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diff --git a/44125-0.txt b/44125-0.txt new file mode 100644 index 0000000..7a86114 --- /dev/null +++ b/44125-0.txt @@ -0,0 +1,25543 @@ +*** START OF THE PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK 44125 *** + + Transcriber's note: + + This book was published in two volumes, of which this is the first. + The second volume was released as Project Gutenberg ebook #44126, + available at http://www.gutenberg.org/ebooks/44126. + + Bold characters are enclosed in plus (+) signs. + Gesperrt text is enclosed in equal (=) signs. + + + + +THE HISTORIES OF POLYBIUS + +[Illustration] + + + THE + + HISTORIES OF POLYBIUS + + TRANSLATED FROM THE TEXT OF F. HULTSCH + + BY + + EVELYN S. SHUCKBURGH, M.A. + + LATE FELLOW OF EMMANUEL COLLEGE, CAMBRIDGE + + IN TWO VOLUMES + + VOL. I + + LONDON + + MACMILLAN AND CO. + + AND NEW YORK + + 1889 + + _All rights reserved_ + + + + TO + + F. M. S. + + IN GRATITUDE FOR MUCH PATIENT HELP + + + + +PREFACE + + +This is the first English translation of the complete works of Polybius +as far as they are now known. In attempting such a task I feel that I +ought to state distinctly the limits which I have proposed to myself +in carrying it out. I have desired to present to English readers a +faithful copy of what Polybius wrote, which should at the same time +be a readable English book. I have not been careful to follow the +Greek idiom; and have not hesitated to break up and curtail or enlarge +his sentences, when I thought that, by doing so, I could present his +meaning in more idiomatic English. Polybius is not an author likely +to be studied for the sake of his Greek, except by a few technical +scholars; and the modern complexion of much of his thought makes +such a plan of translation both possible and desirable. How far I +have succeeded I must leave my readers to decide. Again, I have not +undertaken to write a commentary on Polybius, nor to discuss at length +the many questions of interest which arise from his text. Such an +undertaking would have required much more space than I was able to +give: and happily, while my translation was passing through the press, +two books have appeared, which will supply English students with much +that I might have felt bound to endeavour to give—the Achaean league +by Mr. Capes, and the sumptuous Oxford edition of extracts by Mr. +Strachan-Davidson. + +The translation is made from the text of Hultsch and follows his +arrangement of the fragments. If this causes some inconvenience to +those who use the older texts, I hope that such inconvenience will +be minimised by the full index which I have placed at the end of the +second volume. + +I have not, I repeat, undertaken to write a commentary. I propose +rather to give the materials for commentary to those who, for various +reasons, do not care to use the Greek of Polybius. I have therefore in +the first five complete books left him to speak for himself, with the +minimum of notes which seemed necessary for the understanding of his +text. The case of the fragments was different. In giving a translation +of them I have tried, when possible, to indicate the part of the +history to which they belong, and to connect them by brief sketches of +intermediate events, with full references to those authors who supply +the missing links. + +Imperfect as the performance of such a task must, I fear, be, it has +been one of no ordinary labour, and has occupied every hour that +could be spared during several years of a not unlaborious life. And +though I cannot hope to have escaped errors, either of ignorance or +human infirmity, I trust that I may have produced what will be found +of use to some historical students, in giving them a fairly faithful +representation of the works of an historian who is, in fact, our sole +authority for some most interesting portions of the world’s history. + +It remains to give a brief account of the gradual formation of the text +of Polybius, as we now have it. + +The revival of interest in the study of Polybius was due to Pope +Nicholas V (1447-1455), the founder of the Vatican Library. Soon after +his election he seems to have urged Cardinal Perotti to undertake a +Latin translation of the five books then known to exist. When Perotti +sent him his translation of the first book, the Pope thus acknowledges +it in a letter dated 28th August 1452:—[1] + + “_Primus Polybii liber, quem ad nos misisti, nuper a te de Graeca + in Latinam translatus, gratissimus etiam fuit et jucundissimus: + quippe in ea translatione nobis cumulatissime satisfacis. Tanta + enim facilitate et eloquentia transfers, ut Historia ipsa nunquam + Graeca, sed prorsus Latina semper fuisse videatur. Optimum igitur + ingenium tuum valde commendamus atque probamus, teque hortamur ut + velis pro laude et gloria tua, et pro voluptate nimia singulare + opus inchoatum perficere, nec labori parcas. Nam et rem ingenio + et doctrina tua dignam, et nobis omnium gratissimam efficies; qui + laborum et studiorum tuorum aliquando memores erimus.... Tu vero, + si nobis rem gratam efficere cupis, nihil negligentiae committas + in hoc opere traducendo. Nihil enim nobis gratius efficere + poteris. Librum primum a vertice ad calcem legimus, in cujus + translatione voluntati nostrae amplissime satisfactum est._” + +On the 3d of January 1454 the Pope writes again to Perotti thanking him +for the third book; and in a letter to Torelli, dated 13th November +1453, Perotti says that he had finished his translation of Polybius in +the preceding September. This translation was first printed in 1473. +The Greek text was not printed till 1530, when an edition of the first +five books in Greek, along with Perotti’s translation, was published at +the Hague, _opera Vincentii Obsopaei_, dedicated to George, Marquess of +Brandenburg. Perotti’s translation was again printed at Basle in 1549, +accompanied by a Latin translation of the fragments of books 6 to 17 by +Wolfgan Musculus, and reprinted at the Hague in 1598. + +The chief fragments of Polybius fall into two classes; (1) those +made by some unknown epitomator, who Casaubon even supposed might be +Marcus Brutus, who, according to Plutarch, was engaged in this work +in his tent the night before the battle of Pharsalus. The printing of +these began with two insignificant fragments on the battle between +the Rhodians and Attalus against Philip, Paris, 1536; and another _de +re navali_, Basle, 1537. These fragments have continually accumulated +by fresh discoveries. (2) The other class of fragments are those +made by the order of Constantinus Porphyrogenitus (911-959), among +similar ones from other historians, which were to be digested under +fifty-three heads or tituli; one of which (the 27th) has come down +to us, discovered in the sixteenth century, containing the _selecta +de legationibus_; and another (the 50th) _de virtute et vitio_. The +printing of the first of these begins with the edition of Fulvius +Ursinus, published at Antwerp in 1582. This was supplemented in +1634 (Paris) by an edition by Valesius of _excerpta ex collectaneis +Constantini Augusti Porphyrogeneti_. The first edition of something +like a complete text of Polybius, containing the five entire books, +the _excerptae legationes_, and fragments of the other books, was +that of Isaac Casaubon, Paris, 1609, fo. It was accompanied by a new +and very brilliant Latin translation, and a preface which has been +famous among such works. It contains also a Latin translation of +Aeneas Tacticus. Altogether it is a splendid book. Some additional +_annotationes_ of Casaubon’s were published after his death in 1617, +Paris.[2] Other editions followed; that of Gronovius, Amsterdam, 1670: +of Ernesti, Leipsic, 1764, containing Casaubon’s translation more or +less emended, and additional fragments. But the next important step +in the bibliography of Polybius was the publication of the great +edition of Schweighaeuser, Leipsic, 1789-1795, in nine volumes, with +a new Latin translation,—founded, however, to a great extent on +Casaubon,—a new recension of the text, and still farther additions +to the fragments; accompanied also by an excellent Lexicon and +Onomasticon. This great work has been the foundation from which all +modern commentaries on Polybius must spring. Considerable additions +to the fragments, collected from MSS. in the Vatican by Cardinal Mai, +were published in 1827 at Rome. The chief modern texts are those of +Bekker, 1844; Duebner (with Latin translation), 1839 and 1865; Dindorf, +1866-1868, 1882 (Teubner). A new recension of the five books and all +the known fragments—founded on a collation of some twelve MSS. and all +previous editions, as well as all the numerous works of importance on +our Author that have appeared in Germany and elsewhere—was published +by F. Hultsch, Berlin, 1867-1872, in four volumes. This must now be +considered the standard text. A second edition of the first volume +appeared in 1888, but after that part of my translation had passed +through the press. + +Of English translations the earliest was by Ch. Watson, 1568, of the +first five books. It is entitled _The Hystories of the most famous +Cronographer Polybios; Discoursing of the warres betwixt the Romanes +and Carthaginenses, a rich and goodly work, conteining holsome counsels +and wonderful devices against the inconstances of fickle Fortune. +Englished by C[hristopher] W[atson] whereunto is annexed an Abstract, +compendiously coarcted out of the life and worthy Acts perpetrate +by oure puissant Prince King Henry the fift. London, Imprinted by +Henry Byneman for Tho. Hacket, 1568_, 8vo. See Herbert’s _Ames_, p. +895. Another translation of the five books was published by Edward +Grimestone, London, 1634, of which a second and third edition appeared +in 1648 and 1673. A translation of the Mercenary War from the first +book was made by Sir Walter Raleigh, and published after his death +in 1647 (London, 4to). Next, a new translation of the five books was +published in London, 1693 (2 vols. 8vo), by Sir H[enry] S[hears], +with a preface by Dryden. In 1741 (London, 4to) appeared “A fragment +of the 6th book containing a dissertation on government, translated +from the Greek of Polybius, with notes, etc., by A Gentleman.” This +was followed by the first English translation, which contained any +part of the fragments, as well as the five books, by the Rev. James +Hampton, London, 4to, 1756-1761, which between that date and 1823 +(2 vols., Oxford) went through at least seven editions. Lastly, a +translation of Polybius’s account of Hannibal’s passage of the Alps is +appended by Messrs. Church and Brodribb to their translation of Livy, +21-22. There is a German translation by A. Haakh and Kraz, Stuttgart, +1858-1875. And a French translation by J. A. C. Buchon, Paris, 1842, +Orléans, 1875. For the numerous German essays and dissertations on +the text, and particular questions arising from the history, I must +refer my readers to Engelmann’s _Bibliotheca_. In England such studies +are rare. Mr. Strachan-Davidson published an essay on Polybius in +Hellenica; and his edition of extracts of the text (Oxford, 1888) +contains several dissertations of value. Mr. Capes (London, 1888) has +published an edition of extracts referring to the Achaean league, +with an introductory essay on the author and his work. And a very +admirable article on Polybius appears in the recent edition of the +_Encyclopædia Britannica_ by Mr. H. F. Pelham. There is also a good +paper on Polybius in the _Quarterly Review_ for 1879, No. 296. +Criticisms on Polybius, and estimates of his value as an historian, +will be found in Thirlwall’s _History of Greece_, vol. viii.; Arnold’s +_History of Rome_; Mommsen’s _History of Rome_, book iv. c. xiii.; +Freeman’s _History of Federal Government_ and _Essays_; Bunbury’s +_Ancient Geography_, vol. ii. p. 16; Law’s _Alps of Hannibal_. For +the Roman side of his history, besides the works mentioned by Mr. +Strachan-Davidson, a good list of the literature on the 2d Punic war +is given by Mr. W. T. Arnold in his edition of Dr. Arnold’s history of +that period [London, Macmillan, 1886]. + +Finally, I have to express my warm thanks to Dr. Warre, Head Master of +Eton, for aiding me with his unique knowledge of ancient and modern +tactics in clearing up many points very puzzling to a civilian. To +Mr. W. Chawner, Fellow and Tutor of Emmanuel College, for reading +part of the translation in proof, and making valuable corrections and +suggestions. And to Professor Ridgway, of Queen’s College, Cork, for +corrections in the geographical fragments of book 34. + + + + +CONTENTS + + + PAGES + + INTRODUCTION xvii-lx + + BOOKS I TO IX 1-602 + + + + +INTRODUCTION + +I. POLYBIUS + + +Fortune cast the life of Polybius in stirring times. His special claim +to our admiration is that he understood the importance in the history +of the world of the changes which were passing under his eyes, and +exerted himself to trace the events which immediately preceded them, +and from which they sprang, while it was yet possible to see and +question surviving participators in them; to examine places, before +they had lost all marks of the great events of which they had been +the scene; and records or monuments before time had cast a doubt upon +their meaning or authenticity. Nor is this ordinary praise. Men are +apt to turn their eyes upon the past, as holding all that is worthy of +contemplation, while they fail to take note of history “in the making,” +or to grasp the importance of the transactions of their own day. But +as every year has its decisive influence on the years which succeed +it, the greatest benefactor of posterity is the man who understands +and records events as they pass with care and sincerity. Laborious +compilation, from the study and comparison of ancient records and +monuments, has its value: it may often be all that it is possible to +obtain; it may not unfrequently even serve to correct statements of +contemporaries which have been deformed by carelessness or coloured by +prejudice. But the best compilation is infinitely inferior in interest +and instructiveness to the barest report of a contemporary. And when +such a man is also an eye-witness of much that he relates; when he knew +and conversed with many of the chief actors in the great events which +he records; when again he tells us of transactions so remote in time, +that all written documents have necessarily perished, and those in more +durable bronze and stone all but followed in their train, then indeed +the interest rises to the highest pitch. Like Herodotus and Thucydides, +then, Polybius tells us of his own times, and of the generations +immediately preceding them. It is true that the part of his work which +has survived in a complete form deals with a period before his own +day, just as the greater part of the history of Herodotus does, but in +the larger part of the fragments he is writing with even more complete +personal knowledge than Thucydides. He had, again, neither the faculty +for story-telling possessed by Herodotus nor the literary and dramatic +force of Thucydides. The language which he spoke and wrote had lost +the magic of style; had lost the lucidity and grace of Sophocles, and +the rugged vigour and terseness of Thucydides. Nor had he apparently +acquired any of those artifices which, while they sometimes weary us +in the later rhetoricians, yet generally serve to make their writings +the easiest and pleasantest of reading. Equally remote again is his +style from the elaborate and involved manner of Plutarch, with its huge +compound words built up of intricate sentences, more like difficult +German than Greek. Polybius had no tricks of this sort;[3] but his +style lacks logical order and clearness. It seems rather the language +of a man of affairs, who had had neither leisure to study style, nor +taste to read widely with a view to literature as such. But after all +it is Greek, and Greek that still retained its marvellous adaptability +to every purpose, to every shade of thought, and every form of +literature. Nor is his style in the purely narrative parts of his work +wanting in a certain force, derived from singleness and directness of +purpose. He “speaks right on,” and turns neither to the right hand nor +the left. It is when he reflects and argues and moralises, that his +want of literary skill sometimes makes him difficult and involved; +and though the thought is essentially just, and his point of view +wonderfully modern, we continually feel the want of that nameless charm +which the Greeks called χάρις. + +His bent for historical composition was fortunately encouraged by the +circumstances of his life, which gave Polybius special opportunities +of satisfying his curiosity and completing his knowledge. Not only was +he the son of a man who had held the highest office in the league, and +so must have heard the politics and history of Achaia discussed from +his earliest youth; not only from early manhood was he himself in the +thick of political business; but he knew the sovereigns of Egypt and +Pergamus, of Macedonia and Syria, and the Roman generals who conquered +the latter. He had visited a Roman camp and witnessed its practical +arrangements and discipline. And his enforced residence of sixteen +years in Italy and Rome was, by the good fortune of his introduction to +Aemilius Paullus and his sons, turned into an opportunity of unrivalled +advantage for studying the laws, military discipline, and character +of the imperial people whose world conquest he chronicles. Unlike his +fellow-exiles, he did not allow his depressing circumstances to numb +his faculties, exasperate his temper, or deaden his curiosity. He won +the confidence of the leading men at Rome; and seems, while pushing on +his inquiries with untiring vigour, to have used his influence for the +benefit of his countrymen, and of all Greek subjects of Rome. + +But, like so many of the writers of antiquity, he has had no one to +perform for him the service he had done for others in rescuing their +achievements and the particulars of their career from oblivion. Of the +many _testimonia_ collected by Schweighaeuser and others from ancient +writers, scarcely one gives us any details or anecdotes of the writer, +whose work they briefly describe or praise. We are reduced as usual to +pick out from his own writings the scattered allusions or statements +which help us to picture his character and career. + +[Sidenote: Birth of Polybius.] + +Polybius of Megalopolis was the son of Lycortas, the friend and +partisan of Philopoemen, who had served the Achaean league in several +capacities: as ambassador to Rome in B.C. 189, along with Diophanes, +on the question of the war with Sparta,[4] and to Ptolemy Epiphanes +in B.C. 186,[5] and finally as Strategus in B.C. 184-183. Of the year +of his birth we cannot be certain. He tells us that he was elected +to go on embassy from the league to Ptolemy Epiphanes in the year of +the death of that monarch (B.C. 181), although he was below the legal +age.[6] But we do not know for certain what that age was; although +it seems likely that it was thirty, that apparently being the age at +which a member of the league exercised his full privileges.[7] But +assuming this, we do not know how much under that age he was. Two years +previously (B.C. 183) he had carried the urn at Philopoemen’s funeral. +This was an office usually performed by quite young men (νεανίσκοι)[8], +probably not much over twenty years old. As we know that he lived to +write a history of the Numantine war, which ended B.C. 133[9], and that +he was eighty-two at the time of his death[10], we shall not, I think, +be probably far wrong if we place his birth in B.C. 203 and his death +in B.C. 121 as Casaubon does, who notes that the latter is just sixteen +years before the birth of Cicero. But though this is a good working +hypothesis, it is very far from being a demonstrated fact. + +Between B.C. 181-168 he was closely allied with his father in politics; +and if we wish to have any conception of what he was doing, it is +necessary to form some idea of the state of parties in the Peloponnese +at the time. + +The crowning achievement of Philopoemen’s career had been the uniting +of Sparta to the Achaean league, after the murder of the tyrant Nabis +by the Aetolians who had come to Sparta as his allies (B.C. 192). In +B.C. 191 the Achaeans were allowed to add Messene and Elis to their +league, as a reward for their services to Rome in the war against +Antiochus. The Aetolian league, the chief enemy and opponent of Achaia, +was reduced to a state of humble dependence on Rome in B.C. 189, after +the defeat of Antiochus at Thermopylae (B.C. 191) and the Aetolian +war (B.C. 191-189). From B.C. 190 then begins the time during which +Polybius says that the “name of the Achaeans became the universal one +for all the inhabitants of the Peloponnese” (2, 42). But though Sparta +was included in the league she was always a restive and dissatisfied +member; and the people of Elis and Messene, who were not very willing +members either, were told by Flamininus that if they had any reason to +complain of the federal government they were to appeal to him.[11] Now, +by a treaty of alliance with Rome, decreed at Sikyon in B.C. 198, it +was provided that Rome should receive no envoys from separate states of +the league, but only from the league itself.[12] Flamininus, therefore, +if he said what Livy reports him to have said, was violating this +treaty. And this will be a good instance to illustrate the divisions +of parties existing during the period of Polybius’s active political +life (B.C. 181-169). We have seen that in B.C. 198 the Achaean league +became an ally of Rome as a complete and independent state; that this +state was consolidated by the addition of Sparta (192) and Elis and +Messene (191) so as to embrace the whole of the Peloponnese; that its +chief enemy in Greece, the Aetolian league, was rendered powerless +in B.C. 189. The Macedonian influence in the Peloponnese had been +abolished after the battle of Cynoscephalae (197) by the proclamation +of Greek freedom by Flamininus (196). But all this seeming liberty +and growth in power really depended upon the favour of Rome, and was +continually endangered not only by the appeals to the Senate from +separate states in the league, who conceived themselves wronged, but by +treasonable representations of her own envoys, who preferred a party +triumph to the welfare and independence of their country[13]. In these +circumstances, there were naturally differences of opinion as to the +proper attitude for the league government to assume towards a state, +which was nominally an equal ally, but really an absolute master. There +was one party who were for submissively carrying out the will of the +Roman officers who from time to time visited the Peloponnese; and for +conciliating the Senate by displaying a perpetual readiness to carry +out its wishes, without putting forward in any way the rights which +the treaty of 198 had secured to them. The leaders of this party, in +the time of Philopoemen, were Aristaenos and Diophanes. The other +party, headed till his death by Philopoemen, equally admitting that the +Roman government could not be safely defied, were yet for aiming at +preserving their country’s independence by strictly carrying out the +terms of the Roman alliance, and respectfully but firmly resisting any +encroachment upon those terms by the officers representing the Roman +government. On Philopoemen’s death (B.C. 183) Lycortas, who had been +his most devoted follower, took, along with Archon, the lead of the +party which were for carrying out his policy; while Callicrates became +the most prominent of the Romanising party. Lycortas was supported +by his son Polybius when about B.C. 181 he began to take part in +politics. Polybius seems always to have consistently maintained this +policy. His view seems to have been that Rome, having crushed Philip +and Antiochus, was necessarily the supreme power. The Greeks must +recognise facts; must avoid offending Rome; but must do so by keeping +to a position of strict legality, maintaining their rights, and neither +flattering nor defying the victorious Commonwealth. He believed that +the Romans meant fairly by Greece, and that Greek freedom was safe +in their hands[14]. But the straightforward policy of the Senate, if +it was ever sincere, was altered by the traitor Callicrates in B.C. +179; who, being sent to Rome to oppose what the league thought the +unconstitutional restitution of certain Spartan exiles, advised the +Senate to use the Romanising party in each state to secure a direct +control in Achaia[15]. Acting on this insidious advice, the Roman +government began to view with suspicion the legal and independent +attitude of the other party, and to believe or affect to believe +that they were enemies of the Roman supremacy. Lycortas, Archon, +and Polybius, finding themselves the objects of suspicion, not less +dangerous because undeserved, to the Roman government, appear to have +adopted an attitude of reserve, abstaining from taking an active or +prominent part in the business of the assemblies. This, however, did +not succeed in averting Roman jealousy; and the commissioners, Gaius +Popilius and Gnaeus Octavius, who visited the Peloponnese in B.C. 169, +gave out that those who held aloof were as displeasing to the Senate +as those who openly opposed it. They were said to have resolved on +formally impeaching the three statesmen before the Achaean assembly +as being enemies of Rome; but when the assembly met at Aegium, they +had failed to obtain any reasonable handle against them, and contented +themselves with a speech of general exhortation.[16] This was during +the war with Perseus, when the Romans kept a vigilant eye on all parts +of Greece, and closely inquired which politicians in the several +states ventured to display the least sympathy with the Macedonian +king, or were believed to secretly nourish any wish for his success. +It speaks strongly both for the independent spirit still surviving in +the league, as well as for the character of Archon and Polybius, that +they were elected, apparently in the same assembly, the one Strategus +and the other Hipparch for the year B.C. 169-168.[17] In this office +Polybius doubtless hoped to carry out the principles and discipline +of Philopoemen, under whom he had probably served in the cavalry, and +whose management of this branch of the service he had at any rate +minutely studied.[18] But there was little occasion for the use of the +Achaean cavalry in his year. Being sent on a mission to Q. Marcius +Philippus at Heracleia to offer the league’s assistance in the war +with Perseus, when their help was declined, he remained behind after +the other ambassadors had returned, to witness the campaign.[19] After +spending some time in the Roman camp, he was sent by Q. Marcius to +prevent the Achaeans from consenting to supply five thousand men to +Appius Claudius Cento in Epirus. This was a matter of considerable +delicacy. He had to choose between offending one or the other powerful +Roman. But he conducted the affair with prudence, and on the lines +he had always laid down, those, namely, of strict legality. He found +the Achaean assembly in session at Sicyon; and he carried his point +by representing that the demand of Appius Claudius did not bear on +the face of it the order of the Senate, without which they were +prohibited from supplying the requisitions of Roman commanders.[20] He +thus did not betray that he was acting on the instigation of Quintus +Marcius, and put himself and the league in an attitude of loyalty +toward the Senate.[21] In the same cautious spirit he avoided another +complication. Certain complimentary statues or inscriptions had been +put up in various cities of the league in honour of Eumenes, king of +Pergamus, and on some offence arising had been taken down. This seems +to have annoyed Eumenes exceedingly; and Polybius persuaded the people +that it had been ordered by Sosigenes and Diopeithes, as judges, from +feelings of personal spite, and without any act of Eumenes unfriendly +to the league. He carried his point, and thus avoided offending a +king who at that time was on very friendly terms with Rome.[22] But +while thus minded to avoid unnecessary offence, Polybius and his party +were in favour of strengthening the league by alliances which could +be entered upon with safety. Egypt at this time was under the joint +government of two Ptolemies, Philometor and Physcon, who were being +threatened with an invasion by Antiochus Epiphanes. The friendship +of the league with the kings of Egypt had been of long standing, as +far back as the time of Aratus; and though that friendship had been +afterwards interrupted by the Macedonian policy of Aratus, just before +his death the father of these kings had presented the league with ten +ships and a sum of money. The two kings now sent to beg for aid; and +asked that Lycortas should come as commander-in-chief, and Polybius +as hipparch. Lycortas and Polybius were in favour of supplying the +assistance asked.[23] But the measure was opposed by Callicrates and +his partisans, on the specious ground that their whole efforts should +be directed to aid the Romans against Perseus. Lycortas and Polybius +replied that the Romans did not require their help; and that they were +bound, by gratitude, as well as by treaty, to help the Ptolemies. They +carried with them the popular feeling: but Callicrates outwitted them +by obtaining a dispatch from Q. Marcius, urging the league to join the +senate in effecting a reconciliation between Antiochus and the kings +of Egypt. Polybius gave in, and advised compliance. Ambassadors were +appointed to aid in the pacification; and the envoys from Alexandria +were obliged to depart without effecting their object. They contented +themselves with handing in to the magistrates the Royal letters, +in which Lycortas and Polybius were invited by name to come to +Alexandria.[24] + +[Sidenote: B.C. 167.] + +Careful, however, as he had ever been to avoid giving just offence to +Rome, he and his party had long been marked by the Senate as opponents +of that more complete interference in the details of Achaean politics +which it wished to exercise. This was partly owing to the machinations +of Callicrates; but it was also the result of the deliberate policy of +the Senate: and it was doubtless helped by the report of every Roman +officer who had found himself thwarted by the appeal to legality, +under the influence of the party in the league with which Polybius was +connected.[25] Accordingly, soon after the final defeat of Perseus +by Aemilius Paulus in B.C. 168, and the consequent dismemberment of +Macedonia, the Senate proceeded to execute its vengeance upon those +citizens in every state in Greece who were believed to have been +opposed to the Roman interests. The commissioners entrusted with +the settlement and division of Macedonia were directed to hold an +inquiry into this matter also. From every city the extreme partisans +of Rome were summoned to assist them, men who were only too ready to +sacrifice their political opponents to the vengeance of the power to +which they had long been paying a servile and treacherous court. From +Boeotia came Mnasippus; from Acarnania, Chremes; from Epirus, Charops +and Nicias; from Aetolia, Lyciscus and Tisippus; and from Achaia, +Callicrates, Agesias, and Philippus.[26] Instigated by these advisers, +the commissioners ordered the supposed covert enemies of Rome in the +several states to proceed to Italy to take their trial. To Achaia +two commissioners, Gaius Claudius and Gnaeus Domitius, were sent. An +Achaean assembly being summoned to meet them, they announced that there +were certain men of influence in the league who had helped Perseus by +money and other support. They required that a vote should be passed +condemning them all to death; and said that, when that was done, they +would publish the names. Such a monstrous perversion of justice was +too much for the assembly, who refused to vote until they knew the +names. The commissioners then said that all the Strategi who had been +in office since the beginning of the war were involved. One of them, +Xeno, came forward, declared his innocence, and asserted that he was +ready to plead his cause before any tribunal, Achaean or Roman. Upon +this the commissioners required that all the accused persons should go +to Rome. A list of one thousand names was drawn up, under the guidance +of Callicrates, of those who were at once to proceed to Italy[27] (B.C. +167). The court of inquiry, before which they were to appear, was never +held. They were not allowed even to stay in Rome, but were quartered +in various cities of Italy, which were made responsible for their safe +custody: and there they remained until B.C. 151, when such of them as +were still alive, numbering then somewhat less than three hundred, were +contemptuously allowed to return.[28] Among these detenus was Polybius. +We do not hear that Lycortas was also one, from which it has been with +some probability supposed that he was dead. More fortunate than the +rest, Polybius was allowed to remain at Rome. He had made, it seems, +the acquaintance of Aemilius Paulus and his two sons in Macedonia, and +during the tour of Amelius through Greece after the Macedonian war.[29] +And on their return to Italy he was allowed by their influence to +remain in Rome; and, acting as tutor to the two boys,[30] became well +acquainted with all the best society in the city. The charming account +which he gives[31] of the mutual affection existing between him and +the younger son of Aemilius (by adoption now called Publius Scipio +Africanus Aemilianus) bears all the marks of sincerity, and is highly +to the credit of both. To it we may add the anecdote of Plutarch, that +“Scipio, in observance of the precept of Polybius, endeavoured never to +leave the forum without having made a close friend of some one he met +there.” + +But much as he owed to the friendship of the sons of Aemilius, he +owed it also to his own energy and cheerful vigour that these sixteen +years of exile were not lost time in his life. He employed them, not +in fruitless indulgence in homesickness, or in gloomy brooding over +his wrongs, but in a careful and industrious study of the history and +institutions of the people among whom he was compelled to reside[32]; +in ingratiating himself with those members of the Senate who he thought +might be useful to his countrymen; and in forming and maturing his +judgment as to the course of policy they ought to pursue. Nor was he +without means of gratifying lighter tastes. He was an active sportsman: +and the boar-hunting in the district of Laurentum not only diverted his +attention from the distressing circumstances of his exile, and kept +his body in vigorous health, but obtained for him the acquaintance of +many men of rank and influence. Thus for instance his intimacy with +the Syrian prince Demetrius, afterwards king Demetrius Soter, was made +in the hunting-field[33]: and the value which this young man attached +to his advice and support is some measure of the opinion entertained +generally of his wisdom, moderation, and good judgment. We have no +further details of his life in Rome; but we have what is better,—its +fruits, in the luminous account of its polity, the constitution of its +army, and the aims of its statesmen. + +[Sidenote: B.C. 151. Release of the detenus.] + +At last the time came when he was once more free to visit his own +country, or to extend his knowledge by visiting the countries which +he wished to describe. After repeated applications to the Senate +by embassies from Achaia, made without avail, in B.C. 151 Polybius +appeared in person to plead the cause before the Fathers. There was +now, it was thought, no reason for retaining these unfortunate men. The +original thousand had shrunk to less than three hundred; middle-aged +men had become in sixteen years old and decrepit; they had lost +connexions and influence in the Peloponnese; they had learnt by bitter +experience the impossibility of resisting the power of Rome, and were +no longer likely to venture on organising any opposition. Their longer +detention could only be a measure of vengeance, and useless vengeance. +Still the debate in the Senate was long and doubtful, until it was +brought to a conclusion by the contemptuous exclamation of Cato: “Are +we to sit here all day discussing whether some old Greek dotards are +to be buried by Italian or Achaean undertakers?” Polybius, elated by +a concession thus ungraciously accorded, wished to enter the Senate +once more with a further request for a restitution of their property in +Achaia. But Cato bluntly bade him “remember Ulysses, who wanted to go +back into the cave of the Cyclops to fetch his cap and belt.”[34] + +[Sidenote: Coss. L. Marcius Censornius, Manius Manilius, B.C. 149. +Polybius sent for to Lilybaeum.] + +Polybius seems to have returned to the Peloponnese at once, and to have +remained there until B.C. 149, when he was suddenly summoned to serve +the government whose enforced guest he had been so long. It was the +year in which the Senate had determined to commence their proceedings +against Carthage, which were not to be stayed until she was levelled +with the ground. In B.C. 150 the victory of Massanissa had restored the +oligarchs, who had been superseded by the popular anti-Roman party in +Carthage. These men hastened to make every possible offer of submission +to Rome. The Senate had made up its mind for war; and yet did not at +once say so. After demanding that full satisfaction should be made to +Massanissa, it next decreed that the Carthaginians must at once give +three hundred of their noblest youths as hostages to the Roman consuls +Manilius and Censorinus, who had sailed to Lilybaeum with secret orders +to let no concession induce them to stop the war until Carthage was +destroyed.[35] There was naturally some hesitation in obeying this +demand at Carthage; for the hostages were to be given to the Romans +absolutely without any terms, and without any security. They felt +that it was practically a surrender of their city. To overcome this +hesitation Manilius sent for Polybius, perhaps because he had known and +respected him at Rome, and believed that he could trust him; perhaps +because his well-known opinion, as to the safety in trusting the Roman +_fides_, might make him a useful agent. But also probably because he +was known to many influential Carthaginians, and perhaps spoke their +language.[36] He started for Lilybaeum at once. But when he reached +Corcyra he was met with the news that the hostages had been given up +to the consul: he thought, therefore, that the chance of war was at an +end, and he returned to the Peloponnese.[37] + +He must soon have learnt his mistake. The Consul, in accordance with +his secret instructions,—first to secure the arms in Carthage, and +then to insist on the destruction of the town,—gradually let the +wretched people know the extent of the submission required of them. +These outrageous demands resulted in the Carthaginians taking the +desperate resolution of standing a siege. Censorinus and his colleague +accordingly began operations; but they were not capable of so great +an undertaking. The eyes of the whole army were turned upon Scipio +Aemilianus, who was serving as a military tribune. The siege lingered +through the summer of B.C. 148 without any result; and when in the +autumn Scipio left for Rome, to stand for the Aedileship, he started +amidst loud expressions of hope that he might return as Consul, though +below the legal age.[38] + +The loss of so much of Polybius’s narrative at this point leaves us +uncertain when he arrived in Africa: but as he met and conversed with +Massanissa,[39] who died in B.C. 148, it seems likely that he did join +the army after all in B.C. 149. At any rate he was in Scipio’s train +in B.C. 147-146, when he was in chief command of the army, first as +consul, and then as proconsul; advised him on sundry points in the +formation of his siege works; stood by his side when Carthage was +burning; and heard him, as he watched the dreadful sight, utter with +tearful eyes the foreboding of what might one day befall Rome.[40] +Scipio is also said to have supplied him with ships for an exploring +expedition round the coast of Africa;[41] and it seems most likely that +this was in his year of consulship (147), as after the fall of Carthage +Polybius went home. + +The destruction of Carthage took place in the spring of B.C. 146. When +Scipio went back to celebrate his triumph, Polybius seems to have +returned to the Peloponnese, there to witness another act of vengeance +on the part of Rome, and to do what he could to lighten the blow to his +countrymen, and to preserve the fragments of their shattered liberties. + +[Sidenote: B.C. 148.] + +[Sidenote: B.C. 147.] + +Among the restored Achaean exiles were Diaeus, Damocritus, Alcamenes, +Theodectes, and Archicrates. They had returned with feelings embittered +by their exile; and without any of the experience of active life, which +might have taught them to subordinate their private thirst for revenge +to the safety of their country. Callicrates died in B.C. 148, and +Diaeus was Strategus in B.C. 149-148, 147-146. The appearance of the +pseudo-Philip (Andriscus) in Macedonia, and the continued resistance +of Carthage during his first year of office (148), encouraged him +perhaps to venture on a course, and to recommend the people to adopt +a policy, on which he would otherwise not have ventured. Troubles +arising out of a disgraceful money transaction between the Spartan +Menalchidas, Achaean Strategus, and the Oropians, who had bribed him +to aid them against the Athenians, had led to a violent quarrel with +Callicrates, who threatened to impeach him for treason to the league +in the course of an embassy to Rome. To save himself he gave half the +Oropian money to Diaeus, his successor as Strategus (B.C. 149-148). +This led to a popular clamour against Diaeus: who, to save himself, +falsely reported that the Senate had granted the Achaeans leave to try +and condemn certain Spartans for the offence of occupying a disputed +territory. Sparta was prepared to resist in arms, and a war seemed to +be on the point of breaking out. Callicrates and Diaeus, however, were +sent early in B.C. 148 to place the Achaean case before the Senate, +while the Spartans sent Menalchidas. Callicrates died on the road. The +Senate heard, therefore, the two sides from Diaeus and Menalchidas, and +answered that they would send commissioners to inquire into the case. +The commissioners, however, were slow in coming; so that both Diaeus +and Menalchidas had time to misrepresent the Senate’s answer to their +respective peoples. The Achaeans believed that they had full leave to +proceed according to the league law against the Spartans; the Spartans +believed that they had permission to break off from the league. Once +more, therefore, war was on the point of breaking out.[42] Just at +this time Q. Caecilius Metellus was in Macedonia with an army to crush +Andriscus. He was sending some commissioners to Asia, and ordered them +to visit the Peloponnese on their way and give a friendly warning. It +was neglected, and the Spartans sustained a defeat, which irritated +them without crushing their revolt. When Diaeus succeeded Damocritus as +Strategus in B.C. 147, he answered a second embassy from Metellus by +a promise not to take any hostile steps until the Roman commissioners +arrived. But he irritated the Spartans by putting garrisons into some +forts which commanded Laconia; and they actually elected Menalchidas as +a Strategus in opposition to Diaeus. But finding that he had no chance +of success Menalchidas poisoned himself.[43] + +Then followed the riot at Corinth.[44] Marcus Aurelius Orestes at the +head of a commission arrived at last at Corinth, and there informed the +magistrates in council that the league must give up Argos, Corinth, +and Sparta. The magistrates hastily summoned an assembly and announced +the message from the Senate; a furious riot followed, every man in +Corinth suspected of being a Spartan was seized and thrown into prison; +the very residence of the Roman commissioners was not able to afford +such persons any protection, and even the persons of Orestes and his +colleagues were in imminent danger. + +Some months afterwards a second commission arrived headed by Sextus +Julius Caesar, and demanded, without any express menace, that the +authors of the riot should be given up. The demand was evaded; and when +Caesar returned to Rome with his report, war was at once declared. + +[Sidenote: B.C. 147-146.] + +The new Strategus, elected in the autumn of B.C. 147, was Critolaus. +He was a bitter anti-Romanist like Diaeus: and these statesmen and +their party fancied that the Romans, having already two wars on hand, +at Carthage and in Spain, would make any sacrifice to keep peace with +Achaia. They had not indeed openly declined the demands of Sextus, +but, to use Polybius’s expressive phrase, “they accepted with the left +hand what the Romans offered with the right.”[45] While pretending to +be preparing to submit their case to the Senate, they were collecting +an army from the cities of the league. Inspired with an inexplicable +infatuation, which does not deserve the name of courage, Critolaus even +advanced northwards towards Thermopylae, as if he could with his petty +force bar the road to the Romans and free Greece. He was encouraged, +it was said, by a party at Thebes which had suffered from Rome for its +Macedonising policy. But, rash as the march was, it was managed with at +least equal imprudence. Instead of occupying Thermopylae, they stopped +short of it to besiege Trachinian Heracleia, an old Spartan colony,[46] +which refused to join the league. While engaged in this, Critolaus +heard that Metellus (who wished to anticipate his successor Mummius) +was on the march from Macedonia. He beat a hasty retreat to Scarpheia +in Locris,[47] which was on the road leading to Elateia and the south; +here he was overtaken and defeated with considerable slaughter. +Critolaus appears not to have fallen on the field; but he was never +seen again. He was either lost in some marshes over which he attempted +to escape, as Pausanias suggests, or poisoned himself, as Livy says. +Diaeus, as his predecessor, became Strategus, and was elected for the +following year also. Diaeus exerted himself to collect troops for +the defence of Corinth, nominally as being at war with Sparta. He +succeeded in getting as many as fourteen thousand infantry and six +hundred cavalry, consisting partly of citizens and partly of slaves; +and sent four thousand picked men under Alcamenes to hold Megara, while +he himself occupied Corinth. When Metellus approached, however, this +outpost at Megara hastily retreated into Corinth. Metellus took up his +position in the Isthmus, and offered the Achaeans the fairest terms. +Diaeus, however, induced them to reject all offers; and Metellus was +kept some time encamped before Corinth. + +[Sidenote: B.C. 146. Arrival of Mummius.] + +It was now late in the spring of B.C. 146, and the new Consul, Lucius +Mummius, arrived at the Roman camp. He at once sent Metellus back to +Macedonia, and quietly awaited the arrival of fresh troops, which he +had sent for from Crete and Pergamum, as well as from Italy.[48] He +eventually had an army of about thirty thousand men, nearly double +of the Greek army in Corinth. Nothing apparently was done till the +late summer, or autumn. But then the final catastrophe was rapid and +complete. The Roman officers regarded the Achaean force with such +contempt, that they did not take proper precautions, so that Diaeus +won a slight advantage against one of the Roman outposts. Flushed with +this success, he drew out for a pitched battle, in which he was totally +defeated. He made his way to Megalopolis, where, after killing his +wife, he poisoned himself. + +[Sidenote: Polybius saves some statues of national interest.] + +Thus by a series of imprudent measures, which Polybius denounces, +but was not at home to oppose, the Achaean league had drifted into +downright war with Rome; and, almost without a struggle, had fallen +helplessly at her feet, forced to accept whatever her mercy or contempt +might grant. Mercy, however, was to be preceded by stern punishment. +Corinth was given up to plunder and to fire, and Polybius returned +from Africa in time to witness it.[49] The destruction or deportation +of works of art, of pictures, statues, and costly furniture, he could +not prevent; but he spoke a successful word to preserve the statues of +Philopoemen in the various cities from destruction; and also begged +successfully for the restoration of some of the Eponymous hero Achaeus, +and of Philopoemen and Aratus, which had already been transported as +far as Acarnania on their way to Italy.[50] He also dissuaded his +friends from rushing to take their share in the plunder by purchasing +the confiscated goods of Diaeus, which were put to auction and could be +bought at low rates; and he refused to accept any of them himself.[51] + +[Sidenote: The new settlement of the Peloponnese, B.C. 146-145.] + +The settlement of the territories of the league was put into the hands +of a commission of ten men who were sent out after the sack of Corinth; +while Mummius, after seeing that such towns in the Peloponnese as had +joined in the war were deprived of their fortifications and arms, and +after inflicting punishment upon other towns in Greece which had shown +active sympathy with Perseus, especially Thebes and Chalcis, returned +home to celebrate his triumph, which was adorned with marble and bronze +statues and pictures from Corinth.[52] The commissioners who had been +sent out to make a final settlement of Greece, or Achaia, as it was +henceforth to be called in official language, settled the general +plan in conjunction with Mummius; but the commissioners continued +their labours for six months, at the end of which time they departed, +leaving Polybius to settle with each town the details of their local +legislation. The general principles which the commissioners laid down +were first, the entire abolition of all the leagues, and consequently +of the league assemblies; each town, with its surrounding district, +which had once formed a canton in the league, was to be separate and +independent: its magistrates, secondly, were to be selected according +to a fixed assessment of property, the old equality or democracy +being abolished: thirdly, no member of one canton might own property +in another: fourthly, the Boeotians were ordered to pay a heavy +compensation to the Heracleots and Euboeans, and the Achaeans to the +Spartans: lastly, a fixed tribute to Rome was imposed on all states +in Greece.[53] Some of these measures were in a few years’ time +relaxed, the fines were mitigated, the rule against inter-possession of +property was abolished, and the league assemblies were again allowed +for certain local purposes. But this was the end of the league as a +free federation. It is often said that “Greece was now reduced to the +form of a Roman province under the name of Achaia.” This is true in a +sense, and yet is misleading. Achaia did not become a province like +the other provinces, yearly allotted to a proconsul or propraetor or +legatus, until the time of Augustus. Such direct interference from a +Roman magistrate as was thought necessary was left to the governor of +Macedonia.[54] Yet in a certain sense Achaia was treated as a separate +entity, and had a “formula,” or constitution, founded on the separate +local laws which the commissioners found existing, or imposed, with the +help of Polybius, on the several states; it paid tribute like other +provinces, and was in fact, though called free, subject to Rome. + +Polybius performed his task of visiting the various towns in the +Peloponnese, explaining when necessary the meaning of the new +arrangements, and advising them, when they had to make others for +themselves, so much to the satisfaction of every one, that there was +a universal feeling that he had been a benefactor to his country, and +had made the best of their situation that could be made. Statues of him +are mentioned by Pausanias in several places in the Peloponnese: in +Mantinea[55] and at Megalopolis,[56] with an inscription in elegiacs +to the effect that “he had travelled over every land and sea; was an +ally of the Romans, and mitigated their wrath against Greece.” Another +in the temple of Persephone, near Acacesium,[57] under which was a +legend stating that “Greece would not have erred at all if she had +obeyed Polybius; and that when she did err, he alone proved of any +help to her.” There were others also at Pallantium,[58] Tegea,[59] and +Olympia.[60] + +In these services to his country Polybius was occupied in B.C. 145. +Of his life after that we have no detailed record. He is believed +to have visited Scipio while engaged on the siege of Numantia (B.C. +134-132), on which he wrote a separate treatise.[61] We know also +that he visited Alexandria in the reign of Ptolemy Physcon (B.C. +146-117), and expressed his contempt for the state of the people and +their rulers.[62] These years must have been also much occupied with +the extension of his history, which he originally intended should +end with the fall of the Macedonian kingdom (B.C. 168),[63] but +which was afterwards continued to the fall of Carthage and Greece +(B.C. 146);[64] for even if the history had been completed up to its +originally intended limit, and the notice of extension afterwards +inserted, there still was enough to do to occupy some years of a busy +life; especially as he seems to have carried out his principle that an +historian ought to be a traveller, visiting the localities of which +he speaks, and testing by personal inspection the possibility of the +military evolutions which he undertakes to describe. His travels appear +certainly to have embraced the greater part of Gaul, and it even seems +possible from one passage that he visited Britain.[65] His explorations +on the African coast were doubtless extensive, and he appears to have +visited Phoenicia, Cilicia, and Asia Minor. We hear of him at Sardis, +though we cannot fix the date of the visit.[66] Lastly, Lucian tells us +that, “returning from the country, he had a fall from his horse, the +effects of which he died at the age of eighty-two.” No place is given, +and no clue which may help us to be certain of the date.[67] Polybius, +besides the general history, had written a treatise on Tactics,[68] a +panegyric on Philopoemen,[69] a history of the Numantine war,[70] and +perhaps a treatise on public speaking (δημηγορία).[71] + + +§ 2.—THE SOURCES OF POLYBIUS’S HISTORY + +Polybius always maintains that the study of documents is only one, and +not the most important, element in the equipment of an historian. The +best is personal experience and personal inquiry. + +[Sidenote: Personal knowledge.] + +Of the sources of his own history, then, the first and best may be set +down as knowledge acquired by being actually present at great events, +such as the destruction of Carthage and the sack of Corinth; visits to +the Roman army in camp; assisting at actual debates in his own country; +personal knowledge of and service under men of the first position +in Achaia; personal visits to famous localities; voyages and tours +undertaken for the definite object of inspection and inquiry; and, +lastly, seeing and questioning the survivors of great battles, or the +men who had played a leading part in conspicuous political transactions. + +From his earliest youth Polybius had enjoyed some special advantages +in these respects. As he himself says, “the events in Greece fell +within his own generation, or that immediately preceding his own,—and +he therefore could relate what he had seen, or what he had heard from +eye-witnesses” (4, 2). And of the later period he “was not only an eye +witness, but in some cases an actor, and in others the chief actor” +(3, 4). When he was probably under twenty we hear of his being present +at an important interview between Philopoemen and Archon;[72] and his +election as hipparch in B.C. 169, soon after he reached the legal age, +was in consequence of his having thrown himself with vigour into the +practical working of the cavalry under Philopoemen. In regard to Roman +history and polity, we have Cicero’s testimony that he was _bonus +auctor in primis_,[73] and more particularly in regard to chronology, +_quo nemo fuit in exquirendis temporibus diligentius_.[74] Nor is +this praise undeserved, as is shown by his energy in pushing minute +and personal inquiries. Thus he learnt the details of the Hannibalic +war from some of the survivors of those actually engaged; visited the +localities, and made the pass of the Alps used by Hannibal;[75] studied +and transcribed the stele or bronze tablet placed by Hannibal on the +Lacinian promontory;[76] travelled through Libya, Spain, Gaul, and the +seas which washed their shores (perhaps even as far as Britain), in +order to give a true account of them.[77] Conversed with Massanissa +on the character of the Carthaginians, as well as with many of the +Carthaginians themselves.[78] Carefully observed Carthagena.[79] +Inspected the records at Rhodes,[80] and the Archives at Rome;[81] +and studied and transcribed the treaties preserved there.[82] Visited +Sardis,[83] Alexandria,[84] and Locri Epizephyrii.[85] To this, which +is by no means an exhaustive account of his travels and inquiries, +may be added the fact that his intimacy with the younger Africanus, +grandson by adoption and nephew by marriage of the elder Scipio, +must have placed at his disposal a considerable mass of information +contained in the family archives of the Scipios, as to the Hannibalian +war, and especially as to the campaigns in Spain.[86] + +Such were some of the means by which Polybius was enabled to obtain +accurate and trustworthy information. + +[Sidenote: Use of previous writers by Polybius.] + +It remains to inquire how far Polybius availed himself of the writings +of others. He looks upon the study of books as an important part of +an historian’s work, but, as we have seen, not the most important. +His practice appears to have been conformable to his theory. The +greater part of his information he gained from personal observation +and personal inquiry. Nevertheless, some of his history must have been +learnt from books, and very little of it could have been entirely +independent of them. Still, as far as we have the means of judging from +the fragments of his work that have come down to us, his obligations +to his predecessors are not as extensive as that of most of those who +wrote after him; nor is the number of those to whom he refers great.[87] + +[Sidenote: The Punic wars.] + +Of his preliminary sketch contained in books 1 and 2, the first book, +containing the account of the first Punic war and the Mercenary war, +appears to have been derived mainly from the writings of Fabius Pictor +(b. circ. B.C. 260), and Philinus of Agrigentum (contemporary and +secretary of Hannibal). He complains that they were violent partisans, +the one of Rome, the other of Carthage.[88] But by comparing the two, +and checking both by documents and inscriptions at Rome, he, no doubt, +found sufficient material for his purpose. + +[Sidenote: Illyrians and Gauls.] + +[Sidenote: Achaia.] + +The second book contains an account of the origin of the war between +Rome and Illyricum; of the Gallic or Celtic wars from the earliest +times; and a sketch of Achaean history to the end of the Cleomenic +war. The first two of these must have been compiled with great labour +from various public documents and family records, as well as in part +from Pictor. The sketch of Achaean history rested mainly, as far as +it depends on books, on the Memoirs of Aratus; while he studied only +to refute the writings of Phylarchus the panegyrist of Cleomenes. He +complains of the partiality of Phylarchus: but in this part of the +history it was perhaps inevitable that his own views should have been +coloured by the prejudices and prepossessions of a politician, and one +who had been closely connected from boyhood with the patriotic Achaean +party, led by Philopoemen, which was ever at enmity with all that +Cleomenes did his utmost to establish. + +[Sidenote: Sicilian history.] + +For his account of Sicilian affairs he had studied the works of Timaeus +of Tauromeniun. Although he accuses him bitterly, and at excessive +length,[89] of all the faults of which an historian can be guilty, he +yet confesses that he found in his books much that was of assistance to +him[90] in regard both to Magna Graecia and Sicily; for which he also +consulted the writings of Aristotle, especially it appears the now lost +works on Polities (πολιτείαι), and Founding of Cities (κτίσεις). The +severity of his criticism of Timaeus is supported by later authors. +He was nicknamed ἐπιτίμαιος, in allusion to the petulance of his +criticism of others;[91] and Plutarch attacks him for his perversion +of truth and his foolish and self-satisfied attempts to rival the best +of the ancient writers, and to diminish the credit of the most famous +philosophers.[92] + +[Sidenote: Greek history.] + +As far as we possess his writings, we find little trace in Polybius of +a reference to the earliest historians. Herodotus is not mentioned, +though there may be some indications of acquaintance with his work;[93] +nor the Sicilian Philistus who flourished about B.C. 430. Thucydides +is mentioned once, and Xenophon three times. Polybius was engaged in +the history of a definite period, and had not much occasion to refer to +earlier times; and perhaps the epitomator, in extracting what seemed +of value, chose those parts especially where he was the sole or best +authority. + +[Sidenote: Macedonia.] + +For the early history of Macedonia, he seems to have relied mostly on +two pupils of Isocrates, Ephorus of Cumae and Theopompus of Chios; +though the malignity of the latter deprived his authority of much +weight.[94] He also studied the work of Alexander’s friend and victim, +Callisthenes; and vehemently assailed his veracity, as others have +done. More important to him perhaps were the writings of his own +contemporaries, the Rhodians Antisthenes and Zeno; though he detects +them in some inaccuracies, which in the case of Zeno he took the +trouble to correct: and of Demetrius of Phalerum, whose writings he +seems to have greatly admired. + +[Sidenote: Egypt and Syria.] + +For the contemporary history of Egypt and Syria he seems to have +trusted principally to personal inquiry. He expressly (2, 37) declines +entering on the early history of Egypt on the ground of its having been +fully done by others (referring, perhaps, to Herodotus, Manetho, and +Ptolemy of Megalopolis). For the Seleucid dynasty of Syria he quotes no +authorities. + +[Sidenote: Geography.] + +On no subject does Polybius seem to have read so widely as on +geography: doubtless as preparing himself not only for writing, but for +being able to travel with the knowledge and intelligence necessary to +enable him to observe rightly. He had studied minutely and criticised +freely the writings of Dicaearchus, Pytheas, Eudoxus, and Eratosthenes. +He was quick to detect fallacies in these writers, and to reject their +dogmatising on the possibilities of nature; yet he does not seem to +have had in an eminent degree the topographical faculty, or the power +of giving a graphic picture of a locality. Modern research has tended +rather to strengthen than weaken our belief in the accuracy of his +descriptions, as in the case of Carthagena and the site of the battle +of Cannae; still it cannot be asserted that he is to be classed high in +the list of topographers, whether scientific or picturesque. + +[Sidenote: General Literature.] + +He appears to have been fairly well acquainted with the poets; but +his occasions for quoting them, as far as we have his work, are not +very frequent. He seems to have known his Homer, as every Greek was +bound to do. He quotes the Cypria of Stasinus, who, according to +tradition, was son-in-law of Homer; Hesiod, Simonides of Ceos, Pindar, +Euripides, and Epicharmus of Cos. He quotes or refers to Plato, whom +he appears chiefly to have studied for his political theories; and +certain technical writers, such as Aeneas Tacticus, and Cleoxenos and +Democlitus, inventors of a new system of telegraphy, if they wrote it +rather than taught it practically. + +Even allowing for the loss of so great a part of his work, the list +of authors is not a long one: and it suggests the remark, which his +style as well as his own professions tend to confirm, that he was +not primarily a man of letters, but a man of affairs and action, who +loved the stir of political agitation, and unbent his mind by the +excitement of travel and the chase. Nothing moves his contempt more +than the idea of Timaeus living peaceably for fifty years at Athens, +holding aloof from all active life, and poring over the books in +the Athenian libraries as a preparation for writing history; which, +according to him, can only be worth reading when it springs, not from +rummaging Record offices, but from taking a personal share in the +political strife of the day; studying military tactics in the camp and +field; witnessing battles; questioning the actors in great events; and +visiting the sites of battles, the cities and lands which are to be +described. + + +§ 3. THE ACHAEAN LEAGUE[95] + +To the student of politics the history of Greece is chiefly interesting +as offering examples of numerous small states enjoying complete local +autonomy, yet retaining a feeling of a larger nationality founded in a +community of blood, language, and religion; a community, that is, in +the sense that, fundamentally united in these three particulars, they +yet acknowledged variations even in them, which distinguished without +entirely separating them. From some points of view the experiment may +be regarded as having been successful. From others it was a signal +failure. Local jealousies and mutual provocations not only continually +set city against city, clan against clan, but perpetually suggested +invitations sent by one city, or even one party in a city, to foreign +potentates or peoples to interfere in their behalf against another city +or party, which they hated or feared, but were too weak to resist. Thus +we find the Persians, Macedonians, Syrians, and Romans successively +induced to interfere in Greek politics with the assurance that there +were always some states, or some party in each state, who would welcome +them. From time to time men of larger views had conceived the idea of +creating a united Empire of Hellas, which might present an unbroken +front to the foreigner. From time to time philosophers had preached the +impossibility of combining complete local independence with the idea of +a strong and vigorous nationality. But the true solution of the problem +had never been successfully hit upon: and after various abortive +attempts at combination, Greece was left, a helpless collection of +disjointed fragments, to fall under the intrigues of Macedonia and Rome. + +The Achaean league was not the first attempt at such a formation; +though it was the first that ever arrived at anything like a complete +scheme of federalism (unless the Aetolian preceded it); and was in +many respects a fresh departure in Hellenic policy, and the first +experiment in federation which seemed to contain the elements of +success. From the earliest times certain Greek states had combined more +or less closely, or loosely, for certain specific purposes. Such were +the various Amphictyonies, and especially the Amphictyonic league of +Thermopylae and Delphi. The object of these was primarily religious: +the worship of a particular deity, the care of a particular temple; the +first condition of membership being therefore community of blood. But +though this was the origin of their being, there were elements in their +constitution which might have developed into some form of federalism, +had it not been for the centrifugal forces that always tended to keep +Greek states apart. Thus we can conceive the idea of the Pylagorae from +the various states gradually giving rise to the notion of a central +parliament of elected representatives; and the sphere of its activity +gradually extending to matters purely political, beginning with those +which were on the borderland of religion and politics. And, indeed, +the action of the great Amphictyonic league at times seemed to be +approaching this.[96] + +But the forces tending to decentralisation were always the stronger: +and though the league continued to exist for many centuries, it became +less and less political, and less and less influential in Greece. So +too with other combinations in Greece. The community (τὸ κοινὸν) of the +Ionians, beginning with a common meeting for worship at the Panionium, +on one memorable occasion at least seemed for a brief space to promise +to develop into a federation for mutual succour and defence. In the +Ionian revolt in B.C. 500, the deputies (πρόβουλοι) of the Ionian +states met and determined to combine against the enemy; they even went +so far as to appoint a common general or admiral. But the instinct +of separation was too strong; at the first touch of difficulty and +hardship the union was resolved into its elements.[97] + +The constitution of the Boeotian league was somewhat more regular and +permanent. The Boeotarchs appear to have met at regular intervals, and +now and again to have succeeded in mustering a national levy. There +were also four regularly constituted “Senates” to control them, though +we know nothing of their constitution.[98] But the league had come to +nothing; partly from the resistance of the towns to the overweening +pretensions of Thebes, and later from the severity of the treatment +experienced by it at the hands of Alexander and his successors. + +Thessaly, again, was a loose confederacy of towns or cantons, in which +certain great families, such as the Aleuadae and Scopadae, held the +direction of their local affairs; or some tyrannus, as Alexander of +Pherae, obtained sovereign powers. Still, for certain purposes, a +connexion was acknowledged, and a Tagus of Thessaly was appointed, with +the power of summoning a general levy of men. For a short time prior +to the Roman conquest these officers appear to have gained additional +importance; but Thessaly never was united enough to be of importance, +in spite of its famous cavalry, even among Greek nations, far less to +be capable of presenting a firm front to the foreigner. + +One other early attempt at forming something like a Panhellenic +union ought to be noticed. When the Persian invasion of B.C. 480 was +threatening, deputies (πρόβουλοι) met at the Isthmus, sat there in +council for some months, and endeavoured to unite Greece against the +foreigner.[99] But the one expedition which was sent solely by their +instigation proved a failure.[100] And when the danger was over, +principally by the combined exertion of Athens and Sparta, this council +seems to have died a natural death. Still for a time it acted as a +supreme parliament of Greece, and assumed the power to punish with fine +or death those Greeks who had medised.[101] + +Besides these rudimentary leagues, which might, but did not, issue +in some form of Panhellenic government, there were periods in Greek +history in which the Hegemone of one state did something towards +presenting the appearance of union. Thus Polycrates of Samos seemed +at one time to be likely to succeed in forming a great Ionian Empire. +And in continental Greece, before the Persian wars, we find Sparta +occupying the position of an acknowledged court of reference in +international questions,[102]—a position in which she probably had been +preceded by Argos. And after those wars, by means of the confederacy +of Delos, formed at first for one specific purpose—that of keeping the +Aegean free of the Persians—Athens gradually rose to the position of +an imperial city, claiming active control over the external politics +of a considerable portion of Greece and nearly all the islands (B.C. +478-404). But this proved after all but a passing episode in Greek +history. Athens perhaps misused her power; and Sparta took up the +task with great professions, but in a spirit even less acceptable to +the Greek world than that of Athens; and by the peace of Antalcidas +(B.C. 387) the issue of the hundred years’ struggle with Persia left +one of the fairest portions of Hellas permanently separated from the +main body. Asiatic Greece never became Hellenic again. The fall of the +Persian empire before the invasion of Alexander for a while reunited it +to a semi-Greek power; but Alexander’s death left it a prey to warring +tyrants. It lost its prosperity and its commerce; and whatever else it +became, it was never independent, or really Hellenic again. + +For a few years more Sparta and then Thebes assumed to be head of +Greece, but the Macedonian supremacy secured at Chaeronea (B.C. +338), still more fully after the abortive Lamian war (B.C. 323), +left Greece only a nominal freedom, again and again assured to it by +various Macedonian monarchs, but really held only on sufferance. The +country seemed to settle down without farther struggle into political +insignificance. The games and festivals went on, and there was still +some high talk of Hellenic glories. But one after another of the +towns submitted to receive Macedonian garrisons and governors; and +Athens, once the brilliant leader in national aspirations, practically +abandoned politics, and was content to enjoy a reputation partly +founded on her past, and partly on the fame of the philosophers who +still taught in her gardens and porches, and attracted young men from +all parts of the world to listen to their discourses, and to sharpen +their wits by the acute if not very useful discussions which they +promoted.[103] Sparta, far from retaining her old ascendency, had been +losing with it her ancient constitution, which had been the foundation +of her glory, as well perhaps as in some respects the source of her +weakness; and for good or evil had ceased to count for much in Hellenic +politics. + +In the midst of this general collapse two portions of the Hellenic race +gradually formed or recovered some sort of united government, which +enabled them to play a conspicuous part in the later history of Greece, +and which was essentially different from any of the combinations of +earlier times of which I have been speaking. These were the Aetolians +and Achaeans. + +[Sidenote: Aetolian league.] + +With regard to the former our information is exceedingly scanty. +They were said to have been an emigration from Elis originally;[104] +but they were little known to the rest of Greece. Strange stories +were told of them, of their savage mode of life, their scarcely +intelligible language, their feeding on raw flesh, and their fierceness +as soldiers. They were said to live in open villages, widely removed +from each other, and without effective means of combination for +mutual protection. Their piracies, which were chiefly directed to the +coasts of Messenia, caused the Messenians to seize the opportunity +of Demosthenes being in their neighbourhood in B.C. 426, with a +considerable Athenian army, to persuade him to invade the Aetolians, +who were always on the look-out to attack Naupactus, a town which the +Athenians had held since B.C. 455,[105] and which was naturally an +object of envy to them as commanding the entrance to the Corinthian +gulf. But when Demosthenes attempted the invasion, he found to his +cost that the Aetolians knew how to combine, and he had to retire +beaten with severe loss.[106] The separate tribes in Aetolia seem soon +afterwards to have had, if they had not already, some form of central +government; for we find them negotiating with Agesilaus in B.C. 390, +with the same object of obtaining Naupactus,[107] when the Athenians +had lost it, and it had fallen into the hands of the Locrians.[108] The +Aetolians appear to have gradually increased in importance: for we find +Philip making terms with them and giving them the coveted Naupactus in +B.C. 341, which had at some time previous come into the possession of +the Achaeans.[109] But their most conspicuous achievement, which caused +them to take a position of importance in Greece, was their brilliant +defeat of the invading Gauls at Delphi in B.C. 279.[110] By this +time their federal constitution must in some shape have been formed. +The people elected a Strategus in a general meeting, usually held at +Thermus, at the autumn equinox, to which apparently all Aetolians +were at liberty to come, and at which questions of peace and war and +external politics generally were brought forward; though meanwhile the +Strategus appears to have had the right of declaring and carrying on +war as he chose. There was also a hipparch and a secretary (21, 32); +and a senate called Apocleti (20, 1); and a body called _Synedri_ +(_C. I. G._ 2350), which seem to have been judicial, and another +called _Nomographi_ (13, 1, _C. I. G._ 3046), who were apparently an +occasional board for legislation. They produced some writers, but their +works are lost. Accordingly, as Professor Mahaffy observes, “we know +them entirely from their enemies.” Still the acknowledged principle on +which they acted, ἄγειν λάφυρον ἀπὸ λαφύρου[111]—that is, that where +spoils were going, whether from friend or foe, they were justified in +taking a part, speaks for itself, and is enough to stamp them as at +least dangerous and unpleasant neighbours. + +[Sidenote: Achaean league.] + +The Achaeans have a different and more interesting history. + +The original Achaean league consisted of a federation of twelve +cities and their respective territory (μέρος): Pellene, Aegira, +Aegae, Bura, Helice, Aegium, Rhypes, Patrae, Pharae, Olenus, Dyme, +Tritaea.[112] This league was of great antiquity, but we know nothing +of its history, or how it differed from other leagues, such as I have +already mentioned, in adding political to religious unity. In B.C. +454 it submitted to Athens; but was restored to its original position +in the same year on the signing of the thirty years’ truce between +Sparta and Athens;[113] and though the Athenians demanded that their +authority over it should be restored to them in B.C. 425, when they +had caught the Spartan army at Sphacteria, no change appears to have +been made.[114] Thucydides certainly seems to speak of it, not as +entirely free, but as in some special manner subject to the supremacy +of Sparta. Polybius, however, claims for them, at an early period, a +peculiar and honourable place in Greek politics, as being distinguished +for probity and honour. Thus they were chosen as arbitrators in the +intestine of Magna Graecia (about B.C. 400-390); and again, after the +battle of Leuctra (B.C. 371) to mediate between Sparta and Thebes.[115] +They must therefore, between B.C. 425-390, have obtained a virtual +independence. They shared, however, in the universal decline of +Hellenic activity during the Macedonian period (B.C. 359 to about B.C. +285), and Polybius complains that they were systematically depressed +by the intrigues of Sparta and Macedonia; both which powers took care +to prevent any Achaean of promising ability from attaining influence +in the Peloponnese.[116] The same influence was exerted to estrange +the Achaean cities from each other. They were garrisoned by Macedonian +troops, or fell under the power of tyrants; and to all appearance the +league had fared as other such combinations had fared before, and had +been resolved into its original elements. + +[Sidenote: Revival of the league, B.C. 284-280.] + +But the tradition of the old union did not die out entirely. Eight +of the old cities still existed in a state of more or less vigour. +Olenus and Helice had long ago disappeared by encroachments of the sea +(before B.C. 371), and their places had not been filled up by others. +Two other towns, Rhypes and Aegae, had from various causes ceased to be +inhabited, and their places had been taken in the league (before the +dissolution) by Leontium and Caryneia. There were therefore ten cities +which had once known the advantages and disadvantages of some sort of +federal union; as well as the misfortunes which attached to disunion, +aggravated by constant interference from without. + +[Sidenote: B.C. 284. First union of Dyme, Patrae, Tritaea, Pharae.] + +[Sidenote: Adherence of Aegium, B.C. 279.] + +[Sidenote: B.C. 279-255.] + +[Sidenote: Margos of Caryneia first sole Strategus, B.C. 255.] + +The first step in an attempt to resuscitate the league was taken in +the 124th Olympiad (B.C. 284-280). Macedonia was at the time weakened +by the troubles of a disputed succession: Pyrrhus was absorbed in +his futile Italian expedition: a change in the sovereign of Egypt +opened a way to a possible change of policy at Alexandria: and the +death of Lysimachus gave the monarchs something else to do than to +trouble themselves about the Peloponnese. At this period four of the +Achaean towns, Dyme, Patrae, Tritaea, and Pharae, formed a league +for mutual help. This proving, after a trial of five years, to have +some stability, it was joined by Aegium, from which the Macedonian +garrison was expelled. At intervals, of which we are not informed, this +was again joined by Bura and Caryneia. These seven cities continued +to constitute the entire league for twenty-five years; the federal +magistrates consisting of two Strategi, elected by each city in turns, +and a secretary. As to the doings of the league during this period +we are entirely in the dark. The next step that we hear of is the +abolition of the dual presidency and the election of Margos of Caryneia +as sole Strategus. We are not told the reasons of the change; but it +is clear that a divided command might often give room for delay, when +delay was fatal; and for the conflict of local interests, where the +interests of the community should be the paramount consideration. At +any rate the change was made: and Margos, who had been a loyal servant +of the league, was the first sole Strategus. His immediate successors +we do not know. The next fact in the history of the league was the +adherence of Sicyon, a powerful town and the first of any, not in the +number of the old Achaean federation, to join. This therefore was +a great step in the direction of extending the federation over the +Peloponnese; and it was the work of the man destined to do much in +moulding the league into the shape in which it attained its greatest +effectiveness, Aratus of Sicyon. He found it weak; its cities poor +and insignificant; with no aid from rich soil or good harbourage to +increase its wealth or property;[117] he left it, not indeed free +from serious dangers and difficulties,—in part the result of his own +policy in calling in the aid of the Macedonians, in part created by +the persistent hostility of Aetolia and Sparta,—but yet possessed of +great vitality, and fast becoming the most powerful and influential of +all the Greek governments; although at no time can it be spoken of as +Panhellenic without very considerable exaggeration. Aratus had been +brought up in exile at Argos, after the murder of his father Cleinias +(B.C. 271); and, when twenty years of age, by a gallant and romantic +adventure, had driven out the tyrant Nicocles from Sicyon (B.C. 251). +He became the chief magistrate of his native town, which he induced to +join the Achaean league, thus causing, as I have said, the league to +take its first step towards embracing all the Peloponnese. It seems +that for five years Aratus remained chief magistrate of Sicyon, but +a private citizen of the league. In B.C. 245 (though of the exact +year we have no positive information), he appears to have been first +elected Strategus of the league. But it was not until his second year +of office, B.C. 243-242, that he began putting in practice the policy +which he proposed to himself,—the expulsion of the Macedonian garrisons +and the despots from the cities of the Peloponnese, with the view of +their joining the league. He began with the Acrocorinthus. Corinth, +freed from the foreign garrison, joined the league, and was followed +soon after by Megara[118] (B.C. 240). From this time Aratus was +Strategus of the league in alternate years to the time of his death, +the federal law not allowing two consecutive years of office.[119] + +[Sidenote: Cleomenic war, B.C. 227-221.] + +[Sidenote: B.C. 226-221.] + +The death of Antigonus Gonatas (B.C. 239) led to a new departure. +Hitherto the Aetolians had been in league with the Macedonians to +vex and harry the Achaeans. The two leagues now made peace, and +the Aetolians aided the Achaeans in their resistance to Gonatas’s +successor, Demetrius (B.C. 239-229). Still the despots in many of the +Peloponnesian towns held out, trusting to the support of Demetrius. +When he died (B.C. 229) there was a general movement among them to +abdicate and join their cities to the league. Lydiades of Megalopolis +had done so during Demetrius’s lifetime; and now Aristomachus of Argos, +Xeno of Hermione, and Cleonymus of Phlius did the same. The rapid +extension of the Achaean league, however, could not fail to excite the +jealousy of the Aetolians, to whose league belonged certain Arcadian +cities such as Mantinea, Tegea, and Orchomenus. These they imagined to +be threatened by the policy of Aratus, which was apt to proceed on the +line that even a forcible attachment of a Peloponnesian town to the +league was in reality a liberation of its people from a constraining +power. The Spartan jealousy was aroused by the same fear. And then, as +Polybius puts it, the Aetolians connived at the extension of Spartan +power, even at the expense of cities in league with themselves, in +order to strengthen Cleomenes in his attitude of opposition to the +Achaeans.[120] Aratus, however, resolved to wait for some definite act +of hostility before moving. This was supplied by Cleomenes building +a fort (the Athenaeum) at Belbina, in the territory of Megalopolis, +a league city. Upon this the league necessarily proclaimed war with +Sparta. Thus does Polybius, a warm friend of the league, state the case +in its behalf. The league, he argues, had been growing by the voluntary +adherence of independent towns: it had shown no sign of an intention +to attack Laconian territory, or towns in league with Aetolia: while +Cleomenes had committed an act of wanton aggression and provocation +by building a hostile fort in its territory. But what the other side +had to say may be gathered from Plutarch’s life of Cleomenes, founded +principally on the work of Phylarchus the panegyrist of Cleomenes.[121] +Here the case is put very differently. Aratus, according to him, had +made up his mind that a union of the Peloponnesus was the one thing +necessary for the safety of the league. In a great measure he had been +already successful; but the parts which still stood aloof were Elis, +Laconia, and the cities of Arcadia which were under the influence of +Sparta.[122] He therefore harassed these last by every means in his +power; and the erection or fortification of the Athenaeum at Belbina +by Cleomenes was in truth only a measure of necessary defence. Aratus, +indeed, held that some of these Arcadian cities had been unfairly +seized by Cleomenes, with the connivance of the Aetolians;[123] but to +this Cleomenes might reply that, if the league claimed the right of +extending its connexion with the assent, often extorted, of the various +cities annexed, the same right could not justly be denied to himself. +A series of military operations took place during the next five years, +in which Cleomenes nearly always got the better of Aratus; who, able +and courageous in plots and surprises, was timid and ineffective in +the field. The one important blow struck by Aratus, that of seizing +Mantinea, was afterwards nullified by a counter-occupation of it by +the Lacedaemonians; and in spite of troubles at home, caused by his +great scheme of reform, Cleomenes was by B.C. 224 in so superior a +position that he could with dignity propose terms to the league. He +asked to be elected Strategus, therefore.[124] At first sight this +seemed a means of effecting the desired union of the Peloponnese; and +as such the Achaeans were inclined to accept the proposal. Aratus, +however, exerted all his influence to defeat the measure: and, in +spite of all his failures, his services to the league enabled him to +convince his countrymen that they should reject the offer; and he was +himself elected Strategus for the twelfth time in the spring of B.C. +223. Aratus has been loudly condemned for allowing a selfish jealousy +to override his care for the true interests of his country, in thus +refusing a prospect of a united Achaia, in which some one besides +himself should be the leading man.[125] But I think there is something +to be said on the other side. What Aratus had been working for with a +passionate eagerness was a union of free democratic states. Cleomenes, +in spite of his liberal reforms at home, was a Spartan to the back +bone. Aratus would have no manner of doubt that a league, with Sparta +supreme in it, would inevitably become a Spartan kingdom. The forces +of Sparta would be used to crush dissenting cities; and soon to put +down the free institution which would always be disliked and feared +by the Spartan government. Security from Macedonian influence, if it +were really obtained,—and that was far from certain,—would be dearly +purchased at the price of submission to Spartan tyranny, which would +be more galling and oppressive in proportion as it was nearer and +more unremitting. With these views Aratus began to turn his eyes to +the Macedonian court, as the only possible means of resisting the +encroaching policy of Cleomenes. The character of Antigonus Doson, who +was then administering Macedonia, gave some encouragement to hope for +honest and honourable conduct on his part; and after some hesitation +Aratus took the final step of asking for his aid.[126] I do not expect +to carry the assent of many readers when I express the opinion that +he was right; and that the Greek policy towards Macedonia had been +from the first a grievous error,—fostered originally by the patriotic +eloquence of Demosthenes, and continued ever since by that ineradicable +sentiment for local autonomy which makes Greek history so interesting, +but inevitably tended to the political annihilation of Greece. Had some +_modus vivendi_ been found with the series of very able sovereigns who +ruled Macedonia, a strong Greek nation might have been the result, +with a central government able to hold its own even in the face of +the great “cloud in the West,” which was surely overshadowing Greek +freedom. But this was not to be. The taste for local freedom was too +strong; and showed itself by constant appeals to an outside power +against neighbours, which yet the very men who appealed to it would not +recognise or obey. The Greeks had to learn that nations cannot, any +more than individuals, eat their cake and have it too. Local autonomy, +and the complete liberty of every state to war with its neighbours as +it chooses, and of every one to speak and act as he pleases, have their +charms; but they are not compatible with a united resistance to a great +centralised and law-abiding power. And all the eloquence of all the +Greek orators rolled into one could not make up for the lack of unity, +or enable the distracted Greeks to raise an army which might stand +before a volley of Roman pila or a charge of Roman legionaries. + +The help asked of Antigonus Doson was given with fatal readiness; but +it had to be purchased by the admission of a Macedonian garrison into +the Acrocorinthus, one of those “fetters of Greece,” the recovery of +which had been among Aratus’s earliest and most glorious triumphs. +The battle of Sellasia (B.C. 221) settled the question of Spartan +influence. Cleomenes fled to Alexandria and never returned. Sparta was +not enslaved by Antigonus; who on the contrary professed to restore her +ancient constitution,—probably meaning that the Ephoralty destroyed +by Cleomenes was to be reconstituted, and the exiles banished by him +recalled. Practically she was left a prey to a series of unscrupulous +tyrants who one after the other managed to obtain absolute power, +Lycurgus (B.C. 220-210), Machanidas, B.C. 210-207; Nabis, B.C. 207-192; +who, though differing in their home administrations, all agreed in +using the enmity of the Aetolians in order to harass and oppress the +Achaeans in every possible way. + +[Sidenote: B.C. 213. Death of Aratus.] + +Aratus died in B.C. 213. The last seven years of his life were +embittered by much ill success in his struggles with the Aetolians; +and by seeing Philip V., of whose presence in the Peloponnese he was +the main cause, after rendering some brilliant services to the league, +both in the Peloponnese and the invasion of Aetolia, develop some of +the worst vices of the tyrant; and he believed himself, whether rightly +or wrongly, to be poisoned by Philip’s order: “This is the reward,” he +said to an attendant when he felt himself dying, “of my friendship for +Philip.”[127] + +The history of the league after his death followed the same course for +some years. The war with the Aetolians went on, sometimes slackly, +sometimes vigorously, as Philip V. was or was not diverted by +contests with his barbarian neighbours, or by schemes for joining the +Carthaginian assaults upon the Roman power. + +[Sidenote: B.C. 208-183, Philopoemen.] + +[Sidenote: B.C. 193.] + +[Sidenote: B.C. 195-194.] + +The next phase of vigorous action on the part of the league is that +which corresponds with the career of Philopoemen, who had already +shown his energy and skill at the battle of Sellasia. He was elected +Hipparch in B.C. 210, and Strategus in B.C. 209. In his first office +he did much to reorganise the Achaean cavalry and restore them to +some discipline,[128] and he extended this as Strategus to the whole +army.[129] His life’s work, however, was the defeating and either +killing or confining to their frontier the tyrants of Sparta. But while +he was absent from the country after B.C. 200 a new element appeared in +the Peloponnese. In 197 the battle of Cynoscephalae put an end for ever +to Macedonian influence, and Flamininus proclaimed the liberty of all +Greece in B.C. 195 at the Nemean festival. But Nabis was not deposed; +he was secured in his power by a treaty with Rome; and when Philopoemen +returned from Crete (B.C. 193), he found a fresh war on the point of +breaking out owing to intrigues between that tyrant and the Aetolians. +They suggested, and he eagerly undertook to make, an attempt to +recover the maritime towns of which he had been deprived by the Roman +settlement.[130][Sidenote: 193-192.] Nabis at once attacked Gythium: +and seemed on the point of taking it and the whole of the coast towns, +which would thus have been lost to the league. Philopoemen, now again +Strategus (B.C. 192), failed to relieve Gythium; but by a skilful +piece of generalship inflicted so severe a defeat on Nabis, as he was +returning to Sparta, that he did not venture on further movements +beyond Laconia; and shortly afterwards was assassinated by some +Aetolians whom he had summoned to his aid. + +[Sidenote: 189-187.] + +But the comparative peace in the Peloponnese was again broken in +B.C. 189 by the Spartans seizing a maritime town called Las; the +object being to relieve themselves of the restraint which shut them +from the sea, and the possible attacks of the exiles who had been +banished by Nabis, and who were always watching an opportunity to +effect their return. Philopoemen (Strategus both 189 and 188 B.C.) +led an army to the Laconian frontier in the spring of B.C. 188, and +after the execution of eighty Spartans, who had been surrendered on +account of the seizure of Las, and of the murder of thirty citizens +who were supposed to have Achaean proclivities—Sparta submitted to his +demand to raze the fortifications, dismiss the mercenaries, send away +the new citizens enrolled by the tyrants, and abolish the Lycurgean +laws, accepting the Achaean institutions instead. This was afterwards +supplemented by a demand for the restoration of the exiles banished by +the tyrants. Such of the new citizens (three thousand) as did not leave +the country by the day named were seized and sold as slaves.[131] + +[Sidenote: B.C. 188.] + +[Sidenote: 188-183.] + +Sparta was now part of the Achaean league, which at this time reached +its highest point of power; and its alliance was solicited by the most +powerful princes of the east. It is this period which Polybius seems to +have in mind in his description of the league at its best, as embracing +the whole of the Peloponnese.[132][Sidenote: Lycortas Strategus, B.C. +184-182.] And it was in this third period of the existence of the +renewed league that his father Lycortas came to the front, and he +himself at an early age began taking part in politics. + +[Sidenote: B.C. 179.] + +But the terms imposed on Sparta were essentially violent and unjust, +and, as it turned out, impolitic. Cowed into submission, she proved +a thorn in the side of the league. The exiles continually appealed +to Rome; and after Philopoemen’s death (B.C. 183) the affairs of the +league began more and more to come before the Roman Senate. As usual, +traitors were at hand ready to sell their country for the sake of +the triumph of their party; and Callicrates, sent to Rome to plead +the cause of the league,[133] employed the opportunity to support +himself and his party by advising the Senate to give support to “the +Romanisers” in every state. This Polybius regards as the beginning of +the decline of the league. And the party of moderation, to which he and +his father Lycortas belonged, and which wished to assert the dignity +and legal rights of their country while offering no provocation to the +Romans, were eventually included under the sweeping decree which caused +them, to the number of a thousand, to be deported to Italy. We have +already seen, in tracing the life of Polybius, how the poor remnants of +these exiles returned in B.C. 151, embittered against Rome, and having +learnt nothing and forgotten nothing. And how the old quarrels were +renewed, until an armed interference of Rome was brought upon them; and +how the victory of Mummius at Corinth (B.C. 146), and the consequent +settlement of the commissioners, finally dissolved the league into +separate cantons, nominally autonomous, but really entirely subject to +Rome.[134] + +The constitution of the league presents many points of interest to the +student of politics, and has been elaborately discussed by more than +one English scholar. I shall content myself here with pointing out some +of the main features as they are mentioned by Polybius.[135] + +The league was a federation of free towns, all retaining full local +autonomy of some form or other of democracy, which for certain purposes +were under federal laws and federal magistrates, elected in a federal +assembly which all citizens of the league towns might if they chose +attend. All towns of the league also used the same standards in coinage +and weights and measures (2, 37). The assembly of the league (σύνοδος) +met for election of the chief magistrate in May of each year, at first +always at Aegium, but later at the other towns of the league in turn +(29, 23); and a second time in the autumn.[136] And besides these +annual meetings, the Strategus, acting with his council of magistrates, +could summon a meeting at any time for three days (_e.g._ at Sicyon, +23, 17); and on one occasion we find the assembly delegating its powers +to the armed levy of league troops, who for the nonce were to act as an +assembly (4, 7). Side by side with this general assembly was a council +(βουλή), the functions and powers of which we cannot clearly ascertain. +It seems to have acted as representing the general assembly in foreign +affairs (4, 26; 22, 12); and, being a working committee of the whole +assembly, it sometimes happened that when an assembly was summoned on +some subject which did not rouse popular interest, it practically was +the assembly (29, 24). Its numbers have been assumed to be one hundred +and twenty, from the fact that Eumenes offered them a present of one +hundred and twenty talents, the interest of which was to pay their +expenses. But this, after all, is not a certain deduction (22, 10). + +The officers of the league were: First, a President or Strategus who +kept the seal of the league (4, 7), ordered the levy of federal troops, +and commanded it in the field. He also summoned the assemblies, and +brought the business to be done before them, which was in the form +of a proposal to be accepted or rejected, not amended. He was not +chairman of the assembly, but like an English minister or a Roman +consul brought on the proposals. He was assisted by a kind of cabinet +of ten magistrates from the several towns, who were called Demiurgi +(δημιουργοὶ 23, 5).[137] This was their technical name: but Polybius +also speaks of them under the more general appellation of οἱ ἄρχοντες +(5, 1), οἱ συνάρχοντες (23, 16), αἱ ἀρχαὶ (22, 13), αἱ συναρχίαι (27, +2). Whether the number ten had reference to the ten old towns of the +league or not, it was not increased with the number of the towns; and, +though we are not informed how they were elected, it seems reasonable +to suppose that they were freely selected without reference to the +towns from which they came, as the Strategus himself was. There was +also a vice-president, or hypo-strategus, whose position was, I think, +wholly military. He did not rule in absence of the Strategus, or +succeed him in case of death, that being reserved for the Strategus +of the previous year; but he took a certain command in war next the +Strategus (5, 94; 4, 59). Besides these we hear of a Hipparch to +command the league cavalry (5, 95; 7, 22), an office which seems to +have been regarded as stepping-stone to that of Strategus. This proved +a bad arrangement, as its holder was tempted to seek popularity by +winking at derelictions of duty among the cavalry who were voters.[138] +There was also a Navarch to command the regular squadron of federal +ships (5, 94), who does not seem to have been so important a person. +There are also mentioned certain judges (δίκασται) to administer the +federal law. We hear of them, however, performing duties closely +bordering on politics; for they decided whether certain honorary +inscriptions, statues, or other marks of respect to king Eumenes should +be allowed to remain in the Achaean cities (28, 7). + +The Strategus, on the order of the assembly, raised the federal army +(4, 7). The number of men raised differed according to circumstances. +A fairly full levy seems to have been five thousand infantry and five +hundred cavalry (4, 15). But the league also used mercenaries to a +great extent. And we hear of one army which was to consist of eight +thousand mercenary infantry, with five hundred mercenary cavalry; and +in this case the Achaean levy was only to be three thousand infantry, +with three hundred cavalry (5, 91). + +The pay of the mercenaries and other league expenses were provided for +by an εἰσφορά or contribution from all the states (5, 31, 91). The +contributing towns appear to have been able to recover their payments +as an indemnification for damage which the federal forces had failed to +avert (4, 60). + +The regular federal squadron of ships for guarding the sea-coasts +appears to have consisted of ten triremes (2, 9; δεκαναία μακρῶν πλοίων +22, 10). + +Such was the organisation of the Federal Government. It was in form +purely democratic, all members of thirty years old being eligible for +office, as well as possessing a vote in the assemblies. But a mass +assembly where the members are widely scattered inevitably becomes +oligarchic. Only the well-to-do and the energetic will be able or will +care to come a long journey to attend. And as the votes in the assembly +were given by towns, it must often have happened that the votes of many +towns were decided by a very small number of their citizens who were +there. No doubt, in times of great excitement, the attendance would be +large and the vote a popular one. But the general policy of the league +must have been directed by a small number of energetic men, who made +politics their profession and could afford to do so. + + + ROMAN CAMP FOR TWO LEGIONS + + CONTAINING 4,068,289 SQUARE FEET + + REAR (ἡ ὄπισθεν ἐπιφάνεια). + +---------------------------- -----------------------------+ + | 200 Porta Praetoria. 200 | + | ft. ft. | + | +----+--------------+ +---------------+----+ | + | | | EP | | EP' | | | + | | V +--------------+ 50 +---------------+ V' | | + | | | EE | ft.| EE' | | | + | +----+--------------+ +---------------+----+ | + | 50 | + | +---+--+ +------+ +---+---+ ft. | + | |PE |PP| | | |PP'|PE'| | + | +---+--+ F | P* | Q +---+---+ | + |700 |PE |PP| | | |PP'|PE'| | + |ft. +---+--+ +------+ +---+---+ | + | ...... ...... | + | T-----------------------------------------------T' | + Porta Porta + Principalis 100 ft. Principalis + Dextra. Principia. Sinistra. + | +---+--+ +-+-+ +-+-+ +--+--+ +--+--+ +---+---+ | + | |PS |ES| |H|P| |T|E| |E'|T'| |P'|H'| |ES'|PS'| | + | +---+--+ +-+-+ +-+-+ +--+--+ +--+--+ +---+---+ | + | |PS |ES| |H|P| |T|E| |E'|T'| |P'|H'| |ES'|PS'| | + | +---+--+ +-+-+ +-+-+ +--+--+ +--+--+ +---+---+ | + |200 ft. |PS |ES| |H|P| |T|E| |E'|T'| |P'|H'| |ES'|PS'|200 ft.| + | +---+--+ +-+-+ +-+-+ +--+--+ +--+--+ +---+---+ | + | |PS |ES| |H|P| |T|E| |E'|T'| |P'|H'| |ES'|PS'| | + | +PS +ES+ +-+-+ +-+-+ +--+--+ +--+--+ +---+---+ | + | |PS |ES| |H|P| |T|E| |E'|T'| |P'|H'| |ES'|PS'| | + | +---+--+ +-+-+ +-+-+ +--+--+ +--+--+ +---+---+ | + | Via Quintana. 50 ft. | + | +---+--+ +-+-+ +-+-+ +--+--+ +--+--+ +---+---+ | + | |PS |ES| |H|P| |T|E| |E'|T'| |P'|H'| |ES'|PS'| | + | +---+--+ +-+-+ +-+-+ +--+--+ +--+--+ +---+---+ | + | |PS |ES| |H|P| |T|E| |E'|T'| |P'|H'| |ES'|PS'| | + | +---+--+ +-+-+ +-+-+ +--+--+ +--+--+ +---+---+ | + | |PS |ES| |H|P| |T|E| |E'|T'| |P'|H'| |ES'|PS'| | + | +---+--+ +-+-+ +-+-+ +--+--+ +--+--+ +---+---+ | + | |PS |ES| |H|P| |T|E| |E'|T'| |P'|H'| |ES'|PS'| | + | +---+--+ +-+-+ +-+-+ +--+--+ +--+--+ +---+---+ | 2017 + | |PS |ES| |H|P| |T|E| |E'|T'| |P'|H'| |ES'|PS'| | ft. + | +---+--+ +-+-+ +-+-+ +--+--+ +--+--+ +---+---+ | + | 50ft. 50ft. 50ft. 50ft. 50ft. | + | 200 | + | ft. Porto Decumana. | + +---------------------------- -----------------------------+ + 2017 ft. FRONT (τὸ πρόσωπον). + + + P*. Praetorium. + T T'. Tents of the Tribuni Militum of two legions. + E E'. Equites of two legions. + P P'. Principes ” ” + H H'. Hastati ” ” + T T'. Triarii ” ” + ES ES'. Equites of Socii of two legions. + PS PS'. Pedites ” ” ” + PE PE'. Equites of the Praetorian Cohort of two legions. + PP PP'. Pedites ” ” ” ” ” + EP EP'. Pedites extraordinarii of two legions. + EE EE'. Equites ” ” ” + Q. Quaestorium. + F. Forum or market-place. + V V'. Foreigners or volunteers. + + + + +THE HISTORIES OF POLYBIUS + + + + +BOOK I + + +[Sidenote: Introduction. The importance and magnitude of the subject.] + +[Sidenote: B.C. 219-167.] + ++1.+ Had the praise of History been passed over by former Chroniclers +it would perhaps have been incumbent upon me to urge the choice and +special study of records of this sort, as the readiest means men can +have of correcting their knowledge of the past. But my predecessors +have not been sparing in this respect. They have all begun and ended, +so to speak, by enlarging on this theme: asserting again and again +that the study of History is in the truest sense an education, and a +training for political life; and that the most instructive, or rather +the only, method of learning to bear with dignity the vicissitudes +of fortune is to recall the catastrophes of others. It is evident, +therefore, that no one need think it his duty to repeat what has been +said by many, and said well. Least of all myself: for the surprising +nature of the events which I have undertaken to relate is in itself +sufficient to challenge and stimulate the attention of every one, +old or young, to the study of my work. Can any one be so indifferent +or idle as not to care to know by what means, and under what kind of +polity, almost the whole inhabited world was conquered and brought +under the dominion of the single city of Rome, and that too within +a period of not quite fifty-three years? Or who again can be so +completely absorbed in other subjects of contemplation or study, as to +think any of them superior in importance to the accurate understanding +of an event for which the past affords no precedent. + +[Sidenote: Immensity of the Roman Empire shown by comparison with +Persia, Sparta, Macedonia. 1. Persia.] + +[Sidenote: 2. Sparta. B.C. 405-394.] + +[Sidenote: 3. Macedonia.] + ++2.+ We shall best show how marvellous and vast our subject is by +comparing the most famous Empires which preceded, and which have +been the favourite themes of historians, and measuring them with the +superior greatness of Rome. There are but three that deserve even to +be so compared and measured: and they are these. The Persians for a +certain length of time were possessed of a great empire and dominion. +But every time they ventured beyond the limits of Asia, they found +not only their empire, but their own existence also in danger. The +Lacedaemonians, after contending for supremacy in Greece for many +generations, when they did get it, held it without dispute for barely +twelve years. The Macedonians obtained dominion in Europe from the +lands bordering on the Adriatic to the Danube,—which after all is but +a small fraction of this continent,—and, by the destruction of the +Persian Empire, they afterwards added to that the dominion of Asia. And +yet, though they had the credit of having made themselves masters of a +larger number of countries and states than any people had ever done, +they still left the greater half of the inhabited world in the hands of +others. They never so much as thought of attempting Sicily, Sardinia, +or Libya: and as to Europe, to speak the plain truth, they never even +knew of the most warlike tribes of the West. The Roman conquest, on +the other hand, was not partial. Nearly the whole inhabited world was +reduced by them to obedience: and they left behind them an empire not +to be paralleled in the past or rivalled in the future. Students will +gain from my narrative a clearer view of the whole story, and of the +numerous and important advantages which such exact record of events +offers. + +[Sidenote: B.C. 220-217. The History starts from the 140th Olympiad, +when the tendency towards unity first shows itself.] + ++3.+ My History begins in the 140th Olympiad. The events from which it +starts are these. In Greece, what is called the Social war: the first +waged by Philip, son of Demetrius and father of Perseus, in league with +the Achaeans against the Aetolians. In Asia, the war for the possession +of Coele-Syria which Antiochus and Ptolemy Philopator carried on +against each other. In Italy, Libya, and their neighbourhood, the +conflict between Rome and Carthage, generally called the Hannibalian +war. My work thus begins where that of Aratus of Sicyon leaves off. Now +up to this time the world’s history had been, so to speak, a series +of disconnected transactions, as widely separated in their origin +and results as in their localities. But from this time forth History +becomes a connected whole: the affairs of Italy and Libya are involved +with those of Asia and Greece, and the tendency of all is to unity. +This is why I have fixed upon this era as the starting-point of my +work. For it was their victory over the Carthaginians in this war, and +their conviction that thereby the most difficult and most essential +step towards universal empire had been taken, which encouraged the +Romans for the first time to stretch out their hands upon the rest, and +to cross with an army into Greece and Asia. + +[Sidenote: A sketch of their previous history necessary to explain the +success of the Romans.] + +Now, had the states that were rivals for universal empire been +familiarly known to us, no reference perhaps to their previous history +would have been necessary, to show the purpose and the forces with +which they approached an undertaking of this nature and magnitude. +But the fact is that the majority of the Greeks have no knowledge of +the previous constitution, power, or achievements either of Rome or +Carthage. I therefore concluded that it was necessary to prefix this +and the next book to my History. I was anxious that no one, when fairly +embarked upon my actual narrative, should feel at a loss, and have to +ask what were the designs entertained by the Romans, or the forces and +means at their disposal, that they entered upon those undertakings, +which did in fact lead to their becoming masters of land and sea +everywhere in our part of the world. I wished, on the contrary, that +these books of mine, and the prefatory sketch which they contained, +might make it clear that the resources they started with justified +their original idea, and sufficiently explained their final success in +grasping universal empire and dominion. + +[Sidenote: The need of a comprehensive view of history as well as a +close study of an epoch.] + ++4.+ There is this analogy between the plan of my History and the +marvellous spirit of the age with which I have to deal. Just as Fortune +made almost all the affairs of the world incline in one direction, +and forced them to converge upon one and the same point; so it is my +task as an historian to put before my readers a compendious view of +the part played by Fortune in bringing about the general catastrophe. +It was this peculiarity which originally challenged my attention, and +determined me on undertaking this work. And combined with this was the +fact that no writer of our time has undertaken a general history. Had +any one done so my ambition in this direction would have been much +diminished. But, in point of fact, I notice that by far the greater +number of historians concern themselves with isolated wars and the +incidents that accompany them: while as to a general and comprehensive +scheme of events, their date, origin, and catastrophe, no one as far +as I know has undertaken to examine it. I thought it, therefore, +distinctly my duty neither to pass by myself, nor allow any one else to +pass by, without full study, a characteristic specimen of the dealings +of Fortune at once brilliant and instructive in the highest degree. For +fruitful as Fortune is in change, and constantly as she is producing +dramas in the life of men, yet never assuredly before this did she work +such a marvel, or act such a drama, as that which we have witnessed. +And of this we cannot obtain a comprehensive view from writers of mere +episodes. It would be as absurd to expect to do so as for a man to +imagine that he has learnt the shape of the whole world, its entire +arrangement and order, because he has visited one after the other the +most famous cities in it; or perhaps merely examined them in separate +pictures. That would be indeed absurd: and it has always seemed to me +that men, who are persuaded that they get a competent view of universal +from episodical history, are very like persons who should see the limbs +of some body, which had once been living and beautiful, scattered +and remote; and should imagine that to be quite as good as actually +beholding the activity and beauty of the living creature itself. But +if some one could there and then reconstruct the animal once more, in +the perfection of its beauty and the charm of its vitality, and could +display it to the same people, they would beyond doubt confess that +they had been far from conceiving the truth, and had been little better +than dreamers. For indeed some idea of a whole may be got from a part, +but an accurate knowledge and clear comprehension cannot. Wherefore we +must conclude that episodical history contributes exceedingly little to +the familiar knowledge and secure grasp of universal history. While it +is only by the combination and comparison of the separate parts of the +whole,—by observing their likeness and their difference,—that a man can +attain his object: can obtain a view at once clear and complete; and +thus secure both the profit and the delight of History. + +[Sidenote: B.C. 264-261. I begin my preliminary account in the 129th +Olympiad, and with the circumstances which took the Romans to Sicily.] + ++5.+ I shall adopt as the starting-point of this book the first +occasion on which the Romans crossed the sea from Italy. This is just +where the History of Timaeus left off; and it falls in the 129th +Olympiad. I shall accordingly have to describe what the state of their +affairs in Italy was, how long that settlement had lasted, and on what +resources they reckoned, when they resolved to invade Sicily. For this +was the first place outside Italy in which they set foot. The precise +cause of their thus crossing I must state without comment; for if I let +one cause lead me back to another, my point of departure will always +elude my grasp, and I shall never arrive at the view of my subject +which I wish to present. As to dates, then, I must fix on some era +agreed upon and recognised by all: and as to events, one that admits +of distinctly separate treatment; even though I may be obliged to go +back some short way in point of time, and take a summary review of the +intermediate transactions. For if the facts with which one starts are +unknown, or even open to controversy, all that comes after will fail +of approval and belief. But opinion being once formed on that point, +and a general assent obtained, all the succeeding narrative becomes +intelligible. + +[Sidenote: B.C. 387-386. The rise of the Roman dominion may be traced +from the retirement of the Gauls from the city. From that time one +nation after another in Italy fell into their hands.] + +[Sidenote: The Latini.] + +[Sidenote: The Etruscans, Gauls, and Samnites.] + +[Sidenote: Pyrrhus, B.C. 280.] + +[Sidenote: Southern Italy.] + +[Sidenote: Pyrrhus finally quits Italy, B.C. 274.] + ++6.+ It was in the nineteenth year after the sea-fight at Aegospotami, +and the sixteenth before the battle at Leuctra; the year in which the +Lacedaemonians made what is called the Peace of Antalcidas with the +King of Persia; the year in which the elder Dionysius was besieging +Rhegium after beating the Italian Greeks on the River Elleporus; and +in which the Gauls took Rome itself by storm and were occupying the +whole of it except the Capitol. With these Gauls the Romans made a +treaty and settlement which they were content to accept: and having +thus become beyond all expectation once more masters of their own +country, they made a start in their career of expansion; and in the +succeeding period engaged in various wars with their neighbours. First, +by dint of valour, and the good fortune which attended them in the +field, they mastered all the Latini; then they went to war with the +Etruscans; then with the Celts; and next with the Samnites, who lived +on the eastern and northern frontiers of Latium. Some time after this +the Tarentines insulted the ambassadors of Rome, and, in fear of the +consequences, invited and obtained the assistance of Pyrrhus. This +happened in the year before the Gauls invaded Greece, some of whom +perished near Delphi, while others crossed into Asia. Then it was that +the Romans—having reduced the Etruscans and Samnites to obedience, +and conquered the Italian Celts in many battles—attempted for the +first time the reduction of the rest of Italy. The nations for whose +possessions they were about to fight they affected to regard, not in +the light of foreigners, but as already for the most part belonging and +pertaining to themselves. The experience gained from their contests +with the Samnites and the Celts had served as a genuine training in the +art of war. Accordingly, they entered upon the war with spirit, drove +Pyrrhus from Italy, and then undertook to fight with and subdue those +who had taken part with him. They succeeded everywhere to a marvel, and +reduced to obedience all the tribes inhabiting Italy except the Celts; +after which they undertook to besiege some of their own citizens, who +at that time were occupying Rhegium. + +[Sidenote: The story of the Mamertines at Messene, and the Roman +garrison at Rhegium, Dio. Cassius _fr._] + ++7.+ For misfortunes befell Messene and Rhegium, the cities built on +either side of the Strait, peculiar in their nature and alike in their +circumstances. + +[Sidenote: 1. Messene.] + +[Sidenote: Agathocles died, B.C. 289] + +Not long before the period we are now describing some Campanian +mercenaries of Agathocles, having for some time cast greedy eyes upon +Messene, owing to its beauty and wealth, no sooner got an opportunity +than they made a treacherous attempt upon that city. They entered the +town under guise of friendship, and, having once got possession of +it, they drove out some of the citizens and put others to the sword. +This done, they seized promiscuously the wives and children of the +dispossessed citizens, each keeping those which fortune had assigned +him at the very moment of the lawless deed. All other property and the +land they took possession of by a subsequent division and retained. + +[Sidenote: 2. Rhegium, Livy Ep. 12.] + +[Sidenote: Pyrrhus in Sicily, B.C. 278-275.] + +[Sidenote: B.C. 271. C. Quintus Claudius, L. Genucius Clepsina, Coss.] + +The speed with which they became masters of a fair territory and +city found ready imitators of their conduct. The people of Rhegium, +when Pyrrhus was crossing to Italy, felt a double anxiety. They +were dismayed at the thought of his approach, and at the same time +were afraid of the Carthaginians as being masters of the sea. They +accordingly asked and obtained a force from Rome to guard and support +them. The garrison, four thousand in number, under the command of a +Campanian named Decius Jubellius, entered the city, and for a time +preserved it, as well as their own faith. But at last, conceiving the +idea of imitating the Mamertines, and having at the same time obtained +their co-operation, they broke faith with the people of Rhegium, +enamoured of the pleasant site of the town and the private wealth of +the citizens, and seized the city after having, in imitation of the +Mamertines, first driven out some of the people and put others to the +sword. Now, though the Romans were much annoyed at this transaction, +they could take no active steps, because they were deeply engaged +in the wars I have mentioned above. But having got free from them +they invested and besieged the troops. They presently took the place +and killed the greater number in the assault,—for the men resisted +desperately, knowing what must follow,—but took more than three hundred +alive. These were sent to Rome, and there the Consuls brought them into +the forum, where they were scourged and beheaded according to custom: +for they wished as far as they could to vindicate their good faith in +the eyes of the allies. The territory and town they at once handed over +to the people of Rhegium. + +[Sidenote: Effect of the fall of the rebellious garrison of Rhegium on +the Mamertines.] + ++8.+ But the Mamertines (for this was the name which the Campanians +gave themselves after they became masters of Messene), as long as +they enjoyed the alliance of the Roman captors of Rhegium, not +only exercised absolute control over their own town and district +undisturbed, but about the neighbouring territory also gave no little +trouble to the Carthaginians and Syracusans, and levied tribute from +many parts of Sicily. But when they were deprived of this support, +the captors of Rhegium being now invested and besieged, they were +themselves promptly forced back into the town again by the Syracusans, +under circumstances which I will now detail. + +[Sidenote: The rise of Hiero. He is elected General by the army, B.C. +275-274.] + +Not long before this the military forces of the Syracusans had +quarrelled with the citizens, and while stationed near Merganè elected +commanders from their own body. These were Artemidorus and Hiero, the +latter of whom afterwards became King of Syracuse. At this time he was +quite a young man, but had a certain natural aptitude for kingcraft +and the politic conduct of affairs. Having taken over the command, +and having by means of some of his connexions made his way into the +city, he got his political opponents into his hands; but conducted +the government with such mildness, and in so lofty a spirit, that the +Syracusans, though by no means usually acquiescing in the election of +officers by the soldiers, did on this occasion unanimously approve +of Hiero as their general. His first step made it evident to close +observers that his hopes soared above the position of a mere general. + +[Sidenote: Secures support of Leptines by marrying his daughter.] + +[Sidenote: His device for getting rid of mutinous mercenaries.] + +[Sidenote: Fiume Salso.] + +[Sidenote: Hiero next attacks the Mamertines and defeats them near +Mylae, B.C. 268.] + ++9.+ He noticed that among the Syracusans the despatch of troops, +and of magistrates in command of them, was always the signal for +revolutionary movements of some sort or another. He knew, too, that +of all the citizens Leptines enjoyed the highest position and credit, +and that among the common people especially he was by far the most +influential man existing. He accordingly contracted a relationship by +marriage with him, that he might have a representative of his interests +left at home at such times as he should be himself bound to go abroad +with the troops for a campaign. After marrying the daughter of this +man, his next step was in regard to the old mercenaries. He observed +that they were disaffected and mutinous: and he accordingly led out an +expedition, with the ostensible purpose of attacking the foreigners +who were in occupation of Messene. He pitched a camp against the enemy +near Centuripa, and drew up his line resting on the River Cyamosorus. +But the cavalry and infantry, which consisted of citizens, he kept +together under his personal command at some distance, on pretence of +intending to attack the enemy on another quarter: the mercenaries he +thrust to the front and allowed them to be completely cut to pieces by +the foreigners; while he seized the moment of their rout to affect a +safe retreat for himself and the citizens into Syracuse. This stroke of +policy was skilful and successful. He had got rid of the mutinous and +seditious element in the army; and after enlisting on his own account a +sufficient body of mercenaries, he thenceforth carried on the business +of the government in security. But seeing that the Mamertines were +encouraged by their success to greater confidence and recklessness in +their excursions, he fully armed and energetically drilled the citizen +levies, led them out, and engaged the enemy on the Mylaean plain near +the River Longanus. He inflicted a severe defeat upon them: took their +leaders prisoners: put a complete end to their audacious proceedings: +and on his return to Syracuse was himself greeted by all the allies +with the title of King. + +[Sidenote: Some of the conquered Mamertines appeal to Rome for help.] + +[Sidenote: The motives of the Romans in acceding to this +prayer,—jealousy of the growing power of Carthage.] + ++10.+ Thus were the Mamertines first deprived of support from +Rhegium, and then subjected, from causes which I have just stated, +to a complete defeat on their own account. Thereupon some of them +betook themselves to the protection of the Carthaginians, and were +for putting themselves and their citadel into their hands; while +others set about sending an embassy to Rome to offer a surrender of +their city, and to beg assistance on the ground of the ties of race +which united them. The Romans were long in doubt. The inconsistency +of sending such aid seemed manifest. A little while ago they had put +some of their own citizens to death, with the extreme penalties of +the law, for having broken faith with the people of Rhegium: and now +so soon afterwards to assist the Mamertines, who had done precisely +the same to Messene as well as Rhegium, involved a breach of equity +very hard to justify. But while fully alive to these points, they yet +saw that Carthaginian aggrandisement was not confined to Libya, but +had embraced many districts in Iberia as well; and that Carthage was, +besides, mistress of all the islands in the Sardinian and Tyrrhenian +seas: they were beginning, therefore, to be exceedingly anxious lest, +if the Carthaginians became masters of Sicily also, they should find +them very dangerous and formidable neighbours, surrounding them as +they would on every side, and occupying a position which commanded all +the coasts of Italy. Now it was clear that, if the Mamertines did not +obtain the assistance they asked for, the Carthaginians would very +soon reduce Sicily. For should they avail themselves of the voluntary +offer of Messene and become masters of it, they were certain before +long to crush Syracuse also, since they were already lords of nearly +the whole of the rest of Sicily. The Romans saw all this, and felt +that it was absolutely necessary not to let Messene slip, or allow the +Carthaginians to secure what would be like a bridge to enable them to +cross into Italy. + +[Sidenote: The Senate shirk the responsibility of decision. The people +vote for helping the Mamertines.] + +[Sidenote: B.C. 264. Appius Claudius Caudex. M. Fulvius Flaccus, Coss.] + +[Sidenote: Hiero joins Carthage in laying siege to the Mamertines in +Messene. Appius comes to the relief of the besieged, B.C. 264.] + +[Sidenote: After vain attempts at negotiation, Appius determines to +attack Hiero.] + +[Sidenote: Hiero is defeated, and returns to Syracuse.] + ++11.+ In spite of protracted deliberations, the conflict of motives +proved too strong, after all, to allow of the Senate coming to any +decision; for the inconsistency of aiding the Messenians appeared to +them to be evenly balanced by the advantages to be gained by doing so. +The people, however, had suffered much from the previous wars, and +wanted some means of repairing the losses which they had sustained +in every department. Besides these national advantages to be gained +by the war, the military commanders suggested that individually they +would get manifest and important benefits from it. They accordingly +voted in favour of giving the aid. The decree having thus been passed +by the people, they elected one of the consuls, Appius Claudius, to +the command, and sent him out with instructions to cross to Messene +and relieve the Mamertines. These latter managed, between threats and +false representations, to oust the Carthaginian commander who was +already in possession of the citadel, invited Appius in, and offered +to deliver the city into his hands. The Carthaginians crucified their +commander for what they considered to be his cowardice and folly in +thus losing the citadel; stationed their fleet near Pelorus; their land +forces at a place called Synes; and laid vigorous siege to Messene. +Now at this juncture Hiero, thinking it a favourable opportunity for +totally expelling from Sicily the foreigners who were in occupation of +Messene, made a treaty with the Carthaginians. Having done this, he +started from Syracuse upon an expedition against that city. He pitched +his camp on the opposite side to the Carthaginians, near what was +called the Chalcidian Mount, whereby the garrison were cut off from +that way out as well as from the other. The Roman Consul Appius, for +his part, gallantly crossed the strait by night and got into Messene. +But he found that the enemy had completely surrounded the town and were +vigorously pressing on the attack; and he concluded on reflection that +the siege could bring him neither credit nor security so long as the +enemy commanded land as well as sea. He accordingly first endeavoured +to relieve the Mamertines from the contest altogether by sending +embassies to both of the attacking forces. Neither of them received +his proposals, and at last, from sheer necessity, he made up his mind +to hazard an engagement, and that he would begin with the Syracusans. +So he led out his forces and drew them up for the fight: nor was +the Syracusan backward in accepting the challenge, but descended +simultaneously to give him battle. After a prolonged struggle, Appius +got the better of the enemy, and chased the opposing forces right up +to their entrenchments. The result of this was that Appius, after +stripping the dead, retired into Messene again, while Hiero, with a +foreboding of the final result, only waited for nightfall to beat a +hasty retreat to Syracuse. + +[Sidenote: Encouraged by this success, he attacks and drives off the +Carthaginians.] + ++12.+ Next morning, when Appius was assured of their flight, his +confidence was strengthened, and he made up his mind to attack the +Carthaginians without delay. Accordingly, he issued orders to the +soldiers to despatch their preparations early, and at daybreak +commenced his sally. Having succeeded in engaging the enemy, he killed +a large number of them, and forced the rest to fly precipitately to +the neighbouring towns. These successes sufficed to raise the siege +of Messene: and thenceforth he scoured the territory of Syracuse and +her allies with impunity, and laid it waste without finding any one to +dispute the possession of the open country with him; and finally he sat +down before Syracuse itself and laid siege to it. + +[Sidenote: Such preliminary sketches are necessary for clearness, and +my readers must not be surprised if I follow the same system in the +case of other towns.] + +Such was the nature and motive of the first warlike expedition of +the Romans beyond the shores of Italy; and this was the period at +which it took place. I thought this expedition the most suitable +starting-point for my whole narrative, and accordingly adopted it as +a basis; though I have made a rapid survey of some anterior events, +that in setting forth its causes no point should be left obscure. I +thought it necessary, if we were to get an adequate and comprehensive +view of their present supreme position, to trace clearly how and when +the Romans, after the disaster which they sustained in the loss of +their own city, began their upward career; and how and when, once +more, after possessing themselves of Italy, they conceived the idea of +attempting conquests external to it. This must account in future parts +of my work for my taking, when treating of the most important states, +a preliminary survey of their previous history. In doing so my object +will be to secure such a vantage-ground as will enable us to see with +clearness from what origin, at what period, and in what circumstances +they severally started and arrived at their present position. This is +exactly what I have just done with regard to the Romans. + +[Sidenote: Subjects of the two first books of the Histories. 1. War +in Sicily or first Punic War, B.C. 264-241. 2. The Mercenary or +“inexpiable” war, B.C. 240-237. 3. Carthaginian movements in Spain, +B.C. 241-218. 4. Illyrian war, B.C. 229-228. 5. Gallic war, B.C. +225-221. 6. Cleomenic war, B.C. 227-221.] + ++13.+ It is time to have done with these explanations, and to come to +my subject, after a brief and summary statement of the events of which +my introductory books are to treat. Of these the first in order of +time are those which befell the Romans and Carthaginians in their war +for the possession of Sicily. Next comes the Libyan or Mercenary war; +immediately following on which are the Carthaginian achievements in +Spain, first under Hamilcar, and then under Hasdrubal. In the course +of these events, again, occurred the first expedition of the Romans +into Illyria and the Greek side of Europe; and, besides that, their +struggles within Italy with the Celts. In Greece at the same time the +war called after Cleomenes was in full action. With this war I design +to conclude my prefatory sketch and my second book. + +[Sidenote: The first Punic war deserves more detailed treatment, +as furnishing a better basis for comparing Rome and Carthage than +subsequent wars.] + +To enter into minute details of these events is unnecessary, and would +be of no advantage to my readers. It is not part of my plan to write a +history of them: my sole object is to recapitulate them in a summary +manner by way of introduction to the narrative I have in hand. I will, +therefore, touch lightly upon the leading events of this period in a +comprehensive sketch, and will endeavour to make the end of it dovetail +with the commencement of my main history. In this way the narrative +will acquire a continuity; and I shall be shown to have had good reason +for touching on points already treated by others: while by such an +arrangement the studiously inclined will find the approach to the story +which has to be told made intelligible and easy for them. I shall, +however, endeavour to describe with somewhat more care the first war +which arose between the Romans and Carthaginians for the possession of +Sicily. For it would not be easy to mention any war that lasted longer +than this one; nor one in which the preparations made were on a larger +scale, or the efforts made more sustained, or the actual engagements +more numerous, or the reverses sustained on either side more signal. +Moreover, the two states themselves were at the precise period of +their history when their institutions were as yet in their original +integrity, their fortunes still at a moderate level, and their forces +on an equal footing. So that those who wish to gain a fair view of the +national characteristics and resources of the two had better base their +comparison upon this war rather than upon those which came after. + +[Sidenote: This is rendered more necessary by the partisan +misrepresentations of Philinus and Fabius Pictor.] + ++14.+ But it was not these considerations only which induced me to +undertake the history of this war. I was influenced quite as much +by the fact that Philinus and Fabius, who have the reputation of +writing with the most complete knowledge about it, have given us an +inadequate representation of the truth. Now, judging from their lives +and principles, I do not suppose that these writers have intentionally +stated what was false; but I think that they are much in the same +state of mind as men in love. Partisanship and complete prepossession +made Philinus think that all the actions of the Carthaginians were +characterised by wisdom, honour, and courage: those of the Romans by +the reverse. Fabius thought the exact opposite. Now in other relations +of life one would hesitate to exclude such warmth of sentiment: for a +good man ought to be loyal to his friends and patriotic to his country; +ought to be at one with his friends in their hatreds and likings. But +directly a man assumes the moral attitude of an historian he ought to +forget all considerations of that kind. There will be many occasions on +which he will be bound to speak well of his enemies, and even to praise +them in the highest terms if the facts demand it: and on the other hand +many occasions on which it will be his duty to criticise and denounce +his own side, however dear to him, if their errors of conduct suggest +that course. For as a living creature is rendered wholly useless if +deprived of its eyes, so if you take truth from History what is left is +but an idle unprofitable tale. Therefore, one must not shrink either +from blaming one’s friends or praising one’s enemies; nor be afraid +of finding fault with and commending the same persons at different +times. For it is impossible that men engaged in public affairs should +always be right, and unlikely that they should always be wrong. Holding +ourselves, therefore, entirely aloof from the actors, we must as +historians make statements and pronounce judgment in accordance with +the actions themselves. + +[Sidenote: Philinus’s misrepresentations.] + ++15.+ The writers whom I have named exemplify the truth of these +remarks. Philinus, for instance, commencing the narrative with his +second book, says that the “Carthaginians and Syracusans engaged in +the war and sat down before Messene; that the Romans arriving by +sea entered the town, and immediately sallied out from it to attack +the Syracusans; but that after suffering severely in the engagement +they retired into Messene; and that on a second occasion, having +issued forth to attack the Carthaginians, they not only suffered +severely but lost a considerable number of their men captured by +the enemy.” But while making this statement, he represents Hiero as +so destitute of sense as, after this engagement, not only to have +promptly burnt his stockade and tents and fled under cover of night +to Syracuse, but to have abandoned all the forts which had been +established to overawe the Messenian territory. Similarly he asserts +that “the Carthaginians immediately after their battle evacuated their +entrenchment and dispersed into various towns, without venturing any +longer even to dispute the possession of the open country; and that, +accordingly, their leaders seeing that their troops were utterly +demoralised determined in consideration not to risk a battle: that the +Romans followed them, and not only laid waste the territory of the +Carthaginians and Syracusans, but actually sat down before Syracuse +itself and began to lay siege to it.” These statements appear to me to +be full of glaring inconsistency, and to call for no refutation at all. +The very men whom he describes to begin with as besieging Messene, and +as victorious in the engagements, he afterwards represents as running +away, abandoning the open country, and utterly demoralised: while those +whom he starts by saying were defeated and besieged, he concludes by +describing as engaging in a pursuit, as promptly seizing the open +places, and finally as besieging Syracuse. Nothing can reconcile +these statements. It is impossible. Either his initial statement, +or his account of the subsequent events, must be false. In point of +fact the latter part of his story is the true one. The Syracusans and +Carthaginians _did_ abandon the open country, and the Romans _did_ +immediately afterwards commence a siege of Syracuse and of Echetla, +which lies in the district between the Syracusan and Carthaginian +pales. For the rest it must necessarily be acknowledged that the +first part of his account is false; and that whereas the Romans were +victorious in the engagements under Messene, they have been represented +by this historian as defeated. Through the whole of this work we shall +find Philinus acting in a similar spirit: and much the same may be said +of Fabius, as I shall show when the several points arise. + +I have now said what was proper on the subject of this digression. +Returning to the matter in hand I will endeavour by a continuous +narrative of moderate dimensions to guide my readers to a true +knowledge of this war. + +[Sidenote: B.C. 264.] + +[Sidenote: (Continuing from chap. xii.), B.C. 263, Manius Valerius +Maximus, Manius Otacilius Crassus, Coss. The Consuls with four legions +are sent to Sicily. A general move of the Sicilian cities to join them. +Hiero submits.] + ++16.+ When news came to Rome of the successes of Appius and his +legions, the people elected Manius Otacilius and Manius Valerius +Consuls, and despatched their whole army to Sicily, and both Consuls +in command. Now the Romans have in all, as distinct from allies, four +legions of Roman citizens, which they enrol every year, each of which +consists of four thousand infantry and three hundred cavalry: and +on their arrival most of the cities revolted from Syracuse as well +as from Carthage, and joined the Romans. And when he saw the terror +and dismay of the Sicilians, and compared with them the number and +crushing strength of the legions of Rome, Hiero began, from a review +of all these points, to conclude that the prospects of the Romans +were brighter than those of the Carthaginians. Inclining therefore +from these considerations to the side of the former, he began sending +messages to the Consuls, proposing peace and friendship with them. The +Romans accepted his offer, their chief motive being the consideration +of provisions: for as the Carthaginians had command of the sea, they +were afraid of being cut off at every point from their supplies, warned +by the fact that the legions which had previously crossed had run very +short in that respect. They therefore gladly accepted Hiero’s offers +of friendship, supposing that he would be of signal service to them +in this particular. The king engaged to restore his prisoners without +ransom, and to pay besides an indemnity of a hundred talents of silver. +The treaty being arranged on these terms, the Romans thenceforth +regarded the Syracusans as friends and allies: while King Hiero, having +thus placed himself under the protection of the Romans, never failed +to supply their needs in times of difficulty; and for the rest of his +life reigned securely in Syracuse, devoting his energies to gaining +the gratitude and good opinion of the Greeks. And in point of fact no +monarch ever acquired a greater reputation, or enjoyed for a longer +period the fruits of his prudent policy in private as well as in public +affairs. + +[Sidenote: The Carthaginians alarmed at Hiero’s defection make great +efforts to increase their army in Sicily.] + +[Sidenote: They select Agrigentum as their headquarters.] + ++17.+ When the text of this treaty reached Rome, and the people had +approved and confirmed the terms made with Hiero, the Roman government +thereupon decided not to send all their forces, as they had intended +doing, but only two legions. For they thought that the gravity of the +war was lessened by the adhesion of the king, and at the same time +that the army would thus be better off for provisions. But when the +Carthaginian government saw that Hiero had become their enemy, and that +the Romans were taking a more decided part in Sicilian politics, they +conceived that they must have a more formidable force to enable them +to confront their enemy and maintain their own interests in Sicily. +Accordingly, they enlisted mercenaries from over sea—a large number +of Ligurians and Celts, and a still larger number of Iberians—and +despatched them to Sicily. And perceiving that Agrigentum possessed +the greatest natural advantages as a place of arms, and was the most +powerful city in their province, they collected their supplies and +their forces into it, deciding to use this city as their headquarters +for the war. + +[Sidenote: B.C. 262.] + +[Sidenote: The new Consuls, Lucius Postumius Megellus and Quintus +Mamilius Vitulus, determined to lay siege to Agrigentum.] + +[Sidenote: The Carthaginians make an unsuccessful sally.] + +On the Roman side a change of commanders had now taken place. The +Consuls who made the treaty with Hiero had gone home, and their +successors, Lucius Postumius and Quintus Mamilius, were come to Sicily +with their legions. Observing the measure which the Carthaginians were +taking, and the forces they were concentrating at Agrigentum, they made +up their minds to take that matter in hand and strike a bold blow. +Accordingly they suspended every other department of the war, and +bearing down upon Agrigentum itself with their whole army, attacked it +in force; pitched their camp within a distance of eight stades from +the city; and confined the Carthaginians within the walls. Now it was +just harvest-time, and the siege was evidently destined to be a long +one: the soldiers, therefore, went out to collect the corn with greater +hardihood than they ought to have done. Accordingly the Carthaginians, +seeing the enemy scattered about the fields, sallied out and attacked +the harvesting-parties. They easily routed these; and then one portion +of them made a rush to destroy the Roman entrenchment, the other to +attack the pickets. But the peculiarity of their institutions saved the +Roman fortunes, as it had often done before. Among them it is death for +a man to desert his post, or to fly from his station on any pretext +whatever. Accordingly on this, as on other occasions, they gallantly +held their ground against opponents many times their own number; and +though they lost many of their own men, they killed still more of the +enemy, and at last outflanked the foes just as they were on the point +of demolishing the palisade of the camp. Some they put to the sword, +and the rest they pursued with slaughter into the city. + ++18.+ The result was that thenceforth the Carthaginians were somewhat +less forward in making such attacks, and the Romans more cautious in +foraging. + +[Sidenote: The Romans form two strongly-entrenched camps.] + +[Sidenote: A relief comes from Carthage to Agrigentum.] + +[Sidenote: Hanno seizes Herbesus.] + +[Sidenote: The Romans faithfully supported by Hiero.] + +Finding that the Carthaginians would not come out to meet them at close +quarters any more, the Roman generals divided their forces: with one +division they occupied the ground round the temple of Asclepius outside +the town; with the other they encamped in the outskirts of the city on +the side which looks towards Heracleia. The space between the camps on +either side of the city they secured by two trenches,—the inner one +to protect themselves against sallies from the city, the outer as a +precaution against attacks from without, and to intercept those persons +or supplies which always make their way surreptitiously into cities +that are sustaining a siege. The spaces between the trenches uniting +the camps they secured by pickets, taking care in their disposition +to strengthen the several accessible points. As for food and other +war material, the other allied cities all joined in collecting and +bringing these to Herbesus for them: and thus they supplied themselves +in abundance with necessaries, by continually getting provisions living +and dead from this town, which was conveniently near. For about five +months then they remained in the same position, without being able to +obtain any decided advantage over each other beyond the casualties +which occurred in the skirmishes. But the Carthaginians were beginning +to be hard pressed by hunger, owing to the number of men shut up in the +city, who amounted to no less than fifty thousand: and Hannibal, who +had been appointed commander of the besieged forces, beginning by this +time to be seriously alarmed at the state of things, kept perpetually +sending messages to Carthage explaining their critical state, and +begging for assistance. Thereupon the Carthaginian government put on +board ship the fresh troops and elephants which they had collected, +and despatched them to Sicily, with orders to join the other commander +Hanno. This officer collected all his war material and forces into +Heracleia, and as a first step possessed himself by a stratagem of +Herbesus, thus depriving the enemy of their provisions and supply of +necessaries. The result of this was that the Romans found themselves in +the position of besieged as much as in that of besiegers; for they were +reduced by short supplies of food and scarcity of necessaries to such a +condition that they more than once contemplated raising the siege. And +they would have done so at last had not Hiero, by using every effort +and contrivance imaginable, succeeded in keeping them supplied with +what satisfied, to a tolerable extent, their most pressing wants. This +was Hanno’s first step. His next was as follows. + +[Sidenote: Hanno tempts the Roman cavalry out and defeats them.] + +[Sidenote: After two months, Hanno is forced to try to relieve +Agrigentum,] + +[Sidenote: but is defeated in a pitched battle, and his army cut to +pieces.] + +[Sidenote: Hannibal escapes by night; and the Romans enter and plunder +Agrigentum.] + ++19.+ He saw that the Romans were reduced by disease and want, owing +to an epidemic that had broken out among them, and he believed that +his own forces were strong enough to give them battle: he accordingly +collected his elephants, of which he had about fifty, and the whole +of the rest of his army, and advanced at a rapid pace from Heracleia; +having previously issued orders to the Numidian cavalry to precede +him, and to endeavour, when they came near the enemies’ stockade, +to provoke them and draw their cavalry out; and, having done so, +to wheel round and retire until they met him. The Numidians did as +they were ordered, and advanced up to one of the camps. Immediately +the Roman cavalry poured out and boldly charged the Numidians: the +Libyans retired, according to their orders, until they reached Hanno’s +division: then they wheeled round; surrounded, and repeatedly charged +the enemy; killed a great number of them, and chased the rest up to +their stockade. After this affair Hanno’s force encamped over against +the Romans, having seized the hill called Torus, at a distance of +about a mile and a quarter from their opponents. For two months they +remained in position without any decisive action, though skirmishes +took place daily. But as Hannibal all this time kept signalling and +sending messages from the town to Hanno,—telling him that his men were +impatient of the famine, and that many were even deserting to the enemy +owing to the distress for food,—the Carthaginian general determined to +risk a battle, the Romans being equally ready, for the reasons I have +mentioned. So both parties advanced into the space between the camps +and engaged. The battle lasted a long time, but at last the Romans +turned the advanced guard of Carthaginian mercenaries. The latter fell +back upon the elephants and the other divisions posted in their rear; +and thus the whole Punic army was thrown into confusion. The retreat +became general: the larger number of the men were killed, while some +effected their escape into Heracleia; and the Romans became masters +of most of the elephants and all the baggage. Now night came on, and +the victors, partly from joy at their success, partly from fatigue, +kept their watches somewhat more carelessly than usual; accordingly +Hannibal, having given up hope of holding out, made up his mind that +this state of things afforded him a good opportunity of escape. He +started about midnight from the town with his mercenary troops, and +having choked up the trenches with baskets stuffed full of chaff, led +off his force in safety, without being detected by the enemy. When +day dawned the Romans discovered what had happened, and indeed for a +short time were engaged with Hannibal’s rear; but eventually they all +made for the town gates. There they found no one to oppose them: they +therefore threw themselves into the town, plundered it, and secured +a large number of captives, besides a great booty of every sort and +description. + +[Sidenote: This success inspires the Senate with the idea of expelling +the Carthaginians from Sicily.] + +[Sidenote: B.C. 261.] + ++20.+ Great was the joy of the Roman Senate when the news of what had +taken place at Agrigentum arrived. Their ideas too were so raised that +they no longer confined themselves to their original designs. They were +not content with having saved the Mamertines, nor with the advantages +gained in the course of the war; but conceived the idea that it was +possible to expel the Carthaginians entirely from the island, and that +if that were done their own power would receive a great increase: they +accordingly engaged in this policy and directed their whole thoughts to +this subject. As to their land forces they saw that things were going +on as well as they could wish. For the Consuls elected in succession to +those who had besieged Agrigentum, Lucius Valerius Flaccus and Titus +Otacilius Crassus, appeared to be managing the Sicilian business as +well as circumstances admitted. Yet so long as the Carthaginians were +in undisturbed command of the sea, the balance of success could not +incline decisively in their favour. For instance, in the period which +followed, though they were now in possession of Agrigentum, and though +consequently many of the inland towns joined the Romans from dread of +their land forces, yet a still larger number of seaboard towns held +aloof from them in terror of the Carthaginian fleet. Seeing therefore +that it was ever more and more the case that the balance of success +oscillated from one side to the other from these causes; and, moreover, +that while Italy was repeatedly ravaged by the naval force, Libya +remained permanently uninjured; they became eager to get upon the sea +and meet the Carthaginians there. + +It was this branch of the subject that more than anything else induced +me to give an account of this war at somewhat greater length than I +otherwise should have done. I was unwilling that a first step of this +kind should be unknown,—namely how, and when, and why the Romans first +started a navy. + +[Sidenote: The Romans boldly determine to build ships and meet the +Carthaginians at sea.] + +[Sidenote: A Carthaginian ship used as a model.] + +It was, then, because they saw that the war they had undertaken +lingered to a weary length, that they first thought of getting a fleet +built, consisting of a hundred quinqueremes and twenty triremes. But +one part of their undertaking caused them much difficulty. Their +shipbuilders were entirely unacquainted with the construction of +quinqueremes, because no one in Italy had at that time employed vessels +of that description. There could be no more signal proof of the +courage, or rather the extraordinary audacity of the Roman enterprise. +Not only had they no resources for it of reasonable sufficiency; +but without any resources for it at all, and without having ever +entertained an idea of naval war,—for it was the first time they had +thought of it,—they nevertheless handled the enterprise with such +extraordinary audacity, that, without so much as a preliminary trial, +they took upon themselves there and then to meet the Carthaginians +at sea, on which they had for generations held undisputed supremacy. +Proof of what I say, and of their surprising audacity, may be found in +this. When they first took in hand to send troops across to Messene +they not only had no decked vessels but no war-ships at all, not so +much as a single galley: but they borrowed quinqueremes and triremes +from Tarentum and Locri, and even from Elea and Neapolis; and having +thus collected a fleet, boldly sent their men across upon it. It was on +this occasion that, the Carthaginians having put to sea in the Strait +to attack them, a decked vessel of theirs charged so furiously that it +ran aground, and falling into the hands of the Romans served them as a +model on which they constructed their whole fleet. And if this had not +happened it is clear that they would have been completely hindered from +carrying out their design by want of constructive knowledge. + +[Sidenote: B.C. 260. Cn. Cornelius Scipio Asina, C. Duilius, Coss.] + +[Sidenote: Cornelius captured with the loss of his ships.] + +[Sidenote: The rest of the Roman fleet arrive and nearly capture +Hannibal.] + ++21.+ Meanwhile, however, those who were charged with the shipbuilding +were busied with the construction of the vessels; while others +collected crews and were engaged in teaching them to row on dry land: +which they contrived to do in the following manner. They made the men +sit on rower’s benches on dry land, in the same order as they would sit +on the benches in actual vessels: in the midst of them they stationed +the Celeustes, and trained them to get back and draw in their hands all +together in time, and then to swing forward and throw them out again, +and to begin and cease these movements at the word of the Celeustes. +By the time these preparations were completed the ships were built. +They therefore launched them, and, after a brief preliminary practice +of real sea-rowing, started on their coasting voyage along the shore +of Italy, in accordance with the Consul’s order. For Gnaeus Cornelius +Scipio, who had been appointed by the Roman people a few days before +to command the fleet, after giving the ship captains orders that as +soon as they had fitted out the fleet they should sail to the Straits, +had put to sea himself with seventeen ships and sailed in advance to +Messene; for he was very eager to secure all pressing necessaries for +the naval force. While there some negotiation was suggested to him for +the surrender of the town of Lipara. Snatching at the prospect somewhat +too eagerly, he sailed with the above-mentioned ships and anchored +off the town. But having been informed in Panormus of what had taken +place, the Carthaginian general Hannibal despatched Boōdes, a member +of the Senate, with a squadron of twenty ships. He accomplished the +voyage at night and shut up Gnaeus and his men within the harbour. +When day dawned the crews made for the shore and ran away, while +Gnaeus, in utter dismay, and not knowing in the least what to do, +eventually surrendered to the enemy. The Carthaginians having thus +possessed themselves of the ships as well as the commander of their +enemies, started to rejoin Hannibal. Yet a few days afterwards, though +the disaster of Gnaeus was so signal and recent, Hannibal himself was +within an ace of falling into the same glaring mistake. For having +been informed that the Roman fleet in its voyage along the coast of +Italy was close at hand, he conceived a wish to get a clear view of +the enemy’s number and disposition. He accordingly set sail with fifty +ships, and just as he was rounding the “Italian Headland” he fell in +with the enemy, who were sailing in good order and disposition. He +lost most of his ships, and with the rest effected his own escape in a +manner beyond hope or expectation. + +[Sidenote: The “corvi” or “crows” for boarding.] + ++22.+ When the Romans had neared the coasts of Sicily and learnt the +disaster which had befallen Gnaeus, their first step was to send for +Gaius Duilius, who was in command of the land forces. Until he should +come they stayed where they were; but at the same time, hearing that +the enemy’s fleet was no great way off, they busied themselves with +preparations for a sea-fight. Now their ships were badly fitted out +and not easy to manage, and so some one suggested to them as likely to +serve their turn in a fight the construction of what were afterwards +called “crows.” Their mechanism was this. A round pole was placed in +the prow, about twenty-four feet high, and with a diameter of four +palms. The pole itself had a pulley on the top, and a gangway made +with cross planks nailed together, four feet wide and thirty-six feet +long, was made to swing round it. Now the hole in the gangway was +oval shaped, and went round the pole twelve feet from one end of the +gangway, which had also a wooden railing running down each side of it +to the height of a man’s knee. At the extremity of this gangway was +fastened an iron spike like a miller’s pestle, sharpened at its lower +end and fitted with a ring at its upper end. The whole thing looked +like the machines for braising corn. To this ring the rope was fastened +with which, when the ships collided, they hauled up the “crows,” by +means of the pulley at the top of the pole, and dropped them down +upon the deck of the enemy’s ship, sometimes over the prow, sometimes +swinging them round when the ships collided broadsides. And as soon +as the “crows” were fixed in the planks of the decks and grappled the +ships together, if the ships were alongside of each other, the men +leaped on board anywhere along the side, but if they were prow to prow, +they used the “crow” itself for boarding, and advanced over it two +abreast. The first two protected their front by holding up before them +their shields, while those who came after them secured their sides by +placing the rims of their shields upon the top of the railing. Such +were the preparations which they made; and having completed them they +watched an opportunity of engaging at sea. + +[Sidenote: Victory of Duilius at Mylae, B.C. 260.] + ++23.+ As for Gaius Duilius, he no sooner heard of the disaster which +had befallen the commander of the navy than handing over his legions +to the military Tribunes he transferred himself to the fleet. There +he learnt that the enemy was plundering the territory of Mylae, and +at once sailed to attack him with the whole fleet. No sooner did the +Carthaginians sight him than with joy and alacrity they put to sea +with a hundred and thirty sail, feeling supreme contempt for the Roman +ignorance of seamanship. Accordingly they all sailed with their prows +directed straight at their enemy: they did not think the engagement +worth even the trouble of ranging their ships in any order, but +advanced as though to seize a booty exposed for their acceptance. Their +commander was that same Hannibal who had withdrawn his forces from +Agrigentum by a secret night movement, and he was on board a galley +with seven banks of oars which had once belonged to King Pyrrhus. When +they neared the enemy, and saw the “crows” raised aloft on the prows +of the several ships, the Carthaginians were for a time in a state of +perplexity; for they were quite strangers to such contrivances as these +engines. Feeling, however, a complete contempt for their opponents, +those on board the ships that were in the van of the squadron charged +without flinching. But as soon as they came to close quarters their +ships were invariably tightly grappled by these machines; the enemy +boarded by means of the “crows,” and engaged them on their decks; +and in the end some of the Carthaginians were cut down, while others +surrendered in bewildered terror at the battle in which they found +themselves engaged, which eventually became exactly like a land fight. +The result was that they lost the first thirty ships engaged, crews and +all. Among them was captured the commander’s ship also, though Hannibal +himself by an unexpected piece of luck and an act of great daring +effected his escape in the ship’s boat. The rest of the Carthaginian +squadron were sailing up with the view of charging; but as they were +coming near they saw what had happened to the ships which were sailing +in the front, and accordingly sheered off and avoided the blows of the +engines. Yet trusting to their speed, they managed by a manœuvre to +sail round and charge the enemy, some on their broadside and others on +their stern, expecting by that method to avoid danger. But the engines +swung round to meet them in every direction, and dropped down upon them +so infallibly, that no ships could come to close quarters without being +grappled. Eventually the Carthaginians turned and fled, bewildered at +the novelty of the occurrence, and with a loss of fifty ships. + +[Sidenote: Further operations in Sicily.] + +[Sidenote: Hamilcar.] + +[Sidenote: Segesta and Macella.] + +[Sidenote: Hannibal in Sardinia.] + ++24.+ Having in this unlooked-for manner made good their maritime hopes +the Romans were doubly encouraged in their enthusiasm for the war. For +the present they put in upon the coast of Sicily, raised the siege of +Segesta when it was reduced to the last extremity, and on their way +back from Segesta carried the town Macella by assault. But Hamilcar, +the commander of the Carthaginian land forces happened, after the +naval battle, to be informed as he lay encamped near Panormus that the +allies were engaged in a dispute with the Romans about the post of +honour in the battles: and ascertaining that the allies were encamped +by themselves between Paropus and Himeraean Thermae, he made a sudden +attack in force as they were in the act of moving camp and killed +almost four thousand of them. After this action Hannibal sailed across +to Carthage with such ships as he had left; and thence before very long +crossed to Sardinia, with a reinforcement of ships, and accompanied +by some of those whose reputation as naval commanders stood high. But +before very long he was blockaded in a certain harbour by the Romans, +and lost a large number of ships; and was thereupon summarily arrested +by the surviving Carthaginians and crucified. This came about because +the first thing the Romans did upon getting a navy was to try to become +masters of Sardinia. + +[Sidenote: B.C. 259.] + +[Sidenote: B.C. 258. Coss. A. Atilius Calatinus, C. Sulpicius, +Paterculus.] + +[Sidenote: Hippana and Myttistratum.] + +[Sidenote: Camarina.] + +During the next year the Roman legions in Sicily did nothing worthy +of mention. In the next, after the arrival of the new Consuls, Aulus +Atilius and Gaius Sulpicius, they started to attack Panormus because +the Carthaginian forces were wintering there. The Consuls advanced +close up to the city with their whole force, and drew up in order of +battle. But the enemy refusing to come out to meet them, they marched +away and attacked the town of Hippana. This they carried by assault: +but though they also took Myttistratum it was only after it had stood a +lengthened siege owing to the strength of its situation. It was at this +time, too, that they recovered Camarina, which had revolted a short +time previously. They threw up works against it, and captured it after +making a breach in its walls. They treated Henna, and sundry other +strong places which had been in the hands of the Carthaginians, in the +same way; and when they had finished these operations they undertook to +lay siege to Lipara. + +[Sidenote: Fighting off Tyndaris.] + +[Sidenote: Coss. C. Atilius Regulus, Cn. Cornelius, Blasio II. B.C. +257.] + ++25.+ Next year Gaius Atilius, the Consul, happened to be at anchor +off Tyndaris, when he observed the Carthaginian fleet sailing by +in a straggling manner. He passed the word to the crews of his own +ships to follow the advanced squadron, and started himself before the +rest with ten ships of equal sailing powers. When the Carthaginians +became aware that while some of the enemy were still embarking, others +were already putting out to sea, and that the advanced squadron were +considerably ahead of the rest, they stood round and went to meet them. +They succeeded in surrounding and destroying all of them except the +Consul’s ship, and that they all but captured with its crew. This last, +however, by the perfection of its rowers and its consequent speed, +effected a desperate escape. Meanwhile the remaining ships of the +Romans were sailing up and gradually drawing close together. Having got +into line, they charged the enemy, took ten ships with their crews, and +sunk eight. The rest of the Carthaginian ships retired to the Liparean +Islands. + +[Sidenote: Winter of B.C. 257-256.] + +[Sidenote: B.C. 256. Coss. L. Manlius, Vulso Longus, M. Atilius Regulus +II. (Suff.).] + +The result of this battle was that both sides concluded that they were +now fairly matched, and accordingly made more systematic efforts to +secure a naval force, and to dispute the supremacy at sea. While these +things were going on, the land forces effected nothing worth recording; +but wasted all their time in such petty operations as chance threw in +their way. Therefore, after making the preparations I have mentioned +for the approaching summer, the Romans, with three hundred and thirty +decked ships of war, touched at Messene; thence put to sea, keeping +Sicily on their right; and after doubling the headland Pachynus passed +on to Ecnomus, because the land force was also in that district. The +Carthaginians on their part put to sea again with three hundred and +fifty decked ships, touched at Lilybaeum, and thence dropped anchor at +Heracleia Minoa. + +[Sidenote: Preparations for the Battle of Ecnomus.] + +[Sidenote: Roman forces. 330 ships, with average of 420 men (300 rowers ++ 120 marines) = 138,600 men.] + +[Sidenote: Carthaginian numbers, 150,000 men.] + ++26.+ Now it was the purpose of the Romans to sail across to Libya and +transfer the war there, in order that the Carthaginians might find the +danger affecting themselves and their own country rather than Sicily. +But the Carthaginians were determined to prevent this. They knew that +Libya was easily invaded, and that the invaders if they once effected +a landing would meet with little resistance from the inhabitants; and +they therefore made up their minds not to allow it, and were eager +rather to bring the matter to a decisive issue by a battle at sea. The +one side was determined to cross, the other to prevent their crossing; +and their enthusiastic rivalry gave promise of a desperate struggle. +The preparations of the Romans were made to suit either contingency, an +engagement at sea or a disembarkation on the enemy’s soil. Accordingly +they picked out the best hands from the land army and divided the +whole force which they meant to take on board into four divisions. +Each division had alternative titles; the first was called the “First +Legion” or the “First Squadron,”—and so on with the others. The fourth +had a third title besides. They were called “Triarii,” on the analogy +of land armies. The total number of men thus making up the naval force +amounted to nearly one hundred and forty thousand, reckoning each ship +as carrying three hundred rowers and one hundred and twenty soldiers. +The Carthaginians, on the other hand, made their preparations almost +exclusively with a view to a naval engagement. Their numbers, if we +reckon by the number of their ships, were over one hundred and fifty +thousand men. The mere recital of these figures must, I should imagine, +strike any one with astonishment at the magnitude of the struggle, and +the vast resources of the contending states. An actual view of them +itself could hardly be more impressive than the bare statement of the +number of men and ships. + +[Sidenote: The Roman order at Ecnomus.] + +Now the Romans had two facts to consider: First, that circumstances +compelled them to face the open sea; and, secondly, that their enemies +had the advantage of fast sailing vessels. They therefore took every +precaution for keeping their line unbroken and difficult to attack. +They had only two ships with six banks of oars, those, namely, on +which the Consuls Marcus Atilius and Lucius Manlius respectively were +sailing. These they stationed side by side in front and in a line with +each other. Behind each of these they stationed ships one behind the +other in single file—the first squadron behind the one, and the second +squadron behind the other. These were so arranged that, as each ship +came to its place, the two files diverged farther and farther from +each other; the vessels being also stationed one behind the other with +their prows inclining outwards. Having thus arranged the first and +second squadrons in single file so as to form a wedge, they stationed +the third division in a single line at its base; so that the whole +finally presented the appearance of a triangle. Behind this base they +stationed the horse-transports, attaching them by towing-ropes to the +ships of the third squadron. And to the rear of them they placed the +fourth squadron, called the Triarii, in a single line, so extended as +to overlap the line in front of them at both extremities. When these +dispositions were complete the general appearance was that of a beak +or wedge, the apex of which was open, the base compact and strong; +while the whole was easy to work and serviceable, and at the same time +difficult to break up. + +[Sidenote: The disposition of the Carthaginian fleet.] + +[Sidenote: ch. 19.] + +[Sidenote: ch. 25.] + +[Sidenote: The battle.] + ++27.+ Meanwhile the Carthaginian commanders had briefly addressed their +men. They pointed out to them that victory in this battle would ensure +the war in the future being confined to the question of the possession +of Sicily; while if they were beaten they would have hereafter to fight +for their native land and for all that they held dear. With these words +they passed the word to embark. The order was obeyed with universal +enthusiasm, for what had been said brought home to them the issues at +stake; and they put to sea in the full fervour of excited gallantry, +which might well have struck terror into all who saw it. When their +commanders saw the arrangement of the enemies’ ships they adapted their +own to match it. Three-fourths of their force they posted in a single +line, extending their right wing towards the open sea with a view of +outflanking their opponents, and placing their ships with prows facing +the enemy; while the other fourth part was posted to form a left wing +of the whole, the vessels being at right angles to the others and +close to the shore. The two Carthaginian commanders were Hanno and +Hamilcar. The former was the general who had been defeated in the +engagement at Agrigentum. He now commanded the right wing, supported +by beaked vessels for charging, and the fastest sailing quinqueremes +for outflanking, the enemy. The latter, who had been in the engagement +off Tyndaris, had charge of the left wing. This officer, occupying +the central position of the entire line, on this occasion employed a +stratagem which I will now describe. The battle began by the Romans +charging the centre of the Carthaginians, because they observed that it +was weakened by their great extension. The ships in the Carthaginian +centre, in accordance with their orders, at once turned and fled with +a view of breaking up the Roman close order. They began to retire +with all speed, and the Romans pursued them with exultation. The +consequence was that, while the first and second Roman squadrons were +pressing the flying enemy, the third and fourth “legions” had become +detached and were left behind,—the former because they had to tow the +horse-transports, and the “Triarii” because they kept their station +with them and helped them to form a reserve. But when the Carthaginians +thought that they had drawn the first and second squadron a sufficient +distance from the main body a signal was hoisted on board Hamilcar’s +ship, and they all simultaneously swung their ships round and engaged +their pursuers. The contest was a severe one. The Carthaginians had +a great superiority in the rapidity with which they manœuvred their +ships. They darted out from their line and rowed round the enemy: they +approached them with ease, and retired with despatch. But the Romans, +no less than the Carthaginians, had their reasons for entertaining +hopes of victory: for when the vessels got locked together the contest +became one of sheer strength: their engines, the “crows,” grappled all +that once came to close quarters: and, finally, both the Consuls were +present in person and were witnesses of their behaviour in battle. + ++28.+ This was the state of affairs on the centre. But meanwhile Hanno +with the right wing, which had held aloof when the first encounter +took place, crossing the open sea, charged the ships of the Triarii +and caused them great difficulty and embarrassment: while those of the +Carthaginians who had been posted near the land manœuvred into line, +and getting their ships straight, charged the men who were towing the +horse-transports. These latter let go the towing-ropes, grappled with +the enemy, and kept up a desperate struggle. + +[Sidenote: Three separate battles.] + +[Sidenote: First with Hamilcar’s squadron.] + +[Sidenote: Second squadron under Regulus.] + +So that the engagement was in three separate divisions, or rather there +were three sea-fights going on at wide intervals from each other. Now +in these three engagements the opposing parties were in each case +fairly matched, thanks to the original disposition of the ships, and +therefore the victory was in each case closely contested. However the +result in the several cases was very much what was to be expected where +forces were so equal. The first to engage were the first to separate: +for Hamilcar’s division at last were overpowered and fled. But while +Lucius was engaged in securing his prizes, Marcus observing the +struggle in which the Triarii and horse-transports were involved, went +with all speed to their assistance, taking with him all the ships of +the second squadron which were undamaged. As soon as he had reached and +engaged Hanno’s division, the Triarii quickly picked up courage, though +they were then getting much the worst of it, and returned with renewed +spirits to the fight. It was now the turn for the Carthaginians to be +in difficulties. They were charged in front and on the rear, and found +to their surprise that they were being surrounded by the relieving +squadron. They at once gave way and retreated in the direction of the +open sea. + +[Sidenote: Third squadron relieved by Regulus and Manlius.] + +While this was going on, Lucius, who was sailing back to rejoin his +colleague, observed that the third squadron had got wedged in by the +Carthaginians close in shore. Accordingly he and Marcus, who had by +this time secured the safety of the transports and Triarii, started +together to relieve their imperilled comrades, who were now sustaining +something very like a blockade. And the fact is that they would long +before this have been utterly destroyed had not the Carthaginians been +afraid of the “crows,” and confined themselves to surrounding and +penning them in close to land, without attempting to charge for fear +of being caught by the grappling-irons. The Consuls came up rapidly, +and surrounding the Carthaginians captured fifty of their ships with +their crews, while some few of them managed to slip away and escape by +keeping close to the shore. + +[Sidenote: General result.] + +Such was the result of the separate engagements. But the general upshot +of the whole battle was in favour of the Romans. Twenty-four of their +vessels were destroyed; over thirty of the Carthaginians. Not a single +Roman ship was captured with its crew; sixty-four of the Carthaginians +were so taken. + +[Sidenote: Siege of Aspis. (Clupea.)] + ++29.+ After the battle the Romans took in a fresh supply of victual, +repaired and refitted the ships they had captured, bestowed upon the +crews the attention which they had deserved by their victory, and +then put to sea with a view of continuing their voyage to Libya. +Their leading ships made the shore just under the headland called +the Hermaeum, which is the extreme point on the east of the Gulf of +Carthage, and runs out into the open sea in the direction of Sicily. +There they waited for the rest of the ships to come up, and having +got the entire fleet together coasted along until they came to the +city called Aspis. Here they disembarked, beached their ships, dug a +trench, and constructed a stockade round them; and on the inhabitants +of the city refusing to submit without compulsion, they set to work to +besiege the town. Presently those of the Carthaginians who had survived +the sea-fight came to land also; and feeling sure that the enemy, in +the flush of their victory, intended to sail straight against Carthage +itself, they began by keeping a chain of advanced guards at outlying +points to protect the capital with their military and naval forces. +But when they ascertained that the Romans had disembarked without +resistance and were engaged in besieging Aspis, they gave up the idea +of watching for the descent of the fleet; but concentrated their +forces, and devoted themselves to the protection of the capital and its +environs. + +[Sidenote: Aspis taken.] + +[Sidenote: M. Atilius Regulus remains in Africa, winter of B.C. +256-255.] + +Meanwhile the Romans had taken Aspis, had placed in it a garrison +to hold it and its territory, and had besides sent home to Rome to +announce the events which had taken place and to ask for instructions +as to the future,—what they were to do, and what arrangements they +were to make. Having done this they made active preparations for a +general advance and set about plundering the country. They met with +no opposition in this: they destroyed numerous dwelling houses of +remarkably fine construction, possessed themselves of a great number +of cattle; and captured more than twenty thousand slaves whom they +took to their ships. In the midst of these proceedings the messengers +arrived from Rome with orders that one Consul was to remain with an +adequate force, the other was to bring the fleet to Rome. Accordingly +Marcus was left behind with forty ships, fifteen thousand infantry, and +five hundred cavalry; while Lucius put the crowd of captives on board, +and having embarked his men, sailed along the coast of Sicily without +encountering any danger, and reached Rome. + ++30.+ The Carthaginians now saw that their enemies contemplated a +lengthened occupation of the country. They therefore proceeded first +of all to elect two of their own citizens, Hasdrubal son of Hanno, +and Bostarus, to the office of general; and next sent to Heracleia a +pressing summons to Hamilcar. He obeyed immediately, and arrived at +Carthage with five hundred cavalry and five thousand infantry. He was +forthwith appointed general in conjunction with the other two, and +entered into consultation with Hasdrubal and his colleague as to the +measures necessary to be taken in the present crisis. They decided +to defend the country and not to allow it to be devastated without +resistance. + +[Sidenote: B.C. 256-255. The operations of Regulus in Libya.] + +[Sidenote: Defeat of the Carthaginians near Adys.] + +A few days afterwards Marcus sallied forth on one of his marauding +expeditions. Such towns as were unwalled he carried by assault and +plundered, and such as were walled he besieged. Among others he came to +the considerable town of Adys, and having placed his troops round it +was beginning with all speed to raise siege works. The Carthaginians +were both eager to relieve the town and determined to dispute the +possession of the open country. They therefore led out their army; +but their operations were not skilfully conducted. They indeed seized +and encamped upon a piece of rising ground which commanded the enemy; +but it was unsuitable to themselves. Their best hopes rested on their +cavalry and their elephants, and yet they abandoned the level plain +and cooped themselves up in a position at once steep and difficult of +access. The enemy, as might have been expected, were not slow to take +advantage of this mistake. The Roman commanders were skilful enough to +understand that the best and most formidable part of the forces opposed +to them was rendered useless by the nature of the ground. They did not +therefore wait for them to come down to the plain and offer battle, but +choosing the time which suited themselves, began at daybreak a forward +movement on both sides of the hill. In the battle which followed the +Carthaginians could not use their cavalry or elephants at all; but +their mercenary troops made a really gallant and spirited sally. They +even forced the first division of the Romans to give way and fly: but +they advanced too far, and were surrounded and routed by the division +which was advancing from the other direction. This was immediately +followed by the whole force being dislodged from their encampment. +The elephants and cavalry as soon as they gained level ground made +good their retreat without loss; but the infantry were pursued by +the Romans. The latter however soon desisted from the pursuit. They +presently returned, dismantled the enemy’s entrenchment, and destroyed +the stockade; and from thenceforth overran the whole country-side and +sacked the towns without opposition. + +[Sidenote: Tunes.] + +Among others they seized the town called Tunes. This place had many +natural advantages for expeditions such as those in which they were +engaged, and was so situated as to form a convenient base of operations +against the capital and its immediate neighbourhood. They accordingly +fixed their headquarters in it. + +[Sidenote: Distress at Carthage, which is heightened by an inroad of +Numidians.] + +[Sidenote: Spring of B.C. 255. Regulus proposes harsh terms.] + +[Sidenote: The terms rejected.] + ++31.