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diff --git a/43680-0.txt b/43680-0.txt new file mode 100644 index 0000000..ec3716a --- /dev/null +++ b/43680-0.txt @@ -0,0 +1,14477 @@ +*** START OF THE PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK 43680 *** + +Note: Project Gutenberg also has an HTML version of this + file which includes the original illustrations and maps. + See 43680-h.htm or 43680-h.zip: + (http://www.gutenberg.org/files/43680/43680-h/43680-h.htm) + or + (http://www.gutenberg.org/files/43680/43680-h.zip) + + + Images of the original pages are available through + Internet Archive/Canadian Libraries. See + http://archive.org/details/russianturmoilme00deniuoft + + +Transcriber's Note: + + Text enclosed by underscores is in italics (_italics_). + + + + + +THE RUSSIAN TURMOIL + + +[Illustration: The Stavka Quartermaster-General's Branch. Standing on +the pathway, from left to right (centre): Generals Denikin (Chief of +Staff), Alexeiev (Supreme C.-in-C.), Josephovitch and Markov (first and +second Quartermasters-General).] + + +THE RUSSIAN TURMOIL + +Memoirs: Military, Social, and Political + +by + +GENERAL A. I. DENIKIN + +With 27 Illustrations, Diagrams and Maps + + + + + + + +London: Hutchinson & Co. +Paternoster Row + + + + +CONTENTS + + + PAGE + + FOREWORD 11 + + CHAPTER I. + + THE FOUNDATIONS OF THE OLD POWER: FAITH, THE CZAR, AND THE + MOTHER COUNTRY 13 + + CHAPTER II. + + THE ARMY 23 + + CHAPTER III. + + THE OLD ARMY AND THE EMPEROR 33 + + CHAPTER IV. + + THE REVOLUTION IN PETROGRAD 40 + + CHAPTER V. + + THE REVOLUTION AND THE IMPERIAL FAMILY 48 + + CHAPTER VI. + + THE REVOLUTION AND THE ARMY 57 + + CHAPTER VII. + + IMPRESSIONS OF PETROGRAD AT THE END OF MARCH, 1917 66 + + CHAPTER VIII. + + THE STAVKA: ITS RÔLE AND POSITION 72 + + CHAPTER IX. + + GENERAL MARKOV 79 + + CHAPTER X. + + THE POWER--THE DUMA--THE PROVISIONAL GOVERNMENT--THE HIGH + COMMAND--THE SOVIET OF WORKMEN'S AND SOLDIERS' DELEGATES 84 + + CHAPTER XI. + + THE BOLSHEVIK STRUGGLE FOR POWER--THE POWER OF THE ARMY AND + THE IDEA OF A DICTATORSHIP 96 + + CHAPTER XII. + + THE ACTIVITIES OF THE PROVISIONAL GOVERNMENT--INTERNAL POLITICS, + CIVIL ADMINISTRATION--THE TOWN, THE VILLAGE, AND THE AGRARIAN + PROBLEM 106 + + CHAPTER XIII. + + THE ACTIVITIES OF THE PROVISIONAL GOVERNMENT: FOOD SUPPLIES, + INDUSTRY, TRANSPORT, AND FINANCE 116 + + CHAPTER XIV. + + THE STRATEGICAL POSITION OF THE RUSSIAN FRONT 127 + + CHAPTER XV. + + THE QUESTION OF THE ADVANCE OF THE RUSSIAN ARMY 138 + + CHAPTER XVI. + + MILITARY REFORMS--THE GENERALS--THE DISMISSAL FROM THE HIGH + COMMAND 146 + + CHAPTER XVII. + + "DEMOCRATISATION OF THE ARMY"--ADMINISTRATION, SERVICE AND + ROUTINE 153 + + CHAPTER XVIII. + + THE DECLARATION OF THE RIGHTS OF THE SOLDIER AND COMMITTEES 159 + + CHAPTER XIX. + + THE DEMOCRATISATION OF THE ARMY: THE COMMISSARS 168 + + CHAPTER XX. + + THE DEMOCRATISATION OF THE ARMY--THE STORY OF "THE DECLARATION + OF THE RIGHTS OF THE SOLDIER" 174 + + CHAPTER XXI. + + THE PRESS AND PROPAGANDA 189 + + CHAPTER XXII. + + THE CONDITION OF THE ARMY AT THE JULY ADVANCE 209 + + CHAPTER XXIII. + + OFFICERS' ORGANISATIONS 229 + + CHAPTER XXIV. + + THE REVOLUTION AND THE COSSACKS 239 + + CHAPTER XXV. + + NATIONAL UNITS 248 + + CHAPTER XXVI. + + MAY AND THE BEGINNING OF JUNE IN THE SPHERE OF MILITARY + ADMINISTRATION--THE RESIGNATION OF GUTCHKOV AND GENERAL + ALEXEIEV--MY DEPARTURE FROM THE STAVKA--THE ADMINISTRATION + OF KERENSKY AND GENERAL BRUSSILOV 255 + + CHAPTER XXVII. + + MY TERM AS COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF ON THE WESTERN RUSSIAN FRONT 264 + + CHAPTER XXVIII. + + THE RUSSIAN ADVANCE IN THE SUMMER OF 1917--THE DÉBÂCLE 271 + + CHAPTER XXIX. + + THE CONFERENCE AT THE STAVKA OF MINISTERS AND COMMANDERS-IN-CHIEF + ON JULY 16TH 281 + + CHAPTER XXX. + + GENERAL KORNILOV 297 + + CHAPTER XXXI. + + MY SERVICE AS COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF OF THE SOUTH-WESTERN FRONT--THE + MOSCOW CONFERENCE--THE FALL OF RIGA 308 + + CHAPTER XXXII. + + GENERAL KORNILOV'S MOVEMENT AND ITS REPERCUSSION ON THE + SOUTH-WEST FRONT 318 + + CHAPTER XXXIII. + + IN BERDICHEV GAOL--THE TRANSFER OF THE "BERDICHEV GROUP" OF + PRISONERS TO BYKHOV 329 + + CHAPTER XXXIV. + + SOME CONCLUSIONS AS TO THE FIRST PERIOD OF THE REVOLUTION 338 + + +[Illustration: The old banner] + +[Illustration: And the new.] + + + + +LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS + + + THE STAVKA QUARTERMASTER-GENERAL'S BRANCH _Frontispiece_ + + THE OLD BANNER AND THE NEW Facing page 8 + + THE GRAND DUKE NICHOLAS DISTRIBUTES CROSSES OF ST. + GEORGE " " 14 + + FUNERAL OF THE FIRST VICTIMS OF THE MARCH REVOLUTION + IN PETROGRAD " " 44 + + GENERAL ALEXEIEV " " 72 + + GENERAL KORNILOV " " 72 + + GENERAL MARKOV " " 78 + + FOREIGN MILITARY REPRESENTATIVES AT THE STAVKA " " 144 + + THE CONFERENCE OF COMMANDERS-IN-CHIEF " " 166 + + A GROUP OF "PRISONERS" AT BERDICHEV " " 166 + + THE OLD ARMY: A REVIEW. GENERAL IVANOV " " 192 + + THE REVOLUTIONARY ARMY: A REVIEW. KERENSKY " " 192 + + BEFORE THE BATTLE IN THE REVOLUTIONARY ARMY: A MEETING " " 200 + + TYPES OF MEN IN THE REVOLUTIONARY ARMY " " 200 + + BEFORE THE BATTLE IN THE OLD ARMY: PRAYERS " " 208 + + TYPES OF SOLDIERS OF THE OLD ARMY " " 210 + + GENERAL ALEXEIEV'S FAREWELL " " 254 + + KERENSKY ADDRESSING SOLDIERS' MEETING " " 262 + + GENERAL KORNILOV'S ARRIVAL AT PETROGRAD " " 280 + + GENERAL KORNILOV IN THE TRENCHES " " 280 + + GENERAL KORNILOV'S WELCOME IN MOSCOW " " 316 + + + + +LIST OF DIAGRAMS AND MAPS + + + PAGE + + 1. DIAGRAM OF THE COMPARATIVE FORCES OF THE GERMANS IN + DIFFERENT THEATRES OF WAR 32 + + 2. DIAGRAM INDICATING THE POLITICAL PARTY DIVISIONS IN RUSSIA + AFTER THE REVOLUTION 90 + + 3. MAP OF THE RUSSIAN EUROPEAN FRONT IN 1917 130 + + 4. MAP OF THE RUSSIAN CAUCASIAN FRONT IN 1917 131 + + 5. MAP OF THE RUSSIAN FRONT IN JUNE AND JULY, 1917 298 + + 6. MAP OF THE RUSSIAN FRONT TILL AUGUST 19TH AND AFTER 299 + + + + +FOREWORD + + +In the midst of the turmoil and bloodshed in Russia people perish and +the real outlines of historical events are obliterated. It is for this +reason that I have decided to publish these memoirs, in spite of the +difficulties of work in my present condition of a refugee, unable to +refer to any archives or documents and deprived of the possibility of +discussing events with those who have taken part in them. + +The first part of my book deals chiefly with the Russian Army, with +which my life has been closely linked up. Political, social and +economic questions are discussed only in so far as I have found it +necessary to describe their influence upon the course of events. + +In 1917 the Army played a decisive part in the fate of Russia. Its +participation in the progress of the Revolution, its life, degradation +and collapse should serve as a great warning and a lesson to the new +builders of Russian life. This applies not only to the struggle against +the present tyrants. When Bolshevism is defeated, the Russian people +will have to undertake the tremendous task of reviving its moral and +material forces, as well as that of preserving its sovereign existence. +Never in history has this task been as arduous as it is now, because +there are many outside Russia's borders waiting eagerly for her end. +They are waiting in vain. The Russian people will rise in strength +and wisdom from the deathbed of blood, horror and poverty, moral and +physical. + + + + +The Russian Turmoil + + + + +CHAPTER I. + +THE FOUNDATIONS OF THE OLD POWER: FAITH, THE CZAR AND THE MOTHER +COUNTRY. + + +The inevitable historical process which culminated in the Revolution +of March, 1917, has resulted in the collapse of the Russian State. +Philosophers, historians and sociologists, in studying the course +of Russian life, may have foreseen the impending catastrophe. But +nobody could foresee that the people, rising like a tidal wave, +would so rapidly and so easily sweep away all the foundations of +their existence: the Supreme Power and the Governing classes which +disappeared without a struggle; the intelligencia, gifted but weak, +isolated and lacking will-power, which at first, in the midst of a +deadly struggle, had only words as a weapon, later submissively bent +their necks under the knife of the victors; and last, but not least, an +army of ten million, powerful and imbued with historic traditions. That +army was destroyed in three or four months. + +This last event--the collapse of the army--was not, however, quite +unexpected, as the epilogue of the Manchurian war and the subsequent +events in Moscow, Kronstadt and Sevastopol were a terrible warning. +At the end of November, 1905, I lived for a fortnight in Harbin, and +travelled on the Siberian Railway for thirty-one days in December, +1907, through a series of "republics" from Harbin to Petrograd. I thus +gained a clear indication of what might be expected from a licentious +mob of soldiers utterly devoid of restraining principles. All the +meetings, resolutions, soviets--in a word, all the manifestations of +a mutiny of the military--were repeated in 1917 with photographic +accuracy, but with greater impetus and on a much larger scale. + +It should be noted that the possibility of such a rapid psychological +transformation was not characteristic of the Russian Army alone. There +can be no doubt that war-weariness after three years of bloodshed +played an important part in these events, as the armies of the whole +world were affected by it and were rendered more accessible to the +disintegrating influences of extreme Socialist doctrines. In the +autumn of 1918 the German Army Corps that occupied the region of the +Don and Little Russia were demoralised in one week, and they repeated +to a certain extent the process which we had already lived through of +meetings, soviets, committees, of doing away with Commanding Officers, +and in some units of the sale of military stores, horses and arms. +It was not till then that the Germans understood the tragedy of +the Russian officers. More than once our volunteers saw the German +officers, formerly so haughty and so frigid, weeping bitterly over +their degradation. + +"You have done the same to us; you have done it with your own hands," +we said. + +"Not we; it was our Government," was their reply. + +In the winter of 1918, as Commander-in-Chief of the Volunteer Army, I +received an offer from a group of German officers to join our army as +volunteers in the ranks. + +The collapse of the army cannot be explained away as the psychological +result of defeats and disasters. Even the victors experienced +disturbances in the army. There was a certain amount of disaffection +among the French troops occupying, in the beginning of 1918, the +region of Odessa and Roumania, in the French fleet cruising in the +Black Sea, among the British troops in the region of Constantinople +and Transcaucasia. The troops did not always obey the orders of their +Commanding Officers. Rapid demobilisation and the arrival of fresh, +partly volunteer elements, altered the situation. + +[Illustration: The Grand Duke Nicholas distributes Crosses of St. +George.] + +What was the condition of the Russian Army at the outbreak of the +Revolution? From time immemorial the entire ideology of our soldiers +was contained in the well-known formula: "For God, for the Czar and +for the Mother Country." Generation after generation was born and bred +on that formula. These ideas, however, did not penetrate deeply enough +into the masses of the people and of the army. For many centuries +the Russian people had been deeply religious, but their faith was +somewhat shaken in the beginning of the Twentieth Century. The Russian +people, as the Russian saying goes, was "the bearer of Christ"--a +people inwardly disposed towards Universal Brotherhood, great in its +simplicity, truthfulness, humility and forgiveness. That people, +Christian in the fullest sense of the word, was gradually changing as +it came under the influence of material interests, and learnt or was +taught to see in the gratifying of those interests the sole purpose +of life. The link between the people and its spiritual leaders was +gradually weakening as these leaders were detached from the people, +entered into the service of the Governing powers, and shared the +latter's deficiencies. The development of this moral transformation +of the Russian people is too deep and too complex to fall within the +scope of these memoirs. It is undeniable that the youngsters who +joined the ranks treated questions of the Faith and of the Church with +indifference. In barracks they lost the habits of their homes, and +were forcibly removed from a more wholesome and settled atmosphere, +with all its creeds and superstitions. They received no spiritual or +moral education, which in barracks was considered a matter of minor +importance, completely overshadowed by practical and material cares +and requirements. A proper spirit could not be created in barracks, +where Christian morals, religious discourses, and even the rites of +the Church bore an official and sometimes even compulsory character. +Commanding Officers know how difficult it was to find a solution of the +vexed question of attendance at Church services. + +War introduced two new elements into the spiritual life of the army. On +the one hand, there was a certain moral coarseness and cruelty; on the +other, it seemed as if faith had been deepened by constant danger. I do +not wish to accuse the orthodox military clergy as a body. Many of its +representatives proved their high valour, courage and self-sacrifice. +It must, however, be admitted that the clergy failed to produce a +religious revival among the troops. It is not their fault, because the +world-war into which Russia was drawn was due to intricate political +and economic causes, and there was no room for religious fervour. +The clergy, however, likewise failed to establish closer connection +with the troops. After the outbreak of the Revolution the officers +continued for a long time to struggle to keep their waning power and +authority, but the voice of the priests was silenced almost at once, +and they ceased to play any part whatsoever in the life of the troops. +I recall an episode typical of the mental attitude of military circles +in those days. One of the regiments of the Fourth Rifle Division had +built a camp Church quite close to its lines, and had built it with +great care and very artistically. The Revolution came. A demagogue +captain decided that his company had inadequate quarters and that a +Church was a superstition. On his own authority he converted the Church +into quarters for his company, and dug a hole where the altar stood +for purposes which it is better not to mention. I am not surprised +that such a scoundrel was found in the regiment or that the Higher +Command was terrorised and silent. But why did two or three thousand +orthodox Russians, bred in the mystic rites of their faith, remain +indifferent to such a sacrilege? Be that as it may, there can hardly be +any doubt that religion ceased to be one of the moral impulses which +upheld the spirit of the Russian Army and prompted it to deeds of +valour or protected it later from the development of bestial instincts. +The orthodox clergy, generally speaking, was thrown overboard +during the storm. Some of the high dignitaries of the Church--the +Metropolitans--Pitirim and Makarius--the Archbishop Varnava and others, +unfortunately were closely connected with the Governing bureaucracy +of the Rasputin period of Petrograd history. The lower grades of +the clergy, on the other hand, were in close touch with the Russian +intellectuals. + +I cannot take it upon myself to judge of the extent to which the +Russian Church remained an active force after it came under the yoke of +the Bolsheviks. An impenetrable veil hangs over the life of the Russian +Church in Soviet Russia, but there can be no doubt that spiritual +renaissance is progressing and spreading, that the martyrdom of +hundreds, nay, thousands, of priests is waking the dormant conscience +of the people and is becoming a legend in their minds. + + +THE CZAR. + +It is hardly necessary to prove that the enormous majority of the +Commanding Officers were thoroughly loyal to the Monarchist idea and +to the Czar himself. The subsequent behaviour of the higher Commanding +Officers who had been Monarchists was due partly to motives of +self-seeking, partly to pusillanimity and to the desire to conceal +their real feelings in order to remain in power and to carry out their +own plans. Cases in which a change of front was the result of the +collapse of ideals, of a new outlook, or was prompted by motives of +practical statesmanship, were rare. For example, it would have been +childish to have believed General Brussilov when he asserted that from +the days of his youth he had been "a Socialist and a Republican." He +was bred in the traditions of the Old Guards, was closely connected +with circles of the Court, and permeated with their outlook. His +habits, tastes, sympathies and surroundings were those of a _barin_.[1] +No man can be a lifelong liar to himself and to others. The majority +of the officers of the Regular Russian Army had Monarchist principles +and were undoubtedly loyal. After the Japanese war, as a result of the +first Revolution, the Officers' Corps was, nevertheless, placed, for +reasons which are not sufficiently clear, under the special supervision +of the Police Department, and regimental Commanding Officers received +from time to time "black lists." The tragedy of it was that it was +almost useless to argue against the verdict of "unreliability," while, +at the same time, it was forbidden to conduct one's own investigation, +even in secret. This system of spying introduced an unwholesome +spirit into the army. Not content with this system, the War Minister, +General Sukhomlinov, introduced his own branch of counter-spies, which +was headed unofficially by Colonel Miassoyedov, who was afterwards +shot as a German spy. At every military District Headquarters an +organ was instituted, headed by an officer of the Gendarmerie +dressed up in G.H.Q. uniform. Officially, he was supposed to deal +with foreign espionage, but General Dukhonin (who was killed by the +Bolsheviks), when Chief of the Intelligence Bureau of the Kiev G.H.Q. +before the War, bitterly complained to me of the painful atmosphere +created by this new organ, which was officially subordinate to the +Quartermaster-General, but in reality looked on him with suspicion, and +was spying not only upon the Staff, but upon its own chiefs. + +Life itself seemed to induce the officers to utter some kind of protest +against the existing order. Of all the classes that served the State, +there had been for a long time no element so downtrodden and forlorn +or so ill-provided for as the officers of the Regular Russian Army. +They lived in abject poverty. Their rights and their self-esteem were +constantly ignored by the Senior Officers. The utmost the rank and +file could hope for as the crowning of their career was the rank of +Colonel and an old age spent in sickness and semi-starvation. From the +middle of the nineteenth century the Officers' Corps had completely +lost its character as a class and a caste. Since universal compulsory +service was introduced and the nobility ceased to be prosperous the +gates of military schools were opened wide to people of low extraction +and to young men belonging to the lower strata of the people, but with +a diploma from the civil schools. They formed a majority in the Army. +Mobilisations, on the other hand, reinforced the Officers' Corps by the +infusion of a great many men of the liberal professions, who introduced +new ideas and a new outlook. Finally, the tremendous losses suffered +by the Regular Officers' Corps compelled the High Command to relax to +a certain extent the regulations concerning military training and +education, and to introduce on a broad scale promotions from the ranks +for deeds of valour, and to give rankers a short training in elementary +schools to fit them to be temporary officers. + +These circumstances, characteristic of all armies formed from the +masses, undoubtedly reduced the fighting capacity of the Officers' +Corps, and brought about a certain change in its political outlook, +bringing it nearer to that of the average Russian intellectual and to +democracy. This the leaders of the Revolutionary democracy did not, +or, to be more accurate, would not, understand in the first days of +the Revolution. In the course of my narrative I will differentiate +between the "Revolutionary Democracy"--an agglomeration of socialist +parties--and the true Russian Democracy, to which the middle-class +intelligencia and the Civil Service elements undoubtedly belong. + +The spirit of the Regular Officers was, however, gradually changing. +The Japanese War, which disclosed the grave shortcomings of the country +and of the Army, the Duma and the Press, which had gained a certain +liberty after 1905, played an important part in the political education +of the officers. The mystic adoration of the Monarch began gradually to +vanish. Among the junior generals and other officers there appeared men +in increasing numbers capable of differentiating between the idea of +the Monarchy and personalities, between the welfare of the country and +the form of government. In officer circles opportunities occurred for +criticism, analysis, and sometimes for severe condemnation. + +It is to be wondered that in these circumstances our officers remained +steadfast and stoutly resisted the extremist, destructive currents of +political thought. The percentage of men who reached the depths and +were unmasked by the authorities was insignificant. With regard to the +throne, generally speaking, there was a tendency among the officers to +separate the person of the Emperor from the miasma with which he was +surrounded, from the political errors and misdeeds of the Government, +which was leading the country steadily to ruin and the Army to defeat. +They wanted to forgive the Emperor, and tried to make excuses for him. + +In spite of the accepted view, the monarchical idea had no deep, mystic +roots among the rank and file, and, of course, the semi-cultured masses +entirely failed to realise the meaning of other forms of Government +preached by Socialists of all shades of opinion. Owing to a certain +innate Conservatism, to habits dating from time immemorial, and to +the teaching of the Church, the existing régime was considered as +something quite natural and inevitable. In the mind and in the heart +of the soldier the idea of a monarch was, if I may so express it, "in +a potential state," rising sometimes to a point of high exaltation +when the monarch was personally approached (at reviews, parades and +casual meetings), and sometimes falling to indifference. At any rate, +the Army was in a disposition sufficiently favourable to the idea of +a monarchy and to the dynasty, and that disposition could have easily +been maintained. But a sticky cobweb of licentiousness and crime was +being woven at Petrograd and Czarskoe Selo. The truth, intermingled +with falsehood, penetrated into the remotest corners of the country +and into the Army, and evoked painful regrets and sometimes malicious +rejoicings. The members of the House of Romanov did not preserve the +"idea" which the orthodox monarchists wished to surround with a halo of +greatness, nobility and reverence. I recall the impression of a sitting +of the Duma which I happened to attend. For the first time, Gutchkov +uttered a word of warning from the Tribune of the Duma about Rasputin. + +"All is not well with our land." + +The House, which had been rather noisy, was silent, and every word, +spoken in a low voice, was distinctly audible in remote corners. A +mysterious cloud, pregnant with catastrophe, seemed to hang over the +normal course of Russian history. I will not dwell on the corrupt +influences prevailing in Ministerial dwellings and Imperial palaces +to which the filthy and cynical impostor found access, who swayed +ministers and rulers. + +The Grand Duke Nicholas is supposed to have threatened to hang +Rasputin should he venture to appear at G.H.Q. General Alexeiev also +disapproved strongly of the man. That the influence of Rasputin did +not spread to the old Army is due entirely to the attitude of the +above-named generals. All sorts of stories about Rasputin's influence +was circulated at the front, and the Censor collected an enormous +amount of material on the subject, even from soldiers' letters from the +front; but the gravest impression was produced by the word "TREASON" +with reference to the Empress. In the Army, openly and everywhere, +conversations were heard about the Empress' persistent demands for a +separate peace and of her treachery towards Lord Kitchener, of whose +journey she was supposed to have informed the Germans. As I recall the +past, and the impression produced in the Army by the _rumour_ of the +Empress' treason, I consider that this circumstance had a very great +influence upon the attitude of the Army towards the dynasty and the +revolution. In the spring of 1917 I questioned General Alexeiev on +this painful subject. His answer, reluctantly given, was vague. He +said: "When the Empress' papers were examined she was found to be in +possession of a map indicating in detail the disposition of the troops +along the entire front. Only two copies were prepared of this map, one +for the Emperor and one for myself. I was very painfully impressed. God +knows who may have made use of this map." + +History will undoubtedly throw light on the fateful influence exercised +by the Empress Alexandra upon the Russian Government in the period +preceding the Revolution. As regards the question of treason, this +disastrous rumour has not been confirmed by a single fact, and was +afterwards contradicted by the investigations of a Commission specially +appointed by the Provisional Government, on which representatives of +the Soviet of workmen and soldiers served. + +We now come to the third foundation--the _Mother Country_. Deafened +as we were, alas! by the thunder and rattle of conventional patriotic +phrases, endlessly repeated along the whole length and breadth of +Russia, we failed to detect the fundamental, innate defect of the +Russian people--its lack of patriotism. It is no longer necessary to +force an open door by proving this statement. The Brest-Litovsk Treaty +provoked no outburst of popular wrath. Russian society was indifferent +to the separation of the Border States, even those that were Russian +in spirit and in blood. What is more, Russian society approved of this +dismemberment. We know of the agreement between Poland and Petlura, +between Poland and the Soviet. We know that Russian territorial and +material riches were sold for a song to international, political +usurers. Need we adduce further proofs? + +There can be no doubt that the collapse of Russian Statehood as +manifested in "self-determination" was in several instances caused by +the desire to find a temporary safeguard against the Bedlam of the +Soviet Republic. Life, however, unfortunately does not stop at the +practical application of this peculiar "sanitary cordon," but strikes +at the very idea of Statehood. This occurred even in such stable +districts as the Cossack provinces, not, however, among the masses, +but among the leaders themselves. Thus at Ekaterinodar in 1920, at the +"High Krug" (Assembly) of the three Cossack armies, the mention of +Russia was omitted after a heated discussion from the proposed formula +of the oath.... + +Is Crucified Russia unworthy of our love? + +What, then, was the effect of the Mother Country idea upon the +conscience of the old Army? The upper strata of the Russian +intellectuals were well aware of the reasons for the world +conflagration, of the conflict of the Powers for political and +economic supremacy, for free routes, for markets and colonies--a +conflict in which Russia's part was merely one of self-defence. On +the other hand, the average number of the Russian _intelligencia_, +as well as officers, were often satisfied merely with the immediate +and more obvious and easily comprehensible causes. Nobody wanted the +war, except, perhaps, the impressionable young officers yearning for +exploits. It was believed that the powers-that-be would take every +precaution in order to avoid a rupture. Gradually, however, the fatal +inevitability of war was understood. There was no question on our part +of aggressiveness or self-interest. To sympathise sincerely with the +weak and the oppressed was in keeping with the traditional attitude of +Russia. Also, we did not draw the sword--the sword was drawn against +us. That is why, when the war began, the voices were silenced of those +who feared that, owing to the low level of her culture and economic +development, Russia would be unable to win in the contest with a strong +and cultured enemy. War was accepted in a patriotic spirit, which was +at times akin to enthusiasm. Like the majority of the intellectuals, +the officers did not take much interest in the question of war aims. +The war began; defeat would have led to immeasurable disaster to +our country in every sphere of its life, to territorial losses, +political decadence and economic slavery. Victory was, therefore, +a necessity. All other questions were relegated to the background. +There was plenty of time for their discussion, for new decisions and +for changes. This simplified attitude towards the war, coupled with +a profound understanding and with a national self-consciousness, was +not understood by the left wing of the Russian politicians, who were +driven to Zimmerwald and Kienthal. No wonder, therefore, that when +the anonymous and the Russian leaders of the Revolutionary democracy +were confronted in February, 1917, before the Army was deliberately +destroyed, with the dilemma: "Are we to save the country or the +Revolution?" they chose the latter. + +Still less did the illiterate masses of the people understand the idea +of national self-preservation. The people went to war submissively, +but without enthusiasm and without any clear perception of the +necessity for a great sacrifice. Their psychology did not rise to the +understanding of abstract national principles. "The people-in-arms," +for that was what the Army really was, were elated by victory and +downhearted when defeated. They did not fully understand the necessity +for crossing the Carpathians, and had, perhaps, a clearer idea of +the meaning of the struggle on the Styr and the Pripet. And yet it +found solace in the thought: "We are from Tambov; the Germans will +not reach us." It is necessary to repeat this stale saying, because +it expresses the deep-rooted psychology of the average Russian. As a +result of this predominance of material interests in the outlook of +"the people-in-arms," they grasped more easily the simple arguments +based on realities in favour of a stubborn fight and of victory, as +well as the impossibility of admitting defeat. These arguments were: +A foreign German domination, the ruin of the country and of the home, +the weight of the taxes which would inevitably be levied after defeat, +the fall in the price of grain, which would have to go through foreign +channels, etc. In addition, there was some feeling of confidence that +the Government was doing the right thing, the more so as the nearest +representatives of that power, the officers, were going forward +with the troops and were dying in the same spirit of readiness and +submission as the men, either because they had been ordered to do +so, or else because they thought it their duty. The rank and file, +therefore, bravely faced death. Afterwards when confidence was shaken, +the masses of the Army were completely perplexed. The formulas, +"without annexations and indemnities," "the self-determination of +peoples," etc., proved more abstract and less intelligible than the +old repudiated and rusty idea of the Mother Country, which still +persisted underneath them. In order to keep the men at the front, the +well-known arguments of a materialistic nature, such as the threat of +German domination, the ruin of the home, the weight of taxes, were +expounded from platforms decorated with red flags. They were taught by +Socialists, who favoured a war of defence. + +Thus the three principles which formed the foundations of the Army were +undermined. In describing the anomalies and spiritual shortcomings +of the Russian Army, far be it from me to place it below the level +of armies of other countries. These shortcomings are inherent in all +armies formed from the masses, which are almost akin to a militia, but +this did not prevent these armies or our own from gaining victories +and continuing the war. It is necessary, however, to draw a complete +picture of the spirit of the Army in order to understand its subsequent +destiny. + + + + +CHAPTER II. + +THE ARMY. + + +The Russo-Japanese war had a very great influence upon the +development of the Russian army. The bitterness of defeat and the +clear consciousness that the policy governing military affairs was +disastrously out of date gave a great impulse to the junior military +elements and forced the slack and inert elements gradually to alter +their ways or else to retire. In spite of the passive resistance of +several men at the head of the War Ministry and the General Staff, who +were either incompetent or else treated the interests of the army with +levity and indifference, work was done at full speed. In ten years the +Russian army, without of course attaining the ideal, made tremendous +progress. It may be confidently asserted that, had it not been for the +hard lessons of the Manchurian campaign, Russia would have been crushed +in the first months of the Great War. + +Yet the cleansing of the commanding personnel went too slowly. Our +softness ("Poor devil! we must give him a job"), wire-pulling, +intrigues, and too slavish an observance of the rules of seniority +resulted in the ranks of senior commanding officers being crowded with +worthless men. The High Commission for granting testimonials, which +sat twice a year in Petrograd, hardly knew any of those to whom these +testimonials were given. Therein lies the reason for the mistakes made +at the outbreak of war in many appointments to High Commands. Four +Commanders-in-Chief (one of them suffered from mental paralysis--it is +true that his appointment was only temporary), several Army Commanders, +many Army Corps and Divisional Commanders had to be dismissed. In the +very first days of the concentration of the Eighth Army, in July, +1914, General Brussilov dismissed three Divisional and one Army Corps +Commanders. Yet nonentities retained their commands, and they ruined +the troops and the operations. Under the same General Brussilov, +General D., relieved several times of his command, went from a cavalry +division to three infantry divisions in turn, and found final repose +in German captivity. Most unfortunately, the whole army was aware of +the incompetence of these Commanding Officers, and wondered at their +appointments. Owing to these deficiencies, the strategy of the entire +campaign lacked inspiration and boldness. Such, for example, were +the operations of the North-Western front in East Prussia, prompted +solely by the desire of G.H.Q. to save the French Army from a desperate +position. Such, in particular, was Rennenkampf's shameful manoeuvre, +as well as the stubborn forcing of the Carpathians, which dismembered +the troops of the South-Western front in 1915, and finally our advance +in the spring of 1916. + +The last episode was so typical of the methods of our High Command and +its consequences were so grave that it is worth our while to recall it. + +When the armies of the South-Western front took the offensive in May, +the attack was eminently successful and several Austrian divisions +were heavily defeated. When my division, after the capture of Lutsk, +was moving by forced marches to Vladimir Volynsk, I considered--and +we all considered--that our manoeuvre represented the entire scheme +of the advance, that our front was dealing the main blow. We learnt +afterwards that the task of dealing the main blow had been entrusted +to the Western front, and that Brussilov's armies were only making a +demonstration. There, towards Vilna, large forces had been gathered, +equipped with artillery and technical means such as we had never had +before. For several months the troops had been preparing _places +d'armes_ for the advance. At last all was ready, and the success of the +Southern armies that diverted the enemy's attention and his reserves +also promised success to the Western front. + +Almost on the eve of the contemplated offensive the historical +conversation took place on the telephone between General Evert, +C.-in-C. of the Western front, and General Alexeiev, Chief of Staff of +the Supreme Commander-in-Chief. The gist of the conversation was the +following: + +_A._ Circumstances require an immediate decision. Are you ready for the +advance and are you certain to be successful? + +_E._ I have no certainty of success. The enemy's positions are very +strong. Our troops will have to attack the positions against which +their previous attacks have failed. + +_A._ If that is the case, you must give immediate orders for the +transfer of troops to the South-Western front. I will report to the +Emperor. + +So the operation, so long awaited and so methodically prepared, +collapsed. The Western Army Corps, sent to reinforce us, came too late. +Our advance was checked. The senseless slaughter on the swampy banks +of the Stokhod then began. Incidentally, the Guards lost the flower +of their men in those battles. Meanwhile, the German Eastern front +was going through a period of intense anxiety. "It was a critical +time," says Ludendorff in his _Mes Souvenirs de Guerre_. "We had +spent ourselves, and we knew full well that no one would come to our +assistance if the Russians chose to attack us." + +An episode may be mentioned in this connection, which occurred to +General Brussilov. The story is not widely known, and may serve as +an interesting sidelight on the character of the General--one of the +leaders of the campaign. After the brilliant operations of the Eighth +Army, which ended in the crossing of the Carpathians and the invasion +of Hungary, the C.-in-C., General Brussilov, suffered a curious +psychological breakdown. Under the impression that a partial reverse +had been sustained by one of the Army Corps, he issued an order for +a general retreat, and the Army began rapidly to roll back. He was +haunted by imaginary dangers of the enemy breaking through, surrounding +our troops, of attacks of enemy cavalry which were supposed to threaten +the G.H.Q. Twice General Brussilov moved his H.Q. with a swiftness akin +to a panicky flight. The C.-in-C. was thus detached from his armies and +out of touch with them. + +We were retreating day after day in long, weary marches, and utterly +bewildered. The Austrians did not outnumber us, and their moral was no +higher than ours. They did not press us. Every day, my riflemen and +Kornilov's troops in our vicinity delivered short counter-attacks, took +many prisoners, and captured machine-guns. + +The Quartermaster-General's branch of the Army was even more puzzled. +Every day it reported that the news of the retreat was unfounded; +but Brussilov at first disregarded these reports, and later became +greatly incensed. The General Staff then had recourse to another +stratagem: they approached Brussilov's old friend, the veteran General +Panchulidzev, Chief of the Army Sanitation Branch, and persuaded him +that, if this retreat continued, the Army might suspect treason and +things might take an ugly turn. Panchulidzev visited Brussilov. An +intensely painful scene took place. As a result, Brussilov was found +weeping bitterly and Panchulidzev fainted. On the same day, an order +was issued for an advance, and the troops went forward rapidly and +easily, driving the Austrians before them. The strategical position was +restored as well as the reputation of the Army Commander. + +It must be admitted that not only the troops but the Commanders were +but scantily informed of the happenings of the front, and had hazy +ideas on the general strategical scheme. The troops criticised them +only when it was obvious that they had to pay the price of blood for +these schemes. So it was in the Carpathians, at Stokhod, during the +second attack on Przemyshl in the spring of 1917, etc. The moral of +the troops was affected chiefly by the great Galician retreat, the +unhappy progress of the war on the Northern and Western fronts--where +no victories were won--and by the tedious lingering for over a year in +positions of which everyone was sick to death. + + * * * * * + +I have already mentioned the cadres of commissioned officers. The great +and small shortcomings of these cadres increased as the cadres became +separated. No one expected the campaign to be protracted, and the Army +organisation was not careful to preserve the cadres of officers and +non-commissioned officers. They were drafted wholesale into the ranks +at the outbreak of war. I remember so well a conversation that took +place during the period of mobilisation, which was then contemplated +against Austria alone. It occurred in the flat of General V. M. +Dragomirov, one of the prominent leaders of the Army. A telegram was +brought in announcing that Germany had declared war. There was a dead +silence. Everyone was deep in thought. Somebody asked Dragomirov: + +"How long do you think the war will last?" + +"Four months." + +Companies went to the front sometimes with five to six officers. +Regular officers, and later the majority of other officers, invariably +and in all circumstances gave the example of prowess, pluck and +self-sacrifice. It is only natural that most of them were killed. +Another reliable element--the N.C.O.'s of the Reserve--was also +recklessly squandered. In the beginning of the war they formed +sometimes 50 per cent. of the rank and file. Relations between officers +and men in the old army were not always based upon healthy principles. +It cannot be denied that there was a certain aloofness caused by +the insufficient attention paid by the officers to the spiritual +requirements of the soldier's life. These relations, however, gradually +improved as the barriers of caste and class were broken down. The war +drew officers and men ever closer together, and in some regiments, +mostly of the line, there was a true brotherhood in arms. One +reservation must here be made. The outward intercourse bore the stamp +of the general lack of culture from which not only the masses but also +the Russian intellectuals suffered. Heartfelt solicitude, touching care +of the men's needs, simplicity and friendliness--all these qualities +of the Russian officer, who lay for months on end in the wet, dirty +trenches beside their men, ate out of the same pot, died quietly and +without a murmur, was buried in the same "fraternal grave"--were marred +by an occasional roughness, swearing, and sometimes by arbitrariness +and blows. + +There can be no doubt that the same conditions existed within the +ranks, and the only difference was that the sergeant and the corporal +were rougher and more cruel than the officers. These deplorable +circumstances coupled with the boredom and stupidity of barrack life, +and the petty restrictions imposed upon the men by the military +regulations, gave ample scope for underground seditious propaganda in +which the soldier was described as the "victim of the arbitrariness +of the men with golden epaulettes." The sound feeling and naturally +healthy outlook of the men was not mentioned while the discomforts +of military life were insisted on in order to foster a spirit of +discontent. + +This state of affairs was all the more serious because during the +war the process of consolidating the different units became more and +more difficult. These units, and especially the infantry regiments, +suffering terrible losses and changing their personnel ten or twelve +times, became to some extent recruiting stations through which men +flowed in an uninterrupted stream. They remained there but a short +time, and failed to become imbued with the military traditions of +their unit. The artillery and some other special branches remained +comparatively solid, and this was due in some measure to the fact +that their losses were, as compared with the losses suffered by the +infantry, only in the proportion of one to ten or one to twenty. + +On the whole the atmosphere in the Army and in the Navy was not, +therefore, particularly wholesome. In varying degrees, the two elements +of the Army--the rank and file and the commanding cadres--were divided. +For this the Russian officers, as well as the intellectuals, were +undoubtedly responsible. Their misdeeds resulted in the idea gaining +ground that the _barin_ (master) and the officer were opposed to the +_moujik_ and the soldier. A favourable atmosphere was thus created for +the work of destructive forces. + +Anarchist elements were by no means predominant in the Army. The +foundations, though somewhat unstable, had to be completely shattered; +the new power had to commit a long series of mistakes and crimes to +convert the state of smouldering discontent into active rebellion, +the bloody spectre of which will for some time to come hang over our +hapless Russian land. + +Destructive outside influences were not counteracted in the Army by a +reasonable process of education. This was due partly to the political +unpreparedness of the officers, partly to the instinctive fear felt +by the old régime of introducing "politics" into barracks, even with +a view to criticising subversive doctrines. This fear was felt not +only in respect of social and internal problems but even in respect +of foreign policy. Thus, for example, an Imperial order was issued +shortly before the war, strictly prohibiting any discussion amongst +the soldiers on the subject of the political issues of the moment (the +Balkan question, the Austro-Serbian conflict, etc.). On the eve of the +inevitable national war, the authorities persistently refrained from +awakening wholesome patriotism by explaining the causes and aims of +the war, and instructing the rank and file on the Slav question and +our long-drawn struggle against Germanism. I must confess that, like +many others, I did not carry out that order, and that I endeavoured +properly to influence the moral of the Archangel regiment which I then +commanded. I published an impassioned article against the order in the +Military Press, under the title _Do not quench the spirit_. I feel +certain that the statue of Strassbourg in the Place de la Concorde in +Paris, draped in a black veil, played an important part in fostering +the heroic spirit of the French Army. + +Propaganda penetrated into the old Russian Armies from all sides. +There can be no doubt that the fitful attempts of the ever-changing +governments of Goremykin, Sturmer, Trepov, etc., to arrest the normal +course of life in Russia, provided ample material for propaganda and +roused the anger of the people, which was reflected in the Army. +Socialist and defeatist writers took advantage of this state of +affairs. Lenin first contrived to introduce his doctrines into Russia +through the Social Democratic party of the Duma. The Germans worked +with even greater intensity. + +It should, however, be noted that all this propaganda from outside and +from within affected chiefly the units of the rear, the garrisons and +reserve battalions of the main centres, and especially of Petrograd, +and that, before the Revolution, its influence at the front was +comparatively insignificant. Reinforcements reached the front in a +state of perplexity, but under the influence of a saner atmosphere, +and of healthier, albeit more arduous, conditions of warfare, they +rapidly improved. The effect of destructive propaganda was, however, +noticeable in certain units where the ground was favourable, and two +or three cases of insubordination of entire units occurred before the +Revolution, and were severely repressed. Finally, the bulk of the +Army--the peasantry--was confronted with one practical question which +_prompted them instinctively to delay the social revolution_: "THE LAND +WOULD BE DIVIDED IN OUR ABSENCE. WHEN WE RETURN WE SHALL DIVIDE IT." + + * * * * * + +The inadequate organisation of the rear, the orgy of theft, high +prices, profiteering and luxury, for which the front paid in blood, +naturally afforded material for propaganda. The Army, however, suffered +most heavily from the lack of technical means, especially of ammunition. + +It was only in 1917 that General Sukhomlinov's trial disclosed to the +Russian Army and to public opinion the main causes of the military +catastrophe of 1915. Plans for replenishing the Russian Army stores had +been completed, and credits for that purpose assigned as early as in +1907. Curiously enough, these credits were increased on the initiative +of the Commission for National Defence, not of the Ministry of War. +As a rule, neither the Duma nor the Ministry of Finance ever refused +war credits or reduced them. During Sukhomlinov's tenure of office +the War Ministry obtained a special credit of 450 million roubles, of +which less than 300 millions were spent. Before the war, the question +of providing the Army with munitions after the peace-time stores +were exhausted was never even raised. It is true that the intensity +of firing reached, from the very outbreak of war, unexpected and +unheard-of proportions, which upset all the theoretical calculations of +military specialists in Russia and abroad. Naturally, heroic measures +were necessary in order to deal with this tragic situation. + +Meanwhile, the supplies of ammunition for the reinforcements that +came to the front--at first only 1/10th equipped, and later without +any rifles at all--were exhausted as early as in October, 1914. The +Commander-in-Chief of the South-Western front telegraphed to G.H.Q.: +"The machinery for providing ammunition has completely broken down. +In the absence of fresh supplies, we shall have to cease fighting, or +else send troops to the front in an extremely precarious condition." At +the same time (the end of September) Marshal Joffre inquired "whether +the Imperial Russian Army was adequately supplied with shells for the +uninterrupted conduct of war." The War Minister, General Sukhomlinov, +replied: "The present condition of the Russian Army in respect of +ammunition gives no ground for serious apprehension." Orders were not +placed abroad, and Japanese and American rifles were refused "in order +to avoid the inconvenience due to different calibres." + +When the man who was responsible for the military catastrophe faced his +judges in August, 1917, his personality produced a pitiful impression. +The trial raised a more serious, painful question: "How could this +irresponsible man, with no real knowledge of military matters, and +perhaps even consciously a criminal, have remained in power for six +years?" How "shamelessly indifferent to good and evil," according +to Pushkin's saying, the military bureaucracy must have been, that +surrounded him and tolerated the sins of omission and commission, which +invariably and systematically injured the interests of the State. + +The final catastrophe came in 1915. + +I shall never forget the spring of 1915, the great tragedy of the +Russian Army---the Galician retreat. We had neither cartridges nor +shells. From day to day, we fought heavy battles and did lengthy +marches. We were desperately tired--physically and morally. From hazy +hopes we plunged into the depths of gloom. I recall an action near +Przemyshl in the middle of May. The Fourth Rifle Division fought +fiercely for eleven days. For eleven days the German heavy guns were +roaring, and they literally blew up rows of trenches, with all their +defenders. We scarcely replied at all--we had nothing to reply with. +Utterly exhausted regiments were beating off one attack after another +with bayonets, or firing at a close range. Blood was flowing, the ranks +were being thinned, and graveyards growing. Two regiments were almost +entirely annihilated by firing. + +I would that our French and British friends, whose technical +achievement is so wondrous, could note the following grotesque fact, +which belongs to Russian history: + +Our only six-inch battery had been silent for three days. When it +received FIFTY SHELLS the fact was immediately telephoned to all +regiments and companies, and all the riflemen heaved a sigh of relief +and joy. + +What painful, insulting irony there was in Brussilov's circular, in +which the C.-in-C., incapable of providing us with ammunition, and with +a view to raising our spirits and our moral, advised us not to lay too +much stress upon the German superiority in heavy guns, because there +had been many cases of the Germans inflicting but small losses in our +ranks by spending an enormous amount of shells.... + +On May 21st, General Yanushkevitch (Chief of the Staff of the Supreme +C.-in-C., the Grand Duke Nicholas Nicholaievitch) telegraphed to +the War Minister: "The evacuation of Przemyshl is an accomplished +fact. Brussilov alleges a shortage of ammunition, that _bête noire_, +yours and mine ... a loud cry comes from all the armies: 'Give us +cartridges.'" + + * * * * * + +I am not inclined to idealise our Army. I have to speak many sad +truths about it. But when the Pharisees--the leaders of the Russian +Revolutionary Democracy--endeavour to explain away the collapse of the +Army for which they are mainly responsible, by saying that the Army was +already on the verge of collapse, they are lying. + +I do not deny the grave shortcomings of our system of appointments to +the High Command, the errors of our strategy, tactics and organisation, +the technical backwardness of our Army, the defects of the Officers' +Corps, the ignorance of the rank and file, and the vices of barrack +life. I know the extent of desertions and shirking, of which our +intellectuals were hardly less guilty than the ignorant masses. The +Revolutionary Democracy did not, however, devote special attention +to _these_ serious defects of the Army. It could not remedy these +evils, did not know how to cure them, and, in fact, did not combat +them at all. Speaking for myself, I do not know that the Revolutionary +Democracy has cured or even dealt seriously and effectively with +any one of these evils. What of the famous "Freedom from Bondage" +of the soldier? Discarding all the exaggerations which this term +implies, it may be said that the mere fact of the Revolution brought +about a certain change in the relations between the officers and +the men. In normal circumstances, and without coarse and malicious +outside interference, this change might have become a source of great +moral strength, instead of a disaster. It was into this sore that +the Revolutionary Democracy poured poison. The very essence of the +military organisation: its eternal, unchangeable characteristics, +discipline, individual authority, and the non-political spirit of the +Army, were ruthlessly assailed by the Revolutionary Democracy. These +characteristics were lost. And yet it seemed as if the downfall of +the old régime opened new and immense possibilities for cleansing +and uplifting the Russian people's Army and its Command morally and +technically. Like people, like Army. After all, the old Russian Army, +albeit suffering from the deficiencies of the Russian people, had +also the people's virtues, and particularly an exceptional power +of endurance in facing the horrors of war. The Army fought without +a murmur for nearly three years. With extraordinary prowess and +self-sacrifice the men went into action with empty hands against the +deadly technique of the enemy. The rivers of blood shed by the rank +and file atoned for the sins of the Supreme power, the Government, the +people, and of the Army itself.[2] + +Our late Allies should never forget that in the middle of January, +1917, the Russian Army was holding on its front 187 enemy divisions, +or 49 per cent. of the enemy's forces operating on the European and +Asiatic fronts. + +The old Russian Army was still strong enough to continue the war and to +win victories. + +[Diagram: Comparative forces of the Germans in different theatres +of war] + + + + +CHAPTER III. + +THE OLD ARMY AND THE EMPEROR. + + +In August, 1915, the Emperor, influenced by the entourage of the +Empress and of Rasputin, decided to take the Supreme Command of the +Army. Eight Cabinet Ministers and some politicians warned the Emperor +against this dangerous step, but their pleadings were of no avail. The +official motives they adduced were, on the one hand, the difficulty of +combining the tasks of governing the country and commanding the Army, +and, on the other, the risk of assuming responsibility for the Army at +a time when it was suffering reverses and retreating. The real motive, +however, was the fear lest the difficult position of the Army be +further imperilled by the lack of knowledge and experience of the new +Supreme C.-in-C., and that the German-Rasputin clique that surrounded +him, having already brought about the paralysis of the Government and +its conflict with the Duma, would bring about the collapse of the Army. + +There was a rumour, which was afterwards confirmed, that the Emperor +came to this decision partly because he feared the entourage of the +Empress, and partly because of the popularity of the Grand Duke +Nicholas, which was growing in spite of the reverses suffered by the +Army. + +On August 23rd, an order was issued to the Army and Navy. To the +official text, the Emperor added a note in his own hand, a facsimile of +which is reproduced overleaf: + +This decision, in spite of its intrinsic importance, produced no strong +impression upon the Army. The High Commanding Officers and the lower +grades of Commissioned Officers were well aware that the Emperor's +personal part in the Supreme Command would be purely nominal, and the +question in everyone's mind was: + +"Who will be the Chief of Staff?" + +The appointment of General Alexeiev appeased the anxiety of the +officers. The rank and file cared but little for the technical side +of the Command. To them, the Czar had always been the Supreme Leader +of the Army. One thing, however, somewhat perturbed them: the belief +had gained ground among the people years before that the Emperor was +unlucky. + +[Illustration: Note added by the Emperor to Army and Navy order + + _Translation_:--"With firm faith in the grace of God, and with + unshaken assurance of final victory, let us fulfil our sacred duty + of defending Russia till the end, and let us not bring shame to the + Russian land.--NICHOLAS."] + +In reality, it was General M. V. Alexeiev who took command of the +armed forces of Russia. In the history of the Russian war and the +Russian turmoil, General Alexeiev holds so prominent a place that his +importance cannot be gauged in a few lines. A special historical study +would be necessary in order to describe the career of a man whose +military and political activities, which some have severely criticised +and others extolled, never caused anyone to doubt that (in the words +of an Army Order to the Volunteer Army) "his path of martyrdom was +lighted by crystalline honesty and by a fervent love for his Mother +Country--whether great or downtrodden." + +Alexeiev sometimes did not display sufficient firmness in enforcing +his demands, but, in respect of the independence of the "Stavka" +(G.H.Q.) from outside influences, he showed civic courage which +the High Officials of the old régime, who clung to their offices, +completely lacked. + +One day, after an official dinner at Mohilev, the Empress took +Alexeiev's arm, and went for a walk in the garden with him. She +mentioned Rasputin. In terms of deep emotion she tried to persuade the +General that he was wrong in his attitude towards Rasputin, that "the +old man is a wonderful saint," that he was much calumniated, that he +was deeply devoted to the Imperial family, and, last but not least, +that his visit would bring luck to the "Stavka." + +Alexeiev answered dryly that, so far as he was concerned, the question +had long since been settled. Should Rasputin appear at G.H.Q., he would +immediately resign his post. + +"Is this your last word?" + +"Yes, certainly." + +The Empress cut the conversation short, and left without saying +good-bye to the General, who afterwards admitted that the incident had +an ill-effect upon the Emperor's attitude towards him. Contrary to the +established opinion, the relations between the Emperor and Alexeiev, +outwardly perfect, were by no means intimate or friendly, or even +particularly confidential. The Emperor loved no one except his son. +Therein lies the tragedy of his life as a man and as a ruler. + +Several times General Alexeiev, depressed by the growth of popular +discontent with the regime and the Crown, endeavoured to exceed the +limits of a military report and to represent to the Emperor the +state of affairs in its true light. He referred to Rasputin and to +the question of a responsible Ministry. He invariably met with the +impenetrable glance, so well-known to many, and the dry retort: + +"I know." + +Not another word. + +In matters of Army administration, the Emperor fully trusted Alexeiev, +and listened attentively to the General's long, and perhaps even too +elaborate, reports. Attentively and patiently he listened, but these +matters did not seem to appeal to him. There were differences of +opinion in regard to minor matters, appointments to G.H.Q., new posts, +etc. + +No doubt was left in my mind as to the Emperor's complete indifference +in matters of high strategy after I read an important record--that +of the deliberations of a Military Council held at G.H.Q. at +the end of 1916, under the chairmanship of the Emperor. All the +Commanders-in-Chief and the high officials of G.H.Q. were present, and +the plans of the 1917 campaign and of a general advance were discussed. + +Every word uttered at the conference was placed on record. One could +not fail to be impressed by the dominating and guiding part played by +General Gourko--Chief of the General Staff _pro tem._--by the somewhat +selfish designs of various Commanders-in-Chief, who were trying to +adapt strategical axioms to the special interests of their fronts, and +finally by the total indifference of the Supreme C.-in-C. + +Relations similar to those just described continued between the Emperor +and the Chief of Staff when General Gourko took charge of that office +while Alexeiev, who had fallen seriously ill in the autumn of 1916, was +undergoing a cure at Sevastopol, without, however, losing touch with +G.H.Q., with which he communicated by direct wire. + + * * * * * + +Meanwhile, the struggle between the progressive block of the Duma and +the Government (General Alexeiev and the majority of the Commanding +Officers undoubtedly sympathised with the former) was gradually +becoming more and more acute. The record of the sitting of the Duma +of November 1st, 1916 (of which the publication was prohibited and an +abridged version did not appear in the Press till the beginning of +January, 1917), when Shulgin and Miliukov delivered their historical +speeches, was circulated everywhere in the Army in the shape of +typewritten leaflets. Feeling was already running so high that these +leaflets were not concealed, but were read and provoked animated +discussions in officers' messes. A prominent Socialist, an active +worker of the Union of Towns, who paid his first visit to the Army +in 1916, said to me: "I am amazed at the freedom with which the +worthlessness of the Government and the Court scandals are being +discussed in regiments and messes in the presence of Commanding +officers, at Army Headquarters, etc., and that in our country of +arbitrary repression ... at first it seemed to me that I was dealing +with 'agents provocateurs.'" + +The Duma had been in close connection with the Officers' Corps for +a long time. Young officers unofficially partook in the work of the +Commission of National Defence during the period of the reorganisation +of the Army and revival of the Fleet after the Japanese War. Gutchkov +had formed a circle, in which Savitch, Krupensky, Count Bobrinski +and representatives of the officers, headed by General Gourko, were +included. Apparently, General Polivanov (who afterwards played +such an important part in contributing to the disintegration of the +Army, as Chairman of the "Polivanov Commission") also belonged to +the circle. There was no wish to "undermine the foundations," but +merely to push along the heavy, bureaucratic van, to give impetus +to the work, and initiative to the offices of the inert Military +Administration. According to Gutchkov, the circle worked quite openly, +and the War Ministry at first even provided the members with materials. +Subsequently, however, General Sukhomlinov's attitude changed abruptly, +the circle came under suspicion, and people began to call it "The Young +Turks." + +The Commission of National Defence was, nevertheless, very well +informed. General Lukomski, who was Chief of the Mobilisation Section, +and later Assistant War Minister, told me that reports to the +Commission had to be prepared extremely carefully, and that General +Sukhomlinov, trivial and ignorant, produced a pitiful impression on +the rare occasions on which he appeared before the Commission, and was +subjected to a regular cross-examination. + +In the course of his trial, Sukhomlinov himself recounted an episode +which illustrates this state of affairs. One day, he arrived at a +meeting of the Commission when two important military questions were to +be discussed. He was stopped by Rodzianko,[3] who said to him: + +"Get away, get away. You are to us as a red rag to a bull. As soon as +you come, your requests are turned down." + +After the Galician retreat, the Duma succeeded at last in enforcing the +participation of its members in the task of placing on a proper basis +all orders for the Army, and the Unions of Zemstvos and Towns were +permitted to create the "General Committee for provisioning the Army." + +The hard experience of the war resulted at last in the simple scheme +of mobilising the Russian industries. No sooner did this undertaking +escape from the deadening atmosphere of military offices than it +advanced with giant strides. According to official data, in July, 1915, +each Army received 33 parks of artillery instead of the requisite 50, +whereas, in September, the figure rose to 78, owing to the fact that +private factories had been brought into the scheme. I am in a position +to state, not only on the strength of figures, but from personal +experience, that, at the end of 1916, our Army, albeit falling short of +the high standards of the Allied armies in respect of equipment, had +sufficient stores of ammunition and supplies wherewith to begin an +extensive and carefully-planned operation along the entire front. These +circumstances were duly appreciated in the Army, and confidence in the +Duma and in social organisations was thereby increased. The conditions +of internal policy, however, were not improving. In the beginning of +1917, out of the extremely tense atmosphere of political strife, there +arose the idea of a new remedy: + + "REVOLUTION." + + * * * * * + +Representatives of certain Duma and social circles visited Alexeiev, +who was ill at Sevastopol. They told the General quite frankly that +a revolution was brewing. They knew what the effect would be in the +country, but they could not tell how the front would be impressed, and +wanted advice. + +Alexeiev strongly insisted that violent changes during the war were +inadmissible, that they would constitute a deadly menace to the front, +which, according to his pessimistic view, "was already by no means +steady," and pleaded against any irretrievable steps for the sake of +preserving the Army. The delegates departed, promising to take the +necessary measures in order to avert the contemplated revolution. I do +not know upon what information General Alexeiev based his subsequent +statement to the effect that the same delegates afterwards visited +Generals Brussilov and Ruzsky, and after these generals had expressed +an opposite view to his, altered their previous decision; but the +preparations for the revolution continued. + +It is as yet difficult to elucidate all the details of these +negotiations. Those who conducted them are silent; there are no +records; the whole matter was shrouded in secrecy, and did not reach +the bulk of the army. Certain facts, however, have been ascertained. + +Several people approached the Emperor, and warned him of the impending +danger to the country and the dynasty--Alexeiev, Gourko, the Archbishop +Shavelski, Purishkevitch (a reactionary member of the Duma), the Grand +Dukes Nicholas Mikhailovitch and Alexander Mikhailovitch, and the +Dowager Empress. After Rodzianko's visit to the Army in the autumn of +1916, copies of his letter to the Emperor gained circulation in the +Army. In that letter the President of the Duma warned the Emperor of +the grave peril to the throne and the dynasty caused by the disastrous +activities of the Empress Alexandra in the sphere of internal policy. +On November 1st, the Grand Duke Nicholas Mikhailovitch read a letter to +the Emperor, in which he pointed out the impossible manner, known to +all classes of society, in which Ministers were appointed, through the +medium of the appalling people who surrounded the Empress. The Grand +Duke proceeded: + +"... If you could succeed in removing this perpetual interference, +the renascence of Russia would begin at once, and you would recover +the confidence of the vast majority of your subjects which is now +lost. When the time is ripe--and it is at hand--you can yourself grant +from the throne the desired responsibility (of the Government) to +yourself and the legislature. This will come about naturally, easily, +without any pressure from without, and not in the same way as with +the memorable act of October 17th, 1905.[4] I hesitated for a long +time to tell you the truth, but made up my mind when your mother +and your sisters persuaded me to do so. You are on the eve of new +disturbances, and, if I may say so, new attempts. Believe me, if I so +strongly emphasise the necessity for your liberation from the existing +fetters, I am doing so not for personal motives, but only in the hope +of saving you, your throne, and our beloved country from irretrievable +consequences of the gravest nature." + +All these representations were of no avail. + +Several members of the right and of the liberal wing of the Duma and +of the progressive bloc, members of the Imperial family, and officers, +joined the circle. One of the Grand Dukes was to make a last appeal +to the Emperor before active measures were undertaken. In the event +of failure, the Imperial train was to be stopped by an armed force on +its way from G.H.Q. to Petrograd. The Emperor was to be advised to +abdicate, and, in the event of his refusal, he was to be removed by +force. The rightful heir, the Czarevitch Alexis, was to be proclaimed +Emperor, and the Grand Duke Michael, Regent. + +At the same time, a large group of the progressive bloc of the Duma, of +representatives of Zemstvos and towns--well versed in the activities of +the circle--held several meetings, at which the question was discussed +of "the part the Duma was to play after the _coup d'état_."[5] The new +Ministry was then outlined, and of the two suggested candidates for the +Premiership, Rodzianko and Prince Lvov, the latter was chosen. + +Fate, however, decreed otherwise. + +Before the contemplated _coup d'état_ took place, there began, in the +words of Albert Thomas, "the brightest, the most festive, the most +bloodless Russian Revolution." + + + + +CHAPTER IV. + +THE REVOLUTION IN PETROGRAD. + + +I did not learn of the course of events in Petrograd and at G.H.Q. +until some time had elapsed, and I will refer to these events briefly +in order to preserve the continuity of my narrative. In a telegram +addressed to the Emperor by the members of the Council of the Empire on +the night of the 28th February, the state of affairs was described as +follows:-- + +"Owing to the complete disorganisation of transport and to the lack +of necessary materials, factories have stopped working. Forced +unemployment, and the acute food crisis due to the disorganisation of +transport, have driven the popular masses to desperation. This feeling +is further intensified by hatred towards the Government and grave +suspicions against the authorities, which have penetrated deeply into +the soul of the nation. All this has found expression in a popular +rising of elemental dimensions, and the troops are now joining the +movement. The Government, which has never been trusted in Russia, is +now utterly discredited and incapable of coping with the dangerous +situation." + +Preparations for the Revolution found favourable ground in the +general condition of the country, and had been made long since. The +most heterogeneous elements had taken part in these activities; the +German Government, which spared no means for Socialist and defeatist +propaganda in Russia, and especially among the workmen; the Socialist +parties, who had formed "cells" among the workmen and in the regiments; +undoubtedly, too, the Protopopov Ministry, which was said to have been +provoking a rising in the streets in order to quell it by armed force, +and thus clear the intolerably tense atmosphere. It would seem that all +these forces were aiming at the same goal, which they were trying to +reach by diverse means, actuated by diametrically opposed motives. + +At the same time, the progressive block and social organisations began +to prepare for great events which they considered inevitable, and other +circles, in close touch with these organisations or sharing their +views, were completing the arrangements for a "_Palace coup d'état_" as +the last means of averting the impending Revolution. + +Nevertheless, the rebellion started as an elemental force and caught +everybody unawares. Several days later, when General Kornilov +visited the Executive Committee of the Petrograd Soviet of Workmen +and Soldiers' Deputies, prominent members of that body incidentally +explained that "the soldiers mutinied independently of the workmen, +with whom the soldiers had not been in touch on the eve of the +rebellion," and that the "mutiny had not been prepared--hence the +absence of a corresponding administrative organ." + +As regards the circles of the Duma and the social organisations, they +were prepared for a _coup d'état_, but not for the Revolution. In +the blazing fire of the outbreak they failed to preserve their moral +balance and judgment. + +The first outbreak began on February 23rd, when crowds filled the +streets, meetings were held, and the speakers called for a struggle +against the hated power. This lasted till the 26th, when the popular +movement assumed gigantic proportions and there were collisions with +the police, in which machine-guns were brought into action. On the +26th an ukaze was received proroguing the Duma, and on the morning of +the 27th the members of the Duma decided not to leave Petrograd. On +the same morning the situation underwent a drastic change, because +the rebels were joined by the Reserve battalions of the Litovski, +Volynski, Preobrajenski, and Sapper Guards' Regiments. They were +Reserve battalions, as the real Guards' Regiments were then on the +South-Western Front. These battalions did not differ, either in +discipline or spirit, from any other unit of the line. In several +battalions the Commanding Officers were disconcerted, and could not +make up their minds as to their own attitude. This wavering resulted, +to a certain extent, in a loss of prestige and authority. The troops +came out into the streets without their officers, mingled with the +crowds, and were imbued with the crowds' psychology. Armed throngs, +intoxicated with freedom, excited to the utmost, and incensed by street +orators, filled the streets, smashed the barricades, and new crowds of +waverers joined them. Police detachments were mercilessly slaughtered. +Officers who chanced to be in the way of the crowds were disarmed and +some of them killed. The armed mob seized the arsenal, the Fortress of +Peter and Paul, and the Kresti Prison. + +On that decisive day there were no leaders--there was only the tidal +wave. Its terrible progress appeared to be devoid of any definite +object, plan, or watchword. The only cry that seemed to express the +general spirit was "_Long live Liberty_." + +Somebody was bound to take the movement in hand. After violent +discussions, much indecision and wavering, that part was assumed by the +Duma. A Committee of the Duma was formed, which proclaimed its objects +on February 27th in the following guarded words:-- + +"In the strenuous circumstances of internal strife caused by the +activities of the old Government, the temporary Committee of the +members of the Duma has felt compelled to undertake the task of +restoring order in the State and in society.... The Committee expresses +its conviction that the population and the army will render assistance +in the difficult task of creating a new Government, which will +correspond to the wishes of the population, and which will be in a +position to enjoy its confidence." + +There can be no doubt that the Duma, having led the patriotic and +national struggle against the Government detested by the people, and +having accomplished great and fruitful work in the interests of the +army, had obtained recognition in the country and in the army. The +Duma now became the centre of the political life of the country. No +one else could have taken the lead in the movement. No one else could +have gained the confidence of the country, or such rapid and full +recognition as the Supreme Power, as the power that emanated from +the Duma. The Petrograd Soviet of Workmen and Soldiers' Deputies was +fully aware of this fact, and it did not then claim _officially_ to +represent the Russian Government. Such an attitude towards the Duma +at that moment created the illusion of the _national_ character of +the Provisional Government created by the Duma. Alongside, therefore, +with the troops that mingled with the armed mob and destroyed in their +trail everything reminiscent of the old power, alongside with the +units that had remained faithful to that power and resisted the mob, +regiments began to flock to the Taurida Palace with their commanding +officers, bands and banners. They greeted the new power in the person +of Rodzianko, President of the Duma, according to the rules of the old +ritual. The Taurida Palace presented an unusual sight--legislators, +bureaucrats, soldiers, workmen, women; a chamber, a camp, a prison, +a headquarters, Ministries. Everyone foregathered there seeking +protection and salvation, demanding guidance and answers to puzzling +questions which had suddenly arisen. On the same day, February 27th, +an announcement was made from the Taurida Palace:-- + +"Citizens. Representatives of the workmen, soldiers and people of +Petrograd, sitting in the Duma, declare that the first meeting of +their representatives will take place at seven o'clock to-night on +the premises of the Duma. Let the troops that have joined the people +immediately elect their representatives--one to each company. Let the +factories elect their deputies--one to each thousand. Factories with +less than a thousand workmen to elect one deputy each." + +This proclamation had a grave and fateful effect upon the entire course +of events. In the first place, it created an organ of unofficial, +but undoubtedly stronger, power alongside with the provisional +Government--the Soviet of Workmen and Soldiers' deputies, against which +the Government proved impotent. In the second place, it converted the +political and bourgeois revolution, both outwardly and inwardly, into +a social revolution, which was unthinkable, considering the condition +of the country at that time. Such a revolution in war time could not +fail to bring about terrible upheavals. Lastly, it established a close +connection between the Soviet, which was inclined towards Bolshevism +and defeatism, and the army, which was thus infected with a ferment +which resulted in its ultimate collapse. When the troops, fully +officered, smartly paraded before the Taurida Palace, it was only +for show. The link between the officers and the men had already been +irretrievably broken; discipline had been shattered. Henceforward, the +troops of the Petrograd district represented a kind of Pretorian guard, +whose evil force weighed heavily over the Provisional Government. All +subsequent efforts made by Gutchkov, General Kornilov and G.H.Q. to +influence them and to send them to the front were of no avail, owing to +the determined resistance of the Soviet. + +The position of the officers was undoubtedly tragic, as they had to +choose between loyalty to their oath, the distrust and enmity of the +men, and the dictates of practical necessity. A small portion of the +officers offered armed resistance to the mutiny, and most of them +perished. Some avoided taking any part in the events, but the majority +in the regiments, where comparative order prevailed, tried to find in +the Duma a solution of the questions which perturbed their conscience. +At a big meeting of officers held in Petrograd on March 1st, a +resolution was carried: "To stand by the people and unanimously to +recognise the power of the Executive Committee of the Duma, pending the +convocation of the Constituent Assembly; because a speedy organisation +of order and of united work in the rear were necessary for the +victorious end of the war." + + * * * * * + +Owing to the unrestrained orgy of power in which the successive +rulers appointed at Rasputin's suggestion had indulged during their +short terms of office, there was in 1917 no political party, no class +upon which the Czarist Government could rely. Everybody considered +that Government as the enemy of the people. Extreme Monarchists +and Socialists, the united nobility, labour groups, Grand Dukes +and half-educated soldiers--all were of the same opinion. I do not +intend to examine the activities of the Government which led to the +Revolution, its struggle against the people and against representative +institutions. I will only draw a summary of the accusations which were +justly levelled by the Duma against the Government on the eve of its +downfall: + +All the Institutions of the State and of society--the Council of the +Empire, the Duma, the nobility, the Zemstvos, the municipalities--were +under suspicion of disloyalty, and the Government was in open +opposition to them, and paralysed all their activities in matters of +statesmanship and social welfare. + +Lawlessness and espionage had reached unheard-of proportions. The +independent Russian Courts of Justice became subservient to "the +requirements of the political moment." + +[Illustration: Funeral of the first victims of the March Revolution in +Petrograd.] + +Whilst in the Allied countries all classes of society worked +whole-heartedly for the defence of their countries, in Russia that +work was repudiated with contempt, and the work was done by unskilled +and occasionally criminal hands, which resulted in such disastrous +phenomena as the activities of Sukhomlinov and Protopopov. The +Committee "of Military Industries," which had rendered great services +in provisioning the Army, was being systematically destroyed. Shortly +before the Revolution its labour section was arrested without any +reason being assigned, and this very nearly caused sanguinary +disturbances in the capital. Measures adopted by the Government without +the participation of social organisations shattered the industrial life +of the country. Transport was disorganised, and fuel was wasted. The +Government proved incapable and impotent in combating this disorder, +which was undoubtedly caused to a certain extent by the selfish and +sometimes rapacious designs of industrial magnates. The villages were +derelict. A series of wholesale mobilisations, without any exemptions +granted to classes which worked for defence, deprived the villages +of labour. Prices were unsettled, and the big landowners were given +certain privileges. Later, the grain contribution was gravely +mismanaged. There was no exchange of goods between towns and villages. +All this resulted in the stopping of food supplies, famine in the +towns, and repression in the villages. Government servants of all kinds +were impoverished by the tremendous rise in prices of commodities, and +were grumbling loudly. + +Ministerial appointments were staggering in their fitfulness, and +appeared to the people as a kind of absurdity. The demands of the +country for a responsible Cabinet were voiced by the Duma and by the +best men. As late as the morning of February 27th, the Duma considered +that the granting of the minimum of the political desiderata of Russian +society was sufficient to postpone "the last hour in which the fate +of the Mother Country and of the dynasty was to be settled." Public +opinion and the Press were smothered; the Military Censorship of all +internal regions (including Moscow and Petrograd) had made the widest +use of its telephones. It was impregnable, protected by all the powers +of martial law. Ordinary censorship was no less severe. The following +striking fact was discussed in the Duma: + +In February, 1917, a strike movement, prompted to a certain extent +by the Germans, began to spread in the factories. The Labour members +of the Military Industries Committee then drafted a proclamation, as +follows:--"Comrades, workmen of Petrograd, we deem it our duty to +address to you an urgent request to resume work. The labouring class, +fully aware of its present-day responsibilities, must not weaken itself +by a protracted strike. The interests of the labouring class are +calling upon you to resume work." In spite of Gutchkov's appeal to the +Minister of the Interior and to the Chief Censor, this appeal was twice +removed from the printing press, and was prohibited. + +The question is still open for discussion and investigation as to +what proportion of the activities of the old régime in the domain +of economics can be attributed to individuals, what to the system, +and what to the insuperable obstacles created in the country by a +devastating war. But no excuse will ever be found for stifling the +conscience, the mind, and the spirit of the people and all social +initiative. No wonder, therefore, that Moscow and the provinces joined +the Revolution without any appreciable resistance. Outside Petrograd, +where the terror of street fighting and the rowdiness of a bloodthirsty +mob were absent (there were, however, many exceptions), the Revolution +was greeted with satisfaction, and even with enthusiasm, not only by +the Revolutionary Democracy, but by the real Democracy, the Bourgeoisie +and the Civil Service. There was tremendous animation; thousands of +people thronged the streets. Fiery speeches were made. There was great +rejoicing at the deliverance from the terrible nightmare; there were +bright hopes for the future of Russia. There was the word: + +"LIBERTY." + +It was in the air. It was reproduced in speeches, drawings, in music, +in song. It was stimulating. It was not yet stained by stupidity, by +filth and blood. + +Prince Eugene Troubetskoi wrote: "This Revolution is unique. There +have been bourgeois revolutions and proletarian revolutions, but such +a national Revolution, in the broadest sense of the word, as the +present Russian Revolution, there has never been. Everyone took part +in this Revolution, everyone made it: the proletariat, the troops, +the bourgeoisie, even the nobility ... all the live forces of the +country.... May this unity endure!" In these words the hopes and fears +of the Russian intelligencia, not the sad Russian realities, are +reflected. The cruel mutinies at Helsingfors, Kronstadt, Reval, and the +assassination of Admiral Nepenin and of many officers were the first +warnings to the optimists. + + * * * * * + +In the first days of the Revolution the victims in the Capital were +few. According to the registration of the All-Russian Union of Towns, +the total number of killed and wounded in Petrograd was 1,443, +including 869 soldiers (of whom 60 were officers). Of course, many +wounded were not registered. The condition of Petrograd, however, out +of gear and full of inflammable material and armed men, remained for a +long time strained and unstable. I heard later from members of the Duma +and of the Government that the scales were swaying violently, and that +they felt like sitting on a powder-barrel which might explode at any +moment and blow to bits both themselves and the structure of the new +Government which they were creating. The Deputy-Chairman of the Soviet +of Workmen and Soldiers' Deputies, Skobelev, said to a journalist:-- + +"I must confess that, when in the beginning of the Revolution, I +went to the entrance of the Taurida Palace to meet the first band of +soldiers that had come to the Duma, and when I addressed them, I was +almost certain that I was delivering one of my last speeches, and that +in the course of the next few days I should be shot or hanged." + +Several officers who had taken part in the events assured me that +disorder and the universal incapacity for understanding the position in +the Capital were so great that _one solid battalion_, commanded by an +officer who knew what he wanted, might have upset the entire position. +Be that as it may, the temporary Committee of the Duma proclaimed on +March 2nd the formation of a Provisional Government. After lengthy +discussions with the parallel organs of "Democratic Power," the Soviet +of Workmen and Soldiers' Deputies, the Provisional Government issued a +declaration:-- + +"(1) Full and immediate amnesty for all political, religious and +terrorist crimes, military mutinies and agrarian offences, etc. + +"(2) Freedom of speech, the Press, meetings, unions and strikes. +Political liberties to be granted to all men serving in the Army within +the limits of military requirements. + +"(3) Cancellation of all restrictions of class, religion and +nationality. + +"(4) Immediate preparation for the convocation of a Constituent +Assembly elected by universal, equal, direct and secret suffrage for +the establishment of a form of government and of the Constitution of +the country. + +"(5) The police to be replaced by a people's Militia, with elected +chiefs, subordinate to the organ of Local Self-Government. + +"(6) Members of Local Self-Governing Institutions to be elected by +universal, equal, direct and secret suffrage. + +"(7) The units of the Army that have taken part in the Revolutionary +movement are not to be disarmed or removed from Petrograd. + +"(8) Military discipline to be preserved on parade and on duty. The +soldiers, however, are to be free to enjoy all social rights enjoyed by +other citizens. + +"The Provisional Government deems it its duty to add that it has no +intention of taking advantage of wartime to delay carrying out the +aforesaid reforms and measures." + +This Declaration was quite obviously drafted under pressure from the +"parallel power." + +In his book, _Mes Souvenirs de Guerre_, General Ludendorff says: "I +often dreamt of that Revolution which was to alleviate the burdens +of our war. Eternal chimera! To-day, however, the dream suddenly and +unexpectedly came true. I felt as if a heavy load had fallen off my +shoulders. I could not, however, foresee that it would be the grave of +our might." + +One of the most prominent leaders of Germany--the country that had +worked so hard for the poisoning of the soul of the Russian people--has +come to the belated conclusion that "Our moral collapse began with the +beginning of the Russian Revolution." + + + + +CHAPTER V. + +THE REVOLUTION AND THE IMPERIAL FAMILY. + + +Alone in the Governor's old Palace at Mohilev the Czar suffered in +silence; his wife and children were far away, and there was no one with +him in whom he was able or willing to confide. + +Protopopov and the Government had at first represented the state of +affairs as serious, but not alarming--popular disturbances to be +suppressed with "a firm hand." Several hundred machine-guns had been +placed at the disposal of General Habalov, Commander of the troops of +the Petrograd district. Both he and Prince Golitzin, President of the +Cabinet, had been given full authority to make use of exceptional means +of quelling the riots. On the morning of the 27th General Ivanov had +been despatched with a small detachment of troops and a secret warrant, +to be made public after the occupation of Czarskoe Selo. The warrant +invested him with full military and civic powers. No one could have +been less fitted than General Ivanov to occupy so highly important +a position, which amounted actually to a Military Dictatorship. +Ivanov was a very old man--an honest soldier, unfitted to cope with +political complications and no longer in possession of strength, +energy, will-power, or determination.... His success in dealing with +the Kronstadt disturbances of 1906 most probably suggested his present +nomination. + +Afterwards, when looking over Habalov's and Bieliaiev's[6] reports, +I was aghast at the pusillanimity and the shirking of responsibility +which they revealed. + +The clouds continue to darken. + +On February 26th the Empress wired to the Czar: "Am very anxious +about the state of affairs in town...." On the same day Rodzianko +sent his historic telegram: "Position serious. Anarchy in the +capital. Government paralysed. Transport, supplies of fuel and +other necessaries completely disorganised. General discontent grows. +Disorderly firing in the streets. Military units fire at each other. +Imperative necessity that some person popular in the country should be +authorised to form new Cabinet. No delay possible. Any delay fatal. +I pray God that the Monarch be not now held responsible." Rodzianko +forwarded copies of his telegram to all the Commanders-in-Chief, asking +their support. + +Early on the 27th the President of the Duma wired again to the Czar: +"Position constantly aggravated. Measures must be taken immediately, as +to-morrow may be too late. This hour decides the fate of our country +and the dynasty." + +It is incredible that, after this, the Czar should not have realised +the impending catastrophe, but, in the weakness and irresolution +that characterised him, it is probable that he seized the slightest +available excuse to postpone his decision, and in a fatalistic manner, +left to fate to carry out her secret decrees.... + +Be that as it may, another impressive warning from General Alexeiev, +confirmed by telegrams from the Commanders-in-Chief, yielded no better +results, and the Czar, anxious about the fate of his family, left for +Czarskoe Selo on the morning of the 29th, without coming to any final +decision on the concessions to be granted to his people. + +General Alexeiev, although straightforward, wise, and patriotic, was +lacking in firmness, and his power and influence with the Emperor were +too slight to permit of his insisting on a step the obvious necessity +for which was evident even to the Empress. She wired to her husband on +the 27th: "Concessions inevitable." + +The futile journey was two days in accomplishment. Two days without +any correspondence or news as to the course of events, which were +developing and changing every hour.... The Imperial train, taking a +roundabout course, was stopped at Vishera by orders from Petrograd. +On hearing that the Petrograd garrison had acclaimed the Provisional +Committee of the Duma, and that the troops of Czarskoe Selo had sided +with the Revolution, the Czar returned to Pskov. + +At Pskov, on the evening of March 1st, the Czar saw General Ruzsky, who +explained the position to him, but no decision was arrived at, except +that on the 2nd of March, at 2 a.m., the Czar again sent for Ruzsky, +and handed him an ukase, which made the Cabinet responsible to the +Duma. "I knew that this compromise had come too late," said Ruzsky to +a correspondent, "but I had no right to express my opinion, not having +received any instructions from the Executive Committee of the Duma, so +I suggested that the Emperor should see Rodzianko."[7] + +All night long discussions full of deep interest and importance to the +fate of the country were held over the wire--between Ruzsky, Rodzianko, +and Alexeiev; between Headquarters and the Commanders-in-Chief, and +between Lukomsky[8] and Danilov.[9] + +They unanimously agreed that the Abdication of the Emperor was +unavoidable. + +Before midday on March 2nd Ruzsky communicated the opinion of Rodzianko +and the Military Commanders to the Czar. The Emperor heard him calmly, +with no sign of emotion on his fixed, immovable countenance, but at 3 +p.m. he sent Ruzsky a signed Act of Abdication in favour of his son--a +document drawn up at Headquarters and forwarded to him at Pskov. + +If the sequence of historical events follows immutable laws of its +own, there also seems to be a fate influencing casual happenings of +a simple, everyday nature, which otherwise seem quite avoidable. The +thirty minutes that elapsed after Ruzsky had received the Act of +Abdication materially affected the whole course of subsequent events: +before copies of the document could be despatched, a communication, +announcing the delegates of the Duma, Gutchkov and Shulgin, was +received.... The Czar again postponed his decision and stopped the +publication of the Act. + +The delegates arrived in the evening. + +Amidst the complete silence of the audience,[10] Gutchkov pictured the +abyss that the country was nearing, and pointed out the only course to +be taken--the abdication of the Czar. + +"I have been thinking about it all yesterday and to-day, and have +decided to abdicate," answered the Czar. "Until three o'clock to-day I +was willing to abdicate in favour of my son, but I then came to realise +that I could not bear to part with him. I hope you will understand +this? As a consequence, I have decided to abdicate in favour of my +brother." + +The delegates, taken aback by such an unexpected turn of events, +made no objection. Emotion kept Gutchkov silent. "He felt he could +not intrude on paternal relations, and considered that any pressure +brought to bear upon the Emperor would be out of place." Shulgin was +influenced by political motives. "He feared the little Czar might grow +up harbouring feelings of resentment against those who had parted him +from his father and mother; also the question whether a regent could +take the oath to the Constitution on behalf of an Emperor, who was not +of age was a matter of debate."[11] + +"The resentment" of the little Czar concerned a distant future. As to +legality, the very essence of a Revolution precludes the legality of +its consequences. Also the _enforced_ abdication of Nicholas II., his +rejection of the rights of inheritance of _his son_, a minor, and, +lastly, the transfer of supreme power by Michael Alexandrovitch, a +person who _had never_ held it, to the Provisional Government by means +of an act, in which the Grand Duke "appeals" to Russian citizens to +obey the Government, are all of doubtful legality. + +It is not surprising that, "in the minds of those living in those +first days of the Revolution"--as Miliukov says--"the new Government, +established by the Revolution, was looked upon, not as a consequence +of the acts of March 2nd and 3rd, but as a result of the events of +February 27th...." + +I may add that later, in the minds of many Commanding Officers--amongst +them, Kornilov, Alexeiev, Romanovsky and Markov, who played a +leading part in the attempt to save Russia--legal, party or dynastic +considerations had no place. This circumstance is of primary importance +for a proper understanding of subsequent events. + +About midnight on March 2nd the Czar handed Rodzianko and Ruzsky two +slightly amended copies of the Manifesto of his Abdication. + + * * * * * + +"In the midst of our great conflict with a foreign enemy, who has been +striving for close on three years to enslave our country, it has been +the will of God to subject Russia to new and heavy trials. Incipient +popular disturbances now imperil the further course of the stubborn +war. The fate of Russia, the honour of our heroic Army, the entire +future of our beloved Land, demand that the war should be carried to a +victorious conclusion. + +"The cruel foe is nearly at his last gasp, and the hour approaches when +our gallant Army, together with our glorious Allies, will finally crush +our enemy's resistance. In these decisive days of Russia's existence we +feel it our duty to further the firm cohesion and unification of all +the forces of the people, and, with the approval of the State Duma, +consider it best to abdicate the Throne of Russia and lay down our +supreme power. Not wishing to part from our beloved Son, we transmit +our inheritance to our Brother, the Grand Duke Michael Alexandrovitch, +and give him our blessing in ascending the Throne of the Russian Empire. + +"We command our Brother to rule the State in complete and undisturbed +union with the representatives of the people in such Legislative +Institutions as the People will see fit to establish, binding himself +by oath thereto in the name of our beloved country. + +"I call all true sons of the Fatherland to fulfil their sacred duty--to +obey the Czar in this time of sore distress and help him, together with +the representatives of the people, to lead the Russian State along the +road to victory, happiness and glory. + +"May the Lord our God help Russia! + + "NICHOLAS." + + * * * * * + +Late at night the Imperial train left for Mohilev. Dead silence, +lowered blinds and heavy, heavy thoughts. No one will ever know what +feelings wrestled in the breast of Nicholas II., of the Monarch, the +Father and the Man, when, on meeting Alexeiev at Mohilev, and looking +straight at the latter with kindly, tired eyes, he said irresolutely:-- + +_"I have changed my mind. Please send this telegram to Petrograd."