was, like almost every British +official of the time, a firm and almost bigoted Free Trader; and it +is possible that his alarm at the prospect of retaliation was caused +by the appearance of the Fair Trade League; that harbinger of Tariff +Reform to which somewhat inadequate justice has been rendered by its +imitators. But it is surprising to learn of these qualms, when he is +found predicting that the smaller countries who were willing and able to +retaliate on French goods, would obtain better terms than England. The +very different spirit in which the smaller States approached commercial +questions with France is shown in the following instructive account of +the views of the Swiss Minister at Paris, M. Kern. + + * * * * * + + _Lord Lyons to Sir C. Dilke._ + + Paris, June 25, 1881. + + Last evening, after my letter to you of yesterday had gone, I + met Kern, who told me that in the course of the day he had had an + interview with M. Tirard, and also one with M. Gambetta. He had, + he said, declared most distinctly to both, first, that Switzerland + would not sign a Treaty placing her in a less advantageous + commercial position than that now existing; and secondly, that + if the general tariff were applied to Swiss goods, French goods + would be forthwith subjected to duties of precisely the same amount + in Switzerland. He had, he said, somewhat surprised M. Tirard by + informing him that the Swiss Government had power to impose such + duties at once, without waiting for legislative sanction. + + The impression left upon Kern's mind by the two interviews + was, that as hard a bargain as possible would be driven by France, + but that in the end they would rather make moderate treaties than + no treaties at all, if they saw that this was the only alternative. + + He is going to Berne to confer with his Government, and he + says that he is sure they will approve and confirm his language to + Tirard and Gambetta. + + After these interviews, Kern was very positive that the French + Government were making a great fight to justify themselves to the + Chambers, but that if the Powers, and particularly England, were + firm, the French would yield rather than incur the political and + other inconveniences of not making any treaty at all. + + I am not so sure as he seemed to be of this, but I think that + the French are alive to the political inconveniences of breaking + with England altogether; and it might therefore be worthy of your + consideration, whether, when you go back to the Articles you + reserved in the Tariff, you should not make a last effort to see + whether the French cannot be brought to consent to a Treaty which + would be better commercially than no Tariff Treaty at all. It might + interfere with whatever chance of success such an effort might + have, for the French to feel beforehand that they could get out of + the political difficulty by signing a simple Most Favoured Nation + Treaty. + + Nevertheless I am not shaken in my opinion that it would be + advisable for you to sign a Most Favoured Nation Treaty, if better + may not be, before you break up the Commission, or adjourn it for + any long time. + + Commercially we had better make sure at once of sharing the + concessions which may be made to other Powers under threats of + retaliation. + + Politically we should, I think, find it most disadvantageous + to have even the appearance of being on bad terms with France. + +The British Government apparently still entertained the illusion +that there were real French Free Traders. M. Challemel Lacour was +the chief French Commissioner and Lord Granville welcomed him as a +brother Free Trader. His brother Free Trader said it was true that he +was _Libre-Echangiste_, but he was _Libre-Echangiste Français_, and +recognized the necessity of paying due consideration to the interests of +native industries. To this chilling response, Lord Granville was forced +to retort that he must venture to doubt whether a _Libre-Echangiste +Français_, in His Excellency's acceptation of the term, was not what +in England was called a Protectionist. M. Waddington had once stated +that he was a Free Trader 'bar cotton,' and whenever the French Radical +Parliamentary candidates, who were then perambulating the country in +view of an approaching general election, were asked whether they were +Free Traders or not, they replied in the affirmative, but qualified by +a reserve in favour of French industries which would be ruined by Free +Trade. As a matter of fact, the spirit of Protection was becoming more +and more ingrained in the French people, and the best chance of getting +a reasonable Commercial Treaty lay in the hope that an election would +bring Gambetta into power. + +The London negotiations which had been temporarily suspended were +resumed at Paris in the autumn, and continued during the remainder of +the year; but interest was diverted from commercial matters to the +events which were occurring in Egypt and their probable effect upon +Anglo-French relations. + +FOOTNOTES: + +[Footnote 29: Subsequently Viscount Goschen.] + +[Footnote 30: Sir Francis Adams, Minister at Berne.] + +[Footnote 31: See Appendix by Mrs. Wilfrid Ward, "Lord Lyons in Private +Life."] + +[Footnote 32: Afterwards Lord Alcester.] + +[Footnote 33: 1911.] + +[Footnote 34: French Consul-General at Tunis.] + + + + +CHAPTER XV + +ARABI'S REBELLION + +(1881-1882) + + +In September, 1881, the long-drawn-out Egyptian crisis culminated in the +military _coup d'état_ of Arabi and the colonels, which resulted in the +dismissal of the Ministry and the practical establishment in Egypt of a +military dictatorship. From that moment European intervention, in some +form, became inevitable, and it was the object of the British Government +to continue to adhere honestly and consistently to the policy of working +in conjunction with France, and to avoid carefully as long as possible +any action which might necessitate the employment of force. + + * * * * * + + _Lord Lyons to Lord Granville._ + + Paris, Sept. 30, 1881. + + The article in the _Times_ has produced an anti-English + explosion on the subject of Egypt, and was certainly well + calculated to do so. + + For my part, I think the best thing to be done is to take an + opportunity of distinctly manifesting at Cairo the continuance of + the Anglo-French understanding. + + If we let either the Egyptians or Foreign Powers suppose they + can upset that, we shall not be able to maintain the English and + French Controllers, and if they disappear, the financial prosperity + will disappear with them, and we shall have the bondholders, + French and English, on our backs again. + + If we let in other Foreign Powers, and at the same time try + to establish English predominance, we shall have those Powers + coalescing with France against us. + + A split with us would very probably lead to France throwing + herself into the arms of Bismarck, and he would encourage all + her ambitious aims out of Europe, and, in particular, those + the prosecution of which would widen the breach between her + and England: or, in other words, be especially annoying and + inconvenient to us. + + I hope things are so far calming down in Egypt, that we may + not be called upon to take any special measures this time; and + the best hope of avoiding them in future seems to be in making it + understood that England and France united will resist attempts to + overthrow the existing system. + + I am all against letting the Turks thrust the smallest finger + into the pie. At this moment the French would never consent, and + would consider our bringing in the Turks a specially unfriendly + act, with a view to their Tunisian affairs. The less they merit any + consideration from us, the more sore they will be at not receiving + it. Besides which, where the Turkish hoof has trod, no grass grows, + and woe to the finances of any country with which the Turk can + meddle. + + Of course, in what I have said about Egypt I have confined + myself to the present and the immediate future. + +The chances of being able to avoid active intervention were in reality +non-existent; for temporizing measures taken in conjunction with France +could not put off for ever the day when, moral pressure having been +found insufficient, armed force would necessarily have to be employed. +When that day arrived, the probability was that France would want to +send troops in conjunction with ours, and our consent to that course +might involve us in war with France in a very short time. If we had the +courage to tell the French that our interests were paramount in Egypt, +and that therefore all other European Powers must be kept out, then we +must be prepared to back our words with force, and everything therefore +pointed to the naval superiority of England in the Mediterranean as +being our paramount necessity. With real naval superiority in the +Mediterranean we were practically able to make the French do our +bidding, if we chose. We had the power to shut up their navy in French +ports, to stop their communications with Africa, to render powerless +two millions of French soldiers, and to demolish Bismarck's schemes +of elbowing us out of the Mediterranean. Such was the happy position +which we enjoyed in 1881, and it was a great contrast to that which +we occupy at the present day; but it did not tend towards promoting +goodwill between the two nations, and Lord Lyons constantly urged +that some joint understanding should be arrived at, in the event of +another military outbreak in Egypt. The situation had been complicated +by the despatch of a Turkish mission, and the general impression in +France was that Arabi and the colonels would shortly be engaged in a +conspiracy to dethrone the Khedive and to restore something like the old +_régime_ in the country. A positive declaration from the English and +French Governments that they would not tolerate the overthrow of the +Khedive and the established system might have effected much if it was +felt that the two Governments would interfere by force, if necessary, +rather than permit it; but this would not be felt or believed unless +the two Governments had really come to an understanding and had agreed +upon details; and when it came to discussing details the question +at once presented difficulties. These difficulties were not lessened +by a French Ministerial crisis in the autumn, as a crisis usually +produced a fit of petty Chauvinism, such an encouragement to Consuls +in the East to _porter haut le drapeau de la France_, the bullying of +local authorities, and a demand for the extortion of monopolies and +concessions for French speculators. + + * * * * * + + _Lord Lyons to Lord Granville._ + + Paris, Nov. 4, 1881. + + The Treaty of Commerce and Egypt will probably be the two + first questions we shall have to discuss with the new Government. + + The Commercial negotiations seem to me to have been brought + exactly to the right point. Having obtained the three months + prolongation, we have resumed the negotiation on the day fixed, and + have continued it _bona fide_; and it now stands over in a manner + which will enable us to see in due time whether or no we can make a + treaty with the new Government. + + As regards Egypt, the opinion gains ground here that at the + bottom of the agitation there is (or soon will be) a plot to + dethrone Tewfik and put Halim in his place as a 'National': _i.e._ + anti-European, anti-French, and anti-English Control, Khedive. I + understand that de Blignières represented strongly to Gambetta that + the only way to produce quiet in Egypt and counteract intrigues + in favour of Halim at Yildiz Kiosk is for England and France to + declare positively at Cairo and Constantinople that they will not + stand it, but will resolutely support Tewfik and the existing state + of things. I do not know how far Gambetta assented to this, but I + am told he did not dissent from it. + +The result of much political manoeuvring was that in November, 1881, +Gambetta was forced to take office and to exchange the irresponsible +power which he had hitherto wielded in the background for Ministerial +responsibility. As frequently occurs in similar cases, when the great +mystery man was dragged out into the light of open day, his appearance +was somewhat disappointing. His Administration, with one exception +only, was composed entirely of men belonging to his own immediate +following, and contained no one of any weight beside himself. Gambetta +took the Foreign Office as well as the Presidency of the Council, and +on the principle that _il vaut toujours mieux avoir affaire à Dieu qu'à +ses anges_, this was an advantage, although it was believed that he +entertained so great an admiration for Bismarck, that, following the +latter's example, he would probably hand over the foreign diplomatist to +an under secretary. The first impressions produced by the new Ministry +were not favourable. + + * * * * * + + _Lord Lyons to Lord Granville._ + + Paris, Nov. 18, 1881. + + I don't think the present Ministry is so far at all a success. + Among other inconveniences arising from the appointment of men of + so little personal importance is that there is no one in Gambetta's + party who does not think that he ought to have been a Minister; + or, in other words, who acquiesces in the superiority of any of + those chosen. The fact that Léon Say and Freycinet were offered + portfolios, but would not accept them on Gambetta's terms, tells + against the selection ultimately made. Gambetta's personal genius + must make up for all deficiencies. He appears to have a talent + in particular for parliamentary tactics, especially for making + the right move on the spur of the moment. I doubt his having + deep-matured plans. So far as I can see, he lives _au jour le jour_ + like ordinary men. + + I had a long visit yesterday from Spüller, but we did not get + much beyond generalities. Gambetta and I have exchanged visits, but + have not met. + + I do not hazard conjectures on commercial matters, as Dilke + will ascertain to-morrow exactly how the land lies. ... As a + diplomatist, I cannot but feel that there is convenience in being a + bachelor just now. + +The last sentence does not refer to the fact that he had just been +created a Viscount, but to the somewhat peculiar domestic circumstances +attaching to certain members of the new Government. + +It had been assumed that Gambetta's accession to office would be +marked by a more vigorous foreign policy, especially in the direction +of acquiring fresh territories in distant regions; but this was not +justified by his own language or bearing, and at his first interview +with the Ambassador he abstained from pompous common-places about +preferring England to all the rest of the world, and desiring peace at +any price, which was looked upon as a good sign. At the same time, there +was, in his speeches about Tunis and the Mediterranean, a slight flavour +of Chauvinism which would not have excited remark before 1870, but which +would not have appeared in 1880, and would certainly not have been +applauded in 1881, unless it had become generally known that Bismarck +had sanctioned and encouraged French enterprises away from the continent +of Europe. + + * * * * * + + _Lord Lyons to Lord Granville._ + + Paris, Dec. 6, 1881. + + Gambetta gave the Diplomatic Body an excellent dinner last + Saturday, and played his part as host very successfully. + + What may be at the bottom of his heart, nothing has yet shown. + + The change which has come over the relations between France + and Germany opens to him the door for a comparatively safe yet + ambitious Foreign Policy. Will he resist the temptation? + + During the years which immediately followed the war, the + feeling of France towards Germany was composed of furious hatred + and of mortal dread. The line taken, consciously or unconsciously, + by Germany tended to add bitterness to this feeling. She interfered + dictatorially with France even in internal matters. Her object + seemed to be not only to impede the restoration of French strength + and wealth, but to prevent the French recovering even prestige + anywhere. She was, or affected to be, convinced that a war of + revenge on the part of France was imminent. She was believed by + the French to be angry at their showing so much vitality and to be + preparing to give them the _coup de grâce_. + + At this moment, however, neither France nor Germany appears + to apprehend an attack or to be prepared to make one. Each appears + to consider the other too strong to be attacked with impunity. + Certainly Gambetta would not find the nation in heart to follow him + in defying Germany. If therefore his policy or his passions incline + him to do something striking to flatter the national vanity, how + is he to find the means? The Tunis affair has given Bismarck an + opportunity of showing him. It has enabled the Chancellor to + convince the French that they will have the countenance of Germany + in any enterprise in which they may engage out of Europe. + + How far this may be part of a great plan of Bismarck's + to secure German supremacy in Europe by pushing Austria into + the Levant, Russia into Asia, and France into Africa and the + Mediterranean, and by shutting up England in her own islands, we + need not inquire. In any case it must suit Prince Bismarck to see + France making acquisitions of territory or influence, which weaken + her military force in Europe, throw burthens on her finances, and + make ill blood between her and other Powers. + + Unhappily if Gambetta is so short-sighted as to give in to + temptation of this kind, difficult questions are, more than with + any other Power, likely to arise with England, who is in contact + with France all over the world and especially in the Mediterranean. + + I hope better things, and I am not at all willing to despair + of a thorough good understanding between France and England which + would avert danger from both, and enable both to do good to all the + world. Still one cannot but be anxious at this moment. Egypt may be + the ticklish point. + +The Parliamentary skill of Gambetta was seen to advantage during the +short winter session, and compared favourably with the want of tact and +vigour which had been displayed by his predecessors. He even obtained a +success in the Senate, where he had not expected to find any sympathy +at all, and some of the more sensible Conservatives became disposed to +support him, more from fear of what might result if he fell than from +personal attachment. Some of his appointments, however, aroused alarm, +and he perturbed Lord Lyons by bestowing upon a journalist a most +important post in the Foreign Office. + + * * * * * + + _Lord Lyons to Lord Granville._ + + Paris, Dec. 30, 1881. + + I will not despair, but I am feeling very great anxiety + about the Commercial Treaty. I am afraid that on this side of the + Channel, much more than in England, the failure of the negotiations + would have a most undesirable political effect. In France and on + the Continent generally, it would be taken as a sure indication of + a coolness between the two Governments. Gambetta would be taunted + by the Opposition with having alienated England (Italy having been + alienated before). Gambetta's supporters in the press and elsewhere + would try to throw the blame upon England, the English press would + retort upon France, and a very unpleasant state of feeling would be + the result. + + Gambetta has astounded people by appointing a flashy newspaper + writer, of no particular principles, to the post of Political + Director in the Foreign Office. The Political Director is almost + the most important person in the office, as he drafts all the + political despatches and notes. I hope the communications to the + foreign ambassadors are not to be in the style of 'smart' newspaper + articles. I confess that when I saw the appointment in the _Journal + Officiel_, it did not occur to me that the man could be the same + Weiss who had been writing in the _Figaro_. + +The friendly disposition of Gambetta towards England has already been +noted, and beyond a certain tendency in his speeches towards Chauvinism, +there was nothing in his conduct calculated to arouse alarm, but +nevertheless a critical moment in Anglo-French relations appeared to +be approaching at the beginning of 1882. The Government of France had +passed into the hands of a Minister far more influential, more able, +and more ambitious than any man who had taken part in public affairs +since the retirement of Thiers, and the time was at hand when that +Minister must decide on the line of policy to be followed with regard +to Foreign Powers. The character and temperament of Gambetta naturally +disposed him to endeavour to make his Foreign Policy more vigorous, +more successful and more striking than that of his predecessors, and +with that object he would probably take one of two courses. Either +he would aim at emancipating France from her existing confidential +servility towards Germany; or, despairing of that, he would continue the +existing relations with Bismarck, and thus ensure the latter's willing +acquiescence in aggressive proceedings on the part of France beyond the +limits of Europe. + +In order to shake off the German yoke, Gambetta evidently considered +it essential that he should be able to place himself on distinctly +friendly and intimate terms with England, and if he failed in this, the +probability was that he would be obliged to revert to the patronage +which was felt to be so irksome. But the change which had come over +the relations between France and Germany opened the door to a foreign +policy which was comparatively safe and easy, and yet did not present +the disadvantage of being unambitious. The period which immediately +followed the war of 1870, was, as has already been pointed out, marked +by a feeling in France towards Germany of fierce hatred combined with +extreme fear, and German policy, whether consciously or unconsciously, +tended to embitter this feeling. Germany interfered dictatorially and +ostentatiously even in French internal affairs, and the object seemed +to be not only to crush the reviving strength of France, but to prevent +her recovering anywhere, or in any matter, the smallest portion of her +lost _prestige_. The German Government professed to believe that a war +of revenge was meditated, and was credited with the intention of finally +destroying France before the latter should be sufficiently recuperated +to resume the struggle. + +But with the lapse of time, a change of policy, and, to a certain +extent, a change of feeling had taken place on both sides. Neither +country was in any immediate apprehension of an attack from the other. A +somewhat ostentatious interchange of courtesy had been substituted for +their former reserve, and Bismarck had seized the opportunity of the +invasion of Tunis to let the French understand that they would have the +countenance of Germany in enterprises undertaken by them out of Europe. +Apart from all far-reaching schemes for securing German supremacy in +Europe, it was obviously in the interests of Germany that France should +engage in enterprises and make acquisitions which dispersed her armies, +disorganized her finances and created ill feeling with other Powers. + +Gambetta was much too intelligent a man not to see through this policy, +but the temptation to direct the energies of France into the Colonial, +rather than the continental direction, might prove too strong for him +if he despaired of gaining credit for his Government in another way. +Unhappily, in such a case, with no Power were difficulties so likely to +arise as with England, which was more or less in contact with France in +all parts of the world, and especially in the Mediterranean. Nor could +it be forgotten that in the speeches lately delivered on the subject of +Tunis, Gambetta had made strong appeals to national pride with regard to +French possessions and interests beyond the seas. + +Still there was no reason to suppose that the so-called Colonial Policy +was Gambetta's first choice. He was known to chafe under the practical +subservience of France to Germany, and to feel deeply humiliated by it. +At the bottom of his heart he cherished an ardent desire to recover +the lost provinces, but he knew that neither the military strength of +France nor the spirit of the people would warrant his attempting this +within any assignable period. He did, however, aim at freeing the French +Government from the sort of occult control which Germany had recently +exercised over it, and at improving the position of France as a Great +Power. He desired to present the Government over which he presided +to France and to Europe as taking a dignified and important part in +international questions, and feeling that these objects could best be +attained by a real and visible friendship with England, he was evidently +disposed to treat pending questions with a view to maintaining and +manifesting a cordial understanding. + +The two most important questions of the moment were, of course, Egypt +and the Commercial Treaty. + +As regards Egypt, there was so far complete unity between the two +Governments--the strain having not yet arrived--but the conclusion of +a Commercial Treaty appeared to be a more arduous affair. Gambetta +was apparently ready to go as far towards making an acceptable Treaty +as was possible without risking a defeat in the Chambers. But if the +negotiations were to fail, he would probably despair of keeping up good +feeling towards England in France. He would conceive that the failure +would discredit him in the eyes of France and of Europe; that it would +convey to foreign Governments an impression, which he could not remove, +of there being a coolness between France and England, and that it would +oblige him to seek for his Foreign Policy some other basis than union +with England. + +Perhaps the fear that unsuccessful commercial negotiations would convert +Gambetta into a foe was partly due to a communication from Sir Charles +Dilke announcing that a commercial ultimatum was about to be hurled at +the French Government. This communication is extremely instructive from +the English Parliamentary point of view, for it recommended that in +despatches the word 'bargain' should be carefully avoided, 'as it would +strengthen the reciprocity argument.' In other words, although wine +duties were to be utilized for the purpose of bargaining, the fact was +not to be disclosed lest it might be construed as a departure from the +sacred principles of Free Trade. + +Attention was, however, quickly diverted from the Commercial Treaty +to Egypt. On January 8, the British and French Governments presented +the so-called Dual Note, in which they declared their intention of +'warding off by their united efforts all causes of external or internal +complications, which might menace the _régime_ established in Egypt.' +The Dual Note was by no means as successful as had been hoped, and it is +clear that Gambetta was in favour of more decided and independent action +than the British Cabinet. Within a few days Lord Granville was already +writing to Lord Lyons and asking him whether it would not be advisable +for England and France to ask permission from the Powers to appear as +mandatories of Europe. + + * * * * * + + _Lord Granville to Lord Lyons._ + + Jan. 17, 1882. + + The news from Egypt is certainly not reassuring, and the + _mauvais quart d'heure_ may arrive at any moment. + + M. Gambetta would probably desire joint intervention; the + objections to this are immense: I need not recapitulate them all to + you. + + Single occupation, by England or by France, still more so. + + I am not quite sure that Turkish occupation under proper + conditions and control by France and England, although a great + evil, would not be less bad than the three alternatives I have + mentioned. But it is not only bad in itself, but it would be + strongly opposed by the French, although it would be supported + by the German Powers. In these circumstances, an observation of + Malet's struck me as having some force. Talking of the intentions + of some of the other Powers to have their part in the question, he + said it would not be so objectionable, if they consented to allow + the English and French to be the mandatories. + + The idea seemed to me to be worth considering, and I spoke to + Tenterden and Rivers Wilson (but to no one else) and requested them + to draw up a memorandum as to how this could be carried out. I send + you an extract, and I should like to have your opinion on it before + I submit it even to Gladstone as a possibility. + + Gambetta of course would not like it. But his difficulty is as + great as ours if he were to understand that we will not agree to + joint occupation. There would be nothing humiliating to France if + the proposal was freely consented to by both countries and jointly + offered to Egypt. + + For us it would only be acting on the Concert of Europe + principle, about which we have been making such a fuss. + +This somewhat half-hearted proposal met with no approval from Lord +Lyons, who expressed his objections in more decisive terms than were +usual with him. + + * * * * * + + _Lord Lyons to Lord Granville._ + + Paris, Jan. 19, 1882. + + In your letter of the day before yesterday you ask me for + my opinion on a suggestion as to admitting other Powers to take + part in the Egyptian Question, on the supposition that France and + England should be their mandatories. + + This would, _ipso facto_, be the abandonment of the + exceptional position which England and France have taken up in + Egypt. Whether this position can be, or ought to be, maintained for + a long time, is a question which I will not stop to examine. + + That a proposal to abandon it, at this moment, would have a + very bad effect on our relations with France, does not, I think, + admit of a doubt. It would be taken as an abandonment of our + intention to give up, in the face of Europe, all special intimacy + with the French Government. It would give rise to suspicions + that we were trying to use the other Powers for the purpose of + ousting France from Egypt. The union of England and France on the + Egyptian Question is the principal symbol of there being a good + understanding between them, and to this symbol the French attach no + little importance. + + I don't know that the designation of mandatories of Europe + would mend the matter. The other Powers would not commission + England and France to decide by themselves what measures should + be recommended for Egypt. They might depute England and France + to enforce the decisions of Europe, but this would only bring us + back to the joint intervention of the two Powers in a particularly + awkward and unmanageable form. + + Practically, it would, I think, be found much more difficult + for us to keep well with France, if the other Powers were also to + have a voice in details. Hitherto England and France have managed + to come to an agreement with each other on the questions that have + arisen. It might be made more difficult for them invariably to side + with each other against other Powers. Political considerations as + to affairs distinct from Egypt might come into play. Setting aside + a natural and not improper jealousy on the part of each, lest its + associate should obtain separate and undue influence, the interests + of England and France in Egypt are very much the same. The main + interest of some Governments, and in particular that of the Porte, + might be antagonistic to cordiality between the two Western Powers. + + A Commission appointed now to deal with questions relating to + the government and administration of Egypt would be a different + matter from the Commissions of 1878 and 1880. + + In the first place, it seems probable that the Sultan would + protest strongly against it, and that he would do so whether or + no there were Turkish members of it appointed by him. His Majesty + might possibly acquiesce under strong pressure from all the Powers, + but would all the Powers put such pressure on him? In all matters + bearing upon the relations between the Porte and Egypt, it must, I + am afraid, be taken into consideration that neither France singly, + nor England singly, nor the two acting together, are likely at the + present time to exercise predominant influence at Constantinople; + and that, on the other hand, the Power which does exercise + predominant influence there shows no disposition to jeopardize that + influence by giving unpalatable advice, and is not supposed to have + any desire to promote cordiality between England and France. + + Moreover, we have to consider not only the Sultan and the + Khedive, but the mutinous officers and the so-called National Party + in Egypt. From a telegram which Gambetta showed me yesterday, + it would appear that Arabi had expressed some idea of appealing + against England and France to the Great Powers collectively. But + would he and his party, whose watchword seems to be 'Egypt for + the Egyptians,' submit passively to the installation of a Foreign + Commission to settle all the important national questions? Would + they acquiesce in the subsequent enforcement of the decision of the + Commission? + + The Commission might certainly sit at Alexandria, and it + might perhaps have the support afforded by the presence of an + Anglo-French squadron, or an International squadron. In either + case, would the squadron be provided with men to be landed in + case of need, and would the Commission be authorized to call for + the assistance and protection of a force to be put on shore? If + this were so, it might be merely a small beginning which might + ultimately render intervention in arms on a larger scale inevitable. + + On the other hand, if the presence of the squadron were to + be merely a naval demonstration, would the fact of its being more + or less representative of all the Great Powers give it much more + weight than if it were made on behalf of England and France alone? + Would it, in either case, be safe to trust to the moral effect + of its being sufficient, and to its not rendering further action + imperative? + + Gambetta seems to hope that firm and decided language, used + collectively now by France and England, may ward off a crisis. + If there be any chance of warding off a necessity for action, it + no doubt lies in this; but I suppose that with Gambetta the wish + is father to the thought. On the one hand, in face of the present + unpopularity of the Tunis expedition, it would be very awkward for + him to have to send another French force to Africa at the present + moment. But, on the other hand, he could not confront the mass of + enraged bondholders if he abandoned their interests; and public + opinion here, which is very sensitive about Egypt, would not + tolerate his letting France be openly set at naught in that country. + + It is needless to add that the French Government would + bitterly resent it, if any hint were given to a third Power, + without their having been previously consulted, if there is any + idea on our part of withdrawing from our separate understanding + with them, and merging Egypt in the general Eastern Question. If + they were ever brought to consent to calling in the other Powers, + they would not readily forgive having their hands forced in the + matter. + + For my own part, I would certainly, as regards Egypt, rather + have to deal with France only than with four or five more Powers. + +There can be no shadow of doubt that Lord Lyons's view was the correct +one, but Lord Granville and Mr. Gladstone (no other member of the +Cabinet is mentioned) seem to have hankered after the Concert of Europe, +probably in consequence of the stroke of luck at Dulcigno. + + 'Your very powerful letter,' Lord Granville wrote on January + 21, 'is gone to Gladstone. It is not easy to find an answer to all + your arguments. The question is whether there are not stronger + arguments against any other course. I think it is likely that I + shall write to you to ask you to speak to Gambetta. + + 'On the imminence of the crisis: the importance of perfect + union between England and France: our strong objection to intervene + alone--giving as reasons:--opposition of Egyptians; of Turkey; + jealousy of Europe; responsibility of governing a country of + Orientals without adequate means and under adverse circumstances; + presumption that France would object as much to our sole occupation + as we should object to theirs. + + 'Have carefully considered joint occupation; some of the + objections to sole occupation lessened, but others most seriously + aggravated. + + 'Deprecate Turkish intervention, but think it a lesser evil + than the two to which I have alluded, giving some reasons. + + 'Then propose the European element, as sketched out in my + private letter. + + 'Any concessions to Europe after any demonstrations on the + part of the German powers and Italy would place us in a false + position; but if made spontaneously and jointly by France and + England, would not have that inconvenience. + + 'Please reflect upon the way such arguments might best be put, + but let me have all your opinions upon it. + + 'Such able letters as your last are very valuable.' + +Another letter written on the same day asks for advice as to what should +be done 'if the crisis arrives, as is probable, in a week.' It was very +evident that the Cabinet had no definite plan of their own, and were +only too glad of the opportunity of consulting some one whose opinion +was worth having. + + * * * * * + + _Lord Lyons to Lord Granville._ + + Paris, January 22, 1882. + + I have received this morning your two letters of yesterday + about Egypt; and I have reconsidered the letters from me of the + 19th to which they are answers. + + There exists at this moment one new difficulty, the + uncertainty whether Gambetta will still be in office this day week. + + I do not, however, find in this circumstance any reason to + modify the views expressed in my long letter. + + Whoever may be in office here at the time, if we proposed to + call in the other Powers, we should be held (to use Commercial + Treaty slang) to have 'denounced' our good understanding with + France. We should be reproached with deserting our comrade at the + critical moment, and I am seriously afraid that for a long time + the feeling in France towards England would be bitter, and the + relations of the French Government towards the English Government + more than cold. + + In my communication to the French Government respecting Egypt, + there are some topics in particular which would require delicate + handling. + + First of these, I should mention Turkish intervention. This + has been a subject of difference between France and England for + half a century, and the French have a traditional feeling on + the subject at all times. But at this moment they (rightly or + wrongly) think it a matter of vital importance to them with regard + to Algeria and Tunis, and they would go very great lengths to + resist the introduction of the Turkish Troops into Egypt, or the + increase of Turkish influence there. They always suspect us of + hankering after Turkish support against them, not reflecting that + our influence at Constantinople is not so predominant as when they + supported Mehemet Ali against the Porte and England. + + Another topic on which the French might be sensitive would be + the question of governing a country of Orientals. This is a matter + on which I feel strongly myself, but it would need to be dealt with + very cautiously, or the French would see in it a sneer against + their own shortcomings in Tunis and even in Algeria. + + The objections to joint dual occupation are strong, but almost + any statement of them would apply with equal force, or more, to + joint sextuple occupation, or to the occupation by two Powers as + mandatories of the rest. + + Malet, I see, telegraphs that the Chamber would, he thinks, + listen to the united Great Powers, but would not listen to England + and France alone. + + Admitting that Malet is right (and he generally is right), + there always remains the difficulty as to putting this cumbersome + six-wheeled waggon into motion in any reasonable time. + + And this brings me to the question in your second letter, what + course should I recommend, if the crisis, as is probable, arises in + a week. + + It seems to me that in that case either things must be let + 'slide,' or England and France must take some step together, + without waiting for the other Powers. + +All the anxious speculations which had taken place with regard to +Gambetta's future foreign policy turned out to be quite unnecessary, for +on January 27, after little more than two months of office, he resigned, +having been defeated, like any ordinary political mediocrity, on a +question of domestic interest. His place was taken by M. de Freycinet, +who succeeded in forming a respectable Ministry, but whose policy with +regard to Egypt was as vague and undecided as that of the British +Government, and whose views with regard to a Commercial Treaty were +supposed to be identical with those of his predecessor. + +Advantage was taken of the change by Lord Granville to again urge the +substitution of the Concert of Europe for purely Anglo-French control in +Egypt, and Freycinet showed himself much more amenable than Gambetta. +As far as can be gathered, the attitude of both Governments was the +reverse of heroic; the British Government was anxious to hand over its +responsibility to other parties, and the French Government was not +disposed to take any initiative at all. The French were, in fact, +waiting for England to make a suggestion, and while perhaps ready to act +in conjunction, wished that the responsibility of whatever proceedings +were adopted in common, should rest primarily, if not exclusively, upon +England. The Tunis enterprise had proved to be so much more troublesome +and expensive than had been expected, that the Government shrank from +becoming involved in anything of the same nature in Egypt. But the +condition of affairs in Egypt was such that even the timid Freycinet +Government might find its hand forced. An insult to a French functionary +might produce an outbreak of Chauvinism which would force the Government +to send a force to avenge it, and Gambetta would certainly have had a +force ready for a contingency of this kind. + +Nubar Pasha was in Paris at the time, and his views on the Egyptian +situation were not without interest. + + * * * * * + + _Lord Lyons to Lord Granville._ + + Paris, March 7, 1882. + + I do not find the least diminution of the French opposition to + Turkish intervention in Egypt, even if it were only moral. + + Nubar has been here for some months, and often comes to see + me. His first object in life seems to be to get Blignières out + of Egypt, and his second to get Tewfik deposed. I conclude that + he thinks that both are obstacles to his own return to power. + His language is, that the dictation of the English and French + Controllers in Egypt was more than any country could bear; that the + present state of things is much better; office and power being in + the same hands; that Arabi Bey and his compeers will do very well + if they are properly managed, and that two quiet, conciliatory + (perhaps we should read imbecile) Controllers would keep everything + straight. I think he inclines to the moral intervention of the + Sultan. He seems to be intriguing with Germany. He had an interview + with Freycinet, to whom, according to his own account, he held the + language I have described above. He talks more ably than any one + else about Egypt, but always with a view to his own interests. + +Any one who ever conversed with the late Nubar Pasha could not fail to +be impressed with his ability, but like many other able Orientals, he +was a consummate intriguer, and probably the predominant feeling in his +mind was a desire to be reinstated in power. It should be explained +that, at this time, Arabi was already practically at the head of the +Government, although only occupying the post of Minister of War, and +that M. de Blignières was still French Controller. M. de Blignières, +however, resigned his post on March 12, and an open letter[35] from him +to M. Clémenceau threw a lurid light on the tortuous and inexplicable +course of French policy in Egypt. + + 'Lorsqu'il (Cherif Pasha) a du quitter le pouvoir; lorsque j'ai + compris que les chefs du parti militaire, qui l'avaient renversé, + pouvaient compter sur la bienveillance de notre gouvernement, + ce jour-là, ne me faisant aucune illusion sur les conséquences + nécessaires de cette politique nouvelle, j'ai résigné mes + fonctions.' + +If, therefore, M. de Blignières was correct, the French were playing +a double game; ostensibly acting in concert with England against the +Nationalist agitation in Egypt, while secretly encouraging Arabi and his +friends to persevere in their efforts. In one respect, however, they +were consistent, namely in their opposition to Turkish intervention, and +the traditional French opposition to Turkish influence in Egypt was +accentuated in consequence of the recent events in Tunis and Algeria. + + * * * * * + + _Lord Lyons to Lord Granville._ + + Paris, April 4, 1882. + + You will have seen by the despatches I sent you by post + yesterday that Freycinet has at last put the dots on his i's, and + distinctly proposed that Tewfik shall be deposed and Halim put + in his place. I cannot say I take to the idea. As you said to + Tissot, there might be some good in it if Halim had great moral and + intellectual qualities. But I don't see that we have any reason + to suppose he has such qualities. Nor indeed, if he had, do I see + how his mere appointment would at once set things straight in + Egypt. The removal of Ismail was a great blow to the prestige of + the Khediviate, and it would require a genius to re-establish its + authority, if another deposition takes place in so short a time. + I do not understand how Freycinet reconciles his present idea + with his objection to Turkish interference. If the Khedive is in + daily fear of being deposed by the Sultan, there will be abject + submission to Yildiz Kiosk and a constant flow of backsheesh to the + Porte. + + Halim no doubt promises the French that he will be their man, + and if he becomes so, they may go great lengths to support him; but + how will this suit us? And how long will it be before it leads to + something very like armed intervention of the French in support of + him? + + Then it seems to me that to depose Tewfik would be something + very like treachery, after the dual declaration made to him in + January. + + It seems to me that the things to aim at should be: to keep + Tewfik; to give him some strength against military dictation, and + to preserve the Anglo-French Control, which means a reasonable + financial administration, and gives us at any rate some means of + knowing what the Egyptians (perhaps I ought to add) what the French + are about. + +The immoral proposal to depose Tewfik met with no encouragement from +Her Majesty's Government, as was only to be expected, and the only +conclusion to be drawn from the equivocal language of M. de Freycinet +was that he felt armed intervention to be inevitable, but wanted the +proposal to come from England. He tried to persuade Lord Lyons to +propose a plan of his own which should be put forward privately, but +this met with no approval at all. '"Private and between ourselves +conversations," between Ambassadors and Foreign Ministers generally +cause mischief.' + +As the situation in Egypt continued to get worse, the British Government +was forced to take some action, and accordingly suggested that three +generals, French, English, and Turkish, should be sent to Egypt 'to +restore discipline to the Egyptian army.' As it was not proposed that +these generals should employ anything but moral force, it is difficult +to see how they could have succeeded, but Lord Granville appears to have +considered that it would obviate armed interference, and the French +Government having no plan of their own were presumably ready to accept +almost anything, but caused considerable embarrassment by asking for a +pledge that Turkish intervention by force of arms, in any circumstances, +would not be tolerated. What Freycinet wanted, in fact, was to be able +to declare to the Chamber that England and France were agreed not to +allow armed Ottoman intervention. + + * * * * * + + _Lord Lyons to Lord Granville._ + + Paris, May 5, 1882. + + Freycinet asked me just now to let him speak to me 'privately + and academically' about intervention in Egypt. He said his great + objection to Turkish intervention was that as matters now stand, + it would take place for a vague and indefinite object: that thus + it would be impossible to fix the exact time at which that object + would be accomplished, and that thus the Turks would have pretexts + for prolonging it indefinitely, for mixing themselves up in the + administration, for laying their hands on the Treasury, and what + not. + + If the intervention was simply for installing a new Khedive, + his objections would be less. This would be a single definite + sovereign act of the Sultan. It might be accomplished in a week or + ten days, and the Ottoman troops would have no pretext for staying, + or for interfering in the administration. He should not object to a + Turkish, French, and English fleet going to Egypt to support some + single definite act of this kind, nor even, speaking solely for + himself personally, to Turkish troops being landed. + + After some questioning from me, he said that, for a single + definite object, he personally might even prefer a Turkish + intervention, but that for any such vague purpose as supporting + Tewfik and restoring order, he thought Turkish intervention + absolutely inadmissible. If anything of that kind was to be + attempted, Anglo-French seemed to him the least open to objection. + Italian seemed to him to be worse than Turkish. + + His idea was that we should set on foot some Government that + could stand by itself. Under Tewfik no such Government would in his + opinion be ever possible. He had no predilection for any particular + individual as Khedive: all he wanted was to have some reasonably + efficient man at the head of the Government. + + He begged me to consider all this as strictly confidential, + personal, private, and academic; and he said that except in a + conversation of this character, he could not even have mentioned + the possibility of France consenting under any conceivable + circumstances to Turkish intervention; for he was by no means sure + that it would ever be agreed to by his colleagues or borne by + public opinion. + +The 'confidential, personal, private, and academic' character of M. de +Freycinet's conversation was, of course, merely intended to conceal +his own vacillation and fear of having to communicate to the Chambers +any announcement that he had sanctioned Turkish intervention in any +shape whatever. A little later, however, he nerved himself to make a +proposal that there should be a joint Anglo-French Naval Demonstration +off Alexandria. An allied squadron consequently proceeded to that +port, and its appearance produced a temporary panic in the ranks of +the Nationalists; the latter, however, speedily recovered when it was +realized that there were no troops on board, and that the Sultan, far +from approving of the demonstration, had protested against it. The +ultimatum of the allies was practically rejected, and Arabi, who had +been compelled to resign, was reinstated in office nominally as Minister +of War, in reality as dictator. To make Freycinet's position still +worse, he got into difficulties in the Chamber. + + * * * * * + + _Lord Lyons to Lord Granville._ + + Paris, May 26, 1882. + + The explosion has come, and if the irritation that prevails + in Paris to-day continues, Freycinet will be out of office, or + will, _per fas et nefas_, back out of his proposal that Turkish + intervention may be resorted to in Egypt. His Chauvin speech in the + Chamber about French preponderance, and what not, is now of course + turned against him. + + There is an impression here that in order to keep Gambetta out + of office, Bismarck may help Freycinet to eat his words. + + I am afraid that now, whether Freycinet stays in or goes out, + it will be next to impossible to have any comfortable understanding + with France about intervention in Egypt. + + Even supposing all the other Powers cordially united with + us, to repeat the experiment of 1840 would be dangerous, and would + produce a scarcely ever to be remedied coldness (to call it by a + mild name) between us and France. + + Then I share all Dufferin's misgivings as to the possibility + of either controlling the Turks if they set foot in