+ The Carthaginians were now indeed in evil case. It was not long +since they had sustained a disaster at sea: and now they had met with +one on land, not from any failure of courage on the part of their +soldiers, but from the incompetency of their commanders. Simultaneously +with these misfortunes, they were suffering from an inroad of the +Numidians, who were doing even more damage to the country than the +Romans. The terror which they inspired drove the country folk to flock +for safety into the city; and the city itself had to face a serious +famine as well as a panic, the former from the numbers that crowded +into it, the latter from the hourly expectation of a siege. But Regulus +had different views. The double defeat sustained by the Carthaginians, +by land as well as by sea, convinced him that the capture of Carthage +was a question of a very short time; and he was in a state of great +anxiety lest his successor in the Consulship should arrive from Rome +in time to rob him of the glory of the achievement. He therefore +invited the Carthaginians to make terms. They were only too glad of +the proposal, and sent their leading citizens to meet him. The meeting +took place: but the commissioners could not bring their minds to +entertain his proposals; they were so severe that it was almost more +than they could bear to listen to them at all. Regulus regarded himself +as practically master of the city, and considered that they ought to +regard any concession on his part as a matter of favour and pure grace. +The Carthaginians on the other hand concluded that nothing worse could +be imposed on them if they suffered capture than was now enjoined. +They therefore returned home without accepting the offers of Regulus, +and extremely exasperated by his unreasonable harshness. When the +Carthaginian Senate heard the conditions offered by the Roman general, +though they had almost relinquished every hope of safety, they came to +the gallant and noble resolution that they would brave anything, that +they would try every possible means and endure every extremity, rather +than submit to terms so dishonourable and so unworthy of their past +history. + +[Sidenote: Arrival of the Spartan Xanthippus in Carthage.] + ++32.+ Now it happened that just about this time one of their recruiting +agents, who had some time before been despatched to Greece, arrived +home. He brought a large number of men with him, and among them a +certain Lacedaemonian named Xanthippus, a man trained in the Spartan +discipline, and of large experience in war. When this man was informed +of their defeat, and of how it had taken place, and when he had +reviewed the military resources still left to the Carthaginians, and +the number of their cavalry and elephants, he did not take long to +come to a decided conclusion. He expressed his opinion to his friends +that the Carthaginians had owed their defeat, not to the superiority +of the Romans, but to the unskilfulness of their own commanders. The +dangerous state of their affairs caused the words of Xanthippus to get +abroad quickly among the people and to reach the ears of the generals; +and the men in authority determined to summon and question him. He +appeared, and laid his views before the magistrates; in which he showed +to what they owed their present disasters, and that if they would +take his advice and keep to the flat parts of the country alike in +marching, encamping, and giving battle, they would be able with perfect +ease to secure safety for themselves and to defeat their opponents in +the field. The generals accepted the suggestion, resolved to follow +his advice, and there and then put their forces at his command. Among +the multitude the observation of Xanthippus was passed from mouth to +mouth, and gave rise, as was to be expected, to a good deal of popular +rumour and sanguine talk. This was confirmed when he had once handled +the troops. The way in which he got them into order when he had led +them outside the town; the skill with which he manœuvred the separate +detachments, and passed the word of command down the ranks in due +conformity to the rules of tactics, at once impressed every one with +the contrast to the blundering of their former generals. The multitude +expressed their approbation by loud cheers, and were for engaging +the enemy without delay, convinced that no harm could happen to them +as long as Xanthippus was their leader. The generals took advantage +of this circumstance, and of the extraordinary recovery which they +saw had taken place in the spirits of the people. They addressed +them some exhortations befitting the occasion, and after a few days’ +delay got their forces on foot and started. Their army consisted of +twelve thousand infantry, four thousand cavalry, and nearly a hundred +elephants. + +[Sidenote: The new strategy of the Carthaginians.] + +[Sidenote: The dispositions for the battle.] + ++33.+ The Romans at once noticed a change. They saw that the +Carthaginians chose level country for their line of march, and flat +places for their encampments. This novelty puzzled and rather alarmed +them, yet their prevailing feeling was an eager desire to come to +close quarters with the enemy. They therefore advanced to a position +about ten stades from them and employed the first day in pitching a +camp there. Next day, while the chief officers of the Carthaginians +were discussing in a council of war what dispositions were called for, +and what line of strategy they were to adopt, the common soldiers, in +their eagerness for the engagement, collected in groups, shouted out +the name of Xanthippus, and showed that their opinion was in favour of +an immediate forward movement. Influenced by the evident enthusiasm +and eagerness of the army, and by the appeals of Xanthippus that they +should not let the opportunity slip, the generals gave orders to the +men to get ready, and resigned to Xanthippus the entire direction of +affairs, with full authority to act as he thought most advantageous. +He at once acted upon this authority. He ordered out the elephants, +and placed them in a single line in front of the whole army. The heavy +phalanx of the Carthaginians he stationed at a moderate interval in +the rear of these. He divided the mercenaries into three corps. One +he stationed on the right wing; while the other two, which consisted +of the most active, he placed with the cavalry on both wings. When +the Romans saw that the enemy were drawn up to offer them battle +they readily advanced to accept it. They were however alarmed at +the elephants, and made special arrangements with a view to resist +their charge. They stationed the velites in the van, and behind them +the legionaries, many maniples deep, while they divided the cavalry +between the two wings. Their line of battle was thus less extended +than usual, but deeper. And though they had thereby made a sufficient +provision against the elephants, yet being far out-numbered in cavalry, +their provision in that part of the field was altogether inadequate. +At length both sides had made their dispositions according to their +respective plans of operation, and had placed their several men in the +posts assigned to them: and now they were standing drawn up in order, +and were each of them watching for the right moment for beginning the +attack. + +[Sidenote: The battle.] + +[Sidenote: The Romans are beaten and annihilated.] + +[Sidenote: Regulus made prisoner.] + ++34.+ No sooner had Xanthippus given the order to the men on the +elephants to advance and disperse the lines in front of them, and to +his cavalry to outflank both wings and charge the enemy, than the Roman +army—clashing their shields and spears together after their usual +custom, and simultaneously raising their battle-cry—charged the enemy. +The Roman cavalry being far out-numbered by the Carthaginians were soon +in full retreat on both wings. But the fortune of the several divisions +of the infantry was various. Those stationed on the left wing—partly +because they could avoid the elephants and partly because they thought +contemptuously of the mercenaries—charged the right wing of the +Carthaginians, succeeded in driving them from their ground, and pursued +them as far as their entrenchment. Those stationed in front of the +elephants were less fortunate. The maniples in front were thrown into +utter confusion by the crushing weight of the animals: knocked down and +trampled upon by them they perished in heaps upon the field; yet owing +to its great depth the main body remained for a time unbroken. But it +was not for long. The maniples on the rear found themselves outflanked +by the cavalry, and were forced to face round and resist them: those on +the other hand who forced their way to the front through the elephants, +and had now those beasts on their rear, found themselves confronted +by the phalanx of Carthaginians, which had not yet been in action and +was still in close unbroken order, and so were cut to pieces. This was +followed by a general rout. Most of the Romans were trampled to death +by the enormous weight of the elephants; the rest were shot down in +their ranks by the numerous cavalry: and there were only a very few who +attempted to save themselves by flight. But the flatness of the country +was unfavourable to escape in this manner. Some of the fugitives were +destroyed by the elephants and cavalry; while only those who fled with +the general Regulus, amounting perhaps to five hundred, were after a +short pursuit made prisoners with him to a man. + +On the Carthaginian side there fell about eight hundred of the +mercenaries, those namely who had been stationed opposite the left wing +of the Romans. On the part of the Romans about two thousand survived. +These were those whom I have already described as having chased the +Carthaginian right wing to their entrenchment, and who were thus not +involved in the general engagement. The rest were entirely destroyed +with the exception of those who fled with Regulus. The surviving +maniples escaped with considerable difficulty to the town of Aspis. The +Carthaginians stripped the dead, and taking with them the Roman general +and the rest of their prisoners, returned to the capital in a high +state of exultation at the turn their affairs had now taken. + +[Sidenote: Eurip. fr.] + ++35.+ This event conveys many useful lessons to a thoughtful observer. +Above all, the disaster of Regulus gives the clearest possible warning +that no one should feel too confident of the favours of Fortune, +especially in the hour of success. Here we see one, who a short time +before refused all pity or consideration to the fallen, brought +incontinently to beg them for his own life. Again, we are taught the +truth of that saying of Euripides— + + One wise man’s skill is worth a world in arms. + +For it was one man, one brain, that defeated the numbers which were +believed to be invincible and able to accomplish anything; and restored +to confidence a whole city that was unmistakably and utterly ruined, +and the spirits of its army which had sunk to the lowest depths of +despair. I record these things in the hope of benefiting my readers. +There are two roads to reformation for mankind—one through misfortunes +of their own, the other through those of others: the former is the most +unmistakable, the latter the less painful. One should never therefore +voluntarily choose the former, for it makes reformation a matter of +great difficulty and danger; but we should always look out for the +latter, for thereby we can without hurt to ourselves gain a clear view +of the best course to pursue. It is this which forces us to consider +that the knowledge gained from the study of true history is the best +of all educations for practical life. For it is history, and history +alone, which, without involving us in actual danger, will mature our +judgment and prepare us to take right views, whatever may be the crisis +or the posture of affairs. + +[Sidenote: Xanthippus quits Carthage.] + ++36.+ To return to our narrative. Having obtained this complete success +the Carthaginians indulged in every sign of exultation. Thanksgivings +were poured out to God, and joyful congratulations interchanged among +themselves. But Xanthippus, by whose means such a happy change had +been brought about and such an impulse been given to the fortunes of +Carthage, did not remain there long, but took ship for home again. In +this he showed his wisdom and discernment. For it is the nature of +extraordinary and conspicuous achievements to exasperate jealousies +and envenom slander; against which a native may perhaps stand with the +support of kinsfolk and friends, but a foreigner when exposed to one +or the other of them is inevitably overpowered before long and put +in danger. There is however another account sometimes given of the +departure of Xanthippus, which I will endeavour at a more suitable +opportunity to set forth. + +[Sidenote: The Romans prepare a fleet to relieve their beaten army.] + +[Sidenote: B.C. 255. Coss. Ser. Fulvius Paetinus Nobilior, M. Aemilius +Paullus.] + +Upon this unlooked-for catastrophe in the Libyan campaign, the Roman +government at once set to work to fit out a fleet to take off the men +who were still surviving there; while the Carthaginians followed up +their success by sitting down before Aspis, and besieging it, being +anxious to get the survivors of the battle into their hands. But +failing to capture the place, owing to the gallantry and determined +courage of these men, they eventually raised the siege. When they +heard that the Romans were preparing their fleet, and were intending +to sail once more against Libya, they set about shipbuilding also, +partly repairing old vessels and partly constructing new. Before very +long they had manned and launched two hundred ships, and were on the +watch for the coming of their enemies. By the beginning of the summer +the Romans had launched three hundred and fifty vessels. They put them +under the command of the Consuls Marcus Aemilius and Servius Fulvius, +and despatched them. This fleet coasted along Sicily; made for Libya; +and having fallen in with the Carthaginian squadron off Hermaeum, at +once charged and easily turned them to flight; captured a hundred and +fourteen with their crews, and having taken on board their men who had +maintained themselves in Libya, started from Aspis on their return +voyage to Sicily. + +[Sidenote: The fleet is lost in a storm.] + +[Sidenote: Between June 28 and July 26.] + ++37.+ The passage was effected in safety, and the coast of Camarina +was reached: but there they experienced so terrible a storm, and +suffered so dreadfully, as almost to beggar description. The disaster +was indeed extreme: for out of their three hundred and sixty-four +vessels eighty only remained. The rest were either swamped or driven +by the surf upon the rocks and headlands, where they went to pieces +and filled all the seaboard with corpses and wreckage. No greater +catastrophe is to be found in all history as befalling a fleet at one +time. And for this Fortune was not so much to blame as the commanders +themselves. They had been warned again and again by the pilots not to +steer along the southern coast of Sicily facing the Libyan sea, because +it was exposed and yielded no safe anchorage; and because, of the two +dangerous constellations, one had not yet set and the other was on the +point of rising (for their voyage fell between the rising of Orion and +that of the Dog Star). Yet they attended to none of these warnings; +but, intoxicated by their recent success, were anxious to capture +certain cities as they coasted along, and in pursuance of this idea +thoughtlessly exposed themselves to the full fury of the open sea. As +far as these particular men were concerned, the disaster which they +brought upon themselves in the pursuit of trivial advantages convinced +them of the folly of their conduct. But it is a peculiarity of the +Roman people as a whole to treat everything as a question of main +strength; to consider that they must of course accomplish whatever they +have proposed to themselves; and that nothing is impossible that they +have once determined upon. The result of such self-confidence is that +in many things they do succeed, while in some few they conspicuously +fail, and especially at sea. On land it is against men only and their +works that they have to direct their efforts: and as the forces against +which they exert their strength do not differ intrinsically from +their own, as a general rule they succeed; while their failures are +exceptional and rare. But to contend with the sea and sky is to fight +against a force immeasurably superior to their own: and when they trust +to an exertion of sheer strength in such a contest the disasters which +they meet with are signal. This is what they experienced on the present +occasion: they have often experienced it since; and will continue to do +so, as long as they maintain their headstrong and foolhardy notion that +any season of the year admits of sailing as well as marching. + +[Sidenote: The Carthaginians renew operations in Sicily.] + ++38.+ When the Carthaginians heard of the destruction which had +befallen the Roman fleet, they made up their minds that as their late +victory had made them a match for their enemy on land, so now the +Roman catastrophe had made them a match for him at sea. Accordingly +they devoted themselves with still greater eagerness than before to +their naval and military preparations. And first, they lost no time in +despatching Hasdrubal to Sicily, and with him not only the soldiers +that they had already collected, but those also whom they had recalled +from Heracleia; and along with them they sent also a hundred and forty +elephants. And next, after despatching him, they began fitting out two +hundred ships and making all other preparations necessary for a naval +expedition. Hasdrubal reached Lilybaeum safely, and immediately set to +work to train his elephants and drill his men, and showed his intention +of striking a blow for the possession of the open country. + +[Sidenote: B.C. 254. Coss. Gn. Cornelius Scipio Asina II., Aulus +Atilius, Calatinus II.] + +The Roman government, when they heard of this from the survivors of the +wreck on their arrival home, felt it to be a grievous misfortune; but +being absolutely resolved not to give in, they determined once more +to put two hundred and twenty vessels on the stocks and build afresh. +These were finished in three months, an almost incredibly short time, +and the new Consuls Aulus Atilius and Gnaeus Cornelius fitted out the +fleet and put to sea. As they passed through the straits they took up +from Messene those of the vessels which had been saved from the wreck; +and having thus arrived with three hundred ships off Panormus, which +is the strongest town of all the Carthaginian province in Sicily, they +began to besiege it. They threw up works in two distinct places, and +after other necessary preparations brought up their battering rams. The +tower next the sea was destroyed with ease, and the soldiers forced +their way in through the breach: and so what is called the New Town was +carried by assault; while what is called the Old Town being placed by +this event in imminent danger, its inhabitants made haste to surrender +it. Having thus made themselves masters of the place, the army sailed +back to Rome, leaving a garrison in the town. + +[Sidenote: B.C. 253. Coss. Gn. Servilius Caepio, G. Sempronius Blaesus.] + ++39.+ But next summer the new Consuls Gnaeus Servilius and Gaius +Sempronius put again to sea with their full strength, and after +touching at Sicily started thence for Libya. There, as they coasted +along the shore, they made a great number of descents upon the country +without accomplishing anything of importance in any of them. At length +they came to the island of the Lotophagi called Mēnix, which is not +far from the Lesser Syrtis. There, from ignorance of the waters, they +ran upon some shallows; the tide receded, their ships went aground, +and they were in extreme peril. However, after a while the tide +unexpectedly flowed back again, and by dint of throwing overboard all +their heavy goods they just managed to float the ships. After this +their return voyage was more like a flight than anything else. When +they reached Sicily and had made the promontory of Lilybaeum they cast +anchor at Panormus. Thence they weighed anchor for Rome, and rashly +ventured upon the open sea-line as the shortest; but while on their +voyage they once more encountered so terrible a storm that they lost +more than a hundred and fifty ships. + +[Sidenote: B.C. 252.] + +[Sidenote: B.C. 251. Coss. Lucius Caecilius Metellus, G. Furius +Pacilus.] + +[Sidenote: B.C. 252-251.] + +[Sidenote: B.C. 250.] + +The Romans after this misfortune, though they are eminently persistent +in carrying out their undertakings, yet owing to the severity and +frequency of their disasters, now yielded to the force of circumstances +and refrained from constructing another fleet. All the hopes still left +to them they rested upon their land forces: and, accordingly, they +despatched the Consuls Lucius Caecilius and Gaius Furius with their +legions to Sicily; but they only manned sixty ships to carry provisions +for the legions. The fortunes of the Carthaginians had in their turn +considerably improved owing to the catastrophes I have described. They +now commanded the sea without let or hindrance, since the Romans had +abandoned it; while in their land forces their hopes were high. Nor +was it unreasonable that it should be so. The account of the battle +of Libya had reached the ears of the Romans: they had heard that the +elephants had broken their ranks and had killed the large part of those +that fell: and they were in such terror of them, that though during +two years running after that time they had on many occasions, in the +territory either of Lilybaeum or Selinus, found themselves in order of +battle within five or six stades of the enemy, they never plucked up +courage to begin an attack, or in fact to come down upon level ground +at all, all because of their fear of an elephant charge. And in these +two seasons all they did was to reduce Therma and Lipara by siege, +keeping close all the while to mountainous districts and such as were +difficult to cross. The timidity and want of confidence thus displayed +by their land forces induced the Roman government to change their minds +and once more to attempt success at sea. Accordingly, in the second +consulship of Caius Atilius and Lucius Manlius, we find them ordering +fifty ships to be built, enrolling sailors and energetically collecting +a naval armament. + +[Sidenote: B.C. 251.] + +[Sidenote: Skirmishing at Panormus.] + ++40.+ Meanwhile Hasdrubal noticed the terror displayed by the Romans +whenever they had lately found themselves in the presence of the +enemy. He learnt also that one of the Consuls had departed and gone +to Italy, and that Caecilius was lingering in Panormus with the other +half of the army, with the view of protecting the corn-crops of the +allies just then ripe for the harvest. He therefore got his troops in +motion, marched out, and encamped on the frontier of the territory +of Panormus. Caecilius saw well enough that the enemy had become +supremely confident, and he was anxious to draw him on; he therefore +kept his men within the walls. Hasdrubal imagined that Caecilius +dared not come out to give him battle. Elated with this idea, he +pushed boldly forward with his whole army and marched over the pass +into the territory of Panormus. But though he was destroying all the +standing crops up to the very walls of the town, Caecilius was not +shaken from his resolution, but kept persistently to it, until he had +induced him to cross the river which lay between him and the town. But +no sooner had the Carthaginians got their elephants and men across, +than Caecilius commenced sending out his light-armed troops to harass +them, until he had forced them to get their whole army into fighting +order. When he saw that everything was happening as he designed it, +he placed some of his light troops to line the wall and moat, with +instructions that if the elephants came within range they should pour +volleys of their missiles upon them; but that whenever they found +themselves being forced from their ground by them, they should retreat +into the moat, rush out of it again, and hurl darts at the elephants +which happened to be nearest. At the same time he gave orders to the +armourers in the market-place to carry the missiles and heap them up +outside at the foot of the wall. Meanwhile he took up his own position +with his maniples at the gate which was opposite the enemy’s left +wing, and kept despatching detachment after detachment to reinforce +his skirmishers. The engagement commenced by them becoming more and +more general, a feeling of emulation took possession of the officers +in charge of the elephants. They wished to distinguish themselves in +the eyes of Hasdrubal, and they desired that the credit of the victory +should be theirs: they therefore, with one accord, charged the advanced +skirmishing parties of the enemy, routed them with ease, and pursued +them up to the moat. But no sooner did the elephants thus come to +close quarters than they were wounded by the archers on the wall, and +overwhelmed with volleys of pila and javelins which poured thick and +fast upon them from the men stationed on the outer edge of the moat, +and who had not yet been engaged,—and thus, studded all over with +darts, and wounded past all bearing, they soon got beyond control. They +turned and bore down upon their own masters, trampling men to death, +and throwing their own lines into utter disorder and confusion. When +Caecilius saw this he led out his men with promptitude. His troops were +fresh; the enemy were in disorder; and he charged them diagonally on +the flank: the result was that he inflicted a severe defeat upon them, +killed a large number, and forced the rest into precipitate flight. Of +the elephants he captured ten along with their Indian riders: the rest +which had thrown their Indians he managed to drive into a herd after +the battle, and secured every one of them. This achievement gained him +the credit on all hands of having substantially benefited the Roman +cause, by once more restoring confidence to the army, and giving them +the command of the open country. + +[Sidenote: B.C. 250. C. Caecilius Regulus II., L. Manlius Vulso II.] + ++41.+ The announcement of this success at Rome was received with +extreme delight; not so much at the blow inflicted on the enemy by +the loss of their elephants, as at the confidence inspired in their +own troops by a victory over these animals. With their confidence +thus restored, the Roman government recurred to their original plan +of sending out the Consuls upon this service with a fleet and naval +forces; for they were eager, by all means in their power, to put a +period to the war. Accordingly, in the fourteenth year of the war, +the supplies necessary for the despatch of the expedition were got +ready, and the Consuls set sail for Sicily with two hundred ships. +They dropped anchor at Lilybaeum; and the army having met them there, +they began to besiege it by sea and land. Their view was that if they +could obtain possession of this town they would have no difficulty in +transferring the seat of war to Libya. The Carthaginian leaders were +of the same opinion, and entirely agreed with the Roman view of the +value of the place. They accordingly subordinated everything else to +this; devoted themselves to the relief of the place at all hazards; and +resolved to retain this town at any sacrifice: for now that the Romans +were masters of all the rest of Sicily, except Drepana, it was the only +foothold they had left in the island. + +To understand my story a knowledge of the topography of the district +is necessary. I will therefore endeavour in a few words to convey +a comprehension to my readers of its geographical position and its +peculiar advantages. + ++42.+ Sicily, then, lies towards Southern Italy very much in the same +relative position as the Peloponnese does to the rest of Greece. The +only difference is that the one is an island, the other a peninsula; +and consequently in the former case there is no communication except +by sea, in the latter there is a land communication also. The shape +of Sicily is a triangle, of which the several angles are represented +by promontories: that to the south jutting out into the Sicilian Sea +is called Pachynus; that which looks to the north forms the western +extremity of the Straits of Messene and is about twelve stades from +Italy, its name is Pelorus; while the third projects in the direction +of Libya itself, and is conveniently situated opposite the promontories +which cover Carthage, at a distance of about a thousand stades: +it looks somewhat south of due west, dividing the Libyan from the +Sardinian Sea, and is called Lilybaeum. On this last there is a city +of the same name. It was this city that the Romans were now besieging. +It was exceedingly strongly fortified: for besides its walls there was +a deep ditch running all round it, and on the side of the sea it was +protected by lagoons, to steer through which into the harbour was a +task requiring much skill and practice. + +[Sidenote: Siege of Lilybaeum, B.C. 250.] + +The Romans made two camps, one on each side of the town, and connected +them with a ditch, stockade, and wall. Having done this, they began +the assault by advancing their siege-works in the direction of the +tower nearest the sea, which commands a view of the Libyan main. +They did this gradually, always adding something to what they had +already constructed; and thus bit by bit pushed their works forward +and extended them laterally, till at last they had brought down not +only this tower, but the six next to it also; and at the same time +began battering all the others with battering-rams. The siege was +carried on with vigour and terrific energy: every day some of the +towers were shaken and others reduced to ruins; every day too the +siege-works advanced farther and farther, and more and more towards +the heart of the city. And though there were in the town, besides the +ordinary inhabitants, as many as ten thousand hired soldiers, the +consternation and despondency became overwhelming. Yet their commander +Himilco omitted no measure within his power. As fast as the enemy +demolished a fortification he threw up a new one; he also countermined +them, and reduced the assailants to straits of no ordinary difficulty. +Moreover, he made daily sallies, attempted to carry or throw fire +into the siege-works, and with this end in view fought many desperate +engagements by night as well as by day: so determined was the fighting +in these struggles, that sometimes the number of the dead was greater +than it ordinarily is in a pitched battle. + +[Sidenote: Attempted treason in Lilybaeum.] + ++43.+ But about this time some of the officers of highest rank in the +mercenary army discussed among themselves a project for surrendering +the town to the Romans, being fully persuaded that the men under their +command would obey their orders. They got out of the city at night, +went to the enemy’s camp, and held a parley with the Roman commander on +the subject. But Alexon the Achaean, who on a former occasion had saved +Agrigentum from destruction when the mercenary troops of Syracuse made +a plot to betray it, was on this occasion once more the first to detect +this treason, and to report it to the general of the Carthaginians. +The latter no sooner heard it than he at once summoned a meeting of +those officers who were still in their quarters; and exhorted them to +loyalty with prayers and promises of liberal bounties and favours, if +they would only remain faithful to him, and not join in the treason +of the officers who had left the town. They received his speech with +enthusiasm, and were there and then commissioned by him, some to go +to the Celts accompanied by Hannibal, who was the son of the Hannibal +killed in Sardinia, and who had a previous acquaintance with that +people gained in the expedition against them; others to fetch the rest +of the mercenary troops, accompanied by Alexon, because he was liked +and trusted by them. These officers then proceeded to summon a meeting +of their men and address them. They pledged their own credit for the +bounties promised them severally by the General, and without difficulty +persuaded the men to remain staunch. The result was that when the +officers, who had joined in the secret mission, returned to the walls +and tried to address their men, and communicate the terms offered by +the Romans, so far from finding any adherents, they could not even +obtain a hearing, but were driven from the wall with volleys of stones +and darts. But this treason among their mercenaries constituted a +serious danger: the Carthaginians had a narrow escape from absolute +ruin, and they owed their preservation from it to that same Alexon +whose fidelity had on a former occasion preserved for Agrigentum her +territory, constitution, and freedom. + +[Sidenote: Hannibal relieves Lilybaeum.] + ++44.+ Meanwhile the Carthaginians at home knew nothing of what was +going on. But they could calculate the requirements of a besieged +garrison; and they accordingly filled fifty vessels with soldiers, +furnished their commander Hannibal, a son of Hamilcar, and an officer +and prime favourite of Adherbal’s, with instructions suitable to the +business in hand, and despatched him with all speed: charging him to +be guilty of no delay, to omit no opportunity, and to shrink from no +attempt however venturesome to relieve the besieged. He put to sea with +his ten thousand men, and dropped anchor at the islands called Aegusae, +which lie in the course between Lilybaeum and Carthage, and there +looked out for an opportunity of making Lilybaeum. At last a strong +breeze sprang up in exactly the right quarter: he crowded all sail and +bore down before the wind right upon the entrance of the harbour, with +his men upon the decks fully armed and ready for battle. Partly from +astonishment at this sudden appearance, partly from dread of being +carried along with the enemy by the violence of the gale into the +harbour of their opponents, the Romans did not venture to obstruct the +entrance of the reinforcement; but stood out at sea overpowered with +amazement at the audacity of the enemy. + +The town population crowded to the walls, in an agony of anxiety as to +what would happen, no less than in an excess of joy at the unlooked-for +appearance of hope, and cheered on the crews as they sailed into the +harbour, with clapping hands and cries of gladness. To sail into the +harbour was an achievement of great danger; but Hannibal accomplished +it gallantly, and, dropping anchor there, safely disembarked his +soldiers. The exultation of all who were in the city was not caused +so much by the presence of the reinforcement, though they had thereby +gained a strong revival of hope, and a large addition to their +strength, as by the fact that the Romans had not dared to intercept the +course of the Carthaginians. + +[Sidenote: A sally from Lilybaeum.] + +[Sidenote: It fails.] + ++45.+ Himilco, the general in command at Lilybaeum, now saw that both +divisions of his troops were in high spirits and eager for service,—the +original garrison owing to the presence of the reinforcement, the newly +arrived because they had as yet had no experience of the hardships of +the situation. He wished to take advantage of the excited feelings +of both parties, before they cooled, in order to organise an attempt +to set fire to the works of the besiegers. He therefore summoned +the whole army to a meeting, and dwelt upon the themes suitable to +the occasion at somewhat greater length than usual. He raised their +zeal to an enthusiastic height by the magnitude of his promises for +individual acts of courage, and by declaring the favours and rewards +which awaited them as an army at the hands of the Carthaginians. His +speech was received with lively marks of satisfaction; and the men +with loud shouts bade him delay no more, but lead them into the field. +For the present, however, he contented himself with thanking them and +expressing his delight at their excellent spirit, and bidding them go +early to rest and obey their officers, dismissed them. But shortly +afterwards he summoned the officers; assigned to them severally the +posts best calculated for the success of the undertaking; communicated +to them the watchword and the exact moment the movement was to be made; +and issued orders to the commanders to be at the posts assigned with +their men at the morning watch. His orders were punctually obeyed: +and at daybreak he led out his forces and made attempts upon the +siege-works at several points. But the Romans had not been blind to +what was coming, and were neither idle nor unprepared. Wherever help +was required it was promptly rendered; and at every point they made a +stout resistance to the enemy. Before long there was fighting all along +the line, and an obstinate struggle round the entire circuit of the +wall; for the sallying party were not less than twenty thousand strong, +and their opponents more numerous still. The contest was all the +hotter from the fact that the men were not fighting in their regular +ranks, but indiscriminately, and as their own judgment directed; the +result of which was that a spirit of personal emulation arose among +the combatants, because, though the numbers engaged were so great, +there was a series of single combats between man and man, or company +and company. However, it was at the siege-works themselves that the +shouting was loudest and the throng of combatants the densest. At +these troops had been massed deliberately for attack and defence. The +assailants strove their utmost to dislodge the defenders, the defenders +exerted all their courage to hold their ground and not yield an inch +to the assailants,—and with such emulation and fury on both sides, +that they ended by falling at their posts rather than yield. But +there were others mingled with these, carrying torchwood and tow and +fire, who made a simultaneous attack upon the battering-rams at every +point: hurling these fiery missiles against them with such audacity, +that the Romans were reduced to the last extremity of danger, being +quite unable to overpower the attack of the enemy. But the general +of the Carthaginians, seeing that he was losing large numbers in the +engagement, without being able to gain the object of the sortie, +which was to take the siege-works, ordered his trumpeters to sound a +recall. So the Romans, after coming within an ace of losing all their +siege-gear, finally kept possession of the works, and were able to +maintain them all without dispute. + ++46.+ After this affair Hannibal eluded the enemy’s watch, and sailed +out of the harbour by night with his ships to Drepana, to join the +Carthaginian Commander-in-Chief, Adherbal. Drepana is about one hundred +and twenty stades from Lilybaeum, and was always an object of special +care to the Carthaginians from the convenience of its position and the +excellence of its harbour. + +[Sidenote: Hannibal the Rhodian offers to run the blockade.] + +Now the Carthaginian government were anxious to learn the state of +affairs at Lilybaeum, but could not do so because the garrison was +strictly blockaded, and the Romans were exceedingly vigilant. In this +difficulty a nobleman, called Hannibal the Rhodian, came to them, and +offered to run the blockade, to see what was going on in Lilybaeum with +his own eyes, and to report. The offer delighted them, but they did +not believe in the possibility of its fulfilment with the Roman fleet +lying at the very entrance of the channel. However, the man fitted out +his own private vessel and put to sea. He first crossed to one of the +islands lying off Lilybaeum. Next day he obtained a wind in the right +quarter, and about ten o’clock in the morning actually sailed into the +harbour in the full view of the enemy, who looked on with amazement +at his audacity. Next day he lost no time in setting about a return +voyage. The Roman Consul had determined on taking extra precautions +for watching the sea near the channel: with this view he had during +the night got ready his ten fastest-sailing vessels, and taking up a +position on shore close to the harbour mouth, was watching with his own +eyes what would happen. The whole army was watching also; while the +ships on both sides of the mouth of the channel got as close to the +shallows as it was possible to approach, and there rested with their +oars out, and ready to run down and capture the ship that was about to +sail out. The Rhodian, on his side, attempted no concealment. He put +boldly to sea, and so confounded the enemy by his audacity, and the +speed of his vessel, that he not only sailed out without receiving any +damage to ship or crew, scudding along the bows of the enemy as though +they were fixed in their places, but even brought his ship to, after +running a short way ahead, and, with his oars out and ready, seemed +to challenge the foe to a contest. When none of them ventured to put +out to attack him, because of the speed of his rowing, he sailed away: +having thus with his one ship successfully defied the entire fleet of +the enemy. From this time he frequently performed the same feat, and +proved exceedingly serviceable both to the government at Carthage and +the besieged garrison. To the former by informing them from time to +time of what was pressingly necessary; and to the latter by inspiring +them with confidence, and dismaying the Romans by his audacity. + +[Sidenote: His example is followed by others.] + +[Sidenote: The Rhodian is at length captured.] + ++47.+ What contributed most to encourage him to a repetition of the +feat was the fact that by frequent experience he had marked out the +course for himself by clear land marks. As soon as he had crossed +the open sea, and was coming into sight, he used to steer as though +he were coming from Italy, keeping the seaward tower exactly on his +bows, in such a way as to be in a line with the city towers which +faced towards Libya; and this is the only possible course to hit the +mouth of the channel with the wind astern. The successful boldness of +the Rhodian inspired several of those who were acquainted with these +waters to make similar attempts. The Romans felt themselves to be +in a great difficulty; and what was taking place determined them to +attempt blocking up the mouth of the harbour. The greater part of the +attempted work was a failure: the sea was too deep, and none of the +material which they threw into it would hold, or in fact keep in the +least compact. The breakers and the force of the current dislodged and +scattered everything that was thrown in, before it could even reach the +bottom. But there was one point where the water was shallow, at which +a mole was with infinite labour made to hold together; and upon it a +vessel with four banks of oars and of unusually fine build stuck fast +as it was making the outward passage at night, and thus fell into the +hands of the enemy. The Romans took possession of it, manned it with a +picked crew, and used it for keeping a look out for all who should try +to enter the harbour, and especially for the Rhodian. He had sailed in, +as it happened, that very night, and was afterwards putting out to sea +again in his usual open manner. He was, however, startled to see the +four-banked vessel put out to sea again simultaneously with himself. +He recognised what ship it was, and his first impulse was to escape +her by his superior speed. But finding himself getting overhauled by +the excellence of her rowers, he was finally compelled to bring to and +engage at close quarters. But in a struggle of marines he was at a +complete disadvantage: the enemy were superior in numbers, and their +soldiers were picked men; and he was made prisoner. The possession of +this ship of superior build enabled the Romans, by equipping her with +whatever was wanted for the service she had to perform, to intercept +all who were adventurous enough to try running the blockade of +Lilybaeum. + +[Sidenote: A storm having damaged the siege-works, the Lilybaeans +succeed in burning them.] + ++48.+ Meanwhile, the besieged were energetically carrying on +counterworks, having abandoned the hope of damaging or destroying the +constructions of the enemy. But in the midst of these proceedings a +storm of wind, of such tremendous violence and fury, blew upon the +machinery of the engines, that it wrecked the pent-houses, and carried +away by its force the towers erected to cover them. Some of the Greek +mercenaries perceived the advantage such a state of things offered +for the destruction of the siege-works, and communicated their idea +to the commander. He caught at the suggestion, and lost no time in +making every preparation suitable to the undertaking. Then the young +men mustered at three several points, and threw lighted brands into the +enemy’s works. The length of time during which these works had been +standing made them exactly in the proper state to catch fire easily; +and when to this was added a violent wind, blowing right upon the +engines and towers, the natural result was that the spreading of the +fire became rapid and destructive; while all attempts on the Roman side +to master it, and rescue their works, had to be abandoned as difficult +or wholly impracticable. Those who tried to come to the rescue were +so appalled at the scene, that they could neither fully grasp nor +clearly see what was going on. Flames, sparks, and volumes of smoke +blew right in their faces and blinded them; and not a few dropped down +and perished without ever getting near enough to attempt to combat +the fire. The same circumstances, which caused these overwhelming +difficulties to the besiegers, favoured those who were throwing the +fire-brands in exactly the same proportion. Everything that could +obscure their vision or hurt them was blown clean away and carried into +the faces of the enemy; while their being able to see the intervening +space enabled the shooters to take a good aim at those of the enemy who +came to the rescue, and the throwers of the fire-brands to lodge them +at the proper places for the destruction of the works. The violence +of the wind, too, contributed to the deadly effect of the missiles by +increasing the force of their blows. Eventually the destruction was +so complete, that the foundations of the siege-towers and the blocks +of the battering-rams were rendered unusable by the fire. In spite of +this disaster, though they gave up the idea of assaulting the place +any longer by means of their works, the Romans still persisted. They +surrounded the town with a ditch and stockade, threw up an additional +wall to secure their own encampment, and left the completion of their +purpose to time. Nor were the besieged less determined. They repaired +the part of their walls which had been thrown down, and prepared to +endure the siege with good courage. + +[Sidenote: The Roman army is reinforced.] + +[Sidenote: B.C. 249. Coss. P. Claudius Pulcher, L. Junius Pullus.] + +[Sidenote: Claudius sails to attack Drepana.] + ++49.+ When the announcement of these events at Rome was followed by +reiterated tidings that the larger part of the crews of the fleet had +been destroyed, either at the works, or in the general conduct of the +siege, the Roman government set zealously to work to enlist sailors; +and, having collected as many as ten thousand, sent them to Sicily. +They crossed the straits, and reached the camp on foot; and when they +had joined, Publius Claudius, the Consul, assembled his tribunes, +and said that it was just the time to sail to the attack of Drepana +with the whole squadron: for that Adherbal,[139] who was in command +there, was quite unprepared for such an event, because he as yet knew +nothing of the new crews having arrived; and was fully persuaded +that their fleet could not sail, owing to their loss of men in the +siege. His proposition met with a ready assent from the council of +officers, and he immediately set about getting his men on board, the +old crews as well as those who had recently joined. As for marines, he +selected the best men from the whole army, who were ready enough to +join an expedition which involved so short a voyage and so immediate +and certain an advantage. Having completed these preparations, he set +sail about midnight, without being detected by the enemy; and for the +first part of the day he sailed in close order, keeping the land on +his right. By daybreak the leading ships could be seen coming towards +Drepana; and at the first sight of them Adherbal was overwhelmed with +surprise. He quickly recovered his self-possession however: and, fully +appreciating the significance of the enemy’s attack, he determined to +try every manœuvre, and hazard every danger, rather than allow himself +and his men to be shut up in the blockade which threatened them. +He lost no time in collecting his rowing-crews upon the beach, and +summoning the mercenary soldiers who were in the town by proclamation. +When the muster had taken place, he endeavoured to impress upon them +in a few words what good hopes of victory they had, if they were bold +enough to fight at sea; and what hardships they would have to endure +in a blockade, if they hesitated from any fear of danger and played +the coward. The men showed a ready enthusiasm for the sea-fight, and +demanded with shouts that he would lead them to it without delay. He +thanked them, praised their zeal, and gave the order to embark with all +speed, to keep their eyes upon his ship, and follow in its wake. Having +made these instructions clear as quickly as he could, he got under +weigh himself first, and guided his fleet close under the rocks, on the +opposite side of the harbour to that by which the enemy were entering. + +[Sidenote: Unexpected resistance of Adherbal. The Roman fleet checked.] + ++50.+ When the Consul Publius saw, to his surprise, that the enemy, so +far from giving in or being dismayed at his approach, were determined +upon fighting him at sea: while of his own ships some were already +within the harbour, others just in the very entrance channel, and +others still on their way towards it; he at once issued orders to all +the ships to turn round and make the best of their way out again. The +result of this was that, as some of the ships were in the harbour, +and others at the entrance, they fouled each other when they began +reversing their course; and not only did a great confusion arise among +the men, but the ships got their oars broken also in the collisions +which occurred. However, the captains exerted themselves to get the +ships into line close under the shore, as they successively cleared +the harbour, and with their prows directed towards the enemy. Publius +himself was originally bringing up the rear of the entire squadron; but +he now, while the movement was actually in execution, turned towards +the open sea and transferred himself to a position on the left wing of +the fleet. At the same moment Adherbal succeeded in outflanking the +left of his opponents with five vessels furnished with charging beaks. +He turned his own ship with its prow towards the enemy, and brought to. +As each of the others came up, and fell into line with him, he sent +orders to them by his staff officers to do the same as he had done. +Thus they all fell in and formed a complete line. The signal which had +been agreed upon before was given, and an advance was begun, which was +made at first without disarranging the line. The Romans were still +close in-shore, waiting for the coming out of their ships from the +harbour; and this proximity to the land proved of infinite disadvantage +to them in the engagement. + +[Sidenote: The battle.] + +[Sidenote: The Romans beaten.] + ++51.+ And now the fleets were within a short distance of each other: +the signals were raised from the ships of the respective commanders; +the charge was made; and ship grappled with ship. At first the +engagement was evenly balanced, because each fleet had the pick of +their land forces serving as marines on board. But as it went on +the many advantages which, taking it as a whole, the Carthaginians +possessed, gave them a continually increasing superiority. Owing to the +better construction of their ships they had much the advantage in point +of speed, while their position with the open sea behind them materially +contributed to their success, by giving them freer space for their +manœuvres. Were any of them hard pressed by the enemy? Their speed +secured them a sure escape, and a wide expanse of water was open to +their flight. There they would swing round and attack the leading ships +which were pursuing them: sometimes rowing round them and charging +their broadsides, at other times running alongside them as they lurched +awkwardly round, from the weight of the vessels and the unskilfulness +of the crews. In this way they were charging perpetually, and managed +to sink a large number of the ships. Or was one of their number in +danger? They were ready to come to the rescue, being out of danger +themselves, and being able to effect a movement to right or left, by +steering along the sterns of their own ships and through the open sea +unmolested. The case of the Romans was exactly the reverse. If any of +them were hard pressed, there was nowhere for them to retreat, for they +were fighting close to the shore; and any ship of theirs that was hard +driven by the enemy either backed into shallow water and stuck fast, +or ran ashore and was stranded. Moreover, that most effective of all +manœuvres in sea fights,—sailing through the enemy’s line and appearing +on their stern while they are engaged with others,—was rendered +impossible for them, owing to the bulk of their vessels; and still more +so by the unskilfulness of their crews. Nor, again, were they able +to bring help from behind to those who wanted it, because they were +hemmed in so close to the shore that there was not the smallest space +left in which those who wished to render such help might move. When +the Consul saw how ill things were going for him all along the line; +when he saw some of his ships sticking fast in the shallows, and others +cast ashore; he took to flight. Thirty other ships which happened to be +near him followed him as he sailed from the left, and coasted along the +shore. But the remaining vessels, which amounted to ninety-three, the +Carthaginians captured with their crews, except in the case of those +who ran their ships ashore and got away. + +[Sidenote: The Romans not discouraged send the Consul L. Junius with a +large supply of provisions in 800 transports, convoyed by 60 ships of +war to Lilybaeum.] + ++52.+ The result of this sea fight gave Adherbal a high reputation at +Carthage; for his success was looked upon as wholly due to himself, +and his own foresight and courage: while at Rome Publius fell into +great disrepute, and was loudly censured as having acted without due +caution or calculation, and as having during his administration, as +far as a single man could, involved Rome in serious disasters. He was +accordingly some time afterwards brought to trial, was heavily fined, +and exposed to considerable danger. Not that the Romans gave way in +consequence of these events. On the contrary, they omitted nothing +that was within their power to do, and continued resolute to prosecute +the campaign. It was now the time for the Consular elections: as soon +as they were over and two Consuls appointed; one of them, Lucius +Junius,[140] was immediately sent to convey corn to the besiegers of +Lilybaeum, and other provisions and supplies necessary for the army, +sixty ships being also manned to convoy them. Upon his arrival at +Messene, Junius took over such ships as he found there to meet him, +whether from the army or from the other parts of Sicily, and coasted +along with all speed to Syracuse, with a hundred and twenty ships, and +his supplies on board about eight hundred transports. Arrived there, +he handed over to the Quaestors half his transports and some of his +war-ships, and sent them off, being very anxious that what the army +needed should reach them promptly. He remained at Syracuse himself, +waiting for such of his ships as had not yet arrived from Messene, and +collecting additional supplies of corn from the allies in the central +districts of the island. + +[Sidenote: Carthalo tries to intercept the transports.] + ++53.+ Meanwhile Adherbal sent the prisoners he had taken in the sea +fight, and the captured vessels, to Carthage; and giving Carthalo his +colleague thirty vessels, in addition to the seventy in command of +which he had come, despatched him with instructions to make a sudden +attack upon the enemy’s ships that were at anchor off Lilybaeum, +capture all he could, and set fire to the rest. In obedience to +these instructions Carthalo accomplished his passage just before +daybreak, fired some of the vessels, and towed off others. Great was +the commotion at the quarters of the Romans. For as they hurried to +the rescue of the ships, the attention of Himilco, the commander of +the garrison, was aroused by their shouts; and as the day was now +beginning to break, he could see what was happening, and despatched +the mercenary troops who were in the town. Thus the Romans found +themselves surrounded by danger on every side, and fell into a state of +consternation more than usually profound and serious. The Carthaginian +admiral contented himself with either towing off or breaking up some +few of their vessels, and shortly afterwards coasted along under the +pretence of making for Heracleia: though he was really lying in wait, +with the view of intercepting those who were coming by sea to the +Roman army. When his look-out men brought him word that a considerable +number of vessels of all sorts were bearing down upon him, and were +now getting close, he stood out to sea and started to meet them: for +the success just obtained over the Romans inspired him with such +contempt for them, that he was eager to come to an engagement. The +vessels in question were those which had been despatched in advance +under the charge of the Quaestors from Syracuse. And they too had +warning of their danger. Light boats were accustomed to sail in advance +of a squadron, and these announced the approach of the enemy to the +Quaestors; who being convinced that they were not strong enough to +stand a battle at sea, dropped anchor under a small fortified town +which was subject to Rome, and which, though it had no regular harbour, +yet possessed roadsteads, and headlands projecting from the mainland, +and surrounding the roadsteads, so as to form a convenient refuge. +There they disembarked; and having set up some catapults and ballistae, +which they got from the town, awaited the approach of the enemy. When +the Carthaginians arrived, their first idea was to blockade them: +for they supposed that the men would be terrified and retreat to the +fortified town, leaving them to take possession of the vessels without +resistance. Their expectations, however, were not fulfilled; and +finding that the men on the contrary resisted with spirit, and that the +situation of the spot presented many difficulties of every description, +they sailed away again after towing off some few of the transports +laden with provisions, and retired to a certain river, in which they +anchored and kept a look out for the enemy to renew their voyage. + ++54.+ In complete ignorance of what had happened to his advanced +squadron, the Consul, who had remained behind at Syracuse, after +completing all he meant to do there, put to sea; and, after rounding +Pachynus, was proceeding on his voyage to Lilybaeum. The appearance of +the enemy was once more signalled to the Carthaginian admiral by his +look-out men, and he at once put out to sea, with the view of engaging +them as far as possible away from their comrades. Junius saw the +Carthaginian fleet from a considerable distance, and observing their +great numbers did not dare to engage them, and yet found it impossible +to avoid them by flight because they were now too close. He therefore +steered towards land, and anchored under a rocky and altogether +dangerous part of the shore; for he judged it better to run all risks +rather than allow his squadron, with all its men, to fall into the +hands of the enemy. The Carthaginian admiral saw what he had done; +and determined that it was unadvisable for him to engage the enemy, +or bring his ships near such a dangerous place. He therefore made for +a certain headland between the two squadrons of the enemy, and there +kept a look out upon both with equal vigilance. Presently, however, +the weather became rough, and there was an appearance of an unusually +dangerous disturbance setting in from the sea. The Carthaginian pilots, +from their knowledge of the particular localities, and of seamanship +generally, foresaw what was coming; and persuaded Carthalo to avoid +the storm and round the promontory of Pachynus.[141] He had the good +sense to take their advice: [Sidenote: The Roman fleet is wrecked.] and +accordingly these men, with great exertions and extreme difficulty, +did get round the promontory and anchored in safety; while the Romans, +being exposed to the storm in places entirely destitute of harbours, +suffered such complete destruction, that not one of the wrecks even was +left in a state available for use. Both of their squadrons in fact were +completely disabled to a degree past belief. + +[Sidenote: The Romans abandon the sea.] + ++55.+ This occurrence caused the Carthaginian interests to look up +again and their hopes to revive. But the Romans, though they had met +with partial misfortunes before, had never suffered a naval disaster +so complete and final. They, in fact, abandoned the sea, and confined +themselves to holding the country; while the Carthaginians remained +masters of the sea, without wholly despairing of the land. + +[Sidenote: Lucius Junius perseveres in the siege. B.C. 248.] + +[Sidenote: Eryx.] + +Great and general was the dismay both at Rome and in the camp at +Lilybaeum. Yet they did not abandon their determination of starving +out that town. The Roman government did not allow their disasters +to prevent their sending provisions into the camp overland; and the +besiegers kept up the investment as strictly as they possibly could. +Lucius Junius joined the camp after the shipwreck, and, being in a +state of great distress at what had happened, was all eagerness to +strike some new and effective blow, and thus repair the disaster which +had befallen him. Accordingly he took the first slight opening that +offered to surprise and seize Eryx; and became master both of the +temple of Aphrodite and of the city. This is a mountain close to the +sea-coast on that side of Sicily which looks towards Italy, between +Drepana and Panormus, but nearer to Drepana of the two. It is by far +the greatest mountain in Sicily next to Aetna; and on its summit, which +is flat, stands the temple of Erycinian Aphrodite, confessedly the +most splendid of all the temples in Sicily for its wealth and general +magnificence. The town stands immediately below the summit, and is +approached by a very long and steep ascent. Lucius seized both town and +temple; and established a garrison both upon the summit and at the foot +of the road to it from Drepana. He kept a strict guard at both points, +but more especially at the foot of the ascent, believing that by so +doing he should secure possession of the whole mountain as well as the +town. + +[Sidenote: B.C. 247.] + +[Sidenote: Occupation of Hercte by Hamilcar.] + +[Sidenote: B.C. 247-244.] + ++56.+ Next year, the eighteenth of the war, the Carthaginians +appointed Hamilcar Barcas general, and put the management of the +fleet in his hands. He took over the command, and started to ravage +the Italian coast. After devastating the districts of Locri, and the +rest of Bruttium, he sailed away with his whole fleet to the coast of +Panormus and seized on a place called Hercte, which lies between Eryx +and Panormus on the coast, and is reputed the best situation in the +district for a safe and permanent camp. For it is a mountain rising +sheer on every side, standing out above the surrounding country to a +considerable height. The table-land on its summit has a circumference +of not less than a hundred stades, within which the soil is rich +in pasture and suitable for agriculture; the sea-breezes render it +healthy; and it is entirely free from all dangerous animals. On the +side which looks towards the sea, as well as that which faces the +central part of the island, it is enclosed by inaccessible precipices; +while the spaces between them require only slight fortifications, +and of no great extent, to make them secure. There is in it also an +eminence, which serves at once as an acropolis and as a convenient +tower of observation, commanding the surrounding district. It also +commands a harbour conveniently situated for the passage from Drepana +and Lilybaeum to Italy, in which there is always abundant depth of +water; finally, it can only be reached by three ways—two from the land +side, one from the sea, all of them difficult. Here Hamilcar entrenched +himself. It was a bold measure: but he had no city which he could +count upon as friendly, and no other hope on which he could rely; and +though by so doing he placed himself in the very midst of the enemy, +he nevertheless managed to involve the Romans in many struggles and +dangers. To begin with, he would start from this place and ravage the +seaboard of Italy as far as Cumae; and again on shore, when the Romans +had pitched a camp to overawe him, in front of the city of Panormus, +within about five stades of him, he harassed them in every sort of +way, and forced them to engage in numerous skirmishes, for the space +of nearly three years. Of these combats it is impossible to give a +detailed account in writing. + ++57.+ It is like the case of two boxers, eminent alike for their +courage and their physical condition, engaged in a formal contest +for the prize. As the match goes on, blow after blow is interchanged +without intermission; but to anticipate, or keep account of every feint +or every blow delivered is impossible for combatants and spectators +alike. Still one may conceive a sufficiently distinct idea of the +affair by taking into account the general activity of the men, the +ambition actuating each side, and the amount of their experience, +strength, and courage. The same may be said of these two generals. No +writer could set down, and no reader would endure the wearisome and +profitless task of reading, a detailed statement of the transactions +of every day; why they were undertaken, and how they were carried out. +For every day had its ambuscade on one side or the other, its attack, +or assault. A general assertion in regard to the men, combined with the +actual result of their mutual determination to conquer, will give a far +better idea of the facts. It may be said then, generally, that nothing +was left untried,—whether it be stratagems which could be learnt from +history, or plans suggested by the necessities of the hour and the +immediate circumstances of the case, or undertakings depending upon +an adventurous spirit and a reckless daring. The matter, however, for +several reasons, could not be brought to a decisive issue. In the first +place, the forces on either side were evenly matched: and in the second +place, while the camps were in the case of both equally impregnable, +the space which separated the two was very small. The result of this +was that skirmishes between detached parties on both sides were always +going on during the day, and yet nothing decisive occurred. For though +the men actually engaged in such skirmishes from time to time were cut +to pieces, it did not affect the main body. They had only to wheel +round to find themselves out of the reach of danger behind their own +defences. Once there, they could face about and again engage the enemy. + +[Sidenote: Siege of Eryx, B.C. 244.] + +[Sidenote: B.C. 243-242.] + ++58.+ Presently however Fortune, acting like a good umpire in the +games, transferred them by a bold stroke from the locality just +described, and the contest in which they were engaged, to a struggle +of greater danger and a locality of narrower dimensions. The Romans, +as we have said, were in occupation of the summit of Eryx, and had a +guard stationed at its foot. But Hamilcar managed to seize the town +which lay between these two spots. There ensued a siege of the Romans +who were on the summit, supported by them with extraordinary hardihood +and adventurous daring: while the Carthaginians, finding themselves +between two hostile armies, and their supplies brought to them with +difficulty, because they were in communication with the sea at only one +point and by one road, yet held out with a determination that passes +belief. Every contrivance which skill or force could sustain did they +put in use against each other, as before; every imaginable privation +was submitted to; surprises and pitched battles were alike tried: and +finally they left the combat a drawn one, not, as Fabius says, from +utter weakness and misery, but like men still unbroken and unconquered. +The fact is that before either party had got completely the better of +the other, though they had maintained the conflict for another two +years, the war happened to be decided in quite a different manner. + +[Sidenote: The obstinate persistence of the Romans and Carthaginians.] + +Such was the state of affairs at Eryx and with the forces employed +there. The two nations engaged were like well-bred game-cocks that +fight to their last gasp. You may see them often, when too weak to +use their wings, yet full of pluck to the end, and striking again +and again. Finally, chance brings them the opportunity of once more +grappling, and they hold on until one or other of them drops down dead. + +[Sidenote: The Romans once more fit out a fleet.] + +[Sidenote: B.C. 242. Coss. C. Lutatius Catulus, A. Postumius Albinus.] + ++59.+ So it was with the Romans and Carthaginians. They were worn out +by the labours of the war; the perpetual succession of hard fought +struggles was at last driving them to despair; their strength had +become paralysed, and their resources reduced almost to extinction by +war-taxes and expenses extending over so many years. And yet the Romans +did not give in. For the last five years indeed they had entirely +abandoned the sea, partly because of the disasters they had sustained +there, and partly because they felt confident of deciding the war by +means of their land forces; but they now determined for the third time +to make trial of their fortune in naval warfare. They saw that their +operations were not succeeding according to their calculations, mainly +owing to the obstinate gallantry of the Carthaginian general. They +therefore adopted this resolution from a conviction that by this means +alone, if their design were but well directed, would they be able to +bring the war to a successful conclusion. In their first attempt they +had been compelled to abandon the sea by disasters arising from sheer +bad luck; in their second by the loss of the naval battle off Drepana. +This third attempt was successful: they shut off the Carthaginian +forces at Eryx from getting their supplies by sea, and eventually put +a period to the whole war. Nevertheless it was essentially an effort +of despair. The treasury was empty, and would not supply the funds +necessary for the undertaking, which were, however, obtained by the +patriotism and generosity of the leading citizens. They undertook +singly, or by two or three combining, according to their means, to +supply a quinquereme fully fitted out, on the understanding that they +were to be repaid if the expedition was successful. By these means a +fleet of two hundred quinqueremes were quickly prepared, built on the +model of the ship of the Rhodian. Gaius Lutatius was then appointed +to the command, and despatched at the beginning of the summer. His +appearance on the coasts of Sicily was a surprise: the whole of the +Carthaginian fleet had gone home; and he took possession both of the +harbour near Drepana, and the roadsteads near Lilybaeum. He then +threw up works round the city on Drepana, and made other preparations +for besieging it. And while he pushed on these operations with all +his might, he did not at the same time lose sight of the approach of +the Carthaginian fleet. He kept in mind the original idea of this +expedition, that it was by a victory at sea alone that the result of +the whole war could be decided. He did not, therefore, allow the time +to be wasted or unemployed. He practised and drilled his crews every +day in the manœuvres which they would be called upon to perform; and +by his attention to discipline generally brought his sailors in a very +short time to the condition of trained athletes for the contest before +them. + +[Sidenote: The Carthaginians send Hanno with a fleet.] + +[Sidenote: 10th March B.C. 241. A strong breeze is blowing.] + +[Sidenote: Lutatius however decides to fight.] + ++60.+ That the Romans should have a fleet afloat once more, and +be again bidding for the mastery at sea, was a contingency wholly +unexpected by the Carthaginians. They at once set about fitting out +their ships, loaded them with corn and other provisions, and despatched +their fleet: determined that their troops round Eryx should not run +short of necessary provisions. Hanno, who was appointed to command the +fleet, put to sea and arrived at the island called Holy Isle. He was +eager as soon as possible, if he could escape the observation of the +enemy, to get across to Eryx; disembark his stores; and having thus +lightened his ships, take on board as marines those of the mercenary +troops who were suitable to the service, and Barcas with them; and +not to engage the enemy until he had thus reinforced himself. But +Lutatius was informed of the arrival of Hanno’s squadron, and correctly +interpreted their design. He at once took on board the best soldiers +of his army, and crossed to the Island of Aegusa, which lies directly +opposite Lilybaeum. There he addressed his forces some words suitable +to the occasion, and gave full instructions to the pilots, with the +understanding that a battle was to be fought on the morrow. At daybreak +the next morning Lutatius found that a strong breeze had sprung up on +the stern of the enemy, and that an advance towards them in the teeth +of it would be difficult for his ships. The sea too was rough and +boisterous: and for a while he could not make up his mind what he had +better do in the circumstances. Finally, however, he was decided by the +following considerations. If he boarded the enemy’s fleet during the +continuance of the storm, he would only have to contend with Hanno, +and the levies of sailors which he had on board, before they could be +reinforced by the troops, and with ships which were still heavily laden +with stores: but if he waited for calm weather, and allowed the enemy +to get across and unite with their land forces, he would then have to +contend with ships lightened of their burden, and therefore in a more +navigable condition, and against the picked men of the land forces; and +what was more formidable than anything else, against the determined +bravery of Hamilcar. He made up his mind, therefore, not to let the +present opportunity slip; and when he saw the enemy’s ships crowding +sail, he put to sea with all speed. The rowers, from their excellent +physical condition, found no difficulty in overcoming the heavy sea, +and Lutatius soon got his fleet into single line with prows directed to +the foe. + +[Sidenote: The battle of Aegusa.] + +[Sidenote: Victory of the Romans.] + ++61.+ When the Carthaginians saw that the Romans were intercepting +their passage across, they lowered their masts, and after some words of +mutual exhortation had been uttered in the several ships, closed with +their opponents. But the respective state of equipment of the two sides +was exactly the converse of what it had been in the battle off Drepana; +and the result of the battle was, therefore, naturally reversed also. +The Romans had reformed their mode of shipbuilding, and had eased +their vessels of all freight, except the provisions necessary for the +battle: while their rowers having been thoroughly trained and got well +together, performed their office in an altogether superior manner, and +were backed up by marines who, being picked men from the legions, were +all but invincible. The case with the Carthaginians was exactly the +reverse. Their ships were heavily laden and therefore unmanageable in +the engagement; while their rowers were entirely untrained, and merely +put on board for the emergency; and such marines as they had were raw +recruits, who had never had any previous experience of any difficult or +dangerous service. The fact is that the Carthaginian government never +expected that the Romans would again attempt to dispute the supremacy +at sea: they had, therefore, in contempt for them, neglected their +navy. The result was that, as soon as they closed, their manifold +disadvantages quickly decided the battle against them. They had fifty +ships sunk, and seventy taken with their crews. The rest set their +sails, and running before the wind, which luckily for them suddenly +veered round at the nick of time to help them, got away again to Holy +Isle. The Roman Consul sailed back to Lilybaeum to join the army, and +there occupied himself in making arrangements for the ships and men +which he had captured; which was a business of considerable magnitude, +for the prisoners made in the battle amounted to little short of ten +thousand. + +[Sidenote: Barcas makes terms.] + +[Sidenote: The treaty, B.C. 242.] + ++62.+ As far as strength of feeling and desire for victory were +concerned, this unexpected reverse did not diminish the readiness of +the Carthaginians to carry on the war; but when they came to reckon up +their resources they were at a complete standstill. On the one hand, +they could not any longer send supplies to their forces in Sicily, +because the enemy commanded the sea: on the other, to abandon and, as +it were, to betray these, left them without men and without leaders +to carry on the war. They therefore sent a despatch to Barcas with +all speed, leaving the decision of the whole matter in his hands. +Nor was their confidence misplaced. He acted the part of a gallant +general and a sensible man. As long as there was any reasonable hope +of success in the business he had in hand, nothing was too adventurous +or too dangerous for him to attempt; and if any general ever did so, +he put every chance of victory to the fullest proof. But when all his +endeavours miscarried, and no reasonable expectation was left of saving +his troops, he yielded to the inevitable, and sent ambassadors to +treat of peace and terms of accommodation. And in this he showed great +good sense and practical ability; for it is quite as much the duty of +a leader to be able to see when it is time to give in, as when it is +the time to win a victory. Lutatius was ready enough to listen to the +proposal, because he was fully aware that the resources of Rome were at +the lowest ebb from the strain of the war; and eventually it was his +fortune to put an end to the contest by a treaty of which I here give +the terms. “_Friendship is established between the Carthaginians and +Romans on the following terms, provided always that they are ratified +by the Roman people. The Carthaginians shall evacuate the whole of +Sicily: they shall not make war upon Hiero, nor bear arms against the +Syracusans or their allies. The Carthaginians shall give up to the +Romans all prisoners without ransom. The Carthaginians shall pay to the +Romans in twenty years 2200 Euboic talents of silver._”[142] + ++63.+ When this treaty was sent to Rome the people refused to accept +it, but sent ten commissioners to examine into the business. Upon their +arrival they made no change in the general terms of the treaty, but +they introduced some slight alterations in the direction of increased +severity towards Carthage. Thus they reduced the time allowed for the +payment of the indemnity by one half; they added a thousand talents to +the sum demanded; and extended the evacuation of Sicily to all islands +lying between Sicily and Italy. + +[Sidenote: Greatness of the war.] + +Such were the conditions on which the war was ended, after lasting +twenty-four years continuously. It was at once the longest, most +continuous, and most severely contested war known to us in history. +Apart from the other battles fought and the preparations made, which +I have described in my previous chapters, there were two sea fights, +in one of which the combined numbers of the two fleets exceeded five +hundred quinqueremes, in the other nearly approached seven hundred. +In the course of the war, counting what were destroyed by shipwreck, +the Romans lost seven hundred quinqueremes, the Carthaginians five +hundred. Those therefore who have spoken with wonder of the sea-battles +of an Antigonus, a Ptolemy, or a Demetrius, and the greatness of +their fleets, would we may well believe have been overwhelmed with +astonishment at the hugeness of these proportions if they had had +to tell the story of this war.[143] If, further, we take into +consideration the superior size of the quinqueremes, compared with the +triremes employed by the Persians against the Greeks, and again by the +Athenians and Lacedaemonians in their wars with each other, we shall +find that never in the whole history of the world have such enormous +forces contended for mastery at sea. + +These considerations will establish my original observation, and show +the falseness of the opinion entertained by certain Greeks. It was +_not_ by mere chance or without knowing what they were doing that the +Romans struck their bold stroke for universal supremacy and dominion, +and justified their boldness by its success. No: it was the natural +result of discipline gained in the stern school of difficulty and +danger. + ++64.+ And no doubt the question does naturally arise here as to why +they find it impossible in our days to man so many ships, or take +the sea with such large fleets, though masters of the world, and +possessing a superiority over others many times as great as before. +The explanation of this difficulty will be clearly understood when +we come to the description of their civil constitution. I look +upon this description as a most important part of my work, and one +demanding close attention on the part of my readers. For the subject +is calculated to afford pleasure in the contemplation, and is up to +this time so to speak absolutely unknown, thanks to historians, some +of whom have been ignorant, while others have given so confused an +account of it as to be practically useless. For the present it suffices +to say that, as far as the late war was concerned, the two nations +were closely matched in the character of the designs they entertained, +as well as in the lofty courage they showed in prosecuting them: and +this is especially true of the eager ambition displayed on either side +to secure the supremacy. But in the individual gallantry of their +men the Romans had decidedly the advantage; while we must credit the +Carthaginians with the best general of the day both for genius and +daring. I mean Hamilcar Barcas, own father of Rome’s future enemy +Hannibal. + +[Sidenote: War between Rome and Falerii.] + +[Sidenote: The mercenary war, B.C. 241.] + ++65.+ The confirmation of this peace was followed by events which +involved both nations in a struggle of an identical or similar nature. +At Rome the late war was succeeded by a social war against the +Faliscans, which, however, they brought to a speedy and successful +termination by the capture of Falerii after only a few days’ siege. +The Carthaginians were not so fortunate. Just about the same time +they found themselves confronted by three enemies at once, their own +mercenaries, the Numidians, and such Libyans as joined the former +in their revolt. And this war proved to be neither insignificant +nor contemptible. It exposed them to frequent and terrible alarms; +and, finally, it became a question to them not merely of a loss of +territory, but of their own bare existence, and of the safety of the +very walls and buildings of their city. There are many reasons that +make it worth while to dwell upon the history of this war: yet I must +give only a summary account of it, in accordance with the original plan +of this work. The nature and peculiar ferocity of the struggle, which +has been generally called the “truceless war,” may be best learnt from +its incidents. It conveys two important lessons: it most conspicuously +shows those who employ mercenaries what dangers they should foresee +and provide against; and secondly, it teaches how wide the distinction +is between the character of troops composed of a confused mass of +uncivilised tribes, and of those which have had the benefit of +education, the habits of social life, and the restraints of law. But +what is of most importance to us is, that we may trace from the actual +events of this period the causes which led to the war between Rome and +Carthage in the time of Hannibal. These causes have not only been a +subject of dispute among historians, but still continue to be so among +those who were actually engaged; it is therefore a matter of importance +to enable students to form an opinion on this matter as nearly as +possible in accordance with the truth. + +[Sidenote: Evacuation of Sicily.] + +[Sidenote: The mercenaries sent to Sicca.] + ++66.+ The course of events at Carthage subsequent to the peace was +as follows: As soon as possible after it was finally ratified Barcas +withdrew the troops at Eryx to Lilybaeum, and then immediately laid +down his command. Gesco, who was commandant of the town, proceeded +to transport the soldiers into Libya. But foreseeing what was likely +to happen, he very prudently embarked them in detachments, and did +not send them all in one voyage. His object was to gain time for the +Carthaginian government; so that one detachment should come to shore, +receive the pay due to them, and depart from Carthage to their own +country, before the next detachment was brought across and joined +them. In accordance with this idea Gesco began the transportation of +the troops. But the Government—partly because the recent expenses +had reduced their finances to a low ebb, partly because they felt +certain that, if they collected the whole force and entertained them +in Carthage, they would be able to persuade the mercenaries to accept +something less than the whole pay due to them—did not dismiss the +detachments as they landed, but kept them massed in the city. But +when this resulted in the commission of many acts of lawlessness by +night and day, they began to feel uneasy at their numbers and their +growing licentiousness; and required the officers, until such time as +arrangements for discharging their pay should have been made, and the +rest of the army should have arrived, to withdraw with all their men +to a certain town called Sicca, receiving each a piece of gold for +their immediate necessities. As far as quitting the city was concerned +they were ready enough to obey; but they desired to leave their heavy +baggage there as before, on the ground that they would soon have to +return to the city for their wages. But the Carthaginian government +were in terror lest, considering the length of their absence and their +natural desire for the society of wives or children, they would either +not quit the city at all; or, if they did, would be sure to be enticed +by these feelings to return, and that thus there would be no decrease +of outrages in the city. Accordingly they forced them to take their +baggage with them: but it was sorely against the will of the men, and +roused strong feelings of animosity among them. These mercenaries +being forced to retire to Sicca, lived there as they chose without any +restraint upon their lawlessness. For they had obtained two things +the most demoralising for hired forces, and which in a word are in +themselves the all-sufficient source and origin of mutinies,—relaxation +of discipline and want of employment.[144] For lack of something better +to do, some of them began calculating, always to their own advantage, +the amount of pay owing to them; and thus making out the total to be +many times more than was really due, they gave out that this was the +amount which they ought to demand from the Carthaginians. Moreover they +all began to call to mind the promises made to them by the generals +in their harangues, delivered on various occasions of special danger, +and to entertain high hopes and great expectations of the amount of +compensation which awaited them. The natural result followed. + +[Sidenote: The beginning of the outbreak, B.C. 241.] + ++67.+ When the whole army had mustered at Sicca, and Hanno, now +appointed general in Libya, far from satisfying these hopes and the +promises they had received, talked on the contrary of the burden of +the taxes and the embarrassment of the public finances; and actually +endeavoured to obtain from them an abatement even from the amount of +pay acknowledged to be due to them; excited and mutinous feelings at +once began to manifest themselves. There were constant conferences +hastily got together, sometimes in separate nationalities, sometimes +of the whole army; and there being no unity of race or language +among them, the whole camp became a babel of confusion, a scene +of inarticulate tumult, and a veritable revel of misrule. For the +Carthaginians being always accustomed to employ mercenary troops of +miscellaneous nationalities, in securing that an army should consist +of several different races, act wisely as far as the prevention of +any rapid combinations for mutiny, or difficulty on the part of the +commanders in overawing insubordination, are concerned: but the +policy utterly breaks down when an outburst of anger, or popular +delusion, or internal dissension, has actually occurred; for it makes +it impossible for the commander to soothe excited feelings, to remove +misapprehensions, or to show the ignorant their error. Armies in such a +state are not usually content with mere human wickedness; they end by +assuming the ferocity of wild beasts and the vindictiveness of insanity. + +This is just what happened in this case. There were in the army +Iberians and Celts, men from Liguria and the Balearic Islands, and +a considerable number of half-bred Greeks, mostly deserters and +slaves; while the main body consisted of Libyans. Consequently it was +impossible to collect and address them _en masse_, or to approach +them with this view by any means whatever. There was no help for it: +the general could not possibly know their several languages; and to +make a speech four or five times on the same subject, by the mouths +of several interpreters, was almost more impossible, if I may say so, +than that. The only alternative was for him to address his entreaties +and exhortations to the soldiers through their officers. And this Hanno +continually endeavoured to do. But there was the same difficulty with +them. Sometimes they failed to understand what he said: at others they +received his words with expressions of approval to his face, and yet +from error or malice reported them in a contrary sense to the common +soldiers. The result was a general scene of uncertainty, mistrust, +and misunderstanding. And to crown all, they took it into their heads +that the Carthaginian government had a design in thus sending Hanno to +them: that they purposely did not send the generals who were acquainted +with the services they had rendered in Sicily, and who had been the +authors of the promises made to them; but had sent the one man who had +not been present at any of these transactions. Whether that were so or +not, they finally broke off all negotiations with Hanno; conceived a +violent mistrust of their several commanders; and in a furious outburst +of anger with the Carthaginians started towards the city, and pitched +their camp about a hundred and twenty stades from Carthage, at the town +of Tunes, to the number of over twenty thousand. + +[Sidenote: The mercenaries at Tunes.] + +[Sidenote: Attempts to pacify them.] + +[Sidenote: The demands of the mercenaries.] + +[Sidenote: The dispute referred to the arbitration of Gesco.] + ++68.+ The Carthaginians saw their folly when it was too late. It was a +grave mistake to have collected so large a number of mercenaries into +one place without any warlike force of their own citizens to fall back +upon: but it was a still graver mistake to have delivered up to them +their children and wives, with their heavy baggage to boot; which they +might have retained as hostages, and thus have had greater security for +concerting their own measures, and more power of ensuring obedience to +their orders. However, being thoroughly alarmed at the action of the +men in regard to their encampment, they went to every length in their +eagerness to pacify their anger. They sent them supplies of provisions +in rich abundance, to be purchased exactly on their own terms, and +at their own price. Members of the Senate were despatched, one after +the other, to treat with them; and they were promised that whatever +they demanded should be conceded if it were within the bounds of +possibility. Day by day the ideas of the mercenaries rose higher. For +their contempt became supreme when they saw the dismay and excitement +in Carthage; their confidence in themselves was profound; and their +engagements with the Roman legions in Sicily had convinced them, that +not only was it impossible for the Carthaginians to face them in the +field, but that it would be difficult to find any nation in the world +who could. Therefore, when the Carthaginians conceded the point of +their pay, they made a further claim for the value of the horses they +had lost. When this too was conceded, they said that they ought to +receive the value of the rations of corn due to them from a long time +previous, reckoned at the highest price reached during the war. And +in short, the ill-disposed and mutinous among them being numerous, +they always found out some new demand which made it impossible to +come to terms. Upon the Carthaginian government, however, pledging +themselves to the full extent of their powers, they eventually agreed +to refer the matter to the arbitration of some one of the generals who +had been actually engaged in Sicily. Now they were displeased with +Hamilcar Barcas, who was one of those under whom they had fought in +Sicily, because they thought that their present unfavourable position +was attributable chiefly to him. They thought this from the fact that +he never came to them as an ambassador, and had, as was believed, +voluntarily resigned his command. But towards Gesco their feelings were +altogether friendly. He had, as they thought, taken every possible +precaution for their interests, and especially in the arrangements for +their conveyance to Libya. Accordingly they referred the dispute to the +arbitration of the latter. + +[Sidenote: Spendius.] + +[Sidenote: Mathōs.] + +[Sidenote: Spendius and Mathōs cause an outbreak.] + ++69.+ Gesco came to Tunes by sea, bringing the money with him. There he +held a meeting first of the officers, and then of the men, according +to their nationalities; rebuked them for their past behaviour, and +endeavoured to convince them as to their duty in the present: but +most of all he dwelt upon their obligation in the future to show +themselves well-disposed towards the people whose pay they had been +so long enjoying. Finally, he proceeded to discharge the arrears of +pay, taking each nationality separately. But there was a certain +Campanian in the army, a runaway Roman slave named Spendius, a man of +extraordinary physical strength and reckless courage in the field. +Alarmed lest his master should recover possession of him, and he should +be put to death with torture, in accordance with the laws of Rome, +this man exerted himself to the utmost in word and deed to break off +the arrangement with the Carthaginians. He was seconded by a Libyan +called Mathōs, who was not a slave but free, and had actually served +in the campaign. But he had been one of the most active agitators in +the late disturbances: and being in terror of punishment for the past, +he now gave in his adhesion to the party of Spendius; and taking the +Libyans aside, suggested to them that, when the men of other races +had received their pay, and taken their departure to their several +countries, the Carthaginians would wreak upon them the full weight of +the resentment which they had, in common with themselves, incurred; +and would look upon their punishment as a means of striking terror +into all the inhabitants of Libya. It did not take long to rouse the +men by such arguments, nor were they at a loss for a pretext, however +insignificant. In discharging the pay, Gesco postponed the payment +of the valuations of rations and horses. This was enough: the men at +once hurried to make a meeting; Spendius and Mathōs delivered violent +invectives against Gesco and the Carthaginians; their words were +received with every sign of approval; no one else could get a hearing; +whoever did attempt to speak was promptly stoned to death, without the +assembly so much as waiting to ascertain whether he intended to support +the party of Spendius or no. + +[Sidenote: βάλλε.] + +A considerable number of privates as well as officers were killed in +this manner in the various _émeutes_ which took place; and from the +constant repetition of this act of violence the whole army learnt the +meaning of the word “throw,” although there was not another word which +was intelligible to them all in common. The most usual occasion for +this to happen was when they collected in crowds flushed with wine +after their midday meal. On such occasions, if only some one started +the cry “throw,” such volleys were poured in from every side, and with +such rapidity, that it was impossible for any one to escape who once +ventured to stand forward to address them. The result was that soon +no one had the courage to offer them any counsel at all; and they +accordingly appointed Mathōs and Spendius as their commanders. + +[Sidenote: Gesco and his staff seized and thrown into chains.] + ++70.+ This complete disorganisation and disorder did not escape +the observation of Gesco. But his chief anxiety was to secure the +safety of his country; and seeing clearly that, if these men were +driven to exasperation, the Carthaginians would be in danger of total +destruction, he exerted himself with desperate courage and persistence: +sometimes summoning their officers, sometimes calling a meeting of +the men according to their nationalities and remonstrating with them. +But on one occasion the Libyans, not having received their wages as +soon as they considered that they ought to have been paid to them, +approached Gesco himself with some insolence. With the idea of rebuking +their precipitancy he refused to produce the pay, and bade them “go +and ask their general Mathōs for it.” This so enraged them, that +without a moment’s delay they first made a raid upon the money that +was kept in readiness, and then arrested Gesco and the Carthaginians +with him. Mathōs and Spendius thought that the speediest way to secure +an outbreak of war was for the men to commit some outrage upon the +sanctity of law and in violation of their engagements. They therefore +co-operated with the mass of the men in their reckless outrages; +plundered the baggage of the Carthaginians along with their money; +manacled Gesco and his staff with every mark of insolent violence, +and committed them into custody. Thenceforth they were at open war +with Carthage, having bound themselves together by oaths which were at +once impious and contrary to the principles universally received among +mankind. + +[Sidenote: B.C. 240.] + +This was the origin and beginning of the mercenary, or, as it is +also called, the Libyan war. Mathōs lost no time after this outrage +in sending emissaries to the various cities in Libya, urging them to +assert their freedom, and begging them to come to their aid and join +them in their undertaking. The appeal was successful: nearly all the +cities in Libya readily listened to the proposal that they should +revolt against Carthage, and were soon zealously engaged in sending +them supplies and reinforcements. They therefore divided themselves +into two parties; one of which laid siege to Utica, the other to Hippo +Zarytus, because these two cities refused to participate in the revolt. + +[Sidenote: Despair at Carthage.] + ++71.+ Three things must be noticed in regard to the Carthaginians. +First, among them the means of life of private persons are supplied by +the produce of the land; secondly, all public expenses for war material +and stores are discharged from the tribute paid by the people of Libya; +and thirdly, it is their regular custom to carry on war by means +of mercenary troops. At this moment they not only found themselves +unexpectedly deprived of all these resources at once, but saw each one +of them actually employed against themselves. Such an unlooked-for +event naturally reduced them to a state of great discouragement and +despair. After the long agony of the Sicilian war they were in hopes, +when the peace was ratified, that they might obtain some breathing +space and some period of settled content. The very reverse was now +befalling them. They were confronted by an outbreak of war still more +difficult and formidable. In the former they were disputing with Rome +for the possession of Sicily: but this was a domestic war, and the +issue at stake was the bare existence of themselves and their country. +Besides, the many battles in which they had been engaged at sea had +naturally left them ill supplied with arms, sailors, and vessels. +They had no store of provisions ready, and no expectation whatever +of external assistance from friends or allies. They were indeed now +thoroughly taught the difference between a foreign war, carried on +beyond the seas, and a domestic insurrection and disturbance. + ++72.+ And for these overpowering miseries they had themselves to thank +more than any one else. During the late war they had availed themselves +of what they regarded as a reasonable pretext for exercising their +supremacy over the inhabitants of Libya with excessive harshness. They +had exacted half of all agricultural produce; had doubled the tribute +of the towns; and, in levying these contributions, had refused to show +any grace or indulgence whatever to those who were in embarrassed +circumstances. Their admiration and rewards were reserved, not for +those generals who treated the people with mildness and humanity, but +exclusively for those who like Hanno secured them the most abundant +supplies and war material, though at the cost of the harshest treatment +of the provincials. + +[Sidenote: Revolt of the country people.] + +These people therefore needed no urging to revolt: a single messenger +sufficed. The women, who up to this time had passively looked on +while their husbands and fathers were being led off to prison for the +non-payment of the taxes, now bound themselves by an oath in their +several towns that they would conceal nothing that they possessed; +and, stripping off their ornaments, unreservedly contributed them to +furnish pay for the soldiers. They thus put such large means into the +hands of Mathōs and Spendius, that they not only discharged the arrears +due to the mercenaries, which they had promised them as an inducement +to mutiny, but remained well supplied for future needs. A striking +illustration of the fact that true policy does not regard only the +immediate necessities of the hour, but must ever look still more keenly +to the future. + +[Sidenote: Hanno’s management of the war.] + ++73.+ No such considerations, however, prevented the Carthaginians +in their hour of distress from appointing Hanno general; because he +had the credit of having on a former occasion reduced the city called +Hecatompylos, in Libya, to obedience. They also set about collecting +mercenaries; arming their own citizens who were of military age; +training and drilling the city cavalry; and refitting what were left of +their ships, triremes, penteconters, and the largest of the pinnaces. +Meanwhile Mathōs, being joined by as many as seventy thousand Libyans, +distributed these fresh troops between the two forces which were +besieging Utica and Hippo Zarytus, and carried on those sieges without +let or hindrance. At the same time they kept firm possession of the +encampment at Tunes, and had thus shut out the Carthaginians from +the whole of outer Libya. For Carthage itself stands on a projecting +peninsula in a gulf, nearly surrounded by the sea and in part also by +a lake. The isthmus that connects it with Libya is three miles broad: +upon one side of this isthmus, in the direction of the open sea and at +no great distance, stands the city of Utica, and on the other stands +Tunes, upon the shore of the lake. The mercenaries occupied both +these points, and having thus cut off the Carthaginians from the open +country, proceeded to take measures against Utica itself. They made +frequent excursions up to the town wall, sometimes by day and sometimes +by night, and were continually throwing the citizens into a state of +alarm and absolute panic. + +[Sidenote: Fails to relieve Utica.] + ++74.+ Hanno, however, was busying himself with some success in +providing defences. In this department of a general’s duty he showed +considerable ability; but he was quite a different man at the head of +a sally in force: he was not sagacious in his use of opportunities, +and managed the whole business with neither skill nor promptitude. It +was thus that his first expedition miscarried when he went to relieve +Utica. The number of his elephants, of which he had as many as a +hundred, struck terror into the enemy; yet he made so poor a use of +this advantage that, instead of turning it into a complete victory, +he very nearly brought the besieged, as well as himself, to utter +destruction. He brought from Carthage catapults and darts, and in +fact all the apparatus for a siege; and having encamped outside Utica +undertook an assault upon the enemy’s entrenchment. The elephants +forced their way into the camp, and the enemy, unable to withstand +their weight and the fury of their attack, entirely evacuated the +position. They lost a large number from wounds inflicted by the +elephants’ tusks; while the survivors made their way to a certain hill, +which was a kind of natural fortification thickly covered with trees, +and there halted, relying upon the strength of the position. But Hanno, +accustomed to fight with Numidians and Libyans, who, once turned, never +stay their flight till they are two days removed from the scene of the +action, imagined that he had already put an end to the war and had +gained a complete victory. He therefore troubled himself no more about +his men, or about the camp generally, but went inside the town and +occupied himself with his own personal comfort. But the mercenaries, +who had fled in a body on to the hill, had been trained in the daring +tactics of Barcas, and accustomed from their experience in the Sicilian +warfare to retreat and return again to the attack many times in the +same day. They now saw that the general had left his army and gone into +the town, and that the soldiers, owing to their victory, were behaving +carelessly, and in fact slipping out of the camp in various directions: +they accordingly got themselves into order and made an assault upon +the camp; killed a large number of the men; forced the rest to fly +ignominiously to the protection of the city walls and gates; and +possessed themselves of all the baggage and apparatus belonging to the +besieged, which Hanno had brought outside the town in addition to his +own, and thus put into the hands of the enemy. + +[Sidenote: Hanno’s continued ill success.] + +But this was not the only instance of his incompetence. A few days +afterwards, near a place called Gorza, he came right upon the enemy, +who lay encamped there, and had two opportunities of securing a +victory by pitched battles; and two more by surprising them, as they +changed quarters close to where he was. But in both cases he let the +opportunities slip for want of care and proper calculation. + +[Sidenote: Hamilcar Barcas takes the command.] + ++75.+ The Carthaginians, therefore, when they saw his mismanagement +of the campaign, once more placed Hamilcar Barcas at the head of +affairs; and despatched him to the war as commander-in-chief, with +seventy elephants, the newly-collected mercenaries, and the deserters +from the enemy; and along with them the cavalry and infantry enrolled +from the citizens themselves, amounting in all to ten thousand men. +His appearance from the first produced an immediate impression. The +expedition was unexpected; and he was thus able, by the dismay which +it produced, to lower the courage of the enemy. He succeeded in +raising the siege of Utica, and showed himself worthy of his former +achievements, and of the confidence felt in him by the people. What he +accomplished on this service was this. + +[Sidenote: He gets his men across the Macaras.] + +A chain of hills runs along the isthmus connecting Carthage with the +mainland, which are difficult of access, and are crossed by artificial +passes into the mainland; of these hills Mathōs had occupied all the +available points and posted guards there. Besides these there is a +river called Macaras (Bagradas), which at certain points interrupts +the passage of travellers from the city to the mainland, and though +for the most part impassable, owing to the strength of its stream, +is only crossed by one bridge. This means of egress also Mathōs was +guarding securely, and had built a town on it. The result was that, to +say nothing of the Carthaginians entering the mainland with an army, +it was rendered exceedingly difficult even for private individuals, +who might wish to make their way through, to elude the vigilance of +the enemy. This did not escape the observation and care of Hamilcar; +and while revolving every means and every chance of putting an end to +this difficulty about a passage, he at length hit upon the following. +He observed that where the river discharges itself into the sea its +mouth got silted up in certain positions of the wind, and that then +the passage over the river at its mouth became like that over a marsh. +He accordingly got everything ready in the camp for the expedition, +without telling any one what he was going to do; and then watched +for this state of things to occur. When the right moment arrived, +he started under cover of night; and by daybreak had, without being +observed by any one, got his army across this place, to the surprise +of the citizens of Utica as well as of the enemy. Marching across the +plain, he led his men straight against the enemy who were guarding the +bridge. + +[Sidenote: And defeats Spendius.] + ++76.+ When he understood what had taken place Spendius advanced into +the plain to meet Hamilcar. The force from the city at the bridge +amounted to ten thousand men; that from before Utica to more than +fifteen thousand men; both of which now advanced to support each +other. When they had effected a junction they imagined that they +had the Carthaginians in a trap, and therefore with mutual words of +exhortation passed the order to engage, and at once commenced. Hamilcar +was marching with his elephants in front, his cavalry and light troops +next, while his heavy armed hoplites brought up the rear. But when he +saw the precipitation of the enemy’s attack, he passed the word to +his men to turn to the rear. His instructions were that the troops in +front should, after thus turning to the rear, retire with all speed: +while he again wheeled to the right about what had been originally +his rear divisions, and got them into line successively so as to face +the enemy. The Libyans and mercenaries mistook the object of this +movement, and imagined that the Carthaginians were panic-stricken and +in full retreat. Thereupon they broke from their ranks and, rushing +forward, began a vigorous hand to hand struggle. When, however, they +found that the cavalry had wheeled round again, and were drawn up close +to the hoplites, and that the rest of the army also was being brought +up, surprise filled the Libyans with panic; they immediately turned +and began a retreat as precipitate and disorderly as their advance. +In the blind flight which followed some of them ran foul of their own +rear-guard, who were still advancing, and caused their own destruction +or that of their comrades; but the greater part were trampled to death +by the cavalry and elephants who immediately charged. As many as six +thousand of the Libyans and foreign troops were killed, and about two +thousand taken prisoners. The rest made good their escape, either to +the town on the bridge or to the camp near Utica. After this victory +Hamilcar followed close upon the heels of the enemy, carried the town +on the bridge by assault, the enemy there abandoning it and flying to +Tunes, and then proceeded to scour the rest of the district: some of +the towns submitting, while the greater number he had to reduce by +force. And thus he revived in the breasts of the Carthaginians some +little spirit and courage, or at least rescued them from the state of +absolute despair into which they had fallen. + +[Sidenote: Mathōs harasses Hamilcar’s march.] + ++77.+ Meanwhile Mathōs himself was continuing the siege of Hippo +Zarytus, and he now counselled Autaritus, the leader of the Gauls, +and Spendius to stick close to the skirts of the enemy, avoiding +the plains, because the enemy were strong in cavalry and elephants, +but marching parallel with them on the slopes of the mountains, +and attacking them whenever they saw them in any difficulty. While +suggesting these tactics, he at the same time sent messengers to the +Numidians and Libyans, entreating them to come to their aid, and not to +let slip the opportunity of securing their own freedom. Accordingly, +Spendius took with him a force of six thousand men, selected from each +of the several nationalities at Tunes, and started, keeping along a +line of hills parallel to the Carthaginians. Besides these six thousand +he had two thousand Gauls under Autaritus, who were all that were +left of the original number, the rest having deserted to the Romans +during the period of the occupation of Eryx. Now it happened that, just +when Hamilcar had taken up a position in a certain plain which was +surrounded on all sides by mountains, the reinforcements of Numidians +and Libyans joined Spendius. The Carthaginians, therefore, suddenly +found a Libyan encampment right on their front, another of Numidians +on their rear, and that of Spendius on their flank; and it seemed +impossible to escape from the danger which thus menaced them on every +side. + +[Sidenote: Hamilcar is joined by the Numidian Narávas.] + +[Sidenote: Again defeats Spendius.] + ++78.+ But there was at that time a certain Narávas, a Numidian of +high rank and warlike spirit, who entertained an ancestral feeling of +affection for the Carthaginians, rendered especially warm at that time +by admiration for Hamilcar. He now thought that he had an excellent +opportunity for an interview and association with that general; and +accordingly came to the Carthaginian quarters with a body of a hundred +Numidians, and boldly approaching the out-works, remained there waving +his hand. Wondering what his object could be Hamilcar sent a horseman +to see; to whom Narávas said that he wished for an interview with +the general. The Carthaginian leader still showing hesitation and +incredulity, Narávas committed his horse and javelins to the care of +his guards, and boldly came into the camp unarmed. His fearlessness +made a profound impression not unmixed with surprise. No further +objection, however, was made to his presence, and the desired interview +was accorded; in which he declared his goodwill to the Carthaginians +generally, and his especial desire to be friends with Barcas. “This +was the motive of his presence,” he said; “he was come with the full +intention of taking his place by his side and of faithfully sharing +all his actions and undertakings.” Hamilcar, on hearing these words, +was so immensely charmed by the young man’s courage in coming, and +his honest simplicity in the interview, that he not only consented to +accept his co-operation, but promised also with an oath that he would +give him his daughter in marriage if he kept faith with Carthage to +the end. The agreement having been thus made, Narávas came with his +division of Numidians, numbering two thousand. Thus reinforced Hamilcar +offered the enemy battle; which Spendius, having joined forces with +the Libyans, accepted; and descending into the plain engaged the +Carthaginians. In the severe battle which followed Hamilcar’s army was +victorious: a result which he owed partly to the excellent behaviour +of the elephants, but particularly to the brilliant services rendered +by Narávas. Autaritus and Spendius managed to escape; but of the rest +as many as ten thousand were killed and four thousand taken prisoners. +When the victory was complete, Hamilcar gave permission to those of +the prisoners who chose to enlist in his army, and furnished them with +arms from the spoils of the enemy’s slain: those who did not choose to +accept this offer he summoned to a meeting and harangued them. He told +them that the crimes committed by them up to that moment were pardoned, +and they were permitted to go their several ways, wheresoever they +chose, but on condition that none of them bore arms against Carthage +again: if any one of them were ever caught so doing, he warned them +distinctly that he would meet with no mercy. + +[Sidenote: Mutiny in Sardinia.] + ++79.+ This conspiracy of Mathōs and Spendius caused an outbreak about +this same time in another quarter. For the mercenaries who were +in garrison in Sardinia, inspired by their example, attacked the +Carthaginians in the island; beleaguered Bostarus, the commander of +the foreign contingent, in the citadel; and finally put him and his +compatriots to the sword. The Carthaginians thereupon sent another army +into the island under Hanno. But the men deserted to the mutineers; who +then seized Hanno and crucified him, and exercising all their ingenuity +in the invention of tortures racked to death every Carthaginian in +the island. Having got the towns into their power, they thenceforth +kept forcible possession of the island; until they quarrelled with the +natives and were driven by them into Italy. This was the way in which +Carthage lost Sardinia, an island of first rate importance from its +size, the number of its inhabitants, and its natural products. But as +many have described it at great length, I do not think that I need +repeat statements about which there is no manner of dispute. + +[Sidenote: B.C. 239. Plan of Spendius for doing away with the good +impression made by the leniency of Barcas.] + +To return to Libya. The indulgence shown by Hamilcar to the captives +alarmed Mathōs and Spendius and Autaritus the Gaul. They were afraid +that conciliatory treatment of this sort would induce the Libyans, +and the main body of the mercenaries, to embrace with eagerness the +impunity thus displayed before their eyes. They consulted together, +therefore, how they might by some new act of infamy inflame to +the highest pitch of fury the feelings of their men against the +Carthaginians. They finally determined upon the following plan. They +summoned a meeting of the soldiers; and when it was assembled, they +introduced a bearer of a despatch which they represented to have been +sent by their fellow conspirators in Sardinia. The despatch warned them +to keep a careful watch over Gesco and all his fellow prisoners (whom, +as has been stated, they had treacherously seized in Tunes), as certain +persons in the camp were secretly negotiating with the Carthaginians +for their release. Taking this as his text, Spendius commenced by +urging the men not to put any trust in the indulgence shown by the +Carthaginian general to the prisoners of war, “For,” said he, “it is +with no intention of saving their lives that he adopted this course +in regard to the prisoners; his aim was, by releasing them, to get +us into his power, that punishment might not be confined to some of +us, but might fall on all at once.” He went on to urge them to be on +their guard, lest by letting Gesco’s party go they should teach their +enemies to despise them; and should also do great practical damage to +their own interests, by suffering a man to escape who was an excellent +general, and likely to be a most formidable enemy to themselves. Before +he had finished this speech another courier arrived, pretending to have +been sent by the garrison at Tunes, and bearing a despatch containing +warnings similar to that from Sardinia. + +[Sidenote: Murder of Gesco.] + ++80.+ It was now the turn of Autaritus the Gaul. “Your only hope,” +he said, “of safety is to reject all hopes which rest on the +Carthaginians. So long as any man clings to the idea of indulgence +at their hands, he cannot possibly be a genuine ally of yours. Never +trust, never listen, never attend to anyone, unless he recommend +unrelenting hostility and implacable hatred towards the Carthaginians: +all who speak on the other side regard as traitors and enemies.” After +this preface, he gave it as his advice that they should put to death +with torture both Gesco and those who had been seized with him, as +well as the Carthaginian prisoners of war who had been captured since. +Now this Autaritus was the most effective speaker of any, because he +could make himself understood to a large number of those present at +a meeting. For, owing to his length of service, he knew how to speak +Phoenician; and Phoenician was the language in which the largest number +of men, thanks to the length of the late war, could listen to with +satisfaction. Accordingly his speech was received with acclamation, and +he stood down amidst loud applause. But when many came forward from the +several nationalities at the same time; and, moved by Gesco’s former +kindnesses to themselves, would have deprecated at least the infliction +of torture, not a word of what they said was understood: partly because +many were speaking at the same time, and partly because each spoke in +his own language. But when at length it was disclosed that what they +meant was to dissuade the infliction of torture, upon one of those +present shouting out “Throw!” they promptly stoned to death all who had +come forward to speak; and their relations buried their bodies, which +were crushed into shapeless masses as though by the feet of elephants. +Still they at least were buried. But the followers of Spendius now +seized Gesco and his fellow prisoners, numbering about seven hundred, +led them outside the stockade, and having made them march a short +distance from the camp, first cut off their hands, beginning with +Gesco, the man whom a short while before they had selected out of all +Carthage as their benefactor and had chosen as arbitrator in their +controversy. When they had cut off their hands, they proceeded to lop +off the extremities of the unhappy men, and having thus mutilated them +and broken their legs, they threw them still alive into a trench. + ++81.+ When news of this dreadful affair reached the Carthaginians, they +were powerless indeed to do anything, but they were filled with horror; +and in a transport of agony despatched messengers to Hamilcar and the +second general Hanno, entreating them to rally to their aid and avenge +the unhappy victims; and at the same time they sent heralds to the +authors of this crime to negotiate for the recovery of the dead bodies. +But the latter sternly refused; and warned the messengers to send +neither herald nor ambassador to them again; for the same punishment +which had just befallen Gesco awaited all who came. And for the future +they passed a resolution, which they encouraged each other to observe, +to put every Carthaginian whom they caught to death with torture; and +that whenever they captured one of their auxiliaries they would cut +off his hands and send him back to Carthage. And this resolution they +exactly and persistently carried out. Such horrors justify the remark +that it is not only the bodies of men, and the ulcers and imposthumes +which are bred in them, that grow to a fatal and completely incurable +state of inflammation, but their souls also most of all. For as in +the case of ulcers, sometimes medical treatment on the one hand only +serves to irritate them and make them spread more rapidly, while if, +on the other hand, the medical treatment is stopped, having nothing +to check their natural destructiveness, they gradually destroy the +substance on which they feed; just so at times it happens that similar +plague spots and gangrenes fasten upon men’s souls; and when this is +so, no wild beast can be more wicked or more cruel than a man. To men +in such a frame of mind if you show indulgence or kindness, they regard +it as a cover for trickery and sinister designs, and only become more +suspicious and more inflamed against the authors of it; while if you +retaliate, their passions are aroused to a kind of dreadful rivalry, +and then there is no crime too monstrous or too cruel for them to +commit. The upshot with these men was, that their feelings became so +brutalised that they lost the instincts of humanity: which we must +ascribe in the first place, and to the greatest extent, to uncivilised +habits and a wretchedly bad early training; but many other things +contributed to this result, and among them we must reckon as most +important the acts of violence and rapacity committed by their leaders, +sins which at that time were prevalent among the whole mercenary body, +but especially so with their leaders. + +[Sidenote: Quarrels of Hanno and Hamilcar.] + +[Sidenote: Revolt of Hippo Zarytus and Utica.] + ++82.+ Alarmed by the recklessness displayed by the enemy, Hamilcar +summoned Hanno to join him, being convinced that a consolidation of +the two armies would give him the best chance of putting an end to +the whole war. Such of the enemy as he took in the field he put to +execution on the spot, while those who were made prisoners and brought +to him he threw to the elephants to be trampled to death; for he now +made up his mind that the only possibility of finishing the war was +to entirely destroy the enemy. But just as the Carthaginians were +beginning to entertain brighter hopes in regard to the war, a reverse +as complete as it was unexpected brought their fortunes to the lowest +ebb. For these two generals, when they had joined forces, quarrelled so +bitterly with each other, that they not only omitted to take advantage +of chances against the enemy, but by their mutual animosity gave the +enemy many opportunities against themselves. Finding this to be the +case, the Carthaginian government sent out instructions that one of the +generals was to retire, the other to remain, and that the army itself +was to decide which of them it should be. This was one cause of the +reverse in the fortunes of Carthage at this time. Another, which was +almost contemporaneous, was this. Their chief hope of furnishing the +army with provisions and other necessaries rested upon the supplies +that were being brought from a place to which they give the name of +Emporiae: but as these supplies were on their way, they were overtaken +by a storm at sea and entirely destroyed. This was all the more fatal +because Sardinia was lost to them at the time, as we have seen, +and that island had always been of the greatest service to them in +difficulties of this sort. But the worst blow of all was the revolt of +the cities of Hippo Zarytus and Utica, the only cities in all Libya +that had been faithful to them, not only in the present war, but also +at the time of the invasion of Agathocles, as well as that of the +Romans. To both these latter they had offered a gallant resistance; +and, in short, had never at any time adopted any policy hostile to +Carthage. But now they were not satisfied with simply revolting to +the Libyans, without any reason to allege for their conduct. With all +the bitterness of turncoats, they suddenly paraded an ostentatious +friendship and fidelity to them, and gave practical expression to +implacable rage and hatred towards the Carthaginians. They killed every +man of the force which had come from Carthage to their aid, as well as +its commander, and threw the bodies from the wall. They surrendered +their town to the Libyans, while they even refused the request of the +Carthaginians to be allowed to bury the corpses of their unfortunate +soldiers. Mathōs and Spendius were so elated by these events that +they were emboldened to attempt Carthage itself. But Barcas had now +got Hannibal as his coadjutor, who had been sent by the citizens +to the army in the place of Hanno,—recalled in accordance with the +sentence of the army, which the government had left to their discretion +in reference to the disputes that arose between the two generals. +Accompanied, therefore, by this Hannibal and by Narávas, Hamilcar +scoured the country to intercept the supplies of Mathōs and Spendius, +receiving his most efficient support in this, as in other things, from +the Numidian Narávas. + +[Sidenote: Friendly disposition of Rome.] + +[Sidenote: Hiero of Syracuse.] + ++83.+ Such being the position of their forces in the field, the +Carthaginians, finding themselves hemmed in on every side, were +compelled to have recourse to the help of the free states in alliance +with them.[145] Now Hiero, of Syracuse, had during this war been all +along exceedingly anxious to do everything which the Carthaginians +asked him; and at this point of it was more forward to do so than +ever, from a conviction that it was for his interest, with a view +alike to his own sovereignty and to his friendship with Rome, that +Carthage should not perish, and so leave the superior power to work +its own will without resistance. And his reasoning was entirely sound +and prudent. It is never right to permit such a state of things; nor +to help any one to build up so preponderating a power as to make +resistance to it impossible, however just the cause. Not that the +Romans themselves had failed to observe the obligations of the treaty, +or were showing any failure of friendly dispositions; though at first +a question had arisen between the two powers, from the following +circumstance. At the beginning of the war, certain persons sailing from +Italy with provisions for the mutineers, the Carthaginians captured +them and forced them to land in their own harbour; and presently had +as many as five hundred such persons in their prisons. This caused +considerable annoyance at Rome: but, after sending ambassadors to +Carthage and recovering possession of the men by diplomatic means, the +Romans were so much gratified that, by way of returning the favour, +they restored the prisoners made in the Sicilian war whom they still +retained; and from that time forth responded cheerfully and generously +to all requests made to them. They allowed their merchants to export +to Carthage whatever from time to time was wanted, and prohibited +those who were exporting to the mutineers. When, subsequently, the +mercenaries in Sardinia, having revolted from Carthage, invited their +interference on the island, they did not respond to the invitation; nor +when the people of Utica offered them their submission did they accept +it, but kept strictly to the engagements contained in the treaty. + +[Sidenote: B.C. 238. Hamilcar, with assistance from Sicily, surrounds +Mathōs and Spendius.] + ++84.+ The assistance thus obtained from these allies encouraged the +Carthaginians to maintain their resistance: while Mathōs and Spendius +found themselves quite as much in the position of besieged as in that +of besiegers; for Hamilcar’s force reduced them to such distress +for provisions that they were at last compelled to raise the siege. +However, after a short interval, they managed to muster the most +effective of the mercenaries and Libyans, to the number in all of fifty +thousand, among whom, besides others, was Zarzas the Libyan, with his +division, and commenced once more to watch and follow on the flank of +Hamilcar’s march. Their method was to keep away from the level country, +for fear of the elephants and the cavalry of Narávas; but to seize in +advance of him all points of vantage, whether it were rising ground or +narrow pass. In these operations they showed themselves quite a match +for their opponents in the fury of their assault and the gallantry of +their attempts; but their ignorance of military tactics frequently +placed them at a disadvantage. It was, in fact, a real and practical +illustration of the difference between scientific and unscientific +warfare: between the art of a general and the mechanical movements of +a soldier. Like a good draught-player, by isolating and surrounding +them, he destroyed large numbers in detail without coming to a general +engagement at all; and in movements of more importance he cut off +many without resistance by enticing them into ambushes; while he +threw others into utter dismay by suddenly appearing where they least +expected him, sometimes by day and sometimes by night: and all whom he +took alive he threw to the elephants. Finally, he managed unexpectedly +to beleaguer them on ground highly unfavourable to them and convenient +for his own force; and reduced them to such a pitch of distress that, +neither venturing to risk an engagement nor being able to run away, +because they were entirely surrounded by a trench and stockade, they +were at last compelled by starvation to feed on each other: a fitting +retribution at the hands of Providence for their violation of all laws +human and divine in their conduct to their enemies. To sally forth to +an engagement they did not dare, for certain defeat stared them in the +face, and they knew what vengeance awaited them if they were taken; and +as to making terms, it never occurred to them to mention it, they were +conscious that they had gone too far for that. They still hoped for the +arrival of relief from Tunes, of which their officers assured them, and +accordingly shrank from no suffering however terrible. + +[Sidenote: Spendius and Autaritus fall into the hands of Hamilcar.] + ++85.+ But when they had used up for food the captives in this horrible +manner, and then the bodies of their slaves, and still no one came to +their relief from Tunes, their sufferings became too dreadful to bear; +and the common soldiers broke out into open threats of violence against +their officers. Thereupon Autaritus, Zarzas, and Spendius decided +to put themselves into the hands of the enemy and to hold a parley +with Hamilcar, and try to make terms. They accordingly sent a herald +and obtained permission for the despatch of an embassy. It consisted +of ten ambassadors, who, on their arrival at the Carthaginian camp, +concluded an agreement with Hamilcar on these terms: “The Carthaginians +may select any ten men they choose from the enemy, and allow the rest +to depart with one tunic a-piece.” No sooner had these terms been +agreed to, than Hamilcar said at once that he selected, according +to the terms of the agreement, the ten ambassadors themselves. The +Carthaginians thus got possession of Autaritus, Spendius, and the other +most conspicuous officers. The Libyans saw that their officers were +arrested, and not knowing the terms of the treaty, believed that some +perfidy was being practised against them, and accordingly flew to seize +their arms. Hamilcar thereupon surrounded them with his elephants and +his entire force, and destroyed them to a man. This slaughter, by which +more than forty thousand perished, took place near a place called the +Saw, so named from its shape resembling that tool. + +[Sidenote: Siege of Mathōs in Tunes.] + +[Sidenote: Defeat and death of Hannibal.] + ++86.+ This achievement of Hamilcar revived the hopes of the +Carthaginians who had been in absolute despair: while he, in +conjunction with Narávas and Hannibal, employed himself in traversing +the country and visiting the cities. His victory secured the submission +of the Libyans; and when they had come in, and the greater number of +the towns had been reduced to obedience, he and his colleagues advanced +to attack Tunes, and commenced besieging Mathōs. Hannibal pitched his +camp on the side of the town nearest to Carthage, and Hamilcar on the +opposite side. When this was done they brought the captives taken from +the army of Spendius and crucified them in the sight of the enemy. But +observing that Hannibal was conducting his command with negligence and +over-confidence, Mathōs assaulted the ramparts, killed many of the +Carthaginians, and drove the entire army from the camp. All the baggage +fell into the hands of the enemy, and Hannibal himself was made a +prisoner. They at once took him up to the cross on which Spendius was +hanging, and after the infliction of exquisite tortures, took down the +latter’s body and fastened Hannibal, still living, to his cross; and +then slaughtered thirty Carthaginians of the highest rank round the +corpse of Spendius. It seemed as though Fortune designed a competition +in cruelty, giving either side alternately the opportunity of outdoing +the other in mutual vengeance. Owing to the distance of the two camps +from each other it was late before Barcas discovered the attack made +from the town; nor, when he had discovered it, could he even then go to +the rescue with the necessary speed, because the intervening country +was rugged and difficult. He therefore broke up his camp, and leaving +Tunes marched down the bank of the river Macaras, and pitched his camp +close to its mouth and to the sea. + +[Sidenote: By a final effort the Carthaginians raise a reinforcement +for Hamilcar.] + +[Sidenote: Mathōs beaten and captured.] + ++87.+ This unexpected reverse reduced the Carthaginians once more to +a melancholy state of despair. But though their recent elation of +spirit was followed so closely by this depression, they did not fail +to do what they could for their own preservation. They selected thirty +members of the Senate; with them they associated Hanno, who had some +time ago been recalled; and, arming all that were left of military +age in the city, despatched them to Barcas, with the feeling that +they were now making their supreme effort. They strictly charged the +members of the Senate to use every effort to reconcile the two generals +Hamilcar and Hanno, and to make them forget their old quarrel and act +harmoniously, in view of the imminence of the danger. Accordingly, +after the employment of many various arguments, they induced the +generals to meet; and Hanno and Barcas were compelled to give in +and yield to their representations. The result was that they ever +afterwards co-operated with each other so cordially, that Mathōs found +himself continually worsted in the numerous skirmishes which took place +round the town called Leptis, as well as certain other towns; and at +last became eager to bring the matter to the decision of a general +engagement, a desire in which the Carthaginians also shared in an equal +degree. Both sides therefore having determined upon this course: they +summoned all their allies to join them in confronting the peril, and +collected the garrisons stationed in the various towns, conscious that +they were about to stake their all on the hazard. All being ready on +either side for the conflict, they gave each other battle by mutual +consent, both sides being drawn up in full military array. When victory +declared itself on the side of the Carthaginians, the larger number of +the Libyans perished on the field; and the rest, having escaped to a +certain town, surrendered shortly afterwards; while Mathōs himself was +taken prisoner by his enemies. + +[Sidenote: Reduction of Hippo and Utica, B.C. 238.] + ++88.+ Most places in Libya submitted to Carthage after this battle. +But the towns of Hippo and Utica still held out, feeling that they had +no reasonable grounds for obtaining terms, because their original acts +of hostility left them no place for mercy or pardon. So true is it +that even in such outbreaks, however criminal in themselves, it is of +inestimable advantage to be moderate, and to refrain from wanton acts +which commit their perpetrator beyond all power of forgiveness. Nor did +their attitude of defiance help these cities. Hanno invested one and +Barcas the other, and quickly reduced them to accept whatever terms the +Carthaginians might determine. + +[Sidenote: B.C. 241-238.] + +The war with the Libyans had indeed reduced Carthage to dreadful +danger; but its termination enabled her not only to re-establish her +authority over Libya, but also to inflict condign punishment upon the +authors of the revolt. For the last act in the drama was performed by +the young men conducting a triumphal procession through the town, and +finally inflicting every kind of torture upon Mathōs. For three years +and about four months did the mercenaries maintain a war against the +Carthaginians which far surpassed any that I ever heard of for cruelty +and inhumanity. + +[Sidenote: The Romans interfere in Sardinia.] + +And about the same time the Romans took in hand a naval expedition to +Sardinia upon the request of the mercenaries who had deserted from +that island and come to Italy; and when the Carthaginians expressed +indignation at this, on the ground that the lordship over Sardinia +more properly belonged to them, and were preparing to take measures +against those who caused the revolt of the island, the Romans voted +to declare war against them, on the pretence that they were making +warlike preparations, not against Sardinia, but against themselves. The +Carthaginians, however, having just had an almost miraculous escape +from annihilation in the recent war, were in every respect disabled +from renewing their quarrel with the Romans. They therefore yielded to +the necessities of the hour, and not only abandoned Sardinia, but paid +the Romans twelve hundred talents into the bargain, that they might not +be obliged to undertake the war for the present. + + + + +BOOK II + + +[Sidenote: Recapitulation of the subjects treated in Book I.] + ++1.+ In the previous book I have described how the Romans, having +subdued all Italy, began to aim at foreign dominion; how they crossed +to Sicily, and the reasons of the war which they entered into against +the Carthaginians for the possession of that island. Next I stated at +what period they began the formation of a navy; and what befell both +the one side and the other up to the end of the war; the consequence +of which was that the Carthaginians entirely evacuated Sicily, and the +Romans took possession of the whole island, except such parts as were +still under the rule of Hiero. Following these events I endeavoured to +describe how the mutiny of the mercenaries against Carthage, in what +is called the Libyan War, burst out; the lengths to which the shocking +outrages in it went; its surprises and extraordinary incidents, until +its conclusion, and the final triumph of Carthage. I must now relate +the events which immediately succeeded these, touching summarily upon +each in accordance with my original plan. + +[Sidenote: B.C. 238, Hamilcar and his son Hannibal sent to Spain.] + +[Sidenote: B.C. 238-229.] + +As soon as they had brought the Libyan war to a conclusion the +Carthaginian government collected an army and despatched it under the +command of Hamilcar to Iberia. This general took over the command of +the troops, and with his son Hannibal, then nine years old, crossing +by the Pillars of Hercules, set about recovering the Carthaginian +possessions in Iberia. He spent nine years in Iberia, and after +reducing many Iberian tribes by war or diplomacy to obedience to +Carthage he died in a manner worthy of his great achievements; for he +lost his life in a battle against the most warlike and powerful tribes, +in which he showed a conspicuous and even reckless personal gallantry. +The Carthaginians appointed his son-in-law Hasdrubal to succeed him, +who was at the time in command of the fleet. + +[Sidenote: Illyricum.] + ++2.+ It was at this same period that the Romans for the first time +crossed to Illyricum and that part of Europe with an army. The history +of this expedition must not be treated as immaterial; but must be +carefully studied by those who wish to understand clearly the story I +have undertaken to tell, and to trace the progress and consolidation of +the Roman Empire. + +[Sidenote: B.C. 233-232.] + +[Sidenote: Siege of Medion in Acarnania.] + +Agron, king of the Illyrians, was the son of Pleuratus, and possessed +the most powerful force, both by land and sea, of any of the kings who +had reigned in Illyria before him. By a bribe received from Demetrius +he was induced to promise help to the Medionians, who were at that +time being besieged by the Aetolians, who, being unable to persuade +the Medionians to join their league, had determined to reduce the city +by force. They accordingly levied their full army, pitched their camp +under the walls of the city, and kept up a continuous blockade, using +every means to force their way in, and every kind of siege-machine. But +when the time of the annual election of their Strategus drew near, the +besieged being now in great distress, and seeming likely every day to +surrender, the existing Strategus made an appeal to the Aetolians. He +argued that as he had had during his term of office all the suffering +and the danger, it was but fair that when they got possession of the +town he should have the apportioning of the spoil, and the privilege +of inscribing his name on such arms as should be preserved for +dedication. This was resisted by some, and especially by those who were +candidates for the office, who urged upon the Assembly not to prejudge +this matter, but to leave it open for fortune to determine who was +to be invested with this honour; and, finally, the Aetolians decided +that whoever was general when the city was taken should share the +apportioning of the spoils, and the honour of inscribing the arms, with +his predecessor. + +[Sidenote: The Illyrians relieve Medion.] + ++3.+ The decision was come to on the day before the election of a +new Strategus, and the transference of the command had, according +to the Aetolian custom, to take place. But on that very night a +hundred galleys with five thousand Illyrians on board, sailed up to +land near Medion. Having dropped anchor at daybreak, they effected +a disembarkation with secrecy and despatch; they then formed in the +order customary in their country, and advanced in their several +companies against the Aetolian lines. These last were overwhelmed +with astonishment at the unexpected nature and boldness of the move; +but they had long been inspired with overweening self-confidence, and +having full reliance in their own forces were far from being dismayed. +They drew up the greater part of their hoplites and cavalry in front of +their lines on the level ground, and with a portion of their cavalry +and their light infantry they hastened to occupy some rising ground in +front of their camp, which nature had made easily defensible. A single +charge, however, of the Illyrians, whose numbers and close order gave +them irresistible weight, served to dislodge the light-armed troops, +and forced the cavalry who were on the ground with them to retire +to the hoplites. But the Illyrians, being on the higher ground, and +charging down from it upon the Aetolian troops formed up on the plain, +routed them without difficulty; the Medionians at the same time making +a diversion in their favour by sallying out of the town and charging +the Aetolians. Thus, after killing a great number, and taking a still +greater number prisoners, and becoming masters also of their arms and +baggage, the Illyrians, having carried out the orders of their king, +conveyed their baggage and the rest of the booty to their boats, and +immediately set sail for their own country. + ++4.+ This was a most unexpected relief to the Medionians. They met in +public assembly and deliberated on the whole business, and especially +as to the inscribing the arms reserved for dedication. They decided, +in mockery of the Aetolian decree, that the inscription should contain +the name of the Aetolian commander on the day of battle, and of the +candidates for succession to his office. And indeed Fortune seems, +in what happened to them, to have designed a display of her power to +the rest of mankind. The very thing which these men were in momentary +expectation of undergoing at the hands of their enemies, she put it in +their power to inflict upon those enemies, and all within a very brief +interval. The unexpected disaster of the Aetolians, too, may teach all +the world not to calculate on the future as though it were the actually +existent, and not to reckon securely on what may still turn out quite +otherwise, but to allow a certain margin to the unexpected. And as this +is true everywhere and to every man, so is it especially true in war. + +[Sidenote: Death of Agron, who is succeeded by his wife Teuta, B.C. +231.] + +When his galleys returned, and he heard from his officers the events +of the expedition, King Agron was so beside himself with joy at the +idea of having conquered the Aetolians, whose confidence in their +own prowess had been extreme, that, giving himself over to excessive +drinking and other similar indulgences, he was attacked by a pleurisy +of which in a few days he died. His wife Teuta succeeded him on the +throne; and managed the various details of administration by means of +friends whom she could trust. But her woman’s head had been turned by +the success just related, and she fixed her gaze upon that, and had no +eyes for anything going on outside the country. Her first measure was +to grant letters of marque to privateers, authorising them to plunder +all whom they fell in with; and she next collected a fleet and military +force as large as the former one, and despatched them with general +instructions to the leaders to regard every land as belonging to an +enemy. + +[Sidenote: Teuta’s piratical fleet, B.C. 230.] + +[Sidenote: Takes Phoenice in Epirus.] + ++5.+ Their first attack was to be upon the coast of Elis and Messenia, +which had been from time immemorial the scene of the raids of the +Illyrians. For owing to the length of their seaboard, and to the fact +that their most powerful cities were inland, troops raised to resist +them had a great way to go, and were long in coming to the spot where +the Illyrian pirates landed; who accordingly overran those districts, +and swept them clean without having anything to fear. However, when +this fleet was off Phoenice in Epirus they landed to get supplies. +There they fell in with some Gauls, who to the number of eight hundred +were stationed at Phoenice, being in the pay of the Epirotes; and +contracted with them to betray the town into their hands. Having made +this bargain, they disembarked and took the town and everything in +it at the first blow, the Gauls within the walls acting in collusion +with them. When this news was known, the Epirotes raised a general +levy and came in haste to the rescue. Arriving in the neighbourhood +of Phoenice, they pitched their camp so as to have the river which +flows past Phoenice between them and the enemy, tearing up the planks +of the bridge over it for security. But news being brought them that +Scerdilaidas with five thousand Illyrians was marching overland by +way of the pass near Antigoneia, they detached some of their forces +to guard that town; while the main body gave themselves over to an +unrestrained indulgence in all the luxuries which the country could +supply; and among other signs of demoralisation they neglected the +necessary precaution of posting sentries and night pickets. The +division of their forces, as well as the careless conduct of the +remainder, did not escape the observation of the Illyrians; who, +sallying out at night, and replacing the planks on the bridge, crossed +the river safely, and having secured a strong position, remained there +quietly for the rest of the night. At daybreak both armies drew up +their forces in front of the town and engaged. In this battle the +Epirotes were decidedly worsted: a large number of them fell, still +more were taken prisoners, and the rest fled in the direction of the +country of the Atintanes. + +[Sidenote: The Aetolian and Achaean leagues send a force to the relief +of the Epirotes. A truce is made. The Illyrians depart.] + ++6.+ Having met with this reverse, and having lost all the hopes which +they had cherished, the Epirotes turned to the despatch of ambassadors +to the Aetolians and Achaeans, earnestly begging for their assistance. +Moved by pity for their misfortunes, these nations consented; and +an army of relief sent out by them arrived at Helicranum. Meanwhile +the Illyrians who had occupied Phoenice, having effected a junction +with Scerdilaidas, advanced with him to this place, and, taking up a +position opposite to this army of relief, wished at first to give it +battle. But they were embarrassed by the unfavourable nature of the +ground; and just then a despatch was received from Teuta, ordering +their instant return, because certain Illyrians had revolted to the +Dardani. Accordingly, after merely stopping to plunder Epirus, they +made a truce with the inhabitants, by which they undertook to deliver +up all freemen, and the city of Phoenice, for a fixed ransom. They +then took the slaves they had captured and the rest of their booty to +their galleys, and some of them sailed away; while those who were with +Scerdilaidas retired by land through the pass at Antigoneia, after +inspiring no small or ordinary terror in the minds of the Greeks who +lived along the coast. For seeing the most securely placed and powerful +city of Epirus thus unexpectedly reduced to slavery, they one and all +began henceforth to feel anxious, not merely as in former times for +their property in the open country, but for the safety of their own +persons and cities. + +The Epirotes were thus unexpectedly preserved: but so far from trying +to retaliate on those who had wronged them, or expressing gratitude +to those who had come to their relief, they sent ambassadors in +conjunction with the Acarnanians to Queen Teuta, and made a treaty with +the Illyrians, in virtue of which they engaged henceforth to co-operate +with them and against the Achaean and Aetolian leagues. All which +proceedings showed conclusively the levity of their conduct towards men +who had stood their friends, as well as an originally short-sighted +policy in regard to their own interests. + ++7.+ That men, in the infirmity of human nature, should fall into +misfortunes which defy calculation, is the fault not of the sufferers +but of Fortune, and of those who do the wrong; but that they should +from mere levity, and with their eyes open, thrust themselves upon the +most serious disasters is without dispute the fault of the victims +themselves. Therefore it is that pity and sympathy and assistance await +those whose failure is due to Fortune: reproach and rebuke from all men +of sense those who have only their own folly to thank for it. + +[Sidenote: The career of a body of Gallic mercenaries,] + +[Sidenote: at Agrigentum,] + +[Sidenote: at Eryx.] + +[Sidenote: Disarmed by the Romans.] + +It is the latter that the Epirotes now richly deserved at the hands +of the Greeks. For in the first place, who in his senses, knowing +the common report as to the character of the Gauls, would not have +hesitated to trust to them a city so rich, and offering so many +opportunities for treason? And again, who would not have been on his +guard against the bad character of this particular body of them? +For they had originally been driven from their native country by an +outburst of popular indignation at an act of treachery done by them +to their own kinsfolk and relations. Then having been received by +the Carthaginians, because of the exigencies of the war in which the +latter were engaged, and being drafted into Agrigentum to garrison +it (being at the time more than three thousand strong), they seized +the opportunity of a dispute as to pay, arising between the soldiers +and their generals, to plunder the city; and again being brought by +the Carthaginians into Eryx to perform the same duty, they first +endeavoured to betray the city and those who were shut up in it with +them to the Romans who were besieging it; and when they failed in that +treason, they deserted in a body to the enemy: whose trust they also +betrayed by plundering the temple of Aphrodite in Eryx. Thoroughly +convinced, therefore, of their abominable character, as soon as they +had made peace with Carthage the Romans made it their first business to +disarm them, put them on board ship, and forbid them ever to enter any +part of Italy. These were the men whom the Epirotes made the protectors +of their democracy and the guardians of their laws! To such men as +these they entrusted their most wealthy city! How then can it be denied +that they were the cause of their own misfortunes? + +My object, in commenting on the blind folly of the Epirotes, is to +point out that it is never wise to introduce a foreign garrison, +especially of barbarians, which is too strong to be controlled. + +[Sidenote: Illyrian pirates.] + +[Sidenote: The Romans interfere, B.C. 230.] + +[Sidenote: Queen Teuta’s reception of the Roman legates.] + +[Sidenote: A Roman legate assassinated.] + ++8.+ To return to the Illyrians. From time immemorial they had +oppressed and pillaged vessels sailing from Italy: and now while +their fleet was engaged at Phoenice a considerable number of them, +separating from the main body, committed acts of piracy on a number of +Italian merchants: some they merely plundered, others they murdered, +and a great many they carried off alive into captivity. Now, though +complaints against the Illyrians had reached the Roman government in +times past, they had always been neglected; but now when more and +more persons approached the Senate on this subject, they appointed +two ambassadors, Gaius and Lucius Coruncanius, to go to Illyricum and +investigate the matter. But on the arrival of her galleys from Epirus, +the enormous quantity and beauty of the spoils which they brought +home (for Phoenice was by far the wealthiest city in Epirus at that +time), so fired the imagination of Queen Teuta, that she was doubly +eager to carry on the predatory warfare on the coasts of Greece. At +the moment, however, she was stopped by the rebellion at home; but it +had not taken her long to put down the revolt in Illyria, and she was +engaged in besieging Issa, the last town which held out, when just +at that very time the Roman ambassadors arrived. A time was fixed +for their audience, and they proceeded to discuss the injuries which +their citizens had sustained. Throughout the interview, however, +Teuta listened with an insolent and disdainful air; and when they had +finished their speech, she replied that she would endeavour to take +care that no injury should be inflicted on Roman citizens by Illyrian +officials; but that it was not the custom for the sovereigns of Illyria +to hinder private persons from taking booty at sea. Angered by these +words, the younger of the two ambassadors used a plainness of speech +which, though thoroughly to the point, was rather ill-timed. “The +Romans,” he said, “O Teuta, have a most excellent custom of using the +State for the punishment of private wrongs and the redress of private +grievances: and we will endeavour, God willing, before long to compel +you to improve the relations between the sovereign and the subject +in Illyria.” The queen received this plain speaking with womanish +passion and unreasoning anger. So enraged was she at the speech that, +in despite of the conventions universally observed among mankind, she +despatched some men after the ambassadors, as they were sailing home, +to kill the one who had used this plainness. Upon this being reported +at Rome the people were highly incensed at the queen’s violation of the +law of nations, and at once set about preparations for war, enrolling +legions and collecting a fleet. + +[Sidenote: B.C. 229. Another piratical fleet sent out by Teuta.] + +[Sidenote: Their treacherous attack on Epidamnus, which is repulsed.] + +[Sidenote: Attack on Corcyra.] + +[Sidenote: The Corcyreans appeal to the Aetolian and Achaean leagues.] + ++9.+ When the season for sailing was come Teuta sent out a larger fleet +of galleys than ever against the Greek shores, some of which sailed +straight to Corcyra; while a portion of them put into the harbour of +Epidamnus on the pretext of taking in victual and water, but really to +attack the town. The Epidamnians received them without suspicion and +without taking any precautions. Entering the town therefore clothed +merely in their tunics, as though they were only come to fetch water, +but with swords concealed in the water vessels, they slew the guards +stationed at the gates, and in a brief space were masters of the +gate-tower. Being energetically supported by a reinforcement from the +ships, which came quickly up in accordance with a pre-arrangement, they +got possession of the greater part of the walls without difficulty. But +though the citizens were taken off their guard they made a determined +and desperate resistance, and the Illyrians after maintaining their +ground for some time were eventually driven out of the town. So the +Epidamnians on this occasion went near to lose their city by their +carelessness; but by the courage which they displayed they saved +themselves from actual damage while receiving a useful lesson for the +future. The Illyrians who had engaged in this enterprise made haste to +put to sea, and, rejoining the advanced squadron, put in at Corcyra: +there, to the terror of the inhabitants, they disembarked and set +about besieging the town. Dismayed and despairing of their safety, the +Corcyreans, acting in conjunction with the people of Apollonia and +Epidamnus, sent off envoys to the Achaean and Aetolian leagues, begging +for instant help, and entreating them not to allow of their being +deprived of their homes by the Illyrians. The petition was accepted, +and the Achaean and Aetolian leagues combined to send aid. The ten +decked ships of war belonging to the Achaeans were manned, and having +been fitted out in a few days, set sail for Corcyra in hopes of raising +the siege. + +[Sidenote: Defeat of the Achaean ships.] + +[Sidenote: Corcyra submits.] + ++10.+ But the Illyrians obtained a reinforcement of seven decked ships +from the Acarnanians, in virtue of their treaty with that people, and, +putting to sea, engaged the Achaean fleet off the islands called Paxi. +The Acarnanian and Achaean ships fought without victory declaring for +either, and without receiving any further damage than having some +of their crew wounded. But the Illyrians lashed their galleys four +together, and, caring nothing for any damage that might happen to +them, grappled with the enemy by throwing their galleys athwart their +prows and encouraging them to charge; when the enemies’ prows struck +them, and got entangled by the lashed-together galleys getting hitched +on to their forward gear, the Illyrians leaped upon the decks of the +Achaean ships and captured them by the superior number of their armed +men. In this way they took four triremes, and sunk one quinquereme with +all hands, on board of which Margos of Caryneia was sailing, who had +all his life served the Achaean league with complete integrity. The +vessels engaged with the Acarnanians, seeing the triumphant success of +the Illyrians, and trusting to their own speed, hoisted their sails +to the wind and effected their voyage home without further disaster. +The Illyrians, on the other hand, filled with self-confidence by their +success, continued their siege of the town in high spirits, and without +putting themselves to any unnecessary trouble; while the Corcyreans, +reduced to despair of safety by what had happened, after sustaining +the siege for a short time longer, made terms with the Illyrians, +consenting to receive a garrison, and with it Demetrius of Pharos. +After this had been settled, the Illyrian admirals put to sea again; +and, having arrived at Epidamnus, once more set about besieging that +town. + +[Sidenote: B.C. 229. The Roman Consuls, with fleet and army, start to +punish the Illyrians.] + +[Sidenote: Demetrius of Pharos.] + +[Sidenote: Corcyra becomes a “friend of Rome.”] + +[Sidenote: Aulus Postumius.] + +[Sidenote: The Roman settlement of Illyricum.] + ++11.+ In this same season one of the Consuls, Gnaeus Fulvius, started +from Rome with two hundred ships, and the other Consul, Aulus +Postumius, with the land forces. The plan of Gnaeus was to sail direct +to Corcyra, because he supposed that he should find the result of the +siege still undecided. But when he found that he was too late for +that, he determined nevertheless to sail to the island because he +wished to know the exact facts as to what had happened there, and to +test the sincerity of the overtures that had been made by Demetrius. +For Demetrius, being in disgrace with Teuta, and afraid of what she +might do to him, had been sending messages to Rome, offering to put +the city and everything else of which he was in charge into their +hands. Delighted at the appearance of the Romans, the Corcyreans not +only surrendered the garrison to them, with the consent of Demetrius, +but committed themselves also unconditionally to the Roman protection; +believing that this was their only security in the future against the +piratical incursions of the Illyrians. So the Romans, having admitted +the Corcyreans into the number of the friends of Rome, sailed for +Apollonia, with Demetrius to act as their guide for the rest of the +campaign. At the same time the other Consul, Aulus Postumius, conveyed +his army across from Brundisium, consisting of twenty thousand infantry +and about two thousand horse. This army, as well as the fleet under +Gnaeus Fulvius, being directed upon Apollonia, which at once put itself +under Roman protection, both forces were again put in motion on news +being brought that Epidamnus was being besieged by the enemy. No sooner +did the Illyrians learn the approach of the Romans than they hurriedly +broke up the siege and fled. The Romans, taking the Epidamnians under +their protection, advanced into the interior of Illyricum, subduing the +Ardiaei as they went. They were met on their march by envoys from many +tribes: those of the Partheni offered an unconditional surrender, as +also did those of the Atintanes. Both were accepted: and the Roman army +proceeded towards Issa, which was being besieged by Illyrian troops. On +their arrival, they forced the enemy to raise the siege, and received +the Issaeans also under their protection. Besides, as the fleet coasted +along, they took certain Illyrian cities by storm; among which was +Nutria, where they lost not only a large number of soldiers, but some +of the Military Tribunes also and the Quaestor. But they captured +twenty of the galleys which were conveying the plunder from the country. + +Of the Illyrian troops engaged in blockading Issa, those that belonged +to Pharos were left unharmed, as a favour to Demetrius; while all +the rest scattered and fled to Arbo. Teuta herself, with a very few +attendants, escaped to Rhizon, a small town very strongly fortified, +and situated on the river of the same name. Having accomplished all +this, and having placed the greater part of Illyria under Demetrius, +and invested him with a wide dominion, the Consuls retired to Epidamnus +with their fleet and army. + +[Sidenote: B.C. 228. Teuta submits.] + ++12.+ Then Gnaeus Fulvius sailed back to Rome with the larger part of +the naval and military forces, while Postumius, staying behind and +collecting forty vessels and a legion from the cities in that district, +wintered there to guard the Ardiaei and other tribes that had committed +themselves to the protection of Rome. Just before spring in the next +year, Teuta sent envoys to Rome and concluded a treaty; in virtue +of which she consented to pay a fixed tribute, and to abandon all +Illyricum, with the exception of some few districts: and what affected +Greece more than anything, she agreed not to sail beyond Lissus with +more than two galleys, and those unarmed. When this arrangement had +been concluded, Postumius sent legates to the Aetolian and Achaean +leagues, who on their arrival first explained the reasons for the war +and the Roman invasion; and then stated what had been accomplished in +it, and read the treaty which had been made with the Illyrians. The +envoys then returned to Corcyra after receiving the thanks of both +leagues: for they had freed Greece by this treaty from a very serious +cause for alarm, the fact being that the Illyrians were not the enemies +of this or that people, but the common enemies of all alike. + +Such were the circumstances of the first armed interference of the +Romans in Illyricum and that part of Europe, and their first diplomatic +relations with Greece; and such too were the motives which suggested +them. But having thus begun, the Romans immediately afterwards sent +envoys to Corinth and Athens. And it was then that the Corinthians +first admitted Romans to take part in the Isthmian games. + +[Sidenote: Hasdrubal in Spain. The founding of New Carthage, B.C. 228.] + +[Sidenote: Dread of the Gauls.] + +[Sidenote: Treaty with Hasdrubal.] + ++13.+ We must now return to Hasdrubal in Iberia. He had during this +period been conducting his command with ability and success, and +had not only given in general a great impulse to the Carthaginian +interests there, but in particular had greatly strengthened them by the +fortification of the town, variously called Carthage, and New Town, +the situation of which was exceedingly convenient for operations in +Libya as well as in Iberia. I shall take a more suitable opportunity +of speaking of the site of this town, and pointing out the advantages +offered by it to both countries: I must at present speak of the +impression made by Hasdrubal’s policy at Rome. Seeing him strengthening +the Carthaginian influence in Spain, and rendering it continually more +formidable, the Romans were anxious to interfere in the politics of +that country. They discovered, as they thought, that they had allowed +their suspicions to be lulled to sleep, and had meanwhile given the +Carthaginians the opportunity of consolidating their power. They did +not venture, however, at the moment to impose conditions or make war +on them, because they were in almost daily dread of an attack from +the Celts. They determined therefore to mollify Hasdrubal by gentle +measures, and so to leave themselves free to attack the Celts first +and try conclusions with them: for they were convinced that, with such +enemies on their flank, they would not only be unable to keep their +hold over the rest of Italy, but even to reckon on safety in their own +city. Accordingly, while sending envoys to Hasdrubal, and making a +treaty with him by which the Carthaginians, without saying anything of +the rest of Iberia, engaged not to cross the Iber in arms, they pushed +on the war with the Celts in Italy. + ++14.+ This war itself I shall treat only summarily, to avoid breaking +the thread of my history; but I must go back somewhat in point of time, +and refer to the period at which these tribes originally occupied their +districts in Italy. For the story I think is worth knowing for its own +sake, and must absolutely be kept in mind, if we wish to understand +what tribes and districts they were on which Hannibal relied to assist +him in his bold design of destroying the Roman dominion. I will first +describe the country in which they live, its nature, and its relation +to the rest of Italy; for if we clearly understand its peculiarities, +geographical and natural, we shall be better able to grasp the salient +points in the history of the war. + +[Sidenote: The Geography of Italy.] + +[Sidenote: Col di Tenda.] + +Italy, taken as a whole, is a triangle, of which the eastern side is +bounded by the Ionian Sea and the Adriatic Gulf, its southern and +western sides by the Sicilian and Tyrrhenian seas; these two sides +converge to form the apex of the triangle, which is represented by the +southern promontory of Italy called Cocinthus, and which separates the +Ionian from the Sicilian Sea.[146] The third side, or base of this +triangle, is on the north, and is formed by the chain of the Alps +stretching right across the country, beginning at Marseilles and the +coast of the Sardinian Sea, and with no break in its continuity until +within a short distance of the head of the Adriatic. To the south of +this range, which I said we must regard as the base of the triangle, +are the most northerly plains of Italy, the largest and most fertile +of any with which I am acquainted in all Europe. This is the district +with which we are at present concerned. Taken as a whole, it too forms +a triangle, the apex of which is the point where the Apennines and Alps +converge, above Marseilles, and not far from the coast of the Sardinian +Sea. The northern side of this triangle is formed by the Alps, +extending for 2200 stades; the southern by the Apennines, extending +3600; and the base is the seaboard of the Adriatic, from the town of +Sena to the head of the gulf, a distance of more than 2500 stades. The +total length of the three sides will thus be nearly 10,000 stades. + +[Sidenote: Gallia Cis-Alpina.] + ++15.+ The yield of corn in this district is so abundant that wheat +is often sold at four obols a Sicilian medimnus, barley at two, or a +metretes of wine for an equal measure of barley. The quantity of panic +and millet produced is extraordinary; and the amount of acorns grown +in the oak forests scattered about the country may be gathered from +the fact that, though nowhere are more pigs slaughtered than in Italy, +for sacrifices as well as for family use, and for feeding the army, +by far the most important supply is from these plains. The cheapness +and abundance of all articles of food may also be clearly shown from +the fact that travellers in these parts, when stopping at inns, do not +bargain for particular articles, but simply ask what the charge is per +head for board. And for the most part the innkeepers are content to +supply their guests with every necessary at a charge rarely exceeding +half an as (that is, the fourth part of an obol)[147] a day each. Of +the numbers, stature, and personal beauty of the inhabitants, and still +more of their bravery in war, we shall be able to satisfy ourselves +from the facts of their history. + +[Sidenote: The Alps.] + +[Sidenote: The Apennines.] + +[Sidenote: The Po.] + +[Sidenote: 15th July.] + ++16.+ Such parts of both slopes of the Alps as are not too rocky or +too precipitous are inhabited by different tribes; those on the north +towards the Rhone by the Gauls, called Transalpine; those towards +the Italian plains by the Taurisci and Agones and a number of other +barbarous tribes. The name Transalpine is not tribal, but local, from +the Latin proposition _trans_, “across.” The summits of the Alps, +from their rugged character, and the great depth of eternal snow, are +entirely uninhabited. Both slopes of the Apennines, towards the Tuscan +Sea and towards the plains, are inhabited by the Ligurians, from above +Marseilles and the junction with the Alps to Pisae on the coast, the +first city on the west of Etruria, and inland to Arretium. Next to them +come the Etruscans; and next on both slopes the Umbrians. The distance +between the Apennines and the Adriatic averages about five hundred +stades; and when it leaves the northern plains the chain verges to the +right, and goes entirely through the middle of the rest of Italy, as +far as the Sicilian Sea. The remaining portion of this triangle, namely +the plain along the sea coast, extends as far as the town of Sena. The +Padus, celebrated by the poets under the name of Eridanus, rises in +the Alps near the apex of the triangle, and flows down to the plains +with a southerly course; but after reaching the plains, it turns to the +east, and flowing through them discharges itself by two mouths into +the Adriatic. The larger part of the plain is thus cut off by it, and +lies between this river and the Alps to the head of the Adriatic. In +body of water it is second to no river in Italy, because the mountain +streams, descending from the Alps and Apennines to the plain, one and +all flow into it on both sides; and its stream is at its height and +beauty about the time of the rising of the Dog Star, because it is then +swollen by the melting snows on those mountains. It is navigable for +nearly two thousand stades up stream, the ships entering by the mouth +called Olana; for though it is a single main stream to begin with, it +branches off into two at the place called Trigoboli, of which streams +the northern is called the Padoa, the southern the Olana. At the mouth +of the latter there is a harbour affording as safe anchorage as any +in the Adriatic. The whole river is called by the country folk the +Bodencus. As to the other stories current in Greece about this river,—I +mean Phaethon and his fall, and the tears of the poplars and the black +clothes of the inhabitants along this stream, which they are said to +wear at this day as mourning for Phaethon,—all such tragic incidents +I omit for the present, as not being suitable to the kind of work I +have in hand; but I shall return to them at some other more fitting +opportunity, particularly because Timaeus has shown a strange ignorance +of this district. + +[Sidenote: Their character.] + +[Sidenote: Gauls expel Etruscans from the valley of the Po.] + ++17.+ To continue my description. These plains were anciently inhabited +by Etruscans,[148] at the same period as what are called the Phlegraean +plains round Capua and Nola; which latter, however, have enjoyed the +highest reputation, because they lay in a great many people’s way and +so got known. In speaking then of the history of the Etruscan Empire, +we should not refer to the district occupied by them at the present +time, but to these northern plains, and to what they did when they +inhabited them. Their chief intercourse was with the Celts, because +they occupied the adjoining districts; who, envying the beauty of their +lands, seized some slight pretext to gather a great host and expel +the Etruscans from the valley of the Padus, which they at once took +possession of themselves. First, the country near the source of the +Padus was occupied by the Laevi and Lebecii; after them the Insubres +settled in the country, the largest tribe of all; and next them, +along the bank of the river, the Cenomani. But the district along the +shore of the Adriatic was held by another very ancient tribe called +Venĕti, in customs and dress nearly allied to Celts, but using quite a +different language, about whom the tragic poets have written a great +many wonderful tales. South of the Padus, in the Apennine district, +first beginning from the west, the Ananes, and next them the Boii +settled. Next them, on the coast of the Adriatic, the Lingones; and +south of these, still on the sea-coast, the Senones. These are the most +important tribes that took possession of this part of the country. +They lived in open villages, and without any permanent buildings. As +they made their beds of straw or leaves, and fed on meat, and followed +no pursuits but those of war and agriculture, they lived simple lives +without being acquainted with any science or art whatever. Each man’s +property, moreover, consisted in cattle and gold; as they were the only +things that could be easily carried with them, when they wandered from +place to place, and changed their dwelling as their fancy directed. +They made a great point, however, of friendship: for the man who +had the largest number of clients or companions in his wanderings, +was looked upon as the most formidable and powerful member of the +tribe.[149] + +[Sidenote: Battle of the Allia, 18th July, B.C. 390.] + +[Sidenote: Latin war, B.C. 349-340.] + +[Sidenote: B.C. 360.] + +[Sidenote: B.C. 348.] + +[Sidenote: B.C. 334.] + ++18.+ In the early times of their settlement they did not merely +subdue the territory which they occupied, but rendered also many of +the neighbouring peoples subject to them, whom they overawed by their +audacity. Some time afterwards they conquered the Romans in battle, and +pursuing the flying legions, in three days after the battle occupied +Rome itself with the exception of the Capitol. But a circumstance +intervened which recalled them home, an invasion, that is to say, of +their territory by the Venĕti. Accordingly they made terms with the +Romans, handed back the city, and returned to their own land; and +subsequently were occupied with domestic wars. Some of the tribes, +also, who dwelt on the Alps, comparing their own barren districts with +the rich territory occupied by the others, were continually making +raids upon them, and collecting their forces to attack them. This gave +the Romans time to recover their strength, and to come to terms with +the people of Latium. When, thirty years after the capture of the city, +the Celts came again as far as Alba, the Romans were taken by surprise; +and having had no intelligence of the intended invasion, nor time to +collect the forces of the Socii, did not venture to give them battle. +But when another invasion in great force took place twelve years later, +they did get previous intelligence of it; and, having mustered their +allies, sallied forth to meet them with great spirit, being eager to +engage them and fight a decisive battle. But the Gauls were dismayed +at their approach; and, being besides weakened by internal feuds, +retreated homewards as soon as night fell, with all the appearance of +a regular flight. After this alarm they kept quiet for thirteen years; +at the end of which period, seeing that the power of the Romans was +growing formidable, they made a peace and a definite treaty with them. + +[Sidenote: B.C. 299.] + +[Sidenote: B.C. 297.] + +[Sidenote: B.C. 283.] + +[Sidenote: Sena Gallica.] + ++19.+ They abided by this treaty for thirty years: but at that time, +alarmed by a threatening movement on the part of the Transalpine +tribes, and fearing that a dangerous war was imminent, they diverted +the attack of the invading horde from themselves by presents and +appeals to their ties of kindred, but incited them to attack the +Romans, joining in the expedition themselves. They directed their march +through Etruria, and were joined by the Etruscans; and the combined +armies, after taking a great quantity of booty, got safely back from +the Roman territory. But when they got home, they quarrelled about the +division of the spoil, and in the end destroyed most of it, as well as +the flower of their own force. This is the way of the Gauls when they +have appropriated their neighbours’ property; and it mostly arises from +brutal drunkenness, and intemperate feeding. In the fourth year after +this, the Samnites and Gauls made a league, gave the Romans battle in +the neighbourhood of Camerium, and slew a large number. Incensed at +this defeat, the Romans marched out a few days afterwards, and with +two Consular armies engaged the enemy in the territory of Sentinum; +and, having killed the greater number of them, forced the survivors +to retreat in hot haste each to his own land. Again, after another +interval of ten years, the Gauls besieged Arretium with a great army, +and the Romans went to the assistance of the town, and were beaten in +an engagement under its walls. The Praetor Lucius[150] having fallen in +this battle, Manius Curius was appointed in his place. The ambassadors, +sent by him to the Gauls to treat for the prisoners, were treacherously +murdered by them. At this the Romans, in high wrath, sent an expedition +against them, which was met by the tribe called the Senones. In a +pitched battle the army of the Senones were cut to pieces, and the rest +of the tribe expelled from the country; into which the Romans sent +the first colony which they ever planted in Gaul—namely, the town of +Sena, so called from the tribe of Gauls which formerly occupied it. +This is the town which I mentioned before as lying on the coast at the +extremity of the plains of the Padus. + +[Sidenote: B.C. 282.] + ++20.+ Seeing the expulsion of the Senones, and fearing the same fate +for themselves, the Boii made a general levy, summoned the Etruscans +to join them, and set out to war. They mustered their forces near +the lacus Vadimonis, and there gave the Romans battle; in which the +Etruscans indeed suffered a loss of more than half their men, while +scarcely any of the Boii escaped. But yet in the very next year the +same two nations joined forces once more; and arming even those of them +who had only just reached manhood, gave the Romans battle again; and it +was not until they had been utterly defeated in this engagement that +they humbled themselves so far as to send ambassadors to Rome and make +a treaty.