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diff --git a/43405-0.txt b/43405-0.txt new file mode 100644 index 0000000..1fb44d0 --- /dev/null +++ b/43405-0.txt @@ -0,0 +1,2078 @@ +*** START OF THE PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK 43405 *** + +By RUDOLF EUCKEN + +Senior Professor of Philosophy in the University of Jena + +The Truth of Religion +The Life of the Spirit +Religion and Life +Ethics and Modern Thought + + * * * * * + +Ethics and Modern Thought + +A Theory of Their Relations + +The Deem Lectures + +Delivered in 1913 at New York University + +By +Rudolf Eucken +Professor of Philosophy, University of Jena + +Translated from the German Manuscript by +Margaret von Seydewitz + +G. P. Putnam's Sons +New York and London +The Knickerbocker Press +1913 + + +COPYRIGHT, 1913 +BY +RUDOLF EUCKEN + + +The Knickerbocker Press, New York + + + + +PREFACE + + +These lectures, delivered at New York University from February 20th till +March 1, 1913, appeal less to students and philosophers than to the +cultured public at large. I take this opportunity of expressing my +sincere gratitude to the New York University, and especially to +Chancellor Elmer E. Brown, for all the kindness and interest shown to me +during my stay in New York. + + +RUDOLF EUCKEN. + +JENA, June, 1913. + + + + +CONTENTS + + PAGE + I. THE ETHICAL PROBLEM IN THE PRESENT TIME 1 + + II. THE ETHICAL PRINCIPLE 23 + +III. A DEFENCE OF THE ETHICAL PRINCIPLE 43 + + IV. EVOLUTION OF THE ETHICAL PRINCIPLE 63 + + V. MORALITY AND RELIGION 87 + + VI. THE PRESENT STATUS OF MORALITY 107 + + + + +I + +THE ETHICAL PROBLEM IN THE PRESENT TIME + + +In former times, nothing seemed more plausible and more certain than +morality. It was a tower of strength, where men sought refuge in the +midst of all the doubts and conflicts of life. This was especially the +case during the Age of Enlightenment. Men were beginning to believe less +absolutely in the religion handed down to them, but they clung all the +more to morality. Metaphysical speculation and theoretical endeavours to +reveal the innermost essence of things encountered growing opposition, +yet morality was welcomed as something superior to all complications, +and valuable to all. It was held to be the pivot of Archimedes, which +gives stability to the whole of life. + +In our days morality has ceased to be a matter of such unquestionable +certainty, and has been drawn into the wave of disintegration which is +passing over our minds. Formerly the scientific definition and accurate +conception of morality were matters of contention; but it is now the +fundamental idea of morality that is questioned. Many of our +contemporaries are of opinion that the revelations of modern science and +the claims of modern life have destroyed the foundations of morality and +made it untenable in the old sense. Morality in the old sense demands +dissociation of our aspirations from our own personal interest, and +devotion to something that is esteemed higher; whenever an action that +appears good is seen to proceed from selfish motives, it can no longer +claim any moral value. There is a widespread tendency in modern life, to +question the possibility of such detachment from the _Ego_, and to +acknowledge the coercion exercised over man by his instinct of +self-preservation. Emancipation from this restraint is not even +considered desirable, for constant strife and competition seem +necessary to life and progress, and a softening of this strife would +inevitably reduce the energy of life. + +Morality further demands independence and spontaneity of action. An +action performed under the pressure of external coercion or mechanical +habit, loses immediately its moral character. Now such independence and +spontaneity are not possible apart from some kind of free choice, yet +this would contradict the law of causality, which in the present age is +generally considered to rule the whole of reality. In man's soul, the +supremacy of this law of causality is strengthened by our growing +insight into the power of heredity and of social environment. Yet +morality in the old sense stands and falls with man's power of +spontaneous and independent decision. + +It is difficult also for morality to retain in modern life the position +and estimation it formerly enjoyed. It used to be invested with unique +significance, and placed high above all other manifestations of the +inner life. This conviction found its strongest expression at times of +great historical import. We all remember the words of Jesus: "What shall +it profit a man, if he shall gain the whole world, and lose his own +soul?" The same conviction is expressed in philosophical language by the +greatest antique philosopher and the greatest modern philosopher: Plato +and Kant. Plato says: "All the gold on the earth and under the earth is +less precious than virtue." Kant says: "If righteousness should perish, +it would not be worth while for men to inhabit the earth." + +But this conviction of the absolute supremacy of the moral task requires +an inner gradation of life, for which modern conditions offer no scope. +For modern life subordinates all aspiration and endeavour to the aim of +enhancing the process of life. Every action is valued as a means to this +end; and morality could only hold its own as an instrument of human +welfare. But such degradation of morality would mean annihilation of +morality. The present time is not entirely dominated by such a movement +against morality, only a few currents of thought are so absolute in +their negation of ethical claims. But these currents could never have +attained the strength and expansion they undoubtedly exhibit, if in our +day morality were more securely established and more distinctly +formulated. It is the want of union in moral ideals (never before so +strongly marked) which gives added power to the enemies of morality. + + +There are to-day no less than four kinds of morality, often crossing and +opposing each other, which claim men's allegiance. These are: + +Religious Morality, + +The Morality of Reason or of immanent idealism, + +The Morality of Work, + +Social Morality. + +Religious Morality and the Morality of Reason have come down to us from +past ages, and grow out of an inner world of thought. The Morality of +Work and Social Morality are specific results of the present time, +growing out of work in a visible world of realities. The two older forms +of morality form an antithesis to the two newer forms, as will hereafter +be seen. + +The most effectual kind of morality is still the religious one--for us, +the morality associated with Christianity, the religion of ethical +redemption. Christianity, which is founded on a holy will superior to +the world, exalts moral action far above arbitrary human choice and +human aim. It completely severs moral action from all natural +inclination, dissociates it from all external performance, and gives it +a purely spiritual character. It supplies a most powerful impulse to +action, by connecting man's destiny with his attitude to his moral +obligations. The awakening and ennobling power inherent in Christianity +was not confined to individuals, but was embodied in a large section of +the human race, creating a spiritual atmosphere which still acts +powerfully on individual souls, even if they themselves are not +conscious of it. Religious morality still continues to influence us in +this way. All other kinds of morality could not be as effectual as they +are, were they not constantly supplemented and deepened by religious +morality. + +And yet we cannot ignore the fact that in our day the supremacy of +religious morality is often contested. The world of religion no longer +encompasses man as a matter of course, and this also weakens its moral +influence. At the same time many objections are raised against the +nature and demands of religious morality. Owing to the closer connection +between man's endeavour and his environment and to the accentuation of +the struggle for existence, this kind of morality appears too mild, too +soft, too subjective, and there is often a desire for a sterner and more +virile kind. Religious ethics do not seem to have sufficient latitude to +transform the whole of life. We can therefore understand the widespread +desire for something which can sufficiently supplement religious ethics. + +At all periods of higher civilisation, religious morality has been +supplemented and completed by the morality of reason, which was +developed above all by the philosophers, from the Stoics down to Kant +and Fichte. Here morality does not proceed from a superior and divine +will, but from man's own reasonable nature. This nature seems to demand +recognition of a universal law, and voluntary submission to it; only +then does man bring his own being to perfection. The morality arising +herefrom is strong and manly; it incites man to a proud independence of +spirit, and exalts him far above everyday life. To this morality of +reason we owe the scientific development of the moral world of thought, +and the distinct formulation of conceptions like Duty and Conscience. By +means of such conceptions, the morality of reason also influences our +own time, without however taking the lead, as it did during the Age of +Enlightenment. The idea of reason as the sure foundation of our +spiritual life is no longer universally accepted, and has little +influence on the man of to-day. He is too fully conscious of his +subordination to the world of sense, of which he is a member, to be able +to enfranchise himself completely from it, and to assert his own +superior power. The rationalistic conception of life reckons with +strong, self-centred personalities, who, as we know, do not abound in +our time. + +Morality could not be in close touch with the movements and problems of +the present day, if--either as religious or as rational morality--it +were inseparable from belief in an invisible world. But the latest +development of life supplies morality with valuable motives derived from +the visible world, and even creates new specific forms of morality. On +the one hand, the impulse comes from modern work; on the other hand, +from modern society. In both cases, we have forces that were always at +work, but that gain considerable significance from the conditions of +modern life. + +All really earnest work is directed towards some object which it seeks +to penetrate; it impels us to value the object for its own sake, and to +treat it according to its own requirements. Man is thus exalted above +his own personal opinion and inclination. Only in modern times has work +reached its full development as a factor of education and of moral +culture. For work has now become more and more independent of separate +individuals; it is becoming a concern common to all mankind, and it +forms its own great complexes. Such a complex is modern science. It is +no longer dependent on individuals, but has formed a fabric of its own. +In accordance with the development it has attained, science dictates to +individuals the channels and methods of their work, presents problems to +be solved, and indicates the means of their solution. The individual +works in vain, if he detaches himself from the movement of the whole. +His enrolment in the movement of the whole imparts to life a distinctly +ethical character. For the individual must subordinate himself +completely to the demands of the whole; he must repress everything +bearing upon his own will and desire; he must feel that his own efforts +are part of the great sum of human endeavour, the promotion of which +must be his highest satisfaction. Single workers come and go, but +through the work of generations the proud edifice of science is ever +growing. As Bacon says: "_Multi pertransibunt et augebitur scientia_." +(Many will pass by, and science will grow.) + +What applies to science is equally true of the other provinces of life. +In modern times, mighty complexes are everywhere springing up, which +encompass individuals with their superior power. We see this above all +in technical and industrial work, but also in state organisation, in +education with its schools and so forth. All these finally unite in the +comprehensive conception of civilisation and culture,--in the idea of +man's supremacy over the world by means of his work. + +It is evident that a strong moral force is here engendered. Without +this ethical factor, without a constant enrolment and subordination, +modern civilisation could never have reached its present development. +Yet we cannot deny that this morality of work has inner limitations. The +technical side of work does indeed repress and even destroy all +individual will; but it is an open question in what temper the work is +done, whether from love to the work or from petty and selfish motives. +It is quite possible for a petty and narrow frame of mind to be +accompanied by the greatest technical skill. Further work spurs on +towards achievement, and the worker is judged by what he achieves. What +becomes of his inner life, of his whole personality, is a matter of +indifference. Here we are only parts of a structure, and are nothing at +all in ourselves. This must become so more and more in proportion as +work is specialised, and vitalises an ever smaller part of the +individual's powers. Moreover the union of men which in this direction +takes place, is only confined to their common work. However closely +connected they may be through their work, their individual principles +and convictions can be very different, if not absolutely hostile. It is, +in our day, above all, the social problem, which divides men into +hostile factions. In one special direction--that of work--there is an +ethical development of life; but we cannot base on it an inner entity of +right and humanity. The morality thus developed is cold and impersonal; +it lacks inner warmth, and cannot appeal to the whole personality. + +In this respect, social morality is infinitely superior to the morality +of work. For social morality proceeds from the immediate relation of man +to man. Here also, something old and familiar acquires a new form and +stronger influence. It was an old conviction that man could only develop +in connection with his fellow-men, towards whom his activity was mainly +directed. But what has re-cast the idea of society in a new mould, is +the modern doctrine that men are not united by their common relation to +an invisible world--ruled either by a Divine Being or by an +all-pervading Reason--but by their actual living together in the realm +of experience. This modern doctrine points out that individuals not only +meet during the course of their life, but that they are interdependent +from the very beginning,--that union and life with others is a +fundamental necessity for every human being. In developing this idea, +modern sociology shows, by means of innumerable statistics, how the +nature and welfare of the individual depends upon the condition of the +whole. It tries to prove that all progress--even for the individual--is +inseparable from the amelioration of the community at large; such +amelioration therefore becomes the main object of endeavour. Modern +sociology at the same time advocates the idea of a common +responsibility, a solidarity of all human life and action. Strong +motives are thus offered to the individual to direct his activity, +beyond his own personal interest, towards the welfare of all, and to +find in work for the welfare of others--in "altruistic" action--the +highest value of life. + +The "social" ethics thus developed are further enhanced by the growing +conviction that the traditional form of life in the community is +capable--nay needful--of fundamental changes. Formerly the structure of +society was above all aristocratic in character. The conduct of life was +in the hands of a small minority. They alone acquired full development +of all their powers and full possession of earthly goods, which the rest +could only enjoy in part and through the agency of the favoured few. +This division of mankind appeared to be too firmly established by the +divine will or by a mysterious destiny for human endeavour to try and +alter it. The modern man, in the consciousness of his power, by no means +considers these things incapable of change. For him, it is a sublime +task to suppress such distinctions, and to let "all that bears human +features" (Fichte) participate in the work and enjoyment of life. + +We can here discuss neither the possibility of solving this problem in +all its bearings, nor the complications resulting therefrom. But we +cannot deny the strong ethical stimulus of such a movement. It has +resulted in an eager desire to strengthen the weak, to raise aspiring +spirits, to oppose injustice, to eradicate suffering as far as possible, +and to increase the enjoyment of life. In all this, there is much warmth +and vigour, a strong feeling of responsibility, and recognition of the +rights of others. No other ethical force so strongly influences the men +of to-day, as the social idea; we see this in legislation, in education, +in every relation of man to man. This idea counteracts egoism, and +produces such a wealth of humane action, as was hardly ever witnessed at +any period of the world's history. + +But even here, in spite of so much that is admirable, inner limitations +are evident. Life and morality are concentrated on activity for others. +But this activity is more for man's external welfare than for that of +his soul,--more for the conditions of life than for life itself. Inner +problems find too often only a secondary consideration and the +personality as a whole is apt to be neglected. This morality of social +activity believes in the existence of goodwill and its growth by means +of external activity, and takes human virtue for granted. But it has +nothing to offer that could allay the inner conflicts, or could overcome +the dark, wild, and passionate element in man's soul. Nor does this kind +of morality sufficiently realise what complications and passions are +inseparable from life in the community: the strife for power and +supremacy, the vanity and unreality which arise and rapidly spread among +its members. Social morality shows a very optimistic conception of man, +which is often contradicted by experience. However great therefore the +merits of social morality may be in one special direction, it takes up +the problem too superficially, and offers no firm foundation for +morality, which it presupposes rather than creates. + +Morality to-day thus appears to be accompanied by much confusion and +many complications. There is no lack of separate developments, but these +cross and oppose each other. What one kind of morality takes to be its +chief source of strength, appears to another to be mere weakness. The +inner and spiritual character of the older forms is condemned by the +younger forms as a subjective illusion, while the unremitting activity +of the latter seem to their opponents to be an exclusive concentration +on external work. Life as a whole has become uncertain to us in its +deepest aspects; and we are no longer satisfied with the moral impulses +coming from the life around us. We hesitate between absolutely different +kinds of morality, which can only fully develop their individual +characteristics by injuring one another; this must inevitably weaken the +influence of morality on the whole of life. At the same time, movements +hostile to morality encounter less opposition, and gain ground in spite +of their inherent superficiality. Morality, once an undoubted +possession of mankind, has thus come to be a difficult problem; instead +of ruling over man from the height of its superiority, it seems now to +depend on his opinion and choice. + +The condition of things resulting herefrom is becoming more and more +unendurable. If morality is weakened, then life is robbed of a strong +impulse, an ennobling power, and a dominant aim; it is in danger of +inner insignificance and disintegration. The salt of life is then +lacking, which alone can keep it fresh and healthy, and with all its +outer brilliancy, it is threatened with inner decay. If we are to resist +this danger with all our might, then science must help to overcome the +uncertainty and want of concentration so characteristic of our time, and +to gain full recognition of morality as a whole. To do this, it is above +all necessary to find some point of view whence we can successfully +combat this disintegration. + +We shall therefore have to consider first of all how such a point of +view may be attained. + + + + +II + +THE ETHICAL PRINCIPLE + + +The intricate situation of to-day necessarily incites us to reflection. +We must consider our life as a whole; we must ask ourselves whether +human existence comprises various kinds and gradations of life, and +whether a task thus arises which embraces all man's endeavour. There can +be no doubt that human life is not confined to one single plane,--that +all variety of endeavour does not easily unite to form a definite +entity, but that heterogeneous elements meet and mingle in man. + +Man at first appears to be part of nature, of the world of sense, +subject to its laws and impulses. Dim and unreasonable instincts pervade +man's soul with compelling force. Our conceptions grow out of sense +impressions, and form at first the purely mechanical concatenation +which we term "association," while all our efforts are directed towards +individual self-preservation. In all this, man is entirely within the +limitations of nature. Yet though this natural life at first +predominates, it does not represent the whole of our life. We become +aware of new features, which we characterise as "spiritual." We see how +man grows independent of his environment, and strives to subdue it from +without and within. By thought he frees himself from the shackles of his +environment, and asserts himself against the whole world; at the same +time he is driven back to the world, and feels impelled to fathom it and +to make it his own by personal experience. His actions do not always +remain a mere part of nature's concatenations. He can detach himself +from all cohesion. In unbridled egoism he can subordinate every event +and action to his own well-being; or he can absorb into himself all that +at first existed beside him and apart from him, and that often appeared +hostile, and can thus manifest boundless love and sympathy. His natural +instinct of self-preservation will then appear too small and +insignificant; he can even come to feel its narrow restrictions as +intolerable. + +If we pass from the individual to the whole of mankind, we see in +civilisation and culture a new form of life opposed to mere nature. For +man is no longer swayed and ruled by what assails him from without, but +he confronts it with new aims and ideals. He judges and weighs; he +approves and rejects; he forms new complexes, like those of state +organisation and of science. In all this, man is the representative of a +new and specific kind of life; he manifests an independence unknown to +nature. + +This new life differs from nature and from what may be attained on the +basis of nature, not only in single characteristics, but in all its +manifestations and even in its fundamental essence. Nature forms a +tissue of separate elements, which come into reciprocal action but lack +all inner cohesion. Great complexes are thus formed, but no combination +amounts to real cohesion: there is no inner whole, and no life +proceeding from such an inner entity. + +All life grows out of contact with the environment; therefore +intellectual participation is indissolubly bound to the world of sense. +In this life of nature, the intellect can create no conceptions +independent of sense impressions, and action cannot free itself from the +power of natural impulse. All inner values can here be nothing more than +an accessory and reminiscence of what reaches us from without. + +We see something essentially different, wherever spiritual life +develops. Here life is not decomposed into a multitude of separate +particles, but inner cohesions are formed, which embrace and dominate +all achievement of individual beings. This is especially the case when +human thought aspires towards Truth. Every individual has his own sum of +conceptions and his own special associations; but he does not possess a +truth of his own. All search for truth is based on the conviction that +something must be acquired which is common to all men, and which +embraces and governs them all. Aspiration thus extends far beyond +separate individuals. We have here not a disconnected mass of assertion +and dogma; all is gathered into a well ordered cohesion, and all +separate efforts result in progression to the whole. Every kind of +intellectual endeavour presents a similar situation. Thus the Good and +the Beautiful are not values confined to single individuals; every man +striving after them, only contributes towards the sum of common +endeavour, and what he wins for himself is at the same time a gain for +all. Aspiration is not confined to a limited number of separate results, +but the manifestation of a great whole is sought for: a comprehensive +realm of the good and the beautiful. + +Once the mind is thus concentrated on the whole, greater spiritual +independence inevitably ensues. For it is necessary to rise above the +sense impression and constantly to assert the autonomy of the soul, if +aspiration from the whole and to the whole is to be successfully +developed. From being a mere accessory, the soul now becomes in all +respects a source of independent life. In science ideas gain a +significance of their own, apart from the impressions of sense; they +develop their own laws, and react with transforming power on what they +have absorbed, as we see in the case of mathematics. Our own mind +supplies the forms in which we shape our world. Feeling also frees +itself from sense impressions. Sense enjoyment no longer suffices for +man's happiness. His relation to other human beings does not remain +confined to external contact; pity and love can embrace the whole of +mankind, as is proved by the great religions. We can no longer doubt +man's capacity of aspiring to values far beyond external possessions; +and his inner life, the development of his own individual personality +may become a matter of paramount importance to him. + +But this inner life, with all its distinct manifestations, can cope +successfully with the outer world and its forcible inroads, only by +developing an inner realm which it extends to an independent world of +its own. This does in reality take place. What was at first beside us +and apart from us, can be transferred to the soul without merging into +it. The antithesis between internal and external values, which at first +seemed to disintegrate life, can be overcome, if spiritual endeavour +absorbs the object and brings it into reciprocal action with spiritual +forces. Where spiritual development is at its highest, life does not +fluctuate between the subjective and objective, but unites both in +itself, brings them into reciprocal action, and develops one by means of +the other. Such a triumph over antitheses is to be seen most clearly in +the province of art. Art is not merely capable of copying external +objects as exactly as possible, or of rendering with the greatest +possible truth the feeling of the individual: really great art must +embrace both factors and blend them to a perfect unity. This is how a +real work of art is created, which then gives to life an inner expansion +and a new reality. + +As in art, so also in the other provinces human life. In the mutual +relation of man to man, the spiritual phase by no means does away with +all distinctions, but it exalts us above them, and embraces them all +from a higher point of view. Individuals are not to be merged in a hazy +and colourless whole, but in rising towards a higher life an inner +communion becomes possible, within which even what is alien becomes to a +certain extent our own. This enables men to understand each other, to +put themselves in the place of one another, to find themselves in +others. Man acquires in such communion a vaster self, which is not +dependent on one tiny atom, but has a whole world of its own. + +If scientific research is not to degenerate into barren scepticism, it +must also overcome the antithesis of the subjective and the objective. +To do this, it assimilates external objects by means of thought, and +strives to embrace at the same time both the inner man and the outer +world, developing one by means of the other. + +We observe everywhere this tendency to subject everything to the +operation of spiritual forces--to create and develop an inner world. +Here all problems are confined to life itself, which is no longer +concerned with extraneous matters, but with itself alone. In this inner +world, life develops in its own way; it finds its aims and ideals in +itself, in its own perfection, in its complete triumph over the +antitheses it embraces. + +How are we to interpret this new life and its origin? It cannot have +proceeded from that nature inferior to man, from which it differs even +in its most elementary fundamental forms. It cannot be a creation of man +alone, in whom--as experience proves--it is far too weak, too much +alloyed with lower and sensual elements, for a new gradation of life to +originate in him. Nothing therefore remains but to recognise in this +inward tendency a movement of the universe--a