_ + +_On a small sheet of paper, in a clear hand, the Czar had himself +traced his consent to the immediate accession to the throne of his son, +Alexis_.... + +Alexeiev took the telegram, and--did not send it. It was too late; both +Manifestoes had already been made public to the Army and to the country. + +For fear of "unsettling public opinion," Alexeiev made no mention +of the telegram, and kept it in his portfolio until he passed it on +to me towards the end of May, when he resigned his post of Supreme +Commander-in-Chief. The document, of vast importance to future +biographers of the Czar, was afterwards kept under seal at the +Operations Department of General Headquarters. + + * * * * * + +Meantime, the members of the Cabinet and of the Provisional +Committee[12] had assembled at the Palace of the Grand Duke Michael +Alexandrovitch about midday on May 3rd. Since the 27th of February, +the latter had been cut off from all communication with Headquarters +or with the Emperor. But the issue of this Conference was practically +predetermined by the spirit prevailing in the Soviet of Workmen's +Delegates, after the gist of the Manifesto became known to them, by the +Resolution of Protest passed by their Executive Committee and forwarded +to the Government, by Kerensky's uncompromising attitude, and by the +general correlation of forces. Except Miliukov and Gutchkov, all the +others, "without the faintest desire of influencing the Grand Duke +in any way," eagerly advised him to abdicate. Miliukov warned them +that "the support of a symbol familiar to the masses is necessary, +if decided authority is to be maintained, and that the Provisional +Government, if left alone, might founder in the sea of popular +disturbances, and that it might not survive until the Convocation of +the Constituent Assembly...." + +After another conference with Rodzianko, President of the Duma, the +Grand Duke came to his final decision to abdicate. + +The "Declaration" of the Grand Duke was published on the same day: + + "A heavy burden has been laid on me by the wish of my Brother, who + has transferred the Imperial Throne of All Russia to me at a time + of unexampled warfare and popular disturbances. + + "Animated, together with the nation, by one thought, that the + welfare of our country must prevail over every other consideration, + I have decided to accept supreme power only if such be the will + of our great people, whose part it is to establish the form of + government and new fundamental laws of the Russian State through + their representatives in the Constituent Assembly. + + "With a prayer to God for His blessing, I appeal to all citizens + of the Russian State to obey the Provisional Government, which + is constituted and invested with full powers by the will of the + State Duma, until a Constituent Assembly, convoked at the earliest + possible moment by universal, direct, equal and secret suffrage, + can establish a form of government which will embody the will of + the people." + + "MICHAEL." + +After his abdication, the Grand Duke resided in the neighbourhood of +Gatchino, and stood completely aloof from political life. About the +middle of March, 1918, he was arrested by order of the local Bolshevik +Committee, taken to Petrograd, and, some time later, exiled to the +Government of Perm. + +It was rumoured that the Grand Duke, accompanied by his faithful +English valet, had escaped about the middle of July; since then nothing +definite has been heard about him. The search organised by the Siberian +Government and by that of Southern Russia, as also by the desire of the +Dowager Empress, yielded no certain results. The Bolsheviks, for their +part, volunteered no official information whatever. But subsequent +investigations brought some data to light which indicated that the +"release" was a deception, and that the Grand Duke was secretly carried +off by Bolsheviks, murdered in the vicinity of Perm, and his body +drowned under the ice. + +The mystery of the Grand Duke's fate gave rise to fanciful rumours +and even to the appearance of impostors in Siberia. During the summer +of 1918, at the time of the first successful advance of the Siberian +troops, it was widely reported both in Soviet Russia and in the South +that the Siberian Anti-Bolshevist forces were led by the Grand Duke +Michael Alexandrovitch. Periodically, until late in 1919, his spurious +manifestoes appeared in the Provincial Press, chiefly in papers of the +extreme Right. + +It must be noted, however, that when, in the summer of 1918, the Kiev +monarchists carried on an active campaign to impart a monarchical +character to the Anti-Bolshevist military movement, they rejected the +principle of legitimacy, partly because of the personality of some of +the candidates, and, in regard to Michael Alexandrovitch, because he +had "tied himself" by a solemn promise to the Constituent Assembly. + +In consideration of the complexity and confusion of the conditions that +obtained in March, 1917, I have come to the conclusion that a struggle +to retain Nicholas II. at the head of the State would have led to +anarchy, disruption of the Front, and terrible consequences, both for +the Czar and for the country. A Regency, with Michael Alexandrovitch +as Regent, might have involved conflict, but no disturbance, and was +certain of success. It would have been more difficult to place Michael +Alexandrovitch on the throne, but even that would have been possible if +a Constitution on broad, democratic lines had been accepted by him. + +The members of the Provisional Government and of the Provisional +Committee--Miliukov and Gutchkov excepted--terrorised by the Soviets of +Workmen's Delegates, and attributing too much importance to them and to +the excited workmen and soldier masses in Petrograd, took on themselves +a heavy responsibility for the future when they persuaded the Grand +Duke to decline the immediate assumption of Supreme Power.[13] + +I am not referring to Monarchism or to a particular dynasty. These are +secondary questions. I am speaking of Russia only. + +It is certainly hard to say whether this power would have been lasting +and stable, whether it would not have undergone changes later on; but, +if it had even succeeded in maintaining the Army during the war, the +subsequent course of Russian history might have been one of progress, +and the upheavals that now endanger her very existence might have been +avoided. + + * * * * * + +On March 7th the Provisional Government issued an order according to +which "The ex-Emperor and his Consort are deprived of liberty, and the +ex-Emperor is to be taken to Czarskoe Selo." The duty of arresting the +Empress was laid on Kornilov, and orthodox Monarchists never forgave +him for it. But, strangely enough, Alexandra Fedorovna, after hearing +of the warrant, expressed her satisfaction that the renowned General +Kornilov, and not a member of the new Government, had been sent to her. + +The Emperor was arrested by four members of the Duma. + +On March 8th, after leave-takings at Headquarters, the Czar quitted +Mohilev amidst the stony silence of the crowd, and under the tearful +eyes of his mother, who never saw her son again. + +To understand the seemingly incomprehensible behaviour of the +Government to the Imperial family during the period of their residence +both at Czarskoe Selo and at Tobolsk, the following circumstances must +be kept in mind. Notwithstanding that, in the seven and a half months +of the existence of the Provisional Government, not one single serious +attempt was made to liberate the captives, yet they attracted the +exclusive attention of the Soviet of Workmen and Soldiers' Delegates. +On March 10th Vice-President Sokolov made the following announcement +to a unanimously approving audience: "I was informed yesterday that +the Provisional Government had consented to allow Nicholas II. to go +to England and that it is discussing arrangements with the British +authorities without the knowledge or the consent of the Executive +Committee of Workmen's and Soldiers' Delegates. We have mobilised all +the military units that we can influence, and have taken measures to +prevent Nicholas II. from leaving Czarskoe without our permission. +Telegrams have been sent down the railway lines ... to detain the train +of Nicholas II. should it appear.... We have despatched our Commissars +with the necessary number of troops and armoured cars, and have closely +surrounded the Alexander Palace. After that we conferred with the +Provisional Government, who confirmed all our orders. At present +the late Czar is under our protection, as well as under that of the +Provisional Government...." + +On the 1st August, 1917, the Imperial family was exiled to Tobolsk, +and, after the establishment of Bolshevist rule in Siberia, they were +transferred to Ekaterinburg, and were the victims of incredible insults +and cruelty by the mob, until they were put to death.[14] Thus did +Nicholas II. atone for his grievous sins, voluntary and involuntary, +against the Russian people.[15] + +In the course of the second Kuban campaign I received the news of the +death of the Emperor Nicholas II., and ordered memorial services for +the soul of the former leader of the Russian Army to be held in the +Volunteer Army. Democratic circles and the Press criticised me severely +for this. + +The words of wisdom, _Vengeance is mine: I will repay_, were obviously +forgotten. + + + + +CHAPTER VI. + +THE REVOLUTION AND THE ARMY. + + +ORDER NO. 1. + +These events found me far away from the Capital, in Roumania, where I +was commanding the Eighth Army Corps. In our remoteness from the Mother +Country we felt a certain tension in the political atmosphere, but we +certainly were not prepared for the sudden _dénouement_ or for the +shape it assumed. + +On the morning of March 3rd I received a telegram from Army +Headquarters--"For personal information"--to the effect that a mutiny +had broken out in Petrograd, that the Duma had assumed power, and that +the publication of important State documents was expected. A few hours +later the wire transmitted the manifestoes of the Emperor Nicholas +the Second and of the Grand Duke Michael. At first an order was given +for their distribution, then, much to my amazement (as the telephones +had already been spreading the news) the order was countermanded +and finally confirmed. These waverings were apparently due to the +negotiations between the temporary Committee of the Duma and the +Headquarters of the Norman Front about postponing the publication of +these Acts owing to a sudden change in the Emperor's fundamental idea, +namely, the substitution of the Grand Duke Michael for the Grand Duke +Alexis as Heir to the Throne. It proved, however, impossible to delay +the distribution. The troops were thunderstruck. No other word can +describe the first impression produced by the _manifestoes_. There was +neither sorrow nor rejoicing. There was deep, thoughtful silence. Thus +did the regiments of the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Divisions take the +news of the abdication of their Emperor. Only occasionally on parade +did the rifle waver and tears course down the cheeks of old soldiers. + +In order accurately to describe the spirit of the moment, undimmed by +the passing of time, I will quote extracts from a letter I wrote to a +near relation on March 8th: + +"A page of history has been turned. The first impression is stunning +because it is so unexpected and so grandiose. On the whole, however, +the troops have taken the events quietly. They express themselves +with caution; but three definite currents in the mentality of the men +can easily be traced: (1) A return to the past is impossible; (2) the +country will receive a Constitution worthy of a great people, probably +a Constitutional Limited Monarchy; (3) German domination will come to +an end and the war will be victoriously prosecuted." + +The Emperor's abdication was considered as the inevitable result of +the internal policy of the last few years. There was, however, no +irritation against the Emperor personally or against the Imperial +Family. Everything was forgiven and forgotten. On the contrary, +everyone was interested in their fate, and feared the worst. The +appointment of the Grand Duke Nicholas as Supreme Commander-in-Chief, +and of General Alexeiev as his Chief-of-Staff, was favourably received, +alike by officers and men, and interest was manifested in the question +as to whether the Army would be represented in the Constituent +Assembly. The composition of the Provisional Government was treated +more or less as a matter of indifference. The appointment of a civilian +to the War Ministry was criticised, and it was only the part he had +taken in the Council of National Defence, and his close connection with +the officers' circles, that mitigated the unfavourable impression. A +great many people have found it surprising and incomprehensible that +the collapse of a Monarchist régime several centuries old should not +have provoked in the Army, bred in its traditions, either a struggle or +even isolated outbreaks, or that the Army should not have created its +own Vendée. + +I know of three cases only of stout resistance: The march of General +Ivanov's detachment on Czarskoe Selo, organised by Headquarters in +the first days of the risings in Petrograd, very badly executed and +soon countermanded, and two telegrams addressed to the Emperor by +the Commanding Officers of the Third Cavalry and the Guards Cavalry +Corps, Count Keller (killed in Kiev in 1918 by Petlura's men) and Khan +Nachitchevansky. They both offered themselves and their troops for +the suppression of the mutiny. It would be a mistake to assume that +the Army was quite prepared to accept the provisional "Democratic +Republic," that there were no "loyal" units or "loyal" chiefs ready +to engage in the struggle. They undoubtedly existed. There were, +however, two circumstances which exercised a restraining influence. +In the first place, both Acts of Abdication were apparently legal, +and the second of these Acts, in summoning the people to submit to +the Provisional Government "invested with full power," took the wind +out of the sails of the monarchists. In the second place, it was +apprehended that civil war might open the front to the enemy. The Army +was _then_ obedient to its leaders, and they--General Alexeiev and all +the Commanders-in-Chief--recognised the new power. The newly-appointed +Supreme Commander-in-Chief, the Grand Duke Nicholas, said in his first +Order of the Day: "The power is established in the person of the new +Government. I, the Supreme Commander-in-Chief, have recognised that +power for the good of our Mother Country, serving as an example to us +of our duty as soldiers. I order all ranks of our gallant Army and Navy +implicitly to obey the established Government through their direct +Chiefs. Only then will God grant us victory." + + * * * * * + +The days went by. I began to receive many--both slight and important-- +expressions of bewilderment and questions from the units of my corps: +Who represents the Supreme Power in Russia? Is it the temporary +Committee which created the Provisional Government, or is it the +latter? I sent an inquiry, but received no answer. The Provisional +Government itself, apparently, had no clear notion of the essence of +its power. + +For whom should we pray at Divine Service? Should we sing the National +Anthem and "O God, Save Thy People!" (a prayer in which the Emperor was +mentioned)? + +These apparent trifles produced, however, a certain confusion in the +minds of the men and interfered with established military routine. The +Commanding Officers requested that the oath should be taken as soon as +possible. There was also the question whether the Emperor Nicolas had +the right to abdicate not only for himself, but for his son, who had +not yet attained his majority. + +Other questions soon began to interest the troops. We received the +first Order of the Day of the War Minister, Gutchkov, with alterations +of the Army Regulations in favour of the "Democratisation of the Army" +(March 5th). By this Order, inoffensive at first sight, the officers +were not to be addressed by the men according to their rank, and were +not to speak to the men in the second person singular. A series of +petty restrictions established by Army Regulations for the men, such +as no smoking in the streets and other public places, no card-playing, +and exclusion from Clubs and Meetings, were removed. The consequences +came as a surprise to those who were ignorant of the psychology of +the rank and file. The Commanding Officers understood that if it were +necessary to do away with certain out-of-date forms the process should +be gradual and cautious, and should by no means be interpreted as one +of "the fruits of the Revolutionary victory." The bulk of the men did +not trouble to grasp the meaning of these insignificant changes in the +Army Regulations, but merely accepted them as a deliverance from the +restrictions imposed on them by routine and by respect to the Senior +Officers. + +"There is liberty, and that's all there is to it." + +All these minor alterations of the Army Regulations, broadly +interpreted by the men, affected, to a certain degree, the discipline +of the army. But that soldiers should be permitted, during the war +and during the Revolution, to join in the membership of various +Unions and Societies formed for political purposes, was a menace to +the very existence of the army. G.H.Q., perturbed by this situation, +had recourse to a measure hitherto unknown in the army--to a kind of +plébiscite. All Commanding Officers, including Regimental Commanders, +were advised to address direct telegrams to the Minister of War, +expressing their views on the new orders. I do not know whether the +telegraph was able to cope with this task and whether the enormous mass +of telegrams reached their destination, but I know that those that came +to my notice were full of criticism and of fears for the future of +the army. At the same time, the Army Council in Petrograd, consisting +of Senior Generals--the would-be guardians of the experience and +traditions of the army--decided at a meeting held on March 10th to make +the following report to the Provisional Government: "The Army Council +deems it its duty to declare its full solidarity with the energetic +measures contemplated by the Provisional Government in re-modelling our +armed forces in accordance with the new forms of life in the country +and in the army. We are convinced that these reforms will be the best +means of achieving rapid victory and the deliverance of Europe from +the yoke of Prussian militarism." I cannot help sympathising with a +civilian War Minister after such an occurrence. It was difficult for +us to understand the motives by which the War Ministry was guided in +issuing its Orders of the Day. We were unaware of the unrestrained +opportunities of the men who surrounded the War Minister, as well as of +the fact that the Provisional Government was already dominated by the +Soviet and had entered upon the path of compromise, being invariably +on the losing side. At the Congress of the Soviets on March 30th, one +of the speakers stated that in the Conciliation Commission there never +was a case in which the Provisional Commission did not give way on +important matters. + + * * * * * + +ON THE FIRST OF MARCH THE SOVIET OF WORKMEN AND SOLDIERS' DELEGATES +ISSUED AN ORDER OF THE DAY No. 1., WHICH PRACTICALLY LED TO THE +TRANSFER OF ACTUAL MILITARY POWER TO THE SOLDIERS' COMMITTEES, TO A +SYSTEM OF ELECTIONS AND TO THE DISMISSAL OF COMMANDING OFFICERS BY THE +MEN. THAT ORDER OF THE DAY GAINED WIDE AND PAINFUL NOTORIETY AND GAVE +THE FIRST IMPETUS TO THE COLLAPSE OF THE ARMY. + + + _ORDER No. 1._ + + March 1st, 1917. + + To the Garrison of the Petrograd District, to all Guardsmen, + soldiers of the line, of the Artillery, and of the Fleet, for + immediate and strict observance, and to the workmen of Petrograd + for information. + + The Soviet of Workmen and Soldiers' Delegates has decreed: + + (1) That Committees be elected of representatives of the men in + all companies, battalions, regiments, parks, batteries, squadrons + and separate services of various military institutions, and on the + ships of the fleet. + + (2) All military units not yet represented on the Soviet of + Workmen's Delegates to elect one representative from each + company. These representatives to provide themselves with written + certificates and to report to the Duma at 10 A.M. on March 2nd. + + (3) In all its political activities the military unit is + subordinate to the Soviet,[16] and to its Committees. + + (4) The Orders of the Military Commission of the Duma are to be + obeyed only when they are not in contradiction with the orders and + decrees of the Soviet. + + (5) All arms--rifles, machine-guns, armoured cars, etc.--are to + be at the disposal and under the control of Company and Battalion + Committees, and should never be handed over to the officers even + should they claim them. + + (6) On parade and on duty the soldiers must comply with strict + military discipline; but off parade and off duty, in their + political, social and private life, soldiers must suffer no + restriction of the rights common to all citizens. In particular, + saluting when off duty is abolished. + + (7) Officers are no longer to be addressed as "Your Excellency," + "Your Honour," etc. Instead, they should be addressed as "Mr. + General," "Mr. Colonel," etc. + + Rudeness to soldiers on the part of all ranks, and in particular + addressing them in the second person singular, is prohibited, and + any infringement of this regulation and misunderstandings between + officers and men are to be reported by the latter to the Company + Commanders. + + (Signed) THE PETROGRAD SOVIET. + +The leaders of the Revolutionary Democracy understood full well +the results of Order No. 1. Kerensky is reported to have declared +afterwards pathetically that he would have given ten years of his +life to prevent the Order from being signed. The investigation made +by military authorities failed to detect the authors of this Order. +Tchkeidze and other members of the Soviet afterwards denied their +personal participation and that of the members of the Committee in the +drafting of the Order. + +Pilates! They washed their hands of the writing of their own Credo. For +their words are placed on record, in the report of the secret sitting +of the Government, the Commanders-in-Chief and the Executive Committee +of the Workmen and Soldiers' Deputies of May 4th, 1917: + +_Tzeretelli_: You might, perhaps, understand Order No. 1 if you knew +the circumstances in which it was issued. We were confronted with an +unorganised mob, and we had to organise. + +_Skobelev_: I consider it necessary to explain the circumstances in +which Order No. 1. was issued. Among the troops that overthrew the old +régime, the Commanding Officers did not join the rebels. In order to +deprive the former of their importance, we were forced to issue Order +No. 1. We had inward apprehensions as to the attitude of the front +towards the Revolution. Certain instructions were given, which provoked +our distrust. To-day we have ascertained that this distrust was well +founded. + +A member of the Soviet, Joseph Goldenberg, Editor of _New Life_, +was still more outspoken. He said to the French journalist, Claude +Anet: (Claude Anet: _La Révolution Russe_) "Order No. 1. was not an +error, but a necessity. It was not drafted by Sokolov. It is the +expression of the unanimous will of the Soviet. On the day we 'made the +Revolution,' we understood that if we did not dismember the old army, +it would crush the Revolution. We had to choose between the army and +the Revolution. We did not hesitate--we chose the latter, and I dare +say that we were right." + +Order No. 1. was disseminated rapidly and everywhere along the whole +front and in the rear, because the ideas which it embodied had +developed for many years, in the slums of Petrograd as well as in the +remote corners of the Empire, such as Vladivostock. They had been +preached by all local army demagogues and were being repeated by all +the delegates who visited the front in vast numbers and were provided +with certificates of immunity by the Soviet. + + * * * * * + +The masses of the soldiery were perturbed. The movement began in +the rear, always more easily demoralised than the front, among the +half-educated clerks, doctors' assistants, and technical units. In +the latter part of March in our units, breaches of discipline only +became more frequent. The officer in command of the Fourth Army was +expecting every hour that he would be arrested at his Headquarters by +the licentious bands of men attached to service battalions for special +duty, such as tailoring, cooking, bootmaking, etc. + +The text of the oath of allegiance to the Russian State was received +at last. The idea of Supreme Power was expressed in these words: "I +swear to obey the Provisional Government now at the head of the Russian +State, pending the expression of the popular will through the medium of +the Constituent Assembly." The oath was taken by the troops everywhere +without any disturbance, but the idyllic hopes of the Commanding +Officers were not fulfilled. There was no uplifting of the spirit and +the perturbed minds were not quieted. I may quote two characteristic +episodes. The Commander of one of the Corps on the Roumanian front +died of heart-failure during the ceremony. Count Keller declared that +he would not compel his corps to take the oath because he did not +understand the substance and the legal foundations of the Supreme Power +of the Provisional Government. (Replying to a question addressed from +the crowd as to who had elected the Provisional Government, Miliukov +had answered: "We have been elected by the Russian Revolution"). Count +Keller said he did not understand how one could swear allegiance to +Lvov, Kerensky and other individuals, because they could be removed +or relinquish their posts. Was the oath a sham? I think that not only +for the monarchists, but for many men who did not look upon the oath +as a mere formality, it was in any case a great, moral drama difficult +to live through. It was a heavy sacrifice made for the sake of the +country's salvation and for the preservation of the army.... + +In the middle of May I was ordered to attend a Council at the +Headquarters of the General-in-Command of the Fourth Army. A long +telegram was read from General Alexeiev full of the darkest possible +pessimism, recounting the beginning of the administrative machine and +of the army. He described the demagogic activities of the Soviet, +which dominated the will-power and the conscience of the Provisional +Government, the complete impotence of the latter and the interference +of both in army administration. + +In order to counteract the dismemberment of the army, the despatch was +contemplated of members of the Duma and of the Soviet, possessing a +certain amount of statesmanlike experience, to the front for purposes +of propaganda.... + +This telegram impressed us all in the same way: _General Headquarters +had ceased to be the chief administrative authority in the army._ +And yet a stern warning and remonstrance from the High Command, +supported by the army, which in the first fortnight had still retained +discipline and obedience might, perhaps, have relegated the Soviet, +which over-estimated its importance, to its proper place; might have +prevented the "democratisation" of the army and might have exercised +a corresponding pressure upon the entire course of political events, +albeit devoid of any character of counter-revolution or of military +dictatorship. The loyalty of the Commanding Officers and the complete +absence of active resistance on their part to the destructive policy of +Petrograd exceeded all the expectations of the Revolutionary Democracy. + +Kornilov's movement came too late. + +We drafted a reply suggesting stringent measures against intrusion into +the sphere of military administration. On March 18th I received orders +to proceed forthwith to Petrograd and to report to the War Minister. +I left on the same night and by means of a complex system of carts, +motor cars and railway carriages arrived in the Capital after five +days' journey. On my way I passed through the Headquarters of Generals +Letchitski, Kaledin, and Brussilov. I met many officers and many men +connected with the army. Everywhere I heard the same bitter complaint +and the same request: + +"Tell _them_ that _they_ are ruining the army." + +The summons I had received gave no indication as to the object of my +errand. I was completely in the dark and made all kinds of surmises. +In Kiev I was struck by the cry of a newsboy who ran past. He shouted: +"Latest news. General Denikin is appointed Chief of the Staff of the +Supreme Commander-in-Chief." + + + + +CHAPTER VII. + +IMPRESSIONS OF PETROGRAD AT THE END OF MARCH, 1917. + + +Before his abdication the Emperor signed two ukazes--appointing Prince +Lvov President of the Council of Ministers and the Grand-Duke Nicholas +Supreme Commander-in-Chief. "In view of the general attitude towards +the Romanov Dynasty," as the official Petrograd papers said, and in +reality for fear of the Soviet's attempting a military _coup d'état_, +the Grand-Duke Nicholas was informed on March 9th by the Provisional +Government that it was undesirable that he should remain in supreme +command. Prince Lvov wrote: "The situation makes your resignation +imperative. Public opinion is definitely and resolutely opposed to any +members of the House of Romanov holding any office in the State. The +Provisional Government is not entitled to disregard the voice of the +people, because such disregard might bring about serious complications. +The Provisional Government is convinced that, for the good of the +country, you will bow to the necessity and will resign before returning +to G.H.Q." This letter reached the Grand-Duke when he had already +arrived at G.H.Q. Deeply offended, he immediately handed over to +General Alexeiev and replied to the Government: "I am glad once more +to prove my love for my country, which Russia _heretofore_ has never +doubted...." + +The very serious question then arose of who was to succeed him. +There was great excitement at G.H.Q., and all sorts of rumours were +circulated, but on the day I passed Mohilev nothing was known. On the +23rd I reported to the War Minister Gutchkov, whom I had never met +before. He informed me that the Government had decided to appoint +General Alexeiev to the Supreme Command. At first there had been +differences of opinion. Rodzianko and others were against Alexeiev. +Rodzianko suggested Brussilov; but now the choice had definitely +fallen on Alexeiev. The Government considered him as a man of lenient +disposition, and deemed it necessary to reinforce the Supreme Command +by a fighting general as Chief-of-Staff. I had been selected on +condition that General Klembovski, who was then Alexeiev's assistant, +should remain in charge _pro tem._ until I became familiar with +the work. I had been, in part, prepared for this offer by the news +columns of the Kiev paper. Nevertheless, I felt a certain emotion, and +apprehended the vast amount of work which was being thrust upon me so +unexpectedly and the tremendous moral responsibility inherent in such +an appointment. At great length and quite sincerely I adduced arguments +against the appointment. I said that my career had been spent among my +men and at Fighting Headquarters, that during the war I had commanded +a division and an army corps, and that I was very anxious to continue +this work at the front. I said that I had never dealt with matters of +policy, of national defence, or of administration on such a colossal +scale. The appointment, moreover, had an unpleasant feature. It appears +that Gutchkov had quite frankly explained to Alexeiev the reasons +for my appointment on behalf of the Provisional Government, and had +given the matter the character of an ultimatum. A grave complication +had thus arisen. A Chief-of-Staff was being imposed upon the Supreme +C.-in-C., and for motives not altogether complimentary to the latter. +My arguments, however, were unavailing. I succeeded in obtaining a +delay and the privilege of discussing the matter with General Alexeiev +before taking a definite decision. In the War Minister's office I +met my colleague, General Krymov, and we were both present while the +Minister's assistants reported on uninteresting matters of routine. We +then retired into the next room and began to talk frankly. + +"For God's sake," said Krymov, "don't refuse the appointment. It is +absolutely necessary." + +He imparted to me his impressions in abrupt sentences in his own +peculiar and somewhat rough language, but with all his usual sincerity. +He had arrived on March 14th, summoned by Gutchkov, with whom he had +been on friendly terms, and they had worked together. He was offered +several prominent posts, had asked leave to look round, and then +had refused them all. "I saw that there was nothing for me to do in +Petrograd, and I disliked it all." He particularly disliked the men who +surrounded Gutchkov. + +"I am leaving Colonel Samarine, of the General Staff, as a Liaison +Officer. There will be at least one live man." + +By the irony of fate that officer whom Krymov trusted so well +afterwards played a fatal part, as he was the indirect cause of the +General's suicide.... Krymov was very pessimistic in his account of the +political situation: + +"Nothing will come of it in any case. How can business be done when +the Soviet and the licentious soldiery hold the Government pinioned? +I offered to cleanse Petrograd in two days with one division; but, +of course, not without bloodshed. 'Not for anything in the world,' +they said. Gutchkov refused. Prince Lvov, with a gesture of despair, +exclaimed: 'Oh! but there would be such a commotion!' Things will get +worse. One of these days I shall go back to my army corps. I cannot +afford to lose touch with the troops, as it is upon them that I base +all my hopes. My corps maintains complete order and, perhaps, I shall +succeed in preserving that spirit." + + * * * * * + +I had not seen Petrograd for four years. The impression produced by the +Capital was painful and strange.... To begin with, the Hotel Astoria, +where I stayed, had been ransacked. In the hall there was a guard +of rough and undisciplined sailors of the Guards. The streets were +crowded, but dirty and filled with the new masters of the situation +in khaki overcoats. Remote from the sufferings of the front, they +were "deepening and saving" the Revolution. From whom? I had read a +great deal about the enthusiasm in Petrograd, but I found none. It +was nowhere to be seen. The ministers and rulers were pale, haggard, +exhausted by sleepless nights and endless speeches at meetings and +councils, by addresses to various delegations and to the mob. Their +excitement was artificial, their oratory was full of sonorous phrases +and commonplaces, of which the orators themselves were presumably +thoroughly sick. Inwardly in their heart of hearts they were deeply +anxious. No practical work was being done; in fact, the ministers had +no time to concentrate their thoughts upon the current affairs of +State in their departments. The old bureaucratic machine, creaking and +groaning, continued to work in a haphazard manner. The old wheels were +still revolving while a new handle was being applied. + +The officers of the regular army felt themselves to be stepsons of +the Revolution and were unable to hit upon a proper tone in dealing +with the men. Among the higher ranks, and especially the officers of +the General Staff, there appeared already a new type of opportunist +and demagogue. These men played upon the weaknesses of the Soviet and +of the new governing class of workmen and soldiers, to flatter the +instincts of the crowd, thereby gaining their confidence and making new +openings for themselves and for their careers against the background +of revolutionary turmoil. I must, however, admit that in those days +the military circles proved sufficiently stolid in spite of all the +efforts to dismember them, and that the seeds of demoralisation were +not allowed to grow. Men of the type described above, such as the young +assistant of the War Minister, Kerensky, as well as Generals Brussilov, +Cheremissov, Bonch-Bruevitch, Verkhovsky, Admiral Maximov and others +were unable to strengthen their influence and their position with the +officers. + +The citizen of Petrograd, in the broadest sense of the word, was by no +means enthusiastic. The first enthusiasm was exhausted and was followed +by anxiety and indecision. + +Another feature of the life in Petrograd deserves to be noticed. Men +have ceased to be themselves. Most of them seem to be acting a part +instead of living a life inspired by the new breath of revolution. +Such was the case even in the Councils of the Provisional Government, +in which the deliberations were not altogether sincere, so I was +told, owing to the presence of Kerensky, the "hostage of democracy." +Tactical considerations, caution, partisanship, anxiety for one's +career, feelings of self-preservation, nervousness and various +other good and bad feelings prompted men to wear blinkers and to +walk about in these blinkers as apologists for, or at least passive +witnesses of, "the conquests of the Revolution." Such conquests as +obviously savoured of death and corruption. Hence the false pathos +of endless speeches and meetings; hence these seemingly strange +contradictions. Prince Lvov saying in a public speech: "The process +of the great Russian Revolution is not yet complete, but every day +strengthens our faith in the inexhaustible creative forces of the +Russian people, in its statesmanlike wisdom and in the greatness of +its soul."... The same Prince Lvov bitterly complaining to Alexeiev +of the impossible conditions under which the Provisional Government +was working, owing to the rapid growth of demagogy in the Soviet +and in the country. Kerensky, the exponent of the idea of Soldiers' +Committees, and Kerensky sitting in his railway carriage and nervously +whispering to his adjutant: "Send these d.... committees to h...." +Tchkheidze and Skobelev warmly advocating full democratisation of the +army at a joint sitting of the Soviet, of the Government and of the +Commanders-in-Chief, and during an interval in private conversation +admitting the necessity of rigid military discipline and of their own +incapacity to convince the Soviet of this necessity.... + +I repeat that even then, at the end of March, one could clearly feel +in Petrograd that the ringing of the Easter bells had lasted too long, +and that they would have done better to ring the alarm bell. There were +only two men of all those to whom I had the occasion to speak who had +no illusions whatever: Krymov and Kornilov. + + * * * * * + +I met Kornilov for the first time on the Galician plains, near Galtich, +at the end of August, 1914, when he was appointed to the Command of +the 48th Infantry Division and myself to the 4th (Iron) Rifle Brigade. +Since that day, for four months, our troops went forward side by side +as part of the 14th Corps, fighting incessant, glorious and heavy +battles, defeating the enemy, crossing the Carpathians and invading +Hungary. Owing to the wide extent of the front we did not often meet; +nevertheless, we knew each other very well. I had already then a clear +perception of Kornilov's main characteristics as a leader. He had an +extraordinary capacity for training troops: out of a second-rate unit +from the district of Kazan he made, in several weeks, an excellent +fighting division. He was resolute and extremely pertinacious in +conducting the most difficult and even apparently doomed operations. +His personal prowess, which provoked boundless admiration and gave +him great popularity among the troops, was admirable. Finally, he +scrupulously observed military ethics with regard to units fighting +by his side and to his comrades-in-arms. Many commanding officers +and units lacked that quality. After Kornilov's astounding escape +from Austrian captivity, into which he fell when heavily wounded, +and covering Brussilov's retreat from the Carpathians, towards the +beginning of the Revolution, he commanded the 25th Corps. All those +who knew Kornilov even slightly felt that he was destined to play +an important part in the Russian Revolution. On March 2nd Rodzianko +telegraphed direct to Kornilov: "The Temporary Committee of the Duma +requests you, for your country's sake, to accept the chief command +in Petrograd and to arrive at the Capital at once. We have no doubt +that you will not refuse the appointment, and will thereby render an +inestimable service to the country." Such a revolutionary method of +appointing an officer to a high command, without reference to G.H.Q., +obviously produced a bad impression at the "Stavka." The telegram +received at the "Stavka" is marked "Undelivered," but on the same day +General Alexeiev, having requested the permission of the Emperor, who +was then at Pskov, issued an order of the day (No. 334): "... I agree +to General Kornilov being in temporary high command of the troops of +the Petrograd Military District." + +I have mentioned this insignificant episode in order to explain the +somewhat abnormal relations between two prominent leaders, which were +occasioned by repeated, petty, personal friction. + +I talked to Kornilov at dinner in the War Minister's house. It was the +only moment of rest he could snatch during the day. Kornilov, tired, +morose and somewhat pessimistic, discussed at length the conditions +of the Petrograd Garrison, and his intercourse with the Soviet. The +hero-worship with which he had been surrounded in the army had faded in +the unhealthy atmosphere of the Capital among the demoralised troops. +They were holding meetings, deserting, indulging in petty commerce +in shops and in the street, serving as hall-porters and as personal +guards to private individuals, partaking in plundering and arbitrary +searches, but were not serving. It was difficult for a fighting general +to understand their psychology. He often succeeded by personal pluck, +disregard of danger, and by a witty, picturesque word in holding the +mob, for that was what military units were. There were, however, +cases when the troops did not come out of barracks to meet their +Commander-in-Chief, when he was hissed and the flag of St. George was +torn from his motor-car (by the Finland Regiment of the Guards). + +Kornilov's description of the political situation was the same as that +given by Krymov: Powerlessness of the Government and the inevitability +of a fierce cleansing of Petrograd. On one point they differed: +Kornilov stubbornly clung to the hope that he would yet succeed in +gaining authority over the majority of the Petrograd Garrison. As we +know, that hope was never fulfilled. + + + + +CHAPTER VIII. + +THE STAVKA: ITS RÔLE AND POSITION. + + +On March 25th I arrived at the Stavka, and was immediately received +by General Alexeiev. Of course he was offended. "Well," he said, "if +such are the orders, what's to be done?" Again, as at the War Ministry, +I pointed out several reasons against my appointment, among others, +my disinclination for Staff work. I asked the General to express his +views quite frankly, and in disregard of all conventionalities as my +old Professor, because I would not think of accepting the appointment +against his will. Alexeiev spoke politely, dryly, evasively, and +showed again that he was offended. "The scope," he said, "was wide, +work difficult, and much training necessary. Let us, however, work +harmoniously." In the course of my long career I have never been placed +in such a position, and could not, of course, be reconciled to such an +attitude. "In these circumstances," I said, "I absolutely refuse to +accept the appointment. In order to avoid friction between yourself +and the Government, I will declare that it is entirely my own personal +decision." + +Alexeiev's tone changed immediately. "Oh! no," he said, "I am not +asking you to refuse. Let us work together, and I will help you. Also, +there is no reason, if you feel that the work is not to your liking, +why you should not take command of the First Army, in which there will +be a vacancy two or three months hence. I will have to talk the matter +over with General Klembovski. He could not, of course, remain here as +my assistant." + +[Illustration: General Alexeiev.] + +[Illustration: General Kornilov.] + +Our parting was not quite so frigid; but a couple of days went by and +there were no results. I lived in a railway carriage, and did not go to +the office or to the mess. As I did not intend to tolerate this silly +and utterly undeserved position, I was preparing to leave Petrograd. +On March 28th the War Minister came to the Stavka and cut the Gordian +knot. Klembovski was offered the command of an army or membership of +the War Council. He chose the latter, and on April 5th I took charge +as Chief of the Staff. Nevertheless, such a method of appointing the +closest assistant to the Supreme Commander-in-Chief, practically by +force, could not but leave a certain trace. A kind of shadow seemed +to lie between myself and General Alexeiev, and it did not disappear +until the last stage of his tenure of office. Alexeiev saw in my +appointment a kind of tutelage on the part of the Government. From the +very first moment I was compelled to oppose Petrograd. I served our +cause and tried to shield the Supreme C.-in-C.--and of this he was +often unaware--from many conflicts and much friction, taking them upon +myself. As time went by friendly relations of complete mutual trust +were established, and these did not cease until the day of Alexeiev's +death. + +On April 2nd the General received the following telegram: "The +Provisional Government has appointed you Supreme Commander-in-Chief. +It trusts that, under your firm guidance, the Army and the Navy will +fulfil their duty to the country to the end." My appointment was +gazetted on April 10th. + + * * * * * + +The Stavka, on the whole was not favoured. In the circles of the +Revolutionary Democracy it was considered a nest of counter-Revolution, +although such a description was utterly undeserved. Under Alexeiev +there was a loyal struggle against the disruption of the Army. Under +Brussilov--opportunism slightly tainted with subservience to the +Revolutionary Democracy. As regards the Kornilov movement, although it +was not essentially counter-Revolutionary, it aimed, as we shall see +later, at combatting the Soviets that were half-Bolshevik. But, even +then, the loyalty of the officers of the Stavka was quite obvious. Only +a few of them took an active part in the Kornilov movement. After the +office of Supreme Commander-in-Chief was abolished, and the new office +created of Supreme Commanding Committees, nearly all the members of +the Stavka under Kerensky, and the majority of them under Krylenko, +continued to carry on the routine work. The Army also disliked the +Stavka--sometimes wrongly, sometimes rightly--because the Army did +not quite understand the distribution of functions among the various +branches of the Service, and ascribed to the Stavka many shortcomings +in equipment, organisation, promotion, awards, etc., whereas these +questions belonged entirely to the War Ministry and its subordinates. +The Stavka had always been somewhat out of touch with the Army. Under +the comparatively normal and smoothly working conditions of the +pre-Revolutionary period this circumstance did not greatly prejudice +the working of the ruling mechanism; but now, when the Army was not +in a normal condition, and had been affected by the whirlwind of the +Revolution, the Stavka naturally was behind the times. + +Finally, a certain amount of friction could not fail to arise between +the Government and the Stavka, because the latter constantly protested +against many Government measures, which exercised a disturbing +influence on the Army. There were no other serious reasons for +difference of opinion, because neither Alexeiev nor myself, nor the +various sections of the Stavka, ever touched upon matters of internal +policy. The Stavka was non-political in the fullest sense of the word, +and during the first months of the Revolution was a perfectly reliable +technical apparatus in the hands of the Provisional Government. The +Stavka did but safeguard the highest interests of the Army, and, within +the limits of the War and of the Army, demanded that full powers be +given to the Supreme Commander-in-Chief. I may even say that the +personnel of the Stavka seemed to me to be bureaucratic and too deeply +immersed in the sphere of purely technical interests; they were not +sufficiently interested in the political and social questions which +events had brought to the fore. + + * * * * * + +In discussing the Russian strategy in the Great War, after August, +1915, one should always bear in mind that it was the personal +strategy of General Alexeiev. He alone bears the responsibility +before history for its course, its successes and failures. A man of +exceptional conscientiousness and self-sacrifice, and devoted to +his work, he had one serious failing: all his life he did the work +of others as well as his own. So it was when he held the post of +Quartermaster-General of the General Staff, of Chief-of-Staff of the +Kiev District, and later of the South-Western front and finally of +Chief-of-Staff to the Supreme C.-in-C. Nobody influenced strategical +decisions, and, as often as not, final instructions, written in +Alexeiev's tiny and neat hand-writing, appeared unexpectedly on +the desk of the Quartermaster-General, whose duty under the law +and whose responsibility in these matters were very grave. If such +a procedure was to a certain extent justifiable, when the post of +Quartermaster-General was occupied by a nonentity, there was no excuse +for it when he was superseded by other Quartermasters-General, such as +Lukomski or Josephovitch. These men could not accept such a position. +The former, as a rule, protested by sending in memoranda embodying his +opinion, which was adverse to the plan of operations. Such protests, +of course, were purely academic, but presented a guarantee against +the judgment of history. General Klembovski, my predecessor, was +compelled to demand non-interference with the rightful sphere of his +competence as a condition of his tenure of office. Till then, Alexeiev +had directed all the branches of administration. When these branches +acquired a still broader scope, this proved practically impossible, +and I was given full liberty in my work except ... in respect of +strategy. Again, Alexeiev began to send telegrams in his own hand of +a strategical nature, orders and directions, the motives of which the +Quartermaster-General and myself could not understand. Several times, +three of us, the Quartermaster-General, Josephovitch, his assistant, +General Markov, and myself, discussed this question. The quick-tempered +Josephovitch was greatly excited, and asked to be appointed to a +Divisional Command. "I cannot be a clerk," he said. "There is no need +for a Quartermaster-General at the Stavka if every clerk can type +instructions." The General and myself began to contemplate resignation. +Markov said that he would not stay for a single day if we went. I +finally decided to have a frank talk with Alexeiev. We were both under +the strain of emotion. We parted as friends, but we did not settle the +question. Alexeiev said: "Do I not give you a full share of the work? I +do not understand you." Alexeiev was quite sincerely surprised because +during the war he had grown accustomed to a régime which appeared to +him perfectly normal. So we three held another conference. After a +lengthy discussion, we decided that the plan of campaign for 1917 had +long since been worked out, that preparations for that campaign had +reached a stage in which substantial alterations had become impossible, +that the details of the concentration and distribution of troops were +in the present condition of the Army a difficult matter, allowing for +differences of opinion; that we could perhaps manage to effect certain +alterations of the plan, and that finally our retirement _in corpore_ +might be detrimental to the work, and might undermine the position +of the Supreme C.-in-C., which was already by no means stable. We +therefore decided to wait and see. We did not have to wait very long, +because, at the end of May, Alexeiev left the Stavka, and we followed +him very soon afterwards. + + * * * * * + +What place did the Stavka occupy as a military and political factor of +the Revolutionary period? + +The importance of the Stavka diminished. In the days of the Imperial +régime, the Stavka, from the military point of view, occupied a +predominant position. No individual or institution in the State was +entitled to issue instructions or to call to account the Supreme +Commander-in-Chief, and it was Alexeiev and not the Czar who in reality +held that office. Not a single measure of the War Ministry, even if +indirectly affecting the interests of the Army, could be adopted +without the sanction of the Stavka. The Stavka gave direct orders to +the War Minister and to his Department on questions appertaining to +the care of the Army. The voice of the Stavka had a certain weight +and importance in the practical domain of administration at the +theatre of war, albeit without any connection with the general trend +of internal policy. That power was not exercised to a sufficient +degree; but on principle it afforded the opportunity of carrying on +the defence of the country in co-operation with other branches of the +administration, which were to a certain extent subordinate to it. With +the beginning of the Revolution, these conditions underwent a radical +change. Contrary to the examples of history and to the dictates of +military science, the Stavka became practically subordinate to the War +Minister. This was not due to any act of the Government, but merely to +the fact that the Provisional Government combined supreme power with +executive power, as well as to the combination of the strong character +of Gutchkov and the yielding nature of Alexeiev. The Stavka could no +longer address rightful demands to the branches of the War Ministry +which were attending to Army equipments. It conducted a lengthy +correspondence and appealed to the Ministry of War. The War Minister, +who now signed orders instead of the Emperor, exercised a strong +influence upon appointments and dismissals of officers in High Command. +These appointments were sometimes made by him after consultation with +the fronts, but the Stavka was not informed. Army regulations of the +highest importance altering the conditions of the troops in respect of +reinforcements, routine and duty, were issued by the Ministry without +the participation of the Supreme Command, which learnt of their issue +only from the Press. In fact, such a participation would have actually +been useless. Two products of the Polivanov Commission--the new Courts +and the Committees--which Gutchkov _accidentally_ asked me to look +through, were returned with a series of substantial objections of my +own, and Gutchkov expounded them in vain before the representatives of +the Soviet. The only result was that certain changes in the drafting of +the regulations were made. + +All these circumstances undoubtedly undermined the authority of the +Stavka in the eyes of the Army, and prompted the Generals in High +Command to approach the more powerful Central Government Departments +without reference to the Stavka, as well as to display excessive +individual initiative in matters of paramount importance to the +State and to the Army. Thus, in May, 1917, on the Northern Front, +all the pre-War soldiers were discharged instead of the prescribed +percentage, and this created grave difficulties on other fronts. On +the South-Western Front Ukranian units were being formed. The Admiral +in command of the Baltic Fleet ordered the officers to remove their +shoulder-straps, etc. + +The Stavka had lost influence and power, and could no longer occupy +the commanding position of an administrative and moral centre. This +occurred at the most terrible stage of the World War, when the Army +was beginning to disintegrate, and when not only the entire strength +of the people was being put to the test, but the necessity had arisen +for a power exceptionally strong and wide in its bearing. Meanwhile, +the matter was quite obvious: if Alexeiev and Denikin did not enjoy the +confidence of the Government, and were considered inadequate to the +requirements of the Supreme Command, they should have been superseded +by new men who did enjoy that confidence and who should have been +invested with full powers. As a matter of fact, changes were made +twice. But only the men were changed, not the principles of the High +Command. In the circumstances, when no one actually wielded power, +military power was not centred in anybody's hands. Neither the Chiefs +who enjoyed the reputation of serving their country loyally and with +exceptional devotion, like Alexeiev, and later the "Iron Chiefs," such +as Kornilov undoubtedly was and as Brussilov was supposed to be, nor +all the Chameleons that fed from the hand of the Socialist reformers of +the Army had any real power. + +The entire military hierarchy was shaken to its very foundations, +though it retained all the attributes of power and the customary +routine--instructions which could not move the Armies, orders that were +never carried out, verdicts of the Courts which were derided. The full +weight of oppression, following the line of the least resistance, fell +solely upon the loyal commanding officers, who submitted without a +murmur to persecution from above as well as from below. The Government +and the War Ministry, having abolished repressions, had recourse to +a new method of influencing the masses--to _appeals_. Appeals to +the people, to the Army, to the Cossacks, to everybody, flooded the +country, inviting all to do their duty. Unfortunately, only those +appeals were successful that flattered the meanest instincts of +the mob, inviting it to neglect its duty. As a result, it was not +counter-Revolution, Buonapartism, or adventure, but the elemental +desire of the circles where the ideas of statesmanship still prevailed, +to restore the broken laws of warfare, that soon gave rise to a new +watchword: + + "_Military power must be seized_." + +Such a task was not congenial to Alexeiev or Brussilov. Kornilov +subsequently endeavoured to undertake it, and began independently +to carry out a series of important military measures and to address +ultimatums on military questions to the Government. At first, the only +question raised was that of granting "full powers" to the Supreme +Command within the scope of its competence. + +It is interesting to compare this state of affairs with that of the +command of the armies of our powerful foe. Ludendorff, the first +Quartermaster-General of the German Army says (_Mes Souvenirs de +Guerre_): "In peace-time the Imperial Government exercised full power +over its Departments.... When the War began the Ministers found it +difficult to get used to seeing in G.H.Q. a power which was compelled, +by the immensity of its task, to act with greater resolution as that +resolution weakened in Berlin. Would that the Government could clearly +have perceived this simple truth.... The Government went its own way, +and never abandoned any of its designs in compliance with the wishes +of G.H.Q. On the contrary, it disregarded much that we considered +necessary for the prosecution of the War." + +If we recall that in March, 1918, the deputy of the Reichstag, Haase, +was more than justified in saying that the Chancellor was nothing but +a figure-head covering the military party, and that Ludendorff was +actually governing the country, we will understand the extent of the +power which the German Command deemed it necessary to exercise in order +to win the World War. + +I have drawn a general picture of the Stavka, such as it was when +I took charge as Chief-of-Staff. Taking the entire position into +consideration, I had two main objects in view: first, to counteract +with all my strength the influences which were disrupting the Army, so +as to preserve that Army and to hold the Eastern Front in the world +struggle; and secondly, to reinforce the rights, the power, and the +authority of the Supreme Commander-in-Chief. A loyal struggle was at +hand. In that struggle, which only lasted two months, all sections of +the Stavka had their share. + +[Illustration: General Markov.] + + + + +CHAPTER IX. + +GENERAL MARKOV. + + +The duties of the Quartermaster-General in the Stavka were many-sided +and complex. As in the European Army, it proved therefore necessary to +create the office of a second Quartermaster-General. The first dealt +merely with matters concerning the conduct of operations. I invited +General Markov to accept this new office. His fate was linked up with +mine until his glorious death at the head of a Volunteer Division. +That Division afterwards bore with honour his name, which has become +legendary in the Volunteer Army. At the outbreak of war he was a +lecturer at the Academy of the General Staff. He went to the war as +Staff-Officer to General Alexeiev. Then he joined the 19th Division, +and in December, 1914, he served under my command as Chief-of-Staff +of the 4th Rifle Brigade, which I then commanded. When he came to our +Brigade he was unknown and unexpected, as I had asked the Army G.H.Q. +for another man to be appointed. Immediately upon his arrival he told +me that he had recently undergone a slight operation, was not feeling +well, was unable to ride, and would not go up to the front line. I +frowned, and the Staff exchanged significant glances. The "Professor," +as we afterwards often called him as a friendly jest, was obviously out +of place in our midst. + +I started one day with my staff, all mounted, towards the line where +my riflemen were fiercely fighting, near the town of Friestach. The +enemy was upon us, and the fire was intense. Suddenly, repeated showers +of shrapnel came down upon us. We wondered what it meant, and there +was Markov gaily smiling, openly driving to the firing line in a huge +carriage. "I was bored staying in, so I have come to see what is going +on here." + +From that day the ice was broken, and Markov assumed a proper place in +the family of the "Iron Division." I have never met a man who loved +military work to such an extent as Markov. He was young (when he was +killed in the summer of 1918 in action he was only 39 years of age), +impetuous, communicative, eloquent. He knew how to approach, and +closely, too, any _milieu_--officers, soldiers, crowds--sometimes far +from sympathetic, and how to instil into them his straightforward, +clear, and indisputable articles of faith. He was very quick to grasp +the situation in battle, and made work much easier for me. Markov had +one peculiarity. He was quite exceptionally straightforward, frank, +and abrupt when attacking those who, in his opinion, did not display +adequate knowledge, energy, or pluck. While he was at Headquarters +the troops therefore viewed him (as in the Brigade) with a certain +reserve, and sometimes even with intolerance (as in the Rostov period +of the Volunteer Army). No sooner, however, did Markov join the +Division than the attitude towards him became one of love on the part +of the riflemen, or even enthusiasm on the part of the Volunteers. +The Army had its own psychology. It would have no abruptness and +blame from Markov as a Staff Officer. But when _their_ Markov, in his +usual short fur coat with his cap at the back of his head, waving +his inevitable whip, was in the rifleman's firing line, under the +hot fire of the enemy, he could be as violent as possible, he could +shout and swear--his words provoked sometimes sorrow, sometimes mirth, +but there was always a sincere desire to be worthy of his praise. I +recall the heavy days which the Brigade endured in February, 1915. +The Brigade was pushed forward, was surrounded by a semi-circle of +hills occupied by the enemy, who was in a position to snipe us. The +position was intolerable, the losses were heavy, and nothing could be +gained by keeping us on that line. But the 14th Infantry Division next +to us reported to the Army H.Q.: "Our blood runs cold at the thought +of abandoning the position and having afterwards once more to attack +the heights which have already cost us rivers of blood." I remained. +Matters, however, were so serious that one had to be in close touch +with the men. I moved the field H.Q. up to the position. Count Keller, +in command of our section, having travelled for eleven hours in deep +mud and over mountain paths, arrived at that moment, and rested for a +while. + +"Let us now drive up to the line." + +We laughed. + +"How shall we drive? Would you come to the door, enemy machine-guns +permitting?" + +Count Keller left fully determined to extricate the Brigade from the +trap. The Brigade was melting away. In the rear there was only one +ramshackle bridge across the San. We were in the hands of fate. Will +the torrent swell? If it does, the bridge will be swept away, and +our retreat will be cut off. At this difficult moment the Colonel in +command of the 13th Rifle Regiment was severely wounded by a sniper +as he was coming out of the house where the H.Q. were stationed. All +officers of his rank having been killed, there was nobody to replace +him. I was pacing up and down the small hut, in a gloomy mood. Markov +rose. + +"Give me the 13th Regiment, sir," said Markov. + +"Of course, with pleasure." + +I had already thought of doing so. But I hesitated to offer it to +Markov lest he should think it was my intention to remove him from the +Staff. Markov afterwards went with his regiment from one victory to +another. He had already earned the Cross of St. George and the sword +of St. George, but for nine months the Stavka would not confirm his +appointment, because he had not reached the dead line of seniority. + +I recall the days of the heavy Galician retreat, when a tidal wave +of maddened peasants, with women, children, cattle and carts, was +following the Army, burning their villages and houses.... Markov was in +the rear, and was ordered promptly to blow up the bridge at which this +human tide had stopped. He was, however, moved by the sufferings of the +people, and for six hours he fought for the bridge at the risk of being +cut off, until the last cart of the refugees had crossed the bridge. + +His life was a perpetual fiery impulse. On one occasion I had lost +all hope of ever seeing him again. In the beginning of September, +1915, in the course of the Lutsk operation, in which our Division +so distinguished itself, between Olyka and Klevan, the left column +commanded by Markov broke the Austrian line and disappeared. The +Austrians closed the line. During the day we heard no news, and the +night came. I was anxious for the fate of the 13th Regiment, and rode +to a high slope, observing the enemy's firing line in the silent +distance. Suddenly, from afar, from the dense forest, in the far rear +of the Austrians, I heard the joyous strains of the Regimental March of +the 13th. What a relief it was! + +"I got into such a fix," said Markov afterwards, "the devil himself +could not have known which were my riflemen and which were Austrians. I +decided to cheer up my men and to collect them by making the band play." + +Markov's column had smashed the enemy, had taken two thousand prisoners +and a gun, and had put the Austrians to disorderly flight towards +Lutsk. + +In his impulsiveness he sometimes went from one extreme to another, +but, as soon as matters grew really desperate, he immediately regained +self-possession. In October, 1915, the 4th Rifle Division was +conducting the famous Chartoriisk operation, had broken the enemy on a +front about twelve miles wide and over fifteen miles deep. Brussilov, +having no reserves, hesitated to bring up troops from another front +in order to take advantage of this break. Time was short. The Germans +centred their reserves, and they were attacking me on all sides. The +situation was difficult. Markov, from the front line, telephoned: "The +position is peculiar. I am fighting the four quarters of the earth. It +is so hard as to be thoroughly amusing." Only once did I see him in a +state of utter depression, when, in the spring of 1915, near Przemyshl, +he was removing from the firing line the remnants of his companies. He +was drenched with the blood of the C.O. of the 14th Regiment, who had +been standing by, and whose head had been torn off by a shell. + +Markov never took any personal precautions. In September, 1915, the +Division was fighting in the direction of Kovel. On the right our +cavalry was operating, was moving forward irresolutely, and was +perturbing us by incredible news of the appearance of important enemy +forces on its front, on our bank of the River Styr. Markov became +annoyed with this indecision, and reported to me: "I went to the Styr +with my orderly to give the horses a drink. Between our line and the +Styr there is no one, neither our cavalry nor the enemy." + +I reported him for promotion to General's rank, as a reward for several +battles, but my request was not granted on the plea that he was "a +youngster." Verily youth was a great defect. In the spring of 1916 +the Division was feverishly preparing for the break-through at Lutsk. +Markov made no secret of his innermost wish: "It is to be either one +or the other--a wooden cross or the Cross of St. George of the Third +Degree." But the Stavka, after several refusals, compelled him to +accept "promotion"--once again the office of Divisional Chief-of-Staff. +(This measure was due to a great dearth of officers of the General +Staff, because the normal activities of the Academy had come to an +end. Colonels and Generals were made to hold for a second time and on +special conditions the office of Chief of Divisional Staff before they +were appointed to Divisional Commands.) After several months on the +Caucasian Front, where Markov suffered from inaction, he lectured for +some time at the Academy, which had then reopened, and later returned +to the Army. At the outbreak of the Revolution he was attached to the +Commanding Officer of the Tenth Army as General for special missions. + + * * * * * + +In the beginning of March a mutiny broke out at Briansk in the big +garrison. It was attended by pogroms and by the arrest of officers. +The townfolk were terribly excited. Markov spoke several times in the +crowded Council of Military Deputies. After tempestuous and passionate +debates, he succeeded in obtaining a resolution for restoring +discipline and for freeing twenty of those arrested. Nevertheless, +after midnight several companies in arms moved to the railway station +in order to do away with Markov and with the arrested officers. The mob +was infuriated and Markov seemed to be doomed, but his resourcefulness +saved the situation. Trying to make his voice heard above the tumult, +he addressed an impassioned appeal to the mob. The following sentence +occurred in his speech: "Had any of my 'Iron' Riflemen been here, he +would have told you who General Markov is." "I served in the 13th +Regiment," came a voice from the crowd. + +Markov pushed aside several men who were surrounding him, advanced +rapidly towards the soldier, and seized him by the scruff of the neck. + +"You? You? Then why don't you thrust the bayonet into me? The +enemy's bullet has spared me, so let me perish by the hand of my own +rifleman...." + +The mob was still more intoxicated, but with admiration. Accompanied by +tempestuous cheering, Markov and the arrested officers left for Minsk. + +Markov was lifted by the wave of events, and gave himself entirely to +the struggle, without a thought for himself or for his family. Faith +and despair succeeded each other in his mind; he loved his country and +felt sorry for the Army, which never ceased to occupy a prominent place +in his heart and in his mind. + +Reference will be made more than once in the course of this narrative +to the personality of Markov, but I could not refrain from satisfying +my heart's desire in adding a few laurels to his wreath--the wreath +that was placed upon his tomb by two faithful friends, with the +inscription:-- + + "He lived and died for the good of his country." + + + + +CHAPTER X. + + THE POWER--THE DUMA--THE PROVISIONAL GOVERNMENT--THE HIGH + COMMAND--THE SOVIET OF WORKMEN'S AND SOLDIERS' DELEGATES. + + +Russia's exceptional position, confronted on the one hand with a world +war and on the other with a revolution, made the establishment of a +strong power an imperative necessity. + +The DUMA, which, as I have already said, unquestionably enjoyed +the confidence of the country, refused, after lengthy and heated +discussions, to head the Revolutionary power. Temporarily dissolved +by the Imperial ukaze of February 27th, it remained loyal, and "did +not attempt to hold an official sitting," as it "considered itself a +legislative institution of the old régime, co-ordinated by fundamental +law with the obviously doomed remnants of autocracy." (Miliukov, +_History of the Second Russian Revolution_.) The subsequent decrees +emanated from the "private conference of the members of the Duma." This +body elected the "temporary Committee of the Duma," which exercised +supreme power in the first days of the Revolution. + +When power was transferred to the PROVISIONAL GOVERNMENT, the Duma +and the Committee retired to the background, but did not cease to +exist, and endeavoured to give moral support and a _raison d'être_ +to the first three Cabinets of the Government. On May 2nd, during +the first Government crisis, the Committee still struggled for the +right to _appoint_ members of the Government; subsequently it reduced +its demands to that of the right to _participate_ in the formation +of the Government. Thus, on July 7th, the Committee of the Duma +protested against its exclusion from the formation of a new Provisional +Government by Kerensky, as it considered such a course as "legally +inadmissible and politically disastrous." The Duma, of course, was +fully entitled to participate in the direction of the life of the +country, as, even in the camp of its enemies, the signal service +was recognised which the Duma had rendered to the Revolution "In +converting to it the entire front and all the officers" (Stankevitch: +_Reminiscences_). There can be no doubt that, had the Soviet taken the +lead in the Revolution, there would have been a fierce struggle against +it, and the Revolution would have been squashed. It might, perhaps, +have then given the victory to the Liberal Democracy, and would have +led the country to a normal evolutionary development. Who knows? + +The members of the Duma themselves felt the strain of inactivity +which was at first voluntary and later compulsory. There were many +absentees, and the President of the Duma had to combat this attitude. +Nevertheless, the Duma and the Committee were quite alive to the +importance of the trend events were taking. They issued resolutions +condemning, warning, and appealing to the common sense, the heart, +and the patriotism of the people, of the Army, and of the Government. +The Duma, however, had already been swept aside by the Revolutionary +elements. Its statesmanlike appeals, full of the clear consciousness of +impending perils, had ceased to impress the country, and were ignored +by the Government. Even a Duma so peaceable that it did not even fight +for power aroused the apprehensions of the Revolutionary Democracy, and +the Soviets led a violent campaign for the abolition of the Council +of the State and of the Duma. In August the Duma relaxed its efforts +in issuing proclamations, and when Kerensky dissolved the Duma at the +bidding of the Soviets, nineteen days before the expiration of its five +years' term, on October 6th, this news did not produce any appreciable +effect in the country. Rodzianko kept alive for a long time the idea +of the Fourth Duma or of the Assembly of all Dumas as the foundation +of the power of the State. He stuck to this idea throughout the Kuban +campaigns and the Ekaterinodar Volunteer period of the anti-Bolshevik +struggle. But the Duma was dead.... + +None can tell whether the Duma's abdication of power was inevitable +in the days of March, and whether it was rendered imperative by the +relative strength of the forces that struggled for power, whether +the "class" Duma could have retained the Socialist elements in its +midst and have continued to wield a certain influence in the country, +acquired as a result of its fight against autocracy. It is at least +certain that, in the years of trouble in Russia, when no normal, +popular representation was possible, all Governments invariably felt +the necessity for some substitute for this popular representation, +were it only as a kind of tribune from which expression could be given +to different currents of thought, a rock upon which to stand and to +divine moral responsibilities. Such was the "Temporary Council of +the Russian Republic" at Petrograd in October, 1917, which, however, +had been started by the Revolutionary Democracy, as a counter-blast +to the contemplated Bolshevik Second Congress of Soviets. Such was +the partial constituent Assembly of 1917, which was held on the Volga +in the summer of 1918, and such the proposed convocation of the High +Council and Assembly (_Sobor_) of the Zemstvos in the South of Russia +and in Siberia in 1919. Even the highest manifestation of collective +dictatorship--"the Soviet of People's Commissars"--which reached a +level of despotism and had suppressed social life and all the live +forces of the country to an extent unknown in history, and reduced +the country to a graveyard, still considered it necessary to create a +kind of theatrical travesty of such a representative institution by +periodically convoking the "All-Russian Congress of Soviets." + +The authority of the Provisional Government contained the seed of its +own impotence. As Miliukov has said, that power was devoid of the +"symbol" to which the masses were accustomed. The Government yielded +to the pressure of the Soviet, which was systematically distorting all +State functions and making them subservient to the interests of class +and party. + +Kerensky, the "hostage of Democracy," was in the Government. In a +speech delivered in the Soviet he thus defined his rôle: "I am the +representative of Democracy, and the Provisional Government should look +upon me as expressing the demands of Democracy, and should particularly +heed the opinions which I may utter." Last, but not least, there were +in the Government representatives of the Russian Liberal Intelligencia, +with all its good and bad qualities, and with the lack of will-power +characteristic of that class, the will-power which, by its boundless +daring, its cruelty in removing obstacles, and its tenacity in seizing +power, gives victory in the struggle for self-preservation to class, +caste and nationality. During the four years of the Russian turmoil the +Russian Intelligencia and Bourgeoisie lived in a state of impotence +and of non-resistance, and surrendered every stronghold; they even +submitted to physical extermination and extinction. Strong will-power +appeared to exist only on the two extreme flanks of the social front. +Unfortunately it was a will to destroy and not to create. One flank has +already produced Lenin, Bronstein, Apfelbaum, Uritzki, Dzerjinski, and +Peters.... The other flank, defeated in March, 1917, may not yet have +said its last word. The Russian Revolution was undoubtedly national in +its origin, being a mode of expressing the universal protest against +the old régime. But, when the time came for reconstruction, two forces +came into conflict which embodied and led two different currents of +political thought, two different outlooks. According to the accepted +phrase, it was a struggle between the Bourgeoisie and the Democracy. +But it would be more correct to describe it as a struggle between the +Bourgeois and the Socialist Democracies. Both sides derived their +leading spirits from the same source--the Russian Intelligencia--by no +means numerous and heterogeneous, not so much in respect of class and +wealth as of political ideas and methods of political contest. Both +sides inadequately reflected the thoughts of the popular masses in +whose name they spoke. At first these masses were merely an audience +applauding the actors who most appealed to its impassioned, but not +altogether idealistic, instincts. It was only after this psychological +training that the inert masses, and in particular the Army, became, in +the words of Kerensky, "an elemental mass melted in the fire of the +Revolution and ... exercising tremendous pressure which was felt by +the entire organism of the State." To deny this would be tantamount to +the denial, in accordance with Tolstoi's doctrine, of the influence of +leaders upon the life of the people. This theory has been completely +shattered by Bolshevism, which has conquered for a long time the masses +of the people with whom it has nothing in common and who are inimical +to the Communist creed. + +In the first weeks of the new Government the phenomenon became +apparent, which was described in the middle of July by the Committee of +the Duma in its appeal to the Government in the following words: "The +seizure of the power of the State by irresponsible organisations, the +creation by these organisations of a dual power in the centre, and of +the absence of power in the country." + + * * * * * + +The power of the Soviet was also conditional in spite of a series of +Government crises and of opportunities thereby provided for seizing +that power and wielding it without opposition and unreservedly (the +Provisional Government offered no resistance). The Revolutionary +Democracy, as represented by the Soviet, categorically declined to +assume that rôle because it realised quite clearly that it lacked +the strength, the knowledge, and the skill to govern the country in +which it had as yet no real support. Tzeretelli, one of the leaders +of Revolutionary Democracy, said: "The time is not yet ripe for +the fulfilment of the ultimate aims of the proletariat and for +the solution of class questions.... We understand that a Bourgeois +Revolution is in progress ... as we are unable fully to attain to our +bright ideal ... and we _do not wish to assume that responsibility +for the collapse of the movement_, which we could not avoid if we +made the desperate attempt to impose our will upon events at the +present moment." Another representative, Nahamkes, said that they +preferred "to compel the Government to comply with their demands by +means of perpetual organised pressure." A member of the Executive +Committee of the Soviet, Stankevitch, thus describes the Soviet in his +_Reminiscences_, which reflect the incorrigible idealism of a Socialist +who is off the rails and who has now reached the stage of excusing +Bolshevism, but who nevertheless impresses one as being sincere: "The +Soviet, a gathering of illiterate soldiers, took the lead because +it asked nothing and because it was only a screen covering what was +actually complete anarchy." Two thousand soldiers from the rear and +eight hundred workmen from Petrograd formed an institution which +pretended to guide the political, military, economic and social life +of an enormous country. The records of the meetings of the Soviet, +as reported in the Press, testify to the extraordinary ignorance and +confusion which reigned at these meetings. One could not help being +painfully impressed by such a "representation" of Russia. An impotent +and subdued anger against the Soviet was growing in the circles of the +Intelligencia, the Democratic Bourgeoisie and the Officers. All their +hatred was concentrated upon the Soviet, which they abused in terms +of excessive bitterness. That hatred, often openly expressed, was +wrongly interpreted by the Revolutionary Democracy as abhorrence of +the very _idea of Democratic Representation_. In time the supremacy of +the Petrograd Soviet, which ascribed to itself the exceptional merit +of having destroyed the old régime, began to wane. A vast network +of Committees and Soviets, which had flooded the country and the +Army, claimed the right to participate in the work of the State. In +April, therefore, a Congress was held of the delegates of Workmen and +Soldiers' Soviets. The Petrograd Soviet was reorganised on the basis +of a more regular representation, and in June the All-Russian Congress +of Representatives of the Soviets was opened. The composition of this +fuller representation of Democracy is interesting:-- + + Revolutionary Socialists 285 + Social Democrats (Mensheviks) 248 + Social Democrats (Bolsheviks) 105 + Internationalists 32 + Other Socialists 73 + United Social Democrats 10 + Members of the "Bund" 10 + Members of the "Edimstvo" (Unity) group 3 + Popular Socialists 3 + Trudovik (Labour) 5 + Communist Anarchists 1 + +Thus, the overwhelming masses of Non-Socialist Russia were not +represented at all; even the elements that were either non-political +or belonged to the groups of the right and were elected by the Soviets +and Army Committees as non-party members, hastened for motives +altogether in the interests of the State to profess the Socialistic +creed. In these circumstances the Revolutionary Democracy could hardly +be expected to exercise self-restraint, and there could be no hope +of keeping the popular movement within the limits of the Bourgeois +Revolution. In reality the ramshackle helm was seized by a block of +Social Revolutionaries and Mensheviks, in which first the former and +then the latter predominated. It is that narrow partisan block which +held in bondage the will of the Government and is primarily responsible +for the subsequent course of the Revolution. + +The composition of the Soviet was heterogeneous: intellectuals, +bourgeoisie, workmen, soldiers and many deserters. The Soviet and the +Congresses, and especially the former, were a somewhat inert mass, +utterly devoid of political education. Action, power and influence +afterwards passed therefore into the hands of Executive Committees +in which the Socialist intellectual elements were almost exclusively +represented. The most devastating criticism of the Executive Committee +of the Soviet came from that very institution, and was made by one +of its members, Stankevitch: the meetings were chaotic, political +disorganisation, indecision, haste, and fitfulness showed themselves +in its decisions, and there was a complete absence of administrative +experience and true democracy. One of the members advocated anarchy in +the "Izvestia," another sent written permits for the expropriation of +the landlords, a third explained to a military delegation which had +complained of the Commanding Officers that these officers should be +dismissed and arrested, etc. + +"The most striking feature of the Committee is the preponderance of the +alien element," wrote Stankevitch. "Jews, Georgians, Letts, Poles, and +Lithuanians were represented out of all proportion to their numbers +in Petrograd and in the country." + + +Russia during the turmoil. + + +----------+----------+-----------+-------+-----------+ + | | | | | | + Anarcho-Communists | Non-Party | Non-Party Conservatives + ######## | ----#### | -------- -------- + | (Peasants) | + | Workmen (few) | + | | + Socialists Liberals + | -------- + +-----------+-------------+ | + | | | +--------------+ + | Non-Party | | | + | ----#### | Constitutional- Radical- + | Mostly Workmen | -------- -------- + | | Democrats Democrats + Social-Democrats Populists + | | + +--+---+----+ +---------------+-----------+ + | | | | | | + Bolsheviks | Edinstvo Social Popular Labour + ######## | -------- Revolutionaries -------- -------- + | | Socialists "Trudovik" + Mensheviks | + | +------+-------+ + +---+-----------+ | | | + | | Left Centre Right + Internationalists Defencists #### ---### ---- + ######## -------- + + -------- Defencists + + ----#### Partly Defencist + Partly Defeatist + + ######## Defeatists + +The following is a list of the first Presidium of the All-Russian +Central Committee of the Soviets:-- + + 1 Georgian + 5 Jews + 1 Armenian + 1 Pole + 1 Russian (if his name was not an assumed one). + +This exceptional preponderance of the alien element, foreign to the +Russian national idea, could not fail to tinge the entire activities of +the Soviet with a spirit harmful to the interests of the Russian State. +The Provisional Government was the captive of the Soviet from the very +first day, as it had under-estimated the importance and the power +of that institution, and was unable to display either determination +or strength in resisting the Soviet. The Government did not even +hope for victory in that struggle, as, in its endeavour to save the +country, it could not very well proclaim watchwords which would have +suited the licentious mob and which emanated from the Soviet. The +Government talked about duty, the Soviet about rights. The former +"prohibited," the latter "permitted." The Government was linked with +the old power by the inheritance of statesmanship and organisation, as +well as the external methods of administration; whereas the Soviet, +springing from mutiny and from the slums, was the direct negation of +the entire old régime. It is a delusion to think, as a small portion +of the moderate democracy still appear to do, that the Soviet played +the part of "restraining the tidal wave of the people." _The Soviet +did not actually destroy the Russian State, but was shattering it, +and did so to the extent of smashing the Army and imposing Bolshevism +on it._ Hence the duplicity and insincerity of its activities. Apart +from its declarations, all the speeches, conversations, comments, +and articles of the Soviet and of the Executive Committee, of its +groups and individuals, came to the knowledge of the country and of +the Front, and tended towards the destruction of the authority of the +Government. Stankevitch wrote that not deliberately, but persistently, +the Committee was dealing death-blows to the Government. + +Who, then, were the men who were trying to democratise the Army +Regulations, smashing all the foundations of the Army, inspiring the +Polivanov Commission, and tying the hands of two War Ministers? The +following is the personnel elected in the beginning of April from the +Soldiers' Section of the Soviet to the Executive Committee:-- + + War-time Officers 1 + Clerks 2 + Cadets 2 + Soldiers from the rear 9 + Scribes and men on special duty 5 + +I will leave their description to Stankevitch, who said: "At first +hysterical, noisy, and unbalanced men were elected, who were utterly +useless to the Committee...." New elements were subsequently added. +"The latter tried consciously, and in the measure of their ability, to +cope with the ocean of military matters. Two of them, however, seemed +to have been inoffensive scribes in Reserve Battalions, who had never +taken the slightest interest in the War, the Army, or the political +Revolution." The duplicity and the insincerity of the Soviet were +clearly manifested in regard to the War. The intellectual circles of +the Left and of the Revolutionary Democracy mostly espoused the idea +of Zimmerwald and of Internationalism. It was natural, therefore, that +the first word which the Soviet addressed on March 14, 1917, "To the +Peoples of the Whole World," was: + + "PEACE." + +The world problems, infinitely complex, owing to the national, +political, and economic interests of the peoples who differed in their +understanding of the Eternal Truth, could not be solved in such an +elementary fashion. Bethmann-Holweg was contemptuously silent. On +March 17th, 1917, the Reichstag, by a majority against the votes of +both Social Democratic parties, declined the offer of peace without +annexations. Noske voiced the views of the German Democracy in saying: +"We are offered from abroad to organise a Revolution. If we follow +that advice the working classes will come to grief." Among the Allies +and the Allied Democracies the Soviet manifesto provoked anxiety, +bewilderment, and discontent, which were vividly expressed in the +speeches made by Albert Thomas, Henderson, Vandervelde, and even the +present-day French Bolshevik, Cachin, upon their visits to Russia. The +Soviet subsequently added to the word "Peace" the definition, "Without +annexations and indemnities on the basis of the self-determination of +peoples." The theory of this formula promptly clashed with the actual +question of Western and Southern Russia occupied by the Germans; +of Poland, of Roumania, Belgium, and Serbia, devastated by the +Germans; of Alsace-Lorraine and Posen, as well as of the servitude, +expropriations, and compulsory labour which had been imposed upon all +the countries invaded by the Germans. According to the programme of the +German Social Democrats, which was at length published in Stockholm, +the French in Alsace-Lorraine, the Poles in Posen, and the Danes in +Schleswig were only to be granted national autonomy under the sceptre +of the German Emperor. At the same time, the idea of the independence +of Finland, Russian Poland, and Ireland was strongly advocated. The +demand for the restoration of the German colonies was curiously blended +with the promises of independence for India, Siam, Korea. + +The sun did not rise at the bidding of Chanticleer. The _ballon +d'essai_ failed. The Soviet was forced to admit that "time is necessary +in order that the peoples of all countries should rise, and with +an iron hand compel their rulers and capitalists to make peace.... +Meanwhile, the comrade-soldiers who have sworn to defend Russian +liberties should not refuse to advance, as this may become a military +necessity...." The Revolutionary Democracy was perplexed, and their +attitude was clearly expressed in the words of Tchkeidze: "We have +been preaching against the War all the time. How can I appeal to the +soldiers to continue the War and to stay at the Front?" + +Be that as it may, the words "War" and "Advance" had been uttered. +They divided the Soviet Socialists into two camps, the "Defeatists" +and "Defensists."