[151] + +These events took place in the third year before Pyrrhus crossed into +Italy, and in the fifth before the destruction of the Gauls at Delphi. +For at this period fortune seems to have plagued the Gauls with a kind +of epidemic of war. But the Romans gained two most important advantages +from these events. First, their constant defeats at the hands of the +Gauls had inured them to the worst that could befall them; and so, when +they had to fight with Pyrrhus, they came to the contest like trained +and experienced gladiators. And in the second place, they had crushed +the insolence of the Gauls just in time to allow them to give an +undivided attention, first to the war with Pyrrhus for the possession +of Italy, and then to the war with Carthage for the supremacy in Sicily. + +[Sidenote: B.C. 236.] + +[Sidenote: B.C. 232.] + ++21.+ After these defeats the Gauls maintained an unbroken peace with +Rome for forty-five years. But when the generation which had witnessed +the actual struggle had passed away, and a younger generation of men +had taken their places, filled with unreflecting hardihood, and who +had neither experienced nor seen any suffering or reverse, they began, +as was natural, to disturb the settlement; and on the one hand to let +trifling causes exasperate them against Rome, and on the other to +invite the Alpine Gauls to join the fray. At first these intrigues were +carried on by their chiefs without the knowledge of the tribesmen; +and accordingly, when an armed host of Transalpine Gauls arrived at +Ariminum, the Boii were suspicious; and forming a conspiracy against +their own leaders, as well as against the new-comers, they put their +own two kings Atis and Galatus to death, and cut each other to pieces +in a pitched battle. Just then the Romans, alarmed at the threatened +invasion, had despatched an army; but learning that the Gauls had +committed this act of self-destruction, it returned home again. In +the fifth year after this alarm, in the Consulship of Marcus Aemilius +Lepidus, the Romans divided among their citizens the territory of +Picenum, from which they had ejected the Senones when they conquered +them: a democratic measure introduced by Gaius Flaminius, and a +policy which we must pronounce to have been the first step in the +demoralisation of the people, as well as the cause of the next Gallic +war. For many of the Gauls, and especially the Boii whose lands were +coterminous with the Roman territory, entered upon that war from +the conviction that the object of Rome in her wars with them was no +longer supremacy and empire over them, but their total expulsion and +destruction. + +[Sidenote: B.C. 231.] + ++22.+ Accordingly the two most extensive tribes, the Insubres and +Boii, joined in the despatch of messengers to the tribes living about +the Alps and on the Rhone, who from a word which means “serving for +hire,” are called Gaesatae. To their kings Concolitanus and Aneroetes +they offered a large sum of gold on the spot; and, for the future, +pointed out to them the greatness of the wealth of Rome, and all the +riches of which they would become possessed, if they took it. In +these attempts to inflame their cupidity and induce them to join the +expedition against Rome they easily succeeded. For they added to the +above arguments pledges of their own alliance; and reminded them of the +campaign of their own ancestors in which they had seized Rome itself, +and had been masters of all it contained, as well as the city itself, +for seven months; and had at last evacuated it of their own free will, +and restored it by an act of free grace, returning unconquered and +scatheless with the booty to their own land. These arguments made the +leaders so eager for the expedition, that there never at any other time +came from that part of Gaul a larger host, or one consisting of more +notable warriors. Meanwhile, the Romans, informed of what was coming, +partly by report and partly by conjecture, were in such a state of +constant alarm and excitement, that they hurriedly enrolled legions, +collected supplies, and sent out their forces to the frontier, as +though the enemy were already in their territory, before the Gauls had +stirred from their own lands. + +It was this movement of the Gauls that, more than anything else, helped +the Carthaginians to consolidate their power in Iberia. For the Romans, +as I have said, looked upon the Celtic question as the more pressing +one of the two, as being so near home; and were forced to wink at what +was going on in Iberia, in their anxiety to settle it satisfactorily +first. Having, therefore, put their relations with the Carthaginians on +a safe footing by the treaty with Hasdrubal, which I spoke of a short +time back,[152] they gave an undivided attention to the Celtic war, +convinced that their interest demanded that a decisive battle should be +fought with them. + +[Sidenote: B. C. 225. Coss. L. Aemilius Papus. C. Atilius Regulus.] + ++23.+ The Gaesatae, then, having collected their forces, crossed the +Alps and descended into the valley of the Padus with a formidable army, + +furnished with a variety of armour, in the eighth year after the +distribution of the lands of Picenum. The Insubres and Boii remained +loyal to the agreement they had made with them: but the Venĕti and +Cenomani being induced by embassies from Rome to take the Roman +side, the Celtic kings were obliged to leave a portion of their +forces behind, to guard against an invasion of their territory by +those tribes. They themselves, with their main army, consisting of +one hundred and fifty thousand foot, and twenty thousand horse and +chariots, struck camp and started on their march, which was to be +through Etruria, in high spirits. As soon as it was known at Rome that +the Celts had crossed the Alps, one of the Consuls, Lucius Aemilius +Papus, was sent with an army to Ariminum to guard against the passage +of the enemy, and one of the Praetors into Etruria: for the other +Consul, Gaius Atilius Regulus, happened to be in Sardinia with his +legions. There was universal terror in Rome, for the danger threatening +them was believed to be great and formidable. And naturally so: for +the old fear of the Gauls had never been eradicated from their minds. +No one thought of anything else: they were incessantly occupied in +mustering the legions, or enrolling new ones, and in ordering up such +of the allies as were ready for service. The proper magistrates were +ordered to give in lists of all citizens of military age; that it might +at once be known to what the total of the available forces amounted. +And such stores of corn, and darts, and other military equipments were +collected as no one could remember on any former occasion. From every +side assistance was eagerly rendered; for the inhabitants of Italy, in +their terror at the Gallic invasion, no longer thought of the matter +as a question of alliance with Rome, or of the war as undertaken to +support Roman supremacy, but each people regarded it as a danger +menacing themselves and their own city and territory. The response to +the Roman appeal therefore was prompt. + +[Sidenote: The Roman resources.] + ++24.+ But in order that we may learn from actual facts how great the +power was which Hannibal subsequently ventured to attack, and what a +mighty empire he faced when he succeeded in inflicting upon the Roman +people the most severe disasters, I must now state the amount of the +forces they could at that time bring into the field. The two Consuls +had marched out with four legions, each consisting of five thousand +two hundred infantry and three hundred cavalry. Besides this there +were with each Consul allies to the number of thirty thousand infantry +and two thousand cavalry. Of Sabines and Etruscans too, there had +come to Rome, for that special occasion, four thousand horse and more +than fifty thousand foot. These were formed into an army and sent +in advance into Etruria, under the command of one of the Praetors. +Moreover, the Umbrians and Sarsinatae, hill tribes of the Apennine +district, were collected to the number of twenty thousand; and with +them were twenty thousand Venĕti and Cenomani. These were stationed +on the frontier of the Gallic territory, that they might divert the +attention of the invaders, by making an incursion into the territory of +the Boii. These were the forces guarding the frontier. In Rome itself, +ready as a reserve in case of the accidents of war, there remained +twenty thousand foot and three thousand horse of citizens, and thirty +thousand foot and two thousand horse of the allies. Lists of men for +service had also been returned, of Latins eighty thousand foot and five +thousand horse; of Samnites seventy thousand foot and seven thousand +horse; of Iapygians and Messapians together fifty thousand foot and +sixteen thousand horse; and of Lucanians thirty thousand foot and three +thousand horse; of Marsi, and Marrucini, and Ferentani, and Vestini, +twenty thousand foot and four thousand horse. And besides these, there +were in reserve in Sicily and Tarentum two legions, each of which +consisted of about four thousand two hundred foot, and two hundred +horse. Of the Romans and Campanians the total of those put on the roll +was two hundred and fifty thousand foot and twenty-three thousand +horse; so that the grand total of the forces actually defending Rome +was over 150,000 foot, 6000 cavalry:[153] and of the men able to bear +arms, Romans and allies, over 700,000 foot and 70,000 horse; while +Hannibal, when he invaded Italy, had less than twenty thousand to put +against this immense force. + +[Sidenote: The Gauls enter Etruria.] + +[Sidenote: The Praetor’s army defeated at Clusium.] + ++25.+ There will be another opportunity of treating the subject +in greater detail; for the present I must return to the Celts. +Having entered Etruria, they began their march through the country, +devastating it as they chose, and without any opposition; and finally +directed their course against Rome itself. But when they were encamped +under the walls of Clusium, which is three days’ march from Rome, news +was brought them that the Roman forces, which were on duty in Etruria, +were following on their rear and were close upon them; upon which they +turned back to meet them, eager to offer them battle. The two armies +came in sight of each other about sunset, and encamped for the night a +short distance apart. But when night fell, the Celts lit their watch +fires; and leaving their cavalry on the ground, with instructions +that, as soon as daylight made them visible to the enemy, they should +follow by the same route, they made a secret retreat along the road to +Faesulae, and took up their position there; that they might be joined +by their own cavalry, and might disconcert the attack of the enemy. +Accordingly, when at daybreak the Romans saw that the cavalry were +alone, they believed that the Celts had fled, and hastened in pursuit +of the retreating horse; but when they approached the spot where the +enemy were stationed, the Celts suddenly left their position and fell +upon them. The struggle was at first maintained with fury on both +sides: but the courage and superior numbers of the Celts eventually +gave them the victory. No less than six thousand Romans fell: while +the rest fled, most of whom made their way to a certain strongly +fortified height, and there remained. The first impulse of the Celts +was to besiege them: but they were worn out by their previous night +march, and all the suffering and fatigue of the day; leaving therefore +a detachment of cavalry to keep guard round the hill, they hastened to +procure rest and refreshment, resolving to besiege the fugitives next +day unless they voluntarily surrendered. + +[Sidenote: On the arrival of Aemilius the Gauls retire.] + ++26.+ But meanwhile Lucius Aemilius, who had been stationed on the +coast of the Adriatic at Ariminum, having been informed that the Gauls +had entered Etruria and were approaching Rome, set off to the rescue; +and after a rapid march appeared on the ground just at the critical +moment. He pitched his camp close to the enemy; and the fugitives on +the hill, seeing his watch fires, and understanding what had happened, +quickly recovered their courage and sent some of their men unarmed +to make their way through the forest and tell the Consul what had +happened. This news left the Consul as he thought no alternative but +to fight. He therefore ordered the Tribunes to lead out the infantry +at daybreak, while he, taking command of the cavalry, led the way +towards the hill. The Gallic chieftains too had seen his watch fires, +and understood that the enemy was come; and at once held council of +war. The advice of King Aneroestes was, “that seeing the amount of +booty they had taken,—an incalculable quantity indeed of captives, +cattle, and other spoil,—they had better not run the risk of another +general engagement, but return home in safety; and having disposed of +this booty, and freed themselves from its incumbrance, return, if they +thought good, to make another determined attack upon Rome.” Having +resolved to follow the advice of Aneroestes in the present juncture, +the chiefs broke up their night council, and before daybreak struck +camp, and marched through Etruria by the road which follows the coast +of the Ligurian bay. While Lucius, having taken off the remnant of the +army from the hill, and combined it with his own forces, determined +that it would not be by any means advantageous to offer the enemy +regular battle; but that it was better to dog their footsteps, watching +for favourable times and places at which to inflict damage upon them, +or wrest some of their booty from their hands. + +[Sidenote: Atilius landing at Pisa intercepts the march of the Gauls.] + ++27.+ Just at that time the Consul Gaius Atilius had crossed from +Sardinia, and having landed at Pisae was on his way to Rome; and +therefore he and the enemy were advancing to meet each other. When the +Celts were at Telamon in Etruria, their advanced guard fell in with +that of Gaius, and the men being made prisoners informed the Consul in +answer to questions of what had taken place; and told him that both +the armies were in the neighbourhood: that of the Celts, namely, and +that of Lucius close upon their rear. Though somewhat disturbed at +the events which he thus learnt, Gaius regarded the situation as a +hopeful one, when he considered that the Celts were on the road between +two hostile armies. He therefore ordered the Tribunes to martial the +legions and to advance at the ordinary pace, and in line as far as the +breadth of the ground permitted; while he himself having surveyed a +piece of rising ground which commanded the road, and under which the +Celts must march, took his cavalry with him and hurried on to seize the +eminence, and so begin the battle in person; convinced that by these +means he would get the principal credit of the action for himself. +At first the Celts not knowing anything about the presence of Gaius +Atilius, but supposing from what was taking place, that the cavalry of +Aemilius had outmarched them in the night, and were seizing the points +of vantage in the van of their route, immediately detached some cavalry +and light armed infantry to dispute the possession of this eminence. +But having shortly afterwards learnt the truth about the presence of +Gaius from a prisoner who was brought in, they hurriedly got their +infantry into position, and drew them up so as to face two opposite +ways, some, that is, to the front and others to the rear. For they knew +that one army was following on their rear; and they expected from the +intelligence which had reached them, and from what they saw actually +occurring, that they would have to meet another on their front. + +[Sidenote: The battle of the horse. Atilius falls.] + ++28.+ Aemilius had heard of the landing of the legions at Pisae, but +had not expected them to be already so far on their road; but the +contest at the eminence proved to him that the two armies were quite +close. He accordingly despatched his horse at once to support the +struggle for the possession of the hill, while he marshalled his foot +in their usual order, and advanced to attack the enemy who barred his +way. The Celts had stationed the Alpine tribe of the Gaesatae to face +their enemies on the rear, and behind them the Insubres; on their front +they had placed the Taurisci, and the Cispadane tribe of the Boii, +facing the legions of Gaius. Their waggons and chariots they placed on +the extremity of either wing, while the booty they massed upon one of +the hills that skirted the road, under the protection of a guard. The +army of the Celts was thus double-faced, and their mode of marshalling +their forces was effective as well as calculated to inspire terror. +The Insubres and Boii were clothed in their breeches and light cloaks; +but the Gaesatae from vanity and bravado threw these garments away, +and fell in in front of the army naked, with nothing but their arms; +believing that, as the ground was in parts encumbered with brambles, +which might possibly catch in their clothes and impede the use of their +weapons, they would be more effective in this state. At first the +only actual fighting was that for the possession of the hill: and the +numbers of the cavalry, from all three armies, that had joined in the +struggle made it a conspicuous sight to all. In the midst of it the +Consul Gaius fell, fighting with reckless bravery in the thick of the +battle, and his head was brought to the king of the Celts. The Roman +cavalry, however, continued the struggle with spirit, and finally won +the position and overpowered their opponents. Then the foot also came +to close quarters. + ++29.+ It was surely a peculiar and surprising battle to witness, and +scarcely less so to hear described. A battle, to begin with, in which +three distinct armies were engaged, must have presented a strange +and unusual appearance, and must have been fought under strange and +unusual conditions. Again, it must have seemed to a spectator open to +question, whether the position of the Gauls were the most dangerous +conceivable, from being between two attacking forces; or the most +favourable, as enabling them to meet both armies at once, while their +own two divisions afforded each other a mutual support: and, above +all, as putting retreat out of the question, or any hope of safety +except in victory. For this is the peculiar advantage of having an +army facing in two opposite directions. The Romans, on the other hand, +while encouraged by having got their enemy between two of their own +armies, were at the same time dismayed by the ornaments and clamour of +the Celtic host. For there were among them such innumerable horns and +trumpets, which were being blown simultaneously in all parts of their +army, and their cries were so loud and piercing, that the noise seemed +not to come merely from trumpets and human voices, but from the whole +country-side at once. Not less terrifying was the appearance and rapid +movement of the naked warriors in the van, which indicated men in the +prime of their strength and beauty: while all the warriors in the front +ranks were richly adorned with gold necklaces and bracelets. These +sights certainly dismayed the Romans; still the hope they gave of a +profitable victory redoubled their eagerness for the battle. + +[Sidenote: The infantry engage.] + ++30.+ When the men who were armed with the _pilum_ advanced in front of +the legions, in accordance with the regular method of Roman warfare, +and hurled their _pila_ in rapid and effective volleys, the inner ranks +of the Celts found their jerkins and leather breeches of great service; +but to the naked men in the front ranks this unexpected mode of attack +caused great distress and discomfiture. For the Gallic shields not +being big enough to cover the man, the larger the naked body the more +certainty was there of the _pilum_ hitting. And at last, not being +able to retaliate, because the pilum-throwers were out of reach, and +their weapons kept pouring in, some of them, in the extremity of their +distress and helplessness, threw themselves with desperate courage +and reckless violence upon the enemy, and thus met a voluntary death; +while others gave ground step by step towards their own friends, whom +they threw into confusion by this manifest acknowledgment of their +panic. Thus the courage of the Gaesatae had broken down before the +preliminary attack of the _pilum_. But when the throwers of it had +rejoined their ranks, and the whole Roman line charged, the Insubres, +Boii, and Taurisci received the attack, and maintained a desperate +hand-to-hand fight. Though almost cut to pieces, they held their ground +with unabated courage, in spite of the fact that man for man, as well +as collectively, they were inferior to the Romans in point of arms. The +shields and swords of the latter were proved to be manifestly superior +for defence and attack, for the Gallic sword can only deliver a cut, +but cannot thrust. And when, besides, the Roman horse charged down +from the high ground on their flank, and attacked them vigorously, the +infantry of the Celts were cut to pieces on the field, while their +horse turned and fled. + +[Sidenote: Aemilius returns home.] + ++31.+ Forty thousand of them were slain, and quite ten thousand taken +prisoners, among whom was one of their kings, Concolitanus: the other +king, Aneroestes, fled with a few followers; joined a few of his people +in escaping to a place of security; and there put an end to his own +life and that of his friends. Lucius Aemilius, the surviving Consul, +collected the spoils of the slain and sent them to Rome, and restored +the property taken by the Gauls to its owners. Then taking command of +the legions, he marched along the frontier of Liguria, and made a raid +upon the territory of the Boii; and having satisfied the desires of the +legions with plunder, returned with his forces to Rome in a few days’ +march. There he adorned the Capitol with the captured standards and +necklaces, which are gold chains worn by the Gauls round their necks; +but the rest of the spoils, and the captives, he converted to the +benefit of his own estate and to the adornment of his triumph. + +[Sidenote: B.C. 224.] + +Thus was the most formidable Celtic invasion repelled, which had been +regarded by all Italians, and especially by the Romans, as a danger of +the utmost gravity. The victory inspired the Romans with a hope that +they might be able to entirely expel the Celts from the valley of the +Padus: and accordingly the Consuls of the next year, Quintus Fulvius +Flaccus and Titus Manlius Torquatus, were both sent out with their +legions, and military preparations on a large scale, against them. By +a rapid attack they terrified the Boii into making submission to Rome; +but the campaign had no other practical effect, because, during the +rest of it, there was a season of excessive rains, and an outbreak of +pestilence in the army. + +[Sidenote: B.C. 223.] + ++32.+ The Consuls of the next year, however, Publius Furius Philus and +Caius Flaminius, once more invaded the Celtic lands, marching through +the territory of the Anamares, who live not far from Placentia.[154] +Having secured the friendship of this tribe, they crossed into the +country of the Insubres, near the confluence of the Adua and Padus. +They suffered some annoyance from the enemy, as they were crossing +the river, and as they were pitching their camp; and after remaining +for a short time, they made terms with the Insubres and left their +country. After a circuitous march of several days, they crossed the +River Clusius, and came into the territory of the Cenomani. As these +people were allies of Rome, they reinforced the army with some of +their men, which then descended once more from the Alpine regions +into the plains belonging to the Insubres, and began laying waste +their land and plundering their houses. The Insubrian chiefs, seeing +that nothing could change the determination of the Romans to destroy +them, determined that they had better try their fortune by a great +and decisive battle. They therefore mustered all their forces, took +down from the temple of Minerva the golden standards, which are called +“the immovables,” and having made other necessary preparations, in +high spirits and formidable array, encamped opposite to their enemies +to the number of fifty thousand. Seeing themselves thus out-numbered, +the Romans at first determined to avail themselves of the forces +of the allied Celtic tribes; but when they reflected on the fickle +character of the Gauls, and that they were about to fight with an +enemy of the same race as these auxiliary troops, they hesitated to +associate such men with themselves, at a crisis of such danger, and +in an action of such importance. However, they finally decided to do +this. They themselves stayed on the side of the river next the enemy: +and sending the Celtic contingent to the other side, they pulled up the +bridges; which at once precluded any fear of danger from them, and left +themselves no hope of safety except in victory; the impassable river +being thus in their rear. These dispositions made, they were ready to +engage. + +[Sidenote: Battle with the Insubres.] + ++33.+ The Romans are thought to have shown uncommon skill in this +battle; the Tribunes instructing the troops how they were to conduct +themselves both collectively and individually. They had learned from +former engagements that Gallic tribes were always most formidable at +the first onslaught, before their courage was at all damped by a check; +and that the swords with which they were furnished, as I have mentioned +before, could only give one downward cut with any effect, but that +after this the edges got so turned and the blade so bent, that unless +they had time to straighten them with their foot against the ground, +they could not deliver a second blow. The Tribunes accordingly gave +out the spears of the Triarii, who are the last of the three ranks, to +the first ranks, or Hastati: and ordering the men to use their swords +only, after their spears were done with, they charged the Celts full +in front. When the Celts had rendered their swords useless by the +first blows delivered on the spears, the Romans closed with them, and +rendered them quite helpless, by preventing them from raising their +hands to strike with their swords, which is their peculiar and only +stroke, because their blade has no point. The Romans, on the contrary, +having excellent points to their swords, used them not to cut but to +thrust: and by thus repeatedly hitting the breasts and faces of the +enemy, they eventually killed the greater number of them. And this +was due to the foresight of the Tribunes: for the Consul Flaminius is +thought to have made a strategic mistake in his arrangements for this +battle. By drawing up his men along the very brink of the river, he +rendered impossible a manœuvre characteristic of Roman tactics, because +he left the lines no room for their deliberate retrograde movements; +for if, in the course of the battle, the men had been forced ever so +little from their ground, they would have been obliged by this blunder +of their leader to throw themselves into the river. However, the valour +of the soldiers secured them a brilliant victory, as I have said, and +they returned to Rome with abundance of booty of every kind, and of +trophies stripped from the enemy. + +[Sidenote: B.C. 222. Attack on the Insubres.] + ++34.+ Next year, upon embassies coming from the Celts, desiring peace +and making unlimited offers of submission, the new Consuls, Marcus +Claudius Marcellus and Gnaeus Cornelius Scipio Calvus, were urgent that +no peace should be granted them. Thus frustrated, they determined to +try a last chance, and once more took active measures to hire thirty +thousand Gaesatae,—the Gallic tribe which lives on the Rhone. Having +obtained these, they held themselves in readiness, and waited for +the attack of their enemies. At the beginning of spring the Consuls +assumed command of their forces, and marched them into the territory +of the Insubres; and there encamped under the walls of the city of +Acerrae, which lies between the Padus and the Alps, and laid siege to +it. The Insubres, being unable to render any assistance, because all +the positions of vantage had been seized by the enemy first, and being +yet very anxious to break up the siege of Acerrae, detached a portion +of their forces to affect a diversion by crossing the Padus and laying +siege to Clastidium. Intelligence of this movement being brought to the +Consuls, Marcus Claudius, taking with him his cavalry and some light +infantry, made a forced march to relieve the besieged inhabitants. When +the Celts heard of his approach, they raised the siege; and, marching +out to meet him, offered him battle. At first they held their ground +against a furious charge of cavalry which the Roman Consul launched at +them; but when they presently found themselves surrounded by the enemy +on their rear and flank, unable to maintain the fight any longer, they +fled before the cavalry; and many of them were driven into the river, +and were swept away by the stream, though the larger number were cut +down by their enemies. Acerrae also, richly stored with corn, fell into +the hands of the Romans: the Gauls having evacuated it, and retired +to Mediolanum, which is the most commanding position in the territory +of the Insubres. Gnaeus followed them closely, and suddenly appeared +at Mediolanum. The Gauls at first did not stir; but upon his starting +on his return march to Acerrae, they sallied out, and having boldly +attacked his rear, killed a good many men, and even drove a part of +it into flight; until Gnaeus recalled some of his vanguard, and urged +them to stand and engage the enemy. The Roman soldiers obeyed orders, +and offered a vigorous resistance to the attacking party. The Celts, +encouraged by their success, held their ground for a certain time with +some gallantry, but before long turned and fled to the neighbouring +mountains. Gnaeus followed them, wasting the country as he went, +and took Mediolanum by assault. At this the chiefs of the Insubres, +despairing of safety, made a complete and absolute submission to Rome. + +[Sidenote: B.C. 480.] + +[Sidenote: B.C. 279.] + ++35.+ Such was the end of the Celtic war: which, for the desperate +determination and boldness of the enemy, for the obstinacy of the +battles fought, and for the number of those who fell and of those +who were engaged, is second to none recorded in history, but which, +regarded as a specimen of scientific strategy, is utterly contemptible. +The Gauls showed no power of planning or carrying out a campaign, and +in everything they did were swayed by impulse rather than by sober +calculation. As I have seen these tribes, after a short struggle, +entirely ejected from the valley of the Padus, with the exception of +some few localities lying close to the Alps, I thought I ought not +to let their original attack upon Italy pass unrecorded, any more +than their subsequent attempts, or their final ejectment: for it is +the function of the historian to record and transmit to posterity +such episodes in the drama of Fortune; that our posterity may not +from ignorance of the past be unreasonably dismayed at the sudden +and unexpected invasions of these barbarians, but may reflect how +short-lived and easily damped the spirit of this race is; and so may +stand to their defence, and try every possible means before yielding an +inch to them. I think, for instance, that those who have recorded for +our information the invasion of Greece by the Persians, and of Delphi +by the Gauls, have contributed materially to the struggles made for +the common freedom of Greece. For a superiority in supplies, arms, or +numbers, would scarcely deter any one from putting the last possible +hope to the test, in a struggle for the integrity and the safety of +his city and its territory, if he had before his eyes the surprising +result of those expeditions; and remembered how many myriads of men, +what daring confidence, and what immense armaments were baffled by the +skill and ability of opponents, who conducted their measures under the +dictates of reason and sober calculation. And as an invasion of Gauls +has been a source of alarm to Greece in our day, as well as in ancient +times, I thought it worth while to give a summary sketch of their +doings from the earliest times. + +[Sidenote: Death of Hasdrubal in Spain, B.C. 221. See chap. 13.] + +[Sidenote: Succession of Hannibal to the command in Spain. His +hostility to Rome.] + ++36.+ Our narrative now returns to Hasdrubal, whom we left in command +of the Carthaginian forces in Iberia. After eight years command in +that country, he was assassinated in his own house at night by a +certain Celt in revenge for some private wrong. Before his death he +had done much to strengthen the Carthaginian power in Iberia, not so +much by military achievements, as by the friendly relations which +he maintained with the native princes. Now that he was dead, the +Carthaginians invested Hannibal with the command in Iberia, in spite +of his youth, because of the ability in the conduct of affairs, and +the daring spirit which he had displayed. He had no sooner assumed the +command, than he nourished a fixed resolve to make war on Rome; nor was +it long before he carried out this resolution. From that time forth +there were constant suspicions and causes of offence arising between +the Carthaginians and Romans. And no wonder: for the Carthaginians +were meditating revenge for their defeats in Sicily; and the Romans +were made distrustful from a knowledge of their designs. These things +made it clear to every one of correct judgment that before long a war +between these two nations was inevitable. + +[Sidenote: Social war, B.C. 220-217.] + ++37.+ At the same period the Achaean league and King Philip, with their +allies, were entering upon the war with the Aetolian league, which is +called the Social war. Now this was the point at which I proposed to +begin my general history; and as I have brought the account of the +affairs of Sicily and Libya, and those which immediately followed, in +a continuous narrative, up to the date of the beginning of the Social +and Second Punic, generally called the Hannibalic, wars, it will be +proper to leave this branch of my subject for a while, and to take up +the history of events in Greece, that I may start upon my full and +detailed narrative, after bringing the prefatory sketch of the history +of the several countries to the same point of time. For since I have +not undertaken, as previous writers have done, to write the history of +particular peoples, such as the Greeks or Persians, but the history +of all known parts of the world at once, because there was something +in the state of our own times which made such a plan peculiarly +feasible,—of which I shall speak more at length hereafter,—it will be +proper, before entering on my main subject, to touch briefly on the +state of the most important of the recognised nations of the world. + +[Sidenote: The progress of the Achaean league.] + +Of Asia and Egypt I need not speak before the time at which my history +commences. The previous history of these countries has been written +by a number of historians already, and is known to all the world; +nor in our days has any change specially remarkable or unprecedented +occurred to them demanding a reference to their past. But in regard to +the Achaean league, and the royal family of Macedonia, it will be in +harmony with my design to go somewhat farther back: for the latter has +become entirely extinct; while the Achaeans, as I have stated before, +have in our time made extraordinary progress in material prosperity and +internal unity. For though many statesmen had tried in past times to +induce the Peloponnesians to join in a league for the common interests +of all, and had always failed, because every one was working to secure +his own power rather than the freedom of the whole; yet in our day +this policy has made such progress, and been carried out with such +completeness, that not only is there in the Peloponnese a community of +interests such as exists between allies or friends, but an absolute +identity of laws, weights, measures, and currency.[155] All the States +have the same magistrates, senate, and judges. Nor is there any +difference between the entire Peloponnese and a single city, except in +the fact that its inhabitants are not included within the same wall; in +other respects, both as a whole and in their individual cities, there +is a nearly absolute assimilation of institutions. + +[Sidenote: The origin of the name as embracing all the Peloponnese.] + ++38.+ It will be useful to ascertain, to begin with, how it came to +pass that the name of the Achaeans became the universal one for all +the inhabitants of the Peloponnese. For the original bearers of this +ancestral name have no superiority over others, either in the size of +their territory and cities, or in wealth, or in the prowess of their +men. For they are a long way off being superior to the Arcadians and +Lacedaemonians in number of inhabitants and extent of territory; nor +can these latter nations be said to yield the first place in warlike +courage to any Greek people whatever. Whence then comes it that these +nations, with the rest of the inhabitants of the Peloponnese, have +been content to adopt the constitution and the name of the Achaeans? +To speak of chance in such a matter would not be to offer any adequate +solution of the question, and would be a mere idle evasion. A cause +must be sought; for without a cause nothing, expected or unexpected, +can be accomplished. The cause then, in my opinion, was this. Nowhere +could be found a more unalloyed and deliberately established system of +equality and absolute freedom, and, in a word, of democracy, than among +the Achaeans. This constitution found many of the Peloponnesians ready +enough to adopt it of their own accord: many were brought to share in +it by persuasion and argument: some, though acting under compulsion +at first, were quickly brought to acquiesce in its benefits; for none +of the original members had any special privilege reserved for them, +but equal rights were given to all comers: the object aimed at was +therefore quickly attained by the two most unfailing expedients of +equality and fraternity. This then must be looked upon as the source +and original cause of Peloponnesian unity and consequent prosperity. + +That this was the original principle on which the Achaeans acted in +forming their constitution might be demonstrated by many proofs; but +for the present purpose it will be sufficient to allege one or two in +confirmation of my assertion. + +[Sidenote: B.C. 371.] + +[Sidenote: B.C. 405-367.] + +[Sidenote: Ζεὺς ὁμάριος or ἀμάριος] + ++39.+ And first: When the burning of the Pythagorean clubs in Magna +Grecia was followed by great constitutional disturbances, as was +natural on the sudden disappearance of the leading men in each state; +and the Greek cities in that part of Italy became the scene of murder, +revolutionary warfare, and every kind of confusion; deputations +were sent from most parts of Greece to endeavour to bring about +some settlement of these disorders.[156] But the disturbed states +preferred the intervention of the Achaeans above all others, and +showed the greatest confidence in them, in regard to the measures +to be adopted for removing the evils that oppressed them. Nor was +this the only occasion on which they displayed this preference. For +shortly afterwards there was a general movement among them to adopt +the model of the Achaean constitution. The first states to move in +the matter were Croton, Sybaris, and Caulonia, who began by erecting +a common temple to Zeus Homorios,[157] and a place in which to hold +their meetings and common councils. They then adopted the laws and +customs of the Achaeans, and determined to conduct their constitution +according to their principles; but finding themselves hampered by the +tyranny of Dionysius of Syracuse, and also by the encroachment of the +neighbouring barbarians, they were forced much against their will +to abandon them. Again, later on, when the Lacedaemonians met with +their unexpected reverse at Leuctra, and the Thebans as unexpectedly +claimed the hegemony in Greece, a feeling of uncertainty prevailed +throughout the country, and especially among the Lacedaemonians and +Thebans themselves, because the former refused to allow that they were +beaten, the latter felt hardly certain that they had conquered. On +this occasion, once more, the Achaeans were the people selected by the +two parties, out of all Greece, to act as arbitrators on the points +in dispute. And this could not have been from any special view of +their power, for at that time they were perhaps the weakest state in +Greece; it was rather from a conviction of their good faith and high +principles, in regard to which there was but one opinion universally +entertained. At that period of their history, however, they possessed +only the elements of success; success itself, and material increase, +were barred by the fact that they had not yet been able to produce a +leader worthy of the occasion. Whenever any man had given indications +of such ability, he was systematically thrust into the background and +hampered, at one time by the Lacedaemonian government, and at another, +still more effectually, by that of Macedonia. + ++40.+ When at length, however, the country did obtain leaders of +sufficient ability, it quickly manifested its intrinsic excellence by +the accomplishment of that most glorious achievement,—the union of the +Peloponnese. The originator of this policy in the first instance was +Aratus of Sicyon; its active promotion and consummation was due to +Philopoemen of Megalopolis; while Lycortas and his party must be looked +upon as the authors of the permanence which it enjoyed. The actual +achievements of these several statesmen I shall narrate in their proper +places: but while deferring a more detailed account of the other two, I +think it will be right to briefly record here, as well as in a future +portion of my work, the political measures of Aratus, because he has +left a record of them himself in an admirably honest and lucid book of +commentaries. + +I think the easiest method for myself, and most intelligible to my +readers, will be to start from the period of the restoration of the +Achaean league and federation, after its disintegration into separate +states by the Macedonian kings: from which time it has enjoyed an +unbroken progress towards the state of completion which now exists, and +of which I have already spoken at some length. + +[Sidenote: 124th Olympiad, B.C. 284-280.] + +[Sidenote: First Achaean league.] + +[Sidenote: B.C. 371.] + +[Sidenote: B.C. 323-284.] + ++41.+ The period I mean is the 124th Olympiad. In this occurred the +first league of Patrae and Dyme, and the deaths of Ptolemy son of +Lagus, Lysimachus, Seleucus, Ptolemy Ceraunus. In the period before +this the state of Achaia was as follows. It was ruled by kings from +the time of Tisamenus, son of Orestes, who, being expelled from +Sparta on the return of the Heraclidae, formed a kingdom in Achaia. +The last of this royal line to maintain his power was Ogyges, +whose sons so alienated the people by their unconstitutional and +tyrannical government, that a revolution took place and a democracy +was established. In the period subsequent to this, up to the time of +the establishment of the supreme authority of Alexander and Philip, +their fortunes were subject to various fluctuations, but they always +endeavoured to maintain intact in their league a democratical form of +government, as I have already stated. This league consisted of twelve +cities, all of them still surviving, with the exception of Olenus, and +Helice which was engulfed by the sea before the battle of Leuctra. +The other ten were Patrae, Dyme, Pharae, Tritaea, Leontium, Aegium, +Aegeira, Pellene, Bura, Caryneia. In the period immediately succeeding +Alexander, and before the above-named 124th Olympiad, these cities, +chiefly through the instrumentality of the Macedonian kings, became so +estranged and ill-disposed to each other, and so divided and opposed +in their interests, that some of them had to submit to the presence +of foreign garrisons, sent first by Demetrius and Cassander, and +afterwards by Antigonus Gonatas, while others even fell under the power +of Tyrants; for no one set up more of such absolute rulers in the Greek +states than this last-named king. + +[Sidenote: B.C. 284-280, Second Achaean league.] + +But about the 124th Olympiad, as I have said, a change of sentiment +prevailed among the Achaean cities, and they began again to form a +league. This was just at the time of Pyrrhus’s invasion of Italy. The +first to take this step were the peoples of Dyme, Patrae, Tritaea, and +Pharae. And as they thus formed the nucleus of the league, we find no +column extant recording the compact between these cities. But about +five years afterwards the people of Aegium expelled their foreign +garrison and joined the league; next, the people of Bura put their +tyrant to death and did the same; simultaneously, the state of Caryneia +was restored to the league. For Iseas, the then tyrant of Caryneia, +when he saw the expulsion of the garrison from Aegium, and the death of +the despot in Bura at the hands of Margos and the Achaeans, and when he +saw that he was himself on the point of being attacked on all sides, +voluntarily laid down his office; and having obtained a guarantee for +his personal safety from the Achaeans, formally gave in the adhesion of +his city to the league. + ++42.+ My object in thus going back in point of time was, first, to show +clearly at what epoch the Achaeans entered into the second league, +which exists at this day, and which were the first members of the +original league to do so; and, secondly, that the continuity of the +policy pursued by the Achaeans might rest, not on my word only, but on +the evidence of the actual facts. It was in virtue of this policy,—by +holding out the bait of equality and freedom, and by invariably making +war upon and crushing those who on their own account, or with the +support of the kings, enslaved any of the states within their borders, +that they finally accomplished the design which they had deliberately +adopted, in some cases by their own unaided efforts, and in others +by the help of their allies. For in fact whatever was effected in +this direction, by the help of these allies in after times, must be +put down to the credit of the deliberately adopted policy of the +Achaeans themselves. They acted indeed jointly with others in many +honourable undertakings, and in none more so than with the Romans: +yet in no instance can they be said to have aimed at obtaining from +their success any advantage for a particular state. In return for the +zealous assistance rendered by them to their allies, they bargained for +nothing but the freedom of each state and the union of the Peloponnese. +But this will be more clearly seen from the record of their actual +proceedings. + +[Sidenote: Victory of Lutatius off the insulae Aegates, B.C. 241.] + +[Sidenote: B.C. 243-242.] + +[Sidenote: B.C. 255-254. Margos.] + +[Sidenote: B.C. 251-250. Aratus.] + ++43.+ For the first twenty-five years of the league between the cities +I have mentioned, a secretary and two strategi for the whole union were +elected by each city in turn. But after this period they determined +to appoint one strategus only,[158] and put the entire management of +the affairs of the union in his hands. The first to obtain this honour +was Margos of Caryneia. In the fourth year after this man’s tenure +of the office, Aratus of Sicyon caused his city to join the league, +which, by his energy and courage, he had, when only twenty years of +age, delivered from the yoke of its tyrant. In the eighth year again +after this, Aratus, being elected strategus for the second time, laid +a plot to seize the Acrocorinthus, then held by Antigonus; and by his +success freed the inhabitants of the Peloponnese from a source of +serious alarm: and having thus liberated Corinth he caused it to join +the league. In his same term of office he got Megara into his hands, +and caused it to join also. These events occurred in the year before +the decisive defeat of the Carthaginians, in consequence of which they +evacuated Sicily and consented for the first time to pay tribute to +Rome. + +[Sidenote: Antigonus Gonatas, B.C. 283-239.] + +Having made this remarkable progress in his design in so short a time, +Aratus continued thenceforth in the position of leader of the Achaean +league, and in the consistent direction of his whole policy to one +single end; which was to expel Macedonians from the Peloponnese, to +depose the despots, and to establish in each state the common freedom +which their ancestors had enjoyed before them. So long, therefore, +as Antigonus Gonatas was alive, he maintained a continual opposition +to his interference, as well as to the encroaching spirit of the +Aetolians, and in both cases with signal skill and success; although +their presumption and contempt for justice had risen to such a pitch, +that they had actually made a formal compact with each other for the +disruption of the Achaeans. + +[Sidenote: Demetrius, B.C. 239-229.] + ++44.+ After the death of Antigonus, however, the Achaeans made terms +with the Aetolians, and joined them energetically in the war against +Demetrius; and, in place of the feelings of estrangement and hostility, +there gradually grew up a sentiment of brotherhood and affection +between the two peoples. Upon the death of Demetrius, after a reign of +only ten years, just about the time of the first invasion of Illyricum +by the Romans, the Achaeans had a most excellent opportunity of +establishing the policy which they had all along maintained. For the +despots in the Peloponnese were in despair at the death of Demetrius. +It was the loss to them of their chief supporter and paymaster. And now +Aratus was for ever impressing upon them that they ought to abdicate, +holding out rewards and honours for those of them who consented, +and threatening those who refused with still greater vengeance from +the Achaeans. There was therefore a general movement among them to +voluntarily restore their several states to freedom and to join the +league. I ought however to say that Ludiades of Megalopolis, in the +lifetime of Demetrius, of his own deliberate choice, and foreseeing +with great shrewdness and good sense what was going to happen, had +abdicated his sovereignty and become a citizen of the national league. +His example was followed by Aristomachus, tyrant of Argos, Xeno of +Hermione, and Cleonymus of Phlius, who all likewise abdicated and +joined the democratic league. + +[Sidenote: The Aetolians and Antigonus Doson, B.C. 229-220.] + ++45.+ But the increased power and national advancement which these +events brought to the Achaeans excited the envy of the Aetolians; who, +besides their natural inclination to unjust and selfish aggrandisement, +were inspired with the hope of breaking up the union of Achaean states, +as they had before succeeded in partitioning those of Acarnania with +Alexander,[159] and had planned to do those of Achaia with Antigonus +Gonatas. Instigated once more by similar expectations, they had now +the assurance to enter into communication and close alliance at once +with Antigonus (at that time ruling Macedonia as guardian of the +young King Philip), and with Cleomenes, King of Sparta. They saw that +Antigonus had undisputed possession of the throne of Macedonia, while +he was an open and avowed enemy of the Achaeans owing to the surprise +of the Acrocorinthus; and they supposed that if they could get the +Lacedaemonians to join them in their hostility to the league, they +would easily subdue it, by selecting a favourable opportunity for +their attack, and securing that it should be assaulted on all sides at +once. And they would in all probability have succeeded, but that they +had left out the most important element in the calculation, namely, +that in Aratus they had to reckon with an opponent to their plans of +ability equal to almost any emergency. Accordingly, when they attempted +this violent and unjust interference in Achaia, so far from succeeding +in any of their devices, they, on the contrary, strengthened Aratus, +the then president of the league, as well as the league itself. So +consummate was the ability with which he foiled their plan and reduced +them to impotence. The manner in which this was done will be made clear +in what I am about to relate. + +[Sidenote: The Aetolians intrigue with Cleomenes, King of Sparta, B.C. +229-227.] + ++46.+ There could be no doubt of the policy of the Aetolians. They +were ashamed indeed to attack the Achaeans openly, because they could +not ignore their recent obligations to them in the war with Demetrius: +but they were plotting with the Lacedaemonians; and showed their +jealousy of the Achaeans by not only conniving at the treacherous +attack of Cleomenes upon Tegea, Mantinea, and Orchomenus (cities not +only in alliance with them, but actually members of their league), but +by confirming his occupation of those places. In old times they had +thought almost any excuse good enough to justify an appeal to arms +against those who, after all, had done them no wrong: yet they now +allowed themselves to be treated with such treachery, and submitted +without remonstrance to the loss of the most important towns, solely +with the view of creating in Cleomenes a formidable antagonist to +the Achaeans. These facts were not lost upon Aratus and the other +officers of the league: and they resolved that, without taking the +initiative in going to war with any one, they would resist the attempts +of the Lacedaemonians. Such was their determination, and for a time +they persisted in it: but immediately afterwards Cleomenes began to +build the hostile fort in the territory of Megalopolis, called the +Athenaeum,[160] and showed an undisguised and bitter hostility. Aratus +and his colleagues accordingly summoned a meeting of the league, and it +was decided to proclaim war openly against Sparta. + +[Sidenote: Cleomenes, B.C. 227-221.] + +[Sidenote: Aratus applies to Antigonus Doson.] + ++47.+ This was the origin of what is called the Cleomenic war. At +first the Achaeans were for depending on their own resources for +facing the Lacedaemonians. They looked upon it as more honourable not +to look to others for preservation, but to guard their own territory +and cities themselves; and at the same time the remembrances of his +former services made them desirous of keeping up their friendship with +Ptolemy,[161] and averse from the appearance of seeking aid elsewhere. +But when the war had lasted some time; and Cleomenes had revolutionised +the constitution of his country, and had turned its constitutional +monarchy into a despotism; and, moreover, was conducting the war with +extraordinary skill and boldness: seeing clearly what would happen, and +fearing the reckless audacity of the Aetolians, Aratus determined that +his first duty was to be well beforehand in frustrating their plans. He +satisfied himself that Antigonus was a man of activity and practical +ability, with some pretensions to the character of a man of honour; +he however knew perfectly well that kings look on no man as a friend +or foe from personal considerations, but ever measure friendships and +enmities solely by the standard of expediency. He, therefore, conceived +the idea of addressing himself to this monarch, and entering into +friendly relations with him, taking occasion to point out to him the +certain result of his present policy. But to act openly in this matter +he thought inexpedient for several reasons. By doing so he would not +only incur the opposition of Cleomenes and the Aetolians, but would +cause consternation among the Achaeans themselves, because his appeal +to their enemies would give the impression that he had abandoned all +the hopes he once had in them. This was the very last idea he desired +should go abroad; and he therefore determined to conduct this intrigue +in secrecy. + +The result of this was that he was often compelled to speak and act +towards the public in a sense contrary to his true sentiments, that he +might conceal his real design by suggesting one of an exactly opposite +nature. For which reason there are some particulars which he did not +even commit to his own commentaries. + +[Sidenote: Philip II. in the Peloponnese, B.C. 338.] + ++48.+ It did not escape the observation of Aratus that the people of +Megalopolis would be more ready than others to seek the protection of +Antigonus, and the hopes of safety offered by Macedonia; for their +neighbourhood to Sparta exposed them to attack before the other +states; while they were unable to get the help which they ought to +have, because the Achaeans were themselves hard pressed and in great +difficulties. Besides they had special reasons for entertaining +feelings of affection towards the royal family of Macedonia, founded +on the favours received in the time of Philip, son of Amyntas. He +therefore imparted his general design under pledge of secrecy to +Nicophanes and Cercidas of Megalopolis, who were family friends of +his own and of a character suited to the undertaking; and by their +means experienced no difficulty in inducing the people of Megalopolis +to send envoys to the league, to advise that an application for help +should be made to Antigonus. Nicophanes and Cercidas were themselves +selected to go on this mission to the league, and thence, if their view +was accepted, to Antigonus. The league consented to allow the people +of Megalopolis to send the mission; and accordingly Nicophanes lost no +time in obtaining an interview with the king. About the interests of +his own country he spoke briefly and summarily, confining himself to +the most necessary statements; the greater part of his speech was, in +accordance with the directions of Aratus, concerned with the national +question. + +[Sidenote: The message to Antigonus Doson.] + ++49.+ The points suggested by Aratus for the envoy to dwell on were +“the scope and object of the understanding between the Aetolians and +Cleomenes, and the necessity of caution on the part primarily of the +Achaeans, but still more even on that of Antigonus himself: first, +because the Achaeans plainly could not resist the attack of both; and, +secondly, because if the Aetolians and Cleomenes conquered them, any +man of sense could easily see that they would not be satisfied or stop +there. For the encroaching spirit of the Aetolians, far from being +content to be confined by the boundaries of the Peloponnese, would +find even those of Greece too narrow for them. Again, the ambition of +Cleomenes was at present directed to the supremacy in the Peloponnese: +but this obtained, he would promptly aim at that of all Greece, in +which it would be impossible for him to succeed without first crushing +the government of Macedonia. They were, therefore, to urge him to +consider, with a view to the future, which of the two courses would +be the more to his own interests,—to fight for supremacy in Greece in +conjunction with the Achaeans and Boeotians against Cleomenes in the +Peloponnese; or to abandon the most powerful race, and to stake the +Macedonian empire on a battle in Thessaly, against a combined force +of Aetolians and Boeotians, with the Achaeans and Lacedaemonians to +boot. If the Aetolians, from regard to the goodwill shown them by +the Achaeans in the time of Demetrius, were to pretend to be anxious +to keep the peace as they were at present doing, they were to assert +that the Achaeans were ready to engage Cleomenes by themselves; and if +fortune declared in their favour they would want no assistance from +any one: but if fortune went against them, and the Aetolians joined +in the attack, they begged him to watch the course of events, that he +might not let things go too far, but might aid the Peloponnesians while +they were still capable of being saved. He had no need to be anxious +about the good faith or gratitude of the Achaeans: when the time for +action came, Aratus pledged himself to find guarantees which would be +satisfactory to both parties; and similarly would himself indicate the +moment at which the aid should be given.” + +[Sidenote: Aratus wishes to do without the king if possible.] + ++50.+ These arguments seemed to Antigonus to have been put by Aratus +with equal sincerity and ability: and after listening to them, he +eagerly took the first necessary step by writing a letter to the people +of Megalopolis with an offer of assistance, on condition that such a +measure should receive the consent of the Achaeans. When Nicophanes +and Cercidas returned home and delivered this despatch from the king, +reporting at the same time his other expressions of goodwill and zeal +in the cause, the spirits of the people of Megalopolis were greatly +elated; and they were all eagerness to attend the meeting of the +league, and urge that measures should be taken to secure the alliance +of Antigonus, and to put the management of the war in his hands with +all despatch. Aratus learnt privately from Nicophanes the king’s +feelings towards the league and towards himself; and was delighted +that his plan had not failed, and that he had not found the king +completely alienated from himself, as the Aetolians hoped he would +be. He regarded it also as eminently favourable to his policy, that +the people of Megalopolis were so eager to use the Achaean league as +the channel of communication with Antigonus. For his first object was +if possible to do without this assistance; but if he were compelled +to have recourse to it, he wished that the invitation should not be +sent through himself personally, but that it should rather come from +the Achaeans as a nation. For he feared that, if the king came, and +conquered Cleomenes and the Lacedaemonians in the war, and should then +adopt any policy hostile to the interests of the national constitution, +he would have himself by general consent to bear the blame of the +result: while Antigonus would be justified, by the injury which had +been inflicted on the royal house of Macedonia in the matter of the +Acrocorinthus. Accordingly when Megalopolitan envoys appeared in the +national council, and showed the royal despatch, and further declared +the general friendly disposition of the king, and added an appeal to +the congress to secure the king’s alliance without delay; and when also +the sense of the meeting was clearly shown to be in favour of taking +this course, Aratus rose, and, after setting forth the king’s zeal, and +complimenting the meeting upon their readiness to act in the matter, +he proceeded to urge upon them in a long speech that “They should +try if possible to preserve their cities and territory by their own +efforts, for that nothing could be more honourable or more expedient +than that: but that, if it turned out that fortune declared against +them in this effort, they might then have recourse to the assistance of +their friends; but not until they had tried all their own resources to +the uttermost.” This speech was received with general applause: and it +was decided to take no fresh departure at present, and to endeavour to +bring the existing war to a conclusion unaided. + +[Sidenote: Euergetes jealous of the Macedonian policy of Aratus, helps +Cleomenes.] + ++51.+ But when Ptolemy, despairing of retaining the league’s +friendship, began to furnish Cleomenes with supplies,—which he did +with a view of setting him up as a foil to Antigonus, thinking the +Lacedaemonians offered him better hopes than the Achaeans of being able +to thwart the policy of the Macedonian kings; and when the Achaeans +themselves had suffered three defeats,—one at Lycaeum in an engagement +with Cleomenes whom they had met on a march; and again in a pitched +battle at Ladocaea in the territory of Megalopolis, in which Lydiades +fell; and a third time decisively at a place called Hecatomboeum in +the territory of Dyme where their whole forces had been engaged,—after +these misfortunes, no further delay was possible, and they were +compelled by the force of circumstances to appeal unanimously to +Antigonus. Thereupon Aratus sent his son to Antigonus, and ratified +the terms of the subvention. The great difficulty was this: it was +believed to be certain that the king would send no assistance, except +on the condition of the restoration of the Acrocorinthus, and of having +the city of Corinth put into his hands as a base of operations in this +war; and on the other hand it seemed impossible that the Achaeans +should venture to put the Corinthians in the king’s power against their +own consent. The final determination of the matter was accordingly +postponed, that they might investigate the question of the securities +to be given to the king. + +[Sidenote: The Achaeans offer to surrender the Acrocorinthus to +Antigonus.] + ++52.+ Meanwhile, on the strength of the dismay caused by his successes, +Cleomenes was making an unopposed progress through the cities, +winning some by persuasion and others by threats. In this way, he +got possession of Caphyae, Pellene, Pheneus, Argos, Phlius, Cleonae, +Epidaurus, Hermione, Troezen, and last of all Corinth, while he +personally commanded a siege of Sicyon. But this in reality relieved +the Achaeans from a very grave difficulty. For the Corinthians by +ordering Aratus, as Strategus of the league, and the Achaeans to +evacuate the town, and by sending messages to Cleomenes inviting his +presence, gave the Achaeans a ground of action and a reasonable pretext +for moving. Aratus was quick to take advantage of this; and, as the +Achaeans were in actual possession of the Acrocorinthus, he made his +peace with the royal family of Macedonia by offering it to Antigonus; +and at the same time gave thus a sufficient guarantee for friendship in +the future, and further secured Antigonus a base of operations for the +war with Sparta. + +[Sidenote: Cleomenes prepares to resist.] + +[Sidenote: Antigonus comes to the Isthmus, B.C. 224.] + +Upon learning of this compact between the league and Antigonus, +Cleomenes raised the siege of Sicyon and pitched his camp near the +Isthmus; and, having thrown up a line of fortification uniting the +Acrocorinthus with the mountain called the “Ass’s Back,” began from +this time to expect with confidence the empire of the Peloponnese. But +Antigonus had made his preparations long in advance, in accordance with +the suggestion of Aratus, and was only waiting for the right moment to +act. And now the news which he received convinced him that the entrance +of Cleomenes into Thessaly, at the head of an army, was only a question +of a very few days: he accordingly despatched envoys to Aratus and the +league to conclude the terms of the treaty[162] and marched to the +Isthmus with his army by way of Euboea. He took this route because +the Aetolians, after trying other expedients for preventing Antigonus +bringing this aid, now forbade his marching south of Thermopylae with +an army, threatening that, if he did, they would offer armed opposition +to his passage. + ++53.+ Thus Antigonus and Cleomenes were encamped face to face: the +former desirous of effecting an entrance into the Peloponnese, +Cleomenes determined to prevent him. + +[Sidenote: The Achaeans seize Argos.] + +Meanwhile the Achaeans, in spite of their severe disasters, did +not abandon their purpose or give up all hopes of retrieving their +fortunes. They gave Aristotle of Argos assistance when he headed +a rising against the Cleomenic faction; and, under the command of +Timoxenus the Strategus, surprised and seized Argos. And this must be +regarded as the chief cause of the improvement which took place in +their fortunes; for this reverse checked the ardour of Cleomenes and +damped the courage of his soldiers in advance, as was clearly shown by +what took place afterwards. For though Cleomenes had already possession +of more advantageous posts, and was in the enjoyment of more abundant +supplies than Antigonus, and was at the same time inspired with +superior courage and ambition: yet, as soon as he was informed that +Argos was in the hands of the Achaeans, he at once drew back, abandoned +all these advantages, and retreated from the Isthmus with every +appearance of precipitation, in terror of being completely surrounded +by his enemies. At first he retired upon Argos, and for a time made +some attempt to regain the town. But the Achaeans offered a gallant +resistance; and the Argives themselves were stirred up to do the same +by remorse for having admitted him before: and so, having failed in +this attempt also, he marched back to Sparta by way of Mantinea. + +[Sidenote: Antigonus receives the Acrocorinthus.] + ++54.+ On his part, Antigonus advanced without any casualty into the +Peloponnese, and took over the Acrocorinthus; and, without wasting +time there, pushed on in his enterprise and entered Argos. He only +stayed there long enough to compliment the Argives on their conduct, +and to provide for the security of the city; and then immediately +starting again directed his march towards Arcadia; and after ejecting +the garrisons from the posts which had been fortified by Cleomenes in +the territories of Aegys and Belmina, and, putting those strongholds +in the hands of the people of Megalopolis, he went to Aegium to attend +the meeting of the Achaean league. There he made a statement of his own +proceedings, and consulted with the meeting as to the measures to be +taken in the future. He was appointed commander-in-chief of the allied +army, and went into winter quarters at Sicyon and Corinth. + +[Sidenote: B.C. 223. Recovery of Tegea.] + +[Sidenote: Skirmish with Cleomenes.] + +[Sidenote: Capture of Orchomenus] + +[Sidenote: and Mantinea] + +[Sidenote: and Heraea and Telphusa.] + +At the approach of spring he broke up his camp and got on the march. +On the third day he arrived at Tegea, and being joined there by the +Achaean forces, he proceeded to regularly invest the city. But the +vigour displayed by the Macedonians in conducting the siege, and +especially in the digging of mines, soon reduced the Tegeans to +despair, and they accordingly surrendered. After taking the proper +measures for securing the town, Antigonus proceeded to extend his +expedition. He now marched with all speed into Laconia; and having +found Cleomenes in position on the frontier, he was trying to bring him +to an engagement, and was harassing him with skirmishing attacks, when +news was brought to him by his scouts that the garrison of Orchomenus +had started to join Cleomenes. He at once broke up his camp, hurried +thither, and carried the town by assault. Having done that, he next +invested Mantinea and began to besiege it. This town also being soon +terrified into surrender by the Macedonians, he started again along the +road to Heraea and Telphusa. These towns, too, being secured by the +voluntary surrender of their inhabitants, as the winter was by this +time approaching, he went again to Aegium to attend the meeting of the +league. His Macedonian soldiers he sent away to winter at home, while +he himself remained to confer with the Achaeans on the existing state +of affairs. + ++55.+ But Cleomenes was on the alert. He saw that the Macedonians in +the army of Antigonus had been sent home; and that the king and his +mercenaries in Aegium were three days’ march from Megalopolis; and +this latter town he well knew to be difficult to guard, owing to its +great extent, and the sparseness of its inhabitants; and, moreover, +that it was just then being kept with even greater carelessness than +usual, owing to Antigonus being in the country; and what was more +important than anything else, he knew that the larger number of its +men of military age had fallen at the battles of Lycaeum and Ladoceia. +There happened to be residing in Megalopolis some Messenian exiles; by +whose help he managed, under cover of night, to get within the walls +without being detected. When day broke he had a narrow escape from +being ejected, if not from absolute destruction, through the valour +of the citizens. This had been his fortune three months before, when +he had made his way into the city by the region which is called the +Cōlaeum: but on this occasion, by the superiority of his force, and the +seizure in advance of the strongest positions in the town, he succeeded +in effecting his purpose. He eventually ejected the inhabitants, +and took entire possession of the city; which, once in his power, +he dismantled in so savage and ruthless a manner as to preclude the +least hope that it might ever be restored. The reason of his acting in +this manner was, I believe, that Megalopolis and Stymphalus were the +only towns in which, during the vicissitudes of that period, he never +succeeded in obtaining a single partisan, or inducing a single citizen +to turn traitor. For the passion for liberty and the loyalty of the +Clitorians had been stained by the baseness of one man, Thearces; whom +the Clitorians, with some reason, denied to be a native of their city, +asserting that he had been foisted in from Orchomenus, and was the +offspring of one of the foreign garrison there. + +[Sidenote: Digression (to ch. 63) on the misstatements of Phylarchus.] + +[Sidenote: Mantinea.] + ++56.+ For the history of the same period, with which we are now +engaged, there are two authorities, Aratus and Phylarchus,[163] whose +opinions are opposed in many points and their statements contradictory. +I think, therefore, it will be advantageous, or rather necessary, since +I follow Aratus in my account of the Cleomenic war, to go into the +question; and not by any neglect on my part to suffer misstatements in +historical writings to enjoy an authority equal to that of truth. The +fact is that the latter of these two writers has, throughout the whole +of his history, made statements at random and without discrimination. +It is not, however, necessary for me to criticise him on other points +on the present occasion, or to call him to strict account concerning +them; but such of his statements as relate to the period which I have +now in hand, that is the Cleomenic war, these I must thoroughly sift. +They will be quite sufficient to enable us to form a judgment on the +general spirit and ability with which he approaches historical writing. +It was his object to bring into prominence the cruelty of Antigonus +and the Macedonians, as well as that of Aratus and the Achaeans; and +he accordingly asserts that, when Mantinea fell into their hands, it +was cruelly treated; and that the most ancient and important of all +the Arcadian towns was involved in calamities so terrible as to move +all Greece to horror and tears. And being eager to stir the hearts +of his readers to pity, and to enlist their sympathies by his story, +he talks of women embracing, tearing their hair, and exposing their +breasts; and again of the tears and lamentations of men and women, led +off into captivity along with their children and aged parents. And +this he does again and again throughout his whole history, by way of +bringing the terrible scene vividly before his readers. I say nothing +of the unworthiness and unmanliness of the course he has adopted: let +us only inquire what is essential and to the purpose in history. Surely +an historian’s object should not be to amaze his readers by a series +of thrilling anecdotes; nor should he aim at producing speeches which +_might_ have been delivered, nor study dramatic propriety in details +like a writer of tragedy: but his function is above all to record +with fidelity what was actually said or done, however commonplace +it may be. For the purposes of history and of the drama are not the +same, but widely opposed to each other. In the former the object is +to strike and delight by words as true to nature as possible; in the +latter to instruct and convince by genuine words and deeds; in the +former the effect is meant to be temporary, in the latter permanent. +In the former, again, the power of carrying an audience is the chief +excellence, because the object is to create illusion; but in the latter +the thing of primary importance is truth, because the object is to +benefit the learner. And apart from these considerations, Phylarchus, +in most of the catastrophes which he relates, omits to suggest the +causes which gave rise to them, or the course of events which led up +to them: and without knowing these, it is impossible to feel the due +indignation or pity at anything which occurs. For instance, everybody +looks upon it as an outrage that the free should be struck: still, +if a man provokes it by an act of violence, he is considered to have +got no more than he deserved; and, where it is done for correction +and discipline, those who strike free men are deemed worthy of honour +and gratitude. Again, the killing of a fellow-citizen is regarded +as a heinous crime, deserving the severest penalties: and yet it is +notorious that the man who kills a thief, or his wife’s paramour, is +held guiltless; while he who kills a traitor or tyrant in every country +receives honours and pre-eminence. And so in everything our final +judgment does not depend upon the mere things done, but upon their +causes and the views of the actors, according as these differ. + +[Sidenote: B.C. 227.] + ++57.+ Now the people of Mantinea had in the first instance abandoned +the league, and voluntarily submitted, first to the Aetolians, +and afterwards to Cleomenes. Being therefore, in accordance with +this policy, members of the Lacedaemonian community, in the fourth +year before the coming of Antigonus, their city was forcibly taken +possession of by the Achaeans owing to the skilful plotting of Aratus. +But on that occasion, so far from being subjected to any severity +for their act of treason, it became a matter of general remark how +promptly the feelings of the conquerors and the conquered underwent a +revolution. As soon as he had got possession of the town, Aratus issued +orders to his own men that no one was to lay a finger on anything +that did not belong to him; and then, having summoned the Mantineans +to a meeting, he bade them be of good cheer, and stay in their own +houses; for that, as long as they remained members of the league, +their safety was secured. On their part, the Mantineans, surprised +at this unlooked-for prospect of safety, immediately experienced a +universal revulsion of feeling. The very men against whom they had +a little while before been engaged in a war, in which they had seen +many of their kinsfolk killed, and no small number grievously wounded, +they now received into their houses, and entertained as their guests, +interchanging every imaginable kindness with them. And naturally so. +For I believe that there never were men who met with more kindly foes, +or came out of a struggle with what seemed the most dreadful disasters +more scatheless, than did the Mantineans, owing to the humanity of +Aratus and the Achaeans towards them. + ++58.+ But they still saw certain dangers ahead from intestine +disorders, and the hostile designs of the Aetolians and Lacedaemonians; +they subsequently, therefore, sent envoys to the league asking for a +guard for their town. The request was granted: and three hundred of +the league army were selected by lot to form it. These men on whom the +lot fell started for Mantinea; and, abandoning their native cities +and their callings in life, remained there to protect the lives and +liberties of the citizens. Besides them, the league despatched two +hundred mercenaries, who joined the Achaean guard in protecting the +established constitution. But this state of things did not last long: +an insurrection broke out in the town, and the Mantineans called in the +aid of the Lacedaemonians; delivered the city into their hands; and +put to death the garrison sent by the league. It would not be easy to +mention a grosser or blacker act of treachery. Even if they resolved to +utterly set at nought the gratitude they owed to, and the friendship +they had formed with, the league; they ought at least to have spared +these men, and to have let every one of them depart under some terms +or another: for this much it is the custom by the law of nations to +grant even to foreign enemies. But in order to satisfy Cleomenes and +the Lacedaemonians of their fidelity in the policy of the hour, they +deliberately, and in violation of international law, consummated a +crime of the most impious description. To slaughter and wreak vengeance +on the men who had just before taken their city, and refrained from +doing them the least harm, and who were at that very moment engaged in +protecting their lives and liberties,—can anything be imagined more +detestable? What punishment can be conceived to correspond with its +enormity? If one suggests that they would be rightly served by being +sold into slavery, with their wives and children, as soon as they were +beaten in war; it may be answered that this much is only what, by the +laws of warfare, awaits even those who have been guilty of no special +act of impiety. They deserved therefore to meet with a punishment even +more complete and heavy than they did; so that, even if what Phylarchus +mentions did happen to them, there was no reason for the pity of Greece +being bestowed on them: praise and approval rather were due to those +who exacted vengeance for their impious crime. But since, as a matter +of fact, nothing worse befel the Mantineans than the plunder of their +property and the selling of their free citizens into slavery, this +historian, for the mere sake of a sensational story, has not only told +a pure lie, but an improbable lie. His wilful ignorance also was so +supreme, that he was unable to compare with this alleged cruelty of the +Achaeans the conduct of the same people in the case of Tegea, which +they took by force at the same period, and yet did no injury to its +inhabitants. And yet, if the natural cruelty of the perpetrators was +the sole cause of the severity to Mantinea, it is to be presumed that +Tegea would have been treated in the same way. But if their treatment +of Mantinea was an exception to that of every other town, the necessary +inference is that the cause for their anger was exceptional also. + +[Sidenote: Aristomachus.] + ++59.+ Again Phylarchus says that Aristomachus the Argive, a man of +a most distinguished family, who had been despot of Argos, as his +fathers had been before him, upon falling into the hands of Antigonus +and the league “was hurried off to Cenchreae and there racked to +death,—an unparalleled instance of injustice and cruelty.” But in this +matter also our author preserves his peculiar method. He makes up a +story about certain cries of this man, when he was on the rack, being +heard through the night by the neighbours: “some of whom,” he says, +“rushed to the house in their horror, or incredulity, or indignation +at the outrage.” As for the sensational story, let it pass; I have +said enough on that point. But I must express my opinion that, even +if Aristomachus had committed no crime against the Achaeans besides, +yet his whole life and his treason to his own country deserved the +heaviest possible punishment. And in order, forsooth, to enhance this +man’s reputation, and move his reader’s sympathies for his sufferings, +our historian remarks that he had not only been a tyrant himself, +but that his fathers had been so before him. It would not be easy to +bring a graver or more bitter charge against a man than this: for the +mere word “tyrant” involves the idea of everything that is wickedest, +and includes every injustice and crime possible to mankind. And if +Aristomachus endured the most terrible tortures, as Phylarchus says, +he yet would not have been sufficiently punished for the crime of one +day, in which, when Aratus had effected an entrance into Argos with the +Achaean soldiers,—and after supporting the most severe struggles and +dangers for the freedom of its citizens, had eventually been driven +out, because the party within who were in league with him had not +ventured to stir, for fear of the tyrant,—Aristomachus availed himself +of the pretext of their complicity with the irruption of the Achaeans +to put to the rack and execute eighty of the leading citizens, who were +perfectly innocent, in the presence of their relations. I pass by the +history of his whole life and the crimes of his ancestors; for that +would be too long a story. + ++60.+ But this shows that we ought not to be indignant if a man reaps +as he has sown; but rather if he is allowed to end his days in peace, +without experiencing such retribution at all. Nor ought we to accuse +Antigonus or Aratus of crime, for having racked and put to death a +tyrant whom they had captured in war: to have killed and wreaked +vengeance on whom, even in time of peace, would have brought praise and +honour to the doers from all right-minded persons. + +But when, in addition to these crimes, he was guilty also of treachery +to the league, what shall we say that he deserved? The facts of the +case are these. He abdicted his sovereignty of Argos shortly before, +finding himself in difficulties, owing to the state of affairs brought +on by the death of Demetrius. He was, however, protected by the +clemency and generosity of the league; and, much to his own surprise, +was left unmolested. For the Achaean government not only secured him an +indemnity for all crimes committed by him while despot, but admitted +him as a member of the league, and invested him with the highest office +in it,—that, namely, of Commander-in-Chief and Strategus.[164] All +these favours he immediately forgot, as soon as his hopes were a little +raised by the Cleomenic war; and at a crisis of the utmost importance +he withdrew his native city, as well as his own personal adhesion, +from the league, and attached them to its enemies. For such an act of +treason what he deserved was not to be racked under cover of night at +Cenchreae, and then put to death, as Phylarchus says: he ought to have +been taken from city to city in the Peloponnese, and to have ended his +life only after exemplary torture in each of them. And yet the only +severity that this guilty wretch had to endure was to be drowned in the +sea by order of the officers at Cenchreae. + +[Sidenote: Megalopolis.] + ++61.+ There is another illustration of this writer’s manner to be +found in his treatment of the cases of Mantinea and Megalopolis. The +misfortunes of the former he has depicted with his usual exaggeration +and picturesqueness: apparently from the notion, that it is the +peculiar function of an historian to select for special mention only +such actions as are conspicuously bad. But about the noble conduct +of the Megalopolitans at that same period he has not said a word: as +though it were the province of history to deal with crimes rather than +with instances of just and noble conduct; or as though his readers +would be less improved by the record of what is great and worthy of +imitation, than by that of such deeds as are base and fit only to be +avoided. For instance, he has told us clearly enough how Cleomenes +took the town, preserved it from damage, and forthwith sent couriers +to the Megalopolitans in Messene with a despatch, offering them the +safe enjoyment of their country if they would throw in their lot with +him;—and his object in telling all this is to enhance the magnanimity +and moderation of Cleomenes towards his enemies. Nay, he has gone +farther, and told us how the people of Megalopolis would not allow +the letter to be read to the end, and were not far from stoning the +bearers of it. Thus much he does tell us. But the sequel to this, so +appropriate to an historian,—the commendation, I mean, and honourable +mention of their noble conduct,—this he has altogether left out. And +yet he had an opportunity ready to his hand. For if we view with +approval the conduct of a people who merely by their declarations and +votes support a war in behalf of friends and allies; while to those +who go so far as to endure the devastation of their territory, and a +siege of their town, we give not only praise but active gratitude: +what must be our estimate of the people of Megalopolis? Must it not +be of the most exalted character? First of all, they allowed their +territory to be at the mercy of Cleomenes, and then consented to be +entirely deprived of their city, rather than be false to the league: +and, finally, in spite of an unexpected chance of recovering it, they +deliberately preferred the loss of their territory, the tombs of their +ancestors, their temples, their homes and property, of everything in +fact which men value most, to forfeiting their faith to their allies. +No nobler action has ever been, or ever will be performed; none to +which an historian could better draw his reader’s attention. For what +could be a higher incentive to good faith, or the maintenance of frank +and permanent relations between states? But of all this Phylarchus says +not a word, being, as it seems to me, entirely blind as to all that is +noblest and best suited to be the theme of an historian. + +[Sidenote: and its wealth.] + +[Sidenote: B.C. 378.] + ++62.+ He does, however, state in the course of his narrative that, +from the spoils of Megalopolis, six thousand talents fell to the +Lacedaemonians, of which two thousand, according to custom, were given +to Cleomenes. This shows, to begin with, an astounding ignorance of the +ordinary facts as to the resources of Greece: a knowledge which above +all others should be possessed by historians. I am not of course now +speaking of the period in which the Peloponnese had been ruined by the +Macedonian kings, and still more completely by a long continuance of +intestine struggles; but of our own times, in which it is believed, by +the establishment of its unity, to be enjoying the highest prosperity +of which it is capable. Still even at this period, if you could +collect all the movable property of the whole Peloponnese (leaving +out the value of slaves), it would be impossible to get so large a +sum of money together. That I speak on good grounds and not at random +will appear from the following fact. Every one has read that when the +Athenians, in conjunction with the Thebans, entered upon the war with +the Lacedaemonians, and despatched an army of twenty thousand men, +and manned a hundred triremes, they resolved to supply the expenses +of the war by the assessment of a property tax; and accordingly had a +valuation taken, not only of the whole land of Attica and the houses in +it, but of all other property: but yet the value returned fell short +of six thousand talents by two hundred and fifty; which will show that +what I have just said about the Peloponnese is not far wide of the +mark. But at this period the most exaggerated estimate could scarcely +give more than three hundred talents, as coming from Megalopolis +itself; for it is acknowledged that most of the inhabitants, free and +slaves, escaped to Messene. But the strongest confirmation of my words +is the case of Mantinea, which, as he himself observes, was second to +no Arcadian city in wealth and numbers. Though it was surrendered after +a siege, so that no one could escape, and no property could without +great difficulty be concealed; yet the value of the whole spoil of the +town, including the price of the captives sold, amounted at this same +period to only three hundred talents. + +[Sidenote: Ptolemy Euergetes and Cleomenes.] + ++63.+ But a more astonishing misstatement remains to be remarked. In +the course of his history of this war, Phylarchus asserts “that about +ten days before the battle an ambassador came from Ptolemy announcing +to Cleomenes, that the king declined to continue to support him with +supplies, and advised him to make terms with Antigonus. And that when +this message had been delivered to Cleomenes, he made up his mind that +he had better put his fortune to the supreme test as soon as possible, +before his forces learnt about this message, because he could not hope +to provide the soldiers’ pay from his own resources.” But if he had +at that very time become the master of six thousand talents, he would +have been better supplied than Ptolemy himself. And as for war with +Antigonus, if he had become master of only three hundred talents, he +would have been able to continue it without any difficulty. But the +writer states two inconsistent propositions—that Cleomenes depended +wholly on Ptolemy for money: and that he at the same time had become +master of that enormous sum. Is this not irrational, and grossly +careless besides? I might mention many instances of a similar kind, not +only in his account of this period, but throughout his whole work; but +I think for my present purpose enough has been said. + +[Sidenote: B.C. 222. Cleomenes invades Argos.] + ++64.+ Megalopolis having fallen, then, Antigonus spent the winter at +Argos. But at the approach of spring Cleomenes collected his army, +addressed a suitable exhortation to them, and led them into the Argive +territory. Most people thought this a hazardous and foolhardy step, +because the places at which the frontier was crossed were strongly +fortified; but those who were capable of judging regarded the measure +as at once safe and prudent. For seeing that Antigonus had dismissed +his forces, he reckoned on two things,—there would be no one to resist +him, and therefore he would run no risk; and when the Argives found +that their territory was being laid waste up to their walls, they would +be certain to be roused to anger and to lay the blame upon Antigonus: +therefore, if on the one hand Antigonus, unable to bear the complaints +of the populace, were to sally forth and give him battle with his +present forces, Cleomenes felt sure of an easy victory; but if on the +other hand Antigonus refused to alter his plans, and kept persistently +aloof, he believed that he would be able to effect a safe retreat home, +after succeeding by this expedition in terrifying his enemies and +inspiring his own forces with courage. And this was the actual result. +For as the devastation of the country went on, crowds began to collect +and abuse Antigonus: but like a wise general and king, he refused +to allow any consideration to outweigh that of sound strategy, and +persisted in remaining inactive. Accordingly Cleomenes, in pursuance of +his plan, having terrified his enemies and inspired courage in his own +army for the coming struggle, returned home unmolested. + +[Sidenote: The summer campaign. The army of Antigonus.] + ++65.+ Summer having now come, and the Macedonian and Achaean soldiers +having assembled from their winter quarters, Antigonus moved his army, +along with his allies, into Laconia. The main force consisted of ten +thousand Macedonians for the phalanx, three thousand light armed, and +three hundred cavalry. With these were a thousand Agraei; the same +number of Gauls; three thousand mercenary infantry, and three hundred +cavalry; picked troops of the Achaeans, three thousand infantry and +three hundred cavalry; and a thousand Megalopolitans armed in the +Macedonian manner, under the command of Cercidas of Megalopolis. Of +the allies there were two thousand infantry, and two hundred cavalry, +from Boeotia; a thousand infantry and fifty cavalry from Epirus; the +same number from Acarnania; and sixteen hundred from Illyria, under +the command of Demetrius of Pharos. The whole amounted to twenty-eight +thousand infantry and twelve hundred cavalry. + +[Sidenote: The position of Cleomenes at Sellasia.] + +Cleomenes had expected the attack, and had secured the passes into the +country by posting garrisons, digging trenches, and felling trees; +while he took up position at a place called Sellasia, with an army +amounting to twenty thousand, having calculated that the invading +forces would take that direction: which turned out to be the case. This +pass lies between two hills, called respectively Evas and Olympus, and +the road to Sparta follows the course of the river Oenus. Cleomenes +strengthened both these hills by lines of fortification, consisting of +trench and palisade. On Evas he posted the perioeci and allies, under +the command of his brother Eucleidas; while he himself held Olympus +with the Lacedaemonians and mercenaries. On the level ground along the +river he stationed his cavalry, with a division of his mercenaries, +on both sides of the road. When Antigonus arrived, he saw at once +the strength of the position, and the skill with which Cleomenes had +selected the different branches of his army to occupy the points of +vantage, so that the whole aspect of the position was like that of +skilled soldiers drawn up ready for a charge. For no preparation for +attack or defence had been omitted; but everything was in order, either +for offering battle with effect, or for holding an almost unassailable +position. + ++66.+ The sight of these preparations decided Antigonus not to make an +immediate attack upon the position, or rashly hazard an engagement. He +pitched his camp a short distance from it, covering his front by the +stream called Gorgylus, and there remained for some days; informing +himself by reconnaissances of the peculiarities of the ground and the +character of the troops, and at the same time endeavouring by feigned +movements to elicit the intentions of the enemy. But he could never +find an unguarded point, or one where the troops were not entirely +on the alert, for Cleomenes was always ready at a moment’s notice to +be at any point that was attacked. He therefore gave up all thoughts +of attacking the position; and finally an understanding was come to +between him and Cleomenes to bring the matter to the decision of +battle. And, indeed, Fortune had there brought into competition two +commanders equally endowed by nature with military skill. To face +the division of the enemy on Evas Antigonus stationed his Macedonian +hoplites with brazen shields, and the Illyrians, drawn up in alternate +lines, under the command of Alexander, son of Acmetus, and Demetrius +of Pharos, respectively. Behind them he placed the Acarnanians and +Cretans, and behind them again were two thousand Achaeans to act +as a reserve. His cavalry, on the banks of the river Oenous, were +posted opposite the enemy’s cavalry, under the command of Alexander, +and flanked by a thousand Achaean infantry and the same number of +Megalopolitans. Antigonus himself determined to lead his mercenaries +and Macedonian troops in person against the division on Olympus +commanded by Cleomenes. Owing to the narrowness of the ground, the +Macedonians were arranged in a double phalanx, one close behind the +other, while the mercenaries were placed in front of them. It was +arranged that the Illyrians, who had bivouacked in full order during +the previous night along the river Gorgylus, close to the foot of Evas, +were to begin their assault on the hill when they saw a flag of linen +raised from the direction of Olympus; and that the Megalopolitans and +cavalry should do the same when the king raised a scarlet flag. + +[Sidenote: Battle of Sellasia.] + +[Sidenote: Philopoemen’s presence of mind.] + ++67.+ The moment for beginning the battle had come: the signal was +given to the Illyrians, and the word passed by the officers to their +men to do their duty, and in a moment they started into view of the +enemy and began assaulting the hill. But the light-armed troops who +were stationed with Cleomenes’s cavalry, observing that the Achaean +lines were not covered by any other troops behind them, charged them +on the rear; and thus reduced the division while endeavouring to carry +the hill of Evas to a state of great peril,—being met as they were on +their front by Eucleidas from the top of the hill, and being charged +and vigorously attacked by the light-armed mercenaries on their rear. +It was at this point that Philopoemen of Megalopolis, with a clear +understanding of the situation and a foresight of what would happen, +vainly endeavoured to point out the certain result to his superior +officers. They disregarded him for his want of experience in command +and his extreme youth; and, accordingly he acted for himself, and +cheering on the men of his own city, made a vigorous charge on the +enemy. This effected a diversion; for the light-armed mercenaries, +who were engaged in harassing the rear of the party ascending Evas, +hearing the shouting and seeing the cavalry engaged, abandoned their +attack upon this party and hurried back to their original position to +render assistance to the cavalry. The result was that the division of +Illyrians, Macedonians, and the rest who were advancing with them, no +longer had their attention diverted by an attack upon their rear, and +so continued their advance upon the enemy with high spirits and renewed +confidence. And this afterwards caused it to be acknowledged that to +Philopoemen was due the honour of the success against Eucleidas. + ++68.+ It is clear that Antigonus at any rate entertained that opinion, +for after the battle he asked Alexander, the commander of the cavalry, +with the view of convicting him of his shortcoming, “Why he had engaged +before the signal was given?” And upon Alexander answering that “He had +not done so, but that a young officer from Megalopolis had presumed to +anticipate the signal, contrary to his wish:” Antigonus replied, “That +young man acted like a good general in grasping the situation; you, +general, were the youngster.” + +[Sidenote: Defeat of Eucleidas.] + +What Eucleidas ought to have done, when he saw the enemy’s lines +advancing, was to have rushed down at once upon them; thrown their +ranks into disorder; and then retired himself, step by step, to +continually higher ground into a safe position: for by thus breaking +them up and depriving them, to begin with, of the advantages of their +peculiar armour and disposition, he would have secured the victory by +the superiority of his position. But he did the very opposite of all +this, and thereby forfeited the advantages of the ground. As though +victory were assured, he kept his original position on the summit of +the hill, with the view of catching the enemy at as great an elevation +as possible, that their flight might be all the longer over steep and +precipitous ground. The result, as might have been anticipated, was +exactly the reverse. For he left himself no place of retreat, and by +allowing the enemy to reach his position, unharmed and in unbroken +order, he was placed at the disadvantage of having to give them battle +on the very summit of the hill; and so, as soon as he was forced by the +weight of their heavy armour and their close order to give any ground, +it was immediately occupied by the Illyrians; while his own men were +obliged to take lower ground, because they had no space for manœuvring +on the top. The result was not long in arriving: they suffered a +repulse, which the difficult and precipitous nature of the ground over +which they had to retire turned into a disastrous flight. + +[Sidenote: Defeat of Cleomenes.] + ++69.+ Simultaneously with these events the cavalry engagement was also +being brought to a decision; in which all the Achaean cavalry, and +especially Philopoemen, fought with conspicuous gallantry, for to them +it was a contest for freedom. Philopoemen himself had his horse killed +under him, and while fighting accordingly on foot received a severe +wound through both his thighs. Meanwhile the two kings on the other +hill Olympus began by bringing their light-armed troops and mercenaries +into action, of which each of them had five thousand. Both the kings +and their entire armies had a full view of this action, which was +fought with great gallantry on both sides: the charges taking place +sometimes in detachments, and at other times along the whole line, and +an eager emulation being displayed between the several ranks, and even +between individuals. But when Cleomenes saw that his brother’s division +was retreating, and that the cavalry in the low ground were on the +point of doing the same, alarmed at the prospect of an attack at all +points at once, he was compelled to demolish the palisade in his front, +and to lead out his whole force in line by one side of his position. +A recall was sounded on the bugle for the light-armed troops of both +sides, who were on the ground between the two armies: and the phalanxes +shouting their war cries, and with spears couched, charged each other. +Then a fierce struggle arose: the Macedonians sometimes slowly giving +ground and yielding to the superior courage of the soldiers of Sparta, +and at another time the Lacedaemonians being forced to give way before +the overpowering weight of the Macedonian phalanx. At length Antigonus +ordered a charge in close order and in double phalanx; the enormous +weight of this peculiar formation proved sufficient to finally dislodge +the Lacedaemonians from their strongholds, and they fled in disorder +and suffering severely as they went. Cleomenes himself, with a guard +of cavalry, effected his retreat to Sparta: but the same night he went +down to Gythium, where all preparations for crossing the sea had been +made long before in case of mishap, and with his friends sailed to +Alexandria. + ++70.+ Having surprised and taken Sparta, Antigonus treated the citizens +with magnanimity and humanity; and after re-establishing their ancient +constitution, he left the town in a few days, on receiving intelligence +that the Illyrians had invaded Macedonia and were laying waste the +country. This was an instance of the fantastic way in which Fortune +decides the most important matters. For if Cleomenes had only put off +the battle for a few days, or if when he returned to Sparta he had only +held out for a brief space of time, he would have saved his crown. + +[Sidenote: Death of Antigonus Doson, B.C. 220.] + +As it was, Antigonus after going to Tegea and restoring its +constitution, arrived on the second day at Argos, at the very time +of the Nemean games. Having at this assembly received every mark of +immortal honour and glory at the hands of the Achaean community, as +well as of the several states, he made all haste to reach Macedonia. +He found the Illyrians still in the country, and forced them to give +him battle, in which, though he proved entirely successful, he exerted +himself to such a pitch in shouting encouragement to his men, that +he ruptured a bloodvessel, and fell into an illness which terminated +shortly in his death. He was a great loss to the Greeks, whom he had +inspired with good hopes, not only by his support in the field, but +still more by his character and good principles. He left the kingdom of +Macedonia to Philip, son of Demetrius. + ++71.+ My reason for writing about this war at such length, was the +advisability, or rather necessity, in view of the general purpose of my +history, of making clear the relations existing between Macedonia and +Greece at a time which coincides with the period of which I am about to +treat. + +[Sidenote: B.C. 284-280. B.C. 224-220.] + +Just about the same time, by the death of Euergetes, Ptolemy Philopator +succeeded to the throne of Egypt. At the same period died Seleucus, +son of that Seleucus who had the double surnames of Callinicus +and Pogon: he was succeeded on the throne of Syria by his brother +Antiochus. The deaths of these three sovereigns—Antigonus, Ptolemy, +and Seleucus—fell in the same Olympiad, as was the case with the three +immediate successors to Alexander the Great,—Seleucus, Ptolemy, and +Lysimachus,—for the latter all died in the 124th Olympiad, and the +former in the 139th. + +I may now fitly close this book. I have completed the introduction and +laid the foundation on which my history must rest. I have shown when, +how, and why the Romans, after becoming supreme in Italy, began to +aim at dominion outside of it, and to dispute with the Carthaginians +the dominion of the sea. I have at the same time explained the state +of Greece, Macedonia, and Carthage at this epoch. I have now arrived +at the period which I originally marked out,—that namely in which +the Greeks were on the point of beginning the Social, the Romans the +Hannibalic war, and the kings in Asia the war for the possession of +Coele-Syria. The termination therefore of the wars just described, and +the death of the princes engaged in them, forms a natural period to +this book. + + + + +BOOK III + + ++1.+ I stated in my first book that my work was to start from the +Social war, the Hannibalian war, and the war for the possession of +Coele-Syria. In the same book I stated my reasons for devoting my first +two books to a sketch of the period preceding those events. I will now, +after a few prefatory remarks as to the scope of my own work, address +myself to giving a complete account of these wars, the causes which led +to them, and which account for the proportions to which they attained. + +[Sidenote: A summary of the work from B.C. 220 to B.C. 168.] + +The one aim and object, then, of all that I have undertaken to write is +to show how, when, and why all the known parts of the world fell under +the dominion of Rome. Now as this great event admits of being exactly +dated as to its beginning, duration, and final accomplishment, I think +it will be advantageous to give, by way of preface, a summary statement +of the most important phases in it between the beginning and the end. +For I think I shall thus best secure to the student an adequate idea +of my whole plan, for as the comprehension of the whole is a help to +the understanding of details, and the knowledge of details of great +service to the clear conception of the whole; believing that the best +and clearest knowledge is that which is obtained from a combination +of these, I will preface my whole history by a brief summary of its +contents. + +[Sidenote: B.C. 220-216.] + +I have already described its scope and limits. As to its several parts, +the first consists of the above mentioned wars, while the conclusion or +closing scene is the fall of the Macedonian monarchy. The time included +between these limits is fifty-three years, and never has an equal space +embraced events of such magnitude and importance. In describing them I +shall start from the 140th Olympiad and shall arrange my exposition in +the following order: + +[Sidenote: 1. The cause and course of the Hannibalian war.] + ++2.+ First I shall indicate the causes of the Punic or Hannibalian war: +and shall have to describe how the Carthaginians entered Italy; broke +up the Roman power there; made the Romans tremble for their safety +and the very soil of their country; and contrary to all calculation +acquired a good prospect of surprising Rome itself. + +[Sidenote: 2. Macedonian treaty with Carthage, B.C. 216.] + +I shall next try to make it clear how in the same period Philip of +Macedon, after finishing his war with the Aetolians, and subsequently +settling the affairs of Greece, entered upon a design of forming an +offensive and defensive alliance with Carthage. + +[Sidenote: 3. Syrian war, B.C. 218.] + +Then I shall tell how Antiochus and Ptolemy Philopator first quarrelled +and finally went to war with each other for the possession of +Coele-Syria. + +[Sidenote: 4. Byzantine war, B.C. 220.] + +Next how the Rhodians and Prusias went to war with the Byzantines, and +compelled them to desist from exacting dues from ships sailing into the +Pontus. + +[Sidenote: First digression on the Roman Constitution.] + +At this point I shall pause in my narrative to introduce a disquisition +upon the Roman Constitution, in which I shall show that its peculiar +character contributed largely to their success, not only in reducing +all Italy to their authority, and in acquiring a supremacy over the +Iberians and Gauls besides, but also at last, after their conquest of +Carthage, to their conceiving the idea of universal dominion. + +[Sidenote: Second on Hiero of Syracuse.] + +Along with this I shall introduce another digression on the fall of +Hiero of Syracuse. + +[Sidenote: 5. The attempted partition of the dominions of Ptolemy +Epiphanes, B.C. 204.] + +After these digressions will come the disturbances in Egypt; how, after +the death of King Ptolemy, Antiochus and Philip entered into a compact +for the partition of the dominions of that monarch’s infant son. I +shall describe their treacherous dealings, Philip laying hands upon the +islands of the Aegean, and Caria and Samos, Antiochus upon Coele-Syria +and Phoenicia. + +[Sidenote: 6. War with Philip, B.C. 201-197.] + ++3.+ Next, after a summary recapitulation of the proceedings of the +Carthaginians and Romans in Iberia, Libya, and Sicily, I shall, +following the changes of events, shift the scene of my story entirely +to Greece. Here I shall first describe the naval battles of Attalus and +the Rhodians against Philip; and the war between Philip and Rome, the +persons engaged, its circumstances, and result. + +[Sidenote: 7. Asiatic war, B.C. 192-191.] + +Next to this I shall have to record the wrath of the Aetolians, in +consequence of which they invited the aid of Antiochus, and thereby +gave rise to what is called the Asiatic war against Rome and the +Achaean league. Having stated the causes of this war, and described +the crossing of Antiochus into Europe, I shall have to show first in +what manner he was driven from Greece; secondly, how, being defeated in +the war, he was forced to cede all his territory west of Taurus; and +thirdly, how the Romans, after crushing the insolence of the Gauls, +secured undisputed possession of Asia, and freed all the nations on +the west of Taurus from the fear of barbarian inroads and the lawless +violence of the Gauls. + +[Sidenote: 8. Gallic wars of Eumenes and Prusias.] + +Next, after reviewing the disasters of the Aetolians and Cephallenians, +I shall pass to the wars waged by Eumenes against Prusias and the +Gauls; as well as that carried on in alliance with Ariarathes against +Pharnaces. + +[Sidenote: 9. Union of the Peloponnese. Antiochus Epiphanes in Egypt. +Fall of the Macedonian monarchy, B.C. 188-168.] + +Finally, after speaking of the unity and settlement of the Peloponnese, +and of the growth of the commonwealth of Rhodes, I shall add a summary +of my whole work, concluding by an account of the expedition of +Antiochus Epiphanes against Egypt; of the war against Perseus; and the +destruction of the Macedonian monarchy. Throughout the whole narrative +it will be shown how the policy adopted by the Romans in one after +another of these cases, as they arose, led to their eventual conquest +of the whole world. + +[Sidenote: The plan extended to embrace the period from B.C. 168-146.] + ++4.+ And if our judgment of individuals and constitutions, for praise +or blame, could be adequately formed from a simple consideration of +their successes or defeats, I must necessarily have stopped at this +point, and have concluded my history as soon as I reached these last +events in accordance with my original plan. For at this point the +fifty-three years were coming to an end, and the progress of the Roman +power had arrived at its consummation. And, besides, by this time the +acknowledgment had been extorted from all that the supremacy of Rome +must be accepted, and her commands obeyed. But in truth, judgments of +either side founded on the bare facts of success or failure in the +field are by no means final. It has often happened that what seemed +the most signal successes have, from ill management, brought the +most crushing disasters in their train; while not unfrequently the +most terrible calamities, sustained with spirit, have been turned to +actual advantage. I am bound, therefore, to add to my statement of +facts a discussion on the subsequent policy of the conquerors, and +their administration of their universal dominion: and again on the +various feelings and opinions entertained by other nations towards +their rulers. And I must also describe the tastes and aims of the +several nations, whether in their private lives or public policy. The +present generation will learn from this whether they should shun or +seek the rule of Rome; and future generations will be taught whether +to praise and imitate, or to decry it. The usefulness of my history, +whether for the present or the future, will mainly lie in this. For +the end of a policy should not be, in the eyes either of the actors +or their historians, simply to conquer others and bring all into +subjection. Nor does any man of sense go to war with his neighbours +for the mere purpose of mastering his opponents; nor go to sea for +the mere sake of the voyage; nor engage in professions and trades for +the sole purpose of learning them. In all these cases the objects are +invariably the pleasure, honour, or profit which are the results of +the several employments. Accordingly the object of this work shall +be to ascertain exactly what the position of the several states was, +after the universal conquest by which they fell under the power of +Rome, until the commotions and disturbances which broke out at a later +period. These I designed to make the starting-point of what may almost +be called a new work, partly because of the greatness and surprising +nature of the events themselves, but chiefly because, in the case of +most of them, I was not only an eye-witness, but in some cases one of +the actors, and in others the chief director. + +[Sidenote: A new departure; the breaking-up of the arrangement made +after the fall of Macedonia. Wars of Carthage against Massinissa; and +of Rome against the Celtiberians, B.C. 155-150; and against Carthage +(3d Punic war, B.C. 149-146).] + ++5.+ The events I refer to are the wars of Rome against the +Celtiberians and Vaccaei; those of Carthage against Massinissa, king of +Libya; and those of Attalus and Prusias in Asia. Then also Ariarathes, +King of Cappadocia, having been ejected from his throne by Orophernes +through the agency of King Demetrius, recovered his ancestral power by +the help of Attalus; while Demetrius, son of Seleucus, after twelve +years' possession of the throne of Syria, was deprived of it, and of +his life at the same time, by a combination of the other kings against +him. Then it was, too, that the Romans restored to their country those +Greeks who had been charged with guilt in the matter of the war with +Perseus, after formally acquitting them of the crimes alleged against +them. Not long afterwards the same people turned their hands against +Carthage: at first with the intention of forcing its removal to some +other spot, but finally, for reasons to be afterwards stated, with the +resolution of utterly destroying it. Contemporaneous with this came the +renunciation by the Macedonians of their friendship to Rome, and by the +Lacedaemonians of their membership of the Achaean league, to which the +disaster that befell all Greece alike owed its beginning and end. + +This is my purpose: but its fulfilment must depend upon whether Fortune +protracts my life to the necessary length. I am persuaded, however, +that, even if the common human destiny does overtake me, this theme +will not be allowed to lie idle for want of competent men to handle +it; for there are many besides myself who will readily undertake its +completion. But having given the heads of the most remarkable events, +with the object of enabling the reader to grasp the general scope of my +history as well as the arrangement of its several parts, I must now, +remembering my original plan, go back to the point at which my history +starts. + +[Sidenote: The origin of the 2d Punic war;] + +[Sidenote: B.C. 334,] + +[Sidenote: B.C. 192,] + +[Sidenote: B.C. 401-400,] + +[Sidenote: B.C. 396-394,] + ++6.+ Some historians of the Hannibalian war, when they wish to point +out to us the causes of this contest between Rome and Carthage, allege +first the siege of Saguntum by the Carthaginians, and, secondly, +their breach of treaty by crossing the river called by the natives +the Iber. But though I should call these the first actions in the +war, I cannot admit them to be its causes. One might just as well say +that the crossing of Alexander the Great into Asia was the _cause_ +of the Persian war, and the descent of Antiochus upon Demetrias the +_cause_ of his war with Rome. In neither would it be a probable or true +statement. In the first case, this action of Alexander’s could not be +called the cause of a war, for which both he and his father Philip in +his lifetime had made elaborate preparations: and in the second case, +we know that the Aetolian league had done the same, with a view to a +war with Rome, before Antiochus came upon the scene. Such definitions +are only worthy of men who cannot distinguish between a first overt +act and a cause or pretext; and who do not perceive that a _cause_ +is the first in a series of events of which such an overt act is the +last. I shall therefore regard the first attempt to put into execution +what had already been determined as a “beginning,” but I shall look +for “causes” in the motives which suggested such action and the policy +which dictated it; for it is by these, and the calculations to which +they give rise, that men are led to decide upon a particular line of +conduct. The soundness of this method will be proved by the following +considerations. The true causes and origin of the invasion of Persia +by Alexander are patent to everybody. They were, first, the return +march of the Greeks under Xenophon through the country from the upper +Satrapies; in the course of which, though throughout Asia all the +populations were hostile, not a single barbarian ventured to face them: +secondly, the invasion of Asia by the Spartan king Agesilaus, in which, +though he was obliged by troubles in Greece to return in the middle of +his expedition without effecting his object, he yet found no resistance +of any importance or adequacy. It was these circumstances which +convinced Philip of the cowardice and inefficiency of the Persians; and +comparing them with his own high state of efficiency for war, and that +of his Macedonian subjects, and placing before his eyes the splendour +of the rewards to be gained by such a war, and the popularity which it +would bring him in Greece, he seized on the pretext of avenging the +injuries done by Persia to Greece, and determined with great eagerness +to undertake this war; and was in fact at the time of his death engaged +in making every kind of preparation for it. + +Here we have the _cause_ and the _pretext_ of the Persian war. +Alexander’s expedition into Asia was the _first action_ in it. + +[Sidenote: and of the war with Antiochus.] + ++7.+ So too of the war of Antiochus with Rome. The _cause_ was +evidently the exasperation of the Aetolians, who, thinking that they +had been slighted in a number of instances at the end of the war with +Philip, not only called in the aid of Antiochus, but resolved to go to +every extremity in satisfying the anger which the events of that time +had aroused in them. This was the _cause_. As for the _pretext_, it +was the liberation of Greece, which they went from city to city with +Antiochus proclaiming, without regard to reason or truth; while the +_first act_ in the war was the descent of Antiochus upon Demetrias. + +My object in enlarging upon this distinction is not to attack the +historians in question, but to rectify the ideas of the studious. A +physician can do no good to the sick who does not know the causes +of their ailments; nor can a statesman do any good who is unable to +conceive the manner, cause, and source of the events with which he has +from time to time to deal. Surely the former could not be expected to +institute a suitable system of treatment for the body; nor the latter +to grapple with the exigencies of the situation, without possessing +this knowledge of its elements. There is nothing, therefore, which we +ought to be more alive to, and to seek for, than the causes of every +event which occurs. For the most important results are often produced +by trifles; and it is invariably easier to apply remedial measures at +the beginning, before things have got beyond the stage of conception +and intention. + +[Sidenote: The credibility of Fabius Pictor.] + ++8.+ Now the Roman annalist Fabius asserts that the cause of the +Hannibalian war, besides the injury inflicted upon Saguntum, was the +encroaching and ambitious spirit of Hasdrubal. “Having secured great +power in Iberia, he returned to Libya with the design of destroying +the constitution and reducing Carthage to a despotism. But the leading +statesmen, getting timely warning of his intention, banded themselves +together and successfully opposed him. Suspecting this Hasdrubal +retired from Libya, and thenceforth governed Iberia entirely at his own +will without taking any account whatever of the Carthaginian Senate. +This policy had had in Hannibal from his earliest youth a zealous +supporter and imitator; and when he succeeded to the command in Iberia +he continued it: and accordingly, even in the case of this war with +Rome, was acting on his own authority and contrary to the wish of the +Carthaginians; for none of the men of note in Carthage approved of +his attack upon Saguntum.” This is the statement of Fabius, who goes +on to say, that “after the capture of that city an embassy arrived in +Carthage from Rome demanding that Hannibal should be given up on pain +of a declaration of war.” + +Now what answer could Fabius have given if we had put the following +question to him? “What better chance or opportunity could the +Carthaginians have had of combining justice and interest? According to +your own account they disliked the proceeding of Hannibal: why did they +not submit to the demands of Rome by surrendering the author of the +injury; and thus get rid of the common enemy of the state without the +odium of doing it themselves, and secure the safety of their territory +by ridding themselves of the threatened war—all of which they could +have effected by merely passing a decree?” If this question were put, +I say, it would admit of no answer. The fact is that, so far from +doing anything of the sort, they maintained the war in accordance with +Hannibal’s policy for seventeen years; and refused to make terms until, +at the end of a most determined struggle, they found their own city and +persons in imminent danger of destruction. + ++9.+ I do not allude to Fabius and his annals from any fear of their +wearing such an air of probability in themselves as to gain any +credit,—for the fact is that his assertions are so contrary to reason, +that it does not need any argument of mine to help his readers to +perceive it,—but I wished to warn those who take up his books not to +be misled by the authority of his name, but to be guided by facts. +For there is a certain class of readers in whose eyes the personality +of the writer is of more account than what he says. They look to the +fact that Fabius was a contemporary and a member of the Senate, and +assume without more ado that everything he says may be trusted. My +view, however, is that we ought not to hold the authority of this +writer lightly: yet at the same time that we should not regard it as +all-sufficient; but in reading his writings should test them by a +reference to the facts themselves. + +[Sidenote: The Hannibalian or 2nd Punic war. First cause.] + +This is a digression from my immediate subject, which is the war +between Carthage and Rome. The cause of this war we must reckon to be +the exasperation of Hamilcar, surnamed Barcas, the father of Hannibal. +The result of the war in Sicily had not broken the spirit of that +commander. He regarded himself as unconquered; for the troops at +Eryx which he commanded were still sound and undismayed: and though +he yielded so far as to make a treaty, it was a concession to the +exigencies of the times brought on by the defeat of the Carthaginians +at sea. But he never relaxed in his determined purpose of revenge; and, +had it not been for the mutiny of the mercenaries at Carthage, he would +at once have sought and made another occasion for bringing about a war, +as far as he was able to do so: as it was, he was preoccupied by the +domestic war, and had to give his attention entirely to that. + +[Sidenote: B.C. 238. Bk. i. ch. 88. Second cause.] + +[Sidenote: Third cause.] + ++10.+ When the Romans, at the conclusion of this mercenary war, +proclaimed war with Carthage, the latter at first was inclined to +resist at all hazards, because the goodness of her cause gave her +hopes of victory,—as I have shown in my former book, without which +it would be impossible to understand adequately either this or what +is to follow. The Romans, however, would not listen to anything: and +the Carthaginians therefore yielded to the force of circumstances; +and though feeling bitterly aggrieved, yet being quite unable to do +anything, evacuated Sardinia, and consented to pay a sum of twelve +hundred talents, in addition to the former indemnity paid them, on +condition of avoiding the war at that time. This is the second and +the most important cause of the subsequent war. For Hamilcar, having +this public grievance in addition to his private feelings of anger, as +soon as he had secured his country’s safety by reducing the rebellious +mercenaries, set at once about securing the Carthaginian power in +Iberia with the intention of using it as a base of operations against +Rome. So that I record as a third cause of the war the Carthaginian +success in Iberia: for it was the confidence inspired by their forces +there which encouraged them to embark upon it. It would be easy to +adduce other facts to show that Hamilcar, though he had been dead ten +years at its commencement, largely contributed to bring about the +second Punic war, but what I am about to say will be sufficient to +establish the fact. + +[Sidenote: Hannibal’s oath.] + +[Sidenote: B.C. 195.] + +[Sidenote: B.C. 238.] + ++11.+ When, after his final defeat by the Romans, Hannibal had at last +quitted his country and was staying at the court of Antiochus, the +warlike attitude of the Aetolian league induced the Romans to send +ambassadors to Antiochus, that they might be informed of the king’s +intentions. These ambassadors found that Antiochus was inclined to the +Aetolian alliance, and was eager for war with Rome; they accordingly +paid great court to Hannibal with a view of bringing him into suspicion +with the king. And in this they entirely succeeded. As time went on the +king became ever more and more suspicious of Hannibal, until at length +an opportunity occurred for an explanation of the alienation that had +been thus secretly growing up between them. Hannibal then defended +himself at great length, but without success, until at last he made the +following statement: “When my father was about to go on his Iberian +expedition I was nine years old: and as he was offering the sacrifice +to Zeus I stood near the altar. The sacrifice successfully performed, +my father poured the libation and went through the usual ritual. He +then bade all the other worshippers stand a little back, and calling +me to him asked me affectionately whether I wished to go with him on +his expedition. Upon my eagerly assenting, and begging with boyish +enthusiasm to be allowed to go, he took me by the right hand and led me +up to the altar, and bade me lay my hand upon the victim and swear that +I would never be friends with Rome. So long, then, Antiochus, as your +policy is one of hostility to Rome, you may feel quite secure of having +in me a most thorough-going supporter. But if ever you make terms or +friendship with her, then you need not wait for any slander to make you +distrust me and be on your guard against me; for there is nothing in my +power that I would not do against her.” + ++12.+ Antiochus listened to this story, and being convinced that +it was told with genuine feeling and sincerity, gave up all his +suspicions. And we, too, must regard this as an unquestionable proof +of the animosity of Hamilcar and of the aim of his general policy; +which, indeed, is also proved by facts. For he inspired his son-in-law +Hasdrubal and his son Hannibal with a bitterness of resentment against +Rome which nothing could surpass. Hasdrubal, indeed, was prevented +by death from showing the full extent of his purpose; but time gave +Hannibal abundant opportunity to manifest the hatred of Rome which he +had inherited from his father. + +The most important thing, then, for statesmen to observe is the +motives of those who lay aside old enmities or form new friendships; +and to ascertain when their consent to treaties is a mere concession +to the necessities of the hour, and when it is the indication of a +real consciousness of defeat. In the former case they must be on their +guard against such people lying in wait for an opportunity; while +in the latter they may unhesitatingly impose whatever injunctions +are necessary, in full reliance on the genuineness of their feelings +whether as subjects or friends. So much for the causes of the war. I +will now relate the first actions in it. + +[Sidenote: Death of Hamilcar, B.C. 229.] + +[Sidenote: Death of Hasdrubal, B.C. 221.] + ++13.+ The Carthaginians were highly incensed by their loss of Sicily, +but their resentment was heightened still more, as I have said, by +the transaction as to Sardinia, and by the addition recently made to +their tribute. Accordingly, when the greater part of Iberia had fallen +into their power, they were on the alert to seize any opportunity that +presented itself of retaliating upon Rome. At the death of Hasdrubal, +to whom they had committed the command in Iberia after the death of +Hamilcar, they waited at first to ascertain the feelings of the army; +but when news came from thence that the troops had elected Hannibal as +commander-in-chief, a popular assembly was at once held, and the choice +of the army confirmed by a unanimous vote. As soon as he had taken over +the command, Hannibal set out to subdue the tribe of the Olcades; and, +having arrived before their most formidable city Althaea, he pitched +his camp under its walls; and by a series of energetic and formidable +assaults succeeded before long in taking it: by which the rest of +the tribe were overawed into submission to Carthage. Having imposed +a contribution upon the towns, and thus become possessed of a large +sum of money, he went to the New Town to winter. There, by a liberal +treatment of the forces under his command, giving them an instalment of +their pay at once and promising the rest, he established an excellent +feeling towards himself in the army, as well as great hopes for the +future. + +[Sidenote: B.C. 220. Hannibal attacks the Vaccaei.] + ++14.+ Next summer he set out on another expedition against the Vaccaei, +in which he took Salmantica by assault, but only succeeded in storming +Arbucala, owing to the size of the town and the number and valour of +its inhabitants, after a laborious siege. After this he suddenly found +himself in a position of very great danger on his return march: being +set upon by the Carpesii, the strongest tribe in those parts, who were +joined also by neighbouring tribes, incited principally by refugees +of the Olcades, but roused also to great wrath by those who escaped +from Salmantica. If the Carthaginians had been compelled to give these +people regular battle, there can be no doubt that they would have been +defeated: but as it was, Hannibal, with admirable skill and caution, +slowly retreated until he had put the Tagus between himself and the +enemy; and thus giving battle at the crossing of the stream, supported +by it and the elephants, of which he had about forty, he gained, to +every one’s surprise, a complete success. For when the barbarians +attempted to force a crossing at several points of the river at once, +the greater number of them were killed as they left the water by the +elephants, who marched up and down along the brink of the river and +caught them as they were coming out. Many of them also were killed +in the river itself by the cavalry, because the horses were better +able than the men to stand against the stream, and also because the +cavalry were fighting on higher ground than the infantry which they +were attacking. At length Hannibal turned the tables on the enemy, and, +recrossing the river, attacked and put to flight their whole army, to +the number of more than a hundred thousand men. After the defeat of +this host, no one south of the Iber rashly ventured to face him except +the people of Saguntum. From that town Hannibal tried his best to keep +aloof; because, acting on the suggestions and advice of his father +Hamilcar, he did not wish to give the Romans an avowed pretext for war +until he had thoroughly secured the rest of the country. + +[Sidenote: Saguntum appeals to Rome. Winter of B.C. 220-219.] + +[Sidenote: Hannibal’s defiance.] + ++15.+ But the people of Saguntum kept sending ambassadors to Rome, +partly because they foresaw what was coming, and trembled for their +own existence, and partly that the Romans might be kept fully aware +of the growing power of the Carthaginians in Iberia. For a long +time the Romans disregarded their words: but now they sent out some +commissioners to see what was going on. Just at that time Hannibal had +finished the conquests which he intended for that season, and was going +into winter quarters at the New Town again, which was in a way the +chief glory and capital town of the Carthaginians in Iberia. He found +there the embassy from Rome, granted them an interview, and listened to +the message with which they were charged. It was a strong injunction +to him to leave Saguntum alone, as being under the protection of Rome; +and not to cross the Iber, in accordance with the agreement come to +in the time of Hasdrubal. To this Hannibal answered with all the +heat of youth, inflamed by martial ardour, recent success, and his +long-standing hatred of Rome. He charged the Romans with having a short +time before, when on some political disturbances arising in the town +they had been chosen to act as arbitrators, seized the opportunity to +put some of the leading citizens to death; and he declared that the +Carthaginians would not allow the Saguntines to be thus treacherously +dealt with, for it was the traditional policy of Carthage to protect +all persons so wronged. At the same time he sent home for instructions +as to what he was to do “in view of the fact that the Saguntines were +injuring certain of their subject allies.” And altogether he was in a +state of unreasoning anger and violent exasperation, which prevented +him from availing himself of the real causes for war, and made him +take refuge in pretexts which would not admit of justification, after +the manner of men whose passions master all considerations of equity. +How much better it would have been to demand of Rome the restoration +of Sardinia, and the remission of the tribute, which she had taken an +unfair opportunity to impose on pain of a declaration of war. As it +was, he said not a word of the real cause, but alleged the fictitious +one of the matter of Saguntum; and so got the credit of beginning the +war, not only in defiance of reason, but still more in defiance of +justice. The Roman ambassadors, finding that there must undoubtedly be +a war, sailed to Carthage to enter the same protest before the people +there. They expected, however, that they would have to fight not in +Italy, but in Iberia, and that they would have Saguntum as a base of +operations. + +[Sidenote: Illyrian war, B.C. 219.] + +[Sidenote: B.C. 219. Coss. M. Livius Salinator L. Aemilius Paullus.] + ++16.+ Wherefore the Senate, by way of preparing to undertake this +business, and foreseeing that the war would be severe and protracted, +and at a long distance from the mother country, determined to make +Illyria safe. For it happened that, just at this time, Demetrius +of Pharos was sacking and subduing to his authority the cities of +Illyria which were subject to Rome, and had sailed beyond Lissus, in +violation of the treaty, with fifty galleys, and had ravaged many of +the Cyclades. For he had quite forgotten the former kindnesses done +him by Rome, and had conceived a contempt for its power, when he saw +it threatened first by the Gauls and then by Carthage; and he now +rested all his hopes on the royal family of Macedonia, because he had +fought on the side of Antigonus, and shared with him the dangers of the +war against Cleomenes. These transactions attracted the observation +of the Romans; who, seeing that the royal house of Macedonia was in +a flourishing condition, were very anxious to secure the country +east of Italy, feeling convinced that they would have ample time to +correct the rash folly of the Illyrians, and rebuke and chastise the +ingratitude and temerity of Demetrius. But they were deceived in their +calculations. For Hannibal anticipated their measures by the capture +of Saguntum: the result of which was that the war took place not in +Iberia, but close to Rome itself, and in various parts throughout all +Italy. However, with these ideas fixed in their minds, the Romans +despatched Lucius Aemilius just before summer to conduct the Illyrian +campaign in the first year of the 140th Olympiad. + +[Sidenote: Hannibal besieges Saguntum.] + ++17.+ But Hannibal had started from New Carthage and was leading +his army straight against Saguntum. This city is situated on the +seaward foot of the mountain chain on which the frontiers of Iberia +and Celtiberia converge, and is about seven stades from the sea. The +district cultivated by its inhabitants is exceedingly productive, and +has a soil superior to any in all Iberia. Under the walls of this +town Hannibal pitched his camp and set energetically to work on the +siege, foreseeing many advantages that would accrue if he could take +it. Of these the first was that he would thereby disappoint the Romans +in their expectation of making Iberia the seat of war: a second was +that he would thereby strike a general terror, which would render the +already obedient tribes more submissive, and the still independent +ones more cautious of offending him: but the greatest advantage of +all was that thereby he would be able to push on his advance, without +leaving an enemy on his rear. Besides these advantages, he calculated +that the possession of this city would secure him abundant supplies +for his expedition, and create an enthusiasm in the troops excited +by individual acquisitions of booty; while he would conciliate the +goodwill of those who remained at Carthage by the spoils which would +be sent home. With these ideas he pressed on the siege with energy: +sometimes setting an example to his soldiers by personally sharing in +the fatigues of throwing up the siege works; and sometimes cheering on +his men and recklessly exposing himself to danger. + +[Sidenote: Fall of Saguntum.] + +After a siege extending to the eighth month, in the course of which +he endured every kind of suffering and anxiety, he finally succeeded +in taking the town. An immense booty in money, slaves, and property +fell into his hands, which he disposed of in accordance with his +original design. The money he reserved for the needs of his projected +expedition; the slaves were distributed according to merit among his +men; while the property was at once sent entire to Carthage. The result +answered his expectations: the army was rendered more eager for action; +the home populace more ready to grant whatever he asked; and he himself +was enabled, by the possession of such abundant means, to carry out +many measures that were of service to his expedition. + +[Sidenote: Illyrian war, B.C. 219.] + ++18.+ While this was taking place, Demetrius, discovering the +intentions of Rome, threw a sufficient garrison into Dimale and +victualled it in proportion. In the other towns he put those who were +opposed to him to death, and placed the chief power in the hands of +his own partisans; and selecting six thousand of the bravest of his +subjects, quartered them in Pharos. When the Consul arrived in Illyria +with his army, he found the enemies of Rome confident in the strength +of Dimale and the elaborate preparations in it, and encouraged to +resistance by their belief in its impregnability; he determined, +therefore, to attack that town first, in order to strike terror into +the enemy. Accordingly, after addressing an exhortation to the several +officers of the legions, and throwing up siege works at several points, +he began the siege in form. In seven days he took the town by assault, +which so dismayed the enemy, that envoys immediately appeared from all +the towns, surrendering themselves unconditionally to the protection +of Rome. The Consul accepted their submission: and after imposing +such conditions as appeared suitable to the several cases, he sailed +to Pharos to attack Demetrius himself. Being informed that the city +there was strongly fortified, thronged with excellent soldiers, and +well-furnished with provisions and all other munitions of war, he began +to entertain misgivings that the siege would be long and difficult; and +therefore, with a view to these difficulties, he adopted on the spur of +the moment the following strategem. He crossed to the island by night +with his whole army. The greater part of it he disembarked at a spot +where the ground was well-wooded and low; while with only twenty ships +he sailed at daybreak to the harbour nearest the town. The smallness +of the number of the ships moved only the contempt of Demetrius when +he saw them, and he immediately marched out of the town down to the +harbour to oppose the landing of the enemy. + +[Sidenote: Capture of Pharos.] + ++19.+ A violent struggle at once began: and, as it went on, division +after division of the troops in the city came down to support him, +until at length the whole force had poured out to take part in the +engagement. The Romans who had landed in the night arrived at the +critical moment, after a march by an obscure route; and seizing a +strong position on some rising ground between the city and the harbour, +efficiently cut off from the city the troops that had sallied out. +When Demetrius became aware of what had taken place, he desisted from +opposing the disembarkation; and having rallied his men and addressed +the ranks, he put them in motion, with the resolution of fighting a +pitched battle with the troops on the hill. When the Romans saw the +Illyrian advance being made in good order and with great spirit, they +formed their ranks and charged furiously. At the same moment the Roman +troops which had just effected their landing, seeing what was going on, +charged the enemy on the rear, who being thus attacked on both sides, +were thrown into great disorder and confusion. The result was that, +finding both his van and his rear in difficulties, Demetrius fled. +Some of his men retreated towards the city; but most of them escaped +by bye-paths into various parts of the island. Demetrius himself made +his way to some galleys which he kept at anchor at a solitary point +on the coast, with a view to every contingency; and going on board, +he sailed away at nightfall, and arrived unexpectedly at the court of +King Philip, where he passed the remainder of his life:—a man whose +undoubted boldness and courage were unsupported by either prudence or +judgment. His end was of a piece with the whole tenor of his life; for +while endeavouring at the instigation of Philip to seize Messene, he +exposed himself during the battle with a careless rashness which cost +him his life; of which I shall speak in detail when I come to that +period. + +The Consul Aemilius having thus taken Pharos at a blow, levelled the +city to the ground; and then having become master of all Illyria, and +having ordered all its affairs as he thought right, returned towards +the end of the summer to Rome, where he celebrated a triumph amid +expressions of unmixed approval; for people considered that he had +managed this business with great prudence and even greater courage. + +[Sidenote: Indignation at Rome at the fall of Saguntum.] + ++20.+ But when news came to Rome of the fall of Saguntum, there was +indeed no debate on the question of war, as some historians assert; who +even add the speeches delivered on either side. But nothing could be +more ridiculous. For is it conceivable that the Romans should have a +year before proclaimed war with the Carthaginians in the event of their +entering the territory of Saguntum, and yet, when the city itself had +been taken, should have debated whether they should go to war or no? +Just as absurd are the wonderful statements that the senators put on +mourning, and that the fathers introduced their sons above twelve years +old into the Senate House, who, being admitted to the debate, refrained +from divulging any of its secrets even to their nearest relations. All +this is as improbable as it is untrue; unless we are to believe that +Fortune, among its other bounties, granted the Romans the privilege of +being men of the world from their cradles. I need not waste any more +words upon such compositions as those of Chaereas and Sosilus;[165] +which, in my judgment, are more like the gossip of the barber’s shop +and the pavement than history. + +[Sidenote: Envoys sent to Carthage to demand surrender of Hannibal.] + +The truth is that, when the Romans heard of the disaster at Saguntum, +they at once elected envoys, whom they despatched in all haste to +Carthage with the offer of two alternatives, one of which appeared +to the Carthaginians to involve disgrace as well as injury if they +accepted it, while the other was the beginning of a great struggle +and of great dangers. For one of these alternatives was the surrender +of Hannibal and his staff to Rome, the other was war. When the Roman +envoys arrived and declared their message to the Senate, the choice +proposed to them between these alternatives was listened to by the +Carthaginians with indignation. Still they selected the most capable of +their number to state their case, which was grounded on the following +pleas. + ++21.+ Passing over the treaty made with Hasdrubal, as not having ever +been made, and, if it had, as not being binding on them because made +without their consent (and on this point they quoted the precedent of +the Romans themselves, who in the Sicilian war repudiated the terms +agreed upon and accepted by Lutatius, as having been made without +their consent)—passing over this, they pressed with all the vehemence +they could, throughout the discussion, the last treaty made in the +Sicilian war; in which they affirmed that there was no clause relating +to Iberia, but one expressly providing security for the allies of both +parties to the treaty. Now, they pointed out that the Saguntines at +that time were not allies of Rome, and therefore were not protected +by the clause. To prove their point, they read the treaty more than +once aloud. On this occasion the Roman envoys contented themselves +with the reply that, while Saguntum was intact, the matter in +dispute admitted of pleadings and of a discussion on its merits; but +that, that city having been treacherously seized, they had only two +alternatives,—either to deliver the persons guilty of the act, and +thereby make it clear that they had no share in their crime, and that +it was done without their consent; or, if they were not willing to do +that, and avowed their complicity in it, to take the consequences. + +The question of treaties between Rome and Carthage was referred +to in general terms in the course of this debate: but I think a +more particular examination of it will be useful both to practical +statesmen, who require to know the exact truth of the matter, in order +to avoid mistakes in any critical deliberation; and to historical +students, that they may not be led astray by the ignorance or partisan +bias of historians; but may have before them a conspectus, acknowledged +to be accurate, of the various compacts which have been made between +Rome and Carthage from the earliest times to our own day. + +[Sidenote: Treaties between Rome and Carthage.] + +[Sidenote: The first treaty, B.C. 509-508.] + ++22.+ The first treaty between Rome and Carthage was made in the +year of Lucius Junius Brutus and Marcus Horatius, the first Consuls +appointed after the expulsion of the kings, by which men also the +temple of Jupiter Capitolinus was consecrated. This was twenty-eight +years before the invasion of Greece by Xerxes. Of this treaty I append +a translation, as accurate as I could make it,—for the fact is that +the ancient language differs so much from that at present in use, that +the best scholars among the Romans themselves have great difficulty in +interpreting some points in it, even after much study. The treaty is as +follows:— + +“There shall be friendship between the Romans and their allies, and the +Carthaginians and their allies, on these conditions: + +“Neither the Romans nor their allies are to sail beyond the Fair +Promontory, unless driven by stress of weather or the fear of enemies. +If any one of them be driven ashore he shall not buy or take aught for +himself save what is needful for the repair of his ship and the service +of the gods, and he shall depart within five days. + +“Men landing for traffic shall strike no bargain save in the presence +of a herald or town-clerk. Whatever is sold in the presence of these, +let the price be secured to the seller on the credit of the state—that +is to say, if such sale be in Libya or Sardinia. + +“If any Roman comes to the Carthaginian province in Sicily he shall +enjoy all rights enjoyed by others. The Carthaginians shall do no +injury to the people of Ardea, Antium, Laurentium, Circeii, Tarracina, +nor any other people of the Latins that are subject to Rome. + +“From those townships even which are not subject to Rome[166] they +shall hold their hands; and if they take one shall deliver it unharmed +to the Romans. They shall build no fort in Latium; and if they enter +the district in arms, they shall not stay a night therein.” + ++23.+ The “Fair Promontory” here referred to is that which lies +immediately to the north of Carthage; south of which the Carthaginians +stipulated that the Romans should not sail with ships of war, because, +as I imagine, they did not wish them to be acquainted with the coast +near Byzacium, or the lesser Syrtis, which places they call Emporia, +owing to the productiveness of the district. The treaty then goes on +to say that, if any one of them is driven thither by stress of weather +or fear of an enemy, and stands in need of anything for the worship of +the gods and the repair of his vessel, this and no more he may take; +and all those who have come to anchor there must necessarily depart +within five days. To Carthage, and all the country on the Carthaginian +side of the Fair Promontory in Libya, to Sardinia, and the Carthaginian +province of Sicily, the treaty allows the Romans to sail for mercantile +purposes; and the Carthaginians engage their public credit that such +persons shall enjoy absolute security. + +It is clear from this treaty that the Carthaginians speak of Sardinia +and Libya as belonging to them entirely; but, on the other hand, make +a distinction in the case of Sicily, and only stipulate for that part +of it which is subject to Carthage. Similarly, the Romans also only +stipulate concerning Latium; the rest of Italy they do not mention, as +not being under their authority. + +[Sidenote: Second treaty, B.C. 306 (?).] + ++24.+ After this treaty there was a second, in which we find that the +Carthaginians have included the Tyrians and the township of Utica +in addition to their former territory; and to the Fair Promontory +Mastia and Tarseium are added, as the points east of which the +Romans are not to make marauding expeditions or found a city. The +treaty is as follows: “There shall be friendship between the Romans +and their allies, and the Carthaginians, Tyrians, and township of +Utica, on these terms: The Romans shall not maraud, nor traffic, nor +found a city east of the Fair Promontory, Mastia, Tarseium. If the +Carthaginians take any city in Latium which is not subject to Rome, +they may keep the prisoners and the goods, but shall deliver up the +town. If the Carthaginians take any folk, between whom and Rome a peace +has been made in writing, though they be not subject to them, they +shall not bring them into any harbours of the Romans; if such an one +be so brought ashore, and any Roman lay claim to him,[167] he shall +be released. In like manner shall the Romans be bound towards the +Carthaginians. + +“If a Roman take water or provisions from any district within the +jurisdiction of Carthage, he shall not injure, while so doing, any +between whom and Carthage there is peace and friendship. Neither shall +a Carthaginian in like case. If any one shall do so, he shall not +be punished by private vengeance, but such action shall be a public +misdemeanour. + +“In Sardinia and Libya no Roman shall traffic nor found a city; he +shall do no more than take in provisions and refit his ship. If a storm +drive him upon those coasts, he shall depart within five days. + +“In the Carthaginian province of Sicily and in Carthage he may transact +business and sell whatsoever it is lawful for a citizen to do. In like +manner also may a Carthaginian at Rome.” + +Once more in this treaty we may notice that the Carthaginians emphasise +the fact of their entire possession of Libya and Sardinia, and prohibit +any attempt of the Romans to land in them at all; and on the other +hand, in the case of Sicily, they clearly distinguish their own +province in it. So, too, the Romans, in regard to Latium, stipulate +that the Carthaginians shall do no wrong to Ardea, Antium, Circeii, +Tarracina, all of which are on the seaboard of Latium, to which alone +the treaty refers. + +[Sidenote: Third treaty, B.C. 279.] + ++25.+ A third treaty again was made by Rome at the time of the invasion +of Pyrrhus into Sicily, before the Carthaginians undertook the war for +the possession of Sicily. This treaty contains the same provisions as +the two earlier treaties with these additional clauses:— + +“If they make a treaty of alliance with Pyrrhus, the Romans or +Carthaginians shall make it on such terms as not to preclude the one +giving aid to the other, if that one’s territory is attacked. + +“If one or the other stand in need of help, the Carthaginians shall +supply the ships, whether for transport or war; but each people shall +supply the pay for its own men employed on them. + +“The Carthaginians shall also give aid by sea to the Romans if need be; +but no one shall compel the crews to disembark against their will.” + +Provision was also made for swearing to these treaties. In the case +of the first, the Carthaginians were to swear by the gods of their +ancestors, the Romans by Jupiter Lapis, in accordance with an ancient +custom; in the case of the last treaty, by Mars and Quirinus. + +The form of swearing by Jupiter Lapis was this. The commissioner for +swearing to the treaty took a stone in his hand, and, having taken the +oath in the name of his country, added these words, “If I abide by this +oath may he bless me; but if I do otherwise in thought or act, may all +others be kept safe each in his own country, under his own laws, in +enjoyment of his own goods, household gods, and tombs,—may I alone be +cast out, even as this stone is now.” And having uttered these words he +throws the stone from his hand. + +[Sidenote: Misstatement of Philinus.] + ++26.+ Seeing that such treaties exist and are preserved to this day, +engraved on brass in the treasury of the Aediles in the temple of +Jupiter Capitolinus, the historian Philinus certainly does give us some +reason to be surprised at him. Not at his ignorance of their existence: +for even in our own day those Romans and Carthaginians, whose age +placed them nearest to the times, and who had the reputation of taking +the greatest interest in public affairs, were unaware of it. But what +is surprising is, that he should have ventured on a statement exactly +opposite: “That there was a treaty between Rome and Carthage, in virtue +of which the Romans were bound to keep away from the whole of Sicily, +the Carthaginians from the whole of Italy; and that the Romans broke +the treaty and their oath when they first crossed over to Sicily.” +Whereas there does not exist, nor ever has existed, any such written +compact at all. Yet this assertion he makes in so many words in his +second book. I referred to this in the preface of my work, but reserved +a more detailed discussion of it to this place; which was necessary, +because the assertion of Philinus has misled a considerable number of +people on this point. I have nothing to say if a man chooses to attack +the Romans for crossing into Sicily, on the grounds of their having +taken the Mamertines into alliance at all; or in having thus acted in +answer to their request, after these men’s treachery to Rhegium as well +as Messene: but if any one supposes that in so crossing they broke +oaths or treaties, he is manifestly ignorant of the truth. + +[Sidenote: Fourth treaty, B.C. 241.] + ++27.+ At the end of the first Punic war another treaty was made, +of which the chief provisions were these: “The Carthaginians shall +evacuate Sicily and all islands lying between Italy and Sicily. + +“The allies of neither of the parties to the treaty shall be attacked +by the other. + +“Neither party shall impose any contribution, nor erect any public +building, nor enlist soldiers in the dominions of the other, nor make +any compact of friendship with the allies of the other. + +“The Carthaginians shall within ten years pay to the Romans +two-thousand two-hundred talents, and a thousand on the spot; and shall +restore all prisoners, without ransom, to the Romans.” + +[Sidenote: Fifth treaty, B.C. 238.] + +Afterwards, at the end of the Mercenary war in Africa, the Romans went +so far as to pass a decree for war with Carthage, but eventually made +a treaty to the following effect: “The Carthaginians shall evacuate +Sardinia, and pay an additional twelve hundred talents.” + +[Sidenote: Sixth treaty, B.C. 228.] + +Finally, in addition to these treaties, came that negotiated with +Hasdrubal in Iberia, in which it was stipulated that “the Carthaginians +should not cross the Iber with arms.” + +Such were the mutual obligations established between Rome and Carthage +from the earliest times to that of Hannibal. + +[Sidenote: No excuse for the Roman claim on Sardinia.] + ++28.+ As we find then that the Roman invasion of Sicily was not in +contravention of their oaths, so we must acknowledge in the case of +the second proclamation of war, in consequence of which the treaty for +the evacuation of Sardinia was made, that it is impossible to find any +reasonable pretext or ground for the Roman action. The Carthaginians +were beyond question compelled by the necessities of their position, +contrary to all justice, to evacuate Sardinia, and to pay this enormous +sum of money. For as to the allegation of the Romans, that they had +during the Mercenary war been guilty of acts of hostility to ships +sailing from Rome,—that was barred by their own act in restoring, +without ransom, the Carthaginian prisoners, in gratitude for similar +conduct on the part of Carthage to Romans who had landed on their +shores; a transaction which I have spoken of at length in my previous +book.[168] + +These facts established, it remains to decide by a thorough +investigation to which of the two nations the origin of the Hannibalian +war is to be imputed. + +[Sidenote: The Roman Case.] + ++29.+ I have explained the pleas advanced by the Carthaginians; I must +now state what is alleged on the contrary by the Romans. For though +it is true that in this particular interview, owing to their anger at +the fall of Saguntum, they did not use these arguments, yet they were +appealed to on many occasions, and by many of their citizens. First, +they argued that the treaty of Hasdrubal could not be ignored, as the +Carthaginians had the assurance to do: for it did not contain the +clause, which that of Lutatius did, making its validity conditional +on its ratification by the people of Rome; but Hasdrubal made the +agreement absolutely and authoritatively that “the Carthaginians should +not cross the Iber in arms.” + +Next they alleged that the clause in the treaty respecting Sicily, +which by their own admission stipulated that “the allies of neither +party should be attacked by the other,” did not refer to then existing +allies only, as the Carthaginians interpreted it; for in that case +a clause would have been added, disabling either from making new +alliances in addition to those already existing, or excluding allies, +taken subsequently to the making of the treaty, from its benefits. +But since neither of these provisions was made, it was plain that +both the then existing allies, and all those taken subsequently on +either side, were entitled to reciprocal security. And this was only +reasonable. For it was not likely that they would have made a treaty +depriving them of the power, when opportunity offered, of taking on +such friends or allies as seemed to their interest; nor, again, if they +had taken any such under their protection, was it to be supposed that +they would allow them to be injured by any persons whatever. But, in +fact, the main thing present in the minds of both parties to the treaty +was, that they should mutually agree to abstain from attacking each +other’s allies, and on no account admit into alliance with themselves +the allies of the other: and it was to subsequent allies that this +particular clause applied, “Neither shall enlist soldiers, or impose +contributions on the provinces or allies of the other; and all shall be +alike secure of attack from the other side.” + ++30.+ These things being so, they argued that it was beyond controversy +that Saguntum had accepted the protection of Rome, several years before +the time of Hannibal. The strongest proof of this, and one which would +not be contested by the Carthaginians themselves, was that, when +political disturbances broke out at Saguntum, the people chose the +Romans, and not the Carthaginians, as arbitrators to settle the dispute +and restore their constitution, although the latter were close at hand +and were already established in Iberia. + +[Sidenote: Mutual provocation.] + +I conclude, then, that if the destruction of Saguntum is to be regarded +as the cause of this war, the Carthaginians must be acknowledged to be +in the wrong, both in view of the treaty of Lutatius, which secured +immunity from attack for the allies of both parties, and in view of +the treaty of Hasdrubal, which disabled the Carthaginians from passing +the Iber with arms.[169] If on the other hand the taking Sardinia from +them, and imposing the heavy money fine which accompanied it, are to +be regarded as the causes, we must certainly acknowledge that the +Carthaginians had good reason for undertaking the Hannibalian war: for +as they had only yielded to the pressure of circumstances, so they +seized a favourable turn in those circumstances to revenge themselves +on their injurers. + ++31.+ Some uncritical readers may perhaps say that such minute +discussion on points of this kind is unnecessary. And if any man were +entirely self-sufficing in every event, I might allow that the accurate +knowledge of the past, though a graceful accomplishment, was perhaps +not essential: but as long as it is not in mere mortals to say this, +either in public or private affairs,—seeing that no man of sense, even +if he is prosperous for the moment, will ever reckon with certainty +on the future,—then I say that such knowledge is essential, and not +merely graceful. For take the three commonest cases. Suppose, first, +a statesman to be attacked either in his own person or in that of his +country: or, secondly, suppose him to be anxious for a forward policy +and to anticipate the attack of an enemy: or, lastly, suppose him to +desire to maintain the _status quo_. In all these cases it is history +alone that can supply him with precedents, and teach him how, in the +first case, to find supporters and allies; in the second, to incite +co-operation; and in the third, to give vigour to the conservative +forces which tend to maintain, as he desires, the existing state of +things. In the case of contemporaries, it is difficult to obtain an +insight into their purposes; because, as their words and actions are +dictated by a desire of accommodating themselves to the necessity +of the hour, and of keeping up appearances, the truth is too often +obscured. Whereas the transactions of the past admit of being tested by +naked fact; and accordingly display without disguise the motives and +purposes of the several persons engaged; and teach us from what sort +of people to expect favour, active kindness, and assistance, or the +reverse. They give us also many opportunities of distinguishing who +would be likely to pity us, feel indignation at our wrongs, and defend +our cause,—a power that contributes very greatly to national as well +as individual security. Neither the writer nor the reader of history, +therefore, should confine his attention to a bare statement of facts: +he must take into account all that preceded, accompanied, or followed +them. For if you take from history all explanation of cause, principle, +and motive, and of the adaptation of the means to the end, what is left +is a mere panorama without being instructive; and, though it may please +for the moment, has no abiding value. + ++32.+ Another mistake is to look upon my history as difficult to +obtain or master, because of the number and size of the books. Compare +it in these particulars with the various writings of the episodical +historians. Is it not much easier to purchase and read my forty +books, which are as it were all in one piece, and so to follow with a +comprehensive glance the events in Italy, Sicily, and Libya from the +time of Pyrrhus to the fall of Carthage, and those in the rest of the +world from the flight of Cleomenes of Sparta, continuously, to the +battle between the Achaeans and Romans at the Isthmus? To say nothing +of the fact that the compositions of these historians are many times +as numerous as mine, it is impossible for their readers to get any +certain information from them: first, because most of them differ in +their account of the same transactions; and secondly, because they +omit contemporary history,—the comparative review of which would put +a very different complexion upon events to that derived from isolated +treatment,—and are unable to touch upon the most decisive events at +all. For, indeed, the most important parts of history are those which +treat the events which follow or accompany a certain course of conduct, +and pre-eminently so those which treat of causes. For instance, we +see that the war with Antiochus took its rise from that with Philip; +that with Philip from the Hannibalian; and the Hannibalian from the +Sicilian war: and though between these wars there were numerous events +of various character, they all converged upon the same consummation. +Such a comprehensive view may be obtained from universal history, but +not from the histories of particular wars, such as those with Perseus +or Philip; unless we fondly imagine that, by reading the accounts +contained in them of the pitched battles, we gain a knowledge of the +conduct and plan of the whole war. This of course is not the case; and +in the present instance I hope that there will be as wide a difference +between my history and such episodical compositions, as between real +learning and mere listening. + ++33.+ To resume the story of the Carthaginians and the Roman +deputies.[170] To the arguments of the former the [Sidenote: Answer +of Fabius. See Livy, 21, 18.] ambassadors made no answer, except that +the senior among them, in the presence of the assembly, pointed to the +folds of his toga and said that in them he carried peace and war, and +that he would bring out and leave with them whichever they bade him. +The Carthaginian Suffete[171] bade him bring out whichever of the two +he chose: and upon the Roman saying that it should be war, a majority +of the senators cried out in answer that they accepted it. It was on +these terms that the Senate and the Roman ambassadors parted. + +[Sidenote: Winter of 219-218 B.C. Hannibal’s arrangements for the +coming campaign.] + +Meanwhile Hannibal, upon going into winter quarters at New Carthage, +first of all dismissed the Iberians to their various cities, with +the view of their being prepared and vigorous for the next campaign. +Secondly, he instructed his brother Hasdrubal in the management of +his government in Iberia, and of the preparations to be made against +Rome, in case he himself should be separated from him. Thirdly, he +took precautions for the security of Libya, by selecting with prudent +skill certain soldiers from the home army to come over to Iberia, and +certain from the Iberian army to go to Libya; by which interchange +he secured cordial feeling of confidence between the two armies. The +Iberians sent to Libya were the Thersitae, the Mastiani, as well as +the Oretes and Olcades, mustering together twelve hundred cavalry and +thirteen thousand eight hundred and fifty foot. Besides these there +were eight hundred and seventy slingers from the Balearic Isles, +whose name, as that of the islands they inhabit, is derived from the +word _ballein_, “to throw,” because of their peculiar skill with the +sling. Most of these troops he ordered to be stationed at Metagonia +in Libya, and the rest in Carthage itself. And from the cities in the +district of Metagonia he sent four thousand foot also into Carthage, +to serve at once as hostages for the fidelity of their country, and +as an additional guard for the city. With his brother Hasdrubal in +Iberia he left fifty quinqueremes, two quadriremes, and five triremes, +thirty-two of the quinqueremes being furnished with crews, and all five +of the triremes; also cavalry consisting of four hundred and fifty +Libyophenicians and Libyans, three hundred Lergetae, eighteen hundred +Numidians of the Massolian, Massaesylian, Maccoeian, and Maurian +tribes, who dwell by the ocean; with eleven thousand eight hundred and +fifty Libyans, three hundred Ligures, five hundred of the Balearic +Islanders, and twenty-one elephants. + +[Sidenote: The inscription recording these facts.] + +The accuracy of this enumeration of Hannibal’s Iberian establishment +need excite no surprise, though it is such as a commander himself would +have some difficulty in displaying; nor ought I to be condemned at once +of imitating the specious falsehoods of historians: for the fact is +that I myself found on Lacinium[172] a bronze tablet, which Hannibal +had caused to be inscribed with these particulars when he was in Italy; +and holding it to be an entirely trustworthy authority for such facts, +I did not hesitate to follow it. + ++34.+ Though Hannibal had taken every precaution for the security of +Libya and Iberia, he yet waited for the messengers whom he expected to +arrive from the Celts. He had thoroughly acquainted himself with the +fertility and populousness of the districts at the foot of the Alps +and in the valley of the Padus, as well as with the warlike courage +of the men; but most important of all, with their hostile feelings +to Rome derived from the previous war, which I described in my last +book, with the express purpose of enabling my readers to follow my +narrative. He therefore reckoned very much on the chance of their +co-operation; and was careful to send messages to the chiefs of the +Celts, whether dwelling actually on the Alps or on the Italian side of +them, with unlimited promises; because he believed that he would be +able to confine the war against Rome to Italy, if he could make his way +through the intervening difficulties to these parts, and avail himself +of the active alliance of the Celts. When his messengers returned with +a report that the Celts were ready to help him and all eagerness for +his approach; and that the passage of the Alps, though laborious and +difficult, was not, however, impossible, he collected his forces from +their winter quarters at the approach of spring. Just before receiving +this report he had learnt the circumstances attending the Roman embassy +at Carthage. Encouraged by the assurance thus given him, that he would +be supported by the popular sentiment at home, he no longer disguised +from his army that the object of the forthcoming campaign was Rome; and +tried to inspire them with courage for the undertaking. He explained to +them how the Romans had demanded the surrender of himself and all the +officers of the army: and pointed out the fertility of the country to +which they were going, and the goodwill and active alliance which the +Celts were prepared to offer them. When the crowd of soldiers showed +an enthusiastic readiness to accompany him, he dismissed the assembly, +after thanking them, and naming the day on which he intended to march. + +[Sidenote: B.C. 218. Hannibal breaks up his winter quarters and starts +for Italy.] + ++35.+ These measures satisfactorily accomplished while he was in winter +quarters, and the security of Libya and Iberia being sufficiently +provided for; when the appointed day arrived, Hannibal got his army in +motion, which consisted of ninety thousand infantry and about twelve +thousand cavalry. After crossing the Iber, he set about subduing the +tribes of the Ilurgetes and Bargusii, as well as the Aerenosii and +Andosini, as far as the Pyrenees. When he had reduced all this country +under his power, and taken certain towns by storm, which he did with +unexpected rapidity, though not without severe fighting and serious +loss; he left Hanno in chief command of all the district north of the +Iber, and with absolute authority over the Burgusii, who were the +people that gave him most uneasiness on account of their friendly +feeling towards Rome. He then detached from his army ten thousand +foot and a thousand horse for the service of Hanno,—to whom also he +entrusted the heavy baggage of the troops that were to accompany +himself,—and the same number to go to their own land. The object of +this last measure was twofold: he thereby left a certain number of +well-affected persons behind him; and also held out to the others a +hope of returning home, both to those Iberians who were to accompany +him on his march, and to those also who for the present were to remain +at home, so that there might be a general alacrity to join him if he +were ever in want of a reinforcement. He then set his remaining troops +in motion unencumbered by heavy baggage, fifty thousand infantry and +nine thousand cavalry, and led them through the Pyrenees to the passage +of the river Rhone. The army was not so much numerous, as highly +efficient, and in an extraordinary state of physical training from +their continuous battles with the Iberians. + +[Sidenote: Geography of Hannibal’s march.] + ++36.+ But as a knowledge of topography is necessary for the right +understanding of my narrative, I must state the places from which +Hannibal started, through which he marched, and into which he descended +when he arrived in Italy. Nor must I, like some historians, content +myself with mentioning the mere names of places and rivers, under +the idea that that is quite sufficient to give a clear knowledge. My +opinion is that, in the case of well-known places, the mention of names +is of great assistance, but that, in the case of unknown countries, +names are no better than unintelligible and unmeaning sounds: for the +understanding having nothing to go upon, and being unable by referring +to something known to translate the words into thought, the narrative +becomes confused and vague, and conveys no clear idea. A plan therefore +must be discovered, whereby it shall be possible, while speaking of +unknown countries, to convey real and intelligible notions. + +The first, most important, and most general conception is that of the +division of the heaven into four quarters, which all of us that are +capable of a general idea at all know as east, west, south, and north. +The next is to arrange the several parts of the globe according to +these points, and always to refer in thought any place mentioned to +one or other of them. We shall thus get an intelligible and familiar +conception of places which we do not know or have never seen. + +[Sidenote: General view of the geography of the world.] + ++37.+ This principle established as universally applicable to the +world, the next point will be to make the geography of our own part of +it intelligible by a corresponding division. + +It falls, then, into three divisions, each distinguished by a +particular name,—Asia, Libya, Europe.[173] The boundaries are +respectively the Don, the Nile, and the Straits of the Pillars of +Hercules. Asia lies between the Don and the Nile, and lies under that +portion of the heaven which is between the north-east and the south. +Libya lies between the Nile and the Pillars of Hercules, and falls +beneath the south portion of the heaven, extending to the south-west +without a break, till it reaches the point of the equinoctial sunset, +which corresponds with the Pillars of Hercules. These two divisions +of the earth, therefore, regarded in a general point of view, occupy +all that part which is south of the Mediterranean from east to west. +Europe with respect to both of these lies to the north facing them, +and extending continuously from east to west. Its most important and +extensive part lies under the northern sky between the river Don and +the Narbo, which is only a short distance west of Marseilles and +the mouths by which the Rhone discharges itself into the Sardinian +Sea. From Narbo is the district occupied by the Celts as far as the +Pyrenees, stretching continuously from the Mediterranean to the Mare +Externum. The rest of Europe south of the Pyrenees, to the point where +it approaches the Pillars of Hercules, is bounded on one side by the +Mediterranean, on the other by the Mare Externum; and that part of it +which is washed by the Mediterranean as far as the Pillars of Hercules +is called Iberia, while the part which lies along the Outer or Great +Sea has no general name, because it has but recently been discovered, +and is inhabited entirely by barbarous tribes, who are very numerous, +and of whom I will speak in more detail hereafter. + +[Sidenote: The extreme north and south unknown.] + ++38.+ But as no one up to our time has been able to settle in regard +to those parts of Asia and Libya, where they approach each other in +the neighbourhood of Ethiopia, whether the continent is continuous to +the south, or is surrounded by the sea, so it is in regard to the part +between Narbo and the Don: none of us as yet knows anything of the +northern extent of this district, and anything we can ever know must be +the result of future exploration; and those who rashly venture by word +of mouth or written statements to describe this district must be looked +upon as ignorant or romancing. + +My object in these observations was to prevent my narrative being +entirely vague to those who were unacquainted with the localities. I +hoped that, by keeping these broad distinctions in mind, they would +have some definite standard to which to refer every mention of a place, +starting from the primary one of the division of the sky into four +quarters. For, as in the case of physical sight, we instinctively turn +our faces to any object pointed at; so in the case of the mind, our +thoughts ought to turn naturally to localities as they are mentioned +from time to time. + +It is time now to return to the story we have in hand. + +[Sidenote: The length of the march from Carthagena to the Po, 1125 +Roman miles.] + ++39.+ At this period the Carthaginians were masters of the whole +Mediterranean coast of Libya from the Altars of Philaenus,[174] +opposite the Great Syrtis, to the Pillars of Hercules, a seaboard of +over sixteen thousand stades. They had also crossed the strait of the +Pillars of Hercules, and got possession of the whole seaboard of Iberia +on the Mediterranean as far as the Pyrenees, which separate the Iberes +from the Celts—that is, for a distance of about eight thousand stades: +for it is three thousand from the Pillars to New Carthage, from which +Hannibal started for Italy; two thousand six hundred from thence to +the Iber; and from that river to Emporium again sixteen hundred; from +which town, I may add, to the passage of the Rhone is a distance of +about sixteen hundred stades; for all these distances have now been +carefully measured by the Romans and marked with milestones at every +eighth stade.[175] After crossing the river there was a march up stream +along its bank of fourteen hundred stades, before reaching the foot of +the pass over the Alps into Italy. The pass itself was about twelve +hundred stades, which being crossed would bring him into the plains +of the Padus in Italy. So that the whole length of his march from New +Carthage was about nine thousand stades, or 1125 Roman miles. Of the +country he had thus to traverse he had already passed almost half in +mere distance, but in the difficulties the greater part of his task was +still before him. + +[Sidenote: Coss. P. Cornelius Scipio and Tib. Sempronius Longus. B.C. +218. The Consuls are sent, one to Spain, and the other to Africa.] + +[Sidenote: Placentia and Cremona.] + +[Sidenote: Outrage by Boii and Insubres.] + ++40.+ While Hannibal was thus engaged in effecting a passage over the +Pyrenees, where he was greatly alarmed at the extraordinary strength +of the positions occupied by the Celts; the Romans, having heard the +result of the embassy to Carthage, and that Hannibal had crossed +the Iber earlier than they expected, at the head of an army, voted +to send Publius Cornelius Scipio with his legions into Iberia, and +Tiberius Sempronius Longus into Libya. And while the Consuls were +engaged in hastening on the enrolment of their legions and other +military preparations, the people were active in bringing to completion +the colonies which they had already voted to send into Gaul. They +accordingly caused the fortification of these towns to be energetically +pushed on, and ordered the colonists to be in residence within thirty +days: six thousand having been assigned to each colony. One of these +colonies was on the south bank of the Padus, and was called Placentia; +the other on the north bank, called Cremona. But no sooner had these +colonies been formed, than the Boian Gauls, who had long been lying in +wait to throw off their loyalty to Rome, but had up to that time lacked +an opportunity, encouraged by the news that reached them of Hannibal’s +approach, revolted; thus abandoning the hostages which they had given +at the end of the war described in my last book. The ill-feeling still +remaining towards Rome enabled them to induce the Insubres to join in +the revolt; and the united tribes swept over the territory recently +allotted by the Romans, and following close upon the track of the +flying colonists, laid siege to the Roman colony of Mutina, in which +the fugitives had taken refuge. Among them were the _triumviri_ or +three commissioners who had been sent out to allot the lands, of whom +one—Gaius Lutatius—was an ex-consul, the other two ex-praetors. These +men having demanded a parley with the enemy, the Boii consented: but +treacherously seized them upon their leaving the town, hoping by their +means to recover their own hostages. The praetor Lucius Manlius was +on guard in the district with an army, and as soon as he heard what +had happened, he advanced with all speed to the relief of Mutina. +But the Boii, having got intelligence of his approach, prepared an +ambuscade; and as soon as his army had entered a certain wood, they +rushed out upon it from every side and killed a large number of his +men. The survivors at first fled with precipitation: but having gained +some higher ground, they rallied sufficiently to enable them with much +difficulty to effect an honourable retreat. Even so, the Boii followed +close upon their heels, and besieged them in a place called the +village of Tannes.