movement in which man is +privileged to participate, but which he could never engender from out of +his own nature. The recognition of such a movement completely changes +the aspect of reality. The universe now seems to embrace two planes, and +to be rising--at least as far as humanity is concerned--from one plane +to the other. A new light is cast on reality, which ceases to be a +collection of separate and non-cohesive elements, and becomes capable of +comprehensive operation and of self-concentration. We realise that what +at first appeared to be the whole of reality was only its outer aspect, +which is supplemented by the new depth revealed to us. It is only the +development of these depths that gives life its real significance; +values come into existence which lie beyond the natural instinct of +self-preservation--such values as the good, the true, and the beautiful. + +Let us now see how this order of things strikes and influences man. The +new phase of life at first appears--in man--only in a few individual +operations, while his life and aspiration are still mainly determined by +nature and natural self-preservation. A certain spirituality does indeed +appear wherever there is human life, yet only as something subordinate, +as an accessory to another kind of life, but without the autonomy +necessary to a comprehensive and self-centred whole, which could develop +its own specific character. If man is to participate in the movement of +the universe and bring the spiritual into full operation in himself, +this autonomy of the spiritual life is of paramount importance. It can +only develop where a movement reaches man from the universe, embraces +him, and determines his further course. But, at the same time, man must +recognise and seize this impulse, thus taking possession of this new +life. We have seen that what used to be considered of secondary +importance, is now of paramount value. This requires a reversion of the +original order of things, a readjustment of the values of life. We have +not to realise any new achievement within a given sphere of activity, or +to further develop existing conditions; we have to acquire an +essentially new life. + +The requirements thus formulated lead to a system of ethics. Its +fundamental doctrine is man's power to rise by free action to the higher +plane of cosmic life, and to develop it with all the strength of his +soul. We have shown that the new object of our endeavour is not +something unfamiliar that suddenly invades our consciousness. For it is +the working within us of some spiritual force, that exalts us above the +animal world to the status of human beings. But the spiritual life +undergoes an essential change, as soon as it acquires autonomy within +us. As long as it was held to be of secondary importance, it was chiefly +appreciated as a means towards human ends: spiritual forces were to give +us more power over external realities, and fuller enjoyment of life, +but we did not penetrate into the life of the spirit and there find a +new world. If we do this in accordance with the transformation of life +we have been considering, great results will soon appear. In science and +art, as well as in law and morality, our efforts will be accompanied by +such strength, devotion, and gladness as we never before experienced. We +shall operate with the laws and powers inherent in the things +themselves; we shall become indifferent to outer profit and success, and +shall find full satisfaction in the manifestation of genuine spiritual +life, in spite of the trials and difficulties it may offer. If the +spiritual life can thus grow towards perfection, undisturbed by human +aims, it will manifest all its values in rich and pure abundance; it +will reveal a new world, and will open up a new depth of reality. We +thus take possession of a world which exalts us far above all petty +human considerations, yet which is not alien and unfamiliar to us, but +is essentially our own life and being. + +With autonomy, the spiritual life also gains more unity. As at first +manifested in human life, it is divided into a variety of separate +branches--such as art, science, law, technical knowledge--which lack all +inner cohesion and mutual understanding. If the autonomy of the +spiritual life reveals a new phase of reality, it must also form a +comprehensive whole, of which all the separate provinces are but the +various manifestations. They themselves now appear in a new light, and +every province must determine its position and significance in the +whole, and must submit to the operation of the forces proceeding from +the whole. This will give more depth and more soul to the activity in +each separate province, while all will seek to come into closer touch +and to supplement one another. + + +All this implies a great task for man. He is an imperfect and unfinished +being, full of contradictions. He has to seek and achieve genuine life; +he must penetrate from the sphere of effects to that of their causes; +he must recognise the great cosmic movement as a personal concern of his +own, and must thus give meaning and value to his life and aspiration. + +We have here a matter of vast import. Not only must the new world be +recognised and taken possession of by the individual, but a new order of +things, valid for all humanity, must be created and triumphantly +asserted against an entirely different order of things. Instead of the +mere juxtaposition which the world of sense at first presents to us, we +must establish inner cohesion in society and history. The efforts of all +humanity must supplement the visible world, to which we remain bound, by +an invisible one, and must make of this invisible world the chief seat +of human life. While time is forever flowing onward, permanent truths +and values of life must be found, which can sustain from within all +aspiration and endeavour. We human beings must realise a higher life +within given natural conditions; and to do this, we have first to +create and establish a new order of things within our own sphere of +existence. This transforms our life into a never ending task, but also +imparts to it an incomparable greatness. While thus striving forward, +the individual must first of all submerge himself in the new world as a +whole, until he finds there his true life, his real and higher self. A +complete negation of the little _Ego_ and emancipation from it are +requisite. This does not mean that the individual is to disappear and be +absorbed by the infinite. The infinite becomes a living present at this +special point, and the individual must take possession of it and assert +it. He must also promote the forward movement of life, and must enrich +reality by the culture of a spiritual individuality, very different from +the one nature has given him. This spiritual individuality can only +develop on the basis of the spiritual life, from which it takes its aims +and standards; and it must always be in harmony with the movement of the +whole. + +It is evident that all these factors have laid the foundations for a +system of ethics. As we have seen, life as a whole challenges man to a +great change, to a decision, an action, but also to unremitting work for +the establishment of a new order of things. That which gives us human +beings our pre-eminence and constitutes our innermost essence is not to +be gained without our own efforts, and pervades our life as a continuous +task. We may call the morality arising thence the Ethics of the +Spiritual Life, for the centre of life and its ruling motive lie in +man's relation to a superior spiritual life, which is at the root of his +own being and yet has to be acquired by his own action and effort. +Morality represents the principles underlying this great change. +Morality grasps the question as a whole. Morality elucidates the fact +that all the variety of work is dominated by strife for a spiritual +self, a strife which can only be successful if the original situation is +reversed. + +We must now try to determine more closely what form these ethics are to +take, and whether they are able to overcome the objections which +confront every kind of morality. + + + + +III + +A DEFENCE OF THE ETHICAL PRINCIPLE + + +Before we proceed further in the direction indicated, we must see +whether our own convictions are capable of overcoming the opposition and +impediments to morality, presented by widespread currents of +contemporary thought. Were we unable to overcome them, then all further +advance would be stamped by inner uncertainty. + +The first objection was, that all human action must tend to the +preservation and advancement of the performer, so that action apart from +self-interest, as required by morality, is impossible. We are told that +man cannot be inspired and moved to action by any aim outside his own +personality, and that even where this appears to be the case, closer +examination reveals some hidden motive of self-interest. This was the +doctrine of Spinoza and is now a widespread conviction. There is +undoubtedly some truth in the fundamental idea, but it is by no means +certain that this truth is rightly applied. It is true that all +endeavour must start from the life and being of a man and reflect back +on him. Something absolutely alien would necessarily leave us cold and +indifferent; by his action man must in some way grow and gain and assert +his own inner self. + +But we must ask ourselves whether the natural Ego, to which the opponent +of morality binds all human action, represents the whole of man's life, +and whether all endeavour is obliged to serve the interests of natural +self-preservation. If a man recognises any kind of spiritual activity in +its specific working, he will reject such limitation; and the more he +sees in the spiritual life a new and independent phase of reality, the +more decisively will he declare that a real self is not contained in the +natural Ego, but must first be acquired by means of the spiritual life. +In spite of all the subjective force and passion displayed in the +self-preservation of the natural Ego, this Ego and its life are without +inner significance: it plans and acts, without being absorbed and +illuminated by an inner force; it remains alien and dense. + +On the spiritual plane, on the other hand, man acquires an +individuality, and is able to embrace a whole of reality, into the life +of which he submerges himself; and in developing this life, he is able +to find full satisfaction and joy. The spiritual life does indeed demand +repression, subjection, and even sacrifice of the little Ego; yet the +experience of humanity clearly proves that life thereby suffers neither +degradation nor disintegration, but rather, that it is thus strengthened +and regenerated. Life is certainly not weakened or extinguished in the +efforts to gain truth and beauty, in the activity of the scholar and the +artist, in social and philanthropic work. By enfranchisement from the +little Ego, life has gained in expansion and strength. Man is conscious +of finding his real self and of developing his innermost being in such +work, not of promoting ends outside himself. All deeper religions and +systems of philosophy have in common this requirement that man should +give up his little Ego, and they promise that from this renunciation a +new life shall be born, which is of infinitely greater meaning and value +than the old life. The movement towards spirituality is not a mere +negation, but leads to an assertion founded on the basis of negation. +Once man has found the right plane of life, and has acquired a new +individuality, the gulf between man and the universe is bridged over. +Man can then come into inner relation with reality, and can take +possession of the infinite. This is the meaning of Goethe's lines: + + + Und so lang du dies nicht hast, + Dieses "Stirb und Werde!" + Bist du nur ein trüber Gast + Auf der dunklen Erde. + + (Till thou hearest the behest + Saying: "Death is Birth!" + Thou art but a dreary guest + On the gloomy earth.) + + +If this is the case, then all spiritual work contributes to the +development of a new, real self; then no blame can be attached to +morality for advocating the absolute necessity of this change, and for +recognising, in all ramifications of work, the one great task of +developing a new human individuality. Morality will not thereby weaken +and suppress the impulse of life, but will direct it into the right +channel and ennoble it. By treating man's task as a harmonious +whole--which at the same time forms part of the one great entity--it +will act as a stimulus on all the separate provinces of life. The +gravity of this ethical task is heightened by the fact, that we must +pass through a negative stage in order to reach one of positive +affirmation, and that all action which denies or obscures such negation, +remains one-sided and imperfect. + +Closely allied to this first objection to morality is the second: the +assertion of the Determinists that human action is but part of an +immutable concatenation, and that the decision of the moment arises, +with inevitable necessity, from what is and what has been. This is an +old assertion, reaching back to the latter days of antiquity. It has +frequently aroused men to passion in the domain of religion. It +permeates modern philosophy, and has found classical expression in the +doctrine of Spinoza. In our day, it is often confirmed by a more careful +study of the universe. Favourable to Determinism is also our modern +insight into such forces as heredity and social environment, and our +greater knowledge of psychology. Everywhere the single atom appears as +the result of some cohesion, of which it at the same time forms part. +Closer observation only accentuates such dependence; we can no longer +consider a separate atom or moment as something absolutely self-centred, +nor can we interpret any action as really taking place suddenly. There +exists, without doubt, more cohesion and more subordination than was +formerly believed, or is often accepted even now. + +However legitimate these considerations may be, it does not follow that +they exhaust all the possibilities offered by reality. If we declare +that man is completely absorbed in such concatenation, we must assume +what is by no means unassailable: that man is simply part of a given +order of things, of a natural mechanism, of a network of causality. Were +he in reality no more than this, there would be no possibility of his +own decision, no freedom of action, and consequently no morality. This +would destroy, not morality alone, but much that its opponents could not +well give up. If our life were merely part of a natural mechanism, it +would necessarily cease to be our own life; it would be only a process +realised in us without our