[17] Theoretically, only the right groups of the +Social Revolutionaries, the popular Socialists, the "Unity" ("Edistvo") +group, and the Labour party ("Trudoviki") belonged to the latter. +All other Socialists advocated the immediate cessation of the war and +the "deepening" of the Revolution by means of internal Class War. In +practice, when the question of the continuation of the war was put to +the vote, the Defensists were joined by the majority of the Social +Revolutionaries and of the Social Democrat Mensheviks. The resolutions, +however, bore the stamp of ambiguity--neither war nor peace. Tzeretelli +was advocating "a movement against the war in all countries, Allied and +enemy." The Congress of the Soviets at the end of May passed an equally +ambiguous resolution, which, after demanding that annexations and +indemnities should be renounced by all belligerents, pointed out that, +"so long as the war lasts, the collapse of the Army, the weakening +of its spirit, strength and capacity for _active_ operations would +constitute a strong menace to the cause of Freedom and to the vital +interests of the country." In the beginning of June the Second Congress +passed a new resolution. On the one hand, it emphatically declared that +"the question of the advance should be decided solely from the point of +view of purely military and strategical considerations"; on the other +hand, it expressed an obviously Defeatist idea: "Should the war end by +the complete defeat of one of the belligerent groups, this would be +a source of new wars, would increase the enmity between peoples, and +would result in their complete exhaustion, in starvation and doom." +The Revolutionary Democracy had obviously confused two ideas: the +_strategic victory_ signifying the end of the war and _the terms of the +Peace Treaty_, which might be humane or inhuman, righteous or unjust, +far-seeing or short-sighted. In fact, what they wanted was war and +an advance, but _without a victory_. Curiously enough, the Prussian +Deputy, Strebel, the editor of _Vorwaerts_, invented the same formula +as early as in 1915. He wrote: "I openly profess that a complete +victory of the Empire would not benefit the Social Democracy." + +There was not a single branch of administration with which the Soviet +and the Executive Committee did not interfere with the same ambiguity +and insincerity, due on the one hand to the fear of any action contrary +to the fundamentals of their doctrine, and on the other to the obvious +impossibility of putting these doctrines into practice. The Soviet +did not, and could not, partake in the creative work of rebuilding +the State. With regard to Economics, Agriculture, and Labour, the +activities of the Soviet were reduced to the publication of pompous +Socialist Party programmes, which the Socialist Ministers themselves +clearly understood to be impracticable in the atmosphere of War, +Anarchy, and Economic crisis prevailing in Russia. Nevertheless, these +Resolutions and Proclamations were interpreted in the factories and +in the villages as a kind of "Absolution." They roused the passions +and provoked the desire, immediately and arbitrarily, to put them +into practice. This provocation was followed by restraining appeals. +In an appeal addressed to the sailors of Kronstadt on May 26th, 1917, +the Soviet suggested "that they should demand immediate and implicit +compliance with all the orders of the Provisional Government given in +the interests of the Revolution and of the security of the country...." + +All these literary achievements are not, however, the only form of +activity in which the Soviet indulged. The characteristic feature of +the Soviet and of the Executive Committee was the complete absence of +discipline in their midst. With reference to the special Delegation +of the Committee, whose object it was to be in contact with the +Provisional Government, Stankevitch says: "What could that Delegation +do? While it was arguing and reaching a complete agreement with the +Ministers, dozens of members of the Committee were sending letters +and publishing articles; travelling in the provinces, and at the +Front in the name of the Committee; receiving callers at the Taurida +Palace, everyone of them acting independently and taking no heed of +instructions, Resolutions, or decisions of the Committee." + +Was the Central Committee of the Soviet invested with actual power? A +reply to this question can be found in the appeal of the Organising +Committee of the Labour Socialist Democratic Party of July 17th. "The +watchword 'All-Power to the Soviets,' to which many workmen adhere, is +a dangerous one. _The following of the Soviets represents a minority +in the population_, and we must make every effort in order that the +Bourgeois elements, who are still willing and capable of joining us +in preserving the conquests of the Revolution, shall share with us +the burdens of the inheritance left by the old régime, which we have +shouldered, and the enormous responsibility for the outcome of the +Revolution which we bear in the eyes of the people." The Soviet, and +later the All-Russian Central Committee, could not, and would not, +by reason of its composition and their political ideas, exercise a +powerful restraining influence upon the masses of the people, who had +thrown off the shackles and were perturbed and mutinous. The movement +had been inspired by the members of the Soviet, and the influence and +authority of the Soviet were, therefore, entirely dependent on the +extent to which they were able to flatter the instincts of the masses. +These masses, as Karl Kautsky, an observer from the Marxist Camp, has +said, "were concerned merely with their requirements and their desires +as soon as they were drawn into the Revolution, and they did not care a +straw whether their demands were practicable or beneficial to society." +Had the Soviet endeavoured to resist with any firmness or determination +whatsoever the pressure of the masses, it would have run the risk of +being swept away. Also, day after day and step by step, the Soviet was +coming under the influence of Anarchist and Bolshevik ideas. + + + + +CHAPTER XI. + + THE BOLSHEVIK STRUGGLE FOR POWER--THE POWER OF THE ARMY AND THE + IDEA OF A DICTATORSHIP. + + +In the first period--from the beginning of the Revolution until the +_coup d'état_ of November--the Bolsheviks were engaged in struggling +to seize power by destroying the Bourgeois régime and disorganising +the Army, thus paving the way for the _avénement_ of Bolshevism, as +Trotsky solemnly expressed it. On the day after his arrival in Russia +Lenin published his programme, of which I will here mention the salient +points: + + (1) The War waged by the "Capitalist Government" is an + Imperialistic, plundering War. No concessions, therefore, should + be made to Revolutionary "Defensism." The representatives of that + doctrine and the Army in the field should be made clearly to + understand that the War cannot end in a truly Democratic peace, + without coercion, _unless_ Capitalism is destroyed. + + The troops must fraternize with the enemy. + + (2) The first stage of the Revolution by which the Bourgeoisie came + into power must be followed by the second stage in which power must + pass into the hands of the Proletariat and of the poorest peasants. + + (3) No support should be given to the Provisional Government, and + the fallacy of its promises should be exposed. + + (4) The fact must be acknowledged that, in the majority of the + Soviets, the Bolshevik party is in a minority. The policy must + therefore be continued of criticising and exposing mistakes, while + at the same time advocating the necessity for the transfer of + Supreme Power to the Soviet. + + (5) Russia is not a Parliamentary Republic--that would have been + a step backwards--but a Republic of the Soviets of Workmen's and + Peasants' Deputies. + + The police (Militia?), the Army, and the Civil Service must be + abolished. + + (6) With regard to the agrarian question, the Soviets of + farm-labourers' deputies must come to the fore. All landowners' + estates must be confiscated, and all land in Russia nationalised + and placed at the disposal of Local Soviets of Peasants' Deputies. + The latter to be elected among the poorest peasants. + + (7) All the banks in the country must be united in one National + Bank, controlled by the Soviet. + + (8) Socialism must not be introduced now, but a step must be taken + towards the ultimate control by the Soviet of all industries and of + the distribution of materials. + + (9) The State shall become a Commune, and the Socialist Democratic + Bolshevik Party shall henceforward be called "The Communist Party." + +I shall not dwell upon this programme, which was put into practice, +with certain reservations, in November, 1917. During the first period +the activities of the Bolsheviks, which are of great importance, were +based upon the following three principles: + + (1) The overthrow of the Government and the demoralisation of the + Army. + + (2) The promotion of class war in the country and discontent in the + villages. + + (3) The seizure of power by the minority, which, according to + Lenin, was to be "well-organised, armed and centralised," _i.e._, + the Bolshevik party. (This was, of course, a negation of Democratic + forms of Government.) + +The ideas and aims of the party were, of course, beyond the +understanding not only of the ignorant Russian peasantry, but even of +the Bolshevik underlings scattered throughout the land. The masses +wanted simple and clear watchwords to be immediately put into practice, +which would satisfy their wishes and demands arising from the turmoil +of the Revolution. That "simplified" Bolshevism inherent in all +popular movements against the established power in Russia was all the +easier to institute in that it had freed itself from all restraining +moral influences and was aiming primarily at destruction pure and +simple, ignoring the consequences of military defeat and of the ruin +of the country. The Provisional Government was the first target. In +the Bolshevik Press, at public meetings, in all the activities of +the Soviets and Congresses, and even in their conversations with +the members of the Provisional Government, the Bolshevik leaders +stubbornly and arrogantly advocated its removal, describing it as +an instrument of counter-Revolution and of International reaction. +The Bolsheviks, however, refrained from decisive action, as they +feared the political backwardness of the country as a whole. They +began what soldiers call "a reconnaissance," and carried it out with +great intensity. They seized several private houses in Petrograd, and +organised a demonstration on the 20th and 21st of April. That was the +first "review" of the proletariat, at which an estimate was made of +the Bolshevik forces. The excuse for this demonstration, in which the +workmen and the troops participated, was given by Miliukov's Note on +International Policy. I say _excuse_ because the real reason lay in +the fundamental divergence of opinion mentioned above. Everything else +was only a pretext. As a result of the demonstration there were great +disturbances and armed conflicts in the capital, and many casualties. +The crowds carried placards bearing the inscriptions: "Down with +the Miliukov Policy of Conquests," and "Down with the Provisional +Government." + +The review was a failure. In the course of the debate in the Soviet on +this occasion, the Bolsheviks demanded that the Government be deposed, +but there was a note of hesitation in their speeches: "The proletariat +should first discuss the existing conditions and form an estimate of +its strength." The Soviet passed a resolution condemning both the +Government's policy of conquest and the Bolshevik demonstration, +while at the same time "congratulating the Revolutionary Democracy +of Petrograd, which had proved its intense interest in international +politics by meetings, resolutions and demonstrations." + +Lenin was planning another armed demonstration on a large scale on June +10th during the Congress of the Soviets; but it was countermanded, as +the great majority of the Congress was opposed to it. The demonstration +was likewise intended as a means of seizing power. This internal +struggle between the two wings of the Revolutionary Democracy, which +were bitterly antagonistic to one another, is extremely interesting. +The Left wing made every endeavour to induce the "Defensist" block, +which was preponderant, to break with the Bourgeoisie and to assume +power. The block was also resolutely opposed to such a course. + +Within the Soviets new combinations were coming into being. On certain +questions the Social Revolutionaries of the Left and the Social +Democrats--Internationalists--were leaning towards the Bolsheviks. +Nevertheless, until September the Bolsheviks were not in a majority +in the Petrograd Soviet or in many provincial Soviets. It was only on +September 25th that Bronstein Trotsky succeeded Tchkeidze as Chairman +of the Petrograd Soviet. The motto, "All Power to the Soviets," +sounded from their lips like self-sacrifice or provocation. Trotsky +explained this contradiction by saying that, owing to constant +re-elections, the Soviets reflected the true (?) spirit of the masses +of workmen and soldiers, who were leaning to the Left, whereas, after +the break with the Bourgeoisie, extremist tendencies were bound to +prevail in the Soviets. As the true aspect of Bolshevism gradually +revealed itself these dissensions deepened, and were not limited to +the Social Democratic programme or to party tactics. It was a struggle +between Democracy and the Proletariat, between the majority and a +minority, which was intellectually backward, but strong in its mutinous +daring and headed by strong and unprincipled men. It was a struggle +between the democratic principles of Universal Suffrage, political +liberties, equality, etc., and the dictatorship of a privileged class, +madness, and imminent slavery. On the 2nd July there was a second +Ministerial crisis, for which the outward cause was the disapproval +of the Liberal Ministers of the Act of Ukrainian Autonomy. On July +3rd-5th the Bolsheviks made another riot in the Capital, in which +workmen, soldiers and sailors participated. It was done this time on +a large scale, and was accompanied by plunder and murder. There were +many victims, and the Government was in great difficulty. Kerensky +was at that time visiting us on the Western Front. His conversations +with Petrograd over the direct wire indicated that Prince Lvov and +the Government were deeply depressed. Prince Lvov summoned Kerensky +to return to Petrograd at once, but warned him that he could not +be responsible for his safety. The rebels demanded that the Soviet +and the Central Executive Committee of the Congress should assume +power. These wings of the Revolutionary Democracy returned another +categorical refusal. The movement found no support in the provinces, +and the mutiny was quelled chiefly by the Vladimir military school and +the Cossack regiments. Several companies of the Petrograd garrison +likewise remained loyal. Bronstein Trotsky wrote that the movement was +premature because there were too many passive and irresolute elements +in the garrison; but that it had nevertheless been proved that, "except +the cadets, no one wanted to fight against the Bolsheviks _for the +Government and for the leading parties in the Soviet_." + +The tragedy of the Government headed by Kerensky, and of the Soviet, +lay in the fact that the masses would not follow abstract watchwords. +They proved equally indifferent to the country and to the Revolution, +as well as to the International, and had no intention of shedding their +blood and sacrificing their lives for any of these ideas. The crowd +followed those who gave practical promises and flattered its instincts. + + * * * * * + +When we speak of "power," with reference to the first period of the +Russian Revolution, we actually mean only its outward forms; for under +the exceptional conditions imposed by a World War on a scale unequalled +in history, when 20 per cent. of the entire male population was under +arms, the power was really concentrated in the hands of the Army. That +Army had been led astray, had been demoralised by false doctrines, had +lost all sense of duty, and all fear of authority. Last, but not least, +it had no leader. The Government, Kerensky, the Commanding Corps, the +Soviet, Regimental Committees--for many reasons none of these could +claim that title. The dissensions between all these contending forces +were reflected in the minds of the men, and hastened the ruin of the +Army. It is useless to make any surmises which cannot be proved by +realities, especially in the absence of historical perspective; but +there can be no doubt the question, whether or not it would have been +possible to erect a dam which would have stemmed the tide and preserved +discipline in the Army, will continue to arouse attention. Personally, +I believe that it was possible. At first the Supreme Command might have +done it, as well as the Government, had it shown sufficient resolve to +squash the Soviets or sufficient strength and wisdom to draw them into +the orbit of statesmanship and of truly democratic constructive work. + +There can be no doubt that, in the beginning of the Revolution, the +Government was recognised by all the sane elements of the population. +The High Command, the officers, many regiments, the Bourgeoisie, and +those Democratic elements which had not been led astray by militant +Socialism adhered to the Government. The Press in those days was full +of telegrams, addresses and appeals from all parts of Russia, from +various Social, Military and class organisations and institutions whose +democratic attitude was undoubted. + +As the Government weakened and was driven into two successive +coalitions, that confidence correspondingly decreased and could not +find compensation in fuller recognition by the Revolutionary Democracy; +because anarchist tendencies, repudiating all authority, were gaining +ground within these circles. In the beginning of May, after the armed +rising in the streets of Petrograd, which took place without the +knowledge of the Soviet, but with the participation of its members; +after the resignation of Miliukov and Gutchkov, the complete impotence +of the Provisional Government became so clearly apparent that Prince +Lvov appealed to the Soviet, with the consent of the Duma Committee and +of the Constitutional Democratic Party. He invited "the active creative +forces of the country to participate directly in the government which +had hitherto refrained from any such participation." + +After some hesitation, the Soviet deemed it necessary to accept the +offer, thereby assuming direct responsibility for the fate of the +revolution. (Four members of the Soviet accepted Ministerial posts.) +The Soviet declined to assume full power "because the transfer of +power to the Soviets in that period of the revolution would have +weakened it and would have prematurely estranged the elements capable +of serving it, which would constitute a menace to the revolution." The +impression produced by such declarations upon the Bourgeoisie and upon +the "hostages" in the Coalition Government can be imagined. Although +the Soviet expressed full confidence in the Government and appealed +to the democracy to grant it full support, which would guarantee the +authority of the Government, that Government was already irretrievably +discredited. The Socialist circles which had sent their representatives +to join it neither altered nor strengthened its intellectual level. On +the contrary, it was weakened, inasmuch as the gulf was widened which +separated the two political groups represented in the Government. +While officially expressing confidence in the Government, the Soviet +continued to undermine its power and became somewhat lukewarm towards +the Socialist Ministers, who had been compelled by circumstances to +deviate, to a certain extent, from the programme of the Socialist +party. The people and the Army did not pay much attention to these +events, as they were beginning to forget that there was any power at +all, owing to the fact that the existence of that power had no bearing +upon their everyday life. + +The blood shed during the Petrograd rising organised by the +anarchist-Bolshevik section of the Soviet on July 4th-5th, Prince +Lvov's resignation, and the formation of a new coalition in which the +Socialists, nominated by the Soviet, definitely predominated were +but stepping stones towards the complete collapse of the power of +the State. As I have already said, the first Government crisis was +occasioned by events which, however important politically, were only +"excuses." In the new Coalition the Democratic Bourgeoisie played but +a secondary part, and its "temporary" assistance was only required in +order that responsibility might be shared; while everything was decided +behind the curtain, in the circles closely connected with the Soviet. +Such a coalition could have no vitality and could not reconcile even +the opportunist elements of the Bourgeoisie with the Revolutionary +Democracy. Apart from political and social considerations, the relative +strength of the forces which were brought into play was influenced +by the growing discontent of the masses with the activities of the +Government owing to the general condition of the country. The masses +accepted the revolution not as an arduous, transitory period, linked +up with the past and present political development of Russia and of +the world, but as an independent reality of the day, carrying in its +trail real calamities such as the War, banditism, lawlessness, stoppage +of industry, cold and hunger. The masses were unable to grasp the +situation in its complex entirety and could not differentiate between +elemental, inevitable phenomena inherent in all revolutions and the +will for good or evil of departments of the Government, institutions +or individuals. They felt that the situation was intolerable and tried +to find a remedy. As a result of the universal recognition of the +impotence of the existing power, a new idea began to occupy the minds +of the people: + + A DICTATORSHIP. + +I emphatically declare that in the social and military circles with +which I was in touch the tendency towards a dictatorship was prompted +by a patriotic and clear consciousness of the abyss into which the +Russian people was rapidly sinking. _It was not in the slightest +degree inspired by any reactionary or counter-revolutionary motives._ +There can be no doubt that the movement found adherents among the +reactionaries and among mere opportunists; but both these elements +were accessory and insignificant. Kerensky thus interpreted the rise +of the movement which he described as "the tide of conspiracy": "The +Tarnopol defeat created a movement in favour of conspiracies, while the +Bolshevik rising of July demonstrated to the uninitiated the _depth of +the disruption of Democracy, the impotence of the revolution_ against +anarchy, as well as the strength of the organised minority which acted +spontaneously." It would be difficult to find a better excuse for the +movement. In the atmosphere of popular discontent, universal disorder +and approaching anarchy, endeavours at creating a dictatorship were the +natural outcome of the existing conditions. These endeavours had their +origin in a search for a _strong national and democratic power, but not +a reactionary one_. + +On the whole the Revolutionary Democracy lived in an atmosphere +poisoned by the fear of a counter-revolution. All its cares, measures, +resolutions and appeals, as well as the disruption of the Army and the +abolition of the police in the villages, tended towards a struggle with +this imaginary foe, which was supposed to menace the conquests of the +revolution. Were the conscious leaders of the Soviet really convinced +that such a danger existed, or were they fanning this unfounded fear +as a tactical move? I am inclined to accept the second solution, +because it was quite obvious, not only to myself, but to the Soviet +as well, that the activities of the Democratic Bourgeoisie meant not +counter-revolution, but merely opposition. And yet in the Russian +partisan press and in wide circles outside Russia it is precisely +in the former sense that the pre-November period of the Revolution +was interpreted. The Provisional Government proclaimed a broad, +Democratic programme upon its formation. In the circles of the Right +this programme was criticised and there was discontent; but no active +opposition. In the first four or five months after the beginning of +the Revolution there was not a single important counter-revolutionary +organisation in the country. These organisations became more or less +active and other secret circles, especially officers' circles, were +formed in July in connection with the plans for a Dictatorship. There +can be no doubt that many people with pronounced tendencies towards a +restoration joined these circles. But their main object was to combat +the unofficial government, which was a class government, as well as +the personnel of the Soviet and the Executive Committee. Had these +circles not collapsed prematurely owing to their weakness, numerical +insignificance and lack of organisation, some of the members of +those institutions might very possibly have been destroyed. While +constantly resisting counter-revolution from the Right, the Soviet gave +every opportunity for the preparations for a real counter-revolution +emanating from its own midst, from the Bolsheviks. + +I remember that different persons who came to the Stavka began to +discuss the question of a dictatorship and to throw out feelers, as it +were, approximately in the beginning of June. All these conversations +were stereotyped to such an extent that I have no difficulty in +summarising them. + +"Russia is moving towards inevitable ruin. The Government is utterly +powerless. We must have a strong power. Sooner or later we shall have +to come to a Dictatorship." + +Nobody mentioned restoration or a change of policy in a reactionary +direction. The names were mentioned of Kornilov and Brussilov. I +warned them against hasty decisions. I must confess that we still +entertained the illusory hope that the Government--by internal +evolution, under the influence of a new, armed demonstration on the +part of the anti-National extremist elements towards which they were so +lenient--would realise the futility and hopelessness of continuing in +their present position and would come to the idea of power vested in +one man, which might be achieved in a constitutional manner. The future +seemed pregnant with disaster in the absence of a truly lawful power. +I pointed out that there were no military leaders enjoying sufficient +authority with the demoralised soldiery, but that if a military +dictatorship should become necessary for the State and practicable, +Kornilov was already very much respected by the officers, whereas +Brussilov's reputation had been injured by his opportunism. + +In his book Kerensky says that "Cossack circles and certain politicians" +had suggested repeatedly to him that the impotent Government should +be replaced by a personal dictatorship. It was only when society was +disappointed in him as the "possible organiser and chief agent for +altering the system of Government" that "a search began for another +individual." + +There can be no doubt that the men and social circles that appealed to +Kerensky in the question of a dictatorship were not his apologists and +did not belong to the "Revolutionary Democracy," but the mere fact of +their appeal is sufficient proof that their motives could not have been +reactionary, and that it reflected the sincere desire of the Russian +patriotic elements to see a strong man at the helm in days of storm and +strife. + +Perhaps there may also have been another motive; there had been a short +period, approximately in June, when not only the Russian public, but +also the officers had succumbed to the charm of the War Minister's +impassioned oratory and pathos. The Russian officers, who were being +sacrificed wholesale, had forgotten and forgiven and were desperately +hoping that he would save the Russian Army. And their promise to die in +the front line was by no means an empty one. During Kerensky's visits +to the front, it was a painful sight to see these doomed men, their +eyes shining with exaltation, and their hearts beating with hope, a +hope that was destined to be so bitterly and mercilessly disappointed. + +It is to be noted that Kerensky, seeking in his book to justify the +temporary "concentration of power" which he assumed on August 27th, +says: "In the struggle against the conspiracy conducted by a single +will, the State was compelled to set against it a will capable of +resolute and quick action. No collective power, much less a Coalition, +can possess such a single will." + +I think that the internal condition of the Russian State threatened +with a monstrous joint conspiracy of the German General Staff and +the anti-national and anti-constitutional elements of the Russian +exiles was sufficiently grave to warrant the demand for a strong power +"capable of resolute and quick action." + + + + +CHAPTER XII. + + THE ACTIVITIES OF THE PROVISIONAL GOVERNMENT--INTERNAL POLITICS, + CIVIL ADMINISTRATION--THE TOWN, THE VILLAGE AND THE AGRARIAN + PROBLEM. + + +I will deal in this and in the subsequent chapters with the internal +condition of Russia in the first period of the Revolution only in +so far as it affected the conduct of the World War. I have already +mentioned the duality of the Supreme Administration of the country and +the incessant pressure of the Soviet upon the Provisional Government. A +member of the Duma, Mr. Shulgin, wittily remarked: "The old régime is +interned in the fortress of Peter and Paul, and the new one is under +domiciliary arrest." The Provisional Government did not represent the +people as a whole; it could not and would not forestall the will of +the Constituent Assembly by introducing reforms which would shake the +political and social structure of the State to its very foundations. +It proclaimed that "not violence and compulsion, but the voluntary +obedience of free citizens to the power which they had themselves +created, constituted the foundation of the new administration of the +State. Not a single drop of blood has been shed by the Provisional +Government which has erected no barrier against the free expression +of public opinion...." This non-resistance to evil at the moment when +a fierce struggle, unfettered by moral or patriotic considerations, +was being conducted by some groups of the population for motives of +self-preservation and by others for the attainment by violence of +extreme demands, was undoubtedly a confession of impotence. In the +subsequent declarations of the second and third Coalition Governments +mention was made "of stringent measures" against the forces of +disorganisation in the country. These words, however, were never +translated into deeds. + +The idea of not forestalling the will of the Constituent Assembly was +not carried out by the Government, especially in the domain of national +self-determination. The Government proclaimed the independence of +Poland, but made "the consent to such alterations of the territory of +the Russian State as may be necessary for the creation of independent +Poland" dependent upon the All-Russian Constituent Assembly. That +proclamation, the legal validity of which is contestable, was, however, +in full accord with the juridical standpoint of society. With regard to +Finland, the Government did not alter her legal status towards Russia, +but confirmed the rights and privileges of the country, cancelled all +the limitations of the Finnish Constitution and intended to convoke +the Finnish Chamber ("Seim") that was to confirm the new constitution +of the Principality. The Government subsequently adhered to their +intention to entertain favourably all the just demands of the Finns for +local reconstruction. Nevertheless, both the Provisional Government and +Finland were engaged in a protracted struggle for power on account of +the universal desire for the immediate satisfaction of the interests +of the separate nationalities. On July 6th the Finnish Assembly passed +a law (by the majority of Social-Democratic votes) proclaiming the +assumption by that body of supreme power after the abdication "of +the Finnish Grand-Duke" (the official title of the Russian Emperor). +Only foreign affairs, military legislation and administration were +left to the Provisional Government. This decision corresponded to a +certain degree with the resolution of the Congress of Soviets, which +demanded that full independence should be granted to Finland before +the convocation of the Constituent Assembly, with the above-mentioned +restrictions. The Russian Government answered this declaration of +the actual independence of Finland by dissolving the Assembly, which +met, however, once again in September of its own free will. In this +struggle, the intensity of which varied according to the rise and fall +of the political barometer in Petrograd, the Finnish politicians, +disregarding the interests of the State and having no support +whatsoever in the Army, counted exclusively upon the loyalty or, to +be more correct, the weakness of the Provisional Government. Matters +never reached the stage of open rebellion. The conscious elements of +the population kept the country within the limits of reasonableness, +not out of loyalty, but perhaps because they feared the consequences +of civil war and especially of the sabotage in which the licentious +soldiers and sailors would have presumably indulged. + +May and June were spent in a struggle for power between the Government +and the self-appointed Central Rada (Assembly). The All-Ukrainian +Military Congress, also convened arbitrarily on June 8th, demanded +that the Government should immediately comply with all the demands +of the Central Rada and the Congresses, and suggested that the Rada +should cease to address the Government, but should begin at once +to organise the autonomous administration of the Ukraine. On June +11th the autonomous Constitution of the Ukraine was adopted and a +Secretariat (Council of Ministers) formed under the chairmanship +of Mr. Vinnichenko. After the Government envoys--the Ministers +Kerensky, Tereschenko and Tzeretelli--had negotiated with the Rada, a +proclamation was issued on July 2nd, which forestalled the decision of +the Constituent Assembly and proclaimed the autonomy of the Ukraine +with certain restrictions. The Central Rada and the Secretariat were +gradually seizing the administration, creating a dual power on the spot +and discrediting the All-Russian Government. They thus provoked civil +strife and provided moral excuses for every endeavor to shirk civic +and military duties to the common Mother Country. The Central Rada, +moreover, contained from the outset sympathisers with Germany and was +undoubtedly connected through the "Union for the Liberation of the +Ukraine" with the headquarters of the Central Powers. Bearing in mind +the ample material collected by the Stavka, Vinnichenko's half-hearted +confession to a French correspondent (?) with regard to Germanophil +tendencies in the Rada, and finally the report of the Procurator of the +Kiev Court of Appeal at the end of August, 1917, I cannot doubt that +the Rada played a criminal part. The Procurator complained that the +complete destruction of the machinery of intelligence and of criminal +investigation deprived the Government prosecutors of the possibility +of investigating the situation; he said that not only German espionage +and propaganda, but the mutinies of the Ukrainian troops, as well as +the destination of obscure funds of undoubted Austro-German origin ... +could be traced to the Rada. + + * * * * * + +The Ministry of the Interior, which, in the old days, practically +controlled the Autocracy and provoked universal hatred, now went to the +other extreme. It all but abolished itself, and the functions of that +branch of the administration were divided among local, self-appointed +organisations. The history of the organs of the Ministry of the +Interior is, in many ways, similar to the fate of the Supreme Command. +On March 5th the Minister-President issued an order for the suppression +of the offices of Governor and of Inspector of Police ("Ispravnik"), +which were to be replaced by the presidents of the Provincial and +District self-governing Councils ("Oupravas"), and for the police +to be replaced by a militia organised by Social Institutions. This +measure, adopted owing to the universal dislike for the agents of +the old régime, was, in fact, the only actual manifestation of the +Government's will; because the status of the Commissars was not +established by law until the month of September. The instructions and +orders of the Government were, on the whole, of an academic nature, +because life followed its own course, and was regulated, or, to be more +correct, muddled up, by local revolutionary changes of the law. The +office of Government Commissars became a sinecure from the very outset. +They had no power or authority, and became entirely dependent upon +revolutionary organisations. When the latter passed a vote of censure +upon the activities of a Commissar, he could practically do nothing +more. The organisations elected a new one, and his confirmation in +office by the Provisional Government was a mere formality. In the first +six weeks seventeen Provincial Commissars and a great many District +Commissars were thus removed. Later, in July, Tzeretelli, during his +tenure of the office of Minister of the Interior, which lasted for a +fortnight, gave official sanction to this procedure and sent a circular +to the Local Soviets and Committees, inviting them to send in to him +the names of desirable candidates, which were to replace the unsuitable +ones. Thus there remained no representatives of the Central power on +the spot. In the beginning of the Revolution the so-called "Social +Committees" or "Soviets of Social Organisation" really represented +a social Institution comprising the union of towns and _Zemstvos_, +of Municipal Dumas, professional Unions, Co-operatives, Magistrates, +etc. Things went from bad to worse when these Social Committees were +dissolved into class and party organisations. Local power passed into +the hands of the Soviets of Workmen and Soldiers and in places before +the law had been produced to "democratised" Socialistic Dumas, closely +reminiscent of semi-Bolshevik Soviets. + +The regulations issued by the Government on April 15th, on the +organisation of Municipal Self-Government, comprised the following main +points: + + (1) All citizens of both sexes, having attained the age of twenty, + were given the suffrage in the town. + + (2) No domiciliary qualification was established. + + (3) A proportional system of elections was introduced. + + (4) The Military were given the suffrage in the localities in which + the respective garrisons were quartered. + +I will not examine in detail these regulations, which are probably the +most Democratic ever known in Municipal Law, because the experience +gained in their application was too short to afford any ground for +discussion. I will only note one phenomenon which accompanied the +introduction of these regulations in the autumn of 1917. The free vote +in many places became a mockery. Throughout the length and breadth of +Russia, all the non-Socialist and politically neutral parties were +under suspicion and were subjected to persecution. They were not +allowed to conduct propaganda, and their meetings were dispersed. +Electioneering was characterised by blatant abuses. Occasionally +election agents were subjected to violence and lists of candidates +destroyed. At the same time the licentious and demoralised soldiery +of many garrisons--chance guests in the town in which, as often as +not, they had only appeared a day or two before--rushed to the polls +and presented lists drawn up by the extreme Anti-National parties. +There were cases when military units, arriving after the elections, +demanded a re-election and accompanied this demand by threats and +sometimes murders. There can be no doubt that, among the circumstances +that affected the August elections in Petrograd to the Municipal Duma, +to which sixty-seven Bolsheviks out of two hundred were elected, the +presence in the Capital of numerous demoralised garrisons was not the +least important. The authorities were silent because they were absent. +The _Petite Bourgeoisie_, the intellectual workers, in a word, the Town +Democracy in the widest sense, was the weakest party and was always +defeated in that Revolutionary struggle. The mutinies, rebellions, +and separations of various Republics--the precursors of the bloody +Soviet Régime--had the most painful effect on the life of that portion +of the community. The "self-determination" of the soldiers caused +uneasiness and even fear of unrestricted violence. Even travelling +was unsafe and difficult, because the railways fell into the hands of +deserters. The "self-determination" of the workmen resulted in the +impossibility of obtaining supplies of the most necessary commodities, +owing to a tremendous rise in prices. The "self-determination" of the +villages produced a stoppage of supplies, and the villages were thus +left to starve; not to mention the moral ordeal of the class which was +subjected to insults and degradation. The Revolution had raised hopes +for the betterment of the conditions of life for everyone except the +_Bourgeois_ Democracy, because even the moral conquests proclaimed +by the new Revolutionary power--liberty of speech, of the Press and +of meetings, etc.--soon belonged exclusively to the Revolutionary +Democracy. The upper _Bourgeoisie_ (intellectually superior) was +organised to a certain extent by means of the Constitutional Democratic +Party, but the _Petite Bourgeoisie_ (the _Bourgeois_ Democracy) had +no organisation whatsoever and no means for an organised struggle. +The Democratic Municipalities were losing their true Democratic +aspect--not as a result of the new Municipal law, but of Revolutionary +practice--and became mere class organs of the Proletariat, or the +representatives of purely Socialistic parties, completely out of touch +with the people. + +Self-government in the districts and in the villages in the first +period of the Revolution was of more or less the same nature. Towards +the autumn there should have been a Democratic system of _Zemstvo_ +Administration, on the same basis as that in the municipalities. +The District (Volost) _Zemstvo_ was to undertake the administration +of local agriculture, education, order and safety. As a matter +of fact, the villages were administered--if such a word can be +applied to Anarchy--by a complex agglomeration of revolutionary +organisations, such as peasant Congresses, Supply and Land Committees, +Popular Soviets, Village Councils, etc. Very often another peculiar +organisation--that of the deserters--dominated them all. At any rate, +the All-Russian Union of Peasants agreed with the following declaration +made by the left wing: "All our work for the organisation of various +Committees will be of no avail if these Social Organisations are to +remain under the constant threat of being terrorised by accidental +armed bands." + +The only question that deeply perturbed the minds of the peasantry +and overshadowed all other events, was the old, painful, traditional +question: + + +THE QUESTION OF THE LAND. + +It was an exceptionally complex and tangled question. It arose more +than once in the shape of fruitless mutinies, which were ruthlessly +suppressed. The wave of agrarian troubles which swept over Russia in +the years of the First Revolution (1905-6) and left a trail of fire +and ruined estates was an indication of the consequences that were +bound to follow the Revolution of 1917. It is difficult to form an +exhaustive idea of the motives which prompted the land-owners to defend +their rights so stubbornly and so energetically: was it atavism, a +natural yearning for the land, statesmanlike considerations as to the +desirability of increasing the productivity of the land by introducing +higher methods of agriculture, a desire to maintain a direct influence +over the people, or was it merely selfishness?... One thing is +certain--the agrarian reforms were overdue. Retribution could not fail +to overtake the Government and the Ruling Classes for the long years of +poverty, oppression, and, what is most important, the incredible moral +and intellectual darkness in which the peasant masses were kept, their +education being entirely neglected. + +The peasants demanded that all land should be surrendered to them, and +would not wait for the decision of the Central Land Committee or of the +Constituent Assembly. This impatience was undoubtedly due, to a great +extent, to the weakness of the Government and to outside influences, +which will be described later. There was no divergence of opinion as +to the fundamental idea of the reforms. The Liberal Democracy and +the _Bourgeoisie_, the Revolutionary Democracy and the Provisional +Government, all spoke quite definitely about "handing the land over to +the workers." With the same unanimity these elements favoured the idea +of leaving the final decision on the reform of the land and legislation +on the subject to the Constituent Assembly. This irreconcilable +divergence of opinion arose by reason of the very essence of land +reform. Liberal circles in Russia stood for the private ownership of +the land--an idea which found increasing favour with the peasants--and +demanded that the peasants should receive allotments rather than that +the land should be entirely redistributed. On the other hand, the +Revolutionary Democracy advocated, at all meetings of every party, +class and profession, the adoption of the Resolution of the All-Russian +Congress of Peasants, which was passed on May 25th, with the approval +of the Minister Tchernov on "the transfer of all lands ... _to the +people as a whole, as their patrimony, on the basis of equal possession +without any payment_." The peasants did not or would not understand +this Social Revolutionary Resolution, which caused dissensions. The +peasants were private owners by nature and could not understand the +principle of nationalisation. The principle of equal possession meant +that many millions of peasants, whose allotments were larger than the +normal, would lose their surplus allotments, and the whole question +of the redistribution of the land would lead to endless civil war; +because there were innumerable peasants who had no land at all, and +only 45,000,000 dessiatines of arable land which did not belong to the +peasants to divide among 20,000,000 peasant households. + +The Provisional Government did not consider itself entitled to solve +the land problem. Under the pressure of the masses, it transferred +its rights partly to the Ministry of Agriculture, partly to the +Central Land Committee, which was organised on the basis of broad, +democratic representation. The latter was entrusted with the task of +collecting data and of drawing up a scheme of land reform, as well +as of regulating the existing conditions with regard to the land. In +practice, the use of the land transfer, rent, employment of labour, +etc., were dealt with by the Local Land Committees. These bodies +contained illiterate elements--the intellectuals as a rule were +excluded--which had selfish motives and had no perception either of the +extent or of the limits of their powers. The Central Representative +Institutions and the Ministry of Agriculture, under Tchernov, issued +appeals against arbitrariness and for the preservation of the land, +pending the decision of the Constituent Assembly. At the same time +they overtly encouraged "temporary possession of the land," as seizure +of the land was then described, on the excuse that the Government +were obliged to sell as much land as possible. The propaganda that +was conducted on a large scale in the villages by irresponsible +representatives of Socialist and Anarchist circles completed Tchernov's +work. + +The results of this policy were soon apparent. In one of his circulars +to Provincial Commissars, the Minister of the Interior, Tzeretelli, +admitted that complete anarchy reigned in the villages: "Land is being +seized and sold, agricultural labourers are forced to stop working, and +landowners are faced with demands which are economically impossible. +Breeding stock is being destroyed and implements plundered. Model farms +are being ruined. Forests are being cut down irrespective of ownership, +timber and logs are being stolen, and their shipment prevented. No +sowing is done on privately-owned farms, and harvests of grain and hay +are not reaped." The Minister accused the Local Committees and the +Peasant Congresses of organising arbitrary seizures of the land, and +came to the conclusion that the existing conditions of agriculture and +forestry "would inevitably bring about endless calamities for the Army +and the country, and threatened the very existence of the State." If +we recall the fires, the murders, the lynchings, the destruction of +estates, which were often filled with treasures of great historical +and artistic value, we shall have a true picture of the life of the +villages in those days. + +The question of the ownership of the land by the landlords was thus +not merely a matter of selfish class interest, all the more as, not +only the landlords but the wealthy peasants were subjected to violence +by order of the Committees, and in spite of them. One village rose +against another. It was not a question of the transfer of riches +from one class or individual to another, but of the destruction of +treasures, of agriculture, and of the economic stability of the State. +The instincts of proprietorship inherent in the peasantry irresistibly +grew as these seizures and partitions took place. The mental attitude +of the peasantry upset all the plans of the Revolutionary Democracy. +By converting the peasants into a _Petite Bourgeoisie_, it threatened +to postpone to an indefinite date the triumph of Socialism. The +villagers were obsessed by the idea of land distribution and by +their own interests, and were not in the least concerned with the +War, with politics, or with social questions which did not directly +affect them. The workers of the village were being killed and maimed +at the front, and the village, therefore, considered the War as a +burden. The authorities disallowed seizures of the land and imposed +restrictions in the shape of monopolies and fixed prices for corn. The +peasantry, therefore, bore a grudge against the Government. The towns +ceased to supply manufactured goods and the villages were estranged +from the towns and ceased to supply them with grain. This was the only +real "conquest" made by the Revolution, and those who profited by it +grew very anxious as to the attitude of future Governments towards +the arbitrary solution of the land question. They therefore actively +encouraged anarchy in the villages, condoned seizures and undermined +the authority of the Provisional Government. By this means they hoped +to bring the peasants over to their side as supporters, or, at least, +as a neutral element, in the impending decisive struggle for power. + + * * * * * + +The abolition of the police by the order issued on April 17th was one +of the acts of the Government which seriously complicated the normal +course of life. In reality, this act only confirmed the conditions +which had arisen almost everywhere in the first days of the Revolution, +and were directly due to the wrath of the people against the Executive +of the old regime, and especially of those who had been oppressed and +persecuted by the police and had suddenly found themselves on the crest +of the wave. It would be a hopeless task to defend the Russian police +as an institution. It could only be considered good by comparing it +with the militia and with the Extraordinary Bolshevik Commission.... + +In any case it would have been useless to resist the abolition of the +police, because it was a psychological necessity. There can be no +doubt that the attitude and actions of the old police were due less to +their political opinions than to the instructions of their employers +and to their own personal interests. No wonder, therefore, that the +gendarmes and the policemen, insulted and persecuted, introduced a +very bad element into the Army, into which they were subsequently +forcibly drafted. The Revolutionary Democracy, in self defence, grossly +exaggerated their counter-revolutionary activities in the Army; +nevertheless, it is absolutely true that a great many ex-officers of +the police and of the gendarmerie, partly, perhaps, from motives of +self-defence, chose for themselves a most lucrative profession--that +of the demagogue and the agitator. The fact is that the abolition of +the police in the very midst of the turmoil--when crime was on the +increase and the guarantees of public safety and of the safety of +individual property were weakened--was a real calamity. The militia, +indeed, far from being a substitute for the police, was a caricature +of them. In Western countries the police is placed as a united force +under the orders of a Department of the Central Government. The +Provisional Government placed the militia under the orders of _Zemstvo_ +and Municipal Administrations. The Government Commissars were only +entitled to make use of the militia for certain definite purposes. The +cadres of the militia were filled by untrained men, devoid of technical +experience, and, as often as not, criminals. By virtue of the new +law, there were admitted to the militia persons under arrest or who +had served a term of imprisonment for comparatively grave offences. +The system of recruiting practised by some forcibly "democratised" +_Zemstvo_ and Municipal institutions tended quite as much as the new +law towards the deterioration of the personnel of the militia. + +The Chief of the Central Administration of the Militia himself admitted +that escaped convicts were sometimes placed in command of the militia. +The villages were sometimes without any militia at all, and they +administered themselves as best they could. + +In its proclamation of April 25th the Provisional Government gave +an accurate description of the condition of the country in stating +that "the growth of new social ties was slower than the process of +disruption caused by the collapse of the old régime." In every feature +of the life of the people this fact was clearly to be observed. + + + + +CHAPTER XIII. + + THE ACTIVITIES OF THE PROVISIONAL GOVERNMENT: FOOD SUPPLIES, + INDUSTRY, TRANSPORT AND FINANCE. + + +In the early spring of 1917 the deficiency in supplies for the Army +and for the towns was rapidly growing. In one of its appeals to the +peasants the Soviet said: "The enemies of freedom, the supporters of +the deposed Czar, are taking advantage of the shortage of food in +the towns _for which they are themselves responsible_ in order to +undermine your freedom and ours. They say that the Revolution has +left the country without bread...." This simple explanation, adduced +by the Revolutionary Democracy in every crisis, was, of course, +one-sided. There was the inheritance of the old régime as well as the +inevitable consequences of three years of war, during which imports +of agricultural implements had come to a standstill, labourers were +taken from the land, and, as a result, the area under crops was +diminished. But these were not the only reasons for the food shortage +in a fertile country--a shortage which in the autumn was considered by +the Government as disastrous. The food policy of the Government and +the fluctuation of prices, the depreciation of the currency and a rise +in the price of commodities entirely out of proportion to the fixed +prices for grain also largely contributed to this result. This rise +in prices was due to general economic conditions, and especially to a +very rapid rise in wages; to the agrarian policy of the Government, the +inadequacy of the area under crops, to the turmoil in the villages, +and to the breakdown of transport. Private trade was abolished and +the entire matter of food supplies was handed over to Food Supply +Committees--undoubtedly democratic in character, but, with the +exception of the representatives of the Co-operatives, inexperienced +and devoid of a creative spirit. There are many more reasons, great and +small, which may be included in the formula: The Old Régime, the War +and the Revolution. + +On March 29th the Provisional Government introduced the grain monopoly. +The entire surplus of grain, excluding normal supplies, seed corn and +fodder, reverted to the State. At the same time the Government once +again raised the fixed price of grain, and promised to introduce fixed +prices for all necessary commodities, such as iron, textiles, leather, +kerosine oil, etc. This last measure, which was universally recognised +as just, and to which the Minister of Supplies attributed a very great +importance, proved impossible of application owing to the confused +condition of the country. Russia was covered by a huge network of Food +Supply Institutions, which cost 500,000,000 roubles a year, but could +not cope with their work. The villages, on the other hand, had ceased +to pay taxes and rents, were flooded with paper money, for which they +could get no equivalent in manufactured goods, and were by no means +anxious to supply grain. Propaganda and appeals were of no avail, and, +as often as not, force had to be applied. + +In its Proclamation of August 29th the Government admitted that the +Country was in a desperate position; the Government stores were +emptying; towns, provinces, and armies at the Front were in dire +need of bread, _although, in fact, there was sufficient bread in +the country_. Some had not delivered last year's harvest; some were +agitating and preventing others from doing their duty. In order to +avert grave danger, the Government once more raised the fixed prices +and threatened to apply stringent measures against the offenders, and +to regulate prices and the distribution of articles required by the +villages. But the vicious circle of conflicting political, social and +class interests was narrowing, like to a tight noose, round the neck of +the Government, paralysing its will-power and energy. + + * * * * * + +The condition of industry was no less acute, and it was steadily +falling into ruin. Here, as in the matter of supplies, the calamity +cannot be ascribed to one set of causes, as happened when the employers +and the workmen levelled accusations against one another. The former +were charged with taking excessive profits and having recourse to +sabotage in order to upset the Revolution, while the latter were +blamed for slackness and greed and for deriving selfish gains from the +Revolution. The causes may be divided into three categories. + +Owing to various political and economic reasons and to the fact +that the old Government did not devote sufficient attention to the +development of the natural resources of the country, our industries +were not placed on a solid basis, and were to a great extent dependent +upon foreign markets even for such material as might easily have been +found in Russia. Thus in 1912 there was a serious shortage of pig-iron, +and in 1913 of fuel. From 1908 to 1913 imports of metals from abroad +rose from 29 to 34 per cent. Before the War we imported 48 per cent. +of cotton. We needed 2,750,000 pouds[18] of wool from abroad out of a +total of the 5,000,000 pouds produced. + +The War unquestionably affected industry very deeply. Normal imports +came to a standstill. The mines of Dombrovsk were lost. Owing to +strategical requirements, transport was weakened, supplies of fuel and +of raw materials diminished. Most of the factories had to work for +the Army, and their personnel was curtailed by mobilisations. From an +economic point of view, the militarisation of industry was a heavy +burden for the population, because, according to the estimates made +by one of the Ministers, the Army absorbed 40 to 50 per cent. of the +total of goods produced by the country. Finally, the War widened the +gulf between the employers and the workmen, as the former made immense +profits, whereas the latter were impoverished, and their condition was +further aggravated by the suspension of certain professional guarantees +on account of the War by the fact that certain categories of workmen +were drafted by conscription to definite industrial concerns, and by +the general burden of inflated prices and inadequate food supplies. + +Even in these abnormal circumstances Russian industries to some extent +fulfilled the requirements of the moment, but the Revolution dealt +them a death blow, which caused their gradual dislocation and ultimate +collapse. On the one hand, the Provisional Government was legislating +for the establishment of a strict Government control of the industries +of the country and for regulating them by heavily taxing profits and +excess war profits, as well as by Government distribution of fuel, raw +materials and food. The latter measure caused the trading class to be +practically eliminated and to be replaced by democratic organisations. +Whether excess profits disappeared as a result of this policy, or were +merely transferred to another class, it is not easy to decide. On the +other hand, the Government were deeply concerned with the protection +of labour, and were drafting and passing various laws concerning the +freedom of unions, labour exchanges, conciliation boards, social +insurance, etc. Unfortunately, the impatience and the desire for +"law-making" which had seized the villages were also apparent in the +factories. Heads of industrial concerns were dismissed wholesale, as +well as the administrative and technical staffs. These dismissals were +accompanied by insults and sometimes by violence, out of revenge for +past offences, real or imaginary. Some of the members of the staffs +resigned of their own accord, because they were unable to endure the +humiliating position into which they were forced by the workmen. Given +our low level of technical and educational standards, such methods +were fraught with grave danger. As in the Army, so in the factories, +Committees replaced by elections the dismissed personnel with utterly +untrained and ignorant men. Sometimes the workmen completely seized the +industrial concerns. Ignorant and unprovided with capital, they led +these concerns to ruin, and were themselves driven to unemployment and +misery. Labour discipline in the factories completely vanished, and no +means was left of exercising moral, material or judicial pressure or +compulsion. The "consciousness" alone of the workers proved inadequate. +The technical and administrative personnel which remained or was newly +elected could no longer direct the industries and enjoyed no authority, +as it was thoroughly terrorised by the workmen. Naturally, therefore, +the working hours were still further curtailed, work became careless, +and production fell to its lowest ebb. The metallurgical industries +of Moscow fell 32 per cent. and the productivity of the Petrograd +factories 20 to 40 per cent. as early as in the month of April. In +June the production of coal and the general production of the Donetz +basin fell 30 per cent. The production of oil in Baku and Grozni +also suffered. The greatest injury, however, was inflicted upon the +industries by the monstrous demands for higher wages, completely out of +proportion to the cost of living and to the productivity of labour, as +well as to the actual paying capacity of the industries. These demands +greatly exceeded all excess profits. The following figures are quoted +in a Report to the Provisional Government: In eighteen concerns in the +Donetz Basin, with a total profit of 75,000,000 roubles per annum, the +workmen demanded a wage increase of 240,000,000 roubles per annum; the +total amount of increased wages in all the mining and metallurgical +factories of the South was 800,000,000 roubles per annum. In the Urals +the total Budget was 200,000,000, while the wages rose to 300,000,000. +In the Putilov factory alone, in Petrograd, before the end of 1917, the +increase in wages amounted to 90,000,000 roubles. The wages rose from +200 to 300 per cent. The increase in the wages of the textile workers +of Moscow rose 500 per cent., as compared to 1914. The burden of these +increases naturally fell on the Government, as most of the factories +were working for the defence of the country. Owing to the condition +of industry described above, and to the psychology of the workmen, +industrial concerns collapsed, and the country experienced an acute +shortage of necessary commodities, with a corresponding increase in +prices. Hence the rise in the price of bread and the reluctance of the +villages to supply the towns. + +At the same time Bolshevism introduced a permanent ferment into +the labouring masses. It flattered the lowest instincts, fanned +hatred against the wealthy classes, encouraged excessive demands, +and paralysed every endeavour of the Government and of the moderate +Democratic organisations to arrest the disruption of industry: "All +for the Proletariat and through the Proletariat...." Bolshevism held +up to the working class vivid and entrancing vistas of political +domination and economic prosperity, through the destruction of the +Capitalist régime and the transfer to the workmen of political power, +of industries, of the means of production, and of the wealth of the +country. And all this was to come at once, immediately, and not as a +result of a lengthy, social, economic process and organised struggle. +The imagination of the masses, unfettered by knowledge or by the +authority of leading professional unions, which were morally undermined +by the Bolsheviks, and were on the verge of collapse, was fired by +visions of avenging the hardships and boredom of heavy toil in the +past, and of enjoying amenities of a _Bourgeois_ existence, which they +despised and yet yearned for with equal ardour. It was "Now or Never: +All or Nothing!" As life was destroying illusions, and the implacable +law of economics was meting out the punishment of high prices, hunger +and unemployment, Bolshevism was the more convincingly insisting upon +the necessity of rebellion and explaining the causes of the calamity +and the means of averting it. The causes were: the policy of the +Provisional Government, which was trying to reintroduce enslavement by +the Bourgeoisie, the sabotage of the employers, and the connivance of +the Revolutionary Democracy, including the Mensheviks, which had sold +itself to the Bourgeoisie. The means was the transfer of power to the +Proletariat. + +All these circumstances were gradually killing Russian Industry. + +In spite of all these disturbances, the dislocation of industry was +not immediately felt in the Army to an appreciable degree, because +attention was concentrated upon the Army at the expense of the vital +necessities of the country itself, and also because for several months +there had been a lull at the Front. In June, 1917, therefore, we were +provided adequately, if not amply, for an important offensive. Imports +of war material through Archangel, Murmansk, and partly through +Vladivostok had increased, but had not been sufficiently developed by +reason of the natural shortcomings of maritime routes, and of the low +carrying capacity of the Siberian and of the Murmansk Railways. Only 16 +per cent. of the actual needs of the Army were satisfied. The military +administration, however, clearly saw that we were living on the old +stores collected by the patriotic impulse and effort of the country in +1916. By August, 1917, the most important factories for the production +of war materials had suffered a check. The production of guns and +of shells had fallen 60 per cent., and of aircraft 80 per cent. The +possibility of continuing the War under worse material conditions +was, however, amply proved later by the Soviet Government, which had +been using the supplies available in 1917 and the remnants of Russian +Industrial production for the conduct of civil war for more than three +years. This, of course, was only possible through such an unexampled +curtailment of the consuming market that we are practically driven back +to primitive conditions of life. + + * * * * * + +Transport was likewise in a state of dislocation. As early as May, +1917, at the Regular Congress of Railway Representatives at the Stavka, +the opinion was expressed, and confirmed by many specialists, that, +unless the general conditions of the country changed, our railways +would come to a standstill within six months. Practice has disproved +theory. For over three years, under the impossible conditions of Civil +War and of the Bolshevik Régime, the railways have continued to work. +It is true that they did not satisfy the needs of the population +even in a small measure, but they served the strategical purposes. +That this situation cannot last, and that the entire network of the +Russian Railways is approaching its doom, is hardly open to doubt. In +the history of the disintegration of the Russian Railway System the +same conditions are traceable which I have mentioned in regard to the +Army, the villages, and especially the industries: the inheritance of +the unwise policy of the past in regard to railways, the excessive +demands of the War, the wear and tear of rolling stock, and anarchy on +the line, due to the behaviour of a licentious soldiery; the general +economic condition of the country, the shortage of rails, of metal and +of fuel; the "democratisation" of Railway Administration, in which +the power was seized by various Committees; the disorganisation of +the administrative and technical personnel, which was subjected to +persecution; the low producing power of labour and the steady growth +of the economic demands of the railway employees and workmen. + +In other branches of the Administration the Government offered a +certain resistance to the systematic seizure of power by private +organisations, but in the Ministry of Railways that pernicious system +was introduced by the Government itself, in the person of the Minister +Nekrassov. He was the friend and the inspirer of Kerensky, alternately +Minister of Railways and of Finance, Assistant and Vice-President of +the Council of Ministers, Governor-General of Finland, Octobrist, Cadet +(Constitutional Democrat), and Radical Democrat, holding the scales +between the Government and the Soviet. Nekrassov was the darkest and +the most fatal figure in the Governing Circles, and left the stamp +of destruction upon everything he touched--the All-Russian Executive +Committee of the Union of Railways, the autonomy of the Ukraine, or the +Kornilov movement. + +The Ministry had no economic or technical plan. As a matter of fact, +no such plan could ever be carried out, because Nekrassov decided to +introduce into the Railway Organisation, hitherto strongly disciplined, +"the new principles of Democratic Organisation, instead of the old +watchwords of compulsion and fear"(?). Soviets and Committees were +implanted upon every branch of the Railway Administration. Enormous +sums were spent upon this undertaking, and, by his famous circular of +May 27th, the Minister assigned to these organisations a very wide +scope of control and management, as well as of the "direction" which +they were henceforward entitled to give to the responsible personnel +in the Administration. Executive functions were subsequently promised +to these organisations.... "Meanwhile the Ministry of Railways and its +subordinate branches will work in strict accordance with the ideas +and wishes of the United Railway Workers." Nekrassov thus handed +over to a private organisation the most important interests of the +State--the direction of the Railway policy, the control of the Defence, +of industries, and of all other branches dependent upon the railway +system. As one of our contemporary critics has said, this measure +would have been entirely justified had the whole population of Russia +consisted of railway employees. This reform, carried out by Nekrassov +on a scale unprecedented in history, was something worse than a mere +blunder. The general trend of Ministerial policy was well understood. +In the beginning of August, at the Moscow Congress, which was turned +into a weapon for the Socialist parties of the Left, one of the leaders +declared that "the Railway Union must be fully autonomous and no +authority except that of the workers themselves should be entitled to +interfere with it." In other words, a State within a State. + +Disruption ensued. A new phase of the arbitrariness of ever-changing +organisations was introduced into the strict and precise mechanism of +the railway services in the centre as well as throughout the country. +I understand the democratisation that opens to the popular masses +wide access to science, technical knowledge, and art, but I do not +understand the democratisation of these achievements of human intellect. + +There followed anarchy and the collapse of Labour discipline. As early +as in July the position of the railways was rendered hopeless through +the action of the Government. + +After holding the office of Minister of Railways for four months, +Nekrassov went to the Ministry of Finance, of which he was utterly +ignorant, and his successor, Yurenev, began to struggle against +the usurpation of power by the railwaymen, as he considered "the +interference of private persons and organisations with the executive +functions of the Department as a crime against the State." The struggle +was conducted by the customary methods of the Provisional Government, +and what was lost could no longer be recovered. At the Moscow Congress +the President of the Union of the Railwaymen, fully conscious of its +power, said that the struggle against democratic organisations was a +manifestation of counter-Revolution, that the Union would use every +weapon in order to counteract these endeavours, and "would be strong +enough to slay this counter-Revolutionary hydra." As is well known, the +All-Russian Executive Committee of the Union of Railways subsequently +became a political organisation pure and simple, and betrayed +Kornilov to Kerensky and Kerensky to Lenin. With a zeal worthy of the +secret police of the old régime, it hunted out Kornilov's followers, +and finally met an inglorious end in the clutches of Bolshevik +Centralisation. + + * * * * * + +We now come to another element in the life of the State--Finance. Every +normal financial system is dependent upon a series of conditions: +general political conditions, offering a guarantee of the external +and internal stability of the State and of the country; strategical +conditions, defining the measure of efficiency of the National Defence; +economic conditions, such as the productivity of the country's +industries and the relation of production to consumption; the +conditions of labour, of transport, etc. The Government, the Front, +the villages, the factories, and the transport offered no necessary +guarantees, and the Ministry of Finance could but have recourse to +palliatives in order to arrest the disruption of the entire system +of the currency and the complete collapse of the Budget, pending the +restoration of comparative order in the country. According to the +accepted view, the main defects of our pre-War Budget were that it was +based upon the revenue of the spirit monopoly (800,000,000 roubles), +and that there was scarcely any direct taxation. Before the War the +Budget of Russia was about 3½ milliards of roubles; the National Debt +was about 8½ milliards, and we paid nearly 400,000,000 roubles interest +per annum; half of that sum went abroad, and was partially covered by +1½ milliards of our exports. The War and Prohibition completely upset +our Budget. Government expenses during the War reached the following +figures: + + ½ 1914 5 milliards of roubles. + 1915 12 " " + 1916 18 " " + Seven months, 1917 18 " " + +The enormous deficit was partially covered by loans and by paper +currency. The expenses of the War were met, however, out of the +so-called "War Fund." At the Stavka, in accordance with the dictates +of practical wisdom, expenditure was under the full control of the +Chief-of-Staff of the Supreme Commander-in-Chief, who determined the +heads of expenditure in his Orders, schedules, and estimates. + +The Revolution dealt the death-blow to our finance. As Shingarev, the +Minister of Finance, said, the Revolution "induced everyone to claim +more rights, and stifled any sense of duty. Everybody demanded higher +wages, but no one dreamt of paying taxes, and the finances of the +country were thus placed in a hopeless position." There was a real +orgy; everyone was desperately trying to grab as much as possible from +the Treasury under the guise of democratisation, taking advantage +of the impotence of the Government and of powerlessness to resist. +Even Nekrassov had the courage to declare at the Moscow Congress that +"Never in history had any Czarist Government been as generous and +prodigal as the Government of Revolutionary Russia," and that "the +new Revolutionary régime is much more expensive than the old one." +Suffice it to quote a few "astronomic" figures in order to gauge the +insuperable obstacles in the way of a reasonable Budget. The decline of +production and the excessive rise in wages resulted in the necessity +of enormous expenditure for subsidies to expiring concerns and for +overpayments for means of production. These over-payments in the +Donetz Basin alone amounted to 1,200,000,000 roubles; the increase in +the soldiers' pay, 500,000,000 roubles; railwaymen's pay, 350,000,000 +roubles; Post Office employees, 60,000,000 roubles. After a month +the latter demanded another 105,000,000 roubles, while the entire +revenue of the Posts and Telegraphs was 60,000,000 roubles. The Soviet +demanded 11 milliards (in other words, nearly the total of the Budget +for 1915) for allowances to soldiers' wives, whereas only 2 milliards +had been spent till 1917 under this head. The Food Supply Committees +cost 500,000,000 roubles per annum, and the Land Committee 140,000,000 +roubles, etc., etc. Meanwhile the revenue was falling steadily. Thus, +for example, the Land Tax fell 32 per cent. in the first few months of +the Revolution; the revenue from town property, 41 per cent.; the House +Tax, 43 per cent., etc. At the same time, our internal troubles caused +the depreciation of the rouble and a fall in the price of Russian +securities abroad. The Provisional Government based its financial +policy upon "reorganisation of the Financial System on democratic +lines and the direct taxation of the propertied classes" (Death +Duties, Excess Profits Taxes, Income Taxes, etc.). The Government, +however, would not adopt the measure recommended by the Revolutionary +Democracy--a compulsory loan or a high Capital Levy--a measure +distinctly tainted with Bolshevism. All these just taxes, introduced or +planned, did not suffice even partially to satisfy the growing needs of +the State. In the month of August the Finance Ministry was compelled to +increase indirect taxation on certain monopolies, such as tea, sugar, +and matches. These measures were, of course, extremely burdensome, and +therefore highly unpopular. + +Expenditure was growing, revenue was not forthcoming. The Liberty Loan +was not progressing favourably, and there could be no hope for foreign +loans on account of the condition of the Russian Front. Internal loans +and Treasury Bonds yielded 9½ milliards in the first half of 1917. +Ordinary revenue was expected to yield 5,800,000,000 roubles. There +remained one weapon established by the historical tradition of every +revolution--the Printing Press. + +Paper currency reached colossal proportions: + + ½ 1914 1,425,000,000 roubles. + 1915 2,612,000,000 " + 1916 3,488,000,000 " + ½ 1917 3,990,000,000 " + +According to the estimates of July, 1917, the total of paper currency +was 13,916,000,000 roubles (the gold reserve was 1,293,000,000 +roubles), as against 2 milliards before the War. Four successive +Finance Ministers were unable to drag the country out of the financial +morass. This might possibly have been achieved by the awakening of the +national spirit and an understanding of the interests of the State, or +by the growth of a wise and strong power which could have dealt a final +blow to the anti-State, selfish motives of the Bourgeois elements that +based their well-being upon the War and upon the blood of the people, +as well as of the Democracy, which, in the words of Shingarev, "so +severely condemned through its representatives in the Duma the very +same poison (paper currency) which it was now drinking greedily at the +moment when that Democracy had become its own master." + + + + +CHAPTER XIV. + +THE STRATEGICAL POSITION OF THE RUSSIAN FRONT. + + +The first and fundamental question with which I was confronted at the +Stavka was _the objective of our Front_. The condition of the enemy did +not appear to us as particularly brilliant. But I must confess that +the truth as at present revealed exceeds all our surmises, especially +according to the picture drawn by Hindenburg and Ludendorff of the +condition of Germany and of her Allies in 1917. I will not dwell +upon the respective numerical strength, armaments, and strategical +positions on the Western Front. I will only recall that in the middle +of June Hindenburg gave rather a gloomy description of the condition +of the country in his telegram to the Emperor. He said: "We are very +much perturbed by the depression of the spirits of the people. That +spirit must be raised, _or we shall lose the War_. Our Allies also +require support, lest they desert us.... Economic problems must be +solved, which are of paramount importance to our future. The question +arises--Is the Chancellor capable of solving them? A solution must be +found _or else we perish_." + +The Germans were anticipating a big offensive of the British and the +French on the Western Front, where they had concentrated their main +attention and their main forces, leaving on the Eastern Front after the +Russian Revolution only such numbers as were scarcely sufficient for +defence. And yet the position on the Eastern Front continued to create +a certain nervousness at the German G.H.Q. Will the Russian people +remain steadfast, or will the Defeatist tendencies prevail? Hindenburg +wrote: "As the condition of the Russian Army prevented us from finding +a clear answer to that question, our position in regard to Russia +remained insecure." + +In spite of all its defects, the Russian Army in March, 1917, was +a formidable force, with which the enemy had seriously to reckon. +Owing to the mobilisation of industry, to the activities of the +War-Industries Committees, and partly to the fact that the War +Ministry was showing increased energy, our armaments had reached +a level hitherto unknown. Also, the Allies were supplying us with +artillery and war materials through Murmansk and Archangel on a +larger scale. In the spring we had the powerful Forty-Eighth Corps--a +name under which heavy artillery of the highest calibre for special +purposes, "Taon," was concealed. In the beginning of the year the +engineering troops were reorganised and amplified. At the same time new +infantry divisions were beginning to deploy. This measure, adopted by +General Gourko during his temporary tenure of office as Chief-of-Staff +of the Supreme C.-in-C., consisted in the reduction of regiments from +four battalions to three, as well as the reduction of the number of +guns to a division. A third division was thus created in every Army +Corps, with artillery. There can be no doubt that, had this scheme been +introduced in peace-time, the Army Corps would have been more pliable +and considerably stronger. It was a risky thing to do in war-time. +Before the spring operations the old divisions were disbanded, +whereas the new ones were in a pitiable state in regard to armaments +(machine-guns, etc.), as well as technical strength and equipment. Many +of them had not been sufficiently blended together--a circumstance of +particular importance in view of the Revolution. The position was so +acute that in May the Stavka was compelled to sanction the disbanding +of those of the Third Division which should prove feeble, and to +distribute the men among units of the line. This idea, however, was +hardly ever put into practice, as it encountered strong opposition +on the part of units already disaffected by the Revolution. Another +measure which weakened the ranks of the Army was the dismissal of the +senior men in the ranks. + +This decision, fraught with incalculable consequences, was taken on the +eve of a general offensive. It was due to a statement made at a Council +at the Stavka by the Minister of Agriculture (who was also in charge +of supplies) that the condition of supplies was critical, and that +he could not undertake the responsibility of feeding the Army unless +about a million men were removed from the ration list. In the debate +attention was drawn to the presence in the Army of an enormous number +of non-combatants, quite out of proportion to the numbers of fighting +men, and to the inclusion in the Army of a quantity of auxiliary +bodies, which were hardly necessary, such as of Labour Organisations, +Chinese, and other alien Labour Battalions, etc. Mention was also +made of the necessity of having a younger Army. I very much feared +this trend of mind, and gave orders to the Staff to draw up accurate +lists of all the above-named Capitalists. While this work was still +in preparation the War Minister issued, on April 5th, an Order of the +Day giving leave, in the internal districts, to soldiers over forty to +work in the fields till May 15th. Leave was afterwards extended till +June 15th, but practically hardly anyone returned. On April 10th the +Provisional Government discharged all men over forty-three. Under the +pressure of the men it became unavoidable to spread the provisions +of the first Order to the Army, which would not be reconciled to any +privileges granted to the rear. The second Order gave rise to a very +dangerous tendency, as it practically amounted to a _beginning of +demobilisation_. The elemental desire of those who had been given leave +to return to their homes could not be controlled by any regulations, +and the masses of these men, who flooded the railway stations, caused +a protracted disorganisation of the means of transport. Some regiments +formed out of Reserve battalions lost most of their men. In the rear of +the Army transport was likewise in a state of confusion. The men did +not wait to be relieved, but left the lorries and the horses to their +fate; supplies were plundered and the horses perished. The Army was +weakened as a result of these circumstances, and the preparations for +the defensive were delayed. + +[Map: The Russian (European) Front in 1917.] + +[Map: The Russian Caucasian Front in March 1917.] + +The Russian Army occupied an enormous Front, from the Baltic to the +Black Sea and from the Black Sea to Hamadan. Sixty-eight infantry +and nine cavalry corps occupied the line. Both the importance of and +the conditions obtaining on these Fronts varied. Our Northern Front, +including Finland, the Baltic and the line of the Western Dvina, was +of great importance, as it covered the approaches to Petrograd. But +the importance at that Front was limited to defensive purposes, and +for that reason it was impossible to keep at that Front large forces +or considerable numbers of guns. The conditions of that Theatre--the +strong defensive line of the Dvina--a series of natural positions in +the rear linked up with the main positions of the Western Russian +Front, and the impossibility of any important operations in the +direction of Petrograd without taking possession of the Sea, which was +in our hands--all this would have justified us in considering that +the Front was, to a certain extent, secure, had it not been for two +circumstances, which caused the Stavka serious concern: The troops of +the Northern Front, owing to the vicinity of Revolutionary Petrograd, +were more demoralised than any other, and the Baltic Fleet and its +bases--Helsingfors and Kronstadt, of which the latter served as the +main base of Anarchism and Bolshevism--were either "autonomous" or in +a state of semi-Anarchy. While preserving to a certain degree the +outward form of discipline, the Baltic Fleet was actually in a state +of complete insubordination. The Admiral in command, Maximov, was +entirely in the hands of the Central Committee of Sailors. Not a single +order for Naval operations could be carried out without the sanction +of that Committee, not to speak of Naval actions. Even the work of +laying and repairing minefields--the main defence of the Baltic--met +with opposition from Sailors' Organisations and the crews. Not only +the general decline of discipline, but the well-planned work of the +German General Staff were quite obvious, and apprehensions were +entertained lest Naval secrets and codes be revealed to the enemy. At +the same time, the troops of the Forty-Second Corps, quartered along +the Finnish Coast and on the Monzund Islands, had been idle for a +long time and their positions scattered. With the beginning of the +Revolution they were, therefore, rapidly demoralised, and some of them +were nothing but physically and morally degenerate crowds. To relieve +or to move them was an impossibility. I recall that in May, 1917, I +made several unavailing endeavours to send an Infantry Brigade to the +Monzund Islands. Suffice it to say that the Army Corps Commander would +not make up his mind to inspect his troops and get into touch with +them--a circumstance which is typical of the troops as well as of the +personality of their Commander. In a word, the position on the Northern +Front in the spring of 1917 was the following: We received daily +reports of the Channel between the Islands of the Gulf of Riga and the +mainland being blocked with ice, and this ice appeared to be the chief +real obstacle to an invasion of the German Fleet and Expeditionary +Forces. + +The Western Front extended from the Disna to the Pripet. On this long +line two sectors--Minsk-Vilna and Minsk-Baranovitchi--were of the +greatest importance to us, as they represented the two directions in +which our troops, as well as the Germans, might undertake offensive +operations, for which there had already been precedents. The other +sections of the Front, and especially the Southern--the Pollessie, +with its forests and marshes--owing to the conditions of the country +and of the railways, were passive. Along the River Pripet, its +tributaries and canals, a kind of half-peaceful intercourse with the +Germans had long since been established, as well as a secret exchange +of goods, which was of some advantage to the "Comrades." For example, +we received reports that Russian soldiers from the Line, with bags, +appeared daily in the market of Pinsk, and that their advent was for +many reasons encouraged by the German authorities. There was another +vulnerable point--the bridge-head on the Stokhod by the station, +Chrevishe-Golenin, occupied by one of the Army Corps of General Lesh. +On March 21st, after strong artillery preparation and a gas attack, the +Germans fell upon our Corps and smashed it to pieces. Our troops had +heavy casualties, and the remnants of the Corps retreated behind the +Stokhod. The Stavka did not get an accurate list of the casualties, +because it was impossible to ascertain the numbers of killed or wounded +under the head of "Missing." The German Official Communiqué gave a +list of prisoners--150 officers and about 10,000 men. Owing to the +conditions in that theatre of war, this tactical success was of no +strategical importance, and could lead to no dangerous developments. +Nevertheless, we could not but wonder at the frankness of the +cautious _Norddeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung_, the official organ of +the German Chancellor, which wrote: "The Communiqué of the Stavka of +the Russian Supreme Command of March 29th is mistaken in interpreting +the operations undertaken by the German troops, and dictated by a +tactical necessity which had arisen only within the limits of a given +sector, was an operation of general importance." The paper knew the +facts of which we were not certain and which have now been explained +by Ludendorff. From the beginning of the Russian Revolution, Germany +had a new aim: _Unable to conduct operations on both the main Fronts, +she had decided attentively to follow and to encourage the process +of demoralisation in Russia, striking at her not by arms, but by +developing propaganda_. The battle of the Stokhod was fought on the +personal initiative of General Linsingen, and the German Government was +frightened because it considered that "at a moment when fraternisation +was proceeding at full speed" German attacks might revive the dying +flames of patriotism in Russia and postpone her collapse. The +Chancellor asked the German G.H.Q. to make as little as possible of +that success, and the G.H.Q. cancelled all further offensives "in order +not to dash the hopes for peace which were about to be realised." + +Our reverse on the Stokhod produced a strong impression in the country. +It was the first fighting experience of the "Freest Revolutionary +Army in the world...." The Stavka merely gave the facts in a spirit +of impartiality. In the circles of the Revolutionary Democracy the +reverse was explained partly by the treachery of the Commanding +Officers and partly by a conspiracy to emphasise by this example the +impracticability of the new Army Regulations and the danger of the +collapse of discipline, partly by the incompetence of the military +authorities. The Moscow Soviet wrote to the Stavka accusing one of the +assistants of the War Minister who had commanded a division on that +Front of being a traitor. Others attributed our defeat solely to the +demoralisation of the troops. In reality, the reasons for the defeat +were two-fold: The _tactical_ reason--the doubtful practicability +of occupying a narrow bridge-head when the river was swollen, the +insecurity of the rear and perhaps inadequate use of the troops and of +technical means; and the _psychological_ reason, the collapse of the +_moral_ and of the discipline of the troops. The last circumstance, +apparent in the enormous number of prisoners, gave both the Russian +Stavka and Hindenburg's headquarters much food for thought. + +The South-Western Front, from the Pripet to Moldavia, was the most +important, and attracted the greatest attention. From that Front, +operating lines of the highest importance led to the North-West, into +the depths of Galicia and Poland, to Cracow, Warsaw and Brest-Litovsk. +The advance along these lines was covered from the South by the +Carpathians, separated the Southern Austrian group of armies from the +Northern German, and threatened the rear and the communications of the +latter. These operating lines, upon which no serious obstacles were +encountered, led us to the Front of the Austrian troops, whose fighting +capacity was lower than the Germans. The rear of our South-Western +Front was comparatively well-organised and prosperous. The psychology +of the troops, of the Command, and of the Staffs always differed +considerably from the psychology of other Fronts. In the glorious, +but joyless, campaign only the armies of the South-Western Front had +won splendid victories, had taken hundreds of thousands of prisoners, +had made victorious progress hundreds of miles deep into the enemy +territory, and had descended into Hungary from the Carpathians. These +troops had formerly always believed in success. Brussilov, Kornilov, +Kaledin had made their reputations on that Front. Owing to all these +circumstances the South-Western Front was regarded as the natural base +and the centre of the impending operations. Consequently, troops, +technical means, the greater part of the heavy artillery ("Taon") and +munitions were concentrated at that Front. The region between the +Upper Seret and the Carpathians was, therefore, being prepared for +the offensive, _Places d'armes_ erected, roads made. Further south +there was the Roumanian Front, stretching to the Black Sea. After +the unsuccessful campaign of 1916 our troops occupied the line of +the Danube, the Seret and the Carpathians, and it was sufficiently +fortified. Part of General Averesco's Roumanian troops occupied +the Front between our Fourth and Ninth Armies, and part were being +organised under the direction of the French General, Berthelot, +assisted by Russian Gunner Instructors. The reorganisation and +formation proceeded favourably, the more so as the Roumanian soldier +is excellent war material. I became acquainted with the Roumanian +Army in November, 1916, when I was sent with the Eighth Army Corps to +Buseo, into the thick of the retreating Roumanian Armies. Curiously +enough, I was ordered to advance in the direction of Bucarest until +I came into contact with the enemy, and to cover that direction with +the assistance of the retreating Roumanian troops. For several months +I fought by Buseo, Rymnik and Fokshany, having two Roumanian Corps +at times under my command and Averesco's Army on my flank. I thus +gained a thorough knowledge of the Roumanian troops. In the beginning +of the campaign the Roumanian Army showed complete disregard of the +experience of the World War. In matters of equipment and ammunition +their levity was almost criminal. There were several capable Generals, +the officers were effeminate and inefficient, and the men were +splendid. The artillery was adequate, but the infantry was untrained. +These are the main characteristics of the Roumanian Army, which soon +afterwards acquired better organisation and improved in training and +equipment. The relations between the actual Russian Commander-in-Chief, +who was designated as the Assistant C.-in-C., and the King of Roumania, +who was nominally in Chief Command, were fairly cordial. Although the +Russian troops began to commit excesses, which had a bad effect upon +the attitude of the Roumanians, the condition of the Front did not, +however, cause serious apprehension. Owing to the general conditions at +the Theatre of War, only an advance in great strength in the direction +of Bucarest and an invasion of Transylvania could have had a political +and strategical effect. But new forces could not be moved to Roumania, +and the condition of the Roumanian Railways excluded all hope of the +possibility of transport and supplies on a large scale. The theatre, +therefore, was of secondary importance, and the troops of the Roumanian +Front were preparing for a local operation, with a view to attracting +the Austro-German forces. + +The Caucasian Front was in an exceptional position. It was far distant. +For many years the Caucasian Administration and Command had enjoyed a +certain degree of autonomy. From August, 1916, the Army was commanded +by the Grand-Duke Nicholas, a man of commanding personality, who took +advantage of his position whenever there was a difference of opinion +between himself and the Stavka. Finally, the natural conditions of +the theatre of war and the peculiarities of the enemy rendered that +Front entirely different from the European. All this led to a kind +of remoteness and aloofness of the Caucasian Army and too abnormal +relations with the Stavka. General Alexeiev repeatedly stated that, +in spite of all his efforts, he was unable clearly to discern the +situation in the Caucasus. The Caucasus lived independently, and told +the Government only as much as it considered necessary; and the reports +were coloured in accordance with local interests. + +In the spring of 1917 the Caucasian Army was in a difficult position, +not by reason of the strategical or fighting advantages of the +enemy--the Turkish Army was by no means a serious menace--but of +internal disorganisation. The countryside was roadless and bare. There +were no supplies or forage, and the difficulties of transport made +the life of the troops very arduous. The Army Corps on the Right Flank +was comparatively well supplied, owing to facilities for transport +across the Black Sea, but the other Army Corps, and especially those +of the Left Flank, fared very badly. Owing to geographical conditions, +light transport required an enormous number of horses, while there +was no fodder on the spot. Railways of all kinds were being built +very slowly, partly owing to a lack of railway material and partly +because that material had been wasted by the Caucasian Front upon the +Trapezund Railway, which was of secondary importance, owing to the +parallel Maritime transport. In the beginning of May General Yudenitch +reported that, owing to disease and loss of horses, transport was +completely disorganised, batteries in position had no horses, half of +the transport was non-existent, and 75,000 horses were needed. Tracks, +rolling stock and forage were urgently required. In the first half of +April 30,000 men (22 per cent.) of the Infantry of the Line had died of +typhus and scurvy. Yudenitch therefore foreshadowed the necessity of +a compulsory retreat to points of supply, the centre towards Erzerum +and the Right Flank to the frontier. The solution suggested by General +Yudenitch could not be accepted, both for moral reasons and because our +retreat would have freed Turkish troops for action on other Asiatic +Fronts. This circumstance particularly worried the British Military +Representative at the Stavka, who repeatedly conveyed to us the +desire of the British G.H.Q. that the Left Flank of our troops should +advance in the valley of the River Diala for a combined operation +with General Maude's Mesopotamian contingent against Halil Pasha's +Army. This advance was necessary to the British rather for political +considerations than for strategical requirements. The actual condition +of our Left Flank Army Corps was, moreover, truly desperate, and in +May tropical heat set in in the valley of the Diala. As a result the +Caucasian Front was unable to advance, and was ordered actively to +defend its position. The advance of the Army Corps of the Left Flank, +in contact with the British, was made conditional upon the latter +supplying the troops. As a matter of fact, in the middle of April, a +partial retreat took place in the direction of Ognot and Mush; at the +end of April the Left Flank began its fruitless advance in the valley +of the Diala, and subsequently a condition arose on the Caucasian Front +which was something between War and Peace. + +In conclusion, mention must be made of another portion of the Armed +Forces of Russia in that theatre--the Black Sea Fleet. In May and in +the beginning of June serious disturbances had already occurred, which +led to the resignation of Admiral Koltchak. The Fleet, however, was +still considered strong enough to carry out its task--to hold the Black +Sea and also to blockade the Turkish and Bulgarian coasts and guard the +maritime routes to the Caucasian and Roumanian Fronts. + +I have given a short summary of the conditions of the Russian +Front without indulging in a detailed examination of strategical +possibilities. Whatever our strategy during that period may have been, +it was upset by the masses of the soldiery, for from Petrograd to the +Danube and the Diala demoralisation was spreading and growing. In the +beginning of the Revolution it was impossible to gauge the extent of +its effects upon various fronts and upon future operations. But many +were those whose minds were poisoned by a suspicion as to the futility +of all our plans, calculations and efforts. + + + + +CHAPTER XV. + +THE QUESTION OF THE ADVANCE OF THE RUSSIAN ARMY. + + +We were thus confronted with a crucial question: SHOULD THE RUSSIAN +ARMY ADVANCE? + +On March 27th the Provisional Government issued a proclamation "To the +Citizens" on the subject of war aims. The Stavka could not detect any +definite instructions for governing the Russian Army in the midst of a +series of phrases in which the true meaning of the appeal was obscured +in deference to the Revolutionary Democracy. "The Defence at all costs +of our national patrimony and the liberation of the country from the +enemy who has invaded it is the first and vital aim of our soldiers, +who are defending the freedom of the people.... Free Russia does not +aim at domination over other peoples, at depriving them of _their_ +national patrimony, or at the forcible seizure of foreign territories. +She aims at a lasting peace, on the basis of the self-determination +of peoples. The Russian people do not wish to increase their external +power at the expense of other peoples ... but ... will not allow their +Mother Country to come out of the great struggle downtrodden and +weakened. These principles will constitute the basis of the Foreign +Policy of the Provisional Government ... _while all the obligations to +our Allies will be respected_." + +In the Note of April 18th, addressed to the Allied Powers by the +Foreign Minister, Miliukov, we find yet another definition: "The +universal desire of the people to carry the World War to a victorious +conclusion ... has grown owing to the consciousness of the common +responsibility of everyone. This desire has become more active, +because it is concentrated on the aim which is immediate and clear to +everyone--_that of repelling the enemy who has invaded the territory +of our Mother Country_." These, of course, were mere phrases, which +described the War aims in cautious, timorous and nebulous words, +allowing of any interpretation, and deprived, moreover, any foundation +in fact. The will for victory in the people and in the Army had +not only not grown, but was steadily decreasing, as a result of +weariness and waning patriotism, as well as of the intense work of +the abnormal coalition between the representatives of the extreme +elements of the Russian Revolutionary Democracy and the German +General Staff. That coalition was formed by ties which were unseen +and yet quite perceptible. I will deal with that question later, and +will only say here that the destructive work, in accordance with +the Zimmerwald programme, for ending the War began long before the +Revolution and was conducted from within as well as from without. The +Provisional Government was trying to pacify the militant element of the +Revolutionary Democracy by expounding meaningless and obscure formulas +with regard to the War aims, but it did not interfere with the Stavka +in regard to the choice of strategical means. We were, therefore, to +decide the question of the advance independently from the prevailing +currents of political opinion. The only clear and definite object upon +which the Commanding Staffs could not fail to agree was to defeat the +enemy in close union with the Allies. Otherwise our country was doomed +to destruction. + +Such a decision implied an advance on a large scale because victory was +impossible without it, and a devastating war might otherwise become +protracted. The responsible organs of the Democracy, the majority of +whom had Defeatist tendencies, tried correspondingly to influence +the masses. Even the moderate Socialist circles were not altogether +free from these tendencies. The masses of the soldiery utterly failed +to understand the ideas behind of the Zimmerwald programme; but the +programme itself offered a certain justification for the elementary +feelings of self-preservation. In other words, it was a question with +them of saving their skin. The idea of an advance could not, therefore, +be particularly popular with the Army, as demoralisation was growing. +There was no certainty not only that the advance would be successful, +but even that the troops would obey the order to go forward. The +colossal Russian Front was still steady ... by the force of inertia. +The enemy feared it, as, like ourselves, he was unable to gauge its +potential strength. What if the advance were to disclose our impotence? + +Such were the motives adduced against an advance. But there were +too many weighty reasons in favour of it, and these reasons were +imperative. The Central Powers had exhausted their strength, moral and +material, and their man power. If our advance in the autumn of 1916, +which had no decisive strategical results, had placed the enemy forces +in a critical position, what might not happen now, when we had become +stronger and, technically better equipped, when we had the advantage +in numbers, and the Allies were planning a decisive blow in the spring +of 1917? The Germans were awaiting the blow with feverish anxiety, +and in order to avert it they had retreated thirty miles on a front +of 100 miles between Arras and Soissons to the so-called Hindenburg +line, after causing incredibly ruthless and inexcusable devastation to +the relinquished territory. This retreat was significant, as it was +an indication of the enemy's weakness, and gave rise to great hopes. +_We had to advance._ Our intelligence service was completely destroyed +by the suspicions of the Revolutionary Democracy, which had foolishly +believed that this service was identical with the old secret police +organisation, and had therefore abolished it. Many of the delegates +of the Soviet were in touch with the German agents. The fronts were +in close contact, and espionage was rendered very easy. In these +circumstances our decision not to advance would have been undoubtedly +communicated to the enemy, who would have immediately commenced the +transference of his troops to the Western Front. This would have been +tantamount to treason to our Allies, and would have inevitably led to a +separate peace--with all its consequences--if not officially, at least +practically. The attitude of the revolutionary elements in Petrograd +in this matter was, however, so unstable that the Stavka had at first +suspected--without any real foundation--the Provisional Government +itself. + +This caused the following incident: At the end of April, in the +temporary absence of the Supreme C.