[176] When the news arrived at Rome, that the fourth +legion was surrounded and closely besieged by the Boii, the people in +all haste despatched the legions which had been voted to the Consul +Publius, to their relief, under the command of a Praetor, and ordered +the Consul to enrol two more legions for himself from the allies. + ++41.+ Such was the state of Celtic affairs from the beginning to the +arrival of Hannibal; thus completing the course of events which I have +already had occasion to describe. + +[Sidenote: Tiberius Sempronius prepares to attack Carthage.] + +Meanwhile the Consuls, having completed the necessary preparations for +their respective missions, set sail at the beginning of summer—Publius +to Iberia, with sixty ships, and Tiberius Sempronius to Libya, with a +hundred and sixty quinqueremes. The latter thought by means of this +great fleet to strike terror into the enemy; and made vast preparations +at Lilybaeum, collecting fresh troops wherever he could get them, as +though with the view of at once blockading Carthage itself. + +[Sidenote: Publius Scipio lands near Marseilles.] + +Publius Cornelius coasted along Liguria, and crossing in five days +from Pisae to Marseilles, dropped anchor at the most eastern mouth of +the Rhone, called the Mouth of Marseilles,[177] and began disembarking +his troops. For though he heard that Hannibal was already crossing the +Pyrenees, he felt sure that he was still a long way off, owing to the +difficulty of his line of country, and the number of the intervening +Celtic tribes. But long before he was expected, Hannibal had arrived +at the crossing of the Rhone, keeping the Sardinian Sea on his right +as he marched, and having made his way through the Celts partly by +bribes and partly by force. Being informed that the enemy were at hand, +Publius was at first incredulous of the fact, because of the rapidity +of the advance; but wishing to know the exact state of the case,—while +staying behind himself to refresh his troops after their voyage, and to +consult with the Tribunes as to the best ground on which to give the +enemy battle,—he sent out a reconnoitring party, consisting of three +hundred of his bravest horse; joining with them as guides and supports +some Celts, who chanced to be serving as mercenaries at the time in +Marseilles. + +[Sidenote: Hannibal reaches the Rhone.] + ++42.+ Meanwhile Hannibal had reached the river and was trying to get +across it where the stream was single, at a distance of four days’ +march from the sea. He did all he could to make the natives living by +the river friendly to him, and purchased from them all their canoes of +hollow trunks, and wherries, of which there were a large number, owing +to the extensive sea traffic of the inhabitants of the Rhone valley. +He got from them also the timber suited to the construction of these +canoes; and so in two days had an innumerable supply of transports, +every soldier seeking to be independent of his neighbour, and to have +the means of crossing in his own hands. But now a large multitude of +barbarians collected on the other side of the stream to hinder the +passage of the Carthaginians. When Hannibal saw them, he came to the +conclusion that it would be impossible either to force a passage in +the face of so large a body of the enemy, or to remain where he was, +for fear of being attacked on all sides at once: and he accordingly, +on the third night, sent forward a detachment of his army with native +guides, under the command of Hanno, the son of the Suffete[178] +Bomilcar. [Sidenote: A detachment crosses higher up the river.] This +force marched up stream along the bank for two hundred stades, until +they arrived at a certain spot where the stream is divided by an eyot, +and there halted. They found enough wood close at hand to enable them, +by nailing or tying it together, to construct within a short time a +large number of rafts good enough for temporary use; and on these they +crossed in safety, without any one trying to stop them. Then, seizing +upon a strong position, they kept quiet for the rest of the day: partly +to refresh themselves after their fatigues, and at the same time to +complete their preparations for the service awaiting them, as they had +been ordered to do. Hannibal was preparing to proceed much in the same +way with the forces left behind with himself; but his chief difficulty +was in getting the elephants across, of which he had thirty-seven. + +[Sidenote: The crossing begun.] + ++43.+ When the fifth night came, however, the division which had +crossed first started before daybreak to march down the opposite bank +of the river and attack the barbarians; while Hannibal, having his men +in readiness, began to attempt the passage of the river. He had filled +the wherries with the heavy-armed cavalry, and the canoes with the most +active of his foot; and he now arranged that the wherries should cross +higher up the stream, and the canoes below them, that the violence of +the current might be broken by the former, and the canoes cross more +safely. The plan for the horses was that they should swim at the stern +of the wherries, one man on each side of the stern guiding three or +four with leading reins: so that a considerable number of horses were +brought over at once with the first detachment. When they saw what the +enemy meant to do, the barbarians, without forming their ranks, poured +out of their entrenchments in scattered groups, feeling no doubt of +being able to stop the crossing of the Carthaginians with ease. As soon +as Hannibal saw by the smoke, which was the signal agreed upon, that +the advanced detachment on the other side was approaching, he ordered +all to go on board, and the men in charge of the transports to push +out against the stream. This was promptly done: and then began a most +anxious and exciting scene. Cheer after cheer rose from the men who +were working the boats, as they struggled to outstrip each other, and +exerted themselves to the utmost to overcome the force of the current. +On the edge of either bank stood the two armies: the one sharing in the +struggles of their comrades by sympathy, and shouting encouragement +to them as they went; while the barbarians in front of them yelled +their war-cries and challenged them to battle. While this was going on +the barbarians had abandoned their tents, which the Carthaginians on +that side of the river suddenly and unexpectedly seized. Some of them +proceeded to set fire to the camp, while the greater number went to +attack the men who were standing ready to resist the passage. Surprised +by this unlooked-for event, some of the barbarians rushed off to save +their tents, while others prepared to resist the attack of the enemy, +and were now actually engaged. Seeing that everything was going as +he had intended, Hannibal at once formed the first division as it +disembarked: and after addressing some encouraging words to it, closed +with the barbarians, who, having no time to form their ranks, and being +taken by surprise, were quickly repulsed and put to flight. + +[Sidenote: Completed.] + +[Sidenote: Message from friendly Gauls.] + ++44.+ Being thus master of the passage of the river, and victorious +over those who opposed him, the first care of the Carthaginian +leader was to bring his whole army across. This being expeditiously +accomplished, he pitched his camp for that night by the river-side, and +on the morrow, when he was told that the Roman fleet was anchored off +the mouths of the river, he detached five hundred Numidian horsemen +to reconnoitre the enemy and find out their position, their numbers, +and what they were going to do; and at the same time selected suitable +men to manage the passage of the elephants. These arrangements made, +he summoned a meeting of his army and introduced Magilus and the other +chiefs who had come to him from the valley of the Padus, and caused +them to declare to the whole army, by means of an interpreter, the +resolutions passed by their tribes. The points which were the strongest +encouragement to the army were, first, the actual appearance of envoys +inviting them to come, and promising to take part in the war with Rome; +secondly, the confidence inspired by their promise of guiding them by +a route where they would be abundantly supplied with necessaries, and +which would lead them with speed and safety into Italy; and, lastly, +the fertility and vast extent of the country to which they were going, +and the friendly feelings of the men with whose assistance they were +about to fight the armies of Rome. + +Such was the substance of the speeches of the Celts. When they had +withdrawn, Hannibal himself rose, and after reminding the soldiers +of what they had already achieved, and pointing out that, though +they had under his counsel and advice engaged in many perilous and +dangerous enterprises, they had never failed in one, he bade them “not +lose courage now that the most serious part of their undertaking was +accomplished. The Rhone was crossed: they had seen with their own eyes +the display of goodwill and zeal of their allies. Let this convince +them that they should leave the rest to him with confidence; and while +obeying his orders show themselves men of courage and worthy of their +former deeds.” These words being received with shouts of approval, and +other manifestations of great enthusiasm, on the part of the soldiers, +Hannibal dismissed the assembly with words of praise to the men and +a prayer to the gods on their behalf; after giving out an order that +they should refresh themselves, and make all their preparations with +despatch, as the advance must begin on the morrow. + +[Sidenote: Skirmish between reconnoitring parties.] + ++45.+ When the assembly had been dismissed, the reconnoitring party +of Numidians returned in headlong flight, after losing more than half +their numbers. Not far from the camp they had fallen in with a party +of Roman horse, who had been sent out by Publius on the same errand; +and an engagement took place with such fury on either side, that the +Romans and Celts lost a hundred and forty men, and the Numidians more +than two hundred. After this skirmish, the Romans pursued them up to +the Carthaginian entrenchments: and having surveyed it, they hastened +back to announce to the Consul the presence of the enemy. As soon as +they arrived at the Roman camp with this intelligence, Publius put his +baggage on board ship, and marched his men up the bank of the river, +with the earnest desire of forcing the enemy to give him battle. + +But at sunrise on the day after the assembly, Hannibal having stationed +his whole cavalry on the rear, in the direction of the sea, so as to +cover the advance, ordered his infantry to leave the entrenchment and +begin their march; while he himself waited behind for the elephants, +and the men who had not yet crossed the river. + +[Sidenote: The passage of the elephants.] + ++46.+ The mode of getting the elephants across was as follows. They +made a number of rafts strongly compacted, which they lashed firmly +two and two together, so as to form combined a breadth of about fifty +feet, and brought them close under the bank at the place of crossing. +To the outer edge of these they lashed some others and made them join +exactly; so that the whole raft thus constructed stretched out some way +into the channel, while the edges towards the stream were made fast to +the land with ropes tied to trees which grew along the brink, to secure +the raft keeping its place and not drifting down the river. These +combined rafts stretching about two hundred feet across the stream, +they joined two other very large ones to the outer edges, fastened very +firmly together, but connected with the others by ropes which admitted +of being easily cut. To these they fastened several towing lines, +that the wherries might prevent the rafts drifting down stream, and +might drag them forcibly against the current and so get the elephants +across on them. Then they threw a great deal of earth upon all the +rafts, until they had raised the surface to the level of the bank, and +made it look like the path on the land leading down to the passage. +The elephants were accustomed to obey their Indian riders until they +came to water, but could never be induced to step into water: they +therefore led them upon this earth, putting two females in front whom +the others obediently followed. When they had set foot on the rafts +that were farthest out in the stream, the ropes were cut which fastened +these to the other rafts, the towing lines were pulled taut by the +wherries, and the elephants, with the rafts on which they stood, were +quickly towed away from the mound of earth. When this happened, the +animals were terror-stricken; and at first turned round and round, and +rushed first to one part of the raft and then to another, but finding +themselves completely surrounded by the water, they were too frightened +to do anything, and were obliged to stay where they were. And it was by +repeating this contrivance of joining a pair of rafts to the others, +that eventually the greater part of the elephants were got across. +Some of them, however, in the middle of the crossing, threw themselves +in their terror into the river: but though their Indian riders were +drowned, the animals themselves got safe to land, saved by the strength +and great length of their probosces; for by raising these above the +water, they were enabled to breathe through them, and blow out any +water that got into them, while for the most part they got through the +river on their feet. + ++47.+ The elephants having been thus got across, Hannibal formed them +and the cavalry into a rear-guard, and marched up the river bank away +from the sea in an easterly direction, as though making for the central +district of Europe. + +The Rhone rises to the north-west of the Adriatic Gulf on the northern +slopes of the Alps,[179] and flowing westward, eventually discharges +itself into the Sardinian Sea. It flows for the most part through +a deep valley, to the north of which lives the Celtic tribe of the +Ardyes; while its southern side is entirely walled in by the northern +slopes of the Alps, the ridges of which, beginning at Marseilles and +extending to the head of the Adriatic, separate it from the valley of +the Padus, of which I have already had occasion to speak at length. It +was these mountains that Hannibal now crossed from the Rhone valley +into Italy. + +Some historians of this passage of the Alps, in their desire to +produce a striking effect by their descriptions of the wonders of this +country, have fallen into two errors which are more alien than anything +else to the spirit of history,—perversion of fact and inconsistency. +Introducing Hannibal as a prodigy of strategic skill and boldness, they +yet represent him as acting with the most conspicuous indiscretion; +and then, finding themselves involved in an inextricable maze of +falsehood, they try to cut the knot by the introduction of gods and +heroes into what is meant to be genuine history. They begin by saying +that the Alps are so precipitous and inaccessible that, so far from +horses and troops, accompanied too by elephants, being able to cross +them, it would be very difficult for even active men on foot to do so: +and similarly they tell us that the desolation of this district is so +complete, that, had not some god or hero met Hannibal’s forces and +showed them the way, they would have been hopelessly lost and perished +to a man. + +Such stories involve both the errors I have mentioned,—they are both +false and inconsistent. + ++48.+ For could a more irrational proceeding on the part of a general +be imagined than that of Hannibal, if, when in command of so numerous +an army, on whom the success of his expedition entirely depended, +he allowed himself to remain in ignorance of the roads, the lie of +the country, the route to be taken, and the people to which it led, +and above all as to the practicability of what he was undertaking +to do? They, in fact, represent Hannibal, when at the height of his +expectation of success, doing what those would hardly do who have +utterly failed and have been reduced to despair,—that is, to entrust +themselves and their forces to an unknown country. And so, too, what +they say about the desolation of the district, and its precipitous and +inaccessible character, only serves to bring their untrustworthiness +into clearer light. For first, they pass over the fact that the Celts +of the Rhone valley had on several occasions before Hannibal came, +and that in very recent times, crossed the Alps with large forces, +and fought battles with the Romans in alliance with the Celts of the +valley of the Padus, as I have already stated. And secondly, they are +unaware of the fact that a very numerous tribe of people inhabit the +Alps. Accordingly in their ignorance of these facts they take refuge +in the assertion that a hero showed Hannibal the way. They are, in +fact, in the same case as tragedians, who, beginning with an improbable +and impossible plot, are obliged to bring in a _deus ex machina_ to +solve the difficulty and end the play. The absurd premises of these +historians naturally require some such supernatural agency to help them +out of the difficulty: an absurd beginning could only have an absurd +ending. For of course Hannibal did not act as these writers say he did; +but, on the contrary, conducted his plans with the utmost prudence. +He had thoroughly informed himself of the fertility of the country +into which he designed to descend, and of the hostile feelings of its +inhabitants towards Rome, and for his journey through the difficult +district which intervened he employed native guides and pioneers, whose +interests were bound up with his own. I speak with confidence on these +points, because I have questioned persons actually engaged on the +facts, and have inspected the country, and gone over the Alpine pass +myself, in order to inform myself of the truth and see with my own eyes. + +[Sidenote: Scipio finds that Hannibal has escaped him.] + ++49.+ Three days after Hannibal had resumed his march, the Consul +Publius arrived at the passage of the river. He was in the highest +degree astonished to find the enemy gone: for he had persuaded himself +that they would never venture to take this route into Italy, on account +of the numbers and fickleness of the barbarians who inhabited the +country. But seeing that they had done so, he hurried back to his ships +and at once embarked his forces. He then despatched his brother Gnaeus +to conduct the campaign in Iberia, while he himself turned back again +to Italy by sea, being anxious to anticipate the enemy by marching +through Etruria to the foot of the pass of the Alps. + +[Sidenote: Hannibal’s march to the foot of the Alps.] + +Meanwhile, after four days’ march from the passage of the Rhone, +Hannibal arrived at the place called the Island, a district thickly +inhabited and exceedingly productive of corn. Its name is derived +from its natural features: for the Rhone and Isara flowing on either +side of it make the apex of a triangle where they meet, very nearly +of the same size and shape as the delta of the Nile, except that the +base of the latter is formed by the sea into which its various streams +are discharged, while in the case of the former this base is formed +by mountains difficult to approach or climb, and, so to speak, almost +inaccessible. When Hannibal arrived in this district he found two +brothers engaged in a dispute for the royal power, and confronting each +other with their armies. The elder sought his alliance and invited +his assistance in gaining the crown: and the advantage which such a +circumstance might prove to him at that juncture of his affairs being +manifest, he consented; and having joined him in his attack upon his +brother, and aided in expelling him, he obtained valuable support from +the victorious chieftain. For this prince not only liberally supplied +his army with provisions, but exchanged all their old and damaged +weapons for new ones, and thus at a very opportune time thoroughly +restored the efficiency of the troops: he also gave most of the men +new clothes and boots, which proved of great advantage during their +passage of the mountains. But his most essential service was that, the +Carthaginians being greatly alarmed at the prospect of marching through +the territory of the Allobroges, he acted with his army as their +rear-guard, and secured them a safe passage as far as the foot of the +pass. + +[Sidenote: The ascent.] + ++50.+ Having in ten days’ march accomplished a distance of eight +hundred stades along the river bank, Hannibal began the ascent of the +Alps,[180] and immediately found himself involved in the most serious +dangers. For as long as the Carthaginians were on the plains, the +various chiefs of the Allobroges refrained from attacking them from +fear of their cavalry, as well as of the Gauls who were escorting +them. But when these last departed back again to their own lands, +and Hannibal began to enter the mountainous region, the chiefs of +the Allobroges collected large numbers of their tribe and occupied +the points of vantage in advance, on the route by which Hannibal’s +troops were constrained to make their ascent. If they had only kept +their design secret, the Carthaginian army would have been entirely +destroyed: as it was, their plans became known, and though they did +much damage to Hannibal’s army, they suffered as much themselves. For +when that general learnt that the natives were occupying the points +of vantage, he halted and pitched his camp at the foot of the pass, +and sent forward some of his Gallic guides to reconnoitre the enemy +and discover their plan of operations. The order was obeyed: and he +ascertained that it was the enemy’s practice to keep under arms, and +guard these posts carefully, during the day, but at night to retire +to some town in the neighbourhood. Hannibal accordingly adapted his +measures to this strategy of the enemy. He marched forward in broad +daylight, and as soon as he came to the mountainous part of the road, +pitched his camp only a little way from the enemy. At nightfall he gave +orders for the watch-fires to be lit; and leaving the main body of his +troops in the camp, and selecting the most suitable of his men, he had +them armed lightly, and led them through the narrow parts of the road +during the night, and seized on the spots which had been previously +occupied by the enemy: they having, according to their regular custom, +abandoned them for the nearest town. + +[Sidenote: The Gauls harass the army.] + ++51.+ When day broke the natives saw what had taken place, and at +first desisted from their attempts; but presently the sight of the +immense string of beasts of burden, and of the cavalry, slowly and +painfully making the ascent, tempted them to attack the advancing +line. Accordingly they fell upon it at many points at once; and the +Carthaginians sustained severe losses, not so much at the hands of +the enemy, as from the dangerous nature of the ground, which proved +especially fatal to the horses and beasts of burden. For as the ascent +was not only narrow and rough, but flanked also with precipices, at +every movement which tended to throw the line into disorder, large +numbers of the beasts of burden were hurled down the precipices with +their loads on their backs. And what added more than anything else to +this sort of confusion were the wounded horses; for, maddened by their +wounds, they either turned round and ran into the advancing beasts of +burden, or, rushing furiously forward, dashed aside everything that +came in their way on the narrow path, and so threw the whole line into +disorder. Hannibal saw what was taking place, and knowing that, even +if they escaped this attack, they could never survive the loss of all +their baggage, he took with him the men who had seized the strongholds +during the night and went to the relief of the advancing line. Having +the advantage of charging the enemy from the higher ground he inflicted +a severe loss upon them, but suffered also as severe a one in his +own army; for the commotion in the line now grew worse, and in both +directions at once—thanks to the shouting and struggling of these +combatants: and it was not until he had killed the greater number of +the Allobroges, and forced the rest to fly to their own land, that +the remainder of the beasts of burden and the horses got slowly, and +with difficulty, over the dangerous ground. Hannibal himself rallied +as many as he could after the fight, and assaulted the town from +which the enemy had sallied; and finding it almost deserted, because +its inhabitants had been all tempted out by the hope of booty, he +got possession of it: from which he obtained many advantages for the +future as well as for the present. The immediate gain consisted of a +large number of horses and beasts of burden, and men taken with them; +and for future use he got a supply of corn and cattle sufficient for +two or three days: but the most important result of all was the terror +inspired in the next tribes, which prevented any one of those who lived +near the ascent from lightly venturing to meddle with him again. + +[Sidenote: Treachery of the Gauls.] + ++52.+ Here he pitched a camp and remained a day, and started again. For +the next three days he accomplished a certain amount of his journey +without accident. But on the fourth he again found himself in serious +danger. For the dwellers along his route, having concerted a plan of +treachery, met him with branches and garlands, which among nearly all +the natives are signs of friendship, as the herald’s staff is among the +Greeks. Hannibal was cautious about accepting such assurances, and took +great pains to discover what their real intention and purpose were. +The Gauls however professed to be fully aware of the capture of the +town, and the destruction of those who had attempted to do him wrong; +and explained that those events had induced them to come, because they +wished neither to inflict nor receive any damage; and finally promised +to give him hostages. For a long while Hannibal hesitated and refused +to trust their speeches. But at length coming to the conclusion that, +if he accepted what was offered, he would perhaps render the men +before him less mischievous and implacable; but that, if he rejected +them, he must expect undisguised hostility from them, he acceded to +their request, and feigned to accept their offer of friendship. The +barbarians handed over the hostages, supplied him liberally with +cattle, and in fact put themselves unreservedly into his hands; so that +for a time Hannibal’s suspicions were allayed, and he employed them as +guides for the next difficulty that had to be passed. They guided the +army for two days: and then these tribes collected their numbers, and +keeping close up with the Carthaginians, attacked them just as they +were passing through a certain difficult and precipitous gorge. + +[Sidenote: Severe losses.] + ++53.+ Hannibal’s army would now have certainly been utterly destroyed, +had it not been for the fact that his fears were still on the alert, +and that, having a prescience of what was to come, he had placed his +baggage and cavalry in the van and his hoplites in the rear. These +latter covered his line, and were able to stem the attack of the enemy, +and accordingly the disaster was less than it would otherwise have +been. As it was, however, a large number of beasts of burden and horses +perished; for the advantage of the higher ground being with the enemy, +the Gauls moved along the slopes parallel with the army below, and by +rolling down boulders, or throwing stones, reduced the troops to a +state of the utmost confusion and danger; so that Hannibal with half +his force was obliged to pass the night near a certain white rock,[181] +which afforded them protection, separated from his horses and baggage +which he was covering; until after a whole night’s struggle they slowly +and with difficulty emerged from the gorge. + +[Sidenote: Arrives at the summit.] + +Next morning the enemy had disappeared: and Hannibal, having effected +a junction with his cavalry and baggage, led his men towards the head +of the pass, without falling in again with any important muster of the +natives, though he was harassed by some of them from time to time; +who seized favourable opportunities, now on his van and now on his +rear, of carrying off some of his baggage. His best protection was his +elephants; on whatever parts of the line they were placed the enemy +never ventured to approach, being terrified at the unwonted appearance +of the animals. The ninth day’s march brought him to the head of the +pass: and there he encamped for two days, partly to rest his men and +partly to allow stragglers to come up. Whilst they were there, many of +the horses who had taken fright and run away, and many of the beasts of +burden that had got rid of their loads, unexpectedly appeared: they had +followed the tracks of the army and now joined the camp. + +[Sidenote: 9th November.] + ++54.+ But by this time, it being nearly the period of the setting of +the Pleiads, the snow was beginning to be thick on the heights; and +seeing his men in low spirits, owing both to the fatigue they had +gone through, and that which still lay before them, Hannibal called +them together and tried to cheer them by dwelling on the one possible +topic of consolation in his power, namely the view of Italy: which lay +stretched out in both directions below those mountains, giving the +Alps the appearance of a citadel to the whole of Italy. By pointing +therefore to the plains of the Padus, and reminding them of the +friendly welcome which awaited them from the Gauls who lived there, +and at the same time indicating the direction of Rome itself, he did +somewhat to raise the drooping spirits of his men. + +[Sidenote: The descent.] + +Next day he began the descent, in which he no longer met with any +enemies, except some few secret pillagers; but from the dangerous +ground and the snow he lost almost as many men as on the ascent. +For the path down was narrow and precipitous, and the snow made it +impossible for the men to see where they were treading, while to +step aside from the path, or to stumble, meant being hurled down the +precipices. The troops however bore up against the fatigue, having +now grown accustomed to such hardships; but when they came to a place +where the path was too narrow for the elephants or beasts of burden to +pass,—and which, narrowed before by landslips extending about a stade +and a half, had recently been made more so by another landslip,—then +once more despondency and consternation fell upon the troops. +Hannibal’s first idea was to avoid this _mauvais pas_ by a détour, but +this route too being made impossible by a snow-storm, he abandoned the +idea. + +[Sidenote: A break in the road.] + ++55.+ The effect of the storm was peculiar and extraordinary. For +the present fall of snow coming upon the top of that which was there +before, and had remained from the last winter, it was found that the +former, being fresh, was soft and offered no resistance to the foot; +but when the feet reached the lower frozen snow, they could no longer +make any impression upon it, but the men found both their feet slipping +from under them, as though they were on hard ground with a layer of mud +on the top. And a still more serious difficulty followed: for not being +able to get a foothold on the lower snow, when they fell and tried to +get themselves up by their hands and knees, the men found themselves +plunging downwards quicker and quicker, along with everything they laid +hold of, the ground being a very steep decline. The beasts, however, +when they fell did break through this lower snow as they struggled to +rise, and having done so were obliged to remain there with their loads, +as though they were frozen to it, both from the weight of these loads +and the hardness of the old snow. Giving up, therefore, all hope of +making this détour, he encamped upon the ridge after clearing away the +snow upon it. He then set large parties of his men to work, and, with +infinite toil, began constructing a road on the face of the precipice. +One day’s work sufficed to make a path practicable for beasts of burden +and horses; and he accordingly took them across at once, and having +pitched his camp at a spot below the snow line, he let them go in +search of pasture; while he told off the Numidians in detachments to +proceed with the making of the road; and after three days’ difficult +and painful labour he got his elephants across, though in a miserable +condition from hunger. For the tops of the Alps, and the parts +immediately below them, are completely treeless and bare of vegetation, +because the snow lies there summer and winter; but about half-way down +the slopes on both sides they produce trees and shrubs, and are, in +fact, fit for human habitation. + +[Sidenote: He reaches the plains.] + ++56.+ So Hannibal mustered his forces and continued the descent; and +on the third day after passing the precipitous path just described he +reached the plains. From the beginning of his march he had lost many +men by the hands of the enemy, and in crossing rivers, and many more +on the precipices and dangerous passes of the Alps; and not only men +in this last way, but horses and beasts of burden in still greater +numbers. The whole march from New Carthage had occupied five months, +the actual passage of the Alps fifteen days; and he now boldly entered +the valley of the Padus, and the territory of the Insubres, with such +of his army as survived, consisting of twelve thousand Libyans and +eight thousand Iberians, and not more than six thousand cavalry in all, +as he himself distinctly states on the column erected on the promontory +of Lacinium to record the numbers. + +At the same time, as I have before stated, Publius having left his +legions under the command of his brother Gnaeus, with orders to +prosecute the Iberian campaign and offer an energetic resistance to +Hasdrubal, landed at Pisae with a small body of men. Thence he marched +through Etruria, and taking over the army of the Praetors which was +guarding the country against the Boii, he arrived in the valley of the +Padus; and, pitching his camp there, waited for the enemy with an eager +desire to give him battle. + +[Sidenote: Digression on the limits of history.] + ++57.+ Having thus brought the generals of the two nations and the war +itself into Italy, before beginning the campaign, I wish to say a few +words about what I conceive to be germane or not to my history. + +I can conceive some readers complaining that, while devoting a great +deal of space to Libya and Iberia, I have said little or nothing +about the strait of the Pillars of Hercules, the Mare Externum, or +the British Isles, and the manufacture of tin in them, or even of the +silver and gold mines in Iberia itself, of which historians give long +and contradictory accounts. It was not, let me say, because I thought +these subjects out of place in history that I passed them over; but +because, in the first place, I did not wish to be diffuse, or distract +the attention of students from the main current of my narrative; and, +in the next place, because I was determined not to treat of them in +scattered notices or casual allusions, but to assign them a distinct +time and place, and at these, to the best of my ability, to give a +trustworthy account of them. On the same principle I must deprecate +any feeling of surprise if, in the succeeding portions of my history, +I pass over other similar topics, which might seem naturally in place, +for the same reasons. Those who ask for dissertations in history on +every possible subject, are somewhat like greedy guests at a banquet, +who, by tasting every dish on the table, fail to really enjoy any +one of them at the time, or to digest and feel any benefit from them +afterwards. Such omnivorous readers get no real pleasure in the +present, and no adequate instruction for the future. + ++58.+ There can be no clearer proof, than is afforded by these +particular instances, that this department of historical writing stands +above all others in need of study and correction. For as all, or at +least the greater number of writers, have endeavoured to describe the +peculiar features and positions of the countries on the confines of +the known world, and in doing so have, in most cases, made egregious +mistakes, it is impossible to pass over their errors without some +attempt at refutation; and that not in scattered observations or casual +remarks, but deliberately and formally. But such confutation should +not take the form of accusation or invective. While correcting their +mistakes we should praise the writers, feeling sure that, had they +lived to the present age, they would have altered and corrected many of +their statements. The fact is that, in past ages, we know of very few +Greeks who undertook to investigate these remote regions, owing to the +insuperable difficulties of the attempt. The dangers at sea were then +more than can easily be calculated, and those on land more numerous +still. And even if one did reach these countries on the confines of the +world, whether compulsorily or voluntarily, the difficulties in the way +of a personal inspection were only begun: for some of the regions were +utterly barbarous, others uninhabited; and a still greater obstacle +in way of gaining information as to what he saw was his ignorance +of the language of the country. And even if he learnt this, a still +greater difficulty was to preserve a strict moderation in his account +of what he had seen, and despising all attempts to glorify himself by +traveller’s tales of wonder, to report for our benefit the truth and +nothing but the truth. + ++59.+ All these impediments made a true account of these regions in +past times difficult, if not impossible. Nor ought we to criticise +severely the omissions or mistakes of these writers: rather they +deserve our praise and admiration for having in such an age gained +information as to these places, which distinctly advanced knowledge. +In our own age, however, the Asiatic districts have been opened up +both by sea and land owing to the empire of Alexander, and the other +places owing to the supremacy of Rome. Men too of practical experience +in affairs, being released from the cares of martial or political +ambition, have thereby had excellent opportunities for research and +inquiry into these localities; and therefore it will be but right +for us to have a better and truer knowledge of what was formerly +unknown. And this I shall endeavour to establish, when I find a fitting +opportunity in the course of my history. I shall be especially anxious +to give the curious a full knowledge on these points, because it was +with that express object that I confronted the dangers and fatigues +of my travels in Libya, Iberia, and Gaul, as well as of the sea which +washes the western coasts of these countries; that I might correct the +imperfect knowledge of former writers, and make the Greeks acquainted +with these parts of the known world. + +After this digression, I must go back to the pitched battles between +the Romans and Carthaginians in Italy. + +[Sidenote: Rest and recovery.] + +[Sidenote: Taking of Turin.] + ++60.+ After arriving in Italy with the number of troops which I have +already stated, Hannibal pitched his camp at the very foot of the Alps, +and was occupied, to begin with, in refreshing his men. For not only +had his whole army suffered terribly from the difficulties of transit +in the ascent, and still more in the descent of the Alps, but it was +also in evil case from the shortness of provisions, and the inevitable +neglect of all proper attention to physical necessities. Many had quite +abandoned all care for their health under the influence of starvation +and continuous fatigue; for it had proved impossible to carry a full +supply of food for so many thousands over such mountains, and what they +did bring was in great part lost along with the beasts that carried it. +So that whereas, when Hannibal crossed the Rhone, he had thirty-eight +thousand infantry, and more than eight thousand cavalry, he lost +nearly half in the pass, as I have shown above; while the survivors +had by these long continued sufferings become almost savage in look +and general appearance. Hannibal therefore bent his whole energies to +the restoration of the spirits and bodies of his men, and of their +horses also. When his army had thus sufficiently recovered, finding +the Taurini, who live immediately under the Alps, at war with the +Insubres and inclined to be suspicious of the Carthaginians, Hannibal +first invited them to terms of friendship and alliance; and, on their +refusal, invested their chief city and carried it after a three day’s +siege. Having put to the sword all who had opposed him, he struck such +terror into the minds of the neighbouring tribes, that they all gave in +their submission out of hand. The other Celts inhabiting these plains +were also eager to join the Carthaginians, according to their original +purpose; but the Roman legions had by this time advanced too far, and +had intercepted the greater part of them: they were therefore unable to +stir, and in some cases were even obliged to serve in the Roman ranks. +This determined Hannibal not to delay his advance any longer, but to +strike some blow which might encourage those natives who were desirous +of sharing his enterprise. + +[Sidenote: Approach of Scipio.] + +[Sidenote: Tiberius Sempronius recalled.] + ++61.+ When he heard, while engaged on this design, that Publius had +already crossed the Padus with his army, and was at no great distance, +he was at first inclined to disbelieve the fact, reflecting that it was +not many days since he had left him near the passage of the Rhone, and +that the voyage from Marseilles to Etruria was a long and difficult +one. He was told, moreover, that from the Tyrrhenian Sea to the Alps +through Italian soil was a long march, without good military roads. +But when messenger after messenger confirmed the intelligence with +increased positiveness, he was filled with amazement and admiration +at the Consul’s plan of campaign, and promptness in carrying it out. +The feelings of Publius were much the same: for he had not expected +that Hannibal would even attempt the passage of the Alps with forces +of different races, or, if he did attempt it, that he could escape +utter destruction. Entertaining such ideas he was immensely astonished +at his courage and adventurous daring, when he heard that he had not +only got safe across, but was actually besieging certain towns in +Italy. Similar feelings were entertained at Rome when the news arrived +there. For scarcely had the last rumour about the taking of Saguntum +by the Carthaginians ceased to attract attention, and scarcely had +the measures adopted in view of that event been taken,—namely the +despatch of one Consul to Libya to besiege Carthage, and of the other +to Iberia to meet Hannibal there,—than news came that Hannibal had +arrived in Italy with his army, and was already besieging certain towns +in it. Thrown into great alarm by this unexpected turn of affairs, the +Roman government sent at once to Tiberius at Lilybaeum, telling him +of the presence of the enemy in Italy, and ordering him to abandon +the original design of his expedition, and to make all haste home to +reinforce the defences of the country. Tiberius at once collected +the men of the fleet and sent them off, with orders to go home by +sea; while he caused the Tribunes to administer an oath to the men of +the legions that they would all appear at a fixed day at Ariminum by +bedtime. Ariminum is a town on the Adriatic, situated at the southern +boundary of the valley of the Padus. In every direction there was stir +and excitement: and the news being a complete surprise to everybody, +there was everywhere a great and irrepressible anxiety as to the future. + +[Sidenote: Gallic prisoners.] + ++62.+ The two armies being now within a short distance of each other, +Hannibal and Publius both thought it necessary to address their men in +terms suitable to the occasion. + +The manner in which Hannibal tried to encourage his army was this. He +mustered the men, and caused some youthful prisoners whom he had caught +when they were attempting to hinder his march on the Alpine passes, to +be brought forward. They had been subjected to great severities with +this very object, loaded with heavy chains, half-starved, and their +bodies a mass of bruises from scourging. Hannibal caused these men to +be placed in the middle of the army, and some suits of Gallic armour, +such as are worn by their kings when they fight in single combat, to +be exhibited; in addition to these he placed there some horses, and +brought in some valuable military cloaks. He then asked these young +prisoners, which of them were willing to fight with each other on +condition of the conqueror taking these prizes, and the vanquished +escaping all his present miseries by death. Upon their all answering +with a loud shout that they were desirous of fighting in these single +combats, he bade them draw lots; and the pair, on whom the first lot +fell, to put on the armour and fight with each other. As soon as the +young men heard these orders, they lifted up their hands, and each +prayed the gods that he might be one of those to draw the lot. And +when the lots were drawn, those on whom they fell were overjoyed, +and the others in despair. When the fight was finished, too, the +surviving captives congratulated the one who had fallen no less than +the victor, as having been freed from many terrible sufferings, while +they themselves still remained to endure them. And in this feeling +the Carthaginian soldiers were much disposed to join, all pitying the +survivors and congratulating the fallen champion. + +[Sidenote: Hannibal’s speech.] + ++63.+ Having by this example made the impression he desired upon the +minds of his troops, Hannibal then came forward himself and said, “that +he had exhibited these captives in order that they might see in the +person of others a vivid representation of what they had to expect +themselves, and might so lay their plans all the better in view of the +actual state of affairs. Fortune had summoned them to a life and death +contest very like that of the two captives, and in which the prize of +victory was the same. For they must either conquer, or die, or fall +alive into the hands of their enemies; and the prize of victory would +not be mere horses and military cloaks, but the most enviable position +in the world if they became masters of the wealth of Rome: or if they +fell in battle their reward would be to end their life fighting to +their last breath for the noblest object, in the heat of the struggle, +and with no sense of pain; while if they were beaten, or from desire +of life were base enough to fly, or tried to prolong that life by +any means except victory, every sort of misery and misfortune would +be their lot: for it was impossible that any one of them could be so +irrational or senseless, when he remembered the length of the journey +he had performed from his native land, and the number of enemies that +lay between him and it, and the size of the rivers he had crossed, as +to cherish the hope of being able to reach his home by flight. They +should therefore cast away such vain hopes, and regard their position +as being exactly that of the combatants whom they had but now been +watching. For, as in their case, all congratulated the dead as much as +the victor, and commiserated the survivors; so they should think of +the alternatives before themselves, and should, one and all, come upon +the field of battle resolved, if possible, to conquer, and, if not, +to die. Life with defeat was a hope that must by no means whatever be +entertained. If they reasoned and resolved thus, victory and safety +would certainly attend them: for it never happened that men who came to +such a resolution, whether of deliberate purpose or from being driven +to bay, were disappointed in their hope of beating their opponents in +the field. And when it chanced, as was the case with the Romans, that +the enemy had in most cases a hope of quite an opposite character, +from the near neighbourhood of their native country making flight an +obvious means of safety, then it was clear that the courage which came +of despair would carry the day.” + +When he saw that the example and the words he had spoken had gone home +to the minds of the rank and file, and that the spirit and enthusiasm +which he aimed at inspiring were created, he dismissed them for the +present with commendations, and gave orders for an advance at daybreak +on the next morning. + +[Sidenote: Scipio crosses the Ticinus.] + ++64.+ About the same day Publius Scipio, having now crossed the Padus, +and being resolved to make a farther advance across the Ticinus, +ordered those who were skilled in such works to construct a bridge +across this latter river; and then summoned a meeting of the remainder +of his army and addressed them: dwelling principally on the reputation +of their country and of the ancestors’ achievements. But he referred +particularly to their present position, saying, “that they ought to +entertain no doubt of victory, though they had never as yet had any +experience of the enemy; and should regard it as a piece of extravagant +presumption of the Carthaginians to venture to face Romans, by whom +they had been so often beaten, and to whom they had for so many years +paid tribute and been all but slaves. And when in addition to this they +at present knew thus much of their mettle,—that they dared not face +them, what was the fair inference to be drawn for the future? Their +cavalry, in a chance encounter on the Rhone with those of Rome, had, +so far from coming off well, lost a large number of men, and had fled +with disgrace to their own camp; and the general and his army, as soon +as they knew of the approach of his legions, had beat a retreat, which +was exceedingly like a flight, and, contrary to their original purpose, +had in their terror taken the road over the Alps. And it was evident +that Hannibal had destroyed the greater part of his army; and that what +he had left was feeble and unfit for service, from the hardships they +had undergone: in the same way he had lost the majority of his horses, +and made the rest useless from the length and difficult nature of the +journey. They had, therefore, only to show themselves to the enemy.” +But, above all, he pointed out that “his own presence at their head +ought to be special encouragement to them: for that he would not have +left his fleet and Spanish campaign, on which he had been sent, and +have come to them in such haste, if he had not seen on consideration +that his doing so was necessary for his country’s safety, and that a +certain victory was secured to him by it.” + +The weight and influence of the speaker, as well as their belief +in his words, roused great enthusiasm among the men; which Scipio +acknowledged, and then dismissed them with the additional injunction +that they should hold themselves in readiness to obey any order sent +round to them. + +[Sidenote: Skirmish of cavalry near the Ticinus, Nov. B.C. 219.] + ++65.+ Next day both generals led their troops along the river Padus, +on the bank nearest the Alps, the Romans having the stream on their +left, the Carthaginians on their right; and having ascertained on the +second day, by means of scouts, that they were near each other, they +both halted and remained encamped for that day: but on the next, both +taking their cavalry, and Publius his sharp-shooters also, they hurried +across the plain to reconnoitre each other’s forces. As soon as they +came within distance, and saw the dust rising from the side of their +opponents, they drew up their lines for battle at once. Publius put his +sharp-shooters and Gallic horsemen in front, and bringing the others +into line, advanced at a slow pace. Hannibal placed his cavalry that +rode with bridles, and was most to be depended on, in his front, and +led them straight against the enemy; having put the Numidian cavalry on +either wing to take the enemy on the flanks. The two generals and the +cavalry were in such hot haste to engage, that they closed with each +other before the sharp-shooters had an opportunity of discharging their +javelines at all. Before they could do so, they left their ground, and +retreated to the rear of their own cavalry, making their way between +the squadrons, terrified at the approaching charge, and afraid of being +trampled to death by the horses which were galloping down upon them. +The cavalry charged each other front to front, and for a long time +maintained an equal contest; and a great many men dismounting on the +actual field, there was a mixed fight of horse and foot. The Numidian +horse, however, having outflanked the Romans, charged them on the rear: +and so the sharp-shooters, who had fled from the cavalry charge at +the beginning, were now trampled to death by the numbers and furious +onslaught of the Numidians; while the front ranks originally engaged +with the Carthaginians, after losing many of their men and inflicting a +still greater loss on the enemy, finding themselves charged on the rear +by the Numidians, broke into flight: most of them scattering in every +direction, while some of them kept closely massed round the Consul. + +[Sidenote: Scipio retires to Placentia on the right bank of the Po.] + +[Sidenote: Hannibal crosses the Po higher up and follows Scipio to +Placentia.] + ++66.+ Publius then broke up his camp, and marched through the plains to +the bridge over the Padus, in haste to get his legions across before +the enemy came up. He saw that the level country where he was then was +favourable to the enemy with his superiority in cavalry. He was himself +disabled by a wound;[182] and he decided that it was necessary to shift +his quarters to a place of safety. For a time Hannibal imagined that +Scipio would give him battle with his infantry also: but when he saw +that he had abandoned his camp, he went in pursuit of him as far as +the bridge over the Ticinus; but finding that the greater part of the +timbers of this bridge had been torn away, while the men who guarded +the bridge were left still on his side of the river, he took them +prisoners to the number of about six hundred, and being informed that +the main army was far on its way, he wheeled round and again ascended +the Padus in search of a spot in it which admitted of being easily +bridged. After two days’ march he halted and constructed a bridge over +the river by means of boats. He committed the task of bringing over the +army to Hasdrubal;[183] while he himself crossed at once, and busied +himself in receiving the ambassadors who arrived from the neighbouring +districts. For no sooner had he gained the advantage in the cavalry +engagement, than all the Celts in the vicinity hastened to fulfil their +original engagement by avowing themselves his friends, supplying him +with provisions, and joining the Carthaginian forces. After giving +these men a cordial reception, and getting his own army across the +Padus, he began to march back again down stream, with an earnest +desire of giving the enemy battle. Publius, too, had crossed the river +and was now encamped under the walls of the Roman colony Placentia. +There he made no sign of any intention to move; for he was engaged in +trying to heal his own wound and those of his men, and considered that +he had a secure base of operations where he was. A two days’ march +from the place where he had crossed the Padus brought Hannibal to the +neighbourhood of the enemy; and on the third day he drew out his army +for battle in full view of his opponents: but as no one came out to +attack, he pitched his camp about fifty stades from them. + +[Sidenote: Treachery of the Gauls serving in the army of Scipio.] + ++67.+ But the Celtic contingent of the Roman army, seeing that +Hannibal’s prospects looked the brighter of the two, concerted their +plans for a fixed time, and waited in their several tents for the +moment of carrying them out. When the men within the rampart of the +camp had taken their supper and were gone to bed, the Celts let more +than half the night pass, and just about the time of the morning watch +armed themselves and fell upon the Romans who were quartered nearest +to them; killed a considerable number, and wounded not a few; and, +finally, cutting off the heads of the slain, departed with them to +join the Carthaginians, to the number of two thousand infantry and +nearly two hundred cavalry. They were received with great satisfaction +by Hannibal; who, after addressing them encouragingly, and promising +them all suitable rewards, sent them to their several cities, to +declare to their compatriots what they had done, and to urge them +to make alliance with him: for he knew that they would now all feel +compelled to take part with him, when they learnt the treachery of +which their fellow-countrymen had been guilty to the Romans. Just +at the same time the Boii came in, and handed over to him the three +Agrarian Commissioners, sent from Rome to divide the lands; whom, as +I have already related, they had seized by a sudden act of treachery +at the beginning of the war. Hannibal gratefully acknowledged their +good intention, and made a formal alliance with those who came: but he +handed them back their prisoners, bidding them keep them safe, in order +to get back their own hostages from Rome, as they intended at first. + +[Sidenote: Scipio changes his position at Placentia to one on the +Trebia.] + +Publius regarded this treachery as of most serious importance; and +feeling sure that the Celts in the neighbourhood had long been +ill-disposed, and would, after this event, all incline to the +Carthaginians, he made up his mind that some precaution for the future +was necessary. The next night, therefore, just before the morning +watch, he broke up his camp and marched for the river Trebia, and the +high ground near it, feeling confidence in the protection which the +strength of the position and the neighbourhood of his allies would give +him. + +[Sidenote: Hannibal follows him.] + ++68.+ When Hannibal was informed of Scipio’s change of quarters, +he sent the Numidian horse in pursuit at once, and the rest soon +afterwards, following close behind with his main army. The Numidians, +finding the Roman camp empty, stopped to set fire to it: which proved +of great service to the Romans; for if they had pushed on and caught +up the Roman baggage, a large number of the rear-guard would have +certainly been killed by the cavalry in the open plains. But as it was, +the greater part of them got across the River Trebia in time; while +those who were after all too far in the rear to escape, were either +killed or made prisoners by the Carthaginians. + +[Sidenote: Scipio’s position on the slopes of Apennines, near the +source of the Trebia.] + +Scipio, however, having crossed the Trebia occupied the first high +ground; and having strengthened his camp with trench and palisade, +waited the arrival of his colleague, Tiberius Sempronius, and his army; +and was taking the greatest pains to cure his wound, because he was +exceedingly anxious to take part in the coming engagement. Hannibal +pitched his camp about forty stades from him. While the numerous +Celts inhabiting the plains, excited by the good prospects of the +Carthaginians, supplied his army with provisions in great abundance, +and were eager to take their share with Hannibal in every military +operation or battle. + +When news of the cavalry engagement reached Rome, the disappointment +of their confident expectations caused a feeling of consternation in +the minds of the people. Not but that plenty of pretexts were found to +prove to their own satisfaction that the affair was not a defeat. Some +laid the blame on the Consul’s rashness, and others on the treacherous +lukewarmness of the Celts, which they concluded from their recent +revolt must have been shown by them on the field. But, after all, as +the infantry was still unimpaired, they made up their minds that the +general result was still as hopeful as ever. Accordingly, when Tiberius +and his legions arrived at Rome, and marched through the city, they +believed that his mere appearance at the seat of war would settle the +matter. + +[Sidenote: Tiberius Sempronius joins Scipio.] + +His men met Tiberius at Ariminum, according to their oath, and he +at once led them forward in all haste to join Publius Scipio. The +junction effected, and a camp pitched by the side of his colleague, +he was naturally obliged to refresh his men after their forty days’ +continuous march between Ariminum and Lilybaeum: but he went on with +all preparations for a battle; and was continually in conference with +Scipio, asking questions as to what had happened in the past, and +discussing with him the measures to be taken in the present. + +[Sidenote: Fall of Clastidium. Hannibal’s policy towards the Italians.] + +[Sidenote: A skirmish favourable to the Romans.] + ++69.+ Meanwhile Hannibal got possession of Clastidium, by the treachery +of a certain Brundisian, to whom it had been entrusted by the Romans. +Having become master of the garrison and the stores of corn he used the +latter for his present needs; but took the men whom he had captured +with him, without doing them any harm, being desirous of showing by +an example the policy he meant to pursue; that those whose present +position towards Rome was merely the result of circumstances should +not be terrified, and give up hope of being spared by him. The man +who betrayed Clastidium to him he treated with extraordinary honour, +by way of tempting all men in similar situations of authority to +share the prospects of the Carthaginians. But afterwards, finding +that certain Celts who lived in the fork of the Padus and the Trebia, +while pretending to have made terms with him, were sending messages +to the Romans at the same time, believing that they would thus secure +themselves from being harmed by either side, he sent two thousand +infantry with some Celtic and Numidian cavalry with orders to devastate +their territory. This order being executed, and a great booty obtained, +the Celts appeared at the Roman camp beseeching their aid. Tiberius +had been all along looking out for an opportunity of striking a blow: +and once seized on this pretext for sending out a party, consisting of +the greater part of his cavalry; and a thousand sharp-shooters of his +infantry along with them; who having speedily come up with the enemy +on the other side of the Trebia, and engaged them in a sharp struggle +for the possession of the booty, forced the Celts and Numidians to beat +a retreat to their own camp. Those who were on duty in front of the +Carthaginian camp quickly perceived what was going on, and brought some +reserves to support the retreating cavalry; then the Romans in their +turn were routed, and had to retreat to their camp. At this Tiberius +sent out all his cavalry and sharp-shooters; whereupon the Celts again +gave way, and sought the protection of their own camp. The Carthaginian +general being unprepared for a general engagement, and thinking it a +sound rule not to enter upon one on every casual opportunity, or except +in accordance with a settled design, acted, it must be confessed, on +this occasion with admirable generalship. He checked their flight when +his men were near the camp, and forced them to halt and face about; but +he sent out his aides and buglers to recall the rest, and prevented +them from pursuing and engaging the enemy any more. So the Romans after +a short halt went back, having killed a large number of the enemy, and +lost very few themselves. + +[Sidenote: Sempronius resolves to give battle.] + ++70.+ Excited and overjoyed at this success Tiberius was all eagerness +for a general engagement. Now, it was in his power to administer the +war for the present as he chose, owing to the ill-health of Publius +Scipio; yet wishing to have his colleague’s opinion in support of his +own, he consulted him on this subject. Publius however took quite +an opposite view of the situation. He thought his legions would be +all the better for a winter under arms; and that the fidelity of the +fickle Celts would never stand the test of want of success and enforced +inactivity on the part of the Carthaginians: they would be certain, he +thought, to turn against them once more. Besides, when he had recovered +from his wound, he hoped to be able to do good service to his country +himself. With these arguments he tried to dissuade Tiberius from his +design. The latter felt that every one of these arguments were true and +sound; but, urged on by ambition and a blind confidence in his fortune, +he was eager to have the credit of the decisive action to himself, +before Scipio should be able to be present at the battle, or the next +Consuls arrive to take over the command; for the time for that to take +place was now approaching. As therefore he selected the time for the +engagement from personal considerations, rather than with a view to the +actual circumstances of the case, he was bound to make a signal failure. + +Hannibal took much the same view of the case as Scipio, and was +therefore, unlike him, eager for a battle; because, in the first place, +he wished to avail himself of the enthusiasm of the Celts before it +had at all gone off: in the second place, he wished to engage the +Roman legions while the soldiers in them were raw recruits without +practice in war: and, in the third place, because he wished to fight +the battle while Scipio was still unfit for service: but most of all +because he wanted to be doing something and not to let the time slip +by fruitlessly; for when a general leads his troops into a foreign +country, and attempts what looks like a desperate undertaking, the one +chance for him is to keep the hopes of his allies alive by continually +striking some fresh blow. + +Such were Hannibal’s feelings when he knew of the intended attack of +Tiberius. + +[Sidenote: Hannibal prepares an ambuscade.] + ++71.+ Now he had some time before remarked a certain piece of ground +which was flat and treeless, and yet well suited for an ambush, because +there was a stream in it with a high overhanging bank thickly covered +with thorns and brambles. Here he determined to entrap the enemy. The +place was admirably adapted for putting them off their guard; because +the Romans were always suspicious of woods, from the fact of the Celts +invariably choosing such places for their ambuscades, but felt no fear +at all of places that were level and without trees: not knowing that +for the concealment and safety of an ambush such places are much better +than woods; because the men can command from them a distant view of +all that is going on: while nearly all places have sufficient cover to +make concealment possible,—a stream with an overhanging bank, reeds, or +ferns, or some sort of bramble-bushes,—which are good enough to hide +not infantry only, but sometimes even cavalry, if the simple precaution +is taken of laying conspicuous arms flat upon the ground and hiding +helmets under shields. Hannibal had confided his idea to his brother +Mago and to his council, who had all approved of the plan. Accordingly, +when the army had supped, he summoned this young man to his tent, who +was full of youthful enthusiasm, and had been trained from boyhood +in the art of war, and put under his command a hundred cavalry and +the same number of infantry. These men he had himself earlier in the +day selected as the most powerful of the whole army, and had ordered +to come to his tent after supper. Having addressed and inspired them +with the spirit suitable to the occasion, he bade each of them select +ten of the bravest men of their own company, and to come with them +to a particular spot in the camp. The order having been obeyed, he +despatched the whole party, numbering a thousand cavalry and as many +infantry, with guides, to the place selected for the ambuscade; and +gave his brother directions as to the time at which he was to make the +attempt. At daybreak he himself mustered the Numidian cavalry, who were +conspicuous for their powers of endurance; and after addressing them, +and promising them rewards if they behaved with gallantry, he ordered +them to ride up to the enemy’s lines, and then quickly cross the river, +and by throwing showers of darts at them tempt them to come out: his +object being to get at the enemy before they had had their breakfast, +or made any preparations for the day. The other officers of the army +also he summoned, and gave them similar instructions for the battle, +ordering all their men to get breakfast and to see to their arms and +horses. + +[Sidenote: Battle of the Trebia, December B.C. 218.] + +[Sidenote: Hannibal’s forces.] + +[Sidenote: The Roman forces.] + ++72.+ As soon as Tiberius saw the Numidian horse approaching, he +immediately sent out his cavalry by itself with orders to engage the +enemy, and keep them in play, while he despatched after them six +thousand foot armed with javelins, and got the rest of the army in +motion, with the idea that their appearance would decide the affair: +for his superiority in numbers, and his success in the cavalry skirmish +of the day before, had filled him with confidence. But it was now +mid-winter and the day was snowy and excessively cold, and men and +horses were marching out almost entirely without having tasted food; +and accordingly, though the troops were at first in high spirits, yet +when they had crossed the Trebia, swollen by the floods which the rain +of the previous night had brought down from the high ground above the +camp, wading breast deep through the stream, they were in a wretched +state from the cold and want of food as the day wore on. While the +Carthaginians on the contrary had eaten and drunk in their tents, and +got their horses ready, and were all anointing and arming themselves +round the fires. Hannibal waited for the right moment to strike, and +as soon as he saw that the Romans had crossed the Trebia, throwing out +eight thousand spearmen and slingers to cover his advance, he led out +his whole army. When he had advanced about eight stades from the camp, +he drew up his infantry, consisting of about twenty thousand Iberians, +Celts, and Libyans, in one long line, while he divided his cavalry and +placed half on each wing, amounting in all to more than ten thousand, +counting the Celtic allies; his elephants also he divided between the +two wings, where they occupied the front rank. Meanwhile Tiberius had +recalled his cavalry because he saw that they could do nothing with the +enemy. For the Numidians when attacked retreated without difficulty, +scattering in every direction, and then faced about again and charged, +which is the peculiar feature of their mode of warfare. But he drew up +his infantry in the regular Roman order, consisting of sixteen thousand +citizens and twenty thousand allies; for that is the complete number +of a Roman army in an important campaign, when the two Consuls are +compelled by circumstances to combine forces.[184] He then placed the +cavalry on either wing, numbering four thousand, and advanced against +the enemy in gallant style, in regular order, and at a deliberate pace. + +[Sidenote: The Roman cavalry retreat.] + ++73.+ When the two forces came within distance, the light-armed troops +in front of the two armies closed with each other. In this part of the +battle the Romans were in many respects at a disadvantage, while the +Carthaginians had everything in their favour. For the Roman spearmen +had been on hard service ever since daybreak, and had expended most of +their weapons in the engagement with the Numidians, while those weapons +which were left had become useless from being long wet. Nor were the +cavalry, or indeed the whole army, any better off in these respects. +The case of the Carthaginians was exactly the reverse: they had come on +the field perfectly sound and fresh, and were ready and eager for every +service required of them. As soon, therefore, as their advanced guard +had retired again within their lines, and the heavy-armed soldiers +were engaged, the cavalry on the two wings of the Carthaginian army at +once charged the enemy with all the effect of superiority in numbers, +and in the condition both of men and horses secured by their freshness +when they started. The Roman cavalry on the contrary retreated: and +the flanks of the line being thus left unprotected, the Carthaginian +spearmen and the main body of the Numidians, passing their own advanced +guard, charged the Roman flanks: and, by the damage which they did +them, prevented them from keeping up the fight with the troops on their +front. The heavy-armed soldiers, however, who were in the front rank +of both armies, and in the centre of that, maintained an obstinate and +equal fight for a considerable time. + +[Sidenote: Both Roman wings defeated.] + +[Sidenote: The Roman centre fights its way to Placentia.] + ++74.+ Just then the Numidians, who had been lying in ambush, left their +hiding-place, and by a sudden charge on the centre of the Roman rear +produced great confusion and alarm throughout the army. Finally both +the Roman wings, being hard pressed in front by the elephants, and on +both flanks by the light-armed troops of the enemy, gave way, and in +their flight were forced upon the river behind them. After this, while +the centre of the Roman rear was losing heavily, and suffering severely +from the attack of the Numidian ambuscade, their front, thus driven to +bay, defeated the Celts and a division of Africans, and, after killing +a large number of them, succeeded in cutting their way through the +Carthaginian line. Then seeing that their wings had been forced off +their ground, they gave up all hope of relieving them or getting back +to their camp, partly because of the number of the enemy’s cavalry, and +partly because they were hindered by the river and the pelting storm +of rain which was pouring down upon their heads. They therefore closed +their ranks, and made their way safely to Placentia, to the number of +ten thousand. Of the rest of the army the greater number were killed +by the elephants and cavalry on the bank of the Trebia; while those of +the infantry who escaped, and the greater part of the cavalry, managed +to rejoin the ten thousand mentioned above, and arrived with them at +Placentia. Meanwhile the Carthaginian army pursued the enemy as far +as the Trebia; but being prevented by the storm from going farther, +returned to their camp. They regarded the result of the battle with +great exultation, as a complete success; for the loss of the Iberians +and Africans had been light, the heaviest having fallen on the Celts. +But from the rain and the snow which followed it, they suffered so +severely, that all the elephants except one died, and a large number of +men and horses perished from the cold. + +[Sidenote: Winter of B.C. 118-117. Great exertions at Rome to meet the +danger.] + ++75.+ Fully aware of the nature of his disaster, but wishing to conceal +its extent as well as he could from the people at home, Tiberius sent +messengers to announce that a battle had taken place, but that the +storm had deprived them of the victory. For the moment this news was +believed at Rome; but when soon afterwards it became known that the +Carthaginians were in possession of the Roman camp, and that all the +Celts had joined them: while their own troops had abandoned their +camp, and, after retiring from the field of battle, were all collected +in the neighbouring cities; and were besides being supplied with +necessary provisions by sea up the Padus, the Roman people became +only too certain of what had really happened in the battle. It was a +most unexpected reverse, and it forced them at once to urge on with +energy the remaining preparations for the war. They reinforced those +positions which lay in the way of the enemy’s advance; sent legions +to Sardinia and Sicily, as well as garrisons to Tarentum, and other +places of strategical importance; and, moreover, fitted out a fleet +of sixty quinqueremes. The Consuls designate, Gnaeus Servilius and +Gaius Flaminius, were collecting the allies and enrolling the citizen +legions, and sending supplies to Ariminum and Etruria, with a view +of going to the seat of war by those two routes. They sent also to +king Hiero asking for reinforcements, who sent them five hundred +Cretan archers and a thousand peltasts. In fact they pushed on their +preparations in every direction with energy. For the Roman people are +most formidable, collectively and individually, when they have real +reason for alarm. + +[Sidenote: Gnaeus Scipio in Spain.] + ++76.+ While these events were happening in Italy, Gnaeus Cornelius +Scipio, who had been left by his brother Publius in command of the +fleet, setting sail from the mouth of the Rhone, came to land with his +whole squadron at a place in Iberia called Emporium. Starting from this +town, he made descents upon the coast, landing and besieging those who +refused to submit to him along the seaboard as far as the Iber; and +treating with every mark of kindness those who acceded to his demands, +and taking all the precautions he could for their safety. When he had +garrisoned those towns on the coast that submitted, he led his whole +army inland, having by this time a not inconsiderable contingent of +Iberian allies; and took possession of the towns on his line of march, +some by negotiation and some by force of arms. The Carthaginian troops +which Hannibal had left in that district under the command of Hanno, +lay entrenched to resist him under the walls of a town called Cissa. + +Defeating this army in a pitched battle, Gnaeus not only got possession +of a rich booty, for the whole baggage of the army invading Italy had +been left under its charge, but secured the friendly alliance of all +the Iberian tribes north of the Iber, and took both Hanno, the general +of the Carthaginians, and Andobales, the general of the Iberians, +prisoners. The latter was despot of central Iberia, and had always been +especially inclined to the side of Carthage. + +Immediately he learnt what had happened, Hasdrubal crossed the Iber to +bring aid. There he ascertained that the Roman troops left in charge +of the fleet had abandoned all precautions, and were trading on the +success of the land forces to pass their time in ease. He therefore +took with him eight thousand infantry and one thousand cavalry of his +own army, and finding the men of the fleet scattered about the country, +he killed a great many of them and forced the rest to fly for refuge +to their ships. He then retired across the Iber again, and employed +himself in fortifying and garrisoning the posts south of the river, +taking up his winter quarters at New Carthage. When Gnaeus rejoined his +fleet, he punished the authors of the disaster according to the Roman +custom; and then collected his land and sea forces together in Tarraco, +and there took up his winter quarters; and by dividing the booty +equally between his soldiers, inspired them at once with affection +towards himself and eagerness for future service. Such was the course +of the Iberian campaign. + +[Sidenote: B.C. 217.] + ++77.+ At the beginning of the following spring, Gaius Flaminius marched +his army through Etruria, and pitched his camp at Arretium; while his +colleague Gnaeus Servilius on the other hand went to Ariminum, to await +the advance of the enemy in that direction. + +[Sidenote: Hannibal conciliates the Italians.] + +Passing the winter in the Celtic territory, Hannibal kept his Roman +prisoners in close confinement, supplying them very sparingly with +food; while he treated their allies with great kindness from the first, +and finally called them together and addressed them, alleging, “that he +had not come to fight against them, but against Rome in their behalf; +and that, therefore, if they were wise, they would attach themselves +to him: because he had come to restore freedom to the Italians, and +to assist them to recover their cities and territory which they had +severally lost to Rome.” With these words he dismissed them without +ransom to their own homes: wishing by this policy to attract the +inhabitants of Italy to his cause, and to alienate their affections +from Rome, and to awaken the resentment of all those who considered +themselves to have suffered by the loss of harbours or cities under the +Roman rule. + ++78.+ While he was in these winter quarters also he practised a ruse +truly Punic. Being apprehensive that from the fickleness of their +character, and the newness of the tie between himself and them, the +Celts might lay plots against his life, he caused a number of wigs +to be made for him, suited in appearance to men of various ages; and +these he constantly varied, changing at the same time his clothes also +to harmonise with the particular wig which he wore. He thus made it +hard to recognise him, not only for those who met him suddenly, but +even for his intimates. But seeing that the Celts were discontented at +the lengthened continuance of the war within their borders, and were +in a state of restless hurry to invade the enemy’s territory,—on the +pretence of hatred for Rome, but in reality from love of booty,—he +determined to break up his camp as soon as possible, and satisfy the +desires of his army. Accordingly as soon as the change of season set +in, by questioning those who were reputed to know the country best, he +ascertained that the other roads leading into Etruria were long and +well known to the enemy, but that the one which led through the marshes +was short, and would bring them upon Flaminius as a surprise.[185] This +was what suited his peculiar genius, and he therefore decided to take +this route. But when the report was spread in his army that the general +was going to lead them through some marshes, every soldier felt alarmed +at the idea of the quagmires and deep sloughs which they would find on +this march. + +[Sidenote: Hannibal starts for Etruria. Spring of B.C. 217.] + ++79.+ But after a careful inquiry as to what part of the road was +firm or boggy, Hannibal broke up his camp and marched out. He placed +the Libyans and Iberians and all his best soldiers in the van, +and the baggage within their lines, that there might be plenty of +provisions for their immediate needs. Provisions for the future he +entirely neglected. Because he calculated that on reaching the enemy’s +territory, if he were beaten he should not require them, and if he were +victorious he would find abundance in the open country. Behind this +vanguard he placed the Celts, and in the rear of all the cavalry. He +entrusted the command of the rear-guard to his brother Mago, that he +might see to the security of all, and especially to guard against the +cowardice and impatience of hard labour which characterised the Celts; +in order that, if the difficulty of the route should induce them to +turn back, he might intercept them by means of the cavalry and force +them to proceed. In point of fact, the Iberians and Libyans, having +great powers of endurance and being habituated to such fatigues, and +also because when they marched through them the marshes[186] were +fresh and untrodden, accomplished their march with a moderate amount +of distress: but the Celts advanced with great difficulty, because the +marshes were now disturbed and trodden into a deep morass: and being +quite unaccustomed to such painful labours, they bore the fatigue +with anger and impatience; but were hindered from turning back by the +cavalry in their rear. All however suffered grievously, especially +from the impossibility of getting sleep on a continuous march of four +days and three nights through a route which was under water: but none +suffered so much, or lost so many men, as the Celts. Most of his +beasts of burden also slipping in the mud fell and perished, and could +then only do the men one service: they sat upon their dead bodies, +and piling up baggage upon them so as to stand out above the water, +they managed to get a snatch of sleep[187] for a short portion of the +night. Another misfortune was that a considerable number of the horses +lost their hoofs by the prolonged march through bog. Hannibal himself +was with difficulty and much suffering got across riding on the only +elephant left alive, enduring great agony from a severe attack of +ophthalmia, by which he eventually lost the sight of one eye, because +the time and the difficulties of the situation did not admit of his +waiting or applying any treatment to it. + +[Sidenote: Hannibal in the valley of the Arno.] + ++80.+ Having crossed the marshes in this unexpected manner, Hannibal +found Flaminius in Etruria encamped under the walls of Arretium. For +the present he pitched his camp close to the marshes, to refresh his +army, and to investigate the plans of his enemies and the lie of the +country in his front. And being informed that the country before him +abounded in wealth, and that Flaminius was a mere mob-orator and +demagogue, with no ability for the actual conduct of military affairs, +and was moreover unreasonably confident in his resources; he calculated +that, if he passed his camp and made a descent into the district +beyond, partly for fear of popular reproach and partly from a personal +feeling of irritation, Flaminius would be unable to endure to watch +passively the devastation of the country, and would spontaneously +follow him wherever he went; and being eager to secure the credit of a +victory for himself, without waiting for the arrival of his colleague, +would give him many opportunities for an attack. + +[Sidenote: Hannibal correctly judges the character of Flaminius.] + ++81.+ And in making these calculations Hannibal showed his consummate +prudence and strategical ability. For it is mere blind ignorance to +believe that there can be anything of more vital importance to a +general than the knowledge of his opponent’s character and disposition. +As in combats between individuals or ranks, he who would conquer must +observe carefully how it is possible to attain his object, and what +part of his enemy appears unguarded or insufficiently armed,—so must +a commander of an army look out for the weak place, not in the body, +but in the mind of the leader of the hostile force. For it has often +happened before now that from mere idleness and lack of energy, men +have let not only the welfare of the state, but even their private +fortunes fall to ruin: some are so addicted to wine that they cannot +sleep without bemusing their intellects with drink; and others so +infatuated in their pursuit of sensual pleasures, that they have not +only been the ruin of their cities and fortunes, but have forfeited +life itself with disgrace. In the case of individuals, however, +cowardice and sloth bring shame only on themselves; but when it is a +commander-in-chief that is concerned, the disaster affects all alike +and is of the most fatal consequence. It not only infects the men under +him with an inactivity like his own; but it often brings absolute +dangers of the most serious description upon those who trust such a +general. For rashness, temerity, and uncalculating impetuosity, as well +as foolish ambition and vanity, give an easy victory to the enemy. +And are the source of numerous dangers to one’s friends: for a man +who is the prey of such weaknesses falls the easiest victim to every +stratagem, ambush or ruse. The general then who can gain a clear idea +of his opponent’s weaknesses, and direct his attack on the point where +he is most open to it, will very soon be the victor in the campaign. +For as a ship, if you deprive it of its steerer, falls with all its +crew into the hands of the enemy; so, in the case of an army in war, if +you outwit or out-manœuvre its general, the whole will often fall into +your hands. + +[Sidenote: Flaminius is drawn out of camp.] + ++82.+ Nor was Hannibal mistaken in his calculations in regard to +Flaminius. For no sooner had he left the neighbourhood of Faesulae, +and, advancing a short way beyond the Roman camp, made a raid upon +the neighbouring country, than Flaminius became excited, and enraged +at the idea that he was despised by the enemy: and as the devastation +of the country went on, and he saw from the smoke that rose in every +direction that the work of destruction was proceeding, he could not +patiently endure the sight. Some of his officers advised that they +should not follow the enemy at once nor engage him, but should act +on the defensive, in view of his great superiority in cavalry; and +especially that they should wait for the other Consul, and not give +battle until the two armies were combined. But Flaminius, far from +listening to their advice, was indignant at those who offered it; and +bade them consider what the people at home would say at the country +being laid waste almost up to the walls of Rome itself, while they +remained encamped in Etruria on the enemy’s rear. Finally, with these +words, he set his army in motion, without any settled plan of time or +place; but bent only on falling in with the enemy, as though certain +victory awaited him. For he had managed to inspire the people with such +confident expectations, that the unarmed citizens who followed his camp +in hope of booty, bringing chains and fetters and all such gear, were +more numerous than the soldiers themselves. + +Meanwhile Hannibal was advancing on his way to Rome through Etruria, +keeping the city of Cortona and its hills on his left, and the +Thrasymene lake on his right; and as he marched, he burned and +wasted the country with a view of rousing the wrath of the enemy and +tempting him to come out. And when he saw Flaminius get well within +distance, and observed that the ground he then occupied was suited to +his purpose, he bent his whole energies on preparing for a general +engagement. + +[Sidenote: The ambuscade at Lake Thrasymene.] + ++83.+ The route which he was following led through a low valley +enclosed on both sides by long lines of lofty hills. Of its two ends, +that in front was blocked by an abrupt and inaccessible hill, and that +on the rear by the lake, between which and the foot of the cliff there +is only a very narrow defile leading into this valley. Making his way +to the end of the valley along the bank of the lake, Hannibal posted +himself with the Spanish and Libyan troops on the hill immediately in +front of him as he marched, and pitched a camp on it; but sent his +Balearic slingers and light-armed troops by a détour, and stationed +them in extended order under the cover of the hills to the right of the +valley; and by a similar détour placed the Gauls and cavalry under the +cover of hills to the left, causing them also to extend their line so +far as to cover the entrance of the defile running between the cliff +and lake into the valley.[188] + +Having made these preparations during the night, and having thus +enclosed the valley with ambuscades, Hannibal remained quiet. In +pursuit of him came Flaminius, in hot haste to close with the enemy. It +was late in the evening before he pitched his camp on the border of the +lake; and at daybreak next morning, just before the morning watch, he +led his front maniples forward along the borders of the lake into the +valley with a view of engaging the enemy. + +[Sidenote: The battle, 22d June.] + ++84.+ The day was exceedingly misty: and as soon as the greater part +of the Roman line was in the valley, and the leading maniples were +getting close to him, Hannibal gave the signal for attack; and at the +same time sent orders to the troops lying in ambush on the hills to do +the same, and thus delivered an assault upon the enemy at every point +at once. Flaminius was taken completely by surprise: the mist was so +thick, and the enemy were charging down from the upper ground at so +many points at once, that not only were the Centurions and Tribunes +unable to relieve any part of the line that was in difficulties, but +were not even able to get any clear idea of what was going on: for +they were attacked simultaneously on front, rear, and both flanks. +The result was that most of them were cut down in the order of march, +without being able to defend themselves: exactly as though they had +been actually given up to slaughter by the folly of their leader. +Flaminius himself, in a state of the utmost distress and despair, +was attacked and killed by a company of Celts. As many as fifteen +thousand Romans fell in the valley, who could neither yield nor defend +themselves, being habituated to regard it as their supreme duty not +to fly or quit their ranks. But those who were caught in the defile +between the lake and the cliff perished in a shameful, or rather a +most miserable, manner: for being thrust into the lake, some in their +frantic terror endeavoured to swim with their armour on, and presently +sank and were drowned; while the greater number, wading as far as they +could into the lake, remained there with their heads above water; and +when the cavalry rode in after them, and certain death stared them in +the face, they raised their hands and begged for quarter, offering to +surrender, and using every imaginary appeal for mercy; but were finally +despatched by the enemy, or, in some cases, begged the favour of the +fatal blow from their friends, or inflicted it on themselves. A number +of men, however, amounting perhaps to six thousand, who were in the +valley, defeated the enemy immediately in front of them; but though +they might have done much to retrieve the fortune of the day, they +were unable to go to the relief of their comrades, or get to the rear +of their opponents, because they could not see what was going on. They +accordingly pushed on continually to the front, always expecting to +find themselves engaged with some of the enemy: until they discovered +that, without noticing it, they were issuing upon the higher ground. +But when they were on the crest of the hills, the mist broke and they +saw clearly the disaster which had befallen them; and being no longer +able to do any good, since the enemy was victorious all along the line, +and in complete possession of the ground, they closed their ranks and +made for a certain Etrurian village. After the battle Maharbal was sent +by Hannibal with the Iberians and light-armed troops to besiege the +village; and seeing themselves surrounded by a complication of dangers, +they laid down their arms and surrendered on condition of their lives +being spared. Such was the end of the final engagement between the +Romans and Carthaginians in Etruria. + +[Sidenote: Hannibal’s treatment of prisoners.] + ++85.+ When the prisoners who had surrendered on terms were with the +other prisoners brought to Hannibal, he had them all collected together +to the number of more than fifteen thousand, and began by saying that +Maharbal had no authority to grant them their lives without consulting +him. He then launched out into an invective against Rome: and when he +had finished that, he distributed all the prisoners who were Romans +among the companies of his army to be held in safe keeping; but allowed +all the allies to depart without ransom to their own country, with +the same remark as he had made before, that “he was not come to fight +against Italians, but in behalf of Italians against Rome.” He then gave +his army time to refresh themselves after their fatigue, and buried +those of highest rank who had fallen in his army, amounting to about +thirty; the total number of his loss being fifteen hundred, most of +whom were Celts. He then began considering, in conjunction with his +brother and friends, where and how he should continue his attack, for +he now felt confident of ultimate success. + +[Sidenote: Dismay at Rome.] + +When the news of this disaster reached Rome, the chief men of the state +could not, in view of the gravity of the blow, conceal its extent or +soften it down, but were forced to assemble the people and tell them +the truth. When the Praetor, therefore, from the Rostra said, “We have +been beaten in a great battle,” there was such a consternation, that +those who had been present at the battle as well as at this meeting, +felt the disaster to be graver than when they were on the field of +battle itself. And this feeling of the people was not to be wondered +at. For many years they had been unaccustomed to the word or the fact +of defeat, and they could not now endure reverse with patience or +dignity. The Senate, however, rose to the occasion, and held protracted +debates and consultations as to the future, anxiously considering what +it was the duty of all classes to do, and how they were to do it. + +[Sidenote: Servilius’s advanced guard cut to pieces.] + ++86.+ About the same time as the battle of Thrasymene, the Consul +Gnaeus Servilius, who had been stationed on duty at Ariminum,—which is +on the coast of the Adriatic, where the plains of Cis-Alpine Gaul join +the rest of Italy, not far from the mouths of the Padus,—having heard +that Hannibal had entered Etruria and was encamped near Flaminius, +designed to join the latter with his whole army. But finding himself +hampered by the difficulty of transporting so heavy a force, he sent +Gaius Centenius forward in haste with four thousand horse, intending +that he should be there before himself in case of need. But Hannibal, +getting early intelligence after the battle of Thrasymene of this +reinforcement of the enemy, sent Maharbal with his light-armed troops, +and a detachment of cavalry, who falling in with Gaius, killed nearly +half his men at the first encounter; and having pursued the remainder +to a certain hill, on the very next day took them all prisoners. The +news of the battle of Thrasymene was three days’ old at Rome, and +the sorrow caused by it was, so to speak, at its hottest, when this +further disaster was announced. The consternation caused by it was no +longer confined to the people. The Senate now fully shared in it; and +it was resolved that the usual annual arrangements for the election of +magistrates should be suspended, and a more radical remedy be sought +for the present dangers; for they came to the conclusion that their +affairs were in such a state, as to require a commander with absolute +powers. + +[Sidenote: Hannibal’s advance after the battle.] + +Feeling now entirely confident of success, Hannibal rejected the +idea of approaching Rome for the present; but traversed the country +plundering it without resistance, and directing his march towards the +coast of the Adriatic. Having passed through Umbria and Picenum, he +came upon the coast after a ten days’ march with such enormous booty, +that the army could neither drive nor carry all the wealth which they +had taken, and after killing a large number of people on his road. +For the order was given, usual in the storming of cities, to kill all +adults who came in their way: an order which Hannibal was prompted to +give now by his deep-seated hatred of Rome.[189] + ++87.+ Pitching his camp on the shore of the Adriatic, in a district +extraordinarily rich in every kind of produce, he took great pains to +refresh his men and restore their health, and no less so that of the +horses. For the cold and squalor of a winter spent in Gallia Cis-Alpina +without the protection of a roof, and then the painful march through +the marshes, had brought upon most of the horses, and the men as well, +an attack of scurvy and all its consequences. Having therefore now got +possession of a rich country, he got his horses into condition again, +and restored the bodies and spirits of his soldiers; and made the +Libyans change their own for Roman arms selected for the purpose, which +he could easily do from being possessed of so many sets stripped from +the bodies of the enemy. He now sent messengers, too, to Carthage by +sea, to report what had taken place, for this was the first time he had +reached the sea since he entered Italy. The Carthaginians were greatly +rejoiced at the news: and took measures with enthusiasm for forwarding +supplies to their armies, both in Iberia and Italy. + +[Sidenote: Q. Fabius Maximus Dictator.] + +Meanwhile the Romans had appointed Quintus Fabius Dictator,[190] a +man distinguished no less for his wisdom than his high birth; as is +still commemorated by the fact that the members of his family are even +now called _Maximi_, that is “Greatest,” in honour of his successful +achievements. A Dictator differs from the Consuls in this, that each +Consul is followed by twelve lictors, the Dictator by twenty-four. +Again, the Consuls have frequently to refer to the Senate to enable +them to carry out their proposed plans, but the Dictator is absolute, +and when he is appointed all other magistrates in Rome are at once +deprived of power, except the Tribunes of the People.[191] I shall, +however, take another opportunity of speaking in more detail about +these officers. With the Dictator they appointed Marcus Minucius master +of the horse; this is an officer under the Dictator, and takes his +place when engaged elsewhere. + ++88.+ Though Hannibal shifted his quarters from time to time for short +distances in one direction or another, he remained in the neighbourhood +of the Adriatic; and by bathing his horses with old wine, of which he +had a great store, cured them of the scab and got them into condition +again. By a similar treatment he cured his men of their wounds, and got +the others into a sound state of health and spirits for the service +before them. After traversing with fire and sword the territories +of Praetutia,[192] Hadriana, Marrucina, and Frentana, he started on +his road to Iapygia. This district is divided among three peoples, +each with a district name, Daunii [Peucetii], and Messapii. Hannibal +first invaded the territory of the Daunii, beginning from Luceria, a +Roman colony, and laid the country waste. He next encamped near Vibo, +and overran the territory of Arpi, and plundered all Daunia without +resistance. + +[Sidenote: Fabius takes the command.] + +Meanwhile Fabius, after offering the usual sacrifice to the gods +upon his appointment, started with his master of the horse and four +legions which had been enrolled for the purpose; and having effected a +junction near Daunia with the troops that had come to the rescue from +Ariminum, he relieved Gnaeus of his command on shore and sent him with +an escort to Rome, with orders to be ready with help for any emergency, +in case the Carthaginians made any movement by sea. Fabius himself, +with his master of the horse, took over the command of the whole army +and pitched his camp opposite the Carthaginians, near a place called +Aecae,[193] about six miles from the enemy. + +[Sidenote: Cunctator.] + ++89.+ When Hannibal learnt that Fabius had arrived, he determined to +terrify the enemy by promptly attacking. He therefore led out his +army, approached the Roman camp, and there drew up his men in order of +battle; but when he had waited some time, and nobody came out to attack +him, he drew off and retired to his own camp. For Fabius, having made +up his mind to incur no danger and not to risk a battle, but to make +the safety of his men his first and greatest object, kept resolutely +to this purpose. At first he was despised for it, and gave rise to +scandalous insinuations that he was an utter coward and dared not face +an engagement: but in course of time he compelled everybody to confess +and allow that it was impossible for any one to have acted, in the +existing circumstances, with greater discretion and prudence. And it +was not long before facts testified to the wisdom of his policy. Nor +was it wonderful that it was so. For the forces of his opponents had +been trained from their earliest youth without intermission in war; +had a general who had grown up with them and from childhood had been +instructed in the arts of the camp; had won many battles in Iberia, +and twice running had beaten the Romans and their allies: and, what +was more than all, had thoroughly made up their minds that their one +hope of safety was in victory. In every respect the circumstances of +the Roman army were the exact opposite of these; and therefore, their +manifest inferiority making it impossible for Fabius to offer the enemy +battle, he fell back upon those resources in which the Romans had the +advantage of the enemy; clung to them; and conducted the war by their +means: and they were—an inexhaustible supply of provisions and of men. + +[Sidenote: Minucius discontented.] + ++90.+ He, then, during the following months, kept his army continually +hovering in the neighbourhood of the enemy, his superior knowledge +of the country enabling him to occupy beforehand all the posts of +vantage; and having supplies in abundance on his rear, he never allowed +his soldiers to go on foraging expeditions, or get separated, on any +pretence, from the camp; but keeping them continually massed together +and in close union, he watched for favourable opportunities of time +and place; and by this method of proceeding captured and killed a +large number of the enemy, who in their contempt of him straggled from +their camp in search of plunder. His object in these manœuvres was +twofold,—to gradually diminish the limited numbers of the enemy: and +to strengthen and renew by such successes in detail the spirits of his +own men, which had been depressed, to begin with, by the general defeat +of their armies. But nothing would induce him to agree to give his +enemy a set battle. This policy however was by no means approved of by +his master of the horse, Marcus. He joined in the general verdict, and +decried Fabius in every one’s hearing, as conducting his command in a +cowardly and unenterprising spirit; and was himself eager to venture +upon a decisive engagement. + +[Sidenote: Hannibal in Samnium and Apulia.] + +Meanwhile the Carthaginians, after wasting these districts, crossed +the Apennines; and descending upon Samnium, which was rich and had +been free from war for many years past, found themselves in possession +of such an abundance of provisions, that they could get rid of +them neither by use nor waste. They overran also the territory of +Beneventum, which was a Roman colony; and took the town of Venusia, +which was unwalled and richly furnished with every kind of property. +All this time the Romans were following on his rear, keeping one or +two days’ march behind him, but never venturing to approach or engage +the enemy. Accordingly, when Hannibal saw that Fabius plainly meant to +decline a battle, but yet would not abandon the country altogether, he +formed the bold resolution of penetrating to the plains round Capua; +and actually did so as far as Falernum, convinced that thereby he +should do one of two things,—force the enemy to give him battle, or +make it evident to all that the victory was his, and that the Romans +had abandoned the country to him. This he hoped would strike terror +into the various cities, and cause them to be eager to revolt from +Rome. For up to that time, though the Romans had been beaten in two +battles, not a single city in Italy had revolted to the Carthaginians; +but all maintained their fidelity, although some of them were suffering +severely;—a fact which may show us the awe and respect which the +Republic had inspired in its allies. + ++91.+ Hannibal, however, had not adopted this plan without good reason. +For the plains about Capua are the best in Italy for fertility and +beauty and proximity to the sea, and for the commercial harbours, into +which merchants run who are sailing to Italy from nearly all parts of +the world. They contain, moreover, the most famous and beautiful cities +of Italy. On its seaboard are Sinuessa, Cumae, Puteoli, Naples, and +Nuceria; and inland to the north there are Cales and Teanum, to the +east and south [Caudium[194]] and Nola. In the centre of these plains +lies the richest of all the cities, that of Capua. No tale in all +mythology wears a greater appearance of probability than that which +is told of these, which, like others remarkable for their beauty, are +called the Phlegraean plains; for surely none are more likely for +beauty and fertility to have been contended for by gods. In addition to +these advantages, they are strongly protected by nature and difficult +of approach; for one side is protected by the sea, and the rest by a +long and high chain of mountains, through which there are but three +passes from the interior, narrow and difficult, one from Samnium [a +second from Latium[195]] and a third from Hirpini. So that if the +Carthaginians succeeded in fixing their quarters in these plains, they +would have the advantage of a kind of theatre, in which to display +the terrors of their power before the gaze of all Italy; and would +make a spectacle also of the cowardice of their enemies in shrinking +from giving them battle, while they themselves would be proved beyond +dispute to be masters of the country. + +[Sidenote: Hannibal descends into the Falernian plain.] + ++92.+ With this view Hannibal crossed from Samnium by the pass of the +hill called Eribianus,[196] and encamped on the bank of the river +Vulturnus, which almost divides these plains in half. His camp was on +the side of the river towards Rome, but he overran the whole plain with +foraging parties. Though utterly aghast at the audacity of the enemy’s +proceedings, Fabius stuck all the more firmly to the policy upon which +he had determined. But his colleague Minucius, and all the centurions +and tribunes of the army, thinking that they had caught the enemy in an +excellent trap, were of opinion that they should make all haste into +the plains, and not allow the most splendid part of the country to be +devastated. Until they reached the spot, Fabius hurried on, and feigned +to share their eager and adventurous spirit; and, when he was near +the ager Falernus, he showed himself on the mountain skirts and kept +in a line with the enemy, that he might not be thought by the allies +to abandon the country: but he would not let his army descend into +the plain, being still unwilling to risk a general engagement, partly +for the same reasons as before, and partly because the enemy were +conspicuously superior in cavalry. + +[Sidenote: Fabius lies in wait.] + +After trying to provoke his enemies, and collecting an unlimited +amount of booty by laying waste the whole plain, Hannibal began taking +measures for removing: wishing not to waste his booty, but to stow it +in some safe place, which he might also make his winter quarters; that +the army might not only be well off for the present, but might have +abundant supplies all through the winter. Fabius, learning that he +meditated returning the same way as he came, and seeing that the pass +was a narrow one, and extremely well suited for an attack by ambush, +placed about four thousand men at the exact spot that he would have to +pass; while he, with the main body of his troops, encamped on a hill +which commanded the entrance of the pass. + +[Sidenote: Hannibal eludes him.] + ++93.+ Fabius hoped when the Carthaginians came thither, and encamped on +the plain immediately under the foot of the hill, that he would be able +to snatch away their plunder without any risk to himself; and, most of +all, might even put an end to the whole war by means of the excellent +situation for an attack in which he now was. He was accordingly wholly +intent on forming plans for this purpose, anxiously considering in what +direction and in what manner he should avail himself of the advantages +of the ground, and which of his men were to be the first to attack +the enemy. Whilst his enemies were making these preparations for the +next day, Hannibal, guessing the truth, took care to give them no time +or leisure for executing their design; but summoning Hasdrubal, the +captain of his pioneers, ordered him, with all speed, to make as many +fagots of dry wood of all sorts as possible, and selecting two thousand +of the strongest of the working oxen from the booty, to collect them +outside the camp. When this was done, he summoned the pioneers, and +pointed out to them a certain ridge lying between the camp and the +gorge by which he meant to march. To this ridge they were to drive the +oxen, when the order was given, as actively and energetically as they +could, until they came to the top. Having given these instructions, he +bade them take their supper and go to rest betimes. Towards the end +of the third watch of the night he led the pioneers out of the camp, +and ordered them to tie the fagots to the horns of the oxen. The men +being numerous, this did not take long to do; and he then ordered them +to set the fagots all alight, and to drive the oxen off and force them +to mount the ridge; and placing his light-armed troops behind them he +ordered them to assist the drivers up to a certain distance: but, as +soon as the beasts had got well started, to take open order and pass +them at the double, and, with as much noise as possible, make for the +top of the ridge; that, if they found any of the enemy there, they +might close with and attack them at once. At the same time he himself +led the main army towards the narrow gorge of the pass,—his heavy-armed +men in front, next to them the cavalry, then the booty, and the +Iberians and Celts bringing up the rear. + ++94.+ The Romans who were guarding the gorge, no sooner saw these +fiery fagots advancing to the heights, than, quitting the narrow part +of the pass, they made for the ridge to meet the enemy. But when they +got near the oxen, they were puzzled by the lights, imagining them +to be something more dangerous than they really were; and when the +Carthaginian light-armed troops came on to the ground, after some +slight skirmishing between the two parties, upon the oxen rushing in +among them, they separated and took up their positions on different +heights and waited for daybreak, not being able to comprehend what was +taking place. + +[Sidenote: Hannibal gets through the pass. Autumn, B.C. 217.] + +Partly because he was at a loss to understand what was happening, and, +in the words of the poet, “some deep design suspecting;”[197] and +partly that, in accordance with his original plan, he was determined +not to risk a general engagement, Fabius remained quietly within his +camp: while Hannibal, finding everything going as he designed, led his +army and booty in safety through the gorge, the men who had been set to +guard the narrow road having abandoned their post. At daybreak, seeing +the two troops fronting each other on the heights, he sent some Iberian +companies to the light-armed troops, who engaged the Romans, and, +killing a thousand of them, easily relieved his own light-armed troops +and brought them down to the main body. + +[Sidenote: Fabius goes to Rome, leaving the command to M. Minucius.] + +Having thus effected his departure from the Falernian plain, Hannibal +thenceforth busied himself in looking out for a place in which to +winter, and in making the necessary preparations, after having inspired +the utmost alarm and uncertainty in the cities and inhabitants of Italy. + +Though Fabius meanwhile was in great disrepute among the common people, +for having let his enemy escape from such a trap, he nevertheless +refused to abandon his policy; and being shortly afterwards obliged to +go to Rome to perform certain sacrifices, he handed over the command of +his legions to his master of the horse, with many parting injunctions, +not to be so anxious to inflict a blow upon the enemy, as to avoid +receiving one himself. Marcus, however, paid no heed to the advice, +and, even while Fabius was speaking, had wholly resolved to risk a +general engagement. + +[Sidenote: Spain, B.C. 217.] + ++95.+ While these things were going on in Italy, Hasdrubal, who was in +command in Iberia, having during the winter repaired the thirty ships +left him by his brother, and manned ten additional ones, got a fleet of +forty decked vessels to sea, at the beginning of the summer, from New +Carthage, under the command of Hamilcar; and at the same time collected +his land forces, and led them out of their winter quarters. The fleet +coasted up the country, and the troops marched along the shore towards +the Iber. Suspecting their design, Gnaeus Scipio was for issuing from +his winter quarters and meeting them both by land and sea. But hearing +of the number of their troops, and the great scale on which their +preparations had been made, he gave up the idea of meeting them by +land; and manning thirty-five ships, and taking on board the best men +he could get from his land forces to serve as marines, he put to sea, +and arrived on the second day near the mouth of the Iber. Here he came +to anchor, at a distance of about ten miles from the enemy, and sent +two swift-sailing Massilian vessels to reconnoitre. For the sailors of +Marseilles were the first in every service of difficulty and danger, +and ready at the shortest notice to do whatever was required of them; +and, in fact, Marseilles has distinguished itself above all other +places, before and since, in fidelity to Rome, and never more so than +in the Hannibalian war. The ships sent to reconnoitre having reported +that the enemy’s fleet was lying off the mouth of the Iber, Scipio put +to sea with all speed, wishing to surprise them. + +[Sidenote: Roman success at sea.] + ++96.+ But being informed in good time by his look-out men that the +enemy were bearing down upon him, Hasdrubal drew up his troops on the +beach, and ordered his crews to go on board; and, when the Romans hove +in sight, gave the signal for the attack, determined to fight the +enemy at sea. But, after engaging, the Carthaginians made but a short +struggle for victory, and very soon gave way. For the support of the +troops on the beach did less service in encouraging them to attack, +than harm in offering them a safe place of retreat. Accordingly, +after losing two ships with their crews, and the oars and marines of +four others, they gave way and made for the land; and when the Romans +pressed on with spirit in pursuit, they ran their ships ashore, and +leaping from the vessels fled for refuge to the troops. The Romans +came boldly close to land, towed off such of the vessels as could be +got afloat, and sailed away in great exultation at having beaten the +enemy at the first blow, secured the mastery of the sea, and taken +twenty-five of the enemy’s ships. + +In Iberia therefore, after this victory, the Roman prospects had begun +to brighten. But when news of this reverse arrived at Carthage, the +Carthaginians at once despatched a fleet of seventy ships, judging it +to be essential to their whole design that they should command the +sea. These ships touched first at Sardinia and then at Pisae in Italy, +the commanders believing that they should find Hannibal there. But +the Romans at once put to sea to attack them from Rome itself, with +a fleet of a hundred and twenty quinqueremes; and hearing of this +expedition against them, the Carthaginians sailed back to Sardinia, and +thence returned to Carthage. Gnaeus Servilius, who was in command of +this Roman fleet, followed the Carthaginians for a certain distance, +believing that he should fall in with them; but, finding that he was +far behind, he gave up the attempt. He first put in at Lilybaeum, and +afterwards sailed to the Libyan island of Cercina; and after receiving +a sum of money from the inhabitants on condition of not laying waste +the country, he departed. On his return voyage he took the island of +Cossyrus, and having put a garrison into its small capital, returned to +Lilybaeum. There he placed the fleet, and shortly afterwards went off +himself to join the land army. + +[Sidenote: Publius Scipio, whose imperium is prolonged after his +Consulship of the previous year, with Spain assigned as his province, +is sent to join his brother there with 20 ships: early in B.C. 217.] + ++97.+ When the Senate heard of Gnaeus Scipio’s naval success, believing +it to be advantageous or rather essential not to relax their hold on +Iberia, but to press on the war there against Carthage with redoubled +vigour, they prepared a fleet of twenty ships, and put them under the +command of Publius Scipio; and in accordance with arrangements already +made, despatched him with all speed to join his brother Gnaeus, and +carry on the Iberian campaign in conjunction with him. Their great +anxiety was lest the Carthaginians should get the upper hand in Iberia, +and thus possessing themselves of abundant supplies and recruits, +should get a more complete mastery of the sea, and assist the invasion +of Italy, by sending troops and money to Hannibal. Regarding therefore +the Iberian war as of the utmost importance, they sent these ships +and Publius Scipio to that country; who, when he arrived in Iberia, +effected a junction with his brother and did most substantial service +to the State. For up to that time the Romans had not ventured to cross +the Iber; but had thought themselves fortunate if they could secure the +friendship and allies of the tribes up to that river. They now however +did cross it, and for the first time had the courage to attempt a +movement on the other side: their designs being greatly favoured also +by an accidental circumstance. + +When the two brothers, after overawing the Iberian tribes that lived +near the passage of the Iber, had arrived before the city of Saguntum, +they pitched their camp about forty stades from it, near the temple of +Aphrodite, selecting the position as offering at once security from the +attacks of the enemy, and a means of getting supplies by sea: for their +fleet was coasting down parallel with them. + +[Sidenote: Treason of Abilyx.] + ++98.+ Here an event occurred which produced a decisive change in their +favour. When Hannibal was about to start for Italy, from the Iberian +towns whose loyalty he suspected he took the sons of their leading men +as hostages, and placed them all in Saguntum, because of the strength +of that town and his confidence in the fidelity of those who were left +in charge of it. Now there was a certain Iberian there named Abilyx, +who enjoyed the highest character and reputation with his countrymen, +and was believed to be especially well disposed and loyal to the +Carthaginians. Seeing how affairs were going, and believing that the +fortune of the Romans was in the ascendant, he formed in his own mind a +scheme, worthy of an Iberian and barbarian, for giving up the hostages. +Convinced that he might obtain a high place in the favour of Rome, if +he gave a proof of his fidelity at a critical moment, he made up his +mind to turn traitor to Carthage and put the hostages in the hands +of the Romans. He began his machinations by addressing himself to +Bostar, the Carthaginian general who had been despatched by Hasdrubal +to prevent the Romans from crossing the river, but, not venturing to +do this, had retreated, and was now encamped in the region of Saguntum +next the sea. To this man, who was of a guileless and gentle character, +and quite disposed to trust him, Abilyx now introduced the subject of +the hostages. He argued that “the Romans having now crossed the Iber, +the Carthaginians could no longer hold Iberia by terror, but stood +now in need of the good feeling of their subjects: seeing then that +the Romans had actually approached Saguntum and were besieging it, +and that the city was in danger,—if he were to take the hostages and +restore them to their parents and cities, he would not only frustrate +the ambitious scheme of the Romans, who wished above all things by +getting possession of the hostages to have the credit of doing this; +but would also rouse a feeling of goodwill towards Carthage in all +the cities, for having taken thought for the future and provided for +the safety of the hostages. He would, too, much enhance the favour by +personally managing this business: for if he restored these boys to +their homes, he would provoke the gratitude, not only of their parents, +but of the people at large also, by giving a striking instance of +the magnanimous policy of Carthage towards her allies. He might even +expect large rewards for himself from the families that recovered their +children; for all those, who thus unexpectedly got into their hands +the dearest objects of their affection, would vie with each other in +heaping favours on the author of such a service.” By these and similar +arguments he persuaded Bostar to fall in with his proposals. + ++99.+ Abilyx then went away, after arranging a fixed day on which he +would appear with everything necessary for conveying the boys. At +night he made his way to the Roman lines, and, having fallen in with +some Iberians serving in the Roman army, was by them conducted to +the generals; to whom he discoursed at great length on the revulsion +of feeling of the Iberians in their favour, which would be caused +if they got possession of the hostages: and finally offered to put +the boys in their hands. Publius Scipio received the proposal with +extreme eagerness: and, promising him large rewards, he agreed with +him on a day, hour, and place at which a party were to be waiting to +receive him. After returning home, Abilyx next went with a band of +chosen friends to Bostar; and, after receiving the boys, left the camp +at night, as though he wished not to be seen by the Roman camp as he +passed it, and came at the appointed time to the place arranged, and +there handed over all the boys to the Roman officers. Publius treated +Abilyx with special honour, and employed him in restoring the boys +to their native cities, along with certain of his own friends. He +accordingly went from city to city, giving them a visible proof by +the restoration of the boys of the Roman mildness and magnanimity, in +contrast to the Carthaginian suspiciousness and harshness; and bidding +them also observe that he had found it necessary to change sides, he +induced many Iberians to join the Roman alliance. Bostar was thought, +in thus surrendering the hostages to the enemy, to have behaved more +like a child than became a man of his age, and was in serious danger +of his life. For the present, however, as it was getting late in the +season, both sides began dispersing into winter quarters; the Romans +having made an important step towards success in the matter of the boys. + +[Sidenote: Hannibal takes Geronium.] + ++100.+ Such was the position of affairs in Iberia. To return to +Hannibal, whom we left having just effected the passage from the +Falernian plain. Hearing from his scouts that there was abundance of +corn in the district round Luceria and Geronium, and that Geronium +was an excellent place to store it in, he determined to make his +winter quarters there; and accordingly marched thither by way of Mount +Liburnum. And having come to Geronium, which is about two hundred +stades from Luceria, he first endeavoured to win over the inhabitants +by promises, offering them pledges of his good faith; but when no one +would listen to him, he determined to lay siege to the town. Having +taken it without much delay, he put the inhabitants to the sword; +but preserved most of the houses and walls, because he wished to use +them as granaries for his winter camp: and having encamped his army +in front of it, he fortified his position with trench and palisade. +Having finished these labours, he sent out two-thirds of the army to +collect corn, with orders to bring home every day, each division for +the use of its own men, as much as the regular heads of this department +would usually supply: while with the remaining third of his army he +kept watch over his camp, and occupied certain places with a view +of protecting the foraging parties in case they were attacked. The +district being mostly very accessible and flat, and the harvesting +party being almost innumerable, and the season moreover being at the +very best stage for such operations, the amount of corn collected every +day was very great. + +[Sidenote: Minucius obtains a slight success. Autumn B.C. 217.] + ++101.+ When Minucius took over the command from Fabius, he at first +kept along the line of hills, feeling certain that he would sooner +or later fall in with the Carthaginians; but when he heard that +Hannibal had already taken Geronium, and was collecting the corn of +the country, and had pitched his camp in front of the town, he changed +the direction of his march, and descended from the top of the hills by +way of a ridge leading down into the plains. Arriving at the height +which lies in the territory of Larinum, and is called Calena, he +encamped round its foot, being eager on any terms whatever to engage +the enemy. When Hannibal saw the enemy approaching, he sent a third of +his army foraging for corn, but took the other two-thirds with him, +and, advancing sixteen stades from Geronium towards the enemy, pitched +a camp upon a piece of rising ground, with a view at once of overawing +his opponents, and affording safety to his foraging parties: and there +being another elevation between him and the two armies, which was near, +and conveniently placed for an attack upon the enemy’s lines, he sent +out about two thousand light-armed troops in the night and seized it. +At daybreak when Minucius saw these men, he took his own light-armed +troops and assaulted the hill. After a gallant skirmish the Romans +prevailed; and subsequently their whole camp was transferred to this +place. For a certain time Hannibal kept his men for the most part +within their lines, because the camps were so close to each other; but, +after the lapse of some days, he was obliged to divide them into two +parties, one for pasturing the animals, and one for gathering corn: +being very anxious to carry out his design of avoiding the destruction +of his booty, and of collecting as much corn as possible, that his men +might have abundant food during the winter, and his horses and beasts +of burden as much so; for the chief hope of his army rested on his +cavalry. + +[Sidenote: Carthaginian foragers cut off.] + ++102.+ It was then that Minucius, seeing the great part of the enemy +scattered about the country on these services, selected the exact hour +of the day when they would be away to lead out his army. Having come +close to the Carthaginian lines he drew out his heavy-armed troops +there; and then, dividing his cavalry and light-armed into detachments, +sent them in search of the foragers, ordering them to give no quarter. +This put Hannibal into a great difficulty: for he was not strong +enough to accept battle with the enemy drawn up outside his lines, or +to relieve those of his men who were scattered about the country. The +Romans meanwhile who had been sent to take the foragers found a great +number of them scattered about, and killed them; while the troops +drawn up in front of the camp grew so contemptuous of the enemy, that +they even began to pull down their palisade, and all but assaulted +the Carthaginians. Hannibal was in a very dangerous position: but in +spite of the storm that had suddenly fallen on him, he held his ground, +repulsing the enemy when they approached and defending, though with +difficulty, the rampart; until Hasdrubal came to his relief with about +four thousand of the foraging parties, who had fled for refuge from the +country and collected within the lines near Geronium. This encouraged +Hannibal to make a sally: and having got into order of battle a short +distance from the camp, he just managed with difficulty to avert the +threatened danger. After killing large numbers of the enemy in the +struggle at the camp, and still more in the open country, Minucius for +the present retired, but with great hopes for the future; and on the +morrow, the Carthaginians having abandoned their lines on the hill, he +went up and occupied their position. For Hannibal being alarmed lest +the Romans should go by night and find the camp at Geronium undefended, +and become masters of his baggage and stores, determined to retire +thither himself and again fix his quarters there. After this the +Carthaginians were more timid and cautious in their manner of foraging; +while the Romans on the other hand acted with greater boldness and +recklessness. + +[Sidenote: Minucius invested with co-equal powers with Fabius.] + ++103.+ An exaggerated account of this success reached Rome, and caused +excessive exultation: first, because in their gloomy prospects some +sort of change for the better had at last shown itself; and, secondly, +because the people could now believe that the ill success and want of +nerve, which had hitherto attended the legions, had not arisen from +the cowardice of the men, but the timidity of their leader. Wherefore +everybody began finding fault with and depreciating Fabius, as failing +to seize his opportunities with spirit; while they extolled Minucius +to such a degree for what had happened, that a thing was done for +which there was no precedent. They gave him absolute power as well as +Fabius, believing that he would quickly put an end to the campaign; and +so there were two Dictators made for carrying on the same war, which +had never happened at Rome before. When Minucius was informed of his +popularity with the people, and of the office bestowed upon him by the +citizens, he felt doubly incited to run all risks and act with daring +boldness against the enemy. Fabius rejoined the army with sentiments +not in the least changed by what had happened, but rather fixed +still more immovably on his original policy. Seeing, however, that +Minucius was puffed up with pride, and inclined to offer him a jealous +opposition at every turn, and was wholly bent on risking an engagement, +he offered him the choice of two alternatives: either to command the +whole army on alternate days with him; or that they should separate +their two armies, and each command their respective part in their own +way. Minucius joyfully accepting the second alternative, they divided +the men and encamped separately about twelve stades apart. + +[Sidenote: Hannibal draws on Minucius.] + ++104.+ Partly from observing what was taking place, and partly from the +information of prisoners, Hannibal knew of the mutual jealousy of the +two generals, and the impetuosity and ambition of Minucius. Looking +upon what was happening in the enemy’s camp as rather in his favour +than otherwise, he set himself to deal with Minucius; being anxious +to put an end to his bold methods and check in time his adventurous +spirit. There being then an elevation between his camp and that of +Minucius, which might prove dangerous to either, he resolved to occupy +it; and, knowing full well that, elated by his previous success, +Minucius would be certain to move out at once to oppose his design, he +concerted the following plan. The country round the hill being bare of +trees, but having much broken ground and hollows of every description, +he despatched some men during the night, in bodies of two and three +hundred, to occupy the most favourable positions, numbering in all five +hundred horse and five thousand light-armed and other infantry: and in +order that they might not be observed in the morning by the enemy’s +foraging parties, he seized the hill at daybreak with his light-armed +troops. When Marcus saw what was taking place, he looked upon it as +an excellent opportunity; and immediately despatched his light-armed +troops, with orders to engage the enemy and contest the possession of +the position; after these he sent his cavalry, and close behind them +he led his heavy-armed troops in person, as on the former occasion, +intending to repeat exactly the same manœuvres. + +[Sidenote: Fabius comes to the rescue.] + ++105.+ As the day broke, and the thoughts and eyes of all were +engrossed in observing the combatants on the hill, the Romans had no +suspicion of the troops lying in ambush. But as Hannibal kept pouring +in reinforcements for his men on the hill, and followed close behind +them himself with his cavalry and main body, it was not long before +the cavalry also of both sides were engaged. The result was that the +Roman light-armed troops, finding themselves hard pressed by the +numbers of the cavalry, caused great confusion among the heavy-armed +troops by retreating into their lines; and the signal being given at +the same time to those who were in ambush, these latter suddenly showed +themselves and charged: whereby not only the Roman light-armed troops, +but their whole army, were in the greatest danger. At that moment +Fabius, seeing what was taking place, and being alarmed lest they +should sustain a complete defeat, led out his forces with all speed +and came to the relief of his imperilled comrades. At his approach +the Romans quickly recovered their courage; and though their lines +were entirely broken up, they rallied again round their standards, +and retired under cover of the army of Fabius, with a severe loss in +the light-armed division, and a still heavier one in the ranks of the +legions, and that too of the bravest men. Alarmed at the freshness and +perfect order of the relieving army, Hannibal retired from the pursuit +and ceased fighting. To those who were actually engaged it was quite +clear that an utter defeat had been brought about by the rashness of +Minucius, and that their safety on this and previous occasions had been +secured by the caution of Fabius; while those at home had a clear and +indisputable demonstration of the difference between the rashness and +bravado of a soldier, and the far-seeing prudence and cool calculation +of a general. Taught by experience the Romans joined camps once more, +and for the future listened to Fabius and obeyed his orders: while the +Carthaginians dug a trench across the space between the knoll and their +own lines, and threw up a palisade round the crest of the captured +hill; and, having placed a guard upon it, proceeded thenceforth with +their preparations for the winter unmolested. + +[Sidenote: B.C. 216. Coss. G. Terentius Varro and L. Aemilius Paulus.] + ++106.+ The Consular elections being now come, the Romans elected Lucius +Aemilius and Gaius Terentius. On their appointment the Dictators laid +down their offices, and the Consuls of the previous year, Gnaeus +Servilius and Marcus Regulus—who had been appointed after the death +of Flaminius,—were invested with proconsular authority by Aemilius; +and, taking the command at the seat of war, administered the affairs +of the army independently. Meanwhile Aemilius, in consultation with +the Senate, set at once to work to levy new soldiers, to fill up the +numbers of the legions required for the campaign, and despatched them +to headquarters; enjoining at the same time upon Servilius that he +should by no means hazard a general engagement, but contrive detailed +skirmishes, as sharp and as frequent as he could, for the sake of +practising the raw recruits, and giving them courage for a pitched +battle: for they held the opinion that their former defeats were owing, +as much as anything else, to the fact that they were employing troops +newly levied and entirely untrained. The Senate also sent the Praetor +Lucius Postumius into Gaul, to affect a diversion there, and induce the +Celts who were with Hannibal to return home. They also took measures +for recalling the fleet that had wintered at Lilybaeum, and for sending +to the commanders in Iberia such supplies as were necessary for the +service. Thus the Consul and Senate were busied with these and other +preparations for the campaign; and Servilius, having received his +instructions from the Consuls, carried them out in every particular. +The details of this part of the campaign, therefore, I shall omit to +record; for nothing of importance or worth remembering occurred, partly +in consequence of these instructions, and partly from circumstances; +but there were a considerable number of skirmishes and petty +engagements, in which the Roman commanders gained a high reputation for +courage and prudence. + +[Sidenote: Autumn, B.C. 216.] + +[Sidenote: The Senate order a battle.] + ++107.+ Thus through all that winter and spring the two armies remained +encamped facing each other. But when the season for the new harvest was +come, Hannibal began to move from the camp at Geronium; and making up +his mind that it would be to his advantage to force the enemy by any +possible means to give him battle, he occupied the citadel of a town +called Cannae, into which the corn and other supplies from the district +round Canusium were collected by the Romans, and conveyed thence to the +camp as occasion required. The town itself, indeed, had been reduced to +ruins the year before: but the capture of its citadel and the material +of war contained in it, caused great commotion in the Roman army; +for it was not only the loss of the place and the stores in it that +distressed them, but the fact also that it commanded the surrounding +district. They therefore sent frequent messages to Rome asking for +instructions: for if they approached the enemy they would not be able +to avoid an engagement, in view of the fact that the country was being +plundered, and the allies all in a state of excitement. The Senate +passed a resolution that they should give the enemy battle: they, +however, bade Gnaeus Servilius wait, and despatched the Consuls to the +seat of war. It was to Aemilius that all eyes turned, and on him the +most confident hopes were fixed; for his life had been a noble one, and +he was thought to have managed the recent Illyrian war with advantage +to the State. The Senate determined to bring eight legions into the +field, which had never been done at Rome before, each legion consisting +of five thousand men besides allies. For the Romans, as I have stated +before,[198] habitually enrol four legions each year, each consisting +of about four thousand foot and two hundred horse; and when any unusual +necessity arises, they raise the number of foot to five thousand and of +the horse to three hundred. Of allies, the number in each legion is the +same as that of the citizens, but of the horse three times as great. Of +the four legions thus composed, they assign two to each of the Consuls +for whatever service is going on. Most of their wars are decided by one +Consul and two legions, with their quota of allies; and they rarely +employ all four at one time and on one service. But on this occasion, +so great was the alarm and terror of what would happen, they resolved +to bring not only four but eight legions into the field. + +[Sidenote: The Consuls Aemilius Paulus, and Terentius Varro go to the +seat of war.] + +[Sidenote: Speech of Aemilius.] + ++108.+ With earnest words of exhortation, therefore, to Aemilius, +putting before him the gravity in every point of view of the result of +the battle, they despatched him with instructions to seek a favourable +opportunity to fight a decisive battle with a courage worthy of Rome. +Having arrived at the camp and united their forces, they made known +the will of the Senate to the soldiers, and Aemilius exhorted them +to do their duty in terms which evidently came from his heart. He +addressed himself especially to explain and excuse the reverses which +they had lately experienced; for it was on this point particularly +that the soldiers were depressed and stood in need of encouragement. +“The causes,” he argued, “of their defeats in former battles were +many, and could not be reduced to one or two. But those causes were at +an end; and no excuse existed now, if they only showed themselves to +be men of courage, for not conquering their enemies. Up to that time +both Consuls had never been engaged together, or employed thoroughly +trained soldiers: the combatants on the contrary had been raw levies, +entirely unexperienced in danger; and what was most important of all, +they had been so entirely ignorant of their opponents, that they had +been brought into the field, and engaged in a pitched battle with an +enemy that they had never once set eyes on. Those who had been defeated +on the Trebia were drawn up on the field at daybreak, on the very next +morning after their arrival from Sicily; while those who had fought in +Etruria, not only had never seen the enemy before, but did not do so +even during the very battle itself, owing to the unfortunate state of +the atmosphere. + ++109.+ But now the conditions were quite different. For in the first +place both Consuls were with the army: and were not only prepared to +share the danger themselves, but had also induced the Consuls of the +previous year to remain and take part in the struggle. While the men +had not only seen the arms, order, and numbers of the enemy, but had +been engaged in almost daily fights with them for the last two years. +The conditions therefore under which the two former battles were fought +being quite different, it was but natural that the result of the coming +struggle should be different too. For it would be strange or rather +impossible that those who in various skirmishes, where the numbers of +either side were equal, had for the most part come off victorious, +should, when drawn up all together, and nearly double of the enemy in +number, be defeated.” + +“Wherefore, men of the army,” he continued, “seeing that we have every +advantage on our side for securing a victory, there is only one thing +necessary—your determination, your zeal! And I do not think I need say +more to you on that point. To men serving others for pay, or to those +who fight as allies on behalf of others, who have no greater danger to +expect than meets them on the field, and for whom the issues at stake +are of little importance,—such men may need words of exhortation. But +men who, like you, are fighting not for others, but themselves,—for +country, wives, and children; and for whom the issue is of far more +momentous consequence than the mere danger of the hour, need only to +be reminded: require no exhortation. For who is there among you who +would not wish if possible to be victorious; and next, if that may not +be, to die with arms in his hands, rather than to live and see the +outrage and death of those dear objects which I have named? Wherefore, +men of the army, apart from any words of mine, place before your eyes +the momentous difference to you between victory and defeat, and all +their consequences. Enter upon this battle with the full conviction, +that in it your country is not risking a certain number of legions, +but her bare existence. For she has nothing to add to such an army as +this, to give her victory, if the day now goes against us. All she +has of confidence and strength rests on you; all her hopes of safety +are in your hands. Do not frustrate those hopes: but pay back to your +country the gratitude you owe her; and make it clear to all the world +that the former reverses occurred, not because the Romans are worse men +than the Carthaginians, but from the lack of experience on the part +of those who were then fighting, and through a combination of adverse +circumstances.” With such words Aemilius dismissed the troops. + +[Sidenote: The Roman army approaches Cannae.] + +[Sidenote: Terentius Varro orders an advance.] + +[Sidenote: The Romans are successful.] + ++110.+ Next morning the two Consuls broke up their camp, and advanced +to where they heard that the enemy were entrenched. On the second day +they arrived within sight of them, and pitched their camp at about +fifty stades’ distance. But when Aemilius observed that the ground +was flat and bare for some distance round, he said that they must not +engage there with an enemy superior to them in cavalry; but that they +must rather try to draw him off, and lead him to ground on which the +battle would be more in the hands of the infantry. But Gaius Terentius +being, from inexperience, of a contrary opinion, there was a dispute +and misunderstanding between the leaders, which of all things is the +most dangerous. It is the custom, when the two Consuls are present, +that they should take the chief command on alternate days; and the next +day happening to be the turn of Terentius, he ordered an advance with +a view of approaching the enemy, in spite of the protests and active +opposition of his colleague. Hannibal set his light-armed troops and +cavalry in motion to meet him, and charging the Romans while they were +still marching, took them by surprise and caused a great confusion in +their ranks. The Romans repulsed the first charge by putting some of +their heavy-armed in front; and then sending forward their light-armed +and cavalry, began to get the best of the fight all along the line: +the Carthaginians having no reserves of any importance, while certain +companies of the legionaries were mixed with the Roman light-armed, +and helped to sustain the battle. Nightfall for the present put an +end to a struggle which had not at all answered to the hopes of the +Carthaginians. But next day Aemilius, not thinking it right to engage, +and yet being unable any longer to lead off his army, encamped with +two-thirds of it on the banks of the Aufidus, the only river which +flows right through the Apennines,—that chain of mountains which forms +the watershed of all the Italian rivers, which flow either west to the +Tuscan sea, or east to the Hadriatic. This chain is, I say, pierced by +the Aufidus, which rises on the side of Italy nearest the Tuscan Sea, +and is discharged into the Hadriatic. For the other third of his army +he caused a camp to be made across the river, to the east of the ford, +about ten stades from his own lines, and a little more from those of +the enemy; that these men, being on the other side of the river, might +protect his own foraging parties, and threaten those of the enemy. + +[Sidenote: Hannibal harangues his troops.] + ++111.+ Then Hannibal, seeing that his circumstances called for a battle +with the enemy, being anxious lest his troops should be depressed by +their previous reverse, and believing that it was an occasion which +required some encouraging words, summoned a general meeting of his +soldiers. When they were assembled, he bid them all look round upon +the country, and asked them, “What better fortune they could have +asked from the gods, if they had had the choice, than to fight in such +ground as they saw there, with the vast superiority of cavalry on their +side?” And when all signified their acquiescence in such an evident +truth, he added: “First, then, give thanks to the gods: for they have +brought the enemy into this country, because they designed the victory +for us. And, next to me, for having compelled the enemy to fight,—for +they cannot avoid it any longer,—and to fight in a place so full of +advantages for us. But I do not think it becoming in me now to use many +words in exhorting you to be brave and forward in this battle. When +you had had no experience of fighting the Romans this was necessary, +and I did then suggest many arguments and examples to you. But now +seeing that you have undeniably beaten the Romans in three successive +battles of such magnitude, what arguments could have greater influence +with you in confirming your courage than the actual facts? Now, by +your previous battles you have got possession of the country and all +its wealth; in accordance with my promises: for I have been absolutely +true in everything I have ever said to you. But the present contest is +for the cities and the wealth in them: and if you win it, all Italy +will at once be in your power; and freed from your present hard toils, +and masters of the wealth of Rome, you will by this battle become the +leaders and lords of the world. This, then, is a time for deeds, not +words: for by God’s blessing I am persuaded that I shall carry out my +promises to you forthwith.” His words were received with approving +shouts, which he acknowledged with gratitude for their zeal; and having +dismissed the assembly, he at once formed a camp on the same bank of +the river as that on which was the larger camp of the Romans. + +[Sidenote: Hannibal irritates the enemy.] + ++112.+ Next day he gave orders that all should employ themselves in +making preparations and getting themselves into a fit state of body. +On the day after that he drew out his men along the bank of the river, +and showed that he was eager to give the enemy battle. But Aemilius, +dissatisfied with his position, and seeing that the Carthaginians would +soon be obliged to shift their quarters for the sake of supplies, kept +quiet in his camps, strengthening both with extra guards. After waiting +a considerable time, when no one came out to attack him, Hannibal +put the rest of the army into camp again, but sent out his Numidian +horse to attack the enemy’s water parties from the lesser camp. These +horsemen riding right up to the lines and preventing the watering, +Gaius Terentius became more than ever inflamed with the desire of +fighting, and the soldiers were eager for a battle, and chafed at the +delay. For there is nothing more intolerable to mankind than suspense; +when a thing is once decided, men can but endure whatever out of the +catalogue of evils it is their misfortune to undergo. + +[Sidenote: Anxiety at Rome.] + +But when the news arrived at Rome that the two armies were face to +face, and that skirmishes between advanced parties of both sides were +daily taking place, the city was in a state of high excitement and +uneasiness; the people dreading the result owing to the disasters +which had now befallen them on more than one occasion; and foreseeing +and anticipating in their imaginations what would happen if they were +utterly defeated. All the oracles preserved at Rome were in everybody’s +mouth; and every temple and house was full of prodigies and miracles: +in consequence of which the city was one scene of vows, sacrifices, +supplicatory processions, and prayers. For the Romans in times of +danger take extraordinary pains to appease gods and men, and look upon +no ceremony of that kind in such times as unbecoming or beneath their +dignity. + +[Sidenote: Dispositions for the battle of Cannae.] + ++113.+ When he took over the command on the following day, as soon as +the sun was above the horizon, Gaius Terentius got the army in motion +from both the camps. Those from the larger camp he drew up in order +of battle, as soon as he had got them across the river, and bringing +up those of the smaller camp he placed them all in the same line, +selecting the south as the aspect of the whole. The Roman horse he +stationed on the right wing along the river, and their foot next them +in the same line, placing the maniples, however, closer together than +usual, and making the depth of each maniple several times greater than +its front. The cavalry of the allies he stationed on the left wing, +and the light-armed troops he placed slightly in advance of the whole +army, which amounted with its allies to eighty thousand infantry and a +little more than six thousand horse. At the same time Hannibal brought +his Balearic slingers and spearmen across the river, and stationed +them in advance of his main body; which he led out of their camp, and, +getting them across the river at two spots, drew them up opposite the +enemy. On his left wing, close to the river, he stationed the Iberian +and Celtic horse opposite the Roman cavalry; and next to them half +the Libyan heavy-armed foot; and next to them the Iberian and Celtic +foot; next, the other half of the Libyans, and, on the right wing, the +Numidian horse. Having now got them all into line he advanced with +the central companies of the Iberians and Celts; and so arranged the +other companies next these in regular gradations, that the whole line +became crescent-shaped, diminishing in depth towards its extremities: +his object being to have his Libyans as a reserve in the battle, and to +commence the action with his Iberians and Celts. + ++114.+ The armour of the Libyans was Roman, for Hannibal had armed +them with a selection of the spoils taken in previous battles. The +shield of the Iberians and Celts was about the same size, but their +swords were quite different. For that of the Roman can thrust with as +deadly effects as it can cut, while the Gallic sword can only cut, and +that requires some room. And the companies coming alternately,—the +naked Celts, and the Iberians with their short linen tunics bordered +with purple stripes, the whole appearance of the line was strange and +terrifying. The whole strength of the Carthaginian cavalry was ten +thousand, but that of their foot was not more than forty thousand, +including the Celts. Aemilius commanded on the Roman right, Gaius +Terentius on the left, Marcus Atilius and Gnaeus Servilius, the Consuls +of the previous year, on the centre. The left of the Carthaginians was +commanded by Hasdrubal, the right by Hanno, the centre by Hannibal in +person, attended by his brother Mago. And as the Roman line faced the +south, as I said before, and the Carthaginian the north, the rays of +the rising sun did not inconvenience either of them. + +[Sidenote: The Battle, 2d August, B.C. 216.] + +[Sidenote: The Romans outflanked by the cavalry.] + ++115.+ The battle was begun by an engagement between the advanced guard +of the two armies; and at first the affair between these light-armed +troops was indecisive. But as soon as the Iberian and Celtic cavalry +got at the Romans, the battle began in earnest, and in the true +barbaric fashion: for there was none of the usual formal advance and +retreat; but when they once got to close quarters, they grappled man to +man, and, dismounting from their horses, fought on foot. But when the +Carthaginians had got the upper hand in this encounter and killed most +of their opponents on the ground,— because the Romans all maintained +the fight with spirit and determination,—and began chasing the +remainder along the river, slaying as they went and giving no quarter; +then the legionaries took the place of the light-armed and closed with +the enemy. For a short time the Iberian and Celtic lines stood their +ground and fought gallantly; but, presently overpowered by the weight +of the heavy-armed lines, they gave way and retired to the rear, thus +breaking up the crescent. The Roman maniples followed with spirit, and +easily cut their way through the enemy’s line; since the Celts had been +drawn up in a thin line, while the Romans had closed up from the wings +towards the centre and the point of danger. For the two wings did not +come into action at the same time as the centre: but the centre was +first engaged, because the Gauls, having been stationed on the arc of +the crescent, had come into contact with the enemy long before the +wings, the convex of the crescent being towards the enemy. The Romans, +however, going in pursuit of these troops, and hastily closing in +towards the centre and the part of the enemy which was giving ground, +advanced so far, that the Libyan heavy-armed troops on either wing got +on their flanks. Those on the right, facing to the left, charged from +the right upon the Roman flank; while those who were on the left wing +faced to the right, and, dressing by the left, charged their right +flank,[199] the exigency of the moment suggesting to them what they +ought to do. Thus it came about, as Hannibal had planned, that the +Romans were caught between two hostile lines of Libyans—thanks to their +impetuous pursuit of the Celts. Still they fought, though no longer in +line, yet singly, or in maniples, which faced about to meet those who +charged them on the flanks. + +[Sidenote: Fall of Aemilius Paulus.] + ++116.+ Though he had been from the first on the right wing, and had +taken part in the cavalry engagement, Lucius Aemilius still survived. +Determined to act up to his own exhortatory speech, and seeing that +the decision of the battle rested mainly on the legionaries, riding up +to the centre of the line he led the charge himself, and personally +grappled with the enemy, at the same time cheering on and exhorting +his soldiers to the charge. Hannibal, on the other side, did the same, +for he too had taken his place on the centre from the commencement. +The Numidian horse on the Carthaginian right were meanwhile charging +the cavalry on the Roman left; and though, from the peculiar nature +of their mode of fighting, they neither inflicted nor received much +harm, they yet rendered the enemy’s horse useless by keeping them +occupied, and charging them first on one side and then on another. But +when Hasdrubal, after all but annihilating the cavalry by the river, +came from the left to the support of the Numidians, the Roman allied +cavalry, seeing his charge approaching, broke and fled. At that point +Hasdrubal appears to have acted with great skill and discretion. +Seeing the Numidians to be strong in numbers, and more effective and +formidable to troops that had once been forced from their ground, he +left the pursuit to them; while he himself hastened to the part of +the field where the infantry were engaged, and brought his men up to +support the Libyans. Then, by charging the Roman legions on the rear, +and harassing them by hurling squadron after squadron upon them at many +points at once, he raised the spirits of the Libyans, and dismayed +and depressed those of the Romans. It was at this point that Lucius +Aemilius fell, in the thick of the fight, covered with wounds: a man +who did his duty to his country at that last hour of his life, as he +had throughout its previous years, if any man ever did.[200] As long as +the Romans could keep an unbroken front, to turn first in one direction +and then in another to meet the assaults of the enemy, they held out; +but the outer files of the circle continually falling, and the circle +becoming more and more contracted, they at last were all killed on the +field, and among them Marcus Atilius and Gnaeus Servilius, the Consuls +of the previous year, who had shown themselves brave men and worthy of +Rome in the battle. While this struggle and carnage were going on, the +Numidian horse were pursuing the fugitives, most of whom they cut down +or hurled from their horses; but some few escaped into Venusia, among +whom was Gaius Terentius, the Consul, who thus sought a flight, as +disgraceful to himself, as his conduct in office had been disastrous to +his country. + ++117.+ Such was the end of the battle of Cannae, in which both sides +fought with the most conspicuous gallantry, the conquered no less +than the conquerors. This is proved by the fact that, out of six +thousand horse, only seventy escaped with Gaius Terentius to Venusia, +and about three hundred of the allied cavalry to various towns in +the neighbourhood. Of the infantry ten thousand were taken prisoners +in fair fight, but were not actually engaged in the battle: of those +who were actually engaged only about three thousand perhaps escaped +to the towns of the surrounding district, all the rest died nobly, +to the number of seventy thousand, the Carthaginians being on this +occasion, as on previous ones, mainly indebted for their victory to +their superiority in cavalry: a lesson to posterity that in actual war +it is better to have half the number of infantry, and the superiority +in cavalry, than to engage your enemy with an equality in both. On +the side of Hannibal there fell four thousand Celts, fifteen hundred +Iberians and Libyans, and about two hundred horse. + +[Sidenote: Losses of the Romans.] + +The ten thousand Romans who were captured had not, as I said, been +engaged in the actual battle; and the reason was this. Lucius Aemilius +left ten thousand infantry in his camp that, in case Hannibal should +disregard the safety of his own camp, and take his whole army on to the +field, they might seize the opportunity, while the battle was going on, +of forcing their way in and capturing the enemy’s baggage; or if, on +the other hand, Hannibal should, in view of this contingency, leave a +guard in his camp, the number of the enemy in the field might thereby +be diminished. These men were captured in the following circumstances. +Hannibal, as a matter of fact, did leave a sufficient guard in his +camp; and as soon as the battle began, the Romans, according to their +instructions, assaulted and tried to take those thus left by Hannibal. +At first they held their own: but just as they were beginning to waver, +Hannibal, who was by this time gaining a victory all along the line, +came to their relief, and routing the Romans, shut them up in their own +camp; killed two thousand of them; and took all the rest prisoners. +In like manner the Numidian horse brought in all those who had taken +refuge in the various strongholds about the district, amounting to two +thousand of the routed cavalry. + +[Sidenote: The results of the battle. Defection of the allies.] + ++118.+ The result of this battle, such as I have described it, had the +consequences which both sides expected. For the Carthaginians by their +victory were thenceforth masters of nearly the whole of the Italian +coast which is called _Magna Graecia_. Thus the Tarentines immediately +submitted; and the Arpani and some of the Campanian states invited +Hannibal to come to them; and the rest were with one consent turning +their eyes to the Carthaginians: who, accordingly, began now to have +high hopes of being able to carry even Rome itself by assault. + +[Sidenote: Fall of Lucius Postumius in Gaul. See _supra_, ch. 106.] + +On their side the Romans, after this disaster, despaired of retaining +their supremacy over the Italians, and were in the greatest alarm, +believing their own lives and the existence of their city to be in +danger, and every moment expecting that Hannibal would be upon them. +For, as though Fortune were in league with the disasters that had +already befallen them to fill up the measure of their ruin, it happened +that only a few days afterwards, while the city was still in this +panic, the Praetor who had been sent to Gaul fell unexpectedly into an +ambush and perished, and his army was utterly annihilated by the Celts. +In spite of all, however, the Senate left no means untried to save the +State. It exhorted the people to fresh exertions, strengthened the +city with guards, and deliberated on the crisis in a brave and manly +spirit. And subsequent events made this manifest. For though the Romans +were on that occasion indisputably beaten in the field, and had lost +reputation for military prowess; by the peculiar excellence of their +political constitution, and the prudence of their counsels, they not +only recovered their supremacy over Italy, by eventually conquering the +Carthaginians, but before very long became masters of the whole world. + +[Sidenote: B.C. 216.] + +I shall, therefore, end this book at this point, having now recounted +the events in Iberia and Italy, embraced by the 140th Olympiad. When +I have arrived at the same period in my history of Greece during this +Olympiad, I shall then fulfil my promise of devoting a book to a +formal account of the Roman constitution itself; for I think that a +description of it will not only be germane to the matter of my history, +but will also be of great help to practical statesmen, as well as +students, either in reforming or establishing other constitutions. + + + + +BOOK IV + + +[Sidenote: B.C. 220-216.] + ++1.+ In my former book I explained the causes of the second war between +Rome and Carthage; and described Hannibal’s invasion of Italy, and the +engagements which took place between them up to the battle of Cannae, +on the banks of the Aufidus. I shall now take up the history of Greece +during the same period, ending at the same date, and commencing from +the 140th Olympiad. But I shall first recall to the recollection of my +readers what I stated in my second book on the subject of the Greeks, +and especially of the Achaeans; for the league of the latter has made +extraordinary progress up to our own age and the generation immediately +preceding. + +[Sidenote: Recapitulation of Achaean history, before B.C. 220, +contained in Book II., cc. 41-71.] + +[Sidenote: Ending with the deaths of Antigonus Doson, Seleucus +Ceraunus, and Ptolemy Euergetes, before the 140th Olympiad, B.C. +220-216.] + +I started, then, from Tisamenus, one of the sons of Orestes, and +stated that the dynasty existed from his time to that of Ogygus: that +then there was an excellent form of democratical federal government +established: and that then the league was broken up by the kings of +Sparta into separate towns and villages. Then I tried to describe how +these towns began to form a league once more: which were the first to +join; and the policy subsequently pursued, which led to their inducing +all the Peloponnesians to adopt the general title of Achaeans, and to +be united under one federal government. Descending to particulars, +I brought my story up to the flight of Cleomenes, King of Sparta: +then briefly summarising the events included in my prefatory sketch +up to the deaths of Antigonus Doson, Seleucus Ceraunus, and Ptolemy +Euergetes, who all three died at about the same time, I announced that +my main history was to begin from that point. + +[Sidenote: Reasons for starting from this point. (1.) The fact that the +history of Aratus ends at that point. (2.) The possibility of getting +good evidence. (3.) The changes in the various governments in the 139th +Olympiad. B.C. 224-220.] + ++2.+ I thought this was the best point; first, because it is there that +Aratus leaves off, and I meant my work, as far as it was Greek history, +to be a continuation of his; and, secondly, because the period thus +embraced in my history would fall partly in the life of my father, and +partly in my own; and thus I should be able to speak as eye-witness +of some of the events, and from the information of eye-witnesses of +others. To go further back and write the report of a report, traditions +at second or third hand, seemed to me unsatisfactory either with a +view to giving clear impressions or making sound statements. But, +above all, I began at this period because it was then that the history +of the whole world entered on a new phase. Philip, son of Demetrius, +had just become the boy king of Macedonia; Achaeus, prince of Asia on +this side of Taurus, had converted his show of power into a reality; +Antiochus the Great had, a short time before, by the death of his +brother Seleucus, succeeded while quite a young man to the throne of +Syria; Ariarathes to that of Cappadocia; and Ptolemy Philopator to that +of Egypt. Not long afterwards Lycurgus became King of Sparta, and the +Carthaginians had recently elected Hannibal general to carry on the +war lately described. Every government therefore being changed about +this time, there seemed every likelihood of a new departure in policy: +which is but natural and usual, and in fact did at this time occur. For +the Romans and Carthaginians entered upon the war I have described; +Antiochus and Ptolemy on one for the possession of Coele-Syria; and the +Achaeans and Philip one against the Aetolians and Lacedaemonians. The +causes of this last war must now be stated. + +[Sidenote: The Aetolians.] + ++3.+ The Aetolians had long been discontented with a state of peace and +tired at living at their own charges; for they were accustomed to live +on their neighbours, and their natural ostentation required abundant +means to support it. Enslaved by this passion they live a life as +predatory as that of wild beasts, respecting no tie of friendship and +regarding every one as an enemy to be plundered. + +[Sidenote: B.C. 222.] + +Hitherto, however, as long as Antigonus Doson was alive, their fear +of the Macedonians had kept them quiet. But when he was succeeded at +his death by the boy Philip, they conceived a contempt for the royal +power, and at once began to look out for a pretext and opportunity +for interfering in the Peloponnese: induced partly by an old habit of +getting plunder from that country, and partly by the belief that, now +the Achaeans were unsupported by Macedonia, they would be a match for +them. While their thoughts were fixed on this, chance to a certain +extent contributed to give them the opportunity which they desired. + +[Sidenote: The raids of Dorimachus in Messenia.] + +There was a certain man of Trichonium[201] named Dorimachus, son of +that Nicostratus who made the treacherous attack on the Pan-Boeotian +congress.[202] This Dorimachus, being young and inspired with the +true spirit of Aetolian violence and aggressiveness, was sent by the +state to Phigalea in the Peloponnese, which, being on the borders of +Arcadia and Messenia, happened at that time to be in political union +with the Aetolian league. His mission was nominally to guard the city +and territory of Phigalea, but in fact to act as a spy on the politics +of the Peloponnese. A crowd of pirates flocked to him at Phigalea; +and being unable to get them any booty by fair means, because the +peace between all Greeks which Antigonus had concluded was still in +force, he was finally reduced to allowing the pirates to drive off the +cattle of the Messenians, though they were friends and allies of the +Aetolians. These injurious acts were at first confined to the sheep on +the border lands; but becoming more and more reckless and audacious, +they even ventured to break into the farm-houses by sudden attacks at +night. The Messenians were naturally indignant, and sent embassies to +Dorimachus; which he at first disregarded, because he wanted not only +to benefit the men under him, but himself also, by getting a share +in their spoils. But when the arrival of such embassies became more +and more frequent, owing to the perpetual recurrence of these acts of +depredation, he said at last that he would come in person to Messene, +and decide on the claims they had to make against the Aetolians. +When he came, however, and the sufferers appeared, he laughed at +some, threatened to strike others, and drove others away with abusive +language. + +[Sidenote: Dorimachus leaves Messene.] + ++4.+ Even while he was actually in Messene, the pirates came close to +the city walls in the night, and by means of scaling-ladders broke +into a country-house called Chiron’s villa; killed all the slaves who +resisted them; and having bound the others, took them and the cattle +away with them. The Messenian Ephors had long been much annoyed by +what was going on, and by the presence of Dorimachus in their town; +but this they thought was too insolent: and they accordingly summoned +him to appear before the assembled magistrates. There Sciron, who +happened to be an Ephor at the time, and enjoyed a high reputation for +integrity among his fellow-citizens, advised that they should not allow +Dorimachus to leave the city, until he had made good all the losses +sustained by the Messenians, and had given up the guilty persons to +be punished for the murders committed. This suggestion being received +with unanimous approval, as but just, Dorimachus passionately exclaimed +that “they were fools if they imagined that they were now insulting +only Dorimachus, and not the Aetolian league.” In fact he expressed the +greatest indignation at the whole affair, and said that “they would +meet with a public punishment, which would serve them well right.” Now +there was at that time in Messene a man of disgraceful and effeminate +character named Babyrtas, who was so exactly like Dorimachus in voice +and person, that, when he was dressed in Dorimachus’s sun-hat and +cloak, it was impossible to tell them apart; and of this Dorimachus was +perfectly aware. When therefore he was speaking in these threatening +and insolent tones to the Messenian magistrates, Sciron lost his temper +and said “Do you think we care for you or your threats, _Babyrtas_?” +After this Dorimachus was compelled for the present to yield to +circumstances, and to give satisfaction for the injuries inflicted +upon the Messenians: but when he returned to Aetolia, he nursed such a +bitter and furious feeling of anger at this taunt, that, without any +other reasonable pretext, but for this cause and this alone, he got up +a war against the Messenians. + +[Sidenote: Dorimachus becomes practically Strategus of Aetolia, B.C. +221.] + +[Sidenote: He induces Scopas to go to war with Messenia, Epirus, +Achaia, Acarnania, and Macedonia.] + ++5.+ The Strategus of the Aetolians at that time was Ariston; but +being from physical infirmities unable to serve in the field, and +being a kinsman of Dorimachus and Scopas, he had somehow or another +surrendered his whole authority to the former. In his public capacity +Dorimachus could not venture to urge the Aetolians to undertake the +Messenian war, because he had no reasonable pretext for so doing: +the origin of his wish being, as everybody well knew, the wrongs +committed by himself and the bitter gibe which they had brought upon +him. He therefore gave up the idea of publicly advocating the war, but +tried privately to induce Scopas to join in the intrigue against the +Messenians: He pointed out that there was now no danger from the side +of Macedonia owing to the youth of the king (Philip being then only +seventeen years old); that the Lacedaemonians were alienated from the +Messenians; and that they possessed the affection and alliance of the +Eleans; and these circumstances taken together would make an invasion +of Messenia perfectly safe. But the argument most truly Aetolian which +he used was to put before him that a great booty was to be got from +Messenia, because it was entirely unguarded, and had alone, of all the +Peloponnesian districts, remained unravaged throughout the Cleomenic +war. And, to sum up all, he argued that such a move would secure them +great popularity with the Aetolians generally. And if the Achaeans were +to try to hinder their march through the country, they would not be +able to complain if they retaliated: and if, on the other hand, they +did not stir, would be no hindrance to their enterprise. Besides, he +affirmed that they would have plenty of pretext against the Messenians; +for they had long been in the position of aggressors by promising the +Achaeans and Macedonians to join their alliance. + +By these, and similar arguments to the same effect, he roused such +a strong feeling in the minds of Scopas and his friends, that, +without waiting for a meeting of the Aetolian federal assembly, and +without communicating with the Apocleti or taking any of the proper +constitutional steps, of their own mere impulse and opinion they +committed acts of hostility simultaneously against Messenia, Epirus, +Achaia, Acarnania, and Macedonia. + +[Sidenote: Acts of hostility against Macedonia,] + +[Sidenote: Epirus, and Acarnania.] + ++6.+ By sea they immediately sent out privateers, who, falling in +with a royal vessel of Macedonia near Cythera, brought it with all +its crew to Aetolia, and sold ship-owners, sailors, and marines, and +finally the ship itself. Then they began sacking the seaboard of +Epirus, employing the aid of some Cephallenian ships for carrying out +this act of violence. They tried also to capture Thyrium in Acarnania. +At the same time they secretly sent some men to seize a strong place +called Clarium, in the centre of the territory of Megalopolis; which +they used thenceforth as a place of sale for their spoils, and a +starting place for their marauding expeditions. However Timoxenus, the +Achaean Strategus, with the assistance of Taurion, who had been left +by Antigonus in charge of the Macedonian interests in the Peloponnese, +took the place after a siege of a very few days. For Antigonus retained +Corinth, in accordance with his convention with the Achaeans, made at +the time of the Cleomenic war;[203] and had never restored Orchomenus +to the Achaeans after he had taken it by force, but claimed and +retained it in his own hands; with the view, as I suppose, not only of +commanding the entrance of the Peloponnese, but of guarding also its +interior by means of his garrison and warlike apparatus in Orchomenus. + +[Sidenote: Before midsummer B.C. 220. Invasion of Messenia by +Dorimachus and Scopas.] + +Dorimachus and Scopas waited until Timoxenus had a very short time of +office left, and when Aratus, though elected by the Achaeans for the +coming year, would not yet be in office;[204] and then collecting a +general levy of Aetolians at Rhium, and preparing means of transport, +with some Cephallenian ships ready to convoy them, they got their +men across to the Peloponnese, and led them against Messenia. While +marching through the territories of Patrae, Pharae, and Tritaea they +pretended that they did not wish to do any injury to the Achaeans; +but their forces, from their inveterate passion for plunder, could +not be restrained from robbing the country; and consequently they +committed outrages and acts of violence all along their line of march, +till they arrived at Phigalea. Thence, by a bold and sudden movement, +they entered Messenia; and without any regard for their ancient +friendship and alliance with the Messenians, or for the principles +of international justice common to all mankind, subordinating every +consideration to their selfish greed, they set about plundering the +country without resistance, the Messenians being absolutely afraid to +come out to attack them. + +[Sidenote: The Achaean league decide to assist the Messenians.] + +[Sidenote: B.C. 222-221.] + +[Sidenote: Aratus becomes Strategus of the Achaean league, B.C. 220 +(May-June).] + ++7.+ This being the time, according to their laws, for the meeting +of the Achaean federal assembly, the members arrived at Aegium. When +the assembly met, the deputies from Patrae and Pharae made a formal +statement of the injuries inflicted upon their territories during the +passage of the Aetolians: an embassy from Messenia also appeared, +begging for their assistance on the ground that the treatment from +which they were suffering was unjust and in defiance of treaty. +When these statements were heard, great indignation was felt at the +wrongs of Patrae and Pharae, and great sympathy for the misfortunes +of the Messenians. But it was regarded as especially outrageous that +the Aetolians should have ventured to enter Achaia with an army, +contrary to treaty, without obtaining or even asking for permission +from any one to pass through the country. Roused to indignation by +all these considerations, the assembly voted to give assistance to +the Messenians: that the Strategus should summon a general levy of +the Achaean arms: and that whatever was decided by this levy, when it +met, should be done. Now Timoxenus, the existing Strategus, was just +on the point of quitting office, and felt besides small confidence +in the Achaeans, because martial exercise had been allowed to fall +into neglect among them; he therefore shrank from undertaking the +expedition, or from even summoning the popular levy. The fact was that, +after the expulsion of Cleomenes, King of Sparta, the Peloponnesians, +weary of the wars that had taken place, and trusting to the peaceful +arrangement that had been come to, neglected all warlike preparations. +Aratus, however, indignant and incensed at the audacity of the +Aetolians, was not inclined to take things so calmly, for he had in +fact a grudge of long standing against these people. Wherefore he +was for instantly summoning the Achaeans to an armed levy, and was +all eagerness to attack the Aetolians. Eventually he took over from +Timoxenus the seal of the league, five days before the proper time, +and wrote to the various cities summoning a meeting in arms of all +those who were of the military age, at Megalopolis. But the peculiar +character of this man, I think, makes it proper for me to give a brief +preliminary sketch of him. + +[Sidenote: Character of Aratus.] + ++8.+ Aratus had many of the qualities of a great ruler. He could +speak, and contrive, and conceal his purpose: no one surpassed him +in the moderation which he showed in political contests, or in his +power of attaching friends and gaining allies: in intrigue, stratagem, +and laying plots against a foe, and in bringing them to a successful +termination by personal endurance and courage, he was pre-eminent. +Many clear instances of these qualities may be found; but none more +convincing than the episodes of the capture of Sicyon and Mantinea, +of the expulsion of the Aetolians from Pellene, and especially of the +surprise of the Acrocorinthus.[205] On the other hand whenever he +attempted a campaign in the field, he was slow in conception and timid +in execution, and without personal gallantry in the presence of danger. +The result was that the Peloponnese was full of trophies which marked +reverses sustained by him; and that in this particular department he +was always easily defeated. So true is it that men’s minds, no less +than their bodies, have many aspects. Not only is it the case that +the same man has an aptitude for one class of activities and not +for another; it often happens that in things closely analogous, the +same man will be exceedingly acute and exceedingly dull, exceedingly +courageous and exceedingly timid. Nor is this a paradox: it is a very +ordinary fact, well known to all attentive observers. For instance you +may find men who in hunting show the greatest daring in grappling with +wild beasts, and yet are utter cowards in the presence of an armed +enemy. Or again, in actual war some are active and skilful in single +combats, who are yet quite ineffective in the ranks. For example, the +Thessalian cavalry in squadron and column are irresistible, but when +their order is once broken up, they have not the skill in skirmishing +by which each man does whatever the time and place suggests: while, +on the other hand, exactly the reverse of this is the case with the +Aetolians. The Cretans, again, either by land or sea, in ambushes and +piratical excursions, in deceiving the enemy, in making night attacks, +and in fact in every service which involves craft and separate action, +are irresistible; but for a regular front to front charge in line they +have neither the courage nor firmness; and the reverse again is the +case with the Achaeans and Macedonians. + +I have said thus much, that my readers may not refuse me credit if I +have at times to make contradictory statements about the same men and +in regard to analogous employments. To return to my narrative. + +[Sidenote: The armed levy of Achaeans summoned.] + +[Sidenote: Dorimachus ordered to quit Messenia without passing through +Achaia.] + +[Sidenote: Scopas and Dorimachus prepare to obey.] + ++9.