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diff --git a/43680.txt b/43680.txt deleted file mode 100644 index 9b102d5..0000000 --- a/43680.txt +++ /dev/null @@ -1,14871 +0,0 @@ -The Project Gutenberg eBook, The Russian Turmoil, by Anton Ivanovich -Denikin - - -This eBook is for the use of anyone anywhere at no cost and with -almost no restrictions whatsoever. You may copy it, give it away or -re-use it under the terms of the Project Gutenberg License included -with this eBook or online at www.gutenberg.org - - - - - -Title: The Russian Turmoil - Memoirs: Military, Social, and Political - - -Author: Anton Ivanovich Denikin - - - -Release Date: September 9, 2013 [eBook #43680] - -Language: English - -Character set encoding: ISO-646-US (US-ASCII) - - -***START OF THE PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK THE RUSSIAN TURMOIL*** - - -E-text prepared by Charlene Taylor, Paul Clark, and the Online Distributed -Proofreading Team (http://www.pgdp.net) from page images generously made -available by Internet Archive/Canadian Libraries -(http://archive.org/details/toronto) - - - -Note: Project Gutenberg also has an HTML version of this - file which includes the original illustrations and maps. - See 43680-h.htm or 43680-h.zip: - (http://www.gutenberg.org/files/43680/43680-h/43680-h.htm) - or - (http://www.gutenberg.org/files/43680/43680-h.zip) - - - Images of the original pages are available through - Internet Archive/Canadian Libraries. See - http://archive.org/details/russianturmoilme00deniuoft - - -Transcriber's Note: - - Text enclosed by underscores is in italics (_italics_). - - - - - -THE RUSSIAN TURMOIL - - -[Illustration: The Stavka Quartermaster-General's Branch. Standing on -the pathway, from left to right (centre): Generals Denikin (Chief of -Staff), Alexeiev (Supreme C.-in-C.), Josephovitch and Markov (first and -second Quartermasters-General).] - - -THE RUSSIAN TURMOIL - -Memoirs: Military, Social, and Political - -by - -GENERAL A. I. DENIKIN - -With 27 Illustrations, Diagrams and Maps - - - - - - - -London: Hutchinson & Co. -Paternoster Row - - - - -CONTENTS - - - PAGE - - FOREWORD 11 - - CHAPTER I. - - THE FOUNDATIONS OF THE OLD POWER: FAITH, THE CZAR, AND THE - MOTHER COUNTRY 13 - - CHAPTER II. - - THE ARMY 23 - - CHAPTER III. - - THE OLD ARMY AND THE EMPEROR 33 - - CHAPTER IV. - - THE REVOLUTION IN PETROGRAD 40 - - CHAPTER V. - - THE REVOLUTION AND THE IMPERIAL FAMILY 48 - - CHAPTER VI. - - THE REVOLUTION AND THE ARMY 57 - - CHAPTER VII. - - IMPRESSIONS OF PETROGRAD AT THE END OF MARCH, 1917 66 - - CHAPTER VIII. - - THE STAVKA: ITS ROLE AND POSITION 72 - - CHAPTER IX. - - GENERAL MARKOV 79 - - CHAPTER X. - - THE POWER--THE DUMA--THE PROVISIONAL GOVERNMENT--THE HIGH - COMMAND--THE SOVIET OF WORKMEN'S AND SOLDIERS' DELEGATES 84 - - CHAPTER XI. - - THE BOLSHEVIK STRUGGLE FOR POWER--THE POWER OF THE ARMY AND - THE IDEA OF A DICTATORSHIP 96 - - CHAPTER XII. - - THE ACTIVITIES OF THE PROVISIONAL GOVERNMENT--INTERNAL POLITICS, - CIVIL ADMINISTRATION--THE TOWN, THE VILLAGE, AND THE AGRARIAN - PROBLEM 106 - - CHAPTER XIII. - - THE ACTIVITIES OF THE PROVISIONAL GOVERNMENT: FOOD SUPPLIES, - INDUSTRY, TRANSPORT, AND FINANCE 116 - - CHAPTER XIV. - - THE STRATEGICAL POSITION OF THE RUSSIAN FRONT 127 - - CHAPTER XV. - - THE QUESTION OF THE ADVANCE OF THE RUSSIAN ARMY 138 - - CHAPTER XVI. - - MILITARY REFORMS--THE GENERALS--THE DISMISSAL FROM THE HIGH - COMMAND 146 - - CHAPTER XVII. - - "DEMOCRATISATION OF THE ARMY"--ADMINISTRATION, SERVICE AND - ROUTINE 153 - - CHAPTER XVIII. - - THE DECLARATION OF THE RIGHTS OF THE SOLDIER AND COMMITTEES 159 - - CHAPTER XIX. - - THE DEMOCRATISATION OF THE ARMY: THE COMMISSARS 168 - - CHAPTER XX. - - THE DEMOCRATISATION OF THE ARMY--THE STORY OF "THE DECLARATION - OF THE RIGHTS OF THE SOLDIER" 174 - - CHAPTER XXI. - - THE PRESS AND PROPAGANDA 189 - - CHAPTER XXII. - - THE CONDITION OF THE ARMY AT THE JULY ADVANCE 209 - - CHAPTER XXIII. - - OFFICERS' ORGANISATIONS 229 - - CHAPTER XXIV. - - THE REVOLUTION AND THE COSSACKS 239 - - CHAPTER XXV. - - NATIONAL UNITS 248 - - CHAPTER XXVI. - - MAY AND THE BEGINNING OF JUNE IN THE SPHERE OF MILITARY - ADMINISTRATION--THE RESIGNATION OF GUTCHKOV AND GENERAL - ALEXEIEV--MY DEPARTURE FROM THE STAVKA--THE ADMINISTRATION - OF KERENSKY AND GENERAL BRUSSILOV 255 - - CHAPTER XXVII. - - MY TERM AS COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF ON THE WESTERN RUSSIAN FRONT 264 - - CHAPTER XXVIII. - - THE RUSSIAN ADVANCE IN THE SUMMER OF 1917--THE DEBACLE 271 - - CHAPTER XXIX. - - THE CONFERENCE AT THE STAVKA OF MINISTERS AND COMMANDERS-IN-CHIEF - ON JULY 16TH 281 - - CHAPTER XXX. - - GENERAL KORNILOV 297 - - CHAPTER XXXI. - - MY SERVICE AS COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF OF THE SOUTH-WESTERN FRONT--THE - MOSCOW CONFERENCE--THE FALL OF RIGA 308 - - CHAPTER XXXII. - - GENERAL KORNILOV'S MOVEMENT AND ITS REPERCUSSION ON THE - SOUTH-WEST FRONT 318 - - CHAPTER XXXIII. - - IN BERDICHEV GAOL--THE TRANSFER OF THE "BERDICHEV GROUP" OF - PRISONERS TO BYKHOV 329 - - CHAPTER XXXIV. - - SOME CONCLUSIONS AS TO THE FIRST PERIOD OF THE REVOLUTION 338 - - -[Illustration: The old banner] - -[Illustration: And the new.] - - - - -LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS - - - THE STAVKA QUARTERMASTER-GENERAL'S BRANCH _Frontispiece_ - - THE OLD BANNER AND THE NEW Facing page 8 - - THE GRAND DUKE NICHOLAS DISTRIBUTES CROSSES OF ST. - GEORGE " " 14 - - FUNERAL OF THE FIRST VICTIMS OF THE MARCH REVOLUTION - IN PETROGRAD " " 44 - - GENERAL ALEXEIEV " " 72 - - GENERAL KORNILOV " " 72 - - GENERAL MARKOV " " 78 - - FOREIGN MILITARY REPRESENTATIVES AT THE STAVKA " " 144 - - THE CONFERENCE OF COMMANDERS-IN-CHIEF " " 166 - - A GROUP OF "PRISONERS" AT BERDICHEV " " 166 - - THE OLD ARMY: A REVIEW. GENERAL IVANOV " " 192 - - THE REVOLUTIONARY ARMY: A REVIEW. KERENSKY " " 192 - - BEFORE THE BATTLE IN THE REVOLUTIONARY ARMY: A MEETING " " 200 - - TYPES OF MEN IN THE REVOLUTIONARY ARMY " " 200 - - BEFORE THE BATTLE IN THE OLD ARMY: PRAYERS " " 208 - - TYPES OF SOLDIERS OF THE OLD ARMY " " 210 - - GENERAL ALEXEIEV'S FAREWELL " " 254 - - KERENSKY ADDRESSING SOLDIERS' MEETING " " 262 - - GENERAL KORNILOV'S ARRIVAL AT PETROGRAD " " 280 - - GENERAL KORNILOV IN THE TRENCHES " " 280 - - GENERAL KORNILOV'S WELCOME IN MOSCOW " " 316 - - - - -LIST OF DIAGRAMS AND MAPS - - - PAGE - - 1. DIAGRAM OF THE COMPARATIVE FORCES OF THE GERMANS IN - DIFFERENT THEATRES OF WAR 32 - - 2. DIAGRAM INDICATING THE POLITICAL PARTY DIVISIONS IN RUSSIA - AFTER THE REVOLUTION 90 - - 3. MAP OF THE RUSSIAN EUROPEAN FRONT IN 1917 130 - - 4. MAP OF THE RUSSIAN CAUCASIAN FRONT IN 1917 131 - - 5. MAP OF THE RUSSIAN FRONT IN JUNE AND JULY, 1917 298 - - 6. MAP OF THE RUSSIAN FRONT TILL AUGUST 19TH AND AFTER 299 - - - - -FOREWORD - - -In the midst of the turmoil and bloodshed in Russia people perish and -the real outlines of historical events are obliterated. It is for this -reason that I have decided to publish these memoirs, in spite of the -difficulties of work in my present condition of a refugee, unable to -refer to any archives or documents and deprived of the possibility of -discussing events with those who have taken part in them. - -The first part of my book deals chiefly with the Russian Army, with -which my life has been closely linked up. Political, social and -economic questions are discussed only in so far as I have found it -necessary to describe their influence upon the course of events. - -In 1917 the Army played a decisive part in the fate of Russia. Its -participation in the progress of the Revolution, its life, degradation -and collapse should serve as a great warning and a lesson to the new -builders of Russian life. This applies not only to the struggle against -the present tyrants. When Bolshevism is defeated, the Russian people -will have to undertake the tremendous task of reviving its moral and -material forces, as well as that of preserving its sovereign existence. -Never in history has this task been as arduous as it is now, because -there are many outside Russia's borders waiting eagerly for her end. -They are waiting in vain. The Russian people will rise in strength -and wisdom from the deathbed of blood, horror and poverty, moral and -physical. - - - - -The Russian Turmoil - - - - -CHAPTER I. - -THE FOUNDATIONS OF THE OLD POWER: FAITH, THE CZAR AND THE MOTHER -COUNTRY. - - -The inevitable historical process which culminated in the Revolution -of March, 1917, has resulted in the collapse of the Russian State. -Philosophers, historians and sociologists, in studying the course -of Russian life, may have foreseen the impending catastrophe. But -nobody could foresee that the people, rising like a tidal wave, -would so rapidly and so easily sweep away all the foundations of -their existence: the Supreme Power and the Governing classes which -disappeared without a struggle; the intelligencia, gifted but weak, -isolated and lacking will-power, which at first, in the midst of a -deadly struggle, had only words as a weapon, later submissively bent -their necks under the knife of the victors; and last, but not least, an -army of ten million, powerful and imbued with historic traditions. That -army was destroyed in three or four months. - -This last event--the collapse of the army--was not, however, quite -unexpected, as the epilogue of the Manchurian war and the subsequent -events in Moscow, Kronstadt and Sevastopol were a terrible warning. -At the end of November, 1905, I lived for a fortnight in Harbin, and -travelled on the Siberian Railway for thirty-one days in December, -1907, through a series of "republics" from Harbin to Petrograd. I thus -gained a clear indication of what might be expected from a licentious -mob of soldiers utterly devoid of restraining principles. All the -meetings, resolutions, soviets--in a word, all the manifestations of -a mutiny of the military--were repeated in 1917 with photographic -accuracy, but with greater impetus and on a much larger scale. - -It should be noted that the possibility of such a rapid psychological -transformation was not characteristic of the Russian Army alone. There -can be no doubt that war-weariness after three years of bloodshed -played an important part in these events, as the armies of the whole -world were affected by it and were rendered more accessible to the -disintegrating influences of extreme Socialist doctrines. In the -autumn of 1918 the German Army Corps that occupied the region of the -Don and Little Russia were demoralised in one week, and they repeated -to a certain extent the process which we had already lived through of -meetings, soviets, committees, of doing away with Commanding Officers, -and in some units of the sale of military stores, horses and arms. -It was not till then that the Germans understood the tragedy of -the Russian officers. More than once our volunteers saw the German -officers, formerly so haughty and so frigid, weeping bitterly over -their degradation. - -"You have done the same to us; you have done it with your own hands," -we said. - -"Not we; it was our Government," was their reply. - -In the winter of 1918, as Commander-in-Chief of the Volunteer Army, I -received an offer from a group of German officers to join our army as -volunteers in the ranks. - -The collapse of the army cannot be explained away as the psychological -result of defeats and disasters. Even the victors experienced -disturbances in the army. There was a certain amount of disaffection -among the French troops occupying, in the beginning of 1918, the -region of Odessa and Roumania, in the French fleet cruising in the -Black Sea, among the British troops in the region of Constantinople -and Transcaucasia. The troops did not always obey the orders of their -Commanding Officers. Rapid demobilisation and the arrival of fresh, -partly volunteer elements, altered the situation. - -[Illustration: The Grand Duke Nicholas distributes Crosses of St. -George.] - -What was the condition of the Russian Army at the outbreak of the -Revolution? From time immemorial the entire ideology of our soldiers -was contained in the well-known formula: "For God, for the Czar and -for the Mother Country." Generation after generation was born and bred -on that formula. These ideas, however, did not penetrate deeply enough -into the masses of the people and of the army. For many centuries -the Russian people had been deeply religious, but their faith was -somewhat shaken in the beginning of the Twentieth Century. The Russian -people, as the Russian saying goes, was "the bearer of Christ"--a -people inwardly disposed towards Universal Brotherhood, great in its -simplicity, truthfulness, humility and forgiveness. That people, -Christian in the fullest sense of the word, was gradually changing as -it came under the influence of material interests, and learnt or was -taught to see in the gratifying of those interests the sole purpose -of life. The link between the people and its spiritual leaders was -gradually weakening as these leaders were detached from the people, -entered into the service of the Governing powers, and shared the -latter's deficiencies. The development of this moral transformation -of the Russian people is too deep and too complex to fall within the -scope of these memoirs. It is undeniable that the youngsters who -joined the ranks treated questions of the Faith and of the Church with -indifference. In barracks they lost the habits of their homes, and -were forcibly removed from a more wholesome and settled atmosphere, -with all its creeds and superstitions. They received no spiritual or -moral education, which in barracks was considered a matter of minor -importance, completely overshadowed by practical and material cares -and requirements. A proper spirit could not be created in barracks, -where Christian morals, religious discourses, and even the rites of -the Church bore an official and sometimes even compulsory character. -Commanding Officers know how difficult it was to find a solution of the -vexed question of attendance at Church services. - -War introduced two new elements into the spiritual life of the army. On -the one hand, there was a certain moral coarseness and cruelty; on the -other, it seemed as if faith had been deepened by constant danger. I do -not wish to accuse the orthodox military clergy as a body. Many of its -representatives proved their high valour, courage and self-sacrifice. -It must, however, be admitted that the clergy failed to produce a -religious revival among the troops. It is not their fault, because the -world-war into which Russia was drawn was due to intricate political -and economic causes, and there was no room for religious fervour. -The clergy, however, likewise failed to establish closer connection -with the troops. After the outbreak of the Revolution the officers -continued for a long time to struggle to keep their waning power and -authority, but the voice of the priests was silenced almost at once, -and they ceased to play any part whatsoever in the life of the troops. -I recall an episode typical of the mental attitude of military circles -in those days. One of the regiments of the Fourth Rifle Division had -built a camp Church quite close to its lines, and had built it with -great care and very artistically. The Revolution came. A demagogue -captain decided that his company had inadequate quarters and that a -Church was a superstition. On his own authority he converted the Church -into quarters for his company, and dug a hole where the altar stood -for purposes which it is better not to mention. I am not surprised -that such a scoundrel was found in the regiment or that the Higher -Command was terrorised and silent. But why did two or three thousand -orthodox Russians, bred in the mystic rites of their faith, remain -indifferent to such a sacrilege? Be that as it may, there can hardly be -any doubt that religion ceased to be one of the moral impulses which -upheld the spirit of the Russian Army and prompted it to deeds of -valour or protected it later from the development of bestial instincts. -The orthodox clergy, generally speaking, was thrown overboard -during the storm. Some of the high dignitaries of the Church--the -Metropolitans--Pitirim and Makarius--the Archbishop Varnava and others, -unfortunately were closely connected with the Governing bureaucracy -of the Rasputin period of Petrograd history. The lower grades of -the clergy, on the other hand, were in close touch with the Russian -intellectuals. - -I cannot take it upon myself to judge of the extent to which the -Russian Church remained an active force after it came under the yoke of -the Bolsheviks. An impenetrable veil hangs over the life of the Russian -Church in Soviet Russia, but there can be no doubt that spiritual -renaissance is progressing and spreading, that the martyrdom of -hundreds, nay, thousands, of priests is waking the dormant conscience -of the people and is becoming a legend in their minds. - - -THE CZAR. - -It is hardly necessary to prove that the enormous majority of the -Commanding Officers were thoroughly loyal to the Monarchist idea and -to the Czar himself. The subsequent behaviour of the higher Commanding -Officers who had been Monarchists was due partly to motives of -self-seeking, partly to pusillanimity and to the desire to conceal -their real feelings in order to remain in power and to carry out their -own plans. Cases in which a change of front was the result of the -collapse of ideals, of a new outlook, or was prompted by motives of -practical statesmanship, were rare. For example, it would have been -childish to have believed General Brussilov when he asserted that from -the days of his youth he had been "a Socialist and a Republican." He -was bred in the traditions of the Old Guards, was closely connected -with circles of the Court, and permeated with their outlook. His -habits, tastes, sympathies and surroundings were those of a _barin_.[1] -No man can be a lifelong liar to himself and to others. The majority -of the officers of the Regular Russian Army had Monarchist principles -and were undoubtedly loyal. After the Japanese war, as a result of the -first Revolution, the Officers' Corps was, nevertheless, placed, for -reasons which are not sufficiently clear, under the special supervision -of the Police Department, and regimental Commanding Officers received -from time to time "black lists." The tragedy of it was that it was -almost useless to argue against the verdict of "unreliability," while, -at the same time, it was forbidden to conduct one's own investigation, -even in secret. This system of spying introduced an unwholesome -spirit into the army. Not content with this system, the War Minister, -General Sukhomlinov, introduced his own branch of counter-spies, which -was headed unofficially by Colonel Miassoyedov, who was afterwards -shot as a German spy. At every military District Headquarters an -organ was instituted, headed by an officer of the Gendarmerie -dressed up in G.H.Q. uniform. Officially, he was supposed to deal -with foreign espionage, but General Dukhonin (who was killed by the -Bolsheviks), when Chief of the Intelligence Bureau of the Kiev G.H.Q. -before the War, bitterly complained to me of the painful atmosphere -created by this new organ, which was officially subordinate to the -Quartermaster-General, but in reality looked on him with suspicion, and -was spying not only upon the Staff, but upon its own chiefs. - -Life itself seemed to induce the officers to utter some kind of protest -against the existing order. Of all the classes that served the State, -there had been for a long time no element so downtrodden and forlorn -or so ill-provided for as the officers of the Regular Russian Army. -They lived in abject poverty. Their rights and their self-esteem were -constantly ignored by the Senior Officers. The utmost the rank and -file could hope for as the crowning of their career was the rank of -Colonel and an old age spent in sickness and semi-starvation. From the -middle of the nineteenth century the Officers' Corps had completely -lost its character as a class and a caste. Since universal compulsory -service was introduced and the nobility ceased to be prosperous the -gates of military schools were opened wide to people of low extraction -and to young men belonging to the lower strata of the people, but with -a diploma from the civil schools. They formed a majority in the Army. -Mobilisations, on the other hand, reinforced the Officers' Corps by the -infusion of a great many men of the liberal professions, who introduced -new ideas and a new outlook. Finally, the tremendous losses suffered -by the Regular Officers' Corps compelled the High Command to relax to -a certain extent the regulations concerning military training and -education, and to introduce on a broad scale promotions from the ranks -for deeds of valour, and to give rankers a short training in elementary -schools to fit them to be temporary officers. - -These circumstances, characteristic of all armies formed from the -masses, undoubtedly reduced the fighting capacity of the Officers' -Corps, and brought about a certain change in its political outlook, -bringing it nearer to that of the average Russian intellectual and to -democracy. This the leaders of the Revolutionary democracy did not, -or, to be more accurate, would not, understand in the first days of -the Revolution. In the course of my narrative I will differentiate -between the "Revolutionary Democracy"--an agglomeration of socialist -parties--and the true Russian Democracy, to which the middle-class -intelligencia and the Civil Service elements undoubtedly belong. - -The spirit of the Regular Officers was, however, gradually changing. -The Japanese War, which disclosed the grave shortcomings of the country -and of the Army, the Duma and the Press, which had gained a certain -liberty after 1905, played an important part in the political education -of the officers. The mystic adoration of the Monarch began gradually to -vanish. Among the junior generals and other officers there appeared men -in increasing numbers capable of differentiating between the idea of -the Monarchy and personalities, between the welfare of the country and -the form of government. In officer circles opportunities occurred for -criticism, analysis, and sometimes for severe condemnation. - -It is to be wondered that in these circumstances our officers remained -steadfast and stoutly resisted the extremist, destructive currents of -political thought. The percentage of men who reached the depths and -were unmasked by the authorities was insignificant. With regard to the -throne, generally speaking, there was a tendency among the officers to -separate the person of the Emperor from the miasma with which he was -surrounded, from the political errors and misdeeds of the Government, -which was leading the country steadily to ruin and the Army to defeat. -They wanted to forgive the Emperor, and tried to make excuses for him. - -In spite of the accepted view, the monarchical idea had no deep, mystic -roots among the rank and file, and, of course, the semi-cultured masses -entirely failed to realise the meaning of other forms of Government -preached by Socialists of all shades of opinion. Owing to a certain -innate Conservatism, to habits dating from time immemorial, and to -the teaching of the Church, the existing regime was considered as -something quite natural and inevitable. In the mind and in the heart -of the soldier the idea of a monarch was, if I may so express it, "in -a potential state," rising sometimes to a point of high exaltation -when the monarch was personally approached (at reviews, parades and -casual meetings), and sometimes falling to indifference. At any rate, -the Army was in a disposition sufficiently favourable to the idea of -a monarchy and to the dynasty, and that disposition could have easily -been maintained. But a sticky cobweb of licentiousness and crime was -being woven at Petrograd and Czarskoe Selo. The truth, intermingled -with falsehood, penetrated into the remotest corners of the country -and into the Army, and evoked painful regrets and sometimes malicious -rejoicings. The members of the House of Romanov did not preserve the -"idea" which the orthodox monarchists wished to surround with a halo of -greatness, nobility and reverence. I recall the impression of a sitting -of the Duma which I happened to attend. For the first time, Gutchkov -uttered a word of warning from the Tribune of the Duma about Rasputin. - -"All is not well with our land." - -The House, which had been rather noisy, was silent, and every word, -spoken in a low voice, was distinctly audible in remote corners. A -mysterious cloud, pregnant with catastrophe, seemed to hang over the -normal course of Russian history. I will not dwell on the corrupt -influences prevailing in Ministerial dwellings and Imperial palaces -to which the filthy and cynical impostor found access, who swayed -ministers and rulers. - -The Grand Duke Nicholas is supposed to have threatened to hang -Rasputin should he venture to appear at G.H.Q. General Alexeiev also -disapproved strongly of the man. That the influence of Rasputin did -not spread to the old Army is due entirely to the attitude of the -above-named generals. All sorts of stories about Rasputin's influence -was circulated at the front, and the Censor collected an enormous -amount of material on the subject, even from soldiers' letters from the -front; but the gravest impression was produced by the word "TREASON" -with reference to the Empress. In the Army, openly and everywhere, -conversations were heard about the Empress' persistent demands for a -separate peace and of her treachery towards Lord Kitchener, of whose -journey she was supposed to have informed the Germans. As I recall the -past, and the impression produced in the Army by the _rumour_ of the -Empress' treason, I consider that this circumstance had a very great -influence upon the attitude of the Army towards the dynasty and the -revolution. In the spring of 1917 I questioned General Alexeiev on -this painful subject. His answer, reluctantly given, was vague. He -said: "When the Empress' papers were examined she was found to be in -possession of a map indicating in detail the disposition of the troops -along the entire front. Only two copies were prepared of this map, one -for the Emperor and one for myself. I was very painfully impressed. God -knows who may have made use of this map." - -History will undoubtedly throw light on the fateful influence exercised -by the Empress Alexandra upon the Russian Government in the period -preceding the Revolution. As regards the question of treason, this -disastrous rumour has not been confirmed by a single fact, and was -afterwards contradicted by the investigations of a Commission specially -appointed by the Provisional Government, on which representatives of -the Soviet of workmen and soldiers served. - -We now come to the third foundation--the _Mother Country_. Deafened -as we were, alas! by the thunder and rattle of conventional patriotic -phrases, endlessly repeated along the whole length and breadth of -Russia, we failed to detect the fundamental, innate defect of the -Russian people--its lack of patriotism. It is no longer necessary to -force an open door by proving this statement. The Brest-Litovsk Treaty -provoked no outburst of popular wrath. Russian society was indifferent -to the separation of the Border States, even those that were Russian -in spirit and in blood. What is more, Russian society approved of this -dismemberment. We know of the agreement between Poland and Petlura, -between Poland and the Soviet. We know that Russian territorial and -material riches were sold for a song to international, political -usurers. Need we adduce further proofs? - -There can be no doubt that the collapse of Russian Statehood as -manifested in "self-determination" was in several instances caused by -the desire to find a temporary safeguard against the Bedlam of the -Soviet Republic. Life, however, unfortunately does not stop at the -practical application of this peculiar "sanitary cordon," but strikes -at the very idea of Statehood. This occurred even in such stable -districts as the Cossack provinces, not, however, among the masses, -but among the leaders themselves. Thus at Ekaterinodar in 1920, at the -"High Krug" (Assembly) of the three Cossack armies, the mention of -Russia was omitted after a heated discussion from the proposed formula -of the oath.... - -Is Crucified Russia unworthy of our love? - -What, then, was the effect of the Mother Country idea upon the -conscience of the old Army? The upper strata of the Russian -intellectuals were well aware of the reasons for the world -conflagration, of the conflict of the Powers for political and -economic supremacy, for free routes, for markets and colonies--a -conflict in which Russia's part was merely one of self-defence. On -the other hand, the average number of the Russian _intelligencia_, -as well as officers, were often satisfied merely with the immediate -and more obvious and easily comprehensible causes. Nobody wanted the -war, except, perhaps, the impressionable young officers yearning for -exploits. It was believed that the powers-that-be would take every -precaution in order to avoid a rupture. Gradually, however, the fatal -inevitability of war was understood. There was no question on our part -of aggressiveness or self-interest. To sympathise sincerely with the -weak and the oppressed was in keeping with the traditional attitude of -Russia. Also, we did not draw the sword--the sword was drawn against -us. That is why, when the war began, the voices were silenced of those -who feared that, owing to the low level of her culture and economic -development, Russia would be unable to win in the contest with a strong -and cultured enemy. War was accepted in a patriotic spirit, which was -at times akin to enthusiasm. Like the majority of the intellectuals, -the officers did not take much interest in the question of war aims. -The war began; defeat would have led to immeasurable disaster to -our country in every sphere of its life, to territorial losses, -political decadence and economic slavery. Victory was, therefore, -a necessity. All other questions were relegated to the background. -There was plenty of time for their discussion, for new decisions and -for changes. This simplified attitude towards the war, coupled with -a profound understanding and with a national self-consciousness, was -not understood by the left wing of the Russian politicians, who were -driven to Zimmerwald and Kienthal. No wonder, therefore, that when -the anonymous and the Russian leaders of the Revolutionary democracy -were confronted in February, 1917, before the Army was deliberately -destroyed, with the dilemma: "Are we to save the country or the -Revolution?" they chose the latter. - -Still less did the illiterate masses of the people understand the idea -of national self-preservation. The people went to war submissively, -but without enthusiasm and without any clear perception of the -necessity for a great sacrifice. Their psychology did not rise to the -understanding of abstract national principles. "The people-in-arms," -for that was what the Army really was, were elated by victory and -downhearted when defeated. They did not fully understand the necessity -for crossing the Carpathians, and had, perhaps, a clearer idea of -the meaning of the struggle on the Styr and the Pripet. And yet it -found solace in the thought: "We are from Tambov; the Germans will -not reach us." It is necessary to repeat this stale saying, because -it expresses the deep-rooted psychology of the average Russian. As a -result of this predominance of material interests in the outlook of -"the people-in-arms," they grasped more easily the simple arguments -based on realities in favour of a stubborn fight and of victory, as -well as the impossibility of admitting defeat. These arguments were: -A foreign German domination, the ruin of the country and of the home, -the weight of the taxes which would inevitably be levied after defeat, -the fall in the price of grain, which would have to go through foreign -channels, etc. In addition, there was some feeling of confidence that -the Government was doing the right thing, the more so as the nearest -representatives of that power, the officers, were going forward -with the troops and were dying in the same spirit of readiness and -submission as the men, either because they had been ordered to do -so, or else because they thought it their duty. The rank and file, -therefore, bravely faced death. Afterwards when confidence was shaken, -the masses of the Army were completely perplexed. The formulas, -"without annexations and indemnities," "the self-determination of -peoples," etc., proved more abstract and less intelligible than the -old repudiated and rusty idea of the Mother Country, which still -persisted underneath them. In order to keep the men at the front, the -well-known arguments of a materialistic nature, such as the threat of -German domination, the ruin of the home, the weight of taxes, were -expounded from platforms decorated with red flags. They were taught by -Socialists, who favoured a war of defence. - -Thus the three principles which formed the foundations of the Army were -undermined. In describing the anomalies and spiritual shortcomings -of the Russian Army, far be it from me to place it below the level -of armies of other countries. These shortcomings are inherent in all -armies formed from the masses, which are almost akin to a militia, but -this did not prevent these armies or our own from gaining victories -and continuing the war. It is necessary, however, to draw a complete -picture of the spirit of the Army in order to understand its subsequent -destiny. - - - - -CHAPTER II. - -THE ARMY. - - -The Russo-Japanese war had a very great influence upon the -development of the Russian army. The bitterness of defeat and the -clear consciousness that the policy governing military affairs was -disastrously out of date gave a great impulse to the junior military -elements and forced the slack and inert elements gradually to alter -their ways or else to retire. In spite of the passive resistance of -several men at the head of the War Ministry and the General Staff, who -were either incompetent or else treated the interests of the army with -levity and indifference, work was done at full speed. In ten years the -Russian army, without of course attaining the ideal, made tremendous -progress. It may be confidently asserted that, had it not been for the -hard lessons of the Manchurian campaign, Russia would have been crushed -in the first months of the Great War. - -Yet the cleansing of the commanding personnel went too slowly. Our -softness ("Poor devil! we must give him a job"), wire-pulling, -intrigues, and too slavish an observance of the rules of seniority -resulted in the ranks of senior commanding officers being crowded with -worthless men. The High Commission for granting testimonials, which -sat twice a year in Petrograd, hardly knew any of those to whom these -testimonials were given. Therein lies the reason for the mistakes made -at the outbreak of war in many appointments to High Commands. Four -Commanders-in-Chief (one of them suffered from mental paralysis--it is -true that his appointment was only temporary), several Army Commanders, -many Army Corps and Divisional Commanders had to be dismissed. In the -very first days of the concentration of the Eighth Army, in July, -1914, General Brussilov dismissed three Divisional and one Army Corps -Commanders. Yet nonentities retained their commands, and they ruined -the troops and the operations. Under the same General Brussilov, -General D., relieved several times of his command, went from a cavalry -division to three infantry divisions in turn, and found final repose -in German captivity. Most unfortunately, the whole army was aware of -the incompetence of these Commanding Officers, and wondered at their -appointments. Owing to these deficiencies, the strategy of the entire -campaign lacked inspiration and boldness. Such, for example, were -the operations of the North-Western front in East Prussia, prompted -solely by the desire of G.H.Q. to save the French Army from a desperate -position. Such, in particular, was Rennenkampf's shameful manoeuvre, -as well as the stubborn forcing of the Carpathians, which dismembered -the troops of the South-Western front in 1915, and finally our advance -in the spring of 1916. - -The last episode was so typical of the methods of our High Command and -its consequences were so grave that it is worth our while to recall it. - -When the armies of the South-Western front took the offensive in May, -the attack was eminently successful and several Austrian divisions -were heavily defeated. When my division, after the capture of Lutsk, -was moving by forced marches to Vladimir Volynsk, I considered--and -we all considered--that our manoeuvre represented the entire scheme -of the advance, that our front was dealing the main blow. We learnt -afterwards that the task of dealing the main blow had been entrusted -to the Western front, and that Brussilov's armies were only making a -demonstration. There, towards Vilna, large forces had been gathered, -equipped with artillery and technical means such as we had never had -before. For several months the troops had been preparing _places -d'armes_ for the advance. At last all was ready, and the success of the -Southern armies that diverted the enemy's attention and his reserves -also promised success to the Western front. - -Almost on the eve of the contemplated offensive the historical -conversation took place on the telephone between General Evert, -C.-in-C. of the Western front, and General Alexeiev, Chief of Staff of -the Supreme Commander-in-Chief. The gist of the conversation was the -following: - -_A._ Circumstances require an immediate decision. Are you ready for the -advance and are you certain to be successful? - -_E._ I have no certainty of success. The enemy's positions are very -strong. Our troops will have to attack the positions against which -their previous attacks have failed. - -_A._ If that is the case, you must give immediate orders for the -transfer of troops to the South-Western front. I will report to the -Emperor. - -So the operation, so long awaited and so methodically prepared, -collapsed. The Western Army Corps, sent to reinforce us, came too late. -Our advance was checked. The senseless slaughter on the swampy banks -of the Stokhod then began. Incidentally, the Guards lost the flower -of their men in those battles. Meanwhile, the German Eastern front -was going through a period of intense anxiety. "It was a critical -time," says Ludendorff in his _Mes Souvenirs de Guerre_. "We had -spent ourselves, and we knew full well that no one would come to our -assistance if the Russians chose to attack us." - -An episode may be mentioned in this connection, which occurred to -General Brussilov. The story is not widely known, and may serve as -an interesting sidelight on the character of the General--one of the -leaders of the campaign. After the brilliant operations of the Eighth -Army, which ended in the crossing of the Carpathians and the invasion -of Hungary, the C.-in-C., General Brussilov, suffered a curious -psychological breakdown. Under the impression that a partial reverse -had been sustained by one of the Army Corps, he issued an order for -a general retreat, and the Army began rapidly to roll back. He was -haunted by imaginary dangers of the enemy breaking through, surrounding -our troops, of attacks of enemy cavalry which were supposed to threaten -the G.H.Q. Twice General Brussilov moved his H.Q. with a swiftness akin -to a panicky flight. The C.-in-C. was thus detached from his armies and -out of touch with them. - -We were retreating day after day in long, weary marches, and utterly -bewildered. The Austrians did not outnumber us, and their moral was no -higher than ours. They did not press us. Every day, my riflemen and -Kornilov's troops in our vicinity delivered short counter-attacks, took -many prisoners, and captured machine-guns. - -The Quartermaster-General's branch of the Army was even more puzzled. -Every day it reported that the news of the retreat was unfounded; -but Brussilov at first disregarded these reports, and later became -greatly incensed. The General Staff then had recourse to another -stratagem: they approached Brussilov's old friend, the veteran General -Panchulidzev, Chief of the Army Sanitation Branch, and persuaded him -that, if this retreat continued, the Army might suspect treason and -things might take an ugly turn. Panchulidzev visited Brussilov. An -intensely painful scene took place. As a result, Brussilov was found -weeping bitterly and Panchulidzev fainted. On the same day, an order -was issued for an advance, and the troops went forward rapidly and -easily, driving the Austrians before them. The strategical position was -restored as well as the reputation of the Army Commander. - -It must be admitted that not only the troops but the Commanders were -but scantily informed of the happenings of the front, and had hazy -ideas on the general strategical scheme. The troops criticised them -only when it was obvious that they had to pay the price of blood for -these schemes. So it was in the Carpathians, at Stokhod, during the -second attack on Przemyshl in the spring of 1917, etc. The moral of -the troops was affected chiefly by the great Galician retreat, the -unhappy progress of the war on the Northern and Western fronts--where -no victories were won--and by the tedious lingering for over a year in -positions of which everyone was sick to death. - - * * * * * - -I have already mentioned the cadres of commissioned officers. The great -and small shortcomings of these cadres increased as the cadres became -separated. No one expected the campaign to be protracted, and the Army -organisation was not careful to preserve the cadres of officers and -non-commissioned officers. They were drafted wholesale into the ranks -at the outbreak of war. I remember so well a conversation that took -place during the period of mobilisation, which was then contemplated -against Austria alone. It occurred in the flat of General V. M. -Dragomirov, one of the prominent leaders of the Army. A telegram was -brought in announcing that Germany had declared war. There was a dead -silence. Everyone was deep in thought. Somebody asked Dragomirov: - -"How long do you think the war will last?" - -"Four months." - -Companies went to the front sometimes with five to six officers. -Regular officers, and later the majority of other officers, invariably -and in all circumstances gave the example of prowess, pluck and -self-sacrifice. It is only natural that most of them were killed. -Another reliable element--the N.C.O.'s of the Reserve--was also -recklessly squandered. In the beginning of the war they formed -sometimes 50 per cent. of the rank and file. Relations between officers -and men in the old army were not always based upon healthy principles. -It cannot be denied that there was a certain aloofness caused by -the insufficient attention paid by the officers to the spiritual -requirements of the soldier's life. These relations, however, gradually -improved as the barriers of caste and class were broken down. The war -drew officers and men ever closer together, and in some regiments, -mostly of the line, there was a true brotherhood in arms. One -reservation must here be made. The outward intercourse bore the stamp -of the general lack of culture from which not only the masses but also -the Russian intellectuals suffered. Heartfelt solicitude, touching care -of the men's needs, simplicity and friendliness--all these qualities -of the Russian officer, who lay for months on end in the wet, dirty -trenches beside their men, ate out of the same pot, died quietly and -without a murmur, was buried in the same "fraternal grave"--were marred -by an occasional roughness, swearing, and sometimes by arbitrariness -and blows. - -There can be no doubt that the same conditions existed within the -ranks, and the only difference was that the sergeant and the corporal -were rougher and more cruel than the officers. These deplorable -circumstances coupled with the boredom and stupidity of barrack life, -and the petty restrictions imposed upon the men by the military -regulations, gave ample scope for underground seditious propaganda in -which the soldier was described as the "victim of the arbitrariness -of the men with golden epaulettes." The sound feeling and naturally -healthy outlook of the men was not mentioned while the discomforts -of military life were insisted on in order to foster a spirit of -discontent. - -This state of affairs was all the more serious because during the -war the process of consolidating the different units became more and -more difficult. These units, and especially the infantry regiments, -suffering terrible losses and changing their personnel ten or twelve -times, became to some extent recruiting stations through which men -flowed in an uninterrupted stream. They remained there but a short -time, and failed to become imbued with the military traditions of -their unit. The artillery and some other special branches remained -comparatively solid, and this was due in some measure to the fact -that their losses were, as compared with the losses suffered by the -infantry, only in the proportion of one to ten or one to twenty. - -On the whole the atmosphere in the Army and in the Navy was not, -therefore, particularly wholesome. In varying degrees, the two elements -of the Army--the rank and file and the commanding cadres--were divided. -For this the Russian officers, as well as the intellectuals, were -undoubtedly responsible. Their misdeeds resulted in the idea gaining -ground that the _barin_ (master) and the officer were opposed to the -_moujik_ and the soldier. A favourable atmosphere was thus created for -the work of destructive forces. - -Anarchist elements were by no means predominant in the Army. The -foundations, though somewhat unstable, had to be completely shattered; -the new power had to commit a long series of mistakes and crimes to -convert the state of smouldering discontent into active rebellion, -the bloody spectre of which will for some time to come hang over our -hapless Russian land. - -Destructive outside influences were not counteracted in the Army by a -reasonable process of education. This was due partly to the political -unpreparedness of the officers, partly to the instinctive fear felt -by the old regime of introducing "politics" into barracks, even with -a view to criticising subversive doctrines. This fear was felt not -only in respect of social and internal problems but even in respect -of foreign policy. Thus, for example, an Imperial order was issued -shortly before the war, strictly prohibiting any discussion amongst -the soldiers on the subject of the political issues of the moment (the -Balkan question, the Austro-Serbian conflict, etc.). On the eve of the -inevitable national war, the authorities persistently refrained from -awakening wholesome patriotism by explaining the causes and aims of -the war, and instructing the rank and file on the Slav question and -our long-drawn struggle against Germanism. I must confess that, like -many others, I did not carry out that order, and that I endeavoured -properly to influence the moral of the Archangel regiment which I then -commanded. I published an impassioned article against the order in the -Military Press, under the title _Do not quench the spirit_. I feel -certain that the statue of Strassbourg in the Place de la Concorde in -Paris, draped in a black veil, played an important part in fostering -the heroic spirit of the French Army. - -Propaganda penetrated into the old Russian Armies from all sides. -There can be no doubt that the fitful attempts of the ever-changing -governments of Goremykin, Sturmer, Trepov, etc., to arrest the normal -course of life in Russia, provided ample material for propaganda and -roused the anger of the people, which was reflected in the Army. -Socialist and defeatist writers took advantage of this state of -affairs. Lenin first contrived to introduce his doctrines into Russia -through the Social Democratic party of the Duma. The Germans worked -with even greater intensity. - -It should, however, be noted that all this propaganda from outside and -from within affected chiefly the units of the rear, the garrisons and -reserve battalions of the main centres, and especially of Petrograd, -and that, before the Revolution, its influence at the front was -comparatively insignificant. Reinforcements reached the front in a -state of perplexity, but under the influence of a saner atmosphere, -and of healthier, albeit more arduous, conditions of warfare, they -rapidly improved. The effect of destructive propaganda was, however, -noticeable in certain units where the ground was favourable, and two -or three cases of insubordination of entire units occurred before the -Revolution, and were severely repressed. Finally, the bulk of the -Army--the peasantry--was confronted with one practical question which -_prompted them instinctively to delay the social revolution_: "THE LAND -WOULD BE DIVIDED IN OUR ABSENCE. WHEN WE RETURN WE SHALL DIVIDE IT." - - * * * * * - -The inadequate organisation of the rear, the orgy of theft, high -prices, profiteering and luxury, for which the front paid in blood, -naturally afforded material for propaganda. The Army, however, suffered -most heavily from the lack of technical means, especially of ammunition. - -It was only in 1917 that General Sukhomlinov's trial disclosed to the -Russian Army and to public opinion the main causes of the military -catastrophe of 1915. Plans for replenishing the Russian Army stores had -been completed, and credits for that purpose assigned as early as in -1907. Curiously enough, these credits were increased on the initiative -of the Commission for National Defence, not of the Ministry of War. -As a rule, neither the Duma nor the Ministry of Finance ever refused -war credits or reduced them. During Sukhomlinov's tenure of office -the War Ministry obtained a special credit of 450 million roubles, of -which less than 300 millions were spent. Before the war, the question -of providing the Army with munitions after the peace-time stores -were exhausted was never even raised. It is true that the intensity -of firing reached, from the very outbreak of war, unexpected and -unheard-of proportions, which upset all the theoretical calculations of -military specialists in Russia and abroad. Naturally, heroic measures -were necessary in order to deal with this tragic situation. - -Meanwhile, the supplies of ammunition for the reinforcements that -came to the front--at first only 1/10th equipped, and later without -any rifles at all--were exhausted as early as in October, 1914. The -Commander-in-Chief of the South-Western front telegraphed to G.H.Q.: -"The machinery for providing ammunition has completely broken down. -In the absence of fresh supplies, we shall have to cease fighting, or -else send troops to the front in an extremely precarious condition." At -the same time (the end of September) Marshal Joffre inquired "whether -the Imperial Russian Army was adequately supplied with shells for the -uninterrupted conduct of war." The War Minister, General Sukhomlinov, -replied: "The present condition of the Russian Army in respect of -ammunition gives no ground for serious apprehension." Orders were not -placed abroad, and Japanese and American rifles were refused "in order -to avoid the inconvenience due to different calibres." - -When the man who was responsible for the military catastrophe faced his -judges in August, 1917, his personality produced a pitiful impression. -The trial raised a more serious, painful question: "How could this -irresponsible man, with no real knowledge of military matters, and -perhaps even consciously a criminal, have remained in power for six -years?" How "shamelessly indifferent to good and evil," according -to Pushkin's saying, the military bureaucracy must have been, that -surrounded him and tolerated the sins of omission and commission, which -invariably and systematically injured the interests of the State. - -The final catastrophe came in 1915. - -I shall never forget the spring of 1915, the great tragedy of the -Russian Army---the Galician retreat. We had neither cartridges nor -shells. From day to day, we fought heavy battles and did lengthy -marches. We were desperately tired--physically and morally. From hazy -hopes we plunged into the depths of gloom. I recall an action near -Przemyshl in the middle of May. The Fourth Rifle Division fought -fiercely for eleven days. For eleven days the German heavy guns were -roaring, and they literally blew up rows of trenches, with all their -defenders. We scarcely replied at all--we had nothing to reply with. -Utterly exhausted regiments were beating off one attack after another -with bayonets, or firing at a close range. Blood was flowing, the ranks -were being thinned, and graveyards growing. Two regiments were almost -entirely annihilated by firing. - -I would that our French and British friends, whose technical -achievement is so wondrous, could note the following grotesque fact, -which belongs to Russian history: - -Our only six-inch battery had been silent for three days. When it -received FIFTY SHELLS the fact was immediately telephoned to all -regiments and companies, and all the riflemen heaved a sigh of relief -and joy. - -What painful, insulting irony there was in Brussilov's circular, in -which the C.-in-C., incapable of providing us with ammunition, and with -a view to raising our spirits and our moral, advised us not to lay too -much stress upon the German superiority in heavy guns, because there -had been many cases of the Germans inflicting but small losses in our -ranks by spending an enormous amount of shells.... - -On May 21st, General Yanushkevitch (Chief of the Staff of the Supreme -C.-in-C., the Grand Duke Nicholas Nicholaievitch) telegraphed to -the War Minister: "The evacuation of Przemyshl is an accomplished -fact. Brussilov alleges a shortage of ammunition, that _bete noire_, -yours and mine ... a loud cry comes from all the armies: 'Give us -cartridges.'" - - * * * * * - -I am not inclined to idealise our Army. I have to speak many sad -truths about it. But when the Pharisees--the leaders of the Russian -Revolutionary Democracy--endeavour to explain away the collapse of the -Army for which they are mainly responsible, by saying that the Army was -already on the verge of collapse, they are lying. - -I do not deny the grave shortcomings of our system of appointments to -the High Command, the errors of our strategy, tactics and organisation, -the technical backwardness of our Army, the defects of the Officers' -Corps, the ignorance of the rank and file, and the vices of barrack -life. I know the extent of desertions and shirking, of which our -intellectuals were hardly less guilty than the ignorant masses. The -Revolutionary Democracy did not, however, devote special attention -to _these_ serious defects of the Army. It could not remedy these -evils, did not know how to cure them, and, in fact, did not combat -them at all. Speaking for myself, I do not know that the Revolutionary -Democracy has cured or even dealt seriously and effectively with -any one of these evils. What of the famous "Freedom from Bondage" -of the soldier? Discarding all the exaggerations which this term -implies, it may be said that the mere fact of the Revolution brought -about a certain change in the relations between the officers and -the men. In normal circumstances, and without coarse and malicious -outside interference, this change might have become a source of great -moral strength, instead of a disaster. It was into this sore that -the Revolutionary Democracy poured poison. The very essence of the -military organisation: its eternal, unchangeable characteristics, -discipline, individual authority, and the non-political spirit of the -Army, were ruthlessly assailed by the Revolutionary Democracy. These -characteristics were lost. And yet it seemed as if the downfall of -the old regime opened new and immense possibilities for cleansing -and uplifting the Russian people's Army and its Command morally and -technically. Like people, like Army. After all, the old Russian Army, -albeit suffering from the deficiencies of the Russian people, had -also the people's virtues, and particularly an exceptional power -of endurance in facing the horrors of war. The Army fought without -a murmur for nearly three years. With extraordinary prowess and -self-sacrifice the men went into action with empty hands against the -deadly technique of the enemy. The rivers of blood shed by the rank -and file atoned for the sins of the Supreme power, the Government, the -people, and of the Army itself.[2] - -Our late Allies should never forget that in the middle of January, -1917, the Russian Army was holding on its front 187 enemy divisions, -or 49 per cent. of the enemy's forces operating on the European and -Asiatic fronts. - -The old Russian Army was still strong enough to continue the war and to -win victories. - -[Diagram: Comparative forces of the Germans in different theatres -of war] - - - - -CHAPTER III. - -THE OLD ARMY AND THE EMPEROR. - - -In August, 1915, the Emperor, influenced by the entourage of the -Empress and of Rasputin, decided to take the Supreme Command of the -Army. Eight Cabinet Ministers and some politicians warned the Emperor -against this dangerous step, but their pleadings were of no avail. The -official motives they adduced were, on the one hand, the difficulty of -combining the tasks of governing the country and commanding the Army, -and, on the other, the risk of assuming responsibility for the Army at -a time when it was suffering reverses and retreating. The real motive, -however, was the fear lest the difficult position of the Army be -further imperilled by the lack of knowledge and experience of the new -Supreme C.-in-C., and that the German-Rasputin clique that surrounded -him, having already brought about the paralysis of the Government and -its conflict with the Duma, would bring about the collapse of the Army. - -There was a rumour, which was afterwards confirmed, that the Emperor -came to this decision partly because he feared the entourage of the -Empress, and partly because of the popularity of the Grand Duke -Nicholas, which was growing in spite of the reverses suffered by the -Army. - -On August 23rd, an order was issued to the Army and Navy. To the -official text, the Emperor added a note in his own hand, a facsimile of -which is reproduced overleaf: - -This decision, in spite of its intrinsic importance, produced no strong -impression upon the Army. The High Commanding Officers and the lower -grades of Commissioned Officers were well aware that the Emperor's -personal part in the Supreme Command would be purely nominal, and the -question in everyone's mind was: - -"Who will be the Chief of Staff?" - -The appointment of General Alexeiev appeased the anxiety of the -officers. The rank and file cared but little for the technical side -of the Command. To them, the Czar had always been the Supreme Leader -of the Army. One thing, however, somewhat perturbed them: the belief -had gained ground among the people years before that the Emperor was -unlucky. - -[Illustration: Note added by the Emperor to Army and Navy order - - _Translation_:--"With firm faith in the grace of God, and with - unshaken assurance of final victory, let us fulfil our sacred duty - of defending Russia till the end, and let us not bring shame to the - Russian land.--NICHOLAS."] - -In reality, it was General M. V. Alexeiev who took command of the -armed forces of Russia. In the history of the Russian war and the -Russian turmoil, General Alexeiev holds so prominent a place that his -importance cannot be gauged in a few lines. A special historical study -would be necessary in order to describe the career of a man whose -military and political activities, which some have severely criticised -and others extolled, never caused anyone to doubt that (in the words -of an Army Order to the Volunteer Army) "his path of martyrdom was -lighted by crystalline honesty and by a fervent love for his Mother -Country--whether great or downtrodden." - -Alexeiev sometimes did not display sufficient firmness in enforcing -his demands, but, in respect of the independence of the "Stavka" -(G.H.Q.) from outside influences, he showed civic courage which -the High Officials of the old regime, who clung to their offices, -completely lacked. - -One day, after an official dinner at Mohilev, the Empress took -Alexeiev's arm, and went for a walk in the garden with him. She -mentioned Rasputin. In terms of deep emotion she tried to persuade the -General that he was wrong in his attitude towards Rasputin, that "the -old man is a wonderful saint," that he was much calumniated, that he -was deeply devoted to the Imperial family, and, last but not least, -that his visit would bring luck to the "Stavka." - -Alexeiev answered dryly that, so far as he was concerned, the question -had long since been settled. Should Rasputin appear at G.H.Q., he would -immediately resign his post. - -"Is this your last word?" - -"Yes, certainly." - -The Empress cut the conversation short, and left without saying -good-bye to the General, who afterwards admitted that the incident had -an ill-effect upon the Emperor's attitude towards him. Contrary to the -established opinion, the relations between the Emperor and Alexeiev, -outwardly perfect, were by no means intimate or friendly, or even -particularly confidential. The Emperor loved no one except his son. -Therein lies the tragedy of his life as a man and as a ruler. - -Several times General Alexeiev, depressed by the growth of popular -discontent with the regime and the Crown, endeavoured to exceed the -limits of a military report and to represent to the Emperor the -state of affairs in its true light. He referred to Rasputin and to -the question of a responsible Ministry. He invariably met with the -impenetrable glance, so well-known to many, and the dry retort: - -"I know." - -Not another word. - -In matters of Army administration, the Emperor fully trusted Alexeiev, -and listened attentively to the General's long, and perhaps even too -elaborate, reports. Attentively and patiently he listened, but these -matters did not seem to appeal to him. There were differences of -opinion in regard to minor matters, appointments to G.H.Q., new posts, -etc. - -No doubt was left in my mind as to the Emperor's complete indifference -in matters of high strategy after I read an important record--that -of the deliberations of a Military Council held at G.H.Q. at -the end of 1916, under the chairmanship of the Emperor. All the -Commanders-in-Chief and the high officials of G.H.Q. were present, and -the plans of the 1917 campaign and of a general advance were discussed. - -Every word uttered at the conference was placed on record. One could -not fail to be impressed by the dominating and guiding part played by -General Gourko--Chief of the General Staff _pro tem._--by the somewhat -selfish designs of various Commanders-in-Chief, who were trying to -adapt strategical axioms to the special interests of their fronts, and -finally by the total indifference of the Supreme C.-in-C. - -Relations similar to those just described continued between the Emperor -and the Chief of Staff when General Gourko took charge of that office -while Alexeiev, who had fallen seriously ill in the autumn of 1916, was -undergoing a cure at Sevastopol, without, however, losing touch with -G.H.Q., with which he communicated by direct wire. - - * * * * * - -Meanwhile, the struggle between the progressive block of the Duma and -the Government (General Alexeiev and the majority of the Commanding -Officers undoubtedly sympathised with the former) was gradually -becoming more and more acute. The record of the sitting of the Duma -of November 1st, 1916 (of which the publication was prohibited and an -abridged version did not appear in the Press till the beginning of -January, 1917), when Shulgin and Miliukov delivered their historical -speeches, was circulated everywhere in the Army in the shape of -typewritten leaflets. Feeling was already running so high that these -leaflets were not concealed, but were read and provoked animated -discussions in officers' messes. A prominent Socialist, an active -worker of the Union of Towns, who paid his first visit to the Army -in 1916, said to me: "I am amazed at the freedom with which the -worthlessness of the Government and the Court scandals are being -discussed in regiments and messes in the presence of Commanding -officers, at Army Headquarters, etc., and that in our country of -arbitrary repression ... at first it seemed to me that I was dealing -with 'agents provocateurs.'" - -The Duma had been in close connection with the Officers' Corps for -a long time. Young officers unofficially partook in the work of the -Commission of National Defence during the period of the reorganisation -of the Army and revival of the Fleet after the Japanese War. Gutchkov -had formed a circle, in which Savitch, Krupensky, Count Bobrinski -and representatives of the officers, headed by General Gourko, were -included. Apparently, General Polivanov (who afterwards played -such an important part in contributing to the disintegration of the -Army, as Chairman of the "Polivanov Commission") also belonged to -the circle. There was no wish to "undermine the foundations," but -merely to push along the heavy, bureaucratic van, to give impetus -to the work, and initiative to the offices of the inert Military -Administration. According to Gutchkov, the circle worked quite openly, -and the War Ministry at first even provided the members with materials. -Subsequently, however, General Sukhomlinov's attitude changed abruptly, -the circle came under suspicion, and people began to call it "The Young -Turks." - -The Commission of National Defence was, nevertheless, very well -informed. General Lukomski, who was Chief of the Mobilisation Section, -and later Assistant War Minister, told me that reports to the -Commission had to be prepared extremely carefully, and that General -Sukhomlinov, trivial and ignorant, produced a pitiful impression on -the rare occasions on which he appeared before the Commission, and was -subjected to a regular cross-examination. - -In the course of his trial, Sukhomlinov himself recounted an episode -which illustrates this state of affairs. One day, he arrived at a -meeting of the Commission when two important military questions were to -be discussed. He was stopped by Rodzianko,[3] who said to him: - -"Get away, get away. You are to us as a red rag to a bull. As soon as -you come, your requests are turned down." - -After the Galician retreat, the Duma succeeded at last in enforcing the -participation of its members in the task of placing on a proper basis -all orders for the Army, and the Unions of Zemstvos and Towns were -permitted to create the "General Committee for provisioning the Army." - -The hard experience of the war resulted at last in the simple scheme -of mobilising the Russian industries. No sooner did this undertaking -escape from the deadening atmosphere of military offices than it -advanced with giant strides. According to official data, in July, 1915, -each Army received 33 parks of artillery instead of the requisite 50, -whereas, in September, the figure rose to 78, owing to the fact that -private factories had been brought into the scheme. I am in a position -to state, not only on the strength of figures, but from personal -experience, that, at the end of 1916, our Army, albeit falling short of -the high standards of the Allied armies in respect of equipment, had -sufficient stores of ammunition and supplies wherewith to begin an -extensive and carefully-planned operation along the entire front. These -circumstances were duly appreciated in the Army, and confidence in the -Duma and in social organisations was thereby increased. The conditions -of internal policy, however, were not improving. In the beginning of -1917, out of the extremely tense atmosphere of political strife, there -arose the idea of a new remedy: - - "REVOLUTION." - - * * * * * - -Representatives of certain Duma and social circles visited Alexeiev, -who was ill at Sevastopol. They told the General quite frankly that -a revolution was brewing. They knew what the effect would be in the -country, but they could not tell how the front would be impressed, and -wanted advice. - -Alexeiev strongly insisted that violent changes during the war were -inadmissible, that they would constitute a deadly menace to the front, -which, according to his pessimistic view, "was already by no means -steady," and pleaded against any irretrievable steps for the sake of -preserving the Army. The delegates departed, promising to take the -necessary measures in order to avert the contemplated revolution. I do -not know upon what information General Alexeiev based his subsequent -statement to the effect that the same delegates afterwards visited -Generals Brussilov and Ruzsky, and after these generals had expressed -an opposite view to his, altered their previous decision; but the -preparations for the revolution continued. - -It is as yet difficult to elucidate all the details of these -negotiations. Those who conducted them are silent; there are no -records; the whole matter was shrouded in secrecy, and did not reach -the bulk of the army. Certain facts, however, have been ascertained. - -Several people approached the Emperor, and warned him of the impending -danger to the country and the dynasty--Alexeiev, Gourko, the Archbishop -Shavelski, Purishkevitch (a reactionary member of the Duma), the Grand -Dukes Nicholas Mikhailovitch and Alexander Mikhailovitch, and the -Dowager Empress. After Rodzianko's visit to the Army in the autumn of -1916, copies of his letter to the Emperor gained circulation in the -Army. In that letter the President of the Duma warned the Emperor of -the grave peril to the throne and the dynasty caused by the disastrous -activities of the Empress Alexandra in the sphere of internal policy. -On November 1st, the Grand Duke Nicholas Mikhailovitch read a letter to -the Emperor, in which he pointed out the impossible manner, known to -all classes of society, in which Ministers were appointed, through the -medium of the appalling people who surrounded the Empress. The Grand -Duke proceeded: - -"... If you could succeed in removing this perpetual interference, -the renascence of Russia would begin at once, and you would recover -the confidence of the vast majority of your subjects which is now -lost. When the time is ripe--and it is at hand--you can yourself grant -from the throne the desired responsibility (of the Government) to -yourself and the legislature. This will come about naturally, easily, -without any pressure from without, and not in the same way as with -the memorable act of October 17th, 1905.[4] I hesitated for a long -time to tell you the truth, but made up my mind when your mother -and your sisters persuaded me to do so. You are on the eve of new -disturbances, and, if I may say so, new attempts. Believe me, if I so -strongly emphasise the necessity for your liberation from the existing -fetters, I am doing so not for personal motives, but only in the hope -of saving you, your throne, and our beloved country from irretrievable -consequences of the gravest nature." - -All these representations were of no avail. - -Several members of the right and of the liberal wing of the Duma and -of the progressive bloc, members of the Imperial family, and officers, -joined the circle. One of the Grand Dukes was to make a last appeal -to the Emperor before active measures were undertaken. In the event -of failure, the Imperial train was to be stopped by an armed force on -its way from G.H.Q. to Petrograd. The Emperor was to be advised to -abdicate, and, in the event of his refusal, he was to be removed by -force. The rightful heir, the Czarevitch Alexis, was to be proclaimed -Emperor, and the Grand Duke Michael, Regent. - -At the same time, a large group of the progressive bloc of the Duma, of -representatives of Zemstvos and towns--well versed in the activities of -the circle--held several meetings, at which the question was discussed -of "the part the Duma was to play after the _coup d'etat_."[5] The new -Ministry was then outlined, and of the two suggested candidates for the -Premiership, Rodzianko and Prince Lvov, the latter was chosen. - -Fate, however, decreed otherwise. - -Before the contemplated _coup d'etat_ took place, there began, in the -words of Albert Thomas, "the brightest, the most festive, the most -bloodless Russian Revolution." - - - - -CHAPTER IV. - -THE REVOLUTION IN PETROGRAD. - - -I did not learn of the course of events in Petrograd and at G.H.Q. -until some time had elapsed, and I will refer to these events briefly -in order to preserve the continuity of my narrative. In a telegram -addressed to the Emperor by the members of the Council of the Empire on -the night of the 28th February, the state of affairs was described as -follows:-- - -"Owing to the complete disorganisation of transport and to the lack -of necessary materials, factories have stopped working. Forced -unemployment, and the acute food crisis due to the disorganisation of -transport, have driven the popular masses to desperation. This feeling -is further intensified by hatred towards the Government and grave -suspicions against the authorities, which have penetrated deeply into -the soul of the nation. All this has found expression in a popular -rising of elemental dimensions, and the troops are now joining the -movement. The Government, which has never been trusted in Russia, is -now utterly discredited and incapable of coping with the dangerous -situation." - -Preparations for the Revolution found favourable ground in the -general condition of the country, and had been made long since. The -most heterogeneous elements had taken part in these activities; the -German Government, which spared no means for Socialist and defeatist -propaganda in Russia, and especially among the workmen; the Socialist -parties, who had formed "cells" among the workmen and in the regiments; -undoubtedly, too, the Protopopov Ministry, which was said to have been -provoking a rising in the streets in order to quell it by armed force, -and thus clear the intolerably tense atmosphere. It would seem that all -these forces were aiming at the same goal, which they were trying to -reach by diverse means, actuated by diametrically opposed motives. - -At the same time, the progressive block and social organisations began -to prepare for great events which they considered inevitable, and other -circles, in close touch with these organisations or sharing their -views, were completing the arrangements for a "_Palace coup d'etat_" as -the last means of averting the impending Revolution. - -Nevertheless, the rebellion started as an elemental force and caught -everybody unawares. Several days later, when General Kornilov -visited the Executive Committee of the Petrograd Soviet of Workmen -and Soldiers' Deputies, prominent members of that body incidentally -explained that "the soldiers mutinied independently of the workmen, -with whom the soldiers had not been in touch on the eve of the -rebellion," and that the "mutiny had not been prepared--hence the -absence of a corresponding administrative organ." - -As regards the circles of the Duma and the social organisations, they -were prepared for a _coup d'etat_, but not for the Revolution. In -the blazing fire of the outbreak they failed to preserve their moral -balance and judgment. - -The first outbreak began on February 23rd, when crowds filled the -streets, meetings were held, and the speakers called for a struggle -against the hated power. This lasted till the 26th, when the popular -movement assumed gigantic proportions and there were collisions with -the police, in which machine-guns were brought into action. On the -26th an ukaze was received proroguing the Duma, and on the morning of -the 27th the members of the Duma decided not to leave Petrograd. On -the same morning the situation underwent a drastic change, because -the rebels were joined by the Reserve battalions of the Litovski, -Volynski, Preobrajenski, and Sapper Guards' Regiments. They were -Reserve battalions, as the real Guards' Regiments were then on the -South-Western Front. These battalions did not differ, either in -discipline or spirit, from any other unit of the line. In several -battalions the Commanding Officers were disconcerted, and could not -make up their minds as to their own attitude. This wavering resulted, -to a certain extent, in a loss of prestige and authority. The troops -came out into the streets without their officers, mingled with the -crowds, and were imbued with the crowds' psychology. Armed throngs, -intoxicated with freedom, excited to the utmost, and incensed by street -orators, filled the streets, smashed the barricades, and new crowds of -waverers joined them. Police detachments were mercilessly slaughtered. -Officers who chanced to be in the way of the crowds were disarmed and -some of them killed. The armed mob seized the arsenal, the Fortress of -Peter and Paul, and the Kresti Prison. - -On that decisive day there were no leaders--there was only the tidal -wave. Its terrible progress appeared to be devoid of any definite -object, plan, or watchword. The only cry that seemed to express the -general spirit was "_Long live Liberty_." - -Somebody was bound to take the movement in hand. After violent -discussions, much indecision and wavering, that part was assumed by the -Duma. A Committee of the Duma was formed, which proclaimed its objects -on February 27th in the following guarded words:-- - -"In the strenuous circumstances of internal strife caused by the -activities of the old Government, the temporary Committee of the -members of the Duma has felt compelled to undertake the task of -restoring order in the State and in society.... The Committee expresses -its conviction that the population and the army will render assistance -in the difficult task of creating a new Government, which will -correspond to the wishes of the population, and which will be in a -position to enjoy its confidence." - -There can be no doubt that the Duma, having led the patriotic and -national struggle against the Government detested by the people, and -having accomplished great and fruitful work in the interests of the -army, had obtained recognition in the country and in the army. The -Duma now became the centre of the political life of the country. No -one else could have taken the lead in the movement. No one else could -have gained the confidence of the country, or such rapid and full -recognition as the Supreme Power, as the power that emanated from -the Duma. The Petrograd Soviet of Workmen and Soldiers' Deputies was -fully aware of this fact, and it did not then claim _officially_ to -represent the Russian Government. Such an attitude towards the Duma -at that moment created the illusion of the _national_ character of -the Provisional Government created by the Duma. Alongside, therefore, -with the troops that mingled with the armed mob and destroyed in their -trail everything reminiscent of the old power, alongside with the -units that had remained faithful to that power and resisted the mob, -regiments began to flock to the Taurida Palace with their commanding -officers, bands and banners. They greeted the new power in the person -of Rodzianko, President of the Duma, according to the rules of the old -ritual. The Taurida Palace presented an unusual sight--legislators, -bureaucrats, soldiers, workmen, women; a chamber, a camp, a prison, -a headquarters, Ministries. Everyone foregathered there seeking -protection and salvation, demanding guidance and answers to puzzling -questions which had suddenly arisen. On the same day, February 27th, -an announcement was made from the Taurida Palace:-- - -"Citizens. Representatives of the workmen, soldiers and people of -Petrograd, sitting in the Duma, declare that the first meeting of -their representatives will take place at seven o'clock to-night on -the premises of the Duma. Let the troops that have joined the people -immediately elect their representatives--one to each company. Let the -factories elect their deputies--one to each thousand. Factories with -less than a thousand workmen to elect one deputy each." - -This proclamation had a grave and fateful effect upon the entire course -of events. In the first place, it created an organ of unofficial, -but undoubtedly stronger, power alongside with the provisional -Government--the Soviet of Workmen and Soldiers' deputies, against which -the Government proved impotent. In the second place, it converted the -political and bourgeois revolution, both outwardly and inwardly, into -a social revolution, which was unthinkable, considering the condition -of the country at that time. Such a revolution in war time could not -fail to bring about terrible upheavals. Lastly, it established a close -connection between the Soviet, which was inclined towards Bolshevism -and defeatism, and the army, which was thus infected with a ferment -which resulted in its ultimate collapse. When the troops, fully -officered, smartly paraded before the Taurida Palace, it was only -for show. The link between the officers and the men had already been -irretrievably broken; discipline had been shattered. Henceforward, the -troops of the Petrograd district represented a kind of Pretorian guard, -whose evil force weighed heavily over the Provisional Government. All -subsequent efforts made by Gutchkov, General Kornilov and G.H.Q. to -influence them and to send them to the front were of no avail, owing to -the determined resistance of the Soviet. - -The position of the officers was undoubtedly tragic, as they had to -choose between loyalty to their oath, the distrust and enmity of the -men, and the dictates of practical necessity. A small portion of the -officers offered armed resistance to the mutiny, and most of them -perished. Some avoided taking any part in the events, but the majority -in the regiments, where comparative order prevailed, tried to find in -the Duma a solution of the questions which perturbed their conscience. -At a big meeting of officers held in Petrograd on March 1st, a -resolution was carried: "To stand by the people and unanimously to -recognise the power of the Executive Committee of the Duma, pending the -convocation of the Constituent Assembly; because a speedy organisation -of order and of united work in the rear were necessary for the -victorious end of the war." - - * * * * * - -Owing to the unrestrained orgy of power in which the successive -rulers appointed at Rasputin's suggestion had indulged during their -short terms of office, there was in 1917 no political party, no class -upon which the Czarist Government could rely. Everybody considered -that Government as the enemy of the people. Extreme Monarchists -and Socialists, the united nobility, labour groups, Grand Dukes -and half-educated soldiers--all were of the same opinion. I do not -intend to examine the activities of the Government which led to the -Revolution, its struggle against the people and against representative -institutions. I will only draw a summary of the accusations which were -justly levelled by the Duma against the Government on the eve of its -downfall: - -All the Institutions of the State and of society--the Council of the -Empire, the Duma, the nobility, the Zemstvos, the municipalities--were -under suspicion of disloyalty, and the Government was in open -opposition to them, and paralysed all their activities in matters of -statesmanship and social welfare. - -Lawlessness and espionage had reached unheard-of proportions. The -independent Russian Courts of Justice became subservient to "the -requirements of the political moment." - -[Illustration: Funeral of the first victims of the March Revolution in -Petrograd.] - -Whilst in the Allied countries all classes of society worked -whole-heartedly for the defence of their countries, in Russia that -work was repudiated with contempt, and the work was done by unskilled -and occasionally criminal hands, which resulted in such disastrous -phenomena as the activities of Sukhomlinov and Protopopov. The -Committee "of Military Industries," which had rendered great services -in provisioning the Army, was being systematically destroyed. Shortly -before the Revolution its labour section was arrested without any -reason being assigned, and this very nearly caused sanguinary -disturbances in the capital. Measures adopted by the Government without -the participation of social organisations shattered the industrial life -of the country. Transport was disorganised, and fuel was wasted. The -Government proved incapable and impotent in combating this disorder, -which was undoubtedly caused to a certain extent by the selfish and -sometimes rapacious designs of industrial magnates. The villages were -derelict. A series of wholesale mobilisations, without any exemptions -granted to classes which worked for defence, deprived the villages -of labour. Prices were unsettled, and the big landowners were given -certain privileges. Later, the grain contribution was gravely -mismanaged. There was no exchange of goods between towns and villages. -All this resulted in the stopping of food supplies, famine in the -towns, and repression in the villages. Government servants of all kinds -were impoverished by the tremendous rise in prices of commodities, and -were grumbling loudly. - -Ministerial appointments were staggering in their fitfulness, and -appeared to the people as a kind of absurdity. The demands of the -country for a responsible Cabinet were voiced by the Duma and by the -best men. As late as the morning of February 27th, the Duma considered -that the granting of the minimum of the political desiderata of Russian -society was sufficient to postpone "the last hour in which the fate -of the Mother Country and of the dynasty was to be settled." Public -opinion and the Press were smothered; the Military Censorship of all -internal regions (including Moscow and Petrograd) had made the widest -use of its telephones. It was impregnable, protected by all the powers -of martial law. Ordinary censorship was no less severe. The following -striking fact was discussed in the Duma: - -In February, 1917, a strike movement, prompted to a certain extent -by the Germans, began to spread in the factories. The Labour members -of the Military Industries Committee then drafted a proclamation, as -follows:--"Comrades, workmen of Petrograd, we deem it our duty to -address to you an urgent request to resume work. The labouring class, -fully aware of its present-day responsibilities, must not weaken itself -by a protracted strike. The interests of the labouring class are -calling upon you to resume work." In spite of Gutchkov's appeal to the -Minister of the Interior and to the Chief Censor, this appeal was twice -removed from the printing press, and was prohibited. - -The question is still open for discussion and investigation as to -what proportion of the activities of the old regime in the domain -of economics can be attributed to individuals, what to the system, -and what to the insuperable obstacles created in the country by a -devastating war. But no excuse will ever be found for stifling the -conscience, the mind, and the spirit of the people and all social -initiative. No wonder, therefore, that Moscow and the provinces joined -the Revolution without any appreciable resistance. Outside Petrograd, -where the terror of street fighting and the rowdiness of a bloodthirsty -mob were absent (there were, however, many exceptions), the Revolution -was greeted with satisfaction, and even with enthusiasm, not only by -the Revolutionary Democracy, but by the real Democracy, the Bourgeoisie -and the Civil Service. There was tremendous animation; thousands of -people thronged the streets. Fiery speeches were made. There was great -rejoicing at the deliverance from the terrible nightmare; there were -bright hopes for the future of Russia. There was the word: - -"LIBERTY." - -It was in the air. It was reproduced in speeches, drawings, in music, -in song. It was stimulating. It was not yet stained by stupidity, by -filth and blood. - -Prince Eugene Troubetskoi wrote: "This Revolution is unique. There -have been bourgeois revolutions and proletarian revolutions, but such -a national Revolution, in the broadest sense of the word, as the -present Russian Revolution, there has never been. Everyone took part -in this Revolution, everyone made it: the proletariat, the troops, -the bourgeoisie, even the nobility ... all the live forces of the -country.... May this unity endure!" In these words the hopes and fears -of the Russian intelligencia, not the sad Russian realities, are -reflected. The cruel mutinies at Helsingfors, Kronstadt, Reval, and the -assassination of Admiral Nepenin and of many officers were the first -warnings to the optimists. - - * * * * * - -In the first days of the Revolution the victims in the Capital were -few. According to the registration of the All-Russian Union of Towns, -the total number of killed and wounded in Petrograd was 1,443, -including 869 soldiers (of whom 60 were officers). Of course, many -wounded were not registered. The condition of Petrograd, however, out -of gear and full of inflammable material and armed men, remained for a -long time strained and unstable. I heard later from members of the Duma -and of the Government that the scales were swaying violently, and that -they felt like sitting on a powder-barrel which might explode at any -moment and blow to bits both themselves and the structure of the new -Government which they were creating. The Deputy-Chairman of the Soviet -of Workmen and Soldiers' Deputies, Skobelev, said to a journalist:-- - -"I must confess that, when in the beginning of the Revolution, I -went to the entrance of the Taurida Palace to meet the first band of -soldiers that had come to the Duma, and when I addressed them, I was -almost certain that I was delivering one of my last speeches, and that -in the course of the next few days I should be shot or hanged." - -Several officers who had taken part in the events assured me that -disorder and the universal incapacity for understanding the position in -the Capital were so great that _one solid battalion_, commanded by an -officer who knew what he wanted, might have upset the entire position. -Be that as it may, the temporary Committee of the Duma proclaimed on -March 2nd the formation of a Provisional Government. After lengthy -discussions with the parallel organs of "Democratic Power," the Soviet -of Workmen and Soldiers' Deputies, the Provisional Government issued a -declaration:-- - -"(1) Full and immediate amnesty for all political, religious and -terrorist crimes, military mutinies and agrarian offences, etc. - -"(2) Freedom of speech, the Press, meetings, unions and strikes. -Political liberties to be granted to all men serving in the Army within -the limits of military requirements. - -"(3) Cancellation of all restrictions of class, religion and -nationality. - -"(4) Immediate preparation for the convocation of a Constituent -Assembly elected by universal, equal, direct and secret suffrage for -the establishment of a form of government and of the Constitution of -the country. - -"(5) The police to be replaced by a people's Militia, with elected -chiefs, subordinate to the organ of Local Self-Government. - -"(6) Members of Local Self-Governing Institutions to be elected by -universal, equal, direct and secret suffrage. - -"(7) The units of the Army that have taken part in the Revolutionary -movement are not to be disarmed or removed from Petrograd. - -"(8) Military discipline to be preserved on parade and on duty. The -soldiers, however, are to be free to enjoy all social rights enjoyed by -other citizens. - -"The Provisional Government deems it its duty to add that it has no -intention of taking advantage of wartime to delay carrying out the -aforesaid reforms and measures." - -This Declaration was quite obviously drafted under pressure from the -"parallel power." - -In his book, _Mes Souvenirs de Guerre_, General Ludendorff says: "I -often dreamt of that Revolution which was to alleviate the burdens -of our war. Eternal chimera! To-day, however, the dream suddenly and -unexpectedly came true. I felt as if a heavy load had fallen off my -shoulders. I could not, however, foresee that it would be the grave of -our might." - -One of the most prominent leaders of Germany--the country that had -worked so hard for the poisoning of the soul of the Russian people--has -come to the belated conclusion that "Our moral collapse began with the -beginning of the Russian Revolution." - - - - -CHAPTER V. - -THE REVOLUTION AND THE IMPERIAL FAMILY. - - -Alone in the Governor's old Palace at Mohilev the Czar suffered in -silence; his wife and children were far away, and there was no one with -him in whom he was able or willing to confide. - -Protopopov and the Government had at first represented the state of -affairs as serious, but not alarming--popular disturbances to be -suppressed with "a firm hand." Several hundred machine-guns had been -placed at the disposal of General Habalov, Commander of the troops of -the Petrograd district. Both he and Prince Golitzin, President of the -Cabinet, had been given full authority to make use of exceptional means -of quelling the riots. On the morning of the 27th General Ivanov had -been despatched with a small detachment of troops and a secret warrant, -to be made public after the occupation of Czarskoe Selo. The warrant -invested him with full military and civic powers. No one could have -been less fitted than General Ivanov to occupy so highly important -a position, which amounted actually to a Military Dictatorship. -Ivanov was a very old man--an honest soldier, unfitted to cope with -political complications and no longer in possession of strength, -energy, will-power, or determination.... His success in dealing with -the Kronstadt disturbances of 1906 most probably suggested his present -nomination. - -Afterwards, when looking over Habalov's and Bieliaiev's[6] reports, -I was aghast at the pusillanimity and the shirking of responsibility -which they revealed. - -The clouds continue to darken. - -On February 26th the Empress wired to the Czar: "Am very anxious -about the state of affairs in town...." On the same day Rodzianko -sent his historic telegram: "Position serious. Anarchy in the -capital. Government paralysed. Transport, supplies of fuel and -other necessaries completely disorganised. General discontent grows. -Disorderly firing in the streets. Military units fire at each other. -Imperative necessity that some person popular in the country should be -authorised to form new Cabinet. No delay possible. Any delay fatal. -I pray God that the Monarch be not now held responsible." Rodzianko -forwarded copies of his telegram to all the Commanders-in-Chief, asking -their support. - -Early on the 27th the President of the Duma wired again to the Czar: -"Position constantly aggravated. Measures must be taken immediately, as -to-morrow may be too late. This hour decides the fate of our country -and the dynasty." - -It is incredible that, after this, the Czar should not have realised -the impending catastrophe, but, in the weakness and irresolution -that characterised him, it is probable that he seized the slightest -available excuse to postpone his decision, and in a fatalistic manner, -left to fate to carry out her secret decrees.... - -Be that as it may, another impressive warning from General Alexeiev, -confirmed by telegrams from the Commanders-in-Chief, yielded no better -results, and the Czar, anxious about the fate of his family, left for -Czarskoe Selo on the morning of the 29th, without coming to any final -decision on the concessions to be granted to his people. - -General Alexeiev, although straightforward, wise, and patriotic, was -lacking in firmness, and his power and influence with the Emperor were -too slight to permit of his insisting on a step the obvious necessity -for which was evident even to the Empress. She wired to her husband on -the 27th: "Concessions inevitable." - -The futile journey was two days in accomplishment. Two days without -any correspondence or news as to the course of events, which were -developing and changing every hour.... The Imperial train, taking a -roundabout course, was stopped at Vishera by orders from Petrograd. -On hearing that the Petrograd garrison had acclaimed the Provisional -Committee of the Duma, and that the troops of Czarskoe Selo had sided -with the Revolution, the Czar returned to Pskov. - -At Pskov, on the evening of March 1st, the Czar saw General Ruzsky, who -explained the position to him, but no decision was arrived at, except -that on the 2nd of March, at 2 a.m., the Czar again sent for Ruzsky, -and handed him an ukase, which made the Cabinet responsible to the -Duma. "I knew that this compromise had come too late," said Ruzsky to -a correspondent, "but I had no right to express my opinion, not having -received any instructions from the Executive Committee of the Duma, so -I suggested that the Emperor should see Rodzianko."[7] - -All night long discussions full of deep interest and importance to the -fate of the country were held over the wire--between Ruzsky, Rodzianko, -and Alexeiev; between Headquarters and the Commanders-in-Chief, and -between Lukomsky[8] and Danilov.[9] - -They unanimously agreed that the Abdication of the Emperor was -unavoidable. - -Before midday on March 2nd Ruzsky communicated the opinion of Rodzianko -and the Military Commanders to the Czar. The Emperor heard him calmly, -with no sign of emotion on his fixed, immovable countenance, but at 3 -p.m. he sent Ruzsky a signed Act of Abdication in favour of his son--a -document drawn up at Headquarters and forwarded to him at Pskov. - -If the sequence of historical events follows immutable laws of its -own, there also seems to be a fate influencing casual happenings of -a simple, everyday nature, which otherwise seem quite avoidable. The -thirty minutes that elapsed after Ruzsky had received the Act of -Abdication materially affected the whole course of subsequent events: -before copies of the document could be despatched, a communication, -announcing the delegates of the Duma, Gutchkov and Shulgin, was -received.... The Czar again postponed his decision and stopped the -publication of the Act. - -The delegates arrived in the evening. - -Amidst the complete silence of the audience,[10] Gutchkov pictured the -abyss that the country was nearing, and pointed out the only course to -be taken--the abdication of the Czar. - -"I have been thinking about it all yesterday and to-day, and have -decided to abdicate," answered the Czar. "Until three o'clock to-day I -was willing to abdicate in favour of my son, but I then came to realise -that I could not bear to part with him. I hope you will understand -this? As a consequence, I have decided to abdicate in favour of my -brother." - -The delegates, taken aback by such an unexpected turn of events, -made no objection. Emotion kept Gutchkov silent. "He felt he could -not intrude on paternal relations, and considered that any pressure -brought to bear upon the Emperor would be out of place." Shulgin was -influenced by political motives. "He feared the little Czar might grow -up harbouring feelings of resentment against those who had parted him -from his father and mother; also the question whether a regent could -take the oath to the Constitution on behalf of an Emperor, who was not -of age was a matter of debate."[11] - -"The resentment" of the little Czar concerned a distant future. As to -legality, the very essence of a Revolution precludes the legality of -its consequences. Also the _enforced_ abdication of Nicholas II., his -rejection of the rights of inheritance of _his son_, a minor, and, -lastly, the transfer of supreme power by Michael Alexandrovitch, a -person who _had never_ held it, to the Provisional Government by means -of an act, in which the Grand Duke "appeals" to Russian citizens to -obey the Government, are all of doubtful legality. - -It is not surprising that, "in the minds of those living in those -first days of the Revolution"--as Miliukov says--"the new Government, -established by the Revolution, was looked upon, not as a consequence -of the acts of March 2nd and 3rd, but as a result of the events of -February 27th...." - -I may add that later, in the minds of many Commanding Officers--amongst -them, Kornilov, Alexeiev, Romanovsky and Markov, who played a -leading part in the attempt to save Russia--legal, party or dynastic -considerations had no place. This circumstance is of primary importance -for a proper understanding of subsequent events. - -About midnight on March 2nd the Czar handed Rodzianko and Ruzsky two -slightly amended copies of the Manifesto of his Abdication. - - * * * * * - -"In the midst of our great conflict with a foreign enemy, who has been -striving for close on three years to enslave our country, it has been -the will of God to subject Russia to new and heavy trials. Incipient -popular disturbances now imperil the further course of the stubborn -war. The fate of Russia, the honour of our heroic Army, the entire -future of our beloved Land, demand that the war should be carried to a -victorious conclusion. - -"The cruel foe is nearly at his last gasp, and the hour approaches when -our gallant Army, together with our glorious Allies, will finally crush -our enemy's resistance. In these decisive days of Russia's existence we -feel it our duty to further the firm cohesion and unification of all -the forces of the people, and, with the approval of the State Duma, -consider it best to abdicate the Throne of Russia and lay down our -supreme power. Not wishing to part from our beloved Son, we transmit -our inheritance to our Brother, the Grand Duke Michael Alexandrovitch, -and give him our blessing in ascending the Throne of the Russian Empire. - -"We command our Brother to rule the State in complete and undisturbed -union with the representatives of the people in such Legislative -Institutions as the People will see fit to establish, binding himself -by oath thereto in the name of our beloved country. - -"I call all true sons of the Fatherland to fulfil their sacred duty--to -obey the Czar in this time of sore distress and help him, together with -the representatives of the people, to lead the Russian State along the -road to victory, happiness and glory. - -"May the Lord our God help Russia! - - "NICHOLAS." - - * * * * * - -Late at night the Imperial train left for Mohilev. Dead silence, -lowered blinds and heavy, heavy thoughts. No one will ever know what -feelings wrestled in the breast of Nicholas II., of the Monarch, the -Father and the Man, when, on meeting Alexeiev at Mohilev, and looking -straight at the latter with kindly, tired eyes, he said irresolutely:-- - -_"I have changed my mind. Please send this telegram to Petrograd."