co-operation, and our attitude to it would +resemble our attitude to our bodily functions. It is difficult to see +how we could then be made responsible by society, or how we could +ourselves feel any responsibility,--how such conceptions as those of +good and evil could come into existence and engross our attention. +Neither would there be any real present, for if there is no demand for +decision, and no room for original action, all action would, with +inevitable necessity, grow out of the past, like a flower out of its +bud, without our co-operation. + +We might be able to endure such determination of our life for all time, +if the various movements could easily meet and mingle in our soul, +without any complications. But if our life contains great problems, +grave conflicts, various and often opposed planes, then we human beings, +did we submit passively and unresistingly, would be chained like +Prometheus to a pitiless rock. Determinism, if followed to its logical +conclusion, is nothing less than inner annihilation of life. + +Such recognition necessarily brings us to the question whether the +hypothesis held by the Determinists is unassailable. Do we really +appertain absolutely to a given and distinctly limited existence? From +the point of view of a new plane of reality manifested by the spiritual +life, our reply must be a decided negative. As we have seen, this new +phase does not embrace us from the beginning, but must be grasped, +appropriated, and developed by us; our own decision and action are here +indispensable. Our life must indeed reckon with certain given factors; +we must recognise the powerful influence of heredity and environment. +Our individuality is determined for us by nature; we cannot in all +things remould ourselves as we would wish to do; we are on all sides +encompassed by fate. But man is not entirely at the mercy of this fate. +The spiritual life which can grow up in him gives him a new, spontaneous +source of life; he can originate something new, something entirely his +own, and can oppose his own action to fate. + +Our life thus becomes a struggle between freedom and fate; and to this +struggle it chiefly owes its expansion and greatness. The idea of +development is therefore not applicable to the progression of human +life. There is no inevitable sequence on a well established basis and in +one definite direction; later results are not simply determined by what +has gone before; one thing does not follow another naturally and easily, +but various elements meet and clash. Time after time, we are in danger +of losing what we seemed to have won; over and over again, we must climb +to the summit of life. But this struggle constantly calls forth new +powers. We see that there is much more in us than appeared at first +sight, or than we ourselves were wont to believe. Great shocks and +strong emotions often produce new convictions or set free new forces +within us. It is, above all, suffering which rouses and regenerates, +which teaches us to see and cultivate the deepest that is in us. What +hitherto seemed to constitute our whole being, now proves to be but a +single stratum, which it is quite possible to transcend. + +The real man is only a part, a section of the possible man. The +possibilities dormant in us are an integral part of our being; and these +possibilities enable us to attain something higher and greater. On this +power of inner growth rests the confidence of those who, while +recognising the evils of this life, fight bravely and hopefully on the +side of progress. The statesman wishing to raise his people from within, +builds on such a capacity for inner growth, and believes in the +realisation of new possibilities; so does the educator in his efforts to +cultivate and ennoble men's souls. Art and religion are ever at work, in +order to discover new possibilities and bring them home to man. Were it +not for such new possibilities and the regenerative power of man, his +life could retain nothing of its youthful vigour, and would lapse into +stagnation and senility. The same would apply to human civilisation: it +would drift away from simplicity and truth, and would become more and +more artificial. + +It is in our own power to maintain our vitality, and to oppose +increasing inner strength to all alien and hostile forces. It is by no +means certain that we shall always be victorious; it is one of the +tragedies of life that a man's soul is filled with longing for something +better, yet is held captive by circumstance, and is finally driven back +to that from which he would fain escape. And yet it is this struggle +which gives to life its vitality and its greatness; and wherever there +is religious conviction, there also dwells the hope that what could not +gain full victory in our life, will not be lost before God. To quote +Browning: + + + What I aspired to be, + And was not, comforts me.... + + All instincts immature, + All purposes unsure.... + + All I could never be, + All, men ignored in me: + + This, I was worth to God.[1] + + +If all this helps to prove the autonomy of man and his independent +power of decision, it does not mean the dissociation of man from all +inner cohesion. This freedom only becomes possible by the revelation +within him of a new world. There could be no spontaneity of action in +single cases, if a world of independent and spontaneous life did not +exist and embrace us from within. Thus the individual appertains to the +whole, even in the exercise of freedom. That of which he is capable by +himself alone, is only his ability to bring his own will into accordance +with higher laws. All deep thinkers have seen, in the grasp of the +essence of life and the development of its possibilities by means of +this individual capacity, not an achievement of man alone, but the +manifestation of a higher power, a gift of grace. Life did not seem to +them to be so divided between grace and freedom, that one of these +factors could only be enriched by what was taken from the other; they +considered both to be so indissolubly united, that freedom and the power +of inner growth appeared to them to be the highest sign of grace. The +most energetic natures, if possessed of any spirituality, have generally +felt themselves to be instruments of a higher power and compelled by an +inner necessity. This feeling gave them the strength and self-confidence +indispensable for their work. In the case of achievement for the visible +world, this higher power was mostly looked upon as a dark fate, which +protects man as long as it needs him, and abandons him as soon as he +ceases to be useful. But in the case of inner change and regeneration, +this fate was superseded by a power of love and mercy, which sustains +man even in the midst of the greatest dangers. In religion especially, +the consciousness of complete dependence on a superior power has not led +to a suspension or restriction of activity. This is clearly proved by +such men as St. Paul, St. Augustine, and Calvin. They were not the +soulless vessels of a truth committed to them; they grasped, by their +own recognition and decision, what seemed to them to be the truth. Yet +in their own consciousness, achievement was of small value compared to +what they revered as a gift of grace. "Quid habemus quod non accepimus?" +(St. Augustine). "What have we that we have not received?" + + +Hitherto we have been concerned with refuting widespread objections to +the possibility of morality. We must now consider the violent opposition +against the appreciation which morality demands--and must demand. It +seems impossible for morality to be unquestionably superior to +everything else in life, and to demand absolute obedience to its +requirements, since it does not fill the whole of life, but must share +men's allegiance with other obligations, and must seek some compromise +with them. This objection could only be valid, if our whole life were a +homogeneous structure,--if one single aim dominated all activity, and +achievement in this direction could alone determine the value of our +action. But the case is very different. Even the one fact that two +planes unite in our life makes it impossible to apply the same standard +to all the variety we encounter. The various values determined by these +two planes are too different to be compared with one another. How could +we judge sensuous enjoyment and outer success in the same way as we +judge values like truth and honour? + +Further, morality is not concerned merely with single values +appertaining to the higher plane, but with the recognition and +appropriation of this higher plane itself: it is a movement from a whole +and to a whole. Once the conviction obtains that the spiritual phase of +life is something entirely different to nature, the acquisition of it +becomes the chief problem of life, and the claim of morality--which +upholds the principle of such acquisition--can assert its supremacy over +all other claims. Wherever this was contested, the new world revealed by +the spiritual life was not fully recognised. The experience of history +shows that no artistic or intellectual achievement could prevent a +rapid abatement and deterioration of the spiritual life, if the ethical +task was not fully recognised. Morality is like religion: neither can +take a secondary or even a co-ordinate place; they must be valued _more_ +than everything else in life, or else they will inevitably come to mean +_less_. + +We have now seen that the doubts assailing morality generally proceed +from a particular conception of the universe and of man's position in +it. This more or less naturalistic conception, in spite of all it claims +to be, by no means exhausts the resources of human life. As soon as we +recognise the limitations of this conception of life and free ourselves +from its tyranny, we are able to acknowledge fully the claims of +morality. Nay, more: these claims must then appeal to us as being both +legitimate and imperative; and what might at first appear to be +unintelligible, will become absolutely clear and certain. + +FOOTNOTE: + +[1] From "Rabbi Ben Ezra." + + + + +IV + +EVOLUTION OF THE ETHICAL PRINCIPLE + + +Having removed the obstructions which oppose the development of +morality, we can now inquire into the special characteristics of the +morality based on the spiritual life. Since morality recognises the +principle of the spiritual life, which it absorbs into its own volition +and being, therefore the nature of the spiritual life will also +determine the nature of morality itself. We have already seen that the +life of the spirit constitutes a new world as compared to the life which +originally encompasses us in nature and society, and which, though it +contains certain processes of a spiritual character, is yet mainly and +fundamentally bound to the senses. The spiritual element is here +disintegrated into separate manifestations, and is never free from the +alloy of sense. In the new life, the spiritual gains autonomy, becomes a +comprehensive whole, and is able to cultivate its own individuality. It +reveals a plane of life essentially superior to that of nature. On man +devolves the great task of attaining and developing this plane, on which +life first acquires self-concentration and inner significance, and +becomes real, genuine life. + +Let us see how this affects morality. It is not confined to individual +provinces of life, but extends over its whole expansion and into every +ramification, demanding a change and an uplifting. This refutes a +conception of morality which limits it to the relation of man to man, +and makes it synonymous with altruism. Morality undoubtedly has much to +do in relation to our fellow-men; but does it not also find great tasks +in the culture of the soul,--in spiritual work for the world, as +expressed in science and art? The quintessence of the Stoical teaching +was the development of personality, the proclamation of man's inner +autonomy and superiority to the world around him. We can hardly refuse +to acknowledge the moral character of this teaching, as also of the +Christian teaching, which found expression in men like Augustine, who +brought all moral action into immediate connection with God, and derived +it from love to Him. + +Let us now turn to science and art. We see how, in spite of all inner +and outer difficulties, a man like Kant devotes himself in unremitting +activity to the lifelong task of finding pure and adequate expression +for the perception of truth struggling into consciousness within him. We +see how, in the same spirit, an artist scorns all external advantage, +and strives only after a pure cultivation and assertion of the creative +power within his soul. Must not such fidelity to oneself and to one's +own work strike us as being in the highest degree moral? The ethical +obligation consequently extends to all ramifications of life. Everywhere +we must take possession of the spiritual life for its own sake, +transpose ourselves into its inner movement, and exalt it above all +concerns of the individual or even of mankind. Therefore we must not +seek the highest aim of our actions in the welfare of society, of the +community to which we belong. + +The welfare of society is a conception capable of very different +interpretations. It may mean the mere subjective well-being of people +living together. In that case, a new plane of life is not attained; a +social utilitarianism develops, which destroys all inner values, and the +sole _aim_ of life is to provide the _means_ of life. But the condition +of society can also be our chief aim because the new plane, with its +essentially new values, is best attained through life in the community. +Then we do not place ourselves merely in the service of humanity, but we +labour for the development of a spiritual world within the life of man. +Then humanity as a whole is uplifted, and acknowledges a great task, +while social utilitarianism limits life to the human sphere, and takes +from it all possibility of inner uplifting. Utilitarianism is the most +dangerous opponent of spiritual productive power, for it degrades to a +means what should be valued for its own sake and as the highest aim. +Utilitarianism does not change its character by becoming _social_ +utilitarianism. Inner progress of life is only possible if the spiritual +values, as the true, the good, and the beautiful, are striven after and +appreciated for their own sake, and not as a means for promoting human +welfare,--if creative production is not actuated by any consideration of +results, but is an inner necessity of a man's own soul. + +We have seen that the attainment of autonomy in the spiritual life +implies a reversion of the original order of things, and that the whole +of life is thus seen in a new light. It follows that