Egypt, or of + ever getting them out. I have also a very strong fear of my own as + to the mischief they would do to the country. Even if they went + with the acquiescence of France, I think we should be constantly in + hot water with the French as long as they stayed. + + If Gambetta comes in he will no doubt again propose joint + Anglo-French intervention. Unless the Porte is backed up very + strongly indeed, he will very likely make its intervention in Egypt + something like a _casus belli_ with Turkey--or in fact do as the + French did with regard to Tunis--declare that he will oppose by + force the despatch of Turkish troops to Egypt. + +The Anglo-French Naval Demonstration had been intended as a compromise +between the two Governments over the question of Turkish intervention, +but when it was seen to be useless, it was agreed that the Sultan should +be asked to send a Special Commission to Cairo, and communications were +made to the other Powers with a view to convoking a European Conference +on Egypt; M. de Freycinet, who had for three months opposed the English +proposal for Turkish intervention, suddenly discovering that there was +no danger about it, if requested jointly by England and France. The +Turkish Commission which proceeded to Egypt was not more successful in +restoring order than the Anglo-French Naval Demonstration. It consisted +of three persons; one of whom, Dervish Pasha, was instructed to support +the Khedive and to threaten the Nationalist leaders; the second +Commissioner was instructed to support Arabi and his associates; and +the duty of the third Commissioner was to spy upon his two colleagues. +In order to make everything quite safe, the latter was accompanied by a +fourth official, whose duty it was to spy upon him, and it was perhaps +owing to these over-elaborated precautions that the mission proved to be +a complete failure. + +On June 11, the massacre at Alexandria took place, and armed +intervention became more and more inevitable, but some Governments still +entertained the hope that diplomacy might yet be successful, and the +Conference assembled at Constantinople towards the end of the month. +The chief advantage of the Conference was that it disclosed the views +of the various Great Powers, and the conditions which were to govern +the despatch of Turkish troops to Egypt were of so engrossing a nature +that they were still being discussed when the battle of Tel-el-Kebir +was fought two months subsequently, and the victorious British troops +entered Cairo. + +The vacillations and dilatoriness of M. de Freycinet irritated even the +easy-going Lord Granville, who complained of having twice been put in +a hole by him, and was justifiably anxious as to how he could defend +his Egyptian policy successfully in Parliament if the French Government +could not be relied upon for any consistent line of action. But while +admitting that nearly everything had gone wrong up till now, and that +the failure of the Sultan's Special Mission made the outlook still more +gloomy, he consoled himself with the reflection (which was shortly +afterwards shown in one respect to be quite erroneous) that, 'we have +avoided a rupture with France, a rupture with Europe, and a possible +war.' Within a few weeks, the error of this last assumption was to be +conclusively established. + + * * * * * + + _Lord Lyons to Lord Granville._ + + Paris, June 20, 1882. + + I do not hope much from the Conference: certainly I have very + little expectation of its forwarding the strong measures which the + Alexandria massacres seem to me to call for imperatively. + + I think Germany will be very little inclined to urge the + despatch of Turkish troops. Bismarck's great object appears to be + to keep Freycinet in, and he fears, not without some reason, that + when the first Turkish soldier sets his foot in Egypt, Freycinet + will fall at Paris. + + The Freycinet Ministry would probably be succeeded by a + Cabinet in which Gambetta would not actually have a seat, but + over which he would exercise very great influence. Bismarck very + probably exaggerates the strength of that influence and looks for + more direct hostility to Germany than it would really provoke. But + he is perhaps right in thinking that, under Gambetta's influence, + France would coquet with the Anti-German party in Russia, and would + lose no opportunity of fostering enmity to Germany whenever she + could find an opening for doing so. At all events, it would be + impossible for Germany to feel as much at her ease as she does now, + if Gambetta were the virtual director of French policy. + + Freycinet's strength lies partly in the disinclination of the + nation for anything like what it calls adventures, but mainly in + the dread which the present Chamber has of Gambetta, the Scrutin de + Liste and a dissolution. + + Meanwhile general dissatisfaction with the whole state of + things, and despondency do not diminish. People who looked to + Gambetta as the man to set things straight are directing their eyes + to other quarters, and there is even a sort of revival of Orleanism. + + * * * * * + + A few hours after this letter reaches you, you will in + all probability receive from me by telegraph the French answer to + the proposal to them to concert measures with us for the protection + of the Suez Canal. I don't think Freycinet likes the idea of + anything which may tend towards sending French troops to Egypt. + He seems to me to want to lean on the Conference in the hope that + by so doing, he may be able to stand quite still. Strange to say, + the Chamber and the public seem to be in the same mood. They like + to think that it is more upon England than upon them that the + discredit of putting up with the Alexandria massacre and the recent + patch up in Egypt would fall. Their present pusillanimity seems so + unnatural that I cannot think it will last. Gambetta will rouse + them from it, if he has the chance. + +They are full of suspicions of designs on our part to seize the Suez +Canal with or without the assistance or connivance of Turkey. You will +see by a telegram I have just sent, that Freycinet has asked me a +question about this. I imagine the French would object very much less to +our acting entirely alone than to our acting in any way with the Porte. + +The Sultan seems to tell de Noailles all kinds of stories against +England and Dufferin. It is not, however, from Freycinet that I hear +this. + +In Lord Lyons's opinion, the French, at this stage, were quite prepared +for England acting alone in Egypt, but he considered that it was most +important to be very frank with them, to afford them every opportunity +of joining us, but to do it in such a way that other Powers should not +be given too much time in which to raise objections. + +It was not apparently until June 27, 1882, that the British Government +seriously considered the probability of having to employ 'material +force' in Egypt, whether alone or in concert with other Powers; but +in consequence of the danger of the situation and of the necessity of +acting quickly, they then applied to the War Office for information as +to what forces were available for an expedition. In view of our alleged +military capacity at the present time, it is of interest to learn what +the War Office was prepared to do thirty-one years ago. The military +authorities stated that they were prepared to embark within twenty-four +hours, 3500 infantry, and 500 garrison artillerymen, with a small siege +train, from Malta and Gibraltar, with necessary camp equipage and +reserves of food and ammunition. These troops could be conveyed in the +ships of the Channel Squadron now in the Mediterranean. A force of about +12,000 fighting men, complete in infantry, cavalry, and field artillery, +with forty-eight field guns, was also available, to embark from England. +The first 5000 of the infantry could sail within a week, and the whole +force could leave England in a fortnight from the date of the order, +with complete supplies for an army in the field. The force from England +would be made up partially by the First Class Army Reserve, and a +Brigade was also available to be sent from Bombay to Suez. Such was the +purport of a most confidential communication to Lord Granville from the +War Office, dated June 27, 1882. + +On July 11, the bombardment of Alexandria by the British fleet took +place; the departure of the French ships marking, in an unmistakeable +form, the refusal of the French Government to incur further +responsibility, and foreshadowing the permanent renunciation of the old +French position in Egypt. + +The news of the Alexandria bombardment, which, owing to the absence +of troops for landing, could hardly be described as a very effective +operation, was received without much excitement in Paris, and Freycinet +stated that the Chamber would certainly not have sanctioned the +co-operation of the French fleet. The main point on which sensitiveness +was shown was the Suez Canal. The French seemed disposed to resent any +landing of English troops alone at Port Said, and to insist, if not +on joining with us, on sending a 'lateral' expedition of their own. +It was important, therefore, that they should be given a _bona fide_ +invitation to join in anything we might determine to do, and the French +were accordingly invited by Lord Granville to concert measures at once +for the protection of the canal; questions of detail being left to +the Conference at Constantinople. Upon the whole the bombardment of +Alexandria had tended to improve rather than to impair Anglo-French +relations, and the chief danger seemed to lie in the projected Turkish +intervention, which would alienate public opinion and provoke strong +opposition from Gambetta and his followers. Extraordinary French Naval +Credits were voted and Lord Granville appears to have thought that joint +action was secured after all, at least as far as the Canal was concerned. + + * * * * * + + _Lord Granville to Lord Lyons._ + + July 19, 1882. + + I wish you and ourselves joy of the renewed _entente + cordiale_. It will not be popular in many quarters here, but it is + an immense national advantage, and ought to relieve us from many + dangers. + + I am not in the least jealous of the dual action in the Canal, + though I should prefer its being triangular. But I own I dread it, + if we are obliged, as is probable, to intervene in Egypt itself. + + I hope they do not think we are pressing them too fast. I + believe the Cabinet will settle to send 15,000 men to Malta. If so, + I will let you know. + + Remember I am always grateful for suggestions and criticisms. + I hear Bismarck is really ill and cannot sleep at night. The + preparation of his own financial measures does not act as an + anodyne. + + I am told that the debate in the Commons last night did us + good and not harm. I suppose we shall have a more formidable one in + the Lords. + + It is rumoured that the Peers will pass the Second Reading of + the Arrears Bill, and mutilate it in Committee. + +The voting of the extraordinary French Naval Credits, which had caused +it to be supposed that the French Government intended to take some +decided action, was soon shown to mean nothing at all. Freycinet, whose +position had been much shaken, was in the uncomfortable situation of +being blamed by the Chamber for doing too much and denounced in the +Senate for not doing enough. On July 19, an important debate took place +in the Chamber, during which Gambetta, with his accustomed eloquence, +adjured the Government to adhere to the English alliance at all costs, +and urged that to quarrel with England would be the most fatal of +mistakes. The Credits asked for were agreed to, and the Government +obtained a large majority; but when Freycinet appeared in support of his +modest proposals before the Senate, he was obliged to admit that the +Conference at Constantinople had refused to entrust France and England +with a Mandate, and that in consequence of this refusal the French +Government would leave England to act alone, and would confine their own +action to the protection of the Suez Canal. A fresh credit amounting to +about £350,000 was asked for with this object, but met with formidable +opposition. + + * * * * * + + _Lord Lyons to Lord Granville._ + + Paris, July 26, 1882. + + When I saw Freycinet this afternoon he seemed in absolute + despair. There are two modes of escape which are supposed to be + still open. + + Though the majority of the Chamber are strongly opposed to + military intervention in Egypt, they may still hesitate to turn + Freycinet out, lest by showing it to be impossible to make their + own existence compatible with anything like a stable Government in + France, they may bring about a dissolution. + + It is said that they are casting about for some means of + refusing the Credit and yet not turning out Freycinet; and the + second device, which might enable Freycinet to stay in, is the + singularly undignified one of his playing into their hand, by + declaring that he does not make the Credit a Cabinet question, and + that if it be refused, he will bow to the will of the Chamber and + withdraw from the protection of the Canal. + + So long as it is undeniable that we have _bona fide_ invited + and pressed France to take part in all our operations in Egypt, I + shall not break my heart if she chooses to decline to do so. + + I believe that Freycinet would have been in a better plight + if he had taken a decided course either way; if he had distinctly + refused all intervention, or if he had boldly joined England in all + her operations. + +On July 29, the question of voting the fresh Credit was brought forward +in the Chamber and made one of confidence in the Ministry. Every one +by this time was much alarmed at the prospect of France being dragged +into some vague and desperate adventure; the Credit was refused by an +overwhelming majority; Freycinet resigned office, and France definitely +retired from the scene of action. + + * * * * * + + _Lord Lyons to Lord Granville._ + + Paris, July 30, 1882. + + Among the innumerable Ministerial crises which I have seen + here, I do not recollect one in which there has been so much + uncertainty as to who would be the new Prime Minister. + + Grévy, in conformity with his own views, and with those of + the great majority of the Chamber and indeed of the country, is + trying to form an absolutely non-intervention Cabinet. But such a + Cabinet might have difficulties with the Senate. Léon Say and Jules + Ferry, the most able members of the late Ministry, were for full + intervention and the English Alliance. + + Freycinet very unwisely began with a perfectly idle dispute + with Gambetta as to whether the English Government would, or would + not, have consented to armed intervention with France only, if + Gambetta had remained in power. Gambetta did not speak yesterday, + but he and his followers voted against Freycinet. + + Hohenlohe seemed, I hear, dreadfully put out by the result of + the division yesterday. It was Bismarck's communication which gave + Freycinet the _coup de grâce_. Hohenlohe had evidently hoped that + it would save him, by giving him an excuse for withdrawing the Bill. + + I was very much disappointed to hear from Freycinet that + Russia had gone back to the Conference. I hoped her retirement + would have given us a good opportunity of freeing ourselves from + that cumbrous clog. + + * * * * * + + _Lord Lyons to Lord Granville._ + + Paris, Aug. 1, 1882. + + All is still uncertain as to who the new French Ministers + will be. Grévy is doing his best to keep Freycinet, and Hohenlohe + is working in the same direction, which is not wise. Hitherto + Freycinet has positively declined, but he is a man who sometimes + changes his mind. He will be in an extraordinarily false position + if he does come back. Grévy may, perhaps, manage to appoint a + warming-pan sort of Ministry, just to keep the offices warm during + the recess and to make room for something more serious in October. + + The French are in very good disposition towards us at this + moment. The way to keep them so will be to endeavour to make their + present position comfortable to them, without being humiliating, + and, above all, not to crow over them, as part of our press seems + too much inclined to do. Their fleet, next to our own, is the most + important factor in the Mediterranean question. We can do as well + or better, without any aid from France or other countries, but we + ought to have the field to ourselves. + + I wish we were well rid of that dangerous Conference. I had + a sort of hope that just now it might have a sort of use, as a + means of letting the other Powers talk while we were acting. But in + fact, as worked by Bismarck and by the Turks under his direction, + it seems merely to supply the machinery for formally placing us in + opposition to the so-called European Concert, and for embarrassing + France. I think the French would be glad to be delivered from it. + + Public opinion in France is at this moment friendly to us, but + it is in a very susceptible state. + +A new Ministry was in course of time formed under M. Duclerc, one of +the many uninteresting mediocrities who have governed France during the +last forty years, and a sort of formula was agreed upon that there was +no 'solution of continuity in the Entente,' which was not intended to +commit the French to anything in particular. + +A vast amount has been written respecting the events in Egypt in 1882; +much of it by persons who occupied responsible and important positions +at the time; but the reasons for the inaction and eventual retirement +of the French have never been clearly explained. Probably the French +themselves would be unable to give a satisfactory explanation, and +would attribute their inglorious attitude to the Freycinet Government, +which did not know its own mind. But it may be assumed that a variety +of reasons were responsible for the French refusal of co-operation with +England. Had the invitation been received some months earlier, it would +probably have been accepted with enthusiasm; but the Tunis expedition, +which had opened with so much success and enthusiasm, had proved a much +more troublesome and unsatisfactory business than had been anticipated, +and had created a decided disinclination for further enterprises in +North Africa. In the second place, the difficulties of an Egyptian +campaign were greatly over-estimated; the French calculation was that +no less than 60,000 men would be necessary, and the ordinary French +Minister would not venture to allow so many men to leave the country. +Lastly, the French were quite unable, rightly or wrongly, to get it out +of their minds that they were being deliberately led into a trap by +Bismarck, and this by itself was sufficient to daunt a Government of the +Freycinet type. + +France having now definitely declined, the British invitation was +transferred to Italy. + + 'We have asked the Italians to join us,' Lord Granville wrote + on July 27, 'but we have not pressed them. They also will try to + _se faire prier_, and will be too late. I told Menabrea I could not + delay operations. + + 'I hope they will decline, but I myself was not very hot for + even the offer. But the balance of argument seemed to be in favour + of it, and you did not raise any objection to it. + + 'Please explain that the _Times_ is entirely off the track as + to our wish for a protectorate.' + +The refusal of the Italians was welcome and not unexpected, and as +no other Power was in the least inclined to co-operate, the British +Government was able to set about the task of smashing Arabi with a clear +conscience, in its own way, and unhampered by allies; for the Turks, who +had agreed to send troops, protracted the negotiations with regard to +their employment to such an extent, that the campaign was finished long +before an agreement was arrived at. + +Lord Cromer in his well-known work 'Modern Egypt,' has exposed with +much skill and lucidity the futile nature of many of the proposals +put forward by the British and French Governments during the period +that they were acting together. But the really remarkable fact is, +that each Government succeeded in bringing about the result which it +least desired. The policy of the British Government was governed by a +sincere, if mistaken, determination not to be dragged into assuming +sole responsibility for Egypt, and in particular to avoid the necessity +of military occupation. The efforts of the French Government were +chiefly directed towards the prevention of Turkey or any other Power +establishing its predominant influence in Egypt, and that French policy +should have unconsciously and involuntarily thrust England into this +unsought and unwelcome position is one of the real ironies of recent +history. + +Perhaps the most fortunate event for England during the crisis which +preceded the Egyptian expedition was the fall of Gambetta early in the +year. Had that statesman remained in office he would certainly have +never consented to remain a supine and indifferent spectator; he would +undoubtedly have insisted on France taking an active part: a joint +expedition would have taken place, and the sequel might have followed +the Schleswig-Holstein precedent. + +It was hardly to be expected that the skill and rapidity with which the +campaign against Arabi was conducted would evoke much enthusiasm in +France, nor could the French reasonably expect that upon the restoration +of peace and order the old state of things would be renewed. Before the +end of October Lord Granville informed the French Ambassador in London +that the Control would not be restored; and when the French Government +objected, on the ground that such an alteration must be submitted to the +Powers, it was pointed out the matter was one for the Khedive to decide +himself. In order to soothe wounded French feelings various compromises +in the shape of posts in the Egyptian administration were offered in +vain. + + * * * * * + + _Lord Lyons to Lord Granville._ + + Paris, Nov. 3, 1882. + + I thought it simpler and better to let Duclerc have a copy of + your despatch, as you had no objection to my doing so. He has not + yet given any sign of life since he received it. + + The argument that the Financial Adviser will have only a small + position in Egypt, or at all events a less important position than + the Controllers, cuts both ways here. Duclerc's line is to say that + we are making a distinction without any real difference: that in + practice the adviser will have all and more than all the powers of + the Controllers; and that thus virtually France is to be deprived + of her share in the Control without receiving, even nominally, any + compensation. + + A complaint of a very different kind is made by the 'Haute + Finance.' They say that the only real compensation which could be + given to France, if she is to be ousted from the Control, would + be the establishment, under the auspices and responsibility of + England, of such a strong practical supervision of the Egyptian + Administration as would make the regular payment of the Debt + and the maintenance of the commercial and other interests of + foreigners secure. They pretend that the proposed establishment + of the Financial Adviser is in form injurious to the dignity of + France, while in substance it does not sufficiently provide for the + control by any one of the Egyptian Government. These seem to be the + opinions of a very influential body here. It is quite consistent + with them that Dufferin's mission should be looked on with favour + by those who hold them. + + Clémenceau's views seem to be confined to himself. + + The thing most favourable to our coming to an understanding + with France, is the very general belief among Frenchmen that + Bismarck is egging indirectly both England and France on to a + quarrel. + + In the meantime the alarm caused by the anarchists is enough + to keep the minds of the great majority of the French fixed + on their own internal affairs. People are sending away their + securities and other valuables to foreign countries. I suppose an + absolute outbreak in force enough to resist the Government, if the + Government be resolute, is not to be expected. But there may be + explosions of dynamite here and there, and the employment of the + other new-fangled means of creating panic which the French seem to + be inclined to adopt from the Russians. + + The competition of America and other causes are producing + a curious change in the French peasantry, and a change not + favourable to peace and order. The tenacity with which the very + small proprietors have hitherto clung to their land is visibly + diminishing. They now offer their land for sale to an extent + hitherto quite unprecedented. They say that they can get better + interest by putting the price of the land into the funds or other + speculations, and can thus lead a pleasant life, instead of + slaving from morning to night to get a bare subsistence out of + their fields. The tendency of all this is to reduce the numbers + of the hitherto ultra-Conservative laborious class, and to fill + the towns more and more with idle and very often disappointed and + discontented speculators, who form a material ready to the hand of + anarchists. + +The letters from Lord Granville show that although the British +Government had embarked most unwillingly upon the Egyptian enterprise, +and viewed additional responsibility with so much horror that some +members of the Cabinet were even opposed to the office of Financial +Adviser to the Egyptian Government being given to an Englishman, yet +that the Cabinet was at all events unanimously against the maintenance +of the Control, and of the old dual arrangements. The French Government, +with an entire absence of logic and common sense, was quite indisposed +to recognize the complete change in the situation which had taken place, +and continued to claim that England and France should remain on an +equality as regarded themselves, and in a superior position as far as +the other Powers were concerned. The difficulty lay in discovering some +means of satisfying French vanity without yielding on the essential +point of equality, and efforts to ascertain what would be considered +satisfactory did not meet with much success. + + * * * * * + + _Lord Lyons to Lord Granville._ + + Paris, Nov. 14, 1882. + + I tried to make Duclerc see yesterday that the practical way + towards obtaining some satisfaction for French _amour-propre_ was + to enter upon the discussion of details as to the Boards in Egypt. + I went as far as I could without running the risk of provoking + lofty language, which might have been an obstacle to moderate + arrangements hereafter. + + However, at the moment Duclerc did not go back from his old + grounds. He does not insist upon a literal re-establishment of + the Control, but he does claim a virtual return to the _status quo + ante_, and he interprets that status as equality between England + and France and superiority of the two jointly over other Powers. + + The single Financial Councillor pleases no one here. As + he must of course be an Englishman, the sticklers for French + _gloriole_ declare that whether his functions be great or small, + he will simply be a symbol of English supremacy and French + decadency. To the _haute_ and _petite finance_, the mode of his + appointment and the smallness of his powers seem an additional + cause of complaint, as not giving sufficient security for a proper + administration of the finances of Egypt. I shall be very anxious to + hear how it all strikes Dufferin. + + In fact, at the present moment, the French are too uneasy + about their internal affairs to pay much attention to Egypt. But + they may fire up if any special event comes to irritate them. It + is more, however, future lasting ill will than violence at the + moment which I apprehend. If we leave them bitterly discontented + with arrangements in Egypt, I hardly see when we shall be able to + withdraw our troops and still maintain the influence which is a + necessity to us. + +The idea that the British occupation of Egypt was anything more than +a temporary expedient does not seem to have been considered a serious +possibility by any English Minister so far. Partly by luck, partly +by the skill of Sir Garnet Wolseley and Lord Dufferin, we had found +ourselves in possession of Egypt, unhampered by association with any +European Power or with the Turks; but for a time it looked as if the +brilliant results achieved were to be thrown away because the British +Government had no clear idea what its policy was to be. Fortunately for +all concerned, the step was taken of sending Lord Dufferin on a special +mission to Cairo, and unlike most special missions of more recent date, +the experiment proved a complete success, and quickly destroyed the +mischievous delusion entertained by a section of English politicians +that an evacuation of Egypt was possible at any early date. This +delusion had never been shared by the French, who naturally judged the +action of others in the light in which they themselves would have acted +under similar circumstances, and who made little effort to conceal their +annoyance. + + * * * * * + + _Lord Lyons to Lord Granville._ + + Paris, Dec. 1, 1882. + + I don't succeed in making Duclerc _coulant_ about Egypt. He + rather implied that it was not from Tissot that he had heard that + you were going to send him a favourable communication, and that you + were thinking of sending an expert to discuss details. He did not, + however, say who it was that told him. Perhaps d'Aunay may have had + something to do with it. Duclerc went on to hint at there being two + currents in the English Cabinet, one more favourable to the French + than the other, but I declined to listen to this. He talked as if + he had some special source of information as to your intentions and + sentiments. He seemed to take to the idea of a discussion between + experts. + + He was amiable about Madagascar, but we shall see what + his written answer will be. He represented himself as having + overwhelmed the Ambassadors with kindness, and then as having + broken off the negotiation on the point of the leases being for 99 + years. + + In the meantime prospects at home do not brighten. Railroads + and other public works have been begun, with very little system, in + all kinds of places to please Deputies and their constituents. The + Government dare not stop them for fear of what the workmen would do + if large numbers of them found themselves out of work. To go on, + is ruinous to the finances. There must be a limit to the floating + debt. The Government are again negotiating with the railway + companies. People are beginning to talk of Saviours of Society. + The names most mentioned are those of General Chanzy and the Duc + d'Aumale. Gambetta would have been everybody's man, if he had never + been Minister. However, I don't think that we are very near any + violent change. + + Grévy is certainly not brisk, but he may grow old without + things coming to an early catastrophe. + + There is a not unaccredited rumour that it was in wresting + the revolver from a female hand that Gambetta got wounded. The + bulletins at the office of the _République Française_ are that he + is going on as well as possible. + +The last paragraph refers to the wounding of Gambetta by a pistol shot. +The accident (which terminated fatally) occurred at his villa outside +Paris, and was surrounded by a mystery which has never been dispelled, +but it may be assumed that a lady really was involved. + +The allusion to Madagascar relates to the mission despatched by the +Queen of the Hovas to Europe in the autumn in the vain hope of coming to +some agreement with the French Government, which had raised questions +ominously resembling those which had, in the previous year, formed +the prelude to the Tunis expedition. The Hovas, like the Kroumirs, +constituted 'a serious danger' to the French Republic, and demands were +put forward which involved general French rights over the whole of +Madagascar, and a protectorate over the northwest coast. The unhappy +Hova envoys proceeded from Paris to London, but met with little +encouragement there, and before long a semi-official announcement +was made in which the stereotyped statement, with which small and +defenceless states are so painfully familiar, appeared: 'The Cabinet is +resolved to enforce the respect of the rights and interests of France +in Madagascar, and orders in conformity with the situation have, +therefore, been sent to the Commander of the French naval station.' +Signs of the same ominous activity were also beginning to manifest +themselves in Tonquin; and the only compensating factor was that +Madagascar and Tonquin served to distract a certain amount of French +attention from Egypt, although the tone of the press, and especially of +the _République Française_, the organ of Gambetta, became increasingly +hostile to England. + + * * * * * + + _Lord Lyons to Lord Granville._ + + Paris, Dec. 19, 1882. + + There are reports afloat that Gambetta's cure is not going + on as steadily as it ought. At all events there is no change for + the better in the tone of the _République Française_ respecting + England in Egypt. I don't like the idea of having the French there + in bitter opposition to all we do. It may make it very difficult + for us with safety to ourselves to give any large measure of + independence to the Egyptian Government. At all events, the less we + are able to sacrifice to satisfy French _amour-propre_, the more we + must do to give security to legitimate French material interests by + providing for a really good honest financial administration. If the + French take the protection of their material interests exclusively + into their own hands, they may go very great lengths indeed to + protect them, if they are seriously threatened; and, besides, the + pretext that the credit, property or persons of Frenchmen are + threatened, will always be at hand to sanction interference. + + At present it looks as if the Duclerc Government would be + glad to back out of its expeditions to Tonquin, etc., etc. The + proceedings of the Hova Ambassadors and their supporters in England + may make it difficult for the French Government to be as reasonable + as it might otherwise wish to be about Madagascar. + + The prevalent feeling of depression and uneasiness about + the general condition of France does not seem to diminish. There + seems to be a profound distrust of the abilities, if not of the + intentions, of the men who so rapidly succeed one another in + office, and no one seems to know where to turn for something better. + +It was somewhat unfortunate that French aggression in Tonquin and +Madagascar was unconsciously stimulated by the English press. 'The +English press is driving the French public wild on the subject of +Tonquin, Madagascar, and other beyond sea questions, which the +Government would probably have been glad enough to back out of if they +had been let alone.'[36] + +Until the end of the year private negotiations continued between Lord +Granville and the French Government with reference to the abolition of +the Control with completely unsuccessful results. + + * * * * * + + _Lord Lyons to Lord Granville._ + + Paris, Dec. 26, 1882. + + I hear, not from himself, that Duclerc's present intention + is to make a very strong protest if we abolish Control without + coming to a previous understanding with France; and that our making + our own Control, or that of Europe in general, over the Egyptian + finances weak, would not mollify him. On the contrary, he would try + to make a point of what he would call our abandonment of French + material interests--and deduce from it an argument that France is + bound to protect them herself. While we are absolutely at two with + France, we shall find it very difficult to relax our material hold + on Egypt. Egypt for the Egyptians is only too likely to become + Egypt for the French. + + Gambetta's illness seems to have rather strengthened his + position. The anxiety of his opponents in the press to make out + that he is worse than is really the case and the disgusting + statements they have in consequence put forward, have served to + impress on friends and foes his importance. According to the best + information I have been able to get, he is not at this moment + seriously ill, though his recovery is too slow to be satisfactory. + + Confidence and tranquillity do not appear to revive in France, + and the disappearance of Gambetta would increase uneasiness. People + do not exactly know what they are afraid of, but there is a general + vague uneasiness. Perhaps the most definite cause of fears or hopes + is the intrigue in which certain officers of the army are said to + be engaged with a view of putting the Duc d'Aumale at the head of + the state. + +The childish frame of mind in which the French Government of the day +considered the question of the Control may be judged from the fact that +Duclerc in private conversation had admitted in the autumn that, if +for form's sake, the _status quo ante_ could be restored for only five +minutes, he would agree subsequently to its immediate abolition. In +December, however, he was in a more intractable mood, and, at the end +of the year, Lord Granville found it necessary to break off all private +negotiations on the subject, observing that it was very painful and +disadvantageous to be on bad terms with the French, but that it was, at +the least, equally disadvantageous to them. + +FOOTNOTES: + +[Footnote 35: 'Egypt and the Egyptian Question,' Sir D. Mackenzie +Wallace.] + +[Footnote 36: Lyons to Granville.] + + + + +CHAPTER XVI + +ANGLOPHOBIA + +(1883-1885) + + +The first day of 1883 was signalized by the announcement of the death of +Gambetta, and those who were present at the Elysée on the occasion of +President Grévy's New Year's Day reception will remember the singularly +embarrassed demeanour of that uninteresting personage; an embarrassment +which might have been accounted for on various grounds. Gambetta's +death was followed in a day or two by that of General Chanzy, an event +which caused consternation amongst the Monarchical and Conservative +parties, as he was looked upon as the only man capable of stopping the +too rapid progress of the Republican car. It was doubtless with the +view of anticipating other pretenders, that Prince Napoleon seized the +opportunity to issue a Proclamation denouncing the Republic, which +resulted in his immediate incarceration in the Conciergerie. + +For some months there had existed in France a feeling of uneasiness +and of distrust in the maintenance of orderly government, and this +feeling was greatly increased by the double loss of Gambetta and Chanzy. +Gambetta was the only man in the Republican party whose ability and +popularity were sufficient to induce the country to acquiesce in his +wielding great power, and who was believed to have the will and the +courage to exercise that power energetically in case of need. Chanzy +was looked upon as the only man whose military reputation and influence +qualified him to keep the army united and to use it with effect, in the +case of grave political troubles. + +As for the President of the Republic, M. Grévy, his energy and influence +continued to diminish; the Chamber of Deputies was becoming more and +more discredited, and the professedly anarchical parties were certainly +increasing in violence, and apparently in numbers and influence as well. +The public generally, even amongst the lower orders, showed few signs +of great attachment to the Republican Government. That Government had +not augmented their material prosperity, had not raised their social +position, and had not realized their dreams of absolute equality with, +or rather of predominance over, the rich and the educated. Every form +of Monarchical Government was repugnant to them, but nevertheless a +moderate Republic excited no enthusiasm whatsoever. The upper classes +were alarmed and discontented; they did not believe that their property +was secure, and they considered the work of administration was +deplorably carried on by the various obscure Ministers who succeeded +each other so rapidly in office; their religious feelings were daily +shocked, while bad harvests, bad trade, and an unpromising financial +situation added to the general feeling of dissatisfaction. + +On the other hand, the 'spirited Colonial Policy,' which was now so much +in evidence, did little to counterbalance this feeling, and the attempts +which had been made to pander to the national vanity by the overbearing +policy adopted towards Madagascar; the extension of French predominance +in Tunis; annexations on the Congo; and the consolidation of the French +Protectorate over Tonquin and Annam, had met with little success. The +disquieting fact from the English point of view was that ill-feeling +towards England, chiefly with regard to Egypt, had risen to a high +pitch, and that each successive step taken by the British Government, +and each declaration made by it, seemed only to increase the irritation. +It was in this direction that, Lord Lyons feared, attempts would be made +to divert public discontent by those who might be in power; and the +procedure of the new French Government certainly justified the fear. +The position which the French Government took up, was that of defending +French influence and French interests in Egypt by its own independent +means. It declared that by the abolition of the Control, a deep wound +had been inflicted upon French dignity, while the principal security +for the regular payment of the sums due in regard to the loans had been +taken away. It did not hesitate to declare that any tampering with +the Law of Liquidation, or with the lands and revenues pledged to the +loans; or any failure to provide for the charges on the loans, would +be regarded as a breach of international obligations on the part of +Egypt, which would warrant the active interference of France. It hardly +made any pretence of concealing its intention to work against English +influence in Egypt by every means in its power, and unfortunately it was +evident that in this anti-English policy it could reckon on the support +of public opinion. + + * * * * * + + _Lord Lyons to Lord Granville._ + + Paris, Jan. 9, 1883. + + Blowitz's[37] intelligence certainly comes from the French + Foreign Office, sometimes, I dare say, directly, but often only + through the _Temps_. The _Temps_ is published the afternoon before + the day on which it is dated, and some hours before Blowitz's + letter goes to the _Times_. Blowitz's letter always goes by + telegraph, the _Times_ having the exclusive use of a line for some + hours every night. + + It seems that Ferry will succeed Gambetta in the leadership + of the largest portion of the Republican party. I do not think he + is hostile to Duclerc, but if he attains to anything at all near + to Gambetta's position, Duclerc will only hold office during his + sufferance. Probably neither would be willing to serve under the + other. + + If, as seems likely, the death of Gambetta leads to the + decay of the spirit of revenge upon Germany, this will (as I + have said before) increase the danger of all other Powers from + the restlessness of France, and will in particular increase our + difficulties in Egypt. If any modification of the arrangement of + the Law of Liquidation is proposed or any other step taken which + can give France a pretext for interfering in defence of French + interests, we may have trouble. If we leave a door open for French + intrusion, France may get so far in, that her _amour-propre_ may + force her to push on at all risks. + + * * * * * + + _Lord Lyons to Lord Granville._ + + Paris, Jan. 16, 1883. + + Prince Napoleon's Proclamation and his arrest have put all + other things out of people's heads here for the moment. He was + arrested, very roughly I understand, at 3 o'clock, as he drove up + to his own door in the Avenue d'Autin, and his papers were examined + and seized in the usual way on such occasions. There is not so + far any appearance of his having anything behind to back up the + Proclamation. It is said that he has rendered himself liable to + very severe penalties as a conspirator against the State. What + seems to be more generally expected is that the law enabling the + Government to exile the members of any family that has reigned in + France will be revived. If it is to be the beginning of political + proscriptions, in however mild a form, it will be a calamity and + perhaps a prelude to revolutionary times and ways. + + The only good I can see in it is that it may divert attention + here from Egypt, for the French were getting excessively cross with + us on that subject. I should not have been surprised if Duclerc's + Declaration and Yellow Book had been much more unfriendly than they + are. The Declaration was, it seems, received with icy coldness in + the Chamber. It is creditable to Duclerc that he did not fish for a + cheer by a Chauvin wind up, as Freycinet used to do. But if Duclerc + had been popular and had been thought to be firm in the saddle, he + would have met with a better reception. + +Prince Napoleon's Proclamation did not in reality cause any great +commotion or alarm, as it was obvious that he had no backing of +importance; but it served as an excuse to introduce a preposterous +Exclusion Bill directed against the members of all ex-reigning families. +This measure created great indignation amongst the French Conservatives, +more especially the provision which deprived the Princes of their +Commissions in the army, and in consequence of modifications which were +introduced. Duclerc and his colleagues resigned office, giving place to +an ephemeral Cabinet under M. Fallières, subsequently President of the +Republic. + + * * * * * + + _Lord Lyons to Lord Granville._ + + Feb. 2, 1883. + + Everything is at sixes and sevens here, and no one knows + to whom to turn in the absolute dearth of any man of decided + superiority since the death of Gambetta. It is curious that he + should come to be regretted as the mainstay of Conservatism. + + I send you by the messenger a despatch from Villiers[38] + which seems to me to give a very clear and correct account of + the state of feeling in the French Army. I don't think it at all + overrates the dissatisfaction that exists among the officers. For + my own part I do not believe there is any organized movement, + Legitimist, Orleanist, or Bonapartist, actually in preparation + at this moment. But I do see that confidence in the duration of + the present institutions is diminishing, and that, as a cause or + a consequence, dissatisfaction and disquietude are increasing. + Something subversive may happen with very little warning beforehand. + + Barring accidents, the probabilities seem to be that the + present Ministry may last about ten days, and that then Jules + Ferry may come in for some months and _après lui le déluge_. + Challemel Lacour is talked of as Minister for Foreign Affairs. As a + diplomatist you know him better than I do. The little social (so to + call it) intercourse I have had with him has been pleasant enough, + but he has the reputation of being irritable and cross-grained. + + The proceedings against the Princes are bad enough in + themselves, and they are of evil augury. The Reds having once + tasted blood, may become ravenous for more, and who can say where + they may look for the next victims? + + Notwithstanding the critical state of home affairs, the + French papers find room occasionally for bitter articles against + us about Egypt. The great point to attend to, in order to prevent + the smouldering irritations bursting into a blaze, seems to be to + avoid touching the Law of Liquidation, or the administrations of + the Daira and Domains. Any alteration, however great an improvement + it might be in reality, would give rise to unlimited suspicion and + dissatisfaction here. + +The Prince of Wales had intended visiting Paris about this period, but +in consequence of the violent feelings aroused by the Exclusion Bill +and of the bitterness of the extremists against constituted dynasties, +he was advised to keep away. + + Their newspapers would have no scruple in attacking any + personage, however exalted, whom they believed to be opposed to + their deplorable bill. Indeed, the more exalted the personage, + and the more entitled to respect, the greater might be their + scurrility. Nothing can be more lamentable than all this, and I + am obliged to add that the general feeling towards England is not + particularly cordial. Taking everything into consideration, I have, + though very reluctantly, come to the conclusion that it is my duty + to report to Your Royal Highness that I cannot feel quite sure that + if you were at Paris something unpleasant might not happen, or that + at least very improper language might not be used by a portion of + the press; and I cannot conceal from Your Royal Highness that the + present moment is far from an opportune one for a visit.[39] + +The increasing bad feeling produced a complaint from Lord Granville, +who considered that 'it is hard upon me, that being probably, of all +English public men, the one who for various reasons is most attached to +France, we should always have such difficult moments to pass when I am +in office.' + +After all the fuss that had been made about Prince Napoleon's +Proclamation, it came as a distinct anti-climax that his arrest was +discovered to be illegal. He was accordingly released, and nothing more +was heard of him; meanwhile it was generally believed that General +Billot, the late Minister of War in the Duclerc Government, had actually +made all preparations for a _pronunciamento_ in favour of the Duc +d'Aumale, and that his project was only foiled on account of the want +of enterprise shown by the Orleans princes themselves. General Billot +was superseded by a certain General Thibaudin, who was considered to be +especially well adapted for the purpose of carrying out the dirty work +in connection with the dismissal of the Princes from the army. + +After a period of much uncertainty, during which for more than a month +there was no one at the French Foreign Office to whom the Foreign +Diplomatists could speak on foreign affairs, or even any subordinate who +could express an opinion or give an instruction, M. Fallières was got +rid of, and a new administration was formed under M. Jules Ferry, M. +Challemel Lacour becoming Foreign Minister. + + * * * * * + + _Lord Lyons to Lord Granville._ + + Paris, Feb. 20, 1883. + + I suppose Ferry must have made his Ministry by to-morrow or + the next day. I will not bore you with the innumerable conjectures + as to who his colleagues will be. It is said Thibaudin is to be + kept as Minister of War, long enough at all events to take the + measures against the Princes which a more respectable general would + shrink from. + + I only hope the new Ministry will not try to divert public + attention from home difficulties by a 'spirited' Foreign or + Colonial Policy. Egypt is always a source of trouble ready to their + hand, if they want to produce excitement. I think the great thing + is to avoid touching the Law of Liquidation or the administration + of the securities for the loans; in short, to avoid giving them + any pretext for saying that the material interests of France are + injured, and the guarantee she held weakened. But it is premature + to speculate on these matters in ignorance of who the incoming + Ministers may be and what policy they will adopt. + +The urbane M. Challemel Lacour, in his new capacity as Foreign Minister, +was not likely to begin by making gushing protestations of deep +affection for England, but Lord Lyons was disposed to consider this a +hopeful symptom. 