_ - -_On a small sheet of paper, in a clear hand, the Czar had himself -traced his consent to the immediate accession to the throne of his son, -Alexis_.... - -Alexeiev took the telegram, and--did not send it. It was too late; both -Manifestoes had already been made public to the Army and to the country. - -For fear of "unsettling public opinion," Alexeiev made no mention -of the telegram, and kept it in his portfolio until he passed it on -to me towards the end of May, when he resigned his post of Supreme -Commander-in-Chief. The document, of vast importance to future -biographers of the Czar, was afterwards kept under seal at the -Operations Department of General Headquarters. - - * * * * * - -Meantime, the members of the Cabinet and of the Provisional -Committee[12] had assembled at the Palace of the Grand Duke Michael -Alexandrovitch about midday on May 3rd. Since the 27th of February, -the latter had been cut off from all communication with Headquarters -or with the Emperor. But the issue of this Conference was practically -predetermined by the spirit prevailing in the Soviet of Workmen's -Delegates, after the gist of the Manifesto became known to them, by the -Resolution of Protest passed by their Executive Committee and forwarded -to the Government, by Kerensky's uncompromising attitude, and by the -general correlation of forces. Except Miliukov and Gutchkov, all the -others, "without the faintest desire of influencing the Grand Duke -in any way," eagerly advised him to abdicate. Miliukov warned them -that "the support of a symbol familiar to the masses is necessary, -if decided authority is to be maintained, and that the Provisional -Government, if left alone, might founder in the sea of popular -disturbances, and that it might not survive until the Convocation of -the Constituent Assembly...." - -After another conference with Rodzianko, President of the Duma, the -Grand Duke came to his final decision to abdicate. - -The "Declaration" of the Grand Duke was published on the same day: - - "A heavy burden has been laid on me by the wish of my Brother, who - has transferred the Imperial Throne of All Russia to me at a time - of unexampled warfare and popular disturbances. - - "Animated, together with the nation, by one thought, that the - welfare of our country must prevail over every other consideration, - I have decided to accept supreme power only if such be the will - of our great people, whose part it is to establish the form of - government and new fundamental laws of the Russian State through - their representatives in the Constituent Assembly. - - "With a prayer to God for His blessing, I appeal to all citizens - of the Russian State to obey the Provisional Government, which - is constituted and invested with full powers by the will of the - State Duma, until a Constituent Assembly, convoked at the earliest - possible moment by universal, direct, equal and secret suffrage, - can establish a form of government which will embody the will of - the people." - - "MICHAEL." - -After his abdication, the Grand Duke resided in the neighbourhood of -Gatchino, and stood completely aloof from political life. About the -middle of March, 1918, he was arrested by order of the local Bolshevik -Committee, taken to Petrograd, and, some time later, exiled to the -Government of Perm. - -It was rumoured that the Grand Duke, accompanied by his faithful -English valet, had escaped about the middle of July; since then nothing -definite has been heard about him. The search organised by the Siberian -Government and by that of Southern Russia, as also by the desire of the -Dowager Empress, yielded no certain results. The Bolsheviks, for their -part, volunteered no official information whatever. But subsequent -investigations brought some data to light which indicated that the -"release" was a deception, and that the Grand Duke was secretly carried -off by Bolsheviks, murdered in the vicinity of Perm, and his body -drowned under the ice. - -The mystery of the Grand Duke's fate gave rise to fanciful rumours -and even to the appearance of impostors in Siberia. During the summer -of 1918, at the time of the first successful advance of the Siberian -troops, it was widely reported both in Soviet Russia and in the South -that the Siberian Anti-Bolshevist forces were led by the Grand Duke -Michael Alexandrovitch. Periodically, until late in 1919, his spurious -manifestoes appeared in the Provincial Press, chiefly in papers of the -extreme Right. - -It must be noted, however, that when, in the summer of 1918, the Kiev -monarchists carried on an active campaign to impart a monarchical -character to the Anti-Bolshevist military movement, they rejected the -principle of legitimacy, partly because of the personality of some of -the candidates, and, in regard to Michael Alexandrovitch, because he -had "tied himself" by a solemn promise to the Constituent Assembly. - -In consideration of the complexity and confusion of the conditions that -obtained in March, 1917, I have come to the conclusion that a struggle -to retain Nicholas II. at the head of the State would have led to -anarchy, disruption of the Front, and terrible consequences, both for -the Czar and for the country. A Regency, with Michael Alexandrovitch -as Regent, might have involved conflict, but no disturbance, and was -certain of success. It would have been more difficult to place Michael -Alexandrovitch on the throne, but even that would have been possible if -a Constitution on broad, democratic lines had been accepted by him. - -The members of the Provisional Government and of the Provisional -Committee--Miliukov and Gutchkov excepted--terrorised by the Soviets of -Workmen's Delegates, and attributing too much importance to them and to -the excited workmen and soldier masses in Petrograd, took on themselves -a heavy responsibility for the future when they persuaded the Grand -Duke to decline the immediate assumption of Supreme Power.[13] - -I am not referring to Monarchism or to a particular dynasty. These are -secondary questions. I am speaking of Russia only. - -It is certainly hard to say whether this power would have been lasting -and stable, whether it would not have undergone changes later on; but, -if it had even succeeded in maintaining the Army during the war, the -subsequent course of Russian history might have been one of progress, -and the upheavals that now endanger her very existence might have been -avoided. - - * * * * * - -On March 7th the Provisional Government issued an order according to -which "The ex-Emperor and his Consort are deprived of liberty, and the -ex-Emperor is to be taken to Czarskoe Selo." The duty of arresting the -Empress was laid on Kornilov, and orthodox Monarchists never forgave -him for it. But, strangely enough, Alexandra Fedorovna, after hearing -of the warrant, expressed her satisfaction that the renowned General -Kornilov, and not a member of the new Government, had been sent to her. - -The Emperor was arrested by four members of the Duma. - -On March 8th, after leave-takings at Headquarters, the Czar quitted -Mohilev amidst the stony silence of the crowd, and under the tearful -eyes of his mother, who never saw her son again. - -To understand the seemingly incomprehensible behaviour of the -Government to the Imperial family during the period of their residence -both at Czarskoe Selo and at Tobolsk, the following circumstances must -be kept in mind. Notwithstanding that, in the seven and a half months -of the existence of the Provisional Government, not one single serious -attempt was made to liberate the captives, yet they attracted the -exclusive attention of the Soviet of Workmen and Soldiers' Delegates. -On March 10th Vice-President Sokolov made the following announcement -to a unanimously approving audience: "I was informed yesterday that -the Provisional Government had consented to allow Nicholas II. to go -to England and that it is discussing arrangements with the British -authorities without the knowledge or the consent of the Executive -Committee of Workmen's and Soldiers' Delegates. We have mobilised all -the military units that we can influence, and have taken measures to -prevent Nicholas II. from leaving Czarskoe without our permission. -Telegrams have been sent down the railway lines ... to detain the train -of Nicholas II. should it appear.... We have despatched our Commissars -with the necessary number of troops and armoured cars, and have closely -surrounded the Alexander Palace. After that we conferred with the -Provisional Government, who confirmed all our orders. At present -the late Czar is under our protection, as well as under that of the -Provisional Government...." - -On the 1st August, 1917, the Imperial family was exiled to Tobolsk, -and, after the establishment of Bolshevist rule in Siberia, they were -transferred to Ekaterinburg, and were the victims of incredible insults -and cruelty by the mob, until they were put to death.[14] Thus did -Nicholas II. atone for his grievous sins, voluntary and involuntary, -against the Russian people.[15] - -In the course of the second Kuban campaign I received the news of the -death of the Emperor Nicholas II., and ordered memorial services for -the soul of the former leader of the Russian Army to be held in the -Volunteer Army. Democratic circles and the Press criticised me severely -for this. - -The words of wisdom, _Vengeance is mine: I will repay_, were obviously -forgotten. - - - - -CHAPTER VI. - -THE REVOLUTION AND THE ARMY. - - -ORDER NO. 1. - -These events found me far away from the Capital, in Roumania, where I -was commanding the Eighth Army Corps. In our remoteness from the Mother -Country we felt a certain tension in the political atmosphere, but we -certainly were not prepared for the sudden _denouement_ or for the -shape it assumed. - -On the morning of March 3rd I received a telegram from Army -Headquarters--"For personal information"--to the effect that a mutiny -had broken out in Petrograd, that the Duma had assumed power, and that -the publication of important State documents was expected. A few hours -later the wire transmitted the manifestoes of the Emperor Nicholas -the Second and of the Grand Duke Michael. At first an order was given -for their distribution, then, much to my amazement (as the telephones -had already been spreading the news) the order was countermanded -and finally confirmed. These waverings were apparently due to the -negotiations between the temporary Committee of the Duma and the -Headquarters of the Norman Front about postponing the publication of -these Acts owing to a sudden change in the Emperor's fundamental idea, -namely, the substitution of the Grand Duke Michael for the Grand Duke -Alexis as Heir to the Throne. It proved, however, impossible to delay -the distribution. The troops were thunderstruck. No other word can -describe the first impression produced by the _manifestoes_. There was -neither sorrow nor rejoicing. There was deep, thoughtful silence. Thus -did the regiments of the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Divisions take the -news of the abdication of their Emperor. Only occasionally on parade -did the rifle waver and tears course down the cheeks of old soldiers. - -In order accurately to describe the spirit of the moment, undimmed by -the passing of time, I will quote extracts from a letter I wrote to a -near relation on March 8th: - -"A page of history has been turned. The first impression is stunning -because it is so unexpected and so grandiose. On the whole, however, -the troops have taken the events quietly. They express themselves -with caution; but three definite currents in the mentality of the men -can easily be traced: (1) A return to the past is impossible; (2) the -country will receive a Constitution worthy of a great people, probably -a Constitutional Limited Monarchy; (3) German domination will come to -an end and the war will be victoriously prosecuted." - -The Emperor's abdication was considered as the inevitable result of -the internal policy of the last few years. There was, however, no -irritation against the Emperor personally or against the Imperial -Family. Everything was forgiven and forgotten. On the contrary, -everyone was interested in their fate, and feared the worst. The -appointment of the Grand Duke Nicholas as Supreme Commander-in-Chief, -and of General Alexeiev as his Chief-of-Staff, was favourably received, -alike by officers and men, and interest was manifested in the question -as to whether the Army would be represented in the Constituent -Assembly. The composition of the Provisional Government was treated -more or less as a matter of indifference. The appointment of a civilian -to the War Ministry was criticised, and it was only the part he had -taken in the Council of National Defence, and his close connection with -the officers' circles, that mitigated the unfavourable impression. A -great many people have found it surprising and incomprehensible that -the collapse of a Monarchist regime several centuries old should not -have provoked in the Army, bred in its traditions, either a struggle or -even isolated outbreaks, or that the Army should not have created its -own Vendee. - -I know of three cases only of stout resistance: The march of General -Ivanov's detachment on Czarskoe Selo, organised by Headquarters in -the first days of the risings in Petrograd, very badly executed and -soon countermanded, and two telegrams addressed to the Emperor by -the Commanding Officers of the Third Cavalry and the Guards Cavalry -Corps, Count Keller (killed in Kiev in 1918 by Petlura's men) and Khan -Nachitchevansky. They both offered themselves and their troops for -the suppression of the mutiny. It would be a mistake to assume that -the Army was quite prepared to accept the provisional "Democratic -Republic," that there were no "loyal" units or "loyal" chiefs ready -to engage in the struggle. They undoubtedly existed. There were, -however, two circumstances which exercised a restraining influence. -In the first place, both Acts of Abdication were apparently legal, -and the second of these Acts, in summoning the people to submit to -the Provisional Government "invested with full power," took the wind -out of the sails of the monarchists. In the second place, it was -apprehended that civil war might open the front to the enemy. The Army -was _then_ obedient to its leaders, and they--General Alexeiev and all -the Commanders-in-Chief--recognised the new power. The newly-appointed -Supreme Commander-in-Chief, the Grand Duke Nicholas, said in his first -Order of the Day: "The power is established in the person of the new -Government. I, the Supreme Commander-in-Chief, have recognised that -power for the good of our Mother Country, serving as an example to us -of our duty as soldiers. I order all ranks of our gallant Army and Navy -implicitly to obey the established Government through their direct -Chiefs. Only then will God grant us victory." - - * * * * * - -The days went by. I began to receive many--both slight and important-- -expressions of bewilderment and questions from the units of my corps: -Who represents the Supreme Power in Russia? Is it the temporary -Committee which created the Provisional Government, or is it the -latter? I sent an inquiry, but received no answer. The Provisional -Government itself, apparently, had no clear notion of the essence of -its power. - -For whom should we pray at Divine Service? Should we sing the National -Anthem and "O God, Save Thy People!" (a prayer in which the Emperor was -mentioned)? - -These apparent trifles produced, however, a certain confusion in the -minds of the men and interfered with established military routine. The -Commanding Officers requested that the oath should be taken as soon as -possible. There was also the question whether the Emperor Nicolas had -the right to abdicate not only for himself, but for his son, who had -not yet attained his majority. - -Other questions soon began to interest the troops. We received the -first Order of the Day of the War Minister, Gutchkov, with alterations -of the Army Regulations in favour of the "Democratisation of the Army" -(March 5th). By this Order, inoffensive at first sight, the officers -were not to be addressed by the men according to their rank, and were -not to speak to the men in the second person singular. A series of -petty restrictions established by Army Regulations for the men, such -as no smoking in the streets and other public places, no card-playing, -and exclusion from Clubs and Meetings, were removed. The consequences -came as a surprise to those who were ignorant of the psychology of -the rank and file. The Commanding Officers understood that if it were -necessary to do away with certain out-of-date forms the process should -be gradual and cautious, and should by no means be interpreted as one -of "the fruits of the Revolutionary victory." The bulk of the men did -not trouble to grasp the meaning of these insignificant changes in the -Army Regulations, but merely accepted them as a deliverance from the -restrictions imposed on them by routine and by respect to the Senior -Officers. - -"There is liberty, and that's all there is to it." - -All these minor alterations of the Army Regulations, broadly -interpreted by the men, affected, to a certain degree, the discipline -of the army. But that soldiers should be permitted, during the war -and during the Revolution, to join in the membership of various -Unions and Societies formed for political purposes, was a menace to -the very existence of the army. G.H.Q., perturbed by this situation, -had recourse to a measure hitherto unknown in the army--to a kind of -plebiscite. All Commanding Officers, including Regimental Commanders, -were advised to address direct telegrams to the Minister of War, -expressing their views on the new orders. I do not know whether the -telegraph was able to cope with this task and whether the enormous mass -of telegrams reached their destination, but I know that those that came -to my notice were full of criticism and of fears for the future of -the army. At the same time, the Army Council in Petrograd, consisting -of Senior Generals--the would-be guardians of the experience and -traditions of the army--decided at a meeting held on March 10th to make -the following report to the Provisional Government: "The Army Council -deems it its duty to declare its full solidarity with the energetic -measures contemplated by the Provisional Government in re-modelling our -armed forces in accordance with the new forms of life in the country -and in the army. We are convinced that these reforms will be the best -means of achieving rapid victory and the deliverance of Europe from -the yoke of Prussian militarism." I cannot help sympathising with a -civilian War Minister after such an occurrence. It was difficult for -us to understand the motives by which the War Ministry was guided in -issuing its Orders of the Day. We were unaware of the unrestrained -opportunities of the men who surrounded the War Minister, as well as of -the fact that the Provisional Government was already dominated by the -Soviet and had entered upon the path of compromise, being invariably -on the losing side. At the Congress of the Soviets on March 30th, one -of the speakers stated that in the Conciliation Commission there never -was a case in which the Provisional Commission did not give way on -important matters. - - * * * * * - -ON THE FIRST OF MARCH THE SOVIET OF WORKMEN AND SOLDIERS' DELEGATES -ISSUED AN ORDER OF THE DAY No. 1., WHICH PRACTICALLY LED TO THE -TRANSFER OF ACTUAL MILITARY POWER TO THE SOLDIERS' COMMITTEES, TO A -SYSTEM OF ELECTIONS AND TO THE DISMISSAL OF COMMANDING OFFICERS BY THE -MEN. THAT ORDER OF THE DAY GAINED WIDE AND PAINFUL NOTORIETY AND GAVE -THE FIRST IMPETUS TO THE COLLAPSE OF THE ARMY. - - - _ORDER No. 1._ - - March 1st, 1917. - - To the Garrison of the Petrograd District, to all Guardsmen, - soldiers of the line, of the Artillery, and of the Fleet, for - immediate and strict observance, and to the workmen of Petrograd - for information. - - The Soviet of Workmen and Soldiers' Delegates has decreed: - - (1) That Committees be elected of representatives of the men in - all companies, battalions, regiments, parks, batteries, squadrons - and separate services of various military institutions, and on the - ships of the fleet. - - (2) All military units not yet represented on the Soviet of - Workmen's Delegates to elect one representative from each - company. These representatives to provide themselves with written - certificates and to report to the Duma at 10 A.M. on March 2nd. - - (3) In all its political activities the military unit is - subordinate to the Soviet,[16] and to its Committees. - - (4) The Orders of the Military Commission of the Duma are to be - obeyed only when they are not in contradiction with the orders and - decrees of the Soviet. - - (5) All arms--rifles, machine-guns, armoured cars, etc.--are to - be at the disposal and under the control of Company and Battalion - Committees, and should never be handed over to the officers even - should they claim them. - - (6) On parade and on duty the soldiers must comply with strict - military discipline; but off parade and off duty, in their - political, social and private life, soldiers must suffer no - restriction of the rights common to all citizens. In particular, - saluting when off duty is abolished. - - (7) Officers are no longer to be addressed as "Your Excellency," - "Your Honour," etc. Instead, they should be addressed as "Mr. - General," "Mr. Colonel," etc. - - Rudeness to soldiers on the part of all ranks, and in particular - addressing them in the second person singular, is prohibited, and - any infringement of this regulation and misunderstandings between - officers and men are to be reported by the latter to the Company - Commanders. - - (Signed) THE PETROGRAD SOVIET. - -The leaders of the Revolutionary Democracy understood full well -the results of Order No. 1. Kerensky is reported to have declared -afterwards pathetically that he would have given ten years of his -life to prevent the Order from being signed. The investigation made -by military authorities failed to detect the authors of this Order. -Tchkeidze and other members of the Soviet afterwards denied their -personal participation and that of the members of the Committee in the -drafting of the Order. - -Pilates! They washed their hands of the writing of their own Credo. For -their words are placed on record, in the report of the secret sitting -of the Government, the Commanders-in-Chief and the Executive Committee -of the Workmen and Soldiers' Deputies of May 4th, 1917: - -_Tzeretelli_: You might, perhaps, understand Order No. 1 if you knew -the circumstances in which it was issued. We were confronted with an -unorganised mob, and we had to organise. - -_Skobelev_: I consider it necessary to explain the circumstances in -which Order No. 1. was issued. Among the troops that overthrew the old -regime, the Commanding Officers did not join the rebels. In order to -deprive the former of their importance, we were forced to issue Order -No. 1. We had inward apprehensions as to the attitude of the front -towards the Revolution. Certain instructions were given, which provoked -our distrust. To-day we have ascertained that this distrust was well -founded. - -A member of the Soviet, Joseph Goldenberg, Editor of _New Life_, -was still more outspoken. He said to the French journalist, Claude -Anet: (Claude Anet: _La Revolution Russe_) "Order No. 1. was not an -error, but a necessity. It was not drafted by Sokolov. It is the -expression of the unanimous will of the Soviet. On the day we 'made the -Revolution,' we understood that if we did not dismember the old army, -it would crush the Revolution. We had to choose between the army and -the Revolution. We did not hesitate--we chose the latter, and I dare -say that we were right." - -Order No. 1. was disseminated rapidly and everywhere along the whole -front and in the rear, because the ideas which it embodied had -developed for many years, in the slums of Petrograd as well as in the -remote corners of the Empire, such as Vladivostock. They had been -preached by all local army demagogues and were being repeated by all -the delegates who visited the front in vast numbers and were provided -with certificates of immunity by the Soviet. - - * * * * * - -The masses of the soldiery were perturbed. The movement began in -the rear, always more easily demoralised than the front, among the -half-educated clerks, doctors' assistants, and technical units. In -the latter part of March in our units, breaches of discipline only -became more frequent. The officer in command of the Fourth Army was -expecting every hour that he would be arrested at his Headquarters by -the licentious bands of men attached to service battalions for special -duty, such as tailoring, cooking, bootmaking, etc. - -The text of the oath of allegiance to the Russian State was received -at last. The idea of Supreme Power was expressed in these words: "I -swear to obey the Provisional Government now at the head of the Russian -State, pending the expression of the popular will through the medium of -the Constituent Assembly." The oath was taken by the troops everywhere -without any disturbance, but the idyllic hopes of the Commanding -Officers were not fulfilled. There was no uplifting of the spirit and -the perturbed minds were not quieted. I may quote two characteristic -episodes. The Commander of one of the Corps on the Roumanian front -died of heart-failure during the ceremony. Count Keller declared that -he would not compel his corps to take the oath because he did not -understand the substance and the legal foundations of the Supreme Power -of the Provisional Government. (Replying to a question addressed from -the crowd as to who had elected the Provisional Government, Miliukov -had answered: "We have been elected by the Russian Revolution"). Count -Keller said he did not understand how one could swear allegiance to -Lvov, Kerensky and other individuals, because they could be removed -or relinquish their posts. Was the oath a sham? I think that not only -for the monarchists, but for many men who did not look upon the oath -as a mere formality, it was in any case a great, moral drama difficult -to live through. It was a heavy sacrifice made for the sake of the -country's salvation and for the preservation of the army.... - -In the middle of May I was ordered to attend a Council at the -Headquarters of the General-in-Command of the Fourth Army. A long -telegram was read from General Alexeiev full of the darkest possible -pessimism, recounting the beginning of the administrative machine and -of the army. He described the demagogic activities of the Soviet, -which dominated the will-power and the conscience of the Provisional -Government, the complete impotence of the latter and the interference -of both in army administration. - -In order to counteract the dismemberment of the army, the despatch was -contemplated of members of the Duma and of the Soviet, possessing a -certain amount of statesmanlike experience, to the front for purposes -of propaganda.... - -This telegram impressed us all in the same way: _General Headquarters -had ceased to be the chief administrative authority in the army._ -And yet a stern warning and remonstrance from the High Command, -supported by the army, which in the first fortnight had still retained -discipline and obedience might, perhaps, have relegated the Soviet, -which over-estimated its importance, to its proper place; might have -prevented the "democratisation" of the army and might have exercised -a corresponding pressure upon the entire course of political events, -albeit devoid of any character of counter-revolution or of military -dictatorship. The loyalty of the Commanding Officers and the complete -absence of active resistance on their part to the destructive policy of -Petrograd exceeded all the expectations of the Revolutionary Democracy. - -Kornilov's movement came too late. - -We drafted a reply suggesting stringent measures against intrusion into -the sphere of military administration. On March 18th I received orders -to proceed forthwith to Petrograd and to report to the War Minister. -I left on the same night and by means of a complex system of carts, -motor cars and railway carriages arrived in the Capital after five -days' journey. On my way I passed through the Headquarters of Generals -Letchitski, Kaledin, and Brussilov. I met many officers and many men -connected with the army. Everywhere I heard the same bitter complaint -and the same request: - -"Tell _them_ that _they_ are ruining the army." - -The summons I had received gave no indication as to the object of my -errand. I was completely in the dark and made all kinds of surmises. -In Kiev I was struck by the cry of a newsboy who ran past. He shouted: -"Latest news. General Denikin is appointed Chief of the Staff of the -Supreme Commander-in-Chief." - - - - -CHAPTER VII. - -IMPRESSIONS OF PETROGRAD AT THE END OF MARCH, 1917. - - -Before his abdication the Emperor signed two ukazes--appointing Prince -Lvov President of the Council of Ministers and the Grand-Duke Nicholas -Supreme Commander-in-Chief. "In view of the general attitude towards -the Romanov Dynasty," as the official Petrograd papers said, and in -reality for fear of the Soviet's attempting a military _coup d'etat_, -the Grand-Duke Nicholas was informed on March 9th by the Provisional -Government that it was undesirable that he should remain in supreme -command. Prince Lvov wrote: "The situation makes your resignation -imperative. Public opinion is definitely and resolutely opposed to any -members of the House of Romanov holding any office in the State. The -Provisional Government is not entitled to disregard the voice of the -people, because such disregard might bring about serious complications. -The Provisional Government is convinced that, for the good of the -country, you will bow to the necessity and will resign before returning -to G.H.Q." This letter reached the Grand-Duke when he had already -arrived at G.H.Q. Deeply offended, he immediately handed over to -General Alexeiev and replied to the Government: "I am glad once more -to prove my love for my country, which Russia _heretofore_ has never -doubted...." - -The very serious question then arose of who was to succeed him. -There was great excitement at G.H.Q., and all sorts of rumours were -circulated, but on the day I passed Mohilev nothing was known. On the -23rd I reported to the War Minister Gutchkov, whom I had never met -before. He informed me that the Government had decided to appoint -General Alexeiev to the Supreme Command. At first there had been -differences of opinion. Rodzianko and others were against Alexeiev. -Rodzianko suggested Brussilov; but now the choice had definitely -fallen on Alexeiev. The Government considered him as a man of lenient -disposition, and deemed it necessary to reinforce the Supreme Command -by a fighting general as Chief-of-Staff. I had been selected on -condition that General Klembovski, who was then Alexeiev's assistant, -should remain in charge _pro tem._ until I became familiar with -the work. I had been, in part, prepared for this offer by the news -columns of the Kiev paper. Nevertheless, I felt a certain emotion, and -apprehended the vast amount of work which was being thrust upon me so -unexpectedly and the tremendous moral responsibility inherent in such -an appointment. At great length and quite sincerely I adduced arguments -against the appointment. I said that my career had been spent among my -men and at Fighting Headquarters, that during the war I had commanded -a division and an army corps, and that I was very anxious to continue -this work at the front. I said that I had never dealt with matters of -policy, of national defence, or of administration on such a colossal -scale. The appointment, moreover, had an unpleasant feature. It appears -that Gutchkov had quite frankly explained to Alexeiev the reasons -for my appointment on behalf of the Provisional Government, and had -given the matter the character of an ultimatum. A grave complication -had thus arisen. A Chief-of-Staff was being imposed upon the Supreme -C.-in-C., and for motives not altogether complimentary to the latter. -My arguments, however, were unavailing. I succeeded in obtaining a -delay and the privilege of discussing the matter with General Alexeiev -before taking a definite decision. In the War Minister's office I -met my colleague, General Krymov, and we were both present while the -Minister's assistants reported on uninteresting matters of routine. We -then retired into the next room and began to talk frankly. - -"For God's sake," said Krymov, "don't refuse the appointment. It is -absolutely necessary." - -He imparted to me his impressions in abrupt sentences in his own -peculiar and somewhat rough language, but with all his usual sincerity. -He had arrived on March 14th, summoned by Gutchkov, with whom he had -been on friendly terms, and they had worked together. He was offered -several prominent posts, had asked leave to look round, and then -had refused them all. "I saw that there was nothing for me to do in -Petrograd, and I disliked it all." He particularly disliked the men who -surrounded Gutchkov. - -"I am leaving Colonel Samarine, of the General Staff, as a Liaison -Officer. There will be at least one live man." - -By the irony of fate that officer whom Krymov trusted so well -afterwards played a fatal part, as he was the indirect cause of the -General's suicide.... Krymov was very pessimistic in his account of the -political situation: - -"Nothing will come of it in any case. How can business be done when -the Soviet and the licentious soldiery hold the Government pinioned? -I offered to cleanse Petrograd in two days with one division; but, -of course, not without bloodshed. 'Not for anything in the world,' -they said. Gutchkov refused. Prince Lvov, with a gesture of despair, -exclaimed: 'Oh! but there would be such a commotion!' Things will get -worse. One of these days I shall go back to my army corps. I cannot -afford to lose touch with the troops, as it is upon them that I base -all my hopes. My corps maintains complete order and, perhaps, I shall -succeed in preserving that spirit." - - * * * * * - -I had not seen Petrograd for four years. The impression produced by the -Capital was painful and strange.... To begin with, the Hotel Astoria, -where I stayed, had been ransacked. In the hall there was a guard -of rough and undisciplined sailors of the Guards. The streets were -crowded, but dirty and filled with the new masters of the situation -in khaki overcoats. Remote from the sufferings of the front, they -were "deepening and saving" the Revolution. From whom? I had read a -great deal about the enthusiasm in Petrograd, but I found none. It -was nowhere to be seen. The ministers and rulers were pale, haggard, -exhausted by sleepless nights and endless speeches at meetings and -councils, by addresses to various delegations and to the mob. Their -excitement was artificial, their oratory was full of sonorous phrases -and commonplaces, of which the orators themselves were presumably -thoroughly sick. Inwardly in their heart of hearts they were deeply -anxious. No practical work was being done; in fact, the ministers had -no time to concentrate their thoughts upon the current affairs of -State in their departments. The old bureaucratic machine, creaking and -groaning, continued to work in a haphazard manner. The old wheels were -still revolving while a new handle was being applied. - -The officers of the regular army felt themselves to be stepsons of -the Revolution and were unable to hit upon a proper tone in dealing -with the men. Among the higher ranks, and especially the officers of -the General Staff, there appeared already a new type of opportunist -and demagogue. These men played upon the weaknesses of the Soviet and -of the new governing class of workmen and soldiers, to flatter the -instincts of the crowd, thereby gaining their confidence and making new -openings for themselves and for their careers against the background -of revolutionary turmoil. I must, however, admit that in those days -the military circles proved sufficiently stolid in spite of all the -efforts to dismember them, and that the seeds of demoralisation were -not allowed to grow. Men of the type described above, such as the young -assistant of the War Minister, Kerensky, as well as Generals Brussilov, -Cheremissov, Bonch-Bruevitch, Verkhovsky, Admiral Maximov and others -were unable to strengthen their influence and their position with the -officers. - -The citizen of Petrograd, in the broadest sense of the word, was by no -means enthusiastic. The first enthusiasm was exhausted and was followed -by anxiety and indecision. - -Another feature of the life in Petrograd deserves to be noticed. Men -have ceased to be themselves. Most of them seem to be acting a part -instead of living a life inspired by the new breath of revolution. -Such was the case even in the Councils of the Provisional Government, -in which the deliberations were not altogether sincere, so I was -told, owing to the presence of Kerensky, the "hostage of democracy." -Tactical considerations, caution, partisanship, anxiety for one's -career, feelings of self-preservation, nervousness and various -other good and bad feelings prompted men to wear blinkers and to -walk about in these blinkers as apologists for, or at least passive -witnesses of, "the conquests of the Revolution." Such conquests as -obviously savoured of death and corruption. Hence the false pathos -of endless speeches and meetings; hence these seemingly strange -contradictions. Prince Lvov saying in a public speech: "The process -of the great Russian Revolution is not yet complete, but every day -strengthens our faith in the inexhaustible creative forces of the -Russian people, in its statesmanlike wisdom and in the greatness of -its soul."... The same Prince Lvov bitterly complaining to Alexeiev -of the impossible conditions under which the Provisional Government -was working, owing to the rapid growth of demagogy in the Soviet -and in the country. Kerensky, the exponent of the idea of Soldiers' -Committees, and Kerensky sitting in his railway carriage and nervously -whispering to his adjutant: "Send these d.... committees to h...." -Tchkheidze and Skobelev warmly advocating full democratisation of the -army at a joint sitting of the Soviet, of the Government and of the -Commanders-in-Chief, and during an interval in private conversation -admitting the necessity of rigid military discipline and of their own -incapacity to convince the Soviet of this necessity.... - -I repeat that even then, at the end of March, one could clearly feel -in Petrograd that the ringing of the Easter bells had lasted too long, -and that they would have done better to ring the alarm bell. There were -only two men of all those to whom I had the occasion to speak who had -no illusions whatever: Krymov and Kornilov. - - * * * * * - -I met Kornilov for the first time on the Galician plains, near Galtich, -at the end of August, 1914, when he was appointed to the Command of -the 48th Infantry Division and myself to the 4th (Iron) Rifle Brigade. -Since that day, for four months, our troops went forward side by side -as part of the 14th Corps, fighting incessant, glorious and heavy -battles, defeating the enemy, crossing the Carpathians and invading -Hungary. Owing to the wide extent of the front we did not often meet; -nevertheless, we knew each other very well. I had already then a clear -perception of Kornilov's main characteristics as a leader. He had an -extraordinary capacity for training troops: out of a second-rate unit -from the district of Kazan he made, in several weeks, an excellent -fighting division. He was resolute and extremely pertinacious in -conducting the most difficult and even apparently doomed operations. -His personal prowess, which provoked boundless admiration and gave -him great popularity among the troops, was admirable. Finally, he -scrupulously observed military ethics with regard to units fighting -by his side and to his comrades-in-arms. Many commanding officers -and units lacked that quality. After Kornilov's astounding escape -from Austrian captivity, into which he fell when heavily wounded, -and covering Brussilov's retreat from the Carpathians, towards the -beginning of the Revolution, he commanded the 25th Corps. All those -who knew Kornilov even slightly felt that he was destined to play -an important part in the Russian Revolution. On March 2nd Rodzianko -telegraphed direct to Kornilov: "The Temporary Committee of the Duma -requests you, for your country's sake, to accept the chief command -in Petrograd and to arrive at the Capital at once. We have no doubt -that you will not refuse the appointment, and will thereby render an -inestimable service to the country." Such a revolutionary method of -appointing an officer to a high command, without reference to G.H.Q., -obviously produced a bad impression at the "Stavka." The telegram -received at the "Stavka" is marked "Undelivered," but on the same day -General Alexeiev, having requested the permission of the Emperor, who -was then at Pskov, issued an order of the day (No. 334): "... I agree -to General Kornilov being in temporary high command of the troops of -the Petrograd Military District." - -I have mentioned this insignificant episode in order to explain the -somewhat abnormal relations between two prominent leaders, which were -occasioned by repeated, petty, personal friction. - -I talked to Kornilov at dinner in the War Minister's house. It was the -only moment of rest he could snatch during the day. Kornilov, tired, -morose and somewhat pessimistic, discussed at length the conditions -of the Petrograd Garrison, and his intercourse with the Soviet. The -hero-worship with which he had been surrounded in the army had faded in -the unhealthy atmosphere of the Capital among the demoralised troops. -They were holding meetings, deserting, indulging in petty commerce -in shops and in the street, serving as hall-porters and as personal -guards to private individuals, partaking in plundering and arbitrary -searches, but were not serving. It was difficult for a fighting general -to understand their psychology. He often succeeded by personal pluck, -disregard of danger, and by a witty, picturesque word in holding the -mob, for that was what military units were. There were, however, -cases when the troops did not come out of barracks to meet their -Commander-in-Chief, when he was hissed and the flag of St. George was -torn from his motor-car (by the Finland Regiment of the Guards). - -Kornilov's description of the political situation was the same as that -given by Krymov: Powerlessness of the Government and the inevitability -of a fierce cleansing of Petrograd. On one point they differed: -Kornilov stubbornly clung to the hope that he would yet succeed in -gaining authority over the majority of the Petrograd Garrison. As we -know, that hope was never fulfilled. - - - - -CHAPTER VIII. - -THE STAVKA: ITS ROLE AND POSITION. - - -On March 25th I arrived at the Stavka, and was immediately received -by General Alexeiev. Of course he was offended. "Well," he said, "if -such are the orders, what's to be done?" Again, as at the War Ministry, -I pointed out several reasons against my appointment, among others, -my disinclination for Staff work. I asked the General to express his -views quite frankly, and in disregard of all conventionalities as my -old Professor, because I would not think of accepting the appointment -against his will. Alexeiev spoke politely, dryly, evasively, and -showed again that he was offended. "The scope," he said, "was wide, -work difficult, and much training necessary. Let us, however, work -harmoniously." In the course of my long career I have never been placed -in such a position, and could not, of course, be reconciled to such an -attitude. "In these circumstances," I said, "I absolutely refuse to -accept the appointment. In order to avoid friction between yourself -and the Government, I will declare that it is entirely my own personal -decision." - -Alexeiev's tone changed immediately. "Oh! no," he said, "I am not -asking you to refuse. Let us work together, and I will help you. Also, -there is no reason, if you feel that the work is not to your liking, -why you should not take command of the First Army, in which there will -be a vacancy two or three months hence. I will have to talk the matter -over with General Klembovski. He could not, of course, remain here as -my assistant." - -[Illustration: General Alexeiev.] - -[Illustration: General Kornilov.] - -Our parting was not quite so frigid; but a couple of days went by and -there were no results. I lived in a railway carriage, and did not go to -the office or to the mess. As I did not intend to tolerate this silly -and utterly undeserved position, I was preparing to leave Petrograd. -On March 28th the War Minister came to the Stavka and cut the Gordian -knot. Klembovski was offered the command of an army or membership of -the War Council. He chose the latter, and on April 5th I took charge -as Chief of the Staff. Nevertheless, such a method of appointing the -closest assistant to the Supreme Commander-in-Chief, practically by -force, could not but leave a certain trace. A kind of shadow seemed -to lie between myself and General Alexeiev, and it did not disappear -until the last stage of his tenure of office. Alexeiev saw in my -appointment a kind of tutelage on the part of the Government. From the -very first moment I was compelled to oppose Petrograd. I served our -cause and tried to shield the Supreme C.-in-C.--and of this he was -often unaware--from many conflicts and much friction, taking them upon -myself. As time went by friendly relations of complete mutual trust -were established, and these did not cease until the day of Alexeiev's -death. - -On April 2nd the General received the following telegram: "The -Provisional Government has appointed you Supreme Commander-in-Chief. -It trusts that, under your firm guidance, the Army and the Navy will -fulfil their duty to the country to the end." My appointment was -gazetted on April 10th. - - * * * * * - -The Stavka, on the whole was not favoured. In the circles of the -Revolutionary Democracy it was considered a nest of counter-Revolution, -although such a description was utterly undeserved. Under Alexeiev -there was a loyal struggle against the disruption of the Army. Under -Brussilov--opportunism slightly tainted with subservience to the -Revolutionary Democracy. As regards the Kornilov movement, although it -was not essentially counter-Revolutionary, it aimed, as we shall see -later, at combatting the Soviets that were half-Bolshevik. But, even -then, the loyalty of the officers of the Stavka was quite obvious. Only -a few of them took an active part in the Kornilov movement. After the -office of Supreme Commander-in-Chief was abolished, and the new office -created of Supreme Commanding Committees, nearly all the members of -the Stavka under Kerensky, and the majority of them under Krylenko, -continued to carry on the routine work. The Army also disliked the -Stavka--sometimes wrongly, sometimes rightly--because the Army did -not quite understand the distribution of functions among the various -branches of the Service, and ascribed to the Stavka many shortcomings -in equipment, organisation, promotion, awards, etc., whereas these -questions belonged entirely to the War Ministry and its subordinates. -The Stavka had always been somewhat out of touch with the Army. Under -the comparatively normal and smoothly working conditions of the -pre-Revolutionary period this circumstance did not greatly prejudice -the working of the ruling mechanism; but now, when the Army was not -in a normal condition, and had been affected by the whirlwind of the -Revolution, the Stavka naturally was behind the times. - -Finally, a certain amount of friction could not fail to arise between -the Government and the Stavka, because the latter constantly protested -against many Government measures, which exercised a disturbing -influence on the Army. There were no other serious reasons for -difference of opinion, because neither Alexeiev nor myself, nor the -various sections of the Stavka, ever touched upon matters of internal -policy. The Stavka was non-political in the fullest sense of the word, -and during the first months of the Revolution was a perfectly reliable -technical apparatus in the hands of the Provisional Government. The -Stavka did but safeguard the highest interests of the Army, and, within -the limits of the War and of the Army, demanded that full powers be -given to the Supreme Commander-in-Chief. I may even say that the -personnel of the Stavka seemed to me to be bureaucratic and too deeply -immersed in the sphere of purely technical interests; they were not -sufficiently interested in the political and social questions which -events had brought to the fore. - - * * * * * - -In discussing the Russian strategy in the Great War, after August, -1915, one should always bear in mind that it was the personal -strategy of General Alexeiev. He alone bears the responsibility -before history for its course, its successes and failures. A man of -exceptional conscientiousness and self-sacrifice, and devoted to -his work, he had one serious failing: all his life he did the work -of others as well as his own. So it was when he held the post of -Quartermaster-General of the General Staff, of Chief-of-Staff of the -Kiev District, and later of the South-Western front and finally of -Chief-of-Staff to the Supreme C.-in-C. Nobody influenced strategical -decisions, and, as often as not, final instructions, written in -Alexeiev's tiny and neat hand-writing, appeared unexpectedly on -the desk of the Quartermaster-General, whose duty under the law -and whose responsibility in these matters were very grave. If such -a procedure was to a certain extent justifiable, when the post of -Quartermaster-General was occupied by a nonentity, there was no excuse -for it when he was superseded by other Quartermasters-General, such as -Lukomski or Josephovitch. These men could not accept such a position. -The former, as a rule, protested by sending in memoranda embodying his -opinion, which was adverse to the plan of operations. Such protests, -of course, were purely academic, but presented a guarantee against -the judgment of history. General Klembovski, my predecessor, was -compelled to demand non-interference with the rightful sphere of his -competence as a condition of his tenure of office. Till then, Alexeiev -had directed all the branches of administration. When these branches -acquired a still broader scope, this proved practically impossible, -and I was given full liberty in my work except ... in respect of -strategy. Again, Alexeiev began to send telegrams in his own hand of -a strategical nature, orders and directions, the motives of which the -Quartermaster-General and myself could not understand. Several times, -three of us, the Quartermaster-General, Josephovitch, his assistant, -General Markov, and myself, discussed this question. The quick-tempered -Josephovitch was greatly excited, and asked to be appointed to a -Divisional Command. "I cannot be a clerk," he said. "There is no need -for a Quartermaster-General at the Stavka if every clerk can type -instructions." The General and myself began to contemplate resignation. -Markov said that he would not stay for a single day if we went. I -finally decided to have a frank talk with Alexeiev. We were both under -the strain of emotion. We parted as friends, but we did not settle the -question. Alexeiev said: "Do I not give you a full share of the work? I -do not understand you." Alexeiev was quite sincerely surprised because -during the war he had grown accustomed to a regime which appeared to -him perfectly normal. So we three held another conference. After a -lengthy discussion, we decided that the plan of campaign for 1917 had -long since been worked out, that preparations for that campaign had -reached a stage in which substantial alterations had become impossible, -that the details of the concentration and distribution of troops were -in the present condition of the Army a difficult matter, allowing for -differences of opinion; that we could perhaps manage to effect certain -alterations of the plan, and that finally our retirement _in corpore_ -might be detrimental to the work, and might undermine the position -of the Supreme C.-in-C., which was already by no means stable. We -therefore decided to wait and see. We did not have to wait very long, -because, at the end of May, Alexeiev left the Stavka, and we followed -him very soon afterwards. - - * * * * * - -What place did the Stavka occupy as a military and political factor of -the Revolutionary period? - -The importance of the Stavka diminished. In the days of the Imperial -regime, the Stavka, from the military point of view, occupied a -predominant position. No individual or institution in the State was -entitled to issue instructions or to call to account the Supreme -Commander-in-Chief, and it was Alexeiev and not the Czar who in reality -held that office. Not a single measure of the War Ministry, even if -indirectly affecting the interests of the Army, could be adopted -without the sanction of the Stavka. The Stavka gave direct orders to -the War Minister and to his Department on questions appertaining to -the care of the Army. The voice of the Stavka had a certain weight -and importance in the practical domain of administration at the -theatre of war, albeit without any connection with the general trend -of internal policy. That power was not exercised to a sufficient -degree; but on principle it afforded the opportunity of carrying on -the defence of the country in co-operation with other branches of the -administration, which were to a certain extent subordinate to it. With -the beginning of the Revolution, these conditions underwent a radical -change. Contrary to the examples of history and to the dictates of -military science, the Stavka became practically subordinate to the War -Minister. This was not due to any act of the Government, but merely to -the fact that the Provisional Government combined supreme power with -executive power, as well as to the combination of the strong character -of Gutchkov and the yielding nature of Alexeiev. The Stavka could no -longer address rightful demands to the branches of the War Ministry -which were attending to Army equipments. It conducted a lengthy -correspondence and appealed to the Ministry of War. The War Minister, -who now signed orders instead of the Emperor, exercised a strong -influence upon appointments and dismissals of officers in High Command. -These appointments were sometimes made by him after consultation with -the fronts, but the Stavka was not informed. Army regulations of the -highest importance altering the conditions of the troops in respect of -reinforcements, routine and duty, were issued by the Ministry without -the participation of the Supreme Command, which learnt of their issue -only from the Press. In fact, such a participation would have actually -been useless. Two products of the Polivanov Commission--the new Courts -and the Committees--which Gutchkov _accidentally_ asked me to look -through, were returned with a series of substantial objections of my -own, and Gutchkov expounded them in vain before the representatives of -the Soviet. The only result was that certain changes in the drafting of -the regulations were made. - -All these circumstances undoubtedly undermined the authority of the -Stavka in the eyes of the Army, and prompted the Generals in High -Command to approach the more powerful Central Government Departments -without reference to the Stavka, as well as to display excessive -individual initiative in matters of paramount importance to the -State and to the Army. Thus, in May, 1917, on the Northern Front, -all the pre-War soldiers were discharged instead of the prescribed -percentage, and this created grave difficulties on other fronts. On -the South-Western Front Ukranian units were being formed. The Admiral -in command of the Baltic Fleet ordered the officers to remove their -shoulder-straps, etc. - -The Stavka had lost influence and power, and could no longer occupy -the commanding position of an administrative and moral centre. This -occurred at the most terrible stage of the World War, when the Army -was beginning to disintegrate, and when not only the entire strength -of the people was being put to the test, but the necessity had arisen -for a power exceptionally strong and wide in its bearing. Meanwhile, -the matter was quite obvious: if Alexeiev and Denikin did not enjoy the -confidence of the Government, and were considered inadequate to the -requirements of the Supreme Command, they should have been superseded -by new men who did enjoy that confidence and who should have been -invested with full powers. As a matter of fact, changes were made -twice. But only the men were changed, not the principles of the High -Command. In the circumstances, when no one actually wielded power, -military power was not centred in anybody's hands. Neither the Chiefs -who enjoyed the reputation of serving their country loyally and with -exceptional devotion, like Alexeiev, and later the "Iron Chiefs," such -as Kornilov undoubtedly was and as Brussilov was supposed to be, nor -all the Chameleons that fed from the hand of the Socialist reformers of -the Army had any real power. - -The entire military hierarchy was shaken to its very foundations, -though it retained all the attributes of power and the customary -routine--instructions which could not move the Armies, orders that were -never carried out, verdicts of the Courts which were derided. The full -weight of oppression, following the line of the least resistance, fell -solely upon the loyal commanding officers, who submitted without a -murmur to persecution from above as well as from below. The Government -and the War Ministry, having abolished repressions, had recourse to -a new method of influencing the masses--to _appeals_. Appeals to -the people, to the Army, to the Cossacks, to everybody, flooded the -country, inviting all to do their duty. Unfortunately, only those -appeals were successful that flattered the meanest instincts of -the mob, inviting it to neglect its duty. As a result, it was not -counter-Revolution, Buonapartism, or adventure, but the elemental -desire of the circles where the ideas of statesmanship still prevailed, -to restore the broken laws of warfare, that soon gave rise to a new -watchword: - - "_Military power must be seized_." - -Such a task was not congenial to Alexeiev or Brussilov. Kornilov -subsequently endeavoured to undertake it, and began independently -to carry out a series of important military measures and to address -ultimatums on military questions to the Government. At first, the only -question raised was that of granting "full powers" to the Supreme -Command within the scope of its competence. - -It is interesting to compare this state of affairs with that of the -command of the armies of our powerful foe. Ludendorff, the first -Quartermaster-General of the German Army says (_Mes Souvenirs de -Guerre_): "In peace-time the Imperial Government exercised full power -over its Departments.... When the War began the Ministers found it -difficult to get used to seeing in G.H.Q. a power which was compelled, -by the immensity of its task, to act with greater resolution as that -resolution weakened in Berlin. Would that the Government could clearly -have perceived this simple truth.... The Government went its own way, -and never abandoned any of its designs in compliance with the wishes -of G.H.Q. On the contrary, it disregarded much that we considered -necessary for the prosecution of the War." - -If we recall that in March, 1918, the deputy of the Reichstag, Haase, -was more than justified in saying that the Chancellor was nothing but -a figure-head covering the military party, and that Ludendorff was -actually governing the country, we will understand the extent of the -power which the German Command deemed it necessary to exercise in order -to win the World War. - -I have drawn a general picture of the Stavka, such as it was when -I took charge as Chief-of-Staff. Taking the entire position into -consideration, I had two main objects in view: first, to counteract -with all my strength the influences which were disrupting the Army, so -as to preserve that Army and to hold the Eastern Front in the world -struggle; and secondly, to reinforce the rights, the power, and the -authority of the Supreme Commander-in-Chief. A loyal struggle was at -hand. In that struggle, which only lasted two months, all sections of -the Stavka had their share. - -[Illustration: General Markov.] - - - - -CHAPTER IX. - -GENERAL MARKOV. - - -The duties of the Quartermaster-General in the Stavka were many-sided -and complex. As in the European Army, it proved therefore necessary to -create the office of a second Quartermaster-General. The first dealt -merely with matters concerning the conduct of operations. I invited -General Markov to accept this new office. His fate was linked up with -mine until his glorious death at the head of a Volunteer Division. -That Division afterwards bore with honour his name, which has become -legendary in the Volunteer Army. At the outbreak of war he was a -lecturer at the Academy of the General Staff. He went to the war as -Staff-Officer to General Alexeiev. Then he joined the 19th Division, -and in December, 1914, he served under my command as Chief-of-Staff -of the 4th Rifle Brigade, which I then commanded. When he came to our -Brigade he was unknown and unexpected, as I had asked the Army G.H.Q. -for another man to be appointed. Immediately upon his arrival he told -me that he had recently undergone a slight operation, was not feeling -well, was unable to ride, and would not go up to the front line. I -frowned, and the Staff exchanged significant glances. The "Professor," -as we afterwards often called him as a friendly jest, was obviously out -of place in our midst. - -I started one day with my staff, all mounted, towards the line where -my riflemen were fiercely fighting, near the town of Friestach. The -enemy was upon us, and the fire was intense. Suddenly, repeated showers -of shrapnel came down upon us. We wondered what it meant, and there -was Markov gaily smiling, openly driving to the firing line in a huge -carriage. "I was bored staying in, so I have come to see what is going -on here." - -From that day the ice was broken, and Markov assumed a proper place in -the family of the "Iron Division." I have never met a man who loved -military work to such an extent as Markov. He was young (when he was -killed in the summer of 1918 in action he was only 39 years of age), -impetuous, communicative, eloquent. He knew how to approach, and -closely, too, any _milieu_--officers, soldiers, crowds--sometimes far -from sympathetic, and how to instil into them his straightforward, -clear, and indisputable articles of faith. He was very quick to grasp -the situation in battle, and made work much easier for me. Markov had -one peculiarity. He was quite exceptionally straightforward, frank, -and abrupt when attacking those who, in his opinion, did not display -adequate knowledge, energy, or pluck. While he was at Headquarters -the troops therefore viewed him (as in the Brigade) with a certain -reserve, and sometimes even with intolerance (as in the Rostov period -of the Volunteer Army). No sooner, however, did Markov join the -Division than the attitude towards him became one of love on the part -of the riflemen, or even enthusiasm on the part of the Volunteers. -The Army had its own psychology. It would have no abruptness and -blame from Markov as a Staff Officer. But when _their_ Markov, in his -usual short fur coat with his cap at the back of his head, waving -his inevitable whip, was in the rifleman's firing line, under the -hot fire of the enemy, he could be as violent as possible, he could -shout and swear--his words provoked sometimes sorrow, sometimes mirth, -but there was always a sincere desire to be worthy of his praise. I -recall the heavy days which the Brigade endured in February, 1915. -The Brigade was pushed forward, was surrounded by a semi-circle of -hills occupied by the enemy, who was in a position to snipe us. The -position was intolerable, the losses were heavy, and nothing could be -gained by keeping us on that line. But the 14th Infantry Division next -to us reported to the Army H.Q.: "Our blood runs cold at the thought -of abandoning the position and having afterwards once more to attack -the heights which have already cost us rivers of blood." I remained. -Matters, however, were so serious that one had to be in close touch -with the men. I moved the field H.Q. up to the position. Count Keller, -in command of our section, having travelled for eleven hours in deep -mud and over mountain paths, arrived at that moment, and rested for a -while. - -"Let us now drive up to the line." - -We laughed. - -"How shall we drive? Would you come to the door, enemy machine-guns -permitting?" - -Count Keller left fully determined to extricate the Brigade from the -trap. The Brigade was melting away. In the rear there was only one -ramshackle bridge across the San. We were in the hands of fate. Will -the torrent swell? If it does, the bridge will be swept away, and -our retreat will be cut off. At this difficult moment the Colonel in -command of the 13th Rifle Regiment was severely wounded by a sniper -as he was coming out of the house where the H.Q. were stationed. All -officers of his rank having been killed, there was nobody to replace -him. I was pacing up and down the small hut, in a gloomy mood. Markov -rose. - -"Give me the 13th Regiment, sir," said Markov. - -"Of course, with pleasure." - -I had already thought of doing so. But I hesitated to offer it to -Markov lest he should think it was my intention to remove him from the -Staff. Markov afterwards went with his regiment from one victory to -another. He had already earned the Cross of St. George and the sword -of St. George, but for nine months the Stavka would not confirm his -appointment, because he had not reached the dead line of seniority. - -I recall the days of the heavy Galician retreat, when a tidal wave -of maddened peasants, with women, children, cattle and carts, was -following the Army, burning their villages and houses.... Markov was in -the rear, and was ordered promptly to blow up the bridge at which this -human tide had stopped. He was, however, moved by the sufferings of the -people, and for six hours he fought for the bridge at the risk of being -cut off, until the last cart of the refugees had crossed the bridge. - -His life was a perpetual fiery impulse. On one occasion I had lost -all hope of ever seeing him again. In the beginning of September, -1915, in the course of the Lutsk operation, in which our Division -so distinguished itself, between Olyka and Klevan, the left column -commanded by Markov broke the Austrian line and disappeared. The -Austrians closed the line. During the day we heard no news, and the -night came. I was anxious for the fate of the 13th Regiment, and rode -to a high slope, observing the enemy's firing line in the silent -distance. Suddenly, from afar, from the dense forest, in the far rear -of the Austrians, I heard the joyous strains of the Regimental March of -the 13th. What a relief it was! - -"I got into such a fix," said Markov afterwards, "the devil himself -could not have known which were my riflemen and which were Austrians. I -decided to cheer up my men and to collect them by making the band play." - -Markov's column had smashed the enemy, had taken two thousand prisoners -and a gun, and had put the Austrians to disorderly flight towards -Lutsk. - -In his impulsiveness he sometimes went from one extreme to another, -but, as soon as matters grew really desperate, he immediately regained -self-possession. In October, 1915, the 4th Rifle Division was -conducting the famous Chartoriisk operation, had broken the enemy on a -front about twelve miles wide and over fifteen miles deep. Brussilov, -having no reserves, hesitated to bring up troops from another front -in order to take advantage of this break. Time was short. The Germans -centred their reserves, and they were attacking me on all sides. The -situation was difficult. Markov, from the front line, telephoned: "The -position is peculiar. I am fighting the four quarters of the earth. It -is so hard as to be thoroughly amusing." Only once did I see him in a -state of utter depression, when, in the spring of 1915, near Przemyshl, -he was removing from the firing line the remnants of his companies. He -was drenched with the blood of the C.O. of the 14th Regiment, who had -been standing by, and whose head had been torn off by a shell. - -Markov never took any personal precautions. In September, 1915, the -Division was fighting in the direction of Kovel. On the right our -cavalry was operating, was moving forward irresolutely, and was -perturbing us by incredible news of the appearance of important enemy -forces on its front, on our bank of the River Styr. Markov became -annoyed with this indecision, and reported to me: "I went to the Styr -with my orderly to give the horses a drink. Between our line and the -Styr there is no one, neither our cavalry nor the enemy." - -I reported him for promotion to General's rank, as a reward for several -battles, but my request was not granted on the plea that he was "a -youngster." Verily youth was a great defect. In the spring of 1916 -the Division was feverishly preparing for the break-through at Lutsk. -Markov made no secret of his innermost wish: "It is to be either one -or the other--a wooden cross or the Cross of St. George of the Third -Degree." But the Stavka, after several refusals, compelled him to -accept "promotion"--once again the office of Divisional Chief-of-Staff. -(This measure was due to a great dearth of officers of the General -Staff, because the normal activities of the Academy had come to an -end. Colonels and Generals were made to hold for a second time and on -special conditions the office of Chief of Divisional Staff before they -were appointed to Divisional Commands.) After several months on the -Caucasian Front, where Markov suffered from inaction, he lectured for -some time at the Academy, which had then reopened, and later returned -to the Army. At the outbreak of the Revolution he was attached to the -Commanding Officer of the Tenth Army as General for special missions. - - * * * * * - -In the beginning of March a mutiny broke out at Briansk in the big -garrison. It was attended by pogroms and by the arrest of officers. -The townfolk were terribly excited. Markov spoke several times in the -crowded Council of Military Deputies. After tempestuous and passionate -debates, he succeeded in obtaining a resolution for restoring -discipline and for freeing twenty of those arrested. Nevertheless, -after midnight several companies in arms moved to the railway station -in order to do away with Markov and with the arrested officers. The mob -was infuriated and Markov seemed to be doomed, but his resourcefulness -saved the situation. Trying to make his voice heard above the tumult, -he addressed an impassioned appeal to the mob. The following sentence -occurred in his speech: "Had any of my 'Iron' Riflemen been here, he -would have told you who General Markov is." "I served in the 13th -Regiment," came a voice from the crowd. - -Markov pushed aside several men who were surrounding him, advanced -rapidly towards the soldier, and seized him by the scruff of the neck. - -"You? You? Then why don't you thrust the bayonet into me? The -enemy's bullet has spared me, so let me perish by the hand of my own -rifleman...." - -The mob was still more intoxicated, but with admiration. Accompanied by -tempestuous cheering, Markov and the arrested officers left for Minsk. - -Markov was lifted by the wave of events, and gave himself entirely to -the struggle, without a thought for himself or for his family. Faith -and despair succeeded each other in his mind; he loved his country and -felt sorry for the Army, which never ceased to occupy a prominent place -in his heart and in his mind. - -Reference will be made more than once in the course of this narrative -to the personality of Markov, but I could not refrain from satisfying -my heart's desire in adding a few laurels to his wreath--the wreath -that was placed upon his tomb by two faithful friends, with the -inscription:-- - - "He lived and died for the good of his country." - - - - -CHAPTER X. - - THE POWER--THE DUMA--THE PROVISIONAL GOVERNMENT--THE HIGH - COMMAND--THE SOVIET OF WORKMEN'S AND SOLDIERS' DELEGATES. - - -Russia's exceptional position, confronted on the one hand with a world -war and on the other with a revolution, made the establishment of a -strong power an imperative necessity. - -The DUMA, which, as I have already said, unquestionably enjoyed -the confidence of the country, refused, after lengthy and heated -discussions, to head the Revolutionary power. Temporarily dissolved -by the Imperial ukaze of February 27th, it remained loyal, and "did -not attempt to hold an official sitting," as it "considered itself a -legislative institution of the old regime, co-ordinated by fundamental -law with the obviously doomed remnants of autocracy." (Miliukov, -_History of the Second Russian Revolution_.) The subsequent decrees -emanated from the "private conference of the members of the Duma." This -body elected the "temporary Committee of the Duma," which exercised -supreme power in the first days of the Revolution. - -When power was transferred to the PROVISIONAL GOVERNMENT, the Duma -and the Committee retired to the background, but did not cease to -exist, and endeavoured to give moral support and a _raison d'etre_ -to the first three Cabinets of the Government. On May 2nd, during -the first Government crisis, the Committee still struggled for the -right to _appoint_ members of the Government; subsequently it reduced -its demands to that of the right to _participate_ in the formation -of the Government. Thus, on July 7th, the Committee of the Duma -protested against its exclusion from the formation of a new Provisional -Government by Kerensky, as it considered such a course as "legally -inadmissible and politically disastrous." The Duma, of course, was -fully entitled to participate in the direction of the life of the -country, as, even in the camp of its enemies, the signal service -was recognised which the Duma had rendered to the Revolution "In -converting to it the entire front and all the officers" (Stankevitch: -_Reminiscences_). There can be no doubt that, had the Soviet taken the -lead in the Revolution, there would have been a fierce struggle against -it, and the Revolution would have been squashed. It might, perhaps, -have then given the victory to the Liberal Democracy, and would have -led the country to a normal evolutionary development. Who knows? - -The members of the Duma themselves felt the strain of inactivity -which was at first voluntary and later compulsory. There were many -absentees, and the President of the Duma had to combat this attitude. -Nevertheless, the Duma and the Committee were quite alive to the -importance of the trend events were taking. They issued resolutions -condemning, warning, and appealing to the common sense, the heart, -and the patriotism of the people, of the Army, and of the Government. -The Duma, however, had already been swept aside by the Revolutionary -elements. Its statesmanlike appeals, full of the clear consciousness of -impending perils, had ceased to impress the country, and were ignored -by the Government. Even a Duma so peaceable that it did not even fight -for power aroused the apprehensions of the Revolutionary Democracy, and -the Soviets led a violent campaign for the abolition of the Council -of the State and of the Duma. In August the Duma relaxed its efforts -in issuing proclamations, and when Kerensky dissolved the Duma at the -bidding of the Soviets, nineteen days before the expiration of its five -years' term, on October 6th, this news did not produce any appreciable -effect in the country. Rodzianko kept alive for a long time the idea -of the Fourth Duma or of the Assembly of all Dumas as the foundation -of the power of the State. He stuck to this idea throughout the Kuban -campaigns and the Ekaterinodar Volunteer period of the anti-Bolshevik -struggle. But the Duma was dead.... - -None can tell whether the Duma's abdication of power was inevitable -in the days of March, and whether it was rendered imperative by the -relative strength of the forces that struggled for power, whether -the "class" Duma could have retained the Socialist elements in its -midst and have continued to wield a certain influence in the country, -acquired as a result of its fight against autocracy. It is at least -certain that, in the years of trouble in Russia, when no normal, -popular representation was possible, all Governments invariably felt -the necessity for some substitute for this popular representation, -were it only as a kind of tribune from which expression could be given -to different currents of thought, a rock upon which to stand and to -divine moral responsibilities. Such was the "Temporary Council of -the Russian Republic" at Petrograd in October, 1917, which, however, -had been started by the Revolutionary Democracy, as a counter-blast -to the contemplated Bolshevik Second Congress of Soviets. Such was -the partial constituent Assembly of 1917, which was held on the Volga -in the summer of 1918, and such the proposed convocation of the High -Council and Assembly (_Sobor_) of the Zemstvos in the South of Russia -and in Siberia in 1919. Even the highest manifestation of collective -dictatorship--"the Soviet of People's Commissars"--which reached a -level of despotism and had suppressed social life and all the live -forces of the country to an extent unknown in history, and reduced -the country to a graveyard, still considered it necessary to create a -kind of theatrical travesty of such a representative institution by -periodically convoking the "All-Russian Congress of Soviets." - -The authority of the Provisional Government contained the seed of its -own impotence. As Miliukov has said, that power was devoid of the -"symbol" to which the masses were accustomed. The Government yielded -to the pressure of the Soviet, which was systematically distorting all -State functions and making them subservient to the interests of class -and party. - -Kerensky, the "hostage of Democracy," was in the Government. In a -speech delivered in the Soviet he thus defined his role: "I am the -representative of Democracy, and the Provisional Government should look -upon me as expressing the demands of Democracy, and should particularly -heed the opinions which I may utter." Last, but not least, there were -in the Government representatives of the Russian Liberal Intelligencia, -with all its good and bad qualities, and with the lack of will-power -characteristic of that class, the will-power which, by its boundless -daring, its cruelty in removing obstacles, and its tenacity in seizing -power, gives victory in the struggle for self-preservation to class, -caste and nationality. During the four years of the Russian turmoil the -Russian Intelligencia and Bourgeoisie lived in a state of impotence -and of non-resistance, and surrendered every stronghold; they even -submitted to physical extermination and extinction. Strong will-power -appeared to exist only on the two extreme flanks of the social front. -Unfortunately it was a will to destroy and not to create. One flank has -already produced Lenin, Bronstein, Apfelbaum, Uritzki, Dzerjinski, and -Peters.... The other flank, defeated in March, 1917, may not yet have -said its last word. The Russian Revolution was undoubtedly national in -its origin, being a mode of expressing the universal protest against -the old regime. But, when the time came for reconstruction, two forces -came into conflict which embodied and led two different currents of -political thought, two different outlooks. According to the accepted -phrase, it was a struggle between the Bourgeoisie and the Democracy. -But it would be more correct to describe it as a struggle between the -Bourgeois and the Socialist Democracies. Both sides derived their -leading spirits from the same source--the Russian Intelligencia--by no -means numerous and heterogeneous, not so much in respect of class and -wealth as of political ideas and methods of political contest. Both -sides inadequately reflected the thoughts of the popular masses in -whose name they spoke. At first these masses were merely an audience -applauding the actors who most appealed to its impassioned, but not -altogether idealistic, instincts. It was only after this psychological -training that the inert masses, and in particular the Army, became, in -the words of Kerensky, "an elemental mass melted in the fire of the -Revolution and ... exercising tremendous pressure which was felt by -the entire organism of the State." To deny this would be tantamount to -the denial, in accordance with Tolstoi's doctrine, of the influence of -leaders upon the life of the people. This theory has been completely -shattered by Bolshevism, which has conquered for a long time the masses -of the people with whom it has nothing in common and who are inimical -to the Communist creed. - -In the first weeks of the new Government the phenomenon became -apparent, which was described in the middle of July by the Committee of -the Duma in its appeal to the Government in the following words: "The -seizure of the power of the State by irresponsible organisations, the -creation by these organisations of a dual power in the centre, and of -the absence of power in the country." - - * * * * * - -The power of the Soviet was also conditional in spite of a series of -Government crises and of opportunities thereby provided for seizing -that power and wielding it without opposition and unreservedly (the -Provisional Government offered no resistance). The Revolutionary -Democracy, as represented by the Soviet, categorically declined to -assume that role because it realised quite clearly that it lacked -the strength, the knowledge, and the skill to govern the country in -which it had as yet no real support. Tzeretelli, one of the leaders -of Revolutionary Democracy, said: "The time is not yet ripe for -the fulfilment of the ultimate aims of the proletariat and for -the solution of class questions.... We understand that a Bourgeois -Revolution is in progress ... as we are unable fully to attain to our -bright ideal ... and we _do not wish to assume that responsibility -for the collapse of the movement_, which we could not avoid if we -made the desperate attempt to impose our will upon events at the -present moment." Another representative, Nahamkes, said that they -preferred "to compel the Government to comply with their demands by -means of perpetual organised pressure." A member of the Executive -Committee of the Soviet, Stankevitch, thus describes the Soviet in his -_Reminiscences_, which reflect the incorrigible idealism of a Socialist -who is off the rails and who has now reached the stage of excusing -Bolshevism, but who nevertheless impresses one as being sincere: "The -Soviet, a gathering of illiterate soldiers, took the lead because -it asked nothing and because it was only a screen covering what was -actually complete anarchy." Two thousand soldiers from the rear and -eight hundred workmen from Petrograd formed an institution which -pretended to guide the political, military, economic and social life -of an enormous country. The records of the meetings of the Soviet, -as reported in the Press, testify to the extraordinary ignorance and -confusion which reigned at these meetings. One could not help being -painfully impressed by such a "representation" of Russia. An impotent -and subdued anger against the Soviet was growing in the circles of the -Intelligencia, the Democratic Bourgeoisie and the Officers. All their -hatred was concentrated upon the Soviet, which they abused in terms -of excessive bitterness. That hatred, often openly expressed, was -wrongly interpreted by the Revolutionary Democracy as abhorrence of -the very _idea of Democratic Representation_. In time the supremacy of -the Petrograd Soviet, which ascribed to itself the exceptional merit -of having destroyed the old regime, began to wane. A vast network -of Committees and Soviets, which had flooded the country and the -Army, claimed the right to participate in the work of the State. In -April, therefore, a Congress was held of the delegates of Workmen and -Soldiers' Soviets. The Petrograd Soviet was reorganised on the basis -of a more regular representation, and in June the All-Russian Congress -of Representatives of the Soviets was opened. The composition of this -fuller representation of Democracy is interesting:-- - - Revolutionary Socialists 285 - Social Democrats (Mensheviks) 248 - Social Democrats (Bolsheviks) 105 - Internationalists 32 - Other Socialists 73 - United Social Democrats 10 - Members of the "Bund" 10 - Members of the "Edimstvo" (Unity) group 3 - Popular Socialists 3 - Trudovik (Labour) 5 - Communist Anarchists 1 - -Thus, the overwhelming masses of Non-Socialist Russia were not -represented at all; even the elements that were either non-political -or belonged to the groups of the right and were elected by the Soviets -and Army Committees as non-party members, hastened for motives -altogether in the interests of the State to profess the Socialistic -creed. In these circumstances the Revolutionary Democracy could hardly -be expected to exercise self-restraint, and there could be no hope -of keeping the popular movement within the limits of the Bourgeois -Revolution. In reality the ramshackle helm was seized by a block of -Social Revolutionaries and Mensheviks, in which first the former and -then the latter predominated. It is that narrow partisan block which -held in bondage the will of the Government and is primarily responsible -for the subsequent course of the Revolution. - -The composition of the Soviet was heterogeneous: intellectuals, -bourgeoisie, workmen, soldiers and many deserters. The Soviet and the -Congresses, and especially the former, were a somewhat inert mass, -utterly devoid of political education. Action, power and influence -afterwards passed therefore into the hands of Executive Committees -in which the Socialist intellectual elements were almost exclusively -represented. The most devastating criticism of the Executive Committee -of the Soviet came from that very institution, and was made by one -of its members, Stankevitch: the meetings were chaotic, political -disorganisation, indecision, haste, and fitfulness showed themselves -in its decisions, and there was a complete absence of administrative -experience and true democracy. One of the members advocated anarchy in -the "Izvestia," another sent written permits for the expropriation of -the landlords, a third explained to a military delegation which had -complained of the Commanding Officers that these officers should be -dismissed and arrested, etc. - -"The most striking feature of the Committee is the preponderance of the -alien element," wrote Stankevitch. "Jews, Georgians, Letts, Poles, and -Lithuanians were represented out of all proportion to their numbers -in Petrograd and in the country." - - -Russia during the turmoil. - - +----------+----------+-----------+-------+-----------+ - | | | | | | - Anarcho-Communists | Non-Party | Non-Party Conservatives - ######## | ----#### | -------- -------- - | (Peasants) | - | Workmen (few) | - | | - Socialists Liberals - | -------- - +-----------+-------------+ | - | | | +--------------+ - | Non-Party | | | - | ----#### | Constitutional- Radical- - | Mostly Workmen | -------- -------- - | | Democrats Democrats - Social-Democrats Populists - | | - +--+---+----+ +---------------+-----------+ - | | | | | | - Bolsheviks | Edinstvo Social Popular Labour - ######## | -------- Revolutionaries -------- -------- - | | Socialists "Trudovik" - Mensheviks | - | +------+-------+ - +---+-----------+ | | | - | | Left Centre Right - Internationalists Defencists #### ---### ---- - ######## -------- - - -------- Defencists - - ----#### Partly Defencist - Partly Defeatist - - ######## Defeatists - -The following is a list of the first Presidium of the All-Russian -Central Committee of the Soviets:-- - - 1 Georgian - 5 Jews - 1 Armenian - 1 Pole - 1 Russian (if his name was not an assumed one). - -This exceptional preponderance of the alien element, foreign to the -Russian national idea, could not fail to tinge the entire activities of -the Soviet with a spirit harmful to the interests of the Russian State. -The Provisional Government was the captive of the Soviet from the very -first day, as it had under-estimated the importance and the power -of that institution, and was unable to display either determination -or strength in resisting the Soviet. The Government did not even -hope for victory in that struggle, as, in its endeavour to save the -country, it could not very well proclaim watchwords which would have -suited the licentious mob and which emanated from the Soviet. The -Government talked about duty, the Soviet about rights. The former -"prohibited," the latter "permitted." The Government was linked with -the old power by the inheritance of statesmanship and organisation, as -well as the external methods of administration; whereas the Soviet, -springing from mutiny and from the slums, was the direct negation of -the entire old regime. It is a delusion to think, as a small portion -of the moderate democracy still appear to do, that the Soviet played -the part of "restraining the tidal wave of the people." _The Soviet -did not actually destroy the Russian State, but was shattering it, -and did so to the extent of smashing the Army and imposing Bolshevism -on it._ Hence the duplicity and insincerity of its activities. Apart -from its declarations, all the speeches, conversations, comments, -and articles of the Soviet and of the Executive Committee, of its -groups and individuals, came to the knowledge of the country and of -the Front, and tended towards the destruction of the authority of the -Government. Stankevitch wrote that not deliberately, but persistently, -the Committee was dealing death-blows to the Government. - -Who, then, were the men who were trying to democratise the Army -Regulations, smashing all the foundations of the Army, inspiring the -Polivanov Commission, and tying the hands of two War Ministers? The -following is the personnel elected in the beginning of April from the -Soldiers' Section of the Soviet to the Executive Committee:-- - - War-time Officers 1 - Clerks 2 - Cadets 2 - Soldiers from the rear 9 - Scribes and men on special duty 5 - -I will leave their description to Stankevitch, who said: "At first -hysterical, noisy, and unbalanced men were elected, who were utterly -useless to the Committee...." New elements were subsequently added. -"The latter tried consciously, and in the measure of their ability, to -cope with the ocean of military matters. Two of them, however, seemed -to have been inoffensive scribes in Reserve Battalions, who had never -taken the slightest interest in the War, the Army, or the political -Revolution." The duplicity and the insincerity of the Soviet were -clearly manifested in regard to the War. The intellectual circles of -the Left and of the Revolutionary Democracy mostly espoused the idea -of Zimmerwald and of Internationalism. It was natural, therefore, that -the first word which the Soviet addressed on March 14, 1917, "To the -Peoples of the Whole World," was: - - "PEACE." - -The world problems, infinitely complex, owing to the national, -political, and economic interests of the peoples who differed in their -understanding of the Eternal Truth, could not be solved in such an -elementary fashion. Bethmann-Holweg was contemptuously silent. On -March 17th, 1917, the Reichstag, by a majority against the votes of -both Social Democratic parties, declined the offer of peace without -annexations. Noske voiced the views of the German Democracy in saying: -"We are offered from abroad to organise a Revolution. If we follow -that advice the working classes will come to grief." Among the Allies -and the Allied Democracies the Soviet manifesto provoked anxiety, -bewilderment, and discontent, which were vividly expressed in the -speeches made by Albert Thomas, Henderson, Vandervelde, and even the -present-day French Bolshevik, Cachin, upon their visits to Russia. The -Soviet subsequently added to the word "Peace" the definition, "Without -annexations and indemnities on the basis of the self-determination of -peoples." The theory of this formula promptly clashed with the actual -question of Western and Southern Russia occupied by the Germans; -of Poland, of Roumania, Belgium, and Serbia, devastated by the -Germans; of Alsace-Lorraine and Posen, as well as of the servitude, -expropriations, and compulsory labour which had been imposed upon all -the countries invaded by the Germans. According to the programme of the -German Social Democrats, which was at length published in Stockholm, -the French in Alsace-Lorraine, the Poles in Posen, and the Danes in -Schleswig were only to be granted national autonomy under the sceptre -of the German Emperor. At the same time, the idea of the independence -of Finland, Russian Poland, and Ireland was strongly advocated. The -demand for the restoration of the German colonies was curiously blended -with the promises of independence for India, Siam, Korea. - -The sun did not rise at the bidding of Chanticleer. The _ballon -d'essai_ failed. The Soviet was forced to admit that "time is necessary -in order that the peoples of all countries should rise, and with -an iron hand compel their rulers and capitalists to make peace.... -Meanwhile, the comrade-soldiers who have sworn to defend Russian -liberties should not refuse to advance, as this may become a military -necessity...." The Revolutionary Democracy was perplexed, and their -attitude was clearly expressed in the words of Tchkeidze: "We have -been preaching against the War all the time. How can I appeal to the -soldiers to continue the War and to stay at the Front?" - -Be that as it may, the words "War" and "Advance" had been uttered. -They divided the Soviet Socialists into two camps, the "Defeatists" -and "Defensists."