-in-C., the Chief of the Diplomatic +Chancery reported to me that the Allied Military Attaches were +greatly perturbed because a telegram had just been received from the +Italian Ambassador at Petrograd, in which he categorically stated +that the Provisional Government had decided to conclude a separate +peace with the Central Powers. When the receipt of a telegram had +been ascertained, I sent a telegram to the War Minister, because I +was then unaware of the fact that the Italian Embassy, owing to the +impulsiveness of its personnel, had more than once been the channel +through which false rumours had been spread. My telegram was most +emphatic, and ended thus: "Posterity will stigmatise with deep contempt +the weak-kneed, impotent, irresolute generation which was good +enough to destroy the rotten régime, but not good enough to preserve +the honour, the dignity, and the very existence of Russia." The +misunderstanding was painful indeed; the news was false, the Government +was not thinking of a separate peace. Later, at the fateful sitting of +the Conference at the Stavka of Commanders-in-Chief and members of the +Government, on July 16th, I had an opportunity of expressing my views +once more. I said: "... There is another way--the way of treason. It +would give a respite to our distressed country.... But the curse of +treachery will not give us happiness. At the end of that way there is +slavery--political, economical, and moral." + +I am aware that in certain Russian circles such a straightforward +profession of moral principles in politics was afterwards condemned. +It was stated that such idealism is misplaced and pernicious, that +the interests of Russia must be considered above all "conventional +political morality."... A people, however, lives not for years, but for +centuries, and I am certain that, had we then altered the course of our +external policy, the sufferings of the Russian people would not have +been materially affected, and the gruesome, blood-stained game with +marked cards would have continued ... at the expense of the people. +The psychology of the Russian military leaders did not allow of such a +change, of such a compromise with conscience. Alexeiev and Kornilov, +abandoned by all and unsupported, continued for a long time to follow +that path, trusting and relying upon the common-sense, if not the noble +spirit, of the Allies and preferring to be betrayed rather than betray. + +Was that playing the part of a Don Quixote? It may be so. But the other +policy would have had to be conducted by other hands less clean. As +regards myself, three years later, having lost all my illusions and +borne the heavy blows of fortune, having knocked against the solid +wall of the overt and blind egoism of the "friendly" powers, and +being therefore free from all obligations towards the Allies, almost +on the eve of the final betrayal by these powers of the real Russia, +I remained the convinced advocate of _honest policy_. Now the tables +are turned. At the end of April, 1920, I had to try and convince +British Members of Parliament that a healthy national policy cannot be +free from all moral principles, and that an obvious crime was being +committed because no other name could be given to the abandonment of +the armed forces of the Crimea to the discontinuance of the struggle +against Bolshevism, its introduction into the family of civilised +nations, and to its indirect recognition; that this would prolong for +a short while the days of Bolshevism in Russia, but would open wide +the gates of Europe to Bolshevism. I am firmly convinced that the +Nemesis of history will not forgive THEM, as it would not have then +forgiven us. The beginning of 1917 was a moment of acute peril for the +Central Powers and a decisive moment for the Entente. The question +of the Russian advance greatly perturbed the Allied High Command. +General Barter, the Representative of Great Britain, and General Janin, +the French Representative at Russian Headquarters, often visited the +Supreme C.-in-C. and myself, and made inquiries on the subject. But the +statements of the German Press, with reference to pressure from the +Allies and to ultimatums to the Stavka, are incorrect. These would have +simply been useless, because Janin and Barter understood the situation, +and knew that it was the condition of the Army that hindered the +beginning of the advance. They tried to hurry and to increase technical +assistance, while their more impulsive compatriots--Thomas, Henderson, +and Vandervelde--were making hopeless endeavours to fan the flame of +patriotism by their impassioned appeals to the Representatives of the +Russian Revolutionary Democracy and to the troops. + +The Stavka also took into consideration the strong probability that +the Russian Army would have rapidly and finally collapsed had it +been left in a passive condition and deprived of all impulses for +active hostilities, whereas a successful advance might lift and heal +the _moral_, if not through sheer patriotism, at least through the +intoxication of a great victory. Such feelings might have counteracted +all international formulas sown by the enemy on the fertile soil of +the Defeatist tendencies of the Socialistic Party. Victory would +have given external peace, and some chance of peace within. Defeat +opened before the country an abyss. The risk was inevitable, and was +justified by the aim of saving Russia. The Supreme Commander-in-Chief, +the Quartermaster-General, and myself fully agreed as to the necessity +of an advance. And this view was shared in principle by the Senior +Commanding Officers. Different views were held on various Fronts as +to the degree of fighting capacity of the troops and as to their +preparedness. I am thoroughly convinced that the decision itself +independently of its execution rendered the Allies a great service, +because the forces, the means, and the attention of the enemy were kept +on the Russian Front, which, although it had lost its former formidable +power, still remained a potential danger to the enemy. The same +question, curiously enough, was confronting Hindenburg's Headquarters. +Ludendorff writes: "The general position in April and in May precluded +the possibility of important operations on the Eastern Front." Later, +however, "... there were great discussions on the subject at G.H.Q. +Would not a rapid advance on the Eastern Front with the available +troops, reinforced by a few divisions from the West, offer a better +chance than mere waiting? It was a most propitious moment, as some +people said, for smashing the Russian Army, when its fighting capacity +had deteriorated.... I disagreed, in spite of the fact that our +position in the West had improved. I would not do anything that might +destroy the real chances of peace." Ludendorff means, of course, +separate peace. What such a peace was to be we learnt later, at +Brest-Litovsk.... + +The Armies were given directions for a new offensive. The general idea +was to break through the enemy positions on sectors specially prepared +on all European fronts, to advance on a broad front in great strength +on the South-Western Front, in the direction from Kamenetz-Podolsk to +Lvov, and further to the line of the Vistula, while the striking force +of our Western Front was to advance from Molodetchno to Vilna and the +Niemen, throwing back northwards the German Armies of General Eichorn. +The Northern and the Roumanian Fronts were to co-operate by dealing +local blows and attracting the forces of the enemy. The time for the +advance was not definitely fixed, and a broad margin was allowed. But +the days went by, and the troops, who had hitherto obeyed orders and +carried out the most difficult tasks without a murmur, the same troops +that had hitherto withstood the onset of the Austro-German Armies with +naked breasts, without cartridges or shells, now stood with their +will-power paralysed and their reason obscured. The offensive was still +further delayed. + +Meanwhile the Allies, who had been preparing a big operation for the +spring, as they had counted upon strong reinforcements being brought +up by the enemy in the event of the complete collapse of the Russian +Front, began the great battle in France, as had been planned, at the +end of March, and _without awaiting_ the final decision on our advance. +The Allied Headquarters, however, did not consider simultaneous action +as a necessary condition of the contemplated operations, even before +disaffection had begun in the Russian Army. Owing to the natural +conditions of our Front we were not expected to begin the advance +before the month of May. Meanwhile, according to the general plan of +campaign for 1917, which had been drawn up in November, 1916, at the +Conference at Chantilly, General Joffre intended to begin the advance +of the Anglo-French Army at the end of January and the beginning of +February. General Nivelle, who superseded him, altered the date to the +end of March after the Conference at Calais of February 14th, 1917. +The absence of co-ordination between the Western and Eastern European +Fronts was bearing bitter fruit. It is difficult to tell whether the +Allies would have deferred their spring offensive for two months, and +whether the advances of a combined operation with the Russian Front +would have been a compensation for the delay, which gave Germany the +opportunity of reinforcing and reorganising her armies. One thing is +certain--that that lack of co-ordination gave the Germans a great +respite. Ludendorff wrote: "I detest useless discussions, but I cannot +fail to think of what would have happened had Russia advanced in April +and May and had won a few minor victories. We would have been faced, as +in the autumn of 1916, with a fierce struggle. Our munitions would have +reached a very low ebb. After careful consideration, I fail to see how +our High Command could have remained the master of the situation had +the Russians obtained in April and May even the same scant successes +which crowned their efforts in June. In April and May of 1917, in spite +of our victory (?) on the Aisne and in Champagne, it was only the +Russian Revolution that saved us." + + * * * * * + +Apart from the general advance on the Austro-German Front, another +question of considerable interest arose in April--that of an +_independent operation for the conquest of Constantinople_. Inspired +by young and spirited naval officers, the Foreign Minister, Miliukov, +repeatedly negotiated with Alexeiev, and tried to persuade him to +undertake that operation, which he considered likely to be successful, +and which would, in his opinion, confront the Revolutionary Democracy, +which was protesting against annexations, with an accomplished fact. +The Stavka disapproved of this undertaking, as the condition of +our troops would not permit of it. The landing of an Expeditionary +Force--in itself a very delicate task--demanded stringent discipline, +preparation, and perfect order. What is more, the Expeditionary +Force, which would lose touch with the main Army, should be imbued +with a very strong sense of duty. To have the sea in the rear is a +circumstance which depresses even troops with a very strong _moral_. +These elements had already ceased to exist in the Russian Army. The +Minister's requests were becoming, however, so urgent that General +Alexeiev deemed it necessary to give him an object-lesson, and a small +Expedition was planned to the Turkish coast of Asia Minor. As far +as I can remember, Zunguldak was the objective. This insignificant +operation required a detachment consisting of one Infantry Regiment, +one Armoured Car Division, and a small Cavalry contingent, and was +to have been carried out by the troops of the Roumanian Front. After +a while the Headquarters of that Front had shamefacedly to report +that the detachment could not be formed because the troops declined +to join the Expeditionary Force. This episode was due to a foolish +interpretation of the idea of peace without annexations, which +distorted the very principles of strategy and was also, perhaps, due +to the same instinct of self-preservation. It was another ill omen for +the impending general advance. That advance was still being prepared, +painfully and desperately. + +The rusty, notched Russian sword was still brandished. The question +was, when would it stop and upon whose head would it fall? + +[Illustration: Foreign military representatives at the Stavka. Standing +on the pathway, from left to right: Lieut.-Col. Marsengo (Italy); 2. +General Janin (France); 3. General Alexeiev; 4. General Barter (Great +Britain); 5. General Romei Longhena (Italy).] + + + + +CHAPTER XVI. + +MILITARY REFORMS--THE GENERALS--THE DISMISSAL FROM THE HIGH COMMAND. + + +Preparations for the advance continued alongside of the so-called +"Democratisation." These phenomena must be here recorded, as they had +a decisive effect upon the issue of the summer offensive and upon the +final destinies of the Army. Military reforms began by the dismissal +of vast numbers of Commanding Generals. In military circles this was +described, in tragic jest, as "The slaughter of the innocents." It +opened with the conversation between the War Minister, Gutchkov, and +the General on duty at the Stavka, Komzerovski. At the Minister's +request the General drew up a list of the Senior Commanding Officers, +with short notes (records of service). This list, afterwards completed +by various people who enjoyed Gutchkov's confidence, served as a basis +for the "slaughter." In the course of a few weeks 150 Senior Officers, +including seventy Commanders of Infantry and Cavalry Divisions, were +placed on the Retired List. In his speech to the Delegates of the +Front on April 29th, 1917, Gutchkov gave the following reasons for +this measure: "It has been our first task, after the beginning of the +Revolution, to make room for talent. Among our Commanding Officers +there were many honest men; but some of them were unable to grasp the +new principles of intercourse, and in a short time more changes have +been made in our commanding personnel than have ever been made before +in any army.... I realised that there could be no mercy in this case, +and I was merciless to those whom I considered incapable. Of course, +I may have been wrong. There may have been dozens of mistakes, but I +consulted knowledgeable people and took decisions only when I felt that +they were in keeping with the general opinion. At any rate, we have +promoted all those who have proved their capacity among the Commanding +Officers. I disregarded hierarchical considerations. There are men who +commanded regiments in the beginning of the War and are now commanding +armies.... We have thus attained not only an improvement, but something +different and equally important. By proclaiming the watchword 'Room for +talent' we have instilled joy into the hearts, and have induced the +officers to work with impetus and inspiration...." + +What did the Army gain by such drastic changes? Did the _cadres_ of the +Commanding Officers really improve? In my opinion that object was not +attained. New men appeared on the scene, owing to the newly-introduced +right of selecting assistants, not without the interference of our old +friends--family ties, friendship and wire-pulling. Could the Revolution +give new birth to men or make them perfect? Was a mechanical change +of personnel capable of killing a system which for many years had +weakened the impulse for work and for self-improvement? It may be that +some talented individuals did come to the fore, but there were also +dozens, nay, hundreds, of men whose promotion was due to accident and +not to knowledge or energy. This accidental character of appointments +was further intensified when later Kerensky abolished for the duration +of the War all the existing qualifications, as well as the correlation +of rank and office. The qualification of knowledge and experience +was also thereby set aside. I have before me a list of the Senior +Commanding Officers of the Russian Army in the middle of May, 1917, +when Gutchkov's "slaughter" had been accomplished. The list includes +the Supreme Commander-in-Chief, the Commanders-in-Chief of Fronts, +Armies and Fleets, and their Chiefs of Staff--altogether forty-five men: + + +OPPORTUNISTS. + + ------------+----------------+----------------+----------------+------ + The | Approving | Non-Resisters | Opponents | + Commanding | of | to | of |Total. + Personnel. |Democratisation.|Democratisation.|Democratisation.| + ------------+----------------+----------------+----------------+------ + The Supreme | | | | + C.-in-C. | | | | + Army | | | | + Commanders| | | | + Fleet | | | | + Commanders| 9 | 5 | 7 | + Chiefs | | | | + of Staff | 6 | 6 | 7 | + ------------+----------------+----------------+----------------+------ + | 15 | 11 | 14 | 40 + ------------+----------------+----------------+----------------+------ + +I have excluded five names, as I have no data about them. + +These men were the brain, the soul and the will-power of the Army. It +is difficult to estimate their military capacity according to their +last tenures of office, because strategy and military science in +1917 had almost entirely ceased to be applied and became slavishly +subservient to the soldiery, but I know the activities of these men in +regard to the struggle against democratisation--_i.e._, the disruption +of the Army, and the above table indicates the three groups into which +they were divided. Subsequently, after 1918, some of these men took +part in the struggle or kept aloof from it. + + +OPPORTUNISTS. + + --------------+----------------+----------------+----------------+------ + The | Approving | Non-Resisters | Opponents | + Commanding | of | to | of |Total. + Personnel. |Democratisation.|Democratisation.|Democratisation.| + --------------+----------------+----------------+----------------+------ + In Anti- | | | | + Bolshevik | | | | + Organisations| 2 | 7 | 10 | 19 + With the | | | | + Bolsheviks | 6 | -- | 1 | 7 + Retired from | | | | + the struggle | 7 | 4 | 3 | 14 + --------------+----------------+----------------+----------------+------ + +Such are the results of the changes in the High Command, where men +were in the public eye and where their activities attracted the +critical attention not only of the Government, but of military and +social circles. I think that in the lower grades things were no +better. The question of the justice of this measure may be open to +discussion, but, personally, I have no doubt whatsoever about its +extreme impracticability. The dismissal _en masse_ of Army Chiefs +definitely undermined the faith in the Commanding Staffs, and afforded +an excuse for the arbitrariness and violence of the Committees and of +the men towards individual representatives of the Commanding Staff. +Constant changes and transfers removed most officers from their +units, where they may have enjoyed respect and authority acquired +by military prowess. These men were thrown into new circles strange +to them, and time was needed, as well as difficult work, in the new +and fundamentally changed atmosphere in order to regain that respect +and authority. The formation of Third Infantry Divisions was still +proceeding, and was also occasioning constant changes in the Commanding +Personnel. That chaos was bound to ensue as a result of all these +circumstances is fairly obvious. So delicate a machine as the Army was +in the days of War and Revolution could only be kept going by the +force of inertia, and could not withstand new commotions. Pernicious +elements, of course, should have been removed and the system of +appointments altered, and the path opened for those who were worthy; +beyond that the matter ought to have been allowed to follow its natural +course without laying too much stress upon it and without devising a +new system. Apart from the Commanding Officers who were thus removed, +several Generals resigned of their own accord--such as Letchitzki and +Mistchenko--who could not be reconciled to the new régime, and many +Commanders who were evicted in a Revolutionary fashion by the direct or +indirect pressure of the Committee or of the soldiery. Admiral Koltchak +was one of them. Further changes were made, prompted by varying and +sometimes self-contradictory views upon the Army Administration. These +changes were, therefore, very fitful, and prevented a definite type of +Commanding Officer from being introduced. + +Alexeiev dismissed the Commander-in-Chief, Ruzsky, and the Army +Commander, Radko-Dmitriev, for their weakness and opportunism. He +visited the Northern Front, and, having gained an unfavourable +impression of the activities of these Generals, he discreetly raised +the question of their being "overworked." That is the interpretation +given by the Army and Society to these dismissals. + +Brussilov dismissed Yudenitch for the same reasons. I dismissed an +Army Commander (Kvietsinski) because his will and authority were +subservient to the disorganising activities of the Committees who were +democratising the Army. + +Kerensky dismissed the Supreme Commander-in-Chief and the +Commanders-in-Chief, Gourko and Dragomirov, because they were +strenuously opposed to the democratisation of the Army. He also +dismissed Brussilov for the opposite motives, because Brussilov was +an Opportunist, pure and simple. + +Brussilov dismissed the Commander of the Eighth Army, General +Kaledin--who later became the Ataman of the Don and was universally +respected--on the plea that he had "lost heart" and did not approve +of democratisation. This dismissal of a General with a magnificent +War record was effected in a rude and offensive manner. He was at +first offered the command of another Army, and then offered to retire. +Kaledin then wrote to me: "My record entitles me to be treated +otherwise than as a stop-gap, without taking my own views into +consideration." + +General Vannovski, who was relieved of the command of an Army Corps +by the Army Commander because he refused to acknowledge the priority +of the Army Committee, was immediately appointed by the Stavka to a +Higher Command and given an Army on the South-Western Front. + +General Kornilov, who had refused the Chief Command of the troops of +the Petrograd District, "because he considered it impossible to be +a witness of and a contributor to the disruption of the Army by the +Soviet," was afterwards appointed to the Supreme Command at the Front. +Kerensky removed me from the office of Chief-of-Staff of the Supreme +C.-in-C. because I did not share the views of the Government and openly +disapproved of its activities, but, at the same time, he allowed me to +assume the high office of Commander-in-Chief of our Western Front. + +Things also happened of an entirely different nature. The Supreme +Commander-in-Chief, General Alexeiev, made several unavailing efforts +to dismiss Admiral Maximov, who had been elected to the command of the +Baltic Fleet and was entirely in the hands of the mutinous Executive +Committee of the Baltic Fleet. It was necessary to remove that +officer, who had brought about so much evil, influenced, no doubt, by +his surroundings, because the Committee refused to release him, and +Maximov refused all summonses to come to the Stavka on the plea that +the condition of the Fleet was critical. In the beginning of June +Brussilov managed to remove him from the Fleet ... at the price of +appointing him Chief of the Naval Staff of the Supreme C.-in-C. Many +other examples might be quoted of incredible contrasts in principles of +Army Administration occasioned by the collision of two opposing forces +and two schools of thought. + + * * * * * + +I have already said that the entire Commanding Staff of Generals +was strictly loyal to the Provisional Government. General Kornilov, +the would-be "rebel," addressed the following speech to a Meeting +of Officers: "The old régime has collapsed. The people are building +a new structure of liberty, and it is the duty of the people's Army +wholeheartedly to support the new Government in its difficult, creative +work." The Commanding Staff may have taken some interest in questions +of general policy and in the Socialistic experiments of the Coalition +Governments, but no more than was taken by all cultured Russians, +and they did not consider themselves entitled or obliged to induce +the troops to participate in the solution of social problems. Their +only concern was to preserve the Army and the Foreign policy which +contributed to the victory. Such a connection between the Commanding +Staff and the Government, at first "a love match" and later one of +convenience, prevailed until the General Offensive in June, while +there still remained a flicker of hope that the mood of the Army would +change. That hope was destroyed by events, and, after the advance, +the attitude of the Commanding Staff was somewhat shaken. I may add +that the _entire_ Senior Commanding Staff considered as inadmissible +the democratisation of the Army which the Government was enforcing. +From the table which I have quoted it can be seen that 65 per cent. of +the Commanding Officers did not raise a sufficiently strong protest +against the disruption of the Army. The reasons were manifold and +entirely different. Some did it for tactical considerations, as they +thought that the Army was poisoned and that it should be healed by such +dangerous antidotes. Others were prompted by purely selfish motives. +I do not speak from hearsay, but because I know the _milieu_ and the +individuals, many of whom have discussed the matter with me with +perfect frankness. Cultured and experienced Generals could not frankly +and scientifically advocate such "military" views as, for example, +Klembovski's suggestion that a triumvirate should be placed at the head +of the Army, consisting of the Commander-in-Chief, a Commissar, and +an elected soldier; Kvietzinski's suggestion that the Army Committee +should be invested with special plenary power by the War Minister and +the Central Committee of the Soviet, which would entitle them to act in +the name of that Committee; or Viranovski's suggestion that the entire +Commanding Staff should be converted into "technical advisers" and +their power transferred entirely to the Commissars and the Committee. + +The loyalty of the High Commanding Staff can be gauged from the +following fact: At the end of April General Alexeiev, despairing of +the possibility of personally preventing the Government from adopting +measures which tended to disrupt the Army, and before issuing the +famous Proclamation of the Rights of the Soldier, wired in cipher to +all the Commanders-in-Chief a draft of a strong and resolute collective +appeal from the Army to the Government. This appeal pointed to the +abyss into which the Army was being hurled. In the event of the draft +being approved, it was to have been signed by all Senior ranks, +including Divisional Commanders. The Fronts, however, for various +reasons, disapproved of such means of influencing the Government. +General Ragosa, the temporary C.-in-C. of the Roumanian Front, who was +afterwards Ukrainian War Minister under the Hetman, replied that the +Russian people seemed to be ordained by the Almighty to perish, and +it was therefore useless to struggle against Fate. With a sign of the +Cross, one should patiently await the dictates of Fate!... This was +literally the sense of his telegram. + +Such was the attitude and the confusion in the higher ranks of the +Army. As regards the Commanders, who fought unremittingly against the +disruption of the Army, many of them struggled against the tide of +democratisation, as they considered it their duty to the people. They +did this in disregard of the success or failure of their efforts, of +the blows of Fate, or of the dark future, of which some already had a +premonition, and which was already approaching with disaster in its +train. On they went, with heads erect, misunderstood, slandered and +savagely hated, as long as life and courage permitted. + + + + +CHAPTER XVII. + +"DEMOCRATISATION OF THE ARMY"--ADMINISTRATION, SERVICE AND ROUTINE. + + +In order to carry out the democratisation of the Army and the reform +of the War Ministry in accordance with the new régime, Gutchkov +established a Commission under the Chairmanship of the late War +Minister, Polivanov, who died at Riga in 1920, where he was the expert +of the Soviet Government in the Delegation for making peace with +Poland. The Commission was composed of representatives of the Military +Commission of the Duma and of representatives of the Soviet. There was +a similar Commission in the Ministry of the Navy under the Chairmanship +of Savitch, a prominent member of the Duma. I know more about the +work of the First Commission, and will therefore dwell upon it. The +regulations drafted by the Commission were not confirmed until they +had been approved by the Military Section of the Executive Committee +of the Soviet, which enjoyed great authority and often indulged in +independent military law-making. No future historian of the Russian +Army will be able to avoid mention of the Polivanov Commission--this +fatal Institution whose stamp is affixed to every one of the measures +which destroyed the Army. With incredible cynicism, not far removed +from treachery, this Institution, comprising many Generals and officers +appointed by the War Minister, systematically and daily introduced +pernicious ideas and destroyed the rational foundations of military +administration. Very often drafts of regulations, which appeared to +the Government as excessively demagogic and were not sanctioned, +appeared in the Press and came to the knowledge of the masses of the +soldiery. They were instilled into the Army, and subsequently caused +pressure to be brought to bear upon the Government by the soldiery. +The military members of the Commission seemed to be competing with +one another in slavish subservience to the new masters, and endorsed +by their authority the destructive ideas. Men who reported to the +Committee have told me that civilians occasionally protested during the +debates and warned the Committee against going too far, but no such +protests ever came from the military members. I fail to understand +the psychology of the men, who came so rapidly and unreservedly under +the heel of the mob. The list of military members of the Commission +of the month of May indicates that most of them were Staff Officers +and representatives of other Departments, mostly of Petrograd +(twenty-five); only nine were from the Army, and these do not seem +to have been drawn from the line. Petrograd has its own psychology +different from that of the Army. The most important and detrimental +Democratic regulations were passed concerning the organisation of +Committees, disciplinary action, the reform of the Military Courts, +and, finally, the famous "Declaration of the Rights of the Soldier." + +_Military Chiefs were deprived of disciplinary power._ It was +transferred to Regimental and Company Disciplinary Courts, which also +had to settle "misunderstandings" between officers and men. There is +no need to comment upon the importance of this curtailment of the +disciplinary power of the officers; it introduced complete anarchy in +the internal life of regimental units, and the officer was discredited +_by the law_. The latter circumstance is of paramount importance, and +the Revolutionary Democracy took full advantage of this procedure +in all its attempts at law-making. The reform of the Courts aimed +at weakening the influence of military judges by appointment upon +the course of the trial, the introduction of juries and the general +weakening of military justice. Field Courts-Martial were abolished, +which meted out quick punishment on the spot for obvious and heavy +crimes, such as treason, desertion, etc. + +The democratisation of the Military Courts might be excused to a +certain extent by the fact that confidence in the officers, having +been undermined, it was necessary to create judicial Courts of a +mixed composition on an elective basis, which in theory were supposed +to enjoy to a greater extent the confidence of the Revolutionary +Democracy. But that object was not attained, because the Military +Courts--one of the foundations of order in the Army--fell entirely +into the hands of the mob. The investigating organs were completely +destroyed by the Revolutionary Democracy, and investigation was +strongly resisted by the armed men and sometimes by the Regimental +Revolutionary Institutions. The armed mob, which included many +criminal elements, exercised unrestrained and ignorant pressure upon +the conscience of the judges, and passed sentences in advance of +the verdicts of the judges. Army Corps Tribunals were destroyed, and +members of the jury who had dared to pass a sentence distasteful +to the mob were put to flight. These were common occurrences. The +case was heard in Kiev of the well-known Bolshevik, Dzevaltovski, a +captain of the Grenadier Regiment of the Guards, who was accused, with +seventy-eight other men, of having refused to join in the advance +and of having dragged his regiment and other units to the rear. The +circumstances of the trial were these: In Court there was a mob of +armed soldiers, who shouted approval of the accused on his way from the +prison to the Court. Dzevaltovski called, together with his escort, +at the Local Soviet, where he received an ovation. Finally, while the +jury were deliberating, the Armed Reserve Battalions paraded before the +Court with the band and sang the "International." Dzevaltovski and all +his companions were, of course, found "Not guilty." Military Courts +were thus gradually abolished. + +It would be a mistake, however, to ascribe this new tendency solely to +the influence of the Soviets. It may also be explained by Kerensky's +point of view. He said: "I think that no results can be achieved by +violence and by mechanical compulsion in the present conditions of +warfare, where huge masses are concerned. The Provisional Government in +the three months of its existence has come to the conclusion that it is +necessary to appeal to the common-sense, the conscience and the sense +of duty of the citizens, and that it is the only means of achieving the +desired results." + +In the first days of the Revolution the Provisional Government +abolished Capital Punishment by the Ukase of March 12th. The Liberal +Press greeted this measure with great pathos. Articles were written +expressing strongly humanitarian views, but scant understanding of +realities, of the life of the Army, and also scant foresight. V. +Nabokoff, the Russian Abolitionist, who was General Secretary to the +Provisional Government, wrote: "This happy event is a sign of true +magnanimity and of wise foresight.... Capital Punishment is abolished +unconditionally and for ever.... It is certain that in no other country +has the moral condemnation of this, the worst kind of murder, reached +such enormous proportions as in Russia.... Russia has joined the States +that no longer know the shame and degradation of judicial murder." +It is interesting to note that the Ministry of Justice drafted two +laws, in one of which Capital Punishment was maintained for the most +serious military offences--espionage and treason. But the Department of +Military Justice, headed by General Anushkin, emphatically declared in +favour of complete abolition of Capital Punishment. + +July came. Russia had already become used to Anarchist outbreaks, but +was nevertheless horror-stricken at the events that took place on the +battlefields of Galicia, near Kalush and Tarnopol. The telegrams of the +Government Commissars, Savinkov and Filonenko, and of General Kornilov, +who demanded the immediate reintroduction of Capital Punishment, were +as a stroke of a whip to the "Revolutionary Conscience." On July +11th, Kornilov wrote: "The Army of maddened, ignorant men, who are +not protected by the Government from systematic demoralisation and +disruption, and who have lost all sense of human dignity, is in full +flight. On the fields, which can no longer be called battlefields, +shame and horror such as the Russian Army has never known reign +supreme.... The mild Government measures have destroyed discipline, +and are provoking the fitful cruelty of the unrestrained masses. These +elemental feelings find expression in violence, plunder and murders.... +Capital Punishment would save many innocent lives at the price of a few +traitors and cowards being eliminated." + +On July 12th the Government restored Capital Punishment and +Revolutionary Military Tribunals, which replaced the former Field +Courts-Martial. The difference was that the judges were elected (three +officers and three men) from the list of the juries or from Regimental +Committees. This measure, the restoration of Capital Punishment, due +to pressure having been brought to bear upon the Government by the +Military Command, the Commissars, and the Committees, was, however, +foredoomed to failure. Kerensky subsequently tried to apologise to +the Democracy at the "Democratic Conference": "Wait till I have +signed a single death sentence, and I will then allow you to curse +me...." On the other hand, the very personnel of the Courts and their +surroundings, described above, made the very creation of these Courts +impossible: there were hardly any judges capable of passing a death +sentence or any Commissars willing to endorse such a sentence. On the +Fronts which I commanded there were, at any rate, no such cases. After +the new Revolutionary Military Tribunals had been functioning for two +months, the Department of Military Justice was flooded with reports +from Military Chiefs and Commissars on the "blatant infringements of +judicial procedure, upon the ignorance and lack of experience of the +judges." + +The disbandment of mutinous regiments was one of the punitive measures +carried out by the Supreme Administration or Command. This measure +had not been carefully thought out, and led to thoroughly unexpected +consequences--it provoked mutinies, prompted by a desire to be +disbanded. Regimental honour and other moral impulses had long since +been characterised as ridiculous prejudices. The actual advantages of +disbanding, on the other hand, were obvious to the men: regiments were +removed from the firing line for a long time, disbanding continued for +months, and the men were sent to new units, which were thus filled +with vagabond and criminal elements. Responsibility for this measure +can be equally divided between the War Ministry, the Commissars, +and the Stavka. The whole burden of it finally fell once more upon +the guiltless officers, who lost their regiments--which were their +families--and their appointments, and were compelled to wander about in +new places or find themselves in the desolate condition of the Reserve. + +Apart from this undesirable element, units were filled with the late +inmates of convict prisons, owing to the broad amnesty granted by the +Government to criminals, who were to expiate their crimes by military +service. My efforts to combat this measure were unavailing, and +resulted in the formation of a special regiment of convicts--a present +from Moscow--and in the formation of solid anarchist cadres in the +Reserve Battalions. The _naïf_ and insincere argument of the Legislator +that crimes were committed because of the Czarist Régime, and that +a free country would convert the criminal into a self-sacrificing +hero, did not come true. In the garrisons, where amnestied criminals +were for some reason or other more numerous, they became a menace to +the population before they ever saw the Front. Thus, in June, in the +units quartered at Tomsk, there was an intense propaganda of wholesale +plunder and of the suppression of all authority. Soldiers formed large +robber bands and terrorized the population. The Commissar, the Chief +of the garrison, and all the local Revolutionary Organisations started +a campaign against the plunderers; after much fighting, no less than +2,300 amnestied criminals were turned out of the garrison. + +Reforms were intended to affect the entire administration of the Army +and of the Fleet, but the above-mentioned Committees of Polivanov +and Savitch failed to carry them out, as they were abolished by +Kerensky, who recognised at last all the evil they had wrought. The +Committees merely prepared the Democratisation of the War and Naval +Councils by introducing elected soldiers into them. This circumstance +is the more curious because, according to the Legislator's intention, +these Councils were to consist of men of experience and knowledge, +capable of solving questions of organisation, service, and routine, +of military and naval legislation, and of making financial estimates +of the cost of the armed forces of Russia. This yearning of the +uncultured portion of Democracy for spheres of activity foreign to it +was subsequently developed on an extensive scale. Thus, for example, +many military colleges were, to a certain extent, managed by Committees +of servants, most of whom were illiterate. Under the Bolshevik Régime, +University Councils numbered not only Professors and students, but also +hall-porters. + +I will not dwell upon the minor activities of the Committees, the +reorganisation of the Army, and the new regulations, but will describe +the most important measure--the Committees and the "Declaration of the +Rights of the Soldier." + + + + +CHAPTER XVIII. + +THE DECLARATION OF THE RIGHTS OF THE SOLDIER AND COMMITTEES. + + +Elective bodies from the Military Section of the Soviet to Committees +and Soviets of various denominations in regimental units and in +the Departments of the Army, the Fleet and the rear, were the most +prominent factor of "Democratisation." These institutions were partly +of a mixed type, and included both officers and men and partly soldiers +and workers' institutions pure and simple. Committees and Soviets were +formed everywhere as the common feature of Revolutionary Organisations, +planned before the Revolution and sanctioned by the Order No. 1. +Elections from the troops to the Soviet in Petrograd were fixed for +February 27th, and the first Army Committees came into being on March +1st, in consequence of the above-mentioned Order No. 1. Towards the +month of April self-appointed Soviets and Committees, varying in +denomination, personnel and ability, existed in the Army and in the +rear, and introduced incredible confusion into the system of military +hierarchy and administration. In the first month of the Revolution the +Government and the military authorities did not endeavour to put an +end to or to restrict this dangerous phenomenon. They did not at first +realise its possible consequences, and counted upon the moderating +influence of the Officer element. They occasionally took advantage of +the Committees for counteracting acute manifestations of discontent +among the soldiers, as a doctor applies small doses of poison to a +diseased organism. The attitude of the Government and of the military +authorities towards these organisations was irresolute, but was one of +semi-recognition. On April 9th, addressing the Army Delegates, Gutchkov +said at Yassy: "A Congress will soon be held of the Delegates of all +Army Organisations, and general regulations will then be drawn up. +Meanwhile, you should _organise as best you can_, taking advantage of +the existing organisations and working for general unity." + +In April the position became so complicated that the authorities could +no longer shirk the solution of the question of Committees. At the end +of March there was a Conference at the Stavka, attended by the Supreme +Commander-in-Chief, the War Minister, Gutchkov, his Assistants, and +officers of the General Staff. I was also present in my capacity as +future Chief-of-Staff to the Supreme C.-in-C. A draft was presented to +the Conference, brought from Sevastopol by the Staff-Colonel Verkhovski +(afterwards War Minister). The draft was modelled upon the regulations +already in force in the Black Sea Fleet. The discussion amounted to the +expression of two extreme views--mine and those of Colonel Verkhovski. +The latter had already commenced those slightly demagogic activities +by which he had at first gained the sympathies of the soldiers and +of the sailors. He had had a short experience in organising these +masses. He was persuasive because he used many illustrations--I do +not know whether the facts he mentioned were real or imaginary--his +views were pliable, and his eloquence was imposing. He idealised the +Committees, and argued that they were very useful, even necessary and +statesmanlike, inasmuch as they were capable of bringing order into the +chaotic movements of the soldiery. He emphatically insisted upon the +competence and the rights of these Committees being broadened. + +I argued that the introduction of Committees was a measure which +the Army organisation would be unable to understand, and that it +amounted to disruption of the Army. If the Government was unable to +cope with the movement, it should endeavour to paralyse its dangerous +consequences. With that end in view, I advocated that the activities of +the Committees should be limited to matters of internal organisation +(food supplies, distribution of equipment, etc.), that the officer +element should be strengthened, and that the Committees should remain +within the sphere of the lower grades of the Army, in order to prevent +them from spreading and acquiring a preponderating influence upon +larger formations such as Divisions, Armies, and Fronts. Unfortunately, +I only succeeded in compelling the Conference to accept my views to an +insignificant degree, and on March 30th the Supreme C.-in-C. issued +an Order of the Day on the "transition to the new forms of life," and +appealing to the officers, men, and sailors wholeheartedly to unite in +the work of introducing strict order and solid discipline within the +units of the Army and Navy. + +The main principles of the regulations were the following: + + (1) The _fundamental objects_ of the organisation were (_a_) to + increase the fighting power of the Army and of the Navy in order + to win the War; (_b_) to devise new rules for the life of the + soldier-citizen of Free Russia; and (_c_) to contribute to the + education of the Army and of the Fleet. + + (2) The _structure_ of the organisation: Permanent + sections--Company, Regimental, Divisional, and Army Committees. + Temporary sections--Conferences, attached to the Stavka, of Army + Corps, of the Fronts, and of the Centre. The latter to form + permanent Soviet. + + (3) The Conferences to be called by the respective Commanding + Officers or on the initiative of the Army Committees. All the + resolutions of the Conferences and Committees to be confirmed by + the respective military authorities prior to publication. + + (4) The _competence_ of the Committees was limited to enforcing + order and fighting power (discipline, resistance to desertion, + etc.), routine (leave, barrack life, etc.), internal organisation + (control of food supplies and equipment), and education. + + (5) _Questions of training_ were unreservedly excluded from + discussion. + + (6) The _personnel of the Committees_ was determined in proportion + to elected representatives--one officer to two men. + +In order to give an idea of the slackening of discipline in the +higher ranks I may mention that, immediately after receiving these +regulations, and obviously under the influence of Army organisations, +General Brussilov issued the following order: "Officers to be excluded +from Company Committees, and in higher Committees the proportion +lowered from one-third to one-sixth...." + +In less than a fortnight, however, the War Ministry, in disregard +of the Stavka, published its own regulations, drafted by the famous +Polivanov Committee, with the assistance of Soviet representatives. In +these new regulations substantial alterations were made: the percentage +of officers in Committees was reduced; Divisional Committees abolished; +"the taking of rightful measures against abuses by Commanding Officers +in the respective units" were added to the powers of the Committees; +the Company Committees were not permitted to discuss the matter of +military preparedness and other purely military matters affecting +the unit, but no such reservation was made with regard to Regimental +Committees; the Regimental Commanding Officer was entitled to appeal +against but not to suspend the decisions of the Committee; finally, the +Committees were given the task of negotiating with political parties +of every description in the matter of sending delegates, speakers, and +pamphlets explaining the political programme before the elections to +the Constituent Assembly. + +These regulations, which were tantamount to converting the Army in +war-time into an arena of political strife and depriving the Commanding +Officer of all control over his unit, constituted, in fact, one of the +main turning points on the path of destruction of the Army. + +The following appreciation of these regulations by the Anarchist, +Makhno (the Order of the Day of one of his subordinate Commanders of +November 10th, 1919), is worthy of note: "As any party propaganda at +the present moment strongly handicaps the purely military activities +of the rebel armies, I emphatically declare to the population that all +party propaganda is strictly prohibited pending the complete victory +over the White Armies...." + +Several days later, in view of a protest from the Stavka, the +War Ministry issued orders for the immediate suspension of the +regulations concerning the Committees. Where the Committees had +already been formed, they were allowed to carry on in order to avoid +misunderstandings. The Ministry decided to alter the section of the +regulations concerning the Committees, in accordance with the orders of +the Supreme Commander-in-Chief, in which fuller consideration was given +to the interests of the troops. Thus, in the middle of April there was +an infinite variety in the organisation of the Army. Some institutions +were illegal, others were sanctioned by the Stavka, and others still by +the War Ministry. All these contradictions, changes, and re-elections +might have led to ridiculous confusion had not the Committees +simplified matters: they simply cast off all restrictions and acted +arbitrarily. Wherever troops or Army departments were quartered +among the population local Soldiers' Soviets or Soviets of Soldiers +and Workmen were formed, which recognised no regulations, and were +particularly intent upon covering deserters and mercilessly exploiting +municipalities, Zemstvos, and the population. The authorities never +opposed them, and it was only at the end of August that the War +Ministry lost patience with the abuses of these "Institutions of the +Rear," and informed the Press that it _intended_ to undertake the +drafting of special regulations concerning these Institutions. + +Who were the members of the Committees? The combatant element, living +for and understanding the interests of the Army and imbued with its +traditions, was scantily represented. Valour, courage and a sense of +duty were rated very low on the market of Soldiers' Meetings. The +masses of the soldiery, who were, alas! ignorant, illiterate, and +already demoralised and distrusted their Chiefs, elected mostly men +who imposed on them by smooth talking, purely external political +knowledge derived from the revelation of Party propaganda; chiefly, +however, by shamelessly bowing to the instincts of the men. How could +a real soldier, appealing to the sense of duty, to obedience and to +a struggle for the Mother Country, compete with such demagogues? The +officers did not enjoy the confidence, they did not wish to work in +the Committees, and their political education was probably inadequate. +In the Higher Committees one met honest and sensible soldiers more +often than officers, because a man wearing a soldier's tunic was in +a position to address the mob in a manner in which the officer could +never dare to indulge. The Russian Army was henceforward administered +by Committees formed of elements foreign to the Army and representing +rather Socialist Party organs. It was strange and insulting to the Army +that Congresses of the Front, representing several million combatants +and many magnificent units with a long and glorious record, and +comprising officers and men of whom any Army might be proud, were held +under the Chairmanship of such men as civilian Jews and Georgians, who +were Bolsheviks, Mensheviks, or Social Revolutionaries--Posner on the +Western Front, Gegetchkory on the Caucasian, and Doctor Lordkipanitze +on the Roumanian. + + * * * * * + +What, then, were these Army Organisations doing that were supposed to +reconstruct "the freest Army in the world"? I will quote a list of +questions discussed at Conferences of the Front and which influenced +the Front and Army Committees: + + (1) The attitude towards the Government, the Soviet and the + Constituent Assembly. + + (2) The attitude towards War and Peace. + + (3) The question of a Democratic Republic as a desirable form of + Government. + + (4) The question of the land. + + (5) The Labour question. + +These intricate and burning political and social questions, to which +a radical solution was being given and which created partisanship +and class strife, were thus introduced into the Army that was facing +a strong and cruel enemy. The effect was self-evident. But even +in strictly military matters certain utterances were made at the +Conference at Minsk, which attracted the particular attention of the +military and civil authorities, and caused us gravely to ponder. It was +suggested that the rank of officer, individual disciplinary power, +etc., should be abolished, and that the Committees should be entitled +to remove Commanding Officers of whom they disapproved. From the very +first days of their existence the Committees fought stubbornly to +obtain full power not only with regard to the administration of the +Army, but even for the formula: "All Power to the Soviets." At first, +however, the attitude of the Army Committees towards the Provisional +Government was perfectly loyal, and the lower the Committee the +more loyal it was. The Petrograd papers of March 17th were full of +resolutions proclaiming unrestricted obedience to the Provisional +Government, of telegrams greeting and of records of delegations sent +by the troops, who were perturbed by rumours of the opposition of the +Soviet. This attitude later underwent several changes, due to the +propaganda of the Soviet. A powerful influence was exercised by the +resolution of the Congress of Soviets, which I have already quoted, +and which appealed to the Russian Revolutionary Democracy to organise +under the guidance of the Soviets and to be prepared to resist all the +attempts of the Government to avoid the control of the Democracy or the +fulfilment of their pledges. + +The Higher Committees indulged chiefly in political activities and +in the strengthening of Revolutionary tendencies in the Army, while +the Lower Committees gradually became absorbed in matters of service +and routine, and were weakening and discrediting the authority of the +Commanding Officers. The right to remove these officers was practically +established, because the position of those who had received a vote of +censure became intolerable. Thus, for instance, on the Western Front, +which I commanded, about sixty Senior Officers resigned--from Army +Corps to Regimental Commanders. What was, however, infinitely more +tragic was the endeavour of the Committees, on their own initiative and +under pressure from the troops, to interfere with purely military and +technical Orders, thus rendering military operations difficult or even +impossible. The Commanding Officer who was discredited, fettered and +deprived of power, and, therefore, of responsibility, could no longer +confidently lead the troops into the field of victory and death.... As +there was no authority the Commanding Officers were compelled to have +recourse to the Committees, which sometimes did exercise a restraining +influence over the licentious soldiery, resisted desertion, smoothed +friction between officers and men, appealed to the latter's sense +of duty--in a word, tried to arrest the collapse of the crumbling +structure. These activities of some of the Committees still misled +their apologists, including Kerensky. It is no use to argue with men +who think that a structure may be erected by one laying bricks one day +and pulling them to pieces on the next. + +The work, overt and unseen, of Army Committees, alternating between +patriotic appeals and internationalist watchwords, between giving +assistance to Commanding Officers and dismissing them, between +expressions of confidence in, or of distrust of, the Provisional +Government, and ultimatums for new boots or travelling allowances +for members of Committees.... The historian of the Russian Army, in +studying these phenomena, will be amazed at the ignorance of the +elementary rules governing the very existence of an armed force, +which was displayed by the Committees in their decisions and in their +writings. + +The Committees of the Rear and of the Fleet were imbued with a +particularly demagogic spirit. The Baltic Fleet was in a state +approaching anarchy all the time; the Black Sea Fleet was in a better +condition, and held out until June. It is difficult to estimate the +mischief made by these Committees and Soviets in the Rear, scattered +all over the country. Their overbearing manner was only comparable +with their ignorance. I will mention a few examples illustrating these +activities. + +The Regional Committee of the Army, the Fleet and the Workmen of +Finland issued a declaration in May, in which, not content with the +autonomy granted to Finland by the Provisional Government, they +demanded her complete independence, and declared that "they would give +every support to all the Revolutionary Organisations working for a +speedy solution of that question." + +The Central Committee of the Baltic Fleet, in conjunction with the +above-mentioned Committee, made a declaration, which coincided with the +Bolshevik outbreak in Petrograd in the beginning of June. They demanded +"all power to the Soviets. We shall unite in the Revolutionary struggle +of our working Democracy for power, and will not allow the ships to be +called out by the Provisional Government for the suppression of the +mutiny to leave Petrograd." + +The Committee of the Minsk Military District, shortly before the +advance, gave leave to all the Reservists to proceed to their farms. +I gave orders for the trial of the Committee, but the order was of no +avail, because, in spite of all my representations, the War Ministry +had not established any legal responsibility for the Committees, whose +decisions were recorded by vote and occasionally by secret ballot. I +will mention yet another curious episode. The Committee of one of the +Cavalry Depôts on my Front decided that horses should be watered only +once a day, so most of the horses were lost. + +It would be unjust to deny that the organisations of the Rear +occasionally did adopt reasonable measures, but these instances are +few indeed, and they were drowned in the general wave of anarchy +which these organisations had raised. The attitude of the Committees +towards the War, and in particular towards the proposed advance, was, +of course, a momentous matter. In Chapter X. I have already described +the self-contradictions of the Soviets and Congresses, as well as +the ambiguous and insincere directions which they gave to the Army +Organisations, and which amounted to the acceptance of War and of the +advance, but without victory. The same ambiguity prevailed in the +High Committees, with the exception, however, of the Committee of our +Western Front, which passed in June a truly Bolshevik Resolution to the +effect that War has been engendered by the plundering policy of the +Government; that the only means of ending the War was for the united +Democracies of all countries to resist their Governments; and that a +decisive victory of one or the other of the contending groups of Powers +would only tend to increase militarism at the expense of Democracy. + +As long as the Front was quiet the troops accepted all these discourses +and Resolutions in a spirit of comparative indifference. But when +the time came for the advance, many people thought of saving their +skins, and the ready formulas of Defeatism proved opportune. Besides +the Committees, who were continuing to pass patriotic Resolutions, +certain organisations reflecting the views of the units of the Army, or +their own, violently opposed the idea of an advance. Entire regiments, +divisions, and even Army Corps, especially on the Northern and Western +Russian Fronts, refused to conduct preparatory work or to advance to +the firing line. On the eve of the advance we had to send large forces +for the suppression of units that had treacherously forgotten their +duty. + +I have already mentioned the attitude of many Senior Commanders towards +the Committees. The best summary of these views can be found in the +appeal of General Fedotov, in temporary command of an Army, to the +Army Committee: "Our Army is at present organised as no other Army in +the world.... Elected bodies play an important part. We--_the former +leaders_--can only give the Army our military knowledge of strategy +and tactics. You--the Committees--are called upon to organise the Army +and to create its internal strength. Great indeed is the part which +you--the Committees--are called upon to play in the creation of a +new and strong Army. History will recognise this...." + +Before the Army Organisations were sanctioned the Commander of the +Caucasian Front issued an Order for the decisions of the self-appointed +Tiflis Soldiers' Soviet to be published in the Orders of the Day, and +for all regulations appertaining to the Organisation and routine of the +Army to be sanctioned by that Soviet. Is one to wonder that such an +attitude of a certain portion of the Commanding Staffs gave an excuse +and a foundation for the growing demands of the Committees? + +As regards the Western and South-Western Fronts, which I commanded, +I definitely refused to have anything to do with the Committees, +and suppressed, whenever possible, such of their activities as were +contrary to the interests of the Army. One of the prominent Commissars, +a late member of the Executive Committee of the Soviet, Stankevitch, +wrote: "Theoretically, it became increasingly apparent that either the +Army must be abolished or else the Committees. In practice, one could +do neither one nor the other. The Committees were a vivid expression +of the incurable sociological disease of the Army, and a sign of its +certain collapse and paralysis. Was it not for the War Ministry to +hasten the death by a resolute and hopeless surgical operation?" + +The once great Russian Army of the first period of the Revolution +dwindled inevitably to nothing under such conditions as these: + +There was no Mother Country. The leader had been crucified. In his +stead a group appeared at the Front of five Defensists and three +Bolsheviks, and made an appeal to the Army: + +"Forward, to battle for liberty and for the Revolution, but ... without +inflicting a decisive defeat upon the enemy," cried the former. + +"Down with the War and all power to the Proletariat!" shouted the +others. + +The Army listened and listened, but would not move. And then ... it +dispersed! + +[Illustration: The Conference of Commanders-in-Chief. Standing on +the pathway, from left to right: Generals Denikin, Danilov, Hanjin. +Seated (left): Doukhonin, Gourko, Brussilov. Centre: Alexeiev. Right: +Dragomirov, Scherbatchev.] + +[Illustration: A group of "prisoners" at Berdichev. From left to right: +Captain Kletzando, General Elsner, General Vannovsky, General Denikin, +General Erdeli, General Markov, General Orlov.] + + + + +CHAPTER XIX. + +THE DEMOCRATISATION OF THE ARMY: THE COMMISSARS. + + +The next measure for the democratisation of the Army was the +introduction of the Institution of Commissars. The idea was derived +from the history of the French Revolutionary Wars, and was fostered +in various circles at different times; it was prompted chiefly by +_distrust of the Commanding Staffs_. Pressure was brought to bear +from below. The Conference of the Delegates of the Front addressed an +emphatic demand to the Soviet in the middle of April that Commissars +should be introduced in the Army. The excuse was that it was no longer +possible to preserve order in respect of the attitude of the men +towards individual Commanding Officers, and that, if cases of arbitrary +dismissal had as yet been avoided, it was only due to the fact that +the Army expected the Soviet and the Government to take the necessary +steps and did not wish to handicap their work. At the same time, the +Conference suggested the absurd idea of the simultaneous appointment +to the Army of three kinds of Commissars: (1) from the Provisional +Government, (2) from the Soviets, and (3) from the Army Committees. +The Conference went very far in their demands, and demanded that the +Commissariats, as controlling organs, should: discuss _all_ matters +appertaining to the competence of the Commanders of Armies and Fronts; +counter-sign _all_ Army Orders; investigate the activities of the +Commanding Staffs, with the right to recommend their dismissal. + +Protracted negotiations on this matter ensued between the Soviet and +the Government, and at the end of April it was agreed that Commissars +would be appointed to the Army--one from the Provisional Government and +one from the Soviet. This decision, however, was subsequently altered, +probably as the result of the formation of a Coalition Ministry (May +5th). One Commissar was appointed by agreement between the Government +and the Soviet. He represented both these bodies, and was responsible +to them. At the end of June the Provisional Government introduced the +office of Commissar of the Fronts, and thus defined their function: +according to the instructions of the War Ministry, they were to see +that all political questions arising within the Armies of the Front +should be given a uniform solution, and that the work of the Army +Commissars should be co-ordinated. At the end of July a final touch +was given by the appointment of a High Commissar attached to the +Stavka, and the entire official correspondence was concentrated in the +political section of the War Ministry. No law, however, was passed +defining the rights and the duties of the Commissars. The Commanding +Staffs, at any rate, were unaware of such laws, and this alone gave +rise to all the misunderstandings and conflicts that followed. The +Commissars had secret instructions to watch the Commanding Staffs and +Headquarters in respect of their political reliability. From that +point of view the democratic régime went further, perhaps, than the +autocratic. Of this I became convinced during my command of the Western +and South-Western Fronts, in reading the telegrams exchanged between +the Commissariats and Petrograd. These telegrams--may the Commissars +forgive me!--were handed to me, de-coded, by my Staff, immediately +after their despatch. This part of the Commissars' duty required a +certain training in political intelligence, but their overt duties were +infinitely more complex: they demanded statesmanship, a clear knowledge +of the aims to be pursued, an understanding of the psychology, not +merely of the officers and men, but of the Senior Commanding Staff, +acquaintance with the fundamental principles of service and routine in +the Army, great tact, and, finally, the personal qualities of courage, +strong will, and energy. Only such qualifications were capable of +mitigating to a certain degree the disastrous consequences of a measure +which deprived (to be more accurate, sanctioned the deprivation of) the +Commanding Officers of the possibility of influencing the troops--that +influence being the only means of strengthening the hope and faith in +victory. + +Such elements were not to be found, unfortunately, in the circles +connected with the Government and the Soviet and enjoying their +confidence. The personnel of the Commissars whom I met may be described +thus: War-time officers, doctors, solicitors, newspaper men, exiles +and _emigrés_ completely out of touch with Russian life, members of +militant Revolutionary organisations, etc. These men had, obviously, +inadequate knowledge of the Army. All these men belonged to Socialist +parties, from Social-Democrat Mensheviks to the group "Edinstvo" +(unity), War party blinkers, and very often did not follow the +political lines of the Government because they considered themselves +tied by Soviet and party discipline. Owing to political differences of +opinion, the attitude of the Commissars towards the War also varied. +Stankevitch, one of the Commissars, who carried out his duties in his +own way most conscientiously, when proceeding to visit an advancing +Division was beset with doubts: "The soldiers believe that we do not +wish to deceive them; they force themselves, therefore, to forget +their doubts, and they go forward to death and murder. But we, are we +entitled not only to encourage them, but to take upon ourselves the +decision?" According to Savinkov (who was Commissar of the Seventh +Army of the South-Western Front, and later War Minister), not all the +Commissars agreed upon the question of Bolshevism, and not all of +them considered a resolute struggle against the Bolsheviks possible +or desirable. Savinkov was an exception. Although not a soldier by +profession, he was steeled in struggle and wanderings, in constant +danger, and his hands were stained with the blood of political victims. +This man, however, understood the laws of the struggle, threw off the +yoke of the party, and fought more resolutely than others against the +disorganisation of the Army. But the personal touch in his attitude +towards the events was somewhat too marked. None of the Commissars, +with the exception of very few men of the Savinkov type, displayed +personal strength or energy. They were men of words, not of deeds. +Their lack of training would not have had such negative results had it +not been for the fact that, their functions not being clearly defined, +they gradually began to interfere with every feature of the life and +service of the troops, partly on their own initiative, partly at the +instigation of the men and of the Army Committees, and partly even +of Commanding Officers, who were trying to escape responsibility. +Questions of appointments, dismissals, and even operative plans +attracted the attention of the Commissars, not only from the point of +view of "covert counter-Revolution," but from the point of view of +practicability. The confusion in their minds was so great that the +weaker elements among the Commanding Staffs were sometimes completely +disheartened. I remember one case during the July retreat on the +South-Western Front. One of the Army Corps Commanders rashly destroyed +a well-equipped military railway, thereby placing the Army in an +exceedingly difficult position. He was dismissed by the Army Commander, +and afterwards expressed to me his sincere astonishment: "Why had he +been dismissed? He had acted--upon the instructions of the Commissar." + +The Commissars carried out the ideas of the Soviet and whole-heartedly +defended the sacred newly-acquired rights of the soldier, but failed +to fulfil their primary duty--direct the political life of the Army. +Very often the most destructive propaganda was permitted. Soldiers' +meetings and Committees were allowed to pass all kinds of anti-National +and anti-Government resolutions, and the Commissars only interfered +when the tension of the atmosphere resulted in an armed mutiny. Such a +policy puzzled the troops, the Committees, and the Commanding Officers. + +The institution of Commissars did not attain its purpose. Among the +soldiers the Commissars could not be popular because they were to +a certain extent an instrument of compulsion, and occasionally of +suppression. At the same time, the extent of their power was not +well defined, and they could not gain proper authority over the most +undisciplined units. This was confirmed later after the seizure of +power by the Bolsheviks, when the Commissars were the first to flee +from their posts in a great hurry and in secret. + +There thus appeared in the Russian Army, instead of one authority, +three different authorities, which excluded one another--the Commanding +Officer, the Committee, and the Commissar. They were shadowy +authorities. Another authority was overhanging, and was oppressing them +morally with all its insensate weight--the power of the mob. + + * * * * * + +In examining the question of the new Institutions--Commissars and +Committees--and of their bearing upon the destinies of the Russian +Army, I have done so solely from the point of view of the preservation +of our Armed Forces as an important factor in the future of our +country. It would, however, be a mistake to overlook the connection +between these measures and the entirety of laws which govern the +life of the people and the course of the Revolution. These measures, +moreover, bear the stamp of logic and of inevitability owing to the +part which the Revolutionary Democracy had chosen to play. Therein lies +the tragedy of the situation. The Socialist Democracy did not possess +any elements sufficiently trained to become the instruments of Army +Administration. At the same time, it did not have the courage or the +possibility to quell the resistance of the Bourgeois Democracy and of +the Commanding Staffs, and to compel them to work for the glorification +of Socialism, as the Bolsheviks afterwards did, who forced the remnants +of the Russian _intelligencia_ and of the officers to serve Communism +by applying methods of sanguinary and ruthless extermination. When the +Revolutionary Democracy actually assumed power and set up to fulfil +certain aims it was well aware of the fact that those elements in +the administration and the Command who were called upon to carry out +these aims did not share the views of the Revolutionary Democracy. +Hence the inevitable distrust of these elements and the desire to +weaken their influence and their authority. What methods did the +Democracy have recourse to? As the Central Revolutionary organ was +utterly devoid of statesmanship and of patriotism, it applied in its +struggle against political opponents destructive methods, completely +disregarding the fact that by these methods they were destroying the +country and the Army. Another circumstance must be borne in mind--the +Revolution that had shaken the State to its very foundations and upset +the established class relations occurred at the moment when the flower +of the Nation--over 10,000,000 men--were under arms. Elections to the +Constituent Assembly were impending. In these circumstances it was +impossible to avoid politics being introduced into the Army, as it is +impossible to arrest the course of a river. But it would have been +possible to divert it to proper channels. In this matter, however, the +two contending forces (that which wished to preserve the State and the +Demagogic Force) also collided, as both endeavoured to influence the +attitude of the Army, which was a decisive factor in the Revolution. + +These were the propositions which pre-ordained and explained the +subsequent course of the Democratisation of the Army. The Socialist +Democracy, which governed at first behind the scenes and then overtly, +was endeavouring to strengthen its position and to bow to the +instincts of the crowd, destroyed the military power and connived at +the Institution of Elective Military Organisations, which were less +dangerous and more open to its influence than the Commanding Staffs, +although they did not answer the requirements of the Soviet. The +necessity of military authority of some sort was clearly realised. +The Commanding Staffs were distrusted, and there was a desire to +create a buffer between the two artificially separated elements of +the Army. These considerations inspired the creation of the office of +Commissars, who bore the dual responsibility before the Soviet and the +Government. Neither the men nor the officers were satisfied with these +institutions, which fell together with the Provisional Government, were +revived with certain modifications in the Red Army, and once again +swept away by the tide of events. + +"Peoples cannot choose their Institutions, as man cannot choose his +age. Peoples obey the Institutions to which they are tied by their +past, their creed, by the economic laws and surroundings in which they +live. There are many examples in history when the people have destroyed +by violent Revolution the Institutions which it has taken a dislike +for. But there is not a case in history of these new institutions +forcibly imposed upon the people becoming permanent and solid. After a +while the past comes again into force, because we are created entirely +by that past and it is our supreme ruler."[19] + +It is obvious that the Russian National Army will be revived not only +on democratic, but on historical foundations. + + + + +CHAPTER XX. + + THE DEMOCRATISATION OF THE ARMY--THE STORY OF "THE DECLARATION OF + THE RIGHTS OF THE SOLDIER." + + +The ill-famed law, emanating from the Polivanov Committee and known +as the "Declaration of the Rights of the Soldier," was confirmed by +Kerensky on May 9th. I will give the main points of that law: + + (1) "All soldiers of the Army enjoy full rights of citizenship." + + (2) Every soldier is entitled to the membership of any political, + national, religious, economic, or professional organisation, + society or union. + + (3) Every soldier off duty has the right freely and openly to + express in word, writing, or in the Press his political, religious, + social and other views. + + (4) All printed matter (periodicals and other) should be delivered + to the addressees. + + (5) Soldiers are not to be appointed as orderlies. Officers are + entitled to have one servant, appointed by mutual consent (of the + soldier and of the officer); wages also to be settled by mutual + consent, but there should be no more than one servant to each + officer, Army doctor, Army clerk, or Priest. + + (6) Saluting is abolished for men as well as for units. + + (7) No soldier is to be punished or fined without trial. At + the Front the Commanding Officer is entitled, on his own + responsibility, to take the necessary steps, including armed + force, against disobedient subordinates. Such steps are not to be + considered as disciplinary punishments. Internal administration, + punishments, and control in cases defined by Army regulations, + belong to elective Army Organisations. + +This "Declaration of Rights," of which the above is but a brief +summary, gave official sanction to the malady with which the Army +was stricken, and which spread in varying degrees owing to mutinies, +violence, and "by Revolutionary methods," as the current expression +goes. It dealt a death-blow to the old Army. It introduced boundless +political discussions and social strife into the unbalanced ARMED +MASSES which had already become aware of their rough physical power. +"The Declaration" admitted and sanctioned wide propaganda by speech and +pamphlet of anti-national, immoral and anti-Social doctrines, and even +the doctrines that repudiated the State and the very existence of the +Army. Finally, it deprived Commanding Officers of disciplinary power, +which was handed over to elective bodies, and once again insulted and +degraded the Commanding Staff. In his remarks attached to the text of +the "Declaration," Kerensky says: "Let the freest Army and Navy of the +World prove that there is strength and not weakness in Liberty, let +them forge a new iron discipline of duty and raise the Armed Power of +the country." + +And the "Great Silent One," as the French picturesquely describe the +Army, began to talk and to shout louder and louder still, enforcing its +demands by threats, by arms, and by shedding the blood of those who +dared to resist its folly. + +At the end of April the final draft of the "Declaration" was sent by +Gutchkov to the Stavka for approval. The Supreme Commander-in-Chief and +myself returned an emphatic disapproval, in which we gave vent to all +our moral sufferings and our grief for the dark future of the Army. Our +conclusion was that the "Declaration" "was the last nail driven into +the coffin which has been prepared for the Russian Army." On May 1st +Gutchkov resigned from the War Ministry, as he did not wish "to share +the responsibility for the heavy sin which was committed against the +Mother Country," and in particular to sign the "Declaration." + + * * * * * + +The Stavka sent copies of the draft "Declaration" to the +Commander-in-Chief of the Fronts for reference, and they were called +by General Alexeiev to Moghilev, in order to discuss the fateful +position. This historical Conference took place on May 2nd. The +speeches, in which the collapse of the Russian Army was described, +were restrained and yet moving, as they reflected deep sorrow and +apprehension. Brussilov, in a low voice expressing sincere and unfeigned +pain, ended thus: "All this can yet be borne, and there still remains +some hope of saving the Army and leading it forward, provided the +'Declaration' is not issued. If it is, there is no salvation, and I +would not remain in office for a single day." This last sentence +provoked a warm protest from General Stcherbatchov, who argued that no +one should resign, that, however arduous and hopeless the position may +be, the leaders cannot abandon the Army.... Somebody suggested that all +the Commanders-in-Chief should immediately proceed to Petrograd, +and address to the Provisional Government a stern warning and +definite demands. The General who suggested this thought that such a +demonstration would produce a very strong impression and might arrest +the progress of destructive legislation. Others thought that it was a +dangerous expedient and our last trump card, and that, should the step +prove ineffective, the High Command would be definitely discredited. The +suggestion, however, was accepted, and, on the 4th May, a Conference took +place of all the Commanders-in-Chief (with the exception of the Caucasian +Front), the Provisional Government, and the Executive Committee of +the Soviet. I am in possession of the record of that Conference, of +which I give extensive extracts below. The condition of the Army, such +as it appeared to its leaders, in the course of events, and without, +therefore, any historical perspective, is therein described, as well as +the characteristics of the men who were then in power. The trend of the +speeches made by the Commander-in-Chief was the same as in the Stavka, +but they were less emphatic and less sincere. Brussilov smoothed +over his accusations, lost his pathos, "warmly greeted the Coalition +Ministry," and did not repeat his threat of resignation. + + +THE RECORD. + +_General Alexeiev._--I consider it necessary to speak quite frankly. We +are all united in wishing for the good of our country. Our paths may +differ, but we have a common goal of ending the War in such a manner as +to allow Russia to come out of it unbroken, albeit tired and suffering. +Only victory can give us the desired consummation. Only then will +creative work be possible. But victory must be achieved, and that is +only possible if the orders of the Commanding Officers are obeyed. If +not, it is not an Army, but a mob. To sit in the trenches does not mean +to reach the end of the War. The enemy is transferring, in great haste, +division after division from our Front to the Franco-British Front, and +we continue to sit still. Meanwhile, the conditions are most favourable +for our victory, but we must advance in order to win it. Our Allies are +losing faith in us. We must reckon with this in the diplomatic sphere, +and I particularly in the military one. It seemed as if the Revolution +would raise our spirits, would give us impetus, and therefore victory. +In that, unfortunately, we have so far been mistaken. Not only is +there no enthusiasm or impetus, but the lowest instincts have come +to the fore, such as self-preservation. The interests of the Mother +Country and its future are not being considered.... You will ask what +has happened to the authority, to principles, or even to physical +compulsion? I am bound to state that the reforms to which the Army +has as yet failed to adapt itself have shaken it, have undermined +order and discipline. Discipline is the mainstay of the Army. If we +follow that path any further there will be a complete collapse.... +The Commanders-in-Chief will give you a series of facts describing +the condition of the Armies. I will offer a conclusion and will give +expression to our desires and demands, which must be complied with. + +_General Brussilov._--I must first of all describe to you the present +condition of the officers and men. Cavalry, artillery and engineering +troops have retained about 50 per cent. of their cadres. But in +the infantry, which is the mainstay of the Army, the position is +entirely different. Owing to enormous casualties in killed, wounded +and prisoners, as well as many deserters, some regiments have changed +their cadres nine or ten times, so that only from three to ten men +remain of the original formation. Reinforcements are badly trained +and their discipline is still worse. Of the regular officers from two +to four remain and in many cases they are wounded. Other officers +are youngsters commissioned after a short training and enjoying no +authority owing to their lack of experience. It is upon these new +cadres that the task has fallen to remodel the Army on a new basis, and +that task has so far proved beyond their capacity. Although we felt +that a change was necessary and that it had already come too late, the +ground was nevertheless unprepared. The uneducated soldier understood +it as a deliverance from the officers' yoke. The officers greeted the +change with enthusiasm. Had this not been so, the Revolution may not +have probably passed so smoothly. The result, however, was that freedom +was only given to the men, whereas the officers had to be content +to play the part of pariahs of liberty. The unconscious masses were +intoxicated with liberty. Everyone knows that extensive rights have +been granted, but they do not know what these rights are, and nobody +bothers about duties. The position of the officers is very difficult. +From 15 to 20 per cent. have rapidly adapted themselves to the new +conditions, because they believed that these conditions were all to +the good. Those of the officers who were trusted by the men did not +lose that trust. Some, however, became too familiar with the men, were +too lenient and even encouraged internal dissensions amongst the men. +But the majority of the officers, about 75 per cent., were unable to +adapt themselves. They were offended, retired to the background and +do not know what to do now. We are trying to bring them into contact +with the soldiers once more, because we need the officers for continued +fighting, and we have no other cadres. Many of the officers have no +political training, do not know how to make speeches--and this, of +course, handicaps the work of mutual understanding. It is necessary to +explain and to instil into the masses the idea that freedom has been +granted to _everyone_. I have known our soldiers for forty-five years, +I love them and I will do my best to bring them into close touch with +the officers, but the Provisional Government, the Duma and particularly +the Soviet should also make every effort in order to assist in that +work which must be done as soon as possible in the interests of the +country. It is also necessary, owing to the peculiar fashion in +which the illiterate masses have understood the watchword "without +annexations and indemnities." One of the regiments has declared that +not only would it refuse to advance, but desired to leave the front and +to go home. The Committees opposed this tendency, but were told that +they would be dismissed. I had a lengthy argument with the regiment, +and when I asked the men whether they agreed with me, they begged leave +to give me a written answer. A few minutes later they presented to me +a poster: "Peace at any price and down with the War." In the course of +a subsequent talk I had with one of the men, he said to me: "If there +are to be no annexations, why do we want that hill top?" My reply +was: "I also do not want the hill top, but we must beat the enemy who +is occupying it." Finally, the men promised to hold on, but refused +to advance, arguing that "the enemy is good to us and has informed +us that he will not advance provided we do not move. It is important +that we should go home to enjoy freedom and the land. Why should we +allow ourselves to be maimed?" Is it to be an offensive or a defensive +campaign? Success can be only obtained by an offensive. If we conduct +a passive defence the front is bound to be broken. If discipline is +strong a break-through may yet be remedied. But we must not forget that +we have no well-disciplined troops, that they are badly trained and +that the officers have no authority. In these circumstances an enemy +success may easily become a catastrophe. The masses must, therefore, be +persuaded that we must advance instead of remaining on the defensive. + +We thus have many shortcomings, but numerical superiority is still +on our side. If the enemy succeeds in breaking the French and the +British, he will throw his entire weight upon us and we will then be +lost. We need a strong government upon which we could rely, and we +whole-heartedly greet the coalition government. The power of the State +can only be strong when it leans upon the Army, which represents the +armed forces of the nation. + +_General Dragomirov._--The prevailing spirit in the Army is the +desire of peace. Anyone might be popular in the Army who would preach +peace without annexations and would advocate self-determination. The +illiterate masses have understood the idea of "no annexations" in a +peculiar fashion. They do not understand the conditions of different +peoples, and they repeatedly ask the question: "Why do not the Allied +democracies join in our declarations?" The desire for peace is so +strong that reinforcements refuse to accept equipment and arms and say: +"They are no good to us as we do not intend to fight." Work has come to +a standstill and it is even necessary to see to it that trenches are +not dismantled and that roads are mended. In one of the best regiments +we found, on the sector which it had occupied, a red banner inscribed: +"Peace at all costs." The officer who tore that banner had to flee for +his life. During the night men from that regiment were searching for +the officer at Dvinsk, as he had been concealed by the Headquarters +Staff. The dreadful expression "Adherents of the old régime" caused +the best officers to be cast out of the Army. We all wanted a change, +and yet many excellent officers, the pride of the Army, had to join +the Reserve simply because they tried to prevent the disruption of the +Army, but failed to adapt themselves to the new conditions. What is +much more fatal is the growth of slackness and of a lingering spirit. +Egoism is reaching terrible proportions, and each unit thinks only of +its own welfare; endless deputations come to us daily, demanding to +be relieved, to remove Commanding Officers, to be re-equipped, etc. +All these deputations have to be addressed, and this hinders our work. +Orders that used to be implicitly obeyed now demand lengthy arguments; +if a battery is moved to a different sector, there is immediate +discontent, and the men say: "You are weakening us--you are traitors." +Owing to the weakness of the Baltic Fleet, we found it necessary to +send an Army Corps to the rear to meet the eventual landing of an enemy +force, but we were unable to do so, because the men said: "Our line +is long enough as it is and if we lengthen it still more we will be +unable to hold the enemy." Formerly we had no difficulty whatsoever +in regrouping the troops. In September, 1915, eleven Army Corps were +removed from the Western front, and this saved us from a defeat which +might have decided the fate of the War. At present such a thing would +be impossible, as every unit raises objections to the slightest move. +It is very difficult to compel the men to do anything in the interests +of the Mother Country. Regiments refuse to relieve their comrades +in the firing line under various excuses--such as bad weather, or +the fact that not all their men had had their baths. On one occasion +a unit refused to go to the front on the plea that it had already +been in the firing line at Easter time. We are compelled to ask the +Committees of various regiments to argue the matter out. Only a small +minority of officers is behaving in an undignified manner, trying to +make themselves popular by bowing to the instincts of the men. The +system of elections has not been introduced in its entirety, but many +unpopular officers have been summarily dismissed as they were accused +of being adherents to the old régime; other Commanding Officers, who +had been considered incompetent and liable to dismissal, have been made +to stay. It was quite impossible not to grant the demands for their +retention. With regard to excesses there have been individual cases of +shootings of officers.... Things cannot continue on these lines. We +want strong power. We have fought for the country. You have taken the +ground from under our feet. Will you kindly restore it? Our obligations +are colossal, and we must have the power in order to be able to lead to +victory the millions of soldiers who are entrusted to our care. + +_General Stcherbatchov._--The illiteracy of the soldiery is the main +reason of all these phenomena. It is not, of course, the fault of our +people that it is illiterate. For this the old régime is entirely +responsible, as it looked upon education from the point of view of the +Ministry of the Interior. Nevertheless, we have to reckon with the fact +that the masses do not understand the gravity of our position, and that +they misinterpret even such ideas as may be considered reasonable.... +If we do not wish Russia to collapse, we must continue the struggle +and we must advance. Otherwise we shall witness a grotesque sight. +The representatives of oppressed Russia fought heroically; but having +overthrown the government that was striving for peace with dishonour, +the citizens of free Russia are refusing to fight and to safeguard +their liberties. This is grotesque, strange, incomprehensible. But it +is so. The reason is that discipline has gone and there is no faith +in the Commanding Officers. Mother Country, to most men, is an empty +sound. These conditions are most painful, but they are particularly +painful on the Roumanian front, where one has to reckon not only with +military surroundings of specific difficulty, but also with a very +complex political atmosphere. Our people are used to plains, and the +mountainous nature of the theatre of war has a depressing effect upon +the troops. We often hear the complaint: "Do not keep us in these +cursed mountains." We have only one railway line to rely upon for +supplies, and have great difficulty in feeding the troops. This, of +course, enhances discontent. The fact that we are fighting on Roumanian +territory is interpreted as a fight "for Roumania," which is also an +unpopular idea. The attitude of the local population is not always +friendly, and the men come to the conclusion that they are being +refused assistance by those on whose behalf they are fighting. Friction +thus arises and deepens, because some of the Roumanians blame us for +the defeats which they have themselves suffered and owing to which +they have lost most of their territory and of their belongings. The +Roumanian Government and the Allied representatives are well aware of +the ferment in our Army, and their attitude towards us is changing. +I personally noticed that a shadow has fallen between us, and that +the former respect and faith in the prowess of the Russian Army have +vanished. I still enjoy great authority, but if the disruption of the +Army continues not only shall we lose our Allies but make enemies of +them, and there would then be a danger of peace being made at our +expense. In 1914 we advanced across the whole of Galicia. In 1915, in +our retreat, we took at the South-Western front 100,000 prisoners. +You may judge what that retreat was like and what was the spirit of +the troops. In the summer of 1916 we saved Italy from disaster. Is +it possible that we may now abandon the Allied cause and be false to +our obligations? The Army is in a state of disruption, but that can +be remedied. Should we succeed, within a month and a half our brave +officers and men would advance again. History will wonder at the +inadequate means with which we achieved brilliant results in 1916. If +you wish to raise the Russian Army and to convert it into a strong +organised body which will dictate the terms of peace, you must help us. +All is not lost yet, but only on condition that the Commanding Officers +will regain prestige and confidence. We hope that full powers in the +Army will once again be vested in the Supreme Commander-in-Chief, who +alone can manage the troops. We will obey the will of the Provisional +Government, but you must give us strong support. + +_General Gourko._--If you wish to continue the War till the desired +end, you must restore the power of the Army. We have received the draft +of the "Declaration" (of the rights of the soldier). Gutchkov would +not sign it and has resigned. I am bound to say that if a civilian +has resigned and refused to sign that declaration--to us, the Army +Chiefs, it is inacceptable. It simply completely destroys everything +that is left. I will recount to you an episode which occurred while I +was temporarily holding the office of Chief-of-Staff of the Supreme +C.