no real morality +can be engendered merely by developing existing conditions, or +heightening natural forces. Wherever this was attempted, closer +investigation will always show the presence of both the lower and the +higher phase, and the consequent weakening of morality. Here +Christianity has achieved something of world-wide historical importance: +it clearly demonstrated the gulf between all merely natural development +and real moral action; it has also shown us that something essentially +new appears in morality, something unattainable by merely ennobling +nature. + +This was not only the case with religion, for the deepest thinkers of +all times have seen in morality not a mere intensification, but a +complete transformation. Plato made real virtue dependent on aspiration +to the world of ideas. He distinguished this virtue from all that men +call virtue, though to him it was little more than physical ability. +Kant advocated something similar, by forbidding man to base action on +inclination alone. He even went so far as to make action against natural +inclination a sign of good principle. The requirement thus formulated +does not preclude fruitful moral germs and impulses in the existing +order of things; but their full development is only possible when a +distinct reversion has taken place, and when an independent spiritual +life purifies, unites, and exalts all beginnings. These alone can never, +by a slow process of evolution, raise life to the plane of genuine +spirituality. As we have seen, the morality of the spiritual life +rejects a merely natural origin. But because it represents something +essentially new, its main object cannot consist in the denial and +suppression of mere nature. This was the aim of asceticism, especially +in its development as a reaction against the antique over-estimation of +nature. In the latter days of antiquity, life was swamped and enfeebled +by a refined form of sensuality. Life could only develop if this +sensuality was resisted and full supremacy was advocated for the +spiritual. We can understand that those engaged in this struggle went so +far as to see the highest morality in the complete suppression of +sensual life. This bears witness to admirable personal feeling; and yet +it was a dangerous error, for it diverted men from the great task of +giving inner significance to life, and of filling it with strong and +healthy love. The strictest asceticism can be united to inner +hollowness, to spiritual pride, and to want of love. An ascetic element +is inseparable from all morality, but only an element subject to higher +aims. We feel it to have been one of the great merits of the +Reformation, that it set aside the mediæval appreciation of asceticism. + +If it is true that autonomy of the spiritual life results in progression +towards a new plane, then only such forms of morality can satisfy us as +fully acknowledge such progression and the consequent affirmation of +life,--as establish the value of man, and stimulate him to strenuous +effort. All systems which base morality on pity alone must therefore +appear inadequate. Pity does much to free man from narrow egoism, and to +inspire him with sympathy for others, even for all mankind; but pity +alone shows only one side of life--only limitations and difficulties, +suffering and gloom. It restricts man's outlook to this one side of +life, so that he can acquire neither glad courage nor any impulse +tending to the uplifting of his existence. Pity reveals no new +possibilities as love does it; complete resignation here forms the +highest pinnacle of the philosophy of life and not the creating of a new +world. + +Neither can a system of morality satisfy us which only draws up laws and +regulations,--which indicates definite channels of action, without +vitalising action or giving it any progressive impulse. This might +suffice if man only had to take his place in a given order of things. +But it is quite inadequate if the whole soul is to be gained for a new +plane, and if a new order of things is to be built up within the human +sphere. There is, besides, the danger of interpreting morality above all +as a narrowing, a police system of life, and of thus forfeiting man's +sympathy. We do not deny that the uplifting, inseparable from spiritual +life, demands many struggles and renunciations. We can only rise to an +affirmative by means of a decided negation--a negation rendered +necessary by the brutality of mere nature and the pettiness of mere man. +In the history of mankind, morality at first operated chiefly through +prohibition: it was necessary to restrain the wild natural impulses and +destructive passions of man, in order to prepare the way for spiritual +activity. We have but to think of the frequent recurrence of prohibitive +laws in the older legislation of all nations. But there is a great +distinction, even in this primitive form of morality. The lower kind may +remain permanently on the grade of negation, while higher forms will +work their way through the negation to affirmation, and will retain +consciousness of this affirmation even in presence of negation. Morality +must consequently be productive in character, not merely regulative. +Productive morality will press forward, not waiting till man is brought +face to face with a new requirement or an opportunity of action, but +taking the initiative, seeking new points of attack, bringing +everything into movement, and promoting the growth of the spiritual +life. + +Even then, morality cannot limit its task to the ordering of private +life, but must extend its activity to general conditions and human +society. Life in the community must be exalted, and fitted to become the +representative of spiritual life. It is one of the chief demands of +modern times, that not only private life, but the whole of human +society, should be subject to moral judgment and moral operation. Hegel +condemned as "paltriness of faith," (Kleinkrämerei des Glaubens) men's +belief in the guidance of their personal destiny by divine might and +wisdom, while at the same time they believed the fate of mankind, as +manifested in the history of the world, to be governed by blind +unreasonable chance. We must also combat a paltriness of morality which +concerns itself with the private affairs of individuals, but shows no +interest and recognises no obligation with regard to what concerns +humanity at large. In former times, when man was conscious of his +weakness with regard to his environment, the most hopeless situation +could be accepted as the will of God or as a decree of fate. But the +modern man, with his consciousness of power and of his obligations +towards the community, cannot reject the idea of the moral solidarity of +all. He must therefore concern himself with the general conditions of +mankind, and must display active interest in this direction. + + +Let us further consider what has been achieved by the autonomy of the +spiritual life. We must first of all return to the new depth of life +which we have already recognised as one of its most important results. +This means that we must cultivate in ourselves a firm basis, a +continuous activity which determines, vitalises, and permeates each +individual action. We must develop a distinct nucleus, an essential +character which is not a mere background to our activity, but an +integral part of it. This being the case, morality cannot be satisfied +with stimulating man to certain achievements, and setting free the +forces within him; it demands of him a new life, in which he must strive +to make the deepening of activity we have been considering, an essential +part of all his action. This is the ideal we try to realise in the +development of personality and moral character. We want not merely to +_act_ but to _be_ something, to make something out of ourselves, to put +our own personal self into our action, and to so act that we ourselves +thereby grow and advance. Only then life is so concentrated on itself +and becomes self-conscious and self-centred--only then can it gain +significance; it will otherwise be empty and hollow inwardly, in spite +of unremitting activity. This is what justifies the estimation in which +the ideas of personality and character are held. Why indeed should we +value it so highly, were it but an accumulation of natural forces and +impulses, and not the representative and starting-point of a new life? + +Not only in individuals must such a depth of being, such a spiritual +individuality be developed; but in every community, in every nation, in +all mankind. Everywhere must a spiritual character be formed, and this +spiritual character must inspire and permeate all action. Only thus can +a spiritual atmosphere be created,--can a really civilised nation be +differentiated from other nations; only thus, and not by means of outer +victories and conquests, can any nation gain lasting significance for +all humanity. So, for instance, Greek culture is a possession forever. + +In all this, it is evident that in striving for morality, we are not +seeking something alien, but rather our own essential being. Yet this +being does not already exist in us, but has first to be acquired; it +lies not behind us, but in front of us; we cannot take for granted a +firm basis and positive continuity, which we see before us as high tasks +and ideals. From the imperfect and incomplete life we generally lead, we +must resolutely advance towards real and genuine life. While striving +after morality, we are at the same time battling for our own spiritual +self; we cannot but feel morality as a living inner presence, a source +of strength and of joyous impulse to action. Thus understood, morality +needs no reward from without; indeed, it sustains grave injury, if +action is dominated by the thought of reward. For then the autonomy and +independence which are above all aimed at, must be given up; and we +force under an alien yoke that life which should be based on itself +alone. + +Such accentuation of autonomy in life and morality, might seem to exalt +man unduly, and to inspire him with self-conscious pride. But we have +already guarded ourselves against such misapprehension. We have seen +that every undertaking possible to the individual lies within a +sustaining and impelling movement of the whole. The recognition of +morality is therefore not a matter of personal option or caprice. The +life of the whole operates in the individual; but, on the other hand, +his decision influences the whole of reality in the direction of +progress or retrogression. In this way the conception of duty arises, in +which the whole of life, the whole of the cosmic movement formulates a +claim on us. Kant rightly pointed out that duty cannot come to us from +without, but must proceed from our own being. This can only be the case +if our being experiences an inner gradation. A spiritual world speaks +within us, not as something alien, but in union with our own innermost +being, as the depth of our own soul. The idea of duty is necessary in +proportion to the consciousness and recognition of the difference +between man as he is, and the inner world which corresponds to his +innermost being. Wherever this consciousness grows dim, there morality +speedily experiences an inner weakening. Duty is the salt of life. Where +it is lacking, life, however brilliant externally, becomes inwardly tame +and insipid, while on the other hand, duty can impart inner greatness +and dignity to what appears small and insignificant. But as we do not +wish the presence of salt to be everywhere perceptible, so also the idea +of duty must not always force itself on our consciousness, but must be a +latent power in our soul and life, lifting us above all that is +arbitrary and capricious. We must take duty up into our inner being, and +not place it there as something alien or hostile. Moral life can quite +well unite earnestness and joy, reverence and love--earnestness and +reverence towards the superior majesty of a higher power operative to +us, joy and love arising from the mighty presence of this higher power +within us. + + * * * * * + +Thus constituted, morality can fully acknowledge the various moral +impulses at work in the present day; it can, at the same time, oppose +their disintegration, and help them as far as possible to promote each +others best interests. We have seen how, in our day, invisible and +visible impulses are in operation, which easily come into mutual +opposition. The morality of the spiritual life can in such cases +acknowledge both aspects, even if it cannot value them equally. For this +morality must take up a position in an invisible world, since the +progression from a visible to an invisible world goes through the whole +of the spiritual life. At the same time work in the visible world is +most important for man, if not indispensable. He is driven to it not +only by the necessity of natural self-preservation, but also by the real +interests of the invisible world. He does not find this invisible world +ready for him, or waiting to develop steadily from within, but he must +acquire and strengthen it by battling against the visible world and its +resistance. The spiritual movement is sure to become subjective and +uncertain, as soon as it severs all connection with the visible world, +in relation to which our work gains strength and confidence. Love, +strength, and continuity are thus acquired, which must then be +transformed into activity for our fellow-men. This applies both to +individuals and to all mankind. Such valuation of activity for the +visible world does not mean that we constitute life out of the visible +and the invisible as out of two factors of equal value, for wherever +spiritual life develops, the invisible is of paramount importance, and +everything else must be brought into relation with it. The visible is +valuable only as a means for the development or manifestation of the +invisible. But as such, it is of considerable value. Thus the morality +of the spiritual life is quite able to recognise--and to benefit by--the +great civilising work of the modern age and its untiring social +activity, even while insisting on their assimilation by a vaster +cohesion which is to vitalise them. + +We shall see, later on, that the invisible world cannot hold its own +against doubts and obstacles, unless it is aided by religion. But +although the morality of the spiritual life must seek to be in close +touch with religion, it must do its best to counteract the dangers +arising from an exclusively religious system of ethics. Religious +morality in former times often directed man's endeavour too much towards +a world of faith and hope beyond our world, and was inclined to neglect +earthly matters as being of secondary importance. It often transferred +to human affairs the humility and pliability born of its relation to +God; and it consequently lacked strength and vigour when dealing with +the evils of human life. These perils can be counteracted by a morality +of the spiritual life, which sees the operation of the Divine Being +above all in man, even while acknowledging its superiority to man. Such +morality will urge man to seek and appropriate eternal values, not only +in a future state, but in this our earthly life. Such morality will +teach man not to accept the unreasonable conditions as he finds them, +but to struggle against them with all his might, striving to impart +reality to the reasonable and reason to reality. + +The morality of reason and immanent idealism contains a virile strength +and educational power that the morality of the spiritual life is bound +to acknowledge. Yet spiritual morality must counteract certain +undesirable results frequently brought about by mere rational morality, +which is prone to overrate intellect and abstract ideas, to overvalue +the strength of the individual, and thus to encourage undue pride and +self-consciousness. + + +Thus great tasks are evident in all directions. From the standpoint of +the spiritual life it is possible to take them up hopefully, and to +counteract antitheses which would otherwise disintegrate human life. In +all these tasks, taken together, we see how life may be quickened and +strengthened by the ethics of the spiritual life. Everywhere it is +necessary to proceed beyond a given order of things,--to rise above +merely human aims and conditions,--to develop the consciousness of a +marvellous depth of reality, in which man is privileged to participate. +We discover a great cosmic movement, and we see our own greatness in our +co-operation in this movement, by which we contribute something to the +growth of the spiritual world. To speak with Leibnitz: "Man is not a +part, but an image of the divine, a presentation of the universe, a +denizen of the City of God." + + + + +V + +MORALITY AND RELIGION + + +We have hitherto confined ourselves to the inner development of +morality, without considering the attitude of the world around us and +within us to those claims which morality, from its very nature, is bound +to assert. At all times, this question has presented grave +complications, which are magnified rather than diminished by the +philosophy of the spiritual life. + +If morality is the first condition and an essential factor of all +independent spiritual life,--if this spiritual life is the central point +of reality, and dominates all its manifestations: then we might expect +to see, throughout the visible world, the triumph of good, the +repression of evil, and the rule of a moral order of things, moulding +reality to its requirements. Man's desire for such an order of things +does not rise from petty motives, but from an imperative desire for the +unquestioned supremacy of the good: what is in itself of such absolute +value, must be strong enough to enforce its dominion over reality, +otherwise it might come to be considered merely as a subjective +illusion. + +The world, as we see it, does not come up to this requirement. It +evinces--as every impartial observer must acknowledge--absolute +indifference, not only to the weal and woe of man, but also to his moral +conduct. How often, in the destiny of nations as of individuals, does +good succumb and evil triumph! It may be that we often judge too +exclusively from external impressions, and that there is more justice in +the world than appears at first sight. But this is no more than a +possibility, and we cannot assert that it is in any way realised. Much +remains dark, and has not been explained away, in spite of the efforts +made by religion and philosophy during thousands of years. These +efforts have made the darkness less evident, but have not brought light +into it. We can deny neither the indifference of nature to our moral +action, nor the incapacity of man to enforce, in his own sphere, the +triumph and supremacy of the moral idea. And this gulf between what we +must demand and what we find in the world, receives further accentuation +by the recognition of an independent spiritual life closely allied to +morality. For the impotence of morality now appears as the impotence of +the whole spiritual life. At the same time, the human sphere seems to +lose all its own special significance, since it cannot enforce universal +recognition of the power to which it owes its privileged position. + +Distressing as is this contradiction between the inner requirement and +external experience, it does not necessarily lead to a weakening of the +moral obligation. This is plainly shown by religion, more especially by +early Christianity. The early Christians were fully conscious of the +sorrow and gloom of human life; they realised the unreasonableness of +the world we live in, quite as fully as the pessimists of our day. Yet +their faith and courage remained unshaken. The contradiction of +experience only intensified their inner conviction, and gave it an +almost defiant superiority. This was only possible, because the +possession of a new life and the certainty of a new world made it easy +to bear all the contradictions in the existing order of things. From +their certainty of a new world, arose the conviction that the good could +only be impotent in a certain phase and for a certain time. The early +Christians were so sure of the ultimate triumph of good, that they found +strength to persevere in the battle of life. + +The present time lacks this joyous certainty of a higher world and a new +life. Therefore the contradiction between the course of the world and +the requirements of morality, is felt in all its rigour, and doubt is +intensified by the unsatisfactory moral condition of human life, by the +inner weakness of morality in our day. Single individuals are not +without good intentions, but they lack the power of achievement. +Spiritual activity is generally treated as of secondary importance; +infinitely greater value is attached to the natural self-preservation of +individuals and of society. Life in the community ought to give greater +prominence to moral claims, and be governed as far as possible by moral +law. But on the one hand there is not enough power of volition, and on +the other hand there is, here also, a wide gulf between volition and +achievement. Social life also displays so much self-interest, +selfishness, and passion, so much unreality and hypocrisy, that morality +cannot reach any adequate development. The spiritual powers which should +raise man to a higher plane are mostly withdrawn into the service of the +lower plane, and life is thus diverted into wrong channels. This +contradiction between human conditions and the requirements of morality +has been expressed in various ways by the great thinkers. Plato +lamented, above all, the evanescence and unreality of everyday life; +Augustine the overweening conceit of man; Kant the insincerity and +injustice everywhere apparent. But to one and all, the moral condition +of mankind appeared most unsatisfactory. + +All these contradictions, obstructions, and distortions are so +deep-rooted, that we can hardly expect any essential progress to result +from a gradual amelioration. In other directions--such as science and +technical knowledge--humanity may make steady progress; but it is not so +easy to prove that humanity will also experience moral improvement. The +progress of civilisation brings with it the development of much that is +good, but also of much that is evil, for civilisation develops great +power, without providing for its moral guidance. History shows us how +mankind has always seemed to alternate between periods of moral growth +and periods of moral decay; but it is doubtful whether, on the whole, +much has been gained. How often have the nations longed to return to +simpler and more innocent beginnings! + + +All these impressions might seem to prove that morality has no power in +the life of man. A doubt easily arises as to whether, if morality is so +powerless, we ought to acknowledge it as the guide of our life, or +whether we should not rather expel it as a mere illusion. But the +experience of history shows us unmistakably that the roots of morality +lie deeper, and are not so easily removed. Even if morality is not the +ruling power, it is unquestionably efficacious as man's lawgiver and +judge. Again and again, the nations may resist the claims of morality, +and the conceptions of morality itself may be widely divergent; yet +wherever human life develops, moral judgment develops with it. Certain +actions are highly esteemed, others are decidedly condemned. Something +operates in man which is not confined to his own interest, and which +forces him to judge his actions. Such judgment must inevitably +influence both the action and the spiritual condition of man; in one +direction it promotes, in another it represses. + +History gives us an indirect proof of the power of morality over man. +There are times in the history of mankind when the moral idea, with its +decree of duty, recedes into the background, and is even scoffed at as +an irksome instrument of control. But such times, however brilliant on +the surface, cannot resist inner decay and hollowness, till at last they +become unendurable. Then, if there is a return to morality, it is +superior to, and triumphant over all other interests. It was moral +earnestness and moral strength that were above all instrumental in +causing early Christianity to overcome the pagan world that was, in all +outer respects, superior and more powerful. It was moral energy that +gave the Reformation its power to advance and conquer, while the soft +and beautiful Renaissance perished because it lacked morality. Look +where we will, we see that the moral task, if fully and clearly +grasped, is stronger than anything else. + +It is therefore impossible for mankind to renounce morality. But we have +seen that morality, as a rule, has little power over external life or +man's soul, and is forced into a subordinate position. This produces +inner discord in human life. Man acquires inner insincerity by not +recognising and developing the depths of his own being. This inner +contradiction can be fully appreciated by a system of philosophy which +attaches special importance to the idea of the spiritual life. For in +the light of such philosophy, we see one great contradiction pervading +the whole of life: the spiritual activity--which ought to lead man to an +independent inner life, thus making his existence one of joyous creative +work--is used by average life as a mere means and instrument for human +ends. Spiritual activity is thus degraded, for the good has mostly to +give way to utilitarian considerations. This is the case, when the +motive of scientific research is its utility, and not a desire for +truth. This is the case, when art does not reveal a new world to man by +means of genuine beauty, but appeals only to his senses. This is the +case, whenever the subjective welfare of man--either of the individual +or of society--is the highest aim,--whenever man is not led to a higher +life by spiritual activity, but is only confirmed by it in the lower +life. + +Such conflicts, such inner discord, such stagnation of life impel +morality to seek close contact with religion. We see that man has in +himself an ideal, on which depends all the greatness and dignity of his +life; but he cannot reach it unaided. Something strives to assert itself +within him, without his being able to accomplish it. He remains chained +to a lower level, above which his innermost soul longs to rise. Doubt +and uncertainty proceed from the fact that what is of the very highest +inner value should have so little power in the world and in the sphere +of human life. For deep and earnest natures as St. Augustine and as +Luther, such uncertainty has often become unbearable; from inner +conflicts was born the sure and triumphant conviction of a higher power +in the movement towards morality,--a power which not only imposes moral +obligations on man, but which, by the revelation of a new life, gives +him strength to fulfil them. Morality here appears as something +infinitely superior to the uncertainty of human conditions, and +completely independent of man's attitude towards it. If morality does +not attain the power due to it in man's life, this is now attributed to +the weakness, not of morality, but of man. The majesty of morality is by +no means prejudiced by man's line of conduct. Kant could therefore +declare that "it is most reprehensible to derive either the origin or +any restriction of the laws telling me what I should do, from that which +is done by others." + +It is the essence of all deep religions, especially of Christianity, +that a new life is created in man by a revelation of the Divine by means +of a direct union of the soul with God. This new life is held to be +superior to the complexity of existing conditions, and is sure to +triumph, because it is founded in God. A source of life is thus opened +up, which imparts new activity to the life hitherto stagnant. Man +regains courage and confidence, because he feels himself sustained by +divine strength and love. No contradiction in the world of external +realities is now able to weaken man's inner certainty. A powerful +impulse towards work and creative activity will be born of the gladness +within him. This explains the unquestioning confidence and joyous energy +manifested by all the leaders of religious life; the consciousness of +their deliverance from dire distress filled them with unbounded +gratitude, which sought expression in unremitting work for their +fellow-men. Luther says: "From faith flow love and joy in the Lord, and +from love a free and joyous spirit of voluntary service of our +neighbour, quite irrespective of gratitude or ingratitude, praise or +blame, gain or loss." + +Further development of life by means of religion is sure to stamp +morality with characteristic features. The consciousness of deliverance +by a higher power will arouse not only gratitude, but humility and +childlike confidence. If everything man has is but a gift, then he will +see, in his highest achievement, less his own work than that of God. +Gentleness and toleration will gain ground; arrogance and harshness will +disappear; all decisive action will have an inner rather than an outer +significance. The value of an action depends on loyalty to principle, +and not on the greatness of what is achieved. This is shown by Jesus in +the parable of the talents. + +But this accentuation of softer elements and inner values by no means +paralyses activity. For the new life must be energetically developed and +bravely asserted