'I know by long experience that ardent professions +of love for England on the part of an incoming Minister are not to be +trusted to as good signs.' Mr. Gladstone was in Paris at the time and +paid visits to the President, Challemel Lacour, and Jules Ferry; but +much to the relief of the Ambassador, he avoided the subjects of Egypt +and of Commercial Treaties, and no harm was done. + +The Ferry administration possessed the advantage of attracting a better +class of French politician than had lately been the case, and M. +Waddington now reappeared upon the scene. + + * * * * * + + _Lord Lyons to Lord Granville._ + + March 6, 1883. + + Jules Ferry appears to have hinted to Waddington that he would + be offered the Embassy in London, if he voted with the Government + on the interpellation in the Senate on the Decree putting the + Orleans Princes _en non-activité_. The Embassy at Vienna has, I + understand, been actually offered to and refused by him. He would + not, under any circumstances, take any Embassy but London, and + moreover he would in no case serve a Government of which Thibaudin + was a member. + + Waddington asked Rivers Wilson if he could not suggest some + offer which might be made to France in order to place her once + more in cordial union with England in Egypt. There is, moreover, + a notice in the Havas, purporting to come from London, but very + likely put in more or less on authority here, to the effect that + France cannot, and England ought to, take the initiative of + proposing something. I entirely agree with you that the matter had + better lie still for the moment. I suppose you don't want to make + any such concession to France as would satisfy her, and certainly + matters would not be mended by our making another unsuccessful + proposal. I hope Waddington spoke entirely on his own hook and + not in concert with Challemel Lacour. It would be intolerable + if Challemel Lacour tried the system of indirect irresponsible + communications, the delight of Duclerc, which produced so much + annoyance and inconvenience, and in fact rendered any real + understanding impossible. + + Jules Ferry is believed to be contemplating a conversion of + the 5 per cents. If he makes the attempt, it will bind him over + to keep things quiet abroad and at home, in order to secure the + success of the operation. + + It is very provoking that the French should have put down the + New Hebrides among the places to which to transport their relapsed + criminals. + +Lord Granville, who owned that he had nothing to propose about Egypt, +even if he wished to do so, was not at all enthusiastic at the prospect +of Waddington coming to London, 'I am not particularly anxious to +have Waddington instead of Tissot, he would be burning to distinguish +himself, and very _agissant_.' Lord Granville's fears of Waddington's +activity were founded upon the fact that he had been selected as the +French Representative at the Coronation at Moscow, and that, therefore, +he would find it impossible to settle down quietly at the London Embassy +without burning to distinguish himself, after 'flourishing about Europe.' + + * * * * * + + _Lord Lyons to Lord Granville._ + + Paris, March 23, 1883. + + It is whispered, at least by Waddington's friends, that it is + intended that his special Embassy to Russia shall be a prelude to + his becoming regular Ambassador in London: that the idea is that he + shall offer a Commercial Treaty to us; that he shall by this means + enlist the support of some members of Parliament and influential + manufacturers in England, and that then he shall obtain concessions + for us about Egypt, on the plea that, without such concessions, + the Chambers could not be brought to ratify a Commercial Treaty + favourable to us. The statements in the newspapers about the + assumption of Commercial negotiations between England and France + are stated to be _ballons d'essai_ to see how the wind sets with + regard to such a policy. + + I just give you all this for what it may be worth. I doubt + very much whether formal negotiations or a stirring French + Ambassador in London would be likely to lead just now to cordiality + between France and England. The French could hardly do anything + that would satisfy us about trade, and we should find it very + difficult to do anything that would satisfy them about Egypt. My + hope would rather be that we might glide back into cordiality by + avoiding critical questions. + + In talking to me about his Embassy to Russia, Waddington + mentioned, amongst its advantages, that it would bring him into + contact with important personages of various countries, and he said + he should probably visit Berlin and Vienna on his way home. + +With Challemel Lacour at the Foreign Office there did not appear to +be much prospect of 'gliding back into cordiality,' judging by the +following account of an interview between him and some members of the +Rothschild family who were frequently employed as intermediaries between +the two Governments. + + * * * * * + + _Lord Lyons to Lord Granville._ + + Paris, March 30, 1883. + + Alphonse de Rothschild and his cousin Sir Nathaniel came to + see me yesterday and told me that they had had an interview with + Challemel Lacour on the subject of the proposed sale of the Domain + Lands in Egypt. They told me that they found Challemel Lacour + extremely sore about the whole Egyptian Question. He appears to + have distinctly refused to forward in any way the sale of the + Domain and to have alleged as his reason that he would not help to + do away with any board of management in which a Frenchman still had + a seat; that this would tend to diminish the number of Frenchmen + holding influential positions in Egypt, while his object was to + increase, or at all events, to maintain the existing number. As + indeed might have been foreseen, he was very far from desiring + to facilitate any financial or other arrangements required by + England. We shall no doubt find the French very inconvenient + and embarrassing in Egypt at every turn. I hope they will not + be dangerous, unless some disregard of positive international + engagements affecting French interests gives the Chauvinists the + pretext they are looking out for, and drives the sensible men into + a corner, in face of their public declarations and of popular + irritation. + + I understand Louise Michel has been arrested. The Government + may gain ground by showing vigour, but unless it finds means of + convincing the officers in the army that it will secure their + position against the Radical endeavours to undermine it, things may + end in that fatal solution, a military _pronunciamento_. + +The arrest of Louise Michel had taken place as the result of one of the +numerous riots which occurred at Paris in the spring of 1883; they were +not of much importance, but possessed some significance as being the +first appearance of disturbances in the streets since the suppression of +the Commune, and were due largely to the distress caused by bad trade, +and to artificially stimulated expenditure on building, and other modes +of finding employment. The result of the latter expedient was to raise +the price of labour artificially and consequently to drive manufactures +to other places, thus creating unemployment in Paris itself. In +connection with these disturbances there was one singular peculiarity +in the attitude of the so-called Conservative classes. Not only the +Royalist and Imperial parties, but a considerable number of the richer +people who were without any strong political bias, sympathized rather +with the people in the streets than with the Government. The upper +classes were, in fact, so dissatisfied with the existing state of things +that they appeared willing to run the risk of seeing the Republican +Government discredited and ultimately overthrown by popular tumult. + +The following letter is an admirable illustration of the spirit in +which the French viewed all English action in Egypt. Lord Dufferin, +in the course of a despatch, had spoken in most appreciative terms of +the friendly attitude adopted towards him by M. de Raindre, the French +Agent and Consul-General at Cairo, and the British Government naturally +supposed that it would be agreeable to the French Government if the +despatch were communicated to them. Lord Lyons, however, who was much +better acquainted with French opinion, thought otherwise. + + * * * * * + + _Lord Lyons to Lord Granville._ + + Paris, May 15, 1883. + + I am rather frightened by the praises given by Dufferin in his + despatch of April 29th to the 'very correct and loyal attitude of + M. de Raindre, the French Agent and Consul-General, and of all the + French officials in Egypt.' If this despatch came to the knowledge + of the French Government or the French public, it might do de + Raindre a serious injury, and lead to the immediate substitution + for him of an Agent whose attitude would be more correct in the + French sense. I am afraid also that the claim Dufferin makes + to have considered the interests of the French in the Egyptian + service, however true it is, would provoke a howl of contradiction. + + I do not mean to imply that Raindre's conduct has been at + variance with his instructions. I don't think it is the policy + of the French Government at this moment to get up irritating + discussions with us on small everyday matters, either in Egypt or + in other parts of the world. The French Foreign Office seems to + me to be, on the contrary, more conciliatory than usual in its + answers respecting such matters. I mark this with satisfaction + because I hope that in this way, provided we can avoid irritating + controversies, we may return insensibly to satisfactory relations. + But we are far enough from such relations in reality at this + moment. Challemel Lacour is not given, as you know, to talk about + general diplomatic policy, but others do not hesitate to let us + understand that while they are civil about small matters, they are + only biding their time till an opportunity comes of opposing us in + effect with great ones. + +The course of affairs in Tonquin had not tended to restore the French +to good humour by providing a compensation for their eclipse in Egypt, +and the attempt to indulge in Chauvinism on the cheap had turned out +to be a costly and unsatisfactory experiment. Had it not been for the +provocations of the foreign press, it is possible that the spirited +Colonial Policy with regard to Tonquin, Madagascar, etc., would have +been abandoned quietly; but it was found intolerable to endure the daily +administration of threats, ridicule, and supercilious advice showered +from abroad. As it was, these expeditions did serve one useful purpose, +namely, that of temporarily diverting attention from Egypt. + +The reputation of the French Republic was not enhanced by a most +discreditable incident which occurred at Paris in the autumn. The young +King of Spain who had been visiting some of the European capitals, +arrived at Paris on September 29, shortly after having been created +by the German Emperor an Honorary Colonel of an Uhlan regiment at +Strasbourg. On the strength of this honorary distinction he was met by +a howling mob, which proceeded to demonstrate its patriotism by insults +such as have seldom been offered to any foreign potentate, and for which +the President of the Republic was forced to make an apology on the +following day. + + * * * * * + + _Lord Lyons to Lord Granville._ + + Paris, Oct. 5, 1883. + + I do not remember any moment at which affairs here have + appeared to me so gloomy. The more I learn of the proceedings of + the French authorities, no less than those of the mob, the more + unpardonable do they appear. I have never felt the same repugnance + (and I have had my trials in this way) to the people with whom I + have to deal. It is a comfort to contrast the bearing of the King + of Spain with that of His Majesty's so called hosts. Jules Ferry + himself appears to have behaved decorously. I will forbear from + speculating on the ultimate effect of this deplorable affair on + French institutions. So far as I can see, Ferry and Wilson both + calculate on obtaining the advantage in a battle in the Chambers, + if they put off the fight till the session opens on the 23rd. In + the meantime, decency (if decency were at all taken into account + here at this moment) would seem to require that Thibaudin should + resign or be dismissed. + + Our own political questions with the French Government do + not seem in a much more hopeful state than the general political + condition of things here. + +Not content with having by carelessness allowed the King of Spain to be +insulted, the French Government prevented a correct and complete report +of President Grévy's apology from being published in the _Journal +Officiel_, this action being on a par with the whole disgraceful +proceedings. As, however, the only alternative to the existing +Government appeared to be a thoroughgoing Intransigeant Cabinet, and +there was no telling what the latter might do both at home and abroad, +it was hoped that Jules Ferry and his colleagues would succeed in +holding their own. + +In the autumn, Challemel Lacour, who had become unpopular owing to the +unsatisfactory campaign in Tonquin, resigned office, and his place at +the Foreign Office was taken by Jules Ferry himself. Towards the end of +November there arrived the news of Hicks Pasha's disaster in the Soudan, +and although this event was not by any means unwelcome to the French, +the chances of a speedy termination of the British occupation of Egypt +naturally grew more remote. + + * * * * * + + _Lord Lyons to Lord Granville._ + + Paris, Nov. 23, 1883. + + I suppose there can be no hope that the disaster which has + overwhelmed Hicks's army is less serious than is reported. It seems + to be a grievous misfortune which has come at a most inopportune + moment for us. It is far from causing sorrow to our friends here. + + I quite understand your not being keen to arbitrate between + France and China, and I don't think the French will be willing to + accept the arbitration of anybody. What they understand by our good + offices, is that we should help them to carry all their points + against the Chinese. It is supposed that the Committee will press + on the Government a larger vote for Tonquin than the Government has + asked for. + + In the mean time things at home are looking gloomy in + France. There is likely to be a stagnation of trade and generally + much distress during the winter. People of all classes are + getting irritable, and seem to seek to vent their irritation on + foreign Powers. Add to this that the depression and pusillanimity + which followed 1870-1871, seem to be giving place to the former + overweening opinion of the strength of France and consequently to + Chauvinism. + + I wrote a despatch to you by the last messenger as to the + effect the lowering the wine duties for Spain would have here. I + am never quite at ease when I think of our holding Most Favoured + Nation treatment at the pleasure of the French. The lowest class + who are gaining power are certainly not Free Traders. + +In consequence of the Soudan disaster the Egyptian Government became +anxious to call in the Turks to their assistance, and this project +excited a strong feeling in France against the admission of the Sultan's +troops, or of any Turkish fighting men into Egypt, to take part in the +defence against the Mahdi, that feeling being founded on the old ground +of danger to the French position in Tunis and Algeria. But, for the same +reason, the French were disposed to throw a heavy responsibility upon +England for taking precautions that the Mahdi should be effectually +stopped somewhere or other. Everything, in fact, that England did in +Egypt was wrong in French eyes, and there was a fresh outburst over an +arrangement made between Lesseps and the English shipowners with regard +to the Suez Canal. + +In January, 1884, the British Government decided definitely upon the +evacuation of the Soudan, and Gordon was despatched to carry out the +operation. + + * * * * * + + _Lord Lyons to Lord Granville._ + + Paris, Jan. 19, 1884. + + I do not know that in the main any marked change in public + opinion in France about Egypt has taken place since I wrote ten + days ago; but as the state of things there remains unchanged + for the better or becomes changed for the worse, excitement and + reproaches against England increase. A catastrophe with regard to + the garrison of Khartoum or that of Sinkat, or any massacre of + Europeans, would probably produce a violent outcry against us, of a + much more intense character than the present general upbraiding as + to our allowing the advance of the Soudan towards civilization to + be stopped, and the slave trade to be revived. + + I am told confidentially that Barrère, the French Agent at + Cairo, writes to urge his Government to decide upon some distinct + line of policy, in view of the present crisis. His own idea + would seem to be to ingratiate himself with the Egyptians at the + expense of the English, to lead them to attribute all the present + misfortunes to England and to teach them to look to France for + ultimate deliverance from them. I hear that he rates Baring's + ability very highly, but writes very disparagingly of the other + Englishmen in office in Egypt. One of his topics in decrying + England is said to be the sum charged by her on the Egyptian + Treasury for the occupying troops. He is said not to be averse to + touching the Law of Liquidation, because he conceives that, if this + is done, France will get her finger into the pie again. + + Tonquin is, at this moment, secondary to Egypt in interest + here, but the French are getting impatient for news from Admiral + Courbet. + + Nothing particularly critical has yet taken place in the + Chamber. + +Lord Granville's reply seems to show that General Gordon was almost as +great an optimist as himself. + + * * * * * + + Jan. 19, 1884. + + Many thanks for your important private letter about Egypt. The + information may be of use to Baring. + + Barrère is a very clever fellow, and has persuaded Baring that + he is very friendly. + + Gordon went off yesterday, in a very good humour, determined + to help us in carrying out our policy of evacuation in the best + manner. + + He is wonderfully optimistic, with a great contempt for the + Mahdi and disbelief in Arab fanaticism or love of real fighting. He + is not much afraid of a massacre. I trust he may be right. + +A fresh disaster in the Soudan--Baker Pasha's defeat--encouraged the +idea that these reverses were symptoms of weakness on the part of +England, and gave France a reason for desiring to interfere, and a +_locus standi_ for asserting a claim to do so. + + * * * * * + + _Lord Lyons to Lord Granville._ + + Paris, March 11, 1884. + + The large majority obtained by the Government against the + coalition of the extreme Right and the extreme Left on Paul Bert's + extravagant proposals relative to the salaries of schoolmasters and + schoolmistresses, has strengthened their hands and has given some + confidence to the Union Républicaine Party, on which they mainly + rely. They also succeeded in defeating a very mischievous motion + made by Clémenceau in the Committee of 44 to send a deputation to + Anzin in order to inquire into, or more properly to foment the + troubles in the Anzin coal districts. Nevertheless, the state of + the country and of Paris in particular is far from comfortable. + The distress of the workmen, and the folly and unreasonableness of + their demands and expectations are on the increase. I send you by + this messenger a good despatch by Crowe[40] on the violent cry for + protection from the competition of foreign workmen as well as that + of foreign goods, which has been one of the consequences. + + I am afraid all this does not tend to make the Government + more conciliatory on foreign affairs. They are hourly expecting + to hear of the fall of Bac-Ninh, and if they are quite successful + there, they are only too likely to turn their thoughts to getting + a little glory out of the Egyptian question, as well as out of the + Madagascar, Congo, and other matters in which they are more or less + opposed to England. + + So far as we are concerned, the effect the reconciliation + between Russia and Germany has had upon the French is not good. + So long as they had any hopes of a quarrel between Germany and + Russia, they felt bound to reserve their strength in order to take + advantage of it, and to cultivate good relations with other Powers, + in order to secure at least their non-interference. Now they have + given up the hope of a break between Russia and Germany, and are + at the same time confident that all the Continental Powers are + determined on peace. They think therefore that they may expect to + be _tête-à-tête_ with us and to be free to act as suits them in + affairs in which we are concerned. + + * * * * * + + _Lord Granville to Lord Lyons._ + + March 12, 1884. + + Your letters are most interesting, though not comforting. The + difficulty of keeping on friendly terms with France is not to be + underrated. + + I await with almost equal interest the news which we shall + probably get this evening from [illegible] and that which I suppose + will come in a few days from Bac-Ninh. + + I am afraid victory will make the French Government very + difficult to deal with; on the other hand, a defeat, which is not + likely, will make the Chinese intolerable. + + Our own troubles, especially in the Soudan, are great. If + things could settle there, I am confident that Egypt would soon + recover the state in which she was before Hicks's defeat, and this + notwithstanding all the intrigues which are going on there. + + Bismarck says he shall give us no trouble about the Law of + Liquidation, but that other nations will. What will be the best way + of approaching the French Government when we have made up our own + minds? + + As to protection, it will create a very angry feeling here. + It will ruin the French and it will make us the monopolists of the + neutral markets of the world so long as we can keep at peace. + + The Egyptian blister has diverted public attention from Merv. + The question was treated in excellent speeches in the Lords, but + the debate was dull and flat. + + We do not make you a very handsome present in Mohrenheim. He + is like a diplomatist on the stage. + +Baron Mohrenheim, a diplomatist of a very conventional type, had just +been transferred to Paris from the Russian Embassy in London, and was +generally credited with strong anti-English sentiments. + +On the question of the financial condition of Egypt, the British +Government finally decided to propose a European Conference, and the +decision was communicated to the French Government. As was only to be +expected, the English proposal produced a conflict of opinion in France. +Some approved of calling in Europe generally, but others denounced the +proposal as a new proof of the treachery of England, who, according +to them, was bound to treat with France alone, and called loudly upon +the French Government to refuse to go into a Conference on equal terms +with other Powers. All seemed to think, however, that the moment had +come for France to reassume a position equal with that of England, if +not superior to it. The attitude of the French Government itself was +more moderate. Jules Ferry accepted the Conference 'in principle,' +and endeavoured to show that two absolutely false notions prevailed +in England which seemed to be the great obstacles to an understanding +between the two countries. One was that if the English withdrew their +troops from Egypt, France would send hers in; the other, that France +sought to re-establish the Control. + +The position in which Gordon now found himself in Khartoum began to +cause Her Majesty's Government serious misgivings, and many expedients +were suggested for relieving Ministers from their embarrassment. Amongst +them appears a serio-comic proposition from the Baron de Billing, a +well-known figure in Anglo-French society. + + * * * * * + + _Lord Lyons to Lord Granville._ + + Paris, May 4, 1884. + + I send you copies of a letter written to me by Baron de + Billing yesterday and of a memo annexed to it. I don't know what + you will think of the offer to rescue Gordon which they contain, + but I deem it right to lay it before you. Billing made it to me + verbally yesterday, and I begged him to put it in writing. The + inclosed papers are the result. + + Billing did not tell me who the persons were by whom the + rescue was to be effected, but I understand that they were Arab + Sheikhs or something of that kind. Apparently they are in Paris, + for he professed to go to consult them before he sent me the memo. + + He says you have known him from a boy. + + '_Il se porte garant de l'honorabilité des personnes en jeu._' + For my part '_Je ne me porte garant de rien_' in the matter. + + Billing insisted much on the importance of his receiving a + speedy answer. + + MEMO. + + '_Gordon Pasha sera remis aux autorités egyptiennes ou + anglaises à un des ports de la Mer Rouge ou aux avant-postes de + l'armée anglo-egyptienne moyennant:_ + + 1°. _le paiement immédiat par Lord Lyons d'une somme de deux + mille livres sterling à une personne désignée par le Baron de + Billing, ancien chargé d'affaires de France à Munich, Tunis et + Stockholm._ + + 2°. _Le versement d'une somme de 48,000 livres sterling au + credit du Baron de Billing chez Messrs. Coutts, ses banquiers + ordinaires, le jour même où parviendra à Londres la nouvelle + officielle de la remise de Gordon Pasha entre les mains des + autorités anglo-egyptiennes._ + + _N.B._--1°. _Un compte détaillé sera rendu à Lord Lyons de + l'emploi des deux milles livres sterling immédiatement exigibles._ + + 2° _Gordon Pasha devra prendre l'engagement écrit de quitter + sur le champ l'Egypte et de s'en tenir éloigné pendant une période + de 10 ans._ (_Je crois qu'il sera possible de faire modifier cette + dernière prétention qui semble bien peu pratique._) + + _Le Baron de Billing se porte garant vis-à-vis de Lord Lyons + de l'honorabilité des personnes en jeu, et il ajoute que vû son + expérience de l'Afrique, il croit à de sérieuses chances de succés._ + + _Un permis de séjour en blanc pour l'Egypte sera remis au + Baron de Billing pour un Musulman à désigner par lui._' + + (_Très important._) + +In spite of Lord Granville's life-long acquaintance with the Baron, the +proposal (which bears a striking resemblance to some of the incidents +in the Dreyfus case) was declined, and nothing more was heard of him in +connection with the rescue of Gordon. + +The French military operations in the Far East were terminated +temporarily by a Treaty with China, concluded in May, under which the +Protectorate of France over Tonquin and Annam was recognized, and there +was some uncertainty at first as to how the commercial terms would +be interpreted. When the Prince of Wales, who was then in Paris, +called upon President Grévy, the latter dilated effusively upon the +satisfaction which all nations must feel at the new opening of trade to +them in Tonquin and Annam. On the other hand, the _Temps_, a newspaper +of considerable authority, talked of the _ouverture au commerce +exclusif de la France des Provinces de l'Empire celeste limitrophes de +nos possessions de l'Indo-Chine_. 'I have observed,' Lord Lyons wrote +sadly, 'no symptoms lately in France of anything like a decently liberal +commercial spirit.' Nor when M. Jules Ferry was congratulated upon the +Tonquin settlement, did that statesman let fall any hint of an intention +to open to the rest of the world the commercial advantages which France +had secured for herself. In fact, the chief result of the French success +in Tonquin seemed to be, that, having at all events, got rid temporarily +of this difficulty, a more unconciliatory line of policy than ever would +be adopted as far as Egypt was concerned. + + * * * * * + + _Lord Lyons to Lord Granville._ + + Paris, May 27, 1884. + + You may have observed that, contrary to my usual habit, I + have been sending you lately a great many extracts from French + newspapers. My reason is of a very painful kind. I have thought it + necessary to give you specimens of the ill will towards England, + the suspicions of her, and the irritability respecting her which + seem to become more and more prevalent here. To these unpleasant + symptoms I might add that exclusive and illiberal commercial views + and extreme Protectionist ideas are in the ascendant: and that thus + the spirited Colonial Policy now in vogue, becomes a danger instead + of an advantage to foreign commerce, which it might be if it opened + new areas to the trade of all nations. + + The Ferry Government is wafted along by the pleasant breezes + from Tonquin, but they must be on the look out for squalls as they + near the revision of the Constitution and the discussion of the + Budget of 1885. + + The _Gaulois_ is hardly looked upon here as a serious paper, + but the calumnies upon Sir J. Drummond Hay which it professes + to have derived from a report made, I suppose _viva voce_, by + Ordega[41] to Ferry, are too bad. Menabrea says that the Italian + Minister at Tangier is a man of herculean strength and fierce + temper, and that he is as likely as not to wring Ordega's neck if + he catches him. _Libre à lui de le faire._ + + * * * * * + + _Lord Granville to Lord Lyons._ + + May 28, 1884. + + We must be very clumsy to invite so much indignation in France + and at the same time to run the risk of being turned out next month + for being so subservient to her. + + Waddington seems in earnest to bring about a good + understanding, but our press, over which the Government has + absolutely no control, will be most offensive, until the vote of + censure against the Conference, which is almost sure to be brought + on, is decided one way or the other. + + It will require all Salisbury's want of caution to try to come + in upon a quarrel with all Europe upon the Egyptian question. + +The Egyptian policy of the Gladstone Government, subsequently to the +successful campaign of 1882, never met with much favour in any quarter +in England, but it was not surprising, on the whole, that Lord Granville +should be pained by French hostility, since nothing whatever had been +done to warrant it. Had we behaved ill to France, there might have been +a chance of returning to favour by altering our procedure; as it was, +there was no reasonable ground of offence whatever, and therefore the +prospect of restoring friendly relations appeared to be all the more +remote. + +Lord Hartington, then a prominent member of the Gladstone Government, +was in Paris at the beginning of June, and Lord Granville seems to have +been much alarmed as to the language which he might use with reference +to Egypt in conversation with French Ministers. Lord Hartington was +probably not in the least desirous of conversing with French Ministers +upon Egypt or upon any other subject, and wished to go _incognito_, 'as +he was constantly in the habit of doing;' but it was represented to him +that unless he called upon Jules Ferry it would be believed that he was +engaged upon a secret mission, and Lord Lyons was therefore asked to +give him some preliminary coaching. + + * * * * * + + _Lord Lyons to Lord Granville._ + + Paris, June 3, 1884. + + I sent Lord Hartington your letter yesterday, and I had a long + visit from him in the afternoon. + + As matters stand, what seems to me most to be dreaded with a + view to our relations with France is a vote of the House of Commons + censuring an arrangement made by Her Majesty's Government with the + French Government. Such a vote, and the debate by which it would be + preceded, would, I cannot but fear, have a truly lamentable effect. + + I understand that Jules Ferry is having a memorandum on the + Finances of Egypt drawn up by Blignières, and that it will dispute + the accuracy of Mr. Childers's information and represent that the + Finances were in a flourishing condition, and that there were + surpluses even during Arabi's rebellion, up to the time at which + England took the thing in hand. The memorandum will probably deny + there being any necessity for reducing the interest of the debt, if + the Finances be properly managed. + + I do not know whether such a reason will be assigned to us, + but in fact it seems that the French object to any large loans + being guaranteed by England, on account of the lien, so to speak, + which it would give England upon Egypt. The French would prefer a + simple fresh issue of Unified stock. + + In the meantime, the French bondholders are bestirring + themselves and protesting against any arrangement being made + without their being consulted. + + Jules Ferry, however, himself thinks little of any other + consideration in comparison with the political success which it + would be to him to give France again a political footing in Egypt, + and as a means to this, to get a time fixed for the departure of + our troops. I do not think he is afraid of much disapproval here + of his counter-concession--the engagement that French troops shall + not enter Egypt, either on the departure of the English troops or + afterwards. Unless the engagement were very formally made and very + peculiarly and stringently worded, it would be felt here that it + did not amount to much. For though it would preclude the occupation + of Egypt by the French to preserve order and promote reforms in the + same way we occupy the country now, it would not be interpreted + here as preventing France using force to avenge an insult or + protect distinct French interests in cases which would constitute a + _casus belli_ as regarded any ordinary country. + + I do not quite understand the exact position in which stands + the suggestion that the Financial question should be first + settled by England with the several Powers separately, and then a + conference be held for a day or two only to ratify what had already + been settled. Does this afford an opening for purely financial + negotiations, and admit of dropping the French political proposals + which appear to be so unpopular in England? I believe Jules Ferry + is in some tribulation about the difficulties his proposals have + met with in England, and is half inclined to be sorry he made them + so strong, though I doubt whether Waddington has made him fully + aware of the violence of the opposition they encounter in England. + + Generally speaking, I am very unhappy about the growing + ill-will between France and England which exists on both sides + of the Channel. It is not that I suppose that France has any + deliberate intention of going to war with us. But the two nations + come into contact in every part of the world. In every part of it + questions arise which, in the present state of feeling, excite + mutual suspicion and irritation. Who can say, when and where, in + this state of things, some local events may not produce a serious + quarrel, or some high-handed proceedings of hot-headed officials + occasion an actual collision? + +The variety and number of questions upon which Lord Lyons was requested +to pronounce an opinion have already been commented upon; now he was +asked to consider the effect of a hypothetical vote of the House of +Commons. + + * * * * * + + _Lord Granville to Lord Lyons._ + + Trentham, June 4, 1884. + + Many thanks for your important and pregnant letter. I quite + agree that the relations between England and France will be + disagreeable if the House of Commons rejects our proposals; but + this, though possible, is not so probable as Hartington thinks. + + The M.P.'s neither desire a Salisbury administration; still + less a dissolution. + + But how will our relations be, if we previously break off + with France? and what can you suggest for the settlement of the + financial difficulties of Egypt, if we obtain no sanction for a + change of the Law of Liquidation? + + Do you think that the House of Commons would allow us to take + the whole debt upon ourselves, in order to save the bondholders? I + should be really grateful for your suggestions on this last point. + +From the above letter it is plain that Her Majesty's Government had no +definite Egyptian policy, and were merely stumbling along concerned +only, as frequently happens with British Cabinets, with the possible +result of a division in the House of Commons. The only evidence of +policy was a strong inclination to evade responsibility; to hand it over +to a collection of Powers; and to fritter away such advantages as had +been so hardly won, in the hopeless attempt to recover the goodwill of +the French Government. + +Lord Lyons's reply was to the effect that nothing would have a worse +effect than a bitter debate in the House of Commons followed by the +censure of terms agreed upon by the French and English Governments. But +as there was no doubt whatever that the French Government intended to +take advantage of the Conference to place France in the same position in +Egypt as that which she formerly held, a firm policy on the part of Her +Majesty's Government might have a better effect than an over-yielding +one. + +The Egyptian Conference met in London at the end of June and continued +its sterile discussions for upwards of a month before finally breaking +up, while the tone of the French press grew more and more hostile, and +anything in the nature of a concession on the subject of the interest of +the debt or on any other matter affecting French material interest was +denounced in the fiercest terms. Even the craven British proposals with +regard to the limitation of the military occupation were treated with +contempt, and no person came in for greater abuse than M. Waddington, +who was now established as Ambassador in London, and was constantly +denounced for subservience to England, solely because he owned an +English name. + +The Conference broke up in August, and the Cabinet, which was now being +continually denounced on all sides for its feeble and procrastinating +policy, decided upon despatching Lord Northbrook on a special mission +to Cairo. Before Lord Northbrook started he had a long interview with +Lord Lyons, who did his best to impress upon him the views, interests, +and susceptibilities of France, and the great importance of not running +counter to them if possible. + + * * * * * + + _Lord Lyons to Lord Granville._ + + Paris, Oct. 17, 1884. + + I opened my first conversation with Ferry, the day after my + return, with a message from you as to your desire to be on good + terms, and to avoid unpleasantness in treating matters between + the two countries all over the world. I enlarged upon this theme, + and made it as plain to him as I could, without letting the + conversation degenerate into recrimination, that if France were + perpetually irritating us, we on our side had the means, and should + not always be able to abstain from using them, of making ourselves + very disagreeable too. The subject was treated in the most friendly + way by me, and Ferry was profuse in his acknowledgments to you, and + in assurances; but I should have been glad if I could have brought + him to more practical advances towards intimacy and good fellowship + than I was able to do. However, the conversation may perhaps have + done some good. + + As regards the Congo Conference, I came away with the + impression that there is more or less a tacit, if not very + explicit, understanding between France and Germany, in addition to + what appears in the Yellow Book; and that this understanding may + prove inconvenient to us. + + The session has not opened very favourably for the Government. + The Finance Minister's hocus-pocus expedients for balancing the + Budget have been unanimously rejected by the Budget Committee. The + recent 'glories' in Tonquin hardly outweigh in public estimation + the growing expenses of the operations there and in China. Ferry + told me he disliked the protective duties on cattle and corn, but + that the Government could not altogether resist them, though it + would endeavour to make them as moderate as possible. Rouvier, + the new Minister of Commerce, is less Protectionist than his + predecessor, Hérisson; but I have no confidence in the so-called + Free Trade principles of any Frenchman. Duties on manufactures + are sure to follow in the wake of duties on food, and I can never + forget that we hold our Most Favoured Nation treatment only at the + good pleasure of the French Government. The proceedings of the + Lyonnais are socialist and revolutionary, and a great impetus has + been given to Socialism by the journeyings during the recess of the + sub-committees of the General Committee appointed by the Chamber + of Deputies to inquire into the distress of the working classes. + Nevertheless the chances still seem to be that the Ferry Ministry + will weather the storms of the autumn session. + + Ferry complained bitterly of the English press. He said in + particular that the irritating lecturing tone of the _Times_ goaded + the French to madness; though he himself observed that it used the + same tone towards the Government of its own country. I said that + the press on both sides of the Channel seemed to work as if for the + express purpose of producing ill-will between the two countries; + but that certainly the English Government had no power to restrain + it. A good understanding between the two Governments and friendly + proceedings on their parts to each other, would in time act upon + public opinion; and saying this, I preached a little more on the + text of the importance of the French Government's not making itself + unnecessarily disagreeable. + +Her Majesty's Government were at this time involved in domestic as well +as external difficulties, and Lord Granville's reply to the foregoing +letter contained a renewal of the old importunity to come over and vote +in the House of Lords on a party question. It is quite obvious that +Lord Granville was impelled to do so by Gladstone, and the typical +Gladstonian reasoning is shown in the argument that Lord Lyons ought to +vote, because being an Ambassador he was a non-party man; whereas on +previous occasions his vote had been applied for, because he distinctly +ranked as a party man in the Whip's list. + + * * * * * + + _Lord Granville to Lord Lyons._ + + Walmer, Oct. 18, 1884. + + Gladstone writes to me earnestly, but I think reasonably, + respecting your vote at the present important crisis. + + He says that you must be aware of the estimate we hold of your + judgment and independence. But to save the House of Lords from a + tempest which must strain and may wreck it, some Tory Lords will + be moved to vote for the Franchise Bill, and he asks why the same + motive should not operate upon men like our Ambassadors, who he + believes are of no party. + + I own I think that the same majority, or possibly a larger one + in the Lords, would be a great disaster. + + If the Liberal Party take up hostility to the House of Lords + itself as its leading question--whether led by Gladstone himself, + or not,--and with a leader of the Lords who is personally in favour + of getting a larger career of power and utility for himself in the + Commons, it is difficult not to foresee the result. + + With regard to immediate politics, supposing Salisbury + succeeds in forcing a dissolution, and with the help of the Irish + turns us out, what chance is there of his not being turned out in + six months by nearly the same process? + + The Waddingtons came here to luncheon. I guessed that they + funked being reported as being here. He was very civil, and his + talk was not altogether unpromising. + +No one with the slightest practical acquaintance with politics could +possibly be taken in by the Gladstonian phrase about the 'estimate of +your judgment and independence.' Ministers when urging their docile +supporters either in the Lords or the Commons to support a party +measure, are not in the habit of boasting that some eminent person, +whether an Ambassador or not, is going to give a silent vote in their +favour, and even if they did, it would not produce the slightest effect. +One peer's vote is as good as another's, and in the division list an +Ambassador counts no higher than the most obscure of backwoodsmen. + +Anglo-French relations were not improved by the occurrences in the +Far East, where the French, in consequence of the Tonquin expedition, +had drifted into war with China. The Chinese fleet, composed of small +obsolete vessels, was destroyed at Foochow by the heavily armed French +ships in August; but as the Chinese Government showed no signs of +yielding, the French Admiral, Courbet, was ordered to seize part of +the island of Formosa, where valuable coal mines were known to exist. +In order to effect his object, Admiral Courbet, with a magnificent +disregard of all neutral Powers, proclaimed a paper blockade of Formosa, +which naturally provoked a protestation on the part of the British +Government. During the remainder of the year hostilities between France +and China continued, although from time to time recurrence to the +friendly offices of Her Majesty's Government was suggested but found +impracticable. + +Egypt, however, remained the centre of interest, and the prospects of +any amicable arrangement appeared to recede further into the distance. +Upon the return of Lord Northbrook, the new proposals of Her Majesty's +Government were put before the French Government. + + * * * * * + + _Lord Lyons to Lord Granville._ + + Paris, Dec. 26, 1884. + + I suppose Waddington's private statement to me that we must + not expect an answer to our Egyptian proposals before the end of + the year was intended to imply that we _should_ get an answer about + that time. + + I pressed Ferry strongly on the subject the day before + yesterday. He assured me that he had studied our papers and was + occupying himself without intermission on the subject, but I could + not bring him to book as to the exact time we might look for an + answer, nor could I extract from him any hint as to what the answer + was to be. + + I am afraid that the draft of it has gone, or is going, to + Berlin, and I augur anything but good from this. It seems to + me that without being driven to anything of the kind by German + interests, Bismarck has lately taken a sort of malicious pleasure + in treating matters in a way calculated to embarrass and discredit + us. + + You may be quite sure that I shall leave no stone unturned + to get an answer as soon as possible. I don't think threats of + Tunisifying Egypt, or of bankruptcy, or other strong measures, + would tell upon the French. They would not believe that we + should have recourse to such measures, in face of the opposition + of France, Germany, Austria, and Russia, even if we had the + thoroughgoing support of Italy. I should hesitate to bring matters + to a point at which we could only execute our threats by a very + large display of military and naval force, or back out of them. + The best card in our hand, and it is not a high trump, is the + reluctance of the French to be thrown irretrievably into the + clutches of Bismarck by a distinct quarrel with us. + + Ferry seemed grateful to you for the way in which you + sounded him through Waddington about new proposals from China, + but he appears to think that any eagerness on his part to receive + new proposals would be looked upon by the Chinese as a sign of + weakness, and short of absolutely giving in on the part of China, + an _action d'éclat_ on the part of the French forces would answer + best for him with the Chambers. + + * * * * * + + _Lord Lyons to Lord Granville._ + + Paris, Dec. 30, 1884. + + I put your letter myself into Errington's hand this + morning.