+ The men of military age having assembled in arms at Megalopolis, +in accordance with the decree of the federal assembly, the Messenian +envoys once more came forward, and entreated the people not to +disregard the flagrant breach of treaty from which they were suffering; +and expressed their willingness to become allies of the league, and +their anxiety to be enrolled among its members. The Achaean magistrates +declined the offered alliance, on the ground that it was impossible +to admit a new member without the concurrence of Philip and the other +allies,—for the sworn alliance negotiated by Antigonus during the +Cleomenic war was still in force, and included Achaia, Epirus, Phocis, +Macedonia, Boeotia, Acarnania, and Thessaly;—but they said that they +would march out to their relief, if the envoys there present would +place their sons in Sparta, as hostages for their promise not to make +terms with the Aetolians without the consent of the Achaeans. The +Spartans among the rest were encamped on the frontier of Megalopolis, +having marched out in accordance with the terms of their alliance; +but they were acting rather as reserves and spectators than as active +allies. Having thus settled the terms of the arrangement with the +Messenians, Aratus sent a messenger to the Aetolians to inform them +of the decree of the Achaean federation, and to order them to quit +the territory of Messenia without entering that of Achaia, on pain of +being treated as enemies if they set foot in it. When they heard the +message and knew that the Achaeans were mustered in force, Scopas and +Dorimachus thought it best for the present to obey. They therefore at +once sent despatches to Cyllene and to the Aetolian Strategus, Ariston, +begging that the transports should be sent to a place on the coast of +Elis called the island of Pheia;[206] and they themselves two days +later struck camp, and laden with booty marched towards Elis. For the +Aetolians always maintained a friendship with the Eleans that they +might have through them an entrance for their plundering and piratical +expeditions into the Peloponnese. + +[Sidenote: Aratus dismisses the Achaean levy, with the exception of +3000 foot and 300 horse.] + +[Sidenote: Dorimachus turns upon Aratus.] + ++10.+ Aratus waited two days: and then, foolishly believing that the +Aetolians would return by the route they had indicated, he dismissed +all the Achaeans and Lacedaemonians to their homes, except three +thousand foot and three hundred horse and the division under Taurion, +which he led to Patrae, with the view of keeping on the flank of the +Aetolians. But when Dorimachus learnt that Aratus was thus watching his +march, and was still under arms; partly from fear of being attacked +when his forces were engaged on the embarkation, and partly with a +view to confuse the enemy, he sent his booty on to the transports +with a sufficient number of men to secure their passage, under orders +to meet him at Rhium where he intended to embark; while he himself, +after remaining for a time to superintend and protect the shipment of +the booty, changed the direction of his march and advanced towards +Olympia. But hearing that Taurion, with the rest of the army, was +near Cleitoria; and feeling sure that in these circumstances he would +not be able to effect the crossing from Rhium without danger and a +struggle with the enemy; he made up his mind that it would be best for +his interests to bring on an engagement with the army of Aratus as +soon as possible, since it was weak in numbers and wholly unprepared +for the attack. He calculated that if he could defeat this force, he +could then plunder the country, and effect his crossing from Rhium in +safety, while Aratus was waiting and deliberating about again convoking +the Achaean levy; but if on the other hand Aratus were terrified and +declined the engagement, he would then effect his departure unmolested, +whenever he thought it advisable. With these views, therefore, he +advanced, and pitched his camp at Methydrium in the territory of +Megalopolis. + +[Sidenote: The Battle of Caphyae, B.C. 220.] + ++11.+ But the leaders of the Achaeans, on learning the arrival of the +Aetolians, adopted a course of proceeding quite unsurpassable for +folly. They left the territory of Cleitor and encamped at Caphyae; but +the Aetolians marching from Methydrium past the city of Orchomenus, +they led the Achaean troops into the plain of Caphyae, and there drew +them up for battle, with the river which flows through that plain +protecting their front. The difficulty of the ground between them and +their enemy, for there were besides the river a number of ditches +not easily crossed,[207] and the show of readiness on the part of +the Achaeans for the engagement, caused the Aetolians to shrink from +attacking according to their original purpose; but they retreated in +good order to the high ground of Oligyrtus, content if only they were +not attacked and forced to give battle. But Aratus, when the van of +the Aetolians was already making the ascent, while the cavalry were +bringing up the rear along the plain, and were approaching a place +called Propus at the foot of the hills, sent out his cavalry and +light-armed troops, under the command of Epistratus of Acarnania, with +orders to attack and harass the enemy’s rear. Now if an engagement was +necessary at all, they ought not to have attempted it with the enemy’s +rear, when they had already accomplished the march through the plain, +but with his van directly it had debouched upon the plain: for in this +way the battle would have been wholly confined to the plain and level +ground, where the peculiar nature of the Aetolian arms and general +tactics would have been least effective; while the Achaeans, from +precisely opposite reasons, would have been most effective and able to +act. As it was, they surrendered the advantages of time and place which +were in their favour, and deliberately accepted the conditions which +were in favour of the enemy. + +[Sidenote: The Achaeans defeated.] + ++12.+ Naturally the result of the engagement was in harmony with such +a beginning. For when the light-armed troops approached, the Aetolian +cavalry retired in good order up the hill, being anxious to effect +a junction with their own infantry. But Aratus, having an imperfect +view of what was going on, and making a bad conjecture of what would +happen next, no sooner saw the cavalry retiring, than, hoping that they +were in absolute flight, he sent forward the heavy-armed troops of +his two wings, with orders to join and support the advanced guard of +their light-armed troops; while he himself, with his remaining forces, +executed a flank movement, and led his men on at the double. But the +Aetolian cavalry had now cleared the plain, and, having effected the +junction with their infantry, drew up under cover of the hill; massed +the infantry on their flanks; and called to them to stand by them: +the infantry themselves showing great promptness in answering to +their shouts, and in coming to their relief, as the several companies +arrived. Thinking themselves now sufficiently strong in numbers, they +closed their ranks, and charged the advanced guard of Achaean cavalry +and light armed troops; and being superior in number, and having the +advantage of charging from higher ground, after a long struggle, they +finally turned their opponents to flight: whose flight involved that +of the heavy-armed troops also which were coming to their relief. For +the latter were advancing in separate detachments in loose order, and, +either in dismay at what was happening, or upon meeting their flying +comrades on their retreat, were compelled to follow their example: the +result being that, whereas the number of those actually defeated on the +field was less than five hundred, the number that fled was more than +two thousand. Taught by experience what to do, the Aetolians followed +behind them with round after round of loud and boisterous shouts. The +Achaeans at first retreated in good order and without danger, because +they were retiring upon their heavy-armed troops, whom they imagined +to be in a place of safety on their original ground; but when they +saw that these too had abandoned their position of safety, and were +marching in a long straggling line, some of them immediately broke +off from the main body and sought refuge in various towns in the +neighbourhood; while others, meeting the phalanx as it was coming up to +their relief, proved to be quite sufficient, without the presence of an +enemy, to strike fear into it and force it into headlong flight. They +directed their flight, as I said, to the towns of the neighbourhood. +Orchomenus and Caphyae, which were close by, saved large numbers of +them: and if this had not been the case, they would in all probability +have been annihilated by this unlooked-for catastrophe. Such was the +result of the engagement at Caphyae. + +[Sidenote: The Aetolians retire at their leisure.] + ++13.+ When the people of Megalopolis learnt that the Aetolians were +at Methydrium, they came to the rescue _en masse_, at the summons +of a trumpet, on the very day after the battle of Caphyae; and were +compelled to bury the very men with whose assistance they had expected +to fight the Aetolians. Having therefore dug a trench in the territory +of Caphyae, and collected the corpses, they performed the funeral rites +of these unhappy men with all imaginable honour. But the Aetolians, +after this unlooked-for success gained by the cavalry and light-armed +troops, traversed the Peloponnese from that time in complete security. +In the course of their march they made an attack upon the town of +Pellene, and, after ravaging the territory of Sicyon, finally quitted +the Peloponnese by way of the Isthmus. + +This then, was the cause and occasion of the Social war: its formal +beginning was the decree passed by all the allies after these events, +which was confirmed by a general meeting held at Corinth, on the +proposal of King Philip, who presided at the assembly. + +[Sidenote: Midsummer, B.C. 220.] + +[Sidenote: Attacked at the Achaean Congress, Aratus successfully +defends himself.] + ++14.+ A few days after the events just narrated the ordinary meeting +of the Achaean federal assembly took place, and Aratus was bitterly +denounced, publicly as well as privately, as indisputably responsible +for this disaster; and the anger of the general public was still +further roused and embittered by the invectives of his political +opponents. It was shown to every one’s satisfaction that Aratus had +been guilty of four flagrant errors. His first was that, having taken +office before his predecessor’s time was legally at an end, he had +availed himself of a time properly belonging to another to engage +in the sort of enterprise in which he was conscious of having often +failed. His second and graver error was the disbanding the Achaeans, +while the Aetolians were still in the middle of the Peloponnese; +especially as he had been well aware beforehand that Scopas and +Dorimachus were anxious to disturb the existing settlement, and to stir +up war. His third error was to engage the enemy, as he did, with such a +small force, without any strong necessity; when he might have retired +to the neighbouring towns and have summoned a levy of the Achaeans, and +then have engaged, if he had thought that measure absolutely necessary. +But his last and gravest error was that, having determined to fight, +he did so in such an ill-considered manner, and managed the business +with so little circumspection, as to deprive himself of the advantages +of the plain and the support of his heavy-armed troops, and allow +the battle to be settled by light-armed troops, and to take place on +the slopes, than which nothing could have been more advantageous or +convenient to the Aetolians. Such were the allegations against Aratus. +He, however, came forward and reminded the assembly of his former +political services and achievements; and urged in his defence that, +in the matters alleged, his was not the blame for what had occurred. +He begged their indulgence if he had been guilty of any oversight +in the battle, and claimed that they should at any rate look at the +facts without prejudice or passion. These words created such a rapid +and generous change in the popular feeling, that great indignation +was roused against the political opponents who attacked him; and the +resolutions as to the measures to be taken in the future were passed +wholly in accordance with the views of Aratus. + +[Sidenote: The Achaean league determine upon war with the Aetolians, +and send round to their allies for assistance.] + +[Sidenote: 139th Olympiad, B.C. 224-220; 140th Olympiad, B.C. 220-216.] + ++15.+ These events occurred in the previous Olympiad,[208] what I am +now going to relate belong to the 140th. The resolutions passed by the +Achaean federal assembly were these. That embassies should be sent to +Epirus, Boeotia, Phocis, Acarnania, and Philip, to declare how the +Aetolians, in defiance of treaty, had twice entered Achaia with arms, +and to call upon them for assistance in virtue of their agreement, +and for their consent to the admission of the Messenians into the +alliance. Next, that the Strategus of the Achaeans should enrol five +thousand foot and five hundred horse, and support the Messenians in +case the Aetolians were to invade their territory; and to arrange +with the Lacedaemonians and Messenians how many horse and foot were +to be supplied by them severally for the service of the league. These +decrees showed a noble spirit on the part of the Achaeans in the +presence of defeat, which prevented them from abandoning either the +cause of the Messenians or their own purpose. Those who were appointed +to serve on these embassies to the allies proceeded to carry them out; +while the Strategus at once, in accordance with the decree, set about +enrolling the troops from Achaia, and arranged with the Lacedaemonians +and Messenians to supply each two thousand five hundred infantry and +two hundred and fifty cavalry, so that the whole army for the coming +campaign should amount to ten thousand foot and a thousand horse. + +On the day of their regular assembly the Aetolians also met and decided +to maintain peace with the Spartans and Messenians; hoping by that +crafty measure to tamper with the loyalty of the Achaean allies and +sow disunion among them. With the Achaeans themselves they voted to +maintain peace, on condition that they withdrew from alliance with +Messenia, and to proclaim war if they refused,—than which nothing could +have been more unreasonable. For being themselves in alliance, both +with Achaeans and Messenians, they proclaimed war against the former, +unless the two ceased to be in alliance and friendly relationship +with each other; while if the Achaeans chose to be at enmity with the +Messenians, they offered them a separate peace. Their proposition was +too iniquitous and unreasonable to admit of being even considered. + +[Sidenote: Treachery of the Spartans.] + ++16.+ The Epirotes and King Philip on hearing the ambassadors consented +to admit the Messenians to alliance; but though the conduct of the +Aetolians caused them momentary indignation, they were not excessively +moved by it, because it was no more than what the Aetolians habitually +did. Their anger, therefore, was short-lived, and they presently +voted against going to war with them. So true is it that an habitual +course of wrong-doing finds readier pardon than when it is spasmodic +or isolated. The former, at any rate, was the case with the Aetolians: +they perpetually plundered Greece, and levied unprovoked war upon many +of its people: they did not deign either to make any defence to those +who complained, but answered only by additional insults if any one +challenged them to arbitration for injuries which they had inflicted, +or indeed which they meditated inflicting. And yet the Lacedaemonians, +who had but recently been liberated by means of Antigonus and the +generous zeal of the Achaeans, and though they were bound not to +commit any act of hostility towards the Macedonians and Philip, sent +clandestine messages to the Aetolians, and arranged a secret treaty of +alliance and friendship with them. + +[Sidenote: Invasion of Achaia by the Aetolians and Illyrians.] + +The army had already been enrolled from the Achaeans of military age, +and had been assigned to the duty of assisting the Lacedaemonians and +Messenians, when Scerdilaidas and Demetrius of Pharos sailed with +ninety galleys beyond Lissus, contrary to the terms of their treaty +with Rome. These men first touched at Pylos, and failing in an attack +upon it, they separated: Demetrius making for the Cyclades, from some +of which he exacted money and plundered others; while Scerdilaidas, +directing his course homewards, put in at Naupactus with forty galleys +at the instigation of Amynas, king of the Athamanes, who happened to be +his brother-in-law; and after making an agreement with the Aetolians, +by the agency of Agelaus, for a division of spoils, he promised to +join them in their invasion of Achaia. With this agreement made with +Scerdilaidas, and with the co-operation of the city of Cynaetha, +Agelaus, Dorimachus, and Scopas, collected a general levy of the +Aetolians, and invaded Achaia in conjunction with the Illyrians. + ++17.+ But the Aetolian Strategus Ariston, ignoring everything that was +going on, remained quietly at home, asserting that he was not at war +with the Achaeans, but was maintaining peace: a foolish and childish +mode of acting,—for what better epithets could be applied to a man who +supposed that he could cloak notorious facts by mere words? Meanwhile +Dorimachus and his colleague had marched through the Achaean territory +and suddenly appeared at Cynaetha. + +[Sidenote: The previous history of Cynaetha.] + +Cynaetha was an Arcadian city[209] which, for many years past, had +been afflicted with implacable and violent political factions. The +two parties had frequently retaliated on each other with massacres, +banishments, confiscations, and redivisions of lands; but finally the +party which affected the Achaean connexion prevailed and got possession +of the city, securing themselves by a city-guard and commandant from +Achaia. This was the state of affairs when, shortly before the Aetolian +invasion, the exiled party sent to the party in possession intreating +that they would be reconciled and allow them to return to their own +city; whereupon the latter were persuaded, and sent an embassy to the +Achaeans with the view of obtaining their consent to the pacification. +The Achaeans readily consented, in the belief that both parties would +regard them with goodwill: since the party in possession had all +their hopes centred in the Achaeans, while those who were about to be +restored would owe that restoration to the consent of the same people. +Accordingly the Cynaethans dismissed the city guard and commandant, +and restored the exiles, to the number of nearly three hundred, after +taking such pledges from them as are reckoned the most inviolable among +all mankind. But no sooner had they secured their return, than, without +any cause or pretext arising which might give a colour to the renewal +of the quarrel, but on the contrary, at the very first moment of their +restoration, they began plotting against their country, and against +those who had been their preservers. I even believe that at the very +sacrifices, which consecrated the oaths and pledges which they gave +each other, they were already, even at such a solemn moment, revolving +in their minds this offence against religion and those who had trusted +them. For, as soon as they were restored to their civil rights they +called in the Aetolians, and betrayed the city into their hands, eager +to effect the utter ruin both of the people who had preserved, and the +city which had nourished, them. + ++18.+ The bold stroke by which they actually consummated this treason +was as follows. Of the restored exiles certain officers had been +appointed called Polemarchs, whose duty it was to lock the city-gates, +and keep the keys while they remained closed, and also to be on guard +during the day at the gate-houses. The Aetolians accordingly waited +for this period of closing the gates, ready to make the attempt, and +provided with ladders; while the Polemarchs of the exiles, having +assassinated their colleagues on guard at the gate-house, opened the +gate. Some of the Aetolians, therefore, got into the town by it, while +others applied their ladders to the walls, and mounting by their +means, took forcible possession of them. The inhabitants of the town, +panic-stricken at the occurrence, could not tell which way to turn. +They could not give their undivided energies to opposing the party +which was forcing its way through the gate, because of those who were +attacking them at the walls; nor could they defend the walls owing to +the enemies that were pouring through the gate. The Aetolians having +thus become rapidly masters of the town, in spite of the injustice of +the whole proceeding, did one act of supreme justice. For the very men +who had invited them, and betrayed the town to them, they massacred +before any one else, and plundered their property. They then treated +all the others of the party in the same way; and, finally, taking +up their quarters in the houses, they systematically robbed them +of all valuables, and in many cases put Cynaethans to the rack, if +they suspected them of having anything concealed, whether money, or +furniture, or anything else of unusual value. + +After inflicting this ruin on the Cynaethans they departed, leaving a +garrison to guard the walls, and marched towards Lusi. Arrived at the +temple of Artemis, which lies between Cleitor and Cynaetha, and is +regarded as inviolable by the Greeks, they threatened to plunder the +cattle of the goddess and the other property round the temple. But the +people of Lusi acted with great prudence: they gave the Aetolians some +of the sacred furniture, and appealed to them not to commit the impiety +of inflicting any outrage. The gift was accepted, and the Aetolians at +once removed to Cleitor and pitched their camp under its walls. + +[Sidenote: Measures taken by Aratus.] + ++19.+ Meanwhile Aratus, the Achaean Strategus, had despatched an appeal +for help to Philip; was collecting the men selected for service; and +was sending for the troops, arranged for by virtue of the treaty, from +Sparta and Messenia. + +[Sidenote: The Aetolians at the temple of Artemis. They fail at +Cleitor.] + +[Sidenote: They burn Cynaetha and return home.] + +[Sidenote: Demetrius of Pharos.] + +The Aetolians at first urged the people of Cleitor to abandon their +alliance with the Achaeans and adopt one with themselves; and upon +the Cleitorians absolutely refusing, they began an assault upon the +town, and endeavoured to take it by an escalade. But meeting with a +bold and determined resistance from the inhabitants, they desisted +from the attempt; and breaking up their camp marched back to Cynaetha, +driving off with them on their route the cattle of the goddess. They +at first offered the city to the Eleans, but upon their refusing to +accept it, they determined to keep the town in their own hands, and +appointed Euripides to command it: but subsequently, on the alarm of +an army of relief coming from Macedonia, they set fire to the town and +abandoned it, directing their march to Rhium with the purpose of there +taking ship and crossing home. But when Taurion heard of the Aetolian +invasion, and what had taken place at Cynaetha, and saw that Demetrius +of Pharos had sailed into Cenchreae from his island expedition, he +urged the latter to assist the Achaeans, and dragging his galleys +across the Isthmus to attack the Aetolians as they crossed the gulf. +Now though Demetrius had enriched himself by his island expedition, +he had had to beat an ignominious retreat, owing to the Rhodians +putting out to sea to attack him: he was therefore glad to accede to +the request of Taurion, as the latter undertook the expense of having +his galleys dragged across the Isthmus.[210] He accordingly got them +across, and arriving two days after the passage of the Aetolians, +plundered some places on the seaboard of Aetolia and then returned to +Corinth. + +[Sidenote: Treason of the Spartans.] + +The Lacedaemonians had dishonourably failed to send the full complement +of men to which they were bound by their engagement, but had despatched +a small contingent only of horse and foot, to save appearances. + +[Sidenote: Inactivity of Aratus.] + +Aratus however, having his Achaean troops, behaved in this instance +also with the caution of a statesman, rather than the promptness of a +general: for remembering his previous failure he remained inactively +watching events, until Scopas and Dorimachus had accomplished all they +wanted and were safe home again; although they had marched through a +line of country which was quite open to attack, full of defiles, and +wanting only a trumpeter[211] to sound a call to arms. But the great +disaster and misfortunes endured by the Cynaethans at the hands of the +Aetolians were looked upon as most richly deserved by them. + +[Sidenote: The reasons of the barbarity of the Cynaethans. Their +neglect of the refining influences of music, which is carefully +encouraged in the rest of Arcadia.] + ++20.+ Now, seeing that the Arcadians as a whole have a reputation for +virtue throughout Greece, not only in respect of their hospitality and +humanity, but especially for their scrupulous piety, it seems worth +while to investigate briefly the barbarous character of the Cynaethans: +and inquire how it came about that, though indisputably Arcadians in +race, they at that time so far surpassed the rest of Greece in cruelty +and contempt of law. + +They seem then to me to be the first, and indeed the only, Arcadians +who have abandoned institutions nobly conceived by their ancestors and +admirably adapted to the character of all the inhabitants of Arcadia. +For music, and I mean by that _true_ music, which it is advantageous +to every one to practise, is obligatory with the Arcadians. For we +must not think, as Ephorus in a hasty sentence of his preface, wholly +unworthy of him, says, that music was introduced among mankind for the +purpose of deception and jugglery; nor must the ancients Cretans and +Spartans be supposed to have introduced the pipe and rhythmic movement +in war, instead of the trumpet, without some reason; nor the early +Arcadians to have given music such a high place in their constitution, +that not only boys, but young men up to the age of thirty, are +compelled to practise it, though in other respects most simple and +primitive in their manner of life. Every one is familiarly acquainted +with the fact that the Arcadians are the only people among whom boys +are by the laws trained from infancy to sing hymns and paeans, in which +they celebrate in the traditional fashion the heroes and gods of their +particular towns. They next learn the airs of Philoxenus and Timotheus, +and dance with great spirit to the pipers at the yearly Dionysia in the +theatres, the boys at the boys’ festival, and the young men at what +is called the men’s festival. Similarly it is their universal custom, +at all festal gatherings and banquets, not to have strangers to make +the music, but to produce it themselves, calling on each other in turn +for a song. They do not look upon it as a disgrace to disclaim the +possession of any other accomplishment: but no one can disclaim the +knowledge of how to sing, because all are forced to learn, nor can they +confess the knowledge, and yet excuse themselves from practising it, +because that too among them is looked upon as disgraceful. Their young +men again practise a military step to the music of the pipe and in +regular order of battle, producing elaborate dances, which they display +to their fellow-citizens every year in the theatres, at the public +charge and expense. + +[Sidenote: The object of the musical training of the Arcadians.] + ++21.+ Now the object of the ancient Arcadians in introducing these +customs was not, as I think, the gratification of luxury and +extravagance. They saw that Arcadia was a nation of workers; that the +life of the people was laborious and hard; and that, as a natural +consequence of the coldness and gloom which were the prevailing +features of a great part of the country, the general character of the +people was austere. For we mortals have an irresistible tendency to +yield to climatic influences: and to this cause, and no other, may be +traced the great distinctions which prevail amongst us in character, +physical formation, and complexion, as well as in most of our habits, +varying with nationality or wide local separation. And it was with a +view of softening and tempering this natural ruggedness and rusticity, +that they not only introduced the things which I have mentioned, +but also the custom of holding assemblies and frequently offering +sacrifices, in both of which women took part equally with men; and +having mixed dances of girls and boys and in fact did everything they +could to humanise their souls by the civilising and softening influence +of such culture. The people of Cynaetha entirely neglected these +things, although they needed them more than any one else, because their +climate and country is by far the most unfavourable in all Arcadia; +and on the contrary gave their whole minds to mutual animosities and +contentions. They in consequence became finally so brutalised, that no +Greek city has ever witnessed a longer series of the most atrocious +crimes. I will give one instance of the ill fortune of Cynaetha in this +respect, and of the disapproval of such proceedings on the part of the +Arcadians at large. When the Cynaethans, after their great massacre, +sent an embassy to Sparta, every city which the ambassadors entered +on their road at once ordered them by a herald to depart; while the +Mantineans not only did that, but after their departure regularly +purified their city and territory from the taint of blood, by carrying +victims round them both. + +I have had three objects in saying thus much on this subject. First, +that the character of the Arcadians should not suffer from the crimes +of one city: secondly, that other nations should not neglect music, +from an idea that certain Arcadians give an excessive and extravagant +attention to it: and, lastly, I speak for the sake of the Cynaethans +themselves, that, if ever God gives them better fortune, they may +humanise themselves by turning their attention to education, and +especially to music. + +[Sidenote: Philip V. comes to Corinth. B.C. 220.] + +[Sidenote: Advances toward Sparta.] + +[Sidenote: Adeimantus assassinated.] + ++22.+ To return from this digression. When the Aetolians had reached +their homes in safety after this raid upon the Peloponnese, Philip, +coming to the aid of the Achaeans with an army, arrived at Corinth. +Finding that he was too late, he sent despatches to all the allies +urging them to send deputies at once to Corinth, to consult on the +measures required for the common safety. Meanwhile he himself marched +towards Tegea, being informed that the Lacedaemonians were in a +state of revolution, and were fallen to mutual slaughter. For being +accustomed to have a king over them, and to be entirely submissive to +their rulers, their sudden enfranchisement by means of Antigonus, and +the absence of a king, produced a state of civil war; because they all +imagined themselves to be on a footing of complete political equality. +At first two of the five Ephors kept their views to themselves; while +the other three threw in their lot with the Aetolians, because they +were convinced that the youth of Philip would prevent him as yet from +having a decisive influence in the Peloponnese. But when, contrary to +their expectations, the Aetolians retired quickly from the Peloponnese, +and Philip arrived still more quickly from Macedonia, the three Ephors +became distrustful of Adeimantus, one of the other two, because he was +privy to and disapproved of their plans; and were in a great state of +anxiety lest he should tell Philip everything as soon as that monarch +approached. After some consultation therefore with certain young men, +they published a proclamation ordering all citizens of military age to +assemble in arms in the sacred enclosure of Athene of the Brazen-house, +on the pretext that the Macedonians were advancing against the town. +This startling announcement caused a rapid muster: when Adeimantus, who +disapproved of the measure, came forward and endeavoured to show that +“the proclamation and summons to assemble in arms should have been made +some time before, when they were told that their enemies the Aetolians +were approaching the frontier: not then, when they learnt that their +benefactors and preservers the Macedonians were coming with their +king.” In the middle of this dissuasive speech the young men whose +co-operation had been secured struck him dead, and with him Sthenelaus, +Alcamenes, Thyestes, Bionidas, and several other citizens; whereupon +Polyphontes and certain of his party, seeing clearly what was going to +happen, went off to join Philip. + +[Sidenote: Philip summons Spartan deputies to Tegea.] + ++23.+ Immediately after the commission of this crime, the Ephors who +were then in power sent men to Philip, to accuse the victims of this +massacre; and to beg him to delay his approach, until the affairs of +the city had returned to their normal state after this commotion; +and to be assured meanwhile that it was their purpose to be loyal +and friendly to the Macedonians in every respect. These ambassadors +found Philip near Mount Parthenius,[212] and communicated to him their +commission. Having listened, he bade the ambassadors make all haste +home, and inform the Ephors that he was going to continue his march to +Tegea, and expected that they would as quickly as possible send him +men of credit to consult with him on the present position of affairs. +After hearing this message from the king, the Lacedaemonian officers +despatched ten commissioners headed by Omias to meet Philip; who, on +arriving at Tegea, and entering the king’s council chamber, accused +Adeimantus of being the cause of the late commotion; and promised that +they would perform all their obligations as allies to Philip, and +show that they were second to none of those whom he looked upon as +his most loyal friends, in their affection for his person. With these +and similar asseverations the Lacedaemonian commissioners left the +council chamber. The members of the council were divided in opinion: +one party knowing the secret treachery of the Spartan magistrates, and +feeling certain that Adeimantus had lost his life from his loyalty +to Macedonia, while the Lacedaemonians had really determined upon an +alliance with the Aetolians, advised Philip to make an example of the +Lacedaemonians, by treating them precisely as Alexander had treated +the Thebans, immediately after his assumption of his sovereignty. But +another party, consisting of the older counsellors, sought to show +that such severity was too great for the occasion, and that all that +ought to be done was to rebuke the offenders, depose them, and put the +management of the state and the chief offices in the hands of his own +friends. + +[Sidenote: The king decides not to chastise Sparta.] + ++24.+ The king gave the final decision, if that decision may be +called the king’s: for it is not reasonable to suppose that a mere +boy should be able to come to a decision on matters of such moment. +Historians, however, must attribute to the highest official present +the final decisions arrived at: it being thoroughly understood among +their readers that propositions and opinions, such as these, in all +probability proceed from the members of the council, and particularly +from those highest in his confidence. In this case the decision of +the king ought most probably to be attributed to Aratus. It was to +this effect: the king said that “in the case of injuries inflicted by +the allies upon each other separately, his intervention ought to be +confined to a remonstrance by word of mouth or letter; but that it was +only injuries affecting the whole body of the allies which demanded +joint intervention and redress: and seeing that the Lacedaemonians had +plainly committed no such injury against the whole body of allies, +but professed their readiness to satisfy every claim that could with +justice be made upon them, he held that he ought not to decree any +measure of excessive severity against them. For it would be very +inconsistent for him to take severe measures against them for so +insignificant a cause; while his father inflicted no punishment at +all upon them, though when he conquered them they were not allies +but professed enemies.” It having, therefore, been formally decided +to overlook the incident, the king immediately sent Petraeus, one of +his most trusted friends, with Omias, to exhort the people to remain +faithful to their friendship with him and Macedonia, and to interchange +oaths of alliance; while he himself started once more with his army and +returned towards Corinth, having in his conduct to the Lacedaemonians +given an excellent specimen of his policy towards the allies. + +[Sidenote: The congress of allies at Corinth declare war against the +Aetolians.] + ++25.+ When he arrived at Corinth he found the envoys from the allied +cities already there; and in consultation with them he discussed the +measures to be taken in regard to the Aetolians. The complaints against +them were stated by the various envoys. The Boeotians accused them +of plundering the temple of Athene at Itone[213] in time of peace: +the Phocians of having attacked and attempted to seize the cities of +Ambrysus and Daulium: the Epirotes of having committed depredations in +their territory. The Acarnanians showed how they had contrived a plot +for the betrayal of Thyrium into their hands, and had gone so far as to +actually assault it under cover of night. The Achaeans made a statement +showing that they had seized Clarium in the territory of Megalopolis; +traversed the territories of Patrae and Pharae, pillaging the country +as they went; completely sacked Cynaetha; plundered the temple of +Artemis in Lusi; laid siege to Cleitor; attempted Pylus by sea, and +Megalopolis by land, doing all they could by aid of the Illyrians to +lay waste the latter after its recent restoration. After listening +to these depositions, the congress of allies unanimously decided to +go to war with the Aetolians. A decree was, therefore, formulated in +which the aforesaid causes for war were stated as a preamble, and a +declaration sub-joined of their intention of restoring to the several +allies any portion of their territory seized by the Aetolians since the +death of Demetrius, father of Philip; and similarly of restoring to +their ancestral forms of government all states that had been compelled +against their will to join the Aetolian league; with full possession +of their own territory and cities; subject to no foreign garrison +or tribute; in complete independence; and in enjoyment of their own +constitutions and laws. Finally a clause in the decree declared their +intention of assisting the Amphictyonic council to restore the laws, +and to recover its control of the Delphic temple, wrested from it by +the Aetolians, who were determined to keep in their own hands all that +belonged to that temple. + +[Sidenote: B.C. 220.] + +[Sidenote: Autumn, B.C. 220.] + ++26.+ This decree was made in the first year of the 140th Olympiad, +and with it began the so-called Social war, the commencement of which +was thoroughly justifiable and a natural consequence of the injurious +acts of the Aetolians. The first step of the congress was to send +commissioners at once to the several allies, that the decree having +been confirmed by as many as possible, all might join in this national +war. Philip also sent a declaratory letter to the Aetolians, in order +that, if they had any justification to put forward on the points +alleged against them, they might even at that late hour meet and settle +the controversy by conference: “but if they supposed that they were, +with no public declaration of war, to sack and plunder, without the +injured parties retaliating, on pain of being considered, if they did +so, to have commenced hostilities, they were the most simple people in +the world.” On the receipt of this letter the Aetolian magistrates, +thinking that Philip would never come, named a day on which they would +meet him at Rhium. When they were informed, however, that he had +actually arrived there, they sent a despatch informing him that they +were not competent, before the meeting of the Aetolian assembly, to +settle any public matter on their own authority. But when the Achaeans +met at the usual federal assembly, they ratified the decree, and +published a proclamation authorising reprisals upon the Aetolians. And +when King Philip appeared before the council at Aegium, and informed +them at length of all that had taken place, they received his speech +with warmth, and formally renewed with him personally the friendship +which had existed between his ancestors and themselves. + +[Sidenote: Scopas elected Aetolian Strategus.] + +[Sidenote: B.C. 385.] + +[Sidenote: B.C. 387.] + +[Sidenote: B.C. 382.] + ++27.+ Meanwhile, the time of the annual election having come round, the +Aetolians elected Scopas as their Strategus, the man who had been the +moving spirit in all these acts of violence. I am at a loss for fitting +terms to describe such a public policy. To pass a decree against going +to war,[214] and yet to go on an actual expedition in force and pillage +their neighbours' territories: not to punish one of those responsible +for this: but on the contrary to elect as Strategi and bestow honours +on the leaders in these transactions,—this seems to me to involve the +grossest disingenuousness. I can find no word which better describes +such a treacherous policy; and I will quote two instances to show what +I mean by it. When Phoebidas treacherously seized the Cadmeia, the +Lacedaemonians fined the guilty general but declined to withdraw the +garrison, on the ground that the wrong was fully atoned for by the +punishment of the perpetrator of it: though their plain duty was to +have done the reverse, for it was the latter which was of importance to +the Thebans. Again this same people published a proclamation giving the +various cities freedom and autonomy in accordance with the terms of the +peace of Antalcidas, and yet did not withdraw their Harmosts from the +cities. Again, having driven the Mantineans from their home, who were +at the time their friends and allies, they denied that they were doing +any wrong, inasmuch as they removed them from one city and settled +them in several. But indeed a man is a fool, as much as a knave, if he +imagines that, because he shuts his own eyes, his neighbours cannot +see. Their fondness for such tortuous policy proved however, both to +the Lacedaemonians and Aetolians, the source of the greatest disasters; +and it is not one which should commend itself to the imitation either +of individuals or states, if they are well advised. + +King Philip, then, after his interview with the Achaean assembly, +started with his army on the way to Macedonia, in all haste to make +preparations for war; leaving a pleasant impression in the minds of all +the Greeks: for the nature of the decree, which I have mentioned as +having been passed by him,[215] gave them good hopes of finding him a +man of moderate temper and royal magnanimity. + +[Sidenote: B.C. 118.] + ++28.+ These transactions were contemporaneous with Hannibal’s +expedition against Saguntum, after his conquest of all Iberia south +of the Iber. Now, had the first attempts of Hannibal been from the +beginning involved with the transactions in Greece, it would have been +plainly my proper course to have narrated the latter side by side with +those in Iberia in my previous book, with an eye solely to dates. +But seeing that the wars in Italy, Greece, and Asia were at their +commencements entirely distinct, and yet became finally involved with +each other, I decided that my history of them must also be distinct, +until I came to the point at which they became inseparably interlaced, +and began to tend towards a common conclusion. Thus both will be made +clear,—the account of their several commencements: and the time, +manner, and causes which led to the complication and amalgamation, of +which I spoke in my introduction. This point having been reached, I +must thenceforth embrace them all in one uninterrupted narrative. This +amalgamation began towards the end of the war, in the third year of +the 140th Olympiad. From that year, therefore, my history will, with a +due regard to dates, become a general one. Before that year it must be +divided into distinct narratives, with a mere recapitulation in each +case of the events detailed in the preceding book, introduced for the +sake of facilitating the comprehension, and rousing the admiration, of +my readers. + +[Sidenote: Philip secures the support of Scerdilaidas.] + ++29.+ Philip then passed the winter in Macedonia, in an energetic +enlistment of troops for the coming campaign, and in securing his +frontier on the side of the Barbarians. And having accomplished these +objects, he met Scerdilaidas and put himself fearlessly in his power, +and discussed with him the terms of friendship and alliance; and partly +by promising to help him in securing his power in Illyria, and partly +by bringing against the Aetolians the charges to which they were only +too open, persuaded him without difficulty to assent to his proposals. +The fact is that public crimes do not differ from private, except in +quantity and extent; and just as in the case of petty thieves, what +brings them to ruin more than anything else is that they cheat and are +unfaithful to each other, so was it in the case of the Aetolians. They +had agreed with Scerdilaidas to give him half the booty, if he would +join them in their attack upon Achaea; but when, on his consenting +to do so, and actually carrying out his engagement, they had sacked +Cynaetha and carried off a large booty in slaves and cattle, they gave +him no share in the spoil at all. He was therefore already enraged +with them; and required very little persuasion on Philip’s part to +induce him to accept the proposal, and agree to join the alliance, on +condition of receiving a yearly subsidy of twenty talents; and, in +return, putting to sea with thirty galleys and carrying on a naval war +with the Aetolians. + +[Sidenote: The Acarnanians, B.C. 220.] + +[Sidenote: Duplicity of the Epirotes.] + ++30.+ While Philip was thus engaged, the commissioners sent out to the +allies were performing their mission. The first place they came to was +Acarnania; and the Acarnanians, with a noble promptitude, confirmed the +decree and undertook to join the war against the Aetolians with their +full forces. And yet they, if any one, might have been excused if they +had put the matter off, and hesitated, and shown fear of entering upon +a war with their neighbours; both because they lived upon the frontiers +of Aetolia, and still more because they were peculiarly open to attack, +and, most of all, because they had a short time before experienced +the most dreadful disasters from the enmity of the Aetolians. But I +imagine that men of noble nature, whether in private or public affairs, +look upon duty as the highest consideration; and in adherence to this +principle no people in Greece have been more frequently conspicuous +than the Acarnanians, although the forces at their command were but +slender. With them, above all others in Greece, an alliance should be +sought at a crisis, without any misgiving; for they have, individually +and collectively, an element of stability and a spirit of liberality. +The conduct of the Epirotes was in strong contrast. When they heard +what the commissioners had to say, indeed, they, like the Acarnanians, +joined in confirming the decree, and voted to go to war with the +Aetolians at such time as Philip also did the same; but with ignoble +duplicity they told the Aetolian envoys that they had determined to +maintain peace with them. + +[Sidenote: Ptolemy Philopator.] + +Ambassadors were despatched also to King Ptolemy, to urge him not to +send money to the Aetolians, nor to supply them with any aid against +Philip and the allies. + +[Sidenote: Timidity of the Messenians.] + +[Sidenote: B.C. 480-479. Pindar fr.] + ++31.+ The Messenians again, on whose account the war began, answered +the commissioners sent to them that, seeing Phigalia was on their +frontier and was in the power of the Aetolians, they would not +undertake the war until that city was wrested from them. This decision +was forcibly carried, much against the will of the people at large, +by the Ephors Oenis and Nicippus, and some others of the oligarchical +party: wherein they showed, to my thinking, great ignorance of their +true interests. I admit, indeed, that war is a terrible thing; but it +is less terrible than to submit to anything whatever in order to avoid +it. For what is the meaning of our fine talk about equality of rights, +freedom of speech, and liberty, if the one important thing is peace? We +have no good word for the Thebans, because they shrunk from fighting +for Greece and chose from fear to side with the Persians,—nor indeed +for Pindar who supported their inaction in the verses—[216] + + A quiet haven for the ship of state + Should be the patriot’s aim, + And smiling peace, to small and great + That brings no shame. + +For though his advice was for the moment acceptable, it was not long +before it became manifest that his opinion was as mischievous as it was +dishonourable. For peace, with justice and honour, is the noblest and +most advantageous thing in the world; when joined with disgrace and +contemptible cowardice, it is the basest and most disastrous.[217] + ++32.+ The Messenian leaders, then, being of oligarchical tendencies, +and aiming at their own immediate advantage, were always too much +inclined to peace. On many critical occasions indeed they managed to +elude fear and danger: but all the while this policy of theirs was +accumulating a heavy retribution for themselves; and they finally +involved their country in the gravest misfortunes. And the reason in +my opinion was this, that being neighbours to two of the most powerful +nations in the Peloponnese, or I might almost say in Greece, I mean +the Arcadians and Lacedaemonians,—one of which had been irreconcilably +hostile to them from the moment they occupied the country, and the +other disposed to be friendly and protect them,—they never frankly +accepted hostility to the Spartans, or friendship with the Arcadians. +Accordingly when the attention of the former was distracted by domestic +or foreign war, the Messenians were secure; for they always enjoyed +peace and tranquillity from the fact of their country lying out of +the road: but when the Lacedaemonians, having nothing else on hand to +distract their attention, took to inflicting injuries on them, they +were unable to withstand the superior strength of the Lacedaemonians +by their own power; and, having failed to secure the support of their +true friends, who were ready to do anything for their protection, they +were reduced to the alternatives of becoming the slaves of Sparta and +enduring her heavy exactions; or of leaving their homes to escape from +this servitude, abandoning their country with wives and children. And +this has repeatedly happened to them within comparatively recent times. + +That the present settlement of the Peloponnese may prove a lasting +one, so that no measure such as I am about to describe may be ever +necessary, is indeed my earnest wish: but if anything does happen +to disturb it, and threaten revolutionary changes, the only hope +for the Messenians and Megalopolitans of continuing to occupy their +present territory, that I can see, is a recurrence to the policy of +Epaminondas. They must resolve, that is to say, upon a cordial and +sincere partnership with each other in every danger and labour. + ++33.+ And perhaps my observation may receive some support from +ancient history. For, among many other indications, it is a fact +that the Messenians did set up a pillar close to the altar of Zeus +Lycaeus in the time of Aristomenes,[218] according to the evidence of +Callisthenes, in which they inscribed the following verses: + + A faithless king will perish soon or late! + Messene tracked him down right easily, + The traitor:—perjury must meet its fate; + Glory to Zeus, and life to Arcady! + +[Sidenote: B.C. 362.] + +The point of this is, that, having lost their own country, they pray +the gods to save Arcadia as their second country.[219] And it was +very natural that they should do so; for not only did the Arcadians +receive them when driven from their own land, at the time of the +Aristomenic war, and make them welcome to their homes and free of their +civic rights; but they also passed a vote bestowing their daughters +in marriage upon those of the Messenians who were of proper age; and +besides all this, investigated the treason of their king Aristocrates +in the battle of the Trench; and, finding him guilty, put him to death +and utterly destroyed his whole family. But setting aside these ancient +events, what has happened recently after the restoration of Megalopolis +and Messene will be sufficient to support what I have said. For when, +upon the death of Epaminondas leaving the result of the battle of +Mantinea doubtful, the Lacedaemonians endeavoured to prevent the +Messenians from being included in the truce, hoping even then to get +Messenia into their own hands, the Megalopolitans, and all the other +Arcadians who were allied with the Messenians, made such a point of +their being admitted to the benefits of the new confederacy, that they +were accepted by the allies and allowed to take the oaths and share in +the provisions of the peace; while the Lacedaemonians were the only +Greeks excluded from the treaty. With such facts before him, could any +one doubt the soundness of the suggestion I lately made? + +I have said thus much for the sake of the Arcadians and Messenians +themselves; that, remembering all the misfortunes which have befallen +their countries at the hands of the Lacedaemonians, they may cling +close to the policy of mutual affection and fidelity; and let no fear +of war, or desire of peace, induce them to abandon each other in what +affects the highest interests of both. + +[Sidenote: Division of opinion in Sparta, B.C. 220.] + ++34.+ In the matter of the commissioners from the allies, to go back to +my story, the behaviour of the Lacedaemonians was very characteristic. +For their own ill-considered and tortuous policy had placed them in +such a difficulty, that they finally dismissed them without an answer: +thus illustrating, as it seems to me, the truth of the saying, that, +“boldness pushed to extremes amounts to want of sense, and comes to +nothing.” Subsequently, however, on the appointment of new Ephors, the +party who had originally promoted the outbreak, and had been the causes +of the massacre, sent to the Aetolians to induce them to despatch an +ambassador to Sparta. The Aetolians gladly consented, and in a short +time Machatas arrived there in that capacity. Pressure was at once +put upon the Ephors to allow Machatas to address the people,[220] and +to re-establish royalty in accordance with the ancient constitution, +and not to allow the Heraclid dynasty to be any longer suppressed, +contrary to the laws. The Ephors were annoyed at the proposal, but +were unable to withstand the pressure, and afraid of a rising of the +younger men: they therefore answered that the question of restoring the +kings must be reserved for future consideration; but they consented to +grant Machatas an opportunity of addressing a public assembly. When +the people accordingly were met, Machatas came forward, and in a long +speech urged them to embrace the alliance with Aetolia; inveighing in +reckless and audacious terms against the Macedonians, while he went +beyond all reason and truth in his commendations of the Aetolians. Upon +his retirement, there was a long and animated debate between those who +supported the Aetolians and advised the adoption of their alliance, and +those who took the opposite side. When, however, some of the elders +reminded the people of the good services rendered them by Antigonus +and the Macedonians, and the injuries inflicted on them by Charixenus +and Timaeus,—when the Aetolians invaded them with their full force +and ravaged their territory, enslaved the neighbouring villages, and +laid a plot for attacking Sparta itself by a fraudulent and forcible +restoration of exiles,—these words produced a great revulsion of +feeling, and the people finally decided to maintain the alliance with +Philip and the Macedonians. Machatas accordingly had to go home without +attaining the object of his mission. + +[Sidenote: Murder of the Ephors, B.C. 220.] + +[Sidenote: Agesipolis appointed king,] + +[Sidenote: B.C. 242.] + ++35.+ The party, however, at Sparta who were the original of the +instigators of the outbreak could not make up their minds to give way. +They once more therefore determined to commit a crime of the most +impious description, having first corrupted some of the younger men. +It was an ancestral custom that, at a certain sacrifice, all citizens +of military age should join fully armed in a procession to the temple +of Athene of the Brazen-house, while the Ephors remained in the sacred +precinct and completed the sacrifice. As the young men therefore were +conducting the procession, some of them suddenly fell upon the Ephors, +while they were engaged with the sacrifice, and slew them. The enormity +of this crime will be made apparent by remembering that the sanctity +of this temple was such, that it gave a safe asylum even to criminals +condemned to death; whereas its privileges were now by the cruelty of +these audacious men treated with such contempt, that the whole of the +Ephors were butchered round the altar and the table of the goddess. In +pursuance of their purpose they next killed one of the elders, Gyridas, +and drove into exile those who had spoken against the Aetolians. They +then chose some of their own body as Ephors, and made an alliance +with the Aetolians. Their motives for doing all this, for incurring +the enmity of the Achaeans, for their ingratitude to the Macedonians, +and generally for their unjustifiable conduct towards all, was before +everything else their devotion to Cleomenes, and the hopes and +expectations they continued to cherish that he would return to Sparta +in safety. So true it is that men who have the tact to ingratiate +themselves with those who surround them can, even when far removed, +leave in their hearts very effective materials for kindling the flame +of a renewed popularity. This people for instance, to say nothing of +other examples, after nearly three years of constitutional government, +following the banishment of Cleomenes, without once thinking of +appointing kings at Sparta, no sooner heard of the death of Cleomenes +than they were eager—populace and Ephors alike—to restore kingly rule. +Accordingly the Ephors who were in sympathy with the conspirators, and +who had made the alliance with Aetolia which I just now mentioned, did +so. One of these kings so restored they appointed in accordance with +the regular and legal succession, namely Agesipolis. He was a child +at the time, a son of Agesipolis, and grandson of that Cleombrotus +who had become king, as the next of kin to this family, when Leonidas +was driven from office. As guardian of the young king they elected +Cleomenes, son of Cleombrotus and brother of Agesipolis. + +[Sidenote: and Lycurgas.] + +Of the other royal house there were surviving two sons of Archidamus, +son of Eudamidas, by the daughter of Hippodemon; as well as Hippodemon +himself, the son of Agesilaus, and several other members of the same +branch, though somewhat less closely connected than those I have +mentioned. But these were all passed over, and Lycurgus was appointed +king, none of whose ancestors had ever enjoyed that title. A present +of a talent to each of the Ephors made him “descendant of Hercules” +and king of Sparta. So true is it all the world over that such +nobility[221] is a mere question of a little money. + +The result was that the penalty for their folly had to be paid, not +by the third generation, but by the very authors of this royalist +restoration. + +[Sidenote: Spartans attack Argos, and proclaim war with the Achaeans.] + ++36.+ When Machatas heard what had happened at Sparta, he returned +thither and urged the Ephors and kings to go to war with the Achaeans; + +arguing that that was the only way of stopping the ambition of the +party in Sparta who were doing all they could to break up the alliance +with the Aetolians, or of the party in Aetolia who were co-operating +with them. Having obtained the consent of the Ephors and kings, +Machatas returned home with a success secured him by the blindness +of his partisans in Sparta; while Lycurgus with the army and certain +others of the citizens invaded the Argive territory, the inhabitants +being quite unprepared for an attack, owing to the existing settlement. +By a sudden assault he seized Polichna, Prasiae, Leucae, and Cyphanta, +but was repulsed at Glympes and Zarax. After these achievements of +their king, the Lacedaemonians proclaimed a licence of reprisal +against the Achaeans. With the Eleans also Machatas was successful in +persuading them, by the same arguments as he had used at Sparta, to go +to war with the Achaeans. + +The unexpected success of these intrigues caused the Aetolians to enter +upon the war with high spirits. But it was quite the contrary with the +Achaeans: for Philip, on whom their hopes rested, was still busy with +his preparations; the Epirotes were hesitating about going to war, and +the Messenians were entirely passive; and meantime the Aetolians, aided +by the blind policy of the Eleans and Lacedaemonians, were threatening +them with actual war on every side. + +[Sidenote: Aratus succeeded by his son as Strategus of the Achaeans, +May B.C. 219.] + +[Sidenote: June-September. B.C. 219.] + ++37.+ The year of Aratus’s office was just expiring, and his son Aratus +the younger had been elected to succeed him as Strategus, and was on +the point of taking over the office. Scopas was still Strategus of +the Aetolians, and in fact it was just about the middle of his year. +For the Aetolians hold their elections immediately after the autumn +equinox, while the Achaeans hold theirs about the time of the rising of +the Pleiads. As soon therefore as summer had well set in, and Aratus +the younger had taken over his office, all these wars at once began +simultaneously. Hannibal began besieging Saguntum; the Romans sent +Lucius Aemilius with an army to Illyria against Demetrius of Pharos,—of +both which I spoke in the last book; Antiochus, having had Ptolemais +and Tyre betrayed to him by Theodotus, meditated attacking Coele-Syria; +and Ptolemy was engaged in preparing for the war with Antiochus. While +Lycurgus, wishing to make a beginning after the pattern of Cleomenes, +pitched his camp near the Athenaeum of Megalopolis and was laying +siege to it: the Achaeans were collecting mercenary horse and foot for +the war which was upon them: and Philip, finally, was starting from +Macedonia with an army consisting of ten thousand heavy-armed soldiers +of the phalanx, five thousand light-armed, and eight hundred cavalry. +Such was the universal state of war or preparation for war. + +[Sidenote: Rhodian and Byzantium war, 220-219 B.C.] + ++38.+ At the same time the Rhodians went to war with the Byzantines, +for reasons which I must now describe. + +[Sidenote: Advantages of the situation of Byzantium.] + +As far as the sea is concerned, Byzantium occupies a position the +most secure and in every way the most advantageous of any town in our +quarter of the world: while in regard to the land, its situation is in +both respects the most unfavourable. By sea it so completely commands +the entrance to the Pontus, that no merchant can sail in or out against +its will. The Pontus therefore being rich in what the rest of the +world requires for the support of life, the Byzantines are absolute +masters of all such things. For those commodities which are the first +necessaries of existence, cattle and slaves, are confessedly supplied +by the districts round the Pontus in greater profusion, and of better +quality, than by any others: and for luxuries, they supply us with +honey, wax, and salt-fish in great abundance; while they take our +superfluous stock of olive oil and every kind of wine. In the matter +of corn there is a mutual interchange, they supplying or taking it as +it happens to be convenient. Now the Greeks would necessarily have +been excluded entirely from traffic in these articles, or at least +would have had to carry it on at a loss, if the Byzantines had adopted +a hostile attitude, and made common cause formerly with the Gauls, or +still more at this time with the Thracians, or had abandoned the place +altogether: for owing to the narrowness of the strait, and the number +of the barbarians along its shores, it would have become entirely +impassable to our ships. The Byzantines themselves probably feel the +advantages of the situation, in the supplies of the necessaries of +life, more than any one else; for their superfluity finds a ready +means of export, and what they lack is readily imported, with profit +to themselves, and without difficulty or danger: but other people too, +as I have said, get a great many commodities by their means. As common +benefactors therefore of all Greece they might justly expect, not only +gratitude, but the united assistance of Greeks, when threatened by the +barbarians. + +But since the peculiar natural advantages of this site are generally +unknown, because it lies somewhat outside the parts of the world +ordinarily visited; and since it is an universal wish to be acquainted +with things of this sort, by ocular inspection, if possible, of such +places as have any unusual or remarkable features; or, if that is +impossible, by having in our minds some ideas or images of them as like +the truth as may be, I must now state the facts of the case, and what +it is that makes this city so eminently rich and prosperous. + +[Sidenote: The Pontus.] + ++39.+ The sea called “The Pontus” has a circumference of twenty-two +thousand stades, and two mouths diametrically opposite to each other, +the one opening into the Propontis and the other into the Maeotic Lake; +which latter also has itself a circumference of eight thousand stades. +Into these two basins many great rivers discharge themselves on the +Asiatic side, and still larger and more numerous on the European; and +so the Maeotic lake, as it gets filled up, flows into the Pontus, and +the Pontus into the Propontis. The mouth of the Maeotic lake is called +the Cimmerian Bosporus, about thirty stades broad and sixty long, and +shallow all over; that of the Pontus is called the Thracian Bosporus, +and is a hundred and twenty stades long, and of a varying breadth. +Between Calchedon and Byzantium the channel is fourteen stades broad, +and this is the entrance at the end nearest the Propontis. Coming from +the Pontus, it begins at a place called Hieron, at which they say +that Jason on his return voyage from Colchis first sacrificed to the +twelve gods. This place is on the Asiatic side, and its distance from +the European coast is twelve stades, measuring to Sarapieium, which +lies exactly opposite in Thrace. There are two causes which account +for the fact that the waters, both of the Maeotic lake and the Pontus, +continually flow outwards. One is patent at once to every observer, +namely, that by the continual discharge of many streams into basins +which are of definite circumference and content, the water necessarily +is continually increasing in bulk, and, had there been no outlet, +would inevitably have encroached more and more, and occupied an ever +enlarging area in the depression: but as outlets do exist, the surplus +water is carried off by a natural process, and runs perpetually through +the channels that are there to receive it. The second cause is the +alluvial soil brought down, in immense quantities of every description, +by the rivers swollen from heavy rains, which forms shelving banks and +continually forces the water to take a higher level, which is thus also +carried through these outlets. Now as this process of alluvial deposit +and influx of water is unceasing and continuous, so also the discharge +through the channels is necessarily unceasing and continuous. + +These are the true causes of the outflow of the Pontus, which do +not depend for their credit on the stories of merchants, but upon +the actual observation of nature, which is the most accurate method +discoverable. + ++40.+ As I have started this topic I must not, as most historians do, +leave any point undiscussed, or only barely stated. My object is rather +to give information, and to clear up doubtful points for my readers. +This is the peculiarity of the present day, in which every sea and land +has been thrown open to travellers; and in which, therefore, one can no +longer employ the evidence of poets and fabulists, as my predecessors +have done on very many points, “offering,” as Heraclitus says, “tainted +witnesses to disputed facts,”—but I must try to make my narrative in +itself carry conviction to my readers. + +I say then the Pontus has long been in process of being filled up with +mud, and that this process is actually going on now: and further, that +in process of time both it and the Propontis, assuming the same local +conditions to be maintained, and the causes of the alluvial deposit to +continue active, will be entirely filled up. For time being infinite, +and the depressions most undoubtedly finite, it is plain that, even +though the amount of deposit be small, they must in course of time +be filled. For a finite process, whether of accretion or decrease, +must, if we presuppose infinite time, be eventually completed, however +infinitesimal its progressive stages may be. In the present instance +the amount of soil deposited being not small, but exceedingly large, +it is plain that the result I mentioned will not be remote but rapid. +And, in fact, it is evident that it is already taking place. The +Maeotic lake is already so much choked up, that the greater part of it +is only from seven to five fathoms deep, and accordingly cannot any +longer be passed by large ships without a pilot. And having moreover +been originally a sea precisely on a level with the Pontus, it is now a +freshwater lake: the sea-water has been expelled by the silting up of +the bottom, and the discharge of the rivers has entirely overpowered +it. The same will happen to the Pontus, and indeed is taking place at +this moment; and though it is not evident to ordinary observers, owing +to the vastness of its basin, yet a moderately attentive study will +discover even now what is going on. + ++41.+ For the Danube discharging itself into the Pontus by several +mouths, we find opposite it a bank formed by the mud discharged from +these mouths extending for nearly a thousand stades, at a distance of +a day’s sail from the shore as it now exists; upon which ships sailing +to the Pontus run, while apparently still in deep water, and find +themselves unexpectedly stranded on the sandbanks which the sailors +call the Breasts. That this deposit is not close to the shore, but +projected to some distance, must be accounted for thus: exactly as far +as the currents of the rivers retain their force from the strength of +the descending stream, and overpower that of the sea, it must of course +follow that to that distance the earth, and whatever else is carried +down by the rivers, would be projected, and neither settle nor become +fixed until it is reached. But when the force of the currents has +become quite spent by the depth and bulk of the sea, it is but natural +that the soil held in solution should settle down and assume a fixed +position. This is the explanation of the fact, that, in the case of +large and rapid rivers, such embankments are at considerable distances, +and the sea close in shore deep; while in the case of smaller and more +sluggish streams, these sandbanks are at their mouths. The strongest +proof of this is furnished by the case of heavy rains; for when they +occur, rivers of inferior size, overpowering the waves at their mouths, +project the alluvial deposit out to sea, to a distance exactly in +proportion to the force of the streams thus discharging themselves. +It would be mere foolish scepticism to disbelieve in the enormous +size of this sandbank, and in the mass of stones, timber, and earth +carried down by the rivers; when we often see with our own eyes an +insignificant stream suddenly swell into a torrent, and force its way +over lofty rocks, sweeping along with it every kind of timber, soil, +and stones, and making such huge moraines, that at times the appearance +of a locality becomes in a brief period difficult to recognise.[222] + ++42.+ This should prevent any surprise that rivers of such magnitude +and rapidity, flowing perpetually instead of intermittently, should +produce these effects and end by filling up the Pontus. For it is not +a mere probability, but a logical certainty, that this must happen. +And a proof of what is going to take place is this, that in the same +proportion as the Maeotic lake is less salt than the Pontus, the +Pontus is less so than the Mediterranean. From which it is manifest +that, when the time which it has taken for the Maeotic lake to fill +up shall have been extended in proportion to the excess of the Pontic +over the Maeotic basin, then the Pontus will also become like a marsh +and lake, and filled with fresh water like the Maeotic lake: nay, we +must suppose that the process will be somewhat more rapid, insomuch +as the rivers falling into it are more numerous and more rapid. I +have said thus much in answer to the incredulity of those who cannot +believe that the Pontus is actually being silted up, and will some day +be filled; and that so vast a sea will ever become a lake or marsh. +But I have another and higher object also in thus speaking: which is +to prevent our ignorance from forcing us to give a childish credence +to every traveller’s tale and marvel related by voyagers; and that, +by possessing certain indications of the truth, we may be enabled by +them to test the truth or falsehood of anything alleged by this or that +person. + +[Sidenote: Site of Byzantium.] + +[Sidenote: B.C. 512.] + ++43.+ I must now return to the discussion of the excellence of the +site of Byzantium. The length of the channel connecting the Pontus +and Propontis being, as I have said, a hundred and twenty stades, and +Hieron marking its termination towards the Pontus, and the Strait +of Byzantium that towards the Propontis,—half-way between these, on +the European side, stands Hermaeum, on a headland jutting out into +the channel, about five stades from the Asiatic coast, just at the +narrowest point of the whole channel; where Darius is said to have +made his bridge of ships across the strait, when he crossed to invade +Scythia. In the rest of the channel the running of the current from the +Pontus is much the same, owing to the similarity of the coast formation +on either side of it; but when it reaches Hermaeum on the European +side, which I said was the narrowest point, the stream flowing from the +Pontus, and being thus confined, strikes the European coast with great +violence, and then, as though by a rebound from a blow, dashes against +the opposite Asiatic coast, and thence again sweeps back and strikes +the European shore near some headlands called the Hearths: thence it +runs rapidly once more to the spot on the Asiatic side called the Cow, +the place on which the myth declares Io to have first stood after +swimming the channel. Finally the current runs from the Cow right up to +Byzantium, and dividing into two streams on either side of the city, +the lesser part of it forms the gulf called the Horn, while the greater +part swerves once more across. But it has no longer sufficient way on +it to reach the opposite shore on which Calchedon stands: for after +its several counter-blows the current, finding at this point a wider +channel, slackens; and no longer makes short rebounds at right angles +from one shore to the other, but more and more at an obtuse angle, and +accordingly, falling short of Calchedon, runs down the middle of the +channel. + +[Sidenote: B.C. 410.] + ++44.+ What then makes Byzantium a most excellent site, and Calchedon +the reverse, is just this: and although at first sight both positions +seem equally convenient, the practical fact is that it is difficult to +sail up to the latter, even if you wish to do so; while the current +carries you to the former, whether you will or no, as I have just +now shown. And a proof of my assertion is this: those who want to +cross from Calchedon to Byzantium cannot sail straight across the +channel, but coast up to the Cow and Chrysopolis,—which the Athenians +formerly seized, by the advice of Alcibiades, when they for the first +time levied customs on ships sailing into the Pontus,[223]—and then +drift down the current, which carries them as a matter of course to +Byzantium. And the same is the case with a voyage on either side +of Byzantium. For if a man is running before a south wind from the +Hellespont, or to the Hellespont from the Pontus before the Etesian +winds, if he keeps to the European shore, he has a direct and easy +course to the narrow part of the Hellespont between Abydos and Sestos, +and thence also back again to Byzantium: but if he goes from Calchedon +along the Asiatic coast, the case is exactly the reverse, from the fact +that the coast is broken up by deep bays, and that the territory of +Cyzicus projects to a considerable distance. Nor can a man coming from +the Hellespont to Calchedon obviate this by keeping to the European +coast as far as Byzantium, and then striking across to Calchedon; +for the current and other circumstances which I have mentioned make +it difficult. Similarly, for one sailing out from Calchedon it is +absolutely impossible to make straight for Thrace, owing to the +intervening current, and to the fact that both winds are unfavourable +to both voyages; for as the south wind blows into the Pontus, and the +north wind from it, the one or the other of these must be encountered +in both these voyages. These, then, are the advantages enjoyed by +Byzantium in regard to the sea: I must now describe its disadvantages +on shore. + +[Sidenote: Disadvantages of Byzantium.] + ++45.+ They consist in the fact that its territory is so completely +hemmed in by Thrace from shore to shore, that the Byzantines have a +perpetual and dangerous war continually on hand with the Thracians. For +they are unable once for all to arm and repel them by a single decisive +battle, owing to the number of their people and chiefs. For if they +conquer one chief, three others still more formidable invade their +territory. Nor again do they gain anything by consenting to pay tribute +and make terms; for a concession of any sort to one brings at once five +times as many enemies upon them. Therefore, as I say, they are burdened +by a perpetual and dangerous war: for what can be more hazardous or +more formidable than a war with barbarians living on your borders? Nay, +it is not only this perpetual struggle with danger on land, but, apart +from the evils that always accompany war, they have to endure a misery +like that ascribed by the poets to Tantalus: for being in possession +of an extremely fertile district, no sooner have they expended their +labour upon it and been rewarded by crops of the finest quality, than +the barbarians sweep down, and either destroy them, or collect and +carry them off; and then, to say nothing of the loss of their labour +and expense, the very excellence of the crops enhances the misery and +distress of seeing them destroyed before their eyes. Still, habit +making them able to endure the war with the Thracians, they maintained +their original connexions with the other Greeks; but when to their +other misfortunes was added the attack of the Gauls under Comontorius, +they were reduced to a sad state of distress indeed. + +[Sidenote: The Gauls, B.C. 279.] + ++46.+ These Gauls had left their country with Brennus, and having +survived the battle at Delphi and made their way to the Hellespont, +instead of crossing to Asia, were captivated by the beauty of the +district round Byzantium, and settled there. Then, having conquered +the Thracians and erected Tyle[224] into a capital, they placed the +Byzantines in extreme danger. In their earlier attacks, made under the +command of Comontorius their first king, the Byzantines always bought +them off by presents amounting to three, or five, or sometimes even +ten thousand gold pieces, on condition of their not devastating their +territory: and at last were compelled to agree to pay them a yearly +tribute of eighty talents, until the time of Cavarus, in whose reign +their kingdom came to an end; and their whole tribe, being in their +turn conquered by the Thracians, were entirely annihilated. It was in +these times, then, that being hard pressed by the payment of these +exactions, the Byzantines first sent embassies to the Greek states with +a prayer for aid and support in their dangerous situation: but being +disregarded by the greater number, they, under pressure of necessity, +attempted to levy dues upon ships sailing into the Pontus. + +[Sidenote: The Byzantines levy a toll.] + ++47.+ Now this exaction by the Byzantines of a duty upon goods brought +from the Pontus, being a heavy loss and burden to everybody, was +universally regarded as a grievance; and accordingly an appeal from all +those engaged in the trade was made to the Rhodians, as acknowledged +masters of the sea: and it was from this circumstance that the war +originated of which I am about to speak. + +[Sidenote: The Rhodians declare war, B.C. 220.] + +For the Rhodians, roused to action by the loss incurred by themselves, +as well as that of their neighbours, at first joined their allies in +an embassy to Byzantium, and demanded the abolition of the impost. The +Byzantines refused compliance, being persuaded that they were in the +right by the arguments advanced by their chief magistrates, Hecatorus +and Olympidorus, in their interview with the ambassadors. The Rhodian +envoys accordingly departed without effecting their object. But upon +their return home, war was at once voted against Byzantium on these +grounds; and messengers were immediately despatched to Prusias inviting +his co-operation in the war: for they knew that Prusias was from +various causes incensed with the Byzantines. + +[Sidenote: Achaeus.] + +[Sidenote: B.C. 226.] + ++48.+ The Byzantines took steps of a similar nature, by sending to +Attalus and Achaeus begging for their assistance. For his part Attalus +was ready enough to give it: but his importance was small, because +he had been reduced within the limits of his ancestral dominions by +Achaeus. But Achaeus who exercised dominion throughout Asia on this +side Taurus, and had recently established his regal power, promised +assistance; and his attitude roused high hopes in the minds of the +Byzantines, and corresponding depression in those of the Rhodians and +Prusias. Achaeus was a relation of the Antiochus who had just succeeded +to the kingdom of Syria; and he became possessed of the dominion I +have mentioned through the following circumstances. After the death of +Seleucus, father of the above-named Antiochus, and the succession of +his eldest son Seleucus to the throne, Achaeus accompanied the latter +in an expedition over Mount Taurus, about two years before the period +of which we are speaking.[225] For as soon as Seleucus the younger had +succeeded to the kingdom he learnt that Attalus had already reduced +all Asia on this side of Taurus under his power; and being accordingly +eager to support his own rights, he crossed Taurus with a large army. +There he was treacherously assassinated by Apaturius the Gaul, and +Nicanor. Achaeus, in right of his relationship, promptly revenged his +murder by killing Nicanor and Apaturius; and taking supreme command of +the army and administration, conducted it with wisdom and integrity. +For the opportunity was a convenient one, and the feeling of the common +soldiers was all in favour of his assuming the crown; yet he refused to +do so, and preserving the royal title for Antiochus the younger, son of +Seleucus, went on energetically with the expedition, and the recovery +of the whole of the territory this side Taurus. Meeting however with +unexpected success,—for he shut up Attalus within the walls of Pergamus +and became master of all the rest of the country,—he was puffed up by +his good fortune, and at once swerved from his straightforward course +of policy. He assumed the diadem, adopted the title of king, and was at +this time the most powerful and formidable of all the kings and princes +this side Taurus. This was the man on whose help the Byzantines relied +when they undertook the war against the Rhodians and Prusias. + +[Sidenote: Prusias.] + ++49.+ As to the provocations given before this to Prusias by the +Byzantines they were various. In the first place he complained that, +having voted to put up certain statues of him, they had not done so, +but had delayed or forgotten it. In the second place he was annoyed +with them for taking great pains to compose the hostility, and put an +end to the war, between Achaeus and Attalus; because he looked upon a +friendship between these two as in many ways detrimental to his own +interests. He was provoked also because it appeared that when Attalus +was keeping the festival of Athene, the Byzantines had sent a mission +to join in the celebration; but had sent no one to him when he was +celebrating the Soteria. Nursing therefore a secret resentment for +these various offences, he gladly snatched at the pretext offered him +by the Rhodians; and arranged with their ambassadors that they were to +carry on the war by sea, while he would undertake to inflict no less +damage on the enemy by land. + +Such were the causes and origin of the war between Rhodes and Byzantium. + +[Sidenote: Hostilities commence, B.C. 220.] + ++50.+ At first the Byzantines entered upon the war with energy, in full +confidence of receiving the assistance of Achaeus; and of being able +to cause Prusias as much alarm and danger by fetching Tiboetes from +Macedonia as he had done to them. For Prusias, entering upon the war +with all the animosity which I have described, had seized the place +called Hieron at the entrance of the channel, which the Byzantines not +long before had purchased for a considerable sum of money, because of +its convenient situation; and because they did not wish to leave in +any one else’s hands a point of vantage to be used against merchants +sailing into the Pontus, or one which commanded the slave trade, or the +fishing. Besides this, Prusias had seized in Asia a district of Mysia, +which had been in the possession of Byzantium for many years past. + +Meanwhile the Rhodians manned six ships and received four from their +allies; and, having elected Xenophantus to command them, they sailed +with this squadron of ten ships to the Hellespont. Nine of them dropped +anchor near Sestos, and stopped ships sailing into the Pontus; with +the tenth the admiral sailed to Byzantium, to test the spirit of the +people, and see whether they were already sufficiently alarmed to +change their minds about the war. Finding them resolved not to listen +he sailed away, and, taking up his other nine ships, returned to Rhodes +with the whole squadron. + +Meanwhile the Byzantines sent a message to Achaeus asking for aid, and +an escort to conduct Tiboetes from Macedonia. For it was believed that +Tiboetes had as good a claim to the kingdom of Bithynia as Prusias, who +was his nephew. + +[Sidenote: The Rhodians secure the friendship of Achaeus.] + ++51.+ But seeing the confident spirit of the Byzantines, the Rhodians +adopted an exceedingly able plan to obtain their object. They perceived +that the resolution of the Byzantines in venturing on the war rested +mainly on their hopes of the support of Achaeus. Now they knew that +the father of Achaeus was detained at Alexandria, and that Achaeus was +exceedingly anxious for his father’s safety: they therefore hit upon +the idea of sending an embassy to Ptolemy, and asking him to deliver +this Andromachus to them. This request, indeed, they had before made, +but without laying any great stress upon it: now, however, they were +genuinely anxious for it; that, by doing this favour to Achaeus, +they might lay him under such an obligation to them, that he would +be unable to refuse any request they might make to him. When the +ambassadors arrived, Ptolemy at first deliberated as to detaining +Andromachus; because there still remained some points of dispute +between himself and Antiochus unsettled; and Achaeus, who had recently +declared himself king, could exercise a decisive influence in several +important particulars. For Andromachus was not only father of Achaeus, +but brother also of Laodice, the wife of Seleucus.[226] However, on a +review of the whole situation, Ptolemy inclined to the Rhodians; and +being anxious to show them every favour, he yielded to their request, +and handed over Andromachus to them to conduct to his son. Having +accordingly done this, and having conferred some additional marks of +honour on Achaeus, they deprived the Byzantines of their most important +hope. And this was not the only disappointment which the Byzantines +had to encounter; for as Tiboetes was being escorted from Macedonia, +he entirely defeated their plans by dying. This misfortune damped the +ardour of the Byzantines, while it encouraged Prusias to push on the +war. On the Asiatic side he carried it on in person, and with great +energy; while on the European side he hired Thracians who prevented the +Byzantines from leaving their gates. For their party being thus baulked +of their hopes, and surrounded on every side by enemies, the Byzantines +began to look about then for some decent pretext for withdrawing from +the war. + +[Sidenote: The Gallic king, Cavarus, negotiates a peace, B.C. 220.] + ++52.+ So when the Gallic king, Cavarus, came to Byzantium, and showed +himself eager to put an end to the war, and earnestly offered his +friendly intervention, both Prusias and the Byzantines consented to his +proposals. And when the Rhodians were informed of the interference of +Cavarus and the consent of Prusias, being very anxious to secure their +own object also, they elected Aridices as ambassador to Byzantium, and +sent Polemocles with him in command of three triremes, wishing, as the +saying is, to send the Byzantines “spear and herald’s staff at once.” +Upon their appearance a pacification was arranged, in the year of +Cothon, son of Callisthenes, Hieromnemon in Byzantium.[227] The treaty +with the Rhodians was simple: “The Byzantines will not collect toll +from any ship sailing into the Pontus; and in that case the Rhodians +and their allies are at peace with the Byzantines.” But that with +Prusias contained the following provisions: “There shall be peace and +amity for ever between Prusias and the Byzantines; the Byzantines shall +in no way attack Prusias, nor Prusias the Byzantines. Prusias shall +restore to Byzantines all lands, forts, populations, and prisoners +of war, without ransom; and besides these things, the ships taken at +the beginning of the war, and the arms seized in the fortresses; and +also the timbers, stone-work, and roofing belonging to the fort called +Hieron” (for Prusias, in his terror of the approach of Tiboetes, had +pulled down every fort which seemed to lie conveniently for him): +“finally, Prusias shall compel such of the Bithynians as have any +property taken from the Byzantine district of Mysia to restore it to +the farmers.” + +Such were the beginning and end of the war of Rhodes and Prusias with +Byzantium. + +[Sidenote: War between Rhodes and Crete.] + ++53.+ At the same time the Cnossians sent an embassy to the Rhodians, +and persuaded them to send them the ships that were under the command +of Polemocles, and to launch three undecked vessels besides and send +them also to Crete. The Rhodians having complied, and the vessels +having arrived at Crete, the people of Eleutherna suspecting that one +of their citizens named Timarchus had been put to death by Polemocles +to please the Cnossians, first proclaimed a right of reprisal against +the Rhodians, and then went to open war with them. + +[Sidenote: The destruction of Lyttos.] + +The people of Lyttos,[228] too, a short time before this, met with an +irretrievable disaster. At that time the political state of Crete as +a whole was this. The Cnossians, in league with the people of Gortyn, +had a short time previously reduced the whole island under their power, +with the exception of the city of Lyttos; and this being the only city +which refused obedience, they resolved to go to war with it, being +bent upon removing its inhabitants from their homes, as an example and +terror to the rest of Crete. Accordingly at first the whole of the +other Cretan cities were united in war against Lyttos: but presently +when some jealousy arose from certain trifling causes, as is the way +with the Cretans, they separated into hostile parties, the peoples of +Polyrrhen, Cere, and Lappa, along with the Horii and Arcades,[229] +forming one party and separating themselves from connexion with the +Cnossians, resolved to make common cause with the Lyttians. Among the +people of Gortyn, again, the elder men espoused the side of Cnossus, +the younger that of Lyttos, and so were in opposition to each other. +Taken by surprise by this disintegration of their allies, the Cnossians +fetched over a thousand men from Aetolia in virtue of their alliance: +upon which the party of the elders in Gortyn immediately seized the +citadel; introduced the Cnossians and Aetolians; and either expelled +or put to death the young men, and delivered the city into the hands +of the Cnossians. And at the same time, the Lyttians having gone out +with their full forces on an expedition into the enemy’s territory, the +Cnossians got information of the fact, and seized Lyttos while thus +denuded of its defenders. The children and women they sent to Cnossus; +and having set fire to the town, thrown down its buildings, and damaged +it in every possible way, returned. When the Lyttians reached home from +their expedition, and saw what had happened, they were struck with +such violent grief that not a man of the whole host had the heart to +enter his native city; but one and all having marched round its walls, +with frequent cries and lamentations over their misfortune and that of +their country, turned back again towards the city of Lappa. The people +of Lappa gave them a kind and entirely cordial reception; and having +thus in one day become cityless and aliens, they joined these allies in +their war against the Cnossians. Thus at one fell swoop was Lyttos, a +colony of Sparta and allied with the Lacedaemonians in blood, the most +ancient of the cities in Crete, and by common consent the mother of the +bravest men in the island, utterly cut off. + +[Sidenote: Appeal to the Achaeans and Philip.] + ++55.+ But the peoples of Polyrrhen and Lappa and all their allies, +seeing that the Cnossians clung to the alliance of the Aetolians, and +that the Aetolians were at war with King Philip and the Achaeans, +sent ambassadors to the two latter asking for their help and to be +admitted to alliance with them. Both requests were granted: they +were admitted into the roll of allies, and assistance was sent to +them, consisting of four hundred Illyrians under Plator, two hundred +Achaeans, and a hundred Phocians; whose arrival was of the utmost +advantage to the interest of Polyrrhenia and her allies: for in a brief +space of time they shut the Eleuthernaeans and Cydonians within their +walls, and compelled the people of Aptera to forsake the alliance of +the Cnossians and share their fortunes. When these results had been +obtained, the Polyrrhenians and their allies joined in sending to the +aid of Philip and the Achaeans five hundred Cretans, the Cnossians +having sent a thousand to the Aetolians a short time before; both of +which contingents took part in the existing war on their respective +sides. Nay more, the exiled party of Gortyn seized the harbour of +Phaestus,[230] and also by a sudden and bold attack occupied the port +of Gortyn itself; and from these two places as bases of operation they +carried on the war with the party in the town. Such was the state of +Crete. + +[Sidenote: Mithridates IV., king of Pontus, declares war against +Sinope.] + ++56.+ About the same time Mithridates also declared war against the +people of Sinope; which proved to be the beginning and occasion of the +disaster which ultimately befell the Sinopeans. Upon their sending +an embassy with a view to this war to beg for assistance from the +Rhodians, the latter decided to elect three men, and to grant them a +hundred and forty thousand drachmae with which to procure supplies +needed by the Sinopeans. The men so appointed got ready ten thousand +jars of wine, three hundred talents[231] of prepared hair, a hundred +talents of made-up bowstring, a thousand suits of armour, three +thousand gold pieces, and four catapults with engineers to work them. +The Sinopean envoys took these presents and departed; for the people +of Sinope, being in great anxiety lest Mithridates should attempt +to besiege them both by land and sea, were making all manner of +preparations with this view. Sinope lies on the right-hand shore of the +Pontus as one sails to Phasis, and is built upon a peninsula jutting +out into the sea: it is on the neck of this peninsula, connecting it +with Asia, which is not more than two stades wide, that the city is +so placed as to entirely close it up from sea to sea; the rest of +the peninsula stretches out into the open sea,—a piece of flat land +from which the town is easily accessible, but surrounded by a steep +coast offering very bad harbourage, and having exceedingly few spots +admitting of disembarkation. The Sinopeans then were dreadfully alarmed +lest Mithridates should blockade them, by throwing up works against +their town on the side towards Asia, and by making a descent on the +opposite side upon the low ground in front of the town: and they +accordingly determined to strengthen the line of the peninsula, where +it was washed by the sea, by putting up wooden defences and erecting +palisades round the places accessible from the sea; and at the same +time by storing weapons and stationing guards at all points open to +attack: for the whole area is not large, but is capable of being easily +defended and by a moderate force. + +Such was the situation at Sinope at the time of the commencement of the +Social war,—to which I must now return. + +[Sidenote: The History of the Social war resumed from ch. 37. Philip +starts for Aetolia, B.C. 219. Night surprise of Aegira.] + ++57.+ King Philip started from Macedonia with his army for Thessaly and +Epirus, being bent on taking that route in his invasion of Aetolia. +And at the same time Alexander and Dorimachus, having succeeded in +establishing an intrigue for the betrayal of Aegira, had collected +about twelve hundred Aetolians into Oeanthe, which is in Aetolia, +exactly opposite the above-named town; and, having prepared vessels +to convey them across the gulf, were waiting for favourable weather +for making the voyage in fulfilment of their design. For a deserter +from Aetolia, who had spent a long time at Aegira, and had had full +opportunity of observing that the guards of the gate towards Aegium +were in the habit of getting drunk, and keeping their watch with great +slackness, had again and again crossed over to Dorimachus; and, laying +this fact before him, had invited him to make the attempt, well knowing +that he was thoroughly accustomed to such practices. The city of Aegira +lies on the Peloponnesian coast of the Corinthian gulf, between the +cities of Aegium and Sicyon, upon some strong and inaccessible heights, +facing towards Parnassus and that district of the opposite coast, and +standing about seven stades back from the sea. At the mouth of the +river which flows past this town Dorimachus dropped anchor under cover +of night, having at length obtained favourable weather for crossing. +He and Alexander, accompanied by Archidamus the son of Pantaleon and +the main body of the Aetolians, then advanced towards the city along +the road leading from Aegium. But the deserter, with twenty of the +most active men, having made his way by a shorter cut than the others +over the cliffs where there was no road, owing to his knowledge of the +locality, got into the city through a certain water-course and found +the guards of the gate still asleep. Having killed them while actually +in their beds, and cut the bolts of the gates with their axes, they +opened them to the Aetolians. Having thus surprised the town, they +behaved with a conspicuous want of caution, which eventually saved +the people of Aegira, and proved the destruction of the Aetolians +themselves. They seemed to imagine that to get within the gates was all +there was to do in occupying an enemy’s town; and accordingly acted as +I shall now describe. + +[Sidenote: Alexander killed.] + ++58.+ They kept together for a very brief space of time near the +market-place, and then scattering in every direction, in their passion +for plunder, rushed into the houses and began carrying off the wealth +they contained. But it was now broad daylight: and the attack being +wholly unexpected and sudden, those of the Aegiratans whose houses +were actually entered by the enemy, in the utmost terror and alarm, +all took to flight and made their way out of the town, believing it +to be completely in the power of the enemy; but those of them whose +houses were untouched, and who, hearing the shouting, sallied out to +the rescue, all rushed with one accord to the citadel. These last +continually increased in number and confidence; while the Aetolians on +the contrary kept continually becoming less closely united, and less +subject to discipline, from the causes above mentioned. But Dorimachus, +becoming conscious of his danger, rallied his men and charged the +citizens who were occupying the citadel: imagining that, by acting +with decision and boldness, he would terrify and turn to flight those +who had rallied to defend the town. But the Aegiratans, cheering each +other on, offered a strenuous resistance, and grappled gallantly with +the Aetolians. The citadel being unwalled, and the struggle being at +close quarters and man to man, the battle was at first as desperate +as might be expected between two sides, of which one was fighting for +country and children, the other for bare life. Finally the invading +Aetolians were repulsed: and the Aegiratans, taking advantage of their +higher position, made a fierce and vigorous charge down the slope upon +the enemy; which struck such terror in them, that in the confusion +that followed the fugitives trampled each other to death at the gates. +Alexander himself fell fighting in the actual battle; but Archidamus +was killed in the struggle and crush at the gates. Of the main body of +Aetolians, some were trampled to death; others flying over the pathless +hills fell over precipices and broke their necks; while such as escaped +in safety to the ships managed, after shamefully throwing away their +arms, to sail away and escape from what seemed a desperate danger. +Thus it came about that the Aegiratans having lost their city by their +carelessness, unexpectedly regained it by their valour and gallantry. + +[Sidenote: Euripidas.] + ++59.+ About the same time Euripidas, who had been sent out to act +as general to the Eleans, after overrunning the districts of Dyme, +Pharae, and Tritaea, and collecting a considerable amount of booty, was +marching back to Elis. But Miccus of Dyme, who happened at the time to +be Sub-strategus of the Achaean league, went out to the rescue with a +body of Dymaeans, Pharaeans, and Tritaeans, and attacked him as he was +returning. But proceeding too precipitately, he fell into an ambush +and lost a large number of his men: for forty of his infantry were +killed and about two hundred taken prisoners. Elated by this success, +Euripidas a few days afterwards made another expedition, and seized +a fort belonging to the Dymaeans on the river Araxus, standing in an +excellent situation, and called the Wall, which the myths affirm to +have been anciently built by Hercules, when at war with the Eleans, as +a base of operations against them. + +[Sidenote: Inactivity of Aratus. Dyme, Pharae, and Tritaea separate +from the league.] + ++60.+ The peoples of Dyme, Pharae, and Tritaea having been worsted in +their attempt to relieve the country, and afraid of what would happen +from this capture of the fort, first sent messengers to the Strategus, +Aratus, to inform him of what had happened and to ask for aid, and +afterwards a formal embassy with the same request. But Aratus was +unable to get the mercenaries together, because in the Cleomenic war +the Achaeans had failed to pay some of the wages of the hired troops: +and his entire policy and management of the whole war was in a word +without spirit or nerve. Accordingly Lycurgus seized the Athenaeum of +Megalopolis, and Euripidas followed up his former successes by taking +Gortyna[232] in the territory of Telphusa. But the people of Dyme, +Pharae, and Tritaea, despairing of assistance from the Strategus, +came to a mutual agreement to cease paying the common contribution +to the Achaean league, and to collect a mercenary army on their own +account, three hundred infantry and fifty horse; and to secure the +country by their means. In this action they were considered to have +shown a prudent regard for their own interests, but not for those of +the community at large; for they were thought to have set an evil +example, and supplied a precedent to those whose wish it was to break +up the league. But in fact the chief blame for their proceeding must +rightfully be assigned to the Strategus, who pursued such a dilatory +policy, and slighted or wholly rejected the prayers for help which +reached him from time to time. For as long as he has any hope, from +relations and allies, any man who is in danger will cling to them; but +when in his distress he has to give up that hope, he is forced to help +himself the best way he can. Wherefore we must not find fault with the +people of Tritaea, Pharae, and Dyme for having mercenaries on their own +account, when the chief magistrate of the league hesitated to act: but +some blame does attach to them for renouncing the joint contribution. +They certainly were not bound to neglect to secure their own safety by +every opportunity and means in their power; but they were bound at the +same time to keep up their just dues to the league: especially as the +recovery of such payment was perfectly secured to them by the common +laws; and most of all because they had been the originators of the +Achaean confederacy.[233] + +[Sidenote: Philip V. at Ambracia, B.C. 219.] + ++61.+ Such was the state of things in the Peloponnese when King +Philip, after crossing Thessaly, arrived in Epirus. Reinforcing his +Macedonians by a full levy of Epirotes, and being joined by three +hundred slingers from Achaia, and the five hundred Cretans sent him by +the Polyrrhenians, he continued his march through Epirus and arrived +in the territory of the Ambracians. Now, if he had continued his march +without interruption, and thrown himself into the interior of Aetolia, +by the sudden and unlooked-for attack of so formidable an army he +would have put an end to the whole campaign: but as it was, he was +over-persuaded by the Epirotes to take Ambracus first; and so gave the +Aetolians an interval in which to make a stand, to take precautionary +measures, and to prepare for the future. For the Epirotes, thinking +more of their own advantage than of that of the confederacy, and being +very anxious to get Ambracus[234] into their power, begged Philip to +invest the town and take it before doing anything else: the fact being +that they regarded it as a matter of the utmost importance to recover +Ambracia from the Aetolians; and thought that the only way of doing +this was to become masters of this place, Ambracus, and besiege the +town of Ambracia from it. For Ambracus is a place strongly fortified by +walls and out-works, standing in the midst of marshes, and approached +from the land by only one narrow raised causeway; and commanding by its +situation both the district and town of Ambracia. + +[Sidenote: Scopas tries to effect a diversion by invading Macedonia. On +his return he destroys Dium.] + ++62.+ While Philip, then, by the persuasion of the Epirotes, pitching +his camp near Ambracus, was engaged in making his preparations for +the siege, Scopas raised a general levy of Aetolians, and marching +through Thessaly crossed the frontiers of Macedonia; traversed the +plain of Plena, and laid it waste; and after securing considerable +booty, returned by the road leading to Dium. The inhabitants of that +town abandoning the place, he entered it and threw down its walls, +houses, and gymnasium; set fire to the covered walks round the sacred +enclosure, and destroyed all the other offerings which had been placed +in it, either for ornament, or for the use of visitors to the public +assemblies, and threw down all the statues of the kings. And this +man, who, at the very beginning and first action of the war, had thus +turned his arms against the gods as well as men, was not treated on his +return to Aetolia as guilty of impiety, but was honoured and looked +up to. For he had indeed filled the Aetolians with empty hopes and +irrational conceit. From this time they indulged the idea that no one +would venture to set foot in Aetolia, while they would be able without +resistance not only to plunder the Peloponnese, which they were quite +accustomed to do, but Thessaly and Macedonia also. + +[Sidenote: Ambracus taken.] + +[Sidenote: Philip enters Aetolia; takes Phoeteiae.] + ++63.+ When he heard what had happened in Macedonia, and had thus paid +on the spot for the selfishness and folly of the Epirotes, Philip +proceeded to besiege Ambracus. By an energetic use of earthworks, +and other siege operations, he quickly terrified the people into +submission, and the place surrendered after a delay of forty days in +all. He let the garrison, consisting of five hundred Aetolians, depart +on fixed conditions, and gratified the cupidity of the Epirotes by +handing over Ambracus to them, while he himself set his army in motion, +and marched by way of Charadra, being anxious to cross the Ambracian +gulf where it is narrowest, that is to say, near the Acarnanian temple +called Actium. For this gulf is a branch of the Sicilian sea between +Epirus and Acarnania, with a very narrow opening of less than five +stades, but expanding as it extends inland to a breadth of a hundred +stades; while the length of the whole arm from the open sea is about +three hundred stades. It forms the boundary between Epirus on the north +and Acarnania on the south. Philip, therefore, having got his army +across this entrance of the gulf, and advanced through Acarnania, came +to the city of Phoeteiae, which belonged to the Aetolians;[235] having, +during his march, been joined by an Acarnanian force of two thousand +foot and two hundred horse. Encamping under the walls of this town, +and making energetic and formidable assaults upon it during two days, +it was surrendered to him on terms, and the Aetolian garrison were +dismissed on parole. Next night, however, five hundred other Aetolians, +believing the town still untaken, came to its relief; whose arrival +being ascertained beforehand by the king, he stationed some men in +ambush at certain convenient spots, and slew most of the new-comers +and captured all but a very few of the rest. After these events, he +distributed a month’s rations of corn among his men from what had been +captured, for a large store was found collected at Phoeteiae, and +then continued his advance into the territory of Stratus. At about +ten stades from that town he pitched his camp on the banks of the +river Achelous; and from that began laying waste the country without +resistance, none of the enemy venturing out to attack him. + +[Sidenote: Metropolis and Conope.] + +[Sidenote: Skirmish on the Achelous.] + +[Sidenote: Ithoria.] + ++64.+ Meanwhile the Achaeans, being hard pressed by the war, and +ascertaining that the king was not far off, sent ambassadors to him +begging for help. They found Philip still in his camp near Stratus, +and there delivered their commission: and besides the message with +which they were charged, they pointed out to him the richness of the +booty which his army would get from the enemy’s country, and tried to +persuade him to cross to Rhium and invade Elis. The king listened to +what they had to say, and kept the ambassadors with him, alleging that +he must consider of their request; and meanwhile broke up his camp, +and marched in the direction of Metropolis and Conope. The Aetolians +kept possession of the citadel of Metropolis but abandoned the town: +whereupon Philip set fire to Metropolis, and continued his advance +against Conope. But when the Aetolian horse rallied and ventured to +meet him at the ford of the Achelous, which is about twenty stades +before you reach the town, believing that they would either stop his +advance altogether, or inflict much damage on the Macedonians while +crossing the river; the king, fully understanding their tactics, +ordered his light-armed troops to enter the river first and to cross it +in close order, keeping to their regular companies, and with shields +interlocked. His orders were obeyed: and as soon as the first company +had effected the crossing, the Aetolian cavalry attacked it; but +they could make no impression upon it, standing as it did in close +order, and being joined in similar close order, shield to shield, by +a second and a third company as they crossed. Therefore they wheeled +off discomfited and retired to the city. From this time forth the +proud gallantry of the Aetolians was fain to confine itself to the +protection of the towns, and keep quiet; while Philip crossed with his +army, and after wasting this district also without resistance, arrived +at Ithoria. This is a position completely commanding the road, and of +extraordinary strength, natural as well as artificial. On his approach, +however, the garrison occupying the place abandoned it in a panic; and +the king, taking possession, levelled it to the ground: and gave orders +to his skirmishing parties to treat all forts in the district in the +same way. + +[Sidenote: Paeanium.] + +[Sidenote: Fortifies Oeniadae.] + ++65.+ Having thus passed the narrow part of the road, he proceeded +at a slow and deliberate pace, giving his army time to collect booty +from the country; and by the time he reached Oeniadae his army was +richly provided with every kind of goods. But he resolved first to +take Paeanium: and having pitched his camp under its walls, by a +series of assaults carried the place by force,—a town not large in +circumference, for that was less than seven stades, but second to none +in the construction of its houses, walls, and towers. The wall of this +town he levelled with its foundation, and, breaking down its houses, +he packed their timbers and tiles with great care upon rafts, and sent +them down the river to Oeniadae. At first the Aetolians resolved to +hold the citadel in Oeniadae, which they had strengthened with walls +and other fortifications; but upon Philip’s approach they evacuated it +in a panic. The king therefore having taken this city also, advanced +from it and encamped on a certain secure position in Calydonia, called +Elaeus, which had been rendered extraordinarily strong with walls +and other fortifications by Attalus, who undertook the work for the +Aetolians. Having carried this also by assault, and plundered the whole +of Calydonia, the Macedonians returned to Oeniadae. And observing the +convenient position of this place for all purposes, and especially as +providing a place of embarkation for the Peloponnese, Philip resolved +to build a wall round the town. For Oeniadae lies on the sea-coast, +at the juncture of the Acarnanian and Aetolian frontiers, just at the +entrance of the Corinthian gulf; and the town faces the sea-coast of +Dyme in the Peloponnesus, and is the nearest point to the promontory of +Araxus in it; for the intervening sea is not more than a hundred stades +across. Looking to these facts he fortified the citadel by itself; +and, building a wall round the harbour and dockyards, was intending +to connect them with the citadel, employing for the construction the +materials brought from Paeanium. + +[Sidenote: Philip recalled to Macedonia by a threatened invasion of +Dardani.] + +[Sidenote: Late summer of B.C. 219.] + ++66.+ But whilst he was still engaged on this work, news was brought +to the king that the Dardani, suspecting his intention of invading +the Peloponnese, were collecting forces and making great preparations +with the determination of invading Macedonia. When he heard this, +Philip made up his mind that he was bound to go with all speed to the +protection of Macedonia: and accordingly he dismissed the Achaean +envoys with the answer, which he now gave them, that when he had taken +effectual measures with regard to the circumstances that had just been +announced to him, he would look upon it as his first business to bring +them aid to the best of his ability. Thereupon he broke up his camp, +and began his return march with all speed, by the same route as that by +which he had come. When he was on the point of recrossing the Ambracian +gulf from Acarnania into Epirus, Demetrius of Pharos presented himself, +sailing with a single galley, having just been banished from Illyria by +the Romans,—as I have stated in the previous book.[236] Philip received +him with kindness and bade him sail to Corinth, and go thence through +Thessaly to Macedonia; while he himself crossed into Epirus and pushed +on without a halt. When he had reached Pella in Macedonia, the Dardani +learnt from some Thracian deserters that he was in the country, and +they at once in a panic broke up their army, though they were close to +the Macedonian frontier. And Philip, being informed of their change of +purpose, dismissed his Macedonian soldiers to gather in their harvest: +while he himself went to Thessaly, and spent the rest of the summer at +Larisa. + +[Sidenote: Contemporary events in Spain and Italy.] + +It was at this season that Aemilius celebrated a splendid triumph at +Rome for his Illyrian victories; and Hannibal after the capture of +Saguntum dismissed his troops into winter quarters; while the Romans, +on hearing of the capture of Saguntum, were sending ambassadors to +Carthage to demand the surrender of Hannibal, and at the same time were +making preparations for the war after electing Publius Cornelius Scipio +and Tiberius Sempronius Longus Consuls for the following year, as I +have stated in detail in the previous book. My object in recalling the +facts here is to carry out my original plan of showing what events in +various parts of the world were contemporaneous. + +[Sidenote: Midsummer B.C. 217. Dorimachus Aetolian Strategus, Sept. +B.C. 119.] + +[Sidenote: Destroys Dodona.] + ++67.+ And so the first year of this Olympiad was drawing to a close. +In Aetolia, the time of the elections having come round, Dorimachus +was elected Strategus. He was no sooner invested with his office, +than, summoning the Aetolian forces, he made an armed foray upon +the highlands of Epirus, and began wasting the country with an even +stronger passion for destruction than usual; for his object in +everything he did was not so much to secure booty for himself, as +to damage the Epirotes. And having come to Dodona[237] he burnt the +colonnades, destroyed the sacred offerings, and even demolished the +sacred building; so that we may say that the Aetolians had no regard +for the laws of peace or war, but in the one as well as in the other, +acted in defiance of the customs and principles of mankind. After +those, and other similar achievements, Dorimachus returned home. + +[Sidenote: Philip starts again.] + +[Sidenote: Dec. B.C. 219.] + +But the winter being now considerably advanced, and all idea of the +king coming being given up owing to the time of the year, Philip +suddenly started from Larisa with an army of three thousand hoplites +armed with brass shields, two thousand light-armed, three hundred +Cretans, and four hundred horse of the royal guard; and having +transported them into Euboea and thence to Cynos he came through +Boeotia and the Megarid to Corinth, about the time of the winter +solstice; having conducted his arrival with such promptitude and +secrecy, that not a single Peloponnesian suspected it. He at once +closed the gates of Corinth and secured the roads by guards; and on the +very next day sent for Aratus the elder to come to him from Sicyon, +and issued despatches to the Strategus of the Achaean league and the +cities, in which he named a time and place for them all to meet him in +arms. Having made these arrangements, he again started, and pitched his +camp near the temple of the Dioscuri in Phliasia. + +[Sidenote: B.C. 218, Jan.-Feb. Destruction of a marauding army of +Eleans under Euripidas.] + ++68.+ Meanwhile Euripidas, with two companies of Eleans,—who combined +with the pirates and mercenaries made up an army of two thousand two +hundred men, besides a hundred horse,—started from Psophis and began +marching by way of Pheneus and Stymphalus, knowing nothing about +Philip’s arrival, with the purpose of wasting the territory of Sicyon. +The very night in which it chanced that Philip had pitched his camp +near the temple of the Dioscuri, he passed the royal quarters, and +succeeded in entering the territory of Sicyon, about the time of the +morning watch. But some Cretans of Philip’s army who had left their +ranks, and were prowling about on the track of prey, fell into the +hands of Euripidas, and being questioned by him informed him of the +arrival of the Macedonians. Without saying a word of his discovery to +any one, he at once caused his army to face about, and marched back +by the same road as that by which he had come; with the intention and +hope of getting through Stymphalia, and reaching the difficult ground +beyond it, before the Macedonians could catch him. But the king knowing +nothing at all about the proceedings of the enemy, at daybreak broke +up his camp and began his advance in pursuance of his original plan, +determining to march by way of Stymphalus itself to Caphyae: for it was +at that town that he had written to the Achaeans to meet him. + +[Sidenote: The Eleans come across the Macedonians at the junction of +the two roads above Stymphalus.] + ++69.+ Now it happened that, just as the Macedonian advanced guard +came to the top of the hill, near a place called Apelaurus, about +ten stades before you come to Stymphalus, the advanced guard of +the Eleans converged upon it also. Understanding from his previous +information what had happened, Euripidas took some horsemen with him +and avoided the danger by flight, making his way across country to +Psophis. The rest of the Eleans being thus deserted by their leader, +and panic-struck at what had happened, remained stationary on the +road, not knowing what to do, or which way to turn. For at first their +officers imagined that the troops they saw were some Achaeans come +out to resist them. What favoured this mistake more than anything +else were the brass shields of the hoplites: for they imagined that +they were Megalopolitans, because the soldiers of that town had borne +shields of that sort at the battle of Sellasia against Cleomenes, King +Antigonus having furnished them for the occasion. Under this idea, they +retired in good order to some rising ground, by no means despairing of +getting off safely: but as soon as the Macedonians had advanced close +up to them, grasping the true state of the case, they threw down their +shields and fled. About twelve hundred of them were taken prisoners; +but the rest perished utterly, some at the hands of the Macedonians, +and others by falling down precipices: and finally not more than a +hundred altogether escaped. Having despatched the spoils and the +prisoners to Corinth, Philip continued his expedition. But a great +impression was made upon the Peloponnesians: for they had not heard of +the king’s arrival until they heard of his victory. + +[Sidenote: Philip advances to Psophis.] + +[Sidenote: A description of Psophis.] + ++70.+ Continuing his march through Arcadia, and encountering heavy snow +storms and much fatigue in the pass over Mount Oligyrtus, he arrived on +the third day at Caphyae. There he rested his army for two days, and +was joined by Aratus the younger, and the Achaean soldiers whom he had +collected; so that, with an army now amounting to ten thousand men, +he advanced by way of Clitoria towards Psophis, collecting missiles +and scaling ladders from the towns through which he passed. Psophis is +a place of acknowledged antiquity, and a colony of the Arcadian town +of Azanis. Taking the Peloponnesus as a whole, it occupies a central +position in the country; but in regard to Arcadia it is on its western +frontier, and is close also to the western borderland of Achaia: its +position also commands the territory of the Eleans, with whom at that +time it was politically united. Philip reached this town on the third +day after leaving Caphyae, and pitched his camp on some rising ground +overhanging the city, from which he could in perfect security command +a view both of the whole town and the country round it. But when the +king saw the great strength of the place, he was at a loss what to do. +Along the left side of it rushes a violent winter torrent, which for +the greater part of the winter is impassable, and in any case renders +the city secure and difficult of approach, owing to the size of the +bed which its waters have worn out for themselves by slow degrees, in +the course of ages, as it comes rushing down from the higher ground. +On the east again there is a broad and rapid river, the Erymanthus, +about which so many tales are told. This river is joined by the +winter torrent at a point south of the town, which is thus defended +on three sides by these streams; while the fourth, or northern, side +is commanded by a hill, which has been fortified, and serves as a +convenient and efficient citadel. The town has walls also of unusual +size and construction; and besides all this, a reinforcement of Eleans +happened to have just come in, and Euripidas himself was in the town +after his escape from Stymphalus. + +[Sidenote: Capture of Psophis.] + ++71.+ The sight of these things caused Philip much anxious thought. +Sometimes he was for giving up his plan of attacking and besieging +the place: at others the excellence of its situation made him eager +to accomplish this. For just as it was then a source of danger to the +Achaeans and Arcadians, and a safe place of arms for the Eleans; so +would it on the other hand, if captured, become a source of safety +to the Arcadians, and a most convenient base of operations for the +allies against the Eleans. These considerations finally decided him to +make the attempt: and he therefore issued orders to the Macedonians +to get their breakfasts at daybreak, and be ready for service with +all preparations completed. Everything being done as he ordered, the +king led his army over the bridge across the Erymanthus; and no one +having offered him resistance, owing to the unexpectedness of the +movement, he arrived under the walls of the town in gallant style and +with formidable show. Euripidas and the garrison were overpowered +with astonishment; because they had felt certain that the enemy would +not venture on an assault, or try to carry a town of such strength; +and that a siege could not last long either, owing to the severity of +the season. This calculation of chances made them begin to entertain +suspicions of each other, from a misgiving that Philip must have +established a secret intrigue with some persons in the town against +it. But finding that nothing of the sort existed among themselves, the +greater number hurried to the walls to defend them, while the mercenary +Elean soldiers sallied out of a gate in the upper part of the town +to attack the enemy. The king stationed his men who had ladders at +three different spots, and divided the other Macedonians among these +three parties; this being arranged, he gave the signal by the sound +of trumpet, and began the assault on the walls at once. At first the +garrison offered a spirited resistance and hurled many of the enemy +from their ladders; but when the supply of weapons inside the town, as +well as other necessary materials, began to run short,—as was to be +expected from the hasty nature of the preparations for defence,—and the +Macedonians showed no sign of terror, the next man filling up the place +of each who was hurled from the scaling-ladder, the garrison at length +turned to flight, and made their escape one and all into the citadel. +In the king’s army the Macedonians then made good their footing on +the wall, while the Cretans went against the party of mercenaries who +had sallied from the upper gate, and forced them to throw away their +shields and fly in disorder. Following the fugitives with slaughter, +they forced their way along with them through the gate: so that the +town was captured at all points at once. The Psophidians with their +wives and children retreated into the citadel, and Euripidas with them, +as well as all the soldiers who had escaped destruction. + +[Sidenote: Surrender of the citadel of Psophis.] + ++72.+ Having thus carried the place, the Macedonians at once plundered +all the furniture of the houses; and then, setting up their quarters +in the houses, took regular possession of the town. But the people +who had taken refuge in a body in the citadel, having no provisions +with them, and well foreseeing what must happen, made up their minds +to give themselves up to Philip. They accordingly sent a herald to +the king; and having received a safe-conduct for an embassy, they +despatched their magistrates and Euripidas with them on this mission, +who made terms with the king by which the lives and liberties of all +who were on the citadel, whether citizens or foreigners, were secured. +The ambassadors then returned whence they came, carrying an order to +the people to remain where they were until the army had marched out, +for fear any of the soldiers should disobey orders and plunder them. A +fall of snow however compelled the king to remain where he was for some +days; in the course of which he summoned a meeting of such Achaeans +as were in the army, and after pointing out to them the strength and +excellent position of the town for the purposes of the present war, +he spoke also of his own friendly disposition towards their nation: +and ended by saying, “We hereby yield up and present this town to +the Achaeans; for it is our purpose to show them all the favour in +our power, and to omit nothing that may testify to our zeal.” After +receiving the thanks of Aratus and the meeting, Philip dismissed the +assembly, and getting his army in motion, marched towards Lasion. The +Psophidians descending from the citadel received back the possession of +the town, each man recovering his own house; while Euripidas departed +to Corinth, and thence to Aetolia. Those of the Achaean magistrates who +were present put Prolaus of Sicyon in command of the citadel, with an +adequate garrison; and Pythias of Pallene in command of the town. Such +was the end of the incident of Psophis. + +[Sidenote: Lasion and Stratus.] + +[Sidenote: Philip at Olympia.] + +[Sidenote: Prosperity of Elis.] + ++73.+ But when the Elean garrison of Lasion heard of the coming of the +Macedonians, and were informed of what had taken place at Psophis, they +at once abandoned the town; so that upon his arrival the king took it +immediately, and by way of enhancing his favours to the Achaeans handed +Lasion also over to them; and in a similar spirit restored Stratus +to the Telphusians, which was also evacuated by the Eleans. On the +fifth day after settling these matters he arrived at Olympia. There he +offered a sacrifice to Zeus and entertained his officers at a banquet; +and, having given his army three days’ rest, commenced his return +march. After advancing some way into Elis, he allowed foraging parties +to scour the country while he himself lay encamped near Artemisium, as +it is called; and after receiving the booty there, he removed to the +Dioscurium.[238] In the course of this devastation of the country the +number of the captives was indeed great, but a still greater number +made their escape to the neighbouring villages and strongholds. For +Elis is more populous, as well as more richly furnished with slaves +and other property, than the rest of the Peloponnese: and some of the +Eleans are so enamoured of a country life, that there are cases of +families who, being in enjoyment of considerable wealth, have for two +or three generations never entered a public law-court at all.[239] +And this result is brought about by the great care and attention +bestowed upon the agricultural class by the government, to see that +their law-suits should be settled on the spot, and every necessary of +life abundantly supplied them. To me it seems that they owed these +laws and customs originally to the wide extent of their arable land, +and still more to the fact that their lives were under the protection +of religion; for, owing to the Olympic assembly, their territory +was especially exempted by the Greeks from pillage; and they had +accordingly been free from all injury and hostile invasion. + +[Sidenote: The ancient privileges of Elis lost.] + ++74.+ But in the course of time, when the Arcadians advanced a claim +for Lasion and the whole district of Pisa, being forced to defend +their territory and change their habits of life, they no longer +troubled themselves in the least about recovering from the Greeks +their ancient and ancestral immunity from pillage, but were content to +remain exactly as they were. This in my opinion was a short-sighted +policy. For peace is a thing we all desire, and are willing to submit +to anything to obtain: it is the only one of our so-called blessings +that no one questions. If then there are people who, having the +opportunity of obtaining it, with justice and honour, from the Greeks, +without question and for perpetuity, neglect to do so, or regard other +objects as of superior importance to it, must we not look upon them +as undoubtedly blind to their true interests? But if it be objected +that, by adopting such a mode of life, they would become easily open +to attack and exposed to treachery: I answer that such an event would +be rare, and if it did happen, would be a claim on the aid of united +Greece; but that for minor injuries, having all the wealth which +unbroken peace would be sure to bring them, they would never have +been at a loss for foreign soldiers or mercenaries to protect them at +certain places and times. As it is, from dread of what is occasional +and unlikely, they involve their country and property in perpetual wars +and losses. + +My object in thus speaking is to admonish the Eleans: for they have +never had a more favourable time than the present to get back their +ancient privilege of exemption from pillage, which is universally +acknowledged to belong to them. Even now, some sparks, so to speak, of +their old habit remaining, Elis is more thickly populated than other +districts. + +[Sidenote: Capture of Thalamae.] + ++75.+ And therefore during Philip’s occupation of the country the +number of prisoners taken was immense; and the number of those who +escaped by flight still greater. An enormous amount of movable +property, and an enormous crowd of slaves and cattle, were collected at +a place called Thalamae; which was selected for the purpose, because +the approach to it was narrow and difficult, and the place itself +was retired and not easy to enter. But when the king was informed +of the number of those who had taken refuge in this place, resolved +to leave nothing unattempted or incomplete, he occupied certain +spots which commanded the approach to it, with his mercenaries: +while leaving his baggage and main army in his entrenched camp, he +himself led his peltasts and light-armed troops through the gorge, +and, without meeting with any resistance, came directly under the +fortress. The fugitives were panic-stricken at his approach: for +they were utterly inexperienced in war and unprovided with means of +defence,—a mere rabble hurriedly collected together; they therefore +at once surrendered, and among them two hundred mercenary soldiers, +of various nationalities, who had been brought there by Amphidamas +the Elean Strategus. Having thus become master of an immense booty in +goods, and of more than five thousand slaves, and having in addition +to these driven off an incalculable number of cattle, Philip now +returned to his camp; but finding his army overburdened with spoils of +every description, and rendered by that means cumbrous and useless for +service, he retraced his steps, and once more marched to Olympia. + +[Sidenote: Oppressive conduct of Apelles to the Achaeans.] + ++76.+ But now a difficulty arose which was created by Apelles. Apelles +was one of those who had been left by Antigonus as guardians of his +son, and had, as it happened, more influence than any one else with +the king. He conceived the wish to bring the Achaeans into the same +position as the Thessalians; and adopted for that purpose a very +offensive line of conduct. The Thessalians were supposed to enjoy +their own constitution, and to have quite a different status to the +Macedonians; but in fact they had exactly the same, and obeyed every +order of the royal ministers. It was with the purpose of bringing about +the same state of things, that this officer now set himself to test the +subservience of the Achaean contingent. At first he confined himself +to giving the Macedonian soldiers leave to eject Achaeans from their +quarters, who on any occasion had taken possession of them first, as +well as to wrest from them any booty they might have taken; but he +afterwards treated them with actual violence, through the agency of +his subordinates, on any trifling pretext; while such as complained of +this treatment, or took the part of those who were being beaten, he +personally arrested and put into confinement: being convinced that by +this method he would gradually and imperceptibly bring them into the +habit of submitting, without remonstrance, to any thing which the king +might choose to inflict. And this opinion he deduced from his previous +experience in the army of Antigonus, when he had seen the Achaeans +willing to endure any hardship, on the one condition of escaping from +the yoke of Cleomenes. However, certain young Achaeans held a meeting, +and going to Aratus explained to him the policy which was being pursued +by Apelles: whereupon Aratus at once went to Philip, feeling that a +stand must be made on this point at once and without delay. He made his +statement to the king; who, being informed of the facts, first of all +encouraged the young men by a promise that nothing of the sort should +happen to them again; and then commanded Apelles not to impose any +orders upon the Achaeans without consulting their own Strategus. + +[Sidenote: Character of Philip V.] + ++77.+ Philip, then, was acquiring a great reputation, not only among +those actually in his army, but among the other Peloponnesians also, +for his behaviour to the allies serving with him, as well as for his +ability and courage in the field. Indeed it would not be easy to find a +king endowed with more natural qualities requisite for the acquisition +of power. He had in an eminent degree a quick understanding, a +retentive memory, and a winning grace of manner, joined to a look of +royal dignity and authority; and most important of all, ability and +courage as a general. What neutralised all these excellent qualities, +and made a cruel tyrant of a naturally well-disposed king, it is not +easy to say in a few words: and therefore that inquiry must be reserved +for a more suitable time than the present. + +[Sidenote: Philip continues his campaign.] + +Starting from Olympia by the road leading to Pharae, Philip came first +to Telphusa, and thence to Heraea. There he had the booty sold by +auction, and repaired the bridge over the Alpheus, with the view of +passing over it to the invasion of Triphylia. + +[Sidenote: Arrival of Aetolian troops under Phillidas, B.C. 218.] + +[Sidenote: Triphylia.] + +Just at that time the Aetolian Strategus, Dorimachus, in answer to +a request of the Eleans for protection against the devastation they +were enduring, despatched six hundred Aetolians, under the command +of Phillidas, to their aid. Having arrived in Elis, and taken over +the Elean mercenaries, who were five hundred in number, as well as a +thousand citizen soldiers and the Tarentine cavalry,[240] he marched to +the relief of Triphylia. This district is so called from Triphylus, one +of the sons of Arcas, and lies on the coast of the Peloponnese between +Elis and Messenia, facing the Libyan Sea, and touching the south-west +frontier of Arcadia. It contains the following towns, Samicum, Lepreum, +Hypana, Typaneae, Pyrgos, Aepium, Bolax, Stylangium, Phrixa; all of +which, shortly before this, the Eleans had conquered and annexed, as +well as the city of Alipheira, which had originally been subject to +Arcadia and Megalopolis, but had been exchanged with the Eleans, for +some private object of his own, by Lydiadas when tyrant of Megalopolis. + ++78.+ Phillidas, then, sent his Elean troops to Lepreum, and his +mercenaries to Aliphera; while he himself went with the Aetolian troops +to Typaneae, and waited to see what would happen. Meanwhile the king, +having got rid of his heavy baggage, and crossed the bridge over the +river Alpheus, which flows right under Heraea, came to Alipheira, which +lies on a hill precipitous on every side, and the ascent of which is +more than ten stades. The citadel is on the very summit of this hill, +adorned with a colossal statue of Athene, of extraordinary size and +beauty. The origin and purpose of this statue, and at whose expense it +was set up, are doubtful questions even among the natives; for it has +never been clearly discovered why or by whom it was dedicated: yet it +is universally allowed that its skilful workmanship classes it among +the most splendid and artistic productions of Hecatodorus[241] and +Sostratus. + +[Sidenote: Capture of Alipheira.] + +The next morning being fine and bright, the king made his dispositions +at daybreak. He placed parties of men with scaling ladders at several +points, and supported each of them with bodies of mercenaries, and +detachments of Macedonian hoplites, on the rear of these several +parties. His orders being fulfilled with enthusiasm and a formidable +display of power, the garrison of Alipheira were kept continually +rushing and rallying to the particular spots to which they saw the +Macedonians approaching: and while this was going on, the king himself +took some picked men, and mounted unobserved over some steep hills up +to the suburb of the citadel; and then, at a given signal, all at once +put the scaling ladders to the walls and began attempting the town. +The king was the first to take the suburb of the acropolis, which had +been abandoned by the garrison; and when this was set on fire, those +who were defending the town walls, foreseeing what must happen, and +afraid that by the fall of the citadel they would be deprived of their +last hope, abandoned the town walls, and fled into it: whereupon the +Macedonians at once took the walls and the town. Subsequently the +garrison on the citadel sent an embassy to Philip, who granted them +their lives, and received possession of it also by formal surrender. + +[Sidenote: Typanae and Phigalia surrender to Philip.] + ++79.+ These achievements of the king alarmed the whole people of +Triphylia, and made them take counsel severally for the safety of +themselves and their respective cities: while Phillidas left Typaneae, +after plundering some of the houses there, and retired to Lepreum. +This was the reward which the allies of the Aetolians at that time +usually got: not only to be deserted at the hour of utmost need in the +most barefaced way, but, by being plundered as well as betrayed, to +suffer at the hands of their allies exactly what they had a right to +expect from a victorious enemy. But the people of Typaneae surrendered +their city to Philip; as also did the inhabitants of Hypana. And the +people of Phigalia, hearing of what had taken place in Triphylia, and +disliking the alliance with the Aetolians, rose in arms and seized +the space round the Polemarchium.[242] The Aetolian pirates who were +residing in this city, for the purpose of plundering Messene, were +able at first to keep down and overawe the people; but when they saw +that the whole town was mustering to the rescue, they desisted from +the attempt. Having made terms with them, they took their baggage +and evacuated the town; whereupon the inhabitants sent an embassy to +Philip, and delivered themselves and their town into his hands. + +[Sidenote: Lepreum.] + +[Sidenote: Samicum,] + +[Sidenote: and other towns.] + ++80.+ While these things were going on, the people of Lepreum, having +seized a certain quarter of their town, demanded that the Elean, +Aetolian, and Lacedaemonian garrisons (for a reinforcement had come +from Sparta also) should all alike evacuate the citadel and city. +At first Phillidas refused, and stayed on, hoping to overawe the +citizens; but when the king, despatching Taurion with a guard of +soldiers to Phigalia, advanced in person towards Lepreum, and was +now close to the town, Phillidas lowered his tone, and the Lepreates +were encouraged in their determination. It was indeed a glorious act +of gallantry on their part. Though there was a garrison within their +walls of a thousand Eleans, a thousand Aetolians with the pirates, +five hundred mercenaries, and two hundred Lacedaemonians, and though +too their citadel was in the occupation of these troops, yet they +ventured to make a stand for the freedom of their native city, and +would not give up hope of deliverance. Phillidas therefore, seeing +that the Lepreates were prepared to offer a stout resistance, and that +the Macedonians were approaching, evacuated the town with the Eleans +and Lacedaemonians. The Cretans, who had been sent by the Spartans, +made their way home through Messenia; but Phillidas departed for +Samicum. The people of Lepreum, having thus got control of their own +town, sent ambassadors to place it in the power of Philip. Hearing the +news, Philip sent all his army, except the peltasts and light-armed +troops, to Lepreum; and taking the latter with him, he made all the +haste he could to catch Phillidas. He succeeded so far as to capture +all his baggage; but Phillidas himself managed to outstrip him and +throw himself into Samicum. The king therefore sat down before this +place: and having sent for the rest of his army from Lepreum, made the +garrison believe that he meant to besiege the town. But the Aetolians +and Eleans within it, having nothing ready for sustaining a siege +beyond their bare hands, alarmed at their situation, held a parley +with Philip to secure their lives; and having obtained leave from +him to march out with their arms, they departed into Elis. Thus the +king became master of Samicum on the spot: and this was followed by +deputations from other towns to him, with entreaties for protection; +in virtue of which he took over Phrixa, Stylangium, Aepium, Bolax, +Pyrgos, and Epitalium. Having settled these things, and reduced all +Triphylia into his power in six days, he returned to Lepreum; and +having addressed the necessary warnings to the Lepreates, and put a +garrison into the citadel, he departed with his army towards Heraea, +leaving Ladicus of Acarnania in command of Triphylia. When he arrived +at Heraea, he made a distribution of all the booty; and taking up again +his baggage from Heraea, arrived about the middle of the winter at +Megalopolis. + +[Sidenote: Chilon tries to seize the crown of Sparta, B.C. 218.] + ++81.+ While Philip was thus engaged in Triphylia, Chilon the +Lacedaemonian, holding that the kingship belonged to him in virtue +of birth, and annoyed at the neglect of his claims by the Ephors in +selecting Lycurgus, determined to stir up a revolution: and believing +that if he took the same course as Cleomenes had done, and gave the +common people hopes of land allotments and redivision of property, +the masses would quickly follow him, he addressed himself to carrying +out this policy. Having therefore agreed with his friends on this +subject, and got as many as two hundred people to join his conspiracy, +he entered upon the execution of his project. But perceiving that the +chief obstacles in the way of the accomplishment of his design were +Lycurgus, and those Ephors who had invested him with the crown, he +directed his first efforts against them. The Ephors he seized while at +dinner, and put them all to death on the spot,—chance thus inflicting +upon them the punishment they deserved: for whether we regard the +person at whose hands, or the person for whose sake they were thus +destroyed, we cannot but say that they richly merited their fate. + +After the successful accomplishment of this deed, Chilon went to the +house of Lycurgus, whom he found at home, but failed to seize. Assisted +by slaves and neighbours Lycurgus was smuggled out of the house, and +effected a secret escape; and thence got away by a cross-country route +to the town of Pellene in Tripolis. Thus baffled in the most important +point of his enterprise, Chilon was greatly discouraged; but was forced +all the same to go on with what he had begun. Accordingly he made +a descent upon the market-place, and laid violent hands upon those +opposed to him; tried to rouse his relations and friends; and declared +to the rest of the people there what hopes of success he had. But when +nobody seemed inclined to join him, but on the contrary a mob began to +collect with threatening looks, he saw how it was, and found a secret +way of leaving the town; and, making his way across Laconia, arrived +in Achaia alone and an exile. But the Lacedaemonians who were in the +territory of Megalopolis, terrified by the arrival of Philip, stowed +away all the goods they had got from the country, and first demolished +and then abandoned the Athenaeum. + +[Sidenote: Decline of Sparta.] + +[Sidenote: B.C. 800(?)-B.C. 371.] + +[Sidenote: B.C. 236-222.] + +The fact is that the Lacedaemonians enjoyed a most excellent +constitution, and had a most extensive power, from the time of the +legislation of Lycurgus to that of the battle of Leuctra. But after +that event their fortune took an unfavourable turn; and their political +state continued ever growing worse and worse, until they finally +suffered from a long succession of internal struggles and partisan +warfare; were repeatedly agitated by schemes for the redivision of +lands and the banishment of one party or another; and were subjected to +the severest possible slavery, culminating in the tyrannical government +of Nabis: though the word “tyrant” was one which they had in old times +scarcely endured to hear mentioned. However, the ancient history of +Sparta as well as the great part of it since, has been recorded by +many in terms of eulogy or the reverse; but the part of that history +which admits of the least controversy is that which followed the entire +destruction of the ancient constitution by Cleomenes;[243] and that +shall be narrated by me in the order of events as they occur. + +[Sidenote: Apelles opposes Aratus, Jan.-May, B.C. 218.] + +[Sidenote: May, B.C. 218.] + +[Sidenote: Election of Eperatus as Achaean Strategus.] + ++82.+ Meanwhile Philip left Megalopolis, and marching by way of Tegea +arrived at Argos, and there spent the rest of the winter, having gained +in this campaign an admiration beyond his years for his general conduct +and his brilliant achievements. But, in spite of all that had happened, +Apelles was by no means inclined to desist from the policy on which he +had entered; but was resolved little by little to bring the Achaeans +under the yoke. He saw that the most determined opponents of his +scheme were the elder and younger Aratus; and that Philip was inclined +to listen to them, and especially to the elder, both on account of +his former intimacy with Antigonus, and his pre-eminent influence in +Achaia, and, most of all, because of his readiness of resource and +practical ability: he therefore determined to devote his attention to +them, and enter upon the intrigue against them which I shall proceed to +describe. He sought out in the several cities all such as were opposed +to Aratus, and invited them to visit him: and having got them into his +hands he tried all he could to win their affections, encouraged them to +look upon him as a friend, and introduced them to Philip. To the king +he was always pointing out that, if he listened to Aratus, he would +have to treat the Achaeans according to the letter of the treaty of +alliance; but that, if he would listen to him, and take men like those +which he had introduced to him into favour, he would have the whole of +the Peloponnese at his own unfettered disposal. But what he was most +anxious about was the election; being desirous to secure the office +of Strategus for one of this party, and to oust Aratus in accordance +with his settled plan. With this purpose, he persuaded Philip to be at +Aegium at the time of the Achaean election, on the pretext of being on +his way to Elis. The king’s consent to this enabled Apelles himself +to be there at the right time; and though he found great difficulty, +in spite of entreaties and threats, in carrying his point; yet he did +eventually succeed in getting Eperatus of Pharae elected Strategus, and +Timoxenus, the candidate proposed by Aratus, rejected. + +[Sidenote: Capture of the Wall, and expedition into Elis.] + ++83.+ This over, the king departed by way of Patrae and Dyme, and +arrived with his army before the fortress called the Wall, which is +situated on the frontier of the territory of Dyme, and had a short +time before, as I mentioned above,[244] been occupied by Euripidas. +The king, being anxious at all hazards to recover this place for the +Dymaeans, encamped under its walls with his full force: and thereupon +the Elean garrison in alarm surrendered the place to Philip, which, +though not large, had been fortified with extraordinary care. For +though the circumference of its walls was not more than a stade and a +half, its height was nowhere less than thirty cubits. Having handed the +place over to the Dymaeans, Philip continued his advance, plundering +the territory of Elis: and when he had thoroughly devastated it, and +acquired a large booty, he returned with his army to Dyme. + +[Sidenote: The intrigue of Apelles.] + ++84.+ Meanwhile Apelles, thinking that, by the election of the Achaean +Strategus through his influence, he had partly succeeded in his policy, +began once more attacking Aratus, with the view of entirely detaching +Philip from his friendship: and he accordingly determined to make up +an accusation against him grounded on the following circumstance: When +Amphidamus, the Elean Strategus, had been, with the other refugees, +made prisoner at Thalamae, and had been brought among other captives to +Olympia, he made earnest efforts by the agency of certain individuals +to be allowed an interview with the king. This favour having been +accorded him, he made a statement to the effect that it was in his +power to bring over the Eleans to the king’s side, and induce them to +enter into alliance with him. Philip believed him; and accordingly +dismissed Amphidamus without ransom, with instructions to promise the +Eleans, that, if they would join the king, he would restore their +captive citizens without ransom, and would himself secure their +territory safely from all outside attacks: and besides this would +maintain them in freedom, without impost or foreign garrison, and in +enjoyment of their several constitutions. + +But the Eleans refused to listen to the proposal, although the offer +was thought attractive and substantial. Apelles therefore used this +circumstance to found the false accusation which he now brought before +Philip, alleging that Aratus was not a loyal friend to the Macedonians, +nor sincere in his feelings towards them: “He was responsible for this +alienation of the Eleans; for when the king despatched Amphidamus from +Olympia into Elis, Aratus took him aside and talked to him, asserting +that it was by no means to the interest of the Peloponnesians that +Philip should become supreme in Elis: and this was the reason of the +Eleans despising the king’s offers, and clinging to the friendship of +the Aetolians, and persisting in war against the Macedonians.” + +[Sidenote: The king investigates the charge against Aratus.] + ++85.+ Regarding the matter as important, the first step the king took +was to summon the elder and younger Aratus, and order Apelles to repeat +these assertions in their presence: which he thereupon did in a bold +and threatening tone. And upon the king still not saying a word, he +added: “Since his Majesty finds you, Aratus, so ungrateful and so +exceedingly adverse to his interests, he is determined to summon a +meeting of the Achaeans, and, after making a statement of his reasons, +forthwith to return to Macedonia.” Aratus the elder answered him with a +general exhortation to Philip, never to give a hasty or inconsiderate +credit to any thing which might be alleged before him against his +friends and allies: but when any such allegation were made, to test +its truth before accepting it; for that was the conduct which became +a king, and was in every way to his interest. Wherefore he said, “I +claim that you should, in the present instance of these accusations of +Apelles, summon those who heard my words; and openly produce the man +that informed Apelles of them, and omit no means of ascertaining the +real truth, before making any statement in regard to these matters to +the Achaeans.” + +[Sidenote: Aratus is cleared.] + ++86.+ The king approved of this speech, and said that he would not +neglect the matter, but would thoroughly investigate it. And so for +the present the audience was dissolved. But during the following days, +while Apelles failed to bring any proof of his allegations, Aratus was +favoured by the following combination of circumstances. While Philip +was laying waste their territory, the Eleans, suspecting Amphidamus of +treachery, determined to arrest him and send him in chains to Aetolia. +But getting intelligence of their purpose, he escaped first to Olympia; +and there, hearing that Philip was at Dyme engaged in the division +of his spoils, he followed him to that town in great haste. When +Aratus heard that Amphidamus had been driven from Elis and was come to +Dyme, he was delighted, because his conscience was quite clear in the +matter; and going to the king demanded that he should summon Amphidamus +to his presence; on the ground that the man to whom the words were +alleged to have been spoken would best know about the accusations, +and would declare the truth; for he had become an exile from his home +from Philip’s sake, and had now no hope of safety except in him. +These arguments satisfied the king, who thereupon sent for Amphidamus +and ascertained that the accusation was false. The result was that +from that day forward his liking and respect for Aratus continually +increased, while he began to regard Apelles with suspicion; though +being still under the influence of his old ascendency, he was compelled +to connive at many of his actions. + ++87.+ Apelles however by no means abandoned his policy. He began +undermining the position of Taurion also, who had been placed in +command of the Peloponnese by Antigonus, not indeed openly attacking +him, but rather praising his character, and asserting that he was a +proper person to be with the king on a campaign; his object being +to get some one else appointed to conduct the government of the +Peloponnese. This was indeed a novel method of defamation,—to damage +one’s neighbours, not by attacking, but by praising their characters; +and this method of wreaking one’s malice, envy, and treachery may be +regarded as primarily and specially the invention of the jealousy and +selfish ambition of courtiers. In the same spirit he began making +covert attacks upon Alexander, the captain of the bodyguard, whenever +he got an opportunity; being bent on reconstituting by his own +authority even the personal attendants of the king, and on making a +clean sweep of all arrangements left existing by Antigonus. For as in +his life Antigonus had managed his kingdom and his son with wisdom, so +at his death he made wise provisions for every department of the State. +For in his will he explained to the Macedonians the nature of these +arrangements; and also gave definite instructions for the future, how +and by whom each of these arrangements was to be carried out: being +desirous of leaving no vantage-ground to the courtiers for mutual +rivalry and strife. Among these arrangements was one selecting Apelles +from among his companions in arms to be one of the guardians of his +son; Leontius to command the peltasts; Megaleas to be chief secretary; +Taurion to be governor of the Peloponnese; and Alexander to be captain +of the bodyguard. Apelles had already got Leontius and Megaleas +completely under his influence: and he was now desirous to remove +Alexander and Taurion from their offices, and so to control these, as +well as all other departments of the government, by the agency of his +own friends. And he would have easily succeeded in doing so, had he not +raised up an opponent in the person of Aratus. As it was, he quickly +reaped the fruits of his own blind selfishness and ambition; for +that which he purposed inflicting on his neighbours he had to endure +himself, and that within a very brief space. How and by what means this +was brought about, I must forbear to tell for the present, and must +bring this book to an end: but in subsequent parts of my work I will +endeavour to make every detail of these transactions clear. + +For the present, after concluding the business which I have described, +Philip returned to Argos, and there spent the rest of the winter season +with his friends, while he sent back his forces to Macedonia. + + + + +BOOK V + + +[Sidenote: May, B.C. 218.] + ++1.+ The year of office as Strategus of the younger Aratus had now +come to an end with the rising of the Pleiades; for that was the +arrangement of time then observed by the Achaeans.[245] Accordingly he +laid down his office and was succeeded in the command of the Achaeans +by Eperatus; Dorimachus being still Strategus of the Aetolians. + +It was at the beginning of this summer that Hannibal entered upon +open war with Rome; started from New Carthage; and crossing the Iber, +definitely began his expedition and march into Italy; while the Romans +despatched Tiberius Sempronius to Libya with an army, and Publius +Cornelius to Iberia. + +This year, too, Antiochus and Ptolemy, abandoning diplomacy, and the +support of their mutual claims upon Coele-Syria by negotiation, began +actual war with each other. + +[Sidenote: Recognition of Philip’s services by the assembly of the +Achaean league.] + +As for Philip, being in need of corn and money for his army, he +summoned the Achaeans to a general assembly by means of their +magistrates. When the assembly had met, according to the federal law, +at Aegium,[246] the king saw that Aratus and his son were indisposed +to act for him, because of the intrigues against them in the matter of +the election, which had been carried on by Apelles; and that Eperatus +was naturally inefficient, and an object of general contempt. These +facts convinced the king of the folly of Apelles and Leontius, and +he once more decided to stand by Aratus. He therefore persuaded the +magistrates to transfer the assembly to Sicyon; and there inviting both +the elder and younger Aratus to an interview, he laid the blame of +all that had happened upon Apelles, and urged them to maintain their +original policy. Receiving a ready consent from them, he then entered +the Achaean assembly, and being energetically supported by these two +statesmen, earned all the measures that he desired. For the Achaeans +passed a vote decreeing “that five hundred talents should be paid to +the king at once for his last campaign, that three months’ pay should +be given to his army, and ten thousand medimni of corn; and that, for +the future, so long as the king should remain in the Peloponnese as +their ally in the war, he should receive seventeen talents a month from +the Achaeans. + +[Sidenote: The king prepares to carry on the war by sea.] + ++2.+ Having passed this decree, the Achaeans dispersed to their various +cities. And now the king’s forces mustered again from their winter +quarters; and after deliberations with his friends, Philip decided to +transfer the war to the sea. For he had become convinced that it was +only by so doing that he would himself be able to surprise the enemy +at all points at once, and would best deprive them of the opportunity +of coming to each others' relief; as they were widely scattered, and +each would be in alarm for their own safety, because the approach of +an enemy by sea is so silent and rapid. For he was at war with three +separate nations,—Aetolians, Lacedaemonians, and Eleans. + +Having arrived at this decision, he ordered the ships of the Achaeans +as well as his own to muster at Lechaeum; and there he made continual +experiments in practising the soldiers of the phalanx to the use of +the oar. The Macedonians answered to his instructions with ready +enthusiasm: for they are in fact the most gallant soldiers on the field +of battle, the promptest to undertake service at sea if need be, and +the most laborious workers at digging trenches, making palisades, and +all such engineering work, in the world: just such as Hesiod describes +the Aeacidae to be + + “Joying in war as in a feast.” + +[Sidenote: Fresh intrigue of Apelles.] + +[Sidenote: Philip starts on his naval expedition, B.C. 218.] + +The king, then, and the main body of the Macedonian army, remained in +Corinth, busied with these practisings and preparations for taking +the sea. But Apelles, being neither able to retain an ascendency over +Philip, nor to submit to the loss of influence which resulted from +this disregard, entered into a conspiracy with Leontius and Megaleas, +by which it was agreed that these two men should stay on the spot and +damage the king’s service by deliberate neglect; while he went to +Chalcis, and contrived that no supplies should be brought the king from +thence for the promotion of his designs. Having made this arrangement +and mischievous stipulation with these two men, Apelles set out for +Chalcis, having found some false pretexts to satisfy the king as to +his departure. And while protracting his stay there, he carried out +his sworn agreement with such determination, that, as all men obeyed +him because of this former credit, the king was at last reduced by +want of money to pawn some of the silver-plate used at his own table, +to carry on his affairs. However, when the ships were all collected, +and the Macedonian soldiers already well trained to the oar; the king, +giving out rations of corn and pay to the army, put to sea, and arrived +at Patrae on the second day, with six thousand Macedonians and twelve +hundred mercenaries. + +[Sidenote: The siege of Palus.] + ++3.+ Just at that time the Aetolian Strategus Dorimachus sent Agelaus +and Scopas with five hundred Neo-Cretans[247] into Elis; while the +Eleans, in fear of Philip’s attempting the siege of Cyllene, were +collecting mercenaries, preparing their own citizens, and carefully +strengthening the defences of Cyllene. When Philip saw what was +going on, he stationed a force at Dyme, consisting of the Achaean +mercenaries, some of the Cretans serving with him, and some of the +Gallic horse, together with two thousand picked Achaean infantry. +These he left there as a reserve, as well as an advance guard to +prevent the danger of an attack from Elis; while he himself, having +first written to the Acarnanians and Scerdilaidas, that each of their +towns should man such vessels as they had and meet him at Cephallenia, +put to sea from Patrae at the time arranged, and arrived off Pronni +in Cephallenia. But when he saw that this fortress was difficult to +besiege, and its position a contracted one, he coasted past it with +his fleet and came to anchor at Palus. Finding that the country there +was full of corn and capable of supporting an army, he disembarked +his troops and encamped close to the city: and having beached his +ships close together, secured them with a trench and palisade, and +sent out his Macedonian soldiers to forage. He himself made a personal +inspection of the town, to see how he could bring his siege-works and +artillery to bear upon the wall. He wished to be able to use the place +as a rendezvous for his allies; but he was also desirous of taking it: +first, because he would thereby deprive the Aetolians of their most +useful support,—for it was by means of Cephallenian ships that they +made their descents upon the Peloponnese, and ravaged the seaboards of +Epirus and Acarnania,—and, secondly, that he might secure for himself +and his allies a convenient base of operations against the enemy’s +territory. For Cephallenia lies exactly opposite the Corinthian Gulf, +in the direction of the Sicilian Sea, and commands the north-western +district of the Peloponnese, and especially Elis; as well as the +south-western parts of Epirus, Aetolia, and Acarnania. + ++4.+ The excellent position, therefore, of the island, both as a +rendezvous for the allies and as a base of attack against the hostile, +or of defence for the friendly, territory, made the king very anxious +to get it into his power. His survey of the town showed him that it +was entirely defended by the sea and steep hills, except for a short +distance in the direction of Zacynthus, where the ground was flat; and +he accordingly resolved to erect his works and concentrate his attack +at that spot. + +[Sidenote: Arrival of the allies at Palus.] + +[Sidenote: The walls are undermined and a breach made. Leontius plays +the traitor.] + +While the king was engaged in these operations fifty galleys arrived +from Scerdilaidas, who had been prevented from sending more by the +plots and civil broils throughout Illyria, caused by the despots of +the various cities. There arrived also the appointed contingents of +allies from Epirus, Acarnania, and even Messenia; for the Messenians +had ceased to excuse themselves from taking part in the war ever since +the capture of Phigalia. Having now made his arrangements for the +siege, and having got his catapults and ballistae in position to annoy +the defenders on the walls, the king harangued his Macedonian troops, +and, bringing his siege-machines up to the walls, began under their +protection to sink mines. The Macedonians worked with such enthusiastic +eagerness that in a short time two hundred feet of the wall were +undermined and underpinned: and the king then approached the walls and +invited the citizens to come to terms. Upon their refusal, he set fire +to the props, and thus brought down the whole part of the wall that +rested upon them simultaneously. Into this breach he first sent his +peltasts under the command of Leontius, divided into cohorts, and with +orders to force their way over the ruin. But Leontius, in fulfilment of +his compact with Apelles, three times running prevented the soldiers, +even after they had carried the breach, from effecting the capture of +the town. He had corrupted beforehand the most important officers of +the several cohorts; and he himself deliberately affected fear, and +shrunk from every service of danger; and finally they were ejected from +the town with considerable loss, although they could have mastered the +enemy with ease. When the king saw that the officers were behaving with +cowardice, and that a considerable number of the Macedonian soldiers +were wounded, he abandoned the siege, and deliberated with his friends +on the next step to be taken. + +[Sidenote: Ambassadors from Acarnania urge Philip to invade Aetolia; +others from Messenia beg him to come there.] + +[Sidenote: Philip decides on the invasion of Aetolia.] + ++5.+ Meanwhile Lycurgus had invaded Messenia; and Dorimachus had +started for Thessaly with half the Aetolian army,—both with the +idea that they would thus draw off Philip from the siege of Palus. +Presently ambassadors arrived at the court to make representations on +these subjects from Acarnania and Messenia: the former urging Philip +to prevent Dorimachus’s invasion of Macedonia by himself invading +Aetolia, and traversing and plundering the whole country while there +was no one to resist him; the latter begged him to come to their +assistance, representing that in the existing state of the Etesian +winds the passage from Cephallenia to Messenia could be effected +in a single day, whereby, so Gorgus of Messenia and his colleagues +argued, a sudden and effective attack would be made upon Lycurgus. +In pursuance of his policy Leontius eagerly supported Gorgus, seeing +that by this means Philip would absolutely waste the summer. For it +was easy enough to sail to Messenia; but to sail back again, while +the Etesian winds prevailed, was impossible. It was plain therefore +that Philip would get shut up in Messenia with his army, and remain +inactive for what remained of the summer; while the Aetolians would +traverse Thessaly and Epirus and plunder them at their pleasure. Such +was the insidious nature of the advice given by Gorgus and Leontius. +But Aratus, who was present, advocated an exactly opposite policy, +urging the king to sail to Aetolia and devote himself to that part of +the campaign: for as the Aetolians had gone on an expedition across +the frontier under Dorimachus, it was a most excellent opportunity +for invading and plundering Aetolia. The king had begun to entertain +distrust of Leontius since his exhibition of cowardice in the siege; +and had detected his dishonesty in the course of the discussions held +about Palus: he therefore decided to act in the present instance in +accordance with the opinion of Aratus. Accordingly he wrote to the +Achaean Strategus Eperatus, bidding him take the Achaean levies, and +go to the aid of the Messenians; while he himself put to sea from +Cephallenia, and arrived at night after a two days’ voyage at Leucas: +and having managed by proper contrivances to get his ships through the +channel of Dioryctus,[248] he sailed up the Ambracian Gulf, which, as +I have already stated,[249] stretches from the Sicilian Sea a long +distance into the interior of Aetolia. Having made the whole length of +this gulf, and anchored a short time before daybreak at Limnaea, he +ordered his men to get their breakfast, and leaving the greater part of +their baggage behind them, to make themselves ready in light equipment +for a march; while he himself collected the guides, and made careful +inquiries of them about the country and neighbouring towns. + +[Sidenote: Philip is joined by the Acarnanians, and marches to the +Achelous.] + ++6.+ Before they started, Aristophanes the Acarnanian Strategus arrived +with the full levy of his people. For having in former times suffered +many severe injuries at the hands of the Aetolians, they were now +inspired with a fierce determination to be revenged upon them and +damage them in every possible way: they gladly therefore seized this +opportunity of getting the help of the Macedonians; and the men who now +appeared in arms were not confined to those forced by law to serve, but +were in some cases past the military age. The Epirotes were quite as +eager to join, and for the same motives; but owing to the wide extent +of their country, and the suddenness of the Macedonian arrival, they +had not been able to muster their forces in time. As to the Aetolians, +Dorimachus had taken half their army with him, as I have said, while +the the other half he had left at home, thinking that it would be an +adequate reserve to defend the towns and district against unforeseen +contingencies. The king, leaving a sufficient guard for his baggage, +started from Limnaea in the evening, and after a march of sixty stades +pitched his camp: but, having dined and given his men a short rest, +he started again; and marching right through the night, arrived just +as the day was breaking at the river Achelous, between the towns of +Stratus and Conope, being anxious that his entrance into the district +of Thermus should be sudden and unexpected. + +[Sidenote: Leontius tries to hinder the march.] + ++7.+ Leontius saw that it was likely that the king would attain his +object, and the Aetolians be unable to resist him, for the double +reason of the speed and unexpectedness of the Macedonian attack, and +of his having gone to Thermus; for the Aetolians would never suppose +him likely to venture to expose himself so rashly, seeing the strongly +fortified nature of the country, and would therefore be sure to be +caught off their guard and wholly unprepared for the danger. Clinging +still to his purpose, therefore, he advised the king to encamp on the +Achelous, and rest his army after their night’s march; being anxious +to give the Aetolians a short respite to make preparations for their +defence. But Aratus, seeing clearly that the opportunity for action was +fleeting, and that Leontius was plainly trying to hinder their success, +conjured Philip not to let slip the opportunity by delaying. + +[Sidenote: The king crosses the Achelous and advances against Thermus.] + +The king was now thoroughly annoyed with Leontius: and accepting the +advice of Aratus, continued his march without interruption; and, after +crossing the Achelous, advanced rapidly upon Thermus, plundering and +devastating the country as he went, and marching so as to keep Stratus, +Agrinium, and Thestia on his left, Conope, Lysimachia, Trichonium, and +Phytaeum on his right. Arrived at the town of Metapa, which is on the +borders of the Trichonian Lake, and close to the narrow pass along +it, about sixty stades from Thermus, he found it abandoned by the +Aetolians, and occupied it with a detachment of five hundred men, with +a view of its serving as a fortress to secure both ends of the pass: +for the whole shore of the lake is mountainous and rugged, closely +fringed with forest, and therefore affording but a narrow and difficult +path. He now arranged his order of march, putting the mercenaries in +the van, next them the Illyrians, and then the peltasts and the men of +the phalanx, and thus advanced through the pass; his rear protected +by the Cretans: while the Thracians and light-armed troops took a +different line of country, parallel to his own, and kept up with him on +his right: his left being secured by the lake for nearly thirty stades. + +[Sidenote: The plundering of Thermus.] + ++8.+ At the end of this distance he arrived at the village of Pamphia; +and having, as in the case of Panapa, secured it by a guard, he +continued his advance towards Thermus: the road now being not only +steep and exceedingly rough, but with deep precipices also on either +side, so as to make the path in places very dangerous and narrow; and +the whole ascent being nearly thirty stades. But having accomplished +this also in a short time, thanks to the energy with which the +Macedonians conducted the march, he arrived late in the day at Thermus. +There he pitched a camp, and allowed his men to go off plundering the +neighbouring villages and scouring the plain of Thermus, as well as +to sack the dwelling-houses in Thermus itself, which were full, not +only of corn and such like provisions, but of all the most valuable +property which the Aetolians possessed. For as the annual fair and most +famous games, as well as the elections, were held there, everybody +kept their most costly possessions in store at Thermus, to enable +them to entertain their friends, and to celebrate the festivals with +proper magnificence. But besides this occasion for the employment +of their property, they expected to find the most complete security +for it there, because no enemy had ever yet ventured to penetrate to +that place; while its natural strength was so great as to serve as an +acropolis to the whole of Aetolia. The place therefore having been +in the enjoyment of peace from time immemorial, not only were the +buildings immediately round the temple filled with a great variety of +property, but the homesteads on the outskirts also. For that night the +army bivouacked on the spot laden with booty of every description; but +the next morning they selected the most valuable and portable part of +it, and making the rest into a heap in front of their tents, set fire +to it. So also in regard to the dedicated arms which were hanging up +in the porticoes,—those of them which were valuable they took down and +carried off, some they exchanged for their own, while the rest they +collected together and burnt. The number of these was more than fifteen +thousand. + +[Sidenote: Sacrilege committed at Thermus. Was it justifiable?] + ++9.+ Up to this point everything was right and fair by the laws of +war; but I do not know how to characterise their next proceedings. For +remembering what the Aetolians had done at Dium[250] and Dodona,[251] +they burnt the colonnades, and destroyed what were left of the +dedicated offerings, some of which were of costly material, and had +been elaborated with great skill and expense. And they were not +content with destroying the roofs of these buildings with fire, they +levelled them to their foundations; and threw down all the statues, +which numbered no less than two thousand; and many of them they broke +to pieces, sparing only those that were inscribed with the names or +figures of gods. Such they did abstain from injuring. On the walls +also they wrote the celebrated line composed by Samus, the son of +Chrysogonus, a foster-brother of the king, whose genius was then +beginning to manifest itself. The line was this— + + “Seest thou the path the bolt divine has sped?” + +And in fact the king and his staff were fully convinced that, in +thus acting, they were obeying the dictates of right and justice, +by retaliating upon the Aetolians with the same impious outrages as +they had themselves committed at Dium.[252] But I am clearly of an +opposite opinion. And the readiest argument, to prove the correctness +of my view, may be drawn from the history of this same royal family of +Macedonia. + +For when Antigonus, by his victory in a pitched battle over Cleomenes +the King of the Lacedaemonians, had become master of Sparta, and had +it absolutely in his own power to treat the town and its citizens as +he chose, he was so far from doing any injury to those who had thus +fallen into his hands, that he did not return to his own country until +he had bestowed upon the Lacedaemonians, collectively and individually, +some benefits of the utmost importance. The consequence was that he +was honoured at the time with the title of “Benefactor,” and after his +death with that of “Preserver”; and not only among the Lacedaemonians, +but among the Greeks generally, has obtained undying honour and +glory.[253] + +[Sidenote: B.C. 338.] + ++10.+ Take again the case of Philip, the founder of the family +splendour, and the first of the race to establish the greatness of the +kingdom. The success which he obtained, after his victory over the +Athenians at Chaeronea, was not due so much to his superiority in arms, +as to his justice and humanity. His victory in the field gave him the +mastery only over those immediately engaged against him; while his +equity and moderation secured his hold upon the entire Athenian people +and their city. For he did not allow his measures to be dictated by +vindictive passion; but laid aside his arms and warlike measures, as +soon as he found himself in a position to display the mildness of his +temper and the uprightness of his motives. With this view he dismissed +his Athenian prisoners without ransom, and took measures for the burial +of those who had fallen, and, by the agency of Antipater, caused their +bones to be conveyed home; and presented most of those whom he released +with suits of clothes. And thus, at small expense, his prudence gained +him a most important advantage. The pride of the Athenians was not +proof against such magnanimity; and they became his zealous supporters, +instead of antagonists, in all his schemes. + +[Sidenote: B.C. 335.] + +[Sidenote: The subsequent decline in Philip’s character.] + +Again in the case of Alexander the Great. He was so enraged with the +Thebans that he sold all the inhabitants of the town into slavery, and +levelled the city itself with the ground; yet in making its capture he +was careful not to outrage religion, and took the utmost precautions +against even involuntary damage being done to the temples, or any part +of their sacred enclosures. Once more, when he crossed into Asia, to +avenge on the Persians the impious outrages which they had inflicted +on the Greeks, he did his best to exact the full penalty from men, +but refrained from injuring places dedicated to the gods; though it +was in precisely such that the injuries of the Persians in Greece had +been most conspicuous. These were the precedents which Philip should +have called to mind on this occasion; and so have shown himself the +successor and heir of these men,—not so much of their power, as of +their principles and magnanimity. But throughout his life he was +exceedingly anxious to establish his relationship to Alexander and +Philip, and yet took not the least pains to imitate them. The result +was that, as he advanced in years, as his conduct differed from theirs, +so his general reputation came to be different also. + ++11.