-in-C. + +On February 13th I had a long talk with the late Czar, trying to +persuade him to grant a responsible ministry. As a last trump card, I +alluded to our international position, to the attitude of our Allies +and to the probable consequences of this measure. But my card was +already beaten. I will now endeavour to describe our international +position. We have no direct indication of the attitude of our Allies +towards our intentions to give up the struggle. We cannot, of course, +force them to express their innermost thoughts. As in time of war, one +is often compelled to come to a decision "for the enemy," I will now +try to argue "for the Allies." + +It was easy to begin the Revolution, but we have been submerged by its +tidal wave. I trust that common sense will help us to survive this. If +not, if the Allies realise our impotence, the principles of practical +policy will force upon them the only issue--a separate peace. That +would not be on their part a breach of obligations, because we had +promised to fight together and have now come to a standstill. If one +of the parties is fighting and the other is sitting in the trenches, +like a Chinese dragon, waiting for the result of the fight--you must +agree that the fighting side may begin to think of making separate +peace. Such a peace would, of course, be concluded at our expense. +The Austrians and the Germans can get nothing from our Allies: their +finance is in a state of collapse and they have no natural riches. +Our finances are also in a state of collapse, but we have immense +untouched natural resources. Our Allies would, of course, come to such +a decision only as a last resort, because it would be not peace, but a +lengthy armistice. Bred as they are upon the ideals of the nineteenth +century, the Germans, having enriched themselves at our expense, would +once again fall upon us and upon our late Allies. You may say that if +this is possible why should we not conclude a separate peace first. +Here I will mention first of all the moral aspect of the question. The +obligation was undertaken by Russia, not merely by the late autocrat. +I was aware--long before you had heard of it--of the duplicity of the +Czar, who had concluded soon after the Russo-Japanese War of 1904-5 an +alliance with the Emperor William, while the Franco-Russian Alliance +was still in existence. The free Russian people, responsible for its +acts, cannot renounce its obligations. But setting aside the moral +aspect, there remains the material problem. If we open negotiations +they cannot remain secret, and our Allies would hear of it within +two or three days. They would also enter into a parley, and a kind +of auction sale would begin. The Allies are, of course, richer than +ourselves, but on their side the struggle has not yet ended; besides, +our enemies could get much more at our expense. It is precisely from +the international point of view that we must prove our capacity for +a continued struggle. I will not continue to revolutionise the Army, +because if I should we might find ourselves powerless not only to +advance but even to remain on the defensive. The latter is infinitely +more difficult. In 1915 we retreated and orders were obeyed. You +were entitled to expect this, because we had trained the Army. The +position has now been altered; you have created something new and have +deprived us of power. You can no longer hold us responsible, and the +responsibility must fall heavily upon your heads. You say that the +Revolution is still proceeding. Listen to us. We are better acquainted +with the psychology of the troops, we have gone with them through +thick and thin. Stop the Revolution and give us, the military Chiefs, +a chance to do our duty and to bring Russia to such a condition in +which you may continue your work. Otherwise, we will hand over to you +not Russia, but a field in which our enemies will sow and reap, and +Democracy itself will curse you. It will be Democracy that will suffer +if the Germans win. Democracy will be starving--while the peasants will +always manage to feed themselves on their own land. It was said of +the old régime that it "played into the hands of William." Will it be +possible to level the same accusation against you? William is fortunate +indeed, as both Monarchs and Democracies are playing into his hands. +The Army is on the eve of disruption. Our Mother Country is in danger +and is nearing a collapse. You must help. It is easy to destroy, and if +you know how to destroy--you should also know how to rebuild. + +_General Alexeiev._--The main points have been stated, and they are +true. The Army is on the brink of the abyss. Another step and it will +fall into the abyss and will drag along Russia and all her liberties, +and there will be no return. Everyone is guilty, and the guilt lies +heavily upon all that has been done in that direction for the last +two and a half months. We have made every effort and are now devoting +all our strength to the task of restoring the Army. We trust that Mr. +Kerensky will apply all his qualities of mind and character and all +his influence to that consummation, and will help us. But that is +not enough. Those who have been disrupting the Army must also help. +Those who have issued the Order No. 1 must issue a series of orders +and comments. If the "Declaration" is published, as Gutchkov said, +the last flimsy foundations will fall into dust and the last hope +will be dashed. Be patient, there is time still. That which has been +granted in the last two and a half months has not as yet taken root. +We have regulations defining rights and duties. All the regulations +that are issued nowadays only mention rights. You must do away with +the idea that peace will come by itself. Those who say "down with the +War" are traitors, and those who say "there should be no advance" +are cowards. We still have men with sincere convictions. Let them +come to us not as passing stars, but let them live with us and dispel +the misunderstandings that have arisen. You have the Press. May it +encourage patriotism and demand that everyone do his duty. + +_Prince Lvov._--We have heard the Commanders-in-Chief, we understand +all they have said and will do our duty to our country till the end. + +_Tzeretelli._--There is no one here who has contributed to the +disruption of the Army and played into the hands of William. I have +heard the accusation that the Soviet has contributed to the disruption +of the Army. And yet everyone agrees that the Soviet is the only +institution that enjoys authority at present. What would happen were +there no Soviet? Fortunately, Democracy has come to the rescue and +we still have hope in salvation. What can you do? There are only two +paths for you to follow. One is to reject the policy of the Soviets. +But you would then have no source of power wherewith to hold the Army +and to lead it for the salvation of Russia. Your other path is the +true path, which we have tried; the path of unity with the desires +and expectations of the people. If the Commanding Officers have +failed to make it quite clear that the whole strength of the Army +for the defence of the country lay in the advance, there is no magic +wand capable of doing it. It is alleged that the watchword "Without +annexations or indemnities" has demoralised the Army and the masses. +It is quite likely that it has been misunderstood, but it should have +been explained that this was the ultimate aim; we cannot renounce that +watchword. We are aware that Russia is in danger, but her defence is +a matter for the people as a whole. The Power must be united and must +enjoy the confidence of the people, but this can only be achieved +if the old policy is completely discarded. Unity can only be based +on confidence, which cannot be bought. The ideals of the Soviet are +not those of separate and small groups--they are the ideals of the +country. To renounce them is to renounce the country. You might, +perhaps, understand Order No. 1 if you knew the conditions in which it +was issued. We were confronted with an unorganised mob and we had to +organise it. The masses of the soldiery do not wish to go on with the +War. They are wrong, and I cannot believe that they are prompted by +cowardice. It is the result of distrust. Discipline should remain. But +if the soldiers realise that you are not fighting against Democracy, +they will trust you. By this means the Army may yet be saved. By this +means the authority of the Soviet will be strengthened. There is only +one way of salvation, the way of confidence and of the Democratisation +of the country and of the Army. It is by accepting those principles +that the Soviet has gained the confidence of the people and is now in +a position to carry out its ideas. As long as that is so, not all is +lost. You must try to enhance the confidence in the Soviet. + +_Skobelev._--We have not come here to listen to reproaches. We know +what is going on in the Army. The conditions which you have described +are undoubtedly ominous. It will depend upon the spirit of the Russian +people whether the ultimate goal will be reached and whether we shall +come out of the present difficulty with honour. I consider it necessary +to explain the circumstances in which Order No. 1 was issued. In the +troops which had overthrown the old régime, the Commanding Officers +had not joined the mutineers; we were compelled to issue that Order so +as to deprive these officers of authority. We were anxious about the +attitude of the front towards the Revolution and about the instructions +that were being given. We have proved to-day that our misgivings were +not unfounded. Let us speak the truth: the activities of the Commanding +Staff have prevented the Army, in these two and a half months, from +understanding the Revolution. We quite realise the difficulties of +your position. But when you say that the Revolution must be stayed, we +are bound to reply that the Revolution cannot begin or end to order. +Revolution may take its normal course when the mental process of the +Revolution spreads all over the country, when it is understood by the +70 per cent. of illiterate people. + +Far be it from us to demand that all Commanding Officers be elected. We +agree with you that we have power and have succeeded in attaining it. +When you will understand the aims of the Revolution and will help the +people to understand our watchword, you will also acquire the necessary +power. The people must know what they are fighting for. You are leading +the Army for the defeat of the enemy, and you must explain that a +strategical advance is necessary in order that the watchwords that +have been proclaimed may be vindicated. We trust the new War Minister +and hope that a revolutionary Minister will continue our work and will +hasten the mental process of the Revolution in the heads of those who +think too slowly. + +_The War Minister--Kerensky._--As Minister and Member of the +Government, I must say that we are trying to save the country and to +restore the fighting capacity and activities of the Russian Army. _We +assume responsibility, but we also assume the right to lead the Army_ +and to show it the path of future development. Nobody has been uttering +reproaches here. Everyone has described what he has lived through and +has tried to define the causes of events, but our aims and desires are +the same. The Provisional Government recognises that the Soviet has +played a prominent part and admits its work of organisation--otherwise +I would not be War Minister. No one can level accusations at the +Soviet. But no one can accuse the Commanding Staffs either, because the +officers have borne the brunt of the Revolution quite as much as the +rest of the Russian people. Everyone understands the position. Now that +my comrades are joining the Government, it will be easier to attain our +common aims. There is but one thing for us to do--to save our freedom. +I will ask you to proceed to your commands and to remember that the +whole of Russia stands behind you and behind the Army. It is our aim to +give our country complete freedom. But this cannot be done unless we +show the world at large that we are strong in spirit. + +_General Gourko_ (replying to Skobelev and Tzeretelli).--We are +discussing the matter from different angles. Discipline is the +fundamental condition of the existence of the Army. The percentage of +losses which a unit may suffer without losing its fighting capacity +is the measure of its endurance. I have spent eight months in the +South African Republics and have seen regiments of two different +kinds: (1) Small, disciplined and (2) Volunteer, undisciplined. The +former continued to fight and did not lose their fighting power when +their losses amounted to 50 per cent. The latter, although they were +volunteers who knew what they were fighting for, left the ranks and +fled from the battlefield after losing 10 per cent. No force on earth +could induce them to fight. That is the difference between disciplined +and undisciplined troops. We demand discipline. We do all we can to +persuade. But your authoritative voice must be heard. We must remember +that if the enemy advances, we shall fall to pieces like a pack of +cards. If you will not cease to revolutionise the Army--you must assume +power yourselves. + +_Prince Lvov._--Our ends are the same and everyone will do his duty. I +thank you for your visit and for giving us your views. + + * * * * * + +The Conference came to a close. The Commanders-in-Chief rejoined their +fronts, fully conscious that the last card had been beaten. At the same +time, the Soviet orators and the Press started a campaign of abuse +against Generals Alexeiev, Gourko and Dragomirov, which rendered their +resignations imperative. On the 9th of May, as I already mentioned, +Kerensky confirmed the "Declaration" while issuing an Order of the Day +on the inadmissibility of senior Commanding Officers relinquishing +their posts "in order to shirk responsibility." What was the impression +produced by that fateful Order? + +Kerensky _afterwards_ tried to adduce the excuse that the regulation +was drafted before he had assumed office and was approved of by the +Executive Committee as well as by "military authorities," and that he +had no reason to refuse to confirm it; in a word, that he was compelled +to do so. But I recall more than one of Kerensky's speeches in which, +believing his course to be the right one, he prided himself on his +courage in issuing a Declaration "which Gutchkov had not dared to sign, +and which had evoked the protests of all the Commanding Officers." +On May 13th the Executive Committee of the Soviets responded to the +Declaration by an enthusiastic proclamation which dwelt mainly upon the +question of saluting. Poor, indeed, was the mind that inspired this +verbiage: "Two months we have waited for this day.... Now the soldier +is by law a citizen.... Henceforward the citizen soldier is free from +the servile saluting, and will greet anyone he chooses as an equal and +free man.... In the Revolutionary Army discipline will live through +popular enthusiasm ... and not by means of compulsory saluting...." +Such were the men who undertook to reorganise the Army. + +As a matter of fact, the majority of the Revolutionary Democracy of +the Soviets were not satisfied with the Declaration. They described +it as "a new enslavement of the soldier," and a campaign was opened +for further widening of these rights. Members of the Defencist +coalition demanded that the Regimental Committees should be empowered +to challenge the appointments of the Commanding Officers and to give +them attestations, as well as that freedom of speech should be granted +on service. Their chief demand, however, was for the exclusion of +Paragraph 14 of the Declaration entitling the Commanding Officer to use +arms in the firing line against insubordination. I need hardly mention +the disapproval of the Left, "Defeatist" Section of the Soviet. + +The Liberal Press utterly failed to appraise the importance of the +Declaration and never treated it seriously. The official organ of the +Constitutional Democratic Party (_Retch_, May 11th) had an article +which expressed great satisfaction that the Declaration "afforded +every soldier the chance of taking part in the political life of the +country, definitely freed him from the shackles of the old régime and +led him from the stale atmosphere of the old barracks into the fresh +air of liberty." It also said that "throughout the world all other +armies are remote from politics, whilst the Russian Army will be the +first to enjoy the fullness of political rights." Even the Conservative +paper (_Novoc Vremia_) said in a leading article: "It is a memorable +day; to-day the great Army of mighty Russia becomes truly the Army +of the Revolution.... Intercourse between warriors of all ranks will +henceforward be placed upon the common foundation of a sense of duty +binding on every citizen, irrespective of rank. And the Revolutionary +Army of regenerated Russia will go forward to the great ordeal of blood +with faith in victory and in peace." Difficult, indeed, was the task +of the Commanding Officers who were endeavouring to preserve the Army +when they found that the fundamental principles upon which the very +existence of the Army depended were misunderstood so grossly, even in +circles which had heretofore been considered as the mainstay of Russian +statesmanship. + +The Commanding Officers were still more disheartened, and the Army fell +into the abyss with ever-increasing rapidity. + + + + +CHAPTER XXI. + +THE PRESS AND PROPAGANDA. + + +In the late World War, along with aeroplanes, tanks, poison gases +and other marvels of military _technique_, a new and powerful weapon +came to the fore, viz: _propaganda_. Strictly speaking, it was not +altogether new, for as far back as 1826 Canning said, in the House of +Commons: "Should we ever have to take part in a war we shall gather +under our flag all the rebels, all those who, with or without cause, +are discontented in the country that goes against us." But now this +means of conflict attained an extraordinary development, intensity +and organisation, attacking the most morbid and sensitive points of +national psychology. Organised on a large scale, supplied with vast +means, the propaganda organs of Great Britain, France and America, +especially those of Great Britain, carried on a terrible warfare by +word of mouth, in the Press, in the films and ... with gold, extending +this warfare over the territories of the enemy, the Allies and the +neutrals, introducing it into all spheres--military, political, moral +and economic. The more so, that Germany especially gave grounds enough +for propaganda to have a plentiful supply of irrefragable, evidential +material at its disposal. It is difficult to enumerate, even in their +general features alone, that enormous arsenal of ideas which, step by +step, drop by drop, deepened class differences, undermined the power of +the State, sapped the moral powers of the enemy and their confidence +in victory, disintegrated their alliance, roused the neutral powers +against them and finally raised the falling spirits of their allied +peoples. Nevertheless, we should not attach exceptional importance to +this external moral pressure, as the leaders of the German people are +now doing, to justify themselves: Germany has suffered a political, +economic, military and moral defeat. It was only the interaction of all +these factors that determined the fatal issue of the struggle, which, +towards its end, became a lingering death-agony. One could only marvel +at the vitality of the German people, which, by its intellectual power +and the stability of its political thought, held out so long, until at +last, in November, 1918, "a double death-blow, both at the front and +in the rear," laid it in the dust. In connection with this, history +will undoubtedly note a great analogy between the parts played by the +"Revolutionary Democracies" of Russia and of Germany in the destinies +of these peoples. After the _débâcle_ the leader of the German +Independent Social Democrats acquainted the country with the great and +systematic work which they had carried on, from the beginning of 1918, +for the breaking down of the German Army and Navy, to the glory of the +social revolution. In this work one is struck by the similarity of +method and _modus operandi_ with those practised in Russia. + +While unable to resist British and French propaganda, the Germans were +very successful in applying this means to their Eastern antagonist, the +more so that: "Russia created her own misfortunes," said Ludendorff, +"and the work which we carried on there was not too hard." + +The results of the interaction of the skilful hand of Germany with the +movements which arose, less from the fact itself of the Revolution than +from the individual character of the Russian rebellion, exceeded the +highest hopes of the Germans. + +The work was carried on in three directions--political, military and +social. In the first we note the idea, quite clearly and definitely +formulated and systematically carried out by the German Government, +_of the dismemberment of Russia_. Its realisation took shape in the +proclamation, on November 15, 1916, of the Kingdom of Poland[20] _with +a territory which was to extend eastward "as far as possible"_; in the +creation of the States of Courland and Lithuania--"independent," but +in union with Germany; in the sharing of the White Russian provinces +between Poland and Lithuania, and, finally, in the prolonged and very +persistent preparation of the secession of Little Russia, which took +place later, in 1918. While the former facts had a meaning only in +principle, concerning, as they did, territories actually occupied by +the Germans and defined the character of the future "annexations," the +attitude assumed by the Central Powers with respect to Little Russia +exercised a direct influence on the stability of our South-Western +front, creating political complications in the country and separatist +tendencies in the Army. I shall return to this question later. + +The German Headquarters included an excellently organised +"press-bureau," which, besides influencing and directing the home Press, +also guided German propaganda, which penetrated mainly into Russia and +France. Miliukov quotes a circular issued by the German Foreign Office +to all its representatives in neutral countries: "You are informed that +on the territory of the country to which you are accredited, special +offices have been instituted for the organisation of propaganda in the +States, now fighting with the German coalition. The propaganda will +be engaged in exciting the social movement and, in connection with +the latter, strikes, revolutionary outbreaks, separatism, among the +constituent parts of these States, and civil war, as well as agitation +in favour of disarmament and the cessation of the present sanguinary +slaughter. You are instructed to afford all possible protection and +support to the directors of the said propaganda offices." + +It is curious that, in the summer of 1917, the British Press took up +arms against Sir George Buchanan and the British Propaganda Ministry +for their inertness in the matter of influencing the Democracy of +Russia and of fighting German propaganda in that country. One of the +papers pointed out that the British bureau of Russian propaganda had +at its head a novelist and literary beginners who had "as much idea of +Russia as of Chinese metaphysics." + +As for us, neither in our Government departments nor at the Stavka did +we have any organ whatever which was even in some degree reminiscent of +the mighty Western propaganda institutions. One of the sections of the +Quartermaster-General's department had charge of technical questions, +concerning relations with the Press, and was left without importance, +influence, or any active task. The Russian Army, well or badly, fought +in primitive ways, without ever having recourse to that "poisoning of +the enemy's spirit," which was so widely practised in the West. And it +paid for this with superfluous torrents of blood. But if opinions may +differ regarding the morality of destructive propaganda, we cannot but +note our complete inertness and inactivity in another and perfectly +pure sphere. We did absolutely nothing to acquaint foreign public +opinion with the exceptionally important part played by Russia and +the Russian Army in the World War, with the enormous losses suffered +and the sacrifices made by the Russian people, with those constant +majestic deeds of self-sacrifice, incomprehensible, perhaps, to the +cold understanding of our Western friends, which the Russian Army made +whenever the Allied front was within a hair's-breadth of defeat.... +Such a want of comprehension of the part played by Russia I have +met with almost everywhere, in wide social circles, long after the +conclusion of peace, in my wanderings over Europe. + +The following small episode is a burlesque, but very characteristic +instance of this. On a banner presented to Marshal Foch "from American +friends" are depicted the flags of all countries, lands and colonies, +which in one way or another came within the orbit of the Entente; the +Russian flag occupies the forty-sixth place, after Hayti and Uruguay +and immediately after San-Marino. + +Is this ignorance or triviality? + +We did nothing to lay a firm moral foundation for national unity during +our occupation of Galicia, did not draw public opinion to our side +during the occupation of Roumania by the Russian troops, did nothing +to restrain the Bulgarian people from betraying the interests of the +Slavonic races. Finally, we took no advantage of the presence on +Russian soil of an enormous number of prisoners, to give them at least +a correct idea of Russia. + +The Stavka, firmly barricaded within the sphere of purely military +questions connected with the carrying out of the campaign, made no +attempt to gain any influence over the general course of political +events, which agrees completely with the service idea of a national +army. But, at the same time, the Stavka distinctly avoided influencing +the public spirit of the country so as to lead this powerful factor to +moral co-operation in the struggle. There was no connection with the +leading organs of the Press, which was represented at the Stavka by men +possessing neither weight nor influence. + +When the thunderstorm of the Revolution broke and the political +whirlwind swept up and convulsed the Army, the Stavka could remain +inert no longer. It had to respond. The more so, that suddenly no +source of moral power was to be found in Russia which might have +protected the Army. The Government, especially the War Office, rushed +irresistibly down the path of opportunism; the Soviets and the +Socialist Press undermined the Army; the Bourgeois Press now cried +"videant consules ne quid Imperio detrimenti caparet," now naïvely +rejoiced at the "democratisation and liberation" which were taking +place. Even in what might have been considered the competent spheres +of the higher military bureaucracy of Petrograd there reigned such a +variety of views, as plunged the public opinion of the country into +perplexity and bewilderment. + +It turned out, however, that for the conflict the Stavka possessed +neither organisation nor men, neither technique nor knowledge and +experience. And, worst of all, the Stavka was in some way or other +shoved and thrown aside by the madly-careering chariot of life. Its +voice grew weaker and sank into silence. + +[Illustration: The Old Army: a review. General Ivanov.] + +[Illustration: The Revolutionary Army: a review. Kerensky.] + +The second Quartermaster-General--General Markov--had a serious task +before him--he had to create the necessary apparatus, to establish +communications with the important papers, to supply the Stavka with +a "megaphone" and raise the condition of the Army Press, which was +leading a wretched existence and which the army organisations were +trying to destroy. Markov took up the task warmly, but failed to do +anything serious, as he only remained in office two months. Every step +of the Stavka in this direction called forth from the Revolutionary +Democracy a disingenuous accusation of counter-revolutionary action. +And Liberal Bourgeois Moscow, to which he turned for aid, in the form +of intellectual and technical assistance in his task, replied with +eloquent promises, but did absolutely nothing. + +Thus the Stavka had no means at all, not only for actively combating +the disintegration of the Army, but for resisting German propaganda, +which was spreading rapidly. + + * * * * * + +Ludendorff says frankly and with a national egotism rising to a high +degree of cynicism: "I did not doubt that the _débâcle_ of the Russian +Army and the Russian people was fraught with great danger for Germany +and Austria-Hungary.... _In sending Lenin to Russia_ our Government +assumed an enormous responsibility! This journey was justified from a +military point of view; _it was necessary that Russia should fall_. But +our Government should have taken measures that this should not happen +to Germany."[21] + +Even now the boundless sufferings of the Russian people, now "out of +the ranks," did not call forth a single word of pity or regret from its +moral corrupters.... + +With the beginning of the campaign, the Germans altered the direction +of their work with respect to Russia. Without breaking their +connections with the well-known reactionary circles at Court, in the +Government and in the Duma, using all means for influencing these +circles and all their motives--greed, ambition, German atavism, and +sometimes a peculiar understanding of patriotism--the Germans entered +at the same time into close fellowship with the Russian Revolutionaries +in the country, and especially abroad, amongst the multitudinous +emigrant colony. Directly or indirectly, all were drawn into the +service of the German Government--great agents in the sphere of spying +and recruiting, like Parvus (Helfand); provocateurs, connected with the +Russian Secret Police, like Blum; propaganda agents--Oulianoff (Lenin), +Bronstein (Trotsky), Apfelbaum (Zinovieff), Lunacharsky, Ozolin, Katz +(Kamkoff), and many others. And in their wake went a whole group of +shallow or unscrupulous people, cast over the frontier and fanatically +hating the _régime_ which had rejected them--hating it to the degree +of forgetfulness of their native land, or squaring accounts with this +_régime_, acting sometimes as blind tools in the hands of the German +General Staff. What their motives were, what their pay, how far they +went--these are details; what is important is that they sold Russia, +serving those aims which were set before them by our foe. They were all +closely interlaced with one another and with the agents of the German +Secret Service, forming with them one unbroken conspiracy. + +The work began with a widespread Revolutionary and Separatist +(Ukrainian) propaganda among the prisoners of war. According to +Liebknecht, "the German Government not only helped this propaganda, +but carried it on itself." These aims were served by the Committee +of Revolutionary Propaganda, founded in 1915 at The Hague by the +Union for the Liberation of the Ukraine in Austria by the Copenhagen +Institute (Parvus's organisation), and a whole series of papers of a +Revolutionary and Defeatist character, partly published at the expense +of the German Staff, partly subsidised by it--the _Social Democrat_ +(Geneva--Lenin's paper), _Nashe Slovo_ (Paris--Trotsky's paper), _Na +Tchoozhbeenie_ (Geneva--contributions from Tchernoff, Katz and others), +_Russkii Viestnik_, _Rodnaya Retch_, _Nedielia_, and so forth. Similar +to this was the activity--the spread of Defeatist and Revolutionary +literature, side by side with purely charitable work--of the Committee +of Intellectual Aid to Russian Prisoners of War in Germany and Austria +(Geneva), which was in connection with official Moscow and received +subsidies from it. + +To define the character of these publications it is enough to quote +two or three phrases expressing the views of their inspirers. Lenin +said in the _Social Democrat_: "The least evil will be the defeat +of the Czarist monarchy, the most barbarous and reactionary of all +Governments." Tchernoff, the future Minister of Agriculture, declared +in the _Mysl_ that he had one Fatherland only--the International! + +Along with literature the Germans invited Lenin's and Tchernoff's +collaborators, especially from the editorial staff of _Na +Tchoozhbeenie_, to lecture in the camps, while a German spy, Consul Von +Pelche, carried on a large campaign for the recruiting of agitators for +propaganda in the ranks of the Army--among the Russian emigrants of +conscript age and of Left Wing politics. + +All this was but preparatory work. The Russian Revolution opened +boundless vistas for German propaganda. Along with honest people, once +persecuted, who had struggled for the good of the people, there rushed +into Russia all that revolutionary riff-raff which absorbed the members +of the Russian secret police, the international informers and the +rebels. + +The Petrograd authorities feared most of all the accusation of want of +Democratic spirit. Miliukov, as Minister, stated repeatedly that "the +Government considers unconditionally possible the return to Russia of +all emigrants, regardless of their views on the War and independently +of their registration in the International Control List."[22] This +Minister carried on a dispute with the British, demanding the release +of the Bolsheviks, Bronstein (Trotsky), Zourabov and others, who had +been arrested by the British. + +Matters were more complicated in the case of Lenin and his supporters. +Despite the demands of the Russian Government, the Allies would +undoubtedly have refused to let them through. Therefore, as Ludendorff +acknowledges, the German Government despatched Lenin and his companions +(the first group consisted of seventeen persons) to Russia, allowing +them free transit through Germany. This undertaking, which promised +extraordinarily important results, was richly financed with gold and +credit through the Stockholm (Ganetsky-Fuerstenberg) and Copenhagen +(Parvus) centres and through the Russian Siberian Bank. That gold +which, as Lenin expressed it, "does not smell." + +In October, 1917, Bourtsev published a list of 159 persons brought +through Germany to Russia by order of the German General Staff. Nearly +all of them, according to Bourtsev, "were revolutionaries who, during +the War, had carried on a defeatist campaign in Switzerland and were +now William's voluntary or involuntary agents." Many of them at once +assumed a prominent position in the Social Democratic party, in the +Soviet, the Committee[23] and the Bolshevik Press. The names of Lenin, +Tsederbaum (Martov), Lunacharsky, Natanson, Riazanov, Apfelbaum +(Zinoviev) and others soon became the most fateful in Russian history. + +On the day of Lenin's arrival in Petrograd the German paper _Die Woche_ +devoted an article to this event, in which he was called "a true +friend of the Russian people and an honourable antagonist." And the +Cadet semi-official organ, the _Retch_, which afterwards boldly and +unwaveringly waged war against the Lenin party, greeted his arrival +with the words: "Such a generally acknowledged leader of the Socialist +party ought now to be in the arena, and his arrival in Russia, whatever +opinion may be held of his views, should be welcomed." + +On April 3rd Lenin arrived in Petrograd, where he was received with +much state, and in a few days declared his theses, part of which formed +the fundamental themes of German propaganda: "Down with war and all +power to the Soviet!" + +Lenin's first actions seemed so absurd and so clearly anarchistic that +they called forth protests not only in the whole of the Liberal Press, +but also in the greater part of the Socialist Press. + +But, little by little, the Left Wing of the Revolutionary Democracy, +reinforced by German agents, joined overtly and openly in the +propaganda of its chief, without meeting any decisive rebuff either +from the double-minded Soviet or the feeble Government. The great wave +of German and mutinous propaganda engulfed more and more the Soviet, +the Committee, the Revolutionary Press, and the ignorant masses, and +was reflected, consciously or unconsciously, even among those who stood +at the helm of the State. + +From the very first Lenin's organisation, as was said afterwards, in +July, in the report of the Procurator of the Petrograd High Court of +Justice, "aiming at assisting the States warring against Russia in +their hostile actions against her, entered into an agreement with the +agents of the said States to forward the disorganisation of the Russian +Army and the Russian rear, for which purpose it used the financial +means received from these States to organise a propaganda among the +population and the troops ... and also, for the same purpose, organised +in Petrograd, from July 3rd to 5th, an armed insurrection against the +Supreme Power existing in the State." + +The Stavka had long and vainly raised its voice of warning. General +Alexeiev had, both personally and in writing, called on the Government +to take measures against the Bolsheviks and the spies. Several times +I myself applied to the War Office, sending in, among other things, +evidential material concerning Rakovsky's spying and documents +certifying the treason of Lenin, Skoropis-Yoltoukhovsky and others. +The part played by the Union for the Liberation of the Ukraine (of +which, besides others, Melenevsky and V. Doroshenko were members)[24] +as an organisation of the Central Powers for propaganda, spying and +recruiting for "Setch Ukraine units," was beyond all doubt. In one of +my letters (May 16th), based on the examination of a Russian officer, +Yermolenko, who had been a prisoner of war and had accepted the part +of a German agent for the purpose of disclosing the organisation, +the following picture was revealed: "Yermolenko was transferred to +our rear, on the front of the Sixth Army, to agitate for a speedy +conclusion of a separate peace with Germany. Yermolenko accepted this +commission at the insistence of his comrades. Two officers of the +German General Staff, Schiditzky and Lubar, informed him that a similar +agitation was being carried on in Russia by the sectional president of +the Union for the Liberation of the Ukraine, A. Skoropis-Yoltoukhovsky, +and by Lenin, as agents of the German General Staff. Lenin had been +instructed to seek to undermine by all means the confidence of the +Russian people in the Provisional Government. The money for this work +was received through one Svendson, an employee of the German Embassy in +Stockholm. These methods were practised before the Revolution also. Our +command turned its attention to the somewhat too frequent appearance +of "escaped prisoners." Many of them having surrendered to the enemy, +passed through a definite course of intelligence work, and having +received substantial pay and "papers," were permitted to pass over to +us through the line of trenches. + +Being altogether unable to decide what was a case of courage and what +of treachery, we nearly always sent all escaped prisoners from the +European to the Caucasian Front. + +All the representations of the High Command as to the insufferable +situation of the Army, in the face of such vast treachery, remained +without result. Kerensky carried on free debates in the Soviet with +Lenin on the subject whether the country and the Army should be broken +down or not, basing his action on the view that he was the "War +Minister of the Revolution," and that "freedom of opinion was sacred to +him, whencesoever it might proceed." Tzeretelli warmly defended Lenin: +"I do not agree with Lenin and his agitation. But what has been said by +Deputy Shulgin is a slander against Lenin, _Never has Lenin called for +actions which would infringe upon the course of the Revolution. Lenin +is carrying on an idealist propaganda._" + +This much-talked-of freedom of opinion extremely simplified the work +of German propaganda, giving rise to such an unheard-of phenomenon as +the open preaching in German, at public meetings and in Kronstadt, +of a separate peace and of distrust of the Government, by an agent +of Germany, the President of the Zimmerwald and Kienthal Conference, +Robert Grimm!... + +What a state of moral prostration and loss of all national dignity, +consciousness, and patriotism is presented by the picture of Tzeretelli +and Skobelev "vouching" for the _agent provocateur_; of Kerensky +importuning the Government to grant Grimm the right of entry into +Russia; of Tereshtchenko permitting it, and of Russians listening to +Grimm's speeches--without indignation, without resentment. + +During the Bolshevik insurrection of July the officials of the Ministry +of Justice, exasperated by the laxity of the leaders of the Government, +decided, with the knowledge of their Minister, Pereverzev, to publish +my letter to the Minister of War and other documents, exposing Lenin's +treason to his country. The documents being a statement signed by two +Socialists, Alexinsky and Pankratov, were given to the printers. The +premature disclosure of this fact called forth a passionate protest +from Tchkheidze and Tzeretelli, and terrible anger on the part of the +Ministers Nekrassov and Tereshtchenko. The Government forbade the +publication of information which sullied the good name of comrade +Lenin, and had recourse to reprisals against the officials of the +Ministry of Justice. However, the statement appeared in the Press. +In its turn the Executive Committee of the Soviet of Workmen's and +Soldiers' Delegates exhibited a touching care, not only for the +inviolability of the Bolsheviks, but even for their honour, by issuing +on July 5th a special appeal calling on people "to refrain from the +spreading of accusations reflecting dishonour" on Lenin and "other +political workers" pending the investigation of the matter by a special +commission. This consideration was openly expressed in a resolution +passed by the Central Executive Committees (on July 8th), which, +while condemning the attempt of the Anarchist-Bolshevist elements to +overthrow the Government, expressed the fear that the "inevitable" +measures to which the Government and the military authorities must +have recourse ... would create a basis for the demagogic agitation of +the counter-Revolutionaries who, for the time being, gathered round +the flag of the Revolutionary régime, but who might pave the way for a +military Dictatorship." + +However, the exposure of the direct criminal participation of the +leaders of Bolshevism in acts of mutiny and treason may have obliged +the Government to begin repressions. Lenin and Apfelbaum (Zinoviev) +escaped to Finland, while Bronstein (Trotsky), Kozlovsky, Raskolnikov, +Remniov, and many others were arrested. Several Anarchist-Bolshevist +newspapers were suspended. + +These repressions, however, were not of a serious character. Many +persons known to have been leaders in the mutiny were not charged at +all, and their work of destruction was continued with consistency and +energy. + + * * * * * + +While carrying the war into our country the Germans persistently +and methodically put into practice another watchword--peace at the +Front. Fraternisation had taken place earlier as well, before the +Revolution; but it was then due to the hopelessly wearisome life in the +trenches, to curiosity, to a simple feeling of humanity even towards +the enemy--a feeling exhibited by the Russian soldier more than once +on the battlefield of Borodino, in the bastions of Sevastopol, and in +the Balkan mountains. Fraternisation took place rarely, was punished +by the commanders, and had no dangerous tendencies in it. But now the +German General Staff organised it on a large scale, systematically +and along the whole Front, with the participation of the higher Staff +organs and the commanders, with a detailed code of instructions, which +included the observation of our forces and positions, the demonstration +of the impressive armament and strength of their own positions, +persuasion as to the aimlessness of the War, the incitement of the +Russian soldiers against the Government and their commanders, in whose +interest exclusively this "sanguinary slaughter" was being continued. +Masses of the Defeatist literature manufactured in Germany were passed +over into our trenches, and at the same time agents of the Soviet and +the Committee travelled quite freely along the Front with similar +propaganda, with the organisation of "exhibition fraternisation," and +with whole piles of _Pravda_, _Trench Pravda_, _Social Democrat_, and +other products of our native Socialist intellect and conscience--organs +which, in their forceful argumentation, left the Jesuitical eloquence +of their German brethren far behind. At the same time a general +meeting of simple "delegates from the Front" in Petrograd was passing +a resolution in favour of allowing fraternisation for the purpose of +revolutionary propaganda among the enemy's ranks! + +One cannot read without deep emotion of the feelings of Kornilov, +who, for the first time after the Revolution, in the beginning of +May, when in command of the Eighth Army, came into contact with this +fatal phenomenon in the life of our Front. They were written down by +Nezhintsev, at that time captain of the General Staff and later the +gallant commander of the Kornilov Regiment, who in 1918 fell in action +against the Bolsheviks at the storm of Ekaterinodar. + +"When we had got well into the firing zone of the position," writes +Nezhintsev, "the General (Kornilov) looked very gloomy. His words, +'disgrace, treason,' showed his estimate of the dead silence of the +position. Then he remarked: + +"'Do you feel all the nightmare horror of this silence? You understand +that we are watched by the enemy artillery observers and that we are +not fired at. Yes, the enemy are mocking us as weaklings. Can it be +that the Russian soldier is capable of informing the enemy of my +arrival at the position?' + +"I was silent, but the sacred tears in the eyes of this hero touched me +deeply, and at this moment I vowed in my mind that I would die for him +and for our common Motherland. General Kornilov seemed to feel this. He +turned to me suddenly, pressed my hand, and turned away, as if ashamed +of his momentary weakness. + +"The acquaintance of the new Commander with the infantry began with +the units in the Reserve, when formed in rank, holding a meeting and +replying to all appeals for the necessity of an advance by pointing +out how useless it was to continue a Bourgeois war, carried on by +'militarists.' When, after two hours of fruitless discussion, General +Kornilov, worn out morally and physically, proceeded to the trenches, +he found a scene there which could scarcely have been foreseen by any +soldier of this age. + +"We entered into a system of fortifications where the trench-lines +of both sides were separated or, more correctly, joined by lines of +barbed wire.... The appearance of General Kornilov was greeted ... by +a group of German officers, who gazed insolently on the Commander of +the Russian Army; behind them stood some Prussian soldiers. The General +took my field-glasses and, ascending the parapet, began to examine the +arena of the fights to come. When someone expressed a fear that the +Prussians might shoot the Russian Commander, the latter replied: + +"'I would be immensely glad if they did; perhaps it might sober our +befogged soldiers and put an end to this shameful fraternisation.' + +"At the positions of a neighbouring regiment the Commander of the Army +was greeted by the _bravura_ march of a German Jaeger regiment, to +whose band our 'fraternising' soldiers were making their way. With the +remark, 'This is treason!' the General turned to an officer standing +next him, ordering the fraternisers from both sides to be told that if +this disgraceful scene did not cease at once he would turn the guns +loose on them. The disciplined Germans ceased playing and returned to +their own trenches, seemingly ashamed of the abominable spectacle. +But our soldiers--oh! they held meetings for a long time, complaining +of the way their 'counter-Revolutionary commanders oppressed their +liberty.'" + +In general I do not cherish feelings of revenge. Yet I regret +exceedingly that General Ludendorff left the German Army prematurely, +before its break-up, and did not experience directly in its ranks those +inexpressibly painful moral torments which we Russian officers have +suffered. + +[Illustration: Before the battle in the Revolutionary Army: a meeting.] + +[Illustration: Types of men in the Revolutionary Army.] + +Besides fraternisation, the enemy High Command practised, on an +extensive scale and with provocatory purpose, the dispatch of flags +of truce directly to the troops, or rather to the soldiers. Thus, +about the end of April on the Dvinsk Front there came with a flag of +truce a German officer, who was not received. He managed, however, to +address to the crowd of soldiers the words: "I have come to you with +offers of peace, and am empowered to speak even with the Provisional +Government, but your commanders do not wish for peace." These words +were spread rapidly, and caused agitation among the soldiers and +even threats to desert the Front. Therefore when, a few days later, +in the same section, _parliamentaires_ (a brigade commander, two +officers, and a bugler) made their appearance again, they were taken +to the Staff quarters of the Fifth Army. It turned out, of course, +that they had no authorisations, and could not even state more or +less definitely the object of their coming, since "the sole object of +the pseudo-_parliamentaires_ appearing on our Front," says an order +of the Commander-in-Chief, "has been to observe our dispositions and +our spirit, and, by a lying exhibition of their pacific feelings, to +incline our troops to an inaction profitable to the Germans and ruinous +to Russia and her freedom." Similar cases occurred on the Fronts of +the Eighth, Ninth, and other Armies. + +It is characteristic that the Commander-in-Chief of the Eastern German +Front, Prince Leopold of Bavaria, found it possible to take a personal +part in this course of provocation. In two radiograms, bearing the +systematic character of the customary proclamations and intended for +the soldiers and the Soviet, he stated that the High Command was ready +to meet half-way "the repeatedly expressed desire of the Russian +Soldiers' Delegates to put an end to bloodshed"; that "military +operations between us (the Central Powers) and Russia could be put an +end to _without Russia breaking with her Allies_"; that "if Russia +wants to know the particulars of our conditions, let her give up her +demand for their publication...." And he finishes with a threat: "Does +the new Russian Government, instigated by its Allies, wish to satisfy +itself whether divisions of heavy guns are still to be found on our +Eastern Front?" + +Earlier, when leaders did discreditable things to save their armies and +their countries, at least they were ashamed of it and kept silence. +Nowadays military traditions have undergone a radical change. + +To the credit of the Soviet it must be said that it took a proper +view of this provocationary invitation, saying in reply: "The +Commander-in-Chief of the German troops on the Eastern Front offers us +'a separate truce and secrecy of negotiations.' But Russia knows that +the _débâcle_ of the Allies will be the beginning of the _débâcle_ of +her own Army, and the _débâcle_ of the Revolutionary troops of Free +Russia would mean not only new common graves, but the failure of the +Revolution, the fall of Free Russia." + + * * * * * + +From the very first days of the Revolution a marked change naturally +took place in the attitude of the Russian Press. It expressed itself on +the one hand in a certain differentiation of all the Bourgeois organs, +which assumed a Liberal-Conservative character, the _tactics_ of which +were adopted by an inconsiderable part of the Socialist Press, of the +type of Plekhanov's _Yedinstvo_; and on the other in the appearance of +an immense number of Socialist organs. + +The organs of the Right Wing underwent a considerable evolution, a +characteristic indication of which was the unexpected declaration of +a well-known member of the _Novoye Vremya_ staff, Mr. Menshikov: "We +must be grateful to destiny that the Monarchy, which for a thousand +years has betrayed the people, has at last betrayed itself and put a +cross on its own grave. To dig it up from under that cross and start a +great dispute about the candidates for the fallen throne would be, in +my opinion, a fatal mistake." In the course of the first few months the +Right Press partly closed down--not without pressure and violence on +the part of the Soviets--partly it assumed a pacific-Liberal attitude. +It was only in September, 1917, that its tone grew extremely violent in +connection with the final exposure of the weakness of the Government, +the loss of all hope of a legal way out of the "no thoroughfare" which +had arisen, and the echoes of Kornilov's venture. The attacks of the +extremist organs on the Government passed into solid abuse of it. + +Though differing in a greater or lesser degree in its understanding of +the social problems which the Revolution had to solve, though guilty, +perhaps, along with Russian society, of many mistakes, yet the Russian +Liberal Press showed an exceptional unanimity in the more important +questions of a constitutional and national character: full power to +the Provisional Government, Democratic reforms in the spirit of the +programme of March 2nd,[25] war until victory along with the Allies, +an All-Russia Constituent Assembly as the source of the supreme power +and of the constitution of the country. In yet another respect has the +Liberal Press left a good reputation behind it in history: in the days +of lofty popular enthusiasm, as in the days of doubt, vacillation and +general demoralisation, which distinguished the Revolutionary period of +1917, no place was found in it, nor in the Right Press either, for the +distribution of German gold.... + +The appearance, on a large scale, of the new Socialist Press was +accompanied by a series of unfavourable circumstances. It had no +normal past, no traditions. Its prolonged life below the surface, the +exclusively destructive method of action adopted by it, its suspicious +and hostile attitude towards all authority, put a certain stamp on the +whole tendency of this Press, leaving too little place and attention +for creative work. The complete discord in thought, the contradictions +and vacillation which reigned both within the Soviet and also among the +party groups and within the parties, were reflected in the Press, just +as much as the elemental pressure from below of irresistible, narrowly +egotistic class demands; for neglect of these demands gave rise to +the threat, which was once expressed by the "beauty and pride of the +Revolution," the Kronstadt sailors to Tchernov, the Minister: "If you +will not give us anything, Michael Alexandrovitch will." Finally, the +Press was not uninfluenced by the appearance in it of a number of such +persons as brought into it an atmosphere of uncleanness and perfidy. +The papers were full of names, which had emerged from the sphere of +crime, of the Secret Police and of international espionage. All these +gentlemen--Tchernomazov (a provocator in the Secret Police and director +of the pre-Revolutionary _Pravda_), Berthold (the same and also +editor of the _Communist_), Dekonsky, Malinovsky, Matislavsky, those +colleagues of Lenin and Gorky--Nahamkes, Stoutchka, Ouritsky, Gimmer +(Soukhanov), and a vast number of equally notorious names--brought the +Russian Press to a hitherto unknown degree of moral degradation. + +The difference was only a matter of scope. Some papers, akin to +the Soviet semi-official organ, the _Izvestia of the Workmen's and +Soldiers' Delegates_, undermined the country and the Army, while others +of the _Pravda_ type (the organ of the Bolshevik Social Democrats) +broke them down. + +At the same time as the _Izvestia_ would call on its readers to +support the Provisional Government, while secretly ready to strike +a blow at it, the _Pravda_ would declare that "the Government is +counter-Revolutionary, and therefore there can be no relations +with it. The task of the Revolutionary Democracy is to attain to +the dictatorship of the proletariat." And Tchernov's Socialist +Revolutionary organ, the _Delo Naroda_, would discover a neutral +formula: all possible support to the Coalition Government, but "there +is not, and cannot be, any unanimity in this question; more than that, +there must not be, in the interests of the double defence." + +At the same time as the _Izvestia_ began to preach an advance, but +without a final victory, not abandoning, however, the intention of +"deciding over the heads of the Government and the ruling classes the +conditions on which the War might be stopped," the _Pravda_ called for +universal fraternisation, and the Socialist Revolutionary, _Zemlia i +Volia_, alternately grieved that Germany still wished for conquest, +or demanded a separate peace. Tchernov's paper, which in March had +considered that, "should the enemy be victorious, there would be an end +to Russian freedom," now, in May, saw in the preaching of an advance +"the limit of unblushing gambling on the fate of the Fatherland, the +limit of irresponsibility and demagogy." Gorky's paper, _Novaya Zhizn_, +speaking through Gimmer (Soukhanov), rises to cynicism when it says: +"When Kerensky gives orders for _Russian soil to be cleared of enemy +troops_, his demands far exceed the limits of military _technique_. +He calls for a political act, one which has never been provided for +by the Coalition Government. For clearing the country by an advance +signifies 'complete victory'...." Altogether the _Novaya Zhizn_ +supported German interests with especial warmth, raising its voice in +all cases when German interests were threatened with danger, either +on the part of the Allies or on ours. And when the advance of the +disorganised Army ended in failure--in Tarnopol and Kalush--when Riga +had fallen, the Left Press started a bitter campaign against the Stavka +and the commanding personnel, and Tchernov's paper, in connection +with the proposed reforms in the Army, cried hysterically: "Let the +proletarians know that it is proposed again to give them up to the +iron embrace of beggary, slavery and hunger.... Let the soldiers know +that it is proposed again to enslave them with the 'discipline' of +their commanders and to force them to shed their blood without end, so +long as the belief of the Allies in Russia's 'gallantry' is restored." +The most straightforward of all, however, was afterwards the _Iskra_, +the organ of the Menshevist Internationalists (Martov-Zederbaum), +which, on the day of the occupation of the island of Oesel by a German +landing-party, published an article entitled "Welcome to the German +Fleet!" + +The Army had its own military Press. The organs of the Army staffs and +of those at the Front, which used to appear before the Revolution, +were of the nature of purely military bulletins. Beginning with the +Revolution, these organs, with their weak literary forces, began to +fight for the existence of the Army, conscientiously, honestly, but +not cleverly. Meeting with indifference or exasperation on the part of +the soldiers, who had already turned their backs on the officers, and +especially on the part of the Committee organs of the "Revolutionary" +movement, which existed side by side with them, they began to weaken +and die out, until at last, in the days of August, an order from +Kerensky closed them altogether; the exclusive right of publishing Army +newspapers was transferred to the Army Committee and the Committees of +the troops at the Front. The same fate befell the _News of the Active +Army_, the Stavka organ, started by General Markov and left without +support from the weighty powers of the Press of the capital. + +The Committee Press, widely spread among the troops at the expense of +the Government, reflected those moods of which I have spoken earlier +in the chapter on the Committees, ranging from Constitutionalism to +Anarchism, from complete victory to an immediate conclusion of peace, +without orders. It reflected--but in a worse, more sorry form, as +regards literary style and content--that disharmony of thought and +those tendencies towards extreme theories which characterised the +Socialist Press of the Capital. In this respect, in accordance with the +personnel of the Committees, and to some extent with their proximity to +Petrograd, the respective Fronts differed somewhat from one another. +The most moderate was the South-Western Front, somewhat worse, the +Western, while the Northern Front was pronouncedly Bolshevist. Besides +local talent, the columns of the Committee Press were in many cases +opened wide to the resolutions not only of the extreme national +parties, but even of the German parties. + +It would be incorrect, however, to speak of the immediate action of the +Press on the masses of the soldiers. It did not exist any more than +there were any popular newspapers which these masses could understand. +The Press exercised an influence principally on the semi-educated +elements in the ranks of the Army. This sphere turned out to be nearer +to the soldiers, and to it passed a certain share of that authority +which was enjoyed earlier by the officers. Ideas gathered from the +papers and refracted through the mental prism of this class passed +in a simplified form to the soldiery, the vast majority of which +unfortunately consisted of ignorant and illiterate men. And among these +masses all these conceptions, stripped of cunningly-woven arguments, +premises and grounds, were transformed into wondrously simple and +terrifically logical conclusions. + +In them dominated the straightforward negation: "Down!" + +Down with the Bourgeois Government, down with the counter-Revolutionary +Commanders, down with the "sanguinary slaughter," down with everything +of which they were sick, of which they were wearied, all that in one +way or another interfered with their animal instincts and hampered +"free will"--down with them all! + +In such an elementary fashion did the Army at innumerable soldiers' +meetings settle all the political and social questions that were +agitating mankind. + + * * * * * + +The curtain has fallen. The Treaty of Versailles has for a time given +pause to the armed conflict in Central Europe. Evident to the end that, +having regained their strength, the nations may again take up their +arms, so as to burst the chains in which defeat has fettered them. + +The idea of the "world-peace," which the Christian churches have been +preaching for twenty centuries, is buried for years to come. + +To us, how childishly naïve now seem the efforts of the humanists of +the nineteenth century, who by prolonged, ardent propaganda sought +to soften the horrors of war and to introduce the limiting norms +of International Law! Yes, now, when we know that one may not only +infringe the neutrality of a peaceful, cultured country, but give it +to be ravaged and plundered; when we can sink peaceable ships, with +women and children on board, by means of submarines; poison people with +suffocating gases and tear their bodies with the fragments of explosive +bullets; when a whole country, a whole nation, is quoted by cold, +political calculation merely as a "Barrier" against the invasion of +armed force and pernicious ideas, and is periodically either helped or +betrayed in turn. + +But the most terrible of all weapons ever invented by the mind of man, +the most shameful of all the methods permitted in the late World War +was _the poisoning of the soul of a people_! + +Germany assigns the priority of this invention to Great Britain. Let +them settle this matter between themselves. But I see my native land +crushed, dying in the dark night of horror and insanity. And I know her +tormentors. + +Two theses have arisen before mankind in all their grim power and all +their shameless nakedness: + +_All is permissible for the advantage of one's country!_ + +_All is permissible for the triumph of one's party, one's class!_ + +All, even the moral and physical ruin of an enemy country, even the +betrayal of one's native land and the making on its living body of +_social experiments_, the failure of which threatens it with paralysis +and death. + +Germany and Lenin unhesitatingly decided these questions in the +affirmative. The world has condemned them; but are all those who speak +of the matter so unanimous and sincere in their condemnation? Have not +these ideas left somewhat too deep traces in the minds, not so much +perhaps of the popular masses as of their leaders? I, at least, am led +to such a conclusion by all the present soulless world policy of the +Governments, especially towards Russia, by all the present utterly +selfish tactics of the class organisations. + +This is terrible. + +I believe that every people has the right to defend its existence, +sword in hand; I know that for many years to come war will be the +customary method of settling international disputes, and that methods +of warfare will be both honourable and, alas! dishonourable. But there +is a certain limit, beyond which even baseness ceases to be simply +baseness and becomes insanity. This limit we have already reached. And +if religion, science, literature, philosophers, humanitarians, teachers +of mankind do not arouse a broad, idealistic movement against the +Hottentot morality with which we have been inoculated, the world will +witness the decline of its civilisation. + +[Illustration: Before the battle in the Old Army: Prayers.] + + + + +CHAPTER XXII. + +THE CONDITION OF THE ARMY AT THE JULY ADVANCE. + + +Having outlined a whole series of conditions which exercised an +influence on the life, spirit, and military efficiency of the once +famous Russian Army, I shall now pass to the sorrowful tale of its fall. + +I was born in the family of an officer of the line, and for twenty-two +years (including the two years of the Russo-Japanese War) before the +European War served in the ranks of modest line units and in small Army +Staffs. I shared the life, the joys and the sorrows of the officer and +the soldier, and devoted many pages in the Military Press to their +life which was my own. From 1914 to 1920, almost without interval, I +stood at the head of the troops and led them into battle on the fields +of White Russia, Volynia, Galicia, in the mountains of Hungary, in +Roumania, and then--then in the bitter internecine war which, with +bloody share, ploughed up our native land. + +I have more grounds and more right to speak of the Army and in the +name of the Army than all those strangers of the Socialist Camp, who, +in their haughty self-conceit, as soon as they touched the Army, +began breaking down its foundations, judging its leaders and fighters +and diagnosing its serious disease, who even now, after grievous +experiments and experiences, have not given up the hope of transforming +this mighty and terrible weapon of national self-preservation into a +means for satisfying party and social appetites. For me, the Army is +not only an historical, social, national phenomenon, but nearly the +whole of my life, in which lie many memories, precious and not to be +forgotten, in which all is bound up and interlaced into one general +mass of swiftly passing days of sadness and of joy, in which there are +hundreds of cherished graves, of buried dreams and unextinguishable +faith. + +The Army should be approached cautiously, never forgetting that not +only its historical foundations, but even such details of its life +as may, perhaps, seem strange and absurd, have their meaning and +significance. + +When the Revolution began that old veteran, beloved by both officers +and soldiers, General P. I. Mishtchenko, being unable to put up with +the new régime, retired from the Army. He lived at Temir-Han Shoura, +never went outside his garden fence, and always wore his General's +uniform and his crosses of St. George, even in the days of Bolshevik +power. One day the Bolsheviks came to search his house, and, among +other things, wanted to deprive him of his shoulder straps and +decorations. The old General retired to a neighbouring room and shot +himself. + +Let whoever will laugh at "old-fashioned prejudices." We shall +reverence his noble memory. + +And so the storm-cloud of the Revolution broke. + +There was no doubt whatever that such a cataclysm in the life of the +nation could not but have a grave effect. The Revolution was _bound_ +to convulse the Army, greatly weakening and breaking all its historic +ties. Such a result was normal, natural and unavoidable, independently +of the condition of the Army at the moment, independently of the mutual +relations of Commanders and subordinates. We can speak only of the +circumstances which arrested or hastened the disintegration of the Army. + +A Government appeared. + +Its source might have been one of three elements: The High Command +(a military dictatorship), the Bourgeois State Duma (the Provisional +Government), or the Revolutionary Democracy (the Soviet). It was the +Provisional Government that was acknowledged. The attitude of the other +two elements towards it was different; the Soviet practically robbed +the Government of its power, while the High Command submitted to it +implicitly, and was therefore obliged to carry out its plans. + +The Government had two courses open to it; it could combat the +disintegrating influences which began to appear in the Army by stern +and ruthless measures, or it could encourage them. Owing to pressure +from the Soviet and partly through want of firmness and through +misunderstanding of the laws of existence of armed forces, the +Government chose the second course. + +This circumstance decided the fate of the Army. All other circumstances +could but influence the duration of the process of disruption and its +depth. + +[Illustration: Types of soldiers of the Old Army. This company was sent +to the West European Front.] + +The festive days of touching and joyous union between the officers +and the soldiers vanished rapidly, being replaced by tiresome, weary +week-days. But they had been in the past, those days of joy, and, +therefore, no impassable abyss existed between the two Ranks, over +which the inexorable logic of life had long been casting a bridge. +The unnecessary, obsolete methods, which had introduced an element of +irritation into the soldiery, fell away at once, as of themselves; the +officers became more thoughtful and industrious. + +Then came a torrent of newspapers, appeals, resolutions, orders, from +some unknown authority, and with them a whole series of new ideas, +which the soldier masses were unable to digest and assimilate. New +people appeared, with a new speech, so fascinating and promising, +liberating the soldiers from obedience and inspiring hope that they +would be saved from deadly danger immediately. When one Regimental +Commander naïvely inquired whether these people might not be tried +by Field Court-Martial and shot, his telegram, after passing through +all official stages, called forth the reply from Petrograd that these +people were inviolable, and had been sent by the Soviet to the troops +for the very purpose of explaining to them the true meaning of current +events. + +When such leaders of the Revolutionary Democracy, as have not yet lost +their feeling of responsibility for crucified Russia, now say that the +movement, caused by the deep class differences between the officers +and the soldiers and by "the enslavement" of the latter, was of an +elemental nature, which they could not resist, this is deeply untrue. + +All the fundamental slogans, all the programmes, tactics, instructions +and text-books, forming the foundation of the "democratisation" of +the Army, had been drawn up by the military sections of the secret +Socialist parties long before the War, outside of "elemental" pressure, +on the grounds of clear, cold calculation, as a product of "Socialist +reasoning and conscience." + +True, the officers strove to persuade the men not to believe the +"new words" and to do their duty. But from the very beginning the +Soviets had declared the officers to be foes of the Revolution; in +many towns they had been subjected to cruel torture and death, and +this with impunity. Evidently not without some reason, when even the +"Bourgeois" Duma issued such a strange and unexpected "announcement" +as the following: "This first day of March, rumours were spread among +the soldiers of the garrison of Petrograd to the effect that the +officers in the regiments were disarming the soldiers. These rumours +were investigated and found to be false. As President of the Military +Commission of the Provisional Committee of the State Duma, I declare +that the most decided measures _will be_ taken to prevent such action +on the part of the officers, up to the shooting of those guilty of it. +Signed, COLONEL ENGELHARDT." + +Next came Order No. 1., the Declaration and so forth. + +Perhaps, however, it might have been possible to combat all this verbal +ocean of lies and hypocrisy which flowed from Petrograd and from the +local Soviets and was echoed by the local demagogues had it not been +for a circumstance which paralysed all the efforts of the Commanders, +viz., the animal feeling of self-preservation which had flooded the +whole mass of the soldiers. This feeling had always existed. But it +had been kept under and restrained by examples of duty fulfilled, by +flashes of national self-consciousness, by shame, fear and pressure. +When all these elements had disappeared, when for the soothing of a +drowsy conscience there was a whole arsenal of new conceptions, which +justified the care for one's own hide and furnished it with an ideal +basis, then the Army could exist no longer. This feeling upset all the +efforts of the Commanders, all moral principles and the whole regiment +of the Army. + + * * * * * + +In a large, open field, as far as the eye can see, run endless lines of +trenches, sometimes coming close up to each other, interlacing their +barbed wire fences, sometimes running far off and vanishing behind a +verdant crest. The sun has risen long ago, but it is still as death +in the field. The first to rise are the Germans. In one place and +another their figures look out from the trenches; a few come out on to +the parapet to hang their clothes, damp after the night, in the sun. +A sentry in our front trench opens his sleepy eyes, lazily stretches +himself, after looking indifferently at the enemy trenches. A soldier +in a dirty shirt, bare-footed, with coat slung over his shoulders, +cringing under the morning cold, comes out of his trench and plods +towards the German positions, where, between the lines, stands a +"postbox"; it contains a new number of the German paper, _The Russian +Messenger_, and proposals for barter. + +All is still. Not a single gun is to be heard. Last week the Regimental +Committee issued a resolution against firing, even against distance +firing; let the necessary distances be estimated by the map. A +Lieutenant-Colonel of the gunners--a member of the Committee--gave +his full approval to this resolution. When yesterday the Commander +of a field battery began firing at a new enemy trench, our infantry +opened rifle fire on our observation post and wounded the telephone +operator. During the night the infantry lit a fire on the position +being constructed for a newly arrived heavy battery.[26] + +Nine a.m. The first Company gradually begins to awaken. The trenches +are incredibly defiled; in the narrow communication trenches and those +of the second line the air is thick and close. The parapet is crumbling +away. No one troubles to repair it; no one feels inclined to do so, +and there are not enough men in the Company. There is a large number +of deserters; more than fifty have been allowed to go. Old soldiers +have been demobilised, others have gone on leave with the arbitrary +permission of the Committee. Others, again, have been elected members +of numerous Committees, or gone away as delegates; a while ago, for +instance, the Division sent a numerous delegation to "Comrade" Kerensky +to verify whether he had really given orders for an advance. Finally, +by threats and violence, the soldiers have so terrorised the regimental +surgeons that the latter have been issuing medical certificates even to +the "thoroughly fit." + +In the trenches the hours pass slowly and wearily, in dullness and +idleness. In one corner men are playing cards, in another a soldier +returned from leave is lazily and listlessly telling a story; the air +is full of obscene swearing. Someone reads aloud from the _Russian +Messenger_ the following: + +"The English want the Russians to shed the last drop of their blood for +the greater glory of England, who seeks her profit in everything.... +Dear soldiers, you must know that Russia would have concluded peace +long ago had not England prevented her.... We must turn away from +her--the Russian people demand it; such is their sacred will." + +Someone or other swears. + +"Don't you wish for peace. _They_ make peace, the ----; we shall die +here, without getting our freedom!" + +Along the trenches came Lieutenant Albov, the Company Commander. He +said to the groups of soldiers, somewhat irresolutely and entreatingly: + +"Comrades, get to work quickly. In three days we have not made a single +communication trench to the firing line." + +The card players did not even look round; someone said in a low voice, +"All right." The man reading the newspaper rose and reported, in a free +and easy manner: + +"The Company does not want to dig, because that would be preparation +for an advance, and the Committee has resolved...." + +"Look here, you understand nothing at all about it, and, moreover, why +do you speak for the whole Company? Even if we remain on the defensive +we are lost in case of an alarm; the whole Company cannot get out to +the firing line along a single trench." + +He said this, and with a gesture of despair went on his way. Matters +were hopeless. Every time he tried to speak with them for a time, and +in a friendly way, they would listen to him attentively; they liked to +talk to him, and, on the whole, his Company looked on him favourably +in their own way. But he felt that between him and them a wall had +sprung up, against which all his good impulses were shattered. He +had lost the path to their soul--lost it in the impassable jungle of +darkness, roughness, and that wave of distrust and suspicion which +had overwhelmed the soldiers. Was it, perhaps, that he used the wrong +words, or was not able to say what he meant? Scarcely that. But a +little while before the War, when he was a student and was carried away +by the popular movement, he had visited villages and factories and had +found "real words" which were clear and comprehensible to all. But, +most of all, with what words can one move men to face death when all +their feelings are veiled by one feeling--that of self-preservation? + +The train of his thoughts was broken by the sudden appearance of the +Regimental Commander. + +"What the devil does this mean? The man on duty does not come forward. +The men are not dressed. Filth and stench. What are you about, +Lieutenant?" + +The grey-headed Colonel cast a stern glance on the soldiers which +involuntarily impressed them. They all rose to their feet. He glanced +through a loop-hole and, starting back, asked nervously: + +"What is that?" + +In the green field, among the barbed wire, a regular bazaar was +going on. A group of Germans and of our men were bartering vodka, +tobacco, lard, bread. Some way off a German officer reclined on the +grass--red-faced, sturdy, with an arrogant look on his face--and +carried on a conversation with a soldier named Soloveytchick; and, +strange to say, the familiar and insolent Soloveytchick stood before +the Lieutenant respectfully. + +The Colonel pushed the observer aside and, taking his rifle from him, +put it through the loop-hole. A murmur was heard among the soldiers. +They began to ask him not to shoot. One of them, in a low voice, as if +speaking to himself, remarked: + +"This is provocation." + +The Colonel, crimson with fury, turned to him for a moment and shouted: + +"Silence!" + +All grew silent and pressed to the loop-hole. A shot was heard, and the +German officer convulsively stretched himself out and was still; blood +was running from his head. The haggling soldiers scattered. + +The Colonel threw the rifle down and, muttering through his teeth +"Scoundrels!" strode further along the trenches. The "truce" was +infringed. + +The Lieutenant went off to his hut. His heart was sad and empty. He was +oppressed by the realisation of his unwantedness and uselessness in +these absurd surroundings, which perverted the whole meaning of that +service to his country, which alone justified all his grave troubles +and the death which might perhaps be near. He threw himself on his bed, +where he lay for an hour, for two hours, striving to think of nothing, +to forget himself. + +But from beyond the mud wall, where the shelter lay, there crept +someone's muffled voice, which seemed to wrap his brain in a filthy fog: + +"It is all very well for them, the ----. They receive their hundred and +forty roubles a month clear, while we--so generous of them--get seven +and a half. Wait a bit, our turn will come." + +Silence. + +"I hear they are sharing the land in our place in the province of +Kharkov. If I could only get home." + +There was a knock at the door. The Sergeant-Major had come. + +"Your honour (so he always addressed his Company Commander in the +absence of witnesses), the Company is angry, and threatens to leave the +position if it is not relieved at once. The Second Battalion should +have relieved us at five o'clock, and it is not here yet. Couldn't they +be rung up?" + +"They will not go away. All right, I shall inquire; but, all the same, +it is too late now. After this morning's incident the Germans will not +allow us to be relieved by day." + +"They will allow us. The Committee members know about it already. +I think"--he lowered his voice--"that Soloveytchick has managed to +slip across and explain matters. It is rumoured that the Germans have +promised to overlook it, on condition that next time the Colonel comes +to visit the trenches we should let them know, and they will throw a +bomb. You had better report it or else, who knows?" + +"All right." + +The Sergeant-Major was preparing to leave. The Lieutenant stopped him. + +"Matters are bad, Petrovitch. They do not trust us." + +"God alone knows whom they trust; only last week the Sixth Company +elected their Sergeant-Major themselves, and now they are making a mock +of him; they won't let him say a word." + +"What will things be afterwards?" + +The Sergeant-Major blushed, and said softly: + +"Then the Soloveytchicks will rule over us, and we shall be, so to +speak, dumb animals before them--that is how matters will be, your +honour." + +The relief came at last. Captain Bouravin, the Commander of the Fifth +Company, came into the hut. Albov offered to show him the section and +explain the disposition of the enemy. + +"Very well, though that does not matter, because I am not really in +command of the Company--I am boycotted." + +"How?" + +"Just so. They have elected the 2nd Lieutenant, my subaltern, +as Company Commander, and degraded me as a supporter of the old +régime, because, you see, I had drill twice a day--you know that the +marching contingents come up here absolutely untrained. Indeed, the +2nd Lieutenant was the first to vote for my removal. 'We have been +slave-driven long enough,' said he. 'Now we are free. We must clean out +everyone, beginning with the head. A young man can manage the regiment +just as well, so long as he is a true Democrat and supports the freedom +of the soldier.' I would have left, but the Colonel flatly refused to +allow it, and forbids me to hand over the company. So now, you see, we +have two commanders. I have stood the situation for five days. Look +here, Albov, you are not in a hurry, are you? Very good, then; let us +have a chat. I am feeling depressed. Albov, have you not yet thought of +suicide?" + +"Not as yet." + +Bouravin rose to his feet. + +"Understand me, they have desecrated my soul, outraged my human +dignity, and so every day, every hour, in every word, glance or gesture +one sees a constant outrage. What have I done to them? I have been in +the service for eight years; I have no family, no house or home. All +this I have found in the regiment, my own regiment. Twice I have been +badly wounded, and before my wounds were healed have rushed back to the +regiment--so there you are! And I loved the soldier--I am ashamed to +speak of it myself, but they must remember how, more than once, I have +crept out under the barbed wire to drag in the wounded. And now! Well, +yes, I reverence the regimental flag and hate their crimson rags. I +accept the Revolution. But to me Russia is infinitely dearer than the +Revolution. All these Committees and meetings, all this adventitious +rubbish which has been sown in the Army I am organically unable to +swallow and digest. But, after all, I interfere with no one; I say +nothing of this to anyone, I strive to convince no one. If only the War +could be ended honourably, and then I am ready to break stones on the +highway, only not to remain in an Army democratised in such a manner. +Take my subaltern; he discusses everything with them--nationalisation, +socialisation, labour control. Now I cannot do so--I never had time +to study it, and I confess I never took any interest in the matter. +You remember how the Army Commander came here and, amidst a crowd of +soldiers, said: 'Don't say "General"; call me simply Comrade George.' +Now I cannot do such things; besides, all the same, they would not +believe me. So I am silent. But they understand and pay me off. And, +you know, with all their ignorance, what subtle psychologists they +are! They are able to find the place where the sting hurts most. Now, +yesterday for instance...." + +He stooped down to Albov's ear, and continued in a whisper: + +"I returned from our mess. In my tent, at the head of my bed, I have +a photograph--well, just a treasured memory. There they had drawn an +obscenity!" + +Bouravin rose and wiped his brow with his handkerchief. + +"Well, let us take a look at the positions. God willing, we shall not +have to stand it long. No one in the Company wants to go scouting. I +go myself every night; sometimes there is a volunteer who accompanies +me--he has a hunter's strain in him. Should anything happen, please, +Albov, see to it that a little packet--it is in my bag--is sent to its +destination." + +The company, without waiting for the completion of the relief, wandered +away in disorder. Albov plodded after them. + +The communication trench ended in a broad hollow. Like a great ant-hill +the regimental bivouac stretched in rows of huts, tents, smoking +camp-kitchens and horse-lines. They had once been carefully masked by +artificial plantations, which had now withered, lost their leaves, and +were merely leafless poles. On an open green soldiers were drilling +here and there--listlessly, lazily, as if to create an impression +that they were doing something; after all, it would be awkward to +be doing absolutely nothing at all. There were few officers about; +the good ones were sick of the trivial farce into which real work was +now transformed, while the inferior ones had a moral justification +for their laziness and idleness. In the distance something between a +mob and a column marched along the road towards the regimental staff +quarters, carrying crimson flags. Before them went a huge banner +bearing the inscription, in white letters, visible in the distance: +"Down with War!" + +These were reinforcements coming up. At once, all the soldiers drilling +on the green, as if at a signal, broke their ranks and ran towards the +column. + +"Hey, countrymen! What province are you from?" + +An animated conversation began on the usual anxious themes: how did +matters stand with the land; would peace be concluded soon? Much +interest, also, was shown in the question as to whether they had +brought any home-brewed spirits, as "their own regimental" home brew, +manufactured in fairly large quantities at "the distillery" of the +Third Battalion, was very disgusting, and gave rise to painful symptoms. + +Albov made his way to the mess-room. The officers were gathering for +dinner. What had become of the former animation, friendly talk, healthy +laughter and torrents of reminiscences of a stormy, hard, but glorious +life of war? The reminiscences had faded, the dreams had flown away, +and stern reality crushed them all down with its weight. + +They spoke in low voices, sometimes breaking off or expressing +themselves figuratively: the mess servants might denounce them, and +also new faces had appeared among themselves. Not so long ago the +Regimental Committee, on the report of a servant, had tried an officer +of the regiment, who wore the Cross of St. George and to whom the +regiment owed one of its most famous victories. This Lieutenant-Colonel +had said something about "mutinous slaves." And though it was proved +that those were not his own words and that he had only quoted a speech +made by Comrade Kerensky, the Committee "expressed its indignation at +him"; he had to leave the regiment. + +The personnel of the officers, too, was much changed. Of the original +staff, some two or three remained. Some had perished, others had been +crippled, others again, having earned "distrust," were wandering about +the Front, importuning Staffs, joining shock battalions, entering +institutions in the rear, while some of the weaker brethren had simply +gone home. The Army had ceased to need the bearers of the traditions +of its units, of its former glory--of those old Bourgeois prejudices, +which had been swept into the dust by the Revolutionary creative power. + +Everyone in the regiment knows already of that morning's event in +Albov's Company. He is questioned about details. A Lieutenant-Colonel +sitting next him wagged his head. + +"Well done, our old man. There was something in the Fifth Company, too. +But I am afraid it will end badly. Have you heard what was done to the +Commander of the Doubov Regiment, because he refused to confirm an +elected Company Commander and put three agitators under arrest? _He was +crucified._ Yes, my boy! They nailed him to a tree and began, in turn, +to stick their bayonets into him, to cut off his ears, his nose, his +fingers." + +He seized his head in his hands. + +"My God! Where do these men get so much brutality, so much baseness?" + +At the other end of the table the ensigns are carrying on a conversation +on that ever harassing theme--where to get away to. + +"Have you applied for admission to the Revolutionary Battalion?" + +"No, it is not worth while. It seems that it is being formed under the +superintendence of the Executive Committee, with Committees, elections +and "Revolutionary" discipline. It does not suit me." + +"They say that shock units are being formed in Kornilov's Army and at +Minsk also. That would be good...." + +"I have applied for transfer to our rifle brigade in France. Only I do +not know what I am to do about the language." + +"Alas! my boy, you are too late," remarked the Lieutenant-Colonel from +the other end of the table. "The Government has long ago sent 'emigrant +comrades' there to enlighten minds. And now our brigades, somewhere +in the South of France, are in the situation of something like either +prisoners of war or disciplinary battalions." + +This talk, however, was realised by all to be of a purely platonic +character, in view of the hopelessness of a situation from which there +was no escape. It was only a case of dreaming a little, as Tchekhov's +_Three Sisters_ once dreamed of Moscow. Dreaming of such a wondrous +place, where human dignity is not trampled into the mud daily, where +one can live quietly and die honourably, without violence and without +outrage to one's service. Such a very little thing. + +"Mitka, bread!" boomed out the mighty bass of 2nd Lieutenant Yassny. + +He is quite a character, this Yassny. Tall and sturdy, with a +thick crop of hair and a copper-coloured beard, he is altogether +an embodiment of the strength and courage of the soil. He wears +four crosses of St. George, and has been promoted from the rank of +Sergeant for distinction in action. He does not adapt himself to his +new surroundings in the least, said "levorution" for "revolution" and +"mettink" for "meeting," and cannot reconcile himself to the new order. +Yassny's undoubted "democratic" views, his candour and sincerity, +have given him an exceptionally privileged position in the regiment. +Without enjoying any special influence, he can, however, condemn, +rudely, harshly, sometimes with an oath, both people and ideas, which +are jealously guarded and worshipped by the regimental "Revolutionary +Democracy." The men are angry, but suffer him. + +"There is no bread, I say." + +The officers, absorbed in their thoughts and in their conversation, had +not even noticed that they had eaten their soup without bread. + +"There will be no bread to-day," answered the waiter. + +"What is the meaning of this? Call the mess-sergeant." + +The mess-sergeant came, and began to justify himself in a bewildered +manner; he had sent in a request that morning for two pouds of bread. +The head of the Commissariat had endorsed it "to be issued," but the +clerk, Fedotov, a member of the Commissariat Committee, had endorsed it +in his turn "not to be issued." So the storehouse would not issue any +bread. + +No one made any objection, so painfully ashamed was everyone both of +the mess-sergeant and of those depths of inanity which had suddenly +broken into their life and swamped it with a grey, filthy slime. +Only Yassny's bass voice rang out distinctly under the arches of the +mess-room: + +"What swine!" + +Albov was just preparing for a nap after dinner when the flap of his +tent was lifted, and through the aperture appeared the bald head of the +Chief of the Commissariat--a quiet, elderly Colonel, who had joined the +Army again from the retired list. + +"May I come in?" + +"I beg your pardon, Colonel." + +"Never mind, my dear fellow, don't get up. I have just come in for a +second. You see, to-day at six o'clock there is to be a regimental +meeting. It will hear the Report of the Committee for verifying +the Commissariat, and apparently they will go for me. I am no +speech-maker, but you are a master of it. Take my part, should it be +necessary." + +"Certainly. I did not intend going, but once it is necessary, I shall +be there." + +"Thank you, then, my dear fellow." + +By six o'clock the square next to the regimental Staff quarters was +completely covered with men. At least two thousand had turned up. +The crowd moved, chattered, laughed--just such a Russian crowd as +on the Khodynka in Moscow or the _Champs de Mars_ in Petrograd at a +holiday entertainment. The Revolution could not transform it all at +once, either mentally or spiritually. But, having stunned it with a +torrent of new words and opened up before it unbounded possibilities, +the Revolution had destroyed its equilibrium and made it nervously +susceptible and stormily reactive to all methods of external influence. +An ocean of words--both morally lofty and basely criminal--flowed +through their minds as through a sieve, which passed through the +trend of the new ideas and retained only those grains which had a +real applied meaning in their daily life, in the surroundings of +the soldier, the peasant, the workman. Hence the absolute absence +of results from the torrents of eloquence which flooded the Army at +the instance of the Minister of War; hence, too, the illogical warm +sympathy with both speakers of clearly opposed politics. + +Under such conditions, what practical meaning could the crowd find in +such ideas as duty, honour, interests of the State, on the one hand; +annexations, indemnities, the self-determination of peoples, conscious +discipline, and other dim conceptions on the other. + +The whole regiment had turned out; the soldiers were attracted by +the meeting, as by any other spectacle. Delegates had been sent by +the Second Battalion, which was in the trenches--about one-third of +the battalion. In the middle of the square stood a platform for the +speakers; it was decorated with red flags, faded with time and rain; +they have been there since the platform was erected for a review by the +Commander of the Army. Reviews are now held not among the ranks, but +from a tribune. To-day the agenda of the meeting contain two questions: +"(1) The Report of the Commissariat Committee on the anomalies in the +supply of Officers' rations; and (2) the report of Comrade Sklianka, +an orator specially invited from the Moscow Soviet to speak about the +formation of a Coalition Ministry." + +During the preceding week a stormy meeting, which nearly ended in a +riot, had been held in connection with the complaint of one of the +companies that the soldiers had to eat lentils, which they hated, +and thin soup, simply because all the groats and butter were taken +for the officers' mess. This was clearly nonsense. Nevertheless, it +was resolved to appoint a Committee for investigation, which would +report to a general meeting of the regiment. The Report was drawn up +by a member of the Committee, Lieutenant-Colonel Petrov, who had been +removed the year before from the post of Chief of the Commissariat and +was now settling accounts with his successor. In a petty, cavilling +way, with a sort of mean irony, he enumerated slight, irrelevant, +inaccuracies in the Commissariat Department of the regiment--there were +no serious ones--and dragged out his Report endlessly in his creaking, +monotonous voice. The crowd, which at first had kept quiet, now hummed +again, having ceased to listen. From different sides voices were heard: + +"Enough!" + +"That will do!" + +The Chairman of the Commission ceased reading and suggested that "those +comrades who wished" should express their opinions. A tall, stout +soldier ascended the platform, and began speaking in a loud, hysterical +voice: + +"Comrades, you have heard? That is where the soldiers' property goes. +We suffer, our clothes are worn out, we are covered with lice, we go +hungry, while they pull the last piece of food out of our mouths." + +As he spoke a spirit of nervous excitement kept growing in the crowd, +muffled murmurs ran through it, and shouts of approval burst from it +here and there. + +"When will there be an end to all this? We are worn out, weary to +death." + +Suddenly 2nd Lieut. Yassny's deep voice was heard from the rear ranks, +drowning the voices both of the speaker and of the crowd. + +"What is your Company?" + +Some confusion took place. The orator was dumb. Shouts of indignation +were flung at Yassny. + +"What is your Company, I ask you?" + +"The Seventh!" + +Voices were heard in the ranks: + +"We have no such man in the Seventh Company." + +"Wait a bit, my friend," boomed Yassny, "was it not you that came in +to-day with the new lot ... you were carrying a large placard? When +have you had time to get worn out, poor fellow?" + +The spirit of the crowd changed in an instant. It began to hiss, laugh, +shout, and crack jokes. The unsuccessful orator disappeared in the +crowd. Someone shouted: + +"Pass a resolution!" + +Lieutenant-Colonel Petrov mounted the platform again, and began to +read out a ready resolution for transferring the officers' mess to +privates' rations. But no one listened to him now. Two or three voices +shouted "That's right!" Petrov hesitated a little, then put the paper +in his pocket and left the platform. The second question, concerning +the removal of the Chief of the Commissariat and the immediate election +of his successor (the author of the report was the candidate proposed) +remained unread. The Chairman of the Committee then announced: + +"Comrade Sklianka, member of the Executive Committee of the Moscow +Council of Workmen's and Soldiers' Delegates, will now address the +meeting." + +They were tired of their own speakers--it was always one and the +same thing--and the arrival of a new man, somewhat advertised by +the Committee, aroused general interest. The crowd closed up round +the platform and was still. A small, black-haired man, nervous and +short-sighted, who constantly adjusted the eyeglasses which kept +slipping off his nose, mounted the platform, or rather quickly ran +up on to it. He began speaking rapidly, with much spirit and much +gesticulation. + +"Soldier comrades! Three months have passed already since the Petrograd +workers and Revolutionary soldiers threw off the yoke of the Czar and +of all his Generals. The Bourgeoisie, in the person of Tereshtchenko, +the well-known sugar refiner; Konovalov, the factory owner; the +landowners, Gutchkov, Rodzianko, Miliukov, and other traitors to the +interests of the people, having seized the supreme power, have tried to +deceive the popular masses. + +"The demand of the people that negotiations be commenced at once for +that peace which we are offered by our German worker and soldier +brethren--who are just as much bereft of all that makes life worth +living as we are--has ended in a fraud--a telegram from Miliukov to +England and France to say that the Russian people are ready to fight +until victory is attained. + +"The unfortunate people understood that the supreme power had fallen +into even worse hands, _i.e._, into those of the sworn foes of the +workman and the peasant. Therefore the people shouted mightily: 'Down +with you, hands off!' + +"And the accursed Bourgeoisie shook at the mighty cry of the workers +and hypocritically invited to a share in their power the so-called +Democracy--the Socialist-Revolutionaries and the Mensheviks, who always +associated with the Bourgeoisie for the betrayal of the interests of +the working people." + +Having thus outlined the process of the formation of the Coalition +Ministry, Comrade Sklianka passed in greater detail to the fascinating +prospects of rural and factory anarchy, where "the wrath of the +people sweeps away the yoke of capital" and where "Bourgeois property +gradually passes into the hands of its real masters--the workmen and +the poorer peasants." + +"The soldiers and the workmen still have enemies," he continued. "These +are the friends of the overthrown Czarist Government, the hardened +admirers of shooting, the knout, and blows. The most bitter foes of +freedom, they have now donned crimson rosettes, call you 'comrades' and +pretend to be friends, but cherish the blackest intentions in their +hearts, preparing to restore the rule of the Romanovs. + +"Soldiers, do not trust these wolves in sheep's clothing! They call +you to fresh slaughter. Well, follow them if you like! Let them pave +the path for the return of the bloody Czar with your corpses. Let your +orphans, your widows and children, deserted by all, pass again into +slavery, hunger, beggary, and disease!" + +The speech undoubtedly had a great success. The atmosphere grew +red-hot, the excitement increased--that excitement of the "molten +mass," in the presence of which it is impossible to foresee either the +limits or the tension, or the tracks along which the torrent will pour. +The crowd was noisy and agitated, accompanying with shouts of approval +or curses against "the enemies of the people" those parts of the speech +which especially touched its instincts, its naked, cruel egotism. + +Albov, pale, with burning eyes, made his appearance on the platform. +He spoke excitedly of something or other to the chairman, who then +addressed the crowd. The chairman's words were inaudible amidst the +noise; for a long time he waved his hands and the flag which he had +pulled down, until at last the noise had subsided somewhat. + +"Comrades, Lieutenant Albov wishes to address you!" + +Shouts and hisses were heard. + +"Down with him! We do not want him!" + +But Albov was already on the platform, gripping hard, bending downwards +towards the sea of heads. And he said: + +"No, I will speak, and you dare not refuse to listen to one of those +officers whom this man has been abusing and dishonouring here before +you. Who he may be, whence he has come, who pays him for his speeches, +so profitable to the Germans, not one of you knows. He has come here, +befogged you, and will go on his way to sow evil and treason. And you +have believed him. And we, who along with you have now carried our +heavy cross into the fourth year of the War--we are now to be regarded +as your enemies? Why? Is it because we never sent you into action, +but led you, bestrewing with officers' corpses the whole of the path +covered by the regiment? Is it because that, of the officers who led +you in the beginning, there is not one left in the regiment who is not +maimed?" + +He spoke with deep sincerity and pain in his voice. There were moments +when it seemed as if his words were breaking through the withered crust +of those hardened hearts, as if a break would again take place in the +attitude of the crowd. + +"He, your 'new friend,' is calling you to mutiny, to violence, to +robbery. Do you understand who will benefit when, in Russia, brother +rises against brother, so as to turn to ashes, in sack and fire, +the last property left not only to the 'capitalists,' but to the +poverty-stricken workers and peasants? No, it is not by violence, +but by law and right, that you will acquire land and liberty and a +tolerable existence. Your enemies are not here, among the officers, +but there--beyond the barbed wire. And we shall not attain either to +freedom or to peace by a dishonourable, cowardly standing in one and +the same place, but in the general mighty rush of an _advance_." + +Was it that the impression of Sklianka's speech was still too vivid or +that the regiment took offence at the word "cowardly"--for the most +arrant coward will never forgive such a reminder--or, finally, was it +the fault of the magic word "advance," which for some time past had +ceased to be tolerated in the Army? But anyhow Albov was not allowed to +continue his speech. + +The crowd bellowed, belched forth curses, pressed forward more and +more, advancing toward the platform, and broke down the railing. An +ominous roar, faces distorted with fury, and hands stretched forth +towards the platform. The situation was becoming critical. 