[42] He starts for Italy this evening. + + You will see by the despatch I send with this that Ferry + promises an answer on the Egyptian Finances on the 15th of next + month, and that he intends to make counter-proposals. I cried out + at his mentioning so distant a date as the 15th, but he would not + name a nearer one. If, as I cannot but surmise, he is consulting + Berlin, I fear that neither speed nor conciliation to us will be + recommended from that quarter. I confess I cannot think of any + threat which would be likely to mend matters. The French would + probably rejoice at any crisis which might array distinctly against + us the three Emperors, as well as this Republic. I doubt the + Tonquin affair being very much of a safeguard. I should feel safer + if France were not getting into the habit of sending out distant + expeditions. + + I report officially this evening Ferry's language about the + new Chinese proposals. The Chambers were all in favour of an + _action d'éclat_. I don't think Ferry could face them with another + doubtful negotiation on his hands which would suspend military + action. At any rate he does not seem to wish to hear anything of + Chinese proposals, short of actual surrender. + +At the beginning of 1885 Her Majesty's Government were confronted +with the unpleasant fact, that whereas hitherto they had only had +French opposition to reckon with in respect to Egypt, Bismarck had +now engineered a European combination against them in consequence of +dissatisfaction at the English attitude towards his colonial policy. +The English financial proposals, more especially those which suggested +that the interest on the debt should be reduced, and the Anglo-French +Administration of the Daira and Domain Lands should be abolished, were +denounced in unmeasured terms in France. Nor did it seem easy to devise +any efficacious means either of reconciling the French to the proposals +or of putting pressure on them. The time for putting pressure on France +was past; earlier in the day, a representation that a refusal to consent +to measures necessary for the well being and good administration of +Egypt would oblige the British Government to take the country formally +under their protection, after the fashion of Tunis, would have met with +little opposition; but now France might go to any extremities to resist +such an arrangement, feeling sure that in so doing she would have the +support of Germany, Austria, and Russia. Under these circumstances the +prospect of a financial crisis, or even of bankruptcy, produced little +alarm, because it was felt that the support of the three Empires would +be forthcoming in demanding that the Egyptian financial administration +should be placed under the joint control of the Powers; and it was in +fact only too probable that the intractability of the French Government +would increase in proportion with the support obtained from Germany and +the Powers which followed the German lead. + +It was hardly credible that the patronage of Germany was acceptable to +the French public or entirely satisfactory to the French Government, +as the danger, not to say the humiliation, of falling altogether into +the hands of Bismarck, could not quite be lost sight of. The French +Government no doubt had two objects in view; the first, to make use +of the support of Germany and the Powers, in order to guard French +pecuniary interests, and to improve as far as possible the political +position of France in Egypt; the second, to avoid severing themselves +so entirely from England as to be left wholly at the mercy of Germany. +Unfortunately for England the second object appeared to be the one to +which the lesser importance was attached. + +In short, the probabilities were, that unless we succeeded in coming to +some arrangement with France, we should find arrayed against us all the +European Powers, except Italy, the position in which we were placed at +the moment, in consequence of the expedition to Khartoum, having been +taken into account in calculating the means at our disposal to withstand +such a coalition. It should be mentioned that the friendship of Italy +had been purchased by an arrangement under which she was to take +possession of Massowah and the adjacent coast. + +The French counter-proposals respecting Egyptian Finance were +communicated in the middle of January. + + * * * * * + + _Lord Lyons to Lord Granville._ + + Paris, Jan. 20, 1885. + + I earnestly hope that a settlement of the Egyptian Financial + Question may be the result of the Cabinet to-day. That question + seems to me to have a disastrous effect on our foreign relations + everywhere. + + Bismarck and Ferry are _jouant au plus fin_ with each other at + our expense. Each seems to think that he can use the other to help + in thwarting us, without risk to himself. But Bismarck has the best + of the game. He occupies the French thoughts, and to some extent + their forces, at a distance from Europe: he keeps up irritation + between them and us, and some of the acquisitions he encourages + them to make (Tonquin for instance) will in all probability + be a permanent cause of weakness to them. At the same time he + neutralizes opposition from us to his childish colonial schemes, + which I cannot help suspecting are founded as much on what, for + want of a better word, I must call spite against us, as on any + real expectation of advantage to Germany. Ferry hopes, by means of + Bismarck and the Powers who follow Bismarck's lead, to carry his + immediate points in regard to Egypt and other parts of the world, + and so increase his reputation at home for the moment; and he + trusts to his skill to enable him to stop before he has so entirely + alienated us as to be quite at Bismarck's mercy. It is the natural + disposition of almost all Europe to side against us, as matters + stand, on the Egyptian Financial Question, which makes this pretty + game possible. + + * * * * * + + _Lord Lyons to Lord Granville._ + + Paris, Feb. 3, 1885. + + I am provoked by Ferry's tardiness in sending Waddington the + instructions to proceed with the Egyptian Finances Question. He + has evidently been waiting for the approval of Berlin. I am more + than ever impatient to get this question disposed of. One, and not + the least of my reasons, is the desire to get rid of this habit of + referring every moment to Bismarck. + + The Tonquin and China affairs seem to get more perplexing + and more expensive to the French in men and money every day. It + seems very doubtful that Ferry will get the _action d'éclat_ he is + looking for there, in time for the election; and if he do not, it + may go hard with him in the new Chamber. + + The _Gaulois_ announces that a great Anglo-French meeting is + to be held in Paris in the month of March, at which a resolution + is to be voted that England and France must remain united in the + interests of liberty in Europe. According to the _Gaulois_, 'Mr. + Cremer, secrétaire general de la Workmen's Peace Association,' is + in communication about it with M. Clémenceau, who is to organise + the meeting in conjunction with Mr. Burns, _Membre de la Chambre + des Communes_, who would come to Paris with a delegation of English + workmen. If there be any truth in the story, the object of the + French promoters of this demonstration is probably to embarrass the + Ferry Government. + +The Mr. Burns referred to was presumably the present President of the +Local Government Board, but the description of him as an M.P. was +premature. + +Negotiations between the French and English Governments over the +financial proposals were resumed, and eventually some sort of +arrangement was arrived at, but in the meanwhile all interest had been +transferred to the Soudan. The battle of Abou Klea took place on January +19, and on February 5 there arrived the news of the fall of Khartoum +and death of Gordon. The French were not wanting in appreciation of +the gallantry shown by the British troops, but were prodigal of gloomy +forebodings with regard to the future prospects of the expeditions. +Prominent amongst these prophets of evil were Lesseps and Jules Ferry. +Lesseps (on the strength of having once been on a tour in the Soudan +with the ex-Khedive) considered that an attempt to advance would be +madness, and that the army was in great danger of being surrounded. +He thought that the only prudent course would be to concentrate the +forces and keep them behind walls and entrenchments until the autumn. +But even then he did not see how the army could ever get away if it +were stoutly opposed by the Arabs, as the scarcity of water and other +difficulties would make the Berber-Suakim route impracticable; and in +short he was convinced that the only practical plan was to come to +terms with the Mahdi, and that the only means of making terms with the +Madhi would be to reinstate Ismail as Khedive and utilize his influence. +This surprising conclusion was due to the fact that Lesseps had for a +long time been exerting himself in every possible way to bring about the +restoration of Ismail. + +M. Jules Ferry was also full of condolences upon the British position in +the Soudan, but was, at the same time, not at all enthusiastic about the +French position in the Far East. He admitted that the troops in Tonquin +were sickly and that the climate was odious; that neither in Tonquin +nor Formosa could any blow be struck which China would really feel, but +that nevertheless 'in the interests of civilization as represented in +those parts by France and England, it was necessary to deal a stunning +blow (_coup foudroyant_) at the huge Empire of China.' This might be +effected by landing an attacking force in China proper, or by blockading +the ports, but either of these methods would involve great difficulties +with other Powers, and the only thing that remained to be done was +to dismember the Empire. Once China was broken up into three or four +provinces she would become comparatively harmless. M. Jules Ferry's +views were expressed after a dinner at the Embassy, and Lord Lyons in +reporting the conversation remarked that his wine must be more heady +than he imagined. + +Before long, however, a crisis in another part of the world temporarily +distracted attention from Egypt and brought home to every thinking +person the indefinite and multifarious responsibilities of British rule, +as well as the singularly inadequate military resources available. +Prominent British statesmen had long derided the absurdity of supposing +that England and Russia could ever become involved in disputes in +Central Asia, but, profiting by our embarrassments in Egypt, the +Russian Government had adopted so aggressive a policy, that even the +peace-loving Gladstone Government found itself on the brink of a +collision before the end of February. This critical situation and the +possibility of a conflict between England and Russia, far from giving +satisfaction to the French, afforded them just cause for anxiety. + + * * * * * + + _Lord Lyons to Lord Granville._ + + Paris, March 13, 1885. + + The critical state of things between England and Russia has + come more home to the French mind during the last few days, and + is looked upon with increased alarm. Whatever may be Bismarck's + feelings and plans, the French cannot help feeling that it would + be a great danger to them for him to be without counterpoise in + Europe. Those who believe that they see far ahead, declare that + Bismarck's ultimate object is Holland, and that Belgium, or a part + of Belgium, is to be given to France as a compensation for the + annexation of Holland to Germany. To this end they conceive that + Bismarck has aimed at embroiling Russia with England, so that the + one may paralyse the other; at separating England and France, and + at setting up an alliance between France and Germany. It is to + be hoped that many Frenchmen would shrink from taking part in an + iniquity which would be equalled only by the partition of Poland. + It is to be supposed that none can be so blind as not to see that + Bismarck will never make a territorial arrangement which would + increase the relative strength of France as compared with that of + Germany. It can hardly be doubted that Bismarck must be well aware + that so far from the gift of Belgium reconciling the French to the + loss of Alsace and Lorraine, any additional power that gift might + confer upon them would certainly be used, on the first opportunity, + for the recovery of the two lost Provinces. + + To people who incline to more simple and obvious explanations + of political conduct, Bismarck himself seems to be rather old to + indulge in any hope of executing schemes of this kind. Moreover, + the character of the Emperor would in all probability prevent his + sanctioning such proceedings, while His Majesty's death would, + in all probability, greatly diminish, if not put an end to, + Bismarck's influence. Bismarck may in fact be working in order to + attain smaller and more immediate objects, and to gratify personal + feelings. + + However all this may be, the French decidedly wish to prevent + a rupture between England and Russia. They do not relish the + effect upon the position of Bismarck in Europe which would be + the consequence of France herself, England and Russia, being all + hampered by being engaged in wars in the extreme East. + + * * * * * + + _Lord Granville to Lord Lyons._ + + March 14, 1885. + + I doubt the Russians going quite to extremes, but the risk is + great. + + Bismarck is behaving as ill as possible--after the mission of + peace and a complete making up, creating difficulties at the last + moment about Egyptian finances, concerning which he promised that + no objections would be raised by Germany, if France and England + were agreed. It is supposed to be with a view to getting a decree + against us at Cairo before the settlement. + +The military preparations for a possible struggle with Russia were +typical of the manner in which British statesmen occasionally prepare +for the worst. In order to strike terror into a Power which could +dispose of millions of soldiers, two army corps of 25,000 men each +were ordered to be mobilized in India, and as 'a time of emergency had +arrived,' it was announced that the first-class army reserve and militia +reserve would be called out; their total numbers amounting to the +stupendous figure of about 70,000 men. By these steps it was hoped that +the greatest military Power in the world would be overawed. + +From one embarrassment Her Majesty's Government were fortunately +relieved, the basis of an arrangement with France having been arrived +at with regard to Egyptian Finance. Mr. Gladstone, with whom Lord Lyons +had been requested to communicate direct, wrote expressing his relief, +but was obviously far more concerned to demonstrate the turpitude of his +political opponents. + + * * * * * + + _Mr. Gladstone to Lord Lyons._ + + 10, Downing St., March 21, 1885. + + When you so kindly wrote to me about Egyptian Finance, I did + not reply. Not because I was insensible or forgetful, but because + the unsatisfactory condition of the question made it so difficult. + Now, thank God, we are through, as far as Foreign Powers are + concerned; and we have thus far escaped from a position the most + hopeless and helpless that it is possible to conceive. + + It remains a subject of regret, and of some surprise, that + the Opposition are pressing for time before we take the vote, in + a manner quite unusual, with almost a certainty of bankruptcy and + financial chaos in Egypt, and the likelihood of consequences more + than financial if we comply; and all this, as far as we can make + out, because of the disorganized condition of the Tory party. It + seems that the mutinous followers have exacted this condition from + their leaders, as some reparation for the agreement about the Seats + Bill, and for their other offences. + + To be defeated on the agreement would be _most_ convenient + for the Government (for me priceless) but somewhat ruinous or + mischievous, I think, to all the rest of the world. + + We must of course hold our ground. + +The rooted belief of Ministers that their continuance in office is +absolutely essential to the welfare of the universe as well as to that +of the British Empire is, of course, a well-known phenomenon which has +manifested itself in more recent times in the case of both political +parties. In 1885 the difficulties of the Gladstone Government continued +to grow, and it was fortunate for Lord Granville's peace of mind that he +was an optimist by nature. + + * * * * * + + _Lord Granville to Lord Lyons._ + + March 25, 1885. + + The incorrigible Turk has not yet sent instructions to + Musurus. We have tried the most serious threats, which Musurus + believes will be successful. + + But if we do not take care, we shall soon be at war with the + Mahdi, with Turkey, and with the Russians. + + I do not know how the latter question will finish. Being of + a sanguine disposition, I hope for the best. We are determined to + take a firm stand. + + Do you believe that the French have many tricks in hand for + the Suez Canal Commission? + +Early in April there arrived the news of the fight at Penjdeh, where, +to use Gladstone's own expression, the attack of the Russians upon +the Afghans 'bore the appearance of an unprovoked aggression.' A +financial panic took place, consols fell 3 per cent., Russian stocks 9 +per cent., and for a short time the impression prevailed that war was +inevitable. In the House of Commons, Mr. Gladstone made one of those +eloquent statements which were so widely accepted by his followers as a +satisfactory solution of any outstanding difficulty, but which failed to +reassure the more intelligent; and even the optimistic Lord Granville +felt some uncomfortable qualms. + + 'It is too dreadful,' he wrote on April 10th, 'jumping from + one nightmare into another. + + 'Once at war with Russia we shall be obliged to toady Germany, + France, and Turkey. + + 'But I cannot believe that it will come to war. It cannot be + a good move of the Russians to have created a blood feud with the + Afghans. + + 'Not having a genius for war, I do not know how we are + effectively to carry it on against Russia, although it is not off + the cards that it may break her up.' + +Probably Lord Granville was not singular in his inability to see how a +war on land was to be effectively carried on against Russia. + +In the meanwhile the French were not without their own foreign troubles. +M. Jules Ferry had spoken of the necessity of inflicting a _coup +foudroyant_. The _coup foudroyant_ fell in a totally unexpected fashion +upon his own head, in the shape of a defeat of the French forces at +Lang-Son. The news of the reverse arrived in Paris on March 25, and +created so absurd a panic and so strong a feeling against Spirited +Colonial Policy that Jules Ferry at once bowed to the storm and resigned +on the 31st. He had been in office for the unprecedented period of two +years and one month, which alone was sufficient cause for disappearance; +nor could it be said that his administration had been colourless, for he +had passed an important Education Bill, established the Protectorate of +France in Tunis, and annexed Tonquin and Madagascar. + + * * * * * + + _Lord Lyons to Lord Granville._ + + Paris, March 31, 1885. + + Ferry was certainly at work quietly with negotiations for + peace with China, and no doubt he calculated on playing it as a + high trump at the Elections; and a great card it would have been + for him, for the war in Tonquin is extremely unpopular. The reverse + at Lang-Son has changed all this; the extreme Right have always + had a special hatred of Ferry on account of the suppression of the + religious communities, and Clémenceau and the extreme Left have + become bitterly hostile to him personally. Not many of his own + party cared to stick to him when their own popularity would have + been risked by doing so. And, besides, he had been in office for + two years; a very unusually long period of late, and people were + tired of him. + + Freycinet is now trying to form a Cabinet. It is not certain + that he will succeed, and if he does succeed, it is very doubtful + whether his Cabinet will last. His idea seems to be to take into it + Republicans of all shades, not excluding deep Red. The Republicans + have been rather startled by the progress, far from great though + it has been, of the Conservatives and Monarchists (Orleanist and + Imperialist) in the constituencies; and the notion seems to be that + the importance to them of resisting this, may keep them together + and prevent them quarrelling with each other, at all events until + after the Elections. But anyway, each change of Ministry produces + a further step towards the Left, and there is a foundation for the + fear that there may be socialist legislation against property and + proprietors, and that the Government may by degrees throw away all + the means of resisting anarchy. + + Freycinet's own tendencies would be towards peace. Now there + is nothing but flame and fury against the Chinese, but considering + the general unpopularity of the war this may to a certain extent + subside. He would, I think, desire to be on good terms with all + countries. He would hardly be so subservient to Bismarck as Ferry + had lately become. It so happens that personally he and I are + particularly good friends. + +Towards the end of April the British Government asked for a credit +of eleven millions, and the eloquence of Mr. Gladstone worked his +faithful followers up to a belief in verbiage which is almost pathetic. +'Gladstone's magnificent speech had a great effect here,' wrote Lord +Granville. 'It will hasten the _dénouement_ one way or the other in +Russia. + +'I understand that the Emperor is decidedly pacific; but he believes his +father lost himself from want of firmness, that he himself is determined +to be firm, and that the particular firmness which appeals to him, is +not that which goes against the wishes of his army.' + + * * * * * + + _Lord Lyons to Lord Granville._ + + Paris, May 1, 1885. + + A war between England and Russia is much dreaded by the + French. They fear that it would leave Bismarck without any + counterpoise in Europe. Any influence they may have will no doubt + be exercised in favour of peace, but their influence at this moment + does not count very much. I do not know that they would have any + strong sympathy with Russia if hostilities broke out, but such a + feeling would be produced by anything which irritated them with us + on account of Egyptian or other matters. Anyhow we must be prepared + to find them exacting and susceptible. + + The consequences of the war as regards the money market here + would be disastrous; but it is believed they would be still more + disastrous at Berlin. + + The dangerous point is considered here to be the notions of + military honour, of a peculiar kind, which prevail in the Russian + as much as, or more than, in other Continental armies. + + These military notions in the armies do not at all require + that the rulers of the armies should keep their words to + foreigners, or abide by their international engagements; but they + do require that, right or wrong, the rulers should not allow the + _amour-propre_ of the army to be wounded. The Emperor of Russia + probably shares these feelings, and at any rate he would certainly + be afraid to run counter to them. Those here who profess to + understand Russia declare that she has no desire to take Herat or + to annex any part of Afghanistan. They think that the ultimate + object at which she is really aiming is to extend her possessions + to the Persian Gulf, and that she would be tractable enough about + the Afghan frontier, if that question were separated from military + honour, or rather vanity. + + I met Freycinet and Herbette at dinner yesterday. They seemed + to be much relieved at having got rid of the _Bosphore Egyptien_ + difficulty, and to be really much obliged to you for the help you + had given to them. + +The _Bosphore Egyptien_, a French newspaper in Cairo which continually +attacked the British administration in Egypt with unparalleled +malignity, had at length worn out the patience of Sir Evelyn Baring, and +been temporarily suspended. + + * * * * * + + _Lord Lyons to Lord Granville._ + + Paris, May 15, 1885. + + The symptoms apparent here indicate that Bismarck is busily + employed in getting up a European coalition against England on the + Egyptian question. He has very nearly succeeded, if not quite, in + isolating us in the Suez Canal Commission. He would seem to have + put great pressure for this purpose upon Italy, who was disposed to + side with us, and to have frightened or cajoled Holland and Spain. + With Russia and Austria he seems to have made a regular cabal. It + has required great tact and firmness on Pauncefote's part to have + resisted the endeavours to turn the Commission into a political + conference on the whole Egyptian question, and at the same time + to have avoided breaking it up prematurely. Another circumstance + which Bismarck is using as a lever against us, is the levying by + the Egyptian Government of the tax upon the coupon, before the + Financial Convention has been ratified by all the parties to it. + + He has sent Courcel here from Berlin to seduce or terrify + the French Government, and is said to have charged him with large + offers relative to establishing an international administration in + Egypt, and assigning to France a preponderant influence in such an + administration. What the real offers may be, of course, I cannot + say, but I think the French are half afraid of them. Probably, like + all Bismarck's demonstrations in so-called support of France, they + contain the essential elements--the employing a considerable number + of French troops at a distance from France, and the promoting + ill-will between France and England. + +These suspicions as to Bismarck's motives were confirmed by Lord +Rosebery, who at the time occupied a minor post in the Gladstone +administration, and had lately paid a visit to Germany. + + * * * * * + + _Lord Granville to Lord Lyons._ + + May 30, 1885. + + Rosebery has not yet written out the report (which Blowitz + saw), but he has given me a full account from his notes. + + Bismarck acknowledged that he had been thwarting us in every + way; but at the last conversation (influenced, Rosebery thought, + by an unsatisfactory conversation with Courcel) he was much more + conciliatory. + + He was exceedingly civil to Rosebery; hostile to Gladstone, + and especially to Derby. + + He is a great man, but he sees through a great many + millstones. + + The Emperor is certainly unwell. Rosebery is convinced that + Bismarck will retire for a time on his death. + +Judging from the material available, no statesman ever disliked so many +persons as Bismarck, and the objects of his antipathy were not confined +to his own sex. Busch's book and the works of other authors contain +frequent references to the grievances which he entertained towards women +who were alleged to have interfered with his policy, and, whether these +charges were well founded or not, he made no secret of his animosity +against even so important a personage as the Empress Augusta. In fact +there can be little doubt that it was owing to the despotic influence +exercised by the Chancellor that the Empress, who had had the misfortune +to incur his displeasure, was forced to leave Berlin and to reside for a +considerable period at Coblentz. + +Apparently the man who inspired him with the greatest aversion was +Gortschakoff, but it is easy to understand that from the Bismarckian +point of view, Mr. Gladstone and Lord Derby represented a singularly +futile type of statesman. Lord Rosebery's prophecy with regard to his +retirement was only partially correct. In private conversation, Bismarck +is understood to have calculated upon three years of office under the +present German Emperor; whereas he only succeeded in remaining for two, +and his retirement was compulsory and not voluntary. + +One of the notable events in Paris in 1885 was the death of Victor Hugo. +His funeral was made the occasion of a great ceremonial, and Queen +Victoria, who was always much interested in functions of this nature, +desired that she should be furnished with a special report. Any one +who happened to have been a witness of the Victor Hugo funeral would +corroborate the accuracy of the following account, which is probably in +striking contrast to the word pictures of the newspaper correspondents +of the time. + + * * * * * + + Paris, June 4, 1885. + + Lord Lyons presents his humble duty to Your Majesty and + in obedience to Your Majesty's commands, proceeds to state the + impression made upon him by the funeral of Victor Hugo. + + There was nothing striking, splendid or appropriate, either in + the monstrous catafalque erected under the Arc de Triomphe, or in + the trappings of the funeral. There was nothing mournful or solemn + in the demeanour of the people. The impressive part of the scene + consisted in the vast crowds from all parts of France and from many + other countries. As decorations of the scene, were the innumerable + wreaths, some conveyed in cars and some carried in the hands of + those who offered them. + + The aspect was that of a vast assemblage of people gathered + together for some ordinary demonstration, or from curiosity. On + the other hand, perfect order was preserved. Both those who joined + in the procession and those who lined the streets through which it + passed, maintained the good humour and civility which are seldom + wanting to a Paris crowd. At some points attempts were made to + raise anarchical or socialistic cries, but met with no response. + The distance from the point of departure to the Arc de Triomphe is + about three miles by the route taken, which was through some of the + finest avenues of Paris. The procession began at 11 o'clock in the + morning and went on until after 4 in the afternoon. + + The general impression left upon Lord Lyons by the day was one + of weariness and unconcern. The orderliness of the people was a + satisfactory symptom, but the total absence of strong feeling was + chilling, and the studied avoidance of any recognition of religion + did away with all solemnity. + +On June 12, the Gladstone Government, having been defeated during a +Budget debate, resigned, and left to the Conservatives the ungrateful +task of facing an accumulation of difficulties while in a minority in +the House of Commons. Lord Salisbury took Lord Granville's place at the +Foreign Office and the transfer was marked by a double compliment to +Lord Lyons. Lord Granville, who was always extremely popular with all +those with whom he was in any way connected, with habitual kindliness +and generosity expressed his obligations to the Ambassador. 'An ordinary +letter of farewell and of thanks would very inadequately express my +feelings to you. I cannot say how much I have valued the loyal and +important assistance you have given me in most difficult circumstances.' + +Lord Salisbury showed his appreciation by at once asking him to come +over to England in order to discuss the general situation, and upon +his return to Paris in July, he was able to report that the change of +Government in England appeared to have had a beneficial effect upon +Anglo-French relations. 'The statement you made in the House of Lords +has made an excellent impression. Freycinet seems to be really disposed +to abstain from endeavouring to thwart us or to raise difficulties for +us with regard to Egyptian Finance. He also appears to be inclined to +come to terms with us about Newfoundland and other matters.' + +'I think he is sincerely desirous to put the relations between the +two countries on a good footing, but I cannot yet say that he will be +willing to make sacrifices for this purpose.' + +As Freycinet, however, showed few symptoms of being willing to retire +from the position he had taken up with regard to the eventual British +evacuation of Egypt, and to the resumption by France of an influence +equal with our own, his professions of friendship did not appear to be +of much value. Some apprehension too was caused by the ostentatious +announcements in the French press, that the numerous military forces in +the Far East released in consequence of the conclusion of peace with +China would return by the Suez Canal and would therefore be 'available +for other purposes in the Mediterranean.' What was perhaps more +encouraging, was the increasing distaste for Spirited Colonial Policy +combined with renewed distrust of Bismarck's intentions. + + * * * * * + + _Lord Lyons to Lord Salisbury._ + + Paris, July 14, 1885. + + I have been rejoiced by your telegram announcing that Germany, + Austria, and Italy agree to the issue of the Egyptian Loan Decree. + It looks as if you were on the eve of settling the question most + pressing in point of time (that of the money for Egypt), and I + hope it augurs well for the disposition generally of the German + Chancellor. The National Fête here puts a stop to all business for + to-day, but I shall see Freycinet about the issue of the Decree + to-morrow. + + The debate on the Budget for 1886 elicited some curious + speeches in the Chamber of Deputies three days ago on the + 'Expéditions lointaines.' There was no difficulty in showing that + they had all cost more than they were worth. They were plainly held + by the Deputies to be unpopular in the country, and condemnation of + them is likely to be one of the election cries of the extreme Left. + But hardly any one seemed to see the way to bring them to an end. + In fact, it looked as if France had got into the groove which by a + fatality leads to annexation and conquest by strong and civilized + nations when they once begin to establish themselves amongst weak + and barbarous peoples. All this may delight Prince Bismarck, + whose avowed object is to find an outlet for what he calls French + vanity and restlessness, and a gulf to swallow up French troops + and treasures at a distance from Europe. From a certain point of + view this may not be without its advantages to other nations; but + it is not without danger to the good relations between France and + England--between whom awkward questions may arise all over the + world. In the present I am uneasy about Siam and more so about + Burmah. It is not a pleasant speculation to consider the change + which may be produced in no very remote future, in the condition + of our Indian Empire, if it be in contact with a great European + Power both on the north and on the east. + +In August, 1885, a prodigious outburst of Anglophobia occurred in Paris +in consequence of mendacious statements published by Rochefort in his +newspaper, charging the British military authorities in the Soudan +with the assassination of a certain Olivier Pain. Olivier Pain was an +ex-Communist and French journalist who had accompanied the Turks in +the campaign of 1877, and who was reputed to be occasionally employed +by the Turkish Government as a secret agent. In the spring of 1884, +he had set off to join the Mahdi, and having completely disappeared +from view, and being presumably dead, Rochefort took the opportunity +to announce that Lord Wolseley had procured his death by offering a +reward of fifty pounds for his head. The enterprise had been allotted to +Major Kitchener[43]: 'un sinistre gredin nourri de psaumes et abreuvé +de whisky qui a eu le premier, l'idée de mettre à prix la tête de celui +qu'il appelait "l'espion français."' + +As, however, it was impossible to reach Lord Wolseley and the +'sinistre gredin,' Rochefort urged that vengeance should be taken upon +'l'Ambassadeur Lyons.' 'A partir d'aujourd'hui il est notre ôtage! +Sa vieille peau est le gage de la satisfaction qui nous est due.' +'L'Ambassadeur Lyons' was, however, also beyond reach, as he happened to +be on leave, and it was, therefore, suggested that the few secretaries +(of whom I was one), who were then in Paris, should be forthwith strung +up to the lamp-posts in the Rue du Faubourg St. Honoré. The astonishing +thing was that these ravings were actually taken more or less seriously, +and that for some time the French authorities found it necessary to +protect the Embassy with numerous police detachments. + +It has always been one of the inscrutable mysteries that Rochefort, +ever since the Commune, was allowed a toleration accorded to no one +else, on the ground of his alleged exceptional wit and humour, whereas +his effusions consisted almost entirely of gross personal abuse of the +lowest type, levelled indiscriminately at prominent individuals of any +description, and largely directed against England, whose hospitality he +enjoyed during many years of exile. + +FOOTNOTES: + +[Footnote 37: _Times_ correspondent in Paris.] + +[Footnote 38: Col. the Hon. George Villiers, Military Attaché at Paris.] + +[Footnote 39: Lyons, Feb. 1883.] + +[Footnote 40: Sir Joseph Crowe, K.C.M.G., Commercial Attaché at the +Paris Embassy.] + +[Footnote 41: French Minister at Tangier.] + +[Footnote 42: Mr. G. Errington, M.P., had been despatched by Mr. +Gladstone on a secret mission to the Vatican in connection with the Home +Rule agitation.] + +[Footnote 43: Now Lord Kitchener.] + + + + +CHAPTER XVII + +THE LAST YEAR'S WORK + +(1886-1887) + + +The sudden and unexpected declaration in September of the Union of +Bulgaria and Eastern Roumelia which caused so much perturbation in +Europe, and resulted in a war between Servia and Bulgaria, left the +French quite indifferent; but the imminence of hostilities between +England and Burmah provoked French ill-humour, which was all the +more inexcusable because no protest had ever been made against +French proceedings in Tonquin and Madagascar. The truth was that the +Burmese resistance to the Indian Government was largely due to French +encouragement. As far back as 1883 a Burmese Mission had arrived in +Paris, and kept studiously aloof from the British Embassy; and although +every opportunity had been taken to impress upon the French Government +the peculiar relations between Burmah and British India, there was not +the least doubt that the object of the Burmese had been to obtain from +the French Government such a Treaty as would enable them to appeal +to France in the event of their being involved in difficulties with +England. How much encouragement they actually received is not known, but +it was probably sufficient to effect their undoing. + + The papers are abusing us about Burmah, and being quite + innocent of any aggression themselves in that part of the world, + are horrified at our holding our own there. Nevertheless, I hope + the Indian Government will finish the thing out of hand, for an + ugly state of feeling about it is growing up here. + +The rapidity with which the operations against Burmah were conducted +left nothing to be desired. The campaign was over within a few weeks; +on January 1, 1886, the annexation of Burmah was proclaimed, and the +affairs of that country ceased to be of any further interest to the +French Government. + +Lord Salisbury's tenure of the Foreign Office, which had been marked +by so successful a policy that even Mr. Gladstone had expressed +satisfaction, came to an end early in 1886, and he was succeeded by Lord +Rosebery. 'The irony of events,' wrote the latter to Lord Lyons, 'has +sent me to the Foreign Office, and one of the incidents of this which +is most agreeable to me, is that it brings me into close relations with +yourself.' + +Although the Paris press had circulated a ridiculous fiction that Lord +Rosebery (presumably because he was personally acquainted with Bismarck) +was anti-French by inclination, the change of Government in England was +received in France with perfect equanimity, as had been the case in the +previous autumn. + +The new Foreign Secretary, however, could not fail to be painfully +impressed by the unsatisfactory feeling which obviously existed in +France towards England, and found it difficult of explanation. + + * * * * * + + _Lord Rosebery to Lord Lyons._ + + March 3, 1886. + + I am rather anxious about the attitude of the French. In + my short tenure of office they have brought up three or four + questions, all in the highest degree distasteful to us. + + 1. The Consul at Suakim: as to which they say, with accuracy + which is disputed, that they had gone too far and could not + withdraw the appointment. + + 2. Arbitration on the Somali coast troubles: as to which they + declare that Salisbury promised it, which Salisbury, I understand, + denies. + + 3. The revival of the Suez Canal Commission. + + 4. The announcement made to me by Waddington yesterday that + they should be obliged shortly to send a cargo of recidivists to + the Isle of Pines. I remonstrated strongly with him, and indeed + I cannot foresee all the consequences, should they carry their + intention into effect. One, however, I do clearly perceive, which + is that we should have to denounce the Postal Convention of 1856, + which gives the Messageries privileges in Australian ports, which + could not be sustained, and which the colonists would not for a + moment, under such circumstances, respect. + + But these are details. What I want to point out is the + apparent animus displayed in these different proceedings. I shall + not mention them to my colleagues until I hear your view of them, + and anything you may be able to collect on the subject. + + What does it all mean? These things did not occur during the + late Government? Are they directed against the new Administration? + I cannot view them as a chapter of accidents. + + As for myself, I have entered upon this office with the most + sincere wish to be friendly with France. There can be no earthly + reason why we should not be so. It is a pity, therefore, that our + cordiality should be poisoned at its source. + + I wish you would let me know what you think of all this. You + can pick up much directly, and perhaps even more indirectly, on + these points. Pray forgive the length of this letter. + + * * * * * + + _Lord Lyons to Lord Rosebery._ + + Paris, March 5, 1886. + + I have naturally been on the watch since you came into office + for indications of the feelings of the French Government respecting + the change. In answer to your letter of the day before yesterday, + asking my opinion, I can only say that I think the French are quite + as well disposed towards the new Government as they were to the + late one--indeed, of the two, I should say better. We come so much + into contact with the French all over the globe that questions + more or less unpleasant are always arising in smaller or greater + numbers, according to circumstances; and French feeling is in a + chronic state of irritability about Egypt. + + The four subjects you mention are certainly annoying, but I do + not believe that the French proceedings respecting them have been + actuated by any animus against the present English Ministry. + + I shall be somewhat staggered in this opinion, however, if the + French Government proposes to substitute arbitration by any third + Power for the understanding that the Somali coast questions shall + be treated by friendly negotiations between the two Governments, + and that meanwhile the _status quo_ shall not be disturbed. With a + view to proceeding with the negotiation, M. Waddington proposed to + Lord Salisbury on Jan. 20th, and by a written note the next day, + that an inquiry should be made on the spot by two Commissioners, + one English and one French. Lord Salisbury received the verbal + proposal favourably, but did not at the moment give a definitive + answer. + + The proposal to reassemble the Suez Canal Commission is simply + the renewal of a proposal made by M. Waddington to Lord Salisbury + at the beginning of January. + + The most serious of the affairs you mention appears to me to + be the imminent despatch of a cargo of _récidivistes_ to the Isle + of Pines. I have seen from the beginning the importance of this + _récidiviste_ question as regards public feeling in Australia, + and there is hardly any question about which I have taken so much + trouble. I have attacked successive French Ministers upon it in + season and out of season, but I have never succeeded in obtaining + any promise that _récidivistes_ should not be sent to the Pacific. + As I reported to you, I remonstrated with Freycinet about the + intention actually to send off a batch, as soon as I became aware + of it. I did not perceive any difference in his manner or language + from what they had been when some other Ministers had been in + office in England, but my remonstrances were equally ineffectual. I + am glad you had an opportunity of speaking strongly to Waddington. + I see troubles ahead, for the Australians have before now + threatened to pass Dominion laws against French ships found to have + escaped convicts on board, which seem to go a good deal beyond + international usage, not to say law. + + It is time, however, for me to wind up this long story. My + answer to your question is that I am far from thinking that there + is any _malus animus_ against Her Majesty's present Government on + the part of Freycinet and his Cabinet. Nor do I know that there is + more than the usual irritability towards England among the French + public; but still I feel strongly that it behoves us to tread + cautiously as well as firmly, when we are coming upon French ground. + +The spring of 1886 was noticeable for another Government onslaught +upon such members of ex-reigning families as were then residing in +France. Of these the most conspicuous were the Orleans Princes. There +was nothing in their conduct to cause alarm to the Republic, as they +confined themselves to taking part in social functions, at which they +maintained a kind of semi-state, being always attended by ladies and +gentlemen-in-waiting after the manner of recognized Royal personages. +This innocent procedure was sufficient excuse to work up an agitation +against them, and to introduce an Expulsion Bill. + + * * * * * + + _Lord Lyons to Lord Rosebery._ + + Paris, May 25, 1886. + + The question of the day is the expulsion of the Princes. The + measure, if taken, will be quite unjustifiable, discreditable to + the Government, and, I should say, not at all injurious to the + cause of the victims. Considering the people and the institutions + with which they had to deal, the partisans of the Orleans Princes + have not been so prudent and correct as the Princes themselves. + They have gone about twitting the Republicans with weakness for + permitting the very mild demonstration made by the Royalists, and + declaring that such want of vigour was simply a sign of the decay + of the Republic. + + * * * * * + + The general opinion is that the Expulsion Bill will pass in + its present, or even in an aggravated form, and that if it does, + the Government will proceed to expel the Comte de Paris at least, + if not the Duc de Chartres, and some others. On the other hand, it + is not expected that the Bill confiscating the property, real and + personal, of the Orleans and Bonapartes will be adopted. + + Much anxiety is felt respecting Boulanger's goings on with + respect to the army. He seems to think of nothing but currying + favour with the lowest ranks in the service, and with the mob + outside. It is believed by many people that he would not act + vigorously, as Minister of War, against any disturbances, but would + try to turn them to account and set up for himself as dictator or + what not. + + The financial situation is very bad, and if common scandal is + to be listened to, the very short duration of French Ministries is + having the effect of making most of the individual Ministers very + unscrupulous and very impatient to make hay during the very short + time that the sun shines. + +The above letter contains one of the first allusions to the enterprising +impostor Boulanger, who very nearly succeeded in making history, and +of whom much was to be heard for some considerable space of time. His +popularity was due in great measure to the vague discontent which +was then prevalent in France. People thought that they saw the same +inefficiency in the Government, the same relaxation of authority, the +same financial difficulties, and the same venality which marked the last +days of the Second Empire. There seemed to be no individual, in or out +of the Royal or Imperial Dynasties, capable of exciting any enthusiasm +or of inspiring any confidence, and public feeling was in that state of +lassitude and dissatisfaction which might give a reasonable chance for a +bold stroke for power. + +The scandalous Expulsion Bill passed both Chambers, and the Princes took +their departure. + + * * * * * + + _Lord Lyons to Lord Rosebery._ + + Paris, June 25, 1886. + + The departure of the Comte de Paris from Eu has been + accompanied by many very sad circumstances, but I cannot help + thinking that his political position is improved by his expulsion. + His own partisans are much pleased at its having elicited from + him a distinct assertion of a claim to the throne, and of a + determination to work for the restoration of monarchy. + + It is less easy to give an opinion on the position of the + Princes who have remained in France. It seems to be hardly + compatible with dignity and comfort, considering the unabated + hostility to them of the Reds, who seem generally to end in + overpowering all generous and conservative feelings in the Chambers + and in the Government. + + Prince Napoleon and his son Prince Victor went off in opposite + directions, one to Geneva, the other to Brussels. The departure of + neither seems to have made much apparent sensation in Paris when + it took place, but I am far from certain that Prince Victor is not + really a more formidable opponent to the Republic than is the Comte + de Paris. + + * * * * * + + _Lord Lyons to Lord Rosebery._ + + Paris, July 2, 1886. + + * * * * * + + The topic of the day here is the conduct of the Minister of + War, General Boulanger. He was supposed to be an Orleanist. Then + he went round to Clémençeau, and was put into Freycinet's Cabinet + as a representative of the Clémençeau party, which though not the + most Red in the Chamber, is more Red than the Freycinet section. + Since he has been in office Boulanger has lost no opportunity of + ingratiating himself with the Radicals, and he has been travelling + about the country making speeches, the object of which has + evidently been to gain personal popularity for himself without + regard to his colleagues. + + He has also by degrees put creatures of his own into the + great military commands. A crisis was produced, during the last + few days, by his quarrelling with General Saussier, the military + Governor of Paris, and provoking him into resigning. He is also + said to have used strange language in the Council of Ministers. At + any rate, President Grévy and the Ministers seem to have thought + they would be more comfortable at Paris without having a satellite + of Boulanger as Governor, and they have insisted upon declining + Saussier's resignation. From the way people talk, one would think + that the questions were whether Boulanger is aiming at being a + Cromwell or a Monk, and if a Monk, which dynasty he will take up. + + There is a good deal of alarm here about foreign affairs. The + reports of a large concentration of Russian troops in Bessarabia + are supposed to confirm other indications that Russia is meditating + a revenge for the check she has sustained with regard to Bulgaria. + This, it is supposed, must bring Austria into the field. Moreover, + Bismarck does not seem to be in an amiable mood towards France; + and with or without instigation from him, Germans talk as if war + was inevitable. + + Then the Republic here has lasted sixteen years, and that is + about the time which it takes to make the French tired of a form of + Government. The Republic has not been successful financially, and + trade and agriculture are not prosperous, nor is the reputation of + the Republican administration high for purity or efficiency. + + So there is plenty to croak about for those who are inclined + to croak. + + * * * * * + + _Lord Lyons to Lord Rosebery._ + + Paris, July 13, 1886. + + The regular session of the French Chambers is to be closed the + day after to-morrow, and the Chambers are to spend to-morrow at + the Review at Longchamps, and I suppose to take part in the other + nuisances which makes Paris insupportable on a National Fête day. + I conclude the Chambers will come back in October for an extra + session as usual. In fact, they have not yet voted the Budget; or, + I had almost said, any useful measure. In Commercial matters and + indeed in everything relating to intercourse with other countries, + they have shown the narrowest and most exclusive spirit. Their + great feat has been the law for the persecution of the Princes, + which seems to be carried out as harshly as possible. I should + not have said that the literal wording of the law necessitated + or even justified the dismissal from the army of Princes who + already belonged to it, but I suppose that was the intention of + the legislators. The Duc d'Aumale's letter to the President is a + powerful document, but was sure to lead to his expulsion, and was + perhaps intended to have that effect. + + Among people who ought to have good information from abroad, + the alarm as to a war this autumn seems stronger than among + the French politicians who confine themselves more closely to + considering French feeling at home. Certainly it comes round to + one in various ways from Germany that war is very generally + expected, or at all events talked of there. The accounts current + in Germany of supposed French provocations look as if there was + a party there trying to work up hostile feeling against France. + An alliance between France and Russia seems to be the bugbear. I + don't see symptoms at present of any war spirit in this country; + but of course a quarrel between Russia and Germany would be a great + temptation to French Chauvinism. + +The abhorred annual fête of July 14, 1886, possessed an interest which +had been wanting previously, and has never since been renewed. This +was due to the presence of a number of troops at the Longchamps Review +who had just returned from Tonquin, and to the excitement caused by +the first appearance of Boulanger at a big military display in Paris. +Notwithstanding the inflated rubbish which was published the next day in +the French press, there could not be the least doubt that the Tonquin +troops were received without the slightest enthusiasm. In Paris the +very word 'Tonquin' was hated; the country was associated with loss of +life, and with heavy taxation, and nothing could have expressed more +eloquently the disenchantment produced by a Spirited Colonial Policy, +than the chilling reception accorded to these returned soldiers. The +enthusiasm which should have been bestowed upon these humble instruments +was lavished upon the charlatan who at that moment was the most +prominent and popular figure in the eye of the French public. + +The military mountebank (aptly christened by Jules Ferry, 'a music +hall St. Arnaud') had, with some foresight, provided himself with a +high-actioned black circus horse, and those who were present on the +occasion will never forget the moment when he advanced to salute the +President, and other notabilities established in the official Tribune. +Only a few days before, it was currently believed, he had terrified his +ministerial colleagues by appearing at a Cabinet Council in uniform, +and now as he pranced backwards or forwards on the circus horse and the +public yelled their acclamations, President Grévy and the uninteresting +crowd of bourgeois ministers and deputies who surrounded him, seemed +visibly to quiver and flinch as shuddering memories of December 2 and +other _coups d'état_ obtruded themselves upon their recollections. + +From that day Boulanger became a dangerous man; the circus horse +had done the trick; the general embodied in the public fancy the +_clinquant_, for which the French had so long been sighing in secret; +_l'homme qui monte à cheval_ in place of _l'homme qui monte à la +tribune_, and for a long time he survived even that ridicule which in +France is supposed to kill more effectively than elsewhere. Even when +he engaged in a duel with an elderly and short-sighted civilian, M. +Floquet, and was decisively worsted, he continued to remain a popular +hero. + +Lord Rosebery, upon whom the unreasonable ill-feeling then constantly +shown by the French towards England had made a painful impression, +had realized in May that the Gladstone Government was doomed, and +had wisely decided in consequence that a process of marking time +was preferable to embarking upon anything in the nature of a heroic +policy. Upon his retirement and the formation of a new administration, +Lord Lyons experienced what was probably the greatest surprise of his +life in the shape of the following letter from Lord Salisbury. In +order to reinforce its arguments the late Lord Currie, then Permanent +Under-Secretary of State at the Foreign Office, was sent over with it to +Paris. + +[Illustration: _General Boulanger._ + +LONDON: EDWARD ARNOLD.] + + * * * * * + + Confidential. July 26, 1886. + + I accepted yesterday the Queen's commission to form a + Government. It is a task full of difficulties; and I would have + gladly seen Lord Hartington undertake it. This, however, he could + not be induced to do; and the duty falls upon me. One of my first + thoughts is to provide a Foreign Secretary for the new Government: + for I could not, with any hope of carrying it through successfully, + repeat the experiment of last summer by uniting the Foreign + Secretaryship with the Premiership. + + There is no one possessing the experience and knowledge of + Foreign Affairs which you have, and no one whose appointment would + exercise so great a moral authority in Europe. And we certainly + have not in our political ranks any one who could claim a tithe of + the fitness for the office which every one would acknowledge in + your case. I earnestly hope the proposal may be not unacceptable to + you. If that should happily be the case, a great difficulty in our + way will have been most successfully removed. + + As there is much to be said on the matter which it would be + too long to write, Currie has very kindly undertaken to take this + letter over and discuss the matter with you. We have talked it over + very fully. + + If you should be in need of any interval of repose, I could + easily take the seals for a few weeks. + + * * * * * + + _Lord Lyons to Lord Salisbury._ + + Paris. July 27, 1886. + + Currie brought me your letter early this morning. In answer to + it I sent you at 11.30 a.m. the following telegram:-- + + 