[17] Theoretically, only the right groups of the -Social Revolutionaries, the popular Socialists, the "Unity" ("Edistvo") -group, and the Labour party ("Trudoviki") belonged to the latter. -All other Socialists advocated the immediate cessation of the war and -the "deepening" of the Revolution by means of internal Class War. In -practice, when the question of the continuation of the war was put to -the vote, the Defensists were joined by the majority of the Social -Revolutionaries and of the Social Democrat Mensheviks. The resolutions, -however, bore the stamp of ambiguity--neither war nor peace. Tzeretelli -was advocating "a movement against the war in all countries, Allied and -enemy." The Congress of the Soviets at the end of May passed an equally -ambiguous resolution, which, after demanding that annexations and -indemnities should be renounced by all belligerents, pointed out that, -"so long as the war lasts, the collapse of the Army, the weakening -of its spirit, strength and capacity for _active_ operations would -constitute a strong menace to the cause of Freedom and to the vital -interests of the country." In the beginning of June the Second Congress -passed a new resolution. On the one hand, it emphatically declared that -"the question of the advance should be decided solely from the point of -view of purely military and strategical considerations"; on the other -hand, it expressed an obviously Defeatist idea: "Should the war end by -the complete defeat of one of the belligerent groups, this would be -a source of new wars, would increase the enmity between peoples, and -would result in their complete exhaustion, in starvation and doom." -The Revolutionary Democracy had obviously confused two ideas: the -_strategic victory_ signifying the end of the war and _the terms of the -Peace Treaty_, which might be humane or inhuman, righteous or unjust, -far-seeing or short-sighted. In fact, what they wanted was war and -an advance, but _without a victory_. Curiously enough, the Prussian -Deputy, Strebel, the editor of _Vorwaerts_, invented the same formula -as early as in 1915. He wrote: "I openly profess that a complete -victory of the Empire would not benefit the Social Democracy." - -There was not a single branch of administration with which the Soviet -and the Executive Committee did not interfere with the same ambiguity -and insincerity, due on the one hand to the fear of any action contrary -to the fundamentals of their doctrine, and on the other to the obvious -impossibility of putting these doctrines into practice. The Soviet -did not, and could not, partake in the creative work of rebuilding -the State. With regard to Economics, Agriculture, and Labour, the -activities of the Soviet were reduced to the publication of pompous -Socialist Party programmes, which the Socialist Ministers themselves -clearly understood to be impracticable in the atmosphere of War, -Anarchy, and Economic crisis prevailing in Russia. Nevertheless, these -Resolutions and Proclamations were interpreted in the factories and -in the villages as a kind of "Absolution." They roused the passions -and provoked the desire, immediately and arbitrarily, to put them -into practice. This provocation was followed by restraining appeals. -In an appeal addressed to the sailors of Kronstadt on May 26th, 1917, -the Soviet suggested "that they should demand immediate and implicit -compliance with all the orders of the Provisional Government given in -the interests of the Revolution and of the security of the country...." - -All these literary achievements are not, however, the only form of -activity in which the Soviet indulged. The characteristic feature of -the Soviet and of the Executive Committee was the complete absence of -discipline in their midst. With reference to the special Delegation -of the Committee, whose object it was to be in contact with the -Provisional Government, Stankevitch says: "What could that Delegation -do? While it was arguing and reaching a complete agreement with the -Ministers, dozens of members of the Committee were sending letters -and publishing articles; travelling in the provinces, and at the -Front in the name of the Committee; receiving callers at the Taurida -Palace, everyone of them acting independently and taking no heed of -instructions, Resolutions, or decisions of the Committee." - -Was the Central Committee of the Soviet invested with actual power? A -reply to this question can be found in the appeal of the Organising -Committee of the Labour Socialist Democratic Party of July 17th. "The -watchword 'All-Power to the Soviets,' to which many workmen adhere, is -a dangerous one. _The following of the Soviets represents a minority -in the population_, and we must make every effort in order that the -Bourgeois elements, who are still willing and capable of joining us -in preserving the conquests of the Revolution, shall share with us -the burdens of the inheritance left by the old regime, which we have -shouldered, and the enormous responsibility for the outcome of the -Revolution which we bear in the eyes of the people." The Soviet, and -later the All-Russian Central Committee, could not, and would not, -by reason of its composition and their political ideas, exercise a -powerful restraining influence upon the masses of the people, who had -thrown off the shackles and were perturbed and mutinous. The movement -had been inspired by the members of the Soviet, and the influence and -authority of the Soviet were, therefore, entirely dependent on the -extent to which they were able to flatter the instincts of the masses. -These masses, as Karl Kautsky, an observer from the Marxist Camp, has -said, "were concerned merely with their requirements and their desires -as soon as they were drawn into the Revolution, and they did not care a -straw whether their demands were practicable or beneficial to society." -Had the Soviet endeavoured to resist with any firmness or determination -whatsoever the pressure of the masses, it would have run the risk of -being swept away. Also, day after day and step by step, the Soviet was -coming under the influence of Anarchist and Bolshevik ideas. - - - - -CHAPTER XI. - - THE BOLSHEVIK STRUGGLE FOR POWER--THE POWER OF THE ARMY AND THE - IDEA OF A DICTATORSHIP. - - -In the first period--from the beginning of the Revolution until the -_coup d'etat_ of November--the Bolsheviks were engaged in struggling -to seize power by destroying the Bourgeois regime and disorganising -the Army, thus paving the way for the _avenement_ of Bolshevism, as -Trotsky solemnly expressed it. On the day after his arrival in Russia -Lenin published his programme, of which I will here mention the salient -points: - - (1) The War waged by the "Capitalist Government" is an - Imperialistic, plundering War. No concessions, therefore, should - be made to Revolutionary "Defensism." The representatives of that - doctrine and the Army in the field should be made clearly to - understand that the War cannot end in a truly Democratic peace, - without coercion, _unless_ Capitalism is destroyed. - - The troops must fraternize with the enemy. - - (2) The first stage of the Revolution by which the Bourgeoisie came - into power must be followed by the second stage in which power must - pass into the hands of the Proletariat and of the poorest peasants. - - (3) No support should be given to the Provisional Government, and - the fallacy of its promises should be exposed. - - (4) The fact must be acknowledged that, in the majority of the - Soviets, the Bolshevik party is in a minority. The policy must - therefore be continued of criticising and exposing mistakes, while - at the same time advocating the necessity for the transfer of - Supreme Power to the Soviet. - - (5) Russia is not a Parliamentary Republic--that would have been - a step backwards--but a Republic of the Soviets of Workmen's and - Peasants' Deputies. - - The police (Militia?), the Army, and the Civil Service must be - abolished. - - (6) With regard to the agrarian question, the Soviets of - farm-labourers' deputies must come to the fore. All landowners' - estates must be confiscated, and all land in Russia nationalised - and placed at the disposal of Local Soviets of Peasants' Deputies. - The latter to be elected among the poorest peasants. - - (7) All the banks in the country must be united in one National - Bank, controlled by the Soviet. - - (8) Socialism must not be introduced now, but a step must be taken - towards the ultimate control by the Soviet of all industries and of - the distribution of materials. - - (9) The State shall become a Commune, and the Socialist Democratic - Bolshevik Party shall henceforward be called "The Communist Party." - -I shall not dwell upon this programme, which was put into practice, -with certain reservations, in November, 1917. During the first period -the activities of the Bolsheviks, which are of great importance, were -based upon the following three principles: - - (1) The overthrow of the Government and the demoralisation of the - Army. - - (2) The promotion of class war in the country and discontent in the - villages. - - (3) The seizure of power by the minority, which, according to - Lenin, was to be "well-organised, armed and centralised," _i.e._, - the Bolshevik party. (This was, of course, a negation of Democratic - forms of Government.) - -The ideas and aims of the party were, of course, beyond the -understanding not only of the ignorant Russian peasantry, but even of -the Bolshevik underlings scattered throughout the land. The masses -wanted simple and clear watchwords to be immediately put into practice, -which would satisfy their wishes and demands arising from the turmoil -of the Revolution. That "simplified" Bolshevism inherent in all -popular movements against the established power in Russia was all the -easier to institute in that it had freed itself from all restraining -moral influences and was aiming primarily at destruction pure and -simple, ignoring the consequences of military defeat and of the ruin -of the country. The Provisional Government was the first target. In -the Bolshevik Press, at public meetings, in all the activities of -the Soviets and Congresses, and even in their conversations with -the members of the Provisional Government, the Bolshevik leaders -stubbornly and arrogantly advocated its removal, describing it as -an instrument of counter-Revolution and of International reaction. -The Bolsheviks, however, refrained from decisive action, as they -feared the political backwardness of the country as a whole. They -began what soldiers call "a reconnaissance," and carried it out with -great intensity. They seized several private houses in Petrograd, and -organised a demonstration on the 20th and 21st of April. That was the -first "review" of the proletariat, at which an estimate was made of -the Bolshevik forces. The excuse for this demonstration, in which the -workmen and the troops participated, was given by Miliukov's Note on -International Policy. I say _excuse_ because the real reason lay in -the fundamental divergence of opinion mentioned above. Everything else -was only a pretext. As a result of the demonstration there were great -disturbances and armed conflicts in the capital, and many casualties. -The crowds carried placards bearing the inscriptions: "Down with -the Miliukov Policy of Conquests," and "Down with the Provisional -Government." - -The review was a failure. In the course of the debate in the Soviet on -this occasion, the Bolsheviks demanded that the Government be deposed, -but there was a note of hesitation in their speeches: "The proletariat -should first discuss the existing conditions and form an estimate of -its strength." The Soviet passed a resolution condemning both the -Government's policy of conquest and the Bolshevik demonstration, -while at the same time "congratulating the Revolutionary Democracy -of Petrograd, which had proved its intense interest in international -politics by meetings, resolutions and demonstrations." - -Lenin was planning another armed demonstration on a large scale on June -10th during the Congress of the Soviets; but it was countermanded, as -the great majority of the Congress was opposed to it. The demonstration -was likewise intended as a means of seizing power. This internal -struggle between the two wings of the Revolutionary Democracy, which -were bitterly antagonistic to one another, is extremely interesting. -The Left wing made every endeavour to induce the "Defensist" block, -which was preponderant, to break with the Bourgeoisie and to assume -power. The block was also resolutely opposed to such a course. - -Within the Soviets new combinations were coming into being. On certain -questions the Social Revolutionaries of the Left and the Social -Democrats--Internationalists--were leaning towards the Bolsheviks. -Nevertheless, until September the Bolsheviks were not in a majority -in the Petrograd Soviet or in many provincial Soviets. It was only on -September 25th that Bronstein Trotsky succeeded Tchkeidze as Chairman -of the Petrograd Soviet. The motto, "All Power to the Soviets," -sounded from their lips like self-sacrifice or provocation. Trotsky -explained this contradiction by saying that, owing to constant -re-elections, the Soviets reflected the true (?) spirit of the masses -of workmen and soldiers, who were leaning to the Left, whereas, after -the break with the Bourgeoisie, extremist tendencies were bound to -prevail in the Soviets. As the true aspect of Bolshevism gradually -revealed itself these dissensions deepened, and were not limited to -the Social Democratic programme or to party tactics. It was a struggle -between Democracy and the Proletariat, between the majority and a -minority, which was intellectually backward, but strong in its mutinous -daring and headed by strong and unprincipled men. It was a struggle -between the democratic principles of Universal Suffrage, political -liberties, equality, etc., and the dictatorship of a privileged class, -madness, and imminent slavery. On the 2nd July there was a second -Ministerial crisis, for which the outward cause was the disapproval -of the Liberal Ministers of the Act of Ukrainian Autonomy. On July -3rd-5th the Bolsheviks made another riot in the Capital, in which -workmen, soldiers and sailors participated. It was done this time on -a large scale, and was accompanied by plunder and murder. There were -many victims, and the Government was in great difficulty. Kerensky -was at that time visiting us on the Western Front. His conversations -with Petrograd over the direct wire indicated that Prince Lvov and -the Government were deeply depressed. Prince Lvov summoned Kerensky -to return to Petrograd at once, but warned him that he could not -be responsible for his safety. The rebels demanded that the Soviet -and the Central Executive Committee of the Congress should assume -power. These wings of the Revolutionary Democracy returned another -categorical refusal. The movement found no support in the provinces, -and the mutiny was quelled chiefly by the Vladimir military school and -the Cossack regiments. Several companies of the Petrograd garrison -likewise remained loyal. Bronstein Trotsky wrote that the movement was -premature because there were too many passive and irresolute elements -in the garrison; but that it had nevertheless been proved that, "except -the cadets, no one wanted to fight against the Bolsheviks _for the -Government and for the leading parties in the Soviet_." - -The tragedy of the Government headed by Kerensky, and of the Soviet, -lay in the fact that the masses would not follow abstract watchwords. -They proved equally indifferent to the country and to the Revolution, -as well as to the International, and had no intention of shedding their -blood and sacrificing their lives for any of these ideas. The crowd -followed those who gave practical promises and flattered its instincts. - - * * * * * - -When we speak of "power," with reference to the first period of the -Russian Revolution, we actually mean only its outward forms; for under -the exceptional conditions imposed by a World War on a scale unequalled -in history, when 20 per cent. of the entire male population was under -arms, the power was really concentrated in the hands of the Army. That -Army had been led astray, had been demoralised by false doctrines, had -lost all sense of duty, and all fear of authority. Last, but not least, -it had no leader. The Government, Kerensky, the Commanding Corps, the -Soviet, Regimental Committees--for many reasons none of these could -claim that title. The dissensions between all these contending forces -were reflected in the minds of the men, and hastened the ruin of the -Army. It is useless to make any surmises which cannot be proved by -realities, especially in the absence of historical perspective; but -there can be no doubt the question, whether or not it would have been -possible to erect a dam which would have stemmed the tide and preserved -discipline in the Army, will continue to arouse attention. Personally, -I believe that it was possible. At first the Supreme Command might have -done it, as well as the Government, had it shown sufficient resolve to -squash the Soviets or sufficient strength and wisdom to draw them into -the orbit of statesmanship and of truly democratic constructive work. - -There can be no doubt that, in the beginning of the Revolution, the -Government was recognised by all the sane elements of the population. -The High Command, the officers, many regiments, the Bourgeoisie, and -those Democratic elements which had not been led astray by militant -Socialism adhered to the Government. The Press in those days was full -of telegrams, addresses and appeals from all parts of Russia, from -various Social, Military and class organisations and institutions whose -democratic attitude was undoubted. - -As the Government weakened and was driven into two successive -coalitions, that confidence correspondingly decreased and could not -find compensation in fuller recognition by the Revolutionary Democracy; -because anarchist tendencies, repudiating all authority, were gaining -ground within these circles. In the beginning of May, after the armed -rising in the streets of Petrograd, which took place without the -knowledge of the Soviet, but with the participation of its members; -after the resignation of Miliukov and Gutchkov, the complete impotence -of the Provisional Government became so clearly apparent that Prince -Lvov appealed to the Soviet, with the consent of the Duma Committee and -of the Constitutional Democratic Party. He invited "the active creative -forces of the country to participate directly in the government which -had hitherto refrained from any such participation." - -After some hesitation, the Soviet deemed it necessary to accept the -offer, thereby assuming direct responsibility for the fate of the -revolution. (Four members of the Soviet accepted Ministerial posts.) -The Soviet declined to assume full power "because the transfer of -power to the Soviets in that period of the revolution would have -weakened it and would have prematurely estranged the elements capable -of serving it, which would constitute a menace to the revolution." The -impression produced by such declarations upon the Bourgeoisie and upon -the "hostages" in the Coalition Government can be imagined. Although -the Soviet expressed full confidence in the Government and appealed -to the democracy to grant it full support, which would guarantee the -authority of the Government, that Government was already irretrievably -discredited. The Socialist circles which had sent their representatives -to join it neither altered nor strengthened its intellectual level. On -the contrary, it was weakened, inasmuch as the gulf was widened which -separated the two political groups represented in the Government. -While officially expressing confidence in the Government, the Soviet -continued to undermine its power and became somewhat lukewarm towards -the Socialist Ministers, who had been compelled by circumstances to -deviate, to a certain extent, from the programme of the Socialist -party. The people and the Army did not pay much attention to these -events, as they were beginning to forget that there was any power at -all, owing to the fact that the existence of that power had no bearing -upon their everyday life. - -The blood shed during the Petrograd rising organised by the -anarchist-Bolshevik section of the Soviet on July 4th-5th, Prince -Lvov's resignation, and the formation of a new coalition in which the -Socialists, nominated by the Soviet, definitely predominated were -but stepping stones towards the complete collapse of the power of -the State. As I have already said, the first Government crisis was -occasioned by events which, however important politically, were only -"excuses." In the new Coalition the Democratic Bourgeoisie played but -a secondary part, and its "temporary" assistance was only required in -order that responsibility might be shared; while everything was decided -behind the curtain, in the circles closely connected with the Soviet. -Such a coalition could have no vitality and could not reconcile even -the opportunist elements of the Bourgeoisie with the Revolutionary -Democracy. Apart from political and social considerations, the relative -strength of the forces which were brought into play was influenced -by the growing discontent of the masses with the activities of the -Government owing to the general condition of the country. The masses -accepted the revolution not as an arduous, transitory period, linked -up with the past and present political development of Russia and of -the world, but as an independent reality of the day, carrying in its -trail real calamities such as the War, banditism, lawlessness, stoppage -of industry, cold and hunger. The masses were unable to grasp the -situation in its complex entirety and could not differentiate between -elemental, inevitable phenomena inherent in all revolutions and the -will for good or evil of departments of the Government, institutions -or individuals. They felt that the situation was intolerable and tried -to find a remedy. As a result of the universal recognition of the -impotence of the existing power, a new idea began to occupy the minds -of the people: - - A DICTATORSHIP. - -I emphatically declare that in the social and military circles with -which I was in touch the tendency towards a dictatorship was prompted -by a patriotic and clear consciousness of the abyss into which the -Russian people was rapidly sinking. _It was not in the slightest -degree inspired by any reactionary or counter-revolutionary motives._ -There can be no doubt that the movement found adherents among the -reactionaries and among mere opportunists; but both these elements -were accessory and insignificant. Kerensky thus interpreted the rise -of the movement which he described as "the tide of conspiracy": "The -Tarnopol defeat created a movement in favour of conspiracies, while the -Bolshevik rising of July demonstrated to the uninitiated the _depth of -the disruption of Democracy, the impotence of the revolution_ against -anarchy, as well as the strength of the organised minority which acted -spontaneously." It would be difficult to find a better excuse for the -movement. In the atmosphere of popular discontent, universal disorder -and approaching anarchy, endeavours at creating a dictatorship were the -natural outcome of the existing conditions. These endeavours had their -origin in a search for a _strong national and democratic power, but not -a reactionary one_. - -On the whole the Revolutionary Democracy lived in an atmosphere -poisoned by the fear of a counter-revolution. All its cares, measures, -resolutions and appeals, as well as the disruption of the Army and the -abolition of the police in the villages, tended towards a struggle with -this imaginary foe, which was supposed to menace the conquests of the -revolution. Were the conscious leaders of the Soviet really convinced -that such a danger existed, or were they fanning this unfounded fear -as a tactical move? I am inclined to accept the second solution, -because it was quite obvious, not only to myself, but to the Soviet -as well, that the activities of the Democratic Bourgeoisie meant not -counter-revolution, but merely opposition. And yet in the Russian -partisan press and in wide circles outside Russia it is precisely -in the former sense that the pre-November period of the Revolution -was interpreted. The Provisional Government proclaimed a broad, -Democratic programme upon its formation. In the circles of the Right -this programme was criticised and there was discontent; but no active -opposition. In the first four or five months after the beginning of -the Revolution there was not a single important counter-revolutionary -organisation in the country. These organisations became more or less -active and other secret circles, especially officers' circles, were -formed in July in connection with the plans for a Dictatorship. There -can be no doubt that many people with pronounced tendencies towards a -restoration joined these circles. But their main object was to combat -the unofficial government, which was a class government, as well as -the personnel of the Soviet and the Executive Committee. Had these -circles not collapsed prematurely owing to their weakness, numerical -insignificance and lack of organisation, some of the members of -those institutions might very possibly have been destroyed. While -constantly resisting counter-revolution from the Right, the Soviet gave -every opportunity for the preparations for a real counter-revolution -emanating from its own midst, from the Bolsheviks. - -I remember that different persons who came to the Stavka began to -discuss the question of a dictatorship and to throw out feelers, as it -were, approximately in the beginning of June. All these conversations -were stereotyped to such an extent that I have no difficulty in -summarising them. - -"Russia is moving towards inevitable ruin. The Government is utterly -powerless. We must have a strong power. Sooner or later we shall have -to come to a Dictatorship." - -Nobody mentioned restoration or a change of policy in a reactionary -direction. The names were mentioned of Kornilov and Brussilov. I -warned them against hasty decisions. I must confess that we still -entertained the illusory hope that the Government--by internal -evolution, under the influence of a new, armed demonstration on the -part of the anti-National extremist elements towards which they were so -lenient--would realise the futility and hopelessness of continuing in -their present position and would come to the idea of power vested in -one man, which might be achieved in a constitutional manner. The future -seemed pregnant with disaster in the absence of a truly lawful power. -I pointed out that there were no military leaders enjoying sufficient -authority with the demoralised soldiery, but that if a military -dictatorship should become necessary for the State and practicable, -Kornilov was already very much respected by the officers, whereas -Brussilov's reputation had been injured by his opportunism. - -In his book Kerensky says that "Cossack circles and certain politicians" -had suggested repeatedly to him that the impotent Government should -be replaced by a personal dictatorship. It was only when society was -disappointed in him as the "possible organiser and chief agent for -altering the system of Government" that "a search began for another -individual." - -There can be no doubt that the men and social circles that appealed to -Kerensky in the question of a dictatorship were not his apologists and -did not belong to the "Revolutionary Democracy," but the mere fact of -their appeal is sufficient proof that their motives could not have been -reactionary, and that it reflected the sincere desire of the Russian -patriotic elements to see a strong man at the helm in days of storm and -strife. - -Perhaps there may also have been another motive; there had been a short -period, approximately in June, when not only the Russian public, but -also the officers had succumbed to the charm of the War Minister's -impassioned oratory and pathos. The Russian officers, who were being -sacrificed wholesale, had forgotten and forgiven and were desperately -hoping that he would save the Russian Army. And their promise to die in -the front line was by no means an empty one. During Kerensky's visits -to the front, it was a painful sight to see these doomed men, their -eyes shining with exaltation, and their hearts beating with hope, a -hope that was destined to be so bitterly and mercilessly disappointed. - -It is to be noted that Kerensky, seeking in his book to justify the -temporary "concentration of power" which he assumed on August 27th, -says: "In the struggle against the conspiracy conducted by a single -will, the State was compelled to set against it a will capable of -resolute and quick action. No collective power, much less a Coalition, -can possess such a single will." - -I think that the internal condition of the Russian State threatened -with a monstrous joint conspiracy of the German General Staff and -the anti-national and anti-constitutional elements of the Russian -exiles was sufficiently grave to warrant the demand for a strong power -"capable of resolute and quick action." - - - - -CHAPTER XII. - - THE ACTIVITIES OF THE PROVISIONAL GOVERNMENT--INTERNAL POLITICS, - CIVIL ADMINISTRATION--THE TOWN, THE VILLAGE AND THE AGRARIAN - PROBLEM. - - -I will deal in this and in the subsequent chapters with the internal -condition of Russia in the first period of the Revolution only in -so far as it affected the conduct of the World War. I have already -mentioned the duality of the Supreme Administration of the country and -the incessant pressure of the Soviet upon the Provisional Government. A -member of the Duma, Mr. Shulgin, wittily remarked: "The old regime is -interned in the fortress of Peter and Paul, and the new one is under -domiciliary arrest." The Provisional Government did not represent the -people as a whole; it could not and would not forestall the will of -the Constituent Assembly by introducing reforms which would shake the -political and social structure of the State to its very foundations. -It proclaimed that "not violence and compulsion, but the voluntary -obedience of free citizens to the power which they had themselves -created, constituted the foundation of the new administration of the -State. Not a single drop of blood has been shed by the Provisional -Government which has erected no barrier against the free expression -of public opinion...." This non-resistance to evil at the moment when -a fierce struggle, unfettered by moral or patriotic considerations, -was being conducted by some groups of the population for motives of -self-preservation and by others for the attainment by violence of -extreme demands, was undoubtedly a confession of impotence. In the -subsequent declarations of the second and third Coalition Governments -mention was made "of stringent measures" against the forces of -disorganisation in the country. These words, however, were never -translated into deeds. - -The idea of not forestalling the will of the Constituent Assembly was -not carried out by the Government, especially in the domain of national -self-determination. The Government proclaimed the independence of -Poland, but made "the consent to such alterations of the territory of -the Russian State as may be necessary for the creation of independent -Poland" dependent upon the All-Russian Constituent Assembly. That -proclamation, the legal validity of which is contestable, was, however, -in full accord with the juridical standpoint of society. With regard to -Finland, the Government did not alter her legal status towards Russia, -but confirmed the rights and privileges of the country, cancelled all -the limitations of the Finnish Constitution and intended to convoke -the Finnish Chamber ("Seim") that was to confirm the new constitution -of the Principality. The Government subsequently adhered to their -intention to entertain favourably all the just demands of the Finns for -local reconstruction. Nevertheless, both the Provisional Government and -Finland were engaged in a protracted struggle for power on account of -the universal desire for the immediate satisfaction of the interests -of the separate nationalities. On July 6th the Finnish Assembly passed -a law (by the majority of Social-Democratic votes) proclaiming the -assumption by that body of supreme power after the abdication "of -the Finnish Grand-Duke" (the official title of the Russian Emperor). -Only foreign affairs, military legislation and administration were -left to the Provisional Government. This decision corresponded to a -certain degree with the resolution of the Congress of Soviets, which -demanded that full independence should be granted to Finland before -the convocation of the Constituent Assembly, with the above-mentioned -restrictions. The Russian Government answered this declaration of -the actual independence of Finland by dissolving the Assembly, which -met, however, once again in September of its own free will. In this -struggle, the intensity of which varied according to the rise and fall -of the political barometer in Petrograd, the Finnish politicians, -disregarding the interests of the State and having no support -whatsoever in the Army, counted exclusively upon the loyalty or, to -be more correct, the weakness of the Provisional Government. Matters -never reached the stage of open rebellion. The conscious elements of -the population kept the country within the limits of reasonableness, -not out of loyalty, but perhaps because they feared the consequences -of civil war and especially of the sabotage in which the licentious -soldiers and sailors would have presumably indulged. - -May and June were spent in a struggle for power between the Government -and the self-appointed Central Rada (Assembly). The All-Ukrainian -Military Congress, also convened arbitrarily on June 8th, demanded -that the Government should immediately comply with all the demands -of the Central Rada and the Congresses, and suggested that the Rada -should cease to address the Government, but should begin at once -to organise the autonomous administration of the Ukraine. On June -11th the autonomous Constitution of the Ukraine was adopted and a -Secretariat (Council of Ministers) formed under the chairmanship -of Mr. Vinnichenko. After the Government envoys--the Ministers -Kerensky, Tereschenko and Tzeretelli--had negotiated with the Rada, a -proclamation was issued on July 2nd, which forestalled the decision of -the Constituent Assembly and proclaimed the autonomy of the Ukraine -with certain restrictions. The Central Rada and the Secretariat were -gradually seizing the administration, creating a dual power on the spot -and discrediting the All-Russian Government. They thus provoked civil -strife and provided moral excuses for every endeavor to shirk civic -and military duties to the common Mother Country. The Central Rada, -moreover, contained from the outset sympathisers with Germany and was -undoubtedly connected through the "Union for the Liberation of the -Ukraine" with the headquarters of the Central Powers. Bearing in mind -the ample material collected by the Stavka, Vinnichenko's half-hearted -confession to a French correspondent (?) with regard to Germanophil -tendencies in the Rada, and finally the report of the Procurator of the -Kiev Court of Appeal at the end of August, 1917, I cannot doubt that -the Rada played a criminal part. The Procurator complained that the -complete destruction of the machinery of intelligence and of criminal -investigation deprived the Government prosecutors of the possibility -of investigating the situation; he said that not only German espionage -and propaganda, but the mutinies of the Ukrainian troops, as well as -the destination of obscure funds of undoubted Austro-German origin ... -could be traced to the Rada. - - * * * * * - -The Ministry of the Interior, which, in the old days, practically -controlled the Autocracy and provoked universal hatred, now went to the -other extreme. It all but abolished itself, and the functions of that -branch of the administration were divided among local, self-appointed -organisations. The history of the organs of the Ministry of the -Interior is, in many ways, similar to the fate of the Supreme Command. -On March 5th the Minister-President issued an order for the suppression -of the offices of Governor and of Inspector of Police ("Ispravnik"), -which were to be replaced by the presidents of the Provincial and -District self-governing Councils ("Oupravas"), and for the police -to be replaced by a militia organised by Social Institutions. This -measure, adopted owing to the universal dislike for the agents of -the old regime, was, in fact, the only actual manifestation of the -Government's will; because the status of the Commissars was not -established by law until the month of September. The instructions and -orders of the Government were, on the whole, of an academic nature, -because life followed its own course, and was regulated, or, to be more -correct, muddled up, by local revolutionary changes of the law. The -office of Government Commissars became a sinecure from the very outset. -They had no power or authority, and became entirely dependent upon -revolutionary organisations. When the latter passed a vote of censure -upon the activities of a Commissar, he could practically do nothing -more. The organisations elected a new one, and his confirmation in -office by the Provisional Government was a mere formality. In the first -six weeks seventeen Provincial Commissars and a great many District -Commissars were thus removed. Later, in July, Tzeretelli, during his -tenure of the office of Minister of the Interior, which lasted for a -fortnight, gave official sanction to this procedure and sent a circular -to the Local Soviets and Committees, inviting them to send in to him -the names of desirable candidates, which were to replace the unsuitable -ones. Thus there remained no representatives of the Central power on -the spot. In the beginning of the Revolution the so-called "Social -Committees" or "Soviets of Social Organisation" really represented -a social Institution comprising the union of towns and _Zemstvos_, -of Municipal Dumas, professional Unions, Co-operatives, Magistrates, -etc. Things went from bad to worse when these Social Committees were -dissolved into class and party organisations. Local power passed into -the hands of the Soviets of Workmen and Soldiers and in places before -the law had been produced to "democratised" Socialistic Dumas, closely -reminiscent of semi-Bolshevik Soviets. - -The regulations issued by the Government on April 15th, on the -organisation of Municipal Self-Government, comprised the following main -points: - - (1) All citizens of both sexes, having attained the age of twenty, - were given the suffrage in the town. - - (2) No domiciliary qualification was established. - - (3) A proportional system of elections was introduced. - - (4) The Military were given the suffrage in the localities in which - the respective garrisons were quartered. - -I will not examine in detail these regulations, which are probably the -most Democratic ever known in Municipal Law, because the experience -gained in their application was too short to afford any ground for -discussion. I will only note one phenomenon which accompanied the -introduction of these regulations in the autumn of 1917. The free vote -in many places became a mockery. Throughout the length and breadth of -Russia, all the non-Socialist and politically neutral parties were -under suspicion and were subjected to persecution. They were not -allowed to conduct propaganda, and their meetings were dispersed. -Electioneering was characterised by blatant abuses. Occasionally -election agents were subjected to violence and lists of candidates -destroyed. At the same time the licentious and demoralised soldiery -of many garrisons--chance guests in the town in which, as often as -not, they had only appeared a day or two before--rushed to the polls -and presented lists drawn up by the extreme Anti-National parties. -There were cases when military units, arriving after the elections, -demanded a re-election and accompanied this demand by threats and -sometimes murders. There can be no doubt that, among the circumstances -that affected the August elections in Petrograd to the Municipal Duma, -to which sixty-seven Bolsheviks out of two hundred were elected, the -presence in the Capital of numerous demoralised garrisons was not the -least important. The authorities were silent because they were absent. -The _Petite Bourgeoisie_, the intellectual workers, in a word, the Town -Democracy in the widest sense, was the weakest party and was always -defeated in that Revolutionary struggle. The mutinies, rebellions, -and separations of various Republics--the precursors of the bloody -Soviet Regime--had the most painful effect on the life of that portion -of the community. The "self-determination" of the soldiers caused -uneasiness and even fear of unrestricted violence. Even travelling -was unsafe and difficult, because the railways fell into the hands of -deserters. The "self-determination" of the workmen resulted in the -impossibility of obtaining supplies of the most necessary commodities, -owing to a tremendous rise in prices. The "self-determination" of the -villages produced a stoppage of supplies, and the villages were thus -left to starve; not to mention the moral ordeal of the class which was -subjected to insults and degradation. The Revolution had raised hopes -for the betterment of the conditions of life for everyone except the -_Bourgeois_ Democracy, because even the moral conquests proclaimed -by the new Revolutionary power--liberty of speech, of the Press and -of meetings, etc.--soon belonged exclusively to the Revolutionary -Democracy. The upper _Bourgeoisie_ (intellectually superior) was -organised to a certain extent by means of the Constitutional Democratic -Party, but the _Petite Bourgeoisie_ (the _Bourgeois_ Democracy) had -no organisation whatsoever and no means for an organised struggle. -The Democratic Municipalities were losing their true Democratic -aspect--not as a result of the new Municipal law, but of Revolutionary -practice--and became mere class organs of the Proletariat, or the -representatives of purely Socialistic parties, completely out of touch -with the people. - -Self-government in the districts and in the villages in the first -period of the Revolution was of more or less the same nature. Towards -the autumn there should have been a Democratic system of _Zemstvo_ -Administration, on the same basis as that in the municipalities. -The District (Volost) _Zemstvo_ was to undertake the administration -of local agriculture, education, order and safety. As a matter -of fact, the villages were administered--if such a word can be -applied to Anarchy--by a complex agglomeration of revolutionary -organisations, such as peasant Congresses, Supply and Land Committees, -Popular Soviets, Village Councils, etc. Very often another peculiar -organisation--that of the deserters--dominated them all. At any rate, -the All-Russian Union of Peasants agreed with the following declaration -made by the left wing: "All our work for the organisation of various -Committees will be of no avail if these Social Organisations are to -remain under the constant threat of being terrorised by accidental -armed bands." - -The only question that deeply perturbed the minds of the peasantry -and overshadowed all other events, was the old, painful, traditional -question: - - -THE QUESTION OF THE LAND. - -It was an exceptionally complex and tangled question. It arose more -than once in the shape of fruitless mutinies, which were ruthlessly -suppressed. The wave of agrarian troubles which swept over Russia in -the years of the First Revolution (1905-6) and left a trail of fire -and ruined estates was an indication of the consequences that were -bound to follow the Revolution of 1917. It is difficult to form an -exhaustive idea of the motives which prompted the land-owners to defend -their rights so stubbornly and so energetically: was it atavism, a -natural yearning for the land, statesmanlike considerations as to the -desirability of increasing the productivity of the land by introducing -higher methods of agriculture, a desire to maintain a direct influence -over the people, or was it merely selfishness?... One thing is -certain--the agrarian reforms were overdue. Retribution could not fail -to overtake the Government and the Ruling Classes for the long years of -poverty, oppression, and, what is most important, the incredible moral -and intellectual darkness in which the peasant masses were kept, their -education being entirely neglected. - -The peasants demanded that all land should be surrendered to them, and -would not wait for the decision of the Central Land Committee or of the -Constituent Assembly. This impatience was undoubtedly due, to a great -extent, to the weakness of the Government and to outside influences, -which will be described later. There was no divergence of opinion as -to the fundamental idea of the reforms. The Liberal Democracy and -the _Bourgeoisie_, the Revolutionary Democracy and the Provisional -Government, all spoke quite definitely about "handing the land over to -the workers." With the same unanimity these elements favoured the idea -of leaving the final decision on the reform of the land and legislation -on the subject to the Constituent Assembly. This irreconcilable -divergence of opinion arose by reason of the very essence of land -reform. Liberal circles in Russia stood for the private ownership of -the land--an idea which found increasing favour with the peasants--and -demanded that the peasants should receive allotments rather than that -the land should be entirely redistributed. On the other hand, the -Revolutionary Democracy advocated, at all meetings of every party, -class and profession, the adoption of the Resolution of the All-Russian -Congress of Peasants, which was passed on May 25th, with the approval -of the Minister Tchernov on "the transfer of all lands ... _to the -people as a whole, as their patrimony, on the basis of equal possession -without any payment_." The peasants did not or would not understand -this Social Revolutionary Resolution, which caused dissensions. The -peasants were private owners by nature and could not understand the -principle of nationalisation. The principle of equal possession meant -that many millions of peasants, whose allotments were larger than the -normal, would lose their surplus allotments, and the whole question -of the redistribution of the land would lead to endless civil war; -because there were innumerable peasants who had no land at all, and -only 45,000,000 dessiatines of arable land which did not belong to the -peasants to divide among 20,000,000 peasant households. - -The Provisional Government did not consider itself entitled to solve -the land problem. Under the pressure of the masses, it transferred -its rights partly to the Ministry of Agriculture, partly to the -Central Land Committee, which was organised on the basis of broad, -democratic representation. The latter was entrusted with the task of -collecting data and of drawing up a scheme of land reform, as well -as of regulating the existing conditions with regard to the land. In -practice, the use of the land transfer, rent, employment of labour, -etc., were dealt with by the Local Land Committees. These bodies -contained illiterate elements--the intellectuals as a rule were -excluded--which had selfish motives and had no perception either of the -extent or of the limits of their powers. The Central Representative -Institutions and the Ministry of Agriculture, under Tchernov, issued -appeals against arbitrariness and for the preservation of the land, -pending the decision of the Constituent Assembly. At the same time -they overtly encouraged "temporary possession of the land," as seizure -of the land was then described, on the excuse that the Government -were obliged to sell as much land as possible. The propaganda that -was conducted on a large scale in the villages by irresponsible -representatives of Socialist and Anarchist circles completed Tchernov's -work. - -The results of this policy were soon apparent. In one of his circulars -to Provincial Commissars, the Minister of the Interior, Tzeretelli, -admitted that complete anarchy reigned in the villages: "Land is being -seized and sold, agricultural labourers are forced to stop working, and -landowners are faced with demands which are economically impossible. -Breeding stock is being destroyed and implements plundered. Model farms -are being ruined. Forests are being cut down irrespective of ownership, -timber and logs are being stolen, and their shipment prevented. No -sowing is done on privately-owned farms, and harvests of grain and hay -are not reaped." The Minister accused the Local Committees and the -Peasant Congresses of organising arbitrary seizures of the land, and -came to the conclusion that the existing conditions of agriculture and -forestry "would inevitably bring about endless calamities for the Army -and the country, and threatened the very existence of the State." If -we recall the fires, the murders, the lynchings, the destruction of -estates, which were often filled with treasures of great historical -and artistic value, we shall have a true picture of the life of the -villages in those days. - -The question of the ownership of the land by the landlords was thus -not merely a matter of selfish class interest, all the more as, not -only the landlords but the wealthy peasants were subjected to violence -by order of the Committees, and in spite of them. One village rose -against another. It was not a question of the transfer of riches -from one class or individual to another, but of the destruction of -treasures, of agriculture, and of the economic stability of the State. -The instincts of proprietorship inherent in the peasantry irresistibly -grew as these seizures and partitions took place. The mental attitude -of the peasantry upset all the plans of the Revolutionary Democracy. -By converting the peasants into a _Petite Bourgeoisie_, it threatened -to postpone to an indefinite date the triumph of Socialism. The -villagers were obsessed by the idea of land distribution and by -their own interests, and were not in the least concerned with the -War, with politics, or with social questions which did not directly -affect them. The workers of the village were being killed and maimed -at the front, and the village, therefore, considered the War as a -burden. The authorities disallowed seizures of the land and imposed -restrictions in the shape of monopolies and fixed prices for corn. The -peasantry, therefore, bore a grudge against the Government. The towns -ceased to supply manufactured goods and the villages were estranged -from the towns and ceased to supply them with grain. This was the only -real "conquest" made by the Revolution, and those who profited by it -grew very anxious as to the attitude of future Governments towards -the arbitrary solution of the land question. They therefore actively -encouraged anarchy in the villages, condoned seizures and undermined -the authority of the Provisional Government. By this means they hoped -to bring the peasants over to their side as supporters, or, at least, -as a neutral element, in the impending decisive struggle for power. - - * * * * * - -The abolition of the police by the order issued on April 17th was one -of the acts of the Government which seriously complicated the normal -course of life. In reality, this act only confirmed the conditions -which had arisen almost everywhere in the first days of the Revolution, -and were directly due to the wrath of the people against the Executive -of the old regime, and especially of those who had been oppressed and -persecuted by the police and had suddenly found themselves on the crest -of the wave. It would be a hopeless task to defend the Russian police -as an institution. It could only be considered good by comparing it -with the militia and with the Extraordinary Bolshevik Commission.... - -In any case it would have been useless to resist the abolition of the -police, because it was a psychological necessity. There can be no -doubt that the attitude and actions of the old police were due less to -their political opinions than to the instructions of their employers -and to their own personal interests. No wonder, therefore, that the -gendarmes and the policemen, insulted and persecuted, introduced a -very bad element into the Army, into which they were subsequently -forcibly drafted. The Revolutionary Democracy, in self defence, grossly -exaggerated their counter-revolutionary activities in the Army; -nevertheless, it is absolutely true that a great many ex-officers of -the police and of the gendarmerie, partly, perhaps, from motives of -self-defence, chose for themselves a most lucrative profession--that -of the demagogue and the agitator. The fact is that the abolition of -the police in the very midst of the turmoil--when crime was on the -increase and the guarantees of public safety and of the safety of -individual property were weakened--was a real calamity. The militia, -indeed, far from being a substitute for the police, was a caricature -of them. In Western countries the police is placed as a united force -under the orders of a Department of the Central Government. The -Provisional Government placed the militia under the orders of _Zemstvo_ -and Municipal Administrations. The Government Commissars were only -entitled to make use of the militia for certain definite purposes. The -cadres of the militia were filled by untrained men, devoid of technical -experience, and, as often as not, criminals. By virtue of the new -law, there were admitted to the militia persons under arrest or who -had served a term of imprisonment for comparatively grave offences. -The system of recruiting practised by some forcibly "democratised" -_Zemstvo_ and Municipal institutions tended quite as much as the new -law towards the deterioration of the personnel of the militia. - -The Chief of the Central Administration of the Militia himself admitted -that escaped convicts were sometimes placed in command of the militia. -The villages were sometimes without any militia at all, and they -administered themselves as best they could. - -In its proclamation of April 25th the Provisional Government gave -an accurate description of the condition of the country in stating -that "the growth of new social ties was slower than the process of -disruption caused by the collapse of the old regime." In every feature -of the life of the people this fact was clearly to be observed. - - - - -CHAPTER XIII. - - THE ACTIVITIES OF THE PROVISIONAL GOVERNMENT: FOOD SUPPLIES, - INDUSTRY, TRANSPORT AND FINANCE. - - -In the early spring of 1917 the deficiency in supplies for the Army -and for the towns was rapidly growing. In one of its appeals to the -peasants the Soviet said: "The enemies of freedom, the supporters of -the deposed Czar, are taking advantage of the shortage of food in -the towns _for which they are themselves responsible_ in order to -undermine your freedom and ours. They say that the Revolution has -left the country without bread...." This simple explanation, adduced -by the Revolutionary Democracy in every crisis, was, of course, -one-sided. There was the inheritance of the old regime as well as the -inevitable consequences of three years of war, during which imports -of agricultural implements had come to a standstill, labourers were -taken from the land, and, as a result, the area under crops was -diminished. But these were not the only reasons for the food shortage -in a fertile country--a shortage which in the autumn was considered by -the Government as disastrous. The food policy of the Government and -the fluctuation of prices, the depreciation of the currency and a rise -in the price of commodities entirely out of proportion to the fixed -prices for grain also largely contributed to this result. This rise -in prices was due to general economic conditions, and especially to a -very rapid rise in wages; to the agrarian policy of the Government, the -inadequacy of the area under crops, to the turmoil in the villages, -and to the breakdown of transport. Private trade was abolished and -the entire matter of food supplies was handed over to Food Supply -Committees--undoubtedly democratic in character, but, with the -exception of the representatives of the Co-operatives, inexperienced -and devoid of a creative spirit. There are many more reasons, great and -small, which may be included in the formula: The Old Regime, the War -and the Revolution. - -On March 29th the Provisional Government introduced the grain monopoly. -The entire surplus of grain, excluding normal supplies, seed corn and -fodder, reverted to the State. At the same time the Government once -again raised the fixed price of grain, and promised to introduce fixed -prices for all necessary commodities, such as iron, textiles, leather, -kerosine oil, etc. This last measure, which was universally recognised -as just, and to which the Minister of Supplies attributed a very great -importance, proved impossible of application owing to the confused -condition of the country. Russia was covered by a huge network of Food -Supply Institutions, which cost 500,000,000 roubles a year, but could -not cope with their work. The villages, on the other hand, had ceased -to pay taxes and rents, were flooded with paper money, for which they -could get no equivalent in manufactured goods, and were by no means -anxious to supply grain. Propaganda and appeals were of no avail, and, -as often as not, force had to be applied. - -In its Proclamation of August 29th the Government admitted that the -Country was in a desperate position; the Government stores were -emptying; towns, provinces, and armies at the Front were in dire -need of bread, _although, in fact, there was sufficient bread in -the country_. Some had not delivered last year's harvest; some were -agitating and preventing others from doing their duty. In order to -avert grave danger, the Government once more raised the fixed prices -and threatened to apply stringent measures against the offenders, and -to regulate prices and the distribution of articles required by the -villages. But the vicious circle of conflicting political, social and -class interests was narrowing, like to a tight noose, round the neck of -the Government, paralysing its will-power and energy. - - * * * * * - -The condition of industry was no less acute, and it was steadily -falling into ruin. Here, as in the matter of supplies, the calamity -cannot be ascribed to one set of causes, as happened when the employers -and the workmen levelled accusations against one another. The former -were charged with taking excessive profits and having recourse to -sabotage in order to upset the Revolution, while the latter were -blamed for slackness and greed and for deriving selfish gains from the -Revolution. The causes may be divided into three categories. - -Owing to various political and economic reasons and to the fact -that the old Government did not devote sufficient attention to the -development of the natural resources of the country, our industries -were not placed on a solid basis, and were to a great extent dependent -upon foreign markets even for such material as might easily have been -found in Russia. Thus in 1912 there was a serious shortage of pig-iron, -and in 1913 of fuel. From 1908 to 1913 imports of metals from abroad -rose from 29 to 34 per cent. Before the War we imported 48 per cent. -of cotton. We needed 2,750,000 pouds[18] of wool from abroad out of a -total of the 5,000,000 pouds produced. - -The War unquestionably affected industry very deeply. Normal imports -came to a standstill. The mines of Dombrovsk were lost. Owing to -strategical requirements, transport was weakened, supplies of fuel and -of raw materials diminished. Most of the factories had to work for -the Army, and their personnel was curtailed by mobilisations. From an -economic point of view, the militarisation of industry was a heavy -burden for the population, because, according to the estimates made -by one of the Ministers, the Army absorbed 40 to 50 per cent. of the -total of goods produced by the country. Finally, the War widened the -gulf between the employers and the workmen, as the former made immense -profits, whereas the latter were impoverished, and their condition was -further aggravated by the suspension of certain professional guarantees -on account of the War by the fact that certain categories of workmen -were drafted by conscription to definite industrial concerns, and by -the general burden of inflated prices and inadequate food supplies. - -Even in these abnormal circumstances Russian industries to some extent -fulfilled the requirements of the moment, but the Revolution dealt -them a death blow, which caused their gradual dislocation and ultimate -collapse. On the one hand, the Provisional Government was legislating -for the establishment of a strict Government control of the industries -of the country and for regulating them by heavily taxing profits and -excess war profits, as well as by Government distribution of fuel, raw -materials and food. The latter measure caused the trading class to be -practically eliminated and to be replaced by democratic organisations. -Whether excess profits disappeared as a result of this policy, or were -merely transferred to another class, it is not easy to decide. On the -other hand, the Government were deeply concerned with the protection -of labour, and were drafting and passing various laws concerning the -freedom of unions, labour exchanges, conciliation boards, social -insurance, etc. Unfortunately, the impatience and the desire for -"law-making" which had seized the villages were also apparent in the -factories. Heads of industrial concerns were dismissed wholesale, as -well as the administrative and technical staffs. These dismissals were -accompanied by insults and sometimes by violence, out of revenge for -past offences, real or imaginary. Some of the members of the staffs -resigned of their own accord, because they were unable to endure the -humiliating position into which they were forced by the workmen. Given -our low level of technical and educational standards, such methods -were fraught with grave danger. As in the Army, so in the factories, -Committees replaced by elections the dismissed personnel with utterly -untrained and ignorant men. Sometimes the workmen completely seized the -industrial concerns. Ignorant and unprovided with capital, they led -these concerns to ruin, and were themselves driven to unemployment and -misery. Labour discipline in the factories completely vanished, and no -means was left of exercising moral, material or judicial pressure or -compulsion. The "consciousness" alone of the workers proved inadequate. -The technical and administrative personnel which remained or was newly -elected could no longer direct the industries and enjoyed no authority, -as it was thoroughly terrorised by the workmen. Naturally, therefore, -the working hours were still further curtailed, work became careless, -and production fell to its lowest ebb. The metallurgical industries -of Moscow fell 32 per cent. and the productivity of the Petrograd -factories 20 to 40 per cent. as early as in the month of April. In -June the production of coal and the general production of the Donetz -basin fell 30 per cent. The production of oil in Baku and Grozni -also suffered. The greatest injury, however, was inflicted upon the -industries by the monstrous demands for higher wages, completely out of -proportion to the cost of living and to the productivity of labour, as -well as to the actual paying capacity of the industries. These demands -greatly exceeded all excess profits. The following figures are quoted -in a Report to the Provisional Government: In eighteen concerns in the -Donetz Basin, with a total profit of 75,000,000 roubles per annum, the -workmen demanded a wage increase of 240,000,000 roubles per annum; the -total amount of increased wages in all the mining and metallurgical -factories of the South was 800,000,000 roubles per annum. In the Urals -the total Budget was 200,000,000, while the wages rose to 300,000,000. -In the Putilov factory alone, in Petrograd, before the end of 1917, the -increase in wages amounted to 90,000,000 roubles. The wages rose from -200 to 300 per cent. The increase in the wages of the textile workers -of Moscow rose 500 per cent., as compared to 1914. The burden of these -increases naturally fell on the Government, as most of the factories -were working for the defence of the country. Owing to the condition -of industry described above, and to the psychology of the workmen, -industrial concerns collapsed, and the country experienced an acute -shortage of necessary commodities, with a corresponding increase in -prices. Hence the rise in the price of bread and the reluctance of the -villages to supply the towns. - -At the same time Bolshevism introduced a permanent ferment into -the labouring masses. It flattered the lowest instincts, fanned -hatred against the wealthy classes, encouraged excessive demands, -and paralysed every endeavour of the Government and of the moderate -Democratic organisations to arrest the disruption of industry: "All -for the Proletariat and through the Proletariat...." Bolshevism held -up to the working class vivid and entrancing vistas of political -domination and economic prosperity, through the destruction of the -Capitalist regime and the transfer to the workmen of political power, -of industries, of the means of production, and of the wealth of the -country. And all this was to come at once, immediately, and not as a -result of a lengthy, social, economic process and organised struggle. -The imagination of the masses, unfettered by knowledge or by the -authority of leading professional unions, which were morally undermined -by the Bolsheviks, and were on the verge of collapse, was fired by -visions of avenging the hardships and boredom of heavy toil in the -past, and of enjoying amenities of a _Bourgeois_ existence, which they -despised and yet yearned for with equal ardour. It was "Now or Never: -All or Nothing!" As life was destroying illusions, and the implacable -law of economics was meting out the punishment of high prices, hunger -and unemployment, Bolshevism was the more convincingly insisting upon -the necessity of rebellion and explaining the causes of the calamity -and the means of averting it. The causes were: the policy of the -Provisional Government, which was trying to reintroduce enslavement by -the Bourgeoisie, the sabotage of the employers, and the connivance of -the Revolutionary Democracy, including the Mensheviks, which had sold -itself to the Bourgeoisie. The means was the transfer of power to the -Proletariat. - -All these circumstances were gradually killing Russian Industry. - -In spite of all these disturbances, the dislocation of industry was -not immediately felt in the Army to an appreciable degree, because -attention was concentrated upon the Army at the expense of the vital -necessities of the country itself, and also because for several months -there had been a lull at the Front. In June, 1917, therefore, we were -provided adequately, if not amply, for an important offensive. Imports -of war material through Archangel, Murmansk, and partly through -Vladivostok had increased, but had not been sufficiently developed by -reason of the natural shortcomings of maritime routes, and of the low -carrying capacity of the Siberian and of the Murmansk Railways. Only 16 -per cent. of the actual needs of the Army were satisfied. The military -administration, however, clearly saw that we were living on the old -stores collected by the patriotic impulse and effort of the country in -1916. By August, 1917, the most important factories for the production -of war materials had suffered a check. The production of guns and -of shells had fallen 60 per cent., and of aircraft 80 per cent. The -possibility of continuing the War under worse material conditions -was, however, amply proved later by the Soviet Government, which had -been using the supplies available in 1917 and the remnants of Russian -Industrial production for the conduct of civil war for more than three -years. This, of course, was only possible through such an unexampled -curtailment of the consuming market that we are practically driven back -to primitive conditions of life. - - * * * * * - -Transport was likewise in a state of dislocation. As early as May, -1917, at the Regular Congress of Railway Representatives at the Stavka, -the opinion was expressed, and confirmed by many specialists, that, -unless the general conditions of the country changed, our railways -would come to a standstill within six months. Practice has disproved -theory. For over three years, under the impossible conditions of Civil -War and of the Bolshevik Regime, the railways have continued to work. -It is true that they did not satisfy the needs of the population -even in a small measure, but they served the strategical purposes. -That this situation cannot last, and that the entire network of the -Russian Railways is approaching its doom, is hardly open to doubt. In -the history of the disintegration of the Russian Railway System the -same conditions are traceable which I have mentioned in regard to the -Army, the villages, and especially the industries: the inheritance of -the unwise policy of the past in regard to railways, the excessive -demands of the War, the wear and tear of rolling stock, and anarchy on -the line, due to the behaviour of a licentious soldiery; the general -economic condition of the country, the shortage of rails, of metal and -of fuel; the "democratisation" of Railway Administration, in which -the power was seized by various Committees; the disorganisation of -the administrative and technical personnel, which was subjected to -persecution; the low producing power of labour and the steady growth -of the economic demands of the railway employees and workmen. - -In other branches of the Administration the Government offered a -certain resistance to the systematic seizure of power by private -organisations, but in the Ministry of Railways that pernicious system -was introduced by the Government itself, in the person of the Minister -Nekrassov. He was the friend and the inspirer of Kerensky, alternately -Minister of Railways and of Finance, Assistant and Vice-President of -the Council of Ministers, Governor-General of Finland, Octobrist, Cadet -(Constitutional Democrat), and Radical Democrat, holding the scales -between the Government and the Soviet. Nekrassov was the darkest and -the most fatal figure in the Governing Circles, and left the stamp -of destruction upon everything he touched--the All-Russian Executive -Committee of the Union of Railways, the autonomy of the Ukraine, or the -Kornilov movement. - -The Ministry had no economic or technical plan. As a matter of fact, -no such plan could ever be carried out, because Nekrassov decided to -introduce into the Railway Organisation, hitherto strongly disciplined, -"the new principles of Democratic Organisation, instead of the old -watchwords of compulsion and fear"(?). Soviets and Committees were -implanted upon every branch of the Railway Administration. Enormous -sums were spent upon this undertaking, and, by his famous circular of -May 27th, the Minister assigned to these organisations a very wide -scope of control and management, as well as of the "direction" which -they were henceforward entitled to give to the responsible personnel -in the Administration. Executive functions were subsequently promised -to these organisations.... "Meanwhile the Ministry of Railways and its -subordinate branches will work in strict accordance with the ideas -and wishes of the United Railway Workers." Nekrassov thus handed -over to a private organisation the most important interests of the -State--the direction of the Railway policy, the control of the Defence, -of industries, and of all other branches dependent upon the railway -system. As one of our contemporary critics has said, this measure -would have been entirely justified had the whole population of Russia -consisted of railway employees. This reform, carried out by Nekrassov -on a scale unprecedented in history, was something worse than a mere -blunder. The general trend of Ministerial policy was well understood. -In the beginning of August, at the Moscow Congress, which was turned -into a weapon for the Socialist parties of the Left, one of the leaders -declared that "the Railway Union must be fully autonomous and no -authority except that of the workers themselves should be entitled to -interfere with it." In other words, a State within a State. - -Disruption ensued. A new phase of the arbitrariness of ever-changing -organisations was introduced into the strict and precise mechanism of -the railway services in the centre as well as throughout the country. -I understand the democratisation that opens to the popular masses -wide access to science, technical knowledge, and art, but I do not -understand the democratisation of these achievements of human intellect. - -There followed anarchy and the collapse of Labour discipline. As early -as in July the position of the railways was rendered hopeless through -the action of the Government. - -After holding the office of Minister of Railways for four months, -Nekrassov went to the Ministry of Finance, of which he was utterly -ignorant, and his successor, Yurenev, began to struggle against -the usurpation of power by the railwaymen, as he considered "the -interference of private persons and organisations with the executive -functions of the Department as a crime against the State." The struggle -was conducted by the customary methods of the Provisional Government, -and what was lost could no longer be recovered. At the Moscow Congress -the President of the Union of the Railwaymen, fully conscious of its -power, said that the struggle against democratic organisations was a -manifestation of counter-Revolution, that the Union would use every -weapon in order to counteract these endeavours, and "would be strong -enough to slay this counter-Revolutionary hydra." As is well known, the -All-Russian Executive Committee of the Union of Railways subsequently -became a political organisation pure and simple, and betrayed -Kornilov to Kerensky and Kerensky to Lenin. With a zeal worthy of the -secret police of the old regime, it hunted out Kornilov's followers, -and finally met an inglorious end in the clutches of Bolshevik -Centralisation. - - * * * * * - -We now come to another element in the life of the State--Finance. Every -normal financial system is dependent upon a series of conditions: -general political conditions, offering a guarantee of the external -and internal stability of the State and of the country; strategical -conditions, defining the measure of efficiency of the National Defence; -economic conditions, such as the productivity of the country's -industries and the relation of production to consumption; the -conditions of labour, of transport, etc. The Government, the Front, -the villages, the factories, and the transport offered no necessary -guarantees, and the Ministry of Finance could but have recourse to -palliatives in order to arrest the disruption of the entire system -of the currency and the complete collapse of the Budget, pending the -restoration of comparative order in the country. According to the -accepted view, the main defects of our pre-War Budget were that it was -based upon the revenue of the spirit monopoly (800,000,000 roubles), -and that there was scarcely any direct taxation. Before the War the -Budget of Russia was about 3-1/2 milliards of roubles; the National Debt -was about 8-1/2 milliards, and we paid nearly 400,000,000 roubles interest -per annum; half of that sum went abroad, and was partially covered by -1-1/2 milliards of our exports. The War and Prohibition completely upset -our Budget. Government expenses during the War reached the following -figures: - - 1/2 1914 5 milliards of roubles. - 1915 12 " " - 1916 18 " " - Seven months, 1917 18 " " - -The enormous deficit was partially covered by loans and by paper -currency. The expenses of the War were met, however, out of the -so-called "War Fund." At the Stavka, in accordance with the dictates -of practical wisdom, expenditure was under the full control of the -Chief-of-Staff of the Supreme Commander-in-Chief, who determined the -heads of expenditure in his Orders, schedules, and estimates. - -The Revolution dealt the death-blow to our finance. As Shingarev, the -Minister of Finance, said, the Revolution "induced everyone to claim -more rights, and stifled any sense of duty. Everybody demanded higher -wages, but no one dreamt of paying taxes, and the finances of the -country were thus placed in a hopeless position." There was a real -orgy; everyone was desperately trying to grab as much as possible from -the Treasury under the guise of democratisation, taking advantage -of the impotence of the Government and of powerlessness to resist. -Even Nekrassov had the courage to declare at the Moscow Congress that -"Never in history had any Czarist Government been as generous and -prodigal as the Government of Revolutionary Russia," and that "the -new Revolutionary regime is much more expensive than the old one." -Suffice it to quote a few "astronomic" figures in order to gauge the -insuperable obstacles in the way of a reasonable Budget. The decline of -production and the excessive rise in wages resulted in the necessity -of enormous expenditure for subsidies to expiring concerns and for -overpayments for means of production. These over-payments in the -Donetz Basin alone amounted to 1,200,000,000 roubles; the increase in -the soldiers' pay, 500,000,000 roubles; railwaymen's pay, 350,000,000 -roubles; Post Office employees, 60,000,000 roubles. After a month -the latter demanded another 105,000,000 roubles, while the entire -revenue of the Posts and Telegraphs was 60,000,000 roubles. The Soviet -demanded 11 milliards (in other words, nearly the total of the Budget -for 1915) for allowances to soldiers' wives, whereas only 2 milliards -had been spent till 1917 under this head. The Food Supply Committees -cost 500,000,000 roubles per annum, and the Land Committee 140,000,000 -roubles, etc., etc. Meanwhile the revenue was falling steadily. Thus, -for example, the Land Tax fell 32 per cent. in the first few months of -the Revolution; the revenue from town property, 41 per cent.; the House -Tax, 43 per cent., etc. At the same time, our internal troubles caused -the depreciation of the rouble and a fall in the price of Russian -securities abroad. The Provisional Government based its financial -policy upon "reorganisation of the Financial System on democratic -lines and the direct taxation of the propertied classes" (Death -Duties, Excess Profits Taxes, Income Taxes, etc.). The Government, -however, would not adopt the measure recommended by the Revolutionary -Democracy--a compulsory loan or a high Capital Levy--a measure -distinctly tainted with Bolshevism. All these just taxes, introduced or -planned, did not suffice even partially to satisfy the growing needs of -the State. In the month of August the Finance Ministry was compelled to -increase indirect taxation on certain monopolies, such as tea, sugar, -and matches. These measures were, of course, extremely burdensome, and -therefore highly unpopular. - -Expenditure was growing, revenue was not forthcoming. The Liberty Loan -was not progressing favourably, and there could be no hope for foreign -loans on account of the condition of the Russian Front. Internal loans -and Treasury Bonds yielded 9-1/2 milliards in the first half of 1917. -Ordinary revenue was expected to yield 5,800,000,000 roubles. There -remained one weapon established by the historical tradition of every -revolution--the Printing Press. - -Paper currency reached colossal proportions: - - 1/2 1914 1,425,000,000 roubles. - 1915 2,612,000,000 " - 1916 3,488,000,000 " - 1/2 1917 3,990,000,000 " - -According to the estimates of July, 1917, the total of paper currency -was 13,916,000,000 roubles (the gold reserve was 1,293,000,000 -roubles), as against 2 milliards before the War. Four successive -Finance Ministers were unable to drag the country out of the financial -morass. This might possibly have been achieved by the awakening of the -national spirit and an understanding of the interests of the State, or -by the growth of a wise and strong power which could have dealt a final -blow to the anti-State, selfish motives of the Bourgeois elements that -based their well-being upon the War and upon the blood of the people, -as well as of the Democracy, which, in the words of Shingarev, "so -severely condemned through its representatives in the Duma the very -same poison (paper currency) which it was now drinking greedily at the -moment when that Democracy had become its own master." - - - - -CHAPTER XIV. - -THE STRATEGICAL POSITION OF THE RUSSIAN FRONT. - - -The first and fundamental question with which I was confronted at the -Stavka was _the objective of our Front_. The condition of the enemy did -not appear to us as particularly brilliant. But I must confess that -the truth as at present revealed exceeds all our surmises, especially -according to the picture drawn by Hindenburg and Ludendorff of the -condition of Germany and of her Allies in 1917. I will not dwell -upon the respective numerical strength, armaments, and strategical -positions on the Western Front. I will only recall that in the middle -of June Hindenburg gave rather a gloomy description of the condition -of the country in his telegram to the Emperor. He said: "We are very -much perturbed by the depression of the spirits of the people. That -spirit must be raised, _or we shall lose the War_. Our Allies also -require support, lest they desert us.... Economic problems must be -solved, which are of paramount importance to our future. The question -arises--Is the Chancellor capable of solving them? A solution must be -found _or else we perish_." - -The Germans were anticipating a big offensive of the British and the -French on the Western Front, where they had concentrated their main -attention and their main forces, leaving on the Eastern Front after the -Russian Revolution only such numbers as were scarcely sufficient for -defence. And yet the position on the Eastern Front continued to create -a certain nervousness at the German G.H.Q. Will the Russian people -remain steadfast, or will the Defeatist tendencies prevail? Hindenburg -wrote: "As the condition of the Russian Army prevented us from finding -a clear answer to that question, our position in regard to Russia -remained insecure." - -In spite of all its defects, the Russian Army in March, 1917, was -a formidable force, with which the enemy had seriously to reckon. -Owing to the mobilisation of industry, to the activities of the -War-Industries Committees, and partly to the fact that the War -Ministry was showing increased energy, our armaments had reached -a level hitherto unknown. Also, the Allies were supplying us with -artillery and war materials through Murmansk and Archangel on a -larger scale. In the spring we had the powerful Forty-Eighth Corps--a -name under which heavy artillery of the highest calibre for special -purposes, "Taon," was concealed. In the beginning of the year the -engineering troops were reorganised and amplified. At the same time new -infantry divisions were beginning to deploy. This measure, adopted by -General Gourko during his temporary tenure of office as Chief-of-Staff -of the Supreme C.-in-C., consisted in the reduction of regiments from -four battalions to three, as well as the reduction of the number of -guns to a division. A third division was thus created in every Army -Corps, with artillery. There can be no doubt that, had this scheme been -introduced in peace-time, the Army Corps would have been more pliable -and considerably stronger. It was a risky thing to do in war-time. -Before the spring operations the old divisions were disbanded, -whereas the new ones were in a pitiable state in regard to armaments -(machine-guns, etc.), as well as technical strength and equipment. Many -of them had not been sufficiently blended together--a circumstance of -particular importance in view of the Revolution. The position was so -acute that in May the Stavka was compelled to sanction the disbanding -of those of the Third Division which should prove feeble, and to -distribute the men among units of the line. This idea, however, was -hardly ever put into practice, as it encountered strong opposition -on the part of units already disaffected by the Revolution. Another -measure which weakened the ranks of the Army was the dismissal of the -senior men in the ranks. - -This decision, fraught with incalculable consequences, was taken on the -eve of a general offensive. It was due to a statement made at a Council -at the Stavka by the Minister of Agriculture (who was also in charge -of supplies) that the condition of supplies was critical, and that -he could not undertake the responsibility of feeding the Army unless -about a million men were removed from the ration list. In the debate -attention was drawn to the presence in the Army of an enormous number -of non-combatants, quite out of proportion to the numbers of fighting -men, and to the inclusion in the Army of a quantity of auxiliary -bodies, which were hardly necessary, such as of Labour Organisations, -Chinese, and other alien Labour Battalions, etc. Mention was also -made of the necessity of having a younger Army. I very much feared -this trend of mind, and gave orders to the Staff to draw up accurate -lists of all the above-named Capitalists. While this work was still -in preparation the War Minister issued, on April 5th, an Order of the -Day giving leave, in the internal districts, to soldiers over forty to -work in the fields till May 15th. Leave was afterwards extended till -June 15th, but practically hardly anyone returned. On April 10th the -Provisional Government discharged all men over forty-three. Under the -pressure of the men it became unavoidable to spread the provisions -of the first Order to the Army, which would not be reconciled to any -privileges granted to the rear. The second Order gave rise to a very -dangerous tendency, as it practically amounted to a _beginning of -demobilisation_. The elemental desire of those who had been given leave -to return to their homes could not be controlled by any regulations, -and the masses of these men, who flooded the railway stations, caused -a protracted disorganisation of the means of transport. Some regiments -formed out of Reserve battalions lost most of their men. In the rear of -the Army transport was likewise in a state of confusion. The men did -not wait to be relieved, but left the lorries and the horses to their -fate; supplies were plundered and the horses perished. The Army was -weakened as a result of these circumstances, and the preparations for -the defensive were delayed. - -[Map: The Russian (European) Front in 1917.] - -[Map: The Russian Caucasian Front in March 1917.] - -The Russian Army occupied an enormous Front, from the Baltic to the -Black Sea and from the Black Sea to Hamadan. Sixty-eight infantry -and nine cavalry corps occupied the line. Both the importance of and -the conditions obtaining on these Fronts varied. Our Northern Front, -including Finland, the Baltic and the line of the Western Dvina, was -of great importance, as it covered the approaches to Petrograd. But -the importance at that Front was limited to defensive purposes, and -for that reason it was impossible to keep at that Front large forces -or considerable numbers of guns. The conditions of that Theatre--the -strong defensive line of the Dvina--a series of natural positions in -the rear linked up with the main positions of the Western Russian -Front, and the impossibility of any important operations in the -direction of Petrograd without taking possession of the Sea, which was -in our hands--all this would have justified us in considering that -the Front was, to a certain extent, secure, had it not been for two -circumstances, which caused the Stavka serious concern: The troops of -the Northern Front, owing to the vicinity of Revolutionary Petrograd, -were more demoralised than any other, and the Baltic Fleet and its -bases--Helsingfors and Kronstadt, of which the latter served as the -main base of Anarchism and Bolshevism--were either "autonomous" or in -a state of semi-Anarchy. While preserving to a certain degree the -outward form of discipline, the Baltic Fleet was actually in a state -of complete insubordination. The Admiral in command, Maximov, was -entirely in the hands of the Central Committee of Sailors. Not a single -order for Naval operations could be carried out without the sanction -of that Committee, not to speak of Naval actions. Even the work of -laying and repairing minefields--the main defence of the Baltic--met -with opposition from Sailors' Organisations and the crews. Not only -the general decline of discipline, but the well-planned work of the -German General Staff were quite obvious, and apprehensions were -entertained lest Naval secrets and codes be revealed to the enemy. At -the same time, the troops of the Forty-Second Corps, quartered along -the Finnish Coast and on the Monzund Islands, had been idle for a -long time and their positions scattered. With the beginning of the -Revolution they were, therefore, rapidly demoralised, and some of them -were nothing but physically and morally degenerate crowds. To relieve -or to move them was an impossibility. I recall that in May, 1917, I -made several unavailing endeavours to send an Infantry Brigade to the -Monzund Islands. Suffice it to say that the Army Corps Commander would -not make up his mind to inspect his troops and get into touch with -them--a circumstance which is typical of the troops as well as of the -personality of their Commander. In a word, the position on the Northern -Front in the spring of 1917 was the following: We received daily -reports of the Channel between the Islands of the Gulf of Riga and the -mainland being blocked with ice, and this ice appeared to be the chief -real obstacle to an invasion of the German Fleet and Expeditionary -Forces. - -The Western Front extended from the Disna to the Pripet. On this long -line two sectors--Minsk-Vilna and Minsk-Baranovitchi--were of the -greatest importance to us, as they represented the two directions in -which our troops, as well as the Germans, might undertake offensive -operations, for which there had already been precedents. The other -sections of the Front, and especially the Southern--the Pollessie, -with its forests and marshes--owing to the conditions of the country -and of the railways, were passive. Along the River Pripet, its -tributaries and canals, a kind of half-peaceful intercourse with the -Germans had long since been established, as well as a secret exchange -of goods, which was of some advantage to the "Comrades." For example, -we received reports that Russian soldiers from the Line, with bags, -appeared daily in the market of Pinsk, and that their advent was for -many reasons encouraged by the German authorities. There was another -vulnerable point--the bridge-head on the Stokhod by the station, -Chrevishe-Golenin, occupied by one of the Army Corps of General Lesh. -On March 21st, after strong artillery preparation and a gas attack, the -Germans fell upon our Corps and smashed it to pieces. Our troops had -heavy casualties, and the remnants of the Corps retreated behind the -Stokhod. The Stavka did not get an accurate list of the casualties, -because it was impossible to ascertain the numbers of killed or wounded -under the head of "Missing." The German Official Communique gave a -list of prisoners--150 officers and about 10,000 men. Owing to the -conditions in that theatre of war, this tactical success was of no -strategical importance, and could lead to no dangerous developments. -Nevertheless, we could not but wonder at the frankness of the -cautious _Norddeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung_, the official organ of -the German Chancellor, which wrote: "The Communique of the Stavka of -the Russian Supreme Command of March 29th is mistaken in interpreting -the operations undertaken by the German troops, and dictated by a -tactical necessity which had arisen only within the limits of a given -sector, was an operation of general importance." The paper knew the -facts of which we were not certain and which have now been explained -by Ludendorff. From the beginning of the Russian Revolution, Germany -had a new aim: _Unable to conduct operations on both the main Fronts, -she had decided attentively to follow and to encourage the process -of demoralisation in Russia, striking at her not by arms, but by -developing propaganda_. The battle of the Stokhod was fought on the -personal initiative of General Linsingen, and the German Government was -frightened because it considered that "at a moment when fraternisation -was proceeding at full speed" German attacks might revive the dying -flames of patriotism in Russia and postpone her collapse. The -Chancellor asked the German G.H.Q. to make as little as possible of -that success, and the G.H.Q. cancelled all further offensives "in order -not to dash the hopes for peace which were about to be realised." - -Our reverse on the Stokhod produced a strong impression in the country. -It was the first fighting experience of the "Freest Revolutionary -Army in the world...." The Stavka merely gave the facts in a spirit -of impartiality. In the circles of the Revolutionary Democracy the -reverse was explained partly by the treachery of the Commanding -Officers and partly by a conspiracy to emphasise by this example the -impracticability of the new Army Regulations and the danger of the -collapse of discipline, partly by the incompetence of the military -authorities. The Moscow Soviet wrote to the Stavka accusing one of the -assistants of the War Minister who had commanded a division on that -Front of being a traitor. Others attributed our defeat solely to the -demoralisation of the troops. In reality, the reasons for the defeat -were two-fold: The _tactical_ reason--the doubtful practicability -of occupying a narrow bridge-head when the river was swollen, the -insecurity of the rear and perhaps inadequate use of the troops and of -technical means; and the _psychological_ reason, the collapse of the -_moral_ and of the discipline of the troops. The last circumstance, -apparent in the enormous number of prisoners, gave both the Russian -Stavka and Hindenburg's headquarters much food for thought. - -The South-Western Front, from the Pripet to Moldavia, was the most -important, and attracted the greatest attention. From that Front, -operating lines of the highest importance led to the North-West, into -the depths of Galicia and Poland, to Cracow, Warsaw and Brest-Litovsk. -The advance along these lines was covered from the South by the -Carpathians, separated the Southern Austrian group of armies from the -Northern German, and threatened the rear and the communications of the -latter. These operating lines, upon which no serious obstacles were -encountered, led us to the Front of the Austrian troops, whose fighting -capacity was lower than the Germans. The rear of our South-Western -Front was comparatively well-organised and prosperous. The psychology -of the troops, of the Command, and of the Staffs always differed -considerably from the psychology of other Fronts. In the glorious, -but joyless, campaign only the armies of the South-Western Front had -won splendid victories, had taken hundreds of thousands of prisoners, -had made victorious progress hundreds of miles deep into the enemy -territory, and had descended into Hungary from the Carpathians. These -troops had formerly always believed in success. Brussilov, Kornilov, -Kaledin had made their reputations on that Front. Owing to all these -circumstances the South-Western Front was regarded as the natural base -and the centre of the impending operations. Consequently, troops, -technical means, the greater part of the heavy artillery ("Taon") and -munitions were concentrated at that Front. The region between the -Upper Seret and the Carpathians was, therefore, being prepared for -the offensive, _Places d'armes_ erected, roads made. Further south -there was the Roumanian Front, stretching to the Black Sea. After -the unsuccessful campaign of 1916 our troops occupied the line of -the Danube, the Seret and the Carpathians, and it was sufficiently -fortified. Part of General Averesco's Roumanian troops occupied -the Front between our Fourth and Ninth Armies, and part were being -organised under the direction of the French General, Berthelot, -assisted by Russian Gunner Instructors. The reorganisation and -formation proceeded favourably, the more so as the Roumanian soldier -is excellent war material. I became acquainted with the Roumanian -Army in November, 1916, when I was sent with the Eighth Army Corps to -Buseo, into the thick of the retreating Roumanian Armies. Curiously -enough, I was ordered to advance in the direction of Bucarest until -I came into contact with the enemy, and to cover that direction with -the assistance of the retreating Roumanian troops. For several months -I fought by Buseo, Rymnik and Fokshany, having two Roumanian Corps -at times under my command and Averesco's Army on my flank. I thus -gained a thorough knowledge of the Roumanian troops. In the beginning -of the campaign the Roumanian Army showed complete disregard of the -experience of the World War. In matters of equipment and ammunition -their levity was almost criminal. There were several capable Generals, -the officers were effeminate and inefficient, and the men were -splendid. The artillery was adequate, but the infantry was untrained. -These are the main characteristics of the Roumanian Army, which soon -afterwards acquired better organisation and improved in training and -equipment. The relations between the actual Russian Commander-in-Chief, -who was designated as the Assistant C.-in-C., and the King of Roumania, -who was nominally in Chief Command, were fairly cordial. Although the -Russian troops began to commit excesses, which had a bad effect upon -the attitude of the Roumanians, the condition of the Front did not, -however, cause serious apprehension. Owing to the general conditions at -the Theatre of War, only an advance in great strength in the direction -of Bucarest and an invasion of Transylvania could have had a political -and strategical effect. But new forces could not be moved to Roumania, -and the condition of the Roumanian Railways excluded all hope of the -possibility of transport and supplies on a large scale. The theatre, -therefore, was of secondary importance, and the troops of the Roumanian -Front were preparing for a local operation, with a view to attracting -the Austro-German forces. - -The Caucasian Front was in an exceptional position. It was far distant. -For many years the Caucasian Administration and Command had enjoyed a -certain degree of autonomy. From August, 1916, the Army was commanded -by the Grand-Duke Nicholas, a man of commanding personality, who took -advantage of his position whenever there was a difference of opinion -between himself and the Stavka. Finally, the natural conditions of -the theatre of war and the peculiarities of the enemy rendered that -Front entirely different from the European. All this led to a kind -of remoteness and aloofness of the Caucasian Army and too abnormal -relations with the Stavka. General Alexeiev repeatedly stated that, -in spite of all his efforts, he was unable clearly to discern the -situation in the Caucasus. The Caucasus lived independently, and told -the Government only as much as it considered necessary; and the reports -were coloured in accordance with local interests. - -In the spring of 1917 the Caucasian Army was in a difficult position, -not by reason of the strategical or fighting advantages of the -enemy--the Turkish Army was by no means a serious menace--but of -internal disorganisation. The countryside was roadless and bare. There -were no supplies or forage, and the difficulties of transport made -the life of the troops very arduous. The Army Corps on the Right Flank -was comparatively well supplied, owing to facilities for transport -across the Black Sea, but the other Army Corps, and especially those -of the Left Flank, fared very badly. Owing to geographical conditions, -light transport required an enormous number of horses, while there -was no fodder on the spot. Railways of all kinds were being built -very slowly, partly owing to a lack of railway material and partly -because that material had been wasted by the Caucasian Front upon the -Trapezund Railway, which was of secondary importance, owing to the -parallel Maritime transport. In the beginning of May General Yudenitch -reported that, owing to disease and loss of horses, transport was -completely disorganised, batteries in position had no horses, half of -the transport was non-existent, and 75,000 horses were needed. Tracks, -rolling stock and forage were urgently required. In the first half of -April 30,000 men (22 per cent.) of the Infantry of the Line had died of -typhus and scurvy. Yudenitch therefore foreshadowed the necessity of -a compulsory retreat to points of supply, the centre towards Erzerum -and the Right Flank to the frontier. The solution suggested by General -Yudenitch could not be accepted, both for moral reasons and because our -retreat would have freed Turkish troops for action on other Asiatic -Fronts. This circumstance particularly worried the British Military -Representative at the Stavka, who repeatedly conveyed to us the -desire of the British G.H.Q. that the Left Flank of our troops should -advance in the valley of the River Diala for a combined operation -with General Maude's Mesopotamian contingent against Halil Pasha's -Army. This advance was necessary to the British rather for political -considerations than for strategical requirements. The actual condition -of our Left Flank Army Corps was, moreover, truly desperate, and in -May tropical heat set in in the valley of the Diala. As a result the -Caucasian Front was unable to advance, and was ordered actively to -defend its position. The advance of the Army Corps of the Left Flank, -in contact with the British, was made conditional upon the latter -supplying the troops. As a matter of fact, in the middle of April, a -partial retreat took place in the direction of Ognot and Mush; at the -end of April the Left Flank began its fruitless advance in the valley -of the Diala, and subsequently a condition arose on the Caucasian Front -which was something between War and Peace. - -In conclusion, mention must be made of another portion of the Armed -Forces of Russia in that theatre--the Black Sea Fleet. In May and in -the beginning of June serious disturbances had already occurred, which -led to the resignation of Admiral Koltchak. The Fleet, however, was -still considered strong enough to carry out its task--to hold the Black -Sea and also to blockade the Turkish and Bulgarian coasts and guard the -maritime routes to the Caucasian and Roumanian Fronts. - -I have given a short summary of the conditions of the Russian -Front without indulging in a detailed examination of strategical -possibilities. Whatever our strategy during that period may have been, -it was upset by the masses of the soldiery, for from Petrograd to the -Danube and the Diala demoralisation was spreading and growing. In the -beginning of the Revolution it was impossible to gauge the extent of -its effects upon various fronts and upon future operations. But many -were those whose minds were poisoned by a suspicion as to the futility -of all our plans, calculations and efforts. - - - - -CHAPTER XV. - -THE QUESTION OF THE ADVANCE OF THE RUSSIAN ARMY. - - -We were thus confronted with a crucial question: SHOULD THE RUSSIAN -ARMY ADVANCE? - -On March 27th the Provisional Government issued a proclamation "To the -Citizens" on the subject of war aims. The Stavka could not detect any -definite instructions for governing the Russian Army in the midst of a -series of phrases in which the true meaning of the appeal was obscured -in deference to the Revolutionary Democracy. "The Defence at all costs -of our national patrimony and the liberation of the country from the -enemy who has invaded it is the first and vital aim of our soldiers, -who are defending the freedom of the people.... Free Russia does not -aim at domination over other peoples, at depriving them of _their_ -national patrimony, or at the forcible seizure of foreign territories. -She aims at a lasting peace, on the basis of the self-determination -of peoples. The Russian people do not wish to increase their external -power at the expense of other peoples ... but ... will not allow their -Mother Country to come out of the great struggle downtrodden and -weakened. These principles will constitute the basis of the Foreign -Policy of the Provisional Government ... _while all the obligations to -our Allies will be respected_." - -In the Note of April 18th, addressed to the Allied Powers by the -Foreign Minister, Miliukov, we find yet another definition: "The -universal desire of the people to carry the World War to a victorious -conclusion ... has grown owing to the consciousness of the common -responsibility of everyone. This desire has become more active, -because it is concentrated on the aim which is immediate and clear to -everyone--_that of repelling the enemy who has invaded the territory -of our Mother Country_." These, of course, were mere phrases, which -described the War aims in cautious, timorous and nebulous words, -allowing of any interpretation, and deprived, moreover, any foundation -in fact. The will for victory in the people and in the Army had -not only not grown, but was steadily decreasing, as a result of -weariness and waning patriotism, as well as of the intense work of -the abnormal coalition between the representatives of the extreme -elements of the Russian Revolutionary Democracy and the German -General Staff. That coalition was formed by ties which were unseen -and yet quite perceptible. I will deal with that question later, and -will only say here that the destructive work, in accordance with -the Zimmerwald programme, for ending the War began long before the -Revolution and was conducted from within as well as from without. The -Provisional Government was trying to pacify the militant element of the -Revolutionary Democracy by expounding meaningless and obscure formulas -with regard to the War aims, but it did not interfere with the Stavka -in regard to the choice of strategical means. We were, therefore, to -decide the question of the advance independently from the prevailing -currents of political opinion. The only clear and definite object upon -which the Commanding Staffs could not fail to agree was to defeat the -enemy in close union with the Allies. Otherwise our country was doomed -to destruction. - -Such a decision implied an advance on a large scale because victory was -impossible without it, and a devastating war might otherwise become -protracted. The responsible organs of the Democracy, the majority of -whom had Defeatist tendencies, tried correspondingly to influence -the masses. Even the moderate Socialist circles were not altogether -free from these tendencies. The masses of the soldiery utterly failed -to understand the ideas behind of the Zimmerwald programme; but the -programme itself offered a certain justification for the elementary -feelings of self-preservation. In other words, it was a question with -them of saving their skin. The idea of an advance could not, therefore, -be particularly popular with the Army, as demoralisation was growing. -There was no certainty not only that the advance would be successful, -but even that the troops would obey the order to go forward. The -colossal Russian Front was still steady ... by the force of inertia. -The enemy feared it, as, like ourselves, he was unable to gauge its -potential strength. What if the advance were to disclose our impotence? - -Such were the motives adduced against an advance. But there were -too many weighty reasons in favour of it, and these reasons were -imperative. The Central Powers had exhausted their strength, moral and -material, and their man power. If our advance in the autumn of 1916, -which had no decisive strategical results, had placed the enemy forces -in a critical position, what might not happen now, when we had become -stronger and, technically better equipped, when we had the advantage -in numbers, and the Allies were planning a decisive blow in the spring -of 1917? The Germans were awaiting the blow with feverish anxiety, -and in order to avert it they had retreated thirty miles on a front -of 100 miles between Arras and Soissons to the so-called Hindenburg -line, after causing incredibly ruthless and inexcusable devastation to -the relinquished territory. This retreat was significant, as it was -an indication of the enemy's weakness, and gave rise to great hopes. -_We had to advance._ Our intelligence service was completely destroyed -by the suspicions of the Revolutionary Democracy, which had foolishly -believed that this service was identical with the old secret police -organisation, and had therefore abolished it. Many of the delegates -of the Soviet were in touch with the German agents. The fronts were -in close contact, and espionage was rendered very easy. In these -circumstances our decision not to advance would have been undoubtedly -communicated to the enemy, who would have immediately commenced the -transference of his troops to the Western Front. This would have been -tantamount to treason to our Allies, and would have inevitably led to a -separate peace--with all its consequences--if not officially, at least -practically. The attitude of the revolutionary elements in Petrograd -in this matter was, however, so unstable that the Stavka had at first -suspected--without any real foundation--the Provisional Government -itself. - -This caused the following incident: At the end of April, in the -temporary absence of the Supreme C.