2nd Lieut. +Yassny pushed his way through to Albov, took him by the arm, and +forcibly led him to the exit. The soldiers of the First Company had +already rushed up to it from all sides, and with their aid Albov, with +great difficulty, made his way out of the crowd, amidst a shower of +choice abuse. Someone shouted out after him: + +"Wait a bit, you ----; we will settle accounts with you!" + +Night. The bivouac had grown quiet. Clouds had covered the sky. It was +dark. Albov, sitting on his bed in his narrow tent, illuminated by +the stump of a candle, was writing a report to the Commander of the +Regiment: + +"The officers--powerless, insulted, meeting with distrust and +disobedience from their subordinates--can be of no further use. I beg +of you to apply for my reduction to the ranks, so that there I might +fulfil my duty honestly and to the end." + +He lay down on his bed. He gripped his head in his hands. A kind of +uncanny, incomprehensible emptiness seized him, just as if some unseen +hand had drawn out of his head all thought, out of his heart all pain. +What was that? A noise was heard, the tent-pole fell down, the light +went out. A number of men on the tent. Hard, cruel blows were showered +on the whole of his body. A sharp, intolerable pain shot through his +head and his chest. Then his whole face seemed covered with a warm, +sticky veil, and soon everything became still and calm again, as if all +that was terrible and hard to bear had torn itself away, had remained +here, on earth, while his soul was flying away somewhere and was +feeling light and joyous. + +Albov awoke to feel something cold touching him: a private of his +company, Goulkin, an elderly man, was sitting at the foot of his bed +and wiping away the blood from his head with a wet towel. He noticed +that Albov had regained consciousness. + +"Look how they have mangled the man, the scum! It can have been no +other than the Fifth Company--I recognised one of them. Does it hurt +you much? Perhaps you would like me to go for the doctor?" + +"No, my friend, it does not matter. Thank you!" and Albov pressed his +hand. + +"And their Commander, too, Captain Bouravin, has met with a misfortune. +During the night they carried him past us on a stretcher, wounded +in the abdomen; the _sanitar_ said that he would not live. He was +returning from reconnoitring, and the bullet took just at our very +barbed wire. Whether it was a German one or whether our own people did +not recognise him--who knows?" + +He was silent for a while. + +"What has come to the people one simply can't understand. And all +this is just put on. It is not true--that which they say against the +officers--we understand that ourselves. Of course, there are all sorts +among you. But we know them very well. Don't we see for ourselves that +you, now, are for us with all your heart. Or let us say 2nd Lieut. +Yassny. Could such a one sell himself? And yet, try to say a word, to +take your part--there would be no living for us. There is a great deal +of hooliganism now. It is only hooligans that men listen to. My idea is +that all this is taking place because men have forgotten God. Men have +nothing to be afraid of." + +Albov closed his eyes from weakness. Goulkin hastily arranged the +blanket, which had slipped to the floor, made the sign of the cross +over him, and quietly slipped out of the tent. + +But sleep would not come. His heart was full of an inexhaustible +sadness and an oppressive feeling of loneliness. He yearned so much to +have some living being at hand, so that he might silently, wordlessly +feel its proximity, and not remain alone with his dreadful thoughts. He +regretted that he had not detained Goulkin. + +All was quiet. The whole camp was sleeping. Albov leaped from his bed +and lit the candle again. He was seized with a dull, hopeless despair. +He had no more faith in anything. Impenetrable darkness lay before +him. To make his exit from life? No, that would be surrender. He +must go on, with clenched teeth and hardened heart, until some stray +bullet--Russian or German--broke the thread of his wearisome days. + +Dawn was coming on. A new day was beginning, new Army week-days, +horribly like their predecessors. + + * * * * * + +Afterwards? + +Afterwards the "molten element" overflowed its banks completely. +Officers were killed, burnt, drowned, torn asunder and had their heads +broken through with hammers, slowly, with inexpressible cruelty. + +Afterwards--millions of deserters. Like an avalanche the soldiery moved +along the railways, water-ways and country roads, trampling down, +breaking and destroying the last nerves of poor, roadless Russia. + +Afterwards--Tarnopol, Kalush, Kazan. Like a whirlwind robbery, murder, +violence, incendiarism swept over Galicia, Volynia, the Podolsk and +other provinces, leaving behind it everywhere a trail of blood and +arousing in the minds of the Russian people, crazed with grief and weak +in spirit, the monstrous thought: + +"O Lord! if only the Germans would come quickly." + +This was done by the soldier. + +That soldier of whom a great Russian writer, with intuitive conscience +and a bold heart, has said:[27] + +"... How many hast thou killed during these days, oh soldier? How many +orphans hast thou made? How many inconsolable mothers hast thou left? +Dost thou hear the whisper on their lips, from which thou hast driven +the smile of joy for evermore? + +"Murderer! Murderer! + +"But why speak of mothers, of orphaned children? A more terrible moment +came, which none had expected--and thou didst betray Russia, thou didst +cast the whole of the Motherland, which had bred thee, under the feet +of the foe! + +"Thou, oh soldier, whom we loved so--and whom we still love." + + + + +CHAPTER XXIII. + +OFFICERS' ORGANISATIONS. + + +In the early days of April the idea arose among the Headquarters' +officers of organising a "Union of the Officers of the Army and the +Navy." The initiators of the Union[28] started with the view that it +was necessary "to think alike, so as to understand alike the events +that were taking place, to work in the same direction," for up to the +present time "the voice of the officers--of all the officers--has been +heard by none. As yet we have said nothing about the great events +amidst which we are living. Everyone who chooses says for us whatever +he chooses. Military questions, and even the questions of our daily +life and internal order, are settled for us by anyone who likes and in +any way he likes." There were two objections made in principle, one +being the objection to the introduction by the officers themselves +into their ranks of those principles of collective self-government +with which the Army had been inoculated from outside, in the form of +Soviets, Committees and Congresses, and had brought disintegration +into it. The second objection was the fear lest the appearance of an +independent Officers' Organisation should deepen still more those +differences which had arisen between the soldiers and the officers. +On the basis of these views we, along with the Commander-in-Chief, at +first took up an altogether negative attitude towards this proposal. +But life had already broken out of its bounds and laughed at our +motives. A draft declaration was published, granting the Army full +freedom for forming Unions and meetings, and it would now have been an +injustice to the officers to deprive them of the right of professional +organisation, if only as a means of self-preservation. In practice, +officers' societies had sprung up in many of the Armies, and in Kiev, +Moscow, Petrograd and other towns they had done so from the earlier +days of the Revolution. They all wandered in different directions, +groping their way, while some Unions in the large centres, under the +influence of the disintegrating conditions of the rear, displayed a +strong leaning towards the policy of the Soviets. + +The officers of the rear frequently lived a completely different +spiritual life from those of the Front. Thus, for instance, the Moscow +Soviet of officers' delegates passed, in the beginning of April, a +resolution to the effect that "the work of the Provisional Government +should proceed ... in the spirit of the Socialistic and political +demands of the Democracy, represented by the Council of Workmen's and +Soldiers' Delegates," and expressed a wish that there should be more +representatives of the Socialist parties in the Provisional Government. +An adulteration of the officers' views was also developing on a +larger scale; the Petrograd officers' Council summoned an "All-Russia +Congress of officers' delegates, Army surgeons and officers" in +Petrograd for May 8th. This circumstance was the more undesirable in +that the initiator of the Congress--the Executive Committee, with +Lieutenant-Colonel Goushchin, of the General Staff, at its head--had +already disclosed to the full its negative policy by its participation +in the drafting of the declaration of soldiers' rights, by its active +co-operation in the Polivanov Commission and its servility before the +Council of Workmen's and Soldier's Delegates, and by its endeavours +to unite with it. A proposal in this sense being made, the Council, +however, replied that such a union was "as yet impossible on technical +grounds." + +Having discounted all these circumstances, the Supreme +Commander-in-Chief gave his approval to the summoning of a Congress of +officers, on condition that no pressure should be exercised either in +his name or in that of the Chief-of-Staff. This scrupulous attitude +somewhat complicated matters. Some of the Staffs, being out of sympathy +with the idea, prevented the circulation of the appeal, while some of +the High Commanders, as, for example, the Commander of the troops of +the Omsk district, forbade the delegation of officers altogether. In +some places also this question roused the suspicion of the soldiers and +caused some complications, in consequence of which the initiators of +the Congress invited the units to delegate soldiers as well as officers +to be present at the sessions. + +Despite all obstacles, over 300 officer delegates gathered in Moghilev, +76 per cent. being from the Front, 17 per cent. from fighting units in +the rear, and 7 per cent. from the rear. On May 7th the Congress was +opened with a speech by the Supreme Commander-in-Chief. On that day, +for the first time, the High Command said, not in a secret meeting, +not in a confidential letter, but openly, before the whole country: +"Russia is perishing." General Alexeiev said: "In appeals, in general +orders, in the columns of the Daily Press, we often meet with the short +sentence: 'Our country is in danger.' + +"We have grown too well accustomed to this phrase. We feel as if we +were reading an old chronicle of bygone days, and do not ponder over +the grim meaning of this curt sentence. But, gentlemen, this is, I +regret to say, a serious fact. _Russia is perishing. She stands on +the brink of an abyss. A few more shocks, and she will crash with all +her weight into it._ The enemy has occupied one-eighth part of her +territory. He cannot be bribed by the Utopian phrase: 'Peace without +annexations or indemnities.' He says frankly that he will not leave our +soil. He is stretching forth his greedy grip to lands where no enemy +soldier has ever set foot--to the rich lands of Volynia, Podolia and +Kiev--_i.e._, to the whole right bank of our Dnieper. + +"And what are we going to do? Will the Russian Army allow this to +happen? Will we not thrust this insolent foe out of our country and let +the diplomatists conclude peace afterwards, with annexations or without +them? + +"Let us be frank. The fighting spirit of the Russian Army has fallen; +but yesterday strong and terrible, it now stands in fatal impotence +before the foe. Its former traditional loyalty to the Motherland has +been replaced by a yearning for peace and rest. Instead of fortitude, +the baser instincts and a thirst for self-preservation are rampant. + +"At home, where is that strong authority for which the whole country +is craving? Where is that powerful authority which would force every +citizen to do his duty honestly by the Motherland? + +"We are told that it will soon appear, but as yet it does not exist. + +"Where is the love of country, where is patriotism? + +"The great word 'brotherhood' has been inscribed on our banners, but +it has not been inscribed in our hearts and minds. Class enmity rages +amongst us. Whole classes which have honestly fulfilled their duty to +their country have fallen under suspicion, and on this foundation a +deep gulf has been created between two parts of the Army--the officers +and the soldiers. + +"And it is at this very moment that the first Congress of officers of +the Russian Army has been summoned. I am of the opinion that a more +convenient, a more timely moment, could not have been chosen to attain +unity in our family, to form a general united family of the corps of +Russian officers, to discuss the means of breathing ardour into our +hearts, _for without ardour there is no victory, without victory there +is no salvation, no Russia_. + +"May your work therefore be inspired with love for your Motherland and +with heartfelt regard for the soldier; mark the ways for raising the +moral and intellectual calibre of the soldiers, so that they may become +your sincere and hearty comrades. Do away with that estrangement which +has been artificially sown in our family. + +"At the present moment--this is a disease common to all--people would +like to set all the citizens of Russia on platforms or pedestals and +scrutinise how many stand behind each of them. What does it matter that +the masses of the Army accepted the new order and the new Constitution +sincerely, honestly and with enthusiasm? + +"_We must all unite on one great object: Russia is in danger. As +members of the great Army, we must save her. Let this object unite us +and give us strength to work._" + +This speech, in which the leader of the Army expressed "the anxiety of +his heart," served as the prologue to his retirement. The Revolutionary +Democracy had already passed its sentence on General Alexeiev at +its memorable session with the Commanders-in-Chief on May 4th; now, +after May 7th, a bitter campaign was begun against him in the Radical +Press, in which the Soviet semi-official organ _Isvestia_ competed +with Lenin's papers in the triviality and impropriety of its remarks. +This campaign was the more significant in that the Minister of War, +Kerensky, was clearly on the side of the Soviet in this matter. + +As if to supplement the words of the Supreme Commander-in-Chief, I said +in my speech, when touching on the internal situation in the country: + +"... Under pressure of the unavoidable laws of history, autocracy has +fallen, and our country has passed under the rule of the people. We +stand on the threshold of a new life, long and passionately awaited, +for which many thousand Idealists have gone to the block, languished in +the mines and pined in the _tundras_. + +"But we look to the future with anxiety and perplexity. + +"For there is no liberty in the Revolutionary torture-chamber. + +"There is no righteousness in misrepresenting the voice of the people. + +"There is no equality in the hounding down of classes. + +"And there is no strength in that insane rout where all around seek to +grasp all that they possibly can, at the expense of their suffering +country, where thousands of greedy hands are stretched out towards +power, breaking down the foundations of that country...." + +Then the sessions of the Congress began. Whoever was present has +carried away, probably for the rest of his life, an indelible +impression produced by the story of the sufferings of the officers. +It could never be written, as it was told with chilling restraint by +these, Captain Bouravin and Lieutenant Albov, who touched upon their +most intimate and painful experiences. They had suffered till they +could suffer no more; in their hearts there were neither tears nor +complaints. + +I looked at the boxes, where the "younger comrades" sat who had been +sent to watch for "counter-Revolution." I wanted to read in their faces +the impression produced by all that they had heard. And it seemed to me +that I saw the blush of shame. Probably it only seemed so to me, for +they soon made a stormy protest, demanded the right of voting at the +Congress, and--five roubles per day "officer's allowance." + +At thirteen general meetings the Congress passed a series of +resolutions. + +Among all the classes, castes, professions and trades which exhibited a +general elemental desire to get from the weak Government all that was +possible, in their own private interests, the officers were the only +Corporation which never asked anything _for itself personally_. + +The officers requested and demanded _authority_--over themselves and +over the Army. A firm, single, national authority--"commanding, not +appealing." The authority of a Government leaning on the trust of the +nation, not on irresponsible organisations. Such an authority the +officers were prepared wholeheartedly and unreservedly to obey, _quite +irrespective of differences of political opinions_. I affirm, moreover, +that all the inner social class conflict which was blazing up more and +more throughout the country did not affect the officers at the Front, +who were immersed in their work and in their sorrows; it did not touch +them deeply; the conflict attracted the attention of the officers +only when its results obviously endangered the very existence of the +country, and of the Army in particular. Of course, I am speaking of the +mass of the officers; individual leanings towards reaction undoubtedly +existed, but they were in no respect characteristic of the Officers' +Corps in 1917. + +One of the finest representatives of the Officers' Class, General +Markov, a thoroughly educated man, wrote to Kerensky, condemning his +system of slighting the Command: "Being a soldier by nature, birth and +education, I can judge and speak only of my own military profession. +All other reforms and alterations in the constitution of our country +interest me only as an ordinary citizen. But I know the Army; I have +devoted to it the best days of my life; I have paid for its successes +with the blood of those who were near to me, and have myself come out +of action steeped in blood." This the Revolutionary Democracy had not +understood or taken into consideration. + +The Officers' Congress in Petrograd, at which about 700 delegates +were gathered (May 18-26), passed off in a totally different manner. +It split into two sharply-divided camps: the Officers and officials +of the Rear who had given themselves to politics and a smaller number +of real officers of the Line who had become delegates through a +misunderstanding of the matter. The Executive Committee drew up their +programme in strict agreement with the custom of the Soviet Congresses: +(1) The attitude of the Congress towards the Provisional Government and +the Soviet; (2) the War; (3) the Constituent Assembly; (4) the labour +question; (5) the land question; and (6) the reorganisation of the +Army on Democratic principles. An exaggerated importance was attached +to the Congress in Petrograd, and at its opening pompous speeches were +made by many members of the Government and by foreign representatives; +the Congress was even greeted in the name of the Soviet by Nahamkes. +The very first day revealed the irreconcilable differences between the +two groups. These differences were inevitable, if only because, even +on such a cardinal question as "Order No. 1.," the Vice-Chairman of +the Congress, Captain Brzozek, expressed the view that "its issue was +dictated by historical necessity: the soldier was downtrodden, and it +was imperatively necessary to free him." This declaration was greeted +with prolonged applause by part of the delegates! + +After a series of stormy meetings, a resolution was passed by a +majority of 265 against 246, which stated that "the Revolutionary power +of the country was in the hands of the organised peasants, workmen and +soldiers, who form the predominating mass of the population," and that +therefore the Government must be responsible to the All-Russia Soviet! + +Even the resolution advocating an advance was passed by a majority of +little more than two-thirds of those who cast their votes. + +The attitude of the Petrograd Congress is to be explained by the +declaration made on May 26th by that group, which, reflecting the +real opinion of the Front, took the point of view of "all possible +support to the Provisional Government." "In summoning the Congress the +Executive Committee of the Petrograd Council of Officers' Delegates +did not seek for the solution of the most essential problem of the +moment--the regeneration of the Army--since the question of the +fighting capacity of the Army and of the measures for raising its +level was not even mentioned in the programme, and was included only +at our request. If we are to believe the statement--strange, to say no +more--made by the Chairman, Lieutenant-Colonel Goushchin, the object of +the summoning of the Congress was the desire of the Executive Committee +to pass under our flag into the Council of Workmen's and Soldiers' +Delegates." This declaration led to a series of serious incidents; +three-quarters of the delegates left the meeting and the Congress came +to an end. + +I have mentioned the question of the Petrograd Officers' Council and +Congress only in order to show the spirit of a certain section of the +officers of the Rear, which was in frequent contact with the official +and unofficial rulers, and represented, in the eyes of the latter, the +"voice of the Army." + +The Moghilev Congress, which attracted the unflagging attention of the +Supreme Commander-in-Chief, and was much favoured by him, closed on May +22nd. At this time General Alexeiev had already been relieved of the +command of the Russian Army. So deeply had this episode affected him +that he was unable to attend the last meeting. I bade farewell to the +Congress in the following words: + +"The Supreme Commander-in-Chief, who is leaving his post, has +commissioned me, gentlemen, to convey to you his sincere greetings, and +to say that his heart, that of an old soldier, beats in unison with +yours, that it aches with the same pain, and lives with the same hope +for the regeneration of the disrupted, but ever great, Russian Army. + +"Let me add a few words from myself. + +"You have gathered here from the distant blood-bespattered marches of +our land, and laid before us your quenchless sorrow and your soul-felt +grief. + +"You have unrolled before us a vivid and painful picture of the life +and work of the officers amidst the raging sea of the Army. + +"You, who have stood a countless number of times in the face of death! +You, who have intrepidly led your men against the dense rows of the +enemy's barbed wire, to the rare boom of your own guns, treacherously +deprived of ammunition! You, who, hardening your hearts, but keeping +up your spirits, have cast the last handful of earth into the grave of +your fallen son, brother, or friend! + +"Will you quail now? + +"No! + +"You who are weak, raise your heads. You who are strong, give of your +determination, of your aspirations, of your desire to work for the +happiness of your Motherland--pour them into the thinned ranks of your +comrades at the Front. You are not alone. With you are all those who +are honourable, all who think, all who have paused at the brink of that +common sense which is now being abolished. + +"The soldiers also will go with you, understanding clearly that you are +leading them, not backwards, to serfdom and to spiritual poverty, but +forwards, to freedom and to light. + +"And then such a thunderstorm will break over the foe as will put an +end both to him and to the War. + +"These three years of the War I have lived one life with you, thought +the same thoughts, shared with you the joy of victory and the burning +pain of retreat. I have therefore the right to fling into the faces of +those who have outraged our hearts, who from the very first days of the +Revolution have wrought the work of Cain on the corps of officers--I +have the right to fling in their faces the words: 'You lie! The Russian +officer has never been either a mercenary or a Pretorian.' + +"Under the old régime you were victimised, down-trodden, and deprived +of all that makes life worth living. In no less a degree than +yourselves, leading a life of semi-beggary, our officers of the Line +have managed to carry through their wretched, laborious life like a +burning torch, the thirst for achievement for the happiness of his +Motherland. + +"Then let my call be heard through these walls by the builders of the +new life of the State: + +"Take care of the officer! For from the beginning and till now he has +stood, faithfully and without relief, on guard over the order of the +Russian State. He can be relieved by death alone." + +Printed by the Committee, the text of my speech was circulated at the +Front, and I was happy to learn, from many letters and telegrams, that +the words spoken in defence of the officer had touched his aching heart. + +The Congress left a permanent institution at the Stavka--the "Chief +Committee of the Officers' Union."[29] During the first three months of +its existence the Committee did not succeed in rooting itself deeply +in the Army. Its activities were confined to organising branches of the +Union in the Armies and in military circles, to the examination of the +complaints that reached it. In exceptional cases incompetent officers +were recommended for dismissal (the "black-board"); to a certain +very limited degree officers expelled by the soldiers were granted +assistance, and declarations were addressed to the Government and to +the Press in connection with the more important events in public and +military life. After the June advance the tone of these declarations +became acrimonious, critical, and defiant, which seriously disturbed +the Prime Minister, who persistently sought to have the Chief Committee +transferred from Moghilev to Moscow, as he considered that its attitude +was a danger to the Stavka. + +The Committee, which was somewhat passive during the command of General +Brussilov, did, indeed, take part afterwards in General Kornilov's +venture. But it was not this circumstance that caused the change in its +attitude. _The Committee undoubtedly reflected the general spirit with +which the Command and the Russian officers were then imbued, a spirit +which had become hostile to the Provisional Government._ Also, no +clear idea had been formed among the officers of the political groups +within the Government of the covert struggle proceeding between them, +or of the protective part played by many representatives of the Liberal +Democracy among them. A hostile attitude was thus created towards the +Government as a whole. + +Having remained hitherto perfectly loyal and in the majority of cases +well-disposed, having patiently borne, much against the grain, the +experiments which the Provisional Government made, deliberately or +involuntarily, on the country and on the Army, these elements lived +only in the hope of the regeneration of the Army, of an advance and of +victory. When all these hopes crashed to the ground, then, not being +united in their ideals with the second Coalitional Government, but, +on the contrary, deeply distrusting it, the masses of the officers +abandoned the Provisional Government, which thus lost its last reliable +support. + +This moment is of great historical importance, giving the key to the +understanding of many later events. As a whole, deeply democratic +in their personnel, views and conditions of life, _rejected by the +Revolutionary Democracy_ with incredible harshness and cynicism, +and finding no real support in the liberal circles in close touch +with the Government, the Russian officers found themselves in a +state of tragic isolation. This isolation and bewilderment served +more than once afterwards as a fertile soil for outside influences, +foreign to the traditions of the officer caste and to its former +political character--influences which led to dissension, and in the +end to fratricide. For there can be no doubt that all the power, all +the organisation, both of the Red and of the White Armies, rested +exclusively on the personality of the former Russian officer. + +And if afterwards, in the course of three years of conflict, we have +witnessed the rise of two conflicting forces in the Russian public life +of the anti-Bolshevist camp, we must seek for their original source not +in political differences only, but also in that work of Cain towards +the officers' caste, which was wrought by the Revolutionary Democracy +from the first days of the Revolution. + +As everyone realised that the "new order" and the Front itself are +on the verge of collapse, it was obvious that officers should have +attempted some organisation to meet such a contingency. But the +advocates of action were lying in prison; the Chief Council of the +Officers' Union, which was best suited for this task, had been broken +up by Kerensky in the latter days of August. The majority of the +responsible leaders of the Army were perturbed by a terrible and not +unfounded fear for the fate of the Russian officers. In this respect +the correspondence between General Kornilov and General Doukhonin is +very characteristic. After the Bolshevist _coup d'état_ on November +1 (14), 1917, General Kornilov wrote to Doukhonin from his prison in +Bykhov: + +"Foreseeing the further course of events, I think that it is necessary +for you to take such measures as would create a favourable atmosphere, +while thoroughly safeguarding Headquarters, for a struggle against the +coming Anarchy." + +Among these measures General Kornilov suggested "the concentration in +Moghilev, or in a point near to it, under a reliable guard, of a store +of rifles, cartridges, machine-guns, automatic guns and hand-grenades +for distribution among the officer-volunteers, who will undoubtedly +gather together in this region." + +Doukhonin made a note against this point: "This might lead to excesses." + +Thus the constant morbid fears of an officers' "Counter-Revolution" +proved to be in vain. Events took the officers unawares. They were +unorganised, bewildered; they did not think of their own safety, and +finally scattered their forces. + + + + +CHAPTER XXIV. + +THE REVOLUTION AND THE COSSACKS. + + +A peculiar part was played by the Cossacks in the history of the +Revolution. + +Built up historically, in the course of several centuries, the +relations of the Cossacks with the Central Government, common to +Russia, were of a dual character. The Government did all to encourage +the development of Cossack colonisation on the Russian south-eastern +borders, where war was unceasing. It made allowances for the +peculiarities of the warlike, agricultural life of the Cossacks, and +allowed them a certain degree of independence and individual forms of +democratic rule, with representative organs (the Kosh, kroog, rada), an +elected "Army elder" and hetmans. + +"In its weakness," says Solovyov, "The State did not look too strictly +on the activities of the Cossacks, so long as they were directed only +against foreign lands; the State being weak, it was considered needful +to give these restless forces an outlet." But the "activities" of the +Cossacks were more than once directed against Moscow as well. This +circumstance led to a prolonged internecine struggle, which lasted +until the end of the eighteenth century, when, after a ferocious +suppression of the Pougatchov Rebellion, the free Cossacks of the +South-East were dealt a final blow; they gradually lost their markedly +oppositionary character, and even gained the reputation of the most +conservative element in the State, the pillars of the throne and the +régime. + +From that time onward the Government incessantly showed favour to the +Cossacks by emphasising their really great merits, by solemn promises +to preserve their "Cossack Liberties,"[30] and by the appointment of +members of the Imperial family to honorary posts among the Cossacks. +At the same time, the Government took all measures to prevent these +"liberties" from developing to excess at the expense of that ruthless +centralisation, which was a historical necessity in the beginning of +the building up of the Russian State and a vast historical blunder +in its later development. To the number of these measures we must +refer the limitation of Cossack self-government, and, latterly, the +traditional appointment to the post of Hetman of persons not belonging +to the Cossack caste, and often complete strangers to the life of the +Cossacks. The oldest and most numerous Cossack Army, that of the Don, +has had Generals of German origin at its head more than once. + +It seemed as if the Czarist Government had every reason to depend upon +the Cossacks. The repeated repression of the local political labour +and agrarian disturbances which broke out in Russia, the crushing of +a more serious rising--the revolution of 1905-1906, in which a great +part was played by the Cossack troops--all this seemed to confirm the +established opinion of the Cossacks. On the other hand, sundry episodes +of the "repressions," accompanied by inevitable violence, sometimes +cruelty, were widely spread among the people, were exaggerated, and +created a hostile attitude towards the Cossacks at the factories, +in the villages, among the Liberal _intelligencia_, and especially +among those elements which are known as the Revolutionary Democracy. +Throughout the whole of the underground literature--in its appeals, +leaflets, and pictures--the idea of a "Cossack" became synonymous with +"servant" of the Reactionary party. + +This definition was greatly exaggerated. The bard of the Don Cossacks, +Mitrophan Bogayevsky, says of the political character of the Cossacks: +"The first and fundamental condition which prevented the Cossacks, at +least in the beginning, from breaking up was the idea of the State, +a lawful order, a deep-seated realisation of the necessity of a life +within the bounds of law. This seeking of a lawful order runs, and has +run, like a scarlet thread through all the circles of all the Cossack +Armies." But such altruistic motives, by themselves, do not exhaust the +question. Notwithstanding the grievous weight of universal military +service, the Cossacks, especially those of the South, enjoyed a certain +prosperity which excluded that important stimulus which roused against +the Government and the régime both the workers' class and the peasantry +of Central Russia. An extraordinarily complicated agrarian question +set the caste economic interests of the Cossacks against the interests +of the "outsider"[31] settlers. Thus, for instance, in the oldest and +largest Cossack Army, that of the Don, the amount of land secured to an +individual farm was, on the average, in _dessiateens_: for Cossacks, +19.3 to 30; for native peasants, 6.5; for immigrant peasants, 1.3. +Finally, owing to historical conditions and a narrow territorial system +of recruiting, the Cossack units possessed a perfectly homogeneous +personnel, a great internal unity, and a discipline which was firm, +though somewhat peculiar as to the mutual relations between the +officers and the privates, and therefore they conceded complete +obedience to their chiefs and to the Supreme Power. + +With the support of all these motives, the Government made a wide use +of Cossack troops for suppressing popular agitation, and thus roused +against them the mute exasperation of the fermenting, discontented +masses of the population. + +In return for their historical "liberties," the Cossack Armies, as I +have said, give all but universal military service. Its burden and the +degree of relative importance of these troops among the armed forces of +the Russian Empire are shown in the following table: + + +COMPOSITION OF THE COSSACK TROOPS IN THE AUTUMN OF 1913. + + ---------------+------------+---------------+------------- + Armies. | Cavalry | Sotnias not | Infantry + | Regiments. | included | Battalions. + | | in Regiments. | + ---------------+------------+---------------+------------- + Don | 60 | 72 | -- + Kouban | 37 | 37 | 22 + Orenburg | 18 | 40 | -- + Terek | 12 | 3 | 2 + Ural | 9 | 4 | -- + Siberian | 9 | 3 | -- + Trans-Baikal | 9 | -- | -- + Semiretchensk | 3 | 7 | -- + Astrakhan | 3 | -- | -- + Amur | 2 | 5 | -- + ---------------+------------+---------------+------------- + TOTAL[32] | 162 | 171 | 24 + ---------------+------------+---------------+------------- + +Partly as cavalry of the line--in divisions and corps, partly as Army +corps and divisional cavalry--in regiments, sub-divisions and detached +_sotnias_, the Cossack units were scattered over all the Russian +fronts, from the Baltic to Persia. _Among the Cossacks, as against all +the other component parts of the Army, desertion was unknown._ + +At the outbreak of Revolution all the political groups, and even +the representatives of the Allies, devoted great attention to the +Cossacks--some building exaggerated hopes on them, others regarding +them with unconcealed suspicion. The circles of the Right looked to the +Cossacks for Restoration; the Liberal Bourgeoisie, for active support +of law and order; while the parties of the Left feared that they were +counter-Revolutionary, and therefore started a strong propaganda in +the Cossack units, seeking to disintegrate them. This was to some +extent assisted by the spirit of repentance which showed itself at +all Cossack meetings, Congresses, "Circles" and "Radas" at which the +late power was accused of systematically rousing the Cossacks against +the people. The mutual relations between the Cossacks and the local +agricultural population were unusually complicated, especially in +the Cossack territories of European Russia.[33] Intermingled with +the Cossack allotments were peasant lands--those of whilom settlers +(the indigenous peasantry)--lands let on long lease, on which large +settlements had sprung up, finally lands which had been granted by the +Emperor to various persons and which had gradually passed into the +hands of "outsiders." On the basis of these mutual relations dissension +now arose which began to assume the character of violence and forcible +seizures. With respect to the Don Army, which gave the keynote to +all others, the Provisional Government considered it necessary to +publish on April 7th an appeal in which, while affirming that "the +rights of the Cossacks to the land, as they have grown historically, +remain inviolable," also promised the "outsider" population, "whose +claim to the land is also based on historical rights," that it would +be satisfied, in as great a measure as possible, by the Constituent +Assembly. This agrarian puzzle, which surrounded with uncertainty the +most tender point of the Cossacks' hopes, was explained unequivocally, +in the middle of May, by the Minister of Agriculture, Tchernov (at the +All-Russia Peasant Congress), who stated that the Cossacks held large +tracts of land and that now they would have to surrender a portion of +their lands. + +In the Cossack territories meanwhile work was in full swing in the +sphere of self-determination and self-government; the information +supplied by the Press was vague and contradictory; no one had yet heard +the voice of the Cossacks as a whole. One can understand, therefore, +that general attention which was concentrated on the All-Russia Cossack +Congress, which gathered in Petrograd in the beginning of June. + +The Cossacks paid a tribute to the Revolution and to the State, +referred to their own needs (after all, the question of their holdings +was the most vital one), and ... smiled to the Soviet.... + +The impression thus produced was indefinite; neither were the hopes of +the one side fulfilled nor the fears of the other dissipated. + +Meanwhile, at the initiative of the Revolutionary Democracy, a violent +propaganda was set on foot for introducing the idea of doing away with +the Cossacks as a separate caste. But, on the whole, this idea of +self-abolition had no success. On the contrary, a growing aspiration +spread among the Cossacks for maintaining their internal organisation +and for the union of all the Cossack Armies. + +Cossack Governments sprang up everywhere, elected Hetmans and +representative institutions ("Circles" and Radas), whose authority +increased in accordance with the weakening of the authority and power +of the Provisional Government. Such eminent men appeared at the head +of the Cossacks as Kaledin (the Don), Doutov (Orenburg), and Karaoulov +(the Terek). + +A triple power was formed in the Cossack territories; the Hetman with +his Government, the commissary of the Provisional Government, and the +Soviet.[34] + +The Commissaries, however, after a short and unsuccessful struggle, +soon subsided and exhibited no activity. Far more serious became +the struggle of the Cossack authority with the local Soviets and +Committees, which sought support in the unruly mob of soldiers who +flooded the territories under the name of Reserve Army Battalions and +Rear Army Units. This curse of the population positively terrorised +the land, creating anarchy in the towns and settlements, instituting +sacks, seizing lands and businesses, trampling upon all rights, all +authority, and creating intolerable conditions of life. The Cossacks +had nothing with which to combat this violence--all their units were at +the Front. Only in the Don territory, accidentally, in the autumn of +1917, not without the deliberate connivance of the Stavka, a division +was concentrated, and afterwards three divisions, with the aid of which +General Kaledin attempted to restore order. + +But all the measures taken by him, as for instance the occupation by +armed forces of railway junctions, of the more important mines, and of +large centres, which secured normal communication and supplies for the +centre and the fronts, were met not only with violent resistance on the +part of the Soviets and with accusations of counter-revolutionism, but +even with some suspicion on the part of the Provisional Government. At +the same time the Cossacks of the Kouban and of the Terek asked the Don +to send them if only a few _sotnias_, as it was "becoming impossible to +breathe for _comrades_." + +The friendly relations, instituted in the early days of the Revolution, +between the general Russian and the Cossack Revolutionary Democracies +were soon broken off finally. "Cossack Socialism" turned out to be +so self-sufficing, so concentrated in its own castes and corporation +limits, that it could find no place in that doctrine. + +The Soviets insisted on the equalising of the holdings of the Cossacks +and the peasants, while the Cossacks vigorously defended their right +of property and disposal in the Cossack lands, basing it on their +historical merits as conquerors, protectors, and colonisers of the +former marches of Russia's territory. + +The organisation of a general territorial Government failed. An +internecine struggle began. + +The consequences were two-fold: The first was a painful atmosphere of +estrangement and hostility between the Cossacks and the "outsider" +population, which later, in the swiftly changing kaleidoscope of the +civil war, sometimes assumed monstrous forms of mutual extermination, +as the power passed from the hands of one side into those of the +other. Along with this, one or the other half of the population of the +larger Cossack territories were generally deemed as participating in +the building up and the economy of the land.[35] The second was the +so-called Cossack separatism or self-determination. + +The Cossacks had no reason to expect from the Revolutionary Democracy +a favourable settlement of their destiny, especially in the question +most vital to it--the land question. On the other hand, the Provisional +Government had also assumed an ambiguous attitude in this matter, and +the Government power was openly tending to its fall. The future assumed +altogether indefinite outlines. Hence, independently of the general +healthy aspiration towards decentralisation, there appeared among the +Cossacks, who for centuries had been seeking "freedom," a tendency +themselves to secure the maximum of independence, so as to place the +future Constituent Assembly before an accomplished fact, or as the +more outspoken Cossack leaders put it, "that there should be something +from which to knock off." Hence a gradual evolution from territorial +self-government to autonomy, federation, and confederation. Hence, +finally--with the intrusion of individual local self-love, ambition, +and interests--a permanent struggle began with every principle of an +imperial tendency, a struggle which weakened both sides and greatly +prolonged the civil war.[36] It was these circumstances, too, that gave +birth to the idea of an independent Cossack army, which first arose +among the Cossacks of the Kouban and was not then supported by Kaledin +and the more imperialistic elements of the Don. + +All that I have related refers mainly to the three Cossack bodies (the +Don, the Kouban, and the Terek) which form more than sixty per cent. +of Cossack-dom. But the general characteristic features belong to the +other Cossack armies as well. + +Along with the alterations in the composition of the Provisional +Government and with the decline of its authority, changes took place +in the attitude toward it of Cossack-dom, expressing themselves +in the resolutions and appeals of the Council of the union of the +Cossack armies, of the hetmans, circles, and Governments. If before +July the Cossacks voted for all possible support to the Government +and for complete obedience, later, however, _while acknowledging the +authority of the Government to the very end_, it comes forward in +sharp opposition to it on the questions of the organisation of the +Cossack administration and _zemstvo_, of the employment of Cossacks +for the repression of rebellious troops and districts and so forth. In +October the Kouban rada assumes constituent powers and publishes the +constitution of the "Kouban territory." It speaks of the Government in +such a manner as the following: "When will the Provisional Government +shake off these fumes (the Bolshevist aggression) and put an end, by +resolute measures, to these scandals?" + +The Provisional Government, being already without authority and without +any real power, surrendered all its positions and agreed to peace with +the Cossack Governments. + +It is remarkable that, even at the end of October, when, owing to the +breach of communications, no correct information had yet been received +on the Don about the events in Petrograd and Moscow and about the fate +of the Provisional Government, and when it was supposed that its +fragments were functioning somewhere or other, the Cossack elders, in +the person of the representatives of the South-Eastern Union, then +gathering,[37] sought to get into touch with the Government, offering +it aid against the Bolsheviks, but conditioning this aid with a whole +series of economic demands: a non-interest-bearing loan of 500,000,000 +roubles, the State to pay all the expenses of supporting Cossack units +outside the territory of the union, the institution of a pension fund +for all sufferers, and the right of the Cossacks to all "spoils of +war"(?) which might be taken in the course of the coming civil war. + +It is not without interest that for a long time Pourishkevitch +cherished the idea of the transfer of the State Duma to the Don, as a +counterpoise to the Provisional Government and for the preservation of +the source of authority, in case of the fall of the latter. Kaledin's +attitude towards this proposal was negative. + +A characteristic indication of the attitude which the Cossacks had +succeeded in retaining towards themselves in the most varied circles +was that attraction to the Don which later, in the winter of 1917, +led thitherward Rodzianko, Miliukov, General Alexeiev, the Bykhov +prisoners, Savinkov, and even Kerensky, who came to General Kaledin, in +Novotcherkassk, in the latter days of November, but was not received by +him. Pourishkevitch alone did not come, and that only because he was +then in prison in Petrograd, in the hands of the Bolsheviks. + +And suddenly it turned out that the whole thing was a mystification, +pure and simple, that at that time the Cossacks had no power left +whatever. + +In view of the growing disorders on the Cossack territory, the hetmans +repeatedly appealed for the recall from the front of if only part of +the Cossack divisions. They were awaited with enormous impatience, +and the most radiant hopes were built on them. In October these hopes +seemed to be on the eve of fulfilment; the Cossack divisions had +started for home. Overcoming all manner of obstacles on their way, +retarded at every step by the Vikzhel (All-Russia Executive Railway +Committee) and the local Soviets, subjected more than once to insults, +disarmament, resorting in one place to requests, in another to cunning, +and in some places to armed threats, the Cossack units forced their way +into their territories. + +But no measures could preserve the Cossack units from the fate which +had befallen the Army, for the whole of the psychological atmosphere +and all the factors of disruption, internal and external, were +absorbed by the Cossack masses, perhaps less intensively, but on the +whole in the same way. The two unsuccessful and, for the Cossacks, +incomprehensible marches on Petrograd, with Krymov[38] and Krasnov,[39] +introduced still greater confusion into their vague political outlook. + +The return of the Cossack troops to their homeland brought complete +disenchantment with it: they--at least the Cossacks of the Don, the +Kouban, and the Terek[40]--brought with them from the front the most +genuine Bolshevism, void, of course, of any kind of ideology, but with +all the phenomena of complete disintegration which we know so well. +This disintegration ripened gradually, showed itself later, but at +once exhibiting itself in the denial of the authority of the "elders," +the negation of all power, by mutiny, violence, the persecution and +surrender of the officers, but principally by complete abandonment +of any struggle against the Soviet power, which falsely promised the +inviolability of the Cossack rights and organisation. Bolshevism and +the Cossack organisation! Such grotesque contradictions were brought to +the surface daily by the reality of Russian life, on the basis of that +drunken debauch into which its long-desired freedom had degenerated. + +Now began the tragedy of Cossack life and the Cossack family in which +an insurmountable barrier had arisen between the "elders" and the "men +of the front," destroying their life and rousing the children against +their fathers. + + + + +CHAPTER XXV. + +NATIONAL UNITS. + + +In the old Russian Army the national question scarcely existed. Among +the soldiery the representatives of the races inhabiting Russia +experienced somewhat greater hardships in the service, caused by their +ignorance or imperfect knowledge of the Russian language, in which +their training was carried on. It was only this ground--the technical +difficulties of training--and perhaps that of general roughness and +barbarism, but in no case that of racial intolerance, that often led to +that friction, which made the position of the alien elements difficult, +the more so that, according to the system of mixed drafting, they +were generally torn from their native lands; the territorial system +of filling the ranks of the Army was considered to be technically +irrational and politically--not void of danger. The Little Russian +question in particular did not exist _at all_. The Little Russian +speech (outside the limits of official training), songs and music +received full recognition and did not rouse in anyone any feeling of +separateness, being accepted as Russian, as one's own. In the Army, +with the exception of the Jews, all the other alien elements were +absorbed fairly quickly and permanently; the community of the Army +was in no way a conductor either for compulsory Russification or for +national Chauvinism. + +Still less were national differences to be noticed in the community of +officers. Qualities and virtues--corporative, military, pertaining to +comradeship or simply human, overshadowed or totally obliterated racial +barriers. Personally, during my twenty-five years of service before the +revolution, it never came into my head to introduce this element into +my relations as commander, as colleague, or as comrade. And this was +done intuitively, not as the result of certain views and convictions. +The national questions which _were raised outside the Army_, in the +political life of the country, interested me, agitated me, were settled +by me in one or the other direction, harshly and irreconcilably at +times, but always without trespassing on the boundaries of military +life. + +The Jews occupied a somewhat different position. I shall return to this +question later. But it may be said that, with respect to the old Army, +this question was of popular rather than of political significance. +It cannot be denied that in the Army there was a certain tendency to +oppress the Jews, but it was not at all a part of any system, was not +inspired from above, but sprang up in the lower strata and in virtue +of complex causes, which spread far outside of the life, customs, and +mutual relations of the military community. + +In any case, the war overthrew all barriers, while the revolution +brought with it the repeal, in legislative order, of all religious and +national restrictions. + +With the beginning of the revolution and the weakening of the +Government, a violent centrifugal tendency arose in the borderlands +of Russia, and along with it a tendency towards the nationalisation, +_i.e._, the dismemberment, of the Army. Undoubtedly, the need of such +dismemberment did not at that time spring from the consciousness +of the masses and had no real foundation (I do not speak of the +Polish formations). The sole motives for nationalisation then lay +in the seeking of the political upper strata of the newly formed +groups to create a real support for their demands, and in the +feeling of self-preservation which urged the military element to +seek in new and prolonged formations a temporary or permanent relief +from military operations. Endless national military congresses +began, without the permission of the Government and of the High +Command. All races suddenly began to speak; the Lithuanians, the +Esthonians, the Georgians, the White Russians, the Little Russians, +the Mohammedans--demanding the "self-determination" proclaimed--from +cultural national autonomy to full independence inclusive, and +principally the immediate formation of separate bodies of troops. +Finally, more serious results, undoubtedly negative as regards the +integrity of the Army, were attained by the Ukrainian, Polish, and +partially by the Trans-Caucasian formations. The other attempts were +nipped in the bud. It was only during the last days of the existence +of the Russian Army, in October, 1917, that General Shcherbatov, +seeking to preserve the Roumanian front, began the classification of +the Army, on a large scale, according to race--an attempt which ended +in complete failure. I must add that one race only made no demand +for self-determination with regard to military service--the Jewish. +And whenever a proposal was made from any source--in reply to the +complaints of the Jews--to organise special Jewish regiments, this +proposal roused a storm of indignation among the Jews and in the +circles of the Left, and was stigmatised as deliberate provocation. + +The Government showed itself markedly opposed to the reorganisation +of the Army according to race. In a letter to the Polish Congress +(June 1st, 1917) Kerensky expressed the following view: "The great +achievement of the liberation of Russia and Poland can be arrived at +only under the condition that the organism of the Russian Army is +not weakened, that no alterations in its organisation infringe its +unity.... The extrusion from it of racial troops ... would, at this +difficult moment, tear its body, break its power, and spell ruin both +for the revolution and for the freedom of Russia, Poland, and of the +other nationalities inhabiting Russia." + +The attitude of the commanding element towards the question of +nationalisation was dual. The majority was altogether opposed to +it; the minority regarded it with some hope that, by breaking their +connection with the Council of Workmen's and Soldiers' Delegates, the +newly created national units might escape the errors and infatuations +of democratisation and become a healthy nucleus for fortifying the +front and building up the army. General Alexeiev resolutely opposed +all attempts at nationalisation, but encouraged the Polish and +Tchekho-Slovak formations. General Brussilov allowed the creation +of the first Ukrainian formation on his own responsibility, after +requesting the Supreme Commander-in-Chief "not to repeal it and not +to undermine his authority thereby."[41] The regiment was allowed to +exist. General Ruzsky, also without permission, began the Esthonian +formations,[42] and so forth. From the same motives, probably, which +led some commanders to allow formations, but with a reverse action, +the whole of the Russian revolutionary democracy, in the person of the +Soviets and the army committees, rose against the nationalisation of +the Army. A shower of violent resolutions poured in from all sides. +Among others, the Kiev Council of Workmen's and Soldiers' Delegates, +about the middle of April, characterised Ukrainisation in rude and +indignant language, as simple desertion and "hide-saving," and by +a majority of 264 against 4 demanded the repeal of the formation +of Ukrainian regiments. It is interesting to note that as great an +opponent of nationalisation was found in the Polish "Left," which had +split off from the military congress of the Poles in June, because of +the resolution for the formation of Polish troops. + +The Government did not long adhere to its original firm decision +against nationalisation. The declaration of July 2nd, along with +the grant of autonomy to the Ukraine, also decided the question of +nationalising the troops: "The Government considers it possible to +continue its assistance to a closer national union of the Ukrainians +in the ranks of the Army itself, or to the drafting into individual +units of Ukrainians exclusively, in so far as such a measure does not +injure the fighting capacity of the Army ... and considers it possible +to attract to the fulfilment of those tasks the Ukrainian soldiers +themselves, who are sent by the Central Rada to the War Ministry, the +General Staff, and the Stavka." + +A great "migration of peoples" began. + +Other Ukrainian agents journeyed along the front, organising Ukrainian +_gromadas_ and committees, getting resolutions passed for transfers +to Ukrainian units, or concerning reluctance to go to the front under +the plea that "the Ukraine was being stifled" and so forth. By October +the Ukrainian committee of the Western front was already calling for +armed pressure on the Government for the immediate conclusion of +peace. Petlura affirmed that he had 50,000 Ukrainian troops at his +disposal. Yet the commander of the Kiev military district, Colonel +Oberoutchev,[43] bears witness as follows: "At the time when heroic +exertions were being made to break the foe (the June advance) _I was +unable to send a single soldier to reinforce the active army_. As +soon as I gave an order to some reserve regiment or other to send +detachments to reinforce the front, a meeting would be called by a +regiment which had until then lived, peaceably, without thinking of +Ukrainisation, the yellow and blue Ukrainian flag would be unfurled and +the cry raised: 'Let us march under the Ukrainian flag!' + +"And after that they would not move. Weeks would pass, a month, but the +detachments would not stir, either under the red, or under the blue and +yellow flag." + +Was it possible to combat this unconcealed care for their own safety? +The answer is given by Oberoutchev again--an answer very characteristic +in its lifeless party rigour: + +"Of course, I could have used force to get my orders obeyed. And that +force lay in my hands." But "by using force against the disobedient, +who are acting under the Ukrainian flag, one risks the reproach +that one is struggling not against acts of anarchy, but against +national freedom and the self-determination of nations. And for me, a +Socialist-Revolutionary, to risk such a reproach, and in the Ukraine +too, with which I had been connected all my life, was impossible. And +so I decided to resign."[44] + +And he resigned. True, it was only in October, shortly before the +Bolshevist _coup d'état_, having occupied the post of commander of the +troops in the most important district next the front for nearly five +months. + +As a development of the orders of the Government, the Stavka appointed +special divisions on each front for Ukrainisation, and on the +South-Western front also the 34th Army Corps, which was under the +command of General Skoropadsky. To these units, which were mostly +quartered in the deep reserve, the soldiers flocked from the whole +front, without leave asked or given. The hopes of the optimists on +the one hand and the fears of the Left circles on the other that +nationalisation would create "firm units" (counter-revolutionary in the +terminology of the Left) were speedily dispersed. The new Ukrainian +troops were permeated with the same elements of disintegration as the +regulars. + +Meanwhile, among the officers and old soldiers of many famous regiments +with a great historical past, now transformed into Ukrainian units, +this measure roused acute pain and the recognition that the end +of the Army was near.[45] In August, when I was in command of the +South-Western front, bad news began to come to me from the 34th Army +Corps. The corps seemed to be escaping from direct subordination, +receiving both directions and reinforcements from the "General +Secretary Petlura" directly. His commissary was attached to the Staff +of the corps, over which waved the "yellow-blue flag." The former +Russian officers and sergeants, left in the regiments because there was +no Ukrainian command, were treated with contumely by the often ignorant +Ukrainian ensigns set over them and by the soldiers. An extremely +unhealthy atmosphere of mutual hostility and estrangement was gathering +in these units. + +I sent for General Skoropadsky and invited him to moderate the violent +course of the process of Ukrainisation and, in particular, either to +restore the rights of the Commanders or to release them from service +in the corps. The future Hetman declared that a mistaken idea had been +formed of his activity, probably because of the historical past of the +Skoropadsky family,[46] that he was a true Russian, an officer of the +Guards and was altogether free of all seeking for self-determination, +that he was only obeying orders, for which he himself had no sympathy. +But immediately afterwards Skoropadsky went to the Stavka, whence my +Staff received directions to aid the speedy Ukrainisation of the 34th +Army Corps. + +The question of the Polish formations was in a somewhat different +position. The Provisional Government had declared the independence +of Poland, and the Poles now counted themselves "foreigners"; Polish +formations had long ago existed on the South-Western front, though they +were breaking up (with the exception of the Polish Lancers); having +given permission to the Ukrainians, the Government could not refuse it +to the Poles. Finally, the Central Powers, by creating the appearance +of Polish independence, also had in view the formation of a Polish +Army, which, however, ended in failure. America also formed a Polish +Army on French territory. + +In July, 1917, the formation of a Polish corps was assigned to the +Western front, of which I was then Commander-in-Chief. At the head of +the corps I put General Dovbor-Mousnitsky,[47] who is now in command +of the Polish Army at Poznan. A strong, energetic, resolute man, who +fearlessly waged war on the disintegration of the Russian troops and +on the Bolshevism among them, he succeeded in a short time in creating +units which, if not altogether firm, were, in any case, strikingly +different from the Russian troops in their discipline and order. It +was the old discipline, rejected by the Revolution--without meetings, +commissaries or committees. Such units roused another attitude towards +them in the Army, notwithstanding the rejection of nationalisation in +principle. Being supplied with the property of the disbanded mutinous +divisions and treated with complaisance by the Chief of Supplies, the +corps was soon able to organise its own commissariat. By order, the +ranks of the officers in the Polish corps were filled by the transfer +of those who desired it, and the ranks of the soldiers--exclusively +by volunteers or from reserve battalions; practically, however, the +inevitable current from the front set in, caused by the same motives +which influenced the Russian soldiers, devastating the thinned ranks of +the Army. + +In the end the Polish formations turned out to be altogether useless to +us. Even at the June military congress of the Poles, fairly unanimous +and unambiguous speeches were heard which defined the aims of these +formations. Their synthesis was thus expressed by one of the delegates: +"It is a secret for no one that the War is coming to an end, and we +need the Polish Army, not for the War, not for fighting; we need it so +that at the coming international conference we may be reckoned with, +that there should be power at our backs." + +And indeed the corps did not make its appearance at the front--it is +true that it was not yet finally formed; it did not wish to interfere +in the "home affairs" of the Russians (October and later--the struggle +against Bolshevism) and soon assumed completely the position of "a +foreign army," being taken over and supported by the French command. + +But neither were the hopes of the Polish nationalists fulfilled. In the +midst of the general break-down and fall of the front in the beginning +of 1918 and after the irruption of the Germans into Russia, part of the +corps was captured and disarmed, part of it dispersed and the remnants +of the Polish troops afterwards found a hospitable asylum in the ranks +of the Volunteer Army. + +Personally, I cannot but say a good word for the 1st Polish Corps, to +the units of which, quartered in Bykhov, we owe much in the protection +of the lives of General Kornilov and the other Bykhov prisoners, in the +memorable days of September to November. + +Centrifugal forces were scattering the country and the Army. To +class and party intolerance was added the embitterment of national +dissensions, partly based on the historically-created relations between +the races inhabiting Russia and the Imperial Government, and partly +altogether baseless, absurd, fed by causes which had nothing in common +with healthy national feeling. Latent or crushed at an earlier date, +these dissensions broke out rudely at just that moment, unfortunately, +when the general Russian authority was voluntarily and conscientiously +taking the path of recognition of the historical rights and the +national cultural self-determination of the component elements of the +Russian State. + +[Illustration: General Alexeiev's (centre) farewell.] + + + + +CHAPTER XXVI. + + MAY AND THE BEGINNING OF JUNE IN THE SPHERE OF MILITARY + ADMINISTRATION--THE RESIGNATION OF GUTCHKOV AND GENERAL + ALEXEIEV--MY DEPARTURE FROM THE STAVKA--THE ADMINISTRATION OF + KERENSKY AND GENERAL BRUSSILOV. + + +On May 1st the Minister of War, Gutchkov, left his post. "We wished," +so he explained the meaning of the "democratisation" of the Army which +he tried to introduce, "to give organised forms and certain channels to +follow, to that awakened spirit of independence, self-help and liberty +which had swept over all. But there is a line, beyond which lies the +beginning of the ruin of that living, mighty organism which is the +Army." Undoubtedly that line was crossed even before the first of May. + +I am not preparing to characterise Gutchkov, whose sincere patriotism +I do not doubt. I am speaking only of the system. It is difficult to +decide who could have borne the heavy weight of administering the Army +during the first period of the Revolution; but, in any case, Gutchkov's +Ministry had not the slightest grounds to seek the part of guiding the +life of the Army. It did not lead the Army. On the contrary, submitting +to a "parallel power" and impelled from below, the Ministry, somewhat +restively, _followed the Army_, until it came right up to the line, +beyond which final ruin begins. + +"To restrain the Army from breaking up completely under the influence +of that pressure which proceeded from the Socialists, and in particular +from their citadel--the Soviet of Workmen's and Soldiers' Delegates--to +gain time, to allow the diseased process to be absorbed, to help the +healthy elements to gain strength, such was my aim," wrote Gutchkov to +Kornilov in June, 1917. The whole question is whether the resistance +to the destroying powers was resolute enough. The Army did not feel +this. The officers read the orders, signed by Gutchkov, which broke +up completely the foundations of military life and custom. That these +orders were the result of a painful internal drama, a painful struggle +and defeat--this the officers did not know, nor did it interest them. +Their lack of information was so great that many of them even now, +four years later, ascribe to Gutchkov the authorship of the celebrated +"Order No. 1." However it may be, the officers felt themselves deceived +and deserted. Their difficult position they ascribed principally to the +reforms of the Minister of War, against whom a hostile feeling arose, +heated still more by the grumbling of hundreds of Generals removed by +him and of the ultra-monarchical section of the officers, who could not +forgive Gutchkov his supposed share in the preparation of the Palace +_coup d'état_ and of the journey to Pskov.[48] + +Thus the resignation of this Minister, even if caused "by those +conditions, in which the Government power was placed in the country, +and in particular the power of the Minister of the Army and the Navy +with respect to the Army and the fleet,"[49] had another justification +as well--the want of support among the officers and the soldiery. + +In a special resolution the Provisional Government condemned Gutchkov's +action in "resigning responsibility for the fate of Russia," and +appointed Kerensky Minister of the Army and the Navy. I do not know how +the Army received this appointment in the beginning, but the Soviet +received it without prejudice. Kerensky was a complete stranger to the +art of war and to military life, but could have been surrounded by +honest men; what was then going on in the Army was simple insanity, +and this even a civilian might have understood. Gutchkov was a +representative of the Bourgeoisie, a Member of the Right, and was +distrusted; now, perhaps, a Socialist Minister, the favourite of the +Democracy, might have succeeded in dissipating the fog in which the +soldiers' consciousness was wrapped. Nevertheless, to take up such a +burden called for enormous boldness or enormous self-confidence, and +Kerensky emphasised this circumstance more than once when speaking +to an Army audience: "At a time when many soldiers, who had studied +the art of war for decades, declined the post of Minister of War, +I--a civilian, accepted it." No one, however, had ever heard that the +Ministry of War had been offered to a soldier that May. + +The very first steps taken by the new Minister dissipated our hopes: +the choice of collaborators, who were even greater opportunists than +their predecessors, but void of experience in military administration +and in active service;[50] the surrounding of himself with men from +"underground"--perhaps having done very great work in the cause of the +Revolution, but without any comprehension of the life of the Army--all +this introduced into the actions of the War Ministry a new party +element, foreign to the military service. + +A few days after his appointment Kerensky issued the Declaration of the +rights of the soldier, thereby predestining the entire course of his +activity. + +On May 11th the Minister was passing through Moghilev to the Front. We +were surprised by the circumstance that the passage was timed for 5 +a.m., and that only the Chief-of-Staff was invited into the train. The +Minister of War seemed to avoid meeting the Supreme Commander-in-Chief. +His conversation with me was short and touched on details--the +suppression of some disturbances or other that had broken out at one +of the railway junctions and so forth. The most capital questions of +the existence of the Army and of the coming advance, the necessity +for unity in the views of the Government and the Command, the absence +of which was showing itself with such marked clearness--all this, +apparently, did not attract the attention of the Minister. Among other +things, Kerensky passed a few cursory remarks on the inappropriateness +of Generals Gourko and Dragomirov, Commanders-in-Chief of fronts, +to their posts, which drew a protest from me. All this was very +symptomatic and created at the Stavka a condition of tense, nervous +expectation. + +Kerensky was proceeding to the South-Western front, to begin his +celebrated verbal campaign which was to rouse the Army to achievement. +The _word_ created hypnosis and self-hypnosis. Brussilov reported +to the Stavka that throughout the Army the Minister of War had been +received with extraordinary enthusiasm. Kerensky spoke with unusual +pathos and exaltation, in stirring "revolutionary" images, often with +foam on his lips, reaping the applause and delight of the mob. At +times, however, the mob would turn to him the face of a wild beast, +the sight of which made words to stick in the throat and caused the +heart to fail. They sounded a note of menace, these moments, but fresh +delight drowned their alarming meaning. And Kerensky reported to +the Provisional Government that "the wave of enthusiasm in the Army +is growing and widening," and that a definite change in favour of +discipline and the regeneration of the Army was displaying itself. In +Odessa he became even more irresistibly poetical: "In your welcome I +see that great enthusiasm which has overwhelmed the country and feel +that great exaltation which the world experiences but once in hundreds +of years." + +Let us be just. + +Kerensky called on the Army to do its duty. He spoke of duty, honour, +discipline, obedience, trust in its commanders; he spoke of the +necessity for advancing and for victory. He spoke in the language of +the established revolutionary ritual, which ought to have reached +the hearts and minds of the "revolutionary people." Sometimes, even, +feeling his power over his audience, he would throw at it the words, +which became household words, of "rebel slaves" and "revolutionary +tyrants." + +In vain! + +At the conflagration of the temple of Russia, he called to the fire: +"Be quenched!" instead of extinguishing it with brimful pails of water. + +Words could not fight against facts, nor heroic poems against the +stern prose of life. The replacement of the Motherland by Liberty and +Revolution did not make the aims of the conflict any clearer. The +constant scoffing at the old "discipline," at the "Czar's generals," +the reminders of the knout, the stick, and the "former unprivileged +condition of the soldier" or of the soldier's blood "shed in vain" by +someone or other--nothing of this could bridge the chasm between the +two component parts of the Army. The passionate preaching of a "new, +conscious, iron revolutionary discipline," _i.e._, a discipline based +on the "declaration of the rights of the soldier"--a discipline of +meetings, propaganda, political agitation, absence of authority in +the commanders, and so forth--this preaching was in irreconcileable +opposition to the call to victory. Having received his impressions in +the artificially exalted, theatrical atmosphere of meetings, surrounded +both in the Ministry and in his journeyings, by an impenetrable wall of +old political friends and of all manner of delegations and deputations +from the Soviets and the Committees, Kerensky looked on the Army +through the prism of their outlook, either unwilling or unable to sink +himself in the real life of the Army and in its torments, sufferings, +searchings, and crimes, and finally to attain a real standing-ground, +get at vital themes and real words. These everyday questions of Army +life and organisation--dry in their form and deeply dramatic in their +content--never served as themes for his speeches. They contained +only a glorification of the Revolution and a condemnation of certain +perversions of the idea of national defence, created by that Revolution +itself. The masses of the soldiery, eager for sentimental scenes, +listened to the appeals of the recognised chief for self-sacrifice, +and they were inflamed with the "sacred fire"; but as soon as the +scene was over, both the chief and the audiences reverted to the daily +occupations: the chief--to the "democratisation" of the Army, and +the masses--to "deepening the Revolution." In the same way, probably, +Djerzinsky's executioners in Soviet Russia now admire, in the temple of +proletarian art, the sufferings of young Werther--before proceeding to +their customary occupation of hanging and shooting. + +At any rate, there was much noise. So much, that Hindenburg sincerely +believes even to this day that in June, 1917, the South-Western Front +was commanded by Kerensky. In his book _Aus meinem Leben_ the German +Field-Marshal relates that Kerensky succeeded Brussilov, "who was +swept away from his post by the rivers of Russian blood which he shed +in Galicia and Macedonia (?) in 1916" (the Field-Marshal has confused +the theatres of war), and tells the story of Kerensky's "advance" and +victories over the Austrians near Stanislavov. + + * * * * * + +Meanwhile life at the Stavka was gradually waning. The wheels of +administration were still revolving, everybody was doing something, +issuing orders and giving directions. The work was purely formal, +because all the plans and directions of the Stavka were upset by +unavoidable and incalculable circumstances. Petrograd never took the +Stavka into serious account, but at that time the attitude of the +Government was somewhat hostile, and the War Ministry was conducting +the work of reorganisation without ever consulting the Stavka. This +position was a great burden to General Alexeiev, the more so that the +attacks of his old disease became more frequent. He was extremely +patient and disregarded all personal pin-pricks and all efforts at +undermining his prerogatives which emanated from the Government. +In his discussions with numerous Army chiefs, and organisations +which took advantage of his accessibility, he was likewise patient, +straightforward, and sincere. He worked incessantly, in order to +preserve the remnants of the Army. Seeking to give an example of +discipline, he protested but obeyed. He was not sufficiently strong +and masterful by nature to compel the Provisional Government and the +civilian reformers of the Army to take the demands of the Supreme +Command into account; at the same time, he never did violence to his +conscience in order to please the powers that be or the mob. + +On May 20th, Kerensky stopped for a few hours at Moghilev on his way +home from the South-Western Front. He was full of impressions, praised +Brussilov, and expressed the view that the general spirit at the front +and the relations between officers and men were excellent. Although +in his conversation with Alexeiev Kerensky made no hint, we noticed +that his entourage was somewhat uneasy, and realised that decisions in +regard to certain changes had already been taken. I did not consider +it necessary to acquaint the Supreme Commander-in-Chief with these +rumours, and merely seized the first opportunity for postponing his +intended visit to the Western Front so as not to put him into a false +position. + +In the night of the 22nd a telegram was received dismissing General +Alexeiev and appointing General Brussilov by order of the Provisional +Government. The Quartermaster-General Josephovitch woke up Alexeiev +and handed him the telegram. The Supreme Commander-in-Chief was +deeply moved, and tears came down his cheeks. May the members of the +Provisional Government who are still alive forgive the vulgarity +of the language: in a subsequent conversation with me the Supreme +Commander-in-Chief inadvertently uttered the following words: "The +cads! They have dismissed me like a servant without notice." + +A great statesman and military leader had thus left the stage, whose +virtue--one of many--was his implicit loyalty (or was it a defect?) to +the Provisional Government. + +On the next day Kerensky was asked--at a meeting of the Soviet--what +steps he had taken in view of the Supreme Commander-in-Chief's speech +at the officers' Conference (see Chapter XXIII). He replied that +Alexeiev had been dismissed, and that he, Kerensky, believed that a +late French politician was right in saying that "discipline of duty" +should be introduced from the top. The Bolshevik Rosenfeldt (Kamenev) +expressed satisfaction, because this decision fully coincided with +the repeated demands of the Soviet. On the same day the Government +published an official communiqué to the effect that: "In spite of +the fact that General Alexeiev was naturally very tired and needed +rest from his arduous labours, it was considered impossible to lose +the services of this exceptionally experienced and talented leader, +and General Alexeiev was therefore to remain at the disposal of the +Provisional Government." The Supreme Commander-in-Chief issued the +following Order of the Day as a farewell to the Armies. + +"For nearly three years I have walked with you along the thorny path +of the Russian Army. Your glorious deeds have filled me with joyful +elation, and I was filled with sorrow in the days of our reverses. +But I continued with implicit hope in Providence, in the mission of +the Russian people, and in the prowess of the Russian soldier. Now +that the foundations of our military power are shattered, I still +preserve the same faith, as life would not be worth living without it. +I reverently salute you, my comrades in arms, all those who have done +their duty faithfully, all those whose hearts beat with the love of +their country, all those who in the days of the popular turmoil were +determined not to allow the Mother Country to be disrupted. I, the old +soldier, and your late Supreme Commander-in-Chief, once more reverently +salute you. Pray think kindly of me." + + (Signed) GENERAL ALEXEIEV. + +Towards the end of our work in common my intercourse with General +Alexeiev was one of cordial friendship. In parting with me, he said: +"All this structure will undoubtedly soon collapse. You will have to +resume work once again. Would you then agree to work with me again?" I +naturally expressed my readiness to collaborate in the future. + +Brussilov's appointment signified definite elimination of the Stavka, +as a decisive factor, and a change in its direction. Brussilov's +unrestrained and incomprehensible opportunism, and his endeavour to +gain the reputation of a revolutionary, deprived the Commanding Staffs +of the Army of the moral support which the former Stavka still gave +them. The new Supreme Commander-in-Chief was given a very frigid and +dry reception at Moghilev. Instead of the customary enthusiastic +ovation to which the "Revolutionary General" had been accustomed, +whom the mob had carried shoulder high at Kamenetz-Podolsk, he found +a lonely railway station and a strictly conventional parade. Faces +were sulky and speeches were stereotyped. Brussilov's first steps, +insignificant but characteristic episodes, had a further disheartening +effect. As he was reviewing the Guard of Honour of men with the Cross +of St. George, he did not greet their gallant wounded Commander, +Colonel Timanovsky, or the officers, but shook hands with the men--the +messenger and the orderly. They were so much perturbed by the +unexpected inconvenience of such greetings on parade that they dropped +their rifles. Brussilov handed to me his Order of the Day intended as a +greeting to the Armies, which he had written in his own hand, and asked +me to send it to Kerensky for approval. In his speech to the members of +the Stavka, who had foregathered to bid farewell to General Alexeiev, +Brussilov tried to make excuses. For excuses they were--his confused +explanations of the sin of "deepening the Revolution" with Kerensky +and "democratising" the Army with the Committees. The closing sentence +of his Order, addressed to the retiring Chief, sounded, therefore, out +of tune: "Your name will always remain unstained and pure as that of a +man who has worked incessantly and has given himself entirely to the +service of the Army. In the dark days of the past and in the present +turmoil you have had the courage, resolutely and loyally, to oppose +violence, to combat mendacity, flattery, subservience, to resist +anarchy in the country and disruption in the ranks of its defenders." + +My activities were disapproved by the Provisional Government as much as +those of General Alexeiev, and I could not work with Brussilov owing to +fundamental differences of opinion. I presume that during Kerensky's +visit to the South-Western Front, Brussilov agreed with his suggestion +of appointing General Lukomsky Chief-of-Staff. I was therefore +surprised at the conversation which took place on the first day of +Brussilov's arrival. He said to me: "Well, General, I thought I was +going to meet a comrade-in-arms and that we were going to work together +at the Stavka, but you look very surly." + +"That is not quite true. I cannot stay at the Stavka any longer. I also +know that General Lukomsky is to supersede me." + +"What? How have they dared to appoint him without my knowledge?" + +We never touched upon that subject again. I continued to work with +Brussilov for about ten days pending my successor's arrival, and I must +confess that work was unpleasant from the moral point of view. From +the very first days of the War Brussilov and I had served together. +For the first month I was Quartermaster-General on the Staff of his +Eighth Army, then for two years in command of the 4th Rifle Division +in that same glorious Army, and Commander of the 8th Army Corps on +his front. The "Iron Division" went from victory to victory, and +Brussilov particularly favoured it and constantly acknowledged its +achievements. His attitude towards the Commander of the Division was +correspondingly cordial. I shared with Brussilov many hardships as well +as many unforgettable happy days of military triumphs. And I found it +difficult to speak to him now, for he was a different man and was so +recklessly, from the personal point of view--which, after all, did +not matter--as well as from the point of view of the interests of the +Army, throwing his reputation to the four winds. When I reported to +him, every question which might be described as "un-Democratic," but +was, in reality, an endeavour to maintain the reasonable standard of +efficiency, was invariably negatived. Argument was useless. Brussilov +sometimes interrupted me and said with strong feeling: "Do you think +that I am not disgusted at having constantly to wave the Red rag? What +can I do? Russia is sick, the Army is sick. It must be cured, and I +know of no other remedy." + +The question of my appointment interested him more than it interested +me. I refused to express any definite desire and said that I would +accept any appointment. Brussilov was negotiating with Kerensky. He +once said to me, "_They_ are afraid that if I give you an appointment +at the Front, you will begin to oust the Committees." I smiled. "No, I +will not appeal to the Committees for help, but will also leave them +alone." I attributed no importance to this conversation, which was +conducted almost in jest; but on the same day a telegram was sent to +Kerensky, of which the following was the approximate wording: "I have +talked it over with Deniken. The obstacles have been removed. I request +that he be appointed Commander-in-Chief of the Western Front." + +[Illustration] + +[Illustration: Kerensky addressing soldiers' meeting.] + +In the beginning of August I proceeded to Minsk and took General +Markov as Chief-of-Staff of the Front. I had no regrets in leaving the +Stavka. For two months I had worked like a slave and my outlook had +widened, but had I achieved anything for the preservation of the Army? +Positive results were nil. There may have been some negative results; +the process of disruption of the Army had been to a certain extent +stayed. And that is all. One of Kerensky's assistants, afterwards +High Commissar, Stankevitch, thus describes my activities: "Nearly +every week telegrams were sent to Petrograd (by Deniken) containing +provocative and harsh criticisms on the new methods in the Army; +criticisms they were, not advice. Is it possible to advise that +the Revolution should be cancelled." If that was only Stankevitch +discussing Denikin it would not matter. But these views were shared by +the wide circles of the Revolutionary Democracy and referred not to +the individual, but to all those who "impersonated the tragedy of the +Russian Army." The appreciation must therefore be answered. + +Yes, the Revolution could not be cancelled, and what is more, I may +state that the majority of the Russian officers, with whom I agreed, +_did not wish to cancel the Revolution_. They demanded one thing +only--that the Army should not be revolutionised from the top. None of +us could give any other advice. And if the Commanding Staffs appeared +to be "insufficiently tied to the Revolution" they should have been +mercilessly dismissed and other people--were they but unskilled +artisans in military matters--should have been appointed, and given +full power and confidence. + +Personalities do not matter. Alexeiev, Brussilov, Kornilov--represent +periods and systems. Alexeiev protested. Brussilov submitted. Kornilov +claimed. In dismissing these men one after another did the Provisional +Government have a definite idea, or were they simply distracted to +the point of convulsion and completely lost in the morass of their +own internal dissensions? Would it not appear that had the order been +changed in which the links had stood in that chain salvation might have +ensued? + + + + +CHAPTER XXVII. + +MY TERM AS COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF ON THE WESTERN RUSSIAN FRONT. + + +I took over the Command from General Gourko. His removal had already +been decided on May 5th, and an Order of the Day had been drafted at +the War Ministry. Gourko, however, sent a report in which he stated +that it was impossible for him to remain morally responsible for the +armies under his command in the present circumstances (after the +"Declaration of the Soldier's Rights" had been issued). This report +afforded Kerensky an excuse for issuing on May 26th an order relieving +Gourko of his post and appointing him to the command of a division. The +motive was adduced that Gourko was "not up to the mark," and that "as +the country was in danger, every soldier should do his duty and not be +an example of weakness to others." Also that "the Commander-in-Chief +enjoys the full confidence of the Government, and should apply all his +energies to the task of carrying out the intentions of the Government; +to decline to bear the moral responsibility was on General Gourko's +part tantamount to dereliction of duty, which he should have continued +to perform according to his strength and judgment." Not to speak of +the fact that Gourko's dismissal had already been decided, suffice +it to recall similar instances, such as the resignations of Gutchkov +and Miliukov, in order to realise the hypocrisy of these excuses. And +what is more--Kerensky himself, during one of the Government crises +caused by the uncompromising attitude of the "Revolutionary Democracy," +had threatened to resign, and had stated in writing to his would-be +successor, Nekrassov, that: "Owing to the impossibility of introducing +into the Government such elements as were required in the present +exceptional circumstances, he could no longer bear the responsibility +before the country according to his conscience and judgment, and +requested therefore to be relieved of all his duties." The papers said +that he had "departed from Petrograd." On October 28th, as we know, +Kerensky fled, abandoning the post of Supreme Commander-in-Chief. + +The old Commanding Staffs were in a difficult position. I refer not +to men of definite political convictions, but of the average honest +soldier. They could not follow Kerensky (the system, not the man) and +destroy with their own hands the edifice which they had themselves +spent their lives in building. They could not resign because the enemy +was on Russian soil and they would be deserters according to their own +conscience. It was a vicious circle. + +Upon my arrival at Minsk I addressed two large gatherings of members of +the Staff and departments of the Front, and later the Army Commanders, +and expounded my fundamental views. I did not say much, but stated +clearly that I accepted the Revolution without any reservations. I +considered, however, that to "revolutionise" the Army was a fatal +procedure, and that to introduce demagogy into the Army would mean the +ruin of the Country. I declared that I would oppose it with all my +might and invited my collaborators to do the same. I received a letter +from General Alexeiev, who wrote: "Congratulations on your appointment. +Rouse them! Make your demands calmly but persistently. I trust that +the revival will come without coaxing, without red ribbons, without +sonorous and empty phrases. The Army cannot continue as it is now, +for Russia is being transformed into a multitude of idlers who have +an exaggerated idea of their own importance (value their movements in +gold). I am in heart and in thought with you, with your work and with +your wishes. God help you." + +The Committee of the Front impersonated at Minsk "Military Politics." +On the eve of my arrival that semi-Bolshevik organisation had passed a +resolution protesting against an advance and in favour of the struggle +of united democracies against their Governments; this naturally helped +to define my attitude towards that body. I had no direct intercourse +with the Committee, which "stewed in its own juice," argued the +matter of preponderant influences of the Social Democratic and Social +Revolutionary factions, passed resolutions which puzzled even the +Army Committees by their demagogic contents, distributed defeatist +pamphlets, and incensed the men against their chiefs. According to the +law, the Committees were not responsible and could not be tried. The +Committee was educating in the same sense the pupils of the "school +for agitators," who were afterwards to spread these doctrines along +the Front. I will quote one instance showing the real meaning of these +manifestations "of civic indignation and sorrow." Pupils of the +school often appealed to the Chief-of-Staff and sent in "demands." +On one occasion the demand for an extra pair of boots was couched +in offensive terms. General Markov refused it. On the next day a +resolution was published (in the paper _The Front_, No. 25) of the +Conference of Pupils of the School of Agitators to the effect that they +had personally tested the reluctance of Headquarters to take elective +organisations into account. The pupils declared that the Committee of +the Front will find in them and in those who sent them full support +against "counter-revolution," and even armed assistance. + +Was work in common possible in these circumstances? + +The idea of the advance was finally, however, accepted by the Committee +of the Front, which demanded that from itself and from Army Committees +"fighting committees of contact" be established which would be entitled +to partake in the drafting of plans of operations to control the +Commanding Officers and Headquarters of the advancing troops, etc. I +naturally refused the request, and a conflict ensued. The War Minister +was very much perturbed, and sent to Minsk the Chief of his Chancery, +Colonel Baronovsky, a young staff officer who prompted Kerensky in +all military matters, and the Commissar Stankevitch, who remained at +the Western Front for two days, was removed to the Northern Front and +replaced by Kalinin. Baronovsky's friends afterwards told me that the +question of my dismissal had been raised in view of "friction with +the Committee of the Front." Stankevitch appeased the Committee and +"fighting committees of contact" were allowed to take part in the +advance, but were denied the right of control over the operations and +of assisting in drawing up plans. + + * * * * * + +Of the three Army Commanders at that Front, two were entirely in the +hands of the Committees. As their sectors were inactive, their presence +could be temporarily tolerated. The advance was to begin on the Front +of the 10th Army, commanded by General Kisselevsky, in the region of +Molodetchno. I inspected the troops and the position, interviewed the +Commanding Officers and addressed the troops. In the preceding chapters +I have recounted impressions, facts, and episodes of the life of the +Western front. I will, therefore, mention here only a few details. I +saw the troops on parade. Some units had preserved the appearance and +the routine of the normal pre-Revolutionary times. These, however, were +exceptions, and were to be found chiefly in the Army Corps of General +Dovbor-Mussnitzki, who was persistently and sternly maintaining +the old discipline. Most of the units, however, were more akin to a +devastated ants-nest than to an organised unit, although they had +retained a semblance of discipline and drill. After the review I walked +down the ranks and spoke to the soldiers. I was deeply depressed by +their new mental attitude. Their speeches were nought but endless +complaints, suspicions and grievances against everyone and everything. +They complained of all the officers, from the Platoon Commander to the +Army Corps Commander, complained of the lentil soup, of having to stand +at the Front for ever, of the next regiment of the line, and of the +Provisional Government for being implacably hostile to the Germans. I +witnessed scenes which I shall not forget till my last hour. In one of +the Army Corps I asked to be shown the worst unit. I was taken to the +703rd Suram Regiment. We drove up to a huge crowd of unarmed men who +were standing, sitting, wandering about the plain behind the village. +Having sold their clothes for cash or for drink, they were dressed in +rags, bare-footed, ragged, unkempt, and seemed to have reached the +utmost limit of physical degradation. I was met by the Divisional +Commander, whose lower lip trembled, and by a Regimental Commander who +had the face of a condemned man. Nobody gave the order "Attention!" +and none of the soldiers rose. The nearest ranks moved towards our +motor cars. My first impulse was to curse the regiment and turn back. +But that might have been interpreted as cowardice, so I went into the +thick of the crowd. I stayed there for about an hour. Good Heavens, +what was the matter with these men, with the reasonable creature of +God, with the Russian field-labourer? They were like men possessed, +their brain dimmed, their speech stubborn and completely lacking logic +or common-sense; their shrieks were hysterical, full of abuse and foul +swearing. We tried to speak, but the replies were angry and stupid. I +remember that my feelings of indignation as an old soldier receded to +the background and I merely felt infinitely sorry for these uncouth, +illiterate Russians to whom little was given and of whom little will, +therefore, be asked. One wished that the leaders of the Revolutionary +Democracy had been on that plain and had seen and heard everything. One +wished one could have said to them: "It is not the time to find out who +is guilty, it doesn't matter whether the guilt is ours, yours, of the +bourgeoisie or of autocracy. Give the people education and an 'image of +man' first, and then socialise, nationalise, Communise, if the people +will then follow you." + +The same Suram Regiment, a few days later, gave a sound thrashing to +Sokolov, the man who drafted Order No. 1, the creator of the new +régime for the Army, because he demanded, in the name of the Soviet, +that the regiment should do its duty and join in the advance. + +After visiting the regiment, in compliance with persistent invitations +from a special delegation, I went to a Conference of the 2nd Caucasian +Army Corps. The members of that Conference had been elected; their +discussions were more reasonable and their aims more practical. Among +the various groups of delegates whom our _aides-de-camp_ had joined, +the argument was put forward that, as the Commander-in-Chief and all +the senior Commanding Officers were present, would it not be expedient +to finish them off at once? That would put an end to the advance. + +To meet the senior Commanding Officer was by no means a consolation. +One of the Army Corps Commanders led his troops with a firm hand, but +experienced strong pressure from the Army organisations; another was +afraid to visit his troops. I found the third in a state of complete +collapse and in tears because someone had passed a vote of censure +upon him: "And this after forty years' service! I loved the men and +they loved me, but now they have dishonoured me, and I cannot serve +any longer!" I had to allow him to retire. In the next room a young +Divisional Commander was already in secret consultation with members +of the Committee, who immediately requested me, in a most peremptory +fashion, to appoint the young General to the command of the Army Corps. + +The visit left me with a painful impression. Disruption was growing and +my hopes were waning; and yet one had to continue the work, of which +there was plenty for all of us. The Western Front lived by theory and +by the experience of others. It had won no striking victories, which +alone can inspire confidence in the methods of warfare, and had no +real experience in breaking through the defensive line of the enemy. +One was very often compelled to discuss the general plan, the plan +of artillery attack, and to establish the points of initiative with +those who were to carry out the general plan. We found the greatest +difficulty in preparing the plans for storming a position. Owing to +demoralisation, every movement of troops, every relief, trench digging, +bringing batteries into position, either were not carried out at all, +or else attended by delays, tremendous efforts or persuasion, and +meetings. Every slightest excuse was made use of in order to avoid +preparations for the advance. Owing to the technical unpreparedness +of the positions, the chiefs had to perform the arduous and unnatural +task of making tactical considerations subservient to the qualities +of the Commanding Officers, instead of giving directions to the +troops in accordance with tactical considerations. The degree of the +demoralisation of different units and the condition of different +sectors of a given firing line, purely accidental, had also to be taken +into account. And yet the statement that our technical backwardness +was one of the reasons of our collapse in 1917 should be accepted with +reservations. Of course, our Army was backward, but in 1917 it was +infinitely better equipped, had more guns and ammunition and wider +experience of her own and of other fronts than in 1916. Our technical +backwardness was a relative factor which was present at all times in +the Great War before the Revolution, but was remedied in 1917, and +cannot, therefore, be taken into account as a decisive feature in +estimating the Russian Revolutionary Army and its work in the field. + +It was the work of Sisyphus. The Commanding Officers gave their heart +and soul to the work because in its success they saw the last ray +of hope for the salvation of the Army and of the country. Technical +difficulties could be overcome, as long as the moral could be raised. + +Brussilov arrived and addressed the regiment. As a result, the officer +commanding the 10th Army was relieved against my will ten days before +the decisive advance. And it was not without difficulty that I secured +the appointment of General Lomnovsky, the gallant Commander of the +8th Army Corps, who had arrived at the Front ten days before the +action. There was an unpleasant misunderstanding about Brussilov's +visit. Headquarters had mistakenly informed the troops that Kerensky +was coming. This substitution provoked strong discontent among the +troops. Many units declared that they were being deceived, and that +unless Comrade Kerensky himself orders them to advance they would +not advance. The 2nd Caucasian Division sent delegates to Petrograd +to make inquiries. And efforts had to be made to appease them by +promising that Comrade Kerensky was due to arrive in a few days. The +War Minister had to be invited. Kerensky came reluctantly, because he +was already disillusioned by the failure of his oratorical campaign +on the South-Western Front. For several days he reviewed the troops, +delivered speeches, was enthusiastically received and sometimes +unexpectedly rebuked. He interrupted his tour, as he was invited to +hurry to Petrograd on July 4th, but he returned with renewed energy and +with a new up-to-date theme, making full use of the "knife with which +the Revolution had been stabbed in the back" (the Petrograd rising of +July 3rd-5th). Having, however, completed his tour and returned to the +Stavka, he emphatically declared to Brussilov: + +"I have no faith whatsoever in the success of the advance." + +Kerensky was equally pessimistic in those days with regard to +another matter, the future destinies of the country. He discussed in +conversation with myself and two or three of his followers, the stages +of the Russian Revolution, and expressed the conviction that whatever +happened we should not escape the Reign of Terror. The days went by and +the advance was further delayed. As early as on June 18th, I issued the +following Order of the Day to the Armies of my Front: + +"The Russian Army of the South-Western Front have this day defeated +the enemy and broken through his lines. A decisive battle has begun +on which depends the fate of the Russian people and of its liberties. +Our brethren on the South-Western Front are victoriously advancing, +sacrificing their lives and expecting us to render them speedy +assistance. We shall not be traitors. The enemy shall soon hear the +roaring of our guns. I appeal to the troops of the Western Front to +make every effort and to prepare as soon as possible for an advance, +otherwise we shall be cursed by the Russian people who have entrusted +to us the defence of their liberty, honour, and property." + +I do not know whether those who read this order, published in the +papers in complete contravention of all the conditions of secrecy +of operation, understood all the inner tragedy of the Russian Army. +All strategy was turned topsy-turvy. The Russian Commander-in-Chief, +powerless to advance his troops and thus alleviate the position of +the neighbouring Front, wanted (even at the cost of exposing his +intentions) to hold the German divisions which were being moved from +his Front and sent to the South-Western and the Allied Front. + +The Germans responded immediately by sending the following proclamation +to the Front: + +"Russian soldiers! Your Commander-in-Chief of the Western Front is +again calling on you to fight. We know of his order, and also know +of the false report that our line to the South-East of Lvov has been +broken. Do not believe it. In reality thousands of Russian corpses are +lying before our trenches. An advance will never lead to peace. If, +nevertheless, you obey the call of your commanders, who are bribed by +England, then we shall continue the struggle until you are overthrown." + +Finally, on July 8th, the thunder of our guns was heard. On July 9th +the storming began, and three days after I was on my way from the 10th +Army to Minsk, with despair in my heart, and clearly recognising that +the last hope of a miracle was gone. + + + + +CHAPTER XXVIII. + +THE RUSSIAN ADVANCE IN THE SUMMER OF 1917--THE DÉBÂCLE. + + +The Russian offensive which had been planned for the month of May was +being delayed. At first a simultaneous advance on all fronts had been +contemplated; later, however, owing to the psychological impossibility +of a forward movement on all fronts, it was decided to advance +gradually. The Western Front was of secondary importance, and the +Northern was intended only for demonstration. They should have moved +first in order to divert the attention and the forces of the enemy from +the main front--the South-Western. The first two of the above-named +fronts were not, however, ready for the advance. The Supreme Command +finally decided to abandon the strategical plan and to give the +commanders of various fronts a free hand in starting operations as +the Armies would be ready, provided these operations were not delayed +too long and the enemy was not given the opportunity of carrying out +re-groupings on a large scale. + +Even such a strategy, simplified as it had been owing to the +Revolution, might have yielded great results, considering the +world-wide scope of the War; if the German Armies on the Eastern +Front could not have been utterly defeated, that Front might at least +have been restored to its former importance. The Central Powers might +have been compelled to send to that Front large forces, war material +and munitions, thus severely handicapping Hindenburg's strategy and +causing him constant anxiety. The operations were finally fixed for the +following dates: They were to begin on the South-Western Front on June +16th, on the Western on July 7th, on the Northern on July 8th, and on +the Roumanian on July 6th. The last three dates almost coincide with +the beginning of the collapse (July 6th-7th) of the South-Western Front. + +As mentioned above, in June, 1917, the Revolutionary Democracy had +already acquiesced in the idea that an advance was necessary, although +this acquiescence was qualified. The offensive thus had the moral +support of the Provisional Government, the Commanding Staffs, all the +officers, the Liberal Democracy, the Defencist Coalition of the Soviet, +the Commissars, of nearly all Army Committees, and of many Regimental +Committees. Against the offensive the minority of the Revolutionary +Democracy was ranged--the Bolsheviks, the Social-Revolutionaries +of Tchernov's and of Martov's (Zederbaum) group. There was a small +appendix to this minority--the Democratisation of the Army. + +At the moment of writing I do not possess a complete list of the +Russian Armies, but I may confidently assert that on all sectors upon +which the advance had been planned we had a numerical and a technical +superiority over the enemy, more especially in guns, of which we had +larger quantities than ever. It fell to the lot of the South-Western +Front to test the fighting capacity of the Revolutionary Army. + +The group of armies under General Bohm-Ermolli (the 4th and 2nd +Austrian Armies and the Southern German Armies) stood between the upper +Sereth and the Carpathians (Brody-Nadvorna) on the position north of +the Dniester which we had captured after Brussilov's victorious advance +in the autumn of 1916. South of the Dniester stood the 3rd Austrian +Army of General Kirchbach, which formed the Left Wing of the Archduke +Joseph's Carpathian Front. Our best Army Corps, which were intended as +shock troops, were opposed to the last three Armies mentioned above. +These Austro-German troops had already been dealt many heavy blows by +the Russian Armies in the summer and in the autumn of 1916. Since then, +the Southern German Divisions of General Botmer, which had been hard +hit, had been replaced by fresh troops from the North. Although the +Austrian Armies had been to a certain extent reorganised by the German +High Command and reinforced by German divisions, they did not represent +a formidable force and, according to the German Headquarters, were not +fit for active operations. + +Since the Germans had occupied the Cherviche "Place d'armes" on the +Stokhod, Hindenburg's Headquarters had given orders that no operations +should be conducted, as it was hoped that the disruption of the Russian +Army and of the country would follow its natural course, assisted by +German propaganda. The Germans estimated the fighting capacity of our +Army very low. Nevertheless, when Hindenburg realised in the beginning +of June that a Russian advance was a contingency to be reckoned with, +he moved six divisions from the Western-European front and sent them to +reinforce the group of Armies of Bohm-Ermolli. The enemy was perfectly +well aware of the directions in which we intended to advance.... + +The Russian Armies of the South-Western Front, commanded by General +Gutor, were to strike in the main direction of Kamenetz-Podolsk-Lvov. +The Armies were to move along both banks of the Dniester: General +Erdely's 11th Army in the direction of Zlochev, General Selivatchev's +7th Army towards Brjeczany, and General Kornilov's 8th Army towards +Galitch. In the event of victory we would reach Lvov, break through +between the fronts of Bohm-Ermolli and the Archduke Joseph, and would +drive the latter's left wing to the Carpathians, cutting it off from +all available natural means of communication. The remainder of our +Armies on the South-Western Front were stretched along a broad front +from the river Pripet to Brody for active defence and demonstration. + +On June 16th the guns of the shock troops of the 7th and 11th Army +opened a fire of such intensity as had never been heard before. After +two days of continuous fire, which destroyed the enemy's strong +position, the Russian regiments attacked. The enemy line was broken +between Zvorov and Brjeczany on a front of several miles; we took two +or three fortified lines. On June 19th the attack was renewed on a +front of forty miles, between the Upper Strypa and the Narauvka. In +this heavy and glorious battle the Russian troops took three hundred +officers and eighteen thousand men prisoners in two days, twenty-nine +guns, and other booty. The enemy positions were captured on many +sectors, and we penetrated the enemy lines to an average depth of over +two miles, driving him back to the Strypa in the direction of Zlochev. + +The news of our victory spread all over Russia, evoked universal +rejoicings, and raised the hopes for the revival of the former strength +of the Russian Army. Kerensky reported to the Provisional Government as +follows: "This day is the day of a great triumph for the Revolution. +On June 18th the Russian Revolutionary Army, in very high spirits, +began the advance and has proved before Russia and before the world its +ardent devotion to the cause of the Revolution and its love of Country +and Liberty.... The Russian warriors are inaugurating a new discipline +based upon feelings of a citizen's duty.... An end has been made to-day +of all the vicious calumnies and slander about the organisation of +the Russian Army, which has been rebuilt on Democratic lines...." The +man who wrote these words had afterwards the courage to claim that it +was not he who had destroyed the Army, because he had taken over the +organisation as a fatal inheritance! + +After three days' respite, a violent battle was resumed on the front +of the 11th Army on both sides of the railway line on the front +Batkuv-Koniuchi. By that time the threatened German regiments were +reinforced, and stubborn fighting ensued. The 11th Army captured +several lines, but suffered heavy losses. The trenches changed hands +several times after a hand-to-hand battle, and great efforts had to +be made in order to break the resistance of the enemy, who had been +reinforced and had recovered. This action practically signified the end +of the advance of the 7th and 11th Armies. The impetus was spent and +the troops began once more to sit in the trenches, the monotony of this +pastime being only broken in places by local skirmishes, Austro-German +counter-attacks, and intermittent gunfire. Meanwhile preparations +for the advance began on June 23rd in Kornilov's Army. On June 25th +his troops broke through General Kirchbach's positions west of +Stanislavov and reached the line of Jesupol-Lyssetz. After a stubborn +and sanguinary battle Kirchbach's troops, utterly defeated, ran and +dragged along in their headlong flight the German division which had +been sent to reinforce them. On the 27th General Cheremissov's right +column captured Galitch, some of his troops crossed the Dniester. +On the 28th the left column overcame the stubborn resistance of the +Austro-Germans and captured Kalush. In the next two or three days, the +8th Army was in action on the river Lomnitza and finally established +itself on the banks of the river and in front of it. In the course of +this brilliant operation Kornilov's Army broke through the 3rd Austrian +Army on a front of over twenty miles and captured 150 officers, 10,000 +men, and about 100 guns. The capture of Lomnitza opened to Kornilov the +road to Dolina-Stryi and to the communications of Botmer's Army. German +Headquarters described the position of the Commander-in-Chief of the +Western Front as _critical_. + +General Bohm-Ermolli meanwhile was concentrating all his reserves in +the direction of Zlochev, the point to which the German divisions were +likewise sent which had been taken from the Western European Front. +Some of the reserves had to be sent, however, across the Dniester +against the 8th Russian Army. They arrived on July 2nd, reinforced the +shattered ranks of the 3rd Austrian Army, and from that day positional +battles began on the Lomnitza, with varying success, and occasionally +stubborn fighting. The concentration of the German shock troops between +the Upper Sereth and the railway line Tarnopol-Zlochev was completed +on July 5th. On the next day, after strong artillery preparations, +this group attacked our 11th Army, broke our front and moved swiftly +towards Kamenetz-Podolsk, pursuing the Army Corps of the 11th Army +who were fleeing in panic. The Army Headquarters, the Stavka and the +Press, losing all perspective, blamed the 607th Mlynov Regiment as the +chief cause of the catastrophe. The demoralised, worthless regiment had +left the trenches of their own accord and opened the front. It was, of +course, a very sad occurrence, but it would be naïve to describe it +even as an excuse. For as early as on the 9th of July the Committees +and Commissars of the 11th Army were telegraphing to the Provisional +Government: "The truth and nothing but the truth about the events." +"The German offensive on the front of the 11th Army, which began on +July 6th, is growing into an immeasurable calamity which threatens +perhaps the very existence of Revolutionary Russia. The spirit of +the troops, that were prompted to advance by the heroic efforts of +the minority, has undergone a decisive and fatal change. The impetus +of the advance was soon spent. Most of the units are in a condition +of increasing disruption. There is not a shadow of discipline or +obedience; persuasion is likewise powerless and is answered by threats +and sometimes by shootings. Cases have occurred when orders to advance +immediately to reinforce the line were debated for hours at meetings, +and reinforcements were twenty-four hours late. Some units arbitrarily +leave the trenches without even waiting for the enemy to advance.... +For hundreds of miles strings of deserters--healthy, strong men who +thoroughly realise their impunity--are to be seen moving along with +rifles or without.... The country should know the whole truth. It will +shudder and will find the strength to fall with all its might upon +all those whose cowardice is ruining and bartering Russia and the +Revolution." + +The Stavka wrote: "In spite of its enormous numerical and technical +superiority, the 11th Army was retreating uninterruptedly. On the +8th of July it had already reached the Serenth, never halting at the +very strong fortified position to the West of the river, which had +been our starting point in the glorious advance of 1916. Bohm-Ermolli +had detached some of his forces for the pursuit of the Russian +troops in the direction of Tarnapol and had moved his main forces +southwards between the Serenth and the Strypa, threatening to cut off +the communication of the 7th Army, to throw them into the Dniester +and, perhaps, cut off the retreat of the 8th Army. On July 9th the +Austro-Germans had already reached Mikulinze, a distance of one march +south of Tarnapol.... The Armies of General Selivatchev and Cheremissov +(who had succeeded General Kornilov upon the latter's appointment on +July 7th to the High Command of the South-Western Front) were in great +difficulty. They could not hope to resist the enemy by manoeuvring, +and all that was left to them was to escape the enemy's blows by +forced marches. The 7th Army was in particularly dire straits, as it +was retreating under the double pressure of the Army Corps of General +Botmer, who was conducting a frontal attack, and of the troops of +Bohm-Ermolli, striking from the north against the denuded right flank. +The 8th Army had to march over one hundred miles under pressure from +the enemy. + +On July 10th the Austro-Germans advanced to the line +Mikulinze-Podgaitze-Stanilavov. On the 11th the Germans occupied +Tarnapol, abandoned without fighting by the 1st Guards Army Corps. On +the next day they broke through our position on the rivers Gniezno +and Sereth, South of Trembovlia, and developed their advance in the +Eastern and South-Eastern directions. On the same day, pursuing the +7th and 8th Armies, the enemy occupied the line from the Sereth to +Monsaterjisko-Tlumatch. + +On the 12th July, seeing that the position was desperate, the +Commander-in-Chief issued orders for a retreat from the Sereth, and by +the 21st the Armies of the South-Western Front, having cleared Galicia +and Bukovina, reached the Russian frontier. Their retreat was marked +by fires, violence, murders and plunder. A few units, however, fought +the enemy stubbornly and covered the retreat of the maddened mob of +deserters by sacrificing their lives. Among them were Russian officers, +whose bodies covered the battlefields. The Armies were retreating in +disorder; the same Armies that, only a year ago, had captured Lutsk, +Brody-Stanislavov, Chernovetz in their triumphal progress ... were +retreating before the same Austro-German troops that only a year ago +had been completely defeated and had strewn with fugitives the plains +of Volynia, Galicia and Bukovina, leaving hundreds of thousands of +prisoners in our hands. We shall never forget that in Brussilov's +advance of 1916, the 7th, 8th, 9th and 11th Armies took 420,000 +prisoners, 600 guns, 2,500,000 machine guns, etc. Our Allies are not +likely to forget this either; they know full well that the loud echo of +the Galician battle sounded on the Somme and at Goritza. + +The Commissars Savinkov and Filonenko telegraphed to the Provisional +Government: "There is no choice; the traitors must be executed.... +Capital punishment must be meted out to all those who refuse to +sacrifice their lives for their country...." + +In the beginning of July, after the Russian advance had ostensibly +failed, it was decided at Hindenburg's Headquarters to undertake a +new extensive operation against the Roumanian front by a simultaneous +advance of the 3rd and 7th Austrian Armies across Bukovina into +Moldavia and of the Right group of General Mackensen on the Lower +Sereth. The objective was to seize Moldavia and Bessarabia. But on +July 11th the Russian Army of General Ragosa and the Roumanian Army +of General Averesco took the offensive between the rivers Susitsa +and Putna against the 9th Austrian Army. The attack was successful, +the enemy positions were captured, the Armies moved forward several +miles, took 2,000 prisoners and over 60 guns, but the operation was not +developed. Owing to the natural conditions of the theatre of war and +to the direction in which the operation was undertaken, it was more +akin to a demonstration in order to relieve the South-Western Front. +Also the troops of the 4th Russian Army soon lost all impetus for the +advance. In July and until August 4th, the troops of the Archduke +Joseph and of Mackensen attacked in several directions and gained +local successes, but without any appreciable result. Although the +Russian divisions repeatedly disobeyed orders and occasionally left the +trenches during the battle, yet the condition of the Roumanian Front +was somewhat better than that of the other Front, owing to its distance +from Petrograd, to the presence of disciplined Roumanian troops and +to the natural conditions of the country. For these reasons we were +able to keep that Front somewhat longer. This circumstance, together +with the apparent weakness of the Austrian Armies, especially the 3rd +and the 7th, and the complete dislocation of the communications of +Bohm-Ermolli's group and of the Archduke Joseph's left wing--caused +Hindenburg's Headquarters indefinitely to postpone the operation, and +a period of calm ensued along the entire South-Western Front. On the +Roumanian Front local actions were fought until the end of August. +At the same time, German divisions began to move from the Sbrucz +northwards in the direction of Riga. Hindenburg's plan was to deal +the Russian Army local blows, without straining his own resources or +spending large reserves, so urgently needed, on the Western-European +Front. By these tactics he intended to contribute to the natural course +of the collapse of the Russian front, for it was upon this collapse +that the Central Powers based all their calculations in regard to +operations and even in regard to the possibility of continuing the +campaign in 1918. + +Our efforts at advancing on other Fronts also ended in complete +failure. On the 7th of July operations began on the Western Front, +which I commanded. The details will be given in the next chapter. Of +this operation Ludendorf wrote: "Of all the attacks directed against +the former Eastern front of General Eichhorn, the attacks of July 9th, +South of Smorgom, and at Krevo were particularly fierce.... For several +days the position was extremely difficult until our reserves and our +gunfire restored the front. The Russians left our trenches; they were +no longer the Russians of the old days." + +On the Northern Front, in the 5th Army, everything was over in one +day. The Stavka wrote: "South-West of the Dvinsk our troops, after +strong artillery preparation, captured the German position across the +railway Dvinsk-Vilna. Subsequently, entire divisions, without pressure +from the enemy, deliberately retreated to their own trenches." The +Stavka noted the heroic behaviour of several units, the prowess of +the officers and the tremendous losses which the latter had suffered. +This fact, however unimportant from the strategical point of view, +deserves to be specially noted. As a matter of fact, the 5th Army was +commanded by General Danilov (afterwards a member of the Bolshevik +Delegation at Brest-Litovsk. He served in 1920 in the Russian Army in +the Crimea). He enjoyed exceptional prestige with the Revolutionary +Democracy. According to Stankevitch, the Commissar of the Northern +Front, Danilov "was the only General who had remained, in spite of the +Revolution, full master in the Army and had succeeded in so dealing +with the new institutions--the Commissars and the Committees--that +they strengthened his authority instead of weakening it.... He knew +how to make use of these elements, and he overcame all obstacles in a +spirit of complete self-control and firmness. In the 5th Army everyone +was working, learning and being educated.... As the best and the most +cultured elements of the Army were working to that end." This is a +striking proof of the fact that even when the Commanding Officer +becomes thoroughly familiar with Revolutionary institutions, this does +not serve as a guarantee of the fighting capacity of his troops. + + * * * * * + +On July 11th Kornilov, upon his appointment to the Chief Command +of the South-Western Front, sent to the Provisional Government his +well-known telegram, of which he forwarded a copy to the Supreme +Commander-in-Chief. In that telegram, already quoted above, Kornilov +demanded the reintroduction of capital punishment, and wrote: "... +I declare that the country is on the verge of collapse and that, +although I have not been consulted, I _demand_ that the offensive be +stopped on all Fronts in order that the Army may be saved, preserved +and re-organised on the basis of strict discipline, and in order that +the lives may not be sacrificed of a few heroes who are entitled to +see better days." In spite of the peculiar wording of this appeal, the +idea of stopping the advance was immediately accepted by the Supreme +Command, the more so that the operations had practically come to a +standstill irrespective of orders as a result of the reluctance of the +Russian Army to fight and to advance, as well as of the schemes of the +German Headquarters. + +Capital punishment and Revolutionary courts-martial were introduced +at the front. Kornilov gave an order to shoot deserters and robbers +and to expose their bodies with corresponding notices on the roads +and in other prominent places. Special shock battalions were formed +of cadets and volunteers to fight against desertion, plunder and +violence. Kornilov forbade meetings at the Front and gave an order to +stop them by the force of arms. These measures--which were introduced +by Kornilov at his own risk and peril, his manly, straightforward +utterances, and the firm tone in which, disregarding discipline, he +began to address the Provisional Government, and last, but not least, +his resolute action--considerably enhanced his authority with the +wide circles of Liberal Democracy and with the officers. Even the +Revolutionary Democracy within the Army, stunned and depressed as it +was by the tragic turn of events, saw in Kornilov, for some time after +the _débâcle_, the last resource and the only possible remedy in the +desperate position. It may be stated that the date of July 8th, on +which Kornilov took command of the South-Western Front and addressed +his first demand to the Provisional Government, sealed his fate: in +the eyes of many people he became a national hero and great hopes were +centred upon him--he was expected to save the country. + +During my stay at Minsk I was not very well informed of the unofficial +tidings prevailing in military circles, yet I felt that the centre +of moral influence had moved to Berditchev (Headquarters of the +South-Western Front). Kerensky and Brussilov had somehow suddenly +receded to the background. A new method of administration was put +into practice: we received from Kornilov's Headquarters copies of +his "demands" or notices of some strong and striking decision he had +adopted, and in a few days these were repeated from Petrograd or from +the Stavka, but in the shape of an order or of a regulation. + +The tragedy of July undoubtedly had a sobering effect upon the men. In +the first place, they were ashamed because things had happened that +were so shameful and so disgraceful that even the dormant conscience +and the deadened spirit of the men could not find excuses for these +happenings. Several months later, in November, after fleeing from +the captivity of Bykhov, I spent several days under an assumed name +and in civilian clothes among the soldiers who had flooded all the +railways. They were discussing the past. I never heard a single man +confessing openly or cynically his participation in the treachery of +July. They all tried to explain away the matter and chiefly attributed +it to somebody's treason, especially, of course, the treason of the +officers. None spoke of his own treachery. In the second place, the men +were frightened. They felt that a kind of power, a kind of authority +had arisen, and they were quietly waiting for developments. Lastly, +operations had ended and nervous tension had been relieved--which +caused a certain reaction, apathy and indifference. _This was the +second occasion (the first took place in March) on which, had the +moment been immediately and properly taken advantage of--it might have +been the turning point in the history of the Russian Revolution._ + +As the sounds were dying out of the last shots fired at the Front, the +men who had been stunned by the disaster began to recover their senses. +Kerensky was the first to return to sanity. The horror had passed away, +the nerve-wrecking, maddening fear which had prompted the issue of +the first stringent order. Kerensky's will-power was dominated by his +fear of the Soviet, of the danger of definitely losing all prestige +with the Revolutionary Democracy by resentment against Kornilov for +the resolute tone of the latter's messages and by the shadow of the +potential dictator. The drafts of military regulations by which it +was intended to restore the power of the Commanding Officers and of +the Army were drowned in red tape and in the turmoil of personal +conflicts, suspicions and hatreds. The Revolutionary Democracy once +again sternly opposed the new course, as it interpreted this course +as an infringement upon the liberties and as a menace to its own +existence. The same attitude was adopted by the Army Committees, whose +powers were to be curtailed as a first step in the proposed changes. In +these circles the new course was described as counter-revolutionary. +The masses of the soldiery, on the other hand, soon appraised the +new situation. They saw that stern words were mere words, that +capital punishment was only a bogy, because there was no real force +capable of mastering their arbitrariness. So fear vanished again. The +hurricane did not clear the close and tense atmosphere. New clouds were +overhanging and peals of a new deafening thunder were to be heard in +the distance. + +[Illustration: General Kornilov's arrival at Petrograd.] + +[Illustration: General Kornilov in the trenches.] + + + + +CHAPTER XXIX. + +THE CONFERENCE AT THE STAVKA OF MINISTERS AND COMMANDERS-IN-CHIEF ON +JULY 16TH. + + +Upon my return from the Front to Minsk I was summoned to the Stavka +at Moghilev, where a Conference was to be held on July 16th. Kerensky +suggested that Brussilov should invite, of his own accord, the +prominent military chiefs, in order to discuss the actual condition +of the Front, the consequences on the July disaster, and to determine +the course of future military policy. It transpired that General +Gourko, who had been invited by Brussilov, had not been admitted to the +Conference by Kerensky. A telegram was sent to Kornilov from the Stavka +saying that, in view of the difficult position of the South-Western +Front, his attendance was impossible, and that he was requested to +present in writing his views on the questions under discussion. It +should be noted that, at that time, on July 14th and 15th, the 11th +Army was in full retreat from the Sereth to the Zbrucz, and that +everyone was anxious to hear whether the 7th Army had succeeded in +crossing the Lower Sereth and the 8th the line of Zalestchiki, thus +avoiding the blows of the German Armies that were trying to cut their +retreat. + +So sad was the plight of the country and the Army that I decided +to disclose to the Conference the full truth on the condition of +the Army in all its hideous nakedness, and in disregard of all +conventionalities. I reported myself to the Supreme Commander-in-Chief. +Brussilov surprised me. He said: "I have come to the conclusion +that this is the limit and we must put the question squarely. All +these Commissars, Committees and Democratisations are driving the +Army and Russia to ruin. I have decided categorically to demand that +they should cease to disorganise the Army. I hope that you will back +me?" I answered that this was in full accord with my intentions and +that the object of my visit was to put the question squarely of the +future destinies of the Army. I must confess that Brussilov's words +reconciled me with him and I therefore decided to eliminate from my +speech all the bitter things which I had intended to say against the +Supreme Command. + +We waited about an hour and a half for the Conference to meet. We +afterwards learnt that a small incident had occurred. The Prime +Minister had not been met at the station either by Brussilov or by his +Chief-of-Staff (General Lukomsky), who had been detained by urgent +military business. Kerensky waited for some time and grew nervous. He +finally sent his _aide-de-camp_ to Brussilov with the order to come to +the station at once and to report. The incident was not commented upon, +but all those who have been in touch with politics know that the actors +on that stage are mere men, with all their weaknesses, and that the +game is often continued behind the curtain. + +The Conference was attended by the Prime Minister Kerensky, the +Foreign Minister Terestchenko, the Supreme C.-in-C. Brussilov, his +Chief-of-Staff General Lukomsky, Generals Alexeiev and Ruzsky, the +C.-in-C. of the Northern Front General Klembovsky, by myself as +C.-in-C. of the Western Front, and by my Chief-of-Staff General Markov, +Admiral Maximov, Generals Velitchko and Romanovsky, the Commissar of +the Western Front Savinkov, and two or three young men of Kerensky's +suite. + +General Brussilov addressed the Conference in a short speech, which +struck me as being very vague and commonplace. In fact, he said nothing +at all. I had hoped that Brussilov would keep his word and would sum up +the situation and draw conclusions. I was mistaken. Brussilov did not +speak again. I opened the discussion. I said: + +"It is with deep emotion and in full consciousness of a grave +responsibility that I am delivering my report to the Conference. I +beg to be excused if I speak as openly and frankly as I have always +done. I was outspoken with the old Autocracy, and intend to be just as +outspoken with the new--the Revolutionary Autocracy. + +"When I took Command of the Front, I found the Armies in a state of +complete disruption. This seemed the more strange that neither in the +reports received at the Stavka or in those I received upon taking +over the Command had the situation been described in such gloomy +colours. The explanation is obvious: as long as the Army Corps were not +conducting active operations, excesses were comparatively few; but no +sooner was the order given for doing the duty of a soldier, for taking +up positions or for the advance, than the instinct of self-preservation +asserted itself and the picture of disruption was unveiled. Some ten +divisions refused to take up positions. All Commanding Officers of +all grades had to work very hard, to argue, to persuade.... In order +to be able to carry out the slightest measure of any importance, it +became imperative to reduce the numbers of mutinous troops. A whole +month was thus lost, although some divisions obeyed orders. Disruption +was rampant in the 2nd Caucasian Corps and in the 169th Infantry +Division. Several units had lost human appearance, not only morally but +physically. I shall never forget the hour which I spent in the 703rd +Suram Regiment. There were up to ten private stills in each regiment; +drunkenness, cardplaying, rioting, plunder and even murder. I took a +drastic step. I sent the 2nd Caucasian Corps (except the 51st Infantry +Division and the 169th Infantry Division) to the rear and ordered them +to be disbanded. Before the operation had developed, I thus lost about +30,000 bayonets without firing a shot. The 28th and 29th Infantry +Divisions, which were considered the best, were sent to occupy the +sector of the Caucasians. What happened? The 29th Division, after a +forced march to its destination, returned on the next day almost in +its entirety (two and a half regiments). The 28th Division sent one +regiment to the trenches, and that regiment passed a resolution against +advancing. Every possible measure was taken in order to raise the +spirit of the troops. The Supreme Commander-in-Chief visited the Front. +From his conversations with the members of Committee and with the +men elected from two Army Corps he gathered the impression that 'the +soldiers were all right, but the Commanding Officers had lost heart.' +That is not so. The Commanding Officers did all they could in extremely +difficult and painful surroundings, but the Supreme Commander-in-Chief +is unaware of the fact that the meeting of the 1st Siberian Corps, +where his speech was most enthusiastically received, continued after +his departure. New speakers came forward and appealed to the men not +to listen to the 'old Bourgeois' (forgive me, that is so.... Brussilov +interjected: "I do not mind") and they heaped vile abuse upon his head. +These appeals were also enthusiastically greeted. The War Minister, who +visited the troops and by his fiery eloquence incited them to deeds +of valour, was enthusiastically received by the 28th Division. Upon +his return to the train he was met by a regimental deputation which +announced that half an hour after the Minister had gone the regiment, +as well as another one, had decided not to advance. The picture was +particularly moving and evoked great enthusiasm when, in the 29th +Division, the Commanding Officer of the Poti Infantry Regiment knelt to +receive the Red Banner. The men swore--there were three speakers and +passionate cheering--to die for the country. On the first day of the +advance the regiment did not reach our trenches, but turned round in a +disgraceful manner and retreated six miles behind the battlefield. + +"The Commissars and the Committee were among the factors which were +meant to give moral support to the troops, but practically contributed +to their demoralisation. Among the Commissars there may have been +favourable exceptions of men who did a certain amount of good without +interfering with other people's business. But the institution itself +cannot fail to contribute to the disruption of the Army because it +implies a dual power, friction and interference uncalled for and +criminal. I am compelled to describe the Commissars of the Western +Front. One of them, for all I know, may be a good and honest man, but +he is an Utopian and not only ignorant of Army life, but of life in +general. He has a great idea of his own importance. In demanding that +the Chief-of-Staff should obey his orders, he declares that he is +entitled to dismiss Commanding Officers, including the General Officer +commanding the Army. In explaining to the troops the extent of his +authority, he thus describes it: 'As the fronts are subordinate to the +War Minister, I am the War Minister for the Western Front.' Another +Commissar, who knows about as much of Army life as the first one, is +a Social Democrat standing somewhere on the verge between Bolshevism +and Menchevism. He is the noted reporter of the Military Section of +the All-Russian Congress of Soviets who has expressed the view that +the Army has not been sufficiently disorganised by the 'Declaration' +and demanded further 'Democratisation.' He claimed the right for the +men to veto appointments of Commanding Officers, insisted upon part +2 of Paragraph 14 of the Declaration which empowered the Commanding +Officers to use arms against cowards and traitors being cancelled, and +upon freedom of speech being granted not only off parade, but on duty. +The 3rd Commissar, who was not a Russian, and who appeared to treat +the Russian soldier with contempt, in addressing the regiment used +such foul language as had never fallen from the Commanding Officers +under the Czar's régime. Curiously enough the conscious and free +Revolutionary warriors accept such treatment as their due and obey him. +That Commissar, according to the Commanding Officers, is undoubtedly +useful. + +"The Committees are another disintegrating force. I do not deny that +some of the Committees have done excellent work, and have done their +best to fulfil their duty. In particular some of their members have +been exceedingly useful, and have rendered their country the supreme +service of dying the death of heroes. But I affirm that the good they +have done will not compensate for the tremendous mischief done to the +Army by the introduction of all these new authorities, by friction, by +interference, and by discrediting the commands. I might quote hundreds +of resolutions bearing that stamp, but will confine myself merely to +the most blatant cases. The struggle for seizing power in the Army is +carried on openly and systematically. The Chairman of the Committee +of the Front has published in his paper an article advocating that +governmental powers be granted to the Committee. The Army Committee of +the 3rd Army has passed the resolution, which to my intense surprise +was endorsed by the Commanding Officer, requesting 'that the Army +Committees be invested with the plenary powers of the War Minister and +of the Central Committee of the Soviets which would entitle them to +act in the name of that Committee.' When the famous 'Declaration' was +discussed opinions varied in the Committee of the Front in regard to +Paragraph 14. Some members wanted the second part to be eliminated; +others demanded that a proviso be added empowering the members of the +Committee of the Front to take the same measures including armed force +against the same persons, and even against the Commanding Officers +themselves. Is that not the limit? In the report of the All-Russian +Congress a demand is formulated for the Soldiers' Committees to be +allowed to cancel appointments of Commanding Officers, and to partake +in the administration of the Army. You must not think that this is +merely theory. Far from it. The Committees endeavour to get hold of +everything, to interfere with purely military questions, with the +routine and the administration. And this is being done in an atmosphere +of complete anarchy caused by wholesale insubordination. + +"Moral preparations for the advance were proceeding apace. On June 8th +the Committee of the Front passed a resolution against the advance, but +changed its mind on the 18th. The Committee of the 2nd Army decided +against the offensive on June 1st, but cancelled its decision on June +20th. In the Minsk Soviet 123 votes against 79 decided against the +advance. All the Committees of the 169th Infantry Division passed +a vote of censure on the Provisional Government, and described the +offensive as "treason to the Revolution." The campaign against the +authorities manifested itself in a series of dismissals of Senior +Commanders, in which the Committees almost invariably participated. +Shortly before the opening of the operations an Army Corps Commander, +the Chief-of-Staff, and a Divisional Commander of the most important +sector occupied by the shock troops, had to resign, and the same +fate was shared by about 60 Commanding Officers, from Army Corps +Commander to Regimental Commander. It is impossible to estimate the +amount of harm done by the Committee. They have no proper discipline +of their own. If the majority passes a reasonable resolution, that +does not suffice. It is put into practice by individual members of +the Committee. Taking advantage of their position as members of Army +Committees, the Bolsheviks have more than once spread mutiny and +rebellion with impunity. As a result, authority is undermined instead +of being strengthened, because so many different individuals and +institutions are supposed to exercise that authority. And the Commander +in the Field, who is being discredited, dismissed, controlled and +watched from all sides, is nevertheless expected to lead the troops +into action with a strong hand. Such was the moral preparation. The +troops have not yet been deployed. But the South-Western Front required +immediate assistance. The enemy had already removed from my Front to +the South-West three or four divisions. I decided to attack with the +troops which presented at least a semblance of loyalty. In three days +our guns had smashed the enemy trenches and wrought havoc among them, +had inflicted heavy losses among the Germans, and had opened the way +for our infantry. The first line had been almost entirely broken, and +our men had already visited the enemy batteries. That breach of the +Front promised to develop into a great victory, for which we had been +hoping for so long.... I now revert to descriptions of the battle. +'The units of the 28th Infantry Division took up their positions only +four hours before the attack; of the 109th Regiment only two and a +half companies, with four machine-guns and 30 officers, reached the +appointed line; only one-half of the 110th came up. Two battalions of +the 111th Regiment, who had occupied the defiles, refused to advance; +men of the 112th Regiment retired to the rear in batches. Units of +the 28th Division were met by a strong artillery fire, machine-gun +and rifle fire, and remained behind their barbed wire, as they were +incapable of advancing. Only a few shock troops and volunteers of the +Volga Regiment, with a company of officers, succeeded in capturing the +first line, but the fire was so strong that they failed to keep the +position, and towards the afternoon units of the 29th Division returned +to their original lines after suffering heavy losses, especially +in officers. On the sector of the 51st Division the attack began +at five minutes past seven. The 202nd Gori Regiment and the 204th +Ardagan-Michailovsky Regiment, as well as two companies of the Sukhum +Regiment, with a shock company of the Poti Regiment, made a dash across +two lines of trenches, bayoneted the enemy, and began to storm the +third line at half-past seven. The break was so rapid and so unexpected +that the enemy failed to establish a barrage. The 201st Poti Regiment, +which was following the advance troops, approached our first line of +trenches, but refused to go any further, so that our troops who had +broken through were not reinforced in time. The units of the 134th +Division, which followed, could not carry out their orders because the +men of the Poti Regiment had crowded in the trenches, while the enemy +had opened a very strong gun fire. These units, therefore, partly +dispersed and partly lay in our trenches. Seeing that no reinforcements +were forthcoming from the rear and from the flanks, the men of the Gori +and Ardagan Regiments lost heart, and some of the companies, in which +all the officers had been killed, began to retire. They were followed +by the remainder of the troops without, however, any pressure from the +Germans, who did not put their batteries and machine-guns into action +until the retreat had begun.... The units of the 29th Division were +late in going into position, because the men advanced reluctantly, +as their mood had changed. A quarter of an hour before the appointed +time the 114th Regiment on the right flank refused to advance, and +the Erivan Regiment had to be drawn up from the Army Corps Reserves. +For some unknown reason the 113th and 116th Regiments also failed +to move.... After this failure desertion began to grow, and at dawn +became general. The men were tired, nervous; they had lost the habit of +fighting, and were unaccustomed to the roar of the guns owing to long +months of inactivity, of fraternisation, and of meetings. They left the +trenches _en masse_, they abandoned the machine-guns and retired to the +rear.... _The Headquarters of the 20th Army Corps sent the following +report of the battle: 'The cowardice and lack of discipline in certain +units reached such a pitch that the Commanding Officers were compelled +to ask our artillery to cease firing, because the fire of our own guns +caused a panic among our soldiers.'_ + +"I will quote another description of the battle made by an Army Corps +Commander who took command on the eve of battle, and whose impressions +are therefore totally unbiassed: '... Everything was ready for the +advance: the plan had been worked out in detail; we had a powerful and +efficient artillery; the weather was favourable because it did not +allow the Germans to take advantage of their superiority in aircraft; +we had superior numbers, our Reserves were drawn up in time, we had +plenty of ammunition, and the sector was well chosen for the advance, +because we were in a position to conceal strong artillery forces in +the close neighbourhood of our trenches. The undulations of ground +also afforded many hidden approaches to the Front; the distance +between ourselves and the enemy was small, and there were no natural +obstacles between us which would have had to have been forced under +fire. Finally, the troops had been prepared by the Committees, the +Commanding Officers and the War Minister, Kerensky, and their efforts +induced the troops to take the first, the most arduous steps. We +attained considerable success without suffering appreciable losses. +Three fortified lines had been broken through and occupied, and there +remained only separate defensive positions. The fighting might soon +have reached the phase of bayonet fighting; the enemy artillery was +silenced, over 1,400 Germans, many machine-guns and other booty had +been captured. Also, our guns had inflicted heavy casualties in killed +and wounded upon the enemy, and it may be confidently stated that +the forces that were opposing our Corps had been temporarily knocked +out. Along the entire front of our Corps only three or four enemy +batteries and occasionally three or four machine-guns were firing, and +there were isolated rifle shots. But--night came. Immediately I began +to receive anxious reports from officers commanding sectors at the +Front to the effect that the men were abandoning the unattacked Front +Line _en masse_, entire companies deserting. It was stated in some of +the reports that the firing line in places was only occupied by the +Commanding Officer, his staff, and a few men. The operations ended in +an irretrievable and hopeless failure. In one day we had lived through +the joy of victory, which had been won in spite of the low spirits +of the men, as well as the horror of seeing the fruits of victory +deliberately cast away by the soldiery. And yet the country needed that +victory for its very life. I realised that we, the Commanding Officers, +are powerless to alter the elemental psychology of the men, and I wept +long and bitterly.' + +"This inglorious operation, however, resulted in serious losses, which +it is now difficult to estimate, as crowds of fugitives returned daily. +Over 20,000 wounded men have already passed through sorting stations +in the rear. I will refrain at present from drawing any conclusion, +but the percentage of various kinds of wounds is symptomatic: 10 per +cent. heavily wounded, 30 per cent. finger and wrist wounds, 40 per +cent. light wounds from which bandages were not removed at the dressing +stations (many wounds were probably simulated), and 20 per cent. +bruised and sick. Such was the end of the operation. I have never yet +gone into battle with such superiority in numbers and technical means. +Never had the conditions been more full of such brilliant promise. +On a front of about 14 miles I had 184 battalions against 29 enemy +battalions; 900 guns against 300 German: 138 of my battalions came +into action against 17 German battalions of the 1st line. All that was +wasted. Reports from various Commanders indicate that the temper of +the troops immediately after the operation was just as indefinite as +before. Three days ago I summoned the Army Commanders and addressed to +them the question: 'Could their Armies resist a strong enemy attack, +provided reserves were forthcoming?' The answer was in the negative. +'Could the Armies resist an organised German offensive in their present +condition, numerical and technical?' Two of the Army Commanders gave +indefinite replies, and the Commanding Officer of the 10th Army +answered in the affirmative. They all said: 'We have no infantry.' I +will go further, and I will say: + +"_We have no Army. It is necessary immediately, and at all costs to +create that Army._ The new Government regulations, which are supposed +to raise the spirit of the Army, have not yet penetrated into its +depths, and the impression they have produced cannot yet be defined. +One thing is certain--that repression alone cannot drag the Army out of +the morass into which it has fallen. It is repeated every day that the +Bolsheviks have caused the disruption of the Army, but I disagree. It +is not so. The Army has been disrupted by others, and the Bolsheviks +are like worms which have bred in the wounds of the Army. The Army has +been disrupted by the regulations of the last four months, and it is +the bitter irony of fate that this has been done by men who, however +honest and idealistic, are unaware of the historical laws governing +the existence of the Army, of its life and routine. At first this was +done under pressure from the Soviet, which was primarily an Anarchist +institution. Later it developed into a fatal, mistaken policy. Soon +after the War Minister had taken up his duties he said to me: 'The +process of revolutionising the country and the Army has been completed. +Now we must proceed with creative work....' I ventured to reply: 'The +process is completed, but it is too late.'" + +General Brussilov here interrupted me, and asked me to curtail my +Report, as the Conference would otherwise be too protracted. I realised +that the length of the Report was not what mattered, but it was its +risky substance, and I replied: "I consider that this question is of +paramount importance, and request that I be allowed to complete my +statement, otherwise I shall have to cease speaking." A silence ensued, +which I interpreted as a permission to continue. + +I then proceeded: "The Declaration of the Soldiers' Rights has been +issued. Every one of the Commanding Officers has stated that it would +bring about the ruin of the Army. The late Supreme C.-in-C., General +Alexeiev, telegraphed that the Declaration was the last nail which was +being driven into the coffin prepared for the Russian Army. The present +Supreme C.-in-C., when in command of the South-Western Front, declared +here, at Moghilev, at the Conference of Commanders-in-Chief, that +the Army may yet be saved and may advance, but on one condition--if +the Declaration is not issued. Our advice, however, was unheeded. +Paragraph 3 of the Declaration authorises free and open expressions +of political, religious, social, and other views. The Army was thus +flooded by politics. When the men of the 2nd Caucasian Grenadier +Division were disbanded they were quite sincerely puzzled. 'What is +the reason? We were allowed to speak whenever and whatever we wished, +and now we are being disbanded....' You must not think that such a +broad interpretation of the 'Liberties' is confined to the illiterate +masses. When the 169th Infantry Division was morally disrupted, and +all the Committees of that Division passed a vote of censure upon +the Provisional Government and categorically refused to advance, I +disbanded the Division. But there arose an unexpected complication: the +Commissars came to the conclusion that no crime had been committed, +because the spoken and the written word were unrestricted. The only +thing that could be incriminated was direct disobedience of Army +orders.... Paragraph 6 stipulates that all literature should be +delivered to the addressees, and the Army was flooded with criminal +Bolshevik and Defeatist literature. The stuff upon which our Army was +fed--and apparently at the expense of Government funds and of the +people's treasure--can be gauged from the report of the Moscow Military +Bureau, which alone supplied to the Front the following publications: + +From March 24th to May 1st-- + + 7,972 copies of the _Pravda_ + 2,000 " " _Soldiers' Pravda_ + 30,375 " " _Social Democrat_ + +From May 1st to June 11th-- + + 61,522 copies of the _Soldiers' Pravda_ + 32,711 " " _Social Democrat_ + 6,999 " " _Pravda_ + +and so on. The same kind of literature was sent to the villages by the +soldiers. + +"Paragraph 14 stipulates that no soldier can be punished without +a trial. Of course, this liberty applied only to the men, because +the officers continued to suffer the heaviest penalty of dismissal. +What was the result? The Central Military Justice Administration, +without reference to the Stavka and in view of the impending +Democratisation of the Courts, suggested that the latter should +suspend their activities, except for cases of special importance, +such, for example, as treason. The Commanding Officers were deprived +of disciplinary powers. Disciplinary Courts were partly inactive, +partly were boycotted. Justice completely disappeared from the Army. +This boycott of Disciplinary Court and reports on the reluctance of +certain units to elect juries are symptomatic. The legislator may come +across the same phenomenon in respect of the new Revolutionary Military +Courts, in which juries may also have to be replaced by appointed +judges. As a result of a series of legislative measures, authority +and discipline have been eliminated, the officers are dishonoured, +distrusted, and openly scorned. Generals in High Command, not excluding +Commanders-in-Chief, are being dismissed like domestic servants. In one +of his speeches at the Northern Front the War Minister inadvertently +uttered the following significant words: 'It lies within my power +to dismiss the entire personnel of the High Command in twenty-four +hours, and the Army would not object.' In the speeches addressed to +the Western Front it was said that 'in the Czarist Army we were driven +into battle with whips and machine-guns ... that Czarist Commanders +led us to slaughter, but now every drop of our blood is precious....' +I, the Commander-in-Chief, stood by the platform erected for the War +Minister, and I was heart-broken. My conscience whispered to me: +'That is a lie. My "Iron" Rifles, only eight battalions and then +twelve, took over 60,000 prisoners and 43 guns.... I have never driven +them into battle with machine-guns. I have never led my troops to +slaughter at Mezolaborch, Lutovisko, Lutsk, Chartoriisk.' To the late +Commander-in-Chief of the South-Western Front these names are indeed +familiar.... + +"Everything may be forgiven and we can stand a great deal if it is +necessary for victory, if the troops can regain their spirit and can +be induced to advance.... I will venture to draw a comparison. Sokolov +and other Petrograd delegates came to our front, to the 703rd Suram +Regiment. He came with the noble object of combating dark ignorance and +moral decrepitude, which were particularly apparent in that regiment. +He was mercilessly flogged. We were, of course, revolted against that +crowd of savage scoundrels, and everyone was perturbed. All kinds of +committees passed votes of censure. The War Minister condemned the +behaviour of the Suram Regiment in fiery speeches and Army orders, and +sent a telegram of sympathy to Sokolov. + +"And here is another story. I well remember January, 1915, near +Lutovisko. There was a heavy frost. Colonel Noskov, the gallant +one-armed hero, up to the waist in snow, was leading his regiment to +the attack under a heavy fire against the steep and impregnable slopes +of Height 804.... Death spared him then. And now two companies came, +asked for General Noskov, surrounded him, killed him and went away. +I ask the War Minister, did he condemn these foul murderers with the +whole might of his fiery eloquence, of his wrath and of his power, and +did he send a telegram of sympathy to the hapless family of the fallen +hero? + +"When we were deprived of power and authority, when the term +'Commanding Officer' was sterilised, we have once again been insulted +by a telegram from the Stavka to the effect that: 'Commanding Officers +who will now hesitate to apply armed force will be dismissed and +tried.' No, gentlemen, you will not intimidate those who are ready to +lose their lives in the service of their country. + +"The senior Commanding Officers may now be divided into three +categories: some of them disregarding the hardships of life and service +with a broken heart, are doing their duty devotedly to the end; others +have lost heart and are following the tide; the third are curiously +brandishing the Red Flag, and mindful of the traditions of the Tartar +captivity, are crawling before new gods of the Revolution as they +crawled before the Czars. It causes me infinite pain to mention the +question of the Officers.... It is a nightmare, and I will be brief. +When Sokolov became familiar with the Army, he said: 'I could not +imagine that your officers could be such martyrs. I take off my hat to +them.' Yes, in the darkest days of Czarist autocracy, the police and +the gendarmerie never subjected the would-be criminal to such moral +torture and derision as the officers have to endure at present from +the illiterate masses, led by the scum of the Revolution. Officers +who are giving their lives for the country. They are insulted at +every turn. They are beaten. Yes, beaten. But they will not come and +complain to you. They are ashamed, dreadfully ashamed. Alone, in their +dug-outs, many of them are silently weeping over their dismal fate. No +wonder many officers consider that the best solution is to be killed +in action. Listen to the subdued and placid tragedy of the following +words which occur in a Field Report: 'In vain did the officers marching +in front try to lead the men into action. At that a moment a white +flag was raised on Redoubt No. 3. Fifteen officers and a small batch +of soldiers then went forward. Their fate is unknown--they did not +return.' (38th Corps). May these heroes rest in peace and their blood +be upon the heads of their conscious and unconscious executioners. + +"The Army is falling to pieces. Heroic measures are needed for its +salvation: (1) The Provisional Government should recognise its mistakes +and its guilt, as it has not understood and estimated the noble and +sincere impulse of the officers who had greeted the news of the +Revolution with joy, and had sacrificed innumerable lives for their +country. (2) Petrograd, entirely detached from the Army, and ignorant +of its life and of the historical foundations of its existence, should +cease to enact military regulations. Full power must be given to the +Supreme Commander-in-Chief, who should be responsible only to the +Provisional Government. (3) Politics must disappear from the Army. (4) +The 'Declaration' must be rescinded in its fundamentals. Commissars +and Committees must be abolished, and the functions of the latter must +gradually be altered. (5) Commanding Officers must be restored to +power. Discipline and the outward form of order and good conduct must +likewise be restored. (6) Appointments to prominent posts must be made +not only according to the standard of youth and strength, but also of +experience in the field and in administration. (7) Special law-abiding +units of all arms must be placed at the disposal of Commanding Officers +as a bulwark against mutiny, and against the horrors of possible +demobilisation. (8) Military Revolutionary Courts must be established +and capital punishment introduced in the rear for the troops and for +civilians guilty of the same crimes. + +"If you ask me whether these measures are likely to produce good +results, I will answer frankly: Yes, but not at once. It is easy to +destroy the Army, but time is needed for its reconstruction. The +measures I suggest would at least lay the foundations for the creation +of a strong Army. In spite of the disruption of the Army, we must +continue the struggle, however arduous it may be, and we must even be +prepared to retreat into the depths of the country. Our Allies should +not count upon immediate relief through our advance. Even in retreating +and remaining on the defensive, we are drawing upon us enormous enemy +forces, which, were they relieved, would be sent to the Western Front +and would crush the Allies and then turn against us. Upon this new +Calvary the Russian people and the Russian Army may yet shed rivers +of blood and endure privations and misfortunes. But at the end of the +Calvary a bright future is in store. + +"There is another way. The way of treason. It would give a respite +to our martyred country.... But the curse of treachery cannot give +us happiness. At the end of that path there is political, moral and +economic slavery. The destinies of the country are in the hands of the +Army. I now appeal to the Provisional Government represented here by +two Ministers: + +"You must lead Russia towards truth and enlightenment under the banner +of Liberty, but you must give us a real chance of leading the troops in +the name of that same Liberty under our old banners. You need have no +fear. The name of the autocrat has been removed from these banners as +well as from our hearts. It is no longer there. But there is a Mother +Country; there is a sea of blood; and there is the glory of our former +victories. You have trampled that banner into the dust. The time has +now come. Raise the banners and bow to them if your conscience is still +within you." + + * * * * * + +I had finished. Kerensky rose, shook hands with me, and said: "Thank +you, General, for your outspoken and sincere speech." + +In the evidence which Kerensky subsequently gave to the High +Commission for the investigation of Kornilov's movement, the Prime +Minister explained this gesture by the fact that he approved, not of +the contents of my speech, but of my courage, and that he wished to +emphasise his respect for every independent opinion, albeit entirely +divergent from the views of the Provisional Government. In substance, +according to Kerensky, "General Deniken had for the first time drawn +a plan for the Revanche--that music of the future military reaction." +There is in these words a deep misinterpretation. We had not forgotten +the Galician retreat of 1915 or its causes, but, at the same time, +we could not forgive Kalush and Tarnopol in 1917. It was our duty, +our right, and our moral obligation not to wish for either of these +contingencies. I was followed by General Klembovsky. I had left the +Assembly, and only heard the end of his speech. He described the +condition of his Front in terms almost identical to mine, with great +restraint, and came to a conclusion that could only have been prompted +by deep despair: he suggested that power should be vested at the Front +in a kind of peculiar triumvirate consisting of the Commander-in-Chief, +a Commissar, and an elected soldier.... + +General Alexeiev was unwell, spoke briefly, described the condition +of the rear, of the reserves and garrison troops, and endorsed the +suggestions I had made. + +General Ruzsky, who had been undergoing a protracted cure in the +Caucasus, and was therefore out of touch with the Army, analysed the +situation such as it appeared to him from the speeches that had been +made. He quoted a series of historical comparisons between the old +Army and the new Revolutionary one with such emphasis and bluntness +that Kerensky, in replying, accused Ruzsky of advocating the return to +Czarist autocracy. The new men were unable to understand the passionate +grief of an old soldier for the Army. Kerensky was probably unaware of +the fact that Ruzsky had been repudiated, and also passionately accused +by the Reactionary circles of the opposite crime, for the part which he +had played in the Emperor's abdication. + +A telegram was read from General Kornilov, urging that capital +punishment should be introduced in the rear, chiefly in order to cope +with the licentious bands of Reservists; that disciplinary powers +should be vested in the Commanding Officers; that the competence of +the Army Committees should be restricted and their responsibilities +fixed; that meetings should be prohibited as well as anti-national +propaganda, and visits to the Front prohibited to various delegations +and agitators. All this was practically implied in my programme, but +under another shape, and was described as "military reaction." But +Kornilov had other suggestions. He advocated that Commissars should +be introduced into the Army Corps and given the right to confirm the +verdicts of the Military Revolutionary Tribunals, as well as to effect +a "cleansing" of the commanding staffs. This last proposal impressed +Kerensky by its "breadth and depth of vision"--greater than those which +emanated from the "old wiseacres," whom he considered intoxicated "with +the wine of hate...." There was an obvious misunderstanding, because +Kornilov's "cleansing" was not intended against the men of solid +military traditions (mistakenly identified with Monarchist Reaction), +but against the hirelings of the Revolution--unprincipled men, deprived +of will-power and of the capacity of taking the responsibility upon +their own shoulders. + +Savinkov, the Commissar of the South-Western Front, also spoke, +expressing his own views only. He agreed with the general description +of the Front which we had given, and pointed out that it is not the +fault of the Revolutionary Democracy that the soldiery of the old +régime is still distrustful of their Commanding Officers; that all is +not well with the latter from the military and political points of +view, and that the main object of the new Revolutionary institutions +was to restore normal relations between these two elements of the Army. + +Kerensky made the closing speech of the Conference. He tried to +justify himself--spoke of the elemental character of the inevitable +"Democratisation" of the Army. He blamed us for seeing in the +Revolution, and in its influence upon the Russian soldier, the only +cause of the _débâcle_ of July, and he severely condemned the old +régime. Finally, he gave us no definite directions for future work. +The members of the Conference dispersed with a heavy feeling of mutual +misunderstanding. I was also discouraged, but at the bottom of my heart +I was pleased to think--alas! I was mistaken--that our voices had been +heeded. My hopes were confirmed by a letter from Kornilov which I +received soon after his appointment to the Supreme Command: + +"I have read the Report you made at the Stavka on July 16th with deep +and sincere satisfaction. I would sign such a Report with both hands; +I take off my hat to you, and I am lost in admiration before your +firmness and courage. I firmly believe that, with the help of the +Almighty, we will succeed in accomplishing the task of reconstructing +our beloved Army and of restoring its fighting power." + +Fate has, indeed, cruelly derided our hopes! + + + + +CHAPTER XXX. + +GENERAL KORNILOV. + + +Two days after the Moghilev Conference General Brussilov was relieved +of the Supreme Command. The attempt to give the leadership of the +Russian Armies to a person who had not only given proof of the most +complete loyalty to the Provisional Government, but had evinced +sympathy with its reforms, had failed. A leader had been superseded, +who, on assuming the Supreme Command, gave utterance to the following: + +"I am the leader of the Revolutionary Army, appointed to this +responsible post by the people in revolution and the Provisional +Government, in agreement with the Petrograd Soviet of Workmen's and +Soldiers' Delegates. I was the first to go over to the people, serve +the people. I will continue to serve them, will never desert them."[51] + +Kerensky, in his evidence before the Commission of Inquiry, explained +Brussilov's dismissal by the catastrophal condition of the Front, by +the possible development of the German offensive, the absence of a firm +hand at the front, and of a definite plan; by Brussilov's inability to +evaluate and forestall the complications of the military situation, and +lastly, by his lack of influence over both officers and men. + +Be it as it may, General Brussilov's retirement from the pages of +military history can in no wise be regarded as a simple episode of +an administrative character. _It marks a clear recognition by the +Government of the wreck of its entire military policy._ + +On July 19th, by an Order of the Provisional Government, Lavr +Georgievich Kornilov, General of Infantry, was appointed to the post of +Supreme Commander-in-Chief. + +[Map: The Russian Front in June and July, 1917] + +In Chapter VII. I spoke of my meeting with Kornilov, then +Commander-in-Chief of the Petrograd district. The whole meaning of his +occupation of this post lay in the chance of bringing the Petrograd +garrison to a sense of duty and subordination. This Kornilov failed to +accomplish. A fighting General who carried fighting men with him by +his courage, coolness, and contempt of death, had nothing in common +with that mob of idlers and hucksters into which the Petrograd garrison +had been transformed. His sombre figure, his dry speech, only at +times softened by sincere feeling, and above all, its tenour so far +removed from the bewildering slogans of the Revolution, so simple in +its profession of a soldier's faith--could neither fire nor inspire +the Petrograd soldiery. Inexperienced in political chicanery, by +profession alien to those methods of political warfare which had been +developed by the joint efforts of the bureaucracy, party sectarianism, +and the revolutionary underworld, Kornilov, as Commander-in-Chief of +the Petrograd district, could neither influence the Government nor +impress the Soviet, which, without any cause, distrusted him from the +very beginning. Kornilov would have managed to suppress the Petrograd +praetorians, even if he had perished in doing so, but he could not +attract them to himself. + +He felt that the Petrograd atmosphere did not suit him, and when on +April 21st, the Executive Committee of the Soviet, after the first +Bolshevist attacks, passed a resolution that no military unit could +leave barracks in arms without the permission of the Committee, it +was totally impossible for Kornilov to remain at a post which gave no +rights and imposed enormous responsibilities. + +There was yet another reason: the Commander-in-Chief of the Petrograd +district was subordinated, not to the Stavka, but to the Minister of +War. Gutchkov had left that post on April 30th, and Kornilov did not +wish to remain under Kerensky, the vice-president of the Petrograd +Soviet. + +[Map: The Russian Front till August 19th and after] + +The position of the Petrograd garrison and command was so incongruous +that this painful problem had to be solved by artificial measures. On +Kornilov's initiative, and with General Alexeiev's full approval, the +Stavka, in conjunction with the Headquarters of the Petrograd District, +drew up a scheme for the organisation of the Petrograd Front, covering +the approaches to the capital through Finland and the Finnish Gulf. +This Front was to include the troops in Finland and Kronstadt, on +the coast, of the Reval fortified region and the Petrograd garrison, +the depôt battalions of which it was proposed to expand into active +regiments and form into brigades; the inclusion of the Baltic Fleet was +likewise probable. Such an organisation--logical from a strategical +point of view, especially in connection with the information received +of the reinforcement of the German Front on the line of advance on +Petrograd--gave the Commander-in-Chief the legal right to alter the +dispositions to relieve the troops at the front and behind, etc. I +do not know whether this would have really made it possible to free +Petrograd from the garrison which had become a veritable scourge to +the Capital, the Provisional Government, and even (in September) +to the non-Bolshevist sections of the Soviet. The Government +most thoughtlessly bound itself by a promise, given in its first +declaration, that "the troops which had taken part in the revolutionary +movement should not be either disarmed or moved from Petrograd." + +This plan, however, naturally failed on Kornilov's departure, as +his successors, appointed one after another by Kerensky, were of +such an indefinite political character, and so deficient in military +experience, that it was impossible to place them at the head of so +large a military force. + +At the end of April, just before his retirement, Gutchkov wished to +make Kornilov Commander-in-Chief of the Northern Front, a post which +had become vacant after General Ruzsky's dismissal. General Alexeiev +and I were at the Conference with Thomas and the French military +representatives, when I was called up to the telegraph instrument to +talk with the Minister of War. As General Alexeiev remained at the +meeting, and Gutchkov was ill in bed, the negotiations, in which I +acted as an intermediary, were exceedingly difficult to carry on, both +technically and because, in view of the indirect transmission, it was +necessary to speak somewhat guardedly. Gutchkov insisted, Alexeiev +refused. No less than six times did I transmit their replies, which +were at first reserved and then more heated. + +Gutchkov spoke of the difficulty of managing the Northern Front, which +was the most unruly, and of the need of a firm hand there. He said +that it was desirable to retain Kornilov in the immediate vicinity of +Petrograd, in view of future political possibilities. Alexeiev refused +flatly. He said nothing about "political possibilities," basing his +refusal on the grounds of Kornilov's inadequate service qualifications +for command, and the awkwardness of passing over Senior Commanders +more experienced and acquainted with the Front, such as General Abram +Dragomirov, for instance. Nevertheless, when the next day an official +telegram arrived from the Ministry in connection with Kornilov's +appointment, Alexeiev replied that he was uncompromisingly against +it, and that if the appointment were made in spite of this, he would +immediately send in his resignation. + +Never had the Supreme Commander-in-Chief been so inflexible in his +communications with Petrograd. Some persons, including Kornilov himself +(as he confessed to me afterwards), involuntarily gained the impression +that the question was a somewhat wider basis one than that of the +appointment of the Commander-in-Chief ... that the fear of a future +dictator played a certain part. However, this supposition is flatly +contradicted by placing this episode in conjunction with the fact that +the Petrograd Front was created for Kornilov--a fact that was of no +less importance and fraught with possibilities. + +In the beginning of May Kornilov took over the 8th Army on +the South-Western Front. General Dragomirov was appointed +Commander-in-Chief of the Northern Front. + +This is the second event which gives the key to the understanding of +the subsequent relations between Alexeiev and Kornilov. + +According to Kornilov, the 8th Army was in a state of complete +disintegration when he assumed command. "For two months," says he, "I +had to visit the units nearly every day and personally explain to the +soldiers the necessity for discipline, encourage the officers, and +urge upon the troops the necessity of an advance.... Here I became +convinced that firm language from the Commander and definite action +were necessary in order to arrest the disintegration of our Army. I +understood that such language was expected both by the officers and the +men, the more reasonable of whom were already tired of the complete +anarchy...." + +Under what conditions Kornilov made his rounds we have already shown +in Chapter XXIII. I hardly think that he managed to arouse the mass +of soldiers to consciousness. The Kalush of June 28th and the Kalush +of July 8th show the 8th Army equally as heroes and as beasts. The +officers and a small part of the real soldiers, however, were more +than ever under the spell of Kornilov's personality. Its power +increased among the non-Socialistic sections of the Russian public +likewise. When, after the rout of July 6th, General Gutor--who had been +appointed to the highly responsible post of Commander-in-Chief of the +South-Western Front, merely not to resist the democratisation of the +Army--yielded to despair and collapsed, there was no one to replace +him except Kornilov (on the night of July 8th).... The spectre of the +"General on a White Horse" was already looming in sight and disturbing +the spiritual peace of many. + +Brussilov was strongly opposed to this appointment. Kerensky hesitated +for a moment. The position, however, was catastrophical. Kornilov +was bold, courageous, stern, resolute and independent, and would +never hesitate to show initiative or to undertake any responsibility +if circumstances required it. Kerensky was of the opinion[52] that +Kornilov's downright qualities, though dangerous in case of success, +would be only too useful in case of a panic-stricken retreat. And "when +the Moor has done his work, let the Moor go...." So Kerensky insisted +on Kornilov's appointment as Commander-in-Chief of the South-Western +Front. + +On the third day after taking over his duties, Kornilov wired to the +Provisional Government: "I declare that if the Government does not +confirm the measures proposed by me, and deprives me of the only means +of saving the Army and of using it for its real purpose of defending +the Motherland and liberty, then I, General Kornilov, will of my own +accord lay down my authority as Commander-in-Chief...." + +A series of political telegrams from Kornilov produced a profound +impression on the country, and inspired some with fear, some with hate, +and others with hope. Kerensky hesitated, but what about the support +of the Commissars and Committees? The tranquilisation and reduction +to order of the South-Western Front attained, among other means, by +Kornilov's bold, resolute struggle against the Army Bolsheviks? The +oppressive isolation felt by the Minister of War after the conference +of July 16th? The uselessness of retaining Brussilov as Supreme +Commander-in-Chief and the hopelessness of placing at the head of the +Army Generals of the new type, as shown by the experiment of appointing +Brussilov and Gutor? Savinkov's persistent advice? Such were the +reasons which forced Kerensky--who fully recognised the inevitability +of the coming collision with the man who repudiated his military policy +with every fibre of his soul--to decide on the appointment of Kornilov +to the post of Supreme Commander-in-Chief. There is not the slightest +doubt that Kerensky did this in a fit of despair. Probably it was the +same feeling of fatality that induced him to appoint Savinkov acting +Minister of War. + +The collisions occurred sooner than might have been expected. On +receiving the order for his appointment, Kornilov at once sent the +Provisional Government a telegram "reporting" that he could accept +command and "lead the nation to victory and to the prospect of a just +and honourable peace only on the following conditions: + + "(1) Responsibility to his own conscience and to the whole nation. + + "(2) Complete non-interference with his orders relating to military + operations and, therefore, with the appointment of the Higher + Command. + + "(3) The application of the measures recently introduced at the + Front to all places in the rear where drafts for the Army were + quartered. + + "(4) Acceptance of his proposals telegraphed to the Conference at + the Stavka on July 16th." + +When in due course I read this telegram in the newspapers, I was not +a little surprised at the first condition, which established a highly +original form of suzerainty on the part of the Supreme Command until +the convocation of the Constituent Assembly. I waited impatiently for +the official reply. There was none. As it turned out, on receiving +Kornilov's ultimatum, the Council of the Government hotly debated +the matter, and Kerensky demanded that the prestige of the High +Command should be upheld by the immediate removal of the new Supreme +Commander-in-Chief. The Government did not agree to this, and Kerensky, +ignoring the other points mentioned in the telegram, replied only to +the second, by recognising the right of the Supreme Commander-in-Chief +to select his own direct assistants. + +Diverging from the established procedure of appointments, the +Government, simultaneously with Kornilov's appointment and without +his knowledge, issued an order appointing General Cheremissov +Commander-in-Chief of the South-Western Front. Kornilov regarded this +as a complete violation of his rights, and sent another ultimatum, +declaring that he could continue to hold Supreme Command only on +condition of Cheremissov's immediate removal. He declined to go +to Moghilev before this question was settled. Cheremissov, on his +part, was very "nervy," and threatened to "bomb his way" into Front +Headquarters and to establish his rights as Commander-in-Chief. + +This complicated matters still further, and Kornilov reported by +wire[53] to Petrograd that, in his opinion, it would be more regular +to dismiss Cheremissov. "For the purpose of strengthening discipline +in the Army, we decided to take severe measures with the soldiers; the +same measures must likewise apply to the higher military commanders." + +The Revolution had upset all mutual relations and the very essence +of discipline. As a soldier, I was bound to see in all this the +undermining of the authority of the Provisional Government (if such +existed), and I could not but recognise that it was both the right and +the duty of the Government to make everyone respect its authority. + +As a chronicler, however, I must add that the military leaders had no +other means of stopping this disintegration of the Army, proceeding +from above. And had the Government actually possessed the power, and +in full panoply of right and might had been able to assert itself, +there would have been no ultimatums either from the Soviet or from the +military leaders. Furthermore, there would have been no need for the +events of the 27th of August, and those of the 25th of October would +have been impossible. + +The matter finally resolved itself into the arrival of Commissar +Filonenko at Front Headquarters. He informed Kornilov that all his +recommendations had been accepted by the Government, in principle, +while Cheremissov was placed at the disposal of the Provisional +Government. General Balnev was hastily, at random, selected to command +the South-Western Front, and Kornilov assumed the Supreme Command on +the 27th of July. + +The spectre of the "General on the White Horse" became more and more +clearly visible. And the eyes of many, suffering at the sight of the +madness and the shame now engulfing Russia, were again and again +turned to this spectre. Honest and dishonest, sincere and insincere, +politicians, soldiers and adventurers, all turned to it. And all with +one voice cried out, "Save Us!" + +He, the stern and straightforward soldier, deeply patriotic, untried in +politics, knowing little of men, hypnotised both by truth and flattery, +and by the general longing expectation of someone's coming, moved by +a fervent desire for deeds of sacrifice--he truly believed in the +predestined nature of his appointment. He lived and fought with this +belief, and died for it on the banks of the Kuban. + +Kornilov became a sign and rallying point. To some, of +counter-Revolution; to others, of the salvation of their native land. + +Around this point a struggle for influence and power was commenced by +people who, unaided, without him could not have attained to such power. + +A characteristic episode had already taken place on the 8th of July, +at Kamenetz-Podolsk. Here, in Kornilov's entourage, there occurred the +first conflict between Savinkov and Zavoiko, the former being the most +prominent Russian Revolutionary, leader of the Terrorist fighting group +of the Social-Revolutionary Party, organiser of the most notorious +political assassinations--those of Plehve, Minister of the Interior, +of the Grand Duke Serge, etc. Strong-willed and cruel by nature, +completely lacking in the controlling influences of "conventional +morality," despising both the Provisional Government and Kerensky, +supporting the Provisional Government from motives of expediency, as +he understood it, ready at any moment to sweep them aside--he saw in +Kornilov merely a weapon in the fight for Revolutionary power, in +which _he_ must have a dominant interest. Zavoiko was one of those +peculiar personages who afterwards clustered closely round Kornilov and +played such a prominent part in the August days. He was not very well +known even to Kornilov. The latter stated, in his evidence before the +Supreme Commission of Inquiry, that he became acquainted with Zavoiko +in April, 1917; that Zavoiko had been "marechal de noblesse" of the +Haisin district of Podolia, had been employed on the Nobel oilfields in +Baku, and, by his own statements, had been employed in prospecting for +minerals in Turkestan and Western Siberia. He arrived in Czernowitz, +enrolled as a volunteer in the Daghestan Mounted Regiment, and was +retained at Army Headquarters as personal aide to Kornilov. That is all +that is known of Zavoiko's past. + +Kornilov's first telegram to the Provisional Government was edited by +Zavoiko, who "gave it the form of an ultimatum with a concealed threat, +in case of non-compliance with the demands presented to the Provisional +Government, to proclaim a military dictatorship on the South-Western +Front."[54] + +I discovered all this subsequently. During all these events I continued +working at Minsk, completely engrossed now, not by the offensive, +but by the organisation of any sort of skeleton defence of the +half-collapsed Front. There was no information, no rumours even, of +what was going on at the head of affairs. Only an increased tension was +noticeable in all official relations. + + * * * * * + +Quite unexpectedly, in the end of July the Stavka offered me the post +of Commander-in-Chief of the South-Western Front. I communicated +by wire with General Lukomsky, the Chief-of-Staff of the Supreme +Commander-in-Chief, and told him that I should obey orders and go +wherever I was sent, but would like to know the reason for this +exchange. If the reasons were political I should ask to be left at my +old post. Lukomsky assured me that what Kornilov had in view was only +the military importance of the South-Western Front and the proposed +strategical operations in that quarter. I accepted the post. + +I parted from my assistants with regret, and, having transferred my +friend, General Markov, to the new front, left for my new place of +service together with him. On my way I stopped at Moghilev. The Stavka +was in a very optimistic mood; everyone was animated and hopeful, but +there were no signs of any "underground" conspiratory working. It +should be mentioned that in this respect the military were so naïvely +inexperienced, that when they really began to "conspire" their work +took such _obvious_ forms that the deaf could not help hearing, nor the +blind seeing, what was going on. + +On the day of our arrival Kornilov held a Council of the Chiefs of +Departments of the Stavka, at which the so-called "Kornilov programme" +for the restoration of the Army was discussed. I was invited to attend. +I shall not repeat all the fundamental propositions, which have already +been mentioned both by me and in Kornilov's telegrams--such demands, +for instance, as the introduction of Revolutionary courts-martial +and capital punishment in the rear, the restoration of disciplinary +authority to Commanders and raising their prestige, the limitation +of the activity of the Committees and their responsibility, etc. I +remember that side by side with clear and irrefutable propositions--the +draft memorandum drawn up by the Departments of the Stavka--there +were bureaucratic lucubrations hardly applicable in actual life. +For instance, with the object of making disciplinary authority more +palatable to Revolutionary Democracy, the authors of the memorandum had +drawn up a curiously detailed list of disciplinary misdemeanour with a +corresponding scale of penalties. And this was meant for the seething +whirlpool of life, where all relations were trampled underfoot, all +standards violated, where every fresh day brought forward an endless +variety of departures from the regulations! + +At any rate, the Supreme Command was finding the proper path, and +apparently Kornilov's personality was a guarantee that the Government +would be obliged to follow that path. Undoubtedly a long struggle with +the Soviets, Committees, and soldiery was still to be waged, but, +at least, the definiteness of the policy gave moral support and a +tangible basis for this heavy task in the future. On the other hand, +the support given to Kornilov's measures by Savinkov's War Ministry +gave reason to hope that Kerensky's vacillations and indecision would +finally be overcome. The attitude to this question of the Provisional +Government as a whole was of no practical importance, and could not +even be officially expressed. At that time it seemed as if Kerensky +had, in some degree, freed himself from the yoke of the Soviet, but, +just as formerly all the most important questions of State had been +settled by him apart from the Government, in conjunction with the +leading Soviet circles, now, in August, the direction of State affairs +passed into the hands of a triumvirate composed of Kerensky, Nekrassov, +and Tereschenko, leaving both the Socialist and Liberal groups of the +Government out of the running. + +After the meeting was over Kornilov asked me to stay, and, when all had +left, said to me, almost in a whisper: "It is necessary to struggle, +otherwise the country will perish. N. came to see me at the Front. He +is nursing his scheme of a _coup d'état_ and of placing the Grand-Duke +Dmitri on the throne. He is organising something or other, and has +suggested collaboration. I told him flatly that I would take no part +in any Romanov adventures. The Government itself understands that it +can do nothing. They have offered my joining in the Government.... No, +thank you! These gentlemen are far too much entangled with the Soviets, +and cannot decide on anything. I have told them that if authority is +given me I shall carry on a decisive struggle. We must lead Russia to +a Constituent Assembly, and then let them do what they like. I shall +stand aside and not interfere in any way. Now, General, may I rely on +your support?" + +"To the fullest extent." + +This was my second meeting and my second conversation with Kornilov. +We embraced heartily and parted ... only to meet again in the Bykhov +Prison. + + + + +CHAPTER XXXI. + + MY SERVICE AS COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF OF THE SOUTH-WESTERN FRONT--THE + MOSCOW CONFERENCE--THE FALL OF RIGA. + + +I was touched by General Alexeiev's letter: + +"My thoughts are with you in your new appointment. I consider that +you have been sent to perform a superhuman task. Much has been said, +but apparently little has been done there. Nothing has been done even +after the 16th July by Russia's chief babbler.... The authority of +the Commanders is being steadily curtailed. Should you want my help +in anything I am ready to go to Berdichev, to go to the Front, to one +Command or another.... God preserve you!" + +Here was a man, indeed, whom neither an exalted position nor +misfortunes could change. He was full of his modest, disinterested work +for the good of his native land. + +A new front, new men. The South-Western Front, shaken by the events +in July, was gradually recovering. Not, however, in the sense of real +convalescence, as the optimists thought, but of a return approximately +to its condition prior to the offensive. There were the same strained +relations between officers and men, the same slip-shod service, the +desertion, and open unwillingness to fight, which was only less +actively expressed owing to the lull in operations; finally there was +the same Bolshevist propaganda, only more active, and not infrequently +disguised under the form of Committee "fractions" and preparations for +the Constituent Assembly. I have a document referring to the 2nd Army +of the Western Front. It is highly characteristic as an indication +of the unparalleled toleration and, indeed, encouragement of the +disintegration of the Army on the part of the representatives of the +Government and Commanders, under the guise of liberty and conscious +voting at the elections. Here is a copy of the telegram sent to all the +senior officers of the 2nd Army: + + The Army Commander, in agreement with the Commissar, and at the + request of the Army fraction of the Bolshevist Social-Democrats, + has permitted the organisation, from the 15th to 18th October, of + preparatory courses for instructors of the aforesaid fraction for + the elections to the Constituent Assembly, one representative of + the Bolshevist organisation of each separate unit being sent to the + said courses. No. 1644. + + SUVOROV.