'I am very much gratified, and I am very grateful for the kind + consideration with which your proposal is accompanied, but my + age and the state of my health make it quite impossible for me to + undertake the office.' + + I hope I need not assure you that I am fully sensible of the + kindness of your letter, and that if I cannot feel that I merit all + you say of me, I am at least grateful for your good opinion. + + The truth is, that I could not now undertake new and laborious + duties with any confidence that I could discharge them efficiently. + I feel the need of rest, and I am not equal to beginning a new + life of hard work. I could not conscientiously assume the great + responsibility which would be thrown upon me. + +If the post of Foreign Secretary has ever been offered during the +last hundred years to any other person outside the ranks of orthodox +party politicians the secret has been well kept, and it might perhaps +be suggested that few people would be found with sufficient strength +of mind to decline so glittering a prize. Lord Lyons, however, as is +sufficiently evident, found no difficulty in at once deciding upon the +refusal of an offer which the ordinary mediocrity would have accepted +with avidity. In the above letter he founded his refusal upon grounds +of age and ill-health, and in private he used to express the opinion +that after the age of forty a man's faculties began and continued to +deteriorate. But it is not in the least likely that he would have +accepted the honour which it was proposed to bestow upon him, at any +period of his life. His extreme modesty and diffidence have already +been dwelt upon, but a more valuable quality than these is a man's +realization of his own limitations, and it is probable that Lord Lyons, +by the exercise of his exceptionally impartial judgment, was able to +form a more correct opinion as to his own potentialities than Lord +Salisbury. A thorough and profound knowledge of foreign politics is +not the sole necessary qualification of an English Foreign Secretary; +had such been the case, Lord Lyons would have been an ideal occupant +of the post; but in England, where the value of Ministers is gauged +chiefly by the fallacious test of oratorical capacity, the Foreign +Secretary is constantly obliged to make speeches in defence of or in +explanation of his policy, and although the House of Lords is the +most long-suffering and good-natured assembly in the world, it would +have been no easy task for a man of sixty-nine, who had never put two +sentences together in public, to suddenly appear in Parliament as the +representative of one of the most important departments, to say nothing +of public meetings, deputations, banquets, etc. It may also be doubted +whether, in spite of his many admirable qualities, he was really adapted +for the post. All his life, he had been merely an instrument--a highly +efficient instrument--of the existing Government, and had received +instructions, which had invariably been carried out with singular skill +and intelligence. But the responsibility had not been his, and as +Foreign Secretary the initiative as well as the responsibility which +would have rested upon him might have imposed too formidable a strain +upon one of so cautious a temperament. Taking into consideration these +doubts, his advanced age, failing health, and the effect of depression +caused by the recent death of his much loved sister, the Dowager Duchess +of Norfolk, the refusal of the Foreign Office by Lord Lyons was only an +additional instance of that robust common sense which was one of his +most pronounced characteristics. Lord Rosebery, at all events, thought +that he had decided wisely. + + * * * * * + + _Lord Rosebery to Lord Lyons._ + + Dalmeny, Aug. 10, 1886. + + As my Foreign Office episode is at an end, I write a line of + good-bye, not as a Minister, but on the footing of what I hope I + may call friendship. + + My six months' experience has led me to the conviction that + our relations with France are really more troublesome than with + any other Power. She is always wanting something of us which it is + impossible to give her, and she then says plaintively, 'You never + do anything for me.' She is quite oblivious of the fact that she + never loses the opportunity of playing us a trick. Witness the + secret expedition to the New Hebrides. Nothing would have induced + me to go on with any one of the negotiations with Waddington until + they had removed their troops from those islands. Whenever he asked + for an answer about anything, I always turned the conversation + round to that interesting spot. + + With this conviction, therefore, it has been a great comfort + to feel that you were at Paris. + + I am not surprised that you did not care about my succession! + It is a weary post. + + * * * * * + + _Lord Lyons to Lord Rosebery._ + + Heron's Ghyll, Uckfield, Aug. 17, 1886. + + Your friendly letter has followed me here and has much + gratified me. + + I think you must look back with great satisfaction to your + time at the Foreign Office. You have certainly won golden opinions + from your subordinates and from the world at large, which is + perhaps a less competent judge. My own official intercourse with + you was certainly both very pleasant to me and very satisfactory. + + I attribute the difficulties with France more to the + inevitable consequences of our coming into contact with the French + in all parts of the world, than to any ill-will on either side, + although I do not pretend to say that the state of feeling is what + I could wish it to be. + + Independently of any other considerations, I felt altogether + too old to undertake the Foreign Office. I was so convinced of + this, that I regarded it as what the French call an objection + _préjudicielle_ to entertaining the question at all. + +The post which Lord Lyons had declined was accepted by Lord Iddesleigh, +who had just been removed from the House of Commons, and, as was only +natural, it is evident that he was in the habit of consulting Lord +Salisbury before taking any step of importance. In October, 1886, with +the concurrence of Lord Salisbury, Lord Lyons was instructed to approach +the French Government on the question of Egypt, and to explain the +conditions under which it would be possible to terminate the British +military occupation. There seems to be absolutely no doubt that Her +Majesty's Government were perfectly sincere and honestly desirous of +carrying out the promises that had been made at various times, and as +subsequent history showed, it was the misguided opposition of France and +Russia which was as much responsible as anything else for the permanent +British occupation of Egypt. + + * * * * * + + _Lord Lyons to Lord Iddesleigh._ + + Paris, Oct. 22, 1886. + + In my previous letter of to-day I have told you what M. de + Freycinet said to me about the Suez Canal Convention. I had a long + interview with him, but though I gave him plenty of opportunities, + he did not say one other word about Egypt. This being the case, + I thought it prudent to abstain, at all events at this first + interview, from saying anything on my side. So far then I have not + made known to him any part of the contents of your letter to Lord + Salisbury of the 18th or of his telegraphic answer. + + The fact is, that from what I have made out since I came back + here, I am led to think that the French Government have now good + reason to doubt whether they would get Bismarck's support if they + raised the Egyptian question with a view to embarrass us. This + being the case, they are very much hesitating to do so, and are + on the look-out for signs of our impressions on the subject, and + would interpret any appearance of unusual anxiety on our part, or + any fresh offers of concessions from us, simply as indications + that we still thought Germany might join against us. If the French + Government are not pretty sure of help and sympathy from abroad, + they will probably not stir in the matter. + + In the meantime, however, the press has been strongly excited, + probably by d'Aunay and Charmes. There is a very nasty article, + principally about the financial part of the Egyptian question, in + the _Débuts_ this morning. + + I shall perhaps be able to see my way more clearly in a day or + two. In the meantime I am disposed to think the most prudent plan + will be to be reserved and firm about Egypt, but not to display + anxiety on the subject. + +The idea of Lord Salisbury, speaking generally, was that a somewhat +distant date of evacuation should be foreshadowed; that if evacuation, +as was fully intended, should be carried out, some return should be +expected for the expenditure of British blood and treasure, and that +the Suez Canal difficulty should be settled without further delay. He +considered that the negotiations should be carried on with the Porte +(Sir Henry Drummond Wolff had already been despatched on this mission), +and that confidential communications should be made to France and +Germany. + + * * * * * + + _Lord Lyons to Lord Iddesleigh._ + + Paris, Oct. 26, 1886. + + I shall be very anxious to know what line Waddington took on + his return to his post, and particularly what, if anything, he said + about Egypt. + + Freycinet is the man chiefly responsible for the refusal of + France to join in our expedition to Egypt, and this no doubt makes + him very anxious to gain for himself the credit of some striking + success in getting England out of that country. So far as I can + make out here, the attempts that have been made to get the Powers + to unite in calling for a general Conference upon Egyptian affairs + have not met with much success. If Bismarck decidedly opposes + attempts of this kind, they will no doubt be abandoned. The Press + continue to urge strong measures against our continuing in Egypt, + and is not measured in its language. + + The autumn session is often fatal to French Ministers. I + recollect Gambetta's saying to me not long before his own fall: + '_En automne les feuilles tombent et les porte-feuilles aussi._' + +It is more than likely that the instructions which M. Waddington +received about this period were of a disagreeable nature. A well-known +French Ambassador once remarked to me some years later, that the London +Embassy was no very desirable post from the French diplomatist's point +of view. 'We are sent there with the mission of getting the English out +of Egypt, and the thing cannot be done!' + + * * * * * + + _Lord Lyons to Lord Iddesleigh._ + + Paris, Nov. 23, 1886. + + Freycinet's aim seems to be to improve his own position in + the Chambers and in the country by obtaining our withdrawal from + Egypt, and of course the object cannot be attained unless he can + make it appear that the withdrawal is his doing. Hence his strong + desire that we should negotiate with him and his dislike to our + negotiating with Turkey or any other Power. + + The crushing defeat of the Right in the elections in the + Department of the Nord is another proof of their blindness in + misusing the chance they had after the general election. They might + possibly have led gradually up to a restoration by giving strength + to Conservative principles and measures. They could only discredit + themselves by joining the extreme Radicals and attempting to + produce mischief and confusion. + + The Germans are either very dilatory, or they have some + _arrière pensée_ about the Zanzibar affair. Yesterday afternoon + Münster was still without any instructions to make the joint + invitation to the French. + + * * * * * + + _Lord Lyons to Lord Iddesleigh._ + + Paris, Dec. 3, 1886. + + You will see by my despatch that Freycinet has again attacked + me about Egypt. He wants the negotiation to go through him, and + if possible to be made with him, independently of the Turks, or + at least virtually in conjunction with us. I have not yet seen + any symptoms of his being anxious really to help us in Egyptian + matters; and I am not generally favourable to carrying on parallel + negotiations, or the same negotiation in different places. The + danger of informal conversations between Freycinet and me is that, + however cautious I may be, he may somehow or other find occasion + to quote me, as being more _coulant_ than you. At any rate, if I + had to talk to him it would be very necessary for you to tell me + very exactly how far I could go: and above all, that I should be + guarded from holding any language which might by any possibility be + embarrassing to the line circumstances might make it advisable for + Her Majesty's Government to take in Parliament afterwards. + + I was long enough at Constantinople to see that no dependence + whatever was to be placed upon what the Porte told an Ambassador + about his colleagues. Still I cannot say that the Turkish + revelation about the communications the Porte affects to receive + from the French and Russian Ambassadors about Egypt and about us, + are, in the face of them, improbable. At any rate, our views must + be much nearer than those we now have to the French ideas, before + we shall get any real help from France at the Porte. + + I write, as you know, in ignorance of Wolff's opinion, as he + did not stop here on his way home. + + Freycinet's defeat in the Chamber this afternoon is serious + because it followed a strong speech from himself against the + _Sous-Préfet_ abolition, but he has wonderful skill in patching + things up. + +Freycinet in December was defeated by one of those combinations of +Royalist and Radicals which were not uncommon in French politics, and +although the absurdity of the situation was obvious to every one, +insisted on placing his resignation and that of the Cabinet in President +Grévy's hands. A change of Government was so useless that even those +who had combined to overthrow Freycinet endeavoured to persuade him +to reconsider his determination. He remained obdurate, however, and +the President, casting about for a successor, pitched at first upon M. +Floquet, a strong Radical who was particularly obnoxious to the Russian +Government. + + * * * * * + + _Lord Lyons to Lord Iddesleigh._ + + Paris, Dec. 7, 1886. + + The chances seem to be in favour of Floquet being Prime + Minister. He is of the section of the Chamber called 'Gauche + radical,' that is to say, he falls just short of the most extreme + Left. Who would be his Minister for Foreign Affairs and what would + be his foreign policy I do not pretend to say. The incident in + his life most talked about is his having cried out, '_Vive la + Pologne!_' and used some expressions taken as disrespectful to + the late Emperor of Russia, when His Majesty was at the Palais de + Justice, on his visit to Paris during the Exhibition of 1867. The + Russian Ambassadors have, I believe, declined or avoided exchanging + courtesies with him when he has since been in situations, such + as that of _Préfet de la Seine_, and President of the Chamber of + Deputies, which have brought him into communication with the rest + of the diplomatic body. Russia at this moment is paying so much + court to France that she might perhaps get over this. + + The Left of the Chamber have hitherto been opposed to the + Tonquin and Madagascar Expeditions and to an adventurous and + Chauvin policy altogether; but if in power they would probably go + in for pleasing the Chamber and the bulk of the people out of doors + even more unreservedly than Freycinet did. + + I should have regretted Freycinet's fall more, if he had + not taken up the Egyptian question in the way he did. Our + communications with him on that subject were becoming very + uncomfortable. I am not very sanguine, however, about their being + more satisfactory with his successor. + +The notion, however, of having M. Floquet as Prime Minister frightened +every one except the extreme Radicals so much that that gentleman was +unable to form an administration, and the choice of the President +ultimately fell upon a M. Goblet, who was Radical enough for most people +and not much hampered by pledges and declarations. The office of Foreign +Minister remained vacant, but, much to the relief of Lord Lyons, it was +definitely refused by M. Duclerc. Lord Lyons had, by this time, had no +less than twenty-one different French Foreign Ministers to deal with, +and of these Duclerc was the one he liked least. No suitable person +seemed to be available, and it was in vain that, one after the other +French diplomatists were solicited to accept the office. At length a +Foreign Minister was found in M. Flourens, a brother of the well-known +Communist who was killed in 1871. M. Flourens was completely ignorant of +everything concerning foreign affairs, and his appointment was perhaps +an unconscious tribute to the English practice of putting civilians at +the head of our naval and military administrations. + + * * * * * + + _Lord Lyons to Lord Iddesleigh._ + + Paris, Dec. 21, 1886. + + I have not yet had the means of improving my acquaintance + with Flourens, but I expect to have some conversation with him + to-morrow. He had not a word to say about Bulgaria when I saw him + on Friday. He did not seem to have known anything about foreign + affairs before he took office, nor to expect to stay long enough in + office to become acquainted with them. Some people suppose that he + is to make way for the return of Freycinet as soon as the Budget is + passed. Anyway, the Goblet Ministry is only the Freycinet Ministry + over again without the strongest man, who was undoubtedly Freycinet + himself. When Parliament meets, things will be just as they were. + There will still be in the Chamber 180 Deputies on the Right, + ready to vote any way in order to make mischief and discredit the + Republic; about 100 Deputies on the extreme Left, intimidating the + Government and forcing it into extreme Radical measures, they being + able to count in all emergencies upon getting the vote of the Right + to turn out a Ministry; and lastly there will be 300 remaining + deputies, who cannot agree enough amongst themselves to form a + majority that can be relied upon, who do not at all like violent + radical measures, but who are too nervously afraid of unpopularity + to show resolution in opposing the extreme Left. + + So far the Comte de Paris's declaration seems simply to have + made the ultra-Monarchists furiously angry, and not to have induced + any great part of the Right to think of taking the wise course it + recommends. + + I do not see any outward signs here of the strained relations + between France and Germany and the imminent war between the two + countries which the _Standard_ announces. But it is true that among + the French themselves some suspicion and distrust of Boulanger's + aims are becoming more apparent. + +The hackneyed saying: _Plus cela change, plus c'est la même chose_, was +never more appropriate than in the case of the change from a Freycinet +to a Goblet Government; one section of uninspiring ministers had merely +given place to another, and no one in France seemed in any way the +better for it. + +On New Year's Dav, 1887, President Grévy broke out into Latin in +congratulating the Diplomatic Corps on the already long continuance +of peace, but a more accurate view of the situation was expressed by +a French newspaper in the sentence: 'Jamais année nouvelle ne s'est +ouverte au milieu d'autant de promesses de paix et de préparatifs de +guerre que l'année 1887.' 'I do not know,' wrote Lord Lyons, 'which is +the nation which wishes for war. France certainly does not, she is, on +the contrary, very much afraid of it. But one would feel more confidence +in peace if there appeared less necessity in all countries to be +perpetually giving pacific assurances. There are rumours of a defensive +alliance between Russia and France. The bond of union between the two +countries, if it exists, must be simply a common hatred of Germany.' + +At the beginning of the year 1887, the Germans professed to be in +dread of an attack from France, while the French complained that they +were threatened by Germany. In France it was believed that in August, +1886, preparations had been actually made to mobilize the German army, +and the language held by Boulanger was to the effect that the military +power of France would be found to be very different to what it was in +1870. Meanwhile an unsuccessful attempt had been made by those two old +Parliamentary hands, Freycinet and Ferry, to get rid of Boulanger, who +was now becoming to be considered as equally dangerous both in France +and Germany. + +It was probably the apprehension caused by the presence of this +adventurer, whose incapacity was as yet imperfectly realized, that was +responsible for the state of tension and alarm which prevailed in France +during January and February, 1887. + + * * * * * + + _Lord Lyons to Lord Salisbury._[44] + + Paris, Jan. 18, 1887. + + I saw M. Grévy this morning, and found him, as it seemed to + me, really alarmed at the possibility of France being attacked + by Germany. The only overt act he spoke of, on the part of + Germany, was the increase of the strength of the German garrisons + in the neighbourhood of the French frontier. Grévy himself is + most peaceful, and quite sincerely so. His natural character and + temperament, and his interest too, tend that way. He would hardly + be able to hold his own as President in case of war, and there is + very little chance of France going to war as long as he is the head + of the State. Flourens also spoke to me of danger to France and + Germany when I saw him this afternoon. + + I think the alarm of Grévy and Flourens was sincere, though I + do not share it myself at this moment. + + In France there is no desire to go to war, and I doubt whether + she is able, or at all events fancies herself able, to cope with + Germany. + + It is perhaps more difficult to keep her on good terms + with us. Egypt is a sore which will not heal. There was a nasty + discussion about Newfoundland Fisheries in the Senate yesterday. I + send you a full report officially. Happily, so far, it has not had + much echo in the public. + +Alarm with respect to Germany continued to grow, and was fed by private +communications from Bismarck, who sent by unofficial agents messages +to the effect that 'he was all for peace, but that it was impossible +for him to stand the way that France was going on.' These messages came +through Bleichröder and members of the _haute finance_ in Paris, who +expressed the opinion that if Boulanger remained in office, war with +Germany was certain. The _haute finance_ is by no means invariably +correct in its political judgment, but it seems highly probable that the +war scares prevalent in 1887 were promulgated with the object of getting +rid of the troublesome firebrand upon whom so much public attention was +concentrated. The position of Boulanger, however, was a strong one, and +to dislodge him was a work of no slight difficulty. Ever since the day +when he had been taken into Freycinet's Cabinet he had contrived by +adroit advertising to keep himself before the public, and to distinguish +himself from his colleagues as exercising a separate and commanding +influence in the Chambers and with the public. In the army he had +managed to make himself feared by the higher officers and assiduously +courted popularity with the rank and file. In the political world he +had at first been regarded as being ultra democratic, but now excited +suspicion by paying court to the Conservatives, and by endeavouring, not +entirely without success, to obtain their good will. + +On the whole, there was a very general impression that he was ambitious, +self-seeking, and thoroughly unscrupulous; but there were few means of +forming an opinion as to what his special plans really were, if indeed +he had formed any. Still he successfully flattered the belief of the +French that they were fast emerging from the eclipse in which their +military power and reputation were involved in 1870, and there were +not wanting those who asserted that he was inclined to seek a war, in +the hope of conducting it with success, and so establishing himself as +a military dictator. Others, influenced by their wishes, indulged in +the hope that he might be meditating a Monarchist restoration under an +Orleanist or Bonapartist Dynasty. Unsubstantial and improbable as these +suppositions may have been, it was plain that in the army and among the +public at large there prevailed a vague notion that he might be the man +of the future, a notion fostered by the absence of any one recognized in +France as possessing conspicuous and commanding abilities, and by the +craving for a real personality after a long succession of second-class +politicians. + +The embarrassment with regard to Germany created by the presence of +so disturbing an element in the Government as Boulanger did not, +contrary to what might have been expected, tend to improve Anglo-French +relations, and a letter from Lord Salisbury expresses in forcible +terms his dissatisfaction at difficulties which seemed to have been +gratuitously created. + + * * * * * + + _Lord Salisbury to Lord Lyons._ + + Feb. 5, 1887. + + The French are inexplicable. One would have thought that under + existing circumstances it was not necessary to _make_ enemies--that + there were enough provided for France by nature just now. But + she seems bent upon aggravating the patient beast of burden that + lives here by every insult and worry her ingenuity can devise. In + Newfoundland she has issued orders which, if faithfully executed, + must bring the French and English fleets into collision. At the + New Hebrides, in spite of repeated promises, she will not stir. In + Egypt she baulks a philanthropic change out of pure 'cussedness.' + In Morocco she is engaged in appropriating the territory by + instalments, threatening to reach Tangier at no distant date. And + now, just as we are entering on pacific negotiations, the French + Government sent orders to do precisely that which, a month ago, + Waddington promised they should not do, namely run up the French + flag at Dongorita.[45] It is very difficult to prevent oneself + from wishing for another Franco-German war to put a stop to this + incessant vexation. + + We have protested earnestly about Dongorita, which has more + the air of a studied insult than any of the others. As to the + Newfoundland Fisheries, if they execute their threats, they render + the passage of a Bait Bill next year a matter of certainty. We + have strained the good will of the colonists very far in refusing + to allow it this year. The other matters will, I suppose, be the + subject of slow negotiations. + + D'Herbette has made at Berlin more practical suggestions as to + naming a date for the annexation of Egypt than we have yet had from + the French Government. I hope the large majorities will persuade + the French that the national feeling is in this instance not in + favour of scuttle. + +All that Lord Lyons, who was always most anxious to make the best case +he could for the French, was able to say in their defence, was that he +hoped that it was an exceptionally dark moment, and that there must be a +change shortly for the better. + + * * * * * + + _Lord Lyons to Lord Salisbury._ + + Paris, Feb. 18, 1887. + + The French seem to be more confident of peace and altogether + in better spirits than they were a few days ago, but I do not know + that they have any positive facts or distinct information to go + upon. The hopes of a certain number of them rest upon the belief + that the Goblet Ministry is likely to be upset as soon as the + Budget is finally disposed of, and that thus Boulanger will be got + rid of. + + The newspaper accounts of Wolff's mission to Constantinople + have brought Egypt on the tapis again, and as anxiety about + Germany falls into the background, irritation against England + comes prominently forward. There are, however, some symptoms of + a return among wiser men to more prudent and reasonable views + respecting the relations of France towards England. These men are + alarmed especially respecting the hostility towards France which is + apparent in Italy, and they see the folly of making enemies on all + sides. If there should be a new Ministry it might possibly pursue + a policy more friendly towards England with regard to Egypt and + other matters. The Egyptian question would no doubt become less + difficult if a change should remove M. Charmes from the Foreign + Office and put into his place, as Political Director there, a man + less prejudiced about Egypt. + + In the meantime much amusement has been caused by an escapade + of Madame Flourens. On Saturday last she called upon Countess Marie + Münster, and found with her Count Hoyos, the Austrian Ambassador. + Madame Flourens announced loudly that her husband had resigned + the Foreign Office, because Boulanger had attempted, without his + knowledge, to send a letter direct to the Emperor of Russia by the + French Military Attaché, who was to start for St. Petersburg. + Hoyos fetched Münster himself out of an adjoining room, to hear the + story. Madame Flourens, it appeared, supposed that Flourens was on + the point of announcing his resignation to the Chamber of Deputies. + It turned out, however, that Flourens had made a scene with + Boulanger at the Council of Ministers, had gone away in a huff, + but had been subsequently calmed by M. Grévy and M. Goblet; no + letter to the Emperor had been sent, and the resignation had been + withdrawn. The story had of course spread all over the town. In + defiance of truth, a _communiqué_ contradicting it was inserted in + the _Agence Havas_, with no other effect than that of discrediting + the _communiqués_ which the Government is apt to put into the Havas. + +There is so little mention of women in Lord Lyons's correspondence that +Madame Flourens's indiscretion comes as a welcome relief, although in +all probability it got the unfortunate Count Münster into trouble with +Bismarck, and afforded an excuse for fresh bullying. Count Münster, +who had been for many years Ambassador in London, where he had been +extremely popular, found the transfer to Paris singularly unpleasant, +more especially as in order to make things thoroughly uncomfortable for +him, Bismarck had provided an entirely new Embassy Staff. + + * * * * * + + _Lord Salisbury to Lord Lyons._ + + Feb. 19, 1887. + + * * * * * + + We are thinking of renewing our negotiations with respect to + the Suez Canal in a serious spirit. But before we sign anything we + shall want some satisfaction about Dongorita and the New Hebrides, + and possibly about the Corvée. + + I think it was very shabby of the French to open the Dongorita + affair upon us, just after we had made so material a concession + upon the subject of the bait in Newfoundland. + + Waddington is gloomy and rather ill-tempered--either from the + fogs or the crisis. I have not had any further talk with him about + Egypt lately. I think he avoids the subject. Wolff tells me that + the French Chargé d'Affaires at Constantinople is a mere creature + of Nelidoff's. Our negotiations are dragging on with little + prospect of success. We are willing to fix a distant date for our + leaving, if we receive a treaty power to go back whenever internal + or external security are threatened. The tone in which both France + and Turkey have received this proposal may be best expressed by the + colloquial phrase 'Damn their impudence!' I do not expect to carry + what I want at present, but before modifying these terms, I should + like to know what is going to happen in Europe. + +Sir Henry Drummond Wolff was at this time at Constantinople endeavouring +to negotiate the Convention with regard to the evacuation of Egypt, +and the French and Russian Embassies were actively engaged in the +senseless opposition which eventually prevented the ratification of the +Convention. The above letter from Lord Salisbury is an additional proof +of the honest desire of the British Government to carry out the rash +undertakings which had been given in the past. + + * * * * * + + _Lord Lyons to Lord Salisbury._ + + Paris, Feb. 25, 1887. + + The general feeling here seems to be that war has been + escaped, but still there is a good deal of discontent against the + foreign policy of the Goblet Cabinet. It seems to be considered + that the understanding between Italy, Austria, and Germany is as + good as made, and that the result of it will be to put an end to + any fear of war between Russia and Austria. On the other hand, it + is thought that Russia will feel it too necessary to watch Germany + for it to be prudent of her to make an alliance with France, while + without the alliance of Russia, France of course cannot face + Germany, particularly as she has almost hostility to expect from + Italy and no great sympathy to look for from England. The policy + which has thus isolated France from the other Powers is seen to + have been a mistake, and there seems to be a disposition to throw + the blame on the Goblet Ministry. If the Goblet Ministry should + fall, it is not improbable that the new Government might take + the line of being conciliatory to the neighbouring countries and + to Italy and England in particular. I am not very sanguine about + this, but if in the meantime no irritating questions come to excite + public opinion against us, there may possibly be a chance that + a change of Ministry here would make our relations with France + smoother. + + My hopes that a change towards England may be in contemplation + have perhaps been strengthened by a visit which I have just had + from a person wholly unconnected with the French Ministry who + evidently came to ascertain what were the particular points with + regard to which the relations between France and England might be + improved. I said that instead of thwarting us in our endeavours + to improve the condition of Egypt and put it in a state to stand + alone, the French might help us; and they could not expect + comfortable relations with us if they endeavoured to stir up other + Powers to make difficulties with us about Egypt. I mentioned also + the New Hebrides question, which most certainly ought and might + be settled at once. I alluded also to those various matters all + over the world which might be treated in a cordial and not in an + antagonistic spirit. + + P.S.--I have strong reasons for thinking it very important + that Waddington should not have the least inkling of my having had + the above interview, or any communication of the kind. + + * * * * * + + _Lord Salisbury to Lord Lyons._ + + Feb. 26, 1887. + + I will not mention to Waddington the interview which you have + had as to English grounds of complaint. I have not seen him for ten + days: he must have taken huff at something. + + I think, as the French are coming to their senses, it might be + well to mention unofficially to Flourens that I am quite ready to + resume the negotiations about the Suez Canal; and that I have good + hope of bringing it to a successful issue, but that I am hindered + by the flag that is floating at Dongorita, and by the delay of the + French in performing their promises as regards the New Hebrides. We + are being a good deal reproached here, on account of our apparent + submission to this breach of faith. If these two matters are + corrected, I shall find it possible, and shall be very glad to + renew the Suez Canal discussion either at Paris or here. + + I have seen Karolyi to-day--an unusual occurrence--and for the + first time have had the admission from him that a war with Russia + was not an impossible contingency. + + The Russians are very quiet; and the negotiations about + Bulgaria do not really advance a bit. + +M. Flourens, in spite of his complete inexperience, seems to have +realized the simple fact that it was not advisable to quarrel with +England just at the moment when relations with Germany were in a +critical condition; but unhappily the public did not appear to be in +an accommodating mood. The statements published in the English press +respecting the Drummond Wolff mission had caused great irritation, +and what was perhaps more serious, had alarmed the French again +about the security of the coupons. As long as they felt sure that +the coupons would be paid regularly, and that there was no fear of +future reduction, they were reasonably patient, unless some specially +severe blow, such as a reduction of the numbers and salaries of French +officials, as compared with English, was struck at their _amour propre_. +Now, however, they were beset with the fear that, under what they +considered to be English mismanagement, they were about to lose their +money as well as their influence. + +In March the Goblet Ministry was already in difficulties, and it was +believed that Freycinet was likely to return to power, although what the +precise advantages were of these continual changes, no one was capable +of explaining. + + * * * * * + + _Lord Lyons to Lord Salisbury._ + + March 8, 1887. + + By taking credit to himself at the expense of his + predecessors, in the interpellation yesterday, Goblet has stirred + up the bile of a large party in the Chamber, and the determination + to turn his Cabinet out, if possible, has revived with fresh + vigour. It is supposed that the attempts will be made as soon as + the Corn Duties Bill is disposed of. It seems to be thought that, + if it succeeds, Freycinet must be Prime Minister; but there appears + to be a strong feeling against his having the Foreign Office again. + He is thought to have got France into uncomfortable relations with + many of his neighbours. In the treatment of the Egyptian question + he is believed to have sacrificed cordiality with England to a + desire to regain the popularity he had lost by the policy which + led to England's occupying her present position in Egypt; while + his attempt to get up an opposition to England on the part of the + European Powers and his worrying way of dealing himself with the + British Government about Egypt, are thought simply to have excited + public opinion on both sides of the Channel and to have provoked + ill will, without in the least improving the position of France. + There can be no doubt that Freycinet looked upon a success with + regard to Egypt as a personal necessity for himself, and was much + influenced in his policy towards England by this feeling. + + It is apprehended that unless the _prestige_ of Boulanger is + put on high again by strong language from Germany, there will be no + difficulty in obtaining, as a matter of course, his fall, with the + rest of the Cabinet of which he is a part. M. Grévy is believed to + be very anxious to be rid of him. + + I hear on good authority that the Russians have been trying + again, though without success, to come to a special understanding + with the French Government. + +To say that M. Grévy was very anxious to be rid of Boulanger was +probably an understatement, for he could not conceivably have desired +anything so ardently. But the 'Music Hall St. Arnaud' was by no means +at the end of his tether, and had contrived to advertise himself by +egregious conduct with regard to the Army Committee of the Chamber +of Deputies. That Committee had drawn up a military Bill, based upon +three years' service, and Boulanger, on the pretext that it was 'not +sufficiently faithful to democratic principles,' had, without consulting +any of his colleagues, written a letter condemning the provisions of +the bill and proposing something quite different. This letter was +thoughtfully communicated to the press before it reached the Committee, +and the outraged members of the Committee as well as his colleagues +were at last goaded into resistance. The Chamber condemned the attitude +of the General towards the sacrosanct representatives of the nation; +the General himself beat a hasty and prudent retreat under cover of an +apology; the Moderate Republicans denounced him as a would-be dictator, +and the Ultra-Radicals accused him of cowardice in consequence of his +apology. Most men under the circumstances would have felt disposed to +resign office, but in the case of Boulanger it was probably immaterial +to him whether he was blamed or praised, so long as he could keep his +name before the public. + +It was, and probably is still, a regulation in the British Diplomatic +Service, that its members should retire at the age of seventy, and, as +a rule, an Ambassador who had attained that age, usually considered +himself fit to discharge his duties for a further period. Lord Lyons, +however, was an exception. His seventieth birthday fell due in April, +and a month beforehand he wrote to announce that he wished to resign. + + * * * * * + + _Lord Lyons to Lord Salisbury._ + + Paris, March 22, 1887. + + Towards the end of the next month, the time will come when + I shall be superannuated, and I feel very strongly that it will + not come too soon. It will not be without a pang that I shall + find myself no longer a diplomatic servant of the Queen, who has + ever received my endeavours to obtain her approval with the most + generous indulgence. But the labour and responsibility of this post + are becoming too much for me, and I shall be anxious to be relieved + from them when the time fixed by the regulations arrives. + + I need not assure you that I shall much regret the termination + of the official connexion with you from which I have derived so + much satisfaction. + +It may not unfairly be presumed that resignations of important official +posts are habitually welcomed by Governments, as they not only remedy +stagnation in the public service, but frequently provide opportunities +for political patronage. It is plain, however, that the prospect of +losing Lord Lyons was looked upon by Lord Salisbury as a genuine +misfortune, and he did his best to induce him to reconsider his decision. + + * * * * * + + _Lord Salisbury to Lord Lyons._ + + March 26, 1887. + + I have considered your letter of the 22nd, stating that you + felt very strongly that the time of your superannuation would not + come too soon; and though it was a matter of very deep regret to me + to receive such an announcement from you, it was not altogether a + matter of surprise; for I remembered the language you had used to + me when I tried to induce you to join us as Foreign Secretary last + July. + + The loss which the Diplomatic Service will suffer by your + retirement will be profound, and, for the time, hardly possible to + repair. Your presence at Paris gave to the public mind a sense of + security which was the result of a long experience of your powers, + and which no one else is in a position to inspire. + + In face of the expressions in your letter I feel as if I were + almost presuming in suggesting any alternative course of action. + But it struck me that possibly you might be willing to make your + official career terminate with the end of your current appointment, + rather than with the precise date of superannuation. The effect of + this would be to prolong your stay at Paris till next December. + + My reasons from a public point of view will, I hope, strike + you at once. We are passing through a very anxious European crisis. + If any fateful decisions are taken this year, it will be within the + next three or four months. It will add very much to our anxiety to + know that the reins at Paris are in new hands, which have never + held them before. This mere fact may even be an element of danger. + The avalanche hangs so loosely, that any additional sensation or + uneasiness may displace it. If we could avoid a change till the + winter it would be a great public advantage, even if the change + should be inevitable. + + I hope you will forgive me for having pressed this on you in + the interests of the public service. Whatever your decision may be, + I give you the warmest thanks for the kind and loyal support which + you have always given to the policy which it has been my duty to + carry out. + +An appeal of this kind from an official chief could not well be +disregarded, setting aside the fact that but few officials can have +experienced the compliment of being assured that their continued service +was essential to the peace of Europe. With well justified misgivings, +Lord Lyons therefore consented to remain on until the end of the year, +knowing perfectly well that his physical energies were on the point of +exhaustion. + + * * * * * + + _Lord Lyons to Lord Salisbury._ + + Paris, March 29, 1887. + + I am deeply touched by your letter of the 26th, and I feel + that, after what you say in it, I should be extremely ungrateful if + I were not ready to sacrifice a great deal to meet your views. + + For my own part I feel that the work and responsibility here + are an increasing strain both upon my mind and upon my bodily + health, and I am beset with misgivings lest, even in ordinary + times, I may be unable to discharge my duties with energy and + efficiency, and lest, in an emergency calling for much labour, + I may break down altogether. This being the case, it would + undoubtedly be a great relief and comfort to me to retire on + becoming superannuated towards the end of next month. + + Begging you to take the misgivings into full consideration, + and to be sure that they have not been conceived without good + reason, and that they are strongly and very seriously felt by + me, I place myself in your hands. If after giving full weight to + them, you still think that it would be a satisfaction to you that + I should continue to hold this post till the winter, and that it + would be a great public advantage to avoid a change till that time, + I am ready to stay on, and trusting to your indulgence to do my + best. + + I should, of course, look upon it as quite settled that in any + case I should retire at latest when my current appointment comes to + an end at the close of the present year. + + If you wish me to hold on, I must ask you what, if any, + announcement respecting my retirement should be made. Up to this + time I have simply stated to people who have questioned me, + that nothing was definitely settled. I did not mention to any + one my intention to write my letter of the 22nd expressing to + you my wish to retire, nor have I made any one acquainted with + my having written it, except of course Sheffield, who, as my + private secretary, made a copy of it for me to keep. The question, + therefore, as to announcing my retirement remains intact. + + I cannot conclude without once more saying how much I am + gratified by the appreciation of my services expressed in your + letter, and how truly I feel the kindness shown by it. + +The offer was accepted by Lord Salisbury in singularly flattering terms, +Queen Victoria also expressing much satisfaction at the consent of the +Ambassador to remain at his post. From Lord Salisbury's language, it +might be inferred that he was in some doubt as to whether his own tenure +of office was likely to be prolonged. + + I have had no hesitation in availing myself of your kind + consent--though you seemed to doubt whether on reflection I should + do so. Of course I fully understand that you do not feel equal to + the amount of exertion which you would take in a more favourable + condition of health. But this circumstance will not detract + from the great value of your counsel and judgment, nor from the + authority which by so many years of experience you have acquired. + + I quite understand that towards the close of the session of + Parliament you will require the holiday you have been accustomed + to take in recent years. I hope also to get to a bath at that + time--whether I am in office or not. + +Why Lord Salisbury should have spoken so doubtfully is not clear, unless +instinct warned him of Miss Cass, who was the first to strike a blow +at the Unionist administration. At the end of March there reappeared +the mysterious emissary who has been already mentioned. There are no +means of actually establishing his identity, but there can be little +doubt that it was M. de Chaudordy, who represented the French Foreign +Office at Tours and Bordeaux during the war. M. de Chaudordy had made +friends with Lord Salisbury at the time of the Constantinople Conference +in 1876, and he was, therefore, a suitable person to utilize for the +purpose of making advances towards a better understanding between the +two Governments. + + * * * * * + + _Lord Lyons to Lord Salisbury._ + + Paris, March 29, 1887. + + In a private letter which I wrote to you on the 25th of last + month, I mentioned that I had received a visit from a person wholly + unconnected officially with the French Government, who appeared to + have come to ascertain what were the particular points with regard + to which the relations between the English and French Governments + might be improved. The same person has been to me again to-day, + and has only just left me. This time he did not conceal that it + was after being in communication with Flourens that he came. He + enlarged on the embarrassing and indeed dangerous position in which + France was placed by the adherence of Italy to the Austro-German + Alliance, and said that M. Flourens was ready to make almost any + sacrifice to secure the good will of England. I said that there + could be no great difficulty in this, if only France would abstain + from irritating opposition to us, and would settle promptly and + satisfactorily outstanding questions. My visitor answered that + Flourens conceived that he had sent conciliatory instructions + to Waddington which would settle these questions, and that both + Waddington and Florian[46] (who had come on leave) reported that + there was decidedly a _détente_ in the strain which had existed in + the Anglo-French relations. I said that I was delighted to hear it, + and that it showed how ready you were to welcome all conciliatory + overtures. My friend seemed on this occasion, as on the last, to + wish me to tell him some special thing which Flourens might do + to please you. I said that I should at any rate mention a thing + which he might do to avoid displeasing you. He might prevent the + French setting up an opposition to financial proposals in Egypt in + cases in which all the other Powers were ready to agree. My friend + spoke of Flourens's readiness to give to Russia on the Bulgarian + question advice which you might suggest, and he mentioned various + things which he thought M. Flourens might be ready to do to please + England. These things appeared to me to be rather too grand and + too vague in character to be very practical. I said, however, that + I would always bear in mind what he had told me of M. Flourens's + good dispositions, and would speak frankly and unreservedly to the + Minister whenever I could make a suggestion as to the means of + acting upon those dispositions in a manner to be satisfactory to + England. + + The conclusions I drew from the conversation of Flourens's + friend were that the French are horribly afraid of our being led + to join the Italo-Austro-German Alliance, and that they have been + urged by Russia to exert themselves to prevent this. I do not + conceive that the French expect to induce us to join them against + the Germans and the German Alliance. What they want is to feel sure + that we shall not join the others against France and Russia. + +It is somewhat curious that M. Flourens, who was evidently desirous +of establishing better relations with England, should have selected +an unofficial person for communication, rather than approach the +Ambassador himself; but perhaps, being quite ignorant of diplomatic +usage, he considered it necessary to shroud his action in mystery. +The Triple Alliance dated in reality from 1882, Italy having joined +the Austro-German Alliance in that year; but a new Treaty had been +signed in the month of February, 1887, and caused the French to feel a +well-justified alarm. In fact, their position was anything but a happy +one, for it was generally believed that the Emperor Alexander III. had +resolved, since the abortive attempt on his life, that he would never +ally himself with Revolutionists, and that he considered the French to +be arch-Revolutionists. Perhaps this belief may have accounted in some +measure for Flourens's amiable professions towards England. + +In the month of April there occurred one of those incidents which +are the despair of peaceably minded politicians and the delight of +sensational journalism and of adventurers of the Boulanger type. A +certain M. Schnaebelé, a French Commissaire de Police, was induced to +cross the German frontier, and thereupon was arrested and imprisoned. +The act had the appearance of provocation and naturally caused a +prodigious uproar in France; Flourens endeavouring to settle the +matter diplomatically and Boulanger seizing the opportunity to display +patriotic truculence. + + * * * * * + + _Lord Lyons to Lord Salisbury._ + + Paris, April 26, 1887. + + So far as one can judge at present the French are irritated + beyond measure by the arrest at Pagny, but generally they still + shrink from war. It will not, I conceive, be difficult for + Bismarck to keep at peace with them, if he really wishes to do so. + The danger is that they are persuaded that he is only looking out + for a pretext, and that however much they may now give way, he will + be bent upon humiliating them till they _must_ resent and resist. + I don't see that so far the German Government have treated the + Pagny affair as if they wished to make a quarrel of it. The German + _Chargé d'Affaires_ has taken many messages from Berlin to Flourens + in the sense that if Schnaebelé shall prove to have been arrested + on German soil, all satisfaction shall be given. But, then, in the + Press of the two countries a controversy is raging as to which side + of the frontier he was arrested on, and as to whether or no he was + inveigled over the frontier. + + The French undoubtedly shrink from war, but they do not + shrink from it as much as they did ten years ago; and if the press + should get up a loud popular cry, there is no Government strength + to resist it. I conceive that at this moment the Government is + pacific, and that it does not believe the army to be yet ready. + But if, as is no doubt the case, the Germans also believe that the + French army is not as ready now as it will be two or three years + hence, they may be impatient to begin. In the mean time, so far + as I can make out, the Pagny affair is being treated by the two + Governments with each other, in correct form diplomatically, and + without any apparent willingness to embitter matters. I cannot say + as much for the press on either side, though there are symptoms of + prudence and caution in the moderate French papers. + +The Schnaebelé incident was disposed of by his release from prison and +transfer to another post at Lyons; but the agitation did not subside +readily, and a bill brought in by Boulanger to mobilize an army corps +caused much disquietude at the German Embassy. It was now generally +known that Bismarck considered Boulanger a danger and desired his +removal from the War Office; but the very knowledge of this feeling and +the support accorded to him by the League of Patriots and other noisy +organizations rendered this step all the more difficult. + + * * * * * + + _Lord Lyons to Lord Salisbury._ + + Paris, May 13, 1887. + + I have not heard of any new incident between France and + Germany, but the suspicion and susceptibility with which the two + nations, and indeed the two Governments, regard each other, are + certainly not diminishing. + + In France home politics are in so peculiar a state as to be + positively disquieting. The Budget Committee and the Ministry have + come to an open breach, and the Committee intend to propose to + the Chamber a resolution which apparently must, if carried, turn + out the Goblet Cabinet. This the Chamber would be willing enough + to do, if it could see its way to forming another Government. The + plan would be to form a Ministry with Freycinet as Prime Minister, + but not as Minister for Foreign Affairs, and without Boulanger. + But then they are afraid to try and upset Boulanger, while they + feel that to form a new Government and put Boulanger in it would + be, or might be, taken in Germany as a plain indication that they + are warlike at heart. It is an emergency in which the Chief of + the State should exert himself; but Grévy's caution has become + something very like lethargy. In the mean time they are letting + Boulanger grow up into a personage whose position may be a danger + to the Republic at home, even if it does not embroil the country + in a foreign war. The redeeming point in all this is that the + Government does seem to feel that it would not do to be upon bad + terms with England, and that it would be wise to be conciliatory + toward us. + +The Goblet Ministry soon found itself in hopeless difficulty over +the Budget, and it was plain that another aimless change of men was +inevitable. Goblet's Government had lasted for five months (inclusive +of a prolonged recess), and the real question of interest was whether +Boulanger was to be a member of the new Government or not. If he was +included in it, it was apprehended that the suspicions of Germany would +be aggravated; and on the other hand, it was doubtful whether any +Government could be formed without him. An ultra-patriotic demonstration +in Paris against German music, in the shape of Wagner's operas, was +eloquent of the state of feeling between the two nations at the time, +and the Government found that the only course open to them was to close +the theatre where the obnoxious productions were to have appeared. + + * * * * * + + _Lord Lyons to Lord Salisbury._ + + Paris, May 20, 1887. + + Freycinet appears to have agreed with Grévy to try and form a + Cabinet and to be hard at work at the task. Of course the question + is whether Boulanger is or is not to be in the new Cabinet? It was + believed this morning that Grévy and Freycinet had decided upon + offering to keep him as Minister of War. As the day has gone on, + however, the belief has gained ground that Freycinet has not found + colleagues willing to run the risk of war which the maintenance + of Boulanger would produce, and that he is to propose to Grévy a + Cabinet from which Boulanger is to be excluded. He is, however, + to make it an essential condition with Grévy that he is to have + the power to dissolve the Chamber of Deputies in his hands, as + without this power he does not feel able to form a Cabinet without + Boulanger, or indeed any Cabinet at all. In the mean time the + Reds are getting up in all directions addresses and petitions in + favour of Boulanger, with a view to forcing Grévy's and Freycinet's + hands and working on their fears. If Boulanger is got rid of, the + immediate danger of war will probably be escaped for the moment. + Boulanger's own character, and the position in which he has placed + himself, make him threatening to peace; and the opinion held of him + in Germany and the irritation felt against him there make him still + more dangerous. + + * * * * * + + _Lord Lyons to Lord Salisbury._ + + Paris, May 24, 1887. + + The last news is supposed to be that Floquet, the President + of the Chamber, has undertaken the task of forming a Ministry, + and that he will keep many of the outgoing Ministers, Boulanger + included. The goings and comings at the Elysée; the singular + selections of men to be Prime Ministers, or quasi Prime Ministers, + and the apparent want of firmness and inability to exercise any + influence on the part of the President of the Republic, have + certainly not increased the reputation of M. Grévy. Floquet will, + I suppose, be unacceptable to Russia, for the Russians have always + ostentatiously kept up the show of resentment against him for the + cry, offensive to the Emperor Alexander II., which he raised when + that monarch visited the Palais de Justice during the Exhibition + of 1867. Boulanger has lately declared that he does not want to + continue to be Minister, but that if he is Minister, he will, + whatever Germany may say, continue his mobilization scheme, and not + relax in his preparations to resist an attack from Germany, and to + avert the necessity of submitting to humiliation. + + I think, in fact, that things look very bad for France both + at home and abroad. I can only hope that as the phases of the + Ministerial crisis change from hour to hour, you may receive by + telegraph some more satisfactory news before you get this letter. + +In course of time a new Ministry was formed under M. Rouvier, and the +important fact attaching to it was that Boulanger had been got rid of. +Otherwise there was nothing much to distinguish the new Ministers from +the old, and they seemed disposed to angle for popularity in the country +much in the same way as Freycinet and Goblet. + +The object of removing Boulanger had been to reassure and placate +Germany, but no sooner had this been done, than the Government appeared +to feel alarmed at the danger of incurring unpopularity in the country, +and hastily announced that the new Minister of War would continue to +follow in the footsteps of his predecessor. + +Again, it had been understood that one of the objects of the new +Government would be to put an end to the isolation of France by +placing itself on more cordial terms with the neighbouring nations +and especially with England; but what it appeared anxious to profess, +was the intention of stoutly refusing to accept or even acquiesce +in the Anglo-Turkish Convention respecting Egypt. All this, as Lord +Lyons observed, might proceed in great measure from ignorance and +inexperience, and might be mitigated by the knowledge of affairs and +sense of responsibility which accompany office, but still it was +disquieting: all the more disquieting, because the French Foreign +Minister never failed to intimate that France would never be a party to +an arrangement which would confer upon England an international right +to re-occupy Egypt under certain circumstances after evacuation, whilst +France was to be formally excluded from enjoying an equal right. + + * * * * * + + _Lord Lyons to Lord Salisbury._ + + Paris, July 12, 1887. + + Baron Alphonse de Rothschild came to see me this afternoon, + and told me that the last accounts he had received from Berlin + caused him to feel more than usual alarm as to the feelings of + Prince Bismarck and of the Germans in general towards France. They + did not indeed imply that Germany was actually contemplating any + immediate declaration of war, but they did show that in Germany + war with France was regarded as a contingency that could not be + long postponed, and of which the postponement was not desirable + for German interests. The Germans did not seem to be prepared to + incur the opprobrium of Europe by attacking France without having + the appearance of a good reason for doing so, but they did seem to + be looking out impatiently for a plausible pretext for a rupture; + far from being sorry, they would be very glad if France would + furnish them with such a pretext. Prince Bismarck was evidently + not disposed to facilitate the task of M. Rouvier's Government, + notwithstanding the pledges it had given of its desire for peace + abroad, and the efforts it was making to promote moderation at home. + + Baron de Rothschild had, he told me, seen M. Rouvier to-day + and made all this known to him. He had pointed out to him the + danger which arose from the sort of coalition against France of + the Powers of Europe, had dwelt on the importance of making almost + any sacrifice to break up this coalition, and had especially urged + the imprudence of allowing coldness, if not ill-will, to subsist + between France and England. + + M. Rouvier had expressed an anxious desire to establish + cordial relations with England. + + Baron de Rothschild had answered that the time had come + to show this by acts, and had strongly pressed M. Rouvier to + settle without any delay the outstanding questions which produced + irritation between the two countries. M. Rouvier had expressed his + intention to do so, and Baron de Rothschild had reason to believe + that this was also the desire and intention of M. Flourens. + + I said that I heard this with great pleasure, and that + I had received with much satisfaction assurances to the same + effect respecting M. Flourens's sentiments, which had come to me + indirectly through various channels. I must, however, confess that + I had not found in M. Flourens himself any disposition to push + assurance to this effect beyond generalities. I had not seen any + strong practical instances of a desire on his part to give a speedy + and satisfactory solution to outstanding questions. + + Baron de Rothschild observed that what he had said on this + point to M. Rouvier had appeared to make a considerable impression + on him. + + I said that it so happened that I should in all probability + have the means of testing this almost immediately. I had in fact + only yesterday strongly urged M. Flourens to close a question, that + of the New Hebrides, which was creating suspicion and annoyance to + England and causing great inconvenience in consequence of the very + strong feeling about it which prevailed in the colonies. The two + Governments were entirely in accord in principle upon it, and in + fact it was only kept open by the pertinacity with which the French + Government delayed to take the formal step necessary for closing it. + + Baron de Rothschild went on to tell me that in speaking of + the relations with England, M. Rouvier alluded to the convention + negotiated by Sir Drummond Wolff at Constantinople, and said that + he did not see why it should produce any lasting disagreement + between France and England. Whether it was ratified or not, France + might be as conciliatory as possible towards England in dealing + with the matter in future. In answer I suppose to a remark from + Baron de Rothschild, M. Rouvier would seem to have said that the + Comte de Montebello[47] appeared to have gone far beyond his + instructions in the language he had used to the Porte. + + I asked Baron de Rothschild whether M. Rouvier had also + said that the Comte de Montebello had received any check or + discouragement from the Government at Paris. + + Passing on from this, Baron de Rothschild told me that before + concluding the conversation, he had pointed out to M. Rouvier that + the great addition of strength which the Ministry had received + from the vote of the Chamber yesterday, would enable them to act + with more independence and vigour, and that they might now settle + questions with England, and establish good relations with her + without being under the constant fear of a check in the Chamber of + Deputies. + + There can be no doubt that, in fact, the position of the + Rouvier Ministry has been immensely strengthened by the large vote + they obtained yesterday on the interpellation put forward against + them on the subject of Monarchical and Clerical intrigues. It is + earnestly to be hoped, for their own sakes, and for the sake of + France, that they will turn it to account in order to pursue a more + reasonable and conciliatory policy towards England, and to take + stronger and more effectual means of preserving order in Paris. The + riot at the Lyons railway station seems to have done Boulangism + harm even among the ultra-Radicals, and to have been the main cause + of Boulanger's having been thrown over by Radical speakers in the + Chamber yesterday. But it is a very dangerous thing to give the + Paris mob its head. + +M. Rouvier's friendly assurances with regard to England had, of course, +been imparted to the Baron in order that they might be communicated +to the British Embassy, but the action of the French Government +appeared to have very little in common with them; nor was there any +reason to assume that Montebello was exceeding his instructions in +opposing at Constantinople the ratification of the Anglo-Turkish +Convention with regard to Egypt. The egregious action which forced +the Sultan to withhold his consent to the Convention, and thereby +perpetuated the British occupation of Egypt, was not the result of the +unauthorized proceedings of the French Ambassador, but the consequence +of the deliberately considered joint policy of the French and Russian +Governments. Incidentally, it may be pointed out that the fruitless +attempt to negotiate the Convention was yet another convincing proof +of the absolute honesty of British policy with regard to Egypt, and +the following letter from Lord Salisbury shows no satisfaction at the +frustration of Sir H. Drummond Wolff's mission. + + * * * * * + + _Lord Salisbury to Lord Lyons._ + + July 20, 1887. + + I am afraid the temper of the French will not make the + settlement of the Egyptian question more easy. I do not now see how + we are to devise any middle terms that will satisfy them. We cannot + leave the Khedive to take his chance of foreign attack, or native + riot. The French refuse to let us exercise the necessary powers + of defence unless we do it by continuing our military occupation. + I see nothing for it but to sit still and drift awhile: a little + further on in the history of Europe the conditions may be changed, + and we may be able to get some agreement arrived at which will + justify evacuation. Till then we must simply refuse to evacuate. + Our relations with France are not pleasant at present. There are + five or six different places where we are at odds:-- + + 1. She has destroyed the Convention at Constantinople. + + 2. She will allow no Press Law to pass. + + 3. She is trying to back out of the arrangement on the Somali + coast. + + 4. She still occupies the New Hebrides. + + 5. She destroys our fishing tackle, etc. + + 6. She is trying to elbow us out of at least two + unpronounceable places on the West Coast of Africa. + + Can you wonder that there is, to my eyes, a silver lining even + to the great black cloud of a Franco-German War? + +On account of the tension existing between France and Germany, and +of the agitation produced by the transfer of Boulanger to a command +at Clermont-Ferrand, it was feared that the National Fête of July 14 +would be marked by serious disturbances; these fears were happily not +realized, although Boulanger's departure from Paris a few days earlier +had formed the pretext for a display of embarrassing Jingoism. The +French Government were so apprehensive of an anti-German demonstration, +that, although Count Münster received the usual invitation to attend +the Longchamps Review, M. Flourens privately begged him to absent +himself, and the two German military attachés, instead of joining the +War Minister's Staff in uniform, went to the Diplomatic Tribune in plain +clothes. + + * * * * * + + _Lord Lyons to Lord Salisbury._ + + Paris, July 15, 1887. + + The National Fête of yesterday passed off quietly enough. + There are said to have been cries in various places of 'Vive + Boulanger,' and 'À bas Grévy,' but nowhere was there anything which + assumed anything like the proportions of a demonstration. There do + not appear to have been any cries at all in the army. + + The low French papers keep up a constant fire of scurrilous + language against the Germans and even against the Germany Embassy. + This sort of thing seems to be taken more seriously and to cause + more irritation in Germany than it would in most countries. Count + Münster naturally enough did not come to the President's stand, to + which he and the other Ambassadors were as usual invited to see + the Review. The German military attachés did not go in uniform + with the staff of the Minister of War, but saw the Review from the + Diplomatic Tribune in plain clothes. In fact, ill will between + France and Germany seems to be on the increase. It looks as if the + Germans would really be glad to find a fair pretext for going to + war with France. On the other hand, Boulangism, which is now the + French term for Jingoism, spreads, especially amongst the reckless + Radicals and enemies of the present Ministry. And even among the + better classes, warlike language and, to some degree, a warlike + spirit grows up with a new generation, which has had no practical + acquaintance with war. Abject fear of the German armies is being + succeeded by overweening confidence in themselves. + + The present Ministry seem to have been afraid of unpopularity + if they abandoned altogether Boulanger's absurd mobilization + scheme. The Germans seem to be taking this quietly. Perhaps they + look on with satisfaction at the French incurring an immense + expenditure for an experiment apparently without any practical use + from a military point of view. Perhaps they believe, as many people + do here, that the Chambers will never really vote the money. + + It is supposed that the session will be over next week, and I + trust that then you will be disposed to receive an application from + me for leave. I am getting quite knocked up by the Paris summer, + and am in urgent need of rest and country air. + +The foregoing letter was one of the last communications received from +Lord Lyons at Paris, and his official career practically terminated a +few days later, when he left on leave, destined never to return to the +post which he had so long occupied, for the unfavourable view which +he held with regard to his physical condition was only too completely +justified. + +He appears to have passed the months of August and September quietly +with his near relatives in Sussex. Towards the end of October he +must have learnt with some surprise that, whereas in March he had +been most urgently begged by Lord Salisbury to remain at his post +until the end of the year, a successor to him, in the person of Lord +Lytton, had been appointed, and that there was no necessity for him to +return to Paris. If he, as would have been the case with most people, +really felt aggrieved at this change of circumstances, there is no +trace of resentment shown in his correspondence. On the contrary, he +warmly welcomed the new appointment, and at once set about making +arrangements for his successor's convenience. On November 1, he made +a formal application to be permitted to resign his appointment, was +created an Earl, and the few remaining letters (the latest bearing the +date of November 20) deal with business details, and unostentatious +acts of kindness to various persons who had been in his service or +otherwise connected with him. The very last of all was a characteristic +communication to Sir Edwin Egerton, the Chargé d'Affaires at Paris, +respecting the payment of the fire insurance premium on the Embassy. + +The close of his life was destined to coincide dramatically with the +close of his official career. Intellectually there were no signs of +decay; but physically he was even more worn out than he realized +himself. On November 28, whilst staying at Norfolk House, he was +stricken with paralysis, and a week later he was dead, without having +in the meanwhile recovered consciousness. Thus the end came at a moment +singularly appropriate to his well ordered existence, and to no one +could the time-honoured Latin epitaph have been applied with greater +accuracy. + +In an earlier portion of this work some attempt has been made to +portray Lord Lyons's personality and to explain the causes of his +success as a diplomatist, but the best criterion of the man is to be +found in his letters, which have been reproduced verbatim, and may be +said to constitute a condensed record of the most interesting episodes +in English diplomatic history during a space of nearly thirty years. +Throughout this long series there is hardly to be found an unnecessary +sentence or even a redundant epithet; there is a total absence of any +straining after effect, of exaggeration, of personal animosity or +predilection, or of any desire to gain his ends by intrigue or trickery. +On the other hand, they are marked by profound mastery of detail, sound +judgment, inexhaustible patience, an almost inhuman impartiality, and +an obviously single-minded desire to do his best for his country as one +of its most responsible representatives. Such, then, was the character +of the man, and the general public is probably quite unconscious of the +inestimable value to the country of officials of this particular type. + +It was Lord Lyons's fate twice to represent this country at most +critical periods during wars, in the course of which, England, while +desiring to observe the strictest neutrality, aroused the bitterest +hostility on the part of the belligerents. In spite of untiring efforts +he had the mortification of seeing the relations of England, first with +the United States and then with France, gradually deteriorate, and never +experienced the satisfaction, which no one would have appreciated more +highly than himself, of seeing those unfriendly relations converted into +the condition which now happily prevails; but it may be fairly said +of him that no one ever laboured more assiduously and efficiently to +promote peace and good will between England and her neighbours; that he +never made either an enemy or apparently a mistake, and that no other +diplomatist of his day enjoyed to an equal degree the confidence of +his chiefs, and the regard of his subordinates. Overshadowed by more +brilliant and interesting personalities, the unobtrusive services of +Lord Lyons are unknown to the rising generation, and probably forgotten +by many of those who have reached middle age; but in the opinion of +the statesman who amongst living Englishmen is the most competent to +judge, he was the greatest Ambassador who has represented this country +in modern times, and by those whose privilege it was to serve under him, +his memory will ever be held in affectionate remembrance. + +FOOTNOTES: + +[Footnote 44: Lord Salisbury had taken over the Foreign Office upon the +death of Lord Iddesleigh on January 12, 1887.] + +[Footnote 45: Dongorita. A town on the Somali coast.] + +[Footnote 46: Secretary of French Embassy at London.] + +[Footnote 47: French Ambassador at Constantinople.] + + + + +APPENDIX + +LORD LYONS IN PRIVATE LIFE. + +BY MRS. WILFRID WARD. + + +It is not uncommon to find a seeming contradiction between the official +and the private characters of the same individual. Extreme reserve, for +instance, even an astonishing power of silence in conducting official +work, may not indicate the same power of silence in private life, or the +same reserve in the life of the affections. In Lord Lyons there was no +such contrast, and no attempt to depict him could pretend to penetrate +his extreme reserve as to his deeper feelings. This reticence on his +part must severely limit any account of his _vie intime_. Moreover, +curiously enough there is another difficulty in describing him which +lies in quite an opposite direction. Lord Lyons had a keen sense of +the ridiculous, and he loved the absolute relaxation of talking pure +nonsense which, however amusing at the moment, would hardly bear the +strain of repetition. Indeed, very little can be added to the history +of the public life of a man so absolutely reticent as to his feelings, +his thoughts, and his opinions, which he further concealed rather than +revealed by an almost burlesque habit of talking nonsense among his +intimates. + +It would be easy to give many instances of his gift for silence when he +did not wish to be 'drawn' by his interlocutor. A little story told to +me by the late Sir Edward Blount is a case in point. + +Sir Edward, waiting to see Lord Lyons at the Embassy, heard talking in +the next room which lasted some time, and soon distinguished the voice +of M. Blowitz. As soon as he was alone with Lord Lyons he said that he +felt obliged to warn him that, if he had liked, he could have overheard +his conversation with the journalist. + +'You might,' was the answer, 'have overheard what was said by M. +Blowitz, but you could not have heard anything said by me for the good +reason that I said nothing at all!' + +It was never known to anybody, as far as it is possible to ascertain, +whether Lord Lyons had ever even contemplated marriage, though he +certainly did not recommend celibacy. 'Matrimony,' he constantly used to +repeat--slightly varying the phrase in his favourite _Rasselas_--'may +have thorns, but celibacy has no roses.' + +There was at one moment, while he was attached to the Embassy at Rome, +a rumour that he was engaged to be married. Hearing something of it he +inquired of a lady friend whether she could tell him to whom he was +supposed to be attached, and later on he discovered that she was herself +the person in question! + +His nature was certainly lonely, and I believe from quite early in life +he was conscious of suffering from loneliness. I have been told of a +letter of his written from school in which this was quite clearly set +forth. In later life he would never have expressed so much. What he felt +and thought on any intimate question can, I think, only be inferred by +his comments on life in general, or on the sorrows and joys of others. +Once only I believe did he take any part in directly influencing the +lives of young people in the critical question of marriage. The daughter +of an old friend, with a courage in her confidence which seems to me +almost phenomenal, told him the story of a mutual affection existing +between her and a young man who did not seem to her parents to be a +sufficiently good match. Lord Lyons listened with the utmost attention, +and eventually interceded with his old friend, speaking of the terrible +danger of causing irremediable pain to two young hearts, and was the +means of making these young people happy. Was there, perhaps, in this +action some reminiscence of a possible past happiness lost by himself? +No one can even make the faintest surmise as to whether this was the +case. He made no allusion to his own past when telling the story. + +Of his childhood I know little, but there is a toy preserved in the +family that gives a curious and characteristic foretaste of what he +was to become. It is a miniature escritoire fitted with pen and paper +and seals, and also soap and towels, etc. All this was supposed to +belong to the children's dog, who was promoted in their games to the +position of an Ambassador, and described as 'His Excellency.' There are +still existing despatches written to and by 'His Excellency' in the +handwriting of the four children. + +I think he must have been too old to have joined in his sister Minna's +bit of naughtiness when at Malta she put snuff in the guitar of a young +exquisite who had provoked their mirth, and whose name was Benjamin +Disraeli. + +He used to say that among his most vivid recollections of his boyhood +while at Malta, was the unexpected return of his father and the fleet. +The children had been deeply engaged in preparing theatricals which were +postponed on account of their father's arrival. He remembered his guilty +feeling that he ought to be glad, and that he was not glad at all! + +It was not at first intended that Bickerton Lyons should enter the +diplomatic service; he began life in the navy. But Bickerton, unlike +his brother Edmund, had no vocation for the sea. The sorrow of Edmund's +loss, who died at Therapia, from a wound received when commanding his +ship in the Sea of Azoph during the Crimean war, was a shadow that never +passed from the lives of the other three. Bickerton was deeply attached +to both his sisters and their families. Annie married Baron Wurtzburg, +and Minna married Lord Fitzalan, afterwards Duke of Norfolk. Other +relations with whom he was in close intimacy all his life were his aunt, +Mrs. Pearson and her children, especially her daughters, Mrs. Lister +Venables and Mrs. Little, who both survived him. + +All his life Lord Lyons was devoted to children, and especially so to +the large family of the Duchess of Norfolk, with whom he was able to +indulge his domestic tastes and his love of fun. He spent with them the +greater part of every holiday, and in the last twenty-five years of his +life they were frequently with him in Paris. My mother, Lady Victoria, +the eldest of the family, married very young, and my aunt Minna, the +second daughter, became a Carmelite nun. Mary, the eldest of the sisters +who remained at home, was Lord Lyons's constant companion and secretary. +I think she was the only person who did not experience the strong sense +of his reserve which so impressed those who had to do with him even in +everyday intercourse. In a very serious state of health which followed +his work at Washington he depended greatly on the companionship of his +nieces. I have been told that for months he could not raise his head, +and the only thing he could do by himself was to play with glass balls +on a solitaire board. During this interval in his career, before he +accepted the Embassy at Constantinople, he had more leisure than usual +for the society of his sister's family, but he had always been devoted +to them when they were quite little children, and was once described as +'an excellent nursery governess.' He said to his sister: 'I could never +have married; it would not have been right, as I could never have loved +my own children as much as I love yours.' + +Into this near association with him my sisters and I were more +closely drawn after the death of our parents. We had lost our mother +in the winter of 1870, and my father, James Hope-Scott, died in the +spring of 1873. It was then that my grandmother took us to live with +her at Arundel, and we were added to the large family party who had +often stayed with him in Paris. My own earliest recollections of my +great-uncle are tinged with an awe which no amount of time spent with +him ever quite overcame; but it did not prevent great enjoyment of all +the fun we had with him. He was certainly very indulgent to the younger +members of the family circle, particularly my brother, who was some +years younger than the rest of us, and this was especially the case when +we were his guests. + +I think that what inspired awe was the immense strength of character, +the reserved force, the severely controlled natural irritability. He +had, too, a humorous vehemence of expression which seemed at times to be +a safety valve to the forces he had under control, and was a reminder of +their existence. + +I suppose that nothing could be imagined more stately and more regular +than life at the Embassy in those days. The Ambassador himself lived +in a routine of absolute regularity and extremely hard work. He got up +at seven, had breakfast at eight, and was, I think, at work by nine +o'clock. His very small leisure, when he was alone, was mostly spent +in reading. And this was carefully classified in three divisions. In +the morning he read history or science, in the evening, between tea and +dinner, biography; while, for an hour before he went to bed he read +novels. While in France he never left the Embassy. Once a year he did +leave it for his annual holiday--generally spent in England. He used to +boast how many nights in succession--I think in one year it amounted +to over 300--he had slept in the same bed. Every afternoon when we +were with him, he drove with my grandmother, generally in the Bois de +Boulogne, and in the warm weather we always stopped at some _café_ for +us children to have ices. He also took us to the circus once during each +visit until, in later life, he became afraid of catching cold. He still +occasionally went to the theatre, to which he had been much devoted as +a younger man. We all dined downstairs, and he used to like my youngest +sister and my brother to sit at a little table near the big one and have +dessert. He insisted on this, and was rather pleased than otherwise at +the scolding he received from an English friend for keeping them up +so late. In later life he used to speak of the pretty picture the two +children had made. + +I recollect the extraordinary general sense of importance as to +his movements in those days, partly on account of their phenomenal +regularity. I could not imagine him ever acting on impulse, even in the +matter of going up or downstairs. I cannot picture him strolling into +his own garden except at the fixed hour. This without intention added to +the dignity of his life which seemed to move like a rather dreary state +procession. + +I wonder if the servants who never saw him break through his routine, +or lose one jot of his dignity, ever guessed at how shy he was of them, +or suspected the rather wistful curiosity he felt about their lives. +I think it was Pierre, the butler, who lived with his family in the +_entresol_ between the two floors of reception rooms in the Embassy. +Lord Lyons was much interested in their family life, and liked to +speculate as to what went on there. One inconvenient result of his +extreme shyness was that when he really wished to alter any detail as +to the daily routine, he could not bring himself to impart his wishes +to any of the servants. I have often heard him say how tired he was of +the same breakfast which never varied in the least, and he would add +that his Italian valet Giuseppe was so convinced that it was the only +breakfast he liked that when he travelled, the man took incredible +pains that the coffee, the eggs, the rolls, the marmalade, the two +tangerine oranges in winter and the tiny basket of strawberries in +summer, should not differ an iota from those served up every morning +at the Embassy. But Lord Lyons could never summon up courage to speak +to him on the subject. On certain days Pierre undertook Giuseppe's +duties, and for many years Lord Lyons wished that Pierre would arrange +his things as they were arranged by Giuseppe, but he never told him +so. While he grumbled, he was amused at the situation and at himself. +Indeed, his keen sense of the ridiculous and his endless enjoyment of +nonsense explain a good deal of his life. He used to say that as he was +too shy to look at the servants' faces, he had learnt to know them by +their silk stockinged calves. When he dined alone he made an amusement +of identifying the six or seven pairs of calves, and was proud of his +success in this odd game of skill. + +I recall one ludicrous instance of his shyness with servants. It was +his custom annually when he came to stay with us to shake hands with +the old family nurse, and on one occasion, meeting her on the stairs, +he leant across the banisters to perform the ceremony with such +_empressement_ and effort that he broke one of the supports. He always +afterwards alluded to the extraordinary emotion he had shown in this +greeting. Nothing is so unaccountable as shyness, but it was curious +that a man who had seen so much of public life and of society should +have so much of it as he had. I remember once helping him to escape +with, for him, astonishing speed across the garden of a country house, +when a very agreeable woman, whom I believe he really liked, had come +to call; he was as full of glee as if he were a boy running away from a +school-master. + +[Illustration: THE BRITISH EMBASSY, PARIS. + +_F. Contet, Paris. Phot._] + +I don't think that in Paris he ever gave way to such impulses; they were +the relaxation of a shy nature in the holidays. + +To return for one moment to Paris. He occasionally gave a big official +dinner which I don't think he at all enjoyed, and of which we knew +nothing. But he certainly enjoyed small gatherings, especially if they +included old friends who were passing through Paris, although not one +word of ordinary sentiment would probably pass his lips, nor would one +of the day's arrangements be changed. He certainly enjoyed the society +of his women friends, and I liked to watch him talking to Mrs. Augustus +Craven, the author of the _Récit d'une Soeur_. Two characteristic +sayings of his about the Cravens I remember. He was always pleased at +showing his knowledge of the most orthodox and strict views of Roman +affairs. He used to say that Mrs. Craven could never make amends for +her conduct at the time of the Vatican Council--when her _salon_ was a +centre for 'inopportunist' Bishops--unless she went back to Rome and +gave 'Infallibilist tea-parties.' + +Mr. Augustus Craven, her husband, was intensely mysterious in manner, +and Lord Lyons used to call him 'the General of the Jesuits.' Once, on +meeting him in London, he asked him if his wife were with him. Mrs. +Craven was staying with Lady Cowper, and Mr. Craven answered with +solemn, slow and mysterious tones: 'She is at Wrest,' and my uncle said +'Requiescat in Pace,' with equal solemnity. + +I think that with all his natural British prejudices he liked French +people and their ways. He used to maintain that Frenchwomen were more +domestic and kept earlier hours than Englishwomen. He certainly liked +French cooking. He spoke once in tones of horror of an Englishman who +had committed the monstrosity of putting pepper on young green peas--a +crime of which a Frenchman was incapable. + +Many of his opinions, however, like Dr. Johnson's, were evoked by the +spirit of contradiction, and it was chiefly with English people that I +heard him talk about the French. + +In the holidays in England reading aloud was one of his chief pleasures. +He read much poetry to us at one time, but later I think he had to +give this up as it tired him. At Arundel he wrote his letters in the +dressing-room opening out of his bedroom. We used to sit there waiting +for him before the appointed time, making drawings in red ink, of which +there was always a large supply, when he would make a mock solemn +entrance, as of a stiff professor. We were allowed to scribble during +the reading, but, woe betide us! if we showed any inattention. He read +'Marmion,' Southey's 'Thalaba,' and, I think, 'The Curse of Kehama,' +also much of Byron, the 'Siege of Corinth,' with especial enjoyment. He +knew many pages of Byron by heart, and we used to get him to repeat any +amount while out walking. 'Rejected Addresses,' 'Bombastes Furioso,' +'The Rape of the Lock' were also among the many things he liked to +recite. I wish I could remember half the things he read or repeated +to us. I am sure there was no Tennyson, and certainly no Browning. He +used to jeer at the obscurity of both the Brownings, and to mutter such +phrases as the 'thundering white silence' of Mrs. Browning with intense +scorn. I think he may have met the Brownings when he was in Rome. He saw +a good deal of Fanny and Adelaide Kemble at that time. He liked Adelaide +much the best of the two, and used to quote with delight a saying of +hers as to the Brownings. When she was told of the birth of their son +she exclaimed: 'There are now then not one incomprehensible, or two +incomprehensibles, but three incomprehensibles!' + +He was always amused at the Kemble grand manner. He used to imitate the +dramatic utterance with which Fanny Kemble frightened a young waiter +who had brought her some beer. 'I asked for _water_, boy; you bring me +_beer_!' + +At that same time he knew Sir Frederick Leighton, and they once had a +pillow fight! Who could imagine that pillow fight who only knew him as +Ambassador in Paris? He always spoke as if he had enjoyed life in Rome; +he was devoted to the theatre, and he had much congenial society. He +used to say, too, that Pius IX. was the most agreeable sovereign with +whom he ever had diplomatic relations. + +Lord Lyons's literary tastes were not those of the present generation. +He declared that he only liked verse that rhymed and music with a tune. +He loved the sonorous sound of Byron as he loved the solemn cadence of +Latin verse. All the time the love of absurdity was never far off. He +would suddenly imitate the action of a schoolboy repeating Latin verse, +first with his arms and then with his feet! A stout, very dignified +elderly man, in some path in the garden, punctuating the verse with the +action of his feet, is sufficiently surprising. Occasionally he would +have the oddest freaks of this kind, and I remember an afternoon when he +took a whim of pretending to be imbecile; he made the most extraordinary +faces, and not a word of sense could be got from him. + +Once in a steamer on the lake of Lucerne he insisted on his nieces +joining him in impersonating a typical family of English tourists +out for their holiday. He was the _paterfamilias_, one niece was his +wife, another the German governess, a third his child. In the middle +of the performance he found that he was being regarded with surprise +and curiosity by some English society friends whose acquaintance with +him had hitherto been exclusively in the character of a very dignified +ambassador. + +My aunt, Mary Howard, used to read aloud to him by the hour, and we all +enjoyed these times immensely. It would be difficult to say how often we +had 'Pickwick,' 'Cranford,' 'Rasselas,' 'The Rose and the Ring,' and +'Mrs. Boss's Niece.' I have never met anybody outside that circle who +ever even heard of 'Mrs. Boss's Niece;' it is a serious loss. To quote +at all appropriately from any of his favourites was to be exceedingly +in his good books for the rest of the day. Like the late Lord Salisbury +he delighted in Miss Yonge; he could not have too many pairs of twins, +or too large a family circle to read about. He loved the analysis of +domestic life, and would have been ready to canonise any really and +genuinely unselfish character. Detective stories were a great joy. 'The +House on the Marsh,' and 'Called Back,' were among the most successful. +He used to prolong discussion as to the solution of the mystery, and +would even knock at our doors very late at night if he thought he had +identified the murderer, and mutter in dramatic undertones, 'So-an-so +was the man who did it.' But the detective story was never read before +dinner, and to look into the book meanwhile was a crime. Anybody who +peeped to see the end of a novel 'deserved to be dragged to death by +wild horses.' And there must be no skipping. Only descriptions of +scenery--to which he had the strongest objection--might be left out. + +The annual holiday was, for the most part, spent with the Duchess of +Norfolk at Arundel, and later at Heron's Ghyll. Sometimes he went to +Germany to take the waters, in company with his eldest sister, Baroness +Wurtzburg. When in England he always paid a certain number of country +house visits. These generally included Knowsley and Woburn. The visits +that were paid every year, I think without exception, were those to +Lord Stratford de Redcliffe, and to an old schoolfellow--Major Trower, +who had been with him at Winchester. Major Trower was one of four old +Wykehamists who remained close friends. The other two had died some time +before. I think the visit to Raby was annual. He specially enjoyed the +society of the Duchess of Cleveland and of Lady Mary Hope. He was at +Raby in the September before he died, and I believe that was the last +visit he ever paid. The famous visitors' book there always amused him, +and he was fond of quoting from it. One of his own contributions I +remember was written with mock modesty. He took from Lockhart's Spanish +ballads the lines:-- + + ''Twere better to be silent before such a crowd of folk, + Than utter words as meaningless as he did when he spoke.' + +His recollections of the society of his youth in these houses had some +amusing details. I think it was at the Duchess of Bedford's that there +was a Christmas tree, off which each young man visitor was given a piece +of flowered silk for a waistcoat. Early next morning, at Mr. Lyons's +suggestion, one of the young men, provided with a list of the names and +addresses of the tailors employed by the others, went up to London and +brought back all the waistcoats made up in time to be worn at dinner +that evening. He used to speak with some amusement of the ungraciousness +of Rogers, the poet, whom he met at the Derbys'. On one occasion Rogers +had lost his spectacles, and Mr. Lyons went a long way in the big house +to find them. Rogers who was drinking tea took the spectacles, but did +not thank him, and, a moment later, when he heard Mr. Lyons refusing +sugar, he observed to the company: 'That young man, having nothing else +to be proud of, is proud of not having sugar with his tea!' + +I don't suppose that he talked much as a young man, and probably he +followed the rule he always preached, that young men should speak +'little but often.' + +Among the few serious sayings to be quoted from him was that the great +axiom in diplomacy was 'Never do anything to-day that can be put off +till to-morrow.' + +In speaking of Leo XIII. and his successful policy with Bismarck, he +said: 'Those very clever men succeed by doing what no one expects. My +success has been made by always doing what was expected of me. I always +did the safe thing.' + +In conversation he enjoyed a Johnsonian style of repartee. One retort of +his had an excellent practical result. He acted as a special constable +in London during the Chartist Riots. Hearing a woman in the dense crowd +cry out, 'Let me faint, let me faint,' he turned to her at once, and +said: 'Pray do, madam,' whereupon she recovered immediately. + +Soon after the Berlin Conference when the Disraeli party were making the +most of the accession of Crete, a visitor at the Embassy, gushing over +its charms concluded with the assertion that Crete was the loveliest +island in the world. Whereupon Mr. William Barrington (now Sir William +Barrington) said drily: 'Have you seen all the others?' This amused +Lord Lyons immensely, and some years afterwards when a young lady who +was and is still famous for her powers of conversation had talked at +him for some time, he adopted the same method. After a good many other +sweeping assertions she said of some work that had just come out: 'It is +the best written book that has appeared this century.' 