-in-C., the Chief of the Diplomatic -Chancery reported to me that the Allied Military Attaches were -greatly perturbed because a telegram had just been received from the -Italian Ambassador at Petrograd, in which he categorically stated -that the Provisional Government had decided to conclude a separate -peace with the Central Powers. When the receipt of a telegram had -been ascertained, I sent a telegram to the War Minister, because I -was then unaware of the fact that the Italian Embassy, owing to the -impulsiveness of its personnel, had more than once been the channel -through which false rumours had been spread. My telegram was most -emphatic, and ended thus: "Posterity will stigmatise with deep contempt -the weak-kneed, impotent, irresolute generation which was good -enough to destroy the rotten regime, but not good enough to preserve -the honour, the dignity, and the very existence of Russia." The -misunderstanding was painful indeed; the news was false, the Government -was not thinking of a separate peace. Later, at the fateful sitting of -the Conference at the Stavka of Commanders-in-Chief and members of the -Government, on July 16th, I had an opportunity of expressing my views -once more. I said: "... There is another way--the way of treason. It -would give a respite to our distressed country.... But the curse of -treachery will not give us happiness. At the end of that way there is -slavery--political, economical, and moral." - -I am aware that in certain Russian circles such a straightforward -profession of moral principles in politics was afterwards condemned. -It was stated that such idealism is misplaced and pernicious, that -the interests of Russia must be considered above all "conventional -political morality."... A people, however, lives not for years, but for -centuries, and I am certain that, had we then altered the course of our -external policy, the sufferings of the Russian people would not have -been materially affected, and the gruesome, blood-stained game with -marked cards would have continued ... at the expense of the people. -The psychology of the Russian military leaders did not allow of such a -change, of such a compromise with conscience. Alexeiev and Kornilov, -abandoned by all and unsupported, continued for a long time to follow -that path, trusting and relying upon the common-sense, if not the noble -spirit, of the Allies and preferring to be betrayed rather than betray. - -Was that playing the part of a Don Quixote? It may be so. But the other -policy would have had to be conducted by other hands less clean. As -regards myself, three years later, having lost all my illusions and -borne the heavy blows of fortune, having knocked against the solid -wall of the overt and blind egoism of the "friendly" powers, and -being therefore free from all obligations towards the Allies, almost -on the eve of the final betrayal by these powers of the real Russia, -I remained the convinced advocate of _honest policy_. Now the tables -are turned. At the end of April, 1920, I had to try and convince -British Members of Parliament that a healthy national policy cannot be -free from all moral principles, and that an obvious crime was being -committed because no other name could be given to the abandonment of -the armed forces of the Crimea to the discontinuance of the struggle -against Bolshevism, its introduction into the family of civilised -nations, and to its indirect recognition; that this would prolong for -a short while the days of Bolshevism in Russia, but would open wide -the gates of Europe to Bolshevism. I am firmly convinced that the -Nemesis of history will not forgive THEM, as it would not have then -forgiven us. The beginning of 1917 was a moment of acute peril for the -Central Powers and a decisive moment for the Entente. The question -of the Russian advance greatly perturbed the Allied High Command. -General Barter, the Representative of Great Britain, and General Janin, -the French Representative at Russian Headquarters, often visited the -Supreme C.-in-C. and myself, and made inquiries on the subject. But the -statements of the German Press, with reference to pressure from the -Allies and to ultimatums to the Stavka, are incorrect. These would have -simply been useless, because Janin and Barter understood the situation, -and knew that it was the condition of the Army that hindered the -beginning of the advance. They tried to hurry and to increase technical -assistance, while their more impulsive compatriots--Thomas, Henderson, -and Vandervelde--were making hopeless endeavours to fan the flame of -patriotism by their impassioned appeals to the Representatives of the -Russian Revolutionary Democracy and to the troops. - -The Stavka also took into consideration the strong probability that -the Russian Army would have rapidly and finally collapsed had it -been left in a passive condition and deprived of all impulses for -active hostilities, whereas a successful advance might lift and heal -the _moral_, if not through sheer patriotism, at least through the -intoxication of a great victory. Such feelings might have counteracted -all international formulas sown by the enemy on the fertile soil of -the Defeatist tendencies of the Socialistic Party. Victory would -have given external peace, and some chance of peace within. Defeat -opened before the country an abyss. The risk was inevitable, and was -justified by the aim of saving Russia. The Supreme Commander-in-Chief, -the Quartermaster-General, and myself fully agreed as to the necessity -of an advance. And this view was shared in principle by the Senior -Commanding Officers. Different views were held on various Fronts as -to the degree of fighting capacity of the troops and as to their -preparedness. I am thoroughly convinced that the decision itself -independently of its execution rendered the Allies a great service, -because the forces, the means, and the attention of the enemy were kept -on the Russian Front, which, although it had lost its former formidable -power, still remained a potential danger to the enemy. The same -question, curiously enough, was confronting Hindenburg's Headquarters. -Ludendorff writes: "The general position in April and in May precluded -the possibility of important operations on the Eastern Front." Later, -however, "... there were great discussions on the subject at G.H.Q. -Would not a rapid advance on the Eastern Front with the available -troops, reinforced by a few divisions from the West, offer a better -chance than mere waiting? It was a most propitious moment, as some -people said, for smashing the Russian Army, when its fighting capacity -had deteriorated.... I disagreed, in spite of the fact that our -position in the West had improved. I would not do anything that might -destroy the real chances of peace." Ludendorff means, of course, -separate peace. What such a peace was to be we learnt later, at -Brest-Litovsk.... - -The Armies were given directions for a new offensive. The general idea -was to break through the enemy positions on sectors specially prepared -on all European fronts, to advance on a broad front in great strength -on the South-Western Front, in the direction from Kamenetz-Podolsk to -Lvov, and further to the line of the Vistula, while the striking force -of our Western Front was to advance from Molodetchno to Vilna and the -Niemen, throwing back northwards the German Armies of General Eichorn. -The Northern and the Roumanian Fronts were to co-operate by dealing -local blows and attracting the forces of the enemy. The time for the -advance was not definitely fixed, and a broad margin was allowed. But -the days went by, and the troops, who had hitherto obeyed orders and -carried out the most difficult tasks without a murmur, the same troops -that had hitherto withstood the onset of the Austro-German Armies with -naked breasts, without cartridges or shells, now stood with their -will-power paralysed and their reason obscured. The offensive was still -further delayed. - -Meanwhile the Allies, who had been preparing a big operation for the -spring, as they had counted upon strong reinforcements being brought -up by the enemy in the event of the complete collapse of the Russian -Front, began the great battle in France, as had been planned, at the -end of March, and _without awaiting_ the final decision on our advance. -The Allied Headquarters, however, did not consider simultaneous action -as a necessary condition of the contemplated operations, even before -disaffection had begun in the Russian Army. Owing to the natural -conditions of our Front we were not expected to begin the advance -before the month of May. Meanwhile, according to the general plan of -campaign for 1917, which had been drawn up in November, 1916, at the -Conference at Chantilly, General Joffre intended to begin the advance -of the Anglo-French Army at the end of January and the beginning of -February. General Nivelle, who superseded him, altered the date to the -end of March after the Conference at Calais of February 14th, 1917. -The absence of co-ordination between the Western and Eastern European -Fronts was bearing bitter fruit. It is difficult to tell whether the -Allies would have deferred their spring offensive for two months, and -whether the advances of a combined operation with the Russian Front -would have been a compensation for the delay, which gave Germany the -opportunity of reinforcing and reorganising her armies. One thing is -certain--that that lack of co-ordination gave the Germans a great -respite. Ludendorff wrote: "I detest useless discussions, but I cannot -fail to think of what would have happened had Russia advanced in April -and May and had won a few minor victories. We would have been faced, as -in the autumn of 1916, with a fierce struggle. Our munitions would have -reached a very low ebb. After careful consideration, I fail to see how -our High Command could have remained the master of the situation had -the Russians obtained in April and May even the same scant successes -which crowned their efforts in June. In April and May of 1917, in spite -of our victory (?) on the Aisne and in Champagne, it was only the -Russian Revolution that saved us." - - * * * * * - -Apart from the general advance on the Austro-German Front, another -question of considerable interest arose in April--that of an -_independent operation for the conquest of Constantinople_. Inspired -by young and spirited naval officers, the Foreign Minister, Miliukov, -repeatedly negotiated with Alexeiev, and tried to persuade him to -undertake that operation, which he considered likely to be successful, -and which would, in his opinion, confront the Revolutionary Democracy, -which was protesting against annexations, with an accomplished fact. -The Stavka disapproved of this undertaking, as the condition of -our troops would not permit of it. The landing of an Expeditionary -Force--in itself a very delicate task--demanded stringent discipline, -preparation, and perfect order. What is more, the Expeditionary -Force, which would lose touch with the main Army, should be imbued -with a very strong sense of duty. To have the sea in the rear is a -circumstance which depresses even troops with a very strong _moral_. -These elements had already ceased to exist in the Russian Army. The -Minister's requests were becoming, however, so urgent that General -Alexeiev deemed it necessary to give him an object-lesson, and a small -Expedition was planned to the Turkish coast of Asia Minor. As far -as I can remember, Zunguldak was the objective. This insignificant -operation required a detachment consisting of one Infantry Regiment, -one Armoured Car Division, and a small Cavalry contingent, and was -to have been carried out by the troops of the Roumanian Front. After -a while the Headquarters of that Front had shamefacedly to report -that the detachment could not be formed because the troops declined -to join the Expeditionary Force. This episode was due to a foolish -interpretation of the idea of peace without annexations, which -distorted the very principles of strategy and was also, perhaps, due -to the same instinct of self-preservation. It was another ill omen for -the impending general advance. That advance was still being prepared, -painfully and desperately. - -The rusty, notched Russian sword was still brandished. The question -was, when would it stop and upon whose head would it fall? - -[Illustration: Foreign military representatives at the Stavka. Standing -on the pathway, from left to right: Lieut.-Col. Marsengo (Italy); 2. -General Janin (France); 3. General Alexeiev; 4. General Barter (Great -Britain); 5. General Romei Longhena (Italy).] - - - - -CHAPTER XVI. - -MILITARY REFORMS--THE GENERALS--THE DISMISSAL FROM THE HIGH COMMAND. - - -Preparations for the advance continued alongside of the so-called -"Democratisation." These phenomena must be here recorded, as they had -a decisive effect upon the issue of the summer offensive and upon the -final destinies of the Army. Military reforms began by the dismissal -of vast numbers of Commanding Generals. In military circles this was -described, in tragic jest, as "The slaughter of the innocents." It -opened with the conversation between the War Minister, Gutchkov, and -the General on duty at the Stavka, Komzerovski. At the Minister's -request the General drew up a list of the Senior Commanding Officers, -with short notes (records of service). This list, afterwards completed -by various people who enjoyed Gutchkov's confidence, served as a basis -for the "slaughter." In the course of a few weeks 150 Senior Officers, -including seventy Commanders of Infantry and Cavalry Divisions, were -placed on the Retired List. In his speech to the Delegates of the -Front on April 29th, 1917, Gutchkov gave the following reasons for -this measure: "It has been our first task, after the beginning of the -Revolution, to make room for talent. Among our Commanding Officers -there were many honest men; but some of them were unable to grasp the -new principles of intercourse, and in a short time more changes have -been made in our commanding personnel than have ever been made before -in any army.... I realised that there could be no mercy in this case, -and I was merciless to those whom I considered incapable. Of course, -I may have been wrong. There may have been dozens of mistakes, but I -consulted knowledgeable people and took decisions only when I felt that -they were in keeping with the general opinion. At any rate, we have -promoted all those who have proved their capacity among the Commanding -Officers. I disregarded hierarchical considerations. There are men who -commanded regiments in the beginning of the War and are now commanding -armies.... We have thus attained not only an improvement, but something -different and equally important. By proclaiming the watchword 'Room for -talent' we have instilled joy into the hearts, and have induced the -officers to work with impetus and inspiration...." - -What did the Army gain by such drastic changes? Did the _cadres_ of the -Commanding Officers really improve? In my opinion that object was not -attained. New men appeared on the scene, owing to the newly-introduced -right of selecting assistants, not without the interference of our old -friends--family ties, friendship and wire-pulling. Could the Revolution -give new birth to men or make them perfect? Was a mechanical change -of personnel capable of killing a system which for many years had -weakened the impulse for work and for self-improvement? It may be that -some talented individuals did come to the fore, but there were also -dozens, nay, hundreds, of men whose promotion was due to accident and -not to knowledge or energy. This accidental character of appointments -was further intensified when later Kerensky abolished for the duration -of the War all the existing qualifications, as well as the correlation -of rank and office. The qualification of knowledge and experience -was also thereby set aside. I have before me a list of the Senior -Commanding Officers of the Russian Army in the middle of May, 1917, -when Gutchkov's "slaughter" had been accomplished. The list includes -the Supreme Commander-in-Chief, the Commanders-in-Chief of Fronts, -Armies and Fleets, and their Chiefs of Staff--altogether forty-five men: - - -OPPORTUNISTS. - - ------------+----------------+----------------+----------------+------ - The | Approving | Non-Resisters | Opponents | - Commanding | of | to | of |Total. - Personnel. |Democratisation.|Democratisation.|Democratisation.| - ------------+----------------+----------------+----------------+------ - The Supreme | | | | - C.-in-C. | | | | - Army | | | | - Commanders| | | | - Fleet | | | | - Commanders| 9 | 5 | 7 | - Chiefs | | | | - of Staff | 6 | 6 | 7 | - ------------+----------------+----------------+----------------+------ - | 15 | 11 | 14 | 40 - ------------+----------------+----------------+----------------+------ - -I have excluded five names, as I have no data about them. - -These men were the brain, the soul and the will-power of the Army. It -is difficult to estimate their military capacity according to their -last tenures of office, because strategy and military science in -1917 had almost entirely ceased to be applied and became slavishly -subservient to the soldiery, but I know the activities of these men in -regard to the struggle against democratisation--_i.e._, the disruption -of the Army, and the above table indicates the three groups into which -they were divided. Subsequently, after 1918, some of these men took -part in the struggle or kept aloof from it. - - -OPPORTUNISTS. - - --------------+----------------+----------------+----------------+------ - The | Approving | Non-Resisters | Opponents | - Commanding | of | to | of |Total. - Personnel. |Democratisation.|Democratisation.|Democratisation.| - --------------+----------------+----------------+----------------+------ - In Anti- | | | | - Bolshevik | | | | - Organisations| 2 | 7 | 10 | 19 - With the | | | | - Bolsheviks | 6 | -- | 1 | 7 - Retired from | | | | - the struggle | 7 | 4 | 3 | 14 - --------------+----------------+----------------+----------------+------ - -Such are the results of the changes in the High Command, where men -were in the public eye and where their activities attracted the -critical attention not only of the Government, but of military and -social circles. I think that in the lower grades things were no -better. The question of the justice of this measure may be open to -discussion, but, personally, I have no doubt whatsoever about its -extreme impracticability. The dismissal _en masse_ of Army Chiefs -definitely undermined the faith in the Commanding Staffs, and afforded -an excuse for the arbitrariness and violence of the Committees and of -the men towards individual representatives of the Commanding Staff. -Constant changes and transfers removed most officers from their -units, where they may have enjoyed respect and authority acquired -by military prowess. These men were thrown into new circles strange -to them, and time was needed, as well as difficult work, in the new -and fundamentally changed atmosphere in order to regain that respect -and authority. The formation of Third Infantry Divisions was still -proceeding, and was also occasioning constant changes in the Commanding -Personnel. That chaos was bound to ensue as a result of all these -circumstances is fairly obvious. So delicate a machine as the Army was -in the days of War and Revolution could only be kept going by the -force of inertia, and could not withstand new commotions. Pernicious -elements, of course, should have been removed and the system of -appointments altered, and the path opened for those who were worthy; -beyond that the matter ought to have been allowed to follow its natural -course without laying too much stress upon it and without devising a -new system. Apart from the Commanding Officers who were thus removed, -several Generals resigned of their own accord--such as Letchitzki and -Mistchenko--who could not be reconciled to the new regime, and many -Commanders who were evicted in a Revolutionary fashion by the direct or -indirect pressure of the Committee or of the soldiery. Admiral Koltchak -was one of them. Further changes were made, prompted by varying and -sometimes self-contradictory views upon the Army Administration. These -changes were, therefore, very fitful, and prevented a definite type of -Commanding Officer from being introduced. - -Alexeiev dismissed the Commander-in-Chief, Ruzsky, and the Army -Commander, Radko-Dmitriev, for their weakness and opportunism. He -visited the Northern Front, and, having gained an unfavourable -impression of the activities of these Generals, he discreetly raised -the question of their being "overworked." That is the interpretation -given by the Army and Society to these dismissals. - -Brussilov dismissed Yudenitch for the same reasons. I dismissed an -Army Commander (Kvietsinski) because his will and authority were -subservient to the disorganising activities of the Committees who were -democratising the Army. - -Kerensky dismissed the Supreme Commander-in-Chief and the -Commanders-in-Chief, Gourko and Dragomirov, because they were -strenuously opposed to the democratisation of the Army. He also -dismissed Brussilov for the opposite motives, because Brussilov was -an Opportunist, pure and simple. - -Brussilov dismissed the Commander of the Eighth Army, General -Kaledin--who later became the Ataman of the Don and was universally -respected--on the plea that he had "lost heart" and did not approve -of democratisation. This dismissal of a General with a magnificent -War record was effected in a rude and offensive manner. He was at -first offered the command of another Army, and then offered to retire. -Kaledin then wrote to me: "My record entitles me to be treated -otherwise than as a stop-gap, without taking my own views into -consideration." - -General Vannovski, who was relieved of the command of an Army Corps -by the Army Commander because he refused to acknowledge the priority -of the Army Committee, was immediately appointed by the Stavka to a -Higher Command and given an Army on the South-Western Front. - -General Kornilov, who had refused the Chief Command of the troops of -the Petrograd District, "because he considered it impossible to be -a witness of and a contributor to the disruption of the Army by the -Soviet," was afterwards appointed to the Supreme Command at the Front. -Kerensky removed me from the office of Chief-of-Staff of the Supreme -C.-in-C. because I did not share the views of the Government and openly -disapproved of its activities, but, at the same time, he allowed me to -assume the high office of Commander-in-Chief of our Western Front. - -Things also happened of an entirely different nature. The Supreme -Commander-in-Chief, General Alexeiev, made several unavailing efforts -to dismiss Admiral Maximov, who had been elected to the command of the -Baltic Fleet and was entirely in the hands of the mutinous Executive -Committee of the Baltic Fleet. It was necessary to remove that -officer, who had brought about so much evil, influenced, no doubt, by -his surroundings, because the Committee refused to release him, and -Maximov refused all summonses to come to the Stavka on the plea that -the condition of the Fleet was critical. In the beginning of June -Brussilov managed to remove him from the Fleet ... at the price of -appointing him Chief of the Naval Staff of the Supreme C.-in-C. Many -other examples might be quoted of incredible contrasts in principles of -Army Administration occasioned by the collision of two opposing forces -and two schools of thought. - - * * * * * - -I have already said that the entire Commanding Staff of Generals -was strictly loyal to the Provisional Government. General Kornilov, -the would-be "rebel," addressed the following speech to a Meeting -of Officers: "The old regime has collapsed. The people are building -a new structure of liberty, and it is the duty of the people's Army -wholeheartedly to support the new Government in its difficult, creative -work." The Commanding Staff may have taken some interest in questions -of general policy and in the Socialistic experiments of the Coalition -Governments, but no more than was taken by all cultured Russians, -and they did not consider themselves entitled or obliged to induce -the troops to participate in the solution of social problems. Their -only concern was to preserve the Army and the Foreign policy which -contributed to the victory. Such a connection between the Commanding -Staff and the Government, at first "a love match" and later one of -convenience, prevailed until the General Offensive in June, while -there still remained a flicker of hope that the mood of the Army would -change. That hope was destroyed by events, and, after the advance, -the attitude of the Commanding Staff was somewhat shaken. I may add -that the _entire_ Senior Commanding Staff considered as inadmissible -the democratisation of the Army which the Government was enforcing. -From the table which I have quoted it can be seen that 65 per cent. of -the Commanding Officers did not raise a sufficiently strong protest -against the disruption of the Army. The reasons were manifold and -entirely different. Some did it for tactical considerations, as they -thought that the Army was poisoned and that it should be healed by such -dangerous antidotes. Others were prompted by purely selfish motives. -I do not speak from hearsay, but because I know the _milieu_ and the -individuals, many of whom have discussed the matter with me with -perfect frankness. Cultured and experienced Generals could not frankly -and scientifically advocate such "military" views as, for example, -Klembovski's suggestion that a triumvirate should be placed at the head -of the Army, consisting of the Commander-in-Chief, a Commissar, and -an elected soldier; Kvietzinski's suggestion that the Army Committee -should be invested with special plenary power by the War Minister and -the Central Committee of the Soviet, which would entitle them to act in -the name of that Committee; or Viranovski's suggestion that the entire -Commanding Staff should be converted into "technical advisers" and -their power transferred entirely to the Commissars and the Committee. - -The loyalty of the High Commanding Staff can be gauged from the -following fact: At the end of April General Alexeiev, despairing of -the possibility of personally preventing the Government from adopting -measures which tended to disrupt the Army, and before issuing the -famous Proclamation of the Rights of the Soldier, wired in cipher to -all the Commanders-in-Chief a draft of a strong and resolute collective -appeal from the Army to the Government. This appeal pointed to the -abyss into which the Army was being hurled. In the event of the draft -being approved, it was to have been signed by all Senior ranks, -including Divisional Commanders. The Fronts, however, for various -reasons, disapproved of such means of influencing the Government. -General Ragosa, the temporary C.-in-C. of the Roumanian Front, who was -afterwards Ukrainian War Minister under the Hetman, replied that the -Russian people seemed to be ordained by the Almighty to perish, and -it was therefore useless to struggle against Fate. With a sign of the -Cross, one should patiently await the dictates of Fate!... This was -literally the sense of his telegram. - -Such was the attitude and the confusion in the higher ranks of the -Army. As regards the Commanders, who fought unremittingly against the -disruption of the Army, many of them struggled against the tide of -democratisation, as they considered it their duty to the people. They -did this in disregard of the success or failure of their efforts, of -the blows of Fate, or of the dark future, of which some already had a -premonition, and which was already approaching with disaster in its -train. On they went, with heads erect, misunderstood, slandered and -savagely hated, as long as life and courage permitted. - - - - -CHAPTER XVII. - -"DEMOCRATISATION OF THE ARMY"--ADMINISTRATION, SERVICE AND ROUTINE. - - -In order to carry out the democratisation of the Army and the reform -of the War Ministry in accordance with the new regime, Gutchkov -established a Commission under the Chairmanship of the late War -Minister, Polivanov, who died at Riga in 1920, where he was the expert -of the Soviet Government in the Delegation for making peace with -Poland. The Commission was composed of representatives of the Military -Commission of the Duma and of representatives of the Soviet. There was -a similar Commission in the Ministry of the Navy under the Chairmanship -of Savitch, a prominent member of the Duma. I know more about the -work of the First Commission, and will therefore dwell upon it. The -regulations drafted by the Commission were not confirmed until they -had been approved by the Military Section of the Executive Committee -of the Soviet, which enjoyed great authority and often indulged in -independent military law-making. No future historian of the Russian -Army will be able to avoid mention of the Polivanov Commission--this -fatal Institution whose stamp is affixed to every one of the measures -which destroyed the Army. With incredible cynicism, not far removed -from treachery, this Institution, comprising many Generals and officers -appointed by the War Minister, systematically and daily introduced -pernicious ideas and destroyed the rational foundations of military -administration. Very often drafts of regulations, which appeared to -the Government as excessively demagogic and were not sanctioned, -appeared in the Press and came to the knowledge of the masses of the -soldiery. They were instilled into the Army, and subsequently caused -pressure to be brought to bear upon the Government by the soldiery. -The military members of the Commission seemed to be competing with -one another in slavish subservience to the new masters, and endorsed -by their authority the destructive ideas. Men who reported to the -Committee have told me that civilians occasionally protested during the -debates and warned the Committee against going too far, but no such -protests ever came from the military members. I fail to understand -the psychology of the men, who came so rapidly and unreservedly under -the heel of the mob. The list of military members of the Commission -of the month of May indicates that most of them were Staff Officers -and representatives of other Departments, mostly of Petrograd -(twenty-five); only nine were from the Army, and these do not seem -to have been drawn from the line. Petrograd has its own psychology -different from that of the Army. The most important and detrimental -Democratic regulations were passed concerning the organisation of -Committees, disciplinary action, the reform of the Military Courts, -and, finally, the famous "Declaration of the Rights of the Soldier." - -_Military Chiefs were deprived of disciplinary power._ It was -transferred to Regimental and Company Disciplinary Courts, which also -had to settle "misunderstandings" between officers and men. There is -no need to comment upon the importance of this curtailment of the -disciplinary power of the officers; it introduced complete anarchy in -the internal life of regimental units, and the officer was discredited -_by the law_. The latter circumstance is of paramount importance, and -the Revolutionary Democracy took full advantage of this procedure -in all its attempts at law-making. The reform of the Courts aimed -at weakening the influence of military judges by appointment upon -the course of the trial, the introduction of juries and the general -weakening of military justice. Field Courts-Martial were abolished, -which meted out quick punishment on the spot for obvious and heavy -crimes, such as treason, desertion, etc. - -The democratisation of the Military Courts might be excused to a -certain extent by the fact that confidence in the officers, having -been undermined, it was necessary to create judicial Courts of a -mixed composition on an elective basis, which in theory were supposed -to enjoy to a greater extent the confidence of the Revolutionary -Democracy. But that object was not attained, because the Military -Courts--one of the foundations of order in the Army--fell entirely -into the hands of the mob. The investigating organs were completely -destroyed by the Revolutionary Democracy, and investigation was -strongly resisted by the armed men and sometimes by the Regimental -Revolutionary Institutions. The armed mob, which included many -criminal elements, exercised unrestrained and ignorant pressure upon -the conscience of the judges, and passed sentences in advance of -the verdicts of the judges. Army Corps Tribunals were destroyed, and -members of the jury who had dared to pass a sentence distasteful -to the mob were put to flight. These were common occurrences. The -case was heard in Kiev of the well-known Bolshevik, Dzevaltovski, a -captain of the Grenadier Regiment of the Guards, who was accused, with -seventy-eight other men, of having refused to join in the advance -and of having dragged his regiment and other units to the rear. The -circumstances of the trial were these: In Court there was a mob of -armed soldiers, who shouted approval of the accused on his way from the -prison to the Court. Dzevaltovski called, together with his escort, -at the Local Soviet, where he received an ovation. Finally, while the -jury were deliberating, the Armed Reserve Battalions paraded before the -Court with the band and sang the "International." Dzevaltovski and all -his companions were, of course, found "Not guilty." Military Courts -were thus gradually abolished. - -It would be a mistake, however, to ascribe this new tendency solely to -the influence of the Soviets. It may also be explained by Kerensky's -point of view. He said: "I think that no results can be achieved by -violence and by mechanical compulsion in the present conditions of -warfare, where huge masses are concerned. The Provisional Government in -the three months of its existence has come to the conclusion that it is -necessary to appeal to the common-sense, the conscience and the sense -of duty of the citizens, and that it is the only means of achieving the -desired results." - -In the first days of the Revolution the Provisional Government -abolished Capital Punishment by the Ukase of March 12th. The Liberal -Press greeted this measure with great pathos. Articles were written -expressing strongly humanitarian views, but scant understanding of -realities, of the life of the Army, and also scant foresight. V. -Nabokoff, the Russian Abolitionist, who was General Secretary to the -Provisional Government, wrote: "This happy event is a sign of true -magnanimity and of wise foresight.... Capital Punishment is abolished -unconditionally and for ever.... It is certain that in no other country -has the moral condemnation of this, the worst kind of murder, reached -such enormous proportions as in Russia.... Russia has joined the States -that no longer know the shame and degradation of judicial murder." -It is interesting to note that the Ministry of Justice drafted two -laws, in one of which Capital Punishment was maintained for the most -serious military offences--espionage and treason. But the Department of -Military Justice, headed by General Anushkin, emphatically declared in -favour of complete abolition of Capital Punishment. - -July came. Russia had already become used to Anarchist outbreaks, but -was nevertheless horror-stricken at the events that took place on the -battlefields of Galicia, near Kalush and Tarnopol. The telegrams of the -Government Commissars, Savinkov and Filonenko, and of General Kornilov, -who demanded the immediate reintroduction of Capital Punishment, were -as a stroke of a whip to the "Revolutionary Conscience." On July -11th, Kornilov wrote: "The Army of maddened, ignorant men, who are -not protected by the Government from systematic demoralisation and -disruption, and who have lost all sense of human dignity, is in full -flight. On the fields, which can no longer be called battlefields, -shame and horror such as the Russian Army has never known reign -supreme.... The mild Government measures have destroyed discipline, -and are provoking the fitful cruelty of the unrestrained masses. These -elemental feelings find expression in violence, plunder and murders.... -Capital Punishment would save many innocent lives at the price of a few -traitors and cowards being eliminated." - -On July 12th the Government restored Capital Punishment and -Revolutionary Military Tribunals, which replaced the former Field -Courts-Martial. The difference was that the judges were elected (three -officers and three men) from the list of the juries or from Regimental -Committees. This measure, the restoration of Capital Punishment, due -to pressure having been brought to bear upon the Government by the -Military Command, the Commissars, and the Committees, was, however, -foredoomed to failure. Kerensky subsequently tried to apologise to -the Democracy at the "Democratic Conference": "Wait till I have -signed a single death sentence, and I will then allow you to curse -me...." On the other hand, the very personnel of the Courts and their -surroundings, described above, made the very creation of these Courts -impossible: there were hardly any judges capable of passing a death -sentence or any Commissars willing to endorse such a sentence. On the -Fronts which I commanded there were, at any rate, no such cases. After -the new Revolutionary Military Tribunals had been functioning for two -months, the Department of Military Justice was flooded with reports -from Military Chiefs and Commissars on the "blatant infringements of -judicial procedure, upon the ignorance and lack of experience of the -judges." - -The disbandment of mutinous regiments was one of the punitive measures -carried out by the Supreme Administration or Command. This measure -had not been carefully thought out, and led to thoroughly unexpected -consequences--it provoked mutinies, prompted by a desire to be -disbanded. Regimental honour and other moral impulses had long since -been characterised as ridiculous prejudices. The actual advantages of -disbanding, on the other hand, were obvious to the men: regiments were -removed from the firing line for a long time, disbanding continued for -months, and the men were sent to new units, which were thus filled -with vagabond and criminal elements. Responsibility for this measure -can be equally divided between the War Ministry, the Commissars, -and the Stavka. The whole burden of it finally fell once more upon -the guiltless officers, who lost their regiments--which were their -families--and their appointments, and were compelled to wander about in -new places or find themselves in the desolate condition of the Reserve. - -Apart from this undesirable element, units were filled with the late -inmates of convict prisons, owing to the broad amnesty granted by the -Government to criminals, who were to expiate their crimes by military -service. My efforts to combat this measure were unavailing, and -resulted in the formation of a special regiment of convicts--a present -from Moscow--and in the formation of solid anarchist cadres in the -Reserve Battalions. The _naif_ and insincere argument of the Legislator -that crimes were committed because of the Czarist Regime, and that -a free country would convert the criminal into a self-sacrificing -hero, did not come true. In the garrisons, where amnestied criminals -were for some reason or other more numerous, they became a menace to -the population before they ever saw the Front. Thus, in June, in the -units quartered at Tomsk, there was an intense propaganda of wholesale -plunder and of the suppression of all authority. Soldiers formed large -robber bands and terrorized the population. The Commissar, the Chief -of the garrison, and all the local Revolutionary Organisations started -a campaign against the plunderers; after much fighting, no less than -2,300 amnestied criminals were turned out of the garrison. - -Reforms were intended to affect the entire administration of the Army -and of the Fleet, but the above-mentioned Committees of Polivanov -and Savitch failed to carry them out, as they were abolished by -Kerensky, who recognised at last all the evil they had wrought. The -Committees merely prepared the Democratisation of the War and Naval -Councils by introducing elected soldiers into them. This circumstance -is the more curious because, according to the Legislator's intention, -these Councils were to consist of men of experience and knowledge, -capable of solving questions of organisation, service, and routine, -of military and naval legislation, and of making financial estimates -of the cost of the armed forces of Russia. This yearning of the -uncultured portion of Democracy for spheres of activity foreign to it -was subsequently developed on an extensive scale. Thus, for example, -many military colleges were, to a certain extent, managed by Committees -of servants, most of whom were illiterate. Under the Bolshevik Regime, -University Councils numbered not only Professors and students, but also -hall-porters. - -I will not dwell upon the minor activities of the Committees, the -reorganisation of the Army, and the new regulations, but will describe -the most important measure--the Committees and the "Declaration of the -Rights of the Soldier." - - - - -CHAPTER XVIII. - -THE DECLARATION OF THE RIGHTS OF THE SOLDIER AND COMMITTEES. - - -Elective bodies from the Military Section of the Soviet to Committees -and Soviets of various denominations in regimental units and in -the Departments of the Army, the Fleet and the rear, were the most -prominent factor of "Democratisation." These institutions were partly -of a mixed type, and included both officers and men and partly soldiers -and workers' institutions pure and simple. Committees and Soviets were -formed everywhere as the common feature of Revolutionary Organisations, -planned before the Revolution and sanctioned by the Order No. 1. -Elections from the troops to the Soviet in Petrograd were fixed for -February 27th, and the first Army Committees came into being on March -1st, in consequence of the above-mentioned Order No. 1. Towards the -month of April self-appointed Soviets and Committees, varying in -denomination, personnel and ability, existed in the Army and in the -rear, and introduced incredible confusion into the system of military -hierarchy and administration. In the first month of the Revolution the -Government and the military authorities did not endeavour to put an -end to or to restrict this dangerous phenomenon. They did not at first -realise its possible consequences, and counted upon the moderating -influence of the Officer element. They occasionally took advantage of -the Committees for counteracting acute manifestations of discontent -among the soldiers, as a doctor applies small doses of poison to a -diseased organism. The attitude of the Government and of the military -authorities towards these organisations was irresolute, but was one of -semi-recognition. On April 9th, addressing the Army Delegates, Gutchkov -said at Yassy: "A Congress will soon be held of the Delegates of all -Army Organisations, and general regulations will then be drawn up. -Meanwhile, you should _organise as best you can_, taking advantage of -the existing organisations and working for general unity." - -In April the position became so complicated that the authorities could -no longer shirk the solution of the question of Committees. At the end -of March there was a Conference at the Stavka, attended by the Supreme -Commander-in-Chief, the War Minister, Gutchkov, his Assistants, and -officers of the General Staff. I was also present in my capacity as -future Chief-of-Staff to the Supreme C.-in-C. A draft was presented to -the Conference, brought from Sevastopol by the Staff-Colonel Verkhovski -(afterwards War Minister). The draft was modelled upon the regulations -already in force in the Black Sea Fleet. The discussion amounted to the -expression of two extreme views--mine and those of Colonel Verkhovski. -The latter had already commenced those slightly demagogic activities -by which he had at first gained the sympathies of the soldiers and -of the sailors. He had had a short experience in organising these -masses. He was persuasive because he used many illustrations--I do -not know whether the facts he mentioned were real or imaginary--his -views were pliable, and his eloquence was imposing. He idealised the -Committees, and argued that they were very useful, even necessary and -statesmanlike, inasmuch as they were capable of bringing order into the -chaotic movements of the soldiery. He emphatically insisted upon the -competence and the rights of these Committees being broadened. - -I argued that the introduction of Committees was a measure which -the Army organisation would be unable to understand, and that it -amounted to disruption of the Army. If the Government was unable to -cope with the movement, it should endeavour to paralyse its dangerous -consequences. With that end in view, I advocated that the activities of -the Committees should be limited to matters of internal organisation -(food supplies, distribution of equipment, etc.), that the officer -element should be strengthened, and that the Committees should remain -within the sphere of the lower grades of the Army, in order to prevent -them from spreading and acquiring a preponderating influence upon -larger formations such as Divisions, Armies, and Fronts. Unfortunately, -I only succeeded in compelling the Conference to accept my views to an -insignificant degree, and on March 30th the Supreme C.-in-C. issued -an Order of the Day on the "transition to the new forms of life," and -appealing to the officers, men, and sailors wholeheartedly to unite in -the work of introducing strict order and solid discipline within the -units of the Army and Navy. - -The main principles of the regulations were the following: - - (1) The _fundamental objects_ of the organisation were (_a_) to - increase the fighting power of the Army and of the Navy in order - to win the War; (_b_) to devise new rules for the life of the - soldier-citizen of Free Russia; and (_c_) to contribute to the - education of the Army and of the Fleet. - - (2) The _structure_ of the organisation: Permanent - sections--Company, Regimental, Divisional, and Army Committees. - Temporary sections--Conferences, attached to the Stavka, of Army - Corps, of the Fronts, and of the Centre. The latter to form - permanent Soviet. - - (3) The Conferences to be called by the respective Commanding - Officers or on the initiative of the Army Committees. All the - resolutions of the Conferences and Committees to be confirmed by - the respective military authorities prior to publication. - - (4) The _competence_ of the Committees was limited to enforcing - order and fighting power (discipline, resistance to desertion, - etc.), routine (leave, barrack life, etc.), internal organisation - (control of food supplies and equipment), and education. - - (5) _Questions of training_ were unreservedly excluded from - discussion. - - (6) The _personnel of the Committees_ was determined in proportion - to elected representatives--one officer to two men. - -In order to give an idea of the slackening of discipline in the -higher ranks I may mention that, immediately after receiving these -regulations, and obviously under the influence of Army organisations, -General Brussilov issued the following order: "Officers to be excluded -from Company Committees, and in higher Committees the proportion -lowered from one-third to one-sixth...." - -In less than a fortnight, however, the War Ministry, in disregard -of the Stavka, published its own regulations, drafted by the famous -Polivanov Committee, with the assistance of Soviet representatives. In -these new regulations substantial alterations were made: the percentage -of officers in Committees was reduced; Divisional Committees abolished; -"the taking of rightful measures against abuses by Commanding Officers -in the respective units" were added to the powers of the Committees; -the Company Committees were not permitted to discuss the matter of -military preparedness and other purely military matters affecting -the unit, but no such reservation was made with regard to Regimental -Committees; the Regimental Commanding Officer was entitled to appeal -against but not to suspend the decisions of the Committee; finally, the -Committees were given the task of negotiating with political parties -of every description in the matter of sending delegates, speakers, and -pamphlets explaining the political programme before the elections to -the Constituent Assembly. - -These regulations, which were tantamount to converting the Army in -war-time into an arena of political strife and depriving the Commanding -Officer of all control over his unit, constituted, in fact, one of the -main turning points on the path of destruction of the Army. - -The following appreciation of these regulations by the Anarchist, -Makhno (the Order of the Day of one of his subordinate Commanders of -November 10th, 1919), is worthy of note: "As any party propaganda at -the present moment strongly handicaps the purely military activities -of the rebel armies, I emphatically declare to the population that all -party propaganda is strictly prohibited pending the complete victory -over the White Armies...." - -Several days later, in view of a protest from the Stavka, the -War Ministry issued orders for the immediate suspension of the -regulations concerning the Committees. Where the Committees had -already been formed, they were allowed to carry on in order to avoid -misunderstandings. The Ministry decided to alter the section of the -regulations concerning the Committees, in accordance with the orders of -the Supreme Commander-in-Chief, in which fuller consideration was given -to the interests of the troops. Thus, in the middle of April there was -an infinite variety in the organisation of the Army. Some institutions -were illegal, others were sanctioned by the Stavka, and others still by -the War Ministry. All these contradictions, changes, and re-elections -might have led to ridiculous confusion had not the Committees -simplified matters: they simply cast off all restrictions and acted -arbitrarily. Wherever troops or Army departments were quartered -among the population local Soldiers' Soviets or Soviets of Soldiers -and Workmen were formed, which recognised no regulations, and were -particularly intent upon covering deserters and mercilessly exploiting -municipalities, Zemstvos, and the population. The authorities never -opposed them, and it was only at the end of August that the War -Ministry lost patience with the abuses of these "Institutions of the -Rear," and informed the Press that it _intended_ to undertake the -drafting of special regulations concerning these Institutions. - -Who were the members of the Committees? The combatant element, living -for and understanding the interests of the Army and imbued with its -traditions, was scantily represented. Valour, courage and a sense of -duty were rated very low on the market of Soldiers' Meetings. The -masses of the soldiery, who were, alas! ignorant, illiterate, and -already demoralised and distrusted their Chiefs, elected mostly men -who imposed on them by smooth talking, purely external political -knowledge derived from the revelation of Party propaganda; chiefly, -however, by shamelessly bowing to the instincts of the men. How could -a real soldier, appealing to the sense of duty, to obedience and to -a struggle for the Mother Country, compete with such demagogues? The -officers did not enjoy the confidence, they did not wish to work in -the Committees, and their political education was probably inadequate. -In the Higher Committees one met honest and sensible soldiers more -often than officers, because a man wearing a soldier's tunic was in -a position to address the mob in a manner in which the officer could -never dare to indulge. The Russian Army was henceforward administered -by Committees formed of elements foreign to the Army and representing -rather Socialist Party organs. It was strange and insulting to the Army -that Congresses of the Front, representing several million combatants -and many magnificent units with a long and glorious record, and -comprising officers and men of whom any Army might be proud, were held -under the Chairmanship of such men as civilian Jews and Georgians, who -were Bolsheviks, Mensheviks, or Social Revolutionaries--Posner on the -Western Front, Gegetchkory on the Caucasian, and Doctor Lordkipanitze -on the Roumanian. - - * * * * * - -What, then, were these Army Organisations doing that were supposed to -reconstruct "the freest Army in the world"? I will quote a list of -questions discussed at Conferences of the Front and which influenced -the Front and Army Committees: - - (1) The attitude towards the Government, the Soviet and the - Constituent Assembly. - - (2) The attitude towards War and Peace. - - (3) The question of a Democratic Republic as a desirable form of - Government. - - (4) The question of the land. - - (5) The Labour question. - -These intricate and burning political and social questions, to which -a radical solution was being given and which created partisanship -and class strife, were thus introduced into the Army that was facing -a strong and cruel enemy. The effect was self-evident. But even -in strictly military matters certain utterances were made at the -Conference at Minsk, which attracted the particular attention of the -military and civil authorities, and caused us gravely to ponder. It was -suggested that the rank of officer, individual disciplinary power, -etc., should be abolished, and that the Committees should be entitled -to remove Commanding Officers of whom they disapproved. From the very -first days of their existence the Committees fought stubbornly to -obtain full power not only with regard to the administration of the -Army, but even for the formula: "All Power to the Soviets." At first, -however, the attitude of the Army Committees towards the Provisional -Government was perfectly loyal, and the lower the Committee the -more loyal it was. The Petrograd papers of March 17th were full of -resolutions proclaiming unrestricted obedience to the Provisional -Government, of telegrams greeting and of records of delegations sent -by the troops, who were perturbed by rumours of the opposition of the -Soviet. This attitude later underwent several changes, due to the -propaganda of the Soviet. A powerful influence was exercised by the -resolution of the Congress of Soviets, which I have already quoted, -and which appealed to the Russian Revolutionary Democracy to organise -under the guidance of the Soviets and to be prepared to resist all the -attempts of the Government to avoid the control of the Democracy or the -fulfilment of their pledges. - -The Higher Committees indulged chiefly in political activities and -in the strengthening of Revolutionary tendencies in the Army, while -the Lower Committees gradually became absorbed in matters of service -and routine, and were weakening and discrediting the authority of the -Commanding Officers. The right to remove these officers was practically -established, because the position of those who had received a vote of -censure became intolerable. Thus, for instance, on the Western Front, -which I commanded, about sixty Senior Officers resigned--from Army -Corps to Regimental Commanders. What was, however, infinitely more -tragic was the endeavour of the Committees, on their own initiative and -under pressure from the troops, to interfere with purely military and -technical Orders, thus rendering military operations difficult or even -impossible. The Commanding Officer who was discredited, fettered and -deprived of power, and, therefore, of responsibility, could no longer -confidently lead the troops into the field of victory and death.... As -there was no authority the Commanding Officers were compelled to have -recourse to the Committees, which sometimes did exercise a restraining -influence over the licentious soldiery, resisted desertion, smoothed -friction between officers and men, appealed to the latter's sense -of duty--in a word, tried to arrest the collapse of the crumbling -structure. These activities of some of the Committees still misled -their apologists, including Kerensky. It is no use to argue with men -who think that a structure may be erected by one laying bricks one day -and pulling them to pieces on the next. - -The work, overt and unseen, of Army Committees, alternating between -patriotic appeals and internationalist watchwords, between giving -assistance to Commanding Officers and dismissing them, between -expressions of confidence in, or of distrust of, the Provisional -Government, and ultimatums for new boots or travelling allowances -for members of Committees.... The historian of the Russian Army, in -studying these phenomena, will be amazed at the ignorance of the -elementary rules governing the very existence of an armed force, -which was displayed by the Committees in their decisions and in their -writings. - -The Committees of the Rear and of the Fleet were imbued with a -particularly demagogic spirit. The Baltic Fleet was in a state -approaching anarchy all the time; the Black Sea Fleet was in a better -condition, and held out until June. It is difficult to estimate the -mischief made by these Committees and Soviets in the Rear, scattered -all over the country. Their overbearing manner was only comparable -with their ignorance. I will mention a few examples illustrating these -activities. - -The Regional Committee of the Army, the Fleet and the Workmen of -Finland issued a declaration in May, in which, not content with the -autonomy granted to Finland by the Provisional Government, they -demanded her complete independence, and declared that "they would give -every support to all the Revolutionary Organisations working for a -speedy solution of that question." - -The Central Committee of the Baltic Fleet, in conjunction with the -above-mentioned Committee, made a declaration, which coincided with the -Bolshevik outbreak in Petrograd in the beginning of June. They demanded -"all power to the Soviets. We shall unite in the Revolutionary struggle -of our working Democracy for power, and will not allow the ships to be -called out by the Provisional Government for the suppression of the -mutiny to leave Petrograd." - -The Committee of the Minsk Military District, shortly before the -advance, gave leave to all the Reservists to proceed to their farms. -I gave orders for the trial of the Committee, but the order was of no -avail, because, in spite of all my representations, the War Ministry -had not established any legal responsibility for the Committees, whose -decisions were recorded by vote and occasionally by secret ballot. I -will mention yet another curious episode. The Committee of one of the -Cavalry Depots on my Front decided that horses should be watered only -once a day, so most of the horses were lost. - -It would be unjust to deny that the organisations of the Rear -occasionally did adopt reasonable measures, but these instances are -few indeed, and they were drowned in the general wave of anarchy -which these organisations had raised. The attitude of the Committees -towards the War, and in particular towards the proposed advance, was, -of course, a momentous matter. In Chapter X. I have already described -the self-contradictions of the Soviets and Congresses, as well as -the ambiguous and insincere directions which they gave to the Army -Organisations, and which amounted to the acceptance of War and of the -advance, but without victory. The same ambiguity prevailed in the -High Committees, with the exception, however, of the Committee of our -Western Front, which passed in June a truly Bolshevik Resolution to the -effect that War has been engendered by the plundering policy of the -Government; that the only means of ending the War was for the united -Democracies of all countries to resist their Governments; and that a -decisive victory of one or the other of the contending groups of Powers -would only tend to increase militarism at the expense of Democracy. - -As long as the Front was quiet the troops accepted all these discourses -and Resolutions in a spirit of comparative indifference. But when -the time came for the advance, many people thought of saving their -skins, and the ready formulas of Defeatism proved opportune. Besides -the Committees, who were continuing to pass patriotic Resolutions, -certain organisations reflecting the views of the units of the Army, or -their own, violently opposed the idea of an advance. Entire regiments, -divisions, and even Army Corps, especially on the Northern and Western -Russian Fronts, refused to conduct preparatory work or to advance to -the firing line. On the eve of the advance we had to send large forces -for the suppression of units that had treacherously forgotten their -duty. - -I have already mentioned the attitude of many Senior Commanders towards -the Committees. The best summary of these views can be found in the -appeal of General Fedotov, in temporary command of an Army, to the -Army Committee: "Our Army is at present organised as no other Army in -the world.... Elected bodies play an important part. We--_the former -leaders_--can only give the Army our military knowledge of strategy -and tactics. You--the Committees--are called upon to organise the Army -and to create its internal strength. Great indeed is the part which -you--the Committees--are called upon to play in the creation of a -new and strong Army. History will recognise this...." - -Before the Army Organisations were sanctioned the Commander of the -Caucasian Front issued an Order for the decisions of the self-appointed -Tiflis Soldiers' Soviet to be published in the Orders of the Day, and -for all regulations appertaining to the Organisation and routine of the -Army to be sanctioned by that Soviet. Is one to wonder that such an -attitude of a certain portion of the Commanding Staffs gave an excuse -and a foundation for the growing demands of the Committees? - -As regards the Western and South-Western Fronts, which I commanded, -I definitely refused to have anything to do with the Committees, -and suppressed, whenever possible, such of their activities as were -contrary to the interests of the Army. One of the prominent Commissars, -a late member of the Executive Committee of the Soviet, Stankevitch, -wrote: "Theoretically, it became increasingly apparent that either the -Army must be abolished or else the Committees. In practice, one could -do neither one nor the other. The Committees were a vivid expression -of the incurable sociological disease of the Army, and a sign of its -certain collapse and paralysis. Was it not for the War Ministry to -hasten the death by a resolute and hopeless surgical operation?" - -The once great Russian Army of the first period of the Revolution -dwindled inevitably to nothing under such conditions as these: - -There was no Mother Country. The leader had been crucified. In his -stead a group appeared at the Front of five Defensists and three -Bolsheviks, and made an appeal to the Army: - -"Forward, to battle for liberty and for the Revolution, but ... without -inflicting a decisive defeat upon the enemy," cried the former. - -"Down with the War and all power to the Proletariat!" shouted the -others. - -The Army listened and listened, but would not move. And then ... it -dispersed! - -[Illustration: The Conference of Commanders-in-Chief. Standing on -the pathway, from left to right: Generals Denikin, Danilov, Hanjin. -Seated (left): Doukhonin, Gourko, Brussilov. Centre: Alexeiev. Right: -Dragomirov, Scherbatchev.] - -[Illustration: A group of "prisoners" at Berdichev. From left to right: -Captain Kletzando, General Elsner, General Vannovsky, General Denikin, -General Erdeli, General Markov, General Orlov.] - - - - -CHAPTER XIX. - -THE DEMOCRATISATION OF THE ARMY: THE COMMISSARS. - - -The next measure for the democratisation of the Army was the -introduction of the Institution of Commissars. The idea was derived -from the history of the French Revolutionary Wars, and was fostered -in various circles at different times; it was prompted chiefly by -_distrust of the Commanding Staffs_. Pressure was brought to bear -from below. The Conference of the Delegates of the Front addressed an -emphatic demand to the Soviet in the middle of April that Commissars -should be introduced in the Army. The excuse was that it was no longer -possible to preserve order in respect of the attitude of the men -towards individual Commanding Officers, and that, if cases of arbitrary -dismissal had as yet been avoided, it was only due to the fact that -the Army expected the Soviet and the Government to take the necessary -steps and did not wish to handicap their work. At the same time, the -Conference suggested the absurd idea of the simultaneous appointment -to the Army of three kinds of Commissars: (1) from the Provisional -Government, (2) from the Soviets, and (3) from the Army Committees. -The Conference went very far in their demands, and demanded that the -Commissariats, as controlling organs, should: discuss _all_ matters -appertaining to the competence of the Commanders of Armies and Fronts; -counter-sign _all_ Army Orders; investigate the activities of the -Commanding Staffs, with the right to recommend their dismissal. - -Protracted negotiations on this matter ensued between the Soviet and -the Government, and at the end of April it was agreed that Commissars -would be appointed to the Army--one from the Provisional Government and -one from the Soviet. This decision, however, was subsequently altered, -probably as the result of the formation of a Coalition Ministry (May -5th). One Commissar was appointed by agreement between the Government -and the Soviet. He represented both these bodies, and was responsible -to them. At the end of June the Provisional Government introduced the -office of Commissar of the Fronts, and thus defined their function: -according to the instructions of the War Ministry, they were to see -that all political questions arising within the Armies of the Front -should be given a uniform solution, and that the work of the Army -Commissars should be co-ordinated. At the end of July a final touch -was given by the appointment of a High Commissar attached to the -Stavka, and the entire official correspondence was concentrated in the -political section of the War Ministry. No law, however, was passed -defining the rights and the duties of the Commissars. The Commanding -Staffs, at any rate, were unaware of such laws, and this alone gave -rise to all the misunderstandings and conflicts that followed. The -Commissars had secret instructions to watch the Commanding Staffs and -Headquarters in respect of their political reliability. From that -point of view the democratic regime went further, perhaps, than the -autocratic. Of this I became convinced during my command of the Western -and South-Western Fronts, in reading the telegrams exchanged between -the Commissariats and Petrograd. These telegrams--may the Commissars -forgive me!--were handed to me, de-coded, by my Staff, immediately -after their despatch. This part of the Commissars' duty required a -certain training in political intelligence, but their overt duties were -infinitely more complex: they demanded statesmanship, a clear knowledge -of the aims to be pursued, an understanding of the psychology, not -merely of the officers and men, but of the Senior Commanding Staff, -acquaintance with the fundamental principles of service and routine in -the Army, great tact, and, finally, the personal qualities of courage, -strong will, and energy. Only such qualifications were capable of -mitigating to a certain degree the disastrous consequences of a measure -which deprived (to be more accurate, sanctioned the deprivation of) the -Commanding Officers of the possibility of influencing the troops--that -influence being the only means of strengthening the hope and faith in -victory. - -Such elements were not to be found, unfortunately, in the circles -connected with the Government and the Soviet and enjoying their -confidence. The personnel of the Commissars whom I met may be described -thus: War-time officers, doctors, solicitors, newspaper men, exiles -and _emigres_ completely out of touch with Russian life, members of -militant Revolutionary organisations, etc. These men had, obviously, -inadequate knowledge of the Army. All these men belonged to Socialist -parties, from Social-Democrat Mensheviks to the group "Edinstvo" -(unity), War party blinkers, and very often did not follow the -political lines of the Government because they considered themselves -tied by Soviet and party discipline. Owing to political differences of -opinion, the attitude of the Commissars towards the War also varied. -Stankevitch, one of the Commissars, who carried out his duties in his -own way most conscientiously, when proceeding to visit an advancing -Division was beset with doubts: "The soldiers believe that we do not -wish to deceive them; they force themselves, therefore, to forget -their doubts, and they go forward to death and murder. But we, are we -entitled not only to encourage them, but to take upon ourselves the -decision?" According to Savinkov (who was Commissar of the Seventh -Army of the South-Western Front, and later War Minister), not all the -Commissars agreed upon the question of Bolshevism, and not all of -them considered a resolute struggle against the Bolsheviks possible -or desirable. Savinkov was an exception. Although not a soldier by -profession, he was steeled in struggle and wanderings, in constant -danger, and his hands were stained with the blood of political victims. -This man, however, understood the laws of the struggle, threw off the -yoke of the party, and fought more resolutely than others against the -disorganisation of the Army. But the personal touch in his attitude -towards the events was somewhat too marked. None of the Commissars, -with the exception of very few men of the Savinkov type, displayed -personal strength or energy. They were men of words, not of deeds. -Their lack of training would not have had such negative results had it -not been for the fact that, their functions not being clearly defined, -they gradually began to interfere with every feature of the life and -service of the troops, partly on their own initiative, partly at the -instigation of the men and of the Army Committees, and partly even -of Commanding Officers, who were trying to escape responsibility. -Questions of appointments, dismissals, and even operative plans -attracted the attention of the Commissars, not only from the point of -view of "covert counter-Revolution," but from the point of view of -practicability. The confusion in their minds was so great that the -weaker elements among the Commanding Staffs were sometimes completely -disheartened. I remember one case during the July retreat on the -South-Western Front. One of the Army Corps Commanders rashly destroyed -a well-equipped military railway, thereby placing the Army in an -exceedingly difficult position. He was dismissed by the Army Commander, -and afterwards expressed to me his sincere astonishment: "Why had he -been dismissed? He had acted--upon the instructions of the Commissar." - -The Commissars carried out the ideas of the Soviet and whole-heartedly -defended the sacred newly-acquired rights of the soldier, but failed -to fulfil their primary duty--direct the political life of the Army. -Very often the most destructive propaganda was permitted. Soldiers' -meetings and Committees were allowed to pass all kinds of anti-National -and anti-Government resolutions, and the Commissars only interfered -when the tension of the atmosphere resulted in an armed mutiny. Such a -policy puzzled the troops, the Committees, and the Commanding Officers. - -The institution of Commissars did not attain its purpose. Among the -soldiers the Commissars could not be popular because they were to -a certain extent an instrument of compulsion, and occasionally of -suppression. At the same time, the extent of their power was not -well defined, and they could not gain proper authority over the most -undisciplined units. This was confirmed later after the seizure of -power by the Bolsheviks, when the Commissars were the first to flee -from their posts in a great hurry and in secret. - -There thus appeared in the Russian Army, instead of one authority, -three different authorities, which excluded one another--the Commanding -Officer, the Committee, and the Commissar. They were shadowy -authorities. Another authority was overhanging, and was oppressing them -morally with all its insensate weight--the power of the mob. - - * * * * * - -In examining the question of the new Institutions--Commissars and -Committees--and of their bearing upon the destinies of the Russian -Army, I have done so solely from the point of view of the preservation -of our Armed Forces as an important factor in the future of our -country. It would, however, be a mistake to overlook the connection -between these measures and the entirety of laws which govern the -life of the people and the course of the Revolution. These measures, -moreover, bear the stamp of logic and of inevitability owing to the -part which the Revolutionary Democracy had chosen to play. Therein lies -the tragedy of the situation. The Socialist Democracy did not possess -any elements sufficiently trained to become the instruments of Army -Administration. At the same time, it did not have the courage or the -possibility to quell the resistance of the Bourgeois Democracy and of -the Commanding Staffs, and to compel them to work for the glorification -of Socialism, as the Bolsheviks afterwards did, who forced the remnants -of the Russian _intelligencia_ and of the officers to serve Communism -by applying methods of sanguinary and ruthless extermination. When the -Revolutionary Democracy actually assumed power and set up to fulfil -certain aims it was well aware of the fact that those elements in -the administration and the Command who were called upon to carry out -these aims did not share the views of the Revolutionary Democracy. -Hence the inevitable distrust of these elements and the desire to -weaken their influence and their authority. What methods did the -Democracy have recourse to? As the Central Revolutionary organ was -utterly devoid of statesmanship and of patriotism, it applied in its -struggle against political opponents destructive methods, completely -disregarding the fact that by these methods they were destroying the -country and the Army. Another circumstance must be borne in mind--the -Revolution that had shaken the State to its very foundations and upset -the established class relations occurred at the moment when the flower -of the Nation--over 10,000,000 men--were under arms. Elections to the -Constituent Assembly were impending. In these circumstances it was -impossible to avoid politics being introduced into the Army, as it is -impossible to arrest the course of a river. But it would have been -possible to divert it to proper channels. In this matter, however, the -two contending forces (that which wished to preserve the State and the -Demagogic Force) also collided, as both endeavoured to influence the -attitude of the Army, which was a decisive factor in the Revolution. - -These were the propositions which pre-ordained and explained the -subsequent course of the Democratisation of the Army. The Socialist -Democracy, which governed at first behind the scenes and then overtly, -was endeavouring to strengthen its position and to bow to the -instincts of the crowd, destroyed the military power and connived at -the Institution of Elective Military Organisations, which were less -dangerous and more open to its influence than the Commanding Staffs, -although they did not answer the requirements of the Soviet. The -necessity of military authority of some sort was clearly realised. -The Commanding Staffs were distrusted, and there was a desire to -create a buffer between the two artificially separated elements of -the Army. These considerations inspired the creation of the office of -Commissars, who bore the dual responsibility before the Soviet and the -Government. Neither the men nor the officers were satisfied with these -institutions, which fell together with the Provisional Government, were -revived with certain modifications in the Red Army, and once again -swept away by the tide of events. - -"Peoples cannot choose their Institutions, as man cannot choose his -age. Peoples obey the Institutions to which they are tied by their -past, their creed, by the economic laws and surroundings in which they -live. There are many examples in history when the people have destroyed -by violent Revolution the Institutions which it has taken a dislike -for. But there is not a case in history of these new institutions -forcibly imposed upon the people becoming permanent and solid. After a -while the past comes again into force, because we are created entirely -by that past and it is our supreme ruler."[19] - -It is obvious that the Russian National Army will be revived not only -on democratic, but on historical foundations. - - - - -CHAPTER XX. - - THE DEMOCRATISATION OF THE ARMY--THE STORY OF "THE DECLARATION OF - THE RIGHTS OF THE SOLDIER." - - -The ill-famed law, emanating from the Polivanov Committee and known -as the "Declaration of the Rights of the Soldier," was confirmed by -Kerensky on May 9th. I will give the main points of that law: - - (1) "All soldiers of the Army enjoy full rights of citizenship." - - (2) Every soldier is entitled to the membership of any political, - national, religious, economic, or professional organisation, - society or union. - - (3) Every soldier off duty has the right freely and openly to - express in word, writing, or in the Press his political, religious, - social and other views. - - (4) All printed matter (periodicals and other) should be delivered - to the addressees. - - (5) Soldiers are not to be appointed as orderlies. Officers are - entitled to have one servant, appointed by mutual consent (of the - soldier and of the officer); wages also to be settled by mutual - consent, but there should be no more than one servant to each - officer, Army doctor, Army clerk, or Priest. - - (6) Saluting is abolished for men as well as for units. - - (7) No soldier is to be punished or fined without trial. At - the Front the Commanding Officer is entitled, on his own - responsibility, to take the necessary steps, including armed - force, against disobedient subordinates. Such steps are not to be - considered as disciplinary punishments. Internal administration, - punishments, and control in cases defined by Army regulations, - belong to elective Army Organisations. - -This "Declaration of Rights," of which the above is but a brief -summary, gave official sanction to the malady with which the Army -was stricken, and which spread in varying degrees owing to mutinies, -violence, and "by Revolutionary methods," as the current expression -goes. It dealt a death-blow to the old Army. It introduced boundless -political discussions and social strife into the unbalanced ARMED -MASSES which had already become aware of their rough physical power. -"The Declaration" admitted and sanctioned wide propaganda by speech and -pamphlet of anti-national, immoral and anti-Social doctrines, and even -the doctrines that repudiated the State and the very existence of the -Army. Finally, it deprived Commanding Officers of disciplinary power, -which was handed over to elective bodies, and once again insulted and -degraded the Commanding Staff. In his remarks attached to the text of -the "Declaration," Kerensky says: "Let the freest Army and Navy of the -World prove that there is strength and not weakness in Liberty, let -them forge a new iron discipline of duty and raise the Armed Power of -the country." - -And the "Great Silent One," as the French picturesquely describe the -Army, began to talk and to shout louder and louder still, enforcing its -demands by threats, by arms, and by shedding the blood of those who -dared to resist its folly. - -At the end of April the final draft of the "Declaration" was sent by -Gutchkov to the Stavka for approval. The Supreme Commander-in-Chief and -myself returned an emphatic disapproval, in which we gave vent to all -our moral sufferings and our grief for the dark future of the Army. Our -conclusion was that the "Declaration" "was the last nail driven into -the coffin which has been prepared for the Russian Army." On May 1st -Gutchkov resigned from the War Ministry, as he did not wish "to share -the responsibility for the heavy sin which was committed against the -Mother Country," and in particular to sign the "Declaration." - - * * * * * - -The Stavka sent copies of the draft "Declaration" to the -Commander-in-Chief of the Fronts for reference, and they were called -by General Alexeiev to Moghilev, in order to discuss the fateful -position. This historical Conference took place on May 2nd. The -speeches, in which the collapse of the Russian Army was described, -were restrained and yet moving, as they reflected deep sorrow and -apprehension. Brussilov, in a low voice expressing sincere and unfeigned -pain, ended thus: "All this can yet be borne, and there still remains -some hope of saving the Army and leading it forward, provided the -'Declaration' is not issued. If it is, there is no salvation, and I -would not remain in office for a single day." This last sentence -provoked a warm protest from General Stcherbatchov, who argued that no -one should resign, that, however arduous and hopeless the position may -be, the leaders cannot abandon the Army.... Somebody suggested that all -the Commanders-in-Chief should immediately proceed to Petrograd, -and address to the Provisional Government a stern warning and -definite demands. The General who suggested this thought that such a -demonstration would produce a very strong impression and might arrest -the progress of destructive legislation. Others thought that it was a -dangerous expedient and our last trump card, and that, should the step -prove ineffective, the High Command would be definitely discredited. The -suggestion, however, was accepted, and, on the 4th May, a Conference took -place of all the Commanders-in-Chief (with the exception of the Caucasian -Front), the Provisional Government, and the Executive Committee of -the Soviet. I am in possession of the record of that Conference, of -which I give extensive extracts below. The condition of the Army, such -as it appeared to its leaders, in the course of events, and without, -therefore, any historical perspective, is therein described, as well as -the characteristics of the men who were then in power. The trend of the -speeches made by the Commander-in-Chief was the same as in the Stavka, -but they were less emphatic and less sincere. Brussilov smoothed -over his accusations, lost his pathos, "warmly greeted the Coalition -Ministry," and did not repeat his threat of resignation. - - -THE RECORD. - -_General Alexeiev._--I consider it necessary to speak quite frankly. We -are all united in wishing for the good of our country. Our paths may -differ, but we have a common goal of ending the War in such a manner as -to allow Russia to come out of it unbroken, albeit tired and suffering. -Only victory can give us the desired consummation. Only then will -creative work be possible. But victory must be achieved, and that is -only possible if the orders of the Commanding Officers are obeyed. If -not, it is not an Army, but a mob. To sit in the trenches does not mean -to reach the end of the War. The enemy is transferring, in great haste, -division after division from our Front to the Franco-British Front, and -we continue to sit still. Meanwhile, the conditions are most favourable -for our victory, but we must advance in order to win it. Our Allies are -losing faith in us. We must reckon with this in the diplomatic sphere, -and I particularly in the military one. It seemed as if the Revolution -would raise our spirits, would give us impetus, and therefore victory. -In that, unfortunately, we have so far been mistaken. Not only is -there no enthusiasm or impetus, but the lowest instincts have come -to the fore, such as self-preservation. The interests of the Mother -Country and its future are not being considered.... You will ask what -has happened to the authority, to principles, or even to physical -compulsion? I am bound to state that the reforms to which the Army -has as yet failed to adapt itself have shaken it, have undermined -order and discipline. Discipline is the mainstay of the Army. If we -follow that path any further there will be a complete collapse.... -The Commanders-in-Chief will give you a series of facts describing -the condition of the Armies. I will offer a conclusion and will give -expression to our desires and demands, which must be complied with. - -_General Brussilov._--I must first of all describe to you the present -condition of the officers and men. Cavalry, artillery and engineering -troops have retained about 50 per cent. of their cadres. But in -the infantry, which is the mainstay of the Army, the position is -entirely different. Owing to enormous casualties in killed, wounded -and prisoners, as well as many deserters, some regiments have changed -their cadres nine or ten times, so that only from three to ten men -remain of the original formation. Reinforcements are badly trained -and their discipline is still worse. Of the regular officers from two -to four remain and in many cases they are wounded. Other officers -are youngsters commissioned after a short training and enjoying no -authority owing to their lack of experience. It is upon these new -cadres that the task has fallen to remodel the Army on a new basis, and -that task has so far proved beyond their capacity. Although we felt -that a change was necessary and that it had already come too late, the -ground was nevertheless unprepared. The uneducated soldier understood -it as a deliverance from the officers' yoke. The officers greeted the -change with enthusiasm. Had this not been so, the Revolution may not -have probably passed so smoothly. The result, however, was that freedom -was only given to the men, whereas the officers had to be content -to play the part of pariahs of liberty. The unconscious masses were -intoxicated with liberty. Everyone knows that extensive rights have -been granted, but they do not know what these rights are, and nobody -bothers about duties. The position of the officers is very difficult. -From 15 to 20 per cent. have rapidly adapted themselves to the new -conditions, because they believed that these conditions were all to -the good. Those of the officers who were trusted by the men did not -lose that trust. Some, however, became too familiar with the men, were -too lenient and even encouraged internal dissensions amongst the men. -But the majority of the officers, about 75 per cent., were unable to -adapt themselves. They were offended, retired to the background and -do not know what to do now. We are trying to bring them into contact -with the soldiers once more, because we need the officers for continued -fighting, and we have no other cadres. Many of the officers have no -political training, do not know how to make speeches--and this, of -course, handicaps the work of mutual understanding. It is necessary to -explain and to instil into the masses the idea that freedom has been -granted to _everyone_. I have known our soldiers for forty-five years, -I love them and I will do my best to bring them into close touch with -the officers, but the Provisional Government, the Duma and particularly -the Soviet should also make every effort in order to assist in that -work which must be done as soon as possible in the interests of the -country. It is also necessary, owing to the peculiar fashion in -which the illiterate masses have understood the watchword "without -annexations and indemnities." One of the regiments has declared that -not only would it refuse to advance, but desired to leave the front and -to go home. The Committees opposed this tendency, but were told that -they would be dismissed. I had a lengthy argument with the regiment, -and when I asked the men whether they agreed with me, they begged leave -to give me a written answer. A few minutes later they presented to me -a poster: "Peace at any price and down with the War." In the course of -a subsequent talk I had with one of the men, he said to me: "If there -are to be no annexations, why do we want that hill top?" My reply -was: "I also do not want the hill top, but we must beat the enemy who -is occupying it." Finally, the men promised to hold on, but refused -to advance, arguing that "the enemy is good to us and has informed -us that he will not advance provided we do not move. It is important -that we should go home to enjoy freedom and the land. Why should we -allow ourselves to be maimed?" Is it to be an offensive or a defensive -campaign? Success can be only obtained by an offensive. If we conduct -a passive defence the front is bound to be broken. If discipline is -strong a break-through may yet be remedied. But we must not forget that -we have no well-disciplined troops, that they are badly trained and -that the officers have no authority. In these circumstances an enemy -success may easily become a catastrophe. The masses must, therefore, be -persuaded that we must advance instead of remaining on the defensive. - -We thus have many shortcomings, but numerical superiority is still -on our side. If the enemy succeeds in breaking the French and the -British, he will throw his entire weight upon us and we will then be -lost. We need a strong government upon which we could rely, and we -whole-heartedly greet the coalition government. The power of the State -can only be strong when it leans upon the Army, which represents the -armed forces of the nation. - -_General Dragomirov._--The prevailing spirit in the Army is the -desire of peace. Anyone might be popular in the Army who would preach -peace without annexations and would advocate self-determination. The -illiterate masses have understood the idea of "no annexations" in a -peculiar fashion. They do not understand the conditions of different -peoples, and they repeatedly ask the question: "Why do not the Allied -democracies join in our declarations?" The desire for peace is so -strong that reinforcements refuse to accept equipment and arms and say: -"They are no good to us as we do not intend to fight." Work has come to -a standstill and it is even necessary to see to it that trenches are -not dismantled and that roads are mended. In one of the best regiments -we found, on the sector which it had occupied, a red banner inscribed: -"Peace at all costs." The officer who tore that banner had to flee for -his life. During the night men from that regiment were searching for -the officer at Dvinsk, as he had been concealed by the Headquarters -Staff. The dreadful expression "Adherents of the old regime" caused -the best officers to be cast out of the Army. We all wanted a change, -and yet many excellent officers, the pride of the Army, had to join -the Reserve simply because they tried to prevent the disruption of the -Army, but failed to adapt themselves to the new conditions. What is -much more fatal is the growth of slackness and of a lingering spirit. -Egoism is reaching terrible proportions, and each unit thinks only of -its own welfare; endless deputations come to us daily, demanding to -be relieved, to remove Commanding Officers, to be re-equipped, etc. -All these deputations have to be addressed, and this hinders our work. -Orders that used to be implicitly obeyed now demand lengthy arguments; -if a battery is moved to a different sector, there is immediate -discontent, and the men say: "You are weakening us--you are traitors." -Owing to the weakness of the Baltic Fleet, we found it necessary to -send an Army Corps to the rear to meet the eventual landing of an enemy -force, but we were unable to do so, because the men said: "Our line -is long enough as it is and if we lengthen it still more we will be -unable to hold the enemy." Formerly we had no difficulty whatsoever -in regrouping the troops. In September, 1915, eleven Army Corps were -removed from the Western front, and this saved us from a defeat which -might have decided the fate of the War. At present such a thing would -be impossible, as every unit raises objections to the slightest move. -It is very difficult to compel the men to do anything in the interests -of the Mother Country. Regiments refuse to relieve their comrades -in the firing line under various excuses--such as bad weather, or -the fact that not all their men had had their baths. On one occasion -a unit refused to go to the front on the plea that it had already -been in the firing line at Easter time. We are compelled to ask the -Committees of various regiments to argue the matter out. Only a small -minority of officers is behaving in an undignified manner, trying to -make themselves popular by bowing to the instincts of the men. The -system of elections has not been introduced in its entirety, but many -unpopular officers have been summarily dismissed as they were accused -of being adherents to the old regime; other Commanding Officers, who -had been considered incompetent and liable to dismissal, have been made -to stay. It was quite impossible not to grant the demands for their -retention. With regard to excesses there have been individual cases of -shootings of officers.... Things cannot continue on these lines. We -want strong power. We have fought for the country. You have taken the -ground from under our feet. Will you kindly restore it? Our obligations -are colossal, and we must have the power in order to be able to lead to -victory the millions of soldiers who are entrusted to our care. - -_General Stcherbatchov._--The illiteracy of the soldiery is the main -reason of all these phenomena. It is not, of course, the fault of our -people that it is illiterate. For this the old regime is entirely -responsible, as it looked upon education from the point of view of the -Ministry of the Interior. Nevertheless, we have to reckon with the fact -that the masses do not understand the gravity of our position, and that -they misinterpret even such ideas as may be considered reasonable.... -If we do not wish Russia to collapse, we must continue the struggle -and we must advance. Otherwise we shall witness a grotesque sight. -The representatives of oppressed Russia fought heroically; but having -overthrown the government that was striving for peace with dishonour, -the citizens of free Russia are refusing to fight and to safeguard -their liberties. This is grotesque, strange, incomprehensible. But it -is so. The reason is that discipline has gone and there is no faith -in the Commanding Officers. Mother Country, to most men, is an empty -sound. These conditions are most painful, but they are particularly -painful on the Roumanian front, where one has to reckon not only with -military surroundings of specific difficulty, but also with a very -complex political atmosphere. Our people are used to plains, and the -mountainous nature of the theatre of war has a depressing effect upon -the troops. We often hear the complaint: "Do not keep us in these -cursed mountains." We have only one railway line to rely upon for -supplies, and have great difficulty in feeding the troops. This, of -course, enhances discontent. The fact that we are fighting on Roumanian -territory is interpreted as a fight "for Roumania," which is also an -unpopular idea. The attitude of the local population is not always -friendly, and the men come to the conclusion that they are being -refused assistance by those on whose behalf they are fighting. Friction -thus arises and deepens, because some of the Roumanians blame us for -the defeats which they have themselves suffered and owing to which -they have lost most of their territory and of their belongings. The -Roumanian Government and the Allied representatives are well aware of -the ferment in our Army, and their attitude towards us is changing. -I personally noticed that a shadow has fallen between us, and that -the former respect and faith in the prowess of the Russian Army have -vanished. I still enjoy great authority, but if the disruption of the -Army continues not only shall we lose our Allies but make enemies of -them, and there would then be a danger of peace being made at our -expense. In 1914 we advanced across the whole of Galicia. In 1915, in -our retreat, we took at the South-Western front 100,000 prisoners. -You may judge what that retreat was like and what was the spirit of -the troops. In the summer of 1916 we saved Italy from disaster. Is -it possible that we may now abandon the Allied cause and be false to -our obligations? The Army is in a state of disruption, but that can -be remedied. Should we succeed, within a month and a half our brave -officers and men would advance again. History will wonder at the -inadequate means with which we achieved brilliant results in 1916. If -you wish to raise the Russian Army and to convert it into a strong -organised body which will dictate the terms of peace, you must help us. -All is not lost yet, but only on condition that the Commanding Officers -will regain prestige and confidence. We hope that full powers in the -Army will once again be vested in the Supreme Commander-in-Chief, who -alone can manage the troops. We will obey the will of the Provisional -Government, but you must give us strong support. - -_General Gourko._--If you wish to continue the War till the desired -end, you must restore the power of the Army. We have received the draft -of the "Declaration" (of the rights of the soldier). Gutchkov would -not sign it and has resigned. I am bound to say that if a civilian -has resigned and refused to sign that declaration--to us, the Army -Chiefs, it is inacceptable. It simply completely destroys everything -that is left. I will recount to you an episode which occurred while I -was temporarily holding the office of Chief-of-Staff of the Supreme -C.-in-C. - -On February 13th I had a long talk with the late Czar, trying to -persuade him to grant a responsible ministry. As a last trump card, I -alluded to our international position, to the attitude of our Allies -and to the probable consequences of this measure. But my card was -already beaten. I will now endeavour to describe our international -position. We have no direct indication of the attitude of our Allies -towards our intentions to give up the struggle. We cannot, of course, -force them to express their innermost thoughts. As in time of war, one -is often compelled to come to a decision "for the enemy," I will now -try to argue "for the Allies." - -It was easy to begin the Revolution, but we have been submerged by its -tidal wave. I trust that common sense will help us to survive this. If -not, if the Allies realise our impotence, the principles of practical -policy will force upon them the only issue--a separate peace. That -would not be on their part a breach of obligations, because we had -promised to fight together and have now come to a standstill. If one -of the parties is fighting and the other is sitting in the trenches, -like a Chinese dragon, waiting for the result of the fight--you must -agree that the fighting side may begin to think of making separate -peace. Such a peace would, of course, be concluded at our expense. -The Austrians and the Germans can get nothing from our Allies: their -finance is in a state of collapse and they have no natural riches. -Our finances are also in a state of collapse, but we have immense -untouched natural resources. Our Allies would, of course, come to such -a decision only as a last resort, because it would be not peace, but a -lengthy armistice. Bred as they are upon the ideals of the nineteenth -century, the Germans, having enriched themselves at our expense, would -once again fall upon us and upon our late Allies. You may say that if -this is possible why should we not conclude a separate peace first. -Here I will mention first of all the moral aspect of the question. The -obligation was undertaken by Russia, not merely by the late autocrat. -I was aware--long before you had heard of it--of the duplicity of the -Czar, who had concluded soon after the Russo-Japanese War of 1904-5 an -alliance with the Emperor William, while the Franco-Russian Alliance -was still in existence. The free Russian people, responsible for its -acts, cannot renounce its obligations. But setting aside the moral -aspect, there remains the material problem. If we open negotiations -they cannot remain secret, and our Allies would hear of it within -two or three days. They would also enter into a parley, and a kind -of auction sale would begin. The Allies are, of course, richer than -ourselves, but on their side the struggle has not yet ended; besides, -our enemies could get much more at our expense. It is precisely from -the international point of view that we must prove our capacity for -a continued struggle. I will not continue to revolutionise the Army, -because if I should we might find ourselves powerless not only to -advance but even to remain on the defensive. The latter is infinitely -more difficult. In 1915 we retreated and orders were obeyed. You -were entitled to expect this, because we had trained the Army. The -position has now been altered; you have created something new and have -deprived us of power. You can no longer hold us responsible, and the -responsibility must fall heavily upon your heads. You say that the -Revolution is still proceeding. Listen to us. We are better acquainted -with the psychology of the troops, we have gone with them through -thick and thin. Stop the Revolution and give us, the military Chiefs, -a chance to do our duty and to bring Russia to such a condition in -which you may continue your work. Otherwise, we will hand over to you -not Russia, but a field in which our enemies will sow and reap, and -Democracy itself will curse you. It will be Democracy that will suffer -if the Germans win. Democracy will be starving--while the peasants will -always manage to feed themselves on their own land. It was said of -the old regime that it "played into the hands of William." Will it be -possible to level the same accusation against you? William is fortunate -indeed, as both Monarchs and Democracies are playing into his hands. -The Army is on the eve of disruption. Our Mother Country is in danger -and is nearing a collapse. You must help. It is easy to destroy, and if -you know how to destroy--you should also know how to rebuild. - -_General Alexeiev._--The main points have been stated, and they are -true. The Army is on the brink of the abyss. Another step and it will -fall into the abyss and will drag along Russia and all her liberties, -and there will be no return. Everyone is guilty, and the guilt lies -heavily upon all that has been done in that direction for the last -two and a half months. We have made every effort and are now devoting -all our strength to the task of restoring the Army. We trust that Mr. -Kerensky will apply all his qualities of mind and character and all -his influence to that consummation, and will help us. But that is -not enough. Those who have been disrupting the Army must also help. -Those who have issued the Order No. 1 must issue a series of orders -and comments. If the "Declaration" is published, as Gutchkov said, -the last flimsy foundations will fall into dust and the last hope -will be dashed. Be patient, there is time still. That which has been -granted in the last two and a half months has not as yet taken root. -We have regulations defining rights and duties. All the regulations -that are issued nowadays only mention rights. You must do away with -the idea that peace will come by itself. Those who say "down with the -War" are traitors, and those who say "there should be no advance" -are cowards. We still have men with sincere convictions. Let them -come to us not as passing stars, but let them live with us and dispel -the misunderstandings that have arisen. You have the Press. May it -encourage patriotism and demand that everyone do his duty. - -_Prince Lvov._--We have heard the Commanders-in-Chief, we understand -all they have said and will do our duty to our country till the end. - -_Tzeretelli._--There is no one here who has contributed to the -disruption of the Army and played into the hands of William. I have -heard the accusation that the Soviet has contributed to the disruption -of the Army. And yet everyone agrees that the Soviet is the only -institution that enjoys authority at present. What would happen were -there no Soviet? Fortunately, Democracy has come to the rescue and -we still have hope in salvation. What can you do? There are only two -paths for you to follow. One is to reject the policy of the Soviets. -But you would then have no source of power wherewith to hold the Army -and to lead it for the salvation of Russia. Your other path is the -true path, which we have tried; the path of unity with the desires -and expectations of the people. If the Commanding Officers have -failed to make it quite clear that the whole strength of the Army -for the defence of the country lay in the advance, there is no magic -wand capable of doing it. It is alleged that the watchword "Without -annexations or indemnities" has demoralised the Army and the masses. -It is quite likely that it has been misunderstood, but it should have -been explained that this was the ultimate aim; we cannot renounce that -watchword. We are aware that Russia is in danger, but her defence is -a matter for the people as a whole. The Power must be united and must -enjoy the confidence of the people, but this can only be achieved -if the old policy is completely discarded. Unity can only be based -on confidence, which cannot be bought. The ideals of the Soviet are -not those of separate and small groups--they are the ideals of the -country. To renounce them is to renounce the country. You might, -perhaps, understand Order No. 1 if you knew the conditions in which it -was issued. We were confronted with an unorganised mob and we had to -organise it. The masses of the soldiery do not wish to go on with the -War. They are wrong, and I cannot believe that they are prompted by -cowardice. It is the result of distrust. Discipline should remain. But -if the soldiers realise that you are not fighting against Democracy, -they will trust you. By this means the Army may yet be saved. By this -means the authority of the Soviet will be strengthened. There is only -one way of salvation, the way of confidence and of the Democratisation -of the country and of the Army. It is by accepting those principles -that the Soviet has gained the confidence of the people and is now in -a position to carry out its ideas. As long as that is so, not all is -lost. You must try to enhance the confidence in the Soviet. - -_Skobelev._--We have not come here to listen to reproaches. We know -what is going on in the Army. The conditions which you have described -are undoubtedly ominous. It will depend upon the spirit of the Russian -people whether the ultimate goal will be reached and whether we shall -come out of the present difficulty with honour. I consider it necessary -to explain the circumstances in which Order No. 1 was issued. In the -troops which had overthrown the old regime, the Commanding Officers -had not joined the mutineers; we were compelled to issue that Order so -as to deprive these officers of authority. We were anxious about the -attitude of the front towards the Revolution and about the instructions -that were being given. We have proved to-day that our misgivings were -not unfounded. Let us speak the truth: the activities of the Commanding -Staff have prevented the Army, in these two and a half months, from -understanding the Revolution. We quite realise the difficulties of -your position. But when you say that the Revolution must be stayed, we -are bound to reply that the Revolution cannot begin or end to order. -Revolution may take its normal course when the mental process of the -Revolution spreads all over the country, when it is understood by the -70 per cent. of illiterate people. - -Far be it from us to demand that all Commanding Officers be elected. We -agree with you that we have power and have succeeded in attaining it. -When you will understand the aims of the Revolution and will help the -people to understand our watchword, you will also acquire the necessary -power. The people must know what they are fighting for. You are leading -the Army for the defeat of the enemy, and you must explain that a -strategical advance is necessary in order that the watchwords that -have been proclaimed may be vindicated. We trust the new War Minister -and hope that a revolutionary Minister will continue our work and will -hasten the mental process of the Revolution in the heads of those who -think too slowly. - -_The War Minister--Kerensky._--As Minister and Member of the -Government, I must say that we are trying to save the country and to -restore the fighting capacity and activities of the Russian Army. _We -assume responsibility, but we also assume the right to lead the Army_ -and to show it the path of future development. Nobody has been uttering -reproaches here. Everyone has described what he has lived through and -has tried to define the causes of events, but our aims and desires are -the same. The Provisional Government recognises that the Soviet has -played a prominent part and admits its work of organisation--otherwise -I would not be War Minister. No one can level accusations at the -Soviet. But no one can accuse the Commanding Staffs either, because the -officers have borne the brunt of the Revolution quite as much as the -rest of the Russian people. Everyone understands the position. Now that -my comrades are joining the Government, it will be easier to attain our -common aims. There is but one thing for us to do--to save our freedom. -I will ask you to proceed to your commands and to remember that the -whole of Russia stands behind you and behind the Army. It is our aim to -give our country complete freedom. But this cannot be done unless we -show the world at large that we are strong in spirit. - -_General Gourko_ (replying to Skobelev and Tzeretelli).--We are -discussing the matter from different angles. Discipline is the -fundamental condition of the existence of the Army. The percentage of -losses which a unit may suffer without losing its fighting capacity -is the measure of its endurance. I have spent eight months in the -South African Republics and have seen regiments of two different -kinds: (1) Small, disciplined and (2) Volunteer, undisciplined. The -former continued to fight and did not lose their fighting power when -their losses amounted to 50 per cent. The latter, although they were -volunteers who knew what they were fighting for, left the ranks and -fled from the battlefield after losing 10 per cent. No force on earth -could induce them to fight. That is the difference between disciplined -and undisciplined troops. We demand discipline. We do all we can to -persuade. But your authoritative voice must be heard. We must remember -that if the enemy advances, we shall fall to pieces like a pack of -cards. If you will not cease to revolutionise the Army--you must assume -power yourselves. - -_Prince Lvov._--Our ends are the same and everyone will do his duty. I -thank you for your visit and for giving us your views. - - * * * * * - -The Conference came to a close. The Commanders-in-Chief rejoined their -fronts, fully conscious that the last card had been beaten. At the same -time, the Soviet orators and the Press started a campaign of abuse -against Generals Alexeiev, Gourko and Dragomirov, which rendered their -resignations imperative. On the 9th of May, as I already mentioned, -Kerensky confirmed the "Declaration" while issuing an Order of the Day -on the inadmissibility of senior Commanding Officers relinquishing -their posts "in order to shirk responsibility." What was the impression -produced by that fateful Order? - -Kerensky _afterwards_ tried to adduce the excuse that the regulation -was drafted before he had assumed office and was approved of by the -Executive Committee as well as by "military authorities," and that he -had no reason to refuse to confirm it; in a word, that he was compelled -to do so. But I recall more than one of Kerensky's speeches in which, -believing his course to be the right one, he prided himself on his -courage in issuing a Declaration "which Gutchkov had not dared to sign, -and which had evoked the protests of all the Commanding Officers." -On May 13th the Executive Committee of the Soviets responded to the -Declaration by an enthusiastic proclamation which dwelt mainly upon the -question of saluting. Poor, indeed, was the mind that inspired this -verbiage: "Two months we have waited for this day.... Now the soldier -is by law a citizen.... Henceforward the citizen soldier is free from -the servile saluting, and will greet anyone he chooses as an equal and -free man.... In the Revolutionary Army discipline will live through -popular enthusiasm ... and not by means of compulsory saluting...." -Such were the men who undertook to reorganise the Army. - -As a matter of fact, the majority of the Revolutionary Democracy of -the Soviets were not satisfied with the Declaration. They described -it as "a new enslavement of the soldier," and a campaign was opened -for further widening of these rights. Members of the Defencist -coalition demanded that the Regimental Committees should be empowered -to challenge the appointments of the Commanding Officers and to give -them attestations, as well as that freedom of speech should be granted -on service. Their chief demand, however, was for the exclusion of -Paragraph 14 of the Declaration entitling the Commanding Officer to use -arms in the firing line against insubordination. I need hardly mention -the disapproval of the Left, "Defeatist" Section of the Soviet. - -The Liberal Press utterly failed to appraise the importance of the -Declaration and never treated it seriously. The official organ of the -Constitutional Democratic Party (_Retch_, May 11th) had an article -which expressed great satisfaction that the Declaration "afforded -every soldier the chance of taking part in the political life of the -country, definitely freed him from the shackles of the old regime and -led him from the stale atmosphere of the old barracks into the fresh -air of liberty." It also said that "throughout the world all other -armies are remote from politics, whilst the Russian Army will be the -first to enjoy the fullness of political rights." Even the Conservative -paper (_Novoc Vremia_) said in a leading article: "It is a memorable -day; to-day the great Army of mighty Russia becomes truly the Army -of the Revolution.... Intercourse between warriors of all ranks will -henceforward be placed upon the common foundation of a sense of duty -binding on every citizen, irrespective of rank. And the Revolutionary -Army of regenerated Russia will go forward to the great ordeal of blood -with faith in victory and in peace." Difficult, indeed, was the task -of the Commanding Officers who were endeavouring to preserve the Army -when they found that the fundamental principles upon which the very -existence of the Army depended were misunderstood so grossly, even in -circles which had heretofore been considered as the mainstay of Russian -statesmanship. - -The Commanding Officers were still more disheartened, and the Army fell -into the abyss with ever-increasing rapidity. - - - - -CHAPTER XXI. - -THE PRESS AND PROPAGANDA. - - -In the late World War, along with aeroplanes, tanks, poison gases -and other marvels of military _technique_, a new and powerful weapon -came to the fore, viz: _propaganda_. Strictly speaking, it was not -altogether new, for as far back as 1826 Canning said, in the House of -Commons: "Should we ever have to take part in a war we shall gather -under our flag all the rebels, all those who, with or without cause, -are discontented in the country that goes against us." But now this -means of conflict attained an extraordinary development, intensity -and organisation, attacking the most morbid and sensitive points of -national psychology. Organised on a large scale, supplied with vast -means, the propaganda organs of Great Britain, France and America, -especially those of Great Britain, carried on a terrible warfare by -word of mouth, in the Press, in the films and ... with gold, extending -this warfare over the territories of the enemy, the Allies and the -neutrals, introducing it into all spheres--military, political, moral -and economic. The more so, that Germany especially gave grounds enough -for propaganda to have a plentiful supply of irrefragable, evidential -material at its disposal. It is difficult to enumerate, even in their -general features alone, that enormous arsenal of ideas which, step by -step, drop by drop, deepened class differences, undermined the power of -the State, sapped the moral powers of the enemy and their confidence -in victory, disintegrated their alliance, roused the neutral powers -against them and finally raised the falling spirits of their allied -peoples. Nevertheless, we should not attach exceptional importance to -this external moral pressure, as the leaders of the German people are -now doing, to justify themselves: Germany has suffered a political, -economic, military and moral defeat. It was only the interaction of all -these factors that determined the fatal issue of the struggle, which, -towards its end, became a lingering death-agony. One could only marvel -at the vitality of the German people, which, by its intellectual power -and the stability of its political thought, held out so long, until at -last, in November, 1918, "a double death-blow, both at the front and -in the rear," laid it in the dust. In connection with this, history -will undoubtedly note a great analogy between the parts played by the -"Revolutionary Democracies" of Russia and of Germany in the destinies -of these peoples. After the _debacle_ the leader of the German -Independent Social Democrats acquainted the country with the great and -systematic work which they had carried on, from the beginning of 1918, -for the breaking down of the German Army and Navy, to the glory of the -social revolution. In this work one is struck by the similarity of -method and _modus operandi_ with those practised in Russia. - -While unable to resist British and French propaganda, the Germans were -very successful in applying this means to their Eastern antagonist, the -more so that: "Russia created her own misfortunes," said Ludendorff, -"and the work which we carried on there was not too hard." - -The results of the interaction of the skilful hand of Germany with the -movements which arose, less from the fact itself of the Revolution than -from the individual character of the Russian rebellion, exceeded the -highest hopes of the Germans. - -The work was carried on in three directions--political, military and -social. In the first we note the idea, quite clearly and definitely -formulated and systematically carried out by the German Government, -_of the dismemberment of Russia_. Its realisation took shape in the -proclamation, on November 15, 1916, of the Kingdom of Poland[20] _with -a territory which was to extend eastward "as far as possible"_; in the -creation of the States of Courland and Lithuania--"independent," but -in union with Germany; in the sharing of the White Russian provinces -between Poland and Lithuania, and, finally, in the prolonged and very -persistent preparation of the secession of Little Russia, which took -place later, in 1918. While the former facts had a meaning only in -principle, concerning, as they did, territories actually occupied by -the Germans and defined the character of the future "annexations," the -attitude assumed by the Central Powers with respect to Little Russia -exercised a direct influence on the stability of our South-Western -front, creating political complications in the country and separatist -tendencies in the Army. I shall return to this question later. - -The German Headquarters included an excellently organised -"press-bureau," which, besides influencing and directing the home Press, -also guided German propaganda, which penetrated mainly into Russia and -France. Miliukov quotes a circular issued by the German Foreign Office -to all its representatives in neutral countries: "You are informed that -on the territory of the country to which you are accredited, special -offices have been instituted for the organisation of propaganda in the -States, now fighting with the German coalition. The propaganda will -be engaged in exciting the social movement and, in connection with -the latter, strikes, revolutionary outbreaks, separatism, among the -constituent parts of these States, and civil war, as well as agitation -in favour of disarmament and the cessation of the present sanguinary -slaughter. You are instructed to afford all possible protection and -support to the directors of the said propaganda offices." - -It is curious that, in the summer of 1917, the British Press took up -arms against Sir George Buchanan and the British Propaganda Ministry -for their inertness in the matter of influencing the Democracy of -Russia and of fighting German propaganda in that country. One of the -papers pointed out that the British bureau of Russian propaganda had -at its head a novelist and literary beginners who had "as much idea of -Russia as of Chinese metaphysics." - -As for us, neither in our Government departments nor at the Stavka did -we have any organ whatever which was even in some degree reminiscent of -the mighty Western propaganda institutions. One of the sections of the -Quartermaster-General's department had charge of technical questions, -concerning relations with the Press, and was left without importance, -influence, or any active task. The Russian Army, well or badly, fought -in primitive ways, without ever having recourse to that "poisoning of -the enemy's spirit," which was so widely practised in the West. And it -paid for this with superfluous torrents of blood. But if opinions may -differ regarding the morality of destructive propaganda, we cannot but -note our complete inertness and inactivity in another and perfectly -pure sphere. We did absolutely nothing to acquaint foreign public -opinion with the exceptionally important part played by Russia and -the Russian Army in the World War, with the enormous losses suffered -and the sacrifices made by the Russian people, with those constant -majestic deeds of self-sacrifice, incomprehensible, perhaps, to the -cold understanding of our Western friends, which the Russian Army made -whenever the Allied front was within a hair's-breadth of defeat.... -Such a want of comprehension of the part played by Russia I have -met with almost everywhere, in wide social circles, long after the -conclusion of peace, in my wanderings over Europe. - -The following small episode is a burlesque, but very characteristic -instance of this. On a banner presented to Marshal Foch "from American -friends" are depicted the flags of all countries, lands and colonies, -which in one way or another came within the orbit of the Entente; the -Russian flag occupies the forty-sixth place, after Hayti and Uruguay -and immediately after San-Marino. - -Is this ignorance or triviality? - -We did nothing to lay a firm moral foundation for national unity during -our occupation of Galicia, did not draw public opinion to our side -during the occupation of Roumania by the Russian troops, did nothing -to restrain the Bulgarian people from betraying the interests of the -Slavonic races. Finally, we took no advantage of the presence on -Russian soil of an enormous number of prisoners, to give them at least -a correct idea of Russia. - -The Stavka, firmly barricaded within the sphere of purely military -questions connected with the carrying out of the campaign, made no -attempt to gain any influence over the general course of political -events, which agrees completely with the service idea of a national -army. But, at the same time, the Stavka distinctly avoided influencing -the public spirit of the country so as to lead this powerful factor to -moral co-operation in the struggle. There was no connection with the -leading organs of the Press, which was represented at the Stavka by men -possessing neither weight nor influence. - -When the thunderstorm of the Revolution broke and the political -whirlwind swept up and convulsed the Army, the Stavka could remain -inert no longer. It had to respond. The more so, that suddenly no -source of moral power was to be found in Russia which might have -protected the Army. The Government, especially the War Office, rushed -irresistibly down the path of opportunism; the Soviets and the -Socialist Press undermined the Army; the Bourgeois Press now cried -"videant consules ne quid Imperio detrimenti caparet," now naively -rejoiced at the "democratisation and liberation" which were taking -place. Even in what might have been considered the competent spheres -of the higher military bureaucracy of Petrograd there reigned such a -variety of views, as plunged the public opinion of the country into -perplexity and bewilderment. - -It turned out, however, that for the conflict the Stavka possessed -neither organisation nor men, neither technique nor knowledge and -experience. And, worst of all, the Stavka was in some way or other -shoved and thrown aside by the madly-careering chariot of life. Its -voice grew weaker and sank into silence. - -[Illustration: The Old Army: a review. General Ivanov.] - -[Illustration: The Revolutionary Army: a review. Kerensky.] - -The second Quartermaster-General--General Markov--had a serious task -before him--he had to create the necessary apparatus, to establish -communications with the important papers, to supply the Stavka with -a "megaphone" and raise the condition of the Army Press, which was -leading a wretched existence and which the army organisations were -trying to destroy. Markov took up the task warmly, but failed to do -anything serious, as he only remained in office two months. Every step -of the Stavka in this direction called forth from the Revolutionary -Democracy a disingenuous accusation of counter-revolutionary action. -And Liberal Bourgeois Moscow, to which he turned for aid, in the form -of intellectual and technical assistance in his task, replied with -eloquent promises, but did absolutely nothing. - -Thus the Stavka had no means at all, not only for actively combating -the disintegration of the Army, but for resisting German propaganda, -which was spreading rapidly. - - * * * * * - -Ludendorff says frankly and with a national egotism rising to a high -degree of cynicism: "I did not doubt that the _debacle_ of the Russian -Army and the Russian people was fraught with great danger for Germany -and Austria-Hungary.... _In sending Lenin to Russia_ our Government -assumed an enormous responsibility! This journey was justified from a -military point of view; _it was necessary that Russia should fall_. But -our Government should have taken measures that this should not happen -to Germany."[21] - -Even now the boundless sufferings of the Russian people, now "out of -the ranks," did not call forth a single word of pity or regret from its -moral corrupters.... - -With the beginning of the campaign, the Germans altered the direction -of their work with respect to Russia. Without breaking their -connections with the well-known reactionary circles at Court, in the -Government and in the Duma, using all means for influencing these -circles and all their motives--greed, ambition, German atavism, and -sometimes a peculiar understanding of patriotism--the Germans entered -at the same time into close fellowship with the Russian Revolutionaries -in the country, and especially abroad, amongst the multitudinous -emigrant colony. Directly or indirectly, all were drawn into the -service of the German Government--great agents in the sphere of spying -and recruiting, like Parvus (Helfand); provocateurs, connected with the -Russian Secret Police, like Blum; propaganda agents--Oulianoff (Lenin), -Bronstein (Trotsky), Apfelbaum (Zinovieff), Lunacharsky, Ozolin, Katz -(Kamkoff), and many others. And in their wake went a whole group of -shallow or unscrupulous people, cast over the frontier and fanatically -hating the _regime_ which had rejected them--hating it to the degree -of forgetfulness of their native land, or squaring accounts with this -_regime_, acting sometimes as blind tools in the hands of the German -General Staff. What their motives were, what their pay, how far they -went--these are details; what is important is that they sold Russia, -serving those aims which were set before them by our foe. They were all -closely interlaced with one another and with the agents of the German -Secret Service, forming with them one unbroken conspiracy. - -The work began with a widespread Revolutionary and Separatist -(Ukrainian) propaganda among the prisoners of war. According to -Liebknecht, "the German Government not only helped this propaganda, -but carried it on itself." These aims were served by the Committee -of Revolutionary Propaganda, founded in 1915 at The Hague by the -Union for the Liberation of the Ukraine in Austria by the Copenhagen -Institute (Parvus's organisation), and a whole series of papers of a -Revolutionary and Defeatist character, partly published at the expense -of the German Staff, partly subsidised by it--the _Social Democrat_ -(Geneva--Lenin's paper), _Nashe Slovo_ (Paris--Trotsky's paper), _Na -Tchoozhbeenie_ (Geneva--contributions from Tchernoff, Katz and others), -_Russkii Viestnik_, _Rodnaya Retch_, _Nedielia_, and so forth. Similar -to this was the activity--the spread of Defeatist and Revolutionary -literature, side by side with purely charitable work--of the Committee -of Intellectual Aid to Russian Prisoners of War in Germany and Austria -(Geneva), which was in connection with official Moscow and received -subsidies from it. - -To define the character of these publications it is enough to quote -two or three phrases expressing the views of their inspirers. Lenin -said in the _Social Democrat_: "The least evil will be the defeat -of the Czarist monarchy, the most barbarous and reactionary of all -Governments." Tchernoff, the future Minister of Agriculture, declared -in the _Mysl_ that he had one Fatherland only--the International! - -Along with literature the Germans invited Lenin's and Tchernoff's -collaborators, especially from the editorial staff of _Na -Tchoozhbeenie_, to lecture in the camps, while a German spy, Consul Von -Pelche, carried on a large campaign for the recruiting of agitators for -propaganda in the ranks of the Army--among the Russian emigrants of -conscript age and of Left Wing politics. - -All this was but preparatory work. The Russian Revolution opened -boundless vistas for German propaganda. Along with honest people, once -persecuted, who had struggled for the good of the people, there rushed -into Russia all that revolutionary riff-raff which absorbed the members -of the Russian secret police, the international informers and the -rebels. - -The Petrograd authorities feared most of all the accusation of want of -Democratic spirit. Miliukov, as Minister, stated repeatedly that "the -Government considers unconditionally possible the return to Russia of -all emigrants, regardless of their views on the War and independently -of their registration in the International Control List."[22] This -Minister carried on a dispute with the British, demanding the release -of the Bolsheviks, Bronstein (Trotsky), Zourabov and others, who had -been arrested by the British. - -Matters were more complicated in the case of Lenin and his supporters. -Despite the demands of the Russian Government, the Allies would -undoubtedly have refused to let them through. Therefore, as Ludendorff -acknowledges, the German Government despatched Lenin and his companions -(the first group consisted of seventeen persons) to Russia, allowing -them free transit through Germany. This undertaking, which promised -extraordinarily important results, was richly financed with gold and -credit through the Stockholm (Ganetsky-Fuerstenberg) and Copenhagen -(Parvus) centres and through the Russian Siberian Bank. That gold -which, as Lenin expressed it, "does not smell." - -In October, 1917, Bourtsev published a list of 159 persons brought -through Germany to Russia by order of the German General Staff. Nearly -all of them, according to Bourtsev, "were revolutionaries who, during -the War, had carried on a defeatist campaign in Switzerland and were -now William's voluntary or involuntary agents." Many of them at once -assumed a prominent position in the Social Democratic party, in the -Soviet, the Committee[23] and the Bolshevik Press. The names of Lenin, -Tsederbaum (Martov), Lunacharsky, Natanson, Riazanov, Apfelbaum -(Zinoviev) and others soon became the most fateful in Russian history. - -On the day of Lenin's arrival in Petrograd the German paper _Die Woche_ -devoted an article to this event, in which he was called "a true -friend of the Russian people and an honourable antagonist." And the -Cadet semi-official organ, the _Retch_, which afterwards boldly and -unwaveringly waged war against the Lenin party, greeted his arrival -with the words: "Such a generally acknowledged leader of the Socialist -party ought now to be in the arena, and his arrival in Russia, whatever -opinion may be held of his views, should be welcomed." - -On April 3rd Lenin arrived in Petrograd, where he was received with -much state, and in a few days declared his theses, part of which formed -the fundamental themes of German propaganda: "Down with war and all -power to the Soviet!" - -Lenin's first actions seemed so absurd and so clearly anarchistic that -they called forth protests not only in the whole of the Liberal Press, -but also in the greater part of the Socialist Press. - -But, little by little, the Left Wing of the Revolutionary Democracy, -reinforced by German agents, joined overtly and openly in the -propaganda of its chief, without meeting any decisive rebuff either -from the double-minded Soviet or the feeble Government. The great wave -of German and mutinous propaganda engulfed more and more the Soviet, -the Committee, the Revolutionary Press, and the ignorant masses, and -was reflected, consciously or unconsciously, even among those who stood -at the helm of the State. - -From the very first Lenin's organisation, as was said afterwards, in -July, in the report of the Procurator of the Petrograd High Court of -Justice, "aiming at assisting the States warring against Russia in -their hostile actions against her, entered into an agreement with the -agents of the said States to forward the disorganisation of the Russian -Army and the Russian rear, for which purpose it used the financial -means received from these States to organise a propaganda among the -population and the troops ... and also, for the same purpose, organised -in Petrograd, from July 3rd to 5th, an armed insurrection against the -Supreme Power existing in the State." - -The Stavka had long and vainly raised its voice of warning. General -Alexeiev had, both personally and in writing, called on the Government -to take measures against the Bolsheviks and the spies. Several times -I myself applied to the War Office, sending in, among other things, -evidential material concerning Rakovsky's spying and documents -certifying the treason of Lenin, Skoropis-Yoltoukhovsky and others. -The part played by the Union for the Liberation of the Ukraine (of -which, besides others, Melenevsky and V. Doroshenko were members)[24] -as an organisation of the Central Powers for propaganda, spying and -recruiting for "Setch Ukraine units," was beyond all doubt. In one of -my letters (May 16th), based on the examination of a Russian officer, -Yermolenko, who had been a prisoner of war and had accepted the part -of a German agent for the purpose of disclosing the organisation, -the following picture was revealed: "Yermolenko was transferred to -our rear, on the front of the Sixth Army, to agitate for a speedy -conclusion of a separate peace with Germany. Yermolenko accepted this -commission at the insistence of his comrades. Two officers of the -German General Staff, Schiditzky and Lubar, informed him that a similar -agitation was being carried on in Russia by the sectional president of -the Union for the Liberation of the Ukraine, A. Skoropis-Yoltoukhovsky, -and by Lenin, as agents of the German General Staff. Lenin had been -instructed to seek to undermine by all means the confidence of the -Russian people in the Provisional Government. The money for this work -was received through one Svendson, an employee of the German Embassy in -Stockholm. These methods were practised before the Revolution also. Our -command turned its attention to the somewhat too frequent appearance -of "escaped prisoners." Many of them having surrendered to the enemy, -passed through a definite course of intelligence work, and having -received substantial pay and "papers," were permitted to pass over to -us through the line of trenches. - -Being altogether unable to decide what was a case of courage and what -of treachery, we nearly always sent all escaped prisoners from the -European to the Caucasian Front. - -All the representations of the High Command as to the insufferable -situation of the Army, in the face of such vast treachery, remained -without result. Kerensky carried on free debates in the Soviet with -Lenin on the subject whether the country and the Army should be broken -down or not, basing his action on the view that he was the "War -Minister of the Revolution," and that "freedom of opinion was sacred to -him, whencesoever it might proceed." Tzeretelli warmly defended Lenin: -"I do not agree with Lenin and his agitation. But what has been said by -Deputy Shulgin is a slander against Lenin, _Never has Lenin called for -actions which would infringe upon the course of the Revolution. Lenin -is carrying on an idealist propaganda._" - -This much-talked-of freedom of opinion extremely simplified the work -of German propaganda, giving rise to such an unheard-of phenomenon as -the open preaching in German, at public meetings and in Kronstadt, -of a separate peace and of distrust of the Government, by an agent -of Germany, the President of the Zimmerwald and Kienthal Conference, -Robert Grimm!... - -What a state of moral prostration and loss of all national dignity, -consciousness, and patriotism is presented by the picture of Tzeretelli -and Skobelev "vouching" for the _agent provocateur_; of Kerensky -importuning the Government to grant Grimm the right of entry into -Russia; of Tereshtchenko permitting it, and of Russians listening to -Grimm's speeches--without indignation, without resentment. - -During the Bolshevik insurrection of July the officials of the Ministry -of Justice, exasperated by the laxity of the leaders of the Government, -decided, with the knowledge of their Minister, Pereverzev, to publish -my letter to the Minister of War and other documents, exposing Lenin's -treason to his country. The documents being a statement signed by two -Socialists, Alexinsky and Pankratov, were given to the printers. The -premature disclosure of this fact called forth a passionate protest -from Tchkheidze and Tzeretelli, and terrible anger on the part of the -Ministers Nekrassov and Tereshtchenko. The Government forbade the -publication of information which sullied the good name of comrade -Lenin, and had recourse to reprisals against the officials of the -Ministry of Justice. However, the statement appeared in the Press. -In its turn the Executive Committee of the Soviet of Workmen's and -Soldiers' Delegates exhibited a touching care, not only for the -inviolability of the Bolsheviks, but even for their honour, by issuing -on July 5th a special appeal calling on people "to refrain from the -spreading of accusations reflecting dishonour" on Lenin and "other -political workers" pending the investigation of the matter by a special -commission. This consideration was openly expressed in a resolution -passed by the Central Executive Committees (on July 8th), which, -while condemning the attempt of the Anarchist-Bolshevist elements to -overthrow the Government, expressed the fear that the "inevitable" -measures to which the Government and the military authorities must -have recourse ... would create a basis for the demagogic agitation of -the counter-Revolutionaries who, for the time being, gathered round -the flag of the Revolutionary regime, but who might pave the way for a -military Dictatorship." - -However, the exposure of the direct criminal participation of the -leaders of Bolshevism in acts of mutiny and treason may have obliged -the Government to begin repressions. Lenin and Apfelbaum (Zinoviev) -escaped to Finland, while Bronstein (Trotsky), Kozlovsky, Raskolnikov, -Remniov, and many others were arrested. Several Anarchist-Bolshevist -newspapers were suspended. - -These repressions, however, were not of a serious character. Many -persons known to have been leaders in the mutiny were not charged at -all, and their work of destruction was continued with consistency and -energy. - - * * * * * - -While carrying the war into our country the Germans persistently -and methodically put into practice another watchword--peace at the -Front. Fraternisation had taken place earlier as well, before the -Revolution; but it was then due to the hopelessly wearisome life in the -trenches, to curiosity, to a simple feeling of humanity even towards -the enemy--a feeling exhibited by the Russian soldier more than once -on the battlefield of Borodino, in the bastions of Sevastopol, and in -the Balkan mountains. Fraternisation took place rarely, was punished -by the commanders, and had no dangerous tendencies in it. But now the -German General Staff organised it on a large scale, systematically -and along the whole Front, with the participation of the higher Staff -organs and the commanders, with a detailed code of instructions, which -included the observation of our forces and positions, the demonstration -of the impressive armament and strength of their own positions, -persuasion as to the aimlessness of the War, the incitement of the -Russian soldiers against the Government and their commanders, in whose -interest exclusively this "sanguinary slaughter" was being continued. -Masses of the Defeatist literature manufactured in Germany were passed -over into our trenches, and at the same time agents of the Soviet and -the Committee travelled quite freely along the Front with similar -propaganda, with the organisation of "exhibition fraternisation," and -with whole piles of _Pravda_, _Trench Pravda_, _Social Democrat_, and -other products of our native Socialist intellect and conscience--organs -which, in their forceful argumentation, left the Jesuitical eloquence -of their German brethren far behind. At the same time a general -meeting of simple "delegates from the Front" in Petrograd was passing -a resolution in favour of allowing fraternisation for the purpose of -revolutionary propaganda among the enemy's ranks! - -One cannot read without deep emotion of the feelings of Kornilov, -who, for the first time after the Revolution, in the beginning of -May, when in command of the Eighth Army, came into contact with this -fatal phenomenon in the life of our Front. They were written down by -Nezhintsev, at that time captain of the General Staff and later the -gallant commander of the Kornilov Regiment, who in 1918 fell in action -against the Bolsheviks at the storm of Ekaterinodar. - -"When we had got well into the firing zone of the position," writes -Nezhintsev, "the General (Kornilov) looked very gloomy. His words, -'disgrace, treason,' showed his estimate of the dead silence of the -position. Then he remarked: - -"'Do you feel all the nightmare horror of this silence? You understand -that we are watched by the enemy artillery observers and that we are -not fired at. Yes, the enemy are mocking us as weaklings. Can it be -that the Russian soldier is capable of informing the enemy of my -arrival at the position?' - -"I was silent, but the sacred tears in the eyes of this hero touched me -deeply, and at this moment I vowed in my mind that I would die for him -and for our common Motherland. General Kornilov seemed to feel this. He -turned to me suddenly, pressed my hand, and turned away, as if ashamed -of his momentary weakness. - -"The acquaintance of the new Commander with the infantry began with -the units in the Reserve, when formed in rank, holding a meeting and -replying to all appeals for the necessity of an advance by pointing -out how useless it was to continue a Bourgeois war, carried on by -'militarists.' When, after two hours of fruitless discussion, General -Kornilov, worn out morally and physically, proceeded to the trenches, -he found a scene there which could scarcely have been foreseen by any -soldier of this age. - -"We entered into a system of fortifications where the trench-lines -of both sides were separated or, more correctly, joined by lines of -barbed wire.... The appearance of General Kornilov was greeted ... by -a group of German officers, who gazed insolently on the Commander of -the Russian Army; behind them stood some Prussian soldiers. The General -took my field-glasses and, ascending the parapet, began to examine the -arena of the fights to come. When someone expressed a fear that the -Prussians might shoot the Russian Commander, the latter replied: - -"'I would be immensely glad if they did; perhaps it might sober our -befogged soldiers and put an end to this shameful fraternisation.' - -"At the positions of a neighbouring regiment the Commander of the Army -was greeted by the _bravura_ march of a German Jaeger regiment, to -whose band our 'fraternising' soldiers were making their way. With the -remark, 'This is treason!' the General turned to an officer standing -next him, ordering the fraternisers from both sides to be told that if -this disgraceful scene did not cease at once he would turn the guns -loose on them. The disciplined Germans ceased playing and returned to -their own trenches, seemingly ashamed of the abominable spectacle. -But our soldiers--oh! they held meetings for a long time, complaining -of the way their 'counter-Revolutionary commanders oppressed their -liberty.'" - -In general I do not cherish feelings of revenge. Yet I regret -exceedingly that General Ludendorff left the German Army prematurely, -before its break-up, and did not experience directly in its ranks those -inexpressibly painful moral torments which we Russian officers have -suffered. - -[Illustration: Before the battle in the Revolutionary Army: a meeting.] - -[Illustration: Types of men in the Revolutionary Army.] - -Besides fraternisation, the enemy High Command practised, on an -extensive scale and with provocatory purpose, the dispatch of flags -of truce directly to the troops, or rather to the soldiers. Thus, -about the end of April on the Dvinsk Front there came with a flag of -truce a German officer, who was not received. He managed, however, to -address to the crowd of soldiers the words: "I have come to you with -offers of peace, and am empowered to speak even with the Provisional -Government, but your commanders do not wish for peace." These words -were spread rapidly, and caused agitation among the soldiers and -even threats to desert the Front. Therefore when, a few days later, -in the same section, _parliamentaires_ (a brigade commander, two -officers, and a bugler) made their appearance again, they were taken -to the Staff quarters of the Fifth Army. It turned out, of course, -that they had no authorisations, and could not even state more or -less definitely the object of their coming, since "the sole object of -the pseudo-_parliamentaires_ appearing on our Front," says an order -of the Commander-in-Chief, "has been to observe our dispositions and -our spirit, and, by a lying exhibition of their pacific feelings, to -incline our troops to an inaction profitable to the Germans and ruinous -to Russia and her freedom." Similar cases occurred on the Fronts of -the Eighth, Ninth, and other Armies. - -It is characteristic that the Commander-in-Chief of the Eastern German -Front, Prince Leopold of Bavaria, found it possible to take a personal -part in this course of provocation. In two radiograms, bearing the -systematic character of the customary proclamations and intended for -the soldiers and the Soviet, he stated that the High Command was ready -to meet half-way "the repeatedly expressed desire of the Russian -Soldiers' Delegates to put an end to bloodshed"; that "military -operations between us (the Central Powers) and Russia could be put an -end to _without Russia breaking with her Allies_"; that "if Russia -wants to know the particulars of our conditions, let her give up her -demand for their publication...." And he finishes with a threat: "Does -the new Russian Government, instigated by its Allies, wish to satisfy -itself whether divisions of heavy guns are still to be found on our -Eastern Front?" - -Earlier, when leaders did discreditable things to save their armies and -their countries, at least they were ashamed of it and kept silence. -Nowadays military traditions have undergone a radical change. - -To the credit of the Soviet it must be said that it took a proper -view of this provocationary invitation, saying in reply: "The -Commander-in-Chief of the German troops on the Eastern Front offers us -'a separate truce and secrecy of negotiations.' But Russia knows that -the _debacle_ of the Allies will be the beginning of the _debacle_ of -her own Army, and the _debacle_ of the Revolutionary troops of Free -Russia would mean not only new common graves, but the failure of the -Revolution, the fall of Free Russia." - - * * * * * - -From the very first days of the Revolution a marked change naturally -took place in the attitude of the Russian Press. It expressed itself on -the one hand in a certain differentiation of all the Bourgeois organs, -which assumed a Liberal-Conservative character, the _tactics_ of which -were adopted by an inconsiderable part of the Socialist Press, of the -type of Plekhanov's _Yedinstvo_; and on the other in the appearance of -an immense number of Socialist organs. - -The organs of the Right Wing underwent a considerable evolution, a -characteristic indication of which was the unexpected declaration of -a well-known member of the _Novoye Vremya_ staff, Mr. Menshikov: "We -must be grateful to destiny that the Monarchy, which for a thousand -years has betrayed the people, has at last betrayed itself and put a -cross on its own grave. To dig it up from under that cross and start a -great dispute about the candidates for the fallen throne would be, in -my opinion, a fatal mistake." In the course of the first few months the -Right Press partly closed down--not without pressure and violence on -the part of the Soviets--partly it assumed a pacific-Liberal attitude. -It was only in September, 1917, that its tone grew extremely violent in -connection with the final exposure of the weakness of the Government, -the loss of all hope of a legal way out of the "no thoroughfare" which -had arisen, and the echoes of Kornilov's venture. The attacks of the -extremist organs on the Government passed into solid abuse of it. - -Though differing in a greater or lesser degree in its understanding of -the social problems which the Revolution had to solve, though guilty, -perhaps, along with Russian society, of many mistakes, yet the Russian -Liberal Press showed an exceptional unanimity in the more important -questions of a constitutional and national character: full power to -the Provisional Government, Democratic reforms in the spirit of the -programme of March 2nd,[25] war until victory along with the Allies, -an All-Russia Constituent Assembly as the source of the supreme power -and of the constitution of the country. In yet another respect has the -Liberal Press left a good reputation behind it in history: in the days -of lofty popular enthusiasm, as in the days of doubt, vacillation and -general demoralisation, which distinguished the Revolutionary period of -1917, no place was found in it, nor in the Right Press either, for the -distribution of German gold.... - -The appearance, on a large scale, of the new Socialist Press was -accompanied by a series of unfavourable circumstances. It had no -normal past, no traditions. Its prolonged life below the surface, the -exclusively destructive method of action adopted by it, its suspicious -and hostile attitude towards all authority, put a certain stamp on the -whole tendency of this Press, leaving too little place and attention -for creative work. The complete discord in thought, the contradictions -and vacillation which reigned both within the Soviet and also among the -party groups and within the parties, were reflected in the Press, just -as much as the elemental pressure from below of irresistible, narrowly -egotistic class demands; for neglect of these demands gave rise to -the threat, which was once expressed by the "beauty and pride of the -Revolution," the Kronstadt sailors to Tchernov, the Minister: "If you -will not give us anything, Michael Alexandrovitch will." Finally, the -Press was not uninfluenced by the appearance in it of a number of such -persons as brought into it an atmosphere of uncleanness and perfidy. -The papers were full of names, which had emerged from the sphere of -crime, of the Secret Police and of international espionage. All these -gentlemen--Tchernomazov (a provocator in the Secret Police and director -of the pre-Revolutionary _Pravda_), Berthold (the same and also -editor of the _Communist_), Dekonsky, Malinovsky, Matislavsky, those -colleagues of Lenin and Gorky--Nahamkes, Stoutchka, Ouritsky, Gimmer -(Soukhanov), and a vast number of equally notorious names--brought the -Russian Press to a hitherto unknown degree of moral degradation. - -The difference was only a matter of scope. Some papers, akin to -the Soviet semi-official organ, the _Izvestia of the Workmen's and -Soldiers' Delegates_, undermined the country and the Army, while others -of the _Pravda_ type (the organ of the Bolshevik Social Democrats) -broke them down. - -At the same time as the _Izvestia_ would call on its readers to -support the Provisional Government, while secretly ready to strike -a blow at it, the _Pravda_ would declare that "the Government is -counter-Revolutionary, and therefore there can be no relations -with it. The task of the Revolutionary Democracy is to attain to -the dictatorship of the proletariat." And Tchernov's Socialist -Revolutionary organ, the _Delo Naroda_, would discover a neutral -formula: all possible support to the Coalition Government, but "there -is not, and cannot be, any unanimity in this question; more than that, -there must not be, in the interests of the double defence." - -At the same time as the _Izvestia_ began to preach an advance, but -without a final victory, not abandoning, however, the intention of -"deciding over the heads of the Government and the ruling classes the -conditions on which the War might be stopped," the _Pravda_ called for -universal fraternisation, and the Socialist Revolutionary, _Zemlia i -Volia_, alternately grieved that Germany still wished for conquest, -or demanded a separate peace. Tchernov's paper, which in March had -considered that, "should the enemy be victorious, there would be an end -to Russian freedom," now, in May, saw in the preaching of an advance -"the limit of unblushing gambling on the fate of the Fatherland, the -limit of irresponsibility and demagogy." Gorky's paper, _Novaya Zhizn_, -speaking through Gimmer (Soukhanov), rises to cynicism when it says: -"When Kerensky gives orders for _Russian soil to be cleared of enemy -troops_, his demands far exceed the limits of military _technique_. -He calls for a political act, one which has never been provided for -by the Coalition Government. For clearing the country by an advance -signifies 'complete victory'...." Altogether the _Novaya Zhizn_ -supported German interests with especial warmth, raising its voice in -all cases when German interests were threatened with danger, either -on the part of the Allies or on ours. And when the advance of the -disorganised Army ended in failure--in Tarnopol and Kalush--when Riga -had fallen, the Left Press started a bitter campaign against the Stavka -and the commanding personnel, and Tchernov's paper, in connection -with the proposed reforms in the Army, cried hysterically: "Let the -proletarians know that it is proposed again to give them up to the -iron embrace of beggary, slavery and hunger.... Let the soldiers know -that it is proposed again to enslave them with the 'discipline' of -their commanders and to force them to shed their blood without end, so -long as the belief of the Allies in Russia's 'gallantry' is restored." -The most straightforward of all, however, was afterwards the _Iskra_, -the organ of the Menshevist Internationalists (Martov-Zederbaum), -which, on the day of the occupation of the island of Oesel by a German -landing-party, published an article entitled "Welcome to the German -Fleet!" - -The Army had its own military Press. The organs of the Army staffs and -of those at the Front, which used to appear before the Revolution, -were of the nature of purely military bulletins. Beginning with the -Revolution, these organs, with their weak literary forces, began to -fight for the existence of the Army, conscientiously, honestly, but -not cleverly. Meeting with indifference or exasperation on the part of -the soldiers, who had already turned their backs on the officers, and -especially on the part of the Committee organs of the "Revolutionary" -movement, which existed side by side with them, they began to weaken -and die out, until at last, in the days of August, an order from -Kerensky closed them altogether; the exclusive right of publishing Army -newspapers was transferred to the Army Committee and the Committees of -the troops at the Front. The same fate befell the _News of the Active -Army_, the Stavka organ, started by General Markov and left without -support from the weighty powers of the Press of the capital. - -The Committee Press, widely spread among the troops at the expense of -the Government, reflected those moods of which I have spoken earlier -in the chapter on the Committees, ranging from Constitutionalism to -Anarchism, from complete victory to an immediate conclusion of peace, -without orders. It reflected--but in a worse, more sorry form, as -regards literary style and content--that disharmony of thought and -those tendencies towards extreme theories which characterised the -Socialist Press of the Capital. In this respect, in accordance with the -personnel of the Committees, and to some extent with their proximity to -Petrograd, the respective Fronts differed somewhat from one another. -The most moderate was the South-Western Front, somewhat worse, the -Western, while the Northern Front was pronouncedly Bolshevist. Besides -local talent, the columns of the Committee Press were in many cases -opened wide to the resolutions not only of the extreme national -parties, but even of the German parties. - -It would be incorrect, however, to speak of the immediate action of the -Press on the masses of the soldiers. It did not exist any more than -there were any popular newspapers which these masses could understand. -The Press exercised an influence principally on the semi-educated -elements in the ranks of the Army. This sphere turned out to be nearer -to the soldiers, and to it passed a certain share of that authority -which was enjoyed earlier by the officers. Ideas gathered from the -papers and refracted through the mental prism of this class passed -in a simplified form to the soldiery, the vast majority of which -unfortunately consisted of ignorant and illiterate men. And among these -masses all these conceptions, stripped of cunningly-woven arguments, -premises and grounds, were transformed into wondrously simple and -terrifically logical conclusions. - -In them dominated the straightforward negation: "Down!" - -Down with the Bourgeois Government, down with the counter-Revolutionary -Commanders, down with the "sanguinary slaughter," down with everything -of which they were sick, of which they were wearied, all that in one -way or another interfered with their animal instincts and hampered -"free will"--down with them all! - -In such an elementary fashion did the Army at innumerable soldiers' -meetings settle all the political and social questions that were -agitating mankind. - - * * * * * - -The curtain has fallen. The Treaty of Versailles has for a time given -pause to the armed conflict in Central Europe. Evident to the end that, -having regained their strength, the nations may again take up their -arms, so as to burst the chains in which defeat has fettered them. - -The idea of the "world-peace," which the Christian churches have been -preaching for twenty centuries, is buried for years to come. - -To us, how childishly naive now seem the efforts of the humanists of -the nineteenth century, who by prolonged, ardent propaganda sought -to soften the horrors of war and to introduce the limiting norms -of International Law! Yes, now, when we know that one may not only -infringe the neutrality of a peaceful, cultured country, but give it -to be ravaged and plundered; when we can sink peaceable ships, with -women and children on board, by means of submarines; poison people with -suffocating gases and tear their bodies with the fragments of explosive -bullets; when a whole country, a whole nation, is quoted by cold, -political calculation merely as a "Barrier" against the invasion of -armed force and pernicious ideas, and is periodically either helped or -betrayed in turn. - -But the most terrible of all weapons ever invented by the mind of man, -the most shameful of all the methods permitted in the late World War -was _the poisoning of the soul of a people_! - -Germany assigns the priority of this invention to Great Britain. Let -them settle this matter between themselves. But I see my native land -crushed, dying in the dark night of horror and insanity. And I know her -tormentors. - -Two theses have arisen before mankind in all their grim power and all -their shameless nakedness: - -_All is permissible for the advantage of one's country!_ - -_All is permissible for the triumph of one's party, one's class!_ - -All, even the moral and physical ruin of an enemy country, even the -betrayal of one's native land and the making on its living body of -_social experiments_, the failure of which threatens it with paralysis -and death. - -Germany and Lenin unhesitatingly decided these questions in the -affirmative. The world has condemned them; but are all those who speak -of the matter so unanimous and sincere in their condemnation? Have not -these ideas left somewhat too deep traces in the minds, not so much -perhaps of the popular masses as of their leaders? I, at least, am led -to such a conclusion by all the present soulless world policy of the -Governments, especially towards Russia, by all the present utterly -selfish tactics of the class organisations. - -This is terrible. - -I believe that every people has the right to defend its existence, -sword in hand; I know that for many years to come war will be the -customary method of settling international disputes, and that methods -of warfare will be both honourable and, alas! dishonourable. But there -is a certain limit, beyond which even baseness ceases to be simply -baseness and becomes insanity. This limit we have already reached. And -if religion, science, literature, philosophers, humanitarians, teachers -of mankind do not arouse a broad, idealistic movement against the -Hottentot morality with which we have been inoculated, the world will -witness the decline of its civilisation. - -[Illustration: Before the battle in the Old Army: Prayers.] - - - - -CHAPTER XXII. - -THE CONDITION OF THE ARMY AT THE JULY ADVANCE. - - -Having outlined a whole series of conditions which exercised an -influence on the life, spirit, and military efficiency of the once -famous Russian Army, I shall now pass to the sorrowful tale of its fall. - -I was born in the family of an officer of the line, and for twenty-two -years (including the two years of the Russo-Japanese War) before the -European War served in the ranks of modest line units and in small Army -Staffs. I shared the life, the joys and the sorrows of the officer and -the soldier, and devoted many pages in the Military Press to their -life which was my own. From 1914 to 1920, almost without interval, I -stood at the head of the troops and led them into battle on the fields -of White Russia, Volynia, Galicia, in the mountains of Hungary, in -Roumania, and then--then in the bitter internecine war which, with -bloody share, ploughed up our native land. - -I have more grounds and more right to speak of the Army and in the -name of the Army than all those strangers of the Socialist Camp, who, -in their haughty self-conceit, as soon as they touched the Army, -began breaking down its foundations, judging its leaders and fighters -and diagnosing its serious disease, who even now, after grievous -experiments and experiences, have not given up the hope of transforming -this mighty and terrible weapon of national self-preservation into a -means for satisfying party and social appetites. For me, the Army is -not only an historical, social, national phenomenon, but nearly the -whole of my life, in which lie many memories, precious and not to be -forgotten, in which all is bound up and interlaced into one general -mass of swiftly passing days of sadness and of joy, in which there are -hundreds of cherished graves, of buried dreams and unextinguishable -faith. - -The Army should be approached cautiously, never forgetting that not -only its historical foundations, but even such details of its life -as may, perhaps, seem strange and absurd, have their meaning and -significance. - -When the Revolution began that old veteran, beloved by both officers -and soldiers, General P. I. Mishtchenko, being unable to put up with -the new regime, retired from the Army. He lived at Temir-Han Shoura, -never went outside his garden fence, and always wore his General's -uniform and his crosses of St. George, even in the days of Bolshevik -power. One day the Bolsheviks came to search his house, and, among -other things, wanted to deprive him of his shoulder straps and -decorations. The old General retired to a neighbouring room and shot -himself. - -Let whoever will laugh at "old-fashioned prejudices." We shall -reverence his noble memory. - -And so the storm-cloud of the Revolution broke. - -There was no doubt whatever that such a cataclysm in the life of the -nation could not but have a grave effect. The Revolution was _bound_ -to convulse the Army, greatly weakening and breaking all its historic -ties. Such a result was normal, natural and unavoidable, independently -of the condition of the Army at the moment, independently of the mutual -relations of Commanders and subordinates. We can speak only of the -circumstances which arrested or hastened the disintegration of the Army. - -A Government appeared. - -Its source might have been one of three elements: The High Command -(a military dictatorship), the Bourgeois State Duma (the Provisional -Government), or the Revolutionary Democracy (the Soviet). It was the -Provisional Government that was acknowledged. The attitude of the other -two elements towards it was different; the Soviet practically robbed -the Government of its power, while the High Command submitted to it -implicitly, and was therefore obliged to carry out its plans. - -The Government had two courses open to it; it could combat the -disintegrating influences which began to appear in the Army by stern -and ruthless measures, or it could encourage them. Owing to pressure -from the Soviet and partly through want of firmness and through -misunderstanding of the laws of existence of armed forces, the -Government chose the second course. - -This circumstance decided the fate of the Army. All other circumstances -could but influence the duration of the process of disruption and its -depth. - -[Illustration: Types of soldiers of the Old Army. This company was sent -to the West European Front.] - -The festive days of touching and joyous union between the officers -and the soldiers vanished rapidly, being replaced by tiresome, weary -week-days. But they had been in the past, those days of joy, and, -therefore, no impassable abyss existed between the two Ranks, over -which the inexorable logic of life had long been casting a bridge. -The unnecessary, obsolete methods, which had introduced an element of -irritation into the soldiery, fell away at once, as of themselves; the -officers became more thoughtful and industrious. - -Then came a torrent of newspapers, appeals, resolutions, orders, from -some unknown authority, and with them a whole series of new ideas, -which the soldier masses were unable to digest and assimilate. New -people appeared, with a new speech, so fascinating and promising, -liberating the soldiers from obedience and inspiring hope that they -would be saved from deadly danger immediately. When one Regimental -Commander naively inquired whether these people might not be tried -by Field Court-Martial and shot, his telegram, after passing through -all official stages, called forth the reply from Petrograd that these -people were inviolable, and had been sent by the Soviet to the troops -for the very purpose of explaining to them the true meaning of current -events. - -When such leaders of the Revolutionary Democracy, as have not yet lost -their feeling of responsibility for crucified Russia, now say that the -movement, caused by the deep class differences between the officers -and the soldiers and by "the enslavement" of the latter, was of an -elemental nature, which they could not resist, this is deeply untrue. - -All the fundamental slogans, all the programmes, tactics, instructions -and text-books, forming the foundation of the "democratisation" of -the Army, had been drawn up by the military sections of the secret -Socialist parties long before the War, outside of "elemental" pressure, -on the grounds of clear, cold calculation, as a product of "Socialist -reasoning and conscience." - -True, the officers strove to persuade the men not to believe the -"new words" and to do their duty. But from the very beginning the -Soviets had declared the officers to be foes of the Revolution; in -many towns they had been subjected to cruel torture and death, and -this with impunity. Evidently not without some reason, when even the -"Bourgeois" Duma issued such a strange and unexpected "announcement" -as the following: "This first day of March, rumours were spread among -the soldiers of the garrison of Petrograd to the effect that the -officers in the regiments were disarming the soldiers. These rumours -were investigated and found to be false. As President of the Military -Commission of the Provisional Committee of the State Duma, I declare -that the most decided measures _will be_ taken to prevent such action -on the part of the officers, up to the shooting of those guilty of it. -Signed, COLONEL ENGELHARDT." - -Next came Order No. 1., the Declaration and so forth. - -Perhaps, however, it might have been possible to combat all this verbal -ocean of lies and hypocrisy which flowed from Petrograd and from the -local Soviets and was echoed by the local demagogues had it not been -for a circumstance which paralysed all the efforts of the Commanders, -viz., the animal feeling of self-preservation which had flooded the -whole mass of the soldiers. This feeling had always existed. But it -had been kept under and restrained by examples of duty fulfilled, by -flashes of national self-consciousness, by shame, fear and pressure. -When all these elements had disappeared, when for the soothing of a -drowsy conscience there was a whole arsenal of new conceptions, which -justified the care for one's own hide and furnished it with an ideal -basis, then the Army could exist no longer. This feeling upset all the -efforts of the Commanders, all moral principles and the whole regiment -of the Army. - - * * * * * - -In a large, open field, as far as the eye can see, run endless lines of -trenches, sometimes coming close up to each other, interlacing their -barbed wire fences, sometimes running far off and vanishing behind a -verdant crest. The sun has risen long ago, but it is still as death -in the field. The first to rise are the Germans. In one place and -another their figures look out from the trenches; a few come out on to -the parapet to hang their clothes, damp after the night, in the sun. -A sentry in our front trench opens his sleepy eyes, lazily stretches -himself, after looking indifferently at the enemy trenches. A soldier -in a dirty shirt, bare-footed, with coat slung over his shoulders, -cringing under the morning cold, comes out of his trench and plods -towards the German positions, where, between the lines, stands a -"postbox"; it contains a new number of the German paper, _The Russian -Messenger_, and proposals for barter. - -All is still. Not a single gun is to be heard. Last week the Regimental -Committee issued a resolution against firing, even against distance -firing; let the necessary distances be estimated by the map. A -Lieutenant-Colonel of the gunners--a member of the Committee--gave -his full approval to this resolution. When yesterday the Commander -of a field battery began firing at a new enemy trench, our infantry -opened rifle fire on our observation post and wounded the telephone -operator. During the night the infantry lit a fire on the position -being constructed for a newly arrived heavy battery.[26] - -Nine a.m. The first Company gradually begins to awaken. The trenches -are incredibly defiled; in the narrow communication trenches and those -of the second line the air is thick and close. The parapet is crumbling -away. No one troubles to repair it; no one feels inclined to do so, -and there are not enough men in the Company. There is a large number -of deserters; more than fifty have been allowed to go. Old soldiers -have been demobilised, others have gone on leave with the arbitrary -permission of the Committee. Others, again, have been elected members -of numerous Committees, or gone away as delegates; a while ago, for -instance, the Division sent a numerous delegation to "Comrade" Kerensky -to verify whether he had really given orders for an advance. Finally, -by threats and violence, the soldiers have so terrorised the regimental -surgeons that the latter have been issuing medical certificates even to -the "thoroughly fit." - -In the trenches the hours pass slowly and wearily, in dullness and -idleness. In one corner men are playing cards, in another a soldier -returned from leave is lazily and listlessly telling a story; the air -is full of obscene swearing. Someone reads aloud from the _Russian -Messenger_ the following: - -"The English want the Russians to shed the last drop of their blood for -the greater glory of England, who seeks her profit in everything.... -Dear soldiers, you must know that Russia would have concluded peace -long ago had not England prevented her.... We must turn away from -her--the Russian people demand it; such is their sacred will." - -Someone or other swears. - -"Don't you wish for peace. _They_ make peace, the ----; we shall die -here, without getting our freedom!" - -Along the trenches came Lieutenant Albov, the Company Commander. He -said to the groups of soldiers, somewhat irresolutely and entreatingly: - -"Comrades, get to work quickly. In three days we have not made a single -communication trench to the firing line." - -The card players did not even look round; someone said in a low voice, -"All right." The man reading the newspaper rose and reported, in a free -and easy manner: - -"The Company does not want to dig, because that would be preparation -for an advance, and the Committee has resolved...." - -"Look here, you understand nothing at all about it, and, moreover, why -do you speak for the whole Company? Even if we remain on the defensive -we are lost in case of an alarm; the whole Company cannot get out to -the firing line along a single trench." - -He said this, and with a gesture of despair went on his way. Matters -were hopeless. Every time he tried to speak with them for a time, and -in a friendly way, they would listen to him attentively; they liked to -talk to him, and, on the whole, his Company looked on him favourably -in their own way. But he felt that between him and them a wall had -sprung up, against which all his good impulses were shattered. He -had lost the path to their soul--lost it in the impassable jungle of -darkness, roughness, and that wave of distrust and suspicion which -had overwhelmed the soldiers. Was it, perhaps, that he used the wrong -words, or was not able to say what he meant? Scarcely that. But a -little while before the War, when he was a student and was carried away -by the popular movement, he had visited villages and factories and had -found "real words" which were clear and comprehensible to all. But, -most of all, with what words can one move men to face death when all -their feelings are veiled by one feeling--that of self-preservation? - -The train of his thoughts was broken by the sudden appearance of the -Regimental Commander. - -"What the devil does this mean? The man on duty does not come forward. -The men are not dressed. Filth and stench. What are you about, -Lieutenant?" - -The grey-headed Colonel cast a stern glance on the soldiers which -involuntarily impressed them. They all rose to their feet. He glanced -through a loop-hole and, starting back, asked nervously: - -"What is that?" - -In the green field, among the barbed wire, a regular bazaar was -going on. A group of Germans and of our men were bartering vodka, -tobacco, lard, bread. Some way off a German officer reclined on the -grass--red-faced, sturdy, with an arrogant look on his face--and -carried on a conversation with a soldier named Soloveytchick; and, -strange to say, the familiar and insolent Soloveytchick stood before -the Lieutenant respectfully. - -The Colonel pushed the observer aside and, taking his rifle from him, -put it through the loop-hole. A murmur was heard among the soldiers. -They began to ask him not to shoot. One of them, in a low voice, as if -speaking to himself, remarked: - -"This is provocation." - -The Colonel, crimson with fury, turned to him for a moment and shouted: - -"Silence!" - -All grew silent and pressed to the loop-hole. A shot was heard, and the -German officer convulsively stretched himself out and was still; blood -was running from his head. The haggling soldiers scattered. - -The Colonel threw the rifle down and, muttering through his teeth -"Scoundrels!" strode further along the trenches. The "truce" was -infringed. - -The Lieutenant went off to his hut. His heart was sad and empty. He was -oppressed by the realisation of his unwantedness and uselessness in -these absurd surroundings, which perverted the whole meaning of that -service to his country, which alone justified all his grave troubles -and the death which might perhaps be near. He threw himself on his bed, -where he lay for an hour, for two hours, striving to think of nothing, -to forget himself. - -But from beyond the mud wall, where the shelter lay, there crept -someone's muffled voice, which seemed to wrap his brain in a filthy fog: - -"It is all very well for them, the ----. They receive their hundred and -forty roubles a month clear, while we--so generous of them--get seven -and a half. Wait a bit, our turn will come." - -Silence. - -"I hear they are sharing the land in our place in the province of -Kharkov. If I could only get home." - -There was a knock at the door. The Sergeant-Major had come. - -"Your honour (so he always addressed his Company Commander in the -absence of witnesses), the Company is angry, and threatens to leave the -position if it is not relieved at once. The Second Battalion should -have relieved us at five o'clock, and it is not here yet. Couldn't they -be rung up?" - -"They will not go away. All right, I shall inquire; but, all the same, -it is too late now. After this morning's incident the Germans will not -allow us to be relieved by day." - -"They will allow us. The Committee members know about it already. -I think"--he lowered his voice--"that Soloveytchick has managed to -slip across and explain matters. It is rumoured that the Germans have -promised to overlook it, on condition that next time the Colonel comes -to visit the trenches we should let them know, and they will throw a -bomb. You had better report it or else, who knows?" - -"All right." - -The Sergeant-Major was preparing to leave. The Lieutenant stopped him. - -"Matters are bad, Petrovitch. They do not trust us." - -"God alone knows whom they trust; only last week the Sixth Company -elected their Sergeant-Major themselves, and now they are making a mock -of him; they won't let him say a word." - -"What will things be afterwards?" - -The Sergeant-Major blushed, and said softly: - -"Then the Soloveytchicks will rule over us, and we shall be, so to -speak, dumb animals before them--that is how matters will be, your -honour." - -The relief came at last. Captain Bouravin, the Commander of the Fifth -Company, came into the hut. Albov offered to show him the section and -explain the disposition of the enemy. - -"Very well, though that does not matter, because I am not really in -command of the Company--I am boycotted." - -"How?" - -"Just so. They have elected the 2nd Lieutenant, my subaltern, -as Company Commander, and degraded me as a supporter of the old -regime, because, you see, I had drill twice a day--you know that the -marching contingents come up here absolutely untrained. Indeed, the -2nd Lieutenant was the first to vote for my removal. 'We have been -slave-driven long enough,' said he. 'Now we are free. We must clean out -everyone, beginning with the head. A young man can manage the regiment -just as well, so long as he is a true Democrat and supports the freedom -of the soldier.' I would have left, but the Colonel flatly refused to -allow it, and forbids me to hand over the company. So now, you see, we -have two commanders. I have stood the situation for five days. Look -here, Albov, you are not in a hurry, are you? Very good, then; let us -have a chat. I am feeling depressed. Albov, have you not yet thought of -suicide?" - -"Not as yet." - -Bouravin rose to his feet. - -"Understand me, they have desecrated my soul, outraged my human -dignity, and so every day, every hour, in every word, glance or gesture -one sees a constant outrage. What have I done to them? I have been in -the service for eight years; I have no family, no house or home. All -this I have found in the regiment, my own regiment. Twice I have been -badly wounded, and before my wounds were healed have rushed back to the -regiment--so there you are! And I loved the soldier--I am ashamed to -speak of it myself, but they must remember how, more than once, I have -crept out under the barbed wire to drag in the wounded. And now! Well, -yes, I reverence the regimental flag and hate their crimson rags. I -accept the Revolution. But to me Russia is infinitely dearer than the -Revolution. All these Committees and meetings, all this adventitious -rubbish which has been sown in the Army I am organically unable to -swallow and digest. But, after all, I interfere with no one; I say -nothing of this to anyone, I strive to convince no one. If only the War -could be ended honourably, and then I am ready to break stones on the -highway, only not to remain in an Army democratised in such a manner. -Take my subaltern; he discusses everything with them--nationalisation, -socialisation, labour control. Now I cannot do so--I never had time -to study it, and I confess I never took any interest in the matter. -You remember how the Army Commander came here and, amidst a crowd of -soldiers, said: 'Don't say "General"; call me simply Comrade George.' -Now I cannot do such things; besides, all the same, they would not -believe me. So I am silent. But they understand and pay me off. And, -you know, with all their ignorance, what subtle psychologists they -are! They are able to find the place where the sting hurts most. Now, -yesterday for instance...." - -He stooped down to Albov's ear, and continued in a whisper: - -"I returned from our mess. In my tent, at the head of my bed, I have -a photograph--well, just a treasured memory. There they had drawn an -obscenity!" - -Bouravin rose and wiped his brow with his handkerchief. - -"Well, let us take a look at the positions. God willing, we shall not -have to stand it long. No one in the Company wants to go scouting. I -go myself every night; sometimes there is a volunteer who accompanies -me--he has a hunter's strain in him. Should anything happen, please, -Albov, see to it that a little packet--it is in my bag--is sent to its -destination." - -The company, without waiting for the completion of the relief, wandered -away in disorder. Albov plodded after them. - -The communication trench ended in a broad hollow. Like a great ant-hill -the regimental bivouac stretched in rows of huts, tents, smoking -camp-kitchens and horse-lines. They had once been carefully masked by -artificial plantations, which had now withered, lost their leaves, and -were merely leafless poles. On an open green soldiers were drilling -here and there--listlessly, lazily, as if to create an impression -that they were doing something; after all, it would be awkward to -be doing absolutely nothing at all. There were few officers about; -the good ones were sick of the trivial farce into which real work was -now transformed, while the inferior ones had a moral justification -for their laziness and idleness. In the distance something between a -mob and a column marched along the road towards the regimental staff -quarters, carrying crimson flags. Before them went a huge banner -bearing the inscription, in white letters, visible in the distance: -"Down with War!" - -These were reinforcements coming up. At once, all the soldiers drilling -on the green, as if at a signal, broke their ranks and ran towards the -column. - -"Hey, countrymen! What province are you from?" - -An animated conversation began on the usual anxious themes: how did -matters stand with the land; would peace be concluded soon? Much -interest, also, was shown in the question as to whether they had -brought any home-brewed spirits, as "their own regimental" home brew, -manufactured in fairly large quantities at "the distillery" of the -Third Battalion, was very disgusting, and gave rise to painful symptoms. - -Albov made his way to the mess-room. The officers were gathering for -dinner. What had become of the former animation, friendly talk, healthy -laughter and torrents of reminiscences of a stormy, hard, but glorious -life of war? The reminiscences had faded, the dreams had flown away, -and stern reality crushed them all down with its weight. - -They spoke in low voices, sometimes breaking off or expressing -themselves figuratively: the mess servants might denounce them, and -also new faces had appeared among themselves. Not so long ago the -Regimental Committee, on the report of a servant, had tried an officer -of the regiment, who wore the Cross of St. George and to whom the -regiment owed one of its most famous victories. This Lieutenant-Colonel -had said something about "mutinous slaves." And though it was proved -that those were not his own words and that he had only quoted a speech -made by Comrade Kerensky, the Committee "expressed its indignation at -him"; he had to leave the regiment. - -The personnel of the officers, too, was much changed. Of the original -staff, some two or three remained. Some had perished, others had been -crippled, others again, having earned "distrust," were wandering about -the Front, importuning Staffs, joining shock battalions, entering -institutions in the rear, while some of the weaker brethren had simply -gone home. The Army had ceased to need the bearers of the traditions -of its units, of its former glory--of those old Bourgeois prejudices, -which had been swept into the dust by the Revolutionary creative power. - -Everyone in the regiment knows already of that morning's event in -Albov's Company. He is questioned about details. A Lieutenant-Colonel -sitting next him wagged his head. - -"Well done, our old man. There was something in the Fifth Company, too. -But I am afraid it will end badly. Have you heard what was done to the -Commander of the Doubov Regiment, because he refused to confirm an -elected Company Commander and put three agitators under arrest? _He was -crucified._ Yes, my boy! They nailed him to a tree and began, in turn, -to stick their bayonets into him, to cut off his ears, his nose, his -fingers." - -He seized his head in his hands. - -"My God! Where do these men get so much brutality, so much baseness?" - -At the other end of the table the ensigns are carrying on a conversation -on that ever harassing theme--where to get away to. - -"Have you applied for admission to the Revolutionary Battalion?" - -"No, it is not worth while. It seems that it is being formed under the -superintendence of the Executive Committee, with Committees, elections -and "Revolutionary" discipline. It does not suit me." - -"They say that shock units are being formed in Kornilov's Army and at -Minsk also. That would be good...." - -"I have applied for transfer to our rifle brigade in France. Only I do -not know what I am to do about the language." - -"Alas! my boy, you are too late," remarked the Lieutenant-Colonel from -the other end of the table. "The Government has long ago sent 'emigrant -comrades' there to enlighten minds. And now our brigades, somewhere -in the South of France, are in the situation of something like either -prisoners of war or disciplinary battalions." - -This talk, however, was realised by all to be of a purely platonic -character, in view of the hopelessness of a situation from which there -was no escape. It was only a case of dreaming a little, as Tchekhov's -_Three Sisters_ once dreamed of Moscow. Dreaming of such a wondrous -place, where human dignity is not trampled into the mud daily, where -one can live quietly and die honourably, without violence and without -outrage to one's service. Such a very little thing. - -"Mitka, bread!" boomed out the mighty bass of 2nd Lieutenant Yassny. - -He is quite a character, this Yassny. Tall and sturdy, with a -thick crop of hair and a copper-coloured beard, he is altogether -an embodiment of the strength and courage of the soil. He wears -four crosses of St. George, and has been promoted from the rank of -Sergeant for distinction in action. He does not adapt himself to his -new surroundings in the least, said "levorution" for "revolution" and -"mettink" for "meeting," and cannot reconcile himself to the new order. -Yassny's undoubted "democratic" views, his candour and sincerity, -have given him an exceptionally privileged position in the regiment. -Without enjoying any special influence, he can, however, condemn, -rudely, harshly, sometimes with an oath, both people and ideas, which -are jealously guarded and worshipped by the regimental "Revolutionary -Democracy." The men are angry, but suffer him. - -"There is no bread, I say." - -The officers, absorbed in their thoughts and in their conversation, had -not even noticed that they had eaten their soup without bread. - -"There will be no bread to-day," answered the waiter. - -"What is the meaning of this? Call the mess-sergeant." - -The mess-sergeant came, and began to justify himself in a bewildered -manner; he had sent in a request that morning for two pouds of bread. -The head of the Commissariat had endorsed it "to be issued," but the -clerk, Fedotov, a member of the Commissariat Committee, had endorsed it -in his turn "not to be issued." So the storehouse would not issue any -bread. - -No one made any objection, so painfully ashamed was everyone both of -the mess-sergeant and of those depths of inanity which had suddenly -broken into their life and swamped it with a grey, filthy slime. -Only Yassny's bass voice rang out distinctly under the arches of the -mess-room: - -"What swine!" - -Albov was just preparing for a nap after dinner when the flap of his -tent was lifted, and through the aperture appeared the bald head of the -Chief of the Commissariat--a quiet, elderly Colonel, who had joined the -Army again from the retired list. - -"May I come in?" - -"I beg your pardon, Colonel." - -"Never mind, my dear fellow, don't get up. I have just come in for a -second. You see, to-day at six o'clock there is to be a regimental -meeting. It will hear the Report of the Committee for verifying -the Commissariat, and apparently they will go for me. I am no -speech-maker, but you are a master of it. Take my part, should it be -necessary." - -"Certainly. I did not intend going, but once it is necessary, I shall -be there." - -"Thank you, then, my dear fellow." - -By six o'clock the square next to the regimental Staff quarters was -completely covered with men. At least two thousand had turned up. -The crowd moved, chattered, laughed--just such a Russian crowd as -on the Khodynka in Moscow or the _Champs de Mars_ in Petrograd at a -holiday entertainment. The Revolution could not transform it all at -once, either mentally or spiritually. But, having stunned it with a -torrent of new words and opened up before it unbounded possibilities, -the Revolution had destroyed its equilibrium and made it nervously -susceptible and stormily reactive to all methods of external influence. -An ocean of words--both morally lofty and basely criminal--flowed -through their minds as through a sieve, which passed through the -trend of the new ideas and retained only those grains which had a -real applied meaning in their daily life, in the surroundings of -the soldier, the peasant, the workman. Hence the absolute absence -of results from the torrents of eloquence which flooded the Army at -the instance of the Minister of War; hence, too, the illogical warm -sympathy with both speakers of clearly opposed politics. - -Under such conditions, what practical meaning could the crowd find in -such ideas as duty, honour, interests of the State, on the one hand; -annexations, indemnities, the self-determination of peoples, conscious -discipline, and other dim conceptions on the other. - -The whole regiment had turned out; the soldiers were attracted by -the meeting, as by any other spectacle. Delegates had been sent by -the Second Battalion, which was in the trenches--about one-third of -the battalion. In the middle of the square stood a platform for the -speakers; it was decorated with red flags, faded with time and rain; -they have been there since the platform was erected for a review by the -Commander of the Army. Reviews are now held not among the ranks, but -from a tribune. To-day the agenda of the meeting contain two questions: -"(1) The Report of the Commissariat Committee on the anomalies in the -supply of Officers' rations; and (2) the report of Comrade Sklianka, -an orator specially invited from the Moscow Soviet to speak about the -formation of a Coalition Ministry." - -During the preceding week a stormy meeting, which nearly ended in a -riot, had been held in connection with the complaint of one of the -companies that the soldiers had to eat lentils, which they hated, -and thin soup, simply because all the groats and butter were taken -for the officers' mess. This was clearly nonsense. Nevertheless, it -was resolved to appoint a Committee for investigation, which would -report to a general meeting of the regiment. The Report was drawn up -by a member of the Committee, Lieutenant-Colonel Petrov, who had been -removed the year before from the post of Chief of the Commissariat and -was now settling accounts with his successor. In a petty, cavilling -way, with a sort of mean irony, he enumerated slight, irrelevant, -inaccuracies in the Commissariat Department of the regiment--there were -no serious ones--and dragged out his Report endlessly in his creaking, -monotonous voice. The crowd, which at first had kept quiet, now hummed -again, having ceased to listen. From different sides voices were heard: - -"Enough!" - -"That will do!" - -The Chairman of the Commission ceased reading and suggested that "those -comrades who wished" should express their opinions. A tall, stout -soldier ascended the platform, and began speaking in a loud, hysterical -voice: - -"Comrades, you have heard? That is where the soldiers' property goes. -We suffer, our clothes are worn out, we are covered with lice, we go -hungry, while they pull the last piece of food out of our mouths." - -As he spoke a spirit of nervous excitement kept growing in the crowd, -muffled murmurs ran through it, and shouts of approval burst from it -here and there. - -"When will there be an end to all this? We are worn out, weary to -death." - -Suddenly 2nd Lieut. Yassny's deep voice was heard from the rear ranks, -drowning the voices both of the speaker and of the crowd. - -"What is your Company?" - -Some confusion took place. The orator was dumb. Shouts of indignation -were flung at Yassny. - -"What is your Company, I ask you?" - -"The Seventh!" - -Voices were heard in the ranks: - -"We have no such man in the Seventh Company." - -"Wait a bit, my friend," boomed Yassny, "was it not you that came in -to-day with the new lot ... you were carrying a large placard? When -have you had time to get worn out, poor fellow?" - -The spirit of the crowd changed in an instant. It began to hiss, laugh, -shout, and crack jokes. The unsuccessful orator disappeared in the -crowd. Someone shouted: - -"Pass a resolution!" - -Lieutenant-Colonel Petrov mounted the platform again, and began to -read out a ready resolution for transferring the officers' mess to -privates' rations. But no one listened to him now. Two or three voices -shouted "That's right!" Petrov hesitated a little, then put the paper -in his pocket and left the platform. The second question, concerning -the removal of the Chief of the Commissariat and the immediate election -of his successor (the author of the report was the candidate proposed) -remained unread. The Chairman of the Committee then announced: - -"Comrade Sklianka, member of the Executive Committee of the Moscow -Council of Workmen's and Soldiers' Delegates, will now address the -meeting." - -They were tired of their own speakers--it was always one and the -same thing--and the arrival of a new man, somewhat advertised by -the Committee, aroused general interest. The crowd closed up round -the platform and was still. A small, black-haired man, nervous and -short-sighted, who constantly adjusted the eyeglasses which kept -slipping off his nose, mounted the platform, or rather quickly ran -up on to it. He began speaking rapidly, with much spirit and much -gesticulation. - -"Soldier comrades! Three months have passed already since the Petrograd -workers and Revolutionary soldiers threw off the yoke of the Czar and -of all his Generals. The Bourgeoisie, in the person of Tereshtchenko, -the well-known sugar refiner; Konovalov, the factory owner; the -landowners, Gutchkov, Rodzianko, Miliukov, and other traitors to the -interests of the people, having seized the supreme power, have tried to -deceive the popular masses. - -"The demand of the people that negotiations be commenced at once for -that peace which we are offered by our German worker and soldier -brethren--who are just as much bereft of all that makes life worth -living as we are--has ended in a fraud--a telegram from Miliukov to -England and France to say that the Russian people are ready to fight -until victory is attained. - -"The unfortunate people understood that the supreme power had fallen -into even worse hands, _i.e._, into those of the sworn foes of the -workman and the peasant. Therefore the people shouted mightily: 'Down -with you, hands off!' - -"And the accursed Bourgeoisie shook at the mighty cry of the workers -and hypocritically invited to a share in their power the so-called -Democracy--the Socialist-Revolutionaries and the Mensheviks, who always -associated with the Bourgeoisie for the betrayal of the interests of -the working people." - -Having thus outlined the process of the formation of the Coalition -Ministry, Comrade Sklianka passed in greater detail to the fascinating -prospects of rural and factory anarchy, where "the wrath of the -people sweeps away the yoke of capital" and where "Bourgeois property -gradually passes into the hands of its real masters--the workmen and -the poorer peasants." - -"The soldiers and the workmen still have enemies," he continued. "These -are the friends of the overthrown Czarist Government, the hardened -admirers of shooting, the knout, and blows. The most bitter foes of -freedom, they have now donned crimson rosettes, call you 'comrades' and -pretend to be friends, but cherish the blackest intentions in their -hearts, preparing to restore the rule of the Romanovs. - -"Soldiers, do not trust these wolves in sheep's clothing! They call -you to fresh slaughter. Well, follow them if you like! Let them pave -the path for the return of the bloody Czar with your corpses. Let your -orphans, your widows and children, deserted by all, pass again into -slavery, hunger, beggary, and disease!" - -The speech undoubtedly had a great success. The atmosphere grew -red-hot, the excitement increased--that excitement of the "molten -mass," in the presence of which it is impossible to foresee either the -limits or the tension, or the tracks along which the torrent will pour. -The crowd was noisy and agitated, accompanying with shouts of approval -or curses against "the enemies of the people" those parts of the speech -which especially touched its instincts, its naked, cruel egotism. - -Albov, pale, with burning eyes, made his appearance on the platform. -He spoke excitedly of something or other to the chairman, who then -addressed the crowd. The chairman's words were inaudible amidst the -noise; for a long time he waved his hands and the flag which he had -pulled down, until at last the noise had subsided somewhat. - -"Comrades, Lieutenant Albov wishes to address you!" - -Shouts and hisses were heard. - -"Down with him! We do not want him!" - -But Albov was already on the platform, gripping hard, bending downwards -towards the sea of heads. And he said: - -"No, I will speak, and you dare not refuse to listen to one of those -officers whom this man has been abusing and dishonouring here before -you. Who he may be, whence he has come, who pays him for his speeches, -so profitable to the Germans, not one of you knows. He has come here, -befogged you, and will go on his way to sow evil and treason. And you -have believed him. And we, who along with you have now carried our -heavy cross into the fourth year of the War--we are now to be regarded -as your enemies? Why? Is it because we never sent you into action, -but led you, bestrewing with officers' corpses the whole of the path -covered by the regiment? Is it because that, of the officers who led -you in the beginning, there is not one left in the regiment who is not -maimed?" - -He spoke with deep sincerity and pain in his voice. There were moments -when it seemed as if his words were breaking through the withered crust -of those hardened hearts, as if a break would again take place in the -attitude of the crowd. - -"He, your 'new friend,' is calling you to mutiny, to violence, to -robbery. Do you understand who will benefit when, in Russia, brother -rises against brother, so as to turn to ashes, in sack and fire, -the last property left not only to the 'capitalists,' but to the -poverty-stricken workers and peasants? No, it is not by violence, -but by law and right, that you will acquire land and liberty and a -tolerable existence. Your enemies are not here, among the officers, -but there--beyond the barbed wire. And we shall not attain either to -freedom or to peace by a dishonourable, cowardly standing in one and -the same place, but in the general mighty rush of an _advance_." - -Was it that the impression of Sklianka's speech was still too vivid or -that the regiment took offence at the word "cowardly"--for the most -arrant coward will never forgive such a reminder--or, finally, was it -the fault of the magic word "advance," which for some time past had -ceased to be tolerated in the Army? But anyhow Albov was not allowed to -continue his speech. - -The crowd bellowed, belched forth curses, pressed forward more and -more, advancing toward the platform, and broke down the railing. An -ominous roar, faces distorted with fury, and hands stretched forth -towards the platform. The situation was becoming critical. 