against an alien, not to say a hostile, world. Man +finds a great task, first of all in his own soul, but then in the whole +of his life with other men. We may here apply a principle of the +Reformation, which has thus been expressed: "The word of God comes to +change and renew the world, whenever it comes." There is one thing on +which a philosophy of the spiritual life must emphatically insist: this +return to religion must not be confined to the individual, but must +embrace all the conditions of human life. Only thus can the whole of man +be won. This can only be done by creating a specific religious sphere of +life, a specific religious community. Many of us may wish the Church to +be, in certain respects, different to what it is; but that should not +make us ignore the necessity of a religious community. It is +indispensable, if we are to establish the new life in the human sphere, +and bring it within the reach of the individual; it is indispensable, if +the struggle is to be maintained by great entities, and is not to +degenerate into small skirmishes. At the present time, when the state is +engrossed by economic and other constantly changing problems of the day, +we need a community which attaches paramount importance to the inner +problems of humanity and which directs our life towards eternal aims and +values. + +In this union with religion, morality will be inclined to see more gloom +than light in the life around us. For morality will then judge by higher +standards, and will emphasise the insufficiency of human achievement, +the unsatisfactory character of the present situation. But morality +cannot lead to despondency, once it is emancipated from the world of +immediate environment, and has gained a new world. Morality will then +see, in the world of strife and antithesis, only a special kind of +reality, and not the whole of reality; it will recognise in this world +only one act of a great drama, and not the whole drama. + +Much that is dark thus remains unexplained. To speak with Goethe, we +"walk among mysteries." Even if we cannot enlighten what is dark, the +new beginnings established in us will save us from becoming cowed and +despondent. We are certain that great things are being accomplished in +us and through us,--that a higher power is present within us throughout +the struggles of our life. At the same time, we feel sure that our inner +renewal is not mechanical, but requires our own decision and action, +thus making us co-operate in the movement of the universe, and giving to +our activity a significance for the whole. That must and that can be +sufficient for us. We can agree with Luther, when he thus characterises +human life: "It is not yet done and accomplished, but it is in working +order and in full swing; it is not the end, but the way. All does not +yet glow and shine, but all is being burnished." + +We know that so close a connection between morality and religion is +often contested nowadays. But we believe that religious morality can +only be attacked by those who have too low an estimate of morality or +too high an estimate of the actual condition of humanity. If morality is +but a means of tolerable order in the social community of life, and is +only looked upon as a controlling force, then it can dispense with +religion. But this means a lowering of the moral requirement, the +fulfilment of which brings but little gain or profit. It is possible, on +the other hand, to value morality more highly, but to over-estimate man, +as experience shows him to be. He is looked on as a good and noble +being, easily won for the highest aims. Were this a true conception of +man, then morality could attain its ends by its own strength alone. But +we are clearly shown that this is not the case, both by the conviction +of all great religious and philosophical teachers, and by the general +impression of human life. At all times, the pessimists--and not the +optimists--were held to have the best knowledge of human nature. We need +only consider more closely the delineation of human life left us by the +so-called optimistic philosophers (like Aristotle and Leibnitz), in +order to see that even they found in it much that was dark and gloomy. + +If we maintain a high conception of the moral task and an impartial +conception of the actual condition of human life, there remains but one +dilemma: either complete hopelessness and inner collapse of life, or the +acquisition of further cohesions, such as that offered by an alliance +with religion. But religion must then mean more than a sum of doctrines +and institutions. It must influence the whole soul. It must not only +cling to the past, but must, above all, be a power in the living +present. It must not only be a source of comfort to individuals, but +must raise the whole of mankind to a higher and purer level. In all +these aspects, religion is both action and life, not mere thinking about +the world, or subjective emotion. A connection of morality with religion +thus understood, can be only a source of profit--not of loss--to +morality, which will thus be strengthened in its bearing on external +reality, and will experience a great deepening of its inner life. + + + + +VI + +THE PRESENT STATUS OF MORALITY + + +We must now consider, in conclusion, the position of Morality in our +day. Let us see what profit and loss accrues to morality from the +present, and what its prospects are for the future. There can be no +doubt about the fact that great changes are being effected--changes not +only in the world of thought, but in the whole range of life and work. +These changes at first result in manifold losses to morality. The +pillars which used to support it began to totter, or gave way +altogether; new ones arose, but are as yet too weak to offer an adequate +substitute for what is lost. We cannot therefore look upon the present +status of morality as a satisfactory one. + +The weakening of religious conviction and practice is unfavourable to +morality. Imperfect as the influence of religion often was on mankind at +large, and excessive as was the importance attached to the idea of +reward and punishment, men yet recognised a power superior to all human +action and all arbitrary human decision. This power was to be an object +of reverence; and life was raised above the care for purely material +possessions. It was also a gain for moral culture, that religion +established the inner solidarity of man, and facilitated mutual +understanding. Thus it is a loss for morality, that religion no longer +maintains its former ruling position. + +The general condition of our intellectual life is unfavourable to +morality, inasmuch as this intellectual life lacks a uniform aim which +could unite scattered aspirations, strengthen every single undertaking, +and counteract, as a whole, the interests of mere individuals. These +interests at all times made themselves felt, and life was always in +danger of being dominated by petty human considerations. But the +difference between period and period depends on whether or not this +danger is counteracted and man is raised above himself by some high aim. +In our day, such counteraction is lacking. Where have we an aim +embracing the whole man, which is common to us all and binds us together +to inner communion? Every party and faction preaches some ideal of its +own, the attainment of which will, it believes, unite men, making them +good and happy. But these individual aims are very different in +character; they are a cause of mutual hindrance, and they divide mankind +in that which should be a means of union. + +Another disadvantage for inner culture is the rapid pace of life, as +compared to former times. While we are hastening from moment to moment, +we have neither repose nor leisure for the culture of our inner man, for +the development of a character, a personality. We are more and more in +danger of being absorbed by the whirlpool of life, and robbed of all +possibility of self-conscious action. Other perils also beset us. In +our thirst for achievement and success, our moral judgment is often +repressed; the accentuation of the battle of life can even make us +indifferent to the moral quality of the ways and means employed by us. +All this necessarily weakens morality, and makes it appear unimportant +and shadowy. + +To these dangers arising from the general conduct of life, we must add +others, which originate in the modern development of work in the +community. In former times, the conditions of life were at once narrower +and less subject to change. Social environment exercised a stricter and +more exclusive control over the individual, holding him within the +bounds of law and custom. This influence was often only an external one; +correct behaviour was frequently mistaken for moral integrity. This gave +rise to much unreality and pharisaical hypocrisy. Still, a certain +result was attained in the direction of moral culture; certain +restraints were acknowledged, which cannot, without impunity, be +dispensed with. Restraints play an important part in the life of the +soul, as well as in that of the body. Modern freedom of action makes the +individual depend on himself alone, and we must be very optimistic to +believe him able to completely withstand, unaided, all the temptations +of life. + +We cannot omit one characteristic modern development: the change of +men's mutual relation from a personal to an impersonal one. We have but +to think of the difference between the cordial community of life +established by the old arts and crafts, and the cool, almost hostile +manner in which, in our great labour complexes, "employers" and +"employees" nowadays associate. There is no longer the slightest +personal relation or personal sympathy between them. + + +If we survey all these losses, the balance of the day will hardly appear +to be in favour of morality. But we must not forget that the present age +has also supplied morality with new and valuable impulses. This is +above all the case with labour--the modern form of work to which we have +just alluded. There is a strong moral element in the ever increasing +formation and organisation of great labour complexes, not only in the +factory, but also in science, state organisation, education, and so +forth. The individual is thereby obliged to work in close union with +others, and in accordance with objective requirements. He must adapt his +own activity to the general character of the work; and yet he must do +his own part conscientiously, so that the mass of separate achievements +may blend harmoniously and ensure the steady progress of the whole. This +requires such loyalty, self-control, and sacrifice of personal taste and +opinion, that a strong moral effect is undeniable. In this respect, man +now learns more implicit obedience than at any former period. Another +moral element in modern labour is the concentration of man's whole +strength on his work, to the exclusion of all inert repose. + +If the impersonal element predominates in work, the social side of +modern life offers, on the other hand, more direct union and more +reciprocal action between man and man. This was, at first, mainly +theoretical. It was pointed out how much one man depends on his +fellow-men. People realised that the individual develops with other +individuals and as part of the community, with which his aspirations are +indissolubly connected, even when he imagines he is striking out a path +for himself. But such theories could only have so much influence, +because they were in harmony with the realities of life. Modern life, +with its technical developments, brought individuals into close touch +and created new opportunities of mutual intercourse, uniting men both in +success and in failure. Thus grew up the consciousness of human +solidarity, the recognition of men's interdependence, the idea of mutual +obligation. The result is a wealth of humane activity, which penetrates +into all the ramifications of life, attacking and seeking to eradicate +all forms of want and misery, instead of merely helping to relieve +individual cases. We encounter the earnest endeavour to impart material +and spiritual possessions, as far as possible, to all men; to help and +strengthen the less favoured section of humanity; to further the +interests of aspiring spirits. These efforts are but various aspects of +one great duty, which we feel we cannot ignore; we can no longer look +upon them as works of mercy, which it is a virtue to perform. This is at +the root of the social idea. And this social idea is, in our day, the +greatest bond of union between human beings; not only does it stir +individuals, but it also exercises a strong influence on law, education, +and so forth. In this respect our time has a right to claim undoubted +superiority over all former times. + +These moral achievements of the present, valuable as they are, yet have +their inner limitations. Nearly all movement here proceeds outward, and +is directed towards distinct single achievements, while the culture and +welfare of the inner man are mostly treated as of secondary importance. +Zeal for surface ends leads to the neglect of the central values of +life. Yet all outer achievement only means real gain for us, if it +promotes the growth of the whole man, of his soul, of his personality, +making him nobler, greater, and happier. If there is no development and +strengthening of the centre of life, achievement on the surface is apt +to result in grave complications, and all that is great in the present +may thereby be driven into the wrong channels. Another danger grows out +of the ever increasing tendency to organise work. Owing to the necessity +of specialising and differentiating, the amount of work is restricted +which the individual can comprehend and master. He is tempted to +concentrate his interest on his own little province, to be indifferent +to everything outside it, and to lose all consciousness of a leading +idea and of a great whole. He thus falls a prey to the narrow conceit of +the specialist, and finally pushes aside as worthless accessories all +matters of general interest, all the questions and sorrows of humanity +at large. + +By furthering a spirit of pity for human want and misery, without giving +to life an inner value and a higher aim, we are in danger of becoming +sentimental and of producing inner languor in spite of all outer +activity. We are often more anxious to procure for man a comfortable and +pleasant life, than to promote inner growth; and our care for the weak, +which is quite justified, leads us to take such weak individuals as a +criterion and to lower life to their level. + +Modern life often lacks the necessary hardness and vigour; in our care +for the rights of individuals, we are inclined to neglect the rights