[55] + +The same toleration had been exercised in many cases previously, and +was founded on the exact meaning of the regulations for Army Committees +and of the "Declaration of Soldiers' Rights." + +Carried away by the struggle against counter-revolution, the +Revolutionary institutions had paid no attention to such facts as +public meetings with extreme Bolshevist watchwords being held at the +very place where the Front Headquarters were situated, or that the +local paper, _Svobodnaia Mysl_,[56] most undisguisedly threatened the +officers with a St. Bartholomew's Eve. + +The front was _holding out_. That is all that could be said of the +situation. At times there would be disturbances ending tragically, +such as the brutal murder of Generals Girshfeld, Hirschfeld, and +Stefanovich, Commissar Linde. The preliminary arrangements and the +concentration of the troops for the coming partial offensive were made, +but there was no possibility of launching the actual attack until the +"Kornilov programme" had been put into practice and the results known. + +I waited very impatiently. + +The Revolutionary organisations (the Commissariat and Committee) of +the South-Western Front were in a position; they had not yet seized +power, but some of it had already been yielded to them voluntarily by +a series of Commanders-in-Chief--Brussilov, Gutor, Baluev. Therefore, +my coming at once roused their antagonism. The Committee of the Western +Front lost no time in sending a scathing report on me to Berdichev on +the basis of which the next issue of the Committee's organ published an +impressive warning to the "enemies of democracy." As usual, I totally +omitted to invoke the aid of the Commissariat, and sent a message to +the Committee saying that I could have nothing to do with it unless it +kept rigidly within the limits of the law. + +The Commissar of the Front was a certain Gobechio. I saw him once only, +on my arrival. In a few days he got transferred to the Caucasus, and +his post was taken by Iordansky.[57] As soon as he arrived he issued +an "order to the troops at the Front." Afterwards he was unable to +understand that two persons could not command the Front at one and the +same time. Iordansky and his assistants, Kostitsin and Grigorier--a +literary man, zoologist, and doctor respectively--were probably rather +prominent men in their own profession, but utterly ignorant of military +life. + +The Committee of the Front was no better and no worse than others.[58] +It took the "Defencist" point of view, and even supported the +repressive measures taken by Kornilov in July, but at that time +the Committee was not in the least degree a _military_ institution +organically connected--for good or evil--with the true Army life. It +was merely a mixed party organ. Divided into "fractions" of all the +Socialist parties, the Committee positively revelled in politics, +and introduced them at the Front likewise. The Committee carried on +propaganda on a large scale, convened congresses of representatives in +order to have them converted by Socialist fractions, including such +as were openly antagonistic to the policy of the Government. I made +an attempt to stop this work in view of the impending strategical +operations and the difficult period of transition, but met with +determined opposition on the part of Commissar Iordansky. At the same +time, the Committee was perpetually interfering in all questions of +military authority, spreading sedition and distrust to the commanders. + + * * * * * + +Meanwhile, both in Petrograd and Moghilev, events were taking their +course, and we could grasp their meaning only in so far as they were +reflected by newspaper reports, rumours and gossip. + +There was still no "programme." The Moscow State Conference[59] raised +great hopes, but it met without making any changes in either State +or military policy. On the contrary, it even outwardly emphasises +the irreconcilable enmity between the Revolutionary Democracy and +the Liberal Bourgeoisie, between the Commanders and the soldiers' +representatives. + +If the Moscow Conference yielded no positive results, nevertheless, it +fully exposed the mood of the opponents, the leaders and the rulers. +All unanimously recognised that the country was in deadly peril. +Everyone understood that the social relations had suffered an upheaval, +that all branches of the nation's economy had been uprooted. Each +party reproached the other with supporting the selfish interests of +their class. This, however, was not the most important matter, for, +strange as it may seem, the primary causes of social class war, even +the agrarian and labour questions, merely led to disagreement, without +rousing any irreconcilable dissentions. Even when Plekhanov, the +old leader of the Social-Democrats, amid universal approval, turned to +the Right demanding sacrifice, and to the Left demanding moderation, it +seemed as if the chasm between the two opposing social camps was not so +very great. + +All the attention of the Conference was taken up by other questions, +those of _authority and of the Army_. + +Miliukov enumerated all the sins of the Government, vanquished by the +Soviets, its "capitulation" to the ideology of the Socialist parties +and Zimmerwaldists, capitulation in the Army, in foreign policy, to +the Utopian demands of the working classes, to the extreme demands of +nationalities. + +"The usurpation of the authority of the State by Central and Local +Committees and Soviets," said General Kaledin distinctly, "must be +stopped at once and decisively." + +Maklakov smoothed the way for his attack: "I demand nothing, but +I cannot help drawing attention to the alarm felt by the social +conscience when it sees that the 'Defeatists' of yesterday have been +invited to join the Government." Shulgin (Right) is agitated. He says: +"I want your (the Provisional Government's) authority to be really +strong, really unlimited. I want this, though I know that a strong +Government easily turns to despotism, which is more likely to crush me +than you, the friends of that Government." + +On the Left, Jehkheidze sings the praises of the Soviets: "It is only +owing to the Revolutionary organisations that the creative spirit of +the Revolution has been preserved, for the salvation of the country +from the disintegration of authority and from anarchy...." "There +is no power higher than that of the Provisional Governments," says +Tzeretelli, "because the source of this power the sovereign people +has, through all the organs at its disposal, directly delegated this +power to the Provisional Government." Of course, in so far as that +Government submits to the will of the Soviets?... And over all one +hears the dominating voice of the President of the Congress, who is +seeking for "heavenly words" in order to "express his shuddering +horror" at coming events, "and at the same time brandishing a wooden +sword and threatening his hidden enemies thus: 'Be it known to everyone +who has once tried to offer armed resistance to the authority of the +people that the attempt will be smothered in blood and iron. Let those +beware who think that the time has come for them to overthrow the +Revolutionary Government with the help of bayonets.'" + +The contradiction was still more striking in military matters. In a dry +but powerful speech, the Supreme Commander-in-Chief drew a picture of +the destruction of the Army, involving the whole country in its ruin, +and with great reserve explained the gist of his programme. General +Alexeiev related, with genuine bitterness, the sad story of the sins, +sufferings and gallantry of the former Army. + +"Weak in technical resources and morally strong in spirit and +discipline," he related how the Army had lived to see the bright +days of the Revolution, and how later on, "when it was thought to be +a danger to the conquests of the Revolution, it was inoculated with +deadly poison." Kaledin, the Don Cossack Attaman, representing thirteen +Cossack Armies and unhampered by any official position, spoke sharply +and distinctly: "The Army must keep out of politics. There must be no +political meetings with their party struggles and disputes. All the +(Army) Soviets and Committees must be abolished. The Declaration of +Soldiers' Rights must be revised. Discipline must be raised both at the +Front and in the rear. The disciplinary authority of the Commanders +must be restored. All power to the leaders of the Army!" + +Kuchin, the representative of the Army and Front Committees, rose +to reply to these trite military axioms. "The Committees were a +manifestation of the instinct of self-defence.... They had to be formed +as organs for the protection of the privates, as hitherto there had +been nothing but oppression ... the Committees had brought light and +knowledge to the soldiers.... Then came the second period--one of decay +and disorganisation ... 'rearguard consciousness' made its appearance, +but failed to digest all the mass of questions which the Revolutions +had raised in the minds of the soldiery...." Now the speaker did +not deny the necessity for repressive measures, but they "must be +compatible with the definite work of Army organisations...." How this +was to be done had been shown by the united front of Revolutionary +Democracy, namely, the Army must be animated, not by the desire of +victory over the enemy, but by "a repudiation of Imperialistic aims, +and a desire for the speedy attainment of universal peace on Democratic +principles.... The commanders should possess complete independence +in the conduct of military operations, and have a decisive voice in +questions of discipline and service training." The object of the +organisations, on the other hand, was to introduce their policy +wholesale among troops, and "the Commissars must be the introducers +of (this) single Revolutionary policy of the Provisional Government, +the Army Committees must direct the social and political life of +the soldiers. The restoration of the disciplinary authority of the +commanders is not to be thought of," etc. + +What is the Government going to do? Will it find enough strength +and boldness to burst the fetters placed on it by the Bolshevistic +Soviet?[60] + +Kornilov said firmly, repeating his words twice: "I do not doubt for a +moment that the (my) measures will be carried out without delay." + +And if not--was it to be War? + +He also said: "It is impossible to admit that the determination to +carry out these measures should in every case be aroused merely by the +pressure of defeats and loss of territory. If the rout at Tarnopol and +the loss of Galicia and Bukovina did indeed result in restoration of +discipline at the Front, it cannot be admitted that order in the rear +should be restored at the cost of the loss of Riga, and that order +on the railways should be restored by the cession of Moldavia and +Bessarabia to the enemy." + +On the 20th Riga fell. + +Both strategically and tactically the Front of the lower Dvina was in +complete preparedness. Taking into consideration the strength of the +defensive positions, the forces were also sufficient. The officers in +command were General Parsky, Army Commander, and General Boldyrev, +Corps Commander; both experienced Generals, and certainly not inclined +to counter-Revolution in the opinion of the Democrats.[61] + +Finally, from deserters' reports, our Headquarters knew not only the +direction but even the day and the hour of the contemplated attack. + +Nevertheless, on the 19th August the Germans (Von Hutier's 8th Army), +after heavy artillery preparation, occupied the Uxküll bridgehead in +the face of feeble opposition on our part, and crossed the Dvina. On +20th August the Germans assumed the offensive also along the Mitau +road; towards evening of the same day the enemy's Uxküll group, +having pierced our lines on the Egel, began deploying in a northerly +direction, threatening the retreat of the Russian troops towards +Wenden. The 12th Army, abandoning Riga, retired some 60-70 versts, +losing touch with the enemy, and on the 25th occupied the so-called +Wenden position. The Army lost in prisoners alone some 9,000 men, +besides 81 guns, 200 machine-guns, etc. A further advance did not enter +into the German plans, and they commenced to establish themselves on +the extensive terrain of the right bank of the Dvina, immediately +sending off two divisions to the Western Front. + +We lost the rich industrial town of Riga, with all its military +structures and supplies; more important still, we lost a safe defensive +line, the abandonment of which placed both the Dvina Front and the way +to Petrograd under a constant threat. + +The fall of Riga made a great impression in the country. Quite +unexpectedly, however, it called forth from the Revolutionary +Democracy, not repentance, not patriotic fervour, but, instead, a still +greater bitterness towards the leaders and officers. The Stavka in one +_communiqué_[62] inserted the following sentence: "The disorganised +masses of the soldiery are flocking in uncontrollable masses along +the Pskov high road and the road to Bieder-Limburg." This statement, +undoubtedly true, and neither mentioning nor relating to the causes +of the above, raised a storm amongst the Revolutionary Democracy. +The Commissars and Committees of the Northern Front sent a series of +telegrams refuting the "provocative attacks of the Stavka" and assuring +that "there was no shame in this reverse"; that "the troops honestly +obey all demands of their leaders ... there have been no cases of +flight or treachery on the part of the troops." + +The Commissar for the Front, Stankevitch, while demurring against there +being no shame in such a causeless and inglorious retreat, pointed +out, amongst other things, a series of errors and delinquencies on +the part of the Commanders. It is extremely possible that there were +errors, both personal and of leadership, as well as purely objective +deficiencies, caused by mutual mistrust, slackening of obedience, +and the _débâcle_ of the technical services. At the same time, it +is undoubtedly a fact that the troops of the Northern Front, and +especially the 12th Army, were the most disorganised of all, and, +logically, could not offer the necessary resistance. Even the apologist +of the 12th Army, Commissar Voitinsky, who always considerably +exaggerated the fighting value of these troops, telegraphed on the +22nd to the Petrograd Soviet: "The troops show want of confidence in +their powers, absence of training for battle, and, consequently, +insufficient steadiness in open warfare.... Many units fight bravely, +as in the early days; others show signs of weariness and panic." + +Actually, the debauched Northern Front had lost all power of +resistance. The troops rolled back to the limit of pursuit by the +German advanced detachments, and only moved forward subsequently +on losing touch with Hutier's main body, which had no intention of +passing, beyond a definite line. + +Meanwhile, all the papers of the Left commenced a fierce campaign +against the Stavka and the Commands. The word "treachery" was heard.... +Tchernov's _Delo Naroda_, a Defeatist paper, complained: "A torturing +fear creeps into the mind: are not the mistakes of the commanders, +the deficiencies in artillery, and the incapacity of the leaders +being unloaded on to the soldiers--courageous, heroic, perishing +in thousands." The _Izvestia_ announced also the motives for the +"provocation": "The Stavka, by putting forth the bogy of menacing +events, is trying to terrorise the Provisional Government and make +it adopt a series of measures, directly and indirectly aimed at the +Revolutionary Democracy and their organisations...." + +In conjunction with all these events, the feeling against the Supreme +Commander-in-Chief, General Kornilov, was increasing in the Soviets, +and rumours of his approaching dismissal appeared in the Press. In +answer to these, a series of angry resolutions addressed to the +Government, and supporting Kornilov, made their appearance.[63] The +resolution of the Council of the Union of Cossack Troops contained even +the following passage: "The supersession of Kornilov will inevitably +imbue the Cossacks with the fatal impression of the futility of further +Cossack sacrifices"; and, further, that the Council "declines all +responsibility for the Cossack troops at and behind the Front should +Kornilov be removed." + +Such was, then, the situation. Instead of pacification, passions burned +fiercer, contradictions increased, the atmosphere of mutual mistrust +and morbid suspicion was thickened. + + * * * * * + +I still postponed my tour of the troops, not abandoning hope of a +satisfactory issue to the struggle and of the publication of the +"Kornilov programme."[64] + +What could I bring the men? A deep, painful feeling, words appealing to +"common-sense and conscience," concealing my helplessness, and like the +voice of one crying in the wilderness? All had been and gone, leaving +bitter memories behind. It will always be so: thoughts, ideas, words, +moral persuasion will never cease to rouse men to deeds of merit; but +what if overgrown, virgin soil must be torn up with an iron plough?... +What should I say to the officers, sorrowfully and patiently awaiting +the end of the regular and merciless lingering death of the Army? For I +could only say to them: If the Government does not radically alter its +policy the end of the Army has come. + +On the 7th August orders were received to move the Caucasian Native +("Wild") Division from under my command northwards; on the 12th the +same order was received for the 3rd Cavalry Corps, then in Reserve, and +later for the Kornilov "shock" Regiment. As always, their destination +was not indicated. The direction prescribed, on the other hand, equally +pointed to the Northern Front, at that time greatly threatened, and +to ... Petrograd. I recommended General Krymov, commanding the 3rd +Cavalry Corps, for the command of the 11th Army. The Stavka agreed, but +demanded his immediate departure for Moghilev on a special mission. On +his way there Krymov reported to me. Apparently he had not yet received +definite instructions--at any rate, he spoke of none; however, neither +he nor I doubted that the mission was in connection with the expected +change in military policy. Krymov was at this time cheerful and +confident, and had faith in the future; as formerly, he considered that +only a crushing blow to the Soviets could save the situation. + +Following on this, official information was received of the formation +of the Detached Petrograd Army, and the appointment of an officer of +the General Staff to be Quartermaster-General of this Army was desired. + +Finally, about the 20th, the situation became somewhat clearer. An +officer reported to me at Berdichev, and handed me a personal letter +from Kornilov, wherein the latter suggested I should hear this +officer's verbal report. He stated as follows: + +"According to reliable information, a rising of the Bolsheviks +will take place at the end of August. By this time the 3rd Cavalry +Corps,[65] commanded by Krymov, would reach Petrograd, would crush +the rising, and simultaneously put an end to the Soviets."[66] + +Simultaneously, Petrograd would be proclaimed in a state of war, and +the laws resulting from the "Kornilov programme" would be published. +The Supreme Commander-in-Chief requested me to despatch to the +Stavka a score or more of reliable officers--officially "for trench +mortar instruction"; actually they would be sent to Petrograd, and +incorporated in the Officers' Detachment. + +In the course of the conversation he communicated the news from the +Stavka, painting all in glowing colours. He told me, among other +things, of rumours concerning new appointments to the Kiev, Odessa and +Moscow commands, and of the proposed new Government, mentioning some +existing ministers, and some names entirely unknown to me. The part +played in this matter by the Provisional Government, in particular by +Kerensky, was not clear. Had he decided on an abrupt change of military +policy, would he resign, or would he be swept away by developments +impossible of prediction by pure logic, or the most prophetic common +sense? + +_In this volume I described the entire course of events during August +in that sequence and in that light, in which these tragic days were +experienced on the South-Western Front, not giving them the perspective +of the stage and the actors acquired subsequently._ + +The seconding of the officers--with all precautions to prevent +either them or their superiors being placed in a false position--was +commenced, but it is hardly likely that it could have been accomplished +by the 27th. Not one Army Commander was supplied by me with the +information I had received; in fact, not one of the senior officers at +the front knew anything of the events brewing. + +It was clear that the history of the Russian Revolution had entered +on a new phase. What would the future bring? General Markov and I +spent many hours discussing this subject. He--nervous, hot-headed and +impetuous--constantly wavered between the extremes of hope and fear. +I also felt much the same; and both of us quite clearly saw and felt +the _fatal inevitability_ of a crisis. The Soviets--Bolshevists or +semi-Bolshevists, no matter which--would unfailingly bring Russia to +her doom. A conflict was unavoidable. But _over there_, was there an +actual chance, or was everything being done in heroic desperation? + +[Illustration: General Kornilov's welcome in Moscow.] + + + + +CHAPTER XXXII. + +GENERAL KORNILOV'S MOVEMENT AND ITS REPERCUSSION ON THE SOUTH-WEST +FRONT. + + +On August 27th I was thunderstruck by receiving from the Stavka +news of the dismissal of General Kornilov from the post of Supreme +Commander-in-Chief. + +A telegram, unnumbered, and signed "Kerensky," requested General +Kornilov to transfer the Supreme Command temporarily to General +Lukomsky, and, without awaiting the latter's arrival to proceed to +Petrograd. Such an order was quite illegal, and not binding, as the +Supreme Commander-in-Chief was in no way under the orders either of the +War Minister or of the Minister-President, certainly not of Comrade +Kerensky. + +General Lukomsky, Chief-of-Staff, answered the Minister-President in +Telegram No. 640, which I give below. Its contents were transmitted +to us, the Commanders-in-Chief by Telegram No. 6412. which I have +not preserved. Its tenor, however, is clear from the deposition of +Kornilov, in which he says: "I ordered that my decision (not to +surrender my command, and first to elucidate the situation), and that +of General Lukomsky, be communicated to the Commanders-in-Chief on all +fronts." + +Lukomsky's telegram, No. 640, ran as follows: + + All persons in touch with military affairs were perfectly aware + that, in view of the existing state of affairs, when the actual + direction of internal policy was in the hands of irresponsible + public organisations, having an enormously deleterious effect on + the Army, it would be impossible to resurrect the latter; on the + contrary, the Army, properly speaking, would cease to exist in + two or three months. Russia would then be obliged to conclude a + shameful separate peace, whose consequences to the country would + be terrible. The Government took half measures, which, changing + nothing, merely prolonged the agony, and, in saving the Revolution, + did not save Russia. At the same time, the preservation of the + benefits of the Revolution depended solely on the salvation of + Russia, for which purpose the first step must be the establishment + of a really strong Government and the reform of the home Front. + General Kornilov drew up a series of demands, the execution of + which has been delayed. In these circumstances, General Kornilov, + actuated by no motives of personal gain or aggrandisement, + and supported by the clearly-expressed will of the entire + right-thinking sections of the Army and the Civil community, who + demanded the speedy establishment of a strong Government for the + saving of their native land, and of the benefits of the Revolution, + considered more severe measures requisite which would secure the + re-establishment of order in the country. + + The arrival of Savinkov and Lvov, who in your name made General + Kornilov similar proposals,[67] only brought General Kornilov to a + speedy decision. In accordance with your suggestions, he issued his + final orders, which it is now too late to repeal. + + Your telegram of to-day shows that you have now altered your + previous decision, communicated in your name by Savinkov and + Lvov. Conscience demands from me, desiring only the good of the + Motherland, to declare to you absolutely that it is now impossible + to stop what was commenced with your approval; this will lead but + to civil war, the final dissolution of the Army, and a shameful + separate peace, as a consequence of which the conquests of the + Revolution will certainly not be secured to us. + + In the interests of the salvation of Russia you must work with + General Kornilov, and not dismiss him. The dismissal of General + Kornilov will bring upon Russia as yet unheard-of horrors. + Personally, I decline to accept any responsibility for the Army, + even though it be for a short period, and do not consider it + possible to take over the command from General Kornilov, as this + would occasion an outburst in the Army which would cause Russia to + perish. + + LUKOMSKY. + +All the hopes which had been entertained of the salvation of the +country and the regeneration of the Army by peaceful means had now +failed. I had no illusions as to the consequences of such a conflict +between General Kornilov and Kerensky, and had no hopes of a favourable +termination if only General Krymov's Corps did not manage to save the +situation. At the same time, not for one moment did I consider it +possible to identify myself with the Provisional Government, which I +considered criminally incapable, and therefore immediately despatched +the following telegram: + + I am a soldier and am not accustomed to play hide and seek. On + the 16th of July, in a conference with members of the Provisional + Government, I stated that, by a series of military reforms, they + had destroyed and debauched the Army, and had trampled our battle + honours in the mud. My retention as Commander-in-Chief I explained + as being a confession by the Provisional Government of their + deadly sins before the Motherland, and of their wish to remedy the + evil they had wrought. To-day I receive information that General + Kornilov, who had put forward certain demands capable yet of saving + the country and the Army,[68] has been removed from the Supreme + Command. Seeing herein a return to the planned destruction of the + Army, having as its consequence the downfall of our country, I + feel it my duty to inform the Provisional Government that I cannot + follow their lead in this. + + 145 DENIKIN. + +Simultaneously Markov sent a telegram to the Government stating his +concurrence in the views expressed by me.[69] + +At the same time I ordered the Stavka to be asked in what way I could +assist General Kornilov. He knew that, besides moral support, I had no +actual resources at my disposal, and, therefore, thanking me for this +support, demanded no more. + +I ordered copies of my telegrams to be sent to all +Commanders-in-Chief, the Army Commanders of the South-Western Front, +and the Inspector-General of Lines of Communication. I also ordered +the adoption of measures which would isolate the Front against the +penetration of any news of events, without the knowledge of the Staff, +until the conflict had been decided. I received similar instructions +from the Stavka. I think it hardly necessary to state that the entire +Staff warmly supported Kornilov, and all impatiently awaited news from +Moghilev, still hoping for a favourable termination. + +Absolutely no measures for the detention of any persons were taken: +this would have been of no use, and did not enter into our plans. + +Meanwhile, the Revolutionary Democracy at the Front were in great +agitation. The members of the Front Committee on this night left their +quarters and lodged in private houses on the outskirts of the town. +The assistants of the Commissar were at the time away on duty, and +Iordansky himself in Zhitomir. An invitation from Markov to him to come +to Berdichev had no result, either that night or on the 28th. Iordansky +expected a "treacherous ambush." + +Night fell, a long, sleepless night, full of anxious waiting and +oppressive thoughts. Never had the future of the country seemed so +dark, never had our powerlessness been so galling and oppressive. A +historic tragedy, played out far from us, lay like a thundercloud over +Russia. And we waited, waited. + +I shall never forget that night. Those hours still live in mental +pictures. Successive telegrams by direct wire: Agreement apparently +possible. No hopes of a peaceful issue. Supreme Command offered to +Klembovsky. Klembovsky likely to refuse. One after another copies of +telegrams to the Provisional Government from all Army Commanders of my +Front, from General Oelssner and several other Senior Officers, voicing +their adherence to the opinion expressed in my telegram. A touching +fulfilment of their _civic duty_ in an atmosphere saturated with hate +and suspicion. Their _soldier's oath_ they could no longer keep. +Finally, the voice of despair from the Stavka. For that is the only +name for the General Orders issued by Kornilov on the night of the 28th: + + The telegram of the Minister-President, No. 4163[70] in its entire + first part is a downright lie: it was not I who sent Vv. N. Lvov, a + member of the State Duma, to the Provisional Government. He came to + me as a messenger from the Minister-President. My witness to this + is Alexei Aladyin, member of the State Duma. + + The great provocation, placing the Motherland on the turn of fate, + is thus accomplished. + + People of Russia. Our great Motherland is dying. Her end is near. + + Forced to speak openly, I, General Kornilov, declare that the + Provisional Government, under pressure from the Bolshevik majority + in the Soviets, is acting in complete accordance with the plans of + the German General Staff and simultaneously with the landing of + enemy troops near Riga, is killing the Army, and convulsing the + country internally. + + The solemn certainty of the doom of our country drives me in these + terrible times to call upon all Russians to save their dying + native land. All in whose breasts a Russian heart still beats, all + who believe in God, go into the Churches, pray Our Lord for the + greatest miracle, the salvation of our dear country. + + I, General Kornilov, son of a peasant Cossack, announce to all and + everyone that I personally desire nothing save the preservation of + our great Russia, and vow to lead the people, through victory over + our enemies, to a Constituent Assembly, when they themselves will + settle their fate and select the form of our new national life. + + I cannot betray Russia into the hands of her ancient enemy--the + German race!--and make the Russian people German slaves. And I + prefer to die honourably on the field of battle, that I may not see + the shame and degradation of our Russian land. + + People of Russia, in your hands lies the life of your native land! + +This order was despatched to the Army Commanders for their information. +The next day one telegram from Kerensky was received at the +Commissariat, and from then all our communications with the outside +world were interrupted.[71] + +Well, the die was cast. A gulf had opened between the Government and +the Stavka, to bridge which was now impossible. + +On the following day, the 28th, the Revolutionary institutions, +seeing that absolutely nothing threatened them, exhibited a feverish +activity. Iordansky assumed the "military authority," made a series of +unnecessary arrests in Zhitomir among the senior officials of the Chief +Board of Supplies, and issued, under his signature and in his own name, +that of the Revolutionary organisations and that of the Commissary +of the Province, an appeal, telling, in much detail and in the usual +language of proclamations, how General Denikin was planning "to restore +the old régime and deprive the Russian people of Land and Freedom." + +At the same time similar energetic work was being carried on in +Berdichev under the guidance of the Frontal Committee. Meetings of all +the organisations went on incessantly, along with the "education" of +the typical rear units of the garrison. Here the accusation brought +forward by the Committee was different: "The counter-Revolutionary +attempt of the Commander-in-Chief, General Denikin, to overthrow +the Provisional Government and restore Nicholas II. to the throne." +Proclamations to this effect were circulated in numbers among the +units, pasted on walls, and scattered from motor-cars careering through +the town. The nervous tension increased, the streets were full of +noise. The members of the Committee became more and more peremptory +and exigent in their relations with Markov. Information was received +of disorders which had arisen on the Lyssaya Gora (Bald Hill). The +Staff sent officers thither to clear up the matter and determine the +possibility of pacification. One of them--a Tchekh officer, Lieutenant +Kletsando--who was to have spoken with the Austrian prisoners, was +attacked by Russian soldiers, one of whom he wounded slightly. This +circumstance increased the disturbance still more. + +From my window I watched the crowds of soldiers gathering on the +Lyssaya Gora, then forming in column, holding a prolonged meeting, +which lasted about two hours, and apparently coming to no conclusion. +Finally the column, which consisted of a troop of orderlies (formerly +field military police), a reserve _sotnia_, and sundry other armed +units, marched on the town with a number of red flags and headed by two +armoured cars. On the appearance of an armoured car, which threatened +to open fire, the Orenburg Cossack _sotnia_, which was on guard next +the Staff quarters and the house of the Commander-in-Chief, scattered +and galloped away. We found ourselves completely in the power of the +Revolutionary Democracy. + +"Revolutionary sentries" were posted round the house. The Vice-President +of the Committee, Koltchinsky, led four armed "comrades" into the +house for the purpose of arresting General Markov, but then began to +hesitate, and confined himself to leaving in the reception-room of the +Chief-of-Staff two "experts" from the Frontal Committee to control his +work. The following wireless was sent to the Government: "General +Denikin and all his staff have been subjected to personal detention at +his Stavka. In the interests of the defence the guidance of the activity +of the troops has been left in their hands, but is strictly controlled +by the delegates of the Committee." + +Now began a series of long, endless, wearisome hours. They will never +be forgotten. Nor can words express the depth of the pain which now +enveloped our hearts. + +At 4 p.m. on the 29th Markov asked me into the reception-room, +where Assistant-Commissary Kostitsin came with ten to fifteen armed +Committee members and read me an "order from the Commissary of the +South-Western Front, Iordansky," according to which I, Markov, and +Quartermaster-General Orlov were to be subjected to preliminary arrest +for an attempt at an armed rising against the Provisional Government. +As a man of letters Iordansky seemed to have become ashamed of the +arguments about "land," "freedom," and "Nicholas II.," designed +exclusively for inflaming the passions of the mob. + +I replied that a Commander-in-Chief could be removed from his post only +by the Supreme Commander-in-Chief or by the Provisional Government; +that Commissary Iordansky was acting altogether illegally, but that I +was obliged to submit to force. + +Motor-cars drove up, accompanied by armoured cars, and Markov and I +took our seats. Then came the long waiting for Orlov, who was handing +over the files; then the tormenting curiosity of the passers-by. Then +we drove on to Lyssaya Gora. The car wandered about for a long time, +halting at one building after another, until at last we drove up to +the guard-house; we passed through a crowd of about a hundred men who +were awaiting our arrival, and were greeted with looks full of hatred +and with coarse abuse. We were taken into separate cells; Kostitsin +very civilly offered to send me any of my things I might require, but I +brusquely declined any services from him; the door was slammed to, the +key turned noisily in the lock, and I was alone. + +In a few days the Stavka was liquidated. Kornilov, Lukomsky, +Romanovsky, and others were taken off to the Bykhov Prison. + +The Revolutionary Democracy was celebrating its victory. + +Yet at that very time the Government was opening wide the doors of the +prisons in Petrograd and liberating many influential Bolsheviks--to +enable them to continue, publicly and openly, their work of destroying +the Russian Empire. + +On September 1 the Provisional Government arrested General Kornilov; +on September 4 the Provisional Government liberated Bronstein Trotsky. +These two dates should be memorable for Russia. + + * * * * * + +Cell No. 1. The floor is some seven feet square. The window is closed +with an iron grating. The door has a small peep-hole in it. The cell +is furnished with a sleeping bench, a table, and a stool. The air is +close--an evil-smelling place lies next door. On the other side is cell +No. 2, with Markov in it; he walks up and down with large, nervous +strides. Somehow or other I still remember that he makes three steps +along his cell, while I manage, on a curve, to make five. The prison +is full of vague sounds. The strained ear begins to distinguish them, +and gradually to make out the course of prison life, and even its +moods. The guards--I guess them to be soldiers of the prison guard +company--are rough and revengeful men. + +It is early morning. Someone's voice is booming. Whence? Outside of +the window, clinging to the grating, hang two soldiers. They look at +me with cruel, savage eyes, and hysterically utter terrible curses. +They throw in something abominable through the open window. There is no +escape from their gaze. I turn to the door--there another pair of eyes, +full of hatred, peers through the peep-hole; thence choice abuse pours +in also. I lie down on the sleeping-bench and cover my head with my +cloak. I lie for hours. The whole day, one after another, the "public +accusers" replace each other at the window and at the door--the guards +allow all to come freely. And into the narrow, close kennel pours, +in an unceasing torrent, a foul stream of words, shouts, and curses, +born of immense ignorance, blind hate, and bottomless coarseness. +One's whole soul seems to be drenched with that abuse, and there is no +deliverance, no escape from this moral torture chamber. + +What is it all about? "Wanted to open the Front" ... "sold himself +to the Germans"--the sum, too, was mentioned--"for twenty thousand +roubles" ... "wanted to deprive us of land and freedom." This +was not their own, this was borrowed from the Committee. But +Commander-in-Chief, General, gentleman--this, indeed, was their own! +"You have drunk our blood, ordered us about, kept us stewing in prison; +now we are free and you can sit behind the bars yourself. You pampered +yourself, drove about in motor-cars; now you can try what lying on a +wooden bench is, you ----. You have not much time left. We shan't wait +till you run away--we will strangle you with our own hands." These +warriors of the rear scarcely knew me at all. But all that had been +gathering for years, for centuries, in their exasperated hearts against +the power they did not love, against the inequality of classes, because +of personal grievances and of their shattered lives--for which someone +or other was to blame--all this now came to the surface in the form +of unmitigated cruelty. And the higher the standing of him who was +reckoned the enemy of the people, and the deeper his fall, the more +violent was the hostility of the mob and the greater the satisfaction +of seeing him in its hands. Meanwhile, behind the wings of the popular +stage stood the managers, who inflamed both the wrath and the delight +of the populace; who did not believe in the villainy of the actors, +but permitted them even to perish for the sake of greater realism in +the performance and to the greater glory of their sectarian dogmatism. +These motives of party policy, however, were called "tactical +considerations." + +I lay, covered head and all by my cloak and, under a shower of oaths, +tried to see things clearly: + +"What have I done to deserve this?" + +I went through the stages of my life.... My father was a stern soldier +with a most kindly heart. Up to thirty years of age he had been a +peasant serf and was drafted into the Army, where, after twenty-two +years of hard service in the ranks, under the severe discipline of the +times of Nicholas I, he was promoted to the rank of 2nd Lieutenant. +He retired with the rank of Major. My childhood was hard and joyless, +amidst the poverty of a pension of 45 roubles a month. Then my father +died. Life became still harder. My mother's pension was 25 roubles +a month. My youth was passed in study and in working for my daily +bread. I became a volunteer in the Army, messing in barracks with the +privates. Then came my officer's commission, then the Staff College. +The unfairness of my promotion, my complaint to the Emperor against +the all-powerful Minister of War, and my return to the 2nd Artillery +Brigade. My conflict with a moribund group of old adherents of serfdom; +their accusation of demagogy. The General Staff. My practice command +of a company in the 183rd Pultussk Regiment. Here I put an end to the +system of striking the soldiers and made an unsuccessful experiment +in "conscious discipline." Yes, Mr. Kerensky, I did this also in my +younger days. I privately abolished disciplinary punishment--"watch +one another, restrain the weak-spirited--after all, you are decent +men--show that you can do your duty without the stick." I finished my +command: during the year the behaviour of the company had not been +above the average, it drilled poorly and lazily. After my departure the +old Sergeant-Major, Stsepoura, gathered the company together, raised +his fist significantly in the air and said distinctly, separating his +words: + +"Now it is not Captain Denikin whom you will have. Do you understand?" + +"Yes, Sergeant-Major." + +It was said, afterwards, that the company soon showed improvement. + +Then came the war in Manchuria; active service; hopes for the +regeneration of the Army. Then an open struggle, in a stifled Press, +with the higher command of the Army, against stagnation, ignorance, +privileges and licence--a struggle for the welfare of the officer and +the soldier. The times were stern--all my service, all my military +career was at stake. Then came my command of a regiment, constant +care for the improvement of the condition of the soldiers, after my +Pultussk experience--strict service demands, but also respect for the +human dignity of the soldier. At that time we seemed to understand +one another and were not strangers. Then came war again, the "Iron" +Division, nearer relations with the rifleman and work with him in +common. The staff was always near the positions, so as to share mud, +want of space, and dangers with the men. Then a long, laborious path, +full of glorious battles, in which a common life, common sufferings +and common fame brought us still closer together, and created a mutual +faith and a touching proximity. + +No, I have never been an enemy to the soldier. + +I threw off my cloak, and, jumping from the wooden bed, went up to the +window, where the figure of a soldier clung to the grating, belching +forth curses. + +"You lie, soldier! It is not your own words that you are speaking. If +you are not a coward, hiding in the rear, if you have been in action, +you have seen how your officers could die. You have seen that they...." + +His hands loosened their grip and the figure disappeared. I think it +was simply because of my stern address, which, despite the impotence of +a prisoner, produced its usual effect. + +Fresh faces appeared at the window and at the peep-hole in the door. + +It was not always, however, that we met with insolence alone. +Sometimes, through the assumed rudeness of our gaolers we could see +a feeling of awkwardness, confusion and even commiseration. But of +these feelings they were ashamed. On the first cold night, when we +had none of our things, a guard brought Markov, who had forgotten +his overcoat, a soldier's overcoat, but half an hour later--whether +he had grown ashamed of his good action, or whether his comrades had +shamed him--he took it back. In Markov's cursory notes we find: "We +are looked after by two Austrian prisoners.... Besides them, we have +as our caterer a soldier, formerly of the Finland Rifles (a Russian), +a very kind and thoughtful man. During our first days he, too, had a +hard time of it--his comrades gave him no peace; now, however, matters +are all right; they have quieted down. His care for our food is simply +touching, while the news he brings is delightful in its simplicity. +Yesterday, he told me that he would miss us when we are taken away. + +"I soothed him by saying that our places would soon be filled by new +generals--that all had not yet been destroyed." + +My heart is heavy. My feelings seem to be split in two: I hate and +despise the savage, cruel, senseless mob, but still I feel the old pity +for the soldier: an ignorant, illiterate man, who has been led astray, +and is capable both of abominable crimes and of lofty sacrifices! + +Soon the duty of guarding us was given to the cadets of the 2nd +Zhitomir School of 2nd Lieutenants. Our condition became much easier +from the moral point of view. They not only watched over the prisoners, +but also guarded them from the mob. And the mob, more than once, on +various occasions, gathered near the guard-room and roared wildly, +threatening to lynch us. In such cases the company on guard gathered +hastily in a house nearly opposite us and the cadets on guard made +ready their machine-guns. I recall that, calmly and clearly realising +my danger, when the mob was especially stormy, I planned out my method +of self-defence: a heavy water-bottle stood upon my table; with it +I might hit the first man to break into my cell; his blood would +infuriate and intoxicate the "comrades," and they would kill me at +once, without torturing me.... + +With the exception, however, of such unpleasant moments, our life in +prison went on in a measured, methodical way; it was quiet and restful; +after the strain of our campaigning, and in comparison with the moral +suffering we had undergone, the physical inconveniences of the prison +régime were mere trifles. Our life was varied by little incidents. +Sometimes a Bolshevist cadet standing at the door would tell the sentry +loudly, so that his words might be heard in the cell, that at their +last meeting the comrades of Lyssaya Gora, having lost all patience, +had finally decided to lynch us, and added that this was what we +deserved. Another time, Markov, passing along the corridor, saw a cadet +sentry leaning on his rifle, with the tears streaming from his eyes--he +felt sorry for us. What a strange, unusual exhibition of sentiment in +our savage days. + +For a fortnight I did not leave my cell for exercise, not wishing to be +an object of curiosity for the "comrades," who surrounded the square +before the guard-room and examined the arrested generals as if they +were beasts in a menagerie. I had no communication with my neighbours, +but much time for meditation and thought. + +And every day as I open my window I hear from the house opposite a +high, tenor voice--whether of friend or foe I know not--singing: + +"This is the last day that I ramble with you, my friends." + + + + +CHAPTER XXXIII. + +IN BERDICHEV GAOL--THE TRANSFER OF THE "BERDICHEV GROUP" OF PRISONERS +TO BYKHOV. + + +Besides Markov and me, whose share in events has been depicted in the +preceding chapters, the following were cast into prison: + +3. General Erdeli, Commander of the Special Army. + +4. Lieutenant-General Varnovsky, Commander of the 1st Army. + +5. Lieutenant-General Selivatchev, Commander of the 7th Army. + +6. Lieutenant-General Eisner, Chief of Supplies to the South-Western +Front. + +The guilt of these men lay in their expression of solidarity with my +telegram No. 145, and of the last, moreover, in his fulfilment of my +orders for the isolation of the frontal region with respect to Kiev and +Zhitomir. + +7 and 8. General Eisner's assistants--General Parsky and General +Sergievsky--men who had absolutely no connection with events. + +9. Major-General Orlov, Quartermaster-General of the Staff of the +Front--a wounded man with a withered arm, timid, and merely carrying +out the orders of the Chief-of-Staff. + +10. Lieutenant Kletsando, of the Tchekh troops, who had wounded a +soldier of Lyssaya Gora on August 28th. + +11. Captain Prince Krapotkin, a man over sixty years of age, a +Volunteer, and the Commandant of the Commander-in-Chief's train. He was +not initiated into events at all. + +General Selivatchev, General Parsky and General Sergievsky were soon +released. Prince Krapotkin was informed on September 6th that his +actions had not been criminal, but was set free only on September +23rd, when it appeared that we were not to be tried at Berdichev. For +a charge of rebellion to hold good against us an association of eight +men at the very least had to be discovered. Our antagonists were much +interested in this figure, being desirous of observing the rules of +decorum.... There was another prisoner, however, kept in reserve and +separate from us, at the Commandant's office, and even afterwards +transferred to Bykhov--a military official named Boudilovitch--a youth +weak in body, but strong in spirit, who on one occasion dared to tell a +wrathful mob that it was not worth the little finger of those whom it +was maltreating.[72] No other crime was imputed to him. + +On the second or third day of my imprisonment I read in a newspaper, +which had accidentally or purposely found its way into my cell, an +order from the Provisional Government to the Senate, dated August 29th, +which ran as follows: + +"Lieutenant-General Denikin, Commander-in-Chief of the Armies of the +South-Western Front, to be removed from the post of Commander-in-Chief +and brought to trial for rebellion.--Signed: Minister-President A. +Kerensky and B. Savinkov--in charge of the War Ministry." + +On the same date similar orders were issued concerning Generals +Kornilov, Lukomsky, Markov and Kisliakov. Later an order was issued for +the removal of General Romanovsky. + +On the second or the third day of my arrest the guard-room was visited, +for our examination, by a Committee of Investigation, under the +superintendence of the Chief Field Prosecutor of the Front, General +Batog, and under the presidency of Assistant-Commissar Kostitsin, +consisting of: + +Lieutenant-Colonel Shestoperov, in charge of the Juridical Section +of the Commissariat; Lieutenant-Colonel Frank, of the Kiev Military +Court; 2nd Lieut. Oudaltsov and Junior Sergeant of Artillery Levenberg, +members of the Committee of the Front. + +My evidence, in view of the facts of the case, was very short, and +consisted of the following statements: (1) None of the persons +arrested with me had taken part in any active proceedings against the +Government; (2) all orders given to and through the Staff during my +last days, in connection with General Kornilov's venture, proceeded +from me; (3) I considered, and still consider, that the activity of the +Provisional Government is criminal and ruinous for Russia, but that +nevertheless I had not instituted a rebellion against it, but having +sent my telegram No. 145, I had left it to the Provisional Government +to take such action towards me as it might see fit. + +Later the Chief Military Prosecutor, Shablovsky, having acquainted +himself with the material of the investigation and with the +circumstances which had arisen around it in Berdichev, was horrified at +the "uncautious formulation" of my evidence. + +By September 1st Iordansky was already reporting to the War Ministry +that the Committee of Investigation had discovered documents +establishing the existence of a conspiracy which had long been +preparing.... At the same time, Iordansky, man of letters, inquired of +the Government whether, in the matter of the direction of the cases of +the Generals arrested, he could act within the limits of the law, _in +conformity with local circumstances_, or whether he was bound to be +guided by any _political considerations_ of the Central Authority. In +reply he was informed that he must act reckoning with the law alone and +... _taking into consideration local circumstances_.[73] + +In view of this explanation, Iordansky decided to commit us for trial +by a Revolutionary Court-Martial, to which end a Court was formed of +members of one of the Divisions formerly subordinated to me at the +Front, while Captain Pavlov, member of the Executive Committee of the +South-Western Front, was marked down for public prosecutor. + +Thus the interests of competency, impartiality and fair play were +observed. + +Iordansky was so anxious to obtain a speedy verdict for myself +and for the Generals imprisoned with me that on September 3rd he +proposed that the Commission, without waiting for the elucidation +of the circumstances, should present the cases to the Revolutionary +Court-Martial in groups, as the guilt of one or other of the accused +was established. + +We were much depressed by our complete ignorance of what was taking +place in the outer world. + +On rare occasions Kostitsin acquainted us with the more important +current events, but in the Commissar's comments on the events only +depressed us still more. It was clear, however, that the Government was +breaking up altogether, that Bolshevism was raising its head higher and +higher, and that the country must inevitably perish. + +About September 8th or 10th, when the investigation was over, our +prison surroundings underwent, to some extent, a change. Newspapers +began to appear in our cells almost daily; at first secretly, +afterwards, from September 22nd, officially. At the same time, after +the relief of one of the Companies of Guards, we decided to try an +experiment: during our exercise in the corridor I approached Markov +and started talking with him; the sentries did not interfere. From +that time we began talking with one another every day; sometimes the +sentries demanded that we should stop, and then we were silent at once, +but more frequently they did not interfere. In the second half of +September visitors also were allowed; the curiosity of the "comrades" +of Lyssaya Gora was now apparently satisfied; fewer of them gathered +about the square, and I used to go out to walk every day, was able +to see all the prisoners and exchange a few words with them now and +again. Now, at least, we knew what was doing in the world, while the +possibility of meeting one another removed the depression caused by +isolation. + +From the papers we learned that the investigation of the Kornilov case +was committed to the Supreme Investigation Committee, presided over by +the Chief Military and Naval Prosecutor, Shablovsky.[74] + +About September 9th, in the evening, a great noise and the furious +shouts of a large crowd were heard near the prison. In a little while +four strangers entered my cell--confused and much agitated by something +or other. They said they were the President and members of the Supreme +Committee of Investigation for the Kornilov case.[75] + +Shablovsky, in a still somewhat broken voice, began to explain that +the purpose of their arrival was to take us off to Bykhov, and that, +judging by the temper which had developed in Berdichev, and by the +fury of the mob which now surrounded the prison, they could see that +there were no guarantees for justice here, but only savage revenge. +He added that the Committee had no doubt as to the inadmissibility +of any segregation of our cases, and as to the necessity of a common +trial for all the participators in the Kornilov venture, but that the +Commissariat and the Committees were using all means against this. The +Committee, therefore, asked me whether I would not wish to supplement +my evidence by any facts which might yet more clearly establish +the connection between our case and Kornilov's. In view of the +impossibility of holding the examination amidst the roar of the crowd +which had gathered, they decided to postpone it to the following day. + +The Committee departed; soon after the crowd dispersed. + +What more could I tell them? Only, perhaps, something of the advice +which Kornilov had given me at Moghilev, and through a messenger. But +this was done as a matter of exceptional confidence on the part of the +Supreme Commander-in-Chief, which I could in no case permit myself to +break. Therefore, the few details which I added next day to my original +evidence did not console the commission and did not, apparently, +satisfy the volunteer, a member of the Committee of the Front, who was +present at the examination. + +Nevertheless, we waited with impatience for our liberation from the +Berdichev chamber of torture. But our hopes were clouded more and more. +The newspaper of the Committee of the Front methodically fomented the +passions of the garrison; it was reported that at all the meetings of +all the Committees resolutions were passed against letting us out of +Berdichev; the Committee members were agitating mightily among the rear +units of the garrison, and meetings were held which passed off in a +spirit of great exaltation. + +The aim of the Shablovsky Commission was not attained. As it turned out +in the beginning of September, to Shablovsky's demand that a separate +trial of the "Berdichev group" should not be allowed, Iordansky replied +that "to say nothing of the transfer of the generals to any place +whatsoever, even the least postponement of their trial would threaten +Russia with incalculable calamities--complications at the front, and a +new civil war in the rear," and that both on political and on tactical +grounds it was necessary to have us tried in Berdichev, in the shortest +possible time, and by Revolutionary Court-Martial.[76] + +The Committee of the Front and the Kiev Soviet of Workmen's and +Soldiers' Delegates would not agree to our transfer, despite all +the arguments and persuasions brought forward at their meeting by +Shablovsky and the members of his Commission. On the way back, at +Moghilev, a consultation took place on this question between Kerensky, +Shablovsky, Iordansky and Batog. All, excepting Shablovsky, came to the +altogether unequivocal conclusion that the front was shaken, that the +soldiery was restless and demanding a victim, and that it was necessary +to enable the tense atmosphere to discharge itself, even at the cost +of injustice.... Shablovsky rose and declared that he would not permit +such a cynical attitude toward law and justice. + +I remember that this tale perplexed me. It is not worth while disputing +about points of view. But if the Minister-President is convinced that +in the matter of protecting the State it is admissible to let oneself +be guided by expediency, in what way, then, was Kornilov to blame? + +On September 14th a debate took place in Petrograd, in the last "court +of appeal"--in the military section of the Executive Committee of the +Council of Workmen's and Soldiers' Delegates--between Shablovsky and +the representative of the Committee of the South-Western Front, fully +supported by Iordansky. The last two declared that if the Revolutionary +Court-Martial was not held on the spot, in Berdichev, in the course +of the next five days the lynching of the prisoners was to be feared. +However, the Central Committee agreed with Shablovsky's arguments, and +sent its resolution to that effect to Berdichev. + +So an organised lynching was prevented. But the Revolutionary +institutions of Berdichev had at their service another method for +liquidating the "Berdichev group," an easy and irresponsible one--the +method of popular wrath.... + +A rumour spread that we were to be taken away on the 23rd, then it was +stated that our departure would take place on the 27th at 5 p.m. from +the passenger station. + +To take the prisoners away without making the fact public was in no +way difficult: in a motor-car, on foot in a column of cadets, or, +again, in a railway carriage--a narrow gauge-line came close up to the +guard-house and joined on to the broad gauge-line outside the town and +the railway station.[77] But such a method of transferring us did not +agree with the intentions of the Commissariat and the Committees. + +General Doukhonin inquired from the Stavka, of the Staff of the Front, +whether there were any reliable units in Berdichev, and offered to send +a detachment to assist in our move. The Staff of the Front declined +assistance. The Commander-in-Chief, General Volodchenko, had left on +the eve, the 26th, for the Front.... + +Much talk and an unhealthy atmosphere of expectation and curiosity were +being artificially created around this question.... + +Kerensky sent a telegram to the Commissariat: "I am sure of the +prudence of the garrison, which may elect, from among its numbers, two +representatives to accompany." + +In the morning the Commissariat began visiting all the units in the +garrison, to obtain their consent to our transfer. + +The Committee had appointed a meeting of the whole garrison for 2 p.m., +_i.e._, three hours before our departure, and in the field, moreover, +immediately beside our prison. This mass meeting did indeed take place; +at it the representatives of the Commissariat and of the Committee of +the Front announced the orders for our transfer to Bykhov, thoughtfully +announced the hour of our departure and appealed to the garrison ... +to be prudent; the meeting continued for a long time and, of course, +did not disperse. By 5 o'clock an excited crowd of thousands of men had +surrounded the guard-room, and its dull murmur made its way into the +building. + +Among the officers of the Cadet Battalion of the 2nd Zhitomir School +of 2nd Lieutenants, which was on guard this day, was Captain Betling, +wounded in many battles, who before the War had served in the 17th +Archangelogorod Infantry Regiment, which I commanded.[78] Betling asked +the superior officer of the School to replace by his half-company the +detachment appointed to accompany the prisoners to the railway station. +We all dressed and came out into the corridor. We waited. An hour, two +hours passed.... + +The meeting continued. Numerous speakers called for an immediate +lynching.... The soldier who had been wounded by Lieutenant Kletsando +was shouting hysterically and demanding his head.... Standing in the +porch of the guard-room, Assistant Commissaries Kostitsin and Grigoriev +were trying persuasion with the mob. That dear Betling, too, spoke +several times, hotly and passionately. We could not hear his words. + +At last, pale and agitated, Betling and Kostitsin came up to me. + +"How will you decide? The crowd has promised not to touch anyone, only +it demands that you should be taken to the station on foot. But we +cannot answer for anything." + +I replied: + +"Let us go." + +I took off my cap and crossed myself: + +"Lord, bless us!" + + * * * * * + +The crowd raged. We, the seven of us, surrounded by a group of cadets, +headed by Betling, who marched by my side with drawn sword, entered +the narrow passage through this living human sea, which pressed on us +from all sides. In front were Kostitsin and the delegates (twelve to +fifteen) chosen by the garrison to escort us. Night was coming on, and +in its eerie gloom, with the rays of the searchlight on the armoured +car cutting through it now and then, moved the raving mob, growing and +rolling on like a flaming avalanche. The air was full of a deafening +roar, hysterical shouts, and mephitic curses. At times they were +covered by Betling's loud, anxious voice: + +"Comrades, you have given your word!... Comrades, you have given your +word!..." + +The cadets, those splendid youths, crushed together on all sides, push +aside with their bodies the pressing crowd, which disorders their thin +ranks. Passing the pools left by yesterday's rain, the soldiers fill +their hands with mud and pelt us with it. Our faces, eyes, ears, are +covered with its fetid, viscid slime. Stones come flying at us. Poor, +crippled General Orlov has his face severely bruised; Erdeli and I, as +well, were struck--in the back and on the head. + +On our way we exchanged monosyllabic remarks. I turned to Markov: + +"What, my dear Professor, is this the end?" + +"Apparently...." + +The mob would not let us come up to the station by the straight path. +We were taken by a roundabout way, some three miles altogether, through +the main streets of the town. The crowd is growing. The balconies of +the Berdichev houses are full of curious spectators; the women wave +their handkerchiefs. Gay, guttural voices come from above: + +"Long live freedom!" + +The railway station is flooded with light. There we find a new, +vast crowd of several thousand people. And all this has merged in +the general sea which rages and roars. With enormous difficulty we +are brought through it under a hail of curses and of glances full +of hatred. The railway carriage. An officer--Elsner's son--sobbing +hysterically and addressing impotent threats to the mob, and his +soldier servant, lovingly soothing him, as he takes away his revolver; +two women, dumb with horror--Kletsando's wife and sister, who had +thought to see him off.... + +We wait for an hour, for another. The train is not allowed to leave--a +prisoner's car is demanded. There were none at the station. The mob +threatens to do for the Commissaries. Kostitsin is slightly buffeted. +A goods car is brought, all defiled with horse-dung--what a trifle! We +enter it without the assistance of a platform; poor Orlov is lifted in +with difficulty; hundreds of hands are stretched towards us through +the firm and steady ranks of the cadets.... It is already 10 p.m. The +engine gives a jerk. The crowd booms out still louder. Two shots are +heard. The train starts. + +The noise dies away, the lights grow dimmer. Farewell Berdichev! + +Kerensky shed a tear of delight over the self-abnegation of "our +saviours"--as he called--not the cadets, but the Commissaries and the +Committee members. + +"What irony of fate! General Denikin, arrested as Kornilov's +accomplice, was saved from the rage of the frenzied soldiers by the +members of the Executive Committee of the South-Western Front and by +the Commissaries of the Provisional Government." + +"I remember with what agitation I and the never-to-be-forgotten +Doukhonin read the account of how a handful of these brave men escorted +the arrested generals through a crowd of thousands of soldiers who were +thirsting for their blood...."[79] Why slander the dead? Certainly, +Doukhonin was no less anxious for the fate of the prisoners than for +... the fate of their revolutionary escort.... + +That Roman citizen, Pontius Pilate, smiled mockingly through the gloom +of the ages.... + + + + +CHAPTER XXXIV. + +SOME CONCLUSIONS AS TO THE FIRST PERIOD OF THE REVOLUTION. + + +History will not soon give us a picture of the Revolution in a broad, +impartial light. Those prospects which are now opening out to our view +are sufficient only to enable us to grasp certain particular phenomena +in it and, perhaps, to reject the prejudices and misconceptions which +have sprung up around them. + +The Revolution was inevitable. It is called a Revolution of the whole +people. This is correct only in so far as the Revolution was the Result +of the discontent of literally all classes of the population with the +old power. But upon the question of its achievements opinions were +divided, and deep breaches were bound to appear between classes on the +very next day after the downfall of the old Power. + +The Revolution was many-faced. For the peasants--the ownership of +the land; for the workmen--the ownership of profits; for the Liberal +Bourgeoisie--changed political conditions of life in the land and +moderate social reforms; for the Revolutionary Democracy--power and the +maximum of social achievement; for the Army--absence of authority and +the cessation of the War. + +With the downfall of the power of the Czar, there was left in the +country, until the summoning of a Constituent Assembly, no lawful +power, no power that had a juridical basis. This is perfectly natural +and follows from the very nature of a Revolution. But whether through +genuine misconception or deliberately perverting the truth, men have +fabricated theories, known to be false, about the "general popular +origin of the Provisional Government" or about the "full powers of the +Soviet of Workmen's and Soldiers' Delegates," as an organ supposed +to represent the "whole of the Russian Democracy." What an elastic +conscience one must have, if, while professing democratic principles +and protesting violently against the slightest deviation from orthodox +conditions of the lawfulness of elections, one can still ascribe full +powers, as the organ of democracy, to the Petrograd Soviet or to the +Congress of Soviets, the election of which is of an extraordinary +simplified and one-sided character. It was not without reason that +for a long time the Petrograd Soviet hesitated to publish lists of +its members. As to the supreme Power, to say nothing of its "popular +origin" from a "private meeting of the State Duma," the technique of +its construction was so imperfect that repeated crises might have put +an end to its very existence and to every trace of its continuity. +Finally, a really "popular" Government could not have remained +isolated, left by all to the will of a group of usurpers of authority. +That same Government which, in the days of March, so easily obtained +general recognition. Recognition, yes, but not practical support. + +After March 3rd, and up to the Constituent Assembly, _every_ +supreme authority bore the marks of self-assumed power, and _no_ +power could satisfy all classes of the population, in view of the +irreconciliableness of their interests and the intemperance of their +desires. + +Neither of the ruling powers (the Provisional Government and the +Soviet) enjoyed the due support of the _majority_. For this majority +(80 per cent.) said, through its representatives in the Constituent +Assembly of 1918: "We peasants make no difference between parties; +parties fight for power, while our peasant business is the land alone." +But even if, forestalling the will of the Constituent Assembly, the +Provisional Government had satisfied these desires of the majority +in full, it could not have reckoned on this majority's immediate +submission to the general interests of the State, nor on its _active_ +support: engaged in the redistribution of the land, which also had +a strong attraction for the elements at the Front, the peasantry +would scarcely have given the State, voluntarily, the forces and +the means for putting it in order, _i.e._ plenty of corn and plenty +of soldiers--brave, faithful and obedient to the law. Even then the +Government would have been faced with insoluble problems: an Army which +did not fight, an unproductive industry, a transport system which was +being broken down and ... the civil war of parties. + +Let us, therefore, set aside the popular and democratic origin of +the Provisional authority. Let it be self-assumed, as it has been in +the history of all revolutions and of all peoples. But the very fact +of the wide recognition of the Provisional Government gave it a vast +advantage over all the other forces which disputed its authority. +It was necessary, however, that this power should become so strong, +so absolute in its nature, so autocratic, as, having crushed all +opposition by force, perhaps by arms, to have led the country to a +Constituent Assembly, elected in surroundings which did not admit of +the falsification of the popular vote, and to have protected this +Assembly. + +We are apt to abuse the words "elemental force," as an excuse for many +phenomena of the Revolution. That "molten element" which swept Kerensky +away with the greatest ease, has it not fallen into the iron grip of +Lenin-Bronstein and, for more than three years, been unable to escape +from Bolshevist duress? + +If such a power, harsh, but inspired by reason and by a true desire for +popular rule, had assumed authority and, having crushed the _licence_ +into which _freedom_ had been transmuted, had led this authority to +a Constituent Assembly, the Russian people would have blessed, not +condemned it. In such a position will every provisional authority find +itself which accepts the heritage of Bolshevism; and Russia will judge +it, not by the juridical marks of its origin, but by its works. + +Why is the overthrow of the incompetent authority of the old Government +to be an achievement, to the memory of which the Provisional Government +proposed erecting a monument in the Capital, while the attempt to +overthrow the incompetent authority of Kerensky, made by Kornilov, +after exhausting all lawful means and after provocation on the part of +the Minister-President, is to be counted rebellion? + +But the need for a powerful authority is far from being exhausted by +the period preceding the Constituent Assembly. Did not the Assembly +of 1918 call in vain on the country, not for submission, but simply +for protection from physical outrage on the part of the turbulent +sailor horde? Yet not a hand was raised in its defence. Let us grant +that _that_ Assembly, born in an atmosphere of mutiny and violence, +did not express the will of the Russian people and that the future +Assembly will reflect that will more perfectly. I think, however, +that even those who have the most exalted faith in the infallibility +of the democratic principle do not close their eyes to the unbounded +possibilities of the future which will be the heritage of such a +physical and psychological transformation in the people as is unknown +to history and has never yet been investigated by anyone. + +Who knows whether it may not be necessary to confirm the democratic +principle, the authority itself of the Constituent Assembly, and its +commands, by iron and fresh bloodshed.... + +Be that as it may, the _outward_ recognition of the Provisional +Government took place. It would be difficult and useless to separate, +in the work of the Government, that which proceeded from its free will +and sincere convictions from what bears the stamp of the forcible +influence of the Soviet. If Tzeretelli was entitled to declare that +"there has never yet been a case when, in important questions, the +Provisional Government has not been ready to come to an agreement," so +have we the right to identify their work and their responsibility. + +All this activity, _volens nolens_, bore the character of destruction, +not creation. The Government repealed, abolished, disbanded, +permitted.... In this lay the centre of gravity of its work. I picture +to myself the Russia of that period as a very old house, in need of +capital reconstruction. In the absence of means and while waiting for +the building season (the Constituent Assembly), the builders began +extracting the decayed girders, some of which they did not replace at +all, others they replaced with light, temporary props, and others again +they reinforced with new baulks without fastenings--the latter means +turning out to be the worst. And the house crashed down. The causes +of such a method of building were first: the absence of a complete +and symmetrical plan among the Russian political parties, the whole +energy, mental and will tension of which were directed mainly towards +the destruction of the former order. For we cannot give the name of +practical plans to the abstract outlines of the party programmes; they +are rather lawful or unlawful diplomas for the right of building. +Secondly--that the new ruling classes did not possess the most +elementary technical knowledge of the art of ruling, as the result +of a systematic, age-long setting them aside from these functions. +Thirdly--the non-forestalling of the will of the Constituent Assembly, +which, in any case, called for heroic measures for its summoning, +and therewith no less heroic measures for securing real freedom of +election. Fourthly--the odiousness of all that bore the stamp of +the old order, even though it were sound at bottom. Fifthly--the +self-conceit of the political parties, each of which individually +represented the "will of the whole people" and was distinguished by +extreme irreconciliableness towards its antagonists. + +I might probably continue this list for a long time, but I shall pause +on one fact which has a significance which is far from being confined +to the past. The Revolution was expected, it was prepared, but _no +one_, not a single one of the political groups _had prepared itself +for it_. And the Revolution came by night, finding everyone, like the +foolish virgins in the Gospel, with lamps unlit. One cannot explain and +excuse everything by elemental forces alone. No one had troubled to +construct beforehand a general plan of the canals and sluices necessary +to prevent the inundation from becoming a flood. Not one of the leading +parties possessed a programme for the interregnum in the life of the +country, a programme which, in its character and scale, could not +correspond with normal plans of construction, either in the system of +administration or in the sphere of economic and social relations. It +would scarcely be an exaggeration to say that the only assets in the +possession of the progressive and Socialist blocks on March 27th, 1917, +were: for the former--the choice for the post of Minister-President of +Prince Lvov, for the latter--the Soviets and Order No. 1. After this +began the convulsive, unsystematic vacillation of the Government and of +the Soviet. + +It is to be regretted that this difference, which constitutes a +marked distinction between two periods--the provisional and the +constructive--two systems, two programmes, has not yet become +sufficiently clear in public consciousness. + +The whole period of the active struggle with Bolshevism passed under +the sign of the mingling of these two systems, of divergent views and +of incapacity to construct a provisional form of authority. It would +seem that now, too, the anti-Bolshevist forces, while increasing the +divergence of their views and building plans for the future, are not +preparing for the process of assuming the power after the downfall +of Bolshevism, and will again approach the task with naked hands +and wavering mind. Only now the process will be immeasurably more +difficult. For the second excuse--after "elemental forces"--for the +failure of the Revolution, or rather of its leading men--"the heritage +of the Czarist régime"--has paled very much on the background of the +sanguinary Bolshevist mist which has enveloped the land of Russia. + + * * * * * + +The new power (the Provisional Government) was faced by a question of +the first importance--the War. On its decision rested the fate of the +country. The decision in favour of continuing the alliance and the +War rested on ethical motives, which at that time did not rouse any +doubts, and on practical motives, which were in some degree disputable. +Now, even the former have been shaken, since both the Allies and the +enemy have treated the fate of Russia with cruel, cynical egotism. +Nevertheless, I have no doubt of the correctness of the decision then +taken to continue the War. Many suppositions might be made as to the +possibilities of a separate peace--whether that of Brest-Litovsk or one +less grievous for the State and for our national self-love. But it is +to be thought that such a peace in the spring of 1917 would have led +either to the dismemberment of Russia and her economic _débâcle_ (a +general peace at the expense of Russia), or to the complete victory +of the Central Powers over our Allies, which would have produced +incomparably deeper convulsions in their countries than those which +the German people are now experiencing. Both in the one case and in +the other, no objective data would be present for any change for the +better in the political, social and economic conditions of Russian life +and any turning of the Russian Revolution into other channels. Only, +besides Bolshevism, Russia would have added to her liabilities the +hatred of the defeated for many years. + +Having decided to fight, it was necessary to preserve the Army by +admitting a certain conservatism into it. Such a conservatism serves +as a guarantee for the stability of the Army and of that authority +which seeks support in it. If the participation of the Army in +historical cataclysms cannot be avoided, neither can it be turned into +an arena for political struggle, creating, instead of the principle +of service--_pretorians or opritchniks_, whether of the Czar, of the +Revolutionary Democracy, or of any party is a matter of indifference. + +The Army was broken up. + +On those principles which the Revolutionary Democracy took as a basis +for the existence of the Army, the latter could neither build nor live. +It was no mere chance that all the later attempts at armed conflict +with Bolshevism began with the organisation of an Army on the normal +principles of military administration, to which the Soviet command as +well sought to pass gradually. No elemental circumstances, no errors +on the part of military dictatorships and of the powers co-operating +with or opposing them which led to the failure of the struggle (of this +some truths will be spoken later) are able to cast this undeniable fact +into the shade. Nor is it a mere chance that the leading circles of +the Revolutionary Democracy could create no armed forces, except that +pitiful parody on them--the "National Army" on the so-called "front of +the Constituent Assembly." It was just this circumstance that led the +Russian Socialist emigrants to the theory of non-resistance, of the +negation of armed struggle, to the concentration of all their hopes +on the inner degeneration of Bolshevism and its overthrow by some +immaterial "forces of the people themselves," which, however, could +not express themselves otherwise than by blood and iron: "the great, +bloodless" Revolution is drowned in blood from its beginning to its end. + +To refuse to consider that vast question--the re-creation of a National +Army on firm principles--is not to solve it. + +What then? On the day that Bolshevism falls will peace and good-will +immediately show forth in a land corrupted by a slavery worse than +that of the Tartar yoke, saturated with dissension, revenge, hatred, +and ... an enormous quantity of arms? Or, from that day forward, will +the self-interested desires of many foreign Governments disappear, or +will they grow stronger when the menace of the moral infection of the +Soviet has vanished? Finally, even should the whole of old Europe, +morally regenerated, beat out its swords into ploughshares, is it +impossible for a new Tchingiz-Khan to come out of the depths of that +Asia which has accounts age-long and huge beyond measure, against +Europe? + +The Army will be regenerated. Of that there can be no doubt. + +Shaken in its historical foundations and traditions, like the heroes +of the Russian legends, it will stand for no short time at the +cross-roads, gazing anxiously into the misty distances, still wrapped +in the gloom before the dawn, and listening intently to the vague +sounds of the voices calling to it. And among the delusive calls it +will seek, straining its hearing to the utmost, for the real voice ... +the voice of its own people. + + + PRINTED BY THE FIELD PRESS LTD., WINDSOR HOUSE, + BREAM'S BUILDINGS, LONDON, E.C. 4. + + +FOOTNOTES: + +[1] _Barin_ is the Russian word for master. It also means gentleman, +and was used by the peasants and by servants in addressing their +superiors. + +[2] The French Deputy, Louis Martin, estimates the losses of the +Armies in killed alone as follows:--(In millions) Russia 2½, Germany +2, Austria 1½, France 1.4, Great Britain 0.8, Italy 0.6, etc. Russia's +share of the martyrdom of all the Allied forces is 40 per cent. + +[3] President of the Duma. + +[4] The Grand Duke here refers to the manifesto drafted by Witte, +granting various liberties and decreeing the convocation of the Duma. + +[5] Miliukov: _History of the Second Russian Revolution_. + +[6] Minister of War. + +[7] Chessin: _La Révolution Russe_. + +[8] Quartermaster-General of the Commander-in-Chief of All Fronts. + +[9] Chief of Staff of the Northern Front (Com.-in-Ch., General Ruzsky). + +[10] Count Fredericks, Narishkine, Ruzsky, Gutchkov, Shulgin. + +[11] Shulgin's narrative. + +[12] Prince Lvov, Miliukov, Kerensky, Nekrassov, Teresvtchenko, Godnev, +Lvov, Gutchkov, and Rodzianko. + +[13] Miliukov: _History of the Second Russian Revolution_. + +[14] The murder took place on the night of July 16th, 1918. + +[15] Much time, pains and labour were devoted to the task of collecting +information about the murdered Imperial family by General Dietrichs. + +[16] The term _Soviet_ for brevity will be used in the course of the +narrative instead of _Soviet of Workmen's and Soldiers' Delegates_. + +[17] The word _Defensists_ is used as a translation of the newly-coined +Russian word _oboronetz_, which means "He who is in favour of a +defensive war." + +[18] A "poud" is equal to 40 pounds. + +[19] Gustave Le-Bon, _The Psychology of Socialism_. + +[20] The restoration of Poland in her _ethnographic_ frontiers was +intended by Russia also. + +[21] _Mes Souvenirs de Guerre._ + +[22] These lists contained the names of those suspected of relations +with the enemy Governments. + +[23] Among the members of the Committee were, for instance, Zourabov +and Perzitch, who had served under Parvus. + +[24] It is curious that Bronstein (Trotsky)--a person sufficiently +competent in the matter of secret communications with the Staffs of our +antagonists--said in the _Izvestia_ for July 8th, 1917: "In the paper +_Nashe Slovo_ I have exposed and pilloried Skoropis-Yoltoukhovsky, +Potok and Melenevsky as agents of the Austrian General Staff." + +[25] V. chap. IV.--Of course articles 7 and 8 did not meet with the +approval of public opinion. + +[26] Generally speaking, the special services, and especially the +artillery, retained their likeness to human beings, as well as a +certain amount of discipline, much longer than the infantry. + +[27] Leonid Andreiev's article: "_To thee, Oh soldier!_" + +[28] The greatest part was played by Lieutenant-Colonels of the General +Staff, Lebedev (afterwards Chief-of-Staff to Admiral Koltchak) and +Pronin. + +[29] The President was Colonel Novosiltsev, a member of the Fourth +State Douma, a Cadet (Constitutional Democrat). + +[30] The last Charter to the Cossacks of the Don was granted on January +24, 1906, by the Emperor Nicholas II., and contained the following +words: "... We confirm all the rights and privileges granted to it (the +Cossack Army), affirming by Our Imperial word both the indefeasibility +of its present form of service, which has earned the Army of the Don +historic glory and the inviolability of all its estates and lands, +gained by the labours, merits and blood of its ancestors...." + +[31] Such was the name given to the non-Cossack immigrant element in +the territory. + +[32] With artillery to correspond. + +[33] In the territory of the Don the peasants formed 48 per cent. of +the population and the Cossacks 46 per cent. + +[34] In places, the Territorial Council of "outsiders." + +[35] In the principal territories--on the Don and on the Kouban--the +Cossacks formed about one-half of the population. + +[36] Of these phenomena I shall speak later in more detail. + +[37] The Don, the Kouban, the Terek, Astrakhan, and the mountaineers of +the Northern Caucasus. I shall speak of this later. + +[38] The third cavalry corps, in Kornilov's advance against Kerensky. + +[39] The third cavalry corps with Kerensky against the Bolsheviks. + +[40] The Ural Cossacks, until their tragic fall in the end of 1919, +knew not Bolshevism. + +[41] General Alexeiev ordered its disbandment, but Kerensky permitted +it to remain. + +[42] They were disbanded. + +[43] A Socialist-Revolutionary emigrant and an active worker in his +party. He was appointed to this post by Kerensky, at the desire of the +Kiev Council of Soldiers' Delegates. + +[44] Oberoutchev. _In the Days of the Revolution._ + +[45] Among others, my former 4th Rifle Division was subjected to +Ukrainisation. + +[46] The Ukrainian Hetman Skoropadsky was one of his ancestors. + +[47] Formerly Commander of the 38th Army Corps. + +[48] The proposal of abdication made to the Emperor Nicholas II. + +[49] Gutchkov's official letter to the President of the Government. + +[50] Colonels: Baranovsky, Yakoubovitch, Prince Toumanov, and later +Verkhovsky. + +[51] 9th July--Reply to the greeting of the Moghilev Soviet. + +[52] See his evidence before the Commission of Inquiry. + +[53] Conversation by telegraph with Colonel Bazanovsky. + +[54] Savinkov: _The Kornilov Affair_. Savinkov's expostulations +prevailed. Kornilov even consented to remove Zavoiko from the limits of +the Front, but soon recalled him. + +[55] Chief of Staff of the Army. + +[56] Free Thought. (Transl. note). + +[57] Former Editor of the _Sovremenny Mir_ (Contemporary World), +and Social-Democrat of the _Yedinstvo_ Group. In 1921 he edited the +Bolshevist newspaper in Helsingfors. + +[58] Undoubtedly better than the Committee of the Western Front. + +[59] Held on August 14th, 1917. + +[60] In August the balance of forces in the Soviet altered rapidly in +favour of the Bolsheviks, giving them a majority. + +[61] General Parsky now occupies an important post in the Soviet Army, +while General Boldyrev was subsequently Commander-in-Chief of the +Anti-Bolshevist "Front of the Constituent Assembly" on the Volga. + +[62] 21st August. + +[63] From the Chief Committee of the Union of Officers, the Military +League, the Council of the Union of Cossack Troops, the Union of the +Knights of St. George, the Conference of Public Men, etc. + +[64] Until August 27th, _i.e._, until the rupture with Kornilov, +Kerensky could not bring himself to sign the draft laws embodying the +"programme." + +[65] The 3rd Cavalry Corps was summoned to Petrograd by the Provisional +Government. + +[66] From the report of the inquiry it is seen that Savinkov, in +charge of the Ministry of War, and the head of Kerensky's secretariat, +Colonel Baranovsky, despatched to the Stavka, themselves admitted the +possibility of simultaneous action by the Soviet of Workmen's and +Soldiers' Delegates and the Bolsheviks, the former under the influence +of the publication of the "Kornilov programme," and the necessity for +ruthlessly suppressing this. (Protocol Appendix XIII. to Kornilov's +deposition.) + +[67] As we shall see later, Savinkov stated in his evidence that +he "suggested no political combinations in the name of the +Minister-President." + +[68] The "Kornilov programme" is meant here. + +[69] The Commanders-in-Chief of the other Fronts sent the Provisional +Government telegrams of a completely loyal nature on August 28th. Their +tenor is seen from the following extracts: "Northern Front--General +Klembovsky: Consider change in Supreme Command extremely dangerous +when the threat of an external enemy to the integrity of our native +land and our freedom demands the speedy adoption of measures for the +strengthening of the discipline and fighting value of our Army." +"Western Front--General Baluev: The present situation of Russia demands +the immediate adoption of exceptional measures, and the retention of +General Kornilov at the head of the Army is an imperative necessity, +no matter what the political situation." "Roumanian Front--General +Scherbachev: The dismissal of General Kornilov will infallibly have a +fatal effect on the Army and the defence of the Motherland. I appeal to +your patriotism in the name of the salvation of our native land." All +the Commanders-in-Chief mentioned the necessity for the introduction of +the measures demanded by Kornilov. + +[70] This telegram was not received at Headquarters. Kerensky gives the +episode with Lvov thus: "On August 26th General Kornilov sent to me Vv. +N. Lvov, member of the State Duma, with a demand that the Provisional +Government should cede all its military and civil authority, leaving +him to form a Government for the country in accordance with his own +personal views." + +[71] On the morning of the 29th a telegram from the Quartermaster-General +at the Stavka somehow reached us, in which again hopes of a peaceful +settlement were held out. + +[72] He went through the Kouban campaigns with the Volunteer Army and +served in it to the day of his death, from spotted typhus, in 1920. + +[73] Official communication. + +[74] The members of the Commission were: Col. Raupach and Col. +Oukraintsev, military jurists; Kolokolov, examining magistrate; and +Lieber and Krochmal, members of the Executive Committee of the Soviet +of Workmen's and Soldiers' delegates. + +[75] Shablovsky, Kolokolov, Raupach and Oukraintsev. + +[76] Shablovsky's interview in the "Retch." + +[77] On that same morning we had been taken without any escort, with +only one guard accompanying us, to the bath, about two-thirds of a mile +from the guard-house, without attracting any attention. + +[78] This gallant officer was afterwards one of the first Volunteers, +was wounded again in Kornilov's first Kouban campaign in 1918, and died +in the spring of 1919 of spotted typhus. + +[79] The Kornilov case. + + + + + * * * * * * + + + + +Transcriber's note: + + Every effort has been made to replicate this text as faithfully as + possible. + + Soviet Order Number 1 is referred to as "Order No. 1." and "Order + No. I." in the printed text: this has been standardised to "Order + No. 1." + + The original contained several unmatched double quotation marks. + It was not possible to determine where the matching double + quotation marks belonged, and none were added. + + The reference to the footnote "Miliukov: _History of the Second + Russian Revolution_" on page 54 was missing in the original. + + The following is a list of changes made to the original. + The first line is the original line, the second the corrected one. + + Shulguin and Miliukov delivered their historical speeches, was + Shulgin and Miliukov delivered their historical speeches, was + + upon which the Czarist Government could reply. Everybody considered + upon which the Czarist Government could rely. Everybody considered + + the villages. Government servants of all kinds were impoverishd + the villages. Government servants of all kinds were impoverished + + the proletariat, the troops, the bourgoisie, even the nobility ... + the proletariat, the troops, the bourgeoisie, even the nobility ... + + terrorist crimes, military mutinies and aggrarian offences, etc. + terrorist crimes, military mutinies and agrarian offences, etc. + + At Pskov, on the evening of March 1st, the Czar saw General Rusky, + At Pskov, on the evening of March 1st, the Czar saw General Ruzsky, + + On the South-Western Front Ukranian units were being formed. + On the South-Western Front Ukrainian units were being formed. + + Socialistic Dumas, closely reminiscent of semi-Boshevik Soviets. + Socialistic Dumas, closely reminiscent of semi-Bolshevik Soviets. + + Administration, on the same basis as that in the munipalities. + Administration, on the same basis as that in the municipalities. + + of agriculture, and of the economic stablity of the State. + of agriculture, and of the economic stability of the State. + + As life was destroying allusions, and the implacable law + As life was destroying illusions, and the implacable law + + new Revolutionary régime is much more expensive that the old one. + new Revolutionary régime is much more expensive than the old one. + + the Baltic Fleet was actally in a state of complete insubordination. + the Baltic Fleet was actually in a state of complete insubordination. + + and Avaresco's Army on my flank. I thus gained a + and Averesco's Army on my flank. I thus gained a + + South-Western Front, in the direction from Kamemetz-Podolsk to Lvov, + South-Western Front, in the direction from Kamenetz-Podolsk to Lvov, + + and afforded an excuse for the abitrariness and violence + and afforded an excuse for the arbitrariness and violence + + Senior Commanding Staff considered as inadmissable the democratisation + Senior Commanding Staff considered as inadmissible the democratisation + + Gutchov, his Assistants, and officers of the General Staff. + Gutchkov, his Assistants, and officers of the General Staff. + + demanded that the Regimetal Committees should be empowered + demanded that the Regimental Committees should be empowered + + of their registration in the International Control List. + of their registration in the International Control List." + + in the Secret Police and director of the pre-Revolutionary _Pravdo_ + in the Secret Police and director of the pre-Revolutionary _Pravda_ + + (the organ of the Bolshevik Social Domocrats) broke them down. + (the organ of the Bolshevik Social Democrats) broke them down. + + issuing medical certicates even to the "thoroughly fit." + issuing medical certificates even to the "thoroughly fit." + + he had sent in a request that morning for two poods of bread. + he had sent in a request that morning for two pouds of bread. + + force every citizen to do his duty honestly by the Motherland?" + force every citizen to do his duty honestly by the Motherland? + + factories, in the villages, among the Liberal _intelligentcia_, + factories, in the villages, among the Liberal _intelligencia_, + + The Don, the Kouban, the Terex, Astrakhan, and the mountaineers + The Don, the Kouban, the Terek, Astrakhan, and the mountaineers + + As soon as I give an order to some reserve regiment or other + As soon as I gave an order to some reserve regiment or other + + that "discipline of duty" should be introduced from the top." + that "discipline of duty" should be introduced from the top. + + broke our front and moved swiftly towards Kaminetz-Podolsk, + broke our front and moved swiftly towards Kamenetz-Podolsk, + + On July 9th the Austro-Germans had aready reached Mikulinze, + On July 9th the Austro-Germans had already reached Mikulinze, + + in the eyes of many people he bacame a national hero + in the eyes of many people he became a national hero + + his Chief-of-Staff General Lukomsky, Generals Alexeiev and Russky, + his Chief-of-Staff General Lukomsky, Generals Alexeiev and Ruzsky, + + manifested itself in a series of dismissal of Senior Commanders, + manifested itself in a series of dismissals of Senior Commanders, + + A silence ensued, which I intrepreted as a permission to continue. + A silence ensued, which I interpreted as a permission to continue. + + had already taken place on the 8th of July, at Kamenets-Podolsk. + had already taken place on the 8th of July, at Kamenetz-Podolsk. + + was subordinated, not to the Stavka, but to the Minister of War, + was subordinated, not to the Stavka, but to the Minister of War. + + the Petrograd garrison, the depôt ballations of which it was proposed + the Petrograd garrison, the depôt battalions of which it was proposed + + Honest and dishonest, sincere and insincere, politicans, soldiers + Honest and dishonest, sincere and insincere, politicians, soldiers + + Even when the Plekhanov, the old leader of the Social-Democrats, + Even when Plekhanov, the old leader of the Social-Democrats, + + Kornilov, Loukomsky, Romanovsky, and others were taken off + Kornilov, Lukomsky, Romanovsky, and others were taken off + + isolation of the frontal region wtih respect to Kiev and Zhitomir. + isolation of the frontal region with respect to Kiev and Zhitomir. + + in the shortest possible time, and by Revolutionary Court-Martial." + in the shortest possible time, and by Revolutionary Court-Martial. + + through its representatives in the Consituent Assembly of 1918: + through its representatives in the Constituent Assembly of 1918: + + [12] Prince Lvov, Miliukov, Kerensky, Nekrasso, Teresvtchenko, + [12] Prince Lvov, Miliukov, Kerensky, Nekrassov, Teresvtchenko, + + [57] Former Editor of the _Souvremenny Mir_ (Contemporary World), + [57] Former Editor of the _Sovremenny Mir_ (Contemporary World), + +*** END OF THE PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK 43680 *** |