2nd Lieut. -Yassny pushed his way through to Albov, took him by the arm, and -forcibly led him to the exit. The soldiers of the First Company had -already rushed up to it from all sides, and with their aid Albov, with -great difficulty, made his way out of the crowd, amidst a shower of -choice abuse. Someone shouted out after him: - -"Wait a bit, you ----; we will settle accounts with you!" - -Night. The bivouac had grown quiet. Clouds had covered the sky. It was -dark. Albov, sitting on his bed in his narrow tent, illuminated by -the stump of a candle, was writing a report to the Commander of the -Regiment: - -"The officers--powerless, insulted, meeting with distrust and -disobedience from their subordinates--can be of no further use. I beg -of you to apply for my reduction to the ranks, so that there I might -fulfil my duty honestly and to the end." - -He lay down on his bed. He gripped his head in his hands. A kind of -uncanny, incomprehensible emptiness seized him, just as if some unseen -hand had drawn out of his head all thought, out of his heart all pain. -What was that? A noise was heard, the tent-pole fell down, the light -went out. A number of men on the tent. Hard, cruel blows were showered -on the whole of his body. A sharp, intolerable pain shot through his -head and his chest. Then his whole face seemed covered with a warm, -sticky veil, and soon everything became still and calm again, as if all -that was terrible and hard to bear had torn itself away, had remained -here, on earth, while his soul was flying away somewhere and was -feeling light and joyous. - -Albov awoke to feel something cold touching him: a private of his -company, Goulkin, an elderly man, was sitting at the foot of his bed -and wiping away the blood from his head with a wet towel. He noticed -that Albov had regained consciousness. - -"Look how they have mangled the man, the scum! It can have been no -other than the Fifth Company--I recognised one of them. Does it hurt -you much? Perhaps you would like me to go for the doctor?" - -"No, my friend, it does not matter. Thank you!" and Albov pressed his -hand. - -"And their Commander, too, Captain Bouravin, has met with a misfortune. -During the night they carried him past us on a stretcher, wounded -in the abdomen; the _sanitar_ said that he would not live. He was -returning from reconnoitring, and the bullet took just at our very -barbed wire. Whether it was a German one or whether our own people did -not recognise him--who knows?" - -He was silent for a while. - -"What has come to the people one simply can't understand. And all -this is just put on. It is not true--that which they say against the -officers--we understand that ourselves. Of course, there are all sorts -among you. But we know them very well. Don't we see for ourselves that -you, now, are for us with all your heart. Or let us say 2nd Lieut. -Yassny. Could such a one sell himself? And yet, try to say a word, to -take your part--there would be no living for us. There is a great deal -of hooliganism now. It is only hooligans that men listen to. My idea is -that all this is taking place because men have forgotten God. Men have -nothing to be afraid of." - -Albov closed his eyes from weakness. Goulkin hastily arranged the -blanket, which had slipped to the floor, made the sign of the cross -over him, and quietly slipped out of the tent. - -But sleep would not come. His heart was full of an inexhaustible -sadness and an oppressive feeling of loneliness. He yearned so much to -have some living being at hand, so that he might silently, wordlessly -feel its proximity, and not remain alone with his dreadful thoughts. He -regretted that he had not detained Goulkin. - -All was quiet. The whole camp was sleeping. Albov leaped from his bed -and lit the candle again. He was seized with a dull, hopeless despair. -He had no more faith in anything. Impenetrable darkness lay before -him. To make his exit from life? No, that would be surrender. He -must go on, with clenched teeth and hardened heart, until some stray -bullet--Russian or German--broke the thread of his wearisome days. - -Dawn was coming on. A new day was beginning, new Army week-days, -horribly like their predecessors. - - * * * * * - -Afterwards? - -Afterwards the "molten element" overflowed its banks completely. -Officers were killed, burnt, drowned, torn asunder and had their heads -broken through with hammers, slowly, with inexpressible cruelty. - -Afterwards--millions of deserters. Like an avalanche the soldiery moved -along the railways, water-ways and country roads, trampling down, -breaking and destroying the last nerves of poor, roadless Russia. - -Afterwards--Tarnopol, Kalush, Kazan. Like a whirlwind robbery, murder, -violence, incendiarism swept over Galicia, Volynia, the Podolsk and -other provinces, leaving behind it everywhere a trail of blood and -arousing in the minds of the Russian people, crazed with grief and weak -in spirit, the monstrous thought: - -"O Lord! if only the Germans would come quickly." - -This was done by the soldier. - -That soldier of whom a great Russian writer, with intuitive conscience -and a bold heart, has said:[27] - -"... How many hast thou killed during these days, oh soldier? How many -orphans hast thou made? How many inconsolable mothers hast thou left? -Dost thou hear the whisper on their lips, from which thou hast driven -the smile of joy for evermore? - -"Murderer! Murderer! - -"But why speak of mothers, of orphaned children? A more terrible moment -came, which none had expected--and thou didst betray Russia, thou didst -cast the whole of the Motherland, which had bred thee, under the feet -of the foe! - -"Thou, oh soldier, whom we loved so--and whom we still love." - - - - -CHAPTER XXIII. - -OFFICERS' ORGANISATIONS. - - -In the early days of April the idea arose among the Headquarters' -officers of organising a "Union of the Officers of the Army and the -Navy." The initiators of the Union[28] started with the view that it -was necessary "to think alike, so as to understand alike the events -that were taking place, to work in the same direction," for up to the -present time "the voice of the officers--of all the officers--has been -heard by none. As yet we have said nothing about the great events -amidst which we are living. Everyone who chooses says for us whatever -he chooses. Military questions, and even the questions of our daily -life and internal order, are settled for us by anyone who likes and in -any way he likes." There were two objections made in principle, one -being the objection to the introduction by the officers themselves -into their ranks of those principles of collective self-government -with which the Army had been inoculated from outside, in the form of -Soviets, Committees and Congresses, and had brought disintegration -into it. The second objection was the fear lest the appearance of an -independent Officers' Organisation should deepen still more those -differences which had arisen between the soldiers and the officers. -On the basis of these views we, along with the Commander-in-Chief, at -first took up an altogether negative attitude towards this proposal. -But life had already broken out of its bounds and laughed at our -motives. A draft declaration was published, granting the Army full -freedom for forming Unions and meetings, and it would now have been an -injustice to the officers to deprive them of the right of professional -organisation, if only as a means of self-preservation. In practice, -officers' societies had sprung up in many of the Armies, and in Kiev, -Moscow, Petrograd and other towns they had done so from the earlier -days of the Revolution. They all wandered in different directions, -groping their way, while some Unions in the large centres, under the -influence of the disintegrating conditions of the rear, displayed a -strong leaning towards the policy of the Soviets. - -The officers of the rear frequently lived a completely different -spiritual life from those of the Front. Thus, for instance, the Moscow -Soviet of officers' delegates passed, in the beginning of April, a -resolution to the effect that "the work of the Provisional Government -should proceed ... in the spirit of the Socialistic and political -demands of the Democracy, represented by the Council of Workmen's and -Soldiers' Delegates," and expressed a wish that there should be more -representatives of the Socialist parties in the Provisional Government. -An adulteration of the officers' views was also developing on a -larger scale; the Petrograd officers' Council summoned an "All-Russia -Congress of officers' delegates, Army surgeons and officers" in -Petrograd for May 8th. This circumstance was the more undesirable in -that the initiator of the Congress--the Executive Committee, with -Lieutenant-Colonel Goushchin, of the General Staff, at its head--had -already disclosed to the full its negative policy by its participation -in the drafting of the declaration of soldiers' rights, by its active -co-operation in the Polivanov Commission and its servility before the -Council of Workmen's and Soldier's Delegates, and by its endeavours -to unite with it. A proposal in this sense being made, the Council, -however, replied that such a union was "as yet impossible on technical -grounds." - -Having discounted all these circumstances, the Supreme -Commander-in-Chief gave his approval to the summoning of a Congress of -officers, on condition that no pressure should be exercised either in -his name or in that of the Chief-of-Staff. This scrupulous attitude -somewhat complicated matters. Some of the Staffs, being out of sympathy -with the idea, prevented the circulation of the appeal, while some of -the High Commanders, as, for example, the Commander of the troops of -the Omsk district, forbade the delegation of officers altogether. In -some places also this question roused the suspicion of the soldiers and -caused some complications, in consequence of which the initiators of -the Congress invited the units to delegate soldiers as well as officers -to be present at the sessions. - -Despite all obstacles, over 300 officer delegates gathered in Moghilev, -76 per cent. being from the Front, 17 per cent. from fighting units in -the rear, and 7 per cent. from the rear. On May 7th the Congress was -opened with a speech by the Supreme Commander-in-Chief. On that day, -for the first time, the High Command said, not in a secret meeting, -not in a confidential letter, but openly, before the whole country: -"Russia is perishing." General Alexeiev said: "In appeals, in general -orders, in the columns of the Daily Press, we often meet with the short -sentence: 'Our country is in danger.' - -"We have grown too well accustomed to this phrase. We feel as if we -were reading an old chronicle of bygone days, and do not ponder over -the grim meaning of this curt sentence. But, gentlemen, this is, I -regret to say, a serious fact. _Russia is perishing. She stands on -the brink of an abyss. A few more shocks, and she will crash with all -her weight into it._ The enemy has occupied one-eighth part of her -territory. He cannot be bribed by the Utopian phrase: 'Peace without -annexations or indemnities.' He says frankly that he will not leave our -soil. He is stretching forth his greedy grip to lands where no enemy -soldier has ever set foot--to the rich lands of Volynia, Podolia and -Kiev--_i.e._, to the whole right bank of our Dnieper. - -"And what are we going to do? Will the Russian Army allow this to -happen? Will we not thrust this insolent foe out of our country and let -the diplomatists conclude peace afterwards, with annexations or without -them? - -"Let us be frank. The fighting spirit of the Russian Army has fallen; -but yesterday strong and terrible, it now stands in fatal impotence -before the foe. Its former traditional loyalty to the Motherland has -been replaced by a yearning for peace and rest. Instead of fortitude, -the baser instincts and a thirst for self-preservation are rampant. - -"At home, where is that strong authority for which the whole country -is craving? Where is that powerful authority which would force every -citizen to do his duty honestly by the Motherland? - -"We are told that it will soon appear, but as yet it does not exist. - -"Where is the love of country, where is patriotism? - -"The great word 'brotherhood' has been inscribed on our banners, but -it has not been inscribed in our hearts and minds. Class enmity rages -amongst us. Whole classes which have honestly fulfilled their duty to -their country have fallen under suspicion, and on this foundation a -deep gulf has been created between two parts of the Army--the officers -and the soldiers. - -"And it is at this very moment that the first Congress of officers of -the Russian Army has been summoned. I am of the opinion that a more -convenient, a more timely moment, could not have been chosen to attain -unity in our family, to form a general united family of the corps of -Russian officers, to discuss the means of breathing ardour into our -hearts, _for without ardour there is no victory, without victory there -is no salvation, no Russia_. - -"May your work therefore be inspired with love for your Motherland and -with heartfelt regard for the soldier; mark the ways for raising the -moral and intellectual calibre of the soldiers, so that they may become -your sincere and hearty comrades. Do away with that estrangement which -has been artificially sown in our family. - -"At the present moment--this is a disease common to all--people would -like to set all the citizens of Russia on platforms or pedestals and -scrutinise how many stand behind each of them. What does it matter that -the masses of the Army accepted the new order and the new Constitution -sincerely, honestly and with enthusiasm? - -"_We must all unite on one great object: Russia is in danger. As -members of the great Army, we must save her. Let this object unite us -and give us strength to work._" - -This speech, in which the leader of the Army expressed "the anxiety of -his heart," served as the prologue to his retirement. The Revolutionary -Democracy had already passed its sentence on General Alexeiev at -its memorable session with the Commanders-in-Chief on May 4th; now, -after May 7th, a bitter campaign was begun against him in the Radical -Press, in which the Soviet semi-official organ _Isvestia_ competed -with Lenin's papers in the triviality and impropriety of its remarks. -This campaign was the more significant in that the Minister of War, -Kerensky, was clearly on the side of the Soviet in this matter. - -As if to supplement the words of the Supreme Commander-in-Chief, I said -in my speech, when touching on the internal situation in the country: - -"... Under pressure of the unavoidable laws of history, autocracy has -fallen, and our country has passed under the rule of the people. We -stand on the threshold of a new life, long and passionately awaited, -for which many thousand Idealists have gone to the block, languished in -the mines and pined in the _tundras_. - -"But we look to the future with anxiety and perplexity. - -"For there is no liberty in the Revolutionary torture-chamber. - -"There is no righteousness in misrepresenting the voice of the people. - -"There is no equality in the hounding down of classes. - -"And there is no strength in that insane rout where all around seek to -grasp all that they possibly can, at the expense of their suffering -country, where thousands of greedy hands are stretched out towards -power, breaking down the foundations of that country...." - -Then the sessions of the Congress began. Whoever was present has -carried away, probably for the rest of his life, an indelible -impression produced by the story of the sufferings of the officers. -It could never be written, as it was told with chilling restraint by -these, Captain Bouravin and Lieutenant Albov, who touched upon their -most intimate and painful experiences. They had suffered till they -could suffer no more; in their hearts there were neither tears nor -complaints. - -I looked at the boxes, where the "younger comrades" sat who had been -sent to watch for "counter-Revolution." I wanted to read in their faces -the impression produced by all that they had heard. And it seemed to me -that I saw the blush of shame. Probably it only seemed so to me, for -they soon made a stormy protest, demanded the right of voting at the -Congress, and--five roubles per day "officer's allowance." - -At thirteen general meetings the Congress passed a series of -resolutions. - -Among all the classes, castes, professions and trades which exhibited a -general elemental desire to get from the weak Government all that was -possible, in their own private interests, the officers were the only -Corporation which never asked anything _for itself personally_. - -The officers requested and demanded _authority_--over themselves and -over the Army. A firm, single, national authority--"commanding, not -appealing." The authority of a Government leaning on the trust of the -nation, not on irresponsible organisations. Such an authority the -officers were prepared wholeheartedly and unreservedly to obey, _quite -irrespective of differences of political opinions_. I affirm, moreover, -that all the inner social class conflict which was blazing up more and -more throughout the country did not affect the officers at the Front, -who were immersed in their work and in their sorrows; it did not touch -them deeply; the conflict attracted the attention of the officers -only when its results obviously endangered the very existence of the -country, and of the Army in particular. Of course, I am speaking of the -mass of the officers; individual leanings towards reaction undoubtedly -existed, but they were in no respect characteristic of the Officers' -Corps in 1917. - -One of the finest representatives of the Officers' Class, General -Markov, a thoroughly educated man, wrote to Kerensky, condemning his -system of slighting the Command: "Being a soldier by nature, birth and -education, I can judge and speak only of my own military profession. -All other reforms and alterations in the constitution of our country -interest me only as an ordinary citizen. But I know the Army; I have -devoted to it the best days of my life; I have paid for its successes -with the blood of those who were near to me, and have myself come out -of action steeped in blood." This the Revolutionary Democracy had not -understood or taken into consideration. - -The Officers' Congress in Petrograd, at which about 700 delegates -were gathered (May 18-26), passed off in a totally different manner. -It split into two sharply-divided camps: the Officers and officials -of the Rear who had given themselves to politics and a smaller number -of real officers of the Line who had become delegates through a -misunderstanding of the matter. The Executive Committee drew up their -programme in strict agreement with the custom of the Soviet Congresses: -(1) The attitude of the Congress towards the Provisional Government and -the Soviet; (2) the War; (3) the Constituent Assembly; (4) the labour -question; (5) the land question; and (6) the reorganisation of the -Army on Democratic principles. An exaggerated importance was attached -to the Congress in Petrograd, and at its opening pompous speeches were -made by many members of the Government and by foreign representatives; -the Congress was even greeted in the name of the Soviet by Nahamkes. -The very first day revealed the irreconcilable differences between the -two groups. These differences were inevitable, if only because, even -on such a cardinal question as "Order No. 1.," the Vice-Chairman of -the Congress, Captain Brzozek, expressed the view that "its issue was -dictated by historical necessity: the soldier was downtrodden, and it -was imperatively necessary to free him." This declaration was greeted -with prolonged applause by part of the delegates! - -After a series of stormy meetings, a resolution was passed by a -majority of 265 against 246, which stated that "the Revolutionary power -of the country was in the hands of the organised peasants, workmen and -soldiers, who form the predominating mass of the population," and that -therefore the Government must be responsible to the All-Russia Soviet! - -Even the resolution advocating an advance was passed by a majority of -little more than two-thirds of those who cast their votes. - -The attitude of the Petrograd Congress is to be explained by the -declaration made on May 26th by that group, which, reflecting the -real opinion of the Front, took the point of view of "all possible -support to the Provisional Government." "In summoning the Congress the -Executive Committee of the Petrograd Council of Officers' Delegates -did not seek for the solution of the most essential problem of the -moment--the regeneration of the Army--since the question of the -fighting capacity of the Army and of the measures for raising its -level was not even mentioned in the programme, and was included only -at our request. If we are to believe the statement--strange, to say no -more--made by the Chairman, Lieutenant-Colonel Goushchin, the object of -the summoning of the Congress was the desire of the Executive Committee -to pass under our flag into the Council of Workmen's and Soldiers' -Delegates." This declaration led to a series of serious incidents; -three-quarters of the delegates left the meeting and the Congress came -to an end. - -I have mentioned the question of the Petrograd Officers' Council and -Congress only in order to show the spirit of a certain section of the -officers of the Rear, which was in frequent contact with the official -and unofficial rulers, and represented, in the eyes of the latter, the -"voice of the Army." - -The Moghilev Congress, which attracted the unflagging attention of the -Supreme Commander-in-Chief, and was much favoured by him, closed on May -22nd. At this time General Alexeiev had already been relieved of the -command of the Russian Army. So deeply had this episode affected him -that he was unable to attend the last meeting. I bade farewell to the -Congress in the following words: - -"The Supreme Commander-in-Chief, who is leaving his post, has -commissioned me, gentlemen, to convey to you his sincere greetings, and -to say that his heart, that of an old soldier, beats in unison with -yours, that it aches with the same pain, and lives with the same hope -for the regeneration of the disrupted, but ever great, Russian Army. - -"Let me add a few words from myself. - -"You have gathered here from the distant blood-bespattered marches of -our land, and laid before us your quenchless sorrow and your soul-felt -grief. - -"You have unrolled before us a vivid and painful picture of the life -and work of the officers amidst the raging sea of the Army. - -"You, who have stood a countless number of times in the face of death! -You, who have intrepidly led your men against the dense rows of the -enemy's barbed wire, to the rare boom of your own guns, treacherously -deprived of ammunition! You, who, hardening your hearts, but keeping -up your spirits, have cast the last handful of earth into the grave of -your fallen son, brother, or friend! - -"Will you quail now? - -"No! - -"You who are weak, raise your heads. You who are strong, give of your -determination, of your aspirations, of your desire to work for the -happiness of your Motherland--pour them into the thinned ranks of your -comrades at the Front. You are not alone. With you are all those who -are honourable, all who think, all who have paused at the brink of that -common sense which is now being abolished. - -"The soldiers also will go with you, understanding clearly that you are -leading them, not backwards, to serfdom and to spiritual poverty, but -forwards, to freedom and to light. - -"And then such a thunderstorm will break over the foe as will put an -end both to him and to the War. - -"These three years of the War I have lived one life with you, thought -the same thoughts, shared with you the joy of victory and the burning -pain of retreat. I have therefore the right to fling into the faces of -those who have outraged our hearts, who from the very first days of the -Revolution have wrought the work of Cain on the corps of officers--I -have the right to fling in their faces the words: 'You lie! The Russian -officer has never been either a mercenary or a Pretorian.' - -"Under the old regime you were victimised, down-trodden, and deprived -of all that makes life worth living. In no less a degree than -yourselves, leading a life of semi-beggary, our officers of the Line -have managed to carry through their wretched, laborious life like a -burning torch, the thirst for achievement for the happiness of his -Motherland. - -"Then let my call be heard through these walls by the builders of the -new life of the State: - -"Take care of the officer! For from the beginning and till now he has -stood, faithfully and without relief, on guard over the order of the -Russian State. He can be relieved by death alone." - -Printed by the Committee, the text of my speech was circulated at the -Front, and I was happy to learn, from many letters and telegrams, that -the words spoken in defence of the officer had touched his aching heart. - -The Congress left a permanent institution at the Stavka--the "Chief -Committee of the Officers' Union."[29] During the first three months of -its existence the Committee did not succeed in rooting itself deeply -in the Army. Its activities were confined to organising branches of the -Union in the Armies and in military circles, to the examination of the -complaints that reached it. In exceptional cases incompetent officers -were recommended for dismissal (the "black-board"); to a certain -very limited degree officers expelled by the soldiers were granted -assistance, and declarations were addressed to the Government and to -the Press in connection with the more important events in public and -military life. After the June advance the tone of these declarations -became acrimonious, critical, and defiant, which seriously disturbed -the Prime Minister, who persistently sought to have the Chief Committee -transferred from Moghilev to Moscow, as he considered that its attitude -was a danger to the Stavka. - -The Committee, which was somewhat passive during the command of General -Brussilov, did, indeed, take part afterwards in General Kornilov's -venture. But it was not this circumstance that caused the change in its -attitude. _The Committee undoubtedly reflected the general spirit with -which the Command and the Russian officers were then imbued, a spirit -which had become hostile to the Provisional Government._ Also, no -clear idea had been formed among the officers of the political groups -within the Government of the covert struggle proceeding between them, -or of the protective part played by many representatives of the Liberal -Democracy among them. A hostile attitude was thus created towards the -Government as a whole. - -Having remained hitherto perfectly loyal and in the majority of cases -well-disposed, having patiently borne, much against the grain, the -experiments which the Provisional Government made, deliberately or -involuntarily, on the country and on the Army, these elements lived -only in the hope of the regeneration of the Army, of an advance and of -victory. When all these hopes crashed to the ground, then, not being -united in their ideals with the second Coalitional Government, but, -on the contrary, deeply distrusting it, the masses of the officers -abandoned the Provisional Government, which thus lost its last reliable -support. - -This moment is of great historical importance, giving the key to the -understanding of many later events. As a whole, deeply democratic -in their personnel, views and conditions of life, _rejected by the -Revolutionary Democracy_ with incredible harshness and cynicism, -and finding no real support in the liberal circles in close touch -with the Government, the Russian officers found themselves in a -state of tragic isolation. This isolation and bewilderment served -more than once afterwards as a fertile soil for outside influences, -foreign to the traditions of the officer caste and to its former -political character--influences which led to dissension, and in the -end to fratricide. For there can be no doubt that all the power, all -the organisation, both of the Red and of the White Armies, rested -exclusively on the personality of the former Russian officer. - -And if afterwards, in the course of three years of conflict, we have -witnessed the rise of two conflicting forces in the Russian public life -of the anti-Bolshevist camp, we must seek for their original source not -in political differences only, but also in that work of Cain towards -the officers' caste, which was wrought by the Revolutionary Democracy -from the first days of the Revolution. - -As everyone realised that the "new order" and the Front itself are -on the verge of collapse, it was obvious that officers should have -attempted some organisation to meet such a contingency. But the -advocates of action were lying in prison; the Chief Council of the -Officers' Union, which was best suited for this task, had been broken -up by Kerensky in the latter days of August. The majority of the -responsible leaders of the Army were perturbed by a terrible and not -unfounded fear for the fate of the Russian officers. In this respect -the correspondence between General Kornilov and General Doukhonin is -very characteristic. After the Bolshevist _coup d'etat_ on November -1 (14), 1917, General Kornilov wrote to Doukhonin from his prison in -Bykhov: - -"Foreseeing the further course of events, I think that it is necessary -for you to take such measures as would create a favourable atmosphere, -while thoroughly safeguarding Headquarters, for a struggle against the -coming Anarchy." - -Among these measures General Kornilov suggested "the concentration in -Moghilev, or in a point near to it, under a reliable guard, of a store -of rifles, cartridges, machine-guns, automatic guns and hand-grenades -for distribution among the officer-volunteers, who will undoubtedly -gather together in this region." - -Doukhonin made a note against this point: "This might lead to excesses." - -Thus the constant morbid fears of an officers' "Counter-Revolution" -proved to be in vain. Events took the officers unawares. They were -unorganised, bewildered; they did not think of their own safety, and -finally scattered their forces. - - - - -CHAPTER XXIV. - -THE REVOLUTION AND THE COSSACKS. - - -A peculiar part was played by the Cossacks in the history of the -Revolution. - -Built up historically, in the course of several centuries, the -relations of the Cossacks with the Central Government, common to -Russia, were of a dual character. The Government did all to encourage -the development of Cossack colonisation on the Russian south-eastern -borders, where war was unceasing. It made allowances for the -peculiarities of the warlike, agricultural life of the Cossacks, and -allowed them a certain degree of independence and individual forms of -democratic rule, with representative organs (the Kosh, kroog, rada), an -elected "Army elder" and hetmans. - -"In its weakness," says Solovyov, "The State did not look too strictly -on the activities of the Cossacks, so long as they were directed only -against foreign lands; the State being weak, it was considered needful -to give these restless forces an outlet." But the "activities" of the -Cossacks were more than once directed against Moscow as well. This -circumstance led to a prolonged internecine struggle, which lasted -until the end of the eighteenth century, when, after a ferocious -suppression of the Pougatchov Rebellion, the free Cossacks of the -South-East were dealt a final blow; they gradually lost their markedly -oppositionary character, and even gained the reputation of the most -conservative element in the State, the pillars of the throne and the -regime. - -From that time onward the Government incessantly showed favour to the -Cossacks by emphasising their really great merits, by solemn promises -to preserve their "Cossack Liberties,"[30] and by the appointment of -members of the Imperial family to honorary posts among the Cossacks. -At the same time, the Government took all measures to prevent these -"liberties" from developing to excess at the expense of that ruthless -centralisation, which was a historical necessity in the beginning of -the building up of the Russian State and a vast historical blunder -in its later development. To the number of these measures we must -refer the limitation of Cossack self-government, and, latterly, the -traditional appointment to the post of Hetman of persons not belonging -to the Cossack caste, and often complete strangers to the life of the -Cossacks. The oldest and most numerous Cossack Army, that of the Don, -has had Generals of German origin at its head more than once. - -It seemed as if the Czarist Government had every reason to depend upon -the Cossacks. The repeated repression of the local political labour -and agrarian disturbances which broke out in Russia, the crushing of -a more serious rising--the revolution of 1905-1906, in which a great -part was played by the Cossack troops--all this seemed to confirm the -established opinion of the Cossacks. On the other hand, sundry episodes -of the "repressions," accompanied by inevitable violence, sometimes -cruelty, were widely spread among the people, were exaggerated, and -created a hostile attitude towards the Cossacks at the factories, -in the villages, among the Liberal _intelligencia_, and especially -among those elements which are known as the Revolutionary Democracy. -Throughout the whole of the underground literature--in its appeals, -leaflets, and pictures--the idea of a "Cossack" became synonymous with -"servant" of the Reactionary party. - -This definition was greatly exaggerated. The bard of the Don Cossacks, -Mitrophan Bogayevsky, says of the political character of the Cossacks: -"The first and fundamental condition which prevented the Cossacks, at -least in the beginning, from breaking up was the idea of the State, -a lawful order, a deep-seated realisation of the necessity of a life -within the bounds of law. This seeking of a lawful order runs, and has -run, like a scarlet thread through all the circles of all the Cossack -Armies." But such altruistic motives, by themselves, do not exhaust the -question. Notwithstanding the grievous weight of universal military -service, the Cossacks, especially those of the South, enjoyed a certain -prosperity which excluded that important stimulus which roused against -the Government and the regime both the workers' class and the peasantry -of Central Russia. An extraordinarily complicated agrarian question -set the caste economic interests of the Cossacks against the interests -of the "outsider"[31] settlers. Thus, for instance, in the oldest and -largest Cossack Army, that of the Don, the amount of land secured to an -individual farm was, on the average, in _dessiateens_: for Cossacks, -19.3 to 30; for native peasants, 6.5; for immigrant peasants, 1.3. -Finally, owing to historical conditions and a narrow territorial system -of recruiting, the Cossack units possessed a perfectly homogeneous -personnel, a great internal unity, and a discipline which was firm, -though somewhat peculiar as to the mutual relations between the -officers and the privates, and therefore they conceded complete -obedience to their chiefs and to the Supreme Power. - -With the support of all these motives, the Government made a wide use -of Cossack troops for suppressing popular agitation, and thus roused -against them the mute exasperation of the fermenting, discontented -masses of the population. - -In return for their historical "liberties," the Cossack Armies, as I -have said, give all but universal military service. Its burden and the -degree of relative importance of these troops among the armed forces of -the Russian Empire are shown in the following table: - - -COMPOSITION OF THE COSSACK TROOPS IN THE AUTUMN OF 1913. - - ---------------+------------+---------------+------------- - Armies. | Cavalry | Sotnias not | Infantry - | Regiments. | included | Battalions. - | | in Regiments. | - ---------------+------------+---------------+------------- - Don | 60 | 72 | -- - Kouban | 37 | 37 | 22 - Orenburg | 18 | 40 | -- - Terek | 12 | 3 | 2 - Ural | 9 | 4 | -- - Siberian | 9 | 3 | -- - Trans-Baikal | 9 | -- | -- - Semiretchensk | 3 | 7 | -- - Astrakhan | 3 | -- | -- - Amur | 2 | 5 | -- - ---------------+------------+---------------+------------- - TOTAL[32] | 162 | 171 | 24 - ---------------+------------+---------------+------------- - -Partly as cavalry of the line--in divisions and corps, partly as Army -corps and divisional cavalry--in regiments, sub-divisions and detached -_sotnias_, the Cossack units were scattered over all the Russian -fronts, from the Baltic to Persia. _Among the Cossacks, as against all -the other component parts of the Army, desertion was unknown._ - -At the outbreak of Revolution all the political groups, and even -the representatives of the Allies, devoted great attention to the -Cossacks--some building exaggerated hopes on them, others regarding -them with unconcealed suspicion. The circles of the Right looked to the -Cossacks for Restoration; the Liberal Bourgeoisie, for active support -of law and order; while the parties of the Left feared that they were -counter-Revolutionary, and therefore started a strong propaganda in -the Cossack units, seeking to disintegrate them. This was to some -extent assisted by the spirit of repentance which showed itself at -all Cossack meetings, Congresses, "Circles" and "Radas" at which the -late power was accused of systematically rousing the Cossacks against -the people. The mutual relations between the Cossacks and the local -agricultural population were unusually complicated, especially in -the Cossack territories of European Russia.[33] Intermingled with -the Cossack allotments were peasant lands--those of whilom settlers -(the indigenous peasantry)--lands let on long lease, on which large -settlements had sprung up, finally lands which had been granted by the -Emperor to various persons and which had gradually passed into the -hands of "outsiders." On the basis of these mutual relations dissension -now arose which began to assume the character of violence and forcible -seizures. With respect to the Don Army, which gave the keynote to -all others, the Provisional Government considered it necessary to -publish on April 7th an appeal in which, while affirming that "the -rights of the Cossacks to the land, as they have grown historically, -remain inviolable," also promised the "outsider" population, "whose -claim to the land is also based on historical rights," that it would -be satisfied, in as great a measure as possible, by the Constituent -Assembly. This agrarian puzzle, which surrounded with uncertainty the -most tender point of the Cossacks' hopes, was explained unequivocally, -in the middle of May, by the Minister of Agriculture, Tchernov (at the -All-Russia Peasant Congress), who stated that the Cossacks held large -tracts of land and that now they would have to surrender a portion of -their lands. - -In the Cossack territories meanwhile work was in full swing in the -sphere of self-determination and self-government; the information -supplied by the Press was vague and contradictory; no one had yet heard -the voice of the Cossacks as a whole. One can understand, therefore, -that general attention which was concentrated on the All-Russia Cossack -Congress, which gathered in Petrograd in the beginning of June. - -The Cossacks paid a tribute to the Revolution and to the State, -referred to their own needs (after all, the question of their holdings -was the most vital one), and ... smiled to the Soviet.... - -The impression thus produced was indefinite; neither were the hopes of -the one side fulfilled nor the fears of the other dissipated. - -Meanwhile, at the initiative of the Revolutionary Democracy, a violent -propaganda was set on foot for introducing the idea of doing away with -the Cossacks as a separate caste. But, on the whole, this idea of -self-abolition had no success. On the contrary, a growing aspiration -spread among the Cossacks for maintaining their internal organisation -and for the union of all the Cossack Armies. - -Cossack Governments sprang up everywhere, elected Hetmans and -representative institutions ("Circles" and Radas), whose authority -increased in accordance with the weakening of the authority and power -of the Provisional Government. Such eminent men appeared at the head -of the Cossacks as Kaledin (the Don), Doutov (Orenburg), and Karaoulov -(the Terek). - -A triple power was formed in the Cossack territories; the Hetman with -his Government, the commissary of the Provisional Government, and the -Soviet.[34] - -The Commissaries, however, after a short and unsuccessful struggle, -soon subsided and exhibited no activity. Far more serious became -the struggle of the Cossack authority with the local Soviets and -Committees, which sought support in the unruly mob of soldiers who -flooded the territories under the name of Reserve Army Battalions and -Rear Army Units. This curse of the population positively terrorised -the land, creating anarchy in the towns and settlements, instituting -sacks, seizing lands and businesses, trampling upon all rights, all -authority, and creating intolerable conditions of life. The Cossacks -had nothing with which to combat this violence--all their units were at -the Front. Only in the Don territory, accidentally, in the autumn of -1917, not without the deliberate connivance of the Stavka, a division -was concentrated, and afterwards three divisions, with the aid of which -General Kaledin attempted to restore order. - -But all the measures taken by him, as for instance the occupation by -armed forces of railway junctions, of the more important mines, and of -large centres, which secured normal communication and supplies for the -centre and the fronts, were met not only with violent resistance on the -part of the Soviets and with accusations of counter-revolutionism, but -even with some suspicion on the part of the Provisional Government. At -the same time the Cossacks of the Kouban and of the Terek asked the Don -to send them if only a few _sotnias_, as it was "becoming impossible to -breathe for _comrades_." - -The friendly relations, instituted in the early days of the Revolution, -between the general Russian and the Cossack Revolutionary Democracies -were soon broken off finally. "Cossack Socialism" turned out to be -so self-sufficing, so concentrated in its own castes and corporation -limits, that it could find no place in that doctrine. - -The Soviets insisted on the equalising of the holdings of the Cossacks -and the peasants, while the Cossacks vigorously defended their right -of property and disposal in the Cossack lands, basing it on their -historical merits as conquerors, protectors, and colonisers of the -former marches of Russia's territory. - -The organisation of a general territorial Government failed. An -internecine struggle began. - -The consequences were two-fold: The first was a painful atmosphere of -estrangement and hostility between the Cossacks and the "outsider" -population, which later, in the swiftly changing kaleidoscope of the -civil war, sometimes assumed monstrous forms of mutual extermination, -as the power passed from the hands of one side into those of the -other. Along with this, one or the other half of the population of the -larger Cossack territories were generally deemed as participating in -the building up and the economy of the land.[35] The second was the -so-called Cossack separatism or self-determination. - -The Cossacks had no reason to expect from the Revolutionary Democracy -a favourable settlement of their destiny, especially in the question -most vital to it--the land question. On the other hand, the Provisional -Government had also assumed an ambiguous attitude in this matter, and -the Government power was openly tending to its fall. The future assumed -altogether indefinite outlines. Hence, independently of the general -healthy aspiration towards decentralisation, there appeared among the -Cossacks, who for centuries had been seeking "freedom," a tendency -themselves to secure the maximum of independence, so as to place the -future Constituent Assembly before an accomplished fact, or as the -more outspoken Cossack leaders put it, "that there should be something -from which to knock off." Hence a gradual evolution from territorial -self-government to autonomy, federation, and confederation. Hence, -finally--with the intrusion of individual local self-love, ambition, -and interests--a permanent struggle began with every principle of an -imperial tendency, a struggle which weakened both sides and greatly -prolonged the civil war.[36] It was these circumstances, too, that gave -birth to the idea of an independent Cossack army, which first arose -among the Cossacks of the Kouban and was not then supported by Kaledin -and the more imperialistic elements of the Don. - -All that I have related refers mainly to the three Cossack bodies (the -Don, the Kouban, and the Terek) which form more than sixty per cent. -of Cossack-dom. But the general characteristic features belong to the -other Cossack armies as well. - -Along with the alterations in the composition of the Provisional -Government and with the decline of its authority, changes took place -in the attitude toward it of Cossack-dom, expressing themselves -in the resolutions and appeals of the Council of the union of the -Cossack armies, of the hetmans, circles, and Governments. If before -July the Cossacks voted for all possible support to the Government -and for complete obedience, later, however, _while acknowledging the -authority of the Government to the very end_, it comes forward in -sharp opposition to it on the questions of the organisation of the -Cossack administration and _zemstvo_, of the employment of Cossacks -for the repression of rebellious troops and districts and so forth. In -October the Kouban rada assumes constituent powers and publishes the -constitution of the "Kouban territory." It speaks of the Government in -such a manner as the following: "When will the Provisional Government -shake off these fumes (the Bolshevist aggression) and put an end, by -resolute measures, to these scandals?" - -The Provisional Government, being already without authority and without -any real power, surrendered all its positions and agreed to peace with -the Cossack Governments. - -It is remarkable that, even at the end of October, when, owing to the -breach of communications, no correct information had yet been received -on the Don about the events in Petrograd and Moscow and about the fate -of the Provisional Government, and when it was supposed that its -fragments were functioning somewhere or other, the Cossack elders, in -the person of the representatives of the South-Eastern Union, then -gathering,[37] sought to get into touch with the Government, offering -it aid against the Bolsheviks, but conditioning this aid with a whole -series of economic demands: a non-interest-bearing loan of 500,000,000 -roubles, the State to pay all the expenses of supporting Cossack units -outside the territory of the union, the institution of a pension fund -for all sufferers, and the right of the Cossacks to all "spoils of -war"(?) which might be taken in the course of the coming civil war. - -It is not without interest that for a long time Pourishkevitch -cherished the idea of the transfer of the State Duma to the Don, as a -counterpoise to the Provisional Government and for the preservation of -the source of authority, in case of the fall of the latter. Kaledin's -attitude towards this proposal was negative. - -A characteristic indication of the attitude which the Cossacks had -succeeded in retaining towards themselves in the most varied circles -was that attraction to the Don which later, in the winter of 1917, -led thitherward Rodzianko, Miliukov, General Alexeiev, the Bykhov -prisoners, Savinkov, and even Kerensky, who came to General Kaledin, in -Novotcherkassk, in the latter days of November, but was not received by -him. Pourishkevitch alone did not come, and that only because he was -then in prison in Petrograd, in the hands of the Bolsheviks. - -And suddenly it turned out that the whole thing was a mystification, -pure and simple, that at that time the Cossacks had no power left -whatever. - -In view of the growing disorders on the Cossack territory, the hetmans -repeatedly appealed for the recall from the front of if only part of -the Cossack divisions. They were awaited with enormous impatience, -and the most radiant hopes were built on them. In October these hopes -seemed to be on the eve of fulfilment; the Cossack divisions had -started for home. Overcoming all manner of obstacles on their way, -retarded at every step by the Vikzhel (All-Russia Executive Railway -Committee) and the local Soviets, subjected more than once to insults, -disarmament, resorting in one place to requests, in another to cunning, -and in some places to armed threats, the Cossack units forced their way -into their territories. - -But no measures could preserve the Cossack units from the fate which -had befallen the Army, for the whole of the psychological atmosphere -and all the factors of disruption, internal and external, were -absorbed by the Cossack masses, perhaps less intensively, but on the -whole in the same way. The two unsuccessful and, for the Cossacks, -incomprehensible marches on Petrograd, with Krymov[38] and Krasnov,[39] -introduced still greater confusion into their vague political outlook. - -The return of the Cossack troops to their homeland brought complete -disenchantment with it: they--at least the Cossacks of the Don, the -Kouban, and the Terek[40]--brought with them from the front the most -genuine Bolshevism, void, of course, of any kind of ideology, but with -all the phenomena of complete disintegration which we know so well. -This disintegration ripened gradually, showed itself later, but at -once exhibiting itself in the denial of the authority of the "elders," -the negation of all power, by mutiny, violence, the persecution and -surrender of the officers, but principally by complete abandonment -of any struggle against the Soviet power, which falsely promised the -inviolability of the Cossack rights and organisation. Bolshevism and -the Cossack organisation! Such grotesque contradictions were brought to -the surface daily by the reality of Russian life, on the basis of that -drunken debauch into which its long-desired freedom had degenerated. - -Now began the tragedy of Cossack life and the Cossack family in which -an insurmountable barrier had arisen between the "elders" and the "men -of the front," destroying their life and rousing the children against -their fathers. - - - - -CHAPTER XXV. - -NATIONAL UNITS. - - -In the old Russian Army the national question scarcely existed. Among -the soldiery the representatives of the races inhabiting Russia -experienced somewhat greater hardships in the service, caused by their -ignorance or imperfect knowledge of the Russian language, in which -their training was carried on. It was only this ground--the technical -difficulties of training--and perhaps that of general roughness and -barbarism, but in no case that of racial intolerance, that often led to -that friction, which made the position of the alien elements difficult, -the more so that, according to the system of mixed drafting, they -were generally torn from their native lands; the territorial system -of filling the ranks of the Army was considered to be technically -irrational and politically--not void of danger. The Little Russian -question in particular did not exist _at all_. The Little Russian -speech (outside the limits of official training), songs and music -received full recognition and did not rouse in anyone any feeling of -separateness, being accepted as Russian, as one's own. In the Army, -with the exception of the Jews, all the other alien elements were -absorbed fairly quickly and permanently; the community of the Army -was in no way a conductor either for compulsory Russification or for -national Chauvinism. - -Still less were national differences to be noticed in the community of -officers. Qualities and virtues--corporative, military, pertaining to -comradeship or simply human, overshadowed or totally obliterated racial -barriers. Personally, during my twenty-five years of service before the -revolution, it never came into my head to introduce this element into -my relations as commander, as colleague, or as comrade. And this was -done intuitively, not as the result of certain views and convictions. -The national questions which _were raised outside the Army_, in the -political life of the country, interested me, agitated me, were settled -by me in one or the other direction, harshly and irreconcilably at -times, but always without trespassing on the boundaries of military -life. - -The Jews occupied a somewhat different position. I shall return to this -question later. But it may be said that, with respect to the old Army, -this question was of popular rather than of political significance. -It cannot be denied that in the Army there was a certain tendency to -oppress the Jews, but it was not at all a part of any system, was not -inspired from above, but sprang up in the lower strata and in virtue -of complex causes, which spread far outside of the life, customs, and -mutual relations of the military community. - -In any case, the war overthrew all barriers, while the revolution -brought with it the repeal, in legislative order, of all religious and -national restrictions. - -With the beginning of the revolution and the weakening of the -Government, a violent centrifugal tendency arose in the borderlands -of Russia, and along with it a tendency towards the nationalisation, -_i.e._, the dismemberment, of the Army. Undoubtedly, the need of such -dismemberment did not at that time spring from the consciousness -of the masses and had no real foundation (I do not speak of the -Polish formations). The sole motives for nationalisation then lay -in the seeking of the political upper strata of the newly formed -groups to create a real support for their demands, and in the -feeling of self-preservation which urged the military element to -seek in new and prolonged formations a temporary or permanent relief -from military operations. Endless national military congresses -began, without the permission of the Government and of the High -Command. All races suddenly began to speak; the Lithuanians, the -Esthonians, the Georgians, the White Russians, the Little Russians, -the Mohammedans--demanding the "self-determination" proclaimed--from -cultural national autonomy to full independence inclusive, and -principally the immediate formation of separate bodies of troops. -Finally, more serious results, undoubtedly negative as regards the -integrity of the Army, were attained by the Ukrainian, Polish, and -partially by the Trans-Caucasian formations. The other attempts were -nipped in the bud. It was only during the last days of the existence -of the Russian Army, in October, 1917, that General Shcherbatov, -seeking to preserve the Roumanian front, began the classification of -the Army, on a large scale, according to race--an attempt which ended -in complete failure. I must add that one race only made no demand -for self-determination with regard to military service--the Jewish. -And whenever a proposal was made from any source--in reply to the -complaints of the Jews--to organise special Jewish regiments, this -proposal roused a storm of indignation among the Jews and in the -circles of the Left, and was stigmatised as deliberate provocation. - -The Government showed itself markedly opposed to the reorganisation -of the Army according to race. In a letter to the Polish Congress -(June 1st, 1917) Kerensky expressed the following view: "The great -achievement of the liberation of Russia and Poland can be arrived at -only under the condition that the organism of the Russian Army is -not weakened, that no alterations in its organisation infringe its -unity.... The extrusion from it of racial troops ... would, at this -difficult moment, tear its body, break its power, and spell ruin both -for the revolution and for the freedom of Russia, Poland, and of the -other nationalities inhabiting Russia." - -The attitude of the commanding element towards the question of -nationalisation was dual. The majority was altogether opposed to -it; the minority regarded it with some hope that, by breaking their -connection with the Council of Workmen's and Soldiers' Delegates, the -newly created national units might escape the errors and infatuations -of democratisation and become a healthy nucleus for fortifying the -front and building up the army. General Alexeiev resolutely opposed -all attempts at nationalisation, but encouraged the Polish and -Tchekho-Slovak formations. General Brussilov allowed the creation -of the first Ukrainian formation on his own responsibility, after -requesting the Supreme Commander-in-Chief "not to repeal it and not -to undermine his authority thereby."[41] The regiment was allowed to -exist. General Ruzsky, also without permission, began the Esthonian -formations,[42] and so forth. From the same motives, probably, which -led some commanders to allow formations, but with a reverse action, -the whole of the Russian revolutionary democracy, in the person of the -Soviets and the army committees, rose against the nationalisation of -the Army. A shower of violent resolutions poured in from all sides. -Among others, the Kiev Council of Workmen's and Soldiers' Delegates, -about the middle of April, characterised Ukrainisation in rude and -indignant language, as simple desertion and "hide-saving," and by -a majority of 264 against 4 demanded the repeal of the formation -of Ukrainian regiments. It is interesting to note that as great an -opponent of nationalisation was found in the Polish "Left," which had -split off from the military congress of the Poles in June, because of -the resolution for the formation of Polish troops. - -The Government did not long adhere to its original firm decision -against nationalisation. The declaration of July 2nd, along with -the grant of autonomy to the Ukraine, also decided the question of -nationalising the troops: "The Government considers it possible to -continue its assistance to a closer national union of the Ukrainians -in the ranks of the Army itself, or to the drafting into individual -units of Ukrainians exclusively, in so far as such a measure does not -injure the fighting capacity of the Army ... and considers it possible -to attract to the fulfilment of those tasks the Ukrainian soldiers -themselves, who are sent by the Central Rada to the War Ministry, the -General Staff, and the Stavka." - -A great "migration of peoples" began. - -Other Ukrainian agents journeyed along the front, organising Ukrainian -_gromadas_ and committees, getting resolutions passed for transfers -to Ukrainian units, or concerning reluctance to go to the front under -the plea that "the Ukraine was being stifled" and so forth. By October -the Ukrainian committee of the Western front was already calling for -armed pressure on the Government for the immediate conclusion of -peace. Petlura affirmed that he had 50,000 Ukrainian troops at his -disposal. Yet the commander of the Kiev military district, Colonel -Oberoutchev,[43] bears witness as follows: "At the time when heroic -exertions were being made to break the foe (the June advance) _I was -unable to send a single soldier to reinforce the active army_. As -soon as I gave an order to some reserve regiment or other to send -detachments to reinforce the front, a meeting would be called by a -regiment which had until then lived, peaceably, without thinking of -Ukrainisation, the yellow and blue Ukrainian flag would be unfurled and -the cry raised: 'Let us march under the Ukrainian flag!' - -"And after that they would not move. Weeks would pass, a month, but the -detachments would not stir, either under the red, or under the blue and -yellow flag." - -Was it possible to combat this unconcealed care for their own safety? -The answer is given by Oberoutchev again--an answer very characteristic -in its lifeless party rigour: - -"Of course, I could have used force to get my orders obeyed. And that -force lay in my hands." But "by using force against the disobedient, -who are acting under the Ukrainian flag, one risks the reproach -that one is struggling not against acts of anarchy, but against -national freedom and the self-determination of nations. And for me, a -Socialist-Revolutionary, to risk such a reproach, and in the Ukraine -too, with which I had been connected all my life, was impossible. And -so I decided to resign."[44] - -And he resigned. True, it was only in October, shortly before the -Bolshevist _coup d'etat_, having occupied the post of commander of the -troops in the most important district next the front for nearly five -months. - -As a development of the orders of the Government, the Stavka appointed -special divisions on each front for Ukrainisation, and on the -South-Western front also the 34th Army Corps, which was under the -command of General Skoropadsky. To these units, which were mostly -quartered in the deep reserve, the soldiers flocked from the whole -front, without leave asked or given. The hopes of the optimists on -the one hand and the fears of the Left circles on the other that -nationalisation would create "firm units" (counter-revolutionary in the -terminology of the Left) were speedily dispersed. The new Ukrainian -troops were permeated with the same elements of disintegration as the -regulars. - -Meanwhile, among the officers and old soldiers of many famous regiments -with a great historical past, now transformed into Ukrainian units, -this measure roused acute pain and the recognition that the end -of the Army was near.[45] In August, when I was in command of the -South-Western front, bad news began to come to me from the 34th Army -Corps. The corps seemed to be escaping from direct subordination, -receiving both directions and reinforcements from the "General -Secretary Petlura" directly. His commissary was attached to the Staff -of the corps, over which waved the "yellow-blue flag." The former -Russian officers and sergeants, left in the regiments because there was -no Ukrainian command, were treated with contumely by the often ignorant -Ukrainian ensigns set over them and by the soldiers. An extremely -unhealthy atmosphere of mutual hostility and estrangement was gathering -in these units. - -I sent for General Skoropadsky and invited him to moderate the violent -course of the process of Ukrainisation and, in particular, either to -restore the rights of the Commanders or to release them from service -in the corps. The future Hetman declared that a mistaken idea had been -formed of his activity, probably because of the historical past of the -Skoropadsky family,[46] that he was a true Russian, an officer of the -Guards and was altogether free of all seeking for self-determination, -that he was only obeying orders, for which he himself had no sympathy. -But immediately afterwards Skoropadsky went to the Stavka, whence my -Staff received directions to aid the speedy Ukrainisation of the 34th -Army Corps. - -The question of the Polish formations was in a somewhat different -position. The Provisional Government had declared the independence -of Poland, and the Poles now counted themselves "foreigners"; Polish -formations had long ago existed on the South-Western front, though they -were breaking up (with the exception of the Polish Lancers); having -given permission to the Ukrainians, the Government could not refuse it -to the Poles. Finally, the Central Powers, by creating the appearance -of Polish independence, also had in view the formation of a Polish -Army, which, however, ended in failure. America also formed a Polish -Army on French territory. - -In July, 1917, the formation of a Polish corps was assigned to the -Western front, of which I was then Commander-in-Chief. At the head of -the corps I put General Dovbor-Mousnitsky,[47] who is now in command -of the Polish Army at Poznan. A strong, energetic, resolute man, who -fearlessly waged war on the disintegration of the Russian troops and -on the Bolshevism among them, he succeeded in a short time in creating -units which, if not altogether firm, were, in any case, strikingly -different from the Russian troops in their discipline and order. It -was the old discipline, rejected by the Revolution--without meetings, -commissaries or committees. Such units roused another attitude towards -them in the Army, notwithstanding the rejection of nationalisation in -principle. Being supplied with the property of the disbanded mutinous -divisions and treated with complaisance by the Chief of Supplies, the -corps was soon able to organise its own commissariat. By order, the -ranks of the officers in the Polish corps were filled by the transfer -of those who desired it, and the ranks of the soldiers--exclusively -by volunteers or from reserve battalions; practically, however, the -inevitable current from the front set in, caused by the same motives -which influenced the Russian soldiers, devastating the thinned ranks of -the Army. - -In the end the Polish formations turned out to be altogether useless to -us. Even at the June military congress of the Poles, fairly unanimous -and unambiguous speeches were heard which defined the aims of these -formations. Their synthesis was thus expressed by one of the delegates: -"It is a secret for no one that the War is coming to an end, and we -need the Polish Army, not for the War, not for fighting; we need it so -that at the coming international conference we may be reckoned with, -that there should be power at our backs." - -And indeed the corps did not make its appearance at the front--it is -true that it was not yet finally formed; it did not wish to interfere -in the "home affairs" of the Russians (October and later--the struggle -against Bolshevism) and soon assumed completely the position of "a -foreign army," being taken over and supported by the French command. - -But neither were the hopes of the Polish nationalists fulfilled. In the -midst of the general break-down and fall of the front in the beginning -of 1918 and after the irruption of the Germans into Russia, part of the -corps was captured and disarmed, part of it dispersed and the remnants -of the Polish troops afterwards found a hospitable asylum in the ranks -of the Volunteer Army. - -Personally, I cannot but say a good word for the 1st Polish Corps, to -the units of which, quartered in Bykhov, we owe much in the protection -of the lives of General Kornilov and the other Bykhov prisoners, in the -memorable days of September to November. - -Centrifugal forces were scattering the country and the Army. To -class and party intolerance was added the embitterment of national -dissensions, partly based on the historically-created relations between -the races inhabiting Russia and the Imperial Government, and partly -altogether baseless, absurd, fed by causes which had nothing in common -with healthy national feeling. Latent or crushed at an earlier date, -these dissensions broke out rudely at just that moment, unfortunately, -when the general Russian authority was voluntarily and conscientiously -taking the path of recognition of the historical rights and the -national cultural self-determination of the component elements of the -Russian State. - -[Illustration: General Alexeiev's (centre) farewell.] - - - - -CHAPTER XXVI. - - MAY AND THE BEGINNING OF JUNE IN THE SPHERE OF MILITARY - ADMINISTRATION--THE RESIGNATION OF GUTCHKOV AND GENERAL - ALEXEIEV--MY DEPARTURE FROM THE STAVKA--THE ADMINISTRATION OF - KERENSKY AND GENERAL BRUSSILOV. - - -On May 1st the Minister of War, Gutchkov, left his post. "We wished," -so he explained the meaning of the "democratisation" of the Army which -he tried to introduce, "to give organised forms and certain channels to -follow, to that awakened spirit of independence, self-help and liberty -which had swept over all. But there is a line, beyond which lies the -beginning of the ruin of that living, mighty organism which is the -Army." Undoubtedly that line was crossed even before the first of May. - -I am not preparing to characterise Gutchkov, whose sincere patriotism -I do not doubt. I am speaking only of the system. It is difficult to -decide who could have borne the heavy weight of administering the Army -during the first period of the Revolution; but, in any case, Gutchkov's -Ministry had not the slightest grounds to seek the part of guiding the -life of the Army. It did not lead the Army. On the contrary, submitting -to a "parallel power" and impelled from below, the Ministry, somewhat -restively, _followed the Army_, until it came right up to the line, -beyond which final ruin begins. - -"To restrain the Army from breaking up completely under the influence -of that pressure which proceeded from the Socialists, and in particular -from their citadel--the Soviet of Workmen's and Soldiers' Delegates--to -gain time, to allow the diseased process to be absorbed, to help the -healthy elements to gain strength, such was my aim," wrote Gutchkov to -Kornilov in June, 1917. The whole question is whether the resistance -to the destroying powers was resolute enough. The Army did not feel -this. The officers read the orders, signed by Gutchkov, which broke -up completely the foundations of military life and custom. That these -orders were the result of a painful internal drama, a painful struggle -and defeat--this the officers did not know, nor did it interest them. -Their lack of information was so great that many of them even now, -four years later, ascribe to Gutchkov the authorship of the celebrated -"Order No. 1." However it may be, the officers felt themselves deceived -and deserted. Their difficult position they ascribed principally to the -reforms of the Minister of War, against whom a hostile feeling arose, -heated still more by the grumbling of hundreds of Generals removed by -him and of the ultra-monarchical section of the officers, who could not -forgive Gutchkov his supposed share in the preparation of the Palace -_coup d'etat_ and of the journey to Pskov.[48] - -Thus the resignation of this Minister, even if caused "by those -conditions, in which the Government power was placed in the country, -and in particular the power of the Minister of the Army and the Navy -with respect to the Army and the fleet,"[49] had another justification -as well--the want of support among the officers and the soldiery. - -In a special resolution the Provisional Government condemned Gutchkov's -action in "resigning responsibility for the fate of Russia," and -appointed Kerensky Minister of the Army and the Navy. I do not know how -the Army received this appointment in the beginning, but the Soviet -received it without prejudice. Kerensky was a complete stranger to the -art of war and to military life, but could have been surrounded by -honest men; what was then going on in the Army was simple insanity, -and this even a civilian might have understood. Gutchkov was a -representative of the Bourgeoisie, a Member of the Right, and was -distrusted; now, perhaps, a Socialist Minister, the favourite of the -Democracy, might have succeeded in dissipating the fog in which the -soldiers' consciousness was wrapped. Nevertheless, to take up such a -burden called for enormous boldness or enormous self-confidence, and -Kerensky emphasised this circumstance more than once when speaking -to an Army audience: "At a time when many soldiers, who had studied -the art of war for decades, declined the post of Minister of War, -I--a civilian, accepted it." No one, however, had ever heard that the -Ministry of War had been offered to a soldier that May. - -The very first steps taken by the new Minister dissipated our hopes: -the choice of collaborators, who were even greater opportunists than -their predecessors, but void of experience in military administration -and in active service;[50] the surrounding of himself with men from -"underground"--perhaps having done very great work in the cause of the -Revolution, but without any comprehension of the life of the Army--all -this introduced into the actions of the War Ministry a new party -element, foreign to the military service. - -A few days after his appointment Kerensky issued the Declaration of the -rights of the soldier, thereby predestining the entire course of his -activity. - -On May 11th the Minister was passing through Moghilev to the Front. We -were surprised by the circumstance that the passage was timed for 5 -a.m., and that only the Chief-of-Staff was invited into the train. The -Minister of War seemed to avoid meeting the Supreme Commander-in-Chief. -His conversation with me was short and touched on details--the -suppression of some disturbances or other that had broken out at one -of the railway junctions and so forth. The most capital questions of -the existence of the Army and of the coming advance, the necessity -for unity in the views of the Government and the Command, the absence -of which was showing itself with such marked clearness--all this, -apparently, did not attract the attention of the Minister. Among other -things, Kerensky passed a few cursory remarks on the inappropriateness -of Generals Gourko and Dragomirov, Commanders-in-Chief of fronts, -to their posts, which drew a protest from me. All this was very -symptomatic and created at the Stavka a condition of tense, nervous -expectation. - -Kerensky was proceeding to the South-Western front, to begin his -celebrated verbal campaign which was to rouse the Army to achievement. -The _word_ created hypnosis and self-hypnosis. Brussilov reported -to the Stavka that throughout the Army the Minister of War had been -received with extraordinary enthusiasm. Kerensky spoke with unusual -pathos and exaltation, in stirring "revolutionary" images, often with -foam on his lips, reaping the applause and delight of the mob. At -times, however, the mob would turn to him the face of a wild beast, -the sight of which made words to stick in the throat and caused the -heart to fail. They sounded a note of menace, these moments, but fresh -delight drowned their alarming meaning. And Kerensky reported to -the Provisional Government that "the wave of enthusiasm in the Army -is growing and widening," and that a definite change in favour of -discipline and the regeneration of the Army was displaying itself. In -Odessa he became even more irresistibly poetical: "In your welcome I -see that great enthusiasm which has overwhelmed the country and feel -that great exaltation which the world experiences but once in hundreds -of years." - -Let us be just. - -Kerensky called on the Army to do its duty. He spoke of duty, honour, -discipline, obedience, trust in its commanders; he spoke of the -necessity for advancing and for victory. He spoke in the language of -the established revolutionary ritual, which ought to have reached -the hearts and minds of the "revolutionary people." Sometimes, even, -feeling his power over his audience, he would throw at it the words, -which became household words, of "rebel slaves" and "revolutionary -tyrants." - -In vain! - -At the conflagration of the temple of Russia, he called to the fire: -"Be quenched!" instead of extinguishing it with brimful pails of water. - -Words could not fight against facts, nor heroic poems against the -stern prose of life. The replacement of the Motherland by Liberty and -Revolution did not make the aims of the conflict any clearer. The -constant scoffing at the old "discipline," at the "Czar's generals," -the reminders of the knout, the stick, and the "former unprivileged -condition of the soldier" or of the soldier's blood "shed in vain" by -someone or other--nothing of this could bridge the chasm between the -two component parts of the Army. The passionate preaching of a "new, -conscious, iron revolutionary discipline," _i.e._, a discipline based -on the "declaration of the rights of the soldier"--a discipline of -meetings, propaganda, political agitation, absence of authority in -the commanders, and so forth--this preaching was in irreconcileable -opposition to the call to victory. Having received his impressions in -the artificially exalted, theatrical atmosphere of meetings, surrounded -both in the Ministry and in his journeyings, by an impenetrable wall of -old political friends and of all manner of delegations and deputations -from the Soviets and the Committees, Kerensky looked on the Army -through the prism of their outlook, either unwilling or unable to sink -himself in the real life of the Army and in its torments, sufferings, -searchings, and crimes, and finally to attain a real standing-ground, -get at vital themes and real words. These everyday questions of Army -life and organisation--dry in their form and deeply dramatic in their -content--never served as themes for his speeches. They contained -only a glorification of the Revolution and a condemnation of certain -perversions of the idea of national defence, created by that Revolution -itself. The masses of the soldiery, eager for sentimental scenes, -listened to the appeals of the recognised chief for self-sacrifice, -and they were inflamed with the "sacred fire"; but as soon as the -scene was over, both the chief and the audiences reverted to the daily -occupations: the chief--to the "democratisation" of the Army, and -the masses--to "deepening the Revolution." In the same way, probably, -Djerzinsky's executioners in Soviet Russia now admire, in the temple of -proletarian art, the sufferings of young Werther--before proceeding to -their customary occupation of hanging and shooting. - -At any rate, there was much noise. So much, that Hindenburg sincerely -believes even to this day that in June, 1917, the South-Western Front -was commanded by Kerensky. In his book _Aus meinem Leben_ the German -Field-Marshal relates that Kerensky succeeded Brussilov, "who was -swept away from his post by the rivers of Russian blood which he shed -in Galicia and Macedonia (?) in 1916" (the Field-Marshal has confused -the theatres of war), and tells the story of Kerensky's "advance" and -victories over the Austrians near Stanislavov. - - * * * * * - -Meanwhile life at the Stavka was gradually waning. The wheels of -administration were still revolving, everybody was doing something, -issuing orders and giving directions. The work was purely formal, -because all the plans and directions of the Stavka were upset by -unavoidable and incalculable circumstances. Petrograd never took the -Stavka into serious account, but at that time the attitude of the -Government was somewhat hostile, and the War Ministry was conducting -the work of reorganisation without ever consulting the Stavka. This -position was a great burden to General Alexeiev, the more so that the -attacks of his old disease became more frequent. He was extremely -patient and disregarded all personal pin-pricks and all efforts at -undermining his prerogatives which emanated from the Government. -In his discussions with numerous Army chiefs, and organisations -which took advantage of his accessibility, he was likewise patient, -straightforward, and sincere. He worked incessantly, in order to -preserve the remnants of the Army. Seeking to give an example of -discipline, he protested but obeyed. He was not sufficiently strong -and masterful by nature to compel the Provisional Government and the -civilian reformers of the Army to take the demands of the Supreme -Command into account; at the same time, he never did violence to his -conscience in order to please the powers that be or the mob. - -On May 20th, Kerensky stopped for a few hours at Moghilev on his way -home from the South-Western Front. He was full of impressions, praised -Brussilov, and expressed the view that the general spirit at the front -and the relations between officers and men were excellent. Although -in his conversation with Alexeiev Kerensky made no hint, we noticed -that his entourage was somewhat uneasy, and realised that decisions in -regard to certain changes had already been taken. I did not consider -it necessary to acquaint the Supreme Commander-in-Chief with these -rumours, and merely seized the first opportunity for postponing his -intended visit to the Western Front so as not to put him into a false -position. - -In the night of the 22nd a telegram was received dismissing General -Alexeiev and appointing General Brussilov by order of the Provisional -Government. The Quartermaster-General Josephovitch woke up Alexeiev -and handed him the telegram. The Supreme Commander-in-Chief was -deeply moved, and tears came down his cheeks. May the members of the -Provisional Government who are still alive forgive the vulgarity -of the language: in a subsequent conversation with me the Supreme -Commander-in-Chief inadvertently uttered the following words: "The -cads! They have dismissed me like a servant without notice." - -A great statesman and military leader had thus left the stage, whose -virtue--one of many--was his implicit loyalty (or was it a defect?) to -the Provisional Government. - -On the next day Kerensky was asked--at a meeting of the Soviet--what -steps he had taken in view of the Supreme Commander-in-Chief's speech -at the officers' Conference (see Chapter XXIII). He replied that -Alexeiev had been dismissed, and that he, Kerensky, believed that a -late French politician was right in saying that "discipline of duty" -should be introduced from the top. The Bolshevik Rosenfeldt (Kamenev) -expressed satisfaction, because this decision fully coincided with -the repeated demands of the Soviet. On the same day the Government -published an official communique to the effect that: "In spite of -the fact that General Alexeiev was naturally very tired and needed -rest from his arduous labours, it was considered impossible to lose -the services of this exceptionally experienced and talented leader, -and General Alexeiev was therefore to remain at the disposal of the -Provisional Government." The Supreme Commander-in-Chief issued the -following Order of the Day as a farewell to the Armies. - -"For nearly three years I have walked with you along the thorny path -of the Russian Army. Your glorious deeds have filled me with joyful -elation, and I was filled with sorrow in the days of our reverses. -But I continued with implicit hope in Providence, in the mission of -the Russian people, and in the prowess of the Russian soldier. Now -that the foundations of our military power are shattered, I still -preserve the same faith, as life would not be worth living without it. -I reverently salute you, my comrades in arms, all those who have done -their duty faithfully, all those whose hearts beat with the love of -their country, all those who in the days of the popular turmoil were -determined not to allow the Mother Country to be disrupted. I, the old -soldier, and your late Supreme Commander-in-Chief, once more reverently -salute you. Pray think kindly of me." - - (Signed) GENERAL ALEXEIEV. - -Towards the end of our work in common my intercourse with General -Alexeiev was one of cordial friendship. In parting with me, he said: -"All this structure will undoubtedly soon collapse. You will have to -resume work once again. Would you then agree to work with me again?" I -naturally expressed my readiness to collaborate in the future. - -Brussilov's appointment signified definite elimination of the Stavka, -as a decisive factor, and a change in its direction. Brussilov's -unrestrained and incomprehensible opportunism, and his endeavour to -gain the reputation of a revolutionary, deprived the Commanding Staffs -of the Army of the moral support which the former Stavka still gave -them. The new Supreme Commander-in-Chief was given a very frigid and -dry reception at Moghilev. Instead of the customary enthusiastic -ovation to which the "Revolutionary General" had been accustomed, -whom the mob had carried shoulder high at Kamenetz-Podolsk, he found -a lonely railway station and a strictly conventional parade. Faces -were sulky and speeches were stereotyped. Brussilov's first steps, -insignificant but characteristic episodes, had a further disheartening -effect. As he was reviewing the Guard of Honour of men with the Cross -of St. George, he did not greet their gallant wounded Commander, -Colonel Timanovsky, or the officers, but shook hands with the men--the -messenger and the orderly. They were so much perturbed by the -unexpected inconvenience of such greetings on parade that they dropped -their rifles. Brussilov handed to me his Order of the Day intended as a -greeting to the Armies, which he had written in his own hand, and asked -me to send it to Kerensky for approval. In his speech to the members of -the Stavka, who had foregathered to bid farewell to General Alexeiev, -Brussilov tried to make excuses. For excuses they were--his confused -explanations of the sin of "deepening the Revolution" with Kerensky -and "democratising" the Army with the Committees. The closing sentence -of his Order, addressed to the retiring Chief, sounded, therefore, out -of tune: "Your name will always remain unstained and pure as that of a -man who has worked incessantly and has given himself entirely to the -service of the Army. In the dark days of the past and in the present -turmoil you have had the courage, resolutely and loyally, to oppose -violence, to combat mendacity, flattery, subservience, to resist -anarchy in the country and disruption in the ranks of its defenders." - -My activities were disapproved by the Provisional Government as much as -those of General Alexeiev, and I could not work with Brussilov owing to -fundamental differences of opinion. I presume that during Kerensky's -visit to the South-Western Front, Brussilov agreed with his suggestion -of appointing General Lukomsky Chief-of-Staff. I was therefore -surprised at the conversation which took place on the first day of -Brussilov's arrival. He said to me: "Well, General, I thought I was -going to meet a comrade-in-arms and that we were going to work together -at the Stavka, but you look very surly." - -"That is not quite true. I cannot stay at the Stavka any longer. I also -know that General Lukomsky is to supersede me." - -"What? How have they dared to appoint him without my knowledge?" - -We never touched upon that subject again. I continued to work with -Brussilov for about ten days pending my successor's arrival, and I must -confess that work was unpleasant from the moral point of view. From -the very first days of the War Brussilov and I had served together. -For the first month I was Quartermaster-General on the Staff of his -Eighth Army, then for two years in command of the 4th Rifle Division -in that same glorious Army, and Commander of the 8th Army Corps on -his front. The "Iron Division" went from victory to victory, and -Brussilov particularly favoured it and constantly acknowledged its -achievements. His attitude towards the Commander of the Division was -correspondingly cordial. I shared with Brussilov many hardships as well -as many unforgettable happy days of military triumphs. And I found it -difficult to speak to him now, for he was a different man and was so -recklessly, from the personal point of view--which, after all, did -not matter--as well as from the point of view of the interests of the -Army, throwing his reputation to the four winds. When I reported to -him, every question which might be described as "un-Democratic," but -was, in reality, an endeavour to maintain the reasonable standard of -efficiency, was invariably negatived. Argument was useless. Brussilov -sometimes interrupted me and said with strong feeling: "Do you think -that I am not disgusted at having constantly to wave the Red rag? What -can I do? Russia is sick, the Army is sick. It must be cured, and I -know of no other remedy." - -The question of my appointment interested him more than it interested -me. I refused to express any definite desire and said that I would -accept any appointment. Brussilov was negotiating with Kerensky. He -once said to me, "_They_ are afraid that if I give you an appointment -at the Front, you will begin to oust the Committees." I smiled. "No, I -will not appeal to the Committees for help, but will also leave them -alone." I attributed no importance to this conversation, which was -conducted almost in jest; but on the same day a telegram was sent to -Kerensky, of which the following was the approximate wording: "I have -talked it over with Deniken. The obstacles have been removed. I request -that he be appointed Commander-in-Chief of the Western Front." - -[Illustration] - -[Illustration: Kerensky addressing soldiers' meeting.] - -In the beginning of August I proceeded to Minsk and took General -Markov as Chief-of-Staff of the Front. I had no regrets in leaving the -Stavka. For two months I had worked like a slave and my outlook had -widened, but had I achieved anything for the preservation of the Army? -Positive results were nil. There may have been some negative results; -the process of disruption of the Army had been to a certain extent -stayed. And that is all. One of Kerensky's assistants, afterwards -High Commissar, Stankevitch, thus describes my activities: "Nearly -every week telegrams were sent to Petrograd (by Deniken) containing -provocative and harsh criticisms on the new methods in the Army; -criticisms they were, not advice. Is it possible to advise that -the Revolution should be cancelled." If that was only Stankevitch -discussing Denikin it would not matter. But these views were shared by -the wide circles of the Revolutionary Democracy and referred not to -the individual, but to all those who "impersonated the tragedy of the -Russian Army." The appreciation must therefore be answered. - -Yes, the Revolution could not be cancelled, and what is more, I may -state that the majority of the Russian officers, with whom I agreed, -_did not wish to cancel the Revolution_. They demanded one thing -only--that the Army should not be revolutionised from the top. None of -us could give any other advice. And if the Commanding Staffs appeared -to be "insufficiently tied to the Revolution" they should have been -mercilessly dismissed and other people--were they but unskilled -artisans in military matters--should have been appointed, and given -full power and confidence. - -Personalities do not matter. Alexeiev, Brussilov, Kornilov--represent -periods and systems. Alexeiev protested. Brussilov submitted. Kornilov -claimed. In dismissing these men one after another did the Provisional -Government have a definite idea, or were they simply distracted to -the point of convulsion and completely lost in the morass of their -own internal dissensions? Would it not appear that had the order been -changed in which the links had stood in that chain salvation might have -ensued? - - - - -CHAPTER XXVII. - -MY TERM AS COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF ON THE WESTERN RUSSIAN FRONT. - - -I took over the Command from General Gourko. His removal had already -been decided on May 5th, and an Order of the Day had been drafted at -the War Ministry. Gourko, however, sent a report in which he stated -that it was impossible for him to remain morally responsible for the -armies under his command in the present circumstances (after the -"Declaration of the Soldier's Rights" had been issued). This report -afforded Kerensky an excuse for issuing on May 26th an order relieving -Gourko of his post and appointing him to the command of a division. The -motive was adduced that Gourko was "not up to the mark," and that "as -the country was in danger, every soldier should do his duty and not be -an example of weakness to others." Also that "the Commander-in-Chief -enjoys the full confidence of the Government, and should apply all his -energies to the task of carrying out the intentions of the Government; -to decline to bear the moral responsibility was on General Gourko's -part tantamount to dereliction of duty, which he should have continued -to perform according to his strength and judgment." Not to speak of -the fact that Gourko's dismissal had already been decided, suffice -it to recall similar instances, such as the resignations of Gutchkov -and Miliukov, in order to realise the hypocrisy of these excuses. And -what is more--Kerensky himself, during one of the Government crises -caused by the uncompromising attitude of the "Revolutionary Democracy," -had threatened to resign, and had stated in writing to his would-be -successor, Nekrassov, that: "Owing to the impossibility of introducing -into the Government such elements as were required in the present -exceptional circumstances, he could no longer bear the responsibility -before the country according to his conscience and judgment, and -requested therefore to be relieved of all his duties." The papers said -that he had "departed from Petrograd." On October 28th, as we know, -Kerensky fled, abandoning the post of Supreme Commander-in-Chief. - -The old Commanding Staffs were in a difficult position. I refer not -to men of definite political convictions, but of the average honest -soldier. They could not follow Kerensky (the system, not the man) and -destroy with their own hands the edifice which they had themselves -spent their lives in building. They could not resign because the enemy -was on Russian soil and they would be deserters according to their own -conscience. It was a vicious circle. - -Upon my arrival at Minsk I addressed two large gatherings of members of -the Staff and departments of the Front, and later the Army Commanders, -and expounded my fundamental views. I did not say much, but stated -clearly that I accepted the Revolution without any reservations. I -considered, however, that to "revolutionise" the Army was a fatal -procedure, and that to introduce demagogy into the Army would mean the -ruin of the Country. I declared that I would oppose it with all my -might and invited my collaborators to do the same. I received a letter -from General Alexeiev, who wrote: "Congratulations on your appointment. -Rouse them! Make your demands calmly but persistently. I trust that -the revival will come without coaxing, without red ribbons, without -sonorous and empty phrases. The Army cannot continue as it is now, -for Russia is being transformed into a multitude of idlers who have -an exaggerated idea of their own importance (value their movements in -gold). I am in heart and in thought with you, with your work and with -your wishes. God help you." - -The Committee of the Front impersonated at Minsk "Military Politics." -On the eve of my arrival that semi-Bolshevik organisation had passed a -resolution protesting against an advance and in favour of the struggle -of united democracies against their Governments; this naturally helped -to define my attitude towards that body. I had no direct intercourse -with the Committee, which "stewed in its own juice," argued the -matter of preponderant influences of the Social Democratic and Social -Revolutionary factions, passed resolutions which puzzled even the -Army Committees by their demagogic contents, distributed defeatist -pamphlets, and incensed the men against their chiefs. According to the -law, the Committees were not responsible and could not be tried. The -Committee was educating in the same sense the pupils of the "school -for agitators," who were afterwards to spread these doctrines along -the Front. I will quote one instance showing the real meaning of these -manifestations "of civic indignation and sorrow." Pupils of the -school often appealed to the Chief-of-Staff and sent in "demands." -On one occasion the demand for an extra pair of boots was couched -in offensive terms. General Markov refused it. On the next day a -resolution was published (in the paper _The Front_, No. 25) of the -Conference of Pupils of the School of Agitators to the effect that they -had personally tested the reluctance of Headquarters to take elective -organisations into account. The pupils declared that the Committee of -the Front will find in them and in those who sent them full support -against "counter-revolution," and even armed assistance. - -Was work in common possible in these circumstances? - -The idea of the advance was finally, however, accepted by the Committee -of the Front, which demanded that from itself and from Army Committees -"fighting committees of contact" be established which would be entitled -to partake in the drafting of plans of operations to control the -Commanding Officers and Headquarters of the advancing troops, etc. I -naturally refused the request, and a conflict ensued. The War Minister -was very much perturbed, and sent to Minsk the Chief of his Chancery, -Colonel Baronovsky, a young staff officer who prompted Kerensky in -all military matters, and the Commissar Stankevitch, who remained at -the Western Front for two days, was removed to the Northern Front and -replaced by Kalinin. Baronovsky's friends afterwards told me that the -question of my dismissal had been raised in view of "friction with -the Committee of the Front." Stankevitch appeased the Committee and -"fighting committees of contact" were allowed to take part in the -advance, but were denied the right of control over the operations and -of assisting in drawing up plans. - - * * * * * - -Of the three Army Commanders at that Front, two were entirely in the -hands of the Committees. As their sectors were inactive, their presence -could be temporarily tolerated. The advance was to begin on the Front -of the 10th Army, commanded by General Kisselevsky, in the region of -Molodetchno. I inspected the troops and the position, interviewed the -Commanding Officers and addressed the troops. In the preceding chapters -I have recounted impressions, facts, and episodes of the life of the -Western front. I will, therefore, mention here only a few details. I -saw the troops on parade. Some units had preserved the appearance and -the routine of the normal pre-Revolutionary times. These, however, were -exceptions, and were to be found chiefly in the Army Corps of General -Dovbor-Mussnitzki, who was persistently and sternly maintaining -the old discipline. Most of the units, however, were more akin to a -devastated ants-nest than to an organised unit, although they had -retained a semblance of discipline and drill. After the review I walked -down the ranks and spoke to the soldiers. I was deeply depressed by -their new mental attitude. Their speeches were nought but endless -complaints, suspicions and grievances against everyone and everything. -They complained of all the officers, from the Platoon Commander to the -Army Corps Commander, complained of the lentil soup, of having to stand -at the Front for ever, of the next regiment of the line, and of the -Provisional Government for being implacably hostile to the Germans. I -witnessed scenes which I shall not forget till my last hour. In one of -the Army Corps I asked to be shown the worst unit. I was taken to the -703rd Suram Regiment. We drove