and +requirements of the whole and also of the spiritual life. So we are in +danger of losing that which according to Goethe, "No one brings with him +into the world, yet which is all important if a man is to become a man +in every respect: reverence." + +If we review the whole and consider the balance of moral profit and +loss in our day, the result cannot be a favourable one. No full +substitute is offered for what is lost. We have gained in breadth, but +we have lost in depth and strength. Above all, morality is in danger of +losing its former ruling position, and of having a subordinate one +assigned to it. It can therefore no longer call forth reverence, or be +treated as an independent aim and ideal. We realise at once the gravity +of this loss. + +But this unfavourable aspect only holds good, if we consider the present +time as something complete and incapable of further development. If, on +the contrary, we seek to grasp all that is struggling into life, all the +requirements of our time that yet await fulfilment: then the situation +is quite different and far more favourable. What mainly told against +morality was the prevalent over-estimation of everything pertaining to +the visible life which surrounds us in nature and in human society. The +invisible realms of religion and the ideal have, as we have seen, often +grown dim and shadowy. Many of our contemporaries deny them altogether, +and look to the visible world for full satisfaction of all man's wants, +even of his spiritual and intellectual requirements. This could only +appear possible because, in reality, the invisible world of spiritual +values continued to influence even those who denied it, and because it +supplemented and completed the achievements of the visible world. It is, +however, characteristic of our time, that the old fusion is no longer +possible, and the irreconcilable antithesis between these two +conceptions of life stands out in bold relief. With increasing zeal, the +movement in favour of the visible world--that is to say, +Naturalism--tries to eradicate everything appertaining to the invisible +world, and to fashion the whole of life in accordance with its own +principles. Naturalism tolerates no rival, and declares war to the death +to Idealism. + +We now see the truth of Bacon's words: "_Veritas potius emergit ex +errore quam ex confusione_" (Truth can more easily emerge from error +than from confusion). For if we accept naturalism as the only valid +conception of life, and develop it consistently in all its bearings, we +cannot but see its incapacity to embrace the whole of life. The apparent +victory of naturalism thus contains the germ of a defeat, the beginning +of a great reaction. What becomes of man and of human life, if the +visible world means to him the only form of reality? He is then but part +of nature--dark and soulless nature. The vast expansion and range of +nature overwhelms him with the consciousness of his own insignificance, +while, at the same time, nature is absolutely indifferent to his wishes +and aspirations. What he makes of himself and his life has not the very +slightest significance for this world of nature. All aspiration which +transcends his natural instinct of self-preservation must appear to be +mere folly. Such ideals as personality and character are but held to be +illusions. + +If man turns away from the outer world and takes refuge in his own +sphere, in the social life among his fellows, naturalism there shows him +a mere juxtaposition, but no inner community which could offer new aims +or develop new values. What remains is only a number of individuals +inhabiting the same little corner of the universe. Each of these +individuals strives to gain recognition of his own merits, and to assert +himself, to the detriment of others. Much sordidness and hypocrisy +become rampant, and it is impossible to counteract them within so narrow +a range, or to hope for the growing up of a nobler and purer race of +men. The individual remains bound to the condition of society, which +also determines his own nature; he appears to be but a product of the +social environment. Having no deeper source of life within himself, how +should he be able to escape from the trammels of society, to rise above +it or oppose it? Society and environment thus become the destiny of man; +and there is no scope for freedom, for initiative, for independent +action. + +If we survey and appreciate all this with unbiassed minds, this life +must appear empty and meaningless and scarcely worth living. At the same +time, we shall discern a development of mankind far transcending these +narrow limits, as indeed has already been pointed out in this our study +of morality. The degradation of life effected by naturalism might be +endured in feeble and senile periods conscious of no great tasks, but +not in our time, which teems with stupendous tasks it is earnestly +striving to carry out. These great tasks and problems can only be +grappled with, if we are fully conscious of concentrated energy and +increased spiritual power. Modern life has developed in various and +opposite directions. Its expansion is greater than its concentration, +and this threatens it with disintegration. There is an increasing and +imperative need of more unity and cohesion, of some universal and +harmonious character of the whole. How should this be attained without a +vigorous deepening of life, without the development of invisible +values? We observe, in our day, the encounter of an older and a newer +age, of a conception of life hallowed by the traditions of history, and +a new one that is struggling into existence; there is a sharp conflict +between the past and the present. We cannot but admit in the old an +imperishable germ of truth, and in the new, an inalienable right to +impress and influence us. We must prove and sift, separate and unite. +But how were any progress in this direction possible, could we not find +a superior point of view, such as can be offered only by a world of +thought, not by the visible life? This problem gains vastly in +significance by extending to the social life of all humanity. We see +here a struggle between an older, more aristocratic form of society, and +a newer, more democratic one. This struggle engenders violent passions, +especially in the province of economics. We are here placed before a +grave question: shall we be able to impart the benefits of civilisation +to all men alike, and thus broaden every individual soul, without +injury to its inner depths? + +These are problems which do not originate in ourselves, but which are +forced upon us by the movement of history. Their very necessity bids us +hope for progression, in spite of all impediments. The power which has +imposed these problems on us will enable us to solve them. But we shall +also need to put forth our uttermost strength, and to quicken all our +latent spiritual forces; we must grasp our life as a whole, must +acknowledge its high aims with all our heart and soul, and must find our +real self in these ideals. Only thus can we gain the sense of inner +necessity which alone can lead us onward. + +In this manner, our aspiration becomes closely linked to morality. Let +us see wherein we have already recognised the quintessence of morality. +Life and aspiration are detached from the little Ego, and take root in a +spiritual world in which we find our own essential being, so that while +working for this spiritual world, we are at the same time working for +our own depth and spiritual self-preservation. Such a change and +reaction, such identification with the movement of the spiritual life, +means only that our aspiration has gained a moral character. This moral +character brings us, at all points, into touch with our time. By means +of our own aspiration, we can now grasp, unite, and deepen all the +goodwill, genuine feeling, and untiring activity of our day, which was +hitherto inadequate only because it lacked inner unity and quickening +spiritual power. + +We can thus face the future with courage and confidence. Humanity has by +no means exhausted its vital power; it is full of new possibilities +which demand realisation; and therefore we may expect an inner +progression of life and a rejuvenation of morality. + +What is true of mankind in general, is especially true of America. The +multitude of grave problems cannot discourage a nation which feels in +itself so much youthful vigour, that it will not submit to a dark fate, +but is able and ready to mould its own fate, and to aspire to yet +greater heights than it has hitherto attained. But to achieve this, +moral force is as necessary as unshaken confidence in the power of the +spirit. We believe in a bright future for this great country. We believe +also in the development in America of such moral strength as will +successfully overcome all conflicts and lead to splendid results, for +the benefit not only of the American nation, but of all mankind. + + +THE END + + + + +ADVERTISEMENTS + + +Works by Dr. Rudolf Eucken + +Professor of Philosophy, University of Jena + +In 1908, Dr. Eucken was awarded the Nobel Prize for literature. His +books have been translated into many languages and their influence is +widespread. + +Through his sustained and heroic appeal to what is most spiritual in +man, Eucken has ennobled the significance and the mission of philosophy. +He aims at developing, not a new category, but a new culture, and holds +that it is the privilege of philosophy, by penetrating to what is most +inward in human nature, to bring a religious inspiration to bear upon +the problems of the world of human labor. Eucken's philosophy is a +philosophy of life. It is a philosophy of reality as well. It treats of +the sources of man's strength, and the meaning and purpose of his +spiritual endeavor. And can there be anything more real than the +activity of a life that has consciously realized the true sources of its +power and the goal of its ultimate aspirations? + +New York G. P. Putnam's Sons London + + +Works by Dr. Rudolf Eucken + +_In the Crown Theological Library Series_ + +The Life of the Spirit + +An Introduction to Philosophy + +Translated by F. L. Pogson, M.A. + +_12º, $1.50 net. By mail, $1.65_ + +_Second Edition. With Introductory Note by Author_ + +"Germany has again given us a great constructive philosopher, whose +influence has gone out through all the thinking world.... No one can +read these powerful pages without understanding that a strong thinker +has arisen among us, and without enlargement and deepening of his own +thought."--_Congregationalist._ + +"With Bergson of France, he is the most influential personal factor in +arming contemporary thinkers for the fray against materialism and +irreligion."--_Christian Science Monitor._ + + +Knowledge and Life + +_12º._ + +"No one is having more influence upon the spiritual life and religious +thought of Europe, at the present time, than Prof. Rudolf Eucken. His +books ... are making a deep impress upon thinking people."--_Christian +Work._ + + +Religion and Life + +_16º. Frontispiece. 50 cts. net. By mail, 60 cts._ + +"The work is able, as may naturally be expected of Prof. Eucken. But it +is more. The author is very much in earnest and he is anxious for men to +see the great need of religion in their lives. In this book we have the +best of his mind and heart." + +_Boston Transcript._ + +"The philosophy of Eucken shares with that of Bergson the keenest living +interest of thoughtful men of all classes at the present day.... Eucken +has endeavored in this book to put his constructive system into the +clearest and most elaborate form."--_Continent._ + +New York G. P. Putnam's Sons London + + +Works by Dr. Rudolf Eucken + +_In the Theological Translations Series_ + + +The Truth of Religion + +Translated by W. Tudor Jones, Ph.D. + +_Second English Edition. Translated from the Third and Revised German +Edition with a special Preface by the Author_ + +_8º. $3.50 net. By mail, $3.75_ + +"When a book of really original thought appears it constitutes an epoch +in literature. Such a new era is introduced by this work. The ideas of +Prof. Eucken are startling, and revolutionary in some respects, but are +at the same time inspiring and reassuring to all the essential features +of Christianity as the true, the supreme and the final +religion."--_Watchman._ + + +Contest for the Spiritual Life + +_8º._ + +"In Professor Eucken, we have the philosopher as preacher. He not only +handles life, he would spread, enrich, and fortify it, and he is a great +force for the restoration of idealism in his own land. He is a preacher +equipped with philosophy and an inspired lecturer on the spiritual life +and its integration in the Whole."--_The Nation._ + + +An Interpretation of Rudolf Eucken's Philosophy + +By W. Tudor Jones, Ph.D. (Jena) + +_12º. With Portrait. $1.50 net. By mail, $1.65_ + +The main aim of the volume is to present the essentials of Eucken's +teaching, to show its genesis and growth, its connection with Science, +Philosophy, Sociology, History and Religion. The whole volume is an +attempt to present the nucleus of Eucken's teaching, and to show its +fundamental importance in the individual life, the society and the +religion of the future. + +New York G. P. Putnam's Sons London + + +_Only Authorized Edition_ + +An Introduction to Metaphysics + +By Henri Bergson + +Member of the Institute and Professor of the Collège de France + +Translated by T. E. Hulme + +Authorized Edition, Revised by the Author, with Additional Material + +_12º. 75 cts. net. By mail, 85 cts._ + + +"I certify that the translation of my volume _Introduction to +Metaphysics_, which has been prepared by Mr. T. E. Hulme, is the only +English version to which I have given my authorization. I may add that +Mr. Hulme was excellently well qualified for his task by the careful +study that he has made of the whole series of my writings. I have +examined his translation with care and am able to say that it renders +with remarkable accuracy the thought and the conclusions presented in my +volume." + +HENRI BERGSON. + +This volume forms the best introduction to M. Bergson's philosophy. In +it the author explains with a thoroughness not attempted in his other +books the precise meaning he wishes to convey by the word intuition. A +reading of this book is, therefore, indispensable to a proper +understanding of Bergson's position. German, Italian, Hungarian, +Swedish, and Russian translations of it have already appeared, +testifying to its intrinsic importance and indicating the scope of its +appeal. + +G. P. Putnam's Sons +New York London + + + + + +End of Project Gutenberg's Ethics and Modern Thought, by Rudolf Eucken + +*** END OF THE PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK 43405 *** |