+ The present affair was an instance of this. He imagined +that he was doing nothing wrong in giving the rein to his anger, +and retaliating upon the impious acts of the Aetolians by similar +impieties, and “curing ill by ill”; and while he was always reproaching +Scopas and Dorimachus with depravity and abandoned wickedness, on +the grounds of their acts of impiety at Dodona and Dium, he imagined +that, while emulating their crimes, he would leave quite a different +impression of his character in the minds of those to whom he spoke. +But the fact is, that whereas the taking and demolishing an enemy’s +forts, harbours, cities, men, ships and crops, and other such things, +by which our enemy is weakened, and our own interests and tactics +supported, are necessary acts according to the laws and rights of war; +to deface temples, statues, and such like erections in pure wantonness, +and without any prospect of strengthening oneself or weakening the +enemy, must be regarded as an act of blind passion and insanity. For +the purpose with which good men wage war is not the destruction and +annihilation of the wrongdoers, but the reformation and alteration of +the wrongful acts. Nor is it their object to involve the innocent in +the destruction of the guilty, but rather to see that those who are +held to be guilty should share in the preservation and elevation of +the guiltless. It is the act of a tyrant to inflict injury, and so to +maintain his power over unwilling subjects by terror,—hated, and hating +those under him: but it is the glory of a king to secure, by doing good +to all, that he should rule over willing subjects, whose love he has +earned by humanity and beneficence. + +[Sidenote: The error of such sacrilege as a matter of policy.] + +But the best way of appreciating the gravity of Philip’s mistake is +to put before our eyes the idea which the Aetolians would probably +have conceived of him, had he acted in an opposite way, and destroyed +neither colonnades nor statutes, nor done injury to any of the sacred +offerings. For my part I think it would have been one of the greatest +goodness and humanity. For they would have had on their consciences +their own acts at Dium and Dodona; and would have seen unmistakably +that, whereas Philip was absolutely master of the situation, and could +do what he chose, and would have been held fully justified as far as +their deserts went in taking the severest measures, yet deliberately, +from mere gentleness and magnanimity, he refused to copy their conduct +in any respect. + ++12.+ Clearly these considerations would most probably have led them +to condemn themselves, and to view Philip with respect and admiration +for his kingly and high minded qualities, shown by his respect for +religion and by the moderation of his anger against themselves. For in +truth to conquer one’s enemies in integrity and equity is not of less, +but of greater, practical advantage than victories in the field. In the +one case the defeated party yields under compulsion; in the other with +cheerful assent. In the one case the victor effects his reformation at +the cost of great losses; in the other he recalls the erring to better +courses without any damage to himself. But above all, in the one case +the chief credit of the victory belongs to the soldiers, in the other +it falls wholly and solely to the part of the leaders. + +[Sidenote: The blame chiefly belongs to Demetrius of Pharos.] + +Perhaps, however, one ought not to lay all the blame for what was +done on that occasion on Philip, taking his age into consideration; +but chiefly on his friends, who were in attendance upon him and +co-operating with him, among whom were Aratus and Demetrius of Pharos. +In regard to them it would not be difficult to assert, even without +being there, from which of the two a counsel of this sort proceeded. +For apart from the general principles animating the whole course of +his life, in which nothing savouring of rashness and want of judgment +can be alleged of Aratus, while the exact contrary may be said of +Demetrius, we have an undisputed instance of the principles actuating +both the one and the other in analogous circumstances, on which I shall +speak in its proper place. + +[Sidenote: The return of Philip from Thermus.] + +[Sidenote: Matape.] + +[Sidenote: Acrae.] + +[Sidenote: Stratus.] + ++13.+ To return then to Philip. Taking with him as much booty living +and dead as he could, he started from Thermus, returning by the same +road as that by which he had come; putting the booty and heavy-armed +infantry in the van, and reserving the Acarnanians and mercenaries +to bring up the rear. He was in great haste to get through the +difficult passes, because he expected that the Aetolians, relying +on the security of their strongholds, would harass his rear. And +this in fact promptly took place: for a body of Aetolians, that had +collected to the number of nearly three thousand for the defence of +the country, under the command of Alexander of Trichonium, hovered +about, concealing themselves in certain secret hiding-places, and not +venturing to approach as long as Philip was on the high ground; but as +soon as he got his rear-guard in motion they promptly threw themselves +into Thermus and began harassing the hindermost of the enemy’s column. +The rear being thus thrown into confusion, the attacks and charges of +the Aetolians became more and more furious, encouraged by the nature +of the ground. But Philip had foreseen this danger, and had provided +for it, by stationing his Illyrians and his best peltasts under cover +of a certain hill on the descent. These men suddenly fell upon the +advanced bodies of the enemy as they were charging; whereupon the rest +of the Aetolian army fled in headlong haste over a wild and trackless +country, with a loss of a hundred and thirty killed, and about the +same number taken prisoners. This success relieved his rear; which, +after burning Pamphium, accomplished the passage of the narrow gorge +with rapidity and safety, and effected a junction with the Macedonians +near Matape, at which place Philip had pitched a camp and was waiting +for his rear-guard to come up. Next day, after levelling Metape to +the ground, he advanced to the city called Acrae; next day to Conope, +ravaging the country as he passed, and there encamped for the night. +On the next he marched along the Achelous as far as Stratus; there he +crossed the river, and, having halted his men out of range, endeavoured +to tempt the garrison outside the walls; for he had been informed that +two thousand Aetolian infantry and about four hundred horse, with five +hundred Cretans, had collected into Stratus. But when no one ventured +out, he renewed his march, and ordered his van to advance towards +Limnaea and the ships. + +[Sidenote: Philip victorious in a skirmish with the garrison of +Stratus.] + +[Sidenote: Arrival at Limnaea.] + ++14.+ But no sooner had his rear passed the town than, first, a small +body of Aetolian cavalry sallied out and began harassing the hindmost +men; and then, the whole of the Cretans and some Aetolian troops having +joined their cavalry, the conflict became more severe, and the rear of +Philip’s army were forced to face about and engage the enemy. At first +the conflict was undecided; but on Philip’s mercenaries being supported +by the arrival of the Illyrians, the Aetolian cavalry and mercenaries +gave way and fled in disorder. The royal troops pursued most of them +to the entrance of the gates, or up to the walls, and killed about a +hundred of them. After this skirmish the garrison remained inactive, +and the rear of the royal army reached the camp and the ships in safety. + +Philip pitched his camp early in the day, and proceeded to make a thank +offering to the gods for the successful issue of his undertaking; and +to invite the officers to a banquet, at which it was his intention to +entertain them all. His view was that he had ventured upon a dangerous +country, and such as no one had ever ventured to enter with an army +before; while he had not only entered it with an army, but had returned +in safety, after accomplishing all that he had intended. But while he +was thus intent on entertaining his officers in great elation of mind, +Megaleas and Leontius were nursing feelings of great annoyance at the +success of the king. They had arranged with Apelles to hamper all his +plans, but had been unable to do so; and now saw everything turning out +exactly contrary to their views. + +[Sidenote: Megaleas and Leontius betray their chagrin at the king’s +success.] + +[Sidenote: They assault Aratus.] + +[Sidenote: Megaleas and Crinon held to bail.] + ++15.+ Still they came to the banquet, where they from the first excited +the suspicions of the king and the rest of the company, by showing +less joy at the events than the others present. But as the drinking +went on, and grew less and less moderate, being forced to do just as +the others did, they soon showed themselves in their true colours. +For as soon as the company broke up, losing control over themselves +under the influence of wine, they roamed about looking for Aratus; +and having fallen in with him on his way home, they first attacked +him with abusive language, and then threw stones at him; and a number +of people coming to the assistance of both parties, there was a noise +and disturbance in the camp. But the king hearing the noise sent some +officers to ascertain the cause, and to put an end to the disturbance. +On their coming upon the scene, Aratus stated what had occurred, called +those present to witness the truth of his words, and retired to his own +tent; but Leontius by some unexplained means slipped away in the crowd. +When informed of what had taken place, the king sent for Megaleas and +Crinon and rebuked them sharply: and when they not only expressed no +submission, but actually retorted with a declaration that they would +never desist until they had paid Aratus out, the king, enraged at their +words, at once required them to give security for the payment of a fine +of twenty talents, and ordered them to be placed under arrest. + +[Sidenote: Arrival at Leucas. Megaleas fined twenty talents.] + ++16.+ Next morning, too, he sent for Aratus and bade him have no +fears, for that he would see that the business was properly settled. +When Leontius learned what had happened to Megaleas, he came to the +king’s tent with some peltasts, believing that, owing to his youth, +he should overawe the king, and quickly induce him to repent of his +purpose. Coming into the royal presence he demanded who had ventured +to lay hands on Megaleas, and lead him to confinement? But when the +king answered with firmness that he had given the order, Leontius was +dismayed; and, with an exclamation of indignant sorrow, departed in +high wrath. + +Immediately after getting the fleet across the gulf, and anchoring +at Leucas, the king first gave orders to the officers appointed to +distribute the spoils to carry out that business with all despatch; and +then summoned his friends to council, and tried the case of Megaleas. +In his speech as accuser Aratus went over the crimes of Leontius +and his party from beginning to end; detailed the massacre in Argos +perpetrated by them after the departure of Antigonus; their arrangement +made with Apelles; and finally their contrivance to prevent success at +Palus. Of all these accusations he gave distinct proof, and brought +forward witnesses: and Megaleas and Crinon being entirely unable to +refute any of them, were unanimously condemned by the king’s friends. +Crinon remained under arrest, but Leontius went bail for the payment of +the Megaleas’s fine. Thus the intrigue of Apelles and Leontius turned +out quite contrary to their original hopes: for they had expected, by +terrifying Aratus and isolating Philip, to do whatever seemed to suit +their interests; whereas the result had been exactly the reverse. + +[Sidenote: Lycurgus of Sparta attacks Tegea.] + ++17.+ About the same time Lycurgus returned from Messenia without +having accomplished anything of importance. Afterwards he started again +and seized Tegea. The inhabitants having retreated into the citadel, +he determined to besiege it; but finding himself unable to make any +impression upon it he returned once more to Sparta. + +[Sidenote: Elis.] + +The Eleans after overrunning Dymaea, gained an easy victory over some +cavalry that had come out to resist them, by decoying them into an +ambush. They killed a considerable number of the Gallic mercenaries, +and among the natives whom they took prisoners were Polymedes of +Aegium, and Agesipolis, and Diocles of Dyme. + +[Sidenote: Dorimachus recalled from Thessaly by Philip’s invasion of +Aetolia.] + +Dorimachus had made his expedition originally, as I have already +mentioned, under the conviction that he would be able to devastate +Thessaly without danger to himself, and would force Philip to raise the +siege of Palus. But when he found Chrysogonus and Petraeus ready in +Thessaly to engage him, he did not venture to descend into the plain, +but kept close upon the skirts of the mountains; and when news reached +him of the Macedonian invasion of Aetolia, he abandoned his attempt +upon Thessaly, and hurried home to resist the invaders, whom he found +however already departed from Aetolia: and so was too late for the +campaign at all points. + +[Sidenote: Philip arrives at Corinth.] + +Meanwhile the king set sail from Leucas; and after ravaging the +territory of Oeanthe as he coasted along, arrived with his whole fleet +at Corinth, and dropping anchor in the harbour of Lechaeum, disembarked +his troops, and sent his letter-bearers to the allied cities in the +Peloponnese, naming a day on which he wished all to be at Tegea by +bedtime. + +[Sidenote: Tegea.] + +[Sidenote: Amyclae and Sparta.] + +[Sidenote: Dismay at Sparta.] + ++18.+ Then, without making any stay in Corinth, he gave the Macedonians +marching orders; and came at the end of a two days’ march by way of +Argos to Tegea. There he took on the Achaean troops that had assembled, +and advanced by the mountain road, being very desirous to effect an +entrance into the territory of the Lacedaemonians before they became +aware of it. Thus after a circuitous route through an uninhabited +district he came out upon the hills facing the town, and continued his +advance right upon Amyclae, keeping the Menelaïum on his right. The +Lacedaemonians were dismayed and terrified at seeing from the town the +army passing along the hills, and wondered what was happening. For +they were still in a state of excitement at the news of Philip which +had arrived,—his destruction of Thermus, and his whole campaign in +Aetolia; and there was even some talk among them of sending Lycurgus +to the assistance of the Aetolians. But no one had so much as thought +of danger coming so quickly to their own gates from such a distance, +especially as the youth of the king still gave room for a certain +feeling of contempt. The event therefore being totally contrary to +their expectations, they were naturally in a state of great dismay. +For the courage and energy beyond his years, with which Philip acted, +reduced all his enemies to a state of the utmost difficulty and terror. +For setting out, as I have shown, from the centre of Aetolia, and +crossing the Ambracian gulf by night, he passed over to Leucas; and +after a two days’ halt there, on the third he renewed his voyage before +daybreak, and after a two days' sail, during which he ravaged the +seaboard of the Aetolians, he dropped anchor in Lechaeum; thence, after +seven days' continuous march, he arrived on the heights above Sparta in +the neighbourhood of the Menelaïum,—a feat which most of those even who +saw it done could scarcely believe. + +[Sidenote: Helos.] + +[Sidenote: Gythium.] + +[Sidenote: Carnium.] + ++19.+ While the Lacedaemonians were thus thoroughly terrified at the +unexpected danger, and at a loss what to do to meet it, Philip encamped +on the first day at Amyclae: a place in Laconia about twenty stades +from Lacedaemon, exceedingly rich in forest and corn, and containing a +temple of Apollo, which is about the most splendid of all the temples +in Laconia, situated in that quarter of the city which slopes down +towards the sea. Next day the king descended to a place called the Camp +of Pyrrhus,[254] wasting the country as he went. After devastating +the neighbouring districts for the two following days, he encamped +near Carnium; thence he started for Asine, and after some fruitless +assaults upon it, he started again, and thenceforth devoted himself +to plundering all the country bordering on the Cretan Sea as far as +Taenarum. Then, once more changing the direction of his march, he +advanced to Gythium, the naval arsenal of Sparta, which possesses a +safe harbour, and is about thirty stades from the city. Then leaving +this on the right, he pitched his camp in the territory of Helos, +which of all the districts of Laconia is the most extensive and most +beautiful. Thence he sent out foraging parties and wasted the country +with fire and sword, and destroyed the crops in it: pushing his +devastation as far as Acriae and Leucae, and even to the district of +Boeae. + +[Sidenote: Abortive attempt of the Messenians to join Philip.] + +[Sidenote: Lycurgus resolves to intercept Philip on his return at the +pass opposite Sparta.] + ++20.+ On the receipt of the despatch from Philip commanding the +levy, the Messenians were no less forward than the other allies to +undertake it. They showed indeed great zeal in making the expedition, +sending out the flower of their troops, two thousand infantry and two +hundred cavalry. Owing, however, to their distance from the seat of +war, they arrived at Tegea after Philip had left, and at first were +at a loss what to do; but being very anxious not to appear lukewarm +in the campaign, because of the suspicions which had attached to them +before, they pressed forward through Argolis into Laconia, with a view +of effecting a junction with Philip; and having reached a fort called +Glympes, which is situated on the frontiers of Argolis and Laconia, +they encamped there in an unskilful and careless manner: for they +neither entrenched themselves with ditch nor rampart, nor selected an +advantageous spot; but trusting to the friendly disposition of the +natives, bivouacked there unsuspiciously outside the walls of the +fortress. But on news being brought to Lycurgus of the arrival of the +Messenians, he took his mercenaries and some Lacedaemonians with him, +and reaching the place before daybreak, boldly attacked the camp. Ill +advised as the proceedings of the Messenians had been, and especially +in advancing from Tegea with inadequate numbers and without the +direction of experts, in the actual hour of danger, when the enemy was +upon them, they did all that circumstances admitted of to secure their +safety. For as soon as they saw the enemy appearing they abandoned +everything and took refuge within the fort. Accordingly, though +Lycurgus captured most of the horses and the baggage, he did not take +a single prisoner, and only succeeded in killing eight of the cavalry. +After this reverse, the Messenians returned home through Argolis: but +elated with success Lycurgus went to Sparta, and set about preparations +for war; and took secret counsel with his friends to prevent Philip +from getting safe out of the country without an engagement. Meanwhile +the king had started from the district of Helos, and was on his return +march, wasting the country as he came; and on the fourth day, about +noon, arrived once more with his whole army at Amyclae. + ++21.+ Leaving directions with his officers and friends as to the coming +engagement, Lycurgus himself left Sparta and occupied the ground +near the Menelaïum, with as many as two thousand men. He agreed with +the officers in the town that they should watch carefully, in order +that, whenever he raised the signal, they might lead out their troops +from the town at several points at once, and draw them up facing the +Eurotas, at the spot where it is nearest the town. Such were the +measures and designs of Lycurgus and the Lacedaemonians. + +[Sidenote: Value of local knowledge.] + +But lest ignorance of the locality should render my story +unintelligible and vague, I must describe its natural features and +general position: following my practice throughout this work of drawing +out the analogies and likenesses between places which are unknown and +those already known and described. For seeing that in war, whether +by sea or land, it is the difference of position which generally is +the cause of failure; and since I wish all to know, not so much what +happened, as how it happened, I must not pass over local description in +detailing events of any sort, least of all in such as relate to war: +and I must not shrink from using as landmarks, at one time harbours and +seas and islands, at another temples, mountains, or local names; or, +finally, variations in the aspect of the heaven, these being of the +most universal application throughout the world. For it is thus, and +thus only, that it is possible, as I have said, to bring my readers to +a conception of an unknown scene. + +[Sidenote: The position of Sparta and the neighbouring heights.] + +[Sidenote: The dispositions of Lycurgus.] + ++22.+ These then are the features of the country in question. Sparta, +as a whole, is in the shape of a circle; and is situated on level +ground, broken at certain points by irregularities and hills. The river +Eurotas flows past it on the east, and for the greater part of the year +is too large to be forded; and the hills on which the Menelaïum stands +are on the other side of the river, to the south-east of the town, +rugged and difficult of access and exceedingly lofty; they exactly +command the space between the town and the Eurotas, which flows at the +very foot of the hill, the whole valley being at this point no more +than a stade and a half wide. Through this Philip was obliged to pass +on his return march, with the city, and the Lacedaemonians ready and +drawn up for battle, on his left hand, and on his right the river, and +the division of Lycurgus posted upon the hills. In addition to these +arrangements the Lacedaemonians had had recourse to the following +device: They had dammed up the river above the town, and turned the +stream upon the space between the town and the hills; with the result +that the ground became so wet that men could not keep their feet, to +say nothing of horses. The only course, therefore, left to the king was +to lead his men close under the skirts of the hills, thus presenting to +the attack of the enemy a long line of march, in which it was difficult +for one part to relieve another. + +[Sidenote: Philip succeeds in baffling Lycurgus.] + +Philip perceived these difficulties, and after consultation with +his friends decided that the matter of most urgent necessity was to +dislodge the division of Lycurgus, first of all, from the position +near the Menelaïum. He took therefore his mercenaries, peltasts, and +Illyrians, and advanced across the river in the direction of the hills. +Perceiving Philip’s design, Lycurgus began getting his men ready, and +exhorted them to face the battle, and at the same time displayed the +signal to the forces in the town: whereupon those whose duty it was +immediately led out the troops from the town, as had been arranged, and +drew them up outside the wall, with the cavalry on their right wing. + ++23.+ When he had got within distance of Lycurgus, Philip at first +ordered the mercenaries to charge alone: and, accordingly, their +superiority in arms and position contributed not a little to give the +Lacedaemonians the upper hand at the beginning of the engagement. But +when Philip supported his men by sending his reserve of peltasts on to +the field, and caused the Illyrians to charge the enemy on the flanks, +the king’s mercenaries were encouraged by the appearance of these +reserves to renew the battle with much more vigour than ever; while +Lycurgus’s men, terrified at the approach of the heavy-armed soldiers, +gave way and fled, leaving a hundred killed and rather more prisoners, +while the rest escaped into the town. Lycurgus himself, with a few +followers going by a deserted and pathless route, made his way into the +town under cover of night. Philip secured the hills by means of the +Illyrians; and, accompanied by his light-armed troops and peltasts, +rejoined his main forces. Just at the same time Aratus, leading the +phalanx from Amyclae, had come close to the town. So the king, after +recrossing the Eurotas, halted with his light-armed peltasts and +cavalry until the heavy-armed got safely through the narrow part of the +road at the foot of the hills. Then the troops in the city ventured to +attack the covering force of cavalry. There was a serious engagement, +in which the peltasts fought with conspicuous valour; and the success +of Philip being now beyond dispute, he chased the Lacedaemonians to +their very gates, and then, having got his army safely across the +Eurotas he brought up the rear of his phalanx. + +[Sidenote: Philip’s strong position.] + +[Sidenote: Sellasia, B.C. 222.] + +[Sidenote: Philip proceeds to Tegea, where he is visited by ambassadors +from Rhodes and Chios seeking to end the Aetolian war.] + ++24.+ But it was now getting late: and being obliged to encamp, he +availed himself for that purpose of a place at the very mouth of the +pass, his officers having chanced already to have selected that very +place; than which it would be impossible to find one more advantageous +for making an invasion of Laconia by way of Sparta itself. For it is +at the very commencement of this pass, just where a man coming from +Tegea, or, indeed, from any point in the interior, approaches Sparta; +being about two stades from the town and right upon the river. The +side of it which looks towards the town and river is entirely covered +by a steep, lofty, and entirely inaccessible rock; while the top of +this rock is a table-land of good soil and well supplied with water, +and very conveniently situated for the exit and entrance of troops. +A general, therefore, who was encamped there, and who had command of +the height overhanging it, would evidently be in a place of safety as +regards the neighbouring town, and in a most advantageous situation as +commanding the entrance and exit of the narrow pass. Having accordingly +encamped himself on this spot in safety, next day Philip sent forward +his baggage; but drew out his army on the table-land in full view of +the citizens, and remained thus for a short time. Then he wheeled to +the left and marched in the direction of Tegea; and when he reached +the site of the battle of Antigonus and Cleomenes, he encamped there. +Next day, having made an inspection of the ground and sacrificed to +the gods on both the eminences, Olympus and Evas, he advanced with his +rear-guard strengthened. On arriving at Tegea he caused all the booty +to be sold; and then, marching through Argos, arrived with his whole +force at Corinth. There ambassadors appeared from Rhodes and Chios to +negotiate a suspension of hostilities; to whom the king gave audience, +and feigning that he was, and always had been, quite ready to come to +terms with the Aetolians, sent them away to negotiate with the latter +also; while he himself went down to Lechaeum, and made preparations +for an embarkation, as he had an important undertaking to complete in +Phocis. + +[Sidenote: Treason of Megaleas and Ptolemy.] + ++25.+ Leontius, Megaleas, and Ptolemy, being still persuaded that they +could frighten Philip, and thus neutralise their former failures, +took this opportunity of tampering with the peltasts, and what the +Macedonians call the _Agema_,[255] by suggesting to them that they were +risking their all, and getting none of their just rights, nor receiving +the booty which, according to custom, properly fell to their share. By +these words they incited the young men to collect together, and attempt +to plunder the tents of the most prominent of the king’s friends, +and to pull down the doors, and break through the roof of the royal +headquarters. + +The whole city being thereby in a state of confusion and uproar, the +king heard of it and immediately came hastily running to the town +from Lechaeum; and having summoned the Macedonians to the theatre he +addressed them in terms of mingled exhortation and rebuke for what had +happened. A scene of great uproar and confusion followed: and while +some advised him to arrest and call to account the guilty, others +to come to terms and declare an indemnity, for the moment the king +dissembled his feelings, and pretended to be satisfied; and so with +some words of exhortation addressed to all, retired: and though he +knew quite well who were the ringleaders in the disturbance, he made a +politic pretence of not doing so. + +[Sidenote: Apelles sent for by Leontius.] + +[Sidenote: Apelles rebuffed by the king.] + +[Sidenote: Courtiers.] + ++26.+ After this outbreak the king’s schemes in Phocis met with +certain impediments which prevented their present execution. Meanwhile +Leontius, despairing of success by his own efforts, had recourse to +Apelles, urging him by frequent messages to come from Chalcis, and +setting forth his own difficulties and the awkwardness of his position +owing to his quarrel with the king. Now Apelles had been acting in +Chalcis with an unwarrantable assumption of authority. He gave out +that the king was still a mere boy, and for the most part under his +control, and without independent power over anything; the management +of affairs and the supreme authority in the kingdom he asserted to +belong to himself. Accordingly, the magistrates and commissioners of +Macedonia and Thessaly reported to him; and the cities in Greece in +their decrees and votes of honours and rewards made brief reference to +the king, while Apelles was all in all to them. Philip had been kept +informed of this, and had for some time past been feeling annoyed and +offended at it,—Aratus being at his side, and using skilful means to +further his own views; still he kept his own counsel, and did not let +any one see what he intended to do, or what he had in his mind. In +ignorance, therefore, of his own position, and persuaded that, if he +could only come into Philip’s presence, he would manage everything as +he chose, Apelles set out from Chalcis to the assistance of Leontius. +On his arrival at Corinth, Leontius, Ptolemy and Megaleas, being +commanders of the peltasts and the other chief divisions of the army, +took great pains to incite the young men to go to meet him. He entered +the town, therefore, with great pomp, owing to the number of officers +and soldiers who went to meet him, and proceeded straight to the royal +quarters. But when he would have entered, according to his former +custom, one of the ushers prevented him, saying that the king was +engaged. Troubled at this unusual repulse, and hesitating for a long +while what to do, Apelles at last turned round and retired. Thereupon +all those who were escorting him began at once openly to fall off from +him and disperse, so that at last he entered his own lodging, with +his children, absolutely alone. So true it is all the world over that +a moment exalts and abases us; but most especially is this true of +courtiers. They indeed are exactly like counters on a board, which, +according to the pleasure of the calculator, are one moment worth a +farthing, the next a talent. Even so courtiers at the king’s nod are +one moment at the summit of prosperity, at another the objects of +pity. When Megaleas saw that the help he had looked for from Apelles +was failing him, he was exceedingly frightened, and made preparations +for flight. Apelles meanwhile was admitted to the king’s banquets +and honours of that sort, but had no share in his council or daily +social employments; and when, some days afterwards, the king resumed +his voyage from Lechaeum, to complete his designs in Phocis, he took +Apelles with him. + +[Sidenote: Flight of Megaleas.] + +[Sidenote: Leontius put to death.] + ++27.+ The expedition to Phocis proving a failure, the king was retiring +from Elatea; and while this was going on, Megaleas removed to Athens, +leaving Leontius behind him as his security for his twenty talents +fine. The Athenian Strategi however refused to admit him, and he +therefore resumed his journey and went to Thebes. Meanwhile the king +put to sea from the coast of Cirrha and sailed with his guards[256] +to the harbour of Sicyon, whence he went up to the city and, excusing +himself to the magistrates, took up his quarters with Aratus, and +spent the whole of his time with him, ordering Apelles to sail back +to Corinth. But upon news being brought him of the proceedings of +Megaleas, he despatched the peltasts, whose regular commander was +Leontius, in the charge of Taurion to Triphylia, on the pretext of some +service of pressing need; and, when they had departed, he gave orders +to arrest Leontius to answer his bail. When the peltasts heard what had +happened from a messenger sent to them by Leontius, they despatched +ambassadors to the king, begging him that, “if he had arrested Leontius +on any other score, not to have him tried on the charges alleged +against him without their presence: for otherwise they should consider +themselves treated with signal contempt, and to be one and all involved +in the condemnation.” Such was the freedom of speech towards their king +which the Macedonians always enjoyed. They added, that “if the arrest +was on account of his bail for Megaleas, they would themselves pay the +money by a common subscription.” The king however was so enraged, that +he put Leontius to death sooner than he had intended, owing to the zeal +displayed by the peltasts. + +[Sidenote: A thirty days' truce offered by the Aetolians through the +Rhodian and Chian ambassadors.] + +[Sidenote: Treason of Megaleas detected. His arrest and suicide.] + +[Sidenote: Death of Appelles.] + ++28.+ Presently the ambassadors of Rhodes and Chios returned from +Aetolia. They had agreed to a truce of thirty days, and asserted that +the Aetolians were ready to make peace: they had also arranged for +a stated day on which they claimed that Philip should meet them at +Rhium; undertaking that the Aetolians would be ready to do anything on +condition of making peace. Philip accepted the truce and wrote letters +to the allies, bidding them send assessors and commissioners to discuss +the terms with the Aetolians; while he himself sailed from Lechaeum and +arrived on the second day at Patrae. Just then certain letters were +sent to him from Phocis, which Megaleas had written to the Aetolians, +exhorting them not to be frightened, but to persist in the war, because +Philip was in extremities through a lack of provisions. Besides this +the letters contained some offensive and bitter abuse of the king. As +soon as he had read these, the king feeling no doubt that Apelles was +the ringleader of the mischief, placed him under a guard and despatched +him in all haste to Corinth, with his son and favourite boy; while +he sent Alexander to Thebes to arrest Megaleas, with orders to bring +him before the magistrates to answer to his bail. When Alexander had +fulfilled his commission, Megaleas, not daring to await the issue, +committed suicide: and about the same time Apelles, his son and +favourite boy, ended their lives also. Such was the end of these men, +thoroughly deserved in every way, and especially for their outrageous +conduct to Aratus. + +[Sidenote: Failure of the negotiations with the Aetolians.] + ++29.+ Now the Aetolians were at first very anxious for the ratification +of a peace, because they found the war burdensome, and because things +had not gone as they expected. For, looking to his tender years and +lack of experience, they had expected to have a mere child to deal with +in Philip; but had found him a full-grown man both in his designs and +his manner of executing them: while they had themselves made a display +of imbecility and childishness alike in the general conduct, and the +particular actions, of the campaign. But as soon as they heard of the +outbreak of the disturbance among the peltasts, and of the deaths of +Apelles and Leontius, hoping that there was a serious and formidable +disaffection at the court, they procrastinated until they had outstayed +the day appointed for the meeting at Rhium. But Philip was delighted +to seize the pretext: for he felt confident of success in the war, +and had already resolved to avoid coming to terms. He therefore at +once exhorted such of the allies as had come to meet him to make +preparations, not for the peace, but for war; and putting to sea again +sailed back to Corinth. He then dismissed his Macedonian soldiers to go +home through Thessaly for the winter: while he himself putting to sea +from Cenchreae, and coasting along Attica, sailed through the Euripus +to Demetrias, and there before a jury of Macedonians had Ptolemy tried +and put to death, who was the last survivor of the conspiracy of +Leontius. + +[Sidenote: B.C. 218. Review of the events of the year in Italy, Asia, +Sparta.] + +It was in this season that Hannibal, having succeeded in entering +Italy, was lying encamped in presence of the Roman army in the +valley of the Padus. Antiochus, after subduing the greater part of +Coele-Syria, had once more dismissed his army into winter quarters. +The Spartan king Lycurgus fled to Aetolia in fear of the Ephors: for +acting on a false charge that he was meditating a _coup d'état_, they +had collected the young men and come to his house at night. But getting +previous intimation of what was impending, he had quitted the town +accompanied by the members of his household. + +[Sidenote: Winter of B.C. 218-217.] + +[Sidenote: Disorder in Achaia owing to the incompetence of the +Strategus Eperatus.] + +[Sidenote: May, B.C. 217. Aratus the elder elected Strategus.] + ++30.+ When the next winter came, Philip having departed to Macedonia, +and the Achaean Strategus Eperatus having incurred the contempt of the +Achaean soldiers and the complete disregard of the mercenaries, no one +would obey his orders, and no preparation was made for the defence of +the country. This was observed by Pyrrhias, who had been sent by the +Aetolians to command the Eleans. He had under him a force of thirteen +hundred Aetolians, and the mercenaries hired by the Eleans, as well as +a thousand Elean infantry and two hundred Elean cavalry, amounting in +all to three thousand: and he now began committing frequent raids, not +only upon the territories of Dyme and Pharae, but upon that of Patrae +also. Finally he pitched his camp on what is called the Panachaean +Mountain, which commands the town of Patrae, and began wasting the +whole district towards Rhium and Aegium. The result was that the +cities, being exposed to much suffering, and unable to obtain any +assistance, began to make difficulties about paying their contribution +to the league; and the soldiers finding their pay always in arrear +and never paid at the right time acted in the same way about going to +the relief of the towns. Both parties thus mutually retaliating on +each other, affairs went from bad to worse, and at last the foreign +contingent broke up altogether. And all this was the result of the +incompetence of the chief magistrate. The time for the next election +finding Achaean affairs in this state, Eperatus laid down his office, +and just at the beginning of summer Aratus the elder was elected +Strategus.[257] + +[Sidenote: 140th Olympiad, Asia.] + +Such was the position of affairs in Europe. We have now arrived at a +proper juncture, both of events and of time, to transfer our narrative +to the history of Asia. I will therefore resume my story of the +transactions which occurred there during the same Olympiad. + ++31.+ I will first endeavour, in accordance with my original plan, +to give an account of the war between Antiochus and Ptolemy for the +possession of Coele-Syria. Though I am fully aware that at the period, +at which I have stopped in my Greek history, this war was all but +decided and concluded, I have yet deliberately chosen this particular +break and division in my narrative; believing that I shall effectually +provide against the possibility of mistakes on the part of my readers +in regard to dates, if I indicate in the course of my narrative the +years in this Olympiad in which the events in the several parts of the +world, as well as in Greece, began and ended. For I think nothing more +essential to the clearness of my history of this Olympiad than to avoid +confusing the several narratives. Our object should be to distinguish +and keep them separate as much as possible, until we come to the next +Olympiad, and begin setting down the contemporary events in the several +countries under each year. For since I have undertaken to write, not a +particular, but a universal history, and have ventured upon a plan on +a greater scale, as I have already shown, than any of my predecessors, +it will be necessary also for me to take greater care than they, as +to my method of treatment and arrangement; so as to secure clearness, +both in the details, and in the general view adopted in my history. I +will accordingly go back a short way in the history of the kingdoms +of Antiochus and Ptolemy, and try to fix upon a starting-point for my +narrative which shall be accepted and recognised by all: for this is a +matter of the first importance. + ++32.+ For the old saying, “Well begun is half done,” was meant by its +inventors to urge the importance of taking the greater pains to make a +good beginning than anything else. And though some may consider this an +exaggeration, in my opinion it comes short of the truth; for one might +say with confidence, not that “the beginning was half the business,” +but rather that it was near being the whole. For how can one make a +good beginning without having first grasped in thought the complete +plan, or without knowing where, with what object, and with what purpose +he is undertaking the business? Or how can a man sum up a series +of events satisfactorily without a reference to their origin, and +without showing his point of departure, or why and how he has arrived +at the particular crisis at which he finds himself? Therefore both +historian and reader alike should be exceedingly careful to mark the +beginnings of events, with a conviction that their influence does not +stop half-way, but is paramount to the end. And this is what I shall +endeavour to do. + ++33.+ I am aware, however, that a similar profession has been made by +many other historians of an intention to write a universal history, +and of undertaking a work on a larger scale than their predecessors. +About these writers, putting out of the question Ephorus, the first +and only man who has really attempted a universal history, I will +not mention any name or say more about them than this,—that several +of my contemporaries, while professing to write a universal history +have imagined that they could tell the story of the war of Rome and +Carthage in three or four pages. Yet every one knows that events more +numerous or important were never accomplished in Iberia, Libya, Sicily, +and Italy than in that war; and that the Hannibalian war was the most +famous and lasting of any that has taken place except the Sicilian. +So momentous was it, that all the rest of the world were compelled to +watch it in terrified expectation of what would follow from its final +catastrophe. Yet some of these writers, without even giving as many +details of it as those who, after the manner of the vulgar, inscribe +rude records of events on house walls, pretend to have embraced the +whole of Greek and foreign history. The truth of the matter is, that +it is a very easy matter to profess to undertake works of the greatest +importance; but by no means so simple a matter in practice to attain +to any excellence. The former is open to every one with the requisite +audacity: the latter is rare, and is given to few. So much for those +who use pompous language about themselves and their historical works. I +will now return to my narrative. + +[Sidenote: Death of Ptolemy Euergetes, B.C. 222.] + ++34.+ Immediately after his father’s death, Ptolemy Philopator put his +brother Magas and his partisans to death, and took possession of the +throne of Egypt. He thought that he had now freed himself by this act +from domestic danger; and that by the deaths of Antigonus and Seleucus, +and their being respectively succeeded by mere children like Antiochus +and Philip, fortune had released him from danger abroad. He therefore +felt secure of his position and began conducting his reign as though it +were a perpetual festival. He would attend to no business, and would +hardly grant an interview to the officials about the court, or at the +head of the administrative departments in Egypt. Even his agents abroad +found him entirely careless and indifferent; though his predecessors, +far from taking less interest in foreign affairs, had generally given +them precedence over those of Egypt itself. For being masters of +Coele-Syria and Cyprus, they maintained a threatening attitude towards +the kings of Syria, both by land and sea; and were also in a commanding +position in regard to the princes of Asia, as well as the islands, +through their possession of the most splendid cities, strongholds, and +harbours all along the sea-coast from Pamphylia to the Hellespont and +the district round Lysimachia. Moreover they were favourably placed for +an attack upon Thrace and Macedonia from their possession of Aenus, +Maroneia, and more distant cities still. And having thus stretched +forth their hands to remote regions, and long ago strengthened their +position by a ring of princedoms, these kings had never been anxious +about their rule in Egypt; and had naturally, therefore, given great +attention to foreign politics. But when Philopator, absorbed in +unworthy intrigues, and senseless and continuous drunkenness, treated +these several branches of government with equal indifference, it was +naturally not long before more than one was found to lay plots against +his life as well as his power: of whom the first was Cleomenes, the +Spartan.[258] + +[Sidenote: Cleomenes endeavours to get assistance from the Egyptian +court.] + ++35.+ As long as Euergetes was alive, with whom he had agreed to make +an alliance and confederacy, Cleomenes took no steps. But upon that +monarch’s death, seeing that the time was slipping away, and that the +peculiar position of affairs in Greece seemed almost to cry aloud +for Cleomenes,—for Antigonus was dead, the Achaeans involved in war, +and the Lacedaemonians were at one with the Aetolians in hostility +to the Achaeans and Macedonians, which was the policy originally +adopted by Cleomenes,—then, indeed, he was actually compelled to use +some expedition, and to bestir himself to secure his departure from +Alexandria. First therefore, in interviews with the king, he urged him +to send him out with the needful amount of supplies and troops; but +not being listened to in this request, he next begged him earnestly +to let him go alone with his own servants; for he affirmed that the +state of affairs was such as to show him sufficient opportunities for +recovering his ancestral throne. The king, however, for the reasons +I have mentioned, taking absolutely no interest in such matters, nor +exercising any foresight whatever, continued with extraordinary folly +and blindness to neglect the petitions of Cleomenes. But the party of +Sosibius, the leading statesman at the time, took counsel together, +and agreed on the following course of action in regard to him. They +decided not to send him out with a fleet and supplies; for, owing to +the death of Antigonus, they took little account of foreign affairs, +and thought money spent on such things would be thrown away. Besides, +they were afraid that since Antigonus was dead, and no one was left +who could balance him, Cleomenes might, if he got Greece into his +power quickly and without trouble, prove a serious and formidable +rival to themselves; especially as he had had a clear view of Egyptian +affairs, had learnt to despise the king; and had discovered that the +kingdom had many parts loosely attached, and widely removed from the +centre, and presenting many facilities for revolutionary movements: +for not a few of their ships were at Samos, and a considerable force +of soldiers at Ephesus. These considerations induced them to reject +the idea of sending Cleomenes out with supplies; for they thought it +by no means conducive to their interests to carelessly let a man go, +who was certain to be their opponent and enemy. The other proposal was +to keep him there against his will; but this they all rejected at once +without discussion, on the principle that the lion and the flock could +not safely share the same stall. Sosibius himself took the lead in +regarding this idea with aversion, and his reason was this. + +[Sidenote: The reason of the opposition of Sosibius.] + ++36.+ While engaged in effecting the destruction of Magas and Berenice, +his anxiety at the possible failure of his attempt, especially through +the courageous character of Berenice, had forced him to flatter the +courtiers, and give them all hopes of advantage in case his intrigue +succeeded. It was at this juncture that, observing Cleomenes to +stand in need of the king’s help, and to be possessed of a clear +understanding and a genuine grasp of the situation, he admitted him to +a knowledge of his design, holding out to him hopes of great advantage. +And when Cleomenes saw that Sosibius was in a state of great anxiety, +and above all afraid of the foreign soldiers and mercenaries, he bade +him not be alarmed; and undertook that the foreign soldiers should do +him no harm, but should rather be of assistance to him. And on Sosibius +expressing surprise rather than conviction at this promise, he said, +“Don't you see that there are three thousand foreign soldiers here from +the Peloponnese, and a thousand from Crete? I have only to nod to these +men, and every man of them will at once do what I want. With these all +ready to hand, whom do you fear? Surely not mere Syrians and Carians.” +Sosibius was much pleased at the remark at the time, and doubly +encouraged in his intrigue against Berenice; but ever afterwards, when +observing the indifference of the king, he repeated it to himself, and +put before his eyes the boldness of Cleomenes, and the goodwill of the +foreign contingent towards him. + +[Sidenote: The intrigue of Sosibius against Cleomenes.] + ++37.+ These feelings now moved him to advise the king and his friends +above all things to arrest and incarcerate Cleomenes: and to carry +out this policy he availed himself of the following circumstance, +which happened conveniently for him. There was a certain Messenian +called Nicagoras, an ancestral guest-friend of the Lacedaemonian +king Archidamus. They had not previously had much intercourse; but +when Archidamus fled from Sparta, for fear of Cleomenes, and came to +Messenia, not only did Nicagoras show great kindness in receiving +him under his roof and furnishing him with other necessaries, but +from the close association that followed a very warm friendship and +intimacy sprang up between them: and accordingly when Cleomenes +subsequently gave Archidamus some expectation of being restored to +his city, and composing their quarrels, Nicagoras devoted himself to +conducting the negotiation and settling the terms of their compact. +These being ratified, Archidamus returned to Sparta relying on the +treaty made by the agency of Nicagoras. But as soon as he met him, +Cleomenes assassinated Archidamus,[259] sparing however Nicagoras +and his companions. To the outside world Nicagoras pretended to be +under an obligation to Cleomenes for saving his life; but in heart +he was exceedingly incensed at what had happened, because he had the +discredit of having been the cause of the king’s death. Now it happened +that this same Nicagoras had, a short time before the events of which +we are speaking, come to Alexandria with a cargo of horses. Just as +he was disembarking he came upon Cleomenes, Panterus, and Hippitas +walking together along the quay. When Cleomenes saw him, he came up +and welcomed him warmly, and asked him on what business he was come. +Upon his replying that he had brought a cargo of horses, “You had +better,” said he, “have brought a cargo of catamites and sakbut girls; +for that is what the present king is fond of.” Nicagoras laughed, and +said nothing at the time: but some days afterwards, when he had, in the +course of his horse-sales, become more intimate with Sosibius, he did +Cleomenes the ill turn of repeating his recent sarcasm; and seeing that +Sosibius heard it with satisfaction, he related to him the whole story +of his grievance against Cleomenes. + +[Sidenote: Cleomenes put under arrest.] + ++38.+ Finding then that he was hostile in feeling to Cleomenes, +Sosibius persuaded Nicagoras, partly by presents given on the spot +and partly by promises for the future, to write a letter accusing +Cleomenes, and leave it sealed; that as soon as he had sailed, as he +would do in a few days, his servant might bring it to him as though +sent by Nicagoras. Nicagoras performed his part in the plot; and after +he had sailed, the letter was brought by the servant to Sosibius, +who at once took the servant and the letter to the king. The servant +stated that Nicagoras had left the letter with orders to deliver it +to Sosibius; and the letter declared that it was the intention of +Cleomenes, if he failed to secure his despatch from the country with +suitable escort and provisions, to stir up a rebellion against the +king. Sosibius at once seized the opportunity of urging on the king and +his friends to take prompt precautions against Cleomenes and to put him +in ward. This was at once done, and a very large house was assigned to +him in which he lived under guard, differing from other prisoners only +in the superior size of his prison. Finding himself in this distressing +plight, and with fear of worse for the future, Cleomenes determined to +make the most desperate attempts for freedom: not so much because he +felt confident of success,—for he had none of the elements of success +in such an enterprise on his side,—but rather because he was eager to +die nobly, and endure nothing unworthy of the gallantry which he had +previously displayed. He must, I think, as is usually the case with men +of high courage, have recalled and reflected upon as his model those +words of the hero:[260]— + + “Yea, let me die,—but not a coward’s death, + Nor all inglorious: let me do one deed, + That children yet unborn may hear and mark!” + +[Sidenote: Bold attempt of Cleomenes to recover his liberty. His +failure and death, B.C. 220.] + ++39.+ He therefore waited for the time at which the king left +Alexandria for Canopus, and then spread a report among his guards +that he was going to be released by the king; and on this pretext +entertained his own attendants at a banquet, and sent out some flesh +of the sacrificial victims, some garlands, and some wine to his +guards. The latter indulged in these good things unsuspiciously, and +became completely drunk; whereupon Cleomenes walked out about noon, +accompanied by his friends and servants armed with daggers, without +being noticed by his guard. As the party advanced they met Ptolemy in +the street, who had been left by the king in charge of the city; and +overawing his attendants by the audacity of his proceeding, dragged +Ptolemy himself from his chariot and put him in a place of security, +while they loudly called upon the crowds of citizens to assert their +freedom. But every one was unprepared for the movement, and therefore +no one obeyed their summons or joined them; and they accordingly turned +their steps to the citadel, with the intention of bursting open the +doors and obtaining the help of the prisoners confined there. But the +commanders of the citadel were on the alert, and learning what was +going to take place had secured the entrance gate: having therefore +failed in this design they killed themselves like brave men and +Spartans. + +Such was the end of Cleomenes: a man of brilliant social qualities, +with a natural aptitude for affairs, and, in a word, endued with all +the qualifications of a general and a king. + +[Sidenote: B.C. 220-219. The origin of the war in Coele-Syria.] + ++40.+ Shortly after the catastrophe of Cleomenes, the governor of +Coele-Syria, who was an Aetolian by birth, resolved to hold treasonable +parley with Antiochus and put the cities of that province into his +hands. He was induced to take this step partly by the contempt with +which Ptolemy’s shameful debauchery and general conduct had inspired +him; and partly by distrust of the king’s ministers, which he had +learned to entertain in the course of the recent attempt of Antiochus +upon Coele-Syria: for in that campaign he had rendered signal service +to Ptolemy, and yet, far from receiving any thanks for it, he had been +summoned to Alexandria and barely escaped losing his life. The advances +which he now made to Antiochus were gladly received, and the affair was +soon in the course of being rapidly completed. + +But I must make my readers acquainted with the position of the royal +family of Syria as I have already done with that of Egypt; and in order +to do so, I will go back to the succession of Antiochus to the throne, +and give a summary of events from that point to the beginning of the +war of which I am to speak. + +[Sidenote: B.C. 226.] + +[Sidenote: B.C. 223. See 4, 48.] + +Antiochus was the younger son of Seleucus Callinicus; and on the +death of his father, and the succession in right of seniority of his +brother Seleucus to the throne, he at first removed to upper Asia +and lived there. But Seleucus having been treacherously assassinated +after crossing Mount Taurus with his army, as I have already related, +he succeeded to the throne himself; and made Achaeus governor of Asia +on this side Taurus, Molon and his brother Alexander guardians of his +dominions in upper Asia,—Molon acting as Satrap of Media, his brother +of Persia. + +[Sidenote: Revolt of Molon.] + ++41.+ These two brothers despising the king for his youth, and hoping +that Achaeus would join in their treason, but most of all because +they dreaded the cruel character and malign influence of Hermeias, +who was at that time the chief minister of the entire kingdom, formed +the design of revolting themselves and causing the upper Satrapies to +revolt also. + +[Sidenote: Intrigues of Hermeias.] + +This Hermeias was a Carian and had obtained his power by the +appointment of the king’s brother Seleucus, who had entrusted it to him +when he was setting out on his expedition to the Taurus. Invested with +this authority he at once began to display jealousy of all those about +the court who were in any way prominent; and being cruel by nature he +inflicted punishment on some for acts of ignorance, on which he always +managed to place the worst interpretation; while against others he +brought trumped-up and lying charges, and then acted towards them the +part of an inflexible and harsh judge. But his chief end and object was +to secure the destruction of Epigenes who had brought home the forces +which had accompanied Seleucus; because he saw that he was a man of +eloquence and practical ability, and highly acceptable to the army. +With this design he was ever on the watch to lay hold of some handle +or pretext against him. Accordingly when a council was summoned on +the subject of Molon’s revolt, and when the king bade each councillor +deliver his opinion on the measures to be taken against the rebels, +Epigenes spoke first and urged that “there ought to be no delay, +but the matter should be taken in hand at once; and that, first and +foremost, the king should go in person to the district, and be ready +to seize the right moments for action. For the actual presence of the +king, and his appearance at the head of an army before the eyes of the +common people, would prevent the party of Molon from venturing upon +revolutionary measures at all; or if they had the audacity to do so, +and persisted in their design, they would be quickly arrested by the +populace and handed over into the king’s power.” + ++42.+ While Epigenes was still speaking in this strain, Hermeias, in +a burst of rage, exclaimed, “That Epigenes had long been secretly +plotting treason against the king; but that now he had happily shown +his real sentiments by the advice which he had given, proving how eager +he was to expose the king’s person to the rebels with an insignificant +guard.” For the present he was content with making this insinuation as +fuel for a future outburst of slander, and without further reference +to Epigenes, after what was rather an ill-timed ebullition of temper +than serious hostility, he delivered his own opinion; which, from his +fear of the danger and his inexperience in war, was against undertaking +the expedition against Molon personally, but was warmly in favour of +an attack upon Ptolemy, because he was of opinion that this latter war +would involve no danger, owing to that monarch’s cowardly character. +For the present he overawed the rest of the council into agreement +with him and he thereupon sent Xenon and Theodotus Hemiolius with an +army against Molon; while he employed himself in continually inciting +Antiochus to undertake the expedition into Coele-Syria: thinking that +it was only by involving the young king in war on every side that he +could escape punishment for his past misdeeds, and avoid being deprived +of his position of authority, for the king would have need of his +services when he found himself surrounded by struggles and dangers. +With this object in view, he finally hit on the device of forging a +letter, which he presented to the king as having been sent by Achaeus. +In it Achaeus was made to state that “Ptolemy had urged him to assert +his right to the government and promised to supply him with ships and +money for all his attempts, if he would only take the crown, and come +forward in the sight of all the world as a claimant of the sovereign +power; which he already possessed, in fact, though he grudged himself +the title, and rejected the crown which fortune gave him.” + +This letter successfully imposed on the king, who became ready and +eager to go on the expedition against Coele-Syria. + +[Sidenote: Marriage of Antiochus III.] + ++43.+ While this was going on, Antiochus happened to be at Seleucia, +on the Zeugma, when the Navarchus Diognetus arrived from Cappadocia, +on the Euxine, bringing Laodice, the daughter of king Mithridates, +an unmarried girl, destined to be the king’s wife. This Mithridates +boasted of being a descendant of one of the seven Persians who killed +the Magus,[261] and he had maintained the sovereignty handed down from +his ancestors, as it had been originally given to them by Darius along +the shore of the Euxine. Having gone to meet the princess with all +due pomp and splendour, Antiochus immediately celebrated his nuptials +with royal magnificence. The marriage having been completed, he went +to Antioch, and after proclaiming Laodice queen, devoted himself +thenceforth to making preparation for the war. + +[Sidenote: Molon.] + +Meanwhile Molon had prepared the people of his own Satrapy to go all +lengths, partly by holding out to them hopes of advantages to be +gained, and partly by working on the fears of their chief men, by +means of forged letters purporting to be from the king, and couched +in threatening terms. He had also a ready coadjutor in his brother +Alexander; and had secured the co-operation of the neighbouring +Satrapies, by winning the goodwill of their leading men with bribes. +It was, therefore, at the head of a large force that he took the +field against the royal generals. Terrified at his approach Xenon +and Theodotus retired into the cities; and Molon, having secured the +territory of Apollonia, had now a superabundance of supplies. + +[Sidenote: Description of Media.] + ++44.+ But, indeed, even before that he was a formidable enemy owing to +the importance of his province. For the whole of the royal horses out +at grass are entrusted to the Medes;[262] and they have an incalculable +quantity of corn and cattle. Of the natural strength and extent of +the district it would be impossible to speak highly enough. For Media +lies nearly in the centre of Asia and in its size, and in the height +of its steppes compares favourably with every other district of Asia. +And again it overlooks some of the most warlike and powerful tribes. On +the east lie the plains of the desert which intervenes between Persia +and Parthia; and, moreover, it borders on and commands the “Caspian +Gates,” and touches the mountains of the Tapyri, which are not far from +the Hyrcanian Sea. On the south it slopes down to Mesopotamia and the +territory of Apollonia. It is protected from Persia by the barrier of +Mount Zagrus, which has an ascent of a hundred stades, and containing +in its range many separate peaks and defiles is subdivided by deep +valleys, and at certain points by cañons, inhabited by Cosseans, +Corbrenians, Carchi, and several other barbarous tribes who have +the reputation of being excellent warriors. Again on the west it is +coterminous with the tribe called Satrapeii, who are not far from the +tribes which extend as far as the Euxine. Its northern frontier is +fringed by Elymaeans, Aniaracae, Cadusii, and Matiani, and overlooks +that part of the Pontus which adjoins the Maeotis. Media itself is +subdivided by several mountain chains running from east to west, +between which are plains thickly studded with cities and villages. + +[Sidenote: Molon takes up arms.] + ++45.+ Being masters, then, of a territory of proportions worthy of a +kingdom, his great power had made Molon from the first a formidable +enemy: but when the royal generals appeared to have abandoned the +country to him, and his own forces were elated at the successful issue +of their first hopes, the terror which he inspired became absolute, and +he was believed by the Asiatics to be irresistible. Taking advantage +of this, he first of all resolved to cross the Tigris and lay siege to +Seleucia; but when his passage across the river was stopped by Zeuxis +seizing the river boats, he retired to the camp at Ctesiphon, and set +about preparing winter quarters for his army. + +[Sidenote: Xenoetas sent against Molon, B.C. 221.] + +[Sidenote: King Antiochus in Coele-Syria.] + +When King Antiochus heard of Molon’s advance and the retreat of his +own generals, he was once more for giving up the expedition against +Ptolemy, and going in person on the campaign against Molon, and not +letting slip the proper time for action. But Hermeias persisted in his +original plan, and despatched the Achaean Xenoetas against Molon, in +command of an army, with full powers; asserting that against rebels it +was fitting that generals should have the command; but that the king +ought to confine himself to directing plans and conducting national +wars against monarchs. Having therefore the young king entirely in +his power, owing to his age, he set out; and having mustered the army +at Apameia he started thence and arrived at Laodiceia. Advancing from +that time with his whole army, the king crossed the desert and entered +the cañon called Marsyas, which lies between the skirts of Libanus +and Anti-Libanus, and is contracted into a narrow gorge by those two +mountains. Just where the valley is narrowest it is divided by marshes +and lakes, from which the scented reed is cut. + ++46.+ On one side of the entrance to this pass lies a place called +Brochi, on the other Gerrha, which leave but a narrow space between +them. After a march of several days through this cañon, and subduing +the towns that lay along it, Antiochus arrived at Gerrha. Finding that +Theodotus the Aetolian had already occupied Gerrha and Brochi, and had +secured the narrow road by the lakes with ditches and palisades and a +proper disposition of guards, the king at first tried to carry the pass +by force; but after sustaining more loss than he inflicted, and finding +that Theodotus remained still stanch, he gave up the attempt. In the +midst of these difficulties news was brought that Xenoetas had suffered +a total defeat and that Molon was in possession of all the upper +country: he therefore abandoned his foreign expedition and started to +relieve his own dominions. + +[Sidenote: Xenoetas at first successful.] + +The fact was that when the general Xenoetas had been despatched with +absolute powers, as I have before stated, his unexpected elevation +caused him to treat his friends with haughtiness and his enemies with +overweening temerity. His first move however was sufficiently prudent. +He marched to Seleucia, and after sending for Diogenes the governor of +Susiana, and Pythiades the commander in the Persian Gulf, he led out +his forces and encamped with the river Tigris protecting his front. But +there he was visited by many men from Molon’s camp, who swam across +the river and assured him that, if he would only cross the Tigris, the +whole of Molon’s army would declare for him; for the common soldiers +were jealous of Molon and warmly disposed towards the king. Xenoetas +was encouraged by these statements to attempt the passage of the +Tigris. He made a feint of bridging the river at a spot where it is +divided by an island; but as he was getting nothing ready for such an +operation, Molon took no notice of his pretended move; while he was +really occupied in collecting boats and getting them ready with every +possible care. Then having selected the most courageous men, horse and +foot, from his entire army, he left Zeuxis and Pythiades in charge of +his camp, and marched up stream at night about eighty stades above +Molon’s camp; and having got his force safely over in boats, encamped +them before daybreak in an excellent position, nearly surrounded by the +river, and covered where there was no river by marshes and swamps. + ++47.+ When Molon learnt what had taken place, he sent his cavalry, +under the idea that they would easily stop those who were actually +crossing, and ride down those who had already crossed. But as soon as +they got near Xenoetas’s force, their ignorance of the ground proved +fatal to them without any enemy to attack them; for they got immersed +by their own weight, and sinking in the lakes were all rendered +useless, while many of them actually lost their lives. Xenoetas, +however, feeling sure that if he only approached, Molon’s forces would +all desert to him, advanced along the bank of the river and pitched +a camp close to the enemy. Thereupon Molon, either as a stratagem, +or because he really felt some doubt of the fidelity of his men, and +was afraid that some of Xenoetas’s expectations might be fulfilled, +left his baggage in his camp and started under cover of night in the +direction of Media. Xenoetas, imagining that Molon had fled in terror +at his approach, and because he distrusted the fidelity of his own +troops, first attacked and took the enemy’s camp, and then sent for +his own cavalry and their baggage from the camp of Zeuxis. He next +summoned the soldiers to a meeting, and told them that they should feel +encouraged and hopeful now that Molon had fled. With this preface, +he ordered them all to attend to their bodily wants and refresh +themselves; as he intended without delay to go in pursuit of the enemy +early next morning. + +[Sidenote: Molon returns to his camp.] + ++48.+ But the soldiers, filled with confidence, and enriched with +every kind of provisions, eagerly turned to feasting and wine and the +demoralisation which always accompanies such excesses. But Molon, +after marching a considerable distance, caused his army to get their +dinner, and then wheeling round reappeared at the camp. He found all +the enemy scattered about and drunk, and attacked their palisade just +before daybreak. Dismayed by this unexpected danger, and unable to +awake his men from their drunken slumber, Xenoetas and his staff rushed +furiously upon the enemy and were killed. Of the sleeping soldiers most +were killed in their beds, while the rest threw themselves into the +river and endeavoured to cross to the opposite camp. The greater part +however even of these perished; for in the blind hurry and confusion +which prevailed, and in the universal panic and dismay, seeing the camp +on the other side divided by so narrow a space, they all forgot the +violence of the stream, and the difficulty of crossing it, in their +eagerness to reach a place of safety. In wild excitement therefore, +and with a blind instinct of self-preservation, they not only hurled +themselves into the river, but threw their beasts of burden in also, +with their packs, as though they thought that the river by some +providential instinct would take their part and convey them safely to +the opposite camp. The result was that the stream presented a truly +pitiable and extraordinary spectacle,—horses, beasts of burden, arms, +corpses, and every kind of baggage being carried down the current along +with the swimmers. + +[Sidenote: Molon’s successful campaign. B.C. 221.] + +Having secured the camp of Xenoetas, Molon crossed the river in perfect +safety and without any resistance, as Zeuxis also now fled at his +approach; took possession of the latter’s camp, and then advanced with +his whole army to Seleucia; carried it at the first assault, Zeuxis and +Diomedon the governor of the place both abandoning it and flying; and +advancing from this place reduced the upper Satrapies to submission +without a blow. That of Babylon fell next, and then the Satrapy which +lay along the Persian Gulf. This brought him to Susa, which he also +carried without a blow; though his assaults upon the citadel proved +unavailing, because Diogenes the general had thrown himself into it +before he could get there. He therefore abandoned the idea of carrying +it by storm, and leaving a detachment to lay siege to it, hurried back +with his main army to Seleucia on the Tigris. There he took great pains +to refresh his army, and after addressing his men in encouraging terms +he started once more to complete his designs, and occupied Parapotamia +as far as the city Europus, and Mesopotamia as far as Dura. + +[Sidenote: Epigenes put to death by the intrigues of Hermeias.] + ++49.+ When news of these events was brought to Antiochus, as I have +said before, he gave up all idea of the Coele-Syrian campaign, and +turned all his attention to this war. Another meeting of his council +was thereupon summoned: and on the king ordering the members of it to +deliver their opinions as to the tactics to be employed against Molon, +the first to speak on the business was again Epigenes: who said that +“his advice should have been followed all along, and measures have been +promptly taken before the enemy had obtained such important successes: +still even at this late hour they ought to take it in hand resolutely.” +Thereupon Hermeias broke out again into an unreasonable and violent fit +of anger and began to heap abuse upon Epigenes; and while belauding +himself in a fulsome manner, brought accusations against Epigenes that +were absurd as well as false. He ended by adjuring the king not to be +diverted from his purpose without better reason, nor to abandon his +hopes in Coele-Syria. This advice was ill-received by the majority of +the council, and displeasing to Antiochus himself; and, accordingly, +as the king showed great anxiety to reconcile the two men, Hermeias +was at length induced to put an end to his invectives. The council +decided by a majority that the course recommended by Epigenes was the +most practical and advantageous, and a resolution was come to that the +king should go on the campaign against Molon, and devote his attention +to that. Thereupon Hermeias promptly made a hypocritical pretence of +having changed his mind and remarking that it was the duty of all to +acquiesce loyally in the decision, made a great show of readiness and +activity in pushing on the preparations. + ++50.+ The forces, however, having been mustered at Apameia, upon a kind +of mutiny arising among the common soldiers, on account of some arrears +of pay, Hermeias, observing the king to be in a state of anxiety, and +to be alarmed at the disturbance at so critical a moment, offered to +discharge all arrears, if the king would only consent to Epigenes +not accompanying the expedition; on the ground that nothing could be +properly managed in the army when such angry feelings, and such party +spirit, had been excited. The proposal was very displeasing to the +king, who was exceedingly anxious that Epigenes should accompany him on +the campaign, owing to his experience in the field; but he was bound +so completely hand and foot, and entangled by the craft of Hermeias, +his skilful finance, constant watchfulness, and designing flattery, +that he was not his own master; and accordingly he yielded to the +necessity of the moment and consented to his demand. When Epigenes +thereupon retired, as he was bidden, the members of the council were +too much afraid of incurring displeasure to remonstrate; while the +army generally, by a revulsion of feeling, turned with gratitude to +the man to whom they owed the settlement of their claims for pay. The +Cyrrhestae were the only ones that stood out: and they broke out into +open mutiny, and for some time occasioned much trouble; but, being +at last conquered by one of the king’s generals, most of them were +killed, and the rest submitted to the king’s mercy. Hermeias having +thus secured the allegiance of his friends by fear, and of the troops +by being of service to them, started on the expedition in company with +the king; while in regard to Epigenes he elaborated the following plot, +with the assistance of Alexis, the commander of the citadel of Apameia. +He wrote a letter purporting to have been sent from Molon to Epigenes, +and persuaded one of the latter’s servants, by holding out the hope of +great rewards, to take it to the house of Epigenes, and mix it with his +other papers. Immediately after this had been done, Alexis came to the +house and asked Epigenes whether he had not received certain letters +from Molon; and, upon his denial, demanded in menacing terms to be +allowed to search. Having entered, he quickly discovered the letter, +which he availed himself of as a pretext for putting Epigenes to death +on the spot. By this means the king was persuaded to believe that +Epigenes had justly forfeited his life; and though the courtiers had +their suspicions, they were afraid to say anything. + +[Sidenote: B.C. 221-220. Antiochus advances through Mesopotamia.] + ++51.+ When Antiochus had reached the Euphrates, and had taken over the +force stationed there, he once more started on his march and got as far +as Antioch, in Mygdonia, about mid-winter, and there remained until the +worst of the winter should be over. Thence after a stay of forty days +he advanced to Libba. Molon was now in the neighbourhood of Babylon: +and Antiochus consulted his council as to the route to be pursued, +the tactics to be adopted, and the source from which provisions could +best be obtained for his army on the march in their expedition against +Molon. The proposal of Hermeias was to march along the Tigris, with +this river, and the Lycus and Caprus, on their flank. Zeuxis, having +the fate of Epigenes before his eyes, was in a state of painful doubt +whether to speak his real opinion or no; but as the mistake involved +in the advice of Hermeias was flagrant, he at last mustered courage +to advise that the Tigris should be crossed; alleging as a reason the +general difficulty of the road along the river: especially from the +fact that, after a considerable march, the last six days of which +would be through a desert, they would reach what was called the +“King’s Dyke,” which it would be impossible to cross if they found it +invested by the enemy; while a retirement by a second march through +the wilderness would be manifestly dangerous, especially as their +provisions would be sure to be running short. On the other hand he +showed that if they crossed the Tigris it was evident the Apolloniates +would repent of their treason and join the king; for even as it was +they had submitted to Molon, not from choice, but under compulsion +and terror; and the fertility of their soil promised abundance of +provisions for the troops. But his most weighty argument was that by +their thus acting Molon would be cut off from a return to Media, and +from drawing supplies from that country, and would thereby be compelled +to risk a general action: or, if he refused to do so, his troops would +promptly fix their hopes upon the king. + +[Sidenote: Antiochus crosses the Tigris.] + ++52.+ The suggestion of Zeuxis being approved, the army was immediately +arranged in three divisions, and got across with the baggage at three +points in the river. Thence they marched in the direction of Dura, +where they quickly caused the siege of the citadel to be raised, which +was being invested at the time by some of Molon’s officers; and thence, +after a march of eight successive days, they crossed the mountain +called Oreicum and arrived at Apollonia. + +[Sidenote: Molon also crosses the Tigris.] + +[Sidenote: Abortive attempt of Molon to make a night attack on the +king.] + +Meanwhile Molon had heard of the king’s arrival, and not feeling +confidence in the inhabitants of Susiana and Babylonia, because he +had conquered them so recently and by surprise, fearing also to be +cut off from a retreat to Media, he determined to throw a bridge over +the Tigris and get his army across; being eager if it were possible +to secure the mountain district of Apollonia, because he had great +confidence in his corps of slingers called Cyrtii. He carried out his +resolution, and was pushing forward in an unbroken series of forced +marches. Thus it came about that, just as he was entering the district +of Apollonia, the king at the head of his whole army was marching out. +The advanced guard of skirmishers of the two armies fell in with each +other on some high ground, and at first engaged and made trial of each +other’s strength; but upon the main armies on either side coming on +to the ground, they separated. For the present both retired to their +respective entrenchments, and encamped at a distance of forty stades +from each other. When night had fallen, Molon reflected that there +was some risk and disadvantage in a battle by broad daylight and in +the open field between rebels and their sovereign, and he determined +therefore to attack Antiochus by night. Selecting the best and most +vigorous of his soldiers, he made a considerable détour, with the +object of making his attack from higher ground. But having learnt +during his march that ten young men had deserted in a body to the king, +he gave up his design, and facing right about returned in haste to his +own entrenchment where he arrived about daybreak. His arrival caused a +panic in the army; for the troops in the camp, startled out of their +sleep by the arrival of the returning men, were very near rushing out +of the lines. + +[Sidenote: Disposition of the king’s army.] + ++53.+ But while Molon was doing his best to calm the panic, the king, +fully prepared for the engagement, was marching his whole army out of +their lines at daybreak. On his right wing he stationed his lancers +under the command of Ardys, a man of proved ability in the field; next +to them the Cretan allies, and next the Gallic Rhigosages. Next these +he placed the foreign contingent and mercenary soldiers from Greece, +and next to them he stationed his phalanx: the left wing he assigned to +the cavalry called the “Companions.”[263] His elephants, which were ten +in number, he placed at intervals in front of the line. His reserves of +infantry and cavalry he divided between the two wings, with orders to +outflank the enemy as soon as the battle had begun. He then went along +the line and addressed a few words of exhortation to the men suitable +to the occasion; and put Hermeias and Zeuxis in command of the left +wing, taking that of the right himself. + +[Sidenote: Molon’s disposition.] + +On the other side, owing to the panic caused by his rash movement of +the previous night, Molon was unable to get his men out of camp, or +into position without difficulty and confusion. He did however divide +his cavalry between his two wings, guessing what the disposition of the +enemy would be; and stationed the scutati and Gauls, and in short all +his heavy-armed men in the space between the two bodies of cavalry. His +archers, slingers, and all such kind of troops he placed on the outer +flank of the cavalry on either wing; while his scythed chariots he +placed at intervals in front of his line. He gave his brother Neolaus +command of the left wing, taking that of the right himself. + +[Sidenote: Death of Molon and his fellow-conspirators.] + ++54.+ When the two armies advanced to the battle, Molon’s right wing +remained faithful to him, and vigorously engaged the division of +Zeuxis; but the left wing no sooner came within sight of the king than +it deserted to the enemy: the result of which was that Molon’s army was +thrown into consternation, while the king’s troops were inspired with +redoubled confidence. When Molon comprehended what had taken place, +and found himself surrounded on every side, reflecting on the tortures +which would be inflicted upon him if he were taken alive, he put an +end to his own life. So too all who had taken part in the plot fled +severally to their own homes, and terminated their lives in the same +way. Neolaus escaped from the field and found his way into Persis, to +the house of Molon’s brother Alexander; and there first killed his +mother and Molon’s children and afterwards himself, having previously +persuaded Alexander to do the same to himself. After plundering the +enemy’s camp, the king ordered the body of Molon to be impaled on the +most conspicuous spot in Media: which the men appointed to the work +immediately did; for they took it to Callonitis and impaled it close +to the pass over Mount Zagrus. The king, after plundering the enemy’s +camp, rebuked the rebel army in a long speech; and finally receiving +them back into favour by holding out his right hand to them, appointed +certain officers to lead them back to Media and settle the affairs +of that district; while he himself went down to Seleucia and made +arrangements for the government of the Satrapies round it, treating +all with equal clemency and prudence. But Hermeias acted with his +usual harshness: he got up charges against the people of Seleucia, +and imposed a fine of a thousand talents upon the city; drove their +magistrates, called Adeiganes, into exile; and put many Seleucians to +death with various tortures, by mutilation, the sword and the rack. +With great difficulty, sometimes by dissuading Hermeias, and sometimes +by interposing his own authority, the king did at length put an end +to these severities; and, exacting only a fine of a hundred and fifty +talents from the citizens for the error they had committed, restored +the city to a state of order. This being done, he left Diogenes in +command of Media, and Apollodorus of Susiana; and sent Tychon, his +chief military secretary, to command the district along the Persian +Gulf. + +Thus was the rebellion of Molon and the rising in the upper Satrapies +suppressed and quieted. + +[Sidenote: Extension of the expedition. The treasonable designs of +Hermeias.] + +[Sidenote: Artabazanes.] + ++55.+ Elated by his success, and wishing to strike awe and terror +into the minds of the princes of the barbarians who were near, or +conterminous with his own Satrapies, that they might never venture to +aid by supplies or arms those who revolted from him, he determined to +march against them. And first of all against Artabazanes, who appeared +to be the most formidable and able of all the princes, and who ruled +over a tribe called the Satrapeii, and others on their borders. But +Hermeias was at that time afraid of an expedition further up country, +owing to its danger; and was always yearning for the expedition against +Ptolemy in accordance with his original plan. When news, however, +came that a son had been born to the king, thinking that Antiochus +might possibly fall by the hands of the barbarians in upper Asia, or +give him opportunities of putting him out of the way, he consented +to the expedition; believing that, if he could only effect the death +of Antiochus, he would be guardian to his son and so sole master of +the whole kingdom. This having been decided, the army crossed Mount +Zagrus and entered the territory of Artabazanes, which borders on +Media, and is separated from it by an intervening chain of mountains. +Part of it overlooks the Pontus, near the valley of the Phasis; and +it extends to the Hyrcanian Sea. Its inhabitants are numerous and +warlike and especially strong in horsemen; while the district produces +within itself all other things necessary for war. The dynasty has +lasted from the time of the Persians, having been overlooked at the +period of Alexander’s conquests. But now in great alarm at the king’s +approach, and at his own infirmities, for he was an extremely old man, +Artabazanes yielded to the force of circumstances, and made a treaty +with Antiochus on his own terms. + +[Sidenote: Fall and death of Hermeias, B.C. 220.] + ++56.+ It was after the settlement of this treaty that Apollophanes, +the physician, who was regarded with great affection by the king, +observing that Hermeias was getting beyond all bounds in his high +place, began to be anxious for the king’s safety, and still more +suspicious and uneasy for his own. He took an opportunity, therefore, +of conveying a suggestion to the king, that he had better not be too +careless or unsuspicious of the audacious character of Hermeias; nor +let things go on until he found himself involved in a disaster like +that of his brother. “The danger,” he said, “is not at all remote.” +And he begged him to be on his guard, and take prompt measures for +the safety of himself and his friends. Antiochus owned to him that +he disliked and feared Hermeias; and thanked him for the care of his +person, which had emboldened him to speak to him on the subject. This +conversation encouraged Apollophanes by convincing him that he had +not been mistaken about the feelings and opinions of the king; and +Antiochus begged him not to confine his assistance to words, but to +take some practical steps to secure the safety of himself and his +friends. Upon Apollophanes replying that he was ready to do anything +in the world, they concerted the following plan. On the pretext of the +king being afflicted with an attack of vertigo, it was given out that +the daily attendance of courtiers and officials was to be discontinued +for a few days: the king and his physician thus getting the opportunity +of conferring with such of his friends as he chose, who came on the +pretext of visiting him. In the course of these visits suitable persons +for carrying out the design were prepared and instructed; and every +one readily responding to the proposal, from hatred of Hermeias, they +proceeded to complete it. The physicians having prescribed walks at +daybreak for Antiochus on account of the coolness, Hermeias came to +the place assigned for the walk, and with him those of the king’s +friends who were privy to the design; while the rest were much too late +on account of the time of the king’s coming out being very different +from what it had usually been. Thus they got Hermeias gradually a +considerable distance from the camp, until they came to a certain +lonely spot, and then, on the king’s going a little off the road, on +the pretence of a necessary purpose, they stabbed him to death. Such +was the end of Hermeias, whose punishment was by no means equal to his +crimes. Thus freed from much fear and embarrassment, the king set out +on his march home amidst universal manifestations from the people of +the country in favour of his measures and policy; but nothing was more +emphatically applauded in the course of his progress than the removal +of Hermeias. In Apameia, at the same time, the women stoned the wife of +Hermeias to death, and the boys his sons. + +[Sidenote: Attempted treason of Achaeus.] + ++57.+ When he had reached home and had dismissed his troops into +winter quarters, Antiochus sent a message to Achaeus, protesting +against his assumption of the diadem and royal title, and warning him +that he was aware of his dealings with Ptolemy, and of his restless +intrigues generally. For while the king was engaged on his expedition +against Artabazanes, Achaeus, being persuaded that Antiochus would +fall, or that, if he did not fall, would be so far off, that it would +be possible for him to invade Syria before his return, and with the +assistance of the Cyrrhestae, who were in revolt against the king, +seize the kingdom, started from Lydia with his whole army; and on +arriving at Laodiceia, in Phrygia, assumed the diadem, and had the +audacity for the first time to adopt the title of king, and to send +royal despatches to the cities, the exile Garsyeris being his chief +adviser in this measure. But as he advanced farther and farther, and +was now almost at Lycaonia, a mutiny broke out among his forces, +arising from the dissatisfaction of the men at the idea of being led +against their natural king. When Achaeus found that this disturbed +state of feeling existed among them, he desisted from his enterprise; +and wishing to make his men believe that he had never had any intention +of invading Syria, he directed his march into Pisidia, and plundered +the country. By thus securing large booty for his army he conciliated +its affection and confidence, and then returned to his own Satrapy. + +[Sidenote: War with Ptolemy, B.C. 219.] + +[Sidenote: Apollophanes advises that they begin by taking Seleucia.] + ++58.+ Every detail of these transactions was known to the king: +who, while sending frequent threatening messages to Achaeus, was +now concentrating all his efforts on the preparations for the war +against Ptolemy. Having accordingly mustered his forces at Apameia +just before spring, he summoned his friends to advise with him as to +the invasion of Coele-Syria. After many suggestions had been made in +respect to this undertaking, touching the nature of the country, the +military preparation required, and the assistance to be rendered by the +fleet,—Apollophanes of Seleucia, whom I mentioned before, put an abrupt +end to all these suggestions by remarking that “it was folly to desire +Coele-Syria and to march against that, while they allowed Seleucia to +be held by Ptolemy, which was the capital, and so to speak, the very +inner shrine of the king’s realm. Besides the disgrace to the kingdom +which its occupation by the Egyptian monarchs involved, it was a +position of the greatest practical importance, as a most admirable base +of operations. Occupied by the enemy it was of the utmost hindrance +to all the king’s designs; for in whatever direction he might have it +in his mind to move his forces, his own country, owing to the fear +of danger from this place, would need as much care and precaution +as the preparations against his foreign enemies. Once taken, on the +other hand, not only would it perfectly secure the safety of the home +district, but was also capable of rendering effective aid to the king’s +other designs and undertakings, whether by land or sea, owing to its +commanding situation.” His words carried conviction to the minds of +all, and it was resolved that the capture of the town should be their +first step. For Seleucia was still held by a garrison for the Egyptian +kings; and had been so since the time of Ptolemy Euergetes, who took it +when he invaded Syria to revenge the murder of Berenice. + ++59.+ In consequence of this decision, orders were sent to Diognetus +the commander of the fleet to sail towards Seleucia: while Antiochus +himself started from Apameia with his army, and encamped near the +Hippodrome, about five stades from the town. He also despatched +Theodotus Hemiolius with an adequate force against Coele-Syria, with +orders to occupy the passes and to keep the road open for him. + +[Sidenote: Description of Seleucia.] + +The situation of Seleucia and the natural features of the surrounding +country are of this kind. The city stands on the sea coast between +Cilicia and Phoenicia; and has close to it a very great mountain called +Coryphaeus, which on the west is washed by the last waves of the sea +which lies between Cyprus and Phoenicia; while its eastern slopes +overlook the territories of Antioch and Seleucia. It is on the southern +skirt of this mountain that the town of Seleucia lies, separated from +it by a deep and difficult ravine. The town extends down to the sea +in a straggling line broken by irregularities of the soil, and is +surrounded on most parts by cliffs and precipitous rocks. On the side +facing the sea, where the ground is level, stand the market-places, and +the lower town strongly walled. Similarly the whole of the main town +has been fortified by walls of a costly construction, and splendidly +decorated with temples and other elaborate buildings. There is only +one approach to it on the seaward side, which is an artificial ascent +cut in the form of a stair, interrupted by frequently occurring drops +and awkward places. Not far from the town is the mouth of the river +Orontes, which rises in the district of Libanus and Anti-Libanus, and +after traversing the plain of Amyca reaches Antioch; through which it +flows, and carrying off by the force of its current all the sewage +of that town, finally discharges itself into this sea not far from +Seleucia. + +[Sidenote: Capture of Seleucia.] + ++60.+ Antiochus first tried sending messages to the magistrates of +Seleucia, offering money and other rewards on condition of having the +city surrendered without fighting. And though he failed to persuade the +chief authorities, he corrupted some of the subordinate commanders; +and relying on them, he made preparations to assault the town on the +seaward side with the men of his fleet, and on the land side with +his soldiers. He divided his forces therefore into three parts, and +addressed suitable words of exhortation to them, causing a herald to +proclaim a promise to men and officers alike of great gifts and crowns +that should be bestowed for gallantry in action. To the division under +Zeuxis he entrusted the attack upon the gate leading to Antioch; to +Hermogenes that upon the walls near the temple of Castor and Pollux; +and to Ardys and Diognetus the assault upon the docks and the lower +town: in accordance with his understanding with his partisans in the +town, whereby it had been agreed that, if he could carry the lower +town by assault, the city also should then be put into his hands. When +the signal was given, a vigorous and determined assault was begun +simultaneously at all these points: though that made by Ardys and +Diognetus was by far the most daring; for the other points did not +admit of any assault at all by means of scaling ladders, nor could +be carried except by the men climbing up on their hands and knees; +while at the docks and lower town it was possible to apply scaling +ladders and fix them firmly and safely against the walls. The naval +contingent therefore having fixed their ladders on the docks, and the +division of Ardys theirs upon the lower town, a violent effort was +made to carry the walls: and the garrison of the upper town being +prevented from coming to the assistance of these places, because the +city was being assaulted at every other point at the same time, Ardys +was not long before he captured the lower town. No sooner had this +fallen, than the subordinate officers who had been corrupted hurried +to the commander-in-chief Leontius, and urged that he ought to send +ambassadors to Antiochus, and make terms with him, before the city was +taken by storm. Knowing nothing about the treason of these officers, +but alarmed by their consternation, Leontius sent commissioners to the +king to make terms for the safety of all within the city. + ++61.+ The king accepted the proposal and agreed to grant safety to +all in the town who were free, amounting to six thousand souls. And +when he took over the town, he not only spared the free, but also +recalled those of the inhabitants who had been exiled, and restored to +them their citizenship and property; while he secured the harbour and +citadel with garrisons. + +[Sidenote: Theodotus turns against Ptolemy. See ch. 46.] + +While still engaged in this business, he received a letter from +Theodotus offering to put Coele-Syria into his hands, and inviting +him to come thither with all speed. This letter caused him great +embarrassment and doubt as to what he ought to do, and how best to +take advantage of the offer. This Theodotus was an Aetolian who, as I +have already narrated, had rendered important services to Ptolemy’s +kingdom: for which, far from being reckoned deserving of gratitude, he +had been in imminent danger of his life, just about the time of the +expedition of Antiochus against Molon. Thereupon conceiving a contempt +for Ptolemy, and a distrust of his courtiers, he seized upon Ptolemais +with his own hands, and upon Tyre by the agency of Panaetolus, and made +haste to invite Antiochus. Postponing therefore his expedition against +Achaeus, and regarding everything else as of secondary importance, +Antiochus started with his army by the same route as he had come. After +passing the cañon called Marsyas, he encamped near Gerrha, close to the +lake which lies between the two mountains. Hearing there that Ptolemy’s +general Nicolaus was besieging Theodotus in Ptolemais, he left his +heavy-armed troops behind with orders to their leaders to besiege +Brochi,—the stronghold which commands the road along the lake,—and led +his light-armed troops forward himself, with the intention of raising +the siege of Ptolemais. But Nicolaus had already got intelligence +of the king’s approach; and had accordingly retired from Ptolemais +himself, and sent forward Diogoras the Cretan and Dorymenes the +Aetolian to occupy the passes at Berytus. The king therefore attacked +these men, and having easily routed them took up a position near the +pass. + +[Sidenote: Antiochus invades Coele-Syria.] + ++62.+ There he awaited the coming up of the remainder of his forces, +and, after addressing them in words befitting the occasion, continued +his advance with his entire army, full of courage and with high +hopes of success. When Theodotus and Panaetolus met him with their +partisans he received them graciously, and took over from them Tyre +and Ptolemais, and the war material which those cities contained. Part +of this consisted of forty vessels, of which twenty were decked and +splendidly equipped, and none with less than four banks of oars; the +other twenty were made up of triremes, biremes, and cutters. These he +handed over to the care of the Navarch Diognetus; and being informed +that Ptolemy had come out against him, and had reached Memphis, and +that all his forces were collected at Pelusium, and were opening the +sluices, and filling up the wells of drinking water, he abandoned the +idea of attacking Pelusium; but making a progress through the several +cities, endeavoured to win them over by force or persuasion to his +authority. Some of the less-fortified cities were overawed at his +approach and made no difficulty about submitting, but others trusting +to their fortifications or the strength of their situations held +out; and to these he was forced to lay regular siege and so wasted a +considerable time. + +Though treated with such flagrant perfidy, the character of Ptolemy was +so feeble, and his neglect of all military preparations had been so +great, that the idea of protecting his rights with the sword, which was +his most obvious duty, never occurred to him. + +[Sidenote: Active measures of Agathocles and Sosibius.] + ++63.+ Agathocles and Sosibius, however, the leading ministers in the +kingdom at that time, took counsel together and did the best they could +with the means at their disposal, in view of the existing crisis. +They resolved to devote themselves to the preparations for war; and, +meanwhile, by embassies to try to retard the advance of Antiochus: +pretending to confirm him in the opinion he originally entertained +about Ptolemy, namely, that he would not venture to fight, but would +trust to negotiations, and the interposition of common friends, to +induce him to evacuate Coele-Syria. Having determined upon this policy, +Agathocles and Sosibius, to whom the whole business was entrusted, lost +no time in sending their ambassadors to Antiochus: and at the same time +they sent messages to Rhodes, Byzantium, and Cyzicus, not omitting the +Aetolians, inviting them to send commissioners to discuss the terms of +a treaty. The commissioners duly arrived, and by occupying the time +with going backwards and forwards between the two kings, abundantly +secured to these statesmen the two things which they wanted,—delay, and +time to make their preparations for war. They fixed their residence +at Memphis and there carried on these negotiations continuously. Nor +were they less attentive to the ambassadors from Antiochus, whom they +received with every mark of courtesy and kindness. But meanwhile they +were calling up and collecting at Alexandria the mercenaries whom +they had on service in towns outside Egypt; were despatching men to +recruit foreign soldiers; and were collecting provisions both for the +troops they already possessed, and for those that were coming in. +No less active were they in every other department of the military +preparations. They took turns in going on rapid and frequent visits to +Alexandria, to see that the supplies should in no point be inadequate +to the undertaking before them. The manufacture of arms, the selection +of men, and their division into companies, they committed to the care +of Echecrates of Thessaly and Phoxidas of Melita. With these they +associated Eurylochus of Magnesia, and Socrates of Boeotia, who were +also joined by Cnopias of Allaria. By the greatest good fortune they +had got hold of these officers, who, while serving with Demetrius and +Antigonus,[264] had acquired some experience of real war and actual +service in the field. Accordingly they took command of the assembled +troops, and made the best of them by giving them the training of +soldiers. + +[Sidenote: Reorganisation of the army.] + ++64.+ Their first measure was to divide them according to their country +and age, and to assign to each division its appropriate arms, taking +no account of what they had borne before. Next they broke up their +battalions and muster-rolls, which had been formed on the basis of +their old system of pay, and formed them into companies adapted to +the immediate purpose. Having effected this they began to drill the +men; habituating them severally not only to obey the words of command, +but also to the proper management of their weapons.[265] They also +frequently summoned general meetings at headquarters, and delivered +speeches to the men. The most useful in this respect were Andromachus +of Aspendus and Polycrates of Argos; because they had recently crossed +from Greece, and were still thoroughly imbued with the Greek spirit, +and the military ideas prevalent in the several states. Moreover, they +were illustrious on the score of their private wealth, as well as on +that of their respective countries; to which advantages Polycrates +added those of an ancient family, and of the reputation obtained by +his father Mnasiades as an athlete. By private and public exhortations +these officers inspired their men with a zeal and enthusiasm for the +struggle which awaited them. + ++65.+ All these officers, too, had commands in the army suited to +their particular accomplishments. Eurylochus of Magnesia commanded +about three thousand men of what were called in the royal armies the +Agema, or Guard; Socrates of Boeotia had two thousand light-armed +troops under him; while the Achaean Phoxidas, and Ptolemy the son of +Thraseas, and Andromachus of Aspendus were associated in the duty of +drilling the phalanx and the mercenary Greek soldiers on the same +ground,—Andromachus and Ptolemy commanding the phalanx, Phoxidas +the mercenaries; of which the numbers were respectively twenty-five +thousand and eight thousand. The cavalry, again, attached to the court, +amounting to seven hundred, as well as that which was obtained from +Lybia or enlisted in the country, were being trained by Polycrates, +and were under his personal command: amounting in all to about three +thousand men. In the actual campaign the most effective service was +performed by Echecrates of Thessaly, by whom the Greek cavalry, which, +with the whole body of mercenary cavalry, amounted to two thousand +men, was splendidly trained. No one took more pains with the men under +his command than Cnopias of Allaria. He commanded all the Cretans, who +numbered three thousand, and among them a thousand Neo-Cretans,[266] +over whom he had set Philo of Cnossus. They also armed three thousand +Libyans in the Macedonian fashion, who were commanded by Ammonius of +Barce. The Egyptians themselves supplied twenty thousand soldiers +to the phalanx, and were under the command of Sosibius. A body of +Thracians and Gauls was also enrolled, four thousand being taken from +settlers in the country and their descendants, while two thousand had +been recently enlisted and brought over: and these were under the +command of Dionysius of Thrace. Such in its numbers, and in the variety +of the elements of which it was composed, was the force which was being +got ready for Ptolemy. + +[Sidenote: Negotiations at Memphis, B.C. 219-218.] + ++66.+ Meanwhile Antiochus had been engaged in the siege of Dura:[267] +but the strength of the place and the support given it by Nicolaus +prevented him from effecting anything; and as the winter was closing +in, he agreed with the ambassadors of Ptolemy to a suspension of +hostilities for four months, and promised that he would discuss the +whole question at issue in a friendly spirit. But he was as far as +possible from being sincere in this negotiation: his real object was +to avoid being detained any length of time from his own country, and +to be able to place his troops in winter quarters in Seleucia; because +Achaeus was now notoriously plotting against him, and without disguise +co-operating with Ptolemy. So having come to this agreement, Antiochus +dismissed the ambassadors with injunctions to acquaint him as soon as +possible with the decision of Ptolemy, and to meet him at Seleucia. He +then placed the necessary guards in the various strongholds, committed +to Theodotus the command-in-chief over them all, and returned home. On +his arrival at Seleucia he distributed his forces into their winter +quarters; and from that time forth took no pains to keep the mass of +his army under discipline, being persuaded that the business would +not call for any more fighting; because he was already master of some +portions of Coele-Syria and Phoenicia, and expected to secure the rest +by voluntary submission or by diplomacy: for Ptolemy, he believed, +would not venture upon a general engagement. This opinion was shared +also by the ambassadors: because Sosibius fixing his residence at +Memphis conducted his negotiations with them in a friendly manner; +while he prevented those who went backwards and forwards to Antiochus +from ever becoming eye-witnesses of the preparations that were being +carried on at Alexandria. Nay, even by the time that the ambassadors +arrived, Sosibius was already prepared for every eventuality. + +[Sidenote: Antiochus’s case.] + +[Sidenote: Ptolemy’s case.] + +[Sidenote: Ptolemy, son of Lagus, B.C. 323-285.] + ++67.+ Meanwhile Antiochus was extremely anxious to have as much the +advantage over the government of Alexandria in diplomatic argument as +he had in arms. Accordingly when the ambassadors arrived at Seleucia, +and both parties began, in accordance with the instructions of +Sosibius, to discuss the clauses of the proposed arrangement in detail, +the king made very light of the loss recently sustained by Ptolemy, and +the injury which had been manifestly inflicted upon him by the existing +occupation of Coele-Syria; and in the pleadings on this subject he +refused to look upon this transaction in the light of an injury at all, +alleging that the places belonged to him of right. He asserted that +the original occupation of the country by Antigonus the One-eyed, and +the royal authority exercised over it by Seleucus,[268] constituted an +absolutely decisive and equitable claim, in virtue of which Coele-Syria +belonged of right to himself and not to Ptolemy; for Ptolemy I. went to +war with Antigonus with the view of annexing this country, not to his +own government, but to that of Seleucus. But, above all, he pressed the +convention entered into by the three kings, Cassander, Lysimachus, and +Seleucus, when, after having conquered Antigonus,[269] they deliberated +in common upon the arrangements to be made, and decided that the whole +of Syria should belong to Seleucus. The commissioners of Ptolemy +endeavoured to establish the opposite case. They magnified the existing +injury, and dilated on its hardship; asserting that the treason of +Theodotus and the invasion of Antiochus amounted to a breach of +treaty-rights. They alleged the possession of these places in the reign +of Ptolemy, son of Lagus; and tried to show that Ptolemy had joined +Seleucus in the war on the understanding that he was to invest Seleucus +with the government of the whole of Asia, but was to take Coele-Syria +and Phoenicia for himself. + +Such were the arguments brought forward by the two contracting parties +in the course of the embassies and counter-embassies and conferences. +There was no prospect, however, of arriving at any result, because the +controversy was conducted, not by the principals, but by the common +friends of both; and there was no one to intervene authoritatively to +check and control the caprice of the party which they might decide to +be in the wrong. But what caused the most insuperable difficulty was +the matter of Achaeus. For Ptolemy was eager that the terms of the +treaty should include him: while Antiochus would not allow the subject +to be so much as mentioned; and was indignant that Ptolemy should +venture to protect rebels, or bring such a point into the discussion at +all. + +[Sidenote: Renewal of hostilities, B.C. 218.] + ++68.+ The approach of spring found both sides weary of negotiations, +and with no prospect of coming to a conclusion. Antiochus therefore +began collecting his forces, with a view of making an invasion by +land and sea, and completing his conquest of Coele-Syria. On his part +Ptolemy gave the supreme management of the war to Nicolaus, sent +abundant provisions to Gaza, and despatched land and sea forces. The +arrival of these reinforcements gave Nicolaus courage to enter upon +the war: the commander of the navy promptly co-operating with him in +carrying out all his orders. This admiral was Perigenes, whom Ptolemy +sent out in command of the fleet, consisting of thirty fully decked +ships and more than four thousand ships of burden. Nicolaus was by +birth an Aetolian, and was the boldest and most experienced officer +in the service of Ptolemy. With one division of his army he hastened +to seize the pass at Platanus; with the rest, which he personally +commanded, he occupied the environs of Porphyrion; and there prepared +to resist the invasion of the king: the fleet being also anchored close +to him. + +[Sidenote: Antiochus marches to Beirût.] + +Meanwhile Antiochus had advanced as far as Marathus. On his way he had +received a deputation of Aradians, asking for an alliance; and had +not only granted their request, but had put an end to a quarrel which +they had amongst themselves, by reconciling those of them who lived +on the island with those who lived on the mainland. Starting from +Marathus he entered the enemy’s country near the promontory called +Theoprosopon, and advanced to Berytus, having seized Botrys on his way, +and burnt Trieres and Calamus. From Berytus he sent forward Nicarchus +and Theodotus with orders to secure the difficult passes near the river +Lyons; while he himself set his army in motion and encamped near the +river Damuras: Diognetus, the commander of his navy, coasting along +parallel with him all the while. Thence once more, taking with him the +divisions commanded by Theodotus and Nicarchus, which were the light +troops of the army, he set out to reconnoitre the pass occupied already +by Nicolaus. After thoroughly surveying the nature of the ground, +he retired to his camp for that day. But on the next, leaving his +heavy-armed troops in the charge of Nicarchus, he set out with the rest +of his forces to execute his design. + +[Sidenote: The pass at Porphyrion.] + +[Sidenote: carried by Antiochus.] + ++69.+ At this point there is but a small and narrow space between +the foot of Libanus and the sea; and even that is intersected by a +steep and rugged spur, leaving only a narrow and difficult passage +along the very water’s edge. On this pass Nicolaus had taken up his +position; and having occupied some of the points by means of his large +numbers, and secured others by artificial works, he felt certain that +he would be able to prevent Antiochus from effecting an entrance. But +the king divided his army into three parts, of which he entrusted one +to Theodotus with orders to close with the enemy and force their way +along the skirts of Libanus; the second to Menedemus with urgent orders +to attempt the centre of the spur; while the third he put under the +command of Diocles, the military governor of Parapotamia, and ordered +them to keep close to the sea. He himself with his guard occupied a +central position, intending to superintend the whole action and give +help where it was wanted. At the same time Diognetus and Perigenes +made preparations for a sea-fight, coming as close as possible to the +shore, and endeavouring to make the battles at sea and on land present +the appearance of a single contest. A general advance having begun by +sea and land, at the same signal and word of command, the battle on the +sea was undecided, because the number of vessels on either side and +their equipment were about equal: but on land the troops of Nicolaus +got the best of it at first, from the advantage of their position. +But when Theodotus routed the men on the mountain skirts, and then +charged from the higher ground, Nicolaus’s men all turned and fled +precipitately. In this flight two thousand of them fell, and as many +were taken prisoners: the rest retreated towards Sidon. Though he now +had the better prospect of the two in the sea-fight; yet, when he saw +the defeat of the army on land, Perigenes turned his prows and made +good his retreat to the same place. + +[Sidenote: The advance of Antiochus continued.] + +[Sidenote: Philoteria.] + +[Sidenote: Scythopolis.] + +[Sidenote: Atabyrium.] + +[Sidenote: Defections from Ptolemy.] + +[Sidenote: Pella, Camus, Gephrus.] + ++70.+ Thereupon Antiochus got his army on the march, and, arriving at +Sidon, encamped under its wall. He did not however venture to attempt +the town, because of the vast stores it contained and the number of +its ordinary inhabitants, as well as of the refugees who had collected +there. He therefore broke up his camp again, and continued his march +towards Philoteria: ordering Diognetus his navarch to sail back with +his ships to Tyre. Now Philoteria is situated right upon the shores +of the lake into which the river Jordan discharges itself, and from +which it issues out again into the plains surrounding Scythopolis. The +surrender of these two cities to him encouraged him to prosecute his +further designs; because the country subject to them was easily able to +supply his whole army with provisions, and everything necessary for the +campaign in abundance. Having therefore secured them by garrisons, he +crossed the mountain chain and arrived at Atabyrium, which is situated +upon a rounded hill, the ascent of which is more than fifteen stades +long. But on this occasion he managed to take it by an ambuscade and +stratagem. He induced the men of the town to come out to a skirmish, +and enticed their leading columns to a considerable distance; then +his troops suddenly turned from their pretended flight, and those who +were concealed rising from their ambush, he attacked and killed a +large number of the enemy; and finally, by pursuing close upon their +heels, and thus creating a panic in the town before he reached it, he +carried it as he had done others by assault. At this juncture Ceraeas, +one of Ptolemy’s officers, deserted to Antiochus, whose distinguished +reception caused great excitement in the minds of many other of the +enemy’s officers. At any rate, not long afterwards, Hippolochus of +Thessaly joined Antiochus with four hundred cavalry of Ptolemy’s army. +Having therefore secured Atabyrium also with a garrison, Antiochus +started once more and took over Pella, Camus, and Gephrus. + +[Sidenote: Abila.] + +[Sidenote: Gadara.] + +[Sidenote: Rabbatamana.] + +[Sidenote: Fall of Rabbatamana.] + +[Sidenote: Samaria.] + +[Sidenote: Antiochus goes into winter quarters, B.C. 218-217.] + ++71.+ This unbroken stream of success caused the inhabitants of the +neighbouring Arabia to rouse each other up to take action; and they +unanimously joined Antiochus. With the additional encouragement and +supplies which they afforded he continued his advance; and, arriving +in the district of Galatis, made himself master of Abila, and the +relieving force which had thrown itself into that town, under the +command of Nicias, a friend and kinsman of Menneas. Gadara was the +only town now left, which is thought to be the strongest of any in +those parts. He therefore encamped under its walls and, bringing +siege-works to bear upon it, quickly terrified it into submission. +Then hearing that a strong force of the enemy were concentrated at +Rabbatamana in Arabia, and were pillaging and overrunning the territory +of those Arabians who had joined him, he threw everything else aside +and started thither; and pitched his camp at the foot of the high +ground on which that city stands. After going round and reconnoitring +the hill, and finding that it admitted of being ascended only at two +points, he led his army to them and set up his siege artillery at these +points. He put one set of siege-works under the care of Nicarchus, the +other under that of Theodotus: while he superintended both equally, +and observed the zeal shown by the two respectively. Great exertions +were accordingly made by each, and a continual rivalry kept up as +to which should be the first to make a breach in the wall opposite +their works: and the result was that both breaches were made with +unexpected rapidity; whereupon they kept making assaults night and +day, and trying every means to force an entrance, without an hour’s +intermission. But though they kept up these attempts continuously, +they failed to make any impression; until a prisoner showed them the +underground passage through which the besieged were accustomed to +descend to fetch water. They broke into this and stopped it up with +timber and stones and everything of that sort; and when this was done, +the garrison surrendered for want of water. Having thus got possession +of Rabbatamana, Antiochus left Nicarchus with an adequate garrison in +command of it; and sent the two deserters from Ptolemy, Hippolochus and +Ceraeas, with five thousand infantry, to Samaria: with orders to take +the government of the district and protect all who submitted to him. +He then started with his army for Ptolemais, where he was resolved to +winter. + +[Sidenote: Asia Minor,[270] + ++72.+ In the course of this same summer, the Pednelissians, being +besieged and reduced to great straits by the Selgians, B.C. 218. Relief +of Pednelissus.] sent messages to Achaeus asking for help: and upon +receiving a ready assent, continued to sustain the siege with great +spirit in reliance upon this hope of relief. Achaeus selected Garsyeris +to conduct the expedition; and sent him out in all haste, with six +thousand infantry and five hundred horse, to relieve the Pednelissians. +But when they heard of the approach of the army of relief, the Selgians +occupied the pass called the Stair with the main body of their own +army; and put a garrison at the entrance into Saperda: breaking up +and spoiling all the paths and tracks leading to it. After entering +Milyades and encamping under the walls of Cretopolis, perceiving that +a farther advance was made impossible by the occupation of these +positions by the enemy, Garsyeris hit upon the following ruse. He broke +up his camp, and began his return march, as though he had abandoned +all thoughts of relieving Pednelissus, owing to the enemy’s occupation +of these positions. The Selgians were readily persuaded that he had +really abandoned the relief of Pednelissus, and departed, some to the +besieging camp and others home to Selge, as it was now close upon +harvest-time. Thereupon Garsyeris faced about, and, marching with great +speed, arrived at the pass over the mountain; and finding it unguarded, +secured it by a garrison, under the command of Phayllus; while he +himself with his main army went to Perga: and thence sent embassies +to the other states in Pisidia and Pamphylia, pointing out that the +power of the Selgians was a standing menace, and urging all to ally +themselves with Achaeus and join in relieving Pednelissus. + ++73.+ Meanwhile the Selgians had sent out a general in command of +a force which they hoped would terrify Phallyus by their superior +knowledge of the country, and expel him from his strong position. +But when, far from attaining their object, they lost large numbers +of men in their attacks upon him; though they abandoned the hope +of accomplishing this, they yet persisted with increased ardour in +the siege of Pednelissus. Garsyeris was now reinforced by eight +thousand hoplites from the Etennes, who inhabit the highlands of +Pisidia above Side, and half that number from Aspendus. The people of +Side itself, partly from a wish to curry favour with Antiochus, but +chiefly from hatred to the Aspendians, refused to take part in the +relief of Pednelissus. With these reinforcements, as well as his own +army, Garsyeris advanced towards Pednelissus, feeling certain that he +would be able to raise the siege at the first attack: but when the +Selgians showed no sign of alarm, he entrenched himself at a moderate +distance from them. The Pednelissians were now becoming hard pressed +from want of provisions; and Garsyeris, being anxious to do all he +could, got ready two thousand men, giving each a medimnus of wheat, +and despatched them under cover of night into Pednelissus. But the +Selgians getting intelligence of what was going on, and, coming out +to intercept them, most of those who were carrying in the corn were +killed, and the Selgians got possession of the wheat. Elated with +this success, they now essayed to storm the camp of Garsyeris as well +as the city. An adventurous daring in the presence of the enemy is +indeed characteristic of the Selgians: and on this occasion they left +a barely sufficient number to guard their camp; and, surrounding the +enemy’s entrenchment with the rest, assaulted it at several points at +once. Finding himself unexpectedly attacked on every side, and portions +of his palisade being already torn down, Garsyeris, appreciating the +gravity of the danger, and feeling that there was but little chance +of averting total destruction, sent out some cavalry at a point which +the enemy had left unguarded. These the Selgians imagined to be flying +in a panic and for fear of what was coming: and therefore, instead of +attending to them, they treated them with utter contempt. When these +horsemen, however, had ridden round, so as to get on the rear of the +enemy, they charged and fought with great fierceness. This raised the +spirits of Garsyeris’s infantry, though they had already given way: +and they therefore faced round, and once more offered resistance to +the troops that were storming their camp. The Selgians, accordingly, +being now attacked on front and rear at once, broke and fled. At the +same time the Pednelissians sallied out and attacked the troops left in +charge of the Selgian camp, and drove them out. The pursuit lasted to +so great a distance that no less than ten thousand of the Selgian army +fell: of the survivors all who were allies fled to their own cities; +while the Selgians themselves escaped over the highlands into their +native land. + +[Sidenote: Panic at Selge.] + +[Sidenote: Logbasis turns traitor.] + ++74.+ Garsyeris immediately started in pursuit of the fugitives, being +in haste to get over the narrow pass, and approach Selge, before they +could make a stand, and form any plan for meeting his approach. Thus he +came to Selge with his army. But the inhabitants, having no longer any +hopes in their allies, after the disaster which had affected them all +alike, and themselves dispirited at the misfortune which had befallen +them, became exceedingly anxious for the safety of themselves and their +country. They accordingly determined in public assembly to send one +of their citizens on an embassy to Gassyeris, and selected for the +purpose Logbasis, who had been for a long time on terms of intimacy +and friendship with the Antiochus that lost his life in Thrace.[271] +Laodice,[272] also, who became afterwards the wife of Achaeus, having +been committed to his care, he had brought this young lady up as his +daughter, and had treated her with conspicuous kindness. The Selgians +therefore thought that his character made him eminently fitted for +an ambassador in the circumstances, and accordingly sent him on the +mission. He, however, obtained a private interview with Garsyeris, +and was so far from carrying out the purpose for which he came, by +properly supporting the interests of his country, that on the contrary +he strongly urged Garsyeris to send with all speed for Achaeus, and +undertook to put the city into their hands. Garsyeris, of course, +grasped eagerly at the chance offered to him and sent messengers to +induce Achaeus to come, and to inform him of the position of affairs. +Meanwhile he concluded an armistice with the Selgians, and protracted +the negotiations for a treaty by continually bringing forward +objections and scruples on points of detail, in order to give time for +the arrival of Achaeus, and for Logbasis to conduct his negotiations +and mature his plot. + ++75.+ While this was going on frequent meetings for discussion took +place between the camp and the town, and it became quite an ordinary +thing for the soldiers to go into the town to purchase corn. This is +a state of things which has on many occasions proved fatal. And it +appears to me that of all animals the most easily deceived is man, +though he has the credit of being the most cunning. For consider how +many entrenched camps and fortresses, how many and what great cities +have been betrayed by this kind of trick! And yet in spite of such +frequent and conspicuous examples of the many people to whom it has +happened, somehow or another we are always new to such deceit, and +fall into the trap with the inexperience of youth. The reason is that +we do not keep ready for reference in our minds the disasters of those +who have made mistakes before us in this or that particular. But while +preparing with great labour and cost stores of corn and money, and a +provision of walls and weapons to meet unforeseen eventualities, that +which is the easiest of all and the most serviceable in the hour of +danger—that we all neglect; although we might obtain this experience +from history and research, which in themselves add a dignity to leisure +and a charm to existence. + +[Sidenote: Failure of the treason of Logbasis.] + +Achaeus then duly arrived at the time expected: and after conference +with him, the Selgians had great hopes of experiencing some signal +kindness at his hands. But in the interval Logbasis had little by +little collected in his house some of the soldiers who came into the +town from the camp; and now advised the citizens not to let slip +the opportunity, but to act with the display of Achaeus’s kindly +disposition towards them before their eyes; and to put the finishing +stroke to the treaty, after holding a general assembly of the whole +community to discuss the situation. An assembly was at once convened, +to which even those on guard were all summoned to assist in bringing +the treaty to completion; and the citizens began deliberating on the +state of affairs. + ++76.+ Meanwhile Logbasis, who had agreed with the enemy to take that +opportunity, began getting ready those who had congregated at his +house, and prepared and armed himself and his sons also for the fight. +And now Achaeus with half the hostile force was advancing towards the +city itself; while Garsyeris with the remainder was marching towards +the Cesbedium as it is called, or temple of Zeus, which stands in a +position commanding the city and presenting very much the appearance of +a citadel. But a goatherd, having by chance observed what was going on, +brought the news to the assembly; thereupon some of the citizens made a +hurried rush to the Cesbedium, others to their posts on the wall, and +the majority in great anger to the house of Logbasis. His treasonable +practice being thus detected, some of them climbed upon the roof, +others forced their way in by the front door, and murdered Logbasis +and his sons and all the other men which they found there at the same +time. Then they caused a proclamation to be made promising freedom to +all slaves who would join them: and dividing themselves into three +companies, they hastened to defend all the points of vantage. When he +saw that the Cesbedium was already occupied, Garsyeris abandoned his +enterprise; but Achaeus held on his way until he came right up to the +gates: whereupon the Selgians sallied out, killed seven hundred, and +forced the rest to give up the attempt. Upon this conclusion of their +enterprise, Achaeus and Garsyeris retired to the camp. But the Selgians +fearing treason among themselves, and alarmed at the presence of a +hostile camp, sent out some of their elders in the guise of suppliants, +and concluded a peace, on condition of paying four hundred talents on +the spot and restoring the Pednelissians whom they had taken prisoners, +and paying a further sum of three hundred talents at a fixed date. Thus +did the Selgians by their own valour save their country, which they had +been in danger of losing through the infamous treason of Logbasis; and +thus neither disgraced their freedom, nor their relationship to the +Lacedaemonians.[273] + ++77.+ But after reducing Milyas, and the greater part of Pamphylia, +Achaeus took his departure, and arriving at Sardis kept up a continuous +warfare with Attalus, and began threatening Prusias, and making himself +an object of terror and alarm to all the inhabitants on this side +Taurus. + +[Sidenote: The expedition of Attalus to recover cities which had joined +Achaeus.] + +But while Achaeus was engaged on his expedition against Selge, Attalus +with the Aegosagae from Gaul was going through all the cities in +Aeolis, and the neighbourhood, which had before this been terrified +into joining Achaeus; but most of which now voluntarily and even +gratefully gave in their adherence to him, though there were some few +which waited to be forced. Now the cities which transferred their +allegiance to him in the first instance were Cyme, Smyrna, and Phocaea; +after them Aegae and Temnus submitted, in terror at his approach; and +thereupon he was waited upon by ambassadors from Teos and Colophon with +offers to surrender themselves and their cities. He received them also +upon the same terms as they had enjoyed before, taking hostages; but +he treated the ambassadors from Smyrna with special kindness, because +they had been the most constant in their loyalty of all. Continuing his +march without interruption, he crossed the Lycus and arrived at the +hamlets of Mysia, and thence came to Carseae. Overawing the inhabitants +of this town, as well as the garrison of the Two Walls, he got them +surrendered to him by Themistocles, who had been, as it happened, left +by Achaeus in command of this district. Starting thence, and wasting +the plain of Apia, he crossed Mount Pelecas and encamped near the river +Megistus. + +[Sidenote: Mutiny of the Gauls.] + ++78.+ While he was here an eclipse of the moon occurred: and the +Gauls who had all along been much discontented at the hardships of +the march,—which was rendered the more painful for them by the fact +of their being accompanied by their wives and children, who followed +the host in waggons,—now regarded the eclipse as an evil augury, and +refused to go on. But King Attalus, who got no effective service out +of them, and saw that they straggled during the march and encamped +by themselves, and wholly declined to obey orders and despised all +authority, was in great doubt as to what to do. He was anxious less +they should desert to Achaeus, and join in an attack upon himself: +and was at the same time uneasy at the scandal to which he would give +rise, if he caused his soldiers to surround and kill all these men, who +were believed to have crossed into Asia in reliance on his honour. He +therefore seized the occasion of their refusal to proceed, to promise +them that he would see that they were taken back to the place where +they had crossed into Asia; would assign them suitable lands for a +settlement; and would afterwards do them any service they asked for, if +it was within his power and consistent with justice. + +Accordingly Attalus led the Aegosagae back to the Hellespont; and after +negotiations with the people of Lampsacus, Ilium, and Alexandria, +conducted in a friendly spirit because they had preserved their loyalty +to him, he returned with his army to Pergamum. + +[Sidenote: Ptolemy’s army: 70,000 infantry, 5000 cavalry, 73 elephants.] + +[Sidenote: B.C. 217. Antiochus and Ptolemy recommence hostilities in +the spring.] + +[Sidenote: The army of Antiochus: 62,000 infantry, 6000 cavalry, 102 +elephants.] + ++79.+ At the beginning of the following spring, having all preparations +for war completed, Antiochus and Ptolemy determined to bring their +claims to Coele-Syria to the decision of a battle. Ptolemy accordingly +set out from Alexandria with seventy thousand infantry, five thousand +cavalry, and seventy three elephants. Being informed of his approach, +Antiochus drew his forces together. These consisted of Daae, Carmani, +and Cilicians, equipped as light armed troops to the number of about +five thousand, under the charge and command of Byttacus the Macedonian. +Under Theodotus, the Aetolian, who had deserted from Ptolemy, were ten +thousand picked men from the whole kingdom, armed in the Macedonian +fashion, most of whom had silver shields. The number of the phalanx +was twenty thousand, and they were led by Nicarchus and Theodotus +Hemiolius. In addition to these there were Agrianes and Persians, who +were either bowmen or slingers, to the number of two thousand. With +them were a thousand Thracians, under the command of Menedemus of +Alabanda. There was also a mixed force of Medes, Cissians, Cadusians, +and Carmanians, amounting to five thousand men, who were assigned to +the chief command of Aspasianus the Mede. Certain Arabians also and men +of neighbouring tribes, to the number of ten thousand, were commanded +by Zabdibelus. The mercenaries from Greece amounting to five thousand +were led by Hippolochus of Thessaly. Antiochus had also fifteen hundred +Cretans who came with Eurylochus, and a thousand Neo-Cretans commanded +by Zelys of Gortyna; with whom were five hundred javelin men of Lydia, +and a thousand Cardaces who came with Lysimachus the Gaul. The entire +number of his horse was six thousand; four thousand were commanded by +the king’s nephew Antipater, the rest by Themison; so that the whole +number of Antiochus’s force was sixty-two thousand infantry, six +thousand cavalry, and one hundred and two elephants. + +[Sidenote: Ptolemy enters Palestine.] + ++80.+ Having marched to Pelusium Ptolemy made his first halt in that +town: and having been there joined by the stragglers, and having given +out their rations of corn to his men, he got the army in motion, and +led them by a line of march which goes through the waterless region +skirting Mount Casius and the Marshes.[274] On the fifth day’s march +he reached his destination, and pitched his camp a distance of fifty +stades from Rhaphia, which is the first city of Coele-Syria towards +Egypt. + +[Sidenote: Antiochus goes to meet him.] + +While Ptolemy was effecting this movement Antiochus arrived with his +army at Gaza, where he was joined by some reinforcements, and once +more commenced his advance, proceeding at a leisurely pace. He passed +Rhaphia and encamped about ten stades from the enemy. For a while the +two armies preserved this distance, and remained encamped opposite each +other. But after some few days, wishing to remove to more advantageous +ground and to inspire confidence in his troops, Antiochus pushed +forward his camp so much nearer Ptolemy, that the palisades of the two +camps were not more than five stades from each other; and while in this +position, there were frequent struggles at the watering-places and on +forays, as well as infantry and cavalry skirmishes in the space between +the camps. + +[Sidenote: Daring attempt of Theodotus to assassinate Ptolemy.] + ++81.+ In the course of these proceedings Theodotus conceived and put +into execution an enterprise, very characteristic of an Aetolian, but +undoubtedly requiring great personal courage. Having formerly lived +at Ptolemy’s court he knew the king’s tastes and habits. Accordingly, +accompanied by two others, he entered the enemy’s camp just before +daybreak; where, owing to the dim light, he could not be recognised +by his face, while his dress and other accoutrements did not render +him noticeable, owing to the variety of costume prevailing among +themselves. He had marked the position of the king’s tent during the +preceding days, for the skirmishes took place quite close; and he +now walked boldly up to it, and passed through all the outer ring of +attendants without being observed: but when he came to the tent in +which the king was accustomed to transact business and dine, though he +searched it in every conceivable way, he failed to find the king; for +Ptolemy slept in another tent, separate from the public and official +tent. He however wounded two men who were sleeping there, and killed +Andreas, the king’s physician; and then returned safely to his own +camp, without meeting with any molestation, except just as he was +passing over the vallum of the enemy’s camp. As far as daring went, he +had fulfilled his purpose: but he had failed in prudence by not taking +the precaution to ascertain where Ptolemy was accustomed to sleep. + +[Sidenote: Disposition of the two armies for the battle of Rhaphia.] + ++82.+ After being encamped opposite each other for five days, the two +kings resolved to bring matters to the decision of battle. And upon +Ptolemy beginning to move his army outside its camp, Antiochus hastened +to do the same. Both formed their front of their phalanx and men armed +in the Macedonian manner. But Ptolemy’s two wings were formed as +follows:—Polycrates, with the cavalry under his command, occupied the +left, and between him and the phalanx were Cretans standing close by +the horsemen; next them came the royal guard;[275] then the peltasts +under Socrates, adjoining the Libyans armed in Macedonian fashion. +On the right wing was Echecrates of Thessaly, with his division of +cavalry; on his left were stationed Gauls and Thracians; next them +Phoxidas and the Greek mercenaries, extending to the Egyptian phalanx. +Of the elephants forty were on the left wing, where Ptolemy was to be +in person during the battle; the other thirty-three had been stationed +in front of the right wing opposite the mercenary cavalry. + +Antiochus also placed sixty of his elephants commanded by his +foster-brother Philip in front of his right wing, on which he was to +be present personally, to fight opposite Ptolemy. Behind these he +stationed the two thousand cavalry commanded by Antipater, and two +thousand more at right angles to them. + +In line with the cavalry he placed the Cretans, and next them the Greek +mercenaries; with the latter he mixed two thousand of these armed in +the Macedonian fashion under the command of the Macedonian Byttacus. +At the extreme point of the left wing he placed two thousand cavalry +under the command of Themison; by their side Cardacian and Lydian +javelin-men; next them the light-armed division of three thousand, +commanded by Menedemus; then the Cissians, Medes, and Carmanians; and +by their side the Arabians and neighbouring peoples who continued the +line up to the phalanx. The remainder of the elephants he placed in +front of his left wing under the command of Myiscus, one of the boys +about the court. + +[Sidenote: Addresses to the two armies before the battle of Rhaphia.] + ++83.+ The two armies having been drawn up in the order I have +described; the kings went along their respective lines, and addressed +words of encouragement and exhortation to their officers and friends. +But as they both rested their strongest hopes on their phalanx, they +showed their greatest earnestness and addressed their strongest +exhortations to them; which were re-echoed in Ptolemy’s case by +Andromachus and Sosibius and the king’s sister Arsinoe; in the case +of Antiochus by Theodotus and Nicarchus: these officers being the +commanders of the phalanx in the two armies respectively. The substance +of what was said on both sides was the same: for neither monarch had +any glorious or famous achievement of his own to quote to those whom he +was addressing, seeing that they had but recently succeeded to their +crowns; but they endeavoured to inspire the men of the phalanx with +spirit and boldness, by reminding them of the glory of their ancestors, +and the great deeds performed by them. But they chiefly dwelt upon the +hopes of advancement which the men might expect at their hands in the +future; and they called upon and exhorted the leaders and the whole +body of men, who were about to be engaged, to maintain the fight with a +manly and courageous spirit. So with these or similar words, delivered +by their own lips or by interpreters, they rode along their lines. + +[Sidenote: The battle of Rhaphia.] + ++84.+ Ptolemy, accompanied by his sister, having arrived at the left +wing of his army, and Antiochus with the royal guard at the right: they +gave the signal for the battle, and opened the fight by a charge of +elephants. Only some few of Ptolemy’s elephants came to close quarters +with the foe: seated on these the soldiers in the howdahs maintained +a brilliant fight, lunging at and striking each other with crossed +pikes.[276] But the elephants themselves fought still more brilliantly, +using all their strength in the encounter, and pushing against each +other, forehead to forehead. + +[Sidenote: Fighting elephants.] + +[Sidenote: Antiochus’s right wing successful.] + +The way in which elephants fight is this: they get their tusks +entangled and jammed, and then push against one another with all their +might, trying to make each other yield ground until one of them proving +superior in strength has pushed aside the other’s trunk; and when once +he can get a side blow at his enemy, he pierces him with his tusks as +a bull would with his horns. Now, most of Ptolemy’s animals, as is the +way with Libyan elephants, were afraid to face the fight: for they +cannot stand the smell or the trumpeting of the Indian elephants, but +are frightened at their size and strength, I suppose, and run away from +them at once without waiting to come near them. This is exactly what +happened on this occasion: and upon their being thrown into confusion +and being driven back upon their own lines, Ptolemy’s guard gave way +before the rush of the animals; while Antiochus, wheeling his men +so as to avoid the elephants, charged the division of cavalry under +Polycrates. At the same time the Greek mercenaries stationed near the +phalanx, and behind the elephants, charged Ptolemy’s peltasts and made +them give ground, the elephants having already thrown their ranks also +into confusion. Thus Ptolemy’s whole left wing began to give way before +the enemy. + +[Sidenote: Ptolemy’s right wing also successful.] + +[Sidenote: The centre coming into action. Ptolemy is victorious.] + +[Sidenote: Final retreat of Antiochus.] + ++85.+ Echecrates the commander of the right wing waited at first +to see the result of the struggle between the other wings of the +two armies: but when he saw the dust coming his way, and that the +elephants opposite his division were afraid even to approach the +hostile elephants at all, he ordered Phoxidas to charge the part of the +enemy opposite him with his Greek mercenaries; while he made a flank +movement with the cavalry and the division behind the elephants; and +so getting out of the line of the hostile elephants’ attack, charged +the enemy’s cavalry on the rear or the flank and quickly drove them +from their ground. Phoxidas and his men were similarly successful: for +they charged the Arabians and Medes and forced them into precipitate +flight. Thus Antiochus’s right wing gained a victory, while his left +was defeated. The phalanxes, left without the support of either wing, +remained intact in the centre of the plain, in a state of alternate +hope and fear for the result. Meanwhile Antiochus was assisting in +gaining the victory on his right wing; while Ptolemy, who had retired +behind his phalanx, now came forward in the centre, and showing +himself in the view of both armies struck terror in the hearts of the +enemy, but inspired great spirit and enthusiasm in his own men; and +Andromachus and Sosibius at once ordered them to lower their sarissae +and charge. The picked Syrian troops stood their ground only for a +short time, and the division of Nicarchus quickly broke and fled. +Antiochus presuming, in his youthful inexperience, from the success of +his own division, that he would be equally victorious all along the +line, was pressing on the pursuit; but upon one of the older officers +at length giving him warning, and pointing out that the cloud of dust +raised by the phalanx was moving towards their own camp, he understood +too late what was happening; and endeavoured to gallop back with the +squadron of royal cavalry on to the field. But finding his whole line +in full retreat he was forced to retire to Rhaphia: comforting himself +with the belief that, as far as he was personally concerned, he had won +a victory, but had been defeated in the whole battle by the want of +spirit and courage shown by the rest. + +[Sidenote: The losses on either side.] + ++86.+ Having secured the final victory by his phalanx, and killed +large numbers of the enemy in the pursuit by means of his cavalry and +mercenaries on his right wing, Ptolemy retired to his own camp and +there spent the night. But next day, after picking up and burying his +own dead, and stripping the bodies of the enemy, he advanced towards +Rhaphia. Antiochus had wished, immediately after the retreat of his +army, to make a camp outside the city; and there rally such of his men +as had fled in compact bodies: but finding that the greater number had +retreated into the town, he was compelled to enter it himself also. +Next morning, however, before daybreak, he led out the relics of his +army and made the best of his way to Gaza. There he pitched a camp: and +having sent an embassy to obtain leave to pick up his dead, he obtained +a truce for performing their obsequies. His loss amounted to nearly ten +thousand infantry and three hundred cavalry killed, and four thousand +taken prisoners. Three elephants were killed on the field, and two died +afterwards of their wounds. On Ptolemy’s side the losses were fifteen +hundred infantry killed and seven hundred cavalry: sixteen of his +elephants were killed, and most of the others captured. + +Such was the result of the battle of Rhaphia between kings Ptolemy and +Antiochus for the possession of Coele-Syria. + +[Sidenote: The effect of the battle of Rhaphia.] + +After picking up his dead Antiochus retired with his army to his own +country: while Ptolemy took over Rhaphia and the other towns without +difficulty, all the states vying with each other as to which should +be first to renew their allegiance and come over to him. And perhaps +it is the way of the world everywhere to accommodate one’s self to +circumstances at such times; but it is eminently true of the race +inhabiting that country, that they have a natural turn and inclination +to worship success. Moreover it was all the more natural in this +case, owing to the existing disposition of the people in favour of +the Alexandrian kings; for the inhabitants of Coele-Syria are somehow +always more loyally disposed to this family than to any other. +Accordingly they now stopped short of no extravagance of adulation, +honouring Ptolemy with crowns, sacrifices, and every possible +compliment of the kind. + +[Sidenote: Peace between Ptolemy and Antiochus for a year, B.C. 217.] + ++87.+ Meanwhile Antiochus, on arriving at the city which bears his +own name, immediately despatched an embassy to Ptolemy, consisting of +Antipater, his nephew, and Theodotus Hemiolius, to treat of a peace, in +great alarm lest the enemy should advance upon him. For his defeat had +inspired him with distrust of his own forces, and he was afraid that +Achaeus would seize the opportunity to attack him. It did not occur +to Ptolemy to take any of these circumstances into account: but being +thoroughly satisfied with his unexpected success, and generally at his +unlooked for acquisition of Coele-Syria, he was by no means indisposed +to peace; but even more inclined to it than he ought to have been: +influenced in that direction by the habitual effeminacy and corruption +of his manner of life. Accordingly, when Antipater and his colleague +arrived, after some little bluster and vituperation of Antiochus for +what had taken place, he agreed to a truce for a year. He sent Sosibius +back with the ambassadors to ratify the treaty: while he himself, after +remaining three months in Syria and Phoenicia, and settling the towns, +left Andromachus of Aspendus as governor of this district, and started +with his sister and friends for Alexandria: having brought the war to a +conclusion in a way that surprised his subjects, when they contrasted +it with the principles on which he spent the rest of his life. +Antiochus after exchanging ratifications of the treaty with Sosibius, +employed himself in making preparations for attacking Achaeus, as he +had originally begun doing. Such was the political situation in Asia. + +[Sidenote: Earthquake at Rhodes. Royal liberality, B.C. 224.] + +[Sidenote: Hiero and Gelo.] + ++88.+ About the same period the earthquake occurred at Rhodes, which +overthrew the great Colossus and the larger part of the walls and +dockyards. But the adroit policy of the Rhodians converted this +misfortune into an opportunity; and under their skilful management, +instead of adding to their embarrassments, it became the means of +restoring their prosperity. So decisive in human affairs, public or +private, is the difference between incapacity and good sense, between +idle indifference and a close attention to business. Good fortune +only damages the one, while disaster is but a means of recovery to +the other. This was illustrated by the manner in which the Rhodians +turned the misfortune that befel them to account. They enhanced its +magnitude and importance by the prominence which they gave it, and the +serious tone in which they spoke of it, as well by the mouth of their +ambassadors as in the intercourse of private life; and they created +thus such an effect upon other states, and especially upon the feelings +of the kings, that they were not only overwhelmed with presents, but +made the donors feel actually obliged for their acceptance of them. +Hiero and Gelo, for instance, presented them with seventy-five talents +of silver, part at once, and the rest at a very short interval, as +a contribution towards the expenses of the gymnasium; gave them +for religious purposes some silver cauldrons and their stands, and +some water vessels; and in addition to this ten talents for their +sacrifices, and ten more to attract new citizens: their intention +being that the whole present should amount to a hundred talents.[277] +Not only so, but they gave immunity from customs to Rhodian merchants +coming to their ports; and presented them besides with fifty +catapults of three cubits length. In spite too of these large gifts, +they regarded themselves as under an obligation to the Rhodians; +and accordingly erected statues in the _Deigma_ or Mart of Rhodes, +representing the community of Rhodes crowned by that of Syracuse. + +[Sidenote: Antigonus.] + ++89.+ Then too Ptolemy offered them three hundred talents of silver; +a million medimni[278] of corn; [Sidenote: Ptolemy.] ship timber for +ten quinqueremes and ten triremes, consisting of forty thousand cubits +of squared pine planking; a thousand talents of bronze coinage; three +thousand talents[279] of tow; three thousand pieces of sail cloth; +three thousand talents for the repair of the Colossus; a hundred master +builders with three hundred and fifty workmen, and fourteen talents +yearly to pay their wages. Besides this he gave twelve thousand medimni +of corn for their public games and sacrifices, and twenty thousand +medimni for victualling ten triremes. The greater part of these goods +was delivered at once, as well as a third of the whole of the money +named. In a similar spirit Antigonus offered ten thousand timbers, +varying from sixteen to eight cubits in length, to be used as purlins; +five thousand rafters seven cubits long; three thousand talents of +iron; a thousand talents of pitch; a thousand amphorae of the same +unboiled; and a hundred talents of silver besides. His queen, Chryseis, +also gave a hundred thousand medimni of corn, and three thousand +talents of lead. Again Seleucus,[280] father of Antiochus, besides +granting freedom from imports to Rhodians sailing to his dominions, +and besides giving ten quinqueremes fully equipped, and two hundred +thousand medimni of corn; gave also ten thousand cubits of timber, and +a thousand talents of resin and hair. + +[Sidenote: Other princes.] + ++90.+ Nor were Prusias and Mithridates far behind these in liberality; +nor the princes Lysanias, Olympichus, and Lymnaeas, who were at that +time in power in different parts of Asia; and as for states that, +according to their several abilities contributed to their assistance, +it would be difficult to reckon their number. In fact, though when we +regard the time which it took the city to recover its populousness, +and the state of desolation from which it started, we cannot fail to +be struck at the rapidity and the extent of its improvement in regard +both to private and public wealth; yet when we contemplate the natural +advantages of its site, and the contributions from outside which served +to raise its fortunes to their original height, this feeling must give +way to a conviction that the advance was somewhat less than might have +been expected. + +My object in giving these details is twofold. I wished to exhibit the +brilliant conduct of their public affairs by the Rhodians, for indeed +they deserve both to be commended and imitated: and I wished also to +point out the insignificance of the gifts bestowed by the kings of our +own day, and received by nations and states; that these monarchs may +not imagine that by the expenditure of four or five talents they are +doing anything so very great, or expect to receive at the hands of the +Greeks the honour enjoyed by former kings; and that states when they +see before their eyes the magnitude of the presents formerly bestowed, +may not, nowadays, in return for insignificant and paltry benefactions, +blindly bestow their most ample and splendid honours; but may use that +discrimination in apportioning their favours to desert, in which Greeks +excel the rest of the world. + +[Sidenote: B.C. 217. Greece. Return of Lycurgus to Sparta. He projects +an invasion of Messenia.] + +[Sidenote: The preparations of Aratus.] + ++91.+ Just at the beginning of this summer, while Agetas was Strategus +of the Aetolians, and when Aratus had just become Strategus of the +Achaean league,—at which point we broke off in our history of the +Social war,[281]—Lycurgus of Sparta returned home from Aetolia. The +Ephors had discovered that the charge on which he had been banished +was false; and had accordingly sent for him back, and recalled him +from exile. He at once began making an arrangement with Pyrrhias the +Aetolian, who happened at the time to be commander in Elis, for an +invasion of Messenia. Now, when Aratus came into office, he found the +mercenary army of the league in a state of complete demoralisation, and +the cities very slack to pay the tax for their support, owing to the +bad and spiritless manner in which his predecessor Eperatus had managed +the affairs of the league. He, however, exhorted the members of the +league to reform, and obtained a decree dealing with this matter; and +then threw himself with energy into the preparations for the war. The +decree passed by the Achaeans ordered the maintenance of eight thousand +mercenary infantry and five hundred horse, together with three thousand +Achaean infantry and three hundred horse, enrolled in the usual way; +and that of these latter five hundred foot and fifty horse were to be +brazen-shield men from Megalopolis, and the same number of Argives. +It ordered also that three ships should be manned to cruise off Acte +and in the Argolic gulf, and three off Patrae and Dyme, and in the sea +there. + +[Sidenote: The ill-success of Lycurgus.] + ++92.+ While Aratus was engaged in these transactions, and in completing +these preparations, Lycurgus and Pyrrhias, after an interchange +of messages to secure their making their expedition at the same +time, marched into Messenia. The Achaean Strategus, aware of their +design, came with the mercenaries and some of the picked Achaeans to +Megalopolis, with the view of supporting the Messenians. After setting +out, Lycurgus got possession of Calamae, a stronghold in Messenia, by +treachery; and pressed hurriedly forward to effect a junction with the +Aetolians. But Pyrrhias had started from Elis with a wholly inadequate +force, and, having been easily stopped at the pass into Messenia by +the Cyparissians, had turned back. Lycurgus therefore being unable +to effect his junction with Pyrrhias, and not being strong enough by +himself, after assaulting Andania for a short time, returned back to +Sparta without having effected anything. + +When the plot of the enemy had thus gone to pieces; Aratus, with a +provident regard for the future, arranged with Taurion to provide fifty +horse and five hundred foot, and with the Messenians to send an equal +number; with the view of using these men to protect the territories of +Messenia, Megalopolis, Tegea, and Argos,—for these districts, being +on the frontier of Laconia, have to bear the brunt of Lacedaemonian +invasion for the rest of the Peloponnese; while with the Achaean levies +and mercenaries he planned to guard the parts of Achaia which lay +towards Elis and Aetolia. + +[Sidenote: Condition of Megalopolis.] + ++93.+ After adjusting these matters, he settled in accordance with the +decree of the league the intestine disputes at Megalopolis. For it +happened that the people of this town having been recently deprived +of their country by Cleomenes,[282] and, to use a common expression, +shaken to their foundations, were in absolute want of many things, +and ill-provided with all: for they persisted in maintaining their +usual scale of living, while their means both public and private were +entirely crippled. The consequence was that the town was filled with +disputes, jealousies, and mutual hatred; which is ever the case, +both with states and individuals, when means fall short of desires. +The first controversy was about the walling of the town,—one party +maintaining that the limits of the city should be contracted to a size +admitting of being completely walled and guarded at a time of danger; +for that in the late occasion it was its size and unguarded state which +had caused their disaster. In addition to this it was maintained by +this party that the landowners should contribute the third part of +their land to provide for the enrolment of new citizens. The other +party rejected the notion of contracting the limits of the city and +would not consent to contribute a third part of their lands. But the +most serious controversy of all was in regard to the laws draughted for +them by Prytanis, an eminent Peripatetic philosopher, whom Antigonus +Doson appointed to draw them up a constitution. In this distracted +state of politics, Aratus intervened with all the earnestness he +could command, and succeeded in pacifying the heated feelings of the +citizens. The terms on which the controversies were settled were +engraved on a column, and set up near the altar of Vesta in the +Homarium.[283] + +[Sidenote: Another raid of Aetolians from Elis.] + +[Sidenote: The Achaean fleet retaliates on Aetolia.] + ++94.+ After arranging this settlement, Aratus broke up his camp; and +going on himself to the congress from of the Achaeans, handed over the +mercenaries to Lycus of Pharae, as the Sub-Strategus of the league. But +the Eleans, being dissatisfied with Pyrrhias, once more induced the +Aetolians to send them Euripidas; who, waiting until the Achaeans were +engaged in their congress, took sixty horse and two thousand foot, and +started on a raid. Having passed through the territory of Pharae, he +overran the country up to the territory of Aegium; and after securing +and driving off a considerable booty, he began a retreat towards +Leontium. But Lycus, learning what had happened, went in all haste to +protect the country; and falling in with the enemy, he attacked them +at once and killed four hundred and took two hundred prisoners, among +whom were the following men of rank: Physsias, Antanor, Clearchus, +Androlochus, Euanoridas, Aristogeiton, Nicasippus, and Aspasius. The +arms and baggage fell entirely into his hands. About the same time +the Navarch of the league having gone on an expedition to Molycria, +returned with nearly a hundred captives. Returning once more to Aetolia +he sailed to Chalceia and captured two war ships, with their crews, +which put out to resist him; and took also a long boat with its men on +the Aetolian Rhium. There being thus an influx of booty both by sea +and land at the same period, and a considerable amount of money and +provisions being obtained from this, the soldiers felt confident of +getting their pay, and the cities of the league were sanguine of not +being likely to be hard pressed by their contributions. + +[Sidenote: Scerdilaidas the Illyrian plunders the coast.] + ++95.+ While these events were taking place Scerdilaidas, thinking +that he was not being treated fairly, because some of the payments +agreed upon in his treaty with Philip were in arrear, sent out fifteen +galleys, treacherously pretending that their object was to receive +and convoy the money. These galleys sailed to Leucas, where they were +received by all as friendly, owing to their former alliance: but the +only mischief they had time to do was to make a treacherous attack +on the Corinthian Agathinus and Cassander, who had come there on +board Taurion’s ships, and were lying at anchor close to them with +four vessels. These they captured with their vessels and sent to +Scerdilaidas; and then putting out to sea from Leucas, and sailing +towards Malea, they plundered and captured the merchants whom they met. + +[Sidenote: More raids.] + +Harvest time was now approaching: and as Taurion paid little attention +to the protection of the cities I mentioned above; Aratus in person, +at the head of some picked Achaean troops, protected the getting in +of the harvest round Argos: while Euripidas at the head of a force of +Aetolians set out on a raid, with the object of ravaging the territory +of Tritaea. But when Lycus and Demodocus, the Hipparch of the league, +heard of the expedition of the Aetolians from Elis, they collected +the people of Dymae, Patrae and Pharae, and joining the mercenaries +to these forces made an incursion upon Elis. Arrived at a place +called Phyxium, they allowed their light-armed troops and their horse +to plunder the country, but kept their hoplites concealed near this +place: and when the Eleans had sallied out in full force to attack +the foraging parties, and were pursuing them as they retreated, the +hoplites with Lycus rose from their hiding-place and charged them +as they rushed heedlessly on. The Eleans did not stand against the +attack, but fled at the mere appearance of the hoplites: who killed two +hundred of them and took eighty prisoners, and carried off with them +in safety all the booty that had been driven in from the country. At +the same time the Navarch of the league made numerous descents upon +Calydonia and the territory of Naupactus; and not only overran the +country, but twice annihilated the force sent out to resist him. Among +others he took Cleonicus of Naupactus prisoner: who owing to this being +a proxenus of the Achaeans was not sold on the spot, and after some +little time was set free without ransom. + +[Sidenote: Acarnania.] + ++96.+ About the same time Agetas, the Strategus of the Aetolian +league, proclaimed a general levy of Aetolians, and went on a foraging +expedition into the territory of the Acarnanians. He marched through +all Epirus, plundering as he went without let or hindrance; after doing +which he returned home, and dismissed the Aetolian levy to their own +cities. But the Acarnanians, upon making a retaliatory invasion of +the territory of Stratus, were seized with a panic: and returned with +disgrace, though without loss; because the people of Stratus did not +venture to pursue them, believing that their retreat was a ruse to +cover an ambuscade. + +[Sidenote: Phanoteus in Phocis. The biter bit.] + +An instance of counter-treachery occurred also at Phanoteus. Alexander +who had been appointed governor of Phocis by Philip, entered into a +plot against the Aetolians, through the agency of a certain Jason, who +had been appointed by himself to command the city of Phanoteus. This +man sent a message to Agetas, the Strategus of the Aetolian league, +agreeing to hand over to him the citadel of Phanoteus; and he confirmed +his offer by a regularly sworn treaty. On the appointed day Agetas +came with his Aetolian levy to Phanoteus under cover of night; and +concealing the rest at some little distance, he selected a hundred +of the most active men and sent them towards the citadel. Jason had +Alexander all ready with his soldiers, but duly received the Aetolians +as he had sworn into the citadel. Immediately Alexander and his men +threw themselves into the citadel also: the Aetolian hundred picked +soldiers were made prisoners; and when daylight showed Agetas what had +taken place, he drew off his troops,—baffled by a ruse very like what +he had on many occasions practised himself. + +[Sidenote: Philip’s campaign in Upper Macedonia and Thessaly.] + +[Sidenote: Meliteia.] + ++97.+ About this same period King Philip captured Bylazora, the largest +town of Paeonia, and very favourably situated for commanding the pass +from Dardania to Macedonia: so that by this achievement he was all +but entirely freed from any fear of the Dardani, it being no longer +easy for them to invade Macedonia, as long as this city gave Philip +the command of the pass. Having secured this place, he despatched +Chrysogonus with all speed to summon the upper Macedonians to arms; +while he himself, taking on the men of Bottia and Amphaxitis, arrived +at Edessa. Waiting there until he was joined by the Macedonians under +Chrysogonus, he started with his whole army, and on the sixth day’s +march arrived at Larisa; and thence by a rapid night march he came +before daybreak to Meliteia, and placing scaling ladders against the +walls, attempted to take the town by escalade. The suddenness and +unexpectedness of the attack so dismayed the people of Meliteia, that +he would easily have taken the town; but he was baffled by the fact of +the ladders proving to be far too short. + ++98.+ This is the kind of mistake which above all others reflects +discredit on the commanders. For what can be more culpable than to +arrive at a town which they mean to carry, in an entirely unprovided +state, without having taken the precaution of measuring walls, cliffs, +and the like, by which they intend to effect their entrance? Or again, +while satisfying themselves as to these measurements, to entrust +the construction of ladders and all such machinery, which, though +taking little time to make, have to stand the test of a very critical +service, without consideration, and to incompetent persons,—is not +this deserving of censure? For in such actions it is not a question of +succeeding or failing without ill consequences; but failure is followed +by positive damage in manifold respects: danger to the bravest of the +men at the actual time, and still greater danger during their retreat, +when they have once incurred the contempt of the enemy. The examples +of such disasters are numerous; for you will find that of those who +have failed in such attempts, many more have perished, or have been +reduced to the last extremity of danger, than have come off scatheless. +Moreover, no one can deny that they arouse distrust and hatred against +themselves for the future, and give all men warning to be on their +guard. For it is not only the persons attacked, but all who know what +has happened, who are thereby bidden to look out for themselves and be +on the watch. Wherefore it is never right for men in places of trust +to conduct such enterprises inconsiderately. The method also of taking +such measurements, and constructing machines of this kind, is easy and +liable to no mistakes, if they are taken in hand scientifically. + +For the present, however, I must resume the thread of my narrative, +but I shall take another fitting opportunity in the course of my work +to speak of these matters, and will endeavour to show how mistakes may +best be avoided in such undertakings. + +[Sidenote: Thebae Phthiotides, B.C. 217.] + ++99.+ Thus baffled in his attempt upon Meliteia, Philip encamped upon +the bank of the Enipeus, and collected from Larisa and the other +cities the siege train which he had caused to be constructed during +the winter. For the chief object of his campaign was the capture of +the city called Phthiotid Thebes. Now this city lies no long way from +the sea, about thirty stades from Larisa, and is conveniently situated +in regard both to Magnesia and Thessaly; but especially as commanding +the district of Demetrias in Magnesia, and of Pharsalus and Pherae in +Thessaly. From it, at that very time, much damage was being inflicted +upon the Demetrians, Pharsalians, and Larisaeans; as the Aetolians +were in occupation of it, and made continual predatory expeditions, +often as far as to the plain of Amyrus. Philip did not regard the +matter as at all of small importance, but was exceedingly bent on +taking the town. Having therefore got together a hundred and fifty +catapults, and twenty-five stone-throwing ballistae, he sat down before +Thebes. He distributed his forces between three points in the vicinity +of the city; one was encamped near Scopium; a second near a place +called Heliotropium; and the third on the hill overhanging the town. +The spaces between these camps he fortified by a trench and double +palisade, and further secured them by towers of wood, at intervals of a +hundred feet, with an adequate guard. When these works were finished, +he collected all his siege train together and began to move his engines +towards the citadel. + +[Sidenote: Thebes is taken, its inhabitants enslaved, and its name +changed to Philippopolis.] + ++100.+ For the first three days the king was unable to make any +progress in bringing his machines against the town, owing to the +gallant and even desperate defence which the garrison opposed to him. +But when the continual skirmishing, and the volleys of missiles, had +began to tell upon the defenders, and some of them were killed and +others disabled by wounds; the defence becoming a little slacker, the +Macedonians began sinking mines, and at last after nine days' work +reached the walls. They then carried on the work by relays, so as never +to leave it off day or night: and thus in three days had undermined +and underpinned two hundred feet of the wall. The props, however, +proved too weak to support the weight, and gave way; so that the wall +fell without the Macedonians having the trouble of setting fire to +them. When they had worked energetically at clearing the debris, and +had made every preparation for entering by the breach, and were just +on the point of carrying it, the Thebans in a panic surrendered the +town. The security which this achievement of Philip’s gave to Magnesia +and Thessaly deprived the Aetolians of a rich field for plunder; and +demonstrated to his army that he had been justified in putting Leontius +to death, for his deliberate treachery in the previous siege of Palae. +Having thus become master of Thebes he sold its existing inhabitants +into slavery, and drafting in some Macedonian settlers changed its name +to Philippopolis. + +Just as the king had finished the settlement of Thebes, ambassadors +once more came from Chios, Rhodes, Byzantium, and King Ptolemy to +negotiate terms of peace. He answered them in much the same terms as +he had the former,[284] that he was not averse to peace; and bade them +go and find out what the feelings of the Aetolians were. Meanwhile he +himself cared little about making peace, but continued steadily to +prosecute his designs. + +[Sidenote: Philip hears of the Battle of Thrasymene, 22d June.] + +[Sidenote: Nemean festival. Midsummer of B.C. 217.] + ++101.+ Accordingly, when he heard that the galleys of Scerdilaidas +were committing acts of piracy off Malea, and treating all merchants +as open enemies, and had treacherously seized some of his own vessels +which were at anchor at Leucas, he fitted out twelve decked ships, +eight open vessels, and thirty light craft called hemioliae,[285] and +sailed through the Euripus in hot haste to come up with the Illyrians; +exceedingly excited about his plans for carrying on the war against the +Aetolians, as he knew nothing as yet of what had happened in Italy. +For the defeat of the Romans by Hannibal in Etruria took place while +Philip was besieging Thebes, but the report of that occurrence had not +yet reached Greece. Philip arrived too late to capture the galleys: +and therefore, dropping anchor at Cenchreae, he sent away his decked +ships, with orders to sail round Malea in the direction of Aegium and +Patrae; but having caused the rest of his vessels to be dragged across +the Isthmus, he ordered them to anchor at Lechaeum; while he went in +haste with his friends to Argos to attend the Nemean festival. Just as +he was engaged in watching the gymnastic contest, a courier arrived +from Macedonia with news of the Romans having been defeated in a great +battle, and of Hannibal being in possession of the open country. +Philip showed the letter to no one at the moment, except to Demetrius +of Pharos, enjoining him not to say a word. The latter seized the +occasion to advise Philip to throw over the war against the Aetolians +as soon as possible; and to concentrate his efforts upon Illyria, +and an expedition into Italy. “For Greece,” said he, “is already +entirely obedient to you, and will remain so: the Achaeans from genuine +affection; the Aetolians from the terror which their disasters in the +present war have inspired them. Italy, and your crossing into it, is +the first step in the acquirement of universal empire, to which no one +has a better claim than yourself. And now is the moment to act when the +Romans have suffered a reverse.” + ++102.+ By using such arguments he found no difficulty in firing +Philip’s ambition: as was natural, I think, considering that he was +but a youthful monarch, who had as yet been successful in all his +undertakings, and was in any case of a singularly daring character; +and considering too that he was sprung from a family which above all +families has somehow a tendency to aim at universal monarchy. + +[Sidenote: Zacynthus visited by Philip.] + +[Sidenote: A peace congress summoned.] + +At the moment then, as I said, Philip communicated the news conveyed +by the letter to Demetrius alone; and afterwards summoning a council +of his friends consulted them on the subject of making peace with the +Aetolians. And when even Aratus professed no disinclination to the +measure, on the ground that they would be making peace as conquerors, +the king without waiting for the ambassadors, who were officially +engaged in negotiating its terms, sent Cleonicus of Naupactus at once +to Aetolia, whom he found still awaiting the meeting of the Achaean +league after his captivity;[286] while he himself, taking his ships and +land force from Corinth, came with it to Aegium. Thence he advanced +as far as Lasion and took the Tower in Perippia, and pretended, in +order to avoid appearing too eager for the conclusion of the war, that +he was meditating an invasion of Elis. By this time Cleonicus had +been backwards and forwards two or three times; and as the Aetolians +begged that he would meet them personally in conference, he assented, +and abandoning all warlike measures, he sent couriers to the allied +cities, bidding their commissioners to sit in the conference with him +and take part in the discussion of the terms of peace: and then crossed +over with his army and encamped near Panormus, which is a harbour of +the Peloponnese, and lies exactly opposite Naupactus. There he waited +for the commissioners from the allies, and employed the time required +for their assembling in sailing to Zacynthus, and settling on his own +authority the affairs of the island; and having done so he sailed back +to Panormus. + +[Sidenote: Philip goes to Naupactus.] + ++103.+ The commissioners having now assembled, Philip sent Aratus and +Taurion, and some others who had come with them, to the Aetolians. They +found them in full assembly at Naupactus; and after a short conference +with them, and satisfying themselves as to their inclination for peace, +they sailed back to Philip to inform him of the state of the case. +But the Aetolians, being very eager to bring the war to a conclusion, +sent ambassadors with them to Philip urging him to visit them with his +army, that by a personal conference the business might be brought to +a satisfactory conclusion. Moved by these representations, the king +sailed across with his army to what is called the Hollows of Naupactus, +about twenty stades from the town. Having pitched a camp there, and +having caused both it and his ships to be surrounded by a palisade, +he waited for the time fixed for the interview. The Aetolians came +_en masse_ without arms; and keeping at a distance of two stades from +Philip’s camp, interchanged messages and discussions on the subjects +in question. The negotiation was begun by the king sending all the +commissioners of the allies, with instructions to offer the Aetolians +peace, on the condition of both parties retaining what they then held. +This preliminary the Aetolians readily agreed to; and then there began +a continuous interchange of messages between the two, most of which I +shall omit as containing no point of interest: but I shall record the +speech made by Agelaus of Naupactus in the first conference before the +king and the assembled allies. It was this. + +[Sidenote: Speech of Agelaus of Naupactus foreshadowing the Roman +conquest.] + ++104.+ “The best thing of all is that the Greeks should not go to war +with each other at all, but give the gods hearty thanks if by all +speaking with one voice, and joining hands like people crossing a +stream, they may be able to repel the attacks of barbarians and save +themselves and their cities. But if this is altogether impossible, +in the present juncture at least we ought to be unanimous and on our +guard, when we see the bloated armaments and the vast proportions +assumed by the war in the west. For even now it is evident to any one +who pays even a moderate attention to public affairs, that whether the +Carthaginians conquer the Romans, or the Romans the Carthaginians, it +is in every way improbable that the victors will remain contented with +the empire of Sicily and Italy. They will move forward: and will extend +their forces and their designs farther than we could wish. Wherefore, I +beseech you all to be on your guard against the danger of the crisis, +and above all you, O King. You will do this, if you abandon the policy +of weakening the Greeks, and thus rendering them an easy prey to the +invader; and consult on the contrary for their good as you would for +your own person, and have a care for all parts of Greece alike, as +part and parcel of your own domains. If you act in this spirit, the +Greeks will be your warm friends and faithful coadjutors in all your +undertakings; while foreigners will be less ready to form designs +against you, seeing with dismay the firm loyalty of the Greeks. If you +are eager for action, turn your eyes to the west, and let your thoughts +dwell upon the wars in Italy. Wait with coolness the turn of events +there, and seize the opportunity to strike for universal dominion. Nor +is the present crisis unfavourable for such a hope. But I intreat of +you to postpone your controversies and wars with the Greeks to a time +of greater tranquillity; and make it your supreme aim to retain the +power of making peace or war with them at your own will. For if once +you allow the clouds now gathering in the west to settle upon Greece, I +fear exceedingly that the power of making peace or war, and in a word +all these games which we are now playing against each other, will be so +completely knocked out of the hands of us all, that we shall be praying +heaven to grant us only this power of making war or peace with each +other at our own will and pleasure, and of settling our own disputes.” + +[Sidenote: The peace is ratified.] + ++105.