up to a huge crowd of unarmed men who -were standing, sitting, wandering about the plain behind the village. -Having sold their clothes for cash or for drink, they were dressed in -rags, bare-footed, ragged, unkempt, and seemed to have reached the -utmost limit of physical degradation. I was met by the Divisional -Commander, whose lower lip trembled, and by a Regimental Commander who -had the face of a condemned man. Nobody gave the order "Attention!" -and none of the soldiers rose. The nearest ranks moved towards our -motor cars. My first impulse was to curse the regiment and turn back. -But that might have been interpreted as cowardice, so I went into the -thick of the crowd. I stayed there for about an hour. Good Heavens, -what was the matter with these men, with the reasonable creature of -God, with the Russian field-labourer? They were like men possessed, -their brain dimmed, their speech stubborn and completely lacking logic -or common-sense; their shrieks were hysterical, full of abuse and foul -swearing. We tried to speak, but the replies were angry and stupid. I -remember that my feelings of indignation as an old soldier receded to -the background and I merely felt infinitely sorry for these uncouth, -illiterate Russians to whom little was given and of whom little will, -therefore, be asked. One wished that the leaders of the Revolutionary -Democracy had been on that plain and had seen and heard everything. One -wished one could have said to them: "It is not the time to find out who -is guilty, it doesn't matter whether the guilt is ours, yours, of the -bourgeoisie or of autocracy. Give the people education and an 'image of -man' first, and then socialise, nationalise, Communise, if the people -will then follow you." - -The same Suram Regiment, a few days later, gave a sound thrashing to -Sokolov, the man who drafted Order No. 1, the creator of the new -regime for the Army, because he demanded, in the name of the Soviet, -that the regiment should do its duty and join in the advance. - -After visiting the regiment, in compliance with persistent invitations -from a special delegation, I went to a Conference of the 2nd Caucasian -Army Corps. The members of that Conference had been elected; their -discussions were more reasonable and their aims more practical. Among -the various groups of delegates whom our _aides-de-camp_ had joined, -the argument was put forward that, as the Commander-in-Chief and all -the senior Commanding Officers were present, would it not be expedient -to finish them off at once? That would put an end to the advance. - -To meet the senior Commanding Officer was by no means a consolation. -One of the Army Corps Commanders led his troops with a firm hand, but -experienced strong pressure from the Army organisations; another was -afraid to visit his troops. I found the third in a state of complete -collapse and in tears because someone had passed a vote of censure -upon him: "And this after forty years' service! I loved the men and -they loved me, but now they have dishonoured me, and I cannot serve -any longer!" I had to allow him to retire. In the next room a young -Divisional Commander was already in secret consultation with members -of the Committee, who immediately requested me, in a most peremptory -fashion, to appoint the young General to the command of the Army Corps. - -The visit left me with a painful impression. Disruption was growing and -my hopes were waning; and yet one had to continue the work, of which -there was plenty for all of us. The Western Front lived by theory and -by the experience of others. It had won no striking victories, which -alone can inspire confidence in the methods of warfare, and had no -real experience in breaking through the defensive line of the enemy. -One was very often compelled to discuss the general plan, the plan -of artillery attack, and to establish the points of initiative with -those who were to carry out the general plan. We found the greatest -difficulty in preparing the plans for storming a position. Owing to -demoralisation, every movement of troops, every relief, trench digging, -bringing batteries into position, either were not carried out at all, -or else attended by delays, tremendous efforts or persuasion, and -meetings. Every slightest excuse was made use of in order to avoid -preparations for the advance. Owing to the technical unpreparedness -of the positions, the chiefs had to perform the arduous and unnatural -task of making tactical considerations subservient to the qualities -of the Commanding Officers, instead of giving directions to the -troops in accordance with tactical considerations. The degree of the -demoralisation of different units and the condition of different -sectors of a given firing line, purely accidental, had also to be taken -into account. And yet the statement that our technical backwardness -was one of the reasons of our collapse in 1917 should be accepted with -reservations. Of course, our Army was backward, but in 1917 it was -infinitely better equipped, had more guns and ammunition and wider -experience of her own and of other fronts than in 1916. Our technical -backwardness was a relative factor which was present at all times in -the Great War before the Revolution, but was remedied in 1917, and -cannot, therefore, be taken into account as a decisive feature in -estimating the Russian Revolutionary Army and its work in the field. - -It was the work of Sisyphus. The Commanding Officers gave their heart -and soul to the work because in its success they saw the last ray -of hope for the salvation of the Army and of the country. Technical -difficulties could be overcome, as long as the moral could be raised. - -Brussilov arrived and addressed the regiment. As a result, the officer -commanding the 10th Army was relieved against my will ten days before -the decisive advance. And it was not without difficulty that I secured -the appointment of General Lomnovsky, the gallant Commander of the -8th Army Corps, who had arrived at the Front ten days before the -action. There was an unpleasant misunderstanding about Brussilov's -visit. Headquarters had mistakenly informed the troops that Kerensky -was coming. This substitution provoked strong discontent among the -troops. Many units declared that they were being deceived, and that -unless Comrade Kerensky himself orders them to advance they would -not advance. The 2nd Caucasian Division sent delegates to Petrograd -to make inquiries. And efforts had to be made to appease them by -promising that Comrade Kerensky was due to arrive in a few days. The -War Minister had to be invited. Kerensky came reluctantly, because he -was already disillusioned by the failure of his oratorical campaign -on the South-Western Front. For several days he reviewed the troops, -delivered speeches, was enthusiastically received and sometimes -unexpectedly rebuked. He interrupted his tour, as he was invited to -hurry to Petrograd on July 4th, but he returned with renewed energy and -with a new up-to-date theme, making full use of the "knife with which -the Revolution had been stabbed in the back" (the Petrograd rising of -July 3rd-5th). Having, however, completed his tour and returned to the -Stavka, he emphatically declared to Brussilov: - -"I have no faith whatsoever in the success of the advance." - -Kerensky was equally pessimistic in those days with regard to -another matter, the future destinies of the country. He discussed in -conversation with myself and two or three of his followers, the stages -of the Russian Revolution, and expressed the conviction that whatever -happened we should not escape the Reign of Terror. The days went by and -the advance was further delayed. As early as on June 18th, I issued the -following Order of the Day to the Armies of my Front: - -"The Russian Army of the South-Western Front have this day defeated -the enemy and broken through his lines. A decisive battle has begun -on which depends the fate of the Russian people and of its liberties. -Our brethren on the South-Western Front are victoriously advancing, -sacrificing their lives and expecting us to render them speedy -assistance. We shall not be traitors. The enemy shall soon hear the -roaring of our guns. I appeal to the troops of the Western Front to -make every effort and to prepare as soon as possible for an advance, -otherwise we shall be cursed by the Russian people who have entrusted -to us the defence of their liberty, honour, and property." - -I do not know whether those who read this order, published in the -papers in complete contravention of all the conditions of secrecy -of operation, understood all the inner tragedy of the Russian Army. -All strategy was turned topsy-turvy. The Russian Commander-in-Chief, -powerless to advance his troops and thus alleviate the position of -the neighbouring Front, wanted (even at the cost of exposing his -intentions) to hold the German divisions which were being moved from -his Front and sent to the South-Western and the Allied Front. - -The Germans responded immediately by sending the following proclamation -to the Front: - -"Russian soldiers! Your Commander-in-Chief of the Western Front is -again calling on you to fight. We know of his order, and also know -of the false report that our line to the South-East of Lvov has been -broken. Do not believe it. In reality thousands of Russian corpses are -lying before our trenches. An advance will never lead to peace. If, -nevertheless, you obey the call of your commanders, who are bribed by -England, then we shall continue the struggle until you are overthrown." - -Finally, on July 8th, the thunder of our guns was heard. On July 9th -the storming began, and three days after I was on my way from the 10th -Army to Minsk, with despair in my heart, and clearly recognising that -the last hope of a miracle was gone. - - - - -CHAPTER XXVIII. - -THE RUSSIAN ADVANCE IN THE SUMMER OF 1917--THE DEBACLE. - - -The Russian offensive which had been planned for the month of May was -being delayed. At first a simultaneous advance on all fronts had been -contemplated; later, however, owing to the psychological impossibility -of a forward movement on all fronts, it was decided to advance -gradually. The Western Front was of secondary importance, and the -Northern was intended only for demonstration. They should have moved -first in order to divert the attention and the forces of the enemy from -the main front--the South-Western. The first two of the above-named -fronts were not, however, ready for the advance. The Supreme Command -finally decided to abandon the strategical plan and to give the -commanders of various fronts a free hand in starting operations as -the Armies would be ready, provided these operations were not delayed -too long and the enemy was not given the opportunity of carrying out -re-groupings on a large scale. - -Even such a strategy, simplified as it had been owing to the -Revolution, might have yielded great results, considering the -world-wide scope of the War; if the German Armies on the Eastern -Front could not have been utterly defeated, that Front might at least -have been restored to its former importance. The Central Powers might -have been compelled to send to that Front large forces, war material -and munitions, thus severely handicapping Hindenburg's strategy and -causing him constant anxiety. The operations were finally fixed for the -following dates: They were to begin on the South-Western Front on June -16th, on the Western on July 7th, on the Northern on July 8th, and on -the Roumanian on July 6th. The last three dates almost coincide with -the beginning of the collapse (July 6th-7th) of the South-Western Front. - -As mentioned above, in June, 1917, the Revolutionary Democracy had -already acquiesced in the idea that an advance was necessary, although -this acquiescence was qualified. The offensive thus had the moral -support of the Provisional Government, the Commanding Staffs, all the -officers, the Liberal Democracy, the Defencist Coalition of the Soviet, -the Commissars, of nearly all Army Committees, and of many Regimental -Committees. Against the offensive the minority of the Revolutionary -Democracy was ranged--the Bolsheviks, the Social-Revolutionaries -of Tchernov's and of Martov's (Zederbaum) group. There was a small -appendix to this minority--the Democratisation of the Army. - -At the moment of writing I do not possess a complete list of the -Russian Armies, but I may confidently assert that on all sectors upon -which the advance had been planned we had a numerical and a technical -superiority over the enemy, more especially in guns, of which we had -larger quantities than ever. It fell to the lot of the South-Western -Front to test the fighting capacity of the Revolutionary Army. - -The group of armies under General Bohm-Ermolli (the 4th and 2nd -Austrian Armies and the Southern German Armies) stood between the upper -Sereth and the Carpathians (Brody-Nadvorna) on the position north of -the Dniester which we had captured after Brussilov's victorious advance -in the autumn of 1916. South of the Dniester stood the 3rd Austrian -Army of General Kirchbach, which formed the Left Wing of the Archduke -Joseph's Carpathian Front. Our best Army Corps, which were intended as -shock troops, were opposed to the last three Armies mentioned above. -These Austro-German troops had already been dealt many heavy blows by -the Russian Armies in the summer and in the autumn of 1916. Since then, -the Southern German Divisions of General Botmer, which had been hard -hit, had been replaced by fresh troops from the North. Although the -Austrian Armies had been to a certain extent reorganised by the German -High Command and reinforced by German divisions, they did not represent -a formidable force and, according to the German Headquarters, were not -fit for active operations. - -Since the Germans had occupied the Cherviche "Place d'armes" on the -Stokhod, Hindenburg's Headquarters had given orders that no operations -should be conducted, as it was hoped that the disruption of the Russian -Army and of the country would follow its natural course, assisted by -German propaganda. The Germans estimated the fighting capacity of our -Army very low. Nevertheless, when Hindenburg realised in the beginning -of June that a Russian advance was a contingency to be reckoned with, -he moved six divisions from the Western-European front and sent them to -reinforce the group of Armies of Bohm-Ermolli. The enemy was perfectly -well aware of the directions in which we intended to advance.... - -The Russian Armies of the South-Western Front, commanded by General -Gutor, were to strike in the main direction of Kamenetz-Podolsk-Lvov. -The Armies were to move along both banks of the Dniester: General -Erdely's 11th Army in the direction of Zlochev, General Selivatchev's -7th Army towards Brjeczany, and General Kornilov's 8th Army towards -Galitch. In the event of victory we would reach Lvov, break through -between the fronts of Bohm-Ermolli and the Archduke Joseph, and would -drive the latter's left wing to the Carpathians, cutting it off from -all available natural means of communication. The remainder of our -Armies on the South-Western Front were stretched along a broad front -from the river Pripet to Brody for active defence and demonstration. - -On June 16th the guns of the shock troops of the 7th and 11th Army -opened a fire of such intensity as had never been heard before. After -two days of continuous fire, which destroyed the enemy's strong -position, the Russian regiments attacked. The enemy line was broken -between Zvorov and Brjeczany on a front of several miles; we took two -or three fortified lines. On June 19th the attack was renewed on a -front of forty miles, between the Upper Strypa and the Narauvka. In -this heavy and glorious battle the Russian troops took three hundred -officers and eighteen thousand men prisoners in two days, twenty-nine -guns, and other booty. The enemy positions were captured on many -sectors, and we penetrated the enemy lines to an average depth of over -two miles, driving him back to the Strypa in the direction of Zlochev. - -The news of our victory spread all over Russia, evoked universal -rejoicings, and raised the hopes for the revival of the former strength -of the Russian Army. Kerensky reported to the Provisional Government as -follows: "This day is the day of a great triumph for the Revolution. -On June 18th the Russian Revolutionary Army, in very high spirits, -began the advance and has proved before Russia and before the world its -ardent devotion to the cause of the Revolution and its love of Country -and Liberty.... The Russian warriors are inaugurating a new discipline -based upon feelings of a citizen's duty.... An end has been made to-day -of all the vicious calumnies and slander about the organisation of -the Russian Army, which has been rebuilt on Democratic lines...." The -man who wrote these words had afterwards the courage to claim that it -was not he who had destroyed the Army, because he had taken over the -organisation as a fatal inheritance! - -After three days' respite, a violent battle was resumed on the front -of the 11th Army on both sides of the railway line on the front -Batkuv-Koniuchi. By that time the threatened German regiments were -reinforced, and stubborn fighting ensued. The 11th Army captured -several lines, but suffered heavy losses. The trenches changed hands -several times after a hand-to-hand battle, and great efforts had to -be made in order to break the resistance of the enemy, who had been -reinforced and had recovered. This action practically signified the end -of the advance of the 7th and 11th Armies. The impetus was spent and -the troops began once more to sit in the trenches, the monotony of this -pastime being only broken in places by local skirmishes, Austro-German -counter-attacks, and intermittent gunfire. Meanwhile preparations -for the advance began on June 23rd in Kornilov's Army. On June 25th -his troops broke through General Kirchbach's positions west of -Stanislavov and reached the line of Jesupol-Lyssetz. After a stubborn -and sanguinary battle Kirchbach's troops, utterly defeated, ran and -dragged along in their headlong flight the German division which had -been sent to reinforce them. On the 27th General Cheremissov's right -column captured Galitch, some of his troops crossed the Dniester. -On the 28th the left column overcame the stubborn resistance of the -Austro-Germans and captured Kalush. In the next two or three days, the -8th Army was in action on the river Lomnitza and finally established -itself on the banks of the river and in front of it. In the course of -this brilliant operation Kornilov's Army broke through the 3rd Austrian -Army on a front of over twenty miles and captured 150 officers, 10,000 -men, and about 100 guns. The capture of Lomnitza opened to Kornilov the -road to Dolina-Stryi and to the communications of Botmer's Army. German -Headquarters described the position of the Commander-in-Chief of the -Western Front as _critical_. - -General Bohm-Ermolli meanwhile was concentrating all his reserves in -the direction of Zlochev, the point to which the German divisions were -likewise sent which had been taken from the Western European Front. -Some of the reserves had to be sent, however, across the Dniester -against the 8th Russian Army. They arrived on July 2nd, reinforced the -shattered ranks of the 3rd Austrian Army, and from that day positional -battles began on the Lomnitza, with varying success, and occasionally -stubborn fighting. The concentration of the German shock troops between -the Upper Sereth and the railway line Tarnopol-Zlochev was completed -on July 5th. On the next day, after strong artillery preparations, -this group attacked our 11th Army, broke our front and moved swiftly -towards Kamenetz-Podolsk, pursuing the Army Corps of the 11th Army -who were fleeing in panic. The Army Headquarters, the Stavka and the -Press, losing all perspective, blamed the 607th Mlynov Regiment as the -chief cause of the catastrophe. The demoralised, worthless regiment had -left the trenches of their own accord and opened the front. It was, of -course, a very sad occurrence, but it would be naive to describe it -even as an excuse. For as early as on the 9th of July the Committees -and Commissars of the 11th Army were telegraphing to the Provisional -Government: "The truth and nothing but the truth about the events." -"The German offensive on the front of the 11th Army, which began on -July 6th, is growing into an immeasurable calamity which threatens -perhaps the very existence of Revolutionary Russia. The spirit of -the troops, that were prompted to advance by the heroic efforts of -the minority, has undergone a decisive and fatal change. The impetus -of the advance was soon spent. Most of the units are in a condition -of increasing disruption. There is not a shadow of discipline or -obedience; persuasion is likewise powerless and is answered by threats -and sometimes by shootings. Cases have occurred when orders to advance -immediately to reinforce the line were debated for hours at meetings, -and reinforcements were twenty-four hours late. Some units arbitrarily -leave the trenches without even waiting for the enemy to advance.... -For hundreds of miles strings of deserters--healthy, strong men who -thoroughly realise their impunity--are to be seen moving along with -rifles or without.... The country should know the whole truth. It will -shudder and will find the strength to fall with all its might upon -all those whose cowardice is ruining and bartering Russia and the -Revolution." - -The Stavka wrote: "In spite of its enormous numerical and technical -superiority, the 11th Army was retreating uninterruptedly. On the -8th of July it had already reached the Serenth, never halting at the -very strong fortified position to the West of the river, which had -been our starting point in the glorious advance of 1916. Bohm-Ermolli -had detached some of his forces for the pursuit of the Russian -troops in the direction of Tarnapol and had moved his main forces -southwards between the Serenth and the Strypa, threatening to cut off -the communication of the 7th Army, to throw them into the Dniester -and, perhaps, cut off the retreat of the 8th Army. On July 9th the -Austro-Germans had already reached Mikulinze, a distance of one march -south of Tarnapol.... The Armies of General Selivatchev and Cheremissov -(who had succeeded General Kornilov upon the latter's appointment on -July 7th to the High Command of the South-Western Front) were in great -difficulty. They could not hope to resist the enemy by manoeuvring, -and all that was left to them was to escape the enemy's blows by -forced marches. The 7th Army was in particularly dire straits, as it -was retreating under the double pressure of the Army Corps of General -Botmer, who was conducting a frontal attack, and of the troops of -Bohm-Ermolli, striking from the north against the denuded right flank. -The 8th Army had to march over one hundred miles under pressure from -the enemy. - -On July 10th the Austro-Germans advanced to the line -Mikulinze-Podgaitze-Stanilavov. On the 11th the Germans occupied -Tarnapol, abandoned without fighting by the 1st Guards Army Corps. On -the next day they broke through our position on the rivers Gniezno -and Sereth, South of Trembovlia, and developed their advance in the -Eastern and South-Eastern directions. On the same day, pursuing the -7th and 8th Armies, the enemy occupied the line from the Sereth to -Monsaterjisko-Tlumatch. - -On the 12th July, seeing that the position was desperate, the -Commander-in-Chief issued orders for a retreat from the Sereth, and by -the 21st the Armies of the South-Western Front, having cleared Galicia -and Bukovina, reached the Russian frontier. Their retreat was marked -by fires, violence, murders and plunder. A few units, however, fought -the enemy stubbornly and covered the retreat of the maddened mob of -deserters by sacrificing their lives. Among them were Russian officers, -whose bodies covered the battlefields. The Armies were retreating in -disorder; the same Armies that, only a year ago, had captured Lutsk, -Brody-Stanislavov, Chernovetz in their triumphal progress ... were -retreating before the same Austro-German troops that only a year ago -had been completely defeated and had strewn with fugitives the plains -of Volynia, Galicia and Bukovina, leaving hundreds of thousands of -prisoners in our hands. We shall never forget that in Brussilov's -advance of 1916, the 7th, 8th, 9th and 11th Armies took 420,000 -prisoners, 600 guns, 2,500,000 machine guns, etc. Our Allies are not -likely to forget this either; they know full well that the loud echo of -the Galician battle sounded on the Somme and at Goritza. - -The Commissars Savinkov and Filonenko telegraphed to the Provisional -Government: "There is no choice; the traitors must be executed.... -Capital punishment must be meted out to all those who refuse to -sacrifice their lives for their country...." - -In the beginning of July, after the Russian advance had ostensibly -failed, it was decided at Hindenburg's Headquarters to undertake a -new extensive operation against the Roumanian front by a simultaneous -advance of the 3rd and 7th Austrian Armies across Bukovina into -Moldavia and of the Right group of General Mackensen on the Lower -Sereth. The objective was to seize Moldavia and Bessarabia. But on -July 11th the Russian Army of General Ragosa and the Roumanian Army -of General Averesco took the offensive between the rivers Susitsa -and Putna against the 9th Austrian Army. The attack was successful, -the enemy positions were captured, the Armies moved forward several -miles, took 2,000 prisoners and over 60 guns, but the operation was not -developed. Owing to the natural conditions of the theatre of war and -to the direction in which the operation was undertaken, it was more -akin to a demonstration in order to relieve the South-Western Front. -Also the troops of the 4th Russian Army soon lost all impetus for the -advance. In July and until August 4th, the troops of the Archduke -Joseph and of Mackensen attacked in several directions and gained -local successes, but without any appreciable result. Although the -Russian divisions repeatedly disobeyed orders and occasionally left the -trenches during the battle, yet the condition of the Roumanian Front -was somewhat better than that of the other Front, owing to its distance -from Petrograd, to the presence of disciplined Roumanian troops and -to the natural conditions of the country. For these reasons we were -able to keep that Front somewhat longer. This circumstance, together -with the apparent weakness of the Austrian Armies, especially the 3rd -and the 7th, and the complete dislocation of the communications of -Bohm-Ermolli's group and of the Archduke Joseph's left wing--caused -Hindenburg's Headquarters indefinitely to postpone the operation, and -a period of calm ensued along the entire South-Western Front. On the -Roumanian Front local actions were fought until the end of August. -At the same time, German divisions began to move from the Sbrucz -northwards in the direction of Riga. Hindenburg's plan was to deal -the Russian Army local blows, without straining his own resources or -spending large reserves, so urgently needed, on the Western-European -Front. By these tactics he intended to contribute to the natural course -of the collapse of the Russian front, for it was upon this collapse -that the Central Powers based all their calculations in regard to -operations and even in regard to the possibility of continuing the -campaign in 1918. - -Our efforts at advancing on other Fronts also ended in complete -failure. On the 7th of July operations began on the Western Front, -which I commanded. The details will be given in the next chapter. Of -this operation Ludendorf wrote: "Of all the attacks directed against -the former Eastern front of General Eichhorn, the attacks of July 9th, -South of Smorgom, and at Krevo were particularly fierce.... For several -days the position was extremely difficult until our reserves and our -gunfire restored the front. The Russians left our trenches; they were -no longer the Russians of the old days." - -On the Northern Front, in the 5th Army, everything was over in one -day. The Stavka wrote: "South-West of the Dvinsk our troops, after -strong artillery preparation, captured the German position across the -railway Dvinsk-Vilna. Subsequently, entire divisions, without pressure -from the enemy, deliberately retreated to their own trenches." The -Stavka noted the heroic behaviour of several units, the prowess of -the officers and the tremendous losses which the latter had suffered. -This fact, however unimportant from the strategical point of view, -deserves to be specially noted. As a matter of fact, the 5th Army was -commanded by General Danilov (afterwards a member of the Bolshevik -Delegation at Brest-Litovsk. He served in 1920 in the Russian Army in -the Crimea). He enjoyed exceptional prestige with the Revolutionary -Democracy. According to Stankevitch, the Commissar of the Northern -Front, Danilov "was the only General who had remained, in spite of the -Revolution, full master in the Army and had succeeded in so dealing -with the new institutions--the Commissars and the Committees--that -they strengthened his authority instead of weakening it.... He knew -how to make use of these elements, and he overcame all obstacles in a -spirit of complete self-control and firmness. In the 5th Army everyone -was working, learning and being educated.... As the best and the most -cultured elements of the Army were working to that end." This is a -striking proof of the fact that even when the Commanding Officer -becomes thoroughly familiar with Revolutionary institutions, this does -not serve as a guarantee of the fighting capacity of his troops. - - * * * * * - -On July 11th Kornilov, upon his appointment to the Chief Command -of the South-Western Front, sent to the Provisional Government his -well-known telegram, of which he forwarded a copy to the Supreme -Commander-in-Chief. In that telegram, already quoted above, Kornilov -demanded the reintroduction of capital punishment, and wrote: "... -I declare that the country is on the verge of collapse and that, -although I have not been consulted, I _demand_ that the offensive be -stopped on all Fronts in order that the Army may be saved, preserved -and re-organised on the basis of strict discipline, and in order that -the lives may not be sacrificed of a few heroes who are entitled to -see better days." In spite of the peculiar wording of this appeal, the -idea of stopping the advance was immediately accepted by the Supreme -Command, the more so that the operations had practically come to a -standstill irrespective of orders as a result of the reluctance of the -Russian Army to fight and to advance, as well as of the schemes of the -German Headquarters. - -Capital punishment and Revolutionary courts-martial were introduced -at the front. Kornilov gave an order to shoot deserters and robbers -and to expose their bodies with corresponding notices on the roads -and in other prominent places. Special shock battalions were formed -of cadets and volunteers to fight against desertion, plunder and -violence. Kornilov forbade meetings at the Front and gave an order to -stop them by the force of arms. These measures--which were introduced -by Kornilov at his own risk and peril, his manly, straightforward -utterances, and the firm tone in which, disregarding discipline, he -began to address the Provisional Government, and last, but not least, -his resolute action--considerably enhanced his authority with the -wide circles of Liberal Democracy and with the officers. Even the -Revolutionary Democracy within the Army, stunned and depressed as it -was by the tragic turn of events, saw in Kornilov, for some time after -the _debacle_, the last resource and the only possible remedy in the -desperate position. It may be stated that the date of July 8th, on -which Kornilov took command of the South-Western Front and addressed -his first demand to the Provisional Government, sealed his fate: in -the eyes of many people he became a national hero and great hopes were -centred upon him--he was expected to save the country. - -During my stay at Minsk I was not very well informed of the unofficial -tidings prevailing in military circles, yet I felt that the centre -of moral influence had moved to Berditchev (Headquarters of the -South-Western Front). Kerensky and Brussilov had somehow suddenly -receded to the background. A new method of administration was put -into practice: we received from Kornilov's Headquarters copies of -his "demands" or notices of some strong and striking decision he had -adopted, and in a few days these were repeated from Petrograd or from -the Stavka, but in the shape of an order or of a regulation. - -The tragedy of July undoubtedly had a sobering effect upon the men. In -the first place, they were ashamed because things had happened that -were so shameful and so disgraceful that even the dormant conscience -and the deadened spirit of the men could not find excuses for these -happenings. Several months later, in November, after fleeing from -the captivity of Bykhov, I spent several days under an assumed name -and in civilian clothes among the soldiers who had flooded all the -railways. They were discussing the past. I never heard a single man -confessing openly or cynically his participation in the treachery of -July. They all tried to explain away the matter and chiefly attributed -it to somebody's treason, especially, of course, the treason of the -officers. None spoke of his own treachery. In the second place, the men -were frightened. They felt that a kind of power, a kind of authority -had arisen, and they were quietly waiting for developments. Lastly, -operations had ended and nervous tension had been relieved--which -caused a certain reaction, apathy and indifference. _This was the -second occasion (the first took place in March) on which, had the -moment been immediately and properly taken advantage of--it might have -been the turning point in the history of the Russian Revolution._ - -As the sounds were dying out of the last shots fired at the Front, the -men who had been stunned by the disaster began to recover their senses. -Kerensky was the first to return to sanity. The horror had passed away, -the nerve-wrecking, maddening fear which had prompted the issue of -the first stringent order. Kerensky's will-power was dominated by his -fear of the Soviet, of the danger of definitely losing all prestige -with the Revolutionary Democracy by resentment against Kornilov for -the resolute tone of the latter's messages and by the shadow of the -potential dictator. The drafts of military regulations by which it -was intended to restore the power of the Commanding Officers and of -the Army were drowned in red tape and in the turmoil of personal -conflicts, suspicions and hatreds. The Revolutionary Democracy once -again sternly opposed the new course, as it interpreted this course -as an infringement upon the liberties and as a menace to its own -existence. The same attitude was adopted by the Army Committees, whose -powers were to be curtailed as a first step in the proposed changes. In -these circles the new course was described as counter-revolutionary. -The masses of the soldiery, on the other hand, soon appraised the -new situation. They saw that stern words were mere words, that -capital punishment was only a bogy, because there was no real force -capable of mastering their arbitrariness. So fear vanished again. The -hurricane did not clear the close and tense atmosphere. New clouds were -overhanging and peals of a new deafening thunder were to be heard in -the distance. - -[Illustration: General Kornilov's arrival at Petrograd.] - -[Illustration: General Kornilov in the trenches.] - - - - -CHAPTER XXIX. - -THE CONFERENCE AT THE STAVKA OF MINISTERS AND COMMANDERS-IN-CHIEF ON -JULY 16TH. - - -Upon my return from the Front to Minsk I was summoned to the Stavka -at Moghilev, where a Conference was to be held on July 16th. Kerensky -suggested that Brussilov should invite, of his own accord, the -prominent military chiefs, in order to discuss the actual condition -of the Front, the consequences on the July disaster, and to determine -the course of future military policy. It transpired that General -Gourko, who had been invited by Brussilov, had not been admitted to the -Conference by Kerensky. A telegram was sent to Kornilov from the Stavka -saying that, in view of the difficult position of the South-Western -Front, his attendance was impossible, and that he was requested to -present in writing his views on the questions under discussion. It -should be noted that, at that time, on July 14th and 15th, the 11th -Army was in full retreat from the Sereth to the Zbrucz, and that -everyone was anxious to hear whether the 7th Army had succeeded in -crossing the Lower Sereth and the 8th the line of Zalestchiki, thus -avoiding the blows of the German Armies that were trying to cut their -retreat. - -So sad was the plight of the country and the Army that I decided -to disclose to the Conference the full truth on the condition of -the Army in all its hideous nakedness, and in disregard of all -conventionalities. I reported myself to the Supreme Commander-in-Chief. -Brussilov surprised me. He said: "I have come to the conclusion -that this is the limit and we must put the question squarely. All -these Commissars, Committees and Democratisations are driving the -Army and Russia to ruin. I have decided categorically to demand that -they should cease to disorganise the Army. I hope that you will back -me?" I answered that this was in full accord with my intentions and -that the object of my visit was to put the question squarely of the -future destinies of the Army. I must confess that Brussilov's words -reconciled me with him and I therefore decided to eliminate from my -speech all the bitter things which I had intended to say against the -Supreme Command. - -We waited about an hour and a half for the Conference to meet. We -afterwards learnt that a small incident had occurred. The Prime -Minister had not been met at the station either by Brussilov or by his -Chief-of-Staff (General Lukomsky), who had been detained by urgent -military business. Kerensky waited for some time and grew nervous. He -finally sent his _aide-de-camp_ to Brussilov with the order to come to -the station at once and to report. The incident was not commented upon, -but all those who have been in touch with politics know that the actors -on that stage are mere men, with all their weaknesses, and that the -game is often continued behind the curtain. - -The Conference was attended by the Prime Minister Kerensky, the -Foreign Minister Terestchenko, the Supreme C.-in-C. Brussilov, his -Chief-of-Staff General Lukomsky, Generals Alexeiev and Ruzsky, the -C.-in-C. of the Northern Front General Klembovsky, by myself as -C.-in-C. of the Western Front, and by my Chief-of-Staff General Markov, -Admiral Maximov, Generals Velitchko and Romanovsky, the Commissar of -the Western Front Savinkov, and two or three young men of Kerensky's -suite. - -General Brussilov addressed the Conference in a short speech, which -struck me as being very vague and commonplace. In fact, he said nothing -at all. I had hoped that Brussilov would keep his word and would sum up -the situation and draw conclusions. I was mistaken. Brussilov did not -speak again. I opened the discussion. I said: - -"It is with deep emotion and in full consciousness of a grave -responsibility that I am delivering my report to the Conference. I -beg to be excused if I speak as openly and frankly as I have always -done. I was outspoken with the old Autocracy, and intend to be just as -outspoken with the new--the Revolutionary Autocracy. - -"When I took Command of the Front, I found the Armies in a state of -complete disruption. This seemed the more strange that neither in the -reports received at the Stavka or in those I received upon taking -over the Command had the situation been described in such gloomy -colours. The explanation is obvious: as long as the Army Corps were not -conducting active operations, excesses were comparatively few; but no -sooner was the order given for doing the duty of a soldier, for taking -up positions or for the advance, than the instinct of self-preservation -asserted itself and the picture of disruption was unveiled. Some ten -divisions refused to take up positions. All Commanding Officers of -all grades had to work very hard, to argue, to persuade.... In order -to be able to carry out the slightest measure of any importance, it -became imperative to reduce the numbers of mutinous troops. A whole -month was thus lost, although some divisions obeyed orders. Disruption -was rampant in the 2nd Caucasian Corps and in the 169th Infantry -Division. Several units had lost human appearance, not only morally but -physically. I shall never forget the hour which I spent in the 703rd -Suram Regiment. There were up to ten private stills in each regiment; -drunkenness, cardplaying, rioting, plunder and even murder. I took a -drastic step. I sent the 2nd Caucasian Corps (except the 51st Infantry -Division and the 169th Infantry Division) to the rear and ordered them -to be disbanded. Before the operation had developed, I thus lost about -30,000 bayonets without firing a shot. The 28th and 29th Infantry -Divisions, which were considered the best, were sent to occupy the -sector of the Caucasians. What happened? The 29th Division, after a -forced march to its destination, returned on the next day almost in -its entirety (two and a half regiments). The 28th Division sent one -regiment to the trenches, and that regiment passed a resolution against -advancing. Every possible measure was taken in order to raise the -spirit of the troops. The Supreme Commander-in-Chief visited the Front. -From his conversations with the members of Committee and with the -men elected from two Army Corps he gathered the impression that 'the -soldiers were all right, but the Commanding Officers had lost heart.' -That is not so. The Commanding Officers did all they could in extremely -difficult and painful surroundings, but the Supreme Commander-in-Chief -is unaware of the fact that the meeting of the 1st Siberian Corps, -where his speech was most enthusiastically received, continued after -his departure. New speakers came forward and appealed to the men not -to listen to the 'old Bourgeois' (forgive me, that is so.... Brussilov -interjected: "I do not mind") and they heaped vile abuse upon his head. -These appeals were also enthusiastically greeted. The War Minister, who -visited the troops and by his fiery eloquence incited them to deeds -of valour, was enthusiastically received by the 28th Division. Upon -his return to the train he was met by a regimental deputation which -announced that half an hour after the Minister had gone the regiment, -as well as another one, had decided not to advance. The picture was -particularly moving and evoked great enthusiasm when, in the 29th -Division, the Commanding Officer of the Poti Infantry Regiment knelt to -receive the Red Banner. The men swore--there were three speakers and -passionate cheering--to die for the country. On the first day of the -advance the regiment did not reach our trenches, but turned round in a -disgraceful manner and retreated six miles behind the battlefield. - -"The Commissars and the Committee were among the factors which were -meant to give moral support to the troops, but practically contributed -to their demoralisation. Among the Commissars there may have been -favourable exceptions of men who did a certain amount of good without -interfering with other people's business. But the institution itself -cannot fail to contribute to the disruption of the Army because it -implies a dual power, friction and interference uncalled for and -criminal. I am compelled to describe the Commissars of the Western -Front. One of them, for all I know, may be a good and honest man, but -he is an Utopian and not only ignorant of Army life, but of life in -general. He has a great idea of his own importance. In demanding that -the Chief-of-Staff should obey his orders, he declares that he is -entitled to dismiss Commanding Officers, including the General Officer -commanding the Army. In explaining to the troops the extent of his -authority, he thus describes it: 'As the fronts are subordinate to the -War Minister, I am the War Minister for the Western Front.' Another -Commissar, who knows about as much of Army life as the first one, is -a Social Democrat standing somewhere on the verge between Bolshevism -and Menchevism. He is the noted reporter of the Military Section of -the All-Russian Congress of Soviets who has expressed the view that -the Army has not been sufficiently disorganised by the 'Declaration' -and demanded further 'Democratisation.' He claimed the right for the -men to veto appointments of Commanding Officers, insisted upon part -2 of Paragraph 14 of the Declaration which empowered the Commanding -Officers to use arms against cowards and traitors being cancelled, and -upon freedom of speech being granted not only off parade, but on duty. -The 3rd Commissar, who was not a Russian, and who appeared to treat -the Russian soldier with contempt, in addressing the regiment used -such foul language as had never fallen from the Commanding Officers -under the Czar's regime. Curiously enough the conscious and free -Revolutionary warriors accept such treatment as their due and obey him. -That Commissar, according to the Commanding Officers, is undoubtedly -useful. - -"The Committees are another disintegrating force. I do not deny that -some of the Committees have done excellent work, and have done their -best to fulfil their duty. In particular some of their members have -been exceedingly useful, and have rendered their country the supreme -service of dying the death of heroes. But I affirm that the good they -have done will not compensate for the tremendous mischief done to the -Army by the introduction of all these new authorities, by friction, by -interference, and by discrediting the commands. I might quote hundreds -of resolutions bearing that stamp, but will confine myself merely to -the most blatant cases. The struggle for seizing power in the Army is -carried on openly and systematically. The Chairman of the Committee -of the Front has published in his paper an article advocating that -governmental powers be granted to the Committee. The Army Committee of -the 3rd Army has passed the resolution, which to my intense surprise -was endorsed by the Commanding Officer, requesting 'that the Army -Committees be invested with the plenary powers of the War Minister and -of the Central Committee of the Soviets which would entitle them to -act in the name of that Committee.' When the famous 'Declaration' was -discussed opinions varied in the Committee of the Front in regard to -Paragraph 14. Some members wanted the second part to be eliminated; -others demanded that a proviso be added empowering the members of the -Committee of the Front to take the same measures including armed force -against the same persons, and even against the Commanding Officers -themselves. Is that not the limit? In the report of the All-Russian -Congress a demand is formulated for the Soldiers' Committees to be -allowed to cancel appointments of Commanding Officers, and to partake -in the administration of the Army. You must not think that this is -merely theory. Far from it. The Committees endeavour to get hold of -everything, to interfere with purely military questions, with the -routine and the administration. And this is being done in an atmosphere -of complete anarchy caused by wholesale insubordination. - -"Moral preparations for the advance were proceeding apace. On June 8th -the Committee of the Front passed a resolution against the advance, but -changed its mind on the 18th. The Committee of the 2nd Army decided -against the offensive on June 1st, but cancelled its decision on June -20th. In the Minsk Soviet 123 votes against 79 decided against the -advance. All the Committees of the 169th Infantry Division passed -a vote of censure on the Provisional Government, and described the -offensive as "treason to the Revolution." The campaign against the -authorities manifested itself in a series of dismissals of Senior -Commanders, in which the Committees almost invariably participated. -Shortly before the opening of the operations an Army Corps Commander, -the Chief-of-Staff, and a Divisional Commander of the most important -sector occupied by the shock troops, had to resign, and the same -fate was shared by about 60 Commanding Officers, from Army Corps -Commander to Regimental Commander. It is impossible to estimate the -amount of harm done by the Committee. They have no proper discipline -of their own. If the majority passes a reasonable resolution, that -does not suffice. It is put into practice by individual members of -the Committee. Taking advantage of their position as members of Army -Committees, the Bolsheviks have more than once spread mutiny and -rebellion with impunity. As a result, authority is undermined instead -of being strengthened, because so many different individuals and -institutions are supposed to exercise that authority. And the Commander -in the Field, who is being discredited, dismissed, controlled and -watched from all sides, is nevertheless expected to lead the troops -into action with a strong hand. Such was the moral preparation. The -troops have not yet been deployed. But the South-Western Front required -immediate assistance. The enemy had already removed from my Front to -the South-West three or four divisions. I decided to attack with the -troops which presented at least a semblance of loyalty. In three days -our guns had smashed the enemy trenches and wrought havoc among them, -had inflicted heavy losses among the Germans, and had opened the way -for our infantry. The first line had been almost entirely broken, and -our men had already visited the enemy batteries. That breach of the -Front promised to develop into a great victory, for which we had been -hoping for so long.... I now revert to descriptions of the battle. -'The units of the 28th Infantry Division took up their positions only -four hours before the attack; of the 109th Regiment only two and a -half companies, with four machine-guns and 30 officers, reached the -appointed line; only one-half of the 110th came up. Two battalions of -the 111th Regiment, who had occupied the defiles, refused to advance; -men of the 112th Regiment retired to the rear in batches. Units of -the 28th Division were met by a strong artillery fire, machine-gun -and rifle fire, and remained behind their barbed wire, as they were -incapable of advancing. Only a few shock troops and volunteers of the -Volga Regiment, with a company of officers, succeeded in capturing the -first line, but the fire was so strong that they failed to keep the -position, and towards the afternoon units of the 29th Division returned -to their original lines after suffering heavy losses, especially -in officers. On the sector of the 51st Division the attack began -at five minutes past seven. The 202nd Gori Regiment and the 204th -Ardagan-Michailovsky Regiment, as well as two companies of the Sukhum -Regiment, with a shock company of the Poti Regiment, made a dash across -two lines of trenches, bayoneted the enemy, and began to storm the -third line at half-past seven. The break was so rapid and so unexpected -that the enemy failed to establish a barrage. The 201st Poti Regiment, -which was following the advance troops, approached our first line of -trenches, but refused to go any further, so that our troops who had -broken through were not reinforced in time. The units of the 134th -Division, which followed, could not carry out their orders because the -men of the Poti Regiment had crowded in the trenches, while the enemy -had opened a very strong gun fire. These units, therefore, partly -dispersed and partly lay in our trenches. Seeing that no reinforcements -were forthcoming from the rear and from the flanks, the men of the Gori -and Ardagan Regiments lost heart, and some of the companies, in which -all the officers had been killed, began to retire. They were followed -by the remainder of the troops without, however, any pressure from the -Germans, who did not put their batteries and machine-guns into action -until the retreat had begun.... The units of the 29th Division were -late in going into position, because the men advanced reluctantly, -as their mood had changed. A quarter of an hour before the appointed -time the 114th Regiment on the right flank refused to advance, and -the Erivan Regiment had to be drawn up from the Army Corps Reserves. -For some unknown reason the 113th and 116th Regiments also failed -to move.... After this failure desertion began to grow, and at dawn -became general. The men were tired, nervous; they had lost the habit of -fighting, and were unaccustomed to the roar of the guns owing to long -months of inactivity, of fraternisation, and of meetings. They left the -trenches _en masse_, they abandoned the machine-guns and retired to the -rear.... _The Headquarters of the 20th Army Corps sent the following -report of the battle: 'The cowardice and lack of discipline in certain -units reached such a pitch that the Commanding Officers were compelled -to ask our artillery to cease firing, because the fire of our own guns -caused a panic among our soldiers.'_ - -"I will quote another description of the battle made by an Army Corps -Commander who took command on the eve of battle, and whose impressions -are therefore totally unbiassed: '... Everything was ready for the -advance: the plan had been worked out in detail; we had a powerful and -efficient artillery; the weather was favourable because it did not -allow the Germans to take advantage of their superiority in aircraft; -we had superior numbers, our Reserves were drawn up in time, we had -plenty of ammunition, and the sector was well chosen for the advance, -because we were in a position to conceal strong artillery forces in -the close neighbourhood of our trenches. The undulations of ground -also afforded many hidden approaches to the Front; the distance -between ourselves and the enemy was small, and there were no natural -obstacles between us which would have had to have been forced under -fire. Finally, the troops had been prepared by the Committees, the -Commanding Officers and the War Minister, Kerensky, and their efforts -induced the troops to take the first, the most arduous steps. We -attained considerable success without suffering appreciable losses. -Three fortified lines had been broken through and occupied, and there -remained only separate defensive positions. The fighting might soon -have reached the phase of bayonet fighting; the enemy artillery was -silenced, over 1,400 Germans, many machine-guns and other booty had -been captured. Also, our guns had inflicted heavy casualties in killed -and wounded upon the enemy, and it may be confidently stated that -the forces that were opposing our Corps had been temporarily knocked -out. Along the entire front of our Corps only three or four enemy -batteries and occasionally three or four machine-guns were firing, and -there were isolated rifle shots. But--night came. Immediately I began -to receive anxious reports from officers commanding sectors at the -Front to the effect that the men were abandoning the unattacked Front -Line _en masse_, entire companies deserting. It was stated in some of -the reports that the firing line in places was only occupied by the -Commanding Officer, his staff, and a few men. The operations ended in -an irretrievable and hopeless failure. In one day we had lived through -the joy of victory, which had been won in spite of the low spirits -of the men, as well as the horror of seeing the fruits of victory -deliberately cast away by the soldiery. And yet the country needed that -victory for its very life. I realised that we, the Commanding Officers, -are powerless to alter the elemental psychology of the men, and I wept -long and bitterly.' - -"This inglorious operation, however, resulted in serious losses, which -it is now difficult to estimate, as crowds of fugitives returned daily. -Over 20,000 wounded men have already passed through sorting stations -in the rear. I will refrain at present from drawing any conclusion, -but the percentage of various kinds of wounds is symptomatic: 10 per -cent. heavily wounded, 30 per cent. finger and wrist wounds, 40 per -cent. light wounds from which bandages were not removed at the dressing -stations (many wounds were probably simulated), and 20 per cent. -bruised and sick. Such was the end of the operation. I have never yet -gone into battle with such superiority in numbers and technical means. -Never had the conditions been more full of such brilliant promise. -On a front of about 14 miles I had 184 battalions against 29 enemy -battalions; 900 guns against 300 German: 138 of my battalions came -into action against 17 German battalions of the 1st line. All that was -wasted. Reports from various Commanders indicate that the temper of -the troops immediately after the operation was just as indefinite as -before. Three days ago I summoned the Army Commanders and addressed to -them the question: 'Could their Armies resist a strong enemy attack, -provided reserves were forthcoming?' The answer was in the negative. -'Could the Armies resist an organised German offensive in their present -condition, numerical and technical?' Two of the Army Commanders gave -indefinite replies, and the Commanding Officer of the 10th Army -answered in the affirmative. They all said: 'We have no infantry.' I -will go further, and I will say: - -"_We have no Army. It is necessary immediately, and at all costs to -create that Army._ The new Government regulations, which are supposed -to raise the spirit of the Army, have not yet penetrated into its -depths, and the impression they have produced cannot yet be defined. -One thing is certain--that repression alone cannot drag the Army out of -the morass into which it has fallen. It is repeated every day that the -Bolsheviks have caused the disruption of the Army, but I disagree. It -is not so. The Army has been disrupted by others, and the Bolsheviks -are like worms which have bred in the wounds of the Army. The Army has -been disrupted by the regulations of the last four months, and it is -the bitter irony of fate that this has been done by men who, however -honest and idealistic, are unaware of the historical laws governing -the existence of the Army, of its life and routine. At first this was -done under pressure from the Soviet, which was primarily an Anarchist -institution. Later it developed into a fatal, mistaken policy. Soon -after the War Minister had taken up his duties he said to me: 'The -process of revolutionising the country and the Army has been completed. -Now we must proceed with creative work....' I ventured to reply: 'The -process is completed, but it is too late.'" - -General Brussilov here interrupted me, and asked me to curtail my -Report, as the Conference would otherwise be too protracted. I realised -that the length of the Report was not what mattered, but it was its -risky substance, and I replied: "I consider that this question is of -paramount importance, and request that I be allowed to complete my -statement, otherwise I shall have to cease speaking." A silence ensued, -which I interpreted as a permission to continue. - -I then proceeded: "The Declaration of the Soldiers' Rights has been -issued. Every one of the Commanding Officers has stated that it would -bring about the ruin of the Army. The late Supreme C.-in-C., General -Alexeiev, telegraphed that the Declaration was the last nail which was -being driven into the coffin prepared for the Russian Army. The present -Supreme C.-in-C., when in command of the South-Western Front, declared -here, at Moghilev, at the Conference of Commanders-in-Chief, that -the Army may yet be saved and may advance, but on one condition--if -the Declaration is not issued. Our advice, however, was unheeded. -Paragraph 3 of the Declaration authorises free and open expressions -of political, religious, social, and other views. The Army was thus -flooded by politics. When the men of the 2nd Caucasian Grenadier -Division were disbanded they were quite sincerely puzzled. 'What is -the reason? We were allowed to speak whenever and whatever we wished, -and now we are being disbanded....' You must not think that such a -broad interpretation of the 'Liberties' is confined to the illiterate -masses. When the 169th Infantry Division was morally disrupted, and -all the Committees of that Division passed a vote of censure upon -the Provisional Government and categorically refused to advance, I -disbanded the Division. But there arose an unexpected complication: the -Commissars came to the conclusion that no crime had been committed, -because the spoken and the written word were unrestricted. The only -thing that could be incriminated was direct disobedience of Army -orders.... Paragraph 6 stipulates that all literature should be -delivered to the addressees, and the Army was flooded with criminal -Bolshevik and Defeatist literature. The stuff upon which our Army was -fed--and apparently at the expense of Government funds and of the -people's treasure--can be gauged from the report of the Moscow Military -Bureau, which alone supplied to the Front the following publications: - -From March 24th to May 1st-- - - 7,972 copies of the _Pravda_ - 2,000 " " _Soldiers' Pravda_ - 30,375 " " _Social Democrat_ - -From May 1st to June 11th-- - - 61,522 copies of the _Soldiers' Pravda_ - 32,711 " " _Social Democrat_ - 6,999 " " _Pravda_ - -and so on. The same kind of literature was sent to the villages by the -soldiers. - -"Paragraph 14 stipulates that no soldier can be punished without -a trial. Of course, this liberty applied only to the men, because -the officers continued to suffer the heaviest penalty of dismissal. -What was the result? The Central Military Justice Administration, -without reference to the Stavka and in view of the impending -Democratisation of the Courts, suggested that the latter should -suspend their activities, except for cases of special importance, -such, for example, as treason. The Commanding Officers were deprived -of disciplinary powers. Disciplinary Courts were partly inactive, -partly were boycotted. Justice completely disappeared from the Army. -This boycott of Disciplinary Court and reports on the reluctance of -certain units to elect juries are symptomatic. The legislator may come -across the same phenomenon in respect of the new Revolutionary Military -Courts, in which juries may also have to be replaced by appointed -judges. As a result of a series of legislative measures, authority -and discipline have been eliminated, the officers are dishonoured, -distrusted, and openly scorned. Generals in High Command, not excluding -Commanders-in-Chief, are being dismissed like domestic servants. In one -of his speeches at the Northern Front the War Minister inadvertently -uttered the following significant words: 'It lies within my power -to dismiss the entire personnel of the High Command in twenty-four -hours, and the Army would not object.' In the speeches addressed to -the Western Front it was said that 'in the Czarist Army we were driven -into battle with whips and machine-guns ... that Czarist Commanders -led us to slaughter, but now every drop of our blood is precious....' -I, the Commander-in-Chief, stood by the platform erected for the War -Minister, and I was heart-broken. My conscience whispered to me: -'That is a lie. My "Iron" Rifles, only eight battalions and then -twelve, took over 60,000 prisoners and 43 guns.... I have never driven -them into battle with machine-guns. I have never led my troops to -slaughter at Mezolaborch, Lutovisko, Lutsk, Chartoriisk.' To the late -Commander-in-Chief of the South-Western Front these names are indeed -familiar.... - -"Everything may be forgiven and we can stand a great deal if it is -necessary for victory, if the troops can regain their spirit and can -be induced to advance.... I will venture to draw a comparison. Sokolov -and other Petrograd delegates came to our front, to the 703rd Suram -Regiment. He came with the noble object of combating dark ignorance and -moral decrepitude, which were particularly apparent in that regiment. -He was mercilessly flogged. We were, of course, revolted against that -crowd of savage scoundrels, and everyone was perturbed. All kinds of -committees passed votes of censure. The War Minister condemned the -behaviour of the Suram Regiment in fiery speeches and Army orders, and -sent a telegram of sympathy to Sokolov. - -"And here is another story. I well remember January, 1915, near -Lutovisko. There was a heavy frost. Colonel Noskov, the gallant -one-armed hero, up to the waist in snow, was leading his regiment to -the attack under a heavy fire against the steep and impregnable slopes -of Height 804.... Death spared him then. And now two companies came, -asked for General Noskov, surrounded him, killed him and went away. -I ask the War Minister, did he condemn these foul murderers with the -whole might of his fiery eloquence, of his wrath and of his power, and -did he send a telegram of sympathy to the hapless family of the fallen -hero? - -"When we were deprived of power and authority, when the term -'Commanding Officer' was sterilised, we have once again been insulted -by a telegram from the Stavka to the effect that: 'Commanding Officers -who will now hesitate to apply armed force will be dismissed and -tried.' No, gentlemen, you will not intimidate those who are ready to -lose their lives in the service of their country. - -"The senior Commanding Officers may now be divided into three -categories: some of them disregarding the hardships of life and service -with a broken heart, are doing their duty devotedly to the end; others -have lost heart and are following the tide; the third are curiously -brandishing the Red Flag, and mindful of the traditions of the Tartar -captivity, are crawling before new gods of the Revolution as they -crawled before the Czars. It causes me infinite pain to mention the -question of the Officers.... It is a nightmare, and I will be brief. -When Sokolov became familiar with the Army, he said: 'I could not -imagine that your officers could be such martyrs. I take off my hat to -them.' Yes, in the darkest days of Czarist autocracy, the police and -the gendarmerie never subjected the would-be criminal to such moral -torture and derision as the officers have to endure at present from -the illiterate masses, led by the scum of the Revolution. Officers -who are giving their lives for the country. They are insulted at -every turn. They are beaten. Yes, beaten. But they will not come and -complain to you. They are ashamed, dreadfully ashamed. Alone, in their -dug-outs, many of them are silently weeping over their dismal fate. No -wonder many officers consider that the best solution is to be killed -in action. Listen to the subdued and placid tragedy of the following -words which occur in a Field Report: 'In vain did the officers marching -in front try to lead the men into action. At that a moment a white -flag was raised on Redoubt No. 3. Fifteen officers and a small batch -of soldiers then went forward. Their fate is unknown--they did not -return.' (38th Corps). May these heroes rest in peace and their blood -be upon the heads of their conscious and unconscious executioners. - -"The Army is falling to pieces. Heroic measures are needed for its -salvation: (1) The Provisional Government should recognise its mistakes -and its guilt, as it has not understood and estimated the noble and -sincere impulse of the officers who had greeted the news of the -Revolution with joy, and had sacrificed innumerable lives for their -country. (2) Petrograd, entirely detached from the Army, and ignorant -of its life and of the historical foundations of its existence, should -cease to enact military regulations. Full power must be given to the -Supreme Commander-in-Chief, who should be responsible only to the -Provisional Government. (3) Politics must disappear from the Army. (4) -The 'Declaration' must be rescinded in its fundamentals. Commissars -and Committees must be abolished, and the functions of the latter must -gradually be altered. (5) Commanding Officers must be restored to -power. Discipline and the outward form of order and good conduct must -likewise be restored. (6) Appointments to prominent posts must be made -not only according to the standard of youth and strength, but also of -experience in the field and in administration. (7) Special law-abiding -units of all arms must be placed at the disposal of Commanding Officers -as a bulwark against mutiny, and against the horrors of possible -demobilisation. (8) Military Revolutionary Courts must be established -and capital punishment introduced in the rear for the troops and for -civilians guilty of the same crimes. - -"If you ask me whether these measures are likely to produce good -results, I will answer frankly: Yes, but not at once. It is easy to -destroy the Army, but time is needed for its reconstruction. The -measures I suggest would at least lay the foundations for the creation -of a strong Army. In spite of the disruption of the Army, we must -continue the struggle, however arduous it may be, and we must even be -prepared to retreat into the depths of the country. Our Allies should -not count upon immediate relief through our advance. Even in retreating -and remaining on the defensive, we are drawing upon us enormous enemy -forces, which, were they relieved, would be sent to the Western Front -and would crush the Allies and then turn against us. Upon this new -Calvary the Russian people and the Russian Army may yet shed rivers -of blood and endure privations and misfortunes. But at the end of the -Calvary a bright future is in store. - -"There is another way. The way of treason. It would give a respite -to our martyred country.... But the curse of treachery cannot give -us happiness. At the end of that path there is political, moral and -economic slavery. The destinies of the country are in the hands of the -Army. I now appeal to the Provisional Government represented here by -two Ministers: - -"You must lead Russia towards truth and enlightenment under the banner -of Liberty, but you must give us a real chance of leading the troops in -the name of that same Liberty under our old banners. You need have no -fear. The name of the autocrat has been removed from these banners as -well as from our hearts. It is no longer there. But there is a Mother -Country; there is a sea of blood; and there is the glory of our former -victories. You have trampled that banner into the dust. The time has -now come. Raise the banners and bow to them if your conscience is still -within you." - - * * * * * - -I had finished. Kerensky rose, shook hands with me, and said: "Thank -you, General, for your outspoken and sincere speech." - -In the evidence which Kerensky subsequently gave to the High -Commission for the investigation of Kornilov's movement, the Prime -Minister explained this gesture by the fact that he approved, not of -the contents of my speech, but of my courage, and that he wished to -emphasise his respect for every independent opinion, albeit entirely -divergent from the views of the Provisional Government. In substance, -according to Kerensky, "General Deniken had for the first time drawn -a plan for the Revanche--that music of the future military reaction." -There is in these words a deep misinterpretation. We had not forgotten -the Galician retreat of 1915 or its causes, but, at the same time, -we could not forgive Kalush and Tarnopol in 1917. It was our duty, -our right, and our moral obligation not to wish for either of these -contingencies. I was followed by General Klembovsky. I had left the -Assembly, and only heard the end of his speech. He described the -condition of his Front in terms almost identical to mine, with great -restraint, and came to a conclusion that could only have been prompted -by deep despair: he suggested that power should be vested at the Front -in a kind of peculiar triumvirate consisting of the Commander-in-Chief, -a Commissar, and an elected soldier.... - -General Alexeiev was unwell, spoke briefly, described the condition -of the rear, of the reserves and garrison troops, and endorsed the -suggestions I had made. - -General Ruzsky, who had been undergoing a protracted cure in the -Caucasus, and was therefore out of touch with the Army, analysed the -situation such as it appeared to him from the speeches that had been -made. He quoted a series of historical comparisons between the old -Army and the new Revolutionary one with such emphasis and bluntness -that Kerensky, in replying, accused Ruzsky of advocating the return to -Czarist autocracy. The new men were unable to understand the passionate -grief of an old soldier for the Army. Kerensky was probably unaware of -the fact that Ruzsky had been repudiated, and also passionately accused -by the Reactionary circles of the opposite crime, for the part which he -had played in the Emperor's abdication. - -A telegram was read from General Kornilov, urging that capital -punishment should be introduced in the rear, chiefly in order to cope -with the licentious bands of Reservists; that disciplinary powers -should be vested in the Commanding Officers; that the competence of -the Army Committees should be restricted and their responsibilities -fixed; that meetings should be prohibited as well as anti-national -propaganda, and visits to the Front prohibited to various delegations -and agitators. All this was practically implied in my programme, but -under another shape, and was described as "military reaction." But -Kornilov had other suggestions. He advocated that Commissars should -be introduced into the Army Corps and given the right to confirm the -verdicts of the Military Revolutionary Tribunals, as well as to effect -a "cleansing" of the commanding staffs. This last proposal impressed -Kerensky by its "breadth and depth of vision"--greater than those which -emanated from the "old wiseacres," whom he considered intoxicated "with -the wine of hate...." There was an obvious misunderstanding, because -Kornilov's "cleansing" was not intended against the men of solid -military traditions (mistakenly identified with Monarchist Reaction), -but against the hirelings of the Revolution--unprincipled men, deprived -of will-power and of the capacity of taking the responsibility upon -their own shoulders. - -Savinkov, the Commissar of the South-Western Front, also spoke, -expressing his own views only. He agreed with the general description -of the Front which we had given, and pointed out that it is not the -fault of the Revolutionary Democracy that the soldiery of the old -regime is still distrustful of their Commanding Officers; that all is -not well with the latter from the military and political points of -view, and that the main object of the new Revolutionary institutions -was to restore normal relations between these two elements of the Army. - -Kerensky made the closing speech of the Conference. He tried to -justify himself--spoke of the elemental character of the inevitable -"Democratisation" of the Army. He blamed us for seeing in the -Revolution, and in its influence upon the Russian soldier, the only -cause of the _debacle_ of July, and he severely condemned the old -regime. Finally, he gave us no definite directions for future work. -The members of the Conference dispersed with a heavy feeling of mutual -misunderstanding. I was also discouraged, but at the bottom of my heart -I was pleased to think--alas! I was mistaken--that our voices had been -heeded. My hopes were confirmed by a letter from Kornilov which I -received soon after his appointment to the Supreme Command: - -"I have read the Report you made at the Stavka on July 16th with deep -and sincere satisfaction. I would sign such a Report with both hands; -I take off my hat to you, and I am lost in admiration before your -firmness and courage. I firmly believe that, with the help of the -Almighty, we will succeed in accomplishing the task of reconstructing -our beloved Army and of restoring its fighting power." - -Fate has, indeed, cruelly derided our hopes! - - - - -CHAPTER XXX. - -GENERAL KORNILOV. - - -Two days after the Moghilev Conference General Brussilov was relieved -of the Supreme Command. The attempt to give the leadership of the -Russian Armies to a person who had not only given proof of the most -complete loyalty to the Provisional Government, but had evinced -sympathy with its reforms, had failed. A leader had been superseded, -who, on assuming the Supreme Command, gave utterance to the following: - -"I am the leader of the Revolutionary Army, appointed to this -responsible post by the people in revolution and the Provisional -Government, in agreement with the Petrograd Soviet of Workmen's and -Soldiers' Delegates. I was the first to go over to the people, serve -the people. I will continue to serve them, will never desert them."[51] - -Kerensky, in his evidence before the Commission of Inquiry, explained -Brussilov's dismissal by the catastrophal condition of the Front, by -the possible development of the German offensive, the absence of a firm -hand at the front, and of a definite plan; by Brussilov's inability to -evaluate and forestall the complications of the military situation, and -lastly, by his lack of influence over both officers and men. - -Be it as it may, General Brussilov's retirement from the pages of -military history can in no wise be regarded as a simple episode of -an administrative character. _It marks a clear recognition by the -Government of the wreck of its entire military policy._ - -On July 19th, by an Order of the Provisional Government, Lavr -Georgievich Kornilov, General of Infantry, was appointed to the post of -Supreme Commander-in-Chief. - -[Map: The Russian Front in June and July, 1917] - -In Chapter VII. I spoke of my meeting with Kornilov, then -Commander-in-Chief of the Petrograd district. The whole meaning of his -occupation of this post lay in the chance of bringing the Petrograd -garrison to a sense of duty and subordination. This Kornilov failed to -accomplish. A fighting General who carried fighting men with him by -his courage, coolness, and contempt of death, had nothing in common -with that mob of idlers and hucksters into which the Petrograd garrison -had been transformed. His sombre figure, his dry speech, only at -times softened by sincere feeling, and above all, its tenour so far -removed from the bewildering slogans of the Revolution, so simple in -its profession of a soldier's faith--could neither fire nor inspire -the Petrograd soldiery. Inexperienced in political chicanery, by -profession alien to those methods of political warfare which had been -developed by the joint efforts of the bureaucracy, party sectarianism, -and the revolutionary underworld, Kornilov, as Commander-in-Chief of -the Petrograd district, could neither influence the Government nor -impress the Soviet, which, without any cause, distrusted him from the -very beginning. Kornilov would have managed to suppress the Petrograd -praetorians, even if he had perished in doing so, but he could not -attract them to himself. - -He felt that the Petrograd atmosphere did not suit him, and when on -April 21st, the Executive Committee of the Soviet, after the first -Bolshevist attacks, passed a resolution that no military unit could -leave barracks in arms without the permission of the Committee, it -was totally impossible for Kornilov to remain at a post which gave no -rights and imposed enormous responsibilities. - -There was yet another reason: the Commander-in-Chief of the Petrograd -district was subordinated, not to the Stavka, but to the Minister of -War. Gutchkov had left that post on April 30th, and Kornilov did not -wish to remain under Kerensky, the vice-president of the Petrograd -Soviet. - -[Map: The Russian Front till August 19th and after] - -The position of the Petrograd garrison and command was so incongruous -that this painful problem had to be solved by artificial measures. On -Kornilov's initiative, and with General Alexeiev's full approval, the -Stavka, in conjunction with the Headquarters of the Petrograd District, -drew up a scheme for the organisation of the Petrograd Front, covering -the approaches to the capital through Finland and the Finnish Gulf. -This Front was to include the troops in Finland and Kronstadt, on -the coast, of the Reval fortified region and the Petrograd garrison, -the depot battalions of which it was proposed to expand into active -regiments and form into brigades; the inclusion of the Baltic Fleet was -likewise probable. Such an organisation--logical from a strategical -point of view, especially in connection with the information received -of the reinforcement of the German Front on the line of advance on -Petrograd--gave the Commander-in-Chief the legal right to alter the -dispositions to relieve the troops at the front and behind, etc. I -do not know whether this would have really made it possible to free -Petrograd from the garrison which had become a veritable scourge to -the Capital, the Provisional Government, and even (in September) -to the non-Bolshevist sections of the Soviet. The Government -most thoughtlessly bound itself by a promise, given in its first -declaration, that "the troops which had taken part in the revolutionary -movement should not be either disarmed or moved from Petrograd." - -This plan, however, naturally failed on Kornilov's departure, as -his successors, appointed one after another by Kerensky, were of -such an indefinite political character, and so deficient in military -experience, that it was impossible to place them at the head of so -large a military force. - -At the end of April, just before his retirement, Gutchkov wished to -make Kornilov Commander-in-Chief of the Northern Front, a post which -had become vacant after General Ruzsky's dismissal. General Alexeiev -and I were at the Conference with Thomas and the French military -representatives, when I was called up to the telegraph instrument to -talk with the Minister of War. As General Alexeiev remained at the -meeting, and Gutchkov was ill in bed, the negotiations, in which I -acted as an intermediary, were exceedingly difficult to carry on, both -technically and because, in view of the indirect transmission, it was -necessary to speak somewhat guardedly. Gutchkov insisted, Alexeiev -refused. No less than six times did I transmit their replies, which -were at first reserved and then more heated. - -Gutchkov spoke of the difficulty of managing the Northern Front, which -was the most unruly, and of the need of a firm hand there. He said -that it was desirable to retain Kornilov in the immediate vicinity of -Petrograd, in view of future political possibilities. Alexeiev refused -flatly. He said nothing about "political possibilities," basing his -refusal on the grounds of Kornilov's inadequate service qualifications -for command, and the awkwardness of passing over Senior Commanders -more experienced and acquainted with the Front, such as General Abram -Dragomirov, for instance. Nevertheless, when the next day an official -telegram arrived from the Ministry in connection with Kornilov's -appointment, Alexeiev replied that he was uncompromisingly against -it, and that if the appointment were made in spite of this, he would -immediately send in his resignation. - -Never had the Supreme Commander-in-Chief been so inflexible in his -communications with Petrograd. Some persons, including Kornilov himself -(as he confessed to me afterwards), involuntarily gained the impression -that the question was a somewhat wider basis one than that of the -appointment of the Commander-in-Chief ... that the fear of a future -dictator played a certain part. However, this supposition is flatly -contradicted by placing this episode in conjunction with the fact that -the Petrograd Front was created for Kornilov--a fact that was of no -less importance and fraught with possibilities. - -In the beginning of May Kornilov took over the 8th Army on -the South-Western Front. General Dragomirov was appointed -Commander-in-Chief of the Northern Front. - -This is the second event which gives the key to the understanding of -the subsequent relations between Alexeiev and Kornilov. - -According to Kornilov, the 8th Army was in a state of complete -disintegration when he assumed command. "For two months," says he, "I -had to visit the units nearly every day and personally explain to the -soldiers the necessity for discipline, encourage the officers, and -urge upon the troops the necessity of an advance.... Here I became -convinced that firm language from the Commander and definite action -were necessary in order to arrest the disintegration of our Army. I -understood that such language was expected both by the officers and the -men, the more reasonable of whom were already tired of the complete -anarchy...." - -Under what conditions Kornilov made his rounds we have already shown -in Chapter XXIII. I hardly think that he managed to arouse the mass -of soldiers to consciousness. The Kalush of June 28th and the Kalush -of July 8th show the 8th Army equally as heroes and as beasts. The -officers and a small part of the real soldiers, however, were more -than ever under the spell of Kornilov's personality. Its power -increased among the non-Socialistic sections of the Russian public -likewise. When, after the rout of July 6th, General Gutor--who had been -appointed to the highly responsible post of Commander-in-Chief of the -South-Western Front, merely not to resist the democratisation of the -Army--yielded to despair and collapsed, there was no one to replace -him except Kornilov (on the night of July 8th).... The spectre of the -"General on a White Horse" was already looming in sight and disturbing -the spiritual peace of many. - -Brussilov was strongly opposed to this appointment. Kerensky hesitated -for a moment. The position, however, was catastrophical. Kornilov -was bold, courageous, stern, resolute and independent, and would -never hesitate to show initiative or to undertake any responsibility -if circumstances required it. Kerensky was of the opinion[52] that -Kornilov's downright qualities, though dangerous in case of success, -would be only too useful in case of a panic-stricken retreat. And "when -the Moor has done his work, let the Moor go...." So Kerensky insisted -on Kornilov's appointment as Commander-in-Chief of the South-Western -Front. - -On the third day after taking over his duties, Kornilov wired to the -Provisional Government: "I declare that if the Government does not -confirm the measures proposed by me, and deprives me of the only means -of saving the Army and of using it for its real purpose of defending -the Motherland and liberty, then I, General Kornilov, will of my own -accord lay down my authority as Commander-in-Chief...." - -A series of political telegrams from Kornilov produced a profound -impression on the country, and inspired some with fear, some with hate, -and others with hope. Kerensky hesitated, but what about the support -of the Commissars and Committees? The tranquilisation and reduction -to order of the South-Western Front attained, among other means, by -Kornilov's bold, resolute struggle against the Army Bolsheviks? The -oppressive isolation felt by the Minister of War after the conference -of July 16th? The uselessness of retaining Brussilov as Supreme -Commander-in-Chief and the hopelessness of placing at the head of the -Army Generals of the new type, as shown by the experiment of appointing -Brussilov and Gutor? Savinkov's persistent advice? Such were the -reasons which forced Kerensky--who fully recognised the inevitability -of the coming collision with the man who repudiated his military policy -with every fibre of his soul--to decide on the appointment of Kornilov -to the post of Supreme Commander-in-Chief. There is not the slightest -doubt that Kerensky did this in a fit of despair. Probably it was the -same feeling of fatality that induced him to appoint Savinkov acting -Minister of War. - -The collisions occurred sooner than might have been expected. On -receiving the order for his appointment, Kornilov at once sent the -Provisional Government a telegram "reporting" that he could accept -command and "lead the nation to victory and to the prospect of a just -and honourable peace only on the following conditions: - - "(1) Responsibility to his own conscience and to the whole nation. - - "(2) Complete non-interference with his orders relating to military - operations and, therefore, with the appointment of the Higher - Command. - - "(3) The application of the measures recently introduced at the - Front to all places in the rear where drafts for the Army were - quartered. - - "(4) Acceptance of his proposals telegraphed to the Conference at - the Stavka on July 16th." - -When in due course I read this telegram in the newspapers, I was not -a little surprised at the first condition, which established a highly -original form of suzerainty on the part of the Supreme Command until -the convocation of the Constituent Assembly. I waited impatiently for -the official reply. There was none. As it turned out, on receiving -Kornilov's ultimatum, the Council of the Government hotly debated -the matter, and Kerensky demanded that the prestige of the High -Command should be upheld by the immediate removal of the new Supreme -Commander-in-Chief. The Government did not agree to this, and Kerensky, -ignoring the other points mentioned in the telegram, replied only to -the second, by recognising the right of the Supreme Commander-in-Chief -to select his own direct assistants. - -Diverging from the established procedure of appointments, the -Government, simultaneously with Kornilov's appointment and without -his knowledge, issued an order appointing General Cheremissov -Commander-in-Chief of the South-Western Front. Kornilov regarded this -as a complete violation of his rights, and sent another ultimatum, -declaring that he could continue to hold Supreme Command only on -condition of Cheremissov's immediate removal. He declined to go -to Moghilev before this question was settled. Cheremissov, on his -part, was very "nervy," and threatened to "bomb his way" into Front -Headquarters and to establish his rights as Commander-in-Chief. - -This complicated matters still further, and Kornilov reported by -wire[53] to Petrograd that, in his opinion, it would be more regular -to dismiss Cheremissov. "For the purpose of strengthening discipline -in the Army, we decided to take severe measures with the soldiers; the -same measures must likewise apply to the higher military commanders." - -The Revolution had upset all mutual relations and the very essence -of discipline. As a soldier, I was bound to see in all this the -undermining of the authority of the Provisional Government (if such -existed), and I could not but recognise that it was both the right and -the duty of the Government to make everyone respect its authority. - -As a chronicler, however, I must add that the military leaders had no -other means of stopping this disintegration of the Army, proceeding -from above. And had the Government actually possessed the power, and -in full panoply of right and might had been able to assert itself, -there would have been no ultimatums either from the Soviet or from the -military leaders. Furthermore, there would have been no need for the -events of the 27th of August, and those of the 25th of October would -have been impossible. - -The matter finally resolved itself into the arrival of Commissar -Filonenko at Front Headquarters. He informed Kornilov that all his -recommendations had been accepted by the Government, in principle, -while Cheremissov was placed at the disposal of the Provisional -Government. General Balnev was hastily, at random, selected to command -the South-Western Front, and Kornilov assumed the Supreme Command on -the 27th of July. - -The spectre of the "General on the White Horse" became more and more -clearly visible. And the eyes of many, suffering at the sight of the -madness and the shame now engulfing Russia, were again and again -turned to this spectre. Honest and dishonest, sincere and insincere, -politicians, soldiers and adventurers, all turned to it. And all with -one voice cried out, "Save Us!" - -He, the stern and straightforward soldier, deeply patriotic, untried in -politics, knowing little of men, hypnotised both by truth and flattery, -and by the general longing expectation of someone's coming, moved by -a fervent desire for deeds of sacrifice--he truly believed in the -predestined nature of his appointment. He lived and fought with this -belief, and died for it on the banks of the Kuban. - -Kornilov became a sign and rallying point. To some, of -counter-Revolution; to others, of the salvation of their native land. - -Around this point a struggle for influence and power was commenced by -people who, unaided, without him could not have attained to such power. - -A characteristic episode had already taken place on the 8th of July, -at Kamenetz-Podolsk. Here, in Kornilov's entourage, there occurred the -first conflict between Savinkov and Zavoiko, the former being the most -prominent Russian Revolutionary, leader of the Terrorist fighting group -of the Social-Revolutionary Party, organiser of the most notorious -political assassinations--those of Plehve, Minister of the Interior, -of the Grand Duke Serge, etc. Strong-willed and cruel by nature, -completely lacking in the controlling influences of "conventional -morality," despising both the Provisional Government and Kerensky, -supporting the Provisional Government from motives of expediency, as -he understood it, ready at any moment to sweep them aside--he saw in -Kornilov merely a weapon in the fight for Revolutionary power, in -which _he_ must have a dominant interest. Zavoiko was one of those -peculiar personages who afterwards clustered closely round Kornilov and -played such a prominent part in the August days. He was not very well -known even to Kornilov. The latter stated, in his evidence before the -Supreme Commission of Inquiry, that he became acquainted with Zavoiko -in April, 1917; that Zavoiko had been "marechal de noblesse" of the -Haisin district of Podolia, had been employed on the Nobel oilfields in -Baku, and, by his own statements, had been employed in prospecting for -minerals in Turkestan and Western Siberia. He arrived in Czernowitz, -enrolled as a volunteer in the Daghestan Mounted Regiment, and was -retained at Army Headquarters as personal aide to Kornilov. That is all -that is known of Zavoiko's past. - -Kornilov's first telegram to the Provisional Government was edited by -Zavoiko, who "gave it the form of an ultimatum with a concealed threat, -in case of non-compliance with the demands presented to the Provisional -Government, to proclaim a military dictatorship on the South-Western -Front."[54] - -I discovered all this subsequently. During all these events I continued -working at Minsk, completely engrossed now, not by the offensive, -but by the organisation of any sort of skeleton defence of the -half-collapsed Front. There was no information, no rumours even, of -what was going on at the head of affairs. Only an increased tension was -noticeable in all official relations. - - * * * * * - -Quite unexpectedly, in the end of July the Stavka offered me the post -of Commander-in-Chief of the South-Western Front. I communicated -by wire with General Lukomsky, the Chief-of-Staff of the Supreme -Commander-in-Chief, and told him that I should obey orders and go -wherever I was sent, but would like to know the reason for this -exchange. If the reasons were political I should ask to be left at my -old post. Lukomsky assured me that what Kornilov had in view was only -the military importance of the South-Western Front and the proposed -strategical operations in that quarter. I accepted the post. - -I parted from my assistants with regret, and, having transferred my -friend, General Markov, to the new front, left for my new place of -service together with him. On my way I stopped at Moghilev. The Stavka -was in a very optimistic mood; everyone was animated and hopeful, but -there were no signs of any "underground" conspiratory working. It -should be mentioned that in this respect the military were so naively -inexperienced, that when they really began to "conspire" their work -took such _obvious_ forms that the deaf could not help hearing, nor the -blind seeing, what was going on. - -On the day of our arrival Kornilov held a Council of the Chiefs of -Departments of the Stavka, at which the so-called "Kornilov programme" -for the restoration of the Army was discussed. I was invited to attend. -I shall not repeat all the fundamental propositions, which have already -been mentioned both by me and in Kornilov's telegrams--such demands, -for instance, as the introduction of Revolutionary courts-martial -and capital punishment in the rear, the restoration of disciplinary -authority to Commanders and raising their prestige, the limitation -of the activity of the Committees and their responsibility, etc. I -remember that side by side with clear and irrefutable propositions--the -draft memorandum drawn up by the Departments of the Stavka--there -were bureaucratic lucubrations hardly applicable in actual life. -For instance, with the object of making disciplinary authority more -palatable to Revolutionary Democracy, the authors of the memorandum had -drawn up a curiously detailed list of disciplinary misdemeanour with a -corresponding scale of penalties. And this was meant for the seething -whirlpool of life, where all relations were trampled underfoot, all -standards violated, where every fresh day brought forward an endless -variety of departures from the regulations! - -At any rate, the Supreme Command was finding the proper path, and -apparently Kornilov's personality was a guarantee that the Government -would be obliged to follow that path. Undoubtedly a long struggle with -the Soviets, Committees, and soldiery was still to be waged, but, -at least, the definiteness of the policy gave moral support and a -tangible basis for this heavy task in the future. On the other hand, -the support given to Kornilov's measures by Savinkov's War Ministry -gave reason to hope that Kerensky's vacillations and indecision would -finally be overcome. The attitude to this question of the Provisional -Government as a whole was of no practical importance, and could not -even be officially expressed. At that time it seemed as if Kerensky -had, in some degree, freed himself from the yoke of the Soviet, but, -just as formerly all the most important questions of State had been -settled by him apart from the Government, in conjunction with the -leading Soviet circles, now, in August, the direction of State affairs -passed into the hands of a triumvirate composed of Kerensky, Nekrassov, -and Tereschenko, leaving both the Socialist and Liberal groups of the -Government out of the running. - -After the meeting was over Kornilov asked me to stay, and, when all had -left, said to me, almost in a whisper: "It is necessary to struggle, -otherwise the country will perish. N. came to see me at the Front. He -is nursing his scheme of a _coup d'etat_ and of placing the Grand-Duke -Dmitri on the throne. He is organising something or other, and has -suggested collaboration. I told him flatly that I would take no part -in any Romanov adventures. The Government itself understands that it -can do nothing. They have offered my joining in the Government.... No, -thank you! These gentlemen are far too much entangled with the Soviets, -and cannot decide on anything. I have told them that if authority is -given me I shall carry on a decisive struggle. We must lead Russia to -a Constituent Assembly, and then let them do what they like. I shall -stand aside and not interfere in any way. Now, General, may I rely on -your support?" - -"To the fullest extent." - -This was my second meeting and my second conversation with Kornilov. -We embraced heartily and parted ... only to meet again in the Bykhov -Prison. - - - - -CHAPTER XXXI. - - MY SERVICE AS COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF OF THE SOUTH-WESTERN FRONT--THE - MOSCOW CONFERENCE--THE FALL OF RIGA. - - -I was touched by General Alexeiev's letter: - -"My thoughts are with you in your new appointment. I consider that -you have been sent to perform a superhuman task. Much has been said, -but apparently little has been done there. Nothing has been done even -after the 16th July by Russia's chief babbler.... The authority of -the Commanders is being steadily curtailed. Should you want my help -in anything I am ready to go to Berdichev, to go to the Front, to one -Command or another.... God preserve you!" - -Here was a man, indeed, whom neither an exalted position nor -misfortunes could change. He was full of his modest, disinterested work -for the good of his native land. - -A new front, new men. The South-Western Front, shaken by the events -in July, was gradually recovering. Not, however, in the sense of real -convalescence, as the optimists thought, but of a return approximately -to its condition prior to the offensive. There were the same strained -relations between officers and men, the same slip-shod service, the -desertion, and open unwillingness to fight, which was only less -actively expressed owing to the lull in operations; finally there was -the same Bolshevist propaganda, only more active, and not infrequently -disguised under the form of Committee "fractions" and preparations for -the Constituent Assembly. I have a document referring to the 2nd Army -of the Western Front. It is highly characteristic as an indication -of the unparalleled toleration and, indeed, encouragement of the -disintegration of the Army on the part of the representatives of the -Government and Commanders, under the guise of liberty and conscious -voting at the elections. Here is a copy of the telegram sent to all the -senior officers of the 2nd Army: - - The Army Commander, in agreement with the Commissar, and at the - request of the Army fraction of the Bolshevist Social-Democrats, - has permitted the organisation, from the 15th to 18th October, of - preparatory courses for instructors of the aforesaid fraction for - the elections to the Constituent Assembly, one representative of - the Bolshevist organisation of each separate unit being sent to the - said courses. No. 1644. - - SUVOROV.[55] - -The same toleration had been exercised in many cases previously, and -was founded on the exact meaning of the regulations for Army Committees -and of the "Declaration of Soldiers' Rights." - -Carried away by the struggle against counter-revolution, the -Revolutionary institutions had paid no attention to such facts as -public meetings with extreme Bolshevist watchwords being held at the -very place where the Front Headquarters were situated, or that the -local paper, _Svobodnaia Mysl_,[56] most undisguisedly threatened the -officers with a St. Bartholomew's Eve. - -The front was _holding out_. That is all that could be said of the -situation. At times there would be disturbances ending tragically, -such as the brutal murder of Generals Girshfeld, Hirschfeld, and -Stefanovich, Commissar Linde. The preliminary arrangements and the -concentration of the troops for the coming partial offensive were made, -but there was no possibility of launching the actual attack until the -"Kornilov programme" had been put into practice and the results known. - -I waited very impatiently. - -The Revolutionary organisations (the Commissariat and Committee) of -the South-Western Front were in a position; they had not yet seized -power, but some of it had already been yielded to them voluntarily by -a series of Commanders-in-Chief--Brussilov, Gutor, Baluev. Therefore, -my coming at once roused their antagonism. The Committee of the Western -Front lost no time in sending a scathing report on me to Berdichev on -the basis of which the next issue of the Committee's organ published an -impressive warning to the "enemies of democracy." As usual, I totally -omitted to invoke the aid of the Commissariat, and sent a message to -the Committee saying that I could have nothing to do with it unless it -kept rigidly within the limits of the law. - -The Commissar of the Front was a certain Gobechio. I saw him once only, -on my arrival. In a few days he got transferred to the Caucasus, and -his post was taken by Iordansky.[57] As soon as he arrived he issued -an "order to the troops at the Front." Afterwards he was unable to -understand that two persons could not command the Front at one and the -same time. Iordansky and his assistants, Kostitsin and Grigorier--a -literary man, zoologist, and doctor respectively--were probably rather -prominent men in their own profession, but utterly ignorant of military -life. - -The Committee of the Front was no better and no worse than others.[58] -It took the "Defencist" point of view, and even supported the -repressive measures taken by Kornilov in July, but at that time -the Committee was not in the least degree a _military_ institution -organically connected--for good or evil--with the true Army life. It -was merely a mixed party organ. Divided into "fractions" of all the -Socialist parties, the Committee positively revelled in politics, -and introduced them at the Front likewise. The Committee carried on -propaganda on a large scale, convened congresses of representatives in -order to have them converted by Socialist fractions, including such -as were openly antagonistic to the policy of the Government. I made -an attempt to stop this work in view of the impending strategical -operations and the difficult period of transition, but met with -determined opposition on the part of Commissar Iordansky. At the same -time, the Committee was perpetually interfering in all questions of -military authority, spreading sedition and distrust to the commanders. - - * * * * * - -Meanwhile, both in Petrograd and Moghilev, events were taking their -course, and we could grasp their meaning only in so far as they were -reflected by newspaper reports, rumours and gossip. - -There was still no "programme." The Moscow State Conference[59] raised -great hopes, but it met without making any changes in either State -or military policy. On the contrary, it even outwardly emphasises -the irreconcilable enmity between the Revolutionary Democracy and -the Liberal Bourgeoisie, between the Commanders and the soldiers' -representatives. - -If the Moscow Conference yielded no positive results, nevertheless, it -fully exposed the mood of the opponents, the leaders and the rulers. -All unanimously recognised that the country was in deadly peril. -Everyone understood that the social relations had suffered an upheaval, -that all branches of the nation's economy had been uprooted. Each -party reproached the other with supporting the selfish interests of -their class. This, however, was not the most important matter, for, -strange as it may seem, the primary causes of social class war, even -the agrarian and labour questions, merely led to disagreement, without -rousing any irreconcilable dissentions. Even when Plekhanov, the -old leader of the Social-Democrats, amid universal approval, turned to -the Right demanding sacrifice, and to the Left demanding moderation, it -seemed as if the chasm between the two opposing social camps was not so -very great. - -All the attention of the Conference was taken up by other questions, -those of _authority and of the Army_. - -Miliukov enumerated all the sins of the Government, vanquished by the -Soviets, its "capitulation" to the ideology of the Socialist parties -and Zimmerwaldists, capitulation in the Army, in foreign policy, to -the Utopian demands of the working classes, to the extreme demands of -nationalities. - -"The usurpation of the authority of the State by Central and Local -Committees and Soviets," said General Kaledin distinctly, "must be -stopped at once and decisively." - -Maklakov smoothed the way for his attack: "I demand nothing, but -I cannot help drawing attention to the alarm felt by the social -conscience when it sees that the 'Defeatists' of yesterday have been -invited to join the Government." Shulgin (Right) is agitated. He says: -"I want your (the Provisional Government's) authority to be really -strong, really unlimited. I want this, though I know that a strong -Government easily turns to despotism, which is more likely to crush me -than you, the friends of that Government." - -On the Left, Jehkheidze sings the praises of the Soviets: "It is only -owing to the Revolutionary organisations that the creative spirit of -the Revolution has been preserved, for the salvation of the country -from the disintegration of authority and from anarchy...." "There -is no power higher than that of the Provisional Governments," says -Tzeretelli, "because the source of this power the sovereign people -has, through all the organs at its disposal, directly delegated this -power to the Provisional Government." Of course, in so far as that -Government submits to the will of the Soviets?... And over all one -hears the dominating voice of the President of the Congress, who is -seeking for "heavenly words" in order to "express his shuddering -horror" at coming events, "and at the same time brandishing a wooden -sword and threatening his hidden enemies thus: 'Be it known to everyone -who has once tried to offer armed resistance to the authority of the -people that the attempt will be smothered in blood and iron. Let those -beware who think that the time has come for them to overthrow the -Revolutionary Government with the help of bayonets.'" - -The contradiction was still more striking in military matters. In a dry -but powerful speech, the Supreme Commander-in-Chief drew a picture of -the destruction of the Army, involving the whole country in its ruin, -and with great reserve explained the gist of his programme. General -Alexeiev related, with genuine bitterness, the sad story of the sins, -sufferings and gallantry of the former Army. - -"Weak in technical resources and morally strong in spirit and -discipline," he related how the Army had lived to see the bright -days of the Revolution, and how later on, "when it was thought to be -a danger to the conquests of the Revolution, it was inoculated with -deadly poison." Kaledin, the Don Cossack Attaman, representing thirteen -Cossack Armies and unhampered by any official position, spoke sharply -and distinctly: "The Army must keep out of politics. There must be no -political meetings with their party struggles and disputes. All the -(Army) Soviets and Committees must be abolished. The Declaration of -Soldiers' Rights must be revised. Discipline must be raised both at the -Front and in the rear. The disciplinary authority of the Commanders -must be restored. All power to the leaders of the Army!" - -Kuchin, the representative of the Army and Front Committees, rose -to reply to these trite military axioms. "The Committees were a -manifestation of the instinct of self-defence.... They had to be formed -as organs for the protection of the privates, as hitherto there had -been nothing but oppression ... the Committees had brought light and -knowledge to the soldiers.... Then came the second period--one of decay -and disorganisation ... 'rearguard consciousness' made its appearance, -but failed to digest all the mass of questions which the Revolutions -had raised in the minds of the soldiery...." Now the speaker did -not deny the necessity for repressive measures, but they "must be -compatible with the definite work of Army organisations...." How this -was to be done had been shown by the united front of Revolutionary -Democracy, namely, the Army must be animated, not by the desire of -victory over the enemy, but by "a repudiation of Imperialistic aims, -and a desire for the speedy attainment of universal peace on Democratic -principles.... The commanders should possess complete independence -in the conduct of military operations, and have a decisive voice in -questions of discipline and service training." The object of the -organisations, on the other hand, was to introduce their policy -wholesale among troops, and "the Commissars must be the introducers -of (this) single Revolutionary policy of the Provisional Government, -the Army Committees must direct the social and political life of -the soldiers. The restoration of the disciplinary authority of the -commanders is not to be thought of," etc. - -What is the Government going to do? Will it find enough strength -and boldness to burst the fetters placed on it by the Bolshevistic -Soviet?[60] - -Kornilov said firmly, repeating his words twice: "I do not doubt for a -moment that the (my) measures will be carried out without delay." - -And if not--was it to be War? - -He also said: "It is impossible to admit that the determination to -carry out these measures should in every case be aroused merely by the -pressure of defeats and loss of territory. If the rout at Tarnopol and -the loss of Galicia and Bukovina did indeed result in restoration of -discipline at the Front, it cannot be admitted that order in the rear -should be restored at the cost of the loss of Riga, and that order -on the railways should be restored by the cession of Moldavia and -Bessarabia to the enemy." - -On the 20th Riga fell. - -Both strategically and tactically the Front of the lower Dvina was in -complete preparedness. Taking into consideration the strength of the -defensive positions, the forces were also sufficient. The officers in -command were General Parsky, Army Commander, and General Boldyrev, -Corps Commander; both experienced Generals, and certainly not inclined -to counter-Revolution in the opinion of the Democrats.[61] - -Finally, from deserters' reports, our Headquarters knew not only the -direction but even the day and the hour of the contemplated attack. - -Nevertheless, on the 19th August the Germans (Von Hutier's 8th Army), -after heavy artillery preparation, occupied the Uxkuell bridgehead in -the face of feeble opposition on our part, and crossed the Dvina. On -20th August the Germans assumed the offensive also along the Mitau -road; towards evening of the same day the enemy's Uxkuell group, -having pierced our lines on the Egel, began deploying in a northerly -direction, threatening the retreat of the Russian troops towards -Wenden. The 12th Army, abandoning Riga, retired some 60-70 versts, -losing touch with the enemy, and on the 25th occupied the so-called -Wenden position. The Army lost in prisoners alone some 9,000 men, -besides 81 guns, 200 machine-guns, etc. A further advance did not enter -into the German plans, and they commenced to establish themselves on -the extensive terrain of the right bank of the Dvina, immediately -sending off two divisions to the Western Front. - -We lost the rich industrial town of Riga, with all its military -structures and supplies; more important still, we lost a safe defensive -line, the abandonment of which placed both the Dvina Front and the way -to Petrograd under a constant threat. - -The fall of Riga made a great impression in the country. Quite -unexpectedly, however, it called forth from the Revolutionary -Democracy, not repentance, not patriotic fervour, but, instead, a still -greater bitterness towards the leaders and officers. The Stavka in one -_communique_[62] inserted the following sentence: "The disorganised -masses of the soldiery are flocking in uncontrollable masses along -the Pskov high road and the road to Bieder-Limburg." This statement, -undoubtedly true, and neither mentioning nor relating to the causes -of the above, raised a storm amongst the Revolutionary Democracy. -The Commissars and Committees of the Northern Front sent a series of -telegrams refuting the "provocative attacks of the Stavka" and assuring -that "there was no shame in this reverse"; that "the troops honestly -obey all demands of their leaders ... there have been no cases of -flight or treachery on the part of the troops." - -The Commissar for the Front, Stankevitch, while demurring against there -being no shame in such a causeless and inglorious retreat, pointed -out, amongst other things, a series of errors and delinquencies on -the part of the Commanders. It is extremely possible that there were -errors, both personal and of leadership, as well as purely objective -deficiencies, caused by mutual mistrust, slackening of obedience, -and the _debacle_ of the technical services. At the same time, it -is undoubtedly a fact that the troops of the Northern Front, and -especially the 12th Army, were the most disorganised of all, and, -logically, could not offer the necessary resistance. Even the apologist -of the 12th Army, Commissar Voitinsky, who always considerably -exaggerated the fighting value of these troops, telegraphed on the -22nd to the Petrograd Soviet: "The troops show want of confidence in -their powers, absence of training for battle, and, consequently, -insufficient steadiness in open warfare.... Many units fight bravely, -as in the early days; others show signs of weariness and panic." - -Actually, the debauched Northern Front had lost all power of -resistance. The troops rolled back to the limit of pursuit by the -German advanced detachments, and only moved forward subsequently -on losing touch with Hutier's main body, which had no intention of -passing, beyond a definite line. - -Meanwhile, all the papers of the Left commenced a fierce campaign -against the Stavka and the Commands. The word "treachery" was heard.... -Tchernov's _Delo Naroda_, a Defeatist paper, complained: "A torturing -fear creeps into the mind: are not the mistakes of the commanders, -the deficiencies in artillery, and the incapacity of the leaders -being unloaded on to the soldiers--courageous, heroic, perishing -in thousands." The _Izvestia_ announced also the motives for the -"provocation": "The Stavka, by putting forth the bogy of menacing -events, is trying to terrorise the Provisional Government and make -it adopt a series of measures, directly and indirectly aimed at the -Revolutionary Democracy and their organisations...." - -In conjunction with all these events, the feeling against the Supreme -Commander-in-Chief, General Kornilov, was increasing in the Soviets, -and rumours of his approaching dismissal appeared in the Press. In -answer to these, a series of angry resolutions addressed to the -Government, and supporting Kornilov, made their appearance.[63] The -resolution of the Council of the Union of Cossack Troops contained even -the following passage: "The supersession of Kornilov will inevitably -imbue the Cossacks with the fatal impression of the futility of further -Cossack sacrifices"; and, further, that the Council "declines all -responsibility for the Cossack troops at and behind the Front should -Kornilov be removed." - -Such was, then, the situation. Instead of pacification, passions burned -fiercer, contradictions increased, the atmosphere of mutual mistrust -and morbid suspicion was thickened. - - * * * * * - -I still postponed my tour of the troops, not abandoning hope of a -satisfactory issue to the struggle and of the publication of the -"Kornilov programme."[64] - -What could I bring the men? A deep, painful feeling, words appealing to -"common-sense and conscience," concealing my helplessness, and like the -voice of one crying in the wilderness? All had been and gone, leaving -bitter memories behind. It will always be so: thoughts, ideas, words, -moral persuasion will never cease to rouse men to deeds of merit; but -what if overgrown, virgin soil must be torn up with an iron plough?... -What should I say to the officers, sorrowfully and patiently awaiting -the end of the regular and merciless lingering death of the Army? For I -could only say to them: If the Government does not radically alter its -policy the end of the Army has come. - -On the 7th August orders were received to move the Caucasian Native -("Wild") Division from under my command northwards; on the 12th the -same order was received for the 3rd Cavalry Corps, then in Reserve, and -later for the Kornilov "shock" Regiment. As always, their destination -was not indicated. The direction prescribed, on the other hand, equally -pointed to the Northern Front, at that time greatly threatened, and -to ... Petrograd. I recommended General Krymov, commanding the 3rd -Cavalry Corps, for the command of the 11th Army. The Stavka agreed, but -demanded his immediate departure for Moghilev on a special mission. On -his way there Krymov reported to me. Apparently he had not yet received -definite instructions--at any rate, he spoke of none; however, neither -he nor I doubted that the mission was in connection with the expected -change in military policy. Krymov was at this time cheerful and -confident, and had faith in the future; as formerly, he considered that -only a crushing blow to the Soviets could save the situation. - -Following on this, official information was received of the formation -of the Detached Petrograd Army, and the appointment of an officer of -the General Staff to be Quartermaster-General of this Army was desired. - -Finally, about the 20th, the situation became somewhat clearer. An -officer reported to me at Berdichev, and handed me a personal letter -from Kornilov, wherein the latter suggested I should hear this -officer's verbal report. He stated as follows: - -"According to reliable information, a rising of the Bolsheviks -will take place at the end of August. By this time the 3rd Cavalry -Corps,[65] commanded by Krymov, would reach Petrograd, would crush -the rising, and simultaneously put an end to the Soviets."[66] - -Simultaneously, Petrograd would be proclaimed in a state of war, and -the laws resulting from the "Kornilov programme" would be published. -The Supreme Commander-in-Chief requested me to despatch to the -Stavka a score or more of reliable officers--officially "for trench -mortar instruction"; actually they would be sent to Petrograd, and -incorporated in the Officers' Detachment. - -In the course of the conversation he communicated the news from the -Stavka, painting all in glowing colours. He told me, among other -things, of rumours concerning new appointments to the Kiev, Odessa and -Moscow commands, and of the proposed new Government, mentioning some -existing ministers, and some names entirely unknown to me. The part -played in this matter by the Provisional Government, in particular by -Kerensky, was not clear. Had he decided on an abrupt change of military -policy, would he resign, or would he be swept away by developments -impossible of prediction by pure logic, or the most prophetic common -sense? - -_In this volume I described the entire course of events during August -in that sequence and in that light, in which these tragic days were -experienced on the South-Western Front, not giving them the perspective -of the stage and the actors acquired subsequently._ - -The seconding of the officers--with all precautions to prevent -either them or their superiors being placed in a false position--was -commenced, but it is hardly likely that it could have been accomplished -by the 27th. Not one Army Commander was supplied by me with the -information I had received; in fact, not one of the senior officers at -the front knew anything of the events brewing. - -It was clear that the history of the Russian Revolution had entered -on a new phase. What would the future bring? General Markov and I -spent many hours discussing this subject. He--nervous, hot-headed and -impetuous--constantly wavered between the extremes of hope and fear. -I also felt much the same; and both of us quite clearly saw and felt -the _fatal inevitability_ of a crisis. The Soviets--Bolshevists or -semi-Bolshevists, no matter which--would unfailingly bring Russia to -her doom. A conflict was unavoidable. But _over there_, was there an -actual chance, or was everything being done in heroic desperation? - -[Illustration: General Kornilov's welcome in Moscow.] - - - - -CHAPTER XXXII. - -GENERAL KORNILOV'S MOVEMENT AND ITS REPERCUSSION ON THE SOUTH-WEST -FRONT. - - -On August 27th I was thunderstruck by receiving from the Stavka -news of the dismissal of General Kornilov from the post of Supreme -Commander-in-Chief. - -A telegram, unnumbered, and signed "Kerensky," requested General -Kornilov to transfer the Supreme Command temporarily to General -Lukomsky, and, without awaiting the latter's arrival to proceed to -Petrograd. Such an order was quite illegal, and not binding, as the -Supreme Commander-in-Chief was in no way under the orders either of the -War Minister or of the Minister-President, certainly not of Comrade -Kerensky. - -General Lukomsky, Chief-of-Staff, answered the Minister-President in -Telegram No. 640, which I give below. Its contents were transmitted -to us, the Commanders-in-Chief by Telegram No. 6412. which I have -not preserved. Its tenor, however, is clear from the deposition of -Kornilov, in which he says: "I ordered that my decision (not to -surrender my command, and first to elucidate the situation), and that -of General Lukomsky, be communicated to the Commanders-in-Chief on all -fronts." - -Lukomsky's telegram, No. 640, ran as follows: - - All persons in touch with military affairs were perfectly aware - that, in view of the existing state of affairs, when the actual - direction of internal policy was in the hands of irresponsible - public organisations, having an enormously deleterious effect on - the Army, it would be impossible to resurrect the latter; on the - contrary, the Army, properly speaking, would cease to exist in - two or three months. Russia would then be obliged to conclude a - shameful separate peace, whose consequences to the country would - be terrible. The Government took half measures, which, changing - nothing, merely prolonged the agony, and, in saving the Revolution, - did not save Russia. At the same time, the preservation of the - benefits of the Revolution depended solely on the salvation of - Russia, for which purpose the first step must be the establishment - of a really strong Government and the reform of the home Front. - General Kornilov drew up a series of demands, the execution of - which has been delayed. In these circumstances, General Kornilov, - actuated by no motives of personal gain or aggrandisement, - and supported by the clearly-expressed will of the entire - right-thinking sections of the Army and the Civil community, who - demanded the speedy establishment of a strong Government for the - saving of their native land, and of the benefits of the Revolution, - considered more severe measures requisite which would secure the - re-establishment of order in the country. - - The arrival of Savinkov and Lvov, who in your name made General - Kornilov similar proposals,[67] only brought General Kornilov to a - speedy decision. In accordance with your suggestions, he issued his - final orders, which it is now too late to repeal. - - Your telegram of to-day shows that you have now altered your - previous decision, communicated in your name by Savinkov and - Lvov. Conscience demands from me, desiring only the good of the - Motherland, to declare to you absolutely that it is now impossible - to stop what was commenced with your approval; this will lead but - to civil war, the final dissolution of the Army, and a shameful - separate peace, as a consequence of which the conquests of the - Revolution will certainly not be secured to us. - - In the interests of the salvation of Russia you must work with - General Kornilov, and not dismiss him. The dismissal of General - Kornilov will bring upon Russia as yet unheard-of horrors. - Personally, I decline to accept any responsibility for the Army, - even though it be for a short period, and do not consider it - possible to take over the command from General Kornilov, as this - would occasion an outburst in the Army which would cause Russia to - perish. - - LUKOMSKY. - -All the hopes which had been entertained of the salvation of the -country and the regeneration of the Army by peaceful means had now -failed. I had no illusions as to the consequences of such a conflict -between General Kornilov and Kerensky, and had no hopes of a favourable -termination if only General Krymov's Corps did not manage to save the -situation. At the same time, not for one moment did I consider it -possible to identify myself with the Provisional Government, which I -considered criminally incapable, and therefore immediately despatched -the following telegram: - - I am a soldier and am not accustomed to play hide and seek. On - the 16th of July, in a conference with members of the Provisional - Government, I stated that, by a series of military reforms, they - had destroyed and debauched the Army, and had trampled our battle - honours in the mud. My retention as Commander-in-Chief I explained - as being a confession by the Provisional Government of their - deadly sins before the Motherland, and of their wish to remedy the - evil they had wrought. To-day I receive information that General - Kornilov, who had put forward certain demands capable yet of saving - the country and the Army,[68] has been removed from the Supreme - Command. Seeing herein a return to the planned destruction of the - Army, having as its consequence the downfall of our country, I - feel it my duty to inform the Provisional Government that I cannot - follow their lead in this. - - 145 DENIKIN. - -Simultaneously Markov sent a telegram to the Government stating his -concurrence in the views expressed by me.[69] - -At the same time I ordered the Stavka to be asked in what way I could -assist General Kornilov. He knew that, besides moral support, I had no -actual resources at my disposal, and, therefore, thanking me for this -support, demanded no more. - -I ordered copies of my telegrams to be sent to all -Commanders-in-Chief, the Army Commanders of the South-Western Front, -and the Inspector-General of Lines of Communication. I also ordered -the adoption of measures which would isolate the Front against the -penetration of any news of events, without the knowledge of the Staff, -until the conflict had been decided. I received similar instructions -from the Stavka. I think it hardly necessary to state that the entire -Staff warmly supported Kornilov, and all impatiently awaited news from -Moghilev, still hoping for a favourable termination. - -Absolutely no measures for the detention of any persons were taken: -this would have been of no use, and did not enter into our plans. - -Meanwhile, the Revolutionary Democracy at the Front were in great -agitation. The members of the Front Committee on this night left their -quarters and lodged in private houses on the outskirts of the town. -The assistants of the Commissar were at the time away on duty, and -Iordansky himself in Zhitomir. An invitation from Markov to him to come -to Berdichev had no result, either that night or on the 28th. Iordansky -expected a "treacherous ambush." - -Night fell, a long, sleepless night, full of anxious waiting and -oppressive thoughts. Never had the future of the country seemed so -dark, never had our powerlessness been so galling and oppressive. A -historic tragedy, played out far from us, lay like a thundercloud over -Russia. And we waited, waited. - -I shall never forget that night. Those hours still live in mental -pictures. Successive telegrams by direct wire: Agreement apparently -possible. No hopes of a peaceful issue. Supreme Command offered to -Klembovsky. Klembovsky likely to refuse. One after another copies of -telegrams to the Provisional Government from all Army Commanders of my -Front, from General Oelssner and several other Senior Officers, voicing -their adherence to the opinion expressed in my telegram. A touching -fulfilment of their _civic duty_ in an atmosphere saturated with hate -and suspicion. Their _soldier's oath_ they could no longer keep. -Finally, the voice of despair from the Stavka. For that is the only -name for the General Orders issued by Kornilov on the night of the 28th: - - The telegram of the Minister-President, No. 4163[70] in its entire - first part is a downright lie: it was not I who sent Vv. N. Lvov, a - member of the State Duma, to the Provisional Government. He came to - me as a messenger from the Minister-President. My witness to this - is Alexei Aladyin, member of the State Duma. - - The great provocation, placing the Motherland on the turn of fate, - is thus accomplished. - - People of Russia. Our great Motherland is dying. Her end is near. - - Forced to speak openly, I, General Kornilov, declare that the - Provisional Government, under pressure from the Bolshevik majority - in the Soviets, is acting in complete accordance with the plans of - the German General Staff and simultaneously with the landing of - enemy troops near Riga, is killing the Army, and convulsing the - country internally. - - The solemn certainty of the doom of our country drives me in these - terrible times to call upon all Russians to save their dying - native land. All in whose breasts a Russian heart still beats, all - who believe in God, go into the Churches, pray Our Lord for the - greatest miracle, the salvation of our dear country. - - I, General Kornilov, son of a peasant Cossack, announce to all and - everyone that I personally desire nothing save the preservation of - our great Russia, and vow to lead the people, through victory over - our enemies, to a Constituent Assembly, when they themselves will - settle their fate and select the form of our new national life. - - I cannot betray Russia into the hands of her ancient enemy--the - German race!--and make the Russian people German slaves. And I - prefer to die honourably on the field of battle, that I may not see - the shame and degradation of our Russian land. - - People of Russia, in your hands lies the life of your native land! - -This order was despatched to the Army Commanders for their information. -The next day one telegram from Kerensky was received at the -Commissariat, and from then all our communications with the outside -world were interrupted.[71] - -Well, the die was cast. A gulf had opened between the Government and -the Stavka, to bridge which was now impossible. - -On the following day, the 28th, the Revolutionary institutions, -seeing that absolutely nothing threatened them, exhibited a feverish -activity. Iordansky assumed the "military authority," made a series of -unnecessary arrests in Zhitomir among the senior officials of the Chief -Board of Supplies, and issued, under his signature and in his own name, -that of the Revolutionary organisations and that of the Commissary -of the Province, an appeal, telling, in much detail and in the usual -language of proclamations, how General Denikin was planning "to restore -the old regime and deprive the Russian people of Land and Freedom." - -At the same time similar energetic work was being carried on in -Berdichev under the guidance of the Frontal Committee. Meetings of all -the organisations went on incessantly, along with the "education" of -the typical rear units of the garrison. Here the accusation brought -forward by the Committee was different: "The counter-Revolutionary -attempt of the Commander-in-Chief, General Denikin, to overthrow -the Provisional Government and restore Nicholas II. to the throne." -Proclamations to this effect were circulated in numbers among the -units, pasted on walls, and scattered from motor-cars careering through -the town. The nervous tension increased, the streets were full of -noise. The members of the Committee became more and more peremptory -and exigent in their relations with Markov. Information was received -of disorders which had arisen on the Lyssaya Gora (Bald Hill). The -Staff sent officers thither to clear up the matter and determine the -possibility of pacification. One of them--a Tchekh officer, Lieutenant -Kletsando--who was to have spoken with the Austrian prisoners, was -attacked by Russian soldiers, one of whom he wounded slightly. This -circumstance increased the disturbance still more. - -From my window I watched the crowds of soldiers gathering on the -Lyssaya Gora, then forming in column, holding a prolonged meeting, -which lasted about two hours, and apparently coming to no conclusion. -Finally the column, which consisted of a troop of orderlies (formerly -field military police), a reserve _sotnia_, and sundry other armed -units, marched on the town with a number of red flags and headed by two -armoured cars. On the appearance of an armoured car, which threatened -to open fire, the Orenburg Cossack _sotnia_, which was on guard next -the Staff quarters and the house of the Commander-in-Chief, scattered -and galloped away. We found ourselves completely in the power of the -Revolutionary Democracy. - -"Revolutionary sentries" were posted round the house. The Vice-President -of the Committee, Koltchinsky, led four armed "comrades" into the -house for the purpose of arresting General Markov, but then began to -hesitate, and confined himself to leaving in the reception-room of the -Chief-of-Staff two "experts" from the Frontal Committee to control his -work. The following wireless was sent to the Government: "General -Denikin and all his staff have been subjected to personal detention at -his Stavka. In the interests of the defence the guidance of the activity -of the troops has been left in their hands, but is strictly controlled -by the delegates of the Committee." - -Now began a series of long, endless, wearisome hours. They will never -be forgotten. Nor can words express the depth of the pain which now -enveloped our hearts. - -At 4 p.m. on the 29th Markov asked me into the reception-room, -where Assistant-Commissary Kostitsin came with ten to fifteen armed -Committee members and read me an "order from the Commissary of the -South-Western Front, Iordansky," according to which I, Markov, and -Quartermaster-General Orlov were to be subjected to preliminary arrest -for an attempt at an armed rising against the Provisional Government. -As a man of letters Iordansky seemed to have become ashamed of the -arguments about "land," "freedom," and "Nicholas II.," designed -exclusively for inflaming the passions of the mob. - -I replied that a Commander-in-Chief could be removed from his post only -by the Supreme Commander-in-Chief or by the Provisional Government; -that Commissary Iordansky was acting altogether illegally, but that I -was obliged to submit to force. - -Motor-cars drove up, accompanied by armoured cars, and Markov and I -took our seats. Then came the long waiting for Orlov, who was handing -over the files; then the tormenting curiosity of the passers-by. Then -we drove on to Lyssaya Gora. The car wandered about for a long time, -halting at one building after another, until at last we drove up to -the guard-house; we passed through a crowd of about a hundred men who -were awaiting our arrival, and were greeted with looks full of hatred -and with coarse abuse. We were taken into separate cells; Kostitsin -very civilly offered to send me any of my things I might require, but I -brusquely declined any services from him; the door was slammed to, the -key turned noisily in the lock, and I was alone. - -In a few days the Stavka was liquidated. Kornilov, Lukomsky, -Romanovsky, and others were taken off to the Bykhov Prison. - -The Revolutionary Democracy was celebrating its victory. - -Yet at that very time the Government was opening wide the doors of the -prisons in Petrograd and liberating many influential Bolsheviks--to -enable them to continue, publicly and openly, their work of destroying -the Russian Empire. - -On September 1 the Provisional Government arrested General Kornilov; -on September 4 the Provisional Government liberated Bronstein Trotsky. -These two dates should be memorable for Russia. - - * * * * * - -Cell No. 1. The floor is some seven feet square. The window is closed -with an iron grating. The door has a small peep-hole in it. The cell -is furnished with a sleeping bench, a table, and a stool. The air is -close--an evil-smelling place lies next door. On the other side is cell -No. 2, with Markov in it; he walks up and down with large, nervous -strides. Somehow or other I still remember that he makes three steps -along his cell, while I manage, on a curve, to make five. The prison -is full of vague sounds. The strained ear begins to distinguish them, -and gradually to make out the course of prison life, and even its -moods. The guards--I guess them to be soldiers of the prison guard -company--are rough and revengeful men. - -It is early morning. Someone's voice is booming. Whence? Outside of -the window, clinging to the grating, hang two soldiers. They look at -me with cruel, savage eyes, and hysterically utter terrible curses. -They throw in something abominable through the open window. There is no -escape from their gaze. I turn to the door--there another pair of eyes, -full of hatred, peers through the peep-hole; thence choice abuse pours -in also. I lie down on the sleeping-bench and cover my head with my -cloak. I lie for hours. The whole day, one after another, the "public -accusers" replace each other at the window and at the door--the guards -allow all to come freely. And into the narrow, close kennel pours, -in an unceasing torrent, a foul stream of words, shouts, and curses, -born of immense ignorance, blind hate, and bottomless coarseness. -One's whole soul seems to be drenched with that abuse, and there is no -deliverance, no escape from this moral torture chamber. - -What is it all about? "Wanted to open the Front" ... "sold himself -to the Germans"--the sum, too, was mentioned--"for twenty thousand -roubles" ... "wanted to deprive us of land and freedom." This -was not their own, this was borrowed from the Committee. But -Commander-in-Chief, General, gentleman--this, indeed, was their own! -"You have drunk our blood, ordered us about, kept us stewing in prison; -now we are free and you can sit behind the bars yourself. You pampered -yourself, drove about in motor-cars; now you can try what lying on a -wooden bench is, you ----. You have not much time left. We shan't wait -till you run away--we will strangle you with our own hands." These -warriors of the rear scarcely knew me at all. But all that had been -gathering for years, for centuries, in their exasperated hearts against -the power they did not love, against the inequality of classes, because -of personal grievances and of their shattered lives--for which someone -or other was to blame--all this now came to the surface in the form -of unmitigated cruelty. And the higher the standing of him who was -reckoned the enemy of the people, and the deeper his fall, the more -violent was the hostility of the mob and the greater the satisfaction -of seeing him in its hands. Meanwhile, behind the wings of the popular -stage stood the managers, who inflamed both the wrath and the delight -of the populace; who did not believe in the villainy of the actors, -but permitted them even to perish for the sake of greater realism in -the performance and to the greater glory of their sectarian dogmatism. -These motives of party policy, however, were called "tactical -considerations." - -I lay, covered head and all by my cloak and, under a shower of oaths, -tried to see things clearly: - -"What have I done to deserve this?" - -I went through the stages of my life.... My father was a stern soldier -with a most kindly heart. Up to thirty years of age he had been a -peasant serf and was drafted into the Army, where, after twenty-two -years of hard service in the ranks, under the severe discipline of the -times of Nicholas I, he was promoted to the rank of 2nd Lieutenant. -He retired with the rank of Major. My childhood was hard and joyless, -amidst the poverty of a pension of 45 roubles a month. Then my father -died. Life became still harder. My mother's pension was 25 roubles -a month. My youth was passed in study and in working for my daily -bread. I became a volunteer in the Army, messing in barracks with the -privates. Then came my officer's commission, then the Staff College. -The unfairness of my promotion, my complaint to the Emperor against -the all-powerful Minister of War, and my return to the 2nd Artillery -Brigade. My conflict with a moribund group of old adherents of serfdom; -their accusation of demagogy. The General Staff. My practice command -of a company in the 183rd Pultussk Regiment. Here I put an end to the -system of striking the soldiers and made an unsuccessful experiment -in "conscious discipline." Yes, Mr. Kerensky, I did this also in my -younger days. I privately abolished disciplinary punishment--"watch -one another, restrain the weak-spirited--after all, you are decent -men--show that you can do your duty without the stick." I finished my -command: during the year the behaviour of the company had not been -above the average, it drilled poorly and lazily. After my departure the -old Sergeant-Major, Stsepoura, gathered the company together, raised -his fist significantly in the air and said distinctly, separating his -words: - -"Now it is not Captain Denikin whom you will have. Do you understand?" - -"Yes, Sergeant-Major." - -It was said, afterwards, that the company soon showed improvement. - -Then came the war in Manchuria; active service; hopes for the -regeneration of the Army. Then an open struggle, in a stifled Press, -with the higher command of the Army, against stagnation, ignorance, -privileges and licence--a struggle for the welfare of the officer and -the soldier. The times were stern--all my service, all my military -career was at stake. Then came my command of a regiment, constant -care for the improvement of the condition of the soldiers, after my -Pultussk experience--strict service demands, but also respect for the -human dignity of the soldier. At that time we seemed to understand -one another and were not strangers. Then came war again, the "Iron" -Division, nearer relations with the rifleman and work with him in -common. The staff was always near the positions, so as to share mud, -want of space, and dangers with the men. Then a long, laborious path, -full of glorious battles, in which a common life, common sufferings -and common fame brought us still closer together, and created a mutual -faith and a touching proximity. - -No, I have never been an enemy to the soldier. - -I threw off my cloak, and, jumping from the wooden bed, went up to the -window, where the figure of a soldier clung to the grating, belching -forth curses. - -"You lie, soldier! It is not your own words that you are speaking. If -you are not a coward, hiding in the rear, if you have been in action, -you have seen how your officers could die. You have seen that they...." - -His hands loosened their grip and the figure disappeared. I think it -was simply because of my stern address, which, despite the impotence of -a prisoner, produced its usual effect. - -Fresh faces appeared at the window and at the peep-hole in the door. - -It was not always, however, that we met with insolence alone. -Sometimes, through the assumed rudeness of our gaolers we could see -a feeling of awkwardness, confusion and even commiseration. But of -these feelings they were ashamed. On the first cold night, when we -had none of our things, a guard brought Markov, who had forgotten -his overcoat, a soldier's overcoat, but half an hour later--whether -he had grown ashamed of his good action, or whether his comrades had -shamed him--he took it back. In Markov's cursory notes we find: "We -are looked after by two Austrian prisoners.... Besides them, we have -as our caterer a soldier, formerly of the Finland Rifles (a Russian), -a very kind and thoughtful man. During our first days he, too, had a -hard time of it--his comrades gave him no peace; now, however, matters -are all right; they have quieted down. His care for our food is simply -touching, while the news he brings is delightful in its simplicity. -Yesterday, he told me that he would miss us when we are taken away. - -"I soothed him by saying that our places would soon be filled by new -generals--that all had not yet been destroyed." - -My heart is heavy. My feelings seem to be split in two: I hate and -despise the savage, cruel, senseless mob, but still I feel the old pity -for the soldier: an ignorant, illiterate man, who has been led astray, -and is capable both of abominable crimes and of lofty sacrifices! - -Soon the duty of guarding us was given to the cadets of the 2nd -Zhitomir School of 2nd Lieutenants. Our condition became much easier -from the moral point of view. They not only watched over the prisoners, -but also guarded them from the mob. And the mob, more than once, on -various occasions, gathered near the guard-room and roared wildly, -threatening to lynch us. In such cases the company on guard gathered -hastily in a house nearly opposite us and the cadets on guard made -ready their machine-guns. I recall that, calmly and clearly realising -my danger, when the mob was especially stormy, I planned out my method -of self-defence: a heavy water-bottle stood upon my table; with it -I might hit the first man to break into my cell; his blood would -infuriate and intoxicate the "comrades," and they would kill me at -once, without torturing me.... - -With the exception, however, of such unpleasant moments, our life in -prison went on in a measured, methodical way; it was quiet and restful; -after the strain of our campaigning, and in comparison with the moral -suffering we had undergone, the physical inconveniences of the prison -regime were mere trifles. Our life was varied by little incidents. -Sometimes a Bolshevist cadet standing at the door would tell the sentry -loudly, so that his words might be heard in the cell, that at their -last meeting the comrades of Lyssaya Gora, having lost all patience, -had finally decided to lynch us, and added that this was what we -deserved. Another time, Markov, passing along the corridor, saw a cadet -sentry leaning on his rifle, with the tears streaming from his eyes--he -felt sorry for us. What a strange, unusual exhibition of sentiment in -our savage days. - -For a fortnight I did not leave my cell for exercise, not wishing to be -an object of curiosity for the "comrades," who surrounded the square -before the guard-room and examined the arrested generals as if they -were beasts in a menagerie. I had no communication with my neighbours, -but much time for meditation and thought. - -And every day as I open my window I hear from the house opposite a -high, tenor voice--whether of friend or foe I know not--singing: - -"This is the last day that I ramble with you, my friends." - - - - -CHAPTER XXXIII. - -IN BERDICHEV GAOL--THE TRANSFER OF THE "BERDICHEV GROUP" OF PRISONERS -TO BYKHOV. - - -Besides Markov and me, whose share in events has been depicted in the -preceding chapters, the following were cast into prison: - -3. General Erdeli, Commander of the Special Army. - -4. Lieutenant-General Varnovsky, Commander of the 1st Army. - -5. Lieutenant-General Selivatchev, Commander of the 7th Army. - -6. Lieutenant-General Eisner, Chief of Supplies to the South-Western -Front. - -The guilt of these men lay in their expression of solidarity with my -telegram No. 145, and of the last, moreover, in his fulfilment of my -orders for the isolation of the frontal region with respect to Kiev and -Zhitomir. - -7 and 8. General Eisner's assistants--General Parsky and General -Sergievsky--men who had absolutely no connection with events. - -9. Major-General Orlov, Quartermaster-General of the Staff of the -Front--a wounded man with a withered arm, timid, and merely carrying -out the orders of the Chief-of-Staff. - -10. Lieutenant Kletsando, of the Tchekh troops, who had wounded a -soldier of Lyssaya Gora on August 28th. - -11. Captain Prince Krapotkin, a man over sixty years of age, a -Volunteer, and the Commandant of the Commander-in-Chief's train. He was -not initiated into events at all. - -General Selivatchev, General Parsky and General Sergievsky were soon -released. Prince Krapotkin was informed on September 6th that his -actions had not been criminal, but was set free only on September -23rd, when it appeared that we were not to be tried at Berdichev. For -a charge of rebellion to hold good against us an association of eight -men at the very least had to be discovered. Our antagonists were much -interested in this figure, being desirous of observing the rules of -decorum.... There was another prisoner, however, kept in reserve and -separate from us, at the Commandant's office, and even afterwards -transferred to Bykhov--a military official named Boudilovitch--a youth -weak in body, but strong in spirit, who on one occasion dared to tell a -wrathful mob that it was not worth the little finger of those whom it -was maltreating.[72] No other crime was imputed to him. - -On the second or third day of my imprisonment I read in a newspaper, -which had accidentally or purposely found its way into my cell, an -order from the Provisional Government to the Senate, dated August 29th, -which ran as follows: - -"Lieutenant-General Denikin, Commander-in-Chief of the Armies of the -South-Western Front, to be removed from the post of Commander-in-Chief -and brought to trial for rebellion.--Signed: Minister-President A. -Kerensky and B. Savinkov--in charge of the War Ministry." - -On the same date similar orders were issued concerning Generals -Kornilov, Lukomsky, Markov and Kisliakov. Later an order was issued for -the removal of General Romanovsky. - -On the second or the third day of my arrest the guard-room was visited, -for our examination, by a Committee of Investigation, under the -superintendence of the Chief Field Prosecutor of the Front, General -Batog, and under the presidency of Assistant-Commissar Kostitsin, -consisting of: - -Lieutenant-Colonel Shestoperov, in charge of the Juridical Section -of the Commissariat; Lieutenant-Colonel Frank, of the Kiev Military -Court; 2nd Lieut. Oudaltsov and Junior Sergeant of Artillery Levenberg, -members of the Committee of the Front. - -My evidence, in view of the facts of the case, was very short, and -consisted of the following statements: (1) None of the persons -arrested with me had taken part in any active proceedings against the -Government; (2) all orders given to and through the Staff during my -last days, in connection with General Kornilov's venture, proceeded -from me; (3) I considered, and still consider, that the activity of the -Provisional Government is criminal and ruinous for Russia, but that -nevertheless I had not instituted a rebellion against it, but having -sent my telegram No. 145, I had left it to the Provisional Government -to take such action towards me as it might see fit. - -Later the Chief Military Prosecutor, Shablovsky, having acquainted -himself with the material of the investigation and with the -circumstances which had arisen around it in Berdichev, was horrified at -the "uncautious formulation" of my evidence. - -By September 1st Iordansky was already reporting to the War Ministry -that the Committee of Investigation had discovered documents -establishing the existence of a conspiracy which had long been -preparing.... At the same time, Iordansky, man of letters, inquired of -the Government whether, in the matter of the direction of the cases of -the Generals arrested, he could act within the limits of the law, _in -conformity with local circumstances_, or whether he was bound to be -guided by any _political considerations_ of the Central Authority. In -reply he was informed that he must act reckoning with the law alone and -... _taking into consideration local circumstances_.[73] - -In view of this explanation, Iordansky decided to commit us for trial -by a Revolutionary Court-Martial, to which end a Court was formed of -members of one of the Divisions formerly subordinated to me at the -Front, while Captain Pavlov, member of the Executive Committee of the -South-Western Front, was marked down for public prosecutor. - -Thus the interests of competency, impartiality and fair play were -observed. - -Iordansky was so anxious to obtain a speedy verdict for myself -and for the Generals imprisoned with me that on September 3rd he -proposed that the Commission, without waiting for the elucidation -of the circumstances, should present the cases to the Revolutionary -Court-Martial in groups, as the guilt of one or other of the accused -was established. - -We were much depressed by our complete ignorance of what was taking -place in the outer world. - -On rare occasions Kostitsin acquainted us with the more important -current events, but in the Commissar's comments on the events only -depressed us still more. It was clear, however, that the Government was -breaking up altogether, that Bolshevism was raising its head higher and -higher, and that the country must inevitably perish. - -About September 8th or 10th, when the investigation was over, our -prison surroundings underwent, to some extent, a change. Newspapers -began to appear in our cells almost daily; at first secretly, -afterwards, from September 22nd, officially. At the same time, after -the relief of one of the Companies of Guards, we decided to try an -experiment: during our exercise in the corridor I approached Markov -and started talking with him; the sentries did not interfere. From -that time we began talking with one another every day; sometimes the -sentries demanded that we should stop, and then we were silent at once, -but more frequently they did not interfere. In the second half of -September visitors also were allowed; the curiosity of the "comrades" -of Lyssaya Gora was now apparently satisfied; fewer of them gathered -about the square, and I used to go out to walk every day, was able -to see all the prisoners and exchange a few words with them now and -again. Now, at least, we knew what was doing in the world, while the -possibility of meeting one another removed the depression caused by -isolation. - -From the papers we learned that the investigation of the Kornilov case -was committed to the Supreme Investigation Committee, presided over by -the Chief Military and Naval Prosecutor, Shablovsky.[74] - -About September 9th, in the evening, a great noise and the furious -shouts of a large crowd were heard near the prison. In a little while -four strangers entered my cell--confused and much agitated by something -or other. They said they were the President and members of the Supreme -Committee of Investigation for the Kornilov case.[75] - -Shablovsky, in a still somewhat broken voice, began to explain that -the purpose of their arrival was to take us off to Bykhov, and that, -judging by the temper which had developed in Berdichev, and by the -fury of the mob which now surrounded the prison, they could see that -there were no guarantees for justice here, but only savage revenge. -He added that the Committee had no doubt as to the inadmissibility -of any segregation of our cases, and as to the necessity of a common -trial for all the participators in the Kornilov venture, but that the -Commissariat and the Committees were using all means against this. The -Committee, therefore, asked me whether I would not wish to supplement -my evidence by any facts which might yet more clearly establish -the connection between our case and Kornilov's. In view of the -impossibility of holding the examination amidst the roar of the crowd -which had gathered, they decided to postpone it to the following day. - -The Committee departed; soon after the crowd dispersed. - -What more could I tell them? Only, perhaps, something of the advice -which Kornilov had given me at Moghilev, and through a messenger. But -this was done as a matter of exceptional confidence on the part of the -Supreme Commander-in-Chief, which I could in no case permit myself to -break. Therefore, the few details which I added next day to my original -evidence did not console the commission and did not, apparently, -satisfy the volunteer, a member of the Committee of the Front, who was -present at the examination. - -Nevertheless, we waited with impatience for our liberation from the -Berdichev chamber of torture. But our hopes were clouded more and more. -The newspaper of the Committee of the Front methodically fomented the -passions of the garrison; it was reported that at all the meetings of -all the Committees resolutions were passed against letting us out of -Berdichev; the Committee members were agitating mightily among the rear -units of the garrison, and meetings were held which passed off in a -spirit of great exaltation. - -The aim of the Shablovsky Commission was not attained. As it turned out -in the beginning of September, to Shablovsky's demand that a separate -trial of the "Berdichev group" should not be allowed, Iordansky replied -that "to say nothing of the transfer of the generals to any place -whatsoever, even the least postponement of their trial would threaten -Russia with incalculable calamities--complications at the front, and a -new civil war in the rear," and that both on political and on tactical -grounds it was necessary to have us tried in Berdichev, in the shortest -possible time, and by Revolutionary Court-Martial.[76] - -The Committee of the Front and the Kiev Soviet of Workmen's and -Soldiers' Delegates would not agree to our transfer, despite all -the arguments and persuasions brought forward at their meeting by -Shablovsky and the members of his Commission. On the way back, at -Moghilev, a consultation took place on this question between Kerensky, -Shablovsky, Iordansky and Batog. All, excepting Shablovsky, came to the -altogether unequivocal conclusion that the front was shaken, that the -soldiery was restless and demanding a victim, and that it was necessary -to enable the tense atmosphere to discharge itself, even at the cost -of injustice.... Shablovsky rose and declared that he would not permit -such a cynical attitude toward law and justice. - -I remember that this tale perplexed me. It is not worth while disputing -about points of view. But if the Minister-President is convinced that -in the matter of protecting the State it is admissible to let oneself -be guided by expediency, in what way, then, was Kornilov to blame? - -On September 14th a debate took place in Petrograd, in the last "court -of appeal"--in the military section of the Executive Committee of the -Council of Workmen's and Soldiers' Delegates--between Shablovsky and -the representative of the Committee of the South-Western Front, fully -supported by Iordansky. The last two declared that if the Revolutionary -Court-Martial was not held on the spot, in Berdichev, in the course -of the next five days the lynching of the prisoners was to be feared. -However, the Central Committee agreed with Shablovsky's arguments, and -sent its resolution to that effect to Berdichev. - -So an organised lynching was prevented. But the Revolutionary -institutions of Berdichev had at their service another method for -liquidating the "Berdichev group," an easy and irresponsible one--the -method of popular wrath.... - -A rumour spread that we were to be taken away on the 23rd, then it was -stated that our departure would take place on the 27th at 5 p.m. from -the passenger station. - -To take the prisoners away without making the fact public was in no -way difficult: in a motor-car, on foot in a column of cadets, or, -again, in a railway carriage--a narrow gauge-line came close up to the -guard-house and joined on to the broad gauge-line outside the town and -the railway station.[77] But such a method of transferring us did not -agree with the intentions of the Commissariat and the Committees. - -General Doukhonin inquired from the Stavka, of the Staff of the Front, -whether there were any reliable units in Berdichev, and offered to send -a detachment to assist in our move. The Staff of the Front declined -assistance. The Commander-in-Chief, General Volodchenko, had left on -the eve, the 26th, for the Front.... - -Much talk and an unhealthy atmosphere of expectation and curiosity were -being artificially created around this question.... - -Kerensky sent a telegram to the Commissariat: "I am sure of the -prudence of the garrison, which may elect, from among its numbers, two -representatives to accompany." - -In the morning the Commissariat began visiting all the units in the -garrison, to obtain their consent to our transfer. - -The Committee had appointed a meeting of the whole garrison for 2 p.m., -_i.e._, three hours before our departure, and in the field, moreover, -immediately beside our prison. This mass meeting did indeed take place; -at it the representatives of the Commissariat and of the Committee of -the Front announced the orders for our transfer to Bykhov, thoughtfully -announced the hour of our departure and appealed to the garrison ... -to be prudent; the meeting continued for a long time and, of course, -did not disperse. By 5 o'clock an excited crowd of thousands of men had -surrounded the guard-room, and its dull murmur made its way into the -building. - -Among the officers of the Cadet Battalion of the 2nd Zhitomir School -of 2nd Lieutenants, which was on guard this day, was Captain Betling, -wounded in many battles, who before the War had served in the 17th -Archangelogorod Infantry Regiment, which I commanded.[78] Betling asked -the superior officer of the School to replace by his half-company the -detachment appointed to accompany the prisoners to the railway station. -We all dressed and came out into the corridor. We waited. An hour, two -hours passed.... - -The meeting continued. Numerous speakers called for an immediate -lynching.... The soldier who had been wounded by Lieutenant Kletsando -was shouting hysterically and demanding his head.... Standing in the -porch of the guard-room, Assistant Commissaries Kostitsin and Grigoriev -were trying persuasion with the mob. That dear Betling, too, spoke -several times, hotly and passionately. We could not hear his words. - -At last, pale and agitated, Betling and Kostitsin came up to me. - -"How will you decide? The crowd has promised not to touch anyone, only -it demands that you should be taken to the station on foot. But we -cannot answer for anything." - -I replied: - -"Let us go." - -I took off my cap and crossed myself: - -"Lord, bless us!" - - * * * * * - -The crowd raged. We, the seven of us, surrounded by a group of cadets, -headed by Betling, who marched by my side with drawn sword, entered -the narrow passage through this living human sea, which pressed on us -from all sides. In front were Kostitsin and the delegates (twelve to -fifteen) chosen by the garrison to escort us. Night was coming on, and -in its eerie gloom, with the rays of the searchlight on the armoured -car cutting through it now and then, moved the raving mob, growing and -rolling on like a flaming avalanche. The air was full of a deafening -roar, hysterical shouts, and mephitic curses. At times they were -covered by Betling's loud, anxious voice: - -"Comrades, you have given your word!... Comrades, you have given your -word!..." - -The cadets, those splendid youths, crushed together on all sides, push -aside with their bodies the pressing crowd, which disorders their thin -ranks. Passing the pools left by yesterday's rain, the soldiers fill -their hands with mud and pelt us with it. Our faces, eyes, ears, are -covered with its fetid, viscid slime. Stones come flying at us. Poor, -crippled General Orlov has his face severely bruised; Erdeli and I, as -well, were struck--in the back and on the head. - -On our way we exchanged monosyllabic remarks. I turned to Markov: - -"What, my dear Professor, is this the end?" - -"Apparently...." - -The mob would not let us come up to the station by the straight path. -We were taken by a roundabout way, some three miles altogether, through -the main streets of the town. The crowd is growing. The balconies of -the Berdichev houses are full of curious spectators; the women wave -their handkerchiefs. Gay, guttural voices come from above: - -"Long live freedom!" - -The railway station is flooded with light. There we find a new, -vast crowd of several thousand people. And all this has merged in -the general sea which rages and roars. With enormous difficulty we -are brought through it under a hail of curses and of glances full -of hatred. The railway carriage. An officer--Elsner's son--sobbing -hysterically and addressing impotent threats to the mob, and his -soldier servant, lovingly soothing him, as he takes away his revolver; -two women, dumb with horror--Kletsando's wife and sister, who had -thought to see him off.... - -We wait for an hour, for another. The train is not allowed to leave--a -prisoner's car is demanded. There were none at the station. The mob -threatens to do for the Commissaries. Kostitsin is slightly buffeted. -A goods car is brought, all defiled with horse-dung--what a trifle! We -enter it without the assistance of a platform; poor Orlov is lifted in -with difficulty; hundreds of hands are stretched towards us through -the firm and steady ranks of the cadets.... It is already 10 p.m. The -engine gives a jerk. The crowd booms out still louder. Two shots are -heard. The train starts. - -The noise dies away, the lights grow dimmer. Farewell Berdichev! - -Kerensky shed a tear of delight over the self-abnegation of "our -saviours"--as he called--not the cadets, but the Commissaries and the -Committee members. - -"What irony of fate! General Denikin, arrested as Kornilov's -accomplice, was saved from the rage of the frenzied soldiers by the -members of the Executive Committee of the South-Western Front and by -the Commissaries of the Provisional Government." - -"I remember with what agitation I and the never-to-be-forgotten -Doukhonin read the account of how a handful of these brave men escorted -the arrested generals through a crowd of thousands of soldiers who were -thirsting for their blood...."[79] Why slander the dead? Certainly, -Doukhonin was no less anxious for the fate of the prisoners than for -... the fate of their revolutionary escort.... - -That Roman citizen, Pontius Pilate, smiled mockingly through the gloom -of the ages.... - - - - -CHAPTER XXXIV. - -SOME CONCLUSIONS AS TO THE FIRST PERIOD OF THE REVOLUTION. - - -History will not soon give us a picture of the Revolution in a broad, -impartial light. Those prospects which are now opening out to our view -are sufficient only to enable us to grasp certain particular phenomena -in it and, perhaps, to reject the prejudices and misconceptions which -have sprung up around them. - -The Revolution was inevitable. It is called a Revolution of the whole -people. This is correct only in so far as the Revolution was the Result -of the discontent of literally all classes of the population with the -old power. But upon the question of its achievements opinions were -divided, and deep breaches were bound to appear between classes on the -very next day after the downfall of the old Power. - -The Revolution was many-faced. For the peasants--the ownership of -the land; for the workmen--the ownership of profits; for the Liberal -Bourgeoisie--changed political conditions of life in the land and -moderate social reforms; for the Revolutionary Democracy--power and the -maximum of social achievement; for the Army--absence of authority and -the cessation of the War. - -With the downfall of the power of the Czar, there was left in the -country, until the summoning of a Constituent Assembly, no lawful -power, no power that had a juridical basis. This is perfectly natural -and follows from the very nature of a Revolution. But whether through -genuine misconception or deliberately perverting the truth, men have -fabricated theories, known to be false, about the "general popular -origin of the Provisional Government" or about the "full powers of the -Soviet of Workmen's and Soldiers' Delegates," as an organ supposed -to represent the "whole of the Russian Democracy." What an elastic -conscience one must have, if, while professing democratic principles -and protesting violently against the slightest deviation from orthodox -conditions of the lawfulness of elections, one can still ascribe full -powers, as the organ of democracy, to the Petrograd Soviet or to the -Congress of Soviets, the election of which is of an extraordinary -simplified and one-sided character. It was not without reason that -for a long time the Petrograd Soviet hesitated to publish lists of -its members. As to the supreme Power, to say nothing of its "popular -origin" from a "private meeting of the State Duma," the technique of -its construction was so imperfect that repeated crises might have put -an end to its very existence and to every trace of its continuity. -Finally, a really "popular" Government could not have remained -isolated, left by all to the will of a group of usurpers of authority. -That same Government which, in the days of March, so easily obtained -general recognition. Recognition, yes, but not practical support. - -After March 3rd, and up to the Constituent Assembly, _every_ -supreme authority bore the marks of self-assumed power, and _no_ -power could satisfy all classes of the population, in view of the -irreconciliableness of their interests and the intemperance of their -desires. - -Neither of the ruling powers (the Provisional Government and the -Soviet) enjoyed the due support of the _majority_. For this majority -(80 per cent.) said, through its representatives in the Constituent -Assembly of 1918: "We peasants make no difference between parties; -parties fight for power, while our peasant business is the land alone." -But even if, forestalling the will of the Constituent Assembly, the -Provisional Government had satisfied these desires of the majority -in full, it could not have reckoned on this majority's immediate -submission to the general interests of the State, nor on its _active_ -support: engaged in the redistribution of the land, which also had -a strong attraction for the elements at the Front, the peasantry -would scarcely have given the State, voluntarily, the forces and -the means for putting it in order, _i.e._ plenty of corn and plenty -of soldiers--brave, faithful and obedient to the law. Even then the -Government would have been faced with insoluble problems: an Army which -did not fight, an unproductive industry, a transport system which was -being broken down and ... the civil war of parties. - -Let us, therefore, set aside the popular and democratic origin of -the Provisional authority. Let it be self-assumed, as it has been in -the history of all revolutions and of all peoples. But the very fact -of the wide recognition of the Provisional Government gave it a vast -advantage over all the other forces which disputed its authority. -It was necessary, however, that this power should become so strong, -so absolute in its nature, so autocratic, as, having crushed all -opposition by force, perhaps by arms, to have led the country to a -Constituent Assembly, elected in surroundings which did not admit of -the falsification of the popular vote, and to have protected this -Assembly. - -We are apt to abuse the words "elemental force," as an excuse for many -phenomena of the Revolution. That "molten element" which swept Kerensky -away with the greatest ease, has it not fallen into the iron grip of -Lenin-Bronstein and, for more than three years, been unable to escape -from Bolshevist duress? - -If such a power, harsh, but inspired by reason and by a true desire for -popular rule, had assumed authority and, having crushed the _licence_ -into which _freedom_ had been transmuted, had led this authority to -a Constituent Assembly, the Russian people would have blessed, not -condemned it. In such a position will every provisional authority find -itself which accepts the heritage of Bolshevism; and Russia will judge -it, not by the juridical marks of its origin, but by its works. - -Why is the overthrow of the incompetent authority of the old Government -to be an achievement, to the memory of which the Provisional Government -proposed erecting a monument in the Capital, while the attempt to -overthrow the incompetent authority of Kerensky, made by Kornilov, -after exhausting all lawful means and after provocation on the part of -the Minister-President, is to be counted rebellion? - -But the need for a powerful authority is far from being exhausted by -the period preceding the Constituent Assembly. Did not the Assembly -of 1918 call in vain on the country, not for submission, but simply -for protection from physical outrage on the part of the turbulent -sailor horde? Yet not a hand was raised in its defence. Let us grant -that _that_ Assembly, born in an atmosphere of mutiny and violence, -did not express the will of the Russian people and that the future -Assembly will reflect that will more perfectly. I think, however, -that even those who have the most exalted faith in the infallibility -of the democratic principle do not close their eyes to the unbounded -possibilities of the future which will be the heritage of such a -physical and psychological transformation in the people as is unknown -to history and has never yet been investigated by anyone. - -Who knows whether it may not be necessary to confirm the democratic -principle, the authority itself of the Constituent Assembly, and its -commands, by iron and fresh bloodshed.... - -Be that as it may, the _outward_ recognition of the Provisional -Government took place. It would be difficult and useless to separate, -in the work of the Government, that which proceeded from its free will -and sincere convictions from what bears the stamp of the forcible -influence of the Soviet. If Tzeretelli was entitled to declare that -"there has never yet been a case when, in important questions, the -Provisional Government has not been ready to come to an agreement," so -have we the right to identify their work and their responsibility. - -All this activity, _volens nolens_, bore the character of destruction, -not creation. The Government repealed, abolished, disbanded, -permitted.... In this lay the centre of gravity of its work. I picture -to myself the Russia of that period as a very old house, in need of -capital reconstruction. In the absence of means and while waiting for -the building season (the Constituent Assembly), the builders began -extracting the decayed girders, some of which they did not replace at -all, others they replaced with light, temporary props, and others again -they reinforced with new baulks without fastenings--the latter means -turning out to be the worst. And the house crashed down. The causes -of such a method of building were first: the absence of a complete -and symmetrical plan among the Russian political parties, the whole -energy, mental and will tension of which were directed mainly towards -the destruction of the former order. For we cannot give the name of -practical plans to the abstract outlines of the party programmes; they -are rather lawful or unlawful diplomas for the right of building. -Secondly--that the new ruling classes did not possess the most -elementary technical knowledge of the art of ruling, as the result -of a systematic, age-long setting them aside from these functions. -Thirdly--the non-forestalling of the will of the Constituent Assembly, -which, in any case, called for heroic measures for its summoning, -and therewith no less heroic measures for securing real freedom of -election. Fourthly--the odiousness of all that bore the stamp of -the old order, even though it were sound at bottom. Fifthly--the -self-conceit of the political parties, each of which individually -represented the "will of the whole people" and was distinguished by -extreme irreconciliableness towards its antagonists. - -I might probably continue this list for a long time, but I shall pause -on one fact which has a significance which is far from being confined -to the past. The Revolution was expected, it was prepared, but _no -one_, not a single one of the political groups _had prepared itself -for it_. And the Revolution came by night, finding everyone, like the -foolish virgins in the Gospel, with lamps unlit. One cannot explain and -excuse everything by elemental forces alone. No one had troubled to -construct beforehand a general plan of the canals and sluices necessary -to prevent the inundation from becoming a flood. Not one of the leading -parties possessed a programme for the interregnum in the life of the -country, a programme which, in its character and scale, could not -correspond with normal plans of construction, either in the system of -administration or in the sphere of economic and social relations. It -would scarcely be an exaggeration to say that the only assets in the -possession of the progressive and Socialist blocks on March 27th, 1917, -were: for the former--the choice for the post of Minister-President of -Prince Lvov, for the latter--the Soviets and Order No. 1. After this -began the convulsive, unsystematic vacillation of the Government and of -the Soviet. - -It is to be regretted that this difference, which constitutes a -marked distinction between two periods--the provisional and the -constructive--two systems, two programmes, has not yet become -sufficiently clear in public consciousness. - -The whole period of the active struggle with Bolshevism passed under -the sign of the mingling of these two systems, of divergent views and -of incapacity to construct a provisional form of authority. It would -seem that now, too, the anti-Bolshevist forces, while increasing the -divergence of their views and building plans for the future, are not -preparing for the process of assuming the power after the downfall -of Bolshevism, and will again approach the task with naked hands -and wavering mind. Only now the process will be immeasurably more -difficult. For the second excuse--after "elemental forces"--for the -failure of the Revolution, or rather of its leading men--"the heritage -of the Czarist regime"--has paled very much on the background of the -sanguinary Bolshevist mist which has enveloped the land of Russia. - - * * * * * - -The new power (the Provisional Government) was faced by a question of -the first importance--the War. On its decision rested the fate of the -country. The decision in favour of continuing the alliance and the -War rested on ethical motives, which at that time did not rouse any -doubts, and on practical motives, which were in some degree disputable. -Now, even the former have been shaken, since both the Allies and the -enemy have treated the fate of Russia with cruel, cynical egotism. -Nevertheless, I have no doubt of the correctness of the decision then -taken to continue the War. Many suppositions might be made as to the -possibilities of a separate peace--whether that of Brest-Litovsk or one -less grievous for the State and for our national self-love. But it is -to be thought that such a peace in the spring of 1917 would have led -either to the dismemberment of Russia and her economic _debacle_ (a -general peace at the expense of Russia), or to the complete victory -of the Central Powers over our Allies, which would have produced -incomparably deeper convulsions in their countries than those which -the German people are now experiencing. Both in the one case and in -the other, no objective data would be present for any change for the -better in the political, social and economic conditions of Russian life -and any turning of the Russian Revolution into other channels. Only, -besides Bolshevism, Russia would have added to her liabilities the -hatred of the defeated for many years. - -Having decided to fight, it was necessary to preserve the Army by -admitting a certain conservatism into it. Such a conservatism serves -as a guarantee for the stability of the Army and of that authority -which seeks support in it. If the participation of the Army in -historical cataclysms cannot be avoided, neither can it be turned into -an arena for political struggle, creating, instead of the principle -of service--_pretorians or opritchniks_, whether of the Czar, of the -Revolutionary Democracy, or of any party is a matter of indifference. - -The Army was broken up. - -On those principles which the Revolutionary Democracy took as a basis -for the existence of the Army, the latter could neither build nor live. -It was no mere chance that all the later attempts at armed conflict -with Bolshevism began with the organisation of an Army on the normal -principles of military administration, to which the Soviet command as -well sought to pass gradually. No elemental circumstances, no errors -on the part of military dictatorships and of the powers co-operating -with or opposing them which led to the failure of the struggle (of this -some truths will be spoken later) are able to cast this undeniable fact -into the shade. Nor is it a mere chance that the leading circles of -the Revolutionary Democracy could create no armed forces, except that -pitiful parody on them--the "National Army" on the so-called "front of -the Constituent Assembly." It was just this circumstance that led the -Russian Socialist emigrants to the theory of non-resistance, of the -negation of armed struggle, to the concentration of all their hopes -on the inner degeneration of Bolshevism and its overthrow by some -immaterial "forces of the people themselves," which, however, could -not express themselves otherwise than by blood and iron: "the great, -bloodless" Revolution is drowned in blood from its beginning to its end. - -To refuse to consider that vast question--the re-creation of a National -Army on firm principles--is not to solve it. - -What then? On the day that Bolshevism falls will peace and good-will -immediately show forth in a land corrupted by a slavery worse than -that of the Tartar yoke, saturated with dissension, revenge, hatred, -and ... an enormous quantity of arms? Or, from that day forward, will -the self-interested desires of many foreign Governments disappear, or -will they grow stronger when the menace of the moral infection of the -Soviet has vanished? Finally, even should the whole of old Europe, -morally regenerated, beat out its swords into ploughshares, is it -impossible for a new Tchingiz-Khan to come out of the depths of that -Asia which has accounts age-long and huge beyond measure, against -Europe? - -The Army will be regenerated. Of that there can be no doubt. - -Shaken in its historical foundations and traditions, like the heroes -of the Russian legends, it will stand for no short time at the -cross-roads, gazing anxiously into the misty distances, still wrapped -in the gloom before the dawn, and listening intently to the vague -sounds of the voices calling to it. And among the delusive calls it -will seek, straining its hearing to the utmost, for the real voice ... -the voice of its own people. - - - PRINTED BY THE FIELD PRESS LTD., WINDSOR HOUSE, - BREAM'S BUILDINGS, LONDON, E.C. 4. - - -FOOTNOTES: - -[1] _Barin_ is the Russian word for master. It also means gentleman, -and was used by the peasants and by servants in addressing their -superiors. - -[2] The French Deputy, Louis Martin, estimates the losses of the -Armies in killed alone as follows:--(In millions) Russia 2-1/2, Germany -2, Austria 1-1/2, France 1.4, Great Britain 0.8, Italy 0.6, etc. Russia's -share of the martyrdom of all the Allied forces is 40 per cent. - -[3] President of the Duma. - -[4] The Grand Duke here refers to the manifesto drafted by Witte, -granting various liberties and decreeing the convocation of the Duma. - -[5] Miliukov: _History of the Second Russian Revolution_. - -[6] Minister of War. - -[7] Chessin: _La Revolution Russe_. - -[8] Quartermaster-General of the Commander-in-Chief of All Fronts. - -[9] Chief of Staff of the Northern Front (Com.-in-Ch., General Ruzsky). - -[10] Count Fredericks, Narishkine, Ruzsky, Gutchkov, Shulgin. - -[11] Shulgin's narrative. - -[12] Prince Lvov, Miliukov, Kerensky, Nekrassov, Teresvtchenko, Godnev, -Lvov, Gutchkov, and Rodzianko. - -[13] Miliukov: _History of the Second Russian Revolution_. - -[14] The murder took place on the night of July 16th, 1918. - -[15] Much time, pains and labour were devoted to the task of collecting -information about the murdered Imperial family by General Dietrichs. - -[16] The term _Soviet_ for brevity will be used in the course of the -narrative instead of _Soviet of Workmen's and Soldiers' Delegates_. - -[17] The word _Defensists_ is used as a translation of the newly-coined -Russian word _oboronetz_, which means "He who is in favour of a -defensive war." - -[18] A "poud" is equal to 40 pounds. - -[19] Gustave Le-Bon, _The Psychology of Socialism_. - -[20] The restoration of Poland in her _ethnographic_ frontiers was -intended by Russia also. - -[21] _Mes Souvenirs de Guerre._ - -[22] These lists contained the names of those suspected of relations -with the enemy Governments. - -[23] Among the members of the Committee were, for instance, Zourabov -and Perzitch, who had served under Parvus. - -[24] It is curious that Bronstein (Trotsky)--a person sufficiently -competent in the matter of secret communications with the Staffs of our -antagonists--said in the _Izvestia_ for July 8th, 1917: "In the paper -_Nashe Slovo_ I have exposed and pilloried Skoropis-Yoltoukhovsky, -Potok and Melenevsky as agents of the Austrian General Staff." - -[25] V. chap. IV.--Of course articles 7 and 8 did not meet with the -approval of public opinion. - -[26] Generally speaking, the special services, and especially the -artillery, retained their likeness to human beings, as well as a -certain amount of discipline, much longer than the infantry. - -[27] Leonid Andreiev's article: "_To thee, Oh soldier!_" - -[28] The greatest part was played by Lieutenant-Colonels of the General -Staff, Lebedev (afterwards Chief-of-Staff to Admiral Koltchak) and -Pronin. - -[29] The President was Colonel Novosiltsev, a member of the Fourth -State Douma, a Cadet (Constitutional Democrat). - -[30] The last Charter to the Cossacks of the Don was granted on January -24, 1906, by the Emperor Nicholas II., and contained the following -words: "... We confirm all the rights and privileges granted to it (the -Cossack Army), affirming by Our Imperial word both the indefeasibility -of its present form of service, which has earned the Army of the Don -historic glory and the inviolability of all its estates and lands, -gained by the labours, merits and blood of its ancestors...." - -[31] Such was the name given to the non-Cossack immigrant element in -the territory. - -[32] With artillery to correspond. - -[33] In the territory of the Don the peasants formed 48 per cent. of -the population and the Cossacks 46 per cent. - -[34] In places, the Territorial Council of "outsiders." - -[35] In the principal territories--on the Don and on the Kouban--the -Cossacks formed about one-half of the population. - -[36] Of these phenomena I shall speak later in more detail. - -[37] The Don, the Kouban, the Terek, Astrakhan, and the mountaineers of -the Northern Caucasus. I shall speak of this later. - -[38] The third cavalry corps, in Kornilov's advance against Kerensky. - -[39] The third cavalry corps with Kerensky against the Bolsheviks. - -[40] The Ural Cossacks, until their tragic fall in the end of 1919, -knew not Bolshevism. - -[41] General Alexeiev ordered its disbandment, but Kerensky permitted -it to remain. - -[42] They were disbanded. - -[43] A Socialist-Revolutionary emigrant and an active worker in his -party. He was appointed to this post by Kerensky, at the desire of the -Kiev Council of Soldiers' Delegates. - -[44] Oberoutchev. _In the Days of the Revolution._ - -[45] Among others, my former 4th Rifle Division was subjected to -Ukrainisation. - -[46] The Ukrainian Hetman Skoropadsky was one of his ancestors. - -[47] Formerly Commander of the 38th Army Corps. - -[48] The proposal of abdication made to the Emperor Nicholas II. - -[49] Gutchkov's official letter to the President of the Government. - -[50] Colonels: Baranovsky, Yakoubovitch, Prince Toumanov, and later -Verkhovsky. - -[51] 9th July--Reply to the greeting of the Moghilev Soviet. - -[52] See his evidence before the Commission of Inquiry. - -[53] Conversation by telegraph with Colonel Bazanovsky. - -[54] Savinkov: _The Kornilov Affair_. Savinkov's expostulations -prevailed. Kornilov even consented to remove Zavoiko from the limits of -the Front, but soon recalled him. - -[55] Chief of Staff of the Army. - -[56] Free Thought. (Transl. note). - -[57] Former Editor of the _Sovremenny Mir_ (Contemporary World), -and Social-Democrat of the _Yedinstvo_ Group. In 1921 he edited the -Bolshevist newspaper in Helsingfors. - -[58] Undoubtedly better than the Committee of the Western Front. - -[59] Held on August 14th, 1917. - -[60] In August the balance of forces in the Soviet altered rapidly in -favour of the Bolsheviks, giving them a majority. - -[61] General Parsky now occupies an important post in the Soviet Army, -while General Boldyrev was subsequently Commander-in-Chief of the -Anti-Bolshevist "Front of the Constituent Assembly" on the Volga. - -[62] 21st August. - -[63] From the Chief Committee of the Union of Officers, the Military -League, the Council of the Union of Cossack Troops, the Union of the -Knights of St. George, the Conference of Public Men, etc. - -[64] Until August 27th, _i.e._, until the rupture with Kornilov, -Kerensky could not bring himself to sign the draft laws embodying the -"programme." - -[65] The 3rd Cavalry Corps was summoned to Petrograd by the Provisional -Government. - -[66] From the report of the inquiry it is seen that Savinkov, in -charge of the Ministry of War, and the head of Kerensky's secretariat, -Colonel Baranovsky, despatched to the Stavka, themselves admitted the -possibility of simultaneous action by the Soviet of Workmen's and -Soldiers' Delegates and the Bolsheviks, the former under the influence -of the publication of the "Kornilov programme," and the necessity for -ruthlessly suppressing this. (Protocol Appendix XIII. to Kornilov's -deposition.) - -[67] As we shall see later, Savinkov stated in his evidence that -he "suggested no political combinations in the name of the -Minister-President." - -[68] The "Kornilov programme" is meant here. - -[69] The Commanders-in-Chief of the other Fronts sent the Provisional -Government telegrams of a completely loyal nature on August 28th. Their -tenor is seen from the following extracts: "Northern Front--General -Klembovsky: Consider change in Supreme Command extremely dangerous -when the threat of an external enemy to the integrity of our native -land and our freedom demands the speedy adoption of measures for the -strengthening of the discipline and fighting value of our Army." -"Western Front--General Baluev: The present situation of Russia demands -the immediate adoption of exceptional measures, and the retention of -General Kornilov at the head of the Army is an imperative necessity, -no matter what the political situation." "Roumanian Front--General -Scherbachev: The dismissal of General Kornilov will infallibly have a -fatal effect on the Army and the defence of the Motherland. I appeal to -your patriotism in the name of the salvation of our native land." All -the Commanders-in-Chief mentioned the necessity for the introduction of -the measures demanded by Kornilov. - -[70] This telegram was not received at Headquarters. Kerensky gives the -episode with Lvov thus: "On August 26th General Kornilov sent to me Vv. -N. Lvov, member of the State Duma, with a demand that the Provisional -Government should cede all its military and civil authority, leaving -him to form a Government for the country in accordance with his own -personal views." - -[71] On the morning of the 29th a telegram from the Quartermaster-General -at the Stavka somehow reached us, in which again hopes of a peaceful -settlement were held out. - -[72] He went through the Kouban campaigns with the Volunteer Army and -served in it to the day of his death, from spotted typhus, in 1920. - -[73] Official communication. - -[74] The members of the Commission were: Col. Raupach and Col. -Oukraintsev, military jurists; Kolokolov, examining magistrate; and -Lieber and Krochmal, members of the Executive Committee of the Soviet -of Workmen's and Soldiers' delegates. - -[75] Shablovsky, Kolokolov, Raupach and Oukraintsev. - -[76] Shablovsky's interview in the "Retch." - -[77] On that same morning we had been taken without any escort, with -only one guard accompanying us, to the bath, about two-thirds of a mile -from the guard-house, without attracting any attention. - -[78] This gallant officer was afterwards one of the first Volunteers, -was wounded again in Kornilov's first Kouban campaign in 1918, and died -in the spring of 1919 of spotted typhus. - -[79] The Kornilov case. - - - - - * * * * * * - - - - -Transcriber's note: - - Every effort has been made to replicate this text as faithfully as - possible. - - Soviet Order Number 1 is referred to as "Order No. 1." and "Order - No. I." in the printed text: this has been standardised to "Order - No. 1." - - The original contained several unmatched double quotation marks. - It was not possible to determine where the matching double - quotation marks belonged, and none were added. - - The reference to the footnote "Miliukov: _History of the Second - Russian Revolution_" on page 54 was missing in the original. - - The following is a list of changes made to the original. - The first line is the original line, the second the corrected one. - - Shulguin and Miliukov delivered their historical speeches, was - Shulgin and Miliukov delivered their historical speeches, was - - upon which the Czarist Government could reply. Everybody considered - upon which the Czarist Government could rely. Everybody considered - - the villages. Government servants of all kinds were impoverishd - the villages. Government servants of all kinds were impoverished - - the proletariat, the troops, the bourgoisie, even the nobility ... - the proletariat, the troops, the bourgeoisie, even the nobility ... - - terrorist crimes, military mutinies and aggrarian offences, etc. - terrorist crimes, military mutinies and agrarian offences, etc. - - At Pskov, on the evening of March 1st, the Czar saw General Rusky, - At Pskov, on the evening of March 1st, the Czar saw General Ruzsky, - - On the South-Western Front Ukranian units were being formed. - On the South-Western Front Ukrainian units were being formed. - - Socialistic Dumas, closely reminiscent of semi-Boshevik Soviets. - Socialistic Dumas, closely reminiscent of semi-Bolshevik Soviets. - - Administration, on the same basis as that in the munipalities. - Administration, on the same basis as that in the municipalities. - - of agriculture, and of the economic stablity of the State. - of agriculture, and of the economic stability of the State. - - As life was destroying allusions, and the implacable law - As life was destroying illusions, and the implacable law - - new Revolutionary regime is much more expensive that the old one. - new Revolutionary regime is much more expensive than the old one. - - the Baltic Fleet was actally in a state of complete insubordination. - the Baltic Fleet was actually in a state of complete insubordination. - - and Avaresco's Army on my flank. I thus gained a - and Averesco's Army on my flank. I thus gained a - - South-Western Front, in the direction from Kamemetz-Podolsk to Lvov, - South-Western Front, in the direction from Kamenetz-Podolsk to Lvov, - - and afforded an excuse for the abitrariness and violence - and afforded an excuse for the arbitrariness and violence - - Senior Commanding Staff considered as inadmissable the democratisation - Senior Commanding Staff considered as inadmissible the democratisation - - Gutchov, his Assistants, and officers of the General Staff. - Gutchkov, his Assistants, and officers of the General Staff. - - demanded that the Regimetal Committees should be empowered - demanded that the Regimental Committees should be empowered - - of their registration in the International Control List. - of their registration in the International Control List." - - in the Secret Police and director of the pre-Revolutionary _Pravdo_ - in the Secret Police and director of the pre-Revolutionary _Pravda_ - - (the organ of the Bolshevik Social Domocrats) broke them down. - (the organ of the Bolshevik Social Democrats) broke them down. - - issuing medical certicates even to the "thoroughly fit." - issuing medical certificates even to the "thoroughly fit." - - he had sent in a request that morning for two poods of bread. - he had sent in a request that morning for two pouds of bread. - - force every citizen to do his duty honestly by the Motherland?" - force every citizen to do his duty honestly by the Motherland? - - factories, in the villages, among the Liberal _intelligentcia_, - factories, in the villages, among the Liberal _intelligencia_, - - The Don, the Kouban, the Terex, Astrakhan, and the mountaineers - The Don, the Kouban, the Terek, Astrakhan, and the mountaineers - - As soon as I give an order to some reserve regiment or other - As soon as I gave an order to some reserve regiment or other - - that "discipline of duty" should be introduced from the top." - that "discipline of duty" should be introduced from the top. - - broke our front and moved swiftly towards Kaminetz-Podolsk, - broke our front and moved swiftly towards Kamenetz-Podolsk, - - On July 9th the Austro-Germans had aready reached Mikulinze, - On July 9th the Austro-Germans had already reached Mikulinze, - - in the eyes of many people he bacame a national hero - in the eyes of many people he became a national hero - - his Chief-of-Staff General Lukomsky, Generals Alexeiev and Russky, - his Chief-of-Staff General Lukomsky, Generals Alexeiev and Ruzsky, - - manifested itself in a series of dismissal of Senior Commanders, - manifested itself in a series of dismissals of Senior Commanders, - - A silence ensued, which I intrepreted as a permission to continue. - A silence ensued, which I interpreted as a permission to continue. - - had already taken place on the 8th of July, at Kamenets-Podolsk. - had already taken place on the 8th of July, at Kamenetz-Podolsk. - - was subordinated, not to the Stavka, but to the Minister of War, - was subordinated, not to the Stavka, but to the Minister of War. - - the Petrograd garrison, the depot ballations of which it was proposed - the Petrograd garrison, the depot battalions of which it was proposed - - Honest and dishonest, sincere and insincere, politicans, soldiers - Honest and dishonest, sincere and insincere, politicians, soldiers - - Even when the Plekhanov, the old leader of the Social-Democrats, - Even when Plekhanov, the old leader of the Social-Democrats, - - Kornilov, Loukomsky, Romanovsky, and others were taken off - Kornilov, Lukomsky, Romanovsky, and others were taken off - - isolation of the frontal region wtih respect to Kiev and Zhitomir. - isolation of the frontal region with respect to Kiev and Zhitomir. - - in the shortest possible time, and by Revolutionary Court-Martial." - in the shortest possible time, and by Revolutionary Court-Martial. - - through its representatives in the Consituent Assembly of 1918: - through its representatives in the Constituent Assembly of 1918: - - [12] Prince Lvov, Miliukov, Kerensky, Nekrasso, Teresvtchenko, - [12] Prince Lvov, Miliukov, Kerensky, Nekrassov, Teresvtchenko, - - [57] Former Editor of the _Souvremenny Mir_ (Contemporary World), - [57] Former Editor of the _Sovremenny Mir_ (Contemporary World), - - - -***END OF THE PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK THE RUSSIAN TURMOIL*** - - -******* This file should be named 43680.txt or 43680.zip ******* - - -This and all associated files of various formats will be found in: -http://www.gutenberg.org/dirs/4/3/6/8/43680 - - - -Updated editions will replace the previous one--the old editions -will be renamed. - -Creating the works from public domain print editions means that no -one owns a United States copyright in these works, so the Foundation -(and you!) can copy and distribute it in the United States without -permission and without paying copyright royalties. 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