'Ah,' he said, +'have you read all the others?' Being alone with her soon afterwards I +was not surprised at her inquiring of me dubiously whether I liked my +great-uncle. + + * * * * * + +It need hardly be said that, in the matter of his personal religion, +Lord Lyons was very reticent. He was absolutely regular in his +attendance at the Sunday service in Paris and in England. He was very +fond of the singing of English hymns. + +He never had any sympathy with the ritualist party in the Church of +England, and was inclined to be sarcastic as to those whom he designated +'Puseyites,' as was then the custom. + +One who knew him very well told me that for a time he was somewhat +unsettled in the matter of definite religious belief. There is also +evidence that in middle life the idea of joining the Catholic Church +had been present to him as a possibility. As far as can be known it +was during the last summer of his life that he began to consider the +question practically. It is not surprising that Lord Lyons, when he +took the matter up, showed the same characteristics in its regard that +he had shown in any serious question throughout his life, namely, the +greatest thoroughness and care in studying the Catholic religion and +in carrying out its practical side, reserve as to deep sentiment, not +without humorous touches which were intensely characteristic. Newman's +works formed the chief part of his study during those summer months. +A letter written in that August says of him, 'He is always reading +Newman.' It was not until shortly before his death that he spoke on the +matter to any of the family. A note in the writing of his secretary and +intimate friend--Mr. George Sheffield--says that he spoke of it six +weeks before his death. Lord Lyons had known Bishop Butt for many years +when he was parish priest at Arundel, and it was to him that he applied +for advice. He studied the Penny Catechism most carefully, learning the +answers by heart, like a child. He began to fulfil the practices of a +Catholic with great regularity. He went to Mass daily at ten o'clock, +and adopted little habits of self-denial and showed greater liberality +in almsgiving. The last honour he ever received was the offer of an +earldom on his retiring from the Paris Embassy. He suggested to Dr. Butt +that it would be a good act of mortification to refuse this honour, but +the Bishop would not advise him to do so. He began, against his usual +custom, to give money to crossing-sweepers or beggars in the streets, +and I am told by my aunt, Lady Phillippa Stewart, that, after returning +from my wedding, he said to her: 'Is it not customary after an event +of this kind to give money in alms?' He then suggested that he should +make some offering to the hospitals and asked her to write out the +names of those she thought would be the most suitable. It was about +ten days before my marriage in November, 1887, that I first heard of +his intentions. I learnt it in a fashion very characteristic of him. I +was not staying in the house, but I had been dining with him when he +remarked casually: 'Really, my austerities are becoming alarming. I have +given up soup for dinner and jam for breakfast.' This struck me as a +novel proceeding, as I knew his fondness for jam and that the ordinary +routine of dinner beginning with a clear soup was a fixed ceremonial +with him. That night I questioned my aunt, who told me that he had been +for some weeks preparing to join the Church. It was at this time that +he said to one of the family: 'I am now ready to be received as soon +as the Bishop likes.' He also characteristically consulted his nephew, +the Duke of Norfolk, as to whether he ought to inform Lord Salisbury of +his intention of becoming a Catholic. He did not, during these weeks, +know that he was in any danger. The last time I saw my great uncle was +at my wedding. He had a stroke about ten days afterwards, and to all +appearance became unconscious. Dr. Butt, knowing what his intentions had +been, had no hesitation in giving him conditional Baptism and Extreme +Unction. I was at the funeral at Arundel, and saw the coffin lowered +into the vault in the Fitzalan Chapel, where his sister Minna had been +placed two and a half years earlier. + + * * * * * + +I feel most strongly as I conclude these very imperfect notes, how +entirely Lord Lyons belonged to a generation of Englishmen now long +passed away. The force of will, the power of self-devotion, the dignity, +the reticence, the minute regularity, the sense of order, the degree +of submission to authority and the undoubting assertion of his own +authority towards others--all were elements in a strong personality. +There are, no doubt, strong men now, but their strength is of a +different kind. Englishmen to-day are obliged to be more expansive +and unreserved. No fixed routine can be followed now as then; no man +can so guard his own life and his own personality from the public +eye. Lord Lyons was not of the type that makes the successful servant +of the democracy. Fidelity, reticence, self-effacement, are not the +characteristics that are prominent in the popular idea of the strong man +to-day. But no one who knew Lord Lyons can doubt that those qualities +were in him a great part of his strength. He was and must always be to +those who knew him very much of an enigma, and it certainly would not +have been his own wish that any great effort should be made to interpret +his inner life to the world at large. + + + + +INDEX + + + Aali Pasha, i. 146, 150, 151, 155, 161, 166, 167, 172; + and the Paris Conference, i. 153. + + Abdul Aziz, Sultan of Turkey, i. 151, ii. 175; + effort for Navy, i. 152; + dismisses Fuad Pasha, i. 155; + unpopularity of, i. 161, 163; + visit to France, i. 169, 170; + to England, i. 171, 173. + + Abdul Hamid, ii. 108, 208; + policy of, ii. 137; + reported conspiracy against, ii. 167; + suzerainty in Tunis, ii. 246; + overthrow of, i. 168. + + Aberdeen, Lord, ii. 11. + + Abolition proclamation, i. 93. + + Abou Klea, battle of, ii. 343. + + Adams, Mr., U.S. Minister in London, i. 38, 43, 59, 63, 71, 72, 98, 99. + + Adams, Sir Francis, chargé d'affaires at Paris, ii. 72; + telegram on Anglo-French sympathies, ii. 136; + Minister at Berne, ii. 220. + + Adrianople, railway to Constantinople, i. 176. + + Aehrenthal, Count, i. 342. + + Afghanistan, Lytton's policy in, ii. 209; + attacked by Russia, ii. 348, 352. + + Africa, west coast, ii. 409. + + _Alabama_ incident, i. 97, 98, 99, 105, 300; + question revived, i. 162, 189. + + Alaska, bought by America, i. 168. + + Albanian league, ii. 228. + + Alderson, Capt., sent to report on army of the Potomac, i. 128, 129. + + Alexander, Emperor of Russia, i. 187, 255, 273, 333, 354, ii. 52, + 54, 404; + visit to Berlin, ii. 76; + friendliness to England, ii. 80; + attempt on life of, ii. 207. + + Alexandretta, ii. 150, 151. + + Alexandria, ii. 172, 188, 273; + Anglo-French Naval Demonstration at, ii. 283; + massacre at, ii. 285; + bombardment of, ii. 288. + + Algeria, position of French in, i. 199, 268, 271, 382, ii. 159, 249. + + Alsace and Lorraine, question of cession, i. 321, 332, 334, 358, + 361, 369; + French hopes of recovery of, ii. 103, 135, 195, 197, 247, 346; + trade of, ii. 14. + + America, army, i. 45, 47, 48, 79, 109; + methods of recruiting, i. 110, 116; + finance, i. 57; + slave trade, i. 20; + affairs in central, i. 13; + relations between North and South, i. 20, 29, 31; + relations with England, i. 12, 15, 16, 45, 46, 79, 129, 189. + + American Civil War, i. 34, 343; + Blockade question, i. 33, 36, 37; + privateering, i. 42; + Confederate Government, i. 53; + Southern Confederacy, i. 31, 33, 34, 36; + position of Consuls, i. 83, 121; + Southern activity, i. 82, 83; + Revolutionary Party, i. 80; + proposed foreign intervention, i. 90, 91, 92, 96; + rising prices, i. 94; + vessel building in England, i. 101, 102; + position of foreigners during, i. 106-109; + seizure of British vessels, i. 100, 104, 105; + Irish in, i. 109, 114, 115; + Germans in, i. 115; + British officers sent to follow operations, i. 128; + M. Mercier on, i. 85. + + Anarchical plots, i. 187. + + Ancona district, Austrian troops in, i. 3. + + Anderson, at Fort Sumter, i. 35. + + Anderson, Mr., attaché at Washington, i. 87. + + Andrassy, Count, ii. 85; + and the Eastern Question, ii. 127, 134, 138; + and the Austro-German Alliance, ii. 194. + + Andrassy Note, ii. 95. + + Anglo-Russian Agreement, ii. 143, 160. + + Anglo-Turkish Convention, ii. 140-142; + disclosed to Waddington, ii. 148; + made public, ii. 151; + irritation in France, ii. 152, 159, 163. + + Annam, French in, ii. 103, 307, 327. + + Anti-Slavery party in England, i. 118. + + Antonelli, Cardinal, i. 3, 4, 184. + + Anzin, ii. 323. + + Arabi Bey, rebellion of, ii. 258, 273, 278; + Minister of War, ii. 279, 283; + campaign against, ii. 295, 296. + + Arago, Emmanuel, succeeds Gambetta as Minister of War, i. 361. + + Archibald, Consul, on the kidnapping of recruits, i. 112. + + Arcolay pamphlet, i. 220. + + Argyll, Duke and Duchess of, i. 41. + + Armenia, ii. 131, 137; + patriarch question, ii. 55. + + Army Purchase Bill, ii. 9, 12. + + Arnim, Count, Minister at Rome, i. 347; + Ambassador at Paris, ii. 14, 16, 27, 30, 60, 68, 140; + and Thiers, ii. 31; + on French policy, ii. 45; + Bismarck's dislike of, ii. 46. + + Arundel, Lyons at, i. 139, ii. 222, 418, 422, 428. + + Ashman, Mr., i. 50. + + Asia Minor, Russian policy in, i. 268, ii. 133, 137. + + Athens, i. 149; Lyons attaché at, i. 1. + + Atlantic, coast defence, i. 40. + + Augusta, Empress, Bismarck's dislike of, ii. 80, 354. + + Aumale Duc d', ii. 2, 7, 16, 44, 48, 51, 56, 64, 311, 368. + + d'Aunay, M., ii. 300, 376. + + Austria, relations with Prussia, i. 186, 193, 202; + relations with France, ii. 35; + military power of, i. 268; + and the Eastern Question, ii. 85, 127; + in the Moldo-Wallachian Principalities, i. 153; + in the Ancona district, i. 3. + + Austro-German Alliance, ii. 194, 199, 205, 398. + + Austro-Prussian War, failure of French policy in, i. 177. + + Azoph, Sea of, ii. 417. + + + Bac-ninh, ii. 324. + + Baden, Grand Duchy of, and Confederation, i. 208, 266, 276, 285, 293; + French policy in, i. 190, ii. 36; + proposed neutrality, i. 302. + + Bagdad railway, ii. 151. + + Bahamas, the, i. 130. + + Baker Pasha, defeat of, ii. 323. + + Balkan Peninsula, ii. 223. + + Bapaume, i. 355. + + Bardo, Treaty of the, ii. 243. + + Baring, Major (Earl of Cromer) in Egypt, ii. 189, 322, 352; + letter to Lyons, ii. 203; + and "Modern Egypt," ii. 295. + + _Barracouta_, H.M.S., i. 100. + + Barrère, M., ii. 322. + + Barrington, Mr. (Sir William), ii. 128, 426. + + Bateman, Sir Alfred, ii. 253. + + Batoum, ii. 137, 138, 143. + + Baucel, M., i. 228. + + Bavaria, i. 193; + and Confederation, i. 266; + proposed neutrality, i. 302. + + Bayazid, ii. 142. + + Baynes, Admiral, i. 23. + + Bazaine, General, i. 317, 320; + capitulation, i. 329. + + Beaconsfield, Lord, ii. 144. + + Beatrice, Princess, ii. 162. + + Beauregard, General, i. 35. + + Beaury, plot against Napoleon III., i. 285. + + Bedford, Duchess of, ii. 425. + + Belfort, i. 370, 374. + + Belgium, Prince Napoleon on, i. 193; + French in, i. 211; + trade relations with France, ii. 25; + neutrality of, i. 298, 302; + foreign policy towards, i. 303, 355, ii. 113, 124, 206; + secret Treaty, i. 320, 340; + in Constantinople Conference, ii. 109; + Bismarck's policy in, i. 254, ii. 74, 83, 345. + + Belgium, King of, i. 212, 216. + + Belgrade, Fortress of, i. 161; + evacuated by the Turks, i. 163. + + Belligerent Rights, Exposition of French Jurists on, i. 44, 46, 50. + + Benedetti, French Ambassador at Berlin, i. 293; + on Franco-Prussian situation, i. 299; + affront to, i. 300, ii. 206; + despatch from, i. 304; + meeting with King of Prussia at Ems, i. 305. + + Benjamin, Mr., i. 122. + + Berlin, Congress at, ii. 147. + + _Berlin Post_, "Is War in Sight" article, ii. 72. + + Berlin, Treaty of, i. 342, ii. 227; + Layard on, ii. 160. + + Bermuda, i. 130. + + Berne, ii. 256. + + Bernstorff, Count, Prussian Ambassador in London, i. 196, 256, 259, + 260, 268, 293, 304, 309, 317, 323, 337; + on Belgian affairs, i. 218; + letter from Bismarck, i. 261. + + Bert, M. Paul, ii. 323. + + Berthaut, General, Minister of War, ii. 115. + + Bessarabia, ii. 142, 367. + + Bessborough, Lord, ii. 11. + + Beust, Count, Austrian Minister, i. 162, 272, 314, 320; ii. 202, 231; + and the Belgian question, i. 229; + letter to Metternich, ii. 35. + + Beyens, Baron, Belgian Minister, i. 213. + + Biarritz, i. 197. + + Biggar, Mr., ii. 234. + + Billing, Baron de, plan to relieve Gordon, ii. 326. + + Billot, General, ii. 311. + + Bisaccia, Duc de, French Ambassador in London, ii. 57. + + Bismarck, Prince, i. 162, 192, 387; + and Luxemburg railway affair, i. 168, 213; + and German Confederation, i. 247, 251, 276; + at Ems, i. 293; + and the Vatican, ii. 30, 68; + relations with Emperor, ii. 62, 120; + and disarmament negotiations, i. 254, 260-5, 270-3, 275, 278, 301; + foreign policy of, i. 179, 211, 214, 218, 314, 355, ii. 14, 29, 49, + 54, 70, 72, 74, 77, 82, 124, 205, 345, 358; + with regard to Austria, ii. 42; + and the Austro-German Alliance, ii. 194; + and Belgium, i. 303; + and the Eastern Question, ii. 90, 97, 231; + and Egypt, ii. 150, 297, 325, 338, 339, 352; + and France, ii. 16, 60, 136, 283, 286, 384; + during war, i. 314; + peace negotiations, i. 345, 348, 357, 361, 365, 370, 374, 380, + ii. 20, 30, 82; + and payment of indemnity, ii. 3; + colonial policy, ii. 60; + and French colonial schemes, ii. 244-5, 251, 259, 264, 268, 342; + and Russia, i. 338; + and Russo-Turkish War, ii. 109; + Suez Canal transaction, ii. 94; + and claims of Prussia in Tunis, i. 200; + and Favre, i. 316, 318, 321, 323, 324, 352; + interviews with Malet, i. 319; + with Thiers, i. 329, 331, 342, 353, 358; + French views of policy, ii. 107; + and Arnim, ii. 46; + and Boulanger, ii. 401; + and Clarendon, i. 250, 279; + and Gramont, i. 307; + and Count Münster, ii. 388; + and Napoleon III., i. 221, 254, 333; + and Odo Russell, i. 338; + and Waddington, ii. 168; + on himself, ii. 61; + on French Press, i. 271-2; + and the German Press, i. 305; + power of, ii. 53, 73; + illness of, ii. 290. + + "Bismarck, his Reflections and Reminiscences," quoted, i. 338. + + Bizerta, ii. 243. + + Black Sea Conference, i. 341, 350, 366; + clauses in Treaty of Paris, concerning, i. 337; + French policy in, i. 337, 339; + Russia policy in, ii. 127. + + Blairgowrie, Lord Russell at, i. 119. + + Blanqui, revolutionary leader, i. 385. + + Bleichröder, ii. 384. + + Blignières, M. de, ii. 171, 204; + in Egypt, ii. 189, 238, 261, 278; + resignation of, ii. 279; + on Egyptian finances, ii. 330. + + Blockade, international law concerning, i. 97. + + Blount, Sir Edward, ii. 415. + + Blowitz, M., _Times_ correspondent, ii. 70, 241, 308, 416. + + Blue Books, publication of, i. 101, 102, 300. + + Boer War, i. 49; + pay of men in, i. 110. + + Bonaparte, Prince Pierre, i. 244. + + Bonapartist Party, policy of, i. 349, 356, 364, ii. 15, 17, 66, 106, + 191. + + Bordeaux, i. 345, 349. + + Bosnia, ii. 127, 134, 141, 143; + annexation of, i. 342; + insurrection in, ii. 84. + + _Bosphore Egyptien_, suspended, ii. 352. + + Boston, i. 73, 75; + harbour, i. 64. + + Boulanger, General, ii. 121; + policy, ii. 367, 384, 385, 393, 403; + and the army, ii. 365, 383; + popularity of, ii. 366; + at Longchamps, ii. 369; + mobilization scheme, ii. 401, 411; + transferred to Clermont-Ferrand, ii. 409. + + Bourbaki, General, i. 327, 354; + on the military situation, i. 327; + at Bourges, i. 348; + defeated, i. 359; + army not included in armistice, i. 360. + + Bourges, Bourbaki at, i. 348. + + Brassey, Mr., application for railway concession, i. 176. + + Bray, Bavarian Minister, i. 302. + + Brodie, attaché at Washington, i. 87. + + Broglie, Duc de, at Black Sea Conference, i. 341; + French Ambassador in London, ii. 22, 23, 24; + in French politics, ii. 64, 67, 100; + becomes Prime Minister, ii. 111; + unpopularity of, ii. 113. + + Browning, Mr. and Mrs., ii. 422. + + Bruce, Sir Frederick, i. 140, 141. + + Brünnow, Baron, i. 186, ii. 38. + + Buchanan, President (U.S.A.), i. 12, 19, 23, 29; + invitation to Prince of Wales, i. 25; + letter from Queen Victoria, i. 26. + + Bucharest, i. 149. + + Buffet, M., i. 282. + + Bulgaria, i. 166-8, ii. 142, 143; + proposed limits of, ii. 130; + Union with Eastern Roumelia, ii. 360; + Russia in, ii. 367, 391, 399. + + Bull's Run, Fight of, i. 47-50, 110. + + Bülow, Count von, ii. 53, 74, 87. + + Bulwer, Sir Henry, at the Constantinople Embassy, i. 145, 146; + opinion on a Turkish Navy, i. 152. + + Bulwer, Lady, i. 146. + + Bunch, Mr., British Consul at Charleston, i. 42, 51-53, 72, 94. + + Burmah, ii. 358; + English in, ii. 360; + annexation of, ii. 361. + + Burnley, Mr., Chargé d'Affaires in Washington, i. 134, 136. + + Burns, Mr., ii. 343. + + Busch, M., ii. 130; + quoted, ii. 82, 344, 352. + + Butt, Bishop, ii. 427. + + Buyak Dere, ii. 138. + + + _Cagliari_ case, i. 8-11. + + Cairo, intrigues at, ii. 87, 258; + British troops enter, ii. 285; + Northbrook mission to, ii. 332. + + Calais, ii. 22. + + Calcutta, i. 223. + + Calice, Baron, ii. 130. + + Cambridge, Duke of, i. 379. + + Canada, i. 15, 119; + defences of, i. 40, 43, 49, 60, 72, 74, 80, 132, 134, 291; + despatch of troops to, i. 54; + Reciprocity Treaties, i. 17, 123. + + _Caradoc_, the, i. 146. + + Carafa, Signor, Neapolitan Foreign Minister, i. 9, 11. + + Carey, Capt., ii. 194. + + Carnarvon, Lord, resigns office, ii. 123. + + Cass, Miss, ii. 398. + + Cass, General, i. 12. + + Cayenne, i. 243. + + Ceylon, i. 223. + + Chalons, i. 204; + French army at i. 307. + + Chambord, Comte de, i. 364; ii. 2, 9, 18, 21, 25, 56, 57, 64, 66; + proclamation of, ii. 7; + White Flag manifesto, ii. 47. + + Chanzy, General, at Le Mans, i. 348, 354, 359; + suggested President, ii. 118, 197; + death of, ii. 305. + + Charles X. of France, i. 254. + + Charleston, fighting at, i. 34, 51; + prices in, during war, i. 94. + + Charmes, M., ii. 376, 387. + + Chartres, Duc de, ii. 3, 365. + + Chase, Mr., Secretary of Treasury, U.S., i. 43, 119. + + Chasseurs d'Afrique, ii. 118. + + Chatsworth, Lyons at, ii. 222. + + Chattanooga, i. 120. + + Chaudordy, Comte de, i. 325; + and the elections, i. 338; + policy at Tours, i. 339; + on the recognition of the Government, i. 357, 362; + on cession of territory, i. 329; + and Black Sea Conference, i. 366, 371; + at Constantinople Conference, ii. 109, 398. + + Cherbourg, i. 303. + + Cherif Pasha, ii. 174, 204. + + Childers, Mr., ii. 330. + + China, French Treaty with, ii. 327; + French war with, ii. 337. + + Chios, ii. 159. + + Chislehurst, Empress Eugénie at, i. 327; + reported review by Napoleon at, ii. 21; + death of Napoleon at, ii. 36. + + Choiseul, ii. 231. + + Christ Church, Oxford, Lord Lyons at, i. 1. + + Christiania, i. 345. + + Christians in Turkey, i. 160, 165, 167. + + Civita Vecchia, i. 8, 180, ii. 55. + + Claremont, Colonel, British military attaché in Paris, i. 194, 196, + 245, 351, 377; + on French army, i. 281. + + Clarendon, Lord, interest in Lyons, i. 6, 8, 174; + and the _Cagliari_ case, i. 9; + succeeds Lord Russell as Foreign Secretary, i. 149; + on Roumanian affairs, i. 156; + on Franco-Prussian relations, i. 201; + and Napoleon III., i. 203; + return to office, i. 205; + and proposed Turco-Greek Conference, i. 210; + on foreign affairs, i. 214, 216; + on French politics, i. 231, 237, 241; + on disarmament, i. 247, 251, 256, 301; + views on the plébiscite, i. 287; + on North American colonies, i. 292; + and party voting, ii. 11; + Bismarck's tribute to, i. 279; + death of, i. 294; + his private correspondence, i. 221; + letters to Lyons, i. 207, 215, 217, 225, 234, 236, 247, 259, 260, + 266, 276, 282, 287, 293; + letters to Loftus, i. 267, 251. + + Clémenceau, M., ii. 201, 350; + open letter from de Blignières to, ii. 279. + + Clermont-Ferrand, ii. 409. + + Cleveland, Duchess of, ii. 424. + + Coasting trade with U.S.A., i. 17. + + Cobden, on intervention in American Civil War, i. 92. + + Cochin China, ii. 103. + + Cologne, i. 193. + + Commercial Treaties, Anglo-French negotiations, i. 239, 241, 243, + 245, 284, 368, 372; ii. 3, 7, 8, 14, 33, 43, 163, 165, 206, 252, + 261, 265, 269, 315. + + Commune, termination of, i. 388. + + Compiègne, i. 206. + + Congo Conference, ii. 334. + + Connecticut, i. 113. + + Conolly, General, ii. 102. + + Conscription Act, in U.S., i. 115. + + Constantinople i. 5; + Embassy at, offered to Lyons, i. 144; + position of British ambassador at, i. 147; + intrigues, i. 149, 151; + discontent among Mussulmans, i. 167; + railway scheme, i. 176; + Russian policy in, ii. 52, 124; + Moustier's policy in, i. 206; + Conference at, ii. 106, 107, 108, 109, 398. + + Corfu, ii. 224. + + Cotton trade with America, i. 31, 88, 89; + during the war, i. 115, 118, 122. + + Courbet, Admiral, ii. 322; + in Chinese war, ii. 337. + + Courbevoie, i. 381. + + Courcel, overtures from Bismarck, ii. 353. + + Coutouly, M., ii. 182. + + Couza, Prince, i. 149, 150, 157; + deposed, i. 153. + + Cowley, Lord, i. 70, 225; + on Eastern question, i. 170; + on Ambassadors' votes, ii. 9; + visit to Napoleon, i. 197; + letter to Lord Lyons, i. 165. + + Cowper, Lady, ii. 421. + + Crampton, Sir John, i. 41, 42. + + Craven, Mr. and Mrs. Augustus, ii. 421. + + Cremer, Mr., ii. 342. + + Crete, i. 148, 180, 300, ii. 159, 426; + insurrection in, i. 160, 163, 208; + proposed cession to Greece, i. 163, 206; + Omar Pasha sent to, i. 166; + settlement in Turco-Greek Conference, i. 210. + + Cridland, Mr., i. 122. + + Crimean war, allusions to, i. 4, 49, 129, 170, ii. 229, 417. + + Cromer, Earl of. _See_ Baring. + + Crowe, Sir Joseph, ii. 196, 253, 323. + + Cuba, United States and, i. 13, 15. + + _Curaçoa_, H.M.S., i. 12. + + Currie, Lord, ii. 371. + + _Cuvier_, the, French gunboat, ii. 22. + + _Cygnet_, H.M.S., i. 100. + + Cyprus, ii. 143, 150, 151. + + Czacki, Mgr., ii. 233. + + Czarewitch, ill-will to Prussia, i. 255, 260. + + + _Daily Telegraph_, letter on Lyons' opinions, ii. 129. + + Daira Land, administration of the, ii. 340. + + Dallas, Mr., U.S. Minister in London, i. 18, 38. + + Damietta, ii. 188. + + Danube, Russian policy, ii. 145. + + Dardanelles, the, i. 350, ii. 123, 224. + + Daru, Count, i. 243, 247, 251, 256, 261, 282; + on disarmament, i. 258, 265, 274, 301; + on political situation in France, i. 244; + on Bismarck's policy, i. 257; + and the plébiscite, i. 289. + + Davies, Jefferson, i. 89, 121, 123. + + Dayton, Mr., i. 46. + + _Débuts,_ anti-English articles in, ii. 180, 376. + + Décazes, Duc, ii. 50; + French Foreign Minister, ii. 56; + and the suzerainty of Tunis, ii. 60; + and ministerial crisis, ii. 67; + on foreign affairs, ii. 68; + and the war scare, ii. 71, 83; + policy in Russo-Turkish war, ii. 109; + internal policy, ii. 90, 100, 112; + suggests secret treaty to England, ii. 113. + + Declaration of Paris, allusions to, i. 38, 42. + + Denmark, Bismarck and, i. 272, 278; + Danish War, i. 177; + position before Franco-Prussian War, i. 302; + and Russia, i. 355. + + Derby, Earl of. _See_ Stanley. + + Dervish Pasha, ii. 284. + + Des Michels, M., ii. 231. + + Dilke, Sir Charles, ii. 197; + and Anglo-French commercial negotiations, ii. 253, 263, 269; + his Cherbourg speech, ii. 244. + + Disarmament negotiations, i. 246 _et seq._ + + Disraeli, Benjamin (Lord Beaconsfield), ii. 61; + quoted, ii. 138, 417; + on Franco-Prussian relations, i. 208; + on Anglo-French relations, ii. 73. + + Dix, Maj.-General John A., Report to, on recruiting system, i. 112-3, + 131; + and raid of St. Albans, i. 135. + + Döllinger movement, ii. 31. + + Domain Land, administration in, ii. 340. + + Dongorita, ii. 386, 388. + + Douglas, Governor, i. 19, 43. + + Dragoman system, Lyons dislike of, i. 146, 150, 175. + + Dresden, Lyons attaché at, i. 2. + + Duclerc, M., ii. 154; + forms a Ministry, ii. 293; + refuses office of Foreign Minister, ii. 380. + + Ducrot, General, ii. 111, 115. + + Dufaure, M., in the National Assembly, i. 365; + President of the Council, ii. 119; + resigns office, ii. 167. + + Dufferin, Lord, ii. 284, 287; + in Egypt, ii. 297, 299, 317. + + Dulcigno, ii. 274; + demonstration at, ii. 228; + surrender of, ii. 232. + + Dundas, Admiral, i. 5. + + Dunkirk, ii. 22. + + Dupanloup, Mgr., Bishop of Orleans, ii. 114. + + + Eastern Question, i. 221 _et seq._; + reopened, ii. 84, 89, 95; + Salisbury's circular on, ii. 132. + + Edinburgh, Duke of, offer of throne of Spain to, i. 200. + + Egerton, Sir Edwin, ii. 412. + + Egypt, affairs of, ii. 128, 154, 163, 203; + crisis in, ii. 171; + controllers appointed, ii. 189; + question of independence, i. 240; + Dual Note presented, ii. 270; + proposed Foreign Commission, ii. 273; + Turkish Commission in, ii. 284; + Conference on situation, ii. 285, 333; + Italy refuses to join England in, ii. 293; + Loan Decree, ii. 357; + question of evacuation, ii. 389; + Anglo-Turkish Convention, ii. 405, 409; + financial affairs, ii. 330; + proposed Conference on, ii. 325; + French counter-proposals, ii. 341; + settlement of, ii. 347; + English policy in, ii. 89, 109, 123, 133, 139, 153, 187-9; + Anglo-French action in, ii. 182; + Anglo-French relations in, ii. 246, 258, 296, 302, 304, 375; + French policy in, ii. 103, 386; + fears of English annexation, ii. 135; + French retirement from, ii. 291, 293; + National Party in, ii. 273; + foreign interests in, ii. 104; + Derby's policy in, ii. 122. + + Elliot, Sir Henry, ii. 216. + + Elysée, the, New Year's reception at, ii. 305. + + Emancipation of Slaves, i. 95. + + Emly, Lord, letter to Czacki, ii. 234. + + Ems, interviews at, i. 305; + visit of Emperor of Russia, i. 293. + + Enfida estate dispute, ii. 238. + + England, relations with the Papal Government, i. 4; + and the Neapolitan Government, i. 9; + and with U.S.A., i. 12; + and Belgian independence, i. 212; + commercial relations with France, i. 239, ii. 25. + (_See_ Commercial Treaties); + expenditure on armament, i. 278; + position in Franco-Prussian question, i. 203, 205, 314, 317; + and peace negotiations, i. 334; + military forces of, ii. 288; + military preparations in Central Asia, ii. 346; + press in, ii. 335. + + Erlanger, Baron Emile d', ii. 93. + + Errington, M.P., Mr. G., ii. 236; + secret mission to the Vatican, ii. 339. + + Erskine, Mr., British Minister at Athens, i. 149. + + Eugénie, Empress, on foreign affairs, i. 179, 180, 191; + visit to the East, i. 236, 239; + proposed visit to India, i. 222; + on Queen Victoria's postponed visit, i. 197; + on Spanish affairs, i. 205, 207; + and the war, i. 308, 309, 316; + on home affairs, i. 235, 245; + withdrawal from politics, i. 241; + press attacks on, i. 244; + a fugitive, i. 310; + at Chislehurst, i. 327, ii. 22; + Bismarck on, i. 271. + + European Conference at Constantinople, ii. 85, 106; + at Berlin, ii. 125, 126, 147. + + Exclusion Bill, ii. 309, 311. + + Expulsion Bill, ii. 365, 366. + + + Fabrice, General von, i. 387, ii. 3. + + Faidherbe, General, defeat at St. Quentin, i. 359. + + Fair Trade League, ii. 255. + + Fallières, M., ii. 309, 312. + + _Faon_, the, French gunboat, ii. 22. + + Fashoda, i. 71. + + Favre, Jules, Minister for Foreign Affairs, i. 313, 315, 332, 341, + 349, 356, 358, 361, 377, 381, 386, ii. 3, 16; + war policy, i. 310; + meeting with Bismarck, i. 316-324; + advises diplomatists to leave Paris, i. 322; + at Black Sea Conference, i. 350; + Bismarck refuses safe conduct to London, i. 353; + and peace negotiations, i. 360; + policy attacked, i. 362; + in the National Assembly, i. 368; + Lyons appreciation of, i. 359, 368. + + Fazyl Pasha, and the Young Turk Party, i. 167. + + Ferrières, i. 321. + + Ferry, M. Jules, i. 361; + Prime Minister, ii. 230; + policy in Tunis, ii. 240; + and Gambetta, ii. 249; + forms a Ministry, ii. 312; + at Foreign Office, ii. 320; + Egyptian policy, ii. 330, 338; + policy in China, ii. 339; + resignation of, ii. 349; + on Soudan affairs, ii. 344. + + Fielding, Hon. Percy, i. 348. + + Fire Island, kidnapped recruits at, i. 112. + + Fitzmaurice, Lord, i. 316; + "Life of Granville," quoted, i. 342. + + Flahault, M. de, i. 92. + + Fleury, General, i. 217; + proposed Minister at Florence, i. 230; + and Russo-French Alliance, i. 273; + Lord Clarendon on, i. 231. + + Floquet, M., ii. 404; + duel with Boulanger, ii. 370; + fails to form an administration, ii. 380. + + Florence, i. 2; + Lyons appointed secretary of legation at, i. 6; + Lyons appointed Minister at, i. 11; + Fleury's mission to, i. 230. + + Florian, Count, ii. 399. + + Flourens, M. Gustave, organizes riot in Paris, i. 330. + + Flourens, M., appointed Foreign Minister, ii. 381; + policy, ii. 398, 406. + + Flourens, Mme., ii. 387. + + Fontainebleau, i. 197, 375. + + Foochow, Chinese fleet destroyed at, ii. 337. + + Formosa, blockade of, ii. 337, 344. + + Forsyth, Mr., i. 14. + + Fort Issy, i. 382. + + Fort Lafayette, i. 131. + + Fort Sumter, i. 34, 50. + + Fort Warren, i. 71, 74, 75. + + Fournier, M., French Ambassador at Constantinople, ii. 169, 182, 205; + withdrawn from Constantinople, ii. 210. + + Fourtou, M., ii. 114. + + France, internal affairs, i. 190, 238, 280, ii. 105, 147, 164, 306, + 402; + republic declared, i. 237, 310; + Constitutional Government in, i. 283, 290; + Bismarck on, i. 271; + government of National Defence, i. 311, 336 _et seq._; + National Assembly, i. 363; + public v. monarchy in, i. 364; + elections in, i. 227, 360, ii. 97, 114, 116, 237, 363; + unrest among peasantry, ii. 297; + finances, i. 236, 358; + Protection v. Free Trade, ii. 321, 328, 335. + (_See_ Commercial Treaties); + press campaigns against England, ii. 178, 307, 310, 328, 333, 376; + anti-German attacks, ii. 411; + military power of, i. 257, 268, 369, ii. 59, 102, 356; + Lord Stanley on, i. 162; + Villiers' report, ii. 310; + and disarmament, i. 246, 258, 277; + navy of, ii. 59; + policy in U.S.A., i. 13, 42, 44, 46, 54, 67, 70, 77, 81; + in the Moldo-Wallachian Principalities, i. 153; + in Belgium, i. 211, 303; + in North Africa, i. 199; + in Eastern Question, ii. 134; + occupation of Rome, i. 3, 183-187; + proposes cession of Crete to Greece, i. 163. + + Franco-Prussian War, apprehensions of, i. 185, 195; + war declared, i. 301; + causes of, i. 305; + panic in Paris, i. 306; + suggestion for armistice, i. 312, 314, 347; + Bourbaki on the military situation, i. 327; + peace party, i. 328; + suggestion for European Congress, i. 367; + suggested terms of Peace, i. 348; + armistice agreed on, i. 360; + preliminaries of Peace signed, i. 369; + harshness of conditions, i. 373; + Neutral Powers and, i. 371; + the war indemnity, i. 369, ii. 3, 29, 41, 45; + effects on the Embassy, i. 347. + + Frankfort, i. 140, 236, 370. + + Frederick William IV., King of Prussia, ii. 41, 62; + in the San Juan dispute, i. 19; + on German unity, i. 208, 247, 266; + and army, i. 207, 247-9, 252, 254-6, 348; + on disarmament, i. 266, 275, 277; + at Ems, i. 293, 305; + and Clarendon, i. 201, 204; + friendship for Arnim, ii. 46; + relations with Bismarck, ii. 54, 57, 62, 73, 120; + attempt to assassinate, ii. 146; + ill-health, ii. 80, 354. + + Frederick William, Crown Prince of Prussia, on Franco-Prussian + relations, i. 207; + in the Franco-Prussian War, i. 309; + peaceful policy, i. 247; + English sympathies, i. 342, 343; + conversation with Odo Russell, ii. 80; + relations with Bismarck, ii. 57, 63, 74. + + Free Trade, decline in France, i. 241, 245, 290, 372, ii. 3, 27, 163. + (_See_ Commercial Treaties and Protection); + Lyons on, i. 284, ii. 27. + + Frère-Orban, M., visit to Paris, i. 219. + + Freycinet, M. de, ii. 119, 154, 200, 350; + succeeds Waddington at Foreign Office, ii. 204; + his ideal ambassador, ii. 211; + refuses office in Gambetta Ministry, ii. 262; + forms Ministry, ii. 277; + retires from office, ii. 291, 378; + Egyptian policy, ii. 281-91, 356, 377, 392; + Eastern policy, ii. 223. + + _Friedland_, the, sent to Tunis, ii. 238. + + Fuad Pasha, Grand Vizier, on Turkish finance, i. 146; + and the Paris Conference, i. 153; + dismissal of, i. 155; + alluded to, i. 151, 155, 166, 167, 171. + + + Galliera, Duchess of, ii. 43. + + Gallipoli, ii. 127. + + Gallway, Colonel, sent to report on army of the Potomac, i. 128, 129. + + Galt, Mr., Canadian Finance Minister, i. 60. + + Gambetta, minister of war, i. 325-329, 336, 338, 345, 349, 351, 355, + 356, 358, 360; + resigns office, i. 361; + recovery of influence, ii. 98; + dispute with Grévy, ii. 118; + interview with Prince of Wales, ii. 156; + growth of power, ii. 168; + on foreign policy of France, ii. 205; + resignation of, ii. 277; + and Ferry, ii. 249; + administrative qualities, ii. 262; + fall from office, ii. 296; + shot, ii. 301; + death, ii. 305; + policy and views of, i. 362, 363, 365, 370, ii. 8, 64, 67, 99, 106, + 119, 133, 147, 166, 197, 198, 226, 237, 266; + Egyptian policy, ii. 177, 181, 261, 290; + St. Hilaire on, ii. 229. + + Gambia, the, ii. 198. + + Garibaldi, invades Papal States, i. 178; + embarrassing foreign policy, i. 177; + in Franco-Prussian war, i. 324. + + _Gaulois_, on Sir J. Drummond Hay, ii. 329. + + Genoa, i. 8. + + Germany. _See also_ Prussia and Franco-German War; + Confederation question, i. 190, 192, 201, 204, 205, 207, 251, 266, + 276, 277, 343; + and need of seaboard, ii. 60; + relations with Russia, ii. 42, 324; + military power, i. 275, ii. 80, 356. + + Gibraltar, i. 200, ii. 288. + + Gladstone, on American struggle, i. 89; + on Belgian independence, i. 212, 214, 218; + on a peer's vote, i. 225, ii. 336; + and disarmament, i. 250, 259; + on the plébiscite, i. 283, 289, 290; + and the Hohenzollern candidature, i. 298; + on peace negotiations, i. 334; + Russian sympathies, ii. 109; + Eastern policy, ii. 228, 231; + Egyptian policy, ii. 274, 329; + visit to Paris, ii. 313; + Bismarck's dislike of, ii. 353, 354; + resigns office, ii. 356; + letters to Lyons, i. 334, ii. 347. + + _Globe_, and the Anglo-Russian Agreement, ii. 143. + + Goblet, M., Prime Minister of France, ii. 380; + foreign policy, ii. 389; + difficulties of, ii. 392. + + Godeaux, M., ii. 172. + + Gontaut, M. de, ii. 29. + + Goodenough, Captain, i. 128. + + Gordon, General, sent to Soudan, ii. 321, 343; + in Khartoum, ii. 326; + death of, ii. 343. + + Gortschakoff, Prince, i. 181, 209, 248, 273, ii. 42, 77, 80, 85, 88, + 90; + Bismarck's abuse of, ii. 168. + + Goschen, Mr. (afterward Viscount), at Constantinople, ii. 210, 223. + + Gozze, Count, i. 6. + + Gramont, Duc de, i. 289, 299, 302, 303, 340; + on the Hohenzollern candidature, i. 294; + and war, i. 307; + letter from Napoleon, i. 304; + Bismarck on, i. 320; + publishes letter of Beust, ii. 35, 36. + + Grant, General, i. 133, 372. + + Granville, Lord, at the Foreign Office, i. 294, 301, 343, 383; + policy in Franco-Prussian War, i. 313; + interview with Thiers, i. 316; + on revolution in Paris, i. 379; + Free Trade policy, ii. 27, 257; + Egyptian policy, ii. 274, 277; + succeeded by Lord Derby, ii. 54; + on the Eastern Question, ii. 231; + and Franco in Tunis, ii. 250; + on peers' voting, ii. 12; + on Waddington, ii. 314; + succeeded by Salisbury, ii. 356; + letters to Lyons, i. 294, 297, 317, 337, 340, 373, ii. 9, 23, 241, + 242, 270, 289, 323, 324, 329, 332, 346, 348, 353; + letter to Gladstone, ii. 274. + + Great Lakes, fortification of, i. 60. + + Greece, ii. 183; + financial immorality, i. 163; + increase of power, i. 164; + and Turkey, i. 166, 209, ii. 89; + and the Eastern question, i. 160, ii. 131, 223; + frontier question, i. 206, ii. 207, 227, 229. + + Greece, King of, ii. 225. + + Greeley, Mr. Horace, i. 96. + + Green, Mr., at Bucharest, i. 149, 153, 158. + + Grévy, M., i. 328; + in the National Assembly, i. 365, 368, ii. 16; + dispute with Gambetta, ii. 118; + becomes President, ii. 167; + loss of prestige, ii. 202; + and Boulanger, ii. 367, 393; + New Year's reception, ii. 305; + and peace policy, ii. 382, 383. + + Grey, General, letter to Clarendon, i. 211. + + Griffith, Mr., i. 28. + + Grousset, Paschal, i. 383. + + + Halifax, i. 73, 74. + + Halim, ii. 261; + proposed to make Khedive, ii. 280. + + Hammond, Mr., Under Secretary for Foreign Affairs, views and opinions + of, i. 63, 64, 77, 86, 294, 299; + letter to Lyons, i. 172. + + Hauseman, ii. 46. + + d'Harcourt, Emmanuel, ii. 91, 100, 144. + + Harney, General. i. 19, 23. + + Harper's Ferry, i. 20. + + Hartington, Lord, ii. 330, 332, 371. + + Hartmann, nihilist, ii. 207. + + Hatfield, Lyons at, ii. 222. + + Havannah, i. 54. + + Hay, Sir J. Drummond, ii. 329. + + Haymerle and the Austro-German Alliance, ii. 194. + + Head, Sir Edmund, Governor-General of Canada, i. 39, 50. + + Heneage, Mr., i. 132. + + Herat, ii. 352. + + Herbert, Sir Michael, i. 90. + + Herbette, M. d', ii. 386. + + Heron's Ghyll, Lyons at, ii. 424. + + Herzegovina, ii. 141; + annexation of, i. 342; + insurrection in, ii. 84; + and the Andrassy Note, ii. 96, 127. + + Hesse, i. 285. + + Hicks Pasha, disaster in Soudan, ii. 320, 325. + + Hobart Pasha, ii. 136. + + Hohenlohe, Prince, ii. 31, 69, 292. + + Hohenzollern, candidature for Spain, i. 294, 296, 305. + + Hohenzollern-Sigmaringen, Prince Charles of, chosen Hereditary Prince + of Roumania, i. 155-157; + invested at Constantinople, i. 158. + + Holland, i. 217; + and Luxembourg, i. 165, 168; + foreign designs on, i. 304, 355, ii. 83; + suggestions for protection of, ii. 113; + foreign relations, ii. 124; + in Constantinople Conference, ii. 109; + Bismarck's policy, ii. 345. + + Hope, Sir James, i. 133. + + Hope, Lady Mary, ii. 424. + + Hope-Scott, James, ii. 418. + + Hotham, Captain, ii. 22. + + Hovas, Queen of the, ii. 301. + + Howard, Lady Mary, ii. 418, 423. + + Hoyos, Count, ii. 387. + + Hudson, Sir James, note to the Sardinian Government, i. 10. + + Hugo, Victor, i. 224, 363, 370, 371; + death and funeral, ii. 354. + + Hungary, policy of Russia concerning, ii. 134. + + Hussein Khan, ii. 216. + + + Iddesleigh, Lord, Foreign Secretary, ii. 375; + death of, ii. 383. + + Ignatieff, General, Russian Minister at Constantinople, i. 148, 158; + mission to London, ii. 109; + foreign policy, ii. 128, 130. + + Imperialists, policy of, ii. 56. + + India, ii. 137, 205. + + International Law on blockade, i. 97. + + Irish emigrants in U.S.A., i. 15, 16, 25, 69; + liability to service, i. 109, 114, 115; + secret societies, i. 40. + + Irish Church Bill, i. 224, ii. 10, 11. + + Irish Nationalists, ii. 232. + + Isabella, Queen, in France, ii. 22. + + Ismail, Khedive, i. 221, 222, 239; + and Suez Canal Shares, ii. 85; + and Russo-Turkish War, ii. 110, 155, 171; + warning to, ii. 177; + deposed, ii. 185; + proposal to restore, ii. 344. + + Italy, ii. 55; + neutral policy, i. 298, 302; + Bismarck on, i. 321; + Eastern policy, i. 164; + and Prussia, i. 178, 193; + and Savoy, i. 382; + policy in Tunis, ii. 240, 248. + + + Jahde, i. 228. + + James river, America, i. 83. + + Janina, ii. 183. + + Jecker bonds, i. 218. + + Jenner, Mr., i. 87. + + Johnstone, Mr. Horace, i. 127. + + Joinville, Prince de, ii. 3, 7, 34. + + _Journal officiel_, i. 315, ii. 320. + + Juarez, i. 13. + + + Karolyi, ii. 391. + + Kars, ii. 143. + + Kemble, Adelaide, ii. 422. + + Kemble, Fanny, ii. 422. + + Kennedy, i. 140. + + Kentucky, i. 60. + + Kern, M., Swiss Minister at Paris, ii. 255. + + Khaireddin Pasha, ii. 167, 196. + + Khartoum, ii. 322; Gordon in, ii. 326; + expedition to, ii. 341; + fall of, ii. 343. + + Khedive. _See_ Ismail. + + Kiel, i. 204. + + Kitchener, Major (Lord), Rochefort's abuse of, ii. 358. + + Klazko, Mgr., i. 272, 278, 294. + + Knollys, Viscount, ii. 152. + + Knowsley, Lyons at, ii. 222, 424. + + Kroumirs, the, ii. 240, 301. + + + Lacour, M. Challemel, ii. 211, 257, 310; + becomes Foreign Minister, ii. 312; + on Egyptian question, ii. 316; + resignation of, ii. 320. + + Lagarde, the Abbé, i. 385. + + Land Bill (English), i. 294. + + Landsturm Bill, ii. 62. + + Lang-Son, French defeat at, ii. 349. + + Lascelles, Sir Frank, i. 377. + + La Tour d'Auvergne, La Prince de, i. 208, 233, 234, 240, 241, 308, 310. + + La Valette, M. de, i. 206, 218, 223, 234, 242, 256, 261, 287, 298, + 300-303; + on home policy, i. 229; + and disarmament, i. 247; + on the Hohenzollern candidature, i. 295; + on political situation, i. 285. + + Layard, Mr. (Sir Henry), i. 295, 347; + reports from Constantinople, ii. 123, 127; + the Anglo-Turkish Convention, ii. 140, 142, 143; + on Treaty of Berlin, ii. 160; + withdrawn from Constantinople, ii. 209; + letter to Lyons, ii. 137, 138. + + League of Patriots, ii. 402. + + Leboeuf, on France's readiness for war, i. 307. + + Le Flô, General, ii. 29; + conversation with Alexander of Russia, ii. 52, 54. + + Legh, Mr. (Lord Newton), ii. 220. + + Legitimists, policy of, i. 228, 364, 368, ii. 15, 18, 25, 56; + and Comte de Chambord, ii. 7; + proposed fusion with Orleanists, ii. 21; + White Flag Manifesto, ii. 47. + + Leighton, Sir Frederick, ii. 423. + + Le Mans, Chanzy at, i. 348, 359. + + Leo XIII., ii. 425. + + Lesseps, M. de, ii. 86; + and Suez Canal Shares, ii. 90, 93, 321; + on Soudan expedition, ii. 343. + + Levy, Mr., and the Enfida estate, ii. 238. + + Lhuys, Drouyn de, i. 241. + + _Liberté_, publishes secret negotiations, i. 301. + + Lincoln, President Abraham, i. 29, 34, 47, 60, 65, 69, 81, 88, 93, + 98, 100, 115, 140; + issues proclamations of Emancipation, i. 95; + and the U.S. Army, i. 110. + + Lindau, employed as secret agent by Bismarck, ii. 46. + + Lindsay, Major-General, i. 129. + + Lisbon, i. 144. + + Little, Mrs., ii. 417. + + Lobanoff, Prince, ii. 130. + + Loftus, Lord Augustus, British Ambassador at Berlin, i. 250, 295; + despatches from, i. 218, 273, 276, 285, 293; + interview with Bismarck, i. 254, 261, 270, 275; + letters to Clarendon, i. 254, 270. + + Longchamps, Reviews at, ii. 368, 369, 410. + + Longworth, Mr., i. 161. + + Lord Mayor, in Paris, ii. 64. + + Lords, House of, Lyons vote in, i. 226, ii. 9, 336. + + Lorraine. _See_ Alsace and Lorraine. + + Louis XVI., i. 254. + + Louis Philippe, i. 254. + + Louis, Prince Imperial, ii. 102; + death of, ii. 190-193. + + Lumley, British Minister at Brussels, ii. 75. + + Luxembourg, report of cession to France, i. 165; + Prussia refuses consent to sell, i. 168; + conference in London, i. 169; + railway affair, i. 211, 257; + Commission in London, i. 219. + + Lynch Law, i. 21. + + Lyons, strength of garrisons at, i. 268, 349. + + Lyons, Richard Bickerton Pemell, Lord, early life, i. 1; + succeeds to the peerage, i. 11; + Mission to Naples respecting _Cagliari_ case, i. 8-11; + appointed Minister at Florence, i. 11; + offer of the Washington Legation, i. 11; + with Prince of Wales in Canada, i. 25; a G.C.B., i. 76; + visits to Canada, i. 119, 134; + returns to London on account of ill-health, i. 89, 136; + resigns U.S. Legation, i. 139; + receives the degree of D.C.L., i. 144; + appointed to the Embassy at Constantinople, i. 144; + to Paris Embassy, i. 177; + removes with Embassy to Tours, i. 322; + to Bordeaux, i. 345; + returns to Paris, i. 375; + invited to represent England at Berlin Congress, ii. 125; + proffered resignation, ii. 394; + offer of Foreign Secretaryship, ii. 371; + termination of office, ii. 411; + created an earl, ii. 412; + death, ii. 412; + his personal characteristics, ii. 213-222, 412; + in private life, ii. 415. + + Letters from Lyons-- + to Lord Clarendon, i. 149, 152, 153, 206, 213, 219, 224, 227, 228, + 230, 233, 235, 239, 241, 244, 248, 256, 273, 280, 283, 285, 288, + 290. + to Earl Cowley, i. 154, 158, 174. + to Lord Derby, i. 156, ii. 54, 66, 95, 102, 107, 111, 112, 117, + 119, 127. + to Sir C. Dilke, ii. 254, 255. + to Lord Granville, i. 296, 299, 301, 303, 305, 308, 312, 315, 322, + 325, 329, 338, 350, 355, 356, 361, 365, 367, 371, 374, 376, 380, + 382, 385, 386, ii. 2, 7, 13, 15, 21, 24, 26, 34, 36, 37, 39, 47, + 48, 50, 223, 225, 226, 229, 230, 233, 235, 239, 243, 247, 248, + 249, 258, 261, 262, 263, 265, 271, 275, 278, 280, 281, 283, 286, + 292, 296, 298, 300, 302, 303, 308, 309, 312, 313, 314, 315, 317, + 319, 320, 321, 323, 326, 328, 330, 334, 338, 339, 341, 342, 345, + 350, 351, 352. + to Mr. Green, i. 158. + to Mr. Griffith, i. 28. + to Mr. Hammond, i. 127, 132, 309, 346. + to Sir Edmund Head, i. 39, 50. + to Lord Iddesleigh, ii. 375, 377, 378, 379, 381. + to Mr. Layard (Sir H.), i. 347, ii. 207. + to Captain Lyons, i. 5. + to Lady Lytton, ii. 209. + to Lord Malmesbury, i. 13, 14. + to Admiral Sir A. Milne, i. 104. + to Viscount Monck, i. 123. + to Duke of Newcastle, i. 28, 29. + to Lord Rosebery, ii. 363, 365, 366, 367, 368, 374. + to Lord John Russell, i. 17, 20, 21, 26, 30, 31, 36, 41, 42, 47, 55, + 57, 59, 65, 67, 71, 74, 82, 85, 88, 101, 102, 115, 120, 122, 128, + 136, 143, 145. + to Lord Odo Russell, ii. 30, 42, 51, 129. + to Lord Salisbury, ii. 134, 139, 145, 151, 152, 156, 165, 169, 171, + 180, 191, 192, 195, 196, 198, 202, 204, 357, 371, 383, 387, 388, + 389, 392, 394, 396, 398, 400, 402, 403, 404, 405, 410. + to Mr. Seward, i. 131, 140. + to Mr. Stuart, i. 139, 156. + to Lord Stanley (Earl Derby), i. 156, 159, 166, 179, 182, 186, 187, + 190, 197, 201, 203. + to Prince of Wales, ii. 98. + + Lyons, Admiral Sir Edmund, first baron, i. 1. + + Lyons, Captain Edmund, i. 5, ii. 417. + + Lytton, Lord, ii. 52, 209; + succeeds Lyons at Paris Embassy, ii. 411; + letter to Lyons, ii. 60. + + + McClellan, General, i. 56, 57, 65, 89. + + McHugh, Mr. James, i. 131. + + McLane, Mr., i. 13, 14. + + MacMahon, Marshal, i. 306, ii. 38; + succeeds Thiers as President, ii. 43; + and war scare, ii. 83; + policy of, ii. 56, 67, 97, 105, 111; + character, ii. 100; + Gambetta on, ii. 100; + election defeat, ii. 116; + resigns office, ii. 167. + + MacMahon, Madame la Maréchale, ii. 47, 114. + + Madagascar, ii. 300, 301, 307, 318, 360, 380. + + Magee, Mr., Consul at Mobile, i. 97, 121. + + _Magicienne_, the, i. 100, 103. + + Magne, M., finance minister, ii. 59. + + Malet, Sir Edward, accompanies Lyons to the Washington Legation, i. 90; + on Lyons' work at, i. 137; + transferred to Lisbon, i. 140; + accompanies Lyons to Constantinople, i. 144; + to Paris, i. 177; + emissary to Bismarck, i. 318; + alluded to, i. 347, 377, 383, 387, ii. 128; + in Egypt, ii. 238, 271, 276; + letter to Lyons, i. 319. + + Malmesbury, Lord, foreign secretary, i. 2, 8, ii. 11; + in the _Cagliari_ case, i. 10-14; + succeeded by Lord John Russell, i. 17. + + Malta, i. 5, 146, ii. 139, 243, 288; + troops in, ii. 290; + Lyons' boyhood at, ii. 417. + + Marne river, i. 345. + + Marseilles, i. 349; riots at, ii. 248. + + Martel, M., ii. 114. + + Martin, Sir Theodore, i. 61. + + Martino, ii. 177. + + Marvin, Mr., ii. 143. + + Mary, Grand Duchess, of Russia, i. 235. + + Maryland, i. 60. + + Mason, Mr., Confederate delegate to England, seized on board the + _Trent_, i. 54; + alluded to, i. 59, 60, 63, 74, 81; + failure of mission to Europe, i. 121. + + Matamoros, i. 100, 104. + + Mathilde, Princess, i. 223. + + Mayence, i. 265. + + Mazzinians, revolt of the, i. 9. + + Mazzini, plot against Napoleon, i. 188. + + Mediterranean, English power in, ii. 109, 113, 140, 200; + fleet ordered to Constantinople, ii. 123; + Indian troops in, ii. 132. + + Mehmet Ali, ii. 276. + + Menabrea, General, ii. 294; + on Sir J. Drummond Hay, ii. 329; + Ministry, i. 186. + + Mentana, i. 178. + + Mercantile Marine Law in France, ii. 24. + + Mercier, M., French Minister in U.S.A., i. 32-34, 46, 66, 115, 156; + friendly relations with Lyons, i. 44, 54; + on _Trent_ case, i. 68, 70; + visits Confederate headquarters, i. 82; + on American Civil War, i. 82; + proposal of foreign intervention, i. 90, 96. + + Merv, ii. 325. + + Mesopotamia, Russian policy in, ii. 137. + + Metternich, Prince, Austrian Ambassador in Paris, i. 287, 318, 338; + letter from Beust, ii. 35. + + Metz, i. 304, 358; + French army at, i. 307, 321, 327; + capitulation of, i. 329, 351. + + Mexico, United States policy in, i. 13, 15, 21; + expedition against, i. 70; + French in, i. 177, 218; + Emperor of, i. 133. + + Michel, Louise, ii. 316. + + Midhat Pasha, ii. 196. + + Military attachés, i. 120. + + Military efficiency, Lord Palmerston on, i. 48. + + Militia regiments in U.S., i. 47, 50. + + Milne, Admiral Sir A., i. 39, 52, 58, 59, 100, 104, 119. + + Missouri, i. 60. + + Mobile, i. 97, 121. + + Mohrenheim, Baron, ii. 325. + + Moldo-Wallachian Principalities, i. 148-150. + + Moltke, General von, i. 354, 374, ii. 30; + on Germany's position in Europe, i. 196; + on Franco-Prussian relations, i. 201; + on relations with Russia, i. 202; + and Clarendon, i. 203; + and the war scare, ii. 74. + + Monck, Lord, Governor-General of Canada, i. 60, 125, 126; + and Canadian defence, i. 132, 133. + + _Moniteur_, article in, i. 159. + + Monroe doctrine, i. 23. + + Monson, Mr., attaché at Washington, i. 87. + + Montebello, M. de, ii. 165; + Eastern policy, ii. 225, 407. + + Montenegro, ii. 142, 227; + surrender of Dulcigno to, ii. 232; + Prince of, ii. 226. + + Montpensier, i. 294. + + Moore, Mr., i. 122. + + Morier, Sir Robert, quoted, i. 344, ii. 82. + + Morocco, French policy in, ii. 386. + + Morrill Tariff (U.S.), i. 57. + + Moscow, coronation, ii. 314. + + Mouchy, Duc de, i. 233. + + Moustier, Marquis de, French Ambassador at Constantinople, i. 147, + 148, 153; + and Roumanian difficulty, i. 156, 158; + Eastern policy, i. 165, 186, 192; + and Prussia, i. 195; + succeeded by de la Valette, i. 206; + alluded to, i. 202, 203. + + Münster, Count, German Ambassador in London, ii. 75; + on the German army, ii. 80; + and French policy in Tunis, ii. 139; + at French Embassy, ii. 388, 410. + + Münster, Countess Marie, ii. 387. + + Murat, Prince Joachim, i. 233. + + Muscovite party, and Germany, i. 255. + + Mussulmans, and the Roman Catholic Church, ii. 4; + population in Turkey, i. 161; + discontent among, i. 167; + position in Bulgaria, ii. 227. + + Musurus Pasha, i. 152, 171, ii. 348. + + + Naples, i. 8, 146. + + Napoleon III., Emperor of France, i. 8; + proposal of intervention in American Civil War, i. 92; + Pro-Russian sympathies, i. 165. 170; + foreign policy, i. 183, 187, 213, 215. 220, 238; + on foreign policy of Prussia, i. 192; + on Franco-Prussian situation, i. 203; + on Spanish affairs, i. 207; + love of Conferences, i. 209; + ill-health of, i. 236; + plot, against, i. 285; + position in France, i. 187, 197, 235; + home policy, i. 227-9, 232, 234, 237, 240, 250; + and Constitutional Government, i. 190, 274; + and the plébiscite, i. 280, 291; + disposition for peace, i. + 191, 296; + with the army, i. 307, 355; + question of restoration, ii. 17; + at Chislehurst, ii. 21; + death of, ii. 36; + Bismarck on, i. 254, 320, 333; + friendship for Clarendon, i. 201; + letter to Gramont, i. 304. + + Napoleon, Prince, on the "Roman" question, i. 181; + on French foreign policy, i. 185; + on war with Germany, i. 191, 194, 203; + visit to Germany, i. 191; + Proclamation denouncing the Republic, ii. 305, 309; + arrest, ii. 308; + release, ii. 311; + expulsion from France, ii. 366; + alluded to, i. 235, ii. 2, 64, 191. + + National Assembly, at Versailles, i. 373. + + National Guards, defection of, i. 376; + at Courbevoie, i. 381. + + Neapolitan troops, i. 9. + + Nelidoff, M. de, ii. 389. + + Newcastle, Duke of, Colonial Secretary, i. 24, 28, 29. + + Newfoundland Fisheries, ii. 103, 153, 156, 197, 356, 384, 386. + + Newfoundland, Governor of, on colonial questions, i. 292. + + New Hampshire, i. 113. + + New Hebrides, ii. 314, 374, 386, 388, 390, 407, 409. + + New Orleans, i. 83; captured, i. 93. + + New York, i. 111, 113, 115; + visit of Russian squadron to, i. 120. + + Nice, ii. 26. + + Nicholas, Grand Duke, ii. 137. + + Niel, Marshal, orations by, i. 196. + + Nigra, Italian minister in Paris, i. 186. + + Noailles, Marquis de, ii. 197, 287. + + Nobiling, attempt to assassinate German Emperor, ii. 146. + + Noir, Victor, i. 244. + + Norfolk, America, i. 83. + + Norfolk, Duke of, i. 11, ii. 417. + + Norfolk, Duchess of, i. 139, ii. 218, 373, 424. + + Normanby, Lord, Minister at Florence, i. 7, 8, 87; + on Parliamentary voting, ii. 9. + + Northbrook, Lord, mission to Cairo, ii. 332; + return to England, ii. 337. + + North Carolina, revolt in, i. 35. + + _North German Gazette_, articles in, i. 299, 305. + + North Sea, Prussian fortifications on, i. 265. + + Nothomb, Baron, ii. 74, 76. + + Nubar Pasha, ii. 171, 204; + on Egyptian situation, ii. 278. + + Nuncio, the, in Paris, i. 287-8, 387. + + + Oldenburg, Duke of, i. 266. + + Ollivier, M. Emile, i. 240, ii. 35; + ministry of, i. 243; + policy of, i. 266; + and the plébiscite, i. 283, 284, 286; + on disarmament, i. 248, 283, 301; + resignation of, i. 307. + + Omar Pasha, sent to Crete, i. 166. + + Ordega, M., French Minister at Tangier, ii. 329. + + _Orénoque_, at Civita Vecchia, ii. 55. + + _Oreto_, the, i. 99. + + Orleans, i. 336, 349. + + Orleanists, i. 228, 349, 368, ii. 2, 15, 18, 21, 25, 56, 66, 106, 116; + Expulsion Bill, ii. 365, 366. + + Orloff, Prince, Russian Ambassador at Paris, ii. 33, 34, 231; + policy in Central Asia, ii. 38; + conversation with Décazes, ii. 69; + withdrawn from Paris, ii. 207. + + Osman Pasha, ii. 167. + + Oxford, Lyons at, i. 1. + + + Pacific coast defence, i. 40. + + Pagny, ii. 400. + + Pain, Olivier, ii. 358. + + Paladines, General d'Aurelle de, i. 336. + + Palermo, i. 146. + + Palikao, Count, i. 307. + + Palmerston, Lord, on fight of Bull's Run, i. 48; + on foreign intervention in American Civil War, i. 92; + and Lyons, i. 144, ii. 11; + death of, i. 149 _n._ + + Papal government, i. 3, 4, 8, 184, ii. 31; + and Irish affairs, ii. 234-6. + + Paris, Conference at, i. 153, 155; + Lyons appointed to the Embassy, i. 173, 177; + riots in, i. 286, 376, 386, ii. 316; + panic in, i. 306; + defences of, i. 317; + diplomatists leave, i. 322; + siege of, i. 348; + bombardment of, i. 356, 383; + military power in, i. 356; + Embassy returns to, i. 375; + Commune proclaimed, i. 379. + + Paris Exhibition, ii. 161. + + Paris, Treaty of, i. 337, 339. + + Paris, Archbishop of, seized by Commune, i. 384; + killed, i. 386. + + Paris, Comte de, ii. 8, 21, 25, 48, 56, 365, 366, 382. + + Park, engineer on the _Cagliari_, i. 9. + + Parnell, Mr., ii. 234. + + Pasquier, Duc d'Audiffret, ii. 117. + + Pau, ii. 22. + + Pauncefote and Egyptian Commission, ii. 353. + + Pearson, Mr., ii. 417. + + Peel, Sir Robert, attack on Lyons, i. 324, ii. 129. + + Penjdeh, fight at, ii. 348. + + Persia, Shah of, visit to Berlin, ii. 354. + + Persian Gulf, Russian policy in, ii. 352. + + Peruvian Papers, i. 32. + + _Peterhoff_, the, i. 100, 103. + + Petre, Mr., i. 2. + + Philippines, German interest in, ii. 60. + + Picard, M., i. 358, 387. + + Pines, Isle of, ii. 362, 364. + + Pius IX., ii. 423. + + Playfair, Colonel, i. 382. + + Poland, French policy in, i. 177, ii. 345. + + Polish Party, intrigues of, i. 272. + + Ponza island, i. 9. + + Portland, U.S.A., i. 81. + + Portugal, independence threatened, ii. 39. + + Postage, international, i. 211. + + Pothuau, Admiral, French ambassador, ii. 203, 210. + + Potomac, i. 59; army of the, i. 128. + + Prague, Treaty of, i. 204. + + Prince Consort, advice in _Trent_ case, i. 61, 77. + + Prince Eugène Barracks, i. 286. + + Protection in U.S.A., i. 18. + + Protection, growth of, in France, i. 241, 243, 245, 284, ii. 3, 27, + 165, 244, 257. + _See also_ COMMERCIAL TREATIES. + + Protestants in Papal dominions, i. 4. + + Provincetown, i. 74. + + Prussia (_see also_ Germany and Franco-German War), proposed + intervention in American Civil War, i. 91; + irritation against, in Paris, i. 165; + alliance with Italy, i. 178; + refuses consent to sell Luxembourg, i. 168; + relations with Austria, i. 186; + armament of, i. 192; + desire for peace, i. 201; + relations with Russia, i. 202; + question of disarmament, i. 246; + and Hohenzollern candidature in Spain, i. 294. + + + Quebec, i. 116, 133. + + Quertier, M. Pouyer, ii. 23, 24. + + + Raby, ii. 424. + + Radowitz, M., ii. 130, 231. + + Rahming, i. 132. + + Raindre, M. de, ii. 317. + + Rastadt, Prussian troops at, i. 302. + + Reciprocity Treaties, i. 17, 50, 74, 123. + + Recruiting methods in American Civil War, i. 110, 133. + + Redcliffe, Lord Stratford de, ii. 424; + letter to Lyons, i. 150. + + Regnier, M., and General Bourbaki, i. 327. + + Rémusat, M. de, ii. 23, 25. + + _République Française_, anti-English articles in, ii. 180, 302. + + Réunion, ii. 198. + + Rhenish Prussia, i. 193. + + Rhodes, ii. 159. + + Riaz Pasha, ii. 203. + + Richmond, U.S.A., Confederate headquarters, i. 82, 93, 133. + + Ring, M. de, ii. 182, 238. + + Rio Grande, i. 100. + + Ripley, General, i. 94. + + Ripon, Lord, mission to Washington, i. 190. + + Rochebouet, General, ii. 120. + + Rochefort, M. de, i. 230, 244, 313, 358, 363. + + Rogers, Mr., ii. 425. + + Rome, i. 2. + + "Roman question," i. 178, 182, 231. + + Rosebery, Lord, visit to Bismarck, ii. 353; + at Foreign Office, ii. 361; + retires from office, ii. 371; + letters to Lyons, ii. 363, 374. + + Rothschild, Baron Alphonse de, ii. 312, 315, 405. + + Rothschild, Sir Nathaniel, ii. 93, 315. + + Rothschild, Messrs., ii. 90, 175. + + Rouher, M., i. 228, 233, 244, 285, ii. 8; + foreign policy, i. 178, 183, 184, 254; + resignation of, i. 234, 237. + + Roumania, i. 155, 156, ii. 131. + + Roumelia, ii. 145, 227, 360. + + Roustan. M., French Agent at Tunis, ii. 240, 248. + + Rouvier, M., ii. 335; + becomes President, ii. 404. + + Russell, Lord John (Earl Russell), at Foreign Office, i. 17; + appoints Lyons attaché at Rome, i. 2, ii. 11; + policy in U.S.A., i. 37, 38, 61, 76, 90, 101, 127; + dislike of Seward, i. 118, 123; + his appreciation of Lyons, i. 141; + offers Lyons Constantinople Embassy, i. 144, ii. 11; + succeeded by Clarendon, i. 149; + visit to Paris, i. 283, 284; + to Versailles, i. 345; + letters to Lyons, i. 19, 37, 52, 62, 64, 92, 98, 99, 118, 132, 141. + + Russell, Odo (Lord Ampthill), on Roman question, i. 187; + meets Bismarck at Versailles, i. 339; + conversation with Bismarck, ii. 55; + on Bismarck's policy, ii. 60, 73, 87; + and the Constantinople Congress, ii. 145; + alluded to, ii. 71, 236, 345, 354; + letters to Derby, ii. 61, 72, 74, 77; + letters to Lyons, i. 184, ii. 29, 31, 40, 45, 52, 130; + despatch from, ii. 96. + + Russell, W. H., quoted, i. 35. + + Russia, policy in America, i. 91; + and the Treaty of Paris, i. 337; + foreign policy of, i. 354, ii. 33, 75, 76; + relations with Prussia, i. 202, 260, 268, ii. 42, 324; + and Denmark, i. 355; + policy in Turkey, i. 154, 159, 166, 209, 351; + in Eastern question, i. 164, 186, ii. 85; + in Asia, ii. 38, 345; + reputed ill-will to England, ii. 71; + military honour of, ii. 352. + + Russo-Turkish War, ii. 109, 121. + + + Sackville, Lord, i. 41. + + Sadowa, i. 185, 202, 301, ii. 36. + + St. Albans (Amer.), raid of, i. 135. + + St. Cloud, i. 197, 203, 208, 233. + + St. Denis, i. 382. + + St. Germain, i. 375. + + St. Hilaire, M. Barthélemy, at Foreign Office, ii. 229, 213, 248. + + St. Lawrence, i. 133. + + St. Malo, i. 347, ii. 22. + + St. Paul, M. de, ii. 114. + + St. Petersburg, i. 162, 317. + + St. Quentin, defeat of French at, i. 359. + + St. Thomas, U.S. ships at, i. 104, 105. + + St. Vallier, Comte de, ii. 136. + + _St. Vincent_, deserters from, i. 111. + + Salisbury, Lord, on Derby's foreign policy, ii. 105; + at Constantinople Conference, ii. 107, 108; + at the Foreign Office, ii. 132, 356; + on government of Orientals, ii. 178; + and Tunis, ii. 250; + and Mgr. Czacki, ii. 233, 234; + succeeded by Rosebery, ii. 361; + Layard on, ii. 138; + letters to Lyons, ii. 133, 140, 142, 144, 158, 172, 173, 175, + 176, 178, 180, 185, 187, 188, 190, 193, 242, 371, 386, 391, + 395, 409; + letter to Waddington, ii. 148. + + Salzburg, ii. 47. + + Sanford, Mr., i. 44. + + _San Jacinto_, American warship, i. 54. + + San Juan, disputed ownership of, i. 18, 23, 29, 30; + Company of Marines on, i. 43. + + San Stefano, Treaty of, ii. 124, 131, 136, 137, 144. + + Sapri, i. 9. + + Sardinia, i. 8, 10. + + Saumarez, Lord de, i. 377. + + Saussier, General, ii. 367. + + Savannah, i. 94. + + Savoy, i. 382. + + Saxony, i. 193. + + Saxony, Crown Prince of, i. 387. + + Say, M. Léon, Minister of Finance, ii. 119, 181, 200; + elected President of the Senate, ii. 210; + Eastern policy, ii. 225; + refuses office in Gambetta ministry, ii. 262. + + Schnaebelé, M., ii. 400, 401. + + Schouvaloff, Count, Russian Ambassador in London, ii. 76, 80, 88, + 140, 142. + + Schwarzenberg, Prince, i. 272. + + Scotland, Papal Government's plans in, i. 4. + + Scott, General, i. 19, 47, 64, 68. + + Sedan, i. 351, ii. 17. + + Seine, English merchant ships sunk in, i. 344; + Prefect of the, ii. 65. + + Semmes, Captain, i. 105. + + Servians and the Fortress of Belgrade, i. 161. + + Seward, Mr., i. 29; + appointed Secretary of State, U.S.A., i. 30; + policy of, i. 31 _et seq._; + advocates annexation of Canada, i. 40; + in the _Trent_ case, i. 65 _et seq._; + friendly relations with England, i. 80; + on the war, i. 92; + and Conscription Act, i. 115; + proposes state visit to England, i. 117-9; + correspondence with, i. 121; + letter to Lyons, i. 141. + + Seymour, Mr., i. 140. + + Seymour, Admiral Sir Beauchamp (Lord Alcester), ii. 228. + + Sfax, insurrections at, ii. 249. + + Sheffield, Mr. George, Private Secretary to Lyons, i. 90, 136; + sent to Frankfort, i. 140; + accompanies Lyons to Constantinople, i. 144; + to Paris, i. 177, 347, 377, ii. 98, 128, 204, 397, 427; + conversations with Gambetta, ii. 226, 237. + + "Shifting Scenes" quoted, i. 137. + + Shumla, ii. 137, 138. + + Siam, ii. 358. + + Simon, M. Jules, i. 387; + Prime Minister, ii. 106; + turned out of office, ii. 111. + + Sinkat, ii. 322. + + Slave trade in America, i. 20, 34; + proclamations of Emancipation, i. 95. + + Slave Trade Treaty, i. 85. + + Slidell, Mr., Confederate delegate to England seized on board the + _Trent_, i. 54, 59, 60, 63, 74, 81; + failure of mission to Europe, i. 121; + Mr. Benjamin's letter to, i. 122. + + Smyrna, proposed seizure of, ii. 228, 230. + + Socialism in France, i. 280. + + Somaliland coast troubles, ii. 362, 363, 409. + + Soudan, Hicks Pasha's disaster, ii. 320, 321; + Baker Pasha's defeat, ii. 323; + affairs in, ii. 343. + + Spain, internal affairs of, i. 200, 207, 221, ii. 39-41; + the Hohenzollern candidature, i. 294; + in Mexico, i. 70; + commercial relations with France, ii. 26; + in Constantinople Conference, ii. 109; + King of, mobbed in Paris, ii. 319. + + Spüller, M., ii. 197, 263. + + Stackelberg, on the Turco-Greek question, i. 206. + + _Standard_, the, on Franco-German relations, ii. 382. + + Stanley, Dean, ii. 193. + + Stanley, Lord (Earl of Derby), becomes Foreign Secretary, i. 156_n._; + diplomatic views, i. 161; + on the Cretan quarrel, i. 163; + on the Luxembourg difficulty, i. 169; + offers Paris Embassy to Lyons, i. 173; + on the Roman question, i. 178, 181; + American policy, i. 188; + and Franco-Prussian situation, i. 195, 203; + succeeded by Clarendon, i. 206; + and Prussian disarmament, i. 246; + on Parliamentary vote, ii. 10, 11; + at the Foreign Office, ii. 54, 123; + resignation of, ii. 132; + foreign policy, ii. 105, 107; + in Egypt, ii. 104, 122; + in Russo-Turkish War, ii. 121; + in the Eastern Question, ii. 95, 125; + in French politics, ii. 64, 112; + and the Suez Canal Shares, ii. 93; + Bismarck's dislike of, ii. 353, 354; + letters to Lyons, i. 164, 168, 195, ii. 71, 86, 87, 91, 121, 125; + letter to Odo Russell, ii. 75. + + Stanton, General, and the Suez Canal Shares, ii. 87, 90. + + Staveley, Mr., letter to Lyons, i. 226. + + Stewart, Lady Phillippa, ii. 427. + + Stoeckl, M. de, Russian Minister in U.S.A., i. 32, 33. + + Stoffel, Colonel, military reports of, ii. 50. + + Strasburg, i. 321, 358. + + Stuart, Lord, ii. 9. + + Stuart, Mr., Chargé d'affaires in Washington, i. 89, 92, 116. + + Suakim, French consul at, ii. 362. + + Suez Canal, i. 156, 221, 222; + Anglo-French relations in, ii. 287, 289, 321; + Commission, ii. 348, 352, 362, 363, 375, 388-91. + + Suez Canal Shares, Khedive prepares to sell, ii. 85; + purchased by England, ii. 90, 96. + + Sumner, Mr., i. 41, 85, 119, 120. + + Sunderland. Rev. Dr., on the _Trent_ case, i. 76. + + Sweden, King and Queen of, visit to Berlin, ii. 81. + + Switzerland, i. 198, 363; + proposed Confederation with South German States, i. 204, 205; + and Savoy, i. 382; + Commercial Treaty, ii. 8; + Protectionist policy, ii. 255. + + Syria, Russia in, ii. 137, 141. + + + Tahiti, ii. 198. + + Tangier, ii. 386. + + Tariff Bill, U.S.A., i. 50. + + Tel-el-Kebir, ii. 285. + + Tennessee, i. 85. + + Tenterden, Lord, letter to Lyons, ii. 90; + on Egypt, ii. 271. + + Tewfik, Prince, ii. 174; + proclaimed Khedive, ii. 185; + plot to dethrone, ii. 261; + proposal to depose, ii. 278, 280. + + Texas, i. 31. + + Therapia, ii. 417. + + Thibaudin, General, ii. 312, 319. + + Thiers, M., foreign policy, i. 185, 338, 347, 368, 373, 378, + ii. 19, 43; + and the political crisis, i. 282, 284; + on Napoleon III., i. 221, ii. 36; + interview with Lyons, i. 311; + mission to the Powers, i. 315, 317, 335; + on causes of the war, i. 316; + interview with Clarendon, i. 323; + interviews with Bismarck, i. 329, 331, 342, 353, 358; + peace efforts, i. 345, 347, 349, 369-71, ii. 29; + on the situation in Prussia, i. 332; + favours a republic, i. 362, 372; + in the National Assembly, i. 365, ii. 1; + commercial policy, i. 245, ii. 3, 5, 24; + made President, ii. 14; + tenders resignation, ii. 21; + and military re-organization, ii. 27, 29; + ill-health, ii. 31; + and the Triple Alliance, ii. 42; + succeeded by MacMahon, ii. 43; + home policy, ii. 34, 64, _et passim_; + Gambetta on, ii. 99. + + Thile, Prussian Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, i. 305. + + Thouvenel, M., i. 44, 63, 66, 67. + + Three Emperors Alliance, ii. 131, 145, 237. + + _Thunderer_, H.M.S., ii. 239. + + _Times_, references to, ii. 258, 303, 335, 343, 358. + + Tirard, M., Minister of Commerce, ii. 253. + + Tissot, M., i. 350, ii. 205; + at Constantinople, ii. 210, 300. + + Tonquin, French affairs in, ii. 302, 307, 318, 320, 322, 327, 334, + 337, 340, 342, 344, 350, 360, 369, 380. + + Toulon, i. 349. + + Tours, i. 315, 324, 345. + + _Trent_ case, i. 29, 54-78, 101, 103. + + Tripartite Treaty, ii. 141, 142. + + Triple Entente foreseen by Thiers, ii. 39. + + Tripoli, ii. 105; Italy in, ii. 251. + + Trochu, General, i. 303, 307, 318, 345, 354, 358, 359, 361. + + Trower, Major, ii. 424. + + Troyes, i. 197. + + Tuilleries, balls at the, i. 245, 288. + + Tunis, i. 8, 221; + French position in, i. 199, ii. 55, 139, 154, 163, 164, 173, 238, + 350; + French Protectorate established, ii. 243; + proposed Commission at, i. 206; + Germany in, ii. 55; + Italy in, ii. 105, 139. + + Tunis, Bey of, i. 148. + + Turkey, financial affairs, i. 146, 149, _et seq._, ii. 208; + bankruptcy of, ii. 84; + navy of, i. 151; + condition in 1866, i. 159; + in Crete, i. 208; + in Egypt, ii. 272, 276, 281, 321; + policy of Russia in, i. 159, 166, 351; + Prussian opinion of, i. 193. + + Turco-Greece affairs, i. 206, 209, 210. + + Turkey, Sultan of, and Khedive Ismail, i. 221; + and French Ambassador, ii. 32. + + Tuscany, i. 2, 7. + + + Ultramontane Party in Belgium, ii. 68. + + Ultramontanes, Bismarck's contest with, ii. 49, 50, 55, 81. + + United States Legation, represents Prussia in France, i. 308, 309. + + _Univers_, the, ii. 51. + + + Vacoufs, question of secularization, i. 147. + + Varna, ii. 137, 138. + + Varzin, Bismarck at, i. 299, ii. 70. + + Vattel, i. 64. + + Venables, Mrs. Lister, ii. 417. + + Versailles, diplomatic meetings at, i. 330, 337, 345, 358; + peace negotiations at, i. 368; + National Assembly established at, i. 373; + Government retires to, i. 376; + Thiers at, ii. 3, 21; + MacMahon at, ii. 44. + + Vevey, ii. 90. + + Victor Emmanuel (King of Italy), i. 178, 183, 201. + + Victor, Prince, expulsion from France, ii. 366. + + Victoria, Queen, letter to President Buchanan, i. 26; + and _Trent_ case, i. 61; + Sultan's wish to visit, i. 171; + reported plot against, i. 188; + visit to Paris, i. 197, 198; + on France in Belgium, i. 211; + and the Empress Eugénie, i. 222; + on Prussian disarmament, i. 250; + on French disarmament, i. 259; + and the Hohenzollern candidature i. 297; + and exiled royalties, ii. 23; + opening speech on Russo-Turkish war, ii. 123; + projected visit to Paris Exhibition, ii. 162; + and Lyons, i. 76, 144, ii. 354, 397. + + Vienna, i. 140. + + Villiers, Colonel the Hon. George, report on French army, ii. 310. + + Vinoy, General, i. 345. + + Virginia, i. 60, 85, 93. + + Vivian, Mr., H.B.M. Agent at Cairo, ii. 172, 173, 177. + + Vogué, Comte de, ii. 32. + + + Waddington, M., Minister for Foreign Affairs, ii. 119; + and foreign policy, ii. 123; + on Egyptian affairs, ii. 133, 171, 176, 180, 338, 389; + and Bismarck, ii. 168; + internal policy, ii. 147, 148, 195; + despatches, ii. 158; + resigns office, ii. 201; + a Free Trader, ii. 257; + and the Ferry Ministry, ii. 313; + Lyons on, ii. 145. + + Wagner, opera in Paris, ii. 403. + + Wales, Prince of (Edward VII.), visit to Canada, i. 24, 25; + visit to U.S.A., i. 27, 86, 117; + visits to Paris, i. 199; ii. 136, 139, 162, 328; + at Paris Exhibition, ii. 161; + proposed visit to South of France ii. 26; + visit to Paris abandoned, ii. 311; + and Thiers, ii. 29; + attacked in French press, ii. 152; + interview with Gambetta, ii. 156; + anti-Turkish opinions, i. 162. + + Wales, Princess of (Queen Alexandra), i. 99, 199. + + Walker, Colonel, British military attaché at Berlin, i. 219, 372. + + Walker, Mr., despatch to Lord Russell, i. 122. + + Walpole, Lord, i. 6. + + Warre, Mr., i. 14, 17, 87. + + Washbourne, Mr., American Minister in Paris, i. 384. + + Washington, Lyons appointed to Legation, i. 11; + Lyons at, i. 23; + society in, i. 87; + climate of, i. 119; + official figures of despatches to and from in 1864, i. 137; + work of the Chancery, i. 138. + + Watt, engineer on the _Cagliari_, i. 9. + + Weiss, appointment by Gambetta, ii. 266. + + Welles, Mr., Secretary to U.S. Navy, i. 58, 101, 103, 119. + + Werther, Prussian Ambassador at Paris, ii. 299. + + West Indies, proposals for defence, i. 40. + + Westminster Abbey, ii. 193. + + Westmoreland, Lord, on Parliamentary vote, ii. 10. + + Wheaton on international law, i. 40, 64. + + White Flag manifesto, ii. 57, 58, 65, 66. + + Wilhelmshöhe, i. 333. + + Wilkes, Captain (of the _San Jacinto_), i. 58, 64, 100, 105. + + Wilmington, Vigilance Committee at, i. 35. + + Wilson, M. Daniel, on the Franco-Prussian war, i. 328. + + Wilson, Sir C. Rivers, Minister of Finance in Egypt, ii. 153, 171, + 173, 175, 178, 188, 271, 313. + + Winchester, Lyons at, i. 1. + + Wistar, General, i. 112. + + Woburn, Lyons at, ii. 219, 222, 424. + + Wodehouse, Mr. Henry, i. 342, 377; + letter to Lyons, i. 343. + + Wood, Mr., despatch from, ii. 55. + + Wolff, Sir H. Drummond, question on Tunis, ii. 239; + mission to the Porte, ii. 376, 387, 389, 391, 407, 409. + + Wolseley, Sir Garnet, in Egypt, i. 299, 358. + + Würtemberg and Confederation, i. 193, 266. + + Wurtzburg, Baron, i. 11, ii. 417. + + Wurtzburg, Baroness, ii. 424. + + + Young Turk Party, i. 167. + + + Zanzibar, ii. 378. + + Zululand expedition, ii. 190. + + + + +THE END + + + + + PRINTED BY + WILLIAM CLOWES AND SONS, LIMITED, + LONDON AND BECCLES. + + Telegrams: + "Scholarly, London." 41 and 43 Maddox Street, + Bond Street, London, W. + Telephone: _September, 1913._ + No. 1883 Mayfair. + + Mr. Edward Arnold's + + AUTUMN + ANNOUNCEMENTS, 1913. + + * * * * * + + LORD LYONS. + + A Record of British Diplomacy. + + By the Right Hon. LORD NEWTON. + + _With Portraits. In Two Volumes._ =30s. net.= + +The late Lord Lyons was not only the most prominent but the most trusted +English diplomatist of his day, and so great was the confidence felt in +his ability that he was paid the unique compliment of being offered the +post of Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs. + +Lord Newton, who has now undertaken the task of preparing a memoir of +him, enjoys the advantage of having served under him for five years at +the Paris Embassy. The interest of this work lies, however, less in the +personality of the Ambassador than in the highly important events in +which he played so prominent a part. + +Lord Lyons was the British representative at Washington during +the period of the Civil War; subsequently he was Ambassador at +Constantinople for two years; and finally he spent twenty years--from +1867 to 1887--as Ambassador at Paris. During the whole of this eventful +period his advice was constantly sought by the Home Government upon +every foreign question of importance, and his correspondence throws +fresh light upon obscure passages in diplomatic history. + +In this book will be found hitherto unpublished information relating to +such matters as the critical relations between England and the United +States during the course of the Civil War; the political situation in +France during the closing years of the Second Empire; the secret attempt +made by the British Foreign Secretary to avert the Franco-German War, +and the explanation of its failure; the internal and external policy +of France during the early years of the Third Republic; the War Scare +of 1875; the Congress of Berlin; the Egyptian Expedition; Anglo-French +political relations, and many other matters of interest. + +The method selected by the writer has been to reproduce all important +correspondence verbatim, and it may be confidently asserted that the +student of foreign politics will find in this work a valuable record of +modern diplomatic history. + + LONDON: EDWARD ARNOLD, 41 & 43 MADDOX STREET. W. + + * * * * * + + + THE LIFE AND LETTERS OF + GEORGE WILLIAM FREDERICK, + FOURTH EARL OF CLARENDON. + + By the Right Hon. Sir HERBERT MAXWELL, Bart. + + _In Two Volumes. With Portraits. Demy 8vo._ =30s. net.= + +Born in the year 1800 and dying in 1870, Lord Clarendon lived through +a period of social, political, and economic change more rapid probably +than had been witnessed in any similar space of time in the previous +history of mankind. It was his lot, moreover, to wield considerable +influence over the course of affairs, inasmuch as his public service, +extending over fifty years, caused him to be employed in a succession +of highly responsible, and even critical, situations. British Minister +at Madrid at the outbreak and during the course of the Carlist Civil +War from 1833 to 1839, he was admitted into Lord Melbourne's Cabinet +immediately upon returning to England in the latter year. He was Lord +Lieutenant of Ireland throughout the memorable famine years, 1847-1852. +Relieved of that arduous post, Lord Clarendon entered Lord Aberdeen's +government in 1852 as Foreign Secretary, which office he retained +through the Crimean War, and became responsible for the terms of the +Treaty of Paris in 1856. On Lord Palmerston's death in 1865, he returned +to the Foreign Office, and had to deal with the settlement of the +"Alabama" claims. + +The annals of the first half of Queen Victoria's reign having been +pretty thoroughly explored and dealt with by many competent writers, the +chief interest in these pages will be found in Lord Clarendon's private +correspondence, which has been well preserved, and has been entrusted to +Sir Herbert Maxwell for the purpose of this memoir. Lord Clarendon was +a fluent and diligent correspondent; Charles Greville and others among +his contemporaries frequently expressed a hope that his letters should +some day find their way into literature. Sir Arthur Helps, for instance, +wrote as follows in _Macmillan's Magazine_: "Lord Clarendon was a man +who indulged, notwithstanding his public labours, in an immense private +correspondence. There were some persons to whom, I believe, he wrote +daily, and perhaps in after years we shall be favoured--those of us +who live to see it--with a correspondence which will enlighten us as +to many of the principal topics of our own period." It is upon this +correspondence that Sir Herbert Maxwell has chiefly relied in tracing +the motives, principles, and conduct of one of the last Whig statesmen. +Among the letters dealt with, and now published for the first time, are +those from Lord Melbourne, Lord Palmerston, Lord Aberdeen, Lord Derby, +M. Thiers, M. Guizot, the Emperor Louis Napoleon, etc., and many ladies. + + +WILLIAM AUGUSTUS, DUKE OF CUMBERLAND, HIS EARLY LIFE AND TIMES, +1721-1748. + +By the Hon. EVAN CHARTERIS, + +AUTHOR OF "AFFAIRS OF SCOTLAND, 1744-1746." + +_With Plans and Illustrations._ =12s. 6d. net.= [_In preparation._ + +Mr. Charteris has a good subject in "Butcher" Cumberland, not only on +account of the historical and romantic interest of his background, but +also by reason of the Duke's baneful reputation. + +In the present volume the author has carried the career of the Duke of +Cumberland down to the Peace of Aix-la-Chapelle. The period includes +the Duke's campaigns in Flanders against Marshal Saxe, the Battle of +Culloden, and the measures taken for the suppression of the Jacobites in +Scotland. Mr. Charteris has had the exceptional advantage of studying +the Cumberland Papers at Windsor Castle, and it is largely by the aid +of hitherto unpublished documents that he is now able to throw fresh +light on a character which has been the subject of so much malevolent +criticism. At the same time the volume deals with the social and +political conditions among which Cumberland was called on to play so +important a part in the life of the nation. These have been treated by +the author with some fulness of detail. Cumberland, in spite of his +foreign origin, was remarkably typical of the characteristics of the +earlier Georgian period, and an endeavour has been made in the present +volume to establish the link between the Duke and the politics, the +morals, the aims, and the pursuits of the age in which he lived. + + +MY ART AND MY FRIENDS. + +THE REMINISCENCES OF SIR F. H. COWEN. + +_With Portrait. Demy 8vo._ =10s. 6d. net.= + +In the course of a long and distinguished musical career, Sir Frederic +Cowen has had opportunities of visiting many parts of the world, of +meeting all the most eminent artists of the last half-century, and +of amassing material for an extremely diverting volume of personal +recollections. As a child he enjoyed the privilege of being embraced +by the great Piccolomini; as a young man he toured with Trebelli, +and became acquainted with the famous Rubinstein, with Bülow, and +with Joachim. In later life he numbered such well-known musicians as +Pachmann, Paderewski, Sir Arthur Sullivan, and the de Reszkes, among his +friends. Nor was the circle of his intimates entirely confined to the +world of music; he was on terms of the closest friendship with Corney +Grain, with George Grossmith and Arthur Cecil; he capped the puns of +Henry J. Byron and Sir Francis Burnand; he laughed at the practical +jokes of Toole, at the caricatures which Phil May drew for him of +his friends. To the public Sir Frederick Cowen is well known as the +conductor of Covent Garden Promenade and Philharmonic Concerts, as the +composer of such celebrated songs as "The Better Land" and "The Promise +of Life," of "The Corsair" and "The Butterfly's Ball." In these pages +he shows himself to be a keen but kindly student of human nature, who +can describe the various experiences of his past life with a genial but +humorous pen. The inexhaustible fund of anecdote from which he draws +tends still further to enliven an amusing and lively volume. + + +A CIVIL SERVANT IN BURMA. + +By Sir HERBERT THIRKELL WHITE, K.C.I.E. + +_With 16 Pages of Illustrations. Demy 8vo._ =12s. 6d. net.= + +Sir Herbert Thirkell White, who has but recently retired from the post +of Lieutenant-Governor of Burma, which he filled with ability and +distinction, has now written what he modestly calls a "plain story" of +more than thirty years of official life in India. In this volume are +narrated the experiences of an Indian Civilian who has devoted the best +part of his existence to the service of the Empire, and is in a position +to speak with assurance of the many complicated problems with which the +white man in India is continually faced. Sir Herbert's acquaintance with +Burma began in 1878; since then he has had every opportunity of judging +the peculiar habits, customs, and characteristics of the native Burmese, +and has been able to compile a valuable record of the impressions they +have made upon his mind. It was his fate to hold official positions +of increasing importance during the Viceroyalties of Lord Ripon, Lord +Dufferin, and Lord Curzon; he was privileged to serve such distinguished +chiefs as Sir Charles Bernard and Sir Charles Crosthwaite, and witnessed +that pacification of Burma which the last-named Chief Commissioner has +described so eloquently in his well-known book on the subject. Sir +Herbert writes clearly and with knowledge of every aspect of Burmese +life and character, and this volume of his recollections should prove +extremely popular among English readers who are interested in the +government of our Indian Empire and the daily routine of the Indian +Civil Servant. + + +THIRTY YEARS IN KASHMIR. + +By ARTHUR NEVE, F.R.C.S.E. + +_With Illustrations and a Map. Demy 8vo._ =12s. 6d. net.= + +The stupendous natural surroundings amidst which they dwell have +inspired sojourners in Kashmir and other Himalayan countries to produce +some of the finest books of travel to be found. Among them will have to +be included in future this book of Dr. Arthur Neve's, so effectively +does the author reveal the wonders of the land of towering peaks and +huge glaciers where he has made his home for the last thirty years. + +Going out to Kashmir in 1882 under the auspices of the Church Missionary +Society, Dr. Neve took over the charge of the Kashmir Mission Hospital +at Srinagur from Dr. Edmund Downes, who was retiring, and has stayed +there ever since. In his earlier chapters he gives some account of the +Punjab and Kashmir in the eighties, and also of the work of the mission. +He then gets to the principal motif of the book--the exploring tours and +mountaineering expeditions to which he has devoted his spare time. Nanga +Parbat, Nun Kun, and many other Himalayan giants, are within hail of +Srinagur, and before he has finished with the book the reader will find +he has acquired the next best thing to a first-hand knowledge of this +magnificent country. Dr. Neve has also a great deal that is interesting +to tell about the people of various races and religions who inhabit the +valleys, and from whom his medical help gained him a warm welcome at all +times. + +A series of rare photographs gives a pictorial support to the +letter-press. + + +SPORT AND FOLK-LORE IN THE HIMALAYA. + +By Captain H. L. HAUGHTON. + +(36TH SIKHS.) + +_With Illustrations from the Author's Photographs. One Volume._ + +_Demy 8vo._ =12s. 6d. net.= + +Captain Haughton has written a book which should prove a welcome +addition to the library of every sportsman, as well as being of supreme +interest to the naturalist and the student of folk-lore. On the subject +of sport the author writes with that thorough insight and sympathy +which are the fruits of many years' practical experience with rod and +rifle, in the jungle, on river-bank or mountain-side. In his agreeable +society the reader may stalk the markhor or the ibex, lightly throw his +"Sir Richard" across some Kashmiri trout-stream, or lie in wait for the +Himalayan black bear on its way to feed; and if the author's description +of his many amusing and exciting adventures and experiences is eminently +readable, the value of his work is still further enhanced by his +intimate knowledge of natural history, and by the introduction of many +of those old Indian legendary tales that he has culled from the lips of +native Shikaris round the camp-fire at night. The book is illustrated +throughout with a series of remarkably interesting photographs taken by +the author in the course of his many sporting expeditions. + + +RECOLLECTIONS OF A PENINSULAR VETERAN. + +By the late Lieut.-Colonel JOSEPH ANDERSON, C.B., K.H. + +_With Photogravure Portrait. Demy 8vo._ =10s. 6d. net.= + +The late Lieut.-Colonel Joseph Anderson was born in 1790, and from the +age of fifteen, when he received a commission as Ensign in the 78th +Regiment, to within a few years of his death in 1877, his career was +almost continuously as adventurous as it was distinguished. In 1806 +he saw active service for the first time, when he took part in the +expedition to Calabria; in the following year he served in the Egyptian +Campaign of that date; and during the Peninsular War he fought at the +battles of Maida, Busaco, Fuentes d'Onoro, was wounded at Talavera, and +accompanied Wellington on the retreat to the lines of Torres Vedras. A +few years later Captain Anderson, now a Captain in the York Chasseurs, +was sent with his regiment to Barbadoes, and was present at the capture +of Guadeloupe in 1815. He was appointed Colonel Commandant of the Penal +Settlement at Norfolk Island in 1834, where his humane endeavours to +reform the prevailing penal system, and his efforts to quell mutinous +convicts, met with marked success. Nine years later Colonel Anderson +went to India to take part in the Mahratta Campaign, and at the Battle +of Punniar (where he commanded a Brigade) was severely wounded when +charging the enemy's guns. After retiring from the Service, Colonel +Anderson settled down in Australia, and it was at his home near +Melbourne that these memories were compiled, during the later years of a +strenuous and active life, for the edification of his family. They are +written in a simple, unaffected style, which renders them peculiarly +readable, and form a most instructive record of the manners and customs, +of the mode of warfare, and the military and social life of a past age, +and a bygone generation. + + +MEMORIES OF A SOLDIER'S LIFE. + +By Major-General Sir H. M. BENGOUGH, K.C.B. + +_With Portrait. Demy 8vo._ =8s. 6d. net.= + +Major-General Sir H. M. Bengough joined the army in 1855, and retired +in 1898, after more than forty years of distinguished service in all +quarters of the Empire. His first experience of active warfare dates +from the Crimea; later on he took the field in the Zulu War and the +Burma Expedition of 1885. In days of peace he held various high commands +in India, South Africa, and Jamaica, and finally commanded a brigade +of infantry at Aldershot. In this volume of personal recollections the +author narrates the many varied incidents and experiences of a long +military career and vividly describes the campaigns in which he took +part. He also gives an interesting account of his adventures in the +realm of sport--pig-sticking, tiger-shooting, and pursuing other forms +of game in India and elsewhere; subjects upon which a long experience +enables him to write with expert knowledge. It will be strange indeed if +so interesting an autobiographical volume from the pen of a deservedly +popular soldier and sportsman fails to appeal to a wide public. + + +ZACHARY STOYANOFF. + +Pages from the Autobiography of a Bulgarian Insurgent. + +Translated by M. POTTER. + +_One Volume. Demy 8vo._ =10s. 6d. net.= + +In this volume Zachary Stoyanoff gives us the narrative of his personal +experiences during the Bulgarian outbreaks of 1875 and 1876. Almost +by accident he became an "apostle" of rebellion, and was sent out +forthwith to range the country, stirring up the villagers and forming +local committees. It is an amazing story. With unsurpassable candour +he portrays for us the leaders, their enthusiasm, their incredible +short-sightedness, and the pitiful inadequacy of their preparations. +The bubble burst, and after a miserable attempt at flight, Stoyanoff +was taken prisoner and sent to Philippopolis for trial. There is no +attempt at heroics. With the same Boswellian simplicity he reveals his +fears, his cringing, his mendacity, and incidentally gives us a graphic +picture, not wholly black, of the conquering Turk. The narrative ends +abruptly while he is still in peril of his life. One is glad to know +that, somehow, he escaped. A very human document, and a remarkable +contrast to the startling exhibition of efficiency given to the world by +the Bulgarians in their latest struggle with the Turks. + + +SPLENDID FAILURES. + +By HARRY GRAHAM, + +AUTHOR OF "A GROUP OF SCOTTISH WOMEN," "THE MOTHER OF PARLIAMENTS," ETC. + +_With Portraits. Demy 8vo._ =10s. 6d. net.= + +It is perhaps unlikely that any two individuals will agree as to the +proper definition of the term "A Splendid Failure"--a phrase of which +the origin would appear to be obscure. It may, however, be roughly +stated that the "Splendid Failures" of the past divide themselves +naturally into three classes: those whom their contemporaries invested +with a fictitious or exaggerated splendour which posterity is quite +unable to comprehend or appreciate; those whom the modern world regards +with admiration--but who signally failed in impressing the men of +their own generation; and those who, gifted with genius and inspired +with lofty ideals, never justified the world's high opinion of their +talents or fulfilled the promise of their early days. In this volume of +biographical essays, the author of "A Group of Scottish Women" and other +popular works has dealt with a selection of "splendid failures" of whose +personal history the public knows but little, though well acquainted +with their names. Wolfe Tone, "the first of the Fenians"; Benjamin +Haydon, the "Cockney Raphael"; Toussaint L'Ouverture, the "Napoleon +of San Domingo"; William Betty, the "Infant Roscius"; and "Champagne" +Townshend, the politician of Pitt's day, may be included under this +category. The reader cannot fail to be interested in that account which +the author gives of the ill-fated Archduke Maximilian's attempt to found +a Mexican monarchy; in his careful review of the work and character +of Hartley Coleridge; and in his biographical study of George Smythe, +that friend of Disraeli whom the statesman-novelist took as his model +for the hero of "Coningsby." This book, which should appeal strongly +to all readers of literary essays, is illustrated with eight excellent +portraits. + + +THE CORINTHIAN YACHTSMAN'S HANDBOOK. + +By FRANCIS B. COOKE. + +_With 20 Folding Plates of Designs for Yachts, and numerous black and +white Illustrations. Demy 8vo._ =10s. 6d. net.= + +This new handbook covers the sport of yachting in all its branches. The +writer, who has had many years' experience of cruising and racing in +yachts and boats of all types, has treated the subject in a thoroughly +practical manner. The book is divided into six parts. + +In Part I., which deals with the selection of a yacht, the various types +and rigs suitable for Corinthian yachting are discussed. The designing +and building of new craft are also dealt with at some length, and +designs and descriptions of a number of up-to-date small cruisers are +given. + +In Part II. some hints are given as to where to station the yacht. All +available headquarters within easy reach of London are described, and +the advantages and disadvantages of each pointed out. + +Part III. is devoted to the equipment of yachts, and contains a wealth +of information as to the internal arrangement, rigging, and fittings of +small cruisers. + +Part IV. treats of the maintenance of small cruising vessels, with +notes on the cost of upkeep, fitting out and laying up. Other matters +dealt with in this section are the preservation of sails and gear, and +insurance. + +Part V., on seamanship, covers the handling of fore-and-aft vessels +under all conditions of weather, and upon every point of sailing. + +Part VI. covers the racing side of the sport in a comprehensive manner. +An exhaustive exposition of the International Sailing Rules is followed +by hints on racing tactics. The appendix contains, _inter alia_, an +illustrated description of the British Buoyage System. + +Mr. Cooke's well-known handbooks have come to be regarded by yachtsmen +as standard works, and a new and more ambitious work from his pen can +hardly fail to interest them. + + +THE FALL OF PROTECTION. + +By BERNARD HOLLAND, C.B., + +AUTHOR OF "IMPERIUM ET LIBERTAS." + +_One Volume. Demy 8vo._ =12s. 6d. net.= + +This volume is a political-historical study of the great change which +took place in British commercial and financial policy mainly between +the years 1840 and 1850. The writer examines the state of things in +these respects which existed before this revolution, and describes the +previous protective system, navigation system, and colonial system. +He then narrates the process by which those systems were overthrown, +devoting special attention to the character, career, and changes in +opinion of Sir Robert Peel, and to the attitude and action of the Tory, +Whig, and Radical parties, and of their leading men, especially Mr. +Disraeli, Lord John Russell, and Mr. Cobden. He analyses with care +the arguments used on all sides in these controversies, especially +with regard to the Repeal of the Corn Laws, and he shows the extent to +which questions of imperial preference and the relations between the +United Kingdom and the Colonies entered into the issues. One chapter is +devoted to the Bank Act of 1844, and to the consideration of its causes +and results. The author concludes by tracing very briefly the chain of +events which connect the period in question with our own day, in respect +of commercial and fiscal policy, and expresses his own views as to +existing tendencies and future developments. + +Mr. Bernard Holland is known as the author of the Life of the Duke +of Devonshire, and of "Imperium et Libertas." In a sense the present +volume is a continuation of the latter book, or rather is an attempt to +deal more expansively and in detail with certain history and questions +connected with the same theme, for the full treatment of which there was +insufficient space in that book. Mr. Holland having acted for a number +of years as Private Secretary to two successive Secretaries of State for +the Colonies, has been brought into close touch in a practical way with +colonial questions. This book, it is hoped, will be of some service both +to students of economic history and to politicians in active life. + + +PAINTING IN THE FAR EAST. + +By LAURENCE BINYON. + +_A New Edition, thoroughly Revised, with many new and additional +Illustrations. Crown 4to._ =21s. net.= + +Since the first edition of this book was published in 1907, much has +happened, and a quantity of new material has been brought to light. + +Interest in the subject has been immensely widened and strengthened. +The museums of Europe and America are vying with each other to procure +fine specimens of Chinese and Japanese art. The opening this autumn of +a new museum at Cologne, exclusively devoted to the arts of Eastern +Asia, is a symptom of the times. Collections, public and private, both +European and American, have been greatly enriched; and the exhibition in +1910 at Shepherd's Bush, of treasured masterpieces lent from Japanese +collections, has provided a standard for the student. + +Six years ago, again, scarcely any of the voluminous literature of art +existing in Chinese and Japanese had been translated. On this side, too, +an added store of information has been made accessible, though still in +great part scattered in the pages of learned periodicals. Above all, +the marvellous discoveries made of recent years in China and Chinese +Turkestan have substituted a mass of authentic material for groping +conjectures in the study of the art of the early periods. + +In preparing a new edition of this book and bringing it up to date, +Mr. Binyon has therefore been able to utilize a variety of new sources +of information. The estimates given of the art of some of the most +famous of the older masters have been reconsidered. The sections +dealing with the early art have been in great measure rewritten; and +the book has been revised throughout. In the matter of illustrations it +has been possible to draw on a wider range and make a fuller and more +representative selection. + + +PAINTING IN EAST AND WEST. + +By ROBERT DOUGLAS NORTON, + +AUTHOR OF "THE CHOICE." + +_Crown 8vo._ =5s. net.= + +The art of painting, which in the days of Gothic church-building +contributed so much both to the education and the pleasure of the +community at large, has admittedly come to appeal to ever-narrowing +circles, until to-day it cannot be said to play any part in popular +life at all. This book seeks to discover the causes of its decline +in influence. A brief review of the chief contemporary movements in +painting gives point to a suggestion made by more than one thoughtful +critic that the chief need of Western painting is spirituality. +Since this is a quality which those competent to judge are at one in +attributing to Eastern art, the author, in a chapter on Far Eastern +Painting, sets forth the ideals underlying the great painting of China +and Japan, and contrasts these ideals with those which have inspired +painters and public in the West. This leads to an inquiry into the +uses of imagination and suggestion in art, and to an attempt to find a +broad enough definition for "spirituality" not to exclude many widely +divergent achievements of Western painting. Finally, the possibility of +training the sense of beauty is discussed in the light of successful +instances. + +Incidentally the book touches on many questions which, though of +interest to picture-lovers, often remain unasked; such, for instance, +as what we look for in a picture; how far subject is important; why it +may happen that the interest of one picture, which pleases at first, +soon wanes, while that of another grows steadily stronger; the value of +technique, of different media of expression, of mere resemblance, etc. + +Without going into the technicalities of aesthetics, the author aims at +investigating certain first principles which are overlooked at times by +possessors of even the widest knowledge of individual schools. + + +SHAKESPEARE'S STORIES. + +By CONSTANCE MAUD and MARY MAUD. + +AS YOU LIKE IT--THE TEMPEST--KING LEAR--TWELFTH NIGHT--THE MERCHANT OF +VENICE--A MIDSUMMER NIGHT'S DREAM--MACBETH--HAMLET--ROMEO AND JULIET. + +_With Illustrations from the famous Boydell prints. Crown 8vo._ + +=5s. net.= + +Miss Constance Maud is the author of "Wagner's Heroes" and "Wagner's +Heroines," two books on similar lines to these tales which have had a +great vogue among young people of all ages. In the present volume she +tells the charming stories of nine of the most famous of Shakespeare's +Tragedies and Comedies in prose of delightful and unstudied simplicity. +On occasion the actual text has been used for familiar passages and +phrases. These great world-tales, regarded merely as tales, with the +elemental motives and passions displayed in them, appeal strongly to the +imagination, and when narrated by a competent pen there cannot be finer +or more absorbing reading. In addition to this, he must be a dull reader +in whom they do not awaken a desire to make a closer acquaintance with +the plays themselves. + +The book forms a companion volume to Sir A. T. Quiller-Couch's +well-known "Historical Tales from Shakespeare." + + +THE MUSE IN MOTLEY. + +By HARRY GRAHAM. + +AUTHOR OF "RUTHLESS RHYMES FOR HEARTLESS HOMES," ETC., ETC. + +_With 24 Illustrations by_ + +LEWIS BAUMER. + +_Fcap. 4to._ =3s. 6d. net.= + +All lovers of humorous verse will welcome a fresh volume of lyrics by +the author of "Deportmental Ditties," "Canned Classics," and other +deservedly popular products of the Minor Muse. Readers of Captain +Graham's new collection of light verse will agree with the _Daily +Chronicle_ in describing its author as "a godsend, a treasure trove, a +messenger from Olympus; a man who really does see the ludicrous side of +life, a man who is a genuine humorist." Once again the author of these +amusing poems attempts to "shoot Folly as she flies," and genially +satirizes the foibles of the age in a fashion that will certainly add +to his reputation as a humorist; and his work is rendered still more +delightful by the drawings of Mr. Lewis Baumer, the well-known _Punch_ +artist, with which it is lavishly illustrated. "It is a great and good +thing," as the _Pall Mall Gazette_ remarked with reference to another +of Captain Graham's books, "to have a man among us who is witty all the +time and lets himself go. We ought to be duly thankful. And we are!" + + +HANNIBAL ONCE MORE. + +By DOUGLAS W. FRESHFIELD, M.A., + +VICE-PRESIDENT OF THE ROYAL GEOGRAPHICAL SOCIETY; TREASURER OF THE +HELLENIC AND ROMAN SOCIETIES; FORMERLY PRESIDENT OF THE ALPINE CLUB. + +_8vo._ =5s. net.= + +In this little volume Mr. Freshfield has put into final shape the +results of his study of the famous and still-debated question: "By which +Pass did Hannibal cross the Alps?" The literature which has grown up +round this intricate subject is surprisingly extensive, and various +solutions have been propounded and upheld, with remarkable warmth and +tenacity, by a host of scholars, historians, geographers, military men, +and mountaineers. Mr. Freshfieid has a solution of his own, which, +however, he puts forward in no dogmatic spirit, but in such a fashion +that his book is practically a lucid review of the whole matter in each +of its many aspects. To an extensive acquaintance with ancient and +modern geographical literature he unites a wide and varied experience as +an alpine climber and a traveller, and a minute topographical knowledge +of the regions under discussion; and these qualifications--in which many +of his predecessors in the same field of inquiry have been conspicuously +lacking--enable him to throw much new light on a perennially fascinating +problem. + + +THE PASTORAL TEACHING OF ST. PAUL. + +By the Rev. Canon H. L. GOUDGE, + +PRINCIPAL OF THE THEOLOGICAL COLLEGE, ELY; AUTHOR OF "THE MIND OF ST. +PAUL," ETC. + +_Crown 8vo. Cloth._ =2s. 6d. net.= + +These lectures were delivered at the end of May, 1913, at the Palace, +Gloucester, to the clergy of the diocese, and are now published in +response to the request of those who heard them. They do not constitute +a detailed commentary on the Pastoral Epistles, though a good deal of +detailed exegesis necessarily finds a place in them. The writer's aim +has been to collect and arrange St. Paul's teaching as to the work of +the Christian pastor, and to point out its applicability to modern +conditions and modern difficulties. The writer has often found, through +his experience in conducting Retreats, that the Pastoral Teaching of +St. Paul is of the greatest value to the clergy to-day, but that this +teaching is often obscured by the unsystematic character of St. Paul's +writing and by the passing controversies with which he has to deal. In +these lectures the First Epistle to Timothy is used as the basis, but +continually illustrated by passages from the other Pastoral Epistles, +and from St. Paul's earlier writings. The first lecture deals with the +pastor's aim, the second with the pastor's character, the third with +the pastor's work, and the fourth with the adaptation of his message to +men and to women, to old and to young, to rich and to poor. The ground +already covered by the writer's earlier book, "The Mind of St. Paul," +has been carefully avoided, but it is hoped that the one book may throw +light upon the other. An index of texts has been added for those who +may wish to use this second book, as far as that is possible, as a +commentary. + + +_NEW NOVELS_ + +SOMETHING AFAR. + +By MAXWELL GRAY, + +AUTHOR OF "THE SILENCE OF DEAN MAITLAND," "THE GREAT REFUSAL," ETC. + +_Crown 8vo. Cloth._ =6s.= + +The scene of Maxwell Gray's new story is laid in London and in Italy, +where the gradual unfolding of an elaborate but absorbing plot holds +the reader's attention until the very last page of the book. This is a +tale of heroism, of self-sacrifice, of romance, full of incident and +adventure, illumined by those tender and imaginative touches, that vivid +portrayal of character, which the public has learnt to expect from +the author of "The Silence of Dean Maitland." From these pages we may +learn that there is "something afar from the sphere of our sorrow," the +highest aspiration of the lover, the artist, the poet and the saint, +which, beautiful beyond all that man's heart can divine, is yet within +the reach of every one of us. + + +THE GENTLE LOVER. + +A Comedy of Middle Age. + +By FORREST REID, + +AUTHOR OF "THE BRACKNELLS," "FOLLOWING DARKNESS," ETC. + +_Crown 8vo._ =6s.= + +This extremely interesting story, of which the title gives a most apt +description, is written in a lighter vein than the author's previous +work. It is a love story, and while the tale itself is enthralling, +it depends in great measure for its charm on the attractiveness of +the characters who figure in the drama and who are all very pleasant +company. The book is essentially human, the note is never forced, yet +the interest goes on increasing right up to the end. It is actual life +with its comedy and tragedy so closely intermingled that it is not +always easy to distinguish one from the other. The scene is laid abroad, +partly in Bruges, and partly in Italy, but the characters are, with one +or two exceptions, natives of that part of Ireland with which the author +is most familiar, and they lose none of their individuality by being +transplanted to those beautiful old-world cities where we follow their +varied fortunes. Mr. Reid's previous novels have already secured for +his work the warm appreciation of some of the best judges of literary +values, and the present novel may be confidently stated to exhibit his +undoubted power as a writer of fiction in an advanced and progressive +stage. + + +_NEW SCIENTIFIC WORKS_ + +INDUSTRIAL POISONING + +From Fumes, Gases, and Poisons of Manufacturing Processes. + +By Dr. J. RAMBOUSEK, + +PROFESSOR OF FACTORY HYGIENE, AND CHIEF STATE HEALTH OFFICER, PRAGUE + +Translated and Edited by Dr. T. M. LEGGE, + +H.M. MEDICAL INSPECTOR OF FACTORIES. + +_Fully Illustrated. Demy 8vo._ =12s. 6d. net.= + + +MALINGERING + +And Feigned Sickness. + +By Sir JOHN COLLIE, M.D., J.P., + +MEDICAL EXAMINER, LONDON COUNTY COUNCIL; CHIEF MEDICAL OFFICER, +METROPOLITAN WATER BOARD; CONSULTING MEDICAL EXAMINER TO THE SHIPPING +FEDERATION; MEDICAL EXAMINER TO THE SUN INSURANCE OFFICE, CENTRAL +INSURANCE COMPANY, LONDON, LIVERPOOL, AND GLOBE INSURANCE COMPANY, +AND OTHER ACCIDENT OFFICES; LATE HOME OFFICE MED. REF. WORKMEN'S +COMPENSATION ACT. + +Assisted by ARTHUR H. SPICER, M.B., B.S. (Lond.), D.P.H. + +_Illustrated, xii + 340 pp. Demy 8vo._ =10s. 6d. net.= + +In this work Sir John Collie, whose wide experience has eminently fitted +him for the task, has given an interesting and lucid description of the +methods and peculiarities of the malingerer. He describes fully and in +detail the methods of examination for the detection of malingering and +the diseases usually simulated, and discusses the attitude required by +the medical attendant towards unduly prolonged illness. + + +OLD AGE: + +Its Care and Treatment in Health and Disease. + +By ROBERT SAUNDBY, M.D., F.R.C.P., LL.D., J.P., + +MEMBER GENERAL MEDICAL COUNCIL; EX-PRESIDENT BRITISH MEDICAL +ASSOCIATION; PROFESSOR OF MEDICINE, UNIVERSITY OF BIRMINGHAM; PHYSICIAN +TO THE BIRMINGHAM GENERAL HOSPITAL. + +_320 pp._ =7s. 6d. net.= + +No English writer having recently dealt with this subject, it has +been felt that there is room for a book which should bring together +the various contributions made to it in modern times, including the +results of the author's extensive experience during forty years of +medical practice. The author discusses the principles of health, by +due attention to which healthy old age may be attained. The diseases +to which the aged are especially liable are fully described, their +causes are clearly indicated, and the author shows in a practical way +by what means they may be avoided and how they may be appropriately +treated. Special attention is given to such important subjects as +diet, exercise, etc. Suggestive dietary tables are given, both for +use in health and in particular diseases, while the chapters devoted +to methods of exercise most suitable in advanced age will also prove +of value. + + * * * * * + +LONDON: EDWARD ARNOLD, 41 & 43 MADDOX STREET, W. + + * * * * * + + +--------------------------------------------------------------+ + | | + | Transcriber notes: | + | | + | P.30. 'Chiselhurst' changed to 'Chislehurst' | + | P.42. 'Gortchakoff' changed to 'Gortschakoff' | + | P.88. 'attribute' changed to 'attributed'. | + | P.268. 'Commerical' changed to 'Commercial'. | + | P.277. 'Commerical' changed to 'Commercial'. | + | P.294. 'futher' changed to 'further'. | + | P.358. 'in in' changed to 'in'. | + | P.376. 'Débats' changed to 'Débuts'. | + | P.378. 'the the' changed to 'the'. | + | P.388. 'Agenu' changed to 'Agence' as in Agence Havas. | + | P.397. 'radicle' changed to 'radical'. | + | P.401. 'Schraebelé" changed to 'Schnaebelé'. | + | P.417. 'D'Israeli' changed to 'Disraeli'. | + | P.419. 'holdiay' changed to 'holiday'. | + | P.432. 'Amabssador' changed to 'Ambassador'. | + | P.437' 'Gortchakoff' changed to 'Gortschakoff'. | + | P.440. 'Maréchal' changed to 'Maréchale'. | + | P.440. 'Malot' changed to 'Malet'. | + | P.442. 'Caroina' changed to 'Carolina'. | + | P.443. 'Pasquior' changed to 'Pasquier'. | + | P.443. 'd'Audiffrot' changed to 'd'Audiffret'. | + | P.445. 'Stowart' changed to 'Stewart'. | + | P.446. 'Secreatry' changed to 'Secretary'. | + | Fixed Various punctuation. | + | | + | Please note, text surrounded by =this= is bold, and | + | text surrounded by _this_ is italics. | + | | + +--------------------------------------------------------------+ + + + + + +End of the Project Gutenberg EBook of Lord Lyons: A Record of British +Diplomacy, Vol. 2 of 2, by Thomas Wodehouse Legh Newton + +*** END OF THE PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK 44143 *** |