+ This speech of Agelaus greatly influenced the allies in favour +of peace; and Philip more than any one: as the arguments employed +chimed in with the wishes which the advice of Demetrius had already +roused in him. Both parties therefore came to terms on the details of +the treaty; and after ratifying it, separated to their several cities, +taking peace with them instead of war. + +[Sidenote: Olympiad 140, 3. Before July B.C. 217.] + +These events all fell in the third year of the 140th Olympiad. I mean +the battle of the Romans in Etruria, that of Antiochus for Coele-Syria, +and lastly the treaty between Philip and the Aetolians. + +[Sidenote: The Eastern and Western politics become involved with each +other.] + +This then was the first point of time, and the first instance of a +deliberation, which may be said to have regarded the affairs of Greece, +Italy, and Libya as a connected whole: for neither Philip nor the +leading statesmen of the Greek cities made war or peace any longer +with each other with a view to Greek affairs, but were already all +fixing their eyes upon Italy. Nor was it long before the islanders and +inhabitants of Asia were affected in the same way; for those who were +displeased with Philip, or who had quarrels with Attalus, no longer +turned to Antiochus or Ptolemy, to the south or the east, but from this +time forth fixed their eyes on the west, some sending embassies to +Carthage, others to Rome. The Romans similarly began sending legates to +Greece, alarmed at the daring character of Philip, and afraid that he +might join in the attack upon them in their present critical position. +Having thus fulfilled my original promise of showing when, how, and why +Greek politics became involved in those of Italy and Libya, I shall now +bring my account of Greek affairs down to the date of the battle of +Cannae, to which I have already brought the history of Italy, and will +end this book at that point. + +[Sidenote: Timoxenus Achaean Strategus, May B.C. 216] + +[Sidenote: Isolation of Athens.] + ++106.+ Directly the Achaeans had put an end to the war, they elected +Timoxenus Strategus for the next year[287] and departed to take up +once more their regular ways and habits. Along with the Achaeans the +other Peloponnesian communities also set to work to repair the losses +they had sustained; recommenced the cultivation of the land; and +re-established their national sacrifices, games, and other religious +observances peculiar to their several states. For these things had all +but sunk into oblivion in most of the states through the persistent +continuance of the late wars. It has ever somehow been the case that +the Peloponnesians, who of all men are the most inclined to a peaceful +and civilised way of life, have hitherto enjoyed it less than any +other nation in the world; but have been rather as Euripides[288] says +“still worn with toil and war’s unrest.” But to me it seems clear +that they bring this upon themselves in the natural course of events: +for their universal desire of supremacy, and their obstinate love of +freedom, involve them in perpetual wars with each other, all alike +being resolutely set upon occupying the first place. The Athenians +on the contrary had by this time freed themselves from fear of +Macedonia, and considered that they had now permanently secured their +independence. They accordingly adopted Eurycleidas and Micion as their +representatives, and took no part whatever in the politics of the rest +of Greece; but following the lead and instigation of these statesmen, +they laid themselves out to flatter all the kings, and Ptolemy most of +all; nor was there any kind of decree or proclamation too fulsome for +their digestion: any consideration of dignity being little regarded, +under the guidance of these vain and frivolous leaders. + +[Sidenote: Revolt in Egypt.] + ++107.+ Ptolemy however immediately after these events became involved +in a war with his Egyptian subjects. For in arming them for his +campaign against Antiochus he had taken a step which, while it served +his immediate purpose sufficiently well, proved eventually disastrous. +Elated with their victory at Rhaphia they refused any longer to receive +orders from the king; but looked out for a leader to represent them, on +the ground that they were quite able to maintain their independence. +And this they succeeded in doing before very long. + +[Sidenote: Winter of 217-216 B.C. B.C. 216.] + +Antiochus spent the winter in extensive preparations for war; and when +the next summer came, he crossed Mount Taurus and after making a treaty +of alliance with King Attalus entered upon the war against Achaeus. + +[Sidenote: Discontent of the Aetolians with the peace.] + +At the time the Aetolians were delighted at the settlement of peace +with the Achaean league, because the war had not answered to their +wishes; and they accordingly elected Agelaus of Naupactus as their +Strategus, because he was believed to have contributed more largely +than any one to the success of the negotiations. But this was scarcely +arranged before they began to be discontented, and to find fault with +Agelaus for having cut off all their opportunities of plundering +abroad, and all their hopes of gain for the future, since the peace was +not made with certain definite states, but with all Greeks. But this +statesman patiently endured these unreasonable reproaches and succeeded +in checking the popular impulse. The Aetolians therefore were forced to +acquiesce in an inactivity quite alien to their nature. + +[Sidenote: Philip’s war against Scerdilaidas of Illyria, autumn of 217 +B.C.] + ++108.+ King Philip having returned, after the completion of the treaty +of peace, to Macedonia by sea, found that Scerdilaidas on the same +pretext of money owed to him, on which he had treacherously seized +the vessels at Leucas, had now plundered a town in Pelagonia called +Pissaeum; had won over by promises some cities of the Dassaretae, +namely, Phibotides, Antipatria, Chrysondym, and Geston; and had overrun +much of the district of Macedonia bordering on these places. He +therefore at once started with his army in great haste to recover the +revolted cities, and determined to proclaim open war with Scerdilaidas; +for he thought it a matter of the most vital importance to bring +Illyria into a state of good order, with a view to the success of all +his projects, and above all of his passage into Italy. For Demetrius +was so assiduous in keeping hot these hopes and projects in the king’s +mind, that Philip even dreamed of them in his sleep, and thought of +nothing else but this Italian expedition. The motive of Demetrius +in so acting was not a consideration for Philip, for he certainly +did not rank higher than third in the calculations of Demetrius. A +stronger motive than that was his hatred of Rome: but the strongest +of all was the consideration of his own prospects. For he had made +up his mind that it was only in this way that he could ever recover +his principality in Pharos. Be that as it may, Philip went on his +expedition and recovered the cities I have named, and took besides +Creonium and Gerus in Dassaretis; Enchelanae, Cerax, Sation, Boei, +round the Lychnidian Lake; Bantia in the district of the Calicoeni; and +Orgyssus in that of the Pisantini. After completing these operations he +dismissed his troops to their winter quarters. + +[Sidenote: B.C. 217-216.] + +[Sidenote: B.C. 216. Coss. Caius Terentius Varro and Lucius Aemilius +Paulus II.] + +This was the winter in which Hannibal, after plundering the fairest +districts of Italy, intended to place his winter quarters near Geranium +in Daunia. And it was then that at Rome Caius Terentius and Lucius +Aemilius entered upon their Consulship. + +[Sidenote: Philip’s preparation for an invasion of Italy.] + +[Sidenote: B.C. 216.] + ++109.+ In the course of the winter, Philip, taking into consideration +that he would want ships to carry out his designs, and men for rowing, +not for fighting,—for he could never have even entertained a hope of +fighting the Romans at sea,—but rather for the transport of soldiers, +and to enable him to cross with greater speed to any point to which he +might desire to go, and so surprise the enemy by a sudden appearance, +and thinking that the Illyrian build was the best for the sort of ships +he wanted, determined to have a hundred galleys built; which hardly any +Macedonian king had ever done before. Having had these fitted out, he +collected his forces at the beginning of the summer; and, after a brief +training of the Macedonians in rowing them, put to sea. It was just at +the time that Antiochus crossed Mount Taurus when Philip, after sailing +through the Euripus and rounding Cape Malea, came to Cephallenia and +Leucas, where he dropped anchor, and awaited anxiously the movements of +the Roman fleet. Being informed that it was at anchor off Lilybaeum, he +mustered up courage to put to sea, and steered for Apollonia. + +[Sidenote: Panic-stricken at the reported approach of a Roman squadron, +Philip retreats to Cephallenia.] + ++110.+ As he neared the mouth of the Aous, which flows past Apollonia, +a panic fell upon his fleet such as happens to land forces. Certain +galleys on the rear of the fleet being anchored at an island called +Sason, which lies at the entrance to the Ionian Sea, came by night +to Philip with a report that some men who had lately come from the +Sicilian Strait had been anchored with them at Sason, who reported +that they left some Roman quinqueremes at Rhegium, which were bound +for Apollonia to support Scerdilaidas. Thinking this fleet must be all +but upon him, Philip, in great alarm, promptly ordered his ships to +weigh anchor and sail back the way they came. They started and got out +to sea in great disorder, and reached Cephallenia, after sailing two +nights and days without intermission. Having now partially recovered +his courage, Philip remained there, covering his flight under the +pretext of having returned for some operations in the Peloponnese. It +turned out that it was a false alarm altogether. The truth was that +Scerdilaidas, hearing in the course of the winter that Philip was +having a number of galleys built, and expecting him to come to attack +him by sea, had sent messages to Rome stating the facts and imploring +help; and the Romans had detached a squadron of ten ships from the +fleet at Lilybaeum, which were what had been seen at Rhegium. But if +Philip had not fled from them in such inconsiderate alarm, he would +have had the best opportunity possible of attaining his objects in +Illyria; because the thoughts and resources of Rome were absorbed in +the war with Hannibal and the battle of Cannae, and it may fairly be +presumed that he would have captured the ten Roman ships. As it was, he +was utterly upset by the news and returned to Macedonia, without loss +indeed, but with considerable dishonour. + +[Sidenote: Prusias and the Gauls. See ch. 78.] + ++111.+ During this period Prusias also did a thing which deserves to be +recorded. The Gauls, whom King Attalus had brought over from Europe to +assist him against Achaeus on account of their reputation for courage, +had separated from that monarch on account of the jealous suspicions +of which I have before spoken, and were plundering the cities on +the Hellespont with gross licentiousness and violence, and finally +went so far as actually to besiege Ilium. In these circumstances the +inhabitants of the Alexandria in the Troad acted with commendable +spirit. They sent Themistes with four thousand men and forced the +Gauls to raise the siege of Ilium, and drove them entirely out of the +Troad, by cutting off their supplies and frustrating all their designs. +Thereupon the Gauls seized Arisba, in the territory of Abydos, and +thenceforth devoted themselves to forming designs and committing acts +of hostility against the cities built in that district. Against them +Prusias led out an army; and in a pitched battle put the men to the +sword on the field, and slew nearly all their women and children in +the camp, leaving the baggage to be plundered by his soldiers. This +achievement of Prusias delivered the cities on the Hellespont from +great fear and danger, and was a signal warning for future generations +against barbarians from Europe being over-ready to cross into Asia. + +[Sidenote: B.C. 220-216.] + +Such was the state of affairs in Greece and Asia. Meanwhile the greater +part of Italy had joined the Carthaginians after the battle of Cannae, +as I have shown before. I will interrupt my narrative at this point, +after having detailed the events in Asia and Greece, embraced by the +140th Olympiad. In my next book after a brief recapitulation of this +narrative, I shall fulfil the promise made at the beginning of my work +by recurring to the discussion of the Roman constitution. + + + + +BOOK VI + +PREFACE + + ++1.+ I am aware that some will be at a loss to account for my +interrupting the course of my narrative for the sake of entering upon +the following disquisition on the Roman constitution. But I think +that I have already in many passages made it fully evident that this +particular branch of my work was one of the necessities imposed on +me by the nature of my original design; and I pointed this out with +special clearness in the preface which explained the scope of my +history. I there stated that the feature of my work which was at once +the best in itself, and the most instructive to the students of it, was +that it would enable them to know and fully realise in what manner, and +under what kind of constitution, it came about that nearly the whole +world fell under the power of Rome in somewhat less than fifty-three +years,—an event certainly without precedent. This being my settled +purpose, I could see no more fitting period than the present for making +a pause, and examining the truth of the remarks about to be made on +this constitution. In private life if you wish to satisfy yourself as +to the badness or goodness of particular persons, you would not, if +you wish to get a genuine test, examine their conduct at a time of +uneventful repose, but in the hour of brilliant success or conspicuous +reverse. For the true test of a perfect man is the power of bearing +with spirit and dignity violent changes of fortune. An examination +of a constitution should be conducted in the same way: and therefore +being unable to find in our day a more rapid or more signal change +than that which has happened to Rome, I reserved my disquistion on its +constitution for this place.... + +What is really educational and beneficial to students of history is +the clear view of the causes of events, and the consequent power of +choosing the better policy in a particular case. Now in every practical +undertaking by a state we must regard as the most powerful agent for +success or failure the form of its constitution; for from this as from +a fountain-head all conceptions and plans of action not only proceed, +but attain their consummation.[289]... + + * * * * * + ++3.+ Of the Greek republics, which have again and again risen to +greatness and fallen into insignificance, it is not difficult to speak, +whether we recount their past history or venture an opinion on their +future. For to report what is already known is an easy task, nor is it +hard to guess what is to come from our knowledge of what has been. But +in regard to the Romans it is neither an easy matter to describe their +present state, owing to the complexity of their constitution; nor to +speak with confidence of their future, from our inadequate acquaintance +with their peculiar institutions in the past whether affecting their +public or their private life. It will require then no ordinary +attention and study to get a clear and comprehensive conception of the +distinctive features of this constitution. + +[Sidenote: Classification of polities.] + +Now, it is undoubtedly the case that most of those who profess to give +us authoritative instruction on this subject distinguish three kinds +of constitutions, which they designate _kingship_, _aristocracy_, +_democracy_. But in my opinion the question might fairly be put to +them, whether they name these as being the _only_ ones, or as the +_best_. In either case I think they are wrong. For it is plain that +we must regard as the _best_ constitution that which partakes of all +these three elements. And this is no mere assertion, but has been +proved by the example of Lycurgus, who was the first to construct a +constitution—that of Sparta—on this principle. Nor can we admit that +these are the _only_ forms: for we have had before now examples of +absolute and tyrannical forms of government, which, while differing as +widely as possible from kingship, yet appear to have some points of +resemblance to it; on which account all absolute rulers falsely assume +and use, as far as they can, the title of king. Again there have been +many instances of oligarchical governments having in appearance some +analogy to aristocracies, which are, if I may say so, as different from +them as it is possible to be. The same also holds good about democracy. + +[Sidenote: Six forms of polity, and their natural cycle.] + ++4.+ I will illustrate the truth of what I say. We cannot hold every +absolute government to be a kingship, but only that which is accepted +voluntarily, and is directed by an appeal to reason rather than to +fear and force. Nor again is every oligarchy to be regarded as an +aristocracy; the latter exists only where the power is wielded by the +justest and wisest men selected on their merits. Similarly, it is not +enough to constitute a democracy that the whole crowd of citizens +should have the right to do whatever they wish or propose. But where +reverence to the gods, succour of parents, respect to elders, obedience +to laws, are traditional and habitual, in such communities, if the +will of the majority prevail, we may speak of the form of government +as a democracy. So then we enumerate six forms of government,—the +three commonly spoken of which I have just mentioned, and three more +allied forms, I mean _despotism_, _oligarchy_ and _mob-rule_. The +first of these arises without artificial aid and in the natural order +of events. Next to this, and produced from it by the aid of art and +adjustment, comes _kingship_; which degenerating into the evil form +allied to it, by which I mean _tyranny_, both are once more destroyed +and _aristocracy_ produced. Again the latter being in the course of +nature perverted to _oligarchy_, and the people passionately avenging +the unjust acts of their rulers, _democracy_ comes into existence; +which again by its violence and contempt of law becomes sheer +_mob-rule_.[290] No clearer proof of the truth of what I say could be +obtained than by a careful observation of the natural origin, genesis, +and decadence of these several forms of government. For it is only by +seeing distinctly how each of them is produced that a distinct view +can also be obtained of its growth, zenith, and decadence, and the +time, circumstance, and place in which each of these may be expected to +recur. This method I have assumed to be especially applicable to the +Roman constitution, because its origin and growth have from the first +followed natural causes. + ++5.+ Now the natural laws which regulate the merging of one form of +government into another are perhaps discussed with greater accuracy +by Plato and some other philosophers. But their treatment, from its +intricacy and exhaustiveness, is only within the capacity of a few. I +will therefore endeavour to give a summary of the subject, just so far +as I suppose it to fall within the scope of a practical history and the +intelligence of ordinary people. For if my exposition appear in any way +inadequate, owing to the general terms in which it is expressed, the +details contained in what is immediately to follow will amply atone for +what is left for the present unsolved. + +[Sidenote: The origin of the social compact.] + +What is the origin then of a constitution, and whence is it produced? +Suppose that from floods, pestilences, failure of crops, or some such +causes the race of man is reduced almost to extinction. Such things +we are told have happened, and it is reasonable to think will happen +again. Suppose accordingly all knowledge of social habits and arts +to have been lost. Suppose that from the survivors, as from seeds, +the race of man to have again multiplied. In that case I presume they +would, like the animals, herd together; for it is but reasonable to +suppose that bodily weakness would induce them to seek those of their +own kind to herd with. And in that case too, as with the animals, +he who was superior to the rest in strength of body or courage of +soul would lead and rule them. For what we see happen in the case of +animals that are without the faculty of reason, such as bulls, goats, +and cocks,—among whom there can be no dispute that the strongest take +the lead,—that we must regard as in the truest sense the teaching of +nature. Originally then it is probable that the condition of life among +men was this,—herding together like animals and following the strongest +and bravest as leaders. The limit of this authority would be physical +strength, and the name we should give it would be despotism. But as +soon as the idea of family ties and social relation has arisen amongst +such agglomerations of men, then is born also the idea of kingship, and +then for the first time mankind conceives the notion of goodness and +justice and their reverse. + +[Sidenote: Origin of morality.] + +[Sidenote: which transmutes despotism into kingship,] + ++6.+ The way in which such conceptions originate and come into +existence is this. The intercourse of the sexes is an instinct of +nature, and the result is the birth of children. Now, if any one of +these children who have been brought up, when arrived at maturity, +is ungrateful and makes no return to those by whom he was nurtured, +but on the contrary presumes to injure them by word and deed, it is +plain that he will probably offend and annoy such as are present, and +have seen the care and trouble bestowed by the parents on the nurture +and bringing up of their children. For seeing that men differ from +the other animals in being the only creatures possessed of reasoning +powers, it is clear that such a difference of conduct is not likely +to escape their observation; but that they will remark it when it +occurs, and express their displeasure on the spot: because they will +have an eye to the future, and will reason on the likelihood of the +same occurring to each of themselves. Again, if a man has been rescued +or helped in an hour of danger, and, instead of showing gratitude to +his preserver, seeks to do him harm, it is clearly probable that the +rest will be displeased and offended with him, when they know it: +sympathising with their neighbour and imagining themselves in his case. +Hence arises a notion in every breast of the meaning and theory of +duty, which is in fact the beginning and end of justice. Similarly, +again, when any one man stands out as the champion of all in a time of +danger, and braves with firm courage the onslaught of the most powerful +wild beasts, it is probable that such a man would meet with marks of +favour and pre-eminence from the common people; while he who acted in +a contrary way would fall under their contempt and dislike. From this, +once more, it is reasonable to suppose that there would arise in the +minds of the multitude a theory of the disgraceful and the honourable, +and of the difference between them; and that one should be sought and +imitated for its advantages, the other shunned. When, therefore, the +leading and most powerful man among his people ever encourages such +persons in accordance with the popular sentiment, and thereby assumes +in the eyes of his subject the appearance of being the distributor to +each man according to his deserts, they no longer obey him and support +his rule from fear of violence, but rather from conviction of its +utility, however old he may be, rallying round him with one heart and +soul, and fighting against all who form designs against his government. +In this way he becomes a _king_ instead of a _despot_ by imperceptible +degrees, reason having ousted brute courage and bodily strength from +their supremacy. + +[Sidenote: which in its turn degenerates into tyranny.] + ++7.+ This then is the natural process of formation among mankind of the +notion of goodness and justice, and their opposites; and this is the +origin and genesis of genuine kingship; for people do not only keep up +the government of such men personally, but for their descendants also +for many generations; from the conviction that those who are born from +and educated by men of this kind will have principles also like theirs. +But if they subsequently become displeased with their descendants, they +do not any longer decide their choice of rulers and kings by their +physical strength or brute courage; but by the differences of their +intellectual and reasoning faculties, from practical experience of the +decisive importance of such a distinction. In old times, then, those +who were once thus selected, and obtained this office, grew old in +their royal functions, making magnificent strongholds and surrounding +them with walls and extending their frontiers, partly for the security +of their subjects, and partly to provide them with abundance of the +necessaries of life; and while engaged in these works they were exempt +from all vituperation or jealousy; because they did not make their +distinctive dress, food, or drink, at all conspicuous, but lived very +much like the rest, and joined in the everyday employments of the +common people. But when their royal power became hereditary in their +family, and they found every necessary for security ready to their +hands, as well as more than was necessary for their personal support, +then they gave the rein to their appetites; imagined that rulers must +needs wear different clothes from those of subjects; have different and +elaborate luxuries of the table; and must even seek sensual indulgence, +however unlawful the source, without fear of denial. These things +having given rise in the one case to jealousy and offence, in the other +to outburst of hatred and passionate resentment, the kingship became a +tyranny; the first step in disintegration was taken; and plots began to +be formed against the government, which did not now proceed from the +worst men but from the noblest, most high-minded, and most courageous, +because these are the men who can least submit to the tyrannical acts +of their rulers. + +[Sidenote: Tyranny is then displaced by aristocracy,] + +[Sidenote: which degenerates into oligarchy,] + ++8.+ But as soon as the people got leaders, they co-operated with +them against the dynasty for the reasons I have mentioned; and +then _kingship_ and _despotism_ were alike entirely abolished, and +_aristocracy_ once more began to revive and start afresh. For in +their immediate gratitude to those who had deposed the despots, the +people employed them as leaders, and entrusted their interests to +them; who, looking upon this charge at first as a great privilege, +made the public advantage their chief concern, and conducted all kinds +of business, public or private, with diligence and caution. But when +the sons of these men received the same position of authority from +their fathers,—having had no experience of misfortunes, and none at +all of civil equality and freedom of speech, but having been bred up +from the first under the shadow of their fathers’ authority and lofty +position,—some of them gave themselves up with passion to avarice +and unscrupulous love of money, others to drinking and the boundless +debaucheries which accompanies it, and others to the violation of +women or the forcible appropriation of boys; and so they turned an +_aristocracy_ into an _oligarchy_. But it was not long before they +roused in the minds of the people the same feelings as before; and +their fall therefore was very like the disaster which befell the +tyrants. + +[Sidenote: which is replaced by democracy,] + +[Sidenote: which degenerates into rule of corruption and violence, only +to be stopped by a return to despotism.] + ++9.+ For no sooner had the knowledge of the jealousy and hatred +existing in the citizens against them emboldened some one to oppose +the government by word or deed, than he was sure to find the whole +people ready and prepared to take his side. Having then got rid of +these rulers by assassination or exile, they do not venture to set up +a king again, being still in terror of the injustice to which this led +before; nor dare they intrust the common interests again to more than +one, considering the recent example of their misconduct: and therefore, +as the only sound hope left them is that which depends upon themselves, +they are driven to take refuge in that; and so changed the constitution +from an oligarchy to a _democracy_, and took upon themselves the +superintendence and charge of the state. And as long as any survive +who have had experience of oligarchical supremacy and domination, they +regard their present constitution as a blessing, and hold equality and +freedom as of the utmost value. But as soon as a new generation has +arisen, and the democracy has descended to their children’s children, +long association weakens their value for equality and freedom, and +some seek to become more powerful than the ordinary citizens; and the +most liable to this temptation are the rich. So when they begin to +be fond of office, and find themselves unable to obtain it by their +own unassisted efforts and their own merits, they ruin their estates, +while enticing and corrupting the common people in every possible way. +By which means when, in their senseless mania for reputation, they +have made the populace ready and greedy to receive bribes, the virtue +of democracy is destroyed, and it is transformed into a government +of violence and the strong hand. For the mob, habituated to feed at +the expense of others, and to have its hopes of a livelihood in the +property of its neighbours, as soon as it has got a leader sufficiently +ambitious and daring, being excluded by poverty from the sweets of +civil honours, produces a reign of mere violence. Then come tumultuous +assemblies, massacres, banishments, redivisions of land; until, after +losing all trace of civilisation, it has once more found a master and a +despot. + +This is the regular cycle of constitutional revolutions, and the +natural order in which constitutions change, are transformed, and +return again to their original stage. If a man have a clear grasp of +these principles he may perhaps make a mistake as to the dates at +which this or that will happen to a particular constitution; but he +will rarely be entirely mistaken as to the stage of growth or decay +at which it has arrived, or as to the point at which it will undergo +some revolutionary change. However, it is in the case of the Roman +constitution that this method of inquiry will most fully teach us its +formation, its growth, and zenith, as well as the changes awaiting it +in the future; for this, if any constitution ever did, owed, as I said +just now, its original foundation and growth to natural causes, and to +natural causes will owe its decay. My subsequent narrative will be the +best illustration of what I say. + +[Sidenote: Lycurgus recognized these truths, and legislated +accordingly.] + ++10.+ For the present I will make a brief reference to the legislation +of Lycurgus: for such a discussion is not at all alien to my subject. +That statesman was fully aware that all those changes which I have +enumerated come about by an undeviating law of nature; and reflected +that every form of government that was unmixed, and rested on one +species of power, was unstable; because it was swiftly perverted +into that particular form of evil peculiar to it and inherent in +its nature. For just as rust is the natural dissolvent of iron, +wood-worms and grubs to timber, by which they are destroyed without +any external injury, but by that which is engendered in themselves; +so in each constitution there is naturally engendered a particular +vice inseparable from it: in kingship it is absolutism; aristocracy +it is oligarchy; in democracy lawless ferocity and violence; and to +these vicious states all these forms of government are, as I have +lately shown, inevitably transformed. Lycurgus, I say, saw all this, +and accordingly combined together all the excellences and distinctive +features of the best constitutions, that no part should become unduly +predominant, and be perverted into its kindred vice; and that, each +power being checked by the others, no one part should turn the scale +or decisively out-balance the others; but that, by being accurately +adjusted and in exact equilibrium, the whole might remain long steady +like a ship sailing close to the wind. The royal power was prevented +from growing insolent by fear of the people, which had also assigned to +it an adequate share in the constitution. The people in their turn were +restrained from a bold contempt of the kings by fear of the Gerusia: +the members of which, being selected on grounds of merit, were certain +to throw their influence on the side of justice in every question that +arose; and thus the party placed at a disadvantage by its conservative +tendency was always strengthened and supported by the weight and +influence of the Gerusia. The result of this combination has been that +the Lacedaemonians retained their freedom for the longest period of any +people with which we are acquainted. + +Lycurgus however established his constitution without the discipline of +adversity, because he was able to foresee by the light of reason the +course which events naturally take and the source from which they come. +But though the Romans have arrived at the same result in framing their +commonwealth, they have not done so by means of abstract reasoning, but +through many struggles and difficulties, and by continually adopting +reforms from knowledge gained in disaster. The result has been a +constitution like that of Lycurgus, and the best of any existing in my +time.... + + * * * * * + ++11.+ I have given an account of the constitution of Lycurgus, I +will now endeavour to describe that of Rome at the period of their +disastrous defeat at Cannae. + +[Sidenote: The Roman constitution at the epoch of Cannae, B.C. 216.] + +I am fully conscious that to those who actually live under this +constitution I shall appear to give an inadequate account of it by +the omission of certain details. Knowing accurately every portion +of it from personal experience, and from having been bred up in its +customs and laws from childhood, they will not be struck so much by +the accuracy of the description, as annoyed by its omissions; nor will +they believe that the historian has purposely omitted unimportant +distinctions, but will attribute his silence upon the origin of +existing institutions or other important facts to ignorance. What is +told they depreciate as insignificant or beside the purpose; what is +omitted they desiderate as vital to the question: their object being +to appear to know more than the writers. But a good critic should not +judge a writer by what he leaves unsaid, but from what he says: if +he detects misstatement in the latter, he may then feel certain that +ignorance accounts for the former; but if what he says is accurate, +his omissions ought to be attributed to deliberate judgment and not to +ignorance. So much for those whose criticisms are prompted by personal +ambition rather than by justice.... + +Another requisite for obtaining a judicious approval for an historical +disquisition, is that it should be germane to the matter in hand; if +this is not observed, though its style may be excellent and its matter +irreproachable, it will seem out of place, and disgust rather than +please.... + +[Sidenote: Triple element in the Roman Constitution.] + +As for the Roman constitution, it had three elements, each of them +possessing sovereign powers: and their respective share of power in +the whole state had been regulated with such a scrupulous regard to +equality and equilibrium, that no one could say for certain, not even +a native, whether the constitution as a whole were an aristocracy +or democracy or despotism. And no wonder: for if we confine our +observation to the power of the Consuls we should be inclined to regard +it as despotic; if on that of the Senate, as aristocratic; and if +finally one looks at the power possessed by the people it would seem a +clear case of a democracy. What the exact powers of these several parts +were, and still, with slight modifications, are, I will now state. + +[Sidenote: The Consuls.] + ++12.+ The Consuls, before leading out the legions, remain in Rome and +are supreme masters of the administration. All other magistrates, +except the Tribunes, are under them and take their orders. They +introduce foreign ambassadors to the Senate; bring matters requiring +deliberation before it; and see to the execution of its decrees. If, +again, there are any matters of state which require the authorisation +of the people, it is their business to see to them, to summon the +popular meetings, to bring the proposals before them, and to carry out +the decrees of the majority. In the preparations for war also, and in +a word in the entire administration of a campaign, they have all but +absolute power. It is competent to them to impose on the allies such +levies as they think good, to appoint the Military Tribunes, to make +up the roll for soldiers and select those that are suitable. Besides +they have absolute power of inflicting punishment on all who are under +their command while on active service and they have authority to expend +as much of the public money as they choose, being accompanied by a +quaestor who is entirely at their orders. A survey of these powers +would in fact justify our describing the constitution as despotic,—a +clear case of royal government. Nor will it affect the truth of my +description, if any of the institutions I have described are changed in +our time, or in that of our posterity: and the same remarks apply to +what follows. + +[Sidenote: The Senate.] + ++13.+ The Senate has first of all the control of the treasury, and +regulates the receipts and disbursements alike. For the Quaestors +cannot issue any public money for the various departments of the state +without a decree of the Senate, except for the service of the Consuls. +The Senate controls also what is by far the largest and most important +expenditure, that, namely, which is made by the censors every _lustrum_ +for the repair or construction of public buildings; this money cannot +be obtained by the censors except by the grant of the Senate. Similarly +all crimes committed in Italy requiring a public investigation, such +as treason, conspiracy, poisoning, or wilful murder, are in the hands +of the Senate. Besides, if any individual or state among the Italian +allies requires a controversy to be settled, a penalty to be assessed, +help or protection to be afforded,—all this is the province of the +Senate. Or again, outside Italy, if it is necessary to send an embassy +to reconcile warring communities, or to remind them of their duty, +or sometimes to impose requisitions upon them, or to receive their +submission, or finally to proclaim war against them,—this too is the +business of the Senate. In like manner the reception to be given to +foreign ambassadors in Rome, and the answers to be returned to them, +are decided by the Senate. With such business the people have nothing +to do. Consequently, if one were staying at Rome when the Consuls +were not in town, one would imagine the constitution to be a complete +aristocracy: and this has been the idea entertained by many Greeks, and +by many kings as well, from the fact that nearly all the business they +had with Rome was settled by the Senate. + +[Sidenote: The people.] + ++14.+ After this one would naturally be inclined to ask what part +is left for the people in the constitution, when the Senate has +these various functions, especially the control of the receipts and +expenditure of the exchequer; and when the Consuls, again, have +absolute power over the details of military preparation, and an +absolute authority in the field? There is, however, a part left the +people, and it is a most important one. For the people is the sole +fountain of honour and of punishment; and it is by these two things +and these alone that dynasties and constitutions and, in a word, human +society are held together: for where the distinction between them is +not sharply drawn both in theory and practice, there no undertaking +can be properly administered,—as indeed we might expect when good and +bad are held in exactly the same honour. The people then are the only +court to decide matters of life and death; and even in cases where the +penalty is money, if the sum to be assessed is sufficiently serious, +and especially when the accused have held the higher magistracies. And +in regard to this arrangement there is one point deserving especial +commendation and record. Men who are on trial for their lives at +Rome, while sentence is in process of being voted,—if even only one +of the tribes whose votes are needed to ratify the sentence has not +voted,—have the privilege at Rome of openly departing and condemning +themselves to a voluntary exile. Such men are safe at Naples or +Praeneste or at Tibur, and at other towns with which this arrangement +has been duly ratified on oath. + +Again, it is the people who bestow offices on the deserving, which +are the most honourable rewards of virtue. It has also the absolute +power of passing or repealing laws; and, most important of all, it is +the people who deliberate on the question of peace or war. And when +provisional terms are made for alliance, suspension of hostilities, or +treaties, it is the people who ratify them or the reverse. + +These considerations again would lead one to say that the chief +power in the state was the people’s, and that the constitution was a +democracy. + +[Sidenote: The mutual relation of the three.] + ++15.+ Such, then, is the distribution of power between the several +parts of the state. I must now show how each of these several parts +can, when they choose, oppose or support each other. + +[Sidenote: The Consul dependent on the Senate,] + +The Consul, then, when he has started on an expedition with the powers +I have described, is to all appearance absolute in the administration +of the business in hand; still he has need of the support both of +people and Senate, and, without them, is quite unable to bring the +matter to a successful conclusion. For it is plain that he must have +supplies sent to his legions from time to time; but without a decree +of the Senate they can be supplied neither with corn, nor clothes, +nor pay, so that all the plans of a commander must be futile, if the +Senate is resolved either to shrink from danger or hamper his plans. +And again, whether a Consul shall bring any undertaking to a conclusion +or no depends entirely upon the Senate: for it has absolute authority +at the end of a year to send another Consul to supersede him, or to +continue the existing one in his command. Again, even to the successes +of the generals the Senate has the power to add distinction and glory, +and on the other hand to obscure their merits and lower their credit. +For these high achievements are brought in tangible form before the +eyes of the citizens by what are called “triumphs.” + +[Sidenote: and on the people.] + +But these triumphs the commanders cannot celebrate with proper pomp, or +in some cases celebrate at all, unless the Senate concurs and grants +the necessary money. As for the people, the Consuls are pre-eminently +obliged to court their favour, however distant from home may be the +field of their operations; for it is the people, as I have said before, +that ratifies, or refuses to ratify, terms of peace and treaties; but +most of all because when laying down their office they have to give an +account[291] of their administration before it. Therefore in no case is +it safe for the Consuls to neglect either the Senate or the goodwill of +the people. + +[Sidenote: The Senate controlled by the people.] + ++16.+ As for the Senate, which possesses the immense power I have +described, in the first place it is obliged in public affairs to take +the multitude into account, and respect the wishes of the people; and +it cannot put into execution the penalty for offences against the +republic, which are punishable with death, unless the people first +ratify its decrees. Similarly even in matters which directly affect the +senators,—for instance, in the case of a law diminishing the Senate’s +traditional authority, or depriving senators of certain dignities and +offices, or even actually cutting down their property,—even in such +cases the people have the sole power of passing or rejecting the law. +But most important of all is the fact that, if the Tribunes interpose +their veto, the Senate not only are unable to pass a decree, but cannot +even hold a meeting at all, whether formal or informal. Now, the +Tribunes are always bound to carry out the decree of the people, and +above all things to have regard to their wishes: therefore, for all +these reasons the Senate stands in awe of the multitude, and cannot +neglect the feelings of the people. + +[Sidenote: The people dependent on the Senate] + +[Sidenote: and Consul.] + ++17.+ In like manner the people on its part is far from being +independent of the Senate, and is bound to take its wishes into account +both collectively and individually. For contracts, too numerous +to count, are given out by the censors in all parts of Italy for +the repairs or construction of public buildings; there is also the +collection of revenue from many rivers, harbours, gardens, mines, and +land—everything, in a word, that comes under the control of the Roman +government: and in all these the people at large are engaged; so that +there is scarcely a man, so to speak, who is not interested either as +a contractor or as being employed in the works. For some purchase the +contracts from the censors for themselves; and others go partners with +them; while others again go security for these contractors, or actually +pledge their property to the treasury for them. Now over all these +transactions the Senate has absolute control. It can grant an extension +of time; and in case of unforeseen accident can relieve the contractors +from a portion of their obligation, or release them from it altogether, +if they are absolutely unable to fulfil it. And there are many details +in which the Senate can inflict great hardships, or, on the other hand, +grant great indulgences to the contractors: for in every case the +appeal is to it. But the most important point of all is that the judges +are taken from its members in the majority of trials, whether public +or private, in which the charges are heavy.[292] Consequently, all +citizens are much at its mercy; and being alarmed at the uncertainty as +to when they may need its aid, are cautious about resisting or actively +opposing its will. And for a similar reason men do not rashly resist +the wishes of the Consuls, because one and all may become subject to +their absolute authority on a campaign. + ++18.+ The result of this power of the several estates for mutual +help or harm is a union sufficiently firm for all emergencies, and a +constitution than which it is impossible to find a better. For whenever +any danger from without compels them to unite and work together, +the strength which is developed by the State is so extraordinary, +that everything required is unfailingly carried out by the eager +rivalry shown by all classes to devote their whole minds to the need +of the hour, and to secure that any determination come to should +not fail for want of promptitude; while each individual works, +privately and publicly alike, for the accomplishment of the business +in hand. Accordingly, the peculiar constitution of the State makes +it irresistible, and certain of obtaining whatever it determines to +attempt. Nay, even when these external alarms are past, and the people +are enjoying their good fortune and the fruits of their victories, and, +as usually happens, growing corrupted by flattery and idleness, show +a tendency to violence and arrogance,—it is in these circumstances, +more than ever, that the constitution is seen to possess within itself +the power of correcting abuses. For when any one of the three classes +becomes puffed up, and manifests an inclination to be contentious +and unduly encroaching, the mutual interdependency of all the three, +and the possibility of the pretensions of any one being checked and +thwarted by the others, must plainly check this tendency: and so the +proper equilibrium is maintained by the impulsiveness of the one part +being checked by its fear of the other.... + + +ON THE ROMAN ARMY + ++19.+ After electing the Consuls they proceed to elect military +tribunes,—fourteen from those who had five years', and ten from those +who had ten years', service. All citizens must serve ten years in the +cavalry or twenty years in the infantry before the forty-sixth year of +their age, except those rated below four hundred asses. The latter are +employed in the navy; but if any great public necessity arises they +are obliged to serve as infantry also for twenty campaigns: and no one +can hold an office in the state until he has completed ten years of +military service.... + +[Sidenote: The levy.] + +When the Consuls are about to enrol the army they give public notice +of the day on which all Roman citizens of military age must appear. +This is done every year. When the day has arrived, and the citizens fit +for service are come to Rome and have assembled on the Capitoline, the +fourteen junior tribunes divide themselves, in the order in which they +were appointed by the people or by the Imperators, into four divisions, +because the primary division of the forces thus raised is into four +legions. The four tribunes first appointed are assigned to the legion +called the 1st; the next three to the 2d; the next four to the 3d; and +the three last to the 4th. Of the ten senior tribunes, the two first +are assigned to the 1st legion; the next three to the 2d; the two next +to the 3d; and the three last to the 4th. + ++20.+ This division and assignment of the tribunes having been settled +in such a way that all four legions have an equal number of officers, +the tribunes of the several legions take up a separate position and +draw lots for the tribes one by one; and summon the tribe on whom it +from time to time falls. From this tribe they select four young men +as nearly like each other in age and physical strength as possible. +These four are brought forward, and the tribunes of the first legion +picks out one of them, those of the second another, those of the third +another, and the fourth has to take the last. When the next four are +selected the tribunes of the second legion have the first choice, and +those of the first the last. With the next four the tribunes of the +third legion have the first choice, those of the second the last; and +so on in regular rotation: of which the result is that each legion +gets men of much the same standard. But when they have selected the +number prescribed,—which is four thousand two hundred infantry for each +legion, or at times of special danger five thousand,—they next used to +pass men for the cavalry, in old times _after_ the four thousand two +hundred infantry; but now they do it before them, the selection having +been made by the censor on the basis of wealth; and they enrol three +hundred for each legion.[293] + ++21.+ The roll having been completed in this manner, the tribunes +belonging to the several legions muster their men; and selecting one +of the whole body that they think most suitable for the purpose, they +cause him to take an oath that he will obey his officers and do their +orders to the best of his ability. And all the others come up and take +the oath separately, merely affirming that they will do the same as the +first man. + +At the same time the Consuls send orders to the magistrates of the +allied cities in Italy, from which they determine that allied troops +are to serve: declaring the number required, and the day and place at +which the men selected must appear. The cities then enrol their troops +with much the same ceremonies as to selection and administration of the +oath, and appoint a commander and a paymaster.[294] + +[Sidenote: Fourfold division of the Legionaries.] + +The Military Tribunes at Rome, after the administering of the oath +to their men, and giving out the day and place at which they are to +appear without arms, for the present dismiss them. When they arrive on +the appointed day, they first select the youngest and poorest to form +the _Velites_, the next to them the _Hastati_, while those who are in +the prime of life they select as _Principes_, and the oldest of all as +_Triarii_. For in the Roman army these divisions, distinct not only +as to their ages and nomenclature, but also as to the manner in which +they are armed, exist in each legion. The division is made in such +proportions that the senior men, called _Triarii_, should number six +hundred, the _Principes_ twelve hundred, the _Hastati_ twelve hundred, +and that all the rest as the youngest should be reckoned among the +_Velites_. And if the whole number of the legion is more than four +thousand, they vary the numbers of these divisions proportionally, +except those of the _Triarii_, which is always the same. + +[Sidenote: 1. Arms of the _Velites_.] + ++22.+ The youngest soldiers or _Velites_ are ordered to carry a sword, +spears, and target (_parma_). The target is strongly made, and large +enough to protect the man; being round, with a diameter of three feet. +Each man also wears a head-piece without a crest (_galea_); which he +sometimes covers with a piece of wolf’s skin or something of that kind, +for the sake both of protection and identification; that the officers +of his company may be able to observe whether he shows courage or the +reverse on confronting dangers. The spear of the velites has a wooden +haft of about two cubits, and about a finger’s breadth in thickness; +its head is a span long, hammered fine, and sharpened to such an extent +that it becomes bent the first time it strikes, and cannot be used by +the enemy to hurl back; otherwise the weapon would be available for +both sides alike. + +[Sidenote: 2. Arms of the _Hastati_, _Principes_, and _Triarii_.] + +The second rank, the _Hastati_, are ordered to have the complete +panoply. This to a Roman means, first, a large shield (_scutum_), the +surface of which is curved outwards, its breadth two and a half feet, +its length four feet,—though there is also an extra sized shield in +which these measures are increased by a palm’s breadth. It consists +of two layers of wood fastened together with bull’s-hide glue; the +outer surface of which is first covered with canvas, then with calf’s +skin, on the upper and lower edges it is bound with iron to resist +the downward strokes of the sword, and the wear of resting upon the +ground. Upon it also is fixed an iron boss (_umbo_), to resist the more +formidable blows of stones and pikes, and of heavy missiles generally. +With the shield they also carry a sword (_gladius_) hanging down by +their right thigh, which is called a Spanish sword.[295] It has an +excellent point, and can deal a formidable blow with either edge, +because its blade is stout and unbending. In addition to these they +have two _pila_, a brass helmet, and greaves (_ocreae_). Some of the +_pila_ are thick, some fine. Of the thicker, some are round with the +diameter of a palm’s length, others are a palm square. The fine pila +are like moderate sized hunting spears, and they are carried along with +the former sort. The wooden haft of them all is about three cubits +long; and the iron head fixed to each half is barbed, and of the same +length as the haft. They take extraordinary pains to attach the head +to the haft firmly; they make the fastening of the one to the other +so secure for use by binding it half way up the wood, and riveting +it with a series of clasps, that the iron breaks sooner than this +fastening comes loose, although its thickness at the socket and where +it is fastened to the wood is a finger and a half’s breadth. Besides +these each man is decorated with a plume of feathers, with three purple +or black feathers standing upright, about a cubit long. The effect of +these being placed on the helmet, combined with the rest of the armour, +is to give the man the appearance of being twice his real height, and +to give him a noble aspect calculated to strike terror into the enemy. +The common soldiers also receive a brass plate, a span square, which +they put upon their breast and call a breastpiece (_pectorale_), and so +complete their panoply. Those who are rated above a hundred thousand +asses, instead of these breastpieces wear, with the rest of their +armour, coats of mail (_loricae_). The Principes and Triarii are armed +in the same way as the _Hastati_, except that instead of _pila_ they +carry long spears (_hastae_). + +[Sidenote: Election of Centurions.] + ++24.+ The _Principes_, _Hastati_, and _Triarii_, each elect ten +centurions according to merit, and then a second ten each. All these +sixty have the title of centurion alike, of whom the first man chosen +is a member of the council of war. And they in their turn select a +rear-rank officer each who is called _optio_. Next, in conjunction with +the centurions, they divide the several orders (omitting the _Velites_) +into ten companies each, and appoint to each company two centurions +and two _optiones_; the _Velites_ are divided equally among all the +companies; these companies are called orders (_ordines_) or maniples +(_manipuli_), or vexilla, and their officers are called centurions or +_ordinum ductores_.[296] Each maniple selects two of their strongest +and best born men as standard-bearers (_vexillarii_). And that each +maniple should have two commanding officers is only reasonable; for +it being impossible to know what a commander may be doing or what +may happen to him, and necessities of war admitting of no parleying, +they are anxious that the maniple may never be without a leader and +commander. + +When the two centurions are both on the field, the first elected +commands the right of the maniple, the second the left: if both are not +there, the one who is commands the whole. And they wish the centurions +not to be so much bold and adventurous, as men with a faculty for +command, steady, and of a profound rather than a showy spirit; not +prone to engage wantonly or be unnecessarily forward in giving battle; +but such as in the face of superior numbers and overwhelming pressure +will die in defence of their post. + +[Sidenote: Officers and arms of the equites.] + ++25.+ Similarly they divide the cavalry into ten squadrons (_turmae_), +and from each they select three officers (_decuriones_), who each +select a subaltern (_optio_). The decurio first elected commands the +squadron, the other two have the rank of _decuriones_: a name indeed +which applies to all alike. If the first _decurio_ is not on the +field, the second takes command of the squadron. The armour of the +cavalry is very like that in Greece. In old times they did not wear +the lorica, but fought in their tunics (_campestria_); the result of +which was that they were prompt and nimble at dismounting and mounting +again with despatch, but were in great danger at close quarters from +the unprotected state of their bodies. And their lances too were +useless in two ways: first because they were thin, and prevented +their taking a good aim; and before they could get the head fixed in +the enemy, the lances were so shaken by the mere motion of the horse +that they generally broke. Secondly, because, having no spike at the +butt end of their lance, they only had one stroke, namely that with +the spear-head; and if the lance broke, what was left in their hands +was entirely useless. Again they used to have shields of bull’s hide, +just like those round cakes, with a knob in the middle which are used +at sacrifices, which were useless at close quarters because they were +flexible rather than firm; and, when their leather shrunk and rotted +from the rain, unserviceable as they were before, they then became +entirely so. Wherefore, as experience showed them the uselessness of +these, they lost no time in changing to the Greek fashion of arms: the +advantages of which were, first, that men were able to deliver the +first stroke of their lance-head with a good aim and effect, because +the shaft from the nature of its construction was steady and not +quivering; and, secondly, that they were able, by reversing the lance, +to use the spike at the butt-end for a steady and effective blow. And +the same may be said about the Greek shields: for, whether used to +ward off a blow or to thrust against the enemy, they neither give nor +bend. When the Romans learnt these facts about the Greek arms they were +not long in copying them; for no nation has ever surpassed them in +readiness to adopt new fashions from other people, and to imitate what +they see is better in others than themselves. + +[Sidenote: Assembly of the legions.] + +[Sidenote: The Socii.] + ++26.+ Having made this distribution of their men and given orders +for their being armed, as I have described, the military tribunes +dismiss them to their homes. But when the day has arrived on which +they were all bound by their oath to appear at the place named by the +Consuls (for each Consul generally appoints a separate place for his +own legions, each having assigned to him two legions and a moiety of +the allies), all whose names were placed on the roll appear without +fail: no excuse being accepted in the case of those who have taken the +oath, except a prohibitory omen or absolute impossibility. The allies +muster along with the citizens, and are distributed and managed by the +officers appointed by the Consuls, who have the title of _Praefecti +sociis_ and are twelve in number. These officers select for the Consuls +from the whole infantry and cavalry of the allies such as are most +fitted for actual service, and these are called _extraordinarii_ (which +in Greek is ἐπίλεκτοι.) The whole number of the infantry of the socii +generally equals that of the legions, but the cavalry is treble that of +the citizens. Of these they select a third of the cavalry, and a fifth +of the infantry to serve as _extraordinarii_. The rest they divide into +two parts, one of which is called the right, the other the left wing +(_alae_). + +These arrangements made, the military tribunes take over the citizens +and allies and proceed to form a camp. Now the principle on which they +construct their camps, no matter when or where, is the same; I think +therefore that it will be in place here to try and make my readers +understand, as far as words can do so, the Roman tactics in regard to +the march (_agmen_), the camp (_castrorum metatio_), and the line of +battle (_acies_). I cannot imagine any one so indifferent to things +noble and great, as to refuse to take some little extra trouble to +understand things like these; for if he has once heard them, he will +be acquainted with one of those things genuinely worth observation and +knowledge. + +[Sidenote: _Castrorum metatio._] + ++27.+ Their method of laying out a camp is as follows. The place for +the camp having been selected, the spot in it best calculated to +give a view of the whole, and most convenient for issuing orders, is +appropriated for the general’s tent (_Praetorium_). + +Having placed a standard on the spot on which they intend to put the +Praetorium, they measure off a square round this standard, in such +a way that each of its sides is a hundred feet from the standard, +and the area of the square is four plethra.[297] Along one side of +this square—whichever aspect appears most convenient for watering +and foraging—the legions are stationed as follows. I have said that +there were six Tribuni in each legion, and that each Consul had two +legions,—it follows that there are twelve _Tribuni_ in a Consular army. +Well, they pitch the tents of these Tribuni all in one straight line, +parallel to the side of the square selected, at a distance of fifty +feet from it (there is a place too selected for the horses, beasts of +burden, and other baggage of the Tribuni); these tents face the outer +side of the camp and away from the square described above,—a direction +which will henceforth be called “the front” by me. The tents of the +Tribuni stand at equal distances from each other, so that they extend +along the whole breadth of the space occupied by the legions. + +[Sidenote: The principia.] + +[Sidenote: The quarters.] + ++28.+ From the line described by the front of these tents they measure +another distance of a hundred feet towards the front. At that distance +another parallel straight line is drawn, and it is from this last that +they begin arranging the quarters of the legions, which they do as +follows:—they bisect the last mentioned straight line and from that +point draw another straight line at right angles to it; along this +line, on either side of it facing each other, the cavalry of the two +legions are quartered with a space of fifty feet between them, which +space is exactly bisected by the line last mentioned. The manner of +encamping the infantry is similar to that of the cavalry. The whole +area of each space occupied by the maniples and squadrons is a square, +and faces the _via_;[298] the length facing the _via_ is one hundred +feet, and they generally try to make the depth the same, except in +the case of the socii; and when they are employing legions of an +extra number, they increase the length and depth of these squares +proportionally. + ++29.+ The spaces assigned to the cavalry are opposite the space between +the two groups of tents belonging to the Tribuni of the two legions, +at right angles to the line along which they stand, like a cross-road; +and indeed the whole arrangement of the _viae_ is like a system of +cross-roads, running on either side of the blocks of tents, those of +the cavalry on one side and those of the infantry on the other. The +spaces assigned to the cavalry and the Triarii in each legion are back +to back, with no _via_ between them, but touching each other, looking +opposite ways; and the depth of the spaces assigned to the Triarii is +only half that assigned to other maniples, because their numbers are +generally only half; but though the number of the men is different, +the length of the space is always the same owing to the lesser depth. +Next, parallel with these spaces, at a distance of fifty feet, they +place the _Principes_ facing the Triarii; and as they face the space +between themselves and the _Triarii_, we have two more roads formed +at right angles to the hundred-foot area in front of the tents of the +Tribunes, and running down from it to the outer agger of the camp on +the side opposite to that of the Principia, which we agreed to call +the front of the camp. Behind the spaces for the _Triarii_ and looking +in the opposite direction, and touching each other, are the spaces +for the _Hastati_. These several branches of the service (_Triarii_, +_Principes_, _Hastati_), being each divided into ten maniples, the +cross-roads between the blocks are all the same length and terminate in +the front agger of the camp; towards which they cause the last maniples +in the rows to face. + +[Sidenote: Via Quintana.] + ++30.+ Beyond the _Hastati_ they again leave a space of fifty feet, +and there, beginning from the same base (the Principia), and going in +a parallel direction, and to the same distance as the other blocks, +they place the cavalry of the allies facing the _Hastati_. Now the +number of the allies, as I have stated above, is equal to that of the +legions in regard to the infantry, though it falls below that if we +omit the _extraordinarii_; but that of the cavalry is double, when +the third part is deducted for service among the _extraordinarii_. +Therefore in marking out the camp the spaces assigned to the latter +are made proportionally deeper, so that their length remains the same +as those occupied by the legions. Thus five viae are formed:[299] and +back to back with these cavalry are the spaces for the infantry of the +allies, the depth being proportionally increased according to their +numbers;[300] and these maniples face the outer sides of the camp and +the agger. In each maniple the first tent at either end is occupied +by the centurions. Between the fifth and sixth squadrons of cavalry, +and the fifth and sixth maniple of infantry, there is a space of fifty +left, so that another road is made across the camp at right angles to +the others and parallel to the tents of the Tribuni, and this they call +the _Via Quintana_, as it runs along the fifth squadrons and maniples. + +[Sidenote: The space between the Principia and the agger.] + +[Sidenote: The Staff, or Praetoria cohors.] + ++31.+ The space behind the tents of the Tribuni is thus used. On one +side of the square of the Praetorium is the market, on the other the +office of the Quaestor and the supplies which he has charge of. Then +behind the last tent of the Tribuni on either side, arranged at right +angles to those tents, are the quarters of the cavalry picked out of +the _extraordinarii_, as well as of some of those who are serving as +volunteers from personal friendship to Consuls. All these are arranged +parallel to the side aggers, facing on the one side the Quaestorium, on +the other the market-place. And, generally speaking, it falls to the +lot of these men not only to be near the Consul in the camp, but to be +wholly employed about the persons of the Consul and the Quaestor on the +march and all other occasions. Back to back with these again, facing +the agger, are placed the infantry who serve in the same way as these +cavalry.[301] + +Beyond these there is another empty space or road left, one hundred +feet broad, parallel to the tents of the Tribuni, skirting the +market-place, Praetorium, and Quaestorium, from agger to agger. On the +further side of this road the rest of the _equites extraordinarii_ +are placed facing the market-place and Quaestorium: and between the +quarters of these cavalry of the two legions a passage is left of +fifty feet, exactly opposite and at right angles to the square of the +Praetorium, leading to the rearward agger. + +Back to back with the _equites extraordinarii_ are the infantry of the +same, facing the agger at the rear of the whole camp. And the space +left empty on either side of these, facing the agger on each side of +the camp, is given up to foreigners and such allies as chance to come +to the camp. + +[Sidenote: The space round the quarters.] + +The result of these arrangements is that the whole camp is a square, +with streets and other constructions regularly planned like a town. +Between the line of the tents and the agger there is an empty space +of two hundred feet on every side of the square, which is turned to +a great variety of uses. To begin with, it is exceedingly convenient +for the marching in and out of the legions. For each division descends +into this space by the _via_ which passes its own quarters, and so +avoids crowding and hustling each other, as they would if they were all +collected on one road. Again, all cattle brought into the camp, as well +as booty of all sorts taken from the enemy, are deposited in this space +and securely guarded during the night-watches. But the most important +use of this space is that, in night assaults, it secures the tents from +the danger of being set on fire, and keeps the soldiers out of the +range of the enemy’s missiles; or, if a few of them do carry so far, +they are spent and cannot penetrate the tents. + +[Sidenote: Provision for extra numbers,] + +[Sidenote: and for two consular armies.] + ++32.+ The number then of foot-soldiers and cavalry being given (at +the rate, that is to say, of four thousand or of five thousand for +each legion), and the length, depth, and number of the maniples being +likewise known, as well as the breadth of the passages and roads, it +becomes possible to calculate the area occupied by the camp and the +length of the aggers. If on any occasion the number of allies, either +those originally enrolled or those who joined subsequently, exceeds +their due proportion, the difficulty is provided for in this way. To +the overplus of allies who joined subsequent to the enrolment of the +army are assigned the spaces on either side of the Praetorium, the +market-place and Quaestorium being proportionally contracted. For the +extra numbers of allies who joined originally an extra line of tents +(forming thus another _via_) is put up parallel with the other tents +of the socii, facing the agger on either side of the camp. But if all +four legions and both Consuls are in the same camp, all we have to do +is to imagine a second army, arranged back to back to the one already +placed, in exactly the same spaces as the former, but side by side +with it at the part where the picked men from the _extraordinarii_ are +stationed facing the rearward agger. In this case the shape of the +camp becomes an oblong, the area double, and the length of the entire +agger half as much again. This is the arrangement when both Consuls are +within the same agger; but if they occupy two separate camps, the above +arrangements hold good, except that the market-place is placed half way +between the two camps. + +[Sidenote: Guard duty.] + ++33.+ The camp having thus been laid out, the Tribuni next administer +an oath to all in it separately, whether free or slave, that they will +steal nothing within the agger, and in case they find anything will +bring it to the Tribuni. They next select for their several duties the +maniples of the Principes and Hastati in each legion. Two are told +off to guard the space in front of the quarters of the Tribuni. For +in this space, which is called the Principia, most of the Romans in +the camp transact all the business of the day; and are therefore very +particular about its being kept well watered and properly swept. Of the +other eighteen maniples, three are assigned to each of the six Tribuni, +that being the respective numbers in each legion; and of these three +maniples each takes its turn of duty in waiting upon the Tribune. The +services they render him are such as these: they pitch his tent for +him when a place is selected for encampment, and level the ground all +round it; and if any extra precaution is required for the protection of +his baggage, it is their duty to see to it. They also supply him with +two relays of guards. A guard consists of four men, two of whom act +as sentries in front of his tent, and two on the rear of it near the +horses. Seeing that each Tribune has three maniples, and each maniple +has a hundred men, without counting _Triarii_ and _Velites_ who are +not liable for this service, the duty is a light one, coming round +to each maniple only once in three days; while by this arrangement +ample provision is made for the convenience as well as the dignity of +the Tribuni. The maniples of Triarii are exempted from this personal +service to the Tribuni, but they each supply a watch of four men to the +squadron of cavalry nearest them. These watches have to keep a general +look out; but their chief duty is to keep an eye upon the horses, to +prevent their hurting themselves by getting entangled in their tethers, +and so becoming unfit for use; or from getting loose, and making a +confusion and disturbance in the camp by running against other horses. +Finally, all the maniples take turns to mount guard for a day each at +the Consul’s tent, to protect him from plots, and maintain the dignity +of his office. + +[Sidenote: Orders of the day.] + +[Sidenote: Construction of the _fossa_ and _agger_.] + ++34.+ As to the construction of the foss and vallum,[302] two sides +fall to the lot of the socii, each division taking that side along +which it is quartered; the other two are left to the Romans, one to +each legion. Each side is divided into portions according to the number +of maniples, and the centurions stand by and superintend the work of +each maniple; while two of the Tribunes superintend the construction +of the whole side and see that it is adequate. In the same way the +Tribunes superintend all other operations in the camp. They divide +themselves in twos, and each pair is on duty for two months out of six; +they draw lots for their turns, and the pair on whom the lot falls +takes the superintendence of all active operations. The prefects of +the socii divide their duty in the same way. At daybreak the officers +of the cavalry and the centurions muster at the tents of the Tribunes, +while the Tribunes go to that of the Consul. He gives the necessary +orders to the Tribunes, they to the cavalry officers and centurions, +and these last pass them on to the rank and file as occasion may demand. + +[Sidenote: The watchword.] + +To secure the passing round of the watchword for the night the +following course is followed. One man is selected from the tenth +maniple, which, in the case both of cavalry and infantry, is quartered +at the ends of the road between the tents; this man is relieved from +guard-duty and appears each day about sunset at the tent of the Tribune +on duty, takes the _tessera_ or wooden tablet on which the watchword +is inscribed, and returns to his own maniple and delivers the wooden +tablet and watchword in the presence of witnesses to the chief officer +of the maniple next his own; he in the same way to the officer of the +next, and so on, until it arrives at the first maniple stationed next +the Tribunes. These men are obliged to deliver the tablet (_tessera_) +to the Tribunes before dark. If they are all handed in, the Tribune +knows that the watchword has been delivered to all, and has passed +through all the ranks back to his hands: but if any one is missing, +he at once investigates the matter; for he knows by the marks on the +tablets from which division of the army the tablet has not appeared; +and the man who is discovered to be responsible for its non-appearance +is visited with condign punishment. + +[Sidenote: Night watches.] + ++35.+ Next as to the keeping guard at night. The Consul’s tent is +guarded by the maniple on duty: those of the Tribuni and praefects of +the cavalry by the pickets formed as described above from the several +maniples. And in the same way each maniple and squadron posts guards of +their own men. The other pickets are posted by the Consul. Generally +speaking there are three pickets at the Quaestorium, and two at the +tent of each of the legati or members of council. The vallum is lined +by the _velites_, who are on guard all along it from day to day. That +is their special duty; while they also guard all the entrances to the +camp, telling off ten sentinels to take their turn at each of them. Of +the men told off for duty at the several _stationes_, the man who in +each maniple is to take the first watch is brought by the rear-rank man +of his company to the Tribune at eventide. The latter hands over to +them severally small wooden tablets (_tesserae_), one for each watch, +inscribed with small marks; on receiving which they go off to the +places indicated. + +[Sidenote: Visiting rounds.] + +The duty of going the rounds is intrusted to the cavalry. The first +Praefect of cavalry in each legion, early in the morning, orders one +of his rear-rank men to give notice before breakfast to four young men +of his squadron who are to go the rounds. At evening this same man’s +duty is to give notice to the Praefect of the next squadron that it +is his turn to provide for going the rounds until next morning. This +officer thereupon takes measures similar to the preceding one until +the next day; and so on throughout the cavalry squadrons. The four +men thus selected by the rear-rank men from the first squadron, after +drawing lots for the watch they are to take, proceed to the tent of the +Tribune on duty, and receive from him a writing stating the order[303] +and the number of the watches they are to visit. The four then take +up their quarters for the night alongside of the first maniple of +Triarii; for it is the duty of the centurion of this maniple to see +that a bugle is blown at the beginning of every watch. When the time +has arrived, the man to whose lot the first watch has fallen goes his +rounds, taking some of his friends as witnesses. He walks through the +posts assigned, which are not only those along the vallum and gates, +but also the pickets set by the several maniples and squadrons. If he +find the men of the first watch awake he takes from them their tessera; +but if he find any one of them asleep or absent from his post, he calls +those with him to witness the fact and passes on. The same process +is repeated by those who go the rounds during the other watches. The +charge of seeing that the bugle is blown at the beginning of each +watch, so that the right man might visit the right pickets, is as I +have said, laid upon the centurions of the first maniple of Triarii, +each one taking the duty for a day. + +Each of these men who have gone the rounds (_tessarii_) at daybreak +conveys the tesserae to the Tribune on duty. If the whole number are +given in they are dismissed without question; but if any of them brings +a number less than that of the pickets, an investigation is made by +means of the mark on the tessera, as to which picket he has omitted. +Upon this being ascertained the centurion is summoned; he brings the +men who were on duty, and they are confronted with the patrol. If the +fault is with the men on guard, the patrol clears himself by producing +the witnesses whom he took with him; for he cannot do so without. If +nothing of that sort happened, the blame recoils upon the patrol. + +[Sidenote: Military punishments: the _fustuarium_.] + ++37.+ Then the Tribunes at once hold a court-martial, and the man who +is found guilty is punished by the _fustuarium_; the nature of which +is this. The Tribune takes a cudgel and merely touches the condemned +man; whereupon all the soldiers fall upon him with cudgels and stones. +Generally speaking men thus punished are killed on the spot; but if by +any chance, after running the gauntlet, they manage to escape from the +camp, they have no hope of ultimately surviving even so. They may not +return to their own country, nor would any one venture to receive such +an one into his house. Therefore those who have once fallen into this +misfortune are utterly and finally ruined. The same fate awaits the +praefect of the squadron, as well as his rear-rank man, if they fail to +give the necessary order at the proper time, the latter to the patrols, +and the former to the praefect of the next squadron. The result of the +severity and inevitableness of this punishment is that in the Roman +army the night watches are faultlessly kept. The common soldiers are +amenable to the Tribunes; the Tribunes to the Consuls. The Tribune is +competent to punish a soldier by inflicting a fine, distraining his +goods, or ordering him to be flogged; so too the praefects in the case +of the socii. The punishment of the _fustuarium_ is assigned also to +any one committing theft in the camp, or bearing false witness: as also +to any one who in full manhood is detected in shameful immorality: or +to any one who has been thrice punished for the same offence. All these +things are punished as crimes. But such as the following are reckoned +as cowardly and dishonourable in a soldier:—for a man to make a false +report to the Tribunes of his valour in order to get reward; or for +men who have been told off to an ambuscade to quit the place assigned +them from fear; and also for a man to throw away any of his arms from +fear, on the actual field of battle. Consequently it sometimes happens +that men confront certain death at their stations, because, from their +fear of the punishment awaiting them at home, they refuse to quit their +post: while others, who have lost shield or spear or any other arm on +the field, throw themselves upon the foe, in hopes of recovering what +they have lost, or of escaping by death from certain disgrace and the +insults of their relations.[304] + +[Sidenote: Decimatio.] + ++38.+ But if it ever happens that a number of men are involved in these +same acts: if, for instance, some entire maniples have quitted their +ground in the presence of the enemy, it is deemed impossible to subject +all to the _fustuarium_ or to military execution; but a solution of +the difficulty has been found at once adequate to the maintenance of +discipline and calculated to strike terror. The Tribune assembles the +legion, calls the defaulters to the front, and, after administering +a sharp rebuke, selects five or eight or twenty out of them by lot, +so that those selected should be about a tenth of those who have been +guilty of the act of cowardice. These selected are punished with the +_fustuarium_ without mercy; the rest are put on rations of barley +instead of wheat, and are ordered to take up their quarters outside the +vallum and the protection of the camp. As all are equally in danger of +having the lot fall on them, and as all alike who escape that, are made +a conspicuous example of by having their rations of barley, the best +possible means are thus taken to inspire fear for the future, and to +correct the mischief which has actually occurred. + +[Sidenote: Military decorations.] + +[Sidenote: Mural crown.] + +[Sidenote: Civic crown.] + ++39.+ A very excellent plan also is adopted for inducing young soldiers +to brave danger. When an engagement has taken place and any of them +have showed conspicuous gallantry, the Consul summons an assembly of +the legion, puts forward those whom he considers to have distinguished +themselves in any way, and first compliments each of them individually +on his gallantry, and mentions any other distinction he may have +earned in the course of his life, and then presents them with gifts: +to the man who has wounded an enemy, a spear; to the man who has +killed one and stripped his armour, a cup, if he be in the infantry, +horse-trappings if in the cavalry: though originally the only present +made was a spear. This does not take place in the event of their +having wounded or stripped any of the enemy in a set engagement or +the storming of a town; but in skirmishes or other occasions of that +sort, in which, without there being any positive necessity for them to +expose themselves singly to danger, they have done so voluntarily and +deliberately. In the capture of a town those who are first to mount the +walls are presented with a gold crown. So too those who have covered +and saved any citizens or allies are distinguished by the Consul with +certain presents; and those whom they have preserved present them +voluntarily with a crown, or if not, they are compelled to do so by +the Tribunes. The man thus preserved, too, reverences his preserver +throughout his life as a father, and is bound to act towards him as +a father in every respect. By such incentives those who stay at home +are stirred up to a noble rivalry and emulation in confronting danger, +no less than those who actually hear and see what takes place. For +the recipients of such rewards not only enjoy great glory among their +comrades in the army, and an immediate reputation at home, but after +their return they are marked men in all solemn festivals; for they +alone, who have been thus distinguished by the Consuls for bravery, +are allowed to wear robes of honour on those occasions: and moreover +they place the spoils they have taken in the most conspicuous places in +their houses, as visible tokens and proofs of their valour. No wonder +that a people, whose rewards and punishments are allotted with such +care and received with such feelings, should be brilliantly successful +in war. + +The pay of the foot soldier is 5⅓ asses a day; of the centurion 10⅔; of +the cavalry 16. The infantry receive a ration of wheat equal to about ⅔ +of an Attic medimnus a month, and the cavalry 7 medimni of barley, and +2 of wheat; of the allies the infantry receive the same, the cavalry 1⅓ +medimnus of wheat, and 5 of barley. This is a free gift to the allies; +but in the cases of the Romans, the Quaestor stops out of their pay +the price of their corn and clothes, or any additional arms they may +require at a fixed rate. + ++40.+ The following is their manner of moving camp. At the first +bugle the men all strike their tents and collect their baggage; but +no soldier may strike his tent, or set it up either, till the same +is done to that of the Tribuni and the Consul. At the second bugle +they load the beasts of burden with their baggage: at the third +the first maniples must advance and set the whole camp in motion. +Generally speaking, the men appointed to make this start are the +_extraordinarii_: next comes the right wing of the socii; and behind +them their beasts of burden. These are followed by the first legion +with its own baggage immediately on its rear; then comes the second +legion, followed by its own beasts of burden, and the baggage of those +socii who have to bring up the rear of the march, that is to say, the +left wing of the socii. The cavalry sometimes ride on the rear of their +respective divisions, sometimes on either side of the beasts of burden, +to keep them together and secure them. If an attack is expected on the +rear, the _extraordinarii_ themselves occupy the rear instead of the +van. Of the two legions and wings each takes the lead in the march on +alternate days, that by this interchange of position all may have an +equal share in the advantage of being first at the water and forage. +The order of march, however, is different at times of unusual danger, +if they have open ground enough. For in that case they advance in +three parallel columns, consisting of the _Hastati_, _Principes_, and +_Triarii_: the beasts of burden belonging to the maniples in the van +are placed in front of all, those belonging to the second behind the +leading maniples, and those belonging to the third behind the second +maniples, thus having the baggage and the maniples in alternate lines. +With this order of march, on an alarm being given, the columns face to +the right or left according to the quarter on which the enemy appears, +and get clear of the baggage. So that in a short space of time, and by +one movement, the whole of the hoplites are in line of battle—except +that sometimes it is necessary to half-wheel the _Hastati_ also—and the +baggage and the rest of the army are in their proper place for safety, +namely, in the rear of the line of combatants. + +[Sidenote: Encampment on the march.] + ++41.+ When the army on the march is approaching the place of +encampment, a Tribune, and those of the centurions who have been from +time to time selected for that duty, are sent forward to survey the +place of encampment. Having done this they proceed first of all to fix +upon the place for the Consul’s tent (as I have described above), and +to determine on which side of the Praetorium to quarter the legions. +Having decided these points they measure out the Praetorium, then they +draw the straight line along which the tents of the Tribunes are to be +pitched, and then the line parallel to this, beyond which the quarters +of the legions are to begin. In the same way they draw the lines on +the other sides of the Praetorium in accordance with the plan which I +have already detailed at length. This does not take long, nor is the +marking out of the camp a matter of difficulty, because the dimensions +are all regularly laid down, and are in accordance with precedent. Then +they fix one flag in the ground where the Consul’s tent is to stand, +and another on the base of the square containing it, and a third on the +line of the Tribunes’ tents; the two latter are scarlet, that which +marks the Consul’s tent is white; the lines on the other sides of the +Praetorium are marked sometimes with plain spears and sometimes by +flags of other colours. After this they lay out the _viae_ between the +quarters, fixing spears at each _via_. Consequently when the legions +in the course of their march have come near enough to get a clear view +of the place of encampment, they can all make out exactly the whole +plan of it, taking as their base the Consul’s flag and calculating from +that. Moreover as each soldier knows precisely on which _via_, and at +what point of it, his quarters are to be, because all occupy the same +position in the camp wherever it may be, it is exactly like a legion +entering its own city; when breaking off at the gates each man makes +straight for his own residence without hesitation, because he knows +the direction and the quarter of the town in which home lies. It is +precisely the same in a Roman camp. + ++42.+ It is because the first object of the Romans in the matter of +encampment is facility, that they seem to me to differ diametrically +from Greek military men in this respect. Greeks, in choosing a place +for a camp, think primarily of security from the natural strength of +the position: first, because they are averse from the toil of digging a +foss, and, secondly, because they think that no artificial defences are +comparable to those afforded by the nature of the ground. Accordingly, +they not only have to vary the whole configuration of the camp to suit +the nature of the ground, but to change the arrangement of details in +all kinds of irregular ways; so that neither soldier nor company has +a fixed place in it. The Romans, on the other hand, prefer to undergo +the fatigue of digging, and of the other labours of circumvallation, +for the sake of the facility in arrangement, and to secure a plan of +encampment which shall be one and the same and familiar to all. + +Such are the most important facts in regard to the legions and the +method of encamping them.... + + +THE ROMAN REPUBLIC COMPARED WITH OTHERS + +[Sidenote: The Theban constitution may be put aside,] + ++43.+ Nearly all historians have recorded as constitutions of eminent +excellence those of Lacedaemonia, Crete, Mantinea, and Carthage. Some +have also mentioned those of Athens and Thebes. The former I may allow +to pass; but I am convinced that little need be said of the Athenian +and Theban constitutions: their growth was abnormal, the period of +their zenith brief, and the changes they experienced unusually violent. +Their glory was a sudden and fortuitous flash, so to speak; and while +they still thought themselves prosperous, and likely to remain so, they +found themselves involved in circumstances completely the reverse. The +Thebans got their reputation for valour among the Greeks, by taking +advantage of the senseless policy of the Lacedaemonians, and the +hatred of the allies towards them, owing to the valour of one, or at +most two, men who were wise enough to appreciate the situation. Since +fortune quickly made it evident that it was not the peculiarity of +their constitution, but the valour of their leaders, which gave the +Thebans their success. For the great power of Thebes notoriously took +its rise, attained its zenith, and fell to the ground with the lives of +Epaminondas and Pelopidas. We must therefore conclude that it was not +its constitution, but its men, that caused the high fortune which it +then enjoyed. + +[Sidenote: as also the Athenian.] + ++44.+ A somewhat similar remark applies to the Athenian constitution +also. For though it perhaps had more frequent interludes of excellence, +yet its highest perfection was attained during the brilliant career +of Themistocles; and having reached that point it quickly declined, +owing to its essential instability. For the Athenian demus is always +in the position of a ship without a commander. In such a ship, if +fear of the enemy, or the occurrence of a storm induce the crew to be +of one mind and to obey the helmsman, everything goes well; but if +they recover from this fear, and begin to treat their officers with +contempt, and to quarrel with each other because they are no longer +all of one mind,—one party wishing to continue the voyage, and the +other urging the steersman to bring the ship to anchor; some letting +out the sheets, and others hauling them in, and ordering the sails to +be furled,—their discord and quarrels make a sorry show to lookers on; +and the position of affairs is full of risk to those on board engaged +on the same voyage: and the result has often been that, after escaping +the dangers of the widest seas, and the most violent storms, they wreck +their ship in harbour and close to shore. And this is what has often +happened to the Athenian constitution. For, after repelling, on various +occasions, the greatest and most formidable dangers by the valour of +its people and their leaders, there have been times when, in periods +of secure tranquillity, it has gratuitously and recklessly encountered +disaster.[305] Therefore I need say no more about either it, or the +Theban constitution: in both of which a mob manages everything on its +own unfettered impulse—a mob in the one city distinguished for headlong +outbursts of fiery temper, in the other trained in long habits of +violence and ferocity. + +[Sidenote: The Spartan polity unlike that of Crete.] + ++45.+ Passing to the Cretan polity there are two points which +deserve our consideration. The first is how such writers as Ephorus, +Xenophon, Callisthenes and Plato[306]—who are the most learned of the +ancients—could assert that it was like that of Sparta; and secondly +how they came to assert that it was at all admirable. I can agree with +neither assertion; and I will explain why I say so. And first as to its +dissimilarity with the Spartan constitution. The peculiar merit of the +latter is said to be its land laws, by which no one possesses more than +another, but all citizens have an equal share in the public land.[307] +The next distinctive feature regards the possession of money: for as it +is utterly discredited among them, the jealous competition which arises +from inequality of wealth is entirely removed from the city. A third +peculiarity of the Lacedaemonian polity is that, of the officials by +whose hands and with whose advice the whole government is conducted, +the kings hold an hereditary office, while the members of the Gerusia +are elected for life. + ++46.+ Among the Cretans the exact reverse of all these arrangements +obtains. The laws allow them to possess as much land as they can get +with no limitation whatever. Money is so highly valued among them, +that its possession is not only thought to be necessary but in the +highest degree creditable. And in fact greed and avarice are so native +to the soil in Crete, that they are the only people in the world among +whom no stigma attaches to any sort of gain whatever. Again all their +offices are annual and on a democratical footing. I have therefore +often felt at a loss to account for these writers speaking of the two +constitutions, which are radically different, as though they were +closely united and allied. But, besides overlooking these important +differences, these writers have gone out of their way to comment at +length on the legislation of Lycurgus: “He was the only legislator,” +they say, “who saw the important points. For there being two things +on which the safety of a commonwealth depends,—courage in the face of +the enemy and concord at home,—by abolishing covetousness, he with +it removed all motive for civil broil and contest: whence it has +been brought about that the Lacedaemonians are the best governed and +most united people in Greece.” Yet while giving utterance to these +sentiments, and though they see that, in contrast to this, the Cretans +by their ingrained avarice are engaged in countless public and private +seditions, murders and civil wars, they yet regard these facts as +not affecting their contention, but are bold enough to speak of the +two constitutions as alike. Ephorus, indeed, putting aside names, +employs expressions so precisely the same, when discoursing on the +two constitutions, that, unless one noticed the proper names, there +would be no means whatever of distinguishing which of the two he was +describing. + ++47.+ In what the difference between them consists I have already +stated. I will now address myself to showing that the Cretan +constitution deserves neither praise nor imitation. + +[Sidenote: Tests of a good polity.] + +To my mind, then, there are two things fundamental to every state, +in virtue of which its powers and constitution become desirable or +objectionable. These are customs and laws. Of these the desirable are +those which make men’s private lives holy and pure, and the public +character of the state civilised and just. The objectionable are those +whose effect is the reverse. As, then, when we see good customs and +good laws prevailing among certain people, we confidently assume that, +in consequence of them, the men and their civil constitution will be +good also, so when we see private life full of covetousness, and public +policy of injustice, plainly we have reason for asserting their laws, +particular customs, and general constitution to be bad. Now, with few +exceptions, you could find no habits prevailing in private life more +steeped in treachery than those in Crete, and no public policy more +inequitable. Holding, then, the Cretan constitution to be neither like +the Spartan, nor worthy of choice or imitation, I reject it from the +comparison which I have instituted. + +[Sidenote: Ideal polities may be omitted.] + +Nor again would it be fair to introduce the Republic of Plato, which +is also spoken of in high terms by some Philosophers. For just as we +refuse admission to the athletic contests to those actors or athletes +who have not acquired a recognised position[308] or trained for them, +so we ought not to admit this Platonic constitution to the contest +for the prize of merit unless it can first point to some genuine and +practical achievement. Up to this time the notion of bringing it into +comparison with the constitutions of Sparta, Rome, and Carthage would +be like putting up a statue to compare with living and breathing men. +Even if such a statue were faultless in point of art, the comparison +of the lifeless with the living would naturally leave an impression of +imperfection and incongruity upon the minds of the spectators. + +[Sidenote: The aims of Lycurgus.] + +[Sidenote: Their partial failure.] + ++48.+ I shall therefore omit these, and proceed with my description +of the Laconian constitution. Now it seems to me that for securing +unity among the citizens, for safe-guarding the Laconian territory, +and preserving the liberty of Sparta inviolate, the legislation +and provisions of Lycurgus were so excellent, that I am forced to +regard his wisdom as something superhuman. For the equality of landed +possessions, the simplicity in their food, and the practice of taking +it in common, which he established, were well calculated to secure +morality in private life and to prevent civil broils in the State; as +also their training in the endurance of labours and dangers to make +men brave and noble minded: but when both these virtues, courage and +high morality, are combined in one soul or in one state, vice will +not readily spring from such a soil, nor will such men easily be +overcome by their enemies. By constructing his constitution therefore +in this spirit, and of these elements, he secured two blessings to +the Spartans,—safety for their territory, and a lasting freedom for +themselves long after he was gone. He appears however to have made no +one provision whatever, particular or general, for the acquisition +of the territory of their neighbours; or for the assertion of their +supremacy; or, in a word, for any policy of aggrandisement at all. What +he had still to do was to impose such a necessity, or create such a +spirit among the citizens, that, as he had succeeded in making their +individual lives independent and simple, the public character of the +state should also become independent and moral. But the actual fact +is, that, though he made them the most disinterested and sober-minded +men in the world, as far as their own ways of life and their national +institutions were concerned, he left them in regard to the rest of +Greece ambitious, eager for supremacy, and encroaching in the highest +degree. + +[Sidenote: First and second Messenian wars, B.C. 745-724 (?), 685-668.] + +[Sidenote: Battle of Plataea, B.C. 479.] + +[Sidenote: Peace of Antalcidas, B.C. 387.] + +[Sidenote: The causes of this failure.] + ++49.+ For in the first place is it not notorious that they were nearly +the first Greeks to cast a covetous eye upon the territory of their +neighbours, and that accordingly they waged a war of subjugation on +the Messenians? In the next place is it not related in all histories +that in their dogged obstinacy they bound themselves with an oath +never to desist from the siege of Messene until they had taken it? +And lastly it is known to all that in their efforts for supremacy in +Greece they submitted to do the bidding of those whom they had once +conquered in war. For when the Persians invaded Greece, they conquered +them, as champions of the liberty of the Greeks; yet when the invaders +had retired and fled, they betrayed the cities of Greece into their +hands by the peace of Antalcidas, for the sake of getting money to +secure their supremacy over the Greeks. It was then that the defect +in their constitution was rendered apparent. For as long as their +ambition was confined to governing their immediate neighbours, or even +the Peloponnesians only, they were content with the resources and +supplies provided by Laconia itself, having all material of war ready +to hand, and being able without much expenditure of time to return +home or convey provisions with them. But directly they took in hand to +despatch naval expeditions, or to go on campaigns by land outside the +Peloponnese, it was evident that neither their iron currency, nor their +use of crops for payment in kind, would be able to supply them with +what they lacked if they abided by the legislation of Lycurgus; for +such undertakings required money universally current, and goods from +foreign countries. Thus they were compelled to wait humbly at Persian +doors, impose tribute on the islanders, and exact contributions from +all the Greeks: knowing that, if they abided by the laws of Lycurgus, +it was impossible to advance any claims upon any outside power at all, +much less upon the supremacy in Greece. + +[Sidenote: Sparta fails where Rome succeeds.] + ++50.+ My object, then, in this digression is to make it manifest by +actual facts that, for guarding their own country with absolute safety, +and for preserving their own freedom, the legislation of Lycurgus was +entirely sufficient; and for those who are content with these objects +we must concede that there neither exists, nor ever has existed, a +constitution and civil order preferable to that of Sparta. But if any +one is seeking aggrandisement, and believes that to be a leader and +ruler and despot of numerous subjects, and to have all looking and +turning to him, is a finer thing than that,—in this point of view we +must acknowledge that the Spartan constitution is deficient, and that +of Rome superior and better constituted for obtaining power. And this +has been proved by actual facts. For when the Lacedaemonians strove +to possess themselves of the supremacy in Greece, it was not long +before they brought their own freedom itself into danger. Whereas the +Romans, after obtaining supreme power over the Italians themselves, +soon brought the whole world under their rule,—in which achievement the +abundance and availability of their supplies largely contributed to +their success. + +[Sidenote: Rome fresher than Carthage;] + ++51.+ Now the Carthaginian constitution seems to me originally to +have been well contrived in these most distinctively important +particulars. For they had kings,[309] and the Gerusia had the powers +of an aristocracy, and the multitude were supreme in such things as +affected them; and on the whole the adjustment of its several parts +was very like that of Rome and Sparta. But about the period of its +entering on the Hannibalian war the political state of Carthage was +on the decline,[310] that of Rome improving. For whereas there is in +every body, or polity, or business a natural stage of growth, zenith, +and decay; and whereas everything in them is at its best at the zenith; +we may thereby judge of the difference between these two constitutions +as they existed at that period. For exactly so far as the strength and +prosperity of Carthage preceded that of Rome in point of time, by so +much was Carthage then past its prime, while Rome was exactly at its +zenith, as far as its political constitution was concerned. In Carthage +therefore the influence of the people in the policy of the state had +already risen to be supreme, while at Rome the Senate was at the height +of its power: and so, as in the one measures were deliberated upon by +the many, in the other by the best men, the policy of the Romans in all +public undertakings proved the stronger; on which account, though they +met with capital disasters, by force of prudent counsels they finally +conquered the Carthaginians in the war. + +[Sidenote: and its citizen levies superior to Carthaginian mercenaries.] + ++52.+ If we look however at separate details, for instance at the +provisions for carrying on a war, we shall find that whereas for +a naval expedition the Carthaginians are the better trained and +prepared,—as it is only natural with a people with whom it has been +hereditary for many generations to practise this craft, and to follow +the seaman’s trade above all nations in the world,—yet, in regard to +military service on land, the Romans train themselves to a much higher +pitch than the Carthaginians. The former bestow their whole attention +upon this department: whereas the Carthaginians wholly neglect their +infantry, though they do take some slight interest in the cavalry. The +reason of this is that they employ foreign mercenaries, the Romans +native and citizen levies. It is in this point that the latter polity +is preferable to the former. They have their hopes of freedom ever +resting on the courage of mercenary troops: the Romans on the valour +of their own citizens and the aid of their allies. The result is that +even if the Romans have suffered a defeat at first, they renew the +war with undiminished forces, which the Carthaginians cannot do. For, +as the Romans are fighting for country and children, it is impossible +for them to relax the fury of their struggle; but they persist with +obstinate resolution until they have overcome their enemies. What has +happened in regard to their navy is an instance in point. In skill the +Romans are much behind the Carthaginians, as I have already said; yet +the upshot of the whole naval war has been a decided triumph for the +Romans, owing to the valour of their men. For although nautical science +contributes largely to success in sea-fights, still it is the courage +of the marines that turns the scale most decisively in favour of +victory. The fact is that Italians as a nation are by nature superior +to Phoenicians and Libyans both in physical strength and courage; but +still their habits also do much to inspire the youth with enthusiasm +for such exploits. One example will be sufficient of the pains taken +by the Roman state to turn out men ready to endure anything to win a +reputation in their country for valour. + +[Sidenote: Laudations at funerals.] + +[Sidenote: Imagines.] + +[Sidenote: Toga praetexta, purpurea, picta.] + +[Sidenote: Sellae curules.] + ++53.+ Whenever one of their illustrious men dies, in the course of his +funeral, the body with all its paraphernalia is carried into the forum +to the Rostra, as a raised platform there is called, and sometimes +is propped upright upon it so as to be conspicuous, or, more rarely, +is laid upon it. Then with all the people standing round, his son, +if he has left one of full age and he is there, or, failing him, one +of his relations, mounts the Rostra and delivers a speech concerning +the virtues of the deceased, and the successful exploits performed +by him in his lifetime. By these means the people are reminded of +what has been done, and made to see it with their own eyes,—not +only such as were engaged in the actual transactions but those also +who were not;—and their sympathies are so deeply moved, that the +loss appears not to be confined to the actual mourners, but to be a +public one affecting the whole people. After the burial and all the +usual ceremonies have been performed, they place the likeness of the +deceased in the most conspicuous spot in his house, surmounted by a +wooden canopy or shrine. This likeness consists of a mask made to +represent the deceased with extraordinary fidelity both in shape and +colour. These likenesses they display at public sacrifices adorned +with much care. And when any illustrious member of the family dies, +they carry these masks to the funeral, putting them on men whom they +thought as like the originals as possible in height and other personal +peculiarities. And these substitutes assume clothes according to the +rank of the person represented: if he was a consul or praetor, a toga +with purple stripes; if a censor, whole purple;[311] if he had also +celebrated a triumph or performed any exploit of that kind, a toga +embroidered with gold. These representatives also ride themselves +in chariots, while the fasces and axes, and all the other customary +insignia of the particular offices, lead the way, according to the +dignity of the rank in the state enjoyed by the deceased in his +lifetime; and on arriving at the Rostra they all take their seats on +ivory chairs in their order. + +There could not easily be a more inspiring spectacle than this for +a young man of noble ambitions and virtuous aspirations. For can we +conceive any one to be unmoved at the sight of all the likenesses +collected together of the men who have earned glory, all as it were +living and breathing? Or what could be a more glorious spectacle? + +[Sidenote: Devotion of the citizens.] + ++54.+ Besides the speaker over the body about to be buried, after +having finished the panegyric of this particular person, starts upon +the others whose representatives are present, beginning with the most +ancient, and recounts the successes and achievements of each. By this +means the glorious memory of brave men is continually renewed; the fame +of those who have performed any noble deed is never allowed to die; +and the renown of those who have done good service to their country +becomes a matter of common knowledge to the multitude, and part of the +heritage of posterity. But the chief benefit of the ceremony is that it +inspires young men to shrink from no exertion for the general welfare, +in the hope of obtaining the glory which awaits the brave. And what I +say is confirmed by this fact. Many Romans have volunteered to decide +a whole battle by single combat; not a few have deliberately accepted +certain death, some in time of war to secure the safety of the rest, +some in time of peace to preserve the safety of the commonwealth. There +have also been instances of men in office putting their own sons to +death, in defiance of every custom and law, because they rated the +interests of their country higher than those of natural ties even with +their nearest and dearest. There are many stories of this kind, related +of many men in Roman history; but one will be enough for our present +purpose; and I will give the name as an instance to prove the truth of +my words. + +[Sidenote: Horatius Cocles.] + ++55.+ The story goes that Horatius Cocles, while fighting with two +enemies at the head of the bridge over the Tiber, which is the entrance +to the city on the north, seeing a large body of men advancing to +support his enemies, and fearing that they would force their way into +the city, turned round, and shouted to those behind him to hasten +back to the other side and break down the bridge. They obeyed him: +and whilst they were breaking the bridge, he remained at his post +receiving numerous wounds, and checked the progress of the enemy: his +opponents being panic stricken, not so much by his strength as by +the audacity with which he held his ground. When the bridge had been +broken down, the attack of the enemy was stopped; and Cocles then threw +himself into the river with his armour on and deliberately sacrificed +his life, because he valued the safety of his country and his own +future reputation more highly than his present life, and the years +of existence that remained to him.[312] Such is the enthusiasm and +emulation for noble deeds that are engendered among the Romans by their +customs. + +[Sidenote: Purity of election.] + +[Sidenote: Cf. ch. 14.] + ++56.+ Again the Roman customs and principles regarding money +transactions are better than those of the Carthaginians. In the view +of the latter nothing is disgraceful that makes for gain; with the +former nothing is more disgraceful than to receive bribes and to make +profit by improper means. For they regard wealth obtained from unlawful +transactions to be as much a subject of reproach, as a fair profit from +the most unquestioned source is of commendation. A proof of the fact is +this. The Carthaginians obtain office by open bribery, but among the +Romans the penalty for it is death. With such a radical difference, +therefore, between the rewards offered to virtue among the two peoples, +it is natural that the ways adopted for obtaining them should be +different also. + +[Sidenote: Regard to religion.] + +But the most important difference for the better which the Roman +commonwealth appears to me to display is in their religious beliefs. +For I conceive that what in other nations is looked upon as a reproach, +I mean a scrupulous fear of the gods, is the very thing which keeps +the Roman commonwealth together. To such an extraordinary height is +this carried among them, both in private and public business, that +nothing could exceed it. Many people might think this unaccountable; +but in my opinion their object is to use it as a check upon the common +people. If it were possible to form a state wholly of philosophers, +such a custom would perhaps be unnecessary. But seeing that every +multitude is fickle, and full of lawless desires, unreasoning anger, +and violent passion, the only resource is to keep them in check by +mysterious terrors and scenic effects of this sort. Wherefore, to my +mind, the ancients were not acting without purpose or at random, when +they brought in among the vulgar those opinions about the gods, and the +belief in the punishments in Hades: much rather do I think that men +nowadays are acting rashly and foolishly in rejecting them. This is the +reason why, apart from anything else, Greek statesmen, if entrusted +with a single talent, though protected by ten checking-clerks, as many +seals, and twice as many witnesses, yet cannot be induced to keep +faith: whereas among the Romans, in their magistracies and embassies, +men have the handling of a great amount of money, and yet from pure +respect to their oath keep their faith intact. And, again, in other +nations it is a rare thing to find a man who keeps his hands out of +the public purse, and is entirely pure in such matters: but among the +Romans it is a rare thing to detect a man in the act of committing such +a crime.[313]... + + +RECAPITULATION AND CONCLUSION + ++57.+ That to all things, then, which exist there is ordained decay +and change I think requires no further arguments to show: for the +inexorable course of nature is sufficient to convince us of it. + +But in all polities we observe two sources of decay existing from +natural causes, the one external, the other internal and self-produced. +The external admits of no certain or fixed definition, but the internal +follows a definite order. What kind of polity, then, comes naturally +first, and what second, I have already stated in such a way, that +those who are capable of taking in the whole drift of my argument can +henceforth draw their own conclusions as to the future of the Roman +polity. For it is quite clear, in my opinion. When a commonwealth, +after warding off many great dangers, has arrived at a high pitch of +prosperity and undisputed power, it is evident that, by the lengthened +continuance of great wealth within it, the manner of life of its +citizens will become more extravagant; and that the rivalry for +office, and in other spheres of activity, will become fiercer than it +ought to be. And as this state of things goes on more and more, the +desire of office and the shame of losing reputation, as well as the +ostentation and extravagance of living, will prove the beginning of +a deterioration. And of this change the people will be credited with +being the authors, when they become convinced that they are being +cheated by some from avarice, and are puffed up with flattery by others +from love of office. For when that comes about, in their passionate +resentment and acting under the dictates of anger, they will refuse to +obey any longer, or to be content with having equal powers with their +leaders, but will demand to have all or far the greatest themselves. +And when that comes to pass the constitution will receive a new name, +which sounds better than any other in the world, liberty or democracy; +but, in fact, it will become that worst of all governments, mob-rule. + +With this description of the formation, growth, zenith, and present +state of the Roman polity, and having discussed also its difference, +for better and worse, from other polities, I will now at length bring +my essay on it to an end. + ++58.+ Resuming my history from the point at which I started on this +digression I will briefly refer to one transaction, that I may give +a practical illustration of the perfection and power of the Roman +polity at that period, as though I were producing one of his works as a +specimen of the skill of a good artist. + +[Sidenote: B.C. 216. Hannibal offers to put the prisoners at Cannae to +ransom.] + +When Hannibal, after conquering the Romans in the battle at Cannae, +got possession of the eight thousand who were guarding the Roman camp, +he made them all prisoners of war, and granted them permission to send +messages to their relations that they might be ransomed and return +home. They accordingly selected ten of their chief men, whom Hannibal +allowed to depart after binding them with an oath to return. But one +of them, just as he had got outside the palisade of the camp, saying +that he had forgotten something, went back; and, having got what he +had left behind, once more set out, under the belief that by means of +this return he had kept his promise and discharged his oath. Upon the +arrival of the envoys at Rome, imploring and beseeching the Senate not +to grudge the captured troops their return home, but to allow them to +rejoin their friends by paying three minae each for them,—for these +were the terms, they said, granted by Hannibal,—and declaring that +the men deserved redemption, for they had neither played the coward +in the field, nor done anything unworthy of Rome, but had been left +behind to guard the camp; and that, when all the rest had perished, +they had yielded to absolute necessity in surrendering to Hannibal: +though the Romans had been severely defeated in the battles, and +though they were at the time deprived of, roughly speaking, all their +allies, they neither yielded so far to misfortune as to disregard +what was becoming to themselves, nor omitted to take into account any +necessary consideration. They saw through Hannibal’s purpose in thus +acting,—which was at once to get a large supply of money, and at the +same time to take away all enthusiasm from the troops opposed to him, +by showing that even the conquered had a hope of getting safe home +again. Therefore the Senate, far from acceding to the request, refused +all pity even to their own relations, and disregarded the services +to be expected from these men in the future: and thus frustrated +Hannibal’s calculations, and the hopes which he had founded on these +prisoners, by refusing to ransom them; and at the same time established +the rule for their own men, that they must either conquer or die on +the field, as there was no other hope of safety for them if they were +beaten. With this answer they dismissed the nine envoys who returned +of their own accord; but the tenth who had put the cunning trick in +practice for discharging himself of his oath they put in chains and +delivered to the enemy. So that Hannibal was not so much rejoiced at +his victory in the battle, as struck with astonishment at the unshaken +firmness and lofty spirit displayed in the resolutions of these +senators.[314] + + + + +BOOK VII + +CAPUA AND PETELIA + + +[Sidenote: Capua and Petelia, the contrast of their fortunes.] + ++1.+ The people of Capua, in Campania, becoming wealthy through the +fertility of their soil, degenerated into luxury and extravagance +surpassing even the common report about Croton and Sybaris. Being then +unable to support their burden of prosperity they called in Hannibal; +and were accordingly treated with great severity by Rome. But the +people of Petelia maintained their loyalty to Rome and held out so +obstinately, when besieged by Hannibal, that after having eaten all the +leather in the town, and the bark of all the trees in it, and having +stood the siege for eleven months, as no one came to their relief, they +surrendered with the entire approval of the Romans.... But Capua by its +influence drew over the other cities to the Carthaginians.... + + +HIERONYMUS OF SYRACUSE + +[Sidenote: Hieronymus succeeded his grandfather Hiero II. in B.C. 216. +Under the influence of his uncles, Zoippus and Andranodorus, members of +the Council of 15 established by Hiero, Hieronymus opens communications +with Hannibal.] + +[Sidenote: Commissioners sent to Carthage to formulate a treaty of +alliance.] + ++2.+ After the plot against Hieronymus, King of Syracuse, Thraso having +departed, Zoippus and Andranodorus persuaded Hieronymus to lose no time +in sending ambassadors to Hannibal. He accordingly selected Polycleitus +of Cyrene and Philodemus of Argos for the purpose, and sent them +into Italy, with a commission to discuss the subject of an alliance +with the Carthaginians; and at the same time he sent his brothers to +Alexandria. Hannibal received Polycleitus and Philodemus with warmth; +held out great prospects to the young king; and sent the ambassadors +back without delay, accompanied by the commander of his triremes, a +Carthaginian also named Hannibal, and the Syracusan Hippocrates and +his younger brother Epicydes. These men had been for some time serving +in Hannibal’s army, being domiciled at Carthage, owing to their +grandfather having been banished from Syracuse because he was believed +to have assassinated Agatharchus, one of the sons of Agathocles. On +the arrival of these commissioners at Syracuse, Polycleitus and his +colleague reported the result of their embassy, and the Carthaginian +delivered the message given by Hannibal: whereupon the king without +hesitation expressed his willingness to make a treaty with the +Carthaginians; and, begging the Hannibal who had come to him to go with +all speed to Carthage, promised that he also would send commissioners +from his own court, to settle matters with the Carthaginians. + +[Sidenote: The Roman praetor sends to remonstrate. A scene with the +king.] + ++3.+ Meanwhile intelligence of this transaction had reached the Roman +praetor at Lilybaeum, who immediately despatched legates to Hieronymus, +to renew the treaty which had been made with his ancestors. Being +thoroughly annoyed with this embassy, Hieronymus said that “He was +sorry for the Romans that they had come to such utter and shameful +grief[315] in the battles in Italy at the hands of the Carthaginians.” +The legates were overpowered by the rudeness of the answer: still they +proceeded to ask him, “Who said such things about them?” Whereupon +the king pointed to the Carthaginian envoys who were there, and said, +“You had better convict them, if they have really been telling me +lies?” The Roman legates answered that it was not their habit to take +the word of enemies: and advised him to do nothing in violation of +the existing treaty; for that would be at once equitable and the best +thing for himself. To this the king answered that he would take time +to consider of it, and tell them his decision another time; but he +proceeded to ask them, “How it came about that before his grandfather’s +death a squadron of fifty Roman ships had sailed as far as Pachynus and +then gone back again.” The fact was that a short time ago the Romans +had heard that Hiero was dead; and being much alarmed lest people in +Syracuse, despising the youth of the grandson whom he left, should stir +up a revolution, they had made this cruise with the intention of being +ready there to assist his youthful weakness, and to help in maintaining +his authority; but being informed that his grandfather was still alive, +they sailed back again. When the ambassadors had stated these facts, +the young king answered again, “Then please to allow me too now, O +Romans, to maintain my authority by ’sailing back’ to see what I can +get from Carthage.” The Roman legates perceiving the warmth with which +the king was engaging in his policy, said nothing at the time; but +returned and informed the praetor who had sent them of what had been +said. From that time forward, therefore, the Romans kept a careful +watch upon him as an enemy. + +[Sidenote: The treaty with Carthage.] + +[Sidenote: The king’s pretensions rise, and a new arrangement is made +with Carthage.] + ++4.+ Hieronymus on his part selected Agatharchus, Onesimus, and +Hipposthenes to send with Hannibal to Carthage, with instructions to +make an alliance on the following terms: “The Carthaginians to assist +him with land and sea forces, in expelling the Romans from Sicily, and +then divide the island with him; so as to have the river Himera, which +divides Sicily almost exactly in half, as the boundary between the +two provinces.” The commissioners arrived in Carthage: and finding, +on coming to a conference, that the Carthaginians were prepared to +meet them in every point, they completed the arrangement. Meanwhile +Hippocrates got the young Hieronymus entirely into his hands: and at +first fired his imagination by telling him of Hannibal’s marches and +pitched battles in Italy; and afterwards by repeating to him that no +one had a better right to the government of all Siceliots than he; in +the first place as the son of Nereis daughter of Pyrrhus, the only +man whom all Siceliots alike had accepted deliberately and with full +assent as their leader and king; and in the second place in virtue of +his grandfather Hiero’s sovereign rights. At last he and his brother +so won upon the young man by their conversation, that he would attend +to no one else at all: partly from the natural feebleness of his +character, but still more from the ambitious feelings which they had +excited in him. And therefore, just when Agatharchus and his colleagues +were completing the business on which they had been sent in Carthage, +he sent fresh ambassadors, saying that all Sicily belonged to him; and +demanding that the Carthaginians should help him to recover Sicily: +while he promised he would assist the Carthaginians in their Italian +campaign. Though the Carthaginians now saw perfectly well the whole +extent of the young man’s fickleness and infatuation: yet thinking it +to be in manifold ways to their interests not to let Sicilian affairs +out of their hands, they assented to his demands; and having already +prepared ships and men, they set about arranging for the transport of +their forces into Sicily. + +[Sidenote: The Romans again remonstrate. Another scene at the Council.] + +[Sidenote: War with Rome decided upon.] + ++5.+ When they heard of this, the Romans sent legates to him again, +protesting against his violation of the treaty made with his +forefathers. Hieronymus thereupon summoned a meeting of his council +consulted them as to what he was to do. The native members of it kept +silent, because they feared the folly of their ruler. Aristomachus +of Corinth, Damippus of Sparta, Autonous of Thessaly advised that +he should abide by the treaty with Rome. Andranodorus alone urged +that he should not let the opportunity slip; and affirmed that the +present was the only chance of establishing his rule over Sicily. +After the delivery of this speech, the king asked Hippocrates and +his brother what they thought, and upon their answering, “The same +as Andranodorus,” the deliberation was concluded in that sense. +Thus, then, war with Rome had been decided upon: but while the king +was anxious to be thought to have given an adroit answer to the +ambassadors, he committed himself to such an utter absurdity as to make +it certain that he would not only fail to conciliate the Romans, but +would inevitably offend them violently. For he said that he would abide +by the treaty, firstly, if the Romans would repay all the gold they had +received from his grandfather Hiero; and secondly, if they would return +the corn and other presents which they had received from him from the +first day of their intercourse with him; and thirdly, if they would +acknowledge all Sicily east of the Himera to be Syracusan territory. +At these propositions of course the ambassadors and council separated; +and from that time forth Hieronymus began pushing on his preparations +for war with energy: collected and armed his forces, and got ready the +other necessary provisions.... + +[Sidenote: Description of Leontini, where Hieronymus was murdered. See +Livy, 24, 7.] + ++6.+ The city of Leontini taken as a whole faces north, and is divided +in half by a valley of level ground, in which are the state buildings, +the court-houses, and market-place. Along each side of this valley run +hills with steep banks all the way; the flat tops of which, reached +after crossing their brows, are covered with houses and temples. The +city has two gates, one on the southern extremity of this valley +leading to Syracuse, the other at the northern leading on to the +“Leontine plains,” and the arable district. Close under the westernmost +of the steep cliffs runs a river called Lissus; parallel to which are +built continuous rows of houses, in great numbers, close under the +cliff, between which and the river runs the road I have mentioned.... + +[Sidenote: Fall of Hieronymus, B.C. 214.] + ++7.+ Some of the historians who have described the fall of Hieronymus +have written at great length and in terms of mysterious solemnity. +They tell us of prodigies preceding his coming to the throne, and of +the misfortunes of Syracuse. They describe in dramatic language the +cruelty of his character and the impiety of his actions; and crown all +with the sudden and terrible nature of the circumstances attending his +fall. One would think from their description that neither Phalaris, +nor Apollodorus, nor any other tyrant was ever fiercer than he. Yet +he was a mere boy when he succeeded to power, and only lived thirteen +months after. In this space of time it is possible that one or two men +may have been put to the rack, or certain of his friends, or other +Syracusan citizens, put to death; but it is improbable that his tyranny +could have been extravagantly wicked, or his impiety outrageous. It +must be confessed that he was reckless and unscrupulous in disposition; +still we cannot compare him with either of the tyrants I have named. +The fact is that those who write the histories of particular episodes, +having undertaken limited and narrow themes, appear to me to be +compelled from poverty of matter to exaggerate insignificant incidents, +and to speak at inordinate length on subjects that scarcely deserve +to be recorded at all. There are some, too, who fall into a similar +mistake from mere want of judgment. With how much more reason might the +space employed on these descriptions,—which they use merely to fill up +and spin out their books,—have been devoted to Hiero and Gelo, without +mentioning Hieronymus at all! It would have given greater pleasure to +readers and more instruction to students. + +[Sidenote: Character of Hiero II., King of Syracuse, from B.C. 269 to +B.C. 215.] + ++8.+ For, in the first place, Hiero gained the sovereignty of Syracuse +and her allies by his own unaided abilities without inheriting wealth, +or reputation, or any other advantage of fortune. And, in the second +place, was established king of Syracuse without putting to death, +banishing, or harassing any one of the citizens,—which is the most +astonishing circumstance of all. And what is quite as surprising as +the innocence of his acquisition of power is the fact that it did +not change his character. For during a reign of fifty-four years he +preserved peace for the country, maintained his own power free from +all hostile plots, and entirely escaped the envy which generally +follows greatness; for though he tried on several occasions to lay +down his power, he was prevented by the common remonstrances of the +citizens. And having shown himself most beneficent to the Greeks, and +most anxious to earn their good opinion, he left behind him not merely +a great personal reputation but also a universal feeling of goodwill +towards the Syracusans. Again, though he passed his life in the midst +of the greatest wealth, luxury, and abundance, he survived for more +than ninety years, in full possession of his senses and with all parts +of his body unimpaired; which, to my mind, is a decisive proof of a +well-spent life.... + +[Sidenote: Gelo, son of Hiero II., associated with his father in the +kingdom, B.C. 216. See 5, 88, Livy, 23, 30.] + +Gelo, his son, in a life of more than fifty years regarded it as the +most honourable object of ambition to obey his father, and to regard +neither wealth, nor sovereign power, nor anything else as of higher +value than love and loyalty to his parents.... + + +TREATY BETWEEN HANNIBAL AND KING PHILIP V. OF MACEDON + +[Sidenote: Gods by whom the oath is taken on either side.] + +[Sidenote: Preamble of a treaty made between Philip and Hannibal, by +envoys sent after the battle of Cannae. Ratified subsequently to March +13, B.C. 215. See Livy, 23, 33-39. _Ante_ 3, 2.] + ++9.+ This is a sworn treaty made between Hannibal, Mago, Barmocarus, +and such members of the Carthaginian Gerusia as were present, and all +Carthaginians serving in his army, on the one part; and Xenophanes, son +of Cleomachus of Athens, sent to us by King Philip, as his ambassador, +on behalf of himself, the Macedonians, and their allies, on the other +part. + +The oath is taken in the presence of Zeus, Hera, and Apollo: of the god +of the Carthaginians, Hercules, and Iolaus: of Ares, Triton, Poseidon: +of the gods that accompany the army, and of the sun, moon, and earth: +of rivers, harbours, waters: of all the gods who rule Carthage: of all +the gods who rule Macedonia and the rest of Greece: of all the gods of +war that are witnesses to this oath. + +[Sidenote: Declaration on the part of Hannibal of the objects of the +treaty.] + +Hannibal, general, and all the Carthaginian senators with him, and +all Carthaginians serving in his army, subject to our mutual consent, +proposes to make this sworn treaty of friendship and honourable +goodwill. Let us be friends, close allies, and brethren, on the +conditions herein following:— + +[Sidenote: 1st article sworn to by Philip’s representative.] + +(1) Let the Carthaginians, as supreme, Hannibal their chief general +and those serving with him, all members of the Carthaginian dominion +living under the same laws, as well as the people of Utica, and the +cities and tribes subject to Carthage, and their soldiers and allies, +and all cities and tribes in Italy, Celt-land, and Liguria, with whom +we have a compact of friendship, and with whomsoever in this country we +may hereafter form such compact, be supported by King Philip and the +Macedonians, and all other Greeks in alliance with them. + +[Sidenote: 1st article sworn to by Hannibal and the Carthaginians.] + +(2) On their parts also King Philip and the Macedonians, and such +other Greeks as are his allies, shall be supported and protected by +the Carthaginians now in this army, and by the people of Utica, and by +all cities and tribes subject to Carthage, both soldiers and allies, +and by all allied cities and tribes in Italy, Celt-land, and Liguria, +and by all others in Italy as shall hereafter become allies of the +Carthaginians. + +[Sidenote: 2d article sworn to by Phillip’s representative.] + +(3) We will not make plots against, nor lie in ambush for, each +other; but in all sincerity and goodwill, without reserve or secret +design, will be enemies to the enemies of the Carthaginians, saving +and excepting those kings, cities, and ports with which we have sworn +agreements and friendships. + +[Sidenote: 2d article sworn to by Hannibal.] + +(4) And we, too, will be enemies to the enemies of King Philip, saving +and excepting those kings, cities, and tribes, with which we have sworn +agreements and friendships. + +[Sidenote: 3d article sworn to by Philip’s representative.] + +(5) Ye shall be friends to us in the war in which we now are engaged +against the Romans, till such time as the gods give us and you the +victory: and ye shall assist us in all ways that be needful, and in +whatsoever way we may mutually determine. + +[Sidenote: 3d article sworn to by Hannibal.] + +(6) And when the gods have given us victory in our war with the Romans +and their allies, if Hannibal shall deem it right to make terms with +the Romans, these terms shall include the same friendship with you, +made on these conditions: (1) the Romans not to be allowed to make +war on you; (2) not to have power over Corcyra, Apollonia, Epidamnum, +Pharos, Dimale, Parthini, nor Atitania; (3) to restore to Demetrius of +Pharos all those of his friends now in the dominion of Rome. + +[Sidenote: 1st joint article.] + +(7) If the Romans ever make war on you or on us we will aid each other +in such war, according to the need of either. + +[Sidenote: 2d joint article.] + +(8) So also if any other nation whatever does so, always excepting +kings, cities, and tribes, with whom we have sworn agreements and +friendships. + +[Sidenote: 3d joint article. Mutual consent required for an alteration.] + +(9) If we decide to take away from, or add to this sworn treaty, + +we will so take away, or add thereto, only as we both may agree.... + + +MESSENE AND PHILIP V. IN B.C. 215 + +[Sidenote: Political state of Messene.] + ++10.+ Democracy being established at Messene, and the men of rank +having been banished, while those who had received allotments on their +lands obtained the chief influence in the government, those of the old +citizens who remained found it very hard to put up with the equality +which these men had obtained.... + +[Sidenote: The character of the Messenian athlete and statesman Gorgus. +See _ante_, 5, 5.] + +Gorgus of Messene, in wealth and extraction, was inferior to no one in +the town; and had been a famous athlete in his time, far surpassing all +rivals in that pursuit. In fact he was not behind any man of his day +in physical beauty, or the general dignity of his manner of life, or +the number of prizes he had won. Again, when he gave up athletics and +devoted himself to politics and the service of his country, he gained +no less reputation in this department than in his former pursuit. +For he was removed from the Philistinism that usually characterises +athletes, and was looked upon as in the highest degree an able and +clear-headed politician.... + +[Sidenote: Philip V. of Macedon at Messene, B.C. 215. See Plutarch, +_Arat._ 49-50.] + ++11.+ Philip, king of the Macedonians, being desirous of seizing the +acropolis of Messene, told the leaders of the city that he wished to +see it and to sacrifice to Zeus, and accordingly walked up thither with +his attendants and joined in the sacrifice. When, according to custom, +the entrails of the slaughtered victims were brought to him, he took +them in his hands, and, turning round a little to one side, held them +out to Aratus and asked him “what he thought the sacrifices indicated? +To quit the citadel or hold it?” Thereupon Demetrius struck in on the +spur of the moment by saying, “If you have the heart of an augur,—to +quit it as quick as you can: but if of a gallant and wise king, to keep +it, lest if you quit it now you may never have so good an opportunity +again: for it is by thus holding the two horns that you can alone keep +the ox under your control.” By the “two horns” he meant Ithome and +the Acrocorinthus, and by the “ox” the Peloponnese. Thereupon Philip +turned to Aratus and said, “And do you give the same advice?” Aratus +not making any answer at once, he urged him to speak his real opinion. +After some hesitation he said, “If you can get possession of this place +without treachery to the Messenians, I advise you to do so; but if, by +the act of occupying this citadel with a guard, you shall ruin all the +citadels, and the guard wherewith the allies were protected when they +came into your hands from Antigonus” (meaning by that, _confidence_), +“consider whether it is not better to take your men away and leave +the confidence there, and with it guard the Messenians, and the other +allies as well.” As far as his own inclination was concerned, Philip +was ready enough to commit an act of treachery, as his own subsequent +conduct proved: but having been sharply rebuked a little while before +by the younger Aratus for his destruction of human life; and seeing +that, on the present occasion, the elder spoke with boldness and +authority, and begged him not to neglect his advice, he gave in from +sheer shame, and taking the latter by his right hand, said, “Then let +us go back the same way we came.” + +[Sidenote: Deterioration in the character of Philip V. See 4, 77.] + ++12.+ I wish here to stop in my narrative in order to speak briefly of +the character of Philip, because this was the beginning of the change +and deterioration in it. For I think that no more telling example can +be proposed to practical statesmen who wish to correct their ideas by +a study of history. For the splendour of his early career, and the +brilliancy of his genius, have caused the dispositions for good and +evil displayed by this king to be more conspicuous and widely known +throughout Greece than is the case with any other man; as well as the +contrast between the results accompanying the display of those opposite +tendencies. + +Now that, upon his accession to the throne, Thessaly, Macedonia, and in +fact all parts of his own kingdom were more thoroughly loyal and well +disposed to him, young as he was on his succeeding to the government +of Macedonia, than they had ever been to any of his predecessors, may +be without difficulty inferred from the following fact. Though he +was with extreme frequency forced to leave Macedonia by the Aetolian +and Lacedaemonian wars, not only was there no disturbance in these +countries, but not a single one of the neighbouring barbarians +ventured to touch Macedonia. It would be impossible, again, to speak +in strong enough terms of the affection of Alexander, Chrysogonus, and +his other friends towards him; or that of the Epirotes, Acarnanians, +and all those on whom he had within a short time conferred great +benefits. On the whole, if one may use a somewhat hyperbolical phrase, +I think it has been said of Philip with very great propriety, that +his beneficent policy had made him “The darling of all Greece.” And +it is a conspicuous and striking proof of the advantage of lofty +principle and strict integrity, that the Cretans, having at length +come to an understanding with each other and made a national alliance, +selected Philip to arbitrate between them; and that this settlement +was completed without an appeal to arms and without danger,—a thing +for which it would be difficult to find a precedent in similar +circumstances. From the time of his exploits at Messene all this was +utterly changed. And it was natural that it should be so. For his +purposes being now entirely reversed, it inevitably followed that men’s +opinions of him should be reversed also, as well as the success of +his various undertakings. This actually was the case, as will become +evident to attentive students from what I am now about to relate.... + ++13.+ Aratus seeing that Philip was now openly engaging in war with +Rome, and entirely changed in his policy toward his allies, with +difficulty diverted him from his intention by suggesting numerous +difficulties and scruples. + +[Sidenote: 5, 12.] + +[Sidenote: Recapitulation of the substance of book 7, viz. the +treacherous dealings of Philip with the Messenians, B.C. 215.] + +[Sidenote: Plato, _Rep._ 565 D.] + +I wish now to remind my readers of what, in my fifth Book, I put +forward merely as a promise and unsupported statement, but which +has now been confirmed by facts; in order that I may not leave any +proposition of mine unproved or open to question. In the course of +my history of the Aetolian war, where I had to relate the violent +proceedings of Philip in destroying the colonnades and other sacred +objects at Thermus; and added that, in consideration of his youth, the +blame of these measures ought not to be referred to Philip so much as +to his advisers; I then remarked that the life of Aratus sufficiently +proved that he would not have committed such an act of wickedness, +but that such principles exactly suited Demetrius of Pharos; and I +promised to make this clear from what I was next to narrate. I thereby +designedly postponed the demonstration of the truth of my assertion, +till I had come to the period of which I have just been speaking; which +with the presence of Demetrius, and in the absence of Aratus, who +arrived a day too late, Philip made the first step in his career of +crime; and, as though from the first taste of human blood and murder +and treason to his allies, was changed not into a wolf from a man, as +in the Arcadian fable mentioned by Plato, but from a king into a savage +tyrant. But a still more decisive proof of the sentiments of these two +men is furnished by the plot against the citadel of Messene, and may +help us to make up our minds which of the two were responsible for the +proceedings in the Aetolian war; and, when we are satisfied on that +point, it will be easy to form a judgment on the differences of their +principles. + ++14.+ For as in this instance, under the influence of Aratus, Philip +refrained from actually breaking faith with the Messenians in regard +to the citadel; and thus, to use a common expression, poured a little +balm into the wide wound which his slaughters had caused: so in the +Aetolian war, when under the influence of Demetrius, he sinned against +the gods by destroying the objects consecrated to them, and against man +by transgressing the laws of war; and entirely deserted his original +principles, by showing himself an implacable and bitter foe to all +who opposed him. The same remark applies to the Cretan business.[316] +As long as he employed Aratus as his chief director, not only without +doing injustice to a single islander, but without even causing them +any vexation, he kept the whole Cretan people under control; and led +all the Greeks to regard him with favour, owing to the greatness of +character which he displayed. So again, when under the guidance of +Demetrius, he became the cause of the misfortunes I have described to +the Messenians, he at once lost the goodwill of the allies and his +credit with the rest of Greece. Such a decisive influence for good or +evil in the security of their government has the choice by youthful +sovereigns of the friends who are to surround them; though it is a +subject on which by some unaccountable carelessness they take not the +smallest care.... + + +THE WAR OF ANTIOCHUS WITH ACHAEUS + +(See 5, 107) + +[Sidenote: Siege of Sardis from the end of B.C. 216 to autumn of B.C. +215.] + ++15.+ Round Sardis ceaseless and protracted skirmishes were taking +place and fighting by night and day, both armies inventing every +possible kind of plot and counterplot against each other: to describe +which in detail would be as useless as it would be in the last degree +wearisome. At last, when the siege had already entered upon its second +year, Lagoras the Cretan came forward. He had had a considerable +experience in war, and had learnt that as a rule cities fall into the +hands of their enemies most easily from some neglect on the part of +their inhabitants, when, trusting to the natural or artificial strength +of their defences, they neglect to keep proper guard and become +thoroughly careless. He had observed too, that in such fortified cities +captures were effected at the points of greatest strength, which were +believed to have been despaired of by the enemy. So in the present +instance, when he saw that the prevailing notion of the strength of +Sardis caused the whole army to despair of taking it by storm, and +to believe that the one hope of getting it was by starving it out, +he gave all the closer attention to the subject; and eagerly scanned +every possible method of making an attempt to capture the town. Having +observed therefore that a portion of the wall was unguarded, near a +place called the Saw, which unites the citadel and city, he conceived +the hope and idea of performing this exploit. He had discovered +the carelessness of the men guarding this wall from the following +circumstance. The place was extremely precipitous: and there was a deep +gully below, into which dead bodies from the city, and the offal of +horses and beasts of burden that died, were accustomed to be thrown; +and in this place therefore there was always a great number of vultures +and other birds collected. Having observed, then, that when these +creatures were gorged, they always sat undisturbed upon the cliffs and +the wall, he concluded that the wall must necessarily be left unguarded +and deserted for the larger part of the day. Accordingly, under cover +of night, he went to the spot and carefully examined the possibilities +of approaching it and setting ladders; and finding that this was +possible at one particular rock, he communicated the facts to the king. + ++16.+ Antiochus encouraged the attempt and urged Lagoras to carry it +out. The latter promised to do his best, and desired the king to join +with him Theodotus the Aetolian, and Dionysius the commander of his +bodyguard, with orders to devote them to assist him in carrying out +the intended enterprise. The king at once granted his request, and +these officers agreed to undertake it: and having held a consultation +on the whole subject, they waited for a night on which there should be +no moon just before daybreak. Such a night having arrived, on the day +on which they intended to act, an hour before sunset, they selected +from the whole army fifteen of the strongest and most courageous men to +carry the ladders, and also to mount with them and share in the daring +attempt. After these they selected thirty others, to remain in reserve +at a certain distance; that, as soon as they had themselves climbed +over the walls, and come to the nearest gate, the thirty might come up +to it from the outside and try to knock off the hinges and fastenings, +while they on the inside cut the cross bar and bolt pins.[317] They +also selected two thousand men to follow behind the thirty, who were to +rush into the town with them and seize the area of the theatre, which +was a favourable position to hold against those on the citadel, as +well as those in the town. To prevent suspicion of the truth getting +about, owing to the picking out of the men, the king gave out that +the Aetolians were about to throw themselves into the town through a +certain gully, and that it was necessary, in view of that information, +to take energetic measures to prevent them. + +[Sidenote: The town of Sardis entered and sacked.] + ++17.+ When Lagoras and his party had made all their preparations, as +soon as the moon set, they came stealthily to the foot of the cliffs +with their scaling ladders, and ensconced themselves under a certain +overhanging rock. When day broke, and the picket as usual broke up +from that spot; and the king in the ordinary way told off some men to +take their usual posts, and led the main body on to the hippodrome and +drew them up; at first no one suspected what was going on. But when +two ladders were fixed, and Dionysius led the way up one, and Lagoras +up the other, there was excitement and a stir throughout the camp. For +while the climbing party were not visible to the people in the town, +or to Achaeus in the citadel, because of the beetling brow of the +rock, their bold and adventurous ascent was in full view of the camp; +which accordingly was divided in feeling between astonishment at the +strangeness of the spectacle, and a nervous horror of what was going +to happen next, all standing dumb with exulting wonder. Observing the +excitement in the camp, and wishing to divert the attention both of +his own men and of those in the city from what was going on, the king +ordered an advance; and delivered an attack upon the gates on the other +side of the town, called the Persian gates. Seeing from the citadel +the unwonted stir in the camp, Achaeus was for some time at a loss to +know what to do, being puzzled to account for it, and quite unable to +see what was taking place. However he despatched a force to oppose the +enemy at the gate; whose assistance was slow in arriving, because they +had to descend from the citadel by a narrow and precipitous path. But +Aribazus, the commandant of the town, went unsuspiciously to the gates +on which he saw Antiochus advancing; and caused some of his men to +mount the wall, and sent others out through the gate, with orders to +hinder the approaching enemies, and come to close quarters with them. + ++18.+ Meanwhile Lagoras, Theodotus, Dionysius, and their men had +climbed the rocks and had arrived at the gate nearest them; and some +of them were engaged in fighting the troops sent from the citadel to +oppose them, while others were cutting through the bars; and at the +same time the party outside told off for that service were doing the +same. The gates having thus been quickly forced open, the two thousand +entered and occupied the area round the theatre. On this all the men +from the walls, and from the Persian gate, to which Aribazus had +already led a relieving force, rushed in hot haste to pass the word to +attack the enemy within the gates. The result was that, the gate having +been opened as they retreated, some of the king’s army rushed in along +with the retiring garrison; and, when they had thus taken possession of +the gate, they were followed by an unbroken stream of their comrades; +some of whom poured through the gate, while others employed themselves +in bursting open other gates in the vicinity. Aribazus and all the men +in the city, after a brief struggle against the enemy who had thus +got within the walls, fled with all speed to the citadel. After that, +Theodotus and Lagoras and their party remained on the ground near the +theatre, determining with great good sense and soldier-like prudence +to form a reserve until the whole operation was completed; while the +main body rushed in on every side and occupied the town. And now by +dint of some putting all they met to the sword, others setting fire to +the houses, others devoting themselves to plunder and taking booty, the +destruction and sacking of the town was completed. Thus did Antiochus +become master of Sardis.... + + + + +BOOK VIII + +THE NECESSITY OF CAUTION IN DEALING WITH AN ENEMY + + +[Sidenote: Fall of Tiberius Sempronius Gracchus [Cons. B.C. 215 and 213] + ++1.+ Tiberius a Roman Proconsul fell into an ambuscade, and, after +offering with his attendants a gallant as he was advancing from Lucania +to Capua, by the treachery of the Lucanian Flavius, B.C. 212. Livy, 25, +16.] resistance to the enemy, was killed. + +[Sidenote: Fall of Archidamus, B.C. 226-225.] + +[Sidenote: Gnaeus Cornelius Scipio Asina with his fleet surprised and +captured at Lipara, B.C. 260. See 1, 21.] + +[Sidenote: Fall of Pelopidas in Thessaly, B.C. 363.] + +Now in regard to such catastrophes, whether it is right to blame or +pardon the sufferers is by no means a safe matter on which to pronounce +an opinion; because it has happened to several men, who have been +perfectly correct in all their actions, to fall into these misfortunes, +equally with those who do not scruple to transgress principles of right +confirmed by the consent of mankind. We should not however idly refrain +from pronouncing an opinion: but should blame or condone this or that +general, after a review of the necessities of the moment and the +circumstances of the case. And my observation will be rendered evident +by the following instances. Archidamus, king of the Lacedaemonians, +alarmed at the love of power which he observed in Cleomenes, fled +from Sparta; but being not long afterwards persuaded to return, put +himself in the power of the latter. The consequence was that he lost +his kingdom and his life together,[318] and left a character not to be +defended before posterity on the score of prudence; for while affairs +remained in the same state, and the ambition and power of Cleomenes +remained in exactly the same position, how could he expect to meet any +other fate than he did, if he put himself in the hands of the very men +from whom he had before barely escaped destruction by flight? Again +Pelopidas of Thebes, though acquainted with the unprincipled character +of the tyrant Alexander, and though he knew thoroughly well that +every tyrant regards the leaders of liberty as his bitterest enemies, +first took upon himself to persuade Epaminondas to stand forth as the +champion of democracy, not only in Thebes, but in all Greece also; and +then, being in Thessaly in arms, for the express purpose of destroying +the absolute rule of Alexander, he yet twice ventured to undertake a +mission to him. The consequence was that he fell into the hands of his +enemies, did great damage to Thebes, and ruined the reputation he had +acquired before; and all by putting a rash and ill advised confidence +in the very last person in whom he ought to have done so. Very similar +to these cases is that of the Roman Consul Gnaeus Cornelius who fell +in the Sicilian war by imprudently putting himself in the power of the +enemy. And many parallel cases might be quoted. + +[Sidenote: Betrayal of Achaeus by Bolis. See _infra_, ch. 17-23.] + ++2.+ The conclusion, then, is that those who put themselves in the +power of the enemy from want of proper precaution deserve blame; +but those who use every practicable precaution not so: for to trust +absolutely no one is to make all action impossible; but reasonable +action, taken after receiving adequate security, cannot be censured. +Adequate securities are oaths, children, wives, and, strongest of all, +a blameless past. To be betrayed and entrapped by such a security as +any of these is a slur, not on the deceived, but on the deceiver. The +first object then should be to seek such securities as it is impossible +for the recipient of the confidence to evade; but since such are rare, +the next best thing will be to take every reasonable precaution one’s +self: and then, if we meet with any disaster, we shall at least be +acquitted of wrong conduct by the lookers on. And this has been the +case with many before now: of which the most conspicuous example, and +the one nearest to the times on which we are engaged, will be the fate +of Achaeus. He omitted no possible precaution for securing his safety, +but thought of everything that it was possible for human ingenuity +to conceive: and yet he fell into the power of his enemies. In this +instance his misfortune procured the pity and pardon of the outside +world for the victim, and nothing but disparagement and loathing for +the successful perpetrators.... + + * * * * * + +[Sidenote: Sardinia reduced by T. Manlius Torquatus, B.C. 215. +Marcellus took Leontini, B.C. 214 (autumn). Livy, 24, 30.] + +[Sidenote: Marcus Valerius Laevinus commands a fleet off Greece, B.C. +215-214. Livy, 24, 10. Publius Sulpicius Galba Cos. (B.C. 211.) sent to +Macedonia. Livy, 26, 22; 27, 31. Appius Claudius Pulcher, Praetor, sent +to Sicily, B.C. 215. Livy, 23, 31, Propraetor, B.C. 214. Livy 24, 33.] + +[Sidenote: Marcus Claudius Marcellus, Cos. III., B.C. 214.] + ++3.+ It appears to me not to be alien to my general purpose, and the +plan which I originally laid down, to recall the attention of my +readers to the magnitude of the events, and the persistency of purpose +displayed by the two States of Rome and Carthage. For who could think +it otherwise than remarkable that these two powers, while engaged in so +serious a war for the possession of Italy, and one no less serious for +that of Iberia; and being still both of them equally balanced between +uncertain hopes and fears for the future of these wars, and confronted +at the very time with battles equally formidable to either, should +yet not be content with their existing undertakings: but should raise +another controversy as to the possession of Sardinia and Sicily; and +not content with merely hoping for all these things, should grasp at +them with all the resources of their wealth and warlike forces? Indeed +the more we examine into details the greater becomes our astonishment. +The Romans had two complete armies under the two Consuls on active +service in Italy; two in Iberia in which Gnaeus Cornelius commanded the +land, Publius Cornelius the naval forces; and naturally the same was +the case with the Carthaginians. But besides this, a Roman fleet was +anchored off Greece, watching it and the movements of Philip, of which +first Marcus Valerius, and afterward Publius Sulpicius was in command. +Along with all these undertakings Appius with a hundred quinqueremes, +and Marcus Claudius with an army, were threatening Sicily; while +Hamilcar was doing the same on the side of the Carthaginians. + ++4.+ By means of these facts I presume that what I more than once +asserted at the beginning of my work is now shown by actual experience +to deserve unmixed credit. I mean my assertion, that it is impossible +for historians of particular places to get a view of universal history. +For how is it possible for a man who has only read a separate history +of Sicilian or Spanish affairs to understand and grasp the greatness of +the events? Or, what is still more important, in what manner and under +what form of polity fortune brought to pass that most surprising of +all revolutions that have happened in our time, I mean the reduction +of all known parts of the world under one rule and governance, a +thing unprecedented in the history of mankind. In what manner the +Romans took Syracuse or Iberia may be possibly learned to a certain +extent by means of such particular histories; but how they arrived at +universal supremacy, and what opposition their grand designs met with +in particular places, or what on the other hand contributed to their +success, and at what epochs, this it is difficult to take in without +the aid of universal history. Nor, again, is it easy to appreciate the +greatness of their achievements except by the latter method. For the +fact of the Romans having sought to gain Iberia, or at another time +Sicily; or having gone on a campaign with military and naval forces, +told by itself, would not be anything very wonderful. But if we learn +that these were all done at once, and that many more undertakings were +in course of accomplishment at the same time,—all at the cost of one +government and commonwealth; and if we see what dangers and wars in +their own territory were, at the very time, encumbering the men who had +all these things on hand: thus, and only thus, will the astonishing +nature of the events fully dawn upon us, and obtain the attention which +they deserve. So much for those who suppose that by studying an episode +they have become acquainted with universal history.... + + +THE SIEGE OF SYRACUSE + +_Hieronymus succeeded his grandfather, Hiero, in B.C. 216, and was +assassinated in Leontini thirteen months afterwards, in B.C. 215. His +death, however, did not bring more peaceful relations between Syracuse +and Rome, but only gave the Syracusans more able leaders (Livy, 24, +21). After the slaughter of Themistius and Andramodorus, who had been +elected on the board of Generals, and the cruel murder of all the +royal family, Epicydes and Hippocrates,—Syracusans by descent, but +born and brought up at Carthage, and who had been sent to Syracuse on +a special mission by Hannibal,—were elected into the vacant places in +the board of Generals. They became the leading spirits in the Syracusan +government, and for a time kept up an appearance of wishing to come +to terms with Rome; and legates were actually sent to Marcellus, at +Morgantia (near Catana). But when the Carthaginian fleet arrived at +Pachynus, Hippocrates and Epicydes threw off their mask, and declared +that the other magistrates were betraying the town to the Romans. This +accusation was rendered more specious by the appearance of Appius with +a Roman fleet at the mouth of the harbour. A rush was made to the +shore by the inhabitants to prevent the Romans landing; and the tumult +was with difficulty composed by the wisdom of one of the magistrates, +Apollonides, who persuaded the people to vote for the peace with Rome +(B.C. 215. Livy, 24, 21-28). But Hippocrates and Epicydes determined +not to acknowledge the peace: they therefore provoked the Romans by +plundering in or near the Roman pale,[319] and then took refuge in +Leontini. Marcellus complained at Syracuse, but was told that Leontini +was not within Syracusan jurisdiction. Marcellus, therefore, took +Leontini. Hippocrates and Epicydes managed to escape, and by a mixture +of force and fraud contrived soon afterwards to force their way into +Syracuse, seize and put to death most of the generals, and induce the +excited mob, whom they had inspired with the utmost dread of being +betrayed to Rome, to elect them sole generals (Livy, 24, 29-32). The +Romans at once ordered Syracuse to be besieged, giving out that they +were coming not to wage war with the inhabitants, but to deliver them._ + + * * * * * + +[Sidenote: Siege of Syracuse, B.C. 215-214.] + +[Sidenote: Archimedes.] + ++5.+ When Epicydes and Hippocrates had occupied Syracuse, and had +alienated the rest of the citizens with themselves from the friendship +of Rome, the Romans who had already been informed of the murder of +Hieronymus, tyrant of Syracuse, appointed Appius Claudius as Propraetor +to command a land force, while Marcus Claudius Marcellus commanded +the fleet. These officers took up a position not far from Syracuse, +and determined to assault the town from the land at Hexapylus, and by +sea at what was called Stoa Scytice in Achradina, where the wall has +its foundation close down to the sea. Having prepared their wicker +pent-houses, and darts, and other siege material, they felt confident +that, with so many hands employed, they would in five days get their +works in such an advanced state as to give them the advantage over the +enemy. But in this they did not take into account the abilities of +Archimedes; nor calculate on the truth that, in certain circumstances, +the genius of one man is more effective than any numbers whatever.[320] +However they now learnt it by experience. The city was strong from +the fact of its encircling wall lying along a chain of hills with +overhanging brows, the ascent of which was no easy task, even with no +one to hinder it, except at certain definite points. Taking advantage +of this, Archimedes had constructed such defences both in the town, and +at the places where an attack might be made by sea, that the garrison +would have everything at hand which they might require at any moment, +and be ready to meet without delay whatever the enemy might attempt +against them. + +[Sidenote: Sambucae or Harps.] + ++6.+ The attack was begun by Appius bringing his pent-houses, and +scaling ladders, and attempting to fix the latter against that part of +the wall which abuts on Hexapylus towards the east. At the same time +Marcus Claudius Marcellus with sixty quinqueremes was making a descent +upon Achradina. Each of these vessels were full of men armed with bows +and slings and javelins, with which to dislodge those who fought on +the battlements. As well as these vessels he had eight quinqueremes +in pairs. Each pair had had their oars removed, one on the larboard +and the other on the starboard side, and then had been lashed together +on the sides thus left bare. On these double vessels, rowed by the +outer oars of each of the pair, they brought up under the walls some +engines called “Sambucae,” the construction of which was as follows:—A +ladder was made four feet broad, and of a height to reach the top of +the wall from the place where its foot had to rest; each side of the +ladder was protected by a railing, and a covering or pent-house was +added overhead. It was then placed so that its foot rested across the +sides of the lashed-together vessels, which touched each other with its +other extremity protruding a considerable way beyond the prows. On the +tops of the masts pulleys were fixed with ropes: and when the engines +were about to be used, men standing on the sterns of the vessels drew +the ropes tied to the head of the ladder, while others standing on +the prows assisted the raising of the machine and kept it steady with +long poles. Having then brought the ships close in shore by using the +outer oars of both vessels they tried to let the machine down upon the +wall. At the head of the ladder was fixed a wooden stage secured on +three sides by wicker-shields, upon which stood four men who fought +and struggled with those who tried to prevent the Sambuca from being +made to rest on the battlements. But when they have fixed it and so +got above the level of the top of the wall, the four men unfasten the +wicker-shields from either side of the stage, and walk out upon the +battlements or towers as the case may be; they are followed by their +comrades coming up by the Sambuca, since the ladder’s foot is safely +secured with ropes and stands upon both the ships. This construction +has got the name of “Sambuca,” or “Harp,” for the natural reason, that +when it is raised the combination of the ship and ladder has very much +the appearance of such an instrument. + +[Sidenote: The engines invented by Archimedes. Cf. Plut. _Marcellus_, +15.] + +[Sidenote: 570 lbs. av.] + ++7.+ With such contrivances and preparations were the Romans intending +to assault the towers. But Archimedes had constructed catapults to suit +every range; and as the ships sailing up were still at a considerable +distance, he so wounded the enemy with stones and darts, from the +tighter wound and longer engines, as to harass and perplex them to the +last degree; and when these began to carry over their heads, he used +smaller engines graduated according to the range required from time +to time, and by this means caused so much confusion among them as to +altogether check their advance and attack; and finally Marcellus was +reduced in despair to bringing up his ships under cover of night. But +when they had come close to land, and so too near to be hit by the +catapults, they found that Archimedes had prepared another contrivance +against the soldiers who fought from the decks. He had pierced the wall +as high as a man’s stature with numerous loop-holes, which, on the +outside, were about as big as the palm of the hand. Inside the wall he +stationed archers and cross-bows, or scorpions,[321] and by the volleys +discharged through these he made the marines useless. By these means he +not only baffled the enemy, whether at a distance or close at hand, but +also killed the greater number of them. As often, too, as they tried +to work their Sambucae, he had engines ready all along the walls, not +visible at other times, but which suddenly reared themselves above the +wall from inside, when the moment for their use had come, and stretched +their beams far over the battlements, some of them carrying stones +weighing as much as ten talents, and others great masses of lead. So +whenever the Sambucae were approaching, these beams swung round on +their pivot the required distance, and by means of a rope running +through a pulley dropped the stone upon the Sambucae, with the result +that it not only smashed the machine itself to pieces, but put the ship +also and all on board into the most serious danger. + ++8.+ Other machines which he invented were directed against storming +parties, who, advancing under the protection of pent-houses, were +secured by them from being hurt by missiles shot through the walls. +Against these he either shot stones big enough to drive the marines +from the prow; or let down an iron hand swung on a chain, by which the +man who guided the crane, having fastened on some part of the prow +where he could get a hold, pressed down the lever of the machine inside +the wall; and when he had thus lifted the prow and made the vessel rest +upright on its stern, he fastened the lever of his machine so that it +could not be moved; and then suddenly slackened the hand and chain by +means of a rope and pulley. The result was that many of the vessels +heeled over and fell on their sides: some completely capsized; while +the greater number, by their prows coming down suddenly from a height, +dipped low in the sea, shipped a great quantity of water, and became +a scene of the utmost confusion. Though reduced almost to despair by +these baffling inventions of Archimedes, and though he saw that all his +attempts were repulsed by the garrison with mockery on their part and +loss to himself, Marcellus could not yet refrain from making a joke at +his own expense, saying that “Archimedes was using his ships to ladle +out the sea-water, but that his 'harps’ not having been invited to the +party were buffeted and turned out with disgrace.” Such was the end of +the attempt at storming Syracuse by sea. + +[Sidenote: The assault by land repulsed.] + +[Sidenote: The siege turned into a blockade, B.C. 214. Coss. Q. Fabius +Maximus IV. M. Claudius Marcellus III.] + ++9.+ Nor was Appius Claudius more successful. He, too, was compelled +by similar difficulties to desist from the attempt; for while his +men were still at a considerable distance from the wall, they began +falling by the stones and shots from the engines and catapults. The +volleys of missiles, indeed, were extraordinarily rapid and sharp, +for their construction had been provided for by all the liberality +of a Hiero, and had been planned and engineered by the skill of an +Archimedes. Moreover, when they did at length get near the walls, they +were prevented from making an assault by the unceasing fire through +the loop-holes, which I mentioned before; or if they tried to carry +the place under cover of pent-houses, they were killed by the stones +and beams let down upon their heads. The garrison also did them no +little damage with those hands at the end of their engines; for they +used to lift the men, armour, and all, into the air, and then throw +them down. At last Appius retired into the camp, and summoning the +Tribunes to a council of war, decided to try every possible means of +taking Syracuse except a storm. And this decision they carried out; for +during the eight months of siege which followed, though there was no +stratagem or measure of daring which they did not attempt, they never +again ventured to attempt a storm. So true it is that one man and one +intellect, properly qualified for the particular undertaking, is a +host in itself and of extraordinary efficacy. In this instance, at any +rate, we find the Romans confident that their forces by land and sea +would enable them to become masters of the town, if only one old man +could be got rid of; while as long as he remained there, they did not +venture even to think of making the attempt, at least by any method +which made it possible for Archimedes to oppose them. They believed, +however, that their best chance of reducing the garrison was by a +failure of provisions sufficient for so large a number as were within +the town; they therefore relied upon this hope, and with their ships +tried to cut off their supplies by sea, and with their army by land. +But desiring that the time during which they were blockading Syracuse +should not be entirely wasted, but that some addition should be made to +their power in other parts of the country, the two commanders separated +and divided the troops between them: Appius Claudius keeping two-thirds +and continuing the blockade, while Marcus Marcellus with the remaining +third went to attack the cities that sided with the Carthaginians.... + + * * * * * + +[Sidenote: Philip’s second devastation of Messene, B.C. 214.] + +[Sidenote: See Plutarch, _Aratus_, ch. 51. Cp. _supra_, 7, 10-14.] + ++10.+ Upon arriving in Messenia Philip began devastating the country, +like an open enemy, with more passion than reason; for while pursuing +this continuous course of injurious actions, he expected, it appears to +me, that the sufferers would feel no anger or hatred towards him. I was +induced to speak of these proceedings in somewhat full detail in the +present as well as in the last book, not alone by the same motives as +those which I have assigned for other parts of my work, but also by the +fact that of our historians, some have entirely omitted this Messenian +episode; while others from love or fear of kings have maintained that, +so far from the outrages committed by Philip in defiance of religion +and law upon the Messenians being a subject of blame, his actions were +on the contrary matters for praise and gratulation. But it is not +only in regard to the Messenians that we may notice the historians of +Philip acting thus; they have done much the same in other cases also. +And the result is that their compositions have the appearance of a +panegyric rather than of a history. I however hold that an historian +ought neither to blame or praise kings untruly, as has often been done; +but to make what we say consistent with what has been written before, +and tally with the characters of the several persons in question. But +it may be urged perhaps that this is easy to say, but very difficult +to carry out; because situations and circumstances are so many and +various, to which men have to give way in the course of their life, +and which prevent them from speaking out their real opinions. This may +excuse some, but not others. + +[Sidenote: The extravagance of Theopompus’s account of Philip II.] + ++11.+ I do not know any one who deserves more blame in this particular +than Theopompus. In the beginning of his history of Philip he said +that what chiefly induced him to undertake it was the fact that +Europe had never produced such a man as Philip son of Amyntas; and +then immediately afterwards, both in his preface and in the whole +course of his history, he represents this king as so madly addicted to +women, that he did all that in him lay to ruin his own family by this +inordinate passion; as having behaved with the grossest unfairness and +perfidy to his friends and allies, as having enslaved and treacherously +seized a vast number of towns by force or fraud; and as having been +besides so violently addicted to strong drink, that he was often +seen by his friends drunk in open day. But if any one will take the +trouble to read the opening passage of his forty-ninth book, he would +be indeed astonished at this writer’s extravagance. Besides his other +strange statements he has ventured to write as follows—for I here +subjoin his actual words:—“If there was any one in all Greece, or among +the Barbarians, whose character was lascivious and shameless, he was +invariably attracted to Philip’s court in Macedonia and got the title +of 'the king’s companion.’ For it was Philip’s constant habit to reject +those who lived respectably and were careful of their property; but to +honour and promote those who were extravagant, and passed their lives +in drinking and dicing. His influence accordingly tended not only to +confirm them in these vices, but to make them proficients in every kind +of rascality and lewdness. What vice or infamy did they not possess? +What was there virtuous or of good report that they did not lack? Some +of them, men as they were, were ever clean shaven and smooth-skinned; +and even bearded men did not shrink from mutual defilement. They took +about with them two or three slaves of their lust, while submitting +to the same shameful service themselves. The men whom they called +companions deserved a grosser name, and the title of soldier was but +a cover to mercenary vice; for, though bloodthirsty by nature, they +were lascivious by habit. In a word, to make a long story short, +especially as I have such a mass of matter to deal with, I believe that +the so-called 'friends’ and 'companions’ of Philip were more bestial +in nature and character than the Centaurs who lived on Pelion, or the +Laestrygones who inhabited the Leontine plain, or in fact any other +monsters whatever.”[322] + ++12.+ Who would not disapprove of such bitterness and intemperance of +language in an historian? It is not only because his words contradict +his opening statement that he deserves stricture; but also because +he has libelled the king and his friends; and still more because his +falsehood is expressed in disgusting and unbecoming words. If he had +been speaking of Sardanapalus, or one of his associates, he could +hardly have ventured to use such foul language; and what that monarch’s +principles and debauchery were in his lifetime we gather from the +inscription on his tomb, which runs thus: + + “The joys I had from love or wine + Or dainty meats—those now are mine.” + +[Sidenote: The vigorous characters of the Diadochi.] + +But when speaking of Philip and his friends, a man ought to be on +his guard, not so much of accusing them of effeminacy and want of +courage, or still more of shameless immorality, but on the contrary +lest he should prove unequal to express their praises in a manner +worthy of their manliness, indefatigable energy, and the general +virtue of their character. It is notorious that by their energy and +boldness they raised the Macedonian Empire from a most insignificant +monarchy to the first rank in reputation and extent. And, putting aside +the achievements of Philip, what was accomplished by them after his +death, under the rule of Alexander, has secured for them a reputation +for valour with posterity universally acknowledged. For although a +large share of the credit must perhaps be given to Alexander, as the +presiding genius of the whole, though so young a man; yet no less is +due to his coadjutors and friends, who won many wonderful victories +over the enemy; endured numerous desperate labours, dangers and +sufferings; and, though put into possession of the most ample wealth, +and the most abundant means of gratifying all their desires, never +lost their bodily vigour by these means, or contracted tastes for +violence or debauchery. On the contrary, all those who were associated +with Philip, and afterwards with Alexander, became truly royal in +greatness of soul, temperance of life, and courage. Nor is it necessary +to mention any names: but after Alexander’s death, in their mutual +rivalries for the possession of various parts of nearly all the world, +they filled a very large number of histories with the record of their +glorious deeds. We may admit then that the bitter invective of the +historian Timaeus against Agathocles, despot of Sicily, though it seems +unmeasured, has yet some reason in it,—for it is directed against a +personal enemy, a bad man, and a tyrant; but that of Theopompus is too +scurrilous to be taken seriously. + ++13.+ For, after premising that he is going to write about a king most +richly endowed by nature with virtue, he has raked up against him every +shameful and atrocious charge that he could find. There are therefore +but two alternatives: either this writer in the preface to his work has +shown himself a liar and a flatterer; or in the body of that history a +fool and utter simpleton, if he imagined that by senseless and improper +invective he would either increase his own credit, or gain great +acceptance for his laudatory expressions about Philip. + +[Sidenote: Thucydides breaks off in B.C. 411. Battle of Leuctra B.C. +371.] + +But the fact is that the general plan of this writer is one also which +can meet with no one’s approval. For having undertaken to write a +Greek History from the point at which Thucydides left off, when he +got near the period of the battle of Leuctra, and the most splendid +exploits of the Greeks, he threw aside Greece and its achievements in +the middle of his story, and, changing his purpose, undertook to write +the history of Philip. And yet it would have been far more telling and +fair to have included the actions of Philip in the general history +of Greece, than the history of Greece in that of Philip. For one +cannot conceive of any one, who had been preoccupied by the study of a +royal government, hesitating, if he got the power and opportunity, to +transfer his attention to the great name and splendid personality of a +nation like Greece; but no one in his senses, after beginning with the +latter, would have exchanged it for the showy biography of a tyrant. +Now what could it have been that compelled Theopompus to overlook +such inconsistencies? Nothing surely but this, that whereas the aim +of his original history was honour, that of his history of Philip was +expediency. As to this deviation from the right path however, which +made him change the theme of his history, he might perhaps have had +something to say, if any one had questioned him about it; but as to +his abominable language about the king’s friends, I do not think that +he could have said a word of defence, but must have owned to a serious +breach of propriety.... + +[Sidenote: Death of Aratus, B.C. 213.] + ++14.+ Though regarding the Messenians as open enemies, Philip was +unable to inflict serious damage upon them, in spite of his setting +to work to devastate their territory; but he was guilty of abominable +conduct of the worst description to men who had been his most intimate +friends. For on the elder Aratus showing disapproval of his proceedings +at Messene, he caused him not long afterwards to be made away with by +poison, through the agency of Taurion who had charge of his interests +in the Peloponnese. The crime was not known at the time by other +people; for the drug was not one of those which kill on the spot, but +was a slow poison producing a morbid state of the body. Aratus himself +however was fully aware of the cause of his illness; and showed that he +was so by the following circumstance. Though he kept the secret from +the rest of the world, he did not conceal it from one of his servants +named Cepholon, with whom he was on terms of great affection. This man +waited on him during his illness with great assiduity, and having one +day pointed out some spittle on the wall which was stained with blood, +Aratus remarked, “That is the reward I have got for my friendship to +Philip.” Such a grand and noble thing is disinterested virtue, that +the sufferer was more ashamed, than the inflicter of the injury, of +having it known, that, after so many splendid services performed in +the interests of Philip, he had got such a return as that for his +loyalty.[323] + +[Sidenote: Seventeen times Strategus. Plutarch, _Aratus_, 53.] + +In consequence of having been so often elected Strategus of the Achaean +league, and of having performed so many splendid services for that +people, Aratus after his death met with the honours he deserved, both +in his own native city and from the league as a body. They voted him +sacrifices and the honours of heroship, and in a word every thing +calculated to perpetuate his memory; so that, if the departed have any +consciousness, it is but reasonable to think that he feels pleasure at +the gratitude of the Achaeans, and at the thought of the hardships and +dangers he endured in his life.... + + +PHILIP TAKES LISSUS IN ILLYRIA, B.C. 213 + +[Sidenote: Lissus founded by Dionysius of Syracuse, B.C. 385. See Diod. +Sic. 15, 13.] + ++15.+ Philip had long had his thoughts fixed upon Lissus and its +citadel; and, being anxious to become master of those places, he +started with his army, and after two days’ march got through the pass +and pitched his camp on the bank of the river Ardaxanus, not far from +the town. He found on surveying the place that the fortifications of +Lissus, both on the side of the sea and of the land, were exceedingly +strong both by nature and art; and that the citadel, which was near it, +from its extraordinary height and its other sources of strength, looked +more than any one could hope to carry by storm. He therefore gave up +all hope of the latter, but did not entirely despair of taking the +town. He observed that there was a space between Lissus and the foot of +the Acrolissus which was fairly well suited for making an attempt upon +the town. He conceived the idea therefore of bringing on a skirmish in +this space, and then employing a strategem suited to the circumstances +of the case. Having given his men a day for rest; and having in the +course of it addressed them in suitable words of exhortation; he hid +the greater and most effective part of his light-armed troops during +the night in some woody gulleys, close to this space on the land side; +and next morning marched to the other side of the town next the sea, +with his peltasts and the rest of his light-armed. Having thus marched +round the town, and arrived at this spot, he made a show of intending +to assault it at that point. Now as Philip’s advent had been no secret, +a large body of men from the surrounding country of Illyria had flocked +into Lissus; but feeling confidence in the strength of the citadel, +they had assigned a very moderate number of men to garrison it. + +[Sidenote: The Acrolissus taken by a feint, and Lissus afterwards.] + ++16.+ As soon therefore as the Macedonians approached, they began +pouring out of the town, confident in their numbers and in the strength +of the places. The king stationed his peltasts on the level ground, +and ordered the light-armed troops to advance towards the hills and +energetically engage the enemy. These orders being obeyed, the fight +remained doubtful for a time; but presently Philip’s men yielded to the +inequality of the ground, and the superior number of the enemy, and +gave way. Upon their retreating within the ranks of the peltasts, the +sallying party advanced with feelings of contempt, and having descended +to the same level as the peltasts joined battle with them. But the +garrison of the citadel seeing Philip moving his divisions one after +the other slowly to the rear, and believing that he was abandoning +the field, allowed themselves to be insensibly decoyed out, in their +confidence in the strength of their fortifications; and thus, leaving +the citadel by degrees, kept pouring down by bye-ways into the lower +plain, under the belief that they would have an opportunity of getting +booty and completing the enemy’s discomfiture. Meanwhile the division, +which had been lying concealed on the side of the mainland, rose +without being observed, and advanced at a rapid pace. At their approach +the peltasts also wheeled round and charged the enemy. On this the +troops from Lissus were thrown into confusion, and, after a straggling +retreat, got safely back into the town; while the garrison which had +abandoned the citadel got cut off from it by the rising of the troops +which had been lying in ambush. The result accordingly was that what +seemed hopeless, namely the capture of the citadel, was effected +at once and without any fighting; while Lissus did not fall until +next day, and then only after desperate struggles, the Macedonians +assaulting with vigour and even terrific fury. Thus Philip having, +beyond all expectation, made himself master of these places, reduced +by this exploit all the neighbouring populations to obedience; so much +so that the greater number of the Illyrians voluntarily surrendered +their cities to his protection; for it had come to be believed that, +after the storming of such strongholds as these, no fortification and +no provision for security could be of any avail against the might of +Philip. + + +THE CAPTURE OF ACHAEUS AT SARDIS + +(See 7, 15-18) + +[Sidenote: B.C. 214. Sosibius secures the help of Bolis to rescue +Achaeus.] + ++17.+ Bolis was by birth a Cretan, who had long enjoyed the honours of +high military rank at King Ptolemy’s court, and the reputation of being +second to none in natural ability, adventurous daring, and experience +in war. By repeated arguments Sosibius secured this man’s fidelity; +and when he felt sure of his zeal and affection he communicated the +business in hand to him. He told him that he could not do the king +a more acceptable service at the present crisis than by contriving +some way of saving Achaeus. At the moment Bolis listened, and retired +without saying more than that he would consider the suggestion. But +after two or three days’ reflection, he came to Sosibius and said that +he would undertake the business; remarking that, having spent some +considerable time at Sardis, he knew its topography, and that Cambylus, +the commander of the Cretan contingent of the army of Antiochus, was +not only a fellow citizen of his but a kinsmen and friend. It chanced +moreover that Cambylus and his men had in charge one of the outposts on +the rear of the acropolis, where the nature of the ground did not admit +of siege-works, but was guarded by the permanent cantonment of troops +under Cambylus. Sosibius caught at the suggestion, convinced that, if +Achaeus could be saved at all from his dangerous situation, it could be +better accomplished by the agency of Bolis than of any one else; and, +this conviction being backed by great zeal on the part of Bolis, the +undertaking was pushed on with despatch. Sosibius at once supplied the +money necessary for the attempt, and promised a large sum besides in +case of its success; at the same time raising the hopes of Bolis to the +utmost by dilating upon the favours he might look for from the king, as +well as from the rescued prince himself. + +Full of eagerness therefore for success, Bolis set sail without delay, +taking with him a letter in cipher and other credentials addressed +to Nicomachus at Rhodes, who was believed to entertain a fatherly +affection and devotion for Achaeus, and also to Melancomas at Ephesus; +for these were the men formerly employed by Achaeus in his negotiations +with Ptolemy, and in all other foreign affairs. + +[Sidenote: Bolis turns traitor.] + ++18.+ Bolis went to Rhodes, and thence to Ephesus; communicated his +purpose to Nicomachus and Melancomas; and found them ready to do what +they were asked. He then despatched one of his staff, named Arianus, +to Cambylus, with a message to the effect that he had been sent from +Alexandria on a recruiting tour, and that he wished for an interview +with Cambylus on some matters of importance; he thought it therefore +necessary to have a time and place arranged for them to meet without +the privity of a third person. Arianus quickly obtained an interview +with Cambylus and delivered his message; nor was the latter at all +unwilling to listen to the proposal. Having appointed a day, and a +place known to both himself and Bolis, at which he would be after +nightfall, he dismissed Arianus. Now Bolis had all the subtlety of a +Cretan, and he accordingly weighed carefully in his own mind every +possible line of action, and patiently examined every idea which +presented itself to him. Finally he met Cambylus according to the +arrangement made with Arianus, and delivered his letter. This was +now made the subject of discussion between them in a truly Cretan +spirit. They never took into consideration the means of saving the +person in danger, or their obligations of honour to those who had +entrusted them with the undertaking, but confined their discussions +entirely to the question of their own safety and their own advantage. +As they were both Cretans they were not long in coming to an unanimous +agreement: which was, first of all, to divide the ten talents supplied +by Sosibius between themselves in equal shares; and, secondly, to +discover the whole affair to Antiochus, and to offer with his support +to put Achaeus into his hands, on condition of receiving a sum of +money and promises for the future, on a scale commensurate with the +greatness of the undertaking. Having settled upon this plan of action: +Cambylus undertook the negotiation with Antiochus, while to Bolis +was assigned the duty of sending Arianus within the next few days to +Achaeus, bearing letters in cipher from Nicomachus and Melancomas: he +bade Cambylus however take upon himself to consider how Arianus was +to make his way into the acropolis and return with safety. “If,” said +Bolis, “Achaeus consents to make the attempt, and sends an answer to +Nicomachus and Melancomas, I will be ready to act and will communicate +with you.” Having thus arranged the parts which each was to take in the +plot, they separated and set about their several tasks. + +[Sidenote: The intended treason against Achaeus communicated to +Antiochus.] + +[Sidenote: Achaeus is deceived.] + ++19.+ At the first opportunity Cambylus laid the proposal before the +king. It was as acceptable to Antiochus as it was unexpected: in the +first flush of his exultation he promised everything they asked; but +presently feeling some distrust, he questioned Cambylus on every detail +of their plan, and their means of carrying it out. Being eventually +satisfied on these points, and believing that the undertaking was under +the special favour of Providence, he repeatedly begged and prayed +Cambylus to bring it to a conclusion. Bolis was equally successful with +Nicomachus and Melancomas. They entertained no doubt of his sincerity, +and joined him in the composition of letters to Achaeus,—composed in +a cipher which they had been accustomed to use,—to prevent any one +who got hold of the letter from making out its contents, exhorting +him to trust Bolis and Cambylus. So Arianus, having by the aid of +Cambylus made his way into the acropolis, delivered the letters to +Achaeus; and having had personal acquaintance with the whole business +from its commencement, he was able to give an account of every detail +when questioned and cross-questioned again and again by Achaeus +about Sosibius and Bolis, about Nicomachus and Melancomas, and most +particularly about the part which Cambylus was taking in the affair. He +could of course stand this cross-examination with some air of sincerity +and candour, because, in point of fact, he was not acquainted with the +most important part of the plan which Cambylus and Bolis had adopted. +Achaeus was convinced by the answers returned by Arianus, and still +more by the cipher of Nicomachus and Melancomas; gave his answer; and +sent Arianus back with it without delay. This kind of communication +was repeated more than once: and at last Achaeus entrusted himself +without reserve to Nicomachus, there being absolutely no other hope of +saving himself left remaining, and bade him send Bolis with Arianus +on a certain moonless night, promising to place himself in their +hands. The idea of Achaeus was, first of all, to escape his immediate +danger; and then by a circuitous route to make his way into Syria. +For he entertained very great hopes that, if he appeared suddenly +and unexpectedly to the Syrians, while Antiochus was still lingering +about Sardis, he would be able to stir up a great movement, and meet +with a cordial reception from the people of Antioch, Coele-Syria, and +Phoenicia. + +With such expectations and calculations Achaeus was waiting for the +appearance of Bolis. + ++20.+ Meanwhile Arianus had reached Melancomas, who, on reading the +letter which he brought, immediately despatched Bolis with many words +of exhortation and great promises of profit if he succeeded in his +enterprise. Bolis sent Arianus in advance to signify his arrival to +Cambylus, and went after nightfall to their usual place of meeting. +There they spent a whole day together settling every detail of their +plan of operations; and having done this they went into the camp under +cover of night. The arrangement made between them was this. If it +turned out that Achaeus came from the acropolis alone with Bolis and +Arianus, or with only one attendant, he would give them no cause for +anxiety at all, but would be easily captured by the ambuscade set for +him. If, on the other hand, he should be accompanied by a considerable +number, the business would be one of some difficulty to those on whose +good faith he relied; especially as they were anxious to capture him +alive, that being what would most gratify Antiochus. In that case, +therefore, Arianus, while conducting Achaeus, was to go in front, +because he knew the path by which he had on several occasions effected +his entrance and return; Bolis was to bring up the rear, in order that, +when they arrived at the spot where Cambylus was to have his ambuscade +ready, he might lay hold on Achaeus, and prevent his getting away +through wooded ground, in the confusion and darkness of the night, or +throwing himself in his terror from some precipice; thus they would +secure that he fell, as they intended, into his enemies’ hands alive. + +These arrangements having been agreed upon, Bolis was taken by Cambylus +on the very night of his arrival, without any one else, and introduced +to Antiochus. The king was alone and received them graciously; he +pledged himself to the performance of his promises, and urged them both +again and again not to postpone any longer the performance of their +purpose. Thereupon they returned for the present to their own camp; +but towards morning Bolis, accompanied by Arianus, ascended to the +acropolis, and entered it before daybreak. + +[Sidenote: Achaeus takes vain precautions.] + ++21.+ Achaeus received them with warmth and cordiality, and questioned +Bolis at great length on every detail. From the expression of his +face, and his conversation, he judged Bolis to be a man of a character +weighty enough for so serious an undertaking; but while at one time he +exulted in the prospect of his release, at another, he grew painfully +excited, and was torn with an agony of anxiety at the gravity of the +issues at stake. But no one had a clearer head or greater experience in +affairs than he; and in spite of the good opinion he had formed of him, +he still determined that his safety should not depend entirely on the +good faith of Bolis. He accordingly told him that it was impossible for +him to leave the acropolis at the moment: but that he would send some +two or three of his friends with him, and by the time that they had +joined Melancomas he would be prepared to depart. So Achaeus did all +he could for his security; but he did not know that he was trying to +do what the proverb declares to be impossible—out-cretan a Cretan. For +there was no trick likely to be tried that Bolis had not anticipated. +However when the night came, in which Achaeus said that he would send +his friends with them, he sent on Arianus and Bolis to the entrance of +the acropolis, with instructions to wait there until those who were +to go with them arrived. They did as he bade them. Achaeus then, at +the very moment of his departure, communicated his plan to his wife +Laodice; and she was so terrified at his sudden resolve, that he had to +spend some time in entreating her to be calm, in soothing her feelings, +and encouraging her by pointing out the hopes which he entertained. +This done he started with four companions, whom he dressed in ordinary +clothes, while he himself put on a mean and common dress and disguised +his rank as much as possible. He selected one of his four companions to +be always prepared to answer anything said by Arianus, and to ask any +necessary question of him, and bade him say that the other four did not +speak Greek. + +[Sidenote: Achaeus made prisoner.] + ++22.+ The five then joined Arianus, and they all started together on +their journey. Arianus went in front, as being acquainted with the +way; while Bolis took up his position behind in accordance with the +original plan, puzzled and annoyed at the way things were turning out. +For, Cretan as he was, and ready to suspect every one he came near, he +yet could not make out which of the five was Achaeus, or whether he +was there at all. But the path was for the most part precipitous and +difficult, and in some places there were abrupt descents which were +slippery and dangerous; and whenever they came to one of these, some +of the four gave Achaeus a hand down, and the others caught him at the +bottom, for they could not entirely conceal their habitual respect +for him; and Bolis was quick to detect, by observing this, which of +them was Achaeus. When therefore they arrived at the spot at which it +had been arranged that Cambylus was to be, Bolis gave the signal by +a whistle, and the men sprang from their places of concealment and +seized the other four, while Bolis himself caught hold of Achaeus, at +the same time grasping his mantle, as his hands were inside it; for +he was afraid that having a sword concealed about his person he would +attempt to kill himself when he understood what was happening. Being +thus quickly surrounded on every side, Achaeus fell into the hands of +his enemies, and along with his four friends was taken straight off to +Antiochus. + +[Sidenote: Achaeus brought to Antiochus, sentenced and executed.] + +The king was in his tent in a state of extreme anxiety awaiting the +result. He had dismissed his usual court, and, with the exception +of two or three of the bodyguard, was alone and sleepless. But when +Cambylus and his men entered, and placed Achaeus in chains on the +ground, he fell into a state of speechless astonishment: and for a +considerable time could not utter a word, and finally overcome by a +feeling of pity burst into tears; caused, I have no doubt, by this +exhibition of the capriciousness of Fortune, which defies precaution +and calculation alike. For here was Achaeus, a son of Andromachus, the +brother of Seleucus’s queen Laodice, and married to Laodice, a daughter +of King Mithridates, and who had made himself master of all Asia this +side of Taurus, and who at that very moment was believed by his own +army, as well as by that of his enemy, to be safely ensconced in the +strongest position in the world,—sitting chained upon the ground, in +the hands of his enemies, before a single person knew of it except +those who had effected the capture. + +[Sidenote: The citadel of Sardis surrendered.] + ++23.+ And, indeed, when at daybreak the king’s friends assembled as +usual at his tent, and saw this strange spectacle, they too felt +emotions very like those of the king; while extreme astonishment +made them almost disbelieve the evidence of their senses. However +the council met, and a long debate ensued as to what punishment they +were to inflict upon Achaeus. Finally, it was resolved that his +extremities should be cut off, his head severed from his body and sewn +up in the skin of an ass, and his body impaled. When this sentence +had been carried out, and the army learnt what had happened, there +was such excitement in the ranks and such a rush of the soldiers to +the spectacle, that Laodice on the acropolis, who alone knew that her +husband had left it, guessed what had happened from the commotion and +stir in the camp. And before long a herald arrived, told Laodice what +had happened to Achaeus, and ordered her to resign the command and +quit the acropolis. At first any answer was prevented by an outburst +of sorrow and overpowering lamentation on the part of the occupants of +the acropolis; not so much from affection towards Achaeus, as from the +suddenness and utter unexpectedness of the catastrophe. But this was +succeeded by a feeling of hesitation and dismay; and Antiochus, having +got rid of Achaeus, never ceased putting pressure on the garrison of +the acropolis, feeling confident that a means of taking it would be put +into his hands by those who occupied it, and most probably by the rank +and file of the garrison. And this is just what did finally happen: +for the soldiers split up into factions, one joining Ariobazus, the +other Laodice. This produced mutual distrust, and before long both +parties surrendered themselves and the acropolis. Thus Achaeus, in +spite of having taken every reasonable precaution, lost his life by +the perfidy of those in whom he trusted. His fate may teach posterity +two useful lessons,—not to put faith in any one lightly; and not to +be over-confident in the hour of prosperity, knowing that, in human +affairs, there is no accident which we may not expect.... + + +THE GALLIC KING, CAUARUS + +[Sidenote: Cauarus, king of the Gauls, settled on the Hellespont. See +4, 46 and 52.] + ++24.+ Cauarus, king of the Gauls in Thrace, was of a truly royal and +high-minded disposition, and gave the merchants sailing into the Pontus +great protection, and rendered the Byzantines important services in +their wars with the Thracians and Bithynians.... + +This king, so excellent in other respects, was corrupted by a flatterer +named Sostratus, who was a Chalchedonian by birth.... + + +ANTIOCHUS THE GREAT AT ARMOSATA + +[Sidenote: In the course of his campaigns for the recovering of the +eastern provinces (B.C. 212-205), Antiochus makes a demonstration +before the city of Armosata, in Armenia, to recover the arrears of +tribute owed by the late king, B.C. 212.] + ++25.+ In the reign of Xerxes, prince of the city of Armosata, situated +on the “Fair Plain,” between the Tigris and Euphrates, King Antiochus +encamped under its walls and prepared to attack it. When he saw the +king’s forces, Xerxes at first conveyed himself away; but feeling +afterwards that, if his palace were seized by his enemies, his whole +kingdom would be overthrown, he changed his mind, and sent a message +to Antiochus declaring his wish for a conference. The most loyal of +the friends of Antiochus were against letting the young prince go when +they once got him into their hands, and advised Antiochus to take +possession of the town, and hand over the principality to Mithridates, +his own sister’s son. The king, however, would not listen to any of +these suggestions; but sent for the young prince and accommodated +their differences, forgiving him the larger part of the money which +he allowed to be owing from his father under the head of tribute, +and accepting a present payment from him of three hundred talents, a +thousand horses, and a thousand mules with their trappings. He then +settled the government of the city, and gave the prince his sister +Antiochis as a wife. By these proceedings, in which he was thought +to have acted with true royal magnanimity, he won the affection and +support of all the inhabitants of that part of the country. + + +THE HANNIBALIAN WAR—TARENTUM + ++26.+ It was in the wantonness of excessive prosperity that the +Tarentines invited Pyrrhus of Epirus; for democratic liberty that has +enjoyed a long and unchecked career comes naturally to experience a +satiety of its blessings, and then it looks out for a master; and when +it has got one, it is not long before it hates him, because it is seen +that the change is for the worse. This is just what happened to the +Tarentines on that occasion.... + +On this news being brought to Tarentum and Thurii there was great +popular indignation.... + +[Sidenote: Hannibal marched south early in B.C. 212 to renew his +attempt upon Tarentum, on which he had wasted much of the previous +summer (Livy, 25, 1). The severity of the punishment of the Tarentine +hostages who tried to escape from Rome caused a conspiracy of +Tarentines to betray the town to Hannibal. Livy, 25, 7-8.] + +The conspirators left the town at first under the pretext of a +foray, and got near Hannibal’s camp before daybreak. Then, while +the rest crouched down on a certain wooded spot by the side of the +road, Philemenus and Nicon went up to the camp. They were seized by +the sentries and taken off to Hannibal, without saying a word as to +where they came from or who they were, but simply stating that they +wished for an interview with the general. Being taken without delay to +Hannibal they said that they wished to speak with him privately. He +assented with the utmost readiness; whereupon they explained to him +their own position and that of their native city, charging the Romans +with many various acts of oppression, that they might not seem to be +entering on their present undertaking without good reason. For the +present Hannibal dismissed them with thanks and a cordial acceptance +of their proposed movement, and charging them to come back very soon +and have another interview with him. “This time,” he added, “when you +get at a sufficient distance from the camp, take possession of the +first cattle you find being driven out to pasture in the early morning, +and go off boldly with them and their herdsmen; for I will take care +that you are unmolested.” His object in doing this was to give himself +time to inquire into the tale of the young men; and also to confirm +their credit with their fellow-citizens, by making it appear that +their expedition had really been for the purpose of foraging. Nicon +and his companions did as they were bidden, and left Hannibal in great +exultation at having at last got an opportunity of completing his +enterprise: while they themselves were made all the more eager to carry +out their plot by having been able to accomplish their interview with +Hannibal without danger, and by having found him warmly disposed to +their undertaking, and by having besides gained the confidence of their +own people by the considerable amount of booty which they had brought +home. This they partly sold and partly used in splendid entertainments, +and thus not only were believed in by the Tarentines, but excited a +considerable number to emulate their exploit. + +[Sidenote: Bargain made with Hannibal.] + ++27.+ On their next expedition, which they conducted in the same way +as the first, they interchanged pledges of fidelity with Hannibal on +the following conditions: “He was to set the Tarentines free; and the +Carthaginians were neither to exact tribute of any sort from them, +nor impose any burden upon them; but the houses and lodgings occupied +by Romans should, on their taking possession of the town, be given up +to the Carthaginians to plunder.” They also arranged on a watchword +at which the sentries were to admit them without delay into the +camp whenever they came. After making these arrangements, they got +the opportunity of often having interviews with Hannibal: sometimes +pretending to be going out of the town on a foray, and sometimes on +a hunting expedition. Everything having thus been put in train, the +greater part of the conspirators waited for the proper occasions +for acting, while they assigned to Philemenus the part of leader of +their hunting excursions; for, owing to his excessive taste for that +amusement, he had the reputation of thinking hunting the most important +thing in life. Accordingly they left it to him, first to win the favour +of Gaius Livius the commander of the town by presents of game, and then +that of the guards of the gate-tower which protected what were called +the Temenid gates. Philemenus undertook the task: and partly by what he +caught himself, and partly with what Hannibal supplied, always managed +to bring in some game; which he divided between Livius and the guards +of the gate, to induce them to be always ready to open the wicket to +him. For he generally went and returned from his expeditions after +nightfall, under the pretext of being afraid of the enemy, but really +with a view of preparing for the plot. When Philemenus then had managed +to make it a regular arranged thing with the picket at the gate, that +the guards should have no hesitation; but that, whenever he came under +the wall and whistled, they should open the wicket to him; he waited +for a day on which the Roman commander of the town was engaged to be +present at a large party, meeting early in the Musaeum, which is near +the agora, and agreed with Hannibal to carry out their plot on that day. + +[Sidenote: Hannibal prepares to act.] + ++28.+ For some time before this, Hannibal had given out that he was +ill, to prevent the Romans wondering when they were told of his staying +so long on the same ground; and he now made a greater pretence than +ever of ill-health, and remained encamped three days’ march from +Tarentum. But when the time was come, he got ready the most conspicuous +for their speed and daring in his cavalry and infantry, to the number +of about ten thousand, and gave orders that they should take provisions +for four days. He started just before daybreak, and marched at full +speed; having told off eighty Numidian horsemen to keep thirty stades +ahead, and to scour the country on both sides of the road; so that +no one might get a sight of the main body, but might either be taken +prisoners by this advanced guard, or, if he escaped, might carry a +report of it into the city as if it were merely a raid of Numidian +horsemen. When the Numidians were about a hundred and twenty stades +from the town, Hannibal halted his men for supper by the side of a +river flowing through a deep gully, and offering excellent cover; and +having summoned his officers, did not indeed tell them outright what +the service was on which they were going, but simply exhorted them, +first to show themselves brave men, as the prize awaiting them was the +greatest they had ever had; and, secondly, that each should keep the +men of his own company well together, and rebuke sharply all who left +their own division on any pretext whatever; and, thirdly, to attend +strictly to orders, and not attempt anything on their own account +outside them. Dismissing the officers with these words, he got his +troops on the march just after dark, being very anxious to reach the +wall about midnight; having Philemenus to act as guide, and having got +ready for him a wild-boar to enable him to sustain the part which he +was to perform. + +[Sidenote: Gaius Livius thrown off the scent.] + ++29.+ About sunset news was brought to Gaius Livius, who had been +with his friends in the Musaeum since early in the day, just when +the drinking was at its height, that the Numidians were scouring +the country. He therefore took measures for that and nothing more, +calling some of his officers and bidding them take half the cavalry, +and sally out to stop the progress of the enemy, who were devastating +the country: but this only made him still more unsuspicious of the +whole extent of the movement. Nicon, Tragiscus, and their confederates +collected together at nightfall in the town and waited for the return +of Livius and his friends. As these last rose from table somewhat +early, because the banquet had begun before the usual time, the +greater number of the conspirators retired to a certain spot and there +remained; but some of the younger men went to meet Gaius, imitating by +their disorderly procession and mutual jests a company returning from +a carouse. As Livius and his company were even more flustered with +drink, as soon as they met laughter and joking were readily excited +on both sides. Finally, they turned and conducted Gaius to his house; +where he went to bed full of wine, as might be expected after a party +beginning so early in the day, without any anxiety or trouble in +his thoughts, but full of cheerfulness and idle content. Then Nicon +and Tragiscus rejoined their companions, and, dividing themselves +into three companies, took up their positions at the most favourable +points in the market-place, to keep themselves fully acquainted with +everything reported from outside the walls, or that happened within +the city itself. They posted some also close to the house of Livius: +being well aware that, if any suspicion of what was coming arose, it +would be to him that the news would be first brought, and that from him +every measure taken would originate. So when the noise of the returning +guests, and every disturbance of the sort, had subsided, and the great +bulk of the citizens was asleep; and now the night was advancing, and +nothing had happened to dash their hopes, they collected together and +proceeded to perform their part of the undertaking. + +[Sidenote: Why the Tarentines bury within the walls.] + ++30.+ The arrangements between these young men and Hannibal were these. +Hannibal was to arrive at the town by the inland road and on the +eastern side near the Temenid gates; and when there, was to light a +fire on the tomb, which some called the tomb of Hyacinthus, and others +of Apollo: Tragiscus and his confederates, when they saw this, were to +light an answering fire from within the walls. This done, Hannibal was +to put out his fire and advance slowly towards the gate. In pursuance +of these arrangements, the young men marched through the inhabited part +of the town and came to the tombs. For the eastern quarter of Tarentum +is full of monuments, because those who die there are to this day all +buried within the walls, in obedience to an ancient oracle. For it is +said that the god delivered this answer to the Tarentines, “That it +were better and more profitable for them if they made their dwelling +with the majority”; and they thought therefore that they would be +living in accordance with the oracle if they kept the departed within +the walls. That is why to this day they bury inside the gates. + +[Sidenote: Hannibal arrives and gets into the town.] + +The young men, then, having gone as far as the tomb of Pythionicus, +waited to see what would happen. Presently Hannibal arrived and did +as arranged: whereupon Nicon and Tragiscus with renewed courage +displayed their beacon also; and, as soon as they saw the fire of the +Carthaginians being put out, they ran to the gates as fast as they +could go, wishing to get the picket at the gate tower killed before +the Carthaginians arrived; as it had been agreed that they should +advance leisurely and at a foot’s pace. Everything went smoothly: the +guards were overpowered; and while some of the young men were engaged +in killing them, others were cutting the bolts. The gates having been +quickly thrown open, Hannibal arrived at the right moment, having so +timed his march that he never had to stop on the way to the town at all. + +[Sidenote: Philemenus also gets in.] + ++31.+ Having thus effected their intended entrance, without danger or +any disturbance whatever, and thinking that the most important part +of their undertaking was accomplished, the Carthaginians now began +advancing boldly along the street leading up from what is called the +Batheia or Deep Road. They left the cavalry however outside the walls, +numbering as many as two thousand, intending them to act as a reserve +both in case of any appearance of the enemy from without, and of any of +those unforeseen casualties which do occur in such operations. But when +they had come to the immediate neighbourhood of the market-place, they +halted, and waited to see how the attempt of Philemenus would turn out: +being anxious as to the success of this part of their plan as well as +the other. For at the same moment that he lighted his fire, and was on +the point of starting for the gates, Hannibal had despatched Philemenus +also, with his boar on a litter, and a thousand Libyans, to the next +gate; wishing, in accordance with his original design, not to depend +solely on one chance, but to have several. When Philemenus, then, +arrived at the wall and gave his customary signal by whistling, the +sentry immediately appeared coming down to open the wicket; and when +Philemenus told him from outside to open quickly because they had a +great weight to carry, as they were bringing a wild boar, he made haste +to open the wicket, expecting that some of the game which Philemenus +was conveying would come his way, as he had always had a share of what +was brought in. + +Thereupon Philemenus himself, being at the head of the litter, entered +first; and with him another dressed like a shepherd, as though he +were one of the country folk of those parts; and after him two others +besides who were carrying the dead beast behind. But when the four had +got inside the wicket, they struck and killed the man who opened it, +as he was unsuspiciously examining and feeling the boar, and then let +the men who were just behind them, and were in advance of the main body +of Libyan horsemen, to the number of thirty, leisurely and quietly +through. This having been accomplished without a hitch, some set about +cutting the bolts, others were engaged in killing the picket on duty at +the gate, and others in giving the signal to the Libyans still outside +to come in. These having also effected their entrance in safety, they +began making their way towards the market-place according to the +arrangement. As soon as he was joined by this division also, in great +delight at the successful progress of the operation, Hannibal proceeded +to carry out the next step. + ++32.+ He told off two thousand of his Celts: and, having divided them +into three companies, he assigned two of the young men who had managed +the plot to each company; and sent with them also certain of his own +officers, with orders to close up the several most convenient streets +that led to the market-place. And when he had done this, he bade the +young men of the town pick out and save those of their fellow-citizens +whom they might chance to meet, by shouting out before they came up +with them, “That Tarentines should remain where they were, as they were +in no danger”; but he ordered both Carthaginian and Celtic officers to +kill all the Romans they met. + +[Sidenote: Escape of Livius into the Citadel.] + +[Sidenote: Massacre of Roman soldiers.] + +So these companies separated and proceeded to carry out their orders. +But when the entrance of the enemy became known to the Tarentines, the +city began to be full of shouting and extraordinary confusion. As for +Gaius, when the enemy’s entrance was announced to him, being fully +aware that his drunkenness had incapacitated him, he rushed straight +out of the house with his servants, and having come to the gate leading +to the harbour, and the sentinel having opened the wicket for him, +he got through that way; and having seized one of the boats lying at +anchor there, went on board it with his servants and arrived safely at +the citadel. Meanwhile Philemenus had provided himself with some Roman +bugles, and some men who were able to blow them, from being used to +do so; and they stood in the theatre and sounded a call to arms. The +Romans promptly rallying in arms, as was their custom at this sound, +and directing their steps towards the citadel, everything happened +exactly as the Carthaginians intended; for as the Roman soldiers came +into the streets, without any order and in scattered groups, some of +them came upon the Carthaginians and others upon the Celts; and by +their being in this way put to the sword in detail, a very considerable +number of them perished. + +But when day began to break, the Tarentines kept quietly in their +houses, not yet being able to comprehend what was happening. For thanks +to the bugle, and the absence of all outrage or plundering in the town, +they thought that the movement arose from the Romans themselves. But +the sight of many of the latter lying killed in the streets, and the +spectacle of some Gauls openly stripping the Roman corpses, suggested a +suspicion of the presence of the Carthaginians. + +[Sidenote: Roman houses sacked, Tarentines spared.] + ++33.+ Presently when Hannibal had marched his forces into the +market-place, and the Romans had retired into the citadel, as having +been previously secured by them with a garrison, and it had become +broad daylight, the Carthaginian general caused a proclamation to be +made to the Tarentines to assemble in full number in the market-place; +while the young conspirators went meanwhile round the town talking +loudly about liberty, and bidding everybody not to be afraid, for the +Carthaginians had come to save them. Such of the Tarentines as held +to their loyalty to Rome, upon learning the state of the case, went +off to the citadel; but the rest came to the meeting, in obedience to +the proclamation, without their arms: and to them Hannibal addressed +a cordial speech. The Tarentines heartily cheered everything he said +from joy at their unexpected safety; and he dismissed the crowd with +an injunction to each man, to go with all speed to his own house, and +write over the door, “A Tarentine’s”; but if any one wrote the same +word on a house where a Roman was living, he declared the penalty to +be death. He then personally told off the best men he had for the +service, and sent them to plunder the houses of the Romans; giving them +as their instructions to consider all houses which had no inscription +as belonging to the enemy: the rest of his men he kept drawn up as a +reserve. + +[Sidenote: Fortifications raised to preserve the town from attack from +the citadel.] + ++34.+ A vast quantity of miscellaneous property having been got +together by this plundering, and a booty fully answering the +expectations of the Carthaginians, they bivouacked for that night +under arms. But the next day, after consulting with the Tarentines, +Hannibal decided to cut off the city from the citadel by a wall, that +the Tarentines might not any longer be under continual alarm from the +Romans in possession of the citadel. His first measure was to throw +up a palisade, parallel to the wall of the citadel and to the trench +in front of it. But as he very well knew that the enemy would not +allow this tamely, but would make a demonstration of their power in +that direction, he got ready for the work a number of his best hands, +thinking that the first thing necessary was to overawe the Romans and +give confidence to the Tarentines. But as soon as the first palisade +was begun, the Romans began a bold and determined attack; whereupon +Hannibal, offering just enough resistance to induce the rest to come +out, as soon as the greater part of them had crossed the trench, gave +the word of command to his men and charged the enemy. A desperate +struggle ensued; for the fight took place in a narrow space surrounded +by walls; but at last the Romans were forced to turn and fly. Many of +them fell in the actual fighting, but the larger number were forced +over the edge of the trench and were killed by the fall over its steep +bank. + +[Sidenote: Further works of security.] + ++35.+ For the present Hannibal, after completing the palisade +unmolested, was content to remain quiet, as his plan had succeeded to +his wish; for he had shut in the enemy and compelled them to remain +inside their wall, in terror for the safety of the citadel as well +as for their own; while he had raised the courage of the citizens of +Tarentum to such an extent, that they now imagined themselves to be a +match for the Romans, even without the Carthaginians. A little later +he made at a short distance from the palisade, in the direction of the +town, a trench parallel to the palisade and the wall of the citadel; +and the earth dug out from it having been piled up on the other side +along the edge nearest the town, he erected another palisade on the +top, thus making a fortification no less secure than the wall itself. +Once more, at a moderate distance, nearer the city, he commenced +building a wall, starting from the street called Soteira up to that +called Batheia; so that, even without a garrison, the Tarentines were +adequately protected by the mere constructions themselves. Then leaving +a sufficient garrison, and enough cavalry to serve on outpost duty for +the protection of the wall, he encamped along the bank of the river +which is called by some the Galaesus, but by most people the Eurotas, +after the river which flows past Sparta. The Tarentines have many such +derived names, both in town and country, from the acknowledged fact +of their being a colony from Sparta and connected by blood with the +Lacedaemonians. As the wall quickly approached completion, owing to +the activity and zeal of the Tarentines, and the vigorous co-operation +of the Carthaginians, Hannibal next conceived the idea of taking the +citadel also. + +[Sidenote: Hannibal’s arrangements for storming the citadel frustrated.] + +[Sidenote: Romans reinforced.] + +[Sidenote: New plans for cutting off the Roman supplies by sea.] + +[Sidenote: B.C. 212-211.] + ++36.+ But when he had already completed the preparation of the +necessary engines for the assault, the Romans received some slight +encouragement on a reinforcement throwing itself into the citadel +by sea from Metapontium; and consequently they sallied out by night +and attacked the works, and destroyed all Hannibal’s apparatus and +engines. After this Hannibal abandoned the idea of a storm: but as the +new wall was now completed, he summoned a meeting of the Tarentines +and pointed out to them that the most imperative necessity, in view +of the present state of things, was to get command of the sea. For +as the citadel commanded the entrance to the harbour, the Tarentines +could not use their ships nor sail out of it; while the Romans could +get supplies conveyed to them by sea without danger: and as long as +that was the case, it was impossible that the city should have any +security for its freedom. Hannibal saw this clearly, and explained to +the Tarentines that, if the enemy on the citadel were deprived of hope +of succour by sea, they would at once give way, and abandon it of their +own accord, without attempting to defend the place. The Tarentines +were fully convinced by his words: but how it was to be brought about +in the present state of affairs they could form no idea, unless a +fleet should appear from Carthage; which at that time of the year was +impossible. They therefore said that they could not understand what +Hannibal was aiming at in these remarks to them. When he replied that +it was plain that, even without the Carthaginians, they were all but in +command of the sea, they were still more puzzled, and could not guess +his meaning. The truth was that Hannibal had noticed that the broad +street, which was at once within the wall separating the town from the +citadel, and led from the harbour into the open sea, was well suited +for the purpose; and he had conceived the idea of dragging the ships +out of the harbour to the sea on the southern side of the town. Upon +his disclosing his idea to the Tarentines, they not only expressed +their agreement with the proposal, but the greatest admiration for +himself; and made up their minds that there was nothing which his +acuteness and daring could not accomplish. Trucks on wheels were +quickly constructed: and it was scarcely sooner said than done, owing +to the zeal of the people and the numbers who helped to work at it. In +this way the Tarentines dragged their ships across into the open sea, +and were enabled without danger to themselves to blockade the Romans +on the citadel, having deprived them of their supplies from without. +But Hannibal himself, leaving a garrison for the city, started with his +army, and returned in a three days’ march to his original camp; and +there remained without further movements for the rest of the winter.... + +FALL OF SYRACUSE, B.C. 212 + +[Sidenote: The method taken by a Roman to estimate the height of the +wall of Syracuse. Livy, 25, 23.] +37.+ He counted the layers; for as +the tower had been built of regular layers of stone, it was very easy +to reckon the height of the battlements from the ground.... + +[Sidenote: Fall of Syracuse by an escalade, autumn B.C. 212. Livy, 24, +23-31.] + +Some days afterwards on information being given by a deserter that +the Syracusans had been engaged in a public sacrifice to Artemis for +the last three days; and that they were using very scanty food in the +festival though plenty of wine, both Epicydes and certain Syracusans +having given a large supply; Marcus Marcellus selected a part of the +wall somewhat lower than the rest, and thinking it probable that the +men were drunk, owing to the license of the hour, and the short supply +of food with their wine, he determined to attempt an escalade. Two +ladders of the proper height for the wall having been quickly made, +he pressed on the undertaking. He spoke openly to those who were fit +to make the ascent and to face the first and most conspicuous risk, +holding out to them brilliant prospects of reward. He also picked +out some men to give them necessary help and bring ladders, without +telling them anything except to bid them be ready to obey orders. +His directions having been accurately obeyed, at the proper time in +the night he put the first men in motion, sending with them the men +with the ladders together with a maniple and a tribune, and having +first reminded them of the rewards awaiting them if they behaved with +gallantry. After this he got his whole force ready to start; and +despatching the vanguard by maniples at intervals, when a thousand had +been massed in this way, after a short pause, he marched himself with +the main body. The men carrying the ladders having succeeded in safely +placing them against the wall, those who had been told off to make the +ascent mounted at once without hesitation. Having accomplished this +without being observed, and having got a firm footing on the top of the +wall, the rest began to mount by the ladders also, not in any fixed +order, but as best they could. At first as they made their way upon the +wall they found no one to oppose them, for the guards of the several +towers, owing to it being a time of public sacrifice, were either +still drinking or were gone to sleep again in a state of drunkenness. +Consequently of the first and second companies of guards, which they +came upon, they killed the greater number before they knew that they +were being attacked. And when they came near Hexapyli, they descended +from the wall, and forced open the first postern they came to which was +let into the wall, through which they admitted the general and the rest +of the army. This is the way in which the Romans took Syracuse.... + +[Sidenote: Livy, 25, 24.] None of the citizens knew what was happening +because of the distance; for the town is a very large one.... + +[Sidenote: The first quarter occupied. Livy, 25, 24.] But the Romans +were rendered very confident by their conquest of Epipolae.... + + * * * * * + ++38.+ He gave orders that the infantry should take the beasts of burden +along with the baggage tied upon them from the rear and range them in +front of themselves. This produced a defence of greater security than +any palisade.[324]... + + * * * * * + +So entirely unable are the majority of mankind to submit to that +lightest of all burdens—silence.... + + * * * * * + +Anything in the future seems preferable to what exists in the +present.... + + + + +BOOK IX + +EXTRACT FROM THE PREFACE + + +[Sidenote: 142d Olympiad, B.C. 212-208.] + ++1.+ Such are the most conspicuous transactions of this Olympiad, that +is, of the four years which an Olympiad must be reckoned to contain; +and I shall endeavour to include the history of them in two books. + +I am quite aware that my history has an element of austerity in it, +and is adapted to, and will be approved by only one class of readers, +owing to the uniformity of its plan. Nearly all other historians, or at +any rate most, attract a variety of readers by entering upon all the +various branches of history. The curious reader is attracted by the +genealogical style; the antiquarian by the discussion of colonisations, +origins of cities, and ties of blood, such as is found in Ephorus; the +student of polities by the story of tribes, cities, and dynasties. It +is to this last branch of the subject that I have had a single eye, and +have devoted my whole work; and accordingly have, as I said before, +accommodated all my plans to one particular class of narrative. The +result is that I have made my work by no means attractive reading to +the majority. Why I thus neglected other departments of history, and +deliberately resolved to confine myself to chronicling actions, I have +already stated at length; however, there is no reason why I should not +briefly remind my readers of it again in this place, for the sake of +impressing it upon them. + ++2.+ Seeing that many writers have discussed in many varieties of style +the question of genealogies, myths, and colonisations, as well as of +the foundations of cities and the consanguinity of peoples, there +was nothing left for a writer at this date but to copy the words of +others and claim them as his own,—than which nothing could be more +dishonourable; or, if he did not choose to do that, to absolutely +waste his labour, being obliged to acknowledge that he is composing a +history and bestowing thought on what has already been sufficiently set +forth and transmitted to posterity by his predecessors. For these and +sundry other reasons I abandoned such themes as these, and determined +on writing a history of actions: first, because they are continually +new and require a new narrative,—as of course one generation cannot +give us the history of the next; and secondly, because such a narrative +is of all others the most instructive. This it has always been: but +it is eminently so now, because the arts and sciences have made such +an advance in our day, that students are able to arrange every event +as it happens according to fixed rules, as it were, of scientific +classification. Therefore, as I did not aim so much at giving pleasure +to my readers, as at profiting those who apply to such studies, I +omitted all other themes and devoted myself wholly to this. But on +these points, those who give a careful attention to my narrative will +be the best witnesses to the truth of what I say.... + + +THE HANNIBALIAN WAR + +_In the previous year (212 B.C.) Syracuse had fallen: the two Scipios +had been conquered and killed in Spain: the siege-works had been +constructed round Capua, at the very time of the fall of Syracuse, i.e. +in the autumn, Hannibal being engaged in fruitless attempts upon the +citadel of Tarentum. See Livy, 25, 22._ + +[Sidenote: Q. Fulvius and Appius Claudius, the Consuls of the previous +year, were continued in command there, with orders not to leave the +place till it fell. Livy, 26, 1. Hannibal tries to raise the siege.] + +[Sidenote: B.C. 211. Coss. Gnaeus Fulvius Centumalus, P. Sulpicius +Galba. The Romans were still engaged in the siege of Capua.] + ++3.+ Entirely surrounding the position of Appius Claudius, Hannibal +at first skirmished, and tried all he could to tempt him to come out +and give him battle. But as no one attended to him, his attack became +very like an attempt to storm the camp; for his cavalry charged in +their squadrons, and with loud cries hurled their javelins inside the +entrenchments, and the infantry attacked in their regular companies, +and tried to pull down the palisading round the camp. But not even +so could he move the Romans from their purpose: they employed their +light-armed troops to repulse those who were actually attacking the +palisade, but protecting themselves with their heavy shields against +the javelins of the enemy, they remained drawn up near their standards +without moving. Discomfited at being neither able to throw himself into +Capua, nor induce the Romans to leave their camp, Hannibal retired to +consult as to what was best to be done. + +[Sidenote: The determination and cautious tactics of the Romans.] + +It is no wonder, in my opinion, that the Carthaginians were puzzled. I +think any one who heard the facts would be the same. For who would not +have received with incredulity the statement that the Romans, after +losing so many battles to the Carthaginians, and though they did not +venture to meet them on the field, could not nevertheless be induced +to give up the contest or abandon the command of the country? Up to +this time, moreover, they had contented themselves with hovering in +his neighbourhood, keeping along the skirts of the mountains; but now +they had taken up a position on the plains, and those the fairest in +all Italy, and were besieging the strongest city in it; and that with +an enemy attacking them, whom they could not endure even the thought of +meeting face to face: while the Carthaginians, who beyond all dispute +had won the battles, were sometimes in as great difficulties as the +losers. I think the reason of the strategy adopted by the two sides +respectively was, that they both had seen that Hannibal’s cavalry +was the main cause of the Carthaginian victory and Roman defeat. +Accordingly the plan of the losers after the battles, of following +their enemies at a distance, was the natural one to adopt; for the +country through which they went was such that the enemy’s cavalry would +be unable to do them any damage. Similarly what now happened at Capua +to either side was natural and inevitable. + +[Sidenote: Carthaginian difficulties.] + ++4.+ For the Roman army did not venture to come out and give battle, +from fear of the enemy’s horse, but remained resolutely within their +entrenchment; well knowing that the cavalry, by which they had +been worsted in the battles, could not hurt them there. While the +Carthaginians, again, naturally could not remain any longer encamped +with their cavalry, because all the pastures in the surrounding country +had been utterly destroyed by the Romans with that very view; and it +was impossible for animals to come from such a distance, carrying on +their backs hay and barley for so large a body of cavalry, and so many +beasts of burden; nor again did they venture, when encamped without +their cavalry, to attack an enemy protected by a palisade and fosse, +with whom a contest, even without these advantages in their favour, was +likely to be a doubtful one if they had not got their cavalry. Besides +this they were much alarmed about the new Consuls, lest they should +come and encamp against them, and reduce them to serious straits by +cutting off their supplies of provisions. + +[Sidenote: Hannibal determines on creating a diversion by threatening +Rome.] + +These considerations convinced Hannibal that it was impossible to raise +the siege by an open attack, and he therefore changed his tactics. He +imagined that if by a secret march he could suddenly appear in the +neighbourhood of Rome, he might by the alarm which he would inspire in +the inhabitants by his unexpected movement, perhaps do something worth +while against the city itself; or, if he could not do that, would at +least force Appius either to raise the siege of Capua, in order to +hasten to the relief of his native town, or to divide the Roman forces; +which would then be easier for him to conquer in detail. + +[Sidenote: Hannibal informs the Capuans of his purpose.] + ++5.+ With this purpose in his mind he sent a letter-carrier into +Capua. This he did by persuading one of his Libyans to desert to the +Roman camp, and thence to Capua. He took this trouble to secure the +safe delivery of his letter, because he was very much afraid that the +Capuans, if they saw him departing, would consider that he despaired of +them, and would therefore give up hope and surrender to the Romans. He +wrote therefore an explanation of his design, and sent the Libyan the +day after, in order that the Capuans, being acquainted with the purpose +of his departure, might go on courageously sustaining the siege. + +[Sidenote: Excitement and activity at Rome.] + +[Sidenote: Hannibal starts.] + +When the news had arrived at Rome that Hannibal had encamped over +against their lines, and was actually besieging their forces, there +was universal excitement and terror, from a feeling that the result of +the impending battle would decide the whole war. Consequently, with +one heart and soul, the citizens had all devoted themselves to sending +out reinforcements and making preparations for this struggle. On their +part, the Capuans were encouraged by the receipt of Hannibal’s letter, +and by thus learning the object of the Carthaginian movement, to stand +by their determination, and to await the issue of this new hope. At +the end of the fifth day, therefore, after his arrival on the ground, +Hannibal ordered his men to take their supper as usual, and leave their +watch-fires burning; and started with such secrecy, that none of the +enemy knew what was happening. He took the road through Samnium, and +marched at a great pace and without stopping, his skirmishers always +keeping before him to reconnoitre and occupy all the posts along the +route: and while those in Rome had their thoughts still wholly occupied +with Capua and the campaign there, he crossed the Anio without being +observed; and having arrived at a distance of not more than forty +stades from Rome, there pitched his camp. + +[Sidenote: Terror at Rome.] + ++6.+ On this being known at Rome, the utmost confusion and terror +prevailed among the inhabitants,—this movement of Hannibal’s being as +unexpected as it was sudden; for he had never been so close to the +city before. At the same time their alarm was increased by the idea +at once occurring to them, that he would not have ventured so near, +if it were not that the armies at Capua were destroyed. Accordingly, +the men at once went to line the walls, and the points of vantage in +the defences of the town; while the women went round to the temples of +the gods and implored their protection, sweeping the pavements of the +temples with their hair: for this is their customary way of behaving +when any serious danger comes upon their country. But just as Hannibal +had encamped, and was intending to attempt the city itself next day, +an extraordinary coincidence occurred which proved fortunate for the +preservation of Rome. + +[Sidenote: The Consular levies fortunately being at Rome enable the +Romans to make a counter-demonstration.] + +[Sidenote: Hannibal devastates the Campagna.] + +For Gnaeus Fulvius and Publius Sulpicius, having already enrolled one +consular army, had bound the men with the usual oath to appear at Rome +armed on that very day; and were also engaged on that day in drawing +out the lists and testing the men for the other army:[325] whereby +it so happened that a large number of men had been collected in Rome +spontaneously in the very nick of time. These troops the Consuls boldly +led outside the walls, and, entrenching themselves there, checked +Hannibal’s intended movement. For the Carthaginians were at first eager +to advance, and were not altogether without hope that they would be +able to take Rome itself by assault. But when they saw the enemy drawn +up in order, and learnt before long from a prisoner what had happened, +they abandoned the idea of attacking the city, and began devastating +the country-side instead, and setting fire to the houses. In these +first raids they collected an innumerable amount of booty, for the +field of plunder upon which they were entered was one into which no one +had ever expected an enemy to set foot. + +[Sidenote: Hannibal starts on his return.] + +[Sidenote: The passage of the Anio.] + +[Sidenote: Hannibal turns upon his pursuers.] + ++7.+ But presently, when the Consuls ventured to encamp within ten +stades of him, Hannibal broke up his quarters before daylight. He did +so for three reasons:—first, because he had collected an enormous +booty; secondly, because he had given up all hope of taking Rome; and +lastly, because he reckoned that the time had now come at which he +expected, according to his original idea, that Appius would have learnt +the danger threatening Rome, and would have raised the siege of Capua +and come with his whole force to the relief of the city; or at any rate +would hurry up with the greater part, leaving a detachment to carry on +the siege. Publius had caused the bridges over the Anio to be broken +down, and thus compelled Hannibal to get his army across by a ford; +and he now attacked the Carthaginians as they were engaged in making +the passage of the stream and caused them great distress. They were +not able however to strike an important blow, owing to the number of +Hannibal’s cavalry, and the activity of the Numidians in every part of +the field. But before retiring to their camp they wrested the greater +part of the booty from them, and killed about three hundred men; and +then, being convinced that the Carthaginians were beating a hasty +retreat in a panic, they followed in their rear, keeping along the +line of hills. At first Hannibal continued to march at a rapid pace, +being anxious to meet the force which he expected; but at the end of +the fifth day, being informed that Appius had not left the siege of +Capua, he halted; and waiting for the enemy to come up, made an attack +upon his camp before daylight, killed a large number of them, and drove +the rest out of their camp. But when day broke, and he saw the Romans +in a strong position upon a steep hill, to which they had retired, he +decided not to continue his attack upon them; but marching through +Daunia and Bruttium he appeared at Rhegium, so unexpectedly, that he +was within an ace of capturing the city, and did cut off all who were +out in the country; and during this excursion captured a very large +number of the Rhegini. + ++8.+ It seems to me that the courage and determination both of the +Carthaginians and Romans at this crisis were truly remarkable; and +merit quite as much admiration as the conduct of Epaminondas, which I +will describe here for the sake of pointing the comparison. + +[Sidenote: The rapid march of Epaminondas to Sparta, and back again to +Mantinea. See Xenophon, _Hell._ 7, 5, 8 _sq._ B.C. 362.] + +[Sidenote: Xenophon, _Hell._ 7, 5, 8 _sq._ B.C. 362.] + +[Sidenote: A Cretan warns Agesilaus.] + +He reached Tegea with the allies, and when he saw that the +Lacedaemonians with their own forces in full were come to Mantinea, +and that their allies had mustered together in the same city, with the +intention of offering the Thebans battle; having given orders to his +men to get their supper early, he led his army out immediately after +nightfall, on the pretext of being anxious to seize certain posts with +a view to the coming battle. But having impressed this idea upon the +common soldiers, he led them along the road to Lacedaemon itself; and +having arrived at the city about the third hour of his march, contrary +to all expectation, and finding Sparta destitute of defenders, he +forced his way right up to the market-place, and occupied the quarters +of the town which slope down to the river. Then however a contretemps +occurred: a deserter made his way into Mantinea and told Agesilaus what +was going on. Assistance accordingly arrived just as the city was on +the point of being taken; and Epaminondas was disappointed of his hope. +But having caused his men to get their breakfast along the bank of the +Eurotas, and recovered them from their fatigue, he started to march +back again by the same road, calculating that, as the Lacedaemonians +and their allies had come to the relief of Sparta, Mantinea would in +its turn be left undefended: which turned out to be the case. So he +exhorted the Thebans to exert themselves; and, after a rapid night +march, arrived at Mantinea about midday, finding it entirely destitute +of defenders. + +But the Athenians, who were at that time zealously supporting the +Lacedaemonians in their contest with the Thebans, had arrived in virtue +of their treaty of alliance; and just as the Theban vanguard reached +the temple of Poseidon, seven stades from the town, it happened that +the Athenians showed themselves, by design, as if on the brow of the +hill overhanging Mantinea. And when they saw them, the Mantineans who +had been left behind at last ventured to man the wall and resist the +attack of the Thebans. Therefore historians are justified in speaking +with some dissatisfaction of these events,[326] when they say that +the leader did everything which a good general could, but that, while +conquering his enemies, Epaminondas was conquered by Fortune. + ++9.+ Much the same remark applies to Hannibal. For who can refrain +from regarding with respect and admiration a general capable of +doing what he did? First he attempted by harassing the enemy with +skirmishing attacks to raise the siege: having failed in this he +made direct for Rome itself: baffled once more by a turn of fortune +entirely independent of human calculation, he kept his pursuers in +play,[327] and waited till the moment was ripe to see whether the +besiegers of Capua stirred: and finally, without relaxing in his +determination, swept down upon his enemies to their destruction, and +all but depopulated Rhegium. One would be inclined however to judge the +Romans to be superior to the Lacedaemonians at this crisis. For the +Lacedaemonians rushed off _en masse_ at the first message and relieved +Sparta, but, as far as they were concerned, lost Mantinea. The Romans +guarded their own city without breaking up the siege of Capua: on the +contrary, they remained unshaken and firm in their purpose, and in fact +from that time pressed the Capuans with renewed spirit. + +I have not said this for the sake of making a panegyric on either the +Romans or Carthaginians, whose great qualities I have already remarked +upon more than once: but for the sake of those who are in office among +the one or the other people, or who are in future times to direct +the affairs of any state whatever; that by the memory, or actual +contemplation, of exploits such as these they may be inspired with +emulation. For in an adventurous and hazardous policy it often turns +out that audacity was the truest safety and the finest sagacity;[328] +and success or failure does not affect the credit and excellence of +the original design, so long as the measures taken are the result of +deliberate thought.... + + +TARENTUM + +[Sidenote: The Carthaginian fleet invited from Sicily to relieve +Tarentum does more harm than good, and departs to the joy of the +people, B.C. 211. Livy, 26, 20.] + +When the Romans were besieging Tarentum, Bomilcar the admiral of the +Carthaginian fleet came to its relief with a very large force; and +being unable to afford efficient aid to those in the town, owing to the +strict blockade maintained by the Romans, without meaning to do so he +used up more than he brought; and so after having been constrained by +entreaties and large promises to come, he was afterwards forced at the +earnest supplication of the people to depart.... + + +THE SPOILS OF SYRACUSE + ++10.+ A city is not really adorned by what is brought from without, but +by the virtue of its own inhabitants.... + +[Sidenote: Syracuse was taken in the autumn, B.C. 212. “The ornaments +of the city, statues and pictures were taken to Rome.” Livy, 25, 40, +cp. 26, 21.] + +The Romans, then, decided to transfer these things to their own city +and to leave nothing behind. Whether they were right in doing so, and +consulted their true interests or the reverse, is a matter admitting +of much discussion; but I think the balance of argument is in favour +of believing it to have been wrong then, and wrong now. If such had +been the works by which they had exalted their country, it is clear +that there would have been some reason in transferring thither the +things by which they had become great. But the fact was that, while +leading lives of the greatest simplicity themselves, as far as possible +removed from the luxury and extravagance which these things imply, they +yet conquered the men who had always possessed them in the greatest +abundance and of the finest quality. Could there have been a greater +mistake than theirs? Surely it would be an incontestable error for a +people to abandon the habits of the conquerors and adopt those of the +conquered; and at the same time involve itself in that jealousy which +is the most dangerous concomitant of excessive prosperity. For the +looker-on never congratulates those who take what belongs to others, +without a feeling of jealousy mingling with his pity for the losers. +But suppose such prosperity to go on increasing, and a people to +accumulate into its own hands all the possessions of the rest of the +world, and moreover to invite in a way the plundered to share in the +spectacle they present, in that case surely the mischief is doubled. +For it is no longer a case of the spectators pitying their neighbours, +but themselves, as they recall the ruin of their own country. Such +a sight produces an outburst, not of jealousy merely, but of rage +against the victors. For the reminder of their own disaster serves +to enhance their hatred of the authors of it. To sweep the gold and +silver, however, into their own coffers was perhaps reasonable; for it +was impossible for them to aim at universal empire without crippling +the means of the rest of the world, and securing the same kind of +resources for themselves. But they might have left in their original +sites things that had nothing to do with material wealth; and thus at +the same time have avoided exciting jealousy, and raised the reputation +of their country: adorning it, not with pictures and statues, but with +dignity of character and greatness of soul. I have spoken thus much as +a warning to those who take upon themselves to rule over others, that +they may not imagine that, when they pillage cities, the misfortunes of +others are an honour to their own country. The Romans, however, when +they transferred these things to Rome, used such of them as belonged to +individuals to increase the splendour of private establishments, and +such as belonged to the state to adorn the city.... + + +SPAIN + +[Sidenote: The two Scipios fall in B.C. 212.] + +[Sidenote: Hasdrubal Gisconis tertius Carthaginiensium dux. Livy 24, +41, cp. 25, 37.] + ++11.+ The leaders of the Carthaginians, though they had conquered their +enemies, could not control themselves: and having made up their minds +that they had put an end to the Roman war, they began quarrelling +with each other, finding continual subjects of dispute through the +innate covetousness and ambition of the Phoenician character; among +whom Hasdrubal, son of Gesco, pushed his authority to such a pitch +of iniquity as to demand a large sum of money from Andobales, the +most faithful of all their Iberian friends, who had some time before +lost his chieftainship for the sake of the Carthaginians, and had but +recently recovered it through his loyalty to them. When Andobales, +trusting to his long fidelity to Carthage, refused this demand, +Hasdrubal got up a false charge against him and compelled him to give +up his daughters as hostages.... + + +ON THE ART OF COMMANDING ARMIES + ++12.+ The chances and accidents that attend military expeditions +require great circumspection; and it is possible to provide for all of +them with precision, provided that a man gives his mind to the conduct +of his plan of campaign. Now that fewer operations in war are carried +out openly and by mere force, than by stratagem and the skillful use of +opportunity, any one that chooses may readily learn from the history +of the past. And again that operations depending on the choice of +opportunity oftener fail than succeed is easily proved from experience. +Nor can there be any doubt that the greater part of such failures are +due to the folly or carelessness of the leaders. It is time therefore +to inquire into the rules of this art of strategy. + +Such things as occur in campaigns without having been calculated upon +in any way we must not speak of as operations, but as accidents or +casualties. It is the conduct of a campaign in accordance with an exact +plan that I am to set forth: omitting all such things as do not fall +under a scientific rule, and have no fixed design. + +[Sidenote: The points of inherent importance in the conduct of a +campaign,—time, place, secrecy, code of signals, agents, and method.] + ++13.+ Every operation requires a time fixed for its commencement, a +period and place for its execution, secrecy, definite signals, persons +by whom and with whom it is to be executed, and a settled plan for +conducting it. It is evident that the man who has rightly provided +for each of these details will not fail in the ultimate result, while +he who has neglected any single one of them will fail in the whole. +Such is the order of nature, that one insignificant circumstance will +suffice for failure, while for success rigid perfection of every detail +is barely enough. + +Leaders then should neglect no single point in conducting such +expeditions. + +[Sidenote: Things necessary. 1. Silence.] + +Now the head and front of such precautions is silence; and not to +allow either joy at the appearance of an unexpected hope, or fear, or +familiarity, or natural affection, to induce a man to communicate his +plans to any one unconcerned, but to impart it to those and those alone +without whom it is impossible to complete his plan, and not even to +them a moment sooner than necessary, but only when the exigencies of +the particular service make it inevitable. It is necessary, moreover, +not only to be silent with the tongue, but much more so in the mind. +For it has happened to many generals before now, while preserving an +inviolable silence, to betray their thoughts either by the expression +of their countenances or by their actions. + +[Sidenote: 2. Knowledge of the capabilities of the force in moving.] + +The second requisite is to know accurately the conditions under which +marches by day or night may be performed, and the distances to which +they can extend, and not only marches on land, but also voyages by sea. + +The third and most important is to have some knowledge of the seasons, +and to be able to adapt the design to them. + +Nor again is the selection of the ground for the operation to be +regarded as unimportant, since it often happens that it is this +which makes what seems impossible possible, and what seemed possible +impossible. + +[Sidenote: 3. Care in concerting signals.] + +[Sidenote: 4. Care in selecting men.] + +Finally there must be no neglect of the subject of signals and counter +signals; and the choice of persons by whom and with whom the operation +is to be carried out. + +[Sidenote: 5. Knowledge of localities.] + ++14.+ Of these points some are learnt by experience, some from history, +and others by the study of scientific strategy. It is a most excellent +thing too that the general should have a personal knowledge both of +the roads, and the locality which he has to reach, and its natural +features, as well as of the persons by whom and with whom he is to act. +If that is not possible, the next best thing is that he should make +careful inquiries and not trust just any one: and men who undertake to +act as guides to such places should always deposit security with those +whom they are conducting. + +[Sidenote: 6. Accurate knowledge of natural phenomena enabling a +general to make accurate calculation of time.] + +These, and other points like them, it is perhaps possible that leaders +may learn sufficiently from the mere study of strategy, whether +practical or in books. But scientific investigation requires scientific +processes and demonstrations, especially in astronomy and geometry; the +working out of which is not much to our present point, though their +results are important, and may contribute largely to the success of +such undertakings. + +The most important operation in astronomy is the calculation of the +lengths of the days and nights. If these had been uniform it would not +have been a matter requiring any study, but the knowledge would have +been common to all the world: since however they not only differ with +each other but also with themselves, it is plainly necessary to be +acquainted with the increase and diminution of both the one and the +other. How can a man calculate a march, and the distance practicable in +a day or in a night, if he is unacquainted with the variation of these +periods of time? In fact nothing can be done up to time without this +knowledge,—it is inevitable otherwise that a man should be sometimes +too late and sometimes too soon. And these operations are the only ones +in which being too soon is a worse fault than being too late. For the +general who overstays the proper hour of action only misses his chance, +since he can find out that he has done so before he arrives, and so +get off safely: but he that anticipates the hour is detected when he +comes up; and so not only misses his immediate aim, but runs a risk of +ruining himself altogether. + +[Sidenote: The divisions of the day;] + +[Sidenote: of the night.] + ++15.+ In all human undertakings opportuneness is the most important +thing, but especially in operations of war. Therefore a general must +have at his fingers’ ends the season of the summer and winter solstice, +the equinoxes, and the periods between them in which the days and +nights increase and diminish. For it is by this knowledge alone that +he can compute the distance that can be done whether by sea or land. +Again, he must necessarily understand the subdivisions both of the day +and the night, in order to know at what hour to order the reveillé, +or the march out; for the end cannot be attained unless the beginning +be rightly taken. As for the periods of the day, they may be observed +by the shadows or by the sun’s course, and the quarter of the heaven +in which it has arrived, but it is difficult to do the same for the +night, unless a man is familiar with the phenomenon of the twelve signs +of the Zodiac, and their law and order: and this is easy to those +who have studied astronomy. For since, though the nights are unequal +in length, at least six of the signs of the Zodiac are nevertheless +above the horizon every night, it is plain that in the same portions +of every night equal portions of the twelve signs of the Zodiac rise. +Now as it is known what portion of the sphere is occupied by the sun +during the day, it is evident that when he has set the arc subtended by +the diameter of his arc must rise. Therefore the length of the night +is exactly commensurate with the portion of the Zodiac which appears +above the horizon after sunset. And, given that we know the number and +size of the signs of the Zodiac, the corresponding divisions of the +night are also known. If however the nights be cloudy, the moon must be +watched, since owing to its size its light as a general rule is always +visible, at whatsoever point in the heaven it may be. The hour may be +guessed sometimes by observing the time and place of its rising, or +again of its setting, if you only have sufficient acquaintance with +this phenomenon to be familiar with the daily variation of its rising. +And the law which it too follows admits of being easily observed; for +its revolution is limited by the period of one month, which serves as a +model to which all subsequent revolutions conform. + +[Sidenote: The example of Ulysses. See Odyss. 5, 270 _sq._] + ++16.+ And here one may mention with admiration that Homer represents +Ulysses, that truest type of a leader of men, taking observations of +the stars, not only to direct his voyages, but his operations on land +also. For such accidents as baffle expectation, and are incapable of +being accurately reckoned upon, are quite sufficient to bring us to +great and frequent distress, for instance, downpours of rain and rise +of torrents, excessive frosts and snows, misty and cloudy weather, and +other things like these;—but if we also neglect to provide for those +which can be foreseen, is it not likely that we shall have ourselves +to thank for frequent failures? None of these means then must be +neglected, if we wish to avoid those errors into which many others are +said to have fallen, as well as the particular generals whom I am about +to mention by way of examples. + +[Sidenote: Aratus fails at Cynaetha.] + ++17.+ When Aratus, the Strategus of the Achaean league, attempted to +take Cynaetha by treachery, he arranged a day with those in the town +who were co-operating with him, on which he was to arrive on the banks +of the river which flows past Cynaetha, and to remain there quietly +with his forces: while the party inside the town about midday, when +they got an opportunity, were to send out one of their men quietly, +wrapped in a cloak, and order him to take his stand upon a tomb agreed +upon in front of the city; the rest were to attack the officers who +were accustomed to guard the gate while taking their siesta. This +being done, the Achaeans were to rise from their ambush and to make +all haste to occupy the gate. These arrangements made, and the time +having come, Aratus arrived; and having concealed himself down by the +river, waited there for the signal. But about an hour before noon, a +man, whose profession it was to keep a fine kind of sheep near the +town, wishing to ask some business question of the shepherd, came out +of the gate with his cloak on, and standing upon the same tomb looked +round to find the shepherd. Whereupon Aratus, thinking that the signal +had been given, hurried with all his men as fast as he could towards +the gate. But the gate being hurriedly closed by the guard, owing to no +preparations having yet been made by the party in the town, the result +was that Aratus not only failed in his attempt but was the cause of the +worst misfortunes to his partisans. For being thus detected they were +dragged forward and put to death. What is one to say was the cause of +this catastrophe? Surely that the general arranged only for a single +signal, and being then quite young had no experience of the accuracy +secured by double signals and counter-signals. On so small a point in +war does the success or failure of an operation turn. + +[Sidenote: Cleomenes. See 2, 55.] + +[Sidenote: May 12.] + ++18.+ Again the Spartan Cleomenes, when proposing to take Megalopolis +by a stratagem, arranged with the guards of that part of the wall +near what is called the Cavern to come out with all their men in the +third watch, the hour at which his partisans were on duty on the wall; +but not having taken into consideration the fact that at the time of +the rising of the Pleiads the nights are very short, he started his +army from Sparta about sunset. The result was that he was not able +to get there in time, but being overtaken by daybreak, made a rash +and ill-considered attempt to carry the town, and was repulsed with +considerable loss and the danger of a complete overthrow. Now if he +had, in accordance with his arrangement, hit the proper time, and led +in his men while his partisans were in command of the entrance, he +would not have failed in his attempt. + +[Sidenote: Philip’s attack on Meliteia. See 5, 97.] + +Similarly, once more, King Philip, as I have already stated, when +carrying on an intrigue in the city of Meliteia, made a mistake in two +ways. The ladders which he brought were too short for their purpose, +and he mistook the time. For having arranged to arrive about midnight, +when every one was fast asleep, he started from Larissa and arrived in +the territory of Meliteia too early, and was neither able to halt, for +fear of his arrival being announced in the city, nor to get back again +without being discovered. Being compelled therefore to continue his +advance, he arrived at the city while the inhabitants were still awake. +Consequently he could neither carry the wall by an escalade, because of +the insufficient length of the ladders; nor enter by the gate, because +it was too early for his partisans inside to help him. Finally, he +did nothing but irritate the people of the town, and, after losing a +considerable number of his own men, retired unsuccessful and covered +with disgrace; having only given a warning to the rest of the world to +distrust him and be on their guard against him. + +[Sidenote: Nicias, B.C. 413. Thucyd. 7, 50.] + ++19.+ Again Nicias, the general of the Athenians, had it in his power +to have saved the army besieging Syracuse, and had selected the proper +time of the night for escaping the observation of the enemy, and +retiring to a place of safety. And then because the moon was eclipsed, +regarding it superstitiously as of evil portent, he stopped the army +from starting. Thanks to this it came about that, when he started the +next day, the enemy had obtained information of his intention, and +army and generals alike fell into the hands of the Syracusans. Yet if +he had asked about this from men acquainted with such phenomena, he +might not only have avoided missing his opportunity for such an absurd +reason, but have also used the occurrence for his own benefit owing +to the ignorance of the enemy. For the ignorance of their neighbours +contributes more than anything else to the success of the instructed. + +[Sidenote: The method of judging of the length necessary for scaling +ladders.] + +Such then are examples of the necessity of studying celestial +phenomena. But as for securing the proper length of scaling ladders, +the following is the method of making the calculation. Suppose the +height of the wall to be given by one of the conspirators within, the +measurement required for the ladders is evident; for example, if the +height of the wall is ten feet or any other unit, the ladders must be +full twelve; and the interval between the wall and the foot of the +ladder must be half the length of the ladder, that the ladders may +not break under the weight of those mounting if they are set farther +away, nor be too steep to be safe if set nearer the perpendicular. But +supposing it not to be possible to measure or get near the wall: the +height of any object which rises perpendicularly on its base can be +taken by those who choose to study mathematics. + ++20.+ Once more, therefore, those who wish to succeed in military +projects and operations must have studied geometry, not with +professional completeness, but far enough to have a comprehension +of proportion and equations. For it is not only in such cases that +these are necessary, but also for raising the scale of the divisions +of a camp. For sometimes the problem is to change the entire form of +the camp, and yet to keep the same proportion between all the parts +included: at other times to keep the same shape in the parts, and to +increase or diminish the whole area on which the camp stands, adding +or subtracting from all proportionally. On which point I have already +spoken in more elaborate detail in my Notes on Military Tactics. For +I do not think that any one will reasonably object to me that I add a +great burden to strategy, in urging on those who endeavour to acquire +it the study of astronomy and geometry: for, while rather rejecting +all that is superfluous in these studies, and brought in for show and +talk, as well as all idea of enjoining their prosecution beyond the +point of practical utility, I am most earnest and eager for so much +as is barely necessary. For it would be strange if those who aim at +the sciences of dancing and flute-playing should study the preparatory +sciences of rhythms and music, (and the like might be said of the +pursuits of the palaestra), from the belief that the final attainment +of each of these sciences requires the assistance of the latter; while +the students of strategy are to feel aggrieved if they find that they +require subsidiary sciences up to a certain point. That would mean that +men practising common and inferior arts are more diligent and energetic +than those who resolve to excel in the best and most dignified subject, +which no man of sense would admit.... + + +THE COMPUTATION OF THE SIZE OF CITIES + ++21.+ Most people calculate the area merely from the length of the +circumference [of towns or camps]. [Sidenote: Sparta and Megalopolis.] +Accordingly, when one says that the city of Megalopolis has a circuit +of fifty stades, and that of Sparta forty-eight, but that Sparta +is twice the size of Megalopolis, they look upon the assertion as +incredible. And if one, by way of increasing the difficulty, were +to say that a city or camp may have a circuit of forty stades and +yet be double the size of one having a perimeter of a hundred, the +statement would utterly puzzle them. The reason of this is that we do +not remember the lessons in geometry taught us at school. I was led to +make these remarks because it is not only common people, but actually +some statesmen and military commanders, who have puzzled themselves +sometimes by wondering whether it were possible that Sparta should be +bigger, and that too by a great deal, than Megalopolis, while having a +shorter circuit; and at other times by trying to conjecture the number +of men by considering the mere length of a camp’s circuit. A similar +mistake is also made in pronouncing as to the number of the inhabitants +of cities. For most people imagine that cities in which the ground is +broken and hilly contain more houses than a flat site. But the fact +is not so; because houses are built at right angles not to sloping +foundations but to the plains below, upon which the hills themselves +are excrescences. And this admits of a proof within the intelligence +of a child. For if one would imagine houses on slopes to be raised +until they were of the same height; it is evident that the plane of the +roofs of the houses thus united will be equal and parallel to the plane +underlying the hills and foundations. + +So much for those who aspire to be leaders and statesmen and are yet +ignorant and puzzled about such facts as these.... + +Those who do not enter upon undertakings with good will and zeal cannot +be expected to give real help when the time comes to act.... + + +THE HANNIBALIAN WAR, B.C. 211 + +Such being the position of the Romans and Carthaginians, Fortune +continually oscillating between the two, we may say with the poet + + “Pain hard by joy possessed the souls of each.”[329]... + +There is profound truth in the observation which I have often made, +that it is impossible to grasp or get a complete view of the fairest of +all subjects of contemplation, the tendency of history as a whole, from +writers of partial histories.... + + +THE CHARACTER OF HANNIBAL + ++22.+ Of all that befell the Romans and Carthaginians, good or bad, the +cause was one man and one mind,—Hannibal. + +For it is notorious that he managed the Italian campaigns in person, +and the Spanish by the agency of the elder of his brothers, Hasdrubal, +and subsequently by that of Mago, the leaders who killed the two +Roman generals in Spain about the same time. Again, he conducted the +Sicilian campaign at first through Hippocrates and afterwards through +Myttonus[330] the Libyan. So also in Greece and Illyria: and, by +brandishing before their faces the dangers arising from these latter +places, he was enabled to distract the attention of the Romans, thanks +to his understanding with Philip. So great and wonderful is the +influence of a Man, and a mind duly fitted by original constitution for +any undertaking within the reach of human powers. + +[Sidenote: ἀρχὴ ἄνδρα δείξει. Bias, in Aristot. Eth. 5, 1.] + +But since the position of affairs has brought us to an inquiry into the +genius of Hannibal, the occasion seems to me to demand that I should +explain in regard to him the peculiarities of his character which have +been especially the subject of controversy. Some regard him as having +been extraordinarily cruel, some exceedingly grasping of money. But to +speak the truth of him, or of any person engaged in public affairs, +is not easy. Some maintain that men’s real natures are brought out +by their circumstances, and that they are detected when in office, +or as some say when in misfortunes, though they have up to that time +completely maintained their secrecy. I, on the contrary, do not regard +this as a sound dictum. For I think that men in these circumstances +are compelled, not only occasionally but frequently, either by the +suggestions of friends or the complexity of affairs, to speak and act +contrary to their real principles. + +[Sidenote: Examples to the contrary. 1. Agathocles.] + +[Sidenote: 2. Cleomenes.] + +[Sidenote: 3. Athens.] + +[Sidenote: 4. Sparta.] + +[Sidenote: 5. Philip V.] + ++23.+ And there are many proofs of this to be found in past history +if any one will give the necessary attention. Is it not universally +stated by the historians that Agathocles, tyrant of Sicily, after +having the reputation of extreme cruelty in his original measures for +the establishment of his dynasty, when he had once become convinced +that his power over the Siceliots was firmly established, is considered +to have become the most humane and mild of rulers? Again, was not +Cleomenes of Sparta a most excellent king, a most cruel tyrant, and +then again as a private individual most obliging and benevolent? And +yet it is not reasonable to suppose the most opposite dispositions +to exist in the same nature. They are compelled to change with the +changes of circumstances: and so some rulers often display to the world +a disposition as opposite as possible to their true nature. Therefore +the natures of men not only are not brought out by such things, but +on the contrary are rather obscured. The same effect is produced also +not only in commanders, despots, and kings, but in states also, by +the suggestions of friends. For instance, you will find the Athenians +responsible for very few tyrannical acts, and of many kindly and noble +ones, while Aristeides and Pericles were at the head of the state: +but quite the reverse when Cleon and Chares were so. And when the +Lacedaemonians were supreme in Greece, all the measures taken by King +Cleombrotus were conceived in the interests of their allies, but those +by Agesilaus not so. The characters of states therefore vary with +the variations of their leaders. King Philip again, when Taurion and +Demetrius were acting with him, was most impious in his conduct, but +when Aratus or Chrysogonus, most humane. + +[Sidenote: Hannibal mastered by circumstances.] + +[Sidenote: His cruelty.] + ++24.+ The case of Hannibal seems to me to be on a par with these. His +circumstances were so extraordinary and shifting, his closest friends +so widely different, that it is exceedingly difficult to estimate his +character from his proceedings in Italy. What those circumstances +suggested to him may easily be understood from what I have already +said, and what is immediately to follow; but it is not right to omit +the suggestions made by his friends either, especially as this matter +may be rendered sufficiently clear by one instance of the advice +offered him. At the time that Hannibal was meditating the march from +Iberia to Italy with his army, he was confronted with the extreme +difficulty of providing food and securing provisions, both because +the journey was thought to be of insuperable length, and because the +barbarians that lived in the intervening country were so numerous and +savage. It appears that at that time this difficulty frequently came +on for discussion at the council; and that one of his friends, called +Hannibal Monomachus, gave it as his opinion that there was one and +only one way by which it was possible to get as far as Italy. Upon +Hannibal bidding him speak out, he said that they must teach the army +to eat human flesh, and make them accustomed to it. Hannibal could +say nothing against the boldness and effectiveness of the idea, but +was unable to persuade himself or his friends to entertain it. It is +this man’s acts in Italy that they say were attributed to Hannibal, to +maintain the accusation of cruelty, as well as such as were the result +of circumstances. + +[Sidenote: His avarice.] + ++25.+ Fond of money indeed he does seem to have been to a conspicuous +degree, and to have had a friend of the same character—Mago, who +commanded in Bruttium. That account I got from the Carthaginians +themselves; for natives know best not only which way the wind lies, as +the proverb has it, but the characters also of their fellow-countrymen. +But I heard a still more detailed story from Massanissa, who maintained +the charge of money-loving against all Carthaginians generally, but +especially against Hannibal and Mago called the Samnite. Among other +stories, he told me that these two men had arranged a most generous +subdivision of operations between each other from their earliest +youth; and though they had each taken a very large number of cities in +Iberia and Italy by force or fraud, they had never taken part in the +same operation together; but had always schemed against each other, +more than against the enemy, in order to prevent the one being with +the other at the taking of a city: that they might neither quarrel in +consequence of things of this sort, nor have to divide the profit on +the ground of their equality of rank. + +[Sidenote: Effect of the fall of Capua, B.C. 211.] + ++26.+ The influence of friends then, and still more that of +circumstances, in doing violence to and changing the natural character +of Hannibal, is shown by what I have narrated and will be shown by +what I have to narrate. For as soon as Capua fell into the hands of +the Romans the other cities naturally became restless, and began to +look round for opportunities and pretexts for revolting back again to +Rome. It was then that Hannibal seems to have been at his lowest point +of distress and despair. For neither was he able to keep a watch upon +all the cities so widely removed from each other,—while he remained +entrenched at one spot, and the enemy were manœuvering against him with +several armies,—nor could he divide his force into many parts; for he +would have put an easy victory into the hands of the enemy by becoming +inferior to them in numbers, and finding it impossible to be personally +present at all points. Wherefore he was obliged to completely abandon +some of the cities, and withdraw his garrisons from others: being +afraid lest, in the course of the revolutions which might occur, he +should lose his own soldiers as well. Some cities again he made up his +mind to treat with treacherous violence, removing their inhabitants to +other cities, and giving their property up to plunder; in consequence +of which many were enraged with him, and accused him of impiety or +cruelty. For the fact was that these movements were accompanied by +robberies of money, murders, and violence, on various pretexts at the +hands of the outgoing or incoming soldiers in the cities, because they +always supposed that the inhabitants that were left behind were on the +verge of turning over to the enemy. It is, therefore, very difficult to +express an opinion on the natural character of Hannibal, owing to the +influence exercised on it by the counsel of friends and the force of +circumstances. The prevailing notion about him, however, at Carthage +was that he was greedy of money, at Rome that he was cruel.[331]... + + +AGRIGENTUM + +[Sidenote: Agrigentum taken by Marcus Valerius Laevinus, late in the +year B.C. 210, _jam magna parte anni circumacta_. Livy, 26, 40.] + ++27.+ The city of Agrigentum is not only superior to most cities in the +particulars I have mentioned, but above all in beauty and elaborate +ornamentation. It stands within eighteen stades of the sea, so that it +participates in every advantage from that quarter; while its circuit of +fortification is particularly strong both by nature and art. For its +wall is placed on a rock, steep and precipitous, on one side naturally, +on the other made so artificially. And it is enclosed by rivers: for +along the south side runs the river of the same name as the town, and +along the west and south-west side the river called Hypsas. The citadel +overlooks the city exactly at the south-east, girt on the outside by +an impassable ravine, and on the inside with only one approach from +the town. On the top of it is a temple of Athene and of Zeus Atabyrius +as at Rhodes: for as Agrigentum was founded by the Rhodians, it is +natural that this deity should have the same appellation as at Rhodes. +The city is sumptuously adorned in other respects also with temples and +colonnades. The temple of Zeus Olympius is still unfinished, but in its +plan and dimensions it seems to be inferior to no temple whatever in +all Greece.... + + * * * * * + +[Sidenote: The treatment of the refugees and desperadoes who had +collected at Agathyrna in Sicily. See Livy, 26, 40 _fin._] + +Marcus Valerius persuaded these refugees, on giving them a pledge +for the security of their lives, to leave Sicily and go to Italy, on +condition that they should receive pay from the people of Rhegium +for plundering Bruttium, and retain all booty obtained from hostile +territory.... + + +GREECE + +_Speech of Chlaeneas, the Aetolian, at Sparta. In the autumn of_ B.C. +211 _the Consul-designate, M. Valerius Laevinus, induced the Aetolians, +Scopas being their Strategus, to form an alliance with them against +Philip. The treaty, as finally concluded, embraced also the Eleans, +Lacedaemonians, King Attalus of Pergamum, the Thracian King Pleuratus, +and the Illyrian Scerdilaidas. A mission was sent from Aetolia to +persuade the Lacedaemonians to join. See Livy, 26, 24._ + +[Sidenote: B.C. 347.] + +[Sidenote: Battle of Chaeronea, B.C. 338.] + +[Sidenote: Succession of Alexander the Great, B.C. 336.] + +[Sidenote: Destruction of Thebes, B.C. 335.] + +“That the Macedonian supremacy, men of Sparta, was the beginning of +slavery to the Greeks, I am persuaded that no one will venture to deny; +and you may satisfy yourselves by looking at it thus. There was a +league of Greeks living in the parts towards Thrace who were colonists +from Athens and Chalcis, of which the most conspicuous and powerful was +the city of Olynthus. Having enslaved and made an example of this town, +Philip not only became master of the Thraceward cities, but reduced +Thessaly also to his authority by the terror which he had thus set up. +Not long after this he conquered the Athenians in a pitched battle, and +used his success with magnanimity, not from any wish to benefit the +Athenians—far from it, but in order that his favourable treatment of +them might induce the other states to submit to him voluntarily. The +reputation of your city was still such that it seemed likely, that, if +a proper opportunity arose, it would recover its supremacy in Greece. +Accordingly, without waiting for any but the slightest pretext, Philip +came with his army and cut down everything standing in your fields, and +destroyed the houses with fire. And at last, after destroying towns and +open country alike, he assigned part of your territory to the Argives, +part to Tegea and Megalopolis, and part to the Messenians: determined +to benefit every people in spite of all justice, on the sole condition +of their injuring you. Alexander succeeded Philip on the throne, and +how he destroyed Thebes, because he thought that it contained a spark +of Hellenic life, however small, you all I think know well. + +[Sidenote: Battle of Crannon, ending the Lamian war, 7th Aug., B.C. +322.] + +[Sidenote: Defeat of Brennus at Delphi, B.C. 279. Pausan. 10, 15; +20-23.] + ++29.+ “And why need I speak in detail of how the successors of this +king have treated the Greeks? For surely there is no man living, so +uninterested in public affairs, as not to have heard how Antipater in +his victory at Lamia treated the unhappy Athenians, as well as the +other Greeks; and how he went so far in violence and brutality as to +institute man-hunters, and send them to the various cities to catch all +who had ever spoken against, or in any way annoyed, the royal family +of Macedonia: of whom some were dragged by force from the temples, +and others from the very altars, and put to death with torture, and +others who escaped were forced to leave Greece entirely; nor had they +any refuge save the Aetolian nation alone. For the Aetolians were +the only people in Greece who withstood Antipater in behalf of those +unjustly defrauded of safety to their lives: they alone faced the +invasion of Brennus and his barbarian army: and they alone came to your +aid when called upon, with a determination to assist you in regaining +your ancestral supremacy in Greece.[332] Who again is ignorant of the +deeds of Cassander, Demetrius, and Antigonus Gonatas? For owing to +their recency the knowledge of them still remains distinct. Some of +them by introducing garrisons, and others by implanting despots in the +cities, effectually secured that every state should share the infamous +brand of slavery. But passing by all these I will now come to the last +Antigonus,[333] lest any of you, viewing his policy unsuspiciously, +should consider that you are under an obligation to the Macedonians. +For it was with no purpose of saving the Achaeans that he undertook +the war against you, nor from any dislike of the tyranny of Cleomenes +inducing him to free the Lacedaemonians. If any man among you holds +this opinion, he must be simple indeed. No! It was because he saw +that his own power would not be secure if you got the rule of the +Peloponnese; and because he saw that Cleomenes was of a nature well +calculated to secure this object, and that fortune was splendidly +seconding your efforts, that he came in a tumult of fear and jealousy, +not to help Peloponnesians, but to destroy your hopes and abase your +power. Therefore you do not owe the Macedonians so much gratitude for +not destroying your city when they had taken it, as hostility and +hatred, for having more than once already stood in your way, when you +were strong enough to grasp the supremacy of Greece. + +[Sidenote: Philip V.] + ++30.+ “Again, what need to speak more on the wickedness of Philip? For +of his impiety towards the gods his outrages on the temples at Thermus +are a sufficient proof; and of his cruelty towards man, his perfidy and +treachery to the Messenians. + +“So much for the past. But as to the present resolution before you, it +is in a way necessary to draft it, and vote on it, as though you were +deciding on war, and yet in real truth not to regard it as a war. For +it is impossible for the Achaeans, beaten as they are, to damage your +territory: but I imagine that they will be only too thankful to heaven +if they can but protect their own, when they find themselves surrounded +by war with Eleans and Messenians as allied to us, and with ourselves +at the same time. And Philip, I am persuaded, will soon desist from his +attack, when involved in a war by land with Aetolians, and by sea with +Rome and King Attalus. The future may be easily conjectured from the +past. For if he always failed to subdue Aetolians when they were his +only enemies, can we conceive that he will be able to support the war +if all these combine? + ++31.+ “I have said thus much with the deliberate purpose of showing you +that you are not hampered by previous engagements, but are entirely +free in your deliberations as to which you ought to join—Aetolians or +Macedonians. If you are under an earlier engagement, and have already +made up your minds on these points, what room is there for further +argument? For if you had made the alliance now existing between +yourselves and us, previous to the good services done you by Antigonus, +there might perhaps have been some reason for questioning whether it +were right to neglect an old treaty in gratitude for recent favours. +But since it was subsequent to this much vaunted freedom and security +given you by Antigonus, and with which they are perpetually taunting +you, that, after deliberation and frequent consideration as to which of +the two you ought to join, you decided to combine with us Aetolians; +and have actually exchanged pledges of fidelity with us, and have +fought by our side in the late war against Macedonia, how can any one +entertain a doubt on the subject any longer? For the obligations of +kindness between you and Antigonus and Philip were cancelled then. It +now remains for you to point out some subsequent wrong done you by +Aetolians, or subsequent favour by Macedonians: or if neither of these +exist, on what grounds are you now, at the instance of the very men to +whom you justly refused to listen formerly, when no obligation existed, +about to undo treaties and oaths—the strongest bonds of fidelity +existing among mankind.” + +Such was the conclusion of what was considered a very cogent speech by +Chlaeneas. + ++32.+ After him the ambassador of the Acarnanians, Lyciscus, came +forward: and at first he paused, seeing the multitude talking to each +other about the last speech; but when at last silence was obtained, he +began his speech as follows:— + +[Sidenote: Speech of Lyciscus, envoy from Acarnania, which country was +to fall to the Aetolians by the proposed new treaty. See Livy, 26, 24.] + +“I and my colleagues, men of Sparta, have been sent to you by the +common league of the Acarnanians; and as we have always shared in +the same prospects as the Macedonians, we consider that this mission +also is common to us and them. For just as on the field of war, owing +to the superiority and magnitude of the Macedonian force, our safety +is involved in their valour; so, in the controversies of diplomacy, +our interests are inseparable from the rights of the Macedonians. +Now Chlaeneas in the peroration of his address gave a summary of the +obligations existing between the Aetolians and yourselves. For he said, +'If subsequent to your making the alliance with them any fresh injury +or offence had been committed by Aetolians, or any kindness done by +Macedonians, the present proposal ought properly to be discussed as +a fresh start; but that if, nothing of the sort having taken place, +we believe that by quoting the services of Antigonus, and your former +decrees, we shall be able to annul existing oaths and treaties, we are +the greatest simpletons in the world.’ To this I reply by acknowledging +that I must indeed be the most foolish of men, and that the arguments +I am about to put forward are indeed futile, if, as he maintains, +nothing fresh has happened, and Greek affairs are in precisely the same +position as before. But if exactly the reverse be the case, as I shall +clearly prove in the course of my speech,—then I imagine that I shall +be shown to give you some salutary advice, and Chlaeneas to be quite in +the wrong. We are come, then, expressly because we are convinced that +it is needful for us to speak on this very point: namely, to point out +to you that it is at once your duty and your interest, after hearing of +the evils threatening Greece, to adopt if possible a policy excellent +and worthy of yourselves by uniting your prospects with ours; or if +that cannot be, at least to abstain from this movement for the present. + ++33.+ “But since the last speaker has ventured to go back to ancient +times for his denunciations of the Macedonian royal family, I feel +it incumbent on me also to say a few words first on these points, to +remove the misconception of those who have been carried away by his +words. + +[Sidenote: Sacred war, B.C. 357-346. Onomarchus killed near the gulf of +Pagasae, B.C. 352. See Diodor. 16, 32-35.] + +[Sidenote: Philip elected generalissimo against Persia in the congress +of allies at Corinth, B.C. 338.] + +“Chlaenaes said, then, that Philip son of Amyntas became master of +Thessaly by the ruin of Olynthus. But I conceive that not only the +Thessalians, but the other Greeks also, were preserved by Philip’s +means. For at the time when Onomarchus and Philomelus, in defiance +of religion and law seized Delphi and made themselves masters of the +treasury of the god, who is there among you who does not know that +they collected such a mighty force as no Greek dared any longer face? +Nay, along with this violation of religion, they were within an ace of +becoming lords of all Greece also. At that crisis Philip volunteered +his assistance; destroyed the tyrants, secured the temple, and became +the author of freedom to the Greeks, as is testified even to posterity +by the facts. For Philip was unanimously elected general-in-chief +by land and sea, not, as my opponent ventured to assert, as one who +had wronged Thessaly; but on the ground of his being a benefactor of +Greece: an honour which no one had previously obtained. 'Ay, but,’ he +says, 'Philip came with an armed force into Laconia.' Yes, but it was +not of his own choice, as you know: he reluctantly consented to do so, +after repeated invitations and appeals by the Peloponnesians, under +the name of their friend and ally. And when he did come, pray observe, +Chlaeneas, how he behaved. Though he could have availed himself of +the wishes of the neighbouring states for the destruction of these +men’s territory and the humiliation of their city, and have won much +gratitude too by his act, he by no means lent himself to such a policy; +but, by striking terror into the one and the other alike, he compelled +both parties to accommodate their differences in a congress, to the +common benefit of all: not putting himself forward as arbitrator of the +points in dispute, but appointing a joint board of arbitration selected +from all Greece. Is that a proceeding which deserves to be held up to +reproach and execration? + +[Sidenote: Alexander’s services to Greece.] + ++34.+ “Again, you bitterly denounced Alexander, because, when he +believed himself to be wronged, he punished Thebes: but of his having +exacted vengeance of the Persians for their outrages on all the Greeks +you made no mention at all, nor of his having released us all in common +from heavy miseries, by enslaving the barbarians, and depriving them +of the supplies which they used for the ruin of the Greeks,—sometimes +pitting the Athenians against the ancestors of these gentlemen here, at +another the Thebans; nor finally of his having subjected Asia to the +Greeks. + +[Sidenote: The Diadochi.] + +[Sidenote: The Aetolian policy.] + +“As for Alexander’s successors how had you the audacity to mention +them? They were indeed, according to the circumstances of the time, on +many occasions the authors of good to some and of harm to others: for +which perhaps others might be allowed to bear them a grudge. But to +_you_ Aetolians it is in no circumstance open to do so,—you who have +never been the authors of anything good to any one, but of mischief +to many and on many occasions! Who was it that called in Antigonus +son of Demetrius to the partition of the Achaean league? Who was it +that made a sworn treaty with Alexander of Epirus for the enslaving +and dismembering of Acarnania? Was it not you? What nation ever sent +out military commanders duly accredited of the sort that you have? Men +that ventured to do violence to the sanctity of asylum itself! Timaeus +violated the sanctuary of Poseidon on Taenarum, and of Artemis at Lusi. +Pharylus and Polycritus plundered, the former the sacred enclosure of +Here in Argos, the latter that of Poseidon at Mantinea. What again +about Lattabus and Nicostratus? Did not they make a treacherous attack +on the assembly of the Pan-boeotians in time of peace, committing +outrages worthy of Scythians and Gauls? You will find no such crimes as +these committed by the Diadochi. + +[Sidenote: B.C. 279.] + +[Sidenote: Defeat and death of Ptolemy Ceraunus in the battle with the +Gauls, B.C. 280. See Pausan. 10, 19, 7.] + ++35.+ “Not being able to say anything in defence of any of these acts, +you talk pompously about your having resisted the invasion of Delphi by +the barbarians, and allege that for this Greece ought to be grateful +to you. But if for this one service some gratitude is owing to the +Aetolians; what high honour do the Macedonians deserve, who throughout +nearly their whole lives are ceaselessly engaged in a struggle with +the barbarians for the safety of the Greeks? For that Greece would +have been continually involved in great dangers, if we had not had +the Macedonians and the ambition of their kings as a barrier, who is +ignorant? And there is a very striking proof of this. For no sooner had +the Gauls conceived a contempt for the Macedonians, by their victory +over Ptolemy Ceraunus, than, thinking the rest of no account, Brennus +promptly marched into the middle of Greece. And this would often have +happened if the Macedonians had not been on our frontiers. + +“However, though I have much that I could say on the past, I think +this is enough. Of all the actions of Philip, they have selected his +destruction of the temple, to fasten the charge of impiety upon him. +They did not add a word about their own outrage and crime, which +they perpetrated in regard to the temples in Dium, and Dodona, and +the sacred enclosures of the gods. The speaker should have mentioned +this first. But anything you Aetolians have suffered you recount to +these gentlemen with exaggeration: but the things you have inflicted +unprovoked, though many times as numerous as the others, you pass over +in silence; because you know full well that everybody lays the blame +of acts of injustice and mischief on those who give the provocation by +unjust actions themselves. + ++36.+ “Of Antigonus I will only make mention so far, as to avoid +appearing to despise what was done, or to treat as unimportant so great +an undertaking. For my part I think that history does not contain the +record of a more admirable service than that which Antigonus performed +for you: indeed it appears to me to be unsurpassable. And the following +facts will show this. Antigonus went to war with you and conquered +you in a pitched battle. By force of arms he became master of your +territory and city at once. He might have exercised all the rights of +war upon you: but he was so far from inflicting any hardships upon you, +that, besides other benefits, he expelled your tyrant and restored your +laws and ancestral constitution. In return for which, in the national +assemblies, calling the Greeks to witness your words, you proclaimed +Antigonus your benefactor and preserver. + +“What then ought to have been your policy? I will speak what I really +think, gentlemen of Sparta: and you will I am sure bear with me. For +I shall do this now from no wish to go out of my way to bring railing +accusations against you, but under the pressure of circumstances, and +for the common good. What then am I to say? This: that both in the late +war you ought to have allied yourselves not with Aetolians but with +Macedonians; and now again, in answer to these invitations, you ought +to join Philip rather than the former people. But, it may be objected, +you will be breaking a treaty. Which will be the graver breach of right +on your part,—to neglect a private arrangement made with Aetolians, or +one that has been inscribed on a column and solemnly consecrated in +the sight of all Greece? On what ground are you so careful of breaking +faith with this people, from whom you have never received any favour, +while you pay no heed to Philip and the Macedonians, to whom you owe +even the very power of deliberating to-day? Do you regard it as a duty +to keep faith with friends? Yet it is not so much a point of conscience +to confirm written pledges of faith, as it is a violation of conscience +to go to war with those who preserved you: and this is what, in the +present instance, the Aetolians are come to demand of you. + ++37.+ “Let it, however, be granted that what I have now said may in +the eyes of severe critics be regarded as beside the subject. I will +now return to the main point at issue, as they state it. It was this: +'If the circumstances are the same now as at the time when you made +alliance with the Aetolians, then your policy ought to remain on the +same lines.’ That was their first proposition. 'But if they have been +entirely changed, then it is fair that you should now deliberate on the +demands made to you as on a matter entirely new and unprejudiced.' I +ask you therefore, Cleonicus and Chlaeneas, who were your allies on the +former occasion when you invited this people to join you? Were they not +all the Greeks? But with whom are you now united, or to what kind of +federation are you now inviting this people? Is it not to one with the +foreigner? A mighty similarity exists, no doubt, in your minds, and no +diversity at all! _Then_ you were contending for glory and supremacy +with Achaeans and Macedonians, men of kindred blood with yourselves, +and with Philip their leader; _now_ a war of slavery is threatening +Greece against men of another race, whom you think to bring against +Philip, but have really unconsciously brought against yourselves and +all Greece. For just as men in the stress of war, by introducing into +their cities garrisons superior in strength to their own forces, while +successfully repelling all danger from the enemy, put themselves at the +mercy of their friends,—just so are the Aetolians acting in the present +case. For in their desire to conquer Philip and humble Macedonia, they +have unconsciously brought such a mighty cloud from the west, as for +the present perhaps will overshadow Macedonia first, but which in the +sequel will be the origin of heavy evils to all Greece. + +[Sidenote: B.C. 492. Herod. 6, 48; 7, 133.] + +[Sidenote: B.C. 480] + ++38.+ “All Greeks indeed have need to be on the alert for the crisis +which is coming on: but Lacedaemonians above all. For why was it, do +you suppose, men of Sparta, that your ancestors, when Xerxes sent an +ambassador to your town demanding earth and water, thrust the man into +a well, and, throwing earth upon him, bade him take back word to Xerxes +that he had got from the Lacedaemonians what he had demanded from +them,—earth and water? Why was it again, do you suppose, that Leonidas +and his men started forth to a voluntary and certain death? Was it not +that they might have the glory of being the forlorn hope, not only of +their own freedom, but of that of all Greece also? And it would indeed +be a worthy action for descendants of such heroes as these to make a +league with the barbarians now, and to serve with them; and to war +against Epirotes, Achaeans, Acarnanians, Boeotians, Thessalians, and in +fact against nearly every Greek state except Aetolians! To these last +it is habitual to act thus: and to regard nothing as disgraceful, so +long only as it is accompanied by an opportunity of plunder. It is not +so, however, with you. And what must we expect these people to do, now +that they have obtained the support of the Roman alliance? For when +they obtained an accession of strength and support from the Illyrians, +they at once set about acts of piracy at sea, and treacherously seized +Pylus; while by land they stormed the city of Cleitor, and sold the +Cynethans into slavery. Once before they made a treaty with Antigonus, +as I said just now, for the destruction of the Achaean and Acarnanian +races; and now they have done the same with Rome for the destruction of +all Greece. + +[Sidenote: Herod. 7, 132.] + ++39.+ “With a knowledge of such transactions before his eyes who could +help suspecting an attack from Rome, and feeling abhorrence at the +abandoned conduct of the Aetolians in daring to make such a treaty? +They have already wrested Oeniadae and Nesus from the Acarnanians, +and recently seized the city of the unfortunate Anticyreans, whom, in +conjunction with the Romans, they have sold into slavery.[334] Their +children and women are led off by the Romans to suffer all the miseries +which those must expect who fall into the hands of aliens; while the +houses of the unhappy inhabitants are allotted among the Aetolians. +Surely a noble alliance this to join deliberately! Especially for +Lacedaemonians: who, after conquering the barbarians, decreed that the +Thebans, for being the only Greeks that resolved to remain neutral +during the Persian invasion, should pay a tenth of their goods to the +gods. + +“The honourable course then, men of Sparta, and the one becoming your +character, is to remember from what ancestors you are sprung; to be +on your guard against an attack from Rome; to suspect the treachery +of the Aetolians. Above all to recall the services of Antigonus: and +so once more show your loathing for dishonest men; and, rejecting the +friendship of the Aetolians, unite your hopes for the future with those +of Achaia and Macedonia. If, however, any of your own influential +citizens are intriguing against this policy, then at least remain +neutral, and do not take part in the iniquities of these Aetolians....” + + * * * * * + +_In the autumn of B.C. 211, Philip being in Thrace, Scopas made a +levy of Aetolians to invade Acarnania. The Acarnanians sent their +wives, children, and old men to Epirus, while the rest of them bound +themselves by a solemn execration never to rejoin their friends except +as conquerors of the invading Aetolians. Livy, 26, 25._ + ++40.+ When the Acarnanians heard of the intended invasion of the +Aetolians, in a tumult of despair and fury they adopted a measure of +almost frantic violence.... + +If any one of them survived the battle and fled from the danger, they +begged that no one should receive him in any city or give him a light +for a fire. And this they enjoined on all with a solemn execration, and +especially on the Epirotes, to the end that they should offer none of +those who fled an asylum in their territory.... + + * * * * * + +_When Philip was informed of the invasion he advanced promptly to the +relief of Acarnania; hearing of which the Aetolians returned home._ +_Livy_, l. c. + + * * * * * + +Zeal on the part of friends, if shown in time, is of great +service; but if it is dilatory and late, it renders the assistance +nugatory,—supposing, of course, that they wish to keep the terms of +their alliance, not merely on paper, but by actual deeds.[335]... + + +INVESTMENT OF ECHINUS BY PHILIP + +[Sidenote: In the campaigns of Philip, during the time that Publius +Sulpicius Galba as Proconsul commanded a Roman fleet in Greek waters, +_i.e._ from B.C. 209 to B.C. 206. See Livy, 26, 22, 28; 28, 5-7; 29, +12.] + ++41.+ Having determined to make his approach upon the town at the +two towers, he erected opposite to them diggers’ sheds and rams; and +opposite the space between the towers he erected a covered way between +the rams, parallel to the wall. And when the plan was complete, the +appearance of the works was very like the style of the wall. For the +super-structures on the pent-houses had the appearance and style of +towers, owing to the placing of the wattles side by side; and the space +between looked like a wall, because the row of wattles at the top of +the covered way were divided into battlements by the fashion in which +they were woven. In the lowest division of these besieging towers the +diggers employed in levelling inequalities, to allow the stands of the +battering-rams to be brought up, kept throwing on earth, and the ram +was propelled forward: in the second story were water vessels and other +appliances for quenching fires, and along with them the catapults: and +on the third a considerable body of men were placed to fight with all +who tried to damage the rams; and they were on a level with the city +towers. From the covered way between the besieging towers a double +trench was to be dug towards the wall, between the city towers. There +were also three batteries for stone-throwing machines, one of which +carried stones of a talent weight, and the other two half that weight. +From the camp to the pent-houses and diggers’ sheds underground tunnels +had been constructed, to prevent men, going to the works from the camp +or returning from the works, being wounded in any way by missiles from +the town. These works were completed in a very few days, because the +district round produced what was wanted for this service in abundance. +For Echinus is situated on the Melian Gulf, facing south, exactly +opposite the territory of Thronium, and enjoys a soil rich in every +kind of produce; thanks to which circumstance Philip had no scarcity of +anything he required for his purpose. Accordingly, as I said, as soon +as the works were completed, they begun at once pushing the trenches +and the siege machinery towards the walls.... + +[Sidenote: Spring of B.C. 209.[336] + ++42.+ While Philip was investing Echinus, and had secured his position +excellently on the side of the town, and had strengthened the outer +line of his camp with a trench and wall, Publius Sulpicius, the Roman +proconsul, ] and Dorimachus, Strategus of the Aetolians, arrived in +person,—Publius with a fleet, and Dorimachus with an army of infantry +and cavalry,—and assaulted Philip’s entrenchment. Their repulse led to +greater exertions on Philip’s part in his attack upon the Echinaeans, +who in despair surrendered to him. For Dorimachus was not able to +reduce Philip by cutting off his supplies, as he got them by sea.... + + * * * * * + +[Sidenote: Aegina taken before the end of 208 B.C., for Sulpicius +wintered there between 208-207 B.C. See Livy, 27, 32.] + +When Aegina was taken by the Romans, such of the inhabitants as had +not escaped crowded together at the ships, and begged the proconsul to +allow them to send ambassadors to cities of their kinsmen to obtain +ransom. Publius at first returned a harsh answer, saying, that “When +they were their own masters was the time that they ought to have sent +ambassadors to their betters to ask for mercy, not now when they were +slaves. A little while ago they had not thought an ambassador from him +worthy of even a word; now that they were captives they expected to +be allowed to send ambassadors to their kinsfolk: was that not sheer +folly?” So at the time he dismissed those who came to him with these +words. But next morning he called all the captives together and said +that, as to the Aeginetans, he owed them no favour; but for the sake of +the rest of the Greeks he would allow them to send ambassadors to get +ransom, since that was the custom of their country.... + + +ASIA + +[Sidenote: July 26.] + +[Sidenote: The transport of the army of Antiochus in his eastern +campaigns. See _supra_, 8, 25.] + ++43.+ The Euphrates rises in Armenia and flows through Syria and the +country beyond to Babylonia. It seems to discharge itself into the +Red Sea; but in point of fact it does not do so: for its waters are +dissipated among the ditches dug across the fields before it reaches +the sea. Accordingly the nature of this river is the reverse of that +of others. For in other rivers the volume of water is increased in +proportion to the greater distance traversed, and they are at their +highest in winter and lowest in midsummer; but this river is fullest +of water at the rising of the dog-star, and has the largest volume +of water in Syria, which continually decreases as it advances. The +reason of this is that the increase is not caused by the collection +of winter rains, but by the melting of the snows; and its decrease by +the diversion of its stream into the land, and its subdivision for the +purposes of irrigation. It was this which on this occasion made the +transport of the army slow, because as the boats were heavily laden, +and the stream very low, the forces of the current did exceedingly +little to help them down. + + +EMBASSY FROM ROME TO PTOLEMY + +[Sidenote: M. Atilius and Manius Glabrio sent to Alexandria with +presents to Ptolemy Philopator and Queen Cleopatra. Livy, 27, 4, B.C. +210.] + ++44.+ The Romans sent ambassadors to Ptolemy, wishing to be supplied +with corn, as they were suffering from a great scarcity of it at home; +and, moreover, when all Italy had been laid waste by the enemy’s +troops up to the gates of Rome, and when all supplies from abroad were +stopped by the fact that war was raging, and armies encamped, in all +parts of the world except in Egypt. In fact the scarcity at Rome had +come to such a pitch, that a Sicilian medimnus was sold for fifteen +drachmae.[337] But in spite of this distress the Romans did not relax +in their attention to the war. + +END OF VOL. I + + +FOOTNOTES: + +[1] Vita Nicolai V. a _Dominico Georgio_, Rome, 1742, p. 206. + +[2] Casaubon mentions in his preface several partial editions and +translations which had appeared by Greeks, Spaniards, Italians, and +Belgians. But he says all such translations were founded on the faulty +Latin translation of Perotti; and none were of any value. The only +fairly good one was a German translation. + +[3] Unless the avoidance of the hiatus be counted one, which has +been pointed out by Hultsch. I cannot forbear from quoting here the +admirable words of Casaubon on the style of Polybius:—_Non deest sed +non eminet in Polybio facundia. Nihil vero est iniquius illis, qui +nullam putant esse eloquentiam, nisi uti nihil est præter eloquentiam. +Semper mihi apprime placuit Diodori Siculi sententia, vehementius in +historico eloquentiae studium improbantis. Verborum enim curam nimiam +veri fere par sequitur incuria. Oratio vultus animi est: ut hic fuerit +gravis aut solutus, ita etiam illa vel severa erit vel mollis._ The +nearest Greek to that of Polybius is II. Maccabees. + +[4] Livy, 38, 30-34. + +[5] Polyb. 23, 1, 7, 9. + +[6] Polyb. 24, 6. + +[7] Polyb. 29, 24. + +[8] Plutarch, _Timol._ ch. 39; Plato, _Laws_, 947. + +[9] Cicero, _Ep. ad Fam._ 5, 12 + +[10] Lucian, _Macrobii_, § 22. + +[11] Livy, 36, 31. + +[12] Pausan. 7, 9, 4. + +[13] As Callicrates in B.C. 179; Polyb. 36, 2. + +[14] 25, 9. + +[15] 26, 3. Callicrates at the same time secured a party in his favour, +during his year of office B.C. 179, by restoring the Spartan and +Messenian exiles; in return for which the former set up his statue at +Olympia, the base of which is preserved. Hicks’s _Greek Inscriptions_, +p. 330. + +[16] 28, 3. + +[17] 28, 6. + +[18] See 11, 8. + +[19] 28, 12. + +[20] The decree was brought into the Peloponnese by C. Popilius and Cn. +Octavius in B.C. 171. See Livy, 43, 17, _ne quis ullam rem in bellum +magistratibus Romanis conferret præter quam quod Senatus censuisset_. +Cp. Polyb. 28, 3. + +[21] 28, 13-14. + +[22] 28, 7. + +[23] 29, 23. + +[24] 29, 25, 26. + +[25] Thus Appius Claudius Cento would be hostile from the rejection of +his illegal demand for 5000 men. One of the common grounds of offence +had long been the refusal of Philopoemen and other Strategi to summon +an assembly to meet a Roman officer unless he came duly authorised +with a definite communication from the Senate. On this ground +Quintus Caecilius was refused in B.C. 185 (Polyb. 23, 19) and also +Titus Flamininus in B.C. 183 (Polyb. 24, 5). See Freeman’s _Federal +Government_, pp. 652-655. And no doubt other cases of a similar nature +would occur, generally leading to an unfavourable report at Rome. + +[26] Polyb. 30, 13. Thirlwall, vol. viii. p. 419. + +[27] Pausanias, 7, 10, 7-12. + +[28] Some few, it appears, had managed to escape, though at the risk of +certain execution if caught. + +[29] Polyb. 29, 21. Plutarch, _Aemilius_, ch. 28. + +[30] Diodorus Sic. _fr. lib._ 31; Plutarch, _Apophth. Scip. min._ 2. + +[31] 32, 8-16. + +[32] Thus he seems to have searched the Archives of the Pontifices. +Dionys. Halicarn. 1, 73. And he observed and criticised all Roman +customs, as, for instance, the provision for boys’ education at Rome. +Cic. _de Rep._ 4, 3. + +[33] 31, 19-21. + +[34] 35, 6. + +[35] Livy, _Ep._ 49; Appian, _Pun._ 74-77. + +[36] I infer this, not very confidently, from 9, 25. + +[37] 37, 3. + +[38] Scipio was born B.C. 185. + +[39] 9, 25. + +[40] 39, 3. + +[41] Pliny, _N. H._ 5, § 9. + +[42] Pausanias, 7, 11-12. + +[43] _Ib._ 13. + +[44] _Ib._ 14; Polyb. 38, 7-8. + +[45] 38, 7-10. + +[46] Thucyd. 3. 92. + +[47] Livy says the battle was at Thermopylae. This was near enough for +a general statement, but Scarpheia is some miles to the south. Livy, +_Ep._ 52, Pausan. 7. 15. + +[48] 39, 8 _sq._ Pausan. 7, 12 _sq._ + +[49] This has been much disputed. See Thirlwall’s note, vol. viii. p. +455. If the fragment, 29, 13 (40, 7) is given correctly by Strabo, it +seems certain that he must have arrived either before or immediately +after the fall of Corinth. + +[50] 39, 13-14. + +[51] 39. 15. + +[52] Livy, _Ep._ 52. + +[53] Pausan. 7, 16, 9. Polyb. 39, 16. + +[54] Thus in B.C. 44 Brutus going out as propraetor to take the +province of Macedonia, goes first to Athens, and there, as well as +in the rest of Greece, collects troops and money. See the note in +Mommsen’s _History of Rome_, vol. III. p. 50 (book IV. c. 1.) + +[55] Pausan. 8, 9, 1. + +[56] _Id._ 8, 30, 8. + +[57] _Id._ 8, 37, 2. + +[58] _Id._ 8, 44, 5. + +[59] _Id._ 8, 48, 8. + +[60] The base of this has been discovered with its inscription— + + Ἡ πόλις ἡ τῶν Ἠλείων Πολύβιον + Λυκόρτα Μεγαλοπολείτην. + + Hê polis tôn Hêleiôn Polybion + Lykorta Megalopoleitên. + +[61] Cicero, _Ep. ad Fam._ 5, 12. For the Numantine war (B.C. 134-132) +the authorities are Appian, _Hisp._ 48-98; Eutrop. 4, 17; Cicero _de +Off._ 1, 11, Strabo, 3, p. 162. + +[62] 34, 14. Strabo, p. 677. + +[63] 1, 1. + +[64] 3, 4. It is clear that such passages, as for instance the +beginning of 2, 42, must have been written before B.C. 146, and perhaps +published, and therefore not altered. Cp. the answer of Zeno of Rhodes +to corrections sent by Polybius, that he could not make alterations, as +his work was already published (16, 20). + +[65] 3, 57, cp. 34, 5. + +[66] 21, 38. + +[67] Lucian, _Macrobii_, §22. + +[68] 9, 20. + +[69] 10, 21. + +[70] Cicero, _Epist. ad Fam._ 5, 12. + +[71] 29, 10. + +[72] 22, 14. + +[73] _Off._ 3, 32. + +[74] Republ. 2, 14, § 27. + +[75] 3, 48. + +[76] 3, 33. + +[77] 3, 59. + +[78] 9, 25. + +[79] 10, 11. + +[80] 16, 15. + +[81] Dionys. Halic. 1, 17. + +[82] 3, 22 _sqq._ + +[83] 31, 38. + +[84] 34, 14. + +[85] 12, 5. + +[86] The elder Africanus died in B.C. 183. + +[87] I append a list of all writers referred to by Polybius, the index +will show the places where they are mentioned. Aeneas Tacticus, Alcaeus +a grammarian, Antiphanes of Berga, Antisthenes of Rhodes, Aratus of +Sicyon, Archedicus, Aristotle, Callisthenes, Demetrius of Phalerum, +Demosthenes, Dicaearchus, Echecrates, Ephorus of Cumae, Epicharmus of +Cos, Eratosthenes, Eudoxus, Euemerus, Euripides, Fabius Pictor, Hesiod, +Homer, Philinus, Phylarchus, Pindar, Plato, Pytheas, Simonides of +Ceos, Stasinus, Strabo, Theophrastus of Lesbos, Theopompus of Chios, +Thucydides, Timaeus, Xenophon, Zaleucus, Zeno of Rhodes. + +[88] 1, 14, 15. + +[89] See bk. 12. + +[90] 12, 15. + +[91] Athenaeus, vi. 272 _b_. + +[92] Plutarch, _Nicias_, 1, _Arat._ 38. + +[93] In the reference to the Seven Magi (5, 43), and to the story of +Cleobis and Bito (22, 20). + +[94] Cornelius Nepos, _Alcib._ 11. Plutarch, _Lys._ 30. Lucian, +_Quomodo hist. conscr._ § 59. + +[95] The History of the Achaean league is given with unrivalled +learning, clearness, and impartiality by Bishop Thirlwall in the eighth +volume of his _History of Greece_. Its constitution has been discussed +with great fulness by Professor E. A. Freeman in his _History of +Federal Government_. Recently Mr. Capes has published an edition of the +parts of Polybius referring to it which will be found useful; and Mr. +Strachan-Davidson has an able essay upon it in his edition of Extracts +from Polybius. Still some brief statement of the main features of this +remarkable attempt to construct a durable Hellenic Federation could not +be altogether omitted here. + +[96] Take for instance the oath of the Pylagorae (Aeschin. _de Fal. +L._ 121): “We will destroy no city of the Amphictyony, nor cut off its +streams in peace or war; if any shall do so, we will march against him +and destroy his cities; should any pillage the property of the god, or +be privy to or plan anything against what is in his temple, we will +take vengeance on him with hand and foot and voice and all our might.” +This is indeed the language rather of a Militant Church than a state; +but it is easily conceivable that, had these principles been carried +out (which they were not), something nearer a central and sovereign +parliament might have arisen. + +[97] Herodotus, vi. 7, 11-12. + +[98] See Herod. 9, 15; Thucyd. 2, 2; 4, 91; 5, 37; Xenophon _Hellen._ +3, 4, 4, Boeckh, _C. I. G._ vol. i. p. 726. + +[99] Herod. 7, 145-169. + +[100] _Id._ 7, 172-174. + +[101] Herod. 9, 88; Polyb. 9, 39. Equally abortive proved another +attempt at combination in B.C. 377, when the ξύνεδροι from the islands +met for a time at Athens. Grote, vol. ix. p. 319. + +[102] Herod. 6, 49. + +[103] Polybius (12, 26 _c_.) says that in his time the schools were +generally in disrepute. But is not this generally the verdict of +“practical” men on universities? The excitement at Rome at the visit +of the philosophers (B.C. 155) seems to show that they still enjoyed a +world-wide reputation. + +[104] Herod. 8, 73. + +[105] Thucy. 1, 103. + +[106] _Id._ 3, 94-98. + +[107] Xen. _Hellen._ 4, 6, 13, 14. + +[108] Pausan. 10, 38, 10. + +[109] Demosth. 3 _Phil._ 120. + +[110] Pausan. 1, 4, 4. + +[111] 18, 4 and 5. + +[112] Herod. 1, 145. Instead of Rhypes and Aegae, the first of which +seems to have been burnt, and the other to have for some reason been +deserted, Polybius (2, 41) mentions Leontium and Caryneia. + +[113] Thucyd. 1, 111, 115. + +[114] Thucyd. 4, 21. + +[115] 2, 38, 39. + +[116] 2, 39, 40. + +[117] Plutarch, _Arat._ ch. 9. + +[118] Plutarch, _Arat._ ch. 22. + +[119] Though this law was several times broken, certainly in the +case of Philopoemen, and probably in that of Aratus also. It is very +difficult to arrive at a satisfactory arrangement of Aratus’s seventeen +generalships if the strict alternation is preserved. See Freeman’s +_Federal Government_, p. 601. + +[120] 2, 46. + +[121] Plutarch, _Cleomenes_, 3-16. + +[122] Plutarch, _Cleom._ 3. Messenia had been free from the Spartans +since the battle of Leuctra (B.C. 371). Epaminondas had meant by +the foundation of Megalopolis and Messene (B.C. 371-370) to form a +united Messenian and Arcadian state as a counterpoise to Sparta. The +Messenians had drifted away from this arrangement, but were now members +of the Achaean league. Polyb. 4, 32. + +[123] 2, 46. + +[124] Plutarch, _Cleom._ 15. + +[125] See the remarks of Plutarch, _Arat._ 38. + +[126] He was believed to have been long in secret communication with +Antigonus. Plutarch, _l.c._ + +[127] Polyb. 8, 14; Plutarch, _Arat._ 52. + +[128] 10, 22, 24 + +[129] 11, 9-10. + +[130] Plutarch, _Philop._ 12, 13. + +[131] Plutarch, _Philop._ 16; Livy, 38, 32-34. + +[132] 2, 38. + +[133] 26, 3 _sq._ + +[134] The title of Achaean Strategus seems to have been revived under +the Empire. _C. I. G._ 1124. The principal authorities for the history +of the last hundred years of Greek Independence, including that of +the Achaean league, are Polybius, beginning with book 2, and in its +turn going on throughout the rest of his work which remains; scattered +notices in Livy from 27, 29 to the end of his extant work, and the +epitomes of the last books, mostly translated directly from Polybius; +Plutarch’s Lives of Agis, Cleomenes, Aratus, Philopoemen, Flamininus, +Aemilius; Pausanias, 7, 6-16; parts of Diodorus; Justinus (epitome of +Trogus); and some fragments of Greek historians collected by Müller. + +[135] I speak of course of the restored league after the election of +one Strategus began, B.C. 255. + +[136] For the change of time of the election see note on 5, 1. + +[137] We hear nothing of a secretary under the new league after the +abolition of the dual presidency. But he probably still existed (2, 43). + +[138] 10, 22. + +[139] See ch. 46. + +[140] This is certainly the meaning of the words of Polybius. But he +has confused matters. The two new Consuls designated at the comitia +of 249 were C. Aurelius Cotta II and P. Servilius Geminus II, whereas +Lucius Junius Pullus was the existing Consul with the disgraced P. +Claudius Pulcher. What really happened is made clear by Livy, Ep. 19. +The Senate sent Junius with these supplies, recalled Claudius, and +forced him to name a Dictator. Claudius retaliated by naming an obscure +person, who was compelled to abdicate, and then Atilius Calatinus was +nominated. + +[141] The dangerous nature of the S. Coast of Sicily was well known to +the pilots. See above, ch. 37. + +[142] About £500,000. For the value of the talent, taking the Euboic +and Attic talent as the same, see note on Book 34, 8. + +[143] ἱστορήσαντας. There seems no need to give this word the unusual +sense of _narratum legere_ here, as some do. + +[144] Sicca Venerea, so called from a temple of Venus, was notorious +for its licentiousness. Valer. Max. 2, 6, 15. + +[145] A line of the text appears to have been lost, probably containing +an allusion to Hiero. + +[146] The southernmost point of Italy is Leucopetra (Capo dell' Armi). +Cocinthus (Punta di Stilo) is much too far to the north; yet it may +have been regarded as the conventional point of separation between +the two seas, Sicilian and Ionian, which have no natural line of +demarcation. + +[147] Really 3/16; for 16 ases = 6 obols (one drachma or denarius) see +34, 8. The Sicilian medimnus is about a bushel and a half; the metretes +8½ gallons. + +[148] Livy, 5, 17, 33-49; Plutarch, _Camillus_, 16; Mommsen, _History +of Rome_, vol. i. p. 338 (Eng. tr.) + +[149] Compare the description of the Gauls given by Caesar, B.G. 6, +11-20. They had apparently made considerable progress in civilisation +by that time, principally perhaps from the influence of Druidism. +But the last characteristic mentioned by Polybius is also observed +by Caesar (15), _omnes in bello versantur atque eorum ut quisque +est genere copiisque amplissimus, ita plurimos circum se ambactos +clienteeque habet. Hanc unam gratiam potentiamque habent._ Even in the +time of Cato they were at least beginning to add something to their +warlike propensities. Or, 2, 2 (Jordan) _Pleraque Gallia duas res +industrissime persequitur, rem militare et argute loqui_. Cf. Diod. 5, +27 _sq._ + +[150] Lucius Caecilius, Livy, Ep. 12. + +[151] For a more complete list of Gallic invasions in this period, see +Mommsen, _H.R._ i. p. 344. The scantiness of continuous Roman history +from B.C. 390, and its total loss from 293 to the first Punic war +renders it difficult to determine exactly which of the many movements +Polybius has selected. + +[152] Ch. 13. + +[153] This clause is bracketed by Hultsch, Mommsen, and +Strachan-Davidson. See the essay of the last named in his Polybius, p. +22. Livy, Ep. 20, gives the number of Romans and Latins as 300,000. + +[154] Others read Ananes and Marseilles [’Ανάνων ... Μασσαλίας]; but it +seems impossible that the Roman march should have extended so far. + +[155] That is, each city struck its own coin, but on a common standard +of weight and value. See P. Gardner’s Introduction to Catalogue of +Greek Coins (Peloponnesus) in the British Museum, p. xxiv. + +[156] The Pythagorean clubs, beginning in combinations for the +cultivation of mystic philosophy and ascetic life, had grown to be +political,— a combination of the upper or cultivated classes to secure +political power. Thus Archytas was for many years ruler in Tarentum +(Strabo, 1, 3, 4). The earliest was at Croton, but they were also +established in many cities of Magna Graecia. Sometime in the fourth +century B.C. a general democratic rising took place against them, and +their members were driven into exile. Strabo, 8, 7, 1; Justin, 20, 4; +Iamblichus _vit. Pythag._, 240-262. + +[157] The MS. vary between ὁμάριος and ὁμόριος. The latter form seems +to mean “god of a common frontier.” But an inscription found at +Orchomenus gives the form ἀμάριος, which has been connected with ἡμάρα +“day.” + +[158] There was still an under-strategus (ὑποστρατηγὸς), see 5, 94; 23, +16; 30, 11. But he was entirely subordinate, and did not even succeed +to power on the death of a strategus during the year of office, as the +vice-president in America does. + +[159] Alexander II. of Epirus, son of Pyrrhus, whom he succeeded B.C. +272. The partition of Acarnania took place in B.C. 266. + +[160] Near Bellina, a town on the north-west frontier of Laconia, which +had long been a subject of dispute between Sparta and the Achaeans. +Plutarch _Arat._ 4; Pausan. 8, 35, 4. + +[161] Ptolemy Euergetes (B.C. 247-222). + +[162] The treaty, besides securing the surrender of the Acrocorinthus, +provided that no embassy should be sent to any other king without the +consent of Antigonus, and that the Achaeans should supply food and pay +for the Macedonian army of relief. Solemn sacrifices and games were +also established in his honour, and kept up long after his death at +Sicyon, see 28, 19; 30, 23. Plutarch, _Arat._ 45. The conduct of Aratus +in thus bringing the Macedonians into the Peloponnese has been always +attacked (see Plut. _Cleom._ 16). It is enough here to say that our +judgment as to it must depend greatly on our view of the designs and +character of Cleomenes. + +[163] Phylarchus, said by some to be a native of Athens, by others of +Naucratis, and by others again of Sicyon, wrote, among other things, +a history in twenty-eight books from the expedition of Pyrrhus into +the Peloponnese (B.C. 272) to the death of Cleomenes. He was a fervent +admirer of Cleomenes, and therefore probably wrote in a partisan +spirit; yet in the matter of the outrage upon Mantinea, Polybius +himself is not free from the same charge. See Mueller’s _Histor. +Graec._ fr. lxxvii.-lxxxi. Plutarch, though admitting Phylarchus’s +tendency to exaggeration (_Arat._ 38), yet uses his authority both in +his life of Aratus and of Cleomenes; and in the case of Aristomachus +says that he was both racked and drowned (_Arat._ 44). + +[164] ἡγεμόνα καὶ στρατηγὸν. It is not quite clear whether this is +merely a description of the ordinary office of Strategus, or whether +any special office is meant, such as that conferred on Antigonus. In +4, 11 ἡγεμόνες includes the Strategus and other officers. See Freeman, +_Federal Government_, p. 299. + +[165] Of Chaereas nothing seems known; a few fragments of an historian +of his name are given in Müller, vol. iii. Of Sosilus, Diodorus (26, +fr. 6) says that he was of Ilium and wrote a history of Hannibal in +seven books. Nepos (Hann. 13) calls him a Lacedaemonian, and says that +he lived in Hannibal’s camp and taught him Greek. + +[166] _i.e._ in Latium. + +[167] ἐπιλάβηται _injecerit manum_, the legal form of claiming a slave. + +[168] 1, 83. + +[169] Saguntum of course is south of the Iber, but the attack on it +by Hannibal was a breach of the former of the two treaties. Livy (21, +2) seems to assert that it was specially exempted from attack in the +treaty with Hasdrubal. + +[170] From ch. 21. + +[171] βασιλεύς. The two Suffetes represented the original Kings of +Carthage (6, 51). The title apparently remained for sacrificial +purposes, like the ἄρχων βασιλεύς, and the _rex sacrificulus_. +Polybius, like other Greek writers, calls them βασιλεῖς. _Infra_, 42. +Herod. 7, 165. Aristot. Pol. 2, 8. + +[172] A promontory in Bruttium, _Capo del Colonne_. + +[173] This division of the world into three parts was an advance upon +the ancient geographers, who divided it into two, combining Egypt with +Asia, and Africa with Europe. See Sall. _Jug._ 17; Lucan, _Phars._ 9, +411; Varro de L. L. 5, § 31. And note on 12, 25. + +[174] The _arae Philaenorum_ were apparently set up as boundary stones +to mark the territory of the Pentapolis or Cyrene from Egypt: and the +place retained the name long after the disappearance of the altars +(Strabo, 3, 5, 5-6). + +[175] For Polybius’s calculation as to the length of the stade, see +note on 34, 12. + +[176] Livy, 21, 25, calls it _Tannetum_, and describes it only as +_vicus Pado propinquus_. It was a few miles from Parma. + +[177] _Pluribus enim divisus amnis in mare decurrit_ (Livy, 21, 26). + +[178] See on ch. 33, note 2. + +[179] This statement has done much to ruin Polybius’s credit as a +geographer. It indicates indeed a strangely defective conception of +distance; as his idea, of the Rhone flowing always west, does of the +general lie of the country. + +[180] I have no intention of rediscussing the famous question of the +pass by which Hannibal crossed the Alps. The reader will find an +admirably clear statement of the various views entertained, and the +latest arguments advanced in favour of each, in the notes to Mr. W. T. +Arnold’s edition of Dr. Arnold’s _History of the Second Punic War_, pp. +362-373. + +[181] περί τι λευκόπετρον, which, however, perhaps only means “bare +rock,” cf. 10, 30. But see Law’s _Alps of Hannibal_, vol. i. p. 201 +_sq._ + +[182] His life according to one story, was saved by his son, the famous +Scipio Africanus (10, 3); according to another, by a Ligurian slave +(Livy, 21, 46). + +[183] Livy says “to Mago,” Hannibal’s younger brother (21, 47). This +Hasdrubal is called in ch. 93 “captain of pioneers.” + +[184] That is, four legions and their regular contingent of socii. See +6, 19 _sqq._ + +[185] “He crossed the Apennines, not by the ordinary road to Lucca, +descending the valley of the Macra, but, as it appears, by a straighter +line down the valley of the Auser or Serchio.”—ARNOLD. + +[186] The marshes between the Arno and the Apennines south of Florence. + +[187] ἀπεκοιμῶντο Schw. translates simply _dormiebant_. But the +compound means more than that; it conveys the idea of an interval of +sleep snatched from other employments. See Herod. 8, 76; Aristoph. +_Vesp._ 211. + +[188] Livy, 22, 4-6. For a discussion of the modern views as to the +scene of the battle, see W. T. Arnold’s edition of Dr. Arnold’s +_History of the Second Punic War_, pp. 384-393. The radical difference +between the account of Livy and that of Polybius seems to be that the +former conceives the fighting to have been on the north shore of the +lake between Tucro and Passignano; Polybius conceives the rear to have +been caught in the defile of Passignano, the main fighting to have +been more to the east, where the road turns up at right angles to the +lake by La Torricella. Mr. Capes, however in his note on the passage +of Livy, seems to think that both accounts agree in representing the +fighting on the vanguard as being opposite Tucro. + +[189] This treatment of non-combatants was contrary to the usages of +civilised warfare even in those days, and seems to have been the true +ground for the charge of _crudelitas_ always attributed to Hannibal by +Roman writers, as opposed to the behaviour of such an enemy as Pyrrhus +(Cic. _de Am._ 28). It may be compared to the order of the Convention +to give no quarter to English soldiers, which the French officers nobly +refused to execute. + +[190] Polybius expresses the fact accurately, for, in the absence of +a Consul to nominate a Dictator, Fabius was created by a plebiscitum; +but the scruples of the lawyers were quieted by his having the title of +_prodictator_ only (Livy, 22, 8). + +[191] Ramsay (_Roman Antiquities_, p. 148) denies this exception, +quoting Livy, 6, 16. But Polybius could hardly have been mistaken on +such a point; and there are indications (Plutarch, _Anton._ 9) that +the Tribunes did not occupy the same position as the other magistrates +towards the Dictator. + +[192] The _ager Praetutianus_ was the southern district of Picenum +(Livy, 22, 9; 27, 43). The chief town was Interamna. + +[193] On the Appian Way between Equus Tuticus and Herdonia, mod. +_Troja_. + +[194] Holsten for the Δαύνιοι of the old text; others suggest _Calatia_. + +[195] Added by conjecture of Schw. One MS. has δευτέρα ἡ ἀπὸ τοῦ +Ἐριβανοῦ. + +[196] Near Cales. + +[197] Homer, _Odyss._ 10, 230. + +[198] See i. 16. + +[199] ἐξ ἀσπίδος ἐπιπαρενέβαλλον. The ordinary word for “forming line” +or “taking dressing” is παρεμβάλλειν. In the other two passages where +ἐπιπαρεμβάλλειν is used, ἐπί has a distinct (though different) force. I +think here it must mean “against,” “so as to attack.” And this seems to +be Casaubon’s interpretation. + +[200] There is nothing here absolutely to contradict the picturesque +story of the death of Paulus given by Livy (22, 49), but the words +certainly suggest that Polybius had never heard it. + +[201] A town on the lake of Trichonis, in Aetolia, but its exact +situation is uncertain. Strabo (10, 2, 3) says that it was on a fertile +plain, which answers best to a situation north of the lake. + +[202] Cf. 9, 34. We know nothing of this incident. + +[203] See 2, 53. + +[204] The Achaean Strategus was elected in the middle of May, the +Aetolian in the autumn. Aratus would be elected May 12, B.C. 220, and +come into office some time before midsummer; Ariston’s Aetolian office +would terminate in September B.C. 220. See v. 1. + +[205] The capture of Sicyon and expulsion of the tyrant Nicocles was +the earliest exploit of Aratus, B.C. 251. Plutarch, _Arat._ 4-9. The +taking of the Acrocorinthus from the Macedonian garrison was in B.C. +243, _ib._ ch. 19-24. For the affair at Pellene see _ib._ 31. The +capture of Mantinea was immediately after a defeat by Cleomenes. See +Plutarch, _Cleom._ 5. + +[206] The city of Pheia was on the isthmus connecting the promontory +Ichthys (_Cape Katákolo_) with the mainland: opposite its harbour is +a small island which Polybius here calls _Pheias_, _i.e._ the island +belonging to Pheia. + +[207] Caphyae was on a small plain, which was subject to inundations +from the lake of Orchomenus; the ditches here mentioned appear to be +those dug to drain this district. They were in the time of Pausanias +superseded by a high dyke, from the inner side of which ran the River +Tragus (_Tara_). Pausan. 8, 23, 2. + +[208] The Olympiads being counted from the summer solstice, these +events occurring before midsummer of B.C. 220 belong to the 139th +Olympiad. The 140th begins with midsummer B.C. 220. + +[209] But outside the natural borders of Arcadia. Mod. Kalávryta. + +[210] By the diolcos which had been formed for the purpose. Strabo, 8, +2. Ships had been dragged across the Isthmus on various occasions from +early times. See Thucyd. 3, 15. + +[211] Reading, μόνου. See ch. 13. + +[212] A mountain on the frontier, on the pass over which the roads to +Tegea and Argos converge. + +[213] A town of Phthiotis in Thessaly. See Book 25, 3. + +[214] See ch. 15. + +[215] See ch. 24. + +[216] See Stobaeus Floril. 58, 9, who gives three more lines. + +[217] Cf. ch. 74. + +[218] The hero of the second Messenian war, B.C. 685-668 (Pausan. 4, +14-24). The story told by Pausanias, who also quotes these verses, is +that Aristocrates, king of the Arcadians, twice played the traitor to +Aristomenes, the Messenian champion: once at the battle of the Great +Trench, and again when Aristomenes renewed the war after his escape +from the Pits at Sparta; and that on the second occasion his own people +stoned him to death, and set up this pillar in the sacred enclosure of +Zeus on Mount Lycaeus. + +[219] But Pausanias represents the pillar as put up by the Arcadians, +not the Messenians (4, 22, 7). + +[220] The text is uncertain here. + +[221] Reading with Hultsch, τὰ καλὰ. + +[222] However cogent may be the reasons for his prophecy adduced by +Polybius, there are no signs of its being fulfilled. Indeed, the bank +at the mouth of the Danube, which he mentions, has long disappeared. +The fact seems to be that he failed to take into calculation the +constant rush of water out of the Euxine, which is sufficient to carry +off any amount of alluvial deposit. + +[223] Xenophon, _Hellen._ 1, 1, 22. + +[224] Or Tylis, according to Stephanos Byz., who says it was near the +Haemus. Perhaps the modern Kilios. + +[225] Seleucus II. (Callinicus), B.C. 246-226. Seleucus III. +(Ceraunus), B.C. 226-223. Antiochus the Great (son of Callinicus), B.C. +223-187. + +[226] Of Seleucus Callinicus. + +[227] That this was the name of a yearly officer at Byzantium appears +from a decree in Demosthenes (_de Cor._ § 90), and Byzantine coins, +Eckhel, ii. p. 31. The title seems to have been brought from the +mother-city Megara; as at Chalcedon, another colony of Megara, the same +existed (C. I. G. 3794). It was connected with the worship of Apollo +brought from Megara, Müller’s _Dorians_, i. p. 250. It seems that this +use of the name (generally employed of the deputies to the Amphictyonic +council) was peculiarly Dorian. See Boeckh. C. I., vol. i. p. 610. + +[228] Or Lyctos (Steph. Byz.) + +[229] Of Arcadia, a city of Crete (Steph. Byz.) + +[230] Which had a harbour formed by a projecting headland called +Lisses. Steph. Byz., who quotes Homer, _Odyss._ 3, 293: + + ἔστι δέ τις Λισσὴς αἰπεῖά τε εἰς ἅλα πέτρη. + +[231] As a measure of weight a talent = about 57 lbs. avoirdupois. The +prepared hair was for making ropes and bowstrings apparently. + +[232] Gortyna or Gortys is an emendation of Reiske for Gorgus, which is +not known. Gortys is mentioned by Pausanias, 5, 7, 1; 8, 27, 4; 8, 28, +1; it was on the river Bouphagus, and in the time of Pausanias was a +mere village. + +[233] See 2, 41. We have no hint, as far as I know, of the +circumstances under which such recovery would take place. We may +conjecture from this passage that it would be on showing that losses +had been sustained by reason of a failure of the league to give +protection. + +[234] Stephanos describes Ambracus as a πολιχνίον close to Ambracia. + +[235] Though it was in the territory of Acarnania (Steph. Byz.) + +[236] 3, 19. + +[237] The position of Dodona, long a subject of doubt, was settled by +the discovery of the numerous inscriptions found about seven miles from +Jannina, and published by Constantine Caraponos in 1878, _Dodon et ses +Ruines_. See also _Journal of Hellenic Studies_, vol. i. p. 228. + +[238] See ch. 68. + +[239] Reading ἁλίαν. See Müller’s _Dorians_, vol. II, p. 88. + +[240] The local name of Tarentine, though doubtless originating in +fact, had come to indicate a species of mercenary cavalry armed in a +particular way. Arrian, _Tact._ 4, distinguishes two sorts of light +cavalry for skirmishing Tarentines armed with javelins (δορατία), and +horse archers (ἱπποτοξόται). Cp, 11, 12. Livy 35, 29; 37, 40. + +[241] Pausanias (8, 26, 7) calls him Hypatodorus; and mentions another +work of his at Delphi (10, 10, 3). He flourished about B.C. 370. He +was a native of Thebes. Sostratos was a Chian, and father of another +statuary named Pantias. Paus. 6, 9, 3. + +[242] That is the office of the Polemarch, as in Athens the Strategium +(στρατηγίον) is the office of the Strategi. Plutarch, _Nicias_, 5. + +[243] Yet the avowed project of Cleomenes was the restoration of the +ancient constitution. Plutarch, _Cleom._ c. 10. + +[244] See ch. 59. + +[245] From 4, 6, it appears that the election took place at the rising +of the Pleiades (13th May) and that the new Strategus did not enter +upon his office until some time afterwards, towards the middle of June +or even midsummer. But the custom apparently varied, and the use of +τότε seems to indicate a change. + +[246] Later on the assemblies were held at the different cities in +turn. See 23, 17; 24, 10, etc. + +[247] Νεοκρῆτες, cf. cc. 65, 79. Livy (37, 40) transcribes the word +_Neocretes_. It is uncertain what the exact meaning of the word is. It +seems most reasonable to suppose that, like Tarentini, it had ceased +to be an ethnical term, and meant mercenary soldiers (νέοι) armed like +Cretans, that is, as archers. + +[248] The narrow channel between Leucas and the mainland, which had +been artificially enlarged. Dionys Halic. 1, 50. + +[249] 4, 63. + +[250] 4, 62. + +[251] 4, 67. + +[252] The pun disappears in translation. The line is + + ὁρᾷς τὸ +δῖον+ οὗ βέλος δίεπτατο. + +[253] Games in his honour were celebrated at Sicyon. See Plutarch, +_Arat._ 45. _Cleomenes_, 16. _Supra_, p. 147 n. _Infra_, 28, 19; 30, 23. + +[254] A memorial, apparently, of the fruitless expedition of Pyrrhus +into Laconia in B.C. 272. + +[255] The Guard. The word _agema_ properly means the leading corps in +an army; but it obtained this technical meaning in the Macedonian army +(see Arrian, 1, 1, 11), whence it was used in other armies also founded +on the Macedonian model, as for instance in Alexandria (see _infra_, +ch. 65). + +[256] Hypaspists, originally a bodyguard to the king, had been extended +in number and formed one or more distinct corps of light infantry +(Grote, ch. 92). + +[257] Here again, as in 5, 1, the outgoing Strategus appears to go out +of office at the time of the election of his successor (see note on ch. +1, and cp. 4, 6). There seems to have been some variety of practice. +Perhaps the interval was left somewhat to mutual arrangement, the +summer solstice being the outside limit. + +[258] See 2, 69. + +[259] Archidamus was the brother of Agis, the king of the other line, +who had been assassinated in B.C. 240. Plutarch, _Cleom._ 5, probably +on the authority of Phylarchus, represents the murder of Archidamus as +not the work of Cleomenes, but of the same party that had murdered Agis +and feared the vengeance of his brother. (See Thirlwall, 8, p. 158, who +agrees with Plutarch.) + +[260] Homer, _Il._, 22, 304. + +[261] The false Smerdis (Herod. 3, 61-82). + +[262] Hence the sacred breed of Nisaean horses, used for the Persian +king’s chariot (Herod 7, 40; 9, 20). The Nisaean plain was one of those +in Media containing the best pasture, and is identified by Rawlinson +with that of _Khawar_ and _Alistan_ near _Behistun_. + +[263] ἕταιροι are cavalry; the πεζέταιροι of the Macedonian army are +represented in Polybius by the Hypaspists. See _supra_, ch. 27, cp. 16, +18. + +[264] That is, Demetrius II. and Antigonus Doson. + +[265] See Professor Mahaffy, _Greek Life and Thought_, p. 405, who +points out that this refers to the Egyptian troops especially, whose +old military castes (see Herod. 2, 164-6) though not extinct had +forgotten their old skill. In a sense, however, it applies to both +kinds of troops; for they had to be trained to act _together_, as is +shown in the next chapter. + +[266] See above, ch. 5 note. + +[267] Two different towns of this name have already been mentioned (ch. +48, 52). This Dura appears to be in Phoenicia; but nothing is known of +it. + +[268] Seleucus I., B.C. 306-280. Antigonus, the One-eyed, in B.C. 318, +occupied Coele-Syria and Phoenicia after a victory over Perdiccas. +Diodor. Sic. 18, 43. + +[269] Battle of Ipsus, B.C. 301. + +[270] See _ante_, ch. 40-2, 57-8. + +[271] Antiochus Hierax, son of Antiochus II. + +[272] Laodice was the sister of the wife of Antiochus (5, 43) and a +daughter of King Mithridates (8, 22-23). + +[273] Selge was said to be a colony of the Lacedaemonians. Strabo 13, +7, 3. + +[274] Called Barathra. See Strabo, 17, 1, 21. + +[275] Agema. See note on 5, 25. + +[276] Sarissae, the long Macedonian spears. + +[277] Polybius therefore reckons the value of the λέβητες and ὑδρίαι as +five talents. + +[278] That is about 171,000 lbs., see 34, 8, note, reckoning the talent +as = 57 lbs. + +[279] ἀρτάβη, an Egyptian measure = the Attic medimnus. + +[280] Callinicus, ob. B.C. 226. This must refer to another case. + +[281] See _ante_, ch. 30. Agetas had been elected Aetolian Strategus in +the autumn of 218 B.C., Aratus Achaean Strategus in the early summer of +B.C. 217. + +[282] See 2, 61-4. B.C. 222. + +[283] See 2, 39. + +[284] See _supra_, ch. 24. + +[285] According to Suidas, these were light vessels used by pirates: +but whether the name arose from their construction, capacity, or the +number of their oars, seems uncertain. According to Hesychius they had +two banks of oars (δίκροτος ναῦς· πλοῖον μικρόν). + +[286] See ch. 95. + +[287] This language is so vague that we might suppose from it that +the Achaeans elected Timoxenus in the summer of B.C. 217 to come +into office in the following spring. But there is nowhere else any +indication of such an interval at this period, and we must suppose +Polybius to be speaking in general terms of the result of the peace +during the next ten months. Agelaus was elected Aetolian Strategus in +the autumn of B.C. 217. + +[288] Euripides, fr. 529. Ed. Nauck. + +[289] Some disconnected fragments which are usually placed at the end +of the first chapter, and form the second chapter of this book, I have +placed among the minor fragments at the end of these volumes. + +[290] Aristotle’s classification is kingship, aristocracy, πολιτεία, +democracy, oligarchy, tyranny (Pol. 4, 2). This was derived from Plato +(Pol. 302, c.) who arranges the six (besides the ideal polity) in +pairs, kingship, tyranny,—aristocracy, oligarchy,—democracy, good and +bad. Plato has no distinct name except δημοκρατία παράνομος, for the +bad democracy which Polybius calls ὀχλοκρατία, “mob-rule.” Polybius’s +arrangement is this— + + Kingship (arising from a natural despotism or monarchy) + degenerates into Tyranny. + + Aristocracy degenerates into Oligarchy. + + Democracy degenerates into Mob-rule. + +[291] εὐθύνας. Polybius uses a word well known at Athens and other +Greek states, but the audit of a Consul seems to have been one of money +accounts only. At the expiration, however, of his office he took an +oath in public that he had obeyed the laws, and if any prosecution were +brought against him it would be tried before the people. See the case +of Publius Claudius, 1, 52. + +[292] This refers primarily to the _consilium_ of the _quaesitor_ in +any special _quaestio_, which up to the time of the lex judiciaria of +Gracchus, B.C. 122, was invariably composed of Senators. The same would +apply to the _Quaestiones perpetuae_, only one of which existed in the +time of Polybius, i.e., _de repetundis_, established in 149 B.C. by the +lex Calpurnia. Other single judices in civil suits, though nominated by +the Praetor, were, Polybius intimates, almost necessarily Senators in +cases of importance. + +[293] Casaubon altered this to “two hundred.” In 3, 107, Polybius +certainly states that the ordinary number of cavalry was 200, raised +in cases of emergency to 300, and Livy, 22, 36, gives an instance. But +both authors in many other passages mention 300 as the usual number, +and any alteration of this passage would be unsafe. + +[294] _Praefectus sociis_ and _quaestor_. But this quaestor must be +distinguished from the Roman quaestors. + +[295] For the Spanish sword see Fr. xxii. + +[296] Polybius does not mention the subdivision of maniples into +centuries, for which the word ordines is sometimes used. Livy, 8, 8; +42, 34. + +[297] The plethrum = 10,000 square feet. The side of the square of the +Praetorium, therefore, is 200 feet. + +[298] That is the _via_ separating it from the next block, or from the +vallum. + +[299] That is, one between the two legions, and two between the blocks +in each. + +[300] That is to say—without the _extraordinarii_ (⅕)—there are 2400 to +get into 10 spaces instead of 3000 into 30. + +[301] That is, who have been selected from the pedites sociorum to +serve on the praetoria cohors. + +[302] Polybius always calls this the χάραξ or χαράκωμα. But the Romans +had two words, _agger_ the embankment, and _vallum_ the palisading on +the top of it. Either word, however, is often used to represent the +whole structure. + +[303] That is, whether in first, second, or other watch in the night. + +[304] See the story of Cato’s son, Plutarch, _Cato Maj._ 20. + +[305] In seeking a constitution to compare with that of Rome, that of +Athens is rejected (1) as not being a mixed one, (2) as not having been +successful: successful, that is, in gaining or keeping an empire. He is +speaking somewhat loosely. The power of Athens, of which Themistocles +laid the foundation, was mainly consolidated by Pericles; so that +Polybius includes much of the period of her rise with that of her +decline. + +[306] For what remains of the account of Ephorus see Strabo, 10, 4, +8-9. The reference to Plato is to the “Laws,” especially Book I. +See also Aristotle, _Pol._ 2, 10, who points out the likeness and +unlikeness between the Cretan and Lacedaemonian constitutions. + +[307] This equality of land had gradually disappeared by the time of +King Agis IV. (B.C. 243-239): so that, according to Plutarch [_Agis_ +5], the number of landowners was reduced to 100. This process had been +accelerated by the Rhetra of Epitadeus, allowing free bequest of land, +Plutarch, _ib._ See Thirlwall, vol. viii. p. 132. + +[308] The meaning of νενεμημένους, which I here represent by “acquired +a recognised position,” is at least doubtful. Casaubon translates it +_qui in album non fuerint recepti_, referring to Sueton. Nero, 21. But +nothing is elsewhere known of such an _album_ for registering the names +of recognised athletes. The passage is important as helping to explain +how the number of those entering for the contests in the greater games +was practically limited, and therefore how it happened that, for +instance, the five contests of the Pentathlum did not often fall to +different athletes so as to leave the victory uncertain. + +[309] The Carthaginian Suffetes are always called βασιλεῖς by the +Greek writers: see 3, 33, note; Herod. 7, 165; Diod. Sic. 14, 53. +Aristotle [_Pol._ 2, 11], in contrasting the Spartan and Carthaginian +constitutions, mentions with approval that, unlike the Spartan kings, +those at Carthage were elected, and were not confined to a particular +family. + +[310] See Bosworth Smith, _Carthage and the Carthaginians_, p. 26 ff. + +[311] This seems to be the only authority for assigning to the censors +the _toga purpurea_ instead of the _toga praetexta_: and, indeed, +Athenaeus speaks of them as wearing the toga praetexta περιπόρφυρος, +14, 69. In Livy, 40, 45, they occupy _sellae curules_. + +[312] Livy (2, 10) makes Cocles succeed in reaching the bank alive. + +[313] But Polybius afterwards admits that a falling off in this respect +had begun. See 18, 35; 32, 11. + +[314] Livy, 22, 58-61. + +[315] κακοὶ κακῶς, a phrase at once insulting and vulgar. + +[316] Plutarch, _Aratus_, ch. 48. + +[317] βαλανάγρας. The βαλανάγρα was a straight piece of wood with +upright pins corresponding with those that fall into the bolt (the +βάλανοι), and which are pushed up by it. It was thus used as a key +which could be taken out and kept by the Commandant, as in Herod. 3, +155; Thucyd. 2, 4. But Polybius here seems to use it as equivalent to +βάλανος. See Aeneas, _Tact._ 18-20, who recommends that the μόχλος +should be sheeted with iron to prevent this very operation. Cp. 4, 57. +What he means by ζύγωμα on the outside (here translated “fastenings”) +is also somewhat doubtful. From Hesychius, s.v. ἐπιξευκτήρ, it might be +conjectured that chains of some kind were intended. Casaubon supposed +it to be a cross bar similar to the μόχλος inside, and Schw. to +represent the posts and the lintel connecting them. + +[318] See 5, 37. According to Phylarchus the murder of Archidamus was +against the wish of Cleomenes. Plut. _Cleom._ 5. + +[319] To which proceedings may be referred a sentence of Polybius +preserved by Suidas, s.v. διεσκευασμένην—“They send out certain +Cretans, as though on a raid, giving them a sham despatch to carry.” +See Livy, 24, 30-31. + +[320] Cp. 1, 35. + +[321] σκορπίδια, mentioned among a number of similar engines in 1 +Macc. 6, 51. Plutarch calls them σκορπίοι, and explains that they only +carried a short distance, but, being concealed, gave wounds at close +quarters; hence, doubtless, their name. + +[322] See also Athenaeus, 4, 166-167. Theopompus of Chius was a +contemporary of Philip II. and Alexander, having been born about B.C. +376-372. + +[323] The accusation of administering slow poisons is a very common +one, as readers of mediæval history know. But the ignorance of the +conditions of health was too great to allow us to accept them without +question. It is doubtful whether drugs, acting in this particular way, +were known to the ancients; and certainly spitting blood would be no +conclusive evidence of the presence of poison. See Creighton’s _History +of the Papacy_, vol. iv. Append. + +[324] This fragment is supposed, by comparison with Livy, 25, 36, to +belong to the account of the fall of Gnaeus Cornelius Scipio in Spain, +B.C. 212. + +[325] Or “legion,” according to others. But as both Consuls are engaged +in the business, it seems reasonable to refer it to the two consular +armies of two legions each. + +[326] That is “blaming Fortune or Providence.” Schw. quotes Xenophon +_Hellen._ 7, 5, 12, ἔξεστι μὲν τὸ θεῖον αἰτιᾶσθαι. + +[327] συμπέμψαι, a difficult word. See Strachan-Davidson’s note. It +seems to me to be opposed to φυγεῖν or some such idea. Hannibal was +not in flight, but kept the enemy with him, as it were, in a kind of +procession, until the moment for striking. + +[328] There is some word wanting in the text here which has been +variously supplied. I have ventured to conjecture =τὰ γὰρ δοκοῦντα= +παράβολον κ.τ.λ., and to translate accordingly: for it is the boldness +and apparent rashness of Hannibal’s movement that Polybius seems to +wish to commend. + +[329] Cp. Homer, _Odyss._ 19, 471. + +[330] Livy, 25, 40, calls him Mutines. + +[331] See 3, 86, note. Cp. Cicero de Am. § 8, cum duobus ducibus de +imperio in Italia decertatum est, Pyrrho et Annibale. Ab altero propter +probitatem ejus non nimis alien os animos habemus; alterum _propter +crudelitatem semper haec civitas oderit_. + +[332] The paragraph “For the Aetolians ... in Greece,” follows “the +Messenians” in ch. 30, in the Greek texts. But it is evidently out of +place there, and falls naturally into this position. + +[333] Antigonus Doson. + +[334] B.C. 211. See Livy, 26, 24-26. + +[335] On the margin of one MS. is written “For such is the +characteristic always maintained by the Athenian State.” But its +relevancy is not very apparent; and at any rate it seems more likely to +be a comment of the Epitomator, than a sentence from Polybius. + +[336] Scopas (B.C. 211-210) must have gone out of office, _i.e._ it was +after autumn of 210 B.C. + +[337] That is, 10s. 3¾d. for about a bushel and a half. See on 2, 15. + + +_Printed by_ R. & R. CLARK, _Edinburgh_ + + + + + +End of the Project Gutenberg EBook of The Histories of Polybius, Vol. I (of +